Catchments, Contracts and Voluntary Cooperation: A Case Study of Cost Sharing in Salinity Management

Abstract

Recent Australian reports on integrated catchment management (ICM) have emphasised the need to make communities and industries more accountable for their commitments to share the costs of implementing conservation works and measures. This signifies a departure from earlier visions of ICM implementation relying on voluntary cooperation. Two issues raised by this policy shift are explored in this paper. Firstly, how might cost sharing commitments be made more accountable (i.e. 'contractualised') without weakening voluntary cooperation? Secondly, how realistic is the aim of making cost sharing more accountable given the associated enforcement costs? These questions are addressed through a case study guided by recent developments in collective-action theory. The case is the Land and Water Management Planning Program now being implemented to reduce salinisation and waterlogging problems in irrigation districts of the central-Murray region of New South Wales. The innovative system of cost-sharing accountabilities introduced in this program is discussed. Insights into how voluntary cooperation enhances the feasibility of enforcing accountabilities are presented. Finally, lessons regarding how accountabilities can be introduced without weakening voluntary cooperation are considered.