|
The doctrine of one way of being is said to be Anderson's fundamental or central doctrine. This thesis examines that doctrine in the context of the claim that Anderson was a systematic philosopher. On those two assumptions, it is reasonable to anticipate that any precise account of that doctrine would elucidate Anderson's central, or 'core', philosophical position. Anderson's philosophical position has been described as empiricist, realist, pluralist and determinist. It is reasonable to assume that if the doctrine of one way of being is fundamental to Anderson's position, a clear account of it would elucidate these four '-isms', and show how they are interrelated. Part I examines a range of '-isms': those which Anderson criticised and rejected, and the four which he used, at various times, to describe his own position. ... In Part II, a quite different -- hypothetical -- approach is adopted. Three non-metaphysical hypotheses are put forward. |
|