

PART I

AN ANALYSIS OF ANDERSON'S CORE POSITION

## ANDERSON'S 'CORE' PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS

If there is to be any real understanding, analysis, or criticism of Anderson's doctrine of one way of being, it must be understood within the wider context of his overall position or system. So some attempt must be made here to provide some outline of that general framework, and how the various facets of it are interrelated. Yet, apart from the sheer magnitude of that task, there are -- as already noted -- considerable difficulties in attempting any such summary. (See p.xxix above.)

It should also be recognised that there are already a number of good general introductions to Anderson's work. Baker's two books (1979 and 1986) are by far the most detailed. Passmore's articles (1962, 1963 and 1972), and Grave's article (1984) are intended to cover the full range of Anderson's philosophical interests. Mackie dealt with what he called Anderson's 'logic in use' (Mackie, 1962b, p.266).

The aim of the present work is different from any of these. It focusses upon the central doctrine of one way of being, and how it could possibly be integrated with Anderson's general position. It deals with what has been called Anderson's 'core' position (Suter, 1984, p.6), or with what might be called Anderson's central 'logical' doctrines; even so, it is a matter of some dispute whether this area of Anderson's position should be called **logical** as he preferred (**metaphysical** or **ontological** as some commentators have described it (see p. 132 ff below), or **methodological** as suggested here. However, there are important differences in aims, emphasis and method between the other introductions to Anderson's position and the present one.

According to Suter, "Anderson's central philosophical position comprises his theory of reality (or metaphysics) and his logic" (Suter, 1984, p.6). That claim raises several problems, the principal ones being whether Anderson's position should be described as metaphysical or not, and if so, how that could be reconciled with empiricism. In any case, Suter's supposed division does not throw any light on the relationship between the doctrine of one way of being and Anderson's logic.

On Suter's view it might be assumed either that the doctrine of one way of being is part of --

- (i) Anderson's logic, or
- (ii) his theory of reality.

To understand Anderson's position, we need to know which, and how, the three are related.

This thesis leans to the view that Anderson's philosophical position, including the doctrine of one way of being, is not metaphysical (see p. 139 ff below). In seeking integration, it aims to avoid the kind of division suggested by Suter. Rather, it sets out to find out how Anderson's various views were, or might be understood to be, interrelated. Understanding of the method employed here should be assisted by reference to Diagram 1 (p.5).

Anderson typically used a limited terminology, including a range of 'technical' terms, the main ones being listed on Diagram 1. The principal tasks for anyone attempting to expound Anderson's 'core' position would be to explain how Anderson used these terms, and how these various terms were interrelated, or, in other words, by using Anderson's terminology, to show how his position was systematic. This thesis aims to embark upon such a course, but does not claim to have completed it by any means. Some of the categories listed on Diagram 1 are not typically used by Anderson at all. He spoke of logic, philosophy, science; but never or rarely of **theory of** logic, philosophy, science. Nevertheless, it may be assumed either that he had theories of each, or that what he said about them implied theories of each. In this thesis, the categories 'inquiry', 'criticism', 'theory of philosophy', 'theory of science', 'classicism', 'education' and 'the categories' are not discussed at all, and some others are mentioned only in passing. Being concerned with Anderson's 'core' views, this thesis does not deal with his views on the specialist areas of social theory, philosophy of mind, ethics and aesthetics, except insofar as his logic or central doctrines are elucidated.

What this thesis does assume is that Anderson was opposed to a number of philosophical views (identified in Diagram 1, Cell A) and that his opposition to these characterises his position almost as definitely as his positive doctrines. It accepts that at various times Anderson described his own position as empiricist, realist, pluralist and determinist (Cell B). The major problem confronting anyone attempting to understand or expound Anderson's position is how these four '-isms' (and their related oppositions) relate to Anderson's (a) doctrine of one way of being (Circle D), (b) theory of logic and (c) formal logic (Cell C). These connections are the principal concern of the present thesis, assuming as it does, that Anderson's position was systematic.

So Part I --

- (i) provides an outline of the wider context within which the doctrine of one way of being should be understood, and
- (ii) seeks principles which show how the various aspects of his 'core' position are integrated.

It commences with an overview of Anderson's logic, and then examines:

- (a) the various philosophical '-isms' which Anderson criticised and opposed;
- (b) the four '-isms' considered central to his position; and
- (c) how the doctrine of one way of being arises in relation to these oppositions and positive doctrines.

The method involved in the examination of the philosophical '-isms' is to briefly outline how these terms have been used in various traditions, and then, by comparing and contrasting, elucidate how Anderson used them. Even if this procedure fails in its attempt to discover some unifying principle or principles underpinning Anderson's 'core' views, it should serve at least to forestall certain likely misunderstandings of his position.

DIAGRAM 1: KEY DOCTRINES AND TERMS IN ANDERSON'S PHILOSOPHICAL WRITING

DIAGRAM 1 aims to identify --

- CELL A:** The main philosophical views Anderson criticised and rejected.
- CELL B:** Major terms and doctrines within his system.
- CELL C:** More definitely logical terms and doctrines.
- CIRCLE D:** Roughly where the doctrine of one way of being stands within Anderson's overall position.
- CELL E:** Those special branches of philosophy or science of interest to Anderson.

**Line arrows** indicate problems in integrating Anderson's various views, terms, doctrines and 'stock' criticisms, if his work is to be understood as systematic.

To some extent, Anderson's philosophical position is 'defined' by his opposition to certain well-established views, as much as by his positive doctrines.




DIAGRAM 1  
(See explanation page opposite)

### FURTHER EXPLANATION OF DIAGRAM 1

The principal concern of this thesis is to discover the significance and status (or the 'real meaning') of Anderson's doctrine of one way of being: how it relates to Anderson's other main doctrines, and why it is considered his central doctrine.

Diagram 1 aims to introduce those unfamiliar with Anderson's general position to major terms and doctrines which he used, and to principal oppositions and problems with which he was concerned. It arranges these terms, etc., into broad categories, thus emphasising where explanation is required if Anderson is to be understood as a systematic philosopher.

**Circle D.** It is left open to some extent where the doctrine of one way of being stands in relation to other major aspects of Anderson's thought. However, while Anderson identified this doctrine with (his brand of) empiricism, if it is his central doctrine, it is reasonable to assume:

- (a) that it is somehow connected with his logic (and theory of logic);
- (b) that it is intimately connected with the other three '-isms' he upheld: realism, pluralism and determinism;
- (c) that it is fundamental to his opposition to other '-isms', not just the opposition of empiricism to rationalism.

**CELL A** identifies some of the most common, more or less well-defined, views Anderson criticised and rejected. To some extent, Anderson's opposition to them 'defines' his position almost as much as do his 'positive doctrines' (Cell B), and is therefore vital to understanding his 'core' position (see p. 1 above).

**CELL B (ANDERSON'S 'CORE' VIEWS)** represents a range of 'systemic' doctrines and terms central to Anderson's empiricism or his logic, some of which were systematically expounded in Anderson's published work. However, the precise connections between these various doctrines and terms is not always clear. Most importantly, Anderson did not publish any clear account of his logic, yet what he meant by 'logic' is certainly unusual within the contemporary philosophical scene.

**CELL C** identifies the central logical terms and doctrines which need clear exposition if we are to understand -- or gain a better understanding of -- Anderson's logical theory and approach to inquiry.

**CELL E** identifies several specialist areas of interest to Anderson, where it may be assumed his logic applied. The connection with his logic should be clear, but discussion of these areas does not constitute a major part of the present thesis.

It is argued here that, apart from any possible inconsistencies in Anderson's position, a systematic exposition of it would have to show the relationship between all of the categories, terms and doctrines illustrated here, at least. And it is assumed that any attempt to interpret Anderson's position as a **systematic** philosophy would be judged by the number of key doctrines, terms and relationships between them that it retained and explained.

### ANDERSON'S THEORY OF LOGIC

It is maintained here that any formal logic presupposes a theory of logic: a theory as to what logic is. Now Anderson developed a comprehensive formal logic, based on the traditional logic of four categorical forms of propositions, but he did not publish any systematic account of his theory of logic. In a number of papers he made 'authoritative' statements about logic (see especially the last paragraph of "The Knower and The Known", SIEP, p.40, and the first and last paragraphs of "Hypotheticals", SIEP, pp.137, 147) which, apart from sounding rather imperious to people like Ryle (see p.xvii above), must be rather puzzling to most readers in the absence of a theory of logic. In any case, however Anderson conceived of logic, it was not how most contemporary philosophers conceive of it.

"In general, Anderson's logic, like his psychology, will strike strangely on the ears of his contemporaries ... What he would with special vehemence oppose is the doctrine, now almost universal, that logic is a calculus." (Passmore, 1962, p.xv).

Passmore also said Anderson's "logic is philosophical, thought through consistently, as the traditional logic of the text-books is not" (Passmore, 1962, p.xv). In other words, his logic was consistent with his empiricism, realism, pluralism, determinism. But it should be asked whether Passmore was referring to Anderson's theory of logic or to his formal logic.

Mackie made it clear that logic was central to Anderson's philosophical system:

"A complete presentation of Anderson's system should start with a full account of his logic, and go on to show how his other theories are developed with its help. For Anderson holds that logic is also what we might call general ontology: it studies the formal features of facts, of what is objectively real. These general formal features do not in themselves determine

what is the case in the other fields studied, for example, by epistemology or ethics or social theory, but they do determine a method of enquiry for all fields. Logic tells us what sorts of fact to look out for, and, what is even more important, it rules out as illogical certain views and certain ways of approaching special questions which inevitably result in confusion." (Mackie, 1962b, p.266)

Here Mackie made four claims about Anderson's logic:

- (i) logic was central to Anderson's philosophical position;
- (ii) Anderson held that logic was (somehow) the study of, or related to the study of, "the formal features of facts" or of "what is objectively real" and may be called "general ontology";
- (iii) Anderson held that these "formal features of facts", etc., "determine a method of inquiry for all fields";
- (iv) logic, in Anderson's sense, determines that certain views are illogical.

Mackie's account of Anderson's logic is taken hereafter to be very significant. The view of logic as a theory of method for all investigation is adopted (see p.139f below), and the other aspects of this account should be compared with the Main Hypothesis of the Non-Metaphysical Interpretation (pp. 142 and 207 below).

Rose provides a somewhat different perspective on Anderson's theory of logic:

"Anderson has always been critical of the view that a logic can be philosophically neutral. He holds that it is impossible to present a general method without making assumptions about the nature of that on which the method is to be turned as an instrument, viz., reality. ... Logical theory, the theory of method, the theory of the conditions of discourse, is not independent of philosophy, the theory of reality, the theory of the conditions of existence." (Rose, 1958, p.57)

It would not be unkind to take Rose's account to involve the following:

- (i) Logic is the theory of method for investigating reality.
- (ii) Reality, for all human purposes, is facts (spatio-temporal situations).
- (iii) In order to develop a method for inquiring into reality, we must make some general assumptions about the nature of reality.

Such a proposal is clearly circular: In order to institute a method for inquiring into reality, we must understand the general nature of reality, but that general nature of reality must be **assumed** in order to develop a method for inquiring into it.

It appears from both accounts -- accounts by colleagues well acquainted with Anderson's views -- Anderson's theory of logic was based upon what can fairly be called a metaphysic (theory of reality). And, as will be argued shortly, that raises serious difficulties for Anderson's empiricism. What is of considerable significance for the present thesis is that both Mackie and Rose link Anderson's theory of logic with **method**, and Rose links it with both "the conditions of discourse" and "the conditions of existence".

What these two kinds of conditions are, and what the connection between them is, is a vital question. It might be supposed that the conditions of discourse could be discovered by an empirical study of discourse. However, the conditions of existence is quite another matter, and appears to belong to the realm of metaphysics.

However, in the absence of a clear theory of logic, it is not possible to show that Anderson's formal logic was consistent with his philosophical system.

### Anderson's Formal Logic

Rose has published two very useful articles on Anderson's logic, in which he has attempted to show the connection between philosophical theory, theory of logic, and the formal logic (Rose, 1958, 1987). And Baker (1986) devotes a chapter to Anderson's "Formal Logic".

Anderson adhered to his own variety of the traditional logic, using only four categorical forms of propositions. His logic lectures are impeccable and thorough, and though important aspects of his logic are discussed in published articles (see especially 'The Problem of Causality', 'Hypotheticals', 'Relational Arguments' and 'Empiricism and Logic'), the reader of these alone cannot grasp the fulness and richness of his formal logic. Passmore pays it high praise:

"Of course, he was aware of, and was affected by, Russell's work, taking over, for example, Russell's conception of a 'propositional function'. But it was the traditional formal logic which he chose to expound and to develop, defending it against its critics, whether they were Russellians, pragmatists or idealists.

"To put the matter thus, however, is certainly to underestimate Anderson's contributions to logic. For, if his logic is traditional in its allegiance to the 'four forms' and its emphasis upon syllogism, no topic in the traditional logic comes out of his hands quite as it entered them." (1962, p.xv).

Central to Anderson's logic is the role of categorical propositions..

### The Importance of Propositions in Anderson's Position

In most systems of logic, terms are regarded as some kind of entity distinct from the 'objects', 'things', or 'qualities' they denote or connote. They may be regarded as words, verbal entities, or related in some way to verbal entities; they may be considered to be 'ideas', 'concepts', 'meanings' or 'universals'. In some cases, predicates (e.g., as universals) may be regarded to be of a totally different kind from subjects (e.g., particulars). Not so in Anderson's logic. For Anderson, the terms of logic are the things under discussion; and all such subjects of discussion have particularity and generality (or universality) (SIEP, p.219). Subjects and predicates are of the same order or status: the distinction between subject and predicate being one of function within any specific proposition (Baker, 1986, p.22). Unlike other logicians, Anderson did not take terms to be the 'fundamental units' of logic. Propositions (or even syllogisms : c.f. Passmore, 1962, p.xviii) are the key 'units', or starting point, of logic.

In most systems of logic, propositions are regarded as some kind of verbal (or conceptual) media which convey truths or falsehoods -- what Anderson referred to as a **tertium quid** view (SIEP, p.169). This is not so in Anderson's logic. Propositions are situations or situational (Ibid); situations, things, events are propositional, and so, in a sense, 'things' as terms are compressed propositions or bundles of propositions. "But there is no logical distinction between things and propositions" (SIEP, p.218).

"We have seen that the central notion in Anderson's philosophy (theory of reality) is the spatio-temporal situation, and that the central notion in his logic (theory of method) is the proposition. The majority of philosophers distinguish sharply between propositions (beliefs, knowledge) and situations (states of affairs, reality). Anderson's empiricism and realism lead him to reject both this distinction and all views which pre-suppose intermediaries between the knower and what he knows, whether they be ideas or judgments, as in conceptualist logical systems, or words, sentences, etc., as in modern formalist treatments

of the subject. On Anderson's view, the relationship between propositions (beliefs) and situations (reality, existence) is not one of exclusion, not one that allows or requires intermediaries. When the proposition which a person believes is true, it is an independent (objective) historical (spatio-temporal) situation. What exists, whether known or unknown, and what is believed, whether true or false, always has the propositional form; and the propositional form is the situational form." (Rose, 1958, pp.57-8)

Propositions are not verbal, and must be distinguished from the sentences we use:

"The propositions which we believe have to be distinguished from the sentences by means of which we convey them, and from mental occurrences, necessary or incidental, which might happen in the course of our having or formulating a belief, or asserting a proposition." (Rose, 1958, p.57)

Anderson's view of propositions was absolutely fundamental to his logic and his philosophical position; and when Anderson spoke of propositions he meant only categorical propositions of the four traditional forms. He made the central importance of propositions quite clear:

"The empiricist, like Socrates, adopts the attitude of considering things in terms of what can be said about them, i.e., in propositions. And he regards this not as 'second-best', but as the only method of speaking or thinking at all, since every statement that we make, every belief that we hold, is a proposition. ... And, in general, it cannot be maintained either that the proposition is our way of understanding things which in themselves are not propositional, or that we have further ways of understanding the proposition which is in itself defective. ... But if there is no way of getting behind the proposition to something either lower or higher, we must assume that propositions can stand by themselves with nothing to supplement them, that facts need no explanation. Discourse, in fact, depends on the possibility of making separate statements, in regard to each of which the very same question can be asked -- 'Is it true?'" (SIEP, pp.4-5).

This passage is so vital to understanding Anderson, and the doctrine of one way of being, that it warrants repetition, with emphasis upon the distinct points made:

- (i) **Discourse** depends upon --
  - (a) making separate statements in the form of propositions;
  - (b) making separate statements in regard to each of which it can be asked meaningfully 'Is it true?'; (later, this is 'Is it true or not?' or 'Is it so or not?'; that is, there is an equivalence between being true and being so); (c.f. p. 185 below)

- (ii) **Empiricism** depends upon considering things (that is, any subject of discourse or inquiry) in propositions;
- (iii) there is no other method of speaking, thinking, or inquiring but the method of considering issues in terms of propositions;
- (iv) in discourse or empirical inquiry, each proposition can stand by itself (can be understood and considered on its own); propositions as facts (or purported facts as propositions) can be considered on their own, and need no further explanation in order to be understood or considered true or false.

It can be taken that the notion of one way of being relates to the copula of categorical propositions: is, is not, are, are not:

"Thus empiricism regards it as illogical to make such distinctions as that between existence and subsistence, or between the 'is' of identity, that of predication and that of membership of a class; and still more obviously illogical to say that there **is** something defective about 'is' itself. These are all attempts to get behind the proposition, to maintain -- in words! -- that we mean more than we can say." (SIEP, p.5).

Anderson is insisting that it is **illogical** to attempt to introduce different senses of 'is/are' to the copula of categorical propositions, and that it would be **illogical** to go outside the four categorical propositions which employ the one sense of 'is/are'. Either step would be an attempt to 'get behind' categorical propositions, or 'get around' a categorical logic. In other words:

- (v) there is no other way of speaking or thinking, except in propositions of the four forms (c.f. (iii) above), and
- (vi) it is **illogical** to attempt to 'get behind' speaking in terms of propositions of the four forms.

It will be argued that these principles are the doctrine of one way of being in its non-metaphysical form (see p.205ff below). And in that context, it should be reiterated that Anderson was saying adherence to the mode of discourse in propositions of the four forms is fundamental to empiricism, and adherence to the four forms of propositions is adhering to 'one way of being' (or one sense of 'is/are') and one sense of truth. Armstrong also saw this connection:

"The proposition, therefore, always involves a single **copula** (the 'is' of predication) and from this is derived the doctrine of a 'single way of being'." (Armstrong, 1977, p.68).

However, it may be asked what adherence to four propositional forms has to do with empiricism specifically. The answer is that adherence to the four forms automatically rejects axioms, first principles, 'necessary truths', 'truths of reason'; they are not part of empiricist method and they are not a part of categorical logic.

### The Problem of the False Proposition

It should be noted in passing that some commentators have claimed that Anderson's situational view of propositions raises an insoluble problem: that of the 'false proposition'. Armstrong maintained that "false propositions cannot be identified with situations in the way true propositions are" (Armstrong, 1977, p.67) having argued this case in some detail previously (Armstrong, 1973). Mackie said: "This difficulty is an obvious one, but the solution is far from obvious" (Mackie, 1962b, p.278). Birchall (1978) examined this problem and responded, defending Anderson's own response (SIEP, p.170). If it is taken that propositions are **situational**, rather than to be identified with **situations**, the problem does not arise. If we take the **contradictibility** of any proposition in discourse seriously, then 'false propositions' are equally situational as 'true propositions'; that is to say, we recognise true propositions by observing, and that false propositions are contradicted by observing. As long as propositions are seen as an aspect of discourse or inquiry, and not as some 'third kind' of entities, they are situational in the sense of being open to testing by observing.

### VARIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL '-ISMS' IN ANDERSON'S WRITING

Anderson recognised "a certain indefiniteness" about, and a consequent difficulty in, explaining philosophical '-isms':

"It is obviously not an easy matter to describe a whole outlook; an attitude of mind which is felt to cover a wide range of problems cannot readily be communicated without going over all these problems." (SIEP, p.3)

A contemporary tradition treats them with at least equal caution. For instance, Sparkes says:

"'Ism' words are often ambiguous. ... and, even when not ambiguous, present standing temptations to over-simplification." (Sparkes, 1991, p.178).

"Idealism.

(i) A very obscure word. Popular senses of the word relate it to **ideals**, i.e., **standards**, **norms**, etc. Philosophic senses relate it to **ideas**, but, as 'idea' is an extremely ambiguous word ..., philosophic talk about 'idealism' can fall short of that crystalline clarity which many regard as a philosophic ideal.

...

(iii) In philosophic talk, 'an idealist' means 'an **idea-ist**', which, as remarked above, does not pin the word down very firmly. ... 'Idealism' (like most 'ism' words) is messy and should be handled with care." (Sparkes, 1991, pp.186-7)

"Realism, Realist

(i) These are perfectly dreadful words which should be used with great caution." (Sparkes, 1991, p.187)

Nevertheless, Anderson refers to such a variety of '-isms' so frequently, that some attempt must be made to deal with them here: to clarify what he meant by them, and in some cases how he criticised them. A thorough examination of the terms most frequently used -- rationalism, idealism, monism, dualism, pluralism, atomism, representationism, empiricism, rea-

lism and determinism -- would occupy a volume on their own. So obviously any survey here must be brief, and to some extent inadequate. And this discussion is complicated by the facts that:

- (a) the various '-isms', in different senses, seem to fall into families or syndromes;
- (b) different senses of the same word ('-ism') are quite incompatible and would radically alter the family relationships just referred to;
- (c) Anderson sometimes used these terms in a unique way, although related to one of the 'traditional' senses;
- (d) Anderson seldom explained the sense in which he was using these terms; with respect to terms he criticised, that sense may have to be inferred from the context; with respect to terms describing his own position, his meaning can only be grasped by familiarity with his position;
- (e) Anderson may allege that a certain philosopher who claims (or wishes) not to be a dualist (or representationist), for example, is dualist, etc. -- at least in a certain way;
- (f) it is possible that such views are, and can be shown to be, fundamentally illogical.

### Anderson's Criticism of Relativism

While relativism may appear to be the least important of the '-isms' listed above -- and may not even appear to be of the same status as the others -- it is being argued that in certain respects Anderson's criticisms of relativism are fundamental to his 'core' position, to his criticisms of rationalism and idealism, and hence to an understanding of his work. For that reason, relativism is the first of those '-isms' considered here.

What relativism is, and what Anderson meant by relativism, will require considerable clarification. In one form it appears to be a general position. But it also appears as the idealist theory of internal relations (see p. 42 below), which Anderson called constitutive relations. So Anderson's criticism of relativism is sometimes directed at terms or ways of speaking.

### Relativism as a General Position

What relativism is, and what Anderson meant by relativism will require considerable clarification.

"There are many sorts of relativism, and many senses of 'relativism'. ... To be a relativist about value is to maintain that there are no universal standards of good and bad, right and wrong. ... To be a relativist about fact is to maintain that there is no such thing as objective knowledge of realities independent of the knower." (Speake, 1979, p.281)

The two senses mentioned by Speake may be taken to define 'whole outlooks'. Relativism with respect to **value**, as defined, involves saying:

- (a) <sup>there</sup> are no universal standards of good and bad", etc.;
- (b) the only senses of 'good' and 'bad' are relative to some culture, life-style, or set of standards not accepted by everyone.

Relativism with respect to **fact** involves saying:

- (a) "there is no such thing as objective knowledge of realities independent of the knower";
- (b) the only sense of knowledge of realities is relative to some person, knower, or mind.

However, in the second case, it could be argued that (b) really means --

- (b<sub>1</sub>) the only sense of truth or falsity is relative to some person, knower or mind.

Anderson criticised and rejected both views, but it is relativism with respect to fact that is most directly relevant to the doctrine of one way of being. Anderson discussed both at length in Part III of "Realism and Some of its Critics" (SIEP, pp.53ff). With respect to ethical relativism, he responded to one of his critics thus:

"Having thus, as strongly as I could, repudiated ethical (or any other) relativism, I am surprised to find Professor T.A. Hunter regarding my more recent criticism of it as an 'inconsistency' on my part. I have certainly at the same time attacked any theory of an absolute or ultimate, since 'ultimates' and 'relatives' hang together; but I have always maintained that true, ethical or other, propositions are absolute, or independent, facts -- in other words, that they are actual occurrences. Professor Hunter does not escape Absolutism by saying that 'all goods are relative'; he merely omits to state what his absolute is, i.e., to what they are relative, ... " (SIEP, pp.56-7)

Relativism in **fact** is what Anderson also called the theory of relative truth, and it will be seen that such a theory runs counter to the doctrine of one way of being expressed as "there are no different degrees or kinds of truth" (Mackie, quoted p.xxv above). Anderson began his criticism of relativism by saying:

"Realism appears finally as a positivist doctrine, a logic of propositions or events; and this brings it into conflict with every theory of degrees of truth and reality." (SIEP, p.53)

He argued that rationalistic theories fluctuate between "the Eleatic doctrine of the One as the sole reality and the doctrine of the super-Eleatic, Gorgias, who held that 'there is nothing' (absolute) but all is 'relative'" and went on to say:

"The inconsistency of this Sophistic position, involving, as it does, a hidden Absolute which appears obscurely as Opinion, does not prevent Relativism from being the most prevalent of 'philosophic' views.

"The realist answer is that there **is** something absolute, namely **facts**; that even the relativist doctrine itself implies that 'the relativity of all' is an absolute fact ... so that the doctrine cannot be maintained." (SIEP, pp.53-4)

So relativism with respect to **fact**, or the doctrine of relative truth "cannot be maintained"; that is to say, anyone who attempts to assert this view cannot **consistently** maintain it: cannot maintain it consistently **all the time**. And that is a reference to **methodological consistency**. The discussion of relative truth is taken up again later (p. 199 below).

### Relativistic Terms

However, Anderson's criticism of relativism is not confined to these two forms, characterised here as 'whole outlooks'. Rather, his principal criticisms of relativism are against relativist **terms** (rather than these 'whole outlooks'), and this is sometimes manifested as the criticism of --

- (a) the theory of constitutive relations,
- (b) other relativistic terms.

Anderson did not publish any clear or systematic account of what he meant by 'relativism', nor did he clarify the distinction or relationship between relativism and the theory of constitutive relations. Both of these terms have separate listings in the index to SIEP, yet there are few common page references. In one passage, Anderson intimated -- more or less in passing -- that the two are to be identified: "Such views fall with the rejection of relativism (the belief in constitutive relations) ... " (SIEP, p.74). It may be inferred from the passage immediately following that Anderson took the theory of constitutive relations to be the claim that some things or qualities of things are constituted by that thing's relations: "Arguing then, as realists, that no thing or quality of a thing is constituted by the thing's relations ... " (SIEP, p.29; c.f. SIEP, pp.42-3). However, it must be doubted that Anderson always used these two expressions in a way which permits such full identification. The evidence from the index to SIEP points to some difference, and on p.33 of SIEP he used the expression 'relative existence' (presumably indicating relativism of a kind; see index) and 'constitutive relations' in a way which makes identification impossible. Mackie also found difficulty with Anderson's use of the term 'relativism'.

Mackie maintained that Anderson's charge of relativism was the claim that someone had confused a thing or quality with a relation (Mackie, 1962b, p.266). Such a description of relativism would embrace any constitutive relation. But Mackie noted that this "charge of confusing (things or qualities with relations) seems to be directed against dis-

tinct ways of thinking" (Ibid, p.267). After examining how Anderson used the term 'relativism', Mackie appeared justified in concluding: "... Anderson's condemnation of 'relativism' thus covers a number of different ways of thinking, which he himself does not distinguish clearly ... " (Ibid, p.270). A.J. Anderson did not accept Mackie's principle, and proffered an account of relativism as "the identification of a relation and a quality, or at least the treating them as **inherent** in each other" (Anderson, A.J., 1987, p.136).

The present writer discusses Anderson's criticism of the theory of constitutive relations and other relativistic words separately, allowing (a) that they may well be related, and (b) that this division may overlook some terms which Anderson would have regarded as relativistic.

(a) **The Theory of Constitutive Relations** is taken here to be associated with the rationalist-idealist theory of internal relations, and the rationalist **methodology** of defining terms at the beginning of inquiry. It is marked by the attempt to characterise or define some 'thing' or 'concept' solely by **one** of its relations; e.g., the attempt to define 'consciousness' as 'that whose nature it is to know' (SIEP, p.31), or "'ideas' as entities 'whose nature it is to be known'" (SIEP, p.29). This methodology of defining can be distinguished from definition by genus and difference in four important ways:

- (i) definition by genus and difference is attempted after an inquiry has been going on for some time, not at the outset;
- (ii) definition by genus and difference is typically based on the characteristics of things, not their relations to other things;
- (iii) definition by genus and difference always involves **two** characteristics (that of genus, and that of difference), not just **one** quality (or relation);
- (iv) definition by genus and difference is an **empirical** method of defining insofar as it is **discovered** after investigation, not laid down **a priori**.

It will be seen that on these grounds alone, Anderson's rejection of defining by constitutive relations is an important aspect of his adhe-

rence to empiricism, and his rejection of rationalism and idealism. See further discussion p.57f below.

(b) Other **Relativistic Words** imply some relation, but either conceal the relation or fail to specify one term of the relation. An example of the first kind (which Anderson did not give) would be to call an accident 'horrifying'. To call anything horrifying implies that someone was, or would be, horrified by that thing, without specifying who. It is worthwhile noting that this sort of relativism involves truncating a relation, which involves a verb -- X horrified Y -- into what appears to be a quality or characteristic, which involves an adjective: 'horrifying', 'horrific' or 'horrible'. An example of the second kind, with which Anderson did deal, is the notion of the obligatory. In most cases we can express obligation as a relation, using a verb: "X is obliged by Y to do Z". What someone is obliged to do -- obliged under some law or principle of conduct, or obliged in relation to some person of authority -- may be called obligatory (using the adjective), implying but not specifying under whom or what the action is obligatory (SIEP, p.240; c.f. Mackie, 1962b, p.267).

In a very early article, Anderson indicated this kind of relativistic term by referring to **incomplete statements**:

"We must distinguish complete statements like 'X is a man' from incomplete statements like 'X is a husband'. The latter is, of course, used roughly to convey the fact that X has those characteristics which will be found in the first term whenever there is a true statement of the form 'X is the husband of Y'. But those characteristics are understood to be discoverable by observing X alone, while we could not in that way find out what was meant by his being a husband." (SIEP, pp.28-9)

The implication seems to be that the statement 'X is a husband' implies another (unstated) term: "X is (the) husband of Y". We know what sort of thing a man is, but we do not know what sort of thing X is if we only know X is married to Y. We may know that X must be -- **is** -- a man if Y is a woman. The point may be made more clearly if it is said

we do not know what sort of thing X **is** if we are told **only** that X is (the thing) on the table.

The transposition from verb to adjective (or substantive) was emphasised here not because Anderson emphasised it (he never drew attention to that linguistic aspect of relativism), but to show that this kind of relativism is tied to a quite common feature of everyday English ('language'). And that point is emphasised in order to stress that some relativistic ways of talking are not (unmistakably) associated with the idealist theory of constitutive relations.

These two categories -- (a) Constitutive Relations, and (b) Other Relativistic Words -- may not identify and exhaust all the cases of words which Anderson criticised as relativistic, but they give a fair indication of the kinds of expression he targeted as relativist. However, one or two points should be made before examining these kinds of relativism in detail.

Mackie said:

"One of Anderson's most characteristic moves in controversy is to accuse an opponent of **relativism**, that is, the confusing of things or qualities with their relations." (Mackie, 1962b, p.266)

What Mackie said suggests that Anderson attacked the man rather than the issue. That is not so. However, there can be no doubt that Anderson criticised certain words, or ways of talking, as relativist. However, that may suggest that Anderson was concerned with words or language, a view rejected here. What might be said is that his criticism of relativism is based upon a point of logic or method, and if it is regarded as in some sense a criticism of language, it is so only because confused thinking (illogicality) can be encapsulated in, and transmitted by, language, or common words and expressions. The important point to notice is, therefore, that Anderson implicitly held that language is (or words, or common conceptions, are) just as much subject to criticism as any theory is; 'language' or 'common usage' are not sacrosanct, and not above logic. So, for Anderson, to deal primarily with words

or language is an "inferior way of treating logic -- that which, instead of bringing everything under logic, subordinates logic to something else; specifically, to forms of speech ... " (SIEP, p.137).

While Anderson criticised relativism in many places (and at times may appear to dismiss such views without argument), his main arguments against relativism are detailed in three places: "The Knower and The Known" (1927), "Realism and Some of Its Critics" (1930), and "Realism versus Relativism in Ethics" (1933).

### Anderson's Criticism of Constitutive Relations

Anderson's first, and main criticism of the idealist theory of constitutive relations appears in the very early paper "The Knower and The Known" (1927). However, what makes that paper -- and hence Anderson's work in general -- so difficult to understand is that numerous themes are interwoven in it. In that paper, Anderson was --

1. criticising
  - (a) the theory of constitutive relations,
  - (b) the rationalist-idealist notions of 'consciousness' and 'ideas'; and
2. developing
  - (a) some principles of an alternative, general theory of relations,
  - (b) a realist theory of knowing as a relation.

Each of these themes in the article is extremely important, and we are apt to be distracted from the importance of 1(a) in itself, because of the importance of what it leads to: especially the questions of the nature of minds, what minds know -- 1(b); and what knowing is -- 2. So an attempt is made in this section to minimise the emphasis on these 'subsequent' but important issues, and concentrate on the principles behind Anderson's criticism of Constitutive Relations.

According to Anderson, Descartes' definition of 'consciousness', and Berkeley's definition of 'ideas' proceed in a similar fashion: "in fact, it may be said that Berkeley has simply applied to the known" (i.e., things which are known: ideas) "the principle of Descartes's argument about the knower" (SIEP, p.31), and he claimed that in both arguments "the same mechanism of essence, identity and ambiguity can be discerned" (Ibid. The justification of this claim is set out in great detail in Anderson's lectures "Modern Philosophy", 1929, in the University of Sydney Archives.)

"The method ... is that what can be conceived separately from a certain thing is not of its essence but is a different thing, while what cannot

be conceived separately **is** of its essence" (SIEP, p.31). With Descartes' argument about 'consciousness', "The assumption is that we cannot suppose ourselves, in knowing, not to know" and this is fallaciously taken to mean "that we cannot, in knowing, suppose ourselves not to know" (Ibid). Of course the two are different. Similarly, Berkeley's argument about ideas begins with an identity stated negatively: "'What is perceived cannot be unperceived'; which is merely an expression of the essence 'perceived'" (SIEP, p.30). "But", Anderson continued, "he proceeds from this, as the first quotation shows, to draw the conclusion that what is perceived cannot be **conceived to be unperceived.**" (Ibid).

So Anderson took Descartes' definition of 'consciousness' and Berkeley's definition of 'ideas' to epitomise the rationalist-idealist method of defining by constitutive relations, and as associated with the rationalist doctrine of essences. He took the first to define:

- (i) 'consciousness' as 'that whose nature it is to know', or
- (ii) 'consciousness' as 'that which is constituted (solely) by the (one) relation of knowing (something else)'.

And he took the second to define:

- (iii) 'ideas' as 'entities whose nature it is to be known', or
- (iv) 'ideas' as 'those things whose whole nature or essence consists in the relation of being known'.

Since these notions of 'consciousness' and 'ideas' are so central to the idealist-realist controversy, it will be helpful to treat this kind of definition more formally. We can take 'consciousness' and 'ideas' as any term to be defined, and symbolise them as X and Y. So (i) can be taken as --

- (v) 'X' is 'that whose nature it is to know';

and (iii) can be taken as:

- (vi) 'Y's' are 'those things which are known'.

If knowing and being known are relations, R, these definitions can be expressed in the general form:

- (vii) 'X' is 'that which (has relation)  $R_1$ ' -- from (v);  
 (viii) 'Y's' are 'those things which (have relation)  $R_2$ ' -- from (vi).

Or, more generally, this kind of definition has the form:

- (ix) 'X' is 'that which R'.

It can be said of this general form of definition that:

- (a) X -- the definiendum which is to be defined -- is **not characterised**, except by the definiens;  
 (b) the 'that which' **does not characterise anything**: it is simply some kind of 'dummy function';  
 (c) therefore, X is characterised solely by R.

It should now be possible to consider this general form of definition by substituting other relations for R. We could consider, for example:

- (x) ' $X_1$ ' is 'that which is (characterised by) being on';  
 (xi) ' $X_2$ ' is 'that which is (characterised by) being to the left of';  
 (xii) ' $X_3$ ' is 'that which is (characterised by) being to the east of'.

Clearly, such definitions do not make sense: they are nonsensical. This may be taken to be Anderson's point about the definitions of 'consciousness' and 'ideas': they are nonsensical. Would it make sense if another term was added, as appears necessary?

- (xiii) ' $X_1$ ' is 'that which is on Y'  
 (xiv) ' $X_2$ ' is 'that which is to the left of Z'  
 (xv) ' $X_3$ ' is 'that which is to the east of U'

To which it must be retorted that nothing is identified or characterised as 'being on Y'; what is on Y could be a man, a leaf, a kettle, a fingerprint, etc. Nothing is characterised by being to the left of or east of something else. At any given time innumerable different things are to the left of, or east of, anything we can think of. So it can be concluded that, as a **general principle**, definitions of this kind are absolutely useless: a total failure **as definitions**.

Granted that such definitions are not of general use, it can then be asked whether they can be used in very **special** cases, 'knowing' being one. But this immediately appears to be a case of **special pleading**, and some **special, exceptional** theory of knowing will have to be introduced to justify the procedure. However, even that view cannot be sustained, for we generally use 'knowing' as a transitive verb: we say such things as 'A knows B' and 'C knows that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris'; i.e., 'A (knows) RB'.

Anderson's principal argument against this method of defining by constitutive relations is absolutely fundamental; it is a point about whether something makes sense or not. It is that "unless things had qualities of their own, there would be nothing to have relations to other things" (SIEP, p.43). If X is characterised **only** by a relation -- if X is characterised as nothing else but R in XRY -- there is **nothing** to have the relation R to Y: the statement XRY is a nonsense.

So it is reasonable to conclude that Anderson's **general** criticism of the theory of defining by constitutive relations is sound. It is (at least partly) that such a definition --

- (a) never characterises anything;
- (b) is **absurd** or **nonsensical** in the form of
  - (i) XR,
  - (ii) X is that which R;
- (c) no **thing** can be defined (or characterised) by just one relation; and
- (d) it is absurd to say a **quality** is defined by a (just one) **relation**.

Returning to the **specific** cases of the definitions of 'consciousness' and 'ideas', Anderson rejected them on the basis of a **general** principle, namely, that such definitions involve us in what is nonsensical or absurd; that such a methodology is illogical.

"Arguing then, as realists, that no thing or quality of a thing is constituted by the thing's relations, we have to assert that nothing is constituted by knowing and nothing by being known.

... Realism is therefore concerned to reject these terms, as involving the attempt to take relations as qualities." (SIEP, p.29)

From this he concluded:

"According to realism, I have argued, we never know 'ideas' but always independent things; or rather states of affairs. It seems to me to follow that such expressions as appearances or data, and as concepts, percepts or sensa have no place in realist theory." (SIEP, p.32)

The two specific examples of constitutive relations -- 'consciousness' and 'ideas' -- discussed above, are fundamental to Anderson's criticism of (a) rationalism, (b) idealism, and (c) the idealist theory of internal (constitutive) relations. He employed those criticisms in general and specific ways, and it is helpful to separate the two. Anderson's criticism of these two relativist terms:

(i) encapsulates both --

- (a) a specific argument against the rationalist-idealist notions of 'consciousness' and 'ideas', and
- (b) a general methodological(?) argument against the idealist doctrine of constitutive or internal relations;

(ii) has both a 'positive' and a 'negative' side --

- (a) in its 'negative' aspect, it is the criticism of the idealist doctrine of constitutive or internal relations;
- (b) in its 'positive' aspect, it is the realist doctrine of independence (see p.82 below).

Ultimately, this general criticism of constitutive relations (internal relations) and relativistic terms in general -- which is the doctrine of independence -- is based upon a logical or methodological principle. Anderson was saying, in effect, that any **term** appearing in (his) propositional logic must meet certain criteria. For any term, symbolised as X, we must be able to say something positive: 'X is Y' or 'All X's are Y's', or 'Some X's are Y's and some X's are not Y's'; and in addition, by the same principle, we must (eventually) be able to say

'All Y's and Z's' or at least 'Some Y's Are Z's'. That is to say, we have to be able to say something propositionally about any term we use, or the term is meaningless: is not a term at all. But those requirements imply, in the most general terms, that for any term X, there must be some propositions of the form:

"Some Y's are Z's" and  
 "All YZ's are X's".

Expressed that way, we can see that Anderson's criticism of relativism is that no propositions of these forms, with respect to term X, have been asserted when 'consciousness' is X (or 'ideas' is Y, etc.). We are simply told that 'X has a certain relation', not 'X is (anything)'. Also, when this kind of criterion is placed upon any term X, or any 'thing', it will be seen that terms are "compressed propositions" (c.f. table 1.8, p.112 below).

What should be stressed, however, is that these two relativist terms -- 'consciousness' and 'ideas' -- are:

- (a) **absolutely fundamental** to rationalism-idealism, and
- (b) they involve a fallacious methodology, or an illogical methodology;

therefore --

- (c) rationalism is founded on a fallacious or illogical methodology.

Also, if the theory of internal relations or constitutive relations or relativism is unsound (can be shown to be based on fallacious method), the whole basis of the notion of dependent or relative existence also falls down, and along with that the presumption of different ways of being collapses. So Anderson's criticism of relativism is not just a general logical principle, but a very powerful weapon against rationalism-idealism. It is a fundamental component of his realism-empiricism: a fundamental component of the doctrine of one way of being, and the doctrine of independence (see p.81ff below).

### Rationalism

"The term 'rationalism' (from the Latin **ratio**, 'reason') has been used to refer to several different outlooks and movements of ideas. By far the most important of these is the philosophical outlook or program which stresses the power of **a priori** reason to grasp substantial truths about the world and correspondingly tends to regard natural science as a basically **a priori** enterprise." (Edwards, 1972, Vol. 7, p.69.)

"Rationalism is opposed to **empiricism**, the doctrine that experience is a necessary basis to all our knowledge; but neither of these terms has a precise meaning. ... But most empiricists have admitted that mathematical truths are **a priori**; ... Leibniz is usually considered to be the most extreme of the rationalists because he claimed that in principle all truths could be known by pure reasoning, experience being but an inferior substitute for reason." (Urmson, 1967, p.339)

"1. In a narrow sense, the doctrines of a group of philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries, whose most important representatives are Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. The characteristics of this kind of rationalism are: (a) the belief that it is possible to obtain by reason alone a knowledge of the nature of what exists; (b) the view that knowledge forms a single system, which (c) is deductive in character; (d) the belief that everything is explicable, that is, that everything can in principle be brought under the single system." (Speake, 1979, p.278)

Reese outlines five different senses of rationalism, one of which should be mentioned here:

"(4) In the 19 century, largely due to the influence of Hegel ... , Rationalism came to be associated with philosophical Idealism ... . Hegel identified the rational and the real in a manner reminiscent of Parmenides. It was largely among the

19th-century Idealists who succeeded Hegel that the Coherence Theory of Truth ... prospered. In this theory the marks of systematic unity, rather than mere correspondence to fact, become the test of truth." (Reese, 1980, p.479)

There is a crucial problem for any general exposition of rationalism, that is, whether rationalism is grounded in terms or propositions (or any parallel distinction such as that between 'ideas' or 'concepts' and 'principles'). Rationalism (such as Descartes'), based on the claim that certain ideas cannot be derived from experience, maintains that certain ideas are innate (Edwards, 1972, Vol. 7, p.69). It is to a large extent because Locke devoted the whole of Chapter II of "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding" to criticising the notion of 'innate ideas' that he is regarded as an empiricist. Leibniz considered Locke's views (Edwards 1972, Vol. 7, p.70), and --

"Leibniz, however, who continued the Cartesian insistence on innate ideas, added a requirement for innate principles. His argument was of the same general type as that ascribed to Descartes with respect to the ideas of mind and matter: if there were no innate and unlearned propositions, we could learn no propositions at all -- at least not by way of logical deduction." (Edwards, 1972, Vol. 7, p.70)

Incidentally, it is conviction in precisely this sort of principle which underpins the rationalism of Russell and Chomsky. Russell maintained that some form of induction underpins science, and induction must be based upon principles:

"And whatever these principles of inference may be, they certainly cannot be logically deduced from facts of experience. Either, therefore, we know something independently of experience, or science is moonshine." (Russell, 1948, p.524; <sup>discussed</sup> by Chomsky, 1971, pp3-4).

Charles L. Dodgson argued that such a view necessarily leads to an infinite regress of such principles and that what is needed to break this cycle "is something of a different category, a rule." (Edwards, 1972, Vol. 7, p.70).

While there may be some similarity of 'spirit' between these various accounts of rationalism, it is not transparently clear what is central to it. It seems that --

1. Rationalism is opposed to empiricism -- in holding that
  - (i) experience is not the basis of all knowledge,
  - (ii) that something is known **a priori**, either
    - (a) innate ideas,
    - (b) innate principles, or
    - (c) the principles of reasoning themselves.
  
2. One brand of rationalism maintained
  - (i) that experience is an inferior form of reason or way of knowing, and
  - (ii) in principle, all truths can be known by pure reasoning, that is, from **a priori** principles.
  
3. One brand of rationalism maintained that the Truth is the Whole, and is true only by virtue of some systematic unity. However, this form of rationalism does not appear to be deductive in any ordinary sense.

The view that all knowledge is derived from **a priori** principles is inconsistent with the view that only some knowledge is (some truths are) deduced from **a priori** principles, and some from experience; and both of these are inconsistent with the Hegelian view that the Truth is the Whole. The first would be consistent with the view that all sciences are basically **a priori** enterprises, whereas the second would imply either that all sciences are empirical or some sciences are rational (*a priori*) and some empirical. However, if it is claimed there are two fundamentally different kinds of science, it would appear

that they differ both in the nature of their **terms** (**a priori** versus **non-a-priori**) and their **methodologies**: rational sciences being deductive, empirical sciences being inductive.

### Idealism, Monism, and Dualism

"**Idealism.** A term first used philosophically by Leibniz. ... He applied the term to Plato's thought, contrasting it with the materialism of Epicurus. The term thus designates philosophies which regard the mental or ideational as the key to the nature of reality." (Reese, 1980, p.243).

"Popular confusion arises from the fact that Idealism is related to either or both uses of the adjective 'ideal', i.e., (a) pertaining to ideas, and (b) pertaining to ideals." (Runes, 1960, p.136).

"There are three principal types of idealism. 1. **Berkeleyian** ... 2. Transcendental ... (Kant). 3. Objective ... " (Speake, 1979, p.149; discussion continued p. 57 below).

"Schelling called his own philosophy in its middle stages 'objective idealism', for nature, he held, is simply 'visible intelligence'." (Reese, 1980, p.243).

It will be seen that Schelling's view, taken up by Hegel, transforms one of the basic tenets of rationalism. For if nature is identified with intelligence or mind (in some unusual sense), 'the power of a **priori** reason' takes on a quite different meaning. Also, 'mind' can be distorted from what we might expect it to mean (the individual mind of person A) to 'spirit' or 'God' in Berkeley, or nature or 'the Absolute' in Hegel. That ambiguity of 'mind' may be intended in the definition of idealism in Speake:

"**idealism.** A name given to a group of philosophical theories, that have in common the view that what would normally be called 'the external world' is somehow created by the mind. Idealism does not quarrel with the plain man's view that material things exist; rather, it disagrees with the analysis of a material thing that many philosophers have offered, according to which

the material world is wholly independent of minds." (Speake, 1979, p.149).

### Idealism and Monism

Now objective idealism is a form of monism: "Whereas Berkeleian idealism and transcendental idealism are pluralistic, objective idealism is monistic, maintaining that all that exists is a form of one mind ('Absolute Mind')." (Speake, 1979, p.149). Speake maintains that monism takes two forms:

"1. A philosophical theory that maintains that there is one, and only one, substance. Examples of this type of theory are provided by the philosophies of Spinoza and Hegel. 2. (in the context of discussions of mind-body relations) A theory of mind-body relations that is not dualistic." (Speake, 1979, p.219).

The first kind of monism regards the **one** substance as **one entity**, whereas the second admits "of many entities ... of the same fundamental kind" which could be "for example, experiences" (Speake, 1979, p.220). Lacking a name for these types, it might be possible to speak of the first as monistic-monism, and the second as atomistic monism (or monadology?).

A further distinction between kinds of monism should also be made. The infinite and indivisible "One" of Parmenides (Russell, 1946, p.67; Burnet, 1950, pp.67-8) is not mind, spirit, or God (Burnet, 1948, pp.178-9). It cannot be regarded as idealist. So perhaps it should be called materialistic, or non-idealist monism, whereas Hegel's monism is, clearly, an idealist form.

### Idealism and Dualism

There is some connection between idealism and dualism, as there is between Descartes' rationalism and dualism.

"**dualism**. A theory concerning the fundamental types into which individual substances are to be divided. It asserts that substances are either material or mental, neither type being reducible to the other." (Speake, 1979, p.91).

While some forms of idealism might reject the notion of material substances, they may, as does Berkeley's, attempt to show "that a material object consists of nothing but ideas, whether in the mind of God or of the conscious agents that he has created" (Speake, 1979, p.149). That is an attempt to reject one brand of dualism, while recognising an **apparent** duality of mental and material. For all that, Berkeley is involved in a different kind of dualism: that of mind or spirit and ideas:

"But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise Something which knows or perceives them; ... This perceiving, active being is what I call **mind, spirit, soul, or myself**. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived; for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived." (Berkeley, 1946, "Principles", Sect.2, pp.113-4)

On either form of idealism, then, there is a dualism: either of mental and material, or mind and ideas. In each case, there are either two distinct substances, or two distinct ways of being. In either case, one substance is dependent upon mind, or has an existence (kind of being) dependent upon mind: what Anderson called a relative or dependent existence.

### Idealism and Internal Relations

The distinction between internal and external relations may best be understood by reference to Aristotle's attempt to distinguish between essential and accidental properties. According to Aristotle, the Predicables are "the kinds of terms or attributes which can always be predicated of any subject" (Jevons, 1909, p.98; c.f. Cohen and Nagel, 1961, p.234ff); they are genus, species, difference, property and accident. Most of these are said to be **essential** to a kind of thing -- essential to its being what it is -- or, in a different terminology, **internal** properties of the thing. An accident, or accidental property of a thing or class "is any quality which may indifferently belong or not belong to a class, as the case may be, without affecting the other qualities of the class" (Jevons, 1909, p.103; c.f. Cohen and Nagel, 1961, p.237f). In the alternative terminology, an accidental property would be said to be **external** to that kind of thing, and falling outside the definition of it.

As outlined, the distinction between essential and accidental properties, or internal-external properties, makes perfectly good sense if it is understood as applying to **general kinds of things, or classes** of things. In this context, it can be understood as maintaining, for any term X, if "All X's are Y's", then Y is an **essential** or **internal** property of X's. If, however, "Some X's are Z's and some X's are not Z's", Z is an **accidental** or **external** property of X's.

The doctrine of internal relations became part of idealist orthodoxy: "some Hegelians -- and in particular the British idealists ... -- have asserted that all relations are internal" (Speake, 1979, p.281).

However, the distinction between internal and external relations is sometimes discussed between two or more **particulars**, and the propositional distinction (above) then makes no sense. According to Edwards, the theory of internal relations associated with idealism and monism relates especially to **things as particulars**, although the "internal-external distinction may be drawn" in other cases. (Edwards, 1972, Vol.VII, p.125). It holds that --

"all of a thing's properties are essential to its being what it is (and, a fortiori, that all its relations are internal to it). ... It holds that the connection between each of a thing's properties (including its relational properties) and all its other properties are so close that the deprivation of a single property would force us to say that, in a nontrivial sense, the thing is no longer what it was." (Ibid)

Later criticism of the idealist view focussed on whether this was indeed a non-trivial claim (c.f. Edwards, Ibid, p.126).

### MONISM, DUALISM, PLURALISM and ATOMISM

At first sight it may appear that the terms 'monism', 'dualism', 'pluralism' and 'atomism' are precise, and exclusive. More careful examination throws doubt upon these assumptions.

In what is here called a 'primary sense' -- that is, as a claim about the 'fundamental substance or substances' -- monism, dualism and pluralism appear to be mutually exclusive, rival claims. This exclusivity applies whether the claims are about the fundamental substance or substances, thing or things, or entity/entities which constitute the world:

- (a) there is only one fundamental substance;
- (b) there are two fundamental substances (mind and matter) and neither type is reducible to the other;
- (c) there are many substances, and their uniqueness cannot be reduced to just one or two.

Expressed in that form, the rival claims of monism, dualism and pluralism appear to be of the one status, namely, metaphysical. But apart from any difficulties in understanding what such claims involve -- what a 'fundamental substance' is -- it is difficult in practice to maintain the clarity and exclusivity of these primary senses.

Monism was discussed previously, and it was suggested that monism could be idealist or non-idealist; and that either of these could be monistic (one-entity claims) or atomistic (many individual atoms, corpuscles, or monads of the same substance). Idealist monism of the Hegelian type is monistic. A case could be made out for saying that Leibniz's monadology is idealist, but postulates a plurality of monads (atoms?) of the same substance, and is therefore pluralist.

Whether views such as that which Thales appears to have held -- "that everything is made out of water" (Burnet, 1950, p.21) -- should be called monistic atomism (or only a substantive pluralist-attributive monism), is not clear (see p.45 below).

Dualism is always associated with a theory of mind, but especially with a theory of ideas, and in that sense may be said to be idealist. But Descartes' dualism is also pluralist: "Some pluralistic philosophies, such as Cartesianism, are dualistic ... " (Speake, 1979, p.91).

Pluralism may be taken as --

"The view that the world contains many kinds of existent, which in their uniqueness cannot be reduced to just one (monism) or two (dualism)." (Speake, 1979, p.259)

Pluralism does not appear to be necessarily associated with idealism. So a distinction could be made between epistemological pluralism and materialistic pluralism. This distinction would be based upon the postulation of many substances or material things as against many ideas.

However --

"It is usual to distinguish substantival pluralism (the doctrine that there are many substances) from attributive pluralism (the doctrine that there are many **kinds** of attribute). Leibniz was a substantival pluralist, but, since Leibnizian monads were all of one kind (that is, souls), he was, in the attributive sense, a monist. The doctrine of logical atomism as developed by Russell is perhaps the most thoroughgoing pluralism in the history of philosophy." (Speake, 1979, p.259)

The notion of atomism is perhaps even more variable. It is "The belief that matter consists of atoms" according to Speake (1979, p.28). But according to Edwards it may involve any of the following claims which, clearly, are not all compatible:

- (a) "atoms do not differ qualitatively" but may differ in their size and shape;
- (b) atoms may differ qualitatively: "There was even a system that assumed as many qualitatively different atoms as there are different observable substances (Anaxagoras)";

- (c) atoms cannot be divided -- are absolutely indivisible (Democritus);
- (d) (although "a system that does not accept the indivisibility of atoms cannot properly be called atomism, ..."), atoms can be divided but --
  - (i) "then they became 'atoms' of another substance",
  - (ii) "remained of the same kind" (**homoimerics**; Anaxagoras);
- (e) atoms are the smallest particles (elachista).

(All of the above varieties derive from Edwards, 1972, Vol.1, p.194.)

It may be a point of some contention whether social atomism and logical atomism should be considered forms of atomism, but taken at face value they appear to be so. Social atomism is "the view that the human individual is the 'unit' or 'atom' or basic subject matter of social science" (Baker, 1979, p.9), and may seem irrelevant to a discussion of atomism, since these 'atoms' are basic, **relative** only to a given inquiry. But that raises a vital question about all atomism. If atomism is concerned with a study of matter, and atoms are the basic constituents of matter, what is the study (or inquiry) of the constituents of atoms? It cannot be a study of matter, **by definition**, as it were.

Logical atomism raises another issue altogether:

"Formal analysis, as Russell conceived it, is the examination of the world from a purely logical point of view. Its primary concern is with the various modes of organization which are revealed by language and reality; formal analysis is abstract cosmology, dealing with the ultimate structures of language and the world."  
(Edwards, 1972, Vol.1, p.98)

Either analysis is concerned with the "various modes of organization" of "the world" and "reality" or it is not. And either the examination of language is precisely part of this examination of the various modes of organisation of the world and reality, or it is not. If it is, then the examination of language is simply and purely part of -- an

aid to -- the examination of the various modes of organisation of the world and reality. But if it is not -- that is, if language has features of its own which are not features of the various modes of organisation of the world and reality -- then it must be asked:

- (a) does this examination of language distort our understanding of the modes of organisation of the world and reality? and
- (b) if so, how, in examining our 'language about the world' do we distinguish --
  - (i) various modes of organisation of the world and reality, and
  - (ii) various modes of organisation of language?

#### **Epistemological Atomism and Reductionism**

It is suggested here that a major distinction should be made between two kinds of atomism. Ancient Greek atomism was concerned with the nature of 'material reality' (c.f. Edwards, 1972, Vol1, p.193) and may be called materialistic atomism. Modern philosophy, especially since Locke, has been concerned with how 'we' (i.e., humans) know reality. And so our knowledge of reality, according to a long tradition of empiricism, has been based on 'sense', and the bodily processes by which we come to learn about and know reality. From this starting point various terms and theories have arisen: ideas (Locke); 'perceptions of the mind': Impressions and Ideas (Hume); *sensa* and sensation (Speake, 1979, p.301); sense-data (Russell); sensationalism, phenomenism and phenomenology (Speake, pp.301f, 247, 247f), and quite probably Wittgenstein's logical atomism. Variations derived from Locke's view have either --

- (a) denied a world apart from sense or ideas, as in Berkeley's idealism, or
- (b) denied that we can know that world (of noumena, Kant), or
- (c) been forthrightly or less plainly representationist.

But no matter what specific form such views have taken, there has been a presumption or an aim to **reduce** knowledge to some basic units of sensation or 'simple ideas', which themselves cannot be reduced further. This view is expressed by Russell, claiming to represent Berkeley's position: "Things as we know them are bundles of sensible qualities" (Russell, 1946, p.680). Now this process of reduction may be compared to what was said about social atomism, in maintaining that, within the context of some kind of inquiry (in the present case into human knowledge), the subject of inquiry can be reduced to some basic unit which cannot be reduced further. In the case of epistemological atomism, these units may be 'primitive', irreducible, or simple (as, for example, with Locke's simple ideas); or perhaps as with the atoms of social atomism, namely humans, they can be analysed further -- are not simple -- but such analysis is of no relevance to the inquiry to hand.

The foregoing analysis has shown that it is not reasonable to presume that any of the philosophical '-isms' discussed so far exclude one another. It would seem that cases could be found in the history of philosophy which strongly suggest that:

- (a) rationalism and idealism are compatible;
- (b) forms of rationalism and idealism have been monist, dualist, pluralist, and/or atomist;
- (c) dualism, pluralism and atomism, in various senses, are not exclusive, but are compatible;
- (d) representationism is compatible with, and dependent upon, a theory of ideas, although some forms of idealism are not representationist;
- (e) one (modified?) form of rationalism is even compatible with a 'moderate' kind of empiricism.

### Anderson's Criticism of Rationalism

Anderson certainly held that rationalism and empiricism are opposed views. In fact, the opposition between them is certainly one of the most significant, and one of the most frequently recurring themes in his published and unpublished material. In Anderson's work, rationalism may be identified with any view which upholds values, ideals or ultimates, higher truths, truths of reason, first principles, necessary truths, or explanations which do not require further explanation (see SIEP, pp. 5, 14). Anderson argued that idealism "in holding that there is a highest truth instead of a number of higher truths ... can be regarded as a variety of rationalism" (SIEP, p.5; c.f. Reese quoted pp 35-6 above). He also maintained that the "theory of natures or essences is precisely rationalism" (SIEP, p.28). In this, he linked rationalism and the doctrine of essences with the idealist theory of internal relations (see p.42 above) or what he called the theory of constitutive relations or relativism (see p.20ff).

But in opposition to the doctrine of one way of being (empiricism) he more or less defined rationalism as any theory which upholds "different kinds or degrees of truth and reality" (SIEP, p.3), which virtually identifies it with all forms of dualism (see p. 61 below). Since Anderson rejected the notion of 'ideas' (see p.29ff above), he would naturally have rejected any theory of 'innate ideas'. It will be seen, therefore, that Anderson believed he had reasons for detecting rationalism where other philosophers may not recognise it.

Anderson took the 'extreme' empirical position that mathematical and geometrical truths are empirical, of the same order of being or truth as any other (see Part II of "Empiricism", SIEP, p.6ff), and therefore, that "all sciences are observational and experimental" (SIEP, p.6); and he rejected the supposed "distinction between necessary and other truths" (SIEP, pp5-6). It should be emphasised that Anderson would regard the acceptance of truths "of the peculiar 'necessary' sort" (SIEP, p.5) as a definite mark of rationalism, and absolutely incompatible with empiricism.

Mackie (1965) examined Anderson's position regarding "Rationalism and Empiricism". He gave an outline of Anderson's view of both, related to the doctrine of one way of being (p.2), and attempted to reconcile Anderson's unorthodox view with the traditional one. Mackie pointed out that Anderson's --

" ... classification both of philosophers and of doctrines fails to coincide with the traditional one. Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, who are traditionally grouped together as British Empiricists, are, according to Anderson, empiricists in only a slight degree; and some of their most characteristic doctrines are, he says, really rationalist ones. Sensationalism is 'a rationalist doctrine miscalled "empiricism"'. Similarly, many later philosophers who would call themselves empiricists, such as the logical positivists and many contemporary linguistic philosophers, would be said by Anderson to have adopted rationalistic views and methods." (Mackie, 1965, pp.1-2, quoting J. Anderson, SIEP, p.83).

Anderson's criticism of the notion of constitutive relations is an important part of his criticism of rationalism since, as was shown previously, he showed that those terms, 'consciousness' and 'ideas' basic to rationalism, were unsound. (See pp.34 and xxx-xxxi above.)

### Rationalism and Propositional Logic

Rationalism, in the rather vague traditional sense or senses, may be taken to uphold either that:

- (a) all knowledge or all truths can be known from pure reasoning,  
or
- (b) only some knowledge or truths can be known by pure reasoning  
and some are known by experience or sense.

There is also the problem whether it is ideas or propositions which are known in the special way.

There are serious problems for any such view, some of which are raised explicitly by Anderson. Some of the objections raised here may be said to be implicit, rather than explicit, in Anderson's position.

Taking the view that all knowledge or truths can be known from pure reasoning first, it can be considered whether all terms are known by pure reason also. And it seems that they must. For if any terms were known by experience, the truths involving those terms would equally depend upon experience. However, if some terms are known by pure reason and some from experience, those truths or propositions involving both kinds of terms would require knowledge of both sorts; they would be both (or partly both) truths of reason and truths of experience. So the view that all knowledge -- all propositions and all terms -- are known by pure reason appears to be the most coherent form of rationalism, even though it seems to be the least plausible.

On the other hand, what proposition could be known to be true which contained only terms derived from pure reason? What would such terms be? 'A is A' is not a proposition, because A is not a term. 'Males are males' may appear to be necessarily true, but the one term involved is not independent of experience.

However, if all terms are known by pure reasoning, rationalism will have to postulate as many truths of reason as there are terms in human knowledge. For no proposition containing term T can be deduced from premises neither of which contains T. That means that the number of truths of reason is as large as or larger than the number of known terms. This makes the number of truths of reason quite vast, and reduces the notion of 'truth of reason' to one of no special character at all. It also raises the questions how we could know such a large number of terms by reason alone, without experience, and what experience could possibly be if it was not learning propositions and terms.

Essentially the same kind of problems arise with respect to propositions. If truths of reason involve terms known by experience, they cannot be said to be independent of experience. However, if it is maintained that all propositions are truths of reason, 'truths of reason' has no significance at all. But once it is admitted that there are two kinds of propositions -- truths of reason and empirical truths -- the distinction breaks down. Take a familiar syllogism. Let it be assumed that "All men are mortal" is a truth of reason, and "Socrates is a man" is a truth of experience. Then is "Socrates is mortal" a truth of reason or a truth of experience? Again, as suggested earlier, some propositions appear to be either both, or partially both, truths of reason and truths of experience. Furthermore, the deduction of "Socrates is mortal" from the major premise "All men are mortal" means that that truth of reason is verified by experience. However, the notion of a truth of reason being verified by a truth of experience is a retraction from the notion of a truth of reason.

Now while Anderson did not criticise the notions of terms known by reason and propositions known by reason in exactly this way, his approach is along the same lines. What he did argue was that the application of geometrical truths (although "regarded as having an ideal or rational character") to "physical phenomena ... would have been impossible unless there were definite points of contact between the geometrical and the physical" (SIEP, p.7). That is to say, the distinction between the rational and empirical cannot be maintained unless

the distinction is absolute -- i.e., unless the rational has no relation to the physical whatsoever.

"We could not say 'Let us suppose this object to be triangular', if triangularity were a 'rational' entity and the object a 'natural' one; and we could not go on to say 'The object must then have certain other properties, and these do not differ greatly from the properties we observe it to have', unless we could make a direct comparison between the two sets of properties."  
(SIEP, pp7-8)

The general position being argued may be summarised this way:

If proposition p contains terms X and Y, and --

- (i) terms X and Y are based on experience, is proposition p an empirical proposition?
- (ii) proposition p is an empirical proposition, are X and Y empirical terms?

Once it is admitted that certain propositions and terms are empirical, and there is any deduction involving -

- (a) **both** propositions which are truths of reason and empirical propositions, or
- (b) non-empirical terms and empirical terms --

the whole supposed distinction between the two kinds of truths breaks down.

It is suggested here that the arguments just outlined are the arguments for the doctrine of one way of being applied to the terms of logic and the propositions of logic. And in simple terms, that argument is: once some distinction such as that between terms known by reason (or propositions or truths known by reason) and empirical terms (or propositions or truths) is made --

- (a) it must be upheld as absolute -- as an irreconcilable dualism, with no common terms, no point of contact, or
- (b) the attempted distinction breaks down: cannot be maintained.

It is also suggested here that Anderson's arguments against this rationalist treatment of terms and propositions is actually methodological. In arguing that all propositions must be on the same footing, or of the same status -- or belong to the one logic -- Anderson appears to be arguing that they must all be treated in the same way -- methodologically. So if one proposition can explain, so can any other; if one proposition can be explained, so can any other.

"Whatever 'explanation' may be, it must at least be a relation of such a sort that what is explained and what explains it can both be stated and believed, i.e., are both propositions. ... Discourse, in fact, depends on the possibility of making separate statements, in regard to each of which the very same question can be asked -- 'Is it true?'" (SIEP, pp.4-5)

Here we find one methodological principle for all propositions: we can ask whether any proposition is true; and that implies a second principle, namely, there is **some further method** of establishing whether a proposition is true or not. A third principle is adumbrated: any proposition which can explain can be explained and vice versa. That is to say, with respect to the methodology of explaining, all propositions are on one level. Further methodological principles concerning all propositions are made explicit:

"Considering propositions as they occur in discourse, we find that they can be asserted or denied, questioned, proved or disproved. In saying, then, that whatever can be asserted can be significantly denied, i.e., that there are no undeniable truths, and that whatever can be asserted or taken for granted can also be made a subject for inquiry, can be questioned or proved, i.e., that there are no unprovables, we are conveying certain characters of the common 'is' of discourse (certain conditions of existence)." (SIEP, p.5)

"Rejecting in this way the distinction between necessary and other truths, empiricism takes up the position that in discussion or inquiry any proposition can be treated as (a) a conclusion to be proved from premises accepted, (b) a premise accepted to be used in proving some conclusion, (c) a hypothesis to be tested by the observation of the truth or falsity of the conclusions drawn from it, or (d) an observation to be used in determining the truth or falsity of conclusions drawn from a hypothesis." (SIEP, pp5-6).

Any departure from this approach -- this methodology -- requires the introduction of some special terms, or some special kind of propositions, requiring some special treatment.

Now all these logical arguments have what might be called epistemological consequences, and the view is summed up by Anderson's claim that:

"It is only after it has been assumed that there are other truths than matters of fact, or that there are objects which 'transcend' existence, that a special faculty has to be invented to know them." (SIEP, p.4)

If person A knows proposition p by reason, there is no **a priori** reason for supposing that person B could not know p by experience. Take the conclusion to the syllogism discussed previously: "Socrates is mortal" (p.52 above). If, as Anderson maintained, knowing is a relation (see SIEP, p.27ff. ), A's knowing p is a relation between A and p, and B's knowing p is a relation between B and p. Being known is not a property of p (except on the idealist doctrine that relations are internal). If that is the case, we cannot tell by examining p alone whether it is known by a particular person by reason or by experience (sense). In any case, once inquiry depends upon **how** propositions are known, inquiry has passed into the murky realm of mind and introspection, and a whole range of intractable methodological problems arise. If certain truths are known by reason, by introspection into our own minds (?), observational methods are of no use. There can be no way person A can check (observe) what is in B's mind and vice versa; there can be no **objective** inquiry, no observation, verification, or disproof.

Both the logical analysis and the epistemological analysis of the supposed distinction of truths of reason and truths of experience raise serious, if not intractable, problems of methodology.

### Anderson's Criticisms of Idealism

Anderson's criticisms of idealism are varied corresponding to the various forms idealism has taken. What appear to be common to all forms of idealism are four principles or basic claims:

- (a) the reification of mind (although what is meant by mind varies considerably);
- (b) what is known by mind(s) are ideas, or constituted of ideas;
- (c) ideas and knowledge are self-contained mental entities, existing or subsisting totally within mind or minds;
- (d) what is known by mind(s) are (in some way) dependent upon mind(s).

Berkeleian idealism maintains that "a material object consists of nothing but ideas, whether in the mind of God or of the conscious agents that he has created" (Speake, 1979, p.149). Kant's Transcendental Idealism is "that the objects of our experience, in the sense of things existing in space and enduring through time, are nothing but appearances, and have no independent existence outside our thoughts" (Ibid). And Objective Idealism, though monistic, maintained "that all that exists is a form of one mind" (Ibid).

As has already been argued, theories or views upholding the four principles just outlined may be monist, dualist, pluralist, atomist or representationist. Although differing from one another in important respects, the views of the three British Empiricists Locke, Berkeley and Hume, conform to these four criteria. So some forms of idealism (or theories conforming to these criteria) embrace a representative theory of knowledge and a correspondence theory of truth. Absolute Idealism is monist and associated with a coherence theory of truth, while specific judgments are relative truths: relative to the whole truth.

Anderson stands opposed to all such views. He rejected:

- (i) the rationalist-idealist notions of --
  - mind as consciousness and the unitary theory of mind;
  - ideas and dependent existence;
  - constitutive relations which underpin the notions of 'consciousness' and 'ideas';
  - mental entities, and thus the view of ideas and knowledge as mental entities, and the notion of a kind of knowledge which cannot be mistaken;
  - utterly simple entities or simple (or atomic) ideas;
- (ii) monism;
- (iii) dualism;
- (iv) representationism;
- (v) both the correspondence and coherence theories of truth (SIEP, p.21) maintaining that there was no totality of truth (SIEP, p.19), no relative truths (SIEP, p.26), but "that there are any number of independent truths, each as 'absolute' as any truth can be" (SIEP, p.15).

Anderson's specific arguments against each of these views are not all dealt with immediately. One of the most important -- in the sense of being fundamental to many of the others -- has been dealt with already: that is the rejection of the theory of constitutive relations which is the basis of the rationalist-idealist views of 'consciousness' and 'ideas'. Others are discussed in various places hereafter.

### Anderson's Rejection of Ultimates: Monism and Atomism

While it may appear somewhat incongruous, Anderson was opposed to monism and atomism for much the same reason, that being because both are set up as ultimates of some kind: ultimates of explanation, insofar as they are an attempt to bring explanation to an end. Attention was drawn previously to Passmore's and Baker's interpretations of the doctrine of one way of being. Passmore said: "No total scheme, no simple units ... " (quoted p.xxvi above), which is clearly a reference to monism and atomism. Baker said: "Thus he rejects all forms of ontological monism, dualism and atomism, maintaining that there is, in this sense, neither the One, the Two, nor the Many, but **none**, that is, there are no ultimates." (quoted p.68f below). While Baker appears to take the rejection of the 'Many' to refer to atomism, it would seem to apply equally to traditional pluralism. This anomaly is taken up under the discussion of "Anderson's Pluralism", p.94 below.

Baker makes a remark which supports what was said earlier about the vagueness of terms such as monism, dualism, atomism (see p.44 above):

"Anderson is likewise critical of monistic and atomistic views, because of their own retention of dualistic doctrines and for other reasons." (Baker, 1986, p.26).

He goes on to outline --

- (a) arguments Anderson put forward to show that monistic theories are incoherent (Baker, 1986, pp.26-28), and
- (b) criticisms of atomism (Baker, 1986, pp.34ff)

Essentially, Anderson's criticism of monism follows the arguments in Plato's **Sophist**: it is that in order to expound his position, the monist "has to assume that in addition to the One there exist further things such as the words 'one' and 'real' that are applied to it." (Baker,

1986, p.27).

Essentially Anderson's criticism of atomism follows that of the **Theaetetus** and **Sophist**; it is that the atoms, as utterly simple entities, would be unknowable: the theory of atoms is 'unspeakable' (Baker, 1986, p.38). But in dealing with modern atomism, that stemming from Locke and Berkeley in particular, Anderson was clearly criticising a form of what is here called epistemological atomism (see p. 47 ), the view that 'the objects of human knowledge' are somehow made up of 'atomic ideas' (SIEP, p.163ff).

It is a question of some significance whether Anderson's rejection of the ultimates -- monism and atomism -- constitutes an argument for his brand of pluralism.

### Anderson's Criticism of Dualism

It is extremely significant that in the index to SIEP, the entry "Being, single way of" indicates no page numbers, but says only "see Dualism". That indicates, quite positively, that Anderson took the doctrine of one way of being to be directed against dualism, not only rationalism, or most probably that dualism is a manifestation of rationalism. (See p.37f above.)

It was suggested (p. 41 above) that dualism may take either of the two forms: the dualism of mind and matter, or the dualism of mind and ideas. It may be taken that Cartesian dualism holds that mind and matter are two distinct substances, each of equal status (c.f. Speake, p.41 above). Russell did not interpret Descartes in that way:

"Most philosophers since Descartes have attached importance to the theory of knowledge, and their doing so is largely due to him. 'I think, therefore I am' makes mind more certain than matter, and my mind (for me) more certain than the minds of others. There is thus, in all philosophy derived from Descartes, a tendency to subjectivism, and to regarding matter as something only knowable, if at all, by inference from what is known of mind." (1946, p.586).

Idealist forms of dualism since Berkeley have made the pre-eminence of mind very clear, Berkeley himself claiming that material things and ideas owe their existence to mind, and so they have a relative or dependent existence. While the doctrine of one way of being may be directed at all forms of dualism, Anderson developed a particularly telling argument against the notion of dependent existence (c.f. p.82f, below). However, it is curious that the doctrine of one way of being should be directed equally against rationalism and dualism, and that Anderson took his doctrine of the independence of things, which was clearly opposed to the rationalist-idealist-dualist notion of dependent existence, to be the foundation of realism. This conflation of rationalism with dualism, associated with the theory of ideas, is evident in the following passage:

"like the other 'English empiricists', (Hume) was rationalistically concerned with 'ideas' (that whose nature it is to be perceived) and not with propositions (what is the case). So long as any admission of 'natures' is made, dualism is inevitable ... " (SIEP, pp.88-9)

Anderson's first clear arguments against the rationalist-idealist-dualist notions of 'consciousness' and 'ideas' are set out in "The Knower and The Known" (SIEP, pp.29-32). Baker summarised Anderson's views thus:

"But the dualism aside, the important legacy for modern idealism was, first, the view of mental substance as something whose essence consists in thinking (as is supposed to be established by the **cogito**) and the associated claim that all consciousness is self-consciousness, and, second, the view, developed explicitly by Berkeley, that the objects of mind or consciousness, ideas or perceptions, are dependent existences whose being lies in being perceived." (Baker, 1986, p.6)

This is the dualism of mind and ideas, and on this view, ideas are dependent upon mind, and account for (by actually replacing) the objects of the material world. Material objects are simply collections of ideas, which ideas are mind-dependent. Minds and ideas exist in different ways, or have different ways of being. (It should be remarked here that the view that material or physical objects are constituted of simple elements is a materialistic kind of atomism. And that is a quite different theory from the claim that our **ideas** of complex things are constituted of simple **ideas**, which view may be called epistemological atomism. See p.47 above.)

Anderson employs two major arguments against dualism, both of which may be taken to support the doctrine of one way of being. One is the realist argument against the notion of dependent existence (see p. 82f below). The second is that somewhere along the way, the dualist has to say something about the two supposedly fundamentally different substances (or two kinds of being) which links them, and thus breaks down the supposed fundamental division. One example of this kind of argument is against Berkeley's division of **active** mind and **passive** idea:

"Finally, as in the case of Cleanthes, Berkeley either has to admit that we are simply some of God's ideas and have no 'agency' whatever, or has to recognise a thoroughgoing interaction and abandon his doctrine of the 'active' over against the 'passive'." (SIEP, p.92)

Baker refers to this general kind of argument:

"... to cite a criticism original, I think, to Anderson, according to Berkeley there is a division between active and passive being such that I, as an active mind, exist in knowing, and the table, as a passive idea, exists in being known. But this is vitiated by the fact that there are obvious cases that encompass both sides of the dualism; thus, the whole situation 'I see the table' cannot exist either in knowing or in being known -- without, that is, our breaking down the dualism and recognising that that situation and its ingredients all have 'being' of the same single kind." (Baker, 1986, p.26)

This, of course, is the doctrine of one way of being manifested as the destructive criticism of just one theory which postulates two different kinds of being. And the argument is clearly **methodological**. It argues, in effect, that if anyone postulates two kinds or levels of being such as this, that person cannot **consistently** uphold the view that they put forward. But what is the nature of this 'consistently'? It is not logical consistency: it is **methodological** consistency. That is to say, no one upholding these different ways of being can **consistently** maintain the distinction; **cannot maintain the distinction uniformly all the time.**

Anderson maintained that this same sort of argument applied to cosmological views of a monistic or dualistic type (SIEP, pp.89-90), and suggested that monism and dualism were both erroneous attempts to deal with the same basic philosophical problem:

"The only way to escape from the vicious circle, in which dualism collapses into monism and monism explodes into dualism, is to adopt a pluralistic position in which variously characterised

and related things are recognised as existing in the same way (spatio-temporally) -- a single logic of existence replacing conceptions of 'self-subsistence', 'relative existence' and any other flights of rationalistic fancy." (SIEP, p.90; c.f. Baker, quoted p.94 below).