

PART II

A NON-METAPHYSICAL INTERPRETATION OF

THE DOCTRINE OF ONE WAY OF BEING

PART II

A NON-METAPHYSICAL INTERPRETATION OF

THE DOCTRINE OF ONE WAY OF BEING

INTRODUCTION

Doubts have already been raised about whether Anderson's doctrine of one way of being is to be interpreted as metaphysical or not, and the remarks of some commentators, discussed shortly, underline this doubt. Taken intuitively, at face value, the doctrine appears to be metaphysical in its generality. On the other hand, taken at face value, intuitively, it seems that empiricism and metaphysics are incompatible: that the former is somehow a rejection of the latter. These issues raise the thorny question as to what metaphysics is, an issue discussed very briefly below.

The problem can be stated more generally, and it obviously presents a major problem for any interpretation of Anderson's work, especially if it is to be presented as systematic. The question whether Anderson's doctrine of one way of being (empiricism) is metaphysical or not, must be considered in relation to the questions whether his realism (or doctrine of the independence of things and of truth) is metaphysical or not; whether his pluralism (doctrine of infinite complexity) is or is not; whether his determinism, theory of categories, and undeveloped theory of 'the conditions of existence' are or are not. For there would be no point in attempting to interpret the doctrine of one way of being as non-metaphysical if other aspects of his position are metaphysical. Whatever interpretation we adopt, it must be **systematic** in the sense that it will be applied consistently to all aspects of Anderson's position -- across the board, so to speak. Examining how the doctrine of one way of being is to be interpreted in relation to Anderson's overall position -- as part of a systematic philosophy -- is one of the main tasks of this thesis.

A Metaphysical System or Not?

The question whether Anderson's central doctrines (especially the doctrine of one way of being) are metaphysical or not is complicated by the fact that it is difficult to determine what metaphysics is.

"Almost everything in metaphysics is controversial, and it is therefore not surprising that there is little agreement among those who call themselves metaphysicians about what precisely it is that they are attempting. ... It has to be admitted, however, that the line between metaphysical and nonmetaphysical philosophy is exceedingly hard to draw ... " (Edwards, 1972, Vol. 5, p.300)

Speake says "'metaphysics' has meant many different things" (Speake, 1979, p.212). Others are less charitable:

"**Metaphysics** is that part of philosophy which has the greatest pretensions and is exposed to the greatest suspicions. Having the avowed aim of arriving at profound truths about everything, it is sometimes held to result only in obscure nonsense about nothing" (Urmson, 1967, p.259)

It may appear from some of the commentators that Anderson equated his logic with metaphysics or ontology :

"Logic, as Anderson sees it, describes the general structure of facts, including the relationships between facts."

"Logic, as Anderson conceives it, incorporates what Mr Strawson has recently described as 'descriptive metaphysics'." (Passmore, 1962, pp.xv and xvi, respectively)

Elsewhere, speaking about Anderson's attachment to 'the tradition of inquiry', Passmore said: "And this reflects his metaphysical theory", and in the same article: "It was his habit in lectures to expound his

metaphysical and epistemological ideas through the medium of a critical commentary on the 'classical philosophers'." (Passmore, 1963, pp. 152 and 162 respectively). After briefly outlining Anderson's main philosophical views, Mackie said that he could not give a systematic account of Anderson's position (at least in that article) for three reasons, the third being:

"Anderson's philosophical system viewed in this way depends on a complete identification of logic with ontology which is, to say the least, very hard to defend and which, I shall argue below, cannot in the end be defended;" (Mackie, 1962b, p.266)

Armstrong had no reservations in talking of Anderson's "ontological or metaphysical views" (1977, p.65). Cumming entitled her MA thesis "Anderson's Ontological Empiricism", and in discussing the contrast between idealism and realism, Baker spoke of "ontological independence" which he contrasted with "causal dependence" and linked both terms with Anderson's views:

"But even where, as a further case, there is causal dependence, as when men build houses or bridges or manufacture cricket balls, there is still ontological independence: 'What exists because of me **nonetheless exists**, apart from or independently of me'" (Baker, 1986, p.12, quoting Anderson, SIEP, p.33)

It should be stressed that most of these are not Anderson's own words, and that except when he was dealing with the 'ontological argument', Anderson hardly ever, or perhaps never, used the words 'ontology/ontological'. These words do not appear in the index to SIEP (except as "Ontological Argument"), which strongly suggests they were not a -- certainly not a central -- part of Anderson's terminology.

Ontological theory, as it is generally understood, would be as unacceptable to Anderson, or as incompatible with his position, as metaphysics:

"**ontology.** 1. The branch of metaphysical inquiry ... concerned with the study of existence itself. ... It differentiates between 'real existence' and 'appearance' ... and investigates the different ways in which entities belonging to various logical categories (physical objects, numbers, universals, abstractions, etc.) may be said to exist. 2. The assumptions about existence underlying any conceptual scheme or any theory or system of ideas." (Speake, 1979, p.238)

The first view represents ontology as a "branch of metaphysics", and is linked to idealism (as Anderson alleged metaphysics was; see p.135 below) by way of the distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality'. The alleged distinction between 'categories' (or levels of reality) is precisely what the doctrine of one way of being was directed against. The second view is related to 'conceptual schemes' and theories of 'ideas' which Anderson equally rejected.

It would be perfectly reasonable and understandable for a philosophy department to include study of Anderson's doctrine of one way of being under the general heading of a course on metaphysics, for that doctrine is clearly not an ethical or aesthetic one; it does not fall under philosophy of mind or science, or political philosophy. But its categorisation in that broad way does not make it a metaphysical theory.

There are good reasons for believing that Anderson rejected all metaphysics and would have rejected the claim that his philosophy was metaphysical. In his own words: "the search for the ultimate is idealism or metaphysics" (SIEP, p.61). In "Empiricism and Logic", Anderson would make no fundamental distinction between philosophy and science (SIEP, p.183). He also said: "The historical and deterministic treatment of goods" (as with the historical or spatio-temporal and deterministic treatment of any subject of inquiry) "is ... only one example of the removal of metaphysics from science, the establishment of all scientific objects on a single level of investigation" (SIEP, p.247; see p.140 below). If these two propositions are considered together, it seems evident that Anderson aimed to remove all (remnants of) metaphysics from science and philosophy. Apart from the obvious reference there to the doctrine of one way of being, it should be plain to anyone that Anderson, concerned as he was with 'things' in space and time, would not accept any metaphysical, logical, or ontological terms or principles which were not on the same 'level' as ordinary 'things' or ordinary discourse. And that being the case, it is difficult to see how any term or any proposition within his system could be called metaphysical. Certainly it would be an abomination to suggest that any part of his philosophy was metaphysical in the sense of being idealist. But the general idea of metaphysics, as "an attempt to characterise existence or reality as a whole" (Speake, 1979, p.212), is --

- (a) incompatible with Anderson's rejection of any notion of a 'whole', 'totality', or 'the universe'; and
- (b) incompatible with empiricism in general in that it appears to lay down what investigation will find, before it begins.

Despite passages quoted previously, Passmore acknowledged Anderson's rejection of metaphysics in one usual, if vague, sense:

"Similarly, although he agreed with positivists in their opposition to metaphysics, when it is understood as the revelation of realities 'beyond facts', he shared neither the positivist hostility to traditional philosophy as such, nor its conception

of experience as consisting in 'having sensations', nor its interpretation of logic and mathematics as calculi." (Passmore, 1972, p.120)

The very most that can be attempted here, then, is --

- (a) to indicate very positively in what ways Anderson could not be considered a metaphysical philosopher, and
- (b) to outline, less definitely, in what sense he may possibly be considered a metaphysician.

In summary, Anderson could not be considered a metaphysical philosopher if that is taken to involve an interest in --

- (a) the study of "first principles" (Urmson, 1967, p.259);
- (b) the study of substance (as one kind of ultimate);
- (c) the study of 'the universe', 'the whole' or any such 'totality';
- (d) the nature and limitations of 'knowledge' (see p.193f below);
- (d) the 'fundamental' distinction between 'appearance and reality' (c.f. Urmson, 1967, p.260);
- (f) **a priori** or non-empirical methodology, or the study of the supersensible (Edwards, 1972, Vol.5, p.302);
- (g) the unravelling of paradoxes created by the misuse of language (Urmson, 1967, p.260);
- (h) the "revision of the set of ideas in terms of which we think about the world" (Urmson, 1967, p.260) because Anderson rejected both the notions of 'ideas' and 'the world'. (Cf.p.92 above)

The only traditional sense in which Anderson might be considered a metaphysical philosopher, then, is in the sense of metaphysics as "the science of existence in general, or of 'being as such'" contrasted with various special sciences each of which studies "only one part or aspect of being". (Urmson, 1967, p.259). That view of metaphysics does have similarities to views Anderson stated and to the doctrine of one way of being. It has similarities to:

- (i) Anderson's claim that "the subject matter of logic is 'what is'" (SIEP, p.122);

(ii) Anderson's claim that the interpretation of saying humans are part of nature is "that 'nature' means no more and no less than **what is**, and that a theory of the conditions of existence, embodying a general theory of causality, will apply indifferently to men and any other existing things." (SIEP, p.122);

(iii) Anderson's conception of his --

"pluralistic position in which variously characterised and related things are recognised as existing in the same way (spatio-temporally) -- a single logic of existence replacing conceptions of 'self-subsistence', 'relative existence' and any other flights of rationalistic fancy." (SIEP, p.90).

Even so, theories of metaphysics as "the science of existence in general, or of 'being as such'" or of "the subject matter of logic" as "what is" require further explanation, and such explanation will almost certainly involve some peculiar philosophical problems or paradoxes. So it would be absurd to suggest that Anderson rejected all other metaphysics for being what they are -- unspeakable and inexplicable? -- only to erect his own manifesting that same unspeakability.

It was noted by Mackie, Passmore, and Rose (pp.8f above) that Anderson's philosophical position was intimately related to his formal logic. Consistent with those views, it is assumed here that Anderson's doctrine of one way of being is integrated with his formal logic. This relationship between that doctrine and Anderson's logic will hold irrespective of whether the doctrine (or Anderson's whole position) is interpreted as metaphysical or not. If Anderson's views, especially the doctrine of one way of being, are to be interpreted as non-metaphysical, it must be shown either:

- (a) that the doctrine of one way of being is a purely logical, or methodological doctrine, or
- (b) how that doctrine is related to Anderson's formal logic.

If either of these alternatives can be achieved, it will have been shown that at least the doctrine of one way of being can be interpreted non-metaphysically. However, if neither of these alternatives is possible, we may be forced to accept the doctrine as metaphysical -- in some sense. So no matter whether the doctrine is interpreted as metaphysical or not, we must be able to understand its relationship to Anderson's formal logic. That is where this examination of the doctrine begins.

It attempts to show that Anderson's doctrine of one way of being can be interpreted non-metaphysically: that in doing so, this interpretation of the doctrine is integrated with Anderson's logic, and elucidates his 'core' position.

PART IISection 1: A NON-METAPHYSICAL INTERPRETATION OF ANDERSON'S 'CORE' POSITION

In Part I it was concluded that the analysis of Anderson's 'core' position, in terms of the '-isms' he supported and those he opposed, did not reveal any underlying unifying principle or principles which would enable us to see in what way that position is integrated, unified, or systematic. Nor did this analysis clarify the doctrine of one way of being; it did not show why it should be regarded as Anderson's central doctrine, nor did it clarify its status as metaphysical or not.

In Part II, an attempt is made (a) to show that Anderson's 'core' position is systematic, and (b) to elucidate the doctrine of one way of being. It will be seen that if this doctrine is central to Anderson's position, these two objectives are essentially the same. Throughout this Part II, the doctrine, and Anderson's position generally, are **consistently** interpreted as non-metaphysical. This is achieved by consistently taking Anderson's preoccupations to be with inquiry or methodology.

This non-metaphysical, methodological interpretation involves three basic hypotheses:

- (1) an hypothesis about Anderson's implicit theory of the nature of logic;
- (2) an hypothesis about the specific nature of the doctrine of one way of being; and
- (3) an hypothesis about Anderson's central philosophical preoccupations, here called "The Crucial Point of Focus".

Hypothesis (1): An Hypothesis about Anderson's Logic

It was argued previously (p. 8 above) that any formal logic presupposes a theory of logic. If that is correct, any systematic account of Anderson's position would have to provide a theory of logic, and in any case, according to Mackie "A complete presentation of Anderson's system should start with a full account of his logic, and go on to show how his other theories are developed with its help" (Mackie, 1962b, p.266; quoted p. 8 above).

It is postulated here that Anderson's 'implicit theory' of logic was that logic is the method of critical inquiry or, what is the same, the method of empirical inquiry or the method of inquiring by observing and propositions, which is a method of inquiring by observing, reasoning, and experiment. Adopting this view, it is possible to give a much more coherent or systematic account of Anderson's formal logic, the doctrine of one way of being, and Anderson's principal philosophical concerns.

This theory of logic, as the method of empirical inquiry, makes sense of Anderson's view that there is only one logic. What Anderson took to be important in Hegel (despite his shortcomings) was his quest for "a single logic and his insistence on the historical treatment of things" (SIEP, p.87). And this theory of logic explains Anderson's unusual approach to ethics, which he attempted to treat in the same way as any other matter of inquiry:

"The historical and deterministic treatment of goods is, in fact, only one example of the removal of metaphysics from science, the establishment of all scientific objects on a single level of investigation. And in thus upholding a logic of events, realist ethics helps to free philosophy from the confused ethics in which metaphysics is rooted -- from the conception of 'higher realities', that is to say, preferred delusions" (SIEP, p.247).

It is difficult to imagine what else Anderson could have meant here by a 'logic of events' than "the establishment of all scientific objects on a **single level of investigation**"; and it is difficult to imagine what else that could mean but the establishment of all **objects** (or subjects) **of inquiry** on a single level of investigation. But it is equally clear that the removal of 'higher realities' in ethics is also a reference to the doctrine of one way of being. So on this interpretation, the doctrine of one way of being is the establishment of all objects of inquiry on a single level of investigation: the adherence to one logic, or one method of inquiry, for all subjects.

What this means was explained under "The Importance of propositions in Anderson's Position" (p.12 above). When our judgments, or what we believe, are correct, they are propositions (or are expressible in propositional form); and when our judgments or beliefs are incorrect they are propositions (or expressible in propositional form); and when we discover we were mistaken, what we discover (like what we formerly believed) is a proposition. That is, when we are wrong and discover that we are wrong "correction will only occur by means of judgments of the same order" (SIEP, p.37); that is, correction will only occur by way of propositions.

The only alternative to this is that what we believe is not a proposition or number of propositions: is not expressible in propositional form. But that means that what we believe in that case is not expressible at all: is illogical, incoherent, or 'unspeakable'.

Hypothesis (2): An Hypothesis about The Doctrine of One Way of Being

Consistent with this view of Anderson's 'implicit theory' of logic as the empirical method of inquiring by observing and propositions, it is possible to construe the doctrine of one way of being as this theory of logic expanded with some more detail:

Hypothesis(1): Anderson's Implicit Theory of Logic

Logic is the method of critical inquiry or the method of inquiring by observing and propositions, which is a method of inquiring by observing, reasoning and experiment.

Hypothesis(2): Anderson's Doctrine of One Way of Being

THE MAIN HYPOTHESIS

1. All genuine problems of inquiry can be accommodated within a logic of four categorical forms of propositions (and syllogism).
2. All attempts to deal with matters of inquiry outside a logic of four propositional forms are illogical; which is to say --
 - (a) it is methodologically inconsistent to deal with issues which can be dealt with in a logic of four forms, in some other form;
 - (b) any so-called issue for discussion or inquiry which cannot be expressed either as one, or a number of proposition(s) of the four forms is illogical, meaningless, or nonsensical.

These two views can be taken together to mean:

- (i) Logic is the method of inquiry by observing and reasoning based on propositions of the four categorical forms.
- (ii) There is only one consistent method of inquiry, or there is only one logic.
- (iii) The adoption of any other method of inquiry but this method of observing and reasoning based on propositions of the four forms will **inevitably** result in absurdity; i.e., is **illogical**.
- (iv) The reference to 'being' in 'one way of being' is to an unambiguous 'is/are' or copula of all categorical propositions.

Hypothesis (3): The Crucial Point of Focus

It is postulated here that Anderson's disagreement with, and departure from, rationalism-idealism can be identified as revolving around three fundamental questions:

"What is the nature of minds?"

"What is the nature of those things which minds know?"

"What is the nature of knowledge or knowing?"

While rationalists or idealists may have differed in many important ways otherwise, they all held to a common core of doctrine on these questions. By contrast with rationalism-idealism, Anderson gave distinctly different answers to each question. It is claimed here that when this difference is recognised, we can both --

- (i) understand what are the central disputes between Anderson and rationalism-idealism, and therefore --
- (ii) discover what is central and distinctive in Anderson's 'core' position.

Adopting the two previous hypotheses -- Anderson's theory of logic and the doctrine of one way of being as methodological -- it is reasonable to interpret Anderson's 'core' position in this way: no matter what issue we are faced with in inquiry -- in philosophy or science -- to be 'logical', or **methodologically consistent**, we must approach it in the same way methodologically; that is, by the method of observing and reasoning in propositions of the four forms. And this adherence to a consistent methodology must, of course, apply to how we inquire into the three issues raised in the questions about the nature of minds, the nature of what minds know, and the nature of knowing. So no matter whether we are inquiring into minds or non-minds, the mental or the non-mental, minds or what minds know, or how minds know, we must (to be consistent) employ the same method of inquiry (one logic): the empirical method of observing and reasoning in propositions of the four categorical forms. And the **only** alternative to employing one methodology, or adhering to one logic, is **methodological inconsistency**, and this either is itself illogical, or leads to illogicality or absurdity. (See

Point 2 of The Main Hypothesis.) Of course, this egalitarianism regarding method rejects the privileged place idealism claims for mind.

* * * * *

It is being argued that when Anderson's 'core' position is interpreted in line with these three hypotheses -- Hypotheses (1), (2) and (3) --

- (i) it is seen to be systematic: based on a central principle of empirical method -- the observational-propositional method; and
- (ii) the doctrine of one way of being is the declaration of adherence to that method, with the corollary that any attempt to go outside that method -- or to get behind the proposition -- is illogical.

* * * * *

Part II falls into two sections, and Hypothesis (1) -- that Anderson's theory of logic as method -- is assumed throughout. Section 1 deals with The Crucial Point of Focus, and aims to show that, in opposition to rationalism-idealism, Anderson was concerned with a method of inquiry which applied equally to all fields, especially those of the mental and non-mental, or of minds and non-minds. That is to say, he was concerned to argue that one logic covered all inquiry. Section 2 attempts to show that the doctrine of one way of being, interpreted not in its more popular form but as The Main Hypothesis (p. 142 above), adequately explains Anderson's central contention: that being that one method of inquiry, or one logic, applies to all fields, and that is the observational-propositional method, with the corollary that any attempt to work outside that methodology leads to absurdity.

ANDERSON'S 'CORE' POSITION AND THE CRUCIAL POINT OF FOCUS

OUTLINE OF THE DISAGREEMENT AT THE CRUCIAL POINT OF FOCUS

It is being argued that all of Anderson's major doctrines and major lines of criticism of other views arise from consideration of the three questions here identified as The Crucial Point of Focus. A brief outline of the two competing views is provided first of all.

(a) The Rationalist-Idealist Answers

It is maintained here that various rationalist-idealist views form exclusive **syndromes** within the full range of alternatives, which are: rationalism, idealism, monism, dualism, traditional pluralism, atomism (including epistemological atomism), and representationism (and also traditional empiricism according to Anderson; see SIEP p.163, and p.50 above). It is also maintained that all such views (syndromes) have certain tenets in common, and these tenets provide answers to the three questions above. What all the rationalist-idealist philosophical views have in common are the claims that --

- (i) **minds** are of a special nature or status, distinct from:
 - (a) all mental entities, or what minds know, whether that is considered to be knowledge, ideas, concepts, sensa; and
 - (b) (if applicable) matter, physical things or objects, etc., which ideas represent, or what knowledge (of one kind) corresponds to;
- (ii) **what minds know** are always mental entities, never matter, material things, physical objects, or whatever;
- (iii) **mental entities** are always of a fundamentally different kind from:
 - (a) minds, .
 - (b) (if applicable) what they represent, or correspond to;
- (iv) knowledge is peculiarly related to mind in an active/passive

relation; mind is active and (actively) **has** knowledge (and ideas, etc.); knowledge is passive (as are ideas) and subsists within (or is 'had' by) mind; the nature of the knowing relation, or relation of 'having', is not made clear.

The rationalist-idealist answers to the three questions are distinctive insofar as further inquiry into mind, mental entities, and knowing or 'having' is blocked. There can be no further penetration or criticism of these dogmas. And in a sense, these general or dogmatic answers exhaust the whole field of philosophy: all specific problems must be dealt with within this conceptual framework -- a framework in which mind has an exalted or 'privileged' place.

(b) Anderson's Answers

Anderson's answers to each of the three questions above are fundamentally different from the rationalist-idealist answers outlined. His views on each will be outlined briefly first of all, then expanded thereafter and documented. They are summarised in Table 2 (p.151 below); expanded; and documented in Table 4 (pp. 154 to 156).

What is the nature of minds?

Anderson's answer to the first question is that minds are -- and must be -- of the same spatio-temporal order as anything else, otherwise we could not know anything about them at all. If they are known at all, they are known by their characteristics (like anything else), as complex (like anything else), as having characteristic ways of behaving (like anything else), and (as with anything else) what we know or say about them will take propositional form. In other words, they are of the same status -- on the same one level of being -- as anything else we know. So while minds are distinctive kinds of things, just as lions, trees and clouds are distinctive kinds of things, they are at the same time a species of things which minds know; they fall into the same category and under the same criteria as all other things which minds know (i.e., in answer to the second question).

This answer has two important consequences: Firstly, it requires only **one way of knowing** which works equally well for knowing minds and non-minds, whereas the rationalist-idealist view must postulate two (or more) ways of knowing two (or more) kinds of 'being' or existences:

minds, ideas (and possibly 'things'). On that score, Anderson's schema is more parsimonious. Secondly, Anderson's schema presents no problem in knowing other minds: we know other minds the same way that we know anything else: by **observing** their characteristics and characteristic ways of behaving.

In summary, on Anderson's view minds do not hold any privileged place in philosophy; they do not present any special problem for our knowing; one way of knowing suffices for all purposes; and there is no need to postulate two or more ways of being, or kinds of existence.

What is the nature of those things which minds know?

To the second question, Anderson answered that what we know are always things or situations, never mental entities such as ideas, concepts, sensa, etc. These things or situations have characteristics of their own, otherwise we could not know anything about 'them'; otherwise there would be nothing to know or to have relations to anything else. In this sense, anything we know is independent. If a thing has its own characteristics, then it is independent of any mind, even if it was conceived by and constructed by some mind or person (SIEP, pp. 33, 93). The things or situations we know are always complex (never simple), and always related to other things in space and time. Things have their own characteristic ways of behaving, and interact with other things. Things are always seen as distinct from and yet related to other things. A leaf is distinct from the tree on which it grows and of which it is a part. In the same way, the tree may be part of a forest, and yet distinct from the forest, just as this forest is distinct from some other forest and from the grassy plain. As was outlined previously, these 'criteria of things' apply equally to minds and non-minds.

What is the Nature of knowledge or knowing?

In answer to the third question, Anderson said in effect there is only one way of knowing; it is intimately related to, or is, observing; it is a relation between knower and thing known; and what is known is always expressible in propositional form. Since there are no such

things as ideas, concepts, etc., there is no independent thing called knowledge existing or subsisting within minds. So there are no mental entities at all.

* * * * *

Obviously the foregoing answers to the three questions (at The Crucial Point of Focus) are given in the simplest, most concise form possible. Those answers will be expanded and documented in the following section. However, it is being claimed here that the general position outlined in this simple way is essentially Anderson's 'core' position, and embodies the doctrine of one way of being expressed in a very simple form.

In other words, Anderson's position, 'summarised' in the doctrine of one way of being, is that no matter whether we are inquiring into minds or non-minds, the mental or the non-mental, we employ the same (one) empiricist methodology or (one) logic: the method of inquiring by observing and reasoning by means of propositions.

It is reasonable to argue that this interpretation is consistent with, and explains, Anderson's rejection of the rationalist-idealist notion of mind (and the whole notion of mental entities associated with it): of mind as holding a 'privileged' or unique place in philosophy, and as requiring to be studied by a unique method. It is consistent with the traditional views, and therefore perfectly reasonable to claim, that it is this 'privileged' status of mind (and the mental) which stands absolutely central to both rationalism and idealism. So it is reasonable to argue that this interpretation of Anderson's logic and the doctrine of one way of being provides the basis for the rejection of:

- (a) **all ultimates**, including --
 - (i) **mind** as an ultimate, because that involves the dualism of 'ultimate' and 'relative', or involves actually denying the reality of appearances altogether;
 - (ii) the **utterly simple** or any **totality** as ultimate, because the claim that some ultimate explains everything inevitably results in some absurdity: some unintelligible claim.

- (b) **all dualisms:** mind and matter; mind and ideas; ideas and what ideas (in the mind) represent; the internal world of the mind and an external world of physical or material things; appearance and reality.
- (c) the dualist correspondence theory of truth, the monist coherence theory of truth, the relativist theory of relative truth, and the rationalist theory of analytic and necessary truths.

Ultimates, (a) above, imply a special 'way of being', and possibly, like dualisms, (b) above, two 'ways of being'; (c) above involves kinds of truths, and some cases would involve two 'kinds of truth' (e.g., analytic and synthetic, or necessary and contingent).

It is being claimed:

- (1) that Anderson's position is **not** made precise and clear by describing it as empiricist, realist, pluralist and determinist; and that to describe his position in that way is, as has been shown, almost certain to result in misunderstanding;
- (2) that Anderson's core position is better described and understood in terms of the answers he gave to -- and the general methodology he adopted with respect to -- the three questions called The Crucial Point of Focus;
- (3) that these answers quite properly encapsulate what is involved in the doctrine of one way of being.

These conclusions may be disputed, but before they can be discussed further, the basis for that view must be outlined in greater detail.

**EXPANDING AND DOCUMENTING THE ANALYSIS OF ANDERSON'S CORE POSITION
BASED ON THE CRUCIAL POINT OF FOCUS**

It has been argued very briefly that Anderson's major 'core' doctrines and criticisms arise from consideration of three fundamental questions identified here as The Crucial Point of Focus: as the issues on which Anderson departed from rationalism-idealism. That general claim will now be argued, and documented, in a little more detail. As indicated, this view is summarised in Table 2, and is expanded and documented in Table 4. It will be seen that the thirty-two points on Table 2 are repeated in, and form the basis of, Table 4. With one exception (4.25.1, where Passmore is quoted), those thirty-two points are related to Anderson's own words in SIEP. There is, therefore, no interpretation involved, except in the arrangement of this material under three headings (related to the three questions), with paired oppositions. Many of the references to SIEP in Table 4 are to be found in the present text, and/or in Table 1 (Pluralism) and Table 3 (Things). This format involves some unavoidable repetition, but was considered preferable to continually referring the reader to Tables and other pages. In most cases, in the following text, references are to the Tables (1.1 refers to Table 1; 4.16.2 to Table 4, and so on) where the quotation and its source in SIEP are to be found.

<p style="text-align: center;"><u>ANDERSON'S POSITIVE DOCTRINES</u></p> <p>THE NATURE OF MINDS</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>ANDERSON'S CRITICISM OF OTHER DOCTRINES</u></p> <p>THE NATURE OF MINDS</p>
<p>2.1 Minds (like anything else) must have qualities of their own. (C.f. 2.5, 2.7)</p> <p>2.2 Minds are complex like anything else. (C.f. 2.6)</p> <p>2.3 Anderson's concern with qualities of minds flows on into his theory of mind as feeling, his ethics and social theory.</p>	<p>2.15 Minds cannot be 'consciousness' -- cannot be based on constitutive relations, essences internal relations.</p> <p>2.16 Mind cannot be 'simple', otherwise we could never know anything about them.</p> <p>2.17 We cannot have a merely inferential knowledge of minds.</p> <p>2.18 Mind and ethics.</p>
<p>THE NATURE OF WHAT MINDS KNOW</p> <p>2.4 What we know are independent things or states of affairs.</p> <p>2.5 Things/situations have qualities of their own (the independence of things).</p> <p>2.6 Things/situations are always complex.</p> <p>2.7 Sometimes what we know are minds, sometimes not minds. When we know minds, we know them in the same way as we know non-minds -- that is, by their characteristics, and as complex -- otherwise we could not know them at all. See 2.1 above.</p> <p>2.8 Things have their own characteristic ways of behaving.</p> <p>2.9 Things are (observed to be) related and distinct.</p>	<p>THE NATURE OF WHAT MINDS KNOW</p> <p>2.19 We never know 'ideas' or 'concepts' or 'meanings'.</p> <p>2.20 Nothing is mind-dependent. There is no DEPENDENT EXISTENCE, relative existence or relative truth.</p> <p>2.21 What we know is never simple.</p> <p>2.22 We never observe any 'absolutes' or fundamental substances'.</p> <p>2.23 We could never know anything or say anything about a 'totality'.</p> <p>2.24 "Mind is not required to relate things, because things are given as related just as much as they are given as distinguished." (SIEP, p.12)</p>
<p>THE NATURE OF KNOWING</p> <p>2.10 Knowing is a relation between knower and thing or situation known.</p> <p>2.11 There is only one way of knowing. There is only one way of knowing truths. There is only one way of knowing minds. We know minds in the same way that we know non-minds.</p> <p>2.12 Knowing is always based on observing.</p> <p>2.13 Knowing is always by way of propositions of the four forms with one unambiguous 'IS' or one way of being; the 'independence' of truth.</p> <p>2.14 Knowing does not necessarily involve knowing anything about mind.</p>	<p>THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE</p> <p>2.25 There is no realm of mental entities.</p> <p>2.26 There are no such things as ideas, concepts, etc.</p> <p>2.27 There cannot be a storehouse view of knowledge or mind.</p> <p>2.28 There are no representations of things in knowing. There is no correspondence between knowledge, or ideas, or meanings and things known.</p> <p>2.29 Knowledge cannot be based on the analysis of ideas; therefore there are no necessary or analytic truths.</p> <p>2.30 Only when it is assumed that there are special truths or special existences (ways of being) is it necessary to postulate a special (second) way of knowing.</p> <p>2.31 Any intermediaries to knowledge (any tertium quid view of propositions) makes knowledge impossible.</p> <p>2.32 There is no need for any epistemological examination of the bases of what we know.</p>

TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF ANDERSON'S CORE DOCTRINES AND RELATED CRITICISMS. This table summarises Anderson's views around three questions here called The Crucial Point of Focus:

- "What is the nature of minds?"
- "What is the nature of those things which minds know?"
- "What is the nature of knowledge (or knowing)?"

It is argued here that when Anderson's answers to these questions are set out as in this Table, his 'core' position is made perfectly clear, and thereby made clearer than by reference to empiricism, realism, pluralism and determinism, which are explained incidentally (as it were) by this Table. On each of the three questions, Anderson rejected rationalist,

dualist, representationist answers, and adhered to one consistent set of answers which require postulating only one way of knowing, only one methodology for inquiring into any subject (whether minds or non-minds).

Each of the thirty-two points of this Table is repeated and documented in Table 4.

TABLE 3**THINGS AS INDEPENDENT, SPATIO-TEMPORAL AND PROPOSITIONAL**

- 3.1 "what we know consists not of things simply but of states of affairs (or propositions)." (SIEP, p.32)
- 3.2 "According to the realist theory 'the known' consists of independent things in space." (SIEP, p.40)
- 3.3 "we know things only as having specific characters and as occupying Space and Time." (SIEP, p.40)
- 3.4 "And, in general, it cannot be maintained either that the proposition is our way of understanding things which in themselves are not propositional, or that we have further ways of understanding the proposition which is in itself defective." (SIEP, p.4)
- 3.5 "what can be contemplated or enunciated is always in the form of a proposition; in other words, that we deal always with complex states of affairs and never with 'simple entities'." (SIEP, p.12)

THINGS AS COMPLEX

Regarding things as complex, see Table 1: 1.1-1.4; 1.6-1.10; 1.14.

THINGS AS RELATED AND DISTINCT

- 3.6 "things are given as related just as much as they are given as distinguished." (SIEP, p.12)
- 3.7 If we say we pursue things as "they **satisfy** processes in our minds" (that view is) "stated in terms of the relations of two complex things, and leaves" (them as) "'subject' and 'object' perfectly distinct and independent." (SIEP, p.40)

THINGS AS DETERMINED

- 3.8 "We must be able to say: 'This is the sort of thing which under certain circumstances will act in such and such a way, and under other circumstances will act in a different way'." (SIEP, p.13; quoted p.117 above)
- 3.9 "a thing **as spatio-temporal** exhibits a certain character, e.g., that it occupies a definite place in a regular sequence of a cer-

tain type. To speak of a thing, it may be said, is to speak of certain 'ways of working', the continuance and the development of which are, of course, affected by the other ways of working by which the thing is surrounded. It would be argued, in this way, that it is a condition of a thing's existence that it determines and is determined by other things, and that to investigate or 'give an account of' it involves consideration of such determinations." (SIEP, p.123)

3.10 "For Realism, then, as against all the 'ultimates', facts are good enough. ... And, rid of 'meanings' and 'purposes' and other products of 'vicious intellectualism', it proposes as the formal solution of any problem **the interaction of complex things.**"

(SIEP, p.59)

TABLE 3. A selection of claims which Anderson made about the nature of **what we know**, or 'things' (in general), categorised. Compare with Table 1, pp.111-3 above, concerning 'things' as complex.

ANDERSON'S POSITIVE DOCTRINES	ANDERSON'S CRITICISM OF OTHER DOCTRINES
THE NATURE OF MINDS	THE NATURE OF MINDS
<p>4.1 Minds (like anything else) must have "qualities of their own".</p> <p>.1 "Unless ... mind can be contemplated by mind and found to have certain qualities, we cannot know minds at all or speak of their knowing." (SIEP, p.38)</p> <p>.2 "Thus we must know what sort of thing a mind is, independently of terms like 'consciousness'" (SIEP, p.29)</p> <p>.3 "The view that knowledge is a relation implies that knower and known are two different things or that, in knowledge, the knower is not the known." (SIEP, p.27)</p> <p>.4 "And, in general, in saying of any two related things that they are distinct, we must suppose each to have some character, or certain qualities, of its own." (SIEP, p.28)</p> <p>.5 "... what knows, as well as what is known, must have a character of its own" (SIEP, p.69)</p>	<p>4.15 Mind cannot be 'consciousness' -- cannot be based on constitutive relations, essences, internal relations. (c.f.SIEP, pp.31-2)</p> <p>.1 "unless" (minds) "had qualities of their own, there would be nothing to have relations to other things" (See 4.20.2)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">REALIST CRITICISM OF RATIONALISM-IDEALISM; CRITICISM OF RELATIVISM</p> <p>.2 Realism "has maintained ... that the existence of a mind is one thing, and the existence of a field of things known by that mind quite another." (SIEP, p.69)</p> <p>.3 Realism "has equally to reject what is characterised by knowing, or 'consciousness'; that it has to say that what knows, as well as what is known, must have a character of its own and cannot be defined by its relation to something else." (SIEP, p.69)</p>
4.2 Minds are complex like anything else. (See 4.6.1, 4.7.1)	<p>4.16 Mind cannot be 'simple'. We could never know anything about it.</p> <p>.1 "What has chiefly to be emphasised, however, is that the observation of minds, the knowledge of them in propositions, requires the rejection of the 'unitary' view of mind, the conception of it as having only one character and being self-contained in that character." (SIEP, p.14; Table 1.7)</p> <p>.2 "the only reason for regarding minds as not in space being the rationalistic contention that they are indivisible" (SIEP, p.14)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">PLURALISM</p>
<p>4.3 Anderson's concern with qualities of minds flows on into his theory of mind as feeling, his ethics and social theory.</p> <p>.1 Feeling "gives us a basis for a general descriptive account of mind" (SIEP, p.73)</p> <p>.2 "It has to be admitted ... that we do observe situations of the sort 'A knows B' ... And this implies that we know A, as well as B, as having a distinctive character, and not simply as knowing. Such characters of mind are found whenever we say that anyone is angry or pleased or afraid." (SIEP, pp.38-9)</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">EMPIRICISM</p> <p>4.17 We cannot have a merely inferential knowledge of minds. (SIEP, p.13)</p> <p>.1 "We cannot have a 'merely inferential' knowledge of" (anything)</p> <p>4.18 Mind and ethics.</p> <p>.1 "If this terminology of motives and objectives be adopted, the position that I am criticising is that there is a peculiarly critical motive which judges all other motives by comparing their objectives with its, or that there is a total motive which dominates all partial motives by subordinating their objectives to its;" (SIEP, p.218)</p>
← REALISM	← PLURALISM

TABLE 4: SUMMARY OF ANDERSON'S CORE DOCTRINES AND RELATED CRITICISMS EXPANDED AND DOCUMENTED

This Table is an expansion of Table 2. It summarises Anderson's views around three questions here called The Crucial Point of Focus, and provides documentation for each of the 32 points set out in Table 2.

Table 4 contains 3 double pages: Anderson's views on --

Page 1: THE NATURE OF MINDS
 Page 2: THE NATURE OF WHAT MINDS KNOW
 Page 3: THE NATURE OF KNOWING (KNOWLEDGE)

(Page 1 of 3 pages)

It is argued that Anderson's answers to these questions, as set out here, clarify his 'core' position, and elucidate what he meant by empiricism, realism, pluralism and determinism.

THE NATURE OF WHAT MINDS KNOW	ANDERSON'S POSITIVE DOCTRINES	THE NATURE OF WHAT MINDS KNOW	ANDERSON'S CRITICISM OF OTHER DOCTRINES
4.4	What we know are independent things or states of affairs.	REALISM	4.19
.1	"what we know consists not of things simply but of states of affairs (or propositions)." (SIEP, p.32; Table 3.1)		We never know 'ideas' or 'concepts' or 'meanings'.
.2	"According to realism, ... we never know 'ideas' but always independent things, or rather states of affairs." (SIEP, p.32)		CRITICISM OF DUALISM
.3	"According to the realist theory 'the known' consists of independent things in space." (SIEP, p.40; Table 3.2)		.1 "According to realism, I have argued, we never know 'ideas' but always independent things, or rather states of affairs. It seems to me to follow that such expressions as appearances or data, and as concepts, percepts or sensa have no place in realist theory." (SIEP, p.32)
4.5	Things/situations have qualities of their own (the independence of things).		CRITICISM OF DUALISM of mind/ideas or ideas/things
.1	"... we know things only as having specific characters and as occupying Space and Time." (SIEP, p.40; Table 3.3)		.2 "though realists have not seen perhaps clearly enough that the very term 'idea' requires to be dispensed with" (SIEP, p.69)
4.6	Things/situations are always complex.	PLURALISM	4.20
.1	"What we see, like what we apprehend in any other way," (i.e., observe?) "is always complex, always a state of affairs;" (SIEP, p.37; Table 1.4) (On Pluralism, see also SIEP, p.127; Table 1.14)		Nothing is mind-dependent. There is no DEPENDENT EXISTENCE , relative existence or relative truth. CRITICISM OF RATIONALISM-IDEALISM
.2	"But there is no logical distinction between things and propositions. Things are known only by their characters, and so the objective ..." (in the sense of our motives seeking some objective) "is a complex situation, not any 'simple' entity." (SIEP, pp.218-9; Table 1.8)		.1 "Now dependence is presumably a relation, and if a certain existence or a certain quality depends on something, this does not justify us, rejecting as we do the theory of constitutive relations, in describing it as a 'dependent existence' or a 'dependent quality'. The existence or quality, though it might not have been but for that other thing, is independent in the sense of being distinct and having a character of its own." (SIEP, p.33)
4.7	Sometimes what we know are minds, sometimes not minds. When we know minds, we know them in the same way as we know non-minds -- that is, by their characteristics, and as complex -- otherwise we could not know them at all. See 4.1 above.	REALISM	.2 "unless things had qualities of their own, there would be nothing to have relations to other things." (SIEP, p.43)
.1	"If we are to have any dealings with minds, we must be able to consider how they act in different situations, i.e., to consider them as having complex characters and activities, as being divisible and determinate." (SIEP, p.14; Table 1.7)		4.21
4.8	Things have their own characteristic ways of behaving.	REALISM, DETERMINISM	What we know is never simple.
.1	"We must be able to say: 'This is the sort of thing which under certain circumstances will act in such and such a way, and under other circumstances will act in a different way'." (SIEP, p.13; and this applies to minds, as to any other thing; c.f. p.260)		.1 "... the objective" (of our motives) "... is a complex situation, not any 'simple' entity." (SIEP, pp.218-9; c.f. Table 1.8)
.2	"... discovery ... is possible only if we can say that in certain situations things of a particular sort behave in a certain way;" (SIEP, p.214)		4.22
.3	"For Realism, then, as against all the 'ultimates', facts are good enough. ... And, rid of 'meanings' and 'purposes' and other products of 'vicious intellectualism', it proposes as the formal solution of any problem the interaction of complex things." (SIEP, p.59; Table 1.10)		We never observe any 'absolutes' or 'fundamental substances'.
.4	"To speak of a thing ... is to speak of certain 'ways of working', the continuance and the development of which are ... affected by the other ways of working by which the thing is surrounded." (SIEP, p.123)		CRITICISM OF MONISM, ATOMISM
4.9	Things are (observed to be) related and distinct.	REALISM	.1 "And therefore all ideals, ultimates, symbols, agencies and the like are to be rejected, and no such distinction as that of facts and principles, or facts and values, can be maintained." (SIEP, p.14)
.1	"... things are given as related just as much as they are given as distinguished." (SIEP, p.12; Table 3.6)		4.23
.2	If we say we pursue things as "they satisfy processes in our minds" (that view is) "stated in terms of the relations of two complex things, and leaves" (them as) "'subject' and 'object' perfectly distinct and independent." (SIEP, p.40; Table 3.7)		We could never know anything or say anything about a 'totality'. CRITICISM OF MONISM
			.1 "A monist must deny all change and all differentiation; the One can have no history and no parts." (SIEP, p.306; c.f. Table 1.11)
			4.24
			"Mind is not required to relate things, because things are given as related just as much as they are given as distinguished." (SIEP, p.12; c.f. Table 3.6)
			CRITICISM OF 'DISTINCT EXISTENCES'

TABLE 4 : Page 2 : THE NATURE OF WHAT MINDS KNOW

ANDERSON'S POSITIVE DOCTRINES		ANDERSON'S CRITICISM OF OTHER DOCTRINES	
<p>THE NATURE OF KNOWING</p> <p>4.10 Knowing is a relation between knower and thing or situation known. REALISM</p> <p>.1 "The view that knowledge is a relation implies that knower and known are two different things or that, in knowledge, the knower is not the known." (SIEP, p.27)</p> <p>4.11 There is only one way of knowing. EMPIRICISM, REALISM</p> <p>There is only one way of knowing truths (see 4.13). There is only one way of knowing minds. We know minds in the same way that we know non-minds (see 4.7 above).</p> <p>.1 "... empiricism has been connected, in the history of philosophy, with the view that there is only one way of knowing, and particularly that that way is what was called 'sense' in contrast to 'reason'; or, rather differently, that sense is the only originator of knowledge." (SIEP, p.3)</p> <p>4.12 Knowing is always based on observing. EMPIRICISM</p> <p>.1 "... empiricism as the doctrine that whatever we know we learn -- in other words, that to know something is to come into active relations, to enter into 'transactions', with it" (SIEP, p.162)</p> <p>4.13 Knowing is always by way of propositions of the four forms with one unambiguous 'IS' or one way of being; the 'independence' of truth. EMPIRICISM</p> <p>.1 "And the nature of belief requires the rejection of any theory of distinct sorts or different degrees of truth; truth being simply what is represented by the copula 'is' in the proposition." (SIEP, p.26)</p> <p>.2 "It is in this way that empiricism is seen as a doctrine of what is real as situations, and that therewith goes the denial that anything can be known except as situations, which is to say except as spatio-temporal and except in propositional form." (SIEP, p.162)</p> <p>.3 "But fundamentally the issue is logical; the dispute is about ways of being or of truth, not about ways of knowing truths." (SIEP, pp.3-4)</p> <p>4.14 Knowing does not necessarily involve knowing anything about mind. REALISM</p> <p>.1 "We have to banish mind from philosophy, and in so doing make incidentally possible a positive account of mind itself." (SIEP, pp.60-61)</p> <p>.2 "... the study of anything is not, on account of its being a study, at the same time a study of mind" (SIEP, p.61)</p> <p>.3 "For an answer to Hegel ... we have to drop epistemology -- the intrusion of mind into logic and of a false logic into psychology -- and return to the Greek consideration of things." (SIEP, p.86)</p>		<p>THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE</p> <p>4.25 There is no realm of mental entities. CRITICISM OF IDEALISM</p> <p>.1 "There is no special realm of 'mental entities'; in remembering, in imagining, in expecting, in desiring, we are concerned all the time with independent states of affairs." (J.A. Passmore, 1962, p.xiii)</p> <p>4.26 There are no such things as ideas, concepts, etc. (see 4.19.1) CRITICISM OF RATIONALISM</p> <p>4.27 There cannot be a storehouse view of knowledge or mind. (See SIEP, pp.72n and 173n)</p> <p>4.28 There are no representations of things in knowing. CRITICISM OF REPRESENTATIONISM</p> <p>There is no correspondence between knowledge, or ideas, or meanings and things known.</p> <p>.1 "... if it is possible for a proposition to claim to be a matter of fact, there can be no other sense of truth to consider." (SIEP, p.21)</p> <p>.2 "The main error of this view -- an error which appears also in the correspondence theory and in many other philosophical doctrines -- lies in the assumption that there is a kind of knowledge which cannot be mistaken as contrasted with that which can; that, e.g., minds can receive 'data' about which there is no dubiety, and can then 'interpret' them in various ways which may possibly be mistaken." (SIEP, p.71)</p> <p>4.29 Knowledge cannot be based on the analysis of ideas; therefore there are no necessary or analytic truths. CRITICISM OF RATIONALISM</p> <p>.1 "Rejecting in this way the distinction between necessary and other truths, empiricism takes up the position ... " (SIEP, pp.5-6; c.f. p.49 below)</p> <p>NO INTEREST IN LANGUAGE</p> <p>4.30 Only when it is assumed that there are special truths of special existences (ways of being) is it necessary to postulate a special (second) way of knowing. CRITICISM OF RATIONALISM</p> <p>.1 "It is only after it has been assumed that there are other truths than matters of fact, or that there are objects which 'transcend' existence" (one example being minds) "that a special faculty has to be invented to know them." (SIEP, p.4)</p> <p>4.31 Any intermediaries to knowledge (any tertium quid view of propositions) makes knowledge impossible. CRITICISM OF REPRESENTATIONISM IN LANGUAGE</p> <p>.1 "The rejection of the 'tertium quid' view leaves us with a propositional view of reality, which, without fully canvassing the matter here, I have been indicating reasons for identifying with a situational or spatio-temporal view." (SIEP, p.171)</p> <p>4.32 There is no need for any epistemological examination of the bases of what we know. NO INTEREST IN EPISTEMOLOGY</p> <p>.1 "Not the least of the reasons for studying the Greek philosophers is that they are far clearer on many questions than modern philosophers, that they avoid many modern errors, and especially that they are not, like the moderns, obsessed with 'the problem of knowledge' -- that they do not set out to discover (i.e., to know!) how, or how much, we can know, before they are prepared to know anything. This 'criticism of the instrument' amounts to scientific defeatism, ... " (SIEP p.82)</p>	

TABLE 4 : Page 3 : THE NATURE OF KNOWING (KNOWLEDGE)

The Nature of Minds

Anderson's view of minds, which was influenced by, but not simply a reflection of Freud's, may be likened to the Copernican revolution in dislodging mind (as against the earth) from the centre of the idealist 'universe' (4.14.1). Anderson's opposition to the idealist view of mind, with its privileged place, and its own special 'way of being', is based on the realist doctrine -- or methodological requirement -- that minds, like anything else (must) have characteristics of their own (4.1), which for Anderson meant they are complex (4.2). The 'must' in parenthesis indicates not 'necessity', but the methodological point that, unless minds have characteristics of their own, we could not know anything about them: we could not observe them, which is what is meant by: "Unless ... mind can be contemplated by mind and found to have certain qualities we cannot know minds at all or speak of their knowing." (4.1.1). So Anderson took a purely naturalistic view of minds and how we might inquire into, or study, them. In so doing, he was rejecting the rationalist-idealist view of mind as a privileged entity, the unitary view of mind (4.16.1) as simple and "indivisible" (4.16.2), and the view of mind as 'consciousness' (4.15; SIEP, pp.31f and 60ff), which is rationalist-idealist because it is based on the theory of constitutive (internal) relations (SIEP, p.31) or 'essences' (c.f. SIEP, p.28, quoted p. 49 above).

While Anderson did not express his criticism of the 'unitary, indivisible' view of mind in this way, he may well have said that it was a **featureless** view of mind, for it is based on the view that mind is constituted **solely** by one of its supposed relations and since "unless things" (in this case, minds) "had qualities of their own, there would be nothing to have relations to other things" (4.20.2), there is nothing else, on this view of mind, which could have relations to other things.

Later, Anderson went on to put forward a theory of mind where he tried to characterise mind ("Mind as Feeling" and 4.3.1). But that theory, being a specialist theory, does not concern us here. What is of relevance to Anderson's 'core' views, so it is contended, is that **methodologically**, he was prepared to treat minds in the same way -- as on

the same level of 'being' -- as anything else as a subject of investigation. In treating minds in the same way as anything else, or on the same level of being, he was taking them, as with all things (all subjects for investigation) as --

- (i) having characteristics of their own,
 - (ii) complex,
 - (iii) spatio-temporal,
 - (iv) interacting with other things,
- and maintaining --

- (v) that whatever can be said about minds can be expressed in propositional form (3.1, 3.4, 3.5).

Methodologically, insofar as minds are to be studied or talked about, they can be studied and talked about in the same way that any other 'thing' or subject of inquiry can be studied or talked about. In that way, whatever minds **are**, or **do** (in their active roles), they are also things which can be known (in, as it were, a passive role). In that way, they fall under the general category covered by the second question: "What is the nature of those things which minds know?"

So it would be perfectly proper to discuss how we know other minds under the heading of the first, second, or third question: under the heading of "What is the nature of minds?", "What is the nature of those things which minds know?", or "What is the nature of knowing?". However, because this issue is of considerable importance, and raises distinctive problems, it is discussed later under the separate heading of "Knowing Minds as Ordinary Things" (p.165 below).

In summary, Anderson's general approach to minds is that they are on exactly the same plane, or of the same status, or on the same level of 'being' as anything else. There is an 'egalitarianism' between minds and non-minds. And that is, of course, one application of the doctrine of one way of being. This view is interpreted here as a **methodological** principle: that when we inquire into the nature or characteristics of minds, we treat them in the same way that we treat anything else we inquire into. Discussion of minds must meet, or fall under, the

same criteria as anything else: having their own characteristics, etc. (See points (i) to (v), ~~previous~~ page.) Anderson's view of mind has what may be called positive and negative aspects to it, and that is understandable because it is worked out in opposition to rationalism-idealism.

Negatively, it rejects the rationalist-idealist view:

- (a) that minds are constituted differently from other things: are of a different order of being;
- (b) that minds are constituted by the (one, and only one) relation of knowing, awareness, etc.; the notion of 'consciousness';
- (c) the unitary theory of mind as simple and indivisible (i.e., as featureless) -- because we could never know anything about such a thing.

And along with these, Anderson rejected the foundation of this view, namely:

- (d) the theory of constitutive relations.

Positively, Anderson's view of mind upholds:

- (e) the empiricist view that minds (like anything else) are observed and observable;
- (f) the realist view that minds (like anything else) have characteristics of their own;
- (g) the pluralist view that minds (like anything else) are complex;
- (h) the realist view that minds (like anything else) are found in space-time, or have spatial and temporal relations with other things;
- (j) the determinist view that minds (like anything else) interact with other things: have causes and effects;

(The foregoing positive claims -- (e) to (j) -- may be called 'conditions of being a thing', and should be compared with what Anderson called 'conditions of existence'.)

- (k) the empiricist principle that what we know about minds can be expressed in propositional form.

(The latter appears to be a 'condition of discourse'.)

While this thesis is not concerned with the specialist areas of Anderson's philosophy, it should be remarked that Anderson's theory of mind ("Mind as Feeling", SIEP, p.68ff) adhered to these realist parameters, especially the requirement that minds must have characteristics of their own (4.1.5). This approach to minds -- as having their own characteristics, and as causally interacting with other things -- is evident in Anderson's ethics (see especially "Determinism and Ethics", SIEP, p.214ff), and his social theory. Individuals get caught up in social movements, and the affiliations and loyalties so formed are important factors in determining social and 'ethical' behaviour (SIEP, p.266). This integration of his 'core' philosophy, philosophy of mind, ethics, and social theory is a mark of Anderson's striving for a systematic philosophy.

The Nature of What Minds Know

It is hard to imagine how any one short sentence could have more far-reaching philosophical consequences than Anderson's "we never know 'ideas' but always independent things, or rather states of affairs" (4.4.1; 4.19.1). In effect, it involves the rejection of all mental entities and the notion of mind as a receptacle or storehouse (4.27). It implies the rejection of knowledge derived from the analysis of ideas or relations between ideas (4.29), and any resemblance or correspondence between ideas and reality (4.28). It implies that minds enter into active relations with things around them (4.12), and that the knowing relation always involves some things which are not mental (neither minds nor ideas) -- except when one mind is contemplating another mind; or, expressed in terms of 'knowledge', it implies that some part of every 'item of knowledge' is a non-mental thing or situation (4.4, 4.13.2). It would require too much space to document all the things Anderson said about **what** we know, but a sampling of such statements will be useful they are set out in Table 3 (p.152f above).

In upholding the view that what we know are always complex things in space, or complex situations, Anderson maintained that we do not know certain things which it is claimed on other views we do know. He maintained, in effect, we do not know any --

- (a) ideas, concepts, sensa, appearances;
- (b) dependent existences;
- (c) relative truths, necessary and analytic truths;
- (d) absolutes;
- (e) (by implication) fundamental substances;
- (f) utterly simple entities;
- (g) totality;
- (h) unrelated things (distinct existences).

Now if, consistent with empiricism we took this to mean we never **observe** any of these, Anderson's position cannot be denied. If it is argued that we **know** any of the above -- (a) to (h) -- it would have to be argued that they are not **observed**, but comprehended in some other way, by mind or 'reason', or are 'constructions' of the mind. And Anderson's

effective response is devastating. If some object is **not** an 'absolute', but mind leads us to believe it is, then mind deceives us, and leads us into error (c.f. p.86f above).

In a sense, when Anderson said that what we know are independent things or states of affairs (4.4), he was providing a view in opposition to the rationalist-idealist view which said we know ideas. But his answer should not be taken to **exclude** the equally realist claim that what we know (at different times) are animals, lions, tigers, dogs, cats, rocks, clouds, stars and, as processes or situations, the eclipse of the moon, and so on. The answer "independent things or ... states of affairs" is an umbrella claim, stated specifically in opposition to the claim that we know ideas, and only ideas. But if the answer was to be given in terms of specifics only, it **could not** be given in its entirety. What Anderson was asserting was that anything at all that we know meets certain criteria: those of having characteristics which can be observed (4.6), of being complex and spatio-temporal (4.5), of interacting with other things (4.8), etc. The same view has been outlined with respect to minds, where it was made clear that Anderson believed minds met these same criteria. So no matter whether we are dealing with minds or non-minds, these same general criteria apply.

The Nature of Knowing

In "The Knower and the Known", Anderson argued at considerable length the realist case that knowing is a relation between knower and known, and, as has been shown, this involves the rejection of the notion of mind as a repository of ideas, concepts, *sensa*, etc.; and it is taken here to involve the **total** rejection of the notion of 'knowledge' as discrete items or mental entities. That view is supported by Passmore's reading of Anderson as saying "There is no special realm of 'mental entities'" (4.25.1). If there are no mental entities, there are no 'ideas', etc., and there are no 'items of knowledge'. This is also consistent with Anderson's rejection of the 'storehouse' view of knowledge and memory (4.27). This view therefore sweeps away all notions of ideas representing things, all notions of knowledge as correspondence (4.28). Anderson's view is that knowing involves a person entering into 'transactions' with things (4.12.1), and that must surely mean by observing, or at least place observing in a central place in this theory of knowing, which is borne out by other things he said.

What we know, according to Anderson, is always propositional or expressible in propositional form (4.13.2). In short, there is only one way of knowing; there is only one way that we know any truths. There is only one way of knowing minds and non-minds; or there is only one way of knowing truths about minds and about non-minds. And that involves knowing propositions.

That view appears to be definite and clear, and consistent with empiricism as it is usually, if vaguely, understood. However, even if this view is accepted, it is clearly not a sufficient account of knowing. Even if knowing is a relation between knower and known, that **relation** has still to be identified, for if knowing and remembering are relations between knower and known, but are not the **same** relation, they have yet to be distinguished. It will be seen, then, that to say knowing is a relation between **knower** and **known** begs the question about **knowing**. Unless we can establish that individual A (the supposed knower) actually **knows** B (the supposedly known), we cannot call A knower, or B known. This shows that the knowing **relation** has yet to be characterised for

Anderson's theory to be a theory of knowing. It does not prove that knowing is not a relation. However, if Anderson's claim that knowing is a relation (and always involves our knowing or recognising something in propositional form) is not a theory of knowing, what is it? It is suggested here that it is, rather, a point about methodology.

It can be shown that Anderson's 'theory' of knowing as a relation involves much more than an attempt at describing or defining knowing. As noted previously, it, like so many of Anderson's views, involves an amalgamation of positive views (methodological principles?) and negative views rejecting rationalist-idealist doctrines and methods.

Knowing Minds as Ordinary Things

It was stated earlier (p.158 above) that it would be perfectly proper to discuss how we know other minds under any of the three questions at The Crucial Point of Focus. Obviously it relates to the question: "What is the nature of mind?". Concerning the second question: "What is the nature of those things which minds know?", Anderson's answer seems to be, in effect: sometimes the objects of knowing are minds, sometimes not minds; but when we know minds we know them in the same way that we know anything else; that is, by their characteristics and propositionally (2.7; 4.7). That is to say, methodologically -- or for the purposes of inquiry or logic -- we treat minds in the same way as we treat anything else; we treat them as on the same spatio-temporal plane as anything else: as of the same kind of 'being'. With respect to the third question: "What is the nature of knowing?", Anderson is claiming that for knowing minds and non-minds there is only one way of knowing, or there is only need to postulate one way of knowing.

If there is to be a total uniformity or consistency in Anderson's approach to knowing minds, he would have to give a general and consistent account of how we know anything at all, as part of a general account of knowing; and show how we know minds as part of this general account. And as part of the account of knowing minds, Anderson would need to show that we know our own and other minds in the same way. In other words, as proof of the claim that --

- there is only one way of knowing,

Anderson must show that --

- we know minds and non-minds in the same way, and
- we know our own and other minds in the same way.

It is being argued here that in doing this, Anderson was going some way towards removing mind from the privileged place it held in idealist philosophy; was thus removing metaphysics from philosophy, and preventing mind from intruding into logic (4.14.3; 4.32; see also p.192 below). However, Anderson's treatment of how we know our minds created a problem which he never resolved, as discussed in the next section.

The problem of knowing our own minds

It should be noted that Anderson recognised a difficulty within his own position with respect to our knowing our own minds. On the face of it, introspection does not appear to be a straightforward kind of observing; it appears to be a particularly private and privileged process which does not involve the senses used in observing things outside us. No one can introspect into someone else's mind, thoughts, or feelings. To that extent it is different from observing 'things', which are open to public scrutiny. However, Anderson, as an empiricist was --

"... not opposed to 'introspection', the study of our own minds, though it opposes the supposition that in this peculiar case the process which knows and the process which is known are identical; i.e., it insists on the fact that the study of our own minds takes place by means of observation. But, an empiricist will say, there is no more reason for confining ourselves to 'introspection' than for considering only our own bodies in studying physiology." (SIEP, p.14)

The problem for Anderson is to explain what introspection **is**. He could hardly deny that introspection is some kind of process. He could not admit that it is not observation, otherwise his adherence to the empiricist principle of one way of knowing would break down. On the other hand, he could not admit that the knowing relation holds between the same thing -- he could not admit that A knows A -- otherwise his argument against the rationalist theory of 'consciousness' would break down. So he insisted that in knowing anything about ourselves "the process which knows and the process which is known" are **not** identical (SIEP, p.32). This claim became a cornerstone of Anderson's realism and pluralism with respect to minds.

It can be said in summary that Anderson's view of knowing is perfectly uniform and consistent with respect to knowing non-minds and knowing other minds: only one way of knowing is involved, and both non-minds and other minds are known as complex, spatio-temporal things with their own characteristics. However there is a lack of uniformity in Anderson's

account of knowing our own minds: only one way of knowing is involved, but only one part of 'my' mind knows another; never itself:

"As regards my knowledge of myself, this will have to be accounted for by saying that a certain process in my mind knows another, or knows myself, but without knowing **itself**." (SIEP, p.32)

While this lack of uniformity may appear minor by comparison with the difficulties involved in the rationalist-idealist view, it detracts from the uniformity of Anderson's explanation of knowing. The present writer has argued elsewhere that this lack of uniformity is due to Anderson's failure to spell out the details of his own theory of knowing. On his own explicit statements, a proposition about someone's knowing would always take the form:

A is a person who knows p, (where p is a proposition), or

A is a person who knows, for example, "All S's are P's".

Anderson never stated this, although it is clear from what he did say that it must be so:

"It is in this way that empiricism is seen as a doctrine of what is real as situations, and that therewith goes the denial that anything can be **known** except as situations, which is to say except as spatio-temporal and except in **propositional** form." (SIEP, p.162;4.13.2)

So the statement of anyone's knowing never takes the form --

A is a person who knows B.

On that account of knowing, the problem of whether A knows A -- whether 'my' mind knows 'my' mind, or whether only part of my mind knows another part -- never arises.

CONCLUSIONS

Anderson's arguments **for** his 'core' position are many, varied, subtle, and at times complex. It might be expected that a philosopher would (a) criticise and reject other views with destructive arguments, **and** (b) develop at least some **positive** deductive arguments which would establish, or help to establish, their own distinctive views. The over-riding impression is that Anderson's arguments **for** his position are quite notably **destructive** of other views. The general approach seems to be:

- (a) we cannot possibly hold that (given) view; therefore we must accept this (alternative) one; or
- (b) view V is unspeakable, sceptical, or illogical, therefore we must hold alternative view A.

This feature of Anderson's work is noteworthy.

But we are not primarily concerned here with the arguments for his 'core' views, but with what these arguments established; that is, with a concise account of Anderson's 'core' position. And it is being claimed here that his 'core' position is essentially what is set out (perhaps with some repetition) in Table 4. What is set out there encompasses the four '-isms' which Anderson upheld, and mentions the doctrine of one way of being (4.13). However, Table 4 does not explain that doctrine, nor does it show how that doctrine is related to the other features of Anderson's 'core' views, and therefore does not explain how that doctrine is central to Anderson's position. Furthermore, as it is usually expressed -- as "there is only one way of being, one kind of truth" -- it is impossible to see how that doctrine relates to any of the questions at The Crucial Point of Focus. However, understood as an adherence to one methodology, to the method of inquiring by observing and propositions (as The Main Hypothesis), it can at least be seen to relate to those answers.

It has been shown that, even in their more conventional uses, the terms 'empiricism', 'realism', 'pluralism' and 'determinism' are vague, and when applied to Anderson's views, are positively misleading. That is simply recognition of the fact that when used in relation to Anderson, those terms have a rather unique meaning, and require special expla-

nation. It is being argued here that the outlines set out in Table 4 provide this special explanation. By compiling what is set out there under the heading "Anderson's Positive Doctrines" the four '-isms' appear as follows:

A. Anderson's Empiricism is associated with the claims that:

- (i) what is real is situations (4.13.2);
- (ii) nothing can be known except as situations: except as spatio-temporal and except in propositional form (4.13.2), or
- (iii) there is only one way of being, and that is what is conveyed by the copula in categorical propositions (4.13);
- (iv) there is only one way of knowing (4.11) which suffices for knowing minds and non-minds;
- (v) knowing is always based on observing (4.12);
- (vi) there is no merely inferential knowledge of anything (4.17).

B. Anderson's Realism is associated with the claims that:

- (vii) knowing is a relation (4.10.1);
- (viii) knower and known are two distinct things and each must have some characteristics or qualities of its own (4.10.1, 4.1.4);
- (ix) what we know are independent things or states of affairs, understood as propositions (4.4);
- (x) what we know are states of affairs or things in Space-Time (4.4.3; 4.5.1);
- (xi) What we know are things observed to be related (spatially and temporally?) and yet distinct (4.9);
- (xii) sometimes what we know are minds and sometimes not minds, but in either case what we know must have characteristics of their own (4.7);
- (xiii) knowing does not necessarily involve knowing anything about mind (4.14). When we assert "A knows B" or "A knows that p", we are not asserting or implying that A knows A, or that A necessarily knows A.

C. **Anderson's Pluralism** is associated with the claims that:

- (xiv) what we observe is never simple (in some absolute sense of 'simple' -- 4.21);
- (xv) what we observe is always complex (4.6);
- (xvi) minds, like anything else, are complex (4.7.1).

(It will be seen that Anderson's pluralism is not concerned with the nature or number of fundamental substances, but principally with the complex character of anything we observe.)

D. **Anderson's Determinism** is associated with the claims that:

- (xvii) apart from having their own characteristics, things have their own distinctive ways of working (4.8.4);
- (xviii) under certain circumstances (or given conditions), any given thing will act in a given way, and under different conditions will act in a different way. (As shown previously, this is the field theory of causality stated in a simple way.)

The foregoing brief outline of Anderson's empiricism, realism, pluralism and determinism conforms closely to the accounts of them given earlier (pp.65-124 above). It does not provide a precise definition of each, nor does it cut one off from the other. But neither did the earlier account provide that sort of precision. Rather, the outline just provided shows that there is an integration of -- a running into one another between -- these four '-isms', suggesting they are not, and should not, be construed as exclusive or definable in any precise and exclusive way. Nonetheless, the account just outlined gives a reasonably clear picture of Anderson's unique position, and may be taken to be as precise as any account of those four '-isms' can be expected to be. Seen from the perspective of the four '-isms', this outline of Anderson's 'core' position is as adequate as could be expected.

What must be considered is whether the outline of Anderson's views in terms of the four '-isms' conveys **all** that is central and distinctive in his 'core' position. And it seems that it does not. While it effectively **enunciates** the doctrine of one way of being, it does not provide

the rationale behind that view, or show clearly how that doctrine is integrated with other doctrines.

To fully appreciate Anderson's position, it must be shown **why** the doctrine of one way of being is considered central to his position, and how it relates to other doctrines. As argued in the following section, interpreting it as methodological does this, and leads to the interpretation of the four '-isms', not as discrete doctrines, but as aspects of the same methodology: the method of inquiring by observing and propositions; i.e., as subordinate to the doctrine of one way of being.

PART II

Section 2: THE METHODOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF
ONE WAY OF BEING

It was argued in Part II, Section 1, that interpreting Anderson's 'core' views as answers to the three fundamental questions at The Crucial Point of Focus --

- (a) brings considerable cohesion and integration to those views;
- (b) manifests more integration than the analysis in terms of the four '-isms' as discussed in Part I; and
- (c) eliminates the necessity to expound Anderson's views in terms of those vague '-isms' because it is wider than them, and yet in a sense encompasses them.

The analysis in Part I repeatedly showed that there was some connection -- or a connection intimated -- between the four '-isms' and the doctrine of one way of being, yet it did not elucidate what that connection was. Such a connection has been postulated in the three Hypotheses put forward in Part II. It remains to be shown that this connection is adequate. If it is adequate, it should show why the doctrine of one way of being was considered central to Anderson's position, by elucidating its connection with all aspects of his 'core' position. As a means of testing that central and illuminating role of the doctrine, interpreted as The Main Hypothesis, it is applied to a number of remaining problems, posed as six questions:

- (i) What is the nature of the logical relation between the doctrine of one way of being and the **rejection** or **denial** of the claim to different ways of being?
- (ii) (Directly related to question (i):)
What are the logical relations between --
 - (a) Anderson's empiricism, and rationalism?
 - (b) Anderson's realism, and idealism?
 - (c) Anderson's pluralism, and monism, dualism and atomism?
 - (d) Anderson's determinism, and indeterminism.

- (iii) What is the relationship between the doctrine of one way of being and the four '-isms' Anderson upheld?
- (iv) What is the logical relation between the claims that --
 - (a) there is only one way of being; and
 - (b) there is only one kind of truth?
- (v) What is the relation between the doctrine of one way of being and the thesis that what we know we learn, or there is only one way of knowing?
- (vi) What did Anderson mean by banishing mind from philosophy? This question raises others about Anderson's treatment of truth.

If Anderson's 'core' position is to be seen as **systematic**, the answers to all of these questions must be consistent. And the consistency of the answers given here revolves around interpreting the doctrine of one way of being as set out as The Main Hypothesis (p.142 above). In other words, the doctrine of one way of being should **not** be read as:

there is only one way of being, one kind of truth,

but as, --

all genuine problems of inquiry can be accommodated within a logic of four categorical forms -- i.e., within one logic -- and all attempts to deal with matters of inquiry outside that logic are illogical.

That is to say, the first of these formulations is only a "rough indicator" of the second, and assumes all of Anderson's destructive arguments against alternative views: against the '-isms' he rejected. So in all of the questions (i) to (vi) considered below, it should make sense to substitute the Main Hypothesis for the more usual formulation of the doctrine. The consistent substitution of The Main Hypothesis is tested in the six sections following.

The view being put forward here hinges upon an answer to the first question. In brief, it is this: the opposition between the claim "There are two or more ways of being" and the claim "There is only one way

of being" (the doctrine of one way of being) may be either one of two kinds. It may be the opposition of contradictory propositions, both of which are meaningful, but only one of which is true, the other being false; or it may be the opposition of one incoherent (or illogical or non-sensical) view and one coherent view, which is **not** a contradictory relationship at all. And the interpretation being argued for here is the second; that is, that the opposition is **not** one of contradictories, is not one of a true as against a false proposition, but one of an illogical view countered by a logical one.

- (i) What is the nature of the relation between the doctrine of one way of being and the rejection or denial of different ways of being?

It must be asked whether this is the opposition between two contradictory propositions, or the rejection of an **illogical** view (c.f. the opposition between 'simple' and 'complex', p.107f above).

If this is an opposition between contradictories, it should be expressible in the form p and not- p . Taking the doctrine of one way of being as p , this would become:

- (a) There is only one way of being.
- (b) There is not only one way of being.

However, this does not convey the view Anderson was concerned to reject, for (b) is consistent with either --

- (c) There are no ways of being, or
- (d) There are two (or more) ways of being.

It is only against the latter that the doctrine was directed; the contradictory of (d) would be:

- (e) There are not two (or more) ways of being.

However, this is consistent with there being one or no ways of being; it does not assert there is one.

The opposition could be expressed in existential terms:

- (f) There exists only one way of being, or
- (g) Only one way of being exists.

This would contradict --

- (h) Only one way of being does not exist.

Alternatively, the opposition may be expressed as --

- (j) Two ways of being exist.
- (k) Two ways of being do not exist.

No matter which way the opposition is expressed it does not result in

two precise and appropriate contradictories; there are a number of problems. Firstly, as noted, in each case there is some kind of ambiguity in one of the proposed contradictories. Secondly, these formulations suggest 'ways of being' is a term, a proposal that will be difficult to maintain, and which Anderson's logic would reject on the grounds that it does not have a logical opposite, if not for other good reasons. Thirdly, to say "there **are ways of being**" or "**ways of being exist**" sounds like some metaphysical tautology; and to say a way of being does not exist seems to be some kind of absurdity. Fourthly, and most importantly, these expressions are not categorical propositions, and therefore have no place in Anderson's categorical logic of four forms. If Anderson insisted on making this kind of assertion, he would have to relinquish his insistence upon a categorical logic of four forms. The **only** way Anderson could maintain the doctrine as "there is only one way of being" is to reformulate it as one, or a number of, categorical propositions.

The alternative to taking this doctrine as involving a contradiction, that is, taking it as rejecting some non-sense, makes much more sense. On that interpretation, there is no need to assert an 'apparent contradictory' of non-sense: there is no contradictory of "there are two or more ways of being". On this interpretation, it may be claimed either

- (a) that Anderson's assertion of the doctrine of one way of being involved a fundamental logical error, or
- (b) that the 'assertion' of one way of being is a loose way of encapsulating a general point of view, which view requires further amplification.

In support of this non-contradictory interpretation, it must be recognised that Anderson **explicitly** stated that the view or views he was criticising was/were **illogical**:

"Any ... theory, or any view which attributes different meanings to 'is', is inherently sceptical or illogical." (SIEP, p.26)

"The chief, and I think final, objection to any theory of higher and lower, or complete and incomplete, truth is that it is contrary to the very nature and possibility of discourse; that it is 'unspeakable'." (SIEP, p.4)

The contexts in which these assertions were made can leave very little room to doubt that Anderson was talking about theories which claimed there are different ways of being or kinds of truth. In the first case, Anderson had already argued that scepticism was illogical; the 'or' is not an exclusive one. So he was there stating such views are **illogical**. No alternative reading of 'unspeakable' (apart from 'incoherent' or 'illogical') would make sense of Anderson's views. On those readings, Anderson believed the views he was **rejecting** were **illogical**. He was not required to assert any 'apparent contradictory', and would have committed a fundamental logical mistake had he done so.

That interpretation of the doctrine of one way of being entitled "The Main Hypothesis" is not, and is not required to be, the contradictory of the claim that there are two or more ways of being, etc. The only real question is: does it convey the general drift, spirit, or intent of Anderson's view summarised as "There is only one way of being (etc.)"?

(ii) **What are the logical relations between empiricism and rationalism; realism and idealism; pluralism and monism; dualism and atomism; determinism and indeterminism?**

The first point which must be made is this: if these various '-isms' are not precise, but vague and undefined, we cannot expect to find precise relations of opposition between these pairs. Subject to that overriding qualification, the answer to the first of these oppositions has already been given. If Anderson's empiricism is the doctrine of one way of being, that doctrine is opposed to rationalism. If rationalism is illogical or incoherent, there cannot be a contradictory of rationalism. If empiricism (as the Main Hypothesis) is a coherent view, it cannot be the contradictory of rationalism, no matter how it is otherwise opposed to rationalism.

That reply does not establish that the other three oppositions are of this non-contradictory kind. However, it may be assumed that if Anderson denied that ideas exist, he might reasonably have held that the view "We know only ideas" was some kind of non-sense. He did say, though not specifically in connection with the theory of ideas (although it may have been the target of this remark):

"Speaking as a realist, I find myself bound to assert that Idealism, so far from being competent philosophy, is not philosophy at all." (SIEP, p.42)

At any rate, it has been shown that he believed Absolute Idealism (as monism) and dualism, atomism and representationism -- all associated with the theory of ideas in some way, and all opposed to his pluralism -- were **illogical**. A somewhat similar argument is used against the attempt to create a division or dualism based on partial indeterminism, partial determinism:

"... this position can be met by the regular arguments against any attempt to divide reality into 'realms' (in effect, to have more than one logic or theory of being) -- and particularly ... by the demonstration of the impossibility of finding any **relation** between the different realms." (SIEP, pp.123-4)

Obviously this is a reference to the doctrine of one way of being, and the implication is that all such views are illogical.

So it is reasonable to conclude that Anderson was saying that, ultimately -- that is, when an attempt is made to state precisely what is being claimed, along with its implications -- all of these views turn out to be illogical, incoherent, or 'unspeakable'. Such claims may appear, at first sight, to be extreme. But as has been shown, Anderson offered strong, detailed arguments against all such views. No doubts about the correct interpretation of his own position can detract from the effectiveness of those arguments.

(iii) What is the relation between the doctrine of one way of being and Anderson's four '-isms'?

It has been shown that Anderson's four '-isms' are not precise. Therefore it would be unreasonable to expect a precise account of the relation between the doctrine of one way of being and those '-isms'. However, it was shown that each of those '-isms' embraces a range of elements, even though no unifying principle could be found to relate them (see p.129 above). When the doctrine of one way of being is interpreted as the adherence to one logic, the connection between that doctrine and the **various elements** of the four '-isms' makes sense. Each of these elements maintains some logical principle, or some principle of inquiring methodology, as will be shown.

The doctrine of one way of being, the four '-isms' and Anderson's adherence to a propositional logic

It is vital for an understanding of Anderson's 'core' philosophical position, and of direct relevance to the present thesis, to recognise that all of Anderson's major doctrines and criticisms of other views were founded in points of logic. It will be recalled that Mackie said: "A complete presentation of Anderson's system should start with a full account of his logic" (Mackie, 1962b, p.266; quoted p. 8 above.) In the following brief summary, an attempt is made to show that Anderson's major tenets, arising from The Crucial Point of Focus, relate to fundamental points of logic.

(1) In the discussion of "Rationalism and Propositional Logic" (p. 51 ff above), a case was made out for saying that Anderson's logic treated all terms and all propositions on an equal footing, or treated them the same methodologically. That is to say, whatever is proposed as a term in inquiry is subject to the same tests and the same criteria; and these are related to observing. Similarly, whatever is proposed as a truth or proposition in inquiry is subject to the same observational tests.

(2) The requirement that things have characteristics of their own is, in logic, the requirement that we must be able to observe something

about that thing or term which is expressible as a proposition. That is to say, with respect to any thing or term X, we must be able to say either "This X is Y" or "Some X's are Y's" or "All X's are Y's".

(3) The rejection of relativism (or the theory of constitutive relations) is, in logic, that it is not sufficient to say of any thing or term X **only** that "X is related to Y in such and such a way". We must be able to describe and identify X as having some characteristics (as above: "This X is Y", etc.) in order to say "X is to the left of Z". In other words, some proposition of the form "This X is Y" or "All X's are Y's" is a pre-condition of our asserting "X is to the left of Y" or "X is related to Y ...".

(4) The claim that nothing X can be the Absolute, or utterly simple, is in logic the claim that we could state no proposition in which X is subject. For once it is stated that "X is Y", we are stating that there is something more than -- distinct from -- X, or we are stating that X is complex, not simple.

It is maintained here that this universal application of observational criteria, or an observational-propositional methodology, to all terms, things, situations is the manifestation of the doctrine of one way of being. In much the same way, Anderson's criticisms of dualism and representationism are applications of the doctrine of one way of being.

(5) A genuine or completely consistent dualism would involve two **totally unrelated** sets of terms and two **totally unrelated** sets of propositions; for example, one set of terms and propositions relating to the mental, and one set relating to the non-mental. No term in one set would describe, define or be defined by any term in the other set. No proposition from one set could serve as a premise or conclusion in any reasoning (syllogism) in the other. And yet the very identification of terms from both sets as terms, and the identification of propositions from both sets as propositions, relates the supposedly unrelated (fundamentally different) fields. In other words, it brings the terms from both fields, and the propositions from both fields, under one logic, one methodology, or one way of being (c.f. SIEP, p.124).

(6) Representationism creates a dualist division (of supposedly fundamental kinds) and then attempts to get around this division by 'correspondence'. But the only way such a fundamental division can be overcome is by denying it: by admitting that what is represented and what represents it can be compared, and indeed are the same in some respects. For if what is represented is one, and what represents it is **not** one, its representing one is misleading and indeed erroneous. Now this kind of argument can be applied quite generally to all qualities and kinds of things and what is said to represent them. And this argument is simply another application of the doctrine of one way of being.

(7) The notions of necessary and analytic truths can also be criticised on methodological grounds. Our supposed understanding of them is not based on observing, which is the basis of Anderson's empirical inquiry. Rather, our knowledge of them is allegedly based on the analysis of what is in the mind, or mental entities of some sort. Both kinds of so-called truths create a kind of dualism; i.e., of two kinds of truths or two ways of being true, and thus imply two ways of knowing, and two methodologies. Necessary truths, of course, do not fit into -- have no place in -- a propositional or categorical logic. Insofar as any analytic truths fit into a propositional logic, they are simply propositions -- no different from any other -- and testable by observational methods.

(8) It has been shown that Anderson's determinism is integrated with his realism (as the view that things have characteristics of their own; p.118 above), and is fully integrated with his formal logic (pp. 117-124 above).

These eight points may be taken to correspond roughly to --

- (1) Anderson's empiricism versus rationalism
- (2) Anderson's realism
- (3) Anderson's realism versus relativism
- (4) Anderson's pluralism versus monism and atomism
- (5) Anderson's pluralism versus dualism
- (6) Anderson's realism versus representationism
- (7) Anderson's empiricism versus rationalism
- (8) Anderson's determinism

It has been shown, very briefly, that all of Anderson's major contentions at The Crucial Point of Focus, including the doctrine of one way of being, are related to basic points of formal logic and methodology. Consequently, it could be claimed with considerable justice that not only is Anderson's logic philosophical (c.f. Passmore quoted p.8 above), but that his 'core' philosophy is logical in the sense that it is founded in points of logic or method. Indeed, it would be an interesting question of scholarship to discover whether any other philosopher held such a range of philosophical views which were based on points of logic.

At any rate, sufficient has been said to warrant putting forward the hypothesis that the doctrine of one way of being is a logical or methodological doctrine. So if the doctrine of one way of being is interpreted as The Main Hypothesis -- as the adherence to one logic, with the rider that departure from a categorical logic leads to absurdity -- it will be seen:

- (a) that the four '-isms' (shown to be vague) are better dispensed with altogether;
- (b) that Anderson's 'core' position is most clearly stated as the adherence to one logic, along with three definitive answers to the three questions at The Crucial Point of Focus, all of which are founded in points of logic or method;
- (c) the specific elements of the four '-isms' (pp.74, 81f, 114ff, 117ff, 128f above) are logical or methodological principles, subordinate to or supplementing the doctrine of one way of being.

(iv) What is the logical relation between the claims --

(a) there is only one way of being, and

(b) there is only one kind of truth ?

On the face of it, there appears to be a serious anomaly in the statement of the doctrine of one way of being as "there is only 'one way of being', one kind of truth" (Grave, 1984, p.49; quoted p.xxv above). The problem can be raised (c.f. p.73 above) as the question: "What is the relation between the apparently distinct claims --

(a) there is only one way of being, and

(b) there is only one kind of truth?"

These claims do not appear to mean the same: do not appear to be logically equivalent. So it could be inquired whether the first implies the second, or the second the first. It is not obvious that either one implies the other, nor what sort of additional premise would enable us to deduce one from the other by mediate inference. Yet there can be no doubt that Anderson made some link between one way of being and one kind of truth. Speaking about the issue between rationalism and empiricism, he said:

"But fundamentally the issue is logical; the dispute is about **ways of being or of truth, ...** " (SIEP, pp.3-4; see p.70 above).

The solution of this problem is consistent with the position adopted throughout Part II. **Firstly**, it denies that these two 'claims' are categorical propositions. In Russell's logic they would be called existential propositions, and existential propositions are not categorical propositions, and therefore have no place in Anderson's logic of four categorical forms. Since neither of them is a categorical proposition, there is no question in Anderson's logic as to which implies which. The explanation of their significance, or meaning, and the relation between them must be sought in some other way. **Secondly**, taken as categorical propositions, it would seem Anderson accepted 'ways of being' and 'kinds of truth' as terms. If he did, he would have had to explain these terms within the requirements he laid down for genuine terms. It is inconceivable that he believed they were terms in his sense.

In line with the present interpretation of logic as the method of inquiry, when Anderson said the dispute between empiricism and rationalism is 'logical', he can be understood to mean that the dispute is about **how** we are to inquire into any subject whatsoever: that is about method, or, what is the same, how we are to treat propositions in inquiry.

Concerning the relationship between 'ways of being' and 'kinds of truth', the solution is extremely simple. For want of a better way of putting the matter, it may be said that consideration of the truth of every proposition involves two elements:

- (a) a commitment about being or not being (being so, or not being so, occurring or not occurring) conveyed by the copula 'is/is not, are/are not'; and
- (b) a 'truth claim'.

But in a very real sense, these two elements are equivalent or the same (c.f. p.14 above). The assertion that this 'is so' (or not) is equivalent to the assertion this 'is **true**' (or not = is false). And what this means is that we do not need both elements, or both kinds of formulation. In principle, we could say everything we wish to say which is meaningful, in propositions (using the appropriate copula 'is, is not, are, are not') without ever relying upon the (superfluous) appellations 'true' or 'false'. This view, of course, echoes F.P. Ramsey's redundancy theory (see Speake, 1979, p.330). But Anderson should be given credit for a quite different, and independent, formulation of such a view. It appeared in his two earliest published philosophical articles (1926):

"Now what else is meant by the truth of (any) proposition except that the supposed state of affairs **has actually occurred?**" (SIEP, p.16)

Propositions "are simply true or false; and, if true, they are independently or 'absolutely' true. To reject this view it would be necessary to show that we do not mean by a 'truth' something which actually occurs." (SIEP, p.17)

"In general, then, when a person formulates a proposition, the copula indicates that he thinks something has occurred, and the

terms ... indicate **what** he thinks has occurred. ... Thus when we speak of judgment, in the sense of what is judged, we are speaking about a proposition; and the proposition or judgment is true, when the supposed situation **has** occurred." (SIEP, p.22)

As the third quotation clearly shows, the references here to occurrence are related to the copula, which is part of the verb "to be". So the relationship between one way of being and one kind of truth, according to the present interpretation, is not one between **two different propositions**, but is one that is involved in any one proposition regarded as a truth claim, or any one claim about being so (or not being so), or any one truth (or falsity) claim. And the key to this explanation lies in the copula, which is always a part of the verb "to be", or 'asserts' or 'implies' or 'involves' something to do with 'being' or 'occurrence'. Anderson's point, it seems, is that just as there is (and must be) one unambiguous, unqualified copula in propositions -- and the alternative is illogicality or absurdity in inquiry -- so, **if we express these matters in terms of truth or falsity** (which we need not do), there is (and must be) one unambiguous, unqualified, 'absolute' sense of truth (and falsity) in discourse -- and the alternative again is illogicality or absurdity. As presented here, these are simply two faces of the same coin.

This claim to a kind of 'equivalence' between the copula and a claim to truth can best be explained in this way: if we say --

All men are mortal is **true**,

we believe, and mean to say --

All men **are** mortal.

In fact, there is no simpler, no more direct, no more positive and unambiguous way of saying --

"I believe all men are mortal is true"

than by simply asserting --

"All men are mortal".

This relatively simple explanation is borne out by two important pieces of evidence. Firstly, there is a widely accepted tradition in philosophy

which accepts a similar kind of 'equivalence', that for example between:

A is A is necessarily **true**, and
A **is** necessarily A.

Secondly, and more importantly, Anderson explicitly expressed this view without referring to truth at all:

"When we assert the proposition 'All men are mortal', **what** we are asserting is the actual mortality of men, and to call the assertion of the proposition merely a **means** to the asserting of the fact is to say that we have **no** way of asserting the fact, ... " (SIEP, p.169)

The aspect of the doctrine of one way of being relating to the one unambiguous, unqualified copula is relevant to much contemporary logic. The feature of propositions which involves a commitment to 'being', via the copula, has been said to involve some commitment to 'existence'. And much has been made of the difference between traditional (categorical) logic and Russell's logic in this regard. (See, for example, Quine, 1958, Section 14; Strawson, 1952, pp.164ff.) It would take too long to adequately explore Anderson's attitude to these accounts in terms of 'existence'. But it is reasonable to suppose that he would have rejected the Russellian distinction between propositions which have existential commitment (the Russellian 'equivalents' of the traditional 'I' and 'O') and those which do not (the Russellian 'equivalents' of the 'A' and 'E'). And the basis for that supposition is that such a view involves propositions of two different statuses: those with and those without existential commitment, which involves a distinction of copulas or ways of being.

- (v) **What is the relation between the doctrine of one way of being and the thesis that what we know we learn, or there is only one way of knowing?**

It was argued previously that there is an hiatus between Anderson's empiricism -- i.e., the doctrine of one way of being -- and traditional empiricism, or an hiatus between that doctrine and that aspect of Anderson's own views related to knowing (see p.68ff above). Anderson's views on knowing may be taken as either --

- (a) what we know we learn (by observing?), or
- (b) there is only one way of knowing.

If some link can be found between the doctrine of one way of being and either of these theses about knowing, an important gap in Anderson's 'core' position will have been filled.

It has been argued, and shown throughout the foregoing discussion, that all of Anderson's central doctrines -- all aspects of his 'core' position -- are worked out in opposition to a range of views linked to rationalism-idealism. It is not unreasonable to suggest that the case of the relationship between the doctrine of one way of being and knowing shares this feature of positive and negative aspects. The relationship between the two claims can be explained if the positive and negative factors are taken into account.

Taking the rationalist view first: if minds and non-minds are of fundamentally different kinds, or if these two kinds of things exist and subsist in two different ways -- or if there are two ways of being -- there have to be two fundamentally different ways of knowing. This was expressed by Anderson's claim that --

"It is only after it has been assumed that there are other truths than matters of fact, or that there are objects which 'transcend' existence, that a special faculty has to be invented to know them." (SIEP, p.4; 4.30.1)

But if there are two ways of knowing these two fundamentally different substances or 'existents/subsistents' -- whether minds and ideas, minds and material things, or mental entities and physical objects -- there

must be two different ways, or **methods**, of inquiring into each. For example, if we inquire into the nature and interaction of physical objects (which we **know** by observing them) by an observational method, this method would not apply to inquiring into our own minds which, on the rationalist view (and most views), we know in a different way, whether that is said to be self-conscious awareness, enjoyment, introspection, intuition or whatever.

By contrast, Anderson, following Alexander, denied mind the privileged place it held in idealist philosophy (Alexander, 1966, Vol.1, pp.5, 7; 4.14, 4.32). And instead of knowledge being of a peculiarly mental (in the dualist sense of non-material) nature, Anderson insisted that the things known (whether minds or non-minds) constitute a significant and indispensable part of the knowing relation. So on Anderson's view, all knowing is of the same kind and of the same status:

- (a) it is based on an observational methodology;
- (b) it is based on observing something other than the mind which does the observing, even in introspection (see p.166f above); that is, on the thing or situation known; and
- (c) what is known takes propositional form.

This is equivalent to saying "what we know we learn", or what we know (or learn) is based upon an observational methodology, or, everything we know (or learn) we learn in the same way: one way. And that is the same as saying there is only one way of knowing, which may need to be said if some philosophers claim there are two ways of knowing.

If we know minds in the same way that we know anything else, the same observational **method** of inquiry (or perhaps logic?; c.f. Hypothesis (1), p.139 above) will be appropriate for both minds and non-minds. And this, it is maintained here, is the essence of the doctrine of one way of being: a method or a logic which is appropriate for, applies to, all things, or issues, or matters for inquiry. It upholds that there is just one unambiguous 'is', copula, or way of being, and that this one 'is', common to all four forms of categorical propositions, enables us to use the one **methodology** (or logic) for all issues of investigation or inquiry -- the observational methodology.

As outlined here, the rationalist-idealist view and Anderson's can be compared and contrasted in the following way:

Rationalist-Idealist view

- (a) There are two ways of being.
- (b) If there are two ways of being, there must be two ways of knowing truths.
- (c) If there are two ways of knowing, there must be two kinds of truth.
- (d) If there are two kinds of truth, there must be two methodologies for inquiring into the two different kinds of truth.

Anderson's view

- (a) There is only one way of being, namely that conveyed by the one unambiguous 'is' of categorical propositions.
- (b) If there is only one way of being, there is only one kind of truth, and one way of knowing.
- (c) If there is only one way of knowing and one kind of truth, there is only need for one methodology (or logic) for inquiring into any truth claim or proposition: the observational-propositional method.

It is worthwhile comparing this interpretation with the accounts of Anderson's logic by Mackie and Rose, given previously. Mackie said Anderson's logic "studies the formal features of facts", etc., and these formal features "determine a method of enquiry for all fields" (Mackie, 1962b, p.266; quoted p. 9 above). What is being claimed here is not greatly at variance with that; it is that logic **is** the method of inquiry applicable to all fields of investigation. Rose said Anderson's logical theory is "the theory of method, the theory of the conditions of discourse", etc. But the view he presented appears flawed in being circular. The view put forward here is not greatly at variance with Rose's view either, but it does avoid the circularity, and it rejects the notion of 'conditions of existence' (c.f. p .9 f. above).

At any rate, it appears quite natural to believe that, if there is only one way of being, interpreted here as there is only one method of inquiry (= logic) applicable to all fields, there is only one way of knowing; or, alternatively if there is only one logic, it is totally unnecessary to postulate two ways of knowing -- which claim would produce difficulties of its own.

(vi) What did Anderson mean by banishing mind from philosophy?

It is perfectly clear from the context in which Anderson said "We have to banish mind from philosophy" that he was directing his remarks at idealism. He was claiming that the theory of 'consciousness' (or mind) put forward by Alexander --

"... is anti-realist and is, in fact, Cartesian; and history has shown how Cartesianism leads on to absolute idealism. To get rid of idealism we have to go back upon all sophisticated 'modern' views and recapture the Greek directness. We have to banish mind from philosophy, and in so doing make incidentally possible a positive account of mind itself." (SIEP, pp.60-61; see Table 4.14.1, 4.14.2, 4.14.3).

While it is clear what this claim is directed against, it is far from clear exactly what it means or how such an aim is to be achieved.

It is being argued here that Anderson's desire to banish mind from philosophy refers especially to methodology; it bears upon his theory of propositions -- how we are to treat propositions, and how we are to treat truth, in inquiry or discourse. To explain what Anderson meant, it is necessary to consider in the broadest way, how minds could possibly come into philosophy, and how they could be banished from it; it is necessary to examine how minds feature in idealist philosophy both as subjects and as objects: as things known, and as things which know.

The issue becomes a little clearer when considered in conjunction with two passages from "The Place of Hegel in the History of Philosophy", where Anderson said --

"For an answer to Hegel, then, we have to drop epistemology -- the intrusion of mind into logic and of a false logic into psychology -- and return to the Greek consideration of **things** ...".
(SIEP, p.86; 4.14.3)

The reference to a consideration of "**things**" can be taken as a reference to considering issues in **propositions**, not in terms of **ideas** and mind's contemplation of ideas. Further light is thrown on this passage by

an earlier one:

"Not the least of the reasons for studying the Greek philosophers is that they are far clearer on many questions than modern philosophers, that they avoid many modern errors, and especially that they are not, like the moderns, obsessed with 'the problem of knowledge' -- that they do not set out to discover (i.e., to know!) how, or how much, we can know, before they are prepared to know anything. This 'criticism of the instrument' amounts to scientific defeatism, and the instrumental view of mind has both prevented a knowledge of minds themselves and hampered direct inquiry into logical and other scientific problems." (SIEP, p.82; 4.32.1)

Here Anderson claimed:

- (a) that obsession with the 'problem of knowledge' is a form of 'criticism of the instrument', and
- (b) that that amounts to 'scientific defeatism' which is another name for scepticism;
- (c) that the 'instrumental view of mind' has two consequences:
 - (i) it has "prevented a knowledge of minds", and
 - (ii) it has "hampered direct inquiry into logical and other scientific problems".

With respect to (c)(i) and (ii), Anderson was claiming that the "instrumental view of mind" --

- (iii) interferes with our understanding of minds as **objects** of study; and
- (iv) interferes with our understanding of anything else as **objects** of study.

Now of course scepticism hampers direct inquiry into any issue whatsoever, hence it must hamper direct inquiry into the nature of minds. So if Anderson could show that idealism, via the instrumental view of mind, leads to scepticism, he would have established his case.

The point is that pursuit of the problem of knowledge is sceptical because it rejects a straightforward acceptance of propositions as they are: rejects the view "that propositions can stand by themselves with nothing to supplement them, that facts need no explanation" (SIEP, p.5; quoted p.14 above). If we can consider the truth or falsity of "All men are mortal" (which someone or other believes) on its own, we do not have to consider "How X (someone or other) came to believe all men are mortal". But if we have to consider the second before we consider the first, we would also have to consider "How Y came to believe X came to believe all men are mortal" before we can consider the second, and so on, **ad infinitum**. This supposed methodology implies that we must carry out an infinite number of steps before we can discover the truth of **any** proposition. Obviously it is impossible to complete an infinite process: the implied methodology leads us into never establishing the truth of any proposition; it is therefore sceptical.

Anderson was not opposed to the investigation of human or animal sensory or cerebral processes. Such investigation would be on the same plane as any other scientific investigation. But he would certainly have opposed the elevation of such studies onto a different level of investigation to any others, or to the claim that they were to be carried out by a quite different method from other studies -- by a special way of knowing, or a special way of observing, for example, by introspection, or by analysing ideas in the mind.

Minds as subjects -- as things known

The problem of whether, and how, we know other minds is a problem any philosophy must face. As explained (p.165 above), Anderson's position on this point is strong and consistent. Effectively he answered the question "What is the nature of those things which minds know?" by saying that sometimes what we know are minds, sometimes not minds (p. 165 above); and when we know minds, or when minds are the objects of our knowing or investigation, they are known in precisely the same way that anything else is known: like anything else, they must be observed and recognised by their characteristics. That means that, methodologically, they are treated as terms in propositions, and are treated

in precisely the same way -- methodologically -- as any other term. And that equanimity towards minds as terms known, is one way of removing mind(s) from the privileged place it(they) held in idealist philosophy.

Furthermore, Anderson could justly claim that all philosophers purport to know something about other minds, in claiming anything about anyone else's knowing:

"It has to be admitted, in fact, that we do observe situations of the sort 'A knows B' (whenever, e.g., we take part in a discussion). And this implies that we know A, as well as B, as having a distinctive character, and not simply as knowing." (SIEP, pp.38-39).

If Anderson was correct, in maintaining that to claim to know about anyone else's knowing, is to claim to know something about another mind, anyone who claimed **not** to know about any other minds would have to refrain from talking about anyone else's **knowing** anything. And that would indeed be a peculiar, and very limited, philosophical position.

At any rate, it has been shown that with respect to knowing other minds, Anderson's position is consistent and strong. However, it is at this very point that the rationalist-idealist position is extremely weak and vulnerable. In fact, it cannot account for our knowing other minds because such knowing is ruled out by definition: and doubly ruled out by definition:

Firstly, if all we ever know are ideas, and minds are fundamentally different from ideas, we could never know any minds, as Berkeley maintained (c.f., p. 41 above), and in any case, certainly we could never know any other minds, by definition.

Secondly, it appears there is an even more fundamental argument than that. If each mind is self-conscious in the sense that it is aware of its own awareness (and that is how mind is defined on the rationalist-idealist view), no mind can have that self-conscious awareness of any other mind, otherwise it would **be** that other mind -- by definition. So if our **only** understanding (knowledge, apprehension, aware-

ness, enjoyment) of our own minds is this relation -- self-conscious awareness of our awareness -- we cannot on that view know any other mind, be definition. This problem has motivated philosophers to suggest that we know other minds by inference, or on the basis of analogy (see Chappell, 1962: Introduction, and esp. p.7ff), but as outlined here, that move must fail. If Anderson was correct in maintaining that we cannot have 'merely inferential' knowledge of anything (4.17.1), we could not have 'merely inferential' knowledge of other minds. Unless we can recognise minds as having certain characteristics, and unless we can say about minds: "This is the sort of thing which under certain circumstances will act in such and such a way, and under other circumstances will act in a different way" (3.8), we cannot speak about them. In other words, unless we can observe minds, and re-cognise minds, as having certain characteristics and characteristic ways of behaving, we cannot speak about them or infer their existence or operation. And on the rationalist-idealist view, we cannot observe them. Therefore, in order to observe them, that definition must be abandoned. If we inferred the existence or operation of any entity (mind, matter, substance or whatever), but then could not confirm that 'inference' by observation, the inference is not an inference (in any sense of logically deduced, valid inference) at all. It is an unfounded, unprovable postulation: a dogma or metaphysical claim. With respect to the parallel case of Locke's matter, Anderson argued:

"But if we have never observed it so acting, if we have never been able to distinguish it from its effects on the situation, then the whole content of our knowledge, all that we are in a position to speak about, consists of the circumstances, no longer to be described as effects of 'it', at least. The appeal to inference, or to the distinction between 'knowledge by acquaintance' and 'knowledge by description' is futile." (SIEP, p.13)

Perhaps Anderson's criticism of the metaphysical(?) view should be stated in terms of 'knowledge of our own minds by introspection', and 'knowledge of other minds by inference'. But the consequences are essentially the same.

* * * * *

It is now possible to compare and contrast these two approaches to knowing other minds. According to Anderson, when minds are the object of our knowing:

- (a) minds meet the same criteria as anything else we know (4.1);
- (b) minds are known in precisely the same way that anything else is known; only one way of knowing is required to know both minds and non-minds (4.11).

The rationalist-idealist view requires two exceptional steps: it maintains that --

- (c) minds are of a fundamentally different kind (or 'way of being') from anything else we know (4.30.1);
- (d) we require a different way of knowing in order to know minds. (Ibid)

This approach involves two extraordinary claims which have the appearance of **special pleading**. It involves firstly a peculiar **metaphysical** claim: (c); and it involves an unusual **methodological** claim: (d). In other words, it involves two quite **extra-ordinary** claims in order to accommodate one (on this view 'special') kind of entity within the field of human knowledge, or investigation, or logic. This is summed up in 4.30.1. Anderson's approach requires no exceptions: no variation to methodology; no metaphysical claims.

So Anderson seems to have been perfectly justified in claiming that the rationalist-idealist view of mind -- what was called the 'featureless' view of mind, p.157 above -- had "prevented a knowledge of minds themselves", as **subjects** of inquiry. And in rejecting that view, (a) he was rejecting a **metaphysical** approach to investigation, and (b) pointing to the only way (**method**) of objectively studying minds; that is, by treating them on the same methodological plane as anything else.

Minds as objects -- as things knowing

Turning to the other side of the coin, Anderson effectively maintained that in idealism, minds as knowers, or when knowing, also adversely affect a propositional logic. The point of his saying "the study of anything is not, on account of its being a study, at the same time a study of mind ... " (SIEP, p.61; 4.14.2) is this: when we study something, whether it is a mind or non-mind, whether it is a tiger or a rock, we must study that subject of investigation, not some other subject. If we are studying tigers, we study tigers, not rocks. If we are studying tigers we are not studying minds, or the mind studying tigers. The study of tigers and the study of a mind which is studying tigers should no more be confused that the study of tigers should be confused with the study of rocks. Anderson's methodology is commonsensical. In discourse and inquiry, we state what we believe in propositional form, and we investigate issues of that kind, one issue at a time. We do not run different issues together. In investigating the the characteristics of tigers, we do not diverge into an investigation of the characteristics of minds, or an investigation of how we know certain facts about tigers.

The important question is whether minds as knowers should obtrude into every issue. For Anderson, the answer is 'No'. However, on this knower side, the obtrusion of mind into philosophy can arise in several ways, but principally the issue which concerned Anderson is whether, when we say anything about what is known, the knower (as a mind) must feature in what is said. That is to say, since every fact known to humans must be known by someone or some mind, is it necessary to introduce the knower or that mind into the statement of that fact? For example, if it is believed by everyone that all men are mortal, is it possible to assert in a plain, unadorned way: "All men are mortal", or is it necessary to add some proviso such as "All humans believe all men are mortal" or "Reality is such that all men are mortal"?

On this side of the coin -- i.e., when minds are knowers -- the main point of Anderson's claim to banishing mind from philosophy is to affirm that, in the long run, we must be able to assert, consider, examine,

test, and either prove or disprove the bald fact -- in plain categorical or propositional form -- "all men are mortal", or discourse and the discovery of true propositions are impossible. This is the affirmation of adherence to one logic -- one way of being. Pursuit of this whole question would require an examination of the various forms of relative truth, conditional truth, and other treatments of relative as against absolute truth postulated by Absolute Idealism. Space precludes such an examination. But the vital point is that the intrusion of mind into philosophy, or rather into logic, has the effect of qualifying truth, or making truth relative to something, or conditional upon something or other. It will be seen that, on the 'equivalence' principle discussed previously (between the copula and the truth of any proposition), qualifying truth is much the same as qualifying the copula. And Anderson's doctrine of one way of being (one kind of truth) is the statement of the rejection of both of these; that is, it is the affirmation of the adherence to one logic, or one methodology with respect to propositions, thereby rejecting any qualification of the copula or truth.

It would be possible to show how Anderson's banishing of mind from philosophy, is simply another aspect of the doctrine of one way of being -- the affirmation of adherence to one logic or one inquiring methodology. It would be possible to show how this led him to reject --

- (i) all qualifications of the copula -- all modal logics, probabilities, etc.;
- (ii) all qualifications of truth -- relative truth, conditional truth, degrees of truth, kinds of truth.

It would be possible to show how the intrusion of mind into philosophy or logic --

- (iii) led rationalists to 'truths of reason': truths discovered by analysing ideas or relations between ideas in the mind;
- (iv) led idealists to all sorts of relative truth, or to placing conditions upon truth -- relative to an Absolute mind, or to the individual mind making a judgment (of truth) under certain conditions.

However, space does not permit of such explanations here. What cannot be doubted is that Anderson criticised, and rejected on the basis of sound arguments, all attempts to qualify the copula of propositions and all attempts to qualify truth. Nor can it be seriously doubted that this rejection was summed up in the doctrine of one way of being. What has been shown, at least in principle, is that these criticisms of the qualification of the copula or of truth, were related to the rationalist and idealist notions of mind, and to the intrusion of such 'minds' into logic, or the treatment of propositions.

IN CONCLUSION

In Part I it was argued (a) that the analysis of Anderson's 'core' position in terms of the four 'isms' which he supported (as well as those '-isms' which he opposed) did not reveal any underlying principle or principles which showed that, or how, his position was systematic; (b) that describing his position in these terms not only requires considerable explanation, but is, certainly in the short term, quite misleading; and (c) did not clarify the significance of the doctrine of one way of being, and did not resolve the question of its status as metaphysical or not. By contrast, it has been argued in Part II that the three hypotheses put forward bring out considerable coherence and integration in Anderson's 'core' position, and in particular elucidate the doctrine of one way of being, showing that it is central to Anderson's position.

On this non-metaphysical interpretation:

- (i) the doctrine of one way of being is a somewhat obscure way of declaring adherence to an observational-propositional methodology, a method which is appropriate for any kind of inquiry or investigation (into truth), which also maintains that any other would-be-method of inquiry is illogical; and
- (ii) Anderson's 'core' position was an attempt to deal **consistently** with three vital questions, called here The Crucial Point of Focus: that consistency -- being methodological consistency -- deriving from the adherence to one method of inquiry, or the doctrine of one way of being.

This interpretation of the doctrine of one way of being involves some positive and negative aspects. It involves:

(A) **positively** --

- (a) taking the doctrine of one way of being as a methodological commitment: the consistent adherence to one logic, or to one method of inquiry -- the observational-propositional method;

- (b) taking the doctrine as non-metaphysical;
- (c) taking its statement as an attempt to summarise a more complex view which itself involves both positive and negative elements; the positive being methodological, the negative destructive arguments against those (**illogical**) views which breach the observational-propositional method;
- (B) **negatively** --
 - (d) **not** taking the doctrine as the contradictory of the claim that there are two or more ways of being, but as an alternative (methodological) approach to any illogical view;
 - (e) **not** taking the doctrine as an existential proposition;
 - (f) **not** taking the doctrine as a proposition involving 'ways of being' or 'kinds of truth' as terms.

It has been argued --

- (a) that this interpretation explains why the doctrine was central to Anderson's position: it is central because it is concerned with what impinges upon every issue in inquiry (philosophy, science, etc.), namely logic or methodology;
- (b) that this interpretation elucidates Anderson's 'core' position, showing that
 - (i) his major criticisms of other views ('-isms') are methodological,
 - (ii) the '-isms' which he supported essentially state methodological principles supplementary to the doctrine of one way of being, or supplementary to an observational-propositional methodology or logic;
- (c) that on this interpretation, Anderson's answers at The Crucial Point of Focus are part of his attempt to show that one methodology (or one logic) is appropriate for any and all inquiry, specifically for inquiry into the mental and the non-mental; minds and non-minds; minds and what minds know;
- (d) that this interpretation reveals far greater integration than any account in terms of empiricism, realism, pluralism, deter-

minism can -- which diffract rather than integrate Anderson's position -- and avoids the problems of misunderstanding associated with that approach;

- (e) that in summary this non-metaphysical, methodological interpretation of Anderson's doctrine of one way of being reveals in which way his position was **systematic**; that being that it was based upon one methodology: one way of approaching all issues for investigation or inquiry. (C.f. Mackie quoted p. 8f above.)

Furthermore, consistent with this methodological interpretation, it is maintained that what distinguishes Anderson's position in the specialist areas of philosophy -- social theory, philosophy of mind, ethics and aesthetics -- is not so much the specific theories he put forward in those fields as the realist **methodology** which he consistently applied within them. He was never concerned with the analysis of concepts or meanings; he was always concerned with 'things' which can be observed. So, in effect, he implicitly insisted that if social forces, minds, goodness or beauty are anything at all -- if they are real, objective, or observable things -- then they, like anything else:

- (a) must have characteristics of their own
- (b) must be complex;
- (c) must interact with other things: be caused and be causes; be effects and have effects;
- (d) must have spatial and temporal relations to other (real) things.

And, in addition --

- (e) whatever can be said about them can be said in propositions of the four forms.

The interpretation put forward here can now be tested against two statements of the doctrine of one way of being appearing in Anderson's articles. The three views being compared are:

1. The first statement of the doctrine as it appears at the conclusion of "The Truth of Propositions" (1926).
2. The statement of the doctrine in "Empiricism" (1927), usually regarded as the definitive statement of the doctrine.
3. The Main Hypothesis postulated here (pp.142 above, and 207f below).

It is maintained here that the arguments Anderson put forward (against Dr. Schiller) in his first two articles are important -- perhaps **the most important** -- arguments in support of the doctrine of one way of being. That claim is based upon the fact that as his conclusion to that discussion (both of his articles), Anderson stated the doctrine for the first time:

"And the nature of belief requires the rejection of any theory of distinct **sorts** or different **degrees** of truth; truth being simply what is represented by the copula 'is' in the proposition. Any such theory, or any view which attributes different meanings to 'is' is inherently sceptical or illogical, since only by the use of the unambiguous 'is' of occurrence (as I have shown in relation to Dr Schiller's view, in particular) could the theory be formulated at all. We must think of propositions, therefore, as capable of being unconditionally true;" (SIEP, p.26).

This statement of the doctrine is important because, while it **rejects** "any theory of distinct **sorts** or different **degrees** of truth", it **does not assert** "there is only one way of being", etc. Yet it enunciates all the other main elements of the doctrine. For purposes of comparison it is worthwhile setting out these elements as **Points** (a) to (f) for comparison later.

This passage:

- Point (a):** **rejects** any theory which postulates "distinct **sorts** or different **degrees** of truth" or "attributes different meanings to 'is'." (It does not assert any contrary or contradictory view.)
- Point (b):** asserts that any theory which upholds distinct sorts or different degrees of truth, or attributes different meanings to the copula, is sceptical or illogical. (This is not a disjunctive or exclusive 'or'.)
- Point (c):** affirms adherence to a propositional logic.
- Point (d):** asserts that truth relates to the consideration of occurrences (that is, "what is", and perhaps 'things' as well.)
- Point (e):** asserts that truth is "what is represented by" the copula 'is' in categorical propositions.
- Point (f):** thereby affirms the 'equivalence' of truth and being (or occurrence which is conveyed by the copula, as discussed p. 185 above.)

This account of the doctrine of one way of being can be compared with the one in "Empiricism", which is usually taken as the definitive statement of the doctrine. Points I and II are separate passages; Points III to V are continuous:

- Point I:** "The distinguishing-mark of empiricism ... is ... "
- (a) that it **denies** "there are different kinds or degrees of truth and reality". and
 - (b) "**maintains** that there is only one way of being" (SIEP, p.3; my emphasis).
- Point II:** "But fundamentally the issue is logical; the dispute" (between rationalism and empiricism) "is about ways of being or of truth, not about ways of knowing truths." (SIEP, pp.3-4)
- Point III:** "The chief, and I think final, objection to any theory of higher and lower," (which would include realities, or ways of being) "or complete and incomplete, truth is that it is contrary to the very nature and possibility of discourse; that it is 'unspeakable'." (SIEP, p.4)
- Point IV:** "The empiricist, like Socrates, adopts the attitude of considering things in terms of what can be said about them, i.e., in propositions. And he regards this not as a 'second-best', but as the only method of speaking or thinking at all, since every statement that we make, every belief that we hold, is a proposition." (SIEP, p.4)
- Point V:** "Since, then, the supposed higher and lower objects of experience both take the propositional form, we are concerned with a single way of being; that, namely, which is conveyed when we say that a proposition is **true**." (SIEP, p.4)

It is not surprising that these two statements of the doctrine correspond in almost every respect. It may be assumed that they complement, and to some extent amplify one another.

Point I(a) denies, rather than **rejects** "there are different kinds or degrees of truth and reality." (Here, 'reality' can be taken as a sub-

stitute for 'being'.) Both Point I(a) and Point (a) declare an opposition to "different kinds or degrees of truth", etc.; but their oppositions are expressed in ways that are significantly different.

Point I(b) goes further than the earlier formulation. It **asserts** "there is only one way of being". This suggests a contrary or contradictory relationship, whereas Point (b) above asserts that such theories are **illogical**, as does Point III. (See below.)

Point II implies the 'equivalence' of 'being' (or the copula) and 'truth'; c.f. Points (e) and (f). A vital issue hinges on what Anderson meant here by 'logical'. It appears to relate either to how we interpret the meaning of 'being' and 'truth', or how we treat them methodologically. The latter is accepted here, as relating to those most fundamental issues of logical form and the methodology of inquiry. In other words, it assumes adherence to a propositional logic or method affirmed in Point IV.

Point III asserts that any theory which distinguishes (higher and lower, etc.) ways of being, or (what is the same, according to the 'equivalence' principle) any theory which attempts to distinguish kinds of truth, is 'unspeakable', which must mean 'illogical' as in Point (b) above.

Point IV affirms adherence to a propositional logic (of four forms) as does Point (c) above.

Point V affirms the 'equivalence' principle, of copula and truth claim, as do Points (e) and (f) above.

It has been shown that these two passages -- from "The Truth of Propositions" and "Empiricism" -- state essentially the same general position, with the important difference that in "Empiricism", Anderson added empiricism "maintains that there is only one way of being". It is being argued here that this additional 'claim' was unwarranted, and actually **illogical** because it appears to be a counter-assertion to (the contrary or contradictory of) an **illogical** view. These two passages are now compared with The Main Hypothesis.

THE MAIN HYPOTHESIS

Point 1: All genuine problems of inquiry can be accommodated within a logic of four categorical forms of propositions (and syllogism).

Point 2: All attempts to deal with matters of inquiry outside a logic of four propositional forms are illogical; which is to say --

- (a) it is methodologically inconsistent to deal with issues which can be dealt with in a logic of four forms, in some other form;
- (b) any so-called issue for discussion or inquiry which cannot be expressed either as one, or a number of, proposition(s) of the four forms is illogical, meaningless, or nonsensical.

Point 1 affirms adherence to a categorical logic of four propositional forms, as do Point (c) and Point IV.

Point 2 asserts that it is **illogical** to attempt to inquire or discuss issues outside the principles of categorical logic, as do Point (b) and Point III.

In summary, the interpretation of Anderson's doctrine of one way of being being argued for here maintains:

- (i) that he was correct in saying certain views are **illogical**;
- (ii) that he was right in rejecting the (implicit) **illogical** claim that "there are different kinds or degrees of truth and reality"; and that his destructive arguments are effective against a wide range of such views;
- (iii) that there is no contradictory of an **illogical** view, and therefore that Anderson made a fundamental logical error in 'asserting' the pseudo-contrary "there is only one way of being", etc.
- (iv) that Anderson was correct in maintaining that the dispute or issue between his empiricism-realism and rationalism-idealism is logical, if that is understood as raising fundamental questions about logical form and inquiring methodology;
- (v) that Anderson defended a categorical logic of four propositional forms, consistent with empiricism, in a way that few other philosophers have, which defence is deserving of much more serious consideration by the philosophical community than it has received hitherto.

It will be seen that the interpretation put forward here explains a number of important relationships in Diagram 1 (p.5 above). This interpretation --

- (i) postulates that Anderson's theory of logic (Cell C) is that logic is the method of inquiry by observation and propositions;
- (ii) postulates that the doctrine of one way of being (Cell D) is the claim that a categorical logic of four propositional forms can accommodate all inquiry, and effectively affirms adherence to that logic;
- (iii) explains the relationship between Anderson's logic and the doctrine of one way of being;
- (iv) explains how the doctrine of one way of being is Anderson's empiricism, and how closely that approximates to the traditional view of empiricism; it being adherence to a method of inquiring by observing and reasoning in propositions of the four forms;
- (v) maintains that the other three '-isms' Anderson upheld -- although not precise -- are methodological principles relating to propositional inquiry consistent with the empirical methodology;
- (vi) maintains that the opposition between Anderson's 'core' position (including the '-isms' he upheld -- Cells C and D) and those '-isms' he opposed (Cell A) are based on quite different methodologies, as has been argued throughout;
- (vii) that Anderson's views in the specialist areas of philosophy (Cell E) are distinguished by the same methodology as that attributed here to the doctrine of one way of being.

It has been argued that, expressed in the form "there is only one way of being", Anderson's doctrine raises insuperable problems within his philosophical position. It raises the problem of relating that doctrine to some claim about knowing, and it raises the more serious problem of how such a claim can be accommodated within Anderson's logic. These

arguments suggest the doctrine must be reformulated. And it has been claimed that the reformulation as The Main Hypothesis is as good a reformulation as it is possible to get, and that this form of the doctrine retains its central import.

EPILOGUE

It was originally envisaged that this thesis would trace the unfolding of Anderson's doctrine of one way of being through a number of his earlier articles, then interpreting it as outlined herein. However, limitations of space precluded that approach. Nevertheless, such a study would add considerably to the explanation and understanding of his philosophical position. It would be particularly important to show how the doctrine of one way of being related to Anderson's views on ethics, which views are important and distinctive. So much work remains to be done on Anderson's thought.

Ample evidence has been provided to show that the statement of Anderson's 'core' position depends heavily upon the notion of 'things'. If those statements using 'things' were stripped away, what is central to, and distinctive in, Anderson's position would be lost. Yet this term (or is it more correctly a word, or a 'concept'?) creates an insoluble problem within Anderson's system. Since there can be no logical opposite of 'things', 'things' cannot be a term in Anderson's logic. Essentially the same point is made by Baker with respect to universal terms and Anderson's views on the categories (Baker, 1986, pp.106ff).

There appear to be only two alternatives to this dilemma. Either Anderson's position has been destroyed by a **reductio ad absurdum** based entirely upon his own doctrines, or those statements employing 'things' as a fundamental purported term, must be expressed and expressible some other way. Those who would like to see Anderson's position demolished may hasten to embrace the first alternative. Yet it seems that there may be an alternative interpretation -- a methodological one. However, the development of that view must be the subject of another work.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ALEXANDER, Samuel. 1966. Space, Time and Deity. The Gifford Lectures at Glasgow, 1916-1918. (Reprint Edition) Macmillan and Company Limited, London.
- ANDERSON, A.J. 1987. Following John Anderson. In Dialectic (Journal of Newcastle University Philosophy Club), Vol. 30, 1987, SPECIAL ISSUE: ANDERSONIAN PAPERS, pp.129-143
- ANDERSON, Janet, Graham Cullum and Kimon Lycos (Eds.). 1982. Art and Reality. Hale and Iremonger Pty. Ltd., Sydney.
- ANDERSON, John. 1943. Religion in Education. (Address by John Anderson before New Education Fellowship). In Religion in Education pp.25-32.
- _____ 1958. Realism. In The Australian Highway, Journal of the Workers' Educational Association. Special Edition September 1958: ANDERSON & ANDERSONIANISM. pp.53-56.
- _____ 1961. Religion and the University. In The Australian Highway, November 1961. pp.50-54.
- _____ 1962. Studies in Empirical Philosophy. Angus and Robertson Ltd., Sydney.
- ARMSTRONG, D.M. 1958. The Andersonians: Review of the Australian Highway Special Edition 'ANDERSON & ANDERSONIANISM'. In The Observer, October 4, 1958.
- _____ 1973. Belief, Truth and Knowledge. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- _____ 1977. On Metaphysics. In Quadrant, No. 120, Vol. XXI, No.7, July 1977, pp.65-69.
- _____ 1983. An Intellectual Autobiography. In Quadrant, Vol.27, Jan-Feb. 1983 pp.89-102; Vol.27, Mar. 1983, pp.68-78.
- AYER, A.J. 1985. Wittgenstein. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London.
- BAKER, A.J. 1979. Anderson's Social Philosophy. Angus and Robertson, Australia.
- _____ 1986. Australian Realism: The Systematic Philosophy of John Anderson. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- BERKELEY, George. 1946. A New Theory of Vision, Etc. Everyman's Library, C. Tinling & Co. Ltd., London.

- BIRCHALL, B.C. 1978. John Anderson and "The False Proposition". In Dialectic, Volume 15, pp.1-15; re-printed In Dialectic Special Issue: ANDERSONIAN PAPERS, Vol. 30, 1987.
- BOYCE-GIBSON, A. 1962. Passionate Philosopher: Review of 'Studies in Empirical Philosophy'. In Sydney Morning Herald, 17 November 1962.
- BURNET, John. 1948. Early Greek Philosophy. Adam and Charles Black, London.
- CHAPPELL, V.C. (Ed.) 1962. The Philosophy of Mind. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., USA.
- CHOMSKY, Noam. 1971. Problems of Knowledge and Freedom : The Russell Lectures. Vintage Books, New York.
- CUMMING, Leila. 1976. Anderson's Ontological Empiricism. Unpublished MA Thesis.
- _____ (Ed.) 1987. Dialectic, Special Issue: ANDERSONIAN PAPERS, Vol.30, 1987.
- DAVIE, George. 1977. John Anderson in Scotland. In Quadrant, July 1977. pp.55-57.
- DOCKER, John. 1974. John Anderson and the Sydney Freethought Tradition. In Australian Cultural Elites: Intellectual traditions in Sydney and Melbourne. Angus and Robertson, Australia. pp.131-155.
- DONAGAN, Alan. 1969. Introduction. In Robert Brown and C.D.Rollins (Eds.) Contemporary Philosophy in Australia. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London. pp.15-19.
- EDDY, W.H.C. 1958. Ethics and Politics. In The Australian Highway, Journal of the Workers' Educational Association. Special Edition September 1958: ANDERSON AND ANDERSONIANISM, pp.64-68.
- _____ 1961. Orr. Jacaranda Publishers, Brisbane.
- EDWARDS. Paul (Ed.) 1972. The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. The Macmillan Company, New York.
- GRAVE, S.A. 1977. Philosophy. In The Australian Encyclopaedia, the Grolier Society of Australia. pp.521-523.
- _____ 1984. A History of Philosophy in Australia. (Esp. Ch.3: 'John Anderson'). University of Queensland Press, Queensland. pp.47-69.
- GROLIER SOCIETY, The. 1977. The Australian Encyclopaedia.

- HOLT, Edwin B., Walter T. MARVIN, William Pepperell MONTAGUE, Ralph Barton PERRY, Walter B. PITKIN and Edward Gleason SPAULDING. 1912. The New Realism: Co-Operative Studies in Philosophy. The Macmillan Company, New York. Kraus Reprint Co., New York, 1970.
- HONI SOIT. 1943. Organ of the Sydney University Students' Representative Council.
- KAMENKA, Eugene. 1977. On Education. In Quadrant, No. 120, Vol. XXI, No. 7, July 1977. pp.47-54.
- _____ 1987. The Andersonians. In Quadrant, Vol. 31, July 1987. pp.60-64.
- KORNER, Stephan. 1963. Anderson's Philosophy of Experience. In Quadrant, Vol. 7, No. 2, November 1963. pp.69-71.
- MACKIE, J.L. 1951. Logic and Professor Anderson. In Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 29, August 1951, pp.109-113.
- _____ 1958a. Philosophy. In The Australian Encyclopaedia. Angus and Robertson, Sydney. pp.96-100.
- _____ 1958b. Anderson's Theory of Education. In The Australian Highway: Journal of the Workers' Educational Association. Special Edition, September, 1958: ANDERSON & ANDERSONIANISM. pp.61-64.
- _____ 1962a. John Anderson. In AJP, Vol. 40, pp.124-126.
- _____ 1962b. The Philosophy of John Anderson. In AJP, Vol. 40, pp.264-282.
- _____ 1965. Rationalism and Empiricism. In AJP, Vol. 43, pp.1-12.
- _____ 1974. The Cement of the Universe. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
- MOLESWORTH, Vol. 1958. Landmarks in Logic. The Law Book Company of Australasia Pty. Ltd., Sydney, Australia.
- MCCALLUM, D.M. 1958. Anderson and Freethought. In The Australian Highway: Journal of the Workers' Educational Association. Special Edition, September 1958: ANDERSON & ANDERSONIANISM. pp.71-75.
- O'NEIL, W.M. 1958. Some Notes on Anderson's Psychology. In The Australian Highway: Journal of the Workers' Educational Association. Special Edition, September 1958: ANDERSON & ANDERSONIANISM. pp.69-71.
- _____ 1979. Anderson, John. In Bede Nairn and Geoffrey Searle (Eds.) Australian Dictionary of Biography Vol. VII 1891-1939, pp.56-59. Melbourne University Press

- PARTRIDGE, P.H. 1958. Anderson as Educator. In The Australian Highway: Journal of the Workers' Educational Association. Special Edition, September 1958: ANDERSON & ANDERSONIANISM. pp.49-52.
- PASSMORE, John, 1962. John Anderson and Twentieth Century Philosophy: Introductory Essay. In Anderson, J. Studies in Empirical Philosophy. Angus and Robertson Ltd., Sydney.
- _____ 1963. Philosophy. In A.L.McLeod (Ed.) The Pattern of Australian Culture. Cornell University Press, New York. pp.131-169.
- _____ 1972. John Anderson. In Paul Edwards (Ed.) The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. The Macmillan Company, New York.
- _____ 1975. The Making of an Australian Philosopher. In Andre Mercier and Maja Svilar (Eds.) Philosophers on Their Own Work, Vol.1, 1975. Federation Internationale des Societes de Philosophie. Verlag Herbert Lang, Bern and Frankfurt. pp.147-155.
- _____ 1976. Commemorating John Anderson. In Times Literary Supplement. 9 April, 1976.
- _____ 1977. Anderson as a Systematic Philosopher. In Quadrant, Vol. June 1977. pp.48-53.
- PLATO, The Phaedo. (Undated Translation by Desmond Stewart). Euphorion Books, London.
- PUTNAM, Hilary. 1978. Meaning and the Moral Sciences. Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London.
- QUINE, W.V.O. 1951. Two Dogmas of Empiricism. In The Philosophical Review, Vol.LX. Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press. pp.20-43.
- _____ 1958. Methods of Logic. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
- QUINTON, Anthony. 1986. Introduction. In Baker, A.J. The Systematic Philosophy of John Anderson. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- REESE, William L. (Ed.) 1980. Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion. Humanities Press, New Jersey.
- ROSE, T.A., 1958. Logic. In The Australian Highway, Journal of the Workers' Educational Association. Special Edition, September 1958: ANDERSON & ANDERSONIANISM. pp.57-60.
- _____ 1987. Some General Features of Anderson's Logic. In Dialectic, Vol.30, Special Edition: ANDERSONIAN PAPERS. pp.85-95
- RUNES, Dagobert D. (Ed.) 1972. Dictionary of Philosophy. Peter Owen, London.

- RUSSELL, Bertrand. 1946. History of Western Philosophy. Unwin Brothers Limited, Woking, Great Britain.
- _____ 1948. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London.
- RYLE, Gilbert. 1950. Logic and Professor Anderson. In AJP, Vol.28, pp.137-153.
- SCHILLER, F.C.S. 1925. The Origin of Bradley's Scepticism. In Mind, Vol.XXXIV, pp.217-223
- _____ 1926. Judgments **versus** Propositions. In Mind, Vol.XXXV, pp.337-343.
- SMART, J.J.C. 1976. The Philosophical Andersonians. In Quadrant, Vol. January 1976, pp.6-10.
- _____ 1989. Australian Philosophers of the 1950's. In Quadrant, Vol.34, June 1989. pp.35-39.
- SPARKES, A.W. 1991. Talking Philosophy: A wordbook. Routledge, London.
- SPEAKE, Jennifer (Ed.) 1979. A Dictionary of Philosophy. Pan Books Ltd. London.
- STOUT, A.K. 1961. Preface. In Eddy, W.H.C. Orr. Jacaranda Publishers, Brisbane.
- _____ 1962a. Foreword. In Anderson J., Studies in Empirical Philosophy. Angus and Robertson Ltd., Sydney.
- _____ 1962b. John Anderson. In Australian Humanities Research Council Annual Report 1961-1962.
- STOVE, D.C. 1962. John Anderson and Cultural Freedom in Australia. In The Free Spirit. May/June 1962. pp.6-7.
- _____ 1977. The Force of Intellect. In Quadrant, Vol. 21, July 1977, pp.45-46.
- STRAWSON, P.F. 1952. Introduction to Logical Theory. Methuen and Co. Ltd., London.
- SUTER, Geraldine. 1984. Bibliographic Study on the Philosophy of John Anderson. In _____ (Ed.) Australian Historical Bibliography, Bulletin No.10, September 1984. Australia 1788-1988 A Bicentennial History. pp.1-60.
- UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY ARCHIVES : John Anderson Collection
- URMSON, J.E. (Ed.) 1967. The Concise Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers. Hutchinson of London.

- WALKER, A.R. 1987. Public Controversies and Academic Freedom. In Dialectic, Vol.30, 1987. Special Issue: ANDERSONIAN PAPERS. pp. 11-23
- WEBLIN, Mark M. 1989. The Logical Structure of Realism. Unpublished MA Thesis, University of New England.