

JOHN ANDERSON'S DOCTRINE OF ONE WAY OF BEING

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A thesis submitted for the degree of
Master of Arts with Honours
of the University of New England

June 1993

CERTIFICATE

I certify that the substance of this thesis has not already been submitted for any degree and is not being currently submitted for any other degree.

I certify that, to the best of my knowledge, any help received in preparing this thesis, and all sources used, have been acknowledged in this thesis.

A solid black rectangular box used to redact the signature of the author.

BRIAN WILD

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am indebted to a number of people, directly and indirectly, in various ways for the development of this Thesis.

I am greatly indebted to the late G. Stuart Watts and the late W.H.C. (Harry) Eddy who encouraged me to study philosophy, and introduced me to John Anderson's philosophical thought.

I must express my appreciation to Prof. Peter Forrest who was generous enough to enable me to enrol as an MA candidate, and for his invaluable assistance and encouragement as temporary supervisor during the latter period of study.

I am also indebted to my supervisor, Dr. Brian Birchall who has offered encouragement and constructive criticism throughout, and who has been most generous in providing useful material from his extensive collection on Anderson.

Special mention should be made of important published material. Firstly, A.J. Baker's two books on Anderson have served as important reference, especially his "Australian Realism". Secondly, Geraldine Suter's Bibliography on Anderson is an essential resource in Anderson studies.

The Anderson collection in the University of Sydney Archives is another important resource, and I wish to thank the staff there for their willing assistance.

Sandy Anderson, Leila Cumming and Mark Weblin have assisted both by way of discussion and in generously providing material.

Above all, I must thank my wife who has assisted me unstintingly in every way: by way of financial and moral support, in research and in compiling research material, and by attending to the very considerable amounts of typing papers over and above typing the final thesis.

NOTE

In relation to the stipulated limit of 60,000 words, the **Introduction** is included as **Supplementary Material**.

ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations have been adopted here:

SIEP: John Anderson's "Studies in Empirical Philosophy"

AJP : for both the "Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy" which in 1947 was re-named the "Australasian Journal of Philosophy".

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ABSTRACT

The doctrine of one way of being is said to be Anderson's fundamental or central doctrine. This thesis examines that doctrine in the context of the claim that Anderson was a systematic philosopher. On those two assumptions, it is reasonable to anticipate that any precise account of that doctrine would elucidate Anderson's central, or 'core', philosophical position.

Anderson's philosophical position has been described as empiricist, realist, pluralist and determinist. It is reasonable to assume that if the doctrine of one way of being is fundamental to Anderson's position, a clear account of it would elucidate these four '-isms', and show how they are interrelated. **Part I** examines a range of '-isms': those which Anderson criticised and rejected, and the four which he used, at various times, to describe his own position. On the basis of that analysis, it is concluded:

- (a) that these '-isms' are not precise; neither as they have been used traditionally, nor as Anderson used them;
- (b) that they do not describe Anderson's position clearly, and actually encourage misunderstanding of it;
- (c) that this analysis does not clarify the doctrine of one way of being or explain how it unifies Anderson's views.

In **Part II**, a quite different -- hypothetical -- approach is adopted. Three non-metaphysical hypotheses are put forward:

1. a relatively simple hypothesis about Anderson's implicit theory of logic;
2. a relatively simple logical or methodological hypothesis about the doctrine of one way of being; and
3. an hypothesis about Anderson's central philosophical concerns and aims arising at the point of his departure from idealism -- here called "The Crucial Point of Focus".

It is claimed that this methodological interpretation --

- (a) shows what the doctrine of one way of being is;
- (b) shows how that doctrine relates to Anderson's 'core' position, and specialist theories as well;
- (c) reveals in what way Anderson's philosophical position is systematic; and
- (d) thereby illuminates Anderson's position as might be expected if it is his central doctrine.

JOHN ANDERSON'S DOCTRINE OF ONE WAY OF BEINGINTRODUCTION

This Introduction is based principally upon what others have said about John Anderson and his philosophy, in contrast with Part II of the thesis which concentrates largely upon Anderson's own published writings. The introduction attempts to provide a fairly wide picture both of the man and his thought, and thereby to provide the context within which the main discussion can be viewed. Within this wider context it raises major problems in how the doctrine of one way of being is to be interpreted, and sets certain parameters upon the understanding of Anderson's work generally.

In their own small way, the introduction and the thesis are a tribute to a great thinker and outstanding man.

* * * * *

JOHN ANDERSON (1893-1962)

John Anderson "modified the tone of Australian philosophising" in a "cataclysmic manner" said his most distinguished former student and colleague, John Passmore. Passmore went on to quote Morris Miller who took up the Chair of Philosophy in the University of Tasmania in 1927, the same year Anderson assumed the comparable role at the University of Sydney:

"'Towards the close of the new decade', writes Morris Miller, 'a new phenomenon appeared in the Australian philosophical sky. John Anderson came to Sydney in the form of a catalyst, and stirred up the dovecote of rationalism; and facts, activities, events, occurrences as they happened, came forth in full splendour. ... The old strongholds of idealism were put on the defensive. An era of critical evaluation dawned for the world of thought in Australia.'" (Passmore, quoting Miller, in McLeod, 1963, pp148-9).

During the subsequent thirty-five years Anderson spent in Sydney, he earned a most distinguished reputation: as a teacher and lecturer, academic, and public figure; for his views on social theory, ethics, aesthetics, literary criticism, education, academic freedom and free speech -- but above all, as a philosopher. The reasons for his outstanding reputation have become somewhat obscured for several reasons: because of controversy about his views and character, the lack of any authoritative work on his life, and the fact that he did not leave a systematic treatise on his basic philosophical views. In some quarters he has been represented as infamous rather than deservedly famous. The force that once united that group known as the Sydney Andersonians has largely dissipated today.

"Anderson's career as a professor was an unusually stormy one. He attacked whatever he took to encourage an attitude of servility -- and this included such diversified enemies as Christianity, social welfare work, professional patriotism, censorship, educational reform of a utilitarian sort, and communism. For a time he was closely associated with the Communist party, seeing

in it the party of independence and enterprise, but he broke with it in the early 1930s. His passionate concern for independence and his rejection of any theory of 'natural subordination' were characteristic of his whole outlook -- political, logical, metaphysical, ethical, and scientific." (Passmore, 1972, pp.119-120).

Published details of Anderson's life are scattered, and apart from his intellectual affairs, rather sketchy. This situation should be rectified by the publication of a biography by Brian Kennedy anticipated shortly. Due to the paucity of material on his early years in Scotland, there is little point going beyond O'Neill's outline of that period in the Australian Dictionary of Biography:

"ANDERSON, JOHN (1893-1962), philosopher, educator and controversialist, was born on 1 November 1893 at Stonehouse, Lanarkshire, Scotland, son of Alexander Anderson, schoolmaster, and his wife, Elizabeth, née Brown. His father reputedly had both socialist and anti-clerical convictions and exerted a great influence on his son. After attending Hamilton Academy, Anderson matriculated at the University of Glasgow. His first concern was with mathematics and physics and he turned primarily to philosophy only late in his undergraduate career. He won prizes in many subjects, including political science, Greek, logic and political economy. In 1917 Anderson graduated Master of Arts with first-class honours in philosophy and in mathematics and natural philosophy. That year he was awarded the Ferguson Scholarship in Philosophy and in 1919 the Shaw Philosophical Fellowship, both in open competition with graduates of all four Scottish universities. As holder of the Shaw Fellowship he was required to deliver four public lectures, which he did in February 1925 on 'The Nature of Mind'. Some of his early published papers were probably based on these lectures.

"Immediately upon graduation Anderson began lecturing at the University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire (Cardiff) (1917-19), the University of Glasgow (1919-20) and at the University of Edinburgh (1920-26). He taught over a wide range of philosophy at both elementary and advanced levels: logic, metaphysics, the history of ancient and of modern philosophy, ethics and the philosophy of mind. During this period he was preparing his Shaw lectures, working out his general philosophical position and drafting a textbook on logic which unfortunately was never published. On 30 June 1922 he married Janet Currie Baillie, a fellow-student at both Hamilton Academy and the University of Glasgow; their one son was born in Scotland." (O'Neill, 1979 , p.57)

An article by Davie (1977) entitled "John Anderson in Scotland" outlines some of the social and intellectual conditions in which the young Anderson matured. It was a period of educational controversy, but

characterised by vigorous and informed debate. In private conversation, his widow Janet said John 'cut his teeth' on Orage's 'New Age', which fostered discussion on a wide range of social issues including politics, religion and the arts. (See Article 29 in Anderson, Cullum and Lycos.) It is noteworthy that in a significant article "Art and Morality" written in 1941, fourteen years after leaving Scotland, Anderson referred to Orage's view that 'the only check that ought to be placed on literature is criticism' (Anderson, 1941, in Anderson, Cullum, and Lycos, p.85; also quoted in Baker, 1979, p.116). Sandy Anderson said his father was giving birth to a logic manuscript (which was never published) while his mother was giving birth to him in 1923 (private communication).

His first interests were in mathematics and physics, but he was won over to philosophy partly due to "the influence of his brother William, then a lecturer at Glasgow and later professor of philosophy at Auckland University College, New Zealand" (Passmore, 1972, p.119).

Anderson took up the chair of Philosophy at the University of Sydney in 1927, a post which he held until his retirement in 1958. Apart from a trip to Scotland, Oxford and New York during 1938 (Baker, 1979, p.112), Anderson lived the remainder of his life entirely in his adopted country. He was already a passionate supporter of the socialist cause when he arrived in Australia. It seems he was instrumental in persuading other Sydney academics to sign a letter forwarded to the Australian (Commonwealth) Government in 1928, protesting over import bans on books of a political nature, specifically the censorship of information from the USSR (University of Sydney Archives). A summary of his political, and more controversial public activities, is given in Baker, 1979, Part II. Later in his life Anderson rejected communism, and became one of its most trenchant and influential critics in Australia (see Passmore 1963, p.153; Baker, 1979, pp.79ff).

Following a somewhat distorted newspaper report of his Presidential Address to the newly-formed Freethought Society (of which he was foundation president) on 9 July 1931, in which he criticised certain idols such as war memorials, his dismissal was called for in the NSW Legis-

lative Assembly. As a consequence, he was censured by the University Senate on 20 July 1931. Unimpressed, he is reputed to have said to his logic class something to the effect: "I won't insult you by asking you to put the Senate's resolution into logical form". (Private communication from the late W.H.C. Eddy.) A searching account of Anderson's views on this, and three later controversies in which he was involved is to be found in Walker, 1987.

In 1939 the Philosophy Department was divided: Anderson retained the areas of Metaphysics and Logic; A.K. Stout was appointed Professor of Moral and Political Philosophy, reputedly to counter Anderson's growing influence (Passmore, 1963, p.156). Whatever effect that reorganisation may have had, it is worth noting that in the 1943 controversy (mentioned later), Stout defended and supported Anderson on his right to criticise religious education in schools (Honi Soit, 16/4/43); and in 1958 Stout, like Anderson, criticised the summary dismissal of Professor S.S. Orr from the University of Tasmania (Eddy, 1961, pp.viiff, xvii).

During his later career, Anderson was involved in three further, major public controversies. In 1943, at the invitation of the New Education Fellowship, he gave an address (as one of a series) on Religion in Education. He began provocatively enough, by saying: "It would be possible to deal with this subject as briefly as with the subject of snakes in Iceland -- one could say, 'There is no religion in education'." (Anderson, 1943 p.25), but developed his case quite cogently, as always, arguing "religion can play a part in education only as a **subject** of a secular kind" (Walker, 1987, p.15; Anderson, 1943 p.28). When publicised, these views brought forth a storm of protest, but on this occasion the University Senate defended Anderson (Walker, 1987, p.17).

During the period c.1958-62, Anderson spoke out publicly and forthrightly in defence of Sydney Sparkes Orr, formerly professor of Philosophy in the University of Tasmania, who was summarily dismissed on a trumped-up charge of misconduct (Eddy, 1961, pp.ixf, xvii, xviii, xxii).

In a sermon to the Law Convention on 6 July 1961, Dr. Gough, Anglican Archbishop of Sydney, made an attack upon the teaching of certain 'soul-destroying philosophies' taught at Sydney University. It emerged that the Archbishop's views were based largely on a discredited paper written some two years earlier by a catholic clergyman, and were aimed partly at Anderson, in which it was alleged that "members of university staffs were teaching free-love" (Walker, 1987, p.21). Anderson responded in his characteristic, uncompromising way; that is, uncompromising with respect to free speech, and the autonomy of education and universities in particular (Anderson, 1961).

"He urged also that 'public opinion should not be conciliated. In matters of discussion, e.g., trial marriages, the University teacher should not take a conciliatory attitude towards conventional views (legalistic or ecclesiastical), should not let the clerics get away with the assumption that they are the **experts** when they have not devoted to ethics the study and discussion it requires'." (Anderson, in Honi Soit, 27/7/61, quoted in Walker, 1987, p.21)

The last of these controversies erupted after his retirement in 1958, at which time a fund was set up to enable his major philosophical papers to be printed together (Stout, Foreword to SIEP). This work was published after Anderson's death in 1962 as "Studies in Empirical Philosophy". It is a remarkable fact that no major review of this book has ever been published.

Anderson died of cerebro-vascular disease on 6 July 1962 (O'Neil, ADB, p.59).

ANDERSON'S REPUTATION

It was remarked previously that Anderson earned a most distinguished reputation in many fields during his life in Sydney, and readers should be aware of the depth of this reputation.

A.K.Stout who was Professor of Moral and Political Philosophy at Sydney University during 20 years of Anderson's period there said: "Anderson was without question the most distinguished and independent philosopher, as well as one of the most remarkable men, to work in an Australian university." (1962, p.26). Mackie, who succeeded Anderson as Professor of Philosophy at Sydney, said at the time of Anderson's death:

"It is as a freethinker that John Anderson is most widely known in Australia, as an uncompromising critic of religion and an enemy of all forms of censorship. And indeed it is this part of his achievement that is least open to question. ... He was always ready to hit back against attacks upon his influence as an educator, and his opponents regularly had the worst of the ensuing controversy. There can be no doubt that he did more for intellectual freedom, by his constant practice and defence of it, than any other one man in Australia." (Mackie, 1962a, p.124);

and concluded that article by saying: "As it was, he was the most distinguished academic figure that we have had in Sydney, or are likely to have for a long time." (Ibid, p.126). Elsewhere Mackie said: "The work of John Anderson is perhaps the most significant contribution to philosophy made in Australia in ..." the period 1922-1958. (Mackie, 1958, Vol.VII, p.99). W.M. O'Neill, one-time student, and later Professorial Colleague (Psychology) said of Anderson: "He was probably the most original philosopher ever to have worked in Australia" (1979, p.57); and elsewhere: "... his influence upon my own basic psychological views has been greater than that of any psychologist I have encountered, either in the flesh or through the printed page." (1958, p.71).

P.H. Partridge, former student of Anderson, who became Director of the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University, said of Anderson that it was as "a thinker engaged in the work of creating a very impressive intellectual construction" which --

"made him a great teacher in that decade (i.e. 1927-1937). He commanded few of the usual arts and skills of the 'good teacher'; he was never popular, spectacular or 'interesting'. But he has been one of the few original and also systematic thinkers who have worked in this country (perhaps, in the field of humanities, the only one)." (Partridge, 1958, p.50).

D.M. Armstrong (later Professor of Philosophy at Sydney University) said: "For thirty years John Anderson, shortly to retire as Professor of Philosophy at Sydney University, has been the greatest intellectual influence at Sydney University, and one of the major figures in Australian culture." (1958, p.535). Later, Armstrong suggested that Anderson's attempts to establish a Heraclitean metaphysics was "a sufficient title to greatness" (1977, p.69). Although Armstrong has been critical of Anderson's philosophy and character, he also said: "In Selwyn Grave's history of Australian philosophy, ... Anderson is, **very properly**, the only philosopher to have a chapter to himself." (1983, p.91; my emphasis).

In his contribution to a series of articles commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Anderson's arrival in Australia, Eugene Kamenka said:

"Others have already written of John Anderson's long career as Challis Professor of Philosophy in the University of Sydney; they have emphasised that combination of unflagging logical incisiveness and acuteness, of an outstanding sense of coherence and connection and of an unusually strong and original capacity for creative theoretical imagination that is not achieved by more than a handful of men in any one generation." (1977, p.47)

And A.J. Baker, another former student and colleague, and the author of the only two books devoted to Anderson's philosophy, said:

"At any rate, Anderson went on to become the most original, all-round philosopher Australia has had, and to have a striking influence through his teaching, his many articles in local journals, the enthusiasm of his followers, and his contributions at Australian philosophy conferences." (1986, p.xx)

Perhaps the most important reflections on Anderson as a philosopher and as a teacher, come from his most distinguished student, colleague, and commentator, J.A. Passmore. In his article on "Anderson as a Systematic Philosopher", Passmore was prepared to seriously consider Anderson, in the context of systematic philosophy, with just two other

philosophers, Plato and Hegel (1977, p.48). That is not to say he ranked Anderson with them alone in the history of philosophy, but there can be little doubt that Passmore took Anderson seriously as a philosopher. In concluding that article, Passmore said:

"Finally, since this is a somewhat special occasion, let me end on a personal note. As a result of a series of chances, I have come to know a good many of the better-known philosophers of our century, and at more than the level of mere acquaintance. I respect and admire them; I have learnt much from what they have written and what they have said to me. But I have never for a moment wished that they rather than Anderson had been my teacher. He opened up my mind as no one else could have done. That fifty years ago, he left Scotland for Australia is, in my judgment, the greatest single piece of intellectual good fortune our country has ever experienced." (1977, p.53).

(Passmore has written several major articles on Anderson's philosophy, including the introductory essay for "Studies in Empirical Philosophy".)

Donagan paid tribute to Anderson's defence of academic freedom, saying that he saw the universities as "guardians of the intellectual tradition" which are sometimes --

"beset by temptations and threats to compromise with one interest or another; and he won his enormous moral authority by the splendid dignity with which he fought for intellectual liberty and seriousness against clerical and political attacks, which few of his colleagues wished to oppose." (Donagan, 1969, p.15).

It is of some significance that D.C. Stove, who cannot be called a follower or admirer of Anderson said: "I still consider Anderson easily the most intelligent person I have known" (1977, p.45); and --

"To me it seems clear that, in most respects, cultural freedom in Australia -- intellectual freedom, political freedom, artistic freedom -- are in better shape than when Anderson arrived here. No one can gauge with any certainty, of course, the precise degree of influence, in such things, of any one man. But my own opinion is that Anderson's share in these changes for the better is great and at least greater than that of any other one man." (Stove, 1962, p.6)

J.J.C. Smart, who was acquainted with Anderson in his later years, was less acquainted with his philosophical views, a fact he attributed to Anderson's being "a vigorous but far from lucid or well organised writer of philosophical prose" (Smart, 1989, p.37). He said:

"As always I have found Anderson as expounded or defended by Mackie and Passmore a much more considerable philosopher than I am able to gather from Anderson's own writings. ... When I see Anderson as expounded by Mackie and Passmore I am inclined to concur with a judgment that I believe was made by George Paul, that Anderson narrowly missed being one of the great philosophers." (Ibid)

Other evidence points to Anderson's extraordinary stature. We have seen that "Anderson is, very properly, the only person to have a chapter to himself" in Selwyn Grave's 'A History of Philosophy in Australia' (c.f. p. xii above). In a thirty-seven page article reviewing the history of Australian philosophy (from c.1852 to 1963), Passmore devoted the best part of fifteen pages to Anderson (Passmore, 1963). And in Docker's "Australian Cultural Elites: Intellectual Traditions in Sydney and Melbourne" (1974), a whole chapter is devoted to 'John Anderson and the Sydney Freethought Tradition', the only philosopher so represented in that work.

That kind of prominence cannot be explained as hero worship or mere lack of balance. Anderson certainly had detractors and critics, but there is no need to discuss these here. The point is not to justify

Anderson's reputation or fame, but simply to show that he had an outstanding reputation; and the passages quoted leave little doubt on that score.

The breadth of Anderson's interests, and the consequent breadth of his influence, are remarkable. It is not possible at present to document the range of his lectures. Those that are available cover the full range of western philosophy up to Moore, Alexander and Russell, but do not deal with Wittgenstein and linguistic philosophy. They deal with the Pre-Socratics, Plato's earlier and later dialogues, Aristotle, the classical rationalists -- Descartes and Leibniz especially -- the British Empiricists; Kant and Hegel; they cover logic, metaphysics, Greek educational theories, political philosophy, social theory, ethics, aesthetics, criticism. Accordingly, his influence has been wide:

"Anderson's general conception of a problem and its solution have influenced Australian social theorists, literary critics, musicologists, jurisprudentialists, psychologists, anthropologists, and historians, even when they have not accepted Anderson's own special views about societies, books, minds, music, morals, educational practices, or historical periods." (Passmore, 1963, p.155)

LACK OF REPUTATION OVERSEAS

It is true that Anderson has attracted little attention from philosophers outside Australia. The only review of Anderson's "Studies in Empirical Philosophy" by an overseas philosopher which the present writer has been able to locate is a short one published in *Quadrant* by Stephan Körner: "Anderson's Philosophy of Experience". He concluded by saying:

"I have certainly not been able to do justice to the variety, the depth and the unity of Anderson's interests and achievements; but as an onlooker from afar I can clearly recognise a philosopher of considerable stature, a teacher with much to teach, and a man whom it must have been a great pleasure to know in person." (1963, p.71)

In his introduction to A.J. Baker's "Australian Realism", Anthony Quinton (then at Oxford) said:

"A convenient way of bringing out Anderson's large place in, and service to, Australian philosophy is to compare Australian philosophy with the philosophy of more populous and equally prosperous Canada. There have been some worthy Canadian philosophers ... but none in Anderson's time who came anywhere near him in originality and importance." (Quinton, in Baker, 1986, p.ix).

Professor Gilbert Ryle attempted to engage Anderson in discussion with limited success. Baker states that --

"It is noteworthy that when Gilbert Ryle wrote to Anderson to ask if he would care to write for *Mind* he was uninterested, and when Ryle wrote a provocative article in The Australasian Journal of Philosophy criticising his views, Anderson did not deign to reply (except in part of a posthumously published essay), although the occasion was a good one for clarifying and publicising his views to what would have been a large and interested set of readers." (Baker, 1986, p.xxi).

There is no point in speculating on the reasons why Anderson did not accept Ryle's offer. Perhaps future scholarship will uncover that reason. In this connection, it is important to understand that Mackie (1951) came to Anderson's defence, pointing out that Ryle (1950) based much of his criticism on misunderstanding. (See p.xxiv below.)

ANDERSON AS A SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHER

A number of commentators refer to the systematic nature of Anderson's philosophy. Mackie, 1958, p.99; 1962a, p.124; 1962b, p.266; Stout, 1962, p. 26 ; O'Neil, 1979, , p.57; Grave, 1977, p.522; 1984, p.58; Quinton, 1986, p.xviii; Körner, 1963, p.69; and Passmore, as discussed below. This is incongruous and must appear almost incomprehensible to outsiders when it is also stated by a number of commentators that it has not been expounded as a system (for example, Mackie, 1958, p.99; 1962a, p.125), and that one of the reasons his work is not widely known or "discussed as fairly and fully as (it) deserved" is "that he never worked out his position thoroughly." (Baker, 1986, p.xx). The title of Baker's second book on John Anderson is "Australian Realism: The Systematic Philosophy of John Anderson".

It was mentioned previously (p.xiiabove) that Passmore wrote an article entitled "Anderson as a Systematic Philosopher" (1977). Early in that article Passmore said:

"From Anderson's essay on Hegel we can readily deduce how he saw his own task as a systematic philosopher, what, in general terms, he was trying to do and what pitfalls he was particularly intent on avoiding. Anderson on Hegel as a systematic philosopher is at the same time Anderson on Anderson as a systematic philosopher." (Passmore, 1977, p.48)

Yet he finishes that article saying:

"To read an essay by Anderson is to read Anderson; perhaps to misunderstand him, no doubt, but to participate in thinking which is everywhere systematic and yet everywhere in opposition to the conception of a total system, indeed, to ultimates of any sort or description. One could not deduce from one's knowledge of Anderson's logic that he would suppose Hegel to be the one and only systematic philosopher. Yet of almost every sentence in his essay one feels that it could only have been written by Anderson. That is the sense in which he was, and took Hegel to be, a systematic philosopher." (1977, p.53)

It may appear that Passmore is being frivolous -- is suggesting that Anderson was a systematic philosopher in being systematically opposed to that kind of Hegelian system; but he was not. Elsewhere, Passmore identified a number of recurring themes, or 'ideas', in Anderson's work, and then said:

"Clearly, these key ideas are closely related one to another; they have, in a sense, to be taken together if we are to get a firm grasp of any one of them. They constitute a philosophical 'system' insofar as they lay down a set of conditions which will have to be fulfilled by any satisfactory solution to any problem." (Passmore, 1963, p.155)

These 'ideas' are objectivity, complexity, historicity, independence, "the idea of 'a single way of being'", and the idea of inquiry (Passmore, Ibid, pp154-5). Passmore also said Anderson's "teachers had been Idealists, and he had not lost all sympathy with them; he agreed with them, in particular, that philosophy must be systematic, and that it was best worked out by a method of continuous exposition." (Passmore, Ibid, p.159). This view of philosophy may be contrasted with a quite different one, of philosophy as 'therapeutic', which claims descent from Socrates (Passmore, Ibid, pp157-8), a view which Anderson opposed (Passmore, 1962, p.xxiii).

But the questions remain: "How can Anderson's philosophy claim to be systematic when it was never systematically expounded? In what sense could it be considered systematic?" The best answer to those questions was suggested (if not spelt out) by Mackie when he said:

1. "Anderson's is a systematic philosophy, which works out in many different fields the same general ideas and methods of criticism;" (1958, p.99)

2. "It is a speculative and systematic philosophy, in which realist and empiricist logical principles and methods of criticism are applied to all branches of the subject, and have radical consequences in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and aesthetics, as well as social theory." (1962a, p.124)

3. "John Anderson's philosophy is at once so independent and so systematic that it would be a mistake to assimilate either his position as a whole, or any of his main doctrines, to those of any earlier or contemporary thinkers. ... His central doctrine is that there is only one way of being, ... Anderson rejects systematically the notion of entities that are constituted, wholly or partly, by their relations:" (1962b, p.265).

It is maintained here that as Mackie (and Passmore, also) indicated, the **systematic** nature of Anderson's philosophical position does not reside in the systematic exposition of views from 'basic' principles, but from a **consistent** empiricist-realist **methodology**: the application of the same methods of criticism to a wide range of fields, or more precisely, to all fields of inquiry. That is the same as saying that **one logic**, or one methodology of inquiry and criticism, applies to all subjects. And in its simplest form, that is Anderson's doctrine of one way of being.

Although this view is not explicitly stated there, it is implicit in the remarks of Cullum & Lycos when they say:

"What distinguishes Anderson from other philosophers, even from those who engage in system building, is his realisation that the conflict between realism and rival positions, as well as that between objectivism and subjectivism, is not confined to various recurring conflicts in the history of philosophy. Realism, and the forms of opposition to it, Anderson thought, are evident in the whole spectrum of intellectual endeavour; in philosophy as well as in politics, education, art and science. As a realist and a philosopher, Anderson clearly saw that to defend realism meant engaging critically the arguments and theories of its opponents. It also meant examining the spirit of various ways of thinking outside philosophy to reveal anti-realist tendencies.

"This unifying concern to work out the implications of realism as an intellectual position gave Anderson a unique way of combining philosophy with other general intellectual concerns." (Anderson, Cullum and Lycos, 1982, p.6).

It also explains what Anderson himself meant when he said:

"What I take to emerge from this whole discussion (of realism in all its facets) is the **range** of realist criticism, and the fact, remarkable as it may appear, that it is this philosophy of independence which alone makes possible a systematic account of the major departments of human culture." (Anderson, 1958 , p.56).

TWO QUESTIONS

If Anderson was such an important, systematic philosopher, and was so influential in Australia, two questions naturally arise:

- * Why is his work not being dealt with in philosophy courses today?
- * Why is his work virtually unknown, much less understood, outside Australia?

These questions cannot be fully discussed or answered here, but a little light can be thrown on them.

Passmore correctly pointed out that Anderson's influence was exerted mainly through his lectures (Passmore, 1972, Vol. 1, p.120). In fact, his work has not been understood much outside a circle of students and colleagues who worked with him in Sydney. Partly due to the Second World War, "The decade 1940-1950 was not productive of philosophical publication, or even of discussion between universities" Passmore wrote, and at that time --

"Anderson had written little, and his former students did not feel it proper to do his writing for him. So nobody in Australia outside Melbourne had any clear idea of what was being taught (in Sydney), and Melbourne was only slightly better acquainted with what was taught in Sydney" (Passmore, 1963, pp158-9).

Apart from being misunderstood because he called himself an empiricist, "To make matters worse, his writings are quantitatively so sparse and qualitatively so concise as scarcely to be intelligible to those who have not heard his university lectures" (Passmore, 1963, p.150).

Baker, too, agreed that Anderson's work was not well known, and offered reasons why that is so:

"Anderson influenced many students who went on to become philosophers or to specialise in various other disciplines or professions. But despite his influence his philosophical views have never been made widely known, even in Australia, nor have they ever been discussed as fairly and fully as they deserved. Of the several reasons for this, one is that he never worked out his position thoroughly, in part because he was an active educator and controversialist, but also because he was not very responsive to the need for detailed elaboration. ... the fact is that he was quite possessive about his philosophy and discouraged or inhibited members of his school from themselves working and writing on core parts of his position. So the able people who were close in spirit to his thought either wrote little, or, in their writing, avoided tackling central issues. In some ways Anderson was quite opposed to publicising his philosophy -- except by the medium of lecturing to his students and writing articles mainly directed at members of his school; although a part defence of this is found in his belief that a philosophical position can only be grasped by concentrated study of it, and in his lack of interest in the embourgeoisement of his views or their becoming fashionable for the wrong reasons." (Baker, 1986, pp.xx-xxi).

For whatever reason or reasons, Anderson's work is not widely understood and it goes without saying that before there can be any informed criticism of his position, it must be more widely appreciated. Some of the reasons why "Studies in Empirical Philosophy" has not changed this situation greatly have already been suggested by Passmore: the articles are very compressed, and couched in a very strict terminology limited to Anderson's viewpoint. Another is intimated by Mackie: Anderson's work is systematic, and a complete presentation of it would begin with an account of his logic and show how other aspects of his position flow from that (Mackie, 1962b, pp265-5). Despite Baker's two useful books (1979, 1986), this has not been done. It is impossible within the word limits here to even contemplate such a task.

Consequently, when philosophers not fully acquainted with Anderson's work have attempted to criticise it, their criticisms have, for the most part, misfired due to misunderstanding (see pp. xvii above, and xxx below). Cumming illustrated three cases of such misunderstanding (1976, p43ff).

COMMENTATORS ON ANDERSON'S DOCTRINE OF ONE WAY OF BEING

A number of major commentaries on Anderson's philosophical position agree that Anderson's central doctrine, his view of empiricism, is his doctrine of 'one way of being'. In two articles written in the year of Anderson's death, J.L. Mackie made the same claim:

"His central doctrine is that there is only one way of being, that of ordinary things in space and time, and that every question is a simple issue of truth or falsity, that there are no different degrees or kinds of truth." (1962a, p.124; 1962b, p.265).

In giving an account of Anderson's logic, T.A. Rose said:

"Empiricism is the doctrine that there is only one way of being, no degrees or grades of reality, no ultimate realities (origins, ends, absolutes, elements, meanings) governing lesser realities." (1958, p.57)

And in an article on Anderson, D.M. Armstrong after quoting and commenting on Heraclitus, said: "In a similar fashion Anderson maintains that there is only a **single way of being**. By this he means to rule out all doctrines of degrees, levels and orders of being." (1977, p.65). In his History of Philosophy in Australia, S.A. Grave wrote:

"The fundamental contention of Anderson's philosophy is that there is 'only one way of being', one kind of truth, and correspondingly, only one way of knowing."

And in the same place, Grave wrote --

"There is only one way of being -- being the case. What is excluded? Degrees of truth or reality, the contrast of higher and lower truths, necessary truths, and entities into whose description a notion of truth other than that of ordinary truth has to enter." (1984, p.49).

Passmore is a little more circumspect about this doctrine, and to substantiate that claim, it is worth considering the contexts in which he raises it:

"No total scheme, no simple units, no first principles, no ultimate objectives, no modes of being, no necessary truths -- these, not the rejection of God, are the fundamental negations of Anderson's philosophy. To put it positively, there is, on his view, a single way of being: the complex activity of a spatio-temporal occurrence, within which discriminations can be made and which is itself discriminable within a wider system. To explain, to prove, is to draw attention to relationships which occur between such occurrences; to assert a proposition is to take something of a certain kind to occur; any proposition can be false; science proceeds by the critical examination of hypotheses; any objective has a variety of characteristics and it can always be pursued as part of a procedure for getting something else." (Passmore, 1962, p.xxiii).

As outlined here, the assertion of "a single way of being" is a "positive" aspect of Anderson's philosophy, but it is very clearly related to discourse, logic, or inquiry. In another place, Passmore represented the doctrine of one way of being as one of six "key ideas" (c.f. pxix above) which recur in Anderson's work:

"The idea of 'a single way of being': there are not degrees or varieties of existence, higher or lower, necessary and contingent, potential and actual; to say of anything that 'it exists' is to say that something happens in space-time." (Passmore, 1963, p.155)

It should be emphasised that in each account of the doctrine as outlined so far, there is a positive and a negative aspect to it. No matter what it purports to assert positively, it is clearly associated with the rejection or denial of other views.

It is rather significant that in another important article on Anderson (in Paul Edwards "Encyclopaedia of Philosophy"), Passmore does not mention the doctrine in that form at all. Rather, it is implicit in three separate passages there, each repeated here:

1. "To be real simply is to be 'propositional', that is, to be a thing of a certain description, or, in Anderson's view, a complex of activities in a spatiotemporal region."
2. "For Anderson, **empiricism consisted in the rejection of the view**" (my emphasis) "that there is anything 'higher' or 'lower' than complex states of affairs as we encounter them in everyday experience; he rejected ultimates of every sort, whether in the form of ultimate wholes, like Bradley's Absolute, or ultimate units, such as 'sense data' or 'atomic propositions'."
3. "What was perhaps his fundamental argument can be put thus: As soon as we try to describe 'ultimate' entities or offer any account of their relation to those 'contingent' entities whose existence and behaviour they are supposed to explain, we find ourselves obliged, by the very nature of the case, to treat alleged 'ultimates' as possessing such-and-such properties as a 'mere matter-of-fact'." (Passmore, 1972, p.120)

Now it should be emphasised that in these three passages, **the major import of the doctrine of one way of being is conveyed**, yet it is not expressed in the form noted earlier: i.e., as "There is only one way of being ...". The first aspect gives its 'positive side': being real is related to being 'propositional' (whatever that means); the second aspect virtually defines empiricism negatively: as opposed to some other kinds of views which are based on dichotomies or divisions; the third aspect is that there is a fundamental kind of argument which can be used against all attempts at dichotomies or divisions of a certain kind.

Curious though this treatment of the doctrine may seem, it is ultimately accepted here as the non-metaphysical interpretation of it. In simple terms, it links the doctrine to a propositional logic; it says that any attempt to go outside a propositional logic is illogical, and can be shown to be so by a fundamental argument. But it characterises empiricism in purely negative terms.

The relationship between the Doctrine of One Way of Being and Anderson's empiricism is taken up again in the section "Empiricism", especially p. 65 ff below.

DIFFICULTIES IN EXPOUNDING ANDERSON'S PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION

There are formidable difficulties involved in attempting to expound, analyse, and criticise Anderson's philosophical position, and these apply no less to the doctrine of one way of being. Some of these difficulties reside on Anderson's side, so to speak; that is, in understanding what he meant, how various aspects of his thought and terminology relate to others; and especially in collecting the evidence necessary for clarification or interpretation of his meaning, which evidence has to be sought in numerous articles, lectures, and commentaries, often from scattered references and offhand remarks. Some of these difficulties reside on the side of the 'audience'; that is, in conveying to contemporary philosophers, whose background assumptions are so vastly different from Anderson's, what Anderson was saying.

These difficulties are so formidable, and the gulf between Anderson's thought and mainstream, contemporary Anglo-American philosophy so great, that it is necessary to recognise their range and kinds from the outset.

(i) Anderson's philosophical 'lineage'

Anderson's grounding in Greek philosophy was a very important influence on his thinking throughout his life (see especially SIEP pp80-82, 86, 192ff). He was influenced by the work of John Burnet on the Greeks, and developed his own unique and important interpretation of the work of Heraclitus. In the first of the papers just mentioned, he extolled the commonsense and directness of Greek philosophy, and in the second criticised the 'modernism' (anti-classical approach) of Bacon and Descartes (SIEP, pp194ff). He was critical of rationalism in all its forms, and detected it in almost all modern philosophy from Descartes on, until one line of twentieth-century realism set a new course. He was influenced by the positive ideas of William James, G.E. Moore, the American New Realists, but especially Samuel Alexander. There can be little doubt from his criticisms of Russell (in "Empiricism", 1927) and Ryle (in "Empiricism and Logic", 1962) that he believed that that dominant line of twentieth-century British philosophy had

'reverted to type', i.e., to rationalism.

It should also be recognised that Anderson studied philosophy (under idealists) at a time when Russell's logic was being developed. He learnt about the traditional logic from extremely capable teachers, and exponents, and learnt it well. He developed his own unique and comprehensive version of traditional logic (Baker, 1986, Chapter 6).

He was critical of Russell's logic, and gave sound reasons for being so. If the notion of 'necessary truth' is rationalist, Russell's logic is rationalist and cannot be appropriate for any empiricist. Anderson had sketched out, in published articles, the main lines of his philosophical position by 1936 when Wittgenstein began working on the 'Investigations' (Ayer, 1985, p.10), and he had published the greater part of his major papers before the 'Investigations' was published in 1953. So it must be understood that Anderson lived through the period when Russellian logic gradually eclipsed traditional logic in acceptance, and had worked out his position before linguistic philosophy had come into vogue. So Anderson's lineage puts him at odds with contemporary assumptions about logic and language; and this 'gulf' is apt to lead to serious misunderstanding.

It is appropriate to note here that Anderson was prepared to link his doctrine of one way of being with the views of Heraclitus of Ephesus:

"It has therefore to be recognised that 'This body is fiery', 'This body is hot' and 'Fire is hot' are propositions all of the same order, and their terms are all of the same order. So far from the recognition of 'forms' settling problems such as that of the like and the unlike, it renders them insoluble; they can be solved only by sticking to things, and recognising that they are **sorts of things**, i.e., historical situations or occurrences. We have to reject the distinction between being and becoming, and recognise, with Heraclitus, that whatever is, is in process and whatever is in process, is. Thus the rea-

listic rejection of 'constitutive relations' develops into the empirical recognition of a single way of being, that, namely, of observable things -- **existence**; and the position finally appears as that of a positive and pluralistic logic of events." (SIEP, p.53)

Both Heraclitus and Anderson (according to Anderson) rejected the dualism of the division of mind and reality, or 'realms', which is also linked with representationism (p.90) below.

"The doctrine of 'realms' or 'worlds' is itself a phantasy (as Heraclitus was the first to point out); and the supposed hard-headedness of believers in an 'external world' (as contrasted with an inner world of thought) is simply theoretical muddlement." (SIEP, p.200)

Baker acknowledges Anderson's indebtedness to Heraclitus by opening with two quotations from Heraclitus opposite the frontispiece of his "Australian Realism" (1986). These are:

"This world, which is the same for all, no one of gods or men has made; but it was ever, is now, and ever shall be an ever-living Fire, with measures kindling, and measures going out."

"If you do not expect the unexpected, you will not find it; for it is hard to be sought out and difficult."

These passages are to be found in Burnet, 1948: fragment 20, p.134 and fragment 7, p.133, respectively. (C:f. p.120 below.)

(ii) Anderson as Systematic Philosopher

It was shown earlier that Anderson purported to be, and was taken by his followers to be, a systematic philosopher; yet he did not systematically expound his position. He wrote no **magnus opus**: no wide-ranging systematic treatise. Under these circumstances, if he is to be regarded as a systematic philosopher, it must be shown how the various facets of his position were related, and this appears to involve describing principles of some kind -- or we must throw up our hands in despair, saying that although Anderson was regarded as a systematic philosopher by his followers, we do not now understand in what way he was.

This problem is made more difficult because of the wide range of Anderson's philosophical interests. To show that Anderson was a systematic philosopher, it would have to be shown either --

- (a) that the principles underpinning his position related to each of the specialist branches of philosophy, or
- (b) that Anderson's views in each of these fields were consistent with his 'core' views.

These wider tasks cannot be undertaken here in dealing with the doctrine of one way of being, although it is presumed that ultimately it would be possible to show that that doctrine did provide a connecting link between Anderson's central, logical views, and his views in specialised departments of philosophy. (See p. 203 below.)

However, it will be clear to anyone who reads Anderson's works that he had his own rather peculiar, and rather limited, terminology. But equally there are many terms which he never systematically explained anywhere (c.f. Baker, 1979, p.9), and some which are explained, which only those familiar with his writings could locate. Furthermore, while he often spoke with authority on logic, he never systematically expounded his theory of logic. (See p.8 below.)

(iii) The Polemical Character of Anderson's Writing

Related to the problem of lack of systematic exposition, and to a large extent compounding that problem, is the fact that most of Anderson's published works and lectures are polemical. As noted, Passmore said: "Anderson on Hegel as a systematic philosopher is at the same time Anderson on Anderson as a systematic philosopher" (1977, p.48). In criticising and rejecting other views, he was developing his own, and yet the two -- the criticism and development of positive views -- remain inextricably intertwined. Anyone who attempts to disentangle Anderson's positive views and expound them systematically will soon find themselves faced with extraordinary difficulties. The 'force' of Anderson's views, if we can so speak, is always partly critical or destructive, partly positive or constructive.

Where many philosophers in dealing with the views of others provide an overall exposition first, and then commence criticism, Anderson's lectures in particular inch their way through others' work with criticism at every step; but this remarkable approach is evident in many of the published articles also. As has already been indicated, this mingling of criticism and development of positive views applies very much to the exposition of the doctrine of one way of being. It involves the rejection of rationalism, the development of Anderson's unique view of empiricism and (or which is?) the doctrine of one way of being.

**(iv) The Difficulty of Providing a Brief Outline
of Anderson's Philosophical Position**

In addition to the problems mentioned, it is extremely difficult to convey a brief and meaningful account of Anderson's central philosophical position which is not misleading in some ways. An attempt has been made to rectify this problem to some extent in Part I of this Thesis.

(v) Are Anderson's Central Doctrines Metaphysical or Not?

In attempting to give an account of Anderson's central doctrines, the problem of their status must be confronted, and this applies no less to the doctrine of one way of being. The Question whether Anderson's major doctrines (including that of one way of being) can be understood as metaphysical (in some sense) and whether it makes sense at all to interpret empiricism as a metaphysical doctrine, is a principal consideration in the present thesis.

* * * * *

Anderson's Relevance to Contemporary Philosophy

Contemporary philosophers reading Anderson for the first time are apt to misunderstand him for a number of reasons, and when his position is made clear, are apt to be struck by a number of unusual features of his work. But while his views may be unusual, and unfamiliar to contemporary philosophers, it is suggested here that his general philosophical position and 'stock' arguments are perfectly relevant to contemporary philosophy, and for those very reasons, have yet to be seriously considered and dealt with. As mentioned, it is assumed here that Anderson's work was systematic. And that implies that there are sound reasons for every feature of his philosophical position. For the most part, the unusual and unfamiliar features of his position are consistent with his non-representationist empiricism-realism. Several of these deserve special mention, and by drawing attention to them, it is anticipated that certain (otherwise likely) misunderstandings will be avoided, and new and important issues will be brought to the attention of contemporary philosophy.

These issues are merely mentioned here. They are:

- (vi) Anderson's adherence to a logic of four categorical propositions and syllogism.
- (vii) Anderson's rejection of rationalism, which accounts for his rejection of --
 - (a) Russell's logic,
 - (b) necessary truths and self-contradictory statements,
 - (c) analytic truths.
- (viii) Anderson's rejection of dualism-representationism, which accounts for --
 - (a) his rejection of ideas and concepts,
 - (b) talk about 'the world',
 - (c) his lack of interest in questions of language and meaning, and
 - (d) his lack of interest in epistemological issues.
- (ix) Anderson's criticism of relativist terms, which is connected with his criticism of rationalism, idealism, and his rejection of 'meanings'.

Anderson's antipathy towards all of these views -- (vii) to (ix) -- is directly related to his logic, and the doctrine of one way of being. It is suggested here that the reason why Anderson is in dispute with mainstream contemporary philosophy on all of these issues is that, as Anderson implied in various places, contemporary philosophy has not freed itself from the influence of its rationalist-idealist forebears, nor from the various marks of these in the form of dualism, atomism, and representationism; that contemporary philosophy is basically rationalist in being concerned with 'knowledge' and 'meanings', which approach Anderson totally rejected.

Some light is thrown upon the place of each of these 'peculiar' views in Parts I and II.

ANY EXPOSITION OF ANDERSON'S WORK MUST BE INTERPRETATIVE

Evidence has been provided that in some sense Anderson aspired to be a systematic philosopher, and that many of his followers believed he was. But it remains undeniable that his philosophical views were never expounded in a systematic way. For that reason, Mackie was fully justified in saying (after outlining some major features of Anderson's thought):

"But while it is easy thus to sum up Anderson's philosophical position, it is a more difficult and much more complicated task to show how these principles are established or supported, how they are worked out in detail, and how they would be defended against objections and criticisms." (1962b, p.266)

Passmore took the problem a little further:

"Anderson once said to me that what he had done was to present the sketch of a systematic philosophy; it could be left to others to work out the detail. That was unrealistic; I can think of no instance in the history of philosophy in which anything of that kind has happened. As Anderson himself points out, those pupils who thought of themselves as being most faithful to Hegel in fact reduced him to a ridiculous doctrinarianism. The better pupils of a great philosopher have always followed their master's example; to whatever degree they have been inspired by his spirit, however grateful for his teaching they may have been, they could not rest content with 'filling in detail', any more than Anderson confined himself to 'filling in detail' in Alexander." (1977, p.53)

The fact that Anderson's philosophical views were not set out in systematic form is, to some extent, philosophy's 'misfortune' (Quinton, 1986, p.xi) and, it would seem, a great loss. While Baker has made a serious attempt to rectify this problem in his two excellent books, and others have dealt with more restricted areas of Anderson's position, it is, as Mackie indicated, a formidable task to attempt to reconstruct

Anderson's position as a systematic one, and even more formidable to convey the vigour and directness of his style while doing so.

In any event, it seems that any attempt to bridge major gaps in Anderson's position now must be recognised as an interpretative one. And this thesis, necessarily, falls into that category. Nevertheless, as such, it aims to pay tribute to the systematic and wide-ranging nature of Anderson's thought by drawing together numerous threads, and by recognising serious difficulties within the larger fabric.

THE AIMS AND FORMAT OF THIS THESIS

As has been shown, the main commentators on Anderson's philosophy recognise --

- (a) that his logic was not only unique, but central to his philosophical position;
- (b) that he described his position variously as empiricist, realist, pluralist and determinist;
- (c) that his philosophical position was, or at least aspired to be, systematic;
- (d) that his empiricism was, or coincided with, the doctrine of one way of being, and that this doctrine was central to his position.

The main aim of this thesis is to attempt to clarify the significance and status of the doctrine of one way of being.

Clearly, if Anderson's position is systematic, examination and understanding of the doctrine must take other important aspects of Anderson's philosophical position into account, which is to say, the doctrine must be understood sympathetically, within the wider context of Anderson's views. It is for this reason that a good deal of space in Part I is devoted to an examination of Anderson's arguments against those philosophical '-isms' which he opposed, and the four singled out here as the central ones by which he described his own position.

So it is consistent with -- indeed part of -- the main aim to clarify how various aspects of Anderson's position fit together, especially how the doctrine of one way of being relates to Anderson's logic, and the four '-isms' -- remembering that it is supposed to be identical with Anderson's empiricism. Accepting the four claims -- (a) to (d) above, it is reasonable to assume that when the significance of the doctrine is understood, it will illuminate the full range of Anderson's 'core' position.

The question whether the doctrine of one way of being is metaphysical or not, is crucial. Indeed, the question whether any part of Anderson's

philosophical position is metaphysical or not is crucial, for it would be absurd to seek a thoroughly non-metaphysical interpretation of one part, say the doctrine of one way of being, if some other aspect -- say, his pluralism -- was clearly metaphysical. This thesis therefore argues consistently for a non-metaphysical interpretation of the doctrine, and all aspects of Anderson's position.

In discussing the doctrine within the wider context of Anderson's 'core' position, this thesis has a number of subsidiary aims. It also **aims**:

- (i) to show that the doctrine of one way of being, and Anderson's position generally, can be interpreted consistently as non-metaphysical;
- (ii) to make Anderson's views more readily comprehensible to those unfamiliar with them;
- (iii) to show that Anderson's views, especially the doctrine of one way of being, are relevant to contemporary philosophy, and raise the most fundamental issues about logic: logical form and methodology.

The approaches adopted in Parts I and II are quite different. Part I is essentially analytical, and attempts by analytical means to discover how various positive and negative aspects of Anderson's 'core' position fit together as a systematic whole. But this analysis only reveals differences, not unifying principles. While the doctrine of one way of being is supposed to relate to Anderson's logic and the four '-isms' he espoused, it cannot be seen how it does, and it cannot be seen how it illuminates Anderson's position.

Part II adopts a hypothetical approach. It represents Anderson's position as systematic by putting forward three hypotheses that centre on logic and methodology, including one which interprets the doctrine of one way of being as the adherence to one observational-propositional methodology. These methodological hypotheses are then tested against Anderson's 'core' views in Section 1, and some remaining problems in Section 2.

It is claimed that the methodological interpretation --

- (a) shows what the doctrine of one way of being is;
- (b) shows how that doctrine relates to Anderson's 'core' position, and specialist theories as well;
- (c) reveals in what way Anderson's philosophical position is systematic; and
- (d) thereby illuminates Anderson's position as might be expected if it is his central doctrine.