Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/11435
Title: On the Argument from Divine Arbitrariness
Contributor(s): Forrest, Peter  (author)
Publication Date: 2012
DOI: 10.1007/s11841-011-0287-8
Handle Link: https://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/11435
Abstract: William Rowe in his 'Can God be Free?' (2004) argues that God, if there is a God, necessarily chooses the best. Combined with the premise that there is no best act of creation, this provides an a priori argument for atheism. Rowe assumes that necessarily God is a 'morally unsurpassable' being, and it is for that reason that God chooses the best. In this article I drop that assumption and I consider a successor to Rowe's argument, the Argument from Arbitrariness, based on the premise that God does not act arbitrarily. My chief conclusion will be that this argument fails because, for all we know, there can be non-arbitrary divine choices even if there is no best act of creation.
Publication Type: Journal Article
Source of Publication: Sophia, 51(3), p. 341-349
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Place of Publication: Netherlands
ISSN: 1873-930X
0038-1527
Fields of Research (FoR) 2008: 220315 Philosophy of Religion
Fields of Research (FoR) 2020: 500316 Philosophy of religion
Socio-Economic Objective (SEO) 2008: 970122 Expanding Knowledge in Philosophy and Religious Studies
Socio-Economic Objective (SEO) 2020: 280119 Expanding knowledge in philosophy and religious studies
Peer Reviewed: Yes
HERDC Category Description: C1 Refereed Article in a Scholarly Journal
Appears in Collections:Journal Article

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