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https://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/11435
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Forrest, Peter | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-10-16T08:46:00Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Sophia, 51(3), p. 341-349 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 1873-930X | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0038-1527 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/11435 | - |
dc.description.abstract | William Rowe in his 'Can God be Free?' (2004) argues that God, if there is a God, necessarily chooses the best. Combined with the premise that there is no best act of creation, this provides an a priori argument for atheism. Rowe assumes that necessarily God is a 'morally unsurpassable' being, and it is for that reason that God chooses the best. In this article I drop that assumption and I consider a successor to Rowe's argument, the Argument from Arbitrariness, based on the premise that God does not act arbitrarily. My chief conclusion will be that this argument fails because, for all we know, there can be non-arbitrary divine choices even if there is no best act of creation. | en |
dc.language | en | en |
dc.publisher | Springer Netherlands | en |
dc.relation.ispartof | Sophia | en |
dc.title | On the Argument from Divine Arbitrariness | en |
dc.type | Journal Article | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s11841-011-0287-8 | en |
dc.subject.keywords | Philosophy of Religion | en |
local.contributor.firstname | Peter | en |
local.subject.for2008 | 220315 Philosophy of Religion | en |
local.subject.seo2008 | 970122 Expanding Knowledge in Philosophy and Religious Studies | en |
local.profile.school | School of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences | en |
local.profile.email | pforrest@une.edu.au | en |
local.output.category | C1 | en |
local.record.place | au | en |
local.record.institution | University of New England | en |
local.identifier.epublicationsrecord | une-20120926-210538 | en |
local.publisher.place | Netherlands | en |
local.format.startpage | 341 | en |
local.format.endpage | 349 | en |
local.identifier.scopusid | 84872602778 | en |
local.peerreviewed | Yes | en |
local.identifier.volume | 51 | en |
local.identifier.issue | 3 | en |
local.contributor.lastname | Forrest | en |
dc.identifier.staff | une-id:pforrest | en |
local.profile.role | author | en |
local.identifier.unepublicationid | une:11634 | en |
dc.identifier.academiclevel | Academic | en |
local.title.maintitle | On the Argument from Divine Arbitrariness | en |
local.output.categorydescription | C1 Refereed Article in a Scholarly Journal | en |
local.search.author | Forrest, Peter | en |
local.uneassociation | Unknown | en |
local.year.published | 2012 | en |
local.subject.for2020 | 500316 Philosophy of religion | en |
local.subject.seo2020 | 280119 Expanding knowledge in philosophy and religious studies | en |
Appears in Collections: | Journal Article |
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