Lessons of Violence: Mass-Violence and Roman Republican Imperialism

Abstract

In describing the sack of New Carthage in 209 BCE, Polybius digresses on the Roman custom ... in sacking a city, namely to kill all those they encounter, even dismembering animals, until the signal is given to engage in plunder. Polybius states that, in his opinion, this is done for the sake of inspiring terror ... (Hist. 10.15.4-5). Polybius thus regards such mass-violence as both conscious and instrumental. Mass-violence could be utilised instrumentally on at least two levels. At the more immediate level, the threat of mass-violence could inspire opponents to surrender swiftly. At a broader level, it could be used in an exemplary fashion - to make an example of a particular people for their conduct - and thus to deter others from like behaviour. This paper will explore both the extent to which Rome did consciously use mass-violence in an exemplary fashion and the range of circumstances in which such violence could be employed. With regard to the first question, I will argue that Rome did indeed employ such violence consciously; for example, Caesar declares that he executed the senate of the Veneti in 57 BCE after that people's mistreatment of ambassadors so that embassies would be well-treated by others in the future (quo diligentius in reliquum tempus a barbaris ius legatorum conservaretur: BG 3.16). In relation to the second question, I will argue that mass-violence was often, though not exclusively, used in an exemplary way in a retributive context, such as the example of Caesar's treatment of the Veneti. At other times, however, the deployment of mass-violence could be less predictable, such as Lucullus' slaughter of the surrendered Vaccaei in 151 BCE (App. Hisp. 52), distorting the extent to which a 'lesson' might be learned from such actions as mass-killing.