Neurophenomenology: Enhancing the Experimental and Cross-Cultural Study of Brain and Experience

Abstract

At this point in the history of social and behavioral science a discussion of methods that is not grounded upon both a neuroepistemology and a neurophenomenology soon will not be worth considering. Why? Because it is now known that consciousness is a function of the internal organization of the brain (Changeux, 1985; Damasio, 2010; Koch, 2004; LeDoux, 2003; Nunez, 2010; Purves, 2010). Every thought, image, feeling, intuition, awareness and sensory experience is mediated by the organ of experience-the brain. Thus questions having to do with how we know, what we can and cannot know, gender-related styles of knowing, the symbolic nature of knowing, how consciousness constructs its world of experience, and how it interacts with the unconscious psyche are really questions about how the brain is organized and develops, and what limiting factors are imposed upon knowing by the organization of the brain and by the physical and sociocultural environments of the developing brain (Mesquita, Barrett, & Smith, 2010). Before we discuss the origin and meaning of the concept of neurophenomenology it would be prudent to explicate the concepts of consciousness and phenomenology.