States of Consciousness or States of Phenomenology?

Abstract

So-called [altered] states of consciousness have been the focus of considerable contemporary interest in the disciplines of, for example, psychology, anthropology, and philosophy. However, we argue that [altered] states of consciousness do not, in fact, exist. We attempt to logically prove this thesis by demonstrating that while definitions of -consciousness typically distinguish -it from -its content (i.e., mental episodes), definitions of -[altered] states of consciousness typically confuse consciousness and its contents by explicitly stating that a [altered] state of consciousness is the content available to a percipient's conscious awareness. In other words, the term -[altered] states of consciousness, rests on the confusion of consciousness with -its content whereby consciousness is erroneously categorized in terms of content rendered perceptible, presumably by consciousness -itself. This error, which we call the consciousness/content fallacy, may be avoided if one replaces -[altered] states of consciousness with a new term, -[altered] states of phenomenology. Implications of the consciousness/content fallacy for theory and research are discussed.