Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/11108
Title: Executive Compensation and Contract-driven Earnings Management
Contributor(s): Sun, Lan (author)
Publication Date: 2012
Handle Link: https://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/11108
Abstract: Earnings management is found to be driven by different managerial incentives. Previous studies have identified that executive compensation contracts create incentives for earnings management. The agency theory and the positive accounting theory provide explanations for contract-driven earnings management. This study links the agency theory and the positive accounting theory and reviews the early executive compensation studies, bonus plan maximization hypothesis and equity-based compensation. The aim of this study is to shed light in explaining contractual incentives and provide useful information in understanding the contract-driven earnings management behaviour.
Publication Type: Conference Publication
Conference Name: 14th Malaysian Finance Association Conference - Emerging Markets and Financial Resilience: Decoupling Growth from Turbulence, Penang, Malaysia, 1st - 3rd June, 2012
Source of Publication: Presented at the 14th Malaysian Finance Association Conference
Field of Research (FOR): 150202 Financial Econometrics
150201 Finance
150303 Corporate Governance and Stakeholder Engagement
HERDC Category Description: E2 Non-Refereed Scholarly Conference Publication
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Downloads: 0
Appears in Collections:Conference Publication
UNE Business School

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