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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/5698
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dc.contributor.authorYalcin, Erkanen
dc.contributor.authorRenstrom, Thomas Ien
dc.date.accessioned2010-04-22T09:03:00Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Public Economic Theory, 5(1), p. 67-94en
dc.identifier.issn1467-9779en
dc.identifier.issn1097-3923en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/5698-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the behavior of a monopolistic firm in general equilibrium when the firm's decisions are taken through shareholder voting. We show that, depending on the underlying distribution, rational voting may imply overproduction as well as underproduction, relative to the efficient level. Any initial distribution of shares is an equilibrium, if individuals do not recognize their influence on voting when trading shares. However, when they do, and there are no short-selling constraints, the only equilibrium is the efficient one. With short-selling constraints typically underproduction occurs. It is not market power itself causing underproduction, but the inability to perfectly trade the rights to market power.en
dc.languageenen
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing, Incen
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Public Economic Theoryen
dc.titleEndogenous Firm Objectivesen
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/1467-9779.00122en
dc.subject.keywordsIndustry Economics and Industrial Organisationen
dc.subject.keywordsMicroeconomic Theoryen
dc.subject.keywordsFinancial Economicsen
dc.subject.keywordsPublic Economics- Public Choiceen
local.contributor.firstnameErkanen
local.contributor.firstnameThomas Ien
local.subject.for2008140104 Microeconomic Theoryen
local.subject.for2008140207 Financial Economicsen
local.subject.for2008140213 Public Economics- Public Choiceen
local.subject.for2008140209 Industry Economics and Industrial Organisationen
local.subject.seo2008910209 Preference, Behaviour and Welfareen
local.subject.seo2008910203 Industrial Organisationsen
local.profile.schoolBusiness Economics and Public Policyen
local.profile.schoolBusiness Economics and Public Policyen
local.profile.emaileyalcin@une.edu.auen
local.output.categoryC1en
local.record.placeauen
local.record.institutionUniversity of New Englanden
local.identifier.epublicationsrecordune-20100420-19086en
local.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen
local.format.startpage67en
local.format.endpage94en
local.peerreviewedYesen
local.identifier.volume5en
local.identifier.issue1en
local.contributor.lastnameYalcinen
local.contributor.lastnameRenstromen
dc.identifier.staffune-id:eyalcinen
local.profile.roleauthoren
local.profile.roleauthoren
local.identifier.unepublicationidune:5834en
dc.identifier.academiclevelAcademicen
local.title.maintitleEndogenous Firm Objectivesen
local.output.categorydescriptionC1 Refereed Article in a Scholarly Journalen
local.search.authorYalcin, Erkanen
local.search.authorRenstrom, Thomas Ien
local.uneassociationUnknownen
local.year.published2003en
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