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https://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/5698
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Yalcin, Erkan | en |
dc.contributor.author | Renstrom, Thomas I | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-04-22T09:03:00Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2003 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Public Economic Theory, 5(1), p. 67-94 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 1467-9779 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 1097-3923 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/5698 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We analyze the behavior of a monopolistic firm in general equilibrium when the firm's decisions are taken through shareholder voting. We show that, depending on the underlying distribution, rational voting may imply overproduction as well as underproduction, relative to the efficient level. Any initial distribution of shares is an equilibrium, if individuals do not recognize their influence on voting when trading shares. However, when they do, and there are no short-selling constraints, the only equilibrium is the efficient one. With short-selling constraints typically underproduction occurs. It is not market power itself causing underproduction, but the inability to perfectly trade the rights to market power. | en |
dc.language | en | en |
dc.publisher | Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc | en |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Public Economic Theory | en |
dc.title | Endogenous Firm Objectives | en |
dc.type | Journal Article | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/1467-9779.00122 | en |
dc.subject.keywords | Industry Economics and Industrial Organisation | en |
dc.subject.keywords | Microeconomic Theory | en |
dc.subject.keywords | Financial Economics | en |
dc.subject.keywords | Public Economics- Public Choice | en |
local.contributor.firstname | Erkan | en |
local.contributor.firstname | Thomas I | en |
local.subject.for2008 | 140104 Microeconomic Theory | en |
local.subject.for2008 | 140207 Financial Economics | en |
local.subject.for2008 | 140213 Public Economics- Public Choice | en |
local.subject.for2008 | 140209 Industry Economics and Industrial Organisation | en |
local.subject.seo2008 | 910209 Preference, Behaviour and Welfare | en |
local.subject.seo2008 | 910203 Industrial Organisations | en |
local.profile.school | Business Economics and Public Policy | en |
local.profile.school | Business Economics and Public Policy | en |
local.profile.email | eyalcin@une.edu.au | en |
local.output.category | C1 | en |
local.record.place | au | en |
local.record.institution | University of New England | en |
local.identifier.epublicationsrecord | une-20100420-19086 | en |
local.publisher.place | United Kingdom | en |
local.format.startpage | 67 | en |
local.format.endpage | 94 | en |
local.peerreviewed | Yes | en |
local.identifier.volume | 5 | en |
local.identifier.issue | 1 | en |
local.contributor.lastname | Yalcin | en |
local.contributor.lastname | Renstrom | en |
dc.identifier.staff | une-id:eyalcin | en |
local.profile.role | author | en |
local.profile.role | author | en |
local.identifier.unepublicationid | une:5834 | en |
dc.identifier.academiclevel | Academic | en |
local.title.maintitle | Endogenous Firm Objectives | en |
local.output.categorydescription | C1 Refereed Article in a Scholarly Journal | en |
local.search.author | Yalcin, Erkan | en |
local.search.author | Renstrom, Thomas I | en |
local.uneassociation | Unknown | en |
local.year.published | 2003 | en |
Appears in Collections: | Journal Article |
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