Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/27063
Title: La Theorie de la Negligence dans le Statut de la Cour Penale Internationale
English Title: A Theory of Negligence under the Statute of the International Criminal Court
Contributor(s): Quirico, Ottavio  (author)orcid 
Publication Date: 2009
Handle Link: https://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/27063
Abstract: Le Statut de la C.P.I., malgre son efficacite relative, tend a resumer l 'evolution du droit international penal 1. Au dela de quelques problemes de coherence, dus surtout aux procedures d'elaboration, sa partie generale constitue un effort remarquable de definition d'une theorie du crime a l'echelle universelle. Dans ce cadre un role important est joue par !'element subjectif, dont le potentiel d'harmonisation et d'unification est considerable.
Publication Type: Journal Article
Source of Publication: Revue Generale de Droit International Public, 113(2), p. 333-364
Publisher: Editions A Pedone
Place of Publication: France
ISSN: 0373-6156
Fields of Research (FoR) 2008: 180116 International Law (excl. International Trade Law)
Socio-Economic Objective (SEO) 2008: 940499 Justice and the Law not elsewhere classified
Peer Reviewed: Yes
HERDC Category Description: C1 Refereed Article in a Scholarly Journal
Publisher/associated links: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/ejemplar/226434
English Abstract: The Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) outlines a theory of mens rea for international crimes, which is consistent with customary law only to a limited extent. The standard principle of imputation is intent, whereas negligence applies exceptionally. However, negligence is a general principle of imputation when a subordinate commits a war crime pursuant to the order of a superior or if a superior fails to exercise adequate control over an offence committed by a subordinate. Such a ‘dualistic’ approach raises problems of consistency and completeness, notably: (1) negligence may be overlooked as a principle of imputation; (2) the systematic nature of international crimes cannot be ordinarily imputed based on recklessness and advertent negligence; (3) inadequate consideration of evitable mistakes entails strict liability; (4) when negligence does not apply, an evitable mistake on defences other than superior orders excludes responsibility; (5) when a superior fails to exercise adequate control over crimes committed by subordinates, there is no adequate rationale for applying a different criterion of imputation to military superiors (negligence) and non-military superiors (intent). By virtue of Article 21 of its Statute, the ICC can apply customary law to fill such normative loopholes; however, this approach is not fully consistent with a strict interpretation of the principle of legality.
Appears in Collections:Journal Article
School of Law

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