Security as a Contested Space: Engagement of China, India and the UK with Post-War Nepal and Implications for Peacebuilding and Recovery

Abstract

Relevant literature in the field reflects, almost unanimously, that the global distribution of power is becoming polycentric. Rising powers are not only dissenting from traditional templates of peacebuilding, but also applying their own methods to respond to international security issues. There are abundant case studies on the influence of Brazil, China, India and other emerging powers on security and peacebuilding in conflict-affected states. Knowledge is lacking about the consequences, when these new powers interact with fellow powers and established powers in conflict contexts. There are a few previous studies, mostly concentrating on reactions at global and regional institutions, but understanding is limited on their interactions in third country contexts. Country case studies are available which acknowledge the significance of regional power structures, but little is available on how powers in such structures interact with great power interests and affect security and peacebuilding in post-crisis situations. Sandwiched between China and India, with the UK remaining its largest bilateral donor, Nepal represents a prototype case of how rising powers and great powers compete in a postwar recovery process. UK policies embrace the ideas of security–development nexus but most scholarship on its engagement builds upon African cases. Previous studies have covered the generic politico-economic roles of China and India in Nepal and only a few have concentrated on security. The implications for Nepal's security future when actors from these two extremities contest or collaborate has been understudied, but cannot be ignored. To fill this gap, this study attempts to explore the drivers and nature of the UK, India and China's engagement with Nepal and their implications for security sector governance. The Democratic Peace Theory and Regional Security Complex Theory have been used to assess securitisation and its subsequent effects in peacebuilding and recovery. Grounded theory provided the methodology and primary data was collected through 104 semi-structured interviews with decision-makers in the Nepal government, development/diplomatic agency officers and civil society stakeholders. Findings suggest that although the UK's persistent engagement helped manage transition peacefully, institutional changes have been normative and winning confidence remains arduous. Indian support contributed to effectuation of strength, but is less likely to ensure democratic standards. By the same token, the hardware-centric, project-based and infrastructure-led Chinese assistance makes recovery efforts lopsided. A comparison indicates that the multilateral UK approach institutionalised democratic values at the grassroots of security sector governance, whereas China and India were more effective in advancing mutual security agendas through elite compromise at upper levels. Hardware of security such as infrastructures engrossed much consideration, whereas software of security such as institutional values attracted little attention. Theoretically, the findings in this thesis suggest that security is a borderless space where multiple actors contest to fulfil imperatives to maintain or maximise power. Reforming security sector governance, therefore, is unlikely to bring about meaningful post-war recovery, if it is to be treated merely as a territorially restricted peacebuilding agenda.