Social Status, Legal Status and Legal Privilege

Abstract

In the early second century AD, the Roman senator Pliny congratulated the governor of Baetica, Calestrius Tiro, on his administration of justice. Pliny lauds Tiro for being both loved by the lesser people ('minores'), and esteemed by the province's leading men ('principes'). In particular, Pliny praises Tiro for preserving the distinctions of rank and dignity ('discrimina ordinum dignitatumque') in his judicial activities, as once such distinctions are confused, nothing is more unequal than the resulting equality ('nihil est ipsa aequalitate inaequalius') (Ep. 9.5). Pliny's brief missive reveals much about elite ideas on the relationship between social status and the administration of justice; in particular, the belief that equality did not lie in treating all as equal before the law, but rather in respecting distinctions of rank and status. In this regard, Pliny refers to two broad hierarchical categories: the leading ('principes') or powerful people ('potentes'), and the lesser folk ('minores'). Pliny also states that some governors do not respect such distinctions appropriately, obtaining a bad reputation through deciding too often for the 'minores' from their fear of seeming to yield excessively to the 'potentes'. This implies that respect for rank and status flowed from the governor's discretion, rather than strict application of legal rules. Pliny's epistle neatly encapsulates the issues for inquiry here: what was the relationship between legal and social status in Roman law, and to what extent did legal or social status distinctions grant legal privilege?