Review of Cappelen, Herman, 'Philosophy Without Intuitions', Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. xii + 242, £30.00 (hardback)

Abstract

In this imaginative book, Herman Cappelen challenges two key orthodoxies: that philosophers, as a matter of fact, rely upon intuitions in their everyday practice; and that it is legitimate for them to do so. What he wants is a philosophy purged of intuition-talk, since he believes such talk is idle when we consider how contemporary philosophers actually proceed in dealing with philosophical problems. One consequence of Cappelen's approach, if he is correct, is that we cannot use the so-called 'method of cases' to develop a common method of philosophical inquiry, the latter being a research goal about which he is, in general, very sceptical. 'Philosophy without Intuitions' raises significant methodological issues to which contemporary philosophy needs to respond.