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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/2215
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dc.contributor.authorKhlentzos, Drew Michaelen
local.source.editorEditor(s): Andrea C. Schalley and Drew Khlentzosen
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-17T18:09:00Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.citationMental States, v.1: Evolution, function, nature, p. 213-232en
dc.identifier.isbn9789027231024en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/2215-
dc.description.abstractThe plausibility of Naturalism - the view that the mind is a purely natural phenomenon that can be explained scientifically (if explained at all) - is a hotly contested topic in cognitive science, as every philosopher and cognitive scientist knows. It is not widely recognised, however that some of the more popular arguments against naturalism rest upon anti-realist metaphysical assumptions. This is a problem since the most plausible defences of naturalism presuppose a realist metaphysics. In this chapter, I shall chart one of these anti-realist assumptions and show how it features as a crucial premise in a leading anti-naturalist argument, the Knowledge Argument.en
dc.languageenen
dc.publisherJohn Benjamins Publishing Companyen
dc.relation.ispartofMental Statesen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesStudies in Language Companion Series (SLCS)en
dc.relation.isversionof1en
dc.titleAnti-realist assumptions and challenges in philosophy of minden
dc.typeBook Chapteren
dc.subject.keywordsPhilosophy of Cognitionen
local.contributor.firstnameDrew Michaelen
local.subject.for2008220312 Philosophy of Cognitionen
local.subject.seo2008970117 Expanding Knowledge in Psychology and Cognitive Sciencesen
local.identifier.epublicationsvtls086376607en
local.profile.schoolSchool of Behavioural, Cognitive and Social Sciencesen
local.profile.emaildkhlentz@une.edu.auen
local.output.categoryB1en
local.record.placeauen
local.record.institutionUniversity of New Englanden
local.identifier.epublicationsrecordpes:5720en
local.publisher.placeAmsterdam, Netherlandsen
local.identifier.totalchapters14en
local.format.startpage213en
local.format.endpage232en
local.series.number92en
local.identifier.volume1: Evolution, function, natureen
local.contributor.lastnameKhlentzosen
dc.identifier.staffune-id:dkhlentzen
local.profile.roleauthoren
local.identifier.unepublicationidune:2287en
dc.identifier.academiclevelAcademicen
local.title.maintitleAnti-realist assumptions and challenges in philosophy of minden
local.output.categorydescriptionB1 Chapter in a Scholarly Booken
local.relation.urlhttp://books.google.com.au/books?id=YUMrT_Fnoo8C&lpg=PP1&pg=PA213en
local.relation.urlhttp://www.benjamins.com/cgi-bin/t_bookview.cgi?bookid=SLCS%2092en
local.relation.urlhttp://nla.gov.au/anbd.bib-an42712161en
local.search.authorKhlentzos, Drew Michaelen
local.uneassociationUnknownen
local.year.published2007en
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