Indirection and 'Parrhesia': The Roles of Socrates' 'Daimonion' and Kierkegaard's 'Styrelse' in Communication

Abstract

The word »'parrhesia'« first appears in Greek literature in the work of Euripides. It means »speaking out« or »free speech.« But we can distinguish two types of 'parrhesia': on the one hand there is 'chatter' - garrulously saying everything that comes to mind. This is 'parrhesia' in the pejorative sense. On the other hand there is a positive sense of 'parrhesia' which means to speak out 'on behalf of the truth'. Michel Foucault traced the changes in the function of, and criteria for recognizing, the 'parrhesiastes' [the one who uses 'parrhesia'] from Euripides to the late Stoics and the beginnings of Christianity. But there he left off. I want to compare Socrates and Kierkegaard as 'parrhesiastes' to mark some of the changes and continuities from the early Platonic context to the modern Christian context. Along the way I also want to draw attention to the roles of Socrates' 'daimonion' and Kierkegaard's 'Styrelse' in their respective forms of 'parrhesia'.