Indirection and 'Parrhesia': The Roles of Socrates' 'Daimonion' and Kierkegaard's 'Styrelse' in Communication

Title
Indirection and 'Parrhesia': The Roles of Socrates' 'Daimonion' and Kierkegaard's 'Styrelse' in Communication
Publication Date
2003
Author(s)
McDonald, William
Editor
Editor(s): Poul Houe and Gordon D Marino
Type of document
Book Chapter
Language
en
Entity Type
Publication
Publisher
Reitzel
Place of publication
Copenhagen, Denmark
Edition
1
UNE publication id
une:6436
Abstract
The word »'parrhesia'« first appears in Greek literature in the work of Euripides. It means »speaking out« or »free speech.« But we can distinguish two types of 'parrhesia': on the one hand there is 'chatter' - garrulously saying everything that comes to mind. This is 'parrhesia' in the pejorative sense. On the other hand there is a positive sense of 'parrhesia' which means to speak out 'on behalf of the truth'. Michel Foucault traced the changes in the function of, and criteria for recognizing, the 'parrhesiastes' [the one who uses 'parrhesia'] from Euripides to the late Stoics and the beginnings of Christianity. But there he left off. I want to compare Socrates and Kierkegaard as 'parrhesiastes' to mark some of the changes and continuities from the early Platonic context to the modern Christian context. Along the way I also want to draw attention to the roles of Socrates' 'daimonion' and Kierkegaard's 'Styrelse' in their respective forms of 'parrhesia'.
Link
Citation
Søren Kierkegaard and the Word(s): Essays on hermeneutics and communication, p. 127-138
ISBN
9788778763280
8778763282
Start page
127
End page
138

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