Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/5698
Title: | Endogenous Firm Objectives | Contributor(s): | Yalcin, Erkan (author); Renstrom, Thomas I (author) | Publication Date: | 2003 | DOI: | 10.1111/1467-9779.00122 | Handle Link: | https://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/5698 | Abstract: | We analyze the behavior of a monopolistic firm in general equilibrium when the firm's decisions are taken through shareholder voting. We show that, depending on the underlying distribution, rational voting may imply overproduction as well as underproduction, relative to the efficient level. Any initial distribution of shares is an equilibrium, if individuals do not recognize their influence on voting when trading shares. However, when they do, and there are no short-selling constraints, the only equilibrium is the efficient one. With short-selling constraints typically underproduction occurs. It is not market power itself causing underproduction, but the inability to perfectly trade the rights to market power. | Publication Type: | Journal Article | Source of Publication: | Journal of Public Economic Theory, 5(1), p. 67-94 | Publisher: | Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc | Place of Publication: | United Kingdom | ISSN: | 1467-9779 1097-3923 |
Fields of Research (FoR) 2008: | 140104 Microeconomic Theory 140207 Financial Economics 140213 Public Economics- Public Choice 140209 Industry Economics and Industrial Organisation |
Socio-Economic Objective (SEO) 2008: | 910209 Preference, Behaviour and Welfare 910203 Industrial Organisations |
Peer Reviewed: | Yes | HERDC Category Description: | C1 Refereed Article in a Scholarly Journal |
---|---|
Appears in Collections: | Journal Article |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format |
---|
SCOPUSTM
Citations
8
checked on Mar 16, 2024
Page view(s)
1,000
checked on Mar 7, 2023
Items in Research UNE are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.