Wright, Andrew

Dollery, Brian

Kortt, Michael

Leu, Shawn

2022

<p>Few studies have examined the effect of varying unemployment benefit sanctions before application on jobseekers' behaviour. However, theory suggests this is the primary way sanctions operate. We examine the effect of increasing sanction values on future non-compliance using administrative data from the introduction of an Australian scheme with increasing sanctions for repeated non-compliance. Jobseekers with equivalent non-compliance histories have decreased hazards of non-compliance when the consequences are higher, even with small variation in sanction values. This suggests policies altering sanction values can effectively encourage compliance with benefit requirements, at least at the level imposed in Australia (low by international standards).</p>

Public Administration Quarterly, 46(2), p. 155-177

2327-4433

0734-9149

https://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/54455

en

Southern Public Administration Education Foundation, Inc

The Effect of Varying Sanction Values on Future Compliance with Unemployment Benefit Requirements: An Empirical Analysis Using Australian Administrative Data

Journal Article

Publication