Prisoner Taking and Prisoner Killing: A Comment on Ferguson's Political Economy Approach

Title
Prisoner Taking and Prisoner Killing: A Comment on Ferguson's Political Economy Approach
Publication Date
2007
Author(s)
Dollery, Brian Edward
Parsons, C
Type of document
Journal Article
Language
en
Entity Type
Publication
Publisher
Sage Publications Ltd
Place of publication
United Kingdom
DOI
10.1177/0968344507084727
UNE publication id
une:1558
Abstract
Niall Ferguson argued that, in part, the Second World War proved much more difficult to end than the First World War because both the German and Japanese armed forces continued fighting long after any realistic prospect of victory had disappeared. He ascribes this difference to the comparatively greater difficulties faced by soldiers wishing to surrender in the Second World War. Only after the Allied military authorities had adopted policies encouraging surrender in the Second World War did large numbers of enemy troops voluntarily surrender, thereby bringing the conflict to a swift conclusion. Ferguson contends that the game theoretic approach developed in economics, as exemplified in the prisoner's dilemma game, can be extended to a `captor's dilemma' game that can shed light on the efficacy of various strategies on surrender policy available to military forces. This paper considers the game theoretic approach advanced by Ferguson and suggests that it requires further refinement before it can satisfactorily explain the problem of surrender.
Link
Citation
War in History, 14(4), p. 499-512
ISSN
1477-0385
0968-3445
Start page
499
End page
512

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