

Chapter One

“Global Terrorism”: Defining the Limits of Inquiry

Terrorism looks to be a grotesque and mindless affair; grotesque because people far removed from the terrorists' agenda are killed and mindless because the actions of the terrorists do not appear to be strictly rational. Grotesque it may be but mindless it is not. It is not the *actions* of the terrorists *per se* that form the essence of terrorism; it is the calculated political result. This excludes terrorism from being logic of pure destruction. And if there does not appear to be an immediate political purpose as in the September 11 2001 US attacks or the 11 March 2004 Madrid attacks or the 7 July 2005 London bombings or the 26 November 2008 Mumbai attacks then the symbolism that challenges us needs to be confronted. Contrary to what is both popularly and politically believed, it is only by attempting to understand this form of violence with its inherent symbolism that we can arrive at appropriate measures to deal with it. This is what I intend in this thesis – to understand what can be and is called “global terrorism” and suggest approaches to deal with it in the face of current measures, viz the War on Terror.. In order to facilitate this, I firstly need to offer a definition and some background.

Terrorism has a long history. It has advanced from very primitive forms such as the poisoning of wells or rivers with dead carcasses in order to facilitate the spread of diseases among rival tribes, to very sophisticated forms of terrorist activity involving conventional, biological, chemical and psychological weaponry (Burgess 2003; Coady and O’Keefe 2002). While its manifestations have understandably changed over time, the expression of terrorism’s many forms indicates that an integral factor of terrorism is the threat of violence against non-combatants in order to influence a target audience that is removed from the scene of that violence. Before introducing a formal definition of terrorism, however, I suggest that on taking a politically judgmental view of this phenomenon, one is bound by the confines of that definition which then prevents a thorough investigation from taking place. One is therefore not open to the nuances of the phenomenon in its entirety. For this reason, I propose to use a more dispassionate definition which gives a general idea of what constitutes terrorism but which does not completely proscribe it. While this may seem a contentious action, it will facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of terrorism in terms of the contexts presented in this thesis.

Thus an appropriate interpretation for my purpose is that of Primoratz (2002: 32) who defines terrorism in a very useful and general way: ‘Terrorism ... is the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating some other people into a course of action they otherwise would not take.’ While this definition captures the essentials of terrorism that allow us to conceive it as being immoral – ‘violence’, ‘threat’, ‘against innocent people’, ‘intimidating’, and its implication of coercion - Primoratz (2002: 33) contends that the definition indicates that terrorism is only *prima facie* wrong and does not prejudge its justification under all circumstances. This is important because there is more space to explore the phenomenon that is terrorism.

I want to extend that thought regarding space with respect to the goal of my thesis which is to rigorously explore the phenomenon that is “global terrorism”, a phenomenon which has, comparatively speaking, only recently manifested in the world’s arena. While terrorism is not new, the specific form that I am labelling as “global” terrorism is a “new age” event. What exactly then is global terrorism? What are its origins? Why has it manifested on a global stage with such rapidity? How can we come to an understanding of it? What can we, as human beings, do to contribute to a peaceful solution? These are questions that will be addressed in this research. In order to ask these questions meaningfully and to gain more than just a fragmentary understanding of this complexity, I acknowledge that one must confront the violent nature of terrorism itself. This can be a very contentious undertaking. Gaining new insights will require a mind that has not already been closed by judgement. In order to clarify the boundaries of “global terrorism”, it is necessary to situate it within contemporary terrorist manifestations.

Contemporary Terrorist Manifestations

There is a multitude of terrorist forms reflected in Primoratz’s definition and these forms seek different objectives. For example, anti-state actors include the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), all of whose principal demands are self-determination. These are national liberation movements. They seek an independent homeland. By contrast, there are state actors that have used sustained terrorism against their own populations such as Nazi Germany, Stalin’s Soviet Union and Cambodia under the rule of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge for the purposes of reinventing that nation’s political identity. Such totalitarian regimes aim for absolute domination of society, which necessitates unanimity among subjects. This form of incessant

terrorism has utilised a ubiquitous secret police against a defenceless population (Primoratz 2002). Extant forms of terrorism, which also fit within the boundaries of the definition include – revolutionary, counterrevolutionary, left-wing and right-wing forms¹. In examining the geographical spread of terrorist entities which lie from North Africa to the Middle East and Central Asia to South East Asia, there exists another major grouping: Islamic militants of various types. While this distribution largely incorporates activists who form networks and links and hence have international reach, there are also some very specific features to their struggles.

For example, the rise of Islamist² movements in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco has occurred in conjunction with extensive liberalising, sometimes radical, government reform projects. However, these North African Islamic political movements explicitly reject theocratic ideas and accept democratic principles within the framework of the nation state (International Crisis Group (ICG) 2004a: 1-2). The intellectual cornerstone of Islamist movements in the Middle East such as Hamas and Hizbu'llah on the other hand, is to establish Islamic states in Palestine and Lebanon respectively. However, the common and fierce existential nature of their conflict with Israel together with their belief in the sanctity of Jerusalem and martyrdom for the purposes of drawing world attention to their cause has cemented a wider, regional solidarity with the broader Muslim *umma* (Amal Saad-Ghorayeb 2002: 72). Such deep religious connections could plausibly accommodate trans-operational links between these groups and others in the region and beyond. In contrast, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, although committing suicide bombings similar to Hamas and Hizbu'llah, are motivated by Palestinian nationalism, not political Islam (Council on Foreign Relations 2004a) and hence cannot be conceived as Islamist in nature.

Information on the Chechnya-based conflict in Central Asia again reveals another set of perspectives. The struggle appears to be between local separatists and the Russian army. The Chechens are a largely Muslim ethnic group with some of the Russian leadership seeing the war as primarily an ethnic separatist conflict while President Putin sees it as part of an international campaign by Islamist radicals (Council on Foreign Relations 2004b). In

¹ I mean by “left wing” forms of terrorism those that profess a revolutionary socialist doctrine and see themselves as protecting the people against the dehumanisation produced by capitalism and imperialism. Those that constitute “right wing” terrorist groups, I see as embracing the principles of racial supremacy and engaging in anti-government rhetoric.

² Islamism can be loosely identified as Islam in political form rather than religious orientation. It is not homogenous in character and has a variety of differing agendas (International Crisis Group (ICG) 2004b: 1).

promulgating such a view, it is a possibility that Putin wished to garner international support for the Russian government in this conflict. Like the Chechen Rebels, the Abu Sayyaf Group based in the southern Philippines, seeks a separate state for the Philippines' Muslim minority but is also seen as perhaps having international Islamist linkages as well (Council on Foreign Relations 2004c). Jemaah Islamiyah, however, is a known militant Islamist group with a presence in several Southeast Asian countries and is actively seeking to establish a pan-Islamic super state across much of Southeast Asia (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2004). There are signs that it has influential links with other groups beyond the region. It is indeed thought by many Australian and US officials that it is a subdivision of that multinational terrorist group which has brought an unprecedented type of terrorism to the world: Al Qaeda (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2004).

Al-Qaeda is an international and dynamic terrorist network led by Osama bin Laden. It is constantly reinventing itself, forming and readapting links with other Islamist organizations such as Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, Hizbu'llah and so the list grows (Gunaratna 2002). It is a new kind of threat seeking to challenge Western influence in the Muslim World and it possesses a corporate like structure to its organization which includes access to advanced technological expertise. There are many cells nested within the global system which we have come to call "global terrorism" which can be seen to be made up of a network of regional and local sub-units. Each cell is in a different geographical place and associated with different cultural contexts. There are cells spread out from Indonesia and the Philippines, to the Middle East in Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia and to Chechnya in Russia. It is this global kind of terrorism which acts as an umbrella for transnational Islamist groups which forms the focus of my thesis.

It can therefore be seen from the above review that there are different forms of terrorism, which establishes clearly that terrorism is not a monolithic entity. Owing to the proliferation of these terrorist forms, it is difficult to situate terrorism historically. There is no single form of terrorism; there are multiple terrorisms. Even Islamist terrorism is not monolithic: While some Islamist groups seek the formation only of an Islamic state within their own nation, others aim for "global" reach. Yet again, these "global" groups still have specific cultural, social, economic and historical settings, which must impact on their experiences and struggles.

However, it is clear that motives underpin these various forms and these motives can be multifaceted. Are the motives indicative of an underlying philosophy? When the motive is simply national self-determination, i.e. choosing the sovereignty under which a people will live, it is easier to appreciate the philosophy. When the motive falls within the shadow of the challenge to Western influence, it becomes more difficult to see. It can be regarded merely as the phantasmagoria of uncompromising extremists. Yet motives have symbolic dimensions that are played out in terrorist acts. This was indeed evident in the September 11 attacks as well as the hostage crisis in Teheran in 1979 when Iranian militants took 70 Americans of the US embassy captive. Therefore despite the diversity of terrorist manifestations and the sometimes symbolic dimension to terrorist motive, there almost always exists an underlying philosophy to terrorist actions and suggests also that contemporary terrorism does have a political or politico-religious agenda. My study of global terrorism will embrace this dimension.

Defining the Scope and Limits of this Study

As has been described, terrorism is a specific kind of violence. It excludes violent acts aimed at personal gain such as criminal violence or violent acts perpetrated by the mentally deranged, for example. Further, this study is concerned only with that kind of terrorism which can be called “global” terrorism, that which has been and is being initiated by bin Laden’s “organisation”, Al-Qaeda, and any transnational groups that fall within the Al-Qaeda umbrella within the time frame of the Bush years, 2001-2008. While the study therefore embraces acts of terrorism perpetrated by global terrorist agents in various parts of the world, the focus is on the events of September the 11th and Osama bin Laden as the metonymy for global terrorism. This will necessitate an enquiry into the Islamic world and more precisely the world of the Islamic fundamentalist. This study also focuses on George W. Bush as the metonymy for neo-liberal hegemony, a factor which will be seen to be involved in both the development of global terrorism and also the response of fighting a war on terror. The study does not include other forms of terrorism as defined by national liberation struggles such as the Palestinian issue or terrorism used by Tamils fighting for a separate state in Sri Lanka or state terrorism such as was manifested under Stalin’s Soviet Union, for example. In stating the scope and limits to the study, I will therefore now proceed to establish the need for research in this area in order to ultimately provide a rationale for my own research project.

Establishing the Need for Research

Today, depictions of things Islamic are still seen to include the “irrational” and the “aberrant”, the “tribal” and the “backward”. John Esposito, professor of religion and international affairs and author on the subject of Muslim-Christian understanding asks, “How many Jews and Christians know that they join Muslims as ‘Children of Abraham,’ that Muslims believe that they are the religious descendants of Ishmail, the first-born son of Abraham and his servant Hagar? How many know that the Quran acknowledges, ‘We believe what you believe, your God and our God is one’ (29:46) (Esposito 2002: 119)?” As Esposito (2002: 119) explains, while Yahweh is generally known to be the Hebrew name for the God of the Bible, Allah is often regarded as the name of an alien God instead of the Arabic word for God which is used by both Arab Christians and Muslims when they pray. Many people in the West including policy-makers and academics argue that Islam is the only religion in the world that condones religious violence and terrorism on a regular basis. Esposito (2002:119) claims that Muslims have gone from representations of oriental stereotypes to hijackers and hostage takers. The picture of the Islamic world in the West from the late 1970’s and throughout the 1980s was of militants aiming to undermine their countries’ stability and imposing their version of an Islamic state. This resulted in the equation: “Islam = fundamentalism = terrorism and extremism” (Esposito 1994: 3). I believe this equation is still valid as a Western perception as the form of terrorism in focus shifts from the national to the global. For example, Abdus Sattar Ghazali, well-known US Muslim analyst and editor, claims that Islamophobia is on the rise and that the vilification of Islam and Muslims has been ‘relentless’ among segments of the media as well as political classes since 9/11 (Ghazali 2007: 1). Ghazali (2007: 1) further claims that ‘Muslim-bashing’ has become an acceptable part of life in the US where politicians, authors and media commentators are busy ‘in demonizing Islam, Muslims and the Muslim world’. Anwarul Kabir, Muslim educationalist and freelance writer, claims that opposition and hostility to Islam has been rife since the end of the Cold War. He states that the lack of understanding of Islamic theology and political Islam in the media has greatly contributed toward creating a negative impression ‘in the very psychology of the secular world towards Islam’ (Kabir 2009: 1). Consequently most of the average people from Non-Muslim communities view Islam as ‘a religious form of terrorism’ (Kabir 2009: 1). Kofi Annan commented in a press release in 2004 that Islam’s tenets are often distorted and taken out of context and that too many times disparaging remarks about Muslims are passed without censure, with the result that ‘prejudice acquires a veneer of acceptability’ (Annan 2004: 1). Annan also stated that

‘when the world is compelled to coin a new term to take account of increasingly widespread bigotry (Islamophobia), that is a sad and troubling development’ (Annan 2004: 1). The reality is that in order to explain suicide bombings, hijackings and urban terrorism, militant Islam is employed in a very simplistic way rather than a search initiated to find the particular political circumstances that have caused these types of violence. What is more, Islam and Muslims are often projected as a threatening power to subvert modern civilisation. Ghazali (2007: 3) refers to a continuing stream of high-profile trials on terrorism charges the allegations of which often do not hold up in the end but which continue ‘to keep the American public afraid’. It is often in this context that the charges of militancy, terrorism and extremism are brought against the entire Islamic world.

The 1970s saw an Islamic resurgence and with it a rise in Islamic fundamentalism (Esposito 1992: 10-12). The term, “fundamentalism” is laden with Western stereotypes and implies a monolithic threat when there are arguably very different forms of “fundamentalism”. Nevertheless, it is useful to employ this generic term because it is a label that is widely recognised both by Muslims and people in the West. The limitations of this label referred to above, however, need to be remembered. Tibi (1995: 4) sees the dominant concern of Muslim fundamentalists as undoing the intellectual impact of the West on Muslims, principally in the fields of knowledge, as an important step towards re-establishing true Islamic knowledge, necessary for the articulation of an Islamic alternative to Western based knowledge. Thus Islamic fundamentalism, according to Tibi (1995: 2), is not only a political movement aimed at repelling the political and economic hegemony of the West but also one that includes a cultural strategy where the Islamization of knowledge is a basic formula in the fundamentalist agenda. What is therefore exemplified in Islamic fundamentalism is a revolt against the West, a revolt that embodies the reassertion of non-Western peoples of their traditional and indigenous cultures. It is not simply a revolt against Western domination. The current fundamentalist revolt is in addition, directed against Western norms and values. The Islamization of knowledge is a ‘battle against unbelief’, a ‘reassertion of the local against the global knowledge and the invading civilisation related to it’ (Tibi 1995: 2).

While it follows from Tibi’s clarification on Islamic culture, knowledge and revolt, that certain minority, fundamentalist groups within the Islamic world resort to violence to achieve their goals and it is these cases that reinforce the image of Islam as a militant threat to the West, the reason for the emergence of such groups needs to be more clearly understood.

Akbar Ahmed (2002: 6), who is both Muslim and a Western based academic articulates this need when he says: ‘The events of September 11 have made it clear how urgent it is to understand Islam in our world’. In the context of Muslim jubilation in parts of the Muslim world in the aftermath of these attacks, Ahmed had this to say:

Few recognized the humiliation, terror, and neurosis in Muslim society from the decades of emotional and physical violence that they had been subjected to; and fewer understood that many Muslims blamed America for their plight. The idea of Islam set on a collision course with America triumphed over any other ideas of global peace and dialogue.

(Ahmed 2002:3)

Thus in the face of a global hostility toward Islam which I feel has not been sufficiently addressed by Western based scholars, I write to contribute my understanding in terms of the global terrorism which has originated from parts within the Islamic world.

In this thesis I take as my point of departure the legacy of colonialism and the more recent hyper imperialism to which the Muslim world has been subjected and which has responded in a variety of ways that include militant confrontation by some fundamentalist groups. It is natural to think that the memories of these two invasive processes are still very much alive in the Muslim world as it struggles to come to terms with the political and economic impediments that they have caused. The emergence of al-Qaeda is thus postulated as a counter discourse to the discursive reproduction of domination of the Bush Administration and the neoconservative right. I use the word “emergence” here and later in the thesis to indicate both birth and evolution of al-Qaeda as a resistance movement, a movement whose appearance first became apparent in 1993 when it was held responsible for bombing the New York City World Trade Center for the first time. Al-Qaeda may have predated the Bush era but this could have been a mistake that came to light only after the impact of the events of September 11, 2001 – only then did the realisation hit that al-Qaeda was serious and could punish the all powerful US with its military might by hitting at the centre of its homeland with a symbolic strike. The world should have paid more attention to al-Qaeda in the first instance. Eight years of development saw this movement increase in strength and capacity enough to be seen as the orchestrator of the 9/11 attacks.

Exposing the discursive reproduction of domination of the Bush Administration and showing how a response is made through Islam in the development of a counter discourse, labelled “terrorist” becomes my first aim. My second and related aim is to critically examine the epistemological bases of the Neoconservative/Bush discourse and Counter discourse by Al-Qaeda on terrorism and anti-terrorism by using Critical Discourse Analysis. While I am

interested in the ontological and the normative as well, my primary interest remains with the epistemological bases.

My third aim relates to exploring the possibility of dialogue as a peace process in addressing global terrorism. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the debate over the competing ideas of a “clash of civilizations” and a “dialogue of civilizations” has been revitalised. The idea of the dialogue of civilizations was advocated by the then President Muhammad Khatami of Iran in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on 24 September 1998 with the support of the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (Ahmed 2005: 103). As Ahmed (2005: 103) explains, President Khatami’s statement made a significant impact because Khatami’s country is associated in the West with terrorism and extremism. This is not a sole example of this kind, however. Various world figures such as Pope John Paul II, Nelson Mandela and Bishop Desmond Tutu both of South Africa have been involved in this kind of dialogue for many years. Ahmed sums up the need for dialogue of this kind beautifully when he says: ‘For people of good will or faith, the idea of dialogue lies at the heart of the human condition and the need to reach out’ (Ahmed 2005: 103).

Ahmed (2005: 112) discerns two basic and diametrically opposed reactions to the present Muslim-Western crisis. One is to advocate a policy of inclusion in the hope of generating dialogue and understanding while the other promotes a policy of exclusion, which can and does result in confrontation. This latter policy is the path of militant Islamists such as the Taliban. In relating these principles to interfaith dialogue, exclusivism means that our concept of God represents the one and only truth. Inclusivism means that we include others in our world-view but our manner of doing so can dodge the question of real difference (Eck 2005: 23-36). To these two outlooks one can add “pluralism”. A pluralist seeks to understand each religion as an expression of the Divine and wants to come to terms with the truth claims of the other (Boase 2005b: 2). A position of pluralism is most conducive to interfaith dialogue. However, that does not mean to say that dialogue within an exclusivist and inclusivist perspective will not produce some positive results. It is possible that dialogue can breach even the exclusivist perspective and yield something of value. However, it is the pluralist outlook that will more probably yield the best outcomes because pluralism is the complex encounter that results from a most radical openness to God combined with a most nourishing understanding given to the Other.

For a dialogue of civilisations to be successful, it is necessary to consider what occurs in the microcosm, for what obtains in the microcosm, obtains also in the macrocosm. For global terrorism, the value to the macrocosm of Muslim-Christian dialogue at the site of conflict therefore cannot be understated. It is improbable, however, that the approaches that can be taken at the site of a conflict will be pluralist. They will most probably be a mixture of exclusivist and inclusivist approaches as each party holds fast to the “truth” of its perspective. This sort of dialogue may still be able to produce some positive results, nevertheless. However, if one considers in addition to the actual site of the conflict the immediate environs, the interface, where people are divided as to whom they support, then this could be fertile ground for dialogue. Here is a possibility where some pluralist approaches may be made and which could be very influential in determining the outcome of the conflict in more positive terms. This argument influenced me in my approach to including a fraction of field research. To explore the possibility of dialogue as a peace process I chose to investigate the process of dialogue between Muslims and Christians in an organization committed to dialogue at Zamboanga, Mindanao, in the Philippines called the Silsilah Dialogue Movement. The conflict in Mindanao had produced violent responses, which had been labelled as “terrorist” by prevailing governments. I could see the dialogue movement in Mindanao as being a critical agency, which could initiate and sustain dialogue between Muslims and Christians and in the process promote understanding and healing where war has created many wounds. I thus perceive the conflict in Mindanao to be a microcosm of the global terrorist problem with the efforts of the Silsilah Dialogue Movement representing the possibility of applying dialogue as a peace process. What can be learnt here in the microcosm could then give an indication of what is possible in the macrocosm in respect of dialogue as a peace process and in how it may be employed in addressing global terrorism.

My own Locus of Enunciation

While I acknowledge that it is difficult to articulate the space that defines me, I believe it is important to provide some information indicating who I am and where I am speaking from. I think it is perhaps relevant to say that I have a form of mental illness which affects me on an intermittent basis. While I work to avoid the victim standpoint, I reveal this about myself because it does have some connotations for why I chose to write this thesis. I have to actively fight for my own self-image and demand respect from people on a continuing basis. I cannot always compete well or contribute to society through work and these issues trouble me. I belong to a minority group which has a poor ability to articulate, a poor ability to

cement a strong sense of self within members of that group. I therefore have some appreciation of what it means to be marginalised and to fight from a marginalised position. It is a reality of life that the politically strong get the best treatment and access to the most resources. It is oftentimes difficult for the marginalised to be heard. I write hoping to reveal some insight into the global terrorism problem by attempting to listen to the voices of the marginalised. I refer here to certain Muslim groups, fundamentalist groups in particular, who may feel and believe that they are marginalised in relation to the context of this thing called “global terrorism”.

On commencing this thesis my religious position was that I believed in God but held no affiliation to any formal religion. I felt myself open to possibilities, however. By the end of this thesis I had changed my view and had become an adherent of the Christian religion. This was not due to the imperatives of writing this thesis but to other personal factors which were impacting upon me. I class myself as an advocate of religious pluralism. This involves an active seeking to understand other faiths and to respect difference. I find the constraints of Western neo-liberalism which I live with and with which I must contend make it challenging to negotiate difference. I experience what it means to be “different” at a very personal level owing to the illness that confronts me, at times. I am motivated to negotiate difference and to see if I can play a positive role in opening up understanding towards people who have been marginalised by the forces of Western neo-liberalism and its more conservative derivatives (neo-conservatism) and who are inherently different to Western peoples.

My assumptions are that Western neo-liberalism need not seek to embrace the entire world. The juggernaut of modernity derived from the European Enlightenment need not define how all of humanity must live. Difference matters. I further assume that the neo-liberal ethic that is imposing itself upon the world is deleterious to some groups within humanity who are suffering as a result and feel their world is being changed without their consent. In the wake of these assumptions I chose the theories of postmodernism and Postcolonialism to frame my thesis. These theories question the dominant truth that modernity has brought to fruition in neo-liberal power, politics and philosophy.

Choosing the theories of postmodernism and Postcolonialism has introduced some complexity for me, however, in the writing of this thesis as some might say that they are at odds with the Christian faith which is based on a system of enunciating an absolute truth.

While I realise that I do not need to subscribe to a theory in order to use it for a specific task, I wish to stress the pluralist nature of the orientation to my faith. While I stand in a particular community, I recognise that others too have communities and commitments. I realise I must live with the particularities of the Other. As Eck (2005: 44) says, the task of the pluralist society is 'to create the space and the means for the encounter of commitments, not to neutralise all commitment'. So I straddle the ground between a modernist meta-narrative and a relativist postmodernism. Pluralism allows an exploration of how Christianity might be simultaneously faithful to tradition yet open to change and dialogue. While it is true I live in this middle position, it is a complexity that I must face but which does not create theoretical problems for my thesis as the application of postmodernism and Postcolonialism is consistent within the epistemological and ontological parameters of these theories.

Connected with the choice of underpinning theories is the assumption that people are not motivated to do evil per se. I am not denying that we all have the capacity for evil and we are always accountable for our actions but we are sometimes caught in a powerful situation within a system that can be oppressive. These conditions undermine empathy and morality and trigger us to do acts that otherwise would be objectionable. The situation cannot be removed from the act. The act must be seen in relation to the situation. It is possible that some terrorist acts can be seen in this context. Understanding a terrorist act is not the same as vindicating it. I do not condone acts of terrorism but believe that attempting to understand them may lead to different ways of dealing with terrorism, e.g. a dialogical approach versus a military approach. In addition, my thesis critiques the Bush Administration of the USA. In doing this I need to say that I do not hold anti-USA sentiments from a personal perspective.

I am a white female of European origin. I am therefore privileged by my race. I am not, however, privileged by my economic position owing to my inability to work full time. I find it challenging to negotiate an economic system whose operating principle is competition, the hallmark of the capitalist system. I am therefore aware that not all people will find this system equally benign. This makes me question the suitability of imposing the neo-liberal ethic universally.

I acknowledge that I bring baggage to this writing project. I have outlined my own historical location. My argument is socially and historically constructed and is therefore open to

interrogation as opposed to a revelation of truth. In my writing of this thesis, I will attempt to be responsible for my own social historical location and the construction of my subjectivity.

I now summarise my aims and research questions below.

Aims and Objectives of Thesis

- (1) To expose the discursive reproduction of domination in society by those holding power, i.e. the Bush Administration and the neoconservative right, and to show how a response is made through Islam in the development of a counter discourse, labelled “terrorist”, to these hegemonic discourses.

This aim will be investigated through the use of the following two hypotheses:

- (a) Global terrorism is authored by Islamic fundamentalist leaders in order to project their value system in its entirety on to the free world.
 - (b) Global terrorism is a response (reaction) by a group of oppressed people (or people who perceive themselves as being oppressed) who have no other means of protecting their value system in a world dominated by the neo-liberal agenda and supported by a militaristic neo-conservatism led by the USA. This group of oppressed people is Islamic fundamentalist.
- (2) To critically examine the epistemological bases of the Neoconservative/Bush discourse and Counter discourse by Al-Qaeda on terrorism and anti-terrorism by using Critical Discourse Analysis.
 - (3) To explore the possibility of dialogue as a peace process in addressing global terrorism by studying the promise of dialogue in making peace within a local context.

Specific Research Questions

- (1) In the context of modernist and neo-conservative thought, how have powerful players and forces attempted to influence the construction of knowledge and the interpretation of global terrorism?
- (2) How can dialogue be used as a peace process in dealing with global terrorism as an alternative to “the war on terror” approach?

These aims and research questions derive from an argument based on evidence. This evidence has different forms and different methods. This will be very briefly considered in the section below and fully discussed in the following chapter on methodology.

Methodology in a Nutshell

This thesis is informed by two theoretical perspectives and two related methodologies. The theoretical perspectives are postmodernism and postcolonialism and these underpin the entire thesis. The two methodologies are critical discourse analysis (CDA) and qualitative analysis. The CDA is performed on texts from George W. Bush and texts from Osama bin Laden in order to investigate their competing visions of the world. The CDA analysis aims to reveal the discursive reproduction of domination in society by those holding power, i.e. the Bush Administration and the neoconservative right and to show how a response is made through Islam in the development of a counter-discourse, labelled “terrorist” to these hegemonic discourses (Aims and Objectives 1). The CDA analysis also critically examines the epistemological Neoconservative/Bush discourse and Counter discourse by Al-Qaeda on terrorism and anti-terrorism (Aims and Objectives 2). The theories of postmodernism and postcolonialism will be applied in these cases also. The qualitative methodology sets up the analysis for exploring the possibility of dialogue as a means for addressing terrorism (Aims and Objectives 3).

As is obvious, several new terms have been introduced: postmodernism; postcolonialism; discourse; counter-discourse; critical discourse analysis (CDA) and qualitative analysis. This makes for a methodology of some complexity. These terms, therefore, will not be defined here as their meaning will become better illustrated when applied against a full exploration of the overall methodology which is carried out in the following chapter.

Thesis Overview

The thesis overview or outline of chapters which is presented generally at this stage will also be presented in the following methodology chapter. There is good reason for this departure from standard procedures. Showing how the various threads of the research are woven together is heavily dependent on an understanding of the components of the methodology. The chapter outline becomes far more explicable and comprehensible once the methodology has been discussed in some detail and consequently it is positioned at the end of the methodology chapter.

Summary

This chapter has defined the area of study of this thesis as being an academic means to understanding “global terrorism” and a suggestion of approaches to deal with it. A definition of terrorism was offered that allowed the space to explore the reality of global terrorism. A brief survey on contemporary terrorist manifestations was given with the aim of locating global terrorism within the spectrum of terrorist phenomena. The scope and limits of the study were stated, the focus being upon Osama bin Laden as the metonymy for global terrorism and George W. Bush as the metonymy for neo-liberal hegemony. My own locus of enunciation was described and my aims and research questions were examined (summarised on pages 13-14) prior to a concise discussion on the methodology which is further explored in the following chapter.

Through a discussion on the demonization of Muslims and Islam in the Western world, the need for research in this area was established. Of course it must be acknowledged that the Western world is demonized also in the writings and the actions of Osama bin Laden. The fear, devastation and impact of what al-Qaeda was capable were evident to all who saw the images on television of the planes running into the twin towers. This is a definite portrayal of power – for what else could it be mistaken? The suicide of the bomber pilots, the deaths of all on board the planes, the destruction of the buildings, the deaths of those on the ground and in the buildings, the selection of particular targets and all the planning that went into the attack – all of this spells out “power”. We in the Western world understand this to be an attack on the USA – the centre of the “free world” and the champion of the “free market” and global capitalism. The question that obviously arises in the minds of the people attacked is why us? We have been the good guy, the champion of the weak, and the country that helped bring an end to World War II? Why should anyone attack us so brutally? We are innocents? In the post 9/11 period, we want to understand more about exactly what al-Qaeda was objecting to or responding to so violently? To answer this question, I will later examine bin Laden’s speeches, the words that constituted his message to the world, which could reveal some of the reasons behind his actions in the use of terror.

To conclude, this thesis is focusing on investigating the reproduction of power abuse or domination and it does so from a perspective of the dominated group, which is arguably also the socially and economically weaker party in the emerging conflict. The research project is setting out to take the real and perceived experiences of Islamic fundamentalist groups

seriously and hence the thesis is written from the standpoint of analysing the Islamic response as potentially being a struggle against inequality. In order to do this, excerpts from the texts of Osama bin Laden are examined in the Critical Discourse Analysis in Chapter Nine. A criticism of bin Laden's perspective is further presented there. After having carried out this research, I along with many others will be in a stronger position to shed more light or provide an answer to the question asked by many US citizens following the 9/11 attack by al Qaeda – why us? We need to understand the terrorist to prevent this from recurring.

Chapter Two

Methodology

Chapter Aim: The aim of this chapter is to present the methodology for this thesis, to introduce the tools I will use to apply to the analyses. These tools include the theoretical perspectives of postmodernism and postcolonialism, which underpin the thesis and methodologies, critical discourse analysis and qualitative analysis. This chapter also briefly discusses the organization of the thesis.

Introduction

In the early hours of the morning of 12 September 2001, I was awakened by a telephone call. It was my son who simply said, “You had better go and turn the television on.” Thinking at the same time that “this better be good” but also quite alarmed by the irregularity of the call, I made my way to the TV and switched it on. By this time the second plane had already crashed into the World Trade Centre. Taking in the situation at a glance was overpowering. I watched the tragedy being played over and over. On thinking back I cannot reconstruct the sequence of events that followed. I did think, however, at the time that the event would become ineradicably engraved into the American conscience. Unable to know what was happening, I intuitively felt its magnitude with its potential consequences to the world.

The attacks were soon after called “International Terrorism” and were being simply known as “9/11”. I later found myself in agreement with Derrida who, in an interview with Borradori, said that we do not know what we are saying or naming in this way, that, in fact ‘we do not know what we are talking about’ (Borradori 2003: 86). In February 2003, I began my doctorate as a part-time external candidate at UNE. The War in Afghanistan had begun in October 2001 as the start to the War on Terror, which was launched in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks. War in Iraq was imminent. I wanted to know about, to understand this phenomenon called “International Terrorism”. President Bush was talking in terms of ‘good and evil’ but I believed what he was saying to be overly simplistic and an obviously biased explanation from his nation’s perspective as the victim of the attacks. I wanted to explore the terrain more deeply. In response to this purpose, I chose several theoretical perspectives to underpin my study. In this chapter I will outline these perspectives in terms of my thesis objectives and research aims and indicate how I will use each perspective. In order to facilitate this objective, I will first discuss the organization of my

thesis into three parts. I will end the chapter with a thesis overview in which I briefly outline each chapter.

Thesis Organization with respect to Methodology

My primary aim in this thesis is to expose the discursive production of domination in society by those holding power, i.e. the Bush Government and the neoconservative within it and to show how a response is made through Islam in the development of a counter discourse, labelled terrorist, to these hegemonic discourses. In order to achieve this aim, I have organised my thesis into three parts. Part One is called “Grounding the Analysis”. It both sets up and informs the analysis, which is principally carried out in Part Two called “The Analysis”. The ideas contained in two theoretical perspectives, postmodernism and postcolonialism, described in the following section, are used in Part One to show how they can be applied to the analysis of terrorism. Each perspective is also given a sound outline in order to situate its origin historically and philosophically such that its relevance to the terrorist problem can be fully appreciated. Finally, some application of the ideas of both postmodernism and postcolonialism is made to terrorism and is discussed in each chapter. Part One also focuses on examining the flaws in the conventional argument against terrorism as well as exploring the marginalisation of the peoples of Islam and presenting Islam as a multi-dimensional world religion. Part One therefore prepares the ground for Part Two, the Analysis, by presenting the background circumstances and historical conditions against which the phenomenon of global terrorism is occurring.

Part Two forms the central analysis and comprises a critical discourse analysis (CDA) on 11 texts originating from President George W. Bush and on 14 texts originating from Osama bin Laden. While the analyses of the selected speeches shows the ability of both the Bush Administration and bin Laden (al Qaeda) to promote their own vision of the world, the CDA performed on bin Laden shows that bin Laden’s rhetoric and actions can be seen as a response to the hegemonic practices of the West. After the CDAs have been performed, the lines of arguments arising from them are tabularised and further discussed. A process of deconstruction is embedded within the CDAs. Deconstruction is a term denoting the application of postmodern/poststructural ideas to criticism of a text. It is in this way that reference is made back to Part One. The Analysis of the two CDA chapters also refers back to other chapters in Part One. The CDA as a concept will be described in the following section. It is in this part that my second thesis aim is addressed: To critically examine the

epistemological bases of the Neoconservative/Bush discourse and Counter discourse by al-Qaeda on terrorism and anti-terrorism by using CDA.

Part Three is called “Dialogue: A Possibility for Peace”. It focuses on dialogue as a means of dealing with terrorism wherever it occurs in the world as part of a global terrorism network. The findings of field research performed at the headquarters of the Silsilah Dialogue Movement at Harmony Village, Zamboanga, Mindanao in the Philippines is presented. The terrorist problem in Mindanao, for the purposes of the study, is regarded as a microcosm of the global terrorist problem. I selected Mindanao because the terrorist problem there was quite complex. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was believed to be nothing more than a domestic separatist movement but on closer examination was subsequently regarded as having the potential for global terrorism with links to al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamia, both Islamic Fundamentalist groups (Frank 2002: 1; CDI Terrorism Project 2002: 6-7). There is an intricacy to Southeast Asia’s terrorist network with links among each network and to al-Qaeda (CDI Terrorism Project 2002: 7). It is argued that a solution to the terrorist problem in the microcosm, at any particular locus, that is worked on across many such microcosms where similar problems may occur in different localities can also be applied to the macrocosm, to address ‘global terrorism’ through international dialogue processes that apply across the whole spectrum of possible or known loci. In other words, the solution to global terrorism lies in dialogue processes that apply and are worked on both locally in particular places and globally, overarching every possible node in the network seen then as an interconnected system or whole. The term “global terrorism” is an umbrella terminology consisting in reality of multiple foci, terror cells distributed among many places across the globe. For example, Bali is culturally, geographically and politically different to Iraq and Afghanistan. There exist different conditions at every locus. At the grassroots there are many places in the world where fundamentalist Islamic groups are involved in using militancy and acts of terror, which hold much complexity in terms of their cultural and geographical matrix yet link into what has been called a global terror movement or network. Dialogue can have an application at each locus yet the substance of that dialogue will to a large extent only meet the conditions prevailing at that locus. The logic here is that terrorism has to be addressed where it occurs; dealing with it in a particular locality is also a means of addressing a small part of the global system across all such localities. Henceforth, numerous local dialogues such as the one in Mindanao, scattered across the globe, can by way of their combined influences work on eliminating or engaging with terrorism globally i.e. global

terrorism. Part Three therefore addresses my third thesis aim: To explore the possibility of dialogue as a peace process in addressing global terrorism both locally and globally. Here dialogue is seen as an alternative means of engaging with ‘global terrorism’, an alternative strategy to a ‘war on terror’ that is being fought in multiple locations across the globe.

The concluding chapters will link together the various themes that have been raised in the thesis as a whole and present a coherent interpretation based on the material derived from the three parts. This final chapter will discuss the final thesis using a postmodernist and postcolonial theoretical framework.

Theoretical Perspectives

There are two differing theoretical perspectives, which inform this thesis and two related methodologies. The theoretical perspectives are postmodernism and postcolonialism. The methodologies are critical discourse analysis and qualitative analysis or interpretive research. As stated above, both postmodernism and postcolonialism underpin the entire thesis, CDA is used as the tool for analysis in Part Two, the central analysis, and qualitative methods have been used in setting up the analysis for exploring the possibility of dialogue as a means for addressing terrorism in Part Three. The qualitative analysis encompasses the use of interviews and then interprets the information collected from those interviews.

Postmodernism

In order to gain an understanding of the theoretical perspective of postmodernism, it is helpful to situate it as the latter philosophical system within the three major philosophical epochs, premodernism, modernism and postmodernism. The primary epistemology, or the nature of knowledge, of the premodern period was based on revealed knowledge derived from God or gods (Hoffman 2005). The Enlightenment of the 18th century, by fostering in two new approaches to knowing, challenged this religious authority and ushered in modernity. These two new approaches – empiricism, which gradually developed into modern science, and reason – became dominant in the modern period: So modernity extends the idea that humanity is able to access absolute truth through these tools of science and reason (Gilley 2007). Because of the absence of God as authority, Gilley (2007: 3) succinctly concludes that “modernity is a celebration of human autonomy”. Monarchs, governments and universities became the new primary sources of authority taking over from God. Postmodernism brought with it a questioning of the previous approaches to knowing. Instead

of relying on one approach to knowing, postmodernists advocate for an epistemological pluralism, which utilises multiple ways of knowing. These can include the premodern ways (revelation) and modern ways (science and reason) as well as other ways of knowing such as intuitive, relational and spiritual ways. Within the theoretical perspective of postmodernism, there is a distrust of power with the consequence that there is a less hierarchical approach to authority resulting in sources of authority being more diffuse (Hoffman 2005).

As it is for premodern and modern philosophy, the issue at the core of postmodernism is truth. Michel Foucault, a recognised founder of the postmodern movement, problematises the question of truth and shows it to be dependent on the work of what he terms “discourses” rather than being absolute (Danaher, Schirato and Webb 2000: 41-42). Discourses can be understood as windows that allow us to make sense of the world. While they permit us to shape our understanding, it must be understood that each window sees a relational truth only. To the postmodernist, there is no such thing as absolute truth; it is not possible to discover a universal truth applicable to all people.

Postmodernism therefore allows us to look at the worldview of terrorism in a different light. If we take a step away from the worldview of the Enlightenment and its legacy, we are one step removed from Western traditions, Western knowledge, and the values of the Western world. Unencumbered by this weight we are more able to appreciate the view from the window of the terrorist: what motivates the terrorist, what are his/her grievances, what is s/he saying. The issue is one of the relevance of relativism. If we engage in this approach, we will not be able to call the terrorist “evil” no matter what his crimes. We will be forced to walk in his/her shoes, to see what s/he sees. Although there is prevalent a political opinion that we should not engage the terrorist, this thesis does not take this path. In this thesis, the imperative is to try to understand the terrorist and his/her cause, viz. bin Laden. At the same time, a postmodernist perspective will allow a critique of Western sources of power, viz. the Bush Administration.

It bears repeating that the aim of this research is to try and understand the “terrorist” al-Qaeda perspective and their reason for being; to stand in their shoes and to try and “see” how the rapidly globalising world may appear through their eyes. This is a postmodern approach. I am attempting to understand if it is possible to unearth a rationale for the acts of terror carried out and planned by such groups as al-Qaeda. I am accepting that in order to do this I have to

critically analyse Western sources of literature, documents and policies of the Bush Administration in the period 2001-2008 during which many al-Qaeda associated terrorist acts took place:

- USA 2974 people dead September 11 2001
- Tunisia 19 dead and 22 injured 11 April 2002
- Bali 180 people dead 12 October 2002
- Riyadh 34 people dead 12 May 2003
- Casablanca 45 people dead and 100 injured 16 May 2003
- Istanbul 25 people dead and 300 injured 15 November 2003
- Madrid 190 dead and 1400 injured 11 March 2004
- London 52 people killed and 700 people injured 7 July 2005

(2005: Congressional Research Service 2005: 1-5). I am using this postmodern lens to find a rationale that may indicate why al-Qaeda has inflicted this use of terror against Western targets, especially the USA and its allies. I also look at Bush's period in office so as to find out, using CDA, what his reasons are for leading the USA in this direction to fight a War on Terror and his intentions to wipe out al-Qaeda as well as bin Laden.

I realise that under normal circumstances one would do the same thing, i.e. carry out a postmodern analysis, to find out why the Bush administration is responding to bin Laden and al-Qaeda via a war on terror by examining bin Laden's sources and use of power. However, I am assuming here that this relationship is well understood, obvious and accepted following what millions of people witnessed on television in relation to 9/11. In other words, the majority of us living in the West know that it is a given that al-Qaeda used and continues to use fear, terror, suicide bombing, propaganda, and trains people to do these abhorrent acts of militancy. Bush is acting upon the 9/11 attack; he is taking bin Laden very seriously and has to salvage the respect that he has lost as a result of the attack on the US, on US soil by a foreign enemy. This paints a vivid picture of a militant organisation that does not require any more analysis. It is obvious what bin Laden's use of power entails – he is resorting to terrorism. However, I do examine the links between al-Qaeda and bin Laden to Islamic fundamentalism; I also analyse bin Laden's speeches in a CDA in a bid to address the main hypothesis that frames this research agenda and in this process find out more about his reasons and rationale.

Foucault (2003:2) is scathing to the suggestion by Kant (2003:1), an Enlightenment thinker, that the Enlightenment means truth for all people on the earth and raises of fundamental importance the significance of the “Other”. The right for other forms of human life to exist in a way other than the Western mode is informed by another perspective, postcolonialism. Postcolonialism also informs this thesis.

Postcolonialism

Postcolonialism is devoted to academically remembering and interrogating the colonial past and, in returning to the colonial encounter, to retrieve its multiple stories of contestation (Leela Gandhi 1998: 4-5). By the 1960s, after years of fighting for independence, most Western colonial territories – India, the Congo, Uganda, Kenya, Indonesia, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq and Lebanon for example – had gained self-rule. Self-government did not bring with it freedom from imperialist influences, however: there was widespread ethnic rivalry, offences against minority populations and unequal distribution of the country’s resources. Some of the issues associated with colonialism do predate the colonial era. For example, ethnic rivalries have existed for a long time dating back to periods before colonialism. However, colonialism did modify these relationships by favouring some groups over others, which could have made the situation worse in the post-independence period. It is vital to acknowledge the effects which past colonialist policies continue to have on contemporary postcolonial societies. As with postmodernism, the discourses of postcolonialism dismantle the Western/Colonial centres and challenge their power, history and prejudices. Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (1995) (1978) is seen as a reference point for postcolonialism. Said’s account identifies Orientalism as a discourse in the full Foucauldian sense of the term. Orientalism becomes a discourse when it starts to produce stereotypes of the peoples of the Orient.

Said (1995) (1978: 65) is especially critical of how Islam has been represented historically by the European mind. Notions and authorities in reference to Islam are easily canonised into Western culture through discourse and anyone wishing to say something about Islam can freely draw from this material. Thus knowledge of Islam comes about not only through texts but also through experiences that are merely interpretations of Islam. Postcolonialism shows that Islam is often mistakenly conceived as if it were one homogenous block and it can be from these types of sources that experts in the social sciences draw and formulate decisions and policies.

Thus Said revealed that Western knowledge of the “Orient” has been based on a Foucauldian concept of discourse, a constructed view. This means that Western knowledge of Muslim people is fed by and feeds into this discourse. The result is that Muslim peoples and their cultures are subjected to western interpretation, misrepresentation and hence could suffer powerlessness. The demand of Postcolonialism is that we listen to the marginalised. This theoretical perspective will be used with postmodernism in this thesis to challenge and contest the power and influence of the West on Muslim peoples. The timeframe, over which these theoretical perspectives will be applied, dates from the 16th Century to the present.

Methodologies

The principal methodology employed in Part Two in the central analysis is critical discourse analysis (CDA) while the secondary methodology I designate to be “qualitative methodology”.

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

Before beginning the outline of CDA as a method I employ in the analysis in Part Two of this thesis, I wish to state that there are both discursive and non-discursive elements operating in everyday life. It is necessary to acknowledge that there is a basic non-discursive materiality to life and death that is beyond discourse (Besley 2005: 78-9; Foucault 1988: 9-15). Having said this, I would like to add that the study of discourse is nevertheless an important and useful analytical tool. People can and do use discourse to produce a particular interpretation of reality. For Foucault, discourses can be seen as ‘language in action’ (Danaher, Schirato and Webb 2000: 31). They are windows which permit us to make sense of the world. Such discursive windows which are types of explanations shape our understanding of ourselves and our ability to distinguish between true and false, right and wrong (Danaher, Schirato and Webb 2000: 31). Initially, I aim to formulate the principles upon which CDA is based. CDA studies the way dominance and inequality are enacted, duplicated and resisted in a societal and political context. I begin by discussing how discourse is related to knowledge, reality, meaning and language. Illustrating how discourses can compete with each other, I contrast a discourse that terrorists are criminals with a discourse that terrorists are combatants fighting for a cause or for justice and from these two competing discourses, how another discourse can emerge. This new discourse is that terrorists are unlawful combatants, a discourse that the Bush Administration has found

convenient to use in maintaining a dominant position over the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

The two basic concepts of a CDA analysis, according to Teun van Dijk (2001b), are discussed. These are that CDA has to theoretically bridge the gap between the micro (language use, verbal interaction and communication) and the macro (power, dominance and inequality) level of the social order. In addition, power is defined in terms of control and may take the form of hegemony, a general acceptance of domination. Thus controlling discourse becomes a great factor in controlling people's minds.

Finally a theoretical framework for CDA is briefly discussed. This framework will be used, in conjunction with the theories of postmodernism and postcolonialism in the overall analysis.

Discourse and Knowledge, Reality and Meaning

Essential to CDA is an understanding of the term "discourse" as outlined above. Discourse is intimately related to knowledge. In describing "knowledge" as the contents that make up a consciousness, Jager (2001: 33) holds that people derive this "knowledge" from the respective discursive contexts into which they are born and in which they are involved during their entire lives. Thus knowledge cannot be an absolute truth. There are only temporary truths, which remain valid for a limited time and are replaced by yet other truths. Jager (2001: 34) conceives discourse 'as the flow of knowledge . . . and/or all societal knowledge stored throughout all time'. This is linked to action, which shapes society. Discourses are therefore not interesting as expressions of social custom. They are interesting, as Jager (2001: 34) says, because they 'serve certain ends', namely 'to exercise power with all its effects'. Discourses facilitate the understanding of how the use of power influences or dominates events or people in societies. Societal reality is however not a discursive homogeneity – discourses become tangled with each other which results in the growth of yet more discourses. However, the individual does not make the discourse – while everyone produces discourse, it is not produced by any single group, it is super-individual. Nevertheless discourses evolve and become independent owing to historical processes (Jager 2001:37). People then deploy these discourses as an exercise of power and as a means of producing interpretations of reality.

Another way of viewing this relationship is to consider the link between reality and meaning. Reality is only meaningful and exists in the form in which it exists only as long as the people who are bound up into the socio-historic discourses have allocated and will continue to allocate meaning to it (Jager 2001:44). Should those knitted into the discourse cease to allocate meaning to it then the reality crumbles.

I will illustrate these points prompted by an argument articulated by Janna Thompson (2002: 87-96). We will consider two discourses. It is to be noted that these are just two discourses of many possible discourses for the subject area. However, let us start with these two “pure” discourses. Discourse 1 is that terrorists are criminals. They should be judged by the criminal code. In being judged by the criminal code, however, laws can be oppressive or prejudiced making it not always wrong to break them. Terrorist acts can therefore be criminal in theory and yet morally justifiable at the same time. Hence terrorism is not always to be condemned. For example, Nelson Mandela was once called a terrorist yet he won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993 with Frederik Willem de Klerk for the peaceful termination of the apartheid regime and for laying the foundations for a new democratic South Africa. Discourse 2 is that terrorists are combatants. Terrorist acts are therefore acts of war. Not all actions are permitted in war, however. The *jus in bello* part of just war theory determines what is acceptable behaviour in war (Coady 2002: 11). Murderous attacks on non-combatants are not acceptable. They are war crimes. Terrorists are thus to be prosecuted. Terrorists as combatants are classed as prisoners of war, however, whose treatment would be subject to international scrutiny. War crimes tribunals set up by the international community are best to prosecute terrorists. If Bin Laden were captured, the best course of action would be to have him tried in an international War Crimes Tribunal.

An interesting point to note here is that these are in a sense competing discourses. They determine different realities. As has been noted above, however, discourses may become tangled resulting in societal reality being a discursive heterogeneity. Two “pure” discourses may intersect yielding a further discourse, a product of the two. For example, the Bush Administration has allowed a new classification to be applied to captured “domestic” terrorists including those connected with Al-Qaeda: “unlawful combatants”. This has some severe repercussions. It entails imprisonment on domestic soil and on a continuing basis as well as the loss of a right to a lawyer and to communicate with anyone in the outside world (Greenberg 2005: 2). This amounts to, in fact, extra-legal coercion. Thus a new discourse

has been developed. If terrorists are found in the homeland they are assigned the status of “unlawful combatants”. However, unlawful combatants do not attract international scrutiny. They can be held indefinitely without trial. Threatening the homeland with terrorism justifies their being held outside the normal justice system in an imprisonment without end. This new discourse could become very powerful if is not challenged by authoritative legal and constitutional mechanisms.

Discourse and Language

Discourse is also related to language but it is much more than simply language. Language is not powerful on its own. It appropriates power through the use powerful people make of it. Powerful people can, in the course of time, help to turn language into discourse. For example, in a speech made to the UN September 21, 2004, Bush alludes many times to the word “freedom” or “liberty” such as ‘The desire for freedom resides in every heart . . . Over time, and across the earth, freedom will find a way . . . The advance of freedom always carries a cost . . . I am confident that this young century will be liberty’s century’ (Bush 2004b: 1). Because these words are being delivered by the President of the United States, a personage of status, at the United Nations General Assembly, they carry a lot of weight and influence³. It is understandable that one could be seduced by the rhetoric through the mechanism and circumstances of delivery – a powerful agent, a powerful setting. In the same speech Bush covers up hidden agendas again through the appeal to the virtues of freedom:

We know that oppressive governments support terror, while free governments fight the terrorists in their midst. We know that free peoples embrace progress and life, instead of becoming the recruits for murderous ideologies.

George W Bush (2004b: 1)

The words, “free governments fight the terrorists in their midst” is particularly powerful. It offers a rationale for the Bush Administration’s policy on the Global War on Terror. It is not a pure discourse but is building upon already existing discursive themes on how all terrorists are motivated by evil and all democracies are based on good. It is for the reason that language can be so effectively appropriated by the powerful that CDA often chooses the perspective of those who suffer, of those who are dominated and critically analyses the language use of those who are in power. Those in power are, in effect, responsible for the inequalities and have the means to address these inequalities and improve conditions (Wodak 2001: 10). CDA scholars thus play an advocatory role for groups who suffer from social

³ I will allude to this speech again later in the chapter with particular reference to the structure of text and recipients of discourse.

discrimination and are explicit about their position. My quest in this thesis and research project is to understand global terrorism and seek to expose the conditions and relationships that nurture its growth. I will therefore aim to uncover the discursive aspects of societal inequalities including the linguistic means used by the privileged to further entrench existing inequities in society.

The Role of Discourse in Power Abuse

CDA does not constitute a single specific direction of research or encompass a unitary theoretical framework. Thus systems of analysis in CDA are diverse and therefore do not comprise a single empirical method. Rather, CDA can best be conceived as an approach or cluster of approaches. One of its principal defining features, as can be deduced from the above discussion, is its concern with power as an essential condition of social life. CDA endeavours to make explicit relationships of power, which are commonly hidden. In addition, it seeks out the interconnectedness of events. So incorporating both these features is prominent in CDA. For example, it may not appear that President George Bush talking about the 'transformational power of liberty' in the first presidential debate prior to the US 2004 election and mispronouncing the word for Islamic clerics, mullah, as "moolas" has much to do with Middle East conceptions of the West. However, Orville Schell, correspondent, witnessing the debate from the vantage point of Germany with a group of Middle Eastern businessmen is able to report the 'restive incredulity' experienced among the group at Bush's less than stellar performance. One businessman exclaimed: 'This president has over two hundred thousand troops in the Middle East, but he doesn't understand the most elemental thing about Islam.' Schell reports the mispronunciation had tipped the scales from bewilderment to contempt (Schell 2004:1).

The approach that I will be following in my analysis is a type of multidisciplinary CDA as enunciated by Teun van Dijk (2001a: 95-120). It focuses on the role of discourse in the creation of power abuse or domination by holding an attitude of dissension against those who abuse text and talk in order to establish and legitimate their abuse of power. While CDA scholarship is therefore biased, it is not inherently bad scholarship and as Teun van Dijk (2001a: 96) claims, there is recognition within CDA scholarship that accusations of biasness are part of the complex mechanisms of domination – marginalising and problematising dissent is a strategic lever of the powerful.

Two Basic Concepts of a CDA Analysis

Before outlining my theoretical framework that will be used in my analysis in the following part of this thesis, I wish to briefly discuss two important basic concepts as outlined by Teun van Dijk (2001b: 354-358) that is basic to a CDA analysis. Verbal interaction belongs to the micro level of the social order. Such interaction includes language use, discourse and communication. Power, dominance and inequality between social groups belong to a macro level of analysis. This means that CDA must bridge the gap between the micro and macro approaches.

The other important basic concept is that of power, more specifically the social power of groups and institutions. Social power will be defined in terms of control. Thus as Teun van Dijk (2001b: 354- 355) argues, groups have power if they are able to control the acts and minds of members of other groups, an ability which is based on ‘privileged access to scarce social resources’. Such resources include money, status, force, knowledge, culture and the various forms of public discourse. Dominated groups may resist, comply with, and even legitimate such power in accepting it as a natural condition. If power is accepted as a natural condition in a general consensus, it is “hegemony” (Teun van Dijk (2001b: 354) quoting Gramsci). For example, the US can be considered to be the leader of an open and liberal world economy since the end of World War II. This leader has used power and influence to promote trade liberalisation in order to advance its own political and economic interests. It has seldom physically attempted to coerce reluctant states to obey the rules of the liberal international economic order, although the efforts to democratise the Middle East through the conduits of Afghanistan and Iraq prove an exception. However, be it so, other states cooperate with the hegemon because it is in their own interests to do so. Nevertheless, in order to maintain the hegemon’s position, fall out occurs in the form of class domination, sexism, racism, and most importantly, the marginalisation of peoples and cultures that prefer a more traditional or less modern way of life. So taking an overall view of the relations between discourse and power, one can say those groups which control primary or leading discourse (as in hegemony) also have more chances to control the minds and consequently the actions, of others.

Controlling discourse thereby assists in controlling minds, which is fundamental in reproducing dominance and hegemony. Structures of context, text and talk can be controlled by powerful speakers and such power may be abused at the expense of others (Teun van Dijk

2001b: 357). Thus power can be enacted over the structures of text and talk as well as content. For example, Bush, in his address to the UN (Bush 2004b: 2), attempts to rally support for democracy building in the Middle East but before broaching this subject, however, he endeavours to create solidarity among UN members through invoking the common causes that have united them in the past and problems which they now face. A structure of text that is particularly striking and that introduces these causes is a repetition of the clause, "Because we believe in human dignity". This is enunciated seven times in all. Is this effective in controlling and thereby furthering Bush's cause? Teun van Dijk (2001b: 357) notes that recipients tend to accept knowledge through discourses from what they see as authoritative and credible sources and who also may not have the knowledge needed to challenge the discourses to which they are exposed. However, this was not the case in this particular context where recipients comprised members of the World Body that collectively opposed the invasion of Iraq. I doubt Bush's attempt to control discourse would have been successful in this context in spite of his potent use of the words "freedom" and "liberty" as referred to earlier in the chapter. Perhaps a more effective use of this structure would be in a national context where the force of patriotism could be invoked. In any event it can be seen how powerful is the control of discourse and how this leads to the reproduction of dominance and hegemony at the further expense of marginal groups.

CDA Theoretical Framework

Since a variety of texts are going to be used and these texts would employ a great many possible discourse structures, it must be stated that only a limited analysis can be given for each text. Broadly speaking, the analysis will be couched in terms of exploring the idea that global terrorism is a response by Islamic fundamentalist people (working through organised groups representing their interests) who have been oppressed by neo-conservative and neo-liberal hegemony and through terrorist acts, seek to protect their value system. In short, these terrorist acts are to be viewed as a response to neo-conservative and neo-liberal hegemony that cannot be negotiated in any other way. The CDA analysis aims to expose the discursive reproduction of domination in society by those holding power, i.e. the Bush Administration and the neoconservative right and to show how a response is made through Islam in the development of a counter discourse, labelled "terrorist" to these hegemonic discourses. I have completed a CDA on 11 texts of George W. Bush and 14 texts of Osama bin Laden. The texts to be considered are presented in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2.

The texts I used were selected because they reveal the public image of the Bush Administration – what it wanted the world to know about them and their intentions and interpretations of reality via a neo-conservative lens, through which they were inviting the world to peer at an emerging new USA. I did the same to find out what bin Laden was saying in opposition or parallel to Bush. This is where a conflict emerges. This conflict exists as opposing counter discourses. It helps us understand why each side has responded as they have – acts of terror versus a war of terror.

I am looking closely at these two sources of text in a bid to analyse them and find information that reveals whether there is evidence that would enable me to accept or reject the main hypothesis that I set up when I embarked on my research journey. I have no previously established argument, only a question posed as a hypothesis, which I address on the basis of what I will find on the analysis of the texts as data-source and interpretation of what I find backed up by literature. This is not about finding the truth about whether bin Laden or Bush is correct in their actions so much as trying to find out the motives and rationale for why bin Laden is advocating terrorist attack as a form of war on the USA and its allies. The question that then arises in the research process is to ask whether there is any other way to respond to bin Laden. This takes place after the analysis of texts.

Table 2.1 lists the text number against a description of the text excerpt and the date for President George W. Bush. After the table in numerical order is a local justification for each text used.

Table 2.1 Texts used in CDA of George W. Bush

Text	Description of Text Excerpt	Date
1	Inaugural Address	20.01.2001
2	Address to a Joint Session of Congress on Terrorist Attacks	20.09.2001
3	Remarks by the President on Trade Promotion Authority	04.04.2002
4	Graduation Speech at the United States Military Academy	01.06.2002
5	Commencement Address at the University of South Carolina	09.05.2003
6	Address to the United Nations General Assembly	23.09.2003
7	Speech to the United Nations General Assembly	21.09.2004
8	Rebuttal to Sen. John Kerry in opening question of 2004 election debate	30.09.2004
9	Second Inaugural Address	20.01.2005
10	Introductory and concluding Paragraphs to the 2006 State of the Union Address	31.01.2006
11	Speech to Military Officers	05.09.2006

1. The inaugural address is an extremely important because it outlines in general terms how the President will lead and govern the country for the next four years. It usually encompasses references from where the country has been to where it is going. It is interesting too in respect of the transfer of power from one party to another such as the case is here. The inaugural address concerned “our democratic faith”.
2. This address was made to congress only nine days after the September 11 terrorist attacks. In it Bush outlined the US response to these events. Less than three weeks after Bush’s speech, US forces launched a military campaign in Afghanistan with a stated goal of capturing bin Laden and overthrowing Afghanistan’s Taliban government. This speech is significant for its nearness to the terrorist attacks on September 11.
3. In this address Bush connects economic reform to political reform, two very important issues. He is articulating the argument that trade can and must play a role in promoting democracy and human rights in the rest of the world. Bush is claiming that trade is more important than the export of goods; it is also about exporting freedom and democracy. I chose this text to explore Bush’s argument relating to economic and political reform and freedom.
4. The 2002 West Point Address is a very significant speech. It was given within a military milieu and it contained a military related subject: pre-emption. This was a concept Bush may have alluded to before but had never fully articulated until now. In this speech Bush justifies pre-emption and discusses why deterrence is no longer valid in the terrorist circumstances facing the country.
5. In this speech Bush announces his goals of creating a greater Middle East free trade region declaring that the Arab world is being completely bypassed in terms of economic progress. The economic progress of the Arab world is important as its potential for terrorism could conceivably rise with increasing poverty.
6. Bush covers several areas in this speech to the UN General Assembly. He focuses firstly on the recent terrorist attacks – the UN headquarters in Baghdad and then moves on to the building of a democratic Iraq. He paints the US as following the true principles of the UN but does not appear to want to share authority with the UN’s constituents. He notes that a free Iraq will be an example throughout the region. He describes the terrorists. It is crucial to know how Bush perceives the “terrorists”.
7. In this speech, Bush mainly talks about Iraq and the need for democracy, appealing to the UN body for help in reconstruction. He likens the US to the UN which appears to

promote the use of the setting to further his own campaign. I chose this text to explore Bush's concept of how the US and the UN share similar values.

8. The address in this text is the rebuttal of President Bush to Sen. John Kerry in the opening question of the 2004 election debate. The topic of the debate is foreign affairs and the question is about preventing another 9/11 type terrorist attack on the US. It seemed to me crucial to explore how President Bush responded in his rebuttal.
9. The second inaugural address embraces the imperative of advancing human freedom worldwide. Such an imperative seems to accept the assumption that "freedom" as the West perceives it holds a universal value for the entire world and can be institutionalised only in Western political forms. I chose to investigate Bush's framework for this imperative.
10. The State of the Union address is an annual address presented before a joint session of Congress. The address is most frequently used to outline the President's legislative proposals for the upcoming year. As such, it is quite an important speech. Bush begins and ends the 2006 State of the Union address with thoughts on freedom and the global economy, a connection that is relevant to my study.
11. This speech was the second in a series linked to the anniversary of the September 11 attacks. It was delivered to the Military Officers Association of America in a room filled with US troops and with diplomatic representatives of foreign countries that had suffered terrorist attacks. Consequently there was a need to recognise the military personnel who had fought in the War on Terror and to justify the war itself. I therefore found Bush's reference to the Caliphate in this context very relevant to my study.

Table 2.2 lists the text number against a description of the text excerpt and the date for Osama bin Laden. After the table in numerical order is a local justification for each text used.

Table 2.2 Texts used in CDA of Osama bin Laden

Text	Description of Text Excerpt	Date
1	First interview by Robert Fisk	1996
2	Second Interview by Robert Fisk	1996
3	Interview by Abdel Bari Atwan	1996
4	Fatwa entitled "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places"	23.08.1996
5	Interview by Peter Arnett	March 1997
6	Fatwa of the World Islamic Front	23.02.1998

7	Interview by Al-Jazeera television correspondent, Tayseer Alouni	October 2001
8	Interview published originally in Pakistani newspaper <i>Ummat</i>	28.09.2001
9	Text of an audio message identified to be from Osama bin Laden broadcast by al-Jazeera	11.02.2003
10	Text of an audio message identified to be from Osama bin Laden broadcast by al-Jazeera	04.01.2004
11	Text of an audio message identified to be from Osama bin Laden broadcast by al-Arabiya and al-Jazeera	15.04.2004
12	Text of an audio message identified to be from Osama bin Laden broadcast by al-Jazeera	30.10.2004
13	Text of an audio message identified to be from Osama bin Laden broadcast by al-Jazeera	19.01.2006
14	Text of an audio message identified to be from Osama bin Laden broadcast by al-Jazeera	23.04.2006

1. This is perhaps the earliest interview of bin Laden that is on record. I chose to include it because I think it is a valuable resource on bin Laden's early motivations and mindset.
2. This is again another early interview chosen for the understanding it can provide on bin Laden's early formative period.
3. Another 1996 interview chosen again for the information it can provide on the early period of bin Laden's life.
4. This text is a fatwa declaring war against the Americans occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places. It is an important document for it provides the rationale for bin Laden's call to arms for all Muslims to fight what bin Laden calls "the enemies of Islam" in Islam's sacred sites.
5. In this text bin Laden clarifies the scope of his Declaration of War by insisting the US desist from intervention against Muslims in the whole world. He claims Muslims are called terrorists when they resist the imposition of US rule upon them. This text shows bin Laden denying Western rhetoric on terrorism.
6. This text is a fatwa with a ruling to kill Americans and their allies, both civilians and military, in order for their armies to move out of the lands of Islam. The military presence is seen as a crime by bin Laden and his supporters and such crimes mean a Declaration by the Americans on God, his prophet and Muslims. This text is central to identify the root cause of the "terrorist" problem.
7. In this interview bin Laden discusses the events of September 11 although not admitting responsibility. He refers to their symbolic value. He also refers to retribution for Muslims killed. Bin Laden weaves these two themes together although

they are at cross purposes with each other. The text is interesting for this contradiction.

8. This text focuses on what bin Laden considers his duty with respect to Islam which is just to awaken Muslims as to *their* duty. It is important to see how bin Laden views himself, his mission and al-Qaeda.
9. This text from an audio message suggests that bin Laden considers that his role in the jihad is one of inciting fellow Muslims to jihad as the previous text indicated. Of particular interest is the range of bin Laden's rhetorical strength and who he *is* to be making these claims.
10. In this text the political bin Laden and the millenarian bin Laden emerge and they are contradictory to each other. Bin Laden also is seen pushing a fundamentalist agenda. These are significant facts to consider regarding the possibility of the West's engagement with him.
11. Bin Laden claims that his acts are a reaction to our own acts. I found this perception to be of vital interest requiring an exploration of the text.
12. This text alludes to US foreign policy which bin Laden claims has been so destructive to the Islamic world. Bin Laden also refers to reciprocal treatment which has a direct bearing on the content and context of my study.
13. In this text, bin Laden offers a truce. I chose to explore the terms of the truce and to ascertain if it was meant sincerely by examining the text.
14. In this text, bin Laden suffers a misunderstanding as to the people's status in a democratic government. I chose to explore what bin Laden's vision means for legitimating the killing of the innocent.

Thus through an examination of structures, strategies and processes of fragments of text an analysis will be performed. I am setting out here to investigate and find out whether Osama bin Laden's discourse is largely or in any way a discourse of response, a resistance, to neo-liberal hegemony and neo-conservative extremes.

I begin bin Laden's texts from 1996. This is when written texts become available from bin Laden and they are few in number. I include these earlier texts because they throw light on bin Laden's formative period. I begin Bush's texts from the year he adopted the presidency. Unlike bin Laden texts, there are numerous Bush texts from which to choose. Hence I consider bin Laden's early texts valuable from this point of view.

Description and Justification of Method in CDA

CDA does not provide a ready-made approach to social analysis. There is no preconceived method to follow. I chose to apply the principles of Teun van Dijk in his *Multidisciplinary CDA* (Teun van Dijk 2001a: 95-119) to my two opposing counter discourses. Van Dijk uses a number of structures that he identifies within the text and builds his argument around them. When a structure is identified, analysis becomes clearer and more meaningful. A listing of these structures is as follows:

Macro propositions

The macro proposition provides a first, overall idea of what a discourse is all about and controls other aspects of discourse. Summaries express macrostructures so I simply list the topics of a text through the use of the macro proposition. Shorter texts (or text excerpts) facilitate all macro propositions to be listed. Longer texts, however, will have only key macro propositions listed due to their size. The ***Overall Macro proposition*** is a reduction of the macro propositions resulting in a somewhat higher level macro proposition or ***implication***. I use ***implication*** to refer to this reduction.

Implicit Meaning; Indirect Meaning

There are different forms of implicit or indirect meanings such as implications, presuppositions and allusions. Information is called ***implicit*** when it can be inferred from the text. Implicit information is not of the text but part of the mental model that the users of a text employ. Implicit meanings are related to underlying beliefs but are not openly asserted.

Local Meanings

Local context refers to the immediate, interactional situation in which a communicative event takes place. Local meanings most directly influence the opinions and attitudes of recipients.

Lexical Choice

Lexical choice relates to the individual words that make up the language of a text.

Omissions

Omissions are information that is being left out of the text. This can be of great importance. The omitted information may be the mental model of a critical reader or part of general shared knowledge that is needed or may be used to understand a text. The entire text is perused to make sure that the supposed omission is indeed not present in the rest of the text.

Hyperbole

Hyperbole is a device for enhancing and exaggerating meaning. Identifying hyperbole in a text imparts clarity to the analysis. Sometimes the hyperbole can come close to obvious lies. Such hyperbole is essential to isolate.

Since a short single text does not exemplify the many discourse structures possible, I am limited in giving a very partial analysis of each text. Nevertheless such a limited study does have value. Each text begins with the identification of the macro propositions followed by the overall macro proposition or implication. Where applicable, other discursive structures, listed above, will be identified. It needs to be emphasized that not all of the discursive structures listed here will be found in every text. While the identification of the discourse structures facilitates analysis, where there is a lack of these structures, I select other structures that appear relevant to the social issue such as topic choice, word order, stress and intonation, word repetition and content for closer analysis. Each text, however, always ends with a summary and discussion.

CDA will not be the only method being used in the analysis. The theoretical framework constructed from postmodernism and postcolonialism, outlined in Chapters Three and Four, will be employed in the analysis as well. The analysis will comprise Part Two of this thesis.

Qualitative Analysis

I am now going to outline the qualitative analysis I employ in Part Three of the thesis. Part Three does not adopt what Kellehear (1993: 19-23) terms either a hypothetico- deductive approach or an ethnographic- inductive approach. It is located in between these two extremes. Part Three aims to present dialogue as a possible means of addressing global terrorism. It does this by showing how dialogue between Muslims and Christians at the Silsilah Dialogue Movement's headquarters at Harmony Village, Zamboanga, in the Philippines has produced promising and significant results which may have a positive effect on solving the nation's terrorism problem. It is argued that a positive result in the microcosm can be extended to the macrocosm, to global terrorism, especially if similar dialogue happens in many localities where terrorism is a problem and can be linked to the global terrorism movement backed by Islamic fundamentalist groups. I also argue that addressing terrorism directly through dialogue is a possibility that holds promise. I discuss the respondents, the interview process, and the goals of the study below.

The Interviewees/Participants

The interviewees comprised Fr. Sebastiano D'Ambra, President of the Silsilah Dialogue Movement, Remy, Chairman of the Board of Trustees and 13 participants who consisted of six Christians and seven Muslims. I met the respondents at Harmony Village in Zamboanga, the Philippines, which is the headquarters of the Silsilah Dialogue Movement, where I stayed for a period of three weeks. With respect to the interview process, I was mindful of my choice of respondents. Sarantakos (1998: 182-83) raises the issue as to the structure of the group, whether it should consist of similar or different people for instance. Dialogue courses were being given at Silsilah during the time of my visit and I gained access to the respondents at the courses, which I also attended. I chose to interview the President of the Movement and the Chairman of the Board of Trustees who could furnish vital information regarding the history and administration of the Movement and 13 participants in the courses who could provide feedback in terms of course value and interaction among course participants. Sarantakos (1998: 182) states that the size of the group must be large enough to provide the basis for a reasonable discussion but not too large to become uncontrollable and suggests 10 to be ideal but more than 20 to be too unmanageable.

Sarantakos (1998: 182-83) discusses group composition and explains this differs with the research issue so my group was, of course, not homogenous with respect to religion being divided into six Christians and seven Muslims. All respondents however were talkative, knowledgeable and interested in the research topic. Most had had tertiary education. All spoke English with varying degrees of competency and the style of their English was quite formal, understandable in a foreign speaker.

The Interview Process

The interview was semi-structured and the questions open-ended. They were single interviews where I questioned one person at a time. Each participant was only questioned once and that was either during or after the courses were presented. As many of the participants stayed at Silsilah headquarters for several days after the courses were completed, it was possible to interview them then. It is necessary to understand that Silsilah headquarters provides a welcoming place for Muslims and Christians to come and visit even in times when there are no courses being offered. The question structure was not fixed or rigid, allowing

change of question order and the addition of new questions where necessary. I adjusted the interview to suit the goal of the study.

I approached the interview with some issues in mind. These issues included questions such as how did Muslims and Christians relate both before and after dialogue, can dialogue improve community relations, was it more difficult for Muslims, the more marginalised group, to become involved in the dialogical process, was there stereotyping of the “Other” involved. However, if a participant wished to embrace a new direction I allowed this to occur subject to what I considered relevant.

Recording the Interview

I chose note-taking to record the interviews. While the tape-recorder maintains a faithful account of verbal data, I felt that it would inhibit interaction as well as possibly hinder the interpretive process during interaction. Minichiello et al caution potential interviewers that electronic recording can lead to a recessive style of research where the interpretive process occurs during the editing and selection of extracts from the transcripts rather than during the interaction process. Minichiello et al also stress that tape-recorders can lull the interviewer into a loss of concentration (Minichiello et al 1995: 99). Sarantakos (1998: 184- 85) states that while electronic recording is common, it demonstrates several shortcomings such as respondents feeling intimidated and not wishing to talk when their statements are being recorded. Minichiello et al (1995: 99) contend that note-taking pulls the researcher into analysis and interpretation earlier in the research than tape-recording and I considered this to be a positive factor. As I made notes I found I used my own version of shorthand, which in fact, also incorporated interpretation. Thus I found that note-taking allowed some insight into how the analysis might be undertaken as Minichiello et al suggested. Sarantakos (1998: 184) also held a positive view of note-taking but cautioned that intensive discussions might be a big task for the researcher. I found this to be the case in fact. A very animated discussion was challenging to record but, as stated above, I quickly developed my own version of shorthand.

I found I had to listen very attentively to the participants in the interviews for two reasons. Firstly, I had to familiarise myself with the participants’ accents. Although they spoke fluent English, their accent was moderately nuanced than with what I was familiar. Secondly, participation meant *active* listening – attending to conversation sensitively and thinking about

the direction of each verbal interaction. This told me when to probe for clarification or elaboration and when to remain silent. Minichiello et al (1995: 101) claim that for the researcher, listening is the means of engaging in the conversation as part of normal social interaction while at the same time being distanced enough to sustain a critical inner dialogue so that analysis of the data can occur. I feel I was able, to some degree, to analyse what was happening while at the same time participate in the interaction and the discussion.

Organising the Data

In reconstructing interviews I did not attempt to recall and reproduce all that was said in exactly the same words but to recall the meaning of remarks. However I did retain quotations, which I thought would be useful. I endeavoured to write up my fieldnotes soon after I finished the interview. This was not always possible and as Minichiello et al (1995: 100) emphasise, a disadvantage of note-taking can be that the memory may not be accurate the day after. I feel I minimised inaccuracies by attending to the write-up as soon as I could and this was usually later at night.

My fieldnotes included my own reflection on what was said and observed. These reflective comments included information I thought was relevant at the time. This reflective account included some speculation about themes and connections between pieces of data. I also searched for emergent ideas in the data with a view to sketching research strategies. Initially, my fieldnotes were broad as my focus was general. As the research progressed, themes became evident and concepts were identified, with the result that the notes became more focused and selective. This is in accord with Minichiello et al (1995: 100).

Method of Data Analysis

The interviews resulted in a vast amount of qualitative data. It was necessary to read and re-read my fieldnotes for several weeks to familiarise myself with their content before attempting to press on with the analysis proper. I realised that the data had to be broken up into manageable units as Minichiello et al (1995: 248) suggest. This required organisation so that I could recover parts of the data relevant to the questions I was addressing. During this data analysis I searched for patterns to the data in the form of recurring themes. As Minichiello et al (1995: 248) contend, for data to become meaningful for analysis, the researcher has to identify common themes which link issues together and ground the analysis in the participant's understanding and in translations of it. Kellehear (1993: 32-33) similarly

maintains that the task of understanding and of theorising or explaining phenomena, begins with the researcher being able to discern a recurring pattern in the research data. The use of themes (within the patterns) as the unit of analysis allowed me to search for the expression of ideas irrespective of their grammatical connections. So I was looking for concepts and linked concepts. This procedure resulted in a list of 10 changes that dialogue initiated in the mindset of certain participants. Participants' Reports are then briefly presented and where changes are present, these are numerically noted at the end of the report.

From this point, I introduced some quantification in terms of the frequency that each change was said to occur by the participants and looked at the composition of those responses, i.e. how many were Muslim, how many were Christian. I then enquired as to the significance of this composition, which led to some conclusions concerning how Muslims and Christians perceived the Other and how they related during dialogue. Thus data was transformed from the raw state to a form that allowed it to be used constructively and this transformation, described above, constituted the method of data analysis.

The Goal of the Silsilah Study

The goal of the study is to show the changes that the dialogue process brings and if dialogue can be interpreted as a transforming force for peace among Muslims and Christians in the conflicted environment of Mindanao where what has been understood as terrorism has been a potent force. What is being compared in the study is the participants' mindset before the dialogue process and the participants' mindset after the dialogue process. As stated above, each participant was only interviewed once either during or after the presentation of the courses. Hence mindset before the dialogue process was gauged through the memory of the participant. This seemed to be a vivid memory for the participants. Some of the participants had completed the course in previous years as well and were repeating it but the participants generally did not have a problem with recall of this mindset. As explained above, the most significant changes are noted in a set of 10 observations. These observations are listed in Table 11.1 in Chapter Eleven.

As referred to above, the frequency that each change was said to occur by participants throughout the entire interview process was then noted and a frequency table was made. Finally, findings were summarised. The purpose here is to find out the extent to which dialogue promoted by Silsilah can help in solving problems of conflict that exist between

Muslims and Christians in that particular region of the Philippines. It is argued that the findings from dialogue in the local context can be applied in the global context.

Weaknesses and Limitations of Qualitative Analysis

Each of the critical perspectives and methodologies has weaknesses. I choose to discuss the weaknesses of the qualitative methodology here but prefer to discuss the weaknesses of the other perspectives at the time of employing the theory for I hold that in order to discuss these weaknesses astutely, one must know something of the theory. The limitations to applying postmodernism and postcolonialism are thus discussed in Chapter Four and to critical discourse analysis in Chapter Eight.

The weaknesses associated with qualitative methodology stem largely from the process of conducting semi-structured interviews and interpreting the data from them. As a white Australian woman who admitted to no religion at the time (and I was asked often), I was in a country whose inhabitants were very religious. It was difficult for my participants to understand why I did not have a faith. I acknowledge that there was some slight hesitation at the outset when I approached them for an interview. Thus there were some subtle barriers both from my side of the interview and from the participants' side. I think possibly there was initially an issue of trust for the participants but as my time in Harmony Village increased, it became easier to recruit participants. However, there is a possibility that the religious influences from both sides did have some impact upon the conclusions of my study.

Another agent, which may have been an influence in the outcome of the study, was the language used. All the participants spoke English well. It was I who had to attune to the accent and it took some time to become a good listener. During this initial time of adjustment, I was not picking up on the subtleties of language use and it is feasible that this may have influenced my interpretation of an interview. My interpreting skills improved as time went on but I think there is a possibility that my verbal inabilities did also impact upon the conclusions of my study to some degree.

My age, too, became another factor of influence. As I was older than the participants, I was granted great respect and I thought that this may have inhibited spontaneity and responses to some degree, which would have ultimately impacted upon my conclusions.

So my values, my linguistic abilities, my age and other cultural aspects all combine to introduce factors in the social construction of knowledge that underpins this study. These factors comprise some inherent weaknesses which may require awareness in the interpretation of my results.

Thesis Overview

I present the following overview for each chapter.

Part One Chapter Three

This chapter comprises a brief review of the pathway from Enlightenment thought to postmodernism with the aim of demonstrating how postmodernist philosophy can be applied to the means of analysing international terrorism. Tracing modernism back to its origins in Enlightenment thought particularly highlights the differences between modernism and postmodernism. This allows knowledge and understanding to be gained from a different perspective thus aiding in the analytical process. The chapter is further developed into a theoretical framework that will underpin the thesis, my intention being to employ postmodernist discourse to deconstruct terrorism as carried out by a particular brand of Islamic fundamentalism.

Part One Chapter Four

As the previous chapter introduced postmodernism as a means of analysing terrorism, this chapter introduces postcolonialism for the same purpose. The work of the theorists who inform postcolonialism will be briefly examined. It will be discussed how, using Foucault's concept of discourse, Said has showed that Western knowledge of the "Orient" is not based on fact and actuality but on a discursive colonial formation, a constructed view where Arab peoples have been denigrated and subject to misrepresentation. This is followed by an analysis of the colonial encounter with references to the situation in present day Iraq. It is stressed in this chapter that postcolonialism challenges the universal validity of Western culture and joins postmodernism in offering a possibility for knowing differently.

Part One Chapter Five

This chapter presents the conventional argument against global terrorism and explores the flaws that are inherent in this argument. The conventional argument sees in militant Islam an aggressive ideology that seeks world domination. It will be shown, however, how the Global War on Terror can be seen as a convenient platform from which the Bush Administration and

its neo-conservative support can launch its own remake of the post Cold War world in attempting to secure an enduring period of American hegemony. It is postulated that the West, dominated by the US, marginalizes the existence of Islamic fundamentalist groups and wider Islamic groups that they represent.

Part One Chapter Six

This chapter sets out to show that Islamic Civilisation, for centuries at the forefront of all civilisations in the world, has been marginalised, politically and economically, over the past 600 years by European and later Anglo/American imperialism and its colonial domination. The chapter seeks to establish that postmodernism and postcolonialism can contribute to the understanding of terrorism as a reaction or response by certain Islamic fundamentalist groups which may resort to using this form of violence to improve their marginalised position of power in the global political economy. The question is raised as to the differentiation between the militant Islamic response and the moderate Islamic response.

Part One Chapter Seven

This chapter seeks to demonstrate that Islam comprises a diversity of religious expression, that it is a world religion with different faces. Global terrorism and the War on Terror have produced a distorted image of this religion, which is becoming increasingly defined in terms of one aspect of its profile, its fundamentalism. It is acknowledged that fundamentalism is one face of Islam from which violent extremism has found a voice. While fundamentalism is discussed, progressive forces are also described which are competing with long held traditions to accommodate change in society and work for peace. This chapter attempts to present a brief but honest critique of Islam.

Part Two Chapter Eight

This chapter begins with a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of 11 texts, which are excerpts from speeches made by George W. Bush as President of the United States. The emergent arguments arising from the texts are tabularised and three strands chosen to present a further analysis. These strands are: September the 11th /Defence Strategies, Freedom/Democracy/Globalisation and Innocence/Terrorism. The thrust of the findings from the analysis is that September the 11th has been used as justification for the promulgation of new US foreign policies that accords with the US pursuit of global dominance. Postmodernist and postcolonialist responses are subsequently given to the Bush discourses.

Part Two Chapter Nine

This chapter comprises a CDA on 14 selected texts of Osama bin Laden in the context of his jihad against the West. It aims to show how a response is made through Islam to the hegemonic discourses of those holding power in the West, primarily the Bush Administration. This analysis provides a deeper understanding of bin Laden and his people's grievances than what his televised speeches and audiotapes offer. The picture that emerges is that of a very single-minded man who can articulate the Muslim position with appeal. The emergent arguments arising from the texts are tabularised and five strands chosen to present a further analysis. These strands are: We, the Victims, Finding Ways to Correct What Has Happened to the Islamic World, Acting to Dispel the Enemy, Fundamentalism as a Response and Incongruity in September the 11th Stories. What emerges from this analysis is bin Laden's defence of the Muslim community from attack through jihad as a political act, the basis of which is grounded within a fundamentalist configuration. A discussion on the counter discourse response labelled "Terrorist" and how this is related to modernity completes the chapter.

Part Three Chapter Ten

This chapter introduces dialogue as a means of addressing terrorism. While a pluralist position is seen to best facilitate interreligious dialogue, exclusivist and inclusivist positions may also contribute to some degree. Examples of Muslim and Christian foundations of dialogue are given as examples as excerpts from the Holy Qur'an and the Holy Bible. Just as postmodernism and postcolonialism showed how the Islamic world has been marginalised by the West and the discursive reproduction of domination of those holding power was exposed, I move to a local example of this phenomenon: the island of Mindanao in the Philippines. Mindanao, a microcosm of the global terrorist problem, is examined in terms of its history and how it has produced a Muslim-Christian Dialogue Movement, the Silsilah Dialogue Movement (SDM). In order to see how effectively dialogue may work in the macrocosm, it is necessary to examine how dialogue works in the microcosm, which is the reason for studying the SDM. The chapter ends with thoughts on the possibility of engaging those we may call "terrorists" through dialogue.

Part Three Chapter Eleven

This chapter reports the results of field research performed at the SDM, Mindanao. Information about the participants and other interviewees is provided followed by comments from the founder and President of Silsilah, Fr. Sebastiano d'Ambra who speaks for the vitality of the movement as applied against the backdrop of the conflict in Mindanao. The data is discussed via a division into three sections: the Mindset before Dialogue, Experiences during Dialogue and the Mindset after Experiences of Dialogue. It is shown that dialogue promoted by Silsilah can help in solving conflict related problems between Muslims and Christians. This contribution towards a solution to the insurgency problem in the microcosm of the Mindanao setting, it is suggested, can be applied and extended to the macrocosm, to global terrorism.

Summary

This chapter presented the methodology of this thesis. The thesis organization was outlined into Parts One, Two and Three. Part One, using postmodernist and postcolonial perspectives, primarily sets up the thesis for the central analysis in Part Two which uses CDA on excerpts from texts on George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden. Part Three focuses on dialogue as a means of addressing terrorism. The theories behind the perspectives of postmodernism and postcolonialism were introduced after which the methodologies of CDA and qualitative analysis were discussed.

The chapter ends with an overview of each chapter from Chapter Three onward to Chapter Eleven. The Interpretation and Discussion of Findings (Chapter Twelve) and the Conclusion and Synthesis (Chapter Thirteen) are where the synthesis of ideas takes place with respect to interpretation of the findings of the research and the identifying of the main conclusions as well as where further efforts can be made in research to follow on from this thesis. Hence chapters Twelve and Thirteen are not included in the thesis overview.

PART I

GROUNDING THE ANALYSIS

Chapter Three

Considering Postmodernism as a Means of Analysing Terrorism

Chapter Aim: As my intention in this thesis is to apply the ideas from the theories of postmodernism and postcolonialism to the analysis of terrorism, this chapter facilitates my objective by comprising a brief review of the pathway from Enlightenment thought to postmodernism with the aim of demonstrating how this philosophy *can be* applied to the means of analysing something as complex as global terrorism. Postcolonialism will be examined in the following chapter.

Introduction

Given the scope of the theoretical movements of postmodernism and postcolonialism in human thought, only the principal features can be noted within such a limited framework. Postmodernism is informed by a multitude of theorists so I am restricting my arguments to only the main ideas that can be applied to my thesis. While the primary purpose of this review is to show how this area of theory can be used in the analysis of global terrorism, the chapter is further developed, however, into a theoretical framework that will underpin this thesis, my intention being to employ postmodernist and postcolonial discourse to deconstruct terrorism as carried out by a particular brand of Islamic fundamentalism. Of course there are other acts of terror carried out by other groups too and for different reasons but I am restricting my focus to terrorism as perpetrated by adherents of what is being termed, Islamic fundamentalism. I will first concentrate on establishing how postmodernism represents a shift from modern thought and how such a shift can facilitate a different way of “seeing” things. Seeing things, such as knowledge and power, differently, can allow analysis to take on new directions. These new directions become evident when postmodernism is contrasted with the birth of modern thought in the Enlightenment.

Descartes’ *Cogito*: The Birth of Modern Thought in the Enlightenment

In his own time Rene Descartes⁴ was a revolutionary. He was perhaps the leading thinker of the European Enlightenment. His words may sound innocuous and familiar to us but they set

⁴ Descartes was born 1596 in Touraine, France. He is sometimes called the father of modern philosophy and certainly one of the influential thinkers in human history. Descartes produced his major philosophical work in which he introduced the now famous Latin phrase “*cogito ergo sum*” or in English “I think, therefore I am” in 1641. Descartes was a contemporary of Galileo (Lucidcafe 1996:1).

the modern world in motion. *Cogito ergo sum*. I think, therefore, I am. It is generally accepted that Descartes' thought presaged an epochal shift from religious authority to that of modern science. Descartes (1996a) (1641) argued that the most prolific scepticism is transcended by the certainty of one's own existence as a thinking entity:

But, in conclusion, . . . since it is now manifest to me that bodies themselves are not properly perceived by the senses nor by the faculty of imagination, but by the intellect alone; and since they are not perceived because they are seen and touched, but only because they are understood [or rightly comprehended by thought], I readily discover that there is nothing more easily or clearly apprehended than my own mind.

(Descartes 1996a (1641): 8)

Descartes (1996b) (c1641) later enlarged upon his method for inquiring into truth, arriving at his famous conclusion, the cogito:

I supposed that all objects (presentations) that had ever entered into my mind when awake, had in them no more truth than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, **I think, therefore I am**, was so certain and of such evidence, that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the Sceptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the Philosophy of which I was in search.

(Descartes 1996b (c1641): 5)

Descartes searches for a truth upon which to build a structure of certainty. He has come to realise that the very fact that he is thinking proves that he, Descartes, exists. Thus, paradoxically, his existence has become validated through his doubt. It is important to realise that Descartes explicitly rejects tradition and values the individual's perception of truth over preordained truth. The effect of Descartes' meditations places humankind as the new possessor, not only of knowledge, but knowledge at a level of perfect certainty. Leela Gandhi (1998: 34) describes this birth date of Cartesian philosophy as Descartes' attempt 'to enthrone man at the centre of epistemology and, simultaneously, to make knowledge impregnable to doubt'. Thus the individual's subjective experience takes precedence as the foundation of truth. At the core of this philosophy is the supreme importance of consciousness, the consciousness of humankind.

As a consequence of the importance placed on this newfound consciousness, key features that characterised the Enlightenment and which were to have significant influence on the shaping of the modern world emerged. They included the deifying of reason – the universe is seen as fundamentally rational, i.e. it can be understood through reason alone. In addition human beings can be improved through the development of their rational faculties but most importantly, truth can be deduced through empirical observation accompanied through reason

and systematised doubt. While religious doctrines formed the basis of truth preceding the Enlightenment, human experience proceeds to replace religious authority as the foundation of truth as a result of Enlightenment thought. Above all, human history comes to be seen as a history of progress. Thus the underlying currents in Enlightenment thought produced the scientific revolution with its emphasis on empirical thought and a mechanistic world view both of which were exported to the human sciences where religious and moral theories of personality and human development were consequently displaced (Hooker 1996).

One of the great figures in philosophy of this period was the German, Immanuel Kant⁵. Kant endeavoured to promote human reason as the new foundation for human values (Grooms 2005: 1). His desire to endorse a shift of emphasis from religion to reason can be seen in Kant's book, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (Kant 1996 (1793)). There is controversy among philosophers as to how far Kant intended to go in reducing religion to a system of ethics. Edwards (1979: 46) proclaims: '... we have in Kant the complete reduction of religion to morality.' However, Palmquist disagrees that Kant reduced religion to 'just a kind of footnote or appendage to morality' (Palmquist 1996: 5), and claims there are errors in the translation from German into English, rendering *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* lacking in religious leaning. However, whatever the case may be, there is no doubt that Kant promoted a rational universe where human values were based on reason.

In broad terms, then, the Enlightenment witnessed a replacement of the old order of absolute sovereignty with a new order based on enlightened reason and human values, which were oriented toward humanness and rationality. To Kant (2003 (1784): 1) for instance, the Enlightenment was 'man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity', its motto being '*Sapere aude!* Have courage to use your own understanding!' With respect to the public enlightening itself, however, Kant was not so optimistic: He believed that a public can only achieve enlightenment slowly for while a revolution can halt despotism and oppression, new prejudices will emerge to control the 'great unthinking mass' (Kant 2003 (1784): 1). The Reign of Terror, for example, was informed by Enlightenment reasoning – the social order could, in fact, be changed through human effort. In October 1793 the entire French nation was mobilised to defend the country from foreign invasion and internal rebellion. The

⁵ Immanuel Kant, a German philosopher, was born in Prussia in 1724. He is generally regarded as one of Europe's most influential Enlightenment thinkers. Kant published *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, the book which I draw from in this passage, in 1793 (Kuehn 2002).

National Assembly declared “terror” against the enemies of the Revolution. While the political agencies paraded representative democracy and equality before the law, it was their adoption of terror that first imprinted the word “terrorist” in the political dictionary, transforming the Revolution in many foreign eyes from a force of liberation to a force of destruction. Justifications had to be found for violent killing. Enlightenment rationalism helped: Terrorists gained support because their action was rational, because it was inevitable in the circumstances (Townshend 2002).

The Enlightenment was, however, a uniquely European phenomenon, a phenomenon that ushered in modernity. Modernity is a term that describes the condition of being “modern”. What epitomises “modern” is that man becomes responsible for knowledge – not God, not Nature, but Man. This definition derives from Michel Foucault, renowned postmodern philosopher, who divided the last four hundred years into three major periods or epistemes – the Renaissance, the Classical and the Modern. While he based the Renaissance on knowledge coming from God, the Classical from Nature, the Modern he based on knowledge derived from man. Foucault does not imply a linear progression within the three periods, however. (Danaher, G., Schirato, T. and Webb, J. (2000: 19).⁶ Now while modernity offers many benefits for humankind, there are also shortcomings. One of the principal downsides is that its cultural order presented Western civilisation as the model for all cultures to follow. It became the sole repository of truth. What was not modern was, by consequence, inferior. Aspects of European modernity included the idea that progress involved an embracing of the ideas of Adam Smith⁷, the rise of market economies and capitalism and eventually secularism. Today, globalisation is the result of that initial modernist momentum and it is steeped in controversy. During the last century, traditional ways of knowing and living were suppressed as the modern disciplines of science, technology and medicine gained ascendancy and displaced whole cultures and communities all over the world. Thus civilisation can be seen as a western construct that was used as a measuring stick to evaluate the non-Western world. The juggernaut of modernity, however, has met with a potent challenge, also of

⁶ I am soon going to focus on Foucault’s philosophy as it is integral to my argument in this thesis. Michel Foucault was a French philosopher born in 1926 in Poitiers. Foucault published prodigiously from the 1960s onwards. He was vitally interested in how “modernity” was defined and although he has been regarded as a postmodernist, he has not been completely reconciled to this label (Macey 1993).

⁷ Adam Smith, born in 1723, was a political economist who studied the historical development of industry and commerce in Europe. His *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* had a profound influence on modern economics and concepts of individual freedom. It also provided an intellectual rationale for free trade and capitalism. Smith argued that state and personal efforts, to promote social good are ineffectual compared to unbridled market forces (Lucidcafe 1998:1).

European origin. The name of this new challenger is called postmodernism and it imposes an alternative viewpoint upon the world. That reason is the only criteria of truth is no longer to be seen as the sole power in the universe.

Foucault's Challenge to Enlightenment Thought: Postmodernism and a New Concept of Power

There are many strands of postmodernism. What unifies them, however, is the questioning of the central assumptions of Enlightenment epistemology. Michel Foucault could be said to have inaugurated the postmodernist movement. In response to Kant's interpretation of '*Sapere aude*', Foucault (2003: 2) prefers to use the terms, 'dare to know', 'have the courage, the audacity, to know'. This is a slightly more aggressive rendering of the Latin text. There is a sense of mastery in the words, deliberately chosen here, perhaps to indicate that the acquisition of knowing is for the Enlightenment a point of departure for modern thought. Foucault (2003) appears to conceive of Kant's thought as humanity's passage to adult status through the Enlightenment, involving a bold seizure of knowledge, while Foucault himself sees that the historical event of the Enlightenment did not make us mature adults. Instead he sees the critical ontology of humankind as a philosophical life where limits are imposed upon us and where we modestly 'experiment with the possibility of going beyond them' (Foucault 2003: 9).

The Enlightenment, for Foucault, in great contrast to Kant, is not limited to the spread of values such as justice, liberty and reason, however. Concomitant with these values, a set of disciplinary techniques emerged which were very different from Enlightenment ideals and which symbolised a new form of power. The techniques of observation, regulation and control culminated in our contemporary system of power, a power that is largely concealed. According to Foucault, these techniques virtually took over the running of various institutions and organised the way in which power operated in society, although these procedures established themselves without having any official status (Danaher, Schirato and Webb 2000). This can be understood if we pause to consider how power *used* to operate and how it was *recognised* in the medieval era, for example, and then compare that with how power operates today. In medieval times, power operated most visibly in Europe through a monarch down through feudal regimes, which were characterised by the legal subjection of the peasantry to higher lords. Vassals were sworn by voluntary oath to serve and protect the lords in return for the granting of revenue producing property from the lord, a fiefdom. Thus

power was recognised as the property of dominant individuals in authority. It was power at *macro-level*. At the onset of the Enlightenment, Foucault proposed that a new form of power began to infiltrate society and this new form of power worked at *micro-level* as a set of forces that determined how people behaved in their day to day lives. This kind of power was not visible like the king or lord of the feudal system. It was invisible but nevertheless extremely potent. Foucault associates this power with discipline.

Foucault's idea of discipline is one that is not imposed from above. People *submit* themselves to be ranked by the gaining of educational qualifications and other types of skills for example, which allows them to be rewarded, to move up the scale but at the same time enables institutions to regulate them (Danaher, Schirato and Webb 2000: 50-51). Such regulation both defines and disciplines. We, as members of society, are *subjects* of this regulation. The emergence of Foucault's ideas of disciplinary forces is well seen in the development of the prison. The penitentiary, an outcome of the Enlightenment, made both the prison officials and the prisoners conform to a regime that was both rational and moral. The prison assessed the wages of crime in regulated units of time:

How could prison not be the penalty par excellence in a society in which liberty is a good that belongs to all in the same way and to which each individual is attached . . . by a "universal and constant" feeling? Its loss has therefore the same value for all; unlike the fine, it is an "egalitarian" punishment. The prison is the clearest, simplest, most equitable of penalties.

Foucault (1991: 232)

In order to catch Foucault's ironic twist on Enlightenment rationality, it must be perceived that the birth of the prison has far wider implications for ordinary citizens than simply a place to house offenders. Foucault (1991) refers to three other disciplinary sites which also have onerous implications for those being "disciplined": the school, the army barracks and the workshop (factory). What is noteworthy is that educational and military establishments are two institutions that make up the building blocks of modern society. It is not hard to extend those disciplinary forces today to other sites in our social fabric such as the business company, the bank, the mental clinic, religious groups, children's sporting organisations and so on which benchmark what is normal and therefore acceptable. Most importantly, disciplinary forces also isolate what is not normal and set it apart for marginalisation or disposal. These disciplinary forces are an integral part of the mechanism of power. Foucault (1991: 235-236) gives this statement clarity in the following, another description of the prison:

In several respects, the prison must be an exhaustive disciplinary apparatus: it must assume responsibility for all aspects of the individual, his physical training, his aptitude to work, his everyday conduct, his moral attitude, his state of mind; the prison . . . is 'omni-disciplinary' . . . Lastly, it gives almost total power over the prisoners; it has its internal mechanisms of repression and punishment: a despotic discipline.

Foucault (1991: 235-236)

Linking the Prison to Power and Control in Society Today

It can be seen therefore that Foucault is not just writing on the history of the modern prison and the power implicit in running it. He is connecting the prison to wider society. Thus the prison is not something marginal to the city. The same strategies of power which operate there are pervasive in society. Foucault (1991: 200-208) offers Bentham's Panopticon⁸ as a metaphor for the plight of the individual in our modern, disciplinary society. In the Panopticon, the prisoner is seen without ever seeing and the prison guards, in their position, see everything without ever being seen! Thus the prison guards exercise an omnipotent God-like power. In society the individual is totally exposed while the forces of coercion, hard to discern, are veiled in society's natural mechanisms. What makes them even more sinister is that they are camouflaged as helpful and humane institutions intended to alleviate pain but which actually work to exercise a power of normalisation.

While power was once located in the figure of the monarch, it can no longer be isolated into a single oppressor for the oppressor is everywhere. Pakosz and Chagani (2003: 2-3), in critiquing Foucault, describe it very eloquently as 'a carceral continuum woven into the very fabric of society' with disciplinary apparatuses collectively producing what society demands: 'docile, productive, hard-working, loyal conformists – people who are "normal" in every way'. Thus individuals do not have freedom. Rather, they only have freedom to be normal. An individual who deviates from the normal will be subjected to the coercive apparatuses of power. These disciplines pursue knowledge of the individual, not to liberate but to control. Pakosz and Chagani (2003: 4) posit that it is non-conformity that is discouraged and punished and that law enforcement could more aptly be termed 'norm enforcement'. Norm enforcement applied across the board is subject to great controversy. For example, let us consider human rights. Human rights, enshrined in United Nations law, proscribes children working. Yet in the poorer countries, if children do not work then it is highly likely the

⁸ The Panopticon is an idea from the mind of Jeremy Bentham, English civil philosopher and designer of prisons. It is a prison system, whereby the jailer can keep in view all of the inmates, all of the time.

family will starve. Should all humanity have to follow the same human rights norms? Norm enforcement hides the delicate, subtle and complex realities of life.

Pakosz and Chagani's view is in harmony with Leela Gandhi's interpretation of Foucault's work. According to Gandhi (1998: 14), Foucault maintains that power is best able to distribute itself through the collaboration of its subjects and that furthering such collaboration of power is really a characteristic of the invasive and claustrophobic omnipresence of power – 'there is no 'outside' to power for it is always, already, everywhere'. Foucault (1980: 119) himself claims that from the 17th and 18th centuries onwards the productivity of power increased sharply. Not only were great state apparatuses created (the army, the police and fiscal administration) but there was born a new 'economy' of power that encompassed procedures which allowed the effects of power to circulate in a manner that was 'continuous, uninterrupted, adapted and "individualised" throughout the entire social body'. Foucault (1980: 98) likens power to a web-like entity:

Power must be analysed as something which circulates . . . It is never localised here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing or exercising this power. They are not only its inert or consenting target; they are also the elements of its articulation. In other words, individuals are like vehicles of power, not its points of application.

Foucault (1980: 98)

This quotation supports Pakosz and Chagani and Leela Gandhi's interpretation of the character that power assumes in Foucault's concept of the carceral network in modern society. The change in the exercise of power from public force to what Danaher, Shirato and Webb (2000: 81) call 'hidden coercions' forms a central tenet to Foucault's philosophy and the postmodern outlook.

Foucault (1997: 300-301) contends that a critical function of philosophy is to create awareness of the danger of power: 'Philosophy is that which calls into question domination at every level and in every form in which it exists, whether political, economic, sexual, institutional or what have you'. It can be seen from the above quotations that Foucault's account of how power is asserted in the modern world is complex and cannot be meaningfully reduced to a few words. However, it would be accurate to say, nevertheless, that to Foucault, power is ubiquitous but hidden from view, devoid of class relations and social structures, mobile and diffused across a culture, employing the philosophy of normalisation. Foucault's work is not only a critique of Enlightenment thought, it is a critique of the scientific rationalism of modern society, a critique which challenges what is

considered normal and what is not. Normalisation, regulating people's thoughts and behaviour, works to qualify or disqualify people as members of the social order. Because most people want to "belong" to the social body, they accept the normative values that are supposed to make them "good" citizens. It is useful to note that recidivist prisoners tend to come from poor economic backgrounds (Danaher, Schirato and Webb 2000: 60). This fits a social system in which the economically advantaged are seen as normal and good, while the economically disadvantaged are seen as abnormal and bad. The economically disadvantaged then become powerless within the "normal" society. This can be said of other "abnormal" people such as those with differing ethnic and religious beliefs who are sometimes faced to find recourse to justice through what might be termed "terrorist responses". According to Foucault, normalisation is a leading mechanism of how modern Western society organises itself (Danaher, Schirato and Webb 2000: 60-61). It will be seen throughout this thesis how the normalising practice of Western society drives the terrorism response. I am aware of the possibility of the counter discourse: Islam is a normalising, disciplining religion. I have addressed this in the two chapters on Islam (Chapters Six and Seven). Also I will later explore whether bin Laden is seeking to normalise and discipline – partly from chapters Six and Seven but also from the results of the CDA where his speeches will be analysed.

Foucault and Truth

Of particular relevance to this thesis is Foucault's account of truth. He claims: 'Truth is a thing of this world (Foucault 1980: 131)'. In other words, it is internal to our world rather than it being related to some transcendental realm. This means, as Alcoff (1996: 146) notes, that Foucault's concept of truth is historically variable and relative to different societies. Foucault elaborates on his ideas of truth to produce the concept of the 'truth game' in the following way:

When I say 'game' I mean an ensemble of rules for the production of truth ... It is an ensemble of procedures which lead to a certain result, which can be considered in function of its principles and its rules of procedure as valid or not, as winner or loser cited in Peters 2004: 55).

Games of truth are important because they play a significant part in producing our subjectivity. They discursively position us to see the 'truth' about ourselves, our experiences and our inner world (Danaher, Schirato and Webb 2000: 40). Through various means, the quest for truth has become a fundamental part of many societies. However, what Foucault does is different to a conventional search for truth; he problematises the question of truth and attempts to show how it is an effect of the work of discourses and institutions rather than it

possessing an absolute quality. This can be productively applied to an understanding of the worldviews of George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden.

For example, part of George W. Bush's truth is the transformational power of liberty: Promoting liberty abroad will build a safer world. The wisest use of American strength is to advance freedom. Free governments in the Middle East will fight terrorists instead of harbouring them. When this particular variety of truth is deployed by Bush, the effect is to justify the invasion of wars abroad. Part of bin Laden's truth is that the USA has committed crimes against the Islamic world and that they are a clear declaration of war on God, his messenger and Muslims. When this particular variety of truth is deployed by bin Laden, the effect is to justify violent jihad. The CDAs performed in Chapters Eight and Nine on Bush and bin Laden respectively are about the truth games that these two people play as leaders of their realms. The CDAs are not an attempt to reveal 'the truth' *per se* but to reveal how particular varieties of the truth are deployed and with what effects.

Power Imbalance, Globalisation and the Terrorism Response

How does Foucault's concept of power relate to terrorism? Firstly, it must be established that globalisation embodies Foucault's notions of power. Jameson (2001: 2) for instance, states unequivocally that Postmodernity is 'absolutely inseparable from globalisation' or even more definitively, that Postmodernity is the culture of globalisation. Jameson (2001) compares the technology of the modern with the technology of the postmodern. The technology of the modern is visible, made apparent in the aeroplane, for example, while the technology of the computer is not visible, not any tangible thing one can look at. In a sense the cybernetic, globalised world is unrepresentable. Jameson (2001) believes that while some postmodernisms in the artistic sense have been left behind, Postmodernity as such has only begun to develop. This is most evident in the globalisation sense. The current economic situation of any country must be seen against the global political economy and how this contributes to power imbalance.

Paul Corey has a slightly different outlook on globalisation. He maintains that globalisation is a movement that is essentially modern in its ambitions but which emerged when it became apparent that 'modern ambitions are essentially unrealizable' (Corey 2004: 3). Corey differentiates between globalisation as spectacle and globalisation as reality. As spectacle, it is the victory of Western capitalist democracy over all other political forms. It represents the

triumph of freedom and democracy over oppression and totalitarianism. It is a new unified world order. As Corey says, with globalisation as spectacle we have reached ‘the eschaton’ (Corey 2004: 3). Markets and borders will open up providing a universal access to technology and consumer goods, there will be equality of opportunity and the human race will become more interconnected. However, the spectacle of globalisation suggests that Western political values spread naturally with Western free markets as if the two are linked. This is not the case. China, for example, is a country that embraces free market capitalism and Western popular culture without accepting liberal democracy. Thus while it may be true to say that Western markets, consumer goods, technology and popular culture are spreading, this cannot be said of Western democratic values. This is globalisation as reality. Western democratic values embody a worldwide recognition of human rights and freedoms. Corey cites the antiglobalisation movement as a protest against the unregulated market compromising human rights and aggravating economic disparity (Corey 2004: 3).

Foucault (1980) has emphasised how power subjectifies an individual in various ways and moreover how an individual ties him/herself to a specific identity through self-identification within a system of “truth” formed by the dominating ideology. The process of normalisation also contributes to the construction of this identity. This kind of subjectification is relevant to globalisation of the world economy. Globalisation is a dominating ideology of the global market. We are all being globalised and subjectified by globalisation.

Important to the understanding of globalisation in the postmodernist sense is Foucault’s notion of “biopower”. As has been briefly referred to earlier in this chapter, at the same time that ideals and theories of freedom, equality and justice were unleashed by the Enlightenment, a set of disciplinary techniques took over the running of institutions and reorganised the manner in which power operated in society. In the name of reform, these disciplinary techniques actually functioned to ‘mould people in order to make them more serviceable for the state’ (Danaher, Schirato and Webb 2000: 70). Thus the notion of “biopower” can be understood as these disciplinary techniques and technologies that were used for analysing and controlling the human body and its behaviour. People were seen not as ends in themselves but as resources or commodities to serve the state. The disciplinary technologies of biopower, for example, facilitated the development of capitalism by supplying a disciplined workforce and imposing a disciplined mindset necessary for the efficient running of a factory system.

Penttinen (2000: 4) elaborates on the Foucauldian notion of biopower as it relates to capitalism and extends this concept to incorporate globalisation. He argues that the development of bio-power required the concept of humanity linked with the concept of the social body. This has meant that bio-power both operates on individuals singularly and as a whole. The development of the concept of humanity, to which all human beings belong, was important for the successful institutionalisation of modern capitalism. As capitalism is based on the discipline of the social body to fit the needs of the production and economic processes, capitalism demonstrates how bio-power subjectifies individuals in particular and en masse. Penttinen (2000:5) further argues that the bio-power of the globalised world economy overrides the nation-state as the primary determinant of the government of individualisation and produces a new totalising and individualising global and globalised governmentality, which subjectifies individuals directly. This underpins the governmentality of modern capitalism where the governmentality of the globalised world economy is the underlying regime of truth, grounded in liberalist notions of the individual. The liberalist ideology that is the grounds of neoliberalist global governance of corporate capitalism, Penttinen (2000:5) asserts, is driven and institutionalised by a new transnational class, multilateral institutions and state managers.

Globalisation may be purely an economic force but economic might has severe political and therefore cultural implications. The possibility exists of one culture seizing a global hegemony and imposing itself unalterably on indigenous and local cultures. Such has been the case with Western culture, particularly American culture. The possible responses to this homogenisation of culture may be an initial and unthinking measure of acceptance – ‘a Nike trainer on every foot . . . a Coke on every table’ (Feffer 2002:1). This superficial receptiveness, some might call it a seduction, may later be accompanied by a deeper reaction of resistance amongst recipient cultures. Why? Not only does globalisation create a suitable environment for the international trade of goods and the exchange of services and finance rendering it attractive to consumers, globalisation has ‘inexorably transferred wealth from the poor to the rich’ and ‘increased inequalities both within and between nations’ creating many more losers than there has been heretofore in capitalist enterprise (George 2003: 18). As an index to this inequality, George compares the North-South differential. In the 18th century it was about 2 to 1; in 1965 it was 30 to 1; now it is over 70 to 1 and rising. Such a disparity, George claims, is indicative of a breach of human rights. Neoliberal globalisation is not,

indeed, conducive to the maintenance of human rights and human welfare nor the meeting of moral global responsibilities. I am therefore saying that globalisation can be construed as bad – as having negative consequences for indigenous peoples, people from some religious backgrounds such as Islam because it leads to or facilitates Culture Change. Although the middle class may have increased in India and China, this does not mean that we can say for certain that relative poverty has not increased or absolute poverty has declined. This is because cost of living may have increased faster than any gains made by increases in income. The analysis requires parity to be considered; how much (rice, bread) can be bought for a dollar today as opposed to a dollar ten years ago. How much more earnings are needed to buy the same amount of food? As a result, absolute poverty can increase at the bottom end (low incomes) of the spectrum while the rate of wealth accumulation at the upper end (high incomes) is disproportionately higher, which has little effect on preventing the rich from getting richer while the poorest get poorer. It also makes matters worse when 6 billion people aspire to be as rich as Middle America. However, this is a separate thesis.

Ziauddin Sardar, a leading Muslim intellectual who writes on contemporary Islam and cross cultural understanding could not be said to be a postmodernist *per se* for he finds this orientation in at least some ways to be significantly lacking (Sardar 2005: 233-39). However, at times he does write from a postmodernist perspective and in doing so offers some incisive comments regarding globalisation and the US. For example, the visible effect of globalisation, Sardar and Davies (2002: 195-196) argue, is that the US has simply ‘made it too difficult for other people to exist’: The US has structured the global economy to enrich itself and degrade non-Western societies to a state of controllable wretchedness and poverty. The US control of international financial institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO coupled with the fact that the US dollar is the medium that all countries need to pay for their foreign imports shows how the world economy functions to marginalise the less-developed world. This is not to say that this system cannot be challenged. The recent global economic collapse of 2009, for example, might result in more trade being transacted in Euros or perhaps some other currency. It is unlikely, however, that it will be the undoing of capitalism and the marginalised and excluded will still exist, captured in their predicament. Pettinen (2000:4) claims that putting emphasis on the marginalised and excluded subject defines a position of otherness where the operations of the network of power become visible. Accordingly, it can be seen that the ability of developing countries to provide access to basic social services has been harshly eroded, increasing absolute poverty over the past few

decades resulting in a deepening of the gulf between the rich and the poor⁹. Sardar and Davies (2002: 196) go so far as to say that ‘America is literally taking bread out of the mouths of the people of the developing world’. The suggestion here is that the governing powers in the US are in fact doing this knowingly and by design. Although it must be recognised that the obvious benefits to globalisation such as human rights, gender equity, improved health and medicine, faster communications and other technological advancements are good for all and this is taken for granted, this does not mean that others do not see negative social effects. So, for some people from some cultures and religions, the benefits may not outweigh the costs, actual or perceived.

The expansion of the influence of the US through trans-national economic regimes and multinational capital and the aggregation of power from so-called multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO is effectively shaping a process of hierarchical integration of the rest of the world. Such integration is in the shape of a rigid pyramid. Those at the bottom of the pyramid face both economic exclusion and political containment. So both politically and economically, these countries are powerless. While politically and economically powerless, such disadvantaged people nevertheless still seek cultural expression. The American-led globalisation allows little room for the flowering of other cultures, however, and does not facilitate the existence of difference. Thus physical, political and cultural existence itself has become problematic for the developing world. The people inhabiting some places in the world, including people in some predominantly Muslim countries are angry at their existential condition. They look to America as the principal criminal offender and as the cause of their dilemma. As a consequence, it is towards America that they direct their hostility (Sardar and Davies 2002).

This hostility can feed a terrorism response. Poverty, injustice, despair and a sense of powerlessness to change the state of things breed frustration. Frustration then acts as a trigger for terrorism. A binary opposition is set up. Terrorists are evil. The US and its allies are good and virtuous. The reasons behind the trigger for terrorism are buried in the rhetoric that God and history has called on the good and virtuous to act. There is no justification for

⁹ This is in accord with Susan George’s claims stated above. See also Joseph Stiglitz (2002) *Globalization and its discontents*, London: Penguin Books and Oxfam (2004) ‘Growth with Equity is Good for the Poor’, in Lechner, F. and Boli, J. (eds), *The Globalization Reader*, Malden: Blackwell Publishing for a defence of this assertion.

terror. However, it needs to be recognised, as Sardar and Davies (2002: 208) recognise, that ‘terrorism is not always the weapon of the weak, it is often the weapon of the alienated’.

Consider Islam, for example. Islam is one culture, among many, to have borne the impact of globalisation and to be subject to the resultant homogenising influences of Western culture to which such an imposition gives rise. Although the universalisation of Western culture is contested by recipient societies including those in the Islamic world, the values of consumerism are encouraged by what is in style from film and television to music to global communication and news systems that are Western based. These networks form a powerful force which projects consumerism as the preferred and natural choice of lifestyles. However, consumerism cannot offer a meaning to life that by its very nature has a spiritual and moral basis. Consumerism must eventually become a spiritual desert to a Muslim whose faith is the very edifice of how to live. Is it true to say then that Islamic peoples have suffered alienation in the face of Western cultural homogenisation, the lethal product of globalisation?

A variety of writers have addressed this topic. Some see globalisation as challenging the fundamental forms of identity that surround people. For example, Ahmed (2003: 51-52) contends that identity is lost when individuals must leave home to search for employment thus threatening the cohesion of the family. When sections of the tribe are forced to migrate to urban areas, the genealogical principle of common descent deteriorates. Political and economic changes that globalisation bring result in profound and destabilising changes in state and society. The materialism of globalisation effaces ‘the spiritual core of religion’ (Ahmed 2003: 51). However, while these identities are weakened by globalisation, ideas of morality and justice become ever more important in the vacuum created for they represent order, God’s order. Thus religion becomes anew a source of identity (Ahmed 2003: 52).

Other writers also see in the response to the neoliberal globalising onslaught a re-articulation of Islam, a re-articulation from Muslims living across many varied geo-cultural frontiers. Such a resurgence is not so hard to understand for the social exclusion that globalisation brings is not only an economic or social concern. It is also a concern that is rooted in self-image, how we see ourselves – our identity – as Ahmed has noted. Mustapha Kamal Pasha (2004: 332) also touches on this concept when he describes the current phase of Islamic resurgence as ‘the articulation of hidden or suppressed *sensibilities* in Muslim collective

consciousness'. This, Pasha notes, stems from an unsuccessful decolonisation process, but one that is exacerbated by neoliberal globalisation (Pasha 2004: 332).

Still other writers like Bassam Tibi (2004: 335-339) argue that it is not Islam in general but Islamic *fundamentalism*, seen as a *political* ideology, which is in resurgence against the powerful Western external threat. Tibi does not see in Islamic fundamentalism an initiative. It is a response. It seeks to replace the West's lead of humanity because the West has imposed its hegemony upon the world, including the Islamic world. There is a claim here for intercivilisational equality and justice because identities have been threatened. The concept of world order posed by Islamic fundamentalists therefore competes with Western universalism (Tibi 2004: 337).

To answer the question, therefore, if Islamic peoples have been alienated by the processes of globalisation, I think it is fair to reply in the affirmative, if I do not place too limiting a definition of the word "alienation". While theorists differ as to specifics, what they do seem to agree on is that the identity of Islamic peoples have been threatened and their sensibilities deeply offended in addition to the economic and social deprivations that globalisation has caused. This has resulted in some speculation, wild though it may be, as to the reestablishment of the Caliphate. The National Intelligence Council (2004: 8) suggests that such a scenario would pose a great challenge to the West because it would reject the foundations of the current international system. This possibility highlights the need to find ways to include those societies that reject elements of the globalisation process. Placing this into a global postmodern context, the entity that is the globalised world economy, the underlying regime of "truth" developed by the West and founded upon neoliberal ideals, has resolutely challenged the identity of Islamic peoples who, in turn, are mounting a response to meet this challenge. Some theorists see this response as resurgence within Islam as a whole while others see it limited to an Islamic fundamentalist movement. Where and how does terrorism enter the Islamic response? It is true that adherents of *political* Islam commit terrorist acts. However, the relationship of global terrorism to Islam is not a simple one and one that will be explored in depth throughout this thesis. For the moment it is necessary to add to my postmodernist tools by investigating how identity and Foucault's notion of "discourse" are connected.

Foucault and Discourse

Power and its associated technologies of disciplining and normalising depend also in part on the process of naming. Human beings across cultures have named themselves but have also denied names to certain groups of people such as slaves for example. The unnamed take on the identity of non-people. The name represents an identity. Losing our identity is fraught with anxiety. As discussed above, the agents of globalisation deny the identity of non-Western people. The consequence of denying identity is also seen in the horror of the concentration camps of the Third Reich, for example, where inmates were stripped and tattooed with numbers. This made them non-human thus making them easier to abuse and kill (Danaher, Schirato and Webb 2000). Perhaps there is a similar process happening in terrorist attacks where “nameless” victims are so effortlessly targeted by the very fact of their anonymity: Possibly they are conceived of as being simply objects and therefore essentially non-human or rather just a statistic and hence also easier to kill.

The plight of the anonymous individual and the omnipresence of power are very well illustrated in the Panopticon of Jeremy Bentham, discussed earlier. The Panopticon represented the ultimate imbalance of power between the State and the Prisoner. While all power resided with the State, the prisoner was completely powerless. Garrard (2003: 1) calls the Panopticon ‘the dream of fascists’ and likens it to the ambition of many of the leaders of the Bush Administration of the United States Government, ostensibly fighting the war against terrorism. Fighting a war against terrorism necessarily increases the surveillance of individuals, whether by video, wiretap, Internet or other means. Intimidation increases as well. Just one example of this increased surveillance is the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Information Awareness Office’s administration of a program known as ‘Total Information Awareness’ (TIA). The aim of TIA is to gather data from all available signal intelligence sources and compile it into a mammoth, ever-churning database. Suitable software would then flag possible terrorist activity. The scope of the data would include transaction data contained in current databases, such as financial histories, medical records, communications, travel records and commercial and other private transactions (Garrard 2003).

Foucault (1991: 201) presciently observed that the major effect of the Panopticon was ‘to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power’. Foucault’s observation remains just as lucid in contemporary society,

especially with respect to such programs as the TIA. For instance, today in US society citizens from all walks of life could find themselves being the object of some form of surveillance. In this Orwellian nightmare, government control becomes internalised. Unlimited government surveillance and unlimited government power, no matter how they are justified, pose dangerous threats to a democracy. Perhaps the greatest fear, however, that we all have is that the state representing the US will subject us to this kind of “Panopticon” security as part of their War on Terror machinery such as the proposing of further new legislation and the granting of ever greater emergency powers in order to attain the powers of a Big Brother like control.

However, Foucault (1970) argues that the subject cannot pre-exist the social order. What the self is understood to be and how it interacts with others varies greatly between cultures and also throughout history. This means that people are not endowed with natural characteristics; rather they are produced out of a network of relations and discourses, hence, liable to change with differing circumstances. Discourse is an important concept to Foucault who has made it an instrument to his “archaeological” approach to the study of history. Isolating various orders of discourse creates the conditions for expressing thoughts and ideas, and forming propositions and statements through which people interpret their historical time. Foucault (2002) speaks informatively about archaeology and discourse:

Archaeology defines the rules of formation of a group of statements. In this way it shows how a succession of events may, in the same order in which it is presented, become an object of discourse, be recorded, described, explained, elaborated into concepts, and provide the opportunity for a theoretical choice. Archaeology analyses the degree and form of permeability of a discourse: it provides the principle of its articulation over a chain of successive events; it defines the operators by which the events are transcribed into statements. . . . Archaeology does not deny the possibility of new statements in correlation with ‘external’ events. Its task is to show on what condition a correlation can exist between them, and what precisely it consists of (what are its limits, its form, its code, its law of possibility).

Foucault (2002) (1969: 184)

Archaeology, in Foucault’s terms, could thus be compared with the modern form of writing history. Conventional history is seen as a progressive movement towards an ideal state: This movement is a gradual evolution, an unfolding over time. From this perspective, it is a possible deduction that colonialism is a function of the evolutionary development of history into higher, more sophisticated, more civilised forms of society. However, it could also be argued that colonialism is the object of discourse in the Foucauldian sense. The succession of events that colonialism represents provides an opportunity for a theoretical choice. Is it an evolutionary development, a civilising experience for the colonised country or is it a series of

repetitive acts of violence to subjugate the colonised country for the gain of prestige and power and in so doing distort the importance of other histories and knowledge systems? It must be acknowledged that a complication in this example is the fact that, as Danaher, Schirato and Webb (2000) discuss, Foucault sees the traditional method of writing history as playing an instrumental role in the colonising process itself and hence offers a biased critique of this process already. So an important characteristic of postmodernism is discourse and its emphasis placed on context and subjectivity.

Foucault's attempt to contextualise notions of truth, knowledge, rationality and reason sharply cut his philosophy off from the mainstream. Postmodern relativism is difficult to absorb for people who have been predominantly exposed to absolutist and teleological thinking as for example, in Marxism, where history marches onward towards a set outcome, when ultimately the working class rules. The social interaction of the true or the good (Marxism) and the false or the evil (bourgeois ideology) are explained by the notion of class warfare. In contrast, to speak of absolutes like "good" and "evil" from a postmodern perspective is meaningless. Indeed, its relativism denies the possibility of universal truths. It could be said that for postmodernists there is no final truth for truth and knowledge are culturally specific. They are social constructs. History does not end with the rise of science and absolute truths created by scientific knowledge.

Postmodernism and the Terrorist Attacks in New York on September 11 2001

What is the response of postmodernism to these unprecedented attacks that shattered the immunity of America's shores from the scourge of terrorism? In the wake of September 11 2001, this relativistic brand of philosophy came under attack. Many critics believed that because postmodernists deny the possibility of describing matters of fact objectively, this left no basis for condemning the terrorist attacks or for fighting back. Since for postmodernists, as has been discussed previously, there are no independent standards for determining which of many competing analyses of an event is true, this criticism may seem justified to some extent. However, it was ably defended by Stanley Fish, dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences of the University of Illinois at Chicago. Fish (2001) argued that the American people could not justify their response to the attacks in universal terms nor invoke the abstract notions of justice and truth to support their cause as this would not be effective anyway: Their adversaries would only use the same language. Rather than groping for

universal absolutes, the American people could justifiably draw from the democratic ideals, which they embraced in order to mount a suitable response. What is pivotal in Fish's defence of postmodernism and why it can be useful in analysing international terrorism is his conception of the "enemy" and the way we can perceive the "enemy" (Fish 2001).

Rather than employing a meaningless absolute like "evil" to describe the enemy, Fish (2001: 3) insists that we need to apply 'serious thought' to the actual relevance of relativism in this issue. By this he means 'the practice of putting yourself in your adversary's shoes, not in order to wear them as your own but in order to have some understanding (far short of approval) of why someone else might want to wear them' (Fish 2001: 3). Deeming the enemy to be "irrational madmen" who wear "the face of evil" obstructs useful thinking. "Irrational" conveys a sense of the illogical. The perpetrators of September 11 did not perform an act that could be termed "illogical". It was a highly orchestrated act, supremely logical in its method of delivery and coldly logical in its conception. Fish (2001:2) astutely observes:

We have not seen the face of evil; we have seen the face of an enemy who comes at us with a full roster of grievances, goals and strategies. If we reduce that enemy to 'evil', we conjure up a shape-shifting demon, a wild-card moral anarchist beyond our comprehension and therefore beyond the reach of any counter-strategies.

Fish (2002: 29) insists that making the enemy smaller than he is blinds us to the danger he presents, giving him an advantage in being underestimated. 'Cowardly', Fish argues, is not the word to describe men who carry out arduous feats in the course of surrendering their lives for a cause they deeply believe in. Neither are these men irrational. Rather, they act from within a rationality we rightly reject because its goal is our destruction. Indeed our adversaries have emerged from a history that has furnished them with reasons and motives and even with a 'perverted version of virtues we might admire', were we not the targets of their destruction (Fish 2002: 29). Fish thus sees that it is the historical reality of the Western (or American in particular), lifestyle, of this way of life that was the target of this massive assault.

Another postmodernist insight on September 11 comes from French philosopher, Jacques Derrida. In an interview with Giovanna Borradori, Derrida comments that from the very first televised images of the 9/11 attack, it was easy to foresee that '*in the eyes of the world*' it was going to be a 'major event' (Borradori 2003: 109). This major event appropriated the term "international terrorism". Derrida notes that it is the dominant power that manages to

impose, and, thus to legitimate, legalise, on a national and also a world stage, the terminology and therefore the interpretation that it wants in any given situation. After September 11, while an overwhelming majority of states condemned what was being called “international terrorism”, some states called into question the clarity of the concept. Derrida argues that what remains obscure does not prevent the “legitimate” powers from making use of the notions in question in an opportunistic manner. Thus the term “international terrorism” became a staple of political discourse throughout the world. Yet, Derrida claims, this term still remains a very confused one, which requires deliberation and clarification. In any case, without any philosophical debate on the subject of “international terrorism”, shortly after the attacks, the UN authorised the US to use *any* means deemed necessary and appropriate by the US administration to protect itself against “international terrorism” (Borradori 2003: 103-104). Derrida’s point here is that one should show caution in trusting blindly in the prevailing language for this could remain subservient to the agendas of political powers as well as the media. The meaning of international terrorism as derived in the above circumstance gets tied in with the discourse that dominates the public space. Yet the term itself lacks rigour and clear definition, which not only means it can be used as a political tool of the major powers but it can mislead at society level as well.

Jean Baudrillard, provocative postmodernist writer, declared the terrorist attacks of September 11 in even more striking terms than Derrida. Baudrillard stated boldly that we have to ‘face facts’ and ‘accept that a new terrorism has come into being’ (Baudrillard 2003: 19). Baudrillard (2003: 25) cautions that it is a mistake to perceive terrorist action as complying with a purely destructive logic. That power which humiliated you; it too must be humiliated. Extermination is not enough. It must be afflicted in a legitimate adversarial relation. In order to accomplish this, a pact is required of the terrorists. Such an obligation is immune to defection. Not only do these new terrorists not play fair by putting their own deaths into play, they have also put into play all the weapons of the dominant power. Thus money, computer technology, aeronautics and media spectacle – the tools of modernity – have been assimilated. According to Baudrillard (2003: 29-30), their piece de resistance was the use of the symbol. The violence of globalisation was embodied in the twin towers. By striking there, more so than the White House, they struck at the brain, at the nerve-centre of the globalised world system. Thus their attack took the form of a symbolic defiance to the historical and political order. In consequence, contemporary and visible power was out manoeuvred by the tiny but symbolic death of a comparatively few individuals.

To Muqtedar Khan (2002a), Islamic scholar, contemporary terrorism is a most remarkable postmodern manifestation. Terrorism is seen as an enemy of the nation state, the most powerful of modern institutions. It undermines the values that support the principle of sovereignty. Today, terrorist organisations and nation states fight it out in the global arena although it must be conceded that some nation states may be involved in global terrorism. Muqtedar Khan (2002a) explains that while terrorists see themselves as freedom fighters, states fighting terrorists claim that they (the states) are protecting freedom. To Muqtedar Khan therefore, the battle of terrorism is about freedom and postmodernism about rediscovering freedom. This is a very bold claim. To put some context to it, postmodernism is seen by Muqtedar Khan like many philosophers, as a rejection of the elements of post-enlightenment modernity: He sees, in Western society, a rejection of modern institutions such as marriage, traditional family structures and gender roles but in the Muslim world, he sees a religious resurgence which advocates a different moral/political ethic of a different political unit (the Ummah) (Muqtedar Khan 2002a: 1).

If one were to define one aspect of the events of September 11 2001 that our four theorists – Fish, Derrida, Baudrillard and Muqtedar Khan – have in common, it would be perhaps that the label “International Terrorism” is a misnomer. International terrorism may be regarded as a tactic that is used to fight a cause about which many people feel passionate and for which some are ready to give up their lives. We cannot detach the tactics from the cause and only examine the tactics. If we do this we fight an illusion. The commitment of those who use terrorism’s tactics is not with those tactics, which in essence is only a style of warfare. The commitment is with the cause. It is this cause that confronts us. It is the cause that we need to understand. Indeed, although Bin Laden’s ideology and tactics are seen to be repugnant to the majority of Muslims in the world, as I explore in this thesis, his basic goals will be seen to be a long way from illegitimate or unsustainable. They have the power of ancient mythology behind them. The jihad, of which Bin Laden has made his instrument, is part of a well-respected institution in the Islamic world even if Bin Laden is using it in a very contentious manner and with questionable authority.

It can be seen then that postmodernism is a method that could well yield a coherent analysis of international terrorism. It is my contention that by casting aside the language of absolutes, by taking a look at the actual workings of power, by dismissing universal truths and putting

context into truth and knowledge, it is possible to gain a certain understanding of the contemporary phenomenon of terrorism through these means or to put it another way, through the lens of postmodernism.

Conclusion

In terms of postmodern philosophy, absolute terms like “good” and “evil” are meaningless. The emphasis for postmodernists is on relativism where truth and knowledge are culturally specific. It is, in fact, a rejection of many values that constitute modernity. By adopting a postmodern perspective, certain barriers can be removed allowing things to be seen differently, knowledge and understanding to be gained from a different context. Thus the events of September 11 2001 take on new meaning when seen through postmodernist eyes, meaning which forces us to re-evaluate the conventional interpretations – the terrorists are irrational madmen – which have been placed on these events. What confronts us, rather, may be better interpreted as an impassioned reaction by representatives of Islamic fundamentalism to improve their position of power in the global political economy.

What is also important to appreciate in the understanding of global terrorism is that globalisation resembles Foucault’s postmodern concept of power, a power that has the potential to homogenise and marginalise non-Western cultures. In response to the neoliberal globalising movements, many theorists are seeing a re-articulation of Islam. While this resurgence is most apparent in the fundamentalist sector, it is also visible in mainstream Islam as well.

Before dismissing Foucault and his philosophy in this review it is necessary to return once again to Foucault’s answer to the question, “What is Enlightenment?” It is here that a link is found to another theoretical framework, which is also going to inform the methodology of this thesis – postcolonial theory. Foucault (2003: 2) asks the following question of Kant (2003:1) who has suggested that the Enlightenment extends the possibility of ‘maturity’ to mankind at large.

Are we to understand that the entire human race is caught up in the process of Enlightenment? In that case, we must imagine Enlightenment as a historical change that affects the political and social existence of all people on the face of the earth. Or are we to understand that it involves a change affecting what constitutes the humanity of human beings?

Foucault (2003:2)

Foucault raises here an issue of fundamental importance regarding Kant’s interpretation: the significance of the “Other”. The significance of the Other, the right for lifestyles, ways and

standards of living to exist other than Western forms, for example, or more appropriately, the right for people to adopt non-Western modes of living, is informed by postcolonial theory¹⁰. Postmodernism and Postcolonialism thus converge in their mutual concern for the marginalised and excluded, for the Local/Colonised vs. the Global/Imperialistic. Postcolonialism is the subject of the next chapter.

¹⁰ I am not rejecting all forms of Western lifestyles. This is a perspective which is in line with Derrida who wants to salvage something of the Enlightenment, an argument discussed in Chapter Thirteen. However, this does not mean that others would not reject Western lifestyles for cultural and religious reasons.

Chapter Four

Considering Postcolonialism as a Means of Analysing Terrorism

Chapter Aim: This chapter aims to demonstrate how postcolonialism *can be* applied as a means of analysing global terrorism. It also provides a critique of postmodernism and postcolonialism in order to show the strengths and weaknesses of these theories to be used in the analysis of global terrorism.

Introduction

Kant's conception of humanity relies on rationality being the universal determining requirement of humankind. This requirement has its origin in European societies. Such an account excludes the possibility of dialogue with other ways of being human as well as adopts an imperialist hierarchical relationship between European hegemony and the colonised Other. Although Foucault's work does not directly address the problem of colonialism, it supports the concept that rational unanimity is hostile to difference and otherness. That which is 'unthought' in *cogito* is synonymous for the Other of Western rationality: 'The unthought . . . is not lodged in man like a shrivelled-up nature or a stratified history; it is, in relation to man, the Other' (Foucault 1970: 326). It is in this challenge of the universal validity of Western culture and epistemology that postcolonial thought becomes an intellectual instrument. The 'indifference to difference' which so characterises the rational anthropocentric world view and of which Leela Gandhi (1998: 39) writes so lucidly, argues for an extension of the notion of Otherness to include such outcasts as homosexuals, foreigners, the mentally ill, criminals and terrorists. Postcolonial theory therefore joins postmodernism in attempting to resist the temptation of constructing a universalising identity in favour of acknowledging more localised cultural identities thus offering a possibility for knowing differently.

As the previous chapter introduced postmodernism as a means of analysing terrorism, this chapter introduces postcolonialism for the same purpose. The work of theorists who inform postcolonialism will be briefly examined followed by an analysis of the colonial encounter with references to the situation in present day Iraq. Postmodernist and Postcolonial perspectives are then critiqued in order to show the strengths and weaknesses of these two theories which are to be used in the analysis of this thesis. A brief examination of the contribution of more recent postcolonial theorists is also made. Finally, links are drawn

between Postmodernism, Postcolonialism and Islamic Fundamentalism as a preview into some perspectives of global terrorism.

In terms of postcolonial theory, Edward Said has been a principal contributor and catalyst. Before discussing his major contribution, however, certain other theorists need to be acknowledged. In revealing their contribution, albeit very concisely, it will become apparent what particularly causative direction Said has given postcolonialism.

Early Postcolonial Contributors: Nandy, Mohandas Gandhi and Fanon

Nandy (1983) recognises two chronologically distinct classes of colonialism. The first was a physical conquest of territories while the second, a far more sinister domination, was the colonisation of minds, in addition to bodies. In this case the colonisers were rationalists and modernists who argued that imperialism brought civilisation to the uncivilised world. European colonisers and missionaries often worked hand in hand in their civilising mission or appeared to do so. From the point of view of the colonised, they both had similar agendas – to transform or modify culture. Hence they both could be seen as similar threats. Such colonisation released forces within the colonised societies which altered their cultural formation. It is this second colonisation on which Nandy (1983) focuses and provides evidence of the idea of psychological resistance to it. For example, the colonised Indians do not remain mere victims; they partake in a moral and psychological struggle against their oppression. The colonised fight their own battle for survival whether conscious or unconscious. For Nandy, however, the oppressor turns out ultimately to be ‘a self-destructive co-victim’ caught in the ‘hinges of history’ suggesting that the boundary between colonial victors and colonised victims be regarded less as a boundary and more of an interface (Nandy 1983: xv).

Thus Nandy (1983) ably adapts Foucault’s analysis of power to explain the adverse consequences of the colonial encounter. Leela Gandhi remarks that for Nandy, modern colonialism is not just a historical example of Foucault’s paradigmatic analysis: It is, more significantly, ‘a sort of crucial historical juncture at which power changes its style and first begins to elaborate the strategies of profusion which Foucault theorises so persuasively’ (Leela Gandhi 1998: 15). This is a reference to Foucault’s notion of ‘biopower’, which can be understood as the development of technologies that have gained impetus at the same time as the rise of the human sciences and are used for controlling and developing the human

body. It is the colonisation of the mind, self and culture that resonates so well with Foucault's analysis of power.

Two writers who have extended Nandy's notion of a psychological resistance to colonialism are Mohandas Gandhi (1938) and Fanon (1969, 1973a, 1973b). It is interesting that both these men prepared the theoretical underpinnings of their revolutionary manifestos of anti-colonialism in a foreign country – Mohandas Gandhi in South Africa and Fanon in Algeria - and were thus wary of the value of a solution based on nationalism. Gandhi and Fanon are united in their proposal of a radicalism of a complete and unqualified resistance to the colonial civilising mission. Fanon is optimistic about the colonised's ability to resist the cultural allure of Europe but Gandhi remains not quite so sure. While Gandhi urged a non-violent ethic to address the aggression of colonialism, an ethic which repudiated modernity, Fanon suffused his existential humanism with the liberty of collective violence (Leela Gandhi 1998).

Fanon (1969) writes with a compelling urgency on the contradiction of the colonial situation. He castigates the system of colonialism in Algeria yet spares some understanding for the colonisers: "Torture in Algeria is not an accident, or an error, or a fault. Colonialism cannot be understood without the possibility of torturing, of violating, or of massacring. Torture is an expression and a means of the occupant-occupied relationship" (Fanon 1969: 66). However, his passion for the rights of the colonised is paramount: "I find myself suddenly in the world and I recognise I have one right alone: that of demanding human behaviour from the other" (Fanon 1973a:163). Such intense feeling becomes compassion for those more 'enslaved': "Many times I have been stopped in broad daylight by policemen who mistook me for an Arab; when they discovered my origins, they were obsequious in the (sic) apologies; 'Of course we know that a Martinican is quite different from an Arab.', they would say. I always protested violently, but I was always told, 'You don't know them' (Fanon 1973a: 64).

Indeed, the European denigration of the Arab is common. A marked feature of European depiction, whether it is fictional representation or supposedly factual representation is the Arab's imaginary homogeneity which gives an erroneous picture of Arab society in general. To expand on that point it would have to be said that the concept of the 'Islamic World' can only be just an elementary way of distinguishing it from America or Europe; cultural,

national and religious divisions themselves defy a simple 'Islamic' identity. This gross simplification of Islam promotes caricatures of Muslims to be perpetuated: They are oil suppliers, bloodthirsty mobs or terrorists. While the Arab creed and nomad philosophy in its dignified simplicity can be seen in the writings of T.E. Lawrence, for example, the dignity of the Arab Muslim life is rarely reflected in any contemporary Western literature or reportage¹¹.

According to Leela Gandhi (1998), both Mohandas Gandhi and Fanon, powerfully attempting to expose the fascination of Western society and lay bare the raw power of the master, recognise the slave's mesmerizing complicity in the colonial invasion. Both men promote a cultural self-differentiation from Europe. In Fanon's case he calls for going beyond the claims of Western civilisation:

Let us decide not to imitate Europe; let us combine our muscles and our brains in a new direction. Let us try to create the whole man, whom Europe has been incapable of bringing to triumphant birth.
Fanon (1973b: 252)

Thus Gandhi and Fanon rewrite a narrative of colonialism to include the marginalised figures of its victims. Their writings establish that there are two interwoven stories: the narrative of power and the counter-narrative of the colonised, rejecting the seduction of colonialism. Postcoloniality, indeed, derives its genealogy from both of these narratives (Leela Gandhi 1998). Having therefore discussed the involvement of the early contributors, Nandy, Gandhi and Fanon to postcolonial theory, I now bring the focus to Edward Said, a major figure in this philosophical undertaking.

Postcolonialism's Advocate: Edward Said

Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1995) (1978) is commonly regarded as a reference point for postcolonialism. It is the first book in a trilogy which explores the biased relationship between the world of Islam, the Middle East and the 'Orient' on the one hand and that of European and American imperialism on the other. *Orientalism* focuses on 19th century British and French imperialism while the two remaining books in the series, *The Question of Palestine* (1979) and *Covering Islam* (1981) investigate the latent imperialism which

¹¹ The entity that we call the 'West' is also erroneously depicted as being homogenous when in fact there is much cultural diversity between for example the US and Europe or Britain and Europe and also within Europe among different countries. However, this does not mean the 'West' would not be considered by fundamentalist Islamists as being a more or less homogenous cultural identity when contrasted against a Muslim Caliphate – for instance. I realize this is a generalisation.

structures the relationship between Zionism and Palestine and the United States and the Islamic world.

Said's account identifies Orientalism as a discourse in the full Foucauldian sense of the term:

My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period.

Said (1995: 3)

Thus for Said (1995) (1978), Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an epistemological distinction made between “the Orient” and “the Occident” supported by voluminous literary material written by a very large number of writers from various disciplines who have accepted the basic distinction between East and West. Orientalism does not merely represent but *is* a dimension of modern political and intellectual culture and as such has less to do with the reality that is the Orient than it does with our conceptualisations of the Orient. Hence when a particular authority is cited to establish some facet of the Orient, this for Said, must not be confused with the “truth” but is to be recognised as simply part of the very thick fabric of Orientalist discourse.

According to Leela Gandhi (1998: 77), colonial or Orientalist discourses typify discursive activity¹² whenever they claim the right to speak for the ‘mute and uncomprehending Orient’ and in so doing represent it as the impoverished “Other” of Western rationality. That is, Orientalism becomes a discourse when it starts to produce stereotypes of the peoples of the Orient. Stereotypes of the Orient have indeed been strengthened in the electronic, postmodern world. The mass media has contributed to this standardisation which has intensified the hold of 19th century academic and imaginative demonology of “the mysterious Orient”. Perceptions of the Arabs and Islam have become increasingly distorted owing to the conflagration of various political issues, the ongoing struggle between the Palestinians and the Israelis fuelling an explosive backdrop to the situation. ‘Freedom-loving democratic Israel’ and ‘evil, totalitarian, and terroristic Arabs’ form a simple-minded political dichotomy of the region, preventing a clear view of reality and perpetuating the colonial discourse (Said 1995 (1978): 27). Thus the nexus of knowledge and power which has created “the Oriental”

¹² According to Danaher, Schirato and Webb (2000:35) discursive formations are defined as much by what lies outside them as what lies within. Science is an example of a discursive formation. Since the 16th century science has encapsulated more areas of experience - biology and medicine, physics and chemistry, and economics, psychology and sociology. Within these disciplines there are common principles for evaluating truth. The discursive formation of science is also defined by what it excludes, e.g. New Age mysticism.

has in a sense changed the identity from particular cultures and cast them as being different, even perhaps less than human beings.

Said (1995) (1978: 65) is particularly indignant of how Islam has been fashioned and represented historically by the European mind. Between the Middle Ages and the 18th century such major authors as Ariosto, Milton, Marlowe, Tasso, Shakespeare, Cervantes, and the authors of the *Chanson de Roland* and the *Poema del Cid* contributed to a nascent Orientalist scholarship concerning Islam. The images that such writers created came together in Barthelemy d'Herbelot's *Bibliothèque orientale*, published posthumously in 1697. It is an Oriental panorama from A to Z. In this text "Mohammed" (under "M") is referred to as an "impostor", "the author and founder of a heresy". Islam is referred to as "Mohammedan Law" which is insulting to adherents of the Islamic religion. As Said (1995) (1978:66) insists, it is the placing of Mohammed in this encyclopaedic text, a text that represents truth and knowledge, which lends to Mohammed's discursive legitimacy as a "false prophet". He is supplied with a genealogy and an explanation thus creating a very powerful and effective Oriental image so easily assimilated by European "rationality".

The European encounter with the Orient and specifically with Islam has, according to Said (1995) (1978: 70), turned Islam into the 'very epitome of an outsider' which has provided European civilisation from the Middle Ages onward with a founding myth. Colonial "knowledge" has legitimated a vocabulary and a representative discourse regarding the understanding of Islam and the Orient. That Mohammed is an impostor is a component of this discourse, the implication being that whenever the name "Mohammed" occurs, the connection to 'Mohammed is an impostor' is made, thus allowing this representation to become canonised. 'Mohammed is an impostor' becomes a reality in Oriental terms. Orientalism can therefore be seen as psychologically a form of fixation based on a kind of knowledge that has not been subject to formal disciplinary rigour, a faulty knowledge system that nevertheless unquestionably wields power.

Said (1981) furthers his project of colonial discourse analysis on Islam in discussing the holding of fifty-two Americans as prisoners in the United States Embassy in Iran for 444 days from January 20 1981. While Said (1981: xxii) acknowledges that revolutionary Iran at the time had been incapable of providing a modern state that could accommodate sensitive decisions to the benefit of the population at large, he maintains that huge generalisations

about Iran and Islam licensed the American media to portray the hostage return in a caricatured manner: It became ‘the war against civilisation by terrorists’. In amongst the rhetoric and talk about ‘crazy Iran’ and confining Islam ‘to the role of terroristic oil supplier’, Said (1981: xxv-xxvi) revealed hints of responsible reporting by the ABC during attempts to free the hostages. Bourguet, a French lawyer with ties to the Iranians acted as an intermediary between the United States and Iran. A portion of Bourguet’s transcript follows:

At a given moment [Carter] spoke of the hostages, saying, you understand that these are Americans. These are innocents. I said to him, yes, Mr. President, I understand that you say they are innocent. But I believe you have to understand that for the Iranians they aren’t innocent. Even if personally none of them has committed an act, they are not innocent because they are diplomats who represent a country that has done a number of things in Iran.

You must understand that it is not against their person that the action is being taken. Of course, you can see that. They have not been harmed. They have not been hurt. No attempt has been made to kill them. You must understand that it is a symbol, that it is on the plane of symbols that we have to think about this matter.

Bourguet’s transcript provided by ABC cited in Said (1981: xxv-xxvi)

Said’s interpretation was that while Carter did seem to have viewed the embassy seizure in symbolic terms, the hostages remained by definition innocent. Iran’s grievances against the United States held no meaning in this dispute. In over simplistic terms the Iranians were terrorists and perhaps had always been a terrorist nation. For anyone to hold Americans captive was beyond rationality and humanity. Americans were, after all, ‘outside history’ (Said 1981: xxxvi).

This inability to connect US long-term support for neighbouring dictators with what was happening or with what had happened to the Americans held hostage in Teheran is particularly suggestive of the official national predisposition to be oblivious to certain political realities. As Said (1981: xxvi) stresses, between people and nations there exist two sides and neither side commands reality so totally as to completely disrespect the other. The other side cannot be ontologically guilty while we remain forever innocent. Said (1981: xxx) is particularly prophetic when he declares, in 1981, that Orientalist misrepresentations had better be thrown away if America is to avoid more international troubles where its innocence will be ‘uselessly offended’. The understanding that comes about when the Other is viewed compassionately would help to displace hatred and the offensive generality of labels like ‘the Muslim’, ‘the Arab’ or ‘the Westerner’.

Yet the incitement to discourse continues to canonise certain notions and authorities particularly in reference to Islam. In our contemporary society there is a prevailing notion that Islam is ‘medieval and dangerous’: Authorities can be cited for it and arguments about particular instances of Islam can be made from it – by anyone, not solely experts on the subject (Said 1981: 149). Anyone therefore wishing to say something about Islam can freely draw from this material. Thus knowledge of such a complex phenomenon as Islam comes about through not only texts but images and experiences that are not direct embodiments of Islam but are merely interpretations of it. This material then becomes an orthodoxy of our society. As Said (1981: 149) claims, it enters the ‘cultural canon’ making the task of changing it extremely difficult.

For example, for the seven million Americans who are Muslims who lived through the backlash of 11 September, it was an ordeal (Said 2002: 1). Amidst ranting about fanatical Islam and violent jihadists, pundits and hosts referred incessantly to war with Islam (Said 2002: 1). Film and television were constantly showing cinema of bloody-minded Arab terrorists. A Gallup poll released during this period stated that 49 per cent of the American people said yes (49 per cent no) to the idea that Arabs, including those who were American citizens should carry special identification while Arabs and Islam were subject to the extremely negative images that were pervasive: ‘the stereotypes of lustful, vengeful, violent, irrational [and] fanatical people’ (Said 2002: 1).

Thus it might seem from this example that there is little room for genuine dialogue and constructive interfacing between non-Western subaltern peoples and Western centres of power. While colonial discourse analysis seeks an understanding of and a counter to the discursive hegemony of imperial cultures and while this has been at the foundation of postcolonial studies, this question of the possibility of interaction between East and West beyond a mere Manichean opposition extends the parameters of such studies thereby allowing postcolonial theory to bring a finer understanding to the responses to my thesis question, when I ask: why do certain Islamic Fundamentalist groups adopt terrorist methods against Western targets. In order for postcolonial theory to permit a deeper insight to this crucial and complex issue, it is necessary to return to Edward Said (1994) who extends his earlier thought to encompass the concept of the potential for dialogue in Postcolonialism.

Opening up the Potential for Dialogue in Postcolonialism

As Said postulates, if one were to consider that only women can understand feminist perspectives, only Jews can understand Jewish suffering and only formerly colonial subjects can understand colonial experience then such an intellectual position would give rise to polarisations that would not facilitate an exchange of knowledge. To state it from a nationalist perspective, if Iranian, German or African experience is only coherent and comprehensible to Iranians, Germans and Africans, then one must posit an essentialism - namely the existence of an entity called Iranianness, Germanness and Africanness or using the same logic, Orientalism and Occidentalism for that matter. A second consequence of such a postulation would be a demotion of the different experience of others to a lesser status (Said 1994:35-36). Following on from this argument, such thinking would position Muslims and Christians as antithetical to each other, each one relegating the other to a lower and even invalid standing.

However, this need not be the case if the interconnectedness of women, of blacks and Africans, of Easterners and Westerners, of Muslims and Christians were acknowledged at the outset. In so doing, their uniqueness could be preserved in which case a sense of the human community of which these extractions are a part would be preserved also. In the words of Said (1994: 36): 'We must be able to think through and interpret together experiences that are discrepant, each with its particular agenda and pace of development, its own internal formations, its internal coherence and system of external relationships, all of them co-existing and interacting with others.' Thus in juxtaposing experiences with each other, those views and experiences that are ideologically and culturally closed to each other can be made more comprehensible in their contemporaneity. In other words, exposing discrepancy highlights the cultural significance of the ideology of those experiences. This fosters an understanding of their power and influence in order to provide perspective to those experiences thus making them intelligible in their entirety.

In illustrating discrepant phenomena, Said (1994: 37-38) contrasts two roughly contemporary early 19th century texts: the *Description de l'Egypte*, a twenty-four volume account of Napoleon's expedition to Egypt, produced by a team of French scientists which he took with him and a slender volume 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti's *Aja'ib al-athar*. The contrast is stark: On the one hand, there is Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 in all its grandeur with the resonances of great names and the normalising of foreign conquest within the cultural

context of European existence, while on the other hand, there are Jabarti's distressed and perceptive reflections on this conquest and on the destruction of his homeland. The discrepancy between the politics producing these two responses accentuates the inequality so eloquently. Said (1994) concludes that it is not difficult to follow through with the results of Jabarti's attitude: a deep-rooted anti-Westernism that is a relentless theme of Egyptian, Arab, Islamic, and Third World history; the seeds of Islamic reformism; the beginnings of national self-consciousness and contemporary movements of Islamic fundamentalism. Thus in order to pursue a course for the opening up of dialogue, it appears necessary to widen and deepen our awareness of the way the past and present of the imperial encounter interact with each other.

A rough parallel can be drawn in the present day invasion/liberation of Iraq by US-led forces. Said (2003) provides the following example. While the American backed forces championed the military occupation of Iraq for the purposes of liberating the country from the clutches of a dangerous and ruthless dictator with the intention of paving the way for the ultimate democratisation of that country, a seventy-year-old Baghdad widow who ran a cultural centre from her house had her house wrecked in the US raids. The widow vociferously expressed her rage. New York Times reporter Dexter Filkins subsequently censured her for having had 'a comfortable life under Saddam Hussein' and then disapproves of her outburst against the Americans (Said 2003: 3). This is also an example of discrepant phenomena. In the immediacy of the loss of her livelihood and her house can it be understood that the lofty goal of democratisation might not have held the widow's attention? While Dexter Filkins appears to be imbued with the spirit of democratic freedom and the desire to promulgate it, he appears not to be able to see the woman whose world has disappeared. This is an imperial encounter of the modern kind. Only a widening of consciousness of both people involved can make the encounter intelligible. Iraq provides fertile ground to further examine US imperialism and postcolonial realities.

Referring back to the Description *de L'Egypte*, it is interesting to note that Aziz Al-Azmeh (2003: 2-3), an Islamic intellectual, has a different viewpoint of this early 19th century text: He cites it as a good example of respect for another culture. However, there is a reason for this. Napoleon embedded archaeologists and not journalists in his mission *civilatrice* thus facilitating respect for Egyptian antiquities some of which were transported to France for preservation under public auspices. Aziz Al-Azmeh (2003:3) uses this example of respect to

good purpose when contrasting it with Operation Iraqi Freedom which he conceives is sustained by an updated version of the civilised mission concomitant with a form of aggressive libertarianism with the result being the spoliation of a civilisation's riches. The idea comes across very strongly that the US and its people are capable of far more imperialism than Europeans. European imperialism would have at least respected the artefacts and buildings of a country. The imperialistic theme will be addressed in short below and in greater length in the following chapter.

Iraq's Colonial History

It might prove useful, for example, if the two contemporary United States dominated wars against Iraq were seen against Iraq's colonial history. I choose to discuss Iraq because at the centre stage in this country is an insurgency involving foreign militant operatives who are fighting against US forces and their allies, as well as internal Shia and Sunni factions who are resisting occupation, fighting each other and are also against the government of Iraq. While it may seem relevant to discuss Saudi Arabia here given that it has been seen to be occupied by US troops, I take this up in another chapter (Chapter Eight). Firstly, it would do well to note that Iraq possesses a unique standing going back thousands of years. The territory nestled between the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers is known as the cradle of civilization. Here the ancient Sumerians gave birth to the written word, using cuneiform script on clay tablets. Muhammad, the founder of Islam, sent his armies here to convert the majority of the population to Islam. In 1533 the Ottoman Empire took over and unified the Middle East (UN Security Council 2002: 1). The spread of the Ottoman Empire after 1533 is an example of the colonial expansion of a Muslim empire that unified the Middle East. This expansion took place by peaceful as well as military means by conquering peoples in an area extending from Southwest Asia to the Iberian Peninsula. However, there do not appear to be any serious objections about this colonisation and expansion at the hands of Muslim rulers by Islamic Fundamentalists today. They do not seem to see this in the same light as European or American colonialism. The Ottoman Empire lasted until 1914 when it joined Germany and Austria-Hungary against England, France, Russia and the United States in World War One. When the Ottoman Empire fell, the land was carved up in a League of Nations mandate, which placed Baghdad under British rule. Thus began a period of British colonialism. Winston Churchill saw Iraq as an experiment in high-technology colonial control as colonial administrators expressed enthusiasm for the power of the imperial military enterprise (UN Security Council 2002: 1).

According to UN Security Council (2002: 1), while Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, denied that oil interests influenced policy in Iraq, archives attest to the contrary. The British Government rushed troops to Mosul in 1918 to gain control of the northern oil fields. Britain and France subsequently clashed over Iraq's oil during the Versailles Conference and also after (Paul 2002: 2). The US sought entrée into the Middle East at this time. Britain and the US engaged in a bitter dispute over oil rights until finally British need for American capital and engineering expertise led in 1928 to a cooperative agreement: The British sold a group of American oil companies a 23.75 percent share of the Turkish Petroleum Company (renamed the Iraq Petroleum Company) in 1929. Having gained access to Middle East oil, American oil interests proceeded in the 1930s to widen its advantage (Kuniholm 1980: 1). US and UK companies then held a major share in Iraq's oil production until the 1972 nationalisation of the Iraq Petroleum Company. Seeking to gain greater control of its oil reserves at this time, Iraq turned to France and Russia for partnerships. In response, the US and the UK have sought to regain their lost position. Direct military intervention by the US-UK has thus been a tempting affair (Paul 2002:2).

The Gulf Region can therefore be seen to be perceived by Anglo-American powers as Oil States to be manipulated to their advantage. Zinn (2002:14-15) claims that US actions in the Middle East can only be traced to US concern for oil and states that in their candid moments members of the US government will affirm this. In testimony to Congress in 1999, General Anthony C. Zinni, commander in chief of the US Central Command, testified that the Gulf Region, with its huge oil reserves, is a 'vital interest' of 'long standing' for the United States and that the US 'must have free access to the region's resources' (Paul 2002: 2). While Britain, the former colonial power, policed the region and its oil riches, the US has deployed even larger military forces to assume free access through overpowering armed might. The US-led war against Iraq is comprehensible in this light. Paul (2002: 2) contends that it is free access to Iraqi oil and the control over it that raises the stakes high enough to have mobilised US forces to risk 'the stakes of global empire'.

Among other conditions, US actions in Iraq and adjacent areas in recent times are attributed to three factors. The US quest to control oil in a world that is reaching the end of oil reserves – peak oil. Oil is needed for efficient functioning of the US economy and its massive military industrial complex. Secondly, there is the well known US interest of propping up Israel – a

major concern of US Middle East policy for over 50 years. The third factor is related to US interests in having a more democratic stronghold in the region amidst other countries such as Iran and Syria, rather than another anti-US and anti-Israel political system. Transforming Iraq would give the US this political advantage. The main point to note here is that all three reasons would fuel anger and animosity among Islamic Fundamentalists and more moderate Muslims alike because it is seen as an attempt to change and transform in a bid to cast a nation into the image of the US, which could be construed as being an activity that is anti-Muslim and pro-Israel in character and hence resisted.

The Colonial Encounter

Perhaps the most astonishing fact about the colonial encounter is the extreme position of intellectual and cultural superiority that the colonial authority assumes. As Said (1994) declares, it is a relationship of dependence and subordination for the colonised. Mutuality is not a considered concept. The British Empire, at the time of takeover, talked in terms of emancipating the people and creating nations, seemingly oblivious to the rich accomplishments of the region's historicity. High sounding aims like promoting freedom and training backward peoples in self-government, proliferated. Good rhetoric covers up a multitude of sins: repression, exploitation and terrorism (MacArthur 2003: 1). The British imperial system did not last. In the 1950s, Arab nationalists disposed of Britain's royal proxies in Iraq and Egypt and eventually all the dominoes fell ending the British imperium at Suez. The Arab nationalist uprising took place during a period following World War II from 1947 to 1956, when many nations were gaining independence from European rulers. This period started with India's independence from Britain in 1947 and ended with the Suez Crisis. This period marks the beginning of the end to colonial rule and control over colonies by European countries.

At the present time, however, the same rhetoric is basically being used in the aftermath of the current war against Iraq. Will the Americans ultimately support recolonisation? As MacArthur (2003: 2) asks: 'How can the Americans make an informed judgment if nobody bothers to examine the British experience'? Tariq Ali (2005: 55) explains that the British occupation failed after three decades: A British intelligence team conducted a study in Iraq and concluded that the British had created 'an oligarchy of racketeers' in Iraq. Ali (2005: 55) contends that in the world of today, Iraq has something even worse than that: 'an oligarchy of foreign racketeers'. Indeed the big winners in Iraq have included the huge firms

that have been awarded massive contracts such as Bechtel, Halliburton, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman. Dobbs (2003: 1-3), in discussing this entry of big business into Iraq, identified Halliburton as positioning itself to take advantage of a growing predilection by the government to contract out support operations overseas. In 2003 Halliburton emerged as the biggest single government contractor in Iraq. In its portfolio of operations, Halliburton was awarded a no-bid contract with a \$7 billion limit for putting out fires at Iraqi oil wells (Dodds 2003: 2). Such lack of competition afforded Halliburton with unprecedented money-making opportunities. This example highlights the possibility that big business connections to senior members of the Bush Administration underscored the awarding of contracts calling into question governmental ethicality. As Dobbs (2003: 3) notes, Dick Cheney served as chief executive of Halliburton, from 1995 to 2000, when he resigned to run for the vice presidency. It makes sense to see Halliburton's rise to prominence in Iraqi military contracting as being influenced by Cheney's prior and present relationship to that firm.

Besides regime change and temporary military occupation, however, the US plan for Iraq appeared to include a more ambitious goal of sowing a first seed of democratic rule in the Arab world. Despite Bush's assurances that the US only wanted to provide an example of freedom for the region, a question emerges that refuses to be silenced: Is there an imperial motive on the agenda for Iraq? The Iraqi Arabs and the Kurds have experienced what it's like to be marginalised and to be disempowered by a greater military influence acting insensitively to the needs of the colonised in favour of its own interests (Kumaraswamy 2006: 2-3). This begs us to inquire whether more people are yet to suffer from the force of imperialism even after what we now know from this history.

To fight terrorism has been the ultimate justification used for the precipitation of the American-led coalition to wage war on Iraq¹³, and before that on Afghanistan. In respect to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, it is understandable that most Americans have felt outraged and have sought the need for retribution. However, political rhetoric in the US has overwhelmed the logic of action and sense. The reality was that an imperial nation-state injured on the home front, suddenly had to confront a reconfiguration of power and conflict. In consequence, Arabs and Muslims have been collectively demonised. Yet as Said (2001: 5) claims: 'There isn't a single Islam: there are Islams, just as there are Americas.'

¹³ There are multiple rationalisations for the war against Iraq. To liberate Iraq from a dictator is also uppermost on the list. The war theme will be explored in the following chapter.

Yet what little time is spent in seeking to understand America's role in the world. Without looking at interdependent histories of injustice and oppression how can a common emancipation be found?

While Osama bin Laden's name has become associated with things terroristic and therefore repugnant to the American, even Western, conscience, condemning all Muslims everywhere to apocalyptic status, however, ought to be balanced with a consideration of the history of terrorism:

It's very interesting that the whole history of terrorism has a pedigree in the policies of imperialists. The French used the word "terrorism" for everything that the Algerians did to resist their occupation, which began in 1830 and didn't end until 1962. The British used it in Burma and in Malaysia. Terrorism is anything that stands in the face of what we want to do. Since the United States is the global superpower and has or pretends to have interests everywhere – from China to Europe to Southern Africa to Latin America and all of the Americas – terrorism becomes a handy instrument to perpetuate this practice.

Said (2001: 2)

Thus under the banner of doing what's necessary to protect the homeland, the pursuit of terrorism can facilitate an excuse for a country with enough resources to annex or invade another nation and rob it of its natural resources. It is therefore comprehensible that two principle discourses have developed to describe the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001. The first discourse conceives the events in strict Manichean terms: Bin Laden is an evil fanatic who wants to take over the world with his brand of Islamic ideology. However, there is, another discourse that Bin Laden might have: America has oppressed the Islamic people through almost unquestioned support not only of Israel and repressive Arab regimes but also through numerous specific depredations and there is no other way of resisting. Such discourses represent discrepant experiences of a colonial encounter. As part of a postcolonial critique, I am saying that bin Laden is seen as evil and Bush is seen as the saviour of the world. Of course, the arguments are much more complex than this and will be addressed later when the public speeches by both Bush and bin Laden are analysed in Chapters Eight and Nine and where more will be learnt about how bin Laden depicts his enemies. Postcolonial theory can therefore be helpful in analysing international terrorism through this colonial encounter. The West maintains a discursive hegemony over Islamic and Arab countries in the East and has done so for some time (Said 1981, 1978, 1993; Slemon 2001; Spivak 1999; Roy 2004a; Chomsky 2003b)¹⁴. The discrepant experiences associated with

¹⁴ While it is true al-Jazeera, a satellite channel originating in the media landscape and sociopolitical context of the Middle East, is considered a counter-hegemonic force in the Arab world, the extent to which Western dominance can be challenged is minimal compared with actual Western discursive hegemony - imposed.

this hegemony expose the limitations of such abstract conceptions as East/ West, American/Arab, Christian/Muslim and suggest the possibilities of respecting tolerance and acceptance of cultural, religious, ethnic, racial and other appearance differences which could help tear down the barriers to political and cultural understanding.

Critique of Postmodernist and Postcolonial Perspectives

Postmodernism has a European origin as is obvious from Foucault's derivation in Chapter Three. Perhaps the greatest strength of this brand of philosophy is what is most disconcerting to both religion and science and also any system of thought which leans heavily on absolutes such as "the truth", the infallible word of God and unquestionable certainty of various guises to explain their existence. This is its relativism or as Foucault would prefer, its potential for us to build games of truth¹⁵ within its framework. There is no one and only truth of things. There is no absolute truth. The problem with absolute truths, according to Greer (2003), is twofold. First, there is a problem of competing absolute truths. The plethora of Christian denominations, for example, arose because of doctrinal schisms somewhere in their respective histories which brings forward the issue as to whose version of absolute truth one espouses. There appear to be many versions of absolute truths. Second, there is a problem of hidden agendas. Here an individual or community take a debateable issue, subject it to their own categories so as to guarantee a desired outcome. Greer (2003: 16) uses the word "God" as a good example of this. The Christian, Buddhist and Hindu definitions of this word are very different, so 'whoever's definition controls the conversation during a debate also controls the range of conclusions permitted by that conversation, and thereby wins the argument by default'. The idea of absolute truth is moreover a phantom construct preventing people from seeing the real agenda which is the maintenance of one's own belief system as the solely legitimate system within the wider community. This is related to power and control which is addressed below. Foucault's attempt to contextualise notions of truth, knowledge and reason, thus invoking the use of games of truth was a point of departure from earlier philosophical thought. In this thesis, this is about developing truths according to Bush or bin Laden, which are relatively distinct. I am deliberately setting out to learn more about these particular points of view as counter discourses in order to better understand the conflict between their world views and interpretations of reality. Foucault's thinking is emancipative in this respect, allowing a totally different perspective to be taken. It facilitates our seeing

¹⁵ See Chapter Three, Foucault and Truth

through another's eyes: through the eyes of the alienated, the criminal and the terrorist. This kind of seeing permits an understanding that could lead to different but effective solutions.

Another strength of postmodernism is that it offers a different and useful view of power. That is, knowledge and truth are actually produced out of power struggles and are used, in turn, to legitimate the workings of power. It is a circular phenomenon. The struggle between the Islamic desire for acceptance and acknowledgement and an aggressive global neoliberal ethic can be seen to have resulted in Arab or Islamic marginalisation where terrorism has been given expression. The "truth" that terrorists seek to take over the world authorises and legitimises the War on Terror, a might is right response that has been instituted to get rid of the terrorists but which in fact exacerbates an already existing situation which, in turn, legitimates even further the function of the War on Terror. The view held by Islamic fundamentalists and their sympathizers is that the US is a neo-colonialist aggressor intent on world domination. The reasons why such views may be held by Islamic fundamentalists like bin Laden are likely to emerge when the speeches of bin Laden and Bush are analysed later in Chapters Eight and Nine¹⁶. Power relations shape values. Postmodernism sees that the true and the powerful are related: The true is frequently expressed and enforced by the powerful. Foucault (1980: 133) suggests that 'truth' operates as a 'regime of truth'¹⁷, 'linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it'. The problem is not changing what is in people's minds but the political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth. It's not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power – truth is already power – but 'of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic, and cultural, within which it operates at the present time' (Foucault 1980: 133). Formulating the relationship between power and truth in this way opens up a new way of seeing the world politically, socially and economically. The values of neoliberalism are not powerful because they are true; they are true because they are powerful.

The postmodern discourse is a link to postcolonial theory. As Foucault explored the contiguity of power and knowledge in order to illuminate how knowledge transforms power from a monolithic entity into a web-like force that sifts through social life, Said extended

¹⁶ I am aware of voices in the US that are critical of US foreign policy. Among such voices are those of Chomsky (2003); Fish (2001); Feffer (2002); Zinn (2002). It is not intended to do a disservice to the oppositional voices in the US.

¹⁷ Foucault later moved from 'regimes of truth' to 'games of truth'.

Foucault's account of the power/knowledge alliance to colonial conditions. Said shows Orientalism as a paradigmatic occurrence of institutionalised and corrupted knowledge, to be opposed by an oppositional knowledge. The final understanding of Orientalism is a "discourse" in the full Foucauldian sense. Discourses limit the means of representation in a society. The Orientalist discourse produces stereotypes which confirm the superiority of the West over the East necessitating colonial government and control over the 'Other'. The central tenet of postcolonialism that holds much merit is the demand that we should listen to the marginalised, appreciate their perspective and understand how much of the total intellectual debate has been exclusively from a Western viewpoint. Another strong point of this theory is it shows that much of the caricaturing of Islam comes about through treating Islam as a single monolithic entity. This is as misleading as talking about Christianity in this way; more so, in fact, because extreme Muslims are still killing other Muslims for their allegedly blasphemous religious beliefs.

In considering the weaknesses of these two systems of thought, the limitations of postmodernism paradoxically emanate from its relativistic strengths: Certainty is not attainable and this is unpalatable to many people. It is thus seen as being nihilistic for it ignores the implications of God and his revelation. To postmodernists, a historical universal knowledge does not exist. It can also be argued that relativism forces us to live in cultural fragments devoid of moral action. Den Ouden (1997) suggests that there is no place assigned to ethical values so absolute cultural relativism legitimates abusive power relations. Practices arising from such relations could possibly result in genocide, the worst case scenario, for example. It seems a space must be made for the articulation of moral action for in the interests of human life, it is a responsibility of human beings to address human suffering. Such a responsibility arguably transcends cultural differences.

Thus to affirm the differences of cultures and their fragmentation does not lead to a conclusion that human beings cannot have anything in common, as postmodernism might indicate. We share a dependence on all the resources of the earth. As den Ouden (1997) argues, universal human rights are necessary to the human condition. Regardless of gender or culture, we should all have the right to personhood and this right should be protected. Human rights are connected to global, community level and individual responsibilities. Postmodernism reduces cultures into insularity thus appearing to suffer from the exclusivity of its relativistic vision in this respect. However, in response to this view, it could be argued

that individual access to the human rights instruments under the auspices of the United Nations is limited and that while a specific nation might accede to a particular human rights treaty, the reality of the situation is that compliance to that treaty is not enforced and very difficult to enforce. So the efficacy of universalising human rights in this way is ideologically sound but difficult in practice to implement. This level of difficulty with imposing human rights is related to the rights of the sovereign state not being forced into compliance. Although there is no obligation to comply due to this practical difficulty with implementation of global human rights norms universally, many non-state actors such as NGOs, Civil Society agents of various persuasions and political leanings constantly lobby national governments into complying by bringing a great deal of adverse publicity and pressure on them, thereby forcing states to observe or take more seriously - universally accepted human rights norms.

A further deficit of postmodernism is that it is seen by some theorists, for example Barry Smart, social thinker, as an umbrella concept and has therefore been subject to some controversy in this context over the last two decades. Among these arguments is that postmodernism is not so much a movement opposing modernity with its meta-narratives but is more of an adaptation to globalisation (Smart 1992: 179). I have referred to this usage earlier in this thesis¹⁸. Smart refers to Frederic Jameson, American literary critic and Marxist political theorist, as rejecting the idea of postindustrial society yet embracing the idea of postmodernism as ‘an appropriate way of conceptualising the cultural space of “late” capitalism’ (Smart 1992: 143). As such, postmodernism becomes, according to Jameson, the cultural dominant of the logic of late capitalism (Smart 1992: 180). It might be seen that this claim may question the sufficiency of postmodernism as an interpretive frame for my thesis. I do not however believe this to be the case. When I use postmodernism in its primary context in developing this thesis, I am using it as an opposition to modernity with its relativism, which is a different lens through which to view modernity. This is not a worthless endeavour. I am using it as a tool to see another point of view. I am using it to attempt to better understand what might be the terrorist’s perspective. I do not see this as invalidating Jameson’s conceptualisation however but as being an alternative application of postmodernist thought.

¹⁸ See Chapter Three Power Imbalance, Globalisation and the Terrorism Response

As for the deficits of postcolonialism, Leela Gandhi (1998) recounts Aijaz Ahmad's polemic against Said's work, his specific objections to *Orientalism* being that it is 'misguidedly' anti-Marxist, 'viciously' poststructuralist and overly concerned with the Third World. In accord with Foucault's thought, Said's general objections to Marxist orthodoxy are due to the postmodernist disavowal toward universalising and totality. Leela Gandhi (1998) advances that for Said the failure of Marxism arises from its inability to accommodate the specific needs of the colonised world. In the Arab world, for example, the development of a theoretical Marxism was not able to adequately confront imperialist challenges. In any account, Said owes nothing to Marx on this score, for Marx, as is well known, unconditionally defends the emergence of European capitalist society as the universal precondition for ultimate social revolution. Marx thus identifies European colonialism as facilitating the globalisation of the capitalist mode of production and, in turn, the destruction of backward forms of society:

England has to fulfil a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerating – the annihilation of the Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia.

Marx (1973: 320) cited in Said (1995: 154)

Thus colonialism becomes a necessity for the realisation of Marx's grand vision. To address the other two criticisms, it is true that *Orientalism* is an attempt to extend geographically the poststructuralist and postmodern disgruntlement with Western epistemology by recognising the colonised Orient as the Other of European reality. By doing so, however, Said saves these movements from a biased ethnocentrism and finally draws attention to the civilisational reality of the Third World. This dynamic has allowed further writers, such as Arjun Appadurai, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Arundhati Roy and Homi Bhabha to extend Said's pioneering work. These theorists will very briefly be discussed in order to highlight their contribution to postcolonial thought, especially as it relates to terrorism. It will be seen that Appadurai and Roy, in particular, connect globalisation with terrorism, a connection that will prove to be a critical one in this thesis.

Later Postcolonial Contributors: Appadurai, Spivak, Roy, Bhabha

Arjun Appadurai's earlier work, *Worship and Conflict under Colonial Rule (1981)*, deals with the encounter between British colonial ideas and South Asian institutions. Appadurai (1981: 19) contends that the primary consequence of British rule and its post-independence successor, has been to radically complicate the idea of temple control and, specifically, to fracture authoritative relations in the Hindu temple. This concern, more in line with

conventional postcolonial thought, addresses an important aspect of the clash between cultures with respect to how religious institutions and rituals are important to the colonized but may not register as an important aspect of everyday life that should be left alone by the colonials¹⁹. A much later important work, however, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (1996), centres on the ethnographic landscapes of modernity and globalisation which represent an extension to postcolonial thought. In this rather optimistic work, Appadurai (1996) draws from interdisciplinary thinking, from anthropology, history, literary studies and philosophy for example in striving to capture modernity in its manifestations and implications, and with this the concept of the cultural and the postcolonial. In a more recent work, *Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger* (2006), Appadurai more realistically appraises the structures underlying globalisation, showing its darker side through which terrorism emerges. In speaking of the global terrorism manifested in the London bombings, Appadurai says: ‘Born out of the shreds and patches of British multiculturalism, the new minorities out of which the London bombers emerged is indeed a minority to be feared, because it is the rogue voice of an injured global majority’ (Appadurai 2006: 111). Thus *Fear of Small Numbers* is a work founded from the unfortunate European past and linked to the blundering global present. It is a work which addresses the tensions ‘between old histories and new provocations’ (Appadurai 2006: 100).

What is most relevant for consideration in this thesis is that Appadurai posits that terrorist rage may be directed at the US and its allies for playing out their hegemonic role in cultural, economic and military terms or, at least, at the perception of this. Appadurai (2006) argues convincingly that the unequal distribution of wealth and the at times indiscriminate use of US power may be contributing to political destabilisation and terroristic violence. Indeed, Appadurai implies that if we want to search for the causes of terrorism in an honest way, we need to take these factors into account.

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has many attributes, one of which is being a renowned postcolonial critic. While the term “subaltern” is widely used in postcolonial theory, Spivak uses it in a very specific and useful sense. For Spivak, it is just not a word for the oppressed or the lower classes. In postcolonial terms, it is anyone who has limited or no access to the

¹⁹ Globalisation and its discontents also have impacts on culture all over the globe, as I cover in other chapters (notably Chapters Three and Eight). So the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized in relation to religion is similar to the conflict between Muslims vs the West.

hegemonic discourse or the cultural imperialism of a society (de Kock 1992). Thus the subaltern remains most excluded from the benefits of that capitalised society. Spivak is well known for her essay, *Can the Subaltern Speak?* (Spivak 1988), as she is for the ensuing controversy of her argument that the subaltern cannot speak. As she explains in the interview *Subaltern Talk* (Landry and MacLean 1996), when she claims that the subaltern “cannot speak”, Landry and MacLean interpret that she means that the subaltern cannot be heard by the privileged of either the First or Third worlds. If the subaltern were able to make herself heard as for example, by becoming a spokesperson for her community, her status as a subaltern would be completely changed and she would thus cease to be subaltern. This is, in fact, what Spivak is calling for – that the subaltern, the most oppressed and invisible, might cease to exist.

Spivak’s writing challenges the reader to “unlearn”. As Landry and MacLean (1996: 4) suggest, unlearning one’s privilege by considering it as one’s loss means a double recognition. Our privileges may very well have prevented us from gaining knowledge of the Other due to our social positions. To unlearn one’s privilege means to work at gaining some knowledge of the Other who occupies those spaces most closed to our privileged view. It also means attempting to speak to the Other in such a way that the Other may take us seriously. Spivak illustrates this concept of unlearning our privileges as our loss when she says:

...I teach, after all abroad. I will have in an undergraduate class, let’s say, a young, white male student, politically-correct, who will say: “I am only a bourgeois white male, I cannot speak.” In that situation – it’s peculiar, because I am in the position of power and their teacher and, on the other hand, I am not a bourgeois white male – I say to them: “Why not develop a certain degree of rage against the history that has written such an abject script for you that you are silenced?” Then you begin to investigate what it is that silences you, rather than take this very deterministic position – since my skin colour is this, since my sex is this, I cannot speak.

Spivak in interview with Sneja Gunew (1990: 62)

As Landry and MacLean (1996: 5) declare, being serious about unlearning one’s privilege ‘marks the beginning of an ethical relation to the Other’.

In referring to the terrorism of 9/11, Spivak (2004: 93) claims that she is a pacifist who does not condone violence as practiced by the state or otherwise. In speaking of the suicide bomber, she does not believe that ‘violence can be brought to an end by ruthless extermination’ (Spivak 2004: 93). However, she believes that we must ‘be able to imagine our opponent as a human being, and to understand the significance of his or her action’

(Spivak 2004: 93). She believes that ‘suicidal resistance is a message inscribed in the body when no other means will get through’ (Spivak 2004: 96). This shows the postcolonial concern and receptiveness to the predicament of the Other even when the Other is a so-called terrorist. She very astutely points out the paradox between the soldier and the terrorist: ‘When the soldier is not afraid to die, s/he is brave. When the terrorist is not afraid to die, s/he is a coward’ (Spivak 2004: 92).

Arundhati Roy is an author, lecturer and activist. Her first major work, *The God of Small Things* (1997) is recognised to be discerning postcolonial literature. The term “postcolonial” is problematic in this sense for at the core of this book is a conflict that deals with caste, a social arrangement that precedes colonization. Nevertheless, this tragic story tells of the paradoxes that exist in a land, India, whose history was forever altered by its British colonizers. There the government struggles to establish itself in a country unable to come to terms with the present. Roy’s central character, Ammu, a divorced, beaten wife and later the lover of an Untouchable, seems to fulfill Spivak’s position of the subaltern in *Can the Subaltern Speak* (Spivak 1988). Ammu’s ambiguous status within her own family sets her up for the subaltern’s position, neither wanted nor included nor completely rejected.

From literary beginnings, Roy has continued her postcolonialist pursuits to become an impassioned critic of globalisation and American influence. In *The Checkbook and the Cruise Missile* (2004), interviewer, David Barsemian invites Roy to respond to the “memory” of being colonized and now the concept of being recolonized under the rubric of corporate globalisation. Roy replied:

We ought not to speak only about the economics of globalization, but about the *psychology* of globalization. It’s like the psychology of a battered woman being faced with her husband again and being asked to trust him again. That’s what is happening. We are being asked by the countries that invented nuclear weapons and chemical weapons and apartheid and modern slavery and racism – countries that have perfected the gentle art of genocide, that colonize other people for centuries – to trust them when they say that they believe in a level playing field and the equitable distribution of resources and in a better world. It seems comical that we should even consider that they really mean what they say.

Barsemian and Roy (2004: 55-56)

Roy delivered keynote addresses at both the World Social Forum and Mumbai Resistance in 2004 in Bombay. She denounced the rapacious plunder of neoliberal capitalism around the world and argued for economic boycotts of US corporations profiting from Iraq’s destruction (Revolutionary Worker citing Roy February 22, 2004).

In *Public Power in the Age of Empire* (2004b), Roy examines the limits to democracy in the world today and announces that we have entered an Age of Empire. She also shows how governments that discourage non-violent dissent end up by encouraging terrorism. Speaking on the events of September 11, 2001, Roy, soon after the attacks, acknowledged that terrorism may never go away but pointed out that if it is to be contained, 'the first step is for America to at least acknowledge that it shares the planet with other nations, with other human beings who, even if they are not on TV, have loves and griefs and stories and songs and sorrows and, for heaven's sake, rights' (Roy 2001: 3). Roy considers the September 11 attacks were 'a monstrous calling card from a world gone horribly wrong' (Roy 2001:3). Challenging the instinct for revenge, she speaks compassionately and eloquently of the event only a few days after it occurred:

The world will probably never know what motivated those particular hijackers who flew planes into those particular American buildings. They were not glory boys. They left no suicide notes, no political messages; no organisation has claimed credit for the attacks. All we know is that their belief in what they were doing outstripped the natural human instinct for survival, or any desire to be remembered. It's almost as though they could not scale down the enormity of their rage to anything smaller than their deeds.

Roy (2001: 1)

Writing after the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks which has been popularly called "India's 9/11", seven years after the events of September 11, Roy (2008: 3-6) defines a Side A and a Side B to global terrorism. On Side A there are those who see global terrorism as both hateful and insane, a scourge that has nothing to do with the world around it. Neither history, or geography or economics are underlying factors in the phenomenon of terrorism. Therefore the people supporting Side A say that to try and place it in a political context, or even to try to understand it amounts to justifying it which is a crime in itself. Those that support Side B believe that although nothing can ever excuse or justify terrorism, it exists in a particular time, place and political context. Refusing to see this can only aggravate the problem and endanger more people. This is also a crime in itself (Roy 2008: 3-4). Roy (2008: 4) acknowledges that while Side A may seem to accommodate some terrorist phenomena²⁰, she would choose Side B on balance. Roy (2008: 6) states, 'We need context. Always.' Thus in Roy we see Postcolonialism that seeks the larger historical context of terrorism, a context which presses for justice over war.

²⁰ Roy cites the case of Hafiz Saeed, the founder of Lashkar-e-Toiba, who claimed, 'There cannot be any peace while India remains intact. Cut them, cut them so much that they kneel before you and ask for mercy' (Roy 2008: 4).

Postcolonial studies have largely been founded through cultural encounters between European powers and their colonies in places or countries categorised as being in the third world. What has emerged in these encounters are what Emily Eakin (2001: 3) calls “stark polarities” – East and West, oppressors and victims, powerful and powerless. This is seen in the early theorists, particularly Edward Said whose works underscore the claim that the East was destined to play the Other to the West (Said (1995) (1978)).

Enter Mr Homi Bhabha. Homi Bhabha argues that binaries and polarities do not aptly describe the struggles of people living on a daily basis in a postcolonial situation (Bhabha 1994: 112-120). As Eakin (2001:3) relates, instead of victors and victims, Bhabha stresses ambivalence and negotiation, terms which can more sensitively describe the colonial encounter. Bhabha (1994) insists that there is always ambivalence inherent in colonial dominance which indicates that modern forms of cultural oppression operate not principally by means of directly repressive policies and practices – there is ambivalence within the colonial project itself. This facilitates a degree of negotiating power for the oppressed even when the site is one of great political inequity. Bhabha (1994: 102-122) gives the example²¹ of how in a colonial setting of master/peasant dialogue, the peasants’ method of dealing with the colonial antagonism was to continually produce supplementary discourses as sites of resistance and negotiation.

The consequence of this entire process is what Bhabha calls “hybridization” which describes the emergence of completely new cultural forms (Bhabha 1994: 112). Such forms cannot be reconstituted back to their original parts. However, within the one utterance there is a mixture of two social languages but separated by social differentiation. Homi Bhabha’s dense prose, although difficult to comprehend at times, defines a new way of thinking about identity and cultural conflict.

Links between Postmodernism, Postcolonialism and Islamic Fundamentalism

There are clear links between postmodernism and postcolonialism. Homi Bhabha, for example, has focussed his research on the colonial experience, presenting a clear and well-articulated example of the continuity between postmodernist and postcolonialist discourses. As was discussed above, Bhabha (1995a) was influenced by his reading of Foucault to

²¹ See Bhabha, H. (1994) *The Location of Culture*, London: Routledge, pp. 102-122 for a detailed description of a situation that involved successful negotiation on the part of the colonized.

rethink the nature of power outside the polar or binary model which he was contesting. However much he was persuaded by Foucault's innovative analysis, Bhabha (1995a:12-13) considered Foucault deficient in his inability to look outside the paradigms of Western modernity: 'He was always illustrating the liminal, or exclusionary, or normalising, or individuating forces of Western modernity, but he never dealt adequately with the disjunction between modernity and what I consider its other space, its double session or inventory – the colonial space.'

Bhabha (1995a) invokes Foucault's terms of generalisation to define when an event, object or ideology seeks to authorise itself to become a representative discourse, a general discourse. According to Bhabha (1995b), discourses arising from imperialist and nationalist views of colonialism often missed the complexity of socio-political struggles taking place culturally. Bhabha's point is that you do not have to first homogenise cultures and then as a concession allow different cultural groupings their right to expression. The issue has to be looked at the other way around: 'We have to respect difference before we can truly think about the ways cultures can speak to each other' (Bhabha 1995b: 3). The post-Enlightenment ideal of cosmopolitan culture gives people their sense of sharing a common language. There is the idea that there is a classical culture that must be learned. Bhabha's argument is that we need a sort of regional or vernacular cosmopolitanism to question the division between central canonical cultures and everyday cultures. This can be done by understanding the unique way colonial cultures were themselves cosmopolitan. Colonial societies were able to adapt and learn the languages of cultural domination.

This concept of 'vernacular cosmopolitanism', Castle (2001:38) explains, proceeds from Fanon's insistence on the continuance of an anti-colonial struggle that combines 'local concerns with international political relevance'. Bhabha's formulation of cosmopolitanism reconstitutes a complicit relation with colonial and neo-colonial discourses as a political form that grants real political power to postcolonial subjects. This is what postcolonial subjects want – some real political power over their destiny. The cause of the terrorist, for example, is directly related to the injustices or perceived injustices in his/her world. There is a global imbalance of wealth, power, resources, education and political participatory mechanisms which fuels terrorist activism and provides motive for the support of multifarious causes. However, people who choose to become terrorists are not always repressed and not always suffering from poverty. There is another force at work, a political force. Often terrorists

work within the confines of an ideology. They may work to rescue others caught up in the oppression-poverty cycle with similar goals to what, for example, Marx had in the emancipation of the working class.

The Federal Research Division (1999) reports that terrorists view the world within the narrow lens of their own ideology whether it is Marxism-Leninism, anarchism, nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism or some other ideology. Generally speaking, terrorists, most researchers agree, see themselves not as terrorists but as legitimate fighters for social causes. The Islamic fundamentalist poses a different problem to the rest, however, and this is the model I am focussing on in this thesis. Islamic fundamentalism cannot be classified solely as a political ideology such as socialism or communism for it taps into a different political consciousness where religious identity determines options and forms boundaries for the fundamentalist, i.e. there is no separation between the private and the political (Monroe and Kreidie 1997).

Islamic fundamentalism presents Islam as a total way of life and as a practical alternative to Western secular ideologies. It aims to bring all of society under the sovereignty of God. Monroe and Kreidie (1997: 32) report that Islamic fundamentalists see the Muslim community as 'one inseparable nation', their ultimate goal being to reach this stage of universality and unity. Thus law is not made by an outside agency but as is revealed in Islamic scripture. This makes Islam incompatible with liberal democracy for many Islamic fundamentalists. As Zeidan (2001) explains, the concept of the world as a battlefield where good and evil fight it out is common to most prophetic religions but it is especially true of fundamentalist groups. Ahmed (2003: 71), for example, interprets historical-religious mythology as feeding the ethnic passions of Russians and Serbs, who speak of a Christian crusade, and of Jews and Muslims in the Middle East, and Hindus and Muslims in South Asia who see each other as enemies in a holy war. These historical references point to the rise of fundamentalism. Like other religious fundamentalisms, Islamic fundamentalism views history as a cosmic struggle between good and evil. It also offers a radical reinterpretation of traditional Islamic concepts where discourse on the subject of battle serves as an incentive to believers to actively participate in the battle itself (Zeidan 2001). Taking these various factors as discussed above into account, a postmodernist and postcolonial analysis on Islamic fundamentalism will, I believe, contribute to an understanding of international terrorism and possibly yield new perspectives.

From a postcolonial viewpoint, the Muslim modernist phase was initiated by European colonialism. As Akbar Ahmed (1992: 29) states, while more conservative Muslims would not socialise with Europeans to the point of resisting them through armed struggle, modernists wished to see them on their own terms. This was often facilitated by incorporating elements of their civilisation. Most sought some form of synthesis and looked for accord between their own position and that of Europeans. Contemporary imperialism has a different nature, however. It is perpetrated principally by America against the Muslim world. It does not aim at the conquest of territories to be colonised. Vernet (2003: 1) perceives this form of imperialism to be essentially ideological: 'It aims at spreading democracy as the best form of political organisation. American neo-conservatives are convinced that the development of democracy serves the security interests of the United States and international peace, because democratic nations are naturally less aggressive than authoritarian regimes'. I believe this is presenting US motives in the best possible light. Democracy is not a uniform concept. US democracy is not the same as, Russian democracy or market democracy or the ancient Greek concept of democracy. It is possible that some people may prefer or choose a totalitarian system over say – a US style democracy. The important matter here is that an imposed democracy from outside a country is not in any sense of the word a democracy at all; it is not based on the people's choice. It could also be argued that it would not be truly democratic if there was an election and less than a third of adults voted because the rest of the country was embroiled in an insurgency.

The exploitation of natural resources cannot be excluded as a reason for conquest or invasion of a country and neither can the positioning of the US to maintain its stranglehold on political and economic hegemony be seen as fulfilling the predicted less aggressive stance of a good peaceful and democratic nation. Global terrorism can thus be interpreted as being a reaction against this political hegemony by the world's only hyper-power. Globalisation has increasingly marginalised the Muslim world. The postmodernist and postcolonial views of the contemporary situation are that representatives of Islamic fundamentalists seek to redress the political imbalance, through the method of what has been come to be known as a form of 'terrorism', in order to improve their position of power in the global political economy. Through the lenses of postmodernism and postcolonialism we can have a fresh look at the dynamics of this terrorism, to analyse a reaction or carefully planned response by a representative group of a marginalised people who are trying to improve their position politically, economically and socially by engaging their oppressors in a violent struggle.

Conclusion

Using Foucault's concept of discourse, Said has revealed that Western knowledge of the "Orient" is not based on fact and actuality but on a discursive colonial formation, a constructed view. Thus Arab peoples have been denigrated and subjected to Orientalist misrepresentation. In particular, Islam has become popularised as something almost malevolent. Consequently Islamic peoples suffer from disrespect and powerlessness and the corresponding loss of political standing that this ensues. Their grievances go largely unheard in a modern world whose heart beats to the rhythm of the neoliberal ethic. However, perhaps terrorism is resulting in at least some people in the West asking some very searching questions, e.g. Why are the Palestinian people responding to Israel in this way? Why are so many of the people in Iraq not happy with their liberation? Perhaps terrorism is paradoxically paving the way for some people to question discursive Western hegemony. More recent postcolonial theorists such as Appadurai, Spivak and Roy have, in fact, spoken more insistently of globalisation and American hegemony in particular and how these may lead to terrorist expression.

This chapter has shown that postcolonialism, with the aid of postmodernism, can contribute to an understanding of international terrorism specifically as a reaction by representatives of Islamic fundamentalism to improve their position of power in the global political economy. This is the theoretical framework that will underpin my thesis. In order to proceed in this direction, I will begin by exploring the flaws of the conventional argument of "global terrorism" in the following chapter.