Growing up in a surveillance society:
The changing spaces of childhood experience

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Abstract

There are many types of surveillance technologies that are used to observe, monitor and control the lives of children, and they are used for many reasons. The use of these technologies in the spaces children inhabit is on the increase. Given that the introduction of new surveillance technologies into childhood spaces has the potential to radically alter a child's experience of those spaces, it is important to explore the impact of these changes.

In this thesis, it is argued that an increased use of surveillance technologies in the spaces that children inhabit brings about fundamental changes both to a child's emerging sense of self and to how a child comes to understand others and the world around them. The consequences of these changes are explored across four areas of childhood experience: imaginative play; childhood narrative; the development of trust and responsibility; and the nurturing of empathy and emotions as key elements of a child's moral development. Consideration is also given to how some of the more detrimental effects of surveillance technologies may be avoided through paths of resistance opened up by children and adults in fostering an environment to allow children to thrive as active agents in society.

Overall, this research demonstrates that if the increased use of surveillance technologies on children continues, without sufficient reflection on the full range of consequences, then childhood experience may suffer as a result. Instead of being a time when a child can be a creative and active participant in their own emerging selfhood, a child may find themselves in an environment that renders them passive and anxious with less appreciation of the richness and diversity of the world around them.

Certification

I certify that the substance of this thesis has not already been submitted for any degree and is not currently being submitted for any other degree or qualification.

I certify that any help received in preparing this thesis, and all sources used, have been acknowledged in this thesis.

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Contents

Introduction

There are many types of surveillance technologies used to observe, monitor and control the lives of children, and they are used for a variety of reasons. Surveillance technologies are often used for security purposes, such as when CCTV cameras are installed in child care institutions to deter or detect harm perpetrated against children. In other cases the primary reason for installing surveillance technology appears to be to improve administrative efficiency, one example being the use of fingerprinting in school libraries to administer borrowing. Many uses of surveillance technologies are no doubt intended to have a positive outcome, promoting values of security and efficiency that as a society we would wish to promote.

However, the introduction of new surveillance technologies into childhood spaces also has the potential to radically alter the experience of those spaces. It is therefore important to explore the potential impact of an increased surveillance of children, rather than simply accept at face value the positive effects often promoted alongside the installation of new surveillance technologies. This is particularly important given that such technologies are being used at an increasing rate, in a manner that appears to be both pervasive and potentially all-encompassing, with only haphazard critical attention being paid to the changes. Children in many societies are now growing up in an environment where technological surveillance is part of everyday life. It is important therefore to understand the types of changes that surveillance may introduce into a space, and the implications of these changes, if we are to critically assess the benefits or otherwise of an increased surveillance presence in childhood.

The central argument in this thesis is that an increased use of surveillance technologies in the spaces that children inhabit may bring about fundamental changes both to a child's emerging sense of self and to how a child comes to understand others and the world around them. I argue that a surveillance presence can alter the way in which a child interacts with others with a number of significant consequences. I explore what these consequences might be across four areas of childhood experience: first, imaginative play where I argue that the role of imagination in transforming childhood agency may be weakened; second, childhood

narrative where I show why there may be limitations on the life story of the child as it is told by the child and others; third, I consider the evidence that the development of trust and responsibility both crucial building blocks for a developing sense of autonomy may be stifled; and finally, I show how the nurturing of empathy and emotions as key elements of a child's moral development may be undermined, denying children the foundation of a rich moral life. Taken together, all of these factors show how a child, when subject to a growing and pervasive surveillance presence, may struggle to play an active and creative role in their own emerging sense of self. Rather, a constant surveillance presence can lead to a tendency for a child to be passive, reactive, less understanding of others and lacking richness in moral and creative endeavours. In the final chapter of this thesis I show how many of these negative consequences may be avoided, through both the paths of resistance opened up by children themselves, and in some cases by the steps we (as adults) can take in fostering opportunities and an environment that will allow children to thrive as active and creative agents in society.

The focus of this thesis is specifically on the use of surveillance technologies and how they impact on a child's day-to-day experience, and it is helpful to note where this discussion sits within broader debates that are taking place. There is a growing body of research on the changing nature of childhood experience in contemporary society, including much debate on the fact that the opportunities for children to move about and negotiate public spaces appear to be declining, and at the same time many children appear to have less time for free play and open ended activities due to increasing demands of highly directed learning programs and tightly scheduled activities. (Aitken 2001; Tranter and Malone 2003; Fotel and Thomsen 2004; Valentine 2004:1; Patte 2006) One key theme in this literature is that these developments may be depriving children of the time and space in which to play and explore with relative freedom and creativity. At the same time, there is another significant body of research emerging on the increasing use of surveillance technologies in society. This literature represents a cross-disciplinary approach to the study of surveillance and the implications of new surveillance practices and technologies for society more broadly. (Haggerty and Ericson 2000; Lyon 2006; Monahan 2006) These different strands of research provide a backdrop for the themes that emerge in this thesis which is grounded primarily in the philosophy discipline. Given that the current work being undertaken on

surveillance studies is highly cross disciplinary, as is research on children and childhood, my thesis will inevitably draw on research from a range of disciplines including, but not limited to, philosophy, psychology, sociology, geography and education. Ultimately, the conclusions aim to provide a philosophical contribution to the issues raised, and at the same time have some practical significance by way of opening up new ways of thinking about what it means if children now face some of their most formative years with an ever increasing surveillance presence.

Much of the research on use of surveillance technologies investigates the cost to individual freedoms versus the benefits for security brought about by a particular application of surveillance technology; and as modern fears of terrorism, identity theft and violent crime increase, so too it seems does the willingness to give up freedoms in return for the comfort of security. However, it is rarely the case that a simple line can be drawn between surveillance and control on the one hand, and personal freedom on the other. (Monahan 2006:21) While one common argument is that surveillance curtails freedom, many also argue that, in some instances the presence of surveillance enables freedom. For example, by installing CCTV cameras in a public space, some people may feel freer to go out and about, while others will feel as if their freedom is curtailed by what is seen as an unnecessary intrusion. The response from children to particular uses of the technology varies widely. Some children respond to a GPS tracking device in a mobile phone in a positive way saying that it gives them freedom to go out that they might not otherwise have (the tracking device being a condition of their freedom); while other children do not like the idea of parents always knowing where they are and therefore resist the use of tracking devices. (Jones, Williams et al. 2003:175; Fotel and Thomsen 2004:544)

This thesis aims to move beyond the security/freedom dichotomy that dominates much of the assessment of surveillance technology, in part because of the limitations of this approach, but more so because when it comes to children there is much more to say about how these technologies may be changing the lives of children and their experience of childhood. Of course questions of freedom and security remain highly relevant. For example, if we are concerned about a child's safety, then it is important to consider how to restrict or monitor that child's activity in order to keep them safe. In some situations this

might be straight-forward. It is relatively easy to suggest that holding a two year old's hand near a busy street is a reasonable response to keeping the child safe. On the other hand, it might be more controversial for a parent to read through the text messages on a child's mobile phone 'just in case' something emerges to indicate the child is at risk, when there is nothing else to suggest that might be the case. Attempting to weigh up security against potential loss of freedom in a wide range of instances where surveillance might be used on children would be a difficult task, often with no clear cut answer. While such debates are important, I tackle these dilemmas from a different angle. By focusing on the impact surveillance technologies may have on childhood imagination, narrative, trust and moral life, I aim to capture some of the broader implications of these technologies on children so as to bring a richer understanding of what is at stake. So for example, if a school is deciding whether to implement a fingerprint roll-call system, rather than weigh this up only in terms of the freedom/security dichotomy just discussed, a more informed response may be achieved if the school also takes into account some of the broader dimensions of childhood experience discussed here that may be impacted by such a change.

Many of the effects of surveillance technology discussed in this thesis are not peculiar to children. However, I will argue that there are compelling reasons why we should specifically consider the impact of surveillance on children. There are four key reasons that have inspired the focus on children in this research.

The first is that, whether justified or not, there is generally a power differential at play between adults and child. The child is less powerful and more vulnerable. (Kennedy 2006:7) When it comes to surveillance practices being imposed more widely, children will therefore have less say as to whether such practices ought to be imposed on them and less power to extract themselves from the surveillance gaze even if they express such a wish to do so. Arguably this in turn places a greater responsibility on those who do have influence over the practices that are implemented in society (including government decision makers, parents, the community, and corporations) to consider what influence increasing surveillance might be having on children's lives. If this trend is altering a child's life experience and the possibilities for their future self, then (as adults) we need to understand these changes and

work with children to ensure that the impact is not to the overall detriment of children and in turn the wider community.

The second reason for the focus of this research is that it is becoming increasingly evident that there are some types of surveillance practices that are applied to children (examples of which will be detailed in the next chapter) that would be simply unacceptable if applied to adults. Monitors that relay continuous sound and video images while a child is at play or asleep, or a tracking device that sets off an alert when the child strays beyond a certain boundary, are two examples of surveillance that adults would be unlikely to welcome if applied to them. There are of course many reasons that might explain this discrepancy; for example, some may argue that children require greater protection, and that surveillance technologies provide a useful tool to achieve this. Such a view illustrates how the rationale for use of surveillance practices is widening as they become increasingly used as tools of 'care'. This is an extension of the more traditional use of these technologies as tools of discipline and control, and children are one of the main groups in the population where this shift is occurring.[1] Some examples of technologies used to 'care' for children include CCTV cameras to watch over children after school before the parents get home, online monitoring software, remote internet video monitoring systems and microchip implant systems designed to protect children from kidnapping. With brand names such as 'NetNanny', 'Remote Peace' and 'Digital Angel', it is clear that these types of surveillance technologies aim to convey the message that they provide a form of 'care' for children when an adult cannot be present. However, it seems that many of these surveillance 'responses' have not been sufficiently thought through. When these technologies are used as a form of 'care', it is important to consider what form of 'care' is being provided. Are there any limitations to the use of technologies for purposes of care? What other motivations are at work to be considered? If we are to begin to address such questions, then unravelling the 'messages' and influences behind the surveillance technologies being applied to children, and attempting to work out whether such measures are justified, is therefore an important task.

[1] Another group where the 'care' terminology is used to justify use of surveillance technologies is people with dementia, where tracking devices attached to electronic 'tags' are sometimes used so as to locate the person if they wander off. (Kennedy 2009; Price 2009)

The third reason is that arguably childhood represents a critical point in a person's development, journey and discovery of selfhood. Childhood is a time for exploration, growing possibilities and rapid change and development. It is a period when activity may be focused on the present rather than directed toward the future. Yet, at the same time it is a period when many of the possibilities for the future are opened up or established. Much of the research on children tends to focus on the second of these a child's 'becoming' and their inevitable path to adulthood. That is, children are viewed as transitional beings, with little focus on their 'being' in the here and now. (Kennedy 2006:103) The concern is often with what type of adult a child will become, rather than on the quality of a child's life as significant in itself. However, it is important not to forget that much of the richness of childhood is gained simply from the opportunity to 'be' without having to incessantly consider future activity and consequences. Childhood is therefore a formative period insofar as it lays groundwork for the future, and yet at the same time it represents an opportunity to be in the world with a type of freedom that is often lost to adults. The combination of these two features makes childhood a unique and significant part of each person's life. This period of childhood development is when children come to understand the notions of self and other. As they develop a growing awareness of others, children are then able to develop an empathic capacity that allows them to express care and concern for others. This growing awareness of self and others is therefore linked with the development of moral capacity and character; qualities that are developed during a time when children experience a growing sense of responsibility without perhaps having to shoulder the full burden of that responsibility. There is a sense therefore in which childhood is a time and space for learning, testing out ways of being with others and developing an understanding of self, with a certain freedom from the social constraints and perspectives that become more entrenched by adult life. It is the opportunity for this type of childhood experience that opens up possibilities for both childhood itself and future adult life.

The final reason why I have chosen to focus on children is that children are in a sense the starting point; the point at which as a society we are defining our future and establishing the values we want for the future. The work of David Kennedy provides insight here. Kennedy argues that childhood represents a point at which we can reconsider the fundamental goals and values of the human life cycle. It is a point of convergence which signifies:

> the ever-recurring possibility for social and cultural transformation. To repress that possibility is to repress our own possibilities as a species and its capacity for reconstruction. (Kennedy 2006:24)

Adopting this approach here, I suggest that if we understand the values and influences that underpin the increasing surveillance of children, and the potential impact of this on childhood spaces and experiences, we can also come to an understanding of what it might in turn mean for us as adults and as a society. More importantly, by focusing on childhood, we open up a domain where there exists the possibility for change; a place where change must occur if we are to develop and transform as a society.

Even though the focus of this research is on children, I will not be attempting to draw any definitive distinction between adults and children. The concepts of 'child' and 'adult' are inextricably linked. (Archard 2004:29) Perhaps if we could define 'child', we could by virtue of that definition define 'adult', but it is unlikely that that such a task would be that simple. (Kennedy 2006:96) There is much evidence to suggest that it is impossible to arrive at any universal or essential definition of such concepts, and it is certainly not the case that these concepts need be mutually exclusive of each other but rather it is likely there is some overlap. It has been argued that such concepts vary across cultures and across history, and resist efforts to clearly define them in a way that is removed from a particular cultural and historical context. (Aries 1962) Nonetheless, I take it there is in general a period of a person's life that we can still meaningfully refer to as 'childhood', and that despite the diverse views on this notion that emerge across culture and history, there does appear to be a consistent view that 'children are importantly different from adults'. (Archard 2004:35) I also accept that the nature of this difference is likely to vary and so any attempt to find consistent and universal points of difference is bound to be problematic.

When I refer to 'children' or 'childhood' then, the terms act as general concepts that say something about the early, formative years of a person's life. In this thesis, I take this period roughly to extend from birth up to 12 years of age. This is based on factors that are socially and biologically significant in many cultures, but I acknowledge that if we are to take a

complete view of childhood then specifying such an age is in fact fairly arbitrary and is therefore of limited use in practice. I urge the reader therefore to take the period specified as no more than an attempt to convey in rough terms what is intended and to remain flexible as to what period may be relevant in particular contexts.[2]

The structure of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 1, by way of setting the scene for the central discussion, I describe the range of surveillance technologies that are currently used on children. In Chapter 2 I then analyse the power structures and driving forces that lie behind the increased use of surveillance technology. I also consider what is different about a particular space if there is a surveillance presence in that space, compared to a space free from surveillance. In doing so, I outline the key features of a 'space of surveillance'. In Chapters 3 to 6 I turn to key aspects of childhood experience where I argue that significant changes are likely as a direct result of an increased surveillance presence. In Chapter 3 I look at the impact on play and imagination in childhood. Chapter 4 considers the implications for a child's own narrative or life story by considering the role of story-telling and memory. The implications for trust, risk and responsibility are discussed in Chapter 5. And Chapter 6 looks at a child's emotional life, empathy and moral development. By focusing on these four areas of childhood experience, a fuller picture emerges of the potential impact that an increased surveillance presence might have on a child's life experience and their emerging selfhood. In the final chapter, I propose ways in which both children, and those with responsibilities for the care of children (from parents to society more broadly), might resist or counter the more controlling and inhibiting aspects of surveillance technologies.

Ultimately, this research shows that if we, as a society, continue to permit an increased use of surveillance technologies on children, without reflecting sufficiently on the full range of consequences, then childhood experience may suffer as a result, with wider consequences for adults and society as well. Instead of childhood being a time when a child can be a creative and active participant in their own emerging selfhood, supported by an environment that achieves a balance between care and security that in turn fosters both resilience and self

[2] Some examples given in the thesis apply to a person's teenage years. These are not intended to extend this analysis to these later years, but rather are provided to illustrate that the use of new surveillance technologies does not suddenly cease in the years following childhood.

assurance, a child may find themselves in an environment that renders them passive and anxious with less appreciation of the richness and diversity of the world around them. An increasing reliance on surveillance technologies reveals much about the way we (both as individual adults and society as a whole) care for and attend to children. It is therefore up to us to ask the question: If we as a society value the development of qualities such imagination, developing autonomy, trust and empathy in childhood, is it possible to continue to nurture and promote such qualities in a society that is increasingly becoming a 'surveillance society'? Further, as surveillance technologies become a more entrenched part of the fabric of the spaces in which we move about each day, what strategies must we employ to promote and encourage a rich childhood experience within and perhaps despite these technological developments?

Chapter 1 – Setting the scene - Childhood spaces and surveillance technologies

This chapter gives a descriptive summary of the surveillance technologies that are applied to children. The technologies are described across the different sites of childhood experience: home life; being out and about; child care and school; and a child's encounters with government or business institutions. I will also explore the ways in which new surveillance technologies are increasingly being used (by both children and others) for recording childhood experience, whether for personal reflection, memories, an expanding social life or simply for entertainment, thus revealing some very new forms of 'chronicles of childhood' and social interactivity.

Before turning to the descriptive part of this chapter, I will firstly clarify the scope and context for this discussion by drawing some boundaries around the types of surveillance technologies considered in this thesis.

The contemporary surveillance landscape – An overview

Throughout history, children have generally been under surveillance of some sort after all, children require varying degrees of watching and care in order to protect them and help them to discover and make their way in the world. There is therefore much that could be said about the range of ways in which children are observed and monitored, and the ways the patterns of their lives are controlled and directed by others. This thesis does not aim to cover all surveillance activities interpreted in this broad sense where 'surveillance' encompasses *all* forms of watching, monitoring and control. Rather, the focus of this research is on a much narrower field of surveillance activities; namely, only those involving the use of new surveillance technologies. The surveillance technologies discussed here are generally 'information' technologies, thus bringing with them the capacity to record, store, collate, cross-check, relay and replay data about a child.

Technology is in one sense simply a tool of surveillance. In another more significant sense, it is a tool that opens up a range of new opportunities for observation and control that

otherwise would not exist. In this sense, it warrants specific attention as to its possible impact on children and childhood.

There are a number of features of the contemporary surveillance landscape that are important to bear in mind as a backdrop to the types of surveillance technologies described in this chapter. Although the description provided here is structured in terms of the different sites where the technology is used, in practice the use of surveillance technologies is rarely so easily separated and categorised.

There are many types of surveillance technologies, used for a range of different reasons by many different organisations and individuals. Surveillance devices rely on a variety of techniques for recording, scanning, monitoring, listening and watching. The technology includes biometrics (for example, fingerprinting, iris scanning and DNA testing), location trackers (using GPS or RFID technology[3]), cameras and webcams, and extends to a wide range of swipe card and microchip technologies, as well as any combination of these. Advances in data matching, data sharing and communication technologies also form part of this complex web of surveillance. The range of purposes for using such technologies extends beyond law enforcement, to include administration, education, security and healthcare. The boundaries of this are stretching even further as illustrated by the use of webcams for marketing and entertainment purposes. These new practices ultimately blur the distinction between surveillance and other forms of 'observational' practice, raising questions about the extent to which the use of webcams fits within the field of surveillance studies. (Koskela 2006:166) The installation of 'citycams', such as the 14 webcams streaming live to the Internet from various points around New York's Times Square, are one example of the marketing uses of these technologies. (Earth Cam 2009) However, as Koskela notes, even though these webcams do not operate in the same way as surveillance cameras, this does not mean that 'citycams would not also enable new forms of control'. (Koskela 2004:169) One

[3] GPS, or Global Positioning System, relies on satellite technology to calculate the position of a GPS receiver. These receivers are sufficiently small meaning they can 'take the form of wristwatches, mini mobiles and bracelets, with the ability to pinpoint the longitude and longitude of a subject 24/7/365'. (Michael, McNamee et al. 2006). RFID, or Radio Frequency Identification, provides a way of identifying and locating items using radio signals. It requires a reader which can capture data stored on RFID tags and return this data to a computer system. (Information Commissioner's Office 2006)

theme that emerges throughout this thesis is that these new technologies do not only make possible more complex and sophisticated forms of surveillance, but open up possibilities for a range of other practices as well.

Even this relatively quick summary of the different types of technologies used, the capacities of these technologies and the reasons they are used, shows that surveillance has moved beyond the simple structure involving a single technology used for a particular task by a particular institution, to something much more complex and multi-layered. The current state of surveillance has been described as 'an assemblage that aligns computers, cameras, people and telecommunications in order to survey the public streets'. (Haggerty and Ericson 2000:610-14) An image captured on CCTV camera is no longer necessarily used in isolation from other surveillance techniques, but may also initiate links to other databases or collections of information, be transmitted live via websites, or work together with profiling techniques to attempt to analyse and identify activities of interest. Each surveillance device is therefore often only one part of the multi-levelled approach to surveillance. As an example of how biometrics are being used in conjunction with CCTV footage, one needs go no further than a controversial Superbowl match in the US, where CCTV camera images were taken of every person entering a sporting stadium to then be matched using facial recognition technology to existing databases. (Hale 2005:141)

Another emerging feature of the new surveillance landscape is that it encroaches on private, not just public, domains. This can happen in a number of ways. The home surveillance industry is one such driving force in this area, marketing a range of products to parents to monitor their children, and bringing a range of new technologies into the domestic sphere. These technologies are now so readily available and affordable that families and individuals are turning to the use of surveillance devices, for example to secure their own homes from intruders. Therefore, technologies that were once only used in the public sphere or by law enforcement agencies are now available to individuals as well. (Katz 2006:28) This increased blurring of the private/public spheres reveals a change in the hierarchy of the traditional power structures that were once commonly found with surveillance technologies. It is no longer just government that use surveillance technologies, but citizens too now have access to the means of surveillance. In this way, surveillance practices are shifting and blurring the

distinction between private and public domains, leading to a narrowing of the boundaries of what might once have been considered 'private'. The use of surveillance technology in the home, traditionally a 'private sphere', and also on children as they move about in public spaces, is of particular significance in the context of this research given the important role of parents and families in shaping a child's experience.

The focus on children also reveals very clearly the ambiguity and shifting ground that often accompanies any attempt to pinpoint the purpose behind a particular use of surveillance technology. For example, while traditionally, surveillance is often characterised as a form of control, many surveillance technologies used on children (such as baby monitors) are marketed and perceived as tools of 'care'. The positive and nurturing features of this characterisation mean that the use of technologies in this situation is less likely to be questioned as to whether it is appropriate or not. They are perceived as benign, harmless, and indeed highly valued, uses of technologies that do not therefore require critical reflection. Many of the examples of surveillance technologies given below embody this form of ambiguity.

The range of uses of surveillance technology mentioned already shows why it is difficult to say anything about surveillance that will apply across all situations. (Haggerty 2006:39) Therefore, when any surveillance technology is mentioned in this thesis, it is important to keep in mind that, in practice, it often forms but one part of a broader fabric of surveillance. Even when a particular surveillance technology is being used in isolation, it carries with it the potential for future uses and connection with other surveillance records and practices, often for purposes totally unrelated to the original purpose that the surveillance was conducted.

In the sections that follow, I describe the types of surveillance technologies that are applied to children across a range of day-to-day activities. The aim is to provide an overview of the types of technologies that have motivated this research and the range of surveillance technologies that fall within the scope of this thesis. The description is not exhaustive. Rather, it describes the technologies in a general sense, so as to give context for the later discussion on the changes in childhood experience that are happening as a direct result of an increased use of surveillance technologies. Many of the technologies described below can

be, and in many cases are, applied to adults as well. However, they are mentioned here if they are used specifically on children or found in child-populated spaces (such as schools), or otherwise they are so widespread that children inevitably come into contact with them on a regular day-to-day basis.

Surveillance in the home

A child's home life establishes an environment for much of the child's nurturing, learning and living. It is this home environment that is now at the forefront of many new uses of surveillance technologies. The increased availability of domestic sized surveillance products, and the decreasing cost of these, means that individuals and families have become key targets for the marketing of such products.

Even before birth, surveillance technologies make their presence felt. When prenatal ultrasound and imaging techniques were developed, they belonged in strictly medical settings. Now, photo and video images of a foetus are made available to parents in a form that can be easily sent to others via email or published on the Internet. These photos are usually obtained in medical settings in the first instance, though there are businesses that offer prenatal photography of the foetus for non-medical, 'entertainment' purposes. (Centrella 2004; Zamora 2004) Prenatal tests, including genetic testing, are another form of surveillance used before a child is born. These are used to assess a range of characteristics, such as disease indicators, sex, size and general health of the foetus. Some of these tests are diagnostic and aim to determine if a baby has a particular condition, while others are screening tests that are used to determine whether there may be an increased risk of a particular condition without providing a definitive diagnosis. (Centre for Genetics Education 2007) These new surveillance technologies allow the unborn child to be watched, observed and monitored quite closely. While these technologies reveal much valuable information, they also provide a new type of information which brings with it corresponding challenges for parents who need to take that information into account in future decision making.[4]

[4] It is acknowledged that there are significant ethical issues relating to prenatal testing that are different in nature to those raised by other technologies to be mentioned here, such as baby monitors and webcams. It is beyond the scope of this discussion to explore the full range of these issues, and the point here is therefore limited to noting the growing use of prenatal testing technologies as a surveillance tool.

Once a child is born, there are other types of technological devices available for watching and monitoring. Baby monitors are one such device, and can be installed in the child's room or bed to transmit information to a small device carried around by the parent or carer. While the basic function of this technology is to allow parents to hear the baby while in another room or outdoors, some offer more. Some transmit video images as well as sound to the parent's device, and some include connections to allow large screen video monitoring. Additional parent monitors are available so you can communicate between the two parent devices as well. Baby monitoring products include the 'My little eye flower camera' installed in a large plastic flower to place near a child's bed, and the 'sleepy bear' monitor installed in a teddy bear. Other devices have the capacity to monitor temperature and humidity in the baby's room, sounding an alarm if these go outside the optimum range. Another detects breathing of a sleeping baby, triggering an alarm if the baby stops breathing. (Baby Monitors Direct 2009) These monitors are generally marketed as devices to give 'peace of mind' while moving about the home without having to be in the same room as the child.

As children move beyond infancy, other surveillance devices may be used in the home environment. Webcams and CCTV allow parents to remotely view their children over the Internet in real-time from anywhere, such as from a workplace on a day-to-day basis or even while travelling overseas. In addition to watching, a variety of alerts can be set up and trigger a message to the parent if certain actions do or do not occur. For example:

> if a child is due home from school at 3.30pm but the front door isn't unlocked by 3.45pm, then an alert is sent to the parent who can then ring the child to check his or her whereabouts. (Skelton 2007)

Webcam and CCTV systems are marketed to parents who are frequently away from home, either so as not to 'miss out' on their children's lives or to keep an eye on them. As one promotional article claims, while you are away:

> You can watch your children sleep, eat and play. ... Your home coming will always be a happy event. You can show off that you've never missed a day with your kids

> because of your hard-working video surveillance. It's like you've been home all the time. (Roberts 2007)

Others CCTV and webcam systems, often referred to as 'Nannycams', are installed to keep an eye on the child minder, but of course inevitably provide a record of the child's activities as well.

Surveillance technologies are also used in some homes to place limits on children's entertainment and social life at home. There are devices that automatically turn off the TV after a certain time, and alerting devices that make certain parts of the home or yard (such as pool areas) 'no go' zones. (Skelton 2007) As the Internet becomes a common extension of, or a new domain for, a child's expanding social life, it is not surprising that a child's online life has become a new focus of surveillance in the home. Online social networking, chat rooms, blogs and email, are popular with children from a young age. With this comes a tendency on the part of parents and carers to want to protect their child from the potential dangers of online life and to want to know more about a child's online life. The market in surveillance technologies that can be installed on home computers to control and monitor children's online activity is therefore a high growth area. These devices range from software filters that restrict access to certain online content, to surveillance 'spyware', a form of software designed to monitor content.[5]

As children get older, and move beyond the 'childhood' under discussion here into their teenage years, their activities can be no less monitored in the home. Home drug testing kits and tests kits designed to monitor sexual activity are two examples of the types of tools marketed for parental use that a teenager may encounter in the home. (Brickhouse Child Safety 2009)

[5] Some Spyware permits parents to access the basic level of information that a child provides online (for example MySpace parent 'spyware'), while other software (such as NetNanny and other keyloggers) allows parents to monitor every keystroke the child makes, gives access to passwords, full records of chat room conversations and emails, as well as pictures of websites visited.

Getting out and about

The use of new types of surveillance technologies is not limited to the confines of the home. If media articles and the number of related business websites are anything to go by, then perhaps the most booming business in surveillance technologies for children is the market in child tracking devices. There are a range of devices parents can purchase that will let them know their children's whereabouts even when the child is not at home. Tracking devices can be installed in children's clothing, shoes, school bags, mobile phones, wrist watches, and even in the child themselves as under-skin microchip implants.

Most tracking devices work by GPS (Global Positioning System) or RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) technology. Both work to determine the child's location. GPS uses satellite technology to locate a person, generally to within a few metres, though they are unreliable in certain conditions including 'dense forest, tall buildings and cloud cover' as well as inaccuracies that could result from the information processing involved. (Michael, McNamee et al. 2006) RFID technology uses radio frequency to detect the presence of an RFID 'tag', so the tag needs to be within reading distance of a compatible reader to be detected. Small RFID tags can be sewn into items of clothing that send an alert to parents if the child moves beyond distance of the reader, and the range of children's clothing that is being tagged includes jackets, shoes, t-shirts, hats and pyjamas. (Sullivan 2005) Many theme parks use RFID technology to identify and locate children using a wristband issued on entry. These wristbands often have other capacities, such as allowing children to make purchases up to a certain limit using data on the wristband.

Plans have been floated to use RFID microchip implants on children; for example as 'anti-kidnapping' devices. These would work by having a small chip implanted under the child's skin allowing an alarm to be sounded if a child is taken through certain key checkpoints (such as an airport), or for the chip's data to be read if a child was found but whose identity was unknown. (Scheeres 2003) While the move from use of RFID applications on products and animals, to human implants is already underway, it is difficult to assess at this stage the full extent of its potential use in relation to children. (Michael and Masters 2006) We can at least note that, if other trends are any indication, there will be considerable pressure and

interest in its application as a tracking and location tool for children. As other forms of tracking technologies are developed, it seems likely that it will only be a matter of time before these are also picked up by the market and tailored to the tracking of children.

One example of how a popular communication device can readily be used as an effective form of surveillance technology is the mobile phone. Children are a key market for mobile phones, starting from a young age with specific products such as the 'teddyfone' designed for young children with tracking facility installed. For many children, mobile phones are a vital social and entertainment tool. For parents, they can provide a source of comfort by providing a way to contact their child, though at times they also become a source of concern due to the potential social uses of mobile phones. Given that mobile phone use is reaching a saturation point in some societies, and the increasing reliance on phones for a range of uses such as text messaging, internet and email access, games, music and multi-media, it is not surprising that mobile phones provide an ideal tool for monitoring a child's movement while out and about. Using GPS technology, mobile phones can provide a tracking capacity that includes sending an SMS alert to parents when the child strays out of a certain range and giving the location of the child. There is also a capacity for parents to adjust the 'safety zones' depending on where the child is going, and to limit calls to a number of pre-programmed contact numbers. The advantage of using mobile phones for tracking purposes is that, as the children use their phones for such a wide range of purposes (including as a social communication and networking tool), it seems unlikely a child will willingly turn off or leave unattended their own phone for very long. One of the disadvantages highlighted in the marketing material, is that potential abductors would be aware of the tracking (and contact) capacity of mobile phones and may therefore dispose of the phone. (GPS for Today 2009) In addition to the tracking capacity of mobile phones, an additional surveillance tool available to parents is software that allows data from a child's mobile phone to be downloaded onto a computer for viewing and storing. (Olsen 2007)

The digital trail left by GPS tracking devices is referred to as 'bread crumbing', and many come with options for parents to set 'bread crumbs' at certain intervals, whether this is ten minutes or half hourly. (Hannah 2008) The reports that are available to the parent of the child's activity, based on the GPS tracker, are both detailed and customisable. A parent can

monitor a child's exact location (including address details where relevant), time spent at each location, a map of the child's movements and even the speed at which the child is travelling. (TrackMyKids)

As children get closer to adulthood, there are driving surveillance devices such as 'track teen driver' available to parents to install in cars that their children drive. Some devices use GPS technology to monitor speed and location, and send an email or SMS to the parent if any of the boundaries are crossed (the boundaries having been predefined by the parents). If speeding is detected, it is possible for parents to then remotely trigger the car's horn or flash the lights until the driver slows down. In-car cameras are another device used by parents to remotely monitor their children's driving habits. (TrackMyKids)

Surveillance in Early Childcare Centres and Schools

In a number of early childcare institutions webcams allow parents to view their children remotely, for example from the workplace. Webcams were originally introduced as devices that would allow parents to watch over their children's carers. Inevitably, such systems transmit images of the children as well, and in some cases have since become just as much a vehicle for parents to monitor their child's development and day-to-day activity. (Jorgensen 2004) Other childcare centres make use of a combination of different technologies for surveillance purposes. One centre in Sydney, Australia, has installed biometric, fingerprint-activated doors and is monitored by sixteen CCTV cameras across all areas. (Timson 2006)

Schools represent one of the largest and most rapidly expanding use of surveillance technologies on children. Of interest here is the technology used in primary schools (for ages around 5-12); though high schools (ages around 12-18) are also increasingly subject to new surveillance proposals, particularly following high profile violent incidents that spark renewed calls for metal detectors, internet monitoring and CCTV devices in school institutions. (Monahan 2006:110)

Traditionally, schools have always been a place where a range of disciplining and monitoring techniques are applied to children in an effort to bring about an appropriate level of social control, discipline or administrative efficiency. However, cutting edge surveillance

technologies are now finding their way into school life as they are used to improve security (from threats that might arise from children themselves as well as both teachers and outsiders), maintain social order , reduce anti-social behaviour, promote attendance and streamline various administrative tasks.

Although it was a relatively short time ago that biometric surveillance (including hand scanning, iris scanning and fingerprinting) started to appear in some schools, it's use is on the increase. Since 2001, a number of schools in the United Kingdom have taken fingerprints from children. The fingerprints are digitally encoded and usually stored on a swipe card to be read with a scanning device. This is then used for library borrowing, purchasing school meals, monitoring attendance, access to computer networks and to control entrance to school buildings. Fingerprints have been taken from children as young as five, and up until recently, parental consent was generally not sought. In practice, the use of fingerprinting in school libraries appears to be mainly for administrative purposes; however, the system can also produce extensive reports on for example children's reading habits, and such extended uses are sometimes used to support the introduction of these systems. (Action on Rights for Children 2007) An Australian high school recently met with some resistance over its attempts to introduce fingerprinting, and called a halt to the practice. Though, at the same time, the initiative received support from some key political figures indicating that it is unlikely to be long until biometrics are used more widely in Australian schools. (ABC News 2008; Norington 2008) In India, the state Gujarat government is looking into biometric software that can be used to check the attendance of all teachers and students at the state-run primary schools. It is the advantage of being able to centrally monitor attendance across the schools on a daily basis that is one of the driving forces behind this initiative. (Sindh Today 2009)

Student ID cards and tags worn by students have been around in various forms for a number of years. However, some of the new technologies, such as biometric scanning and RFID chips are now embedded in these cards, thus increasing the capacity of schools to monitor and control their student populations. It is not just the social, behavioural and educational activities of children that are monitored at school. New technologies are now available to monitor and control what children purchase and eat at the school canteen. A

number of new high-tech systems are now available to process lunch orders; for example swipe card and Internet-based ordering systems. These both accept payment from parents (avoiding the need for children to handle cash), and regulate what and how children spend money at the school canteen. Most of these systems are designed to be controlled by parents, and some also have capacity to provide reports to the parents on what children buy. (See for example MyStudentAccount; MyNutriKids 2009)

Many spaces in and around schools are routinely monitored by CCTV cameras, including classrooms, playground areas, change rooms and school buses. In the past, CCTV would have primarily been used to keep the school secure from external intruders during non-school hours. Now they monitor children and teachers alike across day-to-day school life. In a recent Australian case, a teacher was dismissed on the basis of CCTV footage showing her struggling to control a class of students. This was despite the fact that the cameras were installed to 'combat theft, vandalism and graffiti in and near computer rooms' and that there were guidelines prohibiting the use of CCTV to monitor work performance. (Uebergang and Beauchamp 2005) Given the rapidly changing uptake of surveillance technologies in schools, it is difficult to find exact numbers of schools that have CCTV. In the United Kingdom, recent reports state that 'hundreds of primary and secondary schools across the country intend to install CCTV cameras in classrooms over the next five years'. (Shepard 2009) In the United States, the majority of new schools are being built with surveillance cameras, with some schools, such as the public schools in Biloxi, Mississippi, having had cameras installed in classrooms for some time. (Dillon 2003) While the main argument for installing CCTV cameras in United States schools would appear to be to reduce violence, it is interesting to note that in Biloxi the cameras, according a 2003 article, had only at that stage had to deal with 'humdrum problems like clarifying the disappearance of a child's ice cream money or ensuring that students do not sleep in class'. (Dillon 2003)

It would seem that there are very few areas of school life, or spaces in the school environment, that cannot now potentially be monitored by some form of surveillance technology, and that the indication is that use of such technologies is increasing in schools.

Surveillance by corporate institutions and government

From CCTV in public places, to marketing surveys that target young children online, to the expanding government programs and initiatives designed to monitor children, there is clearly a strong dimension to the surveillance of childhood that stems from both wider corporate interests and government policy. I will note here a few examples of corporate and government use of surveillance technologies that reflect the growing interest in using new surveillance technologies in ways that are specifically directed to children; though this of course only reflects a small sample of such activities.

Corporate and business interest in the use of surveillance technologies on children comes both from entities that make and sell these technologies, as well as from the businesses that make use of surveillance technologies to support their own business practices, such as where this is needed for security or marketing purposes. Given that the surveillance technologies under discussion here are 'information technologies', they open up new ways of gathering information about children, either as current or potential customers, and new ways of transforming this data into a highly valuable marketing resource.

The online social life of children provides one example of the expanding use of information surveillance and collection by business for marketing purposes. There are many sites where children 'chat and hang out' with others in a way that is highly interactive, but where sitting behind this is a commercial interest in the information generated and collected. On many sites, children are asked to provide personal details when they register, and they are given 'reward points' for participating in marketing surveys. The 'Neopets.com' website is one example that provides interactive games and social networking with 'neofriends'. (Kerr and Steeves 2005:1-3) Almost all children's websites have this 'amalgamation between children's culture and marketing initiatives'. (Chung and Grimes 2005:36) It is not just the direct solicitation of information from children that provides a useful marketing tool, some of the more powerful surveillance features that are present in children's online lives are the sophisticated data mining and data trawling techniques that allow companies to collate data on trends, brand loyalty, online relationships and experiences, and then use this as the basis for subsequent marketing and business practices.

Other uses of surveillance techniques used for marketing purposes include the use of SMS on mobile phones to specifically target the children's market. Given the size of the mobile market, this is a rapidly expanding marketing opportunity. The techniques range from enticing children to send a text for a particular reward and then capturing this data for later use, to directly sending advertising to people's mobile phones as they walk by a particular store, generally offering an enticement. (See for example Marketing Success; Textually.org)

Governments have certain responsibilities towards protecting and enhancing the lives of children, both to keep them from harm and to promote their health and well being. In this context there are many government programs that involve monitoring and recording certain features of a child's life. Government databases such as the Childhood Immunisation Register in Australia and child protection programs that require mandatory reporting of harm or suspected harm to children, are some examples of initiatives that are implemented to bring about health, safety, welfare and educational benefits to the children they monitor.

In recent times, some government initiatives involving more wide scale collection of information about children have invited controversy, and indicate that governments are pushing new boundaries in terms of the extent to which childhood is monitored. In Queensland, Australia, the state government has established the 'OneSchool' database. This is a centralised, intranet database designed to capture data of all the 480,000 public school students in the state, from when they start to when they leave school. (O'Loan and Christiansen 2008) The database contains 'student's academic reports, behaviour reports, school extra-curricular activities, student attendance, record of contact with parents and guardians, career aspirations and family contact details', and also has capacity to include a photo of the child. (Darling 2008) The aim of the project is to build a 'single shared student record' that will allow a comprehensive, real-time view of individual student records for teachers and principals of students attending their school. (Queensland Government)

In the United Kingdom, the government has also moved towards the development of more large scale centralised records on children. Starting with a government Green Paper *Every Child Matters* in 2003, and the subsequent passage of the *Children Act 2004*, the United

Kingdom government has established a national approach with the aim of 'maximising opportunities and minimising risks' to children. (Department for Children Schools and Families) One of the key components of this legislation is to establish a national database of every child in the England. This database, known as 'ContactPoint', was launched in early 2009 amid some controversy due to the sheer volume of data that is collected and retained, and concerns that potential security issues could place children at risk. The database will hold the details of 11 million children up to the age of 18 years, and will include name, address, date of birth, contact details for parents or carers, a unique identifying number, details of the child's school and the child's health practitioners working with them. The system will be available across England to 390,000 workers across the country. (BBC News 2009; Liberty 2009)

One of the other initiatives in the United Kingdom that has raised debate in relation to the surveillance of the children is the national DNA database, and the collection and storage of children's DNA on this database. DNA samples are collected from anyone 'arrested on suspicion' of an offence and stored regardless of whether the person is found guilty. While data on children under the age of 10 has now been removed from the database, reports estimate that the database contains details of up to 1.1 million children and young people between the ages of 10-18. (Liberty 2009; Sturcke 2009)

From the above examples, it is possible to see the extent to which both commercial and government imperatives are driving new levels of surveillance of children and drawing on a range of new technologies to achieve this.

Chronicles of childhood and social life

One of the implications of advances in surveillance technologies particularly the fact they are now more readily available to individuals and families both in terms of reduced size and cost is that the use of such technologies has expanded beyond watching, monitoring and controlling childhood activity to the recording of childhood lives more broadly. Many of the surveillance technologies described so far have been primarily designed to watch over or monitor a child's activities for a particular purpose, whether this is to keep them safe or to prevent or detect a child's anti-social behaviour. One area that does not so obviously fall

into this category, yet points to a key change in how information about children is recorded and collated, is the changing ways in which parents, carers, educators, children themselves and even strangers 'record' information about children's lives for a range of recreational, personal, social or family purposes. It was noted in the introduction to this chapter that as the use of surveillance technologies expands into new areas such as entertainment and social life, the boundaries as to when a particular practice would be considered 'surveillance' or not becomes increasingly blurred:

> when people 'surf' the net and view webcams they do not necessarily perceive them as surveillance cameras. (Koskela 2006:166)

The reason for including these types of activities in the scope of the discussion here is that, even if they are not necessarily considered forms of 'surveillance' in the traditional sense, they nonetheless raise the potential for new forms of control, sometimes provide openings for surveillance practices by others and raise potential privacy issues. (Koskela 2006:169) Also, the complexity of the forces at play behind the use of surveillance technologies, even when used for social life and entertainment, means that the extent to which children and others can actually control and direct the new technologies for their own purposes is not always clear and at times open to question; a point I return to in Chapter 2.

The technology makes it possible for the child or others to record a child's day-to-day activity for personal reflection, family records and memories, social life, entertainment and communication. It expands possibilities beyond what was traditionally the realm of the family photo album or a personal diary or at times a written autobiography, to a new realm that is an interactive mass of webcams, personal websites and blogs, digital videos and photos and even bio-data collection. It is not just that the medium for recording information about children's lives has changed, but the increase in the volume that can be recorded, the time across which data can be recorded (up to 24/7) and the rapid transmission of the records to audiences (often unknown) beyond the child's immediate

family and friends.[6] Personal and family chronicles therefore bring with them a new level of visibility that is possible across the day-to-day expression, images and detail of a child's life.

The capacity to build a comprehensive record of a child's life (beginning with the prenatal images and bio-data mentioned earlier in this chapter) is now within the grasp of many, and its use is on the increase. The practice of recording children's lives is mostly carried out by parents, friends and relatives who are now able to collate a comprehensive record of the child's day-to-day experience. However, in many instances, children are becoming part of this record-making themselves. Children's participation in social networking sites, individual blogs, personal websites and use of mobile phone cameras provide a few examples of how children are creating an ongoing personal record in the form of photos, video, diary entries, commentary and communication. Social networking sites such as ClubPenguin and Poptropica are designed specifically for young children, in addition to those such as Facebook and Twitter that target a more general audience. (Lambert 2009)

While some of these technologies allow a child to control and create records about themselves, another consequence of this changing social landscape is that material may be posted online by another child or person. While in most cases this may be well intentioned and well received by the child, there is also the possibility that material could be posted against the will or without the knowledge of the child with no guarantee that the posting will be well-intentioned or friendly. Posts by vindictive others are only the surface of a trend in cyber bullying that is on the rise. (McGilvray 2009) The potential for this type of behaviour, together with the fact that the child may have little control over the ultimate audience for any material posted online, brings with it new challenges in addition to the many new possibilities that arise as a direct result of the changing use of technologies for creating records of children's lives. The fact that it is often others who are creating the records about a child will become particularly relevant in Chapter 4, where I address the question of how a

[6] The changing capacity to record one's life is not limited to childhood. The practice of 'life logging' has been transformed by the technologies now available for recording one's life; for example, the SenseCam is a camera attached to a person's head recording everything a person does, 24/7, including other data such as 'light levels, temperature and movement'. (Sellen, Fogg et al. 2007:1)

child's own narrative is effected by the comprehensive records of that child's life that are being built by others.

In many instances, the new opportunities opened by technologies such as social networking sites and mobile phones reflect an extension of the child's day-to-day social life with people they already know in person. In other cases, they potentially open a child's life to a range of unknown others who may 'peer in' on the child's records in a way that children may simply not be aware of. Children's use of new technologies for social and entertainment purposes will be explored further in the final chapter. What we can note here is that use of new technologies to capture 'chronicles of childhood' does so in a way that is often public and permanent, rather than private and readily destructible, as was once the case in the fairly recent past. An individual's diary in the past was usually a private affair, and though some were published this was more an exception rather than the rule and perhaps only after they had died. Now, personal web blogs provide an opportunity for anyone to publish a diary in a way that is a both a public and less-transient form of self recording and reflection.

The way information is recorded about children requires a new type of understanding and awareness of the impact of potential uses for this information, and also of how it impacts on the way a child comes to know themselves and others. For a child, the 'chronicles' of their life may arise from records they shape themselves using any combination of technologies from personal weblogs to mobile cameras. However, just as often, these records will be generated and published by parents, family, friends, teachers and others. The possibilities and challenges raised by these new practices will be addressed throughout this research, as, even in situations where they might not be considered a form of 'surveillance', they do raise important and inter-related issues that are not easy to separate from a discussion on current surveillance practices.

This chapter has provided a flavour of some of the surveillance technologies that now permeate childhood life. Even from this high level overview, it is clear that the day-to-day activities of children are increasingly under the watchful eye of some form of surveillance and that there are few areas of childhood that are free from a surveillance presence. There is also evidence that these technologies are being put to extended uses, as they make it possible

to record in minute detail the activities of childhood. All the indications are that the expansion of surveillance technologies across childhood life will continue.

This leads us to important questions about what it means for children if they are growing up in spaces that are increasingly under a surveillance gaze. For example, what are the features of a 'space of surveillance' and what are the forces that shape this space? What is it about a surveillance presence that might change childhood experience? Is it possible to identify any key drivers that are influencing decision-making in this area? How do parents, families, peers, businesses and government influence the surveillance environment that children increasingly find themselves within? These are questions I turn to in the next Chapter.

Chapter 2 – Shifting sites of power – understanding 'spaces of surveillance'

Having described the range of surveillance technologies that are applied to children, it is possible to get a sense of some of the changes this might bring about for a child's day-to-day experience of others and the world around them. Clearly surveillance technologies are becoming more prevalent and used for a wider range of purposes, but what does this really mean for children and childhood? Are the changes significant or not, and if they are, how can we begin to understand what these changes might mean for children?

In this chapter I establish a foundation that can be used to answer these questions. First of all I consider what forces and power structures are driving the increased use of surveillance technologies, particularly those applied to children. In the second part of the chapter, I identify the key features of the spaces children inhabit that are under surveillance in order to distinguish these from spaces where there is no surveillance presence. To do this, I introduce the notion of a 'space of surveillance', and identify a number of features that, taken together, uniquely describe such a space. This discussion will set the groundwork for the chapters that follow where I explore specific aspects of childhood experience that are affected as children come to live increasingly within a 'space of surveillance'.

What is driving the increased use of surveillance of children?

Surveillance has traditionally been associated with institutional or state power 'over' its (less powerful) citizens, with the purpose of surveillance being to monitor, control or discipline citizens particularly in relation to anti-social, radical or criminal behaviour. However, the range of uses of surveillance technologies described in the previous chapter means that we need to reconsider whether this view of power captures everything we might want to say about surveillance. Firstly, the fact that surveillance technologies are now also in the hands of individuals and families, not just institutions or the state, expands the range of power dynamics that is now possible in surveillance practices. The growing use of mobile phone cameras, webcams and affordable tracking devices by individuals are evidence of this. Secondly, as noted earlier, the purpose for which surveillance is used is no longer limited to

the traditional aims of discipline and control, but arguably now extends into new territories such as care (particularly when it comes to children) and entertainment. Finally, there is clear evidence that surveillance practices, which up until recently were largely used in the public domain, are now moving into the private domain as well. Each of these three changes in surveillance practices point to a need to consider an expanded model of power that takes into account the new complexities and dynamics at play.

Bentham's panopticon, which in turn was taken up in Foucault's work on disciplinary power, has provided one of the most influential and enduring models of surveillance. Bentham developed an architectural design for a prison, where the cylindrical structure built around a central watch tower allows the prison guards to see from a central point into every cell without themselves being seen. (Kaschadt 2002:114) The principle around which the panopticon was based was that those being watched must never know whether they were being watched at any particular moment, but they must know that this possibility is ever present:

> The persons to be inspected should always feel themselves as if under inspection, at least as standing a great chance of being so. (Bentham: Letter V)

Another feature emphasised by Bentham was the fact that, as far as possible, each individual should actually be under surveillance, and that this should also be reinforced by a system of punishment and sanctions for any transgressors. (Bentham: Letter V) Under Bentham's model, the individuals in these institutions end up having to behave as if they are under surveillance all the time, just in case the gaze is directed at them. Thus, what is established is a machinery of power, to the point that it doesn't even matter who is doing the watching provided that the systems are in place to achieve a sense of being watched (and potentially punished) without the watcher ever actually being seen. (Foucault 1977:202) Under this model, the possibility of being watched, and the constancy of the watching, produces a more permanent effect. That is, the individual takes on the constraints imposed by the external power to the extent that they alter their behaviour to act accordingly. (Foucault 1977:202) The effect of the surveillance would therefore reach its perfection when the exercise of power was no longer actually necessary:

> Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. (Foucault 1977:201)

This disciplining, and in turn self-disciplining, effect of surveillance is a key feature Foucault highlights in his discussion of panoptic power. On this model, surveillance is not only a tool of oppression or repression, but it has a productive element whereby it becomes part of how we construct ourselves. (Haggerty and Ericson 2000:607)

Bentham's panopticon, and Foucault's analysis of this, remain key points of reference in considering what power dynamics are at work when surveillance technologies are used. In recent times, the new possibilities opened up by surveillance technologies have challenged the idea that the panopticon can fully explain the power dynamics involved in contemporary surveillance practices. Some suggest that, though we cannot ignore its influence, we need to move beyond the panopticon. (Lyon 2006:11) Others argue further that the panopticon has 'exhausted its potential' and has become so prominent that it prevents other creative ways of understanding surveillance from coming to the fore. (Haggerty 2006:39) The three changes noted earlier all indicate aspects of current surveillance practices that require us to rethink or to move beyond Foucault's explanation. That is: as surveillance technologies are now more frequently in the hands of individuals, there is no longer a need for a model based on a single, centralised source of power; as uses of the technologies expand beyond discipline and control, we need an explanation of surveillance that can account for other types of activities as well; and, given the increased blurring of private/public domains brought about by the technologies, a model of power is needed that is applicable beyond only institutional structures.

Another change that indicates an updated model of power may be required is the intersecting and intertwined nature of the contemporary surveillance landscape described earlier. The expanding use and availability of surveillance technologies, and the diffuse and fluid way in which these technologies now intersect and overlap has been described as follows:

> The multiplication of the sites of surveillance ruptures the unidirectional nature of the gaze, transforming surveillance from a dynamic of the microscope to one where knowledge and images of unexpected intensity and assorted distortions cascade from viewer to viewer and across institutions, emerging in unpredictable configurations and combinations, while undermining the neat distinction between watchers and watched through a proliferation of criss-crossing, overlapping and intersecting scrutiny. (Haggerty 2006:29)

The work of Gilles Deleuze provides another model of power that may account for some of these developments. Deleuze argues that 'control societies are taking over from disciplinary societies' as there are no longer specific disciplinary sites of confinement that we can identify as we move from one institution to the next (such as from school to factory). (Deleuze 1995) Instead, individuals are caught up in a constantly changing environment where short-term and rapidly changing control mechanisms are used to make sure individuals are where they should be and are doing what they should be doing. Deleuze provides the example of encoded cards that control whether we can access a particular space, drive down a particular road or access certain information, and where this access is subject to change at any time. On this view, the world is characterised by a series of fluid and ever changing states, and a range of control methods emerges to direct or control these flows. (Deleuze 1995) Underpinning this view is the idea that it is difficult to pinpoint a single, exact source of the power 'over' that is being exerted through this surveillance patchwork, and so what we are witnessing is a more diffuse and intertwined set of forces that are shaping the surveillance landscape.

While some of the changes noted above indicate a need to move beyond the panoptic model of surveillance, I suggest that there is still much of relevance in Bentham's panopticon and Foucault's interpretation of this for understanding current surveillance practices, even if it does not tell the full story. Rather than reject the panoptic model altogether, what is required to understand the power structures that underpin acts of surveillance, is an acknowledgement that there are still some features of panoptic power present in the contemporary surveillance landscape.

If we consider Foucault's analysis of panoptic power as a way of understanding the impact of surveillance on individual behaviour, a number of key features continue to be relevant. As a start, surveillance continues to be used in institutional settings but, even more importantly, when individuals are outside such settings they may also be subject to a surveillance gaze that projects certain values and expectations of behaviour as the individual moves between and across different social spaces. It may be that an individual is now more likely to find themselves controlled by an endless stream of short-term, ever changing mechanisms of control across different spaces, rather than being subject to a single, continuous surveillance gaze in a single institution. However, provided that the surveillance technologies produce the desired effect of making people believe they are being watched, and this is sufficiently reinforced by a system of punishment and sanctions, then the impact of the gaze on individual behaviour is not dissimilar.

In a contemporary, multi-dimensional surveillance environment, the individual may not be sure at any point in time whether they are under surveillance or not, and there may also be much less clarity about the expectations intended by a particular surveillance presence, due to the fact that multiple surveillance messages and power dynamics may co-exist and overlap in a particular space. The wider range of potential expectations being communicated by a range of possible surveillance devices therefore means that individuals are required to consider and conform to a number of expectations that may be present. If people are faced with continual uncertainty as to whether they are under surveillance or not, and what expectation is being communicated by the surveillance, it is arguable that this may lead to a heightening of the self-disciplining effect described by Bentham, then Foucault. That is, individuals may ultimately self-regulate their behaviour across a wider range of public (and private) spaces, even when no longer under surveillance, and they may do this across a much wider range of potential actions and types of behaviour so as to accommodate all the possible expectations that the multifaceted surveillance landscape might be projecting. One result may be a heightening of the conforming or normalising effect on individual behaviour across a range of day-to-day activities rather than this effect only being generated from within more clearly bounded institutional settings.

Another result of this expanded, more diffuse, and more ambiguous, form of panoptic power is that it has the potential to generate a widespread form of societal anxiety. That is, a way of being and behaving that requires continual self-checking and consideration from the perspective of the (often unknown) 'other', just in case actions and behaviour are being monitored in some way by someone. While Bentham saw it as critical that a person needed to actually be watched most of the time for surveillance to be effective, this may no longer be as critical. The fact that new technologies allow data to be captured and recorded for potential future viewing or analysis, means the technique of power may no longer have such reliance on a watcher being present as the form of surveillance carries with it possibility for future watching as well. The modern mechanisms of surveillance have therefore if you like made more efficient and long-lasting some of the techniques that Bentham had required of the watch guard's immediate gaze.

Also, while panoptic power was originally conceived as having a central source of authority, this is no longer necessarily the case in the contemporary environment where this might range from any combination of specific forces to a more amorphous, non-specific global audience who may at times provide this 'authority'. Daniel Solove argues that the power of the Internet, when harnessed by the people, has the power to enforce a norm. (Solove 2007:6) There are hundreds of examples of web postings that, whether intentional or not, move rapidly across the Internet to garner the viewing and commentary on or about anyone. Many of these place judgement with very little basis in fact and some are pure gossip, and while some individuals benefit from the publicity this generates, others are scarred for life. (Solove 2007:47) While it may take some time to fully assess the impact of the Internet on individual behaviour, and how and when it acts to enforce norms or self-regulate behaviour, what we can say is that this is an area of rapid change that is likely to continue to add to the complexity of our understanding of the power of another's gaze.

Of course, it is important to note that if surveillance technologies consistently fail to work in a particular application or location, or fail to be reinforced in some way, then the panoptic power will be considerably weakened. So in this sense, while some new forms of surveillance technology do not require a person to be present or even watching from a distance in real time to have some effect, they nonetheless need to at least be functioning in

the way intended; for example, even if this is simply to record data of an event or to set up a CCTV that can be viewed later on.

One question that needs to be asked is does the fact that surveillance technologies are now more in the hands of individuals, and also used in local/private settings, alter or have the potential to alter the broader type of panoptic effect that has been identified here? The fact that the individual appears to be more at the centre of some surveillance practices might lead one to assume that the individual is more in control. However, although individuals have greater access to surveillance capacity, governments and corporations often have more sophisticated forms of surveillance capacity and it is also often these bodies that drive the way in which families and individuals adopt and use surveillance technologies. The capacity of surveillance technologies to both establish and reinforce social inequalities along traditional lines of power is often acknowledged. (Lyon 2003; Haggerty 2006:29) On the other hand, there are instances when individuals make use of technologies to subvert or challenge the traditional power hierarchy; the practice of wearing computing devices to perform 'sousveillance', as watching from 'below' (meaning from a position down in the hierarchy rather than necessarily physically 'below'), being one of many such examples. (Mann, Nolan et al. 2003)

A parent/child relationship reflects a different type of power relationship to the citizen/state relationship that is the focus of much surveillance theory. However, the use of surveillance by a parent over a child still in many cases reflects an underlying desire of the parent to shape the child's behaviour and enforce a form of discipline that will bring about an altered state of conformance, perhaps to the point where the child no longer wishes to misbehave. Even when individuals use surveillance on their peers, and the power relationship is less hierarchical, a panoptic effect created by the use of surveillance may still be at work. If a person is aware there is a possibility a friend's video of a night out may later be placed on a social website, they may alter their behaviour accordingly within what is expected from the audience of an anticipated gaze. The rise in cyber-bullying (Cross, Shaw et al. 2009; McGilvray 2009), and the fact that it is often peers who use surveillance technologies to control or manipulate others, demonstrates that the extension of surveillance practices at a more local level does not automatically subvert the traditional power structures, but rather

opens up a complex web of power forces at play that cannot be described in any straight-forward way.

The discussion above shows how the model of power exhibited in contemporary surveillance practices reflects some features of what could be described as a more expanded version of panopticism, based around the less certain but more multiple sources of power (and expectations) that are at play in any point in space/time of an individual's day-to-day life. Therefore, rather than reject Bentham's panoptic model and Foucault's analysis of this as no longer relevant in the contemporary context, it is perhaps more helpful to consider the features of panopticism that still appear to be at work across a broader range of settings as a basis for understanding some of the effects that surveillance may bring about on an individual's behaviour.

I will briefly consider some of the complexities of the multiple, overlapping power structures that influence families or parents, and their children when it comes to the use of surveillance technologies. This will encompass both the external forces that influence families' surveillance practices and the forces that shape these practices from within. I aim to show how, while it may be difficult to categorise or identify all the diffuse and diverse power structures at play, at the very least we can see the range of forces that lie behind the surveillance of children.

Based on the range of surveillance technologies described in Chapter 1, it seems reasonable to suggest that the use of these technologies by a parent or carer is not only motivated by a desire to discipline and control children, but also just as often driven by a desire for security and safety, or providing care. Tracking devices are one response that parents take up when concerned for their child's safety, but what motivates a parent to take this type of action? Sometimes it seems this may be more a response to anxiety triggered by media publicity, rather than to a realistic assessment of risks. It has been shown that more frequent 'availability' of information about a particular risk will lead to a perception that the risk is more likely to occur. (Tversky and Kahneman 1973) Thus, the perception of risk of a particular action or event, such as a type of crime, will rise as a result of heightened media interest regardless of whether there is any actual increase in risk. This is illustrated by the

upsurge in interest in tracking devices after high profile abductions or killings involving children, including the Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman murders (2002) and the disappearance of Madeleine McCann (2007). (BBC News 2002; The Age 2002; Midgley 2007) As discussed later in this thesis, the desire to control, know where children are and protect them, in response to a heightened sense of fear, may come at a cost to other aspects of childhood. 'Play' may be viewed as a disposable activity in the face of competing benefits of control and safety, and yet there is much evidence to suggest that play activities can promote vital skills in autonomy and resilience that would arguably provide a child with far better 'protection'. I discuss the important role of imaginative play in more detail in Chapter 3.

A key driving force that sits behind many decisions made by schools and parents about when to use surveillance technologies, is the growing surveillance industry itself. (Monahan 2006) There are a number of ways in which the market and the media promote and create widespread use of surveillance technologies as an acceptable practice that does not need to be questioned. This can be illustrated through normalising the use of products such as 'webcams' in childcare centres, which in turn become a marketable feature for the centre with products such as 'WatchMeGrow' (2009) claiming its use will 'increase enrolments'. Arguably, the proliferation of 'reality TV' shows that promote 'surveillance' as a valid form of entertainment, and internet sites such as 'YouTube' that provide a vehicle for posting surveillance footage as a form of entertainment, add to the normalisation and acceptance of surveillance practice. When these powerful media and commercial interests are added to the complex array of forces that appear to be driving an increased use of surveillance technologies on children, it becomes possible to see how this, together with an underlying form of societal fear and angst, can add to the pressure to use these technologies while at the same time making it difficult to come to a balanced decision about their use.

Some have questioned whether the use of surveillance technologies to construct and monitor individuals for marketing purposes brings with it the 'soul training' characteristic of the panopticon. (Haggerty and Ericson 2000:615) However, I suggest that current trends indicate that this type of force is at work, and the techniques used by online marketers are a case in point:

> Online marketers do more than implant branded products into a child's play; they collect the minute details of a child's life so they can build a 'relationship' of 'trust' between the child and the brand. (Kerr and Steeves 2005:1)

Building on this data, the marketing programs then aim to 'learn' about the child and 'create the illusion of friendship between it and the child'. (Kerr and Steeves 2005:2)

A different type of example, this time from a government body, illustrates a similar point. The introduction of 'talking' CCTV cameras in public spaces across the United Kingdom was launched with a poster design competition in schools to promote the cameras. In a move to help 'educate children about acceptable behaviour' and at the same time use their 'pester power' by 'reminding grown-ups how to behave', it was announced that:

> The winning school children will be invited to become the 'voice' of the Talking CCTV in their town or city's CCTV control room. (UK Home Office 2007)

On the one hand, such a move is no doubt designed to appeal to children's enjoyment in subverting the power structures that usually apply. On the other, this example reveals how children are being recruited by promoters of the technology to become 'marketers' themselves with the overt aim of getting children to 'behave responsibly' from the moment the technology is installed and come to accept as 'normal' the surrounding CCTV infrastructure.

This leads us to ask: If such techniques of power are driving an acceptance and normalisation of surveillance practice as part of childhood experience, from what basis might children be able to question or even understand the influences that are driving these types of surveillance activities? If parents and carers are themselves caught in a vicious cycle of fear, followed by greater use of surveillance, followed by an increase in fear, and so on, how can best we understand, and if necessary challenge the forces that perpetuate such a cycle? Ultimately if market and media forces are not also balanced alongside some open public debate and research into what might be effective uses of surveillance technologies,

then it becomes difficult to build alternative responses to the types of issues, such as safety and care, which surveillance technologies aim to address.

The driving forces and power structures that underlie the increasing use of surveillance technology are complex and challenge the simple 'power over' structure that provided a helpful model when surveillance was limited to institutional settings. Now, individuals monitor individuals, families monitor their own children, and not a part of a child's life is spared. Nonetheless, as a technique of power, the use of surveillance technologies continues to shape and self-discipline the behaviour of children during the most formative period of their lives across a wide range of childhood experience. It is the potential consequences of this growing use of surveillance on children that needs to be identified and understood; and it is this aim that lies at the heart of this research.

What distinguishes a 'space of surveillance'?

I will now turn to three key features of a space where surveillance is present. The aim here is to identify and analyse what it is that distinguishes these spaces from those where surveillance is absent.

A space that is under a surveillance gaze can be described as a 'space of surveillance', to distinguish it from the spaces in which children move about that are free from a surveillance presence. A 'space of surveillance' is the social space where people (in this case children), move about and encounter the world and others around them while under the field of vision of a surveillance gaze; it is an otherwise ordinary, everyday space which is transformed by virtue of a surveillance presence. It is a space that is subject to some form of technological monitoring or observation, allowing individuals to be watched, tracked and identified by others who are not necessarily present within the physical space where the activity is taking place. A 'space of surveillance' is also a space where information may be collected about the child for use in other times and places. These features make it very different from spaces that have no surveillance presence.

The example of CCTV cameras allows us to visualise what is encompassed by the 'space' under the surveillance gaze. On the one hand we can describe the space as the physical area

which falls under the field of vision of the camera, a space in which people are observed and/or recorded as they move in and out of the space over period of time. Imagine that same space without the surveillance presence. In one sense it is still the same physical space containing the same potential for social activity, but once surveillance is introduced into the space a number of things change. (A 'space of surveillance' is not limited to those spaces where the surveillance is visual in nature. It can be any space where the activity is being recorded or monitored using surveillance technologies in some form or other, and would include for example spaces where data is being collected and recorded on a database or situations where a tracking device is attached to someone.)

I will describe here some key features of a 'space of surveillance'. Considered individually, some of these features may exist in other spaces not under surveillance, but taken in combination, they are able to describe the nature of the space that occurs under a surveillance gaze. Three key features resulting from the surveillance presence are:

- Activities in the space have a presence beyond the 'here and now'
- There is an observer of the space that is generally distant and non-interactive
- New forms of knowledge emerge from the space

Each of these features will be described briefly below. They will also recur as themes in the chapters that follow as a key part of the analysis of the impact of surveillance technologies across different areas of childhood experience.

Not just the 'here and now'

The presence of a surveillance device such as a CCTV camera means that individual actions can potentially have a presence in other locations in space and time rather than just being an action of the here and now. Individual actions and interactions become visible in other places and at other times by individuals who themselves are not present in that space. Social activity is being conducted in the presence of other(s) who are not 'there' in any physical (or sometimes temporal) sense. Therefore, it can be argued that one of the features that surveillance introduces to a space is the possibility of being viewed or listened to in other times and places by a range of unknown [or known] others. (Patton 2000:184) Surveillance

brings to the space a physically absent 'presence' of others from other times and places, and it also makes possible the individual's activity having a presence in other times and places. Activity is no longer guaranteed a 'here and now' moment that slips into an unrecorded past. Rather, it carries with it other possibilities for future viewing or use, adding an emphasis or another dimension to the activity that might not otherwise have been part of the experience in that space.

There are a number of ways in which this change may be felt, and many of these will emerge in more detail in the chapters that follow. For some individuals, these added possibilities for viewing in other times and places may have an inhibitive effect, reducing spontaneity and causing the person to act more self-consciously than they might otherwise wish. For others, the possibilities beyond the 'here and now' may offer an opportunity for exhibitionism a chance to make the everyday a potential moment of fame or celebrity to be replayed and relived over again. Either way, for now, the key point is that a particular action or event may be imbued with possibilities beyond the 'here and now', and this makes the space different to a space without a surveillance presence.

Of course there are other technologies that also do this in ways that might not be considered 'surveillance'; for example, when taking photos of family or friends we capture moments that have a future 'presence' when viewed. However, the experience of being recorded in a space of surveillance is usually different from this in a couple of ways. Perhaps the key point is that it happens in combination with the other features of the surveillance space that I will discuss shortly. In addition, when the child's activity is being recorded as an act of surveillance, this often means there is no 'person' there for them to negotiate or express a preference to about the terms of the recording; for example, to say 'take a photo of me doing this' or 'please don't take my photo'. However, it is important to note that as photographs can now be readily taken on any mobile phone, there is an increasingly blurred line between what once may have been occasional photography by family and friends, and the constant possibility for a child of being 'snapped' in action at any moment by anyone present.

The observer as distant and non-interactive

The second feature of the 'space of surveillance' I turn to here is the fact that the observer is usually (though not necessarily always) physically distant or absent. That is, they do not place themselves in a co-present, embodied encounter with the child subject at the time the monitoring and/or observation is taking place. In fact, surveillance technology is often used to avoid the need for this co-presence. There is rarely opportunity for interaction, both because of this distance and because surveillance technologies are usually designed as one-way devices where the observer can watch, monitor, record, but there is no in-built mechanism for reciprocity or reply.

There are possible counter examples to the above claim that surveillance technologies work in a largely distant and non-interactive way. Before giving a child shoes with a GPS tracking system installed, a parent may discuss with the child what this means, including how they will be able to monitor the child. In such situations, a child therefore has available to them the opportunity to interact in a face-to-face encounter with their observer both before and after the surveillance activity. However, it nonetheless remains the case that while the surveillance is being conducted, it is generally done from a distance and takes advantage of the fact that co-presence or reciprocity is not required. Similarly, some child monitors allow two-way voice communication. But even here, although the parent can hear the child, and may even respond to the child via the monitor, there is no guarantee that this will happen and the control for any interactivity is very much in the hands of the observer.

It has been noted that there are instances when people being observed via CCTV attempt to communicate with those watching them; for example, by making a dismissive or rude gesture to the camera hoping that the watchers will receive this as a form of response to the act of watching. There are also cases when a CCTV controller might respond to this with a wave or a comment even thought they know the person being watched will not see/hear the response. (Smith 2007:293) In these situations, the person has no knowledge of who their watcher is, or whether they are watching, let alone whether their attempt at interactivity has been received. Some CCTV cameras allow operators to 'speak' to those they are watching via a loud speaker system, though the individual cannot respond and is simply confronted

with a non-embodied, unknown, inaccessible voice directed at their activity. (Smith 2007:293) Overall, we can see that a prevailing feature of a 'space of surveillance' is the fact that it usually involves one-way observation of the space from a non-present distance.

Surveillance is therefore a form of watching that allows non-reciprocal access to others by the observers. (Patton 2000:184) This is significant, because there are many other instances when people have access to each other across a distance, and where technology provides the means for this to happen - telephone, email and video conferences to name a few. However, to the extent that these involve reciprocal, real-time, usually voluntary, communication between people, they would generally not be considered forms of surveillance. (Though of course such day-to-day acts of communicating with others are open to the possibility of surveillance by others, such as through listening devices or computer spyware.) While there may be some limitations to these forms of communication due to the lack of embodied co-presence with the other person (the effect of which I will discuss shortly), they at least usually represent a genuinely reciprocal form of communication.

The opportunity provided by surveillance technology to watch or monitor a child, without the observer having to be physically co-present means that, in some ways, it provides a far greater capacity to watch or monitor an activity in a way that perhaps cannot be readily achieved in person. It becomes possible to monitor for long periods of time and permits wide scale observation from outside the 'space of surveillance'. It also allows monitoring in situations where the observer wishes to remain anonymous or hidden. Surveillance technology, when used as a substitute 'carer', may attempt to replace an action that might once have relied on a one-to-one interaction or encounter, and may extend the level of observation to actions that would not have been monitored in the past because of the sheer physical impossibility of the task. The fact that a parent can, simply by connecting to the Internet, observe their child in childcare or at home via webcams, or locate their child's exact position on an online map using GPS technology as well as details on how long the child has been in that position, demonstrates a level of surveillance that would simply not be possible without such technologies. Similarly, the fact that CCTV cameras can monitor activity in many areas around a school means that a much wider scope of children's activity can be

captured and potentially viewable than would otherwise be possible when teachers only are relied on for this task.

Overall, this reveals a change in emphasis in how a child's care is managed. Outside a 'space of surveillance' children's activities are either monitored in person or not at all, whereas once inside a space with a surveillance presence a child's activities can be monitored on an ongoing basis without a need for this to happen in person. This difference brings with it a number of implications that are worth exploring. While the capacity of surveillance brings with it some benefits (such as the ability to monitor activities that might otherwise be over-looked), the fact that the child is monitored and/or being recorded from a distant and non-interactive perspective also brings some potential losses for the child's overall experience within that space.

This loss comes from two angles. Firstly, when it comes to activities that would otherwise be monitored in person, a child may miss out on the benefits that come with in-person interactivity and contact. Secondly, when it comes to activities that might have remained unobserved, a child may miss out on opportunities to extend their capacity to act autonomously as the fact of being watched may take away from a child's sense that they are acting in a way that is genuinely self-reliant. Both of these features of childhood experience the richness gained from co-present encounters, and the type of environment that best supports a child's emerging sense of self and autonomy will be analysed in more depth in the chapters that follow. At this stage, it is sufficient to briefly note some of the benefits that co-present, embodied encounters bring for children and others, and also to give an initial indication as to why arguments that suggest a 'space of surveillance' can promote autonomy, may be fundamentally flawed.

So what are some of the benefits that co-present, embodied encounters with others bring to children? Many of life's basic nurturing requirements such as comfort, food, security and love, and the development of social and emotional skills, rely on in-person interactions with a range of others, and are important for a child from the day they are born. Even though 'spaces of surveillance' are on the increase, there will still be many times when a child's experience involves a range of in-person encounters (as these will happen both within and

outside of spaces with a surveillance presence). However, the critical question here is, if a child's day-to-day care is increasingly replaced with, or supplemented by, surveillance technology that operates in a way that lessens opportunity for interaction with the observer (whether this be a parent, teacher or government official), then is there a cost to the child that may occur due to the potential loss of embodied, interactive experiences with others? Or to ask the question another way, are there benefits that are unique to an inter-personal form of care that cannot be replaced by the use of surveillance technologies, and that if replaced may result in such a loss for a child's experience? One of my aims in this thesis is to identify areas where there may be such a loss.

A non-embodied, distant encounter can sometimes reduce the level of understanding for both parties (in this instance taken to be an adult and child) as to the meaning and significance of that event. For both adult and child, there are limits to technologically-mediated, distant encounters. It seems likely, for example, that in embodied, co-present encounters, emotional interactions and responses will be more readily understood by both adult and child. This is because many key emotions are revealed through facial expressions, to the point that even when people are trying to act in a certain way there is 'almost always some 'leakage' of the emotion they are *really* feeling, even it is only for a split second'. (Robinson 2005:32-37) The opportunity for the child to have access to the emotional expressions of whoever is doing the surveillance, and for the watcher to have access to expression from the child, is therefore part of what may be missed from a distant act of surveillance. It is not only the lack of understanding of emotions, but of the overall perspective of the 'other' who is doing the watching that cannot be comprehended. Jason Patton draws on Jean-Paul Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* to explain how surveillance can blur or disrupt the spatial and temporal features of the surrounding context. That is:

> the physical absence of the Other disrupts one's ability to understand who one is being seen by. One has the experience of performing for an unknown and unknowable Other that is outside of the comprehensible social context. (Patton 2000:184)

For the purposes of this discussion, we can see some of what is different for a child when in a 'space of surveillance'. The (adult) watcher too may miss vital information and may fail to acknowledge or fully see the child as a person in that moment. It seems that distant encounters:

> neither require nor encourage the same concentration, patience or depth of response that embodied face to face encounters with the commanding presence of the other invites and sometimes demands. (Anderson 2000:156)

If this is the case, then it raises the question as to whether a child, and their actions, can ever be given full 'justice' when observed via surveillance. It is possible to see how decisions made by a teacher or local law enforcement person that are based solely on CCTV footage could be more superficial than those made in person. If they do not have to directly confront or answer to the child in person, as a person, they may be less likely to consider the 'full' child and context surrounding the incident. In this situation, the child is deprived not only of a 'fair' decision, but also of some learning that may have occurred from an in-person encounter with another. The observer in turn is also being deprived of the opportunity to develop a mutual and richer understanding with and of the child.

None of this is to suggest that children can only benefit from care that occurs in an interactive, embodied form. There are times when children may benefit from space to themselves so as to extend their capacity for autonomous and responsible decision-making, or to explore play opportunities with a greater sense of freedom and privacy. I suggest that when there is a surveillance presence, this may have a negative impact on those activities where a child (without surveillance) might otherwise have explored opportunities in a space where they could 'be alone'. However, I argue that the way children are given the opportunity to 'be alone' involves providing an environment that allows a child to feel both secure and loved, and at the same time free to explore spaces with a growing sense of self-reliance. This is based on the work of psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott, and is returned to in more depth in later chapters, where I argue that the features of a surveillance presence are not able to promote what Winnicott refers to as a 'facilitating environment' for enriching childhood experience, and in fact may undermine such an environment. As a result, the

child may experience another type of loss; that being the loss of opportunity to develop a sense of self, a capacity to judge risks and to act responsibly in environments that are independent from an adult presence.

The use of surveillance is often touted as an opportunity to promote a balance between autonomy and safety as children go about day-to-day activities. However, applying surveillance in this way removes the opportunity for both child and parent to make a judgement about risks and safety based on the unique combination of environment, social context and capacity that would best support each child. This may result in children being monitored in situations where they might have been able to manage without such monitoring but are not given the opportunity to do so. In a 'space of surveillance' a child is continually subject to monitoring whether they require it or not, and the distant and non-interactive feature of the technology means that it is difficult for the child to negotiate or even express preferences about the way they are watched and monitored at particular points in time. This can lead to a lack of incentive and opportunity for a child to develop skills and responsibility to further their autonomous capacity, and potentially places at risk a child's capacity to deal with actual threats and risks in future; themes I will also expand on in later chapters.

In summary, the fact that surveillance is often 'from a distance' and permits no interactivity has the potential to reduce opportunity for reciprocity, and hence mutual understanding between the observer and the observed at the time of surveillance. As a result it may lead to a loss of the benefits children get from embodied interactivity such as understanding a range of things best revealed via an in-person encounter with the other. At the same time, if surveillance is conducted at times when it is not necessary, but applied continually because this is easier than a more individualised approach, then there are also potential implications for the development of autonomy in childhood as a child loses the opportunity to be self-reliant in situations where they may have had this capacity.

While surveillance technologies may not be able to capture all the subtleties of co-present encounters, in some other ways they permit more information to be captured; for example, in terms of the detail of the data produced or the level of accuracy in diagnostic information.

This leads to new forms of knowledge and is the feature of a 'space of surveillance' I turn to next.

New forms of knowledge

I have noted above that surveillance technology may fail to capture information about an activity that could otherwise be gleaned from a co-present, one-to-one encounter with another; for example, information gleaned from emotional nuances and body language is less likely to be captured. At the same time, I noted that what can be recorded using new surveillance technologies is potentially far greater in some senses than what could be achieved without the technology; the capacity for continual recording and the ability to record new types of data being prime examples. It is this potential of surveillance technology, and the records produced, that makes possible new types of knowledge about a particular event or encounter knowledge that would simply not be available had the technology been absent from the 'space'. Some examples have already been mentioned, including information obtained via prenatal testing, or the detail a parent can view over time and distance via a webcam of a child's day-to-day activity. The use of a baby monitor will record a new level of detail about a child's breathing, and the temperature and humidity of the room, than a parent or carer would usually be aware of when in the presence of the child. These new sources of information and emerging forms of knowledge raise different responsibilities, decisions and challenges.

The fact that new forms of knowledge may emerge from a 'space of surveillance' is significant because it can change how a child comes to understand themselves and others, it can change how others come to know the child and it can shape or alter a child's very notion of 'knowledge' itself.

As an example, consider the data that is increasingly being recorded, collated and retained from early school years about behaviour and academic achievement, such as via the OneSchool database mentioned in Chapter 1. It is the future potential of this data that raises a critical issue. The database opens up opportunities for future use by employers or law enforcement agencies who may then have to decide how to make sense of the data and how to use it. This information may change an adult's perception of the child well into the

future, and can also impact on a child's own notion of 'self'. In turn, it may also effect what a child comes to understand is 'important' or 'remembered' about their school experience, when what they may have otherwise remembered may have been a more random collection of playground and classroom experiences and personalities. In Chapter 4 I explore the value of 'forgetting', and of leaving certain information unrecorded in the past, and how, particularly for children, this is part of what makes growth and development possible. Records collated in school databases may be useful for a range of assessment, planning and research purposes. However, it is equally important to remember that while these records purport to be extensive and informative they are still ultimately only partial, and can never be the full story of a child's school experience. Furthermore, the potential future uses of such data means more emphasis may be placed on the information in another context than was ever envisaged by either teacher or child at the time the data was collected.

One implication is that the record itself can become a source of knowledge in an objective sense, imbued with a certain 'truth' status. It becomes seen as record of what 'actually happened' in contrast with a more subjective account of a particular event such as might be recounted by someone actually (and not virtually) present. If a bullying incident occurs in a school playground that is captured via CCTV, then the record captured by the camera is likely to be viewed by those dealing with the incident as the objective, and therefore only relevant or reliable, version of the incident. This 'objective' status brings with it implications for moral decision making, such as when the availability of an 'objective' record proves to be the crucial evidence. The case mentioned in Chapter 1 of the teacher dismissed on the basis of CCTV footage may be a case in point, though it is difficult to tell from the reports available how much additional evidence was considered. In some circumstances, such information can prove highly useful. The use of video surveillance as an 'objective' form of evidence is starkly illustrated by the Rodney King case, where a video made by chance cast doubt on the evidence of numerous police and other testimonies. (Pauleit 2002:477) Despite these advantages, there remain many examples of when the 'objective' record captured by surveillance technology may be misused and other information totally ignored to the detriment of fair moral decision making. (Solove 2007)

In this thesis one theme I explore is that the 'knowledge' gleaned from surveillance records may come at a cost to other ways of 'knowing'. For example, subjective elements of experience (such as the account that might be given by eye witnesses to an event, or a child's emotional response to a particular event) may become undervalued as the technology becomes the source of 'knowledge' or 'truth'. Some even go so far as to suggest that, in the era of surveillance:

> interpersonal acts, even if they take place in the presence of witnesses, are no longer enough to constitute an event. An event … has only taken place when it has been subjected to a form of video (self)surveillance. (Levin cited in Pauleit 2002 p476)

In this sense, surveillance records have become to represent the 'real' thing, more so than the experience of actually being there.[7]

In exploring the implications of the 'knowledge' that emerges from a 'space of surveillance', a useful concept to consider is the idea that we have a 'data double'. That is, a 'body as information' captured via surveillance technology and transformed into a usable and comparable state. This 'body' becomes our 'data double'. (Haggerty and Ericson 2000:613) In fact, it is this 'data double' that, in the world of surveillance, is accorded a certain 'truth' status; a 'truth' that becomes more 'real' for those working with or observing the 'data double' than the individual themselves. Even the individual may, in the face of constant review of their data-double (or more accurately, data doubles, for surely there are multiple versions of them) begin to question their own subjective version of a particular event. Yet, there is much evidence to suggest that the 'knowledge' provided by surveillance records is not as infallible as it seems. On a practical level, experience shows that what is recorded as our 'data double' (which would include a multitude of information collated about us, not only CCTV footage) is in fact often full of errors, fictions and misleading information. (Los 2006:78) Some commentators believe that it is only when individuals have to encounter

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[7] This bears similarity to the theme in Jean Baudrillard's *The gulf war did not take place*, where he argues that a 'virtual' war was constructed by media images, which in turn came to be perceived as real, when in fact they were far removed from the reality of the actual combat. (Baudrillard 1995)

their own 'data double' for some reason or other that they will see the 'tangible personal consequences' of surveillance practices. (Los 2006:77)

When a child is in a 'space of surveillance', and activities are recorded and replayable, this can change the emphasis and significance of those activities, perhaps ultimately giving them more prominence and distorting the significance of these when compared to actions undertaken in the absence of a surveillance gaze where no such record exists. This shift in emphasis arises simply because the surveillance presence allows actions and encounters to be recorded and replayed (sometimes over and over) creating a particular impression or 'truth' about the child. One result is likely to be a heightened focus of attention on some actions of a child as the emphasis on the moment recorded becomes intensified.

Perhaps another consequence of the capacity of surveillance to provide information that is seen as 'objective' or the 'truth', is the message this conveys to children about the notion of 'truth' itself. That is, there seems to be a message that 'truth' is what matters above all else, and an assumption that if surveillance technologies can capture and reveal the 'truth' then this is an inherently good thing. However, perhaps the ways in which these technologies are used in relation to children allows us to question this assumption. Maybe there is some value in a child being able to lie or to be naughty; both opportunities that are significantly reduced in a 'space of surveillance'. It is therefore important to consider whether there is an important developmental role of 'lying' for children (particularly in relation to minor transgressions), before assuming that the information that is captured by the surveillance technology (even when it contradicts a child's own account of a particular activity) is necessarily a constructive tool for learning and even discipline. The reliance on the technology to tell or reveal the truth, rather than on other ways of helping children to understand why it may be important to tell the truth in certain situations is illustrated by the following observation of a school principal on the effect of CCTV cameras in his school:

> It's like truth serum, ... when we have a he-said, she-said situation, 9 times out of 10 all we have to do is ask children if they want us to go back and look at the camera, and they fess up. (Dillon 2003)

As children move, play and interact with others under a surveillance gaze, one feature of this space is the fact that such actions are no longer 'lost in the moment'. They are no longer a tiny part of a broader fabric of experience that includes trial and error, remembering and forgetting. Rather if the activity is recorded, it becomes a 'truth'; a new form of knowledge that brings with it new challenges and ways of decision making that carry more weight than the original childhood experience in that space. When children move about in spaces free of a surveillance gaze, the knowledge of those activities lies only in the moment of the experience and the fragments of memories of those who were 'there'. The way these moments influence and shape a child's emerging sense of selfhood and their understanding of others and the world around them, is going to be very different to when such an understanding may be influenced by the 'truth' of a 'data double'. In Chapter 3, I consider what may happen if children lose the sense that they are free to explore, to transgress, to imagine, or put simply, to play within a moment that is transient and spontaneous. In Chapter 4, where I consider how a surveillance presence changes the type of story children tell about themselves and others, I suggest that a narrative saturated by the new forms of knowledge that a 'space of surveillance' makes possible, can be limiting for a child in terms of their emerging sense of selfhood and the way they come to understand others and the world around them. These later discussions will highlight some of what might be lost as 'spaces of surveillance' come to dominate childhood experience. This will illustrate more fully that a surveillance presence not only brings with it new forms of knowledge, but more specifically the fact that this knowledge is attributed with an 'objective' status with the potential to interrupt other ways of knowing and being.

In summary, the three features of a 'space of surveillance' discussed here the fact that activities have a presence beyond the here and now, the often distant and non-interactive relationship between the observed and the observer, and the new forms of knowledge that emerge within the space - each provide a basis for understanding why a child's experience and actions with a 'space of surveillance' is likely to be different to a space without a surveillance presence. These, together with the expanded 'panoptic' model of power described earlier, provide a starting point from which we can begin to understand the types of impacts that an increased use of surveillance technologies may be having on a child's day-to-day life. Furthermore, the new dimensions of power introduced by surveillance are so

powerful that their reach can extend to spaces with no surveillance presence. Here we begin to see some of the wider implications that arise as childhood experience is increasingly conducted within a 'space of surveillance'. It is not therefore sufficient to question the impact on children only while in a 'space of surveillance', but rather to take into account the implications for childhood experience as a whole.

I now turn to the key areas of childhood experience that I suggest will be significantly altered as children increasingly find themselves within 'spaces of surveillance'. Chapters 3 to 6 below consider the implications of this change based around the themes of imaginative play, narrative, trust and moral development.

Chapter 3 – Child's play – Spaces of imagining

There are many who argue that play is an important part of childhood. Indeed, for many, play is seen as the key to understanding children and child development. (Ginsburg 2007) Given the universal tendency for children across cultures and times to engage in many types of play, even though these might vary from one culture to the next, it seems likely that there is something important going on when children are playing. (Huizinga 1950; Engel 2005) However, what exactly 'play' can tell us about children and childhood is open to ongoing debate. (Shields 1998) The range of children's play includes games such as hopscotch, tag, marbles and hide-and-seek, as well as the rich variety of children's imaginative and pretend play, and perhaps even more recent forms of virtual play such as Internet gaming.[8] In this chapter I will only be concerned with a subset of these play activities namely imaginative play; noting that this may often overlap and intertwine with other forms of play activities but that it is the 'imaginative play' element I wish to focus on here.

In this chapter I first of all analyse the concept of imaginative play and demonstrate why imaginative play is important in childhood. I then look at how imaginative play opens up opportunities for self-transformation for both children and adults, develops a child's awareness and understanding of others, and builds resilience and self-reliance. Later in the chapter, I consider what factors may inhibit opportunities for imaginative play, and in particular the impact surveillance technologies might have on this form of play and the possible consequences of this for a child. Overall, I show how the introduction of surveillance technologies into a child's 'play space' brings with it the potential to undermine many of the characteristics of a rich play environment, thereby threatening the opportunity for imaginative play and the possibilities this would otherwise bring to the child.

In perhaps one of the most wide ranging attempts to understand the notion of 'play', Johan Huizinga explores the notion across the course of human history, including its significance in

[8] There is an emerging field of research on virtual or screen based play, such as video and arcade games, and the role of these new forms of 'play' in children's lives, with one commentator suggesting that these provide children with an outlet for the adventures they are no longer able to have due to the increased control over their physical activities. (McNamee 2000:485)

religion, war, philosophy, law, art and even civilization as a whole. (Huizinga 1950) Huizinga seeks to draw out the play element across a range of human activities from sports, rituals and festivals to children's playground games, in order to understand the significance of play. I will not be addressing the full breadth of Huizinga's work here. However, the key features of 'play' that Huizinga identifies provide a useful introduction to the discussion on 'imaginative play' that is the focus here. Huizinga identifies a number of key features of play activity: it is a voluntary activity and therefore an activity cannot be considered 'play' if it has arisen from an order to play - the sense of freedom and enjoyment in play is key here; play involves a 'stepping out' of 'real life' into a temporary sphere of activity, and is totally and intensely absorbing; play works within the boundaries of certain limits, rules and order - 'inside the playground an absolute and peculiar order reigns'; there is an element of tension or uncertainty which creates the desire to achieve or solve something in order to end the tension; and finally, at times when the play is over, the 'play community' maintains its bonds and retains a sense of 'secrecy' or 'difference' from others. (Huizinga 1950:7-13)

I now turn to a more in-depth consideration of the nature of imaginative play, expanding on some of the features above as they arise.

What is imaginative play?

When we think of imaginative play in childhood, we might for example envisage children playing with imaginary friends, making up stories or 'narrative play' with objects, toys or other children, inventing nonsense playground rhymes, role or pretend play involving all sorts of creatures such as dragons, ghosts, monsters or fairies or other more 'real world' personas such as explorers, scientists, construction workers, parents, babies or famous characters from books or film. While this description is far from comprehensive, it does allow us to understand the types of the activities that might be considered to constitute a form of imaginative play.

Imaginative play involves exploration beyond the actual or everyday world. It is an activity that involves 'doing' not just thinking:

> To control what is outside one has to *do* things, not simply to think or to wish, and *doing things takes time*. Playing is doing. (Winnicott 1971:41)

Play is a creative process that involves the whole person, and some would argue that the conditions that allow play to flourish are also the conditions for creativity. (Winnicott 1971:55) One key feature of imaginative play therefore is that it is an embodied activity rather than a purely mental phenomenon. (Cataldi 2002:21; Engel 2005:186) In imaginative play a child has direct physical involvement with their surrounding environment. This can be seen for example in the way children manipulate physical objects such as sticks, stones and building blocks, infusing them with meaning and possibility beyond what they 'really are'. (Jones 2000:40) The way children 'dress up' also reflects this direct involvement and, according to Huizinga, expresses clearly the 'differentness' of play activity from the everyday world: 'The disguised or masked individual 'plays' another part, another being. He is another being.' (Huizinga 1950:13)

When talking about imaginative play, I use the distinction between the 'actual' and the 'imagined' (and the relationship between them), where the 'actual' is of the real world and the 'imagined' is a fictive expansion of that world.

One common use of the term 'imagination' by philosophers centres around the notion that to imagine something is simply to represent in one's mind, or to 'imagine', an 'image as copy' of a pre-existing but absent object. (Ricoeur 1991:118) This is not the sense in which the term is used here. Rather, 'imagination' in this discussion draws on the work of Paul Ricoeur and refers to what has been described by Ricoeur as 'image as fiction'. While, as Ricoeur argues, many philosophers attempt to reduce all imagination as in some way or another arising from simple images that have arisen from previous experience (for example, by claiming that fictions arise from new combinations of these images) this overlooks a key distinction. 'Image as copy' is of an existing thing; it has a real referent, whereas with 'image as fiction' there is no given thing. (Ricoeur 1991:119-120) Even if an 'image as fiction' were to be broken down into parts that could be found in the real world, the new combination would have no such place or corresponding object in the real world. It is therefore a genuine form of unreality. (Ricoeur 1991:120) The reason that Ricoeur is keen to make this

distinction is to show that fictions have a productive element. That is, they do not simply reproduce what is already in the world, but paradoxically through creating something that is 'unreal', fictions ultimately invent and discover something that is a form of reality itself. (Ricoeur 1991:121-3) That is, what fictions produce or create, is not simply a number of 'unreal objects', but also 'an expanded vision of reality'. (Ricoeur 1991:123)

Ricoeur's notion of imagination, as one that transforms and expands on the real world, rather than simply referring to a 'copy' or series of copies of that world, can be aptly applied to children's imaginative play. It helps to explain how imaginative play is an activity that is both creative and productive, and opens up ways of exploring a range of possibilities beyond what exists in the real world and in fact also adds to that world. The imagined may draw on the actual world, but it is more than simply a representation or reproduction of that world. Just as a novel can draw on actual world events and present a story that is explorative and interpretive, rather than an account of what actually happened, so too can a child engage in imaginative play, drawing on actual events in a way that uses interpretation and explores new possibilities. (Harris 2000:27)

A number of theorists have analysed the distinction between a child's play world and the real world. For example, Sutton-Smith, a play theorist, has described imaginative play as belonging to the 'unreal', in contrast with the 'real' world. (Sutton-Smith 1997:127) Huizinga takes a similar line:

> play is not 'ordinary' or 'real' life. It is rather a stepping out of 'real' life into a temporary sphere of activity with a disposition all of its own. (Huizinga 1950:8)

Some theorists, including Huizinga, not only note this distinction but also add that in imaginative play a link is retained to the actual world. In imaginative play a child is absorbed in an imagined world that contains its own meanings, possibilities, rules and order. While the child is transported to an imaginary realm, the child still retains a certain consciousness about the everyday actual world. (Huizinga 1950:14) It acts if you like as a kind of backdrop to the play experience, even though in that experience the child may have a very different sensation of time and space and meaning.

Ricoeur's work shows that there is a sense in which fictions may be considered to be 'unreal', in contrast to the 'real' world of everyday existing objects, and we have seen how this could be applied to imaginative play to draw a distinction between the 'unreal' play world and the 'real' or 'actual' everyday world. However, Ricoeur's work also reveals something more significant, as he brings into the picture the possibility for ongoing influence between these two realms. (Ricoeur 1991:134) Just as reality may influence and inspire the 'imagined', it is in the 'imagined' that a new dimension of experience and reality emerge. (Ricoeur 1991:134) This is helpful as it suggests that it is the interconnections between the 'imagined' and the 'real' worlds, and the way in which they influence and transform each other, rather than their separateness, which arguably provides the key to understanding the significance of children's imaginative play. That is, the fact that the 'actual' can be transformed by the 'imagined' and vice versa, allows us to understand the important role imaginative play has in a child's emerging selfhood. It is not only that the 'imagined' world can draw on events or characters in the 'actual' world, it is also possible that a child's experience of the 'actual' is both different and expanded after the child has engaged in imaginative play. Imaginative play therefore opens up the possibilities for creativity and transformation, not just in the play world, but in everyday life. This is consistent with Riceour's view that fictions expand, rather than simply provide a different version of, reality. It is in this way that imaginative play has an important role in shaping a child's emerging sense of self and understanding of the world around them.

We can further understand the nature of the relationship between the 'actual' and the 'imagined' realms to describe what is happening in imaginative play, if we compare the term 'imagination' to the term 'fantasy'. 'Fantasy' can be said to describe a primarily mental phenomenon in which the person is dissociated from reality. Fantasy is not located in the present, but in a different time and space, and it contains little symbolic value. (Winnicott 1971:26-37) Imagination on the other hand is an embodied activity, located in the here and now (even if there is some distortion of the time/space experience) and it contains much that is symbolic, creative and meaningful. Fantasy suggests dissociation and distance from the 'actual' world in a way that contributes nothing positive back to the 'actual' world. (Winnicott 1971:35) Imagination suggests a meaningful link between the 'actual' and the

'imagined' where each can enrich the other. Understood in this way, even if fantasy were to be considered a form of imagination, it is clearly not the imagination of 'imaginative play' as described here. Fantasy has been described as a 'failure of imagination', and contains nothing of the 'disciplined mental activity' of imagination. (Pateman 1997:6-7)

In summary, imaginative play is an activity that is 'played out' in a sphere that can be distinguished from the 'real' or 'ordinary' world to the extent that involves the creation of fictions and an active embodied engagement with an imagined world with its own rules, order, possibilities and meaning. On the other hand, to emphasise the separateness of the 'imagined' world of imaginative play from the 'real' world is to undervalue the ongoing interaction and influence that occurs between the 'imagined' and the 'real' world and the possibilities for transformation this brings about.

Why is imaginative play important in childhood?

The fact that a child's imaginative play is not simply imitative or a direct representation of 'real world' activity, but has the fictive and creative element described earlier, demonstrates the active power of imaginative play.

Children generally demonstrate imaginative capacity from an early age. Some early childhood theorists, including Piaget, are reluctant to attribute imaginative capacity to children early on. They claim that what we think is children's imaginative play simply involves a reproduction or synthesis of material from the 'actual' events in a child's life, but does not involve any symbolic use of the material. (Harris 2000:26) However, even for children as young as two and perhaps earlier, there is evidence of the capacity to explore, in a fictional way, possible worlds though pretend and narrative play. (Huizinga 1950; Harris 2000:27; Engel 2005) Piaget also argues that children can confuse the boundaries between the real and the imagined. However, there is also evidence to show that children are aware of what is real or imagined, even when they are playing; for example, in play a child may pretend to cook or pretend to kill, with a clear understanding that this is not the actual thing. (Huizinga 1950; Taylor 1989; Harris 2000; Cataldi 2002)

I now turn to some of the number of reasons why imaginative play is important for children. We have already noted the transformative features of imaginative play for the child, and I will briefly explain how this extends to others, including adults who may be with the child during interactive play. I then show how imaginative play fosters understanding of self and others thereby providing a strong foundation for compassion and moral action, as well as how it can build resilience and a growing sense of self-reliance.

In imaginative play a child may play alone or with other children, and at other times with or within the presence adults. Imaginative play therefore often has an interactive dimension, and the child may become engaged in a collaborative and ongoing process of negotiation as to the 'rules' of play. As discussed earlier, it is a child's capacity to move between 'real' and 'imagined' worlds that opens up a space for the child (and other children) to make choices and express preferences that in turn shape their own selfhood. When an adult participates in a child's imaginative play world, such as co-narrator or a subject of stories, the adult may become part of the child's exploration of the world through imaginative play. They might contribute direction and ideas, or they might simply provide a presence that becomes intricately bound up with the play. In this way, imaginative play may provide a site of creative interactivity with adults; a place where both adult and child may be transformed by the experience. (Ginsburg 2007:183) If we (as adults) allow ourselves to be with or around children as they engage in imaginative play (in a way that respects the rules, boundaries and order of the created play space and where an adult presence is welcome), or if we become active and responsive partners in children's story telling, then we potentially open up a space where we can better understand how a child sees things. By being with children, we can also reach a greater self understanding. (Suissa 2006:73) It may, for example, help us to retain something 'childlike' in our own way of being in the world which in turn will bring a richness to our experience whether through memories of childhood that may be revived, our greater understanding of children or simply a chance to break away from the 'tendency to over-seriousness' that threatens our own capacity to play. (Huizinga 1950:211; Smith 1992; Shields 1998:379) Imaginative play therefore provides an important site through which a greater understanding between child and adult can emerge.

Another reason why imaginative play is important is that it allows children to explore the notion of 'otherness', to be other 'selves', to situate ones 'self' in varying roles and to explore possibilities of how to live with others, thus providing a strong foundation for moral life. In imaginative play a child is free to imagine what other beings feel or experience and to draw on endless possibilities for how people may interact or respond in certain situations. If we look at Martha Nussbaum's analysis of narrative play (as a form of imaginative play) and its role in emotional life, a number of significant features emerge:

> Storytelling and narrative play are essential in cultivating the child's sense of her own aloneness, her inner world. ... As time goes on, this play deepens the inner world; it becomes a place for individual creative effort and hence for trusting differentiation of self from the world. (Nussbaum 2001:236)

The influence of Winnicott is evident here in terms of understanding the child's capacity to 'be alone' as that which relies on the presence of a significant other (such as the mother) and the security of her presence even when she is not there. I describe in more detail the significance of this later in the chapter.

Understood in this way, narrative play provides a place where it is all right to be imperfect, to make mistakes and even to play the 'bad guy', without experiencing the full consequences that might otherwise be felt in the 'real' world. In this way a child can work through how different types of actions might make different people feel. A child may for example come to understand the pain they may have caused to another, and ways of healing this. (Nussbaum 2001:237) This can contribute to the development of an empathic capacity that opens up an avenue for expressing care and concern for others, and an appreciation of difference amongst people; themes I return to in Chapter 6. Links are often drawn between imaginative play and the fostering of such qualities as compassion and empathy because of how imaginative play provides opportunities to learn and 'test out' ways of being with others. (Nussbaum 2001:427) This is another way in which imaginative play can influence the lives of others around a child, thus having a transformative impact that is widely felt.

There is also evidence that engaging in imaginative play can help a child to develop resilience and self reliance. Imaginative play not only helps a child develop a better understanding of themselves and others, it also gives the child confidence in themselves to handle a range of situations that then arise in the 'actual' world. When in the 'actual' world, the child can draw strength on their play experience and not fall into a sense of helplessness and depression. (Nussbaum 2001:237) It is on this view that narrative play builds resilience as well as an understanding of others. This confidence comes from the child's capacity to 'be alone', and as mentioned above imaginative play is important for developing a child's sense of this 'aloneness' and of his/her own 'inner world'. (Nussbaum 2001:208) The role of creative play in protecting children against 'the effects of pressure and stress' is becoming more widely acknowledged, with some health professionals suggesting that it is important to consider whether the rise in childhood mental health concerns, including depression, may in part at least be to do with a lifestyle that allows less opportunities for child-centred, creative play. (Ginsburg 2007:184)

In summary, the value of imaginative play is that it provides a site where a child can interact with others in a way that allows for self transformation of the child and others. It also provides a child with a basis for understanding themselves and others, building a foundation for the development of empathy and compassion. Above all, it provides the child with confidence and resilience in the activities and situations that arise in the 'real' world.

Barriers to imaginative play

Many commentators have noted that, in practice very little is required for children to engage in imaginative play. Children will find spaces for imaginative play even in difficult, barren and challenging environments such as war zones, poverty-stricken areas of cities and remote communities where children are required to work long hours. (Holloway and Valentine 2000:12; Punch 2000:57) Based on the features already discussed, it is possible to see how through play a child has an opportunity to explore and reinterpret 'real' world happenings in a way that helps them to understand and become more resilient in the face of difficult times. Some have described children in this sense as play 'opportunists'. (Jones 2000:42) In a study of families in rural Bolivia, where labour needs are high and all children above the age of 5 are expected to work and contribute to the survival of the household, children use a number

of strategies to create more play time. (Punch 2000:49) In this situation, children have little free time to play, but they have much autonomy to move about spaces on their own, as 'they would go to the hillsides with animals and to the river to fetch water', usually alone and without seeking permission from their parents. (Punch 2000:54) Children therefore 'devise ways of extending [play] time by combining play with work' by singing songs, playing in the river or delaying their return home. (Punch 2000:57) These examples provide evidence of the resilience of children's capacity to make creative and playful spaces in environments that might be limited in other ways.

Yet, despite being 'play opportunists', there is at the same time a fragility to a child's imaginative play. It could be easily broken or fragmented, if the time and space for imaginative play is restricted or interrupted, or if a child's relationships with others does not provide them with a supportive environment: that is, a 'potential space in which, because of trust, the child may creatively play'. (Winnicott 1971:109) Here I explore some of the factors that may limit opportunities for imaginative play including: a lack of time available for child-directed play activity; a tendency for the spaces children inhabit to become more fixed and rigid; and situations where the relational environment needed to build a child's confidence and trust may fail to be nourished to the detriment of a child's creative potential. Across these three areas I also consider what impact the use surveillance technologies might have on a child's imaginative play opportunities. That is, I ask can the use of these technologies nurture and sustain the time, spaces and supportive environment required for a rich play environment, or is there evidence to suggest that they might inhibit creative play opportunities?

As noted earlier, imaginative play requires time. However, there are a number of trends that indicate the time available for (child-directed) play appears to be decreasing. In many cultural and social demographics, a child's time is increasingly filled with other more structured, less open, less flexible and more adult-directed types of activities such as after school lessons or training sessions. (Ginsburg 2007) One rationale here appears to be that in order to conform or be successful at a range of activities or skills, a child must spend less time 'doing nothing', or simply 'playing', but rather must be focused on learning the activity at hand. (Ginsburg 2007) Within school hours, the time available for recess has markedly

decreased during the past decade. (Patte 2006; Ginsburg 2007:183) In some cultures children face an increasingly tightly scheduled home life as well. Parents rush a child from one scheduled activity to the next, and some spend the child's 'spare' time tutoring the child to make sure they can compete in the wider world. Even where time for play is acknowledged as valuable, this is often only in terms of the 'educational' value it carries with it (as measured according to adult expectations). (Shields 1998:369) Further:

> It sometimes seems as if not just parents but children themselves have consequently become convinced that they must be *doing* things the whole time. (Suissa 2006:73)

This debate highlights how, in some parts of the world at least, a child's experience may potentially become so structured and adult-directed that it may be difficult for a child to find time for child-directed, imaginative play.

Given that a child requires time to engage in imaginative play, and that there appears to be a trend towards decreased time for such play in some areas, what impact might an increased surveillance presence have on the time permitted for child-directed play activity? One feature of a child's play time that may be under threat is the time for simply hanging out (either alone or with friends); a time for simply 'doing nothing'. Rather than being a time of boredom, this is a child's time for searching, for change, for an 'unfolding of things' to do or to come. Children 'doing nothing' have been described as 'poets waiting for their muse'. (Aitken 2001:16 quoting Denis Wood) It is these moments of childhood that may be harder to find in a 'space of surveillance'. The second way in which a child's time for play may change through an increased use of surveillance technologies is that the adult-directed presence may result in less time available for a child to engage in child-directed imaginative play. I will briefly show how these two effects might arise.

There seems to be certain characteristics of a surveillance presence that threaten the very notion of a child simply 'doing nothing'. Two examples illustrate this point. In the first, a real scenario, a group of young male teenagers was captured on CCTV 'standing still' in the main street. It was purely the fact of their 'standing still' rather than walking through the town as others usually did that alerted the CCTV operator's attention and led them to call

the police to investigate. (Neyland 2006:19-47) As another example, one of the latest GPS tracking devices now measures and reports to the parent exactly when, and for how long, a child stops in a particular location, including address details if relevant. (TrackMyKids) In both cases, the use of technology means childhood moments of 'doing nothing' are now subject to data capture and scrutiny by adults who in turn may place their own judgement on the non-activity as 'suspicious' or a 'waste of time'. The use of surveillance technologies may provide adults with 'data' about a child's activity (and non-activity). While this is unlikely to reveal details of a child's 'inner world', it potentially threatens the nourishment of that world by failing to acknowledge the value of moments of freedom and privacy for doing (what may appear to be) 'nothing'. This is the time when a child can take off down the streets, to explore in ways of their own without having to account to adults for their activities, and it is this kind of 'doing' that requires a degree of freedom. (Aitken 2001:16)

Surveillance technologies can reduce a child's time for child-directed play activity through the fact that the surveillance imposes an adult-structured framework. That is, in a 'space of surveillance' an adult-based agenda is brought to a child's activity via the potential adult gaze. This may mean reduced time where the child has the privacy to play on their own or with other children; whether this be within the home or in public spaces. One important feature of imaginative play is that it provides an important site to make mistakes, and explore alternative courses of action and thought. Providing a child with periods of time where they can play in privacy and free of judgement is necessary if the child is to explore, to be daring and to test out new ideas. (Morris 2000:333) Imaginative play is also where the messy and 'deliciously chaotic' 'stuff' of childhood is played out 'energised by absent-minded reveries that happily fuse the real and the imagined'. (Philo 2003:19) If play is recorded or monitored using a surveillance device, then this has the potential to change the dynamic and transitional status of imaginative play from a private world and 'work in progress', to something viewable, final and open to the judgement of others. The changes that surveillance technologies bring to a child's play spaces are therefore likely to make it more difficult, if not impossible, for a child to find opportunities and moments for child-directed, imaginative play.

It is possible therefore to see how the time available for a child to engage in imaginative play may be restricted as surveillance technologies are increasingly imposed on children's play sites and the spaces children move about in.

I now turn to the second of the potential barriers to imaginative play, that being the fact that the spaces children inhabit are becoming less conducive to open and free-form play activities. There is evidence that children's play spaces are changing. In the discipline of geography, increasing attention is being given to the nature of children's play spaces in both public and private spheres. In an analysis of the interaction between adult and child geographies, Owain Jones uncovers some of the ways in which children are able to form their own geographies in spaces that are largely established via adult agendas. (Jones 2000:30) Jones observes that the spaces children encounter come with varying degrees of flexibility and rigidity in terms of what the child can make of that space, and notes that children will tend to imaginatively construct their own worlds in any given space. However, he goes on to argue that there are environments that allow children to construct such worlds in a way that is 'satisfying to them'. (Jones 2000:39) To make this comparison, Jones compares monomorphic spaces (single use) to polymorphic spaces (spaces which permit alternative uses by children). While a monomorphic space (such as busy roads and gardens that are 'too precious for children') will exclude the possibility of other uses, polymorphic spaces (such as hay barns and forests) sustain alternate uses by children. Jones' work is focused on a rural community, hence the nature of the examples. An equivalent analysis using monomorphic and polymorphic spaces can however also be given in an urban setting. The high polymorphicity of some urban spaces is illustrated through the following recollection of childhood, where for this writer:

> The Wilderness of Childhood ... had nothing to do with trees or nature. I could lose myself on vacant lots and playgrounds, in the alleyway ... the neighbour's yards and on sidewalks. (Chabon 2009)

The distinction between polymorphic and monomorphic space is helpful in understanding the types of play spaces that will foster children's imaginative play opportunities. If children are to have a chance to express and create their own worlds, Jones argues, they need spaces

that permit both 'access and diversity', where the diversity does not just refer to different types of spaces, but also to spaces that change over time. The presence of loose objects as manipulable play objects is also seen as an important part of the creative possibilities offered to the child in any play environment. (Jones 2000:40) Even though children will often necessarily find themselves in spaces dominated by adult agendas, it nonetheless remains possible for children to find spaces for imaginative play, provided that these spaces can be 'permeable, heterogeneous and tolerant of otherness'. (Jones 2000:30)

The relevant question in this context therefore becomes: When surveillance is introduced into a particular space, does this alter the extent to which the space will support multiple uses and therefore flexibility and heterogeneity for children's play? My argument here is that there are uses of surveillance technology that may in fact render a space more rigid and less open to multiple uses, hence revealing a tendency for the increasing use of these technologies to create spaces that are monomorphic rather than polymorphic. This may occur in a number of ways. The fact that surveillance technologies are primarily an adult-driven construction, and are usually applied in a one-size-fits-all way, means they bring with them pre-defined expectations on behaviour in that space. This may result in sites that encourage conforming and homogenous behaviour, and to this extent close off some opportunities that might otherwise be open in the space. A child who is aware that they might set off a tracking device alarm if they stray too far or to an out-of-bounds zone, is likely to be more conservative about how they use and explore the space around them rather than pushing the boundaries and potential that the space might otherwise have offered. Also, a surveillance presence may result in a child feeling anxious; for example, if they wonder whether they have spent too much time in a particular place or with certain friends, or whether they are being watched, recorded or judged at any point in time. The experience of anxiety changes how the child may make use of the space around them for play activities, and there is evidence to suggest that when a child is anxious this can prevent a child from playing. (Engel 2005:107) To the extent that a surveillance presence induces anxiety in a child, then it reduces the flexibility and openness of that space for imaginative play activity. This is because:

> Imagination frequently fails us when the space we are given in which to exercise it ... creates a sense of anxiety rather than a sense of opportunity. We become paralysed, cannot utilize the opportunities offered us, and look around for something to hang on to. (Pateman 1997:4)

The final barrier to imaginative play that I will consider here are the consequences that arise if the interactions and relationships a child has with others do not support and nurture opportunities for imaginative play. We saw above that a number of the benefits for the child arising from imaginative play come from the interactive and collaborative elements of the play activity. At the same time we also noted the benefits of play activity that is 'child-directed' needs to be supported, not by over-protective mechanisms of control, but by an environment that provides a child with sufficient security and confidence in their capacity to 'be alone'. This is precisely the theme that emerges from the work of Winnicott on children and play, and which has been referred to briefly earlier in this thesis. Winnicott discusses the environment that is required for the child to develop a 'capacity to be alone'; first of all 'alone in the presence of mother' and then gradually to a possible physical aloneness, but one that retains a relational element of the shadow of the earlier holding object (such as the child's mother). In this 'holding' environment, a child feels secure and therefore able to explore the world. (Winnicott 1990; Nussbaum 2001:208) It is this sense of safety, and the 'trust and reliability' it brings, that creates a 'potential space' as:

> One that can become an infinite area of separation, which the baby, child, adolescent, adult may creatively fill with playing. (Winnicott 1971:108)

It is in this space that a child can have the confidence for creative play, and it also explains how a lack of confidence in this 'potential space' can cramp a child's play capacity. (Winnicott 1971:109)

Drawing on Winnicott, it is possible to see how a child's trust and confidence in their relationships with significant others holds the key to a child having a rich and creative play life. To create this environment requires a 'good enough' mother (or significant other) who is able to adapt to the infant/child's needs and reduce this adapting as the child becomes

able to deal with them. (Winnicott 1971:10) This concept brings us to the heart of one of the underlying themes of this research. That is, how do we as adults balance a child's need for care, protection and guidance, against the child's equally growing need to develop independence and to explore and make their own life choices? Looking at this issue in the context of imaginative play is helpful in that it reveals some of what is at stake if children are over-protected or over-directed; that is, if we fail to reduce the extent to which we 'adapt' to a child's needs even when they are able to tolerate this.

Nussbaum points out that 'facilitating environments' are created 'not only by individual parents, but also by customs, institutions and laws'. (Nussbaum 2001:227) On this basis, it becomes possible to see how it is not just a child's early relational experiences that shape or open opportunities for creative play, but that this is also determined by the wider 'environment' that a child finds themselves within. In this context we can question, from yet another perspective, how the use of surveillance technology might potentially impact on a child's opportunity for imaginative play. That is, does the increasing use of surveillance technologies by parents, institutions, businesses and governments reflect a 'facilitating environment' or 'potential space' that allows a child to play in a creative and imaginative way? On the basis that surveillance technologies introduce an (absent) 'other' into a child's play space, and to the extent that this may not be needed to protect or care for the child, then arguably the 'space of surveillance' will be overly controlling and therefore not conducive to encouraging a child's imaginative play activity. Furthermore, the relationship of the 'other' in the space may be unclear, making it difficult for a child to have trust and confidence in light of the watcher's (absent) presence. Also, once again, where the controls imposed by the surveillance are not necessary, then imaginative play might not even get started if there is no sense of possible 'aloneness' in the first place. All of these factors suggest that a child's opportunity to engage in imaginative play, and reap the benefits that flow from this, may be severely limited in a 'space of surveillance'. As such spaces become more predominant in a child's life, they may therefore pose a barrier to imaginative play if thought is not given to the impact on the time, space and environment that a child needs to allow such play to flourish.

It is important to note that there are some circumstances, such as when surveillance technologies are not working or where the technologies invite alternative creative uses, where a child may be able to subvert the aims of the technologies and use the technology to expand play activities in a creative way and on their own terms. In such cases children may draw on their skills as 'play opportunists' to use the technologies as an extension of their play space in a way that promotes imaginative play. This is theme I develop more fully in Chapter 7 where I consider how the overly controlling features of surveillance technologies might be resisted or overcome.

In conclusion, imaginative play is engaged in by children from a very young age. It has a unique and transformative role in a child's understanding of self and others by opening up the possibility for feedback and interaction between the 'real' and the 'imagined'. There is evidence that this type of play builds an understanding of self and others, promoting empathy and compassion. It also builds resilience and confidence for the child in their 'real' world encounters. Despite the fact that children are 'play opportunists', seizing time and space for play and others to play with whenever possible, there are barriers that can threaten opportunities for play. In considering how these barriers might impact on childhood play activity, it becomes clear that one impact of an increased use of surveillance technologies across children's play spaces may be that children will miss out on creative play opportunities and the benefits these bring.

Chapter 4 – Stories of self – Narrative, memory and a child's sense of identity

The focus of this chapter is to explore the significance of narrative and memory in a child's emerging sense of self and identity. I use a narrative approach to selfhood in order to explain how a child's understanding of self is formed through the stories that both the child and others tell about them. I also expand on the role of memory within this approach and consider the role of remembering and forgetting in the way a child constructs their own life story. Using this as a basis, I then analyse how the introduction of surveillance practices into a child's day-to-day activity can impact on the way a child may come to understand and tell their own life 'story'. I argue that as surveillance technologies become more widely used in childhood spaces, the possibilities for a child in terms of the story they wish to tell or wish others to tell about them may be affected, with potentially detrimental consequences for the child's emerging sense of self and identify.

There are several ways surveillance technologies might impact on a child's narrative understanding of self. The fact that a surveillance presence may change how and when a child interacts with others, for example by removing interactivity from some situations, could have an impact. This is because the development of narrative and the practice of storytelling often take place when people interact with others. Another area where a surveillance presence might have an impact is if it leads a child to contemplate the 'story' the records of surveillance may 'tell' in a way that undermines the story a child wishes to tell and to have told, or in a way that unnecessarily constrains a child's behaviour as they attempt to conform to an expectation of a story that might be told. Finally, because surveillance practices bring with them new possibilities for recording, preserving and even altering information collected about a child's life, this may impact on the way a child comes to remember and forget the past and in turn the child's sense of self and understanding of who they are. Surveillance records when replayed or viewed are only a partial contributor to a child's memory. Yet, because these records are often presented as a 'complete' or 'truthful' version of past events, they may come to dominate a child's memory to the detriment of other ways of remembering.

A narrative approach to selfhood and identity in childhood

In the previous chapter, I argued that imaginative play provides a key site for the child to be an active and creative part of the transformation of their own world and of others around them. That is, a child explores possibilities in imaginative play which transform and extend the possibilities for the child's life in the 'actual' world. In that discussion, it emerged that storytelling plays a key role in a child's growing understanding of self and others. It is the role of storytelling, both within and outside the play realm, which is expanded on here. In particular, I will look at the way in which children tell stories about themselves and how these stories can form the basis of a child's own understanding of self and others. I argue that if we view the child subject within a 'narrative' style approach to identity, this can provide a promising avenue for understanding a child's emerging sense of self and the role of storytelling in this process. A child's stories about themselves are inevitably intertwined with stories of, about and by others. These stories will often form part of, or be revealed through, stories about other things and events. They will also be situated in a particular context, place and time, and may form part of a fluid interplay with the stories that emerge in a child's imaginative play. All of these interactive and contextual elements of storytelling are provided for in the narrative approach, as I explain below.

The type of narrative under discussion here is the story a child, and others, will tell about the child's life experiences and actions. This form of narrative is often called 'historical' narrative in order to distinguish it from 'fictional' narrative which involves a story of fiction. It seems inevitable that there will often be an overlap between these two types of narrative. A child's narrative may well involve imaginative and highly subjective elements, just as fictional narrative will often draw on actual and past events to construct a story. It is acknowledged that while the primary aim of this chapter is to focus on 'historical narrative' it may not always be possible or desirable to separate the 'fictive' and 'historical' elements of a person's life story.

The so-called 'narrative' approach to understanding human identity has been widely discussed in philosophy, psychology, literary studies and many other disciplines. Although there is no single 'narrative theory' and in fact a range of approaches abound there are

some common themes that can be loosely brought together under what may be described as a 'narrative' approach to selfhood.

A narrative can be described as an account of events (whether about people, places and things) and experiences. An important feature is that a narrative account will follow a temporal sequence where events are causally connected in some way, thus providing some continuity or intelligible way of making links between one action and the next. (Engel 1995:19; Atkins 2004:343) A narrative account will also include a person's intentions (to act) and something about the context in which the action takes place. Thus, a single stand-alone description of an act with no context, and no links to other actions or events and no account of why/how the act occurred, would not constitute a narrative account. (MacIntyre 1985:208-212) According to Riceour, what distinguishes the narrative model of identity from other models is the fact that the events are interconnected through a 'plot', and it is through this connection that an identity of 'character' is constructed. (Ricoeur 1992:140-1) This construction is a dynamic process that is characterised by 'demand for concordance and the admission of discordances', bringing together a demand for order of the story being told and the potential for instability that threatens this order arising from chance events. (Ricoeur 1992:141-2) For Riceour, it is only through this dynamic narrative, and the experiences which unfold, that the identity of character can be understood. (Ricoeur 1992:147-8)

Narratives are often told or recounted as stories to others, and with and by others. To talk of a 'narrative model of identity' is to claim that the way we come to understand or think about ourselves takes this type of narrative form. (Atkins 2004:343) Some suggest further, that it is only through narrative that our actions become intelligible. (MacIntyre 1985:210) According to Alasdair MacIntyre, without narrative, we are left with no basis on which to make sense of individual human actions. We need some idea of the intention, causal relations and context surrounding an action, in order to make the action intelligible. Without this, we would be unable to shed any light on how we come to understand our lives and the lives of those around us. (MacIntyre 1985:208-212)

This view is supported by Charles Taylor's work on modern notions of what it is to be a person or self. He claims that it is a:

> basic condition of making sense of ourselves, that we grasp our lives in a *narrative*. ... our lives exist in this space of questions that only a coherent narrative can answer. In order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a notion of how we have become, and of where we are going. (Taylor 1989:47)

It is this idea of expressing 'how we have become, and where we are going' that is reflected in a narrative approach.

One prominent view under the narrative approach to understanding the self is that a person is not just an actor, but an author. (MacIntyre 1985:213; Kearney 1996:36; Atkins 2004:342) In this sense, the individual is viewed as a creative and active agent who, through narrative, is able to make sense of, and to shape, oneself and one's place in the world. Individuals do this through the way they recount or explain actions and events to themselves and others around them. The narrative shapes where we have been and where we are going next. Adriana Cavarero takes a slightly different angle, by claiming that we are not so much the 'author' of our life-story or the 'product' of that story, but rather that we 'coincide' with the narrative in a way that places us within the 'actual' narrative impulse. (Cavarero 2000:35) Cavarero expresses how we understand our selves through narrative as that 'familiar sense' of being narratable:

> I know that I have a story and that I consist in this story even when I do not pause to recount it to myself, 're-living' through the memory some episodes through a sort of interior monologue. I could nevertheless not know myself to be narratable unless I were not always already interwoven into the autobiographical text of this story. (Cavarero 2000:35)

Cavarero also makes the point that, although each individual has a life that is 'narratable', about which a story can be told, 'life cannot be lived like a story, because the story always comes afterwards'. (Cavarero 2000:3) So, just because our life can be told in a narrative, does not mean we should live as though in anticipation of the story that will come after it.

Our sense of self comes from knowing that we are 'narratable' and furthermore we have a 'desire for this narration' and the 'unity this tale confers to our identity'. (Kottman 2006:xvii)

There appears at least to be an agreed sense, despite the different views on how this comes about, that narrative provides a form of coherence and unity to human life and human identity. Narrative is how we make sense of our 'whole' lives. (MacIntyre 1985:219; Taylor 1989:50) The coherence and intelligibility provided for under a narrative approach to the self should not be mistaken for a fixed and rigid view of the self. Through narrative I might 'project my life forward' or 'endorse the existing direction or give it a new one'. (Taylor 1989:48) Yet, this is not to say that the narrative in anyway 'fixes' the future, or 'tells the whole story'; far from it. That the future remains unpredictable, unforeseeable and open is required by the narrative structure. (MacIntyre 1985:215; Cavarero 2000:3) If there is coherence, it is not because the individual remains static and the same over time. Rather, to adopt Benhabib's approach, the narrative model of identity:

> does not mean 'sameness in time' but rather the capacity to generate meaning over time so as to hold past, present, and future together. (Benhabib 1999:353)

The meaning of human identity is not grasped within a set 'beginning, unfolding, and ending' but rather it is grasped through a capacity to go on, 'to retell, to re-member, to reconfigure'. (Benhabib 1999:348) This reveals how narratives are both creative and open ended. The other reason narratives can never be closed, is that they are always intertwined with the narratives of others. This happens not just because others are the subject of my story, but because they also tell 'stories which compete with my own, unsettle my self-understanding, and spoil my attempts to mastermind my own narrative'. (Benhabib 1999:348) Or, as MacIntyre points out 'we are never more … than the co-authors of our narratives'. (MacIntyre 1985:213) Our narratives always involve others in some way or other:

> I am part of their story, as they are part of mine. The narrative of any one life is part of an interlocking set of narratives. (MacIntyre 1985:218)

The very tale of each person's birth can only come to the person through a narration told by others. (Cavarero 2000:39)

Narratives on the one hand allow a person to make sense of oneself and one's life, bringing a sense of continuity of the self over time, and on the other they are a source of continual change and creativity. We may not choose the narratives we are born into, or the cultural and historical context in which we find ourselves, nonetheless, under a narrative model of self we can be said to be an active human agent:

> Our agency consists in our capacity to weave out of those narratives and fragments of narratives a life story that makes sense for us, as unique individual selves. (Benhabib 1999:344)

Another important point to note here is the link between narrative identity and ethical life. As mentioned above, it is through narrative that we project ourselves forward into an unknown future; one that we actively shape as we go. For some, this does not just mean in the trivial sense of what a person will do in the next few minutes, but in the much more meaningful sense of how a person comes to understand the longer term moral progress of the self. (MacIntyre 1985; Taylor 1989:49) While most agree that a narrative view of self provides a form of coherence and unity to the self, there are differences of opinion as to how narrative contributes to an 'ethical' self. Taylor suggests that narrative involves an orientation of the self towards a sense of moral good. (Taylor 1989:52) On the other hand, Seyla Benhabib insists that it is possible to have 'self identity without moral integrity', revealing a view that moral life may be a possible but not necessary condition of the self coherence that the narrative approach brings about. (Benhabib 1999:346) Rather, when applying a narrative view of the self, Benhabib argues that 'it is not what the story is about that matters but, rather, one's ability to keep telling a story'. (Benhabib 1999:347) This is similar to Cavarero's approach, who claims that it is not the contents of the narrative that matters, but the fact that the person understands themselves as a 'narratable' self, for the life story is already what the person is and what they have exposed to the world through their existence in the world. (Cavarero 2000:36) Riceour's view is that it is the richness of the narratives themselves that contributes as a way of anticipating and thinking about ethical

matters; that is, in telling a story we open up a space for thinking about moral issues. (Ricoeur 1992:170)

Despite this range of views on how a narrative approach contributes to the ethical dimension of selfhood, I suggest that when it comes to understanding moral development in children there is a consistent feature of the narrative approach that provides some insight. This is that there is an ethical dimension to the interactive and social features of a narrative approach to selfhood. Under the narrative view of identity, we are inter-subjective beings who come to understand the world and others around us via narrative. That is:

> the self acquires its identity in large part by receiving other's narrative and re-narrating itself in turn to others. (Kearney 1996:36)

The nature of narrative is 'fundamentally communicative' and involves 'saying something to someone about something'. (Kearney 1996:34) It helps us to understand others and to understand 'oneself as another'. (Ricoeur 1992) Through this we can develop a capacity to understand others who may be different to ourselves, and therefore to empathise with them. (Kearney 1996:45) Empathy is generally understood as the imaginative reconstruction of another person's feelings or experience. (Meyers 1994:33; Nussbaum 2001:302) To the extent that through narrative we are invited into the stories and lives of others, and that we recount our own narrative to others in response to their questions, the opportunity for greater understanding and 'imagining' how other people feel and think in certain situations is greatly enhanced. (Kearney 1996:35) It is in this way that narrative, through enhancing empathy, allows us to identify situations that 'call for a moral response' or where there might be 'morally significant considerations'. (Meyers 1994:26)

The narrative model allows us to understand ourselves as inextricably intertwined with the lives of others; a view that 'stresses otherness and the fluidity of the boundaries between the self and others'. (Benhabib 1999:351) At the same time, it provides a way to understand how the self is constituted in a way that is coherent and meaningful, without being determined and fixed. Within what can broadly be described as a 'narrative approach' to understanding the 'self', there are some important differences, some of which have been

highlighted above. There are also some common themes that provide a useful starting point for understanding child subjectivity.

There are a number of reasons why I suggest that the narrative approach provides an account of self that clearly articulates, and does justice to, the 'self' of the child. It provides a central role for a child's interactivity with, and dependence on, others. It acknowledges the contextual and embodied environment a child finds themselves within. Perhaps most significantly, it supports an active and creative notion of a child as a self who 'desires' to tell and has a story to tell that is uniquely his/her own. A child's developing understanding and sense they make of themselves and others is integrally bound up with the stories they and others tell. Given that story telling is an important way that children come to understand themselves and the world around them, then what is at work is arguably a narrative view of the self.

To the extent that children are born into a world where actions have an intentional, temporal and contextual dimension, they cannot help but make sense of themselves and others in a narrative form. As noted earlier, we are active human agents and through the very act of exposing ourselves to others and interacting with others, we reveal who we are through a story that is uniquely our own. (Cavarero 2000) A child does not simply find themselves in a 'narrative' that, together with others, emerges around them in a fixed and determined way. Rather, a child finds themselves from the time they are born in a world of interactivity, where the growing sense of self comes from the stories that are told about them by both themselves and others. A child's uniqueness:

> Has no need of a form that plans or contains it. Rooted in the unmasterable flux of a constitutive exposition, she is saved from the bad habit of prefiguring herself, and from the vice of prefiguring the lives of others. The figure, the unity of the design ... if it comes only comes afterwards. (Cavarero 2000:144)

It is this openness and sense of unknown possibilities, together with a way of coming to understand the self through the telling of stories by and for others, that perhaps best captures how a child faces the world and comes to understand who they are in the world.

In recent times, there has been much interest in the stories children tell, and the way in which these stories are told. (Engel 1995; Fivush 2008) Of particular interest is the way children rarely tell stories in isolation. Rather they tell stories with others, whether friends, carers or family. Stories are therefore collaborative and often co-constructed. Even in very early childhood (for example 1-2 year olds), communication between infant and parent is often elaborated by the parent, and this feedback often helps to interpret the child's actions or intentions thereby giving shape to how the child understands those intentions. (Engel 1995:27,119) As the child gets older, parent-child conversations, such as those that involve reminiscing about the past, are increasingly co-constructed with substance contributed from both parties, and perhaps even negotiation over differences. In children's friendships it is often collaborative story telling that guides play or social interactions with others. (Engel 1995:52) It is through stories that children make emotional and social sense of the world, as well as how they come to understand their own place in the world. Story telling allows a child to 'imagine, picture and dwell on' a self in the past and into the future. (Engel 1995:55)

Some have argued that it is possible to foster narrative development in children though developing a child's confidence and joy in telling stories. Children can then 'exploit storytelling and story writing as a means of constructing and communicating experience and ideas'. (Engel 1995:207) Engel proposes a number of practical suggestions for parents and carers on how to foster a love and capacity for telling stories. These include: listen to children attentively; respond substantively to the child; collaborate in story-telling; provide multiplicity and diversity in voices and styles of how stories are told; encourage a range of story forms; and allow stories about things that matter. (Engel 1995:209-18) If we consider the earlier discussion on a narrative approach to understanding self, then it seems likely that these types of practical suggestions would open up ways for a child's experience to be enriched by the stories that are told, or that a child desires to be told, about themselves and others around them. In fostering a love for telling and being told stories, a child has a foundation from which to understand themselves and others; each as unique 'narratable' beings about whom there is a story to be told.

Remembering and forgetting

Before turning to the type of impact surveillance technologies may have on a child's sense of self, where this is based on the telling of stories by the child and others, I will briefly consider the role of remembering and forgetting within the context of a narrative view of selfhood. The focus here is on the context of remembering and forgetting *as a child*, rather than on a more common context for this discussion which is reminiscing on our childhood from an adult point of view.

The narrative model of identity provides one way in which a person can 'make sense' of the notion of self. That is, we can understand ourselves as a 'self' existing through time, and we can make connections between past and present in a way that sheds light on understanding the self and others. We do not live with complete knowledge of our past, but rather with what is remembered, retold or reshaped in the context of a narrative in the present.

> Personal memory, intentionally or otherwise, can in fact therefore go on forgetting, re-elaborating, selecting and censuring the episodes of the story that it recounts. Memory nevertheless rarely *invents*, as do the inventors of stories. (Cavarero 2000:36)

Despite the fact that memory is not always trustworthy, it is impossible to escape from the fact that 'I am always the *self* of my narrating memory'. (Cavarero 2000:36) Remembering, therefore, is important because it helps us to make sense of ourselves and our past in the present. Recall that Taylor argued that memories are part of understanding 'how we have become'. (Taylor 1989:47) Without memories, we would be creatures of the present only, with nothing to link us to where we have come from. Without memory, we would have no awareness of ourselves as a 'self' existing through and over time.

It is argued that, at a fairly early age (usually well before the age of 2), a child becomes aware that they have a past, and the memory of that past as it is recalled and discussed becomes part of the child's present experience. (Engel 1995:124) Even from birth, in early infancy there is evidence to suggest that children have ways of 'remembering'. As one example, the recent work on the role of 'mirror neurons' in childhood development explains how young

infants mirror or mimic adult behaviour and facial expressions as a way of learning. A child uses information built up from previous mirror neuron encounters, and this provides a way of 'remembering' earlier events. (Gallese 2003) I return to the role of 'mirror neurons' in child development in Chapter 6.

When we remember, we are not simply involved in a factual recollection of events as they occurred at some time in the past. The process of remembering is just as much a construction as it is a retrieval of the past. (Engel 1999:6) As part of a story told to, with, or by others, a memory may be strengthened, reinforced or given prominence. The influence of others on our memory is powerful. Children in particular often interact with others when it comes to remembering. Remembering is a selective process, where certain fragments, events, experiences or feelings are recalled and recounted, while others are not. Memory can be voluntary or involuntary. (Warnock 1987:92) It can be fleeting or a result of a laboured activity to recall something. It nonetheless remains a partial and subjective recollection of the past, and indeed the very site in which a memory is brought to the present involves a particular, situated context.

One important role of stories is that they help to preserve the memory of actions and deeds of the past, and to 'inspire admiration in the present and in future ages'. (Arendt 1998:197) Without narratives, and people to recount and record them, there would be no memory of many past events, they would simply be forgotten. In traditions that rely on oral storytelling, stories are passed down through generations. At times, children will therefore draw on cultural, social or familial memories as they become closely tied in with the child's own memories. Many stories or 'memories' from a distant past transform into myth and legend, and these stories can play a formative part of a child's emerging sense of self.

Memory is therefore a rich source of how we come to understand the self. It combines recollection with and by others of wider cultural 'memories', and an individual's own recollections, bringing them together as an important part of a child's narrative of self. Understood in this way, memory is much more than simply a factual recollection of events, but rather is a context and meaning laden process closely tied to an individual's own experiences and encounters in the world. A memory is not something that can be conceived

of as an objective and abstract fact about the past, because it inevitably involves some selectivity and interpretation of past events that are recalled. These features of memory also highlight the significant role that memory has in shaping our narratives of self.

At a time when we are confronted with many new ways to capture, store and archive in ever-more increasing detail the minutiae of our day-to-day life, it is important to consider exactly what this information is being kept for and how it might impact on our memories and how we remember. We live in an era when people strive to increase their memory power, and to find new ways to uncover lost or hidden memories. While some of these activities are controversial - such as psychological attempts to recover memories that might have been repressed due to traumatic circumstances - they nonetheless reveal a deep fascination with the role of memory and the notion that bringing memories to the fore will reveal new and valuable insights. (Neisser 1994:2)

Despite the value of remembering discussed above, it is important to consider whether there are situations when 'remembering' is not a constructive activity, and whether there might be value in forgetting as well. We should also ask: Does the growing collection and storage of detailed information about our lives actually contribute to a 'better' memory, or might it be to the detriment to other ways of remembering?

Part of what drives the narrative approach to identity is a view of an individual with a capacity to move forward as an active and creative human agent, and this can help to point to some of the limits of the value of remembering. There may, for example, be times when our memories become so focused on a particular incident or action that it is difficult to draw ourselves away from the past; we 'look back' at the expense of moving forward. Just as remembering is important if we are to make sense of our life story, it is also important to be able to 'forget' in order to move forward and in order to shape our own story. This, as Nietzsche observes, is part of the key in learning how to employ history for the purpose of life. (Nietzsche 1983:66) According to Nietzsche, there is no doubt that history is needed for life in the present and the future, but too much history, where knowledge is simply accumulated for knowledge's sake, can lead to life degenerating and weakening, and can take away from a strong basis for the future. (Nietzsche 1983:77) A present that is too cluttered

with the past allows 'no living space for present projects' and no room for shaping and future progress. (Connerton 2008:63) The importance and power of forgetting has also been linked to a person's capacity for a rich emotional life; for example, it may be necessary to allow certain details of past relationships to be forgotten so that it becomes possible to have relationships, and to love, in the present. (Lingis 1999:211-2; Connerton 2008:63)

It is not only that there may be some value in 'forgetting', it is also necessary to consider whether there are certain factors that contribute to how we remember that may be less valuable or constructive than others. If some ways of remembering, or things that we are encouraged or 'primed' to remember (Schacter 1996:167), come to dominate our memory this may be to the detriment of other ways of remembering. Of relevance here is that certain memories may overshadow the narrative we desire to tell or have others tell of us. It is in this context that I raise the earlier question: Does the highly detailed collection and storage of information about our lives always contribute to a 'better' memory? In the analysis below, when I return to the themes of remembering and forgetting, I suggest that there are situations when the information about the past and the context in which it may be presented, can impact on our memories to the detriment of our narrative self. I also suggest that the type of remembering encouraged by reflecting on data records captured about the past might become so widespread that the value of other ways of remembering, such as through oral storytelling, may be lost. As we are increasingly faced with new ways of recording, storing, analysing and retrieving vast quantities of data, it is I suggest timely to consider that the memories arising though interactive, immediate, embodied and context laden storytelling are still likely to be what continues to provide us with some of the richer sources of our narrative self.

Surveillance technologies and a child's life narrative

I now turn to a discussion about what impact surveillance technologies are likely to have on a child's emerging view of self and identity, using the narrative approach and earlier discussion of memory as the basis for the analysis.

I address this by looking at the potential impact surveillance technologies might have on: interactivity within childhood narrative and the implications of this; the way a child comes to

understand the story that is their life; and, the way a child's memories may be influenced by the types of records collected and the 'information' these records give rise to.

I first turn to how the use of surveillance technologies might impact on how a child interacts with others. It was noted in Chapter 2 that one of the features of the use of surveillance technologies is that they are often employed from a distance, often allowing no interaction between the watcher and the child. Further, the use of these technologies in this way sometimes acts as a replacement for in-person encounters, such as when a roll-call is conducted via a fingerprint or iris scanner at the school or class entrance rather than by the teacher in class. They might also provide a way of monitoring in a more comprehensive way activities that would have been impossible to cover before, such as the use of CCTV in school playgrounds and washrooms.

To the extent that a child may find themselves under an increasing surveillance presence, the child may experience less opportunity for interactivity in some situations, particularly with significant adults such as parents and family members, carers and teachers. Perhaps, more importantly, opportunity for dialogue and interaction may be lacking at times when a child could benefit from it most of all; such as when this might help deepen a child's ethical understanding of others, allow the child to reflect on their own actions or reinforce to the child a sense of self worth. If, for example, the way of dealing with misbehaviour at school tends more to picking up incidents via CCTV, rather than in-person, then the child does not have the advantage of immediate feedback. Even in situations that may be more mundane or trivial, such as the roll-call encounter just mentioned, there may be a cumulative effect for the child in terms of the small moments of interactivity with others that are lost. The example of the roll-call is particularly insightful. The traditional roll-call method involves the teacher saying aloud the 'name' of the child in the presence of the class, representing a small, but significant, acknowledgement of the child as a unique person; of who they are. (Cavarero 2000:19) As surveillance technologies are usually applied in a distant and non-interactive way, there are likely to be a range of day-to-day encounters that a child may no longer experience when in a 'space of surveillance', and this may result in a loss of feedback and validation for the child of both specific actions and the child's sense of unique personhood.

The interactive nature of storytelling is critical to the narrative process. Without opportunities for interactivity, children may at times experience a loss of opportunity to tell stories with others. Everyday interactions between the child and other children, family, teachers and a range of others provide both the substance of stories and an important site for dialogue and story-telling. Through this a child can hear about the lives and stories of others, and understand more deeply the role of narrative in how we come to understand one another. To the extent that the use of surveillance technologies reduces the availability of a listening or collaborative partner in story-telling, then a child may have less opportunity to develop narrative skills.

As widespread use of surveillance technologies becomes more accepted, one result may be that the value of embodied interactivity as a site for a rich narrative development may diminish. This is not to say that there is no value in virtual and online forms of interactivity; the possibilities in this area are no doubt vast as these increasingly provide opportunities for new and different ways of understanding the stories of others to emerge. Rather, the point is that, as described in Chapter 2, there are things that a child can understand more readily through in-person encounters (for example, the emotional response of the person they are interacting with), and such encounters cannot simply be replaced, even if they can be extended, by virtual forms of interactivity. As an example, consider the use of a webcam by a parent who is travelling overseas, and employs this device 24/7 so they do not 'miss out' on their children's lives and can 'look in' on them at any time (as described in Chapter 1). In this scenario, one problem seems to be an underlying assumption that the webcam can simply substitute 'in-person' time, when this might not be the same as sharing with and listening to stories the children have to tell. Similarly, the use of baby monitors appears to be widely accepted as a convenient and valuable form of observation and monitoring, and yet if these are used to such an extent that the infant or young child is actually missing out on 'in-person' time, then it is likely that a child may miss out on small exchanges and interactions that form a critical basis for a child's understanding of self and others. A narrative approach to selfhood explains why such encounters are critical, for without these a child cannot come to hear the stories others tell or to tell their own stories, thereby threatening a key foundation for how a child comes to understand self and others.

Another implication of using surveillance technologies is that they may impose a barrier to the story a child desires to tell and be told. This is because a child may be led to continually contemplate the 'story' that the surveillance presence, and the records it produces, might be 'telling' about them. Yet, as has been noted earlier, if we live life in anticipation of a particular story, or concerned with or guided by a story that we imagine to be the story that will be told of us, then we fail to live in the 'flux' of the present and to allow ourselves to acknowledge the reality of our unknown future. Instead we become limited by 'prefiguring' ourselves within a form or story that can never be the story that will be told. (Cavarero 2000:144) Thus, the use of surveillance technologies could mean that a child's way of 'being' in the present may be restrained and inhibited, rather than open and free. I briefly expand on the reasons for this.

One of the features of the 'space of surveillance' discussed in Chapter 2 is the fact that surveillance brings to a space the possibility that the child may be watched by others who are not necessarily co-present in time and space. The act of surveillance may also result in a record, often produced by others with no selective input or control from the child, that can be distributed or viewed at any time in the future by a range of known or unknown others. Most surveillance records therefore, carry with them the possibility that a child will have to confront these records at a time in the future not of their choosing. This results in the potential for unknown others to construct, tell and retell 'stories' about a child based on surveillance data captured about the child, without input or knowledge of the child. Of course others already do, and will continue to, 'tell' the story of a child in a range of different situations, and in fact this activity is understood as a central part of a narrative approach to self. So, the question here is, why might the way surveillance technologies watch, collect, record, review and reveal data about a child raise any different types of issues for the child in both the way their story is told and what is told about them?

One possible difference is that surveillance often comes in the form of an 'absent presence', meaning a child may be aware they are being watched, but have no idea by whom or at which particular moments in time. This may lead a child to wonder who is watching, when they are watching, what activities may be recorded and whether any consequences will arise. It is this anticipation that may lead the child to think more consciously about their actions,

and alter behaviour according to the 'story' they expect that the surveillance might tell of them. If a surveillance presence has this effect, then the child can be said to be living in anticipation of a 'story' that might be told by another, rather than living according to the desires of the story they wish to have told. If a child is busy contemplating how he/she might appear to another, then this might result in loss of capacity to simply 'be themselves' in a way that may be possible in a space without the surveillance presence.

Some might argue that, as children will often be unaware they are under surveillance, then they would have no cause to wonder on the story others might later 'tell' based on a surveillance record. However, it has been noted that as the surveillance society becomes more pervasive, then people may ultimately change their behaviour as they become aware of and 'get to know' their 'data double'. (Los 2006:77) This means that it only takes a couple of incidents where a person becomes aware that information about them was collected previously (even if they did not know this at the time), for the person to then wonder whether this is a possibility in a range of other situations. A child might therefore begin to alter their actions based on how they imagine 'objective' surveillance data might look to another, regardless of whether they are in fact under surveillance at a particular time. Thus, it is the 'panoptic' effect of surveillance technologies that may undermine the narrative richness of a child's life as it interrupts a child's capacity to simply live in the present due to the constant reminder it imposes on children that there is another 'story' that might be told. The fact that a child has little control or say over the records that are used for 'stories' that are told of them, also provides the child with little option in directing, challenging or being part of the 'story' in a way that reflects their own desires for the story they wish to have told.

The example of 'life logging', an extreme practice where one's life data is recorded and monitored 24/7 described in Chapter 1, also raises the question of whether anything can really happen in a genuinely present sense if one is busy recording it; that is, busy with an anticipated sense of how the self will be viewed in the future. While less extreme, the evidence above suggests that we at least need to consider the possibility that other uses of surveillance technologies, which involve incessant recording and logging of a child's life, may result in a similar effect even if to a lesser degree. That is, to the extent that the child anticipates any future 'story' in their actions and behaviour of the present, a child may be

living in the shadow of an illusion of an impossible story, to the detriment of coming to an understanding of who they are through the story that is the one they are 'in' now.

When we consider the impact surveillance technologies might have on children, in terms of leading them to contemplate a 'prefigured' rather than an open story, then we also need to ask how we might overcome the potential limitations this might bring about for a child's sense of self and understanding of who they are. In chapter 7 I consider how parents and carers in particular, might 'attend' to children in a way that allows children to 'be in the present', shaping and following a story of their own desires rather than being restrained by a technique of power that leads a child to anticipate a particular 'story' which cannot be told, and where if the child imagines that it can be told then limits a child's being and living as themselves.

In the final part of this analysis, I return to the earlier discussion on the role of remembering and forgetting in a narrative approach to selfhood, and consider how a child's memories may be influenced by the types of records collected through the use of surveillance technologies. I show how the volume and nature of data collected may change how a child remembers and forgets. I also suggest that the collection of this data challenges the very function of memory in a narrative view of self, and raises questions about the contribution to a child's memory from other important sources.

There is no doubt that surveillance technologies (as described in Chapter 1) could inevitably lead to a vast volume of recorded data about a child's life. If we think of the extensive logs of a GPS tracking device, CCTV footage, fingerprint and DNA data, mobile phone content and a historical record of a child's online activities including emails sent and websites visited, then we have barely scratched the surface of the possible records that will be kept on children in the years to come. Add to this the increased volume of data captured when a child, their family and friends make use of new technologies to record or 'chronicle' childhood. In an online environment, a child may create a personal record via web logs, chat rooms and social networking sites that is often less easily destroyed, more widely available and readily distributed to others than previous forms of records that a child may have kept (such as in hard copy diaries). Mobile phone text messages between friends (and even ex-

friends) create a record of everyday conversation that can be re-read, passed on to others and used beyond the originally intended purpose of the message. An online 'conversation' may also bring with it similar implications. It is the sheer volume of this recorded information that shows how it may become more difficult for children to 'forget' events and activities that may have once been forgotten or merged into a complex 'story' of a remembered past. The question arises: Does this volume of records provide a useful enhancement to a child's life story? It seems that there are many situations where it may in fact do this, adding a diversity to the material a child may draw on or stumble upon about their past. On the other hand, it seems likely that there will be situations when this practice of building vast records of a child's life may have a negative impact on the child and the story they wish to tell or have told about them. The question of when it might be helpful for a child to be allowed to forget, therefore requires further consideration.

Another implication of not being able to readily 'forget' some aspects of the past, is that surveillance may record material that interrupts or even conflicts with the story a child wishes to tell about an event, or some broader aspect of their life. According to 'Dissonance Theory', when memories conflict we use stories to build a consistent and positive image of self which helps our well-being. (Engel 1999:45) One of the implications of the new records produced by surveillance technologies is that it makes it more difficult for a child to merge the information in the surveillance record often presented as 'objective' or 'truth' with the memory the child has of a particular event or action. Surveillance records may bring an inflexible, rigid and often irrelevant piece of information to a child's memory; one that they nonetheless then have to deal with and give a place in their own memory once it is presented to them. This may make it more difficult to erase negative or even not particularly significant episodes of conversations and day-to-day activity, thereby making it harder for a child to shape or be open to the stories they or others wish to tell.

There is a documented effect known as memory 'priming', which is where we remember things more easily when they have been previously shown to us. (Schacter 1996 p167) Thus, when a child is confronted with a surveillance record, it is likely to become a more accessible memory than many that are not recorded and replayed. Even if a surveillance record is altered, factually wrong, misinterpreted or full of errors, there is still a possibility that a

child's memory may be influenced by this record if/when it is presented to them. As a result, a child may lose confidence in their own version of events, or simply lose confidence in the fact that their own 'story' might be valid or heard. This lack of confidence can arise even if a child is confronted with a surveillance record that is not necessarily 'wrong' in any sense. If a child is confronted by a parent with a GPS alert showing they have 'moved out of bounds', the 'knowledge' gleaned from the surveillance record and the way it is used, makes it more difficult for a child to tell an alternative story their own. The surveillance record therefore carries with it implications for how a child remembers and ultimately the story that will be told. The stories a child tells may therefore be changed both through the viewing by others of surveillance records and what the child takes from such records for their own life story.

This leads to a related point about the impact that surveillance records may have on a child's memory and what the child makes of that memory. In Chapter 2, one of the features of a 'space of surveillance' discussed was the fact that surveillance brings with it the potential for new types of knowledge about the space, through the records that it becomes possible to collect. The vast quantities of data that is now collected on a child means that there is much more detail about the child's past that without the surveillance record would simply not have been available. If a child becomes aware of these records, they then have to take these into account in their own life story, but in many cases as noted above these records may be far from relevant to the child and far removed from the story they wish to tell and have told. One of the challenges of the accumulation of surveillance data is that it may be confusing for a child in coming to an understanding of self.

One of the promises of the narrative approach according to Hannah Ardent and Adrianna Cavarero is that it opens a way for revealing *who* someone is, rather than *what* someone is. It is the focus on the *who*, as representing the uniqueness of a person's being; a being which is both a physical entity and a unique individual who, from the moment of birth, is constituted by their relations with others. (Cavarero 2000:39) Rather than aim for a universal definition or understanding of identity through asking the question '*What* is Man?' (an approach which both Arendt and Cavarero suggest can never achieve an understanding of who someone is) Cavarero suggests that narration 'has a form of biographical knowledge that regards the

unrepeatable identity of someone' by asking '*who* he or she is'. (Cavarero 2000:13) I suggest that the records of surveillance activity are unable to reveal *who* a child is, in the sense of the uniqueness of that child, and in fact may make it harder for both the child and others to come to achieve this understanding. This is because the technologies are generally applied in a one-size-fits-all, homogenous approach that aims to monitor or capture what a child is doing; that is to provide or collect information about the child's movements or activities. However, 'information' or 'contents' alone cannot reveal who the child is, because, as noted earlier, it is not the contents of a person's story that matters but rather the capacity to keep telling the story and the understanding that there is a story to be told. The emphasis of the surveillance record as an 'objective' record might not only be problematic in limiting other stories a child might wish to tell, but also because it fails to reveal to the child the importance of narrative in how we can come to an understanding of self and others, and the world around us.

Another impact that new surveillance technologies may have on the way children remember, is that these technologies place emphasis on certain types of records and ways of remembering. As records of childhood become increasingly image, sound and data based, they could potentially over-shadow other ways of remembering such as oral storytelling, reflective autobiography and context-laden recollections that do not rely on existing 'records' for their re-telling. Other contributors to memory that are more internal, reflective, imaginative and constructed in an active dialogue with others may end up playing a less constitutive role in a child's memories, and therefore in the way a child comes to an understanding of themselves and others. If these ways of remembering become less active, this may lead to a loss of some of the more creative and active ways in which a child contributes to their own life story.

Overall, I suggest that the narrative approach to self and identity provides a helpful way of understanding how a child can make sense of the world and others around them, and of who they are in that world. However, the growing use of surveillance technologies over children's spaces, and the fact that there is a growing body of data resulting from this surveillance activity, has significant implications for the way a child comes to understand themselves as unique, 'narratable' individuals. Where opportunities for meaningful

interactivity are diminished by a surveillance presence, there may be less opportunity for a child's narrative development, including the very story-telling skills that can help a child in understanding the self and others. Further, if a child is led to anticipate the story that might be told by others based on the surveillance records that are created, then this may unnecessarily inhibit a child's behaviour as they attempt to conform to an expectation of the story that might be told; a child may therefore find it more difficult to simply live within their own life story with an impulse that propels them towards an open future. Finally, to the extent that surveillance records might alter how a child remembers, this may make it more difficult for a child to forget when this might be helpful, and it may only promote certain ways of remembering to the detriment of other ways a child might recall and relive memories. The creation of surveillance records therefore has the potential to impact on childhood experience by limiting the stories about the child that may be told and the stories that a child desires to tell and have told. The use of surveillance technologies also raises potential barriers for a child in experiencing the full richness of 'narrative' as a way of coming to understand who they are.

A child's growing confidence in their own sense of self is also determined by how others trust them, and how a child learns to trust others. It is to the notion of trust, and the potential impact of surveillance technologies on childhood experience of trust, that I now turn.

Chapter 5 – Trust, Risk and Responsibility

There is no question that children require care, protection and guidance in order to thrive. The use of surveillance technologies are often applied to children and children's spaces with these aims in mind. However, as we have noted earlier, the use of such technologies brings about changes to the spaces children inhabit, and we need to understand the full nature of these changes if we can assess the benefits or otherwise of using surveillance technologies to watch over and monitor children. This chapter assesses the potential impact on childhood experience through an analysis based on the notion of trust.

In her 2002 BBC Reith Lectures, Onora O'Neill addressed the apparent 'crisis of trust' within society. O'Neill observed that while the media continually raises new stories about the perceived untrustworthiness of certain individuals and professions, there is little actual evidence to suggest that people are more untrustworthy than in the past. What is new is the increasing evidence of a culture of suspicion. According to O'Neill, the problem lies in our response to this changing environment, where we aim to impose more stringent forms of control on those who are perceived to be untrustworthy, rather than look at the way we trust others and make changes to how can (re)build trust in society. (O'Neill 2002) While the focus of O'Neill's lecture was on trust in public and private sector institutions, I suggest something similar is happening when we look at the way surveillance technologies are used on children, raising questions such as: Is the increased use of surveillance technologies on children in part a response to the fact that we do not trust children, or that we do not trust others who are with/around them? If so, is our response based on an informed assessment of the risks involved? Further, is the use of technologies as a form of control, or even 'care', an appropriate response to addressing a lack of trust or minimising risk? What are the implications for children, if we use surveillance technologies in this way, rather than building trust via alternative means?

Before turning to these issues, I firstly discuss the notion of trust itself: what is trust, and why is it important? In particular, I recommend using an extended notion of trust when it comes to children, as this provides more insight into what is at stake if children find themselves in an environment where trust is undervalued or absent.

Trusting another and being trusted

When looking at the notion of 'trust', I first of all consider how a child trusts others based on an understanding of 'trust' as a need to rely on the good will of others, and in this case the way children rely on others such as parents, carers, friends and strangers in a variety of ways to care for and protect them. I then extend this to looking at 'trust' from the perspective of a child being trusted by others to be responsible, to take control and do things in ways that extend their skills and competencies. It is this second dimension that is not as prominent in the literature on trust, and yet which reveals much of what is important for a child in 'being trusted'. Overall, I argue that if we are to fully appreciate the formative role of 'trust' in childhood experience we need to consider both these aspects of the notion of trust. This is because, taken together, they help to explain the key foundations of a child's relationships with others and ways of being with others that allow them to develop into competent, confident and active human agents.

In a key article on 'trust', Annette Baier develops an account of what it is 'to trust' others. (Baier 1986) The motivation for Baier is to address the moral question 'whom should I trust in what way and why?' (Baier 1986:232) According to Baier, trust is a form of reliance on another's good will. That is, when I trust someone, I am depending on their good will toward me, and further:

> Where one depends on another's good will, one is necessarily vulnerable to the limits of that good will. One leaves others an opportunity to harm one when one trusts, and also shows one's confidence that they will not take it. (Baier 1986:234-5)

Why then do we trust others when this leaves us vulnerable to the limits of that goodwill? There are many reasons. One is that trusting others can be beneficial, even necessary. Trust allows us to form and build relationships, to rely on the safety of the food we eat, to drive on the roads and use public transport, to seek advice from health professionals and to carry out many other basic day-to-day actions. (McLeod 2006) Further, we need to trust others, not just to meet these needs or to avoid harm, but also in order to create and transform things in our day-to-day lives. This is because many things we value and wish to sustain whether

this relates to children, political life, the arts, reputation or friendship require us to allow others to be in a position where they may:

> injure what we care about, since those are the same positions that they must be in in order to help us take care of what we care about. (Baier 1986:236)

Another reason we trust others, even though this may leave us vulnerable, is that we often have little or no choice about having to trust others; we simply find ourselves in a position where we must trust another. Trust is therefore inextricably tied with notions of choice, power and control. When we are in a position to make a choice, trust inevitably involves giving the person being trusted some control, and in many cases discretionary power, over what is entrusted. Baier gives an example of when a child is entrusted to the care of the person's separated spouse. In this instance, the trust placed in the other person involves more than simply not harming the child, but a range of expectations about caring for the child. (Baier 1986:237-8) In this example, the trust established between the two adults may be negotiated or changed over time depending on whether expectations of the other are met. The child's interest in this trust relationship is obviously important too. What is needed therefore is to add to this scenario the dimension of the child's need to trust others as well, and although Baier does not address this in her discussion of this example, her later work provides some insight here.

One of the features of trusting others is that this does not always involve a conscious decision to decide to trust another or not, or therefore an explicit decision to place oneself in a vulnerable position to another; this may happen without our being aware of it. Baier's account allows for this form of unconscious trust as well as conscious trust. (Baier 1986:244) Trust often involves people in dependent or unequal power relations with each other, and Baier argues that we need to acknowledge these relationships of dependency if we are to move beyond a simplified, contract-based approach to how we understand trust. (Baier 1986:241) This is particularly helpful in understanding a child's trust-based relationships with others. If we consider how an infant trusts a parent, the infant is initially powerless in such a relation. The infant can however be said to 'trust' enough for example to accept food that is offered. As the infant gains increasing power, they learn that the parent is not

invulnerable and that they too in turn need to trust the child. (Baier 1986:242-3) What develops therefore is a relationship of mutual trust; and even over time as the relationship tends to become more equal, it would not make sense to characterise the relationship as a contract-based one:

> Not only has the child no concept of virtual contract when she trusts, but the parent's duty to the child seems in no way dependent on the expectation that the child will make a later return. (Baier 1986:244)

A child might not make a conscious decision to trust a parent when they are first born, but can develop a more conscious sense of trust over time. A child can also easily come to distrust a parent if the trust is destroyed, and while trust can be easily broken, distrust is much harder to mend. It is however from the most basic trust between a parent and child, that there emerges a sense of trust that becomes amongst other things more conscious, controlled and discriminatory, allowing children to 'trust [themselves] as trusters'. (Baier 1986:244-5) Furthermore, it is helpful to acknowledge that some relationships (such as those between parent and child), inevitably involve relationships of dependency, as in doing so we can obtain a much richer understanding of the nature of trust. (Baier 1986:249)

In summary, when someone is trusted, this generally refers to them being relied upon for some benefit or non-harm to the person doing the trusting. While initially children may have little choice but to trust others, from very early on they do have this choice with respect to some activities, and this soon expands, and includes the choice to distrust or to withhold trust. Just as children need to trust adults, there are instances when an adult or another child will need to trust a child. That is, they will rely on the child to behave in a certain way or perform a certain task in order not to harm, or in order to meet some interest of, the person doing the trusting. These situations might range from simple interactions such as keeping a friend's secret, to even quite onerous circumstances such as where a young child might at times need to feed, protect and care for a parent who is not well.

One of the other benefits of trusting children is that it can be shown that 'trust leads to trustworthiness'. (Pettit 1995:218; Lahno 2001:183) This happens because, when others

trust us, we become trustworthy beings. Further, it is through the act of trusting others that we learn to trust and we come to know the value of trust. Some have described this as a self-perpetuating feature of trust, and it applies equally to distrust as well. If we distrust someone:

> we tend, except in extremely clear cases, to interpret his or her actions and statements in a negative way; even intended overtures may be rejected as attempts to manipulate or deceive. (Govier 1992:18)

Having opportunities to trust and to be trusted are therefore a crucial part of a child's learning how to be with others in a way that supports their capacity to live and to live in a meaningful way. This is not to say that trusting others or being trusted is always a good thing. There may be situations where trust is unwelcome or misplaced, or where it imposes limitations on a person's action that is unwanted or feels 'coercive'. (Jones 1996:9) There are also situations where distrust may be warranted and a necessary response to potential danger. Children therefore not only need to learn to trust, but they need to learn to trust with good judgement, to trust well. (O'Neill 2002) Children also need to be seen as dialogical partners in negotiating trust and risk, not simply subjects of control, a theme that will be returned to later in this chapter.

The lessons of trusting and being trusted are important for children. However, there appears to be something else that is happening when we (as adults) 'trust' a child that is not fully addressed by the notion of trust discussed so far. I am referring to those situations where an adult 'trusts' a child to perform a certain action competently or responsibily, but where this does not involve relying on the child to do this in order to serve the interests of the adult. Rather, the child is being trusted in order to further the interests of the child via a positive expression of confidence in a child's ability to perform a particular action or task. This is the notion of 'trust' that is involved when a parent says to a child 'I trust you to walk to your friend's place on your own' or 'I trust you to climb that tree safely'. That is, the adult expresses confidence in the child's capacity to do something (even if this is for the first time) based on what they know of the child's competency and risks involved, with the aim of allowing the child to extend their confidence and skills. Of course, trusting a child to

perform such tasks may at the same time indirectly serve the interests of another (such as the parent), but usually it is primarily in the interests of the child and the child's development. This is similar to what Horsburgh refers to as 'therapeutic trust', where we trust someone as a form of moral support and expression of confidence in their capacity with the aim of increasing the trustworthiness of the person being trusted. (Horsburgh 1960:348)

I therefore suggest that when we talk of 'trust', particularly when it relates to children, we also include a notion of trust that refers to a positive expression of confidence in a person where the benefit is more for the person being trusted than for the person doing the trusting. For children, many actions are new and untested. If they are trusted to extend themselves, this may help them to develop both competence and confidence. In the context of educational settings, it has been observed that a teacher may give a student a task that requires responsibility even where they believe it is fairly risky to trust a particular child with that task. In placing this trust, they signal confidence in that child, and in doing so 'the teacher may count on the pupil being additionally motivated by the signal of trust to do what is right'. (Lahno 2001:184) Teachers may therefore trust children in order to awaken these skills. That is, the teacher trusts a child with a responsible task in order to reveal to the child their own capacities and potential. In this way the child does not just gain the confidence of others around them, but acquires a sense of self-confidence as well. This is supported by Lahno's argument that:

> This sort of trust is at the heart of any genuine educational enterprise. It requires a positive sympathetic attitude toward the pupil as an evolving person. (Lahno 2001:184)

What we can take from Lahno's argument, is that it is sometimes appropriate to trust children even when we are unsure if they have the skills to perform the task set, as it signals confidence in the child and may in turn build a child's confidence in themselves.

There are a range of reasons a child may welcome the opportunity to be trusted; for example, someone may wish to be trusted in order to receive the good opinion of the person who has trusted them. (Pettit 1995:219) This may be some of what a child is responding to

when they take on the trust placed in them to (at least try to) perform a certain task. That is, they aim to please their parents or carers who will then think well of them. However, it is possible that, in part, a child simply wants to have control over particular actions and do things for themselves for the sheer pleasure of succeeding at something new, or perhaps to overcome the frustration of not being able to do things they see others do. The desire to be trusted on this view stems from a sense of determination and growing self-confidence, in addition to any desire to please others.

So, when we talk of 'trusting' children, it is helpful to consider an expanded notion of trust with two key dimensions: the notion of trust as relying on others for a certain benefit or non-harm to the person doing the trusting; and, trust as a positive expression of confidence in the child. It is this second dimension that takes account of a child's desire to do or control something that is new or for them as yet unchartered territory not simply to please those who care for them, but as a self-confident expression in their own creativity and subjectivity.

I turn now to the relationship between trust and risk, as this helps to reveal some of the implications for a child if opportunities to trust others and to be trusted are denied.

Surveillance technologies - childhood experience of trust and risk

It has been observed that 'risk is generally held to be a central characteristic of a trustful interaction' (Lahno 2001:171) and, even more strongly, that 'trust necessarily involves risk'. (McLeod 2006:1) We can see that trusting others inevitably opens up a window of risk that being what will be at stake if the trust is misplaced or disappointed. Given that we must trust others if we are to get through many both mundane and meaningful day-to-day activities, it follows that there will be situations where it is either necessary or on balance a good thing to take some types of risks. If we take the expanded view of trust just discussed, trusting children leads to risks on a number of fronts. It raises the risk that others may not care for, or may harm, a child in a situation where the child is vulnerable to or reliant on another, and there is also a risk that the child themselves might not live up to the trust placed in them. Just as we need to trust, we therefore need to take the risks that 'trusting'

entails; and this is not just to meet our basic needs, but also because 'it seems impossible to live a satisfying life entirely without risks'. (Lahno 2001:172)

It is clear then that people do not aim to live a life that is entirely risk free, as this would render us immobile. Indeed some would argue even more strongly that risks lie at the very basis of creativity, and that what is missing in all the attempts to assess, measure and control risks is:

> the acknowledgement of unpredictability and non-calculability (true risk, that is) as an inherent, disruptive and creative force of teaching and learning. (Papastephanou 2006:50)

Papastephanou argues that the tendency in education to apply a discourse of control is far removed from the reality of the 'contingency and finitude' of human life. (Papastephanou 2006:48) Further, what we see from learners is a 'longing for the risks that make life meaningful'. (Papastephanou 2006:49)

It may seem obvious to make the point that life inevitably involves risks; but the ways in which surveillance technologies are used on children appear to strive to achieve a risk-free environment, with 'risk-avoidance' promoted as a given good. As described in Chapter 1, from the baby monitors which detect temperature, humidity, breathing and heart rate in addition to transmitting sounds, to GPS tracking systems that can be installed in children's clothing, mobile phones, watches and backpacks, it appears that the efforts to monitor and control children aim to leave little to chance.

There is no doubt that questions of balancing trust and risk are complex. Parents, carers and teachers need to consider on the one hand whether children are protected sufficiently from harm, and whether there are certain technologies that can help to achieve this. On the other, they may need to consider whether there are situations when it is appropriate to accept some risk rather than make use of surveillance technologies in a way that is over-reactive and out of proportion to the risks involved. Sometimes, the desire to protect children from harm may be motivated by an exaggerated fear of the risks involved or an under-estimation of a

child's competency to deal with a particular situation. In a study of parental concerns about children's use of public space, Gill Valentine argues that the global media coverage of violent crimes heightens parental awareness of these types of risks, and, even though they acknowledge the risk is very low, the parents nonetheless fear for their children and take steps to protect them and keep them from public spaces. (Valentine 2004:15) In public spaces, children are discouraged from interacting with strangers, and:

> Unable or unwilling to trust their children to manage their own safety in public places, most parents actively control and restrict their children's use of space. (Valentine 2004:55-6)

Valentine explores the types of negotiations about the spatial ranges that children are allowed to explore in public spaces without an adult present. (Valentine 2004:56) The study revealed that:

> While some parents actively try to develop their children's autonomy and streetwise skills, for example, by giving them special 'licences' to make specific journeys, others are more cautious, keeping their offspring under covert surveillance. (Valentine 2004:57)

While the reaction from children may differ, one important point from Valentine's research is the evidence to suggest that children have the capacity to resist and subvert the levels of controls adults try to put in place. Valentine gives examples of children colluding with each other to tell stories that will reassure parents while giving them the freedom to go out and about, and of children hiding incidents from parents to save their parents from being anxious. (Valentine 2004:63 & 65)

Where there is a climate of fear about public spaces, it is possible to see how parental fears might lead to a tendency to use tighter mechanisms of control, including the range of surveillance technologies that are now more readily available to parents. However, I argue that such an approach, particularly where it is an over-reaction to the risks involved, makes it difficult for children to negotiate an appropriate, realistic and constructive balance between

trust and risk. Surveillance technologies are relatively inflexible, and tend to be applied in a constant, homogeneous manner, and as a result the opportunities for a child to negotiate terms of freedom or to subvert the controls that are placed on them rapidly diminish. This is because the technologies, when applied in this way, have no mechanisms to account for or adapt to each child's capacity and surrounding context. A CCTV installed in a school classroom does not operate differently depending on the context or needs of each individual child, it is there as a 'catch all' measure for any person under its gaze.

Another reason that surveillance technologies make it difficult to negotiate a balance between trust and risk, is that they take away some forms of communication that are critical to achieving this. The chance for a child to negotiate or find some space where they can be trusted is limited by the often distant and non-interactive way in which surveillance devices such as CCTV cameras are used. In some situations, limited negotiation may be possible; for example, some parents 'trust' a child to go out on their own or with friends on the condition that the child agrees to being monitored via a mobile phone or type of GPS tracking systems. (Jones, Williams et al. 2003:175; Fotel and Thomsen 2004:544) However, more often than not, because surveillance technologies are used to allow monitoring from a distance, they potentially reduce the opportunity for negotiation.

While it is possible to establish and build trust over a distance (as is evident across a range of online transactions), it has been noted that there are some features of trust that can only be conveyed in co-present encounters. In a co-present conversation, it is the timing, the pauses, and the fact that there is no set pattern to the discussion, which all contributes to establishing and underpinning the trust that is established in any such encounter:

> A certain form of trust can be displayed and appreciated between actors a trust that derives from the observable timing and placement of talk and gesture. (Boden and Molotch 1994:267)

The subtleties of such encounters are lost if trust is replaced with a surveillance device, as there become fewer openings for dialogue, less chance to understand and respect the other

as a person, and less opportunity for the child to establish a trust-based relationship with the observer.

Wherever there is an opportunity to negotiate options for balancing trust and risk there is also the possibility for re-negotiation and greater extension of autonomy for the child as his/her capacity develops and the adult's confidence in the child's capacity is reinforced. To the extent that using surveillance technologies might remove such opportunities, then there is a risk that a child's experience and development of trust may be diminished.

The complex layers of control, and the messages that accompany the promotion of surveillance technologies, make it difficult for parents and carers to keep sight of the fact that there are some situations when it may be all right and even necessary to expose children to some risk. As noted in Chapter 1, one of the most notable changes in the use of surveillance technologies on children is that they are no longer just about discipline and control, but are used or perceived as a form of 'care' as well. While protecting or caring for children using surveillance technologies may be well-intentioned, we need to question whether this provides a realistic form of protection and also whether the technologies in fact provide no more than a distraction from far more pressing concerns.

Surveillance technologies do not always provide a viable form of protection, either because the technologies do not work or because they are attempting to control things that in reality cannot be controlled in this way. There is evidence to suggest that, while surveillance technologies allow some criminals to be tracked down after the event, they do not actually prevent or reduce crime in any significant way. (Monahan 2006:4) Furthermore, it is suggested that the solutions offered by these technologies do nothing to address the actual social, political and economic problems that may in fact be impacting on children. (Katz 2006:29) Katz notes that the rise in parental anxiety about children has resulted in strategies of 'hyperviligence' (as evidenced by the growing market in surveillance technologies) that can never really be up to the task of protecting children in the ways that are most pressing. This is because it is not the need to protect children from a dangerous or neglectful nanny, or even a stranger, that are the most pressing problems, but rather poverty, inequality, homelessness and 'under-stimulating public environments' that present relatively greater

challenges. (Katz 2006:31-2) If children are overprotected across a range of situations by an ever increasing array of micro-mechanisms of control, then the problem becomes not just that the parents have over-reacted to the potential risks involved, they have in turn added to the climate of suspicion and fear at a cost to other skills and experiences that a child may benefit from.

If we consider the example of a child's online activities, we can see the range of issues that might arise. On the one hand, children may need protection from the potential harms of online activity (such as bullying, harassment, criminal activity, identity fraud, exploitation for commercial gain and inappropriate content to name some concerns that emerge). On the other hand they may also need to develop skills and acquire their own knowledge about how to make judgements about 'others' they meet online or information they come across that might be potentially harmful. High level, secretive monitoring by parents of a child's email or online activity is one approach to controlling children in this situation, but it ignores the role trust plays in developing a child's capacity to eventually handle such situations on their own. One benefit of trusting a child is that they can learn to deal with difficult situations in a way that develops further skills and competencies. Also, a child who is not trusted, may in fact engage in more secretive (and perhaps more risky) behaviour. The potential damage to the trust relationship between parent and child is far greater if the child is not aware they are under surveillance, as it is not just the act of surveillance itself, but the deception involved which destroys the basis of any trust relationship. (O'Neill 2002)

The impact on the development of skills and competencies in childhood can also be seen if we consider the increasing use of smartcards or online ordering systems to replace cash transactions in a school canteen. While these new systems may aim to improve efficiency or to develop healthy eating habits, they also introduce a new level of control over how parents and the school monitor what a child eats and how they spend money. (Rout 2007) As these types of systems become more widespread, one question to explore is whether there are any consequences of denying a child the opportunity to be trusted to spend canteen money wisely without this type of monitoring. If children are not at some point trusted with handling money, then there is a risk they may fail to learn important skills or that the development of such skills may be delayed. Of course, a child in whom such trust is placed

may fail on some occasions to spend the money as they were asked to, choosing to spend it otherwise. However, the benefits arising from the opportunity to be trusted (for example, in terms of skills or confidence generated, or even the opportunity to experience the force of guilt), may be significant in comparison to any risk of a child failing to live up to the trust placed in them in this instance. This example highlights how opportunities for children to have some discretion and control in matters that are relatively 'safe' seem to disappear when surveillance technologies are introduced, as they take away from children an opportunity to be trusted.

These examples draw out some of the changes children face in their day-to-day experience of trust as surveillance technologies become an increasing feature of the spaces they move about in. One additional complexity is that the messages about trust are not always clear; for example in determining who and in what regard it is thought a person(s) cannot be trusted. The ambiguity of the surveillance gaze makes it unclear who in the population cannot be trusted, and it potentially extends to all, making it difficult for a child to know when to trust another or not. When a school introduces CCTV cameras into the classroom, this may be for purposes of security for the teacher or students, yet the message about trust that accompanies this may not be so clear. One of the ironies is that a surveillance presence can produce unease and fear for all under its gaze because it implies that there is a reason to mistrust or suspect those around you. In this sense, the use of surveillance technologies can add to the culture of suspicion, rather than build a sense of security and trust. As noted in Chapter 2, the surveillance technology market has considerable influence in this regard, and it is possible to see a degree of complicity in the role of both the media and the companies who make surveillance technologies in perpetuating this culture:

> The culture of fear generated by the media spills over into a culture of control in schools. ... Surveillance equipment is one material and symbolic manifestation of this reactionary culture of control. (Monahan 2006:117)

Such influences need to be acknowledged if we are to understand the range of pressures that bear on a child's experience and understanding of trust.

The examples mentioned here show that the use of surveillance technologies (whether intended or not) carry with them a judgement about trust, even if the exact target of this activity remains unclear or ambiguous to those under the gaze. If we take this a step further, it is possible to view this use of surveillance technologies as a replacement for trust and trust based relationships. That is, instead of relinquishing some control and trusting a child, or others with a child, or even trusting one's own judgement in caring for the child, and accepting the risks this entails, an attempt is made to replace this 'need to trust' with some sort of surveillance device. Of course, such devices cannot obviate the need to trust entirely, but the intention appears to be to go part of the way to reducing the trust that may be required.

None of this discussion is intended to say that we should not seek to avoid risks in some situations of course we do this regularly throughout each day. Rather, the key point is that it is unrealistic to avoid risks in all situations, and if one of the trends of the use of surveillance technologies is to watch, control and monitor children at all times 'just in case' of some perhaps unknown or remote risk, then the consequences of this may be significant. Rather than simply 'playing it safe', parents and carers may be depriving children of the opportunity to be trusted and to learn about trusting others, and the opportunity for growing competence and capacity that can result from this. The greater risk may therefore lie in using surveillance technologies as a risk avoidance strategy, rather than adopting a more realistic and flexible approach to balancing trust and risk. As noted earlier, part of what it is to trust is to relinquish some control: 'we do not have the power to control other people's actions completely, we must necessarily trust'. (Lahno 2001:172) Perhaps acknowledging this contingency is a key part of forming a more realistic assessment of the limits of what surveillance technologies might achieve in reducing risks to children.

Beyond surveillance to building trust

The fact that the increasing use of surveillance technologies has the potential to change a child's experience of trust is significant. Children, generally speaking, have less choice when it comes to the need to trust others, and are at a key stage in developing an understanding of others and society more broadly in a way that sets the foundation for their own sense of self. As discussed earlier, the lack of opportunity for trust-based activity has the potential to

undermine a child's developing sense of self-confidence and may even fail to provide the conditions for this development to occur in the first place. A child's capacity to become competent and responsible is therefore threatened if the role of trust in a child's emerging agency is overlooked rather than nourished.

This raises an important ethical dimension to a child's experience of being trusted and trusting others, and from being exposed to risks that trust-based encounters with others give rise to. It has been noted that there is a certain 'moral blindness' at play when risks from unknown others are exaggerated, often perpetuating cultural preconceptions that have no basis in fact. (Papastephanou 2006:58) Unless a child is able to place themselves in a position of trusting the 'other', and exposing themselves to whatever risk this may entail, then they also have little basis for understanding the 'other'. This type of risk is a 'necessary condition for an ethical relation to the other, it makes the welcoming of the other possible'. (Safstrom quoted in Papastephanou 2006:58) Without such trust-based encounters, there is also no basis for making decisions about which risks may be worth taking and which are to be avoided. It is only by building trust, that we can in turn understand and make better judgements about trusting.

One of the limitations of surveillance technologies is that children are given the message that there are 'others' who cannot be trusted. Yet, as a basis for ethical decision making, this presents a view of others that is highly arbitrary and all encompassing, providing no basis on which the child can come to an understanding of others as beings who are also vulnerable and reliant on trusting relationships in the same way. There is also no basis for a child to develop as a 'truster'; that is, to learn how to make well-placed decisions about who to trust in the future. Whether it is intended or not, the ways in which surveillance technologies are increasingly being used to monitor and control children's lives conveys, and perhaps even betrays, an underlying lack of trust both in the children themselves and in all those others who share the spaces around them. Furthermore, these acts of surveillance fail to bring with them any ways in which the child may build the necessary trust-based relationships that are needed for the child to become both trusting and trusted.

This leads to the question, if we only trust a child, or others with the child, because surveillance technologies are being used, then in what sense can we be said to be genuinely trusting them? It has been argued, that the only way we can trust others is if their actions or behaviour reinforces the trust we have placed in them, and those others have taken responsibility for meeting that trust. (Bailey 2002:6) If a child acts in a certain way (for example, decides not to go into the swimming pool area because an alarm will be triggered from the CCTV if they do so), in what sense are they genuinely fulfilling the trust placed in them if this only arises from the fear of detection and punishment rather than because they understand the responsibility they have been entrusted with? Raising such questions may help determine the extent to which a child's experience of trust may be weakened with a surveillance presence.

None of this is to say that trust cannot have a place in any decisions around the use of surveillance technologies. Perhaps, if surveillance is applied in a well-judged manner based on the risks posed to children in a certain circumstance, and done with the knowledge and involvement of the children under surveillance, then it may be possible for trust to retain a place in a child's encounters with others. Similarly, if such technologies can be used to maximise potential benefits, and at the same time respect the child as an active agent in any such situations, then some of the potential problems may be overcome. This however would require a conscious acknowledgement of the value of trusting children, and working to ensure they do not become a victim of over-reactive and over-controlling applications of surveillance. In practice, the problem that surveillance technologies poses for trust is not just in how and when the surveillance is used, but in the very fact that it has been introduced at all. Without a surveillance gaze, children have the opportunity to be trusted, to learn how to trust others, and perhaps to show others they could live up to this trust. Once the surveillance is in place, this opportunity is denied. Philip Pettit makes the point that intrusive, heavy regulation can remove opportunities for trust by leaving little room for the opportunity to demonstrate that one can act responsibly in the absence of such rules. (Pettit 1995:225) It is possible to see here how over-surveillance might do the same. That is, to the extent that surveillance technologies take away the opportunity for a person to show they can be trusted without the need for surveillance, then building trust cannot even get started.

As CCTV cameras are introduced into more classrooms and fingerprinting becomes more commonplace for roll-calls and borrowing library books, as parents are marketed drug-testing kits they can use on their children and two year olds have cameras embedded in teddy bears to watch over them, it is important to question whether these are the methods we (as adults) ought to be using to care for, protect or even discipline our children. If surveillance is applied as a response to fear, rather than a more balanced response to any actual risks involved, then arguably both adults and children are reactive agents contributing to a cycle of suspicion and anxiety, robbing childhood of valuable opportunities to trust and to be trusted.

I suggest that it is only through understanding the value of trust, and coming to an acceptance of the necessity of some risk, that we can begin to look for alternative ways to guide a child's development that can provide the foundations for an active and creative sense of selfhood, rather than stifle such opportunities.

In the next chapter, I explore in more detail the potential impact that the use of surveillance technologies may have on a child's moral life and growth.

Chapter 6 – Emotions, empathy and moral life

Each of the themes addressed in previous chapters has briefly touched on some aspect of the moral life of a child. We saw how in imaginative play, a child may test out ideas and explore new ways of being, and how this helps them to consider the perspectives of others, leading to an understanding of how their own behaviour and decisions may affect others. Also, the way a child uses narrative to make sense of their life experience has a distinctly moral dimension; because storytelling provides both a site for exploring ethical issues and a way of understanding the lives of others. It was also noted that the way children learn to trust and to be trusted by others is central to how the child sees and feels about the world around them and how they perceive their own value within the world. To the extent that trust requires people to act in certain ways to support those in a vulnerable position, or that trust builds confidence and good will, then we can see how the notion of 'trust' might be considered one of the key foundations of ethical life. Across all of these sites of a child's life experience, I have argued that an increased use of new surveillance technologies has the potential to alter childhood experience in some way.

In this chapter, I explore more directly the impact that new surveillance technologies may have on a child's moral life and development. I suggest that, far from being morally benign 'tools', surveillance technologies have the potential to alter the moral landscape. Many of the key arguments used to support the introduction of surveillance are based on the positive moral benefits the technology will bring. One such argument is that surveillance will result in compliant moral behaviour through the threat of being caught if one does something wrong. This is an aim common to many types of types of law enforcement surveillance devices, such as speeding cameras, that are a familiar part of day-to-day life in many societies. However, as I argue below, there are other dimensions to moral life that must be taken into account before we can fully assess the moral benefits or otherwise of using surveillance technologies. In particular, it is important to consider the emotional life of a child and the opportunity to develop empathy, if we are to gain a richer insight into the full range of factors that influence a child's moral development. The discussion below shows how surveillance technologies could limit a child's moral development and capacity for moral decision making in the future. If such outcomes are to be avoided, then we need to adopt a

richer view of moral life in order to more fully assess the impact of surveillance technologies in this area.

I will firstly consider how surveillance technologies are used to sanction or enforce certain types of behaviour, and what the potential limitations are of using these technologies as moral 'tools'. I then explore in more detail the two key areas of a child's moral development just mentioned emotional life, including a detailed analysis of the emotion of 'shame', and capacity for empathy and consider how these may be affected if surveillance technologies are used more extensively to enforce certain norms and standards for childhood behaviour.

The limits of surveillance technologies as moral tools

While I do not dispute that there may be benefits to both individuals and society from introducing surveillance mechanisms that enforce or encourage socially acceptable behaviour, I suggest that it is also important to explore the limits of what surveillance technologies can achieve in this respect. It is important to keep in mind that as children become increasingly exposed to 'spaces of surveillance', and as surveillance technologies become a more influential part of the framework that encourages children to behave in certain ways, then other significant sources of a child's moral development may become neglected. If a child complies with the moral expectations (or perceived expectations) within a 'space of surveillance' primarily as a response to the external trigger (being the surveillance technology in use) then what may be lacking is the opportunity to develop a more in-depth approach to moral understanding or growth. While learning to comply with societal rules is an important part of childhood development, it is also important to consider how a child comes to understand the rules and values of the society they live in, and how they uphold, reflect on and question if necessary those rules through the development of their own moral character.

Some, most notably Bernard Williams, have argued that it may not be possible to achieve a coherent, systematic ethical theory that establishes a universal and rigid set of moral rules and standards for how we all ought to behave. Rather, what is more realistic is to build an understanding of key values that are shared in society, together with a capacity for critical reflection on moral issues. (Williams 1985:173) On this view, a child's capacity for some

degree of critical moral reflection is therefore an important part of that child's foundation for future moral growth. In the discussion below, I suggest that if children are to gradually take a more active role in making decisions and to develop as a moral agent, they need to develop an internal and reflective foundation for making moral decisions and judgements. I also explore what types of environment will support this richer form of moral learning, and suggest that this is unlikely to be derived via the excessive use of surveillance technologies to regulate a child's behaviour, but rather from a more supportive and interactive environment where children can develop an awareness of the needs of others, can come to trust the support they receive from others, and have opportunities to interact with others when working through moral issues and dilemmas.

So, first of all, how and when might surveillance technologies influence a child's moral life? As an example, consider the increased introduction of CCTV cameras in school buses, school playgrounds and other sites frequented by children. There are a number of 'moral' changes the presence of CCTV brings about. It may change the way a child comes to a (morally-based) decision about how to act. These changes will not necessarily be consistent among all children within the 'space of surveillance'. One child might decide to behave responsibly on a school bus because a CCTV camera is present. Another might decide that, precisely because of the camera presence, they might flout the rules and 'play up' to the camera. Either way, it seems fair to say that the surveillance presence in some way impacts on a child's behaviour and that it is possible to note a dimension to this decision that involves consideration of what is 'right' or 'wrong' in the 'eyes' of the camera. Similarly, if a CCTV camera in a home makes a child 'think twice' before they enter an 'out of bounds' area of the house, then that surveillance presence has contributed to the way a child comes to that decision. If a child is not sure if a CCTV camera is present in a particular public space, but changes his/her behaviour just in case it is present, then the moral dimension to this decision centres around the mere possibility of a surveillance presence. In some scenarios, a surveillance device can be used by parents or teachers as a 'reminder' to behave in a certain way. In one school where CCTV cameras are installed in the classroom, a student pointed out how the teachers would gesture to the camera and remind students they were being watched saying: 'be good' or the principal 'will see you'. (Dillon 2003) It seems plausible therefore to suggest that an increased surveillance presence may alter the basis for a

child's moral decision making and behaviour, including how and when they are prompted to behave in certain ways.

One significant aspect of moral motivation derived from a surveillance presence is the fact that the guiding force is an extrinsic one. The effect of this may be to undermine the value of a child acting from an internal sense of morality, rather than simply in response to an external presence. This is clearly seen in the fact that, once in a 'space of surveillance', the question of the 'best' way to act is no longer the primary thing, but rather whether the person will be caught or not. (Hale 2005:148) So, instead of thinking 'Is this right?' a person is more likely to think 'Will I be caught on camera doing this?'. The common response to speeding or red light cameras is a clear example of this. That is, the primary focus shifts to whether one will be 'caught' by the camera, instead of considering whether speeding or running a red light is the right thing to do or not. (Levin, Frohne et al. 2002:12) While there may often be some congruence between the actions resulting from behaving in the 'right' way and being motivated to act so as not to get caught, the difference is still significant nonetheless. This shift has been described as an example of how the 'ought' question of ethics is transformed into a 'descriptive and external command'. (Hale 2005:152) That is, instead of asking the question 'ought I do this', the decision to act in a certain way becomes motivated by the threatened or anticipated response from the 'surveillant authority'.

This extrinsic form of motivation for moral behaviour means that, in simply responding to an external command (or perceived/anticipated command), the individual's responsibility to act morally of their own accord is potentially weakened. The only decision is whether or not to respond to the external command, rather than to actively consider in each instance what may be 'right' or 'wrong', or indeed to reflect on whether the moral expectation communicated by the surveillance gaze is an appropriate basis for ethical action. A child may therefore be less actively engaged in considering what is 'moral' once in the 'space of surveillance' and this may in turn limit the basis for a child's developing moral life.

As the discussion so far suggests, an over-reliance on surveillance technologies as moral messengers and rule setters arguably ignores some of the richer and deeper forms of moral motivation that a child might otherwise be encouraged to draw on or develop. So what are

some of these richer areas of a child's moral development? I will discuss two perhaps less obvious areas of moral life where surveillance technologies are likely to have an impact. I first consider the significance of emotions in a child's moral life and how this might be affected by a growing surveillance presence, and then discuss a child's capacity for empathy and the ethical implications arising for both children and adults if opportunities to develop this capacity are reduced. This will lead to a more complete understanding of why and how an increased surveillance presence might inhibit moral growth in childhood. It will also help us to understand what needs to be done to encourage a deeper form of moral development, particularly as the use of surveillance becomes a more common method for encouraging (or even compelling) children to comply with societal rules.

Emotions and a child's moral life

There has always been much controversy around the place of emotions in moral life. By many philosophers, emotions have been viewed as irrational and unreliable, therefore having no place, or at least no central place, in ethical theory. (Nussbaum 2001:2) Rather, ethical theories are often based on rational principles and norms, such as those that strive to articulate moral laws that are both consistent and universalisable. (See for example Kant 1964) Despite this approach that has tended to separate the 'rational' basis for moral decision making from the 'irrational' nature of the emotions, there is nonetheless an entire body of philosophical work that seeks to explore further the role of emotions in moral life. (Nussbaum 2001)

The position I adopt here is that our emotions are an integral part of our day-to-day life and often reflect what is significant or poignant in life. Or, as Nussbaum observes, our emotions 'contain in themselves an awareness of value or importance'. (Nussbaum 2001:1) That is, our emotions can reveal to us information about whether something is good or bad, valuable or not. This is not to say that emotions always provide a reliable basis for moral judgement, but rather to point out that it is difficult and sometimes perhaps impossible to separate our emotional life from the day-to-day decisions and judgements we make. Even if we acknowledge that our emotions may have either a positive or negative impact on our moral decision making, it is difficult to see how we can simply 'set aside' the emotional component of moral decision making. I therefore take it that emotions are inextricably bound up with

the decisions we make, and that it is possible to explore how an altered emotional environment may impact on the moral decisions we make. Such an approach does not exclude the role of more abstract rational decision making in moral deliberations, rather the claim is that it is not possible to separate the way we come to moral decisions and judgements from our emotional life, and more broadly from the way we develop as moral agents. (Nussbaum 2001).

Nussbaum provides a further compelling argument for why emotions should not be side-lined in debate on moral philosophy in her analysis of the role of emotions in the moral life of a child. Nussbaum argues that emotions have a history, and that there is an important developmental dimension to emotions that can be traced back to infancy and childhood. (Nussbaum 2001:177-8) Therefore, in order to consider how a child or adult becomes an ethical human agent, it is relevant to consider the emotional history of a child. That is:

> we must examine sources of variation in development, individual and social, asking how and to what extent it is possible to encourage developmental patterns that are more supportive and less subversive of ethical norms. (Nussbaum 2001:179)

In Nussbaum's account of emotional development in infancy and childhood, she draws in part on the work of Winnicott. In particular, Nussbaum notes that unlike a number of other psychoanalysts, Winnicott's account of an infant acknowledges not only the physical and bodily needs of an infant, but also the sensitive care and comfort they require. This is Winnicott's 'facilitating environment' where the infant, in its state of total helplessness, demands to be at the centre of attention, and where this need is met and acknowledged. (Nussbaum 2001:186) Although, early on, an infant has no sense of the boundaries between themselves and others, according to Nussbaum while in this state they still have the roots of emotions. In fact, for the infant, emotions are present precisely because the infant is helpless and lacking control, and yet at the same time aware that things that are important (such as food and comfort) are coming and going. Emotions are the awareness of these happenings, and are likely to be emotions such as fear, anxiety and joy. (Nussbaum 2001:190) Nussbaum argues that a child is not just seeking to satisfy basic appetites, such as

food and comfort, they are also grappling in a cognitive sense with beginning to understand the source of emotions.

After the first few months of life, as an infant becomes gradually aware of the distinction between self and other, the emotions will have an object. Until that time, confusion and uncertainty for a child as to where anger is to be directed when a need is not met, or where love is to be directed when comfort is received, result in a time of 'unique emotional complexity'. (Nussbaum 2001:192) As noted in Chapter 3, according to Winnicott, it is the parents or primary carers who can provide the child with a 'good enough' environment that permits them to feel secure through this period of ambivalence and beyond. It is this 'holding' that shapes a child's future attitude to self (and I quote extensively as this theme will emerge across both this chapter and the next):

> The parents' (or other caregivers') ability to meet the child's omnipotence with suitably responsive and stable care creates a framework within which trust and interdependence may thus gradually grow: the child will gradually relax its omnipotence, its demand to be attended to constantly, once it understands that others can be relied on and it will not be left in a state of utter helplessness. This early framework of steadiness and continuity will provide a valuable resource in the later crisis of ambivalence. On the other hand, to the extent that a child does not receive sufficiently stable holding, or receives holding that is excessively controlling or intrusive, without space for it to relax into a relationship of trust, it will cling, in later life, to its own omnipotence, demanding perfection in the self and refusing to tolerate imperfection either in object relations or in the inner world. (Nussbaum 2001:193)

Nussbaum also draws on Winnicott's concept of a child's capacity to 'be alone' as a critical developmental concept, where the presence of the parent is:

> available in case of need but not making demands. Secure in that presence, the infant can relax and turn inward, discovering her own personal life. (Nussbaum 2001:208)

As noted earlier in this thesis, the 'capacity to be alone' later in life requires more than simply being physically alone, it also requires the person to feel a sense of trust and self confidence, and importantly this is derived from a child's earlier relationships:

> The personal kind of aloneness is always inherently relational: someone else is always there, and it is from the shadow of the early holder object that creative aloneness derives its richness. (Nussbaum 2001:208)

The environment that a child grows up in therefore has an impact on the child's emotional development. As part of this, it is acknowledged that no childhood environment is completely stable, and it is the instability (for example, from carers' coming and going) that means that a child will eventually have to learn how to inhabit the world. Despite this inevitable instability, there are ways in which we can distinguish the types of childhood environment that encourage a capacity to deal with this instability and bring with it the potential for a richness in moral life, when compared to an environment that gives a child no such security and therefore potentially inhibits moral growth. It is in this context that Nussbaum, following Winnicott, argues that perfection is neither possible nor a desirable aim. (Nussbaum 2001:234) Rather, it is unrealistic, and imposing such standards particularly on children is ultimately inhibiting for moral development. It is far preferable to acknowledge the imperfections that come with being human, and provide an environment that helps a child to deal with the ambivalence that comes with this. An environment that is both responsive and stable, without the unrealistic expectation of perfection, therefore provides a child with a valuable basis for moral growth.

One of the themes throughout this thesis is to question the extent to which a 'space of surveillance' can be considered an environment that provides the steadiness, confidence and security that a child requires as a positive foundation for his/her future self. As suggested in Chapter 2, part of the argument here is that, to the extent that surveillance is used in a way that displaces both meaningful one-to-one interaction between the child and others, as well as meaningful time 'alone' (that is time free from intrusive and controlling observers), then a

'space of surveillance' can in fact deprive a child of a solid emotional foundation from which a secure, confident and trusting self can emerge.

There are a range of emotions a child experiences that could be affected by a surveillance presence. Emotions such as fear, anxiety, shame, guilt, love, security, thrill, anger and resentment may all be either heightened or lessened as a direct result of being under surveillance. The point is not so much that each child has the same type of emotional experience when surveillance technologies are used to watch and monitor them, but rather that there are a range of emotions in a child's experience that might be affected by being within a 'space of surveillance'.

I do not attempt to canvass here the full range of emotional experience that may be influenced by a surveillance presence, but explore a child's experience of one particular emotion - shame - and how this might be affected. I develop this example in detail to show the integral links that exist between a child's emotions and moral life, and to demonstrate how a growing surveillance presence might impact on these areas of a child's experience.

A child's experience of shame

Here, I consider what the experience of shame involves, including the distinction between shame and guilt and the different roles these have in moral decision making and development of moral character. I then look at how an increased surveillance presence might bring about changes to a child's experience of shame. It will then be possible to draw some wider conclusions about the way in which the use of surveillance technologies might change a child's emotional experience, and the implications of this for a child's moral life and growth.

The most basic experience connected with shame 'is that of being seen inappropriately, by the wrong people, in the wrong condition'. (Williams 1993:78) In such cases, you might anticipate how you will feel if someone sees you, and seek to avoid the shameful situation. (Williams 1993:79) Williams, however, is quick to observe that understanding shame simply as a fear of being seen is to over-simplify the notion and miss out some of its richer

dimensions. (Williams 1993:81) There are two characteristics that Williams adds to this notion of shame. The first is that:

> Even if shame and its motivations always involve in some way or other an idea of the gaze of another, it is important that for many of its operations the imagined gaze of an imagined other will do. (Williams 1993:82)

This becomes important when we think of the surveillance gaze, because it is not always clear whether there is an actual gaze, and at times even the possibility of a surveillance presence is enough to evoke an imagined gaze. I will return to this point shortly. The second point Williams makes is that:

> Shame need not be just a matter of being seen, but of being seen by an observer with a certain view. (Williams 1993:82)

The experience of shame might therefore occur when the observer is someone you respect (such as a parent, friend or teacher), or when the view expressed is a criticism that you worry might be, or in fact know to be, true. There is also a reciprocal dimension to the experience of shame. That is, the observer is reacting in a way that the individual themselves might also act if the positions were reversed. However, shame need not always arise because of a specific observer, but because of an internalised sense of shame that reflects the types of behaviours that are accepted or despised. (Williams 1993:82-3) Williams refers to this as the 'internalised other', an 'other' which reflects societal expectations in a way that impacts on how we choose to act, and which has this effect because it is 'potentially somebody rather than nobody, and somebody other than me'. (Williams 1993:84)

In distinguishing 'shame' from 'guilt', Williams firstly explains what it is like to feel shame:

> In my experience of shame, the other sees all of me and all through me, even if the occasion of the shame is on my surface for instance, in my appearance; and the expression of shame, in general as well as in the particular form of it that is

> embarrassment, is not just the desire to hide, or to hide my face, but the desire to disappear, not to be there. (Williams 1993:89)

With guilt, I know that even if I disappeared, the emotion would come with me; there is a voice of moral judgement in me. Guilt, however, also brings with it the possibility for reparation (by the person), and also punishment (whether by self or others). (Williams 1993:89) It is the reparative capacity of guilt that Nussbaum also draws attention to in her analysis. (Nussbaum 2001:229) According to Williams, as with guilt, shame can also come about because of an act (or a failure to act), but shame is more likely to result from some 'failing or defect' and it often results in contempt or avoidance. (Williams 1993:90) Unlike guilt, shame does not offer any reparative capacity, and the person is simply left with the feeling of wishing to disappear.

Williams goes on to provide an argument as to why shame, despite its apparent lack of reparative capacity, plays an important role in developing moral character. He argues that, while guilt is about what I have done (or not done), shame looks more closely to what I am. When trying to figure out the source of the shame, a person is usually confronted with some degree of self discovery that is not always very comfortable. (Williams 1993:93) According to Williams, shame can therefore be used to rebuild the self because of the self discovery it makes possible. It gives:

> a sense of who one is and of what one hopes to be, it mediates between act, character, and consequence, and also between ethical demands and the rest of life. (Williams 1993:102)

While both Williams and Nussbaum have a similar idea of what shame is, and how it is best distinguished from guilt, their views diverge when deciding which emotion (shame or guilt) is most 'constructive' when it comes to the developing moral self. According to Nussbaum (and unlike Williams), shame is an inhibitive emotion, and therefore leads to rigidity when it comes to decision making. Rather than rigidity, Nussbaum argues that what people 'need is to develop confidence in their capacity to make reparation', and this opportunity is derived from guilt rather than shame. (Nussbaum 2001:229) To understand how Nussbaum arrives

at this point, it is helpful to return to Nussbaum's argument that emotions have a history in childhood and infancy, as it is there that we can locate the origins of what Nussbaum calls 'primitive shame'. According to Nussbaum, shame arises in infancy from the:

> realisation that one is weak and inadequate in some way in which one expects oneself to be adequate. Its reflex is to hide from the eyes of those who will see one's deficiency, to cover it. (Nussbaum 2001:196)

Given that, to some extent, all infants expect to control the world, and yet at the same time lack this ability, they will therefore have shame (along with other emotions such as frustration and anger). It is precisely because there is an expectation of self worth that shame can arise; that is, when faced with lack of self worth. This ambivalence that an infant confronts was described earlier - on the one hand the infant has a sense of being omnipotent, and on the other a realisation of imperfection. According to Nussbaum, there are many factors that can lead to a heightened sense of shame, including cultural differences and relative differences in physical abilities, the latter of which are often the focus in early childhood. While shame is an inevitable part of being a child (or indeed a human) it can be tempered by a supporting and responsive parental environment. (Nussbaum 2001:197) Therefore:

> the degree and nature of this shame will vary with the extent to which the child's first relationships have prepared her to take delight in her own humanness. (Nussbaum 2001:214)

For a child to accept imperfection and along with this the idea that there is both goodness and badness in the self the child must begin to give up the notion that they are in some sense omnipotent and the centre of the world, and begin to understand what it is to be human and at the same time understand the needs of others in the world. This is where Nussbaum draws on the advantages of 'reparation', as provided for by the emotion of guilt rather than shame. That is, if a child can learn that it is possible to pay back the bad with the good, and even undo 'damage with loving deeds', then this can provide some relief for the

child and a basis from which they can begin to live in the world with others. (Nussbaum 2001:215-6) This is the basis for Nussbaum's argument that:

> Moral guilt is so much better than shame, because it can be atoned for, it does not sully the entirety of one's being. … The structure of morality thus performs a 'holding' function for the child, giving her a feeling of safety. (Nussbaum 2001:216)

For Nussbaum, while shame arises from the absence of perfection when perfection is expected, guilt does not demand perfection but rather makes it all right to be imperfect and provides a way to repair the damage done. It is this distinction that leads Nussbaum to claim that of the two emotions, shame poses the most danger to a child's moral development as it has the potential to be inhibiting and to make it more difficult for a child to be willing to live in a world of others and objects. (Nussbaum 2001:218) [9]

So what are we to make of these seemingly different views? Williams on the one hand suggests that shame makes possible a form of self discovery and rebuilding because of its focus on the self, while Nussbaum suggests that shame is in fact stifling and inhibiting to moral growth because it fails to allow for imperfection or provide a way of learning to be with others.

To address this seeming disparity, I will consider how surveillance technologies might impact on a child's experience of shame. This achieves two things. First, it demonstrates how a child's emotional life can be affected by being in a 'space of surveillance', and secondly, it may in turn reveal how we can best understand 'shame' as an emotion and the role it plays in a child's moral growth.

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[9] It is important to note, that even though Nussbaum ultimately concludes (unlike Williams) that guilt provides a preferable basis for moral development, Nussbaum also notes that there are problems with guilt that is 'oppressive and excessive'. (Nussbaum 2001:218)

I use William's starting point that 'the basic experience connected with shame is that of being seen, inappropriately, by the wrong people, in the wrong condition' (Williams 1993:78), and take it that this is a view with which Nussbaum would agree.

Williams' description of shame is particularly helpful because it alludes to the different ways in which a person can be 'seen' via the use of surveillance technologies. As discussed in Chapter 2, surveillance opens up possibilities for being seen in different times and places, by a range of known and unknown others, in circumstances that are often way beyond what the individual might have expected when they acted in a certain way. What this means is that the likelihood of being 'seen, inappropriately, by the wrong people in the wrong condition' is exacerbated within a 'space of surveillance'. If actions are recorded and/or carry with them the possibility for replay or viewing by others who do not belong to the immediate context, this can open up new possibilities for being seen in ways that are unexpected and by people with a perspective or view not anticipated.

When considering a child's experience of 'shame' and whether or not this is altered by a surveillance presence, I argue that shaming can be triggered by the use of surveillance, and whether this occurs intentionally or unintentionally, the potential for shaming is greatly increased. This comes about because of the potential for a surveillance record to be viewed, circulated, and shared with others in ways that were not necessarily expected. Even in situations where a child is not sure whether there is a surveillance presence, they might act in a certain way, and then 'imagine' there is another watching, and may experience shame as a result, or attempt to limit their behaviour in fear of the potential for shame. As an example, a child may tease another child in a school classroom, and such an action might usually pass unnoticed or attract an instant reprimand or other form of feedback from the teacher. However, if there is a CCTV camera in the classroom, there is then the potential for the teacher to replay the incident to the class, school or parents, in which case the child (even both children) may be 'shamed' as a result of being seen doing something inappropriate in a context now removed from the child's original action. As surveillance devices are now in the hands of individuals, it is not uncommon for children to take photos or video recordings of other children (that in an immediate, passing, friendly context might have been frivolous or mutually amusing), that when distributed via social websites, phones or email, may bring

shame to the child. A child's lack of capacity to control the records produced by surveillance technologies, and the fact that they can be widely distributed and replayed in different contexts, widens a child's possible experience of shame.

What happens therefore is that the 'space of surveillance' extends the possibility that a relatively small misdemeanour (or perhaps not even a 'wrong' as such, but simply an action that might have been acceptable in one context but not another) can be transmitted to a much wider audience. As a result, there is often a negative moral judgement along with the 'shaming' of the person, and the consequences for that person can easily become way out of proportion to the original act. As Williams notes, shame does not need a specific audience to arise; an 'imagined other will do'. This also is helpful in explaining what is happening when the observer behind a particular surveillance device is unknown to the child but that child is nonetheless aware someone may be watching them.

Some surveillance technologies blatantly attempt to evoke a sense of shame in an individual who does something wrong. One example is the use of 'talking' CCTV cameras in the United Kingdom. These operate by adding a voice to the CCTV cameras that broadcasts a message via the CCTV loudspeaker when a person does something wrong; for example, the voice may order a person to pick up a piece of litter they have just dropped, thus drawing attention to the action in a very public way. (BBC News 2007; Smith 2007:293) Arguably the clear deterrent here is being implemented via the aim to shame.

If shame (or the potential for shame) is increased by greater use of surveillance technologies, then a child may avoid acting in a certain way in fear of the shame that may arise. It is in this way we can see Nussbaum's point; that shame can become an inhibiting emotion rather than one that encourages children to 'test out' ideas and behaviours as part of their growing understanding of the world around them. We saw in Chapter 3 how it is important for children to be able to make mistakes and learn from these. The experience of shame reveals a lack of security and comfort in accepting that it is all right to be imperfect. Further, if the use of surveillance increases a child's experience of shame (or even fear of being shamed), then it follows that the spaces where a child can feel free and comfortable to make mistakes,

test ideas and thoughts with others, will be reduced if childhood surveillance is permitted to expand unchecked.

In a study of how a sense of shame is socialised in young Chinese children, Heidi Fung also observes that guilt comes from a child's fear of punishment while shame arises from the child's fear of social expulsion. (Fung 1999:182) Fung highlights the reparative feature of guilt in the following comparison, in a similar way to the distinction made by Williams and Nussbaum:

> Guilt deals with the specific acts done or undone, and the pain associated with guilt may actually be eased or relieved by confession and reparation. However, the global self is the central focus of attribution and evaluation in shame, which therefore often makes shame intensely painful and irreversible. (Fung 1999:182)

Fung, however, also points out that 'shame' is often treated negatively by Western theorists, particularly when compared to 'guilt' in terms of the respective contribution to moral development these emotions make. (Fung 1999:183) According to Fung, when the contrast is made in this way it often reflects a cultural bias and fails to take into account the contextual and interdependent nature of human socialisation. Fung's study of shame in Taiwan shows how it is possible to teach children via 'shaming' in a way that includes them rather than sets them apart, and in a way that is supported by involved and physically close mother-child relationships. (Fung 1999:203)

Is there anything we can take from Fung's study that will help us to make sense of the disparity between Williams and Nussbaum? I believe so. The key is the context in which shame is experienced, or more specifically the environment in which this takes place. If we were to add to Williams' account the context in which shaming occurred, or the emotional foundation that a child requires to support an experience of shame, then it may be that, like Fung, there is at least one way in which self discovery as an outcome of shame could be a possibility. Furthermore, Nussbaum may well agree that, provided certain conditions in the child's early environment were present, shame experienced once a strong foundation had been established may well be a positive rather than a negative moral experience.

However, I would argue that there is little in an environment where there is a surveillance presence that would allow a child to experience shame in a positive, creative way. A 'space of surveillance' lacks an embodied, interpersonal context between a child and significant others (such as parent or carer) that Fung notes is important if shame is to be used constructively. It also lacks the features of a supportive 'holding' environment that Nussbaum (via Winnicott) proposes is necessary to provide a strong foundation for moral life. Without either of these features, we are left with an environment that increases the experience of shame for a child when they are at a critical period of moral development, and when what is required most is an environment that permits imperfection and that encourages the exploration and 'testing' of ideas and ways of being with others.

Even guilt, with its advantage of the potential for reparation, may not be as constructive an emotion when this arises for a child within a 'space of surveillance' (when compared to spaces without surveillance). This is not because the guilt experienced would be excessive (which is when Nussbaum suggests that guilt might become a problem), but because the constructive features of guilt may not be present. According to Nussbaum, one of the features of guilt is that it makes it all right to be imperfect, but the use of surveillance technologies appears to be used to the opposite effect, expecting 'perfection' across a range of activities by permitting few spaces where even minor transgressions might occur. The experience of 'guilt' as an emotion that may be 'eased or relieved by confession and reparation' may also be undermined in a 'space of surveillance', as the act of confession itself becomes redundant in the face of surveillance records that provide the 'truth' of an event. The role of guilt as a positive emotion may therefore be undermined by the use of surveillance technologies to monitor, control and arbitrate on the moral worth of a child's actions.

If there is anything in Fung's and Williams' notion that shame can assist with self development, I would argue that it does not apply in a 'space of surveillance'. At a minimum it could only apply when the child is also supported by an environment that gives the child self confidence and security to draw on the experience of shame in a constructive way, and these are not features of the environment created by the presence of surveillance

technologies. Therefore, I argue that a child's experience of shame in a space where surveillance technologies are used, is precisely like Nussbaum's description of the experience of 'primitive shame'; an emotion that is ultimately inhibiting. This may lead to future consequences in terms of damage to a child's self-esteem, and lack of openness of expression and creative activity.

Despite this inhibiting environment, I later argue that children demonstrate a number of ways in which the shaming effects of surveillance might be overcome; for example, by subverting any overt attempts at shaming with forms of creative exhibitionism. These possible avenues of resistance are explored further in Chapter 7.

From this analysis of the emotion of 'shame', it is possible to see how a surveillance presence can change the emotional experience for a child within that space. Further, this is significant because a child's emotional experience is inextricably intertwined with the types of moral decisions the child makes and the moral agent they are becoming. By exploring the experience of 'shame' for a child when in a 'space of surveillance' it is possible to see how being within such a space is likely to (at least in the experience of shame) be an inhibiting factor in a child's moral development and future moral agency. This is because the experience within the 'spaces of surveillance' gradually displaces more secure forms of 'holding' environments for children, leading to less secure foundations for moral life.

Our emotional life and our capacity for empathy are linked in an important two-way relationship, for one of the ways we come to be empathic beings is through understanding the emotional life of others. Both empathy and emotional life are important aspects of a person's moral life, not the least because they provide insight into the lives of others in a way that allows concern, compassion and care to flourish. It has been suggested that:

> allowing children to experience a variety of emotions, rather than protecting them, like hothouse flowers, from those emotions, is likely to expand their empathic range. (Krisjansson 2004:302 paraphrasing Hoffman)

I now turn to a more detailed discussion of the significance of empathy, and the role it plays in a child's moral development. I then analyse how a surveillance presence might impact on a child's developing capacity for empathy, hence adding to our understanding of the impact of the changing surveillance landscape on a child's moral growth.

Developing empathy

In recent times, there have been several different types of accounts of empathy, and in particular, the role of empathy in moral decision making. I will draw mainly on philosophical accounts of empathy, such as that discussed in the work of Diana Tietjens Meyers and Martha Nussbaum. I will support this by also considering recent scientific work on mirror neurons. Far from evolving in isolation, these different approaches inform and at times support each other through common findings that are emerging. One theme across all these different approaches is the importance of co-present and embodied interactions to the development of empathy.

This discussion gives an account of empathy that explains its contribution to ethical life, and in particular moral development in childhood. It also explores more specifically, the circumstances needed to promote opportunities for empathy. Using this as a basis, I then assess the implications of any practices which restrict a child's developing empathic capacity; and I provide a number of reasons why the increasing use of surveillance is potentially one such practice.

It was noted in Chapter 4 that empathy is commonly understood as being able to imaginatively reconstruct another person's experience. (Meyers 1994:125; Nussbaum 2001:302) Empathy is not so much about putting yourself in another's shoes, but rather about being able to imagine the experience of that person. (Goldie 2006:6) Nussbaum explains the practice of empathy as similar to the practice of a skilled actor:

> It involves a participatory enactment of the situation of the sufferer, but is always combined with the awareness that one is not oneself the sufferer. (Nussbaum 2001:327)

The two key elements to the practice of empathy are therefore: being able to imaginatively reconstruct the other's experience, and at the same time recognising that the other is still separate and that it is therefore not a matter of really being in the other's place.

In order to explain what distinguishes empathy from a range of other possible emotional responses to another's situation, a distinction is often made between 'empathy' and 'sympathy'. (Meyers 1994:33; Nussbaum 2001:301; Goldie 2006:6) As Nussbaum notes, empathy, in imaginatively reconstructing another's experience, does not necessarily involve any particular evaluation of the other person's experience. Sympathy, on the other hand, is closer to compassion, and involves a judgement that the other person's experience is bad. (Nussbaum 2001:302) In this sense, sympathy is more about feeling sorry or pity for someone through a sharing of what the other feels. It is possible to have empathy, without feeling sympathy; for example, it is possible to empathise with someone who is happy. Even when empathising with a person who is suffering, it is not necessary to follow or combine this with a feeling of compassion or sympathy. Being detached from the suffering of another, or feeling that another does not deserve compassion, are other possibilities. (Nussbaum 2001:229-230) It is also possible to sympathise without having empathy; we may feel sympathy if we simply have it on good authority that another person is suffering. (Nussbaum 2001:330)

However, even if empathy and sympathy do not necessarily follow each other, it is widely acknowledged that empathy plays an important moral role through the way it contributes to sympathy and compassion. Empathy provides:

> a very important tool in the service of getting a sense of what is going on with the other person and also of establishing concern and connection. (Nussbaum 2001:331)

That is, by reconstructing in my own mind the experience of another, I have a basis from which to make sense of that other person's predicament or suffering. Meyers disagrees with Nussbaum on one point. That is, according to Meyers, even though empathy involves coming to an understanding of another, this does not extend to situations where this occurs in detached manner with some manipulative or cruel ends in mind. Rather, empathy

presupposes a degree of concern for the other person. (Meyers 1994:31) This is in contrast to Nussbaum's view that empathy, at least when considered in isolation from other possible responses, is morally neutral. However, Nussbaum's and Meyers' views converge to the extent that both argue empathy is highly relevant to, and usually associated with, compassion. For example, Nussbaum acknowledges that:

> Without an attempt at empathy we would surely be less likely to have appropriate compassion, or to take any actions that might be associated with this emotion. (Nussbaum 2001:332)

Further, empathy, even when it is not accompanied by compassion, at the very least does involve a recognition of another's humanity in that it involves an effort to understand the mind of another. (Nussbaum 2001:334)

Most commentators who advocate a key role for empathy in moral life, also acknowledge the limitations and fallibility of the human capacity to empathise with others. Part of this comes from the very nature of empathy itself. In reconstructing the mental experience of another it is easy to get things wrong, either because it is never possible to really know the other or because a person might project their own experience too strongly onto the other. (Nussbaum 2001:328) Others also argue that because of the different emotional dispositions across individuals, it is not an easy task to imagine the actual emotions of another. (Goldie 2006:2) Despite these difficulties, there is also research that suggests that, at a basic level at least, humans share a common basis for understanding each other.

The recent work on mirror neurons provides some insight here. Scientific research on interpersonal relations suggests that humans have a meaningful basis for understanding each other through what Vittorio Gallese calls a 'shared meaningful inter-subjective space'. (Gallese 2003:517) This exists from the time we are born, and therefore the way we characterise this space reveals much about the way in which infants come to understand others around them. The capacity of infants to imitate the adults around them from a very early age has been a particular focus of this research. As an example, it has been shown that:

> Newborns as young as 18 hours old can reproduce mouth and face movements displayed by the adults they are facing. ... The visual information about the observed behaviour is translated into motor commands for reproducing it. (Gallese 2003:518)

The significance of infants' capacity for early imitation is that it shows that, even before the conscious subject of experience is formed, infants form interpersonal bonds with others in a primitive form of a 'self-other' space. (Gallese 2003:518) After a few months infants develop a more mature form of imitation, and, as Gallase argues, what is common here is that both forms of imitation share the capacity to identify the individual being imitated as a 'different self'. It is this shared interpersonal space where the 'self-other' differentiation is present, that Gallese goes on to argue, lies at the centre of individual capacity for empathy. (Gallese 2003:519) This happens because, when a person observes another acting, they are not just observing actions, but are also observing expression, such as the emotions being displayed. Gallese argues that, when this happens a meaningful embodied interpersonal link is established.

One key point of Gallese' argument for the discussion here is his observation that:

> Whenever we are exposed to behaviours of others requiring our response, be it reactive or simply attentive, we seldom engage in explicit and deliberate interpretative acts. The majority of the time our understanding of the situation is immediate, automatic and almost reflex-like. (Gallese 2003:520)

Gallese uses recent research on mirror neurons to explain how this might be possible. Mirror neurons were first discovered in the early 1990s, when it was shown that when a monkey was observing another doing something, the same neurons were fired in the monkey observing as in the one doing the activity. Humans have also been found to have neurons that act in the same way. That is, when humans observe another, this triggers a form of action simulation in their own neurons. According to Gallese, we still recognise an action as that of an 'other', and not ourselves, because of the different neural networks involved. (Gallese 2003:525) While this research is relatively new, its significance for the study of empathy has already been noted. The research shows that there is a form of

embodied simulation at work in the way we come to understand the actions and emotions of others, and the capacity for this is present from an early age. This reveals a common basis for understanding and sharing of experiences; one that includes the emotional dimension to these experiences.

It is therefore useful to acknowledge that there is a dimension to human capacity for empathy that, at a basic level, relies on an automatic and unconscious response that arises when observing the actions of others. The discovery of mirror neurons provides one explanation for how humans develop a form of mutual understanding of each other via social interactions. When it comes to discussing the development of empathy in children, the discovery of mirror neurons supports the view that a child's evolving capacity for empathy has its roots in very early social encounters with others. Furthermore, if children 'learn' empathy in part though mimicking the facial expressions of adults around them, then it would seem that the more interaction and engagement children have with others, the more opportunity they have to 'learn' about the range of human emotions.

Taking the notion of empathy discussed earlier (based on the work of Nussbaum and Meyers), and adding to this the insight provided by recent research on mirror neurons, we come up with a rich concept of empathy that places shared, embodied human interactivity at the centre. Empathy relies on a broad range of sources to achieve an understanding of what another is going through, such as an appreciation of the context in which the activity is taking place, some analysis based on one's own similar experiences and an assessment of the extent to which they may or may not apply to the situation being observed. However, underpinning this activity is a foundation for empathy that arises from the shared understanding human beings have of each other that has been derived from a range of personal encounters with others from birth.

As noted earlier, empathy plays an important role in moral life and in a child's moral development. This is because empathy allows us to understand others and is an important basis for compassion, recognising differences and responding to the needs of others. According to Meyers, empathy contributes most to moral reflection if we practice 'broad empathy', which Meyers contrasts with specific incidents of empathy. In a specific

encounter, empathy seeks to answer the question: 'What are you going through now?' (Meyers 1994:34) A broader version of empathy considers the question: 'What is it like to be you?', and will attempt to consider the person as a whole. (Meyers 1994:35) Despite the overwhelming arguments in favour of a key role for empathy as a basis for compassion and understanding others, there are those who urge more caution about the extent to which empathy ought to underpin moral reflection. (Koehn 1998) That is, it is important to acknowledge that there are situations when the practice of empathy may not always desirable; for example, if it is misplaced, unwelcome or fails to respect the wishes of the other. Empathy therefore has an important role in moral life when it builds an understanding of others, promotes compassion and an appreciation of diversity and difference. To achieve this however, it must be a form of empathy that places at its centre the recognition that the other is separate to oneself, and, where possible, is open to the views and input of the other one is empathising with. This will help to overcome the risks in empathising in a way that is too centred on one's own view and is not based on respect for the other. The key point here is that although it may not be necessary to promote empathy for its own sake, empathy nonetheless provides an important basis for moral reflection and action, and in this light is a valuable capacity that should be nurtured as part of a child's moral growth.

It was noted in Chapter 4, where I discussed how a child comes to understand others through the stories they tell, that an increased use of surveillance technologies may limit how a child comes to understand others if opportunities for in-person interactivity are reduced. If we add to this the analysis above on the role of mirror neurons in the development of empathy, then it becomes even clearer that in-person encounters play a critical role in early childhood development, as without these a child cannot build a shared understanding of others and the emotions others experience. While technologies such as baby monitors, webcams and GPS tracking systems might all provide 'peace of mind' for the parents, and while CCTV and fingerprinting in schools may enhance the security and efficiency, it is important to note that if the use of these technologies overshadows or replaces a child's day-to-day in-person encounters with others, then they may rob a child of key opportunities to build an understanding of others and to establish key foundations for a compassionate and reflective moral life. This is not to say that surveillance technologies remove the possibility

for interactivity in all situations; children will still interact with others both under and outside of the surveillance gaze, and children (as has been noted elsewhere) also benefit from times alone as well. The point is that, as surveillance technologies become more common tools for monitoring childhood behaviour, the extent to which they impact on how and when a child interacts with others (particularly significant others) must be taken into account to ensure children are not deprived of this critical foundation for the development of empathy.

The use of surveillance technologies in childhood spaces may also deprive (adult) society of the opportunity to practice empathy in its dealings with children. This is because, as surveillance technology is increasingly used to monitor and control childhood activity, there becomes less incentive to morally reflect on the activity that falls within a 'space of surveillance' and to ask of children 'What is it like to be you?'; all that is required of a child is adherence to the expectations and limits conveyed by the surveillance device. Also, as noted in Chapter 2, a distant encounter does not encourage the same depth of response as is required from a face to face encounter, with the result that a distant watching adult is unlikely to 'encounter' a child with the same richness and opportunity for understanding that an in-person encounter would demand and bring about.

One of the other broader impacts for adults and society in this area is that a response to control and care that involves use of surveillance technologies over childhood spaces arguably reflects a lack of respect for individual difference and circumstance. Surveillance is often used as a generic response across the population, or groups of the population, with no way of opening up a space for negotiation or mutual understanding with those under the surveillance gaze. Meyers argues that morally challenging situations demand us to respect and value the other's point of view, and also require ourselves to be open to enriching our own moral point of view; a perspective that can be best brought into play via empathy. (Meyers 1994:153) This is because the practice of empathy:

> Pays attention to individuals and seeks to understand and respond to each individual's distinctive ensemble of strengths and weaknesses, hopes and fears. (Meyers 1994:154)

Clearly one of the elements lacking in a surveillance response is an opening for this empathic capacity to flourish. If we do not seek to empathise with a child as a unique individual in forming a moral response to their behaviour, and are happy to rely on the data produced by a surveillance device as the full story, then we lose a rich source of understanding that could arguably help us form a better way of responding. Ultimately, it is possible to identify shortcomings in the environment provided by a 'space of surveillance' for the development and practice of empathy and in turn moral development for children, adults and the wider society. The effectiveness of face-to-face encounters over surveillance-mediated encounters for resolving moral issues can be summarised as follows:

> Face-to-face control is negotiated, not absolute. It is based on a complex moral assessment of character which assesses demeanour, identity, appearance and behaviour through the lens of context-specific relevancies. But most importantly it is negotiated, and ... this negotiation has a crucial moral and educative function. For it is through negotiation, and the approval and disapproval it entails, that social values are learnt and reinforced. (Norris 2003:276)

In summary, I have argued that surveillance technologies are often used as moral 'tools' to regulate and shape a child's behaviour. However, as these technologies rely on 'extrinsic' motivation to enforce moral behaviour, they are limited to the extent that they do not allow a child to develop a more reflective and internal foundation for moral life. Moral reflection requires us to take into account the role of emotions in moral decision making and to develop a capacity for empathy, and I have explained how these two key elements form part of a child's moral growth and understanding. Furthermore, it is these richer dimensions of childhood moral development that are unlikely to be supported within a 'space of surveillance'. So, while we can acknowledge benefits of surveillance technologies in enforcing moral norms and behaviour, we have to also understand the limits of these technologies so that they do not become the primary basis from which children develop as moral agents. Critical moral reflection including the capacity to consider and reflect on the moral 'messages' and expectations being conveyed by the surveillance technologies is important, and provides a key foundation for a child as a developing active moral agent. What has been highlighted here is the key role of a 'good enough' holding environment to

provide a child with security and self confidence in their emotional life and the importance of embodied, interactive human relationships for building a shared understanding of others. Where both of these are recognised and actively promoted in a child's relationships with others, then the child will develop the capacity to be a confident, critical moral agent. This also opens up a way for both adults and society as a whole to care for and support a child in a way that promotes genuine understanding and respect for the child and at the same time reflects and reinforces wider societal values that respect difference, build understanding of others and an openness to moral growth.

In the next chapter, I explore more fully the extent to which some surveillance practices should and can be resisted, and argue that if this happens we may ultimately be able to promote a society that relies less on surveillance and more on the richness of human interactivity and alternative ways of providing a secure environment to care for and nurture children and childhood experience.

Chapter 7 – Looking Forward – Resistance, care and societal responsibility

In this final chapter, I explore ways in which children, and those with responsibilities for the care of children (from parents to society more broadly), might resist or counter the more controlling and inhibiting aspects of surveillance technologies, and where and how children also might find spaces of 'reprieve' from the scrutiny of the surveillance gaze.

As earlier chapters show, there are a range of features of childhood experience that may fail to thrive in an environment where children increasingly find themselves within a 'space of surveillance'. Rather than lose the creative and active potential that childhood embodies, it is important to ask what type of environment will sustain opportunities for a rich childhood experience. Are there uses of surveillance technologies that should be avoided so that children do not find themselves in an environment that might limit opportunities for imaginative play, for understanding self through narrative, for developing trust and a basis for ethical life? If so, what strategies can be employed to ensure that surveillance technologies do not overly dominate the spaces of childhood? How might children resist the encroachment of these mechanisms of control, and on what basis can parents and carers come to balanced decisions about the use of surveillance technologies? If it is important to have spaces that are free from a surveillance gaze, how can we create and maintain such spaces? If we can begin to address these questions then we have a basis for understanding the action required to resist and avoid the power of forces that might otherwise lead to an ever narrowing cycle of control driven by fear and anxiety, rather than a more balanced approach to security and care of children.

I first address these issues by looking at children's (often under-estimated) capacity for autonomy and imagination, and the ways in which children can use new technologies to extend their social and creative encounters. These provide openings for children to resist or counter some features of surveillance technologies. Despite these capacities and possibilities, there is still a vulnerability that stems from a child's inevitable dependency on others in many aspects of their lives. The second part of the discussion therefore focuses on

the role for parents and carers in supporting and nurturing a child's capacity for active and creative agency, and in fostering an environment where the use of surveillance technologies does not usurp or 'crowd out' other important features of childhood experience. Parents and carers do not operate in isolation from the driving forces that come from wider societal influences, and in the final part of this chapter I consider the responsibility that institutions, government policy makers and commercial bodies have in making sure that the interests of children growing up in a surveillance society are not ignored or exploited for other more narrowly focussed gains.

Resistance – The potential of emerging childhood autonomy

As noted in the introduction to this thesis, children, and very young children in particular, often have limited capacity to resist the imposition of surveillance over the spaces they inhabit due to their dependency on others and relative lack of power. On the other hand, from a very early age, children also have far more capacity and potential for autonomy over some aspects of their life than they are usually given credit for. It is this second point that forms the focus of the initial discussion here. That is, what capacities do children have that might provide avenues of resistance to surveillance technologies, even in situations where the power imbalance is clearly not in their favour?

In recent times, a number of philosophers have observed that, historically, there are few works in philosophical literature where children are the subject of direct consideration, with works such as Rousseau's *Emile* being a rare exception. (Kennedy 1998:30; Archard and Macleod 2002:1; Katz 2002:91; Kennedy 2006:21) The overall absence of children as a subject of philosophical discourse means that discussions around identity, selfhood and subjectivity often assume an 'adult' subject. The philosophical discussion on the nature of autonomy is limited in precisely this way; often with the direct or implied assumption that this concept does not apply to children. (See for example Mill 1989:13; Christman 2003) However, I suggest that there are ways in which we can meaningfully discuss the concept of 'autonomy' in relation to children. As a starting point, each of the central notions discussed earlier in this thesis: imaginative play, narrative selfhood, trust, and emotions and empathy, all reveal some ways in which children contribute to their own 'self-determination', some of which I will return to shortly. In addition, there is a recent body of work on autonomy that

emphasises the contextual and relational aspects of autonomy. (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000; Friedman 2003) Through this work it is possible to see how the fact that children are dependent on others need not rule out the possibility that children can act in ways that display autonomy.

One emerging criticism of the traditional concept of autonomy, where the ideal goals of self-sufficiency and independence are at the centre, is that in practice it is not possible for an individual to make decisions and choices independently of their social context and social relationships. (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000:7) While some take this to suggest that autonomous action is not possible, others have argued that this criticism does not mean that the concept of autonomy needs to be abandoned altogether, but rather that the concept needs to capture the necessary social and relational context, while at the same time providing an account of self-determination and self-realisation. (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000:4) It is this latter approach I adopt in relation to children. Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar use the term 'relational autonomy' to bring together a number of perspectives on the concept of autonomy that, while different, are all based on the same conviction that 'persons are socially embedded and that agents' identities are formed within the context of social relationships'. (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000:4) One of the key aims of relational approaches to autonomy is to understand the potential barriers to autonomous agency, in particular the impact of oppressive social environments in impeding a person's ability to make autonomous choices; another reason why this is particularly relevant to the discussion here. (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000:22)

It is not possible to survey here all the notions of autonomy that fall within the broad concept of 'relational autonomy'. However, as an example I will briefly mention Marilyn Friedman's work *Autonomy, Gender, Politics* (2003). Here, Friedman presents a notion of autonomy centred on the choices and actions an individual makes and the fact that the individual must (as themselves) play a role in determining these. (Friedman 2003:4) Friedman argues that such choices and actions must follow on from the person's wants or desires as reaffirmed through self-reflection, if these choices or actions are to be autonomous. (Friedman 2003:5) The other key point is that people are socially situated, and this not only needs to be acknowledged in understanding the nature of autonomy, but in

understanding the social conditions that provide (or take away) opportunities for autonomous actions. (Friedman 2003:18) Friedman's account of autonomy also allows for degrees of self-determination, making it possible to use this account when considering how a child might exhibit some capacity in certain situations and find opportunities to act autonomously even despite their relative dependency. Perhaps the most exacting criterion of autonomy, when applied to a child given their relative lack of life experience, would be Friedman's notion of self-reflection:

> Self-reflection is self-determining when it (partly) shapes behaviour that mirrors a person's deeper concerns that she has reflectively reaffirmed. Within the compass of self-reflective selfhood lie capacities not only for choices and actions that reflect superficial or momentary concerns but actions that bear a deeper connection to a perspective that constitutes her distinctive identity as an enduring self. (Friedman 2003:7)

If we consider the discussion of imaginative play in Chapter 3, it is possible to at least see one form of self-reflection at work even in relatively young children. In that discussion, I argued how the ongoing interaction and influence between a child's 'play' world and the 'real' world has a transformative effect on the child. In this way, the choices and decisions a child makes during play, and the preferences they display about what matters to them as they move between 'real' and 'imaginative' worlds, reveal a form of self-reflection as the child's self is continually evolving based on choices and feedback that arise. If imaginative play provides one site for self-reflection, including a way in which children's desires can be explored, developed and reaffirmed, then it also provides a valuable site for making choices that, to a degree at least, contribute to the child's self-determination.

The notion of trust, as discussed in an earlier chapter, also highlights the fact that the concept of autonomy clearly has relevance to children. It was noted that it is not only children who need to trust others, but that also it is not long before others (including parents) may need to trust the child. In some situations, children take on quite a burden of responsibility from a young age, and there are some situations when children often display a degree of maturity while adults can behave irresponsibly. (Valentine 2003:38) This indicates

that there is no reason to deny that children can display a capacity for autonomous behaviour in a variety of non-trivial respects. A child's capacity to make meaningful and important choices in certain situations has lead to the observation that:

> The recognition that there are many things the child doesn't know which the adult does, but that there are also things which children know that adults don't, turns the 'deficit theory' of childhood on its head. (Kennedy 1998:36)

Taking a view of autonomy that highlights the necessary context and relationships we find ourselves in, illustrates that we are all in some way or another situated in relationships of dependence. (Friedman 1989:159) The fact that children are dependent on others does not therefore in itself rule out the possibility for autonomous action in childhood. The evidence of children's capacity for reflective decision-making that contributes to their self-determination, as highlighted through some of the earlier chapters in this thesis, suggests that children's capacity in this regard may often be underestimated.

One area where children's competency is often well regarded is in relation to the way children adapt to and make use of new technologies. Yet, even in this case, when it comes to decision-making about the use of technologies, children are often not consulted and children's online life is still highly monitored and controlled. (Valentine 2004:66) The message remains therefore that while children might display technical competency, they do not have the necessary social or reflective skills to appreciate the dangers and risks of online life. In the meantime, online commercial websites continue to develop more sophisticated marketing techniques that blatantly exploit the combination of children's technological capacity and relative youth. (Chung and Grimes 2005; Kerr and Steeves 2005) While there is a number of approaches to helping children develop the skills to navigate safely online, one of the limitations of surveillance technologies (such as parental spyware and webcams) is that they can be used without the need to engage in dialogue with children or to involve children in decisions on the use of these technologies. Yet, one of the key ways in which children develop a sense of independence and extend opportunities to exercise this independence is through negotiation and ongoing dialogue with parents. (Fotel and Thomsen 2004:545)

Given that a child's emerging capacity is not always acknowledged, and that children are not always included in dialogue on the use of surveillance technologies, what other avenues are there for a child to resist some of the overly controlling features of surveillance technologies? The notion of 'opportunity' itself provides one possible opening, and the way in which children shape the 'spaces' they move within provides another. Despite the fact that surveillance technologies could potentially limit opportunities for a child to exercise or extend their capacity for autonomous activity, children nonetheless may be able to draw on their skills as 'play opportunists' to resist some of the more controlling effects. (This concept was first raised in Chapter 3) In this context, Owain Jones observes that children 'have remarkable capacity for responding to shifting, unexpected, often fleeting opportunities for expression'. (Jones 2000:41) If the surrounding space promotes the possibility for diverse and open-ended activity, and if the boundaries of the structures children are required to operate in are partly 'permeable', then children:

> have a chance to build their own geographies, to reorder the space to their own desires and in effect create a dimension parallel to that of the adult space, which itself continues to function. (Jones 2000:41)

To the extent that some types of surveillance technologies might add to the 'polymorphicity' of a space, they could therefore potentially add to the diversity of materials a child might draw on in their creative endeavours. (Jones 2000:38) So for example, child-held devices such as mobile phones or wristband tracking devices, or fixed devices such as CCTV, might be used by children in play either by being imbued with other meanings, functions or roles or by playing with the surveillance factor itself. It has been argued that some forms of 'wearable' computing devices offer children more potential for 'self-authorship and self-direction' than some other technologies, and that because of their 'flexible, mobile and spatial capacities' they may open up opportunities for children to explore outdoor areas in new ways. (Jones, Williams et al. 2003:108-9) There is also potential for new technological environments such as virtual reality and the Internet to provide alternate spaces for creative play. (Aitken 2001:178) Many surveillance technologies, however, do not allow much flexibility and tend to be 'monomorphic' or single use; for example, a facial recognition scanner used for a school roll call is likely to allow few, if any alternatives, other than for a

child to submit to the surveillance routine or suffer any disciplinary consequences. So while children, as 'play opportunists' will no doubt exploit any opportunity provided by surveillance technologies to extend their play activities, in practice many of these opportunities may be limited. Another way in which a child might 'play' with a surveillance presence is through the types of children's games that invoke 'spying' on others. In this a child can play the part of the 'watcher' allowing them to experience an empowering and liberating reversal of roles. This opens up an opportunity to reflect on and interpret the practice of surveillance itself, which as I will expand on shortly is in itself an important basis for resistance. [10]

In addition to opportunities to explore surveillance through 'play', the way children use surveillance technologies for social purposes and new modes of expression also opens up potential sites to resist the more controlling elements of these technologies. However, children's use of mobile phones and webcams for such purposes raises new challenges as well as new possibilities for resisting the surveillance potential of such devices. Just as contemporary entertainment such as reality TV shows and popular weblogs push new boundaries of self-style exhibitionism towards a form of voyeurism where individuals become objects of entertainment rather than active subjects in control of their own making, so too do the possibilities for children in using surveillance-style technologies raise similar challenges. That is, there is a fine line between a child's playful use of such tools in a way that promotes a positive form of self-determining creativity, and the point at which this becomes no more than an unquestioning immersion in the practices of a surveillance society such that the child cannot reflect on or understand when they might need to resist such practices themselves.

A child's use of technologies for online social interaction and entertainment is a key site for the child in challenging surveillance practices imposed on them. Online social networking sites and weblogs provide children with new forms of expression, sites of exploration and

[10] It is not only children who 'play' with surveillance, as is evident through the growing interest in both visual art on surveillance and the play potential of surveillance. (Levin, Frohne et al. 2002; Albrechtslund and Dubbeld 2005)

modes of power that have the potential to be used towards creative endeavours, providing an opportunity to not only reflect oneself to the world, but via feedback received to see oneself from the perspective of others. As Hille Koskela notes, the use of home webcams provides an example of individuals seeking to make themselves visible, yet arguably not at the whim of external power forces, but as an active decision to make oneself visible. This can therefore act as a form of resistance:

> Home webcams can be interpreted as a form of 'bringing back' the subject. In contrast of being targets of the ever-increasing surveillance, people seek to play an active role in the endless production of visual representations. (Koskela 2004:206)

This is acknowledged as a form of exhibitionism, but one where 'the liberation from shame and from the 'need' to hide leads to empowerment'. (Koskela 2004:208)

Even mobile phones, which although when switched on reveal an individual's geographical position thus opening up an avenue for surveillance, offer a tool for 'counter-surveillance':

> By shooting pictures the camera phone owners become active subjects in creating and circulating images from both public and private spheres. (Koskela 2004:202)

While these uses of these technologies open up potentially new sites of creativity and alternate ways of challenging the surveillance potential of the technologies, children also face a number of challenges. One of the down sides is that extensive use of mobile phones and social websites opens up possibilities for children to subject other children to forms of harassment and bullying without necessarily having to face in person the consequences of their behaviour. Children may themselves therefore face being subject to surveillance and forms of control by their peers as well as other adults, corporations and institutions. Just as much as children are keen to exert their independence in such spaces and challenge or circumvent the controls imposed on them, they are also vulnerable to exploitation and to breaches of privacy that may happen if they are unaware of the full extent to which they are exposing themselves to others in this global environment. A child's accessibility to

information they need to make informed choices, in a form that is child-friendly, is often lacking:

> While children's [web]site-designers are extremely talented at creating games and spaces that children are drawn to and deeply connect with ... privacy policies are not articulated in a language that is accessible to young audiences. (Chung and Grimes 2005:Conclusion)

The fact that the surveillance technologies themselves are not foolproof provides another potential site of resistance. As pointed out earlier in Chapters 3 and 5, when an application of surveillance is not working and this becomes known, this can reduce its effectiveness. Also, if there is a reliance on some corresponding action on the part of the child (for example, that a tracking device must stay in the child's school bag and not be swapped with another child's), then this also exposes sites of vulnerability for the effectiveness of the technology. Perhaps most significantly, as noted in Chapter 2, surveillance technologies are limited in the information they can gather and the knowledge they present the observers with. Even when performing at optimum levels, the reality is that surveillance devices can still only offer a particular perspective of the child's activities:

> In order for something to be made observable at all, other things certain fields that are ambiguously linked to observation and organise it in a certain way drop out of the same observation. In brief, the paradox emerges that by means of producing something (an observation), we unwillingly also produce its opposite (concealing). (Katti 2002:53)

In exposing the false sense of 'completeness' portrayed by an all-seeing gaze, it is therefore possible to open up an important site of resistance.

The way a child makes use of surveillance technologies, plays with surveillance themes or exploits weaknesses in the technology itself, all provide areas of potential to resist or reflect on the motivations behind surveillance practices. Subjecting such technologies to alternate uses may subvert some of the intentions of the technologies, even if this is only to the extent

that the technologies aim to render the child passive and compliant but fail to do so. On the other hand, if children participate in surveillance practices in a way that is not directed by the child, but rather reflects a more passive acceptance of or submissiveness to the surrounding influences and environment, then a child's capacity to resist and subvert the controlling influence of surveillance is severely eroded.

Overall, it is possible to see that children often demonstrate some degree of reflective decision-making capacity, and that this potentially provides a rich capacity to draw on in resisting applications of surveillance technologies. Furthermore, children often exercise this capacity in the way they take 'opportunities' and make use of surrounding 'spaces' in creative, playful and social endeavours. However, while children may be able to challenge or make alternate uses of surveillance technologies in these ways, if adult controls are overly rigid, homogeneous and strictly imposed, then there may be little room for the child to engage in dialogue or to exercise their will to shift or reorder the constraints on the space. For this reason, it is important to consider the role of significant adults such as parents, carers and teachers in fostering an environment that is more flexible and permeable, allowing spaces where children can expand and develop their capacity for decision-making and critical reflection, exercising these in active and creative ways.

Philosopher Maxine Greene has argued strongly for a prominent role of imagination and critical questioning in childhood education. Greene's interest is in human freedom as 'the capacity to surpass the given and look at things as if they could be otherwise'. (Greene 1988:3) According to Greene, children need an education that opens up such opportunities for reflection:

> Children who have been provoked to reach beyond themselves, to wonder, to imagine, to pose their own questions are the ones most likely to learn to learn. (Greene 1988:14)

In a way that is consistent with the notion of 'relational autonomy' discussed earlier, the notion of freedom articulated by Greene is critical of the current over-emphasis on 'free choice' and 'self reliance' insofar as it signifies a withdrawal from public space and a lack of

emphasis on community and the inter-subjective space that people inhabit. (Greene 1988:2) Greene argues that this tendency is in fact antithetical to freedom because it denies and alienates people from the social landscape and implies a form of 'completeness' that is not possible. (Greene 1988:22) Instead, according to Greene, reality is not fixed but is perpetually emerging, and 'as more perspectives are taken, more texts are opened, more friendships are made'. (Greene 1988:23) Being aware of how we are situated with others, and being empowered to share and engage in dialogue with others to bring about change, is therefore the key to freedom. If we withdraw into ourselves, we 'no longer inhabit a resisting world'. (Greene 1988:20)

Many others have also highlighted the significance of our inter-dependency with others and the conditions needed to empower and support people to bring about change and shape their own life story. (Brison 2000:283; Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000:22; Friedman 2003:14) For a child, the role of significant adults (such as parents, carers and teachers) provides a lifeline to opening up new possibilities and considering different perspectives, making a place for reflection, dialogue and interpretation that allows the child to move from a mere passive acceptance of the boundaries and spaces within which they live to a more active exploration beyond those boundaries. It is to the potential offered by these relationships that I now turn.

Care - Fostering an environment of security and opportunity

In this section I consider how adults who interact on a daily basis with children can foster a variety of opportunities and spaces, and the important role of relationships with children in promoting an environment that balances security and care.

It was noted in the Introduction to this thesis that surveillance technologies, particularly when used on children, frequently extend to forms of 'care' in addition to more traditional uses for discipline and control. However, I have questioned the expanding use of technologies for this purpose when it supplants or takes away from central features of childhood experience. Here I would like to expand on discussion in earlier chapters of the 'facilitating environment' needed to provide both a secure and caring environment while at the same time allowing opportunities for the child to 'be alone'. I build on this discussion by

considering more directly the value of 'privacy' for children as a site of exploration, resistance and subversive activity, and also by looking at the notion of how we 'attend' to children and how this can provide a helpful basis for making decisions about use of surveillance technologies.

As outlined in Chapter 6, Winnicott's notion that children need to learn to be able to 'be alone' arises from being alone in the presence of someone in the first instance. (Winnicott 1990) On this view, being alone is not about being isolated from the world, but rather it is about establishing a sense of security about one's personal life that comes from an awareness of the (actual or implied) presence of a significant other. This brings us to the role of privacy in a child's life. The notion of privacy continues to be widely discussed across many disciplines. Here I focus on the features of privacy that support a possible site of resistance to over-controlling uses of surveillance technologies and explain how this might occur.

In a recent article on the nature of privacy, Debra Morris argues that privacy needs to be understood as more than simply a space that is distinct or removed from the public political arena. Rather privacy also plays a powerful, positive and transformative role in a political sense even though it provides a place where there is a 'reprieve from power'. That is:

> viewing privacy as a certain kind of reprieve from power does not require thinking of it as the very opposite of power. (Morris 2000:324)

Morris suggests that privacy provides a space where there is a 'reprieve from scrutiny and public judgement'. (Morris 2000:330) The space of non-judgement provides an opportunity to behave 'differently, perhaps deviantly'. (Morris 2000:333) Whether the behaviour is trivial or daring, what matters most of all is the fact that it is not being judged or analysed. This is its significance. Privacy provides a 'time, space and opportunity to come into one's own, to emerge as a singular presence in the world'. (Morris 2000:325) It is here that a person can reflect on their own identity, and test out and explore different ways of behaving. The fact that privacy offers this opportunity is recognised by Morris as having clear links to the political. This has similarities to the earlier explanation of child's imaginative play in Chapter 3, where it was noted how a child's experience in the play space has a transformative effect,

in turn influencing the child's activity in the 'real' world and vice versa. So too, according to Morris it is helpful to see the public and private spheres as fluid sites which are informed and transformed by the other as people move between them. In terms of how the 'private' might provide a basis for resisting the power forces at play in the political space, Morris notes that it is the way a space of privacy allows for 'consideration of identity', and how this can be reflected in (rather than simply seen as distinct from) the public sphere, that becomes a form of resistance. (Morris 2000:331)

Stuart Aitken uses Morris' formulation of privacy to show what happens when children's play spaces begin to disappear as children are subject to increasing forms of control, supervision, surveillance and a narrowing of opportunities. He argues that there are many instances where privacy is a condition of play. (Aitken 2001:176) Therefore, with the loss of privacy, children lose the chance to act in a space of reprieve from the scrutiny of the surveillance gaze. With this also is a loss of different ways of being and behaving in a space without judgement; ways of being that might not be possible under a surveillance gaze.

Children therefore need privacy, including privacy for play that is free from the scrutiny of an adult gaze, if they are to develop ways of resisting the increasing use of surveillance technologies. Privacy allows relief from the power of a surveillance presence, while at the same time providing the child with the potential to resist that power by opening up a space where the self can be transformed through actions and reflection in ways that are free from judgement. It is from this basis that a child can actively contribute to, and where necessary challenge, the environment they find themselves in. However, as Aitken argues, for children to realise this potential, it is up to adults to ensure children have spaces where there is privacy. (Aitken 2001:177)

I now turn to the notion of 'care' in the context that surveillance technologies are often presented as a form of 'care'. There is much that can be said about the range of caring relationships that children find themselves in, from parents to extended family, and from teachers to a range of significant others in their lives. I focus here on the parent-child relationship, in some instances more specifically the mother-child relationship where this is the focus of the literature under discussion.

One of the key things to acknowledge about the parent-child relationship is what this means for the parent as well as the child. It has been suggested that one of the weaknesses in some of the recent literature is that the notion of 'parenting' tends to be focused on parenting as a series of functions or tasks rather than on what it means to 'be a parent'. (Suissa 2006:71) Furthermore, that this results in an emphasis on parents '*doing* things for children rather than *being* with them'. (Suissa 2006:72) It is possible to see how the increasing use of surveillance technologies on children may be both a result of, and a contributor to, this type of approach to caring for children. That is, the technologies provide an alternative tool for how to treat, handle or look after our children, but in doing so they provide no visibility for the option that simply allows parents to be with the child. The use of such technologies may also take away from the development of a child's relationship with the parent:

> Caring relationships require that time and attention be devoted to establishing intimacy, for without those we will not know what is distinctive about the other. (Mullin 2006:182)

To the extent that uses of surveillance technologies mean that a child might lose sight of the parent caring for them, and provide less opportunity for reciprocity, then a child may have less time to come to know what is distinctive about their parent as a person and the parent may have less opportunity to come to know the child.

Tied up in the notion of 'being' with a child is that it reveals to the child that the parent is a person with a complex, emerging, non-static identity whose values and experiences are just as much shaped by being with the child as the child's are by being with the parent. (Suissa 2006:73) It has been suggested that the very basis of valuable caring relationships requires both parent and child to be aware of each other as 'a particular (not interchangeable) person' and that this requires some reciprocity; and further that even very young children can express reciprocity such as through the way they respond to parents. (Mullin 2006:182) These caring relationships are valuable when both parent and child each 'finds specific worth in the other, while not demanding perfection.' (Mullin 2006:194) Arguably then, one of the key features of the relationship between a parent and a child is that they need to attend to

and recognise each other as 'particular' individuals, as only then does it become possible to avoid the situation where parents are only understood in terms of 'doing' things for the children. Instead, parents can reap the richness of 'being' with children and children can benefit from seeing their parents as persons who also have needs and interests. This is consistent with the narrative view of self discussed in Chapter 4 where it was noted that all individuals (adults and children) find themselves in a world with others in a way that reveals a story that is unique to each person.

If we are to address the questions about when it may or may not be appropriate to use certain types of surveillance technologies, we therefore need to be asking the right questions. We should not just ask whether a particular surveillance device is the right way to manage children or keep them safe in a particular situation, we also need to ask whether it reflects a way of being with children that allows both parent and child to be aware of each as unique persons.

The fact that parents might decide to use surveillance technologies to monitor or care for a child is in one sense understandable. Sara Ruddick notes that, in aiming to balance a range of interests, motherhood involves considering interests that are inevitably in conflict:

> A mother who watches a child eagerly push a friend aside as she or he climbs a tree will be torn between preserving the child from danger, encouraging the child's physical skills and courage, and shaping a child according to moral restraints which might, for example, inhibit the child's joy in competitive climbing. (Ruddick 1980:349)

On the one hand, it is hardly surprising that the interest of preservation might mean that a mother is 'liable to the temptations of fearfulness and excessive control'. (Ruddick 1980:350) At the same time, Ruddick argues that in general mothers know that they cannot possibly meet the interest of preservation and all the other competing interests as well:

> Mothers not only must preserve fragile, existing life. They must also foster growth and welcome change. (Ruddick 1980:352)

This reveals to us the balance that a caring parent strives for in considering what values and decisions underlie the care of a child. Acknowledging that this can never fully address all interests reflects a realistic attitude of 'humility', and it is this characteristic that Ruddick wants to highlight as part of a reflective approach to motherhood. (Ruddick 1980:349) Ruddick, in drawing on the work of Iris Murdoch and Simone Weil, uses the notion of 'attention' to show how it might be possible to promote both preservation and growth. Attention is a form of looking that goes on across many 'apparently empty and everyday moments'. (Ruddick 1980:358 quoting Murdoch) It allows us to see a child without seizing or using the child, but rather with a 'patient, loving eye of attention' it reveals to us the reality of the child that is a growing person and 'an individual reality'. (Murdoch 1970:33; Ruddick 1980:358)

Where a gaze builds up a coherent, but false, picture of an object (in this case a child), through failing to acknowledge the unique reality of that child, then 'attention is the effort needed to counteract such states of illusion'. (Murdoch 1970:36) Arguably, it is this notion of 'attention' that perhaps best highlights what is missing when a surveillance gaze is used as a substitute for a child's care, and also at the same time what is needed to counter this lack. The use of surveillance technologies generally reflects little interest in the fleeting moments that are 'apparently empty' but that taken together bring about a cumulative effect in revealing the reality of a child's emerging selfhood. The technologies offer few ways for a parent to consider of a child 'What are you going through?' (Ruddick 1980:359; Meyers 1994:34), as they take away both the incentive to ask this and the means to find out. Any answers to this question derived from surveillance data can only be partial and one-dimensional and fail to reveal or provide an avenue for making these everyday connections. Also, often a surveillance gaze reflects a one-size-fits-all approach to watching and monitoring children, making it difficult for the gaze to provide a way of 'looking' at the child as a unique, individual being.

In one way, the practice of 'attention' is demanding morally demanding. In another way, if a 'looking' is both loving and just, then the 'work of attention' goes on continually across day-to-day moments so that we hardly even notice the 'structures of value' that become built

around us. (Murdoch 1970:36) It seems then, that if we acknowledge the significance of 'attention' in how we love and care for a child, then we have a basis for assessing the implications of using surveillance technologies, particularly where these are used as a substitute for adult attention. If we can identify when surveillance technologies might undermine or replace opportunities for 'attending' to children, then we can also identify the points where we should perhaps question and resist the use of technologies and also build an understanding of why the asking of such questions is important.

Overall, childhood spaces will benefit from both the opportunity for privacy and an acknowledgement that the way we 'attend' to a child is about more than just doing things for them, but about being with the child in a way that reveals to both child and parent the possibilities and opportunities for a creative and active selfhood.

Governments and institutions often create spaces where children are urged to accept what is 'given' rather than interpret or reflect, (Greene 1988:7) and some have argued that this has to change:

> Spaces have to be opened in the schools and around the schools; the windows have to let in the fresh air. (Greene 1988:134)

Some parents are already protesting about what they see as excessive uses of surveillance technologies by governments and schools, particularly around the use of biometric technology (such as facial scanning and fingerprinting) for routine tasks such as roll calls. This has led to active resistance in the form of lobbying governments for change and awareness raising campaigns. Collaborative and community resistance by parents opposing the ways technologies are being used on children, points to one opening for political change and public dialogue on these issues. (LeaveThemKidsAlone; King 2008)

With such calls in mind, I turn to the opportunities offered, and challenges posed, by institutions, corporations and governments in supporting children to resist or find reprieve from the growing encroachment of surveillance technologies into childhood spaces.

Societal responsibility

While children, parents and other adults display a range of creative capacities and opportunities to resist excessive use of surveillance technologies, there will be limits to what can be achieved if the wider society (through its governments, institutions and corporations) does not also take responsibility for promoting the types of spaces and values that are needed to support a rich childhood experience. The key influences driving the increasing use of surveillance technologies are generated through government policy, institutions, the media and commercial influences. It is these bodies that therefore need to bear much of the responsibility in first of all coming to an understanding of the potential impact these developments may have on children growing up in a 'surveillance society', and then in response, ensuring surveillance activities are not implemented to the detriment of individual children and childhood experience as a whole. There is growing evidence that children are embedded in a 'surveillance culture' from the day they are born, and at the same time, that wider societal influences are generating an acceptance of certain forms of 'surveillance practice' amongst parents and carers. At the same time, as much of the earlier discussion has revealed, the growing use of such technologies in childhood spaces may not be as unproblematic or benign as often portrayed. However, it arguably becomes difficult for both children and parents to make informed and critical choices about the use of surveillance technologies in the context of wider societal influences and pressures.

Drawing from the earlier discussion of autonomy, it can be noted that, to the extent that the growing surveillance landscape prevents a person from making choices and acting in a way that reflects deeper concerns, or from 'acting according to what matters to them', then they may be living under conditions of oppression. (Friedman 2003:18) We therefore have a situation where, unless there is more open debate and dialogue around the values that underpin the growing use of surveillance in society, and there is space to reflect on and contribute to decisions around how we wish to protect and care for our children into the future, we may be moving towards an oppressive surveillance landscape. What then can be done to avoid this situation, and what can society do (through its governments, institutions and corporations) to ensure that children are nurtured and protected in ways that support an active and creative basis for a child's emerging selfhood?

One of the issues revealed through the earlier discussion, is that a surveillance presence brings with it a number of contradictions about the perception of children in society. On the one hand, children are viewed as innocent and vulnerable requiring special protection at all costs; on the other, they are perceived as trouble-makers, with unruly behaviour that needs to be controlled and subdued. (Valentine 2004:2) The notion that children are vulnerable is sometimes over-emphasised by the culture of fear and anxiety (as discussed in Chapter 5), and a surveillance presence may reinforce this culture leading to 'hypervigilence' rather than a more balanced approach to care. (Katz 2006) The child as 'nuisance' may be reinforced by the types of attitudes discussed in Chapter 3, where children who are simply hanging out and 'doing nothing' are immediately viewed as suspicious; with CCTV cameras being used to detect such behaviour. The discussion throughout this thesis has exposed some reasons why these views are limited, and why the responses that often accompany them fail to do justice to the child as an active, creative, playful and reflective being who finds themselves in a world of others; a child who seeks to build an understanding of the world through a rich tapestry of interactions, story-telling and imaginative exploration. The surveillance response to controlling or caring for children tends to be based on a one-size-fits-all approach that passes judgement about a child based on certain generalisations. Such an approach will therefore inevitably be limited and partial. If we are to understand the impact of a growing surveillance presence over children's spaces, it is first of all important to come to an understanding about children themselves and to allow the voices of children to be heard; to be willing to recognise them as unique individuals each with a story they would like to have told. If society is to challenge the potentially oppressive elements of surveillance practice, and achieve a more balanced approach to nurture and care, then respecting children as individuals who are active and creative beings, provides an important foundation for resisting practices that might otherwise render children passive and unquestioningly compliant.

Perhaps one of the greatest challenges facing society is the need to dispel the notion that surveillance technologies provide a form of panacea for societal safety and security. This is particularly difficult in face of the market forces that promote the use of surveillance technologies, particularly to parents and families, to protect children from 'everything'. (Katz

2006:28) The neoliberal forces, being those which promote privatised solutions over government-run social programs, that drive the market in surveillance technologies are revealed through the growing range of surveillance devices on the market, and the types of messages that accompany them (some of which were outlined in Chapter 1). Yet, the relationship between surveillance market and the state has been questioned, particularly in relation to the growing push for use of surveillance technologies in schools. (Monahan 2006:121) It has been suggested that:

> To allow individual and communal expressions of agency and equality to flourish may require a radical reconfiguration of surveillance regimes and the neoliberal state. (Monahan 2006:123)

Controlling the burgeoning market in tracking and monitoring devices that can be used on children is clearly an issue that needs to be addressed if children and parents are to resist the oppressive potential of these technologies. There is a role for the wider society (and its governments and institutions) to question and assess the interests and influences that lie behind a market approach to surveillance devices, as without this there is no visibility or understanding of the forces at work.

Public spaces not only provide an important play environment for children, they also are a place where children become part of a wider community beyond their family home. Children not only need to be safe in public spaces, they also need to have both freedom and privacy to explore those spaces. One of the biggest challenges posed by the increasing use of surveillance technologies is the fact that spaces for 'privacy' within the public sphere are being rapidly eroded. In an era where there is increased blurring of public and private boundaries, it becomes increasingly difficult to articulate the value of 'privacy', particularly in public environments. Yet, just because a playground, the streets or even local bushland are in spaces that are 'public' does not mean there is no reason to question what might be at stake if surveillance is widely used across these spaces. At the same time, there must not be an over-emphasis on privacy in public spaces at the expense of sociality. (Patton 2000:186) It has been argued that public spaces have social, cultural and civic importance. Therefore, any response to the use of surveillance in public spaces must also bear in mind that those

spaces need to support social encounters with others as well as provide spaces of privacy. (Patton 2000:186)

This thesis has discussed the need for children to have access to opportunities and diverse spaces for exploration and adventure, and it seems these are precisely the type of features that need to be taken into account in decisions about how communities promote safe and vibrant public spaces for everyone. A number of commentators have noted that in some cities or countries there appears to be a 'retreat' from the public spaces, as everyone turns inward to their own private lives (Greene 1988:19), with one writer noting that when he went for a walk with his daughter:

> What struck me at once on that lovely summer evening, as we wandered the streets of our lovely residential neighbourhood at that after-dinner hour that had once represented the peak moment, the magic hour of my own childhood, was that we didn't encounter a single other child. Even if I do send them out, will there be anyone to play with? (Chabon 2009)

A key part of the wider societal response to childhood experience is therefore about the public spaces in our community, how they are used and how they can be made so that children can inhabit them once more. It is also about how, as a community, we care for children when they do move about in public spaces. Yet, it is unlikely that the response should be simply to install more surveillance, or fit a child with a tracking device, as this may not only provide a false sense of security, it may fail to address the broader community and societal reasons for the shift that discourages children from exploring public spaces in the first place. To the extent that the use of surveillance technologies may inhibit a child's way of being in those spaces, and promote conformity rather than diversity, then these technologies may greatly diminish the potential richness of both the social and personal experience of public spaces.

Overall, the societal response to the emerging 'surveillance society' will reflect the values of society itself. One area deserving greater attention is what the practice of surveillance reveals about how we come to understand others. Based on the discussion in earlier chapters, it

seems that a surveillance gaze is entirely inadequate for such a task. Surveillance tends to promote conformity, and makes it difficult to develop appreciation of difference and diversity as anything other than criminality or deviance. We therefore we need consider how this impacts on the ways we come to a meaningful understanding of others, and in turn develop compassion, empathy and appreciation of the richness of the lives others lead. If we return to the role of a narrative approach to selfhood, the possibility for resistance and change requires a community that:

> sustains one's identity through listening to one, and allowing one to listen to others, with respect within the many webs of interlocution that constitute our lives. (Benhabib 1999:350)

Perhaps, most importantly, society needs to allow the voices of children to be heard. It has been noted that, 'as with other marginalised groups in society, children are often not seen to have a legitimate voice'. (Kennedy 1998:36) Yet, if the voices of children are not heard, it is not just the children who miss out; society more widely denies itself 'whole new dimensions of understanding' that would otherwise be revealed. (Greene 1988:127) It is also through the voices of children that we find the greatest paths of resistance, creativity and possibility:

> If the protests of children were heard in kindergarten, if their questions were attended to, it would be enough to explode the entire educational system. (Deleuze in Deleuze and Foucault 1972)

In conclusion, opportunities for resistance start from the very capacities of children themselves. These are often underestimated, but provide many ways to resist and counter some of the overly-controlling features of surveillance technologies. There is however also a role for parents and carers in supporting a child's capacity for resistance, both through fostering opportunities and spaces that children thrive in, and by creating an environment that permits privacy and that supports 'attending' to a child in a way that is loving and just. Finally, the efforts of children and individual adults may be limited if the wider society (through governments, institutions and corporations) do not also reflect on the potential impact that an increasing use of surveillance technologies may be having on childhood

experience. This requires the values that underpin current surveillance practices to be better understood. Opening up spaces for dialogue and promoting public spaces that support children's play and connection with the community are also key responses to resisting an oppressive surveillance culture.

Conclusion

The proliferation of new surveillance technologies such as tracking devices, microchip implants, CCTV, webcams, online monitoring software and fingerprinting systems, is evident across many of the spaces that children inhabit. I have argued that this growing use of surveillance technologies brings with it significant changes to childhood experience.

While the use of surveillance technologies is often promoted on the basis of the benefits that may arise, such as improved security, efficiency and even care, there has been little exploration of what some of the broader impacts on childhood experience might be. In analysing the effects that surveillance technologies may have across four key areas of childhood experience imaginative play, childhood narrative, trust and responsibility and a child's moral life it becomes possible to understand the potential wider consequences for children as they grow up in a surveillance society.

Overall it is clear that there are a number of areas where an increased surveillance presence is likely to be detrimental to childhood experience and that if, as a society, we continue to allow the expansion of surveillance technologies in childhood spaces without reflecting on these potential consequences, we may rob children of a rich and creative childhood experience.

One theme that has arisen throughout this thesis is that surveillance technologies are often applied in such a way that children may experience two very different types of loss. On the one hand there may be a loss of opportunity for interactivity with others and the richness this brings to childhood experience, and on the other there may be a loss of spaces where a child can 'be alone' or find reprieve from the judgement and scrutiny of the surveillance gaze. Another theme that has consistently emerged is that in many instances the impact of using surveillance technologies may render a child passive and compliant, by undermining spaces and opportunities for active and creative agency.

Just as this research has revealed some of the potential challenges children face in a surveillance society, it has also made it possible to identify some of the features of an environment that children may need in order to flourish. These include: promoting spaces

where a child can feel confident, but at the same time accept that it is all right to be imperfect; building trust between the child and others, and trusting the child as an expression of confidence in their capacities; providing opportunities for imaginative play and spaces that allow children to thrive as play 'opportunists'; and acknowledging the uniqueness of each child revealed through their story as told by the child and others. These reflect some of the themes that have emerged through this research and provide a starting point for thinking about the types of spaces and opportunities that a child might benefit from.

To the extent that the use of surveillance technologies fails to promote and support these wider elements of childhood experience, then what is at risk as the use of surveillance technologies becomes more excessive is precisely some of the benefits that these technologies aim to achieve security, care and a child's confidence in the surrounding environment as a foundation for their emerging personhood.

There is little evidence to suggest any slowing of the rate at which surveillance devices are being used to monitor and control the lives of children. Yet, given that these technologies bring with them the potential to diminish a child's experience across a number of fronts, there is an urgent need to question and challenge this trend. Children, parents, friends and carers have between them a strong basis from which to resist the increasing intrusion of surveillance technologies into spaces of childhood. This needs to be supported by wider public dialogue on these issues, and a growing understanding of what may be at stake if these developments continue unchecked. In exposing the situations where new surveillance technologies are being used to the detriment of childhood experience, we can move to a more balanced approach to nurturing and caring for children.

As noted earlier, Kennedy observes that children are a starting point for how we as a society wish to define ourselves. (Kennedy 2006:24) We therefore need to critically reflect on the growing changes that surveillance technologies bring to childhood spaces, and above all provide opportunities for children to be part of the dialogue on the values that guide how we, as a society, wish to support and care for our children. In this way, we may come to a better understanding of the basis for a rich childhood experience, and at the same time open the way for society to transform and evolve as well.

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