

## CHAPTER 7

### **A Knowledgeability-Competence Theory of the Agent/Agency**

Until now I have argued that Giddens's and Habermas's attempts to reconstruct the project of modernity are biased in favour of metatheory and sensitising concepts; that they therefore disconnect the transformative and healing agent from systems in everyday life; and that this disconnection is an unintended outcome of the immanent logic of each project. I have also argued that each theory has the latent capacity both to re-connect the empirical agent and to clarify the social processes and mechanisms that integrate the agent with interaction and system. Using Bhaskar's critical naturalism as a supporting philosophical resource, I now further explore a synthesis of concepts from structuration theory and communicative rationality for overcoming their deficiencies in relation to pragmatic agency and emancipation. In essence, the synthesis proceeds essentially by aligning Giddens's knowledgeability with Habermas's communicative competence, and by articulating Giddens's modes of interaction with Habermas's dimensions of rationality. This new model of the reflexive causal agent or agency is claimed to be more enabling of therapeutic and political interventions in late modern or 'risk' society.

Because concepts and meanings are otherwise superimposed upon each other in the arguments, diagrams are used to separate them analytically and to plot the direction that the synthesis takes. These diagrams read from left to right and will generally precede discussion. For this diagrammatic mode of presentation, I am indebted to Turner (1987) who assembled composite models



graphically represents the overlapping interconnections among agents, interaction and system, as these three entities are the main levels of explanation connecting the elements of social praxis. These interconnections are vital if the agent-systems dichotomy is to be overcome. Second, it sets up the key concepts within each through which I will explore the synthesis of structuration theory with communicative action.

In Figure 7.2 below the direction of the synthesis is given added conceptual detail. The presumed personal powers and causal properties of agents are shown on the left hand side. The direction of their unfolding and indeterminate consequences will be unpacked in the order shown, that is, towards the right hand side and back.




Figure 7.2 The Knowledgeability-Competence Theory of Agent, Interaction and System.

At its core, the K-C theory assumes that personal powers have causal parity with the coercive power of macro structures to the extent that there is a sustained interrelationship between the two. Further to this assumption, the theory seeks to clarify the causal properties of agent/actors and their interrelations with the system/lifeworld. These claims for personal, transformative power against coercive power draw corroboration from ideas and assumptions in Bhaskar's critical naturalism project: from his

endorsement of the causal power of the agent as co-existent amongst other avenues of emergent power in social reality; from his notion of 'real' reasons as motivating or generating action and here he is commensurate with the discursive consciousness (or reason giving) of Giddens's knowledgeability (page 145) and the validity claims and judgements of Habermas's communicative competence (page 146); from his concept of explanatory critical rationality and its emancipatory emphasis on satisfying unfilled needs; and from his concept of depth-rationality and its possibilities of discovery and disillusionment.

Then, the three concepts of knowledgeability, communicative competence and the dialectic of control are the triad at the heart of this model of the nature and process of agency. The knowledgeability-communicative competence capability is the primary causal property (or emergent power) for empirical agents. 'Real' reasons, as validity claims or beliefs, are at the heart of these properties. These human properties are the source of the manifest capabilities of reflexivity, identity-self and critique that are displayed by actors within the imperatives of the dialectic of control. This latter concept, in its turn, describes the dominance-submission mechanism through which agents/actors engage with the modes of interaction. For Giddens, the modes of interaction or signification, legitimation and domination link the knowledgeable agents to systems and institutions. The dimensions of rationality, linked as they are to reasons and used by Habermas's communicatively competent agent, objectify these Giddensian interactions in a given context and map out the fluctuating sense of identity-self in the agent's life project or narrative.

### **The Agent and Interaction**

So, as with Bhaskar, the capability for consciousness is cardinal in K-C theory (Bhaskar 1979, 102). Consciousness is equally internal (as in the

phenomenological sense of constructing personal meanings) and intersubjective ( as in the communicative action sense of consensus on validity claims) and it comes through at every stage in the life project of an agent in varying forms.




Figure 7.3 The K-C model of the knowledgeable-communicatively competent agent and interaction.

It is drawn upon by agents in different ways and at different times in the unfolding of interaction. Also of pervading significance in this model are the manifest capabilities of agents for reflexivity, critique and identity-self formation. The latter is the personalised point of ethical moment - of the coincidence of subjective needs (affective and effective drives) and objective possibilities (Bhaskar 1986, 210-211). Because we cannot fully know the workings of the internal nature of agents, the reader should see the parts of this model of the nature of an agent (Figure 7.3) as connected but not by any internal mechanism of its own. Clear lines of connection belong to the second

part of the theory (Figure 7.6) that outlines the mechanisms of social interaction.

### *Causal properties of the agent*

Agents possess knowledgeability and communicative competence as part of their being human (Brand 1990, 122). They are therefore capable of reflexive judgements which, once made, help to construct a moral/ethical set for the self or life project or life biography (Beck 1994, 13). Through integrating Giddens's and Habermas's models' of agency, four essential and causative components become co-ordinated within knowledgeability-communicative competence. They are causal because they generate or reproduce validity claims or beliefs. These are Giddens's discursive or reflexive consciousness which is exercised through language, symbols and the intuitive practice of the dimensions of rationality; his practical consciousness or routine; his unconscious motives and perceptions; and Habermas's aesthetic expressiveness and desire. All of these components are consistent with Bhaskar's notion of 'real' and causative reasons or beliefs. They also render reflexive agents capable of *transforming* or making a difference to the lifeworld. Such differences include reparation of errors and constructing counterfactual realities. Their interrelationships are complex and not subject to easy computation. Collectively they allow the generation of a life-project for the 'self' in relation or interaction with the 'other', systems and the lifeworld.

### *Developmental and instrumental capabilities*

It has been suggested by Giddens that these causal properties of agents activate a self-identity which develops visibly over time and which acts as an instrumentality for transformative agent power and practice. K-C theory takes this a step further and postulates that the identity-self is formed in the dialectic

of control between the agents' capacity for the dimensions of rationality and the systems capacity for modes of interaction. The building blocks in this formative process of the identity-self again are the agents' reflexive judgements which may include critique and may enable emancipation. Habermas assures us that these judgements, over validity claims, are conducted within the intersubjective media of speech acts and praxis and in relation to the 'other'. The speech acts particularly then connect the agent-self to the social, objective and personal worlds of the lifeworld.

### *Contextual properties*

In structuration and communicative action, the enabling and constraining capacity of the system or lifeworld over the transformative power of the agent is axiomatic. For the K-C theory, the structures of system and agent power are both separate and integrated. The modes of interaction are the pre-existing enabling/constraining properties of the system. They are encountered by knowledgeable-communicatively competent agents, in practice, as they occur within the distribution of natural resources, frames of reference, organisations, institutions and socio-politico-cultural systems. While these modes of interaction help to determine the long-term outcomes for agents, agent power exercises significant degrees of autonomy at the level of day-to-day responses. The daily link between agent and system power is the ever present dialectic of control (Layder 1994, 211) existing between the enabling/constraining modes of interaction and the agent's transformative dimensions of rationality. The motivations for action are the underlying validity claims or beliefs of agents and societies. The instruments of the dialectic between structures/systems and transformative agent power again are the agent capabilities of reflexivity, identity-self and critique discussed in Chapter 2 (page 58).

The reader may protest at the exclusion of a more direct handling of corporeality as a capability of agents in this dialectic and this is a valid concern. I by-pass any detailed treatment of corporeality because this topic cannot receive the attention it needs in the limits of space and direction that are available to me (cf. Featherstone 1982, 18; Freund 1982, 6-7; Turner 1984, 2; Frank 1990, 133; Featherstone, Hepworth and Turner (eds.) 1991, viii). Aesthetic expressiveness and desire have been included as causative components - in the stratification model of the agent - to the extent that they translate into what is in essence rationalised action as intended by both Bhaskar and Habermas. Giddens, on the other hand, acknowledges the motivational power of emotions, but confines any further explanation of its strength to the concept of ontological security. This latter is seated strongly in the unconscious; as a source of motivation about which Giddens vacillates. As the thrust of my thesis is towards ethics, it is incumbent that I emphasise the decision-making elements of the life project and narrative of the agent in order to be able to suggest a 'healing' model of agency or the agent as in, for instance, politics and therapy.

### *Intersubjectivity*

The pragmatic exercise of reflexivity, identity-self and critique by agents within the dialectic of control would occur through praxis, speech acts and the position-practices or relational structures as per Bhaskar. Praxis is social action imbued with the values and attitudes of the individual or group. It is here, in day-to-day praxis, that the duality of the agent/self and system occur. Speech acts, as the repository of 'the dimensions of rationality', provide the empirical link between agent selves and systemic transformative power that is missing in structuration theory. The relational structure refers to the system of position-practices that enables *continuity* in the connections between the

varieties of agents (passing through) and the modes of production. It is also the case, made by Bhaskar, that '... a structure of social relations is both necessary for every other social structure and a condition for the identity of any social form' (1986, 131). It is through intersubjective and objective means as praxis, speech acts and position-practices that values, beliefs, reasons and relational connections become key conduits for transformative power and ethical relations within the dialectic of control. The identity-self of the agent - and more particularly the moral/ethical agent of late modernity - is an autonomous, material vehicle and instrument of this power.

*The dialectic of control between the system modes of interaction and the agent's dimensions of rationality*

Giddens has demarcated the modes of interaction (signification, domination and legitimation) as the primary link between the knowledgeable agent and structural components in duality (Lee 1990, 222; Chapter 3 page 75). So how adequately can the agents' dimensions of rationality (Chapter 4 pages 121-123), integral to Habermas's image of the agent, integrate with and embellish the modes of interaction? Compatibility here should secure coherent connections between agentic and systemic validity claims and beliefs. This question is asked in full recognition of the caution expressed by Thomas McCarthy (1984, xiv) about Habermas's certainty, specific to the dimensions of rationality, that meaning and validity claims are inseparable. Habermas's position is that the meanings of utterances are derived from the warrants and justifications that *are* simply inherent in or real to the condition of the specific situation. In K-C theory too the dimensions of rationality are understood as *indicators* of authentic reasons. Each mode of interaction is now examined to see how points of coherence between it and the dimensions of rationality are integrated in the K-C theory. This examination is followed by an inverse

examination of how each of the separate dimensions of rationality can adequately integrate with the modes of interaction. The intention of this inverted approach is to thoroughly demonstrate the compatibility of, and lack of obstacle to, the amalgamation of these concepts. The reader is reminded that the blending of these two 'real' structural mechanisms (cf. Bhaskar 1986, 130 Diagram 2.10) occurs through another, the dialectic of control, and is manifest simultaneously in agency, interaction and system.

*First Point - from modes to dimensions*

*Signification* refers to the communication of meaning through interpretive schemes. These schemes include language, bodily gesture, dramatisation, art, music, ikons and conventions (Wuthnow et al. 1984, 200). Giddens's understanding of language, as the key element of signification, is methodological: he emphasises its use as 'the medium and outcome of communicative processes in interaction' (Giddens 1984, 31). His view of the role of language does not include the same analytical capacity of the dimensions of rationality to isolate the types of validity claims in specific utterances by particular agents in personal contexts or in intersubjectivity. This empirical task and its attendant advantages can be better accomplished by building in the Habermasian usage of language. This would mean that the deeper nuances of illocutionary utterances, or action parts of any speech act, examined within the duality paradigm can then be reached through the dimensions of rationality. It would also mean that the analysis of personal interrelations in the perlocutionary utterances can be undertaken. Such analysis would identify one agent's exploitative, if not transformative, power acting to affect another in the warrants and justifications of shared speech. Then, the value of the dimensions of rationality are not confined to language as signification. Dramaturgical action, art, music and ikons are subject also to

demarcation into 'borderline cases' or structural types of validity claims by the dimensions of rationality.

*Legitimation* or normative sanctions do not usually need the support of reasons or validity claims at the level of everyday understanding. Rules or conventions are obeyed or the sanctions are applied. This is the case until the emergence of a crisis either in ontological security for agents or in the legitimacy of the system or part thereof. At times of crisis in ordinary social life the agent acts tactfully to bring about a resolution in ontological security (Giddens 1984, 64). For structuration, this remains an essentially psychological response. It is significant that Giddens's duality paradigm, which brackets interdependent relations, stops short of defining, with any precision, the mechanism through which tactful responses to larger crises reach an intersubjective resolution separate from restraint. I have in mind here, as an example, dislocations that occur at the level of what Bhaskar calls the relational system of position-practices. Our understanding and resolution of this latter type of crisis in legitimation can be strengthened by the inclusion of the Habermasian process of 'argumentation at the level of the discourse'. Argumentation could and should occur once a crisis has served to elevate the 'offending' norm, position-practice or action to the discourse level for validation amongst agents. With the addition of such a mechanism, the knowledgeable, autonomous agent-self is now actively engaged in both the duality of the dominance-submission syndrome of 'legitimation' and in the *intersubjective* process of resolving a system's legitimation crisis. Such processes or mechanisms of resolution operate on both the inner and external planes of agency. The first is that of the actor's validity claims identified through agents' intuitive capacity for the dimensions of rationality, while the second is that of communicative action and understanding in conditions of ideal-speech. This latter again, and its condition of open reciprocity, prescribes the late

modern ideal of free and equal conditions for the emancipatory resolution of the crisis.

*Domination* or access to allocative and/or authoritative resources is a property of society (Giddens 1984, 33). The knowledgeable agent is enabled or constrained by the available access to resources and by the means to such access. Constraint is also due to the unintended consequences and unacknowledged conditions of social actions. Structuration theory, either as duality or as critique, has difficulty explaining pervasive domination because of the neglect of the causal or objective structures responsible for such. This is in no small part due also to the onus of responsibility being conferred upon agents or agency. Emphasising within structuration theory the intuitive capacity for communicative competence and its ties to validity claims and judgement - to verify the authenticity of what is being produced or reproduced - will introduce a sharper sense of personal and ethical critique into Giddens's metatheoretic, apolitical view of bounded agency. These Habermasian notions re-instate the element of emancipation, and in particular, the capacity of the knowledgeable actor to respond dialectically and transformatively to prevailing 'relations' or material resources within institutions of domination. The duality between agent and system and the potential for critique of the systems of domination now become tangible through the enactment of the ethical judgements of agents in relationship with each other. The same applies to the merging of the developing individual personality and group identity.

#### *Second Point - from dimensions to modes*

To what extent do the separate and intuitive dimensions of rationality *interact* with the modes of interaction available to agents? This question is asked in full recognition of the impact of unintended consequences and unacknowledged conditions on the practice of agency. The answer is that the

links with legitimation and signification are more easily identified. The case for domination is less clear-cut because Giddens and Habermas identify divergent points of departure for domination. On the one hand, Giddens identifies resources and rules as structures of constraint or enablement for a knowledgeable actor. In contrast, Habermas identifies a functional strategic rationality embedded in the economic and political systems as the source of domination. With such a divergence in their points of departure (where virtual structure is opposed to instrumental rationality), any compatibility is not at first obvious. It is crucial to note nevertheless, with the synthesis used here, that the personal attributes and capabilities of agents are common, if underdeveloped, concerns in the narrative of domination in both projects.

In Figures 7.4 and 7.5 below, the Giddensian modes of interaction are juxtaposed against the Habermasian linguistic dimensions of rationality and should be read from the bottom up.




Figure 7.4 Agency and the structure-rationality integration: Legitimation and Signification.

Teleological or strategic action corresponds directly to legitimation or normative sanction. In this type of action, judgements about the success of goal achievements are made from a scientific knowledge base; scientific norms are used to make the judgements and confer legitimacy. Teleological action, in this sense, corresponds with legitimation. Another dimension of rationality, namely, the norm-regulated action also corresponds with legitimation. This connection retains the differences that exist amongst the regulative norms that govern the actions of agents, for example, laws versus social mores versus the scientific method. These continue to apply. The Habermasian typology brings to the Giddensian understanding of legitimation an empirical, agent-based capacity for the clearer demonstration of how duality can be verified (see Figure 7.4). In other words, validity claims of the teleological and norm-regulated dimensions of rationality are instantiated through action, interaction and systems. If one refers to Habermas's example of the interaction amongst workers on a construction site who seek agreement upon a simple act of a mid-morning snack (Habermas 1987a, 121) then: the interaction amongst these hierarchically placed workers is norm-regulated action; the setting of a goal by the workers to have a beer at the mid-morning break is teleological action; and legitimation is the Giddensian mode of interaction connecting both.

There are other conceptual advantages here. The different forms of signification - language, gesture, dramatisation, art, music, etcetera - can now be analysed more directly through constative action or conversation and dramaturgical or expressive action. This is because, in constative action, the component 'worlds' that lie beneath symbol and language now become discernible through the validity claims and actions of actors. In dramaturgical action, the same rational discernment can be applied through the 'authenticity' of the staged behaviours of actors in interaction. Also, constative action and dramaturgical action serve as the source of origin for the new and

emerging meanings, that is, the reproduction and transformation of signification in Giddens's duality (see Figure 7.4).

In terms of domination, the interrelation between the dimensions of rationality and the modes of interaction is tenable at the ontological level of power: this is the case despite the apparent gap between them owing to the incompatibility of 'virtual structure' and instrumental rationality as stated earlier. This interrelation is possible because power, as evidenced in Bhaskar's several levels of rationality, is a concept of plural occurrence and interpretations. When spoken of as domination in structuration theory, power refers to access to resources; when spoken of as legitimation it refers to sanctionary power; when spoken of as speech utterances or signification it refers to an actor's seeking to manipulate or contrive with another. In other words, the Giddensian modes of interaction, when understood as a framework of three categorised instances of power relations, are all open to the conceptual advantage of some or all of the agents' capacity for the Habermasian dimensions of rationality. Of those dimensions that are suited to signification there are some that are also especially suited to legitimation (cf. Figure 7.4); while collectively, all the dimensions of rationality engage the issue of domination and with it the issues of transformative power and emancipation (Figure 7.5). To extend the example of the construction workers and legitimations used earlier: should the new worker display a gesture of disapproval to others at being given the job of getting the beer, then this dramaturgical action conveys his challenge to the validity of the status quo; should the older worker then confront the new worker face-to-face and effectively legitimate the validity claims of the status quo then constative action is at work; but both types of actions demonstrate power and domination at work

The dimensions of rationality provide more than a scheme for operationalising key sensitising concepts of structuration theory. They define

the boundaries for the immanent criticism and critique by agents, through validity claims, of the social activities and actions that create and recreate the lifeworld. In them, agents and scientific observers show the same, if not equal, capacity for everyday analysis. Significantly, the potential of validity claims within these dimensions for critical, emancipatory and ethical action includes the communicative action notion of consensus as a non-automatic prompt to action.




Figure 7.5 Agency and the structure-rationality integration: Domination, Legitimation and Signification.

### The Mechanisms of Interaction and the Capabilities of Agents

Besides the unintended consequences and unacknowledged conditions, there are, in structuration theory, two other underlying real phenomena operating within the mechanisms or process of the dialectic of control. They are the structure of risk/opportunity and the mechanism of the double

hermeneutic both of which operate to *constrain and enable* agent knowledgeable and transformative power in social action but without any reliable connection to the outcomes. Yet these two phenomena underscore the idea of social change and critique as common everyday occurrences because they are ever present, if indirect, contributors to the mechanisms and outcomes of social action and decision-making (Hedstrom and Swedberg 1996, 299). However, the hypothesised K-C mechanism of interaction reinforces the idea that agents perpetrate this ongoing critique and change due to their capacity for *reflexivity and judgement* during social action.

*Reflexivity and Judgement: K-C hypothesis of interaction*

Habermas explains every potentially emancipatory action through the medium of communication and common agreement on validity claims. Giddens, on the other hand, explores the struggle of agents to accommodate the risks and opportunities they encounter in the uncertainties of high modernity and a manufactured future. K-C theory then, integrates the intersubjective nuance of the communicative action ethic with the pragmatic utopianism of structuration theory. Further to such integration, it hypothesises underlying realist mechanisms of interaction in the lifeworld that exist independently of the social, cultural or personal worlds emphasised by Giddens and Habermas. The aim of this explorative integration again is to get a fix upon the transformative and healing power of agents or agency in late modernity. The agent capacities for reflexivity and ethical judgement and the lines of connection within the mechanism of interaction are illustrated in Figure 7.6 below.

The hypothetical processes unfold through two sets of options. In the lifeworld, knowledgeable-communicatively competent agents encounter each

other, both singly and collectively, in situations of the dialectic of control. Their mutual and pragmatic enactments of discursive and *reflexive* consciousness in

## INTERACTION




Figure 7.6 The K-C hypothesis of interaction connecting Agents' validity claims with System

this situation, whether intentional or routine, become exposed through the validity claims that underpin the dimensions of rationality and the modes of interaction. Within this *meaningful and reflexive* praxis of an unfolding everyday social situation, the condition of *open reciprocity*, or an ability and a willingness to understand, may or may not be forthcoming from agents. This outcome is the result of choice and will and it presents the first set of options, which is the presence or absence of open reciprocity.

Open reciprocity is a necessary condition of humans seeking to comprehend each other. It is here too that Habermas discerns the basis of morality to exist (Habermas 1990, 201). Its presence relies upon the 'yes' or 'no' judgement that agents will give for its acceptance after reflection upon validity claims. Once accepted, then a second subset of options follow. When open reciprocity is forthcoming or present, and when the judgements that follow criticise and challenge the normative or social or personal order - then risk, in the common-sense meaning of danger or threat, is upheld and opportunity for transformation or change is possible. The energy for transformation or social change is greater when the risk taking is supported by a personal relationship in an ideal-speech context. Notwithstanding the intersubjective potential of open reciprocity, the personal charisma or moral/ethical stance of an agent acting in or outside of a role relation can serve as the initial prompt for collective, transformative action as well. Here I have in mind the impact of charismatic leaders, formal or informal, in organisations, groups, cultures etcetera. When judgements that follow open reciprocity merely uphold the prevailing normative or social or personal order, then risk and the opportunity for change are foregone and the status quo maintained. The second subset of options for transformation or not, provides significant and cyclical episodes in the formation of identity-self. When the condition of open reciprocity is not forthcoming or absent, for whatever reason, then the normative order or

prevailing dominance-submission systems and identity-selves persist. Risk and opportunity in these situations remain dormant.

From these two sets of outcomes it is possible to draw a few hypotheses:

- (i) When open reciprocity is not accepted then the normative order persists and risk/opportunity are dormant.
- (ii) When open reciprocity is accepted then;
  - (a) if risk/opportunity are upheld, transformation of self and system can follow
  - (b) if risk/opportunity are upheld in conditions of ideal-speech, then moral/ethical transformation and healing of self and system can follow
  - (c) if risk/opportunity are foregone, then the status quo for both self and system is re-affirmed.

These few proposals, exacted from K-C, speak to the functioning of meaning and reflexivity amongst agents in late modernity as was earlier associated with Weber, Schutz and Mead, with the exception that open reciprocity replaces ego-centred subjectivity. The arrows in Figure 7.6 show the cyclical unfolding, in time, amongst the sequential steps (or boxes) of mutual interpretation amongst agents. Together, the arrows and analytically separate boxes display the *specifics* of the interrelations of rationality, language and praxis in the unfolding of the transformative power of *agents in interaction with system*. Furthermore, the dynamics of the (1-4) reproduction steps in Bhaskar's TMSA model (Figure 6.2 on page 174) correspond to the top left/bottom right of Figure 7.6. The return arrow corresponds to the (2-3) socialisation steps of Bhaskar in this same Figure. Finally, the knowledgeability-competence box corresponds to Bhaskar's assertion that informed, knowledge-directed desire is a crucial mechanism that drives praxis and emancipation (Bhaskar 1993, 169).

To step aside from the working of this model for a moment, risk in this process refers less to the imponderable and apocalyptic element of high

modernity also referred to by Giddens (1991, 3-4), although this is not to gainsay it, but more to the everyday sense of the term. To the sense that 'there is no risk-free behaviour' (Beck 1992, 183) because, as suggested by Luhmann, risk is an inevitable consequence of decision-making and the growth of advancing complexities of knowledge (Harrison 1995, 81). Nevertheless, in the apocalyptic sense, the material powers available to society exceed any human capability of being able to control or predict the outcomes (Bauman 1993, 17-18). Social and normative parameters of any kind have to come to grips with this. However, individual agents are generally not able to include these types of hazards in their intentions, and neither is any reciprocity and consensus with the generations of the future a viable precaution for addressing these dangers.

Bauman (1993, 220-221) suggests calling upon an ethics of self-limitation and the practice of second-degree evaluation of doubts and second thoughts instead. This would allow contemporaries to seek to preserve and to prevent the deterioration of the present while making room for the autonomous contribution of future generations. Despite his caution with the relevance of reciprocity and consensus to influencing apocalyptic risk, Bauman's appeal for contemporary (and ethical) action does not disavow the value of these two principles. Neither does it undermine the difficulty for decision-making in instances of risk/opportunity that have no reliable connection to the outcomes. Reciprocity and consensus do offer opportunity for decisions, in conditions of either common-sensical or apocalyptic risk, to be made on a rather well founded and responsible basis. Giddens is supportive of such 'radical engagement' and of optimism because he sees the condition of risk as also offering calculable opportunities.

Beck (1994), like Giddens, optimistically suggests that the task falls to science to estimate and to reflect upon the element of opportunity in the risk, because risks and hazards in reflexive modernity cannot easily be recognised

by lay actors' powers of detection (Bauman 1993, 200; Beck 1994, 5-6). Without distracting from this latter element of the inaccessible 'danger' that inhabits Beck's reflexive modernity, K-C theory adopts Giddens's 'get on with it' or 'utopian realism' approach to the reality of risk/opportunity. This is because of its implied reference to the agents' intuitive sense of risk in daily life and because of its sense of action: action that seems to be necessary for any attempt to reconstruct modernity or late modern morality and to avoid paralysis due to overwhelming risk (Beck 1994, 9). It will always be the case that present hazards and risks cannot simply be abolished or wished away.

Bauman argues forcibly against the merit of calculated risk favoured by Giddens and Beck because it seems to perpetuate the destructive path of technological dependence and rationality of modernity (1993, 202-209). Bauman's response to my argument for the re-instated role of ethical agency probably would be that allocating responsibility for unassailable risk to lay actors is tantamount to taking a blindfolded approach to its hazards and dangers because of the institutional roots of this threat (Bauman 1993, 202-203). The K-C approach proceeds in this direction of ethical agency on the assumption, shared by Bauman and less directly by Bhaskar, that there is need to call forth the transformative power of the autonomous moral/ethical actor if this sense of powerlessness in late (or reflexive) modernity is to be engaged. It is supported here by Beck's implication that reflecting enables actors to know 'what is going on', 'how to go on' and 'be able to go on' (Bauman 1993, 201).

To return to the working of K-C model, the explanatory possibilities of this process of interaction in Figure 7.6 go beyond the drawing of specific hypothesis. The mechanism can also act as a correspondence model for explaining key steps in the transformation of crucial institutions. This is briefly demonstrated using an empirical work which Giddens discussed. This example is not intended as conclusive proof of the hypothesised process. It is

rather a corresponding instance of knowledgeability-communicative competence serving as the causal source for the step-by-step unravelling of the stages connecting transformative agents to institutions. The crucial point here is to reinforce the causal impact of agents' validity claims and the substantive outcomes of personal reflexivity and judgements in the complex and dangerous lifeworld of late modernity.

In his discussion of self-help therapy and its thematisation of the unique features of high modernity, Giddens draws from the findings of the study '*Second Chances*' (1989) by Wallerstein and Blakeslee on divorce and remarriage. In general, he uses the work to illustrate: (a) how deeply the structural elements of modernity penetrate '...into the heart of self-identity and personal feelings' (Giddens 1991, 12); (b) how, after divorce, individuals engage in a process of 'decoupling' and reconstruction of self-identity in the face of the prevailing structures; and (c) how this exercise in duality results in the reconstruction of '...the universe of social activity around them' (Giddens 1991, 12). This is what he has to say:

A child in a stepfamily may have two mothers and fathers, two sets of brothers and sisters, together with other complex kin connections resulting from the multiple marriages of parents...These new forms of extended family ties have to be established by the very persons who find themselves most directly caught up in them (Giddens 1991, 13).

Giddens does not go on to demonstrate by what process these 'new forms' are constructed or how they become a part of personal and social change (Giddens 1991, 33). This is understandable given that his ontology is without this type of pragmatic import.

Further to Giddens then, K-C theory postulates the point by point reproduction or not of these 'new forms' and individual life-projects (reading Figure 7.6 top to bottom and left to right). The correspondence between this situation and the K-C hypothesis is as follows.

\*Clearly both the adult and the young members of the stepfamily have the practical task of producing their marriage-family relationship. The individual children and spouses are assumed to be knowledgeable-communicatively competent agents with causal and transformative capabilities.

\*The family and interpersonal relationships, or in Bhaskar's terms the prevailing system of position-practices, are the everyday location of the dialectic of control.

\*Each agent is capable of reflexivity, of activating the dimensions of rationality in relation to the modes of interaction, and of open reciprocity.

\*The condition of open reciprocity will be present when the member agents concede a 'yes' judgement to understanding either the validity claims or dramaturgically communicated desires of other family members for 'new forms' of relationships in their home.

\*When part or all of the prevailing relationships are criticised and challenged from within this open reciprocity, the risk and opportunity for change within the unfolding praxis of this situation are upheld and then these relationships are or can be transformed.

\*When part or all of the prevailing family relationships are normatively upheld by the judgements taking place within open reciprocity, then risk and opportunity for change are foregone and these ties persist in the family.

\*When open reciprocity is absent or not forthcoming, through whatever means, then the status quo will persist or personal disaffections will

become subterranean to re-emerge in another time and space, perhaps even in personal psychological problems. In the absence of open reciprocity, the 'new forms' of extended family ties anticipated by Giddens would not be forthcoming.

\*Changed areas of normative consensus within the family, and between families, lead to new forms of family relationships that, in their short or long term, become again the situation of the dialectic of control for the knowledgeable agents.

In this example, K-C theory has specified the consequences that follow for norms and institutions from the presence or absence of the options of open reciprocity. It has itemised each of the steps of the mechanisms of interaction and isolated the potential points for therapeutic and political intervention. Further to this dialectical connection amongst the actors and societal norms, the K-C theory makes provision for the intentionality of the charismatic agent, young or old, to bring the force of argument and personality to bear upon the autonomy of the others in the stepfamily at any of these steps. In this it acknowledges the different degrees of knowledgeable ability amongst agents and within contexts (Boyne 1991, 59). In Chapter 8, an example of anorexia nervosa is used for the specific purpose of emphasising the transformative power of moral/ethical and healing agents or agency.

*Normative order versus critique and change: ethics, identity-self and aesthetic expressiveness*

So what is the effect of the mechanisms of interaction upon agents as selves, as opposed to the normative order? K-C theory proposes that *the identity-self is constructed and reconstructed in much the same way as are social change and the normative order*. This refers to the return arrow in the top right of Figure 7.6. Here is where the theory is different from the hiatus that Bhaskar considers paramount between the individual and society, and this

difference is due to its inception in the integration of Habermas's communicative action and Giddens's duality of structure. The construction of the self-project and the system are therefore accomplished within the same K-C mechanisms of interaction. In these processes, the moral/ethical judgement of the agent in a context of open reciprocity is the kernel to the integration or otherwise of society, agents and morality (Habermas 1990, 199-200). In other words, Figure 7.6 is to be understood as a cyclical reiteration - rapid or slow, frequent or infrequent. As such it goes further than Bhaskar's TMSA, since it *specifies* the transformation/reproduction of self and society. K-C is consistent with and fills out Bhaskar's TMSA.

The conditions of open reciprocity are where validity claims are justified, and where consensus and the conditions of ideal-speech provide the context necessary for moral reasoning as well as for moral inception into the individual life as ethics. Here too is where ethics provide an agent's life project with 'clinical advice' (Habermas 1993, 9) directed through the authentic self-realisation of that life (Hohengarten 1992, xix). This K-C understanding is least occupied with ethics as a *the* moral code prescribing good and bad behaviour for actors as understood in classical modernity (Bauman 1993, 21). Instead it is concerned more with the taking of responsibility by agents for decisions, unavoidable and even unwelcome in late modernity, that instantiate their own moral-ethical behaviours which are arrived at in open reciprocity with other agents.

Open reciprocity in the intersubjective sense includes therefore a democratic element that Bauman has viewed as the antithesis to the former moral-legal codes of modernity (Bauman 1993, 26). This democratic element is not to deny that individual autonomy and heteronomy are unevenly distributed in late modern society (Bauman 1993, 29), but rather to acknowledge the need for an intersubjective mechanism of agency with which to discern from

amongst the many competing standards and expectations that render agents uncertain and without any satisfactory exit. It is this democratic quality of open reciprocity that dialectically enables the evolving knowledgeability of self, life project and life politics. It is here also that an important impetus for the counterfactual or new order, generated by causal agents in communicative action, is to be found.

### *Moral/Ethical power*

In K-C theory, Giddens's 'confluent love ethic', which structures the pure relationship between partners, and Habermas's 'discourse ethic', which structures intersubjective relationships, become absorbed into each other at the level of open reciprocity. Habermas though would be wary of the inability of confluent love to sustain communal goals (Cronin 1993, xiii), but this does not equate to a rejection of the parallels confluent love has with open reciprocity. In this integrated concept, partners and groups legitimate new validity claims through coherent, democratised and personalised ethical action. This sort of ethical action, in keeping with Habermas, continues to discern between authoritative consensus and the actual coercive functioning of power (White 1988, 76). Individualised and/or collective action (or learning), when in contrast to the dominant norms and rules (McCarthy T. 1979, xxii-xxiii), acts as a counterfactual which should/could lead actors to want to remove obstacles and transform social activity.

Most importantly, in K-C theory, ethical negotiation and consensus formation is made possible through *personal morality* and not the other way round (Bauman 1993, 34). Agents are moral beings. This claim is reinforced by Habermas's assumption that an autonomous morality is embodied in an ethical life (Habermas 1993, 171). For Giddens, on the other hand, ethical imperatives are to be found in the public domain, are difficult to demonstrate

and are vulnerable to power (Giddens 1992b, 201). Further to this personal moral base, K-C theory conceptualises agentic ethical judgement as the empirical moment when the distress to actors, of acting as moral beings in a world of 'morality without foundations' (Bauman 1993, 32), can be confronted and overcome. This does not mean that moral/ethical decisions are not plagued by ambivalence and uncertainty (Bauman 1993, 21) but that impotence and anomie need not be automatic. An example of this moral-ethical interplay is the opposition of environmentalists, singly and collectively, to the unethical practices of rampant industrialism that threatens the survival of the ecosystem. Such moral issues - as survival of the eco-system - start to be addressed at the moral level of agents or agency whose ethical responses become the empirical means towards redress.

### *Identity-Self*

The process of identity-self formation reflects the morality and ethics of agents. For Giddens, identity-self is the result of a reversible self-regulation of the actor who is familiar with the prerogatives and obligations harboured in particular role-positions and situations (Giddens 1984, 84). It is also then '...a *trajectory* across the different institutional settings of modernity...' (Giddens 1991, 14). Yet the question remains for Giddens's emphasis on role positions and institutional settings: how does the production and reproduction of self and social identity occur without a return to ego-centred subjectivity? The idea of the double hermeneutic is useful here but is insufficient on detail.

The K-C theory engages with this question. First, agents are able to exercise their autonomous power for self and social transformation through the process of intersubjective reflexivity, open reciprocity and moral/ethical judgement as mentioned earlier. The emphasis towards Habermas here should be clear. Second, the theory emphasises the necessary role of

communicative action in arriving at a consensus about the new institutional forms as in the family and self-identity example given earlier. Communicative action implies the 'ought to' conditions of ideal-speech, in as much as this can be realistically reached, as well as the democratic principle inferred by communicative action. Most importantly for de-centered subjectivity, K-C theory upholds the idea that identity-self is formed both *through and against* the common understandings and consensus that partners and communities reach through debate on truth claims and value imperatives. In this way it explains the personal and collective exercise of the agents' capacity to 'make a difference' *without* the constraint of total consensus. K-C theory therefore allows for agents either reaching consensus or withholding consent. The latter means that more remains to be done by agents on reflexivity and the reaching of open reciprocity if they care to.

Given its bent to communicative action, how does the K-C mechanism of interaction integrate with Habermas's critique of the institutional, identity-based roles of worker, consumer, citizen and client? For him, the individual process of transformation within these roles, from worker to insatiable consumer and/or from citizen to social welfare client, is unstated. This omission may well be due to Habermas's willingness to engage psychology in instances of agency such as these. It is evident that the paradigm of communicative action does not of itself ascribe to the agent an individual and transformative role in the arrival at the new institutional roles. In contrast, the K-C mechanism of interaction postulates this connection to occur *at the point of moral/ethical judgements and behaviour*. This idea is supported by Habermas's acknowledgement that judgements are the key to action (Habermas 1991, 226). Ethical decisions and practices *for or against* consumerist or political roles, for instance, which are upheld consistently by individual agents, signal their practical identification for or against such

relations. These decisions mean either agreement with the new and emerging institutional roles, caused by the colonisation of the lifeworld, or disagreement with them through a counterfactual, as in the form of new social movements. Moral/ethical decisions are arguably instrumental in what Habermas calls the '...risk-laden self-steering of a highly abstract ego-identity' (Honneth and Joas 1991, 224).

### *Aesthetic expressiveness, unconscious desires and feelings*

By virtue of its function as an alternative route to meaning construction *other than* 'classical' rationality, aesthetic expressiveness is difficult to accommodate in a K-C synthesis intent on salvaging the modernity project. A full treatment of this capability of agents and communities could not be attempted here because of the space available, yet neither could it be put aside without any comment on its place in the life projects of agents and societies. Giddens's model of the stratified self seems to confine aesthetic expressiveness to unconscious motivation or to ontological security (1984, 5 Figure 1). (One can also reasonably infer that the duality of sexuality and intimate relationships with abstract systems, later referred to by Giddens (1992b, 137), is anchored indirectly to one or other of the components of the stratified model of the reflexive monitoring agent as well.) For its part, the K-C theory introduces into Giddens's theory of the stratified self Habermas's notion of aesthetic expressiveness.

Before making the Habermas connection, it should be remembered that Bhaskar has also seen fit to elaborate upon Giddens's stratification model of action (Bhaskar 1986, 127-128). In his reworked model, action stems from discursive, practical and expressive consciousness (and sentiment). For Bhaskar, because reasons, as effective conscious or unconscious beliefs, are causal and underscore feelings and desires or wants they find expression as

sentiment through physical capabilities, skills and competences. In his explanation, Bhaskar (1986, 128 Diagram 2.9) has made it feasible to connect the emotions, which Giddens also considers as motivational (and causal), to pragmatic capabilities and competences. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, Bhaskar's interest in expressiveness can also be approached through Habermas. K-C theory utilises Habermas's explanation of the connection of reasons and actions with feelings and desires, which is, that feelings and needs are transformed through linguistic intersubjectivity into intentional normative expectations (Held 1980, 271). The preference for Habermas is because communicative action integrates individual with intersubjective agency and individualism with 'community' (Lash 1994, 144). Bhaskar's critical naturalism, on the other hand, assigns no particular importance to the situated character of social activity and so it has no capacity for discerning interactional agency (Layder 1990, 131). This is also because Bhaskar's concept of 'relations' is not essentially concerned with the group or with behaviour (Bhaskar 1979, 38). Furthermore, and as previously argued, the mechanism of 'open reciprocity' in communicative action serves extremely well to link morality and ethical action directly to emancipation and collective action.

Scott Lash reminds us that Bauman's critique of Giddens's high modernity calls for a contingent and ambivalent rather than a probabilistic approach to living in the risk society (Lash 1994, 141-142). In his view, contingency and ambivalence are considered more adept to including aesthetic expressiveness than calculative rationality. To his merit, Habermas's communicative rationality does not overlook or exclude contingency and ambivalence, and dramaturgical action allows arguably for the blending of conceptual and mimetic reflexivity in human action. Neither does Habermas neglect the shared interpreted understandings of Lash's 'we' or community as it otherwise could be in aesthetic individualism (Lash 1994, 144, 148).

So what does Habermas's aesthetic expressiveness look like? He defines it as accessible through authenticity and the dimensions of rationality. Aesthetic knowledge or 'everything in our speechless contact with reality', because of its decoupling from the normal and traditional, informs on prevailing value standards which are otherwise unreflectively accommodated. It allows actors to interpret who or what is structuring the social world.

Habermas understands modern aesthetic expressive learning to have two aspects. First, it shares a common character with experimental science and postconventional morality, namely, the process of hypothesis, isolation of the phenomenon and experimental verification. For example, works of art raise claims '...by which they can be measured and in terms of which they may fail' (Habermas 1984a, 235). Second, aesthetic knowledge is accumulated alongside the everyday situations; a process by which learning occurs. The accumulation of learning is achieved through greater '...fluidity and flexibility in modes of access to our desires and feelings' (White 1988, 149) and not only through nomological accumulation. This fluidity and flexibility and the encumbent unexpected discovery of things unassimilated in the challenges of everyday situations (Habermas, 1984a, 236) connects with the validity claims which Habermas calls truthfulness or the authentic self. (Albrecht Wellmer is acknowledged by Habermas for pointing out that this connection may not be one of the three constitutive forms of communicative action. Instead, he rather requires us to take the position '...that the work of art, as a symbolic formation with an aesthetic validity claim, is at the same time an object of the life-world experience, in which the three validity domains are unmetaphorically intermeshed' (Habermas 1984a, 238).)

Claims of authentic self-expression are not only validated in the process of argument and reflexivity, but also by the demonstration of the speaker's sincerity and erstwhile expression of real needs, both of which are gauged by

their ongoing consistency. In this way Habermas's framework gives aesthetic-consciousness a place in accumulated learning, and it is in this place that it carries ethical and life project implications. He cautions that while aesthetic-consciousness transforms our cognitive interpretations and normative expectations, it '...cannot replace an at least partially independent elaboration of juridical subjectivity' (White 1988, 152). Habermas's aesthetic expressiveness comes to fruition in everyday life through repeated exercise in the authenticity and learning accumulated by an agent. K-C theory uses this understanding in which *aesthetic consciousness acts also towards the process of self or identity formation* and vice versa. The agent's relation to the social and natural world therefore is less one of subject-object or mind versus body but more one of mutual inherence or intertwining (Dallmayr 1981, 159).

#### *Integrating institutional axes and the colonisation of the lifeworld*

How does the K-C theory of agency integrate Giddens and Habermas at the macro level of normative order and social change, given the sharp contrast between them on the questions of evolution and critique? For example, structuration emphasises the conjuncture of 'institutional axes' and Habermas the more mechanistic 'colonisation of the lifeworld'. The question becomes much less polemical when approached from the level of empirical agency. Here it translates into the synthesis of Giddens's 'life politics' with Habermas's 'new politics'. Both of these understandings imply therapy and politics in late modernity.

To return to the macro level of normative order and social change, Giddens's four institutional axes are '...central both to the interpretation of immanent change and to the normative demands of constructing (utopian) models of the 'good society' ' (Giddens 1985, 338). These axes again are capitalism, industrialism, surveillance and the control of violence. He also

adds that social movements within these axes, for example, peace movements, operate on a tactical level '...', while at the same time fostering debate about 'possible worlds' in which the threat of nuclear conflict [or ecological disaster etcetera] has disappeared altogether' (Giddens 1985, 339). These 'possible worlds', the suggestion of a role for social movements, and the agents' capacity for life politics are the closest that he comes to a prescription for social critique and emancipation. This is because Giddens's sense of the counterfactual remains ontological.

It follows from his ontology that Giddens prefers a reduction in the emphasis upon a prescriptive connection between theory and practice in sociology. Nevertheless, social theory and research in themselves are for him forms of social critique or the counterfactual (Giddens 1985, 337). In these latter cases, Giddens has a preference for admitting to social reform models of 'utopian realism'; alternative futures that are attached to what is realistically achievable in the relevant context. He argues that such utopian realism becomes necessary when what is immanent, such as nuclear disarmament, does not disclose a practical means to the goals (Giddens 1985, 337). This immanence and unprecedented uncertainty is when risk and opportunity can be calculably accepted and impotence averted.

In terms of integration with Habermas's critique, Giddens's institutional axes equate to the media of money and power; the two steering mechanisms that colonise the lifeworld. But this compatibility of concepts is qualified by their otherwise divergent emancipatory intentions. The K-C theory integrates the emancipatory force of the Giddensian and Habermasian critiques of modernity at the point of moral/ethical judgement in agency. Here agents are personally able to acknowledge the uncertain conditions of risk society, the intrusion of abstract systems into their lives, and the 'dessication of communicative contexts' in late modernity and to act towards a new or

counterfactual condition (see Figure 7.6). This action can/should take the form of healing action or practices, for persons or groups, *without any necessary expectation that the larger impact of the systems is fundamentally transformed in the short term*. The uncertain future of late modernity would suggest that this would not be an importune ask of reflexive agents and systems.

Even despite these realistic options, moral/ethical action remains the socio-personal site for collective debate amongst knowledgeable agents who can challenge the deeper structural principles and for whom praxis is '...a matter of the routine contemplation of counterfactuals...' (Giddens 1991, 29). The dimensions of rationality constitute the reflexive and interpretive tools by which practical instances of the institutional axes, or power and money, become debatable issues amongst agents and observers alike. These debates serve as prompts to social change and to critique in late modernity with the outcome still fluid. They are the mould of what Giddens has called radical engagement or '...an attitude of practical contestation towards perceived sources of danger' (Giddens 1992a, 137).

### **System**

While agency is the more specific investigative focus of K-C theory, it is particularly important that the theory avoids the previously clear and binary separation of agency from system/structure for which the classical approaches are criticised by Giddens, Habermas and antimodernists alike. Bhaskar has sustained this division between individual and society to some extent, and this does threaten to weaken K-C theory along with it. But unlike for Bhaskar, K-C theory interconnects Agent(cy), Interaction and System dialectically through the real structures and options of the dimensions of rationality, dialectic of control and modes of interaction. This connection is also effective through ethics and identity-self. Here I expand further the question of how the macro,

and somewhat more substantive, principles of system organisation in Giddens and Habermas are connected to agents through the K-C mechanisms of interaction.

### *Principles of organisation and change*

How does K-C theory appropriate Giddens's and Habermas's key principles of organisation - identified in and elicited from their typologies of society - and connect them with agency? Not surprisingly, this appropriation and connection is amicably achieved through a juxtaposition and synthesis of the typologies developed by the two (see Table 7.1). The result is a broad-based conceptualisation of the social and material constraints upon and enablements for agency. These common principles appear in Table 7.1 as age, gender, kinship, class, demography, capitalism, economy, state and information technology. The K-C claim is that knowledgeability, communicative competence and identity-self operate dialectically within these principles of system organisation, and that the links to agents' validity claims are made through mechanisms of interaction. But first, how do these principles of organisation compare and contrast?

Table 7.1 shows that Giddens's typology is analytical-descriptive (Craib 1992, 5-6) and that it has no predisposing links between each stage. In contrast, Habermas's typology emphasises evolution, situational embeddedness, overt and implicit dominance and crisis management. What they have in common besides harmonious principles of organisation are that both emphasise the interactive role of resources and normative structures; both identify the transformative role of science and technology upon social structure/system and culture; and both identify a sense of uncertainty and hope, stability and change

Table 7.1 Principles of organisation in the social systems of Giddens and Habermas.

GIDDENS (analytical descriptive)	PRINCIPLES OF ORGANISATION	HABERMAS (evolutionary differentiation)
Tribal society - tradition and kinship	← Age/Gender/Kinship →	Primitive social formations - age - sex roles and kinship in archaic and hierarchical societies
Class divided society - agrarian and class divided, urban versus rural hinterland (the notion of dominance is underplayed)	← Class/Demography →	↓ Traditional social formations - political class domination bureaucracy serves hegemony of the landowning class
Class society - disembedded economic and state institutions	← Capitalism/Economy/ State/Information/ Technology →	↓ Liberal (competitive) and Advanced (organised or welfare) capitalism - Liberal - capital versus wage labour and state versus society
- institutional axes of capitalism, industrialism, surveillance and violence (money and power)  -life politics/ new social movements		↓ -Advanced-administrative control of economy - The lifeworld is colonised by the media of money and power (economic, rationality, legitimation and motivational crises) - new politics/ new social movements

as prevalent features of late modern life. Nevertheless, while both conceive of an active self-reflecting agent and a normative realm predisposed to critical transformation following reflection, I have put the case that they each have some shortfalls on the matter of the mechanisms that interconnect agency and system.

Yet there is another hurdle for the K-C synthesis to traverse: how does Habermas's emphasis on and Giddens's dissociation from evolution affect the new typology? Habermas does not intend his historical typology of the evolution of societies as predetermining for two reasons: because of the vagaries of human conduct in historical contexts, and because this is not his understanding of evolution. His concept of evolution refers rather to a process

of the differential coming about of increasing complexity within the lifeworld, up and until that phase in contemporary capitalism and history characterised by the 'colonisation of the Lifeworld' by systematic mechanisms (Brand 1990, 39-40). It is not a general description of patterned historical events within a developmental logic; it is an abstraction of '...general principles of social organization that set broad limits on the events, institutions, and social crises likely to occur' (Wuthnow et al. 1984, 212). For his part Giddens includes within his criteria for a sound evolutionary theory (1984, 231-233) this very use of universal principles for identifying change and their application in a specific sequence or combination. It comes as little surprise then that the principles of organisation in Habermas's typology, especially those of the earlier or pre-capitalist stages, have strong alignment with those used by Giddens thereby facilitating their synthesis in K-C theory.

As indicated earlier, Table 7.1 names the principles of organisation common to both. While they show an integrated pattern for either typology, and the lines of parity between them, the same must not be automatically assumed for the historical substance that each would call upon to explain institutions, economies or state administrations. Giddens's typology, for instance, is without the specific location of causality for structure and change, so this has a bearing upon his choice of historical material. Habermas, on the other hand, plots the causative development of rationalisation through historical stages. In the manner of projects intent on transcending the dualism, neither set of organisational principles is linear, progressive or deterministic. For example, Habermas's rationality, as in legitimation through validity claims, can take 'side paths' that are outside of the general norm.

Finally, how do these common principles of social organisation connect and integrate with the K-C conceptualisation of the nature of agents and the mechanisms of interaction. They each impact at the level of knowledgeability-

communicative competence and situational context. It is within the personalised experience of these principles of organisation in everyday situations that the processual steps of reflexivity, open reciprocity, ethical judgement and consensus, as well as the other societal properties presumed to be real - such as the double hermeneutic, risk/opportunity, unintended consequences and unacknowledged conditions - come to enable or constrain the transformative and healing power or identity-self of the agent. Along with the K-C mechanism of interaction, this multi-levelled interplay of other independent and real sources of emergent power in society is underwritten by Bhaskar's philosophical notion of the several levels of rationality and emancipation. Also, apart from the unfolding of the K-C processual mechanism of agency, other broader intersubjective (or metatheoretic) undercurrents link these principles of social organisation to the causal and instrumental capabilities of the embodied agent-selves. They are rationality, language and praxis the significances of which have been discussed in Chapter 5.

This chapter has defined the causal nature of the agent and the processes of interaction that connect the agent and system. These theoretic developments were necessary in order to restore autonomy and healing into agency of the project of late modernity. K-C theory has the added capacity to isolate phases in the interaction process where therapeutic or political intervention can be hypothesised. The concluding chapter will address the implications of K-C for therapy and politics relative to those of Giddens and Habermas.