
Introduction

In August 1947 the state of Pakistan came into existence. Born of the act of decolonisation, Pakistan embodied the hopes and failures of the national leaderships of Britain and India. Pakistan comprised two wings: the west, consisting of the former British Indian provinces and states of the North-West Frontier Province, western Punjab, Baluchistan, and Sind; and the east, comprising eastern Bengal and the Sylhet district of Assam. Despite the 1,600 kilometres of Indian territory which lay between the wings, Pakistan quickly established a heavily centralised administration.

Ironically, one of the most striking features of all the constituent units which came to make up Pakistan was their fierce independence and resistance to centripetal government. The southern province of Sind was certainly no exception. It came to pay a very heavy price for its integration into the Pakistani state for Sind was immediately divested of its port and capital (Karachi) by the central Pakistan Government and bore the brunt of the immigration of Muslim refugees from India. Over one million Hindus, Parsis, and Sikhs, whose businesses had largely run the province, fled to India. The migration had been relatively free of bloodshed, but the immigration problem was exacerbated when Hindus were replaced by several times as many Muslims from India. Sindhis soon became a minority in the principal cities and towns, and migrant Muslims came to dominate the province's trade and commerce.

In 1951, the provincial autonomy of Sind was revoked as the central Government removed the ministry and imposed direct control. In 1955, this situation was formalised when the province ceased to exist as a discrete entity because it was subsumed in the West Pakistan 'one unit' amalgamation.¹ Contemporary Sind is torn between the migrant Muslims (known as 'Muhajirs'), who demand the partition of the province between the southern, Muhajir-dominated towns, and Sindhis (who are numerically superior in the countryside). The inability of the Central Government to curb the spiralling violence arising out of the conflict between them has taken Pakistan to the brink of collapse. Gun-battles have become common place on the streets of Karachi and Hyderabad. Torture and assassination have become a regular feature of daily life in the province. In the early 1990s, over 100,000 Federal troops were stationed in the province to try and stem the violence. Not by any stretch of the imagination was this the state that Sindhi Muslims had fought for during the Pakistan movement. How did Sind come to be a part of a state which has served its interests so poorly? That is the central question which this thesis seeks to answer.

The attempt to explain the cause of the creation of Pakistan has proven to be among the more popular and yet enigmatic themes which has persisted in the study of twentieth-century South Asia. The probing of differing facets of the historical dimension of India's partition in the intervening decades has produced various theories which explain why and how the state was established. What has not been presented is a satisfactory explanation of Sind's role in the creation of Pakistan.

There are difficulties with many of the theories explaining the causes of Pakistan in light of events since partition. The secession of Bangladesh, the rise of

¹ In combining Sind, Punjab, North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan into the province of West Pakistan, the Central Government had sought to offset the numerical superiority of the Bengalis and to exert a greater control over the affairs of the former provinces.

secessionist movements in three of the four remaining provinces, the recent demand for partition within Sind province, and the persistent sectarian violence appear to contradict theories of Muslim nationalism and have far more inherently complex rationales than simply being the consequences of manipulative political elites. The dominant ideology in the Pakistan movement, that religious community alone was the cohesive force for the idea of nationalism, has clearly proved ephemeral in Pakistan. It is apparent that factors such as economic inequalities between groups, language and ethnic divisions, and issues of centre-state relations form substantial sub-plots in the reality of Pakistan. Have these factors only developed since partition or were they operating, even contributing to, the Muslim separatist movement in the first half of the twentieth-century?

Many of the existing theoretical frameworks do not allow sufficient scope to explain why conflict has been such a feature of the Pakistan state. In emphasising the notion of a unification of Muslims through the Pakistan movement, aspects of divisiveness amongst the Muslims have tended to be seriously underplayed. The unevenness of the Muslims' response to the All-India Muslim League in the general elections of 1946 is indicative, for example, of the absence of a self-consciously collective Muslim India. Overall the Muslim League won almost 75 percent of the Muslim votes, a result which has generally been taken as having 'proved incontestably that the Muslim League alone represented the Muslims of India.'² However, as Map 1 illustrates, the uneven distribution of votes for the Muslim League across British India's eleven provinces suggests that in some regions the League's claim was perhaps not so incontestable after all.

The voting patterns for each province suggest that Pakistan was perceived by less than half the voters in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) to not mean the same thing as the 93 percent of Muslim voters in the southern peninsula

² C.M. Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (Lahore, Research Society of Pakistan, 1989 reprint), p. 48.


who voted for the League. If Pakistan was understood to be the same thing by all Muslims, why are patterns evident which reveal differing values given to that meaning by Muslims in distinct geographic regions? Did Pakistan mean different things to Muslims in different regions, and if so, what exactly were those meanings? What were the causes and significance of the pattern that where Muslims were in their greatest relative strength to Hindus, the support for the Muslim League was weakest? Can studies of the 1937 and 1946 elections reveal new insights into the moods of India's various religious entities? These questions have not been adequately addressed by historians.

A notable exception is the edited volume by Anthony Low. The purpose of *The Political Inheritance of Pakistan* is to reveal the roots of the problem that plagued the new Pakistan state. Low points out that too often the origins and embodiments of those problems have 'been hidden from view because of the concentration upon the history of the Pakistan movement itself'.³ It can also be added that too often has the focus been exclusively upon the Islamic aspect to the detriment of other possible factors. Low's volume suggests the need for bridging pre- and post-partition Pakistan political histories, and its chapters propose arches for that bridge. In order to understand Pakistan, the forces that produced it must be understood. This thesis attempts to explain what those forces were in the province of Sind, and how they continue to shape the Pakistan state.


The problem with many of the histories of the Pakistan movement lies in the assumption that there existed a 'Muslim India' which was conscious of its own identity and had the capacity to determine its own future. In reality the Muslims of India were a range of diverse groups which differed significantly from each other in all facets except religion. Moreover, in Islam the sectarian differences of *Shia*,

³ D.A. Low (ed.), *The Political Inheritance of Pakistan* [hereafter *Political Inheritance*] (London, Macmillan, 1991).

1946 GENERAL ELECTION: VOTES POLLED BY THE MUSLIM LEAGUE



MUSLIMS AS A PERCENTAGE OF PROVINCIAL POPULATIONS, 1941



SOURCE:
 Compiled from the *Return Showing the Results of Elections to the Central Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Legislatures in 1945-46* (Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1948), pp. 54-79.

SOURCE:
 Compiled from the *Census of India, 1941, Vol. 1, pt 1* (Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1943), pp. 78-105.

Sunni, Ismailis, Khojas, and Ahmadiyyas undermine the contention of the existence of a unified Muslim community. Much scholarly writing embeds, through its language, the image of a collective Muslim identity. For example, Anita Inder Singh speaks of the 1946 election results being 'a great stride forward in the political unification and solidification of the Muslim community.'⁴ Similarly, Farzana Shaikh contends that the demand for Muslim communal representation reflected a 'pre-occupation with the integrity of the Muslim community.'⁵

However, terms such as 'Muslim community' disguise the fact that this 'community' consisted of a vast, and often incongruous, array of different races, tribes, sects and classes.⁶ Historians who offer an over-arching theme to explain the role of Muslims in the Pakistan movement have too often generalised the diversity of Muslim peoples into a single entity which lacked a political reality. The reality was that 'Muslim India' was fragmented. Not only was there ethnic, cultural, and social fragmentation, there was also 'chronological' fragmentation in the sense of the different pasts of each region. The story as to why Pakistan was supported is quite different for each fragment.

The traditional Pakistani historical approach has been to argue that ideology served to combine the different Muslim groups, but the evidence clearly indicates that this was not the case. The case study of Sind in this thesis illustrates that while Muslim identity was of paramount importance in marking Muslims off from non-Muslims, it was not enough in itself to *unify* Muslims. Clearly, the creation of Bangladesh proves this most graphically.

⁴ A.I. Singh, *The Origins of the Partition of India 1936-1947* (Delhi, O.U.P, 1987), p. 243.

⁵ F. Shaikh, 'Muslims and Political Representation in Colonial India: The Making of Pakistan', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 20, no. 3 (1986), p. 541.

⁶ For useful discussions on the role the colonial political system played in constructing notions of religious community, see D. Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan* [hereafter *Empire and Islam*] (New Delhi, O.U.P, 1989); 'Divine Displeasure' and Muslim Elections: The Shaping of Community the Twentieth-Century Punjab', in Low, *Political Inheritance*; and J. Chiriyankandath, 'Democracy' Under the Raj: Elections and Separate Representation in British India', *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. XXX, no. 1, (1992).

It is suggested that by fixing the debate securely on the 'Muslimness' of the phenomenon of the Pakistan movement, insufficient recognition has been afforded to dimensions such as ethnic identity, regional separatism, and conflict between Muslims. Similarly, by centring the focus upon the political behaviours of the most central politicians at the national level (i.e. Jinnah, Nehru and Gandhi), the political realities of the peripheral provinces have been brought into the picture in only a limited way and so have not been fully assessed. Some very important dimensions have slipped through 'cracks' in the theoretical frameworks thus far applied to the Pakistan movement. These dimensions in themselves may not explain the creation of Pakistan anymore than the existing theories. However, they are nonetheless missing pieces of the Pakistan mosaic and their place in history needs to be assessed if we are to understand why and how Pakistan was created. The dimensions may also shed light on contemporary events in Pakistan.

This thesis attempts to explore the immediate pre-and post-partition history of Sind. Its purpose is to assess if there were unrecognised factors at work which can be analysed to extend our understanding of the Pakistan movement, and consequently, the Pakistani state. Sind has been selected for several reasons. In the existing literature on Muslim separatism and early Pakistani history Sind is treated as barely more than a footnote. This is because historians have tended to adopt one of two approaches which bypass the province. The spotlight has remained either at the national level with the focus resting on Jinnah (rather than analysing the other forces inherent in the Pakistan movement), or on specific provincial perspectives which have been constructed. In the case of the former, many Pakistani historians have been unable to extricate themselves from the political environment of the two-nation theory, and hence their works are confined to discourses on the legitimacy of their political rationale.

Other treatments, such as biographies of Jinnah, have tended to overstate his role in that no credit is given to other Muslim leaders except as supporting cast players. Liaquat Ali Khan, Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, Hussein Shaheed Suhrawardy, and Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah are portrayed as simply disciples of the messianic *Quaid-i-Azam*. In those histories where the Muslim-majority provinces feature, both Sind and the NWFP are mere bridesmaids to the resplendent Punjab (the cornerstone of Pakistan) and to Bengal, the eastern Muslim heartland of 50 millions. Measured against the Punjab, Bengal, United Provinces (UP) and Bombay, Sind's population was minuscule. However, as a Muslim-majority province its territory and Muslim populace were integral to the League's demand for the sub-continent's partition.

In the absence of an assessment of the dynamics at work between the Sindhi Muslim and Hindu elites, it seems to have been assumed by scholars that the Sindhi Muslims were either swept along in the fervour for a united Muslim state, or simply did not matter. Several histories mention the difficulties that the All-India Muslim League leadership experienced in bringing the Sindhi Muslim elites into line, and portray them as simply being interpersonal feuds and petty jealousies. Ian Talbot's analysis characterises this perspective when he writes that the League's difficulties 'stemmed from the disunity and political opportunism of leading Muslim politicians. They were concerned with personal rivalries and struggles for power rather than with political ideals and party programmes.'⁷ This view represents a standard portrayal of the Sindhi politics of the period, but does little to explain the role of the Sindhis in the Pakistan movement.

The existence of unique conditions in Sind and its subsequent history bring the conventional lines of analysis into contention. It must be questioned, for

⁷ I.A. Talbot, *Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of the Muslim League in North-West and North-East India, 1937-47* [hereafter *Provincial Politics*] (Karachi, O.U.P, 1988), p. 31.

example, whether the circumstances and ideologies which produced a Muslim separatism in the minority provinces can be validly applied to Sind, or whether Sind suggests an alternate model to explain why the Muslim-majority provinces responded to the Pakistan demand.

This introductory chapter partitions the conceptual framework for the thesis in two. The first part surveys the existing historical theories of why and how Pakistan was achieved with a view to revealing perspectives that do not adequately fit together all the pieces of the Pakistan puzzle. It assesses how accurately the existing literature explains what is known of the dynamics of Sindhi politics of the later colonial Sindh period, especially the decade prior to partition.

The second part outlines an alternate model. The model has been constructed with the purpose of firstly explaining how and why groups of Sind's Muslims supported, or withheld their support from, both the All-India Muslim League and the Pakistan movement. The second purpose is to explain how Muslims within Sind came to define their place in the new Pakistani state. Finally, the Introduction explains how the thesis is structured so as to apply the model to Sind.

I

The two-nation theory

Adopting the theory that Indian Muslims were a nation, the All-India Muslim League in the late 1930s based its interpretation of nationalism upon the primacy of an exclusive cultural and social theory of Islam. The theory in a sense simplified the multiplicity of peoples who constituted the sub-continent into only several nationalities: Hindus, Sikhs, Parsees, Christians, and Muslims. All other possible

factors of cultural identity: race, language, customs, kinship and territory were subsumed into a greater construction of what constituted national identity.

The theory's most powerful advocate, Jinnah, launched its most forceful articulation in the Lahore resolution of March 1940. He encapsulated the theory in the idea that Islam and Hinduism:

are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literature. They never intermarry, nor interdine together and, indeed they belong to two different civilisations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. To yoke together two such nations under a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state.⁸

The two-nation theory has proved to be a popular base for launching explanations for the creation of Pakistan. The theory has the benefit of being drawn directly from the leadership of the Pakistan movement and therefore is based upon an assumption that it conformed ideologically with the views of the majority of Muslims. Acceptance of the theory has been assisted by the logic of a claim to an historical legitimacy. The Muslim League made much use of arguing an apparent inability of the Muslims to assimilate with Hindu culture since the arrival of Islam to the sub-continent more than a thousand years earlier. For example, the theme emphasises the roles of the Mughal emperor, Aurangzeb, as a righteous defender of the faith; of Shah Wali-ulallah to invigorate Islam intellectually; and of Sayyid Ahmed Khan in fathering separate communal electorates for local government. These events have been flagged as major milestones in the development of the Muslim nationalist struggle. I.H Qureshi⁹, Chaudhri Mohammad Ali¹⁰, Khalid Sayeed¹¹, Stanley Wolpert¹², and the milieu of conservative Pakistani

⁸ Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Presidential Address, Twenty-Seventh Session of the All-India Muslim League, Lahore, 22-24 March 1940, quoted in S. ul-Mujahid, *Quaid-i-Azam: Studies in Interpretation* (Delhi, B.R. Publishing, 1985 edition), p. 492.

⁹ I.H Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, second edition (Karachi, University of Karachi, 1974).

¹⁰ Ali, *op. cit.*

scholarship have afforded the two-nation theory the undisputed place in their historical methodology.¹³

To afford the two-nation theory a position of prime historical determinism for Pakistan is problematic for several reasons. When the Lahore resolution was raised in 1940, the two-nation theory provoked an ongoing attack by Muslims and non-Muslims. Publicly, the British saw it as representing a failure of the universalism of its imperialism, while nationalist Indians scorned it as a myth that formed part of the raj's strategy of divide and rule. It was from amongst the Muslim clergy that some of the more sophisticated arguments emerged. The idea of the constitution of an Islamic community based upon territory was anathema for leading orthodox theologians.

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (Congress president, 1940) and Maulana Maududi (founder of the *Jamiat-i-Islami*, an organisation established to combat the League's assumption of the leadership of Indian Muslims) were two of the more influential opponents. Neither shared a common political outlook except for refuting the two-nation theory on the grounds that it was merely a political definition of the Islamic faith. Both Azad and Maududi argued against the theory on the grounds that Islam could not be territorially defined, nor was political authority for the community (*millat*) required for it to prosper. Azad contended:

It is one of the greatest frauds on the people to suggest that religious affinity can unite areas which are geographically, economically, linguistically and culturally different. It is true that Islam sought to

¹¹ K.B. Sayeed, *Pakistan, The Formative Phase* (Karachi, Pakistan Publishing House, 1960).

¹² S. Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan* (Delhi, O.U.P., 1984).

¹³ For examples of the Muslim League's arguments for the two-nation theory, see the speeches of Jinnah in S.S. Pirzada (ed.), *Foundations of Pakistan, All-India Muslim League Documents: 1906-1947, Vol. 2, 1924-1947* [hereafter *Foundations of Pakistan*] (New Delhi, Metropolitan, 1982); articles by M.R.T., 'One Nation Myth Exposed', *Eastern Times*, 12 April 1940, cited in M.H. Saiyid, 'India's Problem of Her Future Constitution' (n.d., Bombay); and J. Ahmad, 'Is India One Nation?' (publishing details not recorded), microfilm copies in G. Austin (ed.), *Political Pamphlets from the Sub-continent* (Bethesda, University Publications of America, 1989).

establish a society which transcends racial, linguistic, economic and political frontiers. History has however proved that after the first few decades or at the most after the first century, Islam was not able to unite all the Muslim countries on the basis of Islam alone.¹⁴

Similarly, Maududi argued that the essential duty of Muslims was the establishment of the Islamic way of life rather than the establishment of a Muslim national state.¹⁵ He viewed the League's theory as a threat to Islam because Muslims may be seduced from their religion by nationalism. Maududi strenuously refuted the League and Congress as he endeavoured to show that nationalism was a western phenomenon 'resting on the false philosophy of western civilisation,' and that the Muslims' loyalty (which must be religious) could never be given to an entity such as the nation.¹⁶ Of course, the problem for Muslims became that of how to preserve that way of life without political control.

The two-nation theory runs into trouble through its argument that all Indian Muslims were members of the nation, irrespective of culture, language, or race. The League's propagandists tried to explain away other factors of cultural identity as being irrelevant. It was Islam which was the civilisation; local cultures were simply variations of Islam or improper Hindu syncretisms. Race too was valueless, for Islam recognised only one distinction in humanity; that between Muslim and non-Muslim.

All Muslims, moreover, were interconnected through the spiritual language of the Quran, regardless of actual linguistic realities. The central Muslim League leadership had realised, however, the necessity of having a common language amongst Muslims, because soon after the League formally adopted the demand to

¹⁴ M.A.K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom: The Complete Version* (New Delhi, Orient Longman, 1989 edition), p. 248.

¹⁵ K. Bahadur, *The Jama'at-i-Islami of Pakistan* (New Delhi, Chetana, 1977), p. 13.

¹⁶ C. J. Adams, 'The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi', in D.E. Smith (ed.), *South Asian Politics and Religion* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1966), p. 374.

partition India, it advocated Urdu as the *lingua franca* of the Muslim peoples. Propagandists were sent to the Muslim-majority provinces (Punjab, Bengal, North-West Frontier Province and Sind) in order to encourage the use of Urdu (where it had little status except amongst the Punjabi elites). The push for Urdu was also a direct response to Congress's demand for Hindi as the official language. The Hindi-Urdu question stretched back to the days when the East India Company replaced Persian as the official script in the courts of Bengal and Oudh with Devanagari (1837). The Muslim elites reacted by defending Urdu with a form of Muslim revivalism. Centred in the former cultural centres (from Delhi to Lucknow) of the Afghan and Mughal nobilities, these elites came to broaden their campaign during the course of the late nineteenth-century from the protection of Urdu to the preservation of Muslim power in India.¹⁷

The main difficulty that the primacy of the two-nation theory presents is that the Muslim separatist movement (led almost exclusively by Urdu-speaking Muslim political, not theological, elites from the United Provinces) failed to incorporate and represent the interests of Muslims outside this group, especially in the Muslim-majority provinces. By including all of India's Muslims in its theory of nationalism, the minority province Muslim elites were consciously trying to claim a collective political leadership identity. Through the catenation of an implied historical legitimacy, the two-nation theory emphasised a distinctiveness, a separateness of Muslims. Yet the theory did not sufficiently demonstrate a notion of unity, despite its acceptance by the British colonial Government. Just as thirsty men share a common desire for water, it cannot be assumed that they are united in the quest.

For a group to claim nationhood legitimately it is a prerequisite that it shares some common characteristic, such as language, race, or culture, but it is equally

¹⁷ F. Robinson, *Separatism Among Indian Muslims: The Politics of United Provinces' Muslims 1860-1923* (Cambridge, C.U.P, 1974).

true that the group must also be sufficiently conscious of its unity. The Muslims of India were conscious of their Muslimness, as were Muslims throughout the world, but did the Muslims of the Afghan borderlands, or the Punjabi heartlands, and Sindhi and Baluchi deserts, share the consciousness of a 'nationhood' with each other or with the Bihari or Bengali Muslims?

The two-nation theory fails to afford sufficient recognition of divisions amongst Muslim groups. Anil Seal rightly deemed in the early 1970s that theories such as Hindus and Muslims constituting separate nationalities were based upon the premise:

that the Islamic community in India can be referred to as a bloc of peoples whose conditions were generally equal, whose interests were generally the same and whose solidarity was generally firm. None of these assumptions is true.¹⁸

There is no denying the potency of heightening the awareness of an Islamic consciousness, and an assessment of the rhetoric and effect of the two-nation theory must form an important ingredient of any explanation of the course of the Pakistan movement. To contend however, that the theory is the sole determinant is an over-simplification.

The instrumentalists

One of the more significant schools of opposition to the two-nation theory is that which argues that religion was an instrument in the hands of self-seeking elites (hence instrumentalists). This school takes its cue from the *ulema* and Congressmen (such as Nehru) who challenged the League leadership's legitimacy to speak on behalf of the Muslims. The phenomenon of the landlord-politicians of the United Provinces championing the cause of Indian Islam has led Paul Brass to

¹⁸ A. Seal, *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth-Century* (Cambridge, C.U.P, 1971), p. 339.

construct an hypothesis which proposes that the crucial factor in the success of the Muslim separatist movement was the ability of the Muslim elites to select symbols which would mobilise Muslims in the name of Islam. Importantly, the elites chose to use divisive rather than composite symbols to redefine Muslim identity.

This hypothesis holds that the cultural and political differences between Muslims and Hindus were not pre-ordained to be separate, but instead allows for the creation of either a composite national culture or at least a secular political union in which those aspects of group culture which could not be shared would be relegated to the private sphere.¹⁹ Thus, the failure of the Hindus and Muslims to establish a single Indian state in 1947 can be attributed to the Muslim elites of the minority provinces who consciously chose to demarcate spheres of authority between the communities in order to maintain their own privileged positions.

Brass demonstrates the hypothesis using several examples. Firstly, the issue of cow slaughter was used to divide Muslims and Hindus because several elite groups among both communities found the issue useful as a convenient symbol in their efforts to build internal unity, and in their conflicts with each other.²⁰ Secondly, the *sharia* (Muslim personal law) was used by Muslim elites in their internal conflicts by both the *ulema* and the political elites in their competition for the allegiance of the Muslim masses.²¹ Thirdly, Brass argues that it was only after the Hindi-Urdu controversy developed that Urdu became a symbol in the minority provinces of Muslim identity second only to Islam itself. Thus, functions such as the eating of beef, personal law, and a communally-shared language were transformed into symbolic links which united the Muslim community and

¹⁹ P. Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India* (New York, C.U.P, 1974), and 'Elite Groups, Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic Identity Among Muslims of South Asia', in D. Taylor and M. Yapp (eds), *Political Identity in South Asia* (London, Curzon, 1978).

²⁰ P. Brass, 'Elite Groups, Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic Identity Among Muslims of South Asia', *op. cit.*, p. 44.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

emphasised conflict with Hindus.²² Moreover, the functions had only become symbols because the elites promoted them as such in their conflicts with each other and with other groups.

Brass's thesis draws attention to the extent to which elites manipulated cultural functions and symbols in the creation of political identity. Implicit in the thesis is the recognition that the Muslims were neither united nor held consistent views as to the value of their cultural functions. Applied to the era of the Pakistan movement, the hypothesis suggests that the claim for 'Muslim nationalism' was artificially manufactured by a core of minority province elites. In the general elections of 1937 the Muslim League had won only 22 percent of the Muslim seats; clearly at this point it represented only a small portion of India's Muslims. Yet less than a decade later in the 1946 elections, during which time the League had introduced and pushed the Pakistan objective, it won 86 percent of the Muslim seats. Was there a particular event or point in time between 1937 and 1946 when most Muslims realised they were a nation? Brass's thesis would argue against this, and contend that through the Pakistan demand the leadership of the Muslim League was not responding to a Muslim nation's need for statehood, but instead was riding on the back of a century of the manipulation of communal symbolism and was creating the myth of nationhood merely to entrench its own privileged position.

The primordialists

Against this construct is poised the primordialist case. Francis Robinson refutes the instrumentalist model for not accepting the conditioning and constraints which culture imposes upon individuals.²³ Brass has been accused by Robinson of elevating the political processes to the status of independent variables in the

²² *Ibid.*, p. 49.

²³ F. Robinson, 'Islam and Muslim Separatism', in Taylor and Yapp, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-112.

fashioning of political identity. The Muslim elites have been made out by Brass to be unfettered by their historical and cultural environments. In a sense they are portrayed as being too free to consciously choose between separatism or unity, and in this sense politics has been promoted to a realm where it is independent of history and contemporary circumstances. Muslim nationalism, therefore, has been left to the exclusive domain of political elites to define.

More recently, Farzana Shaikh has added to the primordialist perspective by arguing that Muslim politics can only be understood from the perspective of the Islamic viewpoint.²⁴ According to Shaikh, Muslim separatist ideology was driven by the very notion of being Muslim. That is, one could not be a Muslim and be represented by non-Muslims (such as the Congress). This tenet lies at the heart of the Muslim League's claims in the 1940s, because:

ultimately it mattered little whether Muslims and non-Muslims could conceivably be treated as coherent, collective 'wholes', what was important was that all politics should be conducted as if they were.²⁵

Yet while trying to reinstate ideology as the prime position of political rationale, Shaikh walks a thin line between the two-nation theory and pragmatic politics.

Similar to other all-India perspectives of Muslim politics, Shaikh's model is troublesome. Her notion of Muslim consensus is not well grounded in the historical reality of the later colonial period, for as late as 1937 the Muslim electorate failed to respond convincingly to Muslim styled representations. The results of the 1937 general elections for the Muslim constituencies show that specifically Muslim organisations won only 39 per cent of the seats, whereas organisations which encompassed cross-communal membership and whose platforms were not

²⁴ F. Shaikh, *Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in Colonial India, 1860-1947* [hereafter *Community and Consensus*] (Cambridge, C.U.P, 1989); and 'Muslim and Political Representation in Colonial India: The Making of Pakistan', *op. cit.*

²⁵ Shaikh, *Community and Consensus*, p. 212.

specifically Muslim-orientated won 33 percent, and independents 28 percent. Clearly, community consensus was not yet the prime factor in Muslim politics. Moreover, Shaikh's hypothesis poses problems when applied to Sind. For example, the Muslim League ministers in 1941 were willing to give up Muslim representation when they supported the introduction of joint electorates to municipalities and boroughs.

The manipulative elites

Despite such criticisms, the central tenet of the instrumentalists' model (that elites manipulate the Muslims' sense of identity) has been used by subsequent writers to explain the rationale behind the Muslim League's push for Pakistan. The most influential recent advocate of the manipulative elites theory has been Ayesha Jalal. Her initial book, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*, centres on the political motives and strategy of Jinnah.²⁶ Jalal sees in Jinnah a most cunning political animal whose advocacy of the two-nation theory was the nucleus of a carefully planned strategy to win a large share of power for Muslims at the centre in a federated India. The basis of the League's power in the new India would come through a ransoming of the Hindu minorities in the Muslim-majority provinces to ensure that the interests of Muslim-minority province Muslims were safeguarded. The key for Jalal in explaining the Pakistan movement lies in understanding the insincerity of Jinnah. His use of the communal factor was a political tactic, not an ideological commitment; its value lay in its potency as a bargaining counter.²⁷

Jalal contends that in the early decades of the twentieth-century the idea that Muslims were a nation had little to commend it politically since it was relevant

²⁶ A. Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan* [hereafter *Sole Spokesman*] (Cambridge, C.U.P, 1983)

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

only if the distribution of power at the centre was at stake.²⁸ Since the British firmly held power at the centre, there was little value in arguing for a Muslim nation to be granted statehood. Jinnah calculated that eventually when the time came to discuss an all-India federation, the British and Congress alike could be forced to negotiate with organised Muslim opinion and would be ready to make substantial concessions in order to retain that centre.²⁹ The Pakistan demand was the anvil that the central Muslim organisation would use to forge its exclusive claim to represent Muslim opinion. Therefore, the Pakistan demand was not a movement to create a new state, but an exacting of the right to negotiate for Muslims on a completely new basis.³⁰

Unfolding this hypothesis, Jalal makes much of Jinnah's refusal to define Pakistan any further than its constituting 'Muslim homelands'. By refusing to clarify what Pakistan was, Jinnah hoped to rope in the Muslims across India as their elites crafted a meaning to suit their interests. The fact that their respective provincial interests were not in conformity with the central Muslim League's leadership forced Jinnah to be evasive about Pakistan. However, the ploy backfired when the British and Congress took the Pakistan demand at face value and acceded to it. Thus, 'hoist by his own petard', Jinnah was the father of a state which would inevitably serve Muslim interests poorly; for it was never meant to be.

To enhance her presentation that Jinnah's Pakistan was a bluff, Jalal provides regular scans of the Muslim elites' politics in the Muslim-majority provinces. Her purpose is to reveal that Jinnah was not the leader of a mass movement but a clever orator. In this undertaking, Jalal restricts her perspective of the elites to meet her task at hand, but in doing so portrays their motives and behaviours as self-serving and without any real connection to national politics

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

except through empathetic British officialdom. The purpose of these provincial sections in Jalal's work is to argue the case that Jinnah was irrelevant to the politics of the majority provinces.

In a sense Jalal's framework imposes this constrained view for, by building on the premise that Jinnah's strength lay in a deliberately vague and ill-defined Pakistan, Jalal holds back from seriously probing what the key Muslim interest groups (which comprised the majority provinces' elites) were defining Pakistan as. This is a lost opportunity, for their definitions provide the key to understanding why the majority province Muslims supported separatism or withheld their support. The intense concentration by Jalal on guessing what was going on in Jinnah's mind has failed to allow her to develop a growing sense of the Pakistan movement, of the drawing in of interest groups from different regions and social bases. Nor does it allow her to assess the impact this growth had on Jinnah's position, or how it affected the British or Congress camps. The growth in the movement occurred, of course, regardless of the sincerity of Jinnah's intentions, but by portraying Jinnah's irrelevance to the majority provinces Jalal inaccurately disconnects him from the key figures in the mobilisation of the Muslims: the provincial elites.

Jalal's thesis stops well short of explaining why a province such as Sind made a great contribution to the Pakistan demand; what this contribution was; what forces were at play in the province to assist the Muslim separatist movement; and what the Sindhi Muslims wanted to achieve through the Pakistan movement. Instead we are simply left with the notion of what Muslim Sindhis did not want. Jalal's treatment of their role is not so much an analysis of the interplay between the provincial elites and Jinnah, but rather an argument against there being any meaningful interplay at all. Jalal overplays her hand in claiming Jinnah's irrelevance to Sindhi politics, because the facts suggest otherwise, as will be shown.

This limitation is further compounded by her failure to acknowledge that the majority province elites distinguished between the All-India Muslim League and the Pakistan demand. This thesis will later show that the distinction which the Sindhi Muslim elites drew formed the basis of their support for Pakistan. While not all Muslims in Sind supported the Muslim League, its most vocal opponents who, on the one hand, were orchestrating campaigns against it in 1946 were, on the other hand, championing the Pakistan demand. Thus Jalal's portrayal of Jinnah at centre-stage is somewhat of a paradox. Deemed to have no apparent relevance in the majority provinces, how did Jinnah come to be recognised as the sole spokesman? Was the reality of his politics to be found in the playing of the communal card, or was it the creation of the British? Moreover, if the Muslim elites of the majority provinces did not want Jinnah, the All-India Muslim League, or Pakistan, it begs the question as to what they did want?

Mushirul Hasan has approached Muslim politics and the issue of Muslim nationalism from a different angle. His works show the impact Congress's policies and politics had on stimulating the sense of Muslim separatism and elevating the status of Jinnah. Hasan's works are particularly useful since they portray the opposition to communalism from within Muslim society, and how such opposition was eventually defeated by the Muslim League. But neither Jalal or Hasan have sufficiently explained the relationship between Islam and provincial politics.³¹

³¹ M. Hasan, *Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1885-1930* [hereafter *Communal Politics*] (New Delhi, Manohar, 1991); *Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1916-1928* (New Delhi, Manohar, 1979); 'Nationalism and Separatist Trends in Aligarh, 1915-1947', *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, Vol. XXII, no. 1 (1985), pp. 1-34; 'The Muslim Mass Contact Campaign: An Attempt at Political Mobilisation', *South Asia*, New Series, Vol. VII, no. 1 (June 1984). See also M. Hasan, (ed.), *Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India* [hereafter *Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends*] (New Delhi, Manohar, 1985).

The role of the mediating elites

The importance of exploring the mechanisms which Jinnah used to become the dominant force in Muslim politics, especially in the majority provinces, has been recognised by a number of other scholars. The works of David Gilmartin are an example of an approach which has attempted to explore the notion of what constituted the basis of political legitimacy of a Muslim community.³² In *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan*, Gilmartin challenges the perspective that the notional identity of a Muslim community as constructed by the politicised classes was an identity shared throughout Muslim India. Instead he constructs an understanding of the phenomenon of the Pakistan movement through a model of 'cultural reconstruction' of both the colonial state and the concept of 'Muslim India' amongst the Muslims of rural Punjab. Gilmartin focuses on the alterations which the Pakistan movement brought to the relationship between the rural Muslim elites and the state. Through the redefinition of the cultural basis of this relationship, Pakistan, theoretically at least presented a means to dissipate the tension between the ideology of the colonial state and the Muslim conceptions of community and legitimate authority.

Gilmartin is able to show that the realities of rural Punjabi politics failed to allow the Pakistan movement to dissolve such tensions. Arguing that the political concept of a 'Muslim nation' was largely an urban one, Gilmartin defines the problem for Jinnah as being how to face the political reality of the necessity of including the rural Muslim majorities. The answer lay in the discovery of how to appeal to the rural intermediaries. The intermediaries (landlords, rural spiritual authorities, and tribal/clan leaders) formed the linkages between the authority of the state and the Muslim populace. They reacted in varying ways to the Pakistan

³² Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam*, and 'Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol.13, no.3 (1979).

demand; not the least importantly being how the demand affected their role in the state apparatus.

The key to the Pakistan movement, according to Gilmartin, lies in the analysis of the dynamics of how those in mediating roles responded to the movement. Through the cultural redefinition of legitimate political authority it was the roles of the *pirs* (spiritual authorities) which were of especial importance, for the *pirs* were not only embedded in the system of local politics, but were the cultural elites of the rural Muslim milieu. It was their ideological commitment to Pakistan which made politically explicit what was implicit in their roles of spiritual authority, namely, their concern to link the structure of local politics with the broader concept of Islamic community which was embodied in the Pakistan demand.³³

In focusing exclusively on politics at the national level, one is likely to miss the heartbeat of the Pakistan movement. The importance of Gilmartin's thesis lies in the methods he applies to examine how the Pakistan demand redefined the relationship between the localised elites, the Muslim masses, and the authority of the state. The assessments of who the mediating elites were, how the Pakistan demand was filtered through the mesh of local political environments, and what it came to represent to the elites forms his explanation of rural Punjab's role in the making of Pakistan. It is these assessments which reveal the very relationship between the state and the community, empire and Islam. According to Gilmartin's thesis, it is the subsequent failure of the local elites to resolve their differing cultural definitions of the Pakistan state which has produced the ongoing instability in Pakistan.

Gilmartin's approach has been mirrored by several scholars. While the model of the cultural bases of power are yet to be incorporated by historians to the

³³ Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam*, p. 215.

extent Gilmartin has, a number of academics have targeted the role of those who acted as brokers between the provincial political system and the village communities. Ian Talbot has produced several works which illustrate how the landlords', *pirs*' and tribal/clan leaders' command of the rural Punjabi Muslim votes was far more important in mobilising support for the League than the actual popularity of the Pakistan demand itself.³⁴

Talbot's mediating elites are less ideologically or culturally-determined in their rationale for supporting Pakistan than Gilmartin's. His are rather more opportunistic in seeking the advantages the League offered as the Unionists' influence dwindled when the British settled down to negotiate with the Congress and the League at the centre for the future governance of India. Neither Talbot nor Gilmartin emphasise the mediating elites as manipulative of the community's symbols to the extent that Brass suggests, but in the translation of the Pakistan demand to their constituents the elites have emphatically emphasised their own role in the legitimisation of the movement for Pakistan.

The question which the models of cultural redefinition and the mobilisation of the masses through mediating roles pose is how appropriate are they to areas outside of the Punjab? Talbot has attempted to explain the role each majority province played in the making of Pakistan in his *Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement*.³⁵ In contrast to his earlier work, Talbot disconnects the role of the mediating elites from the deeper provincial political environment. The mechanisms and importance of the rural mediators is presented, but the

³⁴ I.A. Talbot, 'The 1946 Punjab Elections', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol.14, no.1 (1980); 'Deserted Collaborators: The Political Background to the Rise and Fall of the Punjab Unionist Party, 1923-1947', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. XI, no. 1 (1982); 'The Growth of the Muslim League in the Punjab, 1936-1946', *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. XX, no. 1 (1982); *Punjab and the Raj 1949-1947* [hereafter *Punjab and the Raj*] (New Delhi, Manohar, 1988); 'The Unionist Party and Punjabi Politics, 1937-1947', in Low, *Political Inheritance*. An earlier example of an approach similar to Gilmartin's can be found in R.G. Fox, *Lions of the Punjab: Culture in the Making* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985).

³⁵ Talbot, *Provincial Politics*.

theoretical framework applied in the analysis does not adequately explore what factors existed below the surface in the respective provinces. For Sind, in particular, Talbot follows Jalal's sources and arguments closely, because what is presented is the same evidence and conclusion: that Jinnah was irrelevant to the provincial leaderships. The problem this presents, as for Jalal's thesis, is firstly that one wonders why the Muslims eventually supported a Pakistan which they apparently did not want. Secondly, was there no groundswell of support for Pakistan from below? To some extent Talbot has begun to address the latter question in more recent works,³⁶ but there is still no satisfactory explanation of Sind's role in the creation of the Pakistan state.

The mobilisation of economic classes

The importance of exposing the roles of the mediating elites in class mobilisation has been clearly demonstrated by scholars focusing on Bengal's role in the Pakistan movement. The work of Partha Chatterjee exemplifies the study of the nature of the linkages of peasant-communal politics within the structure of organised politics.³⁷ Chatterjee's framework, characteristic of the 'Subaltern School', emphasises the importance of the interplay between the middling elites and the masses.³⁸ The Muslim peasantry are not depicted as docile masses waiting to be mobilised from above, but are responsible for their own responses to colonialism and changes in the agrarian political economy. In this model, the local elites are more the connections between interdependent systems of political and

³⁶ I.A. Talbot, 'The Role of the Crowd in the Muslim League's Struggle for Pakistan', *Journal of Imperial and Colonial History*, Vol. 21, no. 2 (1993), and *Freedom's Cry: The Popular Dimension in the Pakistan Movement and Partition Experience in North-West India* (Karachi, O.U.P, 1996).

³⁷ P. Chatterjee, 'Bengal Politics and the Muslim Masses, 1920-1947', *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. XX, no.1 (1982).

³⁸ The 'Subaltern School' of history writes of the roles played by ordinary people in historical events, as opposed to that of dominant groups such as the government or social and economic elites. See the series of volumes edited by R. Guha, *Subaltern Studies. Writings on South Asian History and Society* (Delhi, O.U.P, commencing 1982). See also J. Masselos, 'The Dis/Appearance of Subalterns: A Reading of a Decade of Subaltern Studies', *South Asia*, New Series, Vol. XV, no. 1 (1992).

normative life than drivers of mass politics. For Chatterjee, the underlying rationale for change amongst groups is the tensions between economic classes.

This model has more recently been expanded in detail by Taj ul-Islam Hashmi.³⁹ He argues that by the 1930s the Bengali Muslim peasants were convinced that their emancipation lay in the programme-oriented policies of the elites. The resultant ascendancy of the *ashraf/jotedar*⁴⁰ classes in the 1937 elections, and their consequential absorption into the Muslim League, produced an integration of a communalised leadership which was responsive to peasant demands. Thus, the flowing of a tide of radical class-based peasant-politics through the channel of communal politics produced by 1947 its logical outcome: Pakistan. The Muslim nationalist movement has therefore been interpreted as the communalisation of a class struggle within Bengal. Both Chatterjee and Hashmi suggest that the widespread expression of the demand for Pakistan amongst the Muslim peasantry arose from their desire to free themselves from *zamindari* domination and to establish a more just relationship with the state machinery.

There are other hypotheses explaining the Pakistan movement based upon the mobilisation of economic class interests. Hamza Alavi's model of the coalition of an emerging 'salarial' class is particularly relevant.⁴¹ He argues that the nineteenth-century colonial structure of India's political system shifted the centre of gravity of status and influence in Indian society from the landed gentry to a rising class of bureaucracy. The salariat comprised those Indians who had received an education which would equip them for employment in the expanding colonial state apparatus as a bureaucratisee middle class. According to this model, the two-

³⁹ Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, *Pakistan as a Peasant Utopia: The Communalisation of Class Politics in East Bengal, 1920-1947* (Boulder, Westview, 1992).

⁴⁰ *ashraf* refers to Urdu-speaking elites, *jotedar* is the most common kind of intermediary landholder between the landlord (with proprietary rights) and lower peasants.

⁴¹ H. Alavi, 'Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology', in F. Halliday and H. Alavi (eds), *State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan* (London, Macmillan, 1988).

nation theory expressed the ideology of the weaker Muslim salariat asserting themselves against the dominant high caste Hindu salariat groups. In applying the model to the Pakistan movement, Alavi shows that the Muslim salariat was most aroused in the Muslim-minority provinces where they considered they had most to lose as government increasingly came into the hands of the Hindu elites.

In Sind, however, the Muslim salariat was non-existent. Therefore, in order to incorporate all of Muslim India, Jinnah was forced to strike deals with the rural magnates in the Muslim-majority provinces. Jinnah needed the existing power-holders in those provinces, but the landed elites were only willing to join the League when the alternative of a strong Congress-dominated centre loomed. The nature of the deals with the rural landlords meant that they actually took control of the League in their provinces, and so Alavi concludes, the ongoing instability of the Pakistan state is therefore the conflict of class interests between the rural magnates and the urban salariat for control of the state apparatus.

The difficulty with theories explaining Pakistan as the result of the mobilisation of economic classes is that the motives of individuals, and factors extraneous to class mobilisation, are underplayed. Consequently such particular historical presentations are somewhat narrow in that connections between class conflicts and the impact of external events are not fully recognised. In Sind, for example, the actions time after time of the Muslim elites served to undermine the position of their group. Incidents such as conflict between the urban Muslim political elites (e.g. Mohammed Gazdar's struggle with Yusuf Haroon for control of the Karachi branch of the Muslim League, in the mid-1940s, which had a significant bearing on the course of the establishment of the Muslim League) have been generalised in Alavi's thesis as simply being typical of the behaviours of the respective classes.⁴² The result is that other possible determining factors are

⁴² *Ibid.*

ignored and their impact on influencing the course of historical events is marginalised.

Regionalism

There have been only a few scholars who have presented the factor of regionalism as a determinant in the mobilisation of support either for, or against, Pakistan. The thesis of Shila Sen provides a potent argument as to why Bengal strongly supported the League in the important elections of 1946.⁴³ Sen contends that the reason why the Pakistan movement acquired deep roots in Bengal in the early 1940s was because it had been promoted in the context of a Bengali Muslim nationalism. Pakistan was portrayed to the Bengali Muslim constituency as:

achieving an independent sovereign state comprising Bengal and Assam and democratising and making the party [the All-India Muslim League] broad-based so that the aristocratic leadership did not control the destiny of the Muslim masses.⁴⁴

Moreover, Harun-or-Rashid reveals that the internal politics of the provincial Muslim leadership was presented as a conflict between the Bengali-speaking and the non-Bengali-speaking political and business interests.⁴⁵ In a review article, Rafiuddin Ahmed shows that Rashid located the existence of a Bengali 'sub-nationalism' in this conflict, and that the Pakistan movement in Bengal reflected the Bengali Muslims' desire to assert their regional identity.⁴⁶

Two of the more pertinent presentations of the importance of regionalism in

⁴³ S. Sen, *Muslim Politics in Bengal, 1937-1947* (New Delhi, Impex, 1976).

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

⁴⁵ R. Ahmed reviewing H.O. Rashid, *The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh: Bengal Muslim League and Muslim Politics, 1936-1947* (Dhaka, Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1987), in *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 48, no. 3 (1989), p. 69.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

Bengal are those of Bidyut Chakrabarty and Sugata Bose.⁴⁷ Their works show that the idea of an independent greater Bengal was spearheaded by the local Muslim League's Abul Hashim and Hussein Suhrawardy and was supported by the Bengali Congress leaders Sarat Bose and K.S. Roy. Again, the movement was primarily the quest by the Bengali elites to curb the influence of non-Bengalis, and as such reflected the tensions within both the Bengal Provincial Muslim League and the Bengal Congress Committee. The demand was further supported by Jinnah, who saw the benefit in an undivided Bengal which meant the inclusion of Calcutta. Scuttled eventually by the British and central Congress who applied the logic of Jinnah's two-nation theory to partition the province, the united Bengal movement has generally been overlooked by historians as a factor in the Pakistan movement for it failed to prevent the partition of the province.

Chakrabarty, however, shows that the movement was a key factor in the struggle for control of the provincial League and Congress organisations. The importance of the movement did not cease in 1947. It submerged briefly only to become manifest in the language riots of 1951 and finally in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Bose emphasises how the reduction of Bengal to the role of a pawn in the game of all-India politics embedded a problematic basis for the centre-province relations which carried over into the new Pakistan state.

A similar analysis for the North-West Frontier Province has been put forward by Erland Jansson.⁴⁸ He shows that the Khudai Khitmagars (a local organisation with Congress links, representing the smaller khans and tenant-cultivators) possessed more influence than the Muslim League because of its pro-

⁴⁷ B. Chakrabarty, 'The 1947 United Bengal Movement: A Thesis Without a Synthesis', *The Indian Economic Social History Review*, Vol. 30, no.4 (1993), S. Bose, 'A Doubtful Inheritance: The Partition of Bengal in 1947', in Low, *Political Inheritance*.

⁴⁸ E. Jansson, *India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan?: The National Movements in the North-West Frontier Province 1937-1947* [hereafter *Pakistan or Pakhtunistan?*] (Uppsala, Almqvist and Wiksell, 1981); 'The Frontier Province: Khudai Khitmagars and the Muslim League', in Low, *Political Inheritance*.

Pakhtun platform (the Pakhtuns were the major ethnic group in the province). The Khitmagars' *raison d'être* as decolonisation loomed was the quest for an autonomous state of Pakhtunistan. In contrast, the Muslim League (controlled by the large khans) adopted a contrary position and attracted a non-Pakhtun support base as they competed with the Khitmagars. Thus racial ethnicity, not communalism, was the prime factor in mobilising the Muslims of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).

The importance of regionalism portrayed by Sen, Rashid, Chakrabarty, and Jansson are centred on the combination of two significant themes which analysts of the Pakistan movement have largely failed to explore. Firstly, the relationship of regional ethnicity and separatist ideology, and secondly, the tension between economic groups within the regional Muslim communities.

In spite of the differences in political economy between Bengal and the NWFP, there clearly is value in the exploration of the interplay of the themes of Islamic ideology, the coalescence of classes behind economic grievances, and the demands of regional ethnicity.

Provincial histories

What of the provincial histories of Sind to date? What conclusions have their authors drawn to explain Sind's role in the formation of Pakistan? There are only a few scholars who have focused on aspects of the dynamics of its politics in the era of decolonisation. None have attempted a thorough explanation of Sind's role in the Pakistan movement.

Allen Jones in *Muslim Politics and The Growth of the Muslim League in Sind, 1935-41* contends that while the Sindhi Muslim leadership provided strong support for the League in the late 1940s (contrary to Jalal's view), the League

struggled to establish a solid organisational basis in the late 1930s.⁴⁹ The struggle was due to the disunity within the Muslim Sindhi leadership and to disharmonious relations between the Sindhis and the All-India Muslim League. Following the success of the movement to separate Sind from Bombay, the Muslim elites fought for the provincial Cabinet posts as the fruits of victory. An ironic consequence was that Hindu elites benefited, for they held the balance of power and could call the tune in the legislature. The Sindhi Muslims' only recourse therefore, was to turn to the All-India Muslim League for help. The central League and the Sind Muslim League agreed on a strategy which served both their interests, and so 'the League developed a strong party organisation and provided effective leadership in Sind until its all-India goal of Pakistan was realised.'⁵⁰ The Muslim League ministry of 1940-41, and the Pakistan movement, are seen by Jones as the political maturing of the Sindhi Muslim elites and with this maturity, they naturally fell into line behind the Muslim League.

Jones' thesis is problematic. The focus on the period 1935 to 1941 is too narrow to consider the impact and force of the Pakistan movement and the developments which occurred afterwards between 1941 and 1947. Jones' argument does not readily fit the facts of the 1940s. This is regrettable, for Jones' astute handling of his themes actually suggests the conclusions which he failed to articulate or develop: that the cohesion was superficial and that centre-province relations were determined by the agenda of the Sindhi Muslim leaderships, not the agenda of the Muslim League leadership.

The other major works are Sarah Ansari's.⁵¹ In *Sufi Saints and State*

⁴⁹ A.K. Jones, *Muslim Politics and the Growth of the Muslim League in Sind, 1935-1941* [hereafter *Muslim Politics*] (unpublished Ph.D thesis, Durham, Duke University, 1977).

⁵⁰ Jones, *Muslim Politics*, p. iii.

⁵¹ S.F.D Ansari, *Sufi Saints and State Power; The Pirs of Sind, 1843-1947* [hereafter *Sufi Saints*] (Cambridge, C.U.P, 1992); S.F.D. Ansari, 'Political Legacies of Pre-1947 Sind' [hereafter *Political Legacies*] in Low, *Political Inheritance*.

Power: The Pirs of Sind, 1843-1947 her focus is quite different from Jones', for she seeks to explain the Muslim response to the introduction and maintenance of colonial rule in the province. She identifies the *pirs* as the key figures of political influence and explores how the *pirs* responded to new sets of parameters of authority and modes of political influence. Ansari adopts a framework consistent with Gilmartin's 'mediating roles' in the functioning of state authority to assess the groups of *pirs* who supported the British system of control in order to protect (and if possible extend) their interests, and those who rejected the British system and tried to operate outside it. Within this framework she explores the role of the *pirs* in the political developments between 1937-47.

Ansari provides a solid portrayal of the *pirs*' search for the likely power-broker at the transfer of power and, having decided that it would probably be the Muslim League, of how they threw their weight behind the Pakistan movement as a means of ensuring their position in the new order. An invaluable feature of Ansari's work is her delineation of the *pirs* transforming their role through the electoral system from collaboration with the authorities to participation in the administration. While the issue of Sind's role in the Pakistan movement is not central to her study, she brings to light a crucial dimension in the explanation of how the Sindhi masses were mobilised. However, the context of provincial Sindhi politics is beyond the scope of this work, and, as with Talbot's, the underlying causes of the elites' acceptance or rejection of Pakistan is still missing.

However, Ansari's contribution in Low's volume, *Political Legacies of Pre-1947 Sind*, briefly illuminates a crucial aspect of Sind's political history: provincialism. She shows how the awareness of the need to protect Sind from 'outsiders' was evident well before the influx of Mujahirs. This aspect is important, because it provides one of the strongest connecting links between pre-and post-partition Pakistan. The question the link raises is what, if any, the connection was

between Sindhi provincialism and the Pakistan movement. This thesis attempts to address that question. In doing so, it will be explained how influential Sindhi provincialism was in influencing the political behaviours of the Sindhi Muslims, especially the Muslim political leaderships.

Hamida Khuhro has highlighted the role of provincialism in Sind in the 1920s her compilation *Documents of the Separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency*.⁵² Her commentary on the documents is useful because it reveals the important role Sindhi identity performed in influencing the politics of provincial Muslim elites two decades prior to the Pakistan movement. She is the daughter of Mohammed Khuhro (who was a leading figure in the Sind separation movement and Sind Muslim League), and as an historian and contemporary advocate of Sindhi rights, is well placed to understand the roots of Sindhi regionalism. Khuhro has also produced two other works which assist in providing background information of Sind's political history.⁵³

There is a growing literature produced by political theorists, journalists and historians on the problems of contemporary Sind which is of some use. The articles of Feroz Ahmad,⁵⁴ Zahid Hussain,⁵⁵ Hamza Alavi⁵⁶ and Iftikhar H. Malik,⁵⁷ depict the conflicts occurring in Sind as a 'nationalist' struggle. These writers have examined the rise in agitational politics, violence, and separatist movements within Sind since the 1970s. Again, the questions their writings raise are whether the roots of a Sindhi ethno-nationalism can be traced to the Pakistan movement, and

⁵² H. Khuhro (ed.), *Documents of the Separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency* [hereafter *Separation Documents*] (Islamabad, Institute of Islamic History, Culture and Civilisation, 1982).

⁵³ H. Khuhro (ed.), *Sind Through the Centuries* [hereafter *Sind Centuries*] (Karachi, O.U.P, 1981); and *The Making of Modern Sind: British Policy and Social Change in the Nineteenth-Century* [hereafter *Modern Sind*] (Karachi, Indus, 1978).

⁵⁴ F. Ahmed, 'Ethnicity and Politics: The Rise of Muhajir Separatism', *South Asia Bulletin*, Vol. 8, nos. 1 & 2 (1988).

⁵⁵ Z. Hussain, 'Sind: Day of the Nationalist', in *The Herald* (Pakistan), June edition 1988.

⁵⁶ H. Alavi, 'Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology', *op. cit.*

⁵⁷ I.H. Malik, 'Ethno-Nationalism in Pakistan: A Commentary on Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM) in Sindh', *South Asia*, Vol. XVIII, no. 2 (1995).

if so, what role it played? Thus, collectively the works of Khuhro and writers on contemporary Sind suggest a thread of strong Sindhi identity from the 1920s to present times. However, that thread has not been fully explored. This thesis attempts to portray the significance of Sindhi identity and how it impacted on the Pakistan movement.

The context of communalism

Finally, the differing approaches to the explanation of as to why Pakistan was created have all at some point in their unfolding involved the issue of communalism.⁵⁸ The germane discussion of locating communalism in Indian historiography has been presented by Louis Dumont, who explained that communalism is an intermediate stage in the process of the developing group identity as traditional societies become modernised.⁵⁹ Dumont approaches the phenomenon of communalism from a sociologist's perspective and contends that group identity in a traditional society is primarily understood to be 'religious-oriented', whereas group identity in modernising societies is more oriented towards concepts of nationalism. For Dumont, communalism is the transitional stage of 'the affirmation of the religious community as a political group.'⁶⁰

Kenneth Jones develops this paradigm when he argues that not only is 'communalism a consciously-shared religious heritage which becomes the dominant form of identity for a given segment of society,' but the 'expression of this consciousness in demands for a state, a nation which would embody the unique qualities of the religious group, mark the transition from communalism to religious nationalism.'⁶¹ For Jones, communalism exists as an historic reality that

⁵⁸ For a full account of the historical development of the idea of communalism see Chapter One of G. Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism in North India: Partition Historiography Revisited* (Delhi, 1990). See also B. Chandra, *India's Struggle for Independence* (New Delhi, Penguin, 1989).

⁵⁹ L. Dumont, 'Nationalism and Communalism', *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, Vol. VII (March 1964).

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁶¹ K. Jones, in 'Communalism in the Punjab: The Arya Samaj Contribution', *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XXVIII, no.1 (1968), p. 39.

links religious identity with nationalism. Yet, can the historic reality that became Pakistan be so easily explained in this hypothesis?

In contrast Gyanendra Pandey has focused upon developing fresh perspectives of understanding the historicism of the debate concerning communal conflict and argues that communalism is essentially a form of colonialist knowledge.⁶² The notion captured for colonialists 'what they had conceptualised as a basic feature of India society - its religious bigotry and its fundamentally irrational character.'⁶³ For colonialists, communal identity was underscored through the notion of ready made, self-contained religious communities. The colonial British, in trying to explain what they could not understand (Indian societies), constructed an history of India confined within their own framework of understanding concepts such as 'community' and 'nation'. Yet neither fitted the reality of India, and so communalism became blurred with European notions of nationalism and was foisted upon Indian societies. For Pandey, the colonialist explanation implies a certain inevitability that communal identity would eventually become nationalist, and so Pakistan forms the colonialists' classic example of a '[Muslim] community' that became a 'nation.'

Pandey claims that the colonial myth of communalism is deeply embedded in the works of scholarly writing. This fact was due not only to the persistence of colonial dialectics but also to the life that Indian nationalists gave to the debate during the colonial period in their efforts to debunk the myth. Hence, communalism has been given a reality that it does not and cannot really possess, for the existence of ready made religious communities was also a manufacture of the colonial regime's construction of what constituted India. However, the difficulty with Pandey's explanation of conflict in India, as Jalal points out, is his 'insistence

⁶² Pandey, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

of the need to write an history of violence on its own terms without reference to particular historical contexts or any notion of broader historical change.⁶⁴ Ironically, that is the same criticism he levels at the colonialist interpretation of Indian politics.

How can an analysis of decolonisation in India's history be fruitfully progressed without incorrectly locating the phenomenon of what constituted and motivated Indian notions of political identity? Jalal suggests the need for a tracking of the development of communal consciousness before assuming 'communalism' to be a cultural given across India.⁶⁵ Given the complex societal mosaic that constituted India, was there a uniform 'communal consciousness' to be tracked, or were there a multitude of consciousnesses located in different regions and corners of India's societies?⁶⁶

Sandria Freitag lays the groundwork to explore such paradigms, and in doing so injects a vitality to the analysing of the role of communalism in the events, and writing, of Indian history.⁶⁷ Freitag's studies contribute two important hypotheses. Firstly, the British colonial authorities connected clashes inherently directed against their policies (e.g. the riots of 1810 in Benares) and reconstructed them as communal clashes. This hypothesis provides useful insights into the colonial reporting of events and this can do much to explain how the catch-cry of 'communal antagonism' has masked other forces in action, such as conflicts grounded in economic or ethnocentric issues, rather than religious community.

⁶⁴ A. Jalal, 'Secularists, Subalterns and the Stigma of 'Communalism': Partition Historiography Revisited', *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, Vol. 33, no. 1 (1996), p. 98.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

⁶⁶ This notion is contained in the writings of B.R. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, second edition (London, Verso, 1991), and P. Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Post-Colonial Histories* (Delhi, O.U.P., 1994).

⁶⁷ S. B. Freitag, *Collective Action and Community: Public Arenas in the Emergence of Communalism in North India* [hereafter *Collective Action*] (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989).

The second hypothesis argues that the pressures to modernise expressions of political identity caused competition between groups within respective religious communities that in turn produced conflict between communities. For example, Freitag explains how the actions of Hindu reform movements in Agra in the 1880s (such as the Arya Samaj) heightened community consciousness to the extent that symbols which defined the membership of the community were drawn upon by those groups competing for leadership roles of the Hindu societies. The increasing mobilisation of religious symbolism in turn produced hostility amongst Muslims, who perceived the politically activated 'Hinduness' of Hindu groups as a threat to Muslim cultural identity.

The limitation in Freitag's model is that it fails to locate accurately the role of the state structures in the process of communalisation, and that her work stops short of the 1930s, which was the key phase of communal politics. Her model needs to be connected to the structures of the state and applied to the era of provincial autonomy. This thesis will approach the issue of communalism largely from an exploration of the apparatuses of the state. That is, it will use the provincial administration's foremost political institutions (such as the provincial Assembly rather than popular culture) to observe how the transition to democratic institutions affected the elites and how in turn their responses were acted out in the public arena. In a sense this study will test the core elements of Freitag's hypothesis past the late nineteenth/early twentieth-century era when the process of transition to a modernised society was most tumultuous. Moreover, the story of partition cannot be confined to the decoding of actions in the public arena alone. The nature of politics in Sind was such that both the state and public arenas were crucial in the modernising processes. As Jalal states:

one cannot unproblematically relate the 'communal consciousness' in the subaltern mind and periodic outbreaks of inter-communal violence in the 'public arenas' of localities with the outcome of partition. An

historical analysis of the level of high-politics and the arena of the state is indispensable in unravelling the dynamics of the post-colonial transition.⁶⁸

In the 1930s and 1940s the popular cultures of Indian societies and the new institutions of the state were brought together as never previously experienced in colonial Indian history. The new institutions of the state were structured in a way that determined the channel along which politics flowed; it was a channel in which religious identity was paramount. The more elites in the state apparatuses acted in a way that exclusively promoted the interests of their respective religious identities, the more communal conflict was acted out in the public arena. This was particularly the case with Muslim politics in the genre of the Pakistan movement. In a sense, the members of Sind's Legislative Assembly represented the pain which Sindhi society experienced in the transition from a traditional society to a modern state. They acted out, at times in the public arena, the processes of redefining their communities' political identities.

Sind is an important example in the study of the development of communal politics. No sooner had elites been brought into the participative political institutions of the province, then they were immediately forced into the tumult of decolonisation and the establishment of a new nation-state. The definition of communalism in this thesis is that which explains it as the process of the politicising of religious identity. Certainly events in late colonial Sind indicate that as religious identity grew increasingly politicised, and communalised, it assumed a central role in the debate over questions of national identity. However, can communalism alone explain Sind's role in the creation of the Pakistan state?

⁶⁸ Jalal, 'Secularists, Subalterns and the Stigma of Communalism: Partition Historiography Revisited', *op. cit.*, p. 101.

II

After almost five decades of the historiography explaining the creation of Pakistan, the question of how Sind came to be a part of Pakistan remains. There are a number of models which have been applied to other Muslim-majority provinces and to Muslim India as a whole. The models which fail to differentiate between the historical developments which occurred in the differing regions across 'Muslim India' have been unable to provide a satisfactory explanation of the role of Sind's Muslims in the Pakistan movement. Those models which explain the Pakistan movement in other provinces have not been applied to Sind, and so the body of knowledge of why Pakistan was created is far from complete. The purpose of this thesis is to explain what occurred in Sind, especially in the decade prior to partition, which resulted in its becoming a part of the new Muslim state.

An explanation of Sind's role in the Pakistan movement must reveal how the seemingly conflicting pieces of evidence fit together. The movement to separate Sind from the Bombay Presidency (1913-32), the conflict between Hindus and Muslims in the Sind Legislature, the waves of communal riots in the early 1940s, the Sind Muslim League's official programme to bar non-Sindhis from employment or land-ownership (mid-1940s), the tensions between landed interests and agricultural labour, and the repeated proclamations by the Muslim elites that Pakistan meant sovereignty for Sind, produce a mosaic which the histories of the Pakistan movement have failed to incorporate or take account of.

This thesis proposes a three phase explanation of the development amongst the Sindhi Muslim political elites. In the first phase, the Muslims' sense of importance of Sindhi identity and their desire to curb the position of Hindu elites (competing for local economic and political power) combined to produce a localised Muslim separatist movement. This phase was characterised by the

emphasis Muslims placed upon demarcating Sind from non-Sindhi affairs, whereas the Hindu elites redefined their position and forged closer ties with Hindu nationalist movements. Importantly, the granting of provincial status to Sind represented the legitimization of the Sindhi Muslims entwining communal and ethnocentric issues and resulted in furthering the development of a distinctly Sindhi Muslim political identity.

The second phase witnessed the unleashing of competitiveness amongst the Muslim elites for the positions of political pre-eminence in the new provincial structure of authority. The competitiveness served to heighten tensions between economic and social groups. It also widened the cleavage between the Hindu and Muslim communities as Muslim elites sought for means to break the influence of the Hindus.

In the third phase the Muslims coalesced behind the Muslim League Party and were able to establish themselves in government. This development brought into the open the question of what Sind's place would be in the aftermath of Britain's withdrawal from India. The issue of the Sindhi's ethnocentrism rose to the fore as Pakistan was conceived as being the opportunity for the Sindhi Muslims to establish their own sovereign state. The question arose as to which groups would dominate the new order. The struggle between the entrenched large landlords and the smaller landlords/labour classes was manifested in the conflict within the Sind Muslim League's ranks. The processes of redefining political identity continued as the sovereignty of Sind failed to eventuate and the province was swept into a new state of Pakistan which was more heavily centralised than the colonial government it had replaced. The departure of the Sindhi Hindus and their replacement by Urdu-speaking Muslim refugees from across India forced the Sindhi Muslim into new types of relationships with the new central government, amongst themselves,

and with the Sindhi masses. These new relationships produced profound effects which still have their reverberations in Sind today.

Underpinning this explanation are the roles that communalism and ethnicity played. The definition of ethnicity applied in this thesis is that of a perceived belonging to a racial group which drew on symbols, behaviours, and actions which distinguished the group from others.⁶⁹ The political history of Sind in the twentieth century cannot be confined to an analysis of conflict between Hindus and Muslims. Integral to the course of Sind's history is the role which ethnic identity performed. It is a role that is linked to communalism, but has historically been overshadowed by it. The contribution this thesis makes to scholarship is to reveal how regional identity was manifested in politics in the critical years before decolonisation, and what exactly its interconnection was with communalism. Not only does ethnicity feature along with Muslim identity (but not necessarily Muslim unity) as a propelling force in the pieces of evidence cited earlier, but it consistently appears in other evidence which has been more widely analysed by scholars, but not recognised for its worth. For example, the results of the 1946 general election have generally been accepted by scholars to have shown a decisive victory for the Muslim League, but this was hardly the case for Sind and the North-West Frontier Province.

In spite of their future role in the heartland of Pakistan, the Muslims of the north-western provinces were able to generate only enough enthusiasm for the Muslim League to poll 59 percent of the votes. In the United Provinces, where the League polled 64 percent, its performance can be explained by the intense rivalry from the Congress and *ulema* opposition. Yet, in the Punjab, North-West Frontier


⁶⁹ This definition has been developed from Bernard Cohn's description of regionalism. See B. S. Cohn, 'Regions Subjective and Objective: Their Relation to the Study of Modern Indian History and Society,' in R. I. Crane (ed.), *Regions and Regionalism in South Asia* (Durham, Duke, 1966), pp. 5-37, quoted in I.H. Malik, 'Problems of Regionalism in Pakistan', in W.H. Wriggins (ed.), *Pakistan in Transition* (Islamabad, University of Islamabad, 1975), p. 6).

Province and Sind these national parties fared dismally (in Sind the Congress failed to contest a single Muslim constituency). Instead, the opposition to the Muslim League came from exclusively provincial interests. Chart 1 reveals that provincial issues were of significantly more importance to the north-western Muslims than those elsewhere. The results of voting in Sind mirror the results of the aggregate of the north-western Muslims: 59 percent for the Muslim League; 39 percent for provincial interests; and 2 percent for non-Muslim League national parties. The importance of the Sindhis' ethnocentricity is even greater if the Pakistan demand is understood as being a promise of Sindhi sovereignty (and therefore the votes for the Muslim League would represent votes for 'provincial interests').

Chart 1: Votes Polled in the Muslim Constituencies: 1946 General Election

1. Muslim minority provinces and Bengalⁱ

2. Muslim-majority provinces of the north-westⁱⁱ



i. Assam, Bengal, Bihar, Bombay Central Provinces, Madras, Orissa, and United Provinces.

ii. Sind, Punjab, and NWFP.

iii. The National Parties consisted of secular and Muslim organisations advocating Indian national unity.

iv. Provincial Interests consisted of parties and independents representing purely provincial agendas, ranging from independent candidates to those advocating 'sub-nationalist' movements.

Source: Calculated from the *Return Showing the Results of Elections to the Central Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Legislatures in 1945-1946* [hereafter *Results of Elections 1945-1946*] (Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1948).

It is argued that at no stage did the Muslim elites of Sind desire the particular state of Pakistan which was created. Sindhi Muslims, especially since early this century, had sought as much provincial independence as they could get. Their leadership came to the view that the All-India Muslim League, and particularly the Pakistan demand were the necessary mechanisms in the process of decolonisation which were to provide them with a sovereign state. To Sindhi Muslims, Pakistan was not an end in itself but merely a means to an end. This was a view which they realised, too late, was not compatible with either Jinnah's or the British view of the end play of the transfer of power.

In presenting this argument a number of points will unfold. The introduction of British colonial administration brought profound changes to Sind's political economy. Perhaps one of the most far-reaching changes was the introduction of provincial autonomy and the structuring of separate electorates. The institutional frameworks shaped the flow of provincial politics as the interaction between the politicising of religious identity and the weakened position of the Muslim elites resulted in communal conflict.

The processes of the communalisation of provincial politics fuelled the Sindhi Muslims' quest for independence, but it was not a communalism that unified Muslims, either in Sind or between Sindhis and other Muslims. It will be seen that the national political organisations of the All-India Muslim League and the Congress were used by elite groups in the province exclusively to further their own interests, and conversely, the national organisations consistently attempted to manipulate the political affairs of the province in order to strengthen their own position at the national level. As a result of these processes, the brittleness of the relationship between the All-India Muslim League High Command and the Sind Provincial Muslim League leadership will be revealed, particularly the actual

ideological incongruence of these organisations and that the effects that these differences had in shaping the future of Sind and of India.

The tensions between Muslim groups is a crucial factor in an explanation of Pakistan. The expectation of the Muslim elites to control the province of Sind produced tensions which opened deep rifts between agricultural classes, amongst the nascent urban middle classes, within the landowning sectional groups. The more powerful confrontation of the three was centred on the question of which political ideology would predominate in the anticipated Pakistan state: the traditional landowning *zamindari* system, or socialism. In 1942, the position of the Hindus in the Assembly was broken, allowing Muslims to dominate the legislature after five years of Hindu control. This brought an immediate deflating of the communal challenge, and allowed Muslim elites to focus on what Sind's role would be in the post-colonial world. In the clash that arose between the conservative landowners and those propounding socialist reform, the Muslim League in Sind was irrevocably split. However, the key to the fracturing was not simply ideological differences. It lay in Jinnah's continual reliance on the traditional *mirs* and failure to support those who championed his socio-economic creed. The inability of Jinnah to match deeds with words had the effect of hardening the Sindhis' resolve to define their role in Pakistan as a sovereign state free from any extra-territorial influences: British, Hindu, or non-Sindhi Muslim.

The role of religion in Sind politics has, of course, not been neglected. It will be shown that although religion provided a common political platform for Muslims, Islam in itself was insufficient as a mechanism to provide any real lasting unity. The effectiveness of the Pakistan movement in Sind lay not in the potency of its religious appeal, but rather in the opportunities its potency created.

This three phase explanation parallels aspects of the predominant models (discussed earlier) which offer explanations of Pakistan. The Sind separatist movement and the Muslim elites' behaviours at various times suggest conformity with both the primordialist and the instrumentalist models, but both of these models are too extreme to locate accurately what was occurring in Sind over a sustained period. The argument that Sindhi Muslims simply responded to appeals for a pan-Indian Islamic community also fails in light of the evidence. In reality, what occurred was a convergence of several dynamic historical consequences: strong ethnocentrism; pressure to demarcate Hindus and Muslims; and tensions within groups in Sindhi Muslim society. How the Muslim elites responded to the convergence of these factors forms the story of the Pakistan movement in Sind. It is an history of how the Sindhi Muslim elites grappled with their desire for political control and the articulation of their sense of identity in a period of tumultuous change.

The structure of this thesis reflects the three phase model. Part One shows the changes that British colonialism brought to Sind, and how the Muslim elites responded; a response which produced the Sind separation movement of the 1920s. Part Two reveals how the breakdown between Hindu and Muslim elites over the issue of control of the Sind Legislature influenced the elites' politics. Part Three discusses how the Sindhi Muslim elites' ethnocentrism was manifested in the Pakistan movement, and how they responded to the new Pakistan state.