

APPENDICES

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TABLE 1 : Some Major Characteristics of Rationalism Categorised

Two faculties of Mind

1. There are two faculties of mind: sense and reason, or perception and inference [Doniela, 1984, p.12; Boas, 1961, p.vii].
2. Experience (or sense) is not the only basis of knowledge [Boas, p.vii; Doniela, p.14].
3. Rationalism is opposed to the empiricist doctrine that experience is a necessary basis to all knowledge [Urmson, 1967, p.339; Williams, 1972, p.69].
4. Reason is superior to sense [Doniela, p.12].
Reason is granted the primary place in explanation [Reese, 1980, p.478].
Rationalism stresses the role played by reason as opposed to the senses in the acquisition of knowledge [Cottingham, 1984, p.6].
5. Sense or experience is an inferior way of knowing [Doniela, p.12; Urmson, p.122].
Experience is an inferior substitute for reason [Urmson, p.122].
Perception gives us the facts, the qualities of things, etc., but Perception is of particular, localised and dated things and events [Boas, p.viii].
Some rationalists condemn the senses as an inherently suspect and unreliable basis for knowledge [Cottingham, p.6].
6. The foregoing imply there are two ways of knowing.

Contents of Mind

7. The mind contains innate ideas.
(Descartes) Postulates adventitious, factitious and innate ideas [Williams, p.69].
(Descartes) The ideas of God, mind, matter are innate [Williams, p.69].
8. The mind contains innate principles.
(Leibniz) Postulates innate principles -- necessary propositions [Williams, p.70].

Rationalism and Idealism

9. Rationalism became identified with Absolute Idealism [Reese, p.479].
10. (Hegel) Identification of the rational and the real [Reese, p.479].

Knowledge

11. (Descartes) Knowledge is based on clear and distinct perceptions [Williams, p.72].
12. We have knowledge of the world by reasoning alone without experience.
By pure reasoning, without appeal to empirical premises, we can arrive at substantial knowledge about the world [Urmson, p.339].
The belief that it is possible to obtain by reason alone a knowledge of the nature of what exists [Speake, 1979, p.278].
Rationalists claim that by reason, independently of experience, we can come to know important and substantive truths about reality, the nature of mind, the universe and what it contains [Cottingham, p.7].
13. (Leibniz) In principle, all truths can be known by pure reasoning [Urmson, p.339].
14. Some knowledge is (synthetic) *a priori*.
Rationalism stresses the power of *a priori* reason [Williams, p.69].
All rationalists ... maintain the possibility of *a priori* knowledge [Cottingham, p.6].
15. (Descartes) Some rational principles are indubitable [Urmson, p.339].
16. There is some kind of final certainty in knowledge [Williams, p.73].
17. Knowledge forms a single system [Speake, p.278].

18. Knowledge forms a single system which is deductive in character [Speake, p.278].
Postulation of the idea of a total deductive system [Williams, p.738].
19. All knowledge can be brought under this system.
Everything can in principle be (explained in or) brought under the single system [Speake, p.278].

Truth

20. The criterion of truth is intellectual, not sensory [Runes, 1972, p.263].
21. There is a distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact.
(Leibniz) Postulates truths of reason as against truths of fact [Williams, p.73].
22. There is a correspondence between thought and the world [Williams, p.73].
23. In Absolute Idealism, truth is coherence.
Thus truth as coherence, and the notion of the whole, or systematic unity [Reese, p.479].
24. (Leibniz) In all true propositions, the predicate is contained in the subject [Williams, p.73].
25. (Spinoza) The relation of cause to effect is that of implication [Williams, p.73].

Mathematics

26. Mathematics (or geometry) provides a model for all inquiring disciplines.
27. Mathematics is based on concepts not derived from experience.
Mathematical concepts are not derived from experience [Williams, p.71].
28. Mathematics is transcendental.
29. Mathematical truths are *a priori* [Urmsen, p.123].

Philosophy

31. (Descartes and Spinoza) Philosophy is modelled on geometry [Reese, p.479].
Rationalism is associated with the attempt to introduce mathematical methods in philosophy [Runes, p.263].

Science

32. Science is basically an *a priori* enterprise [Williams, p.69].
33. A completed science is a complete deductive system [Williams, p.73].
34. Science is concerned with laws and laws are concerned with ideal objects [Doniela, p.13].
35. Scientific laws cannot be perceived by the senses.
Ideal objects cannot be perceived by the senses [Doniela, p.13].
No act of perception can give one a general law [Boas, p.vii].
Perception is not sufficient to establish scientific laws [Boas, p.vii].
36. (Descartes) claims science employs --
 - (a) an analytic method of exploration
 - (b) a synthetic method of exposition [Williams, p.73].

TABLE 1: Some Major Characteristics of Rationalism Categorised. This Table lists a number of characteristics attributed to rationalism by eight commentators and groups these points, somewhat loosely, in broad categories.

Table 2

1. Presumption of a supernatural order: an hylozoic universe or animated Physis
2. Postulation of the soul
3. Postulation of unobservable, fundamental elements of knowledge, that is, the forms
4. Postulation of a distinction between knowledge and opinion
5. Postulation of two faculties of soul: sense and reason
6. Postulation or Assumption of two ways of knowing
7. The reification of mathematical reasoning
8. The claim that reason is superior to sense, or that sense is an inferior way of knowing
9. Postulation of a division between appearance and reality:
 - (i) in reality between the sensible world and the intelligible world;
 - (ii) between the objects of sense and the forms
10. Together, the foregoing doctrines or conceptions imply that there are two methods of establishing truths:
 - (i) by sense, that is by observing, and
 - (ii) by some non-observational process: apprehension of the forms
11. The conception of science as systematic knowledge, or a deductive system modelled on mathematics.

TABLE 2: Some General Features: of Greek Rationalism

Some important characteristics of Greek rationalism related to "the soul".

Table 3

(a) GREEK RATIONALISM	(b) CLASSICAL RATIONALISM
1. Presumption of a supernatural order (a) an hylozoic universe or animated Physis	(b) Judaism or Judaeo-Christian view of an omnipotent God who created the universe
2. Postulation of -- (a) the soul	(b) the mind
3. Postulation of unobservable, fundamental elements of knowledge -- (a) the forms	(b) ideas, concepts, or in Liebniz, possibly monads
Some combination of the following (from 4 to 8) --	
4. Postulation of a distinction between -- (a) knowledge and opinion	(b) certain knowledge: truths of reason, necessary truth and contingent truth
5. Postulation of two faculties of -- (a) soul: sense and reason	(b) mind: sense and reason
6. Postulation or Assumption of two ways of knowing (b) <i>a priori</i> and <i>a posteriori</i> knowledge	
7. The reification of mathematical reasoning	
8. The claim that reason is superior to sense, or that sense is an inferior way of knowing	
9. Postulation of a division between appearance and reality; (i) in reality between the sensible world and the intelligible world; (ii) between the objects: of sense and -- (a) the forms	(b) ideas
10. Together, the foregoing doctrines or conceptions imply that there are two methods of establishing truths: (i) by sense, that is by observing, and (ii) by some non-observational process: (a) apprehension of the forms	(b) analysis and comparison of ideas in the mind
11. The conception of science as systematic knowledge, or a deductive system modelled on mathematics.	

TABLE 3: Some General Features of Rationalism

Some important characteristics of rationalism related to "soul" or "mind". This table sets out some of the features common to Greek and Classical rationalism in general categories.

Table 4

- (1) Thus the realistic rejection of "constitutive relations" develops into the empirical recognition of a single way of being, that, namely, of observable things -- *existence*; and the position finally appears as that of a positive and pluralistic logic of events. It was fitting that, in the development of such a logic, as far as Plato was able to carry it, honourable mention should be made of the names of Parmenides, Zeno and Socrates, since they had all contributed to the working out of the propositional method, though none of them had seen its incompatibility with "ultimates" and all of them had opposed the Heraclitean theory of a single historical order. [SIEP, p.53]
- (2) Realism appears finally as a positivist doctrine, a logic of propositions or events; and this brings it into conflict with every theory of degrees of truth and reality. [SIEP, p.53]
- (3) ... to the understanding of the spatio-temporal theory, viz., that all things belong to the single order of *events or propositions*. In such a reconstruction Space-Time would be shorn of the monistic features attached to it, and taken consistently, not as the stuff of which things are made, but, in its other formulation, as the medium in which things are. [SIEP, p.67]
- (4) The only way to escape from the vicious circle, in which dualism collapses into monism and monism explodes into dualism, is to adopt a pluralistic position in which variously characterised and related things are recognised as existing in the same way (spatio-temporally) -- a single logic of existence replacing conceptions of "self-subsistence", "relative existence" and any other flights of rationalistic fancy. [SIEP, p.90]
- (5) And this position can be met by the regular arguments against any attempt to divide reality into 'realms' (in effect, to have more than one logic or theory of being) ... [SIEP, p.123-4]
- (6) Thus, in classifying propositions, one can go to forms of speech, to the ways in which things are said, or one can go to the sorts of things that can be *meant*; in other words, to the sorts of things that can be [SIEP, p.137].
- (7) What this involves is that there is a single logic which applies to all the sciences, a single way of being which all their objects have; we cannot divide reality into higher and lower orders, for the difference and the relation between them would alike be indefinable and indemonstrable. [SIEP, p 212]
- (8) The historical and deterministic treatment of goods is, in fact, only one example of the removal of metaphysics from science, the establishment of all scientific objects on a single level of investigation. And in thus upholding a logic of events, realist ethics helps to free philosophy from the confused ethics in which metaphysics is rooted -- from the conception of "higher realities", that is to say, preferred delusions. [SIEP, p.247]

TABLE 4: Passages Relating to Anderson's View of Logic, which imply a distinction between, yet conflate ontological and non-ontological claims.

Table 5

1. "By a scientific method we refer to the way techniques are selected in science; that is, to the evaluation of alternative courses of scientific action." [Ackhoff, 1962, p.6]
2. "Scientific method is simply the way in which inferences are arranged in any science." [Case, 1906, p.1], or "Now scientific method is merely the way, or ways, of using different orders of inference in investigating any subject of science with a view to its system." [Ibid, p.4-5]
3. "Scientific method is a systematic effort to eliminate the poison of error from our common knowledge." [Cohen, 1953, p.79]
4. "Strictly speaking, the scientific method is a phase of rational thought applied more particularly to the phenomena of nature, ..." [Gotch, 1906, p.25]
5. "The method of scientific investigation is nothing but the expression of the necessary mode of working of the human mind. It is simply the mode at which all phenomena are reasoned about, rendered precise and exact." [Huxley, 1964, p.2]
6. "But, by definition, scientific method is that approach which investigates nature in order to account for its phenomena." [Schlesinger, 1963, p.6]
7. "Scientific method is a rather simplified account of what goes on, or what might go on, in the process of making discoveries." [Weatherall, 1968, p.2]
8. In a lecture at the Royal Institution in 1867, Charles Kingsley declared that scientific method needed no elaborate definition: It is simply the exercise of common sense. It is not a peculiar, unique, professional, or mysterious process of the understanding: but the same which all men employ, from the cradle to the grave, in forming correct conclusions. [quoted in Yeo, 1986, p.267]
9. In Herschel's Discourse, his discussion of scientific method "was presented as a general account of the kind of procedures and principles common to all scientific inquiry. ... Most significantly, he presented method as the defining feature of the scientific endeavour, the common bond relating the cultivators of its various branches: ... [Yeo, 1986, p.274]
10. Thus the method of science was opposed to wild anticipations and conjectures, to dogmatic authority, to abstract deductive systems and to the various idols of the mind. Defined in positive terms, it was based on careful observation of nature, well constructed experiments, moving slowly and cautiously to generalizations. [Yeo, 1986, p.275]

TABLE 5. Some Uninformative Descriptions or Definitions of Scientific Method. It should be noted that these "definitions" vary considerably in the substantive claims made.

APPENDIX B:**TERMS USED IN SIEP -- THINGS**

THE FOLLOWING FOURTEEN PAGES CONSIST OF OVER 100 PASSAGES FROM SIEP IN WHICH ANDERSON SPEAKS OF "THINGS" IN AN IMPORTANT WAY. HE USES THE WORD "THINGS" IN THESE PASSAGES OVER 200 TIMES. THIS LIST IS BY NO MEANS COMPLETE. THE PRESENT WRITER HAS STRESSED EACH OCCURRENCE OF THE WORD "THING(S)" IN THESE PASSAGES, THUS : THINGS. WHERE AN ASTERISK FOLLOWS THE WORD "THING(S)*", ANDERSON HIMSELF STRESSED THE WORD IN THAT PASSAGE.

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AT THE END OF THIS APPENDIX, ANDERSON'S REFERENCES TO "THINGS" ARE VERY BROADLY CATEGORISED.

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- 4 And, in general, it cannot be maintained either that the proposition is our way of understanding THINGS which in themselves are not propositional, or that we have further ways of understanding the proposition which is in itself defective.
- 12 Mind is not required to relate THINGS, because THINGS are given as related just as much as they are given as distinguished.
- 13 We cannot, then, make any such distinction as that between "THINGS as we know them" and "THINGS themselves". Unless the former are THINGS themselves, we are not entitled to speak of THINGS (and hence to speak) at all. On the other hand, we are entitled to reject, by reference to THINGS themselves, viz., the THINGS we know, any suggestion of an agency whose operation cannot be detected; ...
- 13 We must be able to say: "This is the sort of THING which under certain circumstances will act in such and such a way, and under other circumstances will act in a different way".
- 18 This does not mean that THINGS do not condition one another. But if we say that two THINGS are connected, we imply that they are distinct and can be distinctly spoken of. And when we speak of one such THING, we are perfectly aware that it has connections with, as well as distinctions from, other THINGS, although these do not enter into the statement in question.

Taking 'things' roughly in the sense of subjects of possible propositions, it may be said that we can select those THINGS we wish to speak about; but what we say about them will be either true or false.

- 18 Our selection of subjects is justified in relation to the fact that there are any number of distinct THINGS. But, as has been said, THINGS though distinct may yet be connected or together. And it may be argued that we may make any combination we like of THINGS, and call it one THING. This is opposed to the view that a THING has a special context, to which alone it belongs. But, as we saw, there is no ground for rejecting the universe as context and still insisting that THINGS have a peculiar context of their own. In treating of any arbitrarily chosen THING we shall still be dealing with a subject which has certain predicates and not others; with specific states of affairs, connections and distinctions, which occur or do not occur. Our choice may be arbitrary; but the occurrence of the chosen THING and its predicates will be quite independent of our choice.

Granted that as a matter of fact THINGS are together and distinct, we are not entitled to limit the possibilities of combination of many THINGS into a "unity", as Dr Schiller does in his criticism ... of Prof. Scott's theory of the "Infinite Whole". We find ... that whatever can be spoken of as one THING can also be spoken of as many THINGS, and vice versa.

- 25-6 In accordance with this view it should be said that truth is to be sought not in concentration upon "parts", but in consideration of THINGS or description of occurrences.

- 28 And, in general, in saying of any two related THINGS that they are distinct, we must suppose each to have some character, or certain qualities, of its own.
- 29 Arguing, then, as realists, that no THING or quality of a THING is constituted by the THING'S relations, we have to assert that nothing is constituted by knowing and nothing by being known. ... Realism is therefore concerned to reject these terms, as involving the attempt to take relations as qualities. ... A strictly realist theory must dispense with all expressions of these sorts, in order to be consistent with its empirical starting-point and logical basis.
- 29 But we must have some notion of what sorts of THINGS these are, since we could never have supposed that nothing knew something or something knew nothing. Thus we must know what sort of THING a mind is, independently of terms like "consciousness" or "state of consciousness"; and we must be able to describe THINGS independently of their being known or of their being known in some particular way, so that "sensa", for example, cannot be a proper name for any species of THINGS.
- 30 This cannot be admitted, since the various THINGS that are said to be perceived cannot have their whole nature constituted by being perceived.
- ... It would, on the contrary, be true to say that we know THINGS as independent of being known, since we can only know them as existing and having characters of their own.
- 32 Just as, in the relation of parenthood, "the parent is not the child" and yet is always the child of someone else, so, when I know a THING, someone else may know me and he may know my knowing the THING.^{*} Only if there are cases of this kind can it be possible for us to talk about "knowledge". But the person's knowledge of my relation to the THING is distinct from his knowledge of my qualities.
- 32 And if it urged that the process which knows does nevertheless belong to myself, the answer must be that what we know consists not of THINGS simply but of states of affairs (or propositions).
- 32 According to realism, ... we never know 'ideas' but always independent THINGS, or rather states of affairs.
- 33 The existence or quality, though it might not have been but for that other THING, is independent in the sense of being distinct and having a character of its own. If Dr Broad's explanations were correct, we should have to say that a certain THING now exists because my body was in a certain position, etc., and has certain qualities because my mind was in a certain condition. Granted all that, the THING now exists and has these qualities, and no reason has been shown for calling it private or non-physical.
- 33-4 But "absolute" Space-Time is simply that in which THINGS "absolutely" exist, and realism is committed to the rejection of "relative existence", and so of "relativity".
- 37 At no time in the process of making our observations more precise, i.e., of discovering new distinctions and connections, as well as previous errors (and it is just in these ways that, on any view, we extend our knowledge of physical objects), do we suppose that we are not observing

the THINGS themselves and their actual shapes and sizes: at no time do we distinguish a "datum" or "sensum" from a THING. There is no THING or quality ... which we can suppose ourselves to know 'all about'; discrimination and association are always possible -- whereas a "datum" [or a totally simple THING] could enter into no proposition.

40 According to the realist theory 'the known' consists of independent THINGS in space. ...; when all these THINGS and characters are equally out there?

40 The answer to the question depends partly on what has been said regarding the "whole nature" of THINGS, i.e., on taking THINGS in propositions or states of affairs, there being distinguishable states of affairs in any situation whatever. In saying that specific features of our minds "select" specific features of our surroundings, we are only saying what can be said of any two THINGS that come into relation. ... we know THINGS only as having specific characters and as occupying Space and Time. But the selection which we call "'knowing" is made more precise if we can say that we *pursue* states of the THINGS that surround us and they *satisfy* processes in our minds. It is still being stated in terms of the relations of two complex THINGS, and leaves "subject" and "object" perfectly distinct and independent.

42 But to recognise real differences, or, what comes to the same, different real THINGS, is not to say that these THINGS are unrelated. On the contrary, any relation has two terms, or holds between different THINGS; and if these THINGS are not "really" different, then there are not really two terms and there is really no relation. Hence there is no argument from relatedness to monism; quite the reverse.

Thus the recognition of the "subject-object" relation, or relation between knower and known, implies that each of these is an independent THING, or THING with an existence and characters of its own, and that it cannot be properly described in terms of the other THING or of the relation between them. This point I expressed (following Marvin; "The New Realism", p.473) by saying that the THING which is known, or the "object", is not *constituted* by the knower or by being known, nor is the THING which knows, or "subject", constituted by knowing or by the known. In other words, we cannot define the nature or character or constitution or "what is it" of a THING by saying what relations it has or what it is related to. Hence I concluded that we must reject the notions of "that whose nature it is to know", or *consciousness*, and "that whose nature it is to be known", or *idea*.

43 The fact that we can in many cases come to a conclusion about X's character, when we are told that it has a certain relation, is due, I argued, to our having the **additional** information that only THINGS of that character have that relation; but, as I said, we could not have this information unless we could distinguish the character from the relation.

43 In fact, unless THINGS had qualities of their own, there would be nothing to have relations to other THINGS. What I have in effect maintained is that even those who support other views, do unwittingly concede, in the language they employ, the distinction between relations which hold between two THINGS and qualities which belong to a THING itself. ... [Men] do not possess the THINGS they know as **qualities**; yet

if the relation were part of what a man is, the THINGS related to him would also have to be part of what he is.

49 As I have argued, a relation can hold only between two THINGS, each having characters of its own, i.e., between two independent existents, not between an "ultimate" and a "relative", or, for that matter, between two "ultimates" -- and it is this which gives point to the Monism of Parmenides, as to that of Spinoza.

59 For Realism, then, as against all the "ultimates", facts are good enough. ... And, rid of "meanings" and "purposes" and other products of "vicious intellectualism", it proposes as the formal solution of any problem the interaction of complex THINGS.*

64 But to one who treats of *acts* of mind, who regards THINGS as events, there should be no difficulty.

64 The same applies to our knowledge in general; we do not deem it impossible to learn more about a THING or event than we observed at first.

65 It is true that "to be an experiencer of the experienced is the very fact of co-membership in the same world," in other words, that we are related to the THINGS we know, but being related is quite different from knowing or "realising" that we are related.

67 [Realism would reject Alexander's theory of mind as consciousness, and its parallelism (dualism); and Anderson's spatio-temporal theory is] that all THINGS belong to the single order of events or propositions. In such a reconstruction Space-Time would be shorn of the monistic features attached to it, and taken consistently, not as the stuff of which THINGS are made, but, in its other formulation, as the medium in which THINGS are.

69 [Realism] has maintained on the contrary, that what we know is part of an independently existing order of THINGS, that the existence of a mind is one THING, and the existence of a field of THINGS known by that mind quite another.

73 Interacting is, of course, something that all THINGS can do; ...

82-3 The recognition of the interaction of distinct THINGS, of THINGS as complex and active, of history, requires the rejection of transcendence and expression, of the Absolute and its aspects, of the philosophy of Spirit or of Matter.

It is in laying the foundations of a logic of THINGS as historical that Kant is important, and in relation to this part of Kant's theory Hegel can be regarded only as reactionary.

83 [Kant] showed as against sensationalism (a rationalist doctrine miscalled "empiricism") that connections and distinctions among THINGS are known along with THINGS.

83 Hence the solution of the Kantian division in reality is just that the objects of observation are THINGS themselves, and that we ourselves are also such THINGS, existing under the same spatio-temporal conditions as

other THINGS, and, under these conditions, entering into relations with them (being in the **same** situation as they are) whereby we can know them.

- 85 So long, we may say, as any "ultimate" is recognised, whether it be a purpose, an essence or a totality, real distinctions, the existence of independent THINGS, cannot be.
- 85-86 We have to recognise **accident**, i.e., the fact that there is no formula, no "principle", which covers all THINGS; that there is no totality or system of THINGS.
- 86 But we are equally unscientific if we say that the beginning is present in the end, that a THING is what it comes out of, instead of what it has it in it to become.
- 86 What is required for the emancipation of psychological science, in particular, from identity-mongering is the abandonment of the notion of "thought", as something either to be contrasted or to be identified with THINGS. Our thoughts are just our dealings with THINGS; and this pragmatic view, developed to some extent by James and at least suggested by Marx, enables us, setting THINGS on the level of historical facts, to stress that in which scientific objectivity is to be found, viz., the proposition. ... The recognition of a single logic of events, of complex THINGS, interacting in Space and Time, disposes at once of the logic and of the psychology of "thought".
- For an answer to Hegel ... we have to drop epistemology -- the intrusion of mind into logic and of a false logic into psychology -- and return to the Greek consideration of THINGS,* ...
- 96 It seems of minor importance then to point out that there can be no contrivance of a 'universe' or totality of THINGS, because the contriver would have to be included in the totality of THINGS;
- 99 But there is no reason whatever for scepticism or "suspense of judgment" so long as we have beliefs, i.e., so long as we find THINGS having definite characters and acting in definite ways; and we always do.
- 100 Philo's question reminds one of the supposition that in certain parts of the "universe" two and two may not be four; indeed, it is even worse, since it is a logical question that is at issue, since we cannot travel away from logic, however distant a system we go to, but the very supposition of such a system is a supposition of complex and interacting THINGS.
- 100 Once that is done, the removal of the dualism of active and passive presents no difficulty. For although, "before experience", we could suppose these classes to be exclusive or again to intersect, so that, in addition to THINGS which are active and passive, there are active THINGS which are not passive and passive THINGS which are not active, in actual experience we find only interaction, THINGS which act and are acted on.
- 116 In short, as the *Parmenides* shows, we can maintain the doctrine of ideals only by describing THINGS in terms which do not apply to them, but all the time we are using terms which do apply to them, and so are contradicting the doctrine of ideals.

- 117 Thus, every term, as a possible description of something else, has universality or characterises, and, as a possible indication of something else, has particularity or locates. In describing THINGS as particulars, I merely meant to emphasise this function of locating, and not to deny to them the capacity for characterising.
- 117 We can explain the use of an "abstract term" like solubility by saying that it is a contraction for "being soluble", i.e., for propositions of the form "X is soluble", however X may be specified in any particular case; or, again, it may be taken to mean the fact that there are soluble THINGS, that certain THINGS have certain characters, just as the term "man" means, if we adopt for the sake of argument the conventional definition, the fact that some animals are rational.
- 119 Accordingly, we do not require to introduce repetition in order to understand a THING's being of a certain sort; a single proposition tells us that, and we have no occasion to think of the "sort" as a peculiar kind of "recurrent" entity. But there is no more difficulty about having propositions which tell us that the THING is of other sorts or has other characters. Any occurrence is the occurrence of a certain sort of THING; that is already indicated in the inter-relation of the constituents of any one proposition.
- 120 The fact that various THINGS are good is no proof that the history of any one has anything to do with the history of any other, or that they are in any way *collected*. ... There is certainly nothing in the attribution of the same character to different THINGS to tell us that they cannot conflict.
- 120 The fundamental idealist fallacy comes out in the statement that if we do ascribe certain characters to THINGS (and Mr Merrylees admits that we do), "we can do so only *in virtue of* our sensations". It may be true that we know certain THINGS only when our mind is affected in a certain way, but it does not follow that we know that mental effect, still less that it is through knowing it that we know THINGS. Knowledge of THINGS is knowledge of knowledge of THINGS -- another infinite regress. The real point is that, when we ascribe certain characters to THINGS, they may *have* these characters, in which case we are right, or they may not, in which case we are wrong; but, in either case, their having some characters is just as much a matter of absolute fact as *our* having characters.
- 121 The ingenuity of Mr Merrylees fails to conceal the fact that we do talk about THINGS, and that, unless we could distinguish them from our attitudes, there would be nothing for us to take up an attitude to. Our taking up the attitude is one occurrence, the THING attended to is another; and the fact that we know it and discourse about it does not entitle us to say that we, any more than "reality", are such that it is.
- 122 When, for example, in supporting man's freedom, he "also" admits necessitation in nature, he prompts the determinist to bring up the important point that there is no distinction whatever between man and nature (and hence no question of a false or forced analogy between the two), that "nature" means no more and no less than *what is*, and that a theory of the conditions of existence, embodying a general theory of causality, will apply indifferently to men and any other existing THINGS.

- 123 As regards direct argument, one may attempt to show, in the manner of Alexander (largely following Kant), that a THING as spatio-temporal exhibits a certain character, e.g., that it occupies a definite place in a regular sequence of a certain type. To speak of a THING, it may be said, is to speak of certain 'ways of working', the continuance and the development of which are, of course, affected by the other ways of working by which the THING is surrounded. It would be argued, in this way, that it is a condition of a THING's existence that it determines and is determined by other THINGS, and that to investigate or 'give an account of' it involves consideration of such determinations. Thus, to give an account of any actual THING that could be called "initiative" would be to exhibit certain regularities, to present it, in the common phrase, as "subject to laws", including those which "govern" its relations to other sorts of THINGS which, in any particular instance, may or may not be present.
- 123 The above remarks suggest a less direct treatment of logical problems, viz., by considering what is involved in the recognition of a THING as a subject of investigation -- more generally, in the very possibility of "discourse". This is, of course, the traditional approach (the "Socratic" approach) to logic; it leads up to and does not abrogate the consideration of what is involved in the recognition of the THING as existing; it is only in terms of existence that we can, in the end, criticise discourse.
- 127 If it were not a general question, a question of "sorts of THINGS" and not of "mere particulars", we should have no right to speak of the irrelevant or, as already suggested, of a "connection". But it always is a general question. When we ask, for example, what causes this fire, it is not its being *this* but its being *fire* that we are seeking to account for. There might, indeed be a special question of what causes fire here rather than anywhere else -- it will be seen, as the discussion develops, that there is a particular sense in which "plurality" must be admitted -- but even so, it is fire, a certain sort of THING, that is the effect in question, and, if any distinction is to be made among conditions of its production, it will be a distinction between different *kinds* of conditions. It is natural, then, that, to the question what causes a certain sort of THING, the answer should be "a certain sort of THING"; it appears that what we are all the time seeking to establish is a general connection, that is to say, a universal proposition, to assert which is to assert that something happens invariably.
- 128 Leaving aside for the present the possibility that different questions are at issue in the different cases, we may note that on no theory will it be denied that there are various sufficient conditions of an event (indeed, on the theory of the infinite complexity of THINGS, there will be various *necessary and sufficient* conditions of anything, these all being necessary and sufficient for one another).
- 135 Since, in fact, to have a character is itself to have a complex way of working, there will be no line of demarcation between the inquiry into differences and the inquiry into causes (and no distinction between classificatory and historical or developmental science), but the former will involve recognition of causal action within a THING (of the THING as a system), this being never unconnected with causal action without.
- 138 It should still be noted, however, that any term can have either function (whatever can locate can describe or be located, whatever can

describe can locate or be described) so that the expressions "THINGS" and "characters" are merely indicative of the functions, respectively, of subject and predicate and are not indicative of different classes of entities.

- 150 It should be noted, moreover, that even in the conjunctive argument first given neither of the premises by itself implies that the conjunctive term XY is a real term ... ; and equally, neither premise in the given disjunctive argument implies that (A or B) is a real term, ... unless it is (or if "everything" is A or B), saying that any given THING is A or B is not settling any real issue, is not distinguishing that THING from anything else.

The special importance of disjunctive argument, or of the conclusion to which it leads, is that it presents us with the notion of a plurality of THINGS (terms) that have a common character ...

- 160 The case of *north and south*, previously referred to, is one in which the range has definite extremities, so that, if we were to say "The North Pole is north of Greenland", we could not present this as "A;; THINGS north of the North Pole are ... ", etc. It might be suggested, however, that when we are comparing the latitudes of two THINGS, we are concerned with which of them is further from the North Pole (or, similarly, from the South Pole), and that we treat the extremes not as THINGS within the range but, like an "origin", as part of the *background* or the "terms of reference" of the relation. ... This shading off, with non-specification of extremes, is also to be found, as suggested earlier, in *right and left* judgments, so that, even though we always recognise a "beyond" and could not make a specific comparison without doing so, our definite reference is always to THINGS (or positions) within the range.

- 160 This is nothing against the definiteness of any given proposition or of any given syllogism; though recognition of further possibilities may at times make us uncertain of our "grasp" of some sort of THING with which we had supposed ourselves well-acquainted, it is only in so far as we have definite knowledge that we can take any step in inquiry or distinguish one line of inquiry from another.

- 161 The point is that we are always confronted simultaneously with questions of relations and questions of qualities, that relations and qualities are linked in the recognition, as in the existence, of any situation, any complex state of affairs, and that there is nothing less, and nothing more, than a complex (spatio-temporal) situation that we can be confronted with in dealing with any material, i.e., in any recognition of or search for connections and distinctions. The attempt to have separate relational and qualitative logics can only lead to confusion and insoluble problems; what this attempt misses is the fact that any object (any known THING and any existing THING) is a complex situation involving both relations and qualities, so that there will always be connections to be found between any object and any other object, between any and any other problem or line of investigation.

- 164 Thus our recognition of distinct complex THINGS is not accounted for at all by 'collections of ideas' (of separate, unitary pieces of content) but is intelligible only as a recognition of complex situations, of situations within situations (in which terms alone 'concomitance' can be understood), of interperetration as well as juxtaposition -- in other words, of infinite complexity (with no least and no greatest situation)

in place of the 'simplicity' which cannot be squared with any complexity or combination.

- 169 I have spoken in a misleading way on this matter in "Empiricism" (A.J.P.P., December, 1927, p.242), i.e., as if I regarded the proposition as a tertium quid, in saying: "The empiricist, like Socrates, adopts the attitude of considering THINGS in terms of what can be said about them, i.e., in propositions" -- when I certainly did not think that there was any other way of considering them, that "THINGS" could be other than propositional (or situational) in their content.
- 183 What would have influenced my apparent assimilation of philosophy to science (not so much besides as incidentally to my repudiation of "the ultimate") is that each of them is concerned with situational reality, with the spatio-temporal field, with THINGS as they in a single sense are.
- 187 It is thus that philosophers, as far as they still carry out their own studies and do not, as has happened so much of late, submit to the direction of scientists dialectically untrained, can themselves offer guidance which would remove "hypotheses" or blockages in the lines of scientific study; it is thus that logic, even while asserting the equal reality of all existing THINGS, can claim that it "stands above" the sciences, that it "governs" the various concrete fields of investigation in a way in which science could not govern logic -- since it is by common forms, and not by special materials, that investigation can be directed.
- 189 For clearly there can be no subject or field of study which is utilitarian in itself, whose character resides in what it produces or helps to produce, and this applies as much to science as to any other study; its intrinsic character, taken as the search for laws, the study of the ways of working of actual THINGS, has no reference to the turning of its findings to "practical" account.
- 193 But however strongly all this may point to the conclusion that no account can be given of culture as a conjunction of Hellenism and Hebraism, this would be nothing against the account of it as Hellenism itself, i.e., "seeing THINGS as they are" -- adopting the objective as against the subjective outlook -- turning critical intelligence on all subjects, including (and perhaps especially) the subject of human activities.
- 193-4 This is in striking contrast with the thorough-going objectivism of his predecessor, Heraclitus, who was unremitting in his attack on subjectivist illusions, on the operation of desire or the imagining of THINGS as we should like them to be, as opposed to the operation of understanding or the finding of THINGS (including our own activities) as they positively are, with no granting of a privileged position in reality to gods, men or molecules, with conflict everywhere and nothing above the battle.
- 194 This last point recalls Arnold's distinction (again in Ch.I of *Literature and Dogma*) between "a term of science or exact knowledge" and "a term of poetry and eloquence" -- and here the Heraclitean or objectivist position is that no line can be drawn between these, that there can be no defensible claim to knowledge of distinct THINGS which have no common measures, which do not exist in the same situations and

enter into joint transactions. And, in particular, there is the implication that we can no more have quantity without quality than we can have quality without quantity or otherwise than as spatio-temporal process.

199 The classicist recognises the natural opposition between disinterestedness, between concern with the ways of working of THINGS themselves and concern with what we can get out of them.

199 But the observation of this and other trends of a subjectivist and superstitious kind will be made in the course of exposing them and thus, as far as can still be done, bringing out the contrasting character of objectivism, of "seeing THINGS as they are".

211 It may be said, in fact, that there is an element of unlearning in all learning; we acquire new reactions to THINGS by developing and altering old ones.

212-3 What this involves is that there is a single logic which applies to all the sciences, a single way of being which all their objects have; we cannot divide reality into higher and lower orders, for the difference and the relation between them would alike be indefinable and indemonstrable. Thus any "science" which affects to discover powers or faculties which "make THINGS what they are", or to apply "laws" to "phenomena", is guilty of logical error. ... The application of logic to "reasons" leads to the conclusion, already obscurely apprehended by the first Ionian philosophers, that any explanation must be on the same level as the THING explained, so that the former in turn can be explained in a similar way.

... Every scientist should be a dialectician, critical of hypotheses and recognising the continuity of THINGS, since otherwise he will make mistakes in his science and be unable to correct them.

213 But this is because society is viewed unhistorically, as a mere field for personal agreements and disagreements, and not as a developing THING.

213 So long as we do not set anything above criticism, we can make progress; but we do so not by having any higher kind of knowledge, but by having opinions and acting on them, that is by reacting on THINGS which are as historical as ourselves.

214 This is not to say, as is sometimes supposed, either that we can have such a knowledge of a person's character and environment as will enable us to predict his whole history, or that his environment alone determines what his history will be. It would be absurd to make any such claim in regard to minds, when we find, in dealing with other THINGS, that both character and environment have to be taken into account -- indeed, if this were not so, we should have in turn to consider the environment, and not the character, of the environing THINGS, and so on indefinitely -- and that, in the investigation of both, new and unexpected factors are continually being revealed. Such discovery, however, is possible only if we can say that in certain situations THINGS of a particular sort behave in a certain way; and this kind of description, which implies neither "freedom" nor subordination to "standards", is the only way of expressing knowledge of human or any other behaviour.

- 214 ... And while natural science can tell us as much about the connections of THINGS as will enable us to select means to ends, it cannot determine the ends themselves.
- 215 The illogicality of this theory appears at once from its conception of the different sorts of reality which attach to norms and to the THINGS which come under these norms, or from its attempt to distinguish values from facts.
- 215 If we accept the term "obligatory", then we shall say that certain THINGS are or are not obligatory, just as we may say that they are or are not red.
- 215 It appears, then, that medical and ethical science may consider the same THINGS, but will concentrate on different features of them.
- 215-6 If the value of anything were something **above** its occurrence, it would be unaffected by whether the THING occurred or not, and thus the occurrence itself would have no value, i.e., the value would not, strictly speaking, be of anything, and, being quite apart from events, certainly could not be chosen as an end. On the other hand, if there is anything in the occurrence itself which could be regarded as its "conformity to a standard", then this character is what we mean by the THING's value and we do not require to look beyond the THING itself in order to know an ethical truth.
- 217 It is just through this sort of confusion between our attitudes to THINGS and their own characters, that it has been supposed that ethics has to do with ends. ... How we are affected by good THINGS, and likewise how we know them, are questions which, though a moralist may be interested in them, cannot constitute ethical inquiry.
- 218-9 Conscience, on the other hand, works by means of judgment; it directs pursuit of THINGS **because they are good**; or, judging that a THING is good -- a proposition -- it approves the inclination that pursues that THING -- simply as a THING. But there is no logical distinction between THINGS and propositions. THINGS are known only by their characters, and so the objective in each case is a complex situation, not any "simple" entity.
- 219 But if all objectives are of the propositional order, having both particularity and universality in that a certain THING is taken to be of a certain sort, then we can have contradiction and conflict.
- 238 On the other hand, however primitive the current conceptions of any subject may be, they are always to some extent realistic; they deal with certain real THINGS. These THINGS, then, being treated in a relativist fashion, are actually taken as confirming the relativist notions with which they have been associated. The development of science thus requires a criticism of popular misconceptions, and the work of disentangling reality from fiction is all the harder, the more deeply the confusion has become embedded in popular thought, and (a substantially equivalent condition) the nearer the subject lies to the centre of our interests and the more it is played upon by our hopes and fears.

- 238 The beginning of modern science with the Milesians was bound up with the rejection of mythology, the rejection of the explanation of natural events by non-natural "powers", supposed to lie behind these events and occasion them. What is thus rejected is relativism, i.e., the conception of something whose nature it is to have a certain relation -- in this case, **that whereby** an event happens; its hidden cause or hidden meaning. It is necessary for science to reject such conceptions, because if, e.g., we know something only as that which caused an event, then we do not know what it is itself, and therefore we do not know **what** causes the event or even that anything causes it. Certainly it is possible for us to know that an event has a cause without knowing what that cause is, but this is only because we have previously had experience of one event causing another, i.e., of causation as a natural or historical relation between natural or historical THINGS. Extension of knowledge is possible, then, if we view THINGS naturalistically and reject all conceptions of mysterious powers, of ultimates and higher realities.
- 241 We do not, in fact, step out of the movement of THINGS, ask "What am I to do?" and, having obtained an answer, step in again. All our actions, all our questionings and answerings, are part of the movement of THINGS; and if we can work on THINGS, THINGS can work on us -- if they can be our "vehicles", we can also be vehicles; social and other forces can work through us.
- 248 In such cases, it may be argued, the group is concerned to maintain certain types of activity and takes as good whatever is favourable to them and as bad whatever is unfavourable (or, it might be said more broadly, the group takes as good and bad, respectively, what it supports and what it opposes); but such attitudes vary from group to group, and lend no colour to the treatment of THINGS as good or bad in themselves.
- Note:* [The passage immediately following does not contain the word "thing(s)" but is helpful for an understanding of Anderson's view of relativism:]
- 248 Now this position of "ethical relativism" is quite widely accepted. According to it, we may say, "ethical" statements are incomplete; they signify relations one term of which has not been stated.
- 248 Here we may consider how in general we come to distinguish a quality, recognise a sort of THING; "use a term". What is in question is not the use of words, but can be illustrated by reference to the use of words; the learning of a language exemplifies the characteristics of learning in general. For while the use of a word may be described as arbitrary in the sense that what we call "green", for example, could conceivably have been (is, in fact, in a language other than English) referred to by some other word, we are not using it as a word unless we refer by means of it to a particular sort of THING. And this implies that we are directly acquainted with that sort of THING or with THINGS as of that sort, i.e., with situations. Further, we have to be acquainted with the word as a noise of a certain sort; and the "reference" of this to the other sort of THING is a further situation with which we become acquainted.
- 264 As has been pointed out by J.B. Watson, the principle of the learning of a language is that "the word brings the THING", this being a particular example of the way in which one sort of THING signifies another (as black clouds mean rain or fire means heat).

- 265 And there are other reasons why the word does not always bring the THING.
- 265 Unless good is one description of certain THINGS, helping us to recognise them just as their being green might do, we can have and communicate no knowledge of it -- assuming, that is, that it is not something relational; but, if it were, our knowledge of it would still depend on our encountering such relations in the situations that confronted us.
- 275 And if we reject (as I contended we must) the doctrine of degrees of goodness, we may still think Moore has made a useful contribution to ethics in recognising appreciation and love as specific goods, THINGS having goodness as a character. Again we might disagree with his view that certain non-mental THINGS are good, while holding with him that those mental THINGS which are good are conscious. This would have nothing to do with the fact that inquiry into ethics is a conscious procedure; at the same time it would not be rendered dubious by the mere fact that some mental processes are *unconscious*, or that they have an influence on our conscious behaviour. We are acquainted with the specific THING, aesthetic appreciation, and that means that we find specific characters in it.
- 275 In putting forward this view Hope seems to have forgotten his earlier pluralism, to have replaced it by a doctrine of the unitary "person" who alone can do THINGS.
- 275 When I say that a THING has a certain activity, I mean that it goes on in a certain way, and this is the very same as saying that it has a certain quality. I should, then, no more speak of "activities *towards THINGS*" than of "*qualities towards THINGS*". At the same time, I should recognise no more of a logical distinction between THINGS and qualities than between subjects and predicates -- a matter which I touched on in my article. Thus I could refer to good as a quality or as a sort of THING or as a way of going on, considering as I do that any treatment of these as different types of entities leads to insoluble problems. [SIEP, p.275]
- 276 And, in referring to this interested THING as "the scientific spirit", I consider that I am distinguishing it qualitatively from other THINGS in the same region.
- 280-1 Now clearly, in doing so, he may make discoveries -- he may find, e.g., that good has characters and relations other than, and even opposed to, those he had been told it had -- but a new discovery does not constitute a new usage, and to pretend that it does (that a person who rejects previous views of good is really talking about a different THING) is simply to erect a barrier to discovery.
- 282 But this leaves me free to maintain that there are descriptions which the admixture of recommendation confuses, and that they (more exactly, THINGS* of those kinds) are the concern of the science of ethics.
- 294 However, the main point is that, in any case, an account of how views arise is not an account of their truth, any more than, in general, an account of a THING's origin is an account of the THING;

- 301 It is commonly supposed that a "correspondence" or representational theory is required to account for error, but what has been said indicates that it does not do so. If we have an "idea" which is unlike a THING, we are not in error unless we think the idea is like the THING, and in that case the THING as much as the idea is an immediate object to the mind; i.e., the position is exactly as when we consider the likeness or unlikeness of two THINGS, and no question of "ideas" arises.
- 306 It is not true, as Burnet suggests, that a solution may be found by passing from a corporeal monism to an incorporeal monism; the One, however it may be characterised (strictly speaking it cannot be characterised at all, and thus the position of Parmenides, like that of Berkeley, can be refuted by a consideration of the plurality involved in the proposition -- in any assertion or theory), is incompatible with history and plurality; and the only resort is the assertion of a thorough-going pluralism, the denial of a "universe" or totality of THINGS, and the recognition of the existence anywhere and at any time of a heterogeneity of THINGS, THINGS of various characters of which "materiality", if it is a character at all (i.e., if it does mean more than existence), is only one.
- 309 In making an assertion, then, we are not identifying different notions; we are saying that a THING of a certain sort is at the same time of a certain other sort -- and there is nothing paradoxical about that.
- 310 Our predictions must be based not only on a knowledge of certain "general laws" but on the recognition of certain "collocations", and we are capable of being wrong about each of these -- about the way in which THINGS we know act, and about what other THINGS they will come in contact with. For there is no contradiction in the fact that the same THING will act differently under different conditions, though we can know this only by recognising such forms of action, by believing that they (absolutely) take place -- and, of course, by acting on them ourselves.
- 310-1 ... we do so, ... by taking a pluralistic or commonsense view of the operation of THINGS.
- 311 [Marxist philosophers] recognise the causal determination of THINGS, they reject the view that THINGS other than minds exist in dependence on minds, and, above all, they recognise that all THINGS are events or processes, interacting with other processes.
- 337 The intellectualist attitude is especially important in the field of social study, for it is there that the notion of objectivity, of the recognition by the inquirer of the ways of working of THINGS themselves, is weakest.
- 366-7 But, as before, there can be no connection between a THING and its supposed "value" unless this is as much one of its characters, part of its "constitution", as any of its other characters. Of course, the THING has various *relations*, but these will also be studied as matters of fact and within continuous situations, and there is still nothing here to support the sort of distinction suggested.

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(Supplementary to Appendix B)

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APPENDIX C: TERMS USED IN SIEP -- RATIONALISM

Page No.	Quote
3	It is recognised that there is a natural opposition between rationalism and empiricism, but the basis of the opposition commonly remains obscure or is wrongly stated.
3	Rationalistic theories of all sorts are distinguished from empiricism by the contention that there are different kinds or degrees of truth and reality.
4	Thus, although we naturally associate rationalism with the theory of a mental faculty of reason, the discussion of faculties will become pointless if it can be shown that any postulation of different orders of being is illogical.
5	It follows that the conception of higher truths than those of fact, and that of a total truth to which all "merely particular" truths contribute, have both to be rejected. The latter view is what is currently called idealism, but since it differs from the former only in holding that there is a highest truth instead of a number of higher truths, it can be regarded as a variety of rationalism. The objection to rationalism is just what is meant by "truth" is what is conveyed in the proposition by the copula "is".
5-11	[Anderson argued against rationalism in geometry]
6	This means that there is no distinction between empirical and rational science. Since everything that can be asserted can be denied or doubted, since deduction and hypothesis are always possible, all sciences are observational and experimental.
7	"If triangles were not X", says the rationalist, "they would not be triangles". Why? we ask. The only possible answer is "Because triangles are X".
12	In maintaining that all our knowledge is derived from sense (a position which, on account of their rationalist preconceptions ...) [the British empiricists] took a view of sense which was dependent on its having been regarded as an <i>inferior</i> way of knowing.
12	Here James is drawing attention to the important fact (important, as well as for other reasons, in view of the persistent misunderstanding of the meaning of empiricism) that there is nothing in the least empirical in the conception of a 'distinct existence'. It is on the contrary the rationalist conception of "essence" masquerading as a fact of experience.
12-13	Any theory which refers to the work of the mind, or to rational factors, as contributing along with sensible or given factors, to making things intelligible, is self-refuting or "unspeakable". If whatever is intelligible has both connections and distinctions, then in order to speak intelligibly of what is contributed by the mind we shall have to assume that it has both connections and distinctions, and in order to speak intelligibly of what is given by things we shall have to assume that it has both connections and distinctions, so that no "work of the mind" is required to make it intelligible. And in the same way,

in speaking intelligibly of "knowledge", we are speaking of a certain state of affairs, the mental process which knows, as connected with and distinguished from another state of affairs, the process or situation, mental or non-mental, which is known.

- 14 What has chiefly to be emphasised, however, is that the observation of minds, the knowledge of them in propositions, requires the rejection of the "unitary" view of mind, the conception of it as having only one character and being self-contained in that character. That is a rationalistic, "unspeakable" view.
- 14 The general conclusion is that all the objects of science, including minds and goods, are things occurring in space and time (the only reason for regarding minds as not in space being the rationalistic contention that they are indivisible), and that we can study them by virtue of the fact that we come into spatial and temporal relations with them.
- 27 While it may be conceded to Professor Montague that "the point at issue between realism and idealism should not be confused with the [point] at issue between empiricism and rationalism", in that the former has specially to do with knowledge while the latter has not, there are reasons, which I think conclusive, for holding that a realist can only be an empiricist. The question of the nature of relations is at any rate one issue between rationalists and empiricists, and, as the authors of *The New Realism* have shown, the basis of a realistic theory of knowledge can only be a certain theory of relations; which enables us to draw definite conclusions from the contention that knowledge is a relation.
- 28 But this theory of natures or essences is precisely rationalism, and the realist, in denying that aRb asserts or implies any identity between a and b , is taking up an empiricist position.
- 31 [Anderson implies that since essences is connected to rationalism, the theory of constitutive relations is too, since:]
... the same mechanism of essence, identity and ambiguity can be discerned [in Descartes' idea of 'consciousness' and Berkeley's of 'idea'].
- 48 Again, when we say that the Absolute *is* self-subsistent and its aspects *are* relatively existent, we are recognising, in spite of ourselves, a *single way of being*. It is seen, therefore, that Monism is not only a false doctrine but an incoherent one; that it implies a division, which it cannot sustain, between "higher" and "lower" orders of being, i.e., that it is dualistic or rationalistic. The realist has to supplement his assertion of real difference or independence with a rejection of the false distinction of any other way of being from existence, since only among existents can there be real relations.
- 48 As already noted, Monism is merely one particular resort of the rationalistic dualist; the unbridgeable gulf between the "higher" and the "lower" remains, whether we postulate *many* ultimates or only One. The *locus classicus* of the idealist-rationalist entanglement is Plato's *Parmenides*, where we are shown the illogicality of both hypotheses, "that there are many" and "that there is one" -- the obvious solution being that there are *none*, i.e., no "ultimates"; which was the conclusion already reached by Gorgias.

- 48-9 Thus, as soon as the monist says anything at all, he can be refuted; and, of course; if he says nothing, there is no Monism to refute. But he has a dialectical advantage over the ordinary rationalist, who says a great deal, and openly employs the distinction between the real real and the somewhat real.
- 49 The Eleatic criticism of rationalism is equivalent to the rejection of constitutive relations. The early Pythagoreans had held that the real was certain units, and that empirical things were simply *arrangements* of these units, so that the reality of a thing was simply the units which constituted it. And the Eleatic arguments, which found their clearest form in Zeno's paradoxes, were to the effect that this derivation from the real admitted the reality of something other than the real.
- 52 It has not been observed that the paradoxes of Zeno, for example, bring out not the "self-contradiction" of Pythagorean theories but a contradiction between their rationalist assumptions and their empirical assumptions; and that this contradiction is demonstrated empirically, however little this may accord with the conclusions Zeno wished to establish.
- 53 Realism appears finally as a positivist doctrine, a logic of propositions or events; and this brings it into conflict with every theory of degrees of truth and reality. It will have been seen that there are natural affinities between the different rationalistic theories; indeed, as Burnet has shown, the Eleatic was simply a heretical Pythagorean. It is characteristic of the instability of the whole position that the extremes between which rationalism fluctuates are the Eleatic doctrine of the One as the sole reality and the doctrine of the super-Eleatic, Gorgias, who held that "there is nothing" (absolute) but all is "relative".
- 54 Rationalist fluctuations are due simply to this, that the rationalist cannot state his doctrine at all without introducing a certain amount of empirical fact, "irrational" as he may call it, and steps have to be taken to conceal the conflict of this fact with the "ultimates", whatever they may be. And until the recognition of a logic of events has prompted us entirely to "remove hypotheses" of degrees of reality and treat things on a common level, we are prone to fall into dualistic errors and, while imagining that we are conducting a straightforward inquiry, to *remove appearances*, i.e., deny facts, instead of "saving" them. It is only from the division of the rational from the irrational that "theories of knowledge" have grown up, and that illogical considerations of "certainty" and "probability" have replaced the sole basis of scientific progress, the formulation of propositions which we believe to be true.
- 61 It (i.e., as misrepresented by its sponsors) has been rationalistic instead of empirical, and Alexander, though he sets out to be empirical, is very often rationalistic.
- 61 The history of Greek philosophy shows with the greatest clearness the inevitable passage from rationalism to idealism, the coalescence of the many ultimates into the One.
- 69 It has also to reject the whole "self-consciousness" theory of the idealists, who, in upholding the rationalist conception of the knowledge relation as belonging to the "nature" of the things related, brought the

whole relation (and both terms of it) within the mind and tried to make a special character out of this internal distinction and relation -- tried to make it *generate* the system which it characterised.

81 Any period in the history of philosophy will afford illustrations of these points. In Greek philosophy there is the notable case of Heraclitus, who, in spite of his exposure of Pythagorean rationalism, exercised a very slight influence on later thought in comparison with the Pythagoreans.

81 Hume refuted Berkeley's theory of spirit, but went back to an acceptance of "rational science" in his doctrine of relations of ideas.

85 The answer is that Hegelianism has to be met, that it can be met only by the abandonment of all idealistic or totalistic notions, and that this requires the abandonment of any form of rationalism.

85 So long, we may say, as any "ultimate" is recognised, whether it be a purpose, an essence or a totality, real distinctions, the existence of independent things, cannot.

85 Strains of rationalism are also observable in the work of the various writers previously mentioned, even though, by taking what is valuable in each, we can construct a coherent anti-idealist position.

87 We find that only a pluralistic logic of events can provide a logical answer to idealism, and that rationalism, in science and philosophy, opens the way to monism and this again to scepticism -- theology, defeatism, leaving things in the hands of higher powers.

(On Representationism, not Rationalism)

87 It may also be pointed out that the most widely prevalent contemporary philosophies are varieties of representationism, more or less similar to Locke's, in spite of the decisive refutations of Locke's view that have been formulated by philosophic thinkers from Berkeley onwards.

88 And, whatever suggestions Hume may make towards a thorough-going solution, he cannot arrive at it and force subsequent attention to it, because of the defects in his philosophical outlook -- because, like the other "English empiricists", he was rationalistically concerned with "ideas" (that whose nature it is to be perceived) and not with propositions (what is the case).

89 Hence, while Hume could point empirically to many of the difficulties of the theory of design, not only could he not prevent it from raising its head again, but his own rationalist preconceptions were an influence towards its doing so. Similarly, it may be remarked in passing, it is because of its rationalism, its retention of "principles" and the like, that the realistic movement set going by Moore and Russell has failed -- failed, i.e., to work out a realist *philosophy*. To reap the full benefit of Hume's work, then -- and the same applies to the work of the later movement -- it is necessary to follow up the questions raised, to cut away rationalist conceptions and so to arrive at a logical position.

89 It should be emphasised here that ontological arguments are not confined to proofs of the existence of God or of something described as *the Absolute*, but are the means of establishing all ultimates, even in nominally pluralistic theories. It is really in the ontological fashion

that the Pythagoreans set up their units or Socrates his forms or that anyone sets up *that which is by its own nature*. It seems indeed to be shown by the Eleatic criticism of the Pythagoreans, and similarly by Spinoza's criticism of Descartes, that there cannot be more than one ultimate, but the more important question is whether there can be one at all. And until it has been shown that there cannot, until the very conception of "ultimacy" has been rejected, until it has been demonstrated not merely that certain arguments are unsound but that their supposed conclusions are untenable, the position has not been worked out and the same types of error recur.

- 90 But, equally, that which establishes itself has to be taken as that on which other things depend, because in its very conception there is the distinction between its character of establishing and its character of being established; and while the latter now appears, like a created cosmos, as having "dependent existence", the same problem as before breaks out in regard to the "self-subsistence" or self-supporting character of the former, the same distinction has to be made between its supporting and its being supported, and so on indefinitely. There is likewise no logical division between cosmological and physico-theological or teleological arguments, because in each case we have the dualism of ways of being, that which has its being in supporting and that which has its being in being supported. The only way to escape from the vicious circle, in which dualism collapses into monism and monism explodes into dualism, is to adopt a pluralistic position in which variously characterised and related things are recognised as existing in the same way (spatio-temporally) -- a single logic of existence replacing conceptions of "self-subsistence", "relative existence" and any other flights of rationalistic fancy.
- 93 This, indeed, is the very point that Hume made in regard to causality in the *Treatise*; but only the abandonment of his rationalistic theories of "ideas", "relations of ideas", and, still more important, spatial and temporal *units*, would have enabled him to bring these questions to a decisive issue.
- 99 " ... No animal can move immediately any thing but the members of its own body; and indeed, the equality of action and re-action seems to be an universal law of nature." Here, in spite of the rationalistic theory of equality (and the theory of ideas appears in the same passage), we have an approach to the recognition of interaction as a condition of existence, so that even a contriver is seen to be influenced by his material -- just as Socrates, in his attempt to show that the mind "rules" the body, cannot get over the fact that, in order to do so, it must act in certain ways on the *occasion* of certain bodily conditions.
- 100 Apart from a rationalistic theory of "natures" (as presented, e.g., by Berkeley) we find no basis for the conception of separate classes of agents and patients, arrangers of phenomena and phenomena to be arranged, designers and the designed.
- 101 The *cogito ergo sum* of Descartes has been variously regarded by subsequent philosophers, and much discussion has been given to such questions as whether it is an inference or not, and, if it is, what conclusion is drawn from what premise (or premises) and whether the inference is valid or invalid. As we shall see, the difficulties here are largely due to rationalistic confusion as to what inference is; but they can best be resolved by an examination of the line of argument by

which the formula itself is arrived at, and an exhibition of the confusions which that argument involves.

- 101 First of all, however, we may observe that Descartes's own presentation of the case would naturally give rise to divergent interpretations, the point being that he has no consistent view, that he exhibits the instability which is characteristic of rationalism.
- 101 Nevertheless, remembering that rationalism is a philosophy of essences or identities, we may consider that the reduction of inference to identity is what Descartes's argument really amounts to, and that the conception of "substance" is only one of the devices by which the emptiness of the position is concealed.
- 102 The rejection of views on the ground of the contradictions they involve is, of course, a regular part of rationalistic or identity-philosophy, and always depends on ambiguity or confusion of some kind.
- 105 But the fact that we are immediately aware of such distinctions tends to make us, in accepting them, overlook their incompatibility with whatever rationalistic suppositions are in question.

Thirdly, the use of *sum* in the formula is a step towards the establishment of *the* perfect or necessary. In reducing an empirical fact to an essence, Descartes has amalgamated subject and predicate; the fact of "my thinking" is equated to the fact (existence) of "myself"..

- 106-7 The *sum*, then, has served its purpose in the fabrication of this rationalistic edifice, both by its identification of an actual thing with an essence and by its treatment of truth as an attribute.

The foregoing argument, if it be sound, shows that criticism of Descartes must be on grounds of logic, and the persistence of rationalistic confusions of the functions of subject, predicate and copula (as in the distinction of an "is" of existence from the "is" of predication, and so forth) shows that such criticism is not of merely historical interest. But it is on the psychological side that Descartes has been specially influential; and, though criticism of rationalistic psychology must still be logical (i.e., must be criticism of rationalism), it is important to bring out the particular ways in which mental events are confused and obscured by Cartesian assumptions. In the first instance, however, it should be observed that those who have followed Descartes in this matter have not in general repeated his argument, that many of them, indeed, have so disguised the introduction of the *cogito* into their theories that they appear to be anti-Cartesian. Thus Berkeley, in the second paragraph of his *Principles*, remarks that "besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering about them:; and here the *cogito* is introduced by the use of the simple word *besides*. Again, Hume, in spite of his criticism, later in the *Treatise*, of those philosophers "who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our *self*", has assumed the *cogito* from the very beginning in speaking of the objects of our knowledge as "perceptions of the human mind"; i.e., he has assumed, like Berkeley, that they are known *as known* and thus as relative to something else which is on a different footing. And Reid, while in the Introduction to his *Inquiry* he raised explicit objections to the *cogito*, implicitly accepts it, in the same place, in

putting forward a doctrine of *inner knowledge* (when he says, e.g., that a man's own mind "is the only subject he can look into"), a doctrine which he adheres to throughout. In all these views, "subject" is set over against "object", self-knowledge against other-knowledge, and thus the Cartesian confusion persists.

109 The virulent rationalism of this doctrine is evident. It is only on the assumption of a knowing *essence* that it could be supposed that, if X knows, to know X is to know that it knows.. [etc.] [doctrine adverted to is that what knows is always known, etc.]

110 Certainly, as Leibniz saw, if we are going to have a theory of natures, we shall have to bring its relations within each nature -- but he himself could explain away some relations only by bringing in others, and it is, as we have noted, on the questions of relations that rationalism most conspicuously breaks down.

113 Thus there is no question of "mereness" (except for rationalists); there is only the question whether mental processes actually are brain processes, and Feuerbach has said nothing to show that they are not.

113 Rejecting rationalism, however, recognising the interconnection of situations, we have still to insist on the *distinction*, as well as the connection, between mind and its surroundings -- and also, of course, on the fact that it conditions or affects them just as they affect it.

114 Much could be said about the psychological basis of the doctrine itself -- about the fetishism which lies at the root of all rationalism, about the motives which lead men to seek the "safe and certain", about the very close connection between the notion of "salvation" and that of the *ego*. Much could be said, again, about its social connections, about the appearance of the *cogito* in a period of rising individualism, and so forth. But, interesting as these questions may be, they are at any rate subsequent to its logical rebuttal. And, considering it simply from that point of view, we can still describe it as one of the greatest impositions in the history of human thinking.

131 This reversibility, of course, raises no logical difficulty, and the fact that either may be taken as a criterion of the other is met in practice by our selecting the more readily observable or controllable, granted that we already know the solution, and, prior to that, by our starting from a specific problem wherein something is taken as the property, and the difference is what we are looking for. It is, however, a point to be remembered in view of rationalist attempts to represent some properties or conditions as "more fundamental" than others.

In the theory of causality this rationalism takes the form of representing the cause as superior in reality or logical standing to the effect.

134 If, therefore, we say that an effect is a property (or a thing's having a property) while a cause is not but is an outside thing (a thing situated in such-and-such a way towards the first thing), we are not raising any obstacles to investigation. On the contrary, we have the advantage, in regarding causation as external action, of rejecting any rationalist doctrine of development from internal resources or by "unfolding of potentialities"; and, in discarding "causal chains", we

are recognising that there is no unilinear form of development but interaction at all points.

- 135 Mill's main error, however, lies in the assumption, which he holds in common with other rationalists, that a situation or "phenomenon" can be analysed into a number of simple factors -- that science, indeed, consists in the reduction of facts to their simple laws of connection.

162 & 163ff [opposition between rationalism and empiricism]

- 162 I argued that, in the distinction between empiricism and *rationalism* (with its division between facts and principles, between actual things and their "grounds" or "explanations"), the question of ways of *knowing* has still to be recognised as a feature of the empiricist position. It is, in fact, quite illuminating, of the particular question of knowledge as well as of the general question of reality, to present the matter from the side of knowledge and take empiricism as the doctrine that whatever we know we *learn* -- in other words, that to know something is to come into active relations, to enter into "transactions", with it -- a position which at once rules out any rationalist notion of ultimates or principles above the facts, any suggestion of "that whereby" things exist, as something distinct from the things themselves, since, unless we are *acquainted* with it, had acquired empirical knowledge of it, we could never infer it from what we are acquainted with or assign it any way of operating on objects of our acquaintance.

More broadly, it might be said that we cannot uphold any doctrine of kinds of reality, since to do so we should have to know the distinction or the relation between any two such kinds, and that is something we could not know except as a single situation -- which would mean that we knew it as of a single reality, so that the doctrine of *distinct* kinds of reality would be automatically abandoned.

- 163 It is remarkable that Locke, Berkeley and Hume, so widely regarded as the founders of modern empiricism, should take their departure from just such a rationalist doctrine of simple and separate entities -- the "ultimates" by reference to which any actual state of affairs is to be explained.

- 163 The failure of Berkeley's attempt to account for "the objects of human knowledge" in terms of atomic "ideas" already emerges in §1 of the *Principles* when, having spoken of the ideas furnished to the mind by the various *senses* (what these are being not itself explicable in terms of simple ideas), he goes on to say that "as several of these [ideas] are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure, and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name *apple*."

- 165 [No mention of rationalism] The incoherence of Berkeley's anti-realist position, which is a part of his anti-empiricist position, appears most strikingly in §§30 and 31 of the *Principles* -- headed, in Lindsay's text, "Laws of Nature" and "Knowledge of them necessary for the conduct of worldly affairs". ... As ideas of ours, our successive sensations are dependent on us, but their regularities, as instituted by God for our guidance, are quite independent of us, so that our knowledge of "laws of nature" is knowledge of objective facts. And the only support Berkeley can give for the adhibiting of objectivity to part of what we experience

is that our sensations are not under our control (an objective fact of which it seems we are directly aware) whereas our "images" or reproductions of sensations are (another fact, independent of our knowing it, which we can discover); so that Berkeley's position is a hotch-potch of realism and representationism, an unavoidable result so long as "ideas" (entities of a different order of reality from minds or agents) are retained.

- 167 But, while consideration of his inconsistencies leads to the showing up of any attempted separation of mind and nature, Berkeley remains sunk in them just because of his rationalism, his doctrine of natures or elementary entities, the discontinuity between which is set aside by the postulation of impossible leaps, such as he himself has shown Locke's representationism to be. For, in spite of all his efforts to find real connections between minds and what they contemplate, he also, as we have seen, makes the representationist leap; it is something he is forced to by the doctrine of "ideas", which must be taken as at once "in" minds and "of" things, leaving us with the insoluble problems which arise on any doctrine of relative existence.

Dualism, disconnections, ambiguities and insoluble problems, can, of course, be brought out just as readily in the theories of Locke and Hume as in that of Berkeley.

- 176 Sometimes, when we say something is necessarily so or must be so, we mean that we know it is so -- which is simply a question of fact. (There may be a suggestion that, as the phrase goes, "there is no possible doubt of it", but that is never strictly correct, and, suggesting something of a rationalist kind, cannot be said to raise a positive issue.)

- 184 We can thus connect the opposition between (a) separate fields and restriction of inquiry and (b) unrestricted inquiry into a single field of reality (space and time, interrelated situations with no smallest and no largest) with an opposition between (a) saving hypotheses and removing appearances (e.g., ethical facts) -- which is rationalism, and (b) saving appearances and removing hypotheses -- which is empiricism. Hypotheses requiring removal are exemplified in axioms of science and elements of things, as well as the general mass of entities supposed to exist or be true in special ways, like normative truths, epiphenomena and sense.

It is this rationalism, this separatism, this breaking up of reality into sundered sections, that is the mark of the scientist who is not a philosopher, who instead presumes to teach the philosophers (it being mostly scientists who have given the lead to contemporary "philosophic" schools) his own rationalism, his own devotion to ultimates and unquestionables, his own "analysis" (what are the elementary constituents of this?), on the basis of his own practicalism -- of what he takes to be absolute ends.

- 210 Whereas Plato, in the *laws*, goes on to take the child's spontaneous activities as of fundamental importance for any training he is to receive, the more rationalistic Socrates and Aristotle appear to regard him as a mere seeking and avoiding mechanism, whose development is determined by what he is allowed to get (or compelled to take).

212 [Rationalism not actually mentioned] The special scientist, Socrates contends, uses hypotheses which he does not criticise and of which, in fact, he cannot "give an account". They are taken as defining his field of study, and within that field, or using those assumptions, he prosecutes his inquiries and arrives at his conclusions. Thus the mathematician arrives at "mathematical truths". But actually there is no mathematical truth, any more than there is an Athenian truth. Fields of study are not cut off from one another but mingle just as peoples do. And to treat each as a separate "world" is to fall into contradictions. It is the business of Dialectic to show that the supposed "indemonstrables" and "indefinables" of the sciences are not indemonstrable or undefinable, but are subject to investigation. Thus all hypotheses implying a division in reality require to be "destroyed" (or removed).

What this involves is that there is a single logic which applies to all the sciences, a single way of being which all their objects have; we cannot divide reality into higher and lower orders, for the difference and the relation between them would alike be undefinable and indemonstrable. Thus any "science" which affects to discover powers or faculties which "make things what they are", or to apply "laws" to "phenomena", is guilty of logical error. The Socratic theory of forms itself calls for dialectic criticism. And though Socrates maintains the possibility of finding the "reason" of these forms in a single ultimate principle, the very assumption of this principle involves a separation (between the ultimate and the relative) which requires to be removed. The application of logic to "reasons" leads to the conclusion, already obscurely apprehended by the first Ionian philosophers, that any explanation must be on the same level as the thing explained, so that the former in turn can be explained in a similar way.

217 The more rationalistic form of this theory [of the moral judgment] is that there is a special moral faculty, conscience or sense of obligation, which issues its edicts, while particular inclinations or reflective faculties (like Butler's "self-love") engage in the pursuit of ends which may or may not be in accordance with these edicts. [This is not obviously rationalistic. Does Anderson mean it is rationalistic because it implies a special way of knowing and a special way of being?]

307 The fact is that, just as in Zeno's paradoxes, the contradiction is between the rationalist assumption of the elementary, unitary or primary, and the empirical recognition of historical facts; and the solution is to *reject* rationalist assumptions and not attempt to combine opposing views in a single theory -- just as in the attempt to combine "truths of the last instance" and "relative truths".

320 But what makes it particularly hard for the Marxists to see these confusions is the complicating factor of their Hegelian rationalism, of their taking the later as nearer to the true or rational conditions of affairs.

321 This ethico-logic, this metaphysic or rationalism, is nowhere more evident than in Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach". The first thesis practically sums up the whole position. "The chief defect of all previous materialism -- including Feuerbach's -- is that the object, reality, sensibility, is conceived only in the form of the object or as conception, but not as human sensory activity, practice [*Praxis*], not subjectively. That is why it happened that the *active* side [of the

object], in opposition to materialism, was developed by idealism, but only abstractly, for idealism, naturally, does not know real, sensory activity as such.

324 It may be said, however that it is not so much the individualism of this position as its rationalism, the conception of a *true* state or outcome of things, with the connected conception of reality, society, humanity, advancing *as a whole*, that prevents the working out of a necessarily pluralistic theory of the struggle of organisations.

326-7 In fact, the "irrational", as opposed to the "rational" or calculable, is what things are, which must be prior to their adjustments. The "consumers'" view, that production is "for the sake of" consumption, cannot account for the development of production itself. The common ethical notions of disinterestedness and of things which are "for their own sake" are approaches to the conception of the independence of production, whether scientific, artistic or industrial. The truth of the "economic interpretator" is that society *is* production and that consumption is only incidental to its history. And, in general, a doctrine of what things are "for" is idealism, not materialism. The science of ethics, in particular, deals with what goods are, and the view that they are productive activities, while it owes much to Marx, could not have been developed without a shedding of Marx's rationalism and an independent reference to production itself.

350 And, thirdly, one may wonder what a life subordinated to the "dictates of reason" would be like or what these dictates themselves could be. If "reason" is to enforce a particular hierarchy of tendencies, it must itself have particular objects: in other words, what is called "reason" is merely certain ruling passions, and *other* passions could (and do) carry out the same function, determine what is "reasonable", in other cases. It appears, in fact, that Freud's thinking is deeply imbued with the rationalistic utilitarianism which is so marked a feature of nineteenth century thought, with fixed ideas of mental and social priority, which have prevented him from working out the consequences of his own recognition of the "unconscious", and have landed him in simplification, in the denial of real distinctions, whether among types of mental processes or between the psychical and the social.

We find in the work of the Freudians generally this rationalistic apparatus -- the setting up of *units*, the identification of things which are merely connected, or as frequently in Freud, the reversal of relations (e.,g., on p.44, the supposition that it was when the need for genital satisfaction became permanent that the male "acquired a motive" for keeping his sexual objects near him, and so families were founded) -- the outstanding example, of course, being the view that the individuals form society instead of society forming individuals.