APPENDIX D : TERMS USED IN SIEP -- LOGIC

This appendix consists of two main parts:

1. Fifty-six passages from SIEP, most of which specifically mention logic. The few that do not can be taken to illuminate Anderson's view of logic.

2. An index to these passages.

This index involves numerous duplications. It aims --

(a) to guide any reader of Anderson's work to some of the most significant passages which discuss or mention logic;

(b) to draw attention to the wide variety of claims Anderson made about logic; and

(c) through the categorisation of some of this material, to assist in the understanding of his conception of logic as some kind of (dialectical) method of inquiry.

It is not claimed that the listings in this index are in any sense complete. The reason for the somewhat overgenerous duplication of entries is that it facilitates the location of passages and cross-references.

Page

3 But I take empiricism as central, as giving the best general description of the philosophy which the other terms partially convey, because the issue which it raises and which it disputes with rationalism, is fundamental to logic, being concerned with truth itself. In the discussion of this issue the ways in which more detailed issues should be dealt with, will in some degree appear.

5 Thus empiricism regards it as illogical to make such distinctions as that between existence and subsistence, or between the "is" of identity, that of predication and that of membership of a class; and still more obviously illogical to say that there *is* something defective about "is" itself.

6 Discourse depends on what the parties to it *believe*. If you deny what I assert, I may try to prove it by means of other propositions you admit; if we both agree on some propositions, we may set out to see what follows from them; if we are doubtful about any proposition, we may test it by its consequences. In general, discourse is possible when and only when persons come together who *(a)* agree about something, *(b)* either disagree, or wish to inquire, about something else. This position itself implies a common logic of assertion, implication and, I should add, definition. Apart from that logic, actual beliefs and observations are all that can be appealed to, and without them the process could not go on. Each of us (not excluding those who take a false view of logic) directs his inquiries and establishes his conclusions, in greater or less disagreement with others, by means of this mechanism of individual statements and particular inferences.

8 The logic of application is simply the logic of syllogism; and if a geometrical theorem and a physical observation together imply the contradictory of a physical observation, we are as much entitled to question the theorem as to reject the observations.

20 But the point can equally well be put by saying that any theory of the kind is illogical, since it can only be upheld by the making of statements of supposed fact.

28 It is thus seen to be logically necessary to hold that, in knowledge, "the knower is not the known".

29 A strictly realist theory must dispense with all expressions of these sorts, in order to be consistent with its empirical starting-point and logical basis.

37 [re elliptical penny; *logic* not mentioned] Any such judgment will be either correct or mistaken; but correction will only occur by means of judgments of the same order.

40 In short, the foundation of the realist position is logical, and if this logic is not impugned, then, whatever the difficulties of any special problem, it must be capable of being worked out in accordance with that logical basis. A theory of "sensa" or of "consciousness" could not be accepted merely because it enabled us to give a simple account of some limited range of facts. It would sooner or later be found to conflict with a logic of propositions; while that logic itself assists us to give a definite theory of the nature of "subjects" and of any particular class of "objects".

48 The second and longer part of the *Parmenides* shows the overthrow of Eleaticism by means of the same logic as the Eleatics had used against the Pythagoreans; but this is because it is a commonsense logic, a logic of events, that logic, in fact, which is involved in all discussion and criticism.

53 Thus the realistic rejection of "constitutive relations" develops into the empirical recognition of a single way of being, that, namely, of observable things -- *existence*; and the position finally appears as that of a positive and pluralistic logic of events.

53 It was fitting that, in the development of such a logic as far as Plato was able to carry it, honourable mention should be made of the names of Parmenides, Zeno and Socrates, since they had all contributed to the working out of the propositional method, though none of them had seen its incompoatibility with "ultimates" and all of them had opposed the Heraclitean theory of a single historical order.

53 Realism appears finally as a positivist doctrine, a logic of propositions or events; and this brings it into conflict with every theory of degrees of truth and reality.

54 The scientist, in so far as he recognises facts and a pluralistic order of events, is in a stronger position than the teleologist. But when he falls short in his logic, divides matters of certainty from matters of uncertainty and makes "probability" the guide of life, when, in fact, in the Pythagorean manner, he separates the rational from the irrational

and appears as an unconscious teleologist, his errors are far more difficult to root out.

54 Rationalist fluctuations are due simply to this, that the rationalist cannot state his doctrine at all without introducing a certain amount of empirical fact, "irrational" as he may call it, and steps have to be taken to conceal the conflict of this fact with the "ultimates", whatever they may be. And until the recognition of a logic of events has prompted us entirely to "remove hypotheses" of degrees of reality and treat things on a common level, we are prone to fall into dualistic errors and, while imagining that we are conducting a straightforward inquiry, to *remove appearances*, i.e., deny facts, instead of "saving" them.

55 [Logic not mentioned, but method of dispute-belief] But, supposing that this does not happen, does this mean that "they can never get away from doubt"? Not at all. As Mr Miller has put it, "A makes a statement which he believes to be true, but B doubts it; what can A do to show that he is right?" A began, it appears, not by doubting but by believing; and, though he has failed to make B believe, this does not give A any reason for ceasing to believe. And, of course, if he *had* convinced B, that would not be an additional reason for believing.

56 [Logic not mentioned] It is most of all in ethics that these scientific requirements are repudiated, and that disagreement and the absence of a "criterion" are taken to imply that there are no independent facts, or that the facts cannot be discovered. But this is a quite incoherent view, as has been shown most particularly by Socrates, in his criticism of Sophistic theories, and by G.E. Moore.

59 For Realism, then, as against all the "ultimates", facts are good enough. It does away with the philosophy of good intentions, of "service" to the idol of social utility or any other, and establishes philosophy as logic, the logic of events.

60 When the separation is made, it will appear that in his doctrine of Space-Time he has laid the foundation of a thoroughgoing realism as a logic of events.

63 The unfortunate feature of this contention of Alexander's is that, when he comes to deal with the actual spatio-temporal relation of togetherness, he imports into it certain of the peculiar characteristics of knowledge, and so is developed the theory of perspectives, which opens the way to relativity; just as the idealists begin by treating mind as an absolute, and end by treating the Absolute as having some of the real characters of mind, and so make "the universe" progress, and logic along with it.

80-81 Hegel is right, then, in maintaining, in opposition to eclecticism or pragmatism, that philosophy should be systematic. But its systematic character should appear in the form of a single logic, not in the form of "totality", of a pretended *solution of all problems*. He is right, also, in maintaining that this logic should be historical, if we take this to mean that it is the theory of things as historical; but it should not itself be considered as advancing, however the study of it may do so. It is the theory of what things are at any time; and, granted that philosophical progress may be made, the nature of philosophical problems remains the same now as it was in 500 B.C. It is only if modern

philosophers have discovered truths which ancient philosophers failed to discover, that modern philosophy can be said to have made any advance on ancient philosophy. To substitute for a logic of things as developing a developing logic is to do away with the object of philosophical study and fall into scepticism; for logic can only develop illogically. The *pretended* object of philosophical study which remains for the devotees of a progressive logic -- the totality, the "Absolute", the historical-unhistorical -- merely exemplifies this scepticism, for its "phases" have to be taken at random; there is nothing to show that any phase is a phase of *its*, that any history is *its* history.

83 It is in laying the foundations of a logic of things as historical that Kant is important, and in relation to this part of Kant's theory Hegel can be regarded only as reactionary. ... Kant showed, as against Locke, that the objects of science are just the objects of observation, that "matter" (that which is treated of in physics) is what we perceive and not something behind it. He showed as against sensationalism (a rationalist doctrine miscalled "empiricism") that connections and distinctions among things are known *along with* things.

86 The recognition of a single logic of events, of complex things interacting in Space and Time, disposes at once of the logic and of the psychology of "thought".

For an answer to Hegel, then, we have to drop epistemology -- the intrusion of mind into logic and of a false logic into psychology -- and return to the Greek consideration of *things*, as Burnet, no less than the English realists, assists us to do; we have to develop a positive theory of mind as feeling and as multiple, on the lines suggested by Freud; we have to be empirical , like James, and to recognise Space and Time as the conditions of existence, as is done by Alexander, largely under the influence of Kant.

87 Certain main points, which, of course, could be more fully and exactly treated, emerge from this brief consideration of Hegel's place in the history of philosophy. We find that only a pluralistic logic of events can provide a logical answer to idealism, and that rationalism, in science and philosophy, opens the way to monism and this again to scepticism -- theology, defeatism, leaving things in the hands of higher powers. We find, further, that history is not progress, that the history of speculation, in particular, is not a progressive discovery of truths and removal of errors, an outstanding illustration being that idealistic errors of Kant, akin as they are to the errors erected by Hegel into a system, did not prevent him from utilising empirical material and working out a logic of events which was not developed but only obscured by Hegel.

87 But the denial of the doctrine of progress does not prevent us from recognising the occurrence of discoveries and other good things. So the baneful effects of the anti-logic of Hegel, his encouragement of mystification in the doctrine of reconciliation of opposites and the cult of profundity, his provision of a sounding and worthless terminology of the theologically-minded and the literary moralisers, his detrimental influence, in opposition to precision and to independence of thought and action, on culture in general -- all this should not keep us from seeing that inquiry has here and there been stimulated by his attempt at finding a single logic and his insistence on the historical

treatment of things, and even by his merely drawing attention to the work of his predecessors.

88 <*Design*> For, apart from the mere ignoring of Hume, there is also the tendency to substitute for the criticised doctrine [argument from Design] other doctrines which are open to the very same type of criticism. And both these reactions are facilitated by Hume's "scepticism", i.e., by his failure to work out a *logic*.

90 The only way to escape from the vicious circle, in which dualism collapses into monism and monism explodes into dualism, is to adopt a pluralistic position in which variously characterised and related things are recognised as existing in the same way (spatio-temporally) -- a single logic of existence replacing conceptions of "self-subsistence", "relative existence" and any other flights of rationalistic fancy.

90 All that his criticism lacks is development in the direction of a thorough-going empiricist logic, which would show that his declension to scepticism is uncalled for.

100 But, in the light of the above passage, it is clear why Hume did not see how near he then was to the mark; for, although the question is plainly one of the conditions of existence in general (somewhat confused, no doubt, by the reference to an *origin*), he does not see that these conditions will govern alike the various forms of operation he mentions, that they are not "principles" but particular proceedings of particular things. Philo's question reminds one of the supposition that in certain parts of the "universe" two and two may not be four; indeed, it is even worse, since it is a logical question that is at issue, since we cannot travel away from logic, however distant a system we go to, but the very supposition of such a system is a supposition of complex and interacting things.

106 The foregoing argument, ... shows that criticism of Descartes must be on the grounds of logic, and the persistence of rationalistic confusions of the functions of subject, predicate and copula (as in the distinction of an "is" of existence from the "is" of predication, and so forth) shows that such criticism is not of merely historical interest. But it is on the psychological side that Descartes has been specially influential; and, though criticism of rationalistic psychology must still be logical (i.e., must be criticism of rationalism), it is important to bring out the particular ways in which mental events are confused and obscured by Cartesian assumptions.

107-8 The case [i.e., Berkeley's dualism] can be met only by a logic of situations, which treats mental situations, and non-mental situations, and situations embracing the mental and the non-mental, as all of the same order, none having any peculiar "inwardness" or "outwardness".

122 [Logic not mentioned] When, for example, in supporting man's freedom, he "also" admits necessitation in nature, he prompts the determinist to bring up the important point that there is no distinction whatever between man and nature (and hence no question of a false or forced analogy between the two), that "nature" means no more and no less than *what is*, <see next entry> and that a theory of the conditions of existence, embodying a general theory of causality, will apply indifferently to men and any other existing things.

122 But without giving some ground for belief in causal necessitation in "nature", they cannot show that this ground is *lacking* in the case of man; and if they do give such a ground, it will be seen to cover the case of any "humanity" with which we are acquainted -- apart from the point, previously noted, <see previous entry> that humanity is in any case included in the subject-matter of logic ("what is") and comes under the logical theory of causality.

123 In other words, discounting metaphysical notions of "governing" and restricting ourselves to a positive account of inter-related ways of working, we should treat the occurrence of "initiative" in the human mind in exactly the same logical way as we should treat the occurrence of magnetism in a pin.

123(ctd) The above remarks suggest a less direct treatment of logical problems, viz., by considering what is involved in the recognition of a thing as a subject of investigation -- more generally, in the very possibility of "discourse". This is, of course, the traditional approach (the "Socratic" approach) to logic; it leads up to and does not abrogate the consideration of what is involved in the recognition of the thing as existing; it is only in terms of existence that we can, in the end, criticise discourse. But this way of expressing the matter brings out the point that, in rejecting a particular logical theory, we should be able to show that the exponent of it not merely has a false view of existence but implicitly, in his own statement of the case, admits the view that we are upholding against him (as when a person *argues* against objective implication or *denies* objective truth). A particularly important instance is that of the demon-stration, by the upholder of a spatio-temporal logic, of the fact that those who argue that certain things (e.g., minds) are *not* spatio-temporal, cannot avoid implying that they are. Again, indirect "proof" of a logical position may take the form of showing that our opponent's view involves him in insoluble problems -- though this amounts to the same as contradicting the possibility of discourse

123-4 The position confronting us is that which upholds determination and also indetermination. And this position can be met by the regular arguments against any attempt to divide reality into "realms" (in effect, to have more than one logic or theory of being) -- and particularly, as I have indicated in a number of papers, by the demonstration of the impossibility of finding any *relation* between the different realms; so that there will be a "universe" of complete determination and *another* "universe" of complete indetermination.

137 The view that hypothetical (or, more broadly, conditionals) are a peculiar *species* of propositions illustrates the inferior way of treating logic -- that which, instead of bringing everything under logic, subordinates logic to something else; specifically, to forms of speech, i.e., ultimately to types of human procedure and relationships. Thus, in classifying propositions, one can go to forms of speech, to the ways in which things are said, or one can go to the sorts of things that can be *meant*; in other words, to the sorts of things that can be.

The former method is, at best, eclectic; no classification could possibly cover all the forms of speech, all the varieties of communication. But all possible forms of speech must fall under forms of being: anything that can be said, or, perhaps better, that can be conveyed, must have some "logical form" -- and the first task of logic

is to find the types of logical form, even if "putting into logical form" is rendered difficult in particular cases by the confusion of the speaker's thought or by the multifarious purposes which people try to serve by what they say.

138 But it should be understood that even if the argument to which I am proceeding, an attempted demonstration of "the four forms" as the only logical forms, were open to decisive objections, some argument of this *kind* is essential to logic -- the alternative, as I said, being eclecticism, the employment of an unformulated and uncriticised method of selection, the adoption of an unstated "logic" amounting in fact to the subjection of logic to non-logical considerations.

139 These "categorical" forms, then, are *the only* logical forms, the only forms in which we can assert that *something is so*; and thus the logical form of "hypotheticals" (and similarly with "modals, etc.) must be found among the four forms.

142 Taking it, then, that the question of hypotheticals in this second usage is that of relations of implication among propositions, we have particularly to note that it is not a question of our proceedings or attitudes. These are, of course, subject to logic (there can be logical consideration of them), but logic is not subject to them; they do not affect the characters and relations of issues.

142-3 It would be to distinguish between "if p, q" and "p, therefore q" only in terms of our attitudes, i.e. according as we are sure of p and infer q or merely consider, from the formal relationship, that being sure of p would lead us to infer q but logic is not affected by our taking up one attitude or the other -- the logical question is that of implication.

147 I think I have said enough to show that a logic of conditionals can have no consistent notation, that it cannot cope with many of the problems, carry out many of the operations, which present no difficulties to a categorical logic, and that, as regards the operations to which it is in some measure adequate, their strict form is still the categorical.

As I contended earlier, there must, if there is to be logic, be a limited number of "logical forms", and there will be the problem of finding *some* argument which shows what they are. There will, if this problem is solved, be the further problem of carrying out the "reduction" of forms which superficially appear to escape the basic classification. I do not think anyone will deny certain *analogies* between hypothetical and categorical forms; the question, then, is whether there is any real distinction. My contention has been that there is not, that hypotheticals are rough devices for dealing with matters that can be covered in an exact way by a categorical logic, a logic which recognises *only* A E, I and O propositions, their features and relations.

148 Opponents of a predicative logic have commonly maintained that there are valid arguments of the form ArB, BrC .·. ArC (arguments holding wherever the relation r is transitive; such validity, in fact, being what is meant by calling a relation transitive) which cannot be presented in ordinary predicative form, particularly in syllogistic form, but depend on principles other than the syllogistic.

148 When we do this, I would argue, when we get a distinction between the valid and the invalid which can be "read off", a distinction, i.e., which is determinable simply from the form and not at all from the material of the arguments, this can only be in terms of a predicative logic; and I shall endeavour to show that in a number of types of argument which have been taken to be striking *exceptions* to the syllogistic character of demonstrative reasoning, the formal distinction must actually be made in syllogistic terms -- that the distinction is between valid and invalid *syllogisms*.

The standpoint of predicative logic involves an immediate questioning of the view that relational assertions (or relational propositions) are the constituents of relational arguments and are to be definitely distinguished from "subject-predicate" assertions.

155 To see in what terms these arguments may be set out syllogistically (or in strict form) we can consider swings or turnings from the left and observe that any such swings which pass through A must pass through B, whereas those that pass through B need not pass through A; ... Putting this more concretely in terms of *things* beyond or not beyond a given thing in a rightward swing, we come to the pair of assertions "All things to the right of A are (things) to the right of B" and "Some things to the right of B are not (things) to the right of A"; that is to say, to a relation of inclusion.

161 The attempt to have separate *relational* and *qualitative* logics can only lead to confusion and insoluble problems; what this attempt misses is the fact that any object (any known thing and any existing thing) is a complex situation involving both relations and qualities, so that there will always be connections to be found between any object and any other object, between any and any other problem or line of investigation.

172 Ryle does not specifically say that he takes questions of quality and questions of relation (and so on with whatever other categories he recognises) to belong to different regions of inquiry; but he gives no sign of seeing that the logician is concerned not with a miscellaneous bunch of types of question which can be raised about this subject or that, but with a group of types of question which have a *common ground*, which hang together in any inquiry and thus apply to any subject-matter.

177 But in such cases of *not therefore not* (possibly), just as in the case of *therefore* (necessarily), we are concerned with fact or "actuality" and there is no question of special kinds of copula; even though the statements have not always been put in precise logical form, we are clearly not going beyond the ordinary predicative logic, the logic of unqualified fact.

182 The division is supported by illogicality (particularly, the relativism of "that whose nature it is to know") and thus the question of meaninglessness is shifted to that of "logical exclusion" from that of *material* exclusion, in considering which, in terms of our experience, we can easily see that it does not apply in this case but the mental *is* bodily. It is only, in short, when we distinguish realms of reality (qualify the copula) that we get involved in logical impasses -- not when we *deny* such distinctions.

183 [*logic* not mentioned] What would have influenced my apparent assimilation of philosophy to science (not so much besides as

incidentally to my repudiation of "the ultimate") is that each of them is concerned with situational reality, with the spatio-temporal field, with things as they in a single sense are.

185 There can be little doubt, however, that the failure of such criticisms to stick was due to the steadily larger and more influential groups who devoted themselves to inquiry but had little knowledge of the history of critical thought and treated "method" rather in a mechanical than in a logical way.

185 Professor Ryle speaks of what logic *tells me*, with the suggestion that I am laying claim to some private communication or even special revelation. What I maintain is that there can be no logic unless it is in the facts (or situations) of which we are aware. And what I take myself to be informed of by what might be called my "logical sense" is the *continuity* of things or their *coherence*, their "making sense" because they have a common ground, ... It would, of course, be maintained by the empiricist logician that no one can offer a *consistent* "separatist" answer to logical questions, but the primary point is that logical questions arise wherever *any* questions arise. ... That is something we must always be considering, as part of our consideration of any special situations whatever, and that is how we come to have a "logic" -- to see (as I should say), if we are consistent, the errors of dualism, the absence of any breaks in reality, along with special problems of how things intermingle. I have suggested that *lack* of consistency in these matters is contingent on pursuit of special aims and objects; but the main point is that we cannot have a piecemeal logic, that logic is concerned with the *running together* of questions of all sorts ("in all the categories") and that to be confused on this matter is to be hazy on one's "logical (or philosophical) sense". This I have also described as a sense of *form*; and it is because form is not additional *matter*, but is characteristic of any matter that may be in question, that one can speak of logic (or philosophy) as governing or directing science, and not the other way round -- just as it is *taking* it the other way round, making matter to duty for form, making science do duty for philosophy, that has produced the intellectual chaos of the present day.

186 n[11] It seems to me that Plato's later philosophy was affected by the same error as is exhibited in my article, though my argument goes the other way round: i.e., that, instead of arguing from the "necessity" of logical equality to that of social equality, he argued from the "necessity" of social inequality to that of logical inequality, this his residual rationalism, his continued adherence to a hierarchical logic, his inability to take the last steps to empiricism (in spite of his contributions to empiricism in the development of a propositional logic and in an approach, at least, to the theory of *being* as the copula and not as a concrete entity or term) could be accounted for by the belief that to support "egalitarian logic" was to support egalitarian society and thus to wreck cultural life.

187 It is thus that philosophers, as far as they still carry out their own studies and do not, as has happened so much of late, submit to the direction of scientists dialectically untrained, can themselves offer guidance which would remove "hypotheses" or blockages in the lines of scientific study; it is thus that logic, even while asserting the equal reality of all existing things, can claim that it "stands above" the sciences, that it "governs" the various concrete fields of investigation

in a way in which science could not govern *logic* -- since it is by common forms, and not by special materials, that investigation can be directed. It is to be understood, of course, that the scientist who sets himself up as a master of method though he has engaged in no systematic study of philosophy will always be found to be *borrowing* from philosophy, to be using scraps from Locke, Hume and so on, in fixing up his rickety apparatus.

194 [Note: Although logic is not specifically mentioned, the following passage is relevant.] This last point recalls Arnold's distinction (again in Ch.I of *Literature and Dogma*) between "a term of science or exact knowledge" and "a term of poetry and eloquence" -- and here the Heraclitean or objectivist position is that no line can be drawn between these, that there can be no defensible claim to knowledge of distinct things which have no common measures, which do not exist in the same situations and enter into joint transactions. And, in particular, there is the implication that we can no more have quantity without quality than we can have quality without quantity or otherwise than as spatio-temporal process.

But while Heraclitus had this sense of the interlocking of all materials and all problems, he had by no means worked out a critical apparatus (a doctrine of types of problem and forms of solution in any inquiry) in the way that Socrates, followed by Plato, did. And thus for a general conception of the objectivist outlook, of classicism on its basic *philosophical* side, of the "judgment" which applies to all subjects and the "literalism" which is always ruinous to inquiry, we have to go to both these sources; ...

195 Adamson (*History of Logic*, p.85) says that to both Bacon and Descartes "the scholastic logic presented itself as the essence of a thoroughly false and futile method of knowledge. ... Both thinkers were animated by the spirit of reformation in science, and both emphasise the practical end of all speculation. For both, therefore, logic, which to neither is of high value, appeared to be a species of practical science, a generalised statement of the mode in which intellect acquires new knowledge, in which the mind proceeds from known to unknown." This degradation of the subject, logic, to the status of an instrument or set of devices is typical of the practicalist or instrumentalist outlook (though it still cannot show how deviser and devised can enter into common situations or, as the phrase goes, "exist in the same world"), and it may be compared to recent views of scientific method (which is actually logic, considered in terms of types of questions that can arise in inquiry) as simply the procedures of scientists. The matter is illustrated again in the contempt of the two thinkers for syllogism (in fact, the commonest as well as the most fruitful form of demonstrative reasoning) and its replacement by the Baconian "induction" and the Cartesian "intuition". . .

200 If any other subject is to have a general apparatus of criticism, it can have it only by drawing upon philosophy -- that is, on major contributions to the theory of objective reality and of the types of question that can be raised concerning any objective reality or actual subject. Thus the historian has to concern himself with questions of sequence and causality, the literary critic has to go into questions of form or structure, these being in either case primarily matters of logic. Each of them has his special lines of criticism; but, when we examine these, we find that they lead us in the same direction. The

historian has his scrutiny of documents and weighing of testimony, but here not only is he confronted immediately with simple logical questions of the soundness or unsoundness of the inferences they present, or of the coherence of their materials, but he has to take account of types of human error and illusion, of obstacles to discovery, which can be elucidated only by reference to logic, to types of actual situations.

201 It should be understood that, in the cultivation of the fields of inquiry that have come to be known as "scientific", there is no less need for the exercise of "judgment" for the recognition of logical categories or the formal distinction among types of problem, for the removal of hypotheses of division in reality, than there is in the pursuit of any other inquiry; it is as speculative and critical, not as "technical", that work in these fields would be truly scientific. But in fact what we find there is the multiplication of divisions and specialisations, the identification of "method" not with logic but with the use of technical devices, the substitution of a mechanical for a critical apparatus. And it is this narrow, specialising and instrumentalist attitude that has infected the most influential schools of philosophy at the moment, leading them largely to ignore the history of philosophy, the "classics" of the subject which could provide them with an outlook at once broader and more critical.

201n[4] [Logic not mentioned] Reference may again be made to the work of Burnet in Greek philosophy, with its striking combination of philosophical and historical insight -- bringing home to us the way in which knowledge of philosophy can help us to determine the course of philosophical thought and the views of individual thinkers, while knowledge of the doctrines of individual thinkers and their historical connections can help us to arrive at philosophical truths (to learn philosophy). This conjunct operation of critical factors, leading to fresh discovery and to comprehensiveness of view, illustrates the general principle that the coherent position, the position that "makes sense", is the one on which all lines of criticism converge.

206 The demonstration of the hollowness of these pretensions may have been historically inadequate and politically negative, but, as far as it went, it was logically sound.

209-210 There is a logical difficulty in that, if the goodness acquired in the early training really "participates in" (i.e., partakes of the nature of) true goodness, it cannot be a mere matter of habituation but must partake of critical activity as well.

210 We have seen that the fundamental weakness of his philosophy is its unhistorical character, and this finds its logical expression in the attribution of true reality to certain unchanging "forms", or ideals, everything changeable being relatively unreal.

212 Such evasion of the issue is described by the educated as "illogical", but the pointing out of fallacies of this kind is a very small part of what is involved in Logic or Dialectic. Its full import can be grasped only when we consider it in relation to the most advanced studies, i.e., to the sciences.

212 Fields of study are not cut off from one another but mingle just as peoples do. And to treat each as a separate "world" is to fall into contradictions. It is the business of Dialectic to show that the

supposed "indemonstrables" and "indefinables" of the sciences are not indemonstrable or indefinable, but are subject to investigation. Thus all hypotheses implying a division in reality require to be "destroyed" (or removed).

What this involves is that there is a single logic which applies to all the sciences, a single way of being which all their objects have; we cannot divide reality into higher and lower orders, for the difference and the relation between them would alike be indefinable and indemonstrable. Thus any "science" which affects to discover powers or faculties which "make things what they are", or to apply "laws" to "phenomena", is guilty of logical error. [DOCTRINE OF ONE WAY OF BEING] ... The application of logic to "reasons" leads to the conclusion, already obscurely apprehended by the first Ionian philosophers, that any explanation must be on the same level as the thing explained, so that the former in turn can be explained in a similar way.

But the discovery of illogicalities in the theory of Socrates does not affect the fact that he has given a valuable account of the conditions of scientific inquiry.

213 In general, we can criticise only by reference to beliefs which we definitely hold; otherwise there would be nothing to say for or against any disputed view. And unless this feature of logical criticism is recognised, the Socratic insistence on logic, the setting of criticism against instruction, is misleading. So long as we do not set anything above criticism,we can make progress; but we do so not by having any kind of higher knowledge, but by having opinions and acting on them, that is, by reacting on things which are as historical as ourselves.

215 The illogicality of this theory appears at once from its conception of the different sorts of reality which attach to norms and to the things which come under these norms, or from its attempt to distinguish values from facts. If the statement that something "ought to be" has any meaning, it can only be that the thing *is*, positively, obligatory; that this is a matter of fact. When such a statement is taken to be true, it can be dealt with by means of the ordinary logical mechanism of assertion and denial, proof and testing of hypotheses, definition and division -- and in no other way.

216 There is nothing *logically* peculiar about the future; what we think of as existing then, we think of as existing in the same sense as what exists now. And the characters we attribute to future occurrences are those which we have already found in similar occurrences.

219 Our object-seeking activities (passions or inclinations) govern our judgments; and there is no logical basis for supposing the existence of a non-passionate judge or "rational" faculty, over and above our activities themselves, which is peculiarly critical of them, or to which they should be referred.

222 If we take the facts which have been considered as constituting the field of ethics, it will appear that the logic of moral events is the same as that of any other events.

247 The historical and deterministic treatment of goods is, in fact, only one example of the removal of metaphysics from science, the establishment of all scientific objects on a single level of

investigation. And in this upholding a logic of events, realist ethics helps to free philosophy from the confused ethics in which metaphysics is rooted -- from the conception of "higher realities", that is to say, preferred delusions.

308 The difficulty of where to draw the line, as in Plekhanov's example of when a man has grown a beard, is quite irrelevant here; because as regards any given amount of hair, there is no point up to which it is not present and from which it is present; and how much hair we call "a beard" is a linguistic, not a logical question. There is no greater logical difficulty in dealing with the contention of Engels (*Landmarks*,, p.43) that it is impossible "to fix the precise moment of death, for physiology shows that death is not a single and sudden event but a very slow process". Physiology could not show this unless it could say when a body is dead and when it is not dead, and, if such statements can be correctly made, then there is a moment up to which it is not dead and from which it is dead.

314 That Marxism is a *metaphysic*, a doctrine of guiding principles, a mingling of logic and ethics to the detriment of both, is shown by its conception of the advance of things to "higher" and "higher" levels, its belief in a world which as Eastman puts it, is evolving "by its own inevitable dialectic" toward something "higher", toward something "more magnificent".

315 It appears also that, on this view, there will be a confounding not merely of logic and ethics but of all theories whatsoever; they will all rank as expressions of the basis, and even if (as is not the case) there could still be distinctions of degree, it would only be degrees of expressiveness, and what was legal and what political, what religious and what philosophical, would not appear.

367 But Flugel's statement that the distinction between means and ends is "nearly always" relative is not (as indeed the reservation itself would show) based on logical considerations. It follows immediately upon the statement that it is the business of ethics to decide what the "higher values" are (so that applied psychology, like other applied sciences, "is concerned with 'means' rather than with 'ends'"), and is the beginning of an attempt to whittle away that concession to ethics.

INDEX TO APPENDIX D: TERMS USED IN SIEP -- LOGIC
Indexed by numerous categories

APPENDIX E: SOME MAJOR EMPIRICIST DEFINITIONS

On the basis of arguments put forward in the text, the following major claims and definitions are suggested here as appropriate for empiricism.

1. Rationalism

Rationalism is the philosophical movement, originally founded in theological beliefs, which upholds (a) the notion of soul or mind, (b) some kind of transcendental entities (forms ideas, concepts, etc.) which are the elements of "knowledge", and (c) that there is some method of comparing and analysing the forms, or ideas in the mind; a method which is quite distinct from the empirical methods of observing (or "sense") and dialectic.

2. Idealism

Idealism is any view which reifies mind, or gives mind a privileged place in the scheme of philosophy. On this view, rationalism is a form of idealism; but the two are almost indistinguishable.

3. Monism

Monism is the doctrine of one substance, mind, embracing all things. According to Speake, monism is "1. A philosophical theory that maintains that there is one, and only one, substance. Examples of this type of theory are provided by the philosophies of Spinoza and Hegel. 2. (in the context of discussions of mind-body relations) A theory of mind-body relations that is not dualistic" [1979, p.219].

4. Dualism

Dualism is any view which divides all things into two substances, mind and matter (or any equivalent). Speake says dualism is "A theory concerning the fundamental types into which individual substances are to be divided. It asserts that substances are either material or mental, neither type being reducible to the other" [Ibid, p.91].

5. Voluntarism

Voluntarism is the view that mind is an active, causal agent which is itself uncaused. Speake says voluntarism is "1. A certain sort of metaphysics (of which Schopenhauer's is typical), that holds that the true nature of reality is will. 2. In controversies about the nature of history, a theory that attaches too much weight to the human will as a factor in history, ... " [Ibid, p.343].

6. Representationism

Representationism is any theory which postulates intermediaries of a mental kind in the processes of perceiving or communicating: any entities such as ideas, concepts, sensa, qua ia, judgments or meanings of any kind. So representationism can be seen as a by-product of rationalism, or the notion of mind. This account is not inconsistent with a widely accepted view. Speake, for example, describes *representationalism* (or *representationism*) as:

> A generic term that broadly refers to theories of perception wherein the sensing mind is believed not to have direct acquaintance with its objects, but to apprehend them through the medium of ideas that are supposed to *represent* those objects. ... it starts by laying down an obstacle to such explanation since it assumes initially that human minds do not apprehend objects directly. [1979, p.284]

7. Necessary Truth

Necessary truth is supposed to be a truth created by the mind or by relations between ideas within the mind.

8. Contingent Truth

Contingent truth is supposed to be a truth not created by the mind nor by relations between ideas within the mind.

9. Empiricism

Empiricism is the dialectical, propositional, observational method of critical inquiry identical with scientific method as described above. Empiricism does not make any assumptions; it is a method, and adheres consistently to its principles of method. It does not make any theological assumptions and does not make any assumptions about minds, ideas, concepts, etc.; but it examines in the same critical way, by the same impartial or objective, methodologically consistent method, all terms, conceptions, definitions, claims, beliefs, assertions, denials, assumptions, theories or hypotheses. Although empiricism does not **make** any assumptions, it can accommodate and work within any range of assumptions, which will then be subject to examination, criticism, testing, proof and disproof. Assumptions brought within the range of dialectic, logic or scientific method are not part of the method of critical inquiry, but are material around which a specific phase of dialectic works.

10. Dialectic

Dialectic is defined here as the critical, discursive method of testing any claims or hypotheses which are expressed in propositional form (including anything believed, assumed, asserted, denied, doubted, remembered or hypothesised), within a more or less defined range of beliefs and assumptions. In conjunction with the process of definition -- which is another important part of the critical, discursive, or philosophical process -- dialectic is also a method of testing terms or conceptions by treating them propositionally. It may be used in conjunction with observational procedures, or it may simply assume that certain observations have been, or could be, carried out; in the latter case, it is a purely discursive process. Therefore, it can deal with any theoretical subject or problem of inquiry or understanding; it is a universal method of inquiry. Any specific phase of dialectic begins with the idertification of an issue in dispute or doubt. It then clarifies (a) some major points of agreement in relation to the issue, and (b) assumptions being made in relation to the issue; and tests the issue in relation to these beliefs and assumptions. Dialectic is the distinctive method of critical philosophy, and is a methodologically consistent method of testing anything expressed in propositional form.

11. Criticism

Criticism is dialectical testing applied in a specific case: to a specific claim, belief, assertion, denial, claimed observation, hypothesis, theory, or term, conception or definition. Criticism is perhaps more frequently associated with the disputatious part of dialectic, or with *elenchus*: with rejection or disproof. However, there is nothing illogical about subjecting a belief or theory to criticism (critical examination) without pre-empting its outcome; and there is nothing illogical about saying that a specific hypothesis or theory has survived the most stringent criticism. In fact, both of these ways of speaking are perfectly acceptable and traditional.

12. Logic

It is necessary to distinguish two components (or between two quite different senses) of logic: informal and formal logic.

Informal logic is identical with dialectic, critical propositional discourse, or the method of critical inquiry in practice.

Formal logic is the theory of the method of critical inquiry (or dialectic). It studies critical, propositional discourse by --

(a) describing, analysing, classifying, dividing and defining its components or elements (this is the identification of logical forms of propositions, logical relations between propositions, and the logical forms of valid arguments) and

(b) describing its methods, procedures or dynamic.

13. Science

Science is not knowledge.

Science is not fundamentally deductive in character, but is distinguished, and is ultimately to be defined by its scholarly, critical, at times destructive, at times speculative, dialectical method employed in conjunction with disciplined observation and experiment.

The empiricist theory of sciences is that they are learned, dialectical, disputatious, speculative and observational disciplines concerned with problems of understanding or theoretical problems (not practical problems), which disciplines are limited to more or less defined areas and problems, although they take into account the findings of other learned disciplines (philosophy and science) which are relevant to their own fields. Sciences are distinguished by a common, disciplined or methodologically consistent method of testing any (scientific) observations, findings, theories, hypotheses, beliefs or assumptions by dialectic (critical testing) in conjunction with scholarship, observing, describing, defining, speculation (theory formulation), and by experiment and mathematics when appropriate. Rather than being conceived of as static knowledge, the empiricist view of sciences is that they are endlessly disputatious processes: continuous dialectical processes that engage innumerable participants and disputants throughout the history of a specific discipline, which disciplines always take into account their own histories of controversy.

14. Scientific Method

Scientific method is dialectic supplemented by a number of methodo-logically consistent investigatory procedures; it is the dialectical method of testing observations, findings, theories, hypotheses, beliefs, assumptions, conceptions, terms or definitions (expressed or expressible in propositional form) by reasoning and observation in conjunction, within a more or less well defined field of beliefs and assumptions. In conjunction with definition, it can also test terms or conceptions. It is supplemented by --

(i) scholarship: the study of the best views on the subject as well as recording one's own views and findings and participation in the ongoing discussion of issues; it thereby takes into account the history of theories and controversies within the field; and these constitute some of the assumptions in a specific phase of inquiry;

(ii) disciplined critical observation (including experiment) followed by exact description;

(iii) speculation: the formulation of hypotheses or theories which are critically tested dialectically and by observation; inquiry may

make new discoveries by observing, but it cannot make new theoretical discoveries without speculation;

(iv) mathematics, wher appropriate; i.e., inquiry will employ methodologically consistent processes of mathematics (counting, measuring and calculating) in relation to any quantitative problems.

15. Mathematics

Mathematics is not a science.

The rationalist reification of mathematics as the model for "other" science(s) is fallacious.

Mathematics --

(i) is compatible with and is an indispensable part of, the method of critical inquiry or dialectic; counting is an integral and indispensable part of critical observing and describing; measuring is an integral and indispensable part of objective and discriminating observing and describing; calculating is an important extension of these;

(ii) is that part of the method of critical inquiry concerned with quantitative matters;

(iii) is an integral part of all sciences;

(iv) is an integral part of the extended method of critical inquiry or scientific method; being that part concerned with quantitative problems of understanding.

* * * * *

It will be seen that the definitions relating to rationalism-idealism, #1 to 8 above, are *generated* by the notion of mind. This would not warrant comment by anyone who upheld that notion, but once the notion of mind is questioned, it becomes very obvious that it creates not only a wide range of philosophical problems, but a range of extremely difficult, we may suspect, *insoluble* problems. It is the source of one major branch of what is known as metaphysics.

Of course it is not being claimed that the foregoing views were expressed by Anderson; but it is being claimed (a) that they are perfectly consistent with a great deal that he said and with the general "drift" of his thought; and (b) that what has been outlined as the empiricist view of logic, dialectic, criticism and scientific method is implicit in Anderson's position.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

This Bibliography is divided into three parts:

PART I: COMPREHENSIVE LISTING OF PUBLISHED MATERIAL BY ANDERSON, arranged chronologically

- (a) Up to 1962
- (b) After 1962, published by others

PART II: PUBLISHED MATERIAL ABOUT ANDERSON

- (a) No author (arranged chronologically)
- (b) Arranged alphabetically, by author

PART III: GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY
(that is, other material used in the preparation of this Thesis)

- (a) Book;
- (b) Journal Articles, etc.

The first two Parts build on Geraldine Suter's important *Bibliographic Study on the Philosophy of John Anderson* (see *Acknowledgments*).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PART I : COMPREHENSIVE LISTING OF PUBLISHED MATERIAL BY ANDERSON
Arranged chronologically. The date of the listing here is that of publication, not the date of the address, as in Geraldine Suter's Bibliography. "Jude" was Anderson's pen name.

Abbreviations:
GUM *Glasgow University Magazine.*
AJPP *Australasian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology*
AJP *Australian Journal of Philosophy*
UR *Union Recorder*
(R) Review Article
AJPH *Australian Journal of Politics and History*

(a) up to 1962

BIB. No.	YEAR	DETAILS
1	1914	THANKSGIVING. GUM. p.39-40 ["Jude"]
2	1915	SOCIOLOGICAL TALES. GUM, Vol.27, No.4. 27 Jan. 1915. p.125-126 ["Jude"]
3	1915	MORE LIGHT. GUM. p.221-222. ["Jude"]
4	1915	TWO BIOLOGICAL THEORIES AND THEIR CONFLICT IN THE SEX WAR. GUM. Vol.27, No.5, 17 February 1915.
5	1916-17	RUSSIA AS I SAW IT. GUM. p.7-9. ["Jude"]
6	1916-17	THE ART OF BEING INTERVIEWED. GUM. p.57-58. ["Jude"]
7	1916-17	A DISQUISITION. GUM. p.73-74. ["Jude"]
8	1916-17	THE WORLD TO COME. GUM. p.157-159 ["Jude"]
9	1916-17	THE EVOLUTION OF A LITERARY ARTIST. GUM. p.218-220 ["Jude"]
10	1916-17	TALES FOR MEN ONLY. GUM. p.252-254 ["Jude"]
11	1917-18	GHOSTS. GUM. p.20-21. ["Jude"]
12	1917-18	GOATS. GUM. p.39-41. ["Jude"]
13	1917-18	TWO HOUSES. GUM. p.65-67 ["Jude"]
14	1917-18	BLIND TO THE WORLD. GUM. p.102-103 ["Jude"]
15	1917-18	Notice: Mr. John Anderson will give a paper on "The Fallacy of Optimism. GUM, p.121
16	1917-18	THE CULT OF IMMATURITY. GUM. p.125-127. ["Jude"]
17	1917-18	OATMEAL.GUM. p.137-138. ["Jude"]
18	1917-18	EDITORIAL. [Note: Anderson was Editor of the GUM 1917-1918] GUM p.140-141

19 1917-18 Full summary of "THE FALLACY OF OPTIMISM". GUM, p.146

20 1917-18 DOUBLE OR QUITS. GUM p.183-184. ["Jude"]

21 1917-18 EDITORIAL. GUM. p.188-189

22 1918-19 Photograph of Anderson. GUM. opp. p.218.

23 1921 SPINOZA AND TIME. Letter. The New Age, 3 November 1921.

24 1926 PROPOSITIONS AND JUDGMENTS. Mind, Vol.35 NS, No.138. April 1926. p.237-241

25 1926 THE TRUTH OF PROPOSITIONS. Mind, Vol.35 NS, No.140, October 1926, p.466-472

26 1927 THE KNOWER AND THE KNOWN. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol XXVII NS. p.61-84.

27 1927 ART AND THE WORKERS. Workers Weekly, 19 June 1927.

28 1927 EVOLUTION AND REVOLUTION. Workers Weekly 15 July 1927

29 1927 POLITICS AND PUBLICITY: ARE WE TO BE ALLOWED TO DISCUSS COMMUNISM? Workers Weekly, 14 October 1927.

30 1927 HISTORY AND THEORY. Communist. 1 December 1927. p.11-14

31 1927 FAMILIAR BELIEFS & TRANSCENDENT REASON, A.Balfour (R) AJPP, Vol.5(3), September 1927. p.233

32 1927 EMPIRICISM. AJPP, Vol.5(4), December 1927. p.241-254.

33 1927 REALITY, B.H.Streeter (R). AJPP, Vol.5(4). December 1927. p.315-316

34 1928 THE MORAL FACTOR IN THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION. [A.Spencer]. The Communist. 1 February 1928: p.7-10; 1 March 1928 p.16-19 [Note: Articles by "A. Spencer" are believed to have been written by Anderson]

35 1928 THE UNIVERSITY APPEAL. Schooling, Vol.XI, No.2. April 1928. p.36-40.

36 1928 REFORMISM AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS [A.Spencer]. The Communist. May-June 1928

37 1928 CENSORSHIP. Schooling, Vol.XI, No.4, August 1928, p.99-107.

38 1928 PROHIBITION. The Workers Weekly, 7 September 1928.

39 1928 REPLY TO "A.B." Workers Weekly, 21 September 1928.

40 1928 CENSORSHIP AND PUBLIC POLICY. Labour Monthly. November 1928, p.14-16

41 1928 ANOTHER OUTBREAK OF VIRTUE (D). AJPP, Vol.6(2), June 1928. p.151-152

42 1928 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY, Brightman, E.S. (Ed) (R) AJPP, Vol.6(3). September 1928. p.223-228

43 1928 DETERMINISM AND ETHICS. AJPP, Vol.6(4). December 1928. p.241-255

44 1928 THE 'EPINOMIS' OF PLATO. J.Harward (R). AJPP, Vol.6(4) December 1928. p.312-313

45 1929 THE NON-EXISTENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS: SPACE, TIME & DEITY, Samuel Alexander. (Rev.Art.) AJPP, Vol.7(1), March 1929, p.68-73.

46 1929 "UNIVERSALS" AND OCCURRENCES (D). AJPP, Vol.7(2). June 1929. p.138-145

47 1929 ON CENSORSHIP. Workers Weekly, 8 November 1929.

48 1929 THEORY AND PRACTICE IN MORALS (D). AJPP, Vol.7(4). Dec. 1929. p.297-300

49 1930 ULYSSES. Aust. English Association, Offprint No.3, 1930.

50 1930 REALISM AND SOME OF ITS CRITICS. AJPP, Vol.8(2), June 1930, p.113-134

51 1930 MORAL LAW AND THE HIGHEST GOOD. E. Morris Miller (R). AJPP, Vol.8(3). September 1930. p.235-236

52 1930 METAPHYSICS AND MODERN RESEARCH, I.C.Isbyam (R). AJPP, Vol.8(3). Sept. 1930, p.236-237.

53 1930 WHO WAS RHODES? : Status Queried. Honi Soit. 15 October 1930. p.1

54 1930 ULYSSES. Union Recorder. 23 October 1930.

55 1930 LETTER TO FRIENDS OF THE SOVIET UNION. Workers Weekly. 14 November 1930

56 1930 SOCRATES AS AN EDUCATOR [Part I]. Journal of the Institute of Inspectors of Schools, Vol.XII, No.3, November 1930, p.5-13.

57 1930 THE CONCEPTION OF A LIBERAL EDUCATION. Education, Vol.XII,2. December 1930 P.41-43

58 1931 EDUCATION AND POLITICS. 1931. Angus and Robertson, Sydney.

59 1931 THE BOOK OF DIOGENES LAERTIUS: ITS SPIRIT AND ITS METHOD, Richard Hope (R) AJPP, Vol.9(1), March 1931. p.71-75

60 1931 A COMPARISON. Honi Soit. 1 April 1931

61 1931 ARE WE ANY HAPPIER? The Sun, 12 April 1931.

62 1931 SOCRATES AS AN EDUCATOR [Part II]. Journal of the Institute of Inspectors of Schools, Vol.XIII, No.1, June 1931,p.7-11.

63 1931 COMMUNISM : Professor Anderson's Analysis. Farrago, Vol.7, No.10. 11 June, 1931. p.1-2.

64 1931 PAPERS GARBLE PROFESSOR'S SPEECH. Professor's Statement. Honi Soit, 15 July 1931. p.1.

65 1931 PARTIZANSHIP OF THE PRESS. Honi Soit. 22 July 1931, p.1.

66 1931 THE PROFESSOR REPLIES. Farrago Vol.7(7). 28 July 1931.

67 1931 LETTER: "SOCIETY FOR FREETHOUGHT". Honi Soit. 29 July 1931.

68 1931 ACADEMIC AUTONOMY. Honi Soit, 5 August 1931. p.2.

69 1931 SOCRATES AS AN EDUCATOR. AJPP, Vol.9(3), September 1931. p.172-184.

70 1932 LEADERSHIP AND SPONTANEITY: published by the Sydney Univ. Freethought Society in a pamphlet entitled: 'CENSORSHIP IN THE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT' when the article was rejected by 'Proletariat'. Freethought, 1932. 7pp.

71 1932 POLITICAL FREEDOM. Zest, No.1. January 1932. p.7-9

72 1932 THE WORKING CLASS. Proletariat 1(1). April 1932. p.2-6

73 1932 THE PLACE OF HEGEL IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. AJPP, Vol.10(2), June 1932. p.81-91.

74 1932 FREEDOM AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE. Proletariat, Vol.1 No.2, July 1932. p.2-6

75 1932 FREEDOM OF THOUGHT. Freethought No.1, July 1932. p.1-3

76 1932 "LIFE" VERSUS LOGIC. Freethought, No.1. 1932. p.11-12

77 1932 UTILITARIANISM. AJPP, Vol.10(3), September 1932. p.161-172

78 1932 SOME QUESTIONS IN AESTHETICS. Booklet. Sydney Univ. Literary Society. November 1932. 25pp.

79 1932 SOME OBSCURANTIST FALLACIES. Freethought, No.2, November 1932. p.10-12

80 1933 JAMES JOYCE. Hermes, Vol.XXXIX,Michaelmas Term 1933.p.13-17

81 1933 REALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM IN ETHICS. AJPP, Vol.11(1). March, 1933. p.1-11

82 1933 OUR REPLY TO THE CPofA. [possibly written by Anderson]. The Militant, Vol. 1, No.1, October 1933. p.5

83 1933 FREEDOM OF SPEECH. The Student. Vol.1, November 1933. p.3

84 1933 SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY. [No signature, but believed to be by Anderson]. The Militant, Vol.1, No.2. November 1933. p.6-8

85 1933 SCIENCE AND EDUCATION. The Science Journal. Sydney University Science Society. Vol.XII, No.1. Michaelmas Term 1933, p.5-8

86 1933 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC: THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS, F.P.Ramsey; THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC, Richard Robinson; L'EMPIRISME DANS LES SCIENCES EXACTES, W. Rivier (Rev.Art.) AJPP, Vol.11(4). December 1933. p.308-314

87 1934 GERMANY AND THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL [J.Baillie]. The Militant, Vol.1, No.5. February 1934. p.2-5,10. ["Baillie" is believed to be another of Anderson's pen-names.]

-- 1934 Item signed "JB" referred to by Anderson in The Militant, 1/9/34. The Militant, 1/6/34, p.10

88 1934 THE COMINTERN SHOWS ITS FACE. [J.Baillie]. The Militant, Vol.1, No.8. May, 1934. p.10-12,13.

89 1934 MIND AS FEELING. AJPP, Vol.12(2), June 1934. p.81-94.

90 1934 REPLY TO SHARKEY. The Militant, July 1934

91 1934 POLITICAL "DEBUNKING". Honi Soit 18 July 1934. p.3

92 1934 STALINISM AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION [J.Baillie]. The Militant, Vol.1, No.10, July 1934. p.10-13.

93 1934 VIRTUE. AJPP Vol.12(3). September 1934. p.224-228

94 1934 THE INTERNATIONAL FABRICATORS, No.1 [J.Baillie]. The Militant Vol 1, No.12, September, 1934, p.14-16, 13.

95 1934 THE INTERNATIONAL FABRICATORS, No.2. [J.Baillie]. The Militant, Vol.2, No. 1, October 1934, p.13-16

96 1934 ROMANTICISM AND CLASSICISM. Hermes, Vol.XL. Michaelmas Term 1934. p.7-10

97 1934 THE ANTI-WAR AGITATION. The Militant, Vol.2 No.3, Dec. 1934, p.17-18

98 1934 MIND AS FEELING : RESPONSE TO O'NEIL, AJPP, Vol. 12(4). December 1934. p.287-288

99 1934 SOME REMARKS ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM (D). AJPP, Vol.12(4). December 1934. p.296-298

101 1935 IS THERE AN AUSTRALIAN PHILOSOPHY? The Sunday Sun and Guardian, 24 Mar. 1935.

102 1935 THE INTERNATIONAL FABRICATORS, No.3 [J.Baillie]. The Militant, Vol.2 No. 7, April, 1935. p.7-8,6

103 1935 CENSORSHIP. Union Recorder, 25 April, 1935. p.52

104 1935 CHINA AND SOVIETS: The Situation Analysed. [J.Baillie] The Militant, Vol.2 No.8, May 1935. p.4-5

105 1935 THE PERFECT WAGNERITE. Manuscripts. Vol.XIII. 13 May 1935. p.25-38

106 1935 PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION AND EXCHANGE. AJPP, Vol.13(2). June 1935. p.136-142

107 1935 SCEPTICISM AND CONSTRUCTION, Charles A. Campbell (R). AJPP, Vol.13(2). June 1935. p.151-156

108 1935 SOVIET DEMOCRACY. The Militant. Vol.2 No.9, July 1935. p.2

109 1935 THE FRENCH SITUATION [J.Baillie]. The Militant, Vol.2 No.10, Aug. 1935, p.1-3

110 1935 EDUCATIONAL REFORM. UR Vol.XV/19. 8 August 1935, pp.180-181

111 1935 UNIVERSITY REFORM. AJPP, Vol.13(3). Sept. 1935. p.215-222

112 1935 STALINISTS CONTROL "DEFENCE OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS COMMITTEE" WORKERS' PARTY REPRESENTATION AUTOCRATICALLY REFUSED! The Militant, Vol.2, No. 13, December,1935. p.3

113 1935 DESIGN. AJPP Vol.13(4), December 1935. p.241-256.

114 1936 THE 'COGITO' OF DESCARTES. AJPP, Vol.14(1). March 1936. p.48-68

115 1936 SUR LE PRINCIPE DU TIERS EXCLU, M.Barzin & A.Errera (R) AJPP, Vol.14(1). March 1936. p.80

116 1936 THE COMIC. Hermes. Vol.XLII. Lent Term 1936. p.10-12.

117 1936 SOCIAL SERVICE. Freethought. Vol.3. May 1936. p.2-7

118 1936 PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND ROMANTICISM. AJPP, Vol.14(3). September 1936. p.210-215

119 1936 AFFAIRS IN RUSSIA TODAY: report of a radio talk by JOHN ANDERSON on 2BL. The Militant. Vol.3 No.7, October, 1936. p.4-5

120 1936 DIALECTIC: THE LOGIC OF MARXISM AND ITS CRITICS, by T.A.Jackson (R). The Australian Highway, Vol.XVIII, No.12. 10 November 1936. p.191-194

121 1936 CAUSALITY AND LOGIC (D). AJPP, Vol.14(4). December 1936. p.309-313

122 1937 MATHEMATIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIE, R.Wavre; LA CAUSE ET L'INTERVALE, DU ORDRE ET PROBABILITE, E.Dupreel. (R). AJPP, Vol.15(1). March 1937. p.77-80

123 1937 ART AND MORALS. Union Recorder. 29 April 1937. p.62.

124 1937 STUDENT INTERESTS. Candide. Trinity Term 1937. p.21-23.

125 1937 MARXIST ETHICS. AJPP, Vol.15(2). June 1937. p.98-117.

126 1937 HOW WE THINK, John Dewey (R). AJPP, Vol.15(3). Sept. 1937. p.224-230

127 1937 LOGICAL POSITIVISM AND ANALYSIS, L.Susan Stebbing (R). AJPP, Vol.15(3). September 1937. p.238-240

128 1937 FREUD AND MARX: A DIALECTICAL STUDY, by R.Osborn (R). The Australian Highway. Vol.XIX (New Series), No.9. 10 October 1937. p.138-141

129 1937 AUSTRALIAN CULTURE. Union Recorder. 14 Oct. 1937. p.228.

130 1937 STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS, Vol.III. Department of Philosophy, Columbia University. (R). AJPP, Vol.15(4). December 1937. p.299-307

131 1938 A TEXTBOOK OF MARXIST PHILOSOPHY (R). The Australian Highway. Vol.XX, No.1. 10 February 1938, p.13-17

132 1938 THE PROBLEM OF CAUSALITY. AJPP, Vol.16(2). August 1938. p.127-142.

133 1939 LITERATURE AND LIFE. Union Recorder, 20 April 1939, p.53

134 1939 LOGIC AND ETHICS (D). AJPP, Vol.17(1). May 1939. p.55-65

135 1939 THE STATUS OF LOGIC. (D). AJPP, Vol.17(2). August 1939. p.164-169

136 1939 LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE. (D). AJPP, Vol.17(3). December 1939. p.257-272

137 1940 LETTER RE FREETHOUGHT SOCIETY. Honi Soit. 15 May 1940

138 1940 FREUDIANISM AND SOCIETY: Superstition and Society, by R.Money-Kyrle; Civilisation, War and Death -- Selections from three works by Sigmund Freud. Ed. John Rickman (R.Article) AJPP, Vol.18(1), June 1940, p.50-77

139 1940 IN THE SPIRIT OF WILLIAM JAMES, R.B.Perry (R). AJPP, Vol.18(1). June 1940. p.85-88

140 1940 PSYCHOLOGY FOR EVERYONE: AN OUTLINE OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY, W.J.H. Sprott (R). AJPP, Vol.18(2), Sept. 1940. p.154-159

141 1941 Professor Anderson Urges: SENATE REFORM NOW: GRADUATE REPRESENTATION ATTACKED. Honi Soit. Special Edition, 13(29). 1941. p.2

142 1941 PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY, 4th Edition. W.Brown (R). AJPP, Vol.19(1) April, 1941. p.94-96

143 1941 "ULYSSES" BAN TO BE EXPECTED. Honi Soit. 25 Sept. 1941. p.3

144 1941 ART AND MORALITY. AJPP, Vol.19(3), Dec. 1941, p.253-266.

145 1941 FROM BEAST-MACHINE TO MAN-MACHINE, L.C.Rosenfield (R). AJPP, Vol.19(3) December 1941. p.277-286

146 1942 ANDERSON ON CHRISTIANITY. Honi Soit. 2 July 1942.

147 1942 THE MEANING OF GOOD. AJPP, Vol.20(2). September 1942. p.111-140

148 1943 ACADEMIC FREEDOM. Honi Soit, 16 April 1943, p.1

149 1943 THE NATURE OF ETHICS (D) AJPP, Vol.21(1) June 1943. p.26-40

150 1943 EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY, J.D.G.Medley (R). AJPP, Vol.21(1), June 1943. p.53-63.

151 1943 RELIGION IN EDUCATION. In Religion in Education. The New Education Fellowship, NSW. July 1943. p.25-32.

152 1943 THE SERVILE STATE. AJPP, Vol.21(2-3), Dec. 1943, p.115-132

153 1943 UNIVERSITIES IN AUSTRALIA, Eric Ashby. AJPP, Vol.21(2-3). December 1943, p.163-181.

154 1943 THE REGENERATION OF CIVILISATION, E.H.Burgmann (R). AJPP, Vol.21(2-3). December 1943. p.182-184

155 1944 DECENTRALISED EDUCATION. Honi Soit, 23 June 1944. p.1

156 1944 EDUCATION AND PRACTICALITY (D). AJPP, Vol.22(1-2). September 1944, p.106-111.

157 1944 ETHICS AND ADVOCACY (D). AJPP, Vol. 22(3), December 1944. p.174-187

158 1945 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY TO 'PROSPECTS OF DEMOCRACY', Ed. W.H.C.Eddy, Consolidated Press, Sydney, 1945., p.7-12

159 1945 POETRY AND SOCIETY. Union Recorder 7 June 1945. p.88-89.

160 1945 A UNIVERSITY OF CLOSED MINDS? Honi Soit, 13 Sept. 1945, p.1

161 1945 THE ONE GOOD (D). AJPP, Vol.23(1-3). Dec. 1945. p.85-89.

162 1948 STUDENTS RIGHTS. Heresy, 12 May 1948. p.3

163 1948 THE POLITICS OF PROSCRIPTION. Australian Quarterly. Vol.XX, No.2, June, 1948. p.7-15

164 1951 THE UNIVERSITY AND RELIGION: ANDERSON IN DEFENCE OF HIMSELF Honi Soit. 12 July 1951, p.4

165 1951 LETTER: THEISM OR ATHEISM. Honi Soit. 19 July 1951. p.4

166 1951 LOGIC AND DOGMA: COUNTER-ATTACK BY PROF. ANDERSON. Honi Soit, 2 August 1951, p.3

167 1952 DEMOCRATIC ILLUSIONS. Hermes Vol.54(1). 1952. p.16-18. [NOTE: G.Suter says this issue of Hermes did not appear until 1954.]

168 1952 HYPOTHETICALS. AJPP, Vol.30(1). May 1952. p.1-16.

169 1953 LITERARY CRITICISM. Union Recorder Vol.XXXIII No.7. 30 April 1953. p.57-58.

170 1953 THE FREUDIAN REVOLUTION. AJPP, Vol.31(2). August 1953. p.101-106

171 1953 PSYCHOLOGICAL MORALISM: Man, Morals and Society. J.C.Flugel (Rev.Art.) AJPP, Vol.31(3). December 1953. p.188-205

172 1954 PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY, 5th Edition. William Brown. (Critical Notice) AJP, Vol.32(1). May 1954. p.48-56

173 1954 UNIVERSITY DEVELOPMENT IN NSW. Honi Soit. 14 Oct. 1954. p.5

174 1954 POLITICS AND MORALS, by Benedetto Croce, trans. Salvatore J.Castiglione (Critical Notice). AJP, Vol.32(3). December 1954. p.213-222

175 1958 THE ORR CASE AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM. The Observer (Sydney) No.10, 28 June 1958. p.293

176 1958 REALISM. The Australian Highway. Special Edition, September 1958: 'Anderson and Andersonianism'. p.53-56

177 1959 THE ILLUSION OF THE EPOCH. H.B.Acton. AJP, Vol.37(2). August 1959. p.156-167

178 1959 MY PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS ON THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF OUR TIME, B.Croce (R). AJP, Vol.37(3), December 1959. p.255-260

179 1959 CLASSICISM. Australian Humanities Research Council, Fourth Annual Report. 1959. p.19-30.

180 1960 THE PLACE OF THE ACADEMIC IN MODERN SOCIETY. Honi Soit. 16 June 1960. p.5

181 1960 TIME AND IDEA: THE THEORY OF HISTORY IN GIAMBATTISTA VICO, A.R. Caponigr. (Critical Notice). AJP, Vol.38(2). August 1960. p.163-172.

182 1960 ORAGE AND THE "NEW AGE" CIRCLE, Paul Selver. (R). Observer, Vol.3, No. 23, 12 November 1960. p.30-31.

183 1961 ACADEMIC AUTONOMY AND RELIGION. Honi Soit 27 July 1961. p.4

184 1961 ACADEMIC AUTONOMY AND RELIGION. Broadsheet, Vol.18. August 1961. p.2-6

185 1961 THE WESTERN INTELLECTUAL TRADITION: FROM LEONARDO TO HEGEL, J.Bronowski & Bruce Mazlish (Rev.Art.). Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol.VII, No.2. November 1961. p.278-284

186 1961 RELIGION AND THE UNIVERSITY. The Australian Highway. Vol.XLII, No.3. November 1961, p.50-54

187 1962 STUDIES IN EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY. Angus and Robertson, Sydney

188 1962 Relational Arguments. In STUDIES IN EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY. Angus and Robertson, Sydney. p.148-161

189 1962 Empiricism and Logic. In STUDIES IN EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY. Angus and Robertson, Sydney. p.162-188

NOTE: John Anderson died on 6 July 1962. The following section lists articles by Anderson which have been published or reprinted by others.

(b) After 1962, published by others.

BIB. No.	YEAR	DETAILS
190	1973	ANDERSON ON CENSORSHIP, COMMUNISM AND THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD. Broadsheet, No.71, 1973. p.6-9 (a) Politics and Publicity: Are we to be allowed to discuss communism? (b) On Censorship
191	1973	ANDERSON ON ART AND THE WORKERS. Broadsheet No.72, 1973. p.6-7.
192	1973	ANDERSON ON PROHIBITION. Broadsheet No.72, 1973. p.7-8.
193	1973	ANDERSON'S REPLY TO A.B. Broadsheet No.72, 1973. p.7-8. ["A.B.": Workers Weekly 14/9/28]
194	1973	ANDERSON ON OBSCENITY. Broadsheet No.73, May 1973. p.7-10
195	1975	ANDERSON ON ULYSSES. Broadsheet No.80, Feb. 1975. p.3-7.
196	1975	ANDERSON ON ROMANTICISM AND CLASSICISM. Broadsheet No.85, 1975, p.5-8

197 1976 ANDERSON ON CHRISTIANITY. Broadsheet No.87, 1976. p.7.

198 1977 ANDERSON ON EDUCATION. Dialectic No.14, 1977. Special edition. Edited by Brian Birchall and Norelle Evans.

199 1977 RELIGION IN EDUCATION. Reprinted in Dialectic, Vol.14, Special Edition May 1977. p.1-8.

200 1977 UNIVERSITY REFORM. Reprinted in Dialectic, Vol.14, Special Edition, May 1977. p.9-15.

201 1977 THE PLACE OF THE ACADEMIC IN MODERN SOCIETY. Reprinted in Dialectic, Vol.14Special Edition, May 1977, p.16-21.

202 1977 STUDENT INTERESTS. Reprinted in Dialectic, Vol.14, Special Edition, May 1977. P.22-24.

203 1977 LECTURES ON SPENCER AND DEWEY: Part I - Spencer. Dialectic, Vol.14, Special Edition, May 1977. p.25-45

204 1977 LECTURES ON SPENCER AND DEWEY: Part II - Dewey. Dialectic, Vol.14, Special Edition, May 1977. p.46-60

205 1980 EDUCATION AND INQUIRY. 1980. Edited by D.Z.Phillips. Basil Blackwell, Oxford

206 1980 LECTURES ON THE EDUCATIONAL THEORIES OF SPENCER AND DEWEY. In Phillips, D.Z. [Ed.] 'Education and Inquiry', p.81-141. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

207 1982 ART AND REALITY: John Anderson on Literature and Aesthetics. 1982. Ed. by Janet Anderson, Graham Cullum and Kimon Lycos. Hale and Iremonger, Sydney

208 1982 KENNETH GRAHAME. Art and Reality, p.157-161. [A very early paper, probably written in 1920. *]

209 1982 KIPLING. Art and Reality, p.163-170. [Reported in the Union Recorder, 9 July 1931.*]

210 1982 BIOGRAPHY. Art and Reality, p.47-49. [Notes dated 1 March 1932.*]

211 1982 GEORGE MEREDITH. Art and Reality, p.171-180. [Reported in the Union Recorder, 21 April 1932.*]

212 1982 EMPEROR AND GALILEAN. Art and Reality, p.147-156. [Reported in the Union Recorder, 5 May 1932. *]

213 1982 MUSIC AND EMOTION. Art and Reality, p.247-249. Reported in the Union Recorder, 28 July 1932.

214 1982 THE ENORMOUS ROOM. Art and Reality, p.181-186. Part of a Symposium on War Literature, 4 August 1932, reported in the Union Recorder, 11 August 1932.*]

215 1982 CLASSICISM VERSUS ROMANTICISM. Art and Reality, p.51-54. [Constructed from a draft dated 1932, and from connected notes.*]

216 1982 THE APPLECART. Art and Reality, p.123-125. [Mrs Anderson observes that this is an informal piece which was probably written in 1932.*]

217 1982 GEORGE BERNARD SHAW. Art and Reality, p.127-134. [Reported in the Union Recorder, 20 April 1933.*]

218 1982 H.G.WELLS. Art and Reality, p.187-194. [Reported in the Union Recorder, 20 July 1933.*]

219 1982 THOMAS LOVE PEACOCK. Art and Reality, p.195-203. [Reported in the Union Recorder, 19 April, 1934

220 1982 HERMAN MELVILLE. Art and Reality, p.205-212. [Reported in the Union Recorder, 19 July 1934.*]

221 1982 R.H. BENSON. Art and Reality. p.227-231. [Reported in the Union Recorder. 18 July 1935.*]

222 1982 FEODOR DOSTOEVSKY. Art and Reality, p.213-225. [Reported in the Union Recorder, 16 April, 1936.*]

223 1982 THE NATURE OF POETRY. Art and Reality. p.73-75

224 1982 JAMES JOYCE: 'FINNEGAN'S WAKE'. Art and Reality, p.113-116

225 1982 EXILES. Art and Reality. p.117-122

226 1982 THE DETECTIVE STORY. Art and Reality. p.233-240

227 1982 FURTHER QUESTIONS IN AESTHETICS: BEAUTY. In Art and Reality, p.263-269.

228 1987 LETTER TO THE ELECTORS, UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY. [Presenting as candidate for Chair of Philosophy]. Dialectic, No.30, 1987. Appendix I. p.144-5

229 1987 SOME PROBLEMS OF POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY. ms, possibly 1922, or later. Dialectic No.30, Appendix II. p.146-161. [See A.J.(Sandy) Anderson's note on p.161]

230 1991 ARE WE ANY HAPPIER? Heraclitus No.23, Oct., 1991, p.1-2.**

231 1991 IS THERE AN AUSTRALIAN PHILOSOPHY? Heraclitus No.23, Oct. 1991, p.2-3.**

232 1993 THE FALLACY OF OPTIMISM. Heraclitus No.32, Aug.1993, p.7.**

* These notes are derived from footnotes relating to each article in *ART AND REALITY*

** Many of Anderson's earlier works have been (and continue to be) re-printed in *Heraclitus,* and are not listed here.

PART II: **PUBLISHED MATERIAL ABOUT ANDERSON**
(excluding newspapers, other than approximately 10 significant articles)

(a) No author (arranged chronologically) Note: M = Mention only

No.	AUTHOR	DATE	DETAILS
401		1918	THE FALLACY OF OPTIMISM. Glasgow University Magazine. 27 February 1918. Reprinted in Heraclitus No.32, August 1933 p.7. [NOTE: This is possibly the first published account of a paper by Anderson on a philosophical subject.]
402		1927	PROFESSOR JOHN ANDERSON. Hermes, Vol.33, No.1, p.55 Lent 1927
403		1927	CHALLIS CHAIR OF PHILOSOPHY. Union Recorder 17/3/27, p.5
404		1930	AAPP REPORT: "ETHICAL INQUIRY". Union Recorder, 10/4/30. p.36
405		1930	UNION NIGHT NOTICE: "THE CENSORSHIP". Union Recorder, 3/7/30. p.134. [M]
406		1930	CENSORSHIP. Union Recorder, 17/7/30, p.5.
407		1930	REPORT [OR MONOGRAPH?]: "ULYSSES". Union Recorder, 23/10/30, p.281.
408		1931	LITERARY SOCIETY: REPORT OF MEETING 17/6/31. J.Anderson elected President for 1931. New constitution read and approved. Union Recorder 25/6/31, p.125 [M]
409		1931	LITERARY SOCIETY REPORT: "KIPLING". Union Recorder, 9/7/31, p.149
410		1933	LITERARY SOCIETY NOTICE: "H.G.WELLS". Union Recorder, 6/7/33, p.134 [M]
411		1935	FREETHOUGHT SOCIETY REPORT: "CENSORSHIP". Union Recorder 25/4/35, p.52
412		1935	FREETHOUGHT SOCIETY NOTICE. Union Recorder 13/6/35, p.102 [M]
413		1935	FREETHOUGHT SOCIETY NOTICE: "THE PEACE BALLOT". Union Recorder 4/7/35, p.132 [M]
414		1936	J. ANDERSON AT NEWCASTLE. Militant Vol.3, No.8. 1/11/36, p.5
414		1939	FREETHOUGHT SOCIETY REPORT: "TOTALITARIANISM". Union Recorder, 4/5/39. p.71-2

415	1940	LITERARY SOCIETY REPORT. Union Recorder 18/4/40, p.42 [M]
416	1945	LITERARY SOCIETY REPORT: "POETRY AND SOCIETY". Union Recorder 7/6/45. p.88-9
417	1947	NEF: "RELIGION IN EDUCATION" booklet: copies available. Union Recorder 8/5/47, p.72
418	1958	MACKIE APPOINTED TO CHAIR PHILOSOPHY, SYDNEY UNIVERSITY: TO SUCCEED JOHN ANDERSON. Union Recorder, 16/10/58, p.197 [M]
419	1959	EMERITUS PROFESSOR CONFERRED ON ANDERSON. Union Recorder 12/3/59, p.3 [M]
420	1960	FATHER AND SONS -- ANDERSON BETRAYED. Broadsheet No.7, August 1960, p4-5 [Re-printed from Honi Soit 7/9/50 p.3]
421	1961	JOHN ANDERSON ON ACADEMIC AUTONOMY & RELIGION. Broadsheet No.18, August 1961, p.2-6. After this account had been prepared for print, another account of Anderson's talk was published in *Honi Soit* 27/7/61.
422	1962	DOBELL PORTRAIT OF PROFESSOR JOHN ANDERSON Union Recorder 21/6/62, p.3
423	1977	DETAILS OF JOHN ANDERSON COMMEMORATION LECTURES AND CONFERENCE. Broadsheet No.89, March 1977, p.8
424	1977	REPORTS OF ANDERSON ON FREEDOM AND ON CENSORSHIP. Broadsheet No.91, June 1977, p.1-3. Re-printed from The Newcastle Morning Herald, October 5, 1936
425	1986	JOHN ANDERSON NOTICING THE SHAPE OF EDUCATION TO COME. Heraclitus No.5, January 1986, p.11
426	1986	RELIGION QUESTION AT UNI. Heraclitus No.5, January 1986, p.12
427	1986	JOHN ANDERSON NOTICING THE SHAPE OF EDUCATORS TO COME. Heraclitus No.5, January 1986, p.12
428	1994	REPORT OF THE JOHN ANDERSON CENTENARY CONFERENCE. Heraclitus No.34, January 1994. p.14

429 1994 JOHN ANDERSON : FIRST PAPER ON 'MIND AS FEELING'. Heraclitus, No.36, June 1944, p.4 [Reprint of Union Recorder report 7/5/31]

PUBLISHED MATERIAL ABOUT ANDERSON
(excluding newspapers, other than approximately 10 significant articles)

(b) Arranged alphabetically by author Note: M = Mention only

430 A.A. 1931 SCIENCE SOCIETY & AAPP NOTICE. Union Recorder 16/7/31, p.165

431 A.A. 1931 SCIENCE SOCIETY REPORT. Union Recorder 30/7/31, p.189

432 A.B. 1973 REPLY TO JOHN ANDERSON ON PROHIBITION [Workers Weekly, 14/9/28]. Broadsheet No.72, April 1973, p.7-8

433 ANDERSON,A.J. 1958 LETTER RE ORR CASE. Observer 1/11/58,p.597

434 1987 FOLLOWING JOHN ANDERSON. Dialectic, Vol. 30, 1987. Special Edition. p.129-143

435 ANDERSON, J. 1929 AAPP MEETING NOTICE. Union Recorder 4/7/29, p.127 [M]

436 ANDERSON, W. 1934 ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A REJOINDER. AJP, Vol.12(4). December 1934. p.289-295. [Discussion]

437 ANGLICAN, The 1961 See BROADSHEET No.18, August 1961, refers to 'The Anglican' 14/7/61.

438 ANON. 1959 PROPHET IN A GOWN. Nation 17/1/59, p.10-13 NOTE: According to an unpublished article by Janet C. Anderson, held in the Sydney University Archives, this article is quite unreliable.

439 ARMSTRONG, D.M. 1958 THE ANDERSONIANS in The Observer 4/10/58, p.535

440 1973 BELIEF, TRUTH AND KNOWLEDGE, Cambridge University Press [M]

441 1977 ON METAPHYSICS. Quadrant. Vol.21, No.7, July 1977. p.65-9

442 1983 AN INTELLECTUAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY, Part I. Quadrant, Vol.XXVII, No.1-2, Jan-Feb 1983. p.89-102

443 ARMSTRONG, D.M. [ctd] 1983 AN INTELLECTUAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY, Part II. Quadrant, Vol.XXVII, No.3, March 1983. p.68-78

444 ARNOLD, John & Deidre MORRIS [Eds] 1994 *Anderson, John*. In MONASH BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF 20th CENTURY AUSTRALIA. Reed Reference Publishing, Melbourne, p.9

445 ARTS JOURNAL 1927 PROFESSOR JOHN ANDERSON, MA. In The Arts Journal, Vol.10, No.1, Trinity Term 1927, p.4

446 BAKER, A.J. (?) 1991 LATEST VIEWS FROM THE PAST: 2 of Anderson's early writings 'ARE WE HAPPIER?' [The Sun, 12/4/31] and 'IS THERE AN AUSTRALIAN PHILOSOPHY?' [The Sunday Sun and Guardian, 24/3/35]. Heraclitus No.23, October 1991. p.1-3

447 BAKER, A.J. 1962 JOHN ANDERSON AND FREETHOUGHT. Australian Quarterly, Vol.XXXIV, No.4. December 1962. p.50-63

448 1969 THE ROLE OF UNREASON IN HISTORY. Australian Highway. December 1969. p.2-7

449 1975 SYDNEY LIBERTARIANISM AND THE PUSH. Broadsheet No.81, March, 1975, p.5-10

450 1975 COMMENT AND REPLY [to 3 letters also appearing in:] Broadsheet No.82, 1/5/75, p.82

551 1976 AUSTRALIAN THEMES. [Review of J.A. Passmore 'Commemorating John Anderson' in TLS 9 April 1976]. Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol.20. p.445-447

552 1977 MYTH-MAKING ABOUT ANDERSON. Broadsheet No.91, June 1977, p.6-9. Reprinted from AJPH, December 1976

553 1977 THE ETHICS OF MOORE AND ANDERSON. Dialectic, Vol.13, p.1-5

554 1977 Libertarianism, Sydney. In THE AUSTRALIAN ENCYCLOPAEDIA, Third Edition, Vol.4, p.6. The Grolier Society of Aust.

555 1978 ANDERSON'S SOCIAL AND ETHICAL THEORY. Broadsheet No.95, July 1978, p.1-6.

556 1979 ANDERSON'S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY: The Social Thought and Political Life of Professor John Anderson. Angus and Robertson, Australia.

557	BAKER, A.J. [ctd.]	1986	AUSTRALIAN REALISM: The Systematic Philosophy of John Anderson. Introduction by Anthony Quinton. Cambridge University Press
558		1987	ANDERSON AS A SYSTEMATIC REALIST. Heraclitus No.9, Jan. 1987, p.1-5
559		1987	ANDERSON'S SOCIAL AND ETHICAL THEORY. Dialectic, Vol.30, 1987. Special Edition. p.78-84
560		1988	THE ANDERSONIANS in Heraclitus No. 15, 1/4/88, p.5-11 [Re Kamenka's article in Quadrant, July 1987: The Andersonians: Philosophy and Criticism in Australia']
561		1993	ANDERSON'S INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND AND INFLUENCES, Pt.I.Heraclitus, No.33, p.4-13
562		1994	ANDERSON'S INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND AND INFLUENCES, Pt.II, Heraclitus, No.34, January 1994. p.1-5
563		1994	ANDERSONIANS AND THE LITERARY SOCIETY, Part I. Heraclitus, August 1994.
564		1994	ANDERSONIANS AND THE LITERARY SOCIETY 1934-1936. Heraclitus, November 1994
565		1995	ANDERSON IN RETROSPECT. [Concluding paper presented on 3 November 1993 at the John Anderson Centenary Conference in Sydney University.] Amended version In 'Heraclitus' No.39, January, 1995
566	BARTON, Gordon	1987	RECOLLECTIONS. In Curthoys, Ann, W.Martin & Tim Rowse [Eds]. AUSTRALIANS FROM 1939. Fairfax, Syme and Weldon Associates. See Esp. p.381.
567	BASS, R.G.	1931	AAPP REPORT: "MIND AS FEELING". Union Recorder 7/5/31, p.75
568		1931	AAPP NOTICE. Union Recorder, 5/11/31. p.317. [M]
569		1932	AAPP NOTICE: BENTHAM CENTENARY "UTILITARIANISM". Union Recorder 9/6/32, p.119. [M]
570	BEDDIE, B.	1939	PHILOSOPHY CLUB REPORT. Union Recorder 22/6/39, p.110 [M]
571	BEILHARZ,P.	1992	JOHN ANDERSON AND THE SYNDICALIST MOVEMENT: Address to APSA Conference

572 BEILHARZ,P. [ctd] 199? SYDNEY'S SON. ALR DEC92/JAN93. p.36-38

573 BENNETT, E.A. 193 CHRISTIAN UNION REPORT: ON "Communism". Union Recorder, 16/7/31, p.164

574 BENNETT, J. 195? THE NUMBER OF LOGICAL FORMS. AJP, Vol.30(4). December 1952. p.177-187

575 BIRCHALL,B. 196? ANDERSON'S POSITIVE ETHICS. Dialectic, Vol.3, 1969. p.46-62

576 197? EDITORIAL NOTE and INTRODUCTION. Dialectic, Vol.14, 1977. Special Edition. p.i-v; Bibliography p.61-62

577 1973 JOHN ANDERSON'S SOCIAL/POLITICAL THEORIES. AJPH, Vol.XXIV, 1978. p.52-60

578 1978 JOHN ANDERSON AND THE FALSE PROPOSITION. Dialectic Vol. 13, 1977, p.1-15. Republished 1987.

579 1983 THE PROBLEM OF FORM: HEGEL AND ANDERSON. International Studies in Philosophy, January 1983. p.15-40

580 1987 JOHN ANDERSON AND THE FALSE PROPOSITION. Dialectic, Vol. 30, 1987, Special Edition. p.96-108

581 BIRCHALL, B.& EVANS,N. [Eds] 1977 DIALECTIC, Vol.14, 1977. Special Issue: ANDERSON ON EDUCATION

582 BISHOP, A.W. 1977 A FEW OF JOHN ANDERSON'S REMARKS Broadsheet, No.91, June 1977, p.3-6

583 BOWLER, F.K. 1933 LITERARY SOCIETY REPORT: GEORGE BERNARD SHAW. Union Recorder 20/4/33, p.46.

584 1933 LITERARY SOCIETY REPORT: H.G. WELLS. Union Recorder, 20/7/33. p.145-6

585 BRENNAN, A.E. 1936 CLASSICAL SOCIETY REPORT: "CLASSICAL EDUCATION". Union Recorder 30/7/36, p.162-3

586 BRITTON, J.M. 1932 LIT.SOCY.: REPORT : IBSEN'S "EMPEROR & GALILEAN". Union Recorder 5/5/32, p.84

587 BROWN, Robert & 1963 CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY IN AUSTRALIA. George Allen & C.D.Rollins [Eds] Unwin Ltd. London. [M]

588 BROWN, B.C. & J.A.P. 193? LITERARY SOCIETY REPORT. Union Recorder 12/4/34

589	BROWN, B.C. & J.A.P. [ctd]	1934	LITERARY SOCIETY NOTICE: "THOMAS LANE [sic] PEACOCK", Union Recorder 12/4/34, p.46
590		1935	LITERARY SOCIETY NOTICE. Union Recorder 4/4/35, p.28 [M]
591	BUCKLEY, Vincent	1962	Intellectuals. In Coleman, P. [Ed.] AUSTRALIAN CIVILISATION. F.W.Cheshire, Melbourne. p.89-104, esp. p.101.
592		1966	Unequal Twins: A Discontinuous Analysis. In *Literary Culture*. In DAVIDSON, Jim [Ed.] THE SYDNEY-MELBOURNE BOOK. Allen and Unwin, Sydney.
593	BULLETIN	1943	PERSONAL ITEMS, in The Bulletin 14/4/43, p.9
594	BURNEYEAT, M.F.	1976	PROTAGORAS AND SELF-REFUTATION IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS. The Philosophical Review, Vol.LXXXV, 2. April, 1976.
595	CAMPBELL, J.W.	1931	LIT.SOCY.: REPORT : "SOME QUESTIONS IN AESTHETICS". Union Recorder, 12/11/31. p.326
596	COLEMAN, P.	n.d.	OBSCENITY BLASPHEMY SEDITION: Censorship in Australia. The Jacaranda Press, Brisbane [M]
597		1962	JOHN ANDERSON: RECOVERING FROM A STAMMER. Bulletin, 30/6/62. p.27-8
598		1994	MEMOIRS OF A SLOW LEARNER. An intimate personal and cultural memoir. Angus and Robertson, Sydney
599	COLEMAN, P. (ed.)	1977	QUADRANT, Vol.XXXI, No.6 June 1977, No.7, July 1977: **"FIFTY YEARS OF JOHN ANDERSON"**
600	COOPER, S.	1970	WHEN REICH AND ANDERSON WERE GOOD STALINISTS. Broadsheet No.61, July 1970, p.6-7
601		1970	A. SPENCER IN DEFENCE OF COMMUNISM: Pt.I. Broadsheet No.62, November 1970, p.9-11
602		1971	A. SPENCER IN DEFENCE OF COMMUNISM: Pt. II Broadsheet No.63, February 1971, p.8-9
603	CRITTENDEN,P.J.	1982	Review: ANDERSON, JOHN, EDUCATION AND INQUIRY. Ed.D.Z. Phillips. AJP 60/3; September 1982, p.299-302.

604	CUMMING, L.	1987	REVIEW: 'Australian Realism, The Systematic Philosophy of John Anderson', by A.J.Baker. Heraclitus, No.9, Jan. 1987, p.5-6
605		1987	RYLE ON LOGIC AND PROFESSOR ANDERSON. Dialectic, Vol.30, 1987, Special Edition. p.109-116
606		1987	THE ANDERSONIANS [Letter]. Quadrant, Vol. XXXI, No.9 September 1987, p.4
607		1989	A REMARKABLE PHILOSOPHICAL HYBRID: The Wisdom of the West. Quadrant, Jan-Feb. 1989, p.61-62
608	CUMMING, L.[Ed]	1987	DIALECTIC, Vol.30, 1987. SPECIAL ISSUE: ANDERSONIAN PAPERS
609	DAVIE, G.E.	1977	JOHN ANDERSON IN SCOTLAND. Quadrant, Vol.21, No.7, July 1977. p.55-57
610		1985	THE CRISIS OF THE DEMOCRATIC INTELLECT: The Problem of Generalism and Specialisation in Twentieth-Century Scotland. Polygon, Edinburgh.
611	DILMAN, Ilham	1983	FREUD AND HUMAN NATURE. Basil Blackwell
612	DOCKER, John	1974	AUSTRALIAN CULTURAL ELITIES: Intellectual Traditions in Sydney and Melbourne. Ch.8: John Anderson and the Sydney Freethought Tradition. p.131-155. Angus & Robertson
613	DONIELA, W.	1987	ANDERSON'S THEORY OF EDUCATION. Dialectic, Vol.30, 1987, Special Edition, p.63-77: Includes 'Bibliography to John Anderson's Writings on Education'.
614	EDDY, W.H.C.	1944	ETHICS AND POLITICS. AJP. Vol.22, p.70-92
615		1958	ETHICS AND POLITICS. In AUSTRALIAN HIGHWAY, Special Edition, September 1958. p.64-68
616		1969	E.H. BURGMANN: A TRIBUTE. The Australian Highway, February 1969. p.12-15.
617		1973	ADULT EDUCATION AND ITS INTELLECTUAL ENVIRONMENT: The 1972 John Anderson Memorial Lecture. In Quadrant, Jan/Feb. 1973. No.81, Vol.XVII, No.1. p.49-60.
618	EDWARDS, P. [Ed.]	1972	British Philosophy - Metaphysical Systems: ALEXANDER AND ANDERSON. In THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Vol.1, p.392-3. The Macmillan Company, New York

619	EDWARDS, P. [Ed.] [ctd]	1972	Philosophical Journals -- The Australasian Journal. In THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Vol.6, p.208. The Macmillan Company, New York.
620	FISCHER, R.	1975	LETTER re article by A.J.Baker 1/3/75. Broadsheet No.82. 1/5/75, p.4
622	FOULKES, P.	1987	IDLE PREMISSES. Dialectic, Vol.30, 1987, Special Edition. p.117
623	FOWLER, F.W.	1962	SOME ANDERSONIANS AND OTHERS ON JOHN ANDERSON. Bulletin, 30/6/62. p.30
624		1981	JOHN ANDERSON ON: HISTORY AND CONSCIOUSNESS. Heraclitus, No.3, June 1981, p.4-6
625		1993	THE ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY [Verbatim notes of address given by Anderson]. Heraclitus No.32, August 1993, p.1-5
626		1993	FREETHOUGHT. [Verbatim notes of address given by Anderson]. Heraclitus, No.32, August 1993, p.5-7
627		1993	ANDERSON IN THE 1930's [reprint of paper presented at 1977 Conference at Bundanoon] Heraclitus, No.33, October 1977, p.1-4
628		1994	JOHN ANDERSON : PSYCHOANALYSIS [Verbatim notes of address by John Anderson to SU Freethought Society social group 1/10/31]. Heraclitus No.35, March 1994, p.3-4
629		1995	JOHN ANDERSON: WHAT IS SOCIAL FASCISM? [Verbatim notes of talk by John Anderson at Sydney University, July 1930]
630		1994	JOHN ANDERSON : SOCIALISM [Notes taken by Ruth Walker of paper presented by John Anderson to AAPP Congress, Melbourne, May 1939]. Heraclitus No.35, March 1994, p.4-6
631	FOX, A.C.	1929	AN EXAMINATION OF REALISM. AJP,Vol.7(4). December 1929. p.278-285 [Discussion]
632	FUREDY, J.J.	1988	ON THE RELEVANCE OF PHILOSOPHY FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH Australian Journal of Psychology, January 1988.
633		1989	ON THE RELEVANCE OF PHILOSOPHY FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH Australian Psychologist. March 1989

634 GARNSEY, D. 1985 ARTHUR GARNSEY: A Man for Truth and Freedom. Kingsdale Press, Sydney.

635 GARTON, Stephen 1983 Freud and the Psychiatrists: The Australian Debate 1900 to 1940. *In* Head, Brian and James Walter [Eds]: INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENTS AND AUSTRALIAN SOCIETY. Oxford University Press, Melbourne. See esp. p.171

636 GASKING,D.A.T. 1949 ANDERSON AND THE TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS, AJP Vol.27, No.1, p.1-26

637 GIBSON, A.Boyce 1939 ETHICS AND LOGIC. AJP, Vol.17(4). December 1939. p.251-5 [Discussion]

638 1962 PASSIONATE PHILOSOPHER [Review of SIEP] Sydney Morning Herald 17/11/62

639 GILBERT, Alan 1982 The Roots of Australian Anti-Suburbanism. In Goldberg, S.L. and F.B.Smith [Eds], AUSTRALIAN CULTURAL HISTORY. Cambridge University Press. See esp. p.44.

640 GINNANE, W. 1962 JOHN ANDERSON'S BOOK. [Review of SIEP] Bulletin 20/10/62

641 GOLLAN, Robin 1975 REVOLUTIONARIES AND REFORMISTS: Communism and the Australian Labour Movement 1920-1955. George Allen & Unwin, Sydney. [M]

642 GRAVE, S.A. 1976 PHILOSOPHY IN AUSTRALIA SINCE 1958. Sydney University Press. See esp. p.3

643 1976 PHILOSOPHY IN AUSTRALIA SINCE 1958. Sydney University Press.

644 1977 Philosophy. In THE AUSTRALIAN ENCYCLOPAEDIA, Third Edition, Vol.4, p.521-523. The Grolier Society of Aust.

645 1980 Australia. In BURR, J.R.[Ed.]. HANDBOOK OF WORLD PHILOSOPHY: Contemporary Developments since 1945. Greenwood Press, Connecticut, p.215-216. [M]

646 1984 A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN AUSTRALIA. Ch.3: John Anderson. p.47-69. University of Queensland Press.

647 GREEN. N & F.K.B. 1933 LITERARY SOCIETY REPORT. Union Recorder 13/4/33, p.40 [M]

648 GROLIER SOCIETY 1977 Anderson, John. In THE AUSTRALIAN ENCYCLOPAEDIA, Third Edition. Vol.1. p.124. The Grolier Society of Aust.

649 HAMLYN, David 1991 WITTGENSTEIN: Attention to Particulars. Ed.D.Z.Phillips and Peter Winch. In PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, Vol.14, No.4, October 1991, p.342-350; c.f. p.343-5

650 HAMMOND, T.C. 1943 CANON T.C. HAMMOND EXPOSES FALSE ATTITUDE OF PROFESSOR ANDERSON. The Watchman. June 1943. Vol.3(5). p.5,9,11,19

651 1944 ABOLISHING GOD: A Reply to Professor John Anderson. S.John Bacon, Melbourne

652 HARRIES,O. [Ed] 1953 LETTER RE D.ARMSTRONG'S REVIEW in 'Australian Highway'. Observer 18/10/58. p.566

653 1953 AUSTRALIAN HIGHWAY (Journal of the Workers Educational Association). Special Edition, Sept.1958: ANDERSON AND ANDERSONIANISM.

654 HARRIES, O. 1974 W.H.C.EDDY. Quadrant, Vol.18, No.1. Feb.1974. p.72

655 HEAD, Brian 1988 Introduction: Intellectuals. In Head Brian, and James Walter [Eds]. INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENTS AND AUSTRALIAN SOCIETY. Oxford Univ'y Press, Melbourne. esp. p.2.

656 HELU, 'I.F. 1992 ANDERSON, HERACLITUS, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE. The Australian Journal of Anthropology, 1992 Vol.3, Nos.1&2, Special Issue 3. p.22-31.

657 HEMPENSTALL, 1993 THE MEDDLESOME PRIEST: A life of Ernest Burgmann. Allen Peter and Unwin.

658 HENTZE, M. 1931 SOCIETY FOR FREETHOUGHT [Included because it is the first mention of the Freethought Society in the Union Recorder] Union Recorder 17/9/31, p.241

659 1932 LITERARY SOCIETY REPORT: "GEORGE MEREDITH". Union Recorder, 21/4/32. p.64

660 1932 LITERARY SOCIETY REPORT. Symposium. Cummings' "ENORMOUS ROOM". Union Recorder, 11/8/32, p.206-7

661 HERBST, Peter 1952 THE NATURE OF FACTS: A REPLY TO MR. MACKIE. AJP, Vol.30. August 1952. p.90-116

662 HIATT, L.R. 1985 MAIDENS, MALES, AND MARX. *In* OCEANIA, Vol. 56, No.1, Sept. 1985, p.34-46; c.f. esp. p.46

663 1987 FREUD AND ANTHROPOLOGY. In Austin-Broos, Diane J. CREATING CULTURE. Allen & Unwin, Sydney.

664	HOLLAND, J.A.B.	1973	A SYSTEM OF CLASSICAL ATHEISM. Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol.26, p.271-294
665	HOPE, A.D.	1943	THE MEANING OF GOOD. AJP, Vol.21(1). June 1943, p.17-26 [Discussion]
666		1992	CHANCE ENCOUNTERS, Melbourne University Press, p.51-53 [M]
667	HORNE, Donald	1946	JOHN ANDERSON: University's stubborn no-man. Daily Telegraph, 14/9/46.
668		1958	ON THE FRINGE. Observer, No.21, 29/11/58. p.652-3
669		1962	SOME ANDERSONIANS AND OTHERS ON JOHN ANDERSON. Bulletin, 84:29-30. 30 June 1962. p.29-30
670		1972	THE AUSTRALIAN PEOPLE: Biography of a Nation. Angus and Robertson, Sydney. [M]
671		1983	THE EDUCATION OF YOUNG DONALD. Penguin Books. [M] See esp. 173ff.
672		1993	MATES IN THE EMPIRE. In Arnold, John; Peter Spearrit and David Walker [Eds]. OUT OF EMPIRE: The British Dominion of Australia. Mandarin Australia.
673	HORNIBROOK, T.E.	1931	FREETHOUGHT IN AUSTRALIA: PROF.JOHN ANDERSON AND HIS CRITICS. The Freethinker, 27/9/31. p.612-613
674	HUNT, T.A.	1932	MUSICAL SOCIETY REPORT: "MUSIC AND EMOTION". Union Recorder, 28/7/32, p.188
675	HUNTER, T.A.	1929	THEORY AND PRACTICE IN MORALS. AJP, Vol.7(1). Mar. 1929. p.50-55. [Discussion]
676		1930	THEORY AND PRACTICE IN MORALS: A REJOINDER. AJPP.Vol.8 No.1, March 1930. p.56-58
677	HUTLEY, F.C.	1962	SOME ANDERSONIANS & OTHERS ON JOHN ANDERSON. Bulletin 84:29-30. 30 June 1962. p.30
678		1987	ANDERSON AND LAW: A Short Comment. Dialectic, Vol.30, 1987, Special Edition. p36-39
679	I...,D.S.[DSI]	1958	ANDERSON ON EDUCATION (re Murray Report). Broadsheet No.3 May 1958, p.6
680	INGLIS, K.S.	1962	The Daily Papers. In Coleman, P. [Ed.] AUSTRALIAN CIVILISATION. F.W.Cheshire, Melbourne. p.145-175, esp. p.156

681	ISAACS, M.	1978	ANDERSON IN THE 1930's. Broadsheet No.94. January 1978. p.9-10. Reprinted in Dialectic, Vol.30, 1987.
682		1987	ANDERSON IN THE 1930's. Dialectic, Vol.30, 1987, Special Edition, p.24-35
683	IVISON, D.J.	1977	ANDERSON AS A LIBERATOR. Broadsheet No.91, June 1977 p.9-10. Reprinted in 'Dialectic' Vol.30, 1987.
684		1987	ANDERSON AS A LIBERATOR. Dialectic, Vol.30 1987, Special Edition. p.7-10
685	JAMES, Clive	1990	UNRELIABLE MEMOIRS. Quality Paperbacks Direct, London.[M]
686	JOBSON, Sandra	1970	THE WISE MEN WHO FOUND NEW KIND OF WISDOM. Sydney Morning Herald, 27 Aug. 1970. p.13
687	JONES, Margaret	1962	OUR MOST CONTROVERSIAL PROFESSOR. Sydney Morning Herald, 8 July 1962, p.67
688	KAMENKA, E.	1977	ON EDUCATION. Quadrant, Vol.21, No.7. July 1977. p.47-54
689		1980	ANDERSON ON EDUCATION AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM in D.Z. Phillips [Ed]. EDUCATION AND INQUIRY. p.18-40. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. [Revised version of an article first published in 'Quadrant' July 1977]
690		1985	PHILOSOPHY AND THE UNIVERSITY. Dialectic, Vol.25, 1985. p.26-39
691		1986	John Anderson. In Kramer, Leonie et al [Eds]. THE GREATS: The 50 Men and Women Who Most Helped to Shape Modern Australia. Angus and Robertson.
692		1987	THE ANDERSONIANS: Philosophy and Criticism in Australia Quadrant, Vol.XXXI, No.7, July 1987. p.60-64
693	KELLY, M.	1939	LITERARY SOCIETY REPORT: "LITERATURE AND LIFE". Union Recorder 20/4/39, p.53
694	KEMP, David	1988	Liberalism and Conservatism in Australia. In Head, Brian and James Walter [Eds]. INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENTS AND AUSTRALIAN SOCIETY. Oxford University Press, Melbourne. Esp. p.330.
695	KENNEDY, B.	1992	JOHN ANDERSON AND MARXISM. The Australian Journal of Anthropology, 1992, Vol.3 Nos.1 & 2; Special Issue 3. p.55-66

696	KENNEDY, Brian	1955	A PASSION TO OPPOSE: JOHN ANDERSON, PHILOSOPHER. Melbourne University Press.
697	KERSHAW, J.	1937	LITERARY SOCIETY REPORT: '"AUSTRALIAN CULTURE". Union Recorder 14/10/37, p.228
698	KORNER, S.	1963	ANDERSON'S PHILOSOPHY OF EXPERIENCE. Quadrant, Vol.VII No.2. p.69-71. [Review of SIEP]
699	LIBERTARIAN	1957	ON LIBERTARIANISM in Libertarian No. 1, p.3
700		1957	RESPONSE in Libertarian No. 1, p.35-39
701	LYNN, E.	1962	SOME ANDERSONIANS AND OTHERS ON JOHN ANDERSON. Bulletin, 84:29-30. 30 June 1962. p.29
702	M... D.H. [DHM]	1956	AAPP NOTICE: CENTENARY OF FREUD'S BIRTH "THE NIGHTMARE" Union Recorder 28/6/56, p.111 [M]
703	MACKIE, J.L.	1936	FREETHOUGHT SOCIETY REPORT: "CENSORSHIP". Union Recorder, 21/5/36, p.96
704		1936	FREETHOUGHT SOCIETY REPORT. Union Recorder 29/10/36. [M]
705		1937	FREETHOUGHT SOCIETY REPORT: "CENSORSHIP AND THE MONARCHY". Union Recorder 15/4/37, p.43
706		1937	FREETHOUGHT SOCIETY REPORT: "THE NEW EDUCATION". Union Recorder, 16/9/37. p.189
707		1937	FREETHOUGHT SOCIETY REPORT: "WHY BOLSHEVISM FAILED". Union Recorder 30/9/37, p.204
708		1951	LOGIC AND PROF. ANDERSON. AJP. Vol.29. August 1951. p.109-113
709		1952	THE NATURE OF FACTS. AJP, Vol.30, August 1952. p.116-123
710		1958	ANDERSON'S THEORY OF EDUCATION. In AUSTRALIAN HIGHWAY Special Edition, September 1958. p.61-64
711		1958	Philosophy. In THE AUSTRALIAN ENCYCLOPAEDIA, Vol.7. Angus and Robertson. p.96-100
712		1962	JOHN ANDERSON. AJP, Vol.40(1), April 1962. p.124-126

713	MACKIE, J.L. [ctd]	1962	THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN ANDERSON. AJP, Vol.40(3), December 1962. p.265-282
714		1965	RATIONALISM AND EMPIRICISM. AJP, Vol.43. May 1965. p.1-12
715		1974	THE CEMENT OF THE UNIVERSE. Clarendon Press, Oxford. [M]
716		1980	ANDERSON'S THEORY OF EDUCATION in D.Z.Phillips (Ed.) EDUCATION AND INQUIRY. p.11-17. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. [NOTE: First appeared in Special Edition of 'Australian Highway', September 1958]
717		1982	Review: Baker, A.J.: ANDERSON'S SOCIAL REALISM: THE SOCIAL THOUGHT AND POLITICAL LIFE OF PROFESSOR JOHN ANDERSON. In AJP, 60/2, June 1982. p.175-177.
718	MACKIE, M.D.	1934	FREETHOUGHT SOCIETY REPORT, AND NOTICE "GOD AND THE STATE". Union Recorder 19/4/34, p.48
719		1935	PUBLIC QUESTIONS SOCIETY REPORT: "TROTSKY AND THE SOVIET UNION". Union Recorder 25/7/35, p.158-9
720	MADDOCK, K.	1966	PLURALISM AND ANARCHISM. In Red and Black, No.2, 1966. p.6-22
721		1973	THE AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINES: A Portrait of their Society. Allen Lane The Penguin Press. See esp.p.192-193
722		1992	AFFINITIES AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES: JOHN ANDERSON AND A.R. RADCLIFFE-BROWN IN SYDNEY. The Australian Journal of Anthropology, 1992, Vol.3, Nos.1 & 2. Special Issue 3. p.3-18
723		1992	SONGS OF FAMOUS MEN. The Australian Journal of Anthropology, 1992, Vol.3, Nos.1&2; Special Issue 3. p.19-21
724		1992	JOHN ANDERSON AND SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY. Heraclitus No.25, March 1992. p.3-4
725	MADDOCK, K. & THIELE, S. [Guest Eds]	1992	THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY: JOHN ANDERSON AND SOCIAL INQUIRY. 1992. Vol.3 Nos. 1&2; Special Issue 3. Guest Editors and Introduction, p.1-2. Anthropological Society of New South Wales, Sydney.

726 MANTON, Joyce 1935 COMMUNIST PHILOSOPHY : A REPLY TO PROFESSOR ANDERSON Proletariat, Apr-Jun, 1935. p.21-25

727 MARTIN, D.R. 1932 FREETHOUGHT SOCIETY REPORT. Union Recorder 14/4/32, p.56. [M]

728 MAZE, J.R. 1953 ON SOME CORRUPTIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF HOMEOSTASIS in Psychological Review, Vol.60, No.6, p.405-412

729 1954 DO INTERVENING VARIABLES INTERVENE? in Psychological Review, Vol.61, No.4, p.226-234

730 1982 WORDSWORTH! STOP THAT DRIVELLING. Review of 'Art and Reality'. 31/7/82.

731 1987 JOHN ANDERSON : IMPLICATIONS OF HIS PHILOSOPHIC VIEWS FOR PSYCHOLOGY. Dialectic, Vol.30, 1987, Special Edition p.50-59

732 1994 LETTER. Heraclitus, No.34, Jan. 1994. p.9

733 McAULEY,James 1962 SOME ANDERSONIANS AND OTHERS ON JOHN ANDERSON. Bulletin 84:29-30. 30 June 1962. p.29

734 1975 COMMENTARY: SIR JOHN KERR. Quadrant, Vol.XX No.1, January 1976. p.25-28

735 McCALLUM, D.M. 1953 ANDERSON AND FREETHOUGHT. The Australian Highway. Special Edition, September 1958. p.71-75

736 1962a SOME ANDERSONIANS AND OTHERS ON JOHN ANDERSON. Bulletin 84:29-30. 30 June 1962. p.30

737 1962b THE STATE OF LIBERTY. *In* P. Coleman [Ed.] AUSTRALIAN CIVILISATION. p.26-46, esp.p.45

738 1963 PROFESSOR JOHN ANDERSON ... And his influence on student politics. Honi Soit, 1/5/63, p.3

739 McDOWELL, John 1991 JOHN LESLIE MACKIE, 1917-1981. *In* The Proceedings of the British Academy. Vol.76. p.487-498.

740 McINTOSH, G.F. 1929 AAPP NOTICE in Hermes, Michaelmas Term 1929, Vol.35, No.3, p.110

741 McINTOSH, G.F.1929 AAPP REPORT: SYDNEY LOCAL BRANCH SOCIETY. [ctd] Union Recorder 18/7/29, p.142 [M]

742 1929 AAPP NOTICE: "LENIN AS PHILOSOPHER". Union Recorder 1/8/29, p.159. [M]

743 1930 AAPP REPORT ANNUAL MEETING. Union Recorder 10/4/30, p.35

744 McINTYRE, J. 1948 FREETHOUGHT AND CHRISTIANITY. [Being Two Addresses delivered by Prof. J.McIntyre, M.A., B.D., to the Student Christian Movement in the University of Sydney, on 27/9/48 and 6/10/48] (No Publication details on pamphlet)

745 McKNIGHT, David 1994 AUSTRALIA'S SPIES AND THEIR SECRETS. Allen & Unwin.

746 McLAUGHLIN, Robert 1989 Review: Baker, A.J. AUSTRALIAN REALISM: The Systematic Philosophy of John Anderson. AJP 67/1, March 1989. p.93-95

747 MELLEUISH, Gregory 1989 Book Reviews (3 books). In Australian Journal of Politics and History. Vol.35. p.294-7.

748 MERRYLEES, W.A. 1929 SOME FEATURES OF PROFESSOR ANDERSON'S LOGIC. AJP, Vol.7. No.2. June 1929. p.130-138. [Discussion]

749 1929 PARTICIPATION. II. : The Logical Significance of Participation. AJPP, Vol.7(3). September 1929. p.188-203

750 MILLER, E.V. 1929 THE WORLD OF TRUTH AND THE WORLD OF ENJOYMENT, AJPP Vol.7(3). September 1929. p.161-176.

751 MILLER, Rhys A. 1939 SOME IMPLICATIONS OF MORALITY. AJP, Vol.17(1). May 1939 p.40-54. [Discussion]

752 1939 LOGIC AND ETHICS. AJP. Vol.17(2), August 1939. p.158-163 [Discussion]

753 MOLESWORTH, V. 1953 LANDMARKS IN LOGIC. The Law Book Company, Sydney. [M] With Foreword by W.H.C.Eddy.

754 MOLNAR, G. 1962 EMPIRICISM AND LANGUAGE. Hermes, 1962. p.3-7

755 MORISON,W.L. 1977 ANDERSON AND LEGAL THEORY. Sydney Law Review. Vol.8 No.2 p.294-304

756 1985 LAW AND IMAGES OF HISTORY : A REMINISCENCE. in The Sydney Law Review, Vol.11, No.1, March 1986, p.114-133

757	MORISON,W.L. [ctd]	1987	ANDERSON AND LEGAL THEORY. Dialectic, Vol.30, 1987. Special Edition. p.40-49
758		1994	ANDERSON, POLITICS AND POPULISM. Heraclitus No.34, Janury 1994, p.1-5
759	MORRIS, E.	1979	THE PATRIARCHIAL PUSH. Quadrant, Jan-Feb. 1979. p.74-77
760	MOUNCE, H.O.	1989	Anderson on Generality. In WITTGENSTEIN: ATTENTION TO PARTICULARS. Ed. D.Z.Phillips and Peter Winch. St. Martin's Press, New York. p.61-73
761	MOYES, M.	1935	FREETHOUGHT SOCIETY REPORT, AND NOTICE "CENSORSHIP". Union Recorder, 11/4/35, p.36 [M]
762	NIELD, Bruce	1959	THE ANDERSONIANS. Century, 13/2/59. p.6
763	OLDING, A.	1983	JOHN ANDERSON AND RELIGION. Philosophical Investigations Vol.6, p.200-213
764		1987	SPACE, TIME AND ATHEISM. Dialectic, Vol.30, 1987, Special Edition. p.118-128
765		1992	THE LAW OF THE EXCLUSIVE MUDDLE: CATEGORIES AND SOCIAL THEORY. The Australian Journal of Anthropology, 1992, Vol.3, Nos.1&2; Special Issue 3. p.43-54
766	O'NEIL, W.M.	1934	MIND AS FEELING? AJP, Vol.12(4). December 1934. p.280-7
767		1958	SOME NOTES ON ANDERSON'S PSYCHOLOGY. The Australian Highway. Special Edition. September 1958. p.69-71
768		1979	Anderson, John. In Nairn, Bede and Geoffrey Serle [Eds] AUSTRALIAN DICTIONARY OF BIOGRAPHY, Vol.VII, 1891-1939 pp.56-59. Melbourne University Press.
769		1987	PSYCHOLOGY: ANOTHER VIEW. Dialectic, Vol.30, 1987, Special Edition. p.60-62
770		1987	Letter re Bill Morrison's "Horne's Anderson" in Broadsheet No. 8, July 1986, p.13. HERACLITUS No.12, August 1987, p.13
771	PARKER, I.	1975	LETTER re article by A.J.Baker 1/3/75, in Broadsheet No.82, 1/5/75, p.4
772	PHP[?PARTRIDGE]	1942	AAPP NOTICE: "LIBERAL EDUCATION". Union Recorder, 13/8/42, p.142. [M]

773 PARTRIDGE, P.H. 1952 The Contribution of Philosophy and History. In ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF THE FACULTY OF ARTS. Angus & Robertson Ltd., Sydney. p.59-80 [M]

774 1953 ANDERSON AS EDUCATOR. In AUSTRALIAN HIGHWAY, Special Edition, September 1958, p.49-52

775 1980 ANDERSON AS EDUCATOR *In* D.Z.Phillips (Ed.) EDUCATION AND INQUIRY, p.3-10. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. [NOTE: First appeared in Special Issue of 'Australian Highway' September, 1958]

776 PASSMORE,J.A. 1934 LITERARY SOCIETY REPORT: "THOMAS LOVE PEACOCK". Union Recorder 19/4/34, p.58

777 1934 LITERARY SOCIETY REPORT: "HERMAN MELVILLE" Union Recorder 19/7/34, p.155-6.

778 1937 AAPP NOTICE: "EDUCATIONAL REFORM". Union Recorder 6/5/37 [M]

779 1939 AAPP NOTICE: 4 LECTURES ON "SAMUEL ALEXANDER". Union Recorder 27/4/39, p.64 [M]

780 1940 AAPP NOTICE: "PHILOSOPHY AND FREUD". Union Recorder 25/7/40, p.186. [M]

781 1941 AAPP NOTICE: "MARXISM" ('Man & Society') Union Recorder 19/6/41, p.95. [M]

782 1942 AAPP NOTICE: "PSYCHOANALYSIS AND RELIGION" Union Recorder 13/8/42, p.142 [M]

783 1943 AAPP NOTICE: "THE SERVILE STATE". Union Recorder 7/10/43, p.181 [M]

784 1944 AAPP NOTICE: ANNUAL CONGRESS "THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION" Union Recorder 3/8/44, p.122 [M]

785 1961 PHILOSOPHICAL REASONING. Duckworth, London. p.viii and ix. [M]

786 1962 JOHN ANDERSON AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHY. Introductory Essay in ANDERSON, J.: STUDIES IN EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY, pp.ix-xxiv. Angus & Robertson, Sydney.

787 1962 THE PHILOSOPHER'S TASK. The Australian Highway 43(1). July 1962. p.3-11

788	PASSMORE, J.A. [ctd]	1963	PHILOSOPHY, in McLEOD, A.L. (Ed.) THE PATTERN OF AUSTRALIAN CULTURE. Cornell University Press, New York p.131-169, esp. p.133, 148ff.
789		1970	PHILOSOPHICAL REASONING. 2nd Edition. Duckworth, London.
790		1972	Anderson, John. In Paul Edwards [Ed] THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Vol.1, p.119-121. The Macmillan Co. N.Y.
791		1975	The Making of an Australian Philosopher. In Mercier, A. and M. Svilar [Eds]. PHILOSOPHERS ON THEIR OWN WORK. Verlag Herbert Lang. Bern & Frankfurt. p.147-172. [M]
792		1975	COMMEMORATING JOHN ANDERSON. Times Literary Supplement, 9 April 1976. p.416
793		1977	ANDERSON AS A SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHER. Quadrant, Vol.21 No.6, June 1977. p.48-53
794		1978	A HUNDRED YEARS OF PHILOSOPHY. 2nd edn. Penguin Books. p.viii and ix. [M]
795		1985	TEACHER. Review of Australian Realism: The Systematic Philosophy of John Anderson, by A.J. Baker. London Review of Books, 4/9/86
796	PHILLIPS, D.Z.	1980	EDUCATION AND INQUIRY: John Anderson. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
797	PHILLIPS, D.Z. & Peter WINCH [Eds.]	1989	WITTGENSTEIN: ATTENTION TO PARTICULARS. Essays in honour of Rush Rhees (1905-1989). St. Martin's Press, New York. See esp. 'Anderson on Generality' by H.O.Mounce, p.61-73
798	POOLE, Ross	1964	THE SYDNEY LINE. Sydney Morning Herald, 30/6/64
799	POST, G.	1975	LETTER re article by A.J.Baker 1/3/75, in Broadsheet No.82, 1/5/75. p.4
800	PRIOR, Arthur N.	1944	THE MEANING OF GOOD. AJP, Vol.22(3). December 1944. p.170-174 [Discussion]
801		1945	THE SUBJECT OF ETHICS. AJP, Vol.23(1-3). December 1945. p.78-84. [Discussion]
802		1952	THIS QUARTER. Landfall, Vol.SIX. No.ONE. March 1952. p.49-53
803	QUINTON, A.	1973	THE NATURE OF THINGS. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.

804 QUINTON, A. [ctd] 1982 THOUGHTS AND THINKERS. Duckworth, London.

805 1985 INTRODUCTION to Baker, A.J., AUSTRALIAN REALISM: The Systematic Philosophy of John Anderson. 1986. Cambridge University Press

806 RATH, A.F. 1935 LITERARY SOCIETY REPORT, AND NOTICE "DOSTOIEVSKI". Union Recorder 2/4/36, p.30. [M]

807 1935 LITERARY SOCIETY REPORT: "DOSTOEVSKI" [sic]. Union Recorder 16/4/36, p.46-8.

808 REINHARDT, L. 1980 OLYMPIAN PESSIMIST. Quadrant, Vol.24, April 1980. p.48-52

809 RHEES, Rush 1969 WITHOUT ANSWERS. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.

810 RIMOLDI, M. 1992 LOCAL KNOWLEDGE AND ANDERSONIAN REALISM. The Australian Journal of Anthropology, 1992, Vol.3, Nos.1&2; Special Issue 3; p.32-42

811 ROBINSON, Ian 1984 JOHN ANDERSON'S 'ART AND REALITY': Review. Philosophical Investigations, Vol.7, 1984. p.96-99

812 ROSE, T.A. 1958 LOGIC. The Australian Highway. Special Edition, September 1958. p.57-60

813 1958 LETTER RE "THE ANDERSONIANS". Observer 4/10/58. p.566

814 1977 ON LITERATURE. Quadrant, Vol.21, No.7. July 1977. p.58-63

815 1987 PREFACE. Dialectic, Vol.30, 1987, Special Edition. p.3-6

816 1987 SOME GENERAL FEATURES OF ANDERSON'S LOGIC. Dialectic, Vol.30, 1987, Special Edition, p.85-95

817 ROWSE, Tim 1973 AUSTRALIAN LIBERALISM AND NATIONAL CHARACTER. Kibble Books, Melbourne. p.32, 99, 215.

818 RUHLE, C. 1935 LITERARY SOCIETY REPORT: "THE PERFECT WAGNERITE". Union Recorder 18/4/35, p.43-4.

819 RYLE, Gilbert 1950 LOGIC AND PROF. ANDERSON. AJP. Vol.28(3). December 1950 p.137-153. Re-printed in COLLECTED ESSAYS, Vol.1, p.236-248. [c.f. Baker, 1986, p.123, n.13]

820 SAWER, Marian 1982 Political Manifestations of Libertarianism in Australia. In SAWER, M.[Ed.] AUSTRALIA AND THE NEW RIGHT. George Allen & Unwin, Sydney. p.1

821 SCHILLER,F.C.S. 1925 "THE ORIGIN OF BRADLEY'S SCEPTICISM" in MIND, Vol.35, p.217-223

822 1926 JUDGMENTS VERSUS PROPOSITIONS. Mind Vol.35, 1926. p.337-343

823 1927 THE TWO LOGICS. Mind, Vol.36,1927. p.64-68

824 SHORT, Laurie 1994 JOHN ANDERSON AS TROTSKYIST. Heraclitus, No.35, March 1994. p.1-3

825 SHORT, Susanna 1992 LAURIE SHORT: A Political Life. Allen & Unwin in association with Lloyd Ross Forum. [M]

826 SHRUBB, P 1962 SOME ANDERSONIANS AND OTHERS ON JOHN ANDERSON. Bulletin, 84:29-30. 30 June 1962. p.29

827 1983 JOHN ANDERSON AS LITERARY CRITIC. Quadrant, Vol.XXVII, No.1-2, Jan-Feb 1983. p.43-49

828 SIDGWICK, A. 1927 "LITERAL TRUTH". In MIND, Vol.36, p.61-63

829 SLEZAK, P. 1989 THE RELEVANCE OF PHILOSOPHY FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH. [Response]. Australian Journal of Psychology, March 1989

830 SMART, JJC 1976 THE PHILOSOPHICAL ANDERSONIANS. Quadrant. Vol.28(3). January 1976. p.6-10

831 1989 AUSTRALIAN PHILOSOPHERS OF THE 1950's. Quadrant, Vol.XXXIV, No.6, June 1989. p.35-39

832 SOUTER, G. 1977 OUR ONE AND ONLY GURU. Sydney Morning Herald 5/3/77. p.13

833 SRZEDNICKI, Jan and David WOOD [Eds] 1992 ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY IN AUSTRALIA. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.

834 STAVROPOULOS, P. 1992 CONSERVATIVE RADICAL: THE CONSERVATISM OF JOHN ANDERSON. The Australian Journal of Anthropology, 1992. Vol.3, Nos. 1&2, Special Issue 3. p.67-79.

835 STOUT, A.K. 1961-2 JOHN ANDERSON. AHRC Annual Report No.6. 1961-2. p.26-8

836 1975 JOHN ANDERSON. The Pauline. p.30-32

837 STOUT, G.F. 1944 A CRITICISM OF ALEXANDER'S THEORY OF MIND AND KNOWLEDGE. AJP Vol.22. September 1944. p.15-54

838 STOVE, D.C. 1952 A NOTE ON "RELATIVISM", AJP, Vol.30, December 1952. p.188-191

839 1962 JOHN ANDERSON AND CULTURAL FREEDOM IN AUSTRALIA. Free Spirit. May-June 1962. p.6-7

840 1977 THE FORCE OF INTELLECT. Quadrant, Vol.21, No.7, July 1977, p.45-46

841 1965 CRICKET VERSUS REPUBLICANISM AND OTHER ESSAYS. Quakers Hill Press, Sydney

842 SUTER, G. 1984 BIBLIOGRAPHIC STUDY ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN ANDERSON. Australian Historical Bibliography. Bulletin No.10, September 1984. AUSTRALIA 1788 - 1988. p.1-60

843 THIELE, S. 1992 ANDERSON AND AUTHORITARIANISM. The Australian Journal of Anthropology, 1992, Vol.3, Nos.1&2. Special Issue 3. p.100-119

844 THOMAS, M. 1989 AUSTRALIA IN MIND: Thirteen Influential Australian Thinkers. Hale and Iremonger, Sydney. [M]

845 TURNER, C. 1991 AUSTRALIA'S FIRST: History of The University of Sydney. Vol.1 1850 - 1939. Hale & Iremonger, Sydney

846 W..., G. [GW] 1953 ENGLISH ASSOCIATION REPORT: "LITERARY CRITICISM". Union Recorder 30/4/53, p.57.

847 WALKER, A.R. 1935 LITERARY SOCIETY REPORT: "R.H.BENSON". Union Recorder, 18/7/35, p.144.

848 1936 FREETHOUGHT SOCIETY REPORT: "SOCIAL SERVICE". Union Recorder 9/4/36, p.38-9

849 1936 FREETHOUGHT SOCIETY REPORT: "THE MOSCOW TRIALS". Union Recorder 8/10/36, p.209-10

850 1963 PROFESSOR JOHN ANDERSON ... And his influence on the student body. Honi Soit, 1 May 1963. p.3-4

851 1987 PUBLIC CONTROVERSIES AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM. Dialectic, Vol.30, 1987, Special Edition. p.11-23

852 WALSH, Thos 1930 SYDNEY VARSITY PROFESSOR GOES "RED": Open letter to Prof.J.Anderson. 20-pp Booklet.

853 WALTERS, R.S. 1958 AAPP NOTICE: "THE MURRAY REPORT". Union Recorder 24/4/58 p.47 [M]

854 WARD, J.K. 1937 LITERARY SOCIETY LIBRARY. Union Recorder 6/5/37, p.71 [M]

855 WARD, J.M. 1937 LITERARY SOCIETY REPORT: "ART AND MORALS". Union Recorder 29/4/37, p.62

856 1937 LITERARY SOCIETY NOTICE: "AUSTRALIAN CULTURE". Union Recorder, 30/9/37, p.203. [M]

857 WARREN, A.P. 1935 SOME PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS. Part 1: What is Realism? [Duplicated, Dec.1935]. Part 2: Is Perception "Pure"? [Duplicated, not dated]

858 WEBLIN, M. 1992 ANDERSON AND SOCIAL INQUIRY. The Australian Journal of Anthropology, 1992. Vol.3, Nos.1&2. Special Issue 3. p.80-99

859 "WELLWISHER" 1957 AN OPEN LETTER TO LIBERTARIANS. Libertarian No.1. p.33-35 [Note: This may be a re-construction of some things said by Anderson to some of his students. This information from A.J.Baker]

PART III: GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

(a) Books

Ackhoff, Russell. L., Shiv K. Gupta and J. Sayer Minas. 1962. Scientific Method: Optimizing Applied Research Decisions. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York.

Alexander, Samuel. 1966. Space, Time, and Deity. Macmillan, London.

Allendorfer, B. and C.A. Oakley. 1969. Principles of Mathematics, 3rd edition. McGraw Hill, New York.

Andrews, P.B. 1986. An Introduction to Mathematical Logic and Type Theory: To Truth Through Proof. Academic Press.

Aristotle. 1928. The Works of Aristotle. Trans. W.D. Ross. Oxford University Press, London.

_____ 1941. The Basic Works of Aristotle. [esp. *de Anima*]. Edited and Intro. by Richard McKeon. Random House, New York.

_____ 1964 Prior and Posterior Analytics. Trans. John Warrington. Everyman's Library, London.

Audi, Robert (ed.). 1995. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.

Averback, B. and O. Chein. 1980. Mathematics: Problem Solving Through Recreational Mathematics. W.H. Freeman & Co., San Francisco.

Bacon, Sir Francis. 1952. Advancement of Learning. Novum Organum. New Atlantis. William Benton, Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., Chicago.

Bak, Thor A. and J. Lichterberg. 1966. Mathematics for Scientists. W.A. Benjamin Inc., New York.

Baldwin, James Mark (ed.). 1960. Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. Peter Smith, Mass.

Barnes, Jonathan. 1987. Early Greek Philosophy. Penguin Classics, London.

Beck, L.J. 1952. The Method of Descartes : A Study of the *Regulae*. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Bell, R.C. 1969. Board and Table Games: from many civilisations. 2nd Edition. Oxford University Press, London.

Bell, J.L. and M. Machiver. 1977. A Course in Mathematical Logic. North Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam.

Berthon, Simon and Andrew Robinson. 1991. The Shape of the World. Guild Publishing, London.

Blakey, Joseph. 1959. University Mathematics. 2nd edition. Blackie & Son, London.

Blitzer, Charles. 1968. Age of Kings. Time-Life International, Nederlands. pp.140-142.

Boas, George. 1961. Rationalism in Greek Philosophy. Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore.

Boas, Marie. 1962. The Scientific Renaissance 1450-1630. Collins, London.

Bourbake, N. 1966. Elements of Mathematics: General Topology. Addison-Wesley, Massechutus.

Bowen, Earl K. 1980. Mathematics. 5th edition. Richard D. Irwin, Illinois.

Bremmer, Jan. 1983. The Early Greek Concept of the Soul. Princeton University Press.

Bunge, Mario. 1973. Method, Model and Matter. D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht.

Burnet, John. 1948. Early Greek Philosophy. Adam & Charles Black, London.

_____, 1950. Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato. Macmillan & Co. Limited, London.

Bury, J.B. 1970. A History of Greece. Macmillan and Co. Ltd., London.

Cain, Frank. 1994. The Australian Security Intelligence Organizastion: An Unofficial History. Spectrum Publications.

CCH. 1993. The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law. CCH Australia Ltd.

Chalmers, A.F. 1982. What is This Thing Called Science? 2nd edition. University of Queensland Press.

_____ 1990. Science and its Fabrication. Oxford University Press.

Churchland, Paul. 1990. Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. The MIT Press, London.

Cohen, Morris, R. 1953. Reason and Nature: An essay on the meaning of scientific method. The Free Press, Illinois.

Cohen, Morris, R. and Ernest Nagel. 1961. An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.

Copi, Irving M. 1961. Introduction to Logic. Second Edition. The Macmillan Company, New York.

Cottingham, John. 1984. Rationalism. Paladin, Granada Publishing.

_____. 1986. Descartes. Basil Blackwell, New York.

Cottingham, John; Robert Stocthoff and Dugald Murdoch. 1985. (Translaters). The Philosophical Writings of DESCARTES (in 2 volumes). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Courant, Richard and H. Robobins. 1943. What is Mathematics? Oxford University Press, London.

Crowther, James G. 1960. Francis Bacon: The First Statesman of Science. The Cresset Press, London.

Dawson, Lawrence H. 1975. Hoyle's Games Modernized. Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London.

Descartes, Rene. 1967. The Philosophical Works of Descartes (in 2 volumes) Trans. Haldane, Elizabeth S. and G.R.T. Ross. University Press, Cambridge.

_____ 1968. Discourse on Method and the Meditations. Trans. with an Introduction by F.E. Sutcliffe. Penguin Classics.

_____ 1985. The Philosophical Writings of DESCARTES (in 2 volumes). Trans. Cottingham, John; Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Devitt, Michael and Kim Sterelny. 1987. Language and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language. Basil Blackwell.

Donagan, Alan. 1988. Spinoza Harvester-Wheatsheaf, New York.

Edwards, Paul (ed.) 1972. The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. The Macmillan Company, New York.

Egner, Robert E. and Lester E. Dennon [Eds]. 1967. The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell, 1903-1959. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London.

Ellis, William. 1940. The Idea of the Soul in Western Philosophy and Science. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London.

Evans, J.D.G. 1977. Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic. Cambridge University Press, London.

Farrington, B. 1953. Greek Science: Its Meaning for Us. Penguin Books, Melbourne.

Frey, Richard L. 1970. According to Hoyle. Fawcett Crest, New York.

Fritz, Charles A. Jr. (ed.). 1965. On the Philosophy of Science: Bertrand Russell. The Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc., Indianapolis.

Garner, Bryan A. 1987. A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage. Oxford University Press, New York.

Gay, Peter. 1966. Age of Enlightenment. Time-Life International, Nederlands. pp.11-15, esp. p.11-12.

Geach, P.T. 1972. Logic Matters. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

Grayling, A.C. (ed.) 1996. Philosophy: A Guide Through the Subject. Oxford University Press.

Gulley, Norman. 1968. The Philosophy of Socrates. Macmillan, London.

Guthrie, W.K.C. 1956. The Greek Philosophers from Thales to Aristotle. Methuen & Co. Ltd., London.

_____, 1962. A History of Greek Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.

Haldane, Elizabeth S. and G.R.T. Ross, 1967. (Translaters) The Philosophical Works of Descartes (in 2 volumes). University Press, Cambridge.

Hall, A. Rupert. 1993. The Revolution in Science 1500-1750. Longman, London.

Hampshire, Stuart. 1951. Spinoza. Penguin Books. Middlesex.

Hankins, Thomas L. 1985. Science and the Enlightenment. Cambridge University Press.

Hoernle, R.F. Alfred. 1924. Idealism as a Philosophical Doctrine. Hodder and Stoughton Limited, London.

Holt, Edwin B., Walter T. Marvin, William Pepperell Montague, Ralph Barton Perry, Walter B. Pitkin and Edward Gleason Spaulding. 1912. The New Realism: Co-Operative Studies in Philosophy. The Macmillan Company, New York. Kraus Reprint Co., 1970, Facsimile Edition.

Ivamy, E.R.Hardy (ed). 1993. Mozley and Whiteley's Law Dictionary. Butterworths, London.

Janson, H.W. 1962. A History of Art. Thames and Hudson, London.

Jardine, L. 1974. Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse. Cambridge University Press.

Jevons, W. Stanley. 1909. Elementary Lessons in Logic: Deductive and Inductive. Macmillan and Co. Limited, London.

_____ 1958. The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method. Dover Publications Inc., New York.

Kant, E. 1966. A Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. F.M. Muller. Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company Inc., New York.

Keeling, S.V. 1968. Descartes. Oxford University Press, London.

Kenny, Anthony. 1968. Descartes. Random House, New York. [Ch. 5 *Ideas*]

Keynes, John Neville. 1928. Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic. Macmillan & Co. Limited, London.

Kitto, H.D.F. 1951. The Greeks. Penguin Books, Middlesex.

Lacey, A.R. 1976. A Dictionary of Philosophy. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

Latta, Robert and Alexander Macbeath. 1949. The Elements of Logic. Macmillan, London.

Lehrer, Keith. 1990. Theory of Knowledge. Westview Press, Boulder and San Francisco, esp. p.1-18.

Leibniz, G.W. 1965. Philosophical Writings. Trans. Mary Morris. Dent & Sons, London.

Locke, John. 1965. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2 volumes. Everyman's Library.

Mellone, Sydney Herbert. 1901. An Introductory Text-Book of Logic. William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh.

Mellor, D.H. (ed.). 1980. Prospects for Pragmatism. Essays in memory of F.P. Ramsey. Cambridge University Press.

_____ 1990. Philosophical Papers: F.P. Ramsey. Cambridge University Press.

Mill, John Stuart. 1949. A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive. Longmans, Green and Co., London.

_____ 1952. A System of Logic. Longmans, Green and Co., London.

Molesworth, Vol. 1957. Logic: Notes for Beginners. The Law Book Co. of Australasia Pty. Ltd., Sydney.

_____ 1958. Landmarks in Logic. The Law Book Co of Australasia Pty. Ltd., Sydney.

Nagel, Ernest. 1961. The Structure of Science : Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.

Nash, Leonard K. 1963. The Nature of the Natural Sciences. Little, Brown and Company, Boston.

New Encyclopaedia Britannica, The. 1992. Encyclopaedia Britannica Publication.

Nielsen, H.A. 1967. Methods of Natural Science: An Introduction. Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.

O'Connor, D.J. 1952. John Locke. Penguin Books, Melbourne.

O'Neil, W.M. 1969. Fact and Theory: An Aspect of the Philosophy of Science. Sydney University Press.

Onions, C.T. (ed). 1955. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Perez-Ramos, Antonio. 1988. Francis Bacon's Idea of Science and the Maker's Knowledge Tradition. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Peterson, John A. and J. Hashisaki. Theory of Arithmetic. John Wiley and Sons, New York.

Pitcher, George (ed). 1966. Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations. Doubleday and Company, Inc., New York.

Plato. 1928. The Works of Plato. Trans. Jowett. The Modern Library, New York.

_____ 1948. The Republic of Plato. Trans. Francis Macdonald Cornford. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

_____ 1953. The Dialogues of Plato, 4 Vols. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

_____ 1960. Gorgias. Trans. Walter Hamilton. Penguin Classics.

_____ 1963. Great Dialogues of Plato. Trans. W.H.D. Rouse. The New American Library.

_____ 1965. Timaeus. Trans. H.D.P. Lee. Penguin Classics.

_____ 1969. The Last Days of Socrates. Trans. Hugh Tredennick. Penguin Classics.

_____ 1970. The Dialogues of Plato. Vols. 1 & 2. Trans. Benjamin Jowett.

_____ 1974. The Republic. Trans. Desmond Lee. Pneguin Classics.

_____ 1982. Philebus. Trans. Robin A.H. Waterfield. Penguin Classics.

_____ 1984. The Works of Plato. Trans. Thomas Taylor. Garland Publishing Inc., New York.

_____ 1985. Protagoras and Meno. Trans. W.K.C. Guthrie. Penguin Classics.

Popper, Karl R. 1969. Conjectures and Refutations. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.

Quine, W.V.O. 1958. Methods of Logic. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

Quinton, Anthony. 1980. Francis Bacon. Oxford University Press.

Ramsey, F.P. [see D.H. Mellor, above, and J.M. Hinton, Articles list]

Reese, W.L. 1980. Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion. Humanities Press, New Jersey.

Robinson, Richard. 1953. Plato's Earlier Dialectic. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

_____ 1954. Definition. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Runes, D. (ed.) 1972. Dictionary of Philosophy. Peter Owen, London.

Russell, Bertrand. [see various items listed by Russell, and by Reichenbach in section *Articles* (below)]

_____ 1929. The Problems of Philosophy. Thornton Butterworth Limited, London.

_____ 1946. History of Western Philosophy. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London.

Ryle, Gilbert. 1949. The Concept of Mind. Barnes & Noble, Inc., New York.

Schlesinger, G. 1963. Method in the Physical Sciences. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.

Schouls, Peter A. 1980. The Imposition of Method. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Scruton, Roger. 1986. Spinoza. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Singer, Charles. 1949. A Short History of Science to the Nineteenth Century. University Press, Oxford.

Sparkes, A.W. 1991. Talking Philosophy: A wordbook. Routledge, London.

Speake, Jennifer (ed.). 1979. A Dictionary of Philosophy. Pan Books, London.

Spinoza, Benedict de. 1989. Ethics. Trans. Andrew Boyle, Revised G.H.R. Parkinson. J.M.Dent & Sons, London.

Sternfeld, Robert. 1958. Reason and Necessity in Classical Rationalism. In: *The Review of Metaphysics,* Vol.XII, No.1. Issue No.45, September 1958.

Strawson, P.F. 1952. Introduction to Logical Theory. Methuen & Co. Ltd., London.

Taton, Rene (ed.). 1964. The Beginnings of Modern Science. Trans. A.J. Pomerans. Thames and Hudson, London.

Taylor, A.E. 1951. Socrates. Peter Davies, London.

_____ 1955. Plato: The man and his work. Methuen & Co. Ltd., London.

Twining, William and David Miers. 1978. How to do Things with Rules: A Primer of Interpretation. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. London.

Urmson, J.O. (ed.) 1967a. The Concise Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers. Hutchinson of London.

Walker, David M. 1980. The Oxford Companion to Law. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Weatherall, M. 1968. Scientific Method. The English Universities Press Ltd., London.

Weblin, Mark Michael. 1995. The Place of John Anderson in the History of Philosophy. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of New England.

Wild, Brian Kingsley. 1993. John Anderson's Doctrine of One Way of Being. Unpublished MA Thesis, University of New England.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1974. Philosophical Investigations [trans. G.E.M. Anscombe] Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

Wright, Georg Henrik von. 1963. Norm and Action: A Logical Enquiry. Routledge & Kegan Paul London.

Xenophon. 1953. Memorabilia. Loeb Edition.

(b) Journal Articles, etc.

... 1992. The History of Mathematics. *In* The New Encyclopaedia Britannica. Macropaedia. Vol. 23. p.561ff.

Alexander, Samuel. 1912. On Relations; and in particular the cognitive relation. *In* Mind No. 33, July 1912, p.305-328.

Baker, A.J. 1956. Category Mistakes. *In* AJP Vol.34, No.1. May 1956, p.13-26.

_____ 1958. Ideologies. *In* Libertarian No. 2, September 1958. p.2-6.

_____ 1972. Syllogistic with Complex Terms. *In* Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. Vol. 13/1, January 1972, p.69-87.

_____ 1977. Classical Logical Relations. *In* Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. Vol. 18/1, January 1977, p.164-168.

Balestra, Dominic J. 1994. Galileo's Unfinished Case and Its Cartesian Product: Method, History and Rationality. *In* International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXXIV, p.307-322.

Beck, Robert N. 1976. The Attribute of Thought. *In* Wilbur, James B. (ed.), *Spinoza's Metaphysics*. Van Gorcum, Assen/Amsterdam.

Berkson, William. 1979. Skeptical Rationalism. *In* Hannay, Alistair (ed) *Inquiry*. Vol.2. Universitetsforlaget.

Beth, Evert W. 1951. Critical epochs in the development of the theory of science. *In* The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol.1, 1950-51. pp.27-42.

Burnet, John. 1916. The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul. *In* Proceedings of the British Academy. p.235-259.

Cannon, Walter F. 1961. John Herschel and the Idea of Science. *In* The Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol.XXII, p.215-239.

Case, Thomas. 1906. Scientific method as a mental operation. *In* Strong, T.B. (ed.), Lectures on the Method of Science. Clarendon press, Oxford. pp.1-24.

Caws, Peter. 1967. Scientific Method. *In* Edwards, Paul (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol.7. Macmillan. pp.339-343.

Cherry, Christopher. 1973. Regulative Rules and Constitutive Rules. *In* Philosophical Quarterly, No.23, p.301-315.

Cohen, Morris R. 1912. Book Review of *Principia Mathematica* by Alfred N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Vol.1. Cambridge University Press, 1910. *In* The Philosophical Review, Vol.XXI, No.1, p.87-91.

D'Agostino, Fred. 1981. The Ethos of Games. *In* Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, VIII. p.7-18.

_____ 1989. Adjudication as an Epistemological Concept. *In* Synthese, Vol.79, p.231-256.

_____ 1990. The Aimless Rationality of Science. *In* International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 4/1, p.33-50.

Doniela, W.V. 1984. Rationalism. *In* Dialectic, Vol.22, p.12-19. [Reprinted 1993].

Drury, Shadia B. 1978. The Relationship of Substances and Simple Natures in the Philosophy of Descartes. *In* Jarrett, Charles E., John King-Farlow and F.J.Pelletier (eds). *New Essays on Rationalism and Empiricism.* Supplementary Volume IV. Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy, Guelph, Ontario.

Ezorsky, G. 1963. Truth in Context. *In* The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LX/5. February 28, 1963. p.113-135.

Feibleman, James K. 1959. The Logical Structure of the Scientific Method. *In* Dialectica, Vol.13, No.3/4, pp.208-225.

Feigl, Herbert. 1954. Scientific Method without Metaphysical Presuppositions. *In* Philosophical Studies, Vol.5, No.2, p.17-29.

Foulkes, Paul. 1972. What is Deduction? *In* International Logic Review, No.5, Vol.III, n.1.

Forrest, Peter. 1994. Why Most of us Should Be Scientific Realists: A Reply to Van Fraassen. *In* The Monist, January 1994, Voil.77, No.1, p.47-68.

Garver, Newton. 1967. Rules. *In* Edwards, Paul (ed) Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Vol.7. p.281-3.

Gotch, F. 1906. On some aspects of the scientific method. *In* Strong, T.B. (ed.), Lectures on the Method of Science. Clarendon press, Oxford. pp.25-58.

Hall, Roland. 1967. Dialectic. *In* Edwards, Paul (ed.) Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, p.385-9.

Heimann, Peter M. 1979. The Scientific Revolution. *In* Burke, Peter (ed) The New Cambridge Modern History, Companion Vol. 13. Cambridge University Press.

Hinton, J.M. 1981. The Fountain of Truth: A Eulogy of Ramsey. *In* Ratio, Vol.XXIII. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. p.43-46.

Hooker, C.A. 1984. Empiricism and Positivism. *In* Dialectic, Vol.22,p.20-28.

Huxley, T.H. 1964. The method of scientific investigation. *In* Rapport, Samuel and Helen Wright (eds.), Science: Method and Meaning. Washington Square Press, Inc., New York.

Jackson, Frank. 1982. Epiphenomenal Qualia. *In* The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.32, No.127, April, 1982. p.127-136.

Kraus, Pamela A. 1983. From Universal Mathematics to Universal Method: Descartes's "Turn" in Rule IV of the *Regulae*. *In* Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol.XXXI, p.159-174.

Leiman, Sid Z. 1992. Judaism. *In* The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol.22.

Mackie, J.L. 1966. Proof. *In* Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. XL, p.29-38

Mason, Richard V. 1990. Explaining Necessity. *In* Metaphilosophy, October 1990, p.382-390.

Olshewsky, Thomas M. 1976. On the Notion of a Rule. *In* Philosophia, Vol.6, No.2. June 1976. p.267-287.

_____ 1976. On the relations of soul to body in Plato and Aristotle. *In Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Vol.14, p.391-404.

Papineau, David. 1995. Methodology: The Elements of the Philosophy of Science. *In* Grayling, A.E. (ed) *Philosophy: A Guide Through the Subject*. Oxford University Press.

Passmore, J.A. 1946. Prediction and Scientific Law. *In* AJPP 24, 1-2. September 1946, p.1-33.

_____ 1949. II: Philosophy and scientific method. *In* Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol.49, p.17-32.

Quinn, Michael Sean. 1975-6. Practice-Defining Rules. *In* Ethics, No.86, p.76-86.

_____ 1927. Facts and Propositions. *In* Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. VII,1927, p.153-170.

Rawls, John. 1955. Two Concepts of Rules. *In* The Philosophical Review. Vol.LXIV, p.3-13.

Reichenbach, Hans. 1944. Bertrand Russell's Logic. *In* P.A. Schilpp (ed) The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell (The Library of Living Philosophers, Vol.V), Northwest University, Evanston, Chicago, p.23-29.

Riley, Patrick. 1976. An Unpublished Lecture by Leibniz on the Greeks as founders of rational theology: its relation to his "Universal Jurisprudence". *In* Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol.14, p.205-216.

Russell, Bertrand. 1905. On Denoting. *In* Mind, Vol. XIV, p.479-493.

_____ 1910. Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description. *In* The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol.XI. 1910-1911. p.108-128.

_____ 1911. On the Relation of Universals and Particulars. *In* The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol.XII, 1911-1912, p.1-24.

_____ 1919. Mathematics and Logic. *In* (1): *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, Ch.XVIII, p.194-206. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London; (2) Egner, Robert E. and Lester E. Dennon (eds). 1962. *The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell, 1903-1959*. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, p.175-183.; (3) Fritz, Charles A. Jr. (ed). 1965. *On the Philosophy of Science: Bertrand Russell*. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., Indianapolis. p.13-24.

Sainsbury, Mark. 1996. Philosophical Logic. *In* Grayling, A.C. (ed) Philosophy. Oxford University Press.

Schouls, Peter A. 1972. Reason, Method, and Science in the Philosophy of Descartes. *In* Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol.50, No.1, May 1972, p.30-39.

Shaffer, Jerome. 1967. Mind-Body Problem. *In* Edwards, P. (ed). The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Volume Five. The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, New York. p.336-346

Sibajiban. 1963. Descartes' Doubt. *In* Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.XXIV, p.106-116.

Solmsen, Friedrich. 1983. Plato and the concept of the soul (Psyche): some historical perspectives. *In* Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol.44, p.355-367.

Urmson, J.O. 1967b. Ideas. *In* Edwards, Paul (ed), The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Volume Four. The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, New York. p.118-121

Waterlow, S. 1909. Some Philosophical Implications of Mr Bertrand Russell's Theory of Mathematics. *In* Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol.X, 1909-1910, p.132-188.

Williams, Bernard. 1972. Rationalism. *In* Edwards, Paul (ed.) *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*. The Macmillan Company, New York.

Wright, J.N. 1955. The Method of Descartes. *In* The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.5, p.78-82.

Yeo, Richard R. 1986. Scientific Method and thge Rhetoric of Science in Britain, 1830-1917. *In* Schuster, John A. and Richard R. Yeo (eds.) The Politics and Rhetoric of Scientific Method. D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht.