PT. IV: ANDERSON ON RATIONALISM

Chapter 7: ANDERSON'S VIEWS ON RATIONALISM RE-ASSESSED

Two major claims have been made here which bring the present view into conflict with Anderson's. Firstly, the claim that the notion of mind is a fundamental rationalist notion is at variance with Anderson's formal account of rationalism, and in outright conflict with his views on mind; secondly, the claim that his account of empiricism (as the doctrine of one way of being) is incompatible with his own logic which suggests that he did not provide an adequate account of the opposition between empiricism and rationalism. If Anderson incorrectly described rationalism, he may well have incorrectly described empiricism, especially since he tried to characterise them as opposed positions. For these reasons, it is appropriate to closely re-examine what Anderson said about rationalism, and then return to these issues.

§1 Anderson's Formal and Informal Views of Rationalism

Anderson's views on rationalism may be divided into two more or less distinct groups: his **formal** view that "Rationalistic theories of all sorts are distinguished from empiricism by the contention that there are different kinds or degrees of truth and reality" [S/p.3]; and **informal** things which he said about rationalism, or which he alleged were rationalistic. The process followed here is to examine these **informal** remarks and divide them into those which clearly or probably conform to the **formal** view and those that do not, and examine each. (The passages being studied are set out in Appendix C.)

Attributions which conform to the formal view

It is clear that many of these additional references to rationalism conform to Anderson's formal description of it. A few examples will elucidate how he criticised various views as rationalist in line with his formal account. He rejected monism and the idealist notion of the Absolute in this way:

> Again, when we say that the Absolute *is* self-subsistent and its aspects *are* relatively existent, we are recognising, in spite of ourselves, a *single way of being*. It is seen, therefore, that Monism is not only a false doctrine but an incoherent one; that it implies a division, which it cannot sustain, between "higher" and "lower" orders of being, i.e., that it is dualistic or rationalistic. [S/p.48]

He argued that idealism inevitably flows from rationalism because both uphold ultimates of some kind: "The history of Greek philosophy shows with the greatest clearness the inevitable passage from rationalism to idealism, the

coalescence of the many ultimates into the One" [S/p.61]. Thus, absolute idealism differs from rationalism "only in holding that there is a highest truth instead of a number of higher truths" and so is a variety of rationalism [S/p.5]. He rejected the notions of self-subsistence and dependent existence as rationalist:

> But, equally, that which establishes itself has to be taken as that on which other things depend, because in its very conception there is the distinction between its character of establishing and its character of being established; ... There is likewise no logical division between cosmological and physico-theological or teleological arguments, because in each case we have the dualism of ways of being, that which has its being in supporting and that which has its being in being supported. The only way to escape from the vicious circle, in which dualism collapses into monism and monism explodes into dualism, is to adopt a pluralistic position in which variously characterised and related things are recognised as existing in the same way (spatio-temporally) -- a single logic of existence replacing conceptions of "self-subsistence", "relative existence" and any other flights of rationalistic fancy. [S/p.90]

The foregoing illustrate a range of divisions which Anderson regarded as rationalist, and which clearly conform with his **formal** account of it. But several other types of claims he made do not so obviously conform to that formal account; these relate to (i) natures or essences, (ii) units of the Pythagorean kind, and (iii) ideas. It is illuminating to understand what Anderson said about each of these.

He said that the conception of "distinct existences" is "the rationalist conception of 'essence' masquerading as a fact of experience" [S/p.12]; and "this theory of natures or essences is precisely rationalism" [S/p.28]. We come closer to an explanation of this view when Anderson said: "Apart from a rationalistic theory of "natures" (as presented, e.g., by Berkeley) we find no basis for the conception of separate classes of agents and patients, arrangers of phenomena and phenomena to be arranged, designers and the designed" [S/p.100]. The reason Anderson regarded the notions of natures or essences as rationalistic is that they are set up as some kind of "ultimate": "So long, we may say, as any "ultimate" is recognised, whether it be a purpose, an essence or a totality, real distinctions, the existence of independent things, cannot" [S/p.85].

In numerous places, Anderson referred to units as a rationalist notion: "Hume's rationalistic theories of ideas, relations between ideas and spatial

and temporal units" [S/p.93; c.f. p.307]. His reason for doing so was that such units are a kind of "ultimate" underpinning real things: "It is remarkable that Locke, Berkeley and Hume, so widely regarded as the founders of modern empiricism, should take their departure from just such a rationalist doctrine of simple and separate entities -- the 'ultimates' by reference to which any actual state of affairs is to be explained" [S/p.163]. His criticism of such views is clear:

> The Eleatic criticism of rationalism is equivalent to the rejection of constitutive relations. The early Pythagoreans had held that the real was certain units, and that empirical things were simply *arrangements* of these units, so that the reality of a thing was simply the units which constituted it. And the Eleatic arguments, which found their clearest form in Zeno's paradoxes, were to the effect that this derivation from the real admitted the reality of something other than the real. [S/p.49]

Anderson rejected all forms of atomism -- the notion that certain things are constituted of basic units -- including social atomism: "We find in the work of the Freudians generally this rationalistic apparatus -- the setting up of *units*, the identification of things which are merely connected, or as frequently in Freud, the reversal of relations ... -- the outstanding example, of course, being the view that individuals form society instead of society forming individuals" [S/p.350].

He also referred to the theory of ideas as rationalist:

> And, whatever suggestions Hume may make towards a thorough-going solution, he cannot arrive at it and force subsequent attention to it, because of the defects in his philosophical outlook -- because, like the other "English empiricists", he was rationalistically concerned with "ideas" (that whose nature it is to be perceived) and not with propositions (what is the case). [S/p.88; see also p.93, cited above, and p.99]

The reason Anderson classed ideas as a rationalist notion is hinted at when he referred to them as "atomic 'ideas'" [S/p.163], but is explained a little later when he said:

> And the only support Berkeley can give for the adhibiting of objectivity to part of what we experience is that our sensations are not under our control (an objective fact of which it seems we are directly aware) whereas our "images" or reproductions of sensations are (another fact, independent of our knowing it, which we can discover); so that Berkeley's position is a hotch-potch of realism and representationism, an unavoidable result so long as "ideas" (entities of a different order of reality from minds or agents) are retained. [S/p.165]

So Anderson believed the theory of ideas, like the theory of natures or essences, in postulating or seeking something more basic (and of a different order) -- "ultimates" underpinning knowledge -- attempted divisions in levels of reality. It is for this reason that he claimed Mill was a rationalist of sorts: "Mill's main error, however, lies in the assumption, which he holds in common with other rationalists, that a situation or 'phenomenon' can be analysed into a number of simple factors -- that science, indeed, consists in the reduction of facts to their simple laws of connection" [S/p.135]. So Anderson saw any attempt to portray anything as more fundamental than other things as a mark of rationalism, and one such case is the notion of a cause being more fundamental or real than its effect: "In the theory of causality this rationalism takes the form of representing the cause as superior in reality or logical standing to the effect" [S/p.131].

A broader and better appreciation of Anderson's conception of these rationalist divisions and ultimates can be gained from two other passages:

> But, while consideration of his inconsistencies leads to the showing up of any attempted separation of mind and nature, Berkeley remains sunk in them just because of his rationalism, his doctrine of natures or elementary entities, the discontinuity between which is set aside by the postulation of impossible leaps, such as he himself has shown Locke's representationism to be. For, in spite of all his efforts to find real connections between minds and what they contemplate, he also, as we have seen, makes the representationist leap; it is something he is forced to by the doctrine of "ideas", which must be taken as at once "in" minds and "of" things, leaving us with the insoluble problems which arise on any doctrine of relative existence. [S/p.167]

> The fact is that, just as in Zeno's paradoxes, the contradiction is between the rationalist assumption of the elementary, unitary or primary, and the empirical recognition of historical facts; and the solution is to *reject* rationalist assumptions and not attempt to combine opposing views in a single theory ... [S/p.307]

The foregoing passages elucidate what Anderson objected to as attempts to set up different levels of existence or orders of being, or attempts to create divisions in reality. These included any claims --

(a) to distinguish kinds of existence: self-subsistent and dependent existence;

(b) to superior existence or reality on the basis of what causes and what is caused; what makes and what is made; what designs and what is designed; what explains and what is explained;

(c) to an underpinning of things or reality; ultimates or ultimate units of things or knowledge;

(d) to distinguish between reality and appearances, noumena and phenomena, "the real" and the superficial;

(e) to distinguish between necessary and contingent -- and, we might add to this list, what is determined as against what happens by "chance" [S/p.123].

According to Anderson, all such attempted distinctions are kinds of dualism. What must be emphasised is that he clearly believed all such **claims**, all such **attempts** to create divisions or dualisms of these kinds, were fallacious and rationalist; were attempts to set up two ways of being.

Anderson's main argument against all such attempts at divisions or ultimates is relatively simple. Any view which postulates (a) some higher order of things: ultimate units, principles, laws (as against facts or "ordinary" propositions), explanations (as against what they explain), causes (as against effects), values (above facts), clear and distinct ideas; or (b) some higher kind of truth: necessary as against contingent, analytic against synthetic -- must say something about the relation between the two "levels" or kinds of truth; and this statement which relates the two cannot be just on one level or the other; it must state a "fact" which is neither on the higher nor the lower level, or which is neither a necessary nor a contingent truth, etc. In other words, the postulation of different levels, orders or kinds of being, reality or truth cannot be stated unless it also says something about the relation between both; and the proposition which states that relation cannot belong to the higher or the lower level but a "level of reality or existence" common to both. This view is intimately related to Anderson's view of the proposition and is stated with force and clarity in *Empiricism*:

> The chief, and I think final, objection to any theory of higher and lower, or complete and incomplete, truth is that it is contrary to the very nature and possibility of discourse; that it is "unspeakable". ... Since ... the supposed higher and lower objects of experience both take the propositional form, we are concerned with a single way of being; that, namely, which is conveyed when we say that a proposition is *true*. Deviation from this view must take the form of saying either that facts are propositional but ideal explanations are above the propositional

> form, or that explanations are propositional and what they have to explain are mere data, not yet propositionalised. ... If there were anything either above or below the proposition, it would be beyond speech or understanding. If, for example, there were anything that required explanation before it became intelligible, we could say nothing about it in its unintelligible form; ... [S/p.4; see Baker's discussion of this argument: 1986, p.18-24]

This argument was expressed in another form elsewhere [see S/p.48, cited p.146 above].

It has been shown that Anderson's **formal** account of rationalism was extremely broad in its ramifications, and that quite a few of his less formal claims about rationalism conform to that formal account. But it will now be argued that all of those claims just considered (which Anderson identified as rationalist, and which conform with the doctrine of one way of being) are intimately connected with the notion of mind. (i) The notion of (nominal) natures or essences is connected with the notion of ideas or concepts: it is, specifically, what is essential to an idea or concept, and thus to how we (our minds) conceive of a thing. (ii) The notion of fundamental units would not make sense except in a context of (a) our explaining why things are as they are, or as they appear to us, or (b) a distinction between (an illusory) "appearance" and an underlying reality (associated with the downgrading of "sense"). They are always associated with **explaining** the "reality" underlying the confused, illusory, transient world of sense or appearance; they constitute fundamental elements of knowledge, which is dependent upon the notion of mind. (iii) Obviously, ideas are fundamental units or components of knowledge, and dependent upon the notion of mind. (iv) "Ultimates" of any kind are the ultimate units of knowledge or explanation, and connected to mind. (v) Fundamentals or higher realities are regarded as such in relation to "higher" knowledge (knowledge which explains) or our (mind's) understanding of specific things.

These points may be made more generally thus: All dualisms under consideration arise out of and depend upon the notion of mind: those of mental and material substances, "self-subsistent" and "relatively existent" etc. [S/p.48], or "relative existence" and "dependent existence" [S/p.33]. Representationism too depends upon the notions of mind and ideas [c.f. S/p.167]. And it may be added that Spinozan and Hegelian monism are doctrines of one substance -- mind -- embracing all. So all the doctrines which Anderson described as rationalist, which he believed were opposed to the doctrine of one way of being, are

related to and dependent upon the notion of mind; and hence their rejection is compatible with the rejection of that notion.

Attributions which do not conform to the formal view

In addition to the passages just considered, Anderson alleged other postulates and doctrines are rationalistic, five of which considered below cannot be connected with the formal account: in relation to which it is not possible to see that "different kinds or degrees of truth and reality" are involved. (i) Anderson accepted that regarding sense as an inferior way of knowing is linked to rationalism. Referring to the British empiricists, he said: "In maintaining that all our knowledge is derived from sense (a position which, on account of their rationalist preconceptions, they by no means maintained consistently) they took a view of sense which was dependent on its having been regarded as an *inferior* way of knowing" [S/p.12]. It is impossible to establish that this is a rationalist view under the formal account. (ii) Anderson claimed Descartes' "'unitary' view of mind, the conception of it as having only one character and being self-contained in that character" is a rationalistic (and unspeakable) view [S/p.14]. However, this claim cannot be derived directly or obviously from the formal account of rationalism. (iii) Anderson's claim that the notion of knowledge is a rationalist one [S/p.69] cannot be derived from the formal account. (iv) The rationalist-idealist treatment of relations cannot be shown to be so on Anderson's formal criteria. He said: "The question of the nature of relations is at any rate one issue between rationalists and empiricists, and, as the authors of *The New Realism* have shown, the basis of a realistic theory of knowledge can only be a certain theory of relations; which enables us to draw definite conclusions from the contention that knowledge is a relation" [S/p.27]. He argued, effectively, that the theory of essences leads to the idealist doctrine of internal relations, and that it is "on the question of relations that rationalism most conspicuously breaks down" [S/p.110]. This may be so, but the rationalist treatment of relations does not follow from Anderson's formal description of rationalism, any more than the method of defining by constitutive relations does. (v) Anderson also attributed certain fallacies in formal logic to rationalist views: the "rationalistic confusion as to what inference is" [S/p.101] and the amalgamation of subject and predicate [S/p.105]. These procedures do not follow directly from Anderson's formal account.

So Anderson positively linked these five doctrines with rationalism, but it is not possible to show how they are related to his formal account of it. Therefore, certain doctrines or conceptions which Anderson recognised as rationalist do not fall (directly or obviously) under his formal account or criteria; which is to say, his formal account is not adequate to the task it is supposed to fulfil. Rationalism, as Anderson conceived of it, must be wider than his formal account suggests.

On the other hand, it should not require any extended argument to show the foregoing are all linked to and depend upon the notion of mind (or mind and ideas). Clearly the treatment of sense as an inferior way of knowing presupposes the division of faculties of mind. The unitary view of mind requires no argument, nor does that of knowledge. The doctrine of internal relations is clearly connected with what is contained within ideas or concepts, and thus with mind And the fallacies of logic to which Anderson referred are connected with the notion of *deductio* as a mental process, and the telescoping of concepts (and relations) within one another. Sufficient has been said to show that both kinds of claims -- those directly related to his formal account and those which are not -- are very closely related to the notion of mind and the theory of ideas.

In connection with this, four further points must be made. Firstly, Anderson's criteria of rationalism (as any position which contends "that there are different kinds or degrees of truth and reality") does not identify rationalism as a "whole outlook", or as an important, historical, philosophical movement that has evolved and taken many forms. Secondly, it does not **explain why**, or provide any hint as to why, rationalists have, adopted conceptions of different kinds of truth or ways of being. Thirdly, except in the case of the Cartesian notion of mind as a special substance, rationalists have not adopted these views as fundamental, or *a priori* principles: they have adopted them incidentally, as a consequence of other doctrines they believed. Fourthly, Anderson's formal account does not explain many of those terms commonly associated with rationalism: the universe, laws of nature, necessity, system, etc. If this is so, then again Anderson's account is inadequate; it omits something more basic to rationalism which a sound account would bring out

These conclusions in no way weaken, but lend support to, the theses that the notion of mind is a fundamental rationalist one, and that Anderson would have been more consistent -- and more readily understood -- had he rejected it as such. It is appropriate now to return to some of the problems raised previously about the doctrine of one way of being as the locus of the opposition between rationalism and empiricism.

§2 The Exact Nature of the Opposition Between Rationalism and Empiricism

Several issues are of vital importance in understanding Anderson's formal account of rationalism and empiricism: (i) What is the precise nature of the opposition between them? (ii) What is the (a) nature and (b) status of each? If rationalism and empiricism are propositions which are either true or false, the opposition between them may be contradiction; but what are those propositions? If rationalism is a proposition known *a priori*, what is the status of empiricism? If they are not propositions, the nature of the opposition must be something else.* When Anderson's interpretations of the two opposed doctrines are set out as he stated them, it is not unambiguously clear what is being asserted or what is being denied [see p.15f, above]. He implied that rationalism and empiricism are propositions that are either true or false when he said: "The distinguishing mark of empiricism as a philosophy is that it **denies** this, that it maintains" [i.e., "it asserts"] "that there is only one way of being" [S/p.3]. But no rationalist ever set down as a basic doctrine "there are different kinds (or degrees) of truth" or "there are different kinds, degrees, or levels of reality" -- even if such views are implicit in all rationalist positions. Anderson's characterisation of rationalism does not appear to be a doctrine; if anything, it appears to be some sort of criterion for detecting rationalism.

Another important way of considering Anderson's conception of the opposition between rationalism and empiricism is to contrast **dualism** with the doctrine of one way of being. In the index to SEP there are two relevant entries: "*Being, single way of, **see** Dualism*" [p.381] and "*Dualism (**see also** Reality, levels of)*" [p.382]. Taken at face value, if both rationalism and dualism are opposed to the doctrine of one way of being, they must be identical. However, according to Anderson, monism is also a form of rationalism: "it is dualistic

*The relation of opposition between the rationalist "thesis" according to Anderson and his doctrine of one way of being was discussed in Wild, 1993, p.175ff.

or rationalistic" [S/p.48; cf p.146 above]; but the two must be distinct because "dualism collapses into monism and monism explodes into dualism" [S/p.90; cf p.147 above]. If dualism and monism are distinct (as the traditional view holds), and empiricism is opposed to both (as Anderson held), then the opposition between the doctrine of one way of being and dualism cannot provide the full account of the opposition between empiricism and rationalism. However, Anderson did not define what dualism is. The term "dualism" has a number of senses [Sparkes, 1991, p.190f]; it is sometimes used to distinguish the view that there are just two substances from (a) monism, the claim that there is just one, and (b) pluralism, the view that there is more than one [Speake, 1979, p.91]. Anderson could not have explained his own pluralism as an alternative to monism and dualism in comparable metaphysical terms, for this would have involved him in speaking of "fundamental substances" which he could not accept. In Anderson's sense, dualism embraces Cartesian dualism, but is wider than that. It also embraces divisions of: "ultimate" and "relative" [S/p.49]; a thing and its ideal [Ibid]; characters things "really have (in the 'sensible world'), and ... characters they 'ought to' but do not have ... in the 'intelligible world'" [S/p.51]; dependent (or relative) existence against self-subsistence [S/p.90, 304]; determination versus indetermination [S/p.113]; mind and ideas [S/p.163,165]; the inner and outer reality of mind and the external world [S/p.168]; mathematical truth and physical truth [S/p.200]; Man and Nature [S/p.360]; facts and values [S/p.364-5]. It is impossible to see any obvious unity or common features in these supposed dualisms.

The upshot is that treating the opposition between rationalism and empiricism as the opposition between dualism and the doctrine of one way of being does nothing to elucidate either, or the nature of the opposition between them. However, this opposition might be illuminated if, as is being argued here, all (relevant) dualisms, all the dichotomies of rationalism, arise out of the notion of soul or mind; then the doctrine of one way of being may be seen as opposed to all the ramifications of that notion. In this context, it should be pointed out that Anderson also criticised and rejected representationism [see S/p.165, cited p.148f, above] which he took as "the view that the mind has 'ideas' which symbolise 'outside things'" [S/p.84]. Thus representationism is another form of dualism, and unquestionably connected with the notion of mind.

In connection with the relation between claims about two ways of knowing and being, Anderson claimed that (a) the question of the opposition between

rationalism and empiricism had been *confused* by reference to knowledge, that the issue was a "logical" one, concerned with "ways of being or truth, not about knowing truths" [S/p.3-4]; and (b) "the discussion of faculties will become pointless if it can be shown that any postulation of different orders of being is illogical" [S/p.4]. We may be able to show that the postulation of different ways of being, or different kinds of truth is illogical; but even if we could, that would not (i) prevent us from examining whether the postulation of two ways of knowing is also illogical, or whether the notion of mind is logical or illogical; (ii) establish the relation between these two "claims" in rationalist thought. But the first claim -- (a) above -- may be doubted. Mackie questioned its historical accuracy [1965, p.3], and suggested that Anderson's claim should be taken, rather, as **logically** prior; "in other words, that distinctions between ways of knowing turn out, on criticism, to rest upon and require distinctions between ways of being" [Ibid, p.4]. It is very significant that Mackie attributed to Plato the view that it is **the mind** which is the source of a kind of "knowledge independent of sensory observation": "With regard to other supposed fields of rational knowledge Anderson's historical claim is even more open to question. It was surely the success of the early geometers in constructing proofs whose force was not impaired by the inaccuracy of the figures drawn to illustrate them that suggested to Plato that the mind had here a source of knowledge independent of sensory observation" [Ibid, p.3].

Mackie's point coincides with the view argued for here, namely, that the notion of mind is fundamental to the dichotomies of rationalism -- although Mackie may not have accepted the more radical contention that the notion of mind is fundamental to rationalism, and a fiction. The alternatives on this matter are crucial for the present thesis. If Anderson was wrong and Mackie right on this issue -- that is, if the basis of the opposition between rationalism and empiricism is the claim that there are different ways of knowing -- then the basis of that opposition stems from a claim about **mind**: that minds have two ways of knowing, roughly, by sense and by reason. There is no evidence to suggest that rationalists upheld, as fundamental principles that there are two ways of being or two kinds of truth. However, there is ample evidence to show that they (a) upheld some vital, qualitative distinction between knowledge and opinion, (b) positively associated opinion with a (supposed) way of knowing called "sense": with what is transient, with the body, the passions and all that is lustful and "animal-like" in humans; (c) sublimated the notion of knowledge by linking it with what is divine,

permanent and eternal in the universe and humans; (d) linked knowledge to truth, certainty, indubitab lity, and opinion to error, "half-truth", illusion, "appearance". It is worthwhile reviewing Anderson's basic claims from this perspective. He actually said "the dual theory of knowledge goes with a dual theory of reali y" [S/p.304], which means the dual theory of reality goes with the dual theory of knowledge, and that relates it to the notion of mind by Anderson's own admission.

It was shown in Part II that rationalism, through the notion of soul or mind, generates many dichotomies; and it has been argued throughout this chapter that many of Anderson's objections to rationalism are directly or indirectly related to the notion of mind and its products including these dichotomies. No matter which way we approach Anderson's conception of rationalism and his criticism of two ways of being, two kinds of truth, or dualisms, the outcome is the same: the root cause of those problems appears to be the notion of mind. The doctrine of one way of being interpreted any other way is, at the very least, unclear, appears to be metaphysical, and worse still, leads to insoluble problems within Anderson's own position.

§3 Conclusions

In Part II it was argued that the notion of soul or mind derived from early theological views, is not a theoretical notion, but is fundamental to rationalism. In Part III it was acknowledged that that view does not coincide with Anderson's formal account of rationalism, and conflicts with his theory of mind as feeling. Nevertheless, it was argued that Anderson was inconsistent in arguing for a theory of mind, and would have been more consistent had he rejected the notion altogether. In this Part it has been argued that his characterisation of rationalism is inadequate in several ways:

(i) It does not provide an unambiguous account of the opposition between rationalism and empiricism, and it is unclear what the status of that opposition is. If rationalism is illogical as Anderson claimed, what is empiricism? If rationalism is a metaphysical view, what is empiricism?

(ii) It does not embrace all the features of rationalism which Anderson himself attributed to it informally.

(iii) It does not portray rationalism as a "whole outlook" or an important historical philosophical movement which has taken many forms.

(iv) It does not explain how the central doctrines, dichotomies or terms of rationalism came about or relate to Anderson's criteria.

(v) It does not give any account of why mathematics and those notions of deductive system and necessity (usually associated with rationalism) are related to it.

(vi) It seems likely that Anderson was wrong about the importance of the question of knowing in relation to the opposition between rationalism and empiricism.

(vii) It draws attention to what seems to be incidental, rather than central to rationalism.

Anderson's formal account of rationalism is inadequate for several reasons; on his criteria, it is not clear precisely what rationalism is (either as a philosophical movement or doctrine), what its status is, or in precisely what way it is opposed to empiricism. On the other hand, the present interpretation of rationalism as founded in the notion of mind is clear and comprehensive, shows the relation between its components, and appears to provide a unified explanation (albeit in different terms) of all Anderson's objections to rationalist doctrines, dualism, monism, idealism (as any view which reifies mind), representationism, voluntarism (mind as an uncaused agent), and why Anderson would have regarded the British Empiricists as rationalists. Finally, it has been argued that there are great difficulties with the doctrine of one way of being as it is usually understood. There is no reason, therefore, to resile from the view that the notion of mind is a rationalist one fundamental to rationalism; rather, the evidence put forward here strengthens that thesis. The main task that remains is to re-interpret and test Anderson's core doctrines, including his conception of empiricism, in line with the thesis that mind is a basic rationalist notion.

PART V: ANDERSON'S EMPIRICISM

Chapter 8: TOWARDS AN INTERPRETATION OF ANDERSON'S EMPIRICISM

§1 Empiricism Opposed to Rationalism

In Part II it was argued that rationalism arose out of attempts to reconcile science with established religious beliefs, that the notion of soul or mind is fundamental to rationalism, is accompanied by the postulation of some transcendental entities, forms or ideas, along with the assumption that there is a method of discovering truths apart from the empirical methods of observing (or "sense"), which method is supposed to be facilitated by comparing and analysing these forms or ideas. If this is a correct account of rationalism, it must be asked what empiricism is, and where Anderson's empiricism stands in relation to rationalism so understood.

On the basis of that account of rationalism it is reasonable to test the hypothesis that empiricism is a philosophical position which --

(a) does not make any theological assumptions;
(b) rejects the notions of soul or mind, forms or ideas, and any such transcendental postulates;
(c) rejects the assumption that there is a method of discovering truths apart from the empirical methods of observing; that is,
(d) adheres to only one method of inquiry; or, to make a direct comparison with Anderson, affirms that there is only one (single) logic.

Points (a) to (c) are a purely negative way of characterising empiricism: they simply describe it simply in opposition to another position. When that opposition to rationalism is set aside, empiricism is a philosophical position which is not founded in any specific assumptions, which upholds and adheres to a method of inquiry based in observing, as the only method of discovering truths or (quite positively avoiding the notion of truth), as the only method of inquiry, discovery or learning; or, more succinctly, empiricism is a method of inquiry which makes no assumptions. It is hardly accidental that this account of empiricism, though somewhat different from more traditional formulations, conforms quite closely to them and, importantly, has close affinities to the doctrine that there is only one way of knowing [see SIEP, p.3], to Anderson's alternative formulation of empiricism as "whatever we know

we *learn*" [SIEP, p.162], and even to the doctrine of one way of being if that is understood as adherence to one logic. This is the theory of empiricism adopted here, although of course it will be elaborated and explained in greater detail later.

On this view, the opposition between rationalism and empiricism is not an opposition of doctrines: not a case of contradiction, but an opposition over the appropriate method(s) of inquiry: whether there are two such methods or just one. So this empiricist interpretation of rationalism, empiricism, and the opposition between the two faces its most crucial test around the questions of what method is and what logic is. It will be argued that rationalism construes inquiring method and logic as processes controlled and carried out by "the mind", whereas empiricism is distinguished by adherence to a method that does not recognise the notion of mind: a method that is not private or "internal", but which is public, repeatable, observable or "objective"; based on observation accompanied by overt discussion.

The important questions now are: (i) What is this method of inquiry? (ii) Does this characterisation of empiricism conform to Anderson's? and (iii) Can Anderson's empiricism be construed as (a) rejecting all assumptions including theological assumptions, (b) rejecting the notions of soul, mind, forms, ideas, etc., and in particular, (c) adhering to one method of inquiry which is founded in observing? There can be no doubt Anderson would have rejected all theological assumptions, and equally, as shown above, he rejected all such notions as ideas, concepts, sense data, universals, knowledge and mental entities of all kinds. It has already been shown that there is a major problem for this interpretation because Anderson upheld the notion of mind. But it has also been shown that he was ambivalent towards that notion, and it has been argued, on other grounds entirely, that he would have been more consistent had he rejected the notion of mind. Most importantly, it will be argued at considerable length that what is central to Anderson's empiricism, to his doctrine of one way of being, to his notion of a single logic, to his criticism of all divisions in reality or different kinds of truths, is the thesis that there is only one method of inquiry: that based on observing and arguing.

Although different from the more commonly "accepted" (rationalist) accounts, the accounts of rationalism and empiricism put forward here accurately reflect

the opposition between the two. Granting (i) that some emendation to Anderson's core position is necessary [as argued p.23 above], and granting (ii) the need to remove all appearance of metaphysics from his core position or empiricism, it is also being argued that --

(a) Anderson's core philosophical position -- his approach to logic and philosophy in general, and his empiricism, realism, pluralism and determinism -- do not depend in any way upon the notion of mind (or any of the paraphernalia of mind); and

(b) Anderson's major doctrines, his empiricism (the doctrine of one way of being), realism, pluralism and determinism (his claims concerning "things") can be interpreted non-metaphysically in line with the definition of empiricism just outlined above.

These contentions will be argued for in this Part. One problem is where to start, and another what areas of Anderson's thought to cover. It is proposed to review, in the first place, rationalist conceptions of method and logic: then turn to a limited range of terms which Anderson repeatedly used, but seldom explained; and even so hardly ever in a full and systematic way. These are "logic", "propositions', "inquiry", "criticism", "discourse" and "dialectic". The findings from these studies will then be considered in relation to the doctrine of one way of being, and against the wider background of Anderson's thought. In Chapter 9, the empirical method of inquiry claimed to be implicit in Anderson's work will be described in considerable detail. It will be argued that this method derives from, and conforms very closely to, the dialectical method employed by Socrates and developed in the dialogues of Plato, and which was further refined in the seventeenth century, developing into what is loosely recognised as scientific method.

§2 Rationalist Method and Mind

It is necessary, first of all, to show that the rationalist conceptions of method and logic are founded upon, and absolutely dependent upon, the notion of mind. Descartes' method of doubt is frequently referred to in the philosophical literature but (a) what that method is supposed to achieve, (b) precisely what it consists of (c) what the steps or procedures of that method are, and (d) whether it is a completely legitimate method (or can be justified) are questions that are not easily answered. A comprehensive survey

of Descartes' views on method is out of the question here, but a few significant points can be made. Descartes deals with method in various ways in three important works, the full titles of which are given here because they are important in themselves: *Rules for the Direction of the Mind, or the Regulae; Discourse on the Method of rightly conducting one's reason and seeking the truth in the sciences, or the Discourse on Method; Meditations on First Philosophy in which are demonstrated the existence of God and the distinction between the human soul and the body, or the Meditations.*

It is clear from the title of the *Regulae -- Rules for the Direction of the Mind* -- as well as from specific rules, that Descartes conceived of the method set out therein, as a fundamentally mental process, as relating to processes carried out by or within the mind, and that he meant what he said, and intended his rules to somehow direct the mind. We must understand from this and other things which Descartes said that he took the mind to be absolutely central to inquiry: the active agent in that process. These assumptions are made perfectly clear from a consideration of the specific rules, especially the first two, which state:

> *Rule One.* The aim of our studies should be to direct the mind with a view to forming true and sound judgements about whatever comes before it.
>
> *Rule Two.* We should attend only to those objects of which our minds seem capable of having certain and indubitable cognition. [CSM, I, p.9-10]

Rule Two sets very severe limits on what the method relates to: only what is certain and indubitable, and only what comes before our mind's eye, a point repeated in Rule Five [Ibid, p.20]. When Descartes talks about the mind's eye he is following Plato and talking about things in the world of intellect, not the world of sense [c.f. Ibid p.25, 35, 36]. The objects of Descartes' method -- the "objects proposed for study" [Rule Three, Ibid, p.13] -- are not physical objects outside us, but ideas or propositions: "whatever comes before" the mind can only be mental entities: ideas or propositions, not "outside" objects, which view is consistent with Descartes' developed in his ***Treatise on Man*** [1629-1633; Ibid, I. p.105-6]. The "objects of which our minds seem capable of having certain and indubitable cognition" are ideas: what Descartes later called "clear and distinct" ideas. When, in Rule Five Descartes says "We shall be following this method exactly if we first reduce complicated and obscure propositions step by step to simpler ones, and then, starting with the intuition of the simplest ones of all, try to ascend through

the same steps to a knowledge of the rest" [Ibid, p.20] he is not talking about physical things, but some kinds of mental entities. This is borne out in Rule Six, when he says: *"In order to distinguish the simplest things from those that are complicated and to set them out in an orderly manner"* [Ibid, p.21]; he is not talking about such things as heavenly bodies or plants, and "setting them out in an orderly manner", but ideas or propositions.

Descartes recognised only two "actions of the intellect by means of which we are able to arrive at a knowledge of things with no fear of being mistaken" [CSM,I,14]. These are intuition and deduction and he says:

> By 'intuition' I do not mean the fluctuating testimony of the senses or the deceptive judgement of the imagination as it botches things together, but the conception of a clear and attentive mind, which is so easy and distinct that there can be no room for doubt about what we are understanding. Alternatively, and this comes to the same thing, intuition is the indubitable conception of a clear and attentive mind which proceeds solely from the light of reason. [Ibid]

By deduction, he means "the inference of something as following necessarily from some other propositions which are known with certainty" which is achieved "through a continuous and uninterrupted movement of thought in which each individual proposition is clearly intuited" [Ibid, p.15]. Intuition and deduction, then, are processes of the mind and as such are completely internal and private to a particular individual. No person can possibly observe or check upon these processes in another's mind -- or carry them out. The complementary notions of doubt and certainty indicate that Descartes' method is concerned with the mind, as Sturgeon, Martin and Grayling indicate: "Certainty is a psychological state that one can be in independently of whether one is right or wrong' [1995, p.51].

There can be no doubt that Descartes' method in the ***Regulae***, as the title indicates, is concerned with the mind as it performs processes with mental entities, ideas and propositions, and the rules are to somehow direct the mind in these processes. It is not in any sense an empirical method concerned with the study of physical objects. It must be recognised that Descartes' method of analysing and comparing ideas is not applicable to the study of "physical objects": stars, rocks, plants, animals, humans. So by definition, as it were (or by the nature of his conception of method), Descartes' method has no direct bearing on empirical or observational procedures, or "empirical" method.

It should be recognised that Descartes' rules are completely incompatible with what we regard as the single most distinctive method used in science: the method of hypothesis. In Rules Two and Three, Descartes stresses the importance of beginning our studies with what is "certain and indubitable"; "we ought to investigate what we can clearly and evidently intuit or deduce with certainty, and not what other people have thought or what we ourselves conjecture" [Ibid, p.10, 13]. The whole tenor of that approach is contrary to the spirit of science which depends upon scholarship, upon a willingness to consider as true what we suspect is not; upon the willingness to speculate when we don't know; upon the willingness to employ the method of hypothesis in such cases, and submit "dubious" propositions to rigorous criticism and testing. Descartes' method is quite incompatible with the method of hypothesis and the "spirit" of inquiry that distinguishes science, and which was a distinctive mark of Socratic inquiry. Descartes' method of the *Regulae* may be appropriate for mathematical problems, but not empirical studies.

There is something paradoxical about the notion of "rules for the direction of the mind". According to Descartes, the mind is the unique component of every individual human: it is that part of us whose whole essence consists in thinking: it is the thinking part of any human, and it has only two functions: "the perception of the intellect and ... the determination of the will" [CSM, Vol.1, p.307; see p.66 above]. Because of this, we can draw an analogy between the mind of an individual and a lone sailor who is the sole captain of a ship [c.f. Beck, 1952, p.23]. Insofar as the ship operates in a purposive way, the sailor alone is responsible for the ship's performance. Similarly, but with even greater authority, the mind of a person controls whatever that person does. In this context, it appears quite incongruous to stipulate "rules for the direction of the mind", for who or what (apart from God) could have any overriding influence on a person's mind as Descartes conceived it? Alternatively, how can the captain of a ship be solely in charge of it and totally responsible for it, yet be directed by rules? Suppose someone (meaning some individual mind) accepted Descartes' rules. How would they (their mind) impose those rules upon themselves (that is, upon itself)? Or what would they do to redirect their own mind: what would they do in order to direct their mind to do something other than what it would ordinarily do? Assuming that "the mind" has a character of its own, and it is that character which directs and determines the processes of its thinking, it seems incongruous that something else -- a set of rules, perhaps laid down by some other human -- should assume

the role of mind (perceiving, willing, thinking), and direct what the mind does and that nothing else does.

So the vital questions that must be raised about Descartes' conception of method, especially of rules of method for the direction of the mind, are: "How could such rules possibly work? How could they possibly override the functions and autonomy of any mind, especially the will? Where could such rules come from such that they could be superior to the mind in the very functions which are its essence and within its own exclusive domain?" Then we would need to inquire how anyone could possibly check on the method that another person employs? How could we test, or validate such a method (in another person's mind)? How could we test, prove or disprove the findings of such a method since, in every specific case, it would be the operation of a different mind, and therefore the manifestation of a different method? It appears, therefore, that Descartes' method is, and is inevitably bound to be, a completely private, personal, unobservable, untestable method, forever excluded from public scrutiny. This case has some affinities with Wittgenstein's discussion of a private language [1974, §243ff; see also Ayer, Rhees and Cook in Pitcher, 1966], but the autonomy of the will is a distinct problem.

In Part 2 of the *Discourse*, Descartes repeats in a much simplified form the rules of the *Regulae*. But the purpose of these rules is not absolutely clear. He works towards them with a very long preamble. The aims implied in this preamble may be compared to two quite distinct aims or processes suggested in the title of the *Discourse*: (i) rightly conducting one's reason and (ii) seeking the truth in the sciences. It is certainly not clear that these two processes are identical, and if Descartes believed they are, he offered no proof of, or real evidence for, that view. But these two aims do not coincide with others outlined in the preamble: (iii) at one place it was to conduct his life better [CSM, I,117]; (iv) in another he said "My plan has never gone beyond trying to reform my own thoughts and construct them upon a foundation which is all my own" [Ibid, p.118]; (v) then he said he was seeking "the true method of attaining the knowledge within my mental capabilities" [Ibid, p.119]; (vi) and finally he sought "some other method" to those of logic, geometric analysis and algebra, which had their advantages, but not their defects [Ibid, p.120]; but he does not say what their purpose is. Clearly, the purposes of the methods of logic and mathematics are not to enable Descartes to conduct his life better, to reform his thoughts, to attain "the knowledge within (his) mental capabilities" or to seek the truth in the sciences.

Clearly, there is an illegitimate admixture of quite different and incompatible aims here, and the net result is that we are quite unclear what the aim(s) of Descartes' method is. If the aim of the method is to be a universal method of discovering truths -- which it both does and does not appear to be -- then its very personal nature is totally inappropriate. On the other hand, if this method is indeed a very personal one, then it has no claim whatsoever to be an appropriate one for inquiry in general or the sciences. Other than recommending their brevity, Descartes does not explain how he came upon the four rules or how he would prove them to be "sufficient" for whatever his purpose was. His faith in their adequacy and efficacy is not subjected to critical scrutiny, which is just as well since, while the matter of aims is as unclear or ambiguous as it is we do not know what the criteria of adequacy or efficacy of these rules would be.

Any real understanding of Descartes' philosophy must resolve the question of what his method is and aims to achieve: whether it is an entirely "personal" method suitable for Descartes' private purposes (and anyone else who cares to adopt it), or whether it is a genuinely universal method of inquiry appropriate for all inquirers and all subjects including "first philosophy" and all sciences, as the titles of Descartes' three works (above) suggest. It is noteworthy that at times Descartes speaks of science as if it is a personal thing [CSM,I,117], which may be appropriate if science is identified with knowledge. However this appears to be an erroneous view. Science does not appear to be a matter of personal knowledge, and it seems to be contrary to the notion of science to suggest a scientist can arbitrarily pick and choose whatever method suits them. Science is a public thing: is widely shared and participated in; and its method is not a matter of personal preference or an arbitrary thing. The question of the universality, validity and reliability of a method of inquiry, its applicability to all individual inquirers, all sciences and all subjects, is crucial. Clearly, a method selected because it happens to suit an individual's taste, temperament or purposes may be selected for the "wrong" reasons: because it reinforces that person's prejudices, or leads to some desired result. In other words, it may be an arbitrary method. This is not amenable to science, or any serious inquiry. Whatever they are, the "standards" or criteria of a method of inquiry which is appropriate to all inquirers and all subjects have to be brought into the open, examined, tested, or in some way evaluated and seen to be justified. Descartes' method does not meet these requirements.

It is concluded here that rationalism necessarily links the notion of inquiring method with its central notion of mind. The corollary of that view is that any "method" or logic which is based in the notions of mind or mental entities -- ideas, concepts, *a priori*, *a posteriori*, analytic or necessary truths -- is a rationalist one. The following outline attempts to show that this conjunction of the notions of method and mind has confounded logical theory, conceptions of scientific method, philosophy and science.

The history of logic since the middle ages has been infected with the rationalist presumption that logic is concerned with operations of the mind: synthesis, analysis and reasoning. It is interesting to note that John Stuart Mill, regarded as an empiricist [Speake, 1979, p.214], took up the rationalist conception of logic as based in the notion of mind and mental processes. He considered the definition of logic as "the science of reasoning, as well as an art" [1952, Introduction §2, p.2], but rejected it because the word "reasoning" is ambiguous [Ibid], and "the province of logic will involve several **operations of the intellect** not usually considered to fall within the meaning of the terms Reasoning and Argumentation" [Ibid, §3, p.3; my emphasis]. He therefore adopted the definition of logic "as the science which **treats of the operations of the human understanding** in the pursuit of truth" [Ibid; my emphasis]. However, he very quickly retracted from the consequences of this definition, assigning all its difficulties to metaphysics, affirming that questions about the "objects of intuition or consciousness" have "never been considered a portion of logic" [Ibid, §4, p.4]. This manoeuvre has two consequences: (i) it means that although logic is "the science which **treats of the operations of the human understanding** in the pursuit of truth" [Ibid, §3, p.3], it does not treat "of the operations of the human understanding" because it does not treat of the objects the understanding operates upon or with; (ii) it means that certain studies, namely metaphysics and mind, fall outside the realm of logic. The first of these appears to be a total retraction, if not contradiction; the second implies metaphysics and the study of mind are not subject to logic: a curious thesis.

A similar illogicality occurs in Book VI where Mill is concerned to deal with the Laws of Mind. He begins by disavowing any need for his treatise to consider "What the Mind is, as well as what Matter is, or any other question respecting Things in themselves, as distinguished from their sensible manifestations" [Bk. VI, Ch.IV, §1, p.555]; but he presupposes mind exists; that thoughts, emotions, volitions and sensations exist and are "truly states

of Mind"; he presumes laws of mind exist and are laws "of mental phenomena"; and he presumes that if the word "mind" means anything, "it means that which feels" [Ibid]. He does not seem to consider that "the meaning" of a word does not establish the existence of such things. He confidently states --

(i) that the distinction between matter and mind, or "between the internal and the external world will always remain as a matter of classification" [Ibid];

(ii) "The phenomena of mind, then, are the various feelings of our nature, both those improperly called physical and those peculiarly designated as mental; and by the laws of mind I mean the laws according to which those feelings generate one another." [Ibid]

(iii) "When a state of mind is produced by a state of mind, I call the law concerned in the case a law of Mind." [Ibid, §2]

As with the earlier British empiricists, Mill cannot justify his claims on mind, evades any examination of the notion of mind, and like them resorts to non-empirical methods in order to state them. But in his case, the difficulties and inconsistencies in appealing to mind as the basis of logic, while evading the implications of that thesis, are very obvious.

The view that logic is the science of reasoning, that is, based on the notion of mind and concerned with mind's activities, is adopted by many subsequent logicians. Keynes, for instance, said:

> Logic may be defined as the science which investigates the general principles of valid thought. Its object is to discuss the characteristics of judgments, regarded not as psychological phenomena but as expressing our knowledge and beliefs; and, in particular, it seeks to determine the conditions under which we are justified in passing from given judgments to other judgments that follow from them.
>
> As thus defined, logic has in view an ideal; it is concerned fundamentally with how we ought to think, and only indirectly and as a means to an end with how we actually think. [1928, p.1]

Keynes discussed whether logic is "concerned with thoughts or with things" [Ibid, p.1-2], but provided no satisfactory answer; and the ensuing discussion treats of "terms", "names", 'concepts", "propositions" and "judgments" almost indifferently, although Keynes recognised that "Those who deal with judgments

from the logical standpoint must when pressed admit that they can deal with them only as expressed in language, and all their illustrations necessarily consist of judgments expressed in language. But a *judgment expressed in language* is precisely what is meant by a *proposition*" [Ibid, p.66]. The exact nature of, and relationship between, judgments and propositions is not explained, but it seems to be implied that propositions are verbal, whereas judgments, as "pure thought", are not.

Jevons attempted an interesting variant of the rationalist thesis that logic is concerned with the mind and the mental process of reasoning. He said: "LOGIC may be most briefly defined as the **Science of Reasoning.** It is more commonly defined, however, as the **Science of the Laws of Thought**, and some logicians think it desirable to specify still more accurately that it is the Science of the Formal, or of the Necessary Laws of Thought" [1909, p.1]. He claimed that "The laws of thought are natural laws with which we have no power to interfere, and which are of course not to be in any way confused with the artificial laws of a country, which are invented by men and can be altered by them" [Ibid]. He discussed other invariable natural laws in astronomy and chemistry to which he equated the Laws of Thought. He said all humans vary in such a way that it is impossible to classify them in ways that people of the same class will act in the same manner under the same circumstances; but despite this, they all conform to certain principles of reasoning:

> Thus if two things are identical with a third common thing they are identical with each other. This is a law of thought of a very simple and obvious character, and we may observe concerning it, --
>
> 1. That all people think in accordance with it, and agree that they do so **as soon as they understand its meaning.**
>
> 2. That they think in accordance with it whatever may be the subject about which they are thinking. [Ibid, p.2-3; my emphasis]

According to Jevons, these Laws of Thought are like natural laws: having no exceptions; "By a **Law of Thought** we mean a certain uniformity or agreement which exists and **must exist** [my emphasis] in the modes in which all persons think and reason, so long as they do not make what we call mistakes, or fall into self-contradiction and fallacy" [Ibid, p.1]. This is exactly comparable to saying: "Sometimes people reason validly and sometimes invalidly; and when they reason validly, they do so by a necessary law of thought", while ignoring

the fact that sometimes they do not reason validly, and that valid reasoning is not an invariant process amongst humans.

Like Keynes, Jevons vacillated between what the subjects of thought (or the basic units of logic) are: terms, ideas, concepts, words or things. For example, he said "every assertion or statement expresses the agreement or difference of **two things**, or of **two general notions**. In putting the assertion or statement into words, we must accordingly have words suitable for **drawing the attention of the mind** to the things which are compared, as well as words indicating the result of the comparison, that is to say, the fact whether they agree or differ" [Ibid, p.16; my emphases].

It would be possible to uncover the same inconsistencies and illogicalities in other logic text-books, but that is not necessary. The important points being made are:

(i) that it has been traditional for post-renaissance logicians to follow the rationalists and treat logic as concerned with the mind, (intellect, understanding) or the process of reasoning;

(ii) that this always leads to inconsistency and confusion about --
   (a) the laws of thought,
   (b) logical rules or principles,
   (c) the objects of thought: whether they are words, terms, ideas, concepts or things;

(iii) that the fiction cannot be maintained unless (by inconsistency and confusion) the student is led to believe that somehow -- by the device of "reference", "denotation" or "extension" of terms -- logic is not only concerned with ideas and concepts, but with things;

(iv) in short, the whole theory (or conception) of logic -- the theory and practice of formal logic -- has been contaminated and subverted by the notions of mind and ideas, just as the whole field of philosophy since Descartes has been; which is why that period has been dominated by the entirely new philosophical subject of epistemology and the problem of knowledge.

It is quite possible, then, to detect the influence of rationalism (mind) in the field of logic, or the theory of (inquiring) method. Consistent with the accounts of rationalism and empiricism put forward previously, it will be argued that inquiring method and logic do not depend upon the notion of mind; and this applies to Anderson's view.

§3 Anderson's Metaphysical or Ontological View of Logic and Propositions

Before dealing with the relation of the notion of mind to Anderson's logic or method of inquiry, another problem must be dealt with: the intrusion of metaphysics. At the end of Part I [p.24 above] it was concluded that, in certain respects -- in the areas of (a) his doctrine of one way of being, (b) his claims about the conditions of existence, (c) his quest for a theory of categories, and (d) his general claims about "things" -- Anderson certainly appeared to have ventured into metaphysics, and these ventures created insoluble problems within his own logic, and therefore in the exposition of his core views. In this section it will be shown that the appearance of metaphysics also infects Anderson's views of logic and propositions, and in Section 5 below, these views will be re-interpreted (or expressed in an alternative form) so as to remove this appearance of metaphysics.

Commentators' accounts of Anderson's view of logic and propositions

Since Anderson did not provide a systematic account of his core philosophical views -- of the nature of logic, inquiring method or discourse, of the relation between empiricism and logic, of the conditions of existence and the categories -- we have to go to other writers for them, especially for an account of his "deeper" views on the proposition. It is fortunate that several of his most outstanding former students and colleagues have given outlines in this area.

For those unfamiliar with Anderson's views, it is vital to understand that what he meant by logic is completely unlike what most contemporary philosophers mean: a deductive system, specifically Russell's calculi. What Passmore had to say on Anderson's logic is of considerable importance:

> In general, Anderson's logic, like his psychology, will strike strangely on the ears of his contemporaries. ... it was the traditional formal logic which he chose to expound and to develop, defending it against its critics, whether they were Russellians, pragmatists or idealists.
>
> To put the matter thus, however, is certainly to underestimate Anderson's contributions to logic. For, if his logic is

> traditional in its allegiance to the "four forms" and its emphasis upon syllogism, no topic in the traditional logic comes out of his hands quite as it entered them. His logic is philosophical, thought through consistently, as the traditional logic of the text-books is not. ... If his logic is traditional, the tradition is worn with a difference.
>
> What he would with special vehemence oppose is the doctrine, now almost universal, that logic is a calculus. [SIEP, p.xv]

Several points should be emphasised here. Passmore makes it clear that Anderson did not accept the Russellian conception of logic as a deductive system, but he did not explain how Anderson did conceive of it, and we will not find any direct account in Anderson's published work. Passmore also makes it clear that Anderson developed and defended his own version of the traditional logic of four categorical forms of propositions, but does not make it clear that Anderson advanced arguments (which he believed were sound) that there are only four forms of propositions, thus disposing of hypothetical and modal forms. Passmore goes on to discuss other features of Anderson's view of logic, but he does not stress how absolutely fundamental logic (in a formal and informal sense) was to Anderson's position.

Other important facts about Anderson's work in logic should be understood. In about 1923, he submitted to Orage, a man whom he greatly admired [Anderson, in Anderson, Cullum and Lycos (eds), 1982, p.241] the manuscript for a logic text-book, which was turned down, and according to Kennedy this disappointment had a life-long effect on Anderson [1995, p.68]. After arriving in Sydney, Anderson delivered lectures in formal logic, and a number of excellent sets of student notes have survived [Sydney University Archives]. Several major papers in SIEP are devoted entirely to the exposition of aspects of his views on logic; long passages in others; and logical issues are never entirely absent, even in ethics or social theory. What has not been sufficiently recognised is the great originality and importance of his field theory of causality which is based in, and emerges out of, his formal logic [Mackie, 1974, mentions this theory]. It is not clear whether Ryle understood all this when he somewhat provocatively attempted to bestir Anderson into public discussion of his position, and made the very mistaken and curious claim that "Anderson seems to be oblivious to any logical differences save the difference between qualities and relations" [Ryle, 1950, p.143], followed by the very ill-informed remark: "Anderson's logical alphabet is so exiguous that one wonders where he got his 'logic' from. Not from Aristotle ... " [Ibid, p.146; see Mackie's reply to Ryle, 1951; also comments by Baker, 1986, p.xvi; and Kennedy, 1995, p.161,

187-188]. At any rate, in this connection, it is worthwhile noting that Davie praised Anderson as one of Scotland's finest logicians, saying "he exhibits a mastery of the techniques of formal logic unequalled in Scotland since the days of Lokert the logician, and John Muir in the sixteenth century" [1986, p.133]. But this comment, important as it is, does not tell us how Anderson conceived of logic. For that, we must consider the views of some of Anderson's colleagues, and probe extensively into his own writings.

Mackie said that:

> A complete presentation of Anderson's system should start with a full account of his logic, and go on to show how his other theories are developed with its help. For Anderson holds that logic is also what we might call general ontology: it studies the formal features of facts, of what is objectively real. These general formal features do not in themselves determine what is the case ... but they do determine a method of enquiry for all fields. Logic tells us what sorts of fact to look out for, and, what is even more important, it rules out as illogical certain views and certain ways of approaching special questions which inevitably result in confusion. [Mackie, 1962b, p.266]

Mackie went on to say that 'One of Anderson's distinctive doctrines is that things are propositional, that the propositional form gives a clue to the general character of what objectively exists. This doctrine links together his insistence on objectivity, on the one way of being, on plurality and complexity, and his rejection of necessary or self-explanatory entities, of universals and pure particulars" [Ibid, p.277].

As presented by Mackie, Anderson's view appears to be that we can learn about important features of reality from the character of propositions (because reality, or real things, share certain features with propositions or are propositions) which, on the face of it, appears to be both a metaphysical claim, and an extremely odd one at that, as if propositions were such special things that they, by their own character, inform us about the nature or structure of "reality" or "facts": as if they were some important intermediary in the acquisition of knowledge, that informed us about certain things which, otherwise, we could not find out.

Rose gave a somewhat similar account of Anderson's views of logic and propositions:

> Anderson has always been critical of the view that a logic can be philosophically neutral. He holds that it is impossible to present a general method without making assumptions about the nature of that on which the method is to be turned as an instrument, viz.,

> reality. ... Logical theory, the theory of method, the theory of the conditions of discourse, is not independent of philosophy, the theory of reality, the theory of the conditions of existence.
>
> ... Broadly speaking, Anderson's philosophy asserts an infinite plurality of infinitely complex situations, independent, but nevertheless interrelated and interacting in virtue of their occurrence in space and time. On this basis he works out his account of the conditions of existence. Whatever exists is subject to certain categories: general ones such as identity and difference, and more specific ones such as substance and causation. ...
>
> We have seen that the central notion in Anderson's philosophy (theory of reality) is the spatio-temporal situation, and that the central notion in his logic (theory of method) is the proposition. The majority of philosophers distinguish sharply between propositions (beliefs, knowledge) and situations (states of affairs, reality). ... On Anderson's view the relationship between propositions (beliefs) and situations (reality, existence) is not one of exclusion, not one that allows or requires intermediaries. When the proposition which a person believes is true, it is an independent (objective historical (spatio-temporal) situation. What exists, whether known or unknown, and what is believed, whether true or false, always has the propositional form; and the propositional form is the situational form. [1958, p.57-58]

In Rose's account of Anderson's views, we find a curious running together of terms which do not appear to be equivalent: a feature which will be shown to occur also in Anderson's writings. Logical theory is the theory of method, and this method is turned upon reality. This theory of method is also the theory of the conditions of discourse, and is not independent of the conditions of existence. The relation between propositions (or beliefs) and situations is not one of exclusion: the propositional form is the situational form. Furthermore, these claims about logic (the theory of method) also appear to be ontological or metaphysical claims -- about reality, one way of being, whatever exists, the conditions of existence and the categories. In an expanded version of the paper just cited, Rose stated that "Anderson took logic to be not a set of rules for manipulating strings of uninterpreted symbols but a general method for investigating actual situations ... Appeals to the 'conditions of discourse' when discussing philosophical problems would be futile, he said, unless the conditions of discourse are also 'conditions of existence', i.e. unless logic is grounded in ontology" [Rose, 1987, p.85]. Rose's statement that Anderson took logic to be a "general method for investigating" is absolutely crucial for the present thesis.

Passmore confirms the general metaphysical or ontological view of logic and the proposition outlined by the previous commentators:

> Logic, as Anderson sees it, describes the general structure of facts, including the relationships between facts. What are sometimes regarded as the supreme examples of logical truths, e.g. the principle of identity, are not, in his view, truths at all; they say nothing. ...
>
> Logic, as Anderson conceives it, incorporates what Mr Strawson has recently described as "descriptive metaphysics". It is neither about forms of language, nor about reasoning processes, nor about special-status entities, e.g. universals; it is about the most general features of facts. ... Every proposition, for Anderson, is about things of a certain description and offers a further description of them. ... Any entity is both specific and general. ... The logician is always concerned with "what is". He does not deduce an ontology from logic or a logic from ontology; rather, in discussing logic, he is already discussing ontology. [1962, p.xv-xvi]

In summary, Passmore confirms that Anderson's view of logic is somehow concerned with giving a most general account of "facts", "entities", "things", "occurrences", "what is", and this account is linked to an account of propositions and their features.

By far the fullest account of Anderson's view of logic and the proposition is given by Baker [1986]. He says: "Anderson's own account of Space, Time and the categories takes the form of giving a detailed account -- a logical and ontological elaboration -- of his view of propositions and situations as involving plurality and complexity" [Ibid, p.97]. Again, there is a connection between the spatio-temporality, plurality and complexity of situations and things on the one hand, and his account of propositions on the other. It appears the form or character of the proposition illuminates the features of real things or situations, for Baker goes on to say:

> **But when we attend to the form of the proposition** and expand on what is involved in the copula and the distinction between the propositional subject and predicate we can amplify our understanding of what it is for things to be in Space and Time. Thus, to say that things exist in Space and Time is equivalent to saying that things exist in propositional or situational form which, specified further, is to say that what the copula conveys is existence in infinite Space and Time, while reference to the subject and predicate enables us to understand further the joint, but differing, roles of Space and Time as conditions of existence. In this connection Anderson argues that we can regard Space as the form of togetherness of things and Time as the form of their distinctness, so that it is as spatial that things can have location and be propositional subjects and as temporal that they can have distinction or peculiarity and be predicates; that is,

> that Space and Time have these different functions within Space-Time just as the subject and predicate have different functions occurring together in the proposition. [Ibid,p.97-98; my emphasis]

Baker goes on to describe Arderson's view of "the complex nature of Space-Time", which was indebted to Alexander, and states "Having connected his account of Space and Time with the form of the proposition, Anderson goes on likewise to argue that what are further involved in being or spatio-temporality, the categories, are also involved in *being propositional*" [Ibid, p.98]. Baker then gives an account of Anderson's views of the categories, which Anderson derived from, or in conjunction with, his theory of the proposition. Anderson did not give any account of the categories in SIEP.

There can be little doubt that Anderson held some view of the proposition which related its features and implications with the features of things or situations in space and time. The four important sources cited agree on that. What appears to be common to each of these accounts is that analysis of propositions reveals to us features of things and situations. However, questions must be asked about the relation between things, situations or "facts" on the one hand, and propositions on the other [see p.182 below].

Before passing on, it should be emphasised that both Mackie and Rose say or imply that Anderson held that logic is method (although they do not elaborate on what that means), and that "things are propositional" (whatever that means); and all four commentators agree that Anderson viewed logic as ontology (Mackie), or as somehow revealing something about reality or existing things -- through the structure of "the" proposition.

Anderson's views on logic

The many claims which Anderson made about logic in SIEP are not systematic; rather, they are brief and almost offhand, sometimes cryptic, and on the whole perplexing. He spoke of a logic of events [p.54], a logic of existence [p.90], a logic of propositions [p.53], a logic of situations [p.107-8], a logic of things as historical [p.83] a logic of unqualified fact [p.177], and a predicative logic [p.148]. In one place he appears to refer to logic as a **doctrine** [p.53], in another as a **theory**: "the theory of things as historical" [p.80], which claims appear to conflict with other views he expressed -- for example, that philosophy is logic [p.59], that logic is dialectic [p.212], and logic is scientific method [p.195] -- since none of these would usually be considered a doctrine or a theory. Other claims he made about logic create

even greater difficulties of interpretation. If, as Mackie indicated, a "complete presentation of Anderson's system would start with a full account of his logic" [p.173 above], these difficulties and apparent conflicts must be cleared up or we cannot claim to understand Anderson as a systematic philosopher at all. With a view to clarifying Anderson's conception of logic, a number of statements he made are discussed under three interrelated and overlapping categories:

(i) ontological claims;
(ii) claims emphasising a **single** logic or **single** order of being;
(iii) claims which imply, but run together, a distinction between existing things a single order of being) on the one hand, and logic, discourse or propositions on the other, as does (ii) above.

These will be discussed briefly together. A reasonably large selection of passages in which Anderson discussed logic will be found in Appendix D, p.299ff below, and some very significant ones which form the basis of the following discussion are set out in Table 4, Appendix A, p.268 below. In referring to a "single way of being", "logic of events", "single order of events", "single logic of existence", "theory of being" and "the sorts of things that can be", all the passages in Table 4 make ontological claims. All but one make reference to a **single** way of being, a **single** order of events, a **single** logic of existence, **one** logic or theory of being, or a **single** level of investigation, and do so in such a way that we must assume a common connection, and that is with the doctrine of one way of being. All but one make some reference to logic in such a way that we must assume a connection between the ontological claims and logic, even in the one exception. All of this is consistent with the various claims made by the commentators discussed. However, several of these passages make connections between different categories as if they were equivalent; for example, between:

(1) (a) a single way of being (of observable things: *existence*)
(b) a pluralistic logic of events
(c) the propositional method
(d) a single historical order [SIEP, p.53]

(2) (a) a logic of propositions
(b) a logic of events [S/p.53]

(3) (a) the single order of *events*
(b) the single order of *propositions* [S/p.67]

(4) (a) a pluralistic position in which variously characterised and related things are recognised as existing in the same way (spatio-temporally)
(b) a single logic of existence [S/p.90]

(5) (a) one logic
(b) one theory of being [S/p.123-4]

(6) (a) things that can be *meant*
(b) things that can be [S/p.137]

(7) (a) a single logic
(b) a single way of being [S/p.212]

(8) (a) a single level of investigation
(b) a logic of events [S/p.247]

Each of these groups involves a term or expression which relates to discourse, and another which relates to some wider "reality" independent of discourse; for instance the propositional method relates to discourse whereas a single way of being and a single historical order relate to some wider "reality"; a logic of propositions relates to discourse while a logic of events appears to relate to a wider reality; the single order of *propositions* belongs to the realm of discourse while the single order of *events* relates to some wider order. These are not equivalences and there treatment as such requires justification.

Other equally baffling, unexplained passage relating to logic could be cited; for example, in arguing against indeterminism in human affairs, Anderson claimed "that there is no distinction whatever between man and nature ... that 'nature' means no more and no less than *what is*, and that a theory of the conditions of existence, embodying a general theory of causality, will apply indifferently to men and any other existing things"; and following that, "humanity is in any case included in the subject-matter of logic ('what is') and comes under the logical theory of causality" [SIEP, p.122]. Presumably

logic is some kind of study, and its subject-matter is all existing things. Other related claims are:

- "there is only one way of being" [S/p.3]
- "There are only facts, i.e., occurrences in space and time." [S/p.14]
- "'absolute' Space-Time is simply that in which things 'absolutely' exist" [S/p.33]
- Space-Time is "the medium in which things are" [S/p.67]
- "all things belong to the single order of events" [S/p.67]
- there is "a single way of being which all (the objects of science) have" [S/p.212]
- Space and Time are "the conditions of existence" [S/p.86]
- the pluralistic position recognises "variously characterised and related things" as "existing in the same way (spatio-temporally)" [S/p.90]

So it has been shown that Anderson made numerous unexplained claims in connection with logic, which appear to be "purely ontological", all of which are vital to an understanding of his core position. Obviously these are special sorts of claims, involving very peculiar terms. In order to explain and justify them, certain terms would have to be defined, and it certainly appears that defining a "way of being", "facts", "the conditions of existence", "Space-Time" or "the medium in which things are", would require superhuman skills. It has already been suggested that "one way of being" and "things" (which occurs here several times) cannot be terms in Anderson's logic; and the same would appear to apply to several of the others. It must also be asked whether Anderson (or anyone else) can use "the medium in which **things are**", "**what is**" or "sorts of things that **can be**" as terms. We can say certain things, for example lions, **are** Y's; but it doesn't make sense to say "Lions **are**". Similarly, we can talk about what **is** on the table, but not about "what is". These forms of expression are incompatible with Anderson's own logic of four forms, so when he speaks this way, he can be raised on his own petard; these are "all attempts to get behind" the proposition [see SIEP, p.5]. So are statements such as "There are only facts", "There is one way of being". At the very least, we are entitled to an explanation of such terms and claims; and Anderson does not provide any such explanation. But the crucial point is that none of these ontological claims explains what logic is; rather, they obscure what it could be

On the basis of the foregoing evidence, it would appear that Anderson's "ontological" view of logic could be summarised in this way:

> There is only one way of being: being or existence in Space and Time; there are only facts. Logic is the theory of being (or of facts?); its subject matter is "what is", or all existing things (including humans and non-humans); it will involve a theory of the conditions of existence and a general theory of causality. In classifying propositions, we go to the sorts of things that can be. The theory of being involves numerous general claims about "things" [see p.179 above].

This account has close affinities with those outlined by Mackie, Rose, Passmore and Baker above, except that Rose claimed Anderson took **philosophy** to be the theory of reality, and logic as the theory of **method**, while the view just outlined suggests logic is a theory of being, existence or reality. There is insufficient discussion of these issues in SIEP to resolve that matter. The problem is that this theory of being does not, as it stands, provide a theory of method or a theory of inquiry, or show how formal logic and valid argument would relate to the theory of being. The two appear to be utterly distinct, and the connection between them is not explained, but appears mysterious. On this view, it would appear that some principles related to Space-Time and being stand over all particular things and events, and over all propositions, which seems to set up some kinds of "ultimates", which is precisely the sort of view which Anderson classified as rationalist.

§4 Anderson's Ontological Claims about Propositions

Although, as Rose said [p.174 above], the proposition is the central notion in Anderson's logic, there is no systematic account of propositions in SIEP, and all that can be done here is to refer to commentators [see above], or draw attention to certain major points in various scattered passages. Anderson believed he had demonstrated that there are only four categorical forms of propositions [c.f. SIEP, p.133,147]; that conditionals are merely a variant of these [S/p.147]; that so-called relational arguments can be treated in a syllogistic logic, and that only then can we get a distinction between valid and invalid arguments based on form alone, not content [S/p.148ff]. He argued that the significance of modals and their logical relations is retained only by ultimately interpreting them categorically [S/p.177ff]. He argued that propositions are, in a sense, the elements of discourse or logic [S/p.4-5]. He maintained that all terms in propositions can function equally as subjects or

predicates, this distinction being one of function [S/p.116]. Broadly speaking, the subject of a proposition locates, and the predicate describes, and so: "... every term, as a possible description of something else, has universality or characterises, and, as a possible indication of something else, has particularity or locates" [S/p.117]. Those parts of a proposition which are not terms (neither subject nor predicate) indicate its form: the signs of quantity and quality [S/p.138], and the copula, which indicates occurrence or (in a negative proposition) non-occurrence: "... what is 'proposed' or supposed in a proposition is a certain state of affairs, and ... whoever believes the proposition takes that state of affairs to have actually occurred -- as he indicates by the use of the copula 'is'" [S/p.21]. In summary, "In terms of occurrence, ..., we can distinguish the functions of subject, predicate and copula; the subject is the region within which the occurrence takes place, the predicate is the sort of occurrence it is, and the copula is its occurring" [S/p.117] Propositions are inextricably related to serious discourse and what the participants believe:

> In general, then, when a person formulates a proposition, the copula indicates that he thinks something has occurred, and the terms ... indicate *what* he thinks has occurred. In other words, a proposition is something which can be thought to have occurred or not to have occurred. ... the proposition or judgment is true, when the supposed situation *has* occurred. ... believing something and believing that it has occurred are the same thing. ... We cannot think of situations as more or less occurring or as conditionally occurring. ... there can be no intermediate stage between absolute occurrence and absolute non-occurrence. [S/p.22]

This is the briefest possible outline of Anderson's view of the proposition.

A major concern here, however, is not just Anderson's formal account of propositions, but, as indicated by the commentators above, the wider, ontological claims which he attempted to base on the proposition. Arguing against the notion of universals, and for his own view that all terms are both particular and general -- for example, that Descartes is both a particular, and in some sense unique, human, but is, at the same time, a thing of a general kind: human -- he argued that this was brought out in any proposition:

> Accordingly, we do not require to introduce repetition in order to understand a thing's being of a certain sort; **a single proposition tells us that**, and we have no occasion to think of the "sort" as a peculiar kind of "recurrent" entity. But there is no more difficulty about having propositions which tell us that other things are of that sort than about having propositions which tell us that that thing is of other sorts or has other characters. Any occurrence is the occurrence of a certain sort of thing; **that is**

> **already indicated in the inter-relation of the constituents of any one proposition.** [SIEP, p.119; my emphases]

As did the commentators accounts, this passage suggests that it is through a consideration of propositions that we learn about the fundamental, spatio-temporal and causal "character" of things. If we were to adopt these ontological claims at all, it would seem more logical to say that what we assert propositionally reflects the spatio-temporal and causal nature of things (which we implicitly recognise in our interactions with them), rather than attribute these features to propositions themselves.

Critical comment

Some critical comment is in order. It is significant that Anderson was not consistent in what he said about propositions. He spoke of situations, states of affairs, events, occurrences, and facts. He equated situations with occurrences [S/p.183], and facts with situations [S/p.185]. All of these terms raise great problems. Firstly, as with "things", there can be no logical opposite of situations, for example; there cannot be (and we cannot observe, or refer to) a non-situation (or non-state-of-affairs, or non-event, etc.). Secondly, according to Anderson, there are "distinguishable states of affairs in any situation whatever" [S/p.40]: so we cannot point to a state of affairs as we can point to a horse or a flower because anything we point to involves situations within situations [S/p.167], states of affairs within states of affairs. But he also equated propositions with states of affairs [S/p.40,56], or with complex states of affairs [S/p.12] ; he said that a **true** proposition is a fact [S/p.22], and as shown above, he spoke of "a logic of propositions or events" as if propositions and events were the same.

It is a major contention of this dissertation that we cannot speak in this way: we cannot use "things", "situations", "states of affairs", "events", "occurrences" or "facts" as terms as if "they" could be observed and discussed in the same way that we observe and discuss stars, rocks, trees, animals, etc. So if we equate "propositions" with "things", "situations", etc., we necessarily transfer the same sort of problem and criticism to propositions.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, let us suppose that we do understand these terms, and we understand that it is a situation, a state of affairs, or a fact, that a specific plant in front of us is green, or is a grevillea; and this situation, state of affairs or fact is independent of us, and does not depend on anyone observing it, perceiving it, knowing it or remembering it

[c.f., SIEP, p.33, 45]. What is the situation? It would appear that it is something like "this-plant's-being-green" or "this green thing's being a plant". But it is also the situation (or part of this situation, etc.), that this plant is illuminated by the sun and is secured to the soil by a complex root system; that this plant and soil are beside a river, and are located on the east coast of the Australian continent; and the plant, soil, river and continent are revolving around the earth's axis, and along with the earth, revolving around the sun. These are all parts of the situation; none of them can be denied or excluded from the situation if we are to speak in that way. We could also describe a whole host of "facts" that are part of this situation at the micro-level: the plant's consisting of trunk, roots, branches, leaves, and the branches and leaves consisting of various cells, structures, and chemicals, etc. All of these are undeniable or un-excludable aspects, parts or features of the situation. In other words, adopting Anderson's own way of approaching such things, any situation is complex and infinitely complex [SIEP, p.128, 135]; there are no limits ("up" or "down") upon a situation. We cannot be specific about a situation, and if that applied to propositions, we could never assert precisely what we mean. On the other hand, we do not and cannot in one assertion assert the sort of complexity just shown to be involved in situations. There are other difficulties in any attempt to identify propositions with situations. We are said to **assert** and **believe** propositions [SIEP, p.56, 13]; we cannot say a situation which is independent of us, independent of anyone's perceiving it, believing it, etc., is asserted or believed. We can suppose a proposition is true; but if a certain situation obtains (or exists), it cannot be said to be supposed. Propositions have two (or more) terms, a subject, a predicate, a copula, and logical form; it doesn't make sense to say a **situation** (for example, this-plant's-being-green or this-green-thing's-being-a-plant) has a subject, predicate, copula or logical form. It seems to be perfectly clear that on any view propositions are related to and confined to discourse, whereas situations, states of affairs, and events are not. (The case with "facts" is somewhat ambiguous.)

Anderson was also inconsistent in describing what the relation is between people, believing, knowing, etc., and propositions. He said --

(a) that people believe propositions: "what is believed (the proposition)" [SIEP, p.21]; "whoever believes the proposition" [Ibid];
(b) what we know "consists of true propositions" [SIEP, p.56; my emphasis];
(c) we have "a direct knowledge of propositions" [SIEP, p.169];

(d) something "is proposed or supposed in a proposition" [SIEP, p.21];
(e) people formulate propositions [SIEP, p.22].

There is some kind of inconsistency in saying we have "a direct knowledge of propositions" on the one hand, and on the other, what we know "consists of propositions"; there appears to be an inconsistency in saying we have "a direct knowledge of propositions" and that something "is proposed ... **in** a proposition"; there is certainly an inconsistency in saying we have "a direct knowledge of propositions" and that we **formulate** propositions, especially if propositions are identified with situations, for we cannot be said to formulate situations even if we have direct knowledge of them.

It was noted previously that in relation to logic, Anderson ran together terms which appear to belong to different categories, and he did this also with the terms "propositional" or "situational": "The force of this propositional or situational realism is commonly concealed ..." [SIEP, p.169]. He suggested that "things" are propositional when he said: "And, in general, it cannot be maintained either that the proposition is our way of understanding things which in themselves are not propositional" [SIEP, p.4]. He actually said "there is no logical distinction between things and propositions" [SIEP, p.218]. It was noted that Rose attributed to Anderson the view that "the propositional form is the situational form" [1958, p.57-58]. Now if Anderson wanted to say either, or both, that propositions are situational and/or situations are propositional, he would be required to distinguish propositions and situations, otherwise such remarks are totally vacuous. So it appears that on the basis of things that Anderson said, we must distinguish between propositions and situations, states of affairs, events, occurrences. And, in fact, Anderson did so: he made it clear that he believed propositions were related to discourse: "The empiricist, like Socrates, adopts the attitude of considering things **in terms of what can be said about them, i.e., in propositions.**" [SIEP, p.4; my emphasis.] No matter how we look at Anderson's view of propositions, we are forced to make some distinction between propositions, situations, events, occurrences, etc.; and there can be no doubt that in the one vital place just cited, Anderson did make such a distinction, placing propositions firmly in the realm of discourse. It is not possible for Anderson to maintain that propositions are **what is said** (that is, belong to the realm of discourse), and that propositions are situations (in the realm of things in space-time independent of us). It should be noted that it is only on the basis of the identification of propositions with situations that the so-

called "problem of the false proposition" arises [SIEP, p.170; Armstrong, 1977; Birchall, 1978].

So questions must be asked about the relation between things, situations or "facts" on the one hand, and propositions on the other. As shown, Rose maintained Anderson believed "the relationship between propositions (beliefs) and situations (reality, existence) is not one of exclusion, not one that allows or requires intermediaries." But no matter what propositions are on this view, they appear to be different from the things or situations which we discuss in serious discourse (otherwise, if they are identical, we are confronted with "the problem of the false proposition"), and so we would be entitled to ask whether these features of things and situations cause propositions to take on the features they have, or whether propositions simply have those features as a matter of fact, and having them, elucidate the character of things and situations. Saying that things or situations are propositional does not promote discourse or inquiry: does not single out any specific proposition or issue under discussion, and does not settle, or enable us to settle, any specific issue. It appears to belong to a realm of generalities that are not open to question or testing; i.e., it appears to be an *a priori* claim, inconsistent with empiricism. Then questions arise as to how we could know that propositions reflect these characters of things and situations unless we can examine these characters of things and situations independently on one hand, and examine the characters of propositions independently on the other.

At the very least, the "equivalences" discussed above concerning logic and a wider reality, and the relation between propositions and situations, must be explained; they are not explained by Anderson, and it would appear they cannot be explained within Anderson's logic of four categorical forms if every term has a logical opposite. It was concluded previously that the ontological and non-ontological claims or "equivalences" cannot possibly be the same, and since there is no evidence of a doctrine which would relate them, we have no real alternative but to conclude that Anderson mistakenly conflated these claims and terms; we have no alternative but to conclude that Anderson did not have a clear theory of what logic is. The vital questions are: "Are Anderson's repeated references to 'one' or a single' something a reference to the same thing, or two different things; and if different, what is the relation between them?" In other words, when Anderson speaks of "one way of being", a "single order of events or propositions" [SIEP, p.67] a "single logic of events"

[SIEP, p.247], "a single logic of existence" [SIEP, p.90], "a single level of investigation" [SIEP, p.247] etc.. is he talking about one thing, two, or many?

Conclusions

Sufficient evidence has been produced to establish that Anderson:

(i) (a) made a baffling variety of claims about logic, some of them inconsistent;
(b) never provided a systematic account of his view of logic;

(ii) made a number of ontological or metaphysical claims -- the doctrine of one way of being; about the categories, conditions of existence and "things" -- which certainly require to be explained, which he did not explain, which appear to be *a priori* and inconsistent with empiricism (as it is usually understood), and which appear to create insoluble problems within Anderson's own formal logic of four categorical forms of propositions;

(iii) repeatedly ran together ontological claims with claims about (a single) logic as if they were equivalent, (a) when they are clearly not, (b) without attempting to explain that conflation (so that it must be concluded he either confused and conflated the two quite different things, or held some further doctrine which would explain the connection between the two, which he never stated in SIEP);

(iv) made ontological claims about propositions which (a) do not make sense and cannot be justified, and (b) appear to reify Space and Time (and possibly propositions too) as the kind of "ultimates" he rejected as rationalist;

(v) definitely believed there was a single logic, which (although closely related to the doctrine of one way of being) needs to be explained no matter what view is taken of his ontological claims;

(vi) claimed there was a propositional method (of inquiry), a single logic, which needs to be explained no matter what view is taken of his ontological claims.

Points (i)-(iv) together suggest Anderson did not have a clearly worked out theory of logic. Points (ii)- iv) establish that all of Anderson's ontological claims create insoluble difficulties within his own position or logic. If we are to claim to understand Anderson's core position, we must be able to give a coherent account of his empiricism (the doctrine of one way of being), and his views of logic, propositions, and "things", and this must include a consistent reading of all his remarks on logic in Appendix D. On the basis of evidence and arguments put forward here, it is maintained that it is not possible to understand what Anderson meant by "logic"; not possible to give a coherent ontological account of the doctrine of one way of being, of Space and Time or existence as a common property of all "things", consistent with Anderson's formal logic; because all of these ontological claims create precisely the kinds of divisions, dualisms or dichotomies within Anderson's position that he regarded as marks of rationalism. Therefore, on a direct reading of his work, we cannot understand Anderson's position on logic at all, certainly not as a systematic one. If we are to interpret his position as a coherent, systematic one, some radical revision will be necessary, and some coherent account of his conception of logic must be found.

§5 A Non-Metaphysical Interpretation of Anderson's Logic

(Logic as dialectic)

In relation to these problems, the solution adopted here involves three main steps:

(i) to totally reject, or re-interpret, all of Anderson's ontological claims,

(ii) to interpret his conception of logic (the propositional method) methodologically: as discourse (his term) or dialectic (the term preferred here), and

(iii) to reject the attempted identification of propositions and situations, and speak only of propositional discourse.

This is a parsimonious and justifiable strategy. In other words, it is being argued that Anderson's metaphysical or ontological claims are incompatible with his empiricism-realism; irrespective of whether his ontological claims

about logic and propositions can be explained and justified or not, some account of his logic as inquiring method must be given, and it will be argued that the only consistent sense which can be given to his numerous, broad claims about logic is that it is dialectic. A great deal of evidence points towards that conclusion.

Rejecting the ontological interpretation of logic, it is perfectly reasonable to consider non-ontological claims Anderson and his followers made about logic, as the possible basis of an empiricist account of it. As indicated, Rose described Anderson's view of logic as "a general method for investigating actual situations" [1987, op. cit., p.85]. This view was also hinted at by Mackie when he said that logic "studies the formal features of facts, ... [and these] ... determine a method of inquiry for all fields" [1962b, p.266; see p.173, above]. This view is not incompatible with, but supplemented by, various things Anderson said. First and foremost, Anderson effectively said that logic is dialectic:

> Dialectic is simply the theory of the kind of hypotheses it is necessary to reject -- those, namely, which would make the prosecution of inquiry impossible, being set above our scrutiny. ... but the pointing out of fallacies of this kind is a very small part of what is involved in Logic or Dialectic. Its full import can be grasped only when we consider it in relation to the most advanced studies, i.e., to the sciences. [SIEP, p.212]

Here, in the sciences, the task of dialectic or logic is to examine all propositions and assumptions; "to show that the supposed 'indemonstrables' and 'indefinables' of the sciences" (that is, all axioms, so-called, *a priori* or necessary truths, etc.) "are not indemonstrable or indefinable, but are subject to investigation" (that is, are subject to precisely the same critical examination and testing as any other propositions). "Thus all hypotheses implying a division in reality require to be 'destroyed' (or removed)" [Ibid]. This reading makes sense of two passages already cited in Table 4. If we combine "what this involves is that there is a single logic which applies to all the sciences, a single way of being which all their objects have" [SIEP, p.212] with "the establishment of all scientific objects on a single level of investigation. And in thus upholding a logic of events ... " [SIEP, p.247], it seems that the "single logic" can be understood as a "single level of investigation".

This reading is consistent with another important passage. When Anderson said that the "empiricist, like Socrates, adopts the attitude of considering things

in terms of what can be said about them, i.e., in propositions" [SIEP, p.4], he implied that discourse or dialectic is "a logic of propositions" [SIEP, p.53], or a logic of situations [SIEP, p.107-108]; and if we discuss issues in categorical propositions, we can see why, in rejecting modalities, he spoke of "the logic of unqualified fact" [SIEP, p.177].

This reading of logic as dialectic is consistent with Anderson's saying "Hegel is right, then, in maintaining ... that philosophy should be systematic. But its systematic character should appear in the form of a single logic. ... that this logic should be historical ... [meaning] it is the theory of things as historical" [SIEP, p.80]. We might take this to mean that logic (whatever it is) is the underpinning of any systematic philosophy. This view is not incompatible with the somewhat puzzling remarks at the end of *Realism and Some of its Critics*: "For Realism, then, as against all the 'ultimates', facts are good enough. It does away with the philosophy of good intentions, ... and establishes philosophy as logic, the logic of events" [SIEP, p.59]. This may be taken to mean that philosophy and logic (dialectic) are concerned with "the actual", as against what people think (or wish) **should** be the case; as against "all ideals, ultimates, symbols, agencies" [SIEP, p.14], standards, social utility, and moral demands -- and, we might add, against the "possible", "probable" and "necessary".

Several important passages referring to Greek philosophy support this reading of "logic" as "dialectic": "For an answer to Hegel ..., we have to drop epistemology -- the intrusion of mind into logic and of a false logic into psychology -- and return to the Greek consideration of *things*, ... " [SIEP, p.86]. This can be taken to mean that Anderson was rejecting the idealist method (or logic) of considering thought, ideas, concepts etc., and considering what can be said about "things" in propositions [see SIEP p.4, cited p.184 above]. That view is elaborated in several places: "The above remarks suggest a less direct treatment of logical problems, viz., by considering what is involved in the recognition of a thing as a subject of investigation -- more generally, in the very possibility of 'discourse'" [SIEP, p.123]. Where Anderson spoke of discourse, we can quite properly read "dialectic". This logic is the propositional method developed by the Greeks and seen at its best in the work of Socrates:

> It was fitting that, in the development of such a logic as far as Plato was able to carry it, honourable mention should be made of the names of Parmenides, Zeno and Socrates, since they had all contributed to the working out of the propositional method, though

> none of them had seen its incompatibility with "ultimates" and all of them had opposed the Heraclitean theory of a single historical order. [SIEP, p.53]

It is important to notice that Anderson referred to this logic as a (propositional) **method**. It is a "commonsense" logic (that is, dialectic), common to all discussion and criticism: "The second and longer part of the *Parmenides* shows the overthrow of Eleaticism by means of the same logic as the Eleatics had used against the Pythagoreans; but this is because it is a commonsense logic, a logic of events, that logic, in fact, which is involved in all discussion and criticism" [SIEP, p.48]. This propositional logic (dialectic) is not only the logic of ordinary discourse, it is also the logic of the sciences: "But the discovery of illogicalities in the theory of Socrates does not affect the fact that he has given a valuable account of the conditions of scientific inquiry" [SIEP, p.212].

Together, these passages suggest that the Greeks developed a dialectical method based on propositions and a consideration of "things" as opposed to forms, ideas, concepts, sense, etc.: that is to say, based upon what we say about "things" or "events"; and what we say in this kind of discourse is expressed or expressible in propositional form. Furthermore, this Socratic dialectic is the basis of scientific inquiry; hence we can understand Anderson's remarks:

(i) "a single logic which applies to all the sciences" [SIEP, p.212];

(ii) "all scientific objects [are] on a single level of investigation" [SIEP, p.247];

(iii) "scientific method (which is actually logic, considered in terms of types of questions that can arise in inquiry)" [p.195];

(iv) "that physical objects do fall within the field of geometry" [SIEP, p.8];

(v) "a theorem and a fact can together imply nothing unless they have a common term, we are bound to say that the fields of geometry and of physics are not cut off from one another, and that the two sciences are on the same empirical level" [Ibid];

(vi) "Since everything that can be asserted can be denied or doubted, since deduction and hypothesis are always possible, all sciences are observational and experimental" [SIEP, p.6].

This reading also holds for his comments on Berkeley, where the rejection of any divisions, of inner and outer worlds, of ideas and things, or ways of being: dependent and independent existence, is evident: "The case [i.e., Berkeley's dualism] can be met only by a logic of situations, which treats mental situations, and non-mental situations, and situations embracing the mental and the non-mental, as all of the same order, none having any peculiar 'inwardness' or 'outwardness'" [SIEP, p.107-8]. The same interpretation -- of logic as inquiry into "things" or dialectic -- also holds for Anderson's remarks about Kant:

> It is in laying the foundations of a logic of things as historical that Kant is important, and in relation to this part of Kant's theory Hegel can be regarded only as reactionary. ... Kant showed, as against Locke, that the objects of science are just the objects of observation, that "matter" (that which is treated of in physics) is what we perceive and not something behind it. He showed as against sensationalism (a rationalist doctrine miscalled "empiricism") that connections and distinctions among things are known *along with* things [SIEP, p.83]

Again, it is on this reading of logic as dialectic, a method of critical inquiry, or as scientific method, that we can make sense of a whole range of Anderson's remarks on method and criticism:

> Ryle does not specifically say that he takes questions of quality and questions of relation ... to belong to different regions of inquiry; but he gives no sign of seeing that the logician is concerned not with a miscellaneous bunch of types of question which can be raised about this subject or that, but with a group of types of question which have a *common ground*, which hang together in any inquiry and thus apply to any subject-matter. [SIEP, p.172]

Consistent with the present interpretation, we can read "inquiry" as "dialectic" and interpret "logician" broadly, as "inquirer" or "dialectician" not merely "formal logician". Again, Anderson made it clear that he regarded logic as a method, and consistent with other passages cited, including the method employed in science: 'This degradation of the subject, logic, to the status of an instrument or set of devices is typical of the practicalist or instrumentalist outlook ... and it may be compared to recent views of scientific method (which is actually logic, considered in terms of types of

questions that can arise in inquiry) as simply the procedures of scientists" [SIEP, p.195].

It was the unfamiliarity of those not trained in the dialectical method (central to philosophy since Socrates) that led them to view method as something different from informal logic or dialectic: "There can be little doubt, however, that the failure of such criticisms to stick was due to the steadily larger and more influential groups who devoted themselves to inquiry but had little knowledge of the history of critical thought and treated "method" rather in a mechanical than in a logical way" [SIEP, p.185].

It is only by taking logic as dialectic, or as a method of critical inquiry, that we can understand how this same logic applies to what Anderson said about the study of (inquiry into minds and ethics. As noted, he argued that whatever minds are, they must have qualities of their own and be observable. In the following passage he expressed much the same sort of view, but relates our treatment (observation and consideration) of minds to precisely the same **method** or **logic** that we would employ with other (quite mundane) things: "In other words, discounting metaphysical notions of "governing" and restricting ourselves to a positive account of inter-related ways of working, we should treat the occurrence of "initiative" in the human mind in exactly the same logical way as we should treat the occurrence of magnetism in a pin" [SIEP, p.123].

In relation to ethics, specifically to a theory of norms, he said:

> The illogicality of this theory appears at once from its conception of the different sorts of reality which attach to norms and to the things which come under these norms, or from its attempt to distinguish values from facts. If the statement that something "ought to be' has any meaning, it can only be that the thing *is*, positively, obligatory; that this is a matter of fact. When such a statement is taken to be true, it can be dealt with by means of the ordinary logical mechanism of assertion and denial, proof and testing of hypotheses, definition and division -- and in no other way. [SIEP, p.215]

In other words, dialectic -- stating what we wish to say in propositional form and testing it against other things that we believe or observe -- is the logic of the sciences and is perfectly appropriate to ethics: "If we take the facts which have been considered as constituting the field of ethics, it will appear that the logic of moral events is the same as that of any other events" [SIEP, p.222]. And so, on this reading, we can see that the "establishment of all

scientific objects on a single level of investigation" clearly means the treatment of all subjects, including ethics, in the same dialectical way, and this adherence to one method of inquiry leads to the removal of metaphysics (the postulation of two ways of being, and ideas, etc.) from science [see SIEP, p.247, cited p.188 above].

One further passage should be considered; it is the last paragraph in *The Knower and the Known*. This passage is vital in the present context because it would be unintelligible unless "logic" is read as "dialectic" or "method of inquiry". It reads:

> In short, the foundation of the realist position is logical, and if this logic is not impugned, then, whatever the difficulties of any special problem, it must be capable of being worked out in accordance with that logical basis. A theory of "sensa" or of "consciousness" could not be accepted merely because it enabled us to give a simple account of some limited range of facts. It would sooner or later be found to conflict with a logic of propositions; while that logic itself assists us to give a definite theory of the nature of "subjects" and of any particular class of "objects". [SIEP, p.40]

If "logic" here is read as "formal logic", it would appear that Anderson was claiming that realism (or Anderson himself) had a sole monopoly on "formal logic", which is, of course, absurd. This appears to be how Ryle interpreted passages like this [1950, p.153; see Anderson's response, SIEP, p.185]. However, read in conjunction with the import of the first part of *The Knower and the Known* especially, which argues for a particular treatment of relations, it makes perfectly good sense. It has been shown that Anderson adopted Socrates' **method** (described in the *Phaedo*, 100a) "of considering things in terms of what can be said about them, i.e., in propositions" [SIEP, p.4; see p.184 above]. And in the first part of *The Knower and the Known*, he worked out certain details of how to treat relational propositions, or a **method** of treating terms in relational propositions consistently. If we take Anderson to mean that logic is a method of inquiry, his claim that "the foundation of the realist position is logical" makes sense if that foundation is to be found in a consistent **method** of treating terms in relational propositions [see p.137ff, above]. It is to this consistent **method** that "logic" refers in the last passage quoted.

So far, then, it has been possible to uncover a quite intelligible, non-ontological, non-metaphysical account of logic based on a large number of specific statements Anderson made. In summary, it is this: Logic is a dialectical method of inquiry, based on formulating in categorical

propositions, what we (the participants) wish to discuss : anything we believe, assert, deny, wonder about, or wish to test. It is, in essentials, the dialectic Socrates employed as described in the Platonic dialogues. It is a method which can be applied to "all fields" [Mackie] of inquiry, provided we are concerned with "things as historical" or actual things as opposed to how we would wish them to be; in that sense, it is a "logic (or dialectic) of events". Logic, or dialectic as a form of critical investigation, does not accept that any assertion, assumption or belief is above criticism: it treats all claims in the same critical way: without exception. Thus we can say logic (dialectic, or critical inquiry) is co-extensive with philosophy, and is scientific method. Being a method applicable to all fields of investigation, all subjects, all problems of inquiry; we can understand Anderson's emphasis on a **single** logic -- especially if there is no other method of inquiry.

On this view, (a) dialectic or the method of critical inquiry may also be called informal logic to distinguish it from formal logic, (b) formal logic is the study which describes, or expresses in formal terms, what occurs in informal logic or dialectic, and (c) dialectic strengthened with methodical observational procedures, is scientific method. On this view, formal logic begins with the clear identification and classification of "propositions", types of claims or assertions, etc., employed in this dialectical method, which explains why Anderson said "the first task of logic" (in this case meaning formal logic) "is to find the types of logical form" [SIEP, p.137].

It is worthwhile considering this interpretation of Anderson's view of logic as dialectic with another range of claims he made: those involving the notion of a **common** logic [S/p.6], things having common measures [S/p.194], a common ground [S/p.172, 185], common forms [S/p.187], being on a common level [S/p.54], or common situations [S/p.195]. The vagueness of this repeated theme is significant. All of these claims are related to Anderson's assertion of a single way of being and a single logic, which can be established by one passage: "until the recognition of a logic of events has prompted us entirely to "remove hypotheses" of degrees of reality and treat things on a **common level**, we are prone to fall into dualistic errors and, while imagining that we are conducting a straightforward inquiry, to *remove appearances*, i.e., deny facts, instead of "saving" them" [SIEP, p.54; my emphasis]. It is clear here that treating "things on a common level" is the avoidance of dualism and is to be identified with the significance of the doctrine of one way of being -- whatever that involves.

If "there is one way of being" is an ontological claim, and difficult to understand, "treating things on a common level" is no less so. However, if we understand "treating things on a common level" not ontologically, but methodologically or dialectically, as meaning very simply "treating issues in discourse in the same way: i.e., propositionally, and testing them by the same methods", this phrase and the doctrine of one way of being make sense in a non-metaphysical way. Another passage expresses essentially the same kind of view in a quite different context, that of terms (of science and poetry) and knowledge. Speaking of Heraclitus' criticism of the Pythagorean "desire for simplicity", and their "little absolutes or atomic realities", etc., Anderson said:

> This last point recalls Arnold's distinction ... between "a term of science or exact knowledge" and "a term of poetry and eloquence" -- and here the Heraclitean or objectivist position is that no line can be drawn between these, that there can be no defensible claim to knowledge of distinct things which have no **common measures**, which do not exist in the same situations and enter into joint transactions. [SIEP, p.194, my emphasis]

If this claim is a purely ontological one, not about discourse, Anderson could not explain what "things which have no common measures" are, or what "things which do not exist in the same situations" are, without admitting the very divisions he wished to reject. However, if this discussion is about **claims** that philosophers have made, there is no difficulty, for what is under discussion is something "empirical": what someone has actually said. Hence the dialectical interpretation again makes sense where the ontological does not.

In attempting to interpret Anderson's apparently complex and confused view of logic, we appear to be faced with one of two alternatives: either (i) the single order of events to which all things belong (an ontological claim) is or is not precisely the same as (ii) the propositional method, a logic of propositions, or the view that all scientific objects are on a single level of investigation. The view taken here is that these two are not, and cannot possibly be the same, and consequently, Anderson was mistaken in identifying them.

The considerable body of evidence provided here establishes that Anderson viewed logic as a dialectical method of inquiry based on the expression of views in propositions of the four forms, which all share a common copula, part of the verb "to be"; a dialectic which is concerned with "things", "events" or

"situations" as opposed to "ideas", "concepts" or "thought". No matter what ontological significance Anderson attributed to logic, it is very clear from many of the passages cited, that his view of logic included this conception of a propositional dialectic or method of inquiry. And on the present reading we can understand Anderson's many references to a single logic, single level of investigation, single (one) way of being, etc., to a common logic, things having a common ground, etc., in a non-metaphysical sense, as referring to this single method of inquiry or dialectic, which applies to all subjects, all problems of inquiry, all sciences. His ontological or metaphysical claims add nothing to this, but create insoluble problems.

A strong case has been made out for the view that --

(a) Anderson's conception of logic was vague, not well developed;
(b) his ontological claims about logic and propositions cannot be justified and are incompatible with his own formal logic;
(c) the only coherent sense which can be given to his many claims about logic and "common" measures, etc., is a dialectical one;
(d) when logic is interpreted as dialectic or a method of inquiry, we can understand why Anderson said it applies to all "things" and all subjects, and why he said there is only one logic.

It is appropriate to formalise some of the general theses of this interpretation:

(i) What is often loosely called logic consists of two quite distinct parts or processes: logic-in-practice, informal logic or dialectic, and formal logic.
(ii) Logic-in-practice or dialectic is a consistent, principled method of critical inquiry or discourse. It proceeds at all times by way of propositions; it presupposes methods of observing and may employ observing; and it employs criticism by means of logical argument. It may also be called propositional discourse.
(iii) Formal logic is the study of the method of critical inquiry. Amongst learned disciplines, it is rather unique, for it involves the study and description of the methods of study. It involves the observation, description, classification and definition of the formal features of dialectic. Unlike any other subject, it is primarily concerned with the *formal* features of inquiry, rather than with specific content, although it cannot ignore content.