Chapter 6: A CRITIQUE OF ANDERSON'S VIEWS ON MIND

If the account of rationalism as founded in the notion of mind is accepted, then, since Anderson was opposed to rationalism, it would seem that he should have rejected the notion of mind. That would be perfectly compatible with his rejection of (a) Descartes' account of mind, and (b) all theories of ideas, concepts, etc; and consistent with his remarks about Descartes' *cogito*: "Acceptance of the *cogito*, ... places insuperable difficulties in the way of psychological science; and, in so far as it has been accepted, ... it has been a tremendous hindrance to inquiry. ... we can still describe it as one of the greatest impositions in the history of human thinking" [S/p.114]. However, as shown, he propounded a theory of mind as feeling which he believed was consistent with empiricism-realism. Recognising this outright conflict, it will be argued that Anderson's views on mind are fundamentally flawed, result in inconsistencies within his own position, and that taken to their logical conclusion, his own realist arguments inevitably culminate in the view that there is no such thing as mind. The arguments and evidence for these rather contentious theses will be presented in stages.

§1 Anderson's Basic Views on Mind and Knowing are Fundamentally Flawed

Anderson's arguments against constitutive relations, and consequently those against the Cartesian notion of mind as consciousness and Berkeley's notion of ideas, are accepted here, but his basic views on knowing as a relation are fundamentally flawed. The problems arise from Anderson's acceptance of Marvin's formulation of the argument against constitutive relations. There are two major problems with this formulation. The first is that it involves the wrong sense of "knowing"; the second, that this formulation is not appropriate in Anderson's logic of four categorical forms. Marvin's symbolic formula for any dyadic relation is aRb, and he gave the example of "when I know this paper", etc., [p.103 above] which Anderson followed. The difference between someone's asserting "I know this paper" and "I know this paper is white" is one between two different senses of "know". The first appears to mean "I am acquainted with this paper", the second "I know that p", where what is known is a proposition. Thus we can distinguish three quite different senses of "know": (i) knowing **how**; (ii) knowing **that**; and (iii) being acquainted with. (The first two senses are recognised by Ryle [1949, p.27].) If we say a person A knows how to swim, we mean little or no more than that person can swim. Typically, if we say that someone knows something in the second sense, that can be expressed as "A knows that p", where "p" would be expressed as a

proposition. In the third sense, to say that "Bill knows Tom" can be exactly re-phrased as "Bill is acquainted with Tom" or, in a slightly different sense, "Bill knows who Tom is (although they have never met)". At any rate, we could use quite distinct forms of expression to make the three different senses absolutely and unambiguously clear and distinct. When Anderson was discussing knowing, the principal sense would be that of "knowing **that**" rather than "being acquainted with". And then, expressed in the Marvin formula , that would typically become aRp, where "p" is a proposition, not a person or a "thing". This interpretation is consistent with Anderson's general position which he specifically stated in *The Knower and the Known*: "what we know consists not of things simply but of states of affairs (or propositions)" [S/p.32].

The important point being made is that Anderson has been misled by an ambiguity in the way we use the words "knows/knowing", and so has taken an inappropriate sense -- being acquainted with -- to provide his model. The consequence is that all the conclusions he drew about the knowing relation [see p.106-7 above] are invalidated. If we take as the principal sense "knowing that", then the "relation" (in the form aRp) is, quite positively, intransitive, not non-transitive as Anderson said. It is precisely because of this incorrect model of knowing (as being acquainted with) that Anderson ran into a difficulty over knowing ourselves. On the view taken here there is no special difficulty in being acquainted with ourselves as complex human beings; and there is no difficulty in our knowing "facts" about ourselves.

As mentioned, the aRb (or aRp) form is inappropriate in Anderson's logic of four categorical forms of propositions. In any specific case where we said that a person knows (that) something (which takes the propositional form), the overall statement would **NOT** take the logical form --

A knows (that) p, (aRp)

but must take the form --

A is a person who knows (that) p

And when "p" is filled out in propositional form, this might take any of the four categorical forms with simple, complex, or relational terms, for example:

A is a person who knows that (a) All X's are Y's
(b) Some X's are YZ's
(c) Bill is a person taller than Tom

Anderson never stated that this was the logical form of propositions which dealt with "knowing that". However, that it is the form he would have recognised is confirmed in a much later paper, *Relational Arguments*, where he dealt with other relations. There he treated "A is greater than B" (aRb) as "Some (things) greater than B are A", and "A is not to the left of B" as "No (things) to the left of B are A" [S/p.149]. As for knowing things about ourselves, the logical form of what we know would be, for example:

I am a person who has brown eyes

In the unusual event that we described what we know about ourselves, the logical form of such a statement would be:

I am a person who knows that I am a person with brown eyes.

It may be unusual for us to say such things, but there is no difficulty about logical form in either case.

§2 Anderson was Ambivalent towards the Notion of Mind

It is notable that Anderson put forward very strong arguments against the Cartesian and various cognitivalist theories of mind, yet attempted to set up an alternative realist theory of mind. After demolishing these theories, it would have been reasonable to conclude that there was no such thing as consciousness, no such thing as a cognitive faculty, no such thing as Reason, no such thing as mind. It was shown previously [p.108 above] that further arguments he put forward -- against "an agency whose operation cannot be detected", or of a "merely inferential" knowledge of minds [S/p.13] -- strengthen this conclusion.

Many of Anderson's broad criticisms were consistent with the rejection of the notion of mind. Clearly, his rejections of idealism and representationism are; so is his rejection of individualism or voluntarism [see Baker, 1979, p.11ff], directed against the notion of mind as a causal agent which is itself undetermined (or "free"). The same can be said of his rejection of --

(a) all the mental entities: ideas, concepts, percepts, knowledge; [see S/p.32; "Realism has denied that what we know need be in any way mental", S/p.69]; and

(b) all the mental paraphernalia: two faculties of mind [S/p.217], sense and reason [S/p.3]; two ways of knowing [S/p.12]; two kinds of knowledge, *a priori* and *a posteriori*; all theories of truth and meaning; two kinds of truth: necessary and contingent [S/p.5], analytic and synthetic; all dualisms, including the dualism of mind and body.

Perhaps even more significantly Anderson believed that dialectic or inquiry could proceed without any recognition of, or reference to, mind. He argued for this view in two passages:

> Nevertheless, the fact that discussion is advanced by consideration only of *the issue itself*, and not of the minds of persons who hold views about it, is evidence of the truth of the realistic position. [S/p.41]

> No realist will deny that what recognises relations, or anything else, can only be a recogniser, and, if it is only minds that are recognisers, that a mind must do so in the case of relations. But what is it that the mind recognises? That certain things are related in a certain way. Now, if they are not, the recogniser is simply mistaken. [S/p.46]

This means that when we are engaged in inquiry, or dialectic, we are concerned with publicly observable "things" or "facts", not what is private, mental, or in a mind. This view partly explains why he argued:

> To get rid of idealism we have to go back upon all sophisticated 'modern' views and recapture the Greek directness. We have to banish mind from philosophy, and in so doing make incidentally possible a positive account of mind itself [S/p.60-61];

> ... the study of anything is not, on account of its being a study, at the same time a study of mind [S/p.61];

> For an answer to Hegel ... we have to drop epistemology -- the intrusion of mind into logic and a false logic into psychology -- and return to the Greek consideration of things. [S/p.86].

All of these views are consistent with the view that there are no such things as minds and, more importantly, that philosophical, scientific or dialectical inquiry proceeds without the intrusion of mind or mental entities. So is his

rejection of any division between an inner world of the mind and an outer, physical world or world of sense: "In line with the general argument against dualism, the distinction between an 'inner' and an 'outer' reality (between mind and 'the external world', as the phrase goes) is one of which no account can be given, since there will be no reality for that distinction to have" [S/p.168].

His rejection of the problem of knowledge as "scientific defeatism" [S/p.82] is also consistent with the rejection of the notion of mind.

§3 Anderson's *a priori*, Realist Criteria of Mind

As shown in Part I and Chapter 5, Anderson set down what appear to be *a priori*, realist criteria for being a "thing", which criteria also apply to minds. On this view (to be a "thing" at all) minds must --

(a) be observable [S/p.13, 75];
(b) have characteristics of their own [S/p.28,38];
(c) be complex (not simple) [S/p.14];
(d) have their own characteristic ways of behaving [S/p.14].

However, Anderson provided no evidence whatsoever that minds meet these criteria. On the contrary, he simply assumed that minds exist [see following sections].

§4 Anderson Provided No Evidence that We Can Observe Minds

Anderson implied that we **observe** minds [S/p.13; cited p.6, above], that we **contemplate** minds [S/p.38, cited p.2 above], that we **know** and **observe** minds [S/p.75, cited p.12 above], and asserted we **recognise** minds [S/p.75, cited p.12 above]; and he implied we have two ways of studying minds: observing them as we observe anything else, and introspection which is, apparently, a special process confined to studying our own minds. He said:

> In holding that in order to know minds we have to look at them, empiricism is not opposed to "introspection", the study of our own minds, ... it insists on the fact that the study of our own minds takes place by means of observation. But, an empiricist will say, there is no more reason for confining ourselves to "introspection" than for considering only our own bodies in studying physiology. [S/p.14]

By Anderson's own realist doctrine, in order for us to know anything about minds, in order for us to observe minds, they, like anything else, must have their own characteristics; and what we observe, or believe, or say about them will take propositional form. However, Anderson never explained how we observe, come to know, contemplate, or recognise minds; he never explained what characteristics of mind we observe; and it is difficult to understand how we could observe minds at all, but especially as "a society or economy of impulses or activities of an emotional character" [S/p.75; c.f. p.12, above]. In order to test Anderson's claims we need to examine both how we might observe minds, especially others' minds, and how we might introspect our own [see p.131 below].

§5. Anderson Consistently Assumed Minds Exist

It can be shown that, in the various articles in which Anderson discussed the notion of mind, he repeatedly assumed minds exist, yet the criticisms he raised against the Cartesian view throw doubt upon the existence of mind. It would seem that part of the reason for this is that he conflated two quite different claims: (a) that people know (believe, think, etc.) and (b) that people's minds know (etc.). For example, he said: "The fact that **a man does know** certain things may enable us to infer that he is a man of a certain character, but this inference would not be possible unless we had previously come to believe that only persons of that character knew these things, ... since knowledge is a relation to tell us *that a man knows* is not to give a description of him, ..." [S/p.28; the first emphasis is mine]. He also said: "the existence of science implies nothing as to general agreement, but only that **somebody** *knows*; and what **he** knows consists of true propositions" [S/p.56; my emphases in bold]. On the other hand, he said: "As regards **my** knowledge of **myself**, this will have to be accounted for by saying that a certain process of **my mind** knows another, or knows **myself**, but without knowing itself" [S/p.32; my emphases] and "... we see that it is possible both that a **mental process should know** without being known and that it should be known without knowing ... " [S/p.39; my emphasis]. Clearly, Anderson conflates the two quite distinct claims (and of course he is not alone in doing that).

However, we can consistently hold to the position that it is people (or animals of a certain kind) which can be said to know (believe, observe or perceive), and consistently avoid talking about, or in terms of, mind altogether -- as knowing or anything else. We can consistently maintain that

it is individual people, or individual humans (which we can observe) which engage in the full range of mental processes (knowing, thinking, believing, etc.); and this is the only consistent position, for on the other hand, we must either maintain --

(a) that minds know and individual humans do not know, or
(b) that both minds know and individual humans know.
(c) that when we say, for example "Julius Caesar walked to the forum" and "Julius Caesar knows *p*" we are talking about two completely different subjects, for clearly, no one would claim Julius Caesar's mind walks.

There are serious difficulties with any of these views. It seems to be simply absurd to say that Socrates' mind knows something, but that Socrates himself does not. On the other hand, if both Socrates' mind knows *p*, and Socrates knows *p*, we must ask: "Do they both know in precisely the same way (in the same sense of 'know')? Or must we assert that there are two quite different kinds of knowing?" and if so "What possible purpose could there be in speaking of minds?" In other words, on these views, we are faced with the alternatives of asserting that there are two different kinds of knowing, which will require explanation, or of admitting that the postulation of minds results in a superfluous duplication.

A few further examples should suffice to establish that Anderson assumed minds exist. In *Empiricism*, he said: "This does not, of course, mean that minds must be studied in a laboratory; ...no one can know much about minds who has not taken (love) into account" [S/p.14]. and "The general conclusion is that all the objects of science, including minds and goods, are things occurring in space and time ... " [Ibid]. That in *Determinism and Ethics* Anderson assumed that minds exist can be shown by several passages: "All these methods of influence are likewise to be found in operation among the motives of a single mind" [S/p.221]; "Of course, they interact with all sorts of things, including other people's minds. But they are in peculiar relations to the other processes which belong to the same mind" [Ibid]; "So that the term 'responsibility' really stands for such relations as hold between any two activities of one mind" [S/p.222]; "We have, in short, to think of our motives as striving to find outlet, of various *tendencies* in mind" [Ibid].

It seems undeniable that in rejecting the Cartesian notion of mind as a simple unitary thing, Anderson confidently **assumed** that mind is (must be) a complex thing, which is brought out in the long passage quoted from *Mind as Feeling*, [p.116 above]. In summarising his main points in that article Anderson said that we must assume feelings are capable of characterising the mental "unless we are going to suppose that some entirely unsuspected character of mind has yet to come to light" [S/p.75]. Here he overlooked the possibility that mind is a fiction: that "it" cannot be characterised and therefore, on his own realist dictum, cannot be real.

These passages clearly establish that Anderson consistently assumed that minds exist. He never seriously doubted that they do.

§6 In Propounding the Theory of Mind as Feeling Anderson was Inconsistent

Given Anderson's starting point and assumptions, the theory of mind as feeling, unconventional though it is, has certain merits. However, there are six major problems with it.

(i) Anderson's theory of mind as feeling is based on the assumption that minds exist, and as shown, Anderson never justified that assumption -- except by a totally inadequate argument: that our speaking of minds is an indication that they exist: "But the fact is that we sometimes speak about our own minds and sometimes about other things; that is, our own minds are sometimes objects to us" [S/p.65]; and "... we do recognise and speak of *minds* and therefore we must already have recognised some mental quality" [S/p.75]. It does not require a great deal of argument to show that our speaking of Santa Claus does not establish the existence of Santa Claus or that "he" is sometimes an object to us, any more than our speaking of our own minds does; and therefore that Anderson was making an assumption about mind which he was not entitled to make.

(ii) No study of mind or the mental conforms to the requirements of empirical science as Anderson understood it: "all sciences are observational and experimental" [S/p.6]. He believed minds were spatio-temporal "and that we can study them by virtue of the fact that we can come into spatial and temporal relations with them" [S/p.14] But nothing he said anywhere established that we can observe minds in the way that we observe other "things".

(iii) The formulations "mind is feeling" and "mind is a complex of emotional activities" do not conform to Anderson's own criteria of a definition. For Anderson, a definition takes the form:

> All X's are YZ's and
> All YZ's are X's
> (conditional upon (i) the truth of "Some Y's are Z's" and (ii) there being some Y's which are not Z's or some Z's which are not Y's) [see Baker, 1986, p.81-82].

The proposition "All minds are feelings" does not conform to this model: effectively, it states an identity, class inclusion or class coextension.

(iv) Anderson's theory of mind as feeling depends upon the notion of **motives** as **tendencies**. As already noted, Anderson put forward the notion that a **motive** is "whatever it is in us that acts; feelings as I should contend)" [S/p.218]. Now this "definition" of motives is as much a definition by constitutive relations as Descartes' "definition" of mind or Berkeley's "definition" of ideas. It attempts to identify something as the cause of our actions by its **relation** of being the cause of those actions, which is, by Anderson's own principles, a fatal objection to that notion. But that is not the only objection to Anderson's conception of a motive. In several places, he retracted from the notion of a motive as that which acts, and qualified it as a tendency: "[Butler] fails, in fact, to show that any of our motives (tendencies to action) are anything but passionate" [S/p.68]; "We have, in short, to think of our motives as striving to find outlet, of various tendencies in mind." [S/p.222]; and: "It may be that there is always some degree of tension, if the motive is present at all, and that at other times we simply have a tendency, i.e., that the processes then present in the mind are of such a character that, when certain circumstances arise, the motive will again appear" [S/p.223; see a so S/p.74]. It will be obvious that the notion of "that which acts" in us (at a specific time) is not compatible with the notion of "that which (at other times) does not act" but remains dormant as a non-acting tendency. Of course we accept that certain things act in certain ways at certain times under certain circumstances, and do not act that way at other times under other circumstances; as a cat will eat mice when hungry, but not when full. We can recognise the cat in either condition, which conforms with Anderson's realist criterion. We cannot justifiably claim to recognise

(observe) a motive (tendency), feeling or emotion in us or anyone else, especially when it is dormant. It is also important to recognise that, in general, Anderson rejected the notions of dispositions or potentialities [see Baker, 1986, p.58].

(v) Anderson said: "Progress in psychology may therefore be made by the actual *discovery* of the emotional character of sentiments or motives, i.e., of what is in our minds, as contrasted with what is *before* our minds, when we engage in certain pursuits" [S/p.75]. Firstly, this statement assumes minds exist. Secondly, it suggests that there is a distinction, and we can distinguish, between "what is in our minds" and "what is before our minds". Granting for the sake of argument that this is so, what Anderson argued suggests sometimes the emotion or feeling of anger is "in our mind", and sometimes not; at others the emotion of fear is "is in our mind", etc. That suggests that our mind is something distinct from that prevailing emotion: that our mind is some kind of receptacle which the emotion or feeling of the moment occupies. However, if that is not so, we cannot make sense of "in" in the phrase "in our mind". But on the view of "mind as a society or economy of impulses or activities of an emotional character", we cannot speak of the feelings of anger or fear being in our mind at some times and not others. They would be permanent features of a mind.

(vi) The most crucial problem is that feeling, every bit as much as knowing and striving, appears to be a **relation** (to use Anderson's terminology), and therefore cannot characterise mind (or anything else). Anderson anticipated this possible criticism and said:

> The objection that feeling also is a relation comes from the same cognitionalist source. On the theory of mind as feeling it is not denied but asserted that feelings *have* relations and hence that we can be angry at, afraid of, pleased with, something or other (this being to say that we are angry, knowing something, or that our anger has an object, i.e., knows something, etc.). But to have a relation is not to *be* a relation. ... What should be admitted is that feelings (e.g., anger and fear) are qualitatively different from one another, though they still have the general feeling-quality in common. It will not surprise us then to find that, besides having similar relations to outside things, they also have different relations to these things, e.g., that they have different objects, that one seeks what another avoids, etc. [S/p.74]

In view of the potentially fatal nature of this objection, Anderson's response warrants close scrutiny. There should be no difficulty with Anderson's claim

that "feelings **have** relations" provided we can recognise feelings by their qualities; but it appears we cannot. And here Anderson's answer is peculiar. If our "feelings (e.g. of anger and fear) are qualitatively different from one another", we can only detect that "introspectively" or privately about our own feelings; we cannot "observe" that with others' feelings. When it is asked how our own private feeling of anger differs from our feeling of fear, we cannot observe or describe any qualities. The case of feelings is not in any way comparable to that of observing stars, clouds, trees or frogs. We can, to some limited extent, describe the kind of pain that we feel in a specific part of our body. We may be able to describe it as being generalised in a certain broad area, or specific; as dull and throbbing, short and stabbing, intermittent or continuous, burning or sharp; but we cannot describe a pain as red or green, rough or smooth, triangular or curved or anything like these. However, we can't describe our 'feelings" of anger, love or loneliness even in the very limited terms we can describe pains. It seems to be a mistake to treat these feelings or emotions as the sorts of independent things which have qualities, as Anderson's realism requires. Anderson's claim that our different feelings "have the general feeling-quality in common", is even more contentious. There does not seem to be any such "quality"; it is certainly not observable in others; and is not describable in our own case. To make a most general point, once the qualities of feelings are disputed, and therefore subject to testing, we have **absolutely no method**, and certainly no public, testable/verifiable/falsifiable method of checking such claims. Discussion of the "qualities" of our own or others' feelings appears to be outside the realm of empirical science.

In a paper commenting on *Mind as Feeling*, O'Neil raised this point that feeling appears to be every bit as much a relation as knowing and striving, and Anderson's response was as unsatisfactory as it was brief:

> As regards the conception of feeling as a relation, the main point is that it would then be impossible to distinguish it from conation. Apart from the emotional quality of the mental process which has the relation, we could treat fear only as "striving to get away from", anger as 'striving to injure", *et cetera*, and what strives is still unspecified. [Ibid, p.287-288]

In fact, this was no answer at all. It says, in effect, if feeling is a relation, we could not distinguish it from conation, but that is simply an admission of the fatal difficulty of the point; it does not justify concluding that feeling must be a quality.

§7 Anderson's Views on Mind are not Coherent

It is appropriate now to consider how different Anderson's conception of mind was from the Cartesian, and to inquire what mind could possibly be if it conformed to Anderson's criteria and parameters. Anderson's main claims about mind are:

(i) To be a thing, mind must have qualities of its own, be observed, be complex, exist in space and time, interact with other things and have characteristic ways of working.

(ii) Mind does not contain or contemplate any mental entities whatsoever; there are no such things as ideas, concepts, percepts, sensa, or knowledge: "we never know 'ideas' but always independent things, or rather states of affairs" [S/p.32]; "what we know consists not of things simply but states of affairs" [Ibid]; "what we know need [not] be in any way mental" [S/p.69]; "the objects of observation are things themselves" [S/p.83].

(iii) There is no distinction between the "inner" world of mind and "the external world" [S/p.168]. Whatever mind is, it is continuous with, and not cut off from other things.

(iv) Mind is in no way comparable to a cinema contained inside our head: "on the doctrine of active mind and passive ideas, our sensations would merely *confront* us, like images on a screen" [S/p.166]. If what we know consists of things or states of affairs, what we know is not in any way in our minds or within the spatial confines of our bodies (except when it is, for example, pain or emotional feeling).

(v) Mind is not a hidden agency [S/p.13] which implies not only that it is observable, but that it is observable in its various operations; that is, when it is knowing, believing, remembering, feeling, striving, awake or asleep.

(vi) Mind is "a society of economy of impulses or activities of an emotional character" [S/p.74].

(i) above sets down general criteria for any "thing", but does not describe one characteristic of minds or establish that they exist. (ii), (iii) and (iv)

are purely negative; they do not describe any characteristics of mind. There is a consistency between (ii), (iii) and (iv); what we observe, perceive, remember, (know), think about are "things" or "states of affairs"; there is no "inner" or private world of mind which contemplates or processes mental entities. This is a completely different view of mind from that of Descartes, or any theory of mind and ideas. But it does not explain what mind is, or what its characteristics are. And we cannot imagine what they could be on this view.

Anderson's only positive claim about mind is that it is feeling. We cannot observe another's mind as feeling (as distinct from the individual human) operating when it is involved in knowing, believing, remembering, feeling or striving; and we certainly cannot observe a "society or economy of impulses" (or tendencies) in others or ourselves, which are sometimes active, sometimes dormant. That view of mind is inconsistent with the claim that mind is not a hidden agency.

It is reasonable to say that Anderson's attempt to establish a positive, realist theory of mind, in opposition to the rationalist view, resulted in an incoherent view of mind and led him into a number of claims which were quite inconsistent with his more fundamental, logical or methodological principles. These may be summarised thus:

(i) Anderson assumed minds existed when his own arguments against the Cartesian view were, effectively, that the notion was illogical.

(ii) The observational methods of empirical science do not, and cannot be shown to, apply to the study of "minds".

(iii) In putting forward a theory of mind as feeling Anderson contravened his own --

(a) clear criteria for (sound) definition,

(b) criticism of the notions of tendencies and potentialities;

(c) contention that knowing and striving are relations and cannot characterise anything, while maintaining feeling is not a relation;

(iv) Anderson could not maintain a consistent position in relation to what mind is insofar as he suggested both that motives (or feelings) **are** mind and **in** mind.

(v) He vacillated between the views that it is people who know and minds which know [see 123f, above].

Anderson was inconsistent on each of these points and when they are seen together, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, in his approach to a positive theory of mind, he was quite illogical.

§8 Anderson's Realist Arguments Lead to the Rejection of the Notion of Mind

Assuming for the sake of argument that there are such things as minds, it is reasonable for empiricists to ask: 'How do we observe them, learn about them, and discover their characteristics? What are their generic characteristics?" If minds are a general kind of thing --

(i) we must be able to recognise
  (a) minds other than our own,
  (b) some of the characteristics of our own mind,
  (c) some of the characteristics of other minds,
  (d) that some of the characteristics of our own mind and other minds are the same (otherwise we cannot know that both are minds at all);

(ii) we must have some method(s) of discovering some of the characteristics of our own and other minds.

It would seem that the full range of possible methods of discovering the characteristics of our own and other minds would be --

1. A method(s) of discovering the characteristics of our own minds by
   (a) observing (or experiencing) our own mind in action and
   (b) introspection.

2. A method(s) of observing the characteristics of other minds by --
   (a) observing other minds directly;
   (b) listening to others describing their own minds.

Accepting the notion of mind for the purpose of argument, it is appropriate to consider each of these possibilities.

It must be said at the outset that we do not have any method by which we can observe others' minds; nor can it be said that (our own or others') minds have any observable characteristics. We cannot point to a mind as distinct from the person whose mind it is, as we can point to an eye, ear or arm. A mind does not have any positive location, or shape; minds cannot be said to be rectangular, triangular, etc. to have any colour; they have no texture, no degree of hardness or softness, no degrees of temperature; no weight, no length, breadth or thickness. We cannot smell, taste or hear minds; they have no pitch or degree of loudness. They have no characteristics which fall into any of these categories. They have neither external nor internal characteristics. They have no internal cavities, organs or parts; no chemical composition; no cellular, crystalline or molecular components. We cannot examine the microscopic structure of minds. We could not even identify a single mind to place it under a microscope or cut pieces off it to do so. We cannot identify a mind interacting with other things, neither a mind causing some change in something else nor something else changing a mind. Therefore, after reasonably comprehensive consideration, it seems we must admit --

(a) that we cannot find one characteristic of mind,
(b) that we have absolutely no method for observing minds, their characteristics or activities.

Against this evidence, Anderson provided no support for his claim that we can and do observe minds.

Let it be assumed that the main activities of minds are, or include: perceiving, conceiving, knowing, thinking, believing, reasoning, concluding,

assuming, counting, measuring, calculating, remembering, introspecting, reflecting, imagining, day-dreaming, fantasising, dreaming, feeling: (i) pain, an itch; (ii) emotions: angry, frightened, affection, lonely; wanting, wishing, hoping, striving, attempting, intending, planning. And let it be accepted that sometimes (at least) individuals are aware that they are perceiving (something), thinking (something), etc. It is being suggested here that no matter whether we are simply, unselfconsciously perceiving something, or perceiving something and aware that we are perceiving something, we are not in addition aware of any characteristic(s) of our mind involved in that process at that time, or aware of any function of our mind operative in that process over and above the process itself.

If we sit in a room and look out a window, we may see cows in a field, hills beyond, and the sky above. But we also see the window itself and the interior walls of the room. By contrast, when we stand outside this window and look upon the same scene, we see the cows in the field, the hills and the sky, but we do not see our eyes with which we see this scene, in the way we see the interior of the room. However we can do certain things which, as it were, draw our attention to our eyes: we can move our eyes, and thus alter what is and is not, within our field of view; we can shut out eyes, both together, one at a time, or alternately, and so on, and this has an effect upon whether we see at all, or what we see, etc.; we can place our hands over our eyes, both at once, singly, alternately, etc., and this too has effects upon what we see or do not see. So while we do not see our eyes when we are looking -- except when we look in a mirror -- we have ways of reminding ourselves of them: that we see with them or by means of them. But there is absolutely no way that we are aware of, or can draw our own attention to, our own minds when we are looking at things. We cannot see our own mind as we see the window when we see the scene through that window; nor can we draw our own attention to any features or effects of our own mind in the way we can draw our own attention to the features or effects of our eyes as just described.

It would be possible to consider, in equal detail, all the other main activities of mind listed above, and show that in each case we are not aware of, not able to recognise, any characteristic or feature of our own minds; not in thinking, not in reasoning, not in remembering, dreaming, feeling, counting, wanting, striving or intending. In none of these mental processes do we discern any characteristic of our own minds.

It may be thought that perhaps there is one important mental process that is totally different from all of the foregoing; perhaps introspection is the one special case where we do actually "look into" our own mind. According to the SOED, to introspect is "To look into, especially with the mind; to examine narrowly or thoroughly" and introspection is "The action of looking within or into one's own mind; examination or observation of one's own thoughts, feelings, etc." On this view (and certainly on any view which upholds the notion of mind) introspection is a process carried out by the mind, and a process carried out by the mind upon itself or on some part or process of itself. However, that description does not explain either (a) precisely what sort of process it is, or (b) how the mind carries out this process of self-examination. In order to discover, and define more precisely what introspection is, it may help to determine what mental processes are not introspection.

Perceiving is not regarded as introspection; nor is reasoning, remembering, reflecting, dreaming, day-dreaming, fantasising, feeling (pain, or emotions such as love, fear or anger) -- although introspection may deal with feeling; nor are counting, measuring, calculating, wanting, wishing, striving, attempting or intending. Introspection is not simply remembering in any form; it is not simply remembering that we perceived something, or that we thought something or felt something. If these processes are not introspection, then introspection must be a very limited and special kind of mental activity. It is reasonable to suggest that introspection is reflecting in an analytical, or perhaps self-critical, way on --

(i) what one (a) feels or felt, (b) did, or (c) intends to do;
(ii) what caused one to do something, feel some way, or think some way.

If this is a correct account of introspection, it is no more a way of observing our minds than any of the other mental processes.

Firstly, while introspection is an analytical and perhaps self-critical process, and differs from some of the other mental activities listed above in that respect, it is not the only analytical or critical mental process. Philosophical and scientific thinking also have that character; so introspection may be regarded as a special case of that wider analytical-

critical process applied to one's self. Critical analysis does not necessarily reveal anything about minds.

Secondly, introspection is not an infallible process. Sometimes we can see why we felt or acted as we did; sometimes we can not. It may, at times, reveal to us facts about ourselves, but it may also result in our deceiving ourselves by rationalising our feelings, beliefs, motives or actions.

Thirdly, although introspection can be an entirely private process, it need not be so. We can ask others their views on, and discuss, why we felt as we did, acted as we did, or intend to act in a certain way. And sometimes others' views on our behaviour are more illuminating than our own. So while A can **introspect** about A's motives, feelings, and reasons for action, B can also **reflect** upon A's motives, etc. Neither observes a mind in doing so.

Therefore there is no reason to believe that introspection as described will reveal anything to us about the character of our minds any more than perceiving or remembering does, etc. We can no more observe the characteristics (or functioning) of our minds in introspection than we can in perception, feeling, dreaming or striving.

It has been argued, on the basis of procedures and evidence available to any person --

(i) that we cannot **observe** our own minds (a) when we engage in any "agreed" mental process, or (b) when we engage in introspection;

(ii) that we cannot **observe any characteristics** of (a) our own minds or (b) others' minds

If we cannot observe minds in the ordinary way, and we cannot discover anything about our own minds by introspection, we cannot describe our own mind, and others cannot describe theirs. Anderson insisted we cannot have a purely inferential knowledge of them.

Although Anderson claimed or implied that we know minds and observe minds, and that empiricism would admit introspection as one way of discovering facts about minds, he did not provide any evidence that we do. These claims are not

supported in any way whatsoever, and appear to be based on the unwarranted assumption that minds exist, and possibly the conflation about what kind of things know. If, as the foregoing discussion indicates, (a) we cannot observe anyone else's mind and cannot describe any characteristics of anyone else's mind; (b) we cannot observe our own mind and we cannot describe any of its characteristics; (c) we cannot observe any characteristics of our own minds by introspection; and (d) we cannot have a purely inferential knowledge of our own or others' minds, then we are not entitled to speak of minds at all. When these conclusions are combined with Anderson's realist doctrine, that "Unless ... mind can be contemplated by mind and found to have certain qualities, we cannot know minds at all or speak of their knowing" [S/p.38, cited p.2, above], we must reject the notion of mind -- as some sort of fiction. These premises surely lead to the conclusion that minds are not just "unknowable", but not things at all. We can arrive at precisely the same conclusion by following a different strand in Anderson's realism: his criticism of relativism or constitutive relations [see next Section].

§9 A Realist, Relational Account of Mental Processes

Adopting Anderson's criticism of relativism in his own terms, that is, as the confusing of qualities and relations, or the treating of a relation as a quality [see Wild, 1993, p.24ff], we can reject a whole range of "abstract entities" including mental entities, and give a consistent treatment of all mental processes. In *The Knower and the Known*, Anderson dealt with a number of relations which some philosophers have taken as, or fallaciously converted into, qualities. He argued that it is inappropriate to assume that because we are sometimes involved in the process of "sensing" (assuming there is such a peculiar way of knowing), we are not thereby entitled to postulate entities called "sensa" [S/p.32]. Similarly, he argued that since dependence is a relation, we are not entitled to speak of anything that depends upon something else as a "dependent existence" or "dependent quality". He stated his argument briefly as:

> The fundamental criticism is ... that what exists because of me nonetheless *exists*, apart from or independently of me. The houses which would not have existed, had not men planned and built them ... are physical and are not private to these men; they stand for other men to see them and may remain when no one perceives them at all. The argument from dependence commits us to the Berkeleian theory of "relative existence"; as does also the notion of a special "sense-field" in which a given sensum occurs. [S/p.33]

In considering the illusion of round things such as coins appearing elliptical from some points of view, Anderson pointed out that appearing is a relation, and that we are not entitled to speak of an (elliptical) appearance:

> There then arises a difficulty about the relation between the round penny and an "elliptical appearance", or something "appearing elliptical". ... it seems to me necessary to point out that "appearing" is a relation, viz., that of being known or apprehended. So that what is apprehended in this case is that "something is elliptical", and, since this interpretation does not allow us to speak of "an appearance", the precise belief would seem to be that the penny is elliptical; a belief which is simply false. Now there are cases in which such a false belief is held, but in many cases it is not, so that it may be questioned whether anything "appears elliptical". In any case, "appearing elliptical" does not state a relation between *the penny* and us, except when we are wrong. [S/p.34]

Anderson's criticism of relativism expressed as a general methodological principle

Anderson's formulation of his criticism of relativism in terms of "things", "qualities" and "relations" raises special difficulties which need not be discussed here [see Part I, above]. But in any case, we can generalise his criticism of relativism in another way which serves the purpose just as well. We can state it as a most **gereral methodological principle** thus: Whenever we are confronted in discussion with a purported "abstract entity" which is clearly related to a definite, observable process, (the "abstract entity" being signified by a noun, the process by a verb) we will take the process as fundamental, and as explicating what is suggested by the noun: the "abstract entity". For example, where people may speak of an "abstract entity" such as a "conclusion" or "product", we will take the **process** of concluding, or the **process** of producing, as fundamental to this way of speaking, and take the **process** as explicating what is meant by the noun involved, which noun seems to suggest there is an abstract entity. When we do this, we will recognise that the process involves separate distinct terms:

A concluded that p

B produced C

The main consequence of this general methodological principle for philosophical inquiry and logic is that in any unambiguous sentences involving such processes ("relations"), the terms involved will be made explicit, or that in order to avoid ambiguity, we will need to specify the terms involved in the process (or "relation"). Thus the logical form of any proposition

involving purported "abstract entities" will (a) identify the process involved, and (b) make explicit the terms involved in the process. This view can be stated in more general terms: any claims about a specific "relation", or specific "thing" being related in a specific way, presuppose some observational basis, and require observational justification. That is to say, we are justified in talking about a "relation" only if we have (or someone has) observed different specific "things" (or terms) so related, and that requires that we have (or someone has) observed (a) both the "things" and (b) their being so related. So Anderson's claims about relations in *The Knower and the Known* are interpreted here as principles relating to dialectical discourse: the specification of terms in relational propositions, and the observational justification of such claims.

The significance of this general methodological principle (this formulation of Anderson's criticism of relativism or constitutive relations) for a theory of mental processes can hardly be overestimated. It involves our --

(i) talking **only** in terms of mental processes (not mind or mental entities),
(ii) specifying the terms involved in the process (or "relation") involved, and
(iii) totally rejecting all mental ("abstract") entities as fictions.

This general methodological principle explains a good deal about Anderson's views in *The Knower and the Known* that are otherwise puzzling. It explains why he said: "According to realism, I have argued, we never know "ideas" but always independent things, or rather states of affairs. It seems to me to follow that such expressions as appearances or data, and as concepts, percepts or sensa have no place in realist theory" [S/p.32]. It also explains the concluding paragraph in that article [see p.193 below].

Applying this general methodological principle to the list of mental processes [p.132-3 above], we can say:

(i) the process itself is fundamental;
(ii) when we assert propositions involving any of these processes, in order to avoid ambiguity, we will specify the terms involved in the process (or "relation");

(iii) following this methodological procedure consistently eliminates any need to "refer" to the abstract "mental entities" usually associated with these processes.

When we specify the terms involved in these processes, the forms of expression will be:

A **perceives** that X is Y (or p)
A **conceives** of X as YZ
A **knows that** X is Y (or p)
A **thinks** (= believes) that X is Y (or p)
A **is thinking** how to solve this problem
A **believes** that X is Y (or p)
A is **reasoning** that if p then q, etc.

and so on for --

counting, measuring, calculating, remembering, introspecting, reflecting, imagining, day-dreaming, fantasising, dreaming, feeling angry, feeling embarrassed, feeling itchy, wanting, wishing, hoping, striving, attempting, intending, planning.

The only so-called mental processes that are exceptions to this general methodological principle are 'willing" and "striving" (or "endeavouring"). The reasons for these exceptions are: (a) there is no such process as "willing". We cannot **do anything** which is a distinctive process that can be called willing. We can no more "will" our index finger to move than we could "will" a large whale to float in the air; (b) if striving is anything at all, it involves bodily (not mental) processes. A person cannot **strive** to get to the top of Mt Everest by thinking only, or by remaining in bed at home.

As far as "mental entities" are concerned, we cannot observe them or any characteristics that might be supposed to belong to them. So it is perfectly reasonable to conclude: there are no such things as percepts, concepts, knowledge, thoughts, beliefs, reasonings, memories, dreams, feelings, wants, wishes, hopes, attempts, intentions, plans, etc. -- or qualia [see below].

Following this methodological principle has achieved several very significant outcomes. Firstly, it has obviated any need to speak of or give an account of "abstract entities" of any kind, but most importantly, those peculiar "abstract mental entities". Secondly, it has shown that "mental entities" are simply a fictitious product of a peculiarity of English (and, presumably, many other languages). Thirdly, it destroys the very foundations of the rationalist presumption that there are mental entities: ideas, concepts, sensa, qualia, knowledge; and as a consequence, fourthly, irreparably damages the whole rationalist conception of mind. In other words, it enables us to speak about all the so-called mental processes without assuming the notion of mind, and therefore opens the way to giving a consistent realist account of them without postulating "minds" or mental entities.

Qualia

In view of the sweeping claims being made here, it is appropriate to consider one recent attempt to set up mental entities. Jackson's arguments for qualia, so-called, begin from extremely vague terms. He speaks of "bodily sensations", "perceptual experiences", "the hurtfulness of pains, the itchiness of itches, pangs of jealousy ...the characteristic experience of tasting a lemon, smelling a rose, hearing a loud noise or seeing the sky" [1982, p.127]. Without arguing the case, he presumes these are independent, discernible entities, classifiable as species of a genus or genera, and that at least some of them are mental entities.

Since pains and itches (whatever they are) are located in specific parts of our body, they appear to be fundamentally different from emotional feelings which are not place specific but generalised; and both of these appear to be fundamentally different from "tasting a lemon ... or seeing the sky" since the latter involve perception of things external to our bodies. It would seem that amongst Jackson's examples we would need to distinguish at least five categories:

(i) pains, itches;
(ii) emotional feelings: feeling afraid, angry, etc.;
(iii) the taste of a lemon, or the typical lemon taste; the scent of a rose, or the typical rose perfume;
(iv) the processes of tasting a lemon, hearing a loud noise, etc.;
(v) objective observation; for example, seeing that the sky is blue.

It should be clear that conflation of these is a recipe for confusion. However, it is certainly not clear how these five categories stand in relation to the two broader ones: "bodily sensations" and "perceptual experiences". Jackson's discussion takes place within an area of great vagueness, and his terminology does nothing to clarify distinctions that need to be made. It must be emphasised that no one can demonstrate, by means of a definition or precise theory, that the "sensations" or "experiences" listed in these five categories are species of a genus, and they do not appear to be so. It could only be by insisting on some unjustifiable intuition (that we do not all share) that Jackson or anyone else could say they are.

His claims, if successful, would force us into some form of representationism. His suggestion that "seeing the sky" is phenomenologically on a par with "the itchiness of itches, pangs of jealousy ... the characteristic experience of tasting a lemon" etc. is supposed to *persuade* us that all perception is mediated through some kind of "mental entities" called "qualia". Thus Jackson's "qualia" are just another instance of the rationalist (representationist) mythology. But we are not required to accept his vague terms, or unargued, *unpersuasive* attempt to set up "qualia" -- or representationism.

Jackson's first, and perhaps most important, argument against physicalism (a position not accepted here), and thus for qualia, is what he calls the knowledge argument. It is based on an imaginary person Fred who sees, or can distinguish, two distinct colours where most people see only one: red; "Show him a batch of ripe tomatoes and he sorts them into two ... groups ... with complete consistency" [p.128]. After studying the physiological basis of "Fred's exceptional ability", it is found that his "optical system is able to separate out two groups of wave-lengths in the red spectrum as sharply as we are able to sort out yellow from blue" [p.128-9]. Jackson's case is therefore based on the assumption "that the rest of the world is red_1 - red_2 colour-blind" [p.128].

The crucial question is what does Fred actually see. As Jackson describes the case, it is **the tomatoes** which Fred sees (and we see as red); it is **the tomatoes** which Fred sorts into two groups; and it is **the tomatoes** which have the distinct colours which Fred alone can recognise and distinguish. It must be noted that Jackson implies (without actually saying so) that Fred sees these colours: he says "I think that we should admit that Fred can **see**, **really**

see, at least one more colour than we can" [p.129]. And this is the **only** way he could present his case, for if it is not **the tomatoes** which have these different colours, if Fred does not actually see two different kinds of coloured tomatoes, but Fred only **thinks** he sees two different coloured tomatoes (has two different coloured sensa or qualia in his head), then Fred is wrong, no matter how consistently he sorts the tomatoes. So "the colours" spoken about in seeing (or perception) are the colours of things seen, not different wave lengths, not some supposed "colours" -- sensa or qualia -- in someone's mind. It is only by speaking of colours in an abstract way -- as if we could find colours on their own as distinct from coloured things -- that Jackson can pretend colours are somehow mental: sensa or qualia; it is only by obfuscating the distinction between the colours of things, wave-lengths of light (as if they were colours), and a concealed notion of sensa (sensations of colour which are entirely internal and private) that Jackson can make out his case at all. However, if Jackson insists we cannot see the colours of things, but can only "see" coloured percepts, sensa or qualia in our minds, or we see different wave-lengths of light, then we can have no discussion whatsoever about the colours of things; there can be no discussion of "objective" colour; and we could never establish that anyone was colour-blind. In fact, we never **see** the wave-lengths of light, and we never **see** anything like percepts, sensa or qualia (since we see coloured things) with our eyes; in Anderson's words, "we never know 'ideas' but always independent things, or rather states of affairs" [S/p.32]. It must be admitted that if we can observe and study Fred's optical system we can observe and study tomatoes; and if we cannot observe the colour of tomatoes, we cannot study Fred's optical system.

Consistent with the general position being argued for here, it is perfectly reasonable to (a) reject Jackson's attempt to set up mental entities, (b) reject it on the grounds that it presupposes some form of representationism, and (c) define representationism as any theory which postulates intermediaries of a mental kind in the processes of perceiving or communicating: any such mental entities as ideas, concepts, sensa, qualia, judgments or meanings of any kind. So representationism can be seen as a by-product of rationalism, or the notion of mind, an account not inconsistent with a widely accepted view [see Speake, 1979, p.284].

§10 Conclusions: There is No Such Thing as Mind

On the basis of arguments advanced by Anderson against the Cartesian and cognitionalist theories of mind, and the additional arguments advanced in previous sections, it is reasonable -- we might say essential -- to conclude that there are no such things as minds.* We can consistently maintain it is people who know, believe, observe, etc. [see p.123f, above]. Certainly we can observe **people**, their characteristics and their behaviour. We can observe that a **person's** hitting their thumb with a hammer somehow causes them to be angry, or from that and inference from our own experience, to have a pain. We can observe how **people** interact with other things, as we interact with other things. We can maintain, with perfect consistency, that it is **people** who think, know, believe, perceive, conceive, wish, feel, intend, strive, and so on. There is no difficulty in doing so, and there is no difficulty in relating the mental processes of people to our "normal" procedures of observing. The intrusion of the notion of mind into the interpretation of our own and others' behaviour is a "tremendous hindrance" to understanding them, and leads to completely insoluble problems [see p.124 above], as the history of "modern" philosophy clearly illustrates.

It is worthwhile noting here that Socrates did not attempt to describe the soul, did not identify one characteristic of it, claiming only that it was immortal and immaterial etc. Descartes did not describe the mind; as he defined mind, it could not have any characteristics: only functions. Neither did Spinoza nor Leibniz describe any characteristics of mind; and these three rationalists each defined mind and ideas in a circular way.**

It will be recalled that what minds are was one of the three basic questions that may be taken as fundamental issues of metaphysics, or the rationalist-idealist position(s) [see p.9 above]. Thus it would be reasonable for Anderson to assume that in giving a systematic account of the basis of the empiricist-realist position (or metaphysics) in opposition to rationalism-idealism, he would have to give an empiricist-realist account of mind, in contradistinction from the rationalist-idealist account. It has been shown that throughout the period of the articles dealt with [1926-1934] he assumed that minds were "real

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*It should be clear that the present view is not closely allied to eliminativism; it is not concerned with the Identity Theory, and clearly not with concepts of any kind [see Churchland, 1990, esp. p.43].

**It could be shown that Locke, Berkeley and Hume also had difficulty with the notion of mind and could not describe any of its characteristics.

things" or existed. Of course there was another possible alternative which would also distinguish empiricism-realism from rationalism-idealism on the issue of mind: to assert that the notion of mind was a rationalist notion, and that there are no such things as minds. This is an alternative Anderson seems not to have considered at all, and certainly not to have taken seriously -- yet as argued, it is clearly consistent with a great deal that he stated and argued for. It seems that Anderson must have made the mistake of assuming that all humans have minds (or are minds), and therefore that minds exist, on the basis of conflating talking about **people** and talking about minds, as argued above.

The position being argued for here is consistent with that argued in Part II, namely, that the notion of mind is a rationalist one; but it goes much further. It takes Anderson's realism to its logical conclusion, or to its logical "extreme": i.e., to the total rejection of the notion of mind, asserting that there is no such thing as mind, a thesis which warrants the inclusion of the word *"radical"* in the title of this dissertation. This is, of course, contrary to Anderson's theory of mind as feeling. However, it has been suggested that that conflict is due to an inconsistency in Anderson's position, not in the present interpretation.

On the basis of the foregoing arguments, it is reasonable to draw the following conclusions:

(i) Anderson did not pursue, with equal thoroughness, the hypothesis that minds do not exist, even though it appears to be a very strong possibility, given the arguments he advanced against Descartes' and other cognitionalist views of mind.

(ii) With respect to the notion of mind, he did not follow through the inevitable consequences of his own empiricism and realism: the requirements of basing our beliefs on observation and the need to observe the characteristics of any subject of inquiry or discourse.

(iii) Other arguments put forward here, based on the assumption that minds exist, suggest we cannot discover any characteristics of our own or others' minds, by any method.

(iv) Applying these findings to Anderson's broad, realist position, we must say that he was mistaken in believing we can observe minds or learn about our own minds by introspection; that since we cannot identify one characteristic of minds and cannot observe them, we are not entitled to speak of them.

(v) The theory of mind as feeling is an attempt to provide a "rival", realist theory of mind to Descartes' rationalist view; is not consistent with or a consequence of Anderson's empiricism or realism, but is based on the unwarranted assumption that minds exist. As such, it is not central to Anderson's empiricism-realism-pluralism-determinism, but is an aberration within the main thrust of his core views.

(vi) When considered together, Anderson's "positive" views on mind are not coherent.

(vii) There is no reason to reject the thesis that the notion of mind is a rationalist one, and fundamental to rationalism.

(viii) For that reason, but also quite independently, on the basis of his own explicit statements (excluding the theory of mind as feeling), Anderson would have been more consistent had he rejected the notion of mind altogether.

(ix) It has been shown that by following Anderson's criticism of relativism as a general methodological principle, it is possible to speak about all the major, "agreed" mental processes without postulating minds or mental entities, thus opening the way for a consistent, realist account of them.