

§2 THE SAFETY OF HELLENIC PILGRIMS

Pilgrims often had to travel long distances in order to reach the sites they intended to visit, and the longest journeys were made by those from the west, in Italy and Sicily, who travelled to the Panhellenic festivals of mainland Greece or to major festivals in Asia Minor. Such journeys were not without risks of various kinds, and the attitudes of the pilgrims to the travel involved, and the problems that they faced *en route*, are of significance for an understanding of Greek pilgrimage. It is important to be aware of whether, for example, pilgrims felt safe in undertaking their journey, or took any special precautions in order to protect themselves from any hostile elements which they might meet, or whether it is possible that their pilgrim status might have freed them from danger while on their sacred journey. Pilgrimage sites themselves could become the focus of military activity, and the Sacred Wars fought in the vicinity of Delphi presumably discouraged pilgrimage to the site, although there is no direct evidence for this.

Despite the provisions of sacred truces and *asylia*, pilgrims occasionally came to harm, and the types of incidents in which pilgrims encountered danger and the degree of risk which they faced are revealed in the sources. There are several examples of pilgrims who did meet with danger, but these give no clue as to the prevalence of such attacks, and it cannot be conclusively decided whether attacks were recorded in the sources because of their rarity, or whether they were only described by ancient authors when they impinged on other events, as is perhaps most likely the case. Inscriptions are the main source for what is known about the provisions of *asylia*, whereby Hellenic states recognised the inviolability of a sacred site, together with its polis and surrounding territory, if the site was in or near an urban area. There could, however, be danger at a sacred site and a few instances of attacks on sanctuaries do occur, but the accounts suggest these to be atypical. Spondophoroi and theoroi were sent out by the state about to celebrate a Panhellenic religious event and announced the commencement of the sacred truce: such truces were generally sufficient to ensure a peaceable celebration of the religious festival involved. It seems reasonable to conclude that pilgrims generally did enjoy safety and this can be adduced from the continued popularity of the Panhellenic festivals and the fact that their sites and religious events attracted visitors throughout the classical and Hellenistic periods and into Roman times until the demise of paganism.

Pilgrims travelling to sacred sites were protected by *ekkekheiriai*, while the sacred site was itself protected and was considered to be inviolable, that is, protected by the provision of *asylia*. For example, when various cities in the third century accepted the

establishment of the Magnesian festival of the Leukophryena they accepted at the same time that the city and its territory had *asylia*.¹ In the same century, various states, at the inauguration of the Koan Asklepieia, accepted the *asylia* of the shrine of Asklepios.² Major Panhellenic sites naturally possessed inviolability, though this was not always observed, as in the case of Delphi when its *asylia* was disregarded by Perseus, son of the Macedonian Philip V, in the second century BC.³ Not only did sacred sites have *asylia*, but apparently this term was also extended to participants in festivals. In the Peloponnesian War, the treaty accompanying the Peace of Nikias guaranteed the safety, by both land and sea, of those travelling to the common shrines of the Greeks, to sacrifice, consult the oracles, or to be a spectator.⁴ Plutarch, for example, in discussing how Aratos, in the third century, enslaved the athletes who were attending the Nemean games, to which he had in rivalry set up his own games, violated the *asylia* and *asphaleia* guaranteed to participants.⁵ As this example indicates, participants were automatically covered by *asylia*, but sacred sites could in addition award *asylia* and *asphaleia* to specific individuals, guaranteeing their safety by land and sea on their journey to and from the site.⁶ The provision of *asylia* was clearly intended to safeguard both the sanctuary and the pilgrims attending a festival at a sacred site,⁷ but this was not always observed: the centres of Delphi, Olympia and Isthmia suffered particularly in this regard.

¹ *I. Magn.* 16.32 (restored); 25b.14; 31.18, .30; 32.13, .26; 33.6; 34.13, .20; 35.24; 36.13; 37.19, .30; 38.8, .18; 39.8-9, .20, .31; 42.15; 43.10, .21; 44.36; 45.12, .28; 46.18, .32-33; 48.11, .16; 50.33; 52.10, .30; 53.6, .35; 54.28; 56.11; 58.28 (restored); 62.2 (restored); 63.5 (restored), .24; 71.16; 72.32 (restored); 73a.12 (restored); 85.18; cf. 57.25; 58.4 (restored).

² Herzog, Klaffenbach *Asylierkunden aus Kos* 2.7, .14-15; 3.22; 4.12-13, .25, .36, .44, .46; 5a.7, b.4; 6.7, .27, .31, .43, .48; 7.9, .13; 8.2-3, .8; 9.1-2; 10.5 (restored); 11.7, .10, .16; 12.6; 13.3 (restored); 14.6; 15.6, .8 (both restored); 16.4; *RC* 25.7, .45; 26.8-9, .22 (explicitly stating that the *asylia* applied both to those who came to the temple and to the temple itself); 27.5. (*RC* 21 & 28 = Herzog, Klaffenbach 1 & 2 respectively; Welles' *RC* edition includes translations of the inscriptions); see below n. 26, with text.

³ *SIG*³ 643, discussed below; Sherk *Roman Documents* no. 40, pp. 234-36 (*SIG*³ 643; *FD* 3.4.75) provides two different editions of the inscription, with an interpretation on pp. 237-39. This document is translated in Lewis & Reinhold *Roman Civilization* 1, no. 71, pp. 184-85, and referred to briefly by Rougemont *BCH* 97 (1973) 103. Hereinafter, it is cited as *SIG*³ 643 (the most convenient edition); for other occasions on which Delphi was attacked, see below nn. 77-91, with text.

⁴ Thuc. 5.18.2; quoted in ch. 1 nn. 33-34, with text.

⁵ Plut. *Arat.* 28.5-6, discussed below in n. 75-76, with text.

⁶ Epidauros: *IG* IV² 1 47; 49; 51; 53; 54; 58; and for Delphi, see below n. 89, with text.

⁷ For the *asylia* of festivals, see Schlesinger *Asylie* 29-32 (general comments), and for the *asylia* granted to slaves, criminals, and other suppliants at sanctuaries, see 32-38 (this work also deals with non-sacral *asylia*).

There were incidents in which pilgrims were threatened as they made their way to pilgrimage sites, but few instances in which they encountered physical violence or met their deaths, and the occurrence of such incidents indicates that piety was not universally displayed in this respect. This is not surprising in view of the impiety found in the Greek world in other matters,⁸ and certainly does not indicate that pilgrimage was taken any less seriously than other religious practices. If anything, the examples which are recorded of violence against pilgrims serve to prove the exception rather than the rule, and it appears that they were generally respected as they made their way to sacred destinations. Most Hellenic pilgrims presumably travelled by ship and it is clear that several of the official delegations, the *theoriai*, of Athens went by sea, such as those to Delphi and Sounion. Pilgrims from the Aegean islands of course had no choice other than to go by sea and generally this was quicker than any overland route. Pilgrims of medieval times travelling to the "Holy Land" preferred the land route until it was virtually closed to them in the twelfth century, as a system of Roman roads enabled them to pass through Europe with relative ease. They were not good sailors in the medieval period, and avoided sea travel whenever possible, but the reverse was true for the Hellenic pilgrims as the Greeks were experienced sailors, and sailing was second nature to them.⁹ Pilgrims to Olympia made their way to the port of Elis and then on to Olympia,¹⁰ and such a method would have been the case for all the pilgrimage sites that were inland: pilgrims to Epidauros landed at the port and then made the six miles journey inland, while those travelling to Delphi would have put in at Kirrha.¹¹

Secular naval journeys and undertakings required the blessings of the gods. The rites which preceded the launching of the Sicilian expedition provide a well known illustration of the general point. Thucydides describes the ritual preceding the departure of the fleet:

"When the ships were manned and everything had been taken aboard for the voyage, the trumpet commanded silence, and the customary prayers before putting out to sea were made, not by each individual ship, but by a herald on behalf of them all. Bowls of wine were mixed for all the army, and the men and officers made libations from drinking-cups of gold and silver. The crowd of citizens and other well-wishers on the shore also joined in the prayer. Then when the hymn had been sung and the libations completed, they put out to sea."¹²

⁸ For military attacks during festivals see Pritchett *Greek State at War* 1.125-26; cf. Goodman, Holladay *CQ* 36 (1986) 151-60.

⁹ The Greeks did, however, have a specific sailing season, largely the summer months, outside of which they would rarely sail (Casson *Ship and Seamanship* 270-73). This concurred with the normal time for the celebration of festivals, but if festivals had fallen outside this period, pilgrimage activity would have been affected, for most pilgrims tended to travel to their pilgrimage destination by sea.

¹⁰ Weniger *Klio* 5 (1905) 198-99; see fig. 2.1.

¹¹ Epidauros: see ch. 8 n. 32, with text; Delphi: Paus. 10.37.8; ch. 6 n. 182, with text.

¹² Thuc. 6.32.1-2.

Significant here are the customary prayers, which though this was a military expedition, would presumably also have been a feature of any major undertaking such as a pilgrimage, and pilgrims setting forth in a ship bound for a sacred site would possibly have engaged in some additional ceremony. The evidence for this is slight, but significant. The Athenian *theoria* sent to Delos began with the priest of Apollo, the deity honoured by the *theoria*, crowning the prow of the ship.¹³ This religious ceremony was presumably intended not merely to honour the god, but also to invoke the blessing of the deity and ensure the safety of its passengers. Accordingly, a ship bearing *theoroi* or other pilgrims would presumably not simply have set sail once all the passengers had boarded, but would have celebrated some ceremony before departing.

Many pilgrims naturally travelled to their destinations overland. Travel by cart is attested in one of the Epidaurian *iama*ta, cures, which records the experience of Thersandros of Halieis, whose trip to Epidauros, and return in the company of a sacred serpent, led to the establishment of an Asklepieion in his home city.¹⁴ A less comfortable means of transport was employed by Sostrata of Pherai,¹⁵ who was taken all the way to Epidauros in a litter. For those coming overland to festivals, both carts and litters would have been employed, while the very rich may have travelled on horseback. Even pilgrims to Epidauros and other healing sites might have proceeded on foot if the nature of the illness allowed, and economic necessity would have ensured that pilgrims in general travelled on foot. The procession from Athens to Eleusis was an integral part of the celebration of the Eleusinian Mysteries, and presumably the majority of the initiates walked this. It is possible that some Athenians walked to Olympia, but it was a walk of five or six days, and the distance could be viewed with apprehension.¹⁶ For those who came from the islands, and from Asia Minor, sailing was of course necessary.

Because most pilgrims travelled by sea the primary danger in peacetime was, naturally, from pirates. This was an everlasting problem in the Mediterranean and pilgrims of a later age were to experience the horror of piracy, particularly at the hands

¹³ Plat. *Phaed.* 58a-b; for the Delian *theoria*, see ch. 7 nn. 2-24, with text.

¹⁴ *IG IV² 1, 122 iama 33*: ἐφ' ἀμάξας [ἄμπαλλ]ιν ἀπεκομίζετο εἰς Ἀλιεῖς. Cf. Paus. 2.10.3; see ch. 8 nn. 114, 130, 132. with text.

¹⁵ *IG IV² 1, 122 iama 25*; for this episode see ch. 8 nn. 175-76, with text. See also fig. 8.9 for an ill person being carried on a litter. For the places from which pilgrims travelled to Epidauros, see fig. 8.1. Which Pherai is meant by the *iama* - that in Thessaly or in the Peloponnese - is uncertain; even if it was the closer one, Sostrata still came a considerable distance (for Peloponnesian Pherai, see fig. 8.1).

¹⁶ Xen. *Comm.* 3.13.5.

of those of an alien faith.¹⁷ However, apart from the seizure of the Sounion theoria, more properly to be described as an act of war rather than an act of piracy, and Philip's towing away of a sacred ship, there is only one known example, that of Phrynon, of a pilgrim vessel meeting with attack, though piracy was prevalent throughout the classical and Hellenistic periods. The seizing of the ship, which was conducting the Athenian penteteric theoria to Sounion to sacrifice to Poseidon, occurred in the early fifth century, during the course of the conflict between Athens and Aegina. The aristocratic theoroi were captured and imprisoned, and the ship also presumably fell into Aeginetan hands. Herodotos is the source of information concerning this theoria, and the incident itself, which he dates to before the First Persian War, had clear political ramifications with further political conflict developing over the issue.¹⁸

Philip II of Macedon captured a sacred ship of the Athenians, docked at Marathon, for an unknown reason, in the late 350s,¹⁹ and ancient sources claimed that the sacred ship in question was the Paralos.²⁰ However, the ship was not involved in pilgrimage activity on this occasion,²¹ and rather than being an attack on pilgrims, the incident was merely an act of war on the part of the Macedonian monarchy. Philip seems also to have been involved in another incident involving a pilgrim; Phrynon, an Athenian of the deme Rhamnous, was attacked during the Olympic truce of 348/7 and was captured by *leistai*, presumably pirates or robbers. He had to be ransomed, and coming back to Athens requested of the *demoi* that an ambassador be sent to Philip, to attempt to recover the ransom money.²² The ambassador chosen was Ktesiphon, who

¹⁷ In the medieval age, attacks by Muslim pirates were a problem.

¹⁸ Hdt. 6.87; see also 6.88-93. Most recently, Figueira *QUCC* 28 (1988) 49-87 (cf. *AJP* 106 (1985) 50) wanted Athenian - Aeginetan hostilities of Hdt. 6.87-93 dated *after* the First Persian War; see also Andrewes *BSA* 37 (1936-37) 1-7, esp. 6-7; Podlecki *Hist.* 25 (1976) 396-413, esp. 400-01. Hammond *Hist.* 4 (1953) 406-11 and Jeffery *AJP* 83 (1962) 44-54, esp. 45, accept Herodotos' chronology.

¹⁹ Dem. 4.34. For the date, see Jacoby *FGH* 3b *Suppl.* 1.141 (with *Suppl.* 2.130), who suggests 354/3; cf. 3b *Suppl.* 1.327-28.

²⁰ *FGH* 324 Androtion F 24; *FGH* 328 Philochoros F 47 (Harp. s.v. ἱερὰ τριήρης· Δημοσθένους ἐν δὲ φιλιππικῶν ἰαὶ τὴν ἱερὰν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας ἄρχετο ἔχων τριήρη." λέγου δ' αὖ τὴν Πάραλον, ὡς συνιδεῖν ἐστὶ ἐκ τε τῆς φιλοχόρου καὶ ἐκ τῆς Ἀνδροτίωνος ὁμοίως ἔσθαι).

²¹ Sandys' suggestion that the ship in question was carrying the Athenian theoria to Delos was rejected by Rhodes *Commentary* 687-88, who notes that Phot. s.v. Πάραλος does state that the Paralos was used for the Delian theoria, but this cannot have been the case, as the Delian theoria was carried on a triakonter ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 55.3) whereas the captured ship was a trireme.

²² Aesch. 2.12: φρύων ὁ Ῥαμνοῦσιος ἔαλω ὑπὸ ληστῶν ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς ταῖς Ὀλυμπιακαῖς, ὡς αὐτὸς ἠγίατο· ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐπανῆλθε δεῦρο λυτρωθεὶς,

returning from his mission reported to the *demos* “on the matters for which he had been sent”.²³ The scholiast on the Aeschines’ passage claims that the *leistai* involved were the soldiers of Philip,²⁴ and this is generally accepted by modern scholars.²⁵ The scholiast is led to this conclusion presumably because he thought that the appeal to Philip needed a direct rationale, but this is not necessary. That Phrynon was attacked by Macedonians has to be accepted, or the appeal to Philip would be inexplicable, and as the truce was in force at the time Phrynon could appeal to no authority for compensation but to the monarch. It was reasonable of Phrynon to expect compensation from Philip, as there are instances of monarchs who agreed to observe the *asylia*, the inviolability, of particular festivals and sacred sites.²⁶ This *asylia* was surely not simply a personal guarantee that the monarch would not lead his forces against the site in question, but also a commitment that his subjects would be expected to adhere to the conditions to which he had agreed, that a site would possess *asylia*, and that sacred truces would be observed.

Philip had doubtless received spondophoroi at his court who had announced the commencement of the Olympic truce, and this would imply his acceptance of this for himself and his subjects. Perdikkas III of Macedonia, for example, was theorodokos for the theoroi announcing the Epidauria in the fourth century.²⁷ Perdikkas’ reception of the theoroi who announced the Epidauria, and the sacred truce which accompanied it, was an undertaking that the Macedonians would not carry out hostilities against pilgrims travelling to Epidauros in this period. Similarly, the Aetolian league accepted the Eleusinian truce in 367/6, and when the spondophoroi were seized by a member state, the Athenians made their complaint, not to the member state, but directly to the

ἔδεῖτο ὑμῶν πρεσβευτὴν αὐτῷ πρὸς Φίλιππον ἐλέσθαι, ἵν’, εἴ πως δύναίτο, ἀπολάβοι τὰ λύτρα.

²³ Aesch. 2.13: ἀπήγγειλε πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐπέμφθη.

²⁴ Dem. 19, Hypoth. 2, para. 3: φρύνων τις Ἀθηναῖος ἀπιῶν Ὀλυμπίασιν ἀγωνισόμενος ἢ θεασόμενος, ἐκρατήθη ὑπὸ τινων στρατιωτῶν τοῦ Φιλίππου ἐν ἱερομηνίᾳ καὶ ἀφηρέθη πάντα τὰ αὐτοῦ. καὶ ἐλθὼν εἰς Ἀθήνας παρεκάλει τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἵνα χειροτονήσωσιν αὐτὸν πρεσβευτὴν, ὅπως ἀπελθὼν πρὸς Φίλιππον λάβῃ ἅπερ ἀφηρέθη.

²⁵ Note esp. Popp *Einwirkung* 138; Hammond & Griffith *History of Macedonia* 2.474; Rougemont *BCH* 97 (1973) 83; and Svaddling *Ancient Olympic Games* 12, who introduces variations, quoted below n. 33. Pickard-Cambridge *Demosthenes* 230 states that Phrynon was captured by “Philip’s ships” (cf. 227, “by privateers”).

²⁶ Two groups of theoroi met Antiochos IV to announce the Panathenaia and Eleusinian Mysteries: Polyb. 28.19.4; and several monarchs agreed to accept the inviolability of sacred sites, see: (Koan Asklepieia) Herzog, Klaffenbach *Asylierkunden aus Kos* 1-3, two of which are translated, with commentary, *RC* 21 (Herzog, Klaffenbach 1); 28 (Herzog, Klaffenbach 2), and further examples, *RC* 25; 26; 27; cf. 68; (Magnesian Leukohryena): *I. Magn.* 18; 19; 23.

²⁷ *IG* IV² 1, 94 (*SEG* 11.410).

governing body of the Aetolian league.²⁸ When a state accepted a truce, it must have been assumed that the truce bound all the citizens, even pirates. Phrynon appealed to Philip as the representative of the Macedonians, and it is not necessary to accept the scholiast's view that Phrynon was attacked by soldiery.²⁹

Aeschines states only that Phrynon was attacked during the sacred truce,³⁰ while the scholiast remarks that he was attacked as he returned from Olympia, but is uncertain whether he was a spectator or a participant.³¹ Even if Phrynon had intended to attend the games, there is no evidence apart from that of the scholiast to state that he was attacked on his return from the n. The term used of Phrynon's assailants, *leistai*, implies robbers, and particularly pirates, and just as the Athenian *theoria* sailed to Olympia,³² so perhaps Phrynon had gone by sea to Olympia and can be viewed as a case of a pilgrim attacked by pirates. The evidence of the scholiast has here confused the issue and been responsible for the assumption that Phrynon was attacked by regular soldiery and not by the ever-present danger of pirates.³³ The fact that the truce

²⁸ *Hesp.* 8 (1939) no. 3, pp. 5-7; this case is discussed in ch. 1 nn. 25, 54, 64, 76-77, with text.

²⁹ Badian and Heskell do not believe that Philip could have given satisfaction to Phrynon in the light of the Macedonian - Athenian hostilities of the time: "How, at just this time, Phrynon could get the idea that Philip might be persuaded - no doubt by a sermon on religious propriety to return to him some money which he had either just calmly pocketed or not received at all (for Aeschines does not tell us whether it was paid to him or to the pirates); and how, at this time, the Athenians could enthusiastically receive a peace offer by Philip - those puzzles are by no means easy to answer..." (Badian, Heskell *Phoenix* 41 (1987) 267). Partly because of their disbelief, they attempt to re-order the chronology of the events in 348/7 as given at Aesch. 2.12-18. McKechnie *Outsiders* 120 argues that Philip would not have paid back the ransom unless the attack was committed by his retainers. These authors overlook the religious significance of both *spondophoroi* and sacred truces.

³⁰ Aesch. 2.12.

³¹ Dem. 19, Hypoth. 2, para. 3.

³² For this and other *theoriai* by sea, see ch. 1 n. 140, with text. Phrynon was not a member of the *theoria*: Aeschines refers to an individual being attacked, and not to a member of an official group. Moreover, Aeschines 2.12 states: "Not much time after this, Phrynon... was captured by *leistai* in the Olympic truce, as he himself has said (ὡς αὐτὸς ἠτήσατο)", which is indicative of a personal complaint rather than an official statement.

³³ There is always a temptation to expand on the slender accounts of the contemporary sources with the remarks of the scholiasts, who themselves were often only making an educated guess and attempting to elucidate passages in the sources which they themselves, or their readers, found difficulty in understanding. Embroidering on the scholiasts must also be avoided. It is disturbing to read in the British Museum guide to the Olympic games that "violators of the [Olympic] Truce were heavily fined, and indeed on one occasion, Alexander the Great himself had to recompense an Athenian who was robbed by some of his mercenaries whilst travelling to Olympia..." The father has become the son, while the *leistai* of Aeschines the soldiers of Philip in the scholiast, have become mercenaries: Swaddling *Ancient Olympic Games* 12.

had been broken by Macedonians and a pilgrim taken prisoner made it the responsibility of Philip to compensate him for this violation of *asylia*.

This particular incident also leads to the question of the scope of a sacred truce and whether pilgrims were recognisable as such. They were not, it seems, distinguishable by their dress, for although there is evidence that participants in various sacred rites had to wear a particular type of clothing for the purposes of the rite, nothing suggests that there was, in any way, a pilgrim uniform. It is possible, but undocumented, that pilgrims travelled to and from their destinations wreathed, just as theoroi seem to have been when on their missions to announce a sacred truce.³⁴ Pilgrims, however, on a ship during the period of a sacred truce, even if garlanded, stood little chance of being recognised until their attackers actually boarded. For pilgrims to be completely protected it would have been necessary for everyone during the time of the festival to be safeguarded, and for a truce to extend to all, not simply to those travelling to the festivals involved. This situation, however, though ideal, was impracticable, and the secular world of violence and warfare continued during the festivals. It was the fact that warfare could take place throughout the Greek world while festivals were being celebrated that gave rise to the fear that pilgrims might be attacked. For, if a sacred truce only protected pilgrims, that is, if it allowed attacks on non-pilgrims to occur, then there would have arisen cases where pilgrims could have been set upon by attackers inadvertently.

Presumably the zenith of the Athenian empire in the fifth century must have made the seas secure, and part of the Lykourgan programme to revitalise Athens at the end of the fourth century was the dispatch of war-ships to the Adriatic to deal with piracy, and thus to encourage trade with that region.³⁵ Pirates might not have been bound by sacred truces but the sovereign authority of their state would have been. Nevertheless, at times when there was no strong maritime control pirates may have been a serious danger to pilgrims. However, even though pirates might have chosen not to observe sacred truces, as the case of Phrynon shows, the sovereign authority of their state might still have chosen to compensate victims of piratical activities.

Accordingly, the activity of pirates could well have been a concern to those organising Panhellenic religious activities. The people of Teos, for example,

³⁴ See ch. 1. n. 50, with text. Note that the Athenians who travelled to Delos for the Ionian celebration put on wreaths when they were about to commence singing, perhaps suggesting that they had worn no wreaths while sailing from Athens to Delos, unless they donned fresh wreaths when reaching the island; see ch. 7 nn. 20-21, with text. Perhaps wreaths as identifying marks for pilgrims were unnecessary in the period when Athens' navy dominated the Aegean.

³⁵ *IG II² 1623.276-308; IG II² 414a* (see *Hesp.* 9 (1940) pp. 340-41 (*SEG* 21.276)); *Plut. Mor.* 844a; cf. Mitchel *Lykourgan Athens* 32 Schwenk *Athens in the Age of Alexander* 134-36. For piracy in the Hellenistic period, see Gabbert *GR* 33 (1986) 156-63.

requested at the end of the third century that their polis and the shrine of Dionysos be accepted as everlastingly sacred, *hiera*, and inviolable, *asylos*, as well as untaxable. The Teans were particularly keen to win favourable responses from the Aetolians and the Athamanians, because Teos was on the coast and as such was particularly vulnerable to pirate raids. Even if these states acceded to the request, this would have been meaningless unless they were able to exercise some constraint over the peoples that they represented and stop them engaging in piracy.³⁶ There is no suggestion that Teos was a Panhellenic destination but this particularly underlines the general point, since such status would have been even more essential for Panhellenic sites attracting large numbers of worshippers. Safety on the seas was of course a necessary prerequisite for the success of the various Panhellenic pilgrimages, and on occasion piracy must necessarily have presented some degree of risk to pilgrims.

Fear of military intervention during the celebration of sacred rites would obviously also act as a deterrent to festival activity, and, during the Peloponnesian War, for example, there is evidence to indicate that warfare interfered with pilgrimage activity. The most striking case is when the Athenians had to give up their annual procession from Athens to Eleusis in the latter part of the Peloponnesian War, after the Spartans occupied Dekeleia. It was only when Alkibiades was welcomed back to Athens in 407 as strategos, having been in self-imposed exile since he had fled to Sparta to escape prosecution for his alleged role in the mutilation of the *Hermai* and the profanation of the mysteries in 415,³⁷ that the normal procession was restored, though only temporarily. On his arrival at Athens on a day of ill-omen, the Plynteria, when the robes of the statue of Athena were removed and the statue covered up,³⁸ he made speeches in the *boule* and *ekklesia*, arguing that he had not been guilty of sacrilege, and had been unfairly treated, and was duly elected as supreme commander.³⁹ Then, as a pointed affirmation of his professed innocence of the charges of sacrilege, he organised a procession to Eleusis. Xenophon gives only a brief account of the incident, but states that Alkibiades led out the troops and conducted the procession to Eleusis by land. According to Plutarch, it was the Spartan fortification of Dekeleia in 413, which Alkibiades himself had encouraged,

³⁶ RC 35.5-6 (Bagnall and Derow *Historical Documents* 209-10): τήν τε πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν ἱε[ρ]ᾶν τῶν / Διονύσῳ καὶ ἄσυλον καὶ ἀφορολόγητον.

³⁷ Thuc. 6.60-61.

³⁸ Many people took his arrival on this day as a bad omen, not only for Alkibiades himself, but also for the polis, for Athenians avoided the conduct of affairs on that day (Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.12; Plut. *Alk.* 34.1-2). For the Plynteria, see Deubner *Attische Feste* 17-22; Stengel *Griechischen Kultusaltertümer* 246; Burkert *Greek Religion* 79; Simon *Festivals of Attika* 46-48; Parker *Miasma* 26-28.

³⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.20; Plut. *Alk.* 33.2, cf. 3; cf. Thuc. 6.91.6-6.93.2, 7.19.1, 7.20.1, 7.27.2-5.

that had interrupted the annual procession from Athens to Eleusis at the time of the celebration of the Great Mysteries, and since then the Athenians had been travelling to Eleusis by sea. The usual ceremonies that accompanied the land procession had, of course, to be abandoned. On this occasion, Alkibiades escorted the procession with the infantry through territory which the enemy threatened, had sentries posted on the heights, and an advance guard sent out. The priests, the *mystai* and the *mystagogoi* taking part were guarded by hoplites, and they made their way safely to Eleusis: none of the enemy dared to attack, and, after the ceremonies, the procession also made its way safely back to the polis.⁴⁰

Athenian loss of control of their territory thus had religious implications. The annual incursions of the Spartans in the early stages of the war had not disrupted the religious activity of the polis, but the permanent garrisoning of Dekeleia had, since the Athenians feeling unsafe by land had to travel by sea for access to the sacred mysteries. Whether their fears of the Spartans were founded is uncertain, nor can it be determined whether the Spartans would have respected the sanctity of the procession. At any rate, the Athenians had their doubts, and preferred not to test the religious sensibilities of the invaders. Alkibiades' defiant gesture of resurgent Athenian power was presumably not repeated in following years. He himself fell into disgrace, the Athenians into defeat, and it was presumably only in 403, after the Thirty Tyrants had been ousted that the procession by land recommenced. Not only had the land invasion of Attica by the Spartans and their allies affected the nature of the celebration of the mysteries, but it is also possible that despite the alternative arrangements that were made to travel from Athens to Eleusis by sea, many would-be initiates from throughout Greece were discouraged from travelling to Athens to participate, particularly Greeks from states which were at war with Athens, or Sparta.⁴¹ In the fourth century the celebration of the mysteries was also interrupted when news reached Athens of the destruction of Thebes, Athens' ally, by Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, and the Greater Mysteries were cancelled through fear of a military attack on Athens.⁴²

War, then, could affect the attendance of worshippers at the Panhellenic shrines. The armistice of 423/2 between the Athenians and the Spartans lasted up until the

⁴⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.21; Plut. *Alk.* 34.3-7: μηδεὺς δὲ τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιθέσθαι τολμήσαντος, ἀσφαλῶς ἀπαγαγῶν εἰς τὴν πόλιν (34.7). For Alkibiades' conduct of the procession, see Hatzfeld *Alcibiade* 299-300; Benson *Alcibiades* 273-78; Ellis *Alcibiades* 89-90; Kagan *Athenian Empire* 290-91; cf. ch. 5 n. 16, with text; for the Eleusinian procession: ch. 5 nn. 63-84, with text; for the route of the procession, see fig. 2.2.

⁴¹ Cf. Clinton *Hesp.* 49 (1980) p. 275; he sees in the inscription *Hesp.* 49 (1980) pp. 263-68 a desire by the Athenians to attract pilgrims for the Eleusinian mysteries (p. 272).

⁴² Arr. *Anab.* 1.10.2; see also ch. 5 n. 84, with text.

commencement of the Pythian games in 422, so clearly the festival itself whose sacred truce would have been proclaimed far in advance was not a period of universal peace, though the area of the festival itself would have been sacrosanct. Thucydides is unclear on precisely when the next military action took place, whether during the Pythian truce or afterwards.⁴³ One of the terms of the Peace of Nikias in 422/1 was that those who wished could consult the oracles or attend the common sanctuaries, travelling by land and sea, without fear.⁴⁴ This clause indicates the importance of pilgrimage for the Greeks, and also confirms the obvious point: war was the greatest obstacle to the successful undertaking of a pilgrimage. This was probably a direct response to the problems which had been experienced by travellers to these sites. In the Peloponnesian War, access to Delphi by land would have been difficult with the Thebans hostile, while by sea there might also have been problems. During the 420s Delphi, under Peloponnesian sway, would have been politically suspect at Athens, and it has been suggested that the oracle at Dodona was consulted as an alternative source of prophecy.⁴⁵ While individual pilgrims from Athens probably did not need to change their destination as long as their questions did not have a political motivation, they would still have needed to face the possibility of hostility on land and perhaps sea on their journey.

The other great Panhellenic sanctuary, Olympia, was also affected in 420 by the Peloponnesian War. Lepreon had at one stage been in alliance with Elis, but had renounced this agreement, and after the Eleans began to bring pressure to bear on Lepreon to renew it, the city appealed to the Spartans. The Eleans refused to accept Spartan arbitration, being on hostile terms with the Spartans, and they ravaged the land of Lepreon, whereupon Sparta decided that Lepreon was an independent state, and garrisoned it.⁴⁶ At the same time the Spartans attacked the Elean fort Phyrkos,⁴⁷ and the Eleans claimed that this attack had taken place during the Olympic truce, and

⁴³ Thuc. 5.1; cf. Gomme *Hist. Comm. Thuc.* 3.629; Popp *Einwirkung* 139. For the next military action, the Athenian attack on Thrace, see Thuc. 5.2.

⁴⁴ Thuc. 5.18.2; cf. Gomme *Hist. Comm. Thuc.* 3.667; for this see above, n. 4 with text; quoted ch. 1 n. 33.

⁴⁵ Parke *Greek Oracles* 109; cf. Garland *Priests* 89, who suggests that during the Peloponnesian War Dodona “was almost certainly consulted” about the introduction of the cult of Bendis to Athens; see also Mikalson *Popular Religion* 71 with 126 n. 3; Parke *Oracles of Zeus* 216, 218. It was also during this war that the Athenians seem to have made their first consultation of the oracle at Siwah (Plut. *Nik.* 13.2, 14.7; Parke *Greek Oracles* 109-11; idem *Oracles of Zeus* 216-17; Garland 89), which would have been made by an official embassy. The visit by Alexander III of Macedon may have been the first private Greek consultation of the oracle at Siwah.

⁴⁶ Thuc. 5.31.4.

⁴⁷ Thuc. 5.49.1. For the incident in 420, see Popp *Einwirkung* 127-32; Rougemont *BCH* 97 (1973) 102 with 94-98; Sordi *Santuario di Olimpia* 20-23; Gomme *Hist. Comm. Thuc.* 4.65.

so they inflicted a fine of two thousand minas on the Spartans, two minas for each hoplite involved.

The amount of the fine levied by the Eleans was laid down by Elean law, and the Eleans, as the custodians of the Olympic festival, were responsible for levying this fine. The Spartans protested, and claimed that the Olympic truce had not yet been announced in Sparta when the Spartan hoplites had been sent on their mission, but had been proclaimed in Sparta only after the attack had occurred. According to the Eleans, since the truce had been announced in Elis, they had therefore been living as in peace time when the attack occurred, and had been caught unawares: the Spartans had thus broken the truce.⁴⁸ The Spartan reply was that there was no point in proclaiming the truce at Sparta after the attack had taken place, if the Eleans believed that the truce was already in existence and the Spartans had broken it by attacking Lepreon. The fact that the Eleans went on to announce the truce after the attack showed, the Spartans argued, that the Eleans did not really believe that the Spartans had broken it. The Eleans remained adamant that it had been broken, but were willing to compromise on the terms that if the Spartans handed back Lepreon, the Eleans would waive the Spartan fine, and that they themselves would pay the god's share of it.⁴⁹ When the Spartans rejected this offer the Eleans proposed that the Spartans could retain control of Lepreon, if they were willing to swear an oath, before the assembled Hellenes, on the altar of Zeus in the temple, presumably during the Olympic ceremonies, that they would pay the fine at a future date. When the Spartans still refused, they were not allowed access to the temple, and had to sacrifice at home.⁵⁰ All of the Hellenes, except for the Spartans and the people of Lepreon, took part in the festival. The Eleans, however, kept their young men under arms because they feared that the Spartans would use force in order to sacrifice at Olympia, and were supported by one thousand Argives and the same number of Mantineians, as well as some Athenian cavalry who were waiting at Harpine, near Olympia, for the festival.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Thuc. 5.49.3: καὶ ἡσυχάζοντων σοῶν καὶ οὐ προσδεχομένων ὡς ἐν σπονδαῖς, αὐτοὺς λαθεῖν ἀδικήσαντας.

⁴⁹ Thuc. 5.49.5. The Eleans stated that they would not claim their share of the money and this must indicate that they were entitled to a share. This was perhaps because they were the injured party, or perhaps because Elis took a percentage of any fines levied as a result of an infraction of the truce.

⁵⁰ Thuc. 5.50.2. Cf. the incident where the Athenians refused to pay a fine imposed by the Eleans and boycotted the Olympic festival, until the Delphic priestess proclaimed that no further oracles would be given at Delphi to Athenians unless they did so: see ch. 4 n. 167, with text.

⁵¹ Thuc. 5.50.3; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.21; c. n. Harpine, see Gomme's note *Hist. Comm. Thuc.* 4.66. For the Athenian cavalry, see Bugh *Horsemen* 95-96, who suggests that the cavalry may have been there because they had acted as an escort for the Athenians participating in the festival, or perhaps as

The Elean attitude is interesting in that they went so far as to offer to allow Sparta to retain Lepreon, which the latter had secured by installing a garrison during the sacred truce. It is almost as if they accepted that the Spartans were in some degree in the right in this matter, although they had, nevertheless, violated the truce while it was in force since it had been proclaimed in Elis. On the other hand, even if the Spartans did not know, or claimed not to know, that the truce was in force, the Eleans believed that they ought to be punished in some way for the infringement. It is obvious that the Eleans feared the Spartans, as their attempts to compromise, and their military state of preparedness during the festival, indicate. The approximate time of the proclamation of the truce in Elis would necessarily have been known to the Spartans, and they would also have become aware of it as they passed through Elis even if they did not already know that it was in force. The truce in Elis meant that any troop movements in this period were violations of this and it was the responsibility of aggressors, the Eleans seem to be arguing, to ensure that they were not contravening it. On the other hand, there was no real point in announcing the truce in other states if it was expected that the truce would be observed by other states as soon as it had been proclaimed at Elis. If Sparta had attacked after the truce had been proclaimed in Sparta that would have been a clear breach of the truce and this is accepted by the Spartans. The crux of the argument is the point at which a sacred truce came into force, whether all states were bound by it from the time of the proclamation in the host state or only from the time of the proclamation in their own.

The fear of Spartan military action was exacerbated by an incident involving a Spartan, Likhas, who had entered his two-horse chariot in a race, and won. Since the Spartans had no right to enter, after being debarred by the Eleans, the victory was announced in the name of the Boeotian people. Likhas, in what must be described as a provocative act to defy the Elean prohibition, came out into the stadium, and crowned the charioteer, in order to indicate that the chariot was owned by him, Likhas, a Spartan. The Elean contest judges gave him an immediate beating.⁵² This gave rise to Elean fears that the Spartans might attack, but these misgivings about

participants themselves. An escort for participants is otherwise unattested, and would indicate a lack of confidence in the *spondai* for the festival.

⁵² Thuc. 5.50.4; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.21; Paus. 6.2.2. Xenophon adds that Likhas was beaten although he was an old man. Gomme *Hist. Comm. Thuc.* 4.67 suggests from this that he may have been a member of the *gerousia*, the Spartan council of old men, which if it was the case "...would increase the fear of Spartan intervention..." The "blows" of Thuc. 5.50.4 become a whipping in Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.21, followed by Paus. 6.2.2. Xenophon includes this as one of the causes, and Pausanias gives it as the sole reason, for Agis' invasion of Elis. Pausanias writes that in his own day the Elean records showed not Likhas as the winner, but the *demos* of Thebes (cf. Thuc. 5.50.4: the Boeotian people; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.21: the Thebans).

Spartan intentions were unfounded as no hostile move was made.⁵³ That they did not disturb the games at the time was perhaps as much due to genuine religious scruples as to the Elean military preparations with their Argive, Mantineian and Athenian supporters, for a Spartan attack. The Spartans had their revenge later, after the Peloponnesian War had ended, when they attacked and defeated Elis in 399, never having paid the fine. However, they allowed Elis to continue to control the festival as there was no other state suitable to do so, and from 399 they competed in the Olympic festival once again, the fact that they had refused to pay the fine having excluded them from the festival for over twenty years.⁵⁴

Some scruples were, however, observed during this long period of internecine struggle. In 412 a Spartan-led expedition against Khios was organised, but the Corinthians refused to sail because they were about to celebrate the Isthmian festival. Agis was prepared to allow them to preserve the truce accompanying the festival, by taking all the responsibility for the expedition himself, but the Corinthians were nevertheless unwilling to be involved. While Agis could make the expedition without breaking the truce, because truces were not a universal ban on war, the Corinthians, as the sponsors of the truce and celebrants of the festival, could not. Those who were celebrating a festival for which a truce was proclaimed held themselves to be both immune from attack, a condition respected by other states, and bound not to attack others.⁵⁵ Agis was willing to press ahead with aid to Khios in the period of the Isthmian truce; the sponsors of that truce were not.

Despite the provisions of *asylia* and inviolability for sacred sites there were occasions when sacred sites did come under attack, and sometimes even after a sacred truce had been proclaimed for the site in question. There were few occasions when this occurred, and the circumstances were generally unusual. Such attacks presumably threatened any pilgrims who were at the site, but there is some evidence to suggest that pilgrims would not be deliberately harmed. The Spartan offensive against the Corinthians in 390 led to an invasion of Corinthian territory under Agesilaos. Xenophon states that because it was the month in which the Isthmian games were

⁵³ Thuc. 5.50.4.

⁵⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.23-31: Sparta's revenge; 3.2.21: the Spartans had been debarred since 420; 3.2.31: Agis did not deprive the Eleans of the presidency of the festival (cf. Hdt. 6.127.3, where Pheidon of Argos' eviction of the Eleans from control of the Olympic festival is described as the greatest act of hubris ever committed by any Greek). See also Paus. 3.8.3-6; Diod. 14.17.4-12, 14.34.1; cf. Sordi *Santuario di Olimpia* 23-25; Unz: *GRBS* 27 (1986) 29-42; Popp *Einwirkung* 132-34.

⁵⁵ Thuc. 8.9.1; cf. the discussion below n. 61, with text, of the Argives' approach to the *spondai* of their festivals, which makes it clear that a state which had declared *spondai* could neither go to war or be warred against.

being held, Agesilaos went first to the Isthmos where the Argives were offering the sacrifice to Poseidon as part of the celebration of the Isthmian festival being held under their jurisdiction, by virtue of their recent *synoikismos*, political union, with the Corinthians. Xenophon here, in a sarcastic aside, comments that the Argives were conducting the sacrifice as if Argos were Corinth. When the Argives learned that Agesilaos was on his way, they fled in alarm back to Corinth, leaving behind the animals which they had already sacrificed and the accompanying feast.⁵⁶

Agesilaos was not one to “look a gift horse in the mouth”, and he did not pursue the fleeing Argives, but encamped in the sacred precinct, and offered up a sacrifice to the deity.⁵⁷ There he remained until the Corinthian exiles with him also offered up sacrifice and held the Isthmian games; their desire to do this was due to the fact that the games were traditionally under Corinthian jurisdiction and the exiles by celebrating them were seeking acceptance as the legitimate rulers of Corinth. This was presumably why Agesilaos had made directly for the Isthmos, and his going there was an act of premeditated intimidation, which was taken seriously enough by the Argives for them to flee. Yet the Argives were not so easily deprived of the directorship of the games, and once Agesilaos, his Spartans and the exiles had left the Isthmos, the Argives proceeded to celebrate the games again from the beginning. So in that year, states Xenophon, some of the competitors were twice defeated, while some were twice victorious.⁵⁸

Although the games were threatened, no harm had come to the competitors. Those who were there on the first day of original sacrifice to Poseidon, remained there to celebrate the games under the direction of the Corinthian exiles, and were still there when the games were re-celebrated by the Argives. It seems plausible to assume that when the Argives fled at the approach of the Spartans, the competitors, and those who had come to watch, remained. This was an effective demonstration of the trust which those who had travelled to the games placed in the *asylia* and *asphaleia* which was guaranteed to them by the sacred truce. The attack on the celebration of the festival was technically a violation of the truce from the Argive point of view, but it is possible that the Spartans did not see it in this light. Agesilaos was contesting the right of the

⁵⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.1: ὡς δ' ἦσθοντο προσιόντα τὸν Ἀγησίλαον, καταλιπόντες καὶ τὰ τεθυμένα καὶ τὰ ἀριστοποιούμενα μάλα σὺν πολλῷ φόβῳ ἀπεχώρουν εἰς τὸ ἄστυ κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ Κεγχρείας ὁδόν. On the *synoikismos* between Argos and Corinth, see Griffith *Hist.* 1 (1950) 236-56; Whitby *Hist.* 33 (1984) 295-308, and 297-98 on this particular incident.

⁵⁷ For Agesilaos' unconventional attitude to sleeping in sanctuary grounds, see ch. 3 nn. 7-8, with text.

⁵⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.2; cf. Plut. *Ages.* 21.3-6; Paus. 3.10.1.

Argives to have jurisdiction over the celebration, and it is possible that he viewed the truce which they had proclaimed as invalid.⁵⁹

This was not the only occasion in which Agesilaos is encountered in a Panhellenic religious setting. In 394 he had engaged, but failed to defeat, the Thebans in battle at Khaironeia, and after the battle he proceeded to Delphi, where the Pythian festival was being celebrated, and took part in the procession of Apollo which was part of the ceremonies.⁶⁰ The sacred truce must surely have been in force at the time when the Thebans and Spartans were fighting, but Plutarch records Agesilaos' actions without condemnation. Clearly, fighting and warfare could take place when a sacred truce was in force, as long as no pilgrims were harmed. The parties involved, Thebans and Spartans, had met freely in war, by mutual consent, and their struggle was confined to one battle in a fixed locality, which did not threaten the lives of any who might still have been on their way to the games. It might have been significant that the Pythian festival took place on the day following the battle, when all the pilgrims had presumably arrived, and none were in danger. It seems that consenting, warring parties would meet in combat during the sacred truces, and could do so without condemnation, provided the safety of pilgrims was not threatened. Such a situation, however, must have inevitably endangered pilgrims at times, and surely the ideal truce was one in which there was absolutely no fighting in the vicinity of a sacred site celebrating a festival, as only in such circumstances could a truce truly guarantee safety. Pilgrims who knew that hostilities were taking place in the area through which they had to pass in order to reach their pilgrimage destination might well have been wary of setting out, while pilgrims who were returning home from a sacred celebration, confronted with military activity, would have had to take their chances and rely on the piety of the combatants.

In 387 the Spartans decided to invade Argos; the Argives proclaimed a truce, *spondai*, for the Argive Karneia in order to ward off hostilities. Agesipolis, the Spartan king in charge of the campaign, travelled to Olympia to consult the oracle there whether the truce, *spondai* ought to be accepted, since the Argives had proclaimed it, not in the month when the Karneia was due to be held, but were claiming that it was a time of *spondai*, simply to ensure a truce throughout Argos so that none could invade their territory, as they were accustomed to do in response to

⁵⁹ Parker *Miasma* 155 n. 58. Technically, the Isthmian games were covered by a truce, but given that authority over Corinth was disputed by the exiles supported by Sparta, it is probable that as Parker *Miasma* 155 n. 58 notes "the Spartans no doubt denied the Argives' right to proclaim an Isthmian truce"; Cartledge *Agesilaos* 223, cf. 336. The feelings of the Eleans in the 360s may have been the same: that since the Arkadians had seized control of Olympia, the truce proclaimed by them had no religious backing.

⁶⁰ Plut. *Ages.* 18.1-19.4.

any threats of Spartan invasion. After receiving a favourable reply from Olympia, Agesipolis also went to Delphi and consulted the oracle there: Apollo was asked if he was of the same opinion as his father, and he was. Thus although the Spartans were aware that the Argives were manipulating the calendar so that the truce of the festival would be in force when they attacked, the Spartans were still scrupulous in seeking religious sanction, from Zeus and Apollo, before invading Argos when a truce had been proclaimed. The Argives, when they realised that the Spartans could not be prevented from invading, sent two garlanded heralds alleging that a truce, *spondai*, was in force. Agesipolis spoke to the heralds, stating that the gods did not consider the Argives to have justly proclaimed a sacred truce, and refused to acknowledge the *spondai*.⁶¹ This refusal was probably “technical” in a sense, like that at the Isthmos: if Agesipolis were to refuse the terms of the *spondai*, he had to justify his position, or he would be judged guilty of impiety, and condemned in a similar way to that in which the Spartans, whom the Eleans found guilty of attacking Eleian possessions after the sacred truce had been proclaimed, were fined for their contravention of the truce.

The Eleans had fewer scruples on a later occasion. In 365 the Eleans captured the town of Lasion, a former possession, which had joined the Arkadian alliance. When the Eleans and the Arkadians met in battle, the former were defeated. The Arkadians, after capturing all the poleis of the Akrorians, except one, took possession of Olympia, constructing a stockade around the hill of Kronos, and marched against Elis itself, but were driven off; various other battles took place.⁶² The Arkadians retained control of Olympia, and after strengthening their garrison there, decided, since in the following year there was to be an Olympic festival, to organise it in conjunction with the Pisans, who maintained a claim that they had been the original guardians of the shrine.⁶³ There is no reference to the sending out of spondophoroi for announcing the Olympic festival. This was the duty of the Eleans, and it is almost certain that they did not dispatch any, with Olympia in enemy hands, and the Arkadian

⁶¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.7.2-3; cf. 5.1.29; see Pritchett *Greek State at War* 1.124-25; Parker *Miasma* 155-56; Parke *Oracles of Zeus* 187. This particular incident is dated to 388 or 387: Pritchett 1.124 n. 32; cf. Parker 155 n. 59. Pritchett 1.122, 124 takes the festival, which Xenophon does not name, to be the Karneia, on the basis that the Argives in the fifth century are known to have manipulated their calendar for the opposite purpose: to delay the sacred period of the Karneia, when military activity would be excluded (Thuc. 5.54.3); Parker 155 n. 59 (with references), however, prefers the Nemean festival.

⁶² Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.12-27; cf. for this incident Sordi *Santuario di Olimpia* 28; Popp *Einwirkung* 135-37.

⁶³ Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.28.

intention to hold the games under their own auspices clear. Whether the Arkadians made any arrangements for announcing the festival is uncertain.

Xenophon states that the Arkadians prepared to celebrate the Olympics with the Pisans, but this does not mean that these were the only two peoples to participate. Rather, the point seems to be that the Pisans, with their claim that they were the original organisers of the games, were to join with the Arkadians in the celebration of the games. That the festival was now in non-Elean hands does not seem to have discouraged entries, and the contests appear to have proceeded normally. According to Xenophon the Arkadians and the Pisans were engaged in the organisation of the festival when the Eleans were on their way to attack. When the month of the Olympia came, and the days when the festival assembly, *panegyris*, gathered, the Eleans, with their preparations complete and the Achaeans as their allies, marched towards Olympia. The wrestling competition was in progress as the Eleans entered the sacred precinct, and a battle ensued between the Eleans and the Arkadians who had as allies two thousand Argive hoplites, and four hundred Athenian cavalry.⁶⁴

Once the Eleans had attacked, a full scale battle ensued throughout the sanctuary, and after a hard day's fighting in which the Eleans had the upper hand, the Arkadians at night built a stockade. The Eleans, on the next day, seeing the stockade, departed to their own polis,⁶⁵ and probably did not regain control of the festival until after the battle of Mantinea in 362. What happened to the competitors and any pilgrims who had attended the sacrifice to Zeus and remained to watch the games is unclear from the account of Xenophon; if they had stayed out of the arena of the fighting they may well have been safe, but anyone caught in the *mêlée* would have been at risk. Diodoros states that while the battle took place those who had come to the games, wearing their festival wreaths, watched from a point of safety applauding the manly deeds of both sides.⁶⁶ This is suspiciously akin to a dramatic flourish, but what really suggests that Diodoros' account is unhistorical is the awkward error which Diodoros makes in having the Eleans celebrating the games when the Arkadians allied with the Pisans attacked, and having the victorious Arkadians proceed to hold the rest of the competitions.⁶⁷ The statement that the games continued after the attack also needs attention. Perhaps the games did go on, but Xenophon states that the Arkadians, frightened by the vehemence of the Elean attack, tore down the *skenomata*, and built a stockade in which they awaited the return of the Eleans on the following day, who withdrew when they saw the preparations for defence.

⁶⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.28-29.

⁶⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.30-32; cf. ch. 3 n. 25, with text.

⁶⁶ Diod. 15.78.3.

⁶⁷ Diod. 15.78.1-3.

If no spondophoroi had been sent out to announce the approach of the games and the commencement of the sacred truce, then these particular games of 364 were not under sacred protection of any kind. This meant, from the Elean point of view, that they had not defiled the site by their action. Moreover, in their eyes, control of the games had been wrested from them by an invasion of their territory and the seizing of Olympia, and the Arkadian recourse to a garrison at the site was an admission of illegal control. Perhaps the Eleans could have held off until after the games, but that was the best time to attack, when the Arkadians were preoccupied, and when the Eleans themselves were determined to wrest back control of their traditional role as organisers. Significantly, the popularity of the Olympics does not seem to have suffered from the incident.

Aelius Aristeides states that the truce for the Eleusinian Mysteries was the only truce never to be violated,⁶⁸ and in support of this statement he lists known irregularities in the observances of other sacred truces. All of these violations are documented in other sources, including the battle which raged between the Eleans and the Arkadians during the course of the Olympia in 364, and the double celebration of the Isthmian games in 390. The third occasion mentioned by Aristeides as an infringement of a sacred truce was the Spartan attack on the Theban Kadmeia, or citadel. The instigator of the attack, the Spartan commander Phoibidas, had undertaken the attack without orders from Sparta, and the ephors and the majority of the Spartans, according to Xenophon, were angry at what Phoibidas had done. Agesilaos, however, defended his actions, arguing that what Phoibidas had done ought to be judged on the benefits resulting to the state from the seizure of the Kadmeia.⁶⁹ This attack, and the eventual acquiescence of the Spartan authorities to the capture of the Kadmeia, is condemned by all of our sources. Aristeides mentions that the attack violated the *spondai* because it occurred during a Pythian year, but the capture of the citadel was not a breaking of the Pythian *ekkekheiria*, as the *ekkekheiria* would not have extended as far as Thebes.⁷⁰ Plutarch notes that the Hellenes were angry at the action because it had taken place at a time of *spondai* and peace: their condemnation of the attack stems from the surreptitious nature of the attack on a peaceful polis, unwary, and in a time of peace throughout Hellas, because the King's Peace of 387/6 was in force, rather than from the breaking of a sacred truce.

⁶⁸ Aristeid. *Orat.* 19.258.

⁶⁹ See for this incident Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.29-35; Isok. 4.126; Polyb. 4.27.2-4; Plut. *Ages.* 23.6-7, *Pelop.* 5.2-3, *Mor.* 575f-576a; Nepos *Pelop.* 1. Incidentally, the attack occurred while the women were celebrating the Thesmophoria on the Kadmeia.

⁷⁰ Cf. Rougemont *BCH* 97 (1973) 105-06.

It can be seen therefore from these incidents in 420, 390 and 364 that military aggression against states celebrating festivals or the sacred sites themselves could occur. However, states that were at out to celebrate a Panhellenic festival felt obliged not to participate in military expeditions, as the Corinthians were reluctant to do in 412, while military activities on the part of other states could hinder pilgrimage activity, as was the case with the Eleusinian procession in the latter part of the Peloponnesian War.

Individual pilgrims at festivals could also be threatened. Not only did the sacred site of Olympia come under attack, but there was at least one occasion when individuals there were also threatened. Lysias in 388/7, in a speech against the Sicilian tyrant Dionysios delivered at Olympia, whipped up the crowd to such an extent that they destroyed the *skenai* of the *theoria* which had been sent by the tyrant to participate in the festival.⁷¹ There is no mention of the authorities taking action against the pilgrims who had in this way degenerated into a mob, and it is possible that against such a crowd the authorities were powerless. Political riots at Olympia were presumably rare, though there might have been a similar incident involving members of Hiero's *theoria* in the fifth century, in which Themistokles is stated to have reacted angrily to the richness of the decoration of the *skene*, and to have urged the Hellenes to tear it down.⁷² The similarity between the two stories, however, suggests that the opposition of Themistokles to Hiero is a fabrication based on the fourth century incident: even though the incidents are separated by a number of decades, and the fate of Dionysios' *theoria* need not necessarily have put future dynasts on their guard, nevertheless, the possibility of a "doublet" fashioned for political purposes should perhaps be considered.⁷³ The authorities were presumably empowered to deal with individual offenders, and it is possible that in political cases such as these the authorities simply had to overlook the situation. Such disputes at a sacred site could thus clearly endanger pilgrims, while conflict over the political control of a sanctuary could also threaten their safety. Oropos, in the territory of which was the Amphiaraion which drew the sick from Athens, Boeotia and presumably elsewhere, was a bone of contention between Athens and Thebes, until Oropos came into the undisputed control of Athens in the fourth century when Philip of Macedon awarded it to them after he had conquered Thebes.⁷⁴ These political disputes might certainly have affected the ease of access of pilgrims to the sanctuary's facilities.

⁷¹ Diod. 14.109.1-3; Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 29-30; *Lys.* 33; Plut. *Mor.* 836d; cf. ch. 3 n. 21, with text.

⁷² Plut. *Them.* 25.1; cf. ch. 3 n. 22, with text.

⁷³ Walker *CAH* 5 (1927) 36; Oldfather *Diodorus* 6.294-95 n. 2; cf. Frost *Themistokles* 206.

⁷⁴ Paus. 1.34.1; see also Petropoulou *GRBS* 22 (1981) 59, 62.

In the third century, the general observance of religious scruples did not improve, and politics continued to take precedence in some cases: while the Eleans and Arkadians could fight over Olympia and leave the pilgrims unharmed, the stakes were too high for such courtesy in one third century incident. The worst case of maltreatment of pilgrims must be the incident arising out of the double celebration of the Nemean games in 235, when Aratos of Sikyon was fighting at the river Khares, against the tyrant Aristippos of Argos, for control of the city of Argos. Aratos gained the upper hand but failed to follow up his advantage adequately, though he achieved a diplomatic victory by bringing the polis of Kleonai into the Achaean league. He organised the Nemean games to be celebrated in that polis, claiming that it had “an ancestral and more fitting claim to them”, than did Argos.⁷⁵ However, the Argives, his enemies, also made arrangements to celebrate the games at Argos, where they had been held for some time. Aratos, however, did not accept the validity of these rival games, because he had set himself up in opposition, and treated as enemies all of the contestants at the Argive Nemean games who were caught crossing through Achaean territory and sold them into slavery. This action was unprecedented. Plutarch states that this was the first time in which the *asylia* and the *asphaleia* which was granted to contestants had been broken. His wording is vague and it is not clear whether he means the first time in the history of the Nemean games, or in the history of any of the great religious festivals which involved contests.⁷⁶ If his statement is intended in a universal sense, then it is a clear, if inaccurate, testimony to the degree to which the Hellenes respected the *asylia* and *asphaleia* conferred by the provisions of the sacred truces. History is, of course, against Plutarch, and several incidents had in fact occurred which make it clear that *asylia* of pilgrims was not always observed: the members of Dionysios’ *theoria* were attacked at Lysias’ instigation and perhaps in a similar incident the members of the *theoria* of Hiero; Phrynon was captured; and Likhas was ill-treated, though technically not entitled to *asylia* since Spartans were excluded from the festival.

Delphi as the main oracular site in Greece was in the unfortunate position of being a bone of political contention for several centuries. Several wars, known as

⁷⁵ Plut. *Arat.* 28.5: καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τῶν Νεμείων ἤγαγεν ἐν Κλεωναῖς, ὡς πατριὸν ὄντα καὶ μᾶλλον προσήκοντα τούτοις. For the disputed control of the Nemean festival in antiquity, see Miller *Nemea and the Nemean Games* 89; Miller *Panhellenic Site of Nemea* 145, with bibliography at 150 n. 25.

⁷⁶ Plut. *Arat.* 28.5, 6: ἤγαγον δὲ καὶ Ἀργεῖοι, καὶ συνεχύθη τότε πρῶτον ἡ δεδομένη τοῖς ἀγωνισταῖς ἀσυλία καὶ ἀσφάλεια, πάντας τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ὅσους ἔλαβον ἠγωνισμένους ἐν Ἀργεῖ, διὰ τῆς χώρας πορευομένους ὡς πολεμίους ἀποδομένων (28. 6). For this incident, see Walbank *Aratos of Sikyon* 60-61, 186-87; cf. ch. 1 n. 15, with text.

sacred wars,⁷⁷ were fought over the site: and for this the important political role both of the oracle and of the control of the Amphiktyonic Council were responsible. The first of these wars is the most interesting in this context. The polis of Krisa (also known as Kirrha), near Delphi, was a port at which many of the pilgrims in the history of the oracle disembarked. Apparently the polis exploited its geographical position, and pilgrims to Delphi complained that Krisa was extorting money from them, by imposing taxes on those on their way to visit the temple at Delphi. Delphi made a complaint to the Amphiktyonic League, and Athens took a leading part in urging the declaration of war upon Krisa. The war which is dated to 595-591 ended with the destruction of Krisa and the dedication of its territory, the Krisan plain, to the god Apollo. It was forbidden for this land to be cultivated; but even more significantly Delphi passed into the jurisdiction of the Amphiktyonic League,⁷⁸ resulting in the war ending to the advantage of the pilgrims as they were relieved of the pilgrim toll.

The Second Sacred War of 449 involved the Spartans ejecting the Phokians from control of Delphi, handing it back to the Delphians. The Athenians, champions of the Phokians, did not intervene, but, immediately after the Spartans had left, recaptured Delphi and handed it back to the Phokians.⁷⁹ The military actions of both Spartans and Athenians were quick and effective and need not necessarily have harmed pilgrims. In contrast, the Third Sacred War lasted for a decade, from 356 to 346,⁸⁰ and was a particularly bitter struggle, in which the Phokians stripped the treasuries of Delphi in order to pay for the mercenaries which they had hired to help them fight the war against the Delphic Amphiktyony. While the Phokians had been accused of cultivating the sacred plain,⁸¹ the war was clearly political in origin.⁸²

⁷⁷ The sources write of the (Third) *Sacred War*: Paus. 9.6.4, the war ὀνομαζόμενον δὲ ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων ἱερὸν; Diod. 16.23.1: ἱερὸς πόλεμος; see also Aesch. 3.148; Strabo 9.3.8 (420); Paus. 8.27.9, 9.6.4, 10.3.1, 10.13.6; Broderson *Gym.* 98 (1991) 7-9 (overlooking Paus. 9.6.4) for some discussion on the term ἱερὸς πόλεμος.

⁷⁸ Strabo 9.3.4 (418-19); Aesch. 3.107-12; Diod. 9.16; Paus. 10.37.5-8, cf. 2.9.6; *LSCG* 78.15-21; of the extensive modern bibliography, see esp. Parke, Wormell *Delphic Oracle* 1.99-113; Forrest *BCH* 80 (1956) 33-52; Broderson *Gym.* 98 (1991) 3-7. Robertson *CQ* 28 (1978) 38-73 argues that there was no First Sacred War, criticised by Lehmann *Hist.* 29 (1980) 242-46; Tausend *RSDA* 16 (1986) 49-66. In the realm of the mythical past the Phylegians were wiped out by the god Apollo because of their attack on the Delphic sanctuary: Paus. 9.36.2-3.

⁷⁹ Thuc. 1.112.5; Plut. *Per.* 21.1-2; Strabo 9.3.15 (423); *FGH* 328 Philochoros F 34 (Schol. *Ar. Birds* 556); cf. Parke, Wormell *Delphic Oracle* 1.185-86.

⁸⁰ The main ancient sources for the Third Sacred War are: Diod. 16.14-60; Paus. 9.6.4, 10.2.1-10.3.1.

⁸¹ Diod. 16.23.3; Paus. 10.15.1.

Pilgrimage activity can only have been hindered by the struggle for the control of Delphi,⁸³ and individuals from states hostile to the Phokians presumably would not have attempted a pilgrimage to Delphi, and potential consultants from non-hostile states may well have been deterred by the existence of hostilities.

The Fourth Sacred War in 359 was short. The Athenians were accused in the Amphiktyony of impiety by the Amphissans; Aeschines, representing the Athenians, reacted with a counter charge that the Amphissans had been cultivating the sacred plain of Krisa, dedicated to the god Apollo in the first sacred war. The next day the Amphiktyony attacked Amphissan houses and port facilities on the sacred plain. A few months later the war was renewed, but was overshadowed by the alliance made between Athens and Thebes and the resulting conflict with Philip at Khaironeia in 338. There is no evidence that this sacred war affected pilgrims to any degree.⁸⁴ The First Sacred War relieved the pilgrims of a financial imposition, the second and fourth do not seem to have concerned them. Only the third may have affected their safety and visits to the oracular site, due to the length of the conflict and the very real nature of the hostilities.

The main threats to Delphi came from Jason of Pherai, the Gauls, and Perseus of Macedon. In 370 BC, Jason of Pherai, *tagos* of the Thessalians, requested the various cities under his influence to contribute sacrificial animals for the approaching Pythian festival, and ordered the Thessalians to prepare for war, because, it was said, he intended to take over jurisdiction of the Pythian festival. His assassination cut short any such plans.⁸⁵ The Gallic invasion of Greece led to an attack on Delphi in 279 BC, and the sanctuary was threatened with destruction; the Delphians sought the advice of the god, whose oracular response was that they were not to fear as the god would protect his own. Thunder, lightning and earthquake struck the ground occupied by the Gauls' army. Ancient heroes put in an appearance; at night, frost and snow, and great rocks falling from Parnassos, brought suffering to the attackers. The next day the Greeks attacked, the Gauls were put to flight, and during that night fear and madness came upon them, so that, dividing into two groups, each imagining the other to be the Greeks, they slaughtered one another. The

⁸² On the war, a complex political event, see Buckler *Philip II and the Sacred War passim* (esp. 7 on the Delphic Amphiktyony); Ellis *Philip II 73-75 and passim*; Parke, Wormell *Delphic Oracle* 1.216-32; for the chronology of the Third Sacred War, see esp. Sealey *Greek City States* 463-68.

⁸³ Parke *Greek Oracles* 115.

⁸⁴ Aesch. 3.113-24; Dem. 18.143; Ellis *Philip II* 186-90, 290 n. 31; Parke, Wormell *Delphic Oracle* 1.236-38; Londey *Chiron* 20 (1990) 239-60. For a similar dispute over sacred land involving Athens and Megara, see de Ste Croix *Origins of the Peloponnesian War* 254-56.

⁸⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.29-31.

Greeks pursued them, affecting a great slaughter, so that no Gauls escaped alive.⁸⁶ A more serious threat than Jason occurred in the second century BC, when Perseus, son of Philip V, abrogated his father's treaty with the Romans, and set about recreating a Macedonian empire. A contemporary document of the period is preserved giving the Roman charges against Perseus, which was engraved and set up at Delphi. In stating the Roman charges against Perseus it was clearly propagandist in motivation, an attempt to convince Delphi, and thus presumably the Amphiktyonic Council, and the states that represented and the Hellenic world in general, that Roman action against Perseus was justifiable, and that the Hellenic cities should rally behind Rome, instead of the Macedonian king.⁸⁷ Among other charges, the inscription states that Perseus, "contrary to what was fitting", brought his army to Delphi during the Pythian truce, and also participated in the oracular rituals, the sacrifices, the contests, and the Amphiktyonic Council of the Hellenic koinon, though this should not have happened, coming as he did with an army. His conduct was all the more heinous because he also called in the barbarians from across the Danube, who had previously invaded Delphi, to come to his aid.⁸⁸

As if this were not enough, Perseus had plotted to assassinate Eumenes, King of Pergamon, friend and ally of the Romans. Eumenes had addressed the Roman senate in 172 BC for the purpose of warning the Romans of Perseus' territorial ambitions, being motivated by his own desire to ensure that Perseus would not cross into Asia Minor. Perseus' alleged assassination attempt, so the Roman version continues, actually took place at Delphi, disregarding the safety which the god (Apollo) gave to all who arrived at his shrine, and also the fact that the sanctity and the inviolability of the polis of the Delphians had been recognised by all men, both by Hellenes and by barbarians for all time.⁸⁹

It is, however, merely propaganda to state that historically the *asylia* of the shrine had always been observed up to this point; in stating this the Romans were glossing over the Gallic attack on the shrine which occurred in the mid third

⁸⁶ Paus. 10.22.12-10.23.14.

⁸⁷ *SIG*³ 643.

⁸⁸ *SIG*³ 643.7 (παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον; .7-8 (Pythian truce); .8-9 (participation in celebrations); .9-13 (barbarians).

⁸⁹ *SIG*³ 643.30-32: [οὐδὲν φροντίσας οὐδὲ / τῆς παρὰ τοῦ] θεοῦ πᾶσιν τοῖς παραγινο[μένοις πρὸς αὐτοὶ δεδομένης ἀσφαλείας οὐδὲ ἐν λόγῳ ποιησάμενος, ὅτι ὑπά]ρχ[ε]ι ἢ παρὰ πάντων ἀνθ[ρώπων] νενομισμένη καθιέρωσις καὶ ἀσυλία τῆς πόλεως τῶν Δελφῶν / τοῖς τε Ἑλλησιν] καὶ βαρβάροις ἐκ παντ[ὸς χρόνου]. Murders on sacred soil were particularly offensive to the gods, see ch. 4 n. 149, with text.

century,⁹⁰ but it helps nevertheless to indicate the attitude of the Hellenes to *asylia*. For the Romans were clearly trying to create prejudice against the Macedonian by stressing the inviolability of the shrine, and the protection the god granted to all who went there. The religious scruples of the Hellenes, and the seriousness with which they took *asylia* were being invoked by the Romans. Nevertheless, pilgrimage to Delphi had been affected by sacred wars, barbarian invasion, and Macedonian seizure, due in each case to the political importance of the site, and Pausanias notes that Delphi had been the victim of numerous attacks, down even to the time of Nero, due to its wealth and importance.⁹¹

In addition to the pilgrims who went to sacred sites for personal reasons it is important to consider the dangers faced by both the *theoroi* sent out to announce sacred truces and the approach of various festivals, and those who were official pilgrims representing their state at a religious celebration, and thus could be expected to enjoy the benefits of a sacred truce accompanying a festival. Whatever degree of safety pilgrims might be expected to enjoy certainly the same provisions should have been accorded to them. But in one particular incident in the late fourth century, the Ephesian *theoroi* who were attending the festival of Artemis at Sardis found themselves under attack, for an unknown reason, from the local population. The beasts which they had brought for sacrifice were taken from them and the *theoroi* were themselves maltreated. The local authorities took the matter seriously, and those who had committed the offence received the maximum sentence: death was meted out to the forty-five offenders, who were found guilty of having behaved impiously towards the shrine and hubristically towards the *theoroi*.⁹²

When Kos introduced a Panhellenic festival for Asklepios in the third century, it sent out *theoroi*, who travelled in parties of two or three, to various Hellenic states in order to announce the new celebration. The two *theoroi* who announced the celebration at Philippi may possibly have experienced some danger in carrying out their mission, for the decree of Philippi recorded that this polis accepted the invitation,

⁹⁰ The first Gallic incursion (for which see Paus. 10.22.12-10.23.14), mentioned earlier in the document, is ignored in the concluding remark that the *asylia* of the shrine had hitherto been respected by both Hellenes and barbarians.

⁹¹ Paus. 10.7.1: "Εοικε δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὸ ἱερόν τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων ἐπιβεβουλευθῆναι πλείστων ἤδη. Cf. Strabo 9.3.7-8 (420): 'Ἐπίφθονος δ' ὧν ὁ πλοῦτος δυσφύλακτός ἐστι καὶ ἱερὸς ἦ' (9.3.8).

⁹² *I. Ephes.* 2; see Knibbe *JOAI* 436 (1961-63) 175-82; Robert *RPh.* 41 (1967) 32-36; Masson *REG* 100 (1987) 225-39; Sokolowski *HTR* 58 (1965) 427-31. The relevant document does not mention a sacred truce, but the local authorities clearly regarded the assault on the *theoroi* as impiety; the *theoroi* had travelled to Sardis to carry out a religious duty, to sacrifice, and the offenders were dealt with as having committed a religious offence. *Theoroi* might even be executed by their home state: see *FHG* Hermippos F 48 (Diog. Laert. 5.91); see ch. 6 n. 69, with text.

and also made arrangements that the theoroi be escorted to the next polis which they were visiting, Nea Polis. The escort was apparently not for ceremonial purposes, because the strategoi were instructed to send soldiers with the theoroi to Nea Polis, in order that the theoroi might travel safely.⁹³ No reason except that of their safe-conduct is provided. It is possible that some incident on the way to this polis led to this offer of assistance, or that the polis of Philippi knew that the route between the two poleis was unsafe. What happened in subsequent penteteric years when other Koan theoroi arrived to announce that the festival was about to be celebrated is unknown, and the polis of Philippi may have continued to provide the escort, or the problem of “safety” may have been resolved by military action. The other evidence for military protection for theoroi does not resolve these points, but clearly there was concern that theoroi, who were ambassadors sent from other states, would reach their next destination unharmed.

Presumably, those pilgrims who travelled with an official theoria would have been less liable to attack than those pilgrims who had recourse to seeking passage on a trading vessel, though there is no evidence whether pilgrims sailing on a theoric ship were safer than those pilgrims who went on their pilgrimage, not in the company of the state theoria, but on their own initiative. The theoria sent by the island of Andros to participate at Delphi seems to have travelled on a ship specifically assigned for their use, rather than on a merchant vessel,⁹⁴ but it is not clear how distinct a theoric ship would have been from an ordinary trading vessel. Piracy and warfare might again have been a major problem, but there is only the evidence of Phrynon, and the seizure of the Sounion theoria, from which this can be deduced. The terms of the Peace of Nikias guaranteed the safety, both by land and sea, of those travelling to the Panhellenic sites, and this is a reference to the fact that pilgrims went to Panhellenic sites, such as Delphi and Olympia, of course, by both land and sea, and having travelled by sea to the nearest port, then travelled inland to the site.⁹⁵ Delphi had no military power to force other states to respect the safety of Delphic pilgrims by land and by sea, but the point was that states should respect this out of piety for the god Apollo, and also because right of access to Delphi was based on a mutual respect and acceptance of others’ right of access.

⁹³ Herzog, Klaffenbach *Asylieurkunden aus Kos* 6.52-54: ὅπως / δ’ ἂν ἀσφαλῶς ἀποσταλῶσιν εἰς Νέαυ Πόλιυ, τοὺς στρατηγοὺς συμπέμψαι αὐτοῖς / τοὺς ξένουο <σ>τρατιώταο. For this and other examples, see ch. 1 n. 135, with text.

⁹⁴ For the Andrian vessel, see ch. 1 nr. 149-54, with text; for the Sounion theoria, see ch. 1 nn. 99, 156, above n. 18, with text; for the Delian triakonter, see ch. 7 n. 19; cf. ch. 1 n. 155, with text.

⁹⁵ Thuc. 5.18.2; quoted ch. 1 n. 33.

The Greeks were not known for their observance of the sanctity of festivals;⁹⁶ but, on the other hand, in general, the sanctity of the major religious centres seems to have been observed. Delphi, for example, seems to have avoided destruction of any sort, though this site was nevertheless the object of armed struggle, and several sacred wars were fought over the issue of its control, and the sacred wars are primarily significant in that they show the Greeks fighting over who was to control the sacred site. There were other disputes in Hellas involving sacred matters, such as that between Athens and Megara concerning the cultivation of sacred land.⁹⁷ But the four sacred wars involving Delphi, and the struggle between the Eleans and the Arkadians for control of Olympia in 364, were the only wars fought around a Panhellenic pilgrimage site, though there were other military threats, such as Agesilaos' march upon Corinth at the time of the celebration of the Isthmian festival. It is unknown to what extent these wars affected pilgrimage to Delphi, or to Olympia, and other sites, and though there is no evidence to suggest that pilgrims felt threatened by these wars, this was surely the case. News of war, or of potential conflict, involving Delphi or any other festival site can only have discouraged pilgrims. While those who were engaged in the armed struggle might have observed the sanctity of any pilgrims travelling to the site, there would have been risks and possible inconvenience for those pilgrims undertaking pilgrimage activity.

By the beginning of the second century BC the Greek world was becoming a part of the Roman world, and Roman activities against the Macedonians brought the Greeks under Roman protection. During the time of the Roman protectorate over Greece, and after the complete annexation of the Greek Mediterranean world, Romans played an increasing role in the affairs of the Greeks. In the religious sphere, the Romans came to guarantee the *asylia* of various sacred sites, and in 191 the oracle at Delphi was freed from Aetolian domination. In 189 the Roman senate passed a *senatus consultum* about Delphian affairs, and this *senatus consultum* was to verify arrangements which had been made in 191 when the site first came under Roman "supervision",⁹⁸ and guaranteed the *asylia* of the site. This was the first of various occasions when *asylia* was guaranteed by the Romans.

The Romans became the guarantors of *asylia*, but in coming to dominate Greece were to render such a condition as *asylia* a concept of increasingly limited significance, for the Romans were not simply guarantors but became dominators. When the *pax Romana* held sway over Hellas and the Hellenic East, there were no more wars, powerful cities or aggressive monarchs against whom sacred sites needed

⁹⁶ See above n. 8.

⁹⁷ See de Ste Croix *Origins of the Peloponnesian War* 254-56.

⁹⁸ See Sherk *Roman Documents* no. 113 with nn. 1-2 for details, cf. nos. 55, 57, 69.

the concept and the observance of *asylia* as a deterrent. In the reign of the Roman emperor Tiberius, the status of *asylia* as claimed by various Hellenic sacred sites came under review. While this *asylia* will have largely been meaningless in that there was no danger of sacred sites being attacked by their neighbours under the *pax Romana*, *asylia* clearly had the value of being a religious distinction, in that the sites which had this *asylia* were distinguished from those without it, and marked out as being more important than other sacred sites. The investigation under Tiberius arose from the abuse of *asylia* within local contexts: the temples of Greek cities were filled with runaway slaves and with debtors, taking advantage of the temples' *asylia*. Accordingly, the senate held an investigation into which sanctuaries had a right to *asylia*: some of the cities involved voluntarily gave up their claim to it, others sent representatives to Rome to argue their case; so many claims had to be investigated that the senators grew weary of their task, and handed it over to the consuls.⁹⁹ By the first century AD it was clearly an honour if the Roman authorities accepted the *asylia* of a particular sacred site, but as a religious and political phenomenon it no longer retained any significance as a bulwark against military aggression.

The safety of pilgrims in the Greek world was indelibly linked with the general adherence to the provisions of the various sacred truces which operated in the Hellenic world, for a religious occasion in itself could not guarantee the safety of the participants, as local festivals were frequently attacked. It was the Panhellenic nature of various festivals that inspired truces which would enable all Greeks to participate if they wished. Sacred truces engendered a spirit of compliance which the sacredness of the festival itself could not, since the Greeks were not at all averse to attacking their enemies while these were pre-occupied in religious ceremonies. The fact that there were sacred truces implies that they were thought to be necessary for the well-being of pilgrims and the success of festivals. By and large, however, the sanctity of sacred sites does seem to have held good, except when overshadowed by political considerations. Hellenic pilgrims did not have to contend with the problems of Christian pilgrims, for there were no Moors and the like, hostile to pilgrims on principle. On the whole, the Hellenic world was a fairly settled place, and the only people whom the pilgrims had to fear were their fellow Hellenes. Thus the fact that truces, the inviolability of sacred sites, and the safety of those attending were generally, if not always, observed, helps to account for the continuing popularity of the major religious festivals and pilgrimage as a popular institution in the Hellenic world.

⁹⁹ Tac. *Ann.* 3.60-63; cf. Belloni *Asylia* 164-80.