

THE '60s MAN: Hierarchical Structures and the Articulation of Male Experience in Selected Novels of Norman Mailer, Ken Kesey and Philip Roth.

Introduction

"Be a man; that's the sum of it all—be a man. Be all that we Americans mean by those three words."

Senator Albert Beveridge, *The Young Man and the World*, 1906.

I

In human history and culture the regular reification of an archetype of "ideal" or "heroic" masculinity is well attested. The "ideal masculine type" might be found in a man who matches, appears to match, or whose facts are constructed so as to appear to match, the paradigm provided by the range of archetypal qualities.¹ Strong of physique and character, competitive and emotionally and psychologically robust, economically and/or socially successful, the heroic type is different and differentiated from his fellows by dint of his character, his exploits and his resultant social standing. In referring to this type Carl Jung says: "The hero figure is an archetype which has existed since time immemorial."²

In human societies the male of heroic stature fulfils actual and symbolic functions as war-leader and exemplar in the context of civil as well as military affairs, and in myth and art as an "everyman" equipped to handle the challenges of a hostile natural world and the arcane spiritual reality of "other world(s)." Depictions of heroes in both literary and non-literary texts reinforce the stereotypical qualities which are attributed to such figures and contribute to the ideological function of the heroic paradigm as a conditioner of male behaviour. The heroic paradigm has become naturalised, as has the belief that it is desirable for men to measure themselves and their behaviour against the heroic or ideal paradigm.

Many cultures valorise those men who have met or attempted to meet the ideal or heroic paradigm. Memorialising, encomiastic narratives preserve heroes' deeds, and encourage their emulation. Thus the tale of the hero serves a didactic function, and is likely to come to the fore in a culture in times of social stress or threat. The hero's qualities of courage, determination and loyalty are within every man's grasp, if heroic stature is

not, and if individuals and societies needs heroes to go to war on their behalf as champions, this representative function of the symbolic elite soldier facilitates the appropriation of his role by art and myth. The hero is a vicarious experiencer who, in conquering exceptional problems with his exceptional abilities, mirrors our desires to conquer our real problems with our real abilities, and our hopes that we will be able to do so. "The hero," as Joseph Campbell comments, "is the man or woman who has been able to battle past his personal and local historical limitations to the generally valid, normally human forms."³ Heroes are "the world's symbolic carriers of the destiny of Everyman."⁴

With weight actual and allegorical on his shoulders, and needing above average allocations of strength, courage and wisdom if he is to be successful in his particular task(s), it is small wonder that the traditional hero figure is usually viewed as being of a superior kind to his fellows. The hero becomes both an ideal and a paradigm: his behavioural attributes, his appearance and his exploits become yardsticks against which men will measure themselves, to which they will aspire, and on which they will model themselves. Qualities shared and required by heroic men come to make up the elements of an ideal or perfect man, and define how other men construct their sense of self, and how they think they should look and behave. Whether a figure from legend or myth, never seen but only described as having existed, or whether an historical character—a war hero or athlete whose stature and capacities become the exaggerated stuff of legends in the eyes of his fellows—the hero is both shaped by and gives shape to the paradigm of ideal masculinity. The heroic ideology paints him as a "peak creation," of some kind; he is at the top of a scale, the apex of a pyramid where his only possible companions are other heroes, or lesser men as servants or retainers.

Even among different human groups conceptions of an "ideal male" display many points of similarity. There appears to be a conspicuous set of paradigmatic characteristics or traits or attributes which underlies conceptions of ideal masculine form and character cross-culturally. The essentials of what comprise the elements of the ideal alter little either across boundaries of western nations, cultures and social classes.⁵ This set of "ideal male" attributes relates both to sex-role stereotypes ("those beliefs concerning the general appropriateness of various roles and activities for men and for women"⁶) and sex-trait stereotypes ("those psychological characteristics or behavioural traits that are believed to characterize men with much greater or lesser frequency than they characterize women."⁷)

A great many people, regardless of who they are or where they are from, will say that they “know” “what makes a man a man,” and find many areas of agreement in attempting to express this knowledge.⁸ Yet this set of attributes, which may be “agreed upon” or conceptually “possessed” by a majority of individuals in a given culture, is rarely thoroughly articulated: maleness and masculinity are assumed to be identical, and so naturalised is the aspiration to ideal masculinity that behaviours not consonant with the paradigm are devalued and discouraged, if not deemed to be outright deviant.

If “maleness” refers to a biologically-based ascription of gender, “masculinity” might be considered as a matter of the internalisation by an individual of those traits which are inscribed upon him by social forces, and which act to elicit from him certain behaviours and attitudes which the dominant discourse valorises or sanctions as appropriate to an ideal conception of masculinity. In any particular society the set of behaviours, attitudes and characteristics of appearance which it deems appropriate or desirable becomes the stereotype of masculinity, and it will ascribe to certain men —often prominent individuals, or figures from legend and literature— the reputation for possessing those traits and characteristics, so that these men will be regarded as archetypically masculine. Any other man's level of masculinity is the measure of how close to these idealisations his behaviour, attitudes and appearance fall, according to the absence or presence of elements of the stereotype of masculinity which he might attribute to himself, or others attribute to him.

The perception of archetypes and the expectations created by the employment of stereotypes condition the ways individual men construct a sense of self, and the views of men and women generally about what a man should and should not be, do, and say. Gayle Greene and Coppélia Kahn indicate that the shape of human society is structured to a major degree by a “sex-gender system,” which is “ ‘that set of arrangements by which the biological raw material of human sexual procreation is shaped by social intervention.’ (Rubin 1975, p. 165; Fox-Genovese, 1982, pp. 14-15.)”⁹ The same authors note of this socio-cultural moulding that “the social construction of gender takes place through the workings of ideology”¹⁰ which is, as they further observe, with recourse to Althusser, “ ‘the imaginary relationships of individuals to their real conditions of existence.’ ”¹¹ Such relationships are often articulated, examined, or in other ways represented in works of fiction.

It seemed intrinsically interesting to study not only the way men's characters were formed by conceptions of ideal masculinity—men's relationships with themselves—but also to study men's interactions with other men, as they relate, for example, to the “homosocial”¹² bonds described by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, and to attempt to find out something about the forms which might govern and characterise these interactions, and how these forms, men's lives, and men's conceptions of ideal masculinity might be connected.

Thus this study was initiated by my interest in observing the construction of masculine identity and the articulation of masculine experience and masculine interactions as depicted in fiction. I wanted to see if the action of the forces responsible for what Toril Moi calls the “patterns of sexuality and behaviour imposed by cultural and social norms”¹³ could be identified.

The artistic depiction of male experience seems to point to vigorous and pervasive models which influence the lives of the men in particular social frameworks. These models in addition “pre-condition” the representation of life and social structures which cultural phenomena, for example literary texts emerging from those frameworks, encode. One is reminded of the critic Robert Alter's comment: “Now we know, of course, that reality outside of literature, outside of the arts, is contaminated by our artistic representations of it.”¹⁴

The paradigms of ideal masculinity which can be found in American history and society, it must be argued, will be found also to condition the representations of the lives of American men as depicted in novels and be conditioned by them in a reciprocal arrangement.

As Greene and Kahn note:

In their creation of fictions, writers call upon the same signifying codes that pervade social interactions, representing in fiction the rituals and symbols that make up social practice. Literature itself is a ‘discursive practice’ (Michel Foucault's term; Eagleton 1983, p. 205) whose conventions encode social conventions and are ideologically implicit. Moreover, since each evocation of a code is also its reinforcement or reinscription, literature does more than transmit ideology: it actually creates it — it is ‘a mediating, moulding force in society’ (Hawkes 1977, p. 56) that structures our sense of the world.¹⁵

The form of the novel can provide a great deal of “information” about individuals, the way they see the world, respond to it, and in the other ways

in which they engage with it. Novelists may not “tell the truth” (whatever that might mean) but they do “write” themselves, and certain aspects of their culture, in their work.

Literature distorts, emphasises, and selects; it creates and is created, influences and is influenced by. Theodor Adorno writes:

Works of art are after-images or replicas of empirical life...As artefacts, works of art communicate not only internally but also with the external reality which they try to get away from and which none the less is the substratum of their content...art resembles the social dialectic without consciously imitating it.¹⁶

This resemblance proceeds according to “rules” which may not be clearly understood, but which support the belief that both ideas and ideology are de facto embedded in style and form, and literary analysis can reveal the nature of these ideas and the ideology(ies) which lie behind the “art” of the novelist, and which, indeed, permit this art and facilitate its transmission. “Evidence” about the functioning of the paradigm of ideal masculinity, and interrelationships between men as shaped by their pursuit of this paradigm of ideal masculinity, can be gathered from the examination of works of literature.

Gregory Rochlin, then Associate Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at the Harvard Medical School, noted in his 1973 book *Man's Aggression*: “Today, as in the past, we cannot afford to neglect looking to our novelists, poets and dramatists for the ‘deeper truths’ of human nature in everyday life which conventional psychology fails to yield.”¹⁷

Terry Eagleton has also made the point that:

There are two ways in which an interest in the sociology of literature can be justified. The first form of justification is (in the epistemological sense of the term) realist: literature is in fact deeply conditioned by its social context, and any critical account of it which omits this fact is therefore automatically deficient. The second is pragmatist: literature is in fact shaped by all kinds of factors and readable in all sorts of contexts, but highlighting its social determinants is useful and desirable...¹⁸

While one should exercise prudence rather than unhesitatingly accepting the conclusions of literary sociologists, we should, then, be able to agree with one of its earliest and most prominent exponents, Leo Lowenthal, in concluding that:

literature conveys many levels of meaning, some intended by the author, some quite unintentional. An artist sets out to invent a plot, to describe action, to depict the interrelationships of characters, to emphasize certain values; wittingly or unwittingly, he stamps his work with uniqueness through an imaginative selection of problems and personages. By this very process of selection...he presents an explicit or implicit picture of man's orientation to his society.¹⁹

It is conceivable, indeed likely, that sociological analysis of literature "will succeed in revealing the central problems with which man has been concerned at various times, permitting us to develop an image of a given society in terms of the individuals who comprised it."²⁰

II

In suggesting that there is a set of preconceptions which is associated culturally and historically with the description of masculinity and the production of masculine behaviour, one is aware that articulating the relationship between a paradigm and an expression of the paradigm has long been a common act in various critical disciplines: for example, the theories of Freud and Marx both feature the notion that various phenomena are systematically ordered by underlying or hidden "rules," and the work of the structuralists and their successors posits a similar relationship embodied in Saussure's terms *langue* and *parole*. Likewise, in first employing the terms which for the sake of their brevity, are used in this investigation, the anthropologist Edwin Ardener distinguishes between "*p*-structures" and "*s*-structures." He describes his "*p*-structures" and "*s*-structures" as "programme" and "output" respectively, (with "programme" generating, facilitating, or structuring "output") and notes that:

The former are in one terminology 'template structures' and the latter are 'structures of realization'...[of which] linguistic and textual analyses of many kinds are possible and in order...The *s*-structures then, as we may now call them, appear in the normal flux of experience. They are studiable in the 'stream of events' itself...The *p*-structures, as we may call the others, are a different class, set up as unknowns, posited before identified. As far as social anthropology is concerned, they are its pions or muons. But we can say something about them. We apprehend (or

construct) them out of the same world as the *s*-structure, but we can document them only by their reflections, or their 'reflexes'.²¹

Ardener goes on to talk of a "world structure" made of transcultural *p*-structures of which participants may not be wholly aware, but which "automatically" influence behaviour.²² These seem related to Durkheim's "collective representations," which do not originate in an individual consciousness, but which emerge from the association of people and ideas and practices, and exist in an almost "organic" cognitive continuum, or to the mechanisms which Raymond Williams, in his book *Problems in Materialism and Culture*, refers to as "significant responses," stating his "belief that all human activity is an attempt to make a significant response to a particular objective situation."²³ "The significant response," he continues, "is a particular view of the world: an organizing view."²⁴ A paradigm of masculinity might be thought of as a "significant response" to historical problems of institutionalised interpersonal and inter-group violence and unstable social organisation; paradigms of masculinity "produce" "brave" "warrior" males devoted to the defence of a social unit or an ideology.

Williams concludes:

We should study...the organizing categories, the essential structures, which give...[literary] works their unity, their specific aesthetic character, their strictly literary quality; and which at the same time reveal to us the maximum possible consciousness of the social group—in real terms, the social class—which finally created them, in and through their individual authors.²⁵

Williams goes on to examine Lucien Goldmann's ideas that an examination of a literary work's structure could reveal

a relation between social and literary facts. This relation, he insisted, was not a matter of content, but of mental structures: 'the categories which simultaneously organize the empirical consciousness of a particular social group and the imaginative world created by the writer.'²⁶

Elements of an archetype of ideal masculinity would certainly fall under the heading of "categories which simultaneously organize the empirical consciousness of a particular social group," which will include the writers who belong to and depict that social group.

In *City of Words* Tony Tanner discusses Edward Hall's 1959 book *The Silent Language* and its proposition concerning " 'underlying patterns' which programme [a person's] responses"²⁷ to the phenomenological "reality." Tanner writes: "What Hall sets out to do is to make people aware of the large number of 'interaction patterns' and systems—most of them non-linguistic—which determine people's behaviour in America."²⁸ Tanner later cites Marcuse's theories about social conspiracy and semiological manipulation and Benjamin Whorf's assertion that " 'the forms of a person's thoughts are *controlled by inexorable laws of pattern* of which he is unconscious.' "²⁹

When individuals create their sense of self, then, and their sense of what are and what are not appropriate behaviours, attitudes and desirable characteristics of appearance, they respond and react to cultural forces which are themselves shaped by "underlying patterns." These forces act through the influence on a child of its parents, friends, teachers, authority or role-model figures, or, more indirectly, through the influence of various "texts" transmitted by commercial and artistic media. The primary "shapes" or distinguishing structures which organise them may be conceived of as patterns which lie behind patterns, *p*-structures (paradigms) behind *s*-structures (manifestations). General cultural *p*-structures affect the paradigm of masculinity, which serves an intermediary function as what Ardener refers to as a "mode of specification,"³⁰ and which in turn affects the *s*-structures in which it is given shape. The *p*-structure's imperative delimits the mode of specification (range of characteristics) within which the objectives of the *p*-structure (the programme) should be realised. *S*-structures are revealed through modes of specification, which are the social phenomena which result from the aggregation of individual "choices." The social and human forces, and short- and long-term patterns which circumscribe the field of those choices are reflected in "artefacts" such as novels, which detail those forces at work.

Cultural models of masculinity are shaped by the words and phrases, metaphors and clichés, available for the description of masculine appearance and behaviour; at the same time as writers employ them, especially in familiar ways, or with them evoke familiar themes or stories, they are contributing to the perpetuation of stereotypes and the entrenching of the modes of specification of paradigmatic (*p*-) structures. They also reveal something of the characteristics of the elusive *p*-structures of humankind.

III

In America the lively cultural manifestations of a vigorous set of archetypal and stereotypical characteristics have shaped a clearly marked paradigm of ideal masculine appearance, personality and behaviour. In the twentieth century conceptions of masculinity with their origin in the United States have been widely disseminated. The American version of the "Ideal Male" provides the dominant paradigm of masculinity available to men in the western world, and the popularity of American mass media, including motion pictures, radio and television programmes, novels, magazines, newspapers and comics, and "pop" music has transmitted this image to men and women in all parts of the world. The result of the dissemination of these heavily manipulated images is to make it seem as if the principal actors of European-American social, political, and artistic history have been variations on the one archetypal physical and personality type. It is as if European America was founded, explored, exploited, expanded and maintained by the heterogeneous offspring of the one muscular patriarch, each man devoted to one monolithic ideology, and united over the course of centuries by an unswerving dedication to the same goals and the same methods of achieving those goals. The ubiquity of the stereotypes concomitant with this characterisation has naturalised the qualities with which it is associated; it is as if the conception of the "ideal" man is something beyond question, culturally posited for each man to deal with, a shaping or formative construct early introduced and reinforced by cultural mechanisms. In selecting a genre of literature to study, contemporary American literature provided a compelling choice for these reasons.

It is important to understand the historical, social and cultural factors which have shaped the contours of male archetypes and stereotypes in America. The particular conditioning "template structures," the *p*-structures, which underlie the articulation of male experience in life and in literature in the United States illustrate the 'power' of the driving ideologies of the society to which they belong, and demonstrate also the changing perspectives of national and individual preoccupations, particularly as they concern the acquisition of "prestige" and the exercise of "power" that results.

In the United States of America the masculine archetype is ingrained in the national ideology; the exhortation in the epigraph of this introduction provides an example. Senator Beveridge assumes no one will need to ask what he means; his comments reveal the existence in America of a thoroughly naturalised version of ideal masculinity. This remains true in

America today, where what has been called “an ideal image of masculinity” is described as being “shared, with minor variation, by nearly every male in America.”³¹ The “heroic” ideal and archetype of “perfect” masculinity is ubiquitous in the culture and is reified in the art and the literature of the nation through narratives and texts depicting males who display elements of or meet aspects of the paradigm of ideal masculinity.

In addition to possessing the general characteristics of the ideal, or heroic, male, in America the pervading ideal of masculinity has well delineated, combative characteristics. In discussing the key, defining traits of the American male, Myriam Miedzian identifies: “toughness, dominance, emotional detachment, callousness toward women...[and]...eagerness to seek out danger and fight.”³² Sam Julty summarises “the powerful messages” American men receive from traditional conceptions of male behaviours and attitudes as: “Do *unto* others; do *for* others; deny thyself; you are your tasks.”³³ In an exhaustive study citing numerous reports, studies and analyses of test data the social critic Alfie Kohn concludes that “[t]he United States...is appreciably more competitive than many other cultures.”³⁴ He indicates that the cause of this is a belief in “mutually exclusive goal attainment.”³⁵ In mutually exclusive goal attainment there is only one “winner,” who wins *at the expense* of an other, or others.³⁶ Where this is the case or where it is believed by the participants to be the case, as in American society, limited resources and hierarchical social organisations lead to a focus on individual rather than group success. Kohn also describes his fellow-Americans as “uniquely uncooperative,”³⁷ the result, he feels, of cultural conditioning in a society in which competition was in many ways a cornerstone. He notes that David Reisman, the eminent sociologist, finds irony in “‘the paradoxical belief of Americans that competition is natural—but only if it is constantly re-created by artificial social roles that direct energies into it.’ First, we are systematically socialized to compete—and to want to compete—and then the results are cited as evidence of competition's inevitability.”³⁸

Intense competitiveness is a feature of American society, and the systems and structures of American society have resulted from this national predilection; they also reinforce it (“each evocation of a code is also its reinforcement or reinscription”) This situation leads to certain qualities becoming entrenched, culturally valorised and self-perpetuating, concentrated on achieving and maintaining a gender-based hegemony over “power.” From its beginnings American society has been stratified in an interesting way—there has been more social mobility within America than

generally permitted by the rigid class system of Old Europe, and “tension” or “vigour” has always been maintained in the American social structure by the competition within extended families, “affinity groups,” and other class and non-class defined societal structures or groupings. In “democratic” American society there is a great deal of competition among peers for the opportunity to rise, as well as interaction between those relatively less and relatively more powerful. The “shape” of social, economic and even family structures in American society seems feudally pyramidal, or hierarchical, as was the model of European monarchies, aristocracies and economic oligarchies. The additional internal tensions of the American model make it an extremely interesting subject for study. As Richard Bartlett writes: “One of the most valid ways to build an understanding of the new country society is to begin with the conscious realisation of its masculinity.”³⁹

Puritan ideology fuelled the first permanent European-American culture. The Puritans' orientation toward the American landscape and its inhabitants was provided by a craving sense of a unique mission, and a unique justification for that mission. The focus on “mission” contained within it the seeds which would eventually turn Puritans into Yankees, and Puritan religious values into those of the secular American.

“The society itself was not nationalist,” Sacvan Bercovitch notes, though it clothed itself in the metaphors of Israel, and it was not theocratic, though it claimed to be God's special instrument...it was both nationalist and universalist *in potentia*...a New World community which defined its purpose and locale in abstractions that fused the dynamics of modernization with the tropes of sacred history.⁴⁰

Bercovitch concludes: “My point is not that ‘America’ is Puritan. It is that the Puritans contributed in a central way to what was to become the American symbology.”⁴¹ The story of Exodus was used anagogically to provide “an ideology of deliverance and liberation, and of oppression and exclusion: a warrant for release and a charter for conquest.”⁴² Warren Motley draws attention to an ongoing patriarchal and paternalistic strain in American society, suggesting that “the idea that patriarchal authority extended out from the family to society at large originated in the Puritan doctrine that God's covenant with Abraham extended to his entire household.”⁴³ The ideology which surrounded the Pilgrim project supported the perspective which is known as American “Exceptionalism,” the doctrine of “Manifest Destiny,” the Monroe Doctrine, and the excuse for

an American expansionism which eventually reached well beyond the geographical limits of the north American continent.

The "heroic" image of the American male derives from a racist and Eurocentric project designed to assert the racial superiority of Europeans and provide a justification for European invasion and colonisation of America by recourse to a particular interpretation of divine intention and history. In American Puritanism is to be found, according to Norman Grabo, "the root of that sense of American specialness: a God-conferred righteousness so deeply felt that it needed no visual proofs."⁴⁴ The smug sedulity of Puritanism and its elaboration of the Calvinist idea of predestination, and its consequent division of all humanity into the "Elect" and the damned, and "two-species theory of European humankind,"⁴⁵ imparted to American society a tendency to cognitive polarisation; Walter Allen in *The Urgent West* writes of

an interpretation of existence in terms of black and white...allied with...indeed inseparable from, an assumption of moral superiority to the rest of the world that the rest of the world finds baffling and infuriating, partly because it is insulting and partly...because it stems from a view of life the rest of the world thinks altogether too simple and naive.⁴⁶

Daniel Hoffman identifies the stresses of the Puritan experience as having enduring consequences in American culture. He perceives the lasting influence of

complementary myths of the land—as Eden, as Hell. The combination of an Adamic view of Man with a prelapsarian concept of nature...[and] the presence of the opposite view: the defeat by an intractable wilderness of the pioneer enterprise, and the inherited Calvinist belief in Man as a fallen creature.⁴⁷

The Puritans also bequeathed to America their "association between industry and hard work...and virtue [which] survived even in those who had no belief in Puritan theology."⁴⁸ John Adams, a signatory of the Declaration of Independence and later President, attributed his family's success to "industry, frugality, regularity, and religion."⁴⁹ From Puritanism emerged a philosophy in which: "Vanity, sloth, dissipation, timorousness, and hypocrisy were to be shunned, while intrepidity, honesty, prudence, and charity were worthy."⁵⁰

Once themselves victims of religious repression and persecution, the Puritan Fathers made instead of an idealised "City on a Hill" a citadel of intolerance and isolationism in which they nurtured the arrogance and self-justification which from the first rejected those who deviated from their social and religious practices. While a class-based hierarchy had been overturned in the founding of the nation, and patriarchal institutions were rejected, it was the patriarchs as individuals, and their particular exercise of power rather than the patriarchy itself which was in dispute. The American models of hierarchy which replaced them became themselves, where not similar, mirror reflections of those they superseded. An economic hierarchy replaced a religious one; material wealth replaced nobility of birth as the measure of success; individual freedom replaced duty and responsibility as the admired ideal: but it was the expression of the form, rather than the form itself, which was being challenged. An observation on power and government from the utopian Saint Simon—later an influence on Marx—is cogent here. Saint Simon argued "that the aggressive pursuit of power is an ineradicable characteristic of man, which will not disappear when one system is transformed into another, but will be enthusiastically exercised by those in charge of the new one."⁵¹

In the first period of the history of European America imperial English, Spanish and French patriarchal cultures achieved a masculinist efflorescence in a country in which European women were relatively few in numbers. From the first American society was intentionally, aggressively hierarchical and patriarchal, characterised by an "extreme degree of sentimentalization and sexual biturcation...the dichotomization of male and female spheres and roles,"⁵² and the development of the "hyper-masculine ethos."⁵³ This ethos conditioned much social, cultural, economic and political life, and continues to do so.

The process, uneven yet distinct, of the "mutation" of Puritan notions into a more secular creed and the Puritan into the Yankee was charted by writers like Benjamin Franklin and J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur, both of whom present literary representations of the emergence of a distinctive masculine character-type in American society. Franklin's personal synthesis of Lockean notions concerning self-education and religious tolerance, precepts taken from classical literature, and his Deist beliefs, was coloured in its expression by Puritan notions. These found form in the carefully constructed "common-sense" maxims in the homely wisdom of Franklin's "Poor Richard's Almanac" (1732-57), in his plethora of journalistic pieces, and in his unfinished *Autobiography*, which was begun in 1771. Franklin is

often cited as the veritable paradigm of the American man; his was certainly one of its earliest—and most encuring—articulations.

Crèvecoeur's *Letters* (1783) ask "What is an American?" Influenced by French romantic individualism as it might be, he provides in answer a portrait of a robust physiocracy in which the tenets of the Enlightenment and Age of Reason have been distilled to provide the impetus for an egalitarian (or at least quasi-egalitarian) cultural-social project; Crèvecoeur, James Nye says, "helped to create the original self-reliant, self-sufficient, independent Yankee as an American character...a prototype already being shaped by English, Calvinistic, and frontier forces."⁵⁴ Nye further describes Crèvecoeur's narrative personae, James the Farmer and Andrew the Hebridean, as part of a tradition which includes "ambitious young Ben Franklin, Jackson's Young Americans, and Horatio Alger's self-made heroes, down to the Junior Chamber-of-Commerce's most recent young-men-of-the-year."⁵⁵

One sees in Franklin's and Crèvecoeur's search to summarise and essentialise what they saw in the American character early textual indications of "collective representations" of American masculinity. These are shaped, as these commentators noted, by social, economic, historical, ideological, linguistic and other factors. They are also associated with the archetypal "underlying patterns" or "template structures" in American life, the *p*-structures of the construction of gender identity. Built on Old World models, these emerging patterns of masculinity provided a paradigm which succeeding generations found amenable, and, with some modification, were able to apply to their purposes, social and ideological. Modalities of social interaction which were primarily English and European in their origin predominated in America; as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries passed, these forms and models of American masculinity took clearer, and more recognisably native, shape.

Richard Slotkin in *Regeneration Through Violence* comments on "the nationalistic fervors of the post-revolutionary and Jacksonian generations"⁵⁶; originating in the conviction that in America "a new nationality"⁵⁷ and "a new and better race of men,"⁵⁸ had arisen. Slotkin describes this as "the social expression of the belief (derived from the Puritans) in a personal regeneration and unlimited self-improvement."⁵⁹ American articulations of masculinity in literature and culture became more pronounced and the paradigm of ideal American masculinity progressively more central to the idea of Americanness as the need for the exaggerated masculine qualities required of the role of explorer and "tamer"

became more urgent to the economic and social imperatives of the southern and westward expansion of the American nation. The epitome of masculinity was the "Frontier Hero," the expression of ideal masculinity in America during its "Great Expansion," and he has from his origins occupied a central place in the American saga.

Combining qualities of the "exceptional" American of Puritan heritage and the pragmatic and competent American New Man of the Age of Enlightenment and Revolution, the "Hero of the Expansion" can be seen as an amalgam of universal stereotypes of masculinity and elements of the dominant expressions of masculinity which had preceded this figure's emergence in American history. The "Hero of the Expansion" has a number of variant forms: for example, the Backwoodsman (the "self-reliant naif, akin to the Yankee or Frontiersman of popular American tradition"⁶⁰); the Frontier Patriarch (which includes politician and "founding-father" figures⁶¹); the "Young Buck" Cowboy; and the Soldier-Aristocrat. The Hero of the Expansion exemplifies American socio-cultural attempts at inclusiveness through the reconciliation of oppositional tendencies: European Stoicism and self-restraint with autochthonic satyr-woodsman; sanguine conquistador and Rousseau-esque Natural Man. Idealised as a combination of modern Christian gentleman and the classical warrior-philosopher to whom he has often been compared, he could also be likened to an Arthurian knight or a Carolian Cavalier, but elements such as a pragmatic attitude to violence, the valorisation of uncouth mannerisms and aloofness carried to the extreme of anti-social orientation equally characterise the American Galahad in buckskins. The narratives which tell stories of expansionist heroes often began as folktales, and also included bizarre and comic elements, as Americans "played" (as they still do) with identities personal, regional and national. Hoffman pairs the heroic and the comic as the two principle modalities for the construction of masculine stereotype originating as and then transmitted by the growth of a "native" European American folk culture,⁶² while Richard M. Dorson explores the extent to which Crockett narratives, for example, repeat the familiar patterns of the Old World heroic story.⁶³ Richard Slotkin focuses on the translation of real characters to figures of mythic import in the nineteenth century, noting how different authors worked with "a gallery of stock figures and moulded them into a composite image of an American hero."⁶⁴

The ultra-masculine, larger than life character of the Hero of the Age of Expansion, then, was the result of the valorisation of ultra-masculine qualities harnessed to expansionist ideology justifying an exploitation of

environment and occupants which, like the original journey across the Atlantic and the Revolution before it, was constructed for its European perpetrators as a courageous passage into the unknown, into hardship, sacrifice and certain danger as the political boundaries of the United States were expanded to and then past its natural boundaries. The conquest of "The Frontier" and the resultant creation of the modern geographical area of the United State of America was facilitated by literary and non-literary fiction of an astonishing variety, the effect of some of which was no doubt to persuade, even enthuse, men and women about an early version of the "American Dream," to leave the boundaries of the world they knew and risk transplanting to a new and hostile environment "in the west." Frederick Turner developed the famous "Frontier Hypothesis,"⁶⁵ which argues the central place of the "Frontier mentality" and its politico-geographical locus as a defining event in the forming of the psyche of the nation and its citizens. The myth of the Frontier was indeed potent: a popular belief in its central, shaping role in the creation of the American nation and growth of its national mythos remains despite revision of Turner's original ideas. The importance which popular culture still places on the role of the frontier in American history and culture shows, as Richard Slotkin argues, that this particular myth arose in part as a response to "the social conflicts that attended the 'modernization' of the Western nations, the emergence of capitalist economies and nation-states,"⁶⁶ and "part of a nascent national ideology and mythology."⁶⁷ Henry Nash Smith's *Virgin Land: the American West as Symbol*⁶⁸ also discusses the dialectical tensions between Europe and America, the claims of the past in conflict with the potential of future and the effect this dichotomy had on the development of American self-conception in art and literature.⁶⁹ It may have been 1851 before John Babson Lane Soule, in the *Terre Haute, Indiana, Express* advised: "Go west, young man,"⁷⁰ but the phrase and the idea had already captured the imagination of at least one generation, and they encapsulate the epic of the westward expansionism in the nineteenth century, which remains part of the folk memory of Americans, and occupies a central place in the national mythos.

An investigation of the development of the characteristic qualities of ideal American masculinity during the period of the "Frontier," the "Great Expansion" of American area, has occupied a number of authors. Richard Slotkin and Richard Drinnon, among others, have charted this as a socio-cultural process, influenced to a greater or lesser degree by historical factors.⁷¹ Still others have been interested in the psychological impact of the

masculinist ethos in early European-American society, and in the effect of the adversarial construction of the natural world engaged in by European-American society.⁷² Others note the ongoing existence and influence of Frontier or Expansion Hero type in American culture and letters.⁷³

However, the very qualities which made the frontiersman successful drove him to reject the emphases of the society whose "frontline" he represented. Peter Aichinger charts this dilemma, noting that

the American Revolution engendered a certain lack of respect for due processes of law. This tendency was fortified by the exigencies of frontier life: the processes of wresting land from its rightful owners or of settling boundary disputes...did not always permit the moral niceties to be observed...At the same time the men who performed these tasks necessarily became heroes in the eyes of the nation.⁷⁴

Tales and legends of the hero serve to reinforce and naturalise images of idealised masculinity which contribute to the enforcement of cultural normatives and ideological imperatives, particularly in terms of constraining and "inspiring" the behaviours of men. Common elements of portrayals of the frontier were that they "offered moral, social, and even political lessons to less-fortunate brothers in the east...offering the reading masses Turner's thesis on a fictional platter."⁷⁵ Martin Green comments that adventure literature "was written almost exclusively for a masculine audience. It has been the main literary means by which males have been taught to take initiatives, to run risks, to give orders, to fight, defeat, and dominate."⁷⁶ For Green the adventure story is

the energizing myth of empire...The American adventure stories represented, in attractive and individualized form, the policies and compromises, the punishments and rewards, and the stresses and problems involved in advancing a frontier at the expense of native populations and against natural obstacles.⁷⁷

The biographies of certain individuals were exaggerated, sanitised and re-inscribed to provide instructive role models for young men and boys "back east": for instance, those of Daniel Boone, Kit Carson, Colonel David Crockett, Jim Bowie, Wyatt Earp, George Armstrong Custer, "Wild Bill" Hickock and "Buffalo Bill" Cody. The weight of other works which dealt with these and other individuals, fictional and "real," is monumental. Violent, lurid accounts of "western life" might be seen as the beginning of a peculiarly American fascination with tales in which brutality and death are

seen as more than incidental, but in some ways essential, perhaps catharsis inducing, elements of the narrative.

An example of the “fantastic chronological abridgment: from elusive oral legend to printed form,”⁷⁸ which was a feature of the creation of the “popular legendary hero”⁷⁹ is seen in the translation of the life of Daniel Boone (1734-1820), the 5' 8" (172 cm.) hunter, trapper, land speculator and surveyor in the employ of the Transylvania Land Company, into “the most significant, most emotionally compelling myth-hero of the early republic.”⁸⁰ John Filson's “Kentucke” narratives and later works by William G. Simms and Timothy Flint promoted Boone as the harbinger of civilisation, a paragon of virtue and a trailblazer of the backwoods who was, “decisive and courageous, never failed to do the manly thing,”⁸¹ and who “possessed the best virtues of true manhood: fearlessness, strength, energy and sagacity.”⁸² Boone stories and Boone characteristics became part of the American heroic paradigm, and, according to Slotkin, all “other [American heroic] myth-figures are reflections or variations of this basic type.”⁸³ This he describes as an example of the “cultural function”⁸⁴ of myth, “generalizing particular and contingent experiences into the bases of universal rules of understanding and conduct...by transforming secular history into a body of sacred and sanctifying legends.”⁸⁵

The revealing anxieties—crises of culture, appropriate sexual expression, and self-definition—to which such characters, caught between the antithetical worlds of the “wilderness” and “civilisation,” are subject, also encapsulate much of the essential tension of the frontier experience for European-Americans. As a result the Hero of the Expansion has become a staple of literature: James Fenimore Cooper's “Leather-Stocking” novels, for example, articulate this tension with symbolic intensity in the person of the cross-cultural hero, Natty Bumppo. Warren Motley notes the novelist's presentation of patriarchal structures and “an unforced hierarchy based on the citizen's respect rather than on the imposition of the leader's will;...one senses Cooper's strong attraction to the clear hierarchy of the Puritan community.”⁸⁶

Amongst other writers of the nineteenth century who deal with these themes, Ralph Waldo Emerson “relentlessly pursued the meaning of the ideal heroic style and virtuous masculinity”⁸⁷ while the correlation of personal physical strength with moral strength, and the further extension of the idea of *mens sana in corpora sano* to include the idea that a nation's fitness might be measured by the physical health of a sample of its male inhabitants found a full expression in Walt Whitman's sexually charged

images, which made an overt connection between a robust, sanguine outdoors-ness and mental and spiritual health. Robert K. Martin finds in Herman Melville's literary corpus "a democratic eros strikingly similar to that of Whitman"⁸⁸ while the former author goes even further than the latter in the celebration of physicality, independence, masculinity with a symbol-laden, mystic/homoerotic vision of life. Jack London, in novels like *Son of the Wolf*, *Call of the Wild*, and *The Sea Wolf* promoted the instinctive and physical side of the "red-blooded"—and violent— male personality, while writers like Robert Herrick and Frank Norris provided a more complex elucidation of similar themes. According to Elizabeth Badinter these and similar writers "took up Kipling's 'white man's burden,' not simply in overt racism against Asians, Mexicans, and all nonwhites, but by reconstructing American identity as a biological category of Anglo-Saxon masculinity."⁸⁹ In this genre the Anglo-centric definition of American-ness (and American masculinity) reaches its apogee as an apology for Anglo-Saxon world domination and the centrality of racist definitions of masculinity are twinned.

In a different vein, throughout the period of the Great Expansion and after, a host of medical professionals and opinionated authors lent their names and pens to the production of didactic literature designed to nurture America's moral tone, preserve men's spiritual and moral health and to inculcate acceptable varieties of manhood into American males.⁹⁰ The regulation of male sexuality and the male appetite for violence and alcohol were often the specific focus of these endeavours. Boys were a particular target and subject of such texts: for example, the young heroes of Horatio Alger represent a fictional exfoliation of an inflexible, morally simplistic ethical code. From humble beginnings, through a combination of good fortune, hard work, and resistance to temptation, heroes with names like Ragged Dick and Tattered Tom rise to enjoy wealth and success, "by serving the interests of benevolent and paternalistic wealthy men with diligence and honesty...frankness, 'manliness,' and honesty."⁹¹ Alger wrote some 130 novels as well as biographies of the "self made men" of business, politics and the military so admired in the nineteenth century. Burt L. Standish's Frank Merriwell was a fictional cousin of Jack Armstrong, "the All-American boy"; both embody a clear-cut, Victorian morality, and cheerful, healthy, sports-minded personalities which saw in acquiescence to the mores of the existing social order the best expression of patriotism and Christianity. The defining virtue of these heroes for boys was "pluck," that characteristically Victorian type of courage which combined connotations of

fortitude, perseverance, and enthusiasm with a love of challenge and competitiveness for its own sake.

Into the twentieth century, the character of the Hero of the Expansion has been kept alive in films, novels, plays and, later, radio, television and motion pictures, and become a widely recognised stereotype. The Frontier Hero has achieved iconographic status—from the Marlboro Man to the High Plains Drifter, to the urban warrior of the law in modern television melodrama. Evoking a world which, it is often imagined, was “simpler,” he is

strong, upright and 110 percent American...engaged in that courageous contest with nature...in which only the best of men were successful...bridging the gap between accounts of primitive woodsmen and the modern nature lovers, who sought to recapture the arcadian grandeur of yesteryear that ordinary men of the early twentieth century were being denied by virtue of their urban imprisonment.⁹²

Examining the survival of the popular image of the “cowboy,” which provides an embodiment of idealised American masculine virtues, Richard Slatta notes that many devotees of motion-pictures “appreciate the traditional values and role models projected by the B-Westerns: individualism, fair play, honesty, integrity, clean living.”⁹³ These traits are still prized in men and women alike by the dominant European-bourgeois culture in America. “The manufactured heroes of mass media,” Daniel Hoffman notes,

thus fulfil an important function in maintaining the stability of certain values in contemporary society. One such value is the illusion of continuity with the historical past. As many observers have remarked, the need for cultural roots seems to be proportionately greater as the rate of social change increases. The disruptive effects on the sense of personal identity of rapid technological change, the high rate of social and spatial mobility, and the insecurities inevitable in a culture where status is (or is thought to be) achieved rather than ascribed—all these factors make attractive the common sharing of references to the national past.⁹⁴

This appeal is likely to increase, not decrease. The ethnographer Michael Fischer has commented that “late twentieth-century society globally seems to be characterized by surface homogenization, by the erosion of public

enactments of tradition, by the loss of ritual and historical rootedness.”⁹⁵ Tales of the hero answer all these absences, as well as providing individual men with paradigms of behaviour which may not be attainable, or even socially acceptable, but which have the overriding advantage of being clear and unequivocal in a world where fixed values seem rare.

IV

The hero paradigm, then, exerts a singular fascination on, and holds a unique place in, American culture. Having examined the historical development of the forms of masculinity in American culture and society, I would like to make some observations and form some preliminary hypotheses about the shapes and forms of American masculinity and the shapes of masculine interaction. My observations relate to America and American men, yet I suspect their wider application to men in the “western” or post-industrial world.

It seems to me that, with little or no variation, interactions between men concern “power” and “prestige.” Such interactions might be described as forming part of the “patriarchy,” a hegemonic dominance of society based on gender. Male participation in patriarchal forms is facilitated, I believe, by the indoctrination of men and women with the belief that it is desirable that men conform to an archetype of “ideal” masculinity. One of the reasons for this is the ideology of American “Exceptionalism” and its strong desire for differential definitions. Americans valorise idealised masculinity, one can only presume, because it is culturally useful, or efficient, for them to do so.

There would appear to be a cultural belief, or national myth, embedded in American society that as a result of the action of “national character” and/or “the American way” there will emerge strong, competent figures to lead, order, and inspire that society in situations of national crisis or emergency. This leadership, and this ordering, takes place on all levels, from the familial to the national, and is a culturally encoded imperative. It expresses itself in a “belief” in the efficiency of the heroic paradigm and its articulation in the lives of individual men is socially sanctioned.

The systems, structures, and institutions which have been sanctioned in the pursuit of the culturally encoded imperative are hierarchical and, for what seems a combination of historical and cultural reasons, patriarchal. American literature appears to reflect the presence of a corollary of the national myth (or, rather, a way of turning it into what is known as a self-fulfilling prophecy), which is that in order to achieve its culturally encoded

imperative American society has systematically valorised certain notions of masculinity, while institutions in American society seem to be directed to instilling them into young men as part of the production of dominant males through a process of "natural selection" resulting from intense interpersonal, inter-group and intra-group competition. American literature, culture and history provide ample evidence that male competitiveness has been formalised in such hierarchically-ordered competition of American society and channelled into the production of a unique, culturally distinctive, ultra-competitive attitude toward life in which even recreation, the experience of pleasure and the quest for material security are part of a "zero-sum" game, i.e. a contest in which one can only win as another loses. While nominally supporting the corporate enterprise, individuals in America are usually motivated by the opposite impulse, i.e. personal gain at the expense of others. This has led to the American valorisation of a certain set of masculine attributes which result in a limited range of expressions of masculinity in operation in American society.

A deep-lying, dualistic mythos can be discerned in the recurrence of tensions in American history which seem to be regularly re-enacted in the nation's cultural and social life. A dichotomous metaphysic has become entrenched in the nation's culture as Americans of various regions, classes and backgrounds have articulated some of the deepest-lying truths they have felt about themselves and their relationship with other Americans by reducing them to simple oppositions, until it seems that the one "truth" which might be enunciated about America is its capacity to reduce all issues to one or the other side of a two-term expression. The process is endemic: many of the first European American settlers were "commoners" at odds with the European socio-economic hierarchies against which they defined themselves; the initial European settlements, hemmed in by frontiers comprising coast, mountain, forest and First Nation peoples, exhibited a Freudian ambivalence toward "mother" earth, and resentment of the place of "father" Europe; the political entity of the United States itself was founded in the struggle of the American "son" to free himself from the tyranny of his legalistic and overbearing British "father"; in the expansion of its geographic area, tensions were exacerbated between American and European, town and country, east and west, north and south, "red" and "white," "black" and "white", and rich and poor; the Civil War, which some have seen as the defining event of the modern American consciousness, was the bloodiest family feud in America's history, leaving an indelible mark on the national spirit through its savage conflict between opposites as

brother and brother and father and son and mother and daughter fought as the reformist North confronted the reactionary South; at the same time freedom fought slavery, and the conflicting interests of regional and Federal control clashed; later in the nineteenth century the values of the high-spirited Westerner were set against those of the sedate, conservative Easterner, just as once the bucolic but vital Yankee had been contrasted with the effete European dandy; Martir. Marty discusses the cultural and religious stresses in America between “[l]iberals and conservatives, northerners and southerners, otherworldly pietists and this-worldly preachers and merchants, establishmentarians and dissenters”⁹⁶; while similar tensions are encapsulated in Richard Slotkin’s distinction, after Turner, between Metropolis and Frontier, redolent as it is of the relationship between *metropolis* (mother city) and *apoikia* (colony-town) in the Greek world. The dichotomies of American life—north versus south, centre versus perimeter, father versus son—had emblematic, metaphoric and psychological resonances, evoking once again the religious conflict which shaped the nation’s founding, and, as Warren Motley frames it, “the anxieties of our War of Independence and the rhetoric of shattered bonds between father and son (Jewson 48; Fliegelman 67-122, 155-94).”⁹⁷; W. R. Brock notes that in the history of the United States “men...have played West against East, North against South, agriculture against commerce, Indians against commercial difficulties, and Francophiles against Anglophiles.”⁹⁸ “America,” Brock explains, “has experienced the classic conflicts which have divided modern society—town against country, industry against agriculture, mass against *élite*—and has added to them some of her own making”⁹⁹; finally, in literary terms, James D. Hart sees James Fenimore Cooper’s novels as retaining their fascination because of their ability to depict the “tension between different kinds of society, between society and the individual, between the settlement and the wilderness, and between civil law and natural rights as these suggest issues of moral and mythic import.”¹⁰⁰ This aspect of the history of the United States has distinctively marked its literature as, in different guises, the conflict between a Jovian parent and a Promethean child recurs. Daniel Hoffman states that “the American hero seeks to discover his own identity by rebelling against fathers, ruler, society, or God”¹⁰¹; for Hoffman “[t]he core of the American experience has been a radical search for identity by attempting to free ourselves from old forms, old orders, old hierarchies of rank and belief, to discover the emergent man.”¹⁰² In the characters which represent them in fiction, if not in themselves, American men are often seen to be, like the

nation itself, made up of conflicting, contrasting traits: the reactionary, conformist Puritan struggling with the exuberance of the bourne-testing, individualist Frontiersman, the traits of one alternately suppressing the traits of the other, while positive attributes—practicality, fairness, inventiveness—and negative characteristics—parochiality, fanaticism, isolationism—are at convenience claimed by those more in tune with one side or assigned to rivals exhibiting the opposite temperament, as if they were inherencies of one or the other “types.”

Writing a little over a century after Crèvecoeur first asked the literary question, “What is an American?” James Russell Lowell would pen an “updated” assessment of his countrymen and women:

‘A strange hybrid, indeed, did circumstance beget, here in the New World, upon the old Puritan stock, and the earth never before saw such mystic-practicalism, such niggard geniality, such calculating-fanaticism, such cast-iron enthusiasm, such sour-faced humor, such close-fisted generosity.’¹⁰³

Formed of struggle and contraction, born of a jejune project which sees the world in light-dark, good-bad, handsome-ugly dichotomies, moulded by the irresistible desire to see these oppositions clearly defined, examined and resolved, lie the characteristics and traits which are recognisable as the literary manifestation of the complex reality of “American man.”

V

It is appropriate at this stage of the introduction to clarify and define some of the terms and ideas which are crucial to this study. The most important are power, prestige and hierarchy.

Power has been called “this most ‘contested’ of concepts,”¹⁰⁴ and one's definition of power invariably depends on the context in which one is discussing the term, and what kinds of power one means by its employment. In the sciences the word has specialised usages related to its descriptive function in the fields of electrical energy, mechanics, optics and especially in physics, where it has the precise meaning of “the time rate at which energy is converted into work”¹⁰⁵ and has application in areas of diverse as politics and mathematics; in the humanities many literary and historical analysts, from Hobbes to Foucault, have been intrigued by the broader definitional problems raised by the subject of “power” as a feature of history, society and culture.

Simple, efficient definitions of power are provided by Kenneth E. Boulding, who notes that "in human and social systems...[f]or individual human beings, power is the ability to get what one wants,"¹⁰⁶ and R. N. Adams, for whom power is "the ability of a person or social unit to influence the conduct and decision making of another."¹⁰⁷

"Power, virtually all analysts agree," Roger Keesing notes, "is a matter of relationships—relationships between individuals (or units such as corporations and governments) who exert control and those who are controlled by them."¹⁰⁸ Certainly, it is possible to elaborate on the situationality, source and exercise of power, but the implications of these simple enucleations as they relate to the economic and "physical" realities on which power is always based should not be overlooked. Power is always a measure of something which can be used to cause an effect on something else. In reference to the United States, John K. Roth chronicles "a long history built on dreams of security and stability...[and] on aspirations for power, fame and fortune."¹⁰⁹ Not just America, but "[t]he world is obsessed by power," he concludes. "Questions about its nature, distribution, and limits affect everyone. Most uncertainties of modern life reduce to power struggles...in competition between conflicting ideologies and interest groups..."¹¹⁰

"Prestige" or "status" are terms which are usefully considered in adjunct with the word "power" as it relates to human systems. In terms of social organisation, prestige is the measure of the potential power which is attributed to an individual, and the amount of power that individual can exercise without direct recourse to, or exercise of, the source of his or her power. John Burt notes that

[t]he desire to gain status is closely linked with the desire to hold and exercise power. In whatever context the exercise of power may be expressed, success or failure in the gaining or losing of it can only be publicly registered in relation to the lesser or greater command of it held by others. Thus, the only way of testing the measure of one's power is by competing with others...The principle is that power can only be held by one who in a certain context succeeds in having influence on others. No matter what the apparent motive of the wielder—service to those others or self-gain—the ambition to have influence is at root self-generated and thus unequivocally self-promoting.¹¹¹

What affords prestige varies enormously depending on context, but essentially prestige is an indicator of influence, reputation, rank, or posited attribute. Prestige is always relational rather than absolute, and has cognates in terms like status. For Theodosius Dobzhansky “[t]he concept of status has several dimensions; economic status is one of them; less tangible but perhaps no less important is the ‘deference-position’, in other words, the evaluation of the degree of prestige attached by members of a society to a given role.”¹¹² In their examination of prestige systems in human society, Greene and Kahn note that “[t]he sources of prestige are multiple: they include political power, personal skill or presence, kinship, property and reputation, among others.”¹¹³ For these authors the “conception of prestige is constituted by the network of beliefs, categories, assumptions and symbols which make up a culture.”¹¹⁴ It is these last factors, in American society in the 1960s, that this study hopes to identify and on which it intends to comment.

In mapping the distribution and access to power, hierarchical structures are convenient and efficient, if not implicit, representations. Hierarchies are a common, if not inevitable, way for complex systems—like prestige structures—to be ordered, and hierarchies are to be found amongst most, if not all, organic life forms. Arthur Koestler, to whose work *The Ghost in the Machine* theories based on hierarchies are central, quotes the biologist J. Needham's 1936 book *Order and Life* to the effect that “ ‘[t]he hierarchy of relations, from the molecular structure of carbon compounds to the equilibrium of species and ecological wholes, will perhaps be the leading idea of the future,’ ”¹¹⁵ and he endorses Professor H. A. Simon's acceptance of “ ‘the observed predominance of hierarchies among the complex systems Nature presents to us.’ ”¹¹⁶ Koestler concludes: “If we look at any form of social organisation with some degree of coherence and stability, from insect state to Pentagon, we shall find that it is hierarchically ordered. The same is true of the structure of living organisms and their ways of functioning.”¹¹⁷

Hierarchies are ubiquitous in human social organisation, and have been associated with such structuring; from earliest recorded times. Boulding comments that:

With agriculture and the rise of cities and empires...hierarchy develops with the development of organized threat systems, institutions for the collection of taxes, and so on. Then the human race tends to divide into a very small group of the powerful and a large group of the relatively indigent and powerless...¹¹⁸

Hierarchical models have become institutionalised and naturalised in human societies. They colour the products of the human mind, human conceptual systems and human structures, creative, cognitive, and social. Louis Dumont, in his 1970 book *Homo Hierarchicus*, calls hierarchy “a fundamental social principle,”¹¹⁹ while Jack Nichols in *Men’s Liberation* (1975) asserts that:

Men have accepted certain kinds of hierarchies...concerned with size and position, and they are closely related to all of the games of one-upmanship, status, dominance, and control so prevalent in our society. Their effect on everyday life is staggering.¹²⁰

Nichols goes on to note that “[t]he structural hierarchies that promote status are hardly visible to a nation accustomed by rationalistic overemphasis to classification, systemization, and the like.”¹²¹

Status rituals, rites of passage, and a myriad of activities, formal and informal, add to, promote and naturalise the hierarchies which colour all aspects of life; this “convenient” system of ordering may be demonstrated in family and kin groups, economic and social complexes, productions of the creative arts, sciences, and in a great many other “things” that humans produce, in the activities of human groups, and in the products of the single human mind, or of social and cultural groups.

A hierarchy is a graded system or structure which allows for progressive access to, or controls from its various levels, the distribution or recognition of any particular commodity, attribute or quality, and/or reflects gradients of conceptual access to these things in terms of status, power or prestige. A hierarchy is a way both of recognising and formalising power. Place in a hierarchy can be a source of prestige and power as well as a recognition of it; hierarchies reflect possession of power and prestige, and also grant it. At least conceptually, there is only one, or a small number, of individuals at the top of a hierarchy. This position might be referred to as the “alpha” position, and, following its usage in describing organisation in primate groups, in this study the person in the position of most authority, power and/or prestige in any given hierarchy is known as the “alpha.”¹²² In a hierarchy the greatest number have the least amount of access to whatever it is the hierarchy controls or the smallest amount of whatever it is the hierarchy reflects, and the smallest number have the greatest access to whatever it is which is controlled/reflected by the hierarchy. A hierarchy is commonly represented by a horizontally divided triangle or pyramid shape. This reflects the differences in access or status afforded or recorded by the

different levels of the hierarchy.²³ In most hierarchical structures those with the least amount of power in the hierarchy are in theory in a position to advance to its apex, and to "alpha" position, and, as part of the process, there is some power available on most levels of a hierarchy. As well as the benefits of status and access allowed by ascension in a hierarchy, in hierarchical structures those at "each successive step [exercise power] embracing all those beneath it."²⁴ These, indeed, are some of the "appealing" or functional characteristics of membership of hierarchies. The functional purpose of some "sharing" of power is obvious; as Boulding notes, quoting Chester I. Barnard's *The Functions of the Executive*: "Hierarchical power cannot survive unless it can be legitimated. Authority in some sense is always granted from below."²⁵

In human hierarchies there is usually competition between those on the same level, as well as between those on different levels. Challenge and adjustment occur between those on the same level of a structure, who are referred to in this study as *isotimoi* (those of "equal honour") while the exercise of "authority" or "power" on the basis of the "prestige" of higher place also characterises the relationship between those of "higher" and "lower" rank, or *anisotimoi* (those not of equal rank).

Concomitant with hierarchical structures are the set of strategies or activities, formal or informal, by which movement into and within hierarchies is achieved. This activity, by which the "pecking order" among men is determined, is referred to in this study as "hierarchicisation," or "hierarchical accommodation." Any activity directed to achieving prominence or promotion within, or toward gaining access to, a hierarchy, the interaction between a male and the rules of a hierarchy, or the representative(s) of a hierarchy, is also referred to as accommodation.

It is necessary to divide hierarchicisation not only by type, but by kind. There seem to be two kinds of accommodations with hierarchies. These can be referred to as "distant" and "close" accommodation. A "distant accommodation" occurs when the imperatives, structures and systems of a hierarchy are imposed on or accepted by an individual. For most males, including most of the characters in the novels under discussion, this kind of accommodation is the most common. Examples of a distant accommodation are a child accepting the rules of life in a family, or a school, a member of a large business enterprise accepting the rules of the corporate milieu, or of one man's desire being forced on one or more other individuals, who become "distantly accommodated" to a hierarchy in which

he assumes "alpha" position. In a distant accommodation the structure's imperatives are absorbed and accepted by the individual; he or she "accommodates" with it.

In a "close accommodation" the individual male forces the structure to accommodate with him. In a "close accommodation" an individual comes to occupy a high place in a particular hierarchy without necessarily following the normal "steady" or institutionalised path of ascension, through the exercise of "prestige" or "power," by force of personality or will, even by strength, cunning, chicanery, or, occasionally, through good fortune. Some of the most successful and dramatic actions of hierarchical accommodation in history have resulted from individuals who have not accepted, or somehow by-passed, the rules and normal channels of ascension in a hierarchy, and rapidly or immediately ascended to the top of the hierarchy. All successful military/political dictators may be taken as examples of successful close accommodators; every would-be patriarch is, at least in his bumptious intentions, an example of a close accommodator.

To refuse or to be unable to hierarchicise is itself a form of hierarchical activity; it does not constitute a close or distant accommodation, although individuals often (for reasons of pride, which is an internalised model of the prestige structures with which an individual is involved) conceive of it as such. One depressed by a failed accommodation may see it as the ultimate distant accommodation, and invent a level below all others which he or she alone occupies; one wishing to valorise his or her refusal to accommodate may try to construe it as an ultimate close accommodation, and invent a level "superior" to all levels of the hierarchy, which he or she alone occupies. However, one who is placed outside of a hierarchy is outside of that hierarchy, for good or ill. One who has not engaged or can not engage in accommodation may be free of the duties required of membership of a hierarchy, but he or she is also denied the "benefits" of even the meanest privileges which attach to membership of a hierarchy. Most people, in the business of living, socialising and procreating, cannot avoid hierarchical activity. In some hierarchies accommodation and subsequent adjustment is almost constant, in others rare. The way in which members of an affinity group, or hierarchy, scorn or exclude those who do not accept their values is an example of the way a hierarchy, through its members, regards hierarchical accommodation as "compulsory."

There is even some evidence that absence of hierarchical accommodation may result in psychological, even physical, disruption or distress. Tony Tanner comments in *City of Words* that:

The person who disengages himself from *all* the groups available to him—and such acts of disengagement constitute one of the strongest traditions in American literature—is, by the same token, depriving himself of the available patterns which make the details of the environment cohere in a legible, meaningful way.¹²⁶

The status and function of the famous “strong-silent-type” and “loner” of American myth and fiction may thus be clarified in terms of hierarchical accommodations. The surliness and sense of estrangement exhibited by such an individual may be explained as the natural response of an hierarchical unit denied a place in a hierarchy, and consequently suffering in banishment. The “loner,” a common subject of American story-telling, often appears to be a close accommodator looking for a hierarchy to dominate; he is frequently portrayed as a man who has failed in the past, his voluntary disengagement or expulsion from society stemming from his having been too strong- or self-willed to have accepted distant accommodation with the hierarchies with which he was involved.

Hierarchies may also be of many types. For the sake of simplicity, in this study they are assumed to fall into a limited number of categories.¹²⁷ Most individuals encounter a family hierarchy, and economic hierarchies. A third type of hierarchy, related to the second and sometimes the first, is the social hierarchy, which takes in relations which are not to be classified as belonging to one of the first two types of hierarchies. Especially among men a fourth type, a physical hierarchy, is important. Size, strength and what might be referred to as “reputation” in a number of areas combine to produce a hierarchy which is largely, but not exclusively, related to fear of physical confrontation, if not fear of actual injury. Among non-human mammals this hierarchy joins the family hierarchy as the most important and most apparent. In primate groups the physical hierarchy often determines the group's “alpha” male, and the prestige he enjoys is related to access to females of the group, and often to essential commodities like food, water and shelter.

Finally, some terms commonly employed here need some further definition. For example, it could be argued that there is no such thing as “the” American experience, but that there are many “experiences” in the United States, as well as many different types of “American,” and that it is improper therefore to speak of such a thing as “the” American experience, and to refer to the experience of middle-class white European males as if they could in any way be taken to be representative of all “American

experience." These objections are proper in their place, but the term "American" is employed here in a very limited sense, and it would be tedious if nouns could only be utilised with the need for constant qualification. The term "American" is utilised in the absence of a suitable adjective to be employed alongside the politico-geographical term "United States," and so while it is accepted that Canadians, Middle- and South-Americans are Americans also, it is not to those nations and cultures that this study refers.

In deciding how to refer to the subjects of this study, I considered the expression "W.A.S.P." (White Anglo Saxon Protestant) to be as inaccurate and offensive as any other pejorative catch-all used to define a group on the grounds of race and religion. Thus, when reference is made to "American men" in these pages what is meant are those male citizens of the United States who might for convenience be described as "mainstream," i.e. those men of whatever ethnic or cultural make-up or religious persuasion who define themselves in terms of the historically dominant, "white" American society, deriving from essentially British and English-language cultural systems, and an Anglo-Celtic-European, Romano-Judeo-Christian heritage. In no way is it implied that those living in North America who are or were not of Anglo-Celtic and/or European heritage are and were not American. Such a definition, then, includes perforce, without meaning to constrain, many "American" men of First Nation American, African, Northern-, Middle- and Eastern- European, Mediterranean, Jewish, Asian or Hispanic descent, who, to a greater or lesser degree, have chosen to be a part of that "mainstream," or who have become "assimilated" into it, as well as those of Western European ancestry. The definition of this "mainstream" embraces values which are essentially bourgeois, although, again, the word is used here loosely, and in a sense which is not economic but cognitive and axiological. Werner Sombart, in *The Quintessence of Capitalism*, published in London in 1915, defined the bourgeois spirit as being "composed of calculation, careful policy, reasonableness and economy," adding to this the idea that it is characterised by "the spirit of enterprise."¹²⁸ This, combined with a Puritan-Calvinist theological, eschatological, and teleological mind-set, (which, in keeping with the contradictions of the "strange hybrid"¹²⁹ that is American culture, is informed by a certain emotional stolidity) is very much in keeping with part of what one understands by terms like, "American" and "the American way".

For reasons which are political in a different sense, in keeping with the idea that men should not, and perhaps can not, speak for the inner life of

women or the social and cultural manifestations of the inner life of women, this study focuses on assertions about hierarchies only as they relate to men. This study is about masculinity, and, unless it is stated otherwise, one does not by "American" here refer to American women.

In studying the ethno-economic group which has traditionally controlled discourse in America, and in the effort to identify the stereotypes and methods of self-perception and self-presentation of this hegemonic gender-class-race nexus, it is hoped to contribute to a critique of that group's operations; the usages employed here reflect on the fact that almost from the time of the first "white" settlement in North America the word "American" meant "European" and "male" and implied a person of English language culture to those who exercised power (military, economic or definitional) in the United States.

VI

In order to facilitate the search for the modes of operation and the identifying marks of the American male, I decided to anchor a synchronic study to a number of specific novels, each of which focuses on a different aspect of constructions of American masculinity and the articulation of the experience of being a man in America. Such a choice allows for the clear identification of attitudes to masculinity and the state of the paradigm of ideal masculinity at one specific time and in one specific place.

I wanted to find novels which would allow me to examine aspects of man's socialisation as it concerns the response of men to expectations aroused by sex-trait and sex-role stereotypes, to the creation of men's self-conceptions and public personae; and to the economic, sexual and social accommodations in which American men must engage. I desired to examine American man at a particular historical juncture, and from several different perspectives, and to identify novels which would provide me with a "rounded portrait" of the American male, in order that the *p*-structures of American society, and the resultant "patterns of sexuality and behaviour imposed by cultural and social norms"¹³⁰ could be identified.

The decade of the 1960s was selected as identifiably discrete in cultural terms. From the perspective of the 1990s the period now seems removed far enough in time for some objectivity to be achieved about its events, while it remains close enough for the mores of the period to seem more familiar than foreign.

Like the Jazz Age of the 1920s, the 1960s stands for an attitude, a mood and a posture as much as for a chronological period.¹³¹ In America, the 1960s is associated with: a burgeoning youth culture which focused attention as

never before on what came to be referred to as the "Generation Gap"; a new openness about sexuality; perceptions of increasing economic and social divisions in society; the debate in America over the war in Vietnam; the question of the status of African-Americans in American society and related civil rights issues; and a mood of challenge and iconoclasm which had complex causes and yet which, far from being an expression of a monolithic youth rebellion, seems to have embraced the aspirations of many segments of society which felt the repression of conformism.

Indeed, race and class as much as age coloured the social upheaval in America, which centred on the divisive national debate over America's involvement in Vietnam. The protest movement against the war and the Civil Rights Movement together gained public attention of unprecedented levels and these issues genuinely seemed to threaten America's social fabric in a way no other recent conflicts had done. In public arenas, in art, in the print and broadcast media, the decisions and comport of the national executive were questioned and there was widespread dissatisfaction with both American domestic and foreign policy—with the "National Direction." In the 1960s, for increasing numbers of Americans, the famous phrase "We the People" had been replaced by "Us versus Them," as stratification caused divisions between the empowered and the disenfranchised; the marginalised and the advantageously centred; and those who had re-defined "American" values by internalising post-industrial, modernist and materialist values and those who averred, more or less, that the nation had "lost its innocence" and contact with its original ideals. By the disaffected, mis-directed national imperatives were blamed for America's divisions: class- and race-based economic and ideological concerns were seen as having suborned the "traditional" democracy and egalitarianism inherent in the constitution and traditions of the American people. If the issues which arose in the American nation were serious, and did cause comment and concern in all parts of the nation, there was, as Paul Lyons has observed, confusion among both the "revolutionaries" and the "conservatives" between cultural and political rebellion.¹³² Many of the rebels of the 1960s saw themselves as patriots, concerned with American renewal, not with desecration of American values.

In the most general sense the youth movement in American culture in the 1960s can be characterised as a set of reactions against a set of restrictions. Many social, philosophical artistic and cultural expressions with which the 1960s are associated have the unifying motif of revolt or response. The construction of masculine identity in the 1960s was one aspect of social life

affected by this phenomenon. In the most basic sense, the fashion for long hair and facial hair can be seen as a reaction against enforced male grooming norms; the hats, jackets and ties and sombre colours which were virtually a uniform for 1950s men were jettisoned in favour of more colourful and less restrictive clothing. The cultural expressions of the youth of the 1960s in every sense seemed designed to call attention to their rejection of values which they associated with their parents, with the education system, with the government—with the range of authority and parent figures which operate as society's collective super-ego. This conflict has obvious psychological overtones, and we have observed this conflict embedded in American culture: in the 1960s we will again see the American male as he “seeks to discover his own identity by rebelling against fathers, ruler, society, [and] God.”¹³³

In the 1960s in America this mood of rebellion for the sake of rebelliousness was, as the newspaper columnist Vermont Royster observed, “blamed for just about everything: long-haired boys, pantalooned girls, revolts on the campus, LSD, teenage vandalism, sexual license, cornflakes art, draft-dodging, and what-have-you.”¹³⁴ John Demos reminds us that “every family is (and was) both a system of gender relations *and* a system of age relations. Power, status, and responsibility within the family are defined by the second no less than the first,”¹³⁵ and I would argue that one of the clear “lessons” of the 1960s is that this observation applies to the hierarchies of the wider society as well as to the family. Young people in America in the 1960s became aware of their political and social power; they were not the only rebels of the 1960s but they were the most prominent. Youth remains a central definitional of the 1960s, and the youthful hippies’ “rejection” of “material values” and promotion of attempts at “alternative lifestyles” and attitudes bears some examination. The 1960s in American social history, then, was a time of challenge and upheaval; it might be instructive to examine more closely the milieu against which the youth of the 1960s were reacting.

America had experienced rapid change in social and economic conditions after the end of the Second World War. Rapid change was effected by the arrival into many areas of electricity and modern plumbing, the rapid rise of the mass media, industrialisation, population increases, and for many a measure of economic and social stability.¹³⁶ For American men, however, especially for those bound by older, more doctrinaire versions of masculine behaviour and attitudes, the amount of social and economic change after World War Two presented a confusing set of challenges: Women, minority

and “unassimilated” ethnic and cultural groups and African American men were confronting the traditional hegemony of “mainstream” males in American life. The changing perceptions of American masculinity were much commented on in the 1940s and 1950s, with the suggestion often made that men were not as “masculine” as they had been in the past.¹³⁷ In the 1950s sociologists began making “reference to the masculine fulfilment problem—the trouble men were having defining themselves in social and economic relationships with women, especially at home.”¹³⁸ The causes were sought not in a falling away of individual men from the model of ideal masculinity, but in the constrictions placed on men by those models. Investigators found that society had kept its paradigm of ideal masculinity intact while discouraging attitudes and behaviours in its young men which would train them to be able to meet the paradigm. America maintained its “theoretical ideal for the free, independent, individualistic man of its frontier days” but found that “the strong dependent needs of the boys are in serious conflict with the forces pushing toward aggressive, independent, masculine and competitive existence.”³⁹ It was noted, in summary, that “[t]he emphasis on the breadwinning role, the patterns of being individualistic, aggressive, successful competitors, and controlling and shaping events,”¹⁴⁰ and other “traditional indicators of masculinity had trapped men into a rather narrow frame of reference.”¹⁴¹

One aspect of what Harold Rosenberg called “the flattening of personality”¹⁴² had been a forced conformism and a suppression of dissent which was, in many respects, not consistent with the tradition of individualism and suspicion of centralised authority in American history and ideology, although it promoted the outward appearance of harmony and prosperity. A combination of security and insularity under the Republican regime of President Dwight D. Eisenhower between 1953-61 might be said to have cocooned the national consciousness of the United States; many citizens were indeed prepared to agree that they “had never had it so good,” and to look back later on this period as a sort of Golden Age. For the sake of the “war effort” (first during the Second World War and then during the United Nations-sponsored conflict in Korea and the so-called “Cold War”) Americans had worked co-operatively; an ethic of individual attainment and the valorisation of individualism and the paradigm provided by the Expansion Hero of the nineteenth century were replaced from the 1940s on by definitions of masculinity in which the “real test of manliness...was how well a person filled whatever role he chose, regardless of what he did.”¹⁴³ The survival of this “team philosophy” of the

war years was promoted by the passage of the G.I. Bill, which provided housing and education finance for those who had “done their bit.”

However, investigations of the attitudes and behaviours of American men into the 1940s and 1950s indicated that the discipline required by military life might have adversely affected the independence and spiritedness of American males.¹⁴⁴ David Van Leer comments on “the age’s ‘idolatry of the normal’—its fanatical pursuit of uniformity,”¹⁴⁵ in a culture in which deviancies minor or major were driven out of sight and the nation, like the individual, “internalised them,”¹⁴⁶ while Sloan Wilson’s 1955 book *The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit* provides the perfect metaphor for the faceless corporation personality which was this era’s incarnation of “ideal American-ness.”¹⁴⁷ The “new” image of ideal masculinity was, it seems, anti-typical, so contrary was it to the assertive individualism of traditional American masculinity. A number of sociological and other works charted this phenomenon: for example, David Reisman’s *The Lonely Crowd* (1950) and *Individualism Reconsidered* (1954); William H. Whyte’s *The Organisation Man* (1956); C. Wright Mills’s *The Power Elite* (1956); Peter Viereck’s *The Unadjusted Man; A New Hero for Americans* (1956); Daniel Bell’s *Work and Its Discontents* (1956), Philip Wylie’s *The Generation of Vipers* (1955); and Vance Packard’s *The Status Seekers* (1959). The insistence on political and personal conservatism and conformism was encouraged and intensified by the “Cold War” between America and Russia. This period of tension was marked by the intense promulgation of normative ideological perspectives in the mass media and more-or-less didactic artistic expressions in political and social life,¹⁴⁸ and in arts and letters. There was a particular focus on the difference between capitalist America and communist Russia and the social and economic theories practiced (or said to be practiced) in each country.

Dissatisfied with material security, perplexed by contradictory messages in American culture about gender, race, class, etc., American youth began an search for enduring values and models in what Daniel Bell describes as the “Radical March” of the 1960s. He styles it as

a youth movement similar to the *Jugendbewegung* of early twentieth-century Germany, with its romanticism, self-preening, the attack on materialism and impersonality of an alienating society, and the use of Nietzsche’s relentless denunciations of bourgeois society.¹⁴⁹

In addition to Nietzsche the 1960s also had Timothy Leary, whose phrase “Turn On, Tune In, Drop Out” is an epigrammatic reduction of the youth

ethos of the period, and an eclectic synthesis of Eastern philosophies and a vague Theosophical-Gnostic pantheism. Leary's catch-cry meant more than the promotion of mind-altering drugs and the avoidance of responsibility; it was a call to Americans to rediscover their personal and political autonomy, re-awaken the senses and reclaim sensuality. The "natural" appetites, according to the former Harvard professor, had been long suppressed: "dropping out" was in part an economic statement and a manifesto of liberation, but it also implied the cessation of involvement in the repressive "ego-games" of a competitive, materialistic society. As such his ideas might have seemed revolutionary, but the attempt of many of Leary's "fellow travellers" of the 1960s to build their "City on a Hill" led to interesting practices as "new" models were found in the conscious or unconscious resurrection of old ones.

If feminist thought underwent a renewal and recasting in the 1960s, the fruits of its social critique were not really felt in the wider community until the 1970s, and I would argue that although much hippie rhetoric was anti-patriarchal ("Don't trust The Man"),¹⁵⁰ the construction of a unified 1960s generation devoted to a social-gender-race-age "revolution" is a tendentious reading of events and their aftermath. Instead, much of the rhetoric and symbolism of the 1960s can be seen as romantic and reactionary posturing, politically and socially conservative and characterised by nostalgic pastoralism and a resurgence of the cult of individualism. I am not the first to suggest that the essence of the "hippy" movement was atavistic, conservative and patriarchal rather than truly radical. Jerry Rubin, a famous spokesperson for the militant "Yippies," surely indicated more than a sense of theatre when wearing a Revolutionary War uniform to a press conference in the 1960s. "It said, 'We're the revolutionaries,'" he recalls. "This country was founded on a revolution. You're violating your own ideals. You're violating your own traditions."¹⁵¹ The youth of the 1960s in the main seem to have sponsored a project of "return" rather than "revolution," and a "reformation" rather than the complete re-structuring called for by the extreme left.¹⁵² I have noted before that in America the recurring social expression of symbolic "parricide" might seem to be a rejection of patriarchal modalities, but is instead an expression of the impatience of the young, would-be patriarchal close accommodator, the product of American masculinist ideology, at work. The potential usurper rejects individual patriarchs but not the patriarchy; he seeks power for himself, rather than its redistribution.¹⁵³ Patriarchal structures of social organisation and traditional assignation of gender roles, for example, were

typical of many “hippy” ventures in communal living; Emerson, Whitman and Thoreau's *Walden and Civil Disobedience* were among the texts most likely to be found on a hippy bookshelf;¹⁵⁴ “dropping out” itself usually involved renunciation of a reliance on modern housing and household appliances in favour of living a “pioneer” lifestyle, while some in communal cohabitation adopted spurious “tribal” modalities of dress and behaviour, as the lifestyles and philosophies of First Nation Americans were gravely appropriated by the great-grandchildren of the Americans who had committed cultural rape and near-genocide on those people. The iconography of the Great Expansion concomitantly enjoyed a renaissance. As “[t]he Pilgrims, steeped in their Biblical allegories, had *materialized* the Biblical myths, translating its allegories into symbols,”¹⁵⁵ so it was not uncommon for the symbols of the Great Expansion to be employed as an metaphoric description of the experiments in cultural, social, and psychedelic “expansion” undertaken by 1960s youth. Their fathers and brothers in Vietnam, meanwhile, were also invoking the world of their forebears with military campaigns and missions bearing names like “Daniel Boone” and “Prairie” against an enemy they often referred to as “Indians.” Malise Ruthven provides a gloss on such dissimilar appropriations when he comments that:

To this day the Puritan project has replicated itself in all sorts of improbable, unexpected ways, from fundamentalist ‘Christian’ enclaves like Liberty University to San Francisco's ‘gay republic.’ Freed from the constraints of European society, generations of settlers and their descendants thought it would be perfectly feasible...to build their ‘Cities on a Hill’ from scratch, as though no one had been there before. Utopia is as much a part of the American agenda as is the Communist millennium in Russia.”¹⁵⁶

It is fair to say that a certain naivety, innocence and ahistoricism, perfectly “American” in character, characterised the social and cultural textures of the 1960s. The period was informed by another of the “Great Revivals”—“sacred” in a mythic rather than a “religious” sense—which have at least once in each century of European settlement swept the American nation, boosting spiritual and cultural life. Although couched in the rhetoric of change and revolution, the philosophy of the 1960s amounted to the invention of a new vocabulary for “old-fashioned,” “essential” and “original” values. This is well illustrated by depictions of masculinity

which emerged from America in the 1960s, and their reliance on revived and re-invigorated "traditional" definitions of what it was to be a man.

As the nation entered the 1960s under John F. Kennedy, its youngest and first Catholic President was conscious of the extent to which America needed to come to terms with new, complex and constantly changing world social, political and economic realities. Part of Kennedy's strategy was to invoke the past and the spirit of American pioneering energy in comparing the challenges of the "Space Age" with those faced by his country a century earlier in the Age of Expansion. Speaking at the Los Angeles Coliseum in July, 1960 Kennedy recalls the glories of "The Frontier" and American men and women, who "gave up their safety, their comfort and sometimes their lives to build a new world here in the west." However, Kennedy reminds his fellow Americans that "the problems are not all solved and the battles are not all won, and we stand today on the edge of a new frontier—the frontier of the 1960s, a frontier of unfulfilled hopes and threats...For the harsh facts of the matter are that we stand on this frontier at a turning point in history."¹⁵⁷

Kennedy's conscious evocation of the metaphors of the Great Expansion in his creation of the "New Frontier" show the persistence of the rhetoric of deity-ordained conquest and the constructions of masculinity which accompanied and facilitated it, as well as the extent to which Kennedy and his advisers could manipulate American symbolism and iconography to political ends. Many have attempted to isolate the complex appeal of Kennedy for the American people; Noam Chomsky points out that the well-tended image of "Kennedy as the leader who was about to lead us to a bright future of peace and justice was carefully nurtured during the Camelot years."¹⁵⁸ Chomsky traces the rise, fall and revival of Kennedy's reputation, finding some irony in the survival of the image of "the lonely hero struck down as (and perhaps because) he sought to prevent a US war in Vietnam,"¹⁵⁹ which he suggests is a representation not derived from the facts of the matter. However, Kennedy was able to evoke heroic modalities to an extent that previous presidents (even those like Eisenhower, with genuine credentials) had not been able. He was relatively young, possessed an admirable war-record, and was tall, fair-haired and advantageously partnered. Kennedy's masculine image also played on generational differentiations and he fostered an image of himself as vigorous and "heroic" in comparison with the "old" men who had traditionally governed; even his sexual peccadilloes and reputed emotional hardness away from public attention were regarded not as hypocrisy, but cited as

evidence of his virility and masculinity Kennedy was placed implicitly in the context of the myth of the “outsider” of American political history—like Abraham Lincoln and Davy Crockett—the “strong” “honest” men who, as archetypically rendered in the film “Mr. Smith Goes to Washington,”¹⁶⁰ from a Lewis R. Foster story, through innocence and faith and their connection with rural locations and “everyman” Americans restore the vitality of a corrupt system.

Kennedy was catching, rather than creating, a mood. At least one member of the 1960s generation, in noting “the essentially pastoral character of the hippie fantasy of utopia,”¹⁶¹ suggested that it had “its roots...in...fantasies carried forward from the movies and TV shows of our childhoods, fantasies of mythic American forebears, the cowboys and -girls and the pioneers, of Davy Crockett, Wild Bill Hickock, Annie Oakley and Buffalo Bill, Jesse James.”¹⁶² The mass media participated in the presentation and re-inscription of “historical” tales of the heroes of the Expansion and “traditional” models of ideal masculinity and sanitised, idealised masculine behaviour during the late 1950s and early 1960s. American culture looked to its past and the invocation of its most potent national myths in order to assert certain contested truths about America and Americans. The virtues of a free spirit and free trade capitalist economics were conflated, and legends of Heroes of the Expansion were revived and recast, as they tend to be in times of stress, as I have argued earlier, in order to provide appropriate paradigms of masculine behaviour. A number of television series, for example, featuring traditional, unequivocal representations of masculinity and devoted to heroes of the Expansion like Daniel Boone, Jim Bowie, Davy Crockett, Wyatt Earp and Bat Masterton, or with “Frontier” settings, like *Gunsmoke* and *Bonanza*, have enjoyed enduring popularity on American television. One of the actors on the last-named programme summarised the program's philosophy when saying: “ ‘When you get right down to it, the strongest attachments are between men—fathers, brothers. It all helps take the western out of the ‘yup’ and ‘nope’ kind of thing.’ ”¹⁶³ American-made motion pictures of the post-war period were also busy re-telling American history to make it better register the idea that this history had been shaped by strong individual males emerging from America's vigorous cultural and social traditions; heroes from the revolution to more recent wars¹⁶⁴ had their stories turned into dramatic tales of patriotism and heroism. Richard Polenberg notes “Hollywood's litmuslike ability to register the popular mood even while helping to define it,”¹⁶⁵ and one can see in the operations of mass media in the post-war period an example of the moulding influence