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Ways of Knowing

"More broadly, it might be said that we cannot uphold any doctrine of kinds of reality, since to do so we should have to know the distinction or the relation between any two such kinds, and that is something we could not know except as a single situation - which would mean that we knew it as a single reality, so that the doctrine of distinct kinds of reality would be automatically abandoned. It is in this way that empiricism is seen as a doctrine of what is real as situations, and that therewith goes the denial that anything can be known except as situations, which is to say except as spatio-temporal and except in propositional form.' (1)

Anderson's empiricism is clear and unambiguous - or is it? There is only one way of knowing the world: as spatio-temporal and in propositional form. But is knowing the world, as Anderson defines it, the only way phenomenologically? We can agree that in so far as a person relates to the world in the form aRb, then he relates to the world as spatio-temporal and "knows" it in the form of the proposition. That may well be the only way of relating to, but is relating to the only way? Curiously, Anderson does not directly address this question. But it is a question that has to be addressed, and answered in the negative, if Anderson is to distinguish between Philosophy and Science.

Anderson takes care to point out to Gilbert Ryle that his earlier "assimilation of philosophy to science" was only apparent. "What would have influenced my apparent assimilation of philosophy to science (not so much besides as incidentally to my repudiation of 'the ultimate') is that each of them is concerned with situational reality, with the spatio-temporal field, with things as they in a single sense are. What distinguishes them is that philosophy is concerned with the forms of situations or occurrences, science with their material; but it is only as forms of such material, as material with such forms, that they can be known." (2) Again, the position appears clear and unambiguous. Science knows matter in propositional form, while philosophy knows form in.....? Presumably, Philosophy is a body of knowledge. That being so, what it knows must be known as spatio-temporal and in the form of the proposition. How, then, is it to be distinguished from Science? Anderson says that Philosophy, unlike Science, is concerned with form. But what is it

to be "concerned with" form? Is it to know form, as distinct from content? If so, then surely its own form, as knowledge, would not be the same as that of Science? Is the form of the spatio-temporal, for example, to be represented in the form of its content-particular spatio-temporal situations? Anderson has no option but to admit either that Philosophy is Science, that there can be no knowledge of form and thus no form, only content, or cling to knowledge and thus existence of form, but at the cost of incorporating in his philosophy the notion of an "ultimate content" by means of which all other contents are governed. An unhappy choice, but unavoidable for the empiricist who insists that relating to the world, as spatio-temporal and in propositional form, is the only way.

Not only is Anderson's empiricism at odds with his philosophy, it is well-nigh impossible to see how knowledge in Art could be worked out in those terms. Despite his warning in "Further Questions in Aesthetics" that "it must not be forgotten that it is, in the long run, by observation and experiment that we come to know aesthetics,"⁽³⁾ Anderson makes no effort to show in what sense knowledge as theme can be assimilated to knowledge as propositional. In discussing Stephen Dedalus' elucidation of Aquinas' doctrine that three things are required for beauty, wholeness, harmony, and radiance, Anderson says that "Dedalus finds these principles, indeed, to be involved in all disinterested perception, all recognition of things as they are in themselves, independently of our purposes. We perceive the object as one thing, as a thing, and as the thing that it is."⁽⁴⁾ Whatever difficulties Aquinas' doctrine or Dedalus' elucidation may occasion, one thing is perfectly plain. In as much as disinterested perception, as defined, is available as spatio-temporal and in the form of the proposition, its distinguishing mark would have to be found in what is known (content) and not in its being known (form). Beauty is something to be known, as spatio-temporal and in the form of the proposition. It is a consideration of content, however that might be confused by Anderson's talk of "structure". How, then, is Art to be distinguished from Science? Anderson cannot say in respect of form, since the only criterion of form available is the form in which we know. And the form in which we know, according to Anderson's empiricism, can only be that of relating to the world as spatio-temporal and in propositional form, i.e., as content. Anderson's empiricism, then, does not allow for knowledge of form. But if it does not, then Anderson is faced with a dilemma: either reject

empiricism as the only way and save philosophy and art or retain empiricism as the only way, but at the cost of philosophy and art. He cannot have it both ways.

There is no doubting that empiricism is the only way of relating to the world, but it does not follow that relating to the world is the only way. There is only one way of believing, but it does not follow that believing is the only way. In his empiricism, Anderson assimilates episteme to believing, on the ground that there is only one way of believing (!), and announces authoritatively that there is only one way of knowing. He ignores the possibility that there is one way of believing and one way of knowing, a position which would not commit him to two ways of believing or knowing. All that it would commit him to would be the possibility that relating to the world, as an object to be described, to be set forth logically in propositional form, is not the only way of relating vis-a-vis the world. In the modality of believing, we talk about the world, understand it in terms of form. In the modality of knowing, however, we do not so much talk about as talk with the world, where content functions as form. It is not the statement that X is Y, but a revelation of x as X. Here we have content functioning as the form of an experience. The modality of description, in other words, differs in respect of form from the modality of definition. We can, of course, state a definition in the modality of description, but stating a definition is not defining. As long as Anderson takes believing that X is or is not Y to be the only way of knowing, he has no place in his epistemology for anything other than what can be talked about or described. He has no place, in other words, for definition and thus knowledge or form. He says in "Literary Criticism" that the question of "showing more fully what is meant by structure or harmony" would be similar to that of definition in logic, "to the setting out of the 'essential features' of anything. A theme is grasped when we recognise characteristics which together constitute it." (5) That might seem to answer the question, but, on closer inspection, it turns out to be essentially evasive. We can say that these are the "essential features" of X, but in what form do we grasp the truth of the statement? Do we know them to be the essential features of X in the form of the proposition? Do we grasp a theme in believing that these characteristics together "constitute" (whatever that might mean) it? Here he is found to be working, once again, with a "grasping", a "relating", that is not intelligible in the terms of his empiricism. It only appears to be intelligible in those terms.

Knowing, as the way of relating with the world, which is to say, experience as formed and forming, is not another way of relating to the world, nor does it imply another kind of being. All that it implies is that believing or relating to the world is not the only account to be offered of episteme. There is also knowing or relating with the world. Thematic exposition or definition, in that sense, is the only way of relating with or knowing, whatever account we might give of relating to or believing. Anderson takes episteme to be nothing but statement of fact or description and thereby excludes, epistemologically, the possibility of knowledge, i.e., form. But he needs knowledge (form) as distinct from belief (content) if his philosophy is to advance beyond a crude positivism or scientism. Indeed, it is Anderson's empiricism, his misconceived strictures against different ways of knowing, that keeps his philosophical secrets under lock and key. The key can be found, however, in the rudimentary, often implicit epistemology of Art & Reality. Despite his empiricist protestations, it is there that we find an appreciation of non-empirical knowledge; of knowledge that is not presented as spatio-temporal and in the form of the proposition; of how we might grasp content as form.

Notes

- * My main concern in this short piece has been to draw attention to a serious problem in Anderson's philosophy and to suggest, in very general terms, how that might be remedied. Any detailed elaboration of the distinction between relating to (believing) and relating with (knowing) would have to draw upon the phenomenological distinction of Place and Time. To know content as form, in other words, is to know place as time. But that leads on to questions of linear and cyclical time. Once we move to the modality of Time, the distinction between believer and believed, and the pre-eminence of the issue, fade away. Taking the place of the issue, you could say, is the theme or definition: that whose nature it is to be known. Anderson, needless to say, would have no truck with anything whose nature it is to be known, accusing it of relativism; of defining something in terms of its relations. But that would be to beg the phenomenological question. Relativism is a confusion, but only in the modality of believing or relating to. It cannot be used as a test, in other words, of knowing or relating with, without assuming that believing or relating to is the only way of episteme.

1. "Empiricism and Logic", Studies in Empirical Philosophy, p.163.
2. Ibid., p.163.
3. Art & Reality, p.268.
4. "Literary Criticism", Ibid., p.260.
5. Ibid., p.262.

What's Wrong with Rationalism?

Phenomenological studies, from the time of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic, through German Idealism, to Husserl, Bergson and Santayana, enable us to make sense of distinct ways of knowing without being committed, thereby, to the "rationalist" doctrine of distinct ways of being. Anderson took the implication to be unavoidable. Distinct ways of knowing comes into conflict with empiricism precisely because it is thought to involve distinct ways of being. 'I argued that, in the distinction between empiricism and rationalism (with its division between facts and principles, between actual things and their 'grounds' or 'explanations'), the question of ways of knowing is a quite secondary matter, though the denial of distinct ways of knowing has still to be recognised as a feature of the empiricist position."¹ Anderson's empiricism is opposed to the alleged rationalism of distinct ways of knowing. That has the unfortunate implication that his empiricism is opposed to his work on Art. In Art and Reality, he says of aesthetic contemplation that it "might be considered as the finding in the instance of A what is involved in Xness (whatness)."² Now aesthetic contemplation is, at the very least, a way of experiencing. But it's not an experience in the category of Being where we're concerned with questions of existence and non-existence. It's an experience in the category of Essence where we're concerned with questions of whatness, theme or definition. Aesthetic contemplation is a thematic as distinct from a propositional experience. Even though Anderson stresses the uniqueness of aesthetic contemplation, he fails to acknowledge the apparent conflict between that view and his empiricist position. Distinct ways of knowing has to be denied. Yet distinct ways of knowing has to be adopted if we're to explain Art and aesthetic contemplation!

There's no suggestion in Art and Reality that experiencing something as theme constitutes a lapse into "rationalism". And why should there be any such suggestion? It's only in those cases where Essence is taken to be something experienced - a realm of being containing the essential as distinct from the accidental - and not as a way of experiencing or an experiencing, that we generate the one-sidedness that Anderson dubs "rationalism". Once Essence is reduced to Being, then distinct ways of knowing are linked, unavoidably, with distinct ways of being. But that reduction is a case of phenomenological shortsightedness or even blindness. Anderson makes the mistake of believing that one way of being implies one way of knowing. It doesn't. What it does imply is one way of knowing something to be the case. The non sequitur is now obvious. There is only one way

of knowing something to be the case, but knowing something to be the case is only one way of knowing. Anderson endorses this view in Art and Reality but gives it short shrift in his Logic. There he assumes that it is the only way of knowing. Knowing something to be the case is the only way of knowing, however, only if Essence cannot be grasped as a distinct way of knowing, but must be grasped as something known, i.e., as a distinct being. How does Anderson show that Essence cannot be grasped as a distinct way of knowing? By his argument that distinct ways of knowing imply the incoherent "rationalism" of distinct ways of being. But this implication holds only if Essence is taken to be something known or a distinct being; i.e., only if it is assumed, from the outset, that there is only one way of knowing and that is knowing something to be the case. It's this initial assumption that rationalism denies. Anderson's repudiation of rationalism on the grounds that distinct ways of knowing implies distinct ways of being turns out to be a classic illustration of begging the question.

To say this, however, doesn't mean that we must reject Empiricism or Anderson's criticism of many of the doctrines he labelled "rationalist". What we must reject is one-sidedness. There is no empiricist philosophy that excludes the moment of rationalism just as there is no rationalist philosophy that excludes the moment of empiricism. In respect of the philosophical, empiricism emphasises the phenomenology of Being or Place whereas rationalism emphasises the phenomenology of Essence or Time. The empiricist emphasis is the claim that there is only one way of knowing that something is the case. It becomes perverted into one-sidedness when this observation is transformed into the claim that there is only one way of knowing, viz., knowing that something is the case. The rationalist emphasis is the claim that there are distinct ways of knowing and that knowing something to be the case is only one way of knowing. It becomes perverted into one-sidedness when this observation is transformed into the claim that there are distinct ways of being. It's as illicit to go from one way of being to one way of knowing as it is to go from distinct ways of knowing to distinct ways of being. Empiricism and Rationalism come into conflict only on the basis of this complementary one-sidedness.} Once Being and Essence or Place and Time are appreciated and acknowledged as phenomenological modes or modes of experience (as Kant stressed in his Transcendental Aesthetic), the one-sidedness vanishes. Empiricism and Rationalism no longer appear as conflicting doctrines, but appear as phases or moments in the exposition or definition of the philosophical.

Notes

1. "Empiricism and Logic", Studies in Empirical Philosophy, p.162.
2. "Further Questions in Aesthetics", Art and Reality, p.266.
3. The locus classicus of the complementary and contradictory one-sidedness of Empiricism and Rationalism is British Empiricism-Continental Rationalism. There are no "essentialities" or "abstractions" existing alongside of or in addition to contingencies or matters of fact. All that we ever perceive, Berkeley argues, are beings, never Being as such (cf. all that we ever perceive are angles and colours, never angularity or colour as such). The assumption here is, of course, that angularity and colour as such are to be experienced in the way or mode in which we experience angles and colours, i.e., as Being or Place rather than as Essence or Time. Nevertheless, Berkeley's empiricism is salutary. It guards against the extravagance of one-sided rationalism on the level of Being. Rationalism, on the other hand, is similarly salutary. It guards against the extravagance of one-sided empiricism on the level of Knowing. If there is only one way of knowing and that is knowing that something is the case, then Empiricism cannot be known as other than contingent and matter of fact, which means, of course, that its Essence collapses into its Being, i.e., into the scepticism that emerges in the work of David Hume.

Art and Ideality

The collection of essays on literature and aesthetics is not entitled Art and Reality for no apparent purpose. As the editors point out in their Introduction, Anderson was one of the last, perhaps the very last, systematic philosopher. His realist insistence on objectivity accompanied him wherever he happened to venture, whether into political studies, ethics or aesthetics. In an important sense he functioned as a philosophical vigilante, an exterminator, who roamed from one area to the next in the search for anti-realist or subjectivist tendencies. The editors quote John Mackie with approval: "... 'there is only one way of being, that of ordinary things in space and time, and... every question is a simple issue of truth or falsity... Knowledge is a matter of finding what is objectively the case.... Ethics is a study of the qualities of human activities; there can be no science of what is right or obligatory, and the study of moral judgments would belong to sociology, not to ethics. Similarly aesthetics can only be a study of the characteristics of beautiful things, not a study of feelings or judgments and not a source of directives for artists.....' This indicates the philosophical background behind the characteristic moves Anderson makes when attacking anti-realist doctrines. Two such moves recur in his discussion of aesthetics and art. The first consists in detecting and revealing relativism - by which Anderson means the confusion of things (or qualities) with the relations such qualities or things enter into. The second move, which he often combines with the first, is to insist on objectivity - on attending to what is the case."¹ Aesthetics is a study. Any study is governed by the logic of inquiry or objectivity, with the issue: Is it so or not? Inquiry is always confronted by obscurantism, the conflict, as Anderson puts it, of truth versus satisfaction.² None of this implies, of course, that there is such a study (and Anderson is quite prepared to admit that) nor that the practise of art, as distinct from the study of aesthetics, is itself a study of what is the case. Indeed, much of what Anderson says on theme strongly suggests that artistic experience is not propositional or objective experience. In the essay "Art and Morality" he has this to say: "It is interesting to observe here that Dedalus refers to what binds him as history. 'History is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake.' This awakening is art. Art is

not concerned with dates, it is not concerned with the conditions and consequences of its subject-matter, though it may present a succession of phases within that subject-matter. Thus, while it may be said to particularise in that it presents something concrete and not a general formula, it may also be said to generalise, to present an 'eternal essence', as Joyce, through the medium of a day in Dublin in 1904, presents servitude and the escape from it as states of the human soul."³ Needless to say, you don't present an 'eternal essence' in the form of the proposition. Equally obviously, it can always be asked of Joyce's presentation: did it work? Anderson fails to see, however, that if this is so, he has no justification for concluding that beauty is a characteristic of things. Were it a characteristic of things, artistic endeavour would be distinguished from scientific endeavour on the ground of content or object studied; both would be presented in the form of the proposition or issue. No distinction could be drawn between the artist and the aesthetician; both would be scientists of the beautiful! ⁴

That an artist is not studying the beautiful in things does not imply that he is confusing between qualities and relations; that he is guilty of relativism. Such a criticism presupposes that the beautiful is a characteristic of things. Anderson is not confusing between qualities and relations where he speaks of a work of art setting out the essence or whatness or character of servitude. At the same time, it's important to appreciate that setting out the essence or whatness or character of anything is not placing it or describing it; it's not asserting, in other words, that this is so. Santayana made the important point that "Essences do not need description, since they are descriptions already."⁵ And Anderson, in criticising Arnold Bennett's failure to appreciate Ulysses, underlines, without realizing it, Santayana's point. "Thus Arnold Bennett simply fails in appreciation of Ulysses when he finds it unintelligible while admiring various passages (Things That Have Interested Me). He wants a book to tell him what it is all about, not realizing that Ulysses is not about anything. It speaks for itself; it is Hell and the unintelligibility he complains of is precisely a characteristic of the thing, Hell or Damnation. There is no question, apart from what arises in envisaging the process itself, of what happens before or after. Hell is there, presented to us, and the person who, having read the book, says, recognises or has discovered that it represents Hell, has appreciated the work."⁶

Ironically, Anderson's aesthetics, in so far as it emphasises objectivity in art and not just in the science of aesthetics, supports Arnold Bennett. Joyce is not setting out a description of Hell; he is not telling us about Hell. He is revealing Hell in its whatness or essence, and to reveal Hell in its whatness or essence is not to assert that Hell is such and such. Nor is it to present an object with various characteristics that can be appropriated by the reader in the form of information. Yet it seems abundantly clear that if Anderson is right and the beautiful is a characteristic of things, then there is no reason why it can't be appropriated in that mode or form - as objective knowledge. I have the suspicion that Anderson simply assumed that because aesthetics is objective knowledge, artistic enterprises must also be cases of objective knowledge, for, if they are not, then we have no alternative but to embrace some subjectivist or anti-realist doctrine.⁸ That's a non sequitur. Anderson's own stress on theme complicates the matter even further. Thematic experience is not objective experience; it's not a case of setting out the characteristics of things. But that does not imply that it's a purely subjective experience; that the theme is "constituted" by the fact of being experienced.⁹ In the essay "Literary Criticism", Anderson says that "Further developments of aesthetics would take the form of showing more fully that is meant by structure or harmony. In my view the question is similar to that of definition in logic, to the setting out of the 'essential features' of anything. A theme is grasped when we recognise characteristics which together constitute it. Thus, if we took the conventional view of the theme of the Iliad as 'the wrath of Achilles', we should say that the goodness of the work depended on its exhibiting the 'moments' or leading features of wrath. It is to be understood that these features are not simply juxtaposed, that there is development from one to another.¹⁰" To speak of 'moments' or 'leading features' of wrath is not to speak of characteristics or properties of wrath. It's to speak of wrath as composed of these 'moments' or 'leading features'. And if we're to avoid mere juxtaposition and make sense of composition, we have no option, I would suggest, but to move to the phenomenology of time¹¹ and an investigation of ways or forms of experiencing. The articulated structure of which Anderson speaks is not a property or set of properties of the thing, quite apart from considerations of experience, but is, on the contrary, the form of what might be described as a self-explanatory experience¹²

Along these lines, then, we could argue that aesthetics is essentially a phenomenological study. It is not an objective study of the beautiful as characteristic of things, but an objective study of the beautiful as the form of certain experiences or performances. There is nothing, in other words, in the objectivity of aesthetics to imply that artistic experience is itself an objective experience. Obviously artistic experiences take place and are, in that sense, objective happenings. But that does not mean that the artistic experience is itself concerned with objective happenings and not with, for instance, the development of ways or forms of experiencing things. As long as Anderson held fast to the empiricist dogma that there is only one way of knowing^{1,3} and that's knowing something to be the case, he could not take his own advice and push his aesthetics in the direction it was, behind his back if you like, already tending.

Notes.

1. p.8, Art & Reality.
2. p.137, SEP.
3. p.92, AR.
4. Perhaps a not very interesting distinction could be drawn on the basis of manufacture. The artist manufactures the object with certain characteristics. The question here would become: how to distinguish the artist from a mechanic or carpenter?
5. p.67, The Realm of Essence.
6. p.121, AR.
7. cf. Susan Sontag's work on the Camera. If beauty is "out there" in the thing as a characteristic of it, then it follows that it's appreciation must be in the form of the proposition or objective knowledge. We acquire the information, in one way or another, that this thing is beautiful, i.e., has a certain characteristic.
8. Not forgetting, of course, Anderson's empiricist dogma that there is only one way of knowing or experiencing.
9. Anderson appears to operate with a simplistic either-or, possibly due to the aforementioned empiricist dogma, that either it's in what is experienced or what is experienced must be no more than the fact of its being experienced.
10. p.262, AR.
11. Notice that Anderson speaks of 'phases' (p.2) and 'moments' (p3).

12. It's a self-sufficient experience; one that stands on its own without the need for explanation in terms of conditions or circumstances. cf (p.2) "Art is not concerned with dates, it is not concerned with the conditions and consequences of its subject-matter..." It's only when we have a disruption of theme, a disruption to a way of seeing, for example, that we consider conditions and circumstances or causal explanation. At that point we have to move to consideration of the object.

13. cf. What's Wrong With Rationalism?

JOHN ANDERSON AND THE PROBLEM OF FORM

1. Introduction

In the introduction to my Ph.D thesis I outlined two questions that the thesis would endeavour to answer. The first was the historical question of John Anderson's place in the history of philosophy and the second was the logical question of the relationship between Realism and Idealism. With respect to the first question, I argued that this question would involve the consideration of the general issue of a continuing philosophic theme in the history of philosophy which I took to be the issue of the relationship between Realism and Idealism. Hence Chapter 2 was an examination of the nature of Idealism, a philosophical theory which is a historical treatment of the traditional philosophical forms of truth, goodness and beauty and which were treated, in nineteenth century British Idealism, as relations internal to and within, the Absolute Idea. In contrast, Chapter 3 examined the reaction to Idealism by the British Realist's, the key feature of which was the insistence on the independent existence of objects based on the doctrine of external relations. However I also argued that this historical question required a consideration of the particular issue of *Anderson's* place in the history of philosophy and, with respect to the general theme of Realism versus Idealism, I took Anderson's contribution to be a vigorous defence of Realism as a systematic and historical philosophy. Consistent with this interpretation I presented, in Chapters 4 to 7, the four main elements of his philosophy - his metaphysical logic, his aesthetics, his ethical theory and his historical theory - in terms of four broad periods in his lifetime - 1926-31, 1932-37, 1938-51 and 1952-62. In presenting these systematic features of Anderson's philosophy, I argued that any systematic and consistent defence of Realism must be in terms of the doctrine of external relations, which firmly distinguishes between qualities and relations and therefore treats the traditional 'forms' of philosophy - truth, goodness and beauty - as *qualities* of objects. Although Anderson defended such a conception of Realism in the early and middle part of his life (1927-51), it was a central contention of my thesis that in the mature period of his life (1952-62) he became increasingly preoccupied with the notion of 'form', which, in its logical sense, I argued he treated as "non-material". Having completed the historical treatment of Anderson's philosophy, I then considered the second question of the thesis as the philosophical or logical issue of whether John Anderson was a Realist or an Idealist. Hence in Chapter 8 I argued that Anderson's acceptance of a non-material conception of form is inconsistent with the Realist requirement that the object of knowledge must exist to be known and therefore that his mature philosophy can best be described as 'Idealistic'. However I also stressed that such an assertion was not to be taken as a denial of the Realist basis of his philosophy and the main argument of Chapter 9 was that the common assumption of the contradictory relationship between Realism and Idealism is in fact unintelligible, which implies that it is not inconsistent or self-contradictory to assert that Anderson's philosophy is both Realist and Idealist. I concluded, in Chapter 10, that it is this thematic conception of philosophy as the conflict between Idealism and Realism that Anderson contributed to and which determines his place in the history of philosophy.

2. The Philosophical Development of John Anderson

For anyone trained in Anderson's philosophy, the conclusion of my thesis will clearly be contentious. Anderson, it will be argued, was, throughout his lifetime, a thorough-going and consistent Realist and never showed any inclination towards Idealism. Such a defence of Anderson's philosophy would inevitably be based on certain articles contained in Studies in Empirical Philosophy and particularly those dating from the late twenties and early thirties.¹ However, as I pointed out in my thesis, it is rather unusual that of the 31 articles reprinted in Studies in Empirical Philosophy only six were written between 1952 and 1962, even though another *eight* articles, dealing mainly with historical issues, were written in this period but have never been published.² That these articles might be significant in reassessing the exact nature of Anderson's philosophy was one of the central contentions of this part of the thesis and recent research into the correspondence between John Anderson and Ruth Walker has confirmed my view, put forward tentatively in the thesis, that 1952 marked a

significant point in Anderson's philosophical development and demonstrates his movement towards Idealism. As early as 1949, John praised Ruth for her 'philosophic sense' in appreciating his 'idealism', while in 1950 he asserted that he was going "more and more Hegelian" and in 1952 he referred to his "revived Hegelianism".³ However to fully understand these references to Anderson's 'Idealism' and 'Hegelianism', it is necessary to trace Anderson's increasing disillusionment with his so-called 'school' of Realist philosophy. After the end of the war, Anderson's sympathy and rapport with the student population on political issues declined with his opposition to the 1947 Margaret Street demonstrations, his criticism of Communism in his 1948 article 'The Politics of Proscription' and the 1950 rift between Anderson and a majority of the Freethought Society on the issue of the anti-conscription committee at the university. This alienation between Anderson and the student population culminated in the disbanding of the Freethought Society in 1951 and found philosophic expression during 1952 when, in his letters to Ruth Walker, he revealed a growing irritation with certain key members of the 'school', including David Armstrong, David Stove, Jim Baker and Peter Gibbons.⁴ Significantly, in a letter from January 1953, Anderson is emphatic that the publication of his 1952 article 'Hypotheticals', "...marked a parting of the ways and was a definite start on the way I wanted to go - emphasising explicit differences, over and above a general feeling of the difference between those who have a 'philosophic sense' and those who haven't."⁵ In particular, as he stated in a letter from July 1952, it is the opening part of 'Hypotheticals' which is his "impassioned plea for the unity of logic" which he hopes will give pause to "malcontents" such as Peter Gibbons in his pursuit of a pragmatic and eclectic logic.⁶ To understand the significance of this 'new start' that Anderson is pursuing in his philosophy it is necessary to analyse the opening section of 'Hypotheticals'.⁷ In this article, Anderson was firstly critical of the linguistic method in philosophy as a concern with the forms of speech, the ways in which things are said, which he argued could only be an eclectic method and he contrasted this with the logician's task of cutting through forms of speech to 'real content'. This 'real content' is 'the issue' in its broadest form - "Is it so or not?" - and he argued that it is by a consideration of 'the issue' that we can establish what the forms of the proposition are and that they are all categorical. Hence by considering the various propositional forms we can establish qualitative distinctions such as affirmative and negative and quantitative distinctions such as universal and particular:

Broadly, the argument is that the distinction of quality requires the distinction of subject and predicate, and this requires the distinction of quantity; and thus we have the four forms, A, E, I and O (XaY, XeY, XiY, XoY), each of which raises a single issue and, of course, presents a settlement of it. These 'categorical' forms, then, are the *only* logical forms, the forms in which we can assert that *something is so*;⁸

This argument that the categorical forms are the *only* logical forms is Anderson's "impassioned plea for the unity of logic", for in opposition to the eclectic method of analytic philosophy, the unity of logic is established by a consideration of the categorical and logical 'forms' of what is at issue. However the second point that Anderson was attempting to establish in this article was that the logician's task of cutting through forms of speech to the real content of what is at issue, can only be achieved by absorption in the philosophical tradition and of one's own sense of what is a connecting philosophic *theme*. For Anderson, this theme is that of objectivism versus subjectivism for it is this theme which 'make sense' of the course of philosophic inquiry and which emerges from "...a series of studies (*digging out* the contributions to an objective view of things, to a positive conception of truth, made by various philosophers - in the first instance, merely becoming capable of *seeing* such issues) and would not be a simple finding or a simple inference from the "philosophical data".⁹ This theme of the conflict between objectivism and subjectivism was also defended by Anderson in a 1952 paper to the Australian Association of Philosophy on the subject of 'History', the content of which he recorded in a letter to Ruth: "...the thesis (of the paper) was that in addition to the question of a historical logic (or philosophy of process), there was history in the human sense - which was the struggle between acceptance and rejection of a

historical logic, between 'understanding' and 'desire', between objectivism and (various forms of) subjectivism."¹⁰ Although he was criticised at the paper for treating this conflict as *the* theme of philosophy rather than simply one theme amongst many, he nevertheless described this theme, some years later, as the "supremely important philosophical antithesis".¹¹ The significance of this examination of 'Hypotheticals' lies in the fact that Anderson expresses the conflict between objectivism and subjectivism in terms of the *theme* of the history of philosophy and not in terms of the *doctrines* of philosophy, e.g. Realism, Empiricism and Positivism, which was such a feature of his early philosophical development.¹² If the notion of theme is defined, as Anderson does in various papers in Art and Reality, as the 'development of phases or moments of a subject', it is difficult to see, as I argued in Ch. 8 of my thesis, how this conception varies significantly from the Hegelian notion of dialectic. This conclusion, it should be noted, reinforces an 'Idealist' interpretation of Anderson's mature philosophy. However this examination of 'Hypotheticals' also establishes the important point that it is the logician's task to get to 'real content' or the logical form of propositions which involves the consideration of the categorical forms of situations. The importance of this argument is that it is only by a consideration of the propositional functions or forms of subject and predicate that one can derive the categorical forms of quality and quantity, which is to say that an understanding of the situational forms of space, time and the various categories can only be achieved by an examination of the forms of the proposition. It is also significant that this is the first time that Anderson discussed the notion of form, whether propositional or categorical, in any detail and this confirms my argument in Chapter 7 that after 1952, the concept of form began to play a more significant role in his philosophy. It is only in terms of the concept of form then, that Anderson's mature philosophical views can be fully understood.

3. The Problem of Form

In my thesis, a large part of Chapter 7 was concerned to establish that from 1952 to 1962 the notion of form began to play an important role in Anderson's theoretical development, appearing as it did in his psychological, social, political, aesthetic, ethical and logical theories. Although I did not distinguish the different meanings of Anderson's notion of form, one convenient way to do so is to distinguish between categorical and non-categorical form. Categorical form covers any situation or occurrence, with the formal categorical features being those that apply to the existence of any event. Non-categorical form covers a wide variety, although not a universal range, of occurrences. Hence we can speak of aesthetic form as relating to works of beauty, of ethical form relating to acts of goodness or of political form as relating to the distribution of power. In the discussion that follows, I will be concerned exclusively with the notion of categorical form. In my thesis, I stated that "It is also important to note that although Anderson had earlier praised Marx for upholding in his 'materialism' an emphasis on continuity, he now emphasised (in 'Empiricism and Logic') that a "common measure of terrestrial events" could only be something *formal*, for as he had earlier stated (in 'Religion and the University') "...no one *thing* could possibly have a *formal* connection with all other things".¹³ I took these last two statements of Anderson's to imply his acceptance of a non-material conception of form. However, this interpretation is apparently a subject of dispute and for the sake of clarification it is necessary to re-examine this contention that form is non-material. In considering this issue there are perhaps three possibilities as to Anderson's view on this subject: that he asserted that form is non-material, that he denied that form was material or that he deliberately did not assert that form was material. With respect to the last possibility, such a view could only be established if there was independent evidence that he did deliberately not make such an assertion. Such evidence would need to be different from any possible implications of his philosophy that would support such a view and would need to be of the form that he wrote or asserted something to the effect that he was aware of the issue of whether form was or was not material but deliberately decided against raising the subject in lectures or articles. Since no such evidence, to my knowledge, exists, this possibility can be discounted. With respect to the first two possibilities, it must be noted that on Anderson's account of logic to assert that X is not Y is equivalent to the denial that X is Y. Whatever subtle linguistic distinctions between

'asserting' and 'denying' there might be, they would have no force in Anderson's philosophy, as there can only be a significant difference between the two if the terms occupying the subject position of the proposition are not real or existent occurrences. For example, while there could be a significant difference between the assertion that unicorns are not yellow and the denial that unicorns are yellow, such *sentences* would not function as propositions in Anderson's sense.¹⁴ The assertion of 'X is not Y' is equivalent, on Anderson's logic, to the denial that 'X is Y' - that is, the assertion that 'the cat is not on the mat' is equivalent to the denial that 'the cat is on the mat'. It is the same situation that we are discussing and we must, he would argue, cut through mere forms of speech to the 'real content' under discussion: what did Anderson say about the relationship of form to matter, or, put in another way, did Anderson use the predicate 'material' to the subject 'form'? However the logical significance of this interpretation should not be overlooked, for, as I argued in my thesis, if the concept of categorical form is regarded as non-existent then it cannot be a subject of empirical, propositional discourse, for in not existing it fails - in a fashion similar to fairies, unicorns and gods - to be a subject term in a proposition. However if the notion of categorical form cannot function within a proposition, then much of his discussion of Space, Time and categories is superfluous. To establish Anderson's view on this question it is necessary to reconsider some of his earlier views on this subject and a convenient starting place for this are his, possibly superfluous, lectures on Alexander's Space, Time and Deity.

4. Anderson's Theory of Logic

Anderson's 'logic' is often taken to be based on the assertion of the identity of propositions with situations, which is often believed to imply the rather ridiculous conclusion that all propositions, even false ones, are identical with particular situations. It is more accurate to say of Anderson's logic, that it is the position that the consideration of any proposition must be in terms of specific situations and that the consideration of any situation must be expressed in propositional terms.¹⁵ The details of this view of logic were made explicit in his 1949 lectures on Alexander.¹⁶ Logic, he argued, is a theory of reality or as Alexander himself described metaphysics, a theory of being, and prefacing what he was to say in 'Hypotheticals' three years later, Anderson asserted that;

... a theory of Space-Time and the categories must be a theory of the form of the proposition, of what is involved in a proposition (allowing some difficulty about the word "involve") and not of the material or terms of a proposition - in other words we must take the line that the proposition is prior to the term, and not the term to the proposition. It must be a situational theory, a theory that there is nothing less than a situation and, we might say, nothing more than a situation, which would involve us in saying that in recognising a situation at all, we are recognising Space-Time and the categories¹⁷

Anderson is clearly stating here that a consideration of Space-Time and the categories is a formal consideration and not a material consideration of the proposition. A propositional theory, in other words, must be a situational theory and a situational theory - a theory of Space-Time and the categories - must be explicated in terms of the forms of the proposition. As he argued in 'Hypotheticals', a consideration of the propositional functions of subject and predicate yields the categorical forms of quantity and quality, and in his lectures on Alexander he clarified the importance of Space and Time in his own philosophy. Anderson was critical of Alexander's substantialist theory of Space-Time - that it was a 'stuff' from which other things originated - and in his criticism of Alexander he unequivocally asserted that;

...we can equally say that Space and Time *are not to be characterised as things, neither as material from which other things are made, nor as containers within which other things fall*, because then we should have not only have the problem of what Space and Time themselves were contained in, or, failing that, of the division of reality into Containers and Contained, but also the problem of

the relation between these universal containers or original materials and the things they contained or the things they were made from them ...we must reject equally the view of Space and Time as relations and the view of them as things and instead of taking them as constituting a universal container or a whole of which all other things are parts... we must take Space and Time, and particularly their infinity, as implying that there is no universal container, no totality, *no thing which embraces all other things*.¹⁸

Space and Time, as the formal features of existence, cannot be regarded as material, existing things, for this would imply that there is a *totality* of things, a *thing* which embraces all other things. However Anderson argued further that just as we must reject substantialist and relational accounts of Space and Time, so too must we reject similar accounts of the categories:

Alexander, from his substantialist point of view, treats the categories as predicates; in other words, treats them as belonging not to the form but to the material of the proposition, which would mean that they weren't part of logic (of its subject matter) but the subject of some particular enquiry and of course in that case we can't use them as pervasive, to use Alexander's expression, they would have real opposites - there would be places from which they were absent as well as places where they were present.¹⁹

Again Anderson is emphasising quite clearly that the categorical forms *are not* material predicates but are part of the form of the proposition, for if the categories are material predicates then they would have 'real' opposites, which would imply they existed in some places but not in others and this would be a denial of the pervasive and universal nature of the categories. Having discussed the general nature of Space and Time and the relations between them, Anderson then moved on to a consideration of the categories and their general groupings and their relation to Space-Time. He distinguished between three general groups of categories, the logical, the mathematical and the physical, which, he argued, are related to the various functions of the proposition. Hence logic, which involves the categories of identity, difference and existence, is primarily concerned with the copula in the proposition, although the category of relation, which is also part of logic, deals with relations between propositions. These logical categories, he asserted, emphasise things as situational or as in Space-Time.²⁰ Secondly, the mathematical categories, such as universality and particularity, number, order and quantity, are indicated by the subject of the proposition and emphasise things as spatio-temporal or as Space or Place.²¹ Finally the physical categories of intensity, substance, causality and individuality, are indicated by the predicate of the proposition and emphasise things as qualitative or as Time.²² These three groups of categories therefore, correspond to the three general functions of the proposition: the general classification of logical categories corresponds to the situational nature of things existing in Space-Time and is related to the existential nature of the copula; the classification of mathematical categories corresponds to the spatio-temporal nature of things as spatial and is related to the subject function of the proposition; and the classification of physical categories corresponds to the qualitative nature of things as temporal and is related to the predicative function of the proposition. In brief, the propositional functions of the proposition - copula, subject and predicate - correspond to the spatio-temporal conditions of existence - Space-Time, Space and Time - which themselves correspond to the general classifications of the categories - logical, mathematical and physical.

This long excursus into Anderson's categorical theory has been necessary to defend my central contention that he held that the notion of form is non-material. On the latter point Anderson has explicitly asserted in these lectures that no one thing could embrace all other things, that Space-Time itself cannot be a thing, and his reason for this assertion is that such a view would be to return to a substantialist theory of Space-Time, such as Alexander's, which he has explicitly rejected. What needs to be emphasised in respect of Space-Time and the categories, is their *infinity*, which implies that they cannot be any particular, finite thing.

A theory of Space-Time and the categories is, as he argued, a question of the *form*, and *not the material*, of the proposition. Anderson's views here also clarify what he says later in 'Hypotheticals' about the categories being found to be involved in a consideration of the forms of the proposition. In particular when he speaks of the functions of the proposition, where the subject terms 'locates' and the predicate term 'describes', it is clear that the subject function of the proposition indicates the mathematical categories which locate the object and the predicate function indicates the physical categories which describe the object and the copula indicates the spatio-temporal existence or occurrence of the object so located and described. There can be little doubt that even at this stage Anderson believed that the spatio-temporal and categorical forms of existence could *not* be regarded as existing things, for to do so would be to deny their universal or pervasive character. However as indicated earlier, after 1952 Anderson began to discuss the problem of form more regularly and in his 1955 address "Ethics and Religion" he addressed the issue of form and matter in terms of the question of God.

If God was taken as a particular thing, then he could make demands upon us, but this would not give his demands any special force. And if he is not to be one particular being, but one with which the reality of other things is bound up, something responsible for the scheme of things, this is completely illogical. If something is bound up with the existence of everything, it is a matter of *form*.²³

Anderson's argument here echoes his earlier sentiment in his lectures on Alexander where he asserted that a theory of Space-Time is a theory of the formal issues involved in the proposition and not of their matter and again reiterates the point that only something *formal* could be bound up with or involved in the existence of everything. Anderson clearly regards any 'substantialist' theory of Space-Time, whether theistic or atheistic, as illogical in confusing the formal consideration of the logical nature of Space-Time, with a material consideration of Space-Time, the 'existence of everything', as a thing which itself is somehow created and existent. If the 'existence of everything' is regarded as an existing, material thing then there will always be the question of what is it related to - what caused it, what is beyond it, what is before it, etc. The relations between things can never be a material thing but must be a formal theory of relations. This issue of the formal interconnectedness between things was also raised in his 1961 address 'Academic Autonomy and Religion'.

The ground of opposition between religion and philosophy lies in the fact that religion takes a personal view, but philosophy takes an impersonal view. Philosophy is concerned to discover the *forms of connection* between things, e.g., how they are caused or brought about. With religion, in order to know reality, it is a question of knowing what person to give your faith to.²⁴

In this address he argued that the only intelligible philosophical position on these 'forms of connection' is empiricism and in a follow up article, 'Religion and the University', he elaborated on his view of empiricism.

Empiricism, then, the doctrine of ways in which situations stand towards situations (with no question of any reality either higher or lower than that of situations), sets out the procedures, the *experimental* procedures, by which investigations can be carried on; rationalism sets out imaginary connections, *pretended* ways of breaking through the discontinuities we set up by postulating "principles" of a higher order than the situations we enter into.²⁵

To illustrate this meaning of empiricism, he argued that in the field of ethics and religion there could be no formal connection between God's commanding with the actions commanded unless there is an empirical connection i.e. a procedural continuity between the related terms, or if there is no procedural continuity, then there would not be any connection.

However Anderson, in rejecting the rationalist division of reality, was again concerned to insist that no thing could possibly have a *formal* connection with all other things.

But there is no need to make a *special* study of Thomism in order to see the unsoundness of a rationalist position, one which distinguishes between any term, X, and its "nature" or "essence", one which distinguishes "necessary" from "contingent" beings instead of recognising that *anything* is "necessary for" something and "contingent on" something, one which asserts a "first necessary being" which is "the cause of all other necessary and contingent beings," though no one thing could possibly have a *formal* connection with all other things. Such "explanations of everything" could provide us only with empty phrases, not real connections which can be found only under *empirical* forms. It is as empirical connections that such relationships as implication, genus and species, cause and effect, must be understood; it is in consideration of forms of continuity and commensurability among things that any doctrine of procedures of inquiry can be opened up. It is by getting rid of rationalist assumptions of discontinuities ("higher realities," etc.) that problems in any field of inquiry can be made precise and soluble.²⁶

Anderson is again emphasising that there can be no being which is the cause of all things, but that the empirical, categorical relations between things must be formal relations. The field of empirical enquiry must be regarded as a field which is continuous with other fields, where the empirical forms of continuity open up enquiry and makes problems precise and soluble. These sentiments were repeated in his criticism of Gilbert Ryle in 'Empiricism and Logic' where he emphasised that it is the 'common ground' of Space and Time, of being situational, that the universality and interrelatedness of logical and propositional issues arise.

...but he (Ryle) gives no sign of seeing that the logician is concerned not with a miscellaneous bunch of types of question which can be raised about this subject or that, but with a group of types of question which have a *common ground*, which hang together in any inquiry and thus apply to any subject-matter. This, I would say, is the ground of Space and Time (or of being situational) in terms of which the universal application and the interlocking of logical questions appear. It is because questions in all the categories are spatio-temporal, because they all arise within any region or "contour", to use Alexander's expression, that they are not discontinuous with one another but form part of a common inquiry (not, of course, an inquiry into everything but inquiry into any specific subject, it being remembered that subjects are not cut off from one another but each of them embraces relations among subjects). Apart from such a common ground, there could be no such thing as logic, no sort of connection between one inquiry and another, and thus no inquiry.²⁷

It is in the context of these remarks that Anderson speaks of the "common measure" of terrestrial events being something formal, although he regards form as not additional matter, but as characteristic of any matter that may be in question and it is this 'sense of form' that he also calls his 'logical sense'.

Professor Ryle speaks of what logic tells me, with the suggestion that I am laying claim to some private communication or even special revelation. What I maintain is that there can be no logic unless it is in the facts, unless their logical characters are found in any facts (or situations) of which we are aware. And what I take myself to be informed of by what might be called my "logical sense" is the *continuity* of things or their *coherence*, their "making sense" because they have a common ground, their negating all "breaks in reality", all doctrines of units or realms - and there seems to me to be no doubt that there is a divergence of view here, that the issue arises anywhere and that to offer a

settlement of it is to offer a view of the interlocking of questions or of the categories. It would, of course, be maintained by the empiricist logician that no one can offer a *consistent* "separatist" answer to logical questions, but the primary point is that logical questions arise wherever any question arises. ...but the main point is that we cannot have a piecemeal logic, that logic is concerned with the *running together* of questions of all sorts ("in all the categories") and that to be confused on this issue is to be hazy in one's "logical (or philosophical) sense". This I have also described as a sense of *form*; and it is because form is not additional *matter*, but is characteristic of any matter that may be in question, that one can speak of logic (or philosophy) as governing or directing science, and not the other way round - just as it is *taking* it the other way round, making matter do duty for form, making science do duty for philosophy, that has produced the intellectual chaos of the present day. This sort of "materialism" is well illustrated in Marxism, a leading strain in which is the treatment of social revolution as the common measure of terrestrial events - a role which could only be filled by something *formal*.²⁸

The meaning of this sentence should now be clear. The materialist error of 'making matter do duty for form', of taking a material thing such as social revolution to be 'the common measure of all things', is to be rejected, for this common measure can only be something *formal*, which does not itself exist. Only a formal theory of relations can fulfil this function of being 'common' to all other things and this formal theory, as indicated earlier, is a theory of Space, Time and the categories. Put in another way, Anderson is asserting that the categories, as the pervasive universals of things, cannot themselves exist, for to think that such formal features do exist, would be to re-commit the error of Plato's dualism. There can be little doubt then, that Anderson held that the notion of form, in both its propositional and categorical senses, was non-material for to argue otherwise is to contradict his expressed view after 1952 and would also commit him to a substantialist conception of Space-Time and the categories, a view which he explicitly rejected.

5. Conclusion

Although the above might be thought to establish conclusively that Anderson believed that form could not be thought of as a material thing, there is still the unresolved question of what this means in terms of his philosophy. It is clear that Anderson rejected any philosophy, such as the Platonic, which divided reality into a realm of forms and a realm of things as rationalistic and ultimately as unintelligible. However it is also clear that he rejected those philosophies which could be described as 'materialistic' in advocating a material foundation for all other existing things or which denied the categorical or situational treatment of things in any thorough-going manner. That is, any philosophy which denied the existence of the categorical forms, denied the ubiquitous nature of the categories or gave a material account of Space-Time and the categories was to be rejected as 'materialist' in its negative or reductionist sense. Anderson's philosophy then, whether it is described as empiricist, objectivist or materialist, is one which asserts that things have categorical and spatio-temporal 'forms' which do not themselves exist in any sense. However, as I argued in Chapter 9 of my thesis, this conclusion presents Anderson with an unpalatable conclusion. On Anderson's view propositional discourse is only meaningful when the terms in the proposition are situational in their exposition - that the terms refer to existing things or qualities and are connected by the unambiguous copula of existence. However on this account Space, Time and the categories cannot function as *terms* in the proposition and therefore must be "unspeakable" and ultimately, unintelligible. Anderson himself, as we saw in his lectures on Alexander, was of the view that Space, Time and the categories could not be material terms in the proposition and in a letter to Ruth Walker in 1952, revealed that he was aware of the difficulty: "...but I gather... that from what I said, in relation to his (Jim Baker's) contention that propositions about 'the form of the proposition' are different from ordinary propositions (asserting particular occurrences), was quite mystifying - viz., that we might have to say that the former were not propositions at all. I don't say that's a position I could

rest in; but they took it all very naively indeed."²⁹ Unfortunately Anderson did not clarify what this new position might mean and it is an issue that he never addressed again. However the logical point remains that any discussion of the form of the proposition or of the categorical forms cannot take place in terms of Anderson's empirical theory of the proposition, for to do so would be to treat these forms as existing, material things. This, it should be noted, is not a problem of existence or ontology, but is a problem of discourse or logic and as such it may be resolved in the manner suggested in my thesis viz., that Anderson's use of the copula of existence - the 'is or is not' - needs to be complemented by a copula of definition - the 'as' - and that such a theory of the copula would yield a theory of categorical discourse remarkably similar to that of the Hegelian dialectic. This modification to Anderson's logic, when complemented with his non-material conception of form, should leave little doubt that his mature philosophical views closely approximated an Idealist conception of philosophy. However this Idealist conception of philosophy is not to be understood as the subjectivist theory that things only exist dependent on our perception of them, but as the Hegelian theory that the traditional 'forms' of philosophy do not exist except as 'ideas' and can only be spoken about in terms of the logical theory of the dialectic.

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- 1 See for example, 'Empiricism', 'Propositions and Judgements', 'The Truth of Propositions', 'The Knower and the Known', 'The Non-Existence of Consciousness', ' "Universals" and Occurrences', 'Realism and its Critics', 'Realism versus Relativism in Ethics' and 'Some Questions in Aesthetics'.
 - 2 See for example, 'Politics and Morals', 'Realism', 'The Illusion of the Epoch', 'Time and Idea: The theory of History of Giambattista Vico', 'The Western Intellectual Tradition' and 'Religion and the University'.
 - 3 Letters from John Anderson to Ruth Walker; 24/1/49, 8/5/50, 13/11/52: Ruth Walker Archives, Sydney University
 - 4 Letters from John Anderson to Ruth Walker; 2/5/52, 15/5/52, 6/6/52, 8/7/52, 23/7/52, 30/7/52, 13/11/52, 26/11/52, 11/12/52, 23/1/53 Ruth Walker Archives, Sydney University
 - 5 Letter from John Anderson to Ruth Walker; 31/1/53, Ruth Walker Archives, Sydney University
 - 6 Letter from John Anderson to Ruth Walker; 8/7/52 Ruth Walker Archives, Sydney University
 - 7 Anderson, J. Studies in Empirical Philosophy pp 137-138.
 - 8 ibid p 139 (his emphasis)
 - 9 ibid p 137 (his emphasis)
 - 10 Letter from John Anderson to Ruth Walker, 15/5/52, Ruth Walker Archives, Sydney University
 - 11 Anderson, J. 'Politics and Morals' A.J.P., Dec. 1959, p 215
 - 12 See for example, "Realism and Some of its Critics".
 - 13 'The Place of John Anderson in the History of Philosophy' p 182
 - 14 Anderson expressed himself concisely on this distinction between sentences and propositions in a letter to Ruth from February, 1952: "'Words' take the place of 'ideas' with the linguisticists; they go on as if there were a priority of (our knowledge of) words to (our knowledge of) what they mean - as if we were ever confronted with *just* words - and this is a version of 'inwardness' and 'certainty': we're supposed to be quite sure of the *sentences* even when we're quite unsure of the facts." (For 'fact' read 'proposition')
 - 15 I owe this distinction to Dr. Brian Birchall and his article "The Problem of Form" International Studies in Philosophy 1983, pp 15-40.
 - 16 Anderson's 1949 Lecture notes on Alexander's Space, Time and Deity, copy obtained from B. Birchall.
 - 17 ibid p 33 (his emphasis)
 - 18 ibid p 33-4 (my emphasis)

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- 19 ibid p 35
- 20 ibid pp 42 - 76
- 21 ibid pp 77 - 90
- 22 ibid pp 91 -124
- 23 'Ethics and Religion', untyped manuscript held in Ruth Walker Archives, Sydney University
- 24 Anderson, J. 'Academic Autonomy and Religion' Honi Soit July 27, 1961 p 4.
- 25 Anderson, J. 'Religion and the University' The Australian Highway 1961 p 53
- 26 ibid p 52 (his emphasis)
- 27 Anderson, J. Studies in Empirical Philosophy p 172 (his emphasis)
- 28 ibid pp 185-186 (his emphasis)
- 29 Letter from John Anderson to Ruth Walker, Ruth Walker Archives, Sydney University