7. THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS

7.1 The limited political impact of environmental interests

Substantial political influence and control has been exerted on EC/EU decision making in favour of CAP support, resulting in considerable environmental costs. There was comparatively little input aimed at reducing the environmental damage and its costs or lowering the level of CAP support until recent years. This is because of the limited nature and weakness of opposing inputs, in spite of the environmental damage caused by the CAP.

This chapter examines the input of 'green' or ecological parties and environmental interests into agricultural policy in the EU, and the relative political success and influence of these groups. It focuses strongly on the German 'Greens' as the most successful green political party, and also on the role of UK interest groups in achieving policy changes.

Representation of the interests of the environment, and of the population as a whole in maintaining it, has been undertaken by a range of entities. These can be grouped as follows:

- special interest political parties;
- mainstream political parties;
- interest groups;
- institutions, including government bodies; and
- individuals.

With respect to environmental issues, these different entities can be broadly grouped together under the term 'the green movement', which includes political parties and ecological groups, supporters of an ecological lifestyle or of specific ecological objectives, and support which could be mobilised from the general population over issues of particular concern.

The green movement has been successful in raising public and political awareness of environmental issues, including the environmental consequences of the CAP, and obtaining the changes aimed at making the CAP less damaging to the environment which were discussed in chapter two. However, these changes were only achieved after the CAP had been in operation for over two decades. Since then improved market conditions have led to a reduction in the set-aside requirement for cereal producers, reducing its beneficial environmental impact. While sales of pesticides fell in all EU countries except Belgium between 1988 and 1992, sales rose again in several countries in 1993 and 1994 (Eur-op News 1996). Variations in pesticide use can be a consequence of the impact of climatic factors on pest populations, or of changes in

non-agricultural use, but these trends do indicate that the 1992 CAP reforms have failed to have a significant impact on this area of the CAP's environmental costs. The green movement has had difficulty in obtaining continued, or even sustained, improvements in the environmental operation of the CAP.

7.2 'Green' political parties

7.2.a Overview

'Green' political parties are found in most EU countries, at the supranational level in the EP, and in state and local governments. In western Europe green parties have obtained representation in national parliaments in most countries, but this has been higher in northern Europe than in southern Europe. While these parties share a general commitment to environmental values and environmental issues, the actual platforms adopted and the methods of pursuing them vary considerably. Attitudes to the environmental damage resulting from the CAP also vary considerably, from support for a return to a more medieval agriculture to a desire for some limitation on further ecological damage and the use of the most toxic pesticides.

Belgian ecologists were the first 'greens' to win election to a national parliament in Europe, in 1981 (Poguntke 1989, p. 4). However, it is the greens of the FRG who have attained the greatest level of political input, as shown in Table 7.1, even though their influence waned for a time at the national level after the first post-unification elections.

The greens represented postmaterialist values, drawing their support from the ranks of the new middle class, including students, public servants and other white collar workers (Inglehart 1977, 1981, 1987, and 1989). However, the movement has also been seen as a manifestation of cyclical intergenerational change, with core supporters being made up of 'a new educated class with its own materialistic self-interest' (Frankland and Schoonmaker 1992, p. 4). Brand (1990) finds evidence that new social movements and their precursors find times of spreading cultural criticism to be fertile ground, and that optimistic versions of cultural criticism tend to appear in times of economic prosperity.

In the cyclical perspective the movement would diminish as its members grew older and more integrated into society. This view has been at least partly disproven by events, though it may be argued that as the greens have grown older and matured they have adopted more of the tactics and policies of 'normal' politicians.

Another view of the greens is as a 'milieu' party with a firm but narrow base, representing specific interests in the same way as minority parties as the CSU and FDP do in Germany. This

Table 7.1: **Representation of Green political parties in the EC/EU (% of vote)**

Country	National elections					EP elections	
FRANCE[a]	1993 7.6	1988 3.8	1986 1.2			1994 2.9	1989 10.6
GERMANY FRG Alliance 90/ Greens East	1994 7.3	1990 3.9[b] 1.2[c]	1987 8.3			10.4	8.1
BELGIUM	1995 5.2	1991 10.0	1987 7.1			11.5	13.9
UK	1992 1.3	1987 1.3	1984 0.5			3.2	14.5
NETHERLANDS	1994 3.5	1989 4.1				3.5	7.0
GREECE	1993 -	1990 -				-	-
DENMARK	1994 -	1990 -	1988 1.3	1987 1.3		-	-
IRELAND	1992 1.4	1987 0.4	1984 0.1			7.9	3.7
ITALY	1994 2.7	1992 2.8	1987 2.5			3.2	8.7
LUXEMBOURG	1994 11.5	1989 8.4	1984 6.8			10.9	10.4
PORTUGAL	1995 -	1991 -	1986 4.8			-	-
SPAIN	1993 -	1986 1.0				-	-
FINLAND	1991 6.8	1987 4.0	1983 1.5				
SWEDEN	1994 5.0	1991 3.4	1988 5.6	1985 1.5			
AUSTRIA	1995 4.4	1994 7.1	1990 *	1986 4.8	1983 3.2		

Notes:

suggests a long term political life for the greens but with only a limited share of the votes and number of seats, and this has tended to be the case so far.

A further view sees the German Green party as a response to severe environmental problems, without which it would not have come into existence (Frankland and Schoonmaker, p. 4). This tends to ignore the popularity of the environmental movement throughout western Europe over the same period, although it may be argued that severe environmental problems may be found in most west European countries, and that the movement is a response to these.

The green movement developed mainly among the young, with its growth reflecting intergenerational change and the impact of this on political divisions in advanced societies. Early manifestations of this included the anti-materialist 'beatniks', and the establishment of the Youth International Party (Yippies) in the US. The growth of the German Greens represented a specific political manifestation of what elsewhere was a more general 'hippy' movement. In the US and in Australia the latter's focus was on opposition to the Vietnam war and the draft. Although it had a strong anti-materialist lifestyle component, the labour and energy expended in opposing the war reduced the resources available for ecological interests. While German students participated in anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in Germany and the UK, since no European country was involved in the war it did not provide a major focus of political activity there.

The greens represent themselves as belonging neither to the right nor the left. Brice Lalonde presented himself as the Ecology candidate in the 1981 French presidential elections under the slogan 'Green Against All' (*En Vert Contre Tous*), while Antoine Waechter, green candidate in the 1988 elections, described his party as being not of the right, the left, or the centre (Meny 1993, p. 84). However, the sympathies of green supporters have tended to be for the left rather than the right.[1]

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[1] For example, in the second ballot of the French presidential elections, Francois Mitterrand, the Socialist candidate, attracted 53 per cent of Lalonde's supporters in the earlier ballot, but the right-wing incumbent Giscard D'Estaing only 26 per cent. In 1988, in the second ballot Mitterrand attracted the support of 63 per cent of Waechter supporters while Jacques Chirac attracted only 20 per cent. In Germany polls of the Greens in the 1980s indicated support for alliances or coalitions with the socialist SPD (Meny 1993, p. 84). However, these situations indicate a left-leaning tendency of green supporters rather than a clear alignment of the movement with the left.

The ideology of the German green movement is seen by Markovits and Gorski (1993, pp. 116-7) as being a combination of humanism and dogmatism from the Marxist socialist tradition and reformism and naturalism from the ecological tradition. Differing combinations of these traditions and ideologies resulted in groups being attached to differing ideological principles, for example fundamentalists versus realists, and eco-libertarians versus eco-socialists. The green movement was attached to the concept of utopia, an ecotopia which could be achieved, and on the other hand an avoidance of the apocalypse, whether the latter was to result from nuclear war, the build-up of pollution, the increasing scarcity of natural resources, the destruction of the ozone layer, or global warming and a consequent rise in sea levels.

Markovits and Gorski (1993, p. 15) make a distinction between earlier green parties and those which emerged in Spain, Greece and France in the 1990s, on the basis that these recently formed parties were more in the nature of 'anti-system protest parties or ecological interest groups'. Certainly they have failed to achieve the same sort of representation and influence as earlier green groups.

In the EP the various national green parties vote together, supporting environmental issues and favouring a federal structure for Europe based on regions. From 1984 a 'Rainbow Group' was put together, made up of three sub-groups which differed considerably, the Green Alternative European Link (GRAEL), the regionalist European Free Alliance (EVA), and the Danish anti-EC party. From 1989 there has been a more focused Green Group which has taken the place of this earlier coalition, made up predominantly of green party representatives with some from the Radical Party.

7.2.b The German Greens

The German Greens constitute the single most influential EU green political party. They gained 5.6 per cent of the vote in the 1983 Federal elections and remained in the *Bundestag* until the post-unification all-Germany elections in 1990. As Weale (1992) argues, the German system of proportional representation has increased the political representation of the Greens in terms of seats in *Land* and Federal governments, whereas in the UK the first-past-the-post system has greatly reduced the chances of greens and other minority parties obtaining seats. The 5 per cent of votes threshold applied to political parties in Germany resulted in the west German Greens losing their seats in 1990, when support for them had fallen due to their opposition to unification and they received only 3.9 per cent of the vote. Only the 'Greens east'/Alliance 90 coalition was able to take up seats because the 1.2 per cent of the all-Germany vote which it received was enough to clear the 5 per cent once-only separate threshold for east Germany. However, in the 1994 elections the Greens cleared the 5 per cent hurdle, with 7 per cent of votes cast, and returned to the *Bundestag*. The 5 per cent threshold has assisted the

Greens by reducing potential competition from other minority parties within Federal and state parliaments.

In the FRG new forces were evident in the *Ohne-mich Bewegung*[2] and in attempts to achieve change through *Buergerinitiativen*[3]. Markovits and Gorski (1993, p. 2) believe that there are direct, although usually hidden, links between Auschwitz and the German Greens. In no other European country was there such a clear desire to break with the past and with values such as nationalism, conformity and respect for authority and order which were still prevalent among the older generation. In their view this gives the German Greens a special importance among green parties in Europe. Huelsberg (1988, p. 41) states that the inter-generational gulf was greater in Germany in the late 1960s and the 1970s than in any other European country.[4]

At first the greens were active in Germany through a number of small protest parties. These included the *Umweltschutzpartei* (USP) (Environmental Protection Party), which merged with other voter initiatives to become the *Gruene Liste Umweltschutz* (GLU) (Green List Environmental Protection) in Lower Saxony. Green lists emerged in other states, as did rival *Bunte* or coloured lists with social rather than ecological programmes. In July 1978 the *Gruene Aktion Zukunft* (GAZ) (Green Action Future) was founded by Herbert Gruhl. Green Lists became active in Hesse, Schleswig-Holstein and Bremen, with the Bremen Green List winning the first green seats in a state parliament in 1979.

The main stimulus for the green movement arose when the left of centre majority party in power, the SPD or Socialist Party, and its coalition partner the FDP, failed to reflect popular views of a sector of society by proceeding with establishment of nuclear power plants at sites which included Brokdorf, Grohnde, Gorleben and Wyhl. Although there were huge mass demonstrations, this failed to change government policy. As a consequence an electoral list or party was formed for *Land* or state elections in 1978. A percentage of the vote was obtained, but not enough to clear the 5 per cent minimum threshold to take up seats until the 1979 election for the Bremen state legislature. In the 1980s the Greens were successful in clearing the 5 per cent hurdle and obtaining seats in a majority of *Land* legislatures, with the exceptions of the Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein. The Federal Constitutional Court ruled in 1986 that

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[2] The Without Me Movement, a protest movement against conscription.

[3] Citizen's initiatives or groups in the FRG

[4] An example of these inter-generational feelings is provided by the following extract from a letter to the editor of *The European* (Siegen 1995):

'As a young German I am sceptical about our progress in reflecting on the events of 50 years ago. Even half a century later most older Germans are unwilling to accept blame for their acquiescence during the Nazi dictatorship. We only hear the same stupid excuse: "We didn't know what was going on at that time" and sulking because of the pain caused by our former enemies.'

Table 7.2: Trends in support for the Greens party in Germany

Year	Change
1976	Mass mobilisation against nuclear energy (Brokdorf, Wyhl).
1977	Further demonstrations, emergence of green lists at a local level.
1978	*Gruene Liste Umweltschutz* (GLU) formed from the *Umweltschutzpartei* in Saxony July: *Gruene Aktion Zukunft* (GAZ) launched by Herbert Gruhl. Green lists gain around 4% of the vote in Hamburg and Lower Saxony state elections.
1979	3.2% vote for a Green List in European elections; another one enters Bremen parliament with 5% of the vote.
1980	Formation of the Green Party: success in Baden Wuerttemberg but not in the federal elections.
1981	Widespread support in Hesse and Lower Saxony local elections, 7.2 per cent of vote in West Berlin.
1982	Over 5 per cent of the vote on average in the *Land* elections, Greens hold balance of power in Hesse and Hamburg.
1983	5.6 per cent of vote in federal elections and 27 seats in the federal parliament.
1990	Seats in all *Land* assemblies except the Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein. Unification - only Greens East/Alliance 90 coalition represented in *Bundestag*. Western Greens failed to clear 5.0% threshold.
1994	Greens return to the *Bundestag* after getting 7 per cent of the vote. Greens improve their share of German votes for the EP, to 10.4 per cent compared with 8.1 per cent in 1989.
1995	Greens form a coalition with the SPD in North Rhine-Westphalia, where the SPD failed to win an outright majority in the *Land* election for the first time in fifteen years.

Source: Papadakis (1984), pp. 20-21, updated.

money should be available for the Greens to have their own foundation, and they agreed to set up a loose grouping of several party institutes known as the 'Rainbow Foundation' (Paterson and Southern 1993, p. 116). The availability of public finance in the FRG for campaign funds for parties winning at least 0.5 per cent of the vote assisted the Greens by providing them with a source of finance at an early stage, when they had no obvious alternative source such as parties representing business, professional or religious interests had. The Greens have had a much higher ratio of voters to members than other parties: 87:1 in 1983, compared with 16.1 for the SPD. Their lower reliance on membership contributions as a source of income: around 15 per cent 1980-86, compared with 50 per cent for the SPD, 43 per cent for the CDU, 29 per cent for

the CSU, and 26 per cent for the FDP (Frankland and Schoonmaker, p. 109), has been related to this. Table 7.2 lists some major trends in support for the Greens.

In 1984 seven German Greens took up seats in the EP after getting 8.2 per cent of the German vote. In the 1989 elections their share of the vote was 8.4 per cent, and in 1994 10.1 per cent, which increased their seats by 4 to reach 12.

Opposition to nuclear power arose from fears with regard to its safety and environmental contamination, and also the potential use of spent nuclear fuel for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Government support for nuclear power programs had been reinforced by the 1973 oil crisis, when Arab states sought to punish western countries regarded as supportive of Israel by restricting oil supplies to them.[5] Nuclear power was seen as a means of limiting or preventing the impact of such political pressures in the future.[6] However, after the 1973 oil crisis the price of oil fell in real terms, and nuclear power has since then remained a more expensive option than conventional coal or oil fired power stations. Hence the dropping of plans for the further development of nuclear power in Germany and elsewhere after the mid-1970s was a result of economic realities as well as green pressures. On the nuclear weapons side, by the mid-1980s the attempts of the peace movement to prevent the stationing of Cruise and Pershing missiles had been defeated (Huelsberg, p. 119), leading to different priorities and concerns within the Green movement.

In the early years of the party there was a strong influence from the far left and ex-communist or communist interests, and those on the left wing of the party constituted a majority. Communist activists in the party manipulated agendas, dominated the party commission, and sought to influence party delegates' voting behaviour (Fogt 1989, p. 105). However, the platform of the Greens became more widely extended in the 1980s as the influence of the far left declined. Associated with this was the departure of prominent *Fundis* – Greens who were strongly against accommodation with the system, as opposed to the *Realos* who were more accepting of the need for accommodation with the system. At one point conflict between the *Fundis* and the *Realos* threatened to split the party. The split was averted

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[5] In the oil crisis self-interest won out over EC common interests, so that France, regarded as relatively pro-Arab, was able to maintain its supply by not helping the Netherlands, which was regarded as pro-Israel. As a consequence vehicle owners in the Netherlands were only allowed to drive on alternative days, and there were fears the whole country would grind to a halt.

[6] In practice neither the fears of the government policy makers nor of the green protesters have been realised. Since the oil crisis there has been a relative glut of oil due to competition between middle east producers. Nuclear power plants in western Europe have been constructed to high safety specifications and not been associated with accidents or substantial environmental degradation. However, nuclear power has remained more expensive than alternatives such as oil and coal, and its higher cost has led to the winding down of nuclear programmes in the EU.

by the putting together of a third force, *Aufbruch* '88, in 1988. Thomas Ebermann and Rainer Trampert resigned in early 1990 to form a more radical leftist organisation, and Jutta Ditfurth left the party in 1991. The association of some *Fundis*, including Jutta Ditfurth's companion Manfred Zieran, with financial scandals in the late 1980s, was a factor in their loss of power in 1989 and 1990.

The Greens aimed for equal gender representation. Their adoption of a 50 per cent minimum female representation quota led to the majority parties also trying to boost the proportion of female candidates, with the Socialist party adopting a 40 per cent female representation goal. Between 1979 and 1989, women accounted for 21 of the 55 elected members of the Greens' executive committee and 48 of the 117 members of the federal executive.

The Greens wanted to transform Germany's society and economy (Frankland and Schoonmaker 1992). Within parliament they did not adopt the usual standards of dress or behaviour, and they took part in protest actions outside it. The ecological movement and Green party in Germany reflected the establishment of a significant alternative or 'counter society' with its own districts or zones, which Minc (1992, p. 39) describes as having values of nature, ecology and peace, and anarchistic instead of Marxist ideals. He sees the ecology movement as something of a resurgence of the old Germanic cult of nature.

The party's support came from the young; from members of the new middle class, and from white collar workers and civil servants. Two thirds of both supporters and delegates are under 35, and support has been strong among students and conscripts. The party has least appeal for the elderly, and less even than the Socialists among high income earners (Poguntke 1993, p. 54). Three per cent of the electorate is considered to swing between the Greens and the SPD (Huelsberg, p. 212). Party membership grew from 18 000 in 1980 to 40 000 in 1985, reaching 41 316 in 1990, but then declining to 40 686 by the first quarter of 1994.

A 1994 poll carried out by the Allensbach Institute suggested that support for the Greens ran at 10.2 per cent of voters (The Economist 1994a). Following the 1994 federal elections their 7 per cent share of the vote gave them 49 seats in the *Bundestag*, and they won 13.5 per cent of the vote in the 1994 Hamburg *Land* election (The Economist 1994b).

Weale (1992, p. 73) describes the coalition government system in Germany as having increased the influence of the Greens on policies by giving them an ability to extract concessions as potential coalition partners. However, this has only really been the case at the *Land* level, as the Greens have not been serious potential coalition partners at the federal level until recently, because of their own political stance and also because of the reluctance of the SPD to accept

them as potential partners in national government.[7] The influence of the Greens on policy has been achieved more through the need of the majority parties to prevent a loss of votes to the Greens by adopting some of their policies.

The Green party of the GDR was only founded in 1989. Although its representatives were able to take up seats as part of the Alliance 90/Green coalition, since they had not obtained 5 per cent of the total German vote they were not able to obtain the funding a *Fraktion* or party group is usually given, and they have since merged with the west German Greens. They had refused to vote as a bloc in the parliament, adopting the principle that no-one should be forced to submit to the will of the party (Markovits and Gorski, p. 238).

The influence of the Greens has been substantial for local planning decisions, for example the building of roads and the provision of green space, reflecting their significant presence in local government, and participation in coalition governments with the SPD in the *Laender* of Hesse, Saxony-Anhalt and North Rhine-Westphalia. Their lack of participation in coalition government at the federal level has meant that they have not themselves secured the adoption of more environmental agricultural policies. However, the CDU/CSU/FDP government adopted some of their policies, and the 1992 CAP reforms which were agreed upon when the CDU had a majority over the SPD included significant environmental measures.

The Greens were influential in making public the relationship between intensive modern agriculture and ecological problems. They sought a chemical-free agriculture without artificial fertilisers and pesticides, and failing this strict limits with controls and penalties for offenders (Poguntke, p. 121). Their ideal included smaller scale production units for all forms of economic activity, including agriculture. In 1985 and 1986 they drew up a Reconstruction Programme which included transformation of agriculture and energy use, income redistribution, and a shift from an export-based industry to import replacement (Lankowski 1993).

The party is still opposed to the rule of the automobile, and to nuclear power.[8] With former Green MP Joschka Fischer as environment minister, the state of Hesse defied federal government guidelines and imposed a 90 kmh speed limit on autobahns throughout the region

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[7] In 1983 and 1984 the prospect of an SPD/Greens alliance was discussed in party circles, but only considered feasible if the radical element in the Greens could be isolated (Huelsberg 1988, p. 160). In 1994 the Green party congress agreed that the party would make itself available for a coalition government with the SPD if the results of the 1994 general election allowed this, but unrealistic conditions were imposed regarding NATO and the armed forces which the SPD could never have accepted (Roberts 1995).

[8] The Green party's opposition to nuclear power resulted in the closure of the Siemens' Mox refabrication plant at Hanau near Frankfurt by the Hesse government and its environment minister, Joschka Fischer, when 95 per cent completed (Born 1995). The plant would have been used for the reprocessing of nuclear fuel for nuclear power stations. It may now be relocated to Chelyabinsk in Russia.

(Paterson 1994). In North Rhine-Westphalia the Greens in the coalition government have made decisions disturbing to the business community, such as a reduction in motorway and airport construction, and refusal to approve a new lignite mining development (Salz-Trautman 1995). Green policies have been least acceptable to the electorate in the area of foreign and defence policy, where they proposed to abolish the German army, take Germany out of NATO, give up nuclear and chemical weapons, and replace conscription with a volunteer force (Paterson). Their proposals in this area have become much less radical, but probably still not flexible enough for acceptance into a coalition government. However, if there is to be a common European defence force with German participation, those who are wary of such trends may provide added support for the Greens.

On immigration, the Greens have changed their earlier position of 'open borders' to one of accepting quotas for migrants, but not for refugees (Raethzel 1992, p. 31). The Greens in the governing coalition of the city of Frankfurt are strongly in favour of privatisation, a major change from the Greens' earlier anti-capitalism (Stuedemann 1994). The party has transformed itself from 'an unruly grouping of often hopelessly idealistic protesters' into 'a party that now considers itself ready for government' (Stuedemann), turning a corner from 'sandals and beard radicalism' (The Economist 1995a). Green MP Antje Vollmer is the vice-president of the federal parliament (Paterson 1995). Objections to the Greens sitting on the parliamentary committees which oversee the secret services and monitor police surveillance operations have been dropped.[9] The party's fortunes have improved due to its winning of the earlier struggle with the fundamentalist wing of the party, and the merging of the west and east German Green parties. The changed nature of the party is also indicated by its employment of a public relations agency for the 1994 federal election.

The Greens have replaced the FDP as Germany's third distinct political party: the share of the vote of the FDP fell from 11 per cent in the 1990 federal elections to 6.9 per cent in the 1994 elections, less than the 7.3 per cent obtained by the Greens. However, unless the Greens are able to enter into a governing coalition with the SPD or the CDU, they will not be able to wield influence in the way the FDP has. SPD leader Rudolf Scharping called for the Greens to ditch such objectionable policies as withdrawal from NATO and scrapping of the armed forces so that their participation in a coalition pact could be seriously considered. However, the spokesperson for the Green Party, Juergen Trittin, responded that such demands were 'simply nonsense', and 'The Greens have no reason to retreat from their positions' (The European

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[9] Wolfgang Schaeuble, the parliamentary leader of the CDU, said in an interview with the magazine *Der Spiegel* that the Greens should be able to sit on these committees (The European 1994b).

1995b). Scharping later indicated that the Greens could be acceptable as coalition partners in 1997.[10] However, he has since been replaced as SPD leader by Oskar Lafontaine.

The greater success of the German Greens compared to other European green parties partly reflects the extent to which they have represented opposition and change to national values such as nationalism, intolerance of minorities, acceptance of centralised government and of police and military power, a sharp contrast with the values of the Nazi period of German history (Frankland and Schoonmaker, p. 23). In no other European country did the greens represent such a contrast. In the Netherlands respect for those of a different religious persuasion has long been a feature of political and social life, and in the UK respect for authority has been a middle class value never greatly accepted by the proletariat.

'Post-materialism' is easiest to achieve when a high level of economic welfare has been attained, and when a tight labour market situation discourages employers from discriminating against those who appear to have adopted too much of an alternative type of lifestyle. These conditions applied in Germany in the late 1960s and early 1970s, whereas in the UK wages and incomes were lower and the job market more depressed. The perceived need for the rejection of traditional values and attitudes in Germany widened support for the Greens there and gave them an ongoing platform which has outlived the alternative society aspects of the movement. The Greens opposed unification, and have adopted a role as the keepers of Gemany's conscience, trying to prevent the growth of nationalism and any return to militarism.[11]

7.2.c France

In France green parties have obtained less than 5 per cent of the vote on an individual party basis in national elections. They have been more successful at the regional and local government level, winning 1369 local council seats in 1989 (Frankland and Schoonmaker, p. 200). Stresses similar to those between the *Realos* and the *Fundis* in Germany resulted in the split between *Génération Écologie* and the *Verts* in France: the first party was formed by Brice Lalonde after he became evironment minister for Mitterand in 1988, the second was run on lines more distant from normal politics by Antoine Waechter.

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[10] Scharping is reported as having told the weekly *Bild am Sonntag* that the SPD could expand the 'red-green' coalition government in North-Rhine Westphalia into a national coalition government: 'In 1997 we'll be able to see that this has potential for Germany as a whole' (The European 1995c).

[11] An example of this is the authorship of the book *Risiko Deutschland: Krise und Zukunft der deutschen Politik* (Germany at Risk: Crisis and Future of German Policy) (Fischer 1994) by Green politician Joschka Fischer. The book deals with the question of Germany's *Sonderweg* or separate path in history, and in it he expresses grave concerns over the ability of a unified Germany to avoid a relapse into nationalism and the power politics of the past (Schlauch 1994).

In the 1992 regional elections the Lalonde wing of the movement got 7.1 per cent of the vote and *Les Verts* (the Greens) 6.8 per cent. The green parties managed collectively to win over ten per cent of the vote in the 1989 EP elections, but in the 1994 elections their share fell to 2.9 per cent, below the 5 per cent threshold which must be passed before a party can take up its seats. Although green parties succeeded obtaining 7.6 per cent of votes for the national assembly in 1993, this was in the first round: in the run-off of the second round they received only 0.2 per cent, with no candidates being elected. The movement has been disadvantaged by being split. The more radical Greens part rejects nuclear energy, while *Génération Écologie* has been more accepting of nuclear power and more flexible, which has allowed it to gain an edge over the Greens (Szarka 1994). The constituency for the two parties is mainly young and from a white collar background, with a preponderance of female voters.

The green parties have had some success in influencing policy.[12] However, they have been riven by in-fighting in recent years, and failed in France to pick up a single seat in the 1994 elections for the EP (The European 1994a). Both parties had an anti-Maastricht platform (Smart 1994). The movement split into three groups after former leader Antoine Waechter decided to leave the executive of the Green party in order to set up a new group for the 1995 presidential elections. In the latter, Green party candidate Dominique Voynet qualified to be included in the list of candidates for the first round of voting, but obtained less than 5 per cent of the vote. Only one of the eight other candidates who also made the first round, Cheminade, the 'Maverick' party candidate, received a smaller share of the vote.

There has been no strong peace movement in France to provide an additional platform for green parties.[13] Other negative factors have included the ability of the strong state to resist new social movements, and the impact of class divisions in maintaining a political system with a mostly one-dimensional left-right party distribution.

7.2.d The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg

In the early 1970s the *Kabouter* (gnome) party succeeded in winning control of the Amsterdam city council for a time on an ecological platform. It sought to reduce the use of cars in the city with a scheme by which municipal 'white bicycles' were provided for free use in public locations. The scheme failed because the bicycles were soon misappropriated.

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[12] They obtained a promise of cancellation of a major nuclear power station at Plogoff in return for their support in 1981, and secured the environment portfolio in the Rocard government in 1988.

[13] The peace movement in France is held in 'particularly low public esteem', and less than half the population would have been willing to add their names to a petition against the arms race (Rochon 1990, p. 107).

A small green party, *De Groenen* (the Greens), came into existence in 1983, but it failed to win parliamentary seats, even with proportional representation and a minimum threshold of only 0.7 per cent of the vote. It was followed by a Green Progressive Accord put together by the Radicals, the Pacific Socialists and the Communists, which won seats in the EP and the national parliament. In 1990 the coalition was widened with the admission of the Evangelical People's Party, and transformed into *Groen Links* (Green Left). It won 5.2 per cent of the vote in the 1991 regional elections compared with the 0.6 per cent of *De Groenen*. Its share of the vote has fallen in the most recent national and EP elections.

The greens' campaign against improvements to the dykes containing the Rhine, Waal and Maas, on the grounds that this would reduce scenic amenity values by blocking views from the river, has resulted in their being been blamed for the severity of the damage from the 1995 floods there, which may affect their future popularity.[14]

Belgium has two green parties, Agalev and Ecolo, but they represent the Flemish and Walloon segments of the movements respectively, and co-operate. In 1981 Ecolo won two seats in the chamber of deputies, becoming the first European green party to be represented in a national parliament. The following year Agalev and Ecolo won 120 seats on local councils, and in 1984 they both won seats in the EP. In the May 1995 national elections Agalev won 5 seats and Ecolo 6, representing 7.3 per cent of the 150 seats in the new federal chamber, a slight decrease on the share of the previous 212 seat chamber they had obtained in the November 1991 general election. Their share of the vote in the 1994 EP elections fell slightly, to 11.5 per cent, compared with the 13.9 per cent obtained in 1989.

In Luxembourg *Dei Greng Alternative* (The Green Alternative) has been successful in maintaining a significant presence in the national parliament and the EP, and increasing its share of the vote.

7.2.e The United Kingdom

The UK has the oldest green party in western Europe, founded in 1973. However, no green party has been able to achieve significant support in the UK, mainly because of the first past the post electoral system, although the numbers and large memberships of environmental interest groups do reflect interest in and support for environmental issues. The lack of support for domestic ecology parties in the UK accords with Alber's (1985, cited on p. 99 of Kaase 1990) view that such parties will be weak where class antagonisms are strong. Such

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[14] The 1995 floods were the worst since 1953 and caused an estimated US$23.5 billion of damage (The European 1995a).

antagonisms tend to prevent party systems from deviating from a basic left-right single dimension. Strong class differences and antagonisms also help to explain the relative lack of development of the Green movement in southern Europe.

The British Ecology Party relaunched itself as the Green Party of the UK in 1986. Prior to this its membership had taken five years to reach 1000, and amounted to 5000 in 1980. As the Green Party it secured a membership of 7000 by early 1988, rising to 10 000 in 1989 and peaking at 18000 in 1989-90, but falling to 12 000 by September 1991. In the 1987 general election it fielded 133 candidates, but won only 1.4 per cent of the vote, and no seats. In the 1989 EP elections the party's candidates won 15 per cent of votes cast, but due to the first past the post electoral system used for the EP in the UK no seats were awarded. This electoral performance could not be sustained and in the May 1990 local elections the Greens' share of the vote was down to 8 per cent, and it fell further in those held the following year; in the 1994 EP elections it was down to 3.2 per cent. Rootes (1992, p. 180) attributes the relative lack of success of green parties in the UK to the lack of a revolutionary tradition in British culture. However, the electoral system, and the deposit of 500 pounds sterling required by candidates for parliamentary election, together with the lack of a party financing system such as exists in Germany, have all been powerful practical obstacles in translating support for green issues in the UK into a successful political movement.

The British Greens have been even more strongly opposed to alliances with left wing and radical parties than the German Greens (Frankland and Schoonmaker, p. 198). Falls in the party's membership reduced its income and brought it close to bankruptcy.

7.2.f Southern Europe and Ireland

In Greece the ecologists won one seat, with 0.58 per cent of the vote, in the November 1989 elections, and 1 seat, with 0.77 per cent of the vote, in the April 1990 election (Pridham and Verney 1991). Since then the introduction of a minimum threshold of 3 per cent of votes cast before seats can be taken up has effectively excluded them from parliamentary politics.

Green parties in Portugal and Spain have had a similar late development and small impact. In Portugal a green party, Los Verdes (The Greens), was put together in 1981, and in 1987 it obtained seats in parliament by standing on the lists of the Communist Party. In Spain the largest green party, also Los Verdes, had a membership of only some 800 in 1987, compared with the 1000 achieved by the Portuguese party, and its electoral successes had been limited to two local council seats.

In Italy Greens have gained significant representation on local councils, and obtained seats in the national parliament and EP. In the 1994 general election they obtained 2.7 per cent of the

vote and eleven seats, a slight reduction compared with the 2.8 per cent and 16 seats obtained in the previous general election in 1992 (Donovan 1994). However, these results were better than the 2.5 per cent of the vote and 13 seats achieved in the 1987 general election. The movement has not become a party as such, rather it is a group of competing sets of candidates. In the EP some of them have stood on the Green List, and others on the red-green Rainbow List coalition.

In Ireland the greens have one seat in the *Dail* or parliament and some local government representation.

7.2.g Scandinavia

There are Green parties in Sweden, Finland and Denmark, but not in Norway where environmental issues were taken up by small left-wing or liberal parties. The Finnish Greens date from 1979, when they obtained 0.1 per cent of the national vote as a list of nominated candidates rather than a national party organisation. Assisted by an electoral system based on proportional representation, their share of the vote increased to 1.5 per cent in 1983 and 4 per cent in 1987 (Mueller Rommel and Poguntke 1989). It has continued to increase.

In Sweden the Centre Party articulated environmental concerns in the 1970s. In 1981 it split over support for a referendum in favour of nuclear power plants, and the *Miljopartiet* was formed by former Centre Party supporters. It obtained 4 per cent of the vote in the 1981 general election, but only 1.6 per cent and no seats in the 1982 general election. In 1985 it was renamed the Green Party, winning 1.5 per cent of the vote in the 1985 general election, and increasing this to 5.5 per cent and twenty seats in the 1988 national election (Mueller-Rommel and Poguntke). In the 1994 general election the party obtained 5.0 per cent of the vote and 18 seats in the 349 seat national parliament, an improvement on the 1991 election when it received only 3.4 per cent of votes and no seats.

In Denmark green parties won only 0.2 per cent of the vote in the 1987 general election, and have not obtained representation in the EP. This is because small left-wing parties have also offered 'Green' programmes, and because the Socialist People's Party (SF) and Venstre Socialist Party (VS), as a result of a close alliance with anti-nuclear power and environmental movements, also supported 'Green' issues (Mueller-Rommel and Poguntke).

7.3 The Greens and the EU's institutions

7.3.a The European Parliament (EP)

The EP has been an important forum for the Greens, and one through which ecological organisations such as Greenpeace and the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) have been able to obtain legislative changes. One of the earliest pieces of legislation passed by the EP was a ban on imports of baby seal products from Canada. The ban resulted from a campaign led by IFAW to stop the slaughter of baby seals in Canada by banning imports of baby seal fur and other products into the EC (Ripa di Meana 1995). A campaign led by Greenpeace, and pressures from Greens in the EP, led to the EP voting against a directive which would have allowed patenting of human genes, subject to ethical considerations (Barnaby 1995).[15]

In the period 1989 to 1994, the French Greens were the most numerous in the EP, followed by German Greens, with some support from Italy and smaller countries. The 1994 EP elections increased the influence of the German Greens, while the representation of Greens from France, Italy and the Netherlands has fallen. This should make the EP's Greens a more cohesive and influential group.

7.3.b The Commission

The relative lack of interest of the EC Commission in environmental issues in the early years of the CAP was a major factor in the continuation of the CAP on a price-supporting output-increasing basis which resulted in high environmental costs. The early administrators of the CAP in DG VI saw maintaining support for agriculture as a key goal, subordinate mainly to considerations of cost and financial efficiency. In order to draw political support from as many member states as possible, they ensured that the benefits of the CAP extended to a range of products which covered all member states. Agricultural and environment commissioners took little interest in the environmental costs of the CAP until these began to be a widely publicised embarrassment for the CAP in the 1980s.

However, once concern over environmental issues became more widespread, the Commission's interest in these issues increased due not only to pressures from environmental groups and political interests, but also because this was seen as a way of increasing its popularity with the European public. It took the step of establishing a new section which tries

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[15] This vote put the EU in a difficult competitive situation with regard to North America, where such patenting is allowed, since medical advances in the US and Canada might not be available to medicine in the EU as a result.

to co-ordinate agricultural and environmental policy, and works more closely with DG XI, the environmental directorate-general (Smith 1990, p. 207).

More recently, the appointment of Franz Fischler as agriculture commissioner has led to more emphasis on environmental issues in changes to the CAP. Due to Fischler's background as an Austrian small farmer he has been very much influenced by Austrian environmental values which emphasise small scale farming on an ecologically friendly basis.[16]

DG XI now also takes a more active interest in the environmental implications of agricultural policy. Environment commissioner Ritt Bjerregaard has announced that one of her key objectives is to get the agricultural budget cut, and to change the basis of subsidies to one of caring for the environment. She foresees tobacco producers in Greece giving up growing tobacco and being paid instead as guardians of nature. She justifies her calls for change with reference to the damage done by nitrates used in agriculture to the water supply, and the use of antibiotics, hormones and other 'medical rubbish' in livestock production (Bendixen 1995). The publicity given to the environmental costs of agriculture and agricultural support by the new environment commissioner, and the pressure she will exert for change, could represent a powerful increase in the inputs of environmental interests into the CAP system.

7.4 Interest groups

7.4.a Overview

Environmental interest groups have also been important in influencing the political system to take decisions in favour of environmental values. They have not had the same impact at the EC/EU level as the green political movement, not having had the same direct channels of influence.

One reason for the relative lack of influence of environmental groups as a counterweight to agricultural interest groups in the EC/EU has been that the former have had a much wider focus than the ecological impact of modern agriculture, or saving the countryside. In Germany they have been more strongly involved in the anti-nuclear movement, in town planning decisions, and in refuse recycling policies. Greenpeace, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) are global environmental interest groups active at the EU level which are discussed further in appendix H. Environmental interest groups have been important in the UK, partly because of the lack of a politically influential strong green party.

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[16] Examiner B.

7.4.b The United Kingdom

In the UK interest groups have played a much greater role in promoting 'green' issues than political parties. There has been no radical ecology movement and no successful 'new politics' party. This is a reflection of the lower level of openness of the political system to new or minority parties than in Germany or France, due to the absence of proportional representation and to the substantial parliamentary majorities UK governments have often had as a consequence of the first past the post electoral system. It also reflects more specific environmental and ecological concerns in the UK, such as the welfare of birds and animals and the protection of the countryside, which led many environmental activists to join more traditional groups with a large membership base and significant resources. One such traditional group is the National Trust, which is discussed in appendix H. Student radicalism was less of a force in the UK than in other large European countries and North America. However, there was an active anti-nuclear movement in CND (the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament), and an environmental movement in Friends of the Earth (FOE). The anti-nuclear movement in the UK has been concerned with banning the placement of nuclear weapons rather than preventing the development of nuclear power stations.

Interest groups devoted to philanthropic and other aims have long been a feature of British political and social life. Their existence has mitigated intergenerational political conflict and given the representation of green interests a continuity largely absent in Germany.

There was a substantial growth in the number of environmental groups in the UK in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Their membership expanded rapidly from the early 1970s, as indicated in Table 7.3, growing from 3 million in 1983 to nearly 5 million in 1989, and continued to expand into the 1990s. That of FOE grew from 1000 in 1971 to 18 000 in 1981 and 140 000 in 1989, and that of Greenpeace from 150 000 to 281 000 over the same period (Rootes 1992).

Some of these groups, for example the Council for the Protection of Rural England and ramblers' associations, directed their activities specifically towards the UK environment. The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) was drawn into European and wider affairs because of the migratory nature of birds and the need to protect their resting grounds during migration and their breeding grounds. The World Wide Fund for Nature has global interests, but has examined and publicised the CAP's environmental consequences.

Further details of Greenpeace, the Council for Rural England, and of the UK animal welfare lobby and some other interest groups, are given in appendix H.

Table 7.3: **Membership growth of leading UK environmental organisations**

Group	1971 '000	1987 '000	1991 '000
Amenity Societies affiliated to the Civic Trust	214	240	222[a]
Council for the Protection of Rural England	21	32	45
Friends of the Earth (England and Wales)	1	55	114
Ramblers Association	22	57	87
Royal Society for Nature Conservation	64	184	204
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds	98	561	852
World Wide Fund for Nature	12	124	227

[a] Civic Trust only for 1991

Source: Grant (1989, p. 14), Richardson (1995, p. 68).

In the UK the main channel of influence for interest groups is through Members of Parliament (MPs), who represent constituency interests and also those of groups and lobbyists in whom they are prepared to take an interest. The interest in many cases may be linked to some financial or professional reward, but this is less often the case for environmental and animal welfare groups than when industry or commercial interests are involved.

7.4.c Germany

Environmental interest groups go back a long way in Germany, just as they do in the UK. In 1899 Frau Lina Haehnle founded the League for Bird Protection, which later developed into the German League for Bird Protection, and at the turn of the century Hugo Conwentz was active in promoting nature conservation (Dominick 1992, p. 53). A variety of nature protection groups was established, such as the Society for Nature Parks, the People's League for Conservation, the League for the Care of Nature and the Homeland, and more special interest groups such as the Men of the Mountains. During the Nazi period the nature protection movement was hijacked by reactionary and racist elements and subordinated to the aims of the regime. Organisations were forced to comply with the dominant National Socialist ethic, or undercut, replaced, or otherwise forced to close.

This association between organised nature protection groups and the Nazi regime in Germany has been a factor in the weakness of post-war interest groups there, and in the strength of the Green political movement. While the UK has had an ongoing tradition of nature and

environmental protection groups such as the RSPB and the National Trust, in Germany a new and radical political movement was required to allow concerns to be vocalised.

The membership of nature protection organisations which were adequately free of the taint of Nazi cooperation to continue fell substantially during the immediate post-war period, although in some cases it recovered in the 1960s. The work of groups was sometimes aided by government subsidies.[17] However, the gains in membership experienced by many groups in the 1960s did not continue into the 1970s.

Certain authors were influential in influencing public opinion towards the adoption of more environmental values, including Reinhard Demoll with *Will Man be Tamed with Nature or by Nature?*, Guenther Schwab with *Dance With the Devil*, and Bodo Manstein with *In the Stranglehold of Progress*. All three were critical of nuclear power, and drew attention to the poisonous environmental effects of pesticides.

Neither the interest kindled by such popular works, nor the major protests taking place to protect the countryside from the impact of airfield extension and nuclear power plant constructions, did much to assist traditional nature protection interest groups. Membership of the Isar Valley Society failed to recover the peak level experienced in the 1960s, while that of the Nature Park Society reached a peak in 1972. However, the League for Bird Protection and the League for Conservation continued to experience gains in membership during the 1970s.

The German environmental organisation the *Bund* (League or Federation) has supported high CAP prices, even though they have led to greater agricultural production and environmental damage.

Greenpeace Germany is an effective environmental organisation and an important part of its parent organisation, as discussed in appendix H, but it has shown little concern for the CAP's environmental consequences.

7.4.d Spain

A Spanish environmental interest group, Genetic Resources Action International, was active in lobbying for the rejection of the biotechnology genetic patenting legislation by the EP, sending a protest letter on behalf of environmental groups in twenty-five countries.

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[17] For example, the Bavarian state government provided 10 000 DM per year in the mid-1950s to the League for Conservation.

7.4.e France

'Green' interest groups have acquired little influence in France. Wilson (1990, pp. 80-81) provides an explanation of this in that under the Fifth Republic France has come to be regarded as a strong state capable of resisting the demands of outside groups, with few governments as able to act decisively and resist powerful interests. This strength of the French state he ascribes to the strong political executive, disciplined parliamentary majority, and centralised administration, and the ability of the political elite to ignore even noisy groups. He considers that the well-developed traditions of direct political action which already existed in France and Italy have limited the ability of the greens and other new social movements to attract attention to themselves there, describing how, as part of political actions campaigns, in France (p. 82), farmers spread manure on motorways, truck drivers block streets, and shopkeepers shut their stores to visiting officials, so that the attention-getting strategies of the new social movements are not seen as new or necessitating political attention.

7.5   The influence of the greens

The policy interests of the greens have been many and varied, going far beyond the issue of the environmental consequences of agriculture and agricultural support. While their objective of a smaller and more ecologically sound farm structure could have reduced the use of pesticides and nitrate fertilisers, a return to the preindustrial farm structure and life which the greens idealised would have resulted in major falls in production. Pressures from green interests have restricted some forms of genetic patenting and genetic engineering of plants, although the latter is one means by which pesticides and fertiliser use may be reduced.

In response to increased concerns over environmental issues, the governments of the UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands established bodies to look into environmental issues in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and followed this up with the establishment of environment ministries. In France the Ministry for the Protection of Nature and the Environment was established in 1971, as was the Ministry of Public Health and Environmental Protection in the Netherlands. The UK the Department of the Environment had already come into being in 1970. Germany did not establish a federal Ministry of the Environment until 1986, but from 1969 the Interior Ministry had been given specific responsibility for environmental issues (Weale 1992). However, much of the responsibility for agriculture and its environmental impacts was left with agriculture ministries.

The EC developed policies on the environment at a relatively early stage: at the Versailles Summit of October 1972 the EEC six adopted a strong resolution calling for an environmental programme for the Community. However, most of the environmental legislation adopted

following this decision had little or no impact on the environmental costs of the CAP. A detergents directive (73/404/EEC) was adopted in 1973. The Discharge of Dangerous Substances (in the Aquatic Environment) Directive (76/464/EEC), and the Bathing Water Directive (76/160/EEC), were adopted in 1976. In 1979 the first pesticides directives were adopted, including (79/117/EEC) which banned the use of the pesticide DDT among others. The Birds Directive (79/409/EEC) dealt with the conservation of wild birds and their habitat, but in practice has had only a limited impact on member state policies. The Drinking Water Directive (80/778/EEC) has had an impact on agricultural practices where these affect the quality of drinking of water, setting ambitious standards with respect to pesticide contamination (von Weizsaecker 1994). A proposal has been under consideration for a directive on the ecological quality of water which would define standards for surface water, rather than just that used for drinking or bathing (Eur-op News 1994).

It can be seen from this that the major early environmental policy interests of the EC did not include mitigation or reversal of the environmental damage caused by the CAP, although they did include restriction of the impact of pesticides and nitrogenous fertilisers on water quality. In Germany up until the 1980s German agricultural policy was based on the view that agriculture was not harmful to the environment or nature so long as it was undertaken in an 'orderly' way (von Weizsacker 1994, p. 83). Germany held up for two years the adoption of provisions allowing aid to be paid to farmers maintaining environmentally sound agricultural practices in ecologically sensitive areas, which were eventually applied as Regulation 1760/87/EEC (von Weizsaecker, p. 86). However, in many other areas of industry and product standards, Germany has higher environmental standards than most other EU countries, and seeks to have EU standards imposed at this level or higher.[18]

The German Greens failed to become more effective at an earlier stage because of policies such as rotation of representatives, avoidance of the normal deal-making of politics, and rejection of participation in government commissions and regulatory bodies.[19] Their leaders

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[18] One problem with the adoption of common environmental policies in the EU is that what is an optimal policy for one country may not be for another. For example, uniform emission standards are not an optimal environmental policy for the UK because air and water pollution are dispersed by wind and short-rivers respectively: the adoption of quality standards for air and water is a more cost-effective policy there. For Germany and the Netherlands, by contrast, the adoption of emission standards is more realistic and cost-effective. This problem was recognised to some extent by the then EC in its Fourth Environmental Action Programme, which allows member states to apply emission standards with reference to quality standards for less toxic 'grey list' substances. However, emission standards are obligatory for 'black list' more toxic substances, with the possibility of exceptions (von Weizsaecker 1994, pp. 31-32).

[19] Upon entering the Bundestag in 1983 the Greens agreed to rotate their representation by requiring candidates to cede their seats to colleagues after two years. This prevented individuals becoming involved in committee work on a long term basis, and hence being able to exercise real influence (Meny, p. 85). While the party

failed to seize the initiative and effectively wield their political power.[20] The 'self-limiting radicalism' of the Greens involved experimentation with a variety of political and institutional forms (Papadakis 1988, p. 439). One view (Harvie 1994, p. 72) is that the Greens made a 'holy mess' of their involvement in federal politics in Bonn, although they have been more successful in their participation in several Land governments. However, there are now prospects of further electoral gains and possibly membership in a coalition government with the SDP, if the SPD could become more popular, though Green MP Antje Vollmer feels that the Greens need to remain a minor party, because (Paterson 1995):

> In an ideal situation the SPD would be the solid responsible party of state, and the Greens would continue in their role as intellectually brilliant provocateurs.

However, the influence of the greens cannot be seen just in terms of political success. The German Greens have made German culture less formal, less conforming and respectful of authority and more tolerant.[21] They have supported the rights of homosexuals, gypsies and convicted criminals, and opposed racism (Frankland and Schoonmaker, p. 9). Governments and major parties have responded to the appeal of green parties and interest groups by adopting more environmental platforms.[22]

In the EP the Greens have achieved policy changes in areas such as seal fur imports and gene patenting, but their influence with respect to reducing the negative environmental impact of the CAP has been small.

Nevertheless, by the 1992 CAP reforms environmental interests had managed to achieve the adoption of a more environmental CAP both as an objective in itself and as a means of changing the focus of the CAP away from output-related support. Lenshow (1995a) sees this as resulting from the ability of environmental interests to participate in a broad reform coalition

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abandoned mid-term rotation for deputies in 1986, the tenure of Green deputies was still limited to one or two terms.

[20] Porritt (1994) describes the Green leader Petra Kelly as 'one of the great political figures of the late 20th century' yet 'the very opposite of a politician's politician'. She lacked a sense of strategy, 'often bottled out on the big occasions', and failed to use her oratorical skills in the Bundestag. Following the election defeat of the Greens in 1990 she failed to gain office in the party in 1991, trailing in third in the election for speaker (Parkin 1994), later meeting a tragic end in a murder-suicide.

[21] Kaschuba (1995, p. 216) argues that in Germany, where officials and representatives of authority 'cast considerably longer shadows' than they do in France and Britain and are less responsive to the public, the Greens and other new social movements and citizens' initiatives: 'have struck new, critical and irreverent notes in German political culture and the courage to stand up for one's individual beliefs is no longer foreign to this country.'

[22] For example, the German Socialists under Oskar Lafontaine adopted the Greens' policies in the 1980s (Harvie 1994, p. 60). In the UK in the late 1980s the government legislated to protect the countryside, restricting agricultural activities where necessary, and offering subsidies to encourage the retention of hedgerows and marshes.

as part of a larger rural policy agenda, the data and analysis presented in this chapter and the previous one suggest that it was a consequence instead of political developments in Germany and France, changes in the EU's institutions, and increased pressures from trading partners and business and industry for CAP reform. The CDU's overall majority in 1990-94 put it in a good position relative to the minority parties in the governing coalition. This allowed it to be more responsive to pressures from business and industry for CAP reform in general, and to pressures from environmental interests and the general population for a more environmental CAP. One indicator of the increased influence and control of the CDU over agricultural policy was the resignation of the CSU minister for agriculture, Kiechle, in 1993, and his replacement by a CDU nominee. The Socialist government and presidency in France was more concerned to obtain aid for industry, infrastructure and state firms than to prevent CAP reform. Governments of countries such as the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark were happy to be permitted to support a more environmental CAP. The reform was achieved through the conscious bargaining of governments, and changes within the Commission which gave a higher priority to environmental objectives, not 'slipped by' decision makers as Lenschow (1995b, p. 11) suggests. However, with the return of the RPR to government as part of a UDF/RPR coalition, with the CDU's loss of its clear majority in the 1994 federal elections, and given the outcome of the 1995 French presidential election, opportunities for further environmental changes to the CAP became more limited.

7.6 Conclusions

The main political influence of the greens in the EU has been that of the German Greens, although there have been significant green parties in most northern European countries. Only in Germany could it clearly be said that the Greens represent an additional, ecological, dimension to the basic left-right dimension of the Downsian model of the party system. Green interests have also been furthered by interest groups, particularly in the UK and at the EU level. The greens failed to restrain the environmental costs of the CAP until recent years for several reasons. One is that cutting the negative environmental consequences of the CAP was not a significant objective of those greens who attained political office. Another is that the direct influence of the greens has been limited, and they have failed to get into a coalition government at the federal level in Germany. A third is that the level and type of attachment to different environmental objectives has varied considerably between countries, as indicated in this chapter and in Van Deth (1995) and Nas (1995). However, green parties have been instrumental in getting environmental issues on the agenda.

In Germany the green movement can be seen as a response to the generation gulf there, while in the UK the lack of such a clear generation gap has been associated with the channeling

of part of the environmental movement through traditional interest groups and the animal welfare movement. In France the fragmented political structure of the greens and the power of the state have reduced their influence. In Scandinavia the espousal of green objectives by majority parties has restrained separate political developments, while in southern Europe populations have more economic than environmental objectives.

Until recent years, the green movement had done relatively little to change and mitigate the environmental costs of the CAP. The early greens in Germany were concerned mainly with anti-nuclear and urban environmental objectives. While some UK interest groups have had anti-nuclear objectives, others have had an interest in conservation of wetlands as bird habitat, in reducing those aspects of the CAP most destructive to the countryside and other wildlife populations, and in the welfare of farm animals as well as wildlife, pets and laboratory animals.

Individual member states introduced some schemes to reduce agricultural damage to water supplies and wetlands during the 1980s, including incentive schemes and restrictions on expansion. However, progress towards a more environmental CAP was limited until the years 1990-93. During this period a combination of factors led to reforms of the CAP and changes intended to reduce its environmental costs. These factors included a reduction in the influence of agricultural parties and interests in the key member states of Germany and France, due to political and demographic factors and the costs of unification in Germany, and changes in the EU's institutions which made the CAP's environmental costs a more important consideration. Environmental measures were adopted to support CAP reforms, to reduce agricultural waste problems in the Netherlands and Denmark, and to court popular approval in the UK. Since then there has been a swing back in France and Germany towards greater political influence for parties with a strong agricultural focus, and the impact of CAP environmental reforms appears to have been reduced. However, there is now a greater public awareness of the ways in which the CAP operates against environmental principles,[23] and enthusiasm on the part of the EU's institutions to show a commitment to environmental improvements.

The findings of this chapter stress the intergovernmental nature of EC/EU decision making with respect to the CAP and its environmental costs, and the importance of member state politics and political change, as well as of changes in the EU's institutions.

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[23] For example, Bond (1996) is able to refer to a variety of recent books, articles and documents to demonstrate the continuation of CAP environmental damage, and the negative environmental impact even of new measures introduced in order to reduce its environmental damage, such as (p. 75) direct soil injection of manure so as to attempt to reduce ammonia emissions. He expresses little faith in the ability of EC bureaucrats to achieve genuine environmental improvements, and sees extensification of production, increased crop rotation, and changes in consumption, as necessary solutions.

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8. CHANGES AND CHALLENGES

8.1 Key issues: 'widening' and 'deepening'

The thesis so far has concentrated on politics and decision making in the EU in the context of the CAP being not only by far the most important policy, but also the major recipient of budgetary funds and focus of political and administrative activity. However, the Maastricht Treaty greatly extended the EU's common policy spectrum from that which existed previously, transferred some powers of co-decision to the EP, and established an intergovernmental CFSP and interior policy, as well as setting in place plans for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Appendix E discusses some of the issues involved in a common defence and security policy, while appendix G covers some of the problems associated with EMU. 'Widening' has resulted in enlargement to include the territory of the former GDR and Austria, Finland and Sweden in recent years. The prospects and difficulties of making an even greater enlargement to take in part of central and eastern Europe in the next decade or two are discussed in appendix D. These changes will create difficulties for the functioning of the EU's political and policy-making institutions. If further political integration is to take place in order to overcome some of these institutional difficulties, an increase in the perceived legitimacy of the EU and its institutions is required in order to obtain support for such a move. Appendix C shows how public opposition to further integration has increased, and could be a major restraining factor.

Further 'deepening' would involve the transfer of further constitutional and legal powers to the EU, and to the EP within the EU, as well as the widening of the common policy spectrum. For such a process to be accepted by the EU's citizens the EU must have legitimacy. 'Widening' to include central and eastern Europe would imply the extension of the common market to these countries, and political integration to the extent of the application of EU laws and policies in force at the time of accession, unless special arrangements were introduced.

Both the widening and the deepening processes create considerable difficulties for the present EU institutional structure. The EU's institutions will achieve legitimacy if and when they are able to be seen as truly representing all citizens, including those of small member states; to be operating on an efficient basis at the lowest possible cost; to be free of corruption; and not seeking to impose harmonisation or control where it is not absolutely necessary. Further widening and deepening will turn the EU into a superpower, which could be costly for its citizens, since it could mean large and well-equipped defence forces, and the possibility of being drawn into conflict, even of provoking it, as discussed in appendices C and E.

Changes to the EU political system are important because of the EU's size, its influence on the world economy, and the dynamic situation of the EU as a potential polity in the making and an expanding area of regional integration. Such changes are likely to involve a greater extension of the powers of the state into the life of the individual in some countries, steps towards superpower status, and the possibility that the EU's political system will become more dominated by interest-groups and less representative, like that of the US.

The extent to which the EU's population is willing to support further political integration and bear the costs of eastwards enlargement will depend at least partly on the capacity of the EU to demonstrate its ability to deal with problems such as elitism, fraud, German predominance, loss of consociational arrangements, and the dangers which a common defence policy and superpower status would bring.

8.2 Reforming the decision making system

A number of problems are evident with the present decision-making system. These will become more crucial with further enlargement and the addition of more member states to the decision making process. Institutional reform is at least necessary to prevent disproportional voting weights in the Council achieving an even greater impact with the further expansion of the Union, and is regarded by some as necessary to stop the growth of an EP 'gravy train' which sells out to interest groups and resembles the Congress of the United States, yet is without restraining influences such as the president and administration provide there. It is also necessary because the EU's institutional arrangements are ill-adapted to an ever-increasing membership and (Crossick 1994) are hopelessly inadequate to cope with further enlargement.

Further expansion will make decision making an increasingly unwieldy process, reinforcing the need for institutional reform. As Kramer (1993, p. 240) asks, '... can a "new European architecture" be constructed without also designing a "new architecture" for the Community itself?' However, there will be a great reluctance to accept reforms on the part of those countries which would lose influence as a result.[1]

The difficulty of an enlarged EU trying to operate with the present EU institutional structure has been recognised in the European Commission (Van Ham 1993, p. 202). Van Ham (p. 203) suggests that retention of the Council's unanimity rule and representation of all

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[1] For example, Edouard Balladur, then prime mininister of France, wrote in *Le Monde* on November 30, 1994, that (The Economist 1994b):

'An enlarged Europe comprising a greater number of states could not be federal. That would mean extending considerably the domain of those decisions taken by majority voting. Therefore, the five big states representing four-fifths of the population and wealth could be put in a minority – which they would not allow.'

member states by commissioners would be difficult in an EU of 24 members, and that one way to overcome this would be to have an operating sub-Council of the four main member states, with some representation of smaller member states. However, given that any EU institutional change can affect not only the political importance of states but also their future economic and social well being, there will be strong resistance from any potential losers. Van Ham's suggested scenario of central European states using their EU membership to form blocking minorities, supporting measures only in return for substantial structural and regional aid, is a realistic one in view of their size and therefore voting power, and their relative poverty.

The unanimity rule has been a source of inefficiency and slowness in decision making, though the extent to which it is applied has been reduced by the SEA and by the Maastricht Treaty. Walsh (1992, p. 49) describes it as slowing down the evolution of the Community, and leading to the persistence of sub-optimal policy choices such as the CAP. However, reductions in the extent to which unanimity is required can lead to the interests and wishes of individual member states being disregarded in the policy choices adopted. This can be particularly damaging where those interests are often in conflict with those of the majority of member states, as has been the case for the UK on many issues, and one consequence has been a natural reluctance on the part of the affected member state to accept further political integration. With regard to the CAP, until the early 1980s Germany and the UK were the only major net contributors, with most member states being net recipients. The abolition of the unanimity rule would have tended to increase the inefficiencies and inter-country unfairness of the CAP, especially as Germany was a major supporter of the CAP for domestic political reasons.

Walsh argues that the EC/EU's institutional arrangements are almost as if designed to ensure inefficient policy choices and to slow the evolution of the EC and later EU towards a more mature federal-type union. This is possibly a result of General de Gaulle's desire to slow political integration, which resulted in the Luxembourg Compromise and the continuation of unanimity, slowing the transfer of power to the EC's institutions.

One major problem in Council decision making is the present imbalance of voting weights of different countries in the Council as described in chapter five. Even though Germany's population is some 40 per cent or so greater than that of the next most populous member state, it still has only ten votes like the other main member states. Small states have a disproportionately large share of votes: this situation has been enhanced by enlargements, which have added seven small states to the EU[2] but only one which is large (UK) and another which is 'medium to large' (Spain). The 1995 enlargement has increased the power of small states to form coalitions and the cost of passing legislation for the large member states, and

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[2] Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Portugal, Sweden, Finland and Austria.

eastwards enlargement would heighten this effect. However, a move to reduce or prevent the imbalance will be resisted.

Some researchers consider that the weak party system in the EU, and the replacement of democratic channels of influence by interest group lobbying activities, make the transfer of greater powers to the EP a potentially costly move in welfare terms.[3] It has been argued, as indicated in Appendix A, that due to its weak party system and increasing lobbying activity, the EP shows signs of becoming like the Congress of the US, which is dominated by interest groups and localism, rather than seeking to represent the interests of the electorate.[4] The EP does not at present have the checks and balances such as are provided in the US by an elected president who controls the administration of government at the federal level. While the member states remain powerful such checks are not necessary, but a continued transfer of power to the EP is seen by some as risking the creation of political institutions which are less representative and efficient even than those of the US. The party list system may allow some of the dangers of 'localism' or the need for representatives to bring back benefits to their areas to be avoided. However, Olson's thesis, which is discussed in appendix F, suggests that unless political arrangements are constructed so as to avoid this, over time rent seeking coalitions will be build up, protection will increase, and 'Eurosclerosis' will return.[5]

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[3] For example, Mazey and Richardson (1993) note that EC/EU lobbying takes place in the context of a weak party system and weak parliament, and Andersen and Eliassen (1995) consider that the replacement of democratic channels by interest group channels of influence in the EU brings up a basic democratic problem. The problem in the growth of interest group activity and lobbying at the supranational level is that it represents the transfer to Europe of practices developed in the United States (d'Aubert 1994, p. 60). Interest group activity and lobbying at the member state level is in most cases constrained by strong party systems and parliaments, and hence democracy is able to operate in a relatively genuine sense. Regardless of whether the supranational system has more layers and access points, the growth of US-style lobbying and interest group activity at the supranational level is regarded by these researchers as a development alien to most existing member state political systems and to genuine democracy.

[4] Examiner C describes these suggestions as 'dubious'.

[5] There appears to be a difference of opinion between researchers such as Anderssen and Eliassen (1995) and, perhaps less strongly, Mazey and Richardson (1993), and Examiner C, as to whether the growth of lobbying at the supranational level represents a growth in the influence of interest groups overall. Examiner C (1996, p. 4) states that 'one must be careful not to equate activity with influence. Multi-layered government and diffused decision-making power tend to raise the costs of lobbying for interest groups, and give the advantage to well-resourced groups', with multiple access points and dispersed power giving an advantage to groups who seek to maintain the status quo. However, several points need to be made in this connection. The first is that some groups seeking changes in the status quo in the sense of the imposition of protection seem to have been assisted by the EU's multiple access points, obtaining a hearing by the Commission and legislative proposals in their favour, although they have not necessarily succeeded in obtaining the assistance or protection they sought, as indicated in Appendix F. The second is that the increasing concentration of power in the EP and to a lesser extent the Commission is reducing the multi-layered and diffused system of fifteen member states plus EU institutions which interest groups at present have to negotiate, which on the basis of the logic of the arguments presented by Examiner C's logic should decrease the costs of lobbying for interest groups, while increasing the benefits from lobbying as these will be available on an EU-wide basis rather than possibly resticted to only one

The EP has been compared to the Congress because of its 'gravy train' nature – the high benefits available to its politicians, and its 'pork barrel' leanings towards protectionism – as indicated in Figures 8.1 and 8.2. The US democratic process is presently seen as undergoing strains from the decline in the importance of parties, accountability deficits, and juridification (Parry and Moran 1994). However, there is a hypothesis that in spite of the inefficiencies of the US system, it has provided a necessary means of accommodation between different parts of the country, and (Cammack 1992, p. 421):

> ... while the decentralized system of spoils-based party machines may have been dysfunctional as far as the changing needs of central government and some north-eastern financial and emerging industrial interests were concerned, it was highly functional in that it permitted an accommodation between north and south which could have been impossible in the context of national executive authority, undisputed north-eastern hegemony, and centralized and programmatic parties.

If this hypothesis is applied to the EU, it suggests that a spoils-based interest group dominated system of government is necessary for the EU, in spite of its costs and inefficiency, because of the need for accommodation between north and south, and prospectively between east and west. On this basis the EU could never be a normal state on the pattern of present EU member states, because the great economic divisions within it would require what is in effect 'bad government' in order to allow the accommodation of different interests.

One of the negative consequences of a move to give greater power to the EP, which would reduce the powers of the member states and of the Commission, is that this would entail a move away from the consociational aspects of the EU political system. Norberto Bobbio (1987, p. 32, cited in Chataway 1995, p. 135) stated that:

> When people want to know if a development towards greater democracy has taken place in a certain country, what should be looked for is an increase, not in the number of those who have the right to participate in making the decisions which concern them, but in the number of contexts or spaces in which they can exercise this right.

On this basis, moves to give further powers to the EP represent a movement away from democracy, since they will reduce the number of contexts and spaces through which the electorate can participate in making the decisions which concern them. This is because the present system, with powers being divided between national parliaments, the Commission and

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country. On this basis it is reasonable to accept that the reduced costs and increased benefits from lobbying the EU's institutions in the areas they have competence, as opposed to lobbying individual member states when these still had competence over the areas concerned, does encourage a growth in interest group activity and influence and a consequent loss of democratic control. While the EU has multiple access points, many of these, for example the ESC and the Committee of the Regions, have no real effective powers. The same is true of the smaller member states in areas where they do not have a veto, or could not justify attempts to use a veto. A further point is that US-style lobbying and interest group pressure is constrained by strong parties and governments in most member states, hence its establishment at the EU level represents a new development, rather than a shift in the focus of lobbying, as indicated in the first footnote above.

Figure 8.1: **The Congressional dining scene**

THE CONGRESSIONAL DINING SCENE.

Source: The Economist (1992)

Figure 8.2: **The European Parliament gravy train**

Source: The Economist (1991)

the EP, provides many such contexts and spaces, for example through the ballot box, party organisations, and interest groups, at both the national and the EU level.

The danger with respect to the transfer of greater powers to the EP is that it will remove national, lower level and closer public control of the activities of the EU, and open it up further to the influence of interest groups. The development of a more powerful EP means that the costs of lobbying fifteen member states and several supranational institutions can, or will be at some point, replaced by those of lobbying a single body, for policies which will apply throughout the whole of the EU. The EP lacks the cabinet control and party discipline of national parliaments, and its size, and the disparate interests represented, make the development of such discipline difficult. Although there is a strong Christian Democratic bloc, there are ideological differences between the EP's conservative and Christian Democratic parties (Johansson 1996, p. 220). The UK Conservatives are relatively Protestant; they favour the rolling back of the state and are opposed to Christian Democratic state corporatism. They have maintained some separateness from the Christian Democratic grouping. As Johansson (p. 20) comments, cooperation between Christian-inspired and secular conservative parties in the EP raises a number of interesting questions, and it remains to be seen whether it continues. The French Gaullists have formed the Union for Europe group with Irish Fianna Fail and some Greek and Portuguese MEPs, now joined by those from *Forza Europa*. The Gaullists are relatively secular and have some reservations over political integration where this weakens the French state. At present the largest party grouping in the EP is that of the Socialist group of MEPs, who are able to form a majority with the support of the Greens or the EP 'Rainbow' group to which the Greens belong. The Socialist group's need for the support of the Greens to form a majority has increased the influence of environmental interests, and made the EP more inclined to the promotion of environmental considerations and limitations with respect to the CAP.

The lack of party discipline means that a new deal must be cut to ensure the passage of new legislation. This enhances the power and influence of minority parties such as the Greens, just as it does in national governments. The weakness of parliamentary discipline also opens up the assembly to interest groups and their influence. Individual members and groups of members can be induced to put forward legislation which benefits narrow sectoral, political or even family interests, and demand agreement to this in return for support of some necessary reform.

MEPs have been seeking to use their powers to the maximum degree. In 1994 they sought the right to be consulted on the appointment of the president of the Commission and the commissioners, and they are hoping that the 1996 IGC will increase their powers. The danger inherent in allowing an assumption of greater power by the EP is that it could lead to the EU's

political system becoming like that of the US, and that the interests of small countries could not necessarily be protected.[6]

8.3   The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference

The 1996 IGC is seen as the next opportunity for discussion and agreement on changes to EU institutional arrangements, and as a follow-up to the Maastricht Treaty. Proposals for discussion have been put forward by member states, political parties, and the EU's common institutions. The IGC's anticipated importance and conflictual nature is demonstrated by the titles of some of the conferences being held to discuss it: these include *The Coming Power Struggle for Europe's Future*[7] and *The 1996 IGC: A New Constitution for Europe?*[8] (European University News 1995a, p. 9 and p. 10 respectively). Beloff (1995) sees the IGC as completing the transfer of power from member states to the EU institutions, if some of the UK's 'partners' in the EU get their way.

Proposals from Germany, the predominant member state, are likely to be particularly influential, although they will be strongly resisted by some member states. Germany is seeking greater political integration of the EU, and increased opportunities to utilise its predominant position. Key desires include further majority voting and by implication an extension in the policy areas over which the EP has powers of co-decision, the placing of CFSP arrangements on a common instead of intergovernmental basis, and agreement upon the eastwards enlargement of the EU. Germany's ruling CDU has also been arguing that the ECJ should have ultimate jurisdiction over many of the police and judicial areas which are of direct interest to private citizens (Smart and Watson 1995). One of Germany's more long-term goals for the IGC is said to be the establishment of an America-EU free-trade zone (The Economist 1995d).

Germany's IGC aims were developed from earlier proposals from the CDU parliamentary affairs spokesman, Karl Lamers, which included a reduction in the number of commissioners to

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[6] A Swedish correspondent to the editor of *The European* (Mattson 1995) puts the case against greater EP powers as follows:

'Any increase in the powers of the European Parliament in its present single-chambered form would be a catastrophe for European democracy. The prerequisite for a single-chamber parliament is the homogeneity of the territory over which it legislates. The rights of minorities, i.e. the smaller states, cannot otherwise be guaranteed and Europe is very far from being homogenous.'

He suggests that a second chamber is needed on the lines of the US Senate or the Swiss *Staenderat*, with each state having the same number of votes. However, the larger member states, and especially Germany, would strongly oppose such a move as it would make it much more difficult for them to dominate the EU.

[7] Organised by the Cicero Foundation and held in Paris on 5 and 6 October 1995.

[8] Organised by the Academy of European Law, Trier, 27-28 October 1995.

ten, and the introduction of 'superqualified' majorities of four-fifths or three-quarters of votes cast in the Council of Ministers (The Economist 1993, p. 47). The latter proposed change would protect the larger member states against coalitions of the smaller ones. The CDU proposals also sought to strengthen the powers of the EP and give it the right to initiate legislation, as well as to limit the number of MEPs to 650, and to standardise the system by which they are elected (Smart 1995). A 1994 policy paper prepared by Chancellor Kohl had proposed that the EP be given a right of co-decision in all European affairs, in other words the right to reject any EU legislation it wishes (Smart and Watson 1994), something which the EP is keenly seeking.

With respect to the implicit move towards a European government involved in Germany's aims and proposals, Scharrer (1994, p. 209) comments that this will be opposed by the UK and some other EU countries, and that such a goal is 'at best achievable only in the long term'. The CDU proposals also argued for a 'variable geometry' or 'two-speed' Europe consisting of a hard core of members which would progress towards further integration, with the remainder forming a more loosely integrated periphery. Scharrer sees this as a desirable arrangement which would allow (p. 210) every member state with its own interests and individual traits to 'find a place in the Community', and overcome the conflict between the difficulties posed by EU membership for central and eastern Europe on the one hand and a commitment to both 'deepening' and 'widening' on the other.

France does not necessarily support German aims for the IGC, being much less keen on the extension of majority voting, on eastern enlargement of the EU, and on putting the voluntary Schengen agreement onto a mandatory common policy basis, but in favour of an eventual merging of WEU into the EU as its defence arm (The Economist 1995d). French aims include the desire to change the Maastricht Treaty so that the number and location of the EP's sessions would be included in it, as opposed to just being part of a protocol to it at present, with the objective of preventing the EP from gravitating away from its seat in Strasbourg (Buonadonna and Moutet 1995). Overall, they are more modest than those of Germany.

MEPs want to be involved in the IGC negotiations, and many of them would like to see the EP's powers increased to allow amendment or rejection of all legislation, and to allow them to propose legislation. The EP has asked for its co-decision powers to be extended to the CAP. The demands it put to the June 1995 Messina conference[9] included a proposal that the internal and foreign policy 'pillars' of the Maastricht Treaty be combined with the 'common' pillar, bringing them into the jurisdiction of the Commission and the EP (European University News 1995b, pp. 4-5): this is also a goal of the German government and the Commission. The

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[9] The Messina conference of the heads of government was seen as a commencement of the IGC process.

EP supports the merging of WEU defence arrangements into the EU and their being made subject to majority voting, but with provisions for neutral and non-aligned EU member states not to participate in common action. It wants a limit of 700 to be set on the number of MEPs, a requirement of EP approval for all European court nominations, and equal powers with the Council in all legislative and budgetary fields. The EP's resolution of 18 May 1995 on the demands to be put to the Messina conference also argued for more majority voting in the Council, with unanimity being retained for votes on enlargement and changes to the Treaties. These proposals for further restrictions on the use of the veto are welcomed by Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium (Watson 1995). The EP also suggested the possible use of an EU-wide referendum to ratify IGC changes, and proposed that greater priority be given to social issues (Watson and Dudley 1995).[10] The Swedish government has also been pushing for greater priority to be given to social issues at the IGC, including the establishment of an 'employment union' (Helgadottir 1995).

The Commission's proposals for the IGC include an extension of majority voting; a change in the 'perception' of subsidiarity, effectively to weaken its application; the transfer of the intergovernmental interior policy and CFSP 'pillars' created by the Maastricht Treaty to a common policy basis; and the eventual creation of a common defence force based on WEU and the EU's common institutions (European University News 1995b, pp. 3-4). In its report to the 'reflection group'[11] for the IGC (European Commission 1995), the Commission expressed strong opposition to the principle of EU intergovernmental policies and to their continuation. It supports a 'variable geometry' or two speed Europe, yet would abolish the UK's opt-out on social policy.

In contrast, the one aim on which the UK, France and Germany are agreed is that the IGC should be used to reduce the authority of the Commission (The Economist 1995a). This is not surprising, since neither France nor Germany has 'its man' at the head of the Commission, or is likely to do so in the future because of fears of their predominance. Also, the over-representation of French officials in the Commission should diminish in the future, due to reforms to recruitment procedures and to enlargement.

The German and EP proposals will mostly be strongly resisted by the UK and Denmark, which are wary of further integration, and by some of the other member states.[12]

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[10] On the adoption of the report, Pauline Green, the leader of the majority Socialist group, commented that 'This report reflects almost exactly our vision' (Buonadonna 1995a, p. 1).

[11] The reflection group consists of representatives of each of the foreign ministers of the member states and of the Commission president, and two representatives of the EP.

[12] Greek prime minister Andreas Papandreou stated after the 1995 Mallorca summit that (The European 1995b): 'It is impossible for us to accept the abolition of unanimity on national issues of vital importance'.

Table 8.1: **Proposed IGC changes and their potential impact**

Year	Proposal	Potential impact
1996	Extension of powers of the EP.	Increased danger of protectionism and 'pork barrel' EP.
	Increased majority voting.	Prevents freezing up of decision making in a Council of 19 or more, but limits input of small states.
	Removal of opt-out arrangements relating to Maastricht Treaty.	All member states would have to accept common social, citizenship, visa and possibly defence policies.
	Transfer of intergovernmental powers on interior affairs, foreign policy and defence.	Member states lose control of immigration and visa policy, foreign policy and defence. Eventual establishment of a common European defence force.

Prospective enlargements (agreement may also be reached on these at the IGC, at least in principle)

Year	Proposal	Potential impact
2000-2020	Enlargement to include central and eastern Europe. Increased power for EP in return for agreeing to this enlargement. EP gets full power of co-decision equal to Council.	Changes in policies to restrict budgetary transfers. The EU becomes much larger, and much poorer in per head terms. Increasing budgetary transfers from west to east. Increasing importance of defence expenditure in new 'superpower'.
	(Greek-Cypriot) Cyprus and possibly Malta join.	Increases the number of very small states in the EU: special reduced voting powers may be required for 'micro-states'.

Given the very major and contentious nature of the proposals which will be under discussion, and elections in the UK and elsewhere over the next two years, the IGC is expected to continue into 1997 (The Economist 1995b).

However, Greece is keen to see the entry of Greek Cypriot Cyprus into the EU. Negotiations for their entry are to be delayed until after the 1996 IGC, and it is possible that agreement on this will be linked by key member states to Greek agreement to at last some of the German IGC proposals.

The new Maltese government which came to power in 1996 has abandoned the idea of membership, at least for the time being, after it was made clear to it that because of its small size, Malta would not be given the full voting rights of an individual EU member state. Greece may still try to argue that it cannot agree to eastwards enlargement of the EU until membership has been agreed to for Cyprus, but the partition of the island still represents a major practical barrier to membership.

8.4 The problem of legitimacy

8.4.a The increasing power of the state

The growth in the power and influence of a huge and overarching governmental structure through the process of 'deepening' discussed above also needs to be considered in the light of Poggi's (1990, p. 142) statement regarding the paradox that Western societies have been undergoing a process of depoliticisation at the same time as the level of political management has been increasing:

> The paradox disappears if ... a huge growth in the output of state action has not been accompanied by a proportionate growth in the structures processing the public's decisional inputs into state activity. This means that many such inputs have to originate from within the state itself, via bureaucratic politics, or from arrangements and understandings between parts of the state apparatus and privileged parts of society.

The transfer of the locus of power and the management of policies from member state capitals to Brussels inevitably results in there being a greater geographical, psychological and institutional distance between the decision inputs of the public and the state apparatus which determines and implements policy. Evidence presented in appendix C indicates that smaller political units such as regions and small states are in at least some cases able to satisfy the preferences of their inhabitants better than larger units can, in terms of the level of satisfaction expressed in surveys. In addition to this loss of satisfaction, the transfer of power to Brussels and other locations of EU institutions increases the costs of decision making and of policy development and monitoring. One reason for this is the better terms and conditions of officials employed at the EU level, and the travel and communication costs involved. Another is that where a central authority gains power, it has a tendency to intervene excessively. Alt and Shepsle (1990, p. 89) also suggest that there may be efficiency costs as the organisation seeks to adapt to control the influence activities of interest groups and their costs. The shift in power from the individual member states and the Commission to the EP reduces the number of access points and lobbying effort needed to achieve results, since other avenues of influence such as the ECJ, COR and the ESC, do not have significant decision making powers.

Majority voting means that the electorates of whole countries can find policies which are objectionable to them imposed upon them. As in Poggi's description, there has been a growth in inputs which originate from the state itself, in terms of proposals put forward by the Commission, and also from the 'arrangements and understandings' which the growing influence of interest groups and elites is able to reach with the Commission, the EP, and other supranational and intergovernmental organs of the new EU superstate. Thiess (1991, p. 27) describes the situation as one in which national interest groups are able to have the 'ear of Brussels', while ordinary individuals are 'left feeling anonymous outside their home districts'.

Although the establishment of the COR and the adoption of the principle of subsidiarity appear to mitigate the trend and risks indicated above, in practice these are weak institutions and instruments and it is difficult to see how they can be effective counterweights to the growing pressure from the Commission, the EP, and interest groups and elites, to put greater distance between the operation of the state and the political inputs of the public. This latter process appears to be an inevitable outcome of the transfer of power to the EU and its geographical expansion.

8.4.b The challenge of the elitism of the EU

One of the major challenges which the EU has to overcome to gain wider legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens is the problem of its elitism, as discussed in appendix C, and the extent to which the EU operates to further enrich the wealthy and impoverish the poor.[13] Tendencies towards political and elite group patronage on the southern European model, combined with a continental European political tradition of lack of transparency and open public accountability, have the potential to turn the EU into a major burden for Europe and for the world at large, instead of an engine of growth for the future. Chryssochoou (1994) argues that the EU has relied heavily on consociational management in its governing process in recent years, but that a cleavage of the elite versus the people has recently emerged. He describes such a cleavage as (p. 8) 'the most dangerous and perverse of all political cleavages'.

8.4.c Fraud, waste and corruption

As shown in chapter two and in appendix C, the existence of fraud and corruption in the EU's administration and policies, and of opulence and waste, have been a source of criticism, especially in northern EU countries where there are high expectations as to the honesty of administrations and the avoidance of fraud and waste. While the Commission estimates fraud to account for only ECU1032 million, or 1.2 per cent of the total budget (Buonadonna 1995b), the true figure is probably nearer to ten times this or more, with the CAP being a major source of fraud and waste.

Steps are being made to reduce fraud, and anti-fraud campaigners such as MEPs John Tomlinson and Thierry Jean-Pierre are ensuring that the issue is not forgotten. However, the expansion of the EU's powers and administration to new policy areas will increase the scope

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[13] This problem has been identified and discussed by a number of writers and analysts. Chryssochoou (1995) considers elite domination versus *demos* control with respect to European integration in the light of a general view of democracy which goes beyond normal interstate relations. Connolly's (1995, reviewed in The Economist 1995b) attack on EMU, which is discussed in appendix G, describes EMU as being undertaken in the caste interests of the elite.

for corruption and waste. Since individual countries do not bear the costs of EU expenditures obtained by fraud, except through their overall budgetary contributions, and fraudulent gains represent a national gain, they have little incentive to prevent frauds.

One problem has been that defrauding the EU is not a crime in some of the member states, and that there are differences in national definitions of what fraud is (Buonadonna 1995b).

8.4.d The problem of German predominance

The inevitable predominance of a united Germany is one of the major problems facing the EU in its quest for legitimacy and popular support for further political integration. Germany is predominant not only in population, but also because of its economic power, accounting for 27.6 per cent of the GDP of the EU fifteen, based on 1993 figures.[14] As Luca Cavazza and Pelanda (1994, p. 62) state, 'The power balance in Europe leans strikingly towards Germany'. Holman and van der Pijl (1996, p. 71) go so far as to argue that 'Europe and its periphery are increasingly turned into a zone incompletely controlled by Germany'. As discussed in appendix C, Germany has a somewhat authoritarian state on the 'Hobbesian' model, which is at odds with the more liberal state traditions of the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Finland, and with the 'Lockeian' Anglo-Saxon model with its strong concepts of freedom and the rights of the individual.

One of the major questions facing the EU as a political entity is, 'In the image of which member state political system will it be most closely formed?' Political integration and the transfer of powers to the EU can only gain full support throughout the EU when it becomes clear that the state which is being created is an improvement on those which are left behind, and not just a creation and possession of political elites. As a model for the EU, the Italian state would be regarded as undesirable even by most Italians, given the prevalence of corruption and patronage there and the difficulties of eradicating these. The German system might be thought to be a reasonable model, on the basis that its politicians and public servants appear to be relatively free of corruption and the system has allowed prosperity to be achieved. However, Hayes and Bean (1993, p. 681) describe the political cultures of both Italy and Germany as being 'reputed to be less strongly oriented towards democratic institutions in general' compared to political systems in Anglo-American countries. The apparent efficiency of the German system needs to be set against its intrusiveness, which results in all citizens being required to carry identification cards in public, to register personal details which include religion

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[14] Germany's 1993 GDP amounted to ECU1 631.5 billion out of an EU 15 total of ECU5 909.3 billion (Frontier-free Europe 1995).

with their local authority, and to inform the authorities within a week of any change of address. Another difference between French and German political systems and the British model is the degree of transparency and openness in policy making.[15] Differences in political culture and the relationship between the state and its citizens are important influences on support or opposition to integration, as indicated in the contributions to Wintle (1996).

Vitale (1995, p. 661-662) expresses the problem of the economic domination of the EU as follows:

> The road to European integration is being paved with each participant's economic strength. (...) Because the power is held in bags of gold, the less affluent risk finding themselves in the compromising position of biding by the norms established by the keepers of the fortunes.

This domination is seen as resulting in the replacement of production practices by those of the stronger states. She cites Gebser's view that ' ... a ... placing in (another's) place, that is replacement, is tantamount to an enthronement which has patriarchal, three-dimensional properties' (Gebser 1984, p. 425). Gebser's work is not intended to refer directly to German domination of the EU, since the 1990 unification was not foreseen. However, Gebser sees nationalism as being (p. 291) 'prototypical of three-dimensional thinking', and his theory of integration suggests that nationalism will not be dissolved, but will adapt to the more ample cultural context. The 'assimilating drive of the powerful' (Vitale, p. 665) means that the culture of minorities is given up for that of the most powerful or the majority.

The predominant position of Germany at the 1995 Cannes summit is depicted in a satirical manner in Figure 8.3. Chancellor Kohl is the belle of the topless beach outside the Hotel Europa in Cannes, attracting the attention of all the photographers and of the French president, Jacques Chirac. Further up the beach UK prime minister John Major postures alone, attracting not a single photographer nor a glance from the French president.

Germany was not always predominant. In the EEC of the 'Six' France was the predominant state until the late 1960s, since it was Germany which needed the arrangement more in order to assist access to markets and to confer post-World War II international political respectability. The *Wirtschaftswunder* or economic miracle of German recovery and growth made Germany's influence more even to that of France by the early 1970s, assisting the acceptance of the UK's second application for EC membership, the first one having been rejected by General de Gaulle. During the 1970s and 1980s Germany's economic growth roughly matched that of France. Germany has gained in influence through having the same ruling coalition in government since 1982, with Helmut Kohl as chancellor, and even more from

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[15] Another factor here may be that there is a (d'Aubert 1994, p. 110) 'tradition of an investigative Anglo-Saxon press' in the UK, but no equivalent in France or Germany.

unification in 1990. France's political influence has been weakened by changes of government, including periods of cohabitation between a Socialist president and centre right government, and by recent corruption scandals. This has left the UK as a major contender for influence, but a much weaker one than Germany.

Figure 8.3:   **The belle of the beach**

Source: The European (1995a).

German influence has been enhanced in the EU by the Franco-German axis,[16] which has been able to dominate the EU because of the weak and short-lived nature of governments in Italy and the opposition between UK interests and those of most of the rest of the EU.[17]

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[16] A correspondent to *The European* (Bobel 1994) argues that the axis is problematic for Europe because 'the French vision of Europe seems to be the Napoleonic dream of dominance' while 'the Germans are clearly trying to re-establish their sphere of interest in central Europe', making reference to the two countries' 'long history of military and cultural expansionism'. The suggested solution is equality between all of the EU partners. Fears of a weakening in the axis have led to the CDU's establishment of a parliamentary working group of 19 German MPs whose task will be to further German-French understanding (Moutet and Paterson 1995).

Cash (1995) sees Germany as pushing EU integration forward because it is in the German national interest, and that it is the latter which is important to key German supporters of further integration, not any interest or belief in the potential benefits for the EU population as a whole. In his view proposals such those put forward by Lamers on behalf of the CDU/CSU, and for EU economic and monetary union, are part of a process which leads to what he refers to as 'the reality of a German Europe'.

However, German proposals for the IGC are relatively weak when compared with earlier German ideas for EU constitutional change, which included weighting votes in the Council for population as well as GNP (The Economist 1994a). Such a change would give Germany much greater formal political influence than the other large member states, since its population is some 40 per cent greater than each of theirs, and its GNP is over 50 per cent larger than that of France and roughly double that of the UK and of Italy. Proposals of this nature, coming from Germany, were bound to cause ill-feeling because of Germany's history.[18]

Professor William Paterson, director of the Institute for German Studies at Birmingham University in the UK, believes that anxieties in the EU about Germany fall into two groups. The first group sees Germany as too strong because its economic advantage will translate into an overall dominant position, with Germany exercising leadership in central and eastern Europe. Germany's early recognition of Croatia in the break-up of Yugoslavia is seen as evidence of this, since it represented a divergence from the tradition of not pressing a minority position against the wishes of the rest of the EU. The second group sees Germany as too weak because it has had to meet the economic costs of incorporation of east Germany, hence being less able to provide finance for the EU budget, and is experiencing growing support for extremist far-right and radical groups (Brookman 1994). In *Fourth Reich* Brian Reading (1995, reviewed by Stuedemann 1995) argues that the time has come for Germany to stand up as a nation against the disastrous protectionist course which, in his view, the French would otherwise lead Europe to pursue. In Reading's view it is Germany which will decide Europe's fate, and Germany which stands for much that is best for Europe's future.

However, what is unavoidable is that the combined political power and economic strength of the united Germany make its predominance in the EU inevitable, and that further

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[17] For example, the CAP has not been in the UK's interests, but for financial or political reasons it has been in the interests of the rest of the EU. Although the major initial difference in interests was over the CAP, now issues such as free trade versus industrial protection, and opposition to corporatism and to a strong centralised EU state, are more important sources of conflict.

[18] Ross (1995, p. 228) assumes that this historical background meant that Germany would not be in a position to seek leadership powers after unification: 'The Germans, given their history, would be in no position to translate superior economic power into political leadership'.

political integration will increase the influence Germany has through its 99 seats in the EP and reduce that of the individual member states through the Council.[19] There is concern in Germany itself over the problems which German predominance is creating. Helmut Schmidt, formerly chancellor of Germany under an SPD government, states that (Hallenstein 1995, p. 12):

> I have always maintained that Germany, with its huge population and resources, must keep a low profile in order not to encourage hysterical fear of German domination, such as is beginning to appear in places such as Britain and Italy.

8.5 Conclusions

This EU is currently faced with a number of major challenges and changes, including 'widening' or enlargement, and 'deepening' or political integration, and proposals for change which will be discussed at the 1996 IGC. The latter include the reduction or removal of the veto, increases in the powers of the EP, and the placing of intergovernmental interior and foreign and security policies on a common policy basis. While institutional changes are needed to ensure more efficient functioning, they may also reduce the ability of the EU's citizens to have an input into the system, and they will increase the political predominance of Germany. The nature of the future EU state remains uncertain, but there are reasons to believe that the US model with its weak parties and domination by interest groups may be one which a diverse grouping such as the EU has to accept. Greater political integration risks giving interest groups more influence, and increasing Germany's predominance.

The EU has problems of a lack of legitimacy in the eyes of many of its citizens, which reduces support for further integration. This arises from a preference for smaller political units, but also from a number of other factors, including the elitism of the EU; the presence of fraud, corruption and waste;[20] and the growing influence and predominance of Germany.

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[19] One aspect of the problem is that registration requirements and ID cards, and regular public police checks of the papers of those who appear 'foreign' and hence potential illegal immigrants, are not seen as problematic in Germany. The existence of a democratic state has made such issues relatively unproblematic. However, in the UK the introduction of such measures is seen as highly problematic, since they would be equivalent to a loss of important freedoms.

[20] D'Aubert (1994) provides extensive details in this respect.

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