

chapter ten

THE JABILUKA CAMPAIGN, 1998

10.1 INTRODUCTION

The 1998 blockade and associated campaign against the proposed Jabiluka uranium mine (see Figure 92) in Kakadu, Northern Territory, is important because it showcased a wide variety of types of nonviolent action, some extremely dramatic. It is also important because of the tensions between the different types of action, with important advances towards the nonviolence tenet of holism being checked by counter-productive schisms. While there was limited development of active resistance, the orthodox nonviolence that the blockade adopted because of deteriorating relationships with police led to a flowering of artistic actions. Some extraordinary events occurred, as activists channeled their energies into artistic rather than militant actions. These actions also incorporated civil disobedience, resulting in inclusive mass actions, colourful and disruptive but conducted with minimal violence. Strong resistance by the traditional owners combined with a large and newsworthy blockade (despite its remote location) was complemented by new forms of campaigning that focused on corporate funding of the proposed mine, resulting in a widespread and diverse campaign that was ultimately successful in preventing the mine.



Figure 92: Jabiluka mine and escarpment.

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The chapter commences with a brief outline of the environmental and social issues involved in the campaign. Then follows a short discussion of the main actors in the campaign. Next can be found a personal narrative account of the blockade, relating to my involvement in street-theatre, music and civil disobedience, my subsequent jailing and court-case, and office-based campaigning. This account draws from the same article used for the CANC account in the last chapter (Branagan 1998). The account is relevant because apart from activist Karl-Eric Paasonen's forthcoming thesis, there is little detailed literature on the campaign, particularly from the emic perspective of someone involved in several aspects of it. Other useful literature includes an informative pre-blockade article by traditional owner Jacqui Katona (1997), an overview of the campaign by Welsh-based activist Helen Hintjens (2000) in the *Community Development Journal*, and a number of impassioned articles by socialists in *Green Left Weekly* relating to campaign activities. There are also writings by Jabiluka blockaders O'Reilly (1998, 1999), Rebecca (2000) and Strong and Strong (2000), which I observe are seriously flawed because of their Eurocentric biases. A number of websites also discuss the campaign, but they focus on the human rights and environmental issues rather than nonviolence or campaign strategies.

I discuss in particular issues relating to Aboriginal land rights and social justice, because they played an important part in the campaign's organisation, focus and tensions. There was an important step towards the nonviolence tenet of holism for the eco-pax movement, in that traditional owners' demands for sovereignty were accepted by the majority of non-indigenous activists, and not just used by the latter to aid our own agenda. I also discuss in depth the problems some activists had with ceding control to the traditional owners. Another social issue relating to holism - how perceived sexism in the blockade was dealt with - is also mentioned, as is the burgeoning of inclusive artistic actions. As in the other case study chapters, summaries of significant nonviolence and arts findings can be found prior to the conclusion.

### 10.2 CAMPAIGN BACKGROUND

As at Roxby Downs, the uranium mine that Energy Resources Australia (ERA) proposed to open at Jabiluka presented a myriad of social and environmental problems. Just as Aboriginal concerns had been more prominent at Roxby than at the Franklin, so too did they continue to be pushed to the forefront at Jabiluka. From a social justice point of view, Jabiluka's major problem was its denial of basic human right to the Mirrar, the traditional owners (TOs). The mine was proceeding despite the express disapproval of the current owners (Gundjemi Aboriginal Corporation 2004:para 1). Although permission was supposedly given for a uranium mine at nearby Ranger in the

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past by Mirrar TO Toby Gangale, the Mirrar argue that this was not specifically given and was not legal<sup>5</sup>, given the extreme pressure under which he was put (Hallam 1998:10). However, the Australian government had amended the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act in 1980 so that mining agreements would stand even if it could be proved that informed consent was not given (Gundjhemí Aboriginal Corporation 1999:34-36; Senate of Australia 1999:5.62). The current major custodian is Toby's daughter, Yvonne Margarula (see Figure 93), who has repeatedly expressed her opposition to the proposed mine. Not only were the Mirrar's land rights contravened (see Figure 94), but also many sites of spiritual, artistic and archaeological significance were threatened by the proposal. Jabiluka is an

outstanding cultural landscape, including over 100 recorded art galleries, numerous Dreaming places including the unique Mosquito Dreaming, and several creation trackways [the most important of which] is the Dreaming path of a gecko (Mulvaney 2000/2001:49).



Figure 93: Mirrar senior custodian Yvonne Margarula.

Many of the Jabiluka proposal's environmental problems were similar to those at Roxby, but with different topography (above a major wetland) and climate (monsoonal) at Jabiluka. As noted in section 7.3, uranium mining causes disturbance of a dangerous substance, depletion and contamination of groundwater, and radioactive waste for which no adequate disposal methods exist. The latter could create problems (and social and economic costs) for up to 200 000 years, almost certainly long after the company has ceased to exist (Marsh 2001:160). The amount of radioactive waste created by the mine would be 20 million tonnes, located within 500 metres of Kakadu's most spectacular wetlands (Doran 2004:17-19).

<sup>5</sup> Appendix 6 shows the political machinations behind the granting of the mining lease.




Figure 94: Shows location of mine relative to Mirrar and flood plain.

Storage and disposal of radioactive waste was a major concern for local Aboriginal people who still undertake traditional food-gathering activities in the region (Katona 1997:13), especially since there have been a number of reported spillages of radioactive material into river systems by the nearby Ranger uranium mine (Krishnapillai 2000/2001:5; see also Figure 100). The Jabiluka project was also seen as impacting on the World Heritage values of the region (Wilson 1997:3). As at Roxby, a problem with Jabiluka was the release of carcinogenic radon gas, with the Roxby Action Collective noting that there is no safe level of radiation, and that low doses of radiation, spread over a number of years, are just as dangerous as acute exposure (1998:3-4; see also Land 1997:30). In one incident, Ranger mine workers were not told of a leak into their water supply, and drank and showered in the contaminated water (Murdoch 2004:1).<sup>6</sup> The contribution of the mine to the threat of nuclear war was a further concern (ECNT 2003:para 3).

### 10.3 THE ACTORS

The campaign against Jabiluka flowed on from earlier anti-uranium campaigns, in the sense that there were similar aims and some similar actors such as Friends of the Earth

<sup>6</sup> For further information on these issues see Burgmann (1993:195-199); Mudd (1998); Voronoff (1998); Resistance Books (1999); Hintjens (2000).

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(FoE), Benny Zable, Ciaron O'Reilly of the Christian anarchist 'Ploughshares' group, and myself. Perhaps the biggest change at Jabiluka was a generally beneficial one in terms of human rights: the Mirrar traditional owners demanded to be acknowledged as the owners of the land *and* as the leaders of the blockade, with the power of veto over actions. This was agreed to by most activists (see Hintjens 2000:382), and was a sign of the growing holism and maturity of the eco-pax movement, learning from previous criticisms, and acting to change itself. The Mirrar were only 26 in number, poverty-stricken, ill-educated in the Western sense, and beset with other social problems (see Katona 1997:13; Peart 1998:9; Hintjens 2000). They were represented by the Gundjhemí Aboriginal Corporation (GAC), whose Executive Officer was the vocal and articulate Mirrar relative Jacqui Katona.

Another difference was the involvement of local group the Northern Territory Environment Centre (NTEC) and Darwin university students, and major national environmental group the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF), which created a big profile. Previously groups behind uranium protests had been smaller and less-well funded, such as the Movement Against Uranium Mining (MAUM) or FoE, the latter nevertheless - as at Roxby - playing an important role at Jabiluka through its activist networks and magazine *Chain Reaction*. Student, environment and socialist groups created numerous grassroots Jabiluka Action Groups (JAGs), at first autonomous and loosely allied in a national campaign (see De Brito 1999).

The Wilderness Society (TWS) was also involved in the Jabiluka campaign, another significant difference to the Roxby campaign. As with ACF, they brought a conservatism with regard to tactics, but they also contributed significantly to the establishment of the blockade, and were able to provide a support base for many JAGs. They also took the eco-pax movement into a relatively unaccustomed direction - that of lobbying not governments but shareholders (Figure 95). I discuss this in section 12.3.



Figure 95: Protest against Westac Bank's involvement in the mine.

#### 10.4 THE JABILUKA BLOCKADE

The blockade of the proposed mine began on the 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1998, after Katona's speech at the July 1997 Students and Sustainability Conference in Townsville (see Matthews 1997:9) inspired a visit to the site and meetings with Mirrar people by university students and a FoE activist (Law 2000:5). Many of the early actions had been quite militant (see Figure 101), with the mine's access road barricaded by people chained to two old car bodies, tripods erected and occupied (see Figure 104), and a trench dug across the road (Flanagan 1998:7). One action involved both militant strategies and the arts, when ten people locked themselves to a car-cum-metal sculpture of a frill-necked lizard at the lease entrance, stopping mining vehicles for twelve hours (*Green Left Weekly* 1998:5 – see Figure 102).

Many of the actions were mass orthodox-style acts of civil disobedience involving incursions onto the mineral lease or occupations of the access road, with two actions in July involving more than 300 people each (Meckelburg & Green 1998:5). Blockade numbers grew and the arrest tally continued to climb (see Figure 96), with between 3000 and 5000 people attending before the end of the blockade at the onset of the wet season, and almost 600 arrests by the campaign's end (Green 2001:28; Anti-Nuclear Alliance of Western Australia 2004:1). A number of 'celebrity arrests' occurred, both at the blockade and elsewhere, such as the arrest of author Nancy Cato, aged 80, in a Noosa action (Green 1999:3). Perhaps one of the most internationally significant actions was the arrest of TO Yvonne Margarula, for 'trespass' – on her own land! This

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arrest sparked international condemnation, and national actions occurred during her court-case<sup>7</sup>, which nevertheless found her guilty (see Ceresa 1998:3).



Figure 96: Jabiluka arrests - note mock gas mask or skull mask on arrestee at right.

Many other actions occurred nationally to support and spread the campaign (see Figures 97 and 106), with the mobilisation of tertiary students by the National Union of Students, and high school students by youth socialist group 'Resistance' being noteworthy. Mass high school walkouts in support of the Mirrar occurred in 1998, which according to *Green Left Weekly* mobilised 14 000 young people (Moon 1999:25), a number and action possibly without precedent for youth activism in Australia. A whole new generation was being exposed to activism.

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<sup>7</sup> After attending her court-case, my cynicism about Australia's judicial systems increased; this court seemed inherently racist with its emphasis on the primacy of the Commonwealth over Mirrar sovereignty.



Figure 97: 'No Mandate' rally, Canberra, 10 November 1998.

International actions of solidarity had been part of the campaign since 18 November 1997 (Land 1997:30) and occurred again in April 1998 (Davis 1998:5). On the 19<sup>th</sup> of May, protests were held in Canada, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Britain, South Korea and the US, organized by John Hallam at FoE Sydney (Flanagan 1998:7). Representatives of overseas anti-nuclear organisations such as the Tokyo-based Citizen's Nuclear Information Centre visited the blockade (Stewart 1998:13). As at the Franklin, the blockade's adherence to nonviolence likely contributed to the internationalisation of the campaign,- a major factor in swaying public opinion nationally<sup>8</sup>. This internationalisation was very obvious at Jabiluka, and is discussed in section 12.2.4.

#### 10.4.1 Induction

An important aspect of the camp was the Mirrar induction, where blockaders were introduced to Mirrar people in a ritual/meeting of welcome. This involved explanation of ground rules for the blockade, and an information session to aid the efficiency of the action. It had practical applications in settling people in, introducing them to key actors, and familiarising them with necessary rules and routines such as consensus decision-making (see Armstrong 1998:8). The presence of Mirrar people at the induction had

<sup>8</sup> At one point there were reputedly so many faxes to the World Heritage Commission urging no mining at Jabiluka that they had to be carried in wheelbarrows!



social, spiritual and geographical implications, as they welcomed us to their land. It also helped to establish acceptance by the blockaders of the Mirrar authority as traditional owners. This was given further validity as new blockaders were given a passport which enabled them to enter Mirrar land. Another important aspect of the induction was that nonviolence training was also available, although it was not compulsory.

We arrived at the sacred escarpment of Jabiluka at night, but drove for miles without finding the camp. Next day we got in, set up camp in the non-existent shade and then lost our driver Alison for a few days to a migraine. Tension was high in camp, the mozzies and flies swapped shifts, giardia was rife and we needed to acclimatize, but it was great to get there. We went through a Mirrar induction, and having done non-violent action workshops aplenty, I was able to link up with my old mate Anthony Kelly (Branagan 1998b:1).

Clearly, the environment alone necessitated an element of the nonviolence tenet of self-suffering<sup>9</sup> while the training aided the blockade's adherence to nonviolence.

### 10.4.2 Move to orthodox nonviolence

Shortly before my arrival, GAC had decided that tensions between the police and protesters were becoming too great because of secretive and militant actions, especially after some protesters had recklessly driven a van through locked gates near the mine, endangering police (see Ryan & Ryan 1998:12). GAC was concerned at the possibility of injury stemming from such actions, and according to one protester decided to ban militant actions and allow only 'non-confrontational' or orthodox nonviolent actions (Rebecca 2000:137). A protocol was established with police. According to Paasonen, however,

Jacqui Katona takes quite a different tack on this. She said that basically it was hard to get people to go out and do much blockading, especially early on. The only [actions] GAC interfered with were ones that impinged on sites. The decision not to allow secret actions anymore was culturally motivated (pers. comm., 25 November 2004).

In other words, the Mirrar felt personally responsible for injuries that were occurring to activists on their land, and they were also concerned because police were stationed on a sacred escarpment to catch secretive activists (Paasonen, Karl-Eric, 2005 pers. comm., 1 August). I had no problem with this shift:

It's a better way, cos eco-guerilla tactics are rarely long-term effective and just play along with the secretive Boys With Toys macho paradigm that got us into all this mess, whereas overt stuff changes heads (Branagan 1998b:1).

This perceived ban nevertheless caused some tensions in the camp, with a common theme being that an increasingly conservative hierarchy – that was itself secretive - was

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<sup>9</sup>This is further discussed in section 10.4.9.

preventing radical actions, and had 'sold out' to the ALP (see Hinman 1999:9; Strong & Strong 2000:145; Rebecca 2000). Paasonen, however, believes that:

... the 'militant' actions took place before the main rush of machinery was brought through at the end of June – to me, the time when the blockade was effectively broken ... The decisions that led to 'militant' actions being restricted were made after that, when it was perhaps less clear what the function of the blockade was, since there was nothing to stop any more (2004, pers. comm., 25 November).<sup>10</sup>

Others (eg O Reilly 1998:4) argued that GAC had been manipulated by a senior Wilderness Society activist visiting the blockade, although this suggests GAC had little agency. In fact, GAC was comprised of intelligent and forthright individuals, well capable of making their own decisions. I had worked closely with one of these – Matt Fagan - at the 'Students and Sustainability' conference in 1996. He is a dedicated activist, yet such was the suspicion of GAC that a blockader I later picked up hitchhiking believed that Fagan was a spy. Nor was GAC's relationship to the environment movement solely through The Wilderness Society. As early as 1996 Katona and the ACF's Dave Sweeney had formed a productive working relationship (Demant 2000:6-7).

Certainly there are similarities between the advocacy of orthodox nonviolence by TWS at previous blockades, and that of GAC at Jabiluka. An important difference however, is that Jabiluka is home to a people that is oppressed, impoverished and suffering from chronic social breakdown, with an associated high level of incarceration. They had already made brave decisions to resist the mine and hold a blockade, and they were satisfied by the progress of the campaign as it grew, drawing international support (see GAC 1998a:1). Militant action may have seemed unnecessary and even counter-productive. Additionally, any further deterioration in relations with the police would severely impact on the Mirrar, and probably for some time in the future. The non-indigenous blockaders, however, would be able to return to their more affluent homes, where their acts at Jabiluka would have fewer personal consequences. Even returning for court-cases, going to jail briefly or paying fines was minor compared with living in what amounts for the Mirrar, like many Aboriginals, to a police state. Thus it was quite justifiable for the GAC to determine what type of action would suit their interests as well as those of the blockade. As Paasonen interprets it (following Kerbo 1982:643-663) the Mirrar was a "movement of crisis", whereas the non-indigenous activists were a "movement of affluence" (2004:8-12).

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<sup>10</sup> The blockade was not 'broken', however, in the sense of stopping ongoing entry of workers and supplies, nor in the sense of creating a focal (and highly symbolic) point of resistance for the wider campaign.

Many non-indigenous activists demonstrated an understanding of indigenous issues, and accepted Mirrar sovereignty. As JAG activist Helen Hintjens writes:

Most JAG members would agree with Lorna Richardson who stated recently ... that: 'it is Mirrar land, and what the Mirrar say, goes. If non-Aboriginal activists don't want to operate in the way that the Mirrar have sanctioned, then fine, let them take action elsewhere' (2000:382).

However, a significant number of blockaders complained about or refused to accept Mirrar sovereignty. When the Mirrar began to assert their rights, for example by forbidding a 'doof' music concert<sup>11</sup>, I heard at a meeting comments such as "the land belongs to everybody, no-one owns it". Such a comment perpetuates the myth of *terra nullius* (see Bayet 1994:28; Grossman 2003:8), and is highly disrespectful of people who have built up a custodial relationship with the land over thousands of years. It is also, as Sydney JAG's Chris Doran points out, precisely the argument that mining companies use (cited in Paasonen 2004:15). The ignorance of indigenous realities was such that some protesters felt affronted that Mirrar people would not 'show them around country' or send out thank-you notes, according to ACF's Dave Sweeney. He writes:

[T]o demand that the number one most marginalized group in Australia send out thank-you letters for supporting their claim to fundamental human rights is equivalent in my mind to walking down the street and thanking people for not hitting me on the head (in Demant 2001:7).

Controversies also arose when GAC asserted greater control over the national campaign as well as the blockade (see Appendix 7), because some perceived that they were being hierarchical and pushing anti-uranium arguments to one side in favour of human rights. Some groups felt demoralised and excluded, others dissolved altogether, according to Hinman (1998:7;1999:9).<sup>12</sup> My only problem was in later office work with the Centralian JAG, where GAC's insistence on vetting all press releases was a minor inconvenience.

#### 10.4.3 The 'Big Stick' meeting

In another affront to Mirrar authority, a number of protesters continued to use drugs such as marijuana and alcohol at the blockade after being asked to refrain. According to Katona, "to not acknowledge the role that substance abuse plays in Aboriginal

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<sup>11</sup> This was because the police had concerns about the lack of toilet facilities, and "according to Jacqui Katona, because it didn't have permission from Parks or anyone else, including the Mirrar, and did not advertise as being drug- and alcohol-free" (Paasonen, Karl-Eric 2004, pers. comm., 25 November).

<sup>12</sup> See Malloch and Fulcher (1998:9), Peart (1998:24) and Thomas (1998:14) for discussion of further tactical disagreements in the national campaign.

communities is a denial of reality” (quoted in Demant 2001:6). She found having to enforce such policies constantly as well as defend tactical decisions was intensely wearying, and no doubt removed her focus from the larger issues. Thus it is understandable that GAC frustrations erupted into what became known as the 'Big Stick' meeting, where two GAC employees

... explained clearly and straightforwardly what the campaign was about and what the Mirrar concerns were, and said if people couldn't go along, they should leave, or words to that effect (Paasonen, Karl-Eric 2004 pers. comm., 25 November).

Although some interpreted this as telling blockaders either to obey their directives or get physically thrown off their land (see Hintjens 2000:382) or beaten or speared (Rebecca 2000:139), Paasonen's numerous interviewees merely stated that

One of the women walked around with a stick in her hand, and some (NOT all – and not even most of the dissident activists) interpreted that as an actual physical threat (2004, pers. comm. 25 November).

Rebecca derides the Mirrar women's display of sticks and their comment that this was how they traditionally dealt with such problems with “enough of a cultural experience for you?” (2000:139). This implies that non-indigenous protesters should only ‘pay lip service’ to land rights and use it to their own anti-nuclear advantage, rejecting any cultural mores they find unpalatable. She makes no suggestion of any culpability of the blockaders, describing those who accepted Mirrar authority as demonstrating “blind obedience and sycophancy” and “cow-towing [sic] to Aboriginals out of a sense of white guilt” (2000:139). Furthermore, her criticism of the Mirrar's supposed consent for the Ranger mine, and their living in houses supplied by ERA royalties displays profound ignorance of indigenous issues. As Katona (1997:13) and Hintjens (2000:387) write, the Mirrar are seriously discriminated against in terms of the basic services and social and economic rights most Australians enjoy, and are *forced* into a dependent relationship with ERA to survive. Disturbingly, hers and Strong and Strong's (2000) comments appear in a publication (Dearling & Hanley 2000) with no input sought from the Mirrar for their version of the story<sup>13</sup>.

#### 10.4.4 The puppet show

One important consequence of the move away from militant actions was that people sought another outlet for expression of protest. On arrival I became involved in the

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<sup>13</sup> Rebecca also relates unsubstantiated allegations about TWS fraudulently misusing Jabiluka funds (2000:140).

preparations for street-theatre, as a team assembled a 20-foot high puppet judge, and prepared for a Peoples' Court<sup>14</sup>, scheduled for 10 August. This involved

... dozens of volunteers labouring in the Creative Space with paint, *papier mache*, wire and cloth. We met and rehearsed and planned. We endured the Doof saga [see above]. We ate fine food around a campfire, staffed the radio shack and Welcome Tent, dug shitpits, tried to wake up the mass media. On Monday morning we assembled at the 'lease' gates, along with a massive crowd - the jury. Many tourists joined us, with international visitors being often far more informed about the dangers of the nuclear industry. When Britain privatised, for example, nuclear power stations were the only things no-one wanted to buy.

...The judge's arms were worked by two people, and his voice came from a guy inside connected to an amp with reverb. Highly qualified witnesses spoke at length about radioactive waste and water, carcinogenic radon gas and their effects on health, about long-term pollution of the Kakadu National Park where the Mirrar still enjoy traditional activities, about nuclear weapons proliferation. The charges were read from a 10 foot scroll, no-one spoke for ERA, (despite there being numerous representatives and security men filming us), the jury erupted with giant letters spelling out **GUILTY** and we marched on the gates. The head cop hit us with some legalese, and a woman read out our Eviction Notice in reply, which, in case he hadn't heard her was painted on an enormous banner. [A policeman opened] the barbed wire gate and 22 people entered [the road to the mine] (Branagan 1998b:2).

It had been an extraordinarily professional piece of theatre, given the circumstances. Despite the fraught social environment, the lack of resources (exacerbated by the blockade's remoteness), the harsh climate, insects and illnesses, a small group was able to construct an enormous and elaborate puppet, write a script based on detailed scientific knowledge and international law, find actors/speakers, rehearse, obtain a public address system and power for it, and produce some large banners. All this occurred over a few days.

The puppet judge was so out-of-the ordinary, because of its size, its nature (with strong childhood connotations) and appearance, that the speeches were transformed into spectacle, into something more than just words<sup>15</sup>. The sheer dedication of the protesters, the amount of work we had put in, was evident from the puppet and the banners, while the scientists added the weight of their words.

The preparations for the play also exemplified the nonviolence tenet of inclusivity, wherein anyone could contribute, at a variety of levels, bringing their own skills to the

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<sup>14</sup> This was similar to the courts used in the early days of the Soviet Union (see McCauley 1975: 178-9), and in the fourth century BC in Athens (Hansen 1974).

<sup>15</sup> Conflict resolution practitioner Val Majors argues that puppets are 'theatrically powerful ... - more so than any other media' (1996:302).

process. The preparations occurred in large tents and open areas in the camp, away from the arrestable situations at the gates to the mine, so there were fewer stresses that may have driven some people away. All of the cast were impassioned and earnest, and the presence of scientists and doctors contributed to the serious and informed nature of the play. Their presence can be attributed to the nonviolence of the blockade, whereas a degeneration into violence may have alienated them.

The performance too was inclusive, drawing in all the protesters into the role of the jury, and many bystanders, who would possibly not have stopped or joined in had the action not been theatrical and thus relatively non-threatening. This added an international element to the protest, of ordinary tourists witnessing or supporting what then became an act of civil disobedience. With so many of the public involved, the line between who were protesters and who were not rapidly blurred, creating uncertainty among the police as to who to arrest. Such internationalisation too probably effected police perceptions of the blockade – no longer was it just a group of strangely-dressed radicals, it now included a broad cross-section of the global community. This inclusivity was thus a major benefit of the artistic action, aiding the movement in several ways. I further discuss this in section 13.3.2.4.

The influence of the show went beyond the immediate surrounds. Several film-makers recorded the puppet show. Additionally, I donned a construction worker's helmet and performed for a film-maker a monologue I had prepared the night before for the show<sup>16</sup>, where I purported to represent ERA; my satire was either atrocious or too convincing, because one protester disrupted the filming by interjecting and knocking my helmet off! The puppet show was also filmed by the police, and ironically their film aided two arrestees in our court-case (see section 10.4.8).

### 10.4.5 Musical civil disobedience

The puppet show was far from merely symbolic. A strong civil disobedience action was planned to follow it. In contrast with many previous such actions I had witnessed at other blockades, this one occurred with a minimum of overt anger and scuffles.

They picked off a number of us straight away, but the majority got through. Arms linked, we marched into the Sickness Country, singing defiantly, cheered on by the crowd. Time and again the police drove up, taking two or three at a time. We obstructed their vehicles by walking in the middle of the road, but they drove through the bush when they could, destroying it in the process. The singing continued, songs of freedom, protest and solidarity. Past solar panels, tempting a chant of 'You've got solar, now bloody use it!' The view back over

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<sup>16</sup> Disappointingly for me, this was not used in the show because the other organisers with whom I consulted felt it was too late to add anything.

the camp and the wetlands was magnificent. 1.5 kilometres on two people were left, myself and an English tourist. We saw the escarpment within the 'lease', a rare sight now for ordinary citizens despite it being definitely of World Heritage standard. The police were out of sight, and it was so tempting to 'go black wallaby' but we kept on the road, now singing a Native American rain chant. A roar from behind and I thought we'd be run over. A 'paddy'wagon ... crashing through the bush, skidding to a halt in front of us, a hand on the shoulder and we're under arrest. I was pretty hot and cranky by this stage and retorted 'And I charge you with aiding and abetting Crimes against Humanity and the Earth', and that he'd be under Citizen's Arrest if it wasn't such a hassle. I tried to give an Eviction Notice to the head cop. 'I don't want it.' 'You're representing ERA' ... Needless to say, I joined the others in the back of the divvy van. The next 26 hours were spent in jail<sup>17</sup>, an experience of great highs and lows. We were forced into a Men's Wild Warrior Workshop, where we played cricket, built a cubby ... and ate salad sandwiches 'without margarine for the vagans', whatever they are. The 400 arrested before us had trained the police well. We were also inspired by the singing of the women. After refusing police bail, we were threatened next day with five months in Berrimah Jail if we refused magistrate's bail. This was by the same neandarthal [sic] who recently found Yvonne Margarula guilty of trespass on her own land. We decided not to try our luck in the big jail (Branagan 1998b:2).

We were finally released to a warm welcome from a jail support crew, and returned to camp emotionally and physically exhausted, but conscious of some success. Following a piece of theatre which alternated between humour and dramatically stating our case, a mass action had ensured media publicity. It also further clogged up the jails and court systems, and brought us into contact with a wide variety of prisoners, police and court officials, with the resultant possibilities of conversion. The theatre had given us something to prepare for, so that we did not dwell on and worry about the civil disobedience as much; its air of spectacle was also empowering to its participants. As elsewhere, music fortified us during the action and subsequently in prison (see section 13.3.2.1 for further discussion).

### 10.4.6 Impromptu band welcomes CANC

The next day saw the triumphal arrival of the CANC bike riders, serenaded by an impromptu welcoming band. An atmosphere of euphoria and deep emotion eventuated.

The morning CANC arrived, we assembled at the turnoff to the camp. Some blockaders had driven out the night before to cook dinner for CANC, others had ridden out to meet and escort them in. Most had walked or ridden the camp bikes down to the turnoff. There was a band that had jammed together the night before. Annette led 'Far Queue' in a rousing anthem to the riders as excitement grew. Then they arrived out of a rise in the shimmering road to a wildly cheering crowd. Most moving for me was when the crowd raised their own bikes and held them above their heads in homage to these young heroes. I had to hold back the tears later when I told Kate, who'd also been on 'The Bike Ride'. 'We never got that,' she said. The times they are definitely a-changing.

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<sup>17</sup> I believe police electronically eavesdropped on our discussions of our legal situation in our initial holding cells, as our charges were changed in this period.

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We got the band on the road for the trip to the 'lease' gates. Baz from Bundagen drove the old Holden whilst playing the saxophone, past some bemused police. Annette's guitar boomed through a speaker mounted precariously on the front, with more woodwind and the rhythm section in the back. At the gates they demanded we play the CANC song without rehearsal or even music, which fortunately was drowned out by the crowd singing (Branagan 1998b:2-3).

As noted above, the band was created the night before, when we had 'jammed'<sup>18</sup> together. Such jamming occurred at most blockades, but rarely was it so well resourced. Blockaders had built a music stage, with a wooden floor and tent surrounding it. High quality musical instruments and amplification equipment were left there unattended for anyone to use, in an atmosphere of remarkable trust rarely found in wider society. This availability of equipment and a meeting place led to many good jams, which quickly became rehearsals and then performances. It was an ideal atmosphere for creating protest music, as I discuss in section 12.2.3.

I played clarinet with the band, and guitar at other times. Since I was still on crutches, playing music was one thing I could still do. This further illustrates the inclusive nature of such art-forms. I found the band memorable, despite its being 'thrown together'. By sticking to a couple of simple songs we were able to create what seemed a reasonable and even rousing sound. Ritual, symbolism and visual art added to the occasion, as we welcomed and lauded the riders.

Up rode CANC, the leaders five abreast holding a banner. The idea was for them to ride through a long sheet of butchers' paper, held taut by a few layers of *papier mache*. Unfortunately the people who'd done the *papier mache* had been a little over-zealous. Michael, holding the banner with one hand and having ridden 4400 kilometres without mishap hit the paper and went down, an ignominious end to a great achievement!

There were welcomes, speeches, a meeting with some Mirrar who were presented with a t-shirt signed by aboriginal people from Adelaide upwards, and there were stickers placed on a giant map of Oz to indicate all the uranium-linked places they'd been. There was more song and dance, then they walked across a line of Benny Zable's radioactive waste barrels and received medals like Olympic champions (Branagan 1998b:3).

The artistic t-shirts gave us further opportunities to converse with and try to convert police to our point of view, and a number professed their sympathies for our cause. I sold my arresting officer a Jabiluka t-shirt for \$5 more than the usual price; money which went into someone's bail fund. Meanwhile, some police had become so supportive they were giving blockaders barramundi they'd caught. Clearly, attempts at conversion were partly succeeding.

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<sup>18</sup> A 'jam' is a gathering of musicians (who may never have met previously) to improvise.



#### 10.4.7 Orthodox actions still effective

With the blockade more open to communication with police, our relations with them had improved dramatically. It was unusual to play as we drove down the road, and the orthodox nonviolent nature of the blockade at the time meant that the police did not stop us for relatively minor things such as traffic infringements, not having safety belts, unsafe driving or being overloaded. In fact, “they halted all car traffic for us, the guy in charge booming in his Scottish brogue, ‘Ladies and Gentlemen, the road is yours’” (Branagan 1998b:3).

Even without militant methods our actions were still effective, with the sheer numbers of arrestees creating a drain on the State’s infrastructure. This was a strong affirmation that orthodox actions continued to be worthwhile:

The police were much more on side now covert actions were over, having sought out [police liaison activist] Anthony [Kelly] from our jail cell and begged him to stop actions for a while because they just couldn't cope with the number of arrestees (Branagan 1998b:3).

The use of serious charges against nonviolent protesters was also openly acknowledged by police to have occurred because the protest was costing ERA money (Meckelburg and Green 1998:5), while the intimidation caused by a semi-trailer (described in section 10.4.9) was widely interpreted as a sign that ERA was becoming desperate (Meckelburg 1998:5).

#### 10.4.8 Court-cases

In late August I hitch-hiked home<sup>19</sup> and began to prepare for my court-case, scheduled for 25 January 1999, but later postponed until 8 February. I devoted much time to studying my legal situation, particularly examining international law defences (see Figure 105). I felt that my international obligations (under various treaties to which Australia is a signatory) to human rights, the environment and freedom from the threat of nuclear weapons were such as to override the Northern Territory law of ‘trespass’ I had broken. I discussed my case with Jabiluka Arrestees Legal Information Service (JAILS) volunteers, and emailed my opinions on the relevance of international law findings to other arrestees, only to find them broadcast widely by email under someone else’s name as legal fact. Only two of us returned to face court. I attempted unsuccessfully to get my case held in Alice Springs<sup>20</sup>, and hitch-hiked<sup>21</sup> up to Darwin,

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<sup>19</sup> This included a frightening ride in a car that reached 210 kph.

<sup>20</sup> I gained media coverage in Alice Springs about this, and the same newspaper (the *Centralian Advocate*) also covered my subsequent acquittal.

<sup>21</sup> I drove part of the way, with monsoonal rain and floodwaters making for precarious travel.

intending to represent myself. There JAILS found me accommodation among local activists, and my co-defendant Moira Humphreys - a late middle-aged pensioner – and I discussed strategies with Tim Pritchard, a lawyer from Legal Aid. I agreed to allow him to act for me. Thus began three grueling days of trial, with the ‘Crown’ calling as witnesses police, ERA personnel and staff from the Surveyor-General’s Department. Our lawyer, however, was expert at finding ‘loopholes’ and building a case for us, while the prosecutor was inexperienced. A significant dent in their case’s credibility was when police film of our action showed the police opening the gate for us, and that we did not trample it down as one policeman had alleged. *Thus their own film showed that that policeman was an unreliable witness.* This emphatically demonstrated the worth of filming such actions (section 13.3.2.7 further discusses this).

The trial had similarities to a performance, although we defendants were for the most part restricted to head-shaking and snorts of disbelief. Unfortunately, our Mirrar passports were discussed but I had not brought mine, because previous court cases had not accepted them as valid. This was a learning for me; that all magistrates are different and do not necessarily know what has occurred in other court-cases. In future, I would take anything that might be useful to such cases.

My statement that I had suggested that my arresting officer should be under arrest, not me, appeared to startle the magistrate. She asked me to repeat myself, while she wrote it down. It appeared that this was a revelation to her, that we supposed criminals considered that *the state* was in the wrong and that *we* had right and even law on our side. Ultimately, it was the magistrate who found a technicality to exonerate us, since the charge sheet did not correctly name the company properly (see Johnston 1999:2; Rivkah 2000, online). She had perhaps been influenced by the limited discussion of our reasons for opposing the mine. Largely, however, it was a case fought on legal technicalities. I was disappointed that the real issues like dispossession and environmental despoliation were not debated, and no legal precedent was set, for example in the use of international law.<sup>22</sup> However, it was a triumph of sorts, and inspired at least one other arrestee to dispute his charges.

### 10.4.9 Self-suffering, forging links

As at other blockades, protesters were subjected to extreme physical and psychological abuse. ERA used explosives without sirens or warnings while protesters were only 200 metres away, while police allegedly assaulted activists locked onto machinery, denied

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<sup>22</sup> Such defences have often been used by, for example, anti-nuclear protesters, but have rarely succeeded, a notable exception being in Frankfurt 1985 (see Carter 1992:131).

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activists prompt medical attention, and removed water supplies despite the sub-tropical heat, according to Meckelburg and Green (1998:5). They also subjected us to atrocious jail conditions, and began to lay serious charges, with further threats of mandatory sentencing. On 9 September, a semi-trailer smashed through the blockade camp's gates, demolished a bicycle, drove close to sleeping blockaders and swerved towards fleeing activists (Meckelburg 1998:5). No charges were laid. The nonviolence tenet of self-suffering was thus an almost inevitable consequence of civil disobedience at Jabiluka. However, the Jabiluka Activist Support Network (JASN) was formed as a result of this maltreatment, and lobbied to rectify the situation. This was in itself a radical political action in the Northern Territory, where a long-term conservative government and political climate had created a 'frontier mentality' where police actions were rarely questioned.

Furthermore, in jail many non-indigenous activists were able to experience first hand the systematic oppression of Aboriginal people in Australia, with Nelson (1998:7) noting "the outrageous 10:1 ratio of black to white Australians" being held in maximum security remand in Berrimah, some for minor property crimes. While in custody in Jabiru police station, I met a local Aboriginal who was seemingly also under arrest. We shook hands, thereby infuriating a large policeman, who cajoled the man to state that he supported uranium mining. Despite the threatening situation, however, the man bravely declared his opposition to mining. Such experiences help draw non-indigenous activists into an understanding of and support for indigenous rights, while encouraging and empowering indigenous people as they meet supportive activists.

### 10.4.10 Unholistic schisms

#### 10.4.10.1 Racism

Two major incidents affected the solidarity of the blockade, and diverted energy from it. Both could be considered as resulting from outlooks that were not holistic. As discussed in section 7.3, contributing to the threat of nuclear war is a major problem with uranium mining. The group 'Ploughshares' – whose work for peace I had long admired, while having concerns about their anti-choice abortion views - claimed that this was more important than any local human rights issues. Thus on 9 August (the eve of Nagasaki Day) they dismantled, vandalised and poured blood on bulldozers to highlight the nuclear threat, actions which GAC had initially allowed but later decided to forbid.

Afterwards the activists issued a press release (which was briefly posted in the Information Tent), giving their reasons for the action, one of which was supposedly to

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support land rights. I was in the camp at the time, and was outraged by the action and particularly the land rights claim, which seemed hypocritical given that they had directly contravened the wishes of the traditional owners:

Their action was immediately condemned by the camp, causing an internal ruckus when for example people nominated them for a 'présenté', where the camp calls out the names of those still in prison (Branagan 1998b:1-2).

The action added to the problems of the camp, creating ongoing acrimonious debate. Many others were angered by the action, and the two activists, Ciaran O'Reilly and Treena Lenthall, were not permitted to return to the camp (GAC 1998c, online). Some felt the action was acceptable, however, and much time was then spent in arguing whether the activists should be allowed to present their reasons for disobeying the Mirrar directive.

Later an article in *Nonviolence Today* by O'Reilly (1999) attempted to justify their actions, largely by belittling the Mirrar and their struggle (see Appendix 8). He argued that (variously) GAC does not really represent the Mirrar - some of whom are violent alcoholics, their numbers are very small, other human rights campaigns (such as East Timor) are more important, and for these reasons their authority counted for nothing. I replied to this article (Branagan 2000:7), while another Jabiluka activist Phil Bourne<sup>23</sup> (1999:3) replied more calmly to a similar article (O'Reilly 1998). I felt the blockade was being unfairly criticised for developing a respectful relationship with traditional owners. The activists' claims that the nuclear threat is so great that it justified their actions is difficult to accept; there are many places such as corporation headquarters to carry out such actions without offending traditional owners on their own land. They used a blockade that had been set up by the traditional owners and supporters, and attempted to push their personal agenda and continue colonialist attitudes of disrespect. Such tactics created divisions in the movement and thus, while gaining the activists notoriety (but little media coverage), failed to advance the movement's long-term aims.

A further statement by the duo (Lenthall 2000), posted on the Australian internet forum for nonviolence: *Nonviolencenet*, criticised "movement bureaucrats" for not giving them jail support during Jabiluka. I was further disturbed by this accusation and the term "movement bureaucrats", who were overworked volunteers or lowly paid and dedicated workers. I had found that jail support for my brief stay in prison was excellent. Both JASN and JAILS actively supported arrestees, and organized protests

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<sup>23</sup> Bourne is a well-respected Gandhian activist connected with the Commonground Gandhian community in Seymour, Victoria (Paasonen, Karl-Eric 2004, pers. comm., 25 November).

and vigils outside Berrimah Prison (Meckelburg 1998:4). Furthermore, a number of articles were written about Jabiluka prisoners and prison conditions (eg Meckelburg & Green 1998; Nelson 1998; Zirngast 1998). I replied to this posting with my own, stating that ‘I will support him when he learns to respect Aboriginal sovereignty (Branagan 2000b). Soon after I received an email from O’Reilly, and we engaged in a heated debate over several weeks. I found these email exchanges very emotionally distressing, and they turned me away from further involvement with *Nonviolencenet* for more than two years.

Jabiluka activist Rebecca enthusiastically endorses the Ploughshares action, but she is incorrect in claiming that activists were asked to “fight with” the Mirrar (2000:138). Their message was “we invite you to come to our country to join our struggle to uphold the cultural and environmental values of Kakadu” (Anti-Nuclear Alliance of Western Australia 2004:1). It is also clear that the Mirrar were placing their human rights before environmental issues – entirely appropriate for a clan living with debilitating poverty. At Jabiluka, for the first time, most protesters did not use Aborigines to support their claims; the traditional owners used protesters to support them, thus asserting their land rights. As I argued in 1994 to a national TWS meeting, the issue of land rights is reasonably clear-cut: one either supports it or one does not.<sup>24</sup> Either the ownership of and control over traditional lands is acknowledged, or it continues to be denied.

The debate continued via letters, articles (eg Hintjens 2000:382; Law 2000:5), emails, a booklet, video, and website, and in a debate between O’Reilly and Anthony Kelly at an Australian Nonviolence Network gathering (Kelly, Anthony 2003, pers.comm., 3 May). The schism continued therefore for several years, expending much time and energy. A holistic approach which links social justice issues with environmental ones may have avoided all this angst. Similarly, the feminist adage that ‘the personal is political’ (see Deming 1982:17) implies that activists need to learn to resolve our differences in a calmer and more respectful manner, a point I return to in section 12.4.2.

### 10.4.10.2 Sexual harassment

Two further major incidents which divided the camp were alleged sexual assaults and harassment of women by two men. In an email sent from the blockade to activists world-wide, Kristina Schmah criticised the long meetings that ensued:

How can we create a safe or peaceful world in the face of this kind of blatant

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<sup>24</sup> The debate over this was so long-winded that one of the few indigenous activists there told me he was about to walk out and quit TWS. I mentioned this to Karenne Jurd, then TWS president, who promptly spoke in favour of land rights, thus finally ensuring the acceptance of the policy.

sexism ... I mean the attitudes that come out of the mouths of many – male and female – saying that ‘we’re here to protest, not deal with this shit’ and delay discuss ignore which is where it’s at now as far as I can see (1998:1).

She notes further that when people tried to exclude from the camp the alleged offenders, they were denigrated as being “out for blood” or “lesbian conspiracy” types (1998:1). Thus continues the paradigm evidenced in most blockades, where some people try to sideline issues like sexism, arguing that they are not central to the blockade and should thus not be dealt with. As Schmah persuasively writes, however, a holistic approach is essential, because everything is connected, in society as well as in nature, and because “sexist attitudes and ignorance about sexism are root causes of the environmental crisis” (1998:1). She further relates sexism to the marginalisation of racism and other forms of social oppression, and argues that they are not separate from global problems of environmental destruction but mutually inclusive, and cannot be solved in isolation.

These calls for holism are not new<sup>25</sup>. As Scalmer points out, there was an outbreak of calls for ‘the Left’ to examine its own sexism, racism and homophobia in Australia from 1970 onwards (2002:85-101). ACF campaigner Geoff Mosley has also noted from long experience that unresolved differences between individuals and groups can lessen the effectiveness of campaigns; groups need to work in “effective alliances towards agreed goals” (1999:164). My experience of the movement is that there has been some progress in these areas. A holistic approach will not magically end all differences, but it will help create cohesion and avoid major issues like human rights and gender politics having to be ‘thrashed out’ repeatedly.

## 10.5 NONVIOLENCE OBSERVATIONS

The early stages of the Jabiluka blockade featured several actions involving active resistance. However, the later opposition of GAC to secretive actions meant that active resistance was not as prominent as in the forest blockades, and there was little further development of it. A notable exception mentioned earlier was the car embedded into the road, to which activists were chained and which effectively slowed work on the mine. This was not just active resistance; it was transformed into a ‘feral sculpture’ - a frill-necked lizard - through welded additions and paint. It thus became a piece of wondrous art, as well as a symbol of resistance, and likely influenced all who saw it, including

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<sup>25</sup> Nor is it a localised phenomenon. It occurred in South Africa, for example, during the struggle against apartheid, where gender issues were pushed to one side; the ‘liberated’ South Africa continues to have one of the highest rates of sexual assault on Earth,

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police and mine workers. The photograph of this (Figure 102) resulted in a powerful media image for *Green Left Weekly* newspaper, further spreading its influence. Thus we can see an excellent example of the effectiveness of the confluence of nonviolent militancy and art.

Another nonviolence development was in the broader campaign, where quiet lobbying of businesses by groups such as TWS along with noisier occupations and protests of businesses by JAG members led to significant withdrawal of money from the mine's backers. TWS's status as a widely-respected mainstream environmental organisation enabled it to wield considerable influence over institutions who were supporting the mine indirectly through their shares in ERA, the parent company of the mine's developer - North Limited. Under pressure from TWS and its related body the Mineral Policy Institute, seven of these institutions, including Sydney University and the South Australian Art Gallery, sold their shares in North Limited and ERA, shares worth nearly seven million dollars (Doran 1999:18). This was a relatively new tactic for eco-pax, and one that was very effective in putting financial pressure on the mining company, along with the social and moral pressure applied by other activists. Not only was this an effective tactic little used previously, it shows how different types of groups can complement each other well, covering different ground but achieving an overall objective together.

Despite the schisms described above, the Jabiluka blockade seemed generally calmer than Roxby, with better group dynamics – including smaller meetings, and less conflict. My impression was that consensus decision-making had become more embedded in the movement's culture, an impression I had first noticed at the 'Students and Sustainability' conference of two years earlier. Consensus was generally accepted as mode of decision-making, - it worked reasonably smoothly and there was little criticism of it as a method. The blockade also seemed better disciplined:- despite several isolated incidents, there was no large scale violence as at Roxby. The campaign, despite being in an isolated area, attracted more people than Roxby and probably the NEFA blockades, and the nonviolence of it likely contributed to these numbers. Similarly, there were more arrests than at those earlier blockades. Relationships with police also seemed generally better than at Roxby, with many more sympathisers among the police, some quite openly supportive. Consequently, there were fewer arrests for petty matters such as overloaded cars. Clearly, the growing maturity of the movement and the availability of nonviolence training at the blockade helped aid blockade dynamics, and produced

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according to Rebecca Spence, who was involved in the struggle (2004, pers. comm., 15 February).

disciplined nonviolent actions. More work on holism, to combat issues of racism and sexism, would prevent major schisms such as those at Jabiluka. Similarly, better support for direct action and for grass-roots democracy from institutions such as TWS and ACF would support activists 'on-the-ground', aiding movement sustainability.

### 10.6 ARTS OBSERVATIONS

Art-forms such as sculpture, music and particularly street-theatre were very prominent at the blockade, and showed great development from previous blockades. Live music was amplified, and sculpture was by professional artists. The construction of a music stage, and the availability of instruments and equipment (left at personal risk) demonstrate that there was a greater feeling of community and trust than at previous uranium blockades<sup>26</sup>, and a greater understanding of and commitment to the role of music. This led to some effective protest music, and helped create the usually genial atmosphere of the camp.

The puppet show discussed above also showed important artistic development in the movement, towards greater professionalism. More people were involved than at any similar street-theatre I had observed previously. The experience of older arts activists combined with the energy and enthusiasm of younger ones to create an impressive show. It was developed quickly, synergistically and enjoyably, using its few resources imaginatively. It catered to a large crowd through amplification of the actors' voices, and through the enormity of the props. The cast was bigger than at previous blockades, the props better, and there was superior script development and rehearsal than previously. The show's humour, erudition, inclusiveness and colour led to a carnival atmosphere, which ensured that the following mass action of civil disobedience involved minimal scuffles with police. Filming of the show and action by activists and police spread its impact further, and assisted a court-case.

Police brutality surfaced in a number of actions nationally, for example with capsicum spray and "a totally inappropriate use of force" being used in a Sydney arrest, according to FoE eye-witness Len Kanaar (in Green 1999:3). In a Brisbane action on August 22, 1997, two protesters were arrested for writing an anti-uranium slogan in chalk on the footpath. This artistic direct action performed an important function when it showed the absurd discrepancy between the actions of the state in allowing uranium mining, and its repression of dissent. According to BJAG's Kate Lecchi the arrests were "ironic considering uranium remains radioactive for 300,000 years while chalk lasts five

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<sup>26</sup> These differed from forest blockades in that people came from all over Australia rather than primarily from nearby established communities.



minutes” (quoted in Wilson 1997:3). This theme is continued by Meckelburg and Green (1998:5), who argued that “there’s no shortage of irony ... ERA, not the protesters, should be charged with ‘criminal damage’”, as should some police and security guards, if the matter was handled equitably. Our puppet show and action attempted to dramatise this need to achieve equitable justice by finding ERA guilty of crimes against humanity and the Earth, by presenting ERA workers and police with an eviction notice, and by my comment to my arresting officer that he should be the one being arrested. The ability of such actions to illuminate state absurdities is further explored in section 13.2.5.

As at Roxby, coverage of the campaign by the mass media was seriously flawed. After returning from Jabiluka, I issued on behalf of CJAG a damning critique of the media, arguing that it was biased, shallow and ignored major occurrences such as CANC, the huge number of arrests, and the punitive sentencing for nonviolent protesters (Branagan 1998a). As with my Roxby letter, it was unpublished. However, I was able to use an alternative news source - the internet, a source which was widely used to disseminate information about the campaign. This was a significant advance from previous blockades (see section 12.2.4 for further discussion). Additionally, a number of films emerged from the campaign, including Pip Starr’s ‘Fight for Country: the story of the Jabiluka blockade’ (see Green 2001:28), Keith Armstrong’s ‘Interstate Ferals for the Planet: Three Weeks at the Jabiluka Blockade’<sup>27</sup> (see *Green Left Weekly* 1998:22), ‘Walking Through a Minefield’ by Cathy Henkel (see *Green Left Weekly* 1999:24) and David Bradbury’s ‘Jabiluka’ (see Land 1997:30). These films helped to counter the poor media coverage, at a grass-roots level and, in the case of Bradbury’s and Henkel’s films, on SBS television. It should also be mentioned that some blockaders’ fears of *agents provocateurs* were occasionally ill-founded and contributed to poor coverage, with journalist Stella Kinsella having difficulties reporting on the blockade because she was regarded as a spy (Dearling & Hanley 2000:136). This demonstrates how secrecy (rather than the nonviolence tenet of openness) can impact on media coverage.

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<sup>27</sup> “[T]here’s footage in that of an action we did in April 1998 at North [ERA shareholder] in Brisbane: two of us dressed as waiters and offered arriving employees tea made (we said) from Jabiluka water, to see whether they’d drink it. Only one did” (Paasonen, Karl-Eric 2004, pers. comm., 25 November).

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Figure 98: Radiation suits were common props for Jabiluka theatre.

The arts also served to spread the campaign's messages amongst the community in a grassroots fashion. Mock nuclear spills featured in several actions (eg see Hinman 1998:7) such as at high schools in Melbourne, where Resistance activists wore white radiation suits as part of street theatre (see Figure 98). A number of poems and raps emerged from the campaign, including June M. Lennon's (1999:2) poem 'Enough is enough' (see also McIlroy 1998:22; Friel 1998:21). Among many artistic fundraisers was the Yellowcake Dance Party in Melbourne on May 9, 1998 (Pradhan 1998:9). The group 'Oms not Bombs' traveled widely with a bus fitted with stereo equipment, holding dance parties wherever they stopped (see Strong & Strong 2000), and 2 CDs emerged from the campaign (one is discussed in section 14.6). Other art-forms used in the campaign include banners and flags, and Benny Zable's 'radioactive' barrels (Figure 103). Innovative symbols on stickers and t-shirts helped spread the campaign's messages, and helped activists identify sympathizers and thus augment networks, an important function of the arts I discuss in section 13.3.2.3. Figure 99 shows an Aboriginal hand over the nuclear symbol, symbolising both opposition to uranium mining, and the importance of the indigenous component of that opposition<sup>28</sup>.



Figure 99: Jabiluka anti-nuclear symbol (Gundjhem Aboriginal Corporation).

<sup>28</sup> One poster used this symbol with the words 'ERA OF DESTRUCTION', a pun on the Energy Resources of Australia acronym.

### 10.7 CONCLUSION

The likelihood of Jabiluka proceeding became smaller and smaller, as world uranium prices dropped (see *Third Opinion* 2000:3). On the 1st of August 2003, Jabiluka's new owners, Rio Tinto, announced that work on the mine would be stopped and the site rehabilitated (TWS 2003:para 1) The success of the campaign, despite its tribulations, will have heartened longer-term activists involved in the earlier, less successful campaigns such as Roxby, and empowered younger activists as they realised that concerted nonviolent action can be effective. Section 12.5 discusses this further.

The assumption of a leadership role by the traditional owners was an important step towards holism by the movement, showing empowerment of Aboriginal people and proof that non-indigenous activists were increasingly acceding to land rights and social justice claims. International support for the cause assisted this empowerment of Aboriginals, and in a cyclic process this was both a result of the nonviolence of the blockade, and a cause for the largely orthodox nature of that nonviolence.

This led, however, to a conflict between holism and the nonviolence tenet of grassroots democracy. Non-indigenous activists were forced to support land rights in a realistic rather than token manner by ceding some control of the campaign. This placed some limitations upon our accustomed modes of protest, while the centralised control of a national campaign by an under-resourced and understaffed group was at times inefficient and frustrating. Some grassroots activists felt disappointed and disempowered by their loss of autonomy, and left or were forced out of the campaign. A better balance between holism and grassroots democracy would benefit future campaigns, and this may occur if non-indigenous activists develop better understanding of indigenous issues, which would then lead to Aboriginals developing greater trust in such activists. Similarly the anarchistic ideal that grassroots democracy implies may need modification towards the acceptance of some forms of hierarchy, such as the councils of elders who preside over many indigenous communities. Something similar already exists in supposedly anarchistic organisations like TWS and NEFA; for the sake of consistency between ideals and practice, it would be useful to acknowledge, codify and work to limit this hierarchy.

There was little development of active resistance methods, particularly compared with the forest blockades. However, the burgeoning of artistic protests in the campaign is a probable consequence of this clampdown on militant actions, since activists were forced

to use creativity and imagination rather than secrecy and guerilla-style tactics. Artistic actions highlighted repression of activists (despite continuing self-suffering), and exposed the absurdities of such repression. These actions were inclusive, both in the preparation and execution stages, resulting in large, colourful and educative actions with minimal violence. Such a development shows an interesting dynamic between nonviolence and the arts, which is discussed further in section 14.2.




Figure 100: Anti-uranium sticker.




Figure 101: Blockaders uncomfortably 'locked-on' at Jabiluka.



Figure 102: Blockaders 'locked-on' to 'frill-necked lizard' car.



Figure 103: 'Radioactive waste barrels' by Benny Zable, at entrance to Jabiluka camp.



Figure 104: Tripods and banners at Jabiluka blockade.

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Mr. Bass, who says - as Mr. Lee will not be granted a  
 large used as a rd contractor by the appl. the by any use  
 rd other than a rd contractor by the appl. the by any use  
 what is not Mr. Lee is a rd. a) has spent  
 unless spec. built for purposes use File No: 9818500  
 only (b/c. major sum of 2nd receipt. to  
 NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA  
 BAIL ACT  
 Sec 25 (10, 27)(a)(2), 29 & 30(1), Reg 3(21)(a)  
 BAIL UNDERTAKING AND AGREEMENT BY ACCUSED PERSON  
 I, Martin Patrick Brennan  
 live at 7 Willshire Street, Alice Springs NT  
 and I undertake to appear at the Court of Summary Jurisdiction at Darwin  
 at 10.00 o'clock on 25 January, 1999  
 or at any other time and place to which the proceedings may be continued for the following offences:

- 1. Trespass
- 2. Trespass

And I agree to comply with the following conditions while at liberty:

(that conditions other than those specified in Part C)

IF YOU DO NOT APPEAR ANY MONEY OR SECURITY GIVEN BY YOU MAY BE LOST BY ORDER OF THE COURT

I agree that if I do not keep my undertaking or agreement I will pay \$200.00 w/e to the Territory Government.

or go to jail  
 Martin Brennan

Signature of accused person:

This undertaking and agreement was entered into on 11 August 1998 before me at Jabiru and a completed copy of this form was handed to the person who signed this bail undertaking and agreement.

*[Signature]*  
 Magistrate Justice of the Peace

PART C BAIL CONDITION(S)

The bail was granted on the following condition(s):

- \* you enter into an agreement to observe the requirements as to your conduct specified in your bail undertaking while at liberty on bail.
- \* you enter into an agreement, and deposit acceptable security, to forfeit the amount of money specified in your bail undertaking if you fail to comply with your bail undertaking.
- \* you deposit with the Court the amount of money specified in your bail undertaking, in cash, and enter into an agreement to forfeit the amount deposited if you fail to comply with your bail undertaking.

Dated this 11 August, 1998.

*[Signature]*  
 (Magistrate Justice of the Peace)

Figure 105: Jabiluka bail document, which I amended before signing. Legal scribbles at top.






the Jabiluka Action Group

*Cordially invites you to:*  
*crash the party and*  
**BLOCKADE**

a \$100-a-head dinner at which Campbell Anderson, Managing Director of North Ltd., will be speaking on the negative impact of environmental controls on uranium mining.



North Ltd. are the parent company of Energy Resources Australia (E.R.A.), who are building Jabiluka uranium mine in Kakadu National Park.

*When:* Tuesday, 22nd September, 1998

*Where:* Royal Society of Victoria  
8 La Trobe St, Melbourne

*Time:* 5:30 p.m.

*Dress:* Formal. (b.y.o. gas mask and noise makers)

Figure 106: Invitation to 'formally' blockade North Limited executive's speech.

# PART THREE

## Unity

I am the land  
I am the trees  
I am the rivers  
that flow to the seas  
joining and moving  
encompassing all  
blending all parts of me  
stars in my thrall  
binding and weaving  
with you who belong  
sometime discordant  
but part of my song  
birds are a whisper  
the four breezes croon  
raindrops in melody  
all form the tune  
of being belonging  
aglow with the surge  
to life and its passions  
to create its urge  
in living expression  
its total of one  
and the I and the tree  
and the you and the me  
and the rivers and birds  
and the rocks that we've heard  
sing the songs we are one  
I'm the tree you are me  
with the land and the sea  
we are one life not three  
in the *essence* of life  
we are one.

Kevin Gilbert, 1994.



Figure 107: Arabunna Elder Kevin Buzzacott with Benny Zable at Lake Cowal protest.



Figure 108: Tripod in mist, NEFA blockade, 1990s.

## chapter eleven

### WE SHALL *NEVER* BE MOVED: THE DEVELOPMENT OF *ACTIVE RESISTANCE*

#### 11.1 INTRODUCTION

As noted in the introductory chapter, this thesis explores two major developments in Australian nonviolence. One relates to a burgeoning use of the arts in eco-pax campaigns, a development detailed in Chapter Thirteen. The other major development in Australian (and global) nonviolence is the use in civil disobedience actions of increasingly militant tactics, often involving physical obstructions in conjunction with activists, actions usually characterised by activists as ‘lock-ons’. In this chapter, I explore that development, describing why and how it occurred, and noting its importance, and its influence on activists overseas.

These militant tactics were characterised by some at the time as being violent or unacceptable because they fell outside the guidelines of orthodox nonviolence. However, as I have argued in the *Journal of Australian Studies* (Branagan 2004a:207-208), such tactics *should* still be regarded as nonviolent, albeit under a revised and more realistic definition of nonviolence. Here I argue that, even according to orthodox definitions, nonviolence should be an evolving and diverse praxis owned by the activists who use it, and not a static dogma enforced by hierarchies of theorists and mainstream organisation leaders. The development of *active resistance* techniques has broadened the scope of nonviolence considerably, presenting a range of new tools, and ensuring that nonviolence continues to develop as an effective, relevant method of social change, owned by those who use it.

#### 11.2 TENSIONS

As noted in Chapter Six, despite the success of the Franklin River campaign, there was a significant level of dissatisfaction during the campaign with the orthodox nonviolence

## Active Resistance

advocated by TWS. A common complaint was that TWS was hierarchical and undemocratic, and thus inconsistent with the egalitarian nature of the nonviolence they imposed on blockaders. The Nomadic Action Group (NAG) in particular had many problems with both TWS and their version of nonviolence, which was felt to be unrealistic and too all-embracing.

The Nomadic Action Group believed that orthodox nonviolence was rarely about “channelling the dynamic fires of social change and too often about organising and taming the cheeky sparkle of indignation” (Cohen and Ruby 1997:244-5). It was too rigid, stifled creativity and incorrectly labelled its critics violent. They argued that openness and cooperation with the police were not always valid, and that experience had taught them not to trust police. Furthermore, they found consensus a waste of time, arguing that it actually mimicked existing power relations, unless the group was small and held similar views. Thus even at the start of the Franklin campaign there were tensions and power struggles. These tensions grew during the campaign, and continued in later campaigns, usually between NAG-style activists (including later groups such as NEFA), and the more mainstream conservation bodies such as TWS and the Australian Conservation Foundation who organised many of the large actions.

### 11.3 SHIFT FROM ORTHODOXY

#### 11.3.1 Roxby violence and tactical shift

The blockades against uranium mining, which occurred at Roxby Downs, South Australia, in 1983 and 1984, were discussed in Chapter Seven. They show that even if most activists are trained or experienced in nonviolence, a minority with violent or at least dangerous tactics can create atrocious publicity for the whole blockade. A spiral of violence was created at Roxby by activists with violent tactics, whether physical or psychological; protest vehicles crashed through gates and careered around police roadblocks, lives were endangered, police were verbally abused and accused (often with justification) of brutality, and many activists and some police were injured in clashes. The resultant media coverage focused on the violence, the dualistic opposition of the protesters versus the police and miners, and law and order issues, with little mention of our environmental and social concerns. Amidst such tensions and an atmosphere of anger, fear and mistrust, there was little dialogue with opponents, and few conversions.

## Active Resistance

Rather, there were a number of alleged assaults on blockaders by irate miners, while two local women interviewed in the Andamooka hotel said that “the demonstrators were dole bludging drug addicts paid to come out into the country to stir up trouble” (Buckley 1983c:2). Admittedly, such attitudes will not be changed quickly, and a violent response to protests may sometimes be unavoidable, but disciplined nonviolence may minimise the violence, as the Franklin case shows. The blockades failed to grow as did the Franklin, and there was little political support. Although there were other factors involved, such as the difference in the issue, location and attitude of the ALP, the failure of the Roxby campaigns can be partly attributed to the use of violent tactics by some participants.

There was little central authority to ban or control violent activists at Roxby, unlike at the Franklin. Although Coalition for a Nuclear-Free Australia (CNFA) organisers made some attempts at ensuring that blockaders were trained in nonviolence and formed into affinity groups, they were largely unable to enforce this, as many protesters made their own way to the blockade (this problem is discussed in section 12.3.5). The failure to close Roxby, in contrast to the Franklin success, caused many to feel disappointed and somewhat disempowered. It did, however, lead to a tradition of continuing action at Roxby, which WMC cannot ignore, as shown by a reference to protests in its 1997 Environmental Progress Report (WMC 1997:5)<sup>1</sup>. It also led to disenchantment with the ALP, and, as the section on the Lakeside Hotel protest showed, helped create alternative parties with different political ideologies and methods, such as the Nuclear Disarmament Party and later the Australian Greens. The Roxby blockades also paved the way for the later success at Jabiluka, by educating many activists and the wider public about the dangers of uranium mining. Media coverage of the 1983 Roxby blockade shows that organisers were already considering a blockade of the proposed Jabiluka and Koongarra uranium mines (see Buckley 1983c:1).

Probably, the primary importance of the Roxby protests, in terms of nonviolence developments, was that they signalled **a shift away from the nonviolence orthodoxy** of the Franklin. The guidelines for action provided by CNFA were significantly

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<sup>1</sup> This report, disturbingly, contains an endorsement of WMC by the World Wide Fund for Nature (p. 40), further fuelling calls that such groups have ‘sold out’ (see Syvret 2001; Doyle 2000:160-195; Hutton & Connors 1999:223-239).



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different to those of TWS, as shown by the statement “[a]n emphasis will be placed on ‘bodies-first’ type action, but the use of metal chains, cars etc for blockading is acceptable under the guidelines” (CNFA 1983a:9). Although “[n]o deliberate, irreversible damage to property” was allowed, graffiti was described as reversible, and actively encouraged (CNFA 1983a:9). These new guidelines were obviously considered newsworthy, with the *Sydney Morning Herald* (27 August 1983:5) reporting that “[a] handbook tells the protesters the use of chains, cars and other means to block access to the mine is acceptable”. Such guidelines, along with the lessened hierarchical control of the blockade by the organisers enabled types of action to occur which would have been banned at the Franklin. Such actions would be used more and more frequently in subsequent blockades, as observed in Chapters Eight, and they represent one of the eco-pax movement’s most important nonviolence developments in the period examined. Section 11.4 analyses such actions.

### 11.3.2 Militant direct actions

One direction which a subset of the eco-pax movement took as it reacted against orthodox nonviolence was in the increased use of militant direct actions (MDAs). These refer to “any form of direct action that does not fit within the traditional rubric of nonviolent action (NVA) and specifically to actions that involve some risk to human beings” (Doyle 2000:48). An example is the 1992 occupation of the State Forests office in Sydney by NEFA and allied activists. Although MDAs have long been evident in Australian environmentalism, Doyle (2000) argues that there has been a slight increase in the incidence in these in recent times. Despite NEFA’s Andrew Kilvert arguing that these were new and radical forms of action (in Rogers 1998: 175), they are not significantly different to the occupations and ‘sit-ins’ that have long been part of acceptable - even orthodox - nonviolence, many of which are detailed by theorist Gene Sharp (1973:367-368). All of these involved people occupying buildings and denying entrance to authorities (eg see Arno 1970; Rooke 1971:1-117; Zashin 1972:149-228; Marwick 1998:621-665). Some were far from docile, such as the 1983 occupation of the Economics Building at Sydney University in which I participated, which ended only with the arrival of the Riot Squad and several arrests (see Casey 1983:2; *Honi Soit* 1983:5).

## Active Resistance

However, such actions are not without their problems, as I witnessed during an occupation of a mining regulatory body office in Lismore during the Timbarra campaign (see John Wilson 1997). Among the few people staffing the office was a pregnant woman who felt enormous distress during the occupation. Being a secretary, she had little influence on the policies of the bureau, yet she felt extremely intimidated during the action. It made me reluctant to join such actions again, although they may have some effectiveness. Figures 109 and 110 show similarly-intimidating MDAs,- the occupation of working bulldozers.

Another MDA was the 'hijacking' of a train in Tasmania (see Cohen 1997:9-11). This action involved some danger, and a level of threat to the train's personnel. Although Cohen claims it was nonviolent, there were no red safety flags present when the activists waved down the train, and the presence of explosives on board it no doubt contributed to the fear of the drivers when they saw it being 'held up'. Similarly, the presence of activists dressed as Ned Kelly added to the threatening nature of the protest. In terms of effectiveness, it generated a great deal of media, but much of it was negative, equating the action with terrorist activity. Similar publicity was accorded to the abovementioned NEFA occupation in Sydney, and NEFA was subsequently shut out of any consultations with State Forests, and barred from speaking at some conferences. Doyle argues convincingly that although "the people of north-east New South Wales lost their voice ... some would say it was lost some time ago, and that it is disempowerment and frustration that lead to such actions" (2000:57). The effectiveness of such actions, however, is difficult to judge, and may be dubious.

Age journalist Peter Adams writes that "just as the loonier lesbians held back feminism, so the half-mad gleam in the eye of the extreme greens threatens a backlash for sensible conservation" (1989:2). Verity Burgmann (1993:251), on the other hand, argues that these extremists, by their far reaching demands and militant tactics, aid the movement by making less militant campaigners more likely to be listened to. She quotes *The Australian* journalist Max Harris who contrasts favourably those who crusade for the environment with "intelligent and objective care and concern" with those "bandwagon activists who join up out of paranoid and exhibitionist needs", and she concludes that "[m]oderate achievements are gained, generally, by militants, though conservatives

## Active Resistance

insist this is not the case and more would be conceded if they only asked nicely. The truth is, if protesters behaved the way their opponents desired, they would make much less political headway” (Burgmann 1993:251; see also Scarce 1990:66).

This is a difficult question, and militant activists often walk a tightrope over the morass of public opinion, alienating some, inspiring others. Perhaps an MDA more effective than the NEFA occupation was when Greenpeace put solar panels on the roof of the prime minister’s residence in 1998 (see Greenpeace 1998). Greenpeace is a group claiming to have developed a good relationship with the police, because it is known for the nonviolence and disciplined manner of its protests (Greenpeace 1998). Yet many of its actions involve secrecy, which is disapproved of by orthodox theorists. The solar action involved secretive guerrilla-style tactics in which activists scaled a fence and climbed onto the roof in a group of seventeen, with security guards unable to prevent them. A drawback of the action is that it would have led to security fears about the possibility of other groups doing similar but violent actions, encouraged by how easy it was to access such a high profile target; hence, more resources would be spent on defence of the residence, detracting from other areas where public money could be spent. The action, however, gained considerable media publicity, much of it admiring its audacity. In addition to the covert action, Greenpeace held a breakfast barbecue the next day, in which they used solar power to do the cooking. The action overall was cheeky, imaginative and humorous. Such an action would not have succeeded nearly as well if security or police knew about it beforehand.

### 11.4 ACTIVE RESISTANCE

The NEFA and associated forest blockades demonstrated a considerable leap forward in some aspects of nonviolence, while at the same time continuing some of the earlier problems of the eco-pax movement, such as sexism, hierarchical structures, exclusionary decision-making processes, and prioritisation of ends over means. As discussed in section 8.9.3.2, in a reaction against earlier blockades, there was no training in or articulated policy of nonviolence, resulting in the sabotage and subsequent failure to preserve Carrai.

**Progress was achieved primarily in the use of a range of devices designed to physically hinder the removal of activists engaged in acts of civil disobedience.**

These techniques were described in section 8.9.1. In tandem with political lobbying and the instigation of legal proceedings, these constituted a considerable advance in the efficacy of blockading. As a result of blockades using active resistance, along with legal and political campaigning, under-resourced groups such as NEFA have preserved hundreds of thousands of hectares of old-growth forests (Hawley 2003:19).

#### 11.4.1 Still nonviolent

For the most part, these forms of action should still be considered nonviolent, despite being new, unorthodox and having elements of secrecy for which they are condemned by advocates of orthodox nonviolence such as Burrowes (1989; 1996:230-235). Although the actions might involve property damage, there are clear differences between them and sabotage. With burials, lock-ons, tripods and dragons, protestors are putting themselves in a vulnerable position, exposing themselves to the mercy of workers and police. These are examples of self-suffering, not much different to Indian activists who submitted themselves to beatings during the 1930 'salt march' (see Bennett 1997). Furthermore, the damage to property can be considered justifiable if it helps prevent far greater damage, which in the case of old growth logging can be considered irreparable (Resource Assessment Commission [RAC] 992:153). This can be related to Gandhi's concept of *satyagraha* or 'truth force', because the action relates to an overall holistic truth in relation to property damage, not one which only examines the activists' damage.

Nor are these actions entirely secretive; after the initial lock-on, they are openly defiant, and usually result in the activists being arrested, as with orthodox civil disobedience. This is an important distinction between active resistance and sabotage, as the latter involves an attempt to "conduct sustained systematic attacks on property and **get away with it** [my emphasis]" (Begg 2002:100). Where active resistance differs from orthodox nonviolence is that activists do not 'go out of their way' to inform police of all their plans. This is not necessarily being secretive. The activists can still openly organise; the

## Active Resistance

affinity group system where most people are known to each other helps prevent the police, using their own secretive tactics, from infiltrating groups and discovering plans.

Active resistance is, in some ways, an improvement on orthodox civil disobedience, since as the case studies showed, it makes it harder for police to arrest and remove protestors. 'We Shall Not Be Moved', the anthem of the US civil rights movement (Spencer 1990:84) thus becomes even more appropriate. It is a move towards tactical effectiveness and away from more symbolic actions (but ironically creating powerful symbols anyway – as section 13.2.3 discusses). Thus activists have a wider range of tactics – effective and empowering - available when mounting a blockade.

These techniques arose largely in conservation blockades in remote areas. Because of their remoteness, there were rarely large numbers of activists available, particularly for extended periods. Thus they were quite different to the urban-based marches of the US civil rights movement (see Eskew 1997), or the actions in India where crowds could be assembled with more ease. They were also different because, in the US and Indian cases, there was a realisation that social justice would take some time to achieve. In blockades of old-growth forests, however, there is an urgency to not just gain long-term support and win political victories, but to physically stop logging, since the old-growth forests, as noted above, can never be restored to their original condition once logged (RAC 1992:153). As Cohen and Felicity Ruby write: “the mass participatory, non-violence theories of Gandhi and Martin Luther King cannot always be plucked out of an historical context and applied to today’s circumstances” (1997:245).

With different situations, activists need to be able to adapt nonviolence to their own needs. While new forms may have deficiencies and may upset some purists, there are certain advantages if they are shown to be effective, and if they bring new adherents to nonviolence. By its own definition, the radically democratic nature of orthodox nonviolence means it cannot be a fixed doctrine enforced by a hierarchy of theorists, but should be a continuously evolving praxis, owned by the activists themselves.

### 11.5 IMPORTANCE OF FOREST BLOCKADES

As noted earlier, this type of resistance did not begin with the NEFA blockades. 'Lock-ons' in particular were used by suffragettes in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, and by feminists who chained themselves to government buildings and public bars in the 1960s (*Four Corners* 2001; Scalmer 2002:83). The NEFA blockades, however, were remarkable for several reasons. Firstly, they brought together all of these forms of active resistance. They used them all, sometimes simultaneously and *en masse*, and further developed and refined them, adding for example cement to lock-ons. The frequency of use of active resistance techniques thus increased dramatically. Activists also began to use combinations of techniques, such as tripods *and* lock-ons, or a variety of techniques in close proximity to slow progress of police or logging trucks. They also used these techniques in innovative ways, such as erecting tripods over bulldozers (and in Tasmania, over a train). Furthermore, they added the monopole, the Star of David, 'trucker fuckers', pipes, hot rocks, 'scrubbing', fires on roads and adopted foreign innovations such as the cantilever.

Another important aspect of the blockades was that their core organising group was not, as elsewhere, a relatively large city-based organisation committed to orthodox nonviolence. Although rural-based members of those groups were involved (such as TWS Armidale), it was primarily rural-based grassroots activists – many of them 'intentional community' dwellers - who organised the blockades (while nomadic 'ferals' staffed them) with no expectation of mainstream support, and with a full intention to use active resistance techniques. Thus such techniques were not just condoned by the organisers – they were actively encouraged. Free and frank discussions of how to innovate and develop them took place at the blockades and campaign centres, resulting in imaginative and effective active resistance. This can be contrasted with other blockades, where such techniques were 'frowned upon' or actively forbidden, making discussion of them only possible in small groups, secretively. If they *were* in the open, long debates on whether they were nonviolent or not frustrated activists, slowed development and use of active resistance, and also created a backlash of dissatisfaction with orthodox nonviolence and its advocates – the mainstream organisers. This led to splits in campaigns and demoralisation of activists, as occurred in the SEFA blockades.

## Active Resistance

A final nonviolence development in the NEFA blockades was that active resistance was not, as elsewhere, by radical activists working largely alone and unsupported by city-based groups. Instead, the NEFA activists had the full support of, and a close working relationship with, activists in the city. These latter were working in two other key areas. Activists such as Dailan Pugh, Carmel Flint and Sue Higginson concentrated on lobbying politicians, scientists and members of the forestry commission, using their intimate knowledge of the issue to great advantage. Meanwhile John Corkhill, and later Al Oshlack and Belinda O'Dwyer would be engaged in legal (and at times political) manoeuvres to get injunctions to stop logging, demanding that (often ignored) regulations be followed, and breaches punished. They were supported by expert lawyers such as Tim Robertson. As with the Jabiluka campaign, this 'pincer' or multi-pronged approach of NEFA was an effective one. Being diverse but unified, the approach is also an example of inclusive nonviolence, with a number of areas in which people could work, and which were supportive and not antipathic to each other.

NEFA's success legitimised active resistance (among student and socialist groups and unaligned environmentalists at least) as valid nonviolent action, such that it was an acceptable part of the Jabiluka campaign at first. This success also no doubt increased the profile of nonviolence in this country as an effective method, albeit a new and more radical form of nonviolence, little analysed as yet by theorists.

### 11.5.1 Globalisation of active resistance

Although this thesis had set out to ascertain developments in Australian nonviolence in relation to those in the rest of the world, the paucity of work on Australian nonviolence developments meant that this work had to take precedence. However, there is some evidence of similar developments overseas, with Australian developments influencing those overseas, and vice versa. As Brent Hoare, the noted rainforest activist, has commented:

It's funny how things that go around, come around. It is no exaggeration to say that the modern direct action environment movement<sup>2</sup> in the UK was spawned in large part due to the efforts of activists who'd participated in actions in Australia taking these experiences back to the UK with them. Now, here we are setting off (on the M2 and Olympic campaigns) inspired by the experience and

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<sup>2</sup> Doherty et al (2003) describe the UK direct action movement eloquently.

achievements of communities on the other side of the world (in Dearling & Hanley 2000:134).

It was not just British activists such as Karen Ellis, who had been part of the Mt Etna blockades<sup>3</sup>, returning home who took these innovations to the UK. In some cases, Australian activists travelled overseas, exporting our blockade ideas and technology<sup>4</sup>. One example is NEFA activist Marita, who became involved in Irish campaigns against deforestation for new roads.<sup>5</sup> On her return to Australia, Marita wrote in a letter that she had showed and made copies of videos of NEFA actions (Happ 1992a, 1992b, 1993a, 1993b), and shown Paula Vermunt's and my slides of the Penan blockades in Borneo to "give 'em a few more ideas" (1998, pers. comm., 11 February). In a case of a prophet being better received elsewhere than in her own country, she writes:

It was quite amazing to be thanked and encouraged and respected and fed for trying to save trees - a far cry from here ... The forest camp has reawakened something in the Irish psyche and in 1 Sunday alone we had 2000 visitors! (1998, pers. comm., 11 February).

Her letter shows how nonviolence developments in far-flung places were transmitted elsewhere in a globalisation of tactics, ideas and solidarity. This follows from Scalmer's (2002:11-30) observations of Australian actions in the 1960s and 1970s, which largely adopted and 'translated' types of protest actions from the US and elsewhere, before developing distinctly Australian types of action. A comparison of Australian and overseas nonviolence developments would form a useful addition to study in this area.

## 11.7 CONCLUSION

Active resistance is an extremely significant development in nonviolence in Australia. It represents a major change in Australian nonviolence, continuing the move away from polite 'old-school-tie' lobbying that had exemplified much environmental campaigning prior to the Nightcap and Franklin blockades. Those blockades had been the first major environmental actions which used direct action, with the Franklin blockade employing an orthodox form of nonviolence. In the following years, the eco-pax movement moved towards more radical forms of blockading, forms that were extremely effective in

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<sup>3</sup> These are mentioned in Table Two and section 12.3.5.

<sup>4</sup> For example, a colleague and I took ecotage information to Borneo (as mentioned in the footnote to section 12.5).

<sup>5</sup> See Evans (1998), or Wheatley (1996) for discussions of UK road protests.



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resistance to state and corporate actions, particularly in tandem with political and corporation lobbying and legal action. Some of these developments also influenced campaigns overseas, which themselves developed and then influenced Australian actions.

What is also clear is that nonviolence is an evolving praxis. It should be recognised as such, and encouraged to continue thus. It is not something created in the past which has little relevance today. It is a developing, constantly changing praxis, which is not 'set in stone' or owned by a particular group of theorists. Because nonviolence training at the Franklin was compulsory, it came to be seen by some as an inflexible set of rules imposed from above, rules that were developed by Gandhi and Martin Luther King decades ago, and which are no longer appropriate for this day and place. The case studies, however, show that nonviolence praxis is far from a static doctrine and set of practices. It encompasses a wide range of beliefs and practices. There is no single agreement in the movement as to what constitutes nonviolence. There are some shared areas of agreement, such as an abhorrence of violence towards people, but many areas of difference. The development of active resistance further splintered any unified notion of nonviolence. It is important for nonviolence educators to recognise and acknowledge this, and not seek to impose some monopolistic doctrine from above. Although this happened at the Franklin, and the blockade was a success, the backlash against nonviolence created by such practices continues today to the detriment of the movement.

Within this evolving but under-theorised praxis, there are many activists working today in Australia and overseas to keep nonviolence relevant and effective. It has been adapted by modern activists to suit their own circumstances: time, place, situation, group(s), opponents. Just as NAG and TWS activists rejected the conservative methods of the ACF with more direct action (Hutton & Connors 1999:153-164), so too have later Australian activists pushed against the limits of 'acceptable' nonviolence set by the hierarchies of groups such as TWS. Often they were rejected by such groups, left stranded at blockades, unfinanced and unsupported. Some activists were ostracized, although occasionally with good reason (such as the Tasmanian train hijackers). Yet, as a result of their actions, they have created a movement where such actions are now

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increasingly acceptable. Their actions generally preceded their theory, as they adapted to pressing circumstances with innovation. As I have theorised in retrospect, most of these actions should be considered nonviolent, albeit under a revised definition of nonviolence. These innovations have thus, in a major benefit to the movement, widened the range of options for nonviolent activists.



Figure 109: Occupation of moving bulldozer in Dingo State Forest, 1993.



Figure 110: Activists board working bulldozer, Dingo State Forest, 1993.

## chapter twelve

### FURTHER NONVIOLENCE CONCLUSIONS

#### 12.1 INTRODUCTION

As we saw in the previous chapter, there was an extremely significant development in Australian nonviolence with the widespread adoption and development of active resistance. In this chapter, I summarise and discuss some further findings about nonviolence in the Australian eco-pax movement which were raised in the case studies. Answering the first question of the thesis - about the evolution of nonviolence - I note important developments, such as in holism - for example, acceptance by many activists of indigenous sovereignty over Jabiluka - and community development during the NEFA blockades. I point to the improved understanding of conversion and the evolution of affinity group structures evidenced by the Cycle Against the Nuclear Cycle. I show other improvements in group dynamics and in consensus decision-making at Jabiluka. I also demonstrate an evolution in the use of emergent information technology to organise, communicate and globalise campaigns. Thus I show that in the period examined, development in nonviolence has been considerable, with recent actions showing significant differences to earlier ones. Clearly, nonviolence in Australia has evolved to suit local conditions and modern circumstances.

In addition, I address the thesis' second question of problems encountered in nonviolence praxis, by examining where nonviolence has not developed, or where major schisms erupted over issues such as holism - for example, protesters acting in a racist or sexist manner at Jabiluka - authority and power relations, and campaign tactics and directions. I note the lack of commitment to nonviolence by some organisers, and the minimal nonviolence training prior to some actions, despite the proven efficacy of such training in keeping actions nonviolent and thus effective. In keeping with this second question, I offer some suggestions for better resolving such schisms, such as more emic and flexible

## Further Nonviolence Conclusions

nonviolence theory, more nonviolence training, discipline and commitment, and further emphasis on the need for holism, diversity and radically-democratic structures, processes and methods.

Finally, I address the thesis' third question of the effectiveness of nonviolence, by showing that nonviolence has contributed significantly to the movement's successes at the Franklin River, in NSW's old-growth forests and at Jabiluka, although this role has rarely been recognised. Furthermore, I argue that where nonviolence has been absent or poorly-articulated, there have been obvious failures.

### 12.2 NONVIOLENCE DEVELOPMENTS

#### 12.2.1 HOLISM

##### 12.2.1.1 Land rights and social justice

Section 4.6.3 described how nonviolent activists strive for a holistic approach that recognises the interconnectedness of issues, and avoids dualistic behaviour. This section shows how there was some progress in the movement towards recognition of Aboriginal rights. As the Franklin case study showed, tensions surfaced between Tasmanian Aboriginal people and The Wilderness Society, with the latter making few attempts to include the former in campaign planning, or acknowledge Aboriginal sovereignty. The term 'wilderness' was considered an insult by many aborigines (see Langton 1998; Grossman 2003:13; Marsh 2003:3), because its implications of *terra nullius* ignored the occupation of the Franklin area over millennia by Aborigines. This debate continues to the present day, with TWS making better attempts to recognise indigenous rights, but refusing to change its name. This has the effect of turning indigenous people and their supporters away from the group (see Bayet 1994:28), and is thus exclusory rather than inclusive behaviour.

The case studies show a continuous progression towards holism in this respect, with stronger involvement of Kokatha people in the Roxby Downs protests. They were more included in the blockade's organisation, and their social justice and cultural claims were supported and reported by the non-indigenous blockaders. The forest blockades also show

## Further Nonviolence Conclusions

more respect being accorded to traditional owners such as the Gumbaingerri, who reciprocated by actively blockading and by issuing supportive press releases. These blockades also saw the creation of a Green/Black Alliance, although the placement of 'Green' before 'Black' in this title indicates that the power balance still lay with the non-indigenous environmentalists. The Cycle Against the Nuclear Cycle provides further evidence of non-indigenous activists seeking to include and work with a range of indigenous communities.

At Jabiluka, the eco-pax movement took a further step towards holism, with social justice issues being viewed by most blockaders as of equal importance to environmental and peace issues. More importantly, the balance of power swung away from the non-indigenous activists and towards the traditional owners:- their authority over both the blockade and the wider campaign was widely recognised. As blockader Monica Nugent writes:

[I]n a reversal of typical Australian power dynamics, it was the Mirrar people who decided what behaviour in the camp was appropriate.... And, on the whole, the protestors accepted that - they knew they were on Aboriginal land (2001:6).

The Mirrar clan was acknowledged as the traditional owners of the area, and their delegated representative, the Gundjhemmi Aboriginal Corporation, was acknowledged by most as the leader of the campaign, with veto power over actions and behaviour of blockaders. This is clear evidence that the non-indigenous activists had become more cognisant of indigenous issues, and had recognised the need to turn holistic theory into practice. It also demonstrates the resolve and eloquence of the Mirrar.

### 12.2.1.2 Community development

In some respects the NEFA blockades were more holistic than previous blockades. They did not rise and fall away, with people returning to far-flung homes, rarely to meet again, as with other blockades. The action was more organic, seamless, tied to the land and local social networks. Many NEFA activists lived nearby; their communes and homes became NEFA centres, and also introduced young activists to communal living. The blockades themselves were examples of moving communes, providing homes for many activists. The

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contacts established at these times enabled many people to find more permanent homes in the area.

The NEFA blockades also contributed cultural, educational and social benefits to the community, with the creation of a distinctive ‘feral’ subculture in the region (see Ricketts 2003:140-145). The insistence of blockaders on doing media appearances despite their ‘feral’ looks contrasted with the Franklin, where TWS stage-managed media interviews with clean-cut spokespeople. NEFA helped to legitimise and spread the ‘feral’ counterculture, as many ‘ferals’ showed themselves to be informed, articulate and confident. The two-fold (environmental and cultural) success of these blockades is thus a strong argument against those organisers who seek to tightly control the appearances of media spokespeople, thereby marginalising activists of eccentric appearance. NEFA was able to save forests *and* challenge cultural norms of self-expression.

### 12.2.2 GROUP DYNAMICS, CONVERSION: developments evidenced by anti-nuclear bicycle rides

Chapter Nine showed that there had been considerable nonviolence development between The Bike Ride of 1986 and the Cycle Against the Nuclear Cycle (CANC) of 1998, particularly in terms of group dynamics and strategies of conversion. The Bike Ride had been over-ambitious and too large, with a massed group that met for the first time at the start of the ride. It was unwieldy in organisation and communication, and quickly became racked with dissension, splintering into factions. It held a number of confrontational protest actions, but gained little media coverage. It was mainly received with hostility in outback towns.

By contrast, CANC demonstrated a better understanding of the nonviolence tenet of conversion. Using only a well-formed affinity group and supporters, CANC was more successful in terms of media, achieving favourable coverage through newspapers and a self-produced video documentary. The Cycle Against the Nuclear Cycle built on earlier actions such as The Bike Ride but was less oppositional than them. Its group dynamics

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were superior, a factor which enhanced its engagement with the general public. Its affinity group structure had a synergistic energy of love and good-humour that could not help energising local activists and influencing communities wherever it went. As seen in section 10.4.6, CANC also achieved better liaison with indigenous communities *en route*, evidence of a stronger commitment to social justice. CANC's manageable size and organisational efficiency also aided its physical goal of riding from Melbourne to Jabiluka.

### 12.2.3 GROUP DYNAMICS, TRAINING, TACTICS: further developments at Jabiluka

The Jabiluka blockade displayed significant evolution from previous blockades. Meeting procedures used consensus-decision making (unlike in the forest blockades), and showed an improved understanding and practice of consensus decision-making from the Franklin and Roxby blockades. This indicates that the movement had improved its learning of this process over time, and with a successive generation of activists. Communication was sophisticated, with a radio tent at the blockade, and phone, computer and fax communication at the Gundjhembi Aboriginal Corporation's office in nearby Jabiru. Camp organisation/'housekeeping' was generally superior to previous blockades and achieved with less fuss, with excellent kitchen, shower and toilet facilities (see Armstrong 1998:7), and large tents for general use, such as meetings, music 'jamming' and making props for street-theatre. Despite its size and transient nature, there was great trust within the blockade community, with valuable musical equipment being freely available for use. Returning to Monica Nugent:

[the acknowledgement of the authority of the Mirrar], together with the communal organisational structure of the camp seem to indicate that at Jabiluka, the most contemporary, progressive elements of ecofeminism were being practiced (2001:6).

Training in nonviolence, while not comprehensive, nevertheless aided the Jabiluka blockade by preparing people for action. There was also evidence that the movement has developed a culture of nonviolence, since it was widely and seemingly implicitly understood as necessary. Furthermore, there was evidence that this culture is evolving, as shown by the acceptance as nonviolent of active resistance techniques at the start of the blockade. These techniques further developed in an artistic direction, for example with the



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frill-necked lizard lock-on discussed in sections 10.4 and 10.5. The ban by GAC on secretive actions, understandable for cultural reasons, had the important consequence of leading to the creation of sophisticated artistic actions in tandem with massed civil disobedience. (This consequence is explored in the next chapter.) Such actions, although more orthodox than active resistance, nevertheless were still effective in gaining media attention, in slowing work on the mine, and in pressuring the state through burdening its prison and justice systems.

The Jabiluka campaign also showed tactical development and evidence of the maturation of the movement, in that it employed a diversified and effective approach. As with the NEFA campaign, different groups worked in different areas, forming a relatively harmonious symbiosis. Methods used included the blockade, political lobbying on a national and international stage, city marches, street-theatre, art exhibitions, and actions directed at the corporations backing the uranium mine. The sophistication of the latter types of action grew significantly, with the targeting of corporations through high-level lobbying complementing widespread protests and direct actions (for example, at branches of the Westpac bank). The grassroots protests gave the wider public the opportunity to take action through changing their bank accounts, or selling their shares. Thus this diversified approach created social change through a variety of groups using different methods to target all of society, not just elites or the masses. The effectiveness of this approach can be seen by the withdrawal of much of the capital supporting the mine, and ultimately by the discarding of the project altogether.

### 12.2.4 TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENTS

The use of communications technology, and the technology itself, developed considerably over the period examined. The radio communications at the forest blockades, for example, were considerably better than at Roxby Downs, and even an improvement on the exemplary communications at the Franklin, thanks to new technology such as mobile phones and better radios, and new combinations of these. Mobile phones, land lines and a satellite phone aided CANC's advance communication with groups such as the Arid Lands

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Environment Centre in Alice Springs. This enabled the riders to get much support in towns and add to their support crew. One rider also used a new type of bicycle - a 'recumbent', in which he was lower and more supine; its efficiency aided his achievement of CANC's physical objective.

The development of information and digital technologies in the twenty year period examined was considerable, and it is inevitable that this had an impact on nonviolence (and artistic protest). The internet – or 'Pegasus', as it was then termed - was seen early by activists, such as Ian Peters of Lismore's Rainforest Information Centre<sup>1</sup>, as a valuable tool for social change, through facilitating the rapid spread of ideas and information, garnering of support, and potentially reducing consumption of paper. Many of these predictions came true<sup>2</sup>, with communication via email proving cheaper than by telephone (particularly over long distances) once one has the computer, modem and expertise. Transmission (of long or short messages) to large groups is also faster using emails than the previous 'telephone trees', and can occur more often. It is easy to send large documents, (colour) pictures, movies and music. The internet consumes little energy, and is accessible from public libraries and universities. Websites are also important nodes of information dissemination. The development of the internet was thus an enormous technological advance that affected the Jabiluka campaign particularly. In this campaign, the use of email and websites helped groups that were under-resourced and widely-separated geographically to communicate effectively and to organise on a national and even international scale.

Importantly, the internet enabled a **globalisation** of the campaign to a much greater degree than in previous campaigns. Although internationally co-ordinated protests had occurred in the 1950s peace movement, and trade unions had supported overseas struggles since the 1880s (Boughton, Bob 2005, pers. comm., 18 March), co-ordination was now considerably

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<sup>1</sup> RIC was discussed in sections 3.3 and 3.5.2.

<sup>2</sup> Unforeseen developments included online petitions, the 'jamming' or overloading of corporate websites, and computer hacking by activists to disrupt military computers or to divert people from corporate websites to activist ones (see Scalmer 2002:171-173; The Hacktivists [video recording] 2002).

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easier due to the speed and convenience of the internet<sup>3</sup>. International condemnation of the Jabiluka miners and government, and support for the owners and blockaders flooded into the country, and several well-coordinated international actions occurred. A number of websites continue to aid the local and international anti-uranium movement by providing detailed information on (or links to) the Jabiluka campaign and the industry (eg [www.mirrar.net](http://www.mirrar.net); [www.whoseland.com](http://www.whoseland.com) *Mirrar*; [www.ecnt.org](http://www.ecnt.org); [www.antenna.nl/wise](http://www.antenna.nl/wise)). This technology (for those who can access it - and many cannot due to remoteness or poverty) thus reduces the isolation of activists and provides easy conduits to information. As Brian Martin has suggested, “the essence of satyagraha is communication” (2001:90), so the internet has significantly aided nonviolent practice.

As with most technology, however, computer use brings its own ethical dilemmas. Computer manufacturer IBM, for example, has a long history of involvement in the military-industrial complex (Barnet & Muller 1974:60), while the inbuilt obsolescence of computers is contributing to landfill problems, particularly in less developed countries (Green 2002). A further note of caution is sounded by deep ecologist Jerry Mander, who argues that despite the many benefits for activists of the new technology, it is the elites who benefit much more than any social movements, as corporations, banks and global trade bureaucracies gain staggering new power:

For while we sit happily at our PCs editing our copy, sending our e-mails, designing our little web pages, transnational corporations are using their global networks 24-hours a day, at a scale and at a speed that makes our level of empowerment seem pathetic by comparison (2001:42; see also Suaranta & Tomperi 2002:35-7).

I return to technology in the next chapter. Having discussed the evolution of Australian nonviolence above, I now turn to the problems it has encountered, the thesis’ second question.

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<sup>3</sup> This could also be seen with 2003 peace protests, which formed the largest globally-coordinated peace protest ever (United for Peace and Justice 2003).

## 12.3 NONVIOLENCE PROBLEMS

### 12.3.1 Sexism, Racism, Homophobia

Earlier chapters, particularly that on Jabiluka, have explored the extent to which sexism and racism continued in the movement. Mirrar control of the Jabiluka blockade led to difficulties with activists wanting to perform more militant forms of actions, and specifically with those who refused to acknowledge GAC's authority. Further difficulties arose because of what many perceived was sexist behaviour by a minority of men. Similarly, there were discussions at TWS in the 1990s indicating that some members had been targeted in a homophobic manner. As I argued in those chapters, such behaviours had a divisive effect on blockades and campaigns, turning people away from joining actions, and creating schisms that required the diversion of enormous amounts of energy in attempts to resolve them. Following ecofeminists such as Schmah (1998:12-16), I have emphasised the need for holism, to see the interconnected nature of issues. For example, as Andy Smith, a Cherokee feminist and social justice activist, has written,- "colonialism is a fundamental aspect of the domination of nature because indigenous people suffer the brunt of environmental degradation" (in Nugent 2001:6). It is only by recognising this interconnection of issues and acceding to calls for land rights and indigenous social justice, that the eco-pax movement can become a truly united force.

Similarly, despite the pioneering role of women in many parts of the movement (see Jones 1985:1; Burgmann 1993:190; Gaard 1998:24; Hutton & Connors 1999:237) and Nugent's comments about ecofeminism at Jabiluka (in section 12.2.3) there is still much sexism in the movement. As well as the patriarchal attitudes evidenced in the forest blockades and at Jabiluka, sexism has been observed as groups become formalised and some hierarchical roles are created, with these roles tending to be filled by men (see Gaard 1998:168-9; Schmah 1998:64-65). Rodda (in Schmah 1998:30) suggests some affirmative action and other strategies (such as separate meetings for women) that can ensure women's voices do not become drowned out by those of men. Schmah encourages people to challenge dualisms and oppression of the 'other', to respect diversity, and to investigate ecofeminism, because it is "the most holistically radical theory of our time" (2001:2).

### 12.3.2 Tactical tensions/effective diversity

We have seen in the preceding chapter how tensions arising from the imposition of orthodox nonviolence at the Franklin led to more active resistance at Roxby and particularly in the forest blockades. Tensions over the best tactics for a campaign were also evident at Jabiluka, with ACF and TWS withdrawing support for the blockade to campaign for the election of the ALP, and concentrating on lobbying businesses, rather than organising city-based rallies to build a mass movement, because these rallies were seen by some as too confrontational (see Thomas 1998:14). This echoes the problems ensuing from the environment movement's support of the ALP in 1983, with, according to Green (1998:14), cooption by the ALP weakening the movement before it reached its maturity, leading to a decade-long decline in the movement's effectiveness. Long-term FoE activist Cam Walker is one of the critics of a reformist approach, where

mainstream environmental activism in countries like Australia tends to be consciously middle-class and seeks to appeal to the existing power structures to gain environmental protection (2002:52).

Walker argues too that Australian environmentalism is very insular, and needs to globalise its goals and strategies, and needs to ally itself more with social justice movements. The case studies have shown some progress of the mainstream groups in the movement towards embracing social justice and towards globalising; they have also shown such groups' conservatism with regard to active resistance, and their avoidance of controversial spokespeople and actions.<sup>4</sup> Such groups have also been urban-centric as well as hierarchical<sup>5</sup>. A challenge for the movement is thus to check the tendency for large organisations to become conservative, by making them transparent and accountable to their grassroots members, and ensuring that their work is holistic, globally relevant, and aims for fundamental social change as well as reformist successes.

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<sup>4</sup> Section 13.2.3 discusses the latter further.

<sup>5</sup> Bruce Taylor, a Greens candidate for the 2004 federal election, has experienced the same conservatism from the Australian Greens hierarchy, being requested to get a haircut and a more respectable email address, and issue a press release inflammatory to farmers, all of which he refused to do (2004, pers. comm., 4 August).

## Further Nonviolence Conclusions

At the other end of the spectrum to TWS and the ACF were vociferous advocates of minority militant direct action, who argued that marches and lobbying achieved little. Such minority actions can be inspiring, but - as Malloch and Fuller (1998:9) observe - if they are all the campaign consists of, activists quickly become discouraged and burnt-out. Despite my criticisms of the more mainstream groups, my understanding now is that the movement benefits from a wide range of groups, using a variety of tactics. As U.S. *Earth First!* activist Helen Woods argues:

So what if Sierra Club [mainstream US conservation group] feels like doing the courtyard scene! *Let them do it!* ... That's such an important avenue. Why are we at each other's throats just because our ways are different and our means are different? We all have the same goal - to save our Mother (in Scarce 1990:265).

These arguments can be situated within the reformist/revolutionary schism discussed in section 4.7.2, where I argued that both extremes can make worthwhile contributions, and that maintaining an isolated, purist stance hostile to others in the movement achieves little. Acceptance of diversity, and working together despite differences is a holistic strategy that rises above dualistic skirmishing. Doyle discusses the Terania, Franklin, Roxby and Jabiluka blockades within the similar debate of structuralism versus pluralism, described in section 4.7.3. He views (with some qualifications) the Terania and Franklin campaigns as pluralist, legitimate politics that relied on 'appeals-to-elites', whereas the anti-nuclear campaigns are seen as upholding structuralist traditions. There is some truth to this analysis, but it oversimplifies complex campaigns, all of which had elements of both traditions. That is, there were immediate goals which were sought by appeals-to-elites, and there were long-term, fundamental structuralist goals which were worked towards, in varying degrees, by the articulation and implementation of holistic philosophies, and by radically-democratic group dynamics. Again, both legitimate and illegitimate methods were used. The organising bodies of those blockades all aimed to change government policy about logging, damming or uranium mining. As Hay rightly notes, the only realistic way to save the Franklin was to get the Federal government to override the Tasmanian government (in Doyle 2000:131).

## Further Nonviolence Conclusions

Many activists were involved at both forest and anti-nuclear blockades; we shared the same commitment to structural change at both. However, we would not have travelled to those blockades merely for long-term change, which is so nebulous a concept that it could be worked on at home. We also had the specific objective of securing government intervention. If anything, there was greater commitment to fundamental change at the Franklin than elsewhere. In addition to the blockade's challenge to the anthropocentric values of mainstream society, was a challenge to the violence and hierarchical nature of the state through the blockade's commitment to nonviolence and radical democracy. While TWS did rely on an appeal-to-elites, this approach was criticised by a number of blockaders and TWS members, leading to TWS moves towards a more structuralist approach (Lambert 1984:208; Runciman et al unpub. p.6).

Again, it is difficult to completely accept Doyle's generalisation that from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s outsider groups then became insider groups and concentrated on appeal-to-elites strategies, becoming on many occasions indistinguishable from the state, and driving the remaining radical groups underground (Doyle 2000:138-139). While that is often true of the elites of those groups, there remained many activists who worked tirelessly in outsider politics during that period, such as in rainforest and peace actions, The Bike Ride and old-growth forest blockades (see Table Two). Some, such as Jo Vallentine, who became the world's first person elected to parliament solely on an anti-nuclear platform, did not lose contact with their roots, but maintained a commitment to radical activism (Kearns 2004:93-107).

Again, accepting a diversity of groups and methods would help to avoid dualistic schisms, and, as the Jabiluka campaign showed, can be very effective. French peace researcher Jean-Marie Muller writes that the reformist and structuralist approaches:

often clash with each other as if they were irreconcilable. But I see them as completely compatible: we should choose both and create a coherent movement (1991:13).

This argument has elements of post-structuralism<sup>6</sup>, following Elaine Stratford's argument that post-structuralism discards the binary opposites of, for example, nature and culture, or the masculine and the feminine (in Doyle 2000:189-190). This analysis moves beyond the binary opposites of structuralism and pluralism, while recognising the value of both approaches.<sup>7</sup> That is, there is value in viewing society as having significant power blocs, such as corporate and governmental elites (although their power is complex and ever-changing). However, the masses should also be seen as having agency and some power through the possibility of withdrawal of consent, as discussed in section 4.6.1. Incremental, reformist change through legislation is important in the short-term, while the legitimacy this can give to elites can be opposed by long-term strategies to replace unrepresentative systems of governance with systems that are radically democratic, and to challenge fundamentally such modernist notions as that of infinite economic growth on a finite planet.

### 12.3.3 Consensus

Not all the actions initiated by the dissenters against orthodox nonviolence have been beneficial. The retention of voting for large meetings of groups such as NEFA, rather than using consensus, continues a disempowering method of decision-making. Consensus is a valuable method. It is new to most people, and like any new technology or method, will inevitably be difficult at first. However, with practice it becomes efficient as well as empowering. Contrary to many of the critics, it *can* work in large groups. Thousands of people at a Quaker meeting in Europe used consensus to decide to boycott South African goods during apartheid (Spence, Rebecca 2002, pers. comm., 18 March). In Australia, groups of several hundred have used it effectively, as happened at the women's peace protest at Pine Gap in 1983 (Finch, Barbara 2002, pers. comm., 3 February), or as I observed at the Students and Sustainability Conference (Southern Cross University) in

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<sup>6</sup> See Sarup (1993) and Lloyd (1995:80-83) for detailed discussions of structuralism and post-structuralism.

<sup>7</sup> Martin (1989) argues that structural analyses are important but can lead to 'paralysis of analysis', whereas the consent theory's pluralist approach encourages activism, and is often complemented by informal structural analyses by local activists (see also Summy 1995:166).



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1996<sup>8</sup>. Certainly, as Cohen and Ruby have argued (1997:245), such groups have many internal similarities, but they also have many differences. Part of the art of consensus involves finding and augmenting those similarities, rather than becoming mired in the differences.

Roxby blockader Denise Smekal wrote after the Roxby action that:

[Consensus] may be subject to an undercurrent of manipulation and power play, with more dominant persons having the greatest influence in the decision, thus ensuring less democracy than it seems to promise. Meetings can be long and cumbersome, resulting in burnout and disillusionment. Furthermore, decisions can sometimes be watered-down, sacrificing quality in the process. These issues need to be confronted and worked through to ensure that consensus in practice more closely reflects its ideology (1984:6).

In groups such as TWS these issues were worked through often, both in practice, and to a lesser extent in theory. My experiences at national TWS meetings in the 1990s, were that they flowed well, were usually calm and explicitly excluded personal attacks, enabled everyone to speak and feel empowered, and despite some structure, displayed an enjoyable level of informality. These meetings dealt successfully with difficult agendas involving a widely-dispersed organisation and its network of shops. Most people seem to have left these meetings satisfied with the outcomes. The blocking of consensus by one man at a 1994 meeting was dealt with in a 'Fishbowl' fashion, where the whole group observed and had limited input to a smaller representative group meeting. Although this took some time, ultimately the group was able to find a solution. During large actions such as Pine Gap 1983 and 1987 and later Jabiluka, consensus was found to be effective if representatives of all the affinity groups met and discussed options, and then, if necessary, returned to their affinity groups. The job of representing an affinity group was alternated to prevent the build-up of hierarchies.

Decentralising the movement and minimising hierarchy can also avoid many of the problems Cohen and Ruby (1997) and others had where they believed consensus was

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<sup>8</sup> In 2005 consensus was being used by the Australian Greens (Schultz, Pat 2005, pers. comm. 28 February), a growing force in Australian politics.

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stifling individuality, diversity and flamboyance. For example, if the larger action is comprised of numerous affinity groups all empowered to make its own decisions about how to participate in the action, as occurred at the global justice protests of Seattle 2000, consensus can be used widely and efficiently while creating diversity:

We did not interpret consensus to mean unanimity. The only mandatory agreement was to act within the nonviolence guidelines. Beyond that the ... organizers set a tone that valued autonomy and freedom over conformity, and stressed coordination rather than pressure to conform (Starhawk 2002:55).

The practice of consensus can also be seen as an end in itself, in that it encourages frank discussion and group solidarity rather than the divisive 'number-crunching' of voting. Although difficult, it can be empowering. To return to Smekal:

[C]onflict is inevitable, but it is the process of working through and resolving this conflict which provides the source of satisfaction ... The beauty of consensus involves the idea of power stemming from our own inner resources, sharing our feelings and ideas in an atmosphere of mutual dependence and support. This is a refreshing contrast to what we are used to thinking- that power comes from independence, from controlling people and from depriving others of our love and knowledge ... [A]ll in all, my experience of consensus decision making has been a positive one (Smekal 1984:6).

It is this empowering and democratic aspect of consensus that makes it an important tool of the eco-pax movement. This is why its problems need to be resolved, where possible, and why it needs to be embraced, practiced and developed further by the movement.

### 12.3.4 Hierarchical organisation

As with other blockades, the Jabiluka blockade saw a continuation of hierarchical organisation, with the significant difference that Aboriginal people were at the top of the hierarchy. Nevertheless, when this hierarchy extended its authority from the blockade to the national campaign, its paucity of personnel and resources slowed the campaign, frustrating and demoralising many activists. A better balance between holism and grassroots democracy would probably benefit campaigns, and this may occur in future if non-indigenous activists develop a better understanding of indigenous issues, which would then lead to Aboriginal people developing greater trust in such activists.

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An important finding of my research is that Australian nonviolence changed considerably (often developing for the better) when movement structures were anarchistic rather than hierarchical. There are clear parallels overseas. As US activist Starhawk notes of the disciplined and courageous actions of most of the activists who shut down the opening meeting of the World Trade Organisation in Seattle, 1999, despite considerable police brutality:

No centralized leader could have coordinated the scene in the midst of the chaos, and none was needed – the organic, autonomous organization we had proved far more powerful and effective. No authoritarian figure could have compelled people to hold a blockade line while being tear-gasses – but empowered people free to make their own decisions did choose to do that (Starhawk 2002:54-55)

Nevertheless, the anarchistic ideal that grassroots democracy implies may need modification towards the acceptance of some forms of hierarchy, such as the councils of Elders who preside over many indigenous communities. Something similar already exists in supposedly anarchistic organisations such as TWS and NEFA; for the sake of consistency of ideals and practice, it would be useful to acknowledge this hierarchy and codify it or work to limit it. Detailed research in this area would be invaluable.

### 12.3.5 Commitment needed

Despite the emergence of active resistance, there are still protesters who oppose nonviolence. They believe it limits the scope of their protest, and they can be vocal in their opposition. Hence the poster by the National Union of Students Women's Collective about a Sydney protest against the World Trade Organisation in November 2002, proclaiming that “we support a diversity of tactics”, rather than advocating nonviolent tactics. This is a global phenomenon, with for example, the ‘visions for action’ statement of August 2001 by the US-based Mobilisation for Global Justice indicating “a rather tepid commitment to nonviolence and suggesting a tolerance for destructive tactics that seems contrary to the declared goal of upholding nonviolence” (Cortright 2002:para 7).

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Cortright further notes a reluctance in the global justice movement to mount more concerted efforts to disown vandalism and streetfighting:

[I]t's impossible to control the actions of everyone who participates in a demonstration, of course, but more vigorous efforts to ensure non-violence and prevent destructive behaviour are possible and necessary. A 95 percent commitment to non-violence is not enough. The discipline must be total if the political benefits of the non-violent method are to be realised (2002:para 7).

Ricketts (2003:138) and Cohen and Ruby (1997:247) justifiably denounce the efforts by conservation groups to impose orthodox nonviolence on blockades and hierarchically control them, but they suggest no methods for dealing with violence from within the movement, other than to allow experienced blockaders to control events. This too leads to a hierarchy, as I experienced with Cohen at the 1988 protest against the mining for limestone of Mt Etna, near Rockhampton (see Table Two). Cohen lambasted a group of us for organising and carrying out a boisterous, musical action, because it had apparently disrupted his own secretive action. How were we to know? His secretiveness resulted in his anger at our action, and caused our feelings of resentment at being criticised for not anticipating Cohen's every move! The build-up of a hierarchy, as we saw in Chapter Seven, was also evident in the NEFA blockades. This reliance on experienced blockaders for maintaining the nonviolence of blockades is too *ad hoc* to deal with emergency situations in the middle of a large action. These should be quickly resolved rather than being the time for involved meetings about nonviolence philosophy.

A *laissez-faire* approach to nonviolence is not a valid long-term solution. The commitment to nonviolence needs to be as strong as the commitment to other aspects of social change, if nonviolence is to be effective. 'Paying lip service' to it without embracing its more difficult aspects is as bad as not using it at all, for it denigrates the praxis and its more committed practitioners, and the broader social change movements within which it operates.

This raises an important question: how to keep a movement nonviolent, if not from above, by a hierarchy? Is it possible to separate activists who want to use violent tactics from nonviolent activists, so the latter's actions are not affected by the former? U.S. protest

## Further Nonviolence Conclusions

movements lost many activists because of this problem (Jezer 1993:182), so at the Seattle 1999 global justice rallies people wore signs on their backs reading “NON-VIOLENT” and in smaller letters “RESISTER OF GLOBAL EXPLOITATION” (Hawken 2001:23).

Another solution is to

... announc[e] in the call to the demonstration that nonviolence will be strictly adhered to - those who cannot commit to such a discipline are asked not to come; those who do come and find they cannot hold their commitment, to leave (Woito 1997:362).

Another possibility is for organisers to create separate blockades, although this would create some logistical, financial and other difficulties, and both actions may still be seen as one by the mainstream media. Another solution is to require all actionists to sign an agreement on nonviolence, and to undergo training or prove previous training and experience. Policing this might prove difficult, and *agents provocateurs* could still infiltrate and discredit the action through violence. These problems, however, can be overcome by marshals and groups of peacekeepers (see Sharp 1973:630-631).

Media statements can also be made denouncing violent activists, such as that issued by the Sydney Walk Against The War Coalition (SWAWC), condemning the Democratic Socialist Party, Resistance, Students Against War, Books Not Bombs, and “a very small number of people identifying as anarchists” (SWAWC 2003:1) for the violence these groups were involved in during a march in 2003. The media release criticised them for failure in their duty of care, failure to communicate adequately with groups such as the National Union of Students to ensure marshals and proper equipment, and stepping outside the coalition’s agreement with the police. It also criticised the actions of police in provoking and inflaming violence, and the hypocrisy of pro-war media commentators concentrating on these relatively minor incidents while promoting “the massive violence of war and invasion” (SWAWC 2003:1). Such statements, while valuable, can rarely undo the damage of adverse media already caused by violent incidents.

## 12.4 FURTHER OBSERVATIONS

### 12.4.1 Nonviolence training

The success of both the Franklin and the Jabiluka blockades can be partly attributed to the nonviolence training that activists received prior to the actions. Training is an important way to ensure that nonviolence and its components, such as the consent theory of power, are better understood and practiced. An understanding that nonviolence is part of a holistic drive for radical and long-term change can prevent the burnout and disillusionment which can occur if activists do not see immediate results of their action, disillusionment which can lead to abandonment of nonviolence. An understanding of nonviolence praxis, for example, can show that the Roxby blockades, while seemingly a failure, were in fact a precursor of more active resistance in the movement, and helped to build it into a force which would enlist 95 percent of Australians to oppose French nuclear testing in the Pacific Ocean (Hymans 2000:15) and which would close the Jabiluka mine. Training can educate activists about the subtle nature of real change, beyond the headlines of sensational actions and parliamentary debates, and in the heads and hearts of individuals and the community.

Training can also impress upon activists the need for open and holistic praxis, and for means to be as important as ends, so that change is fundamental rather than merely reformist. It can thus help avoid many of the blockade problems relating to racism, sexism, homophobia and passive smoking discussed in this work. The sexist behaviour at Jabiluka, for example, eroded the solidarity and thus effectiveness of the blockade. While long debates about sexism may not seem appropriate for a blockade meeting, they may be necessary to resolve the issue satisfactorily, and help to prevent future incidents. However, such discussions can frustrate direct actionists, and it would be better that education about these issues occurs in information dissemination/calls to blockade, in training/introduction sessions prior to the blockade, and generally within the movement.

Training can also facilitate use of consensus, and contribute to democratic structures. Inevitably, training has had its problems (see Runciman et al, unpub, pp. 19-21; Nonviolence Training Project 2005:19-28; Clark 1986:60-62), so further research is needed

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to improve training and develop the best models. An obvious suggestion arising from this thesis is to encourage activists to embrace the arts and create actions that utilise humour and flair.

### 12.4.2 The need for communication and respectful debate

The backlashes against nonviolence and its elements, such as training and consensus, could be prevented by better communication between city-based activists and those 'in the bush', between peak bodies and grassroots activists, and between hierarchies of such bodies and the general membership. The movement need to develop better ways of resolving differences. Hysterical, highly personal and threatening attacks on people with opposing viewpoints, as I and others experienced in the Jabiluka campaign, and as Doyle endured because of his critiques of the Australian environment movement (see Doyle's 1994 article 'Dissent Within the Environment Movement') are divisive, dualistic and counterproductive. Respectful debate and critiques are vital for a healthy, evolving social movement; so too are flexibility and diversity to accommodate our many differences while working towards common goals.

There have been sophisticated discussions of various aspects of nonviolence in the magazine *Nonviolence Today* (such as 'Covert or Open', 1999:7), in some issues of the journal *Social Alternatives*, and on the *Australian Nonviolence Network* website, the most relevant of which have been referred to. The first of these fora, however, is now defunct; the second tends to be quite theoretical and academic rather than emic, while the third is a web forum for members only. Rarely is there in-depth discussion of nonviolence in the broad eco-pax movement, at blockades, in Environment Centre newsletters, or in weekly papers such as *Green Left Weekly*. This needs to be remedied if the movement is to avoid recurring dualistic schisms over strategies, tactics and behaviour in campaigns, and if it is to advance as an effective nonviolent movement, diverse but unified.

## 12.5 EFFECTIVENESS

Although many complex factors are involved in the success or failure of blockades, the case studies showed that nonviolent praxis has been a key ingredient in the successes of the eco-pax movement,- at the Franklin, in the old-growth forests of New South Wales and at Jabiluka. The Franklin blockade is a good case study, because all blockaders were well trained in nonviolence, and nonviolence was a constant topic of conversation, permeating the whole action. More than 1400 people were arrested in civil disobedience actions – making it one of the largest and most spectacularly successful actions of its kind in the world (Summy 1993:119) - yet there were almost no reports of violence by protestors, including violence towards property.

Conversely, where nonviolence has been poorly implemented, or not implemented at all, campaigns have been less successful. A contrasting case study is the NEFA blockade of old growth forest logging at Carrai in 1992. Here there was no nonviolence training, little discussion of nonviolence, and a disdain for nonviolence by some. Sabotage of a bulldozer was carried out one night<sup>9</sup>. As a consequence of the backlash created in the media, and by loggers, State Forests and locals, NEFA felt obliged to withdraw their support for the blockade, which subsequently collapsed. The area was logged. We saw also in Chapter Seven, that the ill-disciplined brawling of the Roxby Downs protests resulted in vitriolic media, a focus on law-and-order issues rather than environmental, social justice and peace issues, and the failure of the blockade to grow or stop the uranium mine. Although these blockades had major differences, it seems clear that where disciplined nonviolence permeated an action, it grew into a successful mass campaign, whereas an action where nonviolence was absent or ill-articulated was less likely to meet its objectives.

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<sup>9</sup> As discussed in section 4.8.1, sabotage should not occur in conjunction with blockades, but it can be appropriate at other times. For example, the tribal people of Borneo are a 'movement of crisis', who requested me to bring them sabotage information and aid their activities, actions which I felt were justifiable given their desperate and remote situation (see Branagan 1994:70). This is another area which would greatly benefit from further research.



## Further Nonviolence Conclusions

The Franklin campaign's success publicised nonviolence as an effective tool of social change. It showed that nonviolence did not die with the assassinations of Gandhi and Martin Luther King, as the theoretical reliance on them might indicate, but that it is a continuing tradition and it can be effective and relevant in the modern world. The success of the blockade (and election of the ALP) convinced many of the blockaders, including myself, of the efficacy of such actions. This had a flow-on effect in other campaigns, with 1983 Roxby protest leader Nadine Williams estimating that one-quarter of the people at that protest were veterans of the Franklin (in Buckley 1983:3). The Franklin success empowered us, gave us hope, and showed that our actions were worthwhile. This was an important lesson in an age where many of us felt deep despair about the environmental crisis, and paralysing fears that the mutually-assured destruction (MAD) doctrine of the US and the USSR would lead to nuclear war (see Macy and Seed 1983).

Blockades after the Franklin also enjoyed considerable success. As Chapters Eight and Eleven showed, the active resistance and legal and political campaigning of NEFA led to the preservation of hundreds of thousands of hectares of old-growth forests. It also legitimised active resistance as a valid and viable method of action, and influenced non-violent methods in other countries. It had significant political and legislative ramifications. It also augmented political activism locally, and had other socio-cultural effects, such as community development and significant instrumental, communicative and emancipatory learning. The Cycle Against the Nuclear Cycle and the campaign against uranium mining at Jabiluka were also highly successful, leading to the closure of the mine and the abandonment of most plans to mine there in the future. In all these cases, activist networks were initiated or strengthened, people were empowered by their successes, and nonviolence was further validated as a method of social change. Even the actions that seemed to have failed, such as the Roxby blockades and The Bike Ride, can be viewed as contributing to a shift in public opinion about both uranium mining and protest. They trialled active resistance methods, and built networks ranging from the desert-dwelling Kokatha and Arabunna to city-based environmentalists. Thus these actions made valuable contributions to the success at Jabiluka, as well as to the success

## Further Nonviolence Conclusions

at Billa Kalina (near Roxby Downs) in South Australia, where a proposed dump of radioactive materials was prevented in 2002 (World Information Service on Energy 2002).

### 12.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter has added weight to the conclusion of the preceding chapter: that nonviolence in Australia has evolved considerably over the period examined. In addition to the development of active resistance, the eco-pax movement has shown a significant movement in the direction of holism. In particular, this was reflected by the widespread acceptance of Mirrar traditional owner authority over the Jabiluka campaign,- evidence that non-indigenous conservationists were prepared to relinquish power in order to advance social justice needs. There was also evidence that movement learning has taken place in the group dynamics areas of consensus decision-making and affinity group structures, and in the use of the nonviolent technique of conversion. Advances in communication and organisation occurred via emergent technology, leading to increasing globalisation of protest.

A number of schisms, however, plagued the movement, with the racist, sexist or homophobic behaviour of some activists dividing groups, slowing movement growth and hindering effective action. More emphasis on holism and on pre-blockade training was advanced as a possible solution. The hierarchical structures and conservative methods of some organisations were seen as disempowering, impeding grassroots activism and the development of new tactics. More emphasis on grassroots methods, communication, radically-democratic group dynamics and a diversity of tactics (including the more radical ones of direct action and mass rallies) was suggested as a way forward. It was argued further that prevention of further tactical schisms could be facilitated by more commitment to nonviolence, and more discipline, training and debate in nonviolence. These steps would be aided if theorists produced more emic and flexible versions of nonviolence that were cognisant of the changing nature of nonviolent activism.

## Further Nonviolence Conclusions

Finally, it is apparent that nonviolence has played a key role in significant successes of the movement. These successes include the preservation of the Franklin River through orthodox nonviolence. The newer active resistance form of nonviolence has also been successful, particularly in preserving old-growth forests. The closure of the Jabiluka uranium mine can be attributed to a combination of orthodox nonviolence and active resistance. These actions have also had important political and legislative ramifications, and impacts that include the empowerment and education of individuals and activist groups, and the development of surrounding communities. The use of a multiplicity of approaches, including artistic activism and refined lobbying strategies, has also aided the eco-pax movement's effectiveness. The role of nonviolence has nevertheless rarely been given the widespread credence it deserves, and there is a continuing paucity of informed theoretical dialogue on nonviolence issues by the eco-pax movement. This thesis has attempted to contribute to rectifying that problem, although much more work is necessary.