

## **Chapter One:**

### **Roman Understanding of Advantage**

## Chapter One: Roman Understanding of Advantage

In order to determine the advantages and disadvantages associated with an annexation four key areas will be discussed in the methodology to follow: economic factors, geopolitical factors, systemic frustration and internal factors. These four key groupings will be used in the fourth chapter of this work to demonstrate that the annexation of Dacia was advantageous to Rome and Trajan. Before proceeding to the discussion of the methodology it is important to demonstrate that the Romans understood these factors in practice and that they could provide advantage. Therefore, this chapter will demonstrate that the Roman decision-making elite possessed an understanding of the advantages associated with each of these groupings (even though they would not have used the terms themselves).

The decision-making elite is an important element that needs to be considered in any examination of the causes of annexation. Augustus' reign saw the system of decision-making change substantially, from one in which the Senate collectively made decisions, to one where the emperor alone possessed the power to make decisions regarding whether the empire engaged in war

or annexed new territory.<sup>61</sup> Augustus' reign also saw the introduction of the *amici principis*, the friends of the emperor, as a force in the decision making process.<sup>62</sup> In a short amount of time this body took on a semi-official position. Juvenal's depiction of a meeting of Domitian's *amici* presents an interesting insight into how they could be utilised by an emperor.<sup>63</sup> In this instance each member of the *amici* was given the opportunity to express his opinion about the matter at hand: a large fish, and what the emperor should do with it. As absurd as the situation presented by Juvenal is, the importance of Juvenal's account stems from the fact that it demonstrates how contemporaries thought the *amici* were consulted by an emperor. The *amici* often included important military commanders with significant experience. Marcus Aurelius' *amici* during the Marcomannic Wars was largely comprised of former governors of the Danubian provinces.<sup>64</sup> Interestingly, in Juvenal's example of the *amici* consulting with Domitian, four of those summoned possessed military experience in the Danubian area,<sup>65</sup> strongly indicating the probability that

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<sup>61</sup> N.J.E. Austin and N.B. Rankov, *Exploratio, Military and Political Intelligence in the Roman World from the Second Punic War to the Battle of Adriaople* (London: Routledge, 1995), p.109.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p.110.

<sup>63</sup> *Juv., Sat.*, IV.147-9.

<sup>64</sup> Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy*, p.19.

<sup>65</sup> B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian* (London: Routledge, 1992), p.135.

in the case of decision-making concerning the Dacian situation, Domitian was employing experienced military men with some first hand knowledge of the region. This suggests a strong likelihood that an emperor engaged in detailed deliberations before committing to a course of action against a foreign power.

Rankov's discussion of the *amici principis* suggests that the introduction of these advisors benefited Rome considerably.<sup>66</sup> As he suggests, the decision-making process was no longer largely dictated by the political ends of and rivalries amongst members of the Senate.<sup>67</sup> The introduction of these 'professional advisors' led to the potential for Roman policy to become somewhat more consistent and allowed for long-term objectives and views to be considered, particularly as the post-Augustan *amici* were not changed on a six monthly basis,<sup>68</sup> nor were members elected by lot. Some *amici* actually advised successive emperors.<sup>69</sup> These positions were clearly of some importance and Tacitus' concerns over the *amici* of both Claudius and

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<sup>66</sup> Austin and Rankov, *Exploratio*, pp.110-11.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, p.111.

<sup>68</sup> Dio, LIII.21.4; Suet., *Aug.*, 35.3-4; *Ibid.*, p.110.

<sup>69</sup> As was the case with the young Domitian who was advised by Vespasian's friends: Suet., *Dom.*, 2.1.

Nero indicates that the Romans did think about who would be considered appropriate *amici* for the emperor to consult.<sup>70</sup>

There is evidence of the use of *amici* in several reigns and around several important decisions. Claudius' and Nero's *amici* are mentioned by Tacitus who is clearly concerned about the individuals filling these positions and Domitian's *amici* are mentioned by Juvenal, also in a less than favourable light. Marcus Aurelius mentions his own use of *amici* and how much weight he actually attributed to their advice,<sup>71</sup> and Commodus' discussions with his *amici* about the future of the Marcomannic War are presented by Dio.<sup>72</sup> The last example is perhaps the clearest one of the use of *amici* to advise on a significant military action. Juvenal's description of the events of Domitian's discussion with his *amici* suggests that Domitian was also using his *amici* to advise him regarding the issue of action against Dacia.

Evidence clearly indicates that the Romans attempted to gain as much information about a region that they were considering conquering prior to committing themselves to action. Domitian's use of advisors that had

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<sup>70</sup> Tac., Ann., XIII.6.

<sup>71</sup> A.R. Birley, *Marcus Aurelius, a Biography* (London: Routledge 1966), p.169.

<sup>72</sup> Dio, LXXII.1-2.

experience in the Danubian region should be seen as a prime example of an emperor trying to gather as much useful intelligence on a proposed conquest as possible. Caesar's actions prior to his invasion of Britain also demonstrate an undeniable attempt to gather accurate and meaningful intelligence.<sup>73</sup> Caesar's attempts, although largely a failure, also indicate the sorts of issues a general thought important and wanted to investigate. He sought not only accurate information about suitable ports, but also information about the tribes in Britain and their ways of warfare. These sorts of questions point to an understanding on Caesar's part that these elements affect the conduct of the war, the potential for victory, and the likelihood of significant plunder.

The first grouping addressed in the methodology examines the potential economic costs and benefits associated with annexation. There have been many modern works published concerning the Roman ability to think economically and whether they were influenced by a desire to obtain economic advantage when deciding whether to annex foreign territory. Badian and Frank argue that the Romans did not concern themselves with the economic benefits associated with annexation, as demonstrated by the number of opportunities to increase

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<sup>73</sup> Caes., *BG.*, IV.20.2-4.

economic benefits that they did not actively exploit.<sup>74</sup> Conversely Harris, although agreeing with Badian and Frank that the Romans did not exploit all potential economic opportunities to the fullest, correctly argues that the Romans clearly understood the economic benefits associated with imperialist action and that this understanding played some role in the decision to engage in acts of annexation.<sup>75</sup> Although the Romans did not exploit all avenues of economic gain to their fullest they did actively consider the potential benefits and costs of imperialist action before committing to such an action, and the results of these deliberations certainly affected the decision to engage in military action.

Ancient sources clearly demonstrate that the Romans both understood and were concerned with the economic effects of military actions. *On the Defence of Fortified Positions*, written sometime in the years following 360 BC and certainly before 346 BC, is the sole surviving part of a greater corpus of works on military science written by Aeneas Tacticus. This work discusses several important economic concerns in times of siege such as the cancellation of debt as a method of ensuring loyalty.<sup>76</sup> Importantly Tacticus also mentions

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<sup>74</sup> Badian, *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic*, pp.17; 18; 20; cf. Frank, *Roman Imperialism*.

<sup>75</sup> Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome*, Chapter 2.

<sup>76</sup> Aen. Tac., XIV.

that he wrote a book dedicated to war finance, discussing in part how the expenses of war could be met.<sup>77</sup> Although no longer extant, the existence of this work, which was known to the Romans, suggests that concerns regarding economic issues associated with warfare were understood and had been given consideration.

An understanding that success or failure in warfare engendered economic consequences is not a modern concept. Lawrence Keeley in his work *War before Civilization* clearly demonstrates that even 'primitive' pre-state societies without coin-based monetary systems had an understanding of the fact that warfare could, and more often than not did, entail economic consequences.<sup>78</sup> Furthermore, Keeley illustrates that economic advantage could contribute to the decision to engage in warfare.<sup>79</sup> The fact that pre-state societies were able to determine that successful military action could result in economic gains that included increased supplies of food, natural resources, expanded territory, and an enlarged labour pool, all factors that were important for the survival and growth of a community, demonstrates that modernity and modern economic or military theories were not pre-requisites to an understanding of

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<sup>77</sup> Aen. Tac., XIV.

<sup>78</sup> Keeley, *War before Civilization*, p.115.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p.108.

the economic consequences of imperialist action.<sup>80</sup> This understanding also extended to the knowledge that a failed campaign might lead to disastrous economic and social consequences and potentially the destruction of the community as a whole.

The second book of *The Art of War*, attributed to a 4<sup>th</sup> century BC Chinese general named Sun Tzu, is largely devoted to the potential for the economic ruin of the state if it engaged in prolonged campaigns. Sun Tzu argued that overly long campaigns, or even poorly managed ones, could result in the weakening of the state to the point where the state's enemies might be encouraged to take military advantage of this weakness. He comments:

If the campaign is protracted, the resources of the state will not be equal to the strain.

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, II.3.

and elaborates:

When your weapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity.

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, II.4.

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid., p.114.

As the oldest extant Chinese work on military matters, the fact that Sun Tzu's *Art of War* presents a discussion of potential economic consequences resulting from poorly-conducted campaigns further demonstrates that the link between military matters and the economy was established well before the period under consideration in this work and was commonly understood by a variety of cultures.

Not all groups within Rome necessarily benefited from the economic advantages of annexation in the same manner and these therefore need to be examined individually. Several groups within the Roman social hierarchy need to be considered: the decision-making elite, the non-senatorial businessmen, the citizen body, and the State itself. The State, although not an individual and certainly not a conscious being, will be considered here in terms of it being a collective and an entity whose success or failure affected all the individuals that made up the collective.

It is clear that individual Romans were concerned with economic advantage, and that the class system of the state itself was geared to division not only by birth but also to division by wealth.<sup>81</sup> This sort of system ensured

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<sup>81</sup> Pliny, *Epist.*, I.14; I.19.

that the populace was concerned with economic advantage and profit-making. From the reign of Augustus onwards membership of the Roman Senate required more than birth into an aristocratic family. Although the expectation was that the son of a senator would himself become a senator, this was not necessarily a foregone conclusion as the position was reserved for those that met a financial mark set by the state. Therefore downward movement through the strata of Roman society's social ranks was assured for those who were unable to maintain the required 1,000,000 sesterces in property as Dio tells us occurred to several senators during Claudius' fourth consulship.<sup>82</sup> Although downward social mobility was easily achieved, there is evidence however of emperors saving some senators from such a fate by giving them sufficient property to meet the financial requirements of the class. Conversely, upward social mobility was also possible at least to the rank of Eques, (which also possessed a wealth criterion of 400,000 Sesterces in property, though it might take several generations).<sup>83</sup> These wealth-based criteria ensured that the Roman populace had an interest in the acquisition and retention of wealth and understood the importance of money in maintaining and advancing within the social hierarchy of the state.

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<sup>82</sup> Dio, LXI.29.1.

<sup>83</sup> Even then upward mobility was not assured as it required the emperor's sanction.

A clear demonstration of economic factors regarding military matters can be seen in the composition of the Roman army prior to Marius' first reform in 107 BC. The individual soldiers who were tasked with the defence of the state and were required to engage in the dangerous activity that is warfare for the benefit of the collective were chosen, prior to the Marian reform of 107 BC, by means of the *dilectus*, which ensured that only the propertied classes were enlisted into the Roman army.<sup>84</sup> The belief seems to have been that these men, having a financial investment in the state, had something to lose and therefore would fight loyally for the state to protect this investment and their livelihood.<sup>85</sup> This itself attributes an economic factor to the recruitment of the Roman army and the conduct of Roman warfare prior to 107 BC, as loyalty is directly linked to financial investment in the state. In this period it was normal for all men aged 18 to 46 who met the property criteria to be eligible for service.<sup>86</sup> The normal length of service was notionally one year but was in reality the term of a short campaign, after which the troops would

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<sup>84</sup> There were some exceptions to this, when the state urgently needed additional manpower. At these times the *capite censi*, freedmen and slaves might be called to serve the state in a military capacity. Frank, *Roman Imperialism*, p.269.

<sup>85</sup> Plut., *Marius*, 9.

<sup>86</sup> J. Penrose, ed., *Rome and Her Enemies* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2005), p.32.

return home and tend to their farms.<sup>87</sup> However, as the severity and duration of Rome's wars increased, specifically during the Punic Wars, a significant number of small land-owners who had been enlisted in the army faced financial ruin because prolonged campaigning over several years prevented them adequately tending their farms,<sup>88</sup> demonstrating another economic consequence of warfare known to the Romans and acknowledged in Roman literature.

The economic connection to warfare is even more pronounced when we examine the post-Marian reform period of Roman history. Marius had started recruiting men from the *capite censi* who did not meet the property qualifications previously in place.<sup>89</sup> By doing so Marius was placing the safety of the state in the hands of men who theoretically had little to lose because many of them did not own any part of the state. Based on the beliefs evident in the previous Roman recruiting policy, these men were more likely to abandon the defence of the state if their lives were placed in serious enough jeopardy because they lacked the financial inducement of property ownership. Marius prevented this from occurring by instituting an alternative economic bond

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<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Sallust, *BJ.*, 85.

between the troops and the state – regular pay. Although the pay was not large, the legionaries also received a share of the spoils and plunder, directly involving them in the economic advantages obtained from imperialist action.<sup>90</sup>

The fact that these soldiers, many of which were drawn from the poorest members of the Roman state, were being paid, given a share of any booty, and given land upon retirement clearly reinforced in the Roman mind the connection between economic benefits and warfare and ensured the loyalty of these troops. The Greek philosopher Onasander, author of *The General* which he dedicated to Veranius, a Consul of Rome in AD 49, illustrates this: ‘poor men eager to supply what fortune omitted, will endure more than the rich.’<sup>91</sup>

There is evidence to suggest that many Roman citizens joined the military simply because they had heard stories of the fabulous wealth brought back from shares of captured booty by others, illustrating that wars were seen as economic ventures by citizens of the Republic.<sup>92</sup> Onasander asserts that Marius’ pre-enlistment speeches concentrated on the glory and wealth to be gained by participation in the forthcoming North African campaigns when

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<sup>90</sup> Polybius, 6.19.

<sup>91</sup> Onasander, I.25.

<sup>92</sup> Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome*, pp.50; 101

he sought recruits.<sup>93</sup> The fact that he promised the opportunity to gain wealth through booty obviously resulted from his belief that this factor would assist his recruitment drive.<sup>94</sup> The opportunity to gain wealth was also used as an inducement by Octavian in the fight against Antony:

It follows, then, that if you believe that the wealth of Antony and his allies is so much greater than that of the earlier kingdoms of Asia, you should be all the more eager to take it for yourselves. It is the greatest contests which offer the greatest rewards, and make it worthwhile to engage in them.

Dio, L.28.

Octavian further utilises the promise of spoils to spur on his troops:

They have loaded into their ships the best and most valuable of their possessions ... and since they carry the prizes of victory in their ships, let us not allow them to slip away anywhere else, but defeat them here on the spot and make all these treasures our own.

Dio, L.30.

This led to an interesting phenomenon where warfare against poor neighbours, which was less likely to provide significant plunder, was not as

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<sup>93</sup> Onasander, I.24.

<sup>94</sup> Frank, *Roman Imperialism*, p.270.

popular with the existing soldiers, and a war against a reputedly poor people could see a demonstrable decline in new recruitment.<sup>95</sup> This clearly brought the economic connection to war into the view of the Roman policy-makers.<sup>96</sup> Therefore, the potential profitability of any war needed to be considered and calculated, as far as possible, in the planning stages of any campaign, rather than face a potential recruiting shortage that might prevent a successful resolution to the conflict at a critical juncture.<sup>97</sup> This is not to suggest that money was the only reason that republican soldiers went to war, rather that it was a factor Roman policy-makers had to consider before committing to a war of conquest – soldiers clearly did weigh the potential benefits to be gained in the form of booty against the dangers that they would face.<sup>98</sup>

Although most of the discussion presented above refers directly to the republican period, the fact that the link between profitability and warfare

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<sup>95</sup> Dio, V.36.3 demonstrates that wealthy areas were considered particularly worth fighting for; Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome*, p.50, discusses the differences in recruiting for the Spanish and Carthaginian campaigns, primarily because the Spanish campaigns were seen as unlikely to produce much plunder.

<sup>96</sup> Juv., *Sat.*, XVI; Josephus, *BJ.*, VII.1.3; Tac., *Ann.*, 39; Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome*, p.104.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, p.50.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, p.102.

had been established and the consideration of potential profits had become a necessary element in the decision to engage in a war of conquest suggests that this factor would have remained an important consideration during the imperial period.

Roman citizens understood the economic potential of wars of conquest beyond the simple level of war equals booty.<sup>99</sup> Firstly, as Onasander demonstrates, the Romans possessed an understanding of variable profitability; in other words, that warfare led to gains proportionate to the wealth of the vanquished and the prosperity of the territory conquered.<sup>100</sup>

This understanding is also important as it demonstrates a complexity of thought often, in my opinion, overlooked by modern authors.<sup>101</sup> Roman civilians are known to have relocated to recently-conquered regions in order to take advantage of the economic climate often created during the process of Romanisation. Roman citizens also understood that a war of conquest was often followed by an influx of new slave labour,<sup>102</sup> a resource that particularly

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid., p.47.

<sup>100</sup> Onasander, XXX.V.1.

<sup>101</sup> Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy*, p.xi.

<sup>102</sup> Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome*, p.59, fn.4.

the wealthier elements in the society could exploit to further enrich themselves, and the state could utilise to ensure certain tasks were completed in the most economically viable manner possible. The fact that soldiers and civilians alike were concerned with the potential economic benefits of a successful war of conquest ensured that regions that were believed to be wealthy were seen as preferred targets and more popular choices for annexation.<sup>103</sup>

The process of allowing non-landowning citizens to join the military forces, which were tasked with the protection of the state, and the increasing professionalism of the Roman army, which engendered a significant cost to maintain a standing force of troops, embedded the concept that if possible war should return an economic benefit in the minds of Roman policy-makers, and that the two were intricately and inextricably connected. The economic link to warfare can be demonstrated in even clearer terms. As Dio demonstrates, the division of booty could cause conflict within the military forces:

They eagerly sailed up to Antony's vessels in the hope of seizing their treasure, and tried to put out the fires which they themselves had started. The result was that many of them perished, both from the flames and from their own greed.

Dio, L.34.

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<sup>103</sup> Ibid., p.101.

The desire of individual soldiers to attain spoils could lead to foolhardy acts demonstrating the importance these men placed on the acquisition of wealth through warfare. It is clear that the Roman soldiers believed they were entitled to financial rewards. Soldiers who felt that they had not received sufficient economic benefit for their loyalty and the dangers they had endured could mutiny.<sup>104</sup>

There can be no doubt that the Roman policy-makers of the republic understood and considered the economic results of warfare. The same must also be true of the imperial period, perhaps even more so, as the emperor's position depended on the survival of the state. As the individual directly in charge of the *fiscus*, the emperor was well aware of the state's financial position, perhaps more so than many of the senators during the republican era. Individuals were not the only ones that stood to gain an economic benefit from a successful war of conquest. The Empire collected taxes on almost all trade conducted within its borders or crossing its borders. The state also had to concern itself with feeding a growing population, making the acquisition

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<sup>104</sup> Dio, LI.3.2. "However, the men who had been discharged after having helped Octavian to win his victory felt aggrieved that their efforts had gone unrewarded, and soon afterwards began to mutiny." Plautus, *Epidicus*, 158 - 160; Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome*, pp.102 - 103.

of agricultural land an important factor. Furthermore, the Empire also took possession of the natural resources of the conquered and most commonly leased these out to private citizens to exploit, which brought in substantial amounts of money to the imperial *fiscus*.<sup>105</sup>

The other side of this discussion mentioned by Sun Tzu, but which has not yet been examined, is the potential for financial ruin if the state were to engage in a costly war of expansion and lose. Not only would the state suffer from a loss of a great deal of money, potentially bankrupting it, the loss of citizens would also reduce the workforce the state had available. The potential also existed for heavy war indemnities being forced on the state, as Rome was known to force on others.<sup>106</sup> None of this is intended to suggest that financial motives were the sole determining factor in Roman decisions to annex new territory in the republican or the imperial period. Financial considerations played an important role in such a decision but did not provide the sole reason to engage in such a dangerous exercise.

The Romans understood the link between the economy and warfare, but which elements they were likely to consider has not yet been fully explored

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<sup>105</sup> Smallwood, *Nerva-Hadrian*, 439.

<sup>106</sup> Livy, XXX.37; Polybius, III.27.

or clarified. From the discussion presented above it is clear that one element to be considered was the potential for booty. An examination of the potential for booty would likely centre on the descriptions of the enemy circulated in the works of contemporary authors, and *publicani* who had had contact with the nation in question. If the potential target was described as wealthy and possessing large cities then the chances for substantial booty must have been considered very good. If the target was described as consisting mostly of poor farmers living in small disjointed communities the hope for booty had to be pinned on the number of slaves that might be captured and sold, although small communities were not likely to present much potential for this sort of booty.

The Roman *publicani* were renowned for preceding the growing empire into regions beyond Roman control. The traders did this in order to take advantage of potential profits and as a result they would also have been able to supply the emperor with information regarding the geography of the region. This meant that the decision-making elite could gain some understanding of the likely costs of the annexation, based on terrain (both in terms of distance and difficulty), the natural resources worth exploiting, the quality of the land, the population density of the area as well as the military capacity of an

intended target, the political structure and level of urbanisation (allowing the emperor to determine the likelihood of successful and rapid integration into the Empire), and the trade the people of the region conducted beyond their borders, all of which presented potential profit-making ventures for Rome.

To think that the *publicani*, because of their civilian status and the lack of a suitable military title would be unable to provide the required detail is an assumption largely based on the likelihood of a modern citizen to provide such detailed intelligence. These men lived in a highly militaristic period, where an understanding of at least the basic elements discussed above would have been commonplace.<sup>107</sup>

The state policy-makers during the republican and the imperial periods would also have considered the financial elements that would have benefited the state. These include the potential for taxation, which is of course directly related to the likely amount of trade to pass through the region; the income-generating natural resources that would become the property of the state to be

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<sup>107</sup> Elizabethan intelligence also often relied on non-military personnel to provide key pieces of intelligence: Report of Gilbert Lee, in *State Papers Relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada Anno 1588*, pp.341-342; Letters from Captain Cely, December 1579, in *State Papers Relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada Anno 1588*, pp.343-344.

leased out; the agricultural resources that could be subordinated to the state; and the amounts of land available for Roman citizens. The Romans would have been able to make some estimation of the long-term financial benefits of all of these,<sup>108</sup> and additionally the potential for increasing them either through the process of centralising the economy and trade specialisation or through the process of Romanisation and the creation of an effective transport system.

The second key grouping presented in the methodology to follow is that of geopolitical considerations. Geopolitics is here defined as political issues affected in some way by the physical boundaries or location of those issues. The importance of an annexation can in part be determined by the geographical location of the conquest, or its placement in a wider geopolitical context. The Roman understanding of geopolitical circumstances can be demonstrated by examples that they were concerned about political situations beyond the borders of the Roman Empire. That the Romans were concerned with the geopolitical circumstances associated with conquest cannot be doubted. It is also clear that the Romans understood the geopolitical consequences of their actions. This is demonstrated by the differing strategies employed by Rome to minimise any geopolitical weaknesses they faced. The Romans

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<sup>108</sup> Strabo, XVI.4.22.

were known to utilise financial subsidies where they felt these would have the most advantageous effect,<sup>109</sup> and the retention of hostages and potential contenders to thrones where financial inducements were unlikely to achieve their objectives.<sup>110</sup> Additionally, Augustus' willingness to change the features of the principate according to the socio-political norms of a given region further clarify the Roman understanding of regional geopolitics.

It is generally believed that regions that had not had the Roman army actively pass through would not have maps available depicting a reasonable level of detail that could be used for strategic and geopolitical planning purposes. However, evidence indicates that it was an expectation that good commanders would gather as much information as possible about a region before trying to conquer it. Vegetius recommended that a conscientious general would have detailed itineraries, pictorial if possible, created for all regions in which war was being waged.<sup>111</sup> This could be achieved by sending scouts ahead to collect enough intelligence to create a useful map, interviewing Roman merchants trading in those regions, or as in the case of Agricola interviewing

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<sup>109</sup> C.D. Gordon, "Subsidies in Roman Imperial Defence," *Phoenix* 3, no. 2 (1949): p.60; 61

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, p.62.

<sup>111</sup> Vegetius, III.6.

relocated political leaders from the region itself.<sup>112</sup> Vegetius also suggests methods commanders could employ to ensure that the information they gathered was as accurate as possible, by separately interviewing ‘persons of sense and reputation well acquainted with the country’ and then comparing their accounts.<sup>113</sup>

Although it is often stated by modern observers that the Romans possessed a very limited understanding of geography which would certainly have hindered their ability to strategically plan any proposed annexation,<sup>114</sup> evidence clearly indicates that experienced responsible generals actively undertook to acquire as much geographic knowledge as possible prior to engaging in a military conquest.<sup>115</sup> Caesar’s account of the events leading up to his invasion of Britain provides evidence of his own attempts to gather intelligence about the geography and ethnography of Britain prior to sailing

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<sup>112</sup> Tac., *Agric.*, 24.

<sup>113</sup> Vegetius, III.6.

<sup>114</sup> Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy*, pp.19-66.

<sup>115</sup> The emperor Nero is known to have sent scouts to two regions that he was considering making war on, in order to improve the geographical knowledge of these regions: Dio, LXIII.1.8. Similarly, Agricola sent his fleet to reconnoitre safe harbours before he advanced against the tribes beyond the Forth and co-ordinated a land-sea advance demonstrating a significant understanding of the geography of the region: Tac., *Agric.*, 25.

there.<sup>116</sup> Although his results were not spectacular, at least in part because of his choice of Gaius Volusenus to conduct a detailed reconnaissance of the region, Caesar's actions demonstrate that at least some Roman generals actively sought to discover as much information about their targets as possible. Caesar's commentary indicates the sort of intelligence he sought. He wanted to identify harbours of enough size to hold a large number of ships and get an impression of the political and military circumstances in Britain before proceeding with an invasion.<sup>117</sup>

Caesar's account also illustrates the manner in which a commander could try to gather this sort of intelligence. Caesar's sources were drawn from people that had had demonstrable contact with or experience in the region. His sources of information about the Britons included the Gauls who were known to have had contact with the Britons, and merchants known to trade with in the region. Finally, he sent his lieutenant to investigate and survey the region in person. Unfortunately for Caesar the choice of Volusenus was a poor one as he himself implies, describing him as 'having viewed the localities as far as means could be afforded one who dared not to leave his ship and trust

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<sup>116</sup> Caes., *BG.*, IV.20.2-4.

<sup>117</sup> Caes., *BG.*, IV.20, IV.21.

himself to barbarians.<sup>118</sup> Polybius provides an earlier equally clear example for the gathering of strategic intelligence and geographical information in his discussion of the actions of Scipio during his Carthaginian campaigns.<sup>119</sup> Scipio's campaign strategy was clearly based on the results of the intelligence he had been able to gather.<sup>120</sup> The gathering of geographical knowledge formed a significant part of the intelligence Scipio sought and clearly aided the planning for this campaign down to escape routes in case the campaign failed.

There is no doubt that Roman maps lacked the precise information discernible on modern two dimensional topographical maps,<sup>121</sup> which has led to them often being used as evidence of the limited level of geographic knowledge the Romans possessed. This should not be taken to mean that Roman mapping illustrates that the Romans possessed no understanding of the geographical conditions of surrounding regions. The fact that it was common practice to publish itineraries, both literary and pictorial, illustrating

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<sup>118</sup> Caes., *BG.*, IV.21.

<sup>119</sup> Polybius, X.6-8.

<sup>120</sup> Polybius, X.9.

<sup>121</sup> Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy*, pp.47-57; H. Elton, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), p.248.

where an army would camp on given days, prior to the departure of the army in order to ensure that supplies were available clearly demonstrates that the extant maps were sufficiently detailed to provide an accurate understanding of the regions depicted and the routes used to traverse them.<sup>122</sup> The Peutinger table, perhaps the most well known of Roman maps,<sup>123</sup> clearly depicts way-stations, granaries, watering-places, altars, spas and distances between them.<sup>124</sup> Interestingly many modern global positioning systems (GPS) work on the same principle, depicting nothing more than waypoints, the distances between them and the direction travelled in order to reach a desired location.<sup>125</sup> Roman maps actually present a clearer illustration in that they often named the roads and demonstrated which roads needed to be followed to reach a desired destination.

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<sup>122</sup> K. Greene, *The Archaeology of the Roman Economy* (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd, 1986), p.36; This is particularly true within the empire, where the army would receive Roman supplies. Once out of Roman-held territory they were more reliant on pillage and forage for food supplies. Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy*, p.29.

<sup>123</sup> Itself a medieval copy of a fourth century Roman map, is based on sources going back as far as the first century AD, Austin and Rankov, *Exploratio*, p.115.

<sup>124</sup> O. A. W. Dilke, *Greek and Roman Maps* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1985), p.115; Dilke suggests that because there is no depiction of military installations the Peutinger table was a civilian map.

<sup>125</sup> For example the basic Magellan GPS315, has no map display function and presents no graphic topographical information.

Some of the pictorial maps clearly depict the sorts of terrain that the traveller would encounter on the journey.<sup>126</sup> Although it is true that the geographical features do not intersect with the illustrations of the roads, the fact that the illustrations of these features were placed next to the road suggests that in the conventional reading of these maps it would be understood that these features would modify the course of the road.

Because of a perceived lack of detailed geographic knowledge it has been argued by Mattern and others that the Roman conception of their world was insufficient to formulate a geopolitical strategy.<sup>127</sup> In order to have an understanding of potential geopolitical consequences of conquest, it was less important for the Romans to be expert cartographers and to know the exact shape or even size of the region that they sought to annex, but it was extremely important for them to have an understanding of the relative positions of the conquest and its neighbours.<sup>128</sup> There can be no doubt that the Romans knew of the major ethnic groups in the areas surrounding a potential

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<sup>126</sup> The distinction between pictorial and text maps must be noted here as some Roman 'maps' were purely descriptions of the region, without accompanying illustrations.

<sup>127</sup> Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy*, p.80.

<sup>128</sup> Well-developed cartography and an understanding of the geopolitical circumstances of a region, although related, are not wholly dependant on each other.

conquest, as is demonstrated by their attempts to ally with the enemies of a potential conquest,<sup>129</sup> and the descriptions provided by Strabo and the other geographers.<sup>130</sup>

Perhaps the best geographical information available to Roman emperors came in the form of the reports written by previous military commanders who had entered the region under consideration. It was not uncommon for commanders to publish an itinerary of a region that they had been stationed in,<sup>131</sup> illustrating the distances along important routes and detailing the locations of towns and cities. These sorts of reports would have been invaluable to later commanders in the region, as they would provide a relatively clear understanding of routes suitable for the movement of armies. Merchants and embassies that had travelled in the region often provided important geographical and ethnographical information used by Roman geographers in their works.<sup>132</sup> Although merchants are at times dismissed as unreliable sources for this sort of information,<sup>133</sup> many merchants would

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<sup>129</sup> Polybius, X.6.

<sup>130</sup> Strabo, VII.3.2.

<sup>131</sup> Austin and Rankov, *Exploratio*, p.115.

<sup>132</sup> Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy*, p.26.

<sup>133</sup> Polybius, IV.39.11.

have possessed a vested interest in gathering accurate information about the locations of important population centres and the distances between them, as the profitability of their trade activities could easily rely on the distances goods needed to be transported. This is particularly true of regions outside of the direct control of the empire that did not have hard surfaced roads, where the expenses associated with transportation of trade goods in these conditions definitely increased costs.<sup>134</sup> Additionally, a poor understanding of the locations inhabited by the highest concentration of populace would prevent the merchant reaching the largest possible market for his goods.

The Romans use of financial inducements to prevent border hostilities, purchase allies, or create division amongst the enemies of the empire,<sup>135</sup> clearly demonstrates a relatively sophisticated understanding of geopolitical circumstances. The use of financial inducements to prevent border hostilities can be seen as early as Caesar's Gallic wars, with Caesar himself informing us that he had provided Ariovistus, the German monarch of the Suebi, with 'generous gifts' to ensure that he remained neutral during these wars.<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> The Romans clearly understood the vagaries of transport costs. Cato, *On Agriculture*, XXII.3.

<sup>135</sup> Gordon, "Subsidies in Roman Imperial Defence," p.60.

<sup>136</sup> Caes., *BG*, I. 43.

Similarly, the conquest of Britain during the reign of Claudius demonstrates the Roman use of their substantial wealth to buy allies and military assistance.<sup>137</sup> It is clear that Claudius bought the loyalty of many British tribes early in this campaign, and that Boudicca's revolt was in part the result of the confiscation of these funds.<sup>138</sup>

Tacitus also illustrates that the Romans utilised financial inducements in order to sow disunity amongst their enemies. The Roman treatment of the German situation is particularly enlightening about the Roman methods for dealing with potential threats that had proven difficult to conquer. Financial inducements were utilised to keep the Germans fighting amongst themselves in what can only be described as a conscious and lucid plan to prevent them from forming any sort of conglomeration.<sup>139</sup> The effort that the Romans expended on keeping the Germans divided strongly suggests that Rome viewed individual German tribes as presenting only a low-level threat unless they were allowed to considerably expand their military resources, or managed to unify several tribes into a conglomeration that could pose a significant threat to the security of the empire.

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<sup>137</sup> Gordon, "Subsidies in Roman Imperial Defence," p.61.

<sup>138</sup> Dio, LXII.2.

<sup>139</sup> Tac., *Ann.*, II.25.

The Eastern situation was quite different, due to the presence of another equally unified force, Persia. This unity ensured that financial inducements were less likely to be an effective tool. Armenia, the key to the security of the eastern part of the empire, presents a solid illustration of the Roman understanding of geopolitics.<sup>140</sup> This contentious region situated between the Persian and Roman Empires acted as a buffer zone between them, and control of Armenia presented geopolitical advantages to the empire that was able to appoint its ruler. Roman annexation of the region would certainly have led to the onset of further difficulties between Persia and Rome, something Augustus believed Rome could not afford.<sup>141</sup> Therefore Augustus could not implement an overtly aggressive policy in this region, something he avoided by retaining the brothers of the Persian-appointed king of Armenia, Artaxes, as hostages in addition to installing this king's enemy Artavasdes on the throne of Armenia minor.<sup>142</sup> Augustus' policies in the region demonstrate an understanding of the geopolitical consequences that would likely have resulted from direct aggressive action.

The Romans were also known to maintain a stock supply of potential

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<sup>140</sup> H.H. Scullard, *From the Gracchi to Nero* (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1959), p.256.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, p.257.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, p.256.

candidates to the thrones of hostile, or potentially hostile, nations.<sup>143</sup> This was done in order to provide Rome the ability to cause dissent and political confusion within a hostile nation by supporting, financially or militarily, another candidate to the throne. In effect this can be seen as an advanced form of the strategy clearly employed against the Germans with Rome creating instability where none otherwise existed. This would have the effect of weakening the hostile power and forcing a hostile sovereign to redirect his attention to internal political matters.

The disposition of Roman troops further demonstrates that the Romans possessed a complex understanding of their geopolitical circumstances. In the northern part of the province of Cilicia located in the Eastern region of the empire the Romans placed four legions.<sup>144</sup> This concentration of troops could be directed to the Euphrates, Armenia, or Asia Minor, thereby providing a garrison to secure the Eastern frontier of the empire whilst providing a deterrent against Armenian, or Persian hostility. The reduction in the number of troops in permanent employ by the state during the reign of Augustus made an understanding of the geopolitical circumstances of the empire and

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<sup>143</sup> Gordon, "Subsidies in Roman Imperial Defence," p.62.

<sup>144</sup> Scullard, *From the Gracchi to Nero*, p.257.

the acquisition of new territory more important for Rome than it had been before. Evidence indicates that the Romans needed to withdraw troops from some areas to be combined if an unusually large force was required elsewhere. The movement of troops required that the Roman administration carefully consider in which regions the existing force size could be reduced and by how much; a decision that required a clear understanding of the geopolitical circumstances of the region.

The third key grouping to be examined in the methodology is systemic frustration. Systemic frustration is defined in this work as frustration normally affecting an individual affecting a larger group of people within a society leading to the mobilisation of social or political discontent and potentially rebellion.<sup>145</sup> Although the Romans certainly did not use nor would they have understood the term systemic frustration, which is a modern construct, this does not indicate that the Romans did not have an understanding of the problems associated with systemic frustration. Systemic frustration determines some of the costs associated with an annexation or potentially determines the medium

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<sup>145</sup> I. K. Feierabend, , R. L. Feierabend, and T. R. Gurr, "Systemic Conditions of Political Aggression: An Application of Frustration-Aggression Theory," in *Anger, Violence, and Politics Theories and Research*, ed. I. K. Feierabend, R. L. Feierabend, and T. R. Gurr, (Sydney: Prentice-Hall Pty. Ltd., 1972).

to long-term success or failure of an annexation. The assessment of actual or potential systemic frustration is a key issue in determining the profitability of any annexation. Systemic frustration occurs when elements that might cause individual frustration affect a large percentage of a significant group within the conquered society.<sup>146</sup>

Many modern authors, including Feierabend, Gurr, Weede, Midlarsky, and Oppenheimer,<sup>147</sup> have participated in codifying the meaning and causes of systemic frustration. This work has primarily focussed on the determination of the factors that contribute to the formation of political discontent in modern societies. Few authors (Horsley is a notable exception) have applied these theories to the ancient world.<sup>148</sup>

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<sup>146</sup> Here 'group' refers to a societal grouping such as tradesmen, warriors, or nobles.

<sup>147</sup> Feierabend, Feierabend, and Gurr, "Systemic Conditions of Political Aggression: An Application of Frustration-Aggression Theory."; M. I. Midlarsky, "Rulers and the Ruled: Patterned Inequality and the Onset of Mass Political Violence," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2 (1988); E. Weede, "Some New Evidence on Correlates of Political Violence: Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Economic Development," *European Sociological Review* 3, no. 2 (1987); M. Oppenheimer, *The Urban Guerrilla* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969).

<sup>148</sup> R. A. Horsley, "Sicarii: Ancient Jewish "Terrorists"," *The Journal of Religion* 59, no. 4 (1979): p.59.

Political anthropologists and modern historians have established much of the theoretical basis used here for the determination of the potential for resistance and the resulting effects on the productivity of the conquered.<sup>149</sup> Systemic frustration is often the result of changes in the customs, or in the pre-conquest political system of the conquered nation, in order to more closely align them with the political institutions of the conqueror. In the examination of discontent many modern political theories place a great deal of importance on democracy and democratisation.<sup>150</sup> In an examination of conquest in the ancient world this would be anachronistic and inappropriate. Therefore, when examining conquest in the ancient world the changes in political systems, customs, and the disempowerment of those who would normally have been politically empowered in the pre-conquest society of the conquered must be examined in comparison to the pre-conquest systems.

Many ancient authors demonstrate that the Romans understood the potential for systemic frustration and methods appropriate to control this issue. The correspondence between Pliny and Trajan clearly illustrates

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<sup>149</sup> P. Liberman, *Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), chapter 2.

<sup>150</sup> See Feierabend, Feierabend, and Gurr, "Systemic Conditions of Political Aggression: An Application of Frustration-Aggression Theory," p.157.

Trajan's understanding of this potential and the measures that he took in order to minimise the potential for political unrest in the East.<sup>151</sup> The works of Josephus and others provide us with a clear illustration of the costs that could be associated with the political unrest resulting from unchecked systemic frustration.<sup>152</sup> Josephus' work further demonstrates that it was not only the Romans that understood contributing factors to systemic frustration but that the *sicarii* also made clear use of this understanding.<sup>153</sup>

There can be little doubt that the Romans understood the results of what we term systemic frustration and what caused it, as it is clear that they had been exposed to occurrences of systemic frustration on several occasions, and had subsequently learnt about the costs associated with suppressing it. Social or civil unrest could lead to serious problems for a conqueror or occupier. The Romans were certainly not strangers to this concept and had throughout their history suffered significantly as a result of uprisings against their authority. Instances such as the Jewish revolt and in particular the siege of Masada demonstrated how even a relatively small group of citizens could impose an extremely high cost on the numerically and technologically superior

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<sup>151</sup> Pliny, *Epist.*, 10.34 and 96.7.

<sup>152</sup> Josephus, *BJ.*, 2.425.

<sup>153</sup> Josephus, *BJ.*, 4.147.

Roman occupation forces. The stronghold of Masada held out against 7000 Roman legionaries and auxiliaries for almost three years at an extreme cost to the Roman administration.<sup>154</sup> Another example of resistance that would have demonstrated the costs of systemic frustration and the mobilisation of discontent was the rebellion of Caratacus in Britain from AD 43 after a Roman attack against Camulodunum.<sup>155</sup> Caratacus' rebellion and the guerrilla tactics that he employed against the Romans caused, as Tacitus describes them, 'serious disruptions' to the Roman forces in Britain during this period,<sup>156</sup> and undoubtedly increased the expense of the Roman annexation and policing of the region.

The impact of rebellion could be quite extreme, especially if the rebels were able to mobilise significant forces against the Romans. The process of tracking and disposing of rebels in the Roman Empire could be time-consuming and expensive, as is alluded to by Josephus:

The ringleader in the plot, Jonathon, got away for the moment, but there was a lengthy and extremely careful search all over the country and he was caught.

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<sup>154</sup> A. Goldsworthy, *The Complete Roman Army* (London: Thames and Hudson, 2003), p.190.

<sup>155</sup> Levick, *Claudius*, pp.144f.

<sup>156</sup> Tac., *Ann.*, XII.31.

Josephus, *Jewish War*, 7.441.

The fact that the Romans did engage in the expense suggests the importance with which the Romans viewed rebellion. Dio demonstrates that organised rebellions could pose a significant enough threat to Rome that a direct military action might fail:

His (Cassius') strategy was to damage good relations they had with one another and to separate one group from another: they were so desperate and so numerous that he did not dare to attack them when they were united. So he got the better of them by setting them at loggerheads with one another.

Dio, LXXII.4.

The Romans understood that some degree of political and social discontent was inevitable after an annexation and that of itself it posed little threat unless it was allowed to become organised and mobilised. That the Romans understood this can be demonstrated by an examination of the methods that they utilised to limit the mobilisation and organisation of discontent. Available evidence indicates that Romans viewed the potential for, and methods of, controlling systemic frustration in a sophisticated fashion not limited to the use of military coercion embodied in the creation of garrisons in regions likely to demonstrate political discontent. Rather the Romans used a sophis-

ticated combination of the threat of physical violence, the legal repression of potentially politically active organisations and perhaps most importantly the promotion of inclusiveness that encouraged potential organisers of discontent to remain loyal to Rome.

No rebellion is spontaneous. Mass discontent and dissatisfaction must first exist before a potentially damaging movement can emerge.<sup>157</sup> The Romans possessed a clear understanding of the most likely breeding grounds for discontent. Individuals were unlikely to be able to foment political strife in isolation, and even if they managed to start some form of rebellion the lack of support would limit their actions to those of ordinary criminals – highly unlikely to achieve any political ends. If rebellion could be started within a collective, it possessed a far greater chance of developing into a political movement. The banning of perceived opposition groups with the potential for collective political activity was common Roman policy and identifies the Roman understanding of the use of repression and coercion in the suppression of politically motivated collective violence. The prohibition of these groups is clearly illustrated by the Roman treatment of, and legislative control of political clubs and associations:

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<sup>157</sup> Oppenheimer, *The Urban Guerrilla*, p.92.

it happens from time to time that the people are thrown into disorder and rioting by the reckless rhetoric of the bakers' factions in the marketplace ... Consequently I order the bakers not to meet as an association and not to become the ringleaders in reckless behaviour.

AJ, 124.

In effect this legislation acted as a restriction on the freedom of association within the empire. The Romans saw these clubs as threats to the stability of the empire and thus outlawed them unless the club had applied for and been granted a licence from the emperor.<sup>158</sup> The fact that these clubs did actually engage in political activity is proven by archaeological finds of placards espousing political slogans.<sup>159</sup>

The correspondence between Pliny the younger and the emperor Trajan regarding the possible establishment of a new *Hetaeria* in Nicomedia to act as a fire brigade is an interesting example of this legislation in action as it demonstrates the importance that emperors placed on the suppression of

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<sup>158</sup> Augustus reintroduced Caesar's legislation and 'dissolved all workmen's guilds except those that had been established for some time and were carrying on legitimate business': Suet., *Aug.*, 32.

<sup>159</sup> R. L. Wilken, *The Christians as the Romans Saw Them* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p.13.

these clubs. In this instance Trajan would not allow Pliny to establish a new club as the region had previously suffered from civil disobedience due to the involvement of local *Hetaeriae*.<sup>160</sup> Tertullian perhaps best identifies the reasons for the outlawing of *Hetaeriae*, stating:

unless I am mistaken, the reason for prohibiting associations clearly lay in the forethought for public order – to save the state from being torn into parties, a thing very likely to disturb election assemblies, public gatherings, local senates, meetings, even the public games, with the clashing and rivalry of partisans.<sup>161</sup>

Tertullian, *Apology*, 4. xxxviii – xxxix.

It can therefore be assumed that in newly annexed regions, where the potential of resistance would naturally be quite high for a number of years, this concern would have been greater still. To further highlight the importance the Roman administration placed on the suppression of these associations it is interesting to note that the punishment for maintaining illegal *Hetaeriae* was identical to the punishment for the ‘occupying of public places or temples with armed men.’<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>160</sup> Pliny, *Epist.*, 10.34 and 96.7.

<sup>161</sup> Tertullian, *Apology*, Harvard University Press, London, 1966, 4. xxxviii - xxxix.

<sup>162</sup> Justinian, *The Digest of Roman Law*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1979, xlvi.

Perhaps the most farsighted of the Roman policies for dealing with the potential for systemic frustration was the development and utilisation of an extremely inclusive political system. The Romans minimised the potential for mobilised and organised discontent by being very politically inclusive, particularly of the native nobility. This inclusiveness bound the native nobility to the Roman rule of their society. By ensuring them a role in the new hierarchy the Romans effectively deterred many of the native nobility from adopting a leadership role in any rebellion. This lack of leadership would certainly have increased the difficulty of effectively organising and mobilising discontent. Aelius Aristides demonstrates that the Romans deliberately created a politically inclusive environment for the conquered and some of the benefits associated with this policy:

No envy sets foot in the Empire. You yourselves have set the example of how to avoid it by making everything available to all and providing those who are capable of it with a chance of taking their turn at ruling, not keeping them as subjects. Accordingly no hatred develops on the part of those who are outdistanced; since political life is open to all and it is as if it were being carried on in a single city, it is only to be expected that the rulers treat the ruled not as aliens but as their own people.

Aelius Aristides, *Oration*, 26.65.

The Roman policy of inclusiveness extended further than just finding political positions for the existing native nobility. Roman policy was designed with careful consideration given to the generations to follow. The Roman administration actively participated in the education of the offspring of the native nobility to develop in these individuals aspirations compatible with those of Rome. This in no way intended to detract from the fact that these children also acted as hostages, coercive leverage, to ensure their parents' continued compliance to Rome's will.<sup>163</sup>

This demonstrates the ideal that the Romans certainly had in mind and also demonstrates the Roman strategy for minimising systemic frustration. It is likely that if the Romans had been less inclusive of the conquered they would have faced more regular and serious mobilisations of discontent within their provinces.<sup>164</sup> By including the conquered into the political system of the empire they satisfied one of the primary needs of humanity, a degree of self-determination. Additionally, this level of inclusiveness which would have largely ignored the lower classes and concentrated on the indigenous elite ensured that the class most likely to function in a leadership capacity in the

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<sup>163</sup> Tac., *Ann.*, III.43.1.

<sup>164</sup> This is illustrated by the suggestion that the anti-Roman feeling amongst the Alexandrian elite reduced when the city was granted a council. Dio, LVII.17.3.

case of a rebellion stood to lose more than they stood to gain from a successful revolt.

The Romans were known to pass off rebellion by the lower classes, without significant input from the nobility, as nothing more than criminality.<sup>165</sup> This effectively discounted the political threat posed and prevented or at least limited the spread of the rebels' political message. This was not as easily achieved when the native nobility were actively involved in the rebellion.

The Romans were not the only ones who demonstrated an understanding of the political uses of coercion. The *sicarii*, who have been described as terrorists,<sup>166</sup> also demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of how the Romans acquired indigenous support and compliance as is illustrated by the methods they used to minimise collaboration and foment the mobilisation of political discontent within the Jewish community. The *sicarii* carefully targeted their own native nobility and leaders, assassinating them in retaliation for their collaboration with the Romans.<sup>167</sup> This was a clear measure designed

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<sup>165</sup> T. Grunewald, *Bandits in the Roman Empire: Myth and Reality* trans. J. Drinkwater (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), pp.40-41.

<sup>166</sup> Horsley, "Sicarii: Ancient Jewish "Terrorists"."

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, p.457.

to counter the advantages received by the leadership as a result of their collaboration with Rome and an effort to recruit the disaffected from amongst the least empowered strata of society – the poor.<sup>168</sup>

After they began to carry fire to the archives: they were keen to destroy the bonds of the money-lenders and to bring debt-recovery to an end, with the double object of winning over a mass of debtors to themselves and of setting the poor against the rich, from whom they now had nothing to fear.

Josephus, *Jewish War*, 2.425.

The result (of the public murder campaign conducted by the *sicarii*) was that the people reached such a point of grovelling terror, and the insurgents of frenzy, that even the election of the high priest fell into their hands.

Josephus, *Jewish War*, 4.147.

This clearly illustrates that the *sicarii* used repressive techniques for political gain in direct opposition to the control of the Roman state. It is interesting to note that the rebels in this instance felt the need to utilise repressive techniques in order to compel a significant portion of the Jewish populace to join the rebellion or at least to not work against it. Through their actions the *sicarii* destroyed the advantage that collaborators would

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<sup>168</sup> Ibid.

normally have enjoyed and significantly contributed to the mobilisation of discontent.<sup>169</sup>

The Romans conceived the potential for systemic frustration in both short and medium to long terms. They understood that the political and social upheaval associated with annexation would lead to some degree of systemic frustration and carefully instituted universally applicable repressive measures such as the establishment of military garrisons and banning of political collectives likely to function as breeding grounds for dissidence. This was however only a short-term solution as the retention of garrisons for an indefinite period of time could prove extremely costly and unsatisfactory, occupying a significant percentage of the available military forces indefinitely. Therefore, in addition to the implementation of short-term solutions the Romans quickly instituted measures to mitigate the need for a substantial military presence in the medium to long terms. These methods included the education of children of the native nobility in order to increase the acceptance of the Romanisation process. The Romans believed that with the influence of time the conquered associated more with their Romaness than their native

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<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

heritage.<sup>170</sup>

No matter how sophisticated, Roman policy was not able to prevent all occurrences of systemic frustration. If the nobility stood to gain more through successful rebellion than continued adherence to Rome they might be convinced to participate in or orchestrate rebellion. Not all rebellion was the result of displeasure at Roman conquest, rather systemic frustration could occur under conditions of heavy debt. In the example illustrated by Tacitus the indigenous elite of Gaul feeling overly burdened by taxation and debt organised a revolution:

The keenest instigators of it (the Gallic rebellion) were Julius Florus among the Treveri and Julius Sacrovir of the Aedui. Both men were of high descent and their ancestors had performed good service; for that reason the Roman citizenship had long since been conferred on their families, at a time when that was an uncommon reward and given only for merit.

Tac., *Ann.*, III.40.2.

These motivations could surpass the Roman attempts at inclusiveness in maintaining a control over systemic frustration.

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<sup>170</sup> Dio, LXXIX.28.

Under normal conditions it would seem unlikely that either Florus or Sacrovir would turn to rebellion because of the inclusiveness of the Roman system which ensured that the indigenous elite maintained their pre-eminent position with their own society and granted them the potential for advancement in a far larger and more prestigious system that was the Roman Empire as a collective. Because of this system in most instances they would have stood to lose more than they could hope to gain, therefore instances such as this are relatively rare and can often be explained by the fact that the individuals had reached a point where they no longer felt that this was the case.

The final area to be examined in the methodology is that of internal Roman factors. Successful wars of conquest undoubtedly enhanced military glory,<sup>171</sup> and created an identification with the great men of the past. This was particularly important for some emperors who themselves lacked a record of military successes and wished to bind the army to them.<sup>172</sup> Glory and honour were real contributors in determining war and peace.<sup>173</sup> Claudius' annexation of Britain is considered an excellent example of a war of conquest engaged

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<sup>171</sup> Isaac, *The Limits of Empire*, p.383.

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*, p.387.

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*

in largely in order to achieve military glory.<sup>174</sup> Claudius' physical disability and lack of military experience clearly concerned him; he made careful use of his war on Britain to link himself with the past, particularly with the *gloria* of Caesar, and further ensured his connection to the military by making a personal appearance in Britain.<sup>175</sup>

Annexation was popular with several important groups within the empire: the army which stood to gain wealth and improve their social status,<sup>176</sup> and Roman citizens living in the newly-annexed region because Roman control ensured their legal rights and provided protection for trade rights.<sup>177</sup> The fact that both the military and resident Roman citizens benefited from conquest, ensured that the Emperor's glory would be further enhanced. However, this is not to suggest that either group exerted significant pressure to start a war of annexation.<sup>178</sup>

The historical contact between an annexed region and Rome, or its provinces, contributed significantly to the glory an emperor might receive as

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<sup>174</sup> Suet., *Claud.*, 17.1; Levick, *Claudius*, p.139; Austin and Rankov, *Exploratio*, p.128.

<sup>175</sup> Isaac, *The Limits of Empire*, p.389.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, p.382.

<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.384-85.

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.385-86.

a result of a conquest. Historical contact with the conquered prior to conquest is a very important factor in determining the importance of the conquest to various groups within the empire. This factor will also help demonstrate whether the conquest could easily be justified or if there was likely to be lingering doubts about the justification for the war. If there is evidence of ongoing difficulties with the conquered people then the potential justifications are quite easily determined. Rome had for a long time defined just reasons for war, and often we see an effort to place a conquest into the context of what could be considered a just war.

To the Romans glory was tangible, and as such an important component in any decision-making process.<sup>179</sup> The desire for state glory was considered a laudable and worthwhile goal. Cicero makes it clear that military glory was seen as a method of achieving immortality:

For Neptune shall sooner bury Salamis itself with his waters than  
memory of the trophies gained there; and the Boeotian Leuctra  
shall perish sooner than the glory of the great battle

Cicero, *The Tusculan Disputations*, I.XLVI.

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<sup>179</sup> Cicero, *The Tusculan Disputations*, III.2. 'Glory is a real and express substance, not a mere shadow.'

It is clear that the Roman decision-making elite possessed an understanding of each of the four key groupings used in the methodology (chapter two) to determine the existence of advantage. The following chapter will illustrate the sub-factors relevant in the determination of advantage for each of these groupings that will be used in this work to examine advantage and disadvantage.

## **Chapter Two:**

### **A Methodology for Determining Advantage**

## Chapter Two: A Methodology for Determining Advantage

The methodology presented here discusses and demonstrates which factors are relevant in the determination of whether an annexation resulted in advantage. The methodology outlined below is also utilised in the fourth chapter of this work to examine the Dacian annexation of AD 106 – 107 and illustrate that this annexation resulted in several important advantages for the Romans, which outweighed the inherent disadvantages, confirming that the Dacian annexation was advantageous to Rome.

Historians regularly argue that economic gain was an important motive behind conquest.<sup>180</sup> The examination of profitability however is too often limited to a determination of simplistic economic advantage, rather than a determination of overall advantage gained through the act of annexation.<sup>181</sup> The most simplistic form of economic advantage relies only on an investigation of contemporary literary sources that indicate that the Romans plundered

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<sup>180</sup> B. Levick, *The Government of the Roman Empire, a Sourcebook*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2000), p.2.

<sup>181</sup> See Liberman, *Does Conquest Pay?*, particularly p.2. Liberman's examination of the advantage of conquest relies purely on an examination of economic profitability.

significant amounts of wealth from the newly annexed regions during the course of the war.<sup>182</sup> Furthermore, Roman frontier historians such as Luttwak and Isaac disagree about the level of decision-making and reasoning behind conquest and the coherence of defensive policy in the imperial period.

Luttwak presents an apparently cohesive plan for the defence of the empire by suggesting that conquests were undertaken in order to create defensible frontiers.<sup>183</sup> He further suggests that during the period under consideration the imperial system changed its focus. from an expansionist and aggressive defensive network which utilised strong client kingdoms and buffer states to provide a defensive cordon for the empire. The new focus was one where client states were eliminated in favour of an insular and fixed defensive network directly administered by Rome, suggesting that the Romans were acting according to a deliberate plan.<sup>184</sup>

Conversely, Isaac in his treatment of the subject attempts to demonstrate that no such cohesive policy existed, and that much of the empire's expansion

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<sup>182</sup> Goldsworthy, *The Complete Roman Army*, p.166.

<sup>183</sup> Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, from the First Century A.D. To the Third*.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.114-15.

was due purely to a desire for glory or wealth.<sup>185</sup> Furthermore, Isaac argues that the anachronistic utilisation of modern military theory, which leads to the discovery of a seemingly cohesive frontier policy where none existed, should not be used to determine the aims of Roman emperors.<sup>186</sup>

The methodology proposed in this thesis has been developed utilising relevant components of a variety of methodologies developed by modern strategists and anthropologists, including elements of quagmire hypothesis, coercion hypothesis, and time, size, and trade hypothesis.<sup>187</sup> These hypotheses on their own cannot determine the advantages of a successful annexation as they concentrate only on the economic aspects of profitability; other relevant factors have been added in order to present a holistic method of determining the profitability of annexation in general and the Dacian annexation in particular.

Economic profitability, and hence advantage, has often been established by a simplistic reading of those literary sources which indicate that the Romans were able to collect significant amounts of plunder during the course

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<sup>185</sup> Isaac, *The Limits of Empire*, p.392.

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.376-77.

<sup>187</sup> Liberman, *Does Conquest Pay?*, p.31.

of the war that led to an annexation.<sup>188</sup> However, a more holistic examination of profitability could be defined as imperial income exceeding the costs of mounting a war of conquest and administrating a newly conquered region. This would present a more realistic gauge of economic advantage. Even this definition however is not satisfactory as it is too simplistic. Because it ignores any pre-annexation contact with the newly conquered region, it leaves us with an incomplete and inaccurate picture of the true economic advantage gained. In order to make a financial profit an imperial power must exceed the profit that was already being made via peaceful dealings with the other nation by more than the cost of the annexation and the continuing costs of administration and policing.<sup>189</sup>

Overall advantage cannot be measured in terms of economic profitability alone. The geopolitical consequences of the conquest both directly on the newly-conquered territory and in relation to any other peoples adjacent to the newly-conquered region must be determined, as must any strategic, trade or political benefits resulting from the conquest. It is clear that certain factors

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<sup>188</sup> F. Millar, *The Roman Empire and Its Neighbours* (London: Duckworth, 1981), p.278, mentions the threat posed by the Dacians but emphasises the wealth amassed by the Romans as a result of this annexation.

<sup>189</sup> Liberman, *Does Conquest Pay?*, p.18.

utilised in the determination of advantage in modern hypotheses cannot be applied to the study of profitability in the ancient world. The key factors that do apply and will therefore be examined to demonstrate advantage include coercion, resistance, trade incentives, expectation versus achievements, geopolitics, infrastructure, manpower, inclusiveness, strategic elements, and tactical elements. These can be grouped into several key categories: 'economic factors' concerning the effects on trade, and the expenses associated with the annexation; 'geopolitical factors', including strategic elements, tactical elements, manpower considerations and the potential costs of not taking action; 'systemic frustration' incorporates resistance, inclusiveness, and social expectations; and the 'internal factors' grouping will address those advantages the emperor achieved at home within his own society as the result of an annexation.

To argue that annexation was profitable because the Romans carried away a great deal of gold and silver immediately after the conquest<sup>190</sup> does not provide evidence of true advantage.<sup>191</sup> This sort of simplistic assessment does not in fact truly reflect profitability or advantage, merely that a one-

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<sup>190</sup> Dio, LXVIII.14.4.

<sup>191</sup> Liberman, *Does Conquest Pay?*, p.18.

off influx of capital occurred. No matter how large this influx, this sort of assessment ignores the fact that if annexation is the end result of a military struggle continuing costs will be incurred after the military operation has come to an end. Although a short-term influx of capital can be a contributing factor to the advantage gained from an annexation, on its own, the desire to obtain it cannot be utilised to justify the act of annexation. If a short-term influx of capital was the desired result then annexation would not have been necessary – a well-orchestrated punitive expedition with the inevitable looting had just as high a probability of producing high financial returns without the expenses normally associated with the necessary post-annexation policing,<sup>192</sup> administration, and infrastructure creation.

The Advantage Matrix (Fig. 1) on the following page illustrates the key factors that need to be considered in order to determine whether an annexation can be considered to have been advantageous. The factors presented have been colour-coded in order to represent the grouping to which they have been assigned and the arrows indicate their relationship to each other. The Advantage Matrix is not intended to suggest that all of the represented factors need to demonstrate positive results in order for an annexation to

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<sup>192</sup> Isaac, *The Limits of Empire*, p.384.



## Economic Advantage Indicators

There are six key factors that will be utilised in this work to determine whether an annexation was economically advantageous to the conqueror: changes in regional trade, changes in local trade, high-efficiency economic collaboration, income versus expenditure, changes in trade barriers with the conquered, and the potential for low-cost Romanisation.

Roman frontier administration often modified existing trade patterns.<sup>193</sup> This sometimes included the opening of new markets, but more often caused the expansion of existing markets, largely owing to the more secure access provided by the presence of the Roman army which also created a new market for indigenous producers.<sup>194</sup> The very presence of the Roman army and its need for supplies modified the regional trade conditions. However, as Elton has demonstrated with the example of the Menapii who lived on both sides of the Rhine, it was not always the case that a shift in the Roman frontier significantly altered existing regional trade networks.<sup>195</sup> Wells has recently demonstrated that an ongoing war could have significantly affected

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<sup>193</sup> Elton, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, p.77.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*, p.78.

interregional trade to the detriment of those people nearest the war-torn region as it did in the case of Germania during the Gallic war.<sup>196</sup>

The presence of Roman traders in regions not yet under Roman domination was not unusual, and *negotiatores* were often known to have preceded the military into 'barbaric' regions as there was a potential for significant profits in these areas.<sup>197</sup> That Roman *negotiatores* often operated in areas outside of Roman military control is demonstrated by references to their murder in territories at war with Rome. This was the case with Mithridates' revolt in 88 B.C. where 80,000 to 150,000 Italians were killed, many of them *negotiatores*.<sup>198</sup> Additionally, remains of Mediterranean goods have been found within the artificial mounds dated to the early La Tène period that the Germanic Frisii built their villages on.<sup>199</sup> Tacitus makes it clear that the Hermunduri, a German tribe, was engaged in regular trade with the Romans.<sup>200</sup> The early La

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<sup>196</sup> Wells, *The Barbarians Speak, How the Conquered Peoples Shaped Roman Europe*, p.78.

<sup>197</sup> Aelius Aristides, *To Rome*, xi-xiii.

<sup>198</sup> Elton, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, p.81. (these figures are likely exaggerated, but clearly demonstrate the presence of many Italian merchants in the region).

<sup>199</sup> A. Alföldi and G. Ekholm, "The Peoples of Northern Europe: The Getae and Dacians," in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, ed. F.E. Adcock, S.A. Cook, M.P. Charlesworth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954), p.53.

<sup>200</sup> Tacitus *Germ.* 41.1; *Ibid.*, p.56.

Tène fortified hilltop on the Ehrenburg in Northern Bavaria has evidence of Roman trade in the form of a series of Mediterranean objects found, including fragments of Greek glass ware from Northern Italy.<sup>201</sup> Caesar's account of his British campaign indicates that both the Gauls and Romans were engaged in trade with the Britons.<sup>202</sup>

This clearly demonstrates that in many cases there was at least some, if not substantial, trade interaction between Rome and those outside the empire. The existing trade circumstances must be examined, on a case-by-case basis, in order to determine whether any significant trade benefits might have eventuated from the conquest of an individual region. The ability of a newly-conquered region to maintain pre-conquest trade relations with Rome would most certainly have been affected by the impositions of the Roman army necessary for feeding, clothing, and accommodating the occupation forces,<sup>203</sup> slash and burn tactics employed by either the defenders or aggressors during

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<sup>201</sup> P. S. Wells, "The La Tène Period in Germany," in *Different Iron Ages Studies on the Iron Age in Temperate Europe*, ed. J.D. Hill and C.G. Cumberpatch, *Bar International Series* (Oxford: Tempus Repartum, 1995), p.6.

<sup>202</sup> Caes., *BG.*, IV.20.

<sup>203</sup> Ekholm, "The Peoples of Northern Europe: The Getae and Dacians," p.56; Wells, "The La Tène Period in Germany," p.9.

the course of the war, and the increased demand on resources during the course of a war. Furthermore, significant damage caused to crops, manpower, the economy, or infrastructure would have had drastic effects on the new province's ability to maintain levels of pre-annexation trade, as would looting and the reduction of the pre-war workforce.

### **Regional Trade**

Regional trade refers specifically to trade with other powers in the adjoining regions to the new conquest, not trade with the conquest itself. Factors that could have affected regional trade include an increase in the exploitation of nearby markets due to closer contact with those markets, and access to newly-established markets previously unexploited by the conqueror. Additionally, new tax revenues garnered from taxation stations placed on the newly-established frontiers of the conquered region could have provided increased revenue for the conqueror. Regional trade could, however, have been adversely affected by the conduct of the war itself, as is clearly demonstrated by the abandonment of at least two German *oppida* during Caesar's conquest of Gaul. The citizens of the German *oppida* were unable to continue their pre-war trade and as such were forced to resort

to subsistence manufacture, evidenced by their abandoning of their larger centralised communities in favour of smaller dispersed settlements.<sup>204</sup>

Both the German *oppida* at Manching and Kelheim were abandoned during Caesar's annexation of Gaul because the war interrupted the flow of goods between Gaul and Germany, causing the economies and material culture of these two *oppida* to become unsustainable.<sup>205</sup> This is not to suggest that all Germans abandoned the region, rather that a demonstrable dispersal from the concentrated communities into smaller settlements and a clear change in the material culture took place. This change in the material culture is particularly interesting as it clearly demonstrates the damage to a regional economy which ceased to produce highly-specialised serial goods and shifted primary production to domestically-made non-specialised goods necessary for personal day-to-day use.<sup>206</sup> This disruption of interregional commerce has been demonstrated to have caused the breakdown of local systems of goods circulation, which would have affected not only the Germans but the profitability of Gaul itself and any potential Roman trade in the region after

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<sup>204</sup> Wells, *The Barbarians Speak, How the Conquered Peoples Shaped Roman Europe*, p.78.

<sup>205</sup> Ibid.

<sup>206</sup> Ibid., p.80.

the conquest of Gaul.<sup>207</sup> Regional trade might also have been adversely affected by a backlash against the conquering power as a result of their aggressive behaviour in the region, or the retention of property that had traditionally been viewed as the property of a neighbouring nation.

## Local Trade

Local trade refers to trade directly with the conquered area. Literary and archaeological sources substantiate that the Romans were actively engaged in trade in a number of regions beyond the frontiers of the empire:<sup>208</sup>

Around lie the continents far and wide, pouring an endless flow of goods to you. There is brought from every land and sea whatever is brought forth by the seasons and is produced by all countries, rivers, lakes, and the skills of Greeks and foreigners.

Aelius Aristides, *To Rome*, xi – xiii.

In many cases archaeology presents the best evidence for the extent of trade with foreign nations, however, the extent of local trade interaction can at

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<sup>207</sup> Ibid., p.78.

<sup>208</sup> Pliny, *NH.*, XXXVII.xi, amber from Germania, XII.xxxii.63-65, frankincense from Arabia, VI.xxvi.100-106, at least 50,000,000 Sesterces trade with India per annum; Tac., *Ann.*, II.62, Roman traders found in the territory of the Marcomanni during the reign of Maroboduus.

times be difficult to assess archaeologically, as is the case with the trade in perishable goods between the Romans and the Germans after the Gallic annexation.<sup>209</sup>

If trade in the newly-conquered region was reduced because of the loss of manpower or damage to infrastructure or the economy as a result of looting by the conqueror, then the economic benefits to the conqueror must be reduced by the amount that trade has been damaged, possibly to levels below that of the pre-conquest period. If the conquered nation suffered a reduction in interregional trade caused by the war this could have had significant effects on the productivity of the conquered nation. Conversely, local trade could have been affected in a positive way if the conqueror had managed to remove internal barriers to the development of the economy, through the investment of substantial amounts of capital, an influx of manpower, or the implementation of more advanced economic institutions or technologically advanced methods of production, improving the ability of the locals to advance their economy or by improvements to trade-related infrastructure

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<sup>209</sup> O. Brogan, "Trade between the Roman Empire and the Free Germans," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 26 (1936): p.219. A wax tablet found near Leeuwarden provides clear evidence that the Germans were engaged in, at least small scale sales, of cattle to the Romans.

such as markets or roads.

### **High-efficiency Economic Collaboration**

High-efficiency economic collaboration refers to the conqueror's ability to integrate the existing economy of the conquered into their own economic system. Factors that help indicate the potential for economic collaboration include a compatible existing economy and economic institutions. Factors that demonstrate that the potential for high-efficiency collaboration was low include significant differences in the economic systems of the conquered and those of the conqueror, economic resistance designed to slow down production, or a scorched earth policy that damages the agriculturally fertile land.

Although evidence of pre-existing trade between the conquered and conqueror demonstrates at least some understanding of how each other's economy functioned, it does not necessarily equate to the potential for high-efficiency economic collaboration. Even though the Germans had certainly been exposed to the Roman economic system and the tribes living closest to the Roman frontier largely utilised a three metal coinage system, their economy and economic infrastructure could not be considered sufficiently

compatible with the Roman economic institutions to allow for high-efficiency economic collaboration. The fact, as Pitt has suggested, that many of the tribes in the interior of Free-Germany were only utilising coins only as bullion and not as a true coinage system, indicates that the likelihood of high-efficiency economic collaboration with this region was slim.<sup>210</sup>

### **Income versus Expenditure**

Wars of conquest could prove to be extremely expensive. Marcus Aurelius is said to have spent the entire treasury on the war against the Marcomanni and was forced to sell his own property in order to continue the funding for the war.<sup>211</sup> Factors to be examined when determining income versus expenditure ratings include the expense of the war that led to the annexation, the one-off plunder gained, and the continuing income that could be extracted from the region. An approximation of the costs of a particular conflict can be obtained by deducing the number of troops utilised and the duration of the wars themselves. Additionally, the length of supply lines from the front to the nearest stable supply area needs to be determined, as the transport of enough

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<sup>210</sup> L. F. Pitts, "Relations between Rome and the German 'Kings' on the Middle Danube in the First to Fourth Centuries A.D.," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 79 (1989): p.57.

<sup>211</sup> *SHA, MA, XVII.4, XXI.9.*

goods to keep an army of any significant size well supplied could have been very expensive, particularly when overland routes had to be utilised.<sup>212</sup> The loss of a significant number of soldiers or the destruction of infrastructure could also have rendered a war extremely expensive. Marcus Aurelius was forced to recruit slaves and gladiators to continue his prosecution of the war against the Marcomanni, providing some indication of the cost to the Roman military being expended on this war.<sup>213</sup>

The expense of policing the newly-annexed region and the costs associated with the development of required infrastructure for the policing and administration of a province must also be included in these calculations, 'for it is impossible to maintain quiet peace between tribes without the use of armed forces; these cannot be kept up without pay, nor pay without tribute.'<sup>214</sup> Conversely, the additional profits, above and beyond those made from dealings with the province prior to annexation, must then be compared to these expenses in order to determine the income versus expenditure ratio.

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<sup>212</sup> Greene, *The Archaeology of the Roman Economy*, p.40.

<sup>213</sup> *SHA, MA*, XXI.6-8.

<sup>214</sup> *Tac., Hist.*, IV.74.

## **Changes in Trade Barriers with the Conquered**

Changes in the trade barriers with the conquered allow for an easy examination of potential profits to be gained through annexation. If prior to the conquest major barriers existed to international trade and therefore prevented the Romans from having effective and profitable dealings with a resource rich nation, conquest would have led to an elimination of these barriers and significantly raised the potential for profitable dealings with the conquered for Roman merchants, which in turn benefited the administration through increased taxes. If few or no trade barriers existed prior to annexation, conquest would not have been likely to increase the profits gained after conquest.

## **Potential for low-cost Romanisation**

As Hingley suggests in his discussion of the term Romanisation, it has often been utilised to suggest that barbarians were incapable of advancement or peaceful existence without the assistance of a dominant 'civilising' force which has 'gifted' the 'poor barbarian' with civilisation. This concept has been adopted as a justification for colonialism in more recent times.<sup>215</sup> Furthermore,

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<sup>215</sup> R. Hingley, *Globalizing Roman Culture Unity, Diversity and Empire* (London: Routledge,

Hingley is undoubtedly correct in pointing out that Romanisation focuses on the native elite much more than the commoner,<sup>216</sup> and can create a blanket impression that the native culture was eradicated in favour of the civilised institutions of the conqueror. There can be little doubt that native culture survived to some extent, and affected the form that Roman culture in the region took. Because of the literary sources' concentration on the literate elite they do not present a balanced account of the adoption of Roman culture by the lower strata natives of a newly-annexed region.

In this work the term Romanisation is not used to denote the cultural advancement of a barbarian people, nor is the intent here to discuss or demonstrate that the conquered wholly gave way to the 'civilising' forces of the Empire. Rather, the term Romanisation will be used to describe the changes encouraged and implemented by the Romans and adopted by willing native elite and native institutions. It is clear that the Roman authority saw advantages in the adoption of Roman ways in order to implement mechanisms for better control of the new acquisition. The native elite also saw advantages to the adoption of Roman culture, as it increased their chances of participating

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2005), pp.27-29.

<sup>216</sup> Ibid., p.14.

in the governance of their homeland.

The goals of Rome in regards to the Romanisation of the native elite and the institutions used to control the indigenous population by their previous leaders are quite obvious.<sup>217</sup> By Romanising these control elements the empire was able to more effectively and efficiently control the indigenous population of a newly acquired province and reduce the chances of any local rebellion possessing effective leadership.<sup>218</sup>

The potential for the low-cost Romanisation of the native elite and the indigenous institutions of control are important for a number of reasons, firstly because they lower the costs associated with bringing the conquered into line with the rest of the Empire and thereby increase the economic benefit for the Empire. The more Romanised the native elite were before conquest, the less likely the newly-annexed region would suffer from internal rebellion as those who were most likely to provide leadership in any anti-Roman activity had demonstrated a desire to become more Romanised of their own initiative.<sup>219</sup>

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<sup>217</sup> Rome utilised the native elite, where possible, to create largely self-governing communities: Scullard, *From the Gracchi to Nero*, p.273.

<sup>218</sup> The last point is discussed in detail in systemic frustration section

<sup>219</sup> Romanised control consisted of a remote ruler governing through the use of lesser delegates, and a centralised government, production, and economy: Scullard, *From the*

Additionally, if pre-annexation Romanisation can be demonstrated, then it is more likely the conqueror would have found compatible institutions of control utilised by the conquered that they were easily able to adopt or at least adapt in order to impose their own control. This is not intended to suggest that the process or results of Romanisation were identical in every conquest, or that the Romans were applying a standardised model to each conquest. As Hingley demonstrates Romanisation took different forms in different places affected by the input of the native population.<sup>220</sup>

An important indicator of a Romanised control system would be demonstrated if evidence of a centralised form of control can be demonstrated. Centralisation was an important component of Roman control: the Emperor, being geographically removed from most of the provinces by a large distance, ruled through the use of lesser officials whose power stemmed from his authority. This form of rule would certainly have been seen as alien by cultures accustomed to direct rule by a chieftain and unaccustomed to centralisation.

Romanisation is also an important determining factor in an assessment of whether Rome could effectively incorporate the economy of the conquered

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*Gracchi to Nero*, p.273.

<sup>220</sup> Hingley, *Globalizing Roman Culture Unity, Diversity and Empire*, pp.49-71.

into the Roman system of production and distribution. If the conquered lacked an understanding of the standards of the Roman economy and the use of a tri-metallic coinage system, the introduction of these basics might have taken a significant amount of time, effort and expense; conversely, if the conquered had engaged in relatively high volume trade with the Romans prior to their conquest then it is likely the conquered possessed at least a basic understanding of the Roman economy, allowing the native system to be integrated more readily.

### **Geopolitical Factors in the Determination of Advantage or Disadvantage**

The key factors in determining the advantage or disadvantage of geopolitical interaction post-conquest include the manpower required to protect the frontier, hostility on other fronts, regional tactical changes, regional strategic changes and security.

## Changes in Manpower Requirements to Defend the Frontier

The manpower required to protect the newly-created frontier after the annexation of new territory could have potentially had a dramatic effect on the level of advantage gained by annexation. A demonstrable lack of centralisation in a newly-annexed region can indicate that the Romans needed to provide significantly larger garrisons than would otherwise be required.<sup>221</sup> An examination of the Claudian annexation of Britain in AD 43 demonstrates that the number of troops required to secure the non-centralised tribal regions, such as those of the Cornovii, was significantly greater than those required in centralised regions such as those of the Catuvellauni.<sup>222</sup> In centralised societies, after the completion of an annexation garrisons could be placed at central points controlling both the native populace of the newly-annexed region and preventing external threats with a relatively smaller force than would otherwise be required. Millett's discussion of the British annexation demonstrates that decentralised regions with multiple political nuclei required between two and three times the amount of manpower than

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<sup>221</sup> M. Millet, *The Romanization of Britain an Essay in Archaeological Interpretation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp.49-51.

<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.*, p.50.

would be required in centralised regions.<sup>223</sup>

A positive change can be demonstrated when the required amount of troops to defend the new frontier is reduced below the number required to defend the pre-annexation frontier. Conversely, if due to the annexation the required manpower increased, whether from direct border contact with hostile nations, or an increase in the geographical frontier requiring additional defenders, a negative change has occurred.

### **Hostility on other Fronts**

Hostility on other fronts refers specifically to changes that resulted from the act of annexation, whether from Roman absorption of nearby territories not actually owned by the conquered peoples, or from an adverse response to Roman aggression in the region and nervousness resulting from an expectation that the region as a whole might become the target of Roman expansion. Increased hostility on the fronts is related to the previous topic as an increase in manpower requirements might be the result of such increased hostilities. This factor must also take into account existing enemies that post-annexation are able to redirect their hostility against the newly established

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<sup>223</sup> Ibid., p.49.

frontier.

## **Security**

Security is intimately linked with the two preceding factors.<sup>224</sup> Changes in the manpower utilised not only demonstrate the defensive requirements of the new frontier but also, as described in the manpower section, the garrison forces that were utilised to maintain control of the native population. If the native populace had been responsible for significant military concern for Rome or a Roman province then it is likely that the forces stationed in the new province would be required to prevent any re-emergence of this threat. Additionally, an examination of the hostility on surrounding fronts can assist in demonstrating the level of threat that the Romans might have faced from the region as a whole. In order for this factor to prove advantageous to the Romans the conquest under examination must demonstrably enhance the security of the empire or its frontiers by eliminating a serious or persistent threat. This factor can best be determined by examining the contact between

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<sup>224</sup> Interestingly the issue of Rome annexing new territory to enhance the security of the empire is a much debated topic, with the likes of Harris firmly arguing against the idea that Rome engaged in defensive imperialism, and those that agree with Luttwak that the defence of the empire formed an important background to some wars of conquest.

Rome or her provinces and the conquered nation in the period preceding the annexation, and the threat posed by the military forces of the annexed region prior to the conquest.

### **Regional Tactical Changes**

Regional tactical changes refer specifically to situations where the conqueror is able to gain a tactical advantage over the nearby peoples, for example providing themselves with an access to the rear of an enemy nation which they had previously been unable to threaten, or where the Roman ability to strike at an enemy increased significantly because the conquest allowed the Romans to attack an enemy from multiple fronts. Alternatively, the conquest may have placed the conqueror at a tactical disadvantage because of the fact that an enemy nation or nations is able to more easily position their forces to attack sensitive regions of the conqueror's empire, including the conquest, particularly while the conqueror had not managed to complete the defensive works for the region.

### **Regional Strategic Changes**

Regional strategic changes can include anything that might have enabled

the conqueror to control the regional political or military situation, such as separating two powers hostile to the conqueror and thereby decreasing the chances of an alliance against this nation. Alternatively, taking possession of strategically important territory that would increase the difficulty of an attack against the empire and demonstrate strategic advantage.

### **Systemic Frustration**

Four key factors in determining the actuality of, and predicting the potential for, the mobilisation of social discontent are: the controlling state's political inclusiveness of the conquered; levels of coercion applied; social expectations of the conquered; and the level to which these aspirations were seen to be attained (in the present or potential achievement of aspirations in the future). Modern political theorists have demonstrated that in modern societies low levels of inclusiveness, a large gap between aspiration and achievement and moderate levels of coercion demonstrate the highest potential for increased levels of civil strife.<sup>225</sup> This is in part because pseudo-participation in government was unlikely to achieve genuine change, a desire for which is demonstrated in the gap between aspiration and achievement,

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<sup>225</sup> Feierabend, Feierabend, and Gurr, "Systemic Conditions of Political Aggression: An Application of Frustration-Aggression Theory," p.156.

and the moderate levels of coercion are insufficient to prevent the organisation of dissident groups. The relevance of these theories to this work stem from the fact that to determine profitability the potential for the smooth integration of the conquered into the empire of the conqueror needs to be determined; additionally, instances of political unrest after the act of conquest had occurred could dramatically affect the costs of policing and controlling the newly-incorporated territory.

Factors likely to cause systemic frustration include detrimental changes in socio-economic circumstances, political disenfranchisement, and little realisation (or low-potential for the realisation) of social aspirations.<sup>226</sup> The suppression of resistance<sup>227</sup> could prove to be an extremely costly process. Although at times it may not be possible to demonstrate that the mobilisation of social discontent actually occurred, if the conqueror felt that there was the potential for resistance, and hence political instability, a substantial amount of

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<sup>226</sup> I. K. Feierabend, R. L. Feierabend, and B. Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns," in *Anger, Violence, and Politics Theories and Research*, ed. I. K. Feierabend, R. L. Feierabend, and T. Gurr, Robert (Sydney: Prentice-Hall Pty. Ltd., 1972), p.109.

<sup>227</sup> The terms 'resistance' and 'mobilised social discontent' will be used interchangeably to refer to the act of opposing the conqueror's will, whether openly by force of arms or by other less direct means.

capital might have been invested on additional programs designed to prevent the organisation and mobilisation of social discontent, such as the use of low-cost incentives for collaboration.

The profitability of annexation depends significantly on the likelihood of the mobilisation of social discontent which requires expensive counter-measures. It has been demonstrated elsewhere that guerrilla tactics enable the imposition of high costs on occupation forces and substantially reduce the potential for high-efficiency economic collaboration.<sup>228</sup> Most modern societies have a small percentage of 'ultra-patriotic' citizens who willingly risk their lives to impose high costs on occupying forces, and evidence indicates that this was no different in the ancient world.<sup>229</sup>

An examination of the defensive infrastructure built by the conqueror immediately or shortly after the completion of conquest can be utilised to demonstrate expected or actual resistance. If there is evidence of infrastructure development but no evidence of actual revolts then it

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<sup>228</sup> Liberman, *Does Conquest Pay?*, p.13; Velleius, II.110.6; Tac., *Ann.*, III.42.1.

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.*, p.31; the actions of the Sicarii, in particular the siege of Masada culminating in the mass-suicide of those present demonstrate the presence of 'ultra-patriotic' citizens in the Roman world.

may be argued that the lack of resistance was, at least in part, a result of the conqueror's countermeasures. Furthermore, it might be argued that this demonstrates that the conqueror had the ability to judge the potential for resistance and reacted appropriately in order to stop this potential from becoming a reality. An examination of resistance in the region to be assessed assists in any determination of the expense of policing and defending it. In addition to the financial costs, the relevance of defensive works needs to be determined by a comparison of the financial costs versus military 'output'.<sup>230</sup>

An equally important factor is the determination of the type of threat the defensive system was designed to counter, for example infiltration, hit and run, invasion, raids or other threats. This assists in understanding Rome's expectations of those geopolitical consequences directly associated with the expansion of the imperial boundaries and the annexation of new territory. The reduction in the cost of manpower needed after the creation of such a defensive network must also be considered (possibly evident by reduction in manpower stationed at the defensive network and pre-defensive network).

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<sup>230</sup> Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, from the First Century A.D. To the Third*, p.61.

## **Inclusiveness**

The inclusiveness of the conqueror needs to be assessed in order to gain an insight into the potential for systemic frustration. An assessment of inclusiveness will indicate the degree to which the Romans included, or were required to coerce, the native nobility of their subject peoples, and therefore the potential additional costs of the annexation under examination. Any examination of inclusiveness needs to determine the levels of economic, social, and political discrimination – these factors will help demonstrate to what degree Rome allowed the indigenous populations of conquered states to participate in the economic and political functions of the empire.

Ivo and Rosalind Feierabend in their article ‘Systemic Conditions of Political Aggression: An Application of Frustration-Aggression Theory’ clearly identify many of the key indicators of political and judicial inclusiveness in modern communities, although the authors utilise the term ‘permissiveness’ in their discussions of what follows. For the purposes of this work ‘permissiveness’ will be defined as a function of inclusiveness. By allowing a conquered people to participate in their own governance, to a greater or lesser degree, the conquerors demonstrate their willingness to include that

people into the conqueror's state.

A modern highly-inclusive society can be characterised by an expectation that civil rights are present and protected, as is the right of political opposition.<sup>231</sup> Evidence that public opinion is effective in policy formation also indicates a highly-inclusive society;<sup>232</sup> furthermore, highly-permissive societies generally limit significant heads of government in power and term of office.<sup>233</sup> In these societies local political groups are able to participate in the decision-making process, the existence of independent judicial bodies can be demonstrated,<sup>234</sup> and evidence of a tradition of structures mediating between individual and central government can be verified.<sup>235</sup>

In a modern moderately-inclusive society civil rights are both present and protected but suffer from the occasional infringement,<sup>236</sup> some opposition political parties are banned, but in general terms limited opposition is

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<sup>231</sup> Feierabend, Feierabend, and Gurr, "Systemic Conditions of Political Aggression: An Application of Frustration-Aggression Theory," p.157.

<sup>232</sup> Ibid.

<sup>233</sup> Ibid.

<sup>234</sup> Ibid.

<sup>235</sup> Ibid.

<sup>236</sup> Ibid.

acceptable.<sup>237</sup> Public opinion is usually effective in the formation of policy, the significant head of government is responsible to the public or to the popular legislature, judicial bodies are adequately independent and regularised, there is evidence of moderately strong mediation between the government and the individual, and there is some indication of the existence of a representative constitution.<sup>238</sup>

The indicators of a modern slightly-inclusive society include the intermittent interference with the protection of civil rights, political opposition although tolerated is ineffective, there is some form of free election process, the significant head of government is appointed by means other than popular election, public opinion rarely effects policy, judicial bodies although adequately independent are lacking in fixed procedures, there is weak meditation between government and individual, and the constitution is either easily altered or excessively difficult to alter.<sup>239</sup>

The numerical indicator scale for inclusiveness, presented later,<sup>240</sup> differs

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<sup>237</sup> Ibid.

<sup>238</sup> Ibid., p.158.

<sup>239</sup> Ibid.

<sup>240</sup> See Numerical Indicator Scale description pp. 130-153.

from the others in that it does not possess a zero value. This is a result of the fact that the conqueror's inclusiveness of the conquered as citizens cannot be the same as it was in pre-conquest circumstances, because political inclusiveness of the conquered could not exist in any meaningful manner pre-conquest.

## **Aspiration**

I. and R. Feierabend and B. Nesvold state that 'violent political behaviour is instigated by systemic frustration' and 'systemic frustration may stem, among other circumstances of the social system, from specific characteristics of social change.'<sup>241</sup> Specific circumstances of social change must certainly include annexation by a greater power, with a subsequent change to the social system of the conquered in order to make it more compatible with the systems and institutions of the conqueror. However, even a change of this magnitude alone does not automatically lead to high levels of systemic frustration and politically-inspired violence. It is only when change or uncertainty in social aspirations causes discontent that it can be considered an additional factor contributing to acts of resistance and social turmoil.<sup>242</sup>

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<sup>241</sup> Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns," p.109.

<sup>242</sup> Ibid., pp.108-09.

One method for determining the potential for discontent is to examine the differences between the aspirations of the conquered and the reality created by the conqueror. This factor is of particular interest in ancient societies with a high potential for modernisation and socio-economic advancement.<sup>243</sup> This is particularly true for those societies outside of the Roman Empire and Greece. 'Barbarian' nations absorbed into the Roman Empire could expect a rapid increase in the level of modernisation, and an increase in sophisticated infrastructure that would potentially assist trade<sup>244</sup> – accompanying this could be an expectation of a more peaceful lifestyle due to the *Pax Romana*.

So-called 'barbarian' societies already involved in the process of self-Romanisation prior to annexation had demonstrated a desire to become more Roman, and therefore would have been likely to more rapidly adopt the Roman ideals and aspirations driving them towards Romanisation. This in turn would lead to a reduction in the potential levels of frustration that could otherwise accompany conquest. The fact that Rome generally engaged

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<sup>243</sup> Modernisation and socio-economic development here refer to advancement within the limits achieved by the most advanced contemporary societies, which they may have had contact with or knowledge of.

<sup>244</sup> N. Lewis and M. Reinhold, eds., *Roman Civilization, the Empire Selected Readings*, vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p.72.

in an active and highly visible process of Romanisation and infrastructure building programs soon after the completion of a conquest, would increase the expectations of the native populace whilst also meeting many of their demonstrated aspirations in a short period of time,<sup>245</sup> or at least demonstrate the potential for meeting these aspirations in the conceivable future. It must be remembered that it would largely be the pre-annexation politically-enfranchised native nobility that would benefit most, and most rapidly, from annexation. The importance of this is that if the politically enfranchised class is satisfied with the changes taking place, even if the lower classes were not they would be without military leadership from the class fulfilled that role.

### **Discontent**

It is equally important to examine the evidence for actual resistance in the newly-conquered region. This assists in the determination of how effective the conqueror's coercive measures were, and whether the conqueror was able to effectively judge how much resistance was likely. If there is very little or no evidence of mobilised social discontent this may indicate that the conqueror was able to accurately assess the potential for resistance and

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<sup>245</sup> Hingley, *Globalizing Roman Culture Unity, Diversity and Empire*, p.78.

effectively introduced counter-measures to prevent that potential becoming a reality. The determination of the actual resistance within a newly-conquered region can be undertaken in a number of ways, including a traditional literary survey, or an examination of troop deployments in the region which might assist in demonstrating that there was an unusually high concentration of troops in certain areas. An examination of the fixed defensive network might indicate that it was designed primarily to protect against an internal threat. Additionally, an examination of coercive measures and low-cost incentives must be undertaken in order to explain why demonstrated potential was not converted into reality.

### **Coercion and Repression**

The Roman destruction of all existing fortifications and enslavement of many of the warriors that were not killed during the conflict itself were clearly methods of destroying the remaining military resources of the conquered. Additionally, the Roman way of popularising the conquest, by meeting aspirations, to the upper echelon of the conquered society also reduced the ability of the conquered to retaliate and clearly reduced their coercive resources by reducing the pool of potential leaders for any concerted

rebellion. Nonetheless, these rebellions did occur in some instances, but often well after the original conquest when disaffection had had the opportunity to develop. The banning of groups that could become politically active was another clear demonstration of Roman repression designed to prevent the emergence, organisation and mobilisation of discontent.

## **Internal Factors**

### **Glory**

In order to take advantage of an annexation and gain the maximum potential glory, emperors were required to spend substantial amounts of money 'advertising' their actions and presenting them as the greatest possible achievement. Some methods utilised for advertising a victory included the holding of games, a triumph, the production of coins, the writing of histories, and the construction of buildings, dedications to temples, and the construction of monuments.

Triumphal processions were one way for the emperor to illustrate his victories to the Roman populace. The awarding of a triumph was directly connected with conquest or military action, and as with the staging of

games the triumph was only directly witnessed by those within Rome, geographically limiting the audience. Triumphal processions transcended class limitations, and show that glory was not only dependent on pleasing troops and merchants.

The games provided a demonstration of imperial power and a physical confirmation of the hierarchy of Roman society. As such they provided an ideal avenue for communicating an emperor's victories and achievements. Games, although a relatively short-lived event, were known to have a lasting beneficial effect for their sponsor, as is demonstrated particularly during the republican era.<sup>246</sup> The audience of the games consisted of members of all social strata within Roman society. According to some estimates the colosseum could seat up to 87,000 people, ensuring that the emperor's message was instantly spread to a very large audience. Attendance at the games was important for a number of reasons, not least of which was that those attending re-confirmed the hierarchy of Roman society through the structured status in every

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<sup>246</sup> In the republican era the glory of the victory advertised by the triumphal games transferred directly to the commander responsible. During the republic the staging of games was utilised to obtain political advantage, specifically throughout election campaigns illustrating the popularity and importance of the staging of games.

element of the colosseum, especially the structured seating arrangements.<sup>247</sup>

The attendance of this wide spectrum of the Roman population presented the emperor with the ability to reach the whole range of Roman citizens simultaneously with a physical demonstration of his victory. Emperors often took this opportunity to express the fact that conquest attracted wealth to those within the Empire directly, by dispensing gifts to those present.<sup>248</sup>

The gladiatorial games also allowed many Romans who were unlikely to ever venture outside of Italy, let alone actually participate in an act of conquest,<sup>249</sup> to gain some measure of ownership over the distant expanses of the Empire. This empowered even the least fortunate Romans whose position in the artificial hierarchy of the arena clearly demonstrated their superiority over those fighting and dying on the arena floor.<sup>250</sup> The triumphal games in which ever increasing numbers of victims were forced to fight and die illustrated the power and wealth of the organiser and the state.<sup>251</sup> The presentation of an artificial battlefield where the audience could witness and participate

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<sup>247</sup> D. L. Bomgardner, *The Story of the Roman Amphitheatre* (London: Routledge, 2000), p.9.

<sup>248</sup> D. G. Kyle, *Spectacles of Death in Ancient Rome* (London: Routledge, 1998), p.8.

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid.*, p.80.

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid.*, p.17.

<sup>251</sup> K. M. Coleman, "Fatal Charades: Roman Executions Staged as Mythological Enactments," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 80 (1990): p.8; Kyle, *Spectacles of Death in Ancient Rome*, p.8.

in the emperor's victory,<sup>252</sup> simultaneously enhanced the emperor's glory, reaffirmed the security of the state, and demonstrated Rome's domination of those outside of the empire.<sup>253</sup>

The games were not solely a political tool but the role they played in politics cannot be disputed.<sup>254</sup> Although Kyle correctly states that during the republic the games were primarily utilised to gain support and during the empire they were used to appease the populace,<sup>255</sup> the appeasement and empowering of the populace was done to further the political ends of the emperor. Although the slaughter of large numbers of captives was clearly an economically costly exercise, particularly as these combatants might have been sold into slavery increasing the wealth of the emperor and the community by providing cheap labour, their deaths in the arena provided immeasurable political benefit and glory for the organiser.<sup>256</sup>

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<sup>252</sup> Kyle, *Spectacles of Death in Ancient Rome*, p.80; Keith Hopkins, *Death and Renewal* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp.1-2; 29.

<sup>253</sup> Kyle, *Spectacles of Death in Ancient Rome*, p.80; Thomas Weidemann, *Emperors and Gladiators* (London: Routledge, 1992), p.4.

<sup>254</sup> Kyle, *Spectacles of Death in Ancient Rome*, p.8.

<sup>255</sup> Ibid.

<sup>256</sup> R. Auguet, *Cruelty and Civilization: The Roman Games* (London: Routledge, 1994), p.15.

The term *ex manubiis* is found on many Roman structures and refers to booty taken during conquest. The interesting point to note here is that *manubiae* refers only to the booty from an annexation or military victory, not to the ongoing income achieved by annexation. Booty was commonly used to advantage by an emperor to advertise a successful campaign through the construction of impressive monuments, with the sponsorship of *munera* in some way sharing the rewards of victory with Rome and re-establishing the principle that conquest was beneficial to all Romans.<sup>257</sup> This sort of advantage could be vitally important to an emperor in need of financial security for his reign.

Roman coinage served two distinct purposes: to act as a medium of exchange, and as a type of media directed at changing the perceptions of the imperial populace by advertising the achievements that an emperor wished to convey.<sup>258</sup> Coinage issues were an important medium for the distribution of information for an emperor. Typically, gold and silver coins had official use, such as the paying of salaries, while the brass and bronze coins were

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<sup>257</sup> Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome*, p.20.

<sup>258</sup> B. Levick, "Messages on the Roman Coinage: Types and Inscriptions," in *Roman Coins and Public Life under the Empire: E. Togo Salmon Papers II*, ed. George M. Paul; Michael Lerardi (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1999), p.44.

used in everyday transactions. Bronze, brass and to a lesser degree silver coinage would therefore have been seen by every facet of the wider imperial community across all classes. Silver coinage was generally used to pay the army and as such would have been distributed throughout the provinces in which the armies of the empire were stationed. Gold coinage, being less commonly used and certainly not in everyday transactions, would generally have only reached the wealthy and upper-class within the empire and important trade partners outside the empire.<sup>259</sup> This usage pattern allowed the emperor to tailor his message to specific class groupings within the contemporary society.

The key importance of coinage as a form of media for the Roman imperial machine was the fact that the message the emperor was trying to convey would, in time, reach every corner of the empire and beyond the imperial frontiers through trade. The breadth of the distribution network for Roman coinage was largely a result of international trade and the requirement to pay the soldiers most commonly stationed on the frontiers of the empire. The empire had a uniform currency which further enhanced the size of the audience that would be reached through this medium. The fact that the higher

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<sup>259</sup> Although exceptions did exist in the form of the emperor's donatives to the troops and lavish gifts at the games. Suet., *Nero*, 11; Suet., *Claud.*, 10.

value denominations of Roman currency would likely be handled only by the wealthy and upper-class members of the empire however meant that the emperor could tailor the message presented to specific audiences.

For the purpose of glorifying an emperor's reign and gaining increased acceptance during the reign itself, the demonstrable longevity and extent of circulation made Roman coins a medium of communication without par in the ancient world. This longevity ensured that the message to be disseminated would remain conspicuously in the public eye for at least several decades. One extreme example of the longevity of circulation is a Roman republican Denarius attributed to Lucius Appuleius Saturninus and minted in 104 BC that was counter-marked in AD 69 during Vespasian's reign,<sup>260</sup> indicating that this coin remained legal tender 173 years after its original minting date.<sup>261</sup> Coins as a means of communicating imperial propaganda were highly effective largely because they were able to transcend class and literacy because of the pictorial representation of events and messages. The fact that even the illiterate were able to understand the message being conveyed dramatically increased the size of the message's potential audience.

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<sup>260</sup> Coin reference Cr. 317/3a; Syd. 578.

<sup>261</sup> <http://www.ancientcoins.biz/pages/circulation/>, accessed 24-10-2005.

The factors presented in this chapter will be used to construct a cost-benefit analysis of the Trajan's Dacian annexation in chapter four of this work. The following chapter demonstrates how the factors will be assigned values in order to rate each individual factor and subsequently each key grouping. This will allow for an assessment of the overall advantage gained or disadvantage incurred as a result of the annexation examined and allow for ready comparison between annexations.

## **Chapter: Three**

### **Numerical Indicators of Advantage and Disadvantage**

## Chapter Three: Numerical Indicators of Advantage and Disadvantage

The methodology presented in this work is based on the modern cost-benefit analysis tool often used by business and government in order to determine the profitability of potential action.<sup>262</sup> Cost-benefit analyses have been used to decide whether to build highways, acquire new business interests, or determine the effects of potential health care changes.<sup>263</sup> In its simplest form a cost-benefit analysis examines only the financial costs and benefits of a potential action. In its most simplistic form a cost-benefit analysis does not account for any less tangible elements that might affect the profitability of a certain course of action. The inherent complexity of annexationist imperialism however requires the examination of several less tangible elements in order to determine the true costs and benefits of

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<sup>262</sup> K. L. Nichol, "Cost-Benefit Analysis of a Strategy to Vaccinate Healthy Working Adults Against Influenza," *Arch Intern Med.* (2001); K. Kikuzawa, "A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Leaf Habit and Leaf Longevity of Trees and Their Geographical Pattern," *The American Naturalist* 138 (1991); A. R. Prest and R. Turvey, "Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey," *The Economic Journal* 75, no. 300 (1965).

<sup>263</sup> T. F. Nas, *Cost-Benefit Analysis Theory and Application* (California: Sage Publications Inc., 1996), pp.2; 4.

such an action. By assigning dollar values to intangibles, more sophisticated cost-benefit analyses tend to become necessarily subjective because of the difficulties involved in estimating monetary values of intangibles.

In order to conduct a full cost-benefit analysis a common unit of measurement must be assigned to each factor. This unit of measurement acts as a scale which allows each factor to be compared and contrasted with the others being examined. Modern cost-benefit analyses almost exclusively utilise money as the common unit of measurement.<sup>264</sup> Therefore, benefits are represented in terms of income (either one-off or ongoing) and costs related to the expenses expected over the life of the project. In the modern world the commodification of intangibles has reached an extreme where the value of human life and the environment is often assigned a monetary value so that they can be factored into these models in order to determine the profitability of a proposed project.<sup>265</sup>

The common unit of measurement presented in this work is not money.

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<sup>264</sup> R. G. Bias and D. J. Mayhew, *Cost-Justifying Usability* (California: Academic Press, 1994), p.148.

<sup>265</sup> D. W. Pearce, "The Environment: Assessing the Social Rate of Return from Investment in Temperate Zone Forestry," in *Cost-Benefit Analysis*, ed. R. Layard and S. Glaister (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.464.

The use of money as the common unit of measurement here is not possible because of the difficulties associated with judging the contemporary values of material goods, changes in the value of the currency and assessing the fiscal value of intangibles. Instead a numerical indicator scale is presented. This scale is a subjective metaphorical tool designed to numerically weight the results of the traditional research which is presented in chapter four of this work. The scale involves assigning a numerical value to each factor, dependent on how significant the advantage gained from or the disadvantage suffered as a result, to assist in determining the level of change that took place after an annexation, or as a measure of the potential change if the methodology is utilised as a analytical tool. These numerical values are subjective and affected by the level of evidence available, but the use of this scale allows for a researcher to make comparisons across multiple annexations and permits a simple graphical representation of results that readily enable contrast and comparison. Similar subjective numerical scales have proven valuable in modern anthropological assessments of political inclusiveness.<sup>266</sup>

It is highly likely that it will be impossible to assign a numerical value

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<sup>266</sup> Feierabend, Feierabend, and Gurr, "Systemic Conditions of Political Aggression: An Application of Frustration-Aggression Theory," p.161.

for all factors involved in an annexation due to the paucity of available data. Although this is not an ideal situation, it is unavoidable and will not affect the scale presented. In an effort to reduce some of the inevitable subjectivity of the process and ensure the reduction of variation between different individuals utilising this scale, a base definition of slight, moderate, substantial and extreme has been included in each of the following sections. Ideally this scale would be employed by one researcher comparing several acts of annexation, thereby further reducing the likelihood of variation.

If based on a careful examination of the evidence and utilisation of the scale provided, the numerical indicator scale will assist in providing the most accurate results possible and illustrate these results in an easily digestible summary format.

This scale assigns the value 0 to factors where there is no discernible change between the period prior to annexation and the period following the annexation. A value of +1, +2, or +3 will be assigned to factors that shifted slightly in favour of the conqueror after the annexation, +4, +5, or +6 where there was a moderate shift in favour of the conqueror, and +7, +8, or +9 where the conqueror benefited substantially from changes post conquest with +10

being reserved for cases where exceptional advantage can be demonstrated. Conversely, a value of -1, -2, or -3 will be assigned to factors where a slight detrimental result to the conqueror can be demonstrated, -4, -5, or -6 if a moderately detrimental effect can be established, and -7, -8, or -9 where a substantially detrimental effect can be demonstrated after the annexation, with -10 being again reserved for exceptional circumstances.

Results are separated into four groupings: economic advantage indicators, geopolitical advantage indicators, systemic frustration indicators, and internal factors, and displayed to allow an individual examination of each of these groupings. The results will be presented in graph form with columns representing a negative value moving towards the bottom of the page and those representing a positive value moving towards the top of the page.

If, after the application of the methodology, the annexation examined displays an overall negative result, but was carried out, the methodology enables the researcher to determine the reasons why the annexation was conducted more accurately. For example, one of the key groupings may demonstrate a positive result and the rest suggest that Rome incurred disadvantages. If so, an examination of the emperor's reign focussing in detail on the positive

element may suggest why a positive in a single factor outweighed the other negative factors, at that time. This in turn may illustrate a deficiency in the reign of the emperor or society that the annexation in question could rectify.

The following tables illustrate each factor. In order to reduce the subjectivity of the process examples are provided of what could cause specific ratings.

## Numerical Indicator Scale Tables

## Regional Trade

Rating	Definition	Example Reasons
-10	Extreme reduction in regional trade	The loss of multiple previous trading partners
-9 -8 -7	Substantial reduction in regional trade	The loss of a previous trading partner
-6 -5 -4	The significant reduction of pre-conquest trade	Partial loss of a trading partner, long-term damage to interregional trade due to the war
-3 -2 -1	Minor reduction of pre-conquest trade	Short-term damage sustained by local trade industry as a result of the war
0	No discernible change in regional trade patterns	
+1 +2 +3	Minor increase in regional trade after conquest.	Added security of trade routes because of Roman regional presence
+4 +5 +6	Significant increase on pre-conquest trade.	Significant increase in trade because of improved trade route security, or access to a previously unexploited market
+7 +8 +9	Substantial increase in regional trade	Addition of a previously unexploited market
+10	Extreme increase in regional trade	Addition of multiple previously unexploited markets

## Local Trade

Rating	Definition	Example Reasons
-10	Extreme reduction in local trade	Critical damage to infrastructure, agricultural land and manpower
-9 -8 -7	Major reduction in local trade	Destruction of infrastructure, agricultural land, and the loss of substantial amounts of manpower
-6 -5 -4	Significant reduction in local trade	Destruction or loss of any two of the following: infrastructure, agricultural land, or loss of significant amounts of manpower
-3 -2 -1	Minor reduction in local trade	Any one of the above factors
0	No discernible change	
+1 +2 +3	Minor increases	Improved practices, or increased centralisation
+4 +5 +6	Significant increases	Centralisation or the creation of a specialised labour force
+7 +8 +9	Major increases	The introduction of substantially improved practices, the introduction of centralisation or the creation of a specialised labour force

+10	Extreme increases	Extreme improvement of practices, the introduction of centralisation or the creation of a specialised labour force
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### High-Efficiency Economic Collaboration

Rating	Definition	Example Reasons
-10	Extreme economic resistance	Completely different economic systems prior to conquest
-9 -8 -7	Major economic resistance	Alien financial systems and currencies and destruction of infrastructure and agricultural land, and
-6 -5 -4	Significant economic resistance	Destruction of infrastructure and agricultural land, no previous trade contact, dissimilar currencies
-3 -2 -1	Economic slowdown	The demonstrated desire by the native populace to hinder the conqueror's profit-making ability
0	No discernible change	
+1 +2 +3	Minor increases in economic productivity pre-conquest trade	Compatible currency. Some significant pre-conquest trade, and economic systems
+4 +5 +6	Significant increases in economic productivity pre-conquest trade	Identical currency. No economic resistance, very similar economic institutions, pre-existing centralisation
+7 +8 +9	Substantial increases in economic productivity in pre-conquest trade	Virtually identical economic systems and currency, no economic resistance

+10	Extreme increases	Identical economic systems and currency, no economic resistance
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### Income versus Expenditure

Rating	Definition	Example Reasons
-10	Extreme expenses	Expenditures are extremely high and income is virtually non-existent
-9 -8 -7	Major expenses	Policing and administrative infrastructure and manpower, for little or no increase in income beyond that achieved by peaceful dealings pre-annexation
-6 -5 -4	Significant expenses	Little or no increase in income
-3 -2 -1	Minor expenses	Moderate gain, gain does not exceed expenses
0	Break-even point: expenses and income cancel each other out.	
+1 +2 +3	Minor income	Moderate expenses, either equalled or exceeded by a small amount

+4 +5 +6	Significant income	Profits exceed expenses by a significant amount
+7 +8 +9	Major increase in income	Clearly exceeding the expenses undertaken to achieve victory and policing costs
+10	Extreme increase in income	Income is extreme with little or no costs associated

### Changes in Trade Barriers with the Conquered

Rating	Definition	Example Reasons
-10	Incentives for foreign traders evident pre-conquest	Trade with external powers subject to large subsidies prior to conquest
-9 -8 -7	No pre-conquest trade barriers evident	Free trade with external powers or potentially some small subsidies pre-conquest
-6 -5 -4	No evident trade barriers	Some potential for a small amount of increased international trade
-3 -2 -1	Minor trade barriers evident	Elimination of these barriers present the potential for some increase in trade
0	The institution of new frontier taxation points	Potential for a larger share of the profits from international trade for the conqueror
+1 +2 +3	Moderate trade barriers pre-conquest	Favourable treatment for other external nations, brought to an end by the conquest.

+4 +5 +6	Significant international trade barriers eliminated by the conqueror	Significant trade barriers that might include taxation upon Roman traders by the native populace
+7 +8 +9	Substantial positive changes in trade barriers	Major international trade barriers eliminated for trade with the conqueror, and potentially for other external markets
+10	Restrictive trade barriers evident pre-conquest	Possibly a complete ban on much or all trade with external powers

### Potential for Low-Cost Romanisation

Rating	Definition	Example Reasons
-10	Extreme difficulties and expense involved in Romanisation	Not only is there no evidence of pre-annexation Romanisation but there are significant blocks to the process
-9 -8 -7	Substantial expense required to Romanise	No pre-annexation Romanisation, and the conquered believe their institutions and way of life are superior to that of the conqueror.
-6 -5 -4	Significant expenses associated with Romanisation	No pre-annexation Romanisation, significantly different institutions and lifestyles between the conquered and the conqueror
-3 -2 -1	Moderate expenses associated with Romanisation	No pre-annexation Romanisation, minor differences in institutions and lifestyles between the conquered and the conqueror
0		No discernible Romanisation, institutions and lifestyles similar between the conquered and the conqueror, no anti-Roman feelings evident

+1 +2 +3	Substantial Romanisation	Some compatible institutions evident
+4 +5 +6	Little Romanisation	Some Romanisation evident, no significant differences between lifestyles and institutions
+7 +8 +9	Very little Romanisation necessary	Significant Romanisation evident, with many similarities in lifestyle and compatible institutions
+10	No Romanisation required	The conquered had Romanised before the annexation and require no input from Rome at all

### Changes in Manpower Requirements to Defend the Frontier

Rating	Definition	Example Reasons
-10	Extreme increase in the numbers of defenders required	Substantial increase in the length of the frontier bordering hostile peoples
-9 -8 -7	Substantial increase in the numbers of defenders required	Direct contact with hostile people/s or increased frontier to defend
-6 -5 -4	Significant increase in the numbers of defenders required	Significant resistance requiring an increase in the troop numbers
-3 -2 -1	Minor increase in the numbers of defenders required	Some initial resistance evident resulting in a minor or short-term increase manpower
0	No evident change in manpower requirements	

+1 +2 +3	Minor decrease in the numbers of defenders required	Minor decrease in the manpower required due to geographical shortening of the frontier
+4 +5 +6	Significant decrease in the numbers of defenders required	Significantly shortened frontier, or reduction in number of hostile forces
+7 +8 +9	Substantial decrease in the numbers of defenders required	Substantially shortened frontier, reduced hostility
+10	Virtually no defenders required	Favourable geographic conditions, or achieving a frontier that connects to an uninhabitable zone and such as an ocean or large tract of desert

### Hostility on other Fronts

Rating	Definition	Example Reasons
-10	Extreme increase in the levels of regional hostility	New hostility possibly on multiple fronts
-9 -8 -7	Substantially increased levels of hostility	Hostility on new front/s
-6 -5 -4	Significantly increased frontier hostility	Increased tensions with existing enemies
-3 -2 -1	Minor increase in frontier hostility	A short-term increase in tensions with existing enemy
0	No discernible change in frontier hostility	

+1 +2 +3	Slight reduction in frontier hostility	A short-term decrease in tensions with existing enemy
+4 +5 +6	Significant reduction in frontier hostility	Decreased tensions with existing enemies
+7 +8 +9	Substantially reduced frontier hostility	Reduction in hostility with multiple enemies
+10	Reduction of previously hostile region, to one where no hostility is evident	Critical tensions from multiple borders cease due to the annexation

## Security

Rating	Definition	Example Reasons
-10	Extreme decrease in security	By annexing this region the conqueror has weakened their own defenses which multiple serious threats can readily take advantage of
-9 -8 -7	Substantially reduced levels of security	The conqueror has somewhat weakened their own defensive network through acquisition of new territory
-6 -5 -4	Significantly reduced security	A more significant threat than the one posed by the conquered now borders the conqueror's territory

-3 -2 -1	Minor decrease in security	He conqueror has damaged their own defensive situation perhaps through the relocation of their forces to a location less defensively sound
0	No discernible change to security	
+1 +2 +3	Slight increase in security	The conqueror has eliminated a minor security threat
+4 +5 +6	Significant increase in security	The conqueror has reduced the security threat posed to their holdings
+7 +8 +9	Substantially increased security	The conqueror has eliminated a moderate threat to the security of their own community, in the form of one enemy or perhaps by separating multiple threats
+10	Extreme increase in security	The conqueror has rendered impotent several serious security threats

### Regional Tactical Changes

Rating	Definition	Example Reasons
-10	Extreme tactical disadvantage	Provided an important tactical advantage to a major enemy or multiple enemies
-9 -8 -7	Substantial tactical disadvantage	Annexation provided a significant tactical advantage to an enemy

-6 -5 -4	Significant tactical disadvantage	Annexation provided several minor enemies tactical advantage
-3 -2 -1	Small tactical disadvantage	Annexation provided a nearby enemy a minor tactical advantage
0	No change	No tactical change
+1 +2 +3	Small tactical advantage	Some additional pressure applied to an existing minor enemy
+4 +5 +6	Significant tactical advantage	Additional pressure applied to more than one minor enemy, or a significant enemy
+7 +8 +9	Substantial tactical advantage	Additional pressure applied to more than one significant enemy
+10	Extreme tactical advantage	Major pressure applied to one or more extreme threats

### Regional Strategic Changes

Rating	Definition	Example Reasons
-10	Extreme Disadvantage	A serious threat gained a significant strategic advantage over Rome due to annexation

-9 -8 -7	Substantial strategic disadvantage	One significant enemy or multiple minor enemies gained a substantial strategic advantage over Rome
-6 -5 -4	Significant strategic disadvantage	One significant enemy or multiple minor enemies gained a minor strategic advantage over Rome
-3 -2 -1	Some strategic disadvantage	One minor enemy gained a strategic advantage over Rome
0	No change	
+1 +2 +3	Small strategic advantage	Rome gained a minor strategic advantage over one minor threat
+4 +5 +6	Significant strategic advantage	Rome gained some strategic advantage over more than one enemy
+7 +8 +9	Substantial strategic advantage	Rome gained a significant advantage over a significant threat
+10	Extreme strategic advantage	Rome gained a strategic advantage over several serious threats

### Inclusiveness

Rating	Definition	Example Reasons
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-10	Extreme Disadvantage	The conquered are forced into the role of a sub-class to the citizens of Rome, with no legal or political rights
-9 -8 -7	No visible inclusiveness	The conquered are forced into the role of a sub-class to the citizens of the conquering nation, with few legal or political rights
-6 -5 -4	Small levels of inclusiveness	Minor legal rights are present for the conquered however there is a clear difference in the status of citizens; the conquered possess no political rights
-3 -2 -1	Some inclusiveness	Some legal rights present. The conquered possess no political power for self-determination beyond that granted as incentives to native elite who are willing to acquiesce
	There is no zero score for inclusiveness	
+1 +2 +3	Significant inclusiveness	Political power controlled by the conqueror. Substantial legal rights for the conquered
+4 +5 +6	Moderate levels of inclusiveness	Some small differentiation between the conquered and the conqueror. The conquered possess the same basic legal rights as the citizens of the conqueror
+7 +8 +9	Highly inclusive	The conquered are, in time, treated as members of the conqueror's community, with the freedom of self-government. The conquered possess the same legal and political rights as the conqueror's citizens

+10	Extremely inclusive	The conquered are, immediately, treated as members of the conqueror's community, with the freedom of self-government. The conquered possess the same legal and political rights as the conqueror's citizens
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### Aspiration

Rating	Definition	Example Reasons
-10	Extreme disadvantage	The conquered believe that the conqueror will prevent the attainment of social aspirations

-9 -8 -7	Substantial disadvantage	The conqueror is seen as substantially hindering social aspiration satisfaction
-6 -5 -4	Significant disadvantage	The act of conquest increases the aspirations of the conquered due to new potential, although no significant progress towards this potential is evident
-3 -2 -1	Minor disadvantage	Increased aspirations but little progress
0	No discernible effect	The conquered do not feel that the conquerors affect their aspirations
+1 +2 +3	Minor advantage	Increased aspirations with significant progress
+4 +5 +6	Significant advantage	Conqueror appears to be making significant progress towards fulfilling pre-conquest aspirations
+7 +8 +9	Substantial advantage	Conqueror is seen by the conquered to actively participate in and enhance aspirations
+10	Extreme advantage	The conquered see the conqueror as actively exceeding pre-annexation aspirations

## Discontent

Rating	Definition	Example Reasons
-10	Extreme disadvantage	Regular high levels of organised resistance

-9 -8 -7	Substantial disadvantage	High levels of organised resistance evident
-6 -5 -4	Significant disadvantage	Moderate levels of organised resistance, or high levels of spontaneous resistance
-3 -2 -1	Minor disadvantage	Minor occurrences of spontaneous resistance
0		No mobilised social discontent evident
+1 +2 +3	Minor advantage	Use of low-cost incentives for collaboration present
+4 +5 +6	Significant advantage	No resistance evident; little need for incentives
+7 +8 +9	Substantial advantage	The conquest is accepted, even favoured by pre-conquest politically-enfranchised class
+10	Extreme advantage	Conquest readily accepted even encouraged within the conquered society by more than one group within society

## Glory

Rating	Definition	Example Reasons
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-10	Extreme disadvantage	Disadvantages caused as a result of the new acquisition are obviously responsible for hardships to a large percentage of the conqueror's population
-9 -8 -7	Substantial disadvantage	Conquest endangered the conqueror's state, involved significant losses, has no legitimate cause, and is seen as an act of self-indulgence
-6 -5 -4	Significant disadvantage	Conquest involved significant losses, has no legitimate cause, and is seen as an act of self-indulgence
-3 -2 -1	Minor disadvantage	Seen as an act of self-indulgence, or seen unreasonably inflating a minor achievement
0	No discernible effect	
+1 +2 +3	Minor advantage	Conquest over a minor region with little advertising, or benefit.
+4 +5 +6	Significant advantage	Successful conquest of a region where previous attempts by others had failed
+7 +8 +9	Substantial advantage	Successful conquest of a region where previous attempts by others had failed, with obvious benefits to a percentage of the populace
+10	Extreme advantage	Well-advertised conquest that is seen as essential to the survival of the state, and engendered many benefits to a large percentage of the population