Introduction

Traditional approaches to the justification of belief in the existence of God are mainly based on the ontological argument,[3] cosmological argument,[4] or design argument.[5] These arguments have been seriously criticised not only by atheists and religious sceptics but also by theists. These arguments, according to some critics, are either question-begging, like the ontological argument,[6] which has its conclusion presupposed in its premises; or very weak,

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[3]The ontological argument first appeared in St Anselm's *Proslogium*, where St Anselm commented on the words of the Psalmist (Anselm, 1070, pp. 93-94). Later, Rene Descartes introduced a version of the ontological argument in his *Discourse on the Method* (Descartes, 1637, Part IV, p. 22) and *Meditations on Metaphysics* (Descartes, 1641, Part V, pp. 91-95).

[4]The cosmological argument is not a single argument. It is a set of arguments which generally start from some relatively simple facts about the world and, by appealing to the Principle of Sufficient Reason or some principle governing causality, aim to establish the existence of a being that has the properties of the theistic God (Rowe, 1975, p. 6). The origin of the cosmological argument can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle. Its standard formulation is to be found in St Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Theologica*, where he provides five ways to argue for the existence of God (Aquinas, 1273, I, Q. 2, Art. 3). The first three ways (from motion, from causation and from contingency) are usually designated as cosmological arguments. Cf: Rowe, *ibid.*

[5]The argument from design starts with an appeal to the order in the universe and the premise that ordered things are always the work of intelligent being and then concludes, by analogy, that there must be a supreme intelligent being, that is, God who is the designer of the ordered universe. The central thought of the argument from design can be traced backed to the Bible (Psalms, 19:1). The argument is stated clearly in St. Thomas's Fifth Way (Aquinas, 1273, I, Q, 2, Art 3).

[6]According to Kant, the ontological argument is question-begging. He made serious criticisms of the ontological argument in his *Critique of Pure Reason.* According to the proponents of the ontological argument, God is a perfect being and perfect being must exist, for perfection necessarily entails existence. If the existence of an absolute being is denied, a logical contradiction will arise. Kant raises an objection to this. According to Kant, the absolute necessity of a judgment is only a conditional necessity of the thing, or of the predicate in the judgment. For example, the absolute necessity of the judgment that all triangles must be three-sided is only a conditional necessity of things called triangles: if any thing is called a triangle, then it has three sides. In this hypothetical statement, that there are actually triangles is not affirmed (Kant, 1781, B 622). Likewise, the absolute necessity of the judgment that absolutely perfect being must exist is only a conditional necessity of thing that is absolutely perfect: if anything is absolutely perfect, then it will actually exist. In this hypothetical statement, that there is actually an absolute being is not affirmed. Now if the antecedent of the hypothetical statement is not affirmed, the consequent of the statement cannot be affirmed. If we negate the antecedent, all predicates about the absolute being, including the predicate 'existence', will have vanished. No contradiction arises. Kant raises another objection to the ontological argument. According to Kant, in the ontological argument, the word 'existence' is used as a predicate (quality or attribute) but the word 'existence' is not a quality or attribute word and, therefore, cannot be a predicate. For to say that something exists is not at all to add any quality or attribute to the thing in question but to admit the thing, with its all qualities or attributes, as an actual thing, not a fictional thing. Now if existence is not a predicate, the entailment between an absolute perfect being and the existence of such being, on which the ontological argument is based, collapse: an absolutely perfect being cannot be thought to lack any good qualities or attributes, otherwise, a contradiction will occur; but to think the non-existence of an absolutely perfect being does not involve a contradiction, for existence is not a quality or attribute of such an absolute being (Kant, 1781, B626).

like the cosmological argument[7] and the design argument,[8] whose conclusions have few traces of traditional conceptions of God.

Starting from Kant, many philosophical arguments for the existence of God have appealed to moral beliefs. The best known of these arguments are Kant's[9] and the one implicit in the

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Kant's argument against the ontological argument is not decisive. According to some philosophers, it is dubious that Kant's theses that an existential proposition is not logical necessary and that existence is not a real predicate are relevant to St. Anselm's ontological argument (Craig, E, 1998, pp. 89-93). Besides, some philosophers, such as Hartshorne, think there are some versions of the ontological argument which are non-question-beginning. Hartshorne presents a modal version of ontological argument which is not question-begging and therefore not subject to Kant's objections (see: Hartshorne, 1941). There is another way of interpreting the Ontological Argument as non-question-begging. Feuer, for example, interprets the Ontological Argument as having the emotion of guilt as its covert premise. "It is this component makes the argument convince its users" (Feuer, S. 1989, p. 257). This version of the Ontological Argument is not question-begging. But, it makes the Ontological Argument rather close to an Argument from Conscience.
So far, the issue about whether ontological argument is question-begging is still not settled.

[7]Kant also made serious criticisms of the cosmological argument. According to him, the argument has four defects. First, it appeals to the Principle of Sufficient Reason for a causal explanation of the existence of the world-order, that is, looking for a cause of the world-order beyond the phenomenal world. But, the Principle of Sufficient Reason can only be legitimately applied to the category of cause within the realm of the phenomenal world and beyond the phenomenal world it cannot, for the notion of cause beyond the phenomenal world does not make sense; Second, it presupposes that an infinite regress of causes is impossible and thus the causal chain must have a necessary cause as its end. But, this supposition does not hold within the phenomenal order and it cannot, therefore, hold unquestionably beyond the phenomenal order; Third, it looks for a self-explanatory and unconditional necessary cause. But there is no such thing as unconditional necessity because all necessity is under certain conditions; Fourth, it looks for a transcendent, supreme being on which the whole universe depends and it confuses the logical possibility with the real possibility of such a being. Kant also criticises the cosmological argument for depending on the ontological argument---the argument looks for an unconditional, absolute necessary being as the cause of the ordered universe, but the notion of an absolutely necessary being, the non-existence of which involves a logical contradiction, is one of the central claims of the ontological argument. Thus, the cosmological argument is parasitical upon the ontological argument (Kant, 1781, B636).

[8]David Hume first systematically criticises the argument from design in his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion.* According to him, the analogy betweer the works of human art (such as a machine) and natural objects is very weak. However, Hume admitted that the cause or the causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence (Hume, 1779, part XII). Kant also criticises the argument from design. Like Hume, Kant thinks the analogy between the works of intelligent architect and natural objects is weak and may do violence to nature. Kant also thinks the argument fails to reach the theistic conception of God, that is, all--powerful and all good God. However, Kant made positive comments on the argument from design: it "is the oldest, the clearest, and most in conformity with human reason" and it has an attention-directing function: it helps us to look for and to notice new regularities which otherwise might have escaped our undirected observation (Kant, 1781, A624).

[9] Kant's moral argument appears in his *Critique of Practical Reason* (Kant, 1788, pt I, bk II, ch 2, sec 5). The argument can be formulated like this:

1) We ought to attain the highest good (because the practical reason demands it);
2) The highest good is logically possible (otherwise it cannot be a duty);
3) However, the highest good is actually impossible (because of human beings' actual conditions)

divine command theory, which have long attracted philosophers' interests.[10] These two arguments start by analysing moral concepts (such as moral laws, moral obligations, moral rightness or wrongness of an action, etc.) and conclude with a justification for the belief in the existence of God. Compared with the traditional arguments, they provide a better reason for believing in the existence of a personal and morally good God, the traditionally conceived God.[11] However, both Kant's argument and the divine command theory are merely based upon conceptual analyses of moral beliefs, without appealing to moral phenomenology.[12] This feature makes these two arguments essentially weak.[13]

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unless there is an afterlife and there exists an all-good, omnipotent, omniscient and eternal God; Therefore,

4) An all-good, omnipotent, omniscient and eternal God exists.

According to Eric Adickes, Kant has repudiated his moral argument for the existence of God in his *Opus Postumum* on the grounds that the existence of God is not demonstrable and that faith in God is subjective. George Schrader has persuasively argued against Adickes' position and maintained that Kant didn't repudiate his moral argument in his *Opus Postumum* (Schrader, 1951, pp. 228-241).

[10]A divine command theory of morality is the thesis that an action is morally good or obligatory because God commands it. There are two types of divine command theories. One type is based upon an analysis of the semantics of moral concepts, or on the logical relations of propositions that contain moral concepts, to the thesis that something that is moral right/wrong because God commands/forbids it. Robert Adams and Philip Quinn present two versions of this type of the divine command theory. According to Adams' semantic version of the divine command theory, the word right means "commanded (or permitted) by God", and the word wrong means "forbidden by God" (Adams, 1979 p. 67). According to Quinn's analytical version, it is necessary that, for all p, it is required or permitted or forbidden that p if and only if God commands that p or it is not the case that God commands that not-p or God commands that not-p (Quinn, 1978, p. 27). Another type of the divine command theory is based upon an analysis of the nature of moral values/actions. This type of divine command theory argues from the objectiveness of moral value/actions, by inference to the best explanation, to the thesis that an action being morally right (or wrong) is because God commands (or prohibits) it. Robert Burch (1980, pp. 279-304) and Peter Forrest (1989, pp.2-19) present two versions of this type of divine command theory. I think this version of divine command theory is much more promising than that of merely analysing the meanings of moral terms or logical relations of propositions which contains moral terms: moral phenomenology reveals us that there are objective moral values/actions and objective moral values/actions can be best explained by God's commands/prohibitions.

[11]This is a better reason because I take moral goodness as an essential attribute of the traditional conception of God. I follow Kant in asserting that the moral standpoint on the question of God's existence and on the other theological issues is the only one capable of yielding any positive results. If it were not for our moral interest in the concept of God, there would be no legitimate reason for us to form anything but a 'deistic' concept of the Supreme Being (Wood, 1978, pp. 22-23).

[12] By 'moral phenomenology' I mean the study of moral phenomena which investigates, analyses and interprets the structure and contents of concrete moral experience and tries to bring out the metaphysical/epistemological significance of moral experience; in contrast with, on the one hand, the pure conceptual analyses of moral terms or propositions, and, on the other hand, the pure description of moral experience regardless of its metaphysical significance and suspending all moral beliefs that transcend the phenomena of moral consciousness.

[13]Kant's argument and the divine command theory could have some force if (and only if) they are re-interpreted as based upon appeals to moral phenomenology.

First, the mere conceptual analysis of moral beliefs cannot provide a forceful argument for the belief in the existence of God, for: (1) Whether God exists is a factual question, not a conceptual one, mere conceptual analysis lacks the force to convince people to believe that there is *in fact* a God and cannot settle the question; (2) Conceptual analysis can only provide a justifying reason for believing in the proposition that God exists. It seldom actually motivates one to believe in the proposition. One may acknowledge the logic of conceptual analysis but still withhold assent to the existence of God. To believe in the proposition that God exists, unlike believing in an ordinary proposition, not only a justification, but also a motive is needed; (3) Mere conceptual analyses, without the sustenance of moral phenomenology, are vulnerable to moral scepticism.[14] They can be easily rejected by moral scepticism, such as Mackie's sort, on the ground that because moral beliefs are false, it does not follow that there exists a God, a conclusion drawn from conceptual analyses of moral beliefs.[15]

Second, Kant's argument and the divine command theory, besides being based merely upon conceptual analysis, take value judgements as premises, and then conclude with a factual statement. They cannot, therefore, be free from the objection that it is fallacious to argue from value judgments to factual statements, for there is a logical gap between value judgments and factual statements, in other words, 'is' cannot be derived from 'ought'. They express different relations.[16] Whether there is really a logical gap between value judgments

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[14] Moral scepticism is a type of moral theory which holds that moral beliefs cannot be objectively justified because there are no such things as objective moral facts on which moral beliefs can be based. Moral beliefs are, according to this theory, purely the projection of our subjective world and, therefore, have no truth-values. John Mackie presents a typical moral scepticism, holding that moral beliefs are false because there are no objective moral values and the moral values we talk about are invented. See: Mackie, J. (1977).

[15] Kant's argument could be interpreted as taking moral realism as a premise and then uses conceptual analysis to draw consequences from this. Then, the lack of motivational force in the argument is not because it is just conceptual analysis but because moral realism by itself lacks emotional force.

[16] In the history of western philosophy, Hume first made this sort of distinction between value judgments and factual statements. In his Book III, Part I, Section I of *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume says: "For as this ought, or ought not expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it" (Hume, 1739, p.469). Here, Hume was arguing against the inference from 'is' to 'ought'. Kant introduces the thesis that there is an unbridgeable

and factual statements is beyond the scope of this thesis. For my purpose, I assume that there is a logical gap, and hence that Kant's argument and the argument implicit in the divine command theory have a serious philosophical problem.[17]

To say this, however, is not to commit us to the religious scepticism that there is no rational justification for the belief in God,[18] nor the religious irrationalism, which maintains that religious beliefs do not need rational justification.[19] Instead we should hold the view that the justification of the belief in God does not lie in conceptual analysis but in moral experience. Moral experience provides not only a justification but also a motive for the belief in the existence of God. This view is advocated by John Henry Newman in his *An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent.*[20]

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logical gulf between sentences which express statements of fact and sentences which express judgements of value particularly moral judgements. If Kant's thesis is true, we neither can infer 'ought' from 'is' nor 'is' from 'ought'.

[17] It has been long-debated whether it is a fallacy to infer 'is' from 'ought' or 'ought' from 'is'. Some philosophers, for example, John R. Searle (1964, 1969), argue that we can legitimately infer 'ought' from 'is' because factual statements have a normative dimension. Other philosophers, for example R. M. Hare (1969), argue that we cannot legitimately infer 'ought' from 'is' because they belong to different logical domains. So far, the debate has not been closed up.
I think it is not fallacious to infer 'ought' from 'is' because values and facts, though distinctive from each other, are not completely apart and the former supervenes on the latter. However, I do think it is fallacious to infer 'is' from 'ought' because 'ought' presupposes 'is' and so if we infer 'is' from 'ought' we beg the question.

[18] For typical religious sceptic views, see Anthony Flew (1976) and John Mackie (1982).

[19] For typical religious irrationalistic views see Karl Barth (1956).

[20] Newman's *An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent*, abbreviated to *G. A.* subsequently in this thesis, was first published in 1870. Eight editions appeared before Newman's death (Ker, I. T. 1985, xlix). In this thesis, I mainly use the edition by Charles Frederick Harrold (1947). However, I also refer to Ker's edition.
G. A. is Newman's most systematic philosophical work. It deals mainly with the modes of assent (belief) and inferences (reasoning), and the justification (rationality) of assent in general and religious assent in particular. The central argument in the book is that assent is not arrived at, primarily, by demonstrative reasoning but by non-demonstrative reasoning. Therefore, non-demonstrative reasoning plays a central role in the justification of assent (belief), especially, in the justification of religious beliefs. For detailed analyses of the structure and contents, and the development of main ideas in *G. A.*, please see Ker (1985): "Introduction".
Some philosophers may think that the *Grammar* is merely a fragment of Newman's epistemology and contains no criteriology at all. In my opinion, *G. A.* is the most important philosophical work done by Newman because it has integrated his early philosophical thoughts and ideas, and thoroughly explicated his basic philosophical principles. From the *Grammar*, we can sketch the framework of his whole metaphysical project. The significant status of *G. A.* among Newman's works is confirmed by what Newman himself says in *A. W.*: "What I have written has been for the most part what may be called official, works done in some office I held or engagement I had made—all my Sermons are such, my lectures on the Prophetical Office, on Justification, my Essays in the British Critic and translation of St Athanasius—or has been from some especial call, or invitation, or necessity, or emergency, as my Arians, Anglican Difficulties, Apologia or Tales. The Essay on Assent is nearly the only exception...I had felt it on my conscience for years, that it

Newman departs from the traditional natural theology, which looks for formal arguments to justify the belief in the existence of God, and grounds the belief on concrete experience: "Here my method of argument differs from that adopted by Paley in his *Evidences of Christianity*. ... If I am asked to use Paley's argument for my own conversion, I say plainly I do not want to be converted by a smart syllogism; ..." (*G. A.* pp. 322-323)[21] According to him, the belief in God is justified by concrete experience—the experience of moral conscience:

> As from a multitude of instinctive perceptions, acting in particular instances, of something beyond the sense, we generalize the notion of an external world, and then picture that world in and according to those particular phenomena from which we started, so from the perceptive power which identifies the intimation conscience with the reverberation or echoes (so to say) of an external admonition, we proceed on to the notion of a Supreme Ruler and Judge, ... (*G. A.* p. 79)

> We have by nature a conscience. The feeling of conscience has two aspects: a moral sense and a sense of duty, the latter is the primary and most authoritative aspect of conscience. Conscience does not repose on itself, but vaguely reaches forward to something beyond self and dimly discerns a sanction higher than self for its decision. Conscience, taken as a sense of duty, is a voice or the echo of a

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would not do to quit the world without doing it." (pp. 272-273) Thus, we cannot regard the *Grammar* as merely a fragment of Newman's epistemology and containing no criteriology at all.

When summarizing his proposal on Newman, Frecerick D. Aquino says: "I recognize that Newman, on the whole, did not write as a systematic thinker. Rather, Newman understood most of his works as a response to some specific occasion. Thus, development seems to be a logical outcome of studying his thought." (Aquino, 2003, p. 94) It seems to me this statement suggests that Newman's works are fragmental and disjointed, and lacks integrity, and therefore, there is a need of development in studying Newman's thought. If this is what is really meant, I think Aquino hasn't done justice to Newman. I admit that Newman often writes for certain specific occasion and his works employ different philosophical style, method and terminology from analytical philosophers, but this does not entail that he does not write as a systematic thinker. From *The University Sermon to The Grammar of Assent*, we can see a continual and systematic development of Newman's major epistemological principles and ideas, and that his works are integrated into a holistic unity. In my view, any interpretation or development of Newman's thought must take this as its starting-point.

> voice which is imperative and constraining: when we obey the voice of conscience, we enjoy the sunny serenity of mind, the soothing satisfactory delight; when we transgress the voice of conscience, we feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened. Inanimate things cannot stir these affections. These feelings in us are such as require for their exciting causes an intelligent being. There is no sensible, no earthly object to elicit them. If the cause of these emotions does not belong to this visible world, the object to which his perception is directed must be supernatural and divine. Thus, the phenomena of conscience, as a dictate, avail to impress the imagination with the picture of a supreme Governor, a Judge, ... (*G. A.* pp. 80-84) [22]

Conscience for Newman, as we will see in chapter 3 of this thesis, is a mental capability which originates, like our other metal capabilities such as perception, memory, reasoning, etc. in human nature. Our experience of conscience is like, in particular, our perceptual experience—it is intentional and has a claim to objectivity, and the belief-forming process of the former is same as the belief-forming process of the latter as well: as certain objects are presented to our senses we immediately form the belief that these objects exist, when moral facts are presented to our conscience and generate certain emotions we immediately form the belief that there is a Supreme Ruler or Judge. According to him, the way to form the belief in God from our experience of conscience is just like the way to form the belief in the external world from our perceptual experience. Now, if our belief in the external world bases on perceptual experience is justified so is our belief in God based on our experience of conscience.

Newman's approach to the justification of the belief in God has many similarities to the reformed epistemologists' approach arisen during last two decades.[23] Both of them reject the

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[21] For Paley's argument, see Paley (1859).

[22] Besides the *Grammar*, Newman takes up the issue of the theistic implication of conscience at *The Parochial and Plain Sermons* (1836), *The Oxford University Sermons* (1843), *The Apologia pro Vita Sua* (1864), etc.

[23] By 'the reformed epistemologists' I refer to the contemporary American Christian philosophers who reject the traditional epistemological principles and approaches to the justification of the belief in the existence of God, and

traditional approach to the justification of belief in God and ground the belief on concrete experience. However, there is a significant difference between them: the former grounds the belief on the experience of conscience, while the latter grounds the belief in the existence of God on religious experience. Newman's approach, in my view, has an advantage over that of the reformed epistemologists. Since it grounds the belief in the existence of God on the experience of conscience, Newman's approach makes the rational foundation of the belief more solid than that of the reformed epistemologists, for the experience of conscience is more universal, less controversial than religious experience, and more importantly, unlike religious experience, it does not presuppose the belief in the existence of God.[24]

Newman's approach shifts away from the traditional approaches based on conceptual analyses and appeals to concrete human experience—the experience of conscience. It has advantages over the traditional approaches: conceptual analyses are weak in terms of justification of belief in God for they lack motivational force. It also has advantages over the reformed epistemologist approach based on religious experience: the experience of conscience is more universal and less controversial than religious experience, and the

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apply a reformed approach to the problem. Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, George Marvrodes and Kenneth Konyndyk are notable reformed epistemologists. Their reformed views are explicated mainly in *Faith and Rationality,* edited by A. Plantinga and N. Wolterstorff. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983. I will discuss Plantinga's reformed views in details in chapter 6.

[24]Some people may object that I intend to narrow religious experience so that it does not include the experience of Buddhists and Taoists because it is clear that they do not have a belief in God or gods. Therefore, I am subject to the fallacy of assuming that which I must prove by asserting this. Also, some would dispute the connection between religious experience and moral experience and would argue the former is broader than the latter. It is true that Buddhists and Taoists do not profess a belief in a supernatural being, but, they believe in an afterlife and a supernatural, mysterious force which is the ultimate source of the universe and controls the operation of the universe. These beliefs, if pushed further, can rationally lead to a belief in a supernatural being who is the creator and administrator of the universe. When I say that Buddhists' and Taoists' beliefs can be rationally led to theism I do not mean this can be proved by demonstrated reasoning. What I mean is: if we hold the following beliefs a) there is a supernatural force which commands the operation of the universe; b) there is an after-life which will reward the virtues and punish the vices of this life, the best explanation of these beliefs is theism because it is more intelligible than that of Buddhism and Daoism. I agree that some people take the experience of conscience as a part of their religious experience. But there are a large proportion of people who have the experience of conscience, but not religious experience. This is why I say that the experience of conscience is more universal than religious experience. Here, I follow Newman in holding that there are no experiences more fundamental and universal than the experience of conscience. For Newman's view about the importance of the experience of conscience, please see L. Armour, 1981.

former approach is, thus, far more philosophically attractive than the latter approach.

Though there is much literature about Newman's approach to the justification of the belief in the existence of God, there is still a need to reconsider it for an adequate interpretation and assessment of the approach. An adequate interpretation and assessment of Newman's approach enable us to see its epistemic importance and advantages over other approaches. Thus, in this thesis, I am going to reconsider Newman's approach and attempt to give an adequate interpretation and assessment.

Newman's approach, as I shall interpret it, has two steps. The first step is based on the experience of conscience, and then relies on an analogy between the way to form the belief in the external world and the way to form the belief in the existence of God to justify that belief. The second step is based on the phenomenology of moral conscience manifested as moral obligation and moral emotion, and then relies on an inference to the best explanation to justify the belief in the existence of God.

In order to give an adequate interpretation and assessment of his approach to the justification of the belief in the existence of God from conscience, we need first to understand Newman's philosophical affinities and main ideas. Thus, in chapter 1, I shall trace Newman's philosophical sources to clarify those affinities and ideas; In order to determine in what sense Newman uses the word 'conscience,' we need to examine the etymology and the various conceptions of conscience. This I do in chapter 2, where I argue that, based on the phenomenology of moral experience, an adequate conception of conscience is three-fold, that is, conscience involves moral belief, the sense of duty and moral emotion; In chapter 3, I shall examine Newman's conception of conscience to show that it belongs to the three-fold type of conception of conscience; In chapter 4, I shall look at the first step of Newman's approach to the justification of belief in the existence of God based on the phenomenon of conscience, that is, the analogy with the justification of the belief in the existence of the external world based on sensory phenomena, then defend it by appealing to Chisholm's theory of the justification of perceptual beliefs; In Chapter 5, I shall look at the second step of

Newman's approach to the justification of belief in the existence of God, that is, the best explanation of the phenomena of conscience and reply to some typical objections to it, especially, John Mackie's; In chapter 6, I shall first trace the sources of reformed epistemology and the development of Plantinga's epistemic theories, and then compare Newman's approach with that of the reformed epistemologists, to show that the former has several advantages over the latter. Finally, a chronology of Newman's life will be given in Appendix I.

Chapter One: The Philosophical sources of Newman

As I have stated in the Introduction, the objective of the thesis is to examine Newman's approach to the justification for the belief in the existence of God and compare it with the reformed epistemologists' approach, to draw the conclusion that the former has advantages over the latter. In order to achieve this objective, we need to understand Newman's philosophical affinities and main ideas. Thus, in this chapter, I am going to trace the philosophical sources of Newman to clarify those affinities and ideas.

Part One: The Influences of Aristotle on Newman[25]

Newman openly acknowledges Aristotelian influences on him:

> While we are men, we cannot help, to a great extent, being Aristotelians, for the great master does but analyse the thoughts, feelings, views, and opinions of human kind. He has told us the meaning of our own words, and ideas, before we were born. In many subject-matters, to think correctly, is to think like Aristotle, and we are his disciples whether we will or not ... (Newman, 1856, pp. 109-110)

> ...as to the intellectual position from which I have contemplated the subject (of

[25] Edward Sillem has done an extensive study on Newman's philosophical sources and has provided comprehensive and detailed information about Newman's philosophical sources in his Introduction to *The Philosophical Notebook of John Henry Newman* (Louvain: Nauwelaerts Publishing House, 1969). According to him, there are seven main sources which had particular influence on the formation of Newman's philosophy: (a) the Aristotelian sources; (b) the philosophy of the 'Noetics' of the Oriel Common Room; (c) the Analogy of Religion of Joseph Butler; (d) the Cosmic Platonism of the Alexandrian Fathers; (e) the natural philosophies of Isaac Newton and Francis Bacon, and the advances made in Mathematics by contemporary mathematicians; (f) the empiricism of Locke and Hume; (g) the associationist theories in psychology derived from Abraham Tucker and Sir Joshua Reynolds, which were systematized by William Paley. Besides, there are some minor sources of Newman's philosophy. Sillem divides them into English, German and scholastic sources (Sillem, *ibid.* p. 149). It is not my purpose here to give full discussion of the sources of Newman's philosophy. I am going to only look at some sources which had great influence on Newman's main philosophical principles and ideas.

human knowledge), Aristotle has been my master. (*G. A.* p. 327)

Newman did an extensive study of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, the *Poetics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* while he was an undergraduate at Trinity College, Oxford.[26] Through studying these works he developed two fundamental principles of his own philosophy: (a) There are a variety of ways of reasoning and thinking by which we can grasp truth, not just one standardized, uniform way, because each individual has his/her own specialised ways of thinking through experience, and the experience of individuals who have expertise in certain fields is a reliable source of knowledge: "though truth is ever one and the same, and the assent of certitude is immutable, still the reasonings which carry us on to truth and certitude are many and distinct, and vary with the inquirer; ...' (*G. A.* p. 270) "...we must trust persons, namely, those who by long acquaintance with their subject have a right to judge." (*G. A.* p. 259)[27] (b) Personal elements play a great role in the process of gaining knowledge: "Nor, lastly, is an action of the mind itself less necessary in relation to those first elements of thought which in all reasoning are assumptions, the principles, tastes, and opinions, very often of a personal character, which are half the battle in the inference with which the reasoning is to terminate."(*G. A.* p. 274) Besides, Aristotle's idea of *phronesis* had special influences on Newman's theory of illative sense.[28] *Phronesis* is 'the faculty guiding the mind in matters of conduct' and it is 'the directing, controlling and determining principle in such matters, personal and social.' (*G. A.* p. 268) The Illative sense, like *phronesis*, is the power of judging and concluding in concrete matters (*G. A.* p. 262, pp. 268-270).[29]

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[26]See: Sillem, 1969, p. 151; Thomas, K. Carr, 1996, pp. 64-65. According to Sillem, these works had great influence on his life-long reflections on our experimental knowledge of individual particular things, which later developed into the distinctive Newmanian doctrine of *the illative sense* (Sillem, 1969, p. *ibid.*). We can clearly see the influence of these three works on Newman from his *The Idea of University, The Grammar of Assent* and from some of his letters. See: the letter to Whatley on Sept. 27, 1825, in Dessain, vol. 1, pp. 260-261; the letter to Whatley on Nov. 14, 1826, in Dessain, vol. 1, pp. 306-307).

[27]Newman cited a passage from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* in the *Grammar* to support his view: "We are bound to give heed to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of the experienced and aged, not less than to demonstrations; because, from their having the eye of experience, they behold the principles of things." (*G. A.* p. 259)

[28]Sillem, *ibid.* p. 162; Carr, 1996, p. 68.

Although Aristotle had great influence on him, Newman is not a pure Aristotelian.[30] This can be seen from (a) his rejection of Aristotle's view that we have no intellectual knowledge of particular things (b) his criticisms of the limitations of Aristotle's Logic. In the following, I am going to look at Newman's criticisms of Aristotle's logic in more detail, for they have laid the foundation for his departure from the traditional approach to the justification of belief in existence of God.

Newman's first acquaintance with Aristotle's logic was at Trinity from Dr Aldrich's *Artis Logicae Rudimenta* when he was preparing for his honours degree (Sillem, *ibid.* p. 156). However, he gained the main ideas of Aristotle's logic through Richard Whately, who presented Aristotle's logic in a clear and lively style in his *Elements of Logic* (Sillem, *ibid.* p. 156). It is evident that Newman was an admirer of Aristotle's logic at that time, for he had a very close friendship with Whately and made substantial contribution to his *Elements of Logic.*[31]

In his later Catholic years, Newman's interest in Aristotle's logic was dramatically reduced. This is because, for him, Aristotle's formal logic has little use in concrete matters. Newman made severe criticisms of Aristotle's logic due to its simplicity and abstractness, and therefore, lacking force in concrete matters. According to him, abstract reasoning cannot reach concrete truth:

> Abstract can only conduct to abstract; but we have need to attain by our reasoning to what is concrete; and the margin between the abstract conclusions of the science, and the concrete facts which we wish to ascertain, will be found

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[29] I will further discuss the Illative Sense in Part Three, Chapter 3 and Part Six, chapter 6.

[30] Sillem, *ibid.* p.158, p. 163; Carr, *ibid.* p. 69.

[31] Whately openly acknowledged Newman's contribution in his *Element of Logic*: "I cannot avoid particularizing the Revd J. Newman, Fellow of Oriel College, who actually composed a considerable portion of the work as it now stands, from manuscripts not designed for publication, and who is the original author of several pages" (Whately, 1826, p. viii). In a letter to William Monsell, dated on the 10th of October 1852, Newman recounted the details of his relationship with Whately and the work he contributed to *Elements of Logic*. According to his recount, the part of work he did is the pages on "The *History* of Logic, from Zeno to Watts in the Introduction" For more details please see Dessain, 1964, vol. XV, pp. 175-179.

> to reduce the force of the inferential method from demonstration to the mere determination of the probable. (*G. A.* p. 204)

This is because, first "its premises are assumed, not proved"; and second, "its conclusions are abstract, and not concrete''. Besides, the process of attaining knowledge in concrete matters is so intricate and long, and it can only stop at propositions which are self-evident, i.e. the first principle, that formal logic does not have a full command over them (*G. A.* pp. 204-205). Furthermore, logic cannot prove that there are any self-evident propositions and even if it has its use, it provides little help in arriving at the first principles (*G. A.* pp. 204-205) So, he concludes that logic has no decisive role in concrete matter—it only "enables us to join issue with others; it suggests ideas; it opens views; it maps out for us the lines of thought; it verifies negatively; it determines when differences of opinion are hopeless; and when and how far conclusions are probable" (*G. A.* p. 206).

According to Newman, for genuine proof in concrete matters we require an organon more delicate, versatile, and elastic than verbal argumentation (*G. A.* p. 206). That is, we need probable reasoning to reach conclusions in concrete matters: in the concrete matter, it is "a number of independent probable arguments, sufficient, when united, for a reasonable conclusion", not syllogisms. (*G. A.* p. 221)

It should be noted that, although he criticizes the limitation of Aristotle's logic, Newman does not deny the usefulness of Aristotle's logic. We can see this from the following passage:

> Every exercise of nature or art is good in its place; and the uses of this logical inference are manifold. It is the great principle of order in thinking; it reduces a chaos into harmony; it catalogues the accumulations of knowledge; it maps out for us the relations of its separate departments; it puts us in the way to correct its own mistakes. It enables the independent intellects of many, acting and re-acting on each other, to bring their collective force to bear upon one and the same subject-matter, or the same question.... Though it does not go so far as to

> ascertain truth, still it teaches us the direction in which truth lies, and how propositions lie towards each other. ...Though it does not itself discover the unknown, it is one principal way by which discoveries are made. ... A logical hypothesis is the means of holding facts together, explaining difficulties, and reconciling the imagination to what is strange. (*G. A.* p. 217)

In the above, we have looked at the Aristotle's influence on Newman. In the following we are going to look at Joseph Butler's influence on him.

Part Two: The Influences of Joseph Butler on Newman

Another most influential philosopher on Newman was Joseph Butler.[32] Butler's *Analogy of Religion* had a great influence on Newman and through studying the *Analogy* he gained two important ideas, which helped him to shape his own philosophy: (a) Butler's Platonic idea of the analogy which exists between God's various works in the natural and supernatural orders.[33] Newman thinks Butler is the great master of the doctrine that there is an analogy between natural orders and supernatural orders and uses Butler's analogy in great deal in the *Grammar* (*G. A.* p.89, p.308-309). (b) Butler's doctrine that probability is the guide of life.[34] Newman regarded Butler's *Analogy of Religion* as of the highest importance to him: Butler's idea of an analogy between God's works and the orders, and his "doctrine that probability is the guide of life" are "the underlying principles of a great portion of my teaching" (Newman, 1864, p. 23). In the following, let us see how Butler's *Analogy* influenced Newman.

In his *The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature* (Butler, 1736), Butler argues for religious assent based on probable evidence. According to him, probable evidence is sufficient for religious assent, this is because

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[32]Newman has cited Butler eleven times in the *Grammar* (p. 242, p. 244, p. 262, p. 274, p. 287, p. 290, p. 308, 309, 376, 379 and p. 380).
[33]Sillem, 1969, p. 171.
[34] (Sillem, *ibid.* p.107) John L. Murphy made the same point in his "The Influence of Bishop Butler on Religious Thought". See Murphy (1963), p. 381.

"Probable proofs, by being added, not only increase the evidence, but multiply it". For him, the truth of religion, like the truth of common matters, is to be judged by the whole evidence taken together:

> ...in like manner as, if in any common case numerous events acknowledged were to be alleged in proof of any other event disputed, the truth of the disputed event would be proved, not only if any one of the acknowledged ones did of itself clearly imply it, but though no one of them singly did so, if the whole of the acknowledged events taken together could not in reason be supposed to have happened, unless the disputed one were true." (Butler, 1736, pp. 329-330)

Thus, probability, according to Butler, "is the very guide of life". (Butler, *ibid.* vol.1 "Introduction", p. 5)

Newman, influenced by Butler, holds that probability plays a very important role in concrete matters, especially, in the areas of moral and religious matters. For him, probable reasoning is the footing for religion as it is the footing for Astronomy:

> ...I observe that moral evidence and moral certitude are all that we can attain, not only in the case of ethical and spiritual subjects, such as religion, but of terrestrial and cosmical questions also. So far, physical Astronomy and Revelation stand on the same footing. (*G. A.* p. 242)

In Astronomy, what warrants the proposition that the Earth rotates, for example, is a cluster of independent cumulative probabilities. There is no demonstrative proof for the proposition, yet we are certain that the Earth rotates because this cluster of independent cumulative probabilities amounts to a proof. (*G. A.* p. 242) Likewise, in religion, the grounds are the same: there are no demonstrative proofs for religious beliefs, yet they are true beliefs as they are warranted by cumulative, converging probabilities. (*G. A.* p. 243)

Newman, however, didn't accept Butler's theory of probability as a whole. According to Butler, there is a distinction between demonstrative evidence and probable evidence, and demonstrative evidence is only available to us in abstract thinking, as, for example, in mathematics. When we are dealing with matters of fact we can attain nothing more than probable evidence. Thus, we can never have true certainty about statements of fact. Newman disagrees with Butler here. In a letter to Canon Walker on the question of certainty, he writes:

> Butler *tends* to reduce the certainty to a *practical* certainty, viz. that it is *safer to act*, *as if* the conclusion were true; I maintain that probabilities lead to a speculative certainty legitimately; so that it is quite *rational* to come to that conviction, ... (Dessain, 1971, vol. XXI, p. 270)

According to Newman, probable evidence can lead to true certainty. We are certain about a great number of statements of fact, even though we cannot prove or demonstrate their truth. Newman uses a large scope in the *Grammar* to show that probable evidence can lead to certainty:

> We are all absolutely certain, beyond the possibility of doubt, that Great Britain is an island. We give to that proposition our deliberate and unconditional adhesion (*G. A.* p. 223). ... we should not think it unnatural to say that the insularity of Great Britain is as good as demonstrated,...(*G. A.* p. 241)

According to Newman, probability and demonstration are not opposed each other, on the contrary, they are in a same continuum and the former converges to the latter. Newman uses an example of a polygon becoming a circle when its sides are multiplied to ∞ to illustrate this:

> We know that a regular polygon, inscribed in a circle, its sides being continually

diminished, tends to become that circle, as its limit; but it vanishes before it has coincided with the circle, so that its tendency to be the circle, though ever nearer fulfilment, never in fact gets beyond a tendency. (*G. A.* p. 244)[35]

We can see that, for Newman, statically, probability is distinct from demonstration, but, dynamically, the distinction disappears when it becomes cumulative and converging, and tends to be demonstration.

In the above, we have looked at Butler's influences on Newman. In the following we are going to look at the influences of the Scottish common sense philosophy on him.

Part Three: The Influences of the Scottish Common Sense Philosophy on Newman

The third important source of Newman's philosophy is the Scottish common sense philosophy, especially, Thomas Reid's philosophy.

There is a close philosophical affinity between Reid and Newman.[36] As Ferreira has

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[35]One may take Newman's above example as an example of mathematical induction, not of probability, because, on the surface, the example takes the form of mathematical induction: for any polygon P_x (x=1, ..., n) and its sides N, when N tends to be infinite, P_x gradually becomes a circle. Now, if Newman uses the example as a mathematical induction, he cannot legitimately say that it warrants the conclusion 'as good as proved', 'amounting to a proof', and it cannot be otherwise (*G. A.* p. 244).I think Newman uses the example as one of probable reasoning, not a mathematical induction, because by using the example he is illustrating the likelihood of a polygon to become a circle when its sides tend to be infinite. Also, from the context in which Newman uses the example, we can determine that Newman uses the example as one of probable reasoning: preceding the example, Newman says: "I consider, then, that the principle of concrete reasoning is parallel to the method of proof which is the foundation of modern mathematical science, as contained in the celebrated lemma with which Newton opens *his Principia* (*G. A.* pp. 243-244). The lemma Newman mentioned here is Newton's Lemma 1 in his *Principia*, which states: "Quantities, and the ratios of quantities, which in any finite time converge continually to equality, and before the end of that time approach nearer to each other than by given difference, become ultimately equal. If you deny it, suppose them to be ultimately unequal, and let D be their ultimate difference. Therefore they cannot approach nearer to equality than by that difference D; which is contrary to the conclusion."(Newton, 1725 p.25) We can clearly see that Newton is talking about the converging probabilities of quantities and of the ratios of quantities in his Lemma 1. Thus, Newman uses the example of polygon as one of probable reasoning, not a mathematical induction.

[36] In her *Scepticism and Reasonable Doubt*, Ferreira firmly holds that Reid had great influence on Newman and has carefully examined and thoroughly explained the depth and broadness of these influences. Although, as Ferreira has noticed, it is unusual to connect Reid with Newman due to their different life styles and writings (Ferreira, 1986. p. 145); and, especially, because Newman made negative comments on Reid in a letter to his

observed, the German philosopher A. Bellesheim first acknowledged Reid's influence on Newman. According to him, Newman's *Grammar of Assent* was not free from objection from an Aristotelian-Thomist standpoint and that what was objectionable was due to the influence of Richard Whately's nominalist philosophy and Thomas Reid's common sense theory. But, Bellesheim didn't explain the form he thought Reid's influence took (Ferreira, *ibid.* p. 146).

Sillem also acknowledged the connection between Reid and Newman. According to him, Newman had first become acquainted with Reid during the course of his reading in preparation for his fellowship examination. Later, at the time he was writing his "Discursive Enquiries", Newman studied Reid once more with considerable care, for his volume of *The Collected Works of Reid* is extensively marked and a large number of notes are pencilled around the text. Newman read all or most of *An Inquiring into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense*, Parts of the *Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man* ... (Sillem, 1969, p. 223) However, for him, the connection between Reid and Newman is minor: "From references scattered here and there in the *Discursive Enquiries*, it is clear that Newman was interested, in his Birmingham rather than his Oxford years, in the writings of the Scottish Common Sense School of Philosophy, with which he had become acquainted during his early years at The Trinity College, but there is no evidence to show that he ever made any extensive use of their ideas" (Sillem, *ibid*, p. 221).

In disagreement with Sillem, I support J. Ferreira's position that there is a close connection between Reid and Newman and that there are many ways in which Newman has been influenced by Reid. As Ferreira has pointed out, before his close study of Reid began in 1859 Newman had already given evidence of holding Reid in significant esteem. In his *The Idea of A University*, Newman indicated a number of the foremost standard bearers of the British empirical tradition. He judged Locke to be of unsatisfactory repute, while Hobbes,

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sister, Jemima ("As to Reid, I used to know something of him some twelve years since, when I was preparing for standing at Oriel. He is a Scotchman who pretends to set Plato to rights. I have no business to talk of writers I have not studied; but your Scotch metaphysicians seem to me singularly destitute of imagination...") Nevertheless there is, as we shall see, a close philosophical affinity between them.

Hume, and Bentham were simply a disgrace, and added that by way of compensation, philosophy could boast of Clarke, Berkeley, Butler, Reid and Bacon (Newman, 1856, p. 263).[37] Newman's commendation of Reid is significant because it places Reid in the company of at least two sources of influences on him whose importance was explicitly admitted by him, that is, Butler and Bacon. It is significant also because it occurs before Newman took up Reid seriously in 1859--it therefore shows that on the basis of his early acquaintance with Reid, contrary to his explicit estimate, he took Reid to be worthy of being placed in the company of men he openly admired and expressly followed in important ways (Ferreira, *ibid*, p. 147). Ferreira further points out that Newman's responses to scepticism suggest especially his commendation of Reid: "Newman's self-conscious and determined attempt to avoid a perceptual theory which would give support to scepticism would no doubt also be able to account for his commendation of Reid, despite terminological differences about an 'inferential first principle' concerning an external world." (Ferreira, *ibid*, p. 170) Also, Newman's discussion of the role of probable reasoning, as we shall see, is influenced by Reid's.

Recently, Alvin Plantinga has observed the philosophical connection between Reid and Newman.[38] In rejecting classical foundationalism, Plantinga argues that the majority of our ordinary beliefs do not confirm with the criteria laid down by classical foundationalism and he has appealed to both Reid and Newman to support his position. Plantinga remarks:

> In his controversies with David Hume, Thomas Reid pointed out that the vast majority of our beliefs do not seem to conform to (CP):[39] at least as far as justification is concerned, they are none the worse for that. This sentiment was echoed in the nineteenth century by others, in particular, Cardinal Newman. (Plantinga, 2000, p. 97)

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[37] Also cf. Ferreira, *ibid*. p. 147.

[38] J Artz, Stephen R. Grimm, etc. have also acknowledged the philosophical affinities between Reid and Newman. See: Artz (1976, p. 268); Stephen R. Grimm (2001, p. 507, p. 508).

[39] Plantinga uses CP to refer the evidential conception of justification. Cf. Plantinga, 2000, pp. 93-94.

Plantinga then cited the passage from the *Grammar* where he thinks Newman echoed Reid:

> Nor is the assent which we give to facts limited to the range of self-consciousness. We are sure beyond all hazard of a mistake, that our own self is not the only being existing; that there is an external world; that it is a system with parts and a whole, a universe carried on by laws; and that the future is affected by the past. We accept and hold with an unqualified assent, that the earth, considered as a phenomenon, is a globe; that all its regions see the sun by turns; that there are vast tracts on it of land and water; that there are really existing cities on definite sites, which go by the names of London, Paris, Florence and Madrid. (*G. A.* pp. 133-134)

One might think this passage merely suggests a homology in Reid's and Newman's thinking, not reflecting Reid's influence on Newman. In my view, this passage does reflect Reid's influence on Newman. Reid gives a very similar example, in his *Essays on the Intellectual Powers*, to illustrate that non-demonstrative reasoning can lead to certainty which is as sure as demonstrative reasoning:

> That there is a city as Rome, I am as certain as of any proposition in Euclid; but the evidence is not demonstrative, but of that kind which philosophers call probable. Yet, in common language, it would sound oddly to say, it is probable there is such a city as Rome; because it would imply some degree of doubt or uncertainty. (Reid, 1785, VII, iii, 482b)

Newman did extensive studies on Reid's *Inquiry* and *Essays* and he must be familiar with Reid's this passage and his thinking. Thus, we cannot say it is merely a homology in their thinking.

From above we have glimpsed that Reid had influences on Newman. But, except Bellesheim, Sillem, Ferreira and a few others, philosophers, for over a century, have failed to

acknowledge this. So it is of a great importance to reconsider in what aspects and how much influence Reid had on Newman in order to thoroughly understand Newman's philosophical ideas and approaches. In the following, I am going to examine the areas and extent of influences that Reid had on Newman through a comparison between them on the following themes:

1. Direct realism of perception in Reid and Newman—no reasoning is involved in the process of perception.

2. Foundationalism in Reid and Newman—in order to avoid an infinite regress, ultimately scepticism, we must appeal to the first principles–the foundation of our knowledge.[40]

3. The reliability of human cognitive faculties and responses to the sceptic in Reid and Newman–the normal functions of human cognitive faculties vouch for their reliability and scepticism is not tenable.

4. The limit of demonstrative reasoning and the role of non-demonstrative reasoning in Reid and Newman—non-demonstrative reasoning can lead to certainty, which is as strong and sure as demonstrative certainty.

5. The naturalistic epistemology in Reid and Newman—both Reid's and Newman's epistemology is essentially naturalistic, non-providential.

1. The direct realistic theory of perception in Reid and Newman

Both Reid and Newman advocate a direct realism in their theory of perception.[41] Let's first

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[40]In terms of the structure of knowledge Reid and Newman are foundationalists, nevertheless, they both reject the classical foundationalists' criteria for justification, which is a subset of foundationalism. For details about the classical foundationalism, please see Part Three, Chapter 6 of this thesis.

[41]By 'direct realism' here I mean the theory of perception which advocates that perception involves a non-

have a look at Reid's theory of perception.

a. Direct realistic theory of perception in Reid

According to Reid, the traditional theory of perception from Plato to Hume holds that we do not perceive external objects immediately and the immediate objects of perception are ideas,[42] images or impressions, not the objects in themselves: "...all philosophers, from Plato to Mr Hume, agree in this, That we do not perceive external objects immediately, and that the immediate object of perception must be some image present to the mind." (Reid, 1785, II, vii, 263a) This theory, he calls 'the theory of ideas', can lead to scepticism and agnosticism. Reid says:

> The theory of ideas, like the Trojan horse, had a specious appearance both of innocence and beauty; but if those philosophers had known that it carried in its belly death and destruction to all science and common sense, they would not have broken down their wall to give it admittance. (Reid, 1764, V, viii, p. 132b)

Thus, he makes severe criticisms to the theory and develops a realistic direct theory of perception.

According to Reid, 'the theory of ideas' confuses perception with sensation, in fact, the two modes of mental operations are different and distinguishing the former from the latter is the key to understand them both (Reid, 1785, II, xvi, 312b). According to him, perception is object-directed and the object of perception, either real or imaginary, is distinct from the mental act about it (Reid, *ibid.* II, xi, 292b). In this way, perception is different from

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inferential way of forming beliefs about objects. There is another sense of direct realism, which advocates that perception involves no representations of the objects. Both Reid and Newman are direct realists in the former sense, not the latter sense. Although both of them reject the theory of ideas, they don't deny there are mental representations of objects involved in perceptual processes.

[42]The word 'idea' has several referents. It can refer to the content/thought of the mind, or a mental representation of an object. An idea, in the former sense, is a concept; while, in the latter sense, it is an image or impression of an object left in the mind. Both Reid and Newman use the word 'idea' in the latter sense.

sensation, which has no object distinct from itself (Reid, *ibid.* II, xvi, 312b). He gives two examples to explicate the distinction between perception and sensation: I see a tree, which denotes a perception. There is an object (the tree) as the object of the perception and the object and the perception are distinct; I feel a pain, which denotes a sensation. The object of the sensation and the sensation itself are not distinct and they are the same thing, that is, the feeling of pain (Reid, 1764, VI, xx, 182b, 183a).[43]

According to Reid, the distinction between mental act and object in sensation is only grammatical, not real:[44]

> The form of the expression *I feel a pain*, might seem to imply that the feeling is something distinct from the pain felt; yet in reality there is no distinction. As *thinking a thought* is an expression which could signify no more than *thinking*, so, *feeling a pain* signifies no more than *being pained.* (Reid, *ibid.* VI, xx, 182b, 183a) [45]

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[43]Here, Reid is using two different things—one mental and another external—to distinguish perception from sensation. Is perception different from sensation with respect to the same external object, such as a tree? The answer is 'yes'. When I see a palm tree through my window, for example, I have a perception of the tree which is tall, straight, and the leaves are green and gently waving in the wind. At the same time, I also have certain sensation, such as the greenness and movement of palm tree leaves, etc. in my mind. Now, the object of my perception is the tree external to my mind and when the tree is chopped I cannot have a perception of it any more; while the object of my sensation is the greenness, movement of the palm tree leaves reflected in my mind and when the tree is chopped I can still have the sensation impressed in my mind. Thus, my perception of the tree is different from my sensation of the tree.

[44]One may raise an objection to Reid's position here: at least there is a conceptual distinction between the object of sensation and sensation itself, so the distinction between them is real. I think Reid doesn't deny this. What he says here means that the object of sensation and sensation, unlike the object of perception and perception, cannot be distinguished metaphysically because the object of sensation is the same as the content of sensation. When we feel a pain in the head, for example, the content of our feeling is exactly same as the pain felt; after we take pain-killer the pain disappears and we have no pain-feeling in the head any more. Metaphysically, the object of sensation and the content of sensation cannot be distinguished as different entities or relations. It is in this sense that Reid says the distinction between the object of sensation and sensation is not real.

[45] Reid's explanations of sensation here have been given an adverbial interpretation as foreshadowing C.J. Ducasse's 'adverbial' theory of sensation (Ducasse, C. J. 1951) by Timothy Duggan (1970) and Keith Lehrer (1976). E. H. Madden has persuasively argued that Reid was no way an adverbial theorist in his mainline epistemology because the adverbial interpretation does not fit into Reid's nativistic model of perception (Madden, 1986, pp. 271-276). In agreement with Madden, I think Reid is not an adverbialist, for the adverbialist doesn't commit to the existence of the object which causes the sensation, while Reid does. If he were an adverbialist, his criticisms of scepticism would lose their force.

While, the distinction between mental act and object in perception is not only grammatical but also real: "There must be an object, real or imaginary, distinct from the operation of the mind about it." (Reid, 1785, II, xi, 292b)Thus, Reid concludes, sensation is different from perception. This is not to say, however, that sensation is objectless. In fact, Reid takes the object of sensation as the sign of certain thing and the object of perception as the thing signified (Reid, *ibid.* II, xvi, 312b).

According to Reid, perception implies an immediate conviction and belief in something external—something different both from the mind that perceives, and from the act of perception (Reid, *ibid.* II, xvi, 312b). From here we can immediately see that Reid holds a realistic view of perception.

Now, how does the mind perceive an object? According to Reid, there are three elements involved in the perceptual process of an object: (1) a conception of the object;[46] (2) a belief of its existence; (3) immediate awareness of the object:

> If ...we attend to that act of our mind which we call the perception of an external object of sense, we shall find in it these three things: —First, Some conception or notion of the object perceived; Secondly, A strong and irresistible conviction and belief of its present existence; and Thirdly, That this conviction and belief are immediate, and not the effect of reasoning. (Reid, *ibid.* II, v, 258a)

For Reid, the mind perceives objects spontaneously and immediately, no reasoning is involved in the process. He gives an example: "when I hear a certain sound, I conclude immediately, without reason, that a coach passes by" (Reid, 1764, IV, i, 117b). From here we

[46]I think having a conception of an object is not necessarily involved in the perceptual process of that object. For example, in the case of perceiving an unknown object, though we have certain concepts about the primary properties of the object (such as colour, size, shape, etc.) through our sensations, we don't have any knowledge about the defining properties of that object, and, therefore, we can't form a conception of that

can clearly see that Reid is a *direct* realist.

Although Reid holds that there is no reasoning involved in the perceptual processes, he does not deny that there are images, impressions, etc. involved in the perceptual processes: "Although there is no reasoning in perception, yet there are certain means and instruments, which, by the appointment of nature, must intervene between the object and our perception of it" (Reid, *ibid.* VI, xxi, 186a). These means and instruments, however, are merely ontological mediators, not epistemological mediators. Images on the retina, for example, are only the means between the object and our perception and '...we are not conscious of this impression' and 'it is not an impression on the mind but on the body' (Reid, *ibid.* VI, xiii, 146b). We will see that Newman has a very similar view about perception as Reid's.

Some philosophers, for example, W. Hamilton (1865), J. S. Mill (1877), etc. have argued that Reid is not a *direct* realist due to his endorsement of the role of sensation, mental image and impression in the perceptual process, for direct realism requires the immediacy of perception. Hamilton doubts that Reid is a direct realist because there are representative elements in his theory of perception (Hamilton, *ibid.* vol. 2, pp. 820-821). According to Mill, Reid holds semiotic representationalism even in the *Essay on Intellectual Power*, for he constantly referred to sensations as signs of properties (Mill, *ibid.* pp. 190-233).

E. Madden has rejected Hamilton and Mill's views and persuasively argued that Reid is a direct realist. According to him, Hamilton and Mill have mistakenly interpreted Reid as a representative realist because they failed to understand and appreciate the nativistic elements of understanding of sensation and, in turn, the importance of the epistemic input of the native constitution of the percipient emphasized by Reid (Madden, 1986, p. 262). Sensation for Reid, he remarks,

> is a sign, suggestion, or occasion which prompts into action the native perceptual capacities. The result of the combined action of sensation and the

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object as a whole.

> native input is perception proper, a completely new mental act which immediately apprehends, and produces belief in the existence of, properties inhering in physical objects. ... The nativistic "reading" of the sensation, constituting, as it does, a new mental act, reveals clearly that sensation is a condition of perception but not its intermediary. (Madden, *ibid.* pp. 262-263)

The relationship between sensation as sign and thing signified 'is not from sign to thing signified,... but from the native constitution of the intellect to the sign. The intellect is keyed to interpret the sign and turn it into a wholly new experience as the thing signified.' (Madden, ibid.)

While there may be difficulties with Reid's views, Madden concludes, they are purely presentative in nature and have no representative dimension whatever (Madden, *ibid*).

According to John Immerwahr, there is a development in Reid's realism: in the *Inquiry* it is most accurately described as a version of indirect realism due to his endorsement of the mediate elements in the process of perception and in the *Intellectual Powers* Reid adopts a version of direct realism (Immerwahr, 1978, p. 245).

Recently, Rebecca Copenhaver has raised objections to Immerwahr's position and argued that Reid's realism is mediated but direct. She rejects the definition of direct realism which requires being unmediated and argues that mediation is not the dividing line between direct and indirect realist and it is the way mediating entities represent external objects that is the dividing line between direct and indirect realists. For indirect realists, mediating entities represent external objects via intrinsic characters; for direct realists, mediating entities represent external objects via extrinsic relations (Coperhaver, 2004, p. 62).[47] According to

[47]By "intrinsic characters" Coperhaver means the characters of mediating entities which are internal to the mind; by "extrinsic relations' she means the relations of external objects which are external to the mind. I agree with Coperhaver that there must be mediating entities or relations between perception and external objects, and, thus, what divides direct and indirect realists lies in the way how mediating entities or relations represent external objects, not whether there are mediating entities or relations between them. For example, when we perceive a rose, there must be certain mediating entities, such as our senses of sight, touch, or smell,

this definition of direct/indirect realism, Reid is a mediated but direct realist.

I think Reid's endorsement of the roles of sensation, mental image and impression in the perceptual process does not affect his direct realism, for direct realism, for him, means spontaneous awareness of external objects without reasoning involved, not that there are no mental entities in the perceptual process. We can justify this reading from the following passage:

> Although there is no reasoning in perception, yet there are certain means and instruments, which, by the appointment of Nature, must intervene between the object and our perception of it; ...(Reid, 1764, VI, xxi, 186a)

From the above we have seen that Reid's direct realism is intact even if he endorses the role of sensations, mental images and impressions in the perceptual process.

According to Reid, although our senses, sometimes, can deceive us, on the whole, our perception is reliable. For example, a straight stick in the water looks bent, but if we understand the principles of optics we can have just and true information (Reid, 1785, II, xxii, 338b). The deceptions made by our senses cannot undermine the reliability of our perception. He asserts the reliability of perception as one of twelves basic contingent truths.[48]

According to Phillip D. Cummins, there is an inconsistency in Reid's theory of perception: on the one hand, Reid admits the reliability of perception; on the other hand, he admits the fallibility of perception. Cummins comments: Reid's Principle 5 of First Principles of Contingent Truths "that those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are what we perceive them to be", if interpreted as a universal truth, as Reid encourages us to do, it is inconsistent with his endorsement of the fallibility of perception

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between our perception and the rose. Otherwise, we will be unable to perceive it.

elsewhere (Cummins, 1974, 337). He suggests a number of ways to reconcile the inconsistency: first, we could interpret that the principle only apply to the distinct perceptions, not all perceptual acts, because Reid uses the word 'distinctly' to qualify 'perceive', then, the principle might not be inconsistent with his endorsement of fallibility of perception, for Reid could say the fallacious perceptual acts are not the distinct ones, therefore, the principle does not apply to them. But, Cummins finds this interpretation is unsatisfactory, for Reid himself is not happy with Descartes' use of distinctness as a measure of truth; second, we could interpret the perceptual acts Reid refers to in the principle as veridical ones, not non-veridical ones, then there is no inconsistency between the principle and his endorsement of the fallibility of perception, for fallacious perceptual acts are excluded from the principle. He finds this approach is not satisfactory either, for it suggests that Reid doesn't admit genuine perceptual errors, but Reid in fact does; third, we could take that whatever is perceived is the case at its face value, then there would be no real inconsistency in Reid's theory of perception. But, Reid himself, Cummins remarks, would reject this interpretation. So, he concludes that the inconsistency cannot be reconciled unless a major revision of Principle 5 is done, that is, to include non-veridical perceptions in Principle 5 (Cummins, *ibid.* pp. 337-40).

Recently, Phillip de Bary has persuasively argued against the alleged inconsistency in Reid's theory of perception by Cummins. According to him, the three routes Cummins considered to escape from the inconsistency are actually viable, if used in a correct way, the inconsistency alleged in Reid by Cummins is only superficial and we can explain away the alleged inconsistency by interpreting the principle as asserting a general truth, not a universal truth, that our perceptual beliefs in the main are true beliefs. Thus, the typical reliability of perception is consistent with its occasional unreliability (de Bary, 1998, pp.43-47; 2002, pp. 56-60). I agree with de Bary that there is no real inconsistency in Reid's theory of perception. Reid is asserting in Principle 5, in my view, that our perception, *as a mental power*, is reliable, not that each of our individual perceptual acts is reliable. In other words, he is asserting that perception, as a mental power, does not systematically produce false beliefs,

[48] We will see in the next section that Reid's Principle 5 asserts the reliability of perception.

when we exercise this mental power, however, we could make mistakes due to certain circumstances. There is no inconsistency in asserting the general reliability of our perceptual power and the particular unreliability of individual perceptual acts. Only if Reid's is asserting that each individual perceptual act is reliable would an inconsistency occur in his theory of perception.

In the above, I have briefly looked at Reid's theory of perception. In the following, I am going to look at Newman's theory of perception.

b. Direct realistic theory of perception in Newman

Newman's theory of perception, like Reid's, is of direct realism. According to him, there exist external objects and we perceive them through our senses. Like Reid, Newman holds that the process of perceiving is spontaneous and immediate and there is no reasoning involved. Although he admits that perception is, ontologically, mediated through senses, he holds that it is, epistemically, spontaneous and immediate, and it does not involve epistemic mediators. He says: "...perception comes to me *through* my senses–therefore I cannot call it *immediate*...I perceive by instinct (as I call it) without *argumentative* media, *through* my senses, but not logically *by* my senses" (Dessain, 1973, XXIV, p. 314).[49] We can immediately see from here that Newman, like Reid, holds a direct realist view of perception.

According to Charles Meynell, one of Newman's commentators, Newman holds a hypothetical realism, not a direct realism of perception. When he commented on the final draft of Newman's *Grammar*, Meynell said: "Reid wavers between two views of sensible perception, one of direct immediate perception, and another which is precisely your own", that is, a 'hypothetical realism' (Dessain, *ibid.* XXIV, pp. 306-307). By 'hypothetical

[49] Newman uses the word 'instinct' in a quite different sense from the ordinary sense of the word. Ordinarily, 'instinct' is used to denote an innate faculty or capacity, existing in all members of a species, to behave as such, without intellectual instrument and training. Newman does not use the word 'instinct' in this ordinary sense. He uses the word to denote the immediacy of realizing particular objects without assignable media. I will discuss this later.

realism' Meynell means the theory which "admits that we perceive nothing but our own sensations which are subjective', but "postulates an external object as a hypothesis to account for the sensation", without proving the existence of such object (Dessain, *ibid.* p.312).[50] The reason why Meynell takes Newman's theory of perception as hypothetical realism is because Newman, in the *Grammar,* holds that we perceive an external object instinctively from sensation, we infer the existence of the external world from individual sensible phenomena by instinctive perception, without the proof of logical inference (*G. A.* p 48). Now, Meynell comments, sensation is subjective and it does not give the objective reality because, to be objective, a thing must produce resistance and 'there is no such thing as a sensation of resistance," so, the belief in the external world inferred from sensation, without a proof is merely a hypothesis (Dessain, vol. XXIV, pp. 306-307, 312). Thus, he thinks that Newman holds a hypothetical realism (Dessain, *ibid.* pp. 306-307).

I think Newman does not only hold a hypothetical realism, but also a direct realism. This is because he uses the term *sensation* in the sense of experience, which obviously contains resistance and, thus, is objective, not in the idealistic sense that Meynell understands (*Dessain, ibid.* p. 309). Sensation, according to him, is not purely subjective and it reveals the objective reality; the belief that there is an external world is gained from sensible phenomena by the Illative Sense, not by pure logical inference. Thus, it is an absolute truth, not merely a hypothesis. So, Newman doesn't only hold a hypothetical realism, but also a direct realism.[51]

I agree with Ferreira that sometimes Newman's talk about perception suggests representationalism,[52] which Reid seriously attacks. For example, Newman say: "No one

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[50]According to Meynell, the term 'hypothetical realism' was first introduced by Hamilton. See: Dessain, *ibid.* p. 312.

[51]Newman made this clearly in his reply to Meynell: "'Hypothetical realism,' yes—if conclusions are necessary conditional. But I consider Ratiocination is far higher, more subtle, wider, more certain than logical Inference—and its principle of action is the 'illative Sense,' all which I treat of towards the end of the volume. If I say that ratiocination leads to absolute truth, am I still a hypothetical realist?" (Dessain, *ibid.* p. 309)

[52]According to Meynell, representationalism is the theory, which Hamilton calls cosmothetic idealism, that maintains that we do not perceive objects, but only and always images of objects. He comments that there are

whatever doubts that what the mind contemplates is, at least in corporeal objects itself, but a representation of it, which we call an idea"(Ferreira, 1986, p. 168). Newman's use of the Lockean language of 'impression' seems to support further a representationalist theory of perception (Ferriera, *ibid.*). For example, when he distinguishes real assent from notional assent Newman says: "In its Notional Assents as well as in its inferences, the mind contemplates its own creations instead of things; in Real, it is directed towards things, represented by the impressions which they left on the imagination" (*G. A.* p. 57). Nevertheless, as Ferreira remarks, Newman and Reid are in substantive agreement on the status of perception of objects existing external to us and despite some ambiguities in both their positions they hold a direct, though critical, perceptual realism (Ferreira, *ibid.* p. 168). So, the affinities between Newman and Reid are not only in terms of hypothetical realism, but also direct realism.

2. Foundationalism in Reid and Newman: First principles and their epistemic status

In terms of the structure of knowledge, both Reid and Newman are foundationalists.[53] This can be seen from their theories about first principles. In order to thoroughly understand their positions, we need first look at what foundationlism is.

Foundationalism is an epistemic theory according to which a belief that can be held rationally is either held on the basis of another belief, which provides adequate evidential support for the belief in question, or held as immediately true. The former constitutes the superstructure and the latter constitutes the foundation of one's structure of rationally held beliefs. William Alston gives a precise formulation of foundationalism:

> Our justified beliefs form a structure, in that some beliefs (the foundations) are justified by something other than their relation to other justified beliefs; beliefs

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some elements of representationalism in Newman. See; Dessain, *ibid.* p. 318.

[53] The foundationalism in Reid and Newman is not, as we shall see, the classical type of foundationalism, which requires that basic beliefs at the foundation are self-evident or evident to the sense, or incorrigible, and the inferential relation between the foundation and the beliefs basing on the foundation is strictly deductive or

> that are justified by their relation to other beliefs all depend for their justification on the foundation. (Alston, 1976a, p. 165)[54]

John L. Pollock characterizes foundationalism as consisting of two elements: (1) a characterization of what it is to be an epistemologically basic proposition; and (2) a characterization of the sense in which non-epistemologically basic propositions are supported by epistemologically basic propositions (Pollock, 1979, p. 93). Laurence Bonjour gives a more subtle characterization of foundationalism. According to him, foundationalism involves the twofold thesis: (a) that some empirical beliefs possess a measure of epistemic justification which is somehow immediate or intrinsic to them, at least in the sense of not being dependent, inferencially or otherwise, on the epistemic justification of other empirical beliefs; and (b) that it is these 'basic beliefs' which are the ultimate source of justification for all of empirical knowledge (Bonjour, 1985, pp. 16-17). From these characterizations we can see that there is a common feature in all forms of foundationalism, that is, the justification of a belief does not need its being inferred from some other justified belief and it can be justified noninferencially.

Versions of foundationalism differ in terms of the evidential relations and the foundation of the structure. As a result of this, there are different types of foundationlism. Alston distinguishes between simple foundationalism and iterative foundationalism: Simple foundationalism is the position that "for any epistemic subject, S, there are p's such that S is immediately justified in believing that p" and iterative foundationalism is the position that "for any epistemic subject, S, there are p's such that S is immediately justified in believing p and S is immediately justified in believing that he is immediately justified in believing that p" (Alston, *ibid.* p. 171).[55] According to Bonjour, foundationalism can be

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inductively valid. The foundationalism in Reid and Newman is a weak version of foundationalism.

[54]There are various rival conceptions of epistemic justification, some internalist (the deontological, the evidential conception and the coherent conceptions), and other externalist (the reliablist and properly functioning conceptions). Please see Part Three, Chapter 6 of this thesis for detailed discussions of these conceptions.

[55]Iterative Foundationalism is stronger than simple Foundationalism in that it requires a meta-level of immediate justification for S's belief that p is immediately justified. See: Alston (1976a), p. 171.

distinguished as moderate foundationalism, historical foundationalism, strong foundationalism and weak foundationalism in terms of the precise degree of non-inferential epistemic justification that basic beliefs possess (Bonjour, *ibid.* pp. 26-30). Foundationalism can be also distinguished as internalist foundationalism and externalist foundationalism in terms of whether there is an epistemic access to the non-inferential justification (Bonjour, *ibid*, p. 34).

Foundationalism has been hotly debated during last three decades. The opponents of foundationalism question where the non-inferential justification for basic beliefs comes from and how basic beliefs can be justified by the non-inferential justifier. The proponents of foundationalism answer that the non-inferential justification from basic beliefs comes from experience and the non-inferential justifiers are the basic cognitive states such as intuitions, immediate apprehensions, or direct awareness, that is, 'the given', which ends the regress of justification.

In his *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge*, BonJour has strongly argued against foundationlism. According to him, there can be no basic empirical beliefs and 'the idea of given' cannot end the regress (BonJour, 1985, p. 32; pp. 64-65, p. 69, p.78). He provides two basic arguments for his claim. His argument against the concept of a basic empirical belief goes like this:

1. Suppose, for reductio, that there are basic empirical beliefs.
2. A belief is justified only if there is a reason why it is likely to be true.
3. A belief is justified for a person only if he is in cognitive possession of such a reason.
4. A person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only if he believes with justification the premises from which it follows that the belief is likely to be true.
5. The premises of such a justifying argument must include at least one empirical premise.

6. So, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief depends on the justification of at least one other empirical belief, contradicting 1.

Therefore, there can be no basic empirical beliefs (BonJour, *ibid.* p. 32).

BonJour, then, provides a dilemma to reject 'the doctrine of given'. According to him, the central thesis of 'the doctrine of the given' is

> ...that basic empirical beliefs are justified, not by appeal to further beliefs or merely external facts but rather by appeal to states of "immediate experience" or "direct apprehension" or "intuition"—states which allegedly can confer justification without themselves requiring justification... Immediate experience thus brings the regress of justification to an end by making possible a direct comparison between the basic belief and its object. (BonJour, *ibid.* pp. 59-60)

Now, according to BonJour, the doctrine faces a dilemma and the justificatory role of the given is a myth:

> The givenist is caught in a fundamental dilemma: if his intuitions or immediate apprehensions are construed as cognitive, then they will be both capable of giving justification and in need of it themselves; if they are non-cognitive, then they do not need justification but are also apparently incapable of providing it. This, at bottom, is why epistemological giveness is a myth. (Bonjour, 1978, p. 11)

He formulates his dilemma like this:

1. Either an experiential state has representational content or it does not.
2. If it does, it is in need of justification itself.
3. If it does not, then it cannot contribute to the justification of a belief.

4. An experiential state can end the regress only if it can contribute to the justification of a belief and it is not in need of justification itself.

5. So, an experiential state cannot end the regress. (BonJour, *ibid.* pp. 64-65)

So, foundationalism, according to Bonjour, is untenable.

I think Bonjour's argument against the existence of basic empirical beliefs is not successful because, as Daniel Howard-Snyder has objected, the premise 3 begs the question and premises 2, 3 and 4 jointly entail global skepticism (Howard-Snyder, 1998, pp. 164-165). Besides this, the argument rests on two controversial presumptions: (1) epistemic justification is internalistic (premise 3), and (2) reasons are propositional and the process of epistemic justification is inferential (premise 4).[56] His argument against the doctrine of given is not successful either, for the premise 2, as Howard-Snyder has pointed out, is clearly false for "if an experiential state were in need of justification because it has representational content, then, every cognitive state with content would be in need of justification. But this consequence is false" (Howard-Snyder, 1998, p. 173).[57] Also, as James van Cleve has argued, if we understand epistemic properties as supervening on non-epistemic properties, the justificatory role of the given is not a myth because it can generate, not simply transmit, justification (Cleve, 1985, p.100).[58]

Recently, Peter Klein has argued that all forms of foundationalism are flawed due to its

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[56]Please see my arguments against these two presumptions in Part Three, Chapter 4 of this thesis.

[57]Howard-Snyder's main contention against Bonjour's premise 2 is that not every cognitive state with representational content is in need of justification. He distinguishes an assertive cognitive state/aspect from a non-assertive cognitive state/aspect and argues that only an assertive cognitive state/aspect is in need of justification because it involves a commitment to the truth or obtaining of its content. A non-assertive cognitive state/aspect is not in need of justification because it does not involve a commitment to the truth or obtaining of its content. It is not the representational content of a cognitive state that entails its need to be justified, but its assertive aspect. Thus, although it has a representational content, an experiential state is not in need of justification because it does not have an assertive aspect. According to Howard-Snyder, Bonjour seems to have confused the assertive aspect of a cognitive state with its representational content when he argues that an experiential state is in need of justification. For the details of Howard-Snyder's argument, please see: Howard-Snyder, 1998, pp. 173-174).

[58]Cleve formulates the thesis of epistemic supervenience like this: whenever a belief has any epistemic property S, it also has some nonepistemic property B such that necessarily, whatever has B has S (Cleve,

common feature, that is, that a belief can be justified non-inferentially (Klein, 1999, p. 297) and there is a deep irrationality in being a practising foundationalist insofar as s/he holds a basic belief without being able to give an inferential reason for it (Klein, 2000, p. 17). Like Bonjour, Klein confronts the foundationalist with a dilemma:

> ...I think the foundationalist typically advocates an explicit process of reasoning that ends with beliefs which have P [the property conferring non-inferential justification] rather than with epistemic belief about P. The meta-justification is invoked in order to avoid the appearance of arbitrariness for it is designed to show why the "final" beliefs are likely to be true...Either the meta-justification provides a reason for thinking the base proposition is true (and hence, the regress does not end) or it does not (hence, accepting the base proposition is arbitrary). (Klein, 1999, pp. 303-304)

Hence, foundationalism, according to Klein, cannot provide a satisfactory way of addressing the regress problem and "the only account of warrant that will provide its self-conscious practitioner with an acceptable way of addressing the regress problem is infinitism." (Klein, 2004, p. 171)

I think, Klein's dilemma rests, like Bonjour's', on the assumption that a reason must be a proposition or proposition-like. But, according to the foundationalist, a reason doesn't need to be a proposition or proposition-like and it can be experience, especially, in the cases of empirical beliefs. Take an example, by looking at the flash of lightning in the dark sky and hearing the sounds of cracking thunder and gusty wind I firmly believe there is a thunderstorm coming. The reason for my belief is not propositional or propositional-like, but a cluster of experiences: my experience of the flash of lightning in the dark sky and the sounds of cracking thunder and gusty wind give me a sufficient reason to believe that there is a storm coming. I don't need any proposition(s) or a proposition-like cognitive state to justify the belief. Can a rational person accuse me of being arbitrary or irrational to hold

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1999, p. 1049).

such a belief without a propositional reason? This example shows that there is an end of epistemic justification, at which foundationalists can exit from the so-called infinite regress.

Klein may reply that, in the above example, my experience is merely the cause of my belief, not the reason for my belief because the cause of a belief is different from the reason for the belief—they belong to different logical realms. So, I still need a proposition or propositional-like cognitive state to justify my belief. Otherwise, I would be arbitrary or commit myself to infinitism.

I think the reason for a belief and the cause of the belief cannot be completely apart. A cause is something which brings something else into being and at the same time serves as grounds for believing the existence of that thing. Using above example, my experience of the flash of lightning in the dark sky and the sounds of cracking thunder and gusty wind not only causes me to believe that there is a storm coming but also serves as grounds for my belief that there is a storm coming. It is in this sense that a cause can be a reason for a belief.[59]

From the above discussion, we can see that Klein's dilemma, fails on the same grounds as Bonjour's.[60]

Recently, Jane Duran has also presented two arguments against foundationalism. According to her, foundationalism involves two key notions, that is, the epistemic privileged state and non-instantiability (Duran, 2002, p. 241). Since the former notion is tied with the notion of incorrigibility, which has been rejected by philosophers such as Austin and Lehrer (Duran, *ibid.* pp. 242-246), and the latter notion does not pace with cognitive science (Duran, *ibid.* pp. 246-248), foundationalism is unworkable (Duran, *ibid.* pp. 249-250).

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[59] Please see Part Three, Chapter 4 of this thesis for further discussion about the relation between reason and cause.

[60] Michael Bergmann has raised objections to Klein's argument along a different line and Klein has replied Bergmann's objections. See: Bergmann (2004) and P. Klein (2004).

I think Duran has assumed that the notion of the epistemic privileged state implies the notion of incorrigibility. But, the weak foundationalist denies this: that the epistemic privileged states are *epistemic privileged* is because these states can serve as grounds for beliefs. That they do not further need propositional reasons to justify themselves is not because they are incorrigible.[61] As for the problem of non-instantiability I don't think it constitutes a counter to foundationalism, just as it cannot be a counter to any other non-empirical theories.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to give a full appraisal of foundationalism here. In brief, I think foundationalism, at least in some weak form, is tenable. This is because if we do not accept foundationalism in our epistemic practice we will be involved in vicious regress of epistemic justification and we have no way to avoid skepticism.

In the above I have briefly outlined what foundationalism is, different types of foundationalism and the debates about foundationalism. Now, let us look at foundationalism in Reid and Newman.

a. Foundationalism in Reid:

According to Reid, there are intuitive propositions which support all other propositions and do not need any support for themselves: "One of the most important distinctions of our judgements is, that some of them are intuitive, others grounded on argument" (Reid, 1785, VI, iv, 434a). In order to avoid an infinite regress we must stop at some of our intuitive propositions which are self-evident:

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[61]Duran further claims that even if the notion of a privileged state is not tied with the notion of incorrigibility it is still problematic: "The difficulty with an epistemic notion as strong as incorrigibility is not simply that there are extremely well-constructed counters to it, but, as we have seen, it relies on the concept of a privileged state (and so do most foundationalist epistemologies, of whatever shade or stripe). This means that any notion—whether one of "incorrigibility" or not— that is connected to these states in the same sort of way is subject to the same counters, even if it rests on a weakened epistemic base." (Duran, *ibid.* p. 246) I think if the notion of a privileged state does not imply incorrigibility it is not subject to the same counters as it does.

> When we examine, by way of analysis, the evidence of any proposition, either we find it self-evident, or it rests upon one or more propositions that support it, and of those that support them, as far back as we can go. But we cannot go back in this track to infinity. Where then must this analysis stop? It is evident that it must stop only when we come to propositions which support all that are built upon them, but are themselves supported by none-that is, to self-evident propositions. (Reid, *ibid.* VI, iv, 435a, b)

We cannot deny these intuitive, self-evident principles, upon which our knowledge is based:

> ...all knowledge got by reasoning must be built upon first principles. ... This is as certain as that every house must have a foundation.... (Reid, *ibid.* VI, iv, 435a)

> It is demonstrable and was long ago demonstrated by Aristotle, that every proposition to which we give a rational assent, must either have its evidence in itself, or derive it from some antecedent proposition. And the same thing may be said of the antecedent proposition. As, therefore, we cannot go back to antecedent proposition without end, the evidence must at last rest upon propositions, one or more, which have their evidence in themselves... that is, upon first principles. (Reid, *ibid.* VI, vii, 466b)

Reid calls these intuitive, self-evident propositions 'the first principles' or the principles of 'common sense' (Reid, *ibid.* VI, iv, 434a, b; vii, 466b).[62] Let's first look at Reid's conception of common sense.

By 'common sense' Reid means 'a branch of reason' which discerns truth immediately

[62]By 'the principles of common sense' Reid means intuitive judgements whose truths are self-evident, without either inductive or deductive reasoning.

without argumentation, in contrast to reasoning. He says:

> We ascribe to reason two offices, or two degrees. The first is to judge of things self-evident; the second to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are. The first of these is the province, and the sole province of common sense; and therefore it coincides with reason in its [i.e. common sense's] whole extent, and is only another name for one branch or one degree of reason. (Reid, *ibid.* VI, ii, 425b)

> In common language, sense always implies judgement. A man of sense is a man of judgement. Good sense is good judgement. Nonsense is what is evidently contrary to right judgement. Common sense is that degree of judgement which is common to men with whom we can converse and transact business. (Reid, *ibid.* VI, ii, 421b)

> I have endeavoured to show that sense, in its most common, and therefore its most proper meaning, signifies judgement, though philosophers often use it in another meaning. From this it is natural to think, that common sense should mean common judgement; so it really does. (Reid, *ibid.* VI, ii, 423a)

We have seen from above that Reid's conception of common sense is different from the popular sense of the conception, which denotes merely uncritical, practical wisdom in the conduct of life, and it involves judgement and rational consideration.

According to Wolterstorff, Reid's discussion of common sense, due to its involving judgement, is confusing, not just confusing but confused: it both confuses us and reveals confusion in Reid (Wolterstorff, 2001, p. 218). He raises questions:

> What does Reid mean by 'judgement'? Does he mean the faculty of judging, or

> the judgements rendered? Does Common Sense consist of belief-forming faculties that we all share in common, with a particular principle of Common Sense being one of those shared faculties? Or does Common Sense consist of propositions judged or believed by human beings in common, with a particular principle of Common Sense being some item in that totality of shared beliefs? Or—here's yet a third possibility—does Common Sense consist of those shared faculties that produce beliefs we all share in common? (Wolterstorff, *ibid.* p. 219)

Wolterstorff thinks there are two very different understandings of the Principles of Common Sense in Reid: (a) shared first principles; (b) what we all do and must take for granted in our daily lives. He takes the latter as determinative in Reid (Wolterstorff, *ibid.* p. 227). I do not agree with Wolterstorff's interpretation here, for this interpretation is ruled out by what Reid has said above about common sense, that is, common sense is a branch of reason which makes non-inferential judgments on things (1785, VI, ii, 425b).[63]

In the above we have looked at Reid's conception of common sense. Now, let's look at his first principles or the principles of 'common sense'.

Reid classifies first principles into two groups: first principles of necessary truth and first principles of contingent truth, the former are, like axioms, infallible and the latter is fallible. In chapter V of Essay VI of *The Intellectual Powers*, Reid lists twelves first principles, which he calls 'the first principles of contingent truths':

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[63] It is worth to note Kant's interpretation of Reid's common sense here. According to Kant, Reid's common sense has nothing to do with human reason, but a cluster of opinions of the multitude. Therefore, Kant has made severe criticisms of Reid's appeal to the common sense and ridiculed that it is but "an oracle when no rational justification for one's position can be advanced" and 'it is but an appeal to the opinion of the multitude, of whose applause the philosopher is ashamed, while the popular charlatan glories and boasts in it (Kant, 1783, 'Introduction", p. 7). As we have seen above, for Reid, common sense is a part of human reason, that is, non-inferential reason, the product of which is rational consideration, not a cluster of uncritical opinions shared by the multitude. Thus, Kant has misinterpreted Reid's common sense and his criticisms of Reid's appealing to common sense are inadequate.

1. First, then, I hold, as a first principle, the existence of everything of which I am conscious.

2. Another first principle, I think is, that the thoughts of which I am conscious, are the thoughts of a being which I call myself, my mind, my person.

3. Another first principle I take to be—That those things did really happen which I distinctly remember.

4. Another first principle is, Our own personal identity and continued existence, as far back as we remember anything distinctly.

5. Another first principle is, That those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are what we perceive them to be.

6. Another first principle, I think, is, That we have some degree of power over our actions, and the determinations of our will.

7. Another first principle is—That the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious.

8. Another first principle … is, That there is life and intelligence in our fellow-men with whom we converse.

9. Another first principle I take to be, That certain features of the countenance, sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of the mind.

10. Another first principle appears to me to be—That there is a certain regard

due to human testimony in matters of opinion.

11. There are many events depending upon the will of man, in which there is a self-evident probability, greater or less, according to circumstances.

12. The last principle of contingent truths I mention is, That, in the phenomena of nature, what is to be will probably be like to what has been in similar circumstances.

We can see that Principle 1 is to advocate the existence of our consciousness; Principles 2 and 4 are to advocate the existence of our self-identity; Principle 3 is to advocate the reliability of the faculty of memory; Principle 5 is to advocate the reliability of perception; Principle 6 is to advocate the existence of free will; Principle 7 is to advocate the reliability of faculties of judging and reasoning; Principle 8 and 9 are to advocate the existence of other mind; Principle 10 is to advocate a certain degree of the reliability of human testimony; Principle 11 is to advocate the predictability of human behaviour; Principle 12 is to advocate the law of causation.[64]

There is a controversy over the interpretation of the Principle 7 among Reid scholars. According to Lehrer, the Principle 7, that our natural faculties by which we distinguish truth from error are not fallacious, is a *metaprinciple* which underlies all other principles and has a special epistemic status:

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[64]de Bary takes Principle 12 as asserting the Principle of Induction (de Bary, 2002, p. 33). I think it is more appropriate to interpret it as asserting the Law of Causation. The reasons are (1) the validity of Induction is grounded in the Law of Causation—unless there are causal relations among phenomena we cannot infer what will happen in the future from what happened in the past; (2) Reid was certainly aware of the problem with Induction raised by Hume. He couldn't simply state the Principle of Induction as one of First Principles of Contingent Truth without answering Hume's Prob em. My interpretation can be confirmed by what Reid comments on Principle 12 later: "This is one of those principles which, when we grow up and observe the course of nature, we can confirm by reasoning. We perceive that Nature is governed by fixed laws, and that, if it were not so, there could be no such thing as prudence in human conduct... But the principle is necessary for us before we are able to discover it by reasoning, and therefore is made a part of our constitution... (Reid, 1785, VI, v, 451b) What Reid says here is that the Law of Causation is made a part of our constitution and we can discover it by inductive reasoning.

> The most important first principle is a metaprinciple concerning all the faculties: 'Another first principle is—that the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious.' (Lehrer, 1989, p.162)

According to him, principle 7 has a special position among the first principles (Lehrer, *ibid.*), for it provides epistemological justification for other first principles: it tells us that first principles, in addition to causally producing conviction, provide us with epistemological information vouching for the truth of the conviction (Lehrer, ibid.), and it fills 'the truth gap' (Lehrer, 1998, p. 25) Thus, principle 7 not only vouches for its own truth but also loops around and, thus, is the keystone principle of first principles(Lehrer, 1990, pp. 42-43).

The inclusion of Principle 7 in Reid's system of first principles, according to Lehrer, shows that Reid is not a pure foundationalist, but a *coherent* foundationalist. This is because Principle 7, on the one hand, serves as the foundation of all first principles: it vouches for its own truth and the truth of other first principles; on the other hand, it links in a chain of first principles and is confirmed by the application of other first principles (Lehrer, *ibid.* p. 43).

In his *Thomas Reid and Scepticism: His Reliabilist Response*, de Bary argues that Lehrer's interpretation of Principle 7 is incorrect.[65] According to him, Principle 7 is not a metaprinciple to vouch for all other first principle but an individual first principle which vouches for the faculties of judgement and reasoning. He first gives a textual interpretation of Principle 7. According to him, 'the natural faculties' in Principle 7 refer to the powers of judging and reasoning and thus the principle is to vouch for the faculties of judgement and reasoning, not for all other mental faculties—consciousness, memory and perception, for each of them has an individual first principle to vouch for itself (de Bary, 2002, p. 77).

[65]Also, see de Bary's "Thomas Reid's Metaprinciple", *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. LXXIV, no. 3 (2000), pp. 373-383.

Then, he presents a dilemma to reject Lehrer's interpretation:

> Either the first principles without the metaprinciple are sufficient for knowledge or they are not. If they are sufficient, then principle 7 as a metaprinciple is superfluous; if they are not sufficient, then the addition of the metaprinciple opens the way to a regress. (de Bary, *ibid*)

That is, we need a meta-meta principle to vouch for Principle 7.

I think de Bary's interpretation of Principle 7 is correct. To see this, let us look at Principle 7 again: "Another first principle is—That the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious." Now, if 'the natural faculties' here refer to not only the power of judgment and reasoning but also consciousness, memory and perception then consciousness, memory and perception must have the function of distinguishing truth from error. But, as we know, consciousness, perception and memory do not function as *distinguishing* truth from error: the functions of consciousness and perception are to be *aware* or *realize* what the mind and external world presents to us, and the function of memory is to *recall* what happened to us in the past. Only the powers of judgment and reasoning can *distinguish* the correct from the incorrect and the true from the false. Clearly, the function of distinguishing truth from error belongs to the faculties of judgement and reasoning, not all other mental powers.

According to de Bary, there is a passage in Reid which seems to support Lehrer's interpretation of Principle 7:

> If any truth can be said to be prior to all others in the order of nature, this seems to have the best claim; because, in every instance of assent, whether upon intuitive, demonstrative, or probable evidence, the truth of our faculties is taken for granted, and is, as it were, one of the premises on which our assent is grounded. (Reid, 1785, VI, v, 447b)

This passage, says he, "appears to claim priority over other principle for principle 7. But also, the reason it gives for this priority is the assumption of the 'truth of our faculties' tout court and not, as would better suit the revised reading, 'the truth of our power of judgment and reasoning' ". He thinks this passage is embarrassing and it is 'bad Reid' (de Bary, 2000, p.382; 2002, p. 82).

I don't think the above passage supports Lehrer's interpretation. It is neither embarrassing nor reflecting a 'bad Reid'. From the contextual reading, what Reid means by 'our faculties' are 'our powers of judgement and reasoning', not 'our intellectual powers', for, only when we exercise the powers of judgment and reasoning do we need intuitive, demonstrative or probable evidence, while in the cases of exercising other intellectual powers such as consciousness, memory and perception, we do not need intuitive, demonstrative or probable evidence. Does Reid intend to give a priority to the principle about our powers of judgment and reasoning? I think he doesn't. If he does, as de Bary observes, he would violate his 'implicit commitment to the parity of the first principles.' (de Bary, 2000, p. 382) This is why he uses a hypothetical manoeuvre here. But why does Reid give a hypothetical priority to Principle 7 at all? I think this is because, for Reid, most of our beliefs are derived using our powers of judgment and reasoning based on intuitive, demonstrative or probable evidence and these beliefs are grounded on the reliability of these two powers.

In the above, we have had a look at Reid's list of first principles. In the following, we are going to look at the characteristics of Reid's first principles.

According to Reid, first principles do not admit of proof because they are self-evident: it "may admit of illustration, yet being self-evident, do not admit of proof." (Reid, 1785, I, ii, 231a) He remarks:

> It is unreasonable to require demonstration for things which do not admit of it.

> It is no less unreasonable to require reasoning of any kind for things which are known without reasoning." (Reid, *ibid.* VII, iii, 482a)
>
> I take it for granted that there are self-evident principles. Nobody, I think, denies it. And if any man were so sceptical as to deny that there is any proposition that is self-evident, I see not how it would be possible to convince him by reasoning."(Reid, *ibid.* VI, iv, 434b)

The evidence of first principles, for him, "is not demonstrative, but intuitive. They require not proof, but to be placed in a proper point of view."(Reid, *ibid.* I, ii, 231b)

Reid does not only rule out deductive arguments (Reid, *ibid.* I, ii, 231a), but also rejects inductive reasoning for the first principles (Reid, *ibid.* VI, iv, 434a, 435b).[66] He emphases, particularly, that Principle 7 does not need a proof and if anyone insists on demanding a proof, s/he will beg the question: "because, to judge of a demonstration, a man must trust his faculties, and take for grant the very thing in question ... The same absurdity there is in attempting to prove, by any kind of reasoning...that our reason is not fallacious, since the very point in question is, whether reasoning may be trusted." (Reid, *ibid.* VI, v, 447a, b)

Although, for Reid, first principles require no proof, that does not mean there is no way to tell whether a given proposition is a first principle. Whether a proposition is a first principle can be confirmed: "...there are certain ways of reasoning even about them, by which those that are just and solid may be confirmed, and those that are false may be detected" (Reid, *ibid.* VI, iv, 439a). The ways of confirming propositions as the first principles are: (1) an 'argument ad hominem', which is used to shows some inconsistency in the denial of one first principle on the basis of another which is on the same epistemic footing; (2) an informal *reductio ad absurdum*, which is used to show that the denial of the first principle in question leads to absurdity; (3) an argument from the consent of the learned and unlearned across time; (4) an

[66] We will see that Newman is different from Reid in terms of the justification for the first principles.

argument from the prima facie primitiveness of some first principles; and (5) an argument from the practical indispensability of a first principles (Reid, *ibid.* Vi, iv, 439a, 441b).

According to Reid, what these first principles assert are not infallible, thus, these first principles that assert them are only contingent truths. Our consciousness, memory, reasoning, for example, can make mistakes, and, therefore, the first principles that assert them are not necessary truths, but only contingent truths. However, for Reid, the fallibility of our mental faculties does not imply that they are fallacious.

Now, is there any inconsistency in Reid's claim that human faculties are not fallacious on the one hand and fallible on the other hand? It is important to distinguish fallaciousness from fallibility here. If we say something/someone is fallacious we mean that thing/person produces errors more often than is normal, and cannot be trustable; if we say something/someone is fallible we mean that thing/person can make mistakes in some cases. That is, fallibility does not imply untrustworthiness. Now, what Reid means here is that human faculties are trustworthy and do not systematically produce errors, however, they can make mistakes in individual cases.

From the above discussions about Reid's first principles we can clearly see that Reid is a foundationalist. However, his foundationalism is not a classical type,[67] that is, the propositions at the base are not infallible and the superstructure of the foundation can be supported by non-deductive reasoning. Also, we can clearly see that Reid is a reliablist-foundationalist: in terms of his advocacy of the foundational function of the first principles, Reid is a foundationalist; in terms of his advocacy of the reliability of our cognitive faculties, Reid is a reliabilist.[68]

Some philosophers, for example, Keith Lehrer and John-Christian Smith, interpret Reid as a

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[67]For the characterization and detailed discussion of classical foundationalism, please see Part Two, Chapter 6 of this thesis.

[68]Recently Andy Hamilton has argued that Reid is not a reliabilist because he does not believe that the reliability of memory has empirical status (Hamilton, 2003, p. 238). Due to the limit of space, I have to leave the issue behind.

coherentist on the basis of some passages in Reid's *Inquiry*. de Bary strongly rejects this interpretation. According to him, Reid is not a coherentist, either with respect to the theory of truth or of justification (de Bary, 2002, p. 154). He agrees that there are some passages in Reid's writing (Reid, 1764, V, vii, 127a, VI, xx, 184b, and 1785, VI, iv, 439b) that suggest a coherentist interpretation of Reid, but these passages are not sufficient for an interpretation of Reid as a coherentist (de Bary, *ibid.* p. 154). With respect to theory of truth, it is not plausible to interpret Reid as a coherentist, for Reid doesn't hold the view that truth is a function of coherence among beliefs and what he holds, at maximum, that truth is a product of the fit between beliefs and the world (de Bary, *ibid.* p. 154); with respect to the theory of justification, Reid doesn't hold that first principles need to seek justifications from other principles, for each of them "has the light of truth in itself." (de Bary, *ibid.* p.155)

I think, although there are some isolate passages which suggest otherwise, Reid is a reliabilist-foundationalist because reliabilism and foundationalism are the two pillars of his common-sense philosophical project.

Having looked at foundationalism in Reid, let's look at foundationalism in Newman.

b. Foundationalism in Newman:

Like Reid, Newman thinks we have a set of instinctive propositions which are at the foundation of the structure of knowledge. These propositions support all other propositions and they do not need any support because they are self-evident:

> In order to complete the proof, we are thrown upon some previous syllogism or syllogisms, in which the assumptions may be proved; and then, still farther back, we are thrown upon others again, to prove the new assumptions of that second order of syllogisms. Where is this process to stop? ... (*G. A.* p. 204)

Like Reid, Newman uses an infinite regress argument to prove the existence of first

principles:

> it would be something to arrive at length at premises which are undeniable, however long we might be in arriving at them; but in this case the long retrospection lodges us at length at what are called first principles, the recondite sources of all knowledge, as to which logic provides no common measure of mind—which are accepted by some, rejected by others—in which, and not in the syllogistic exhibitions, lies the whole problem of attaining to truth, —and which are called self-evident by their respective advocates because they are evident in no other way. (*G. A.* pp. 204-205)

According to him, in order to avoid infinite regress, and hence scepticism, we must assume something which is undeniable as a premise, that is, a first principle.[69]

Now, let us have a look at what first principles are in Newman. By first principles Newman means 'the starting points of reasoning', 'the propositions with which we start in reasoning on any given subject matter.' (*G. A.* p. 46) Some of these propositions are 'primary principles, the general, fundamental, cardinal truths' (*G. A.* p. 239) and they are universally accepted "immutable truths"; while some of them are admitted according to the degree of shared acceptance: "They are in consequence very numerous, and vary in great measure with the persons who reason, according to their judgement and power of assent, being received by some minds, not by others, and few of them received universally." (*G. A.* p. 46)[70] As Ferreira has observed, the first principles in Newman can be classified into three categories in terms of the degree of acceptance: (a) Individual initial premises in particular chains of reasoning; (b) Initial premises or ways of reasoning common to larger groups; (c) Propositions which

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[69]Here, Newman is in fact making the point that in order to end the infinite regress there must be non-inferencial knowledge. For a modern view of this, see: Armstrong, D. 1973.

[70]Newman's discussions about first principles can be found in the "Oxford University Sermons", "Discursive Enquiries on Metaphysical Subjects", "Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England", *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, and the *Grammar of Assent*. He describes first principles in a variety of ways: first principles are 'initial truths', 'primary principles, the general, fundamental cardinal truths', etc. For an extensive study of Newman's discussions about first principles, see Ferreira, M. J. (1986), pp. 149-171.

'resolve themselves into the conditions of human nature' and 'range through time and space' being 'innate and necessary', and are universally accepted as truth (Ferreira, 1986, p. 154).

Newman does not have, like Reid, a list of first principles in any of his writings. However, he discusses the following propositions, which are commonly being treated as first principles, in the *Grammar*:

> 1. Sometimes our trust in our powers of reasoning and memory, that is, our implicit assent to their telling truly, is treated as a first principle;
>
> 2. Next, as to the proposition, that there are things existing externally to ourselves, this I do consider a first principle, and one of universal reception;
>
> 3. I have spoken, and I think rightly spoken, of instinct as a force which spontaneously impels us, not only to bodily movements, but to mental acts;
>
> 4. And so again, as regards the first principles expressed in such propositions as "There is a right and a wrong," "a true and a false," "a just and unjust," "a beautiful and a deformed;" they are abstractions to which we give a notional assent in consequence of our particular experiences of qualities in the concrete, to which we give a real assent;
>
> 5. Another of these presumptions is the belief in causation.

We can see that Proposition 1 is about the reliability of memory and reasoning; Proposition 2 is about the existence of external world; Proposition 3 is about the existence of perceptual power; Proposition 4 is about the existence of objective moral and aesthetic values; Proposition 5 is about the existence of causation.

Now, Newman accepts, in agreement with Reid, Proposition 2, Proposition 3 and Proposition

4 as first principles.[71] However, he seems not in agreement with Reid that our trust on powers of memory and reasoning (Reid's Principle 3 and Principle 7) and our belief in causation (Reid's Principle 12) are first principles. To see this, let us have a look at Reid's Principle 3, Principle 7 and Principle 12, and Newman's Proposition 1 and Proposition 5 again:

Reid's Principles:

> 3. Another first principle I take to be—That those things did really happen which I distinctly remember.
>
> 7. Another first principle is—That the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious.
>
> 12. The last principle of contingent truths I mention is, That, in the phenomena of nature, what is to be will probably be like to what has been in similar circumstances.

Newman's Propositions:

> 1. Sometimes our trust in our powers of reasoning and memory, that is, our implicit assent to their telling truly, is treated as a first principle.
>
> 5. Another of these presumptions is the belief in causation.

We can immediately see the differences between Reid and Newman here. In Principle 3, Reid uses an active voice *I take,* not a passive voice *is taken.* Also, he firmly believes the

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[71] For Reid, these propositions are, undoubtedly, first principles: "Who can doubt whether men have universally believed the existence of a material world? Who can doubt whether men have universally believed that every change that happens in nature must have a cause? Who can doubt whether men have universally believed, that there is a right and a wrong in human conduct?" (Reid, 1785, Vi, v, 451b)

reliability of memory and reasoning in Principle 7; while, in Proposition 1, Newman uses a passive voice *is treated*, not an active voice *I treat* or *I take*. Also, he uses a time measure word *sometimes* to modify *our trust in our powers of reasoning and memory is treated as a first principle*. In Principle 12, Reid takes the law of causation as one of principles of contingent truths; While, in Proposition 5, Newman uses the phrase *another of these presumptions*, not *another of these first principles*. Obviously, he takes the law of causation merely as a presumption, not a first principle. From these differences we can clearly see that Newman is in disagreement with Reid that our trust on powers of memory and reasoning, and our belief in causation are first principles. In the following, I am going to explain why Newman doesn't take our trust on powers of memory and reasoning, and our belief in causation as first principles.

According to Newman, we have no direct experience of mental powers or faculties, mental powers or faculties are manifested in mental acts and we know their existence through mental acts. So, it is improper to say that we trust our mental faculties. And also, mental powers are a part of our natural constitution and we have no option to accept or reject them; while, to say trust our mental faculties implies that we have options whether we should trust them or not. Newman says:

> We know indeed that we have a faculty by which we remember, as we know we have a faculty by which we breathe; but we gain this knowledge by abstraction or inference from its particular acts, not by direct experience. ...It seems to me unphilosophical to speak of trusting ourselves. We are what we are, and we use, not trust our faculties. ...We act according to our nature, by means of ourselves, when we remember or reason. We are as little able to accept or reject our mental constitution, as our being. We have not the option; we can but misuse or mar its functions. We do not confront or bargain with ourselves; and therefore I cannot call the trustworthiness of the faculties of memory and reasoning one of our first principles. (*G. A.* P. 47)

As we have seen, for Reid, the trustworthiness of the faculties of memory and reasoning is one of our first principles (Reid's principle 3 and principle 7 confirm this). Does Newman really disagree with Reid here? I think there is no substantial disagreement between Newman and Reid: both of them hold memory and reasoning are part of our mental constitution and we cannot deny their existence. The difference between them is that Newman holds a more radical view than Reid here: the reliability of memory and reasoning is instantiated in their operations, not being taken for granted. The notion of 'trust', for Newman, implies 'being taken for granted', in turn, a 'choice', which opens a backdoor for the sceptic to escape.[72] As Ferreira remarks, "Newman is attempting to offer the sceptic more than a simple counter-description of the necessity of trusting our faculties. He is interpreting what the sceptic sees as merely the necessity of our nature, interpreting it in light of a philosophical position which argues for the unintelligibility of the notion of choice (and hence of 'trust') in such a case—because there is no standpoint from which we can judge the general status of our faculties, no place more sure to stand from which to challenge the validity of our natural responses in general." (Ferreira, *ibid.* p. 223)[73]

As we have seen, Reid takes it that every change must have a cause as one of our first principles and treats it as an intuitive truth: "Who can doubt whether men have universally believed that every change that happens in nature must have a cause?" (Reid, 1785, Vi, v, 451b) Now, Newman does not agree with Reid's view that belief in causation is an intuitive truth and he only takes the belief as a presumption. He says:

> It is to me a perplexity that grave authors seem to enunciate as an intuitive truth, that every thing must have a cause.... The assent which we give to the proposition, as a first principle, that nothing happens without a cause, is derived, in the first instance, from what we know of ourselves; and we argue

[72]It should be noted that the notion of trust in Reid is different from Newman's: it doesn't mean 'being taken for grant', thus, doesn't implies a choice, but 'reliable', 'not fallacious'.
[73]As Ferreira has argued, the shift away from Reid's language of 'trust' doesn't suggest that Newman is un-Redian, instead, it suggests that he is more Redian (Ferreira, 1986, p. 212).

> analogically from what it is within us to what is external to us.... It rests on the argument from analogy.... There are philosophers who go farther, and teach, not only a general, but an invariable, and inviolable, and necessary uniformity in the action of the laws of nature, holding that everything is the result of some law or laws, and that exceptions are impossible; but I do not see on what ground of experience or reason they take up this position.... It seems safer, then, to hold that the order of nature is not necessary, but general in its manifestations." (*G. A.* pp. 51-55)

Newman further distinguishes two senses of the word "cause": one sense means that which brings a thing to be; another that on which a thing under given circumstances follows. According to him, in the former sense, our belief in causation is derived by us from our experience of the past and it rests on the argument from analogy and, therefore, our belief in causation is not an intuitive truth; in the latter sense, our belief in causation is derived from our experience of the uniformity of nature and the uniformity of nature is merely a probable hypothesis and, therefore, the belief in causation is not an intuitive truth.

From above we can see that Newman obviously doesn't take Proposition 5 as a first principle and only takes it as a presumption. He challenges those philosophers, including Reid, who take our belief in causation as a first principle by questioning their ground or reason for taking up the position.

Now, on what ground or reason do Reid and other philosophers take our belief in causation as a first principle? Is it the unfailing uniformity of nature? It cannot be, says Newman, for the unfailing uniformity of nature is the very point which has to be proved (*G. A.* p. 55). I think the ground or reason for Reid and other philosophers to take our belief in causation as a first principle is some *priori* first principles, such as, that there are space and time in the universe; that every event in the universe occurs at a certain time within a certain space and

it is governed by a certain law. To assume otherwise will be contrary to our intuitions.[74]

In the above, we have looked at some disagreements between Reid and Newman on whether the trustworthiness of memory and reasoning and belief in causation should be taken as first principles. In the following, let us have a look at Newman's characterizations of first principles.

Newman characterizes first principles as self-evident:

> In order to complete the proof, we are thrown upon some previous syllogism or syllogisms, in which the assumptions may be proved; and then, still farther back, we are thrown upon others again, to prove the new assumptions of that second order of syllogisms. Where is this process to stop? ...it would be something to arrive at length at premises which are undeniable, however long we might be in arriving at them; but in this case the long retrospection lodges us at length at what are called first principles, the recondite sources of all knowledge, as to which logic provides no common measure of minds,—which are accepted by some, rejected by others,—in which, and not in the syllogistic exhibitions, lies the whole problem of attaining to truth,—and which are called self-evident by their respective advocates because they are evident in no other way. (*G. A.* pp. 204-205)

But, on some other occasions, he characterizes first principles as inductive generalizations. For example, when he discusses the first principle about the existence of external world he characterizes it as an inductive generalization:

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[74] According to Meynell, that things have causes is not a *priori* truth because we know that things have causes by experience, but, that whatsoever happens must have causes is a *priori* truth because it goes far beyond experience. He thinks those philosophers refer to the latter, not the former, when they say the *Principle of Causation* is a *priori* truth. Thus, he thinks Newman's criticisms have done less than justice to those philosophers (Dessain, *ibid.* vol. XXIV, p. 308).

> that there are things existing external to ourselves, this I do consider a first principle, and one of universal reception. It is founded on an instinct; ... this instinct or intuition acts whenever the phenomena of sense present themselves, to lay down in broad terms, by an inductive process, the great aphorism, that there is an external world, and that all the phenomena of sense proceed from it. (*G. A.* pp. 47-48)

When he discusses first principles "There is a right and wrong," "a true and a false," "a just and an unjust," "a beautiful and a deformed," Newman says:

> They are abstractions to which we give a notional assent in consequence of our particular experiences of qualities in the concrete, to which we give a real assent." "These so-called first principles, I say, are really conclusions or abstractions from particular experiences... (*G. A.* pp. 49-50)[75]

It seems that there is an inconsistency between Newman's characterizations of first principles here: if a first principle is self-evident, in the sense that it is epistemologically immediate, it cannot be the result of inductive reasoning; if it is the result of inductive reasoning, it cannot be self-evident in the sense of epistemic immediacy.[76] To determine whether there is an inconsistency here it is very important to understand in what sense Newman uses the term 'self-evident'.

I take it that by 'self-evident' Newman means psychological immediacy, not epistemic immediacy. Psychological immediacy refers to the immediate apprehension of the truth of the proposition in question, without being conscious of any argumentation; while,

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[75]Here, we can see the difference between Reid and Newman. Although both of them agree that the conception of rationality based on abstract reasoning only is too narrow, Newman appeals to non-abstract reasoning while Reid appeals to the psychological process of belief-forming. According to Reid, if we want to understand knowledge and rationality, we cannot talk only about the abstract relations holding among propositions, along the way making unreflective assumptions about the 'mechanisms' which form our beliefs. We must look head-on at the psychological 'mechanisms' involved in belief formation.

[76]Ferreira suggests we should read the inferential character of first principles as compatible with their self-evidence in ways which allow a 'basis' which is not strictly speaking a 'justification'. (Ferreira, *ibid.* p. 167)

epistemic immediacy refers to the immediate apprehension of the truth of the proposition in question without inference of any kind involved. It should be noted that psychological immediacy does not imply epistemic immediacy, that is, the immediate apprehension of the truth of a proposition in question without being conscious of any argumentation does not imply that there is no inference of any kind involved. Take an example, a fine physician, by looking at his patient's face, immediately diagnoses that the patient is suffering from iron deficiency. The physician reaches the diagnosis immediately without being conscious of any reasoning process in his mind. This does not imply that, however, there is no reasoning of any kind involved in the diagnosis. Suppose the patient doubts the physician's diagnosis by asking why he thinks she is suffering from iron deficiency. The physician explains to the patient that her face is very pale and eyelids are very dark and these symptoms indicate the shortage of iron in the blood system. Now, when the physician initially makes the diagnosis, he isn't conscious of any mental processes of reasoning at all, just immediately reaches the conclusion. Is his diagnosis justified without being conscious of reasoning processes in his mind? In other words, is the physician's psychological immediacy adequate for his diagnosis? I think so, for the physician, due to his expertise and experience, doesn't need to make conscious reasoning in his mind in order to reach a diagnosis and his immediate diagnosis is warranted by his expertise and experience.

From above example, we have seen that psychological immediacy does not imply epistemic immediacy. Now, as I understand it, Newman uses the term 'self-evident' in the sense of psychological immediacy, not epistemic immediacy. Since psychological immediacy does not imply epistemic immediacy, there is no inconsistency between Newman's characterizations of the first principles being self-evident and being the result of inductive reasoning: a first principle can be both self-evident and the result of inductive generation.

Like Reid, Newman advocates that there are first principles, upon which our knowledge is ultimately based. First principles neither require nor admit of proof, otherwise we will

incur in an infinite regress.[77] This is not to say that, for Newman, any proposition can be claimed to be a first principle. According to him, there is a faculty in us, that is, the Illative sense, which can distinguish legitimate first principles from illegitimate ones (*G. A.* p. 282).

Some philosophers have argued that the certainty of the first principles for Newman are groundless and, therefore, not epistemically justified but only psychologically apprehended. Ieuan Williams argues, for example, that for Newman first principles—the fundamental starting-points of reasoning are also the stopping-points of justification, thus, they are groundless propositions. Our certainty towards them is not epistemically justified, but psychologically apprehended:

> Newman is concerned to show that there are certainties, that we give unconditional assent to a variety of fundamental truths, and that these, although themselves lacking justification, provide unquestioned starting-points for inferring other propositions: the fundamental starting-points of reasoning are also the stopping-points of justification.
>
> Newman, as I have said, takes first principles to be propositions whose groundless certainty is psychologically apprehended." (Williams, 1992, pp. 58-60)

Williams goes on comparing Newman with Wittgenstein:

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[77] I think, for Newman, that first principles do not require proof is because their truths are psychological-immediately apprehended and, although they can be supported by inductive reasoning, there is no need to do so. For him, that first principles do not admit of proof does not imply that they are unprovable, but that we are unable to prove them by using formal reasoning. We can see this from the following passage: "We are unable to prove by syllogism that there are any self-evident propositions at all; but supposing there are (as of course I hold there are), still who can determine these by logic? (*G. A.* p. 204) So, there is no inconsistency in saying that first principles are psychological immediate and can be supported by inductive reasoning and that first principles neither require not admit of proof.

> In Wittgenstein we find the same frequently repeated reminder that 'justification comes to an end.' (Wittgenstein, 1951, 92)

For Wittgenstein, while first principles provide grounds for other propositions, they are not themselves well-grounded or justified: "At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not well-founded." (Wittgenstein, *ibid.* 253) According to Williams, this view is found in Newman:

> The truth of such propositions is taken for granted, and has to be so if there is to be any action and inquiry at all: the ways in which we do act and inquire show that, as a matter of fact, we do accept them; they are, as Newman has it, conditions of thought and action. (Williams, *ibid.* pp. 59-60)

I think that Newman is different from Wittgenstein in this aspect. As we have seen above, though first principles, for Newman, are assumed, taken for granted without further inferences to justify them, they are not groundless. They have their grounds in recurring experience. Thus, our certainty of these propositions is epistemically well-founded.

In the above, I have discussed Newman's first principles. In so far as his endorsement of that there are first principles at the foundation of our noetic structure, Newman is a foundationalist.[78] However, Newman's foundationalism, like Reid's, is of a special type, that is, anti-classical foundationalism: the propositions at the base are not infallible and the superstructure of the foundation can be supported by non-deductive reasoning.

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[78]According to Gerald McCarthy, there are two types of foundationalism in Newman: regress foundationalism and reduction foundationalism. By *regress foundationalism* he means the view according to which "the first principles of knowledge are those self-evident propositions, known 'instinctively' to be true, that serve as the absolute, self-justifying beginning points for our reasoning". By *reduction foundationalism,* he means the type of foundationalism which "argues that, if we are to avoid scepticism, we must make certain assumptions that are neither inductively nor deductively justifiable. However, they are nevertheless required for the justification of what we in fact know. These propositions, therefore, do not derive their epistemic warrant from any *a priori* excellence that they possess; rather, they derive it from the propositions for which they serve as foundations." See: McCarthy (1981), p. 74.

In the above I have looked at first principles in Reid and Newman. We have seen these similarities between Newman and Reid: (1) both of them think that there are some first principles which are universally accepted truths; (2) both of them hold that first principles are self-evident and do not admit of proof; (3) both of them hold an anti-classical foundationalist view—first principles are not immutable truth and they can be fallible. We also see some differences between Reid and Newman: (1) for Reid, first principles are formed through intuitive apprehension, while for Newman they are formed through inductive generalization; (2) for Reid, first principles are sometimes propensities, while for Newman they are propositions; (3) Newman appeals to inductive and probabilistic support for the first principles, while Reid declines to appeal to any support for the first principles (Reid, 1785, VI, iv, 434a, 435b). The differences between Reid and Newman, however, do not undermine my position that Reid had great influence on Newman, for their basic views are in agreement.

3. Anti-sceptical approaches in Reid and Newman

The main objective of both Reid's and Newman's philosophical projects is to reject scepticism and defend the certainty of knowledge about the world around us, about ourselves and other minds. In the following, let's first look at what scepticism is, then Reid's and Newman's anti-scepticism approaches, respectively.

Scepticism is a type of philosophical theory which was originated from Pyrrho and descended to Descartes and Hume.[79] According to this theory, we cannot trust our senses and cognitive faculties because sometimes they make mistakes and therefore we do not have real knowledge about ourselves, the external world and other minds.

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[79]It is important to note that although Hume advocates the theory of ideas and accepts its sceptical implications, he actually defends the thesis that common beliefs about the world are psychologically irresistible from empirical grounds. In this regard, Hume and Reid belong to the same tradition, that is, the 'Scottish Naturalism'. For the naturalistic reading of Hume, see: Norman Kemp Smith (1941); H. O. Mounce (1999). For the philosophical affinities between Hume and Reid, see: Daniel A. Kaufman (2002), pp. 331-361.

In Section XII of his first *Enquiry*, Hume distinguishes between antecedent scepticism, consequent scepticism and mitigated scepticism. Antecedent scepticism is "a species of scepticism, antecedent to all study and philosophy, which is much inculcated by Descartes and others as a sovereign preservative against error and precipitate judgement. It recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and principles, but also of our very faculties; ... (Hume, 1741, 176) Consequent scepticism is "another species of scepticism, consequent to science and enquiry, when men are supposed to have discovered, either the absolute fallaciousness of their mental faculties, or their unfitness to reach any fixed determination...(Hume, *ibid.* 177) Mitigated scepticism is a type of moderate scepticism, according to which there is "a degree of doubt, and caution, and modesty, which, in all kinds of scrutiny and decision, ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner." (Hume, *ibid.* 189)

The sceptical view was very popular in the 17th and 18th philosophical literature and became a threat to human efforts at gaining truth and knowledge. Reid gave a systematic response to the sceptical view and launched a battle against scepticism from the common sense perspective.

a. Reid's anti-sceptical approach:

Reid sees scepticism as the enemy of human common sense. He says:

> [T]he wisdom of philosophy is set in opposition to the common sense of mankind. The first pretends to demonstrate...that there can be no such thing as a material world; that sun, moon, stars, and earth...are, and can be nothing else, but sensation in the mind...The last can conceive no otherwise of this opinion, than as a kind of metaphysical lunacy, and concludes that too much learning is apt to make men mad...This opposition betwixt philosophy and common sense, is apt to have a very unhappy influence upon the philosopher himself...He considers himself and the rest of his species, as born under a necessity of

believing ten thousand absurdities and contradictions...(Reid, 1764, V, vii, 127a)

Reid first launches an attack on the inconsistency between the theory and practice of the sceptic [80]: on the one hand, sceptics doubt the reliability of human faculties, and on the other hand, they use them in their ordinary life:

> When a man in the common course of life gives credit to the testimony of his senses, his memory, or his reason, he does not put the question to himself, whether these faculties may deceive him; yet the trust he reposes in them supposes an inward conviction, that, in that instance at least, they do not deceive him.... Many have, in general, maintained that the senses are fallacious, yet there never was found a man so sceptical as not to trust his senses in particular instances, when his safety required it; and it may be observed of those who have professed scepticism, that their scepticism lies in generals, while in particulars they are no less dogmatic than others. (Reid, 1785, VI, v, 448a, b)

Reid ridicules the sceptic for not being genuine (Reid, *ibid.* VI, v, 448a). If there were any genuine sceptic who actually doubts the reliability of his faculties, no wise man would reason with such a person by argument to convince him of his error (Reid, *ibid.* I, ii, 230b). Instead, this person would be "clapped into a mad-house." (Reid, 1764, VI, xx, 184a)

Reid then appeals to the nature and the consensus of mankind against the sceptic:

> It is too evident to need to proof, that all men are by nature led to give implicit

[80] According to Ferreira, the inconsistency Reid charges the sceptic is not between the sceptic's theory and their practice, but between the sceptic's belief and their metatheory (see: Ferreira, 1986, p. 132). Bary disagrees with this. According to Bary, Reid's charge of the inconsistency between the conduct and the principle of the sceptic is superficial and it is a part of his polemic, not his reasoned argument (de Bary, 2002, p. 12). Reid starts his reasoned attack on scepticism from a clear-eyed acknowledgement that in its most radical form, scepticism cannot be an answer. What Reid attacks are the "semi-sceptics", such as, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume (de Bary, 2002, p. 17).

> faith to the distinct testimony of their senses before they are capable of any bias from prejudices of education or of philosophy. How came we at first to know that there are certain beings about us whom we call father, and mother, and sister, and brother, and nurse? Was it not by the testimony of our senses? (Reid, 1785, VI, v, 445b)

Reid appeals to the normal function of human faculties to respond the sceptical attack that our mental faculties are not reliable because sometimes they make mistakes. According to him, although mental faculties sometimes make mistakes, this fact does not affect their reliabilities. He draws an analogy between the function of body and the function of mind: as we do not judge the normal function of our body from its disordered state, we shouldn't judge the normal function of our mind from the errors we sometimes make. He says:

> as we do not judge the natural constitution of the body from the disorders or diseases to which it is subject from accidents, so neither ought we to judge of the natural powers of the mind from its disorders, but from its sound state. (Reid, *ibid.* II, v, 259a)

> Error is not their natural issue, any more than disease is of the natural structure of the body. (Reid, ibid)

Reid urges that we must trust our mental faculties and it is against our nature to doubt their reliability:

> We are born under a necessity of trusting to our reasoning and judging powers; and a real belief of their being fallacious cannot be maintained...because it is doing violence to our constitution. (Reid, *ibid.* VI, v, 448a)

According to the sceptic, we must build our knowledge on a foundation which is infallible, that is, every proposition in the foundation must be deductively justified. Reid responds that

seeking a justification for every proposition in the foundation of our knowledge will involve an infinite regress and it is practically impossible, and thus we must take the truth of certain propositions, contrary to which is absurd, for granted:

> If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them; these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call absurd." (Reid, 1764, II, vi, 108b)

As Wolterstorff has noticed, there are some similarities between Reid and Wittgenstein here: both advocate that there is no need for justification of certain belief and we must take it for granted (Wolterstorff, 2001, p. 241). However, in disagreement with Wolterstorff, I think Reid and Wittgenstein have different reasons for taking something for granted. As we have seen above, for Reid, we take certain propositions for granted because these propositions are self-evident, immediately seen to be true and being contrary to them will lead to absurdity; while for Wittgenstein, we take something for granted because justification must come to an end and the end is not an ungrounded presupposition—it is an ungrounded way of acting (Wittgenstein, 1951, 110); ".... the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of *seeing* on our part; it is our *acting*, which lies at the bottom of the language-game." (Wittgenstein, *ibid.* 204)[81]

In the above, we have seen that Reid's anti-sceptical approach, as Ferreira has observed, is

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[81] According to Wittgenstein, language does not always convey thoughts because, for a large class of cases, the meanings of words lie in their uses in the language (*P. I.* 43). There are countless uses of words in daily life and in different contexts they have different meanings. He calls various uses of language as "language-games", which is meant that speaking of language is part of an activity, not asserting that there are objects which correspond to words in the language. Wittgenstein uses the example of playing chess to illustrate this: "We only understand the statement 'This is the king' if we know the rules of chess and thereby understand the context of surroundings which give the terms their meaning" (*P. I.* 31). For Wittgenstein, religious and ethical languages are typical examples of those languages whose meanings lie in their uses in certain contexts. Thus, religious and ethical beliefs, to him, have no truth values, and to believe them is simply to acting according to certain rules and there is no need of theoretical justification of them. That is, acting is the foundation of these beliefs.

essentially constituted by appealing to the natural (Ferreira, 1986, p. 96). In the following, I am going to look at Newman's anti-sceptical approach and we will see that Newman's approach is very similar to Reid's.

b. Newman's anti-sceptical approach:

Like Reid, the sceptic that Newman fights against is the Humean semi-sceptic, who doubts that our senses and mental faculties are reliable, and that we can have knowledge of the external world.

According to Newman, we are certain about a lot of things, such as self-identity, the reliability of our mental faculties, the existence of the external world, etc.[82]These beliefs are gained instinctively:

> ... the belief in an external world is an *instinct* on the apprehension of sensible phenomena.
>
> That to *deny* those instincts is an absurdity, *because* they are the voice of nature. (Dessain, 1973, vol. XXIV. p. 294)

These beliefs are knowledge, not due to *a priori* principle or arguments, but because *they are the results of the normal function of human nature*:

> There are those, who, arguing *a priori*, maintain, that, since experience leads by syllogism only to probabilities, certitude is ever a mistake. There are others,

[82]As Ferreira has observed, sometimes what Newman and Reid say about the nature of the external world suggest a metaphysical agnosticism, the agnosticism about real essences or ultimate natures, in both of them (Ferreira, 1986, p. 170). Can this lead to scepticism, which both Reid and Newman themselves strongly reject? The answer is no. This is because agnosticism about real nature of the external world does not imply scepticism about perception of the external world. The gap for Newman and Reid is between the external object and its real or ultimate nature, not between a sensation or idea and an external object (Ferreira 1986, p. 170).

> who, while they deny this conclusion, grant the *a priori* principle assumed in the argument, and in consequence are obliged, in order to vindicate the certainty of knowledge, to have recourse to the hypothesis of intuitions, intellectual forms, and the like, which belong to us by nature, and may be considered to elevate our experience into something more than it is in itself. *Earnestly maintaining, as I would, with this latter school of philosophers, the certainty of knowledge, I think it enough to appeal to the common voice of mankind in proof of it. That is to be accounted a normal operation of our nature, which men in general do actually instance. That is a law of our minds, which is exemplified in action on a large scale, whether a priori it ought to be a law or no. Our hoping is a proof that hope, as such, is not an extravagance; and our possession of certitude is a proof that it is not a weakness or an absurdity to be certain.*" (*G. A.* pp. 261-262, italic added)

According to Ieuan Williams, here Newman is, like Wittgenstein, taking a practical, descriptive approach, rather than a theoretical, metaphysical approach, to refute scepticism. (Williams, 1992, p, 57) I disagree with Williams here. Williams fails to see that, for Newman, there is no logical gulf between the practical-descriptive and the theoretical-metaphysical and what is practical-descriptive has theoretical-metaphysical significance. For him, in the majority of cases what we actually believe are the results of the normal function of our mind and, therefore, they are knowledge. It is absurd to doubt and deny them because they are the products of our nature. Newman, like Reid, tries to justify common beliefs by appealing to the normal function of human minds. So, Newman's approach is different from Wittgenstein's. the latter is merely descriptive.

Let's further look at Newman's anti-sceptical approach. Like Reid, Newman thinks that it is absurd to disbelieve the reliability of our mental faculties:

> We are conscious of the objects of external nature, and we reflect and act upon them, and this consciousness, reflection, and action we call our own rationality.

> And as we use the (so called) elements without first criticizing what we have no command over, so is it much more unmeaning in us, to criticize or find fault with our own nature, which is nothing else than we ourselves, instead of using it according to the use of which it ordinarily admits. Our being, with its faculties, mind and body, is a fact not admitting of question, all things being of necessity referred to it, not it to other things." (*G. A.* P. 263)

Like Reid, Newman takes our self-identity for granted:

> If I may not assume that I exist, and in a particular way, that is, with a particular mental constitution, I have nothing to speculate about, and had better let speculation alone. Such as I am, it is my all; this is my essential stand-point, and must be taken for granted; otherwise, thought is but an idle amusement, not worth the trouble. (*G. A.* p. 263)

Like Reid, Newman thinks that it is against our nature to disbelieve our self-identity and mental faculties:

> I am what I am, or I am nothing. I cannot think, reflect, or judge about my being, without starting from the very point which I aim at concluding. ... I cannot avoid being sufficient for myself, for I cannot make myself any thing else, and to change me is to destroy me. If I do not use myself, I have no other self to use. It is enough for the proof of the value and authority of any function which I possess, to be able to pronounce that it is natural. (*G. A.* p. 264)

We have seen from the above that Newman's anti-sceptical approach, as Ferreira points out, is very similar to Reid's, that is, it appeals to the 'sanction of the natural.' (Ferreira, *ibid.* p. 148) This similarity further supports the influence of Reid on Newman.

4. The role of probable reasoning in Reid and Newman

According to the sceptic, we have no certainty of knowledge about common beliefs because these beliefs are based on probability and probability cannot lead to certainty. In combating this sceptical attack, both Reid and Newman hold that probable reasoning can lead to certainty and probable reasoning can yield certainty no less than can demonstrative reasoning.

a. The role of probable reasoning in Reid

According to Reid, probability is not an inferior degree of evidence, but a species of evidence which can lead to certainty just as demonstration does[83] He gives an example:

> That there is a city as Rome, I am as certain as of any proposition in Euclid; but the evidence is not demonstrative, but of that kind which philosophers call probable. Yet, in common language, it would sound oddly to say, it is probable there is such a city as Rome; because it would imply some degree of doubt or uncertainty." (Reid, 1785, VII, iii, 482b)[84]

That is, probable reasoning can generate certainty as sure as demonstration.

Why does probable reasoning, for Reid, have such force? This is because, as Ferreira observes, for Reid the strength of probable reasoning is not merely cumulative, that is, linear and additive, but also convergent, that is, configurational (Ferreira, 1986, p. 65). Merely cumulative strength can only lead to quantitative changes, while convergent strength can lead to qualitative changes. Thus, probable reasoning, if understood as not

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[83] Reid discusses the role of probable reasoning in the chapters 'Of Probable Reasoning', 'Of Mr. Hume's Scepticism with Regard to Reason' and 'Of Reasoning' of his *Essays on the Intellectual Powers.*

[84] Reid's account of Rome's existence may be considered questionable because a phenomenological account of what that certainty is/how that experience is felt is not included. In a very similar example, Newman includes a phenomenological explanation of what that certainty is/how that experience is felt (*G. A.* pp. 133-134), which makes his account of certainty reached through non-demonstrative reasoning better than Reid's.

merely cumulative but also convergent, can lead to certainty as demonstrative reasoning does. Reid explains both cumulative and convergent characteristics of probable reasoning in this way:

> The strength of probable reasoning, for the most part, depends not upon any one argument, but upon many, which unite their force, and lead to the same conclusion. Any one of them by itself would be insufficient to convince; but the whole taken together may have a force that is irresistible, ... Such evidence may be compared to a rope made up of many slender filaments twisted together. The rope has strength more than sufficient to bear the stress laid upon it, though no one of the filaments of which it is composed would be sufficient for that purpose. (Reid, *ibid.* VII, iii, 482a)[85]

As Ferreira remarks, Reid's use of the image of rope and elements of which it is made to the strength of probable reasoning is significant because it has important implications for the legitimacy of non-demonstrative certainty:

> For Reid the rope and filaments image is especially suited to show not only that (1) though none of the filaments individually could bear the requisite weight, together they can, but also that (2) even though an iron bar could also lift the weight, the rope can be 'sufficient'. And where a rope can do the job, it should not be faulted for not being an iron bar... Reid's point is clear: once the weight to be carried is determined, the important question is whether there is sufficient evidence to bear that weight—*not* whether there could have been more. (Ferreira, *ibid.* p. 76)

In another word, if probable reasoning is sufficient for certainty, demonstrative reasoning shouldn't be required.

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[85] We will see later that Newman uses a similar metaphor to illustrate the strength and legitimacy of probable reasoning.

Sometimes, what Reid says seems to suggest that he takes certainty reached through probable reasoning as purely practical, that is, "act as if a proposition p is true", not of theoretical type, that is, "it is certain that p is true." For example, he says:

> the man who makes the best use he can of the faculties which God has given him, without thinking them more perfect than they really are, may have all the belief necessary in the conduct of life, and all that is necessary to the acceptance with his Maker. (Reid, 1785, VII, iv, 485b)

Fortunately, this is not the whole of Reid's view on certainty reached through probable reasoning. As Ferreira points out, Reid does claim that the certainty achievable by probable reasoning can be 'equal to that demonstration'. (Ferreira, *ibid.* p. 73) We can see this from what Reid says about the strength of evidence from testimony:

> When there is an agreement of many witnesses in a great variety of circumstances, without the possibility of a previous concert, the evidence may be equal to that of demonstration." (Reid, *ibid.* VII, iii, 483a)

This shows that certainty, for Reid, is not merely practical but also theoretical. In the following, let's have a look at the role of probable reasoning in Newman.

b. The role of probable reasoning in Newman

According to Newman, probable reasoning, not formal reasoning, plays a great role in concrete matters:

> It is plain that formal logical sequence is not in fact the method by which we are enabled to become certain of what is concrete; and it is equally plain, from what the real and necessary method is. It is the cumulation of probabilities,

> independent of each other, arising out of 'the nature and circumstances of the particular case which is under review; probabilities are fine to avail separately, too subtle and circuitous to be convertible into syllogisms, too numerous and various for such conversion, even were they convertible. (*G. A.* p. 219)

He gives many examples, from Astronomy, Physics, court cases, etc. to illustrate the role of probable reasoning. He cites a passage from Phillipps' "Law of Evidence" to illustrate the role of probable reasoning: "In criminal prosecutions, the circumstantial evidence should be such, as to produce nearly the same degree of certainty as that which arises from direct testimony, and to exclude a rational probability of innocence." (*G. A.* p. 246) According to him, the certitude made by the jury in a court case is based on converging probabilities, which constitute a real, though only a reasonable, not an argumentative, proof. The probable evidence is sufficient for the conclusion. (*G. A.* p. 249)

Like Reid, Newman holds that probability is not only cumulative but also convergent and it can lead to certainty. Although a single probability itself only indicates a tendency, the combination or multiplicity of accumulated probabilities converge to an actuality, thus, it amounts to a proof. He says:

> ... the conclusion in a real or concrete question is foreseen and predicted rather than actually attained; foreseen in the number and direction of accumulated premises, which all converge to it, and as the result of their combination, approach it more nearly than any assignable difference, yet do not touch it logically...It is by the strength, variety, or multiplicity of premises, which are only probable, not by invincible syllogisms...that the practised and experienced mind is able to make a sure divination that a conclusion is inevitable, ...This is what is meant by a proposition being 'as good as proved,' a conclusion as undeniable 'as if it were proved,' and by the reasons for it 'amounting to a proof,' for a proof is the limit of converging probabilities. (*G. A.* p. 244)

Like Reid, Newman holds that probable reasoning is strong enough to carry the epistemic weight that leads our mind to certainty. Newman uses a similar metaphor as Reid's metaphor of the rope and filaments to illustrate the strength and legitimacy of probable reasoning. In a letter to J. Canon Walker, Newman uses a cable to represent probable reasoning and illustrates that the strength of probable reasoning is like the strength of a cable: a cable is made up of a number of separate threads and each of them is feeble, yet together as sufficient as an iron rod. Likewise, probable reasoning, which is assemblage of probabilities, separately insufficient for certainty, but together, is irrefragable (Dessain, 1978, vol. XXI, p. 146).[86]

According to Newman, probable reasoning is like a *reductio ad absurdum*, that is, if we suppose the conclusion be otherwise it will be against the antecedent probability, so the conclusion cannot be otherwise. This is why he thinks probable reasoning can reach a conclusion 'as undeniable', 'as if it were proved', and 'amounting to a proof'" (*G. A.* pp. 244-245).

It seems puzzling that Newman takes the logical form of probable reasoning as *the reductio ad absurdum*. As we know, the probability P of the occurrence of an event e, i.e. $P(e)$ ranges from zero (impossibility) to one (certainty), depending on the proportion of actual occurrence to the total number of possible occurrence. Thus, in a probable reasoning, only if $P(e) = 1$ the conclusion arrived through the reasoning is certain; while, in a reasoning by *the reductio ad absurdum*, the conclusion arrived does not range from impossibility to certainty. It is certain unconditionally. Apparently, probable reasoning and *the reductio ad absurdum* take very different logical forms. How can Newman legitimately take the logical

[86]When discussing Newman's analogies of probable reasoning as a cable and strict demonstration as an iron bar, Aquino suggests that Newman's analogies might be improved by equating formal inference with a chain, informal inference with a cable, and natural inference with an iron bar (Aquino, 2003, p. 100). I think this suggestion is inappropriate, for it seems to suggest that Newman is arguing that natural and informal inference have more epistemic weight than demonstrative reasoning using the analogies. In my view, by using the analogies, Newman is arguing that whenever natural/informal reasoning is enough for a conclusion it is irrational to demand a strict demonstrative reasoning for it, not that natural inference and informal inference have more epistemic weight than strict demonstrative reasoning. Obviously, Newman does not deny the epistemic weight of demonstrative reasoning, but only stresses its limit to certain provinces of human inquiry.

form of probable reasoning as *the reductio ad absurdum?*

I understand that the reason Newman takes the logical form of probable reasoning as *the reductio ad absurdum* is: in concrete matter when converging probabilities are so great as reaching a certain degree that we cannot help to accept the conclusion, which is beyond the reasonable doubt and it is irrational to deny the conclusion because it will lead to the rejection of the available converging probabilities. We can use the Neyman-Pearson's method used in testing hypotheses to justify Newman here: according to this method, to argue for hypothesis *H*, we calculate the probability of the actual data given not-*H*. If this probability is below a given threshold (eg 1%) then we treat this as a reductio ad absurdum of not-*H*. (S. Kotz & N. L. Johnson, 1985. p. 226)[87]

In the above, we have looked at Newman's discussion of the role of probable reasoning. Newman's discussion, as Ferreira has observed, is very similar to Reid's (Ferreira, *ibid.* p. 148). However, I think Newman gives more credit to probable reasoning than Reid, for he uses a cable to represent probable reasoning, while Reid uses a rope—a cable is certainly stronger than a rope and, therefore, bears more weight than a rope. Moreover, Newman maintains that where a probable reasoning is sufficient for the conclusion, one would be irrational and unreasonable to demand a rigid demonstration, just like demanding an iron bar when a cable is sufficient for bear the weight (Dessain, 1978, vol. XXI, *ibid.*).

5. Naturalistic epistemology in Reid and Newman

We can see the connection between Reid and Newman from another perspective—both Reid's and Newman's epistemology is naturalistic. Before looking at their naturalistic epistemology let me clarify the term 'naturalistic epistemology'.

There are two senses of 'naturalistic epistemology'. In the first sense, 'naturalistic

[87]See: "The Neyman-Pearson Lemma in Testing Hypotheses", in *Encyclopedia of Statistical Science*, vol. 6, edited by Samuel Kotz and Norman L. Johnson. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1985, p. 226.

epistemology' refers to the type of epistemology which is regarded as an enterprise within empirical science and looks at epistemological issues from cognitive science.[88] The approach to this type of epistemology is descriptive, that is, it concerns mainly how a belief arises and is altered. In contrast, there is transcendental epistemology which looks for *a priori* necessary conditions of human knowledge that reflect the structure of the human cognitive apparatus.[89] The approach to this type of epistemology is analytic; in the second sense, 'naturalistic epistemology' refers to the type of epistemology which looks at epistemological issues within the natural realm and tries to justify epistemological principles by appealing to natural causes. In contrast, there is supernaturalistic epistemology which looks at epistemological issues within the divine realm and tries to justify epistemological principles by appealing to God's providence.[90]

Now, both Reid's and Newman's epistemology is naturalistic in the both senses mentioned above, that is, according to their epistemology, the conditions of human knowledge is not something a priori and it can be investigated empirically within the natural realm, without appealing to God's providence. However, Neither Reid nor Newman take epistemic principles as purely descriptive, as other naturalized epistemologists do. For them, epistemic principles are simultaneously descriptive and prescriptive. Thus, there is no logical problem of deriving 'ought' from 'is' in their epistemology.[91]

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[88] W.V. Quine, Alvin Goldman, are, for example, the famous advocators of naturalized epistemology. See: W.V. Quine (1969), pp. 69-90; Goldman, A. (1992), p. 156.

[89] According to some philosophers, these conditions cannot be studied empirically. Kant, for example, advocates this. According to him, *a priori* necessary conditions of human knowledge that reflect the structure of the human cognitive apparatus, such as space, time and the categories, can only be studied conceptually. See his *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1965), A93/B126. Recently, there is a hot debate on whether a *priori* necessary conditions of human knowledge that reflect the structure of the human cognitive apparatus can be studied empirically, that is, whether transcendental epistemology can be naturalised. Quassim Cassam, for example, argues that transcendental epistemology cannot be naturalised, not because an investigation of conditions of knowledge which are determined by our cognitive constitution cannot be naturalised, but because the human cognitive constitution is not the source of the conditions of human knowledge. See: Cassam (2003), pp. 181-203.

[90] These two senses of naturalistic epistemology are not mutually excluding, nevertheless, I think it is useful to make the distinction.

[91] I do not mean that Reid and Newman do not distinguish "ought" from "is" in their epistemology, but that there is no logical gulf between "ought" and "is". According to their epistemology, we can derive, for example, the "ought" of "this is conducive to arriving at the truth" from the "is" of "this is how normal human beings reason", which is forbidden in the transcendental epistemology.

a. Reid's naturalistic epistemology

We can see Reid's naturalistic epistemology in his criticisms of Descartes' proof of the reliability of human cognitive faculties by appealing to God.

According to Descartes, we can have doubt on every other thing, such as our senses, memory, reason, the existence of the external world, of other mind, etc., but one thing we cannot doubt—the *cogito*, that is, our own current mental states. According to Descartes, the reliability of *cogito* is due to a non-deceiving God and the faculties he had given us are true and worthy to be trusted. Reid sees circular reasoning in Descartes' argument:

> It is strange that so acute a reasoner did not perceive that in this reasoning there is evidently a begging of the question. For, if our faculties be fallacious, why may they not deceive us in this reasoning as well as in others? And, if they are not to be trusted in this instance without a voucher, why not in others? Every kind of reasoning for the veracity of our faculties, amounts to no more than taking their own testimony for their veracity." (Reid, 1785, VI v, 447)

According to Reid, we cannot reason to the reliability of our cognitive faculties from our belief in God because in order to do so we have to trust our reason first:

> He who is persuaded that he is the workmanship of God and that it is a part of his constitution to believe his senses, may think that a good reason to confirm his belief: but he had the belief before he could give this or any other reason for it. (Reid, *ibid.* II, xx, 329b)

From above we can see that Reid's epistemology is naturalistic and it does not depend on his ontological belief in God. But, at many occasions, he uses theistic terms when he talks about human cognitive faculties. These usages seem to suggest that Reid's epistemology is

dependent on his ontological belief in God. For example, when he talks about 'the universal administration' Reid says:

> Common Sense and Reason have both one author, that Almighty Author in all whose other works we observe a consistency, uniformity and beauty which charm and delight the understanding: there must, therefore, be some order and consistency in the human faculties, as well as in other parts of his workmanship. (Reid, 1764, V, vii, 127a)

Thus, many philosophers take Reid's epistemology as depending on his ontological belief in God. For example, F. Ueberweg (1903), S. A. Grave (1960), Norman Daniel (1974) and D. F. Norton (1979) hold such a view. [92] Recently, K. Haakonssen (1990), P. B. Wood (1996) and D. R. Brookes (1997) have also endorsed this view. Daniel, for example, remarks:

> Reid's only defence against the sceptical outcome of his own nativism—namely, that our constitutions might lead us to systematically false beliefs—is his belief that God would not deceive us.... Reid justifies natively 'common sense' beliefs through a dogmatic appeal to God as a non-deceiver. (Daniel, *ibid.* pp. 119-120)[93]

According to Norton, Reid holds that our faculties "are part of the overall design of a providential nature, and can be trusted implicitly. What we naturally believe is in fact supernaturally guaranteed." (Norton, 1979, p. 318)

Brookes characterizes Reid's epistemology as 'providential naturalism' (Brookes, 1997, p. xiv) Providential naturalism consists of, according to Brookes, the following tenets:

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[92] cf. Louise Marcil-Lacoste. According to Marcil-Lacoste, these philosophers think that "the reliance on a Deity is a basic presupposition of Reid's epistemology and doctrine." (Marcil-Lacoste, 1982, p. 146

[93] Daniel has revised his view in his second edition. He has realized that his early view hardly sets well with the portrayal of Reid as a naturalistic scientist of the mind (Daniel, 1989, p. 133).

1. Adherence to Newton's regulae philosophandi
2. Belief that the ultimate explanation of the laws of nature is to be found in God's providence
3. A teleological orientation in discovering those laws
4. Belief that the end/purpose of our cognitive processes is (among other things) to furnish us with true beliefs.

According to Brookes, although Reid does not appeal to God's providence in arguing for the reliability of our faculties, he does hold that the rationality of our belief in the general reliability of our faculties is best sustained by belief in God (Brookes, 1997, p. xxii).

In opposition to the view that Reid's epistemology is providentialistic, Keith Lehrer (1978, 1989, 1990, 1998), D. Robinson and T. Beauchamp (1978), J. Ferreira (1986), and, recently, James Somerville (1995), Dale Jacquette (2003), etc. hold that Reid's epistemology is naturalistic, not providentialistic.

According to Robinson and Beauchamp, Reid's philosophy is naturalistic–even Darwinian, and it does not depend on a providential God (Robinson & Beauchamp, 1978, p. 336).

According to Ferreira, for Reid, belief in God cannot be a reason for trusting our faculties since we trust before we can have this reason...Admittedly, the divine authorship of our constitution is responsible for the functioning of our faculties, but we can come to know of that authorship only after we have trusted our faculties, so such trust cannot be epistemologically dependent on belief in God. The appeal to God in Reid plays only a retrospective role, that is, to confirm the trust, not to generate or legitimate that trust (Ferreira, *ibid.* p. 124).

According to Somerville, Reid's references to divine providence have no epistemological significance for they are "quite irrelevant to the specific epistemological issues."

(Somerville, 1995, p. 348) For him, Reid's epistemology is completely detached from his theism.

In between the two opposite views, there is a third view which holds that Reid's theism does not play any justifying role, but only an explanatory role, in his epistemology. C. Hookway (1990), P. Rysiew (2002), Philip de Bary (2002), etc. hold this view. According to Hookway, for Reid,

> the reliability of our faculties is self-evident, and stands in no need of justification. However, it is natural to seek a systematic understanding of ourselves and our capacities; the benevolence of God explains our possession of reliable faculties although it has no role in justifying our belief that they are reliable. This may add to the justification which these beliefs already possess but it has no role in warranting our initial acceptance of them." (Hookway, 1990, p. 116)

According to Rysiew, Reid makes no essential appeal to God in his epistemology, for instance, in defending the rationality of our common sense beliefs (Rysiew, 2002, p. 438); Even if Reid is an adherent of providential naturalism as Brookes characterizes that would most have Reid giving God's providence an explanatory role in accounting for the source of our faculties and our belief in their basic reliability. But from this we cannot infer that providentialist considerations play any justificatory role in Reid's defence of the rationality of such beliefs. (Rysiew, *ibid.* p. 439)

Rysiew thinks the view Brookes ascribes to Reid is not Reid's own view, but Alvin Plantinga's.[94] According to him, Reid's epistemology is not providential naturalism as

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[94] In his *Warrant and Proper Functioning*, Plantinga provides an account of warrant based on the concept of the proper function of cognitive faculties. According to him, proper functioning of cognitive faculties is a necessary condition for warrant and, to work properly, these faculties must be operating in an appropriate environment which these faculties are designed for either by evolution or God or both (Plantinga, 1993b, p. 7). He rejects naturalistic account of the proper function of cognitive faculties on the grounds that there is no the plausible naturalistic account of the reliability of human cognitive faculties, for naturalistic accounts,

Plantinga's is: "...I doubt very much that Reid's is a 'providentialist epistemology' in the way in which Plantinga's ultimately is" (Rysiew, *ibid*, p. 441), because, unlike Plantinga, providence only plays an explanatory role (if it plays any role in Reid), not a justificatory role in Reid (Rysiew, *ibid.* p. 441).

Philip de Bary argues for a similar view. According to him, there are four possible views about the detachability or otherwise of Reid's principles from God: (a) strong detachability; (b) weak detachability; (c) strong non-detachability; and (d) weak non-detachability (de Bary, 2002, p. 67). By 'strong detachability' he means that Reid's epistemological principles are independent, on the large scale, from his metaphysical belief in God; By 'weak detachability', meaning that Reid's epistemological principles are independent, on the small scale, from his metaphysical belief in God; By 'strong non-detachability', meaning that Reid's epistemological principles are dependent, on the large scale, on his metaphysical belief in God; By 'weak non-detachability', meaning that Reid's epistemological principles are dependent, on the small scale, on his metaphysical belief in God (de Bary, *ibid.* p. 67).

Now, de Bary rejects both strong detachability and strong non-detachability of Reid's epistemology from his metaphysical belief in God and argues that Reid's epistemology is weakly non-detached from his metaphysical belief in God (de Bary, *ibid.* p. 70). He compares the detachability of Reid's epistemological principles from his metaphysical beliefs with Plantinga's [95] and concludes that although we can give an interpretation, based

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such as Darwinian evolutionary account, make it very unlikely that our faculties are generally reliable and most of our beliefs are true. Plantinga notes that even Darwin himself has 'the horrid doubt': "whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy" (Darwin, 1887, vol. 1, pp. 315-316). Thus, he remarks: "Naturalistic epistemology conjoined with naturalistic metaphysics leads via evolution to scepticism or to violations of canons of rationality", while "the theist has nothing impelling him in the direction of such scepticism in the first place" (Plantinga, 1993b, p. 237). Plantinga concludes: "...naturalistic epistemology flourishes best in the garden of supernaturalistic metaphysics" (Plantinga, *ibid.*). For a full appraisal of Plantinga's Proper Function Theory of Warrant, please see Part Three, Chapter 6 of this thesis.

[95] According to de Bary, Plantinga's account of the proper function of cognitive faculties is much influenced by Reid's: "Just as Reid says that 'as we do not judge of the natural constitution of the body from the disorders or diseases to which it is subject...so neither ought we to judge of the natural powers of mind from its disorders, but from its sound state" [259a], so Plantinga maintains that a belief has warrant only if it is the

on textual comparison, to show that Reid's epistemology is, like Plantinga's, weakly detached from God (de Bary, *ibid.* p. 70). Reid's epistemology is, in fact, less dependent on his theism than Plantinga's (de Bary, *ibid.* p. 70)

According to de Bary, Reid's theism does not play any justifying role in his epistemology—it only gives him an explanation for the reliability of the faculties, in terms of God's benevolence, which in a naturalistic garden he would lack (de Bary, *ibid.* p. 188). While Plantinga's theism, according to him, plays a much stronger role in his epistemology—he argues that theism is a necessary condition for reliabilism by confronting naturalism with an undercutting-defeater and the 'Darwin Doubt' (de Bary, *ibid.* pp. 181-182).[96] de Bary thinks this is quite un-Reidian (de Bary, *ibid.* p. 187).

In the above, I have looked at Reid's naturalistic epistemology and we have seen that Reid does not appeal to his ontological belief in God as a justifying reason in his epistemology.

In the following, I am going to look at Newman's epistemology and we will see that Newman's epistemology, like Reid's, is essentially naturalistic and it does not depend on his ontological belief in God.

b. Newman's naturalistic epistemology:

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product of mature and properly functioning faculties. And where Reid adds that, to work properly, the natural powers of the mind require only that 'the proper circumstances concur' [328b], Plantinga specifies that they must be operating in an appropriate environment-'one for which...[they]...are designed-by God, or evolution, or both' (Plantinga: 7)" (de Bary, 2002, p. 69); "Reid's remarks on the illegitimacy of Descartes's manoeuvre, ... continue: 'Every kind of reasoning for the veracity of our faculties, amounts to no more than taking their own testimony for their veracity...[447b] Similarly, Plantinga says: 'Suppose...you find yourself with the doubt that our cognitive faculties produce truth: you can't quell that doubt by producing an argument about God and his veracity, or indeed any argument at all; for the argument, of course, will be under as much suspicion as its source'(Plantinga, 1993, p. 237)." (de Bary, *ibid.* pp. 69-70) Plantinga himself made a similar remark in his *Current Debate*: my theory of proper function of noetic faculties marks "a real advance–or better, it represents a fortunate retreat, a happy return to the externalist perspective occupied much earlier by Thomas Reid." (Plantinga, 1993a, viii)

[96]For the detailed discussion of Plantinga's argument against naturalism, please see Part 2, Chapter 6 of this thesis.

Newman's epistemology, like Reid's, is essentially naturalistic, non-providential. We can see this from his appeal to the natural operation of mind and Bacon's naturalism to attack the sceptic and defend the certainty of knowledge:

> Earnestly maintaining, as I would, ... the certainty of knowledge, I think it enough to appeal to the common voice of mankind in proof of it. That is to be accounted a normal operation of our nature, which men in general do actually instance. That is a law of our minds, which is exemplified in action on a large scale, whether *a priori* it ought to be a law or no." (*G. A.* pp. 261-262)

> It is enough for the proof of the value and authority of any function which I possess, to be able to pronounce that it is natural." (*G. A.* p. 264)

> Knowledge is power, for it enables us to use eternal principles which we cannot alter. So also is it in that microcosm, the human mind. Let us follow Bacon more closely than to distort its faculties according to the demands of an ideal optimism; instead of looking out for modes of thought proper to our nature, and faithfully observing them in our intellectual exercises." (*G. A.* p. 266)[97]

What Newman says here is that it is sufficient to appeal to the natural operation of human mind to justify our beliefs and the certainty of knowledge and there is no need to go beyond that. From here we can see that Newman holds a naturalistic epistemological view. [98]

However, what Newman says at some other occasions seems to suggest that his epistemology is entirely providential. For example, right after the passage cited above he says:

> Of course, I do not stop here. As the structure of the universe speaks to us of

[97] From this passage we can see that Newman, like Reid, admires Bacon. This further suggests the philosophical affinity between Reid and Newman.

> Him who made it, so the laws of the mind are the expression, not of mere constituted order, but of his will. I should be bound by them even were they not His laws; but since one of their very functions is to tell me of Him, they throw a reflex light upon themselves, and, for resignation to my destiny, I substitute a cheerful concurrence in an overruling Providence. ... (*G. A.* pp. 266-267)

Many philosophers, thus, take the view that Newman's epistemology is entirely providential and the whole enterprise of his epistemology is apologetic. Copleston (1967), T.J. Norris (1977), Jay Newman (1989), etc. hold this view.

I think this view is not tenable. As we have seen before, Newman has severely attacked the sceptic, which is one of his central focuses in the *Grammar*. According to the sceptic, we have no real knowledge of the external world because, on the one hand, what we immediately perceive are just the 'ideas', 'images' or 'impressions' of things, not things-in-themselves, and there are no necessary connections between the phenomenal and nomenal worlds; on the other hand, our mental faculties sometimes cheat us, thus they are not reliable. Now, if his epistemology were entirely providential Newman would reply the sceptic this way: "Hay, sir, we cannot doubt that we have real knowledge of the external world because God has created the universe with laws and orders and He, by His nature, guarantees us to perceive the real world, not just ideas or impressions, and to have reliable mental faculties, not untrustable ones." Then, his anti-scepticism project would completely fail. But, as we have seen above, Newman's replies to the sceptic are based on the natural–normal operation of mind, not on his theistic commitment. Thus, we can draw the conclusion that Newman's epistemology is not providential, but naturalistic, even somewhat Darwinistic.[99] Look at the following passage:

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[98] It should be noted that Newman's naturalism is methodological naturalism, not ontological naturalism.

[99] Here, I am trying to give a naturalistic interpretation of Newman's epistemology along the British naturalist tradition that Newman apparently belongs to. This does not, however, exclude other interpretations of Newman's epistemology along other readings. The naturalistic interpretation of Newman's epistemology is, in fact, corresponding to the Thomist reading of Newman. One can give a providential interpretation of Newman's epistemology along the Augustinian reading of Newman.

> What is the peculiarity of our nature, in contrast with the inferior animals around us? It is that, though man cannot change what he is born with, he is a being of progress with relation to his perfection and characteristic good. Other beings are complete from their first existence, in that line of excellence which is allotted to them; *but man begins with nothing realized (to use the word), and he has to make capital for himself by the exercise of those faculties which are his natural inheritance. Thus, he gradually advances to the fullness of his original destiny. Nor is this progress mechanical, nor is it of necessity; it is committed to the personal efforts of each individual of the species; each of us has the prerogative of completing his inchoate and rudimental nature, and of developing his own perfection out of the living elements with which his mind began to be. It is his gift to be the creator of his own sufficiency; and to be emphatically self-made. This is the law of his being, which he cannot escape; and whatever is involved in that law he is bound, or rather he is carried on, to fulfil.* (*G. A.* p. 265, italic added)

There are no theistic inputs or implications when Newman talks about the functions of human faculties and their progress. Here, he simply sounds like a Darwinist.

Now, how can we reconcile Newman's theistic ontological commitment with his naturalistic epistemological position? There is a plausible approach to explain away the discrepancy: like Reid, Newman's theism plays only an explanatory role, not a justificatory role in his epistemology.

In the above sections, I have compared Newman with Reid from a number of perspectives– their direct realistic theories of perception, foundationalistic theories of knowledge, anti-sceptical approaches, the role of probable reasoning and naturalistic epistemology, and we have seen that there are many similarities between them. These similarities suggest that there is a close philosophical affinity between Reid and Newman and the former has a great

deal of influence on the latter.

In this chapter, I have traced Newman's philosophical sources in order to understand his main philosophical ideas and approaches. In following chapters, I am going to examine his approach to the justification of belief in God based on the phenomena of conscience. In order to do this, we need first to look at the etymology and various conceptions of conscience to determine in what sense Newman uses the word *conscience*.

Chapter 2: The Etymology and Various Conceptions of Conscience

The objective of this thesis is to investigate and assess Newman's approach to justifying the belief in the existence of God based on conscience and show that it has advantages over the reformed epistemologists' approach. In order to achieve this objective, it is necessary to review the etymology of the word *conscience* and the various conceptions of conscience and determine in what sense Newman uses the word *conscience*, for the word *conscience*, for different people, has very different meanings.

Part One: The Etymology and Historical Usages of the Word *Conscience*

The English word *conscience* originates from the Latin word *conscientia*. The latter is a translation of the Greek word *syneidesis* (συνείδησις). The word 'συνείδησις' stems from verb 'συνοιδα', meaning "I know in common with". It usually implies knowledge about another person, which can be used in witness for or against him. Thus, it came to mean "I bear witness"(Potts, 1980, p. 2). Since it would be rather pointless to insist upon the shared aspect of the knowledge where its object was public, *syneidesis* was used primarily in cases where one was privy to another's secret, and this carried two further implications. The first is that, in being privy to another's secret, I am in a position to witness to what the person knows. The second (not always fulfilled) is that one is ashamed of what he keeps secret, so that my witness, if I choose to give it, will be against him rather than to his credit (Potts, *ibid*). Thus, *conscientia,* according to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, means:

> I. A joint knowledge of something, a being privy to, a knowing along with others.
>
> II. Consciousness, Knowledge, feeling, sense; in particular, a consciousness of right and wrong, the moral sense, conscience. [100]

[100]According to Potts, the modern English sense of *conscience* derives from its etymological sense 'being privy to' by two stages: stage one is reflexive, that is, being privy to one's own secret; the second stage has been its

In relation to *conscientia*, there is another Greek notion συντήρησις, whose Latin transliteration is *synderesis*, needs to be mentioned. *Synderesis* most commonly means 'preservation' or 'maintenance'. Since the prefix can have reflexive force, which gives it the sense of observing or watching over oneself and, perhaps, thereby preserving oneself from wrongdoing (Potts, *ibid.* p. 10).

Synderesis is a main topic in the discussion of *conscientia* in medieval moral philosophy. *Synderesis*, it was agreed by medieval scholastics, is an innate and infallible source of moral knowledge or moral principles. But there is a disagreement about its nature and relation to *conscientia* among medieval scholastics. Some scholastics take *synderesis* as one faculty of human soul. Some take it as habit-like faculty or habit. Some scholastics identify *synderesis* with *conscientia*, while others distinguish *synderesis* from *conscientia*. Earlier St. Jerome, in his *Commentary on Ezeckiel*, took *synderesis* to be a special faculty of the human soul, distinct from reason, spirit, and desire. According to him, *synderesis* is the spark of *conscientia*. *Conscientia* can be lost, while *synderesis* can not: "This is that spark of conscientia which was not quenched even in the heart of Cain, when he was driven out of paradise". This suggests that there is a distinction between *conscientia* and *synderesis* in Jerome. However, St. Jerome also identifies *synderesis* with *conscientia* and takes it that *synderesis* can be lost: "This is that spirit which *Paul prayed might be kept unimpaired with soul and body. And yet in some men we see this* conscientia overthrown and displaced." (D'Arcy, E. 1961, pp. 16-17) Philip the Chancellor takes *synderesis* as a habit-like faculty. According to him, *synderesis* is not same as *conscientia*. *Conscientia* comes from a conjunction of *synderesis* with free choice: "synderesis plus the reason for a free choice makes *conscientia* right or mistaken, and *conscientia* sticks more to the side of reason; *synderesis* itself, however, which is the spark of *conscientia*, ... is not mistaken." (Potts, *ibid.* p. 12) According to St. Thomas, *synderesis* is a habit, a natural habit by which we readily grasp the basic principles of our moral life (Aquinas, 1273, Part I, Q 79, Art 13, p 121). For

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application to a person's standards of behavior, for when one witnesses to what he did or failed, customarily, he will also judge his actions or omissions as right or wrong in the circumstances, by measuring them against his standards of behavior. Though, logically, there is a transition from being witness to being a judge, psychologically, recall and judgment are often simultaneous. That conscience has its application to a person's

St. Thomas, *synderesis* is different from *conscientia. Conscientia* is neither a faculty nor a habit, but an act, the act of judging the rightness or wrongness of particular action by applying universal moral principles to it. The judgment of *conscientia* is a conclusion of a practical syllogism in which *synderesis* provides the major and reason the minor. Since there may be errors either by misapplying a universal moral principle to particular situations or by invalid reasoning, *conscientia* may be erroneous (Aquinas, *ibid.* Part II, Q.19, Art 5, p. 241) Nevertheless *synderesis*, for Thomas, is infallible (Aquinas, *ibid.*).[101]

According to D'Arcy, the word synderesis first appeared in a fragment of Democritus' writing, then Plato's, but not Aristotle's, and commonly used by the early Church Fathers and the Scholastic philosophers (D'Arcy, E. *ibid.* pp.5-47). For the early Church Fathers and the scholastic philosophers, conscience has both judicial and legislative roles. Thus, D'Arcy summaries, "Here we have the word 'conscience' itself, and we have the two functions of guiding and advising (legislative conscience), and of judging and punishing (judicial conscience)." (D'Arcy, E. *ibid.* pp. 13-15)

We have seen that, from the Greek origin and historical usages of the word, conscience has both judicial and legislative roles in moral discourses. This implies that conscience has a function in making judgments about one's own conduct and the conduct of others as well.

In the following section, I am going to review various conceptions of conscience and, relying on the phenomenology of moral experience, argue for a three-fold conception of conscience, that is, conscience involves moral belief, the sense of duty and moral emotion.

Part Two: Various Conceptions of Conscience

The objective of this section is to argue for a threefold conception of conscience, that is,

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standards of behavior, according to him, is the central sense in modern English (Potts, *ibid.* p. 4).

[101]It should be noted that, for St. Thomas, *syderesis* as habit can only be infallible if it is habitually well-formed. It is not infallible in an absolute sense (Cf: Aquinas, *ibid.* Q.79, Art. 13, pp. 121-122)

conscience involves moral belief, the sense of duty and moral emotion. Before doing this, let me first briefly review various conceptions of conscience.

In his *An Examination of the Nature of Conscience and Its claim to Freedom*, Brunk Conrad Grebel has thoroughly summarized various conceptions of conscience (Grebel, 1974). According to him, there are following conceptions of conscience:

1. Conscience as an innate, infallible moral faculty in the human mind.

This conception of conscience is held by some scholastic philosophers and the 18th-century British 'moral faculty' philosophers. As we have seen in section one of this chapter, some scholastic philosophers identify conscience with *synderesis* and hold that *synderesis* is an innate faculty and infallible source of our moral knowledge or moral principles. The 18th century British 'moral faculty' philosophers also hold that conscience is an innate, infallible moral faculty in human mind. Among the 18th-century 'moral sense' philosophers, there are two schools: one is the perceptual school and the other is the rationalist school. Although they differ in that the former takes conscience as a perceptual sense by which we perceive the rightness or wrongness of acts and the latter takes it as rational intuition of moral character of acts and of the obligations imposing on us, the two schools agree in taking conscience as an innate moral faculty and the infallible sole source of our moral knowledge.

This conception of conscience, according to Grebel, has three difficulties: one is the presumption that conscience is a special faculty; another is the presumption that the dictate of conscience is infallible; the third is that it is the sole source of our moral knowledge. (Grebel, *ibid.* 42) He raises three objections: a) If conscience is a special faculty, whether perceptual or rational, why are we unable to specify the nature of this sense in terms of the bodily structures and processes that underlie it? b) If its dictates are infallible, how can the dictates of different people's consciences conflict with each other? c) If it is the source of one's moral knowledge, one would not need to ask someone else for moral advice, for one only needs to

look within oneself to seek what is right, what is wrong and what one's duty is. But sometimes we do ask someone else for moral advice. Thus, the 'moral faculty' conception of conscience, according to Grebel, is not an adequate one.

I think whether Grebel's criticisms are valid depends on how we understand the words 'faculty' and 'infalliable'. Concerning his criticism a), only if the word 'faculty' is understood as *entity*, is the criticism valid. But if the word 'faculty' is understood as *ability*, his criticism is no longer valid. According to this understanding, that conscience is an innate, infallible moral faculty means that conscience is an inborn, reliable moral ability, which can discern moral truth, either perceptually or intuitively. If we have sufficient knowledge about brain structure, we might be able to specify the nature of this ability in terms of the neural structures and processes that underlie it, just as we might be able to specify the nature of our other mental ability, such as memory, in terms of the neural structures and processes that underlie it. Concerning his criticism b), if 'infallibility' is understood as *reliability*, not incorrigibility, then the infallibility of conscience is not contradictory to the conflicts of people's conscience, for to say that conscience is infallible is equivalent to say that conscience is generally reliable, though in particular cases, it can make mistakes, just as our other mental abilities, such as memory, are generally reliable, though they can make mistakes in particular cases. Concerning his criticism c), if we understand conscience as a moral ability, not an entity, then there is no contradiction between that conscience is the source of one's moral knowledge and that sometimes we seek moral advices from someone else, just as, though we have memory as the source of our knowledge about past, sometimes we do seek information about past from other sources.

2. Conscience as moral emotion, inclination or pre-reflective belief.

This conception of conscience is held by Freudians and some twentieth-century philosophers, such as P. H. Nowell-Smith, R. M. Hare, etc. Freudians identify conscience as the emotional manifestation of the 'super-ego' that represents the internalization of moral custom, social

reinforcements or parental authority and the turning of primitive aggressive instincts away from the external world and against the ego itself. Nowell-Smith, Hare, etc. identify conscience with a sort of psychological occurrence, which is taken as a moral urging of some kind, such as a feeling, inclination, or pre-reflective hunch. This conception of conscience, according to Grebel, is fundamentally uncritical. To follow one's conscience, according to this conception, is to take at face value the first feeling of inclination which comes to a person when faced with the necessity of moral choice, without critically examining the nature of the circumstances, considering the consequences of alternative course of action, or reflecting on the principles that are pertinent to the case (Grebel, *ibid.* p. 56).[102]

3. Conscience as rule-following.

This conception of conscience is very often associated with and limited to authoritarian forms of morality that identify moral rules and principles as the commands of a sovereign moral authority, either divine or human. It is this sense of conscience as blind rule-following and devotion to authority that we often speak of evil men as nevertheless 'conscientious' in their devotion to their evil undertakings. Conscientiousness, in this sense, is hardly a moral attitude at all (Grebel, *ibid.* p. 60).

4. Conscience as consciousness in general.

This conception of conscience is often used to refer to little more than our thoughts, beliefs, opinions, intentions, or private mental events in general. It has little moral significance.

According to Grebel, none of these conceptions has adequately reflected the defining features of moral conscience manifested in our moral experience. He has argued for a conception of conscience, which originates from Aquinas, Butler and Kant, that:

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[102] I agree with Grebel that this conception of conscience is uncritical and it is not a moral conscience. I will evaluate this conception of conscience in Part One, Chapter Three of this thesis.

5. Conscience as a) a moral verdict that a particular course of action is morally right (or wrong); b) a sense of duty to perform (or refrain from) that course of action because it is right (or wrong); c) moral resolve: conscientiousness, that is, the disposition or will to act in accord with what one takes as his moral duty (Grebel, *ibid.* p.67).

I think the conception Grebel has argued for has reflected some features of the phenomenology of conscience, such as making moral verdicts, having a sense of duty and reaching a moral resolve, but it fails to capture the emotional dimension, which is an essential element of moral conscience. In the following, I am going to argue, basing my case on the phenomenology of moral experience, that an adequate conception of conscience must involve the three elements: moral belief, the sense of duty and moral emotion.

Part Three: A Three-Fold Conception of Conscience

In this part, I am going to argue, by appealing to the phenomenology of moral experience, that an adequate conception of conscience must involve three elements: moral belief, the sense of duty and moral emotion.

a) Conscience involves a moral belief or judgment that a particular course of action is morally right or wrong. It is a common moral experience that, when one is confronted with a moral conflict, one's conscience comes on the scene to make moral judgments or moral decisions: this particular course of action is morally right thus ought to be done and that particular course of action is morally wrong thus ought not to be done, etc. That conscience involves making moral judgments is also shown by this phenomenon: one's conscience pronounces judgment condemning one's wrong doing and punishing oneself with shame, guilt, or remorse, etc. after one has done something morally wrong. One would not genuinely feel shame, guilt or remorse about one's doing an act X if one's conscience could not judge whether doing X is morally wrong. The phenomenon of the ascription of conscientiousness also shows that conscience has a function in making moral judgments. When we ascribe a person as a conscientious person we take it into account that s/he judges whether it is morally

right or wrong before performing a course of action, not blindly accepting what others tell her/him as duty. We do not call a person conscientious, who does not judge whether it is morally right or wrong before performing a course of action and always takes what other people (usually an authority) tell her/him as duty, without re-evaluation of them.

In this way, the phenomena of moral experience show that conscience has a function in making moral judgments. Thus, an adequate conception of conscience should reflect this feature.[103]

It has been argued by some philosophers that one's conscience has no function in making moral judgments. S. Grave, for example, has argued that one's conscience has no operation in the determination of what is right and what is wrong:

> The ordinary conception of conscience does not assign to it any determination of right and wrong. What is right and what is wrong are already taken for granted before one's conscience operates in the ordinary conception of conscience. (Grave, 1989, p. 26)

The grounds for the claim are etymological considerations and the use of the word 'conscience' in ordinary speech. (Grave, *ibid*, p. 6) Etymologically, one's conscience is one's inward consciousness. It cannot judge others' conduct:

> If conscience ever determines right and wrong, it ought, at least sometimes, to be in order to speak of one's conscience as judging the actions of someone else

[103]That one's conscience involves making moral judgments is an essential character of Thomas Aquinas' conception of conscience. As we have seen in the previous section, for Aquinas, conscience is an act of reaching moral conclusion of what is right and what is wrong by applying general moral principles to a particular case (See: Aquina's "Commentary On the Sentences", II dist, 39, q. 3, art 3). This feature of conscience is also reflected in Joseph Butler's conception of conscience: "there is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man, which distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart, as well as his external actions: which passes judgement upon himself and them; pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good; others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust ..." (Butler, 1726, p. 59). Newman's conception of conscience, as we will see in chapter 2, also involves this element.

to be right or wrong; and it never is. (Grave, *ibid*, p. 19)

Therefore, one's conscience has no function in determining right and wrong:

> We can count on never hearing anyone say that his conscience makes inferences, goes into various considerations, reaches conclusions, thinks anything out. (Grave, *ibid.*)

I think the success of this argument depends upon whether one's conscience can make judgments on others' conduct.

Ryle, in his article 'Conscience and Moral Convictions', has argued that one's conscience cannot judge others' conduct, its verdicts are limited within one's own conduct: "We limit the verdicts of conscience to judgments about the rightness or wrongness of the acts only of the owner of that conscience". For, firstly, 'conscience', etymologically, generally connoted 'self-knowledge' or 'self-consciousness'. Introspection would be an activity of *conscientia*. It cannot, therefore, judge others' conduct and its judgments are restricted to one's own thoughts, motives and resolves (Ryle, 1940, p. 26); Second, phenomenologically, conscience is operative: "Conscience is not something other than, prior to or posterior to moral conviction; it is having those convictions in an operative degree, i.e., being disposed to behave according." (Ryle, *ibid.* p. 29) That is, the judgment of one's conscience about one's own conduct can direct and motivate one to do what the judgment says right and refrain from what the judgment says wrong. One's judgment on the conduct of others cannot be operative: it cannot direct or oblige others to do what the judgment says right and refrain from what it says wrong. Therefore, according to Ryle, one's conscience cannot make judgments on the conduct of others and the judgment of one's conscience is limited to one's own conduct and it is absurd to say my conscience says that you ought to do this or ought not to have done that, and judgments about the morality of other people's behavior would not be called verdicts of conscience, for to say that you should do so and so can be only to pronounce and perhaps to try to persuade and it cannot issue in the required behavior (Ryle, *ibid.* p. 25).

In the following, I am going to argue that one's conscience can make judgments on the conduct of others.

On the first point, as we have seen in section one of this chapter, etymologically, conscience does not merely mean 'self-knowledge' or 'self-consciousness', but also 'knowledge about another'. The morpheme of *conscientia* shows this. The prefix 'con-' in Latin means 'with' and 'scientia' means 'knowledge'. So, *conscientia* has the meaning of 'shared knowledge' or 'knowledge about another'. Thus, the etymology of the word of conscience does not support the argument that the verdicts of conscience are limited within one's own actions. Even if the word 'conscience', etymologically, did merely mean 'self-knowledge' or 'self-consciousness', this could not be a good reason for arguing that one's conscience has no function in making judgments about the conduct of others. For the connotation of a word is always changing with the way that how people use it. We cannot reject the new connotation on the grounds that there was no such connotation in the etymology of the word. Furthermore, the 'self-knowledge' or 'self-consciousness' conception of conscience has obvious difficulties. For conscience, according to this conception, is purely private, a private monitor (Ryle, *ibid.* p. 25). If the word 'conscience' denotes a purely private thing, it cannot have, as Wittgenstein says, an intersubjectively shared meaning, for no word could acquire a meaning if it denotes a purely private thing. A word only has meaning as part of a language and a language is something essentially public and shareable... (Wittgenstein, 1953, I. 243-258) Conscience cannot be a purely private thing. It has public manifestations, especially in the case of a guilty conscience, even if no one else knows the details.

On the second point, it is true that the judgment of one's conscience about one's own conduct is operative: it can direct one to do what the judgment says right and refrain from what the judgment says wrong and can cause one to feel guilty or shame after one fails to do what the judgment says right. On the other hand, the judgment about the conduct of others cannot be so operative: it cannot direct others and motivate them to do what it says right and refrain from what it says wrong, and does not cause them to feel guilty or shame after they have

done something that the judgment says wrong. If my conscience judges that, say, stealing, is immoral, the judgment cannot direct and motivate another person, say, who is a thief, to stop engaging in stealing, and does not cause her/him to feel shame towards her/his conduct. So, it is absurd to say that my conscience can *direct* her/him not to engage in stealing. But it is not absurd to say that my conscience can *judge* that it is morally wrong for her/him to do that. A verdict of one's conscience has two aspects. One is indicative: it says what is morally right and what is morally wrong; another is imperative: it directs or commands one to do what the indicative aspect says as morally right. Only the imperative aspect is limited within one's own conduct. The indicative aspect can be universalized and passed on others' conduct. And, although my judgment about the rightness or wrongness of an action of others cannot direct the doer to perform it or to refrain from it, it can direct me to approve it or disapprove it. For example, if I judge that the adultery between x and y is morally wrong, the judgment can direct me to disapprove of it. My judgment and my disapproval of the conduct may have effects on the doers. Thus, our judgments on the conduct of others are not merely, as Ryle holds, academic. They can be operative in some degree.

What we can draw from the phenomenology of moral experience is that one's conscience, primarily, concerns one's own conduct. But it is not the case that it cannot make a judgment on the conduct of others. If the verdicts of one's conscience are limited to merely the conduct of the owner of that conscience, one's conscience cannot morally disapprove the conduct of others, for, to morally approve or disapprove the conduct of others, one's conscience needs to judge whether the conduct is morally right or morally wrong. By supposition, one's conscience cannot do this. Therefore, one's conscience cannot morally approve or disapprove the conduct of others. But, the phenomenology of conscience reveals that conscience does disapprove some conduct of others. Suppose, I am a conscientious person and do what my conscience tells me. Suppose, I am seeing a person setting fire to my neighbor's house. Should I keep silence and tolerate the conduct or blame and stop it? According to Ryle's thesis, I should choose the former, for my conscience cannot disapprove the conduct: "If someone else misbehaves, my conscience cannot be said to disapprove." (Ryle, *ibid*, p. 25) "If God is omniscient it would still be absurd to say that his conscience chided me for my

behavior." (Ryle, *ibid*) For my self-interest, I had better to choose the former, for the man may kill me if I blame him for his wrongdoing. But the conduct really strikes my conscience. I imagine what will happen if I keep silence: the house will be on fire, my neighbor and their children will be burned, etc. My conscience cannot be morally indifferent and unmoved towards the conduct. It commands me to blame and to stop the person's doing. Can't one's conscience disapprove the conduct of others?

Ryle may object to this by saying that it is my stopping the man set fire to my neighbor's house is a matter of my conscience, not my blame of the conduct. But, the fact is that the act of interfering cannot be separated from the blame of another: my stopping the man set fire to my neighbor's house cannot be separated from my blame of the conduct. It is absurd for me to stop the man set fire to my neighbor's house without disapproving it. So my blame of the conduct is a matter of my conscience.

Ryle might further object that my intervention in the above situation is not solely due to my conscience but due to some other reasons as well, say my neighbor's wife is my best friend. Then, my case that one's conscience can disapprove the conduct of others is not very convincing. Let us consider another case. Suppose John is having his holiday oversea. He needs to exchange his money into foreign currency. So, he is walking into a bank and just about to ask for some information from a bank teller. Suddenly, a robber is coming into the bank, pointing a pistol at another bank teller and demanding a large amount of money. John, as a foreign traveler, could choose to keep silence and watch the robber fleeing away with money. But John, judging by his conscience that the robber is doing something morally wrong and ignoring the dangerous situation, jumps over to the robber and taking his pistol off from his hand. From this example, we can see that one's conscience can disapprove the conduct of others purely out of altruism.

There are so many cases in our moral life in which our conscience disapproves some conduct of others, even if the conduct is approved by authority, or tradition or culture. Since one's conscience can disapprove the conduct of others, it can, therefore, make judgments about the

rightness or wrongness of the conduct of others. It should be noted that, however, not every judgment on the conduct of others is a judgment of one's conscience. Only if the judgments can direct one to act and one will feel compunction if one fails to act, one's judgments on the conduct of others are judgments of one's conscience. If I only deliver a judgment on the person who is setting fire on my neighbor's house, but feel no obligation to stop him doing it or have no guilt-feeling for my failing to stop him doing it, my judgment is not a judgment of my conscience. But if I not only deliver judgment on his conduct but also take it as my obligation to stop him doing that, my judgment on his conduct is a judgment of my conscience.

In the above, I have argued that one's conscience can disapprove the conduct of others by appealing to the phenomenology of conscience. If my argument is successful, Ryle's position that one's conscience cannot make judgment about the conduct of others fails.

Although Ryle does not hold that one's conscience can make judgments about the conduct of others, he holds that, nevertheless, one's conscience can make judgments on the conduct of the owner of that conscience. Grave disagrees with Ryle here: "If conscience makes such judgments at all, it was argued just now, they cannot be limited to the actions of the owner of the conscience", for "if it would be wrong for me to do whatever it is, it would be wrong for anyone to do it-anyone whose circumstances are not relevantly different from mine." And since one's conscience cannot deliver judgments of any kind on the conduct of others—not on the rightness or wrongness of what they are doing any more than on their justifiability or culpability in doing it. I can pass these judgments of course on the conduct of others; the conceptually circumscribed 'part' of myself that is my conscience cannot (Grave, *ibid.* p. 19). Therefore, the conclusion was drawn that conscience makes no judgments as to the rightness or wrongness of action (Grave, *ibid.* P. 20).

Grave's argument is based upon the etymological conception of conscience. Etymologically, he says, one's conscience is one's inward consciousness. It cannot, conceptually, apply to the conduct of others. Therefore, conscience makes no judgments at all. In Part One of this

chapter, we have seen that, etymologically, the word 'conscience' does not merely connate knowledge about oneself, but also knowledge about others.

In reply to Ryle, I have already argued that it is not a good reason to argue that one's conscience cannot make judgments on the conduct of others purely on the etymological grounds. Now, I argue that even if on the etymological conception as Grave understands, one's conscience can make judgments about the rightness or wrongness of the conduct of others. First, let me make the distinction between judgment about the blameworthiness or blamelessness of action and judgments about the rightness or wrongness of action.[104] To judge about the blameworthiness or praiseworthiness of an action, we need to look into the doer's motivations or reasons for the action; while to make judgments about the rightness or wrongness of an action, we do not need to look into the doer's motivations or reasons. We only need to look at the action itself. If the action complies with the moral principles that we accept we judge it as morally right; if it violates them we judge it as morally wrong, without referring to the doer's motivations or reasons. Take an example. A husband killed his wife. When we judge whether the act is blameworthy or not, we appeal to his motivation or reason: if he killed his wife out of the motive that he wanted to stop his wife suffering from serious disease, the act is less blameworthy or even not blameworthy at all;[105] if the man killed his wife out of the motive that he wanted to marry another woman, the act is blameworthy. While, when we judge whether the act is morally right or wrong, we do not appeal to his motivation, etc. What we appeal to is our moral principle and the act itself. Our moral principle says that killing is morally wrong. So we judge the man's killing his wife as morally wrong without respect to his motive. Now, if conscience is one's inward consciousness, there is a good reason, as Grave says, why one's conscience does not deliver judgments of the first kind, a condemnatory judgment on someone else: I can look into myself as I cannot look into

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[104] When he remarks Ryle's view that we limit the verdicts of conscience to judgments about the rightness or wrongness of the acts only the owner of that conscience, Grave seems aware of the need to make the distinction between a judgment about the blameworthiness or the blamelessness of action and a judgment about the rightness or the wrongness of action (Grave, 1989, p. 18). But he didn't actually keep the distinction.

[105] I am not arguing for euthanasia here. The point I try to make here is that if a person kills someone out of a good motive(s) s/he is less culpable than out of a bad motive(s).

you, and it might be that what I find inexcusable in my self would be excusable in you. (Grave, *ibid.* p. 18) But from this it cannot be drawn that one's conscience cannot deliver judgments about the rightness or wrongness of the conduct of others, for to judge the rightness or wrongness of actions of others, one's conscience does not need to look into others' motivations, intentions or reasons but at the moral principles that the owner of that conscience accepts and the action itself. Certainly, one's conscience can do this. One's conscience judges the rightness or wrongness of actions of others in the same way by which it judges the rightness or wrongness of one's own actions. So, the argument that conscience makes no judgments as to the rightness or wrongness of action fails.

In the final analysis, to determine whether conscience has a function in making judgments about the rightness or wrongness of one's own conduct and the conduct of others, one should look at the phenomenology of moral experience, rather than at etymology or locutions, although the latter reflect, to some extent, the phenomenology. The phenomenology reveals to us that one's conscience has a function in making judgment about the rightness or wrongness of one's own conduct and the conduct of others. So, an adequate conception of moral conscience must reflect this aspect. Making moral judgments is one of the important characteristics of conscience. If one's conscience has no function in judging whether it is morally right to do it before (or after) the performance of a course of action, but merely follows traditional or dominant moral ideas without critical re-evaluation of them, it is hardly called a conscience, but a Freudian superego.

To say that one's conscience has a function in making moral judgments or moral decisions, however, is not to say that one's conscience is the source of one's moral knowledge nor that its judgments are infallible. According to the conception argued here, conscience, in the cognitive sense, is an ability to distinguish what is morally right and what is morally wrong. The criterion by which conscience distinguishes the rightness or wrongness of an action does not come from one's conscience itself. Just as the exercises of one's other abilities, such as reasoning, remembering, etc. can be erroneous, the exercise of one's conscience can be erroneous. This conception of conscience does not undermine the claim that conscience is

authoritative, for to say that conscience is authoritative, according to this conception, is neither to say that it is the sole source of our moral knowledge nor that it is infallible, but that it is a final judgment or decision, all things considered.

In the above, I have argued, from the phenomenology of moral experience, that conscience involves making moral judgments.

b) Conscience also involves a sense of duty. The phenomenology of moral experience reveals to us that having a conscience involves in having the sense of duty. To have a conscience is not merely to make moral judgments but also, more importantly, to take what the judgment says as right as one's duty and to act according with it. We do not take a person, who only makes moral judgments but does not act according to what s/he judges as morally right, as a conscientious person. Use the example I gave earlier: if I am seeing a man setting fire to my neighbor's house, and I merely judge the man's conduct as morally wrong but take no action towards it, I cannot be called a conscientious person. To act according with one's moral judgment is an essential element of having a conscience.[106]

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[106]Kant stresses this point so much. For Kant, "conscience is practical reason, holding up before a man his duty for acquittal or condemnation in every case under a law" (Kant, 1785, p. 59); "conscience is a condition of all duty in general." (Kant, *ibid.* p. 66) We cannot have a conscience without having a duty, because conscience is our ability to recognize our duty and strive to act in accord with it. Because he takes the sense of duty so seriously, Kant is usually interpreted as holding that only actions which are done out of duty have moral worth, and that the sense of duty is the sole incentive to moral action, denying that natural inclinations such as sympathy, benevolence and love of good have any moral worth and can be incentives to moral action. Shiller, for example, offers an extreme interpretation that for Kant an act has moral worth only if it is done from duty in the face of contrary inclinations (cf: Oakley, 1992, p. 90). According to Henson, Kant holds that an act has moral worth only if it is done from duty, but only when one acts without any cooperating inclinations present is action done from duty (cf: Oakley, *ibid*). According to Herman, Kant does not claim that acting from duty involves the absence of cooperating inclinations. What Kant holds is that as long as it is duty that actually moves one to act, the act has moral worth, regardless of whether cooperating inclinations are present (Oakley, *ibid.* p. 91). I agree with Grebel that for Kant only the sense of duty can be a sufficient incentive to the right action, because men do not have perfect holy wills (which are necessarily in accord with the moral law) and their natural inclinations may lead them to do the wrong if they act only out of them. If one acts out of duty one can consistently do what one judges as morally right and avoid the wrong even if one's natural inclinations do not favor or contradict the action (Grebel, *ibid.* p. 104). However, Kant does not hold that moral actions are always in opposition to our natural inclinations (Kant, 1785, p. 51). He argues that benevolent and loving inclinations are an aid to the doing of good actions and to the development of good moral character, and that we have a duty to cultivate our inclinations accordingly. (Kant, *ibid*, pp. 112-144.)

From the phenomenology of conscience we can see that a sense of duty involves two elements: (1) recognizing what one's duty is; (2) willing or having a disposition to do the duty.[107] If one has a sense of duty to perform a course of action that one judges as morally right or wrong, psychologically, one *will* or has a disposition to perform that course of action. It is paradoxical if one has a sense of duty to perform a course of action but does not will or has no disposition to do it. Having a sense of duty is not merely recognizing what one's duty is, but being disposed to act accordingly. Thus, an adequate conception of conscience must involve the two elements of sense of duty.

According to Grebel, the conative aspect, that is, willing or having a disposition, is not involved in the sense of duty. The reason for this is that a judgment of moral obligation does not logically entail a conation to act accordingly: "The 'externalist' moral philosophers are correct, it seems to me, in their insistence that to make a moral judgment is one thing, but to have the will or disposition to act in accord with that judgment is quite another. Certainly a judgment of moral obligation does not logically entail a sufficient motivation to act accordingly, and it seems to me doubtful that a judgment of moral obligation psychologically entails a sufficient motivation." (Grebel, *ibid.* pp. 108-109)

As I have shown above a sense of duty must include the conative element–the disposition or will to act in accord with what one judges as his moral duty. I agree with Grebel that the internalist position is incorrect because a judgment of moral obligation does not logically entail a motivation for acting. This is because making a judgment only needs pure reason and does not necessarily involve will or volition. But to assert that *having a sense of duty* involves having a will or disposition to act accordingly does not commit one to the internalist

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[107] I have folded moral resolve into the sense of duty, because, phenomenologically, the sense of duty has two components: a) to recognizing the duty; b) having a desire or will to perform the duty. If we treated moral resolve separately from the sense of duty, it would not be phenomenologically adequate because the former is an essential constituent of the latter. Phenomenologically, the recognition of a duty and the desire to perform the duty in the sense of duty are linked together. For example, when a parent recognizes that it is his/her duty to provide best possible education for his/her children, he/she will have, spontaneously, the desire to perform the duty, even if there are difficulties which prevent the parent to perform the duty. The recognition of and the desire to perform the duty is phenomenologically inseparable. Also, I think that without moral resolve the sense of duty will lose its paramount significance in morality.

position. Only if one asserts that to have *a duty* involves having a will or disposition to act accordingly, is one committed to the internalist position. It seems to me that Grebel confuses having a duty with having a sense of duty here. There is a distinction between having a duty and having a sense of duty.[108] Having a duty does not necessarily involve a conation. It may be merely an intellectual apprehension of the duty. But having a sense of duty necessarily involves a conation, that is, a will or a disposition to act accordingly. Take an example. If I say: "I have a duty to look after my aged mother", I may merely state a fact that I am obliged to do it. Perhaps, psychologically, I do not want to do it, for the duty may prevent me enjoying my own life. But if I say: "I have a sense of duty to look after my aged mother", I do not merely state that I have a duty to do it, but also that I am disposed to act accordingly. Grebel defends Kant's position that only the sense of duty can be sufficient motivation to moral action (Grebel, *ibid.* pp. 102-103). But if the sense of duty, for Grebel, does not involve a conation and merely an intellectual apprehension of moral obligation, he fails to defend Kant's position, for how can the sense of duty be a sufficient motivation to moral action if it does not involve a conation? Thus, the conative aspect of conscience must be involved in the sense of duty in an adequate conception of conscience.

c) Conscience involves moral emotion. The phenomenology of moral experience reveals to us that conscience has an emotional dimension, which is manifested as empathy, guilt, shame, remorse, etc. A truly conscientious person not only judges whether it is moral right or wrong before performing a course of action and has a sense of duty to do the right and avoid the wrong, but also has the emotion of guilt or remorse after failing to do (or avoid) the right (or the wrong). We do not take a person, who has done something that is morally wrong, but does not feel shame, guilty or remorse, as a truly conscientious person, even if s/he has a moral sense and the sense of duty.

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[108]Hare made a distinction between having a sense of duty and having a duty: "to say the former is to make a statement of psychological fact; to say the latter is to make a value-judgment." Hare rightly sees that the conative element is involved in having a sense of duty, not in having a duty. But Hare denies that having a sense of duty implies recognizing what one's duty is: "a man who has been brought up in an Army family, but has been affected by pacifism, may well say 'I have a strong feeling that I ought to fight for my country, but I wonder whether I really ought.' " (Hare, 1964, pp. 165-166) It seems to me that the *ought* in this case is not a *moral* ought. A moral ought should involve recognizing what one's duty is.

Moral emotions are inseparable from moral sense and the sense of duty in one's conscience—if one sincerely believes that a course of action is morally wrong and has a sense of duty to avoid it, one would have certain moral emotions, such as guilt, remorse, or compunction, etc. if s/he has failed to avoid it. We do not take a person, who has failed to avoid a course of action that is morally wrong, but does not feel shame, guilt or remorse, as a truly conscientious person, even if s/he has a moral sense and the sense of duty. Take an example. A soldier was ordered to kill an innocent civilian. He considered that it was morally wrong to kill the civilian and felt a sense of obligation to avoid the killing. But, his intention to avoid killing the civilian was discovered by his commander and he had to shoot the civilian in front of the commander. After the killing, the soldier had no feelings of compunction or regret because he thought that he did try to avoid it. We do not regard the soldier as a truly conscientious person, do we? A truly conscientious person would feel regret for her/his failing to avoid the killing because s/he would envisage a possibility in which the civilian could be saved. For a truly conscientious person, even if s/he is absolved from the responsibility for her/his failing to avoid doing something morally wrong, s/he would still feel regret for a period of time, perhaps at a less intensive degree, but the emotion does not disappear immediately, simply because of her/his involvement in the event which has caused grave suffering to others.

Some philosophers have argued that our feeling of guilt will disappear if we ourselves are absolved from responsibility for the suffering we have brought to someone. Jiwei Ci, for example, has argued for this:

> In this case, the victims may go on suffering, and we may continue to feel for them, but our conscience will have ceased to trouble us. And it would be idle to pretend that this will not come to us as a relief, regardless of whether there has been any improvement in the victims' situation. (Jiwei Ci, 1991, p. 49)

I think Jiwei Ci's argument is not morally sustainable. Certainly, for a truly conscientious

person, her/his conscience will still trouble her/him, feeling regret for her/his action as well as sorrow for the suffering caused to the victim. This is because absolution from responsibility for the suffering s/he has brought to others can only eliminate the blameworthiness of her/his action and it does not eliminate her/his involvement in the incident which has caused suffering to others and put her/him in the place of an observer. Absolution from responsibility may reduce the degree of feeling, but it does not eliminate it immediately. Otherwise, our moral character needs to be questioned. Bernard Williams has persuasively argued for this:

> A lorry drive who, though no fault of his, runs over a child, will feel differently from any spectator. People will try, in comforting him, to move the driver from this state of feeling, move him from where he is to something more like the place of a spectator. But some doubt would be felt about a driver who too blandly or readily moved to that position. We feel sorry for the driver, but that sentiment co-exists with, indeed presupposes, that there is something that cannot merely be eliminated by the consideration that it was not his fault. (Williams, 1981, p. 28)[109]

We can see that, from Williams' example, absolution from responsibility for suffering caused to others does not immediately eliminate a conscientious person's feelings of guilty, regret, etc. Imagine that Williams' lorry driver, after he ran over the child, didn't feel guilty or regret at all, but a bit of pity for the child, a bit of sympathy for the parents and a bit of relief for himself because he was absolved from responsibility. Do we think the lorry driver is a conscientious person? Certainly not. If the driver is a conscientious person, he cannot just feel like an observer and enjoy his luck for his absolution from responsibility, and he must feel compunction or regret. These emotions are sustained by his involvement in the incident, not by his absolution from responsibility, so, they are appropriate and genuine

[109]Bernard Williams terms this type of feeling which a person feels towards his own involuntary action as 'agent-regret'. Sentiments of agent-regret are different from regret in general, such as might be felt by a spectator (Williams, 1981. p. 28).

moral emotions.

Although he distinguishes agent-regret from remorse, Williams does not identify it with the regret felt by the spectators and admits it as a type of appropriate moral emotion (Williams, 1981, pp. 29-30).

There is a philosophical view that those moral feelings that people have towards their own actions are irrational. Rawls, for example, advocates that "a rational individual is always to act so that he need never blame himself no matter how things finally transpire." (Rawls, 1979, p. 422) I think that this view cannot be morally justified. A moral being should feel shame, guilt, or remorse towards her/his wrongdoing. Without such feelings, s/he would not be a morally being. As Kant says:

> no man is devoid of all moral feeling; for if he were totally unsusceptible to this sensation, he would be morally dead. And if (to speak in the language of physicians) the moral vital force could no longer produce any effect on this feeling, then his humanity would be dissolved (as if by chemical laws) into mere animality, and would be irretrievably mixed with the mass of other natural beings. (Kant, 1785, pp. 58-59)[110]

Bernard Williams makes a similar remark: one who has done wrong but has no unpleasant feeling is morally insane:

> it would be a kind of insanity never to experience sentiments of this kind towards anyone and it would be an insane concept of rationality which insisted that a rational person never would. (Williams, *ibid.* p. 29)

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[110]Kant takes moral feeling as one of natural predispositions of a moral being: "These are such moral qualities that, if one does not possess them, there can be no duty to acquire them. These are moral feeling, conscience, love of one's neighbor, and respect for oneself (self-esteem)... Though it cannot be regarded as a duty to have these predispositions, yet every man has them, and it is by means of them that he can be obliged." (Kant, 1785, pp. 57-58)

It might be that what Rawls says is suggesting that it is irrational to let ourselves get in situations where we might have to blame ourselves, not that if we do get in such situations we should not blame ourselves. Even if this is what Rawls means it is still, I think, morally unjustified. For, if we really have done something wrong, to avoid getting into situations in which we might have to blame ourselves is morally unacceptable.[111]

In his *Morality and the Emotions*, Justin Oakley (1992) has discussed the moral significance of emotions, such as love, care, sympathy, compassion, etc. and argued for the centrality of emotions in morality. I think, Oakley is right to emphasize the centrality of emotions in morality, but his discussion is incomplete. For the emotions Oakley has discussed do not include the emotions which constitute a bad conscience. This makes his argument unconvincing. One may deny the moral significance of these emotions by appealing to the fact that love, care, sympathy, compassion, etc. are not always morally good or praisable, for example, sympathy and care may not be morally good when felt towards a person known to be thoroughly evil.[112] I think Oakley should include the emotions that constitute a bad conscience in his discussion, such as shame, guilt, remorse, etc. because these emotions have paramount moral significance and play a central role in morality.

To sum up, I have argued in the above, basing on the phenomenology of moral experience, that having moral emotions, especially the emotion of guilt, shame and remorse, is a necessary condition for having a conscience.

A conception of conscience that adequately reflects the phenomenology of moral experience must, therefore, involve the following three elements:

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[111]Rawls' position can only be defended in such a case in which we haven't really done something wrong. It is irrational to let ourselves get in situations where we might have to blame ourselves in such a case.

[112]Even if love, care, compassion, etc. are always appropriate there are situations in which they require some mixture of horror at the evil that has consumed the person. In his *A Common Humanity* Gaita argues for the importance of respect in all cases but he is sensitive to just how unloveable some people can seem (Gaita, 1999, pp. 29-55).

a. moral belief;

b. sense of duty;

c. moral emotion.

Phenomenologically, these three elements are not independent mental states that happen to go together. They are interdependent and the former two elements are usually united in the latter, i.e. in the moral emotion. In the following, I am going to explain this, but before doing so, it is necessary for me first to analyze what an emotion is.

According to the 'Feeling Theory', emotions are conscious feelings of our physiological changes or bodily sensations. For Descartes, an emotion is 'a passion of the soul' and passion is the reflective awareness of the activities of the animal spirits in the body (Descartes, 1649, part I, art 27). William James identifies emotions as bodily sensations: "My theory...is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion."(James, 1893, vol. II, p. 499) For James, it is impossible to have any strong emotion without having the appropriate bodily sensations.

The feeling theory, I think, is correct in asserting that one cannot have a certain emotion without having a certain feeling. If someone is in an emotional state, say, love, s/he must have a certain feeling. But the feeling is not necessarily, as the feeling theory insists, bodily feeling. It may be psychic feeling. A psychic feeling is a non-bodily feeling, such as, the mentally buoyed feeling in joy or the mentally drained feeling in despair (Oakley, 1992, p. 10; also, M. Stocker, 1983, p. 5). The emotion of love, say, does not only involve physiological changes or bodily sensations, but also mental joy, satisfaction, etc.

Some philosophers, e.g. E. Bedford (1962), G. Pitcher (1965), R. Solomon (1973) and J. Neu (1977), Oakley (1992), etc. deny the role of feelings in emotions. All of them think that feeling is neither necessary nor sufficient for an emotion. E. Bedford, for example, takes all emotions as dispositional emotions and argues that no feeling is involved in dispositional emotions (Bedford, *ibid.* pp.110-111). When we are in love with someone, for instance, we

need not, indeed cannot, have feelings of love every moment (Oakley, *ibid.* p. 8).

In disagreeing with Bedford, I hold that not all emotional states are dispositional. Emotions, primarily, are episodic or occurrent states in which feelings are necessary. It is true that we do not always have bodily feelings every moment when we are in love with someone over a long time. But we do have certain psychic feelings over that period of time, such as joyful, optimistic feelings (in the case of loving, we have such feelings as manifested in our care, concern or interest in our beloved ones). If we have no feeling at all over that period of time, we cannot be said having the emotion of love.

One may raise objections to my position here: consider a man who is absorbed in his work all day and does not think of his beloved wife at all for eight hours. He has no feeling at all towards his wife during that time, yet still loves his wife; consider another man who has a severe migraine headache lasting 36 hours. He has no feeling at all towards his wife during that time, yet still love his wife. Therefore, feelings are not an essential component of emotion.

What I am arguing here is that, when the object of love is appearing in her/his consciousness, if a person doesn't have appropriate feelings at all over a significant period of time towards the object, s/he cannot be said to be having the emotion of love. Consider the man who is absorbed in his work all day and does not think of his beloved wife at all for eight hours. In this case, the man has no appropriate feelings towards his beloved wife during that time because his mind is wholly occupied by his work and the object of his love does not appear in his consciousness. But let's suppose that during the eight hours his wife rang him and told him how much she loved him. At this moment, a vivid mental picture of his loving wife was appearing in his consciousness. Now, should the man have certain appropriate feelings towards his wife if he loves his wife at all? In the case of someone who is having a severe migraine headache for 36 hours, the person has no appropriate feelings towards the object of her/his love because her/his body does not function properly during that time. When I say that if a person has no appropriate feelings towards certain

object s/he cannot be said to be having the emotion of love towards that object I presuppose the person is in physically and psychologically normal conditions.[113]

From above discussion, we can conclude that feelings are an essential component of emotion and without them we cannot experience emotion.

However, feeling is only necessary, not sufficient, for an emotion. Merely experiencing a certain feeling is not having a certain emotion. We may undergo the same physiological changes or bodily sensations in having what are clearly different emotions. For example, merely experiencing palpitation is not having the emotion of fear. One may experience palpitation when one has the emotion of love. Only if there is a circumstance in which one believes that there is something which is fearful, is one's palpitation the emotion of fear. And we may have the same bodily changes in having what are commonly agreed not to be emotions. When we feel extremely hungry, for example, we may experience palpitation. Certainly, hunger is not an emotion. So, an emotion cannot be merely identified with our conscious feeling of physiological changes or bodily sensations.

Some philosophical behaviorists, for example, O. H. Green (1972), explain emotions in terms of typical behavioral responses. According to Green, typical behaviours are the expressions of certain emotions and the link between emotions and such typical behaviour is conceptual one. Therefore, we can define emotions in terms of typical behaviours: "...it is necessary that emotion terms are defined by reference to a person's behaviour in certain circumstances." (Green, 1970, p. 552)[114] Thus, the emotion of anger, according to them, can be explained by the behavior of pounding tables, slamming doors, etc. The difficulty for this theory is that the pattern of behavior cannot account for various emotions, for characteristic behavior patterns are neither necessary nor sufficient for an emotion. To be angry with

[113]There might be a further objection to my position here: suppose a person A has a tendency to feel love about B but her/his tendency is not manifested for a long time. Isn't that still love? My answer to the objection is: if there is no feeling involved, either bodily or psychic feeling, A's tendency indicates only her/his liking, not love, towards B. Although liking can be developed into love but itself is not love.

[114]Green modified his position later and admitted that some emotions are not characterized by purposive behaviour, such as grief, despair, sorrow, depressive emotions, etc. See: Green, 1972.

someone one does not necessarily pound tables, slam doors, etc. One does not even necessarily say anything; to be in love with someone, one does not necessarily actually embrace one's beloved. What is necessary is a certain disposition or desire to behave as such, not actually behave as such. Take an example. Suppose X is in love with Y. Unfortunately, Y is married and has a happy family. In this case, what is necessary for X to love Y is the desire to be close to Y and to do what are good for Y's well-being, not actually behave as such, for X's actual behavior as such may affect Y's marriage and family, eventually, bring pain to Y. This is not saying, however, that being in love is merely dispositional. X's being in love with Y is occurrent in the sense that there are certain occurrent feelings, either bodily or psychic feelings, over X.

Some philosophers completely deny behavioral dispositions in an emotion. Sousa, for example, argues that behavioral dispositions are neither necessary nor sufficient for the presence of any given emotion (Sousa, 1987, p. 39). I think Sousa is right to assert that behavioral dispositions are not sufficient for the presence of any given emotion; but he is wrong to assert that they are not necessary for the presence of an emotion. Using the example above, although X's behavioral dispositions such as being close with Y, caring about and doing what are good for Y's well-being, etc, are not sufficient for the emotion of love, for one may have these behavioral dispositions out of, say, sympathy, they are necessary for the emotion of love. Without these behavioral dispositions, X cannot be said to have the emotion of love towards Y.

According to the cognitive theory, an emotion involves cognition (in the form of a belief or a judgment or awareness or apprehension) and cognition is essential to the concept of emotion. For neither feeling nor behavior can distinguish one emotional state from another and emotional states from non-emotional states, but only cognition:

> The connection between cognition and emotion is conceptual, for without the appropriate cognition, we cannot (logically speaking) have a particular emotion. Indeed, if our affective state was not linked with any cognitions at all, then our

> state here would be better characterized as bodily sensation or other feeling rather than an emotion, for unlike emotions, sensations and feelings need not involve cognitions. (Oakley, 1992, p. 22)

I agree with the theory that an emotion involves cognition. Otherwise we cannot distinguish emotional states from non-emotional states, one emotional state from another and cannot give rational explanations of emotions. But the cognition, as Lyons argues (1980), is not any type of beliefs or judgments but an evaluative type. Factual beliefs do not necessarily generate emotions. Emotions are generated from the evaluative type of beliefs. Take an example: a man may firmly believe that he has killed his wife but have no emotion of guilt at all. Only if he evaluates his doing as morally wrong, can he have the emotion of guilt. It is the evaluation that causes him to have that emotion.

There is an argument against the cognitive theory that beliefs or judgments are essential to emotions: certain feeling still persists after the belief that causes the feeling is changed. For example, a mother is anxious about her children's safety, and remains so at the very moment of sincerely admitting that they are safe (Roberts, 1988, p. 195). I think, this example cannot counter the thesis that beliefs or judgments are essential to emotions. The anxiety the mother continues to have after she believes that her children are safe is due to the inertia of her previous belief that her children are in danger, not due to her current belief that her children are safe. A belief has an inertial force and it can persistently affect our feeling, even if we give it up and have a quite different belief. However, the inertial force of our previous belief gradually diminishes as time goes by. We can see this from the way that the strength of our feeling caused by our previous belief decreases after our belief has changed: the anxiety the mother continues to have after she believes that her children are safe is not as strong as the anxiety she experienced when she believed that her children were in danger.

There is another argument against the cognitive theory: our emotional response to fictional things, for example, figures in novels, seem to be a difficulty for the account of emotion in which belief is essential to emotion. For, in such case, the emotion responses seem not to be

founded on our belief that such and such is the case. For example, we pity Desdemona, are horrified by Oedipus' self-blinding, envious of Orpheus' musical talent, distressed by the death of Anna Karenina, or sorrow for Mercurio. These emotions clearly do not depend on a belief that the situations witnessed or described is actual (Neill, 1993, p. 5). I think our emotions towards these figures are based on our belief that these figures are extracted from actual, real life, not sheer fabricated. Otherwise, we would not have genuine emotions towards them. These figures may stand in for all people who are in the same situations, not merely particular persons.

We have seen from the above that beliefs of the evaluative sort are essential to emotions. But, some philosophers go to the extreme and give a purely cognitive account of emotions: emotions are some kind of evaluative judgment or belief or combination of beliefs and desires. Solomon, for example, argues that "emotions are judgments." (Solomon, 1973, p. 257) "My anger is my judgment that John has wronged me." (Solomon, *ibid*, p. 258) I think that an emotion cannot be merely a belief or a judgment. There must be a feeling of certain sort involved in it.[115] My judgment that John has wronged me cannot be the emotion of anger unless my body is undergoing certain physiological changes and I desire to act against John. My belief that there is a snake in front of me that is dangerous to me cannot be the emotion of fear unless my heart is palpitating, my muscles are getting tighter and I have the desire to flee away.

In conclusion, from the above analysis we have seen that an emotion is a dynamic complex of belief, feeling and desire. Merely belief (or feeling or desire) cannot account for emotion. Thus, an adequate account of emotion must include these three components.

Now, moral emotions are typically the complex of cognition, feeling and desire. Having a certain moral emotion is having a certain bodily or psychic feeling with certain moral beliefs and desires. Having the emotion of guilt, for example, is undergoing such feelings as pangs, twinges, etc. with the belief that something that is morally wrong has been done and the

desire not to do it again.

Some philosophers have argued that occurrent feeling is not necessary for emotions of shame, guilt, remorse, etc. David H. Jones, for example, advocates this position. In rejecting the Freudian identification of moral feelings, such as shame, guilt and remorse, with non-moral feelings, such as anxiety, tension and dread, Jones argues that moral feelings are different from non-moral feelings in that the former involve moral beliefs while the latter does not involve any belief (moral or otherwise); and the actual presence of occurrent-feeling or sensation are necessary for attribution of non-moral feelings while not necessary for attribution of moral feelings.[116] For example, the feeling of guilt, according to Jones, only involves a *disposition* to have unpleasant occurrent-feelings. The presence of such a disposition is a necessary condition for the attribution of the feeling of guilt, but the actual presence of occurrent-feelings, is neither necessary nor sufficient for attributing the feeling of guilt (Jones, 1973, p. 106).[117] Jones takes moral feelings such as shame, guilt, and remorse as generic dispositions. Generic dispositions—Jones appeals to Ryle—signify abilities, tendencies or proneness to do, not things of one unique kind, but things of lots of different kinds. It is not necessary that there are certain acts or states corresponding to them. According to Jones, most of our feeling concepts are such generic-disposition concepts. A person is said to feel patriotic, for example, not merely because it may be true that he tends to swell with pride when the national anthem is played, but also (perhaps) because he has a tendency to defend the foreign policy of his country when it is attacked. Thus, many feeling-concepts include the notions of 'feeling like doing this, that, or the other kind of thing.'

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[115] In any case no paradigm of emotion is without feeling.

[116] Jones should have used 'moral emotions', instead of 'moral feelings', to denote shame, guilt or remorse, etc. For shame, guilt or remorse, etc. are emotions rather than merely feelings. Merely feelings are neither moral nor immoral but non-moral. Only emotions can be said moral or immoral. And emotions, rather than feelings, involve beliefs. However, for convenience, sometimes I follow Jones' terminology.

[117] This view can be traced back to John Rawls. In his *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls argues that the characteristic sensations and manifestations are neither necessary nor sufficient in particular instances for someone to feel guilty, ashamed, or indignant. To have these feelings it is often sufficient that a person sincerely say that he feels guilty, ashamed or indignant, and that he is prepared to give an appropriate explanation of why he feels as he does (assuming of course that he accepts this explanation as correct). However, Rawls admits that some characteristic sensations and behavioral manifestations of disturbance may be necessary if one is to be overwhelmed by feelings of guilt, shame, or indignation (Rawls, 1979, p. 481).

(Jones, *ibid.* p. 104) Thus, when we attribute the feeling of guilt or shame to a person we are attributing to him a highly generic disposition to do or to experience a number of different kinds of things. The actual occurrent-feelings are not necessary for the attribution (Jones, *ibid.* p.105).

I agree with Jones that moral feelings are different from non-moral feelings in that the former involve moral beliefs while the latter does not, but not that the former only involves a disposition to have certain occurrent feelings, not the actual presence of the occurrent feelings. We can see that Jones' account of emotion is based on the behavioral dispositions. But behavioral dispositions, as we have seen above, are not sufficient for an emotion. When one feels guilty one may, say, feel like being punished. But the behavioral disposition alone cannot constitute the emotion of guilt. What are required to constitute the emotion are one's belief that one has done something morally wrong and one's unpleasant occurrent feeling. It is because one experiences the unpleasant occurrent feeling that one has a tendency to do something. So moral emotions are not generic dispositions to which there is no actual presence of occurrent feelings corresponding. Moral emotions involve, necessarily, the actual presence of occurrent feelings. When one feels guilty, one must have certain occurrent feeling, such as, pangs, twinges, etc. Without the actual presence of such feeling, one does not genuinely feel guilty. The actual presence of the occurrent feeling is a necessary condition for attribution of the feeling of guilt. Take an example: suppose I have wronged someone. I had no unpleasant occurrent feeling at all about my wrongdoing, but I said to the person "I feel guilty about my wrong doing to you." Can I be correctly attributed as having the emotion of guilt? Certainly not.

In the final analysis, the actual presence of the occurrent feeling is a necessary condition for attribution of the feeling of guilt. It is the occurrent feelings such pangs, twinges, etc. which indicates that I have the emotion of guilt. It is the occurrent feelings, combined with the belief that I have done something morally wrong which motivate me to will not to do the wrong again.

A moral emotion does not merely involve bodily feelings or psychic feelings. It involves beliefs of the evaluative sort. Moral emotions, such as guilt, shame or remorse, are especially tied to beliefs. They necessarily involve a belief of the evaluative sort that something morally wrong has been done. The emotion of guilt, for example, does not merely involve such feelings as pangs, twinge, etc. It also involves one's belief that one has done something which one sincerely believes is morally wrong. It is inappropriate to call the pangs or twinges one felt as the emotion of guilt unless one believes that one has done something which one sincerely believes is morally wrong. To borrow Jones' example, if Paul experiences unpleasant occurrent feelings or sensations when confronted by Mary, there is no justification for asserting that he feels guilty unless it is assumed or known that he believes he has done something which he sincerely believes is morally wrong, and so on (Jones, *ibid.* p. 104). Thus, one's belief that one has done something that one sincerely believes to be morally wrong is a necessary condition for attributing the emotion of guilt.

The emotion of guilt also involves the desire or disposition not to do again what one sincerely believes as morally wrong. That is, it involves a sense of duty not to do the wrong again. It is impossible that one has such a feeling as pangs or twinges and believes that one has done something that one sincerely takes as morally wrong while one has no disposition not to do the wrong again. If Paul believes he has done something morally wrong to Mary and feels guilty, he must have a disposition not to do the wrong to Mary again. The guilt-feeling and the belief provide a motive for Paul not to do it again. Thus, one's genuine emotion of guilt is such a feeling as pangs or twinges, united with one's belief that one has done something that one sincerely believes as morally wrong and with the sense of duty not to do the wrong again.

We have seen from the above that a moral emotion involves three components: feeling, evaluative belief and disposition. These components are not separated and they are causally and logically related. When one feels guilty, for example, the guilt-feeling the agent has is caused by her/his belief that s/he has done something morally wrong and her/his belief and the remorse-feeling cause her/him to be disposed not do it again. Also, moral emotions are

intentional states which are about or towards or directed at actions believed by the agent as morally wrong. If one feels guilty, one's guilt-feeling must be about something one sincerely believes that it is morally wrong and that one has done it. One cannot have the feeling without the belief and, in turn, cannot have the disposition not to do it again without the belief and the feeling. Thus, the three components are causally and logically related in a moral emotion.

In the above, I have argued for the conception of moral conscience which involves three components: moral belief, moral duty and moral emotion and showed that the three components of moral conscience are such combined together as a unity. In the following, I am going to consider some objections to the three-fold conception of conscience.

Part Four: Objections to the Three-Fold Conception of Conscience

There are some philosophers, for example, Peter Fuss, who argue against the three-fold conception of conscience. Fuss' direct target is Broad. According to Broad, Conscience is "a system of cognitive, emotional, and conative dispositions, and it is only when these dispositions are in operation that we have conscientious action." (Broad, 1973, p. 8) At first, Fuss thinks that the claim that conscience is a cognitive disposition is problematic:

> If by 'disposition' is meant 'inclination', then conscience is more properly called a conative disposition. If 'disposition' means 'tendency', as Broad seems to intend, then he is failing to note the distinction between actual moral discernment on the one hand, and a mere tendency to have such discernments on the other. (Fuss, 1973, p. 41)

To determine whether Broad's claim that conscience is a cognitive disposition is problematic, we need to look at the meaning of the word 'disposition'. The word 'disposition' has two sense: a tendency or inclination to behave in a certain way; an ability to do something which one is not necessarily actually doing. One has a certain disposition to do

something, in the latter sense, means that one is able to do it at any time if one wants to do it, not a merely tendency or inclination. What Broad means 'disposition', I think, is in the latter sense–an ability to do something. Now, to say conscience is a cognitive disposition is to say conscience is an ability to discern what is morally right and what is morally wrong. That is, one's conscience can actually discern moral values if it chooses to do it. Thus, there is no problem with the claim that conscience is a cognitive disposition.

Having attacked the claim that conscience is a cognitive disposition, Fuss then argues against the claim that conscience is cognitive, conative and emotive. According to Fuss, firstly, the claim that conscience is cognitive implies that conscience is a faculty or source of moral knowledge. But conscience is not in any usual sense a faculty or source of moral knowledge. Of itself it does not tell the agent what is right or wrong, good or evil, either in individual concrete instances or as a matter of principle (Fuss, *ibid.* p. 43); second, conscience has no emotive aspect, for conscience merely occasions feelings of remorse and guilt, approval and esteem and it is not constituted by these feelings. If conscience is a feeling of guilt, approbation, etc., then not only is it not a faculty or source of moral knowledge, it is not even a faculty or source of distinctively moral sentiment. It is extremely difficult to distinguish, psychologically, authentic 'pangs of conscience' from feelings not generally regarded as moral, such as feelings of guilt or shame at having violated rules of propriety, custom, or etiquette. But if conscience merely occasions these feelings there is no reason to ascribe to it as such an emotive aspect or character.

On the first point, as I have already argued, phenomenologically, conscience is cognitive: it distinguishes what is morally right and what is morally wrong. To say that conscience is cognitive, in this sense, does not imply that conscience is an entitive cognitive faculty and the sole source of moral knowledge, but a cognitive ability. On the second point, as I have already argued, moral conscience necessarily involves moral emotions, such as guilt, shame and remorse, rather than occasioning these emotions. Since the claim that conscience is cognitive does not necessarily imply that conscience is a cognitive faculty, the claim that conscience is emotive does not violate the claim that conscience is cognitive. Since moral

emotions are dynamic complexes of cognition, feeling and desire, not merely feelings, we can distinguish authentic 'pangs of conscience' from feelings at violating rules of propriety, custom or etiquette by appealing to the cognition and desire involved. Only if emotions are identified with feelings, is it difficult to distinguish moral feelings from non-moral feelings.

To sum up, in this chapter, I have reviewed the etymology and various conceptions of conscience, and argued that, based on moral phenomenology, conscience involves moral belief, sense of duty and moral emotion. An adequate conception of conscience must, therefore, involve the three components.

Having reviewed the etymology and various conceptions of conscience in this chapter, I am going to examine Newman's conception of conscience in the next chapter to show that Newman's conception of conscience belongs to the three-fold type of conscience I have argued for in this chapter.