Appendix I: A Chronology of John Henry Newman's Life [277]

February 21, 1801-- born at Old Broad Street in the city of London.

April 9th, 1801-- baptised in the church of St. Benet Fink.

May 1, 1808--sent to a private school at Ealing, which was run by Dr. Nicholas of Wadham College, Oxford. He remained at Ealing until he went up to Trinity College.

December 14, 1816--entered into Trinity College.

1818--elected as a Scholar of Trinity.

April 12, 1822--received the Oriel Fellowship, which was the turning-point in Newman's early life. [278]

1824--ordained in the Church of England.

1824-1826--greatly influenced by the Oriel noetics, especially Richard Whately.

-----appointed as Vice-Principal of Alban Hall.

1826--appointed as one of the public tutors of Oriel and resigned the curacy of St. Clement.

-----delivered "The University Sermons".

January 1828--lost his sister Mary. The event made an epoch in his life and greatly developed his religious nature.

1828-- made the Vicar of St Mary's at Oxford.

1828-1832--developed a close friendship with Hurrel Froude.

1828--started writing *History of the Arians* and *Essay on Development.*

1831--was selected as a preacher to the University of Oxford.

1832--resigned his tutorship after a dispute over the religious duties of a tutor.

June 1832--completed *The Arians of the Fourth Century.*

December 1832--travelled with Hurrel Froude to the Mediterranean, which had great impact on his later life. During his trip, he wrote "Lead, kindly Light" and some other hymns.

September 1833--started writing the *Tracts for the Times* and led the "Oxford Movement",

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[277] The sources I used here are mainly from Ward (1912) and Dessain (1980).

[278] According to W. Ward, Newman's career at Oriel may be divided into three periods: (1) the period of the development of his mind (before 1824); (2) the period of influences by Whately (1824 to 26): (3) the period of leadership of the Oxford Movement (1833 to 1841). See Ward (1912).

[279] which marked the third and last period of his Anglican career.

1836--took the editorship of the "British Critic" which was the organ of the Tractarian Party.

-----delivered "The Parochial Sermons" at St. Mary's, which were the main instrument of Newman's influence on the Oxford Movement.

-----Hurrel Froude died. The event had a great impact on Newman.

-----built a chapel at the village of Littlemore, Parish of St. Mary's.

1837--delivered lectures "Via Media".

1838--W. G. Ward and Frederick Oakley Joined the Tractarian Party in a spirit of avowed admiration for Rome. After joining the Tractarian Party, Ward rapidly became intimate with Newman.

-----delivered *Lectures on Justification.*

1840--began to lose faith in Anglicanism and considered accepting Catholicism.

-----developed the chapel at Littlemore and intended to erect a monastic house upon it.

1841--edited the English translation of Aquinas' *Catena Aurea: Commentary on the Four Gospels Collected out of the Works of the Fathers.*

February 1841--published *Tract 90* to demonstrate that the foundation of faith of the Church of England, the Thirty-nine Articles, was consistent with Catholicism. This event brought his Anglican period to the end. [280]

April 19, 1842-- moved to his cottage at Littlemore.

September 18, 1843--resigned the Vicarage of St. Mary's. He believed the Roman Catholic Church to be the Church of the Apostles.

September 25, 1843--preached his last sermon as an Anglican: "The Parting of Friends" at

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[279]The Oxford Movement started in 1833 and lasted to 1850s. It was a religious movement launched by Anglican clergymen at Oxford University to reform the Church of England by reviving certain Roman Catholic doctrines and rituals. The spirit of the movement was Anglo-Catholicism, which advocates the restoration of ancient Roman Catholic practices in the Church of England abandoned since the Reformation. Newman was a key leader of the movement. The other leaders of the Oxford Movement were Froude, Keble, Palmer and Pusey. Their views were published in a serious of tracts titled *Tracts for the Times,* and, thus, they were called "tractarians". Cf. Ward (1912); Dessain (1980); Nockle, (1994).

[280] The affair of Tract 90 was a crisis in Newman's life. The Bishop of Oxford sent a formal message objecting to the Tract and advising the suspension of the series of 'Tracts for the Times'. After this event, Newman's position at Oxford became difficult. To remain an Anglican with his views appeared to him a paradox. See: Ward (1912).

Littlemore. [281]

1844--started writing "Development of Christian Doctrine" and resolved to complete it before the change of communion.

1845--his Anglican life was over and his connection with Oxford Movement was at the end.

-----published *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine.*

October 3, 1845--resigned his Fellowship at Oriel.

October 8, 1845--admitted into Roman Catholic Church at the Oratory, Littlemore, which was a great step in his life.

1846--went to Rome. He was ordained and received a doctorate of divinity.

1847--came back to England with the idea of extending the Roman Catholic Church in England by means of the Oratory.

1848--founded the Oratory at Edgbaston, Birmingham and spent the rest of his life there.

-----published his religious novel *Loss and Gain: The story of a Convert.*

1850--delivered *Lectures on Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching.*

1851-- delivered *Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England.*

-----caught up with the Papal aggression and the Achilli Trial.

1851-1854--established the Catholic University of Ireland.

1854 to 1858--delivered the University Lectures.

1855-1857--devoted to the progress of the University.

1856--published *The Idea of A University.*

-----published his novel *Callista.*

1858--proposed to found a Roman Catholic hall at Oxford to provide Catholics with the advantages of Catholicism and university training. This was opposed by Henry Manning and the English hierarchy.

1864--published *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, which was resulted from the controversy over the Catholic clergy between Newman and Charles Kingsley.

1866--published his poem *The Dream of Gerontius,* which was later set to music by Sir Edward Elgar.

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[281] From this time onwards, Newman lived in seclusion at Littlemore with a group of his younger disciples in whose company he led a life of quasi-monastic discipline.

1870--published *An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent.*

1878--was awarded with an honorary fellowship by Trinity College, Oxford.

1879--Pope Leo XIII created him cardinal.

August 11, 1890--died at Edgbaston, Birmingham.

Appendix II: My Responses to Examiners

Part One: My Responses to Examiner A

General responses:

Thank you very much for your valuable time spent on commenting this thesis. I sincerely appreciate your constructive comments, which help me greatly to deepen my understanding of Newman.

Specific responses to each of the areas you have noted:

1. *First, Huang, in general, stays focused but occasionally loses the reader through overviews. For example, the overview of Sillem's material is unnecessary to substantiate the link between Newman and Reid. I was left wondering whether chapter 1 needs to rehash all of the antecedent influences or simply make the connection between Newman and Reid. Moreover, this broad venture doesn't really hone in on the specific issue of whether any of the other sources actually influence Newman's epistemology of conscience. I guess this is to be expected in a dissertation, but it eclipses the main focus of the proposal.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I agree with you that the overview of Sillem's material is not necessary to substantiate the link between Newman and Reid. However, I think Sillem's material contains a lot of first-hand, detailed and comprehensive information about the antecedent influences of Newman. I intended to introduce it as background knowledge for further study. I admit that the overview eclipses, to some extent, the main focus of my proposal. So, I am going to tailor Sillem's material in chapter 1 so that the main focus of my proposal becomes clearer.

2. *Second, the claim in chapter 1 that first principles fall under the epistemic category of foundationalism is questionable. Huang notes this problem but never fully works it out (29f.). In fact, Newman, in the Grammar, recognizes that employing first-principles in an argument among radically different people does not resolve the problem of common measure, that is, they do not provide an independent standard to adjudicate claims. Therefore, it seems problematic to couch Newman's notion of first principles in the language of foundationalism. First principles are not self-evident in the absence of a common measure and they do not themselves furnish such a foundation (see Newman's chapter on the illative sense in the Grammar).*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I admit that Newman's first principles do not fall under the epistemic category of strong foundationalism of the classical type, which requires that first principles are self-evident logically and constitute an infallible foundation of knowledge. However, I think Newman's first principles fall under the epistemic category of weak foundationalism, which does not require that first principles are self-evident logically and constitute an infallible foundation of knowledge.

Newman puts first principles in different categories and admits that some of them are self-evident and they form a solid foundation for our knowledge (*G. A.* p. 205). In addition, Newman holds that we have some fundamental beliefs about things, which are self-evident (in the sense of psychological immediacy) and we all take for granted, and they form the foundation of our knowledge (*G. A.* 71); it is necessary to assume some propositions that are intuitively true as first principles; the assumptive nature of first principle does not undermine its epistemic status (*G. A.* p. 285). This is why I interpret Newman's first principles in terms of foundationalism.

I admit the fact that Newman recognizes first principles do not resolve the problem of common measure among radically different people. But, this does not imply that Newman denies that there is a common measure about justification. Newman holds that there are

objective and absolute truths and they are attainable. Thus, he does not deny that there is a common measure about justification. What Newman denies is *logic* as the common measure and the ultimate test of truth in concrete matters (*G. A.* 205, 266, 275, 279). The final judgment and ultimate test of truth in concrete matters, according to him, is the Illative Sense (*G. A.* 262)

3. *Third, Huang rightly points out that Newman rejects evidentialism. Yet, the alternative claim that "it is not formal, explicit reasoning, but informal, implicit reasoning which is the provider of justification of religious beliefs" (148) is not as obvious. I am not sure that Newman sees implicit reason as the primary means for justifying beliefs. Rather, explicit and implicit reasoning play distinctive roles in the formation of beliefs (see Newman's discussion of simple and complex assent in the Grammar and explicit and implicit reason in the University Sermons). The key here is to remember that Newman's main contention is that explicit reasoning is not a precondition to forming rational beliefs. However, Newman sees the importance of showing how one knows what one knows through the act of complex assent. Huang is correct in arguing that the term "instinctive perception' is an immediate apprehension of an object (154). This places Newman in an externalist framework, but it is unclear whether the internalist element is absent in Newman's epistemology, especially, for example, in the category of complex assent.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I fully agree with you on the following points: a) Newman holds that implicit and explicit reasoning play distinctive roles; b) Newman's main contention is that explicit reasoning is not a precondition to forming rational beliefs; c) Newman sees the importance of showing how one knows and what one knows through the act of complex assent; and d) there are some internalist elements in Newman's epistemology. I am going to include a footnote there to highlight these points. However, I firmly believe that Newman holds that informal, implicit reasoning is the primary provider of justification in concrete matters, such as religion, for the processes of reasoning in concrete matters are so subtle, delicate and intricate that explicit reasoning alone cannot fully reflect them. In addition, explicit reasoning, according to him, is only an

account of the original process of reasoning and itself does not make a belief true (*O.U.S*, p. 259; *G. A.* pp. 136, 143). Although he admits the role of explicit reasoning in showing the reason or evidence for a belief, he sees the limit of it in concrete matters. There are many places in the *Grammar* where Newman has made the point: "The reflex assent does not immediately touch us; it is purely intellectual, and taken by itself, has scarcely more force than the recording of a conclusion". (*G. A.* pp. 16-163) "...in reasoning on any subject whatever, which is concrete, we proceed, as far indeed as we can, by the logic of language, but we are obliged to supplement it by the more subtle and elastic logic of thought; for forms by themselves prove nothing." (*G. A.* 272) For him, it is implicit reasoning, which is the original process of reasoning and it contains the grounds for a belief, that is the primary provider of justification in concrete matters, such as religion.

Newman criticises those who have confounded implicit reasoning and explicit reasoning, and have exaggerate the role of explicit reasoning in concrete matters (*O. U. S.* p. 259; *G. A.* 120). I also firmly believe that Newman's epistemology is, essentially, externalistic, for, according to him, what make a belief warranted is external and it may not be internally accessible by the believer (*O. U. S.* p. 261; *G. A.* p. 252).

I will discuss the issues you have raised on pages 153-154, and page 250.

4. *Fourth, I am not sure whether Huang's thesis adequately addresses the problem of common measure in the Grammar. I think that Newman, like Alston, would grant the epistemic circularity and claim, however, that we implicitly trust these belief-forming processes. Newman's proposal explains how the illative sense shapes the process of argumentation and makes sense of intellectual difference among people of informed judgement. Yet its personal nature creates the problem of a common measure, falling short of resolving intellectual exchanges among different people. In fact, the personal dimension of the illative sense, along with the presumptive nature of first principles, complicates the goal of achieving a common standard of justification. Cultivation of the illative sense may lead people to form different opinions about the same subject matter. The core of*

disagreement stems from acceptance of certain first principles.

Thus, Newman's focus on conscience is the move of a particularist. This might strength Huang's argument about national and real assent (169). Conscience fits Newman's overall assumption that grace complements nature. It is natural phenomenon and its sacramental mediating qualities should not be confused with the direct voice of God. The Alexandrian notion of the universe as sacramental presence undergirds Newman's overall argument (170). This is why conscience belongs both to the believer and non-believer. Newman gets accused of being an idealist but in the Grammar he has some profound realist assumptions (e.g. truth is immutable but our grasp of it is subject to change).

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I really appreciate it. I admit that I have overlooked the problem of common measure in the *Grammar*. I am going to include a detailed discussion of the issue in Part Six, Chapter 6 of my thesis (pages 264-266).

I agree with you that for Newman there is an intellectual difference of informed judgement among people due to their disagreement about certain first principles and this creates the problem of a common measure. However, I do not think that Newman thus maintains that there is no common measure for intellectual judgement. In fact, Newman is searching for one: "Every one who reasons, is his own centre, and no expedient for attaining a common measure of minds can reverse this truth; but then the question follows, is there any criterion of the accuracy of an act of inference, such as may be our warrant that certitude is rightly elicited in favour of the proposition inferred…?" (*G. A.* p. 262)

Newman's solution to the problem of a common measure is to appeal to the Illative Sense. (*G. A.* p. 262) Although there are personal elements involved in the Illative Sense, which makes it difficult to achieve a common standard of justification, intellectual duty requires us to achieve that goal. There is an ethical dimension here: duty is intimately bound up with the right use of inference and assent; it is our duty to rightly use them (*G. A.* p. 265). If we use them rightly, most disagreements can be resolved.

Critics of Newman often cite the passage in the *Grammar* to support the claim that Newman denied that there is a common measure for justification: the Illative Sense "supplies no common measure between mind and mind, as being nothing else that a personal gift or acquisition" (*G. A.* 275). Thus, they criticise Newman as being arbitrary or even fanatic. Jay Newman, for example, says: if the illative sense is so personal and diverse that it has nothing to do with any common measure, standard, or rules, how can Newman legitimately claim his position is epistemically superior to those, such as Muslims', Buddhists', ... ? (Jay Newman, 1989, p. 84) Thomas K. Carr says that where Newman goes wrong "is in maintaining that the illative sense is nothing other than a personal gift or acquisition, and that it therefore supplies 'no common measure between mind and mind.'" He then criticises Newman for divorcing human wholeness and authenticity from the wholeness of human civilisation and placing it instead only in the Roman Catholic Church, and barring his epistemology from participation in the broader conversation governed by those more general forms of human collective. Carr concludes that Newman's position appears to be close to fanaticism (Carr, 1996, pp. 148-149).

I think these critics fail to recognise that Newman does not deny that there is a certain common measure in Illative Sense, and he only denies that there is a common measure of the *logical* sort in the Illative Sense when we come to deal with concrete matters.
We can see this from the context of the chapter on the Illative Sense: Newman is vindicating the certainty of knowledge there. He rejects the sceptical claim that certainty is a mistake on the one hand; and the a priori approach to the certainty of knowledge on the other hand, and maintains that for certain knowledge we need to appeal to the normal operation of the mind (261, 262). Now, when we observe and investigate the normal operation of the mind we see the process of attaining knowledge and truth in concrete matters is so intricate that logic itself cannot provide a common measure (*G. A.* 272, 274). According to him, the final measure on the validity of an inference in concrete matter is the Illative Sense (262, 268), which is the perfection or virtue of our ratiocinative faculty reached through experience, training, moral quality or gift. However, unlike logic which

supplies a set of rules for verbal reasoning. the Illative Sense does not supply a common measure of *the logical sort* in concrete matters, due to that the processes of reasoning in concrete matter are too subtle, minute, delicate and intricate to be put into logical rules or forms (*G. A.* p.275, p.277, p.282).

I agree that Newman has recognized that the personal elements of the Illative Sense, the disagreement from the acceptance of certain first principles and the presumptive nature of certain first principles complicates the goal of achieving a common standard of justification. However, I do not think that Newman thus denies that there is a common measure of justification for truth. The Illative Sense, for Newman, must involve a certain common measure in order to be the final judgement on the validity of an inference in concrete matters. If it is purely personal and does not involve any common measure whatever, how can it be the sole and final judgement on the validity of an inference in concrete matters? Newman uses the Illative Sense in parallel to 'good sense', 'common sense' and 'a sense of beauty' (*G. A.* p. 263). This suggests that he does not take the judgement made by the Illative Sense as pure personal choice, but contains certain criterion, just as good sense, common sense, and a sense of beauty involve personal elements, such as experience, taste, education, etc, and at the same time they contain certain criteria in order to judge something is good, reasonable or beautiful.

Newman sees the difficulty in searching for a common criterion for justification, due to individual differences among people towards a certain subject-matter. This is especially in the case of religion: "In religious inquiry each of us can speak only for himself, and for himself he has a right to speak. His own experiences are enough for himself, but he cannot speak for others: he cannot lay down the law; he can only bring his own experiences to the common stock of psychological facts." (*G. A.* p. 292) However, he believes that there is a common criterion for justification: "... if it satisfies him, it is likely to satisfy others; if, as he believes and is sure, it will approve itself to others also, for there is but one truth. And doubtless he does find in fact, that, allowing for the difference of minds and of modes of speech, what convinces him, does convince others also." (*G. A.* p. 293)

I also agree with you that Newman's focus on conscience is the move of a particularist, however, not in the sense of denying that there is a common standard of justification, but that starting from something concrete and real which can exert a strong psychological force upon the mind, through informal reasoning, to compel the mind to assent the proposition that God exists.

5. *Fifth, Huang rightly points out that Newman's account is not merely a phenomenological one. Yet, the thesis does not adequately show the relationship of the phenomenological and the epistemic in Newman's proposal; it merely notes that Newman does not stop at the phenomenological. The key to understanding the dialectic in Newman's thought is to recognize that normative statements must emerge from the phenomenological. Newman's appeal to the concrete is a corrective of the Lockean proposal. This distinction might help Huang to give a stronger response to David Pailin and Jay Newman. In fact, the thesis would be stronger here by showing where Newman, in the Grammar, links, but does not confuse, the phenomenological and normative.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I really appreciate it. I earnestly maintain that Newman is not merely doing phenomenological investigation but also trying to arrive at epistemic principles in the *Grammar*. Due to his belief that epistemic principles must have something to do with concrete belief-forming processes, he maintains that phenomenological investigation is the start-point of epistemic normalisation. So, he is not merely doing phenomenological investigation on the one hand, nor has he confused the phenomenological and epistemic on the other. I admit that my position needs to be strengthened by referring to the passages in the *Grammar* where Newman links, but does not confuse, the phenomenological and normative. I am going to rewrite the part to strength my position (pages 184-185):

"According to Newman, the correct approach to epistemology is to look at the normal operation of the human mind because the human mind is made for truth, not looking at

something a priori or ideal, which is unreal: "The human mind is made for truth, and so rests in truth, as it cannot rest in falsehood (*G. A.* p. 167). So, what we actually reason can furnish as an account for what we ought to reason. This is why he holds that epistemology must emerge from phenomenology: "... as we do not gain the knowledge of the law of progress by any *a priori* view of man, but by looking at it as the interpretation which is provided by himself on a large scale in the ordinary action of his intellectual nature, so too we must appeal to himself, as a fact, and not to any antecedent theory, in order to find what is the law of his mind as regards the two faculties in question." (*G. A.* pp. 265-266) "Knowledge is power, for it enables us to use eternal principles which we cannot alter. So also is it in that microcosm, the human mind. Let us follow bacon more closely than to distort its faculties according to the demands of an ideal optimism; instead of looking out for modes of thought proper to our nature, and faithfully observing them in our intellectual exercises." (*G. A.* p. 266) Thus, Newman criticizes Locke's theory as being arbitrary and unreal: "Reasoning and convictions which I deem natural and legitimate, Locke apparently would call irrational, enthusiastic, perverse, and immoral; and that, as I think, because he consults his own ideal of how the mind ought to act, instead of interrogating human nature, as an existing thing, as it is found in the world. Instead of going by the testimony of psychological facts, and thereby determining our constitutive faculties and our proper condition, he would form men as he thinks they ought to be formed, into something better and higher, and calls them irrational and indefensible, if they take to the water, instead of remaining under the narrow wings of his own arbitrary theory" (*G. A.* p.124). From the above discussion, we can clearly see that Newman is rejecting Locke's approach to epistemology and vindicating a naturalistic approach to epistemology.[282] This shows that he does not confuse phenomenology and epistemology, but recognises the epistemic importance of the ways people normally reason and tries to set epistemology on a proper foundation."

6. *Sixth, the thesis contains some typographical errors. For example, Jamie Ferreira is a*

[282] From here, we can clearly see that Newman's appeal to the phenomenological and concrete is a corrective of the Lockean proposal.

she and not a he (p. 19). Or occasionally, the thesis has some awkward grammatical structures (e.g. 'vulnerable to be dismissal" twice on p. 154, "thus have same epistemic status" on p. 154, "One way to handle the objection is appeal to information theory" on p. 163, "anything we know or perceive is known or perceive' on p. 164, "I am going to consider various interpretations of Newman's this line of argument" on p. 168). These are minor corrections and do not detract from the major argument of the thesis.

Thank you very much for pointing out these errors. Although English is not my mother language I am ashamed at these errors. I will correct them.

7. *In the end, I am not sure that Newman's epistemology of conscience provides "a universal criterion which can be applied to any community" (250). In fact, Newman acknowledges the problem here, as intimated earlier in my remarks of lingering problem of common measure in the Grammar.*

Thank you very much for the comment. I think if we accept that conscience is a part of human nature we are forced by reason to accept that Newman's epistemology of conscience is a universal criterion which can be applied to any community. As I have said above, disagreements about common measure among communities do not constitute a decisive argument against the existence of a common measure.

Part Two: My Responses to Examiner B

General responses:

Thank you very much for your valuable time spent on commenting this thesis. I sincerely appreciate your criticisms because they have helped me greatly to enhance my critical thinking ability and to improve the quality of this thesis.

Responses to each of comments:

Chapter 1

1. *Pages 30ff The discussion of Alston, BonJour et al employs the word 'justification' without any indication that this term is a contested one. At the very least, YH should include a forward reference to her later discussion of various rival conceptions of justification. After all, the argument ascribed to BonJour on p.33 looks a lot more plausible given internalism than given externalism.*

Thanks for the valuable comment. Sorry for the omission. I am going to include a reference on passage 31 to address this:

"There are various rival conceptions of epistemic justification, some internalist (the deontological, the evidential conception, the coherent conceptions, etc.), and others externalist (the reliablist, properly functioning conceptions, etc.). Please see Part Three, Chapter 6 of this thesis for detailed discussions of these conceptions."

I agree that BonJour's argument might be plausible if epistemic justification is purely internalistic. But I do not think that epistemic justification can be purely internalistic. Please see my argument against this position on pages 224-226.

2. *Page 33 final paragraph surely it is 2&3&4 that might plausibly be said to entail global scepticism–not 3 & 4.*

Thanks for pointing out this error. I am going to correct it.

3. *Page 39 YH's argument against Wolterstorff is feeble. For the cluster of opinions of the multitude is not the same as what we all do and must take for granted in our daily lives. A better argument against Wolterstorff would be that his (b) is ruled out by the quotation she gives on p. 37 from Reid's VI, ii, 425b.*

Thanks for the valuable comment and suggestion. I am going to rewrite the passage as follows (page 41):

"I do not agree with Wolterstorff's interpretation here, for this interpretation is ruled out by what Reid has said about common sense, that is, common sense is a branch of reason which makes non-inferencial judgments on things (1785, VI, ii, 425b).

It is worth noting Kant's interpretation of Reid's common sense here. According to Kant, Reid's common sense has nothing to do with human reason, but is a cluster of opinions of the multitude. Therefore, Kant is severely critical of Reid's appeal to common sense, and thought that it is but "an oracle when no rational justification for one's position can be advanced" and 'it is but an appeal to the opinion of the multitude, of whose applause the philosopher is ashamed, while the popular charlatan glories and boasts in it" (Kant, 1783, 'Introduction", p. 7).

As we have seen above, for Reid, common sense is a part of human reason, that is, non-inferential reason, the product of which is rational consideration, not a cluster of uncritical opinions shared by the multitude. Thus, Kant has misinterpreted Reid's common sense and his criticisms of Reid's appeal to common sense are inadequate."

4. *Page 55 YH endorses Ferreira's attempt to reconcile Newman's statements that first principles are self-evident and that they are supported by inductive reasoning: interpret Newman's phrase 'self evident' as meaning 'psychologically immediate'. But how does this fit in with YH's ascription to Newman of the view that 'first principles neither require not admit of proof, otherwise we will incur in [sic] an infinite regress'? (It would of course, be a fallacy to start with the truth 'To avoid an infinite regress, there must be some principles that are justified even though they are not proven' to 'To avoid an infinite regress, there must be some principles that are justified even though they are unprovable')*

Thank you very much for highlighting the important issue. I think, for Newman, that first principles do not require proof because their truths are psychological-immediately apprehended and, although they can be supported by inductive reasoning, there is no need to do so. For him, that first principles do not admit of proof does not imply that they are unprovable, but that we are unable to prove them by using formal reasoning. We can see this from the following passage: "We are unable to prove by syllogism that there are any self-evident propositions at all; but supposing there are (as of course I hold there are), still who can determine these by logic? (*G. A.* p. 204) Understanding Newman's view in this way, I claim there is no inconsistency in saying that first principles are psychological immediate and can be supported by inductive reasoning and that first principles neither require not admit of proof. I am going to explain this on page 58.

5. *Page 57 YH's first point of similarities between Reid and Newman seems incompatible with Newman's assertion, made in first quotation on p. 57, that first principles are 'acceptable by some, rejected by others.'*

Thank you very much for the comment. My point is that for Reid and Newman, there are some first principles which are universally accepted truth. This is not incompatible with Newman's assertion that some first principles are 'acceptable by some, rejected by others.'

6. *Page 71. The characterisation of transcendental epistemology should be tightened. After all, one a priori necessary condition of human knowledge is that human beings acquire beliefs, and there is no doubt that human acquisition of beliefs can be studied empirically.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I agree that the acquisition of beliefs is one a *priori* necessary condition of human knowledge and it can be studied empirically. I am going to rewrite the passage as follows (page 75) :

"In contrast, there is transcendental epistemology which looks for *a priori* necessary conditions of human knowledge that reflect the structure of the human cognitive apparatus. The approach to this type of epistemology is analytical."

I am also going to include the following passage in footnote 89:

"According to some philosophers, these conditions cannot be studied empirically. Kant, for example, advocates this. According to him, *a priori* necessary conditions of human knowledge, which reflect the structure of the human cognitive apparatus, such as space, time and the categories, can only be studied conceptually. See his *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1965), A93/B126. Recently, there has been a hot debate on whether *a priori* necessary conditions of human knowledge that reflect the structure of the human cognitive apparatus can be studied empirically, that is, whether transcendental epistemology can be naturalised. Quassim Cassam, for example, argues that transcendental epistemology cannot be naturalised, not because an investigation of conditions of knowledge which are determined by our cognitive constitution cannot be naturalised, but because the human cognitive constitution is not the source of the conditions of human knowledge. See: Cassam (2003), pp. 181-203."

Chapter 2

1. *Page 87 Here is one of a number of places in which YH confines herself to uncritically*

summarising a commentator's views. Grebel's criticism (a) needs to be much more carefully explained if it is to look at all cogent. Grebel seems to be resting too much weight on the word 'faculty.' Consider: "If we do have the ability to intuitively discern truths of elementary logic and mathematics, why are we unable to specify the nature of this ability in terms of the neural structures and processes that underlie it?" Re criticism (b): The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on Moral Sense Theories suggests that the 18th century moral sense philosophers may have had a more nuanced view than Grebel credits them with. Hutcheson held that we need to justify our specific moral judgments argument which end the end goes back to the very general deliverances of moral sense. If so, then there is ample room for you and I to disagree about whether it would be morally permissible to fight in such-and such a war, and so on. As for criticism (c) consider: 'If sight, hearing etc are the source of our knowledge of our physical surroundings, why would we need ever to seek other people's opinions about what is going on around us?"

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I accept the criticism that I didn't look at Grebel's criticisms of Moral Sense Theories critically here. I am going to evaluate Grebel's criticisms on page 90:

"I think whether Grebel's criticisms are valid depends on how we understand the words 'faculty' and 'infallible'. Concerning his criticism a), only if the word 'faculty' is understood as an entity and the word 'infallible' as incorrigible, is the criticism valid. But if the word 'faculty' is understood as ability and the word 'infallible' as reliable, his criticisms are no longer valid. According to this understanding, that conscience is an innate, infallible moral faculty means that conscience is an inborn, reliable moral ability, which can discern moral truth, either perceptually or intuitively. If we have sufficient knowledge about brain structure, we might be able to specify the nature of this ability in terms of the neural structures and processes that underlie it, just as we might be able to specify the nature of our other mental ability, such as memory, in terms of the neural structures and processes that underlie it." Concerning his criticism b): if 'infallibility' is understood as *reliability*, not incorrigibility, then the infallibility of conscience is not

contradictory to the conflicts of people's conscience, for to say that conscience is infallible is equivalent to say that conscience is generally reliable, though in particular cases, it can make mistakes, just as our other mental abilities, such as memory, are generally reliable, though they can make mistakes in particular cases. Concerning his criticism c), if we understand conscience as a moral ability, not an entity, then there is no contradiction between saying that conscience is the source of one's moral knowledge and that sometimes we seek moral advices from someone else, just as, though we have memory as the source of our knowledge about the past, sometimes we do seek information about the past from other sources. "

2. *Page 100 I do not disagree with YH's main claim in paragraph (c). But I should point out that she needs to tighten up the sloppy presentation of her example about the man ordered to kill someone. YH tells us that the agent 'tried to avoid' killing the target, and that maybe even he 'is absolved from responsibility'. So why should the agent feel guilt, shame etc? YH suggests that these emotions would be appropriate if the agent should have tried much harder to have avoided killing anyone. But if this were so, then the agent was surely responsible: if you drive negligently and kill a pedestrian then you are held responsible for the victim's death.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. Here, I am trying to use an example to illustrate my point that having moral emotions is an essential part of being a conscientious person. I think, for a conscientious person, if s/he sincerely believes that a course of action is morally wrong and has a sense of duty to avoid it, that person would have certain moral emotions if s/he has failed to do it. Even if the agent is absolved from responsibility s/he would still have certain moral emotions and the emotions do not disappear immediately. I am going to rewrite the passage as follows (pages 103-104):

"Moral emotions are inseparable from moral sense and the sense of duty in one's conscience—if one sincerely believes that a course of action is morally wrong and has a sense of duty to avoid it, one would have certain moral emotions, such as guilt, remorse, or

compunction, etc. if s/he has failed to avoid it. We do not take a person, who has failed to avoid a course of action that is morally wrong, but does not feel shame, guilt or remorse, as a truly conscientious person, even if s/he has a moral sense and the sense of duty. Take an example. A soldier was ordered to kill an innocent civilian. He considered that it was morally wrong to kill the civilian and felt a sense of obligation to avoid the killing. But, his intention to avoid killing the civilian was discovered by his commander and he had to shoot the civilian in front of the commander. After the killing, the soldier had no feelings of compunction or regret because he thought that he did try to avoid it. We do not regard the soldier as a truly conscientious person, do we? A truly conscientious person would feel regret for her/his failing to avoid the killing because s/he would envisage a possibility in which the civilian could be saved. For a truly conscientious person, even if s/he is absolved from the responsibility for her/his failing to avoid doing something morally wrong, s/he would still feel regret for a period of time, perhaps at a less intensive degree, but the emotion does not disappear immediately, simply because of her/his involvement in the event which has caused grave suffering to others."

3. *Page 101Following on from the foregoing discussion, YH declares that absolution from responsibility for suffering caused to others does not immediately eliminate an agent's feelings of guilt, and she cites Bernard Williams as agreering with her. But if Williams' lorry driver was not negligent or in any other way morally to blame for the accident, then presumably his conscience, if it working properly, will deliver this very verdict; in that case, if his distress and horror are genuinely moral emotions–he feels guilty, ashamed etc–then they are inconsistent with the judgment that his conscience is making. If we go to Williams himself to check what he says, we find that he does not say that the lorry driver should at any time feel guilty. Williams uses the expression 'agent regret' to describe what the lorry driver feels, and on his p. 30 he declares that agent regret is not remorse. Does YH think that the lorry driver's understandable agent regret–his distress and horror–are genuine moral emotions? So far, YH's characterisation of moral emotions has been fairly thin, so it is hard to tell what answer she is committed to.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I still think absolution from responsibility for suffering caused to others does not immediately eliminate a conscientious person's feelings of guilty, regret, etc. because absolution from responsibility can only eliminate the blameworthiness of the agent's action and it does not eliminate the agent's involvement in the incident which has caused grave suffering to others, and put him in the place of an observer. These emotions are sustained by the agent's involvement in the incident, not her/his absolution from responsibility, so they are rational, appropriate and genuine moral emotions.

Although he distinguishes agent-regret from remorse, Williams doesn't identify it with the regret felt by the spectators and admits it as a type of appropriate moral emotion (Williams, 1981, pp.29-30). In order to make my point more clear, I am going to rewrite the passage as follows (pages 104-106):

"I think Jiwei Ci's argument is not morally sustainable. Certainly, for a truly conscientious person, her/his conscience will still trouble her/him, feeling regret for her/his action as well as sorrow for the suffering caused to the victim. This is because absolution from responsibility for the suffering s/he has brought to others can only eliminate the blameworthiness of her/his action and it does not eliminate her/his involvement in the incident which has caused suffering to others and put her/him in the place of an observer. Absolution from responsibility may reduce the degree of feeling, but it does not eliminate it immediately. Otherwise, our moral character needs to be questioned. Bernard Williams has persuasively argued for this:

> A lorry drive who, though no fault of his, runs over a child, will feel differently from any spectator. People will try, in comforting him, to move the driver from this state of feeling, move him from where he is to something more like the place of a spectator. But some doubt would be felt about a driver who too blandly or readily moved to that position. We feel sorry for the driver, but that sentiment co-exists with, indeed presupposes, that there is something that cannot merely be eliminated

by the consideration that it was not his fault. (Williams, 1981, p. 28)

We can see that, from Williams' example, absolution from responsibility for suffering caused to others does not immediately eliminate a conscientious person's feelings of guilty, regret, etc. Imagine that Williams' lorry driver, after he ran over the child, didn't feel guilt or regret at all, but a bit of pity for the child, a bit of sympathy for the parents and a bit of relief for himself because he was absolved from responsibility. Do we think the lorry driver is a conscientious person? Certainly not. If the driver is a conscientious person, he cannot just feel like an observer and enjoy his luck for his absolution from responsibility, he must feel compunction or regret. These emotions are sustained by his involvement in the incident, not his absolution from responsibility and they are appropriate and genuine moral emotions.

Although he distinguishes agent-regret from remorse, Williams does not identify it with the regret felt by the spectators and admits it as a type of appropriate moral emotion (Williams, 1981, pp. 29-30)."

4. *Page 104 YH's account of Bedford's views is inaccurate. Bedford does not on his pp. 110 say that no feeling is involved in dispositional emotions; the nearest he comes is in the footnote, where he says, in effect, that different emotions are not individuated by different feelings. YH argues against Bedford along the following lines; "If we have no appropriate feelings at all over a significant extent of time, we cannot said to be having the emotion of love. Therefore feelings are an essential component of emotion, and emotions are episodic or concurrent states rather than dispositions.' This argument is inadequate. The first premise is doubtful: think of a man who is absorbed in his work all day and does not think of his beloved wife at all for eight hours; think of someone with a severe migraine headache lasting 36 hours. And it is hard to see why we should infer either half of the conclusion from the premise. What is a lot more plausible is that there are various occasions on which, or circumstances in which, one would naturally expect the loving person to have appropriate feelings, and other things being equal the absence of such*

feelings in the relevant circumstances casts doubt on whether the person loves the other party.

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I agree that Bedford does not say (on p. 110) that no feeling is involved in dispositional emotions, but he argues against the view that emotional dispositions involve feelings using the example of being angry (pp110-112). Bedford says: "In any case, does the truth of such a statement as 'He is afraid" logically require the existence of a specific feeling? I imagine that it would nowadays be generally conceded that emotion words are commonly used without any implication that the person they refer to is having a particular experience at any given time (p. 111). ... The conclusion to be drawn, if I am right, is that being angry is logically prior to feeling angry, and therefore that being angry does not entail feeling angry, and *a fortiori* does not entail having any other feeling.... We do not first ascertain that a man feels angry, and then conclude that he is angry. On the contrary, we realize that he is angry, and assume (perhaps wrongly) that he feels angry."(p. 112). This is why I said on my page 104 that Bedford "argues that no feeling is involved in dispositional emotions (Bedford, ibid. p. 110)". I admit that I should have said that Bedford argues that no feeling is necessarily involved in dispositional emotions and referred to pp 110-111 instead of p.

Concerning the emotion of love, what I am arguing here is that, when the object of love appears in her/his consciousness, if a person doesn't have appropriate feelings at all over a significant period of time towards the object, s/he cannot be said to be having the emotion of love. Consider the man who is absorbed in his work all day and does not think of his beloved wife at all for eight hours. In this case, the man has no appropriate feelings towards his beloved wife during that time because his mind is wholly occupied by his work and the object of his love does not appear in his consciousness. But let's suppose that during the eight hours his wife rang him and told him how much she loved him. At this moment, a vivid mental picture of his loving wife was appearing in his consciousness. Now, should the man have certain appropriate feelings towards his wife if he loves his wife at all? In the case of someone who is having a severe migraine headache for 36 hours, the person has no

appropriate feelings towards the object of her/his love because her/his body does not function properly during that time. When I say that if a person has no appropriate feelings towards certain object s/he cannot be said to be having the emotion of love towards that object I presuppose the person is in physically and psychologically normal conditions.

I am going to discuss your points on page 109.

5. *Page 105 The first two sentences of the second paragraph are very doubtful. Let me appeal to the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which distinguishes in psychology between Methodological Behaviourism and Scientific Behaviourism, and describes the latter as the doctrine that 'scientific psychology ought to be concerned only with the formulation of laws relating observables such as stimuli and responses; not with unobservable mental processes and mechanisms such as attention, intention, memory and motivation.' This does not look like the claim that emotion is identical with behaviour. It looks like either agnosticism or eliminativism about emotions as we normally think of them. Of course philosophers like Ryle, often called 'Analytical Behaviourists' did not hold that emotions are behavioural responses either.*

Thank you very much for the comment. Here, I am referring to the philosophical behavioural theory, such as O. H. Green's. According to Green, typical behaviours are the expressions of certain emotions and the link between emotions and such typical behaviour is conceptual one. Therefore, we can define emotions in terms of typical behaviours: "...it is necessary that emotion terms are defined by reference to a person's behaviour in certain circumstances." (Green, "The Expression of Emotion", *Mind*, Vol. 79, 1970, p. 552) Though, Green modified his position later and admitted that some emotions are not characterized by purposive behaviour, such as grief, despair, sorrow, depressive emotions, etc. (Green, "Emotions and Belief", *Studies in the Philosophy of Mind, American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series* no. 6, N. Rescher (ed.), Basil Blackwell, 1972)

I admit that I should be more careful about the characterization of philosophical

behavioural theory since some other philosophical behaviourists do not identify emotions with typical behaviours. I am going to rewrite the passage as follows (page 110):

"Some philosophical behaviourists, for example, O. H. Green, explain emotions in terms of typical behavioural responses. Thus, the emotion of anger, according to them, can be explained by the behaviour of pounding tables, slamming doors, etc. The difficulty for this theory is that the pattern of behaviour cannot account for various emotions, for characteristic behaviour patterns are neither necessary nor sufficient for an emotion."

6. *Pages 110-111 YH gives an account of moral emotions in terms of feelings plus evaluative beliefs plus disposition, but she should say something about how these three are related. Suppose that you have the occurrent feelings, you believe that my actions A and B were both wrong, and you are disposed to not do either A or B again. This is quite consistent with its being the case that you possess the moral emotion towards A but not towards B. YH needs to say more about intentionality. (She manifests some awareness of the intentionality of emotion, at the top of p. 166)*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I really appreciate it. I am going to add a paragraph on pages 116-117 to explain how the three components of moral emotions are related in terms of the intentionality of moral emotion:

"We have seen from the above that a moral emotion involves three components: feeling, evaluative belief and disposition. These components are not separated and they are causally and logically related. When one feels guilty, for example, the guilt-feeling the agent has is caused by her/his belief that s/he has done something morally wrong and her/his belief and the remorse-feeling cause her/him to be disposed not do it again. Also, moral emotions are intentional states which are about or towards or directed at actions believed by the agent as morally wrong. If one feels guilty, one's guilt-feeling must be about something one sincerely believes that it is morally wrong and that one has done it. One cannot have the feeling without the belief and, in turn, cannot have the disposition not to do it again

without the belief and the feeling. Thus, the three components are causally and logically related in a moral emotion."

Chapter 3

1. *Pages 114 --119 Chapter 3 Part 1 is defective in two respects. Firstly, its final paragraph draws a general conclusion that is obviously not justified by the preceding discussion, since YH has argued only against Freud's developmentalist conception. Secondly, YH needs a deeper investigation of what is meant by 'an original element in human nature.' For example, is language an original element? There are both innate and development conditions that together produce the ability to speak and understand language.*

Thanks for the valuable comment. I admit that there is a gap between my conclusion and the previous discussion. I am going to rewrite the part as follows (pages 125-126):

"The developmentalist conception of conscience takes conscience as merely a learned phenomenon produced by upbringing or socialization, involving no ontological element. I think this is incorrect. Conscience cannot be merely a learned phenomenon produced either by upbringing or by socialization, with no ontological element involved. This is because if conscience were merely a learned phenomenon without any ontological element, a society would have no foundation for morality: a most vicious person shouldn't be blamed for her/his moral character because, by supposition, it is her/his upbringing or socialization, not her/his nature, that is responsible for her/his moral character. From this, we can see that conscience must be rooted in human nature and it is, as Newman says, an original element in human nature.

To say that conscience is an original element in human nature does not, however, exclude the position that there is a developmental condition for the proper functioning of conscience. One's conscience needs to be fostered and developed in order to function

properly,[283] just as one's language capacity needs to be fostered and developed in order to be able to use language. This does not, however, undermine the originality of conscience in human nature. Without the original element in human nature, human beings cannot, no matter how much training they have had, make moral judgements, have moral emotions, etc., just as a species that lacks innate language ability, no matter how much training they are given, cannot use language.

From the above discussion, we can draw the conclusion that the developmentalist conception of conscience, which identifies conscience as merely a learned phenomenon, cannot undermine Newman's claim to the originality of conscience."

2. *Pages 122-123 In Chapter 3 Part 2, YH considers only two possibilities: mental acts, and capacity. She says that Newman holds that conscience consists of mental capacities. She should think further: (i) Most of us think of memory as more than the capacity to remember, and yet as not reducible to individual acts of memory: we use a model of information storage and retrieval. Perhaps YH should say something more about the relevant concept of a capacity. (ii) YH has said that conscience involves moral belief, a sense of duty, and moral emotion, but it is doubtful that these three are capacities.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I admit that I didn't discuss the mode of capacity as mental states and only focused on the mode of capacity as mental acts. This is because I was focusing on interpreting Newman's saying that conscience is a mental act. I am going to add a footnote on page 128 to explain what a mental capacity is and the modes of a mental capacity:

"A mental capacity is an ability that our mind possesses. It is dispositional and when in operation it manifests itself as two different modes–mental states or mental acts. For example, memory, as a mental capacity, can manifests as mental acts, such as

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[283] Newman argues outside the *Grammar* that conscience can be diminished by no use or bad use. See his *The Oxford University Sermons* (Newman, 1843)

remembering, or mental states, such as information storage, etc."

However, I didn't say that Newman holds that conscience consists of mental capacities. What I said is that the nature of conscience, for Newman, is a mental capacity and when it is in operation it manifests as mental acts or states. In other words, ontologically, conscience is a mental capacity and phenomenologically it manifests as mental acts or states. When I say that conscience involves moral belief, a sense of duty and moral emotions I am looking at conscience from the phenomenological perspective: when one's conscience is in operation it involves having moral belief, a sense of duty and moral emotions. These three elements themselves are not mental capacities, but mental states or acts produced by conscience.

Chapter 4

1. *Page 141. Last paragraph YH says here that in Newman's time rationality was limited strictly to demonstrative reasoning. But a few pages later she tells us that Locke did not hold this view. And surely it is plain that Paley, Butler, Reid, and others did not do so either.*

Thanks for pointing out this. I tried to say that during Newman's time, the dominant view about rationality in Western thinking was Cartesian rationalism. I am going to rewrite the passage as follows:

'During Newman's time, the *dominant* view about rationality in Western thinking was the Cartesian conception of rationality, that is, strictly demonstrative reasoning."

2. *Page 141 footnote 102. YH's account of Plantinga's view is out of date. In Warranted Christian Belief, pp.84f, 93f, Plantinga characterises classical foundationalism as saying that the relevant inferences may be deductive, inductive or abductive.*

Sorry for the omission. I am going to add Plantinga's new characterisation of classical foundationalism in *Warranted Christian Belief* in footnote 147, page 149.

3. *Pages 156-157 'Now, by modelling...' Surely the appropriate conclusion to draw via analogy would be that the experience of the magisterial dictate is evidence for the belief that there is some person or group of persons with magisterial authority. It would require a separate argument to argue that magisterial authority could be possessed only by God. Of course subsequent argument may turn out to help, but if so then YH should flag the point here.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I really appreciate it. I am going to flag the point in footnote 173, page 166:

"One can raise an objection to the analogical argument: from the analogy we can only draw, legitimately, the conclusion that the experience of the magisterial dictate is evidence for the belief that there is some person or group of persons with magisterial authority, not that the magisterial authority could be possessed only by God, which requires a separate argument. Fortunately, Newman's argument from conscience, as I interpret it, is not only based on the analogy, but also based on an inference to the best explanation, which offers a separate argument for the belief that the magisterial authority could be possessed only by God (please see Part Two, Chapter 5 of this thesis)."

4. *Pages 164-top of p.166 YH's overall argument here is unsatisfactory. She needs to take into account truisms like these: different people may result emotionally in very different ways to the same external situation, depending on differences of belief about the context, or differences in their life histories, personalities, fatigue levels, etc. If Alice loves Bill and Cathy does not, it does not follow that either Alice or Cathy is responding to Bill inadequately, or in a defective manner. We can try to love someone, and in many cases can take steps aimed at coming to love them. Moral emotions such as remorse respond not to actual wrongdoing but to believed wrongdoing, and the inference from 'A feels guilty' to*

'A did something genuinely wrong' and from 'A does not feel guilty' to 'A did nothing wrong' are not strong ones.

Thanks for the valuable comment. Here, I am arguing for the objectivity of emotions via the involuntariness and the intentionality of emotions. I agree with you that different people may react emotionally in very different ways to the same external situation, depending on differences of belief about the context, or differences in their life histories, personalities, and fatigue levels. But this does not show that emotions are purely voluntary, it only shows that emotions are the products of one's personal circumstances. As we know, one's personal circumstances are not voluntary, and, therefore, emotions produced by these circumstances are not voluntary.

In addition, I do think there is an objective appropriateness or inappropriateness (adequacy or inadequacy) in emotional responses, especially, in moral cases. If Bill is an evil man and Alice loves him just because of his evil character and Cathy does not love him because she hates his evil character, we would think that Alice's emotional response towards Bill is morally inappropriate and Cathy's is morally appropriate. Let me borrow Williams' example again: if the lorry driver, after running down the child, didn't feel regret at all, and, on the contrary, he felt delighted because he was absolved from responsibility, we would think the driver's emotional response is inappropriate, even morally defective, don't we?

I agree that moral emotions, such as remorse, respond not to actual wrongdoing but to believed wrongdoing, because actual wrongdoing is its intentional object and believed wrongdoing is its cause. But there is still a strong connection between the actual wrongdoing (the intentional object of emotion) and the emotional response because the cause of emotional response (believed wrongdoing) has a strong connection to the actual wrongdoing.

I am going to rewrite the part on pages 175-176.

Chapter 5

1. *Page 181 'In my view...' YH should explain 'adequacy, coherence and cogency'.*

Thanks for the valuable comment. I am going to explain these terms in footnote180, page 191:

"Here, I use the word 'adequacy' in the sense of accuracy in conformity of a belief or a theory to truth. So, when I say that a hypothesis H gives an adequate explanation of data E, I mean H gives an accurate explanation of E and there is no gap or error involved. By 'coherence' I mean something like consistency, together with the fitness of a hypothesis H into available data so that not-H is highly improbable. So, when I say that a hypothesis H gives a coherent explanation of data E, I mean H gives a consistent explanation of E and fits into E so that not-H is highly improbable. By 'cogency' I mean the 'convincingness' of a belief or theory. So when I say that a hypothesis H gives a cogent explanation of E, I mean H gives a convincing explanation of E and the acceptance of its truth cannot be rationally resisted. The contents of these qualitative virtues are those epistemic properties which make a theory to be true. I think that adequacy, coherence and cogency are three important truth-conducive characteristics of a theory because and without them a theory cannot be true."

2. *Pages 181-182 YH should give a clearer explanation of Douven's response to van Fraassen. Why doesn't van Fraassen's second objection apply to IBE*? How does IBE* 'license an inference to the unqualified truth of the absolutely best or perfect explanation'? Why should we suppose that, given that van Fraassen thinks that the true explanation may not be included in the 'available' explanations, he thinks this because he thinks that at any given time the set of potential explanations is infinite?*
Surely he needs only the assumption that there are potential explanations than we have been able to formulate.

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I am going to explain why van Fraassen's second objection does not apply to IBE* on pages 192-193:

"I agree with Douven that van Fraassen's second objection does not apply to IBE* because, unlike IBE, IBE* does not require that, given evidence E and potential explanations H_1, … , H_n of E, there must be Hi which explains E best. It only requires that, among the potential explanations H_i, … , H_n of E, if there is Hi which explains E better than any of the other hypotheses, then H_i is closer to the truth than any of these other hypotheses. The requirement of H_i in IBE* is conditional, not necessary. Thus, even if the true explanation may not be included in the potential explanations, IBE* still holds. This is why Douven thinks that IBE* licenses an inference to the unqualified truth of the absolutely best or perfect explanation.

It seems to me that van Fraassen's second objection presupposes that, at given time t, the set of potential explanations of evidence E is infinite. This is why he thinks the true explanation may not be included in the available explanations H_1, …, H_n. I think this supposition is not legitimate. At given time t, the set of potential explanations of E is finite and there must be one explanation that explains E better than any other available explanation. Even if van Fraassen might only assume that there are more potential explanations than the available explanations and the true explanation may not be included in the available explanations. The objection, I think, still does not apply to IBE* because IBE* does not rests on the necessary requirement that there must be a true explanation among the available explanations, and it only rests on the conditional requirement that *if* there is a hypothesis H_i which explains E better than any of the other hypotheses, then H_i is closer to the truth than any of these other hypotheses."

3. *Pages 184-5 The structure of your response to Mackie needs improvement. The first horn of Mackie's dilemma rests on his claim that if conscience is legitimate or authoritative then there is a rational prescriptivity about certain kinds of action in their*

own right. That is, the authority of conscience is not intrinsic to conscience but is derived from the intrinsic prescriptivity of moral principles. YH thinks that Mackie identifies authority with intrinsic prescriptivity, but he doesn't: he holds that if conscience is authoritative then its authority is derived from that of the moral principles. YH eventually gets around to attacking this conditional statement on her pp. 186ff.

P. 186 *While she cites Garner in support of her claim that objectively intrinsic prescriptivity is incoherent, YH does not present any arguments (her own or Garner's) in support of the claim. Indeed, in footnote 136 she quotes Macki as rejecting the claim.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comments. I really appreciate them. I am going to rewrite this part as follows (pages 195-198):

"The first horn of Mackie's dilemma rests on his claim that if conscience is legitimate or authoritative, then there is a rational prescriptivity about certain kinds of action in their own right. That is, if conscience is authoritative, then its authority is derived from the intrinsic prescriptivity of moral principles, i.e. from the to-be-done-ness or not-to-be-done-ness of actions themselves. In Mackie's own words:

> There is a rational prescriptivity about certain kinds of actions in their own right: that they are of this or that kind is in itself a reason for doing them or refraining from them. There is a to-be-done-ness or not to-be-done-ness involved in that kind of action in itself. (Mackie, 1982, p. 105)

If my conscience commands me to do x and not to do y, according to Mackie, it is because x involves a certain kind of feature which constitutes the reason for x to be done and y involves a certain kind of feature which constitutes the reason for y not be done. There is no need to look beyond the intrinsic prescriptivity for any extrinsic imperative to my conscience.

In the following, I am going to appeal to the strong version of argument from queerness to argue that to-be-done-ness or not-to-be-done-ness of actions cannot be involved in actions themselves, in other words, there cannot be objectively intrinsic prescriptivity, for the notion of objectively intrinsic prescriptivity is incoherent. Let me first explain what the argument from queerness is.

The argument from queerness argues against objective moral values, basing on some odd features of moral values. There are two versions of the argument–the weak version, which argues against objective moral values themselves, and the strong version, which argues against the objective intrinsic prescriptivity of moral values.

In his *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*, Mackie present a weak version of the argument from queerness against objective moral values:

> If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing anything else.

Therefore, according to Mackie, it is, both metaphysically and epistemologically, improbable that there are such objective moral values. (Mackie, 1977, p. 38)

It should be noted that Mackie merely takes objective values themselves, not their intrinsic prescriptivity, as queer in his version of the argument from queerness. He thinks nothing is queer about objective intrinsic prescriptivity. (Mackie, 1977, p. 42) Now, if objective intrinsic prescriptivity is not queer, objective moral values themselves, are not queer at all. They need not to be a strange kind of entities, qualities or relations (therefore, we do not need a special kind of faculty of moral perception or intuition to aware of them). They can be supervenient on natural entities or properties of natural entities.

According to Richard Garner, it is objective intrinsic prescriptivity–action-guiding or action-directing feature that is genuinely queer. So, Garner presents a strong version of argument from queerness to argue against the notion of objective intrinsic prescriptivity (Garner, 1990, pp. 137-146).

According to Garner, the genuine queerness of an objective moral value lies in its intrinsic prescriptivity. Objective intrinsically prescriptive moral values are queer not because they are unusual (there are so many unusual things in the universe) but because they make demands: they prescribe us to do something and to refrain from something else. But how could any feature of reality outside us make demands? How could actions themselves oblige us to perform them or not to perform them? Even the most virtuous action itself cannot make a demand on us. "It is hard to believe in objective prescriptivity because it is hard to make sense of a demand without a demander..." (Garner, *ibid.* 143). [284] The notion of objective intrinsic prescriptivity is, therefore, incoherent.

According to Mackie, objective intrinsic prescriptivity is not incoherent. [285] For it is presented in ordinary moral thought and language along with relations to desires and feelings, reasoning about the means to desired ends, inter-personal demands, so on. (Mackie, 1977, p. 42) I think Mackie has changed the connotation of objective intrinsic prescriptivity here: if we take objective intrinsic prescriptivity as what he says, that is, there is a to-to-done-ness or not-to-be-done-ness in actions themselves, then it is incoherent as

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[284] According to Garner, the only way to make sense of the demands of morality may be to see morality as a conventional social device, and its demands as ones we ourselves make. He rejects the theistic explanation of the prescriptivity of morality. (Garner, *ibid.* 143) This position is same as the one that Mackie puts into the second horn of his dilemma. I will deal with it later on with the contention that sociological explanation cannot explain the constraining power of morality.

[285] Mackie says: "some thinkers—R. M. Hare, for example—would reject the argument that objective intrinsically prescriptive features, supervening upon natural ones, constitute so odd a cluster of qualities and relations that they are most unlikely to have arisen in the ordinary course of events, without an all-powerful god to create them, on the ground that the notion of objective intrinsically prescriptive features, supervening on natural ones is not merely puzzling but incoherent... however, I have argued elsewhere that it is not incoherent, and the oddity of these features is just what is needed to make their existence count significantly in favour of theism" (Mackie, 1982, pp. 115-116).

we have seen above; if we take it as involving something else such as inter-personal demands, then it is no longer objective intrinsic prescriptivity—it becomes objective extrinsic prescriptivity. In a final analysis, the notion of objective intrinsic prescriptivity is incoherent."

4. Page 188 para 2 *The argument is unclear. It might be worth reflecting on what Kant says about autonomy and the moral law.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment and suggestion. I am going to add my reflection on what Kant says about autonomy on page 199 to make the argument more clear:

"Conscience can not be completely autonomous and it must subject itself to the constraints of moral laws. This is because autonomy pushes itself in different directions and moral laws are required to guide it in the right direction. Conscience is very much like a Kantian moral agent: he has autonomy to make judgement whether a course of action is right or wrong, make choices among a set of actions and make decisions for himself based on rational considerations, and at the same time he has to follow the moral imperatives and subject to the constraints of the moral laws."

5. Pages 188-191 *YH's treatment of the second horn is too swift. Consider the following argument: 'The authority of the laws cannot be derived from the legislature because if it were then there would be no conflict between any law and what the legislature has enacted; but there can be such conflict'. The argument fails to recognise the complexity of law and its relationship to the legislature, the possibility of the legislature's imposing institutional or procedural restrictions on itself, and so on. Similarly social traditions come in layers, and can be in conflict with one another, and one might choose between two conflicting prescriptions on the basis of which fits in best with the main body of tradition. I recommend that YH read Robert Adams' book: Finite and Infinite Goods, Chapters 9, 10.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I agree that my treatment of the second horn is too swift and I am going to add two points to extend my response on pages 201-203

"I think the conflict between the dictates of one's conscience and the requirements by the tradition or institutions or part of the society in which one has been brought up constitutes a valid argument against the sociological account of the origin of the authority of conscience because the conflict, unlike the conflict between the authority of the laws and what the legislature has enacted, does indicate the authority of conscience has a different source which is superior to social requirements: the authority of laws can be imposed by social institutions if there is any conflict between the law and what the legislature has enacted, thus, the conflict does not undermine the authority; while, there is no social institution which can impose authority on one's conscience if there is a genuine conflict between the dictates of conscience and requirements by the tradition or social institutions or part of the society in which one has been brought up.

Although the traditions, or social institutions of a society in which one lives in, can force one to accept what contradicts to the dictates of one's conscience, it cannot, as the example of Dietrich Bonhoeffer in Robert Adams' *Finite and Infinite Goods*,[286] illustrates, extinguish the dictates and completely stop one acts according to the dictates of his/her conscience. Even if one obeys the authority from the society or tradition, due to external forces, one still feels an inner pain caused by the genuine conflict and tries to act against the authority from the society (or a group of society) or tradition. This is because, the conflict, on the surface, seems to disappear, but it still exists at a deep level, tears one's heart and prompts one to act according to the dictates of one's conscience.

Besides that the conflict between the dictates of one's conscience and the requirements by

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[286] Dietrich Bonhoeffer, a theologian of the Protestant church in Germany, was a leader of resistance to Hitler. Under the coercion of the Nazism, he had to perform things in public required by the Nazi, which were contradictory to the dictate of his conscience. However, the Nazi's coercion didn't stop him acting according to the dictate of his conscience. He was secretly involved in the anti-Nazi movement and was put to death by Nazi at the end of the World War II. See: Adams, 2002, pp. 215-216.

the traditions or other social requirements indicates that the authority of conscience has a different source which is superior to social requirements, the fact that there are dictates of conscience which are far beyond the requirements by the traditions, or other social requirements also shows that the authority of conscience has a different source which is superior to social requirements.

Moreover, from the motive for fulfilling of the dictates of conscience we can see that the authority of conscience has a different source which is superior to social requirements. When a person's conscience dictates that x ought to be done and y ought not to be done s/he doesn't follow the dictates out of the motive for gaining a reward or avoiding a punishment by social institutions or part of the society in which s/he has been brought up. The fulfilment is categorical, even if at the price of losing one's life.

If the authority of one's conscience came from the tradition or other social requirements one would not feel guilty about certain actions when the tradition, or institution of the society approve them.[287] But there are indeed such cases in human history where someone feels guilty about certain actions even if the tradition or other social requirements approve them. This also shows that the authority of conscience must come from an origin which is superior to the society.

From above analyses we can see that the sociological account cannot fully explain the authority of conscience."

Chapter 6

1. Page 194 *YH gives the impression that 'traditional' epistemologists require deductive*

[287] Here, I am not denying that the authority of a virtuous model one admires has an imperative impact on one's conscience. For example, if the authority one admires judges one's behaviour, say, adultery, to be immoral, one can feel guilt. This is because the judgement of the authority would be the same as the judgement of one's conscience and there is no genuine conflict between the dictate of one's conscience and the authority. Otherwise, one would not admire the authority.

validity, and that reformed epistemologists are innovative ('new') in breaking with this requirement. I have already pointed out that this is not so.

Thank you very much for pointing out this again. I am going to revise the passage as follows on page 206-207:

"By adequate evidence, the mainstream of traditional epistemologists means a formal, deductively or inductively valid argument. The reformed epistemologists reject this account of rationality and justification and developed a broader account of rationality and epistemic justification originated from Reid. According to them, to justify a proposition *P*, we do not need formal, deductively or inductively valid propositional evidence supporting *P*. *P* can be epistemically justified by means of a range of informal inferences derived from perceptual experience or other properly basic beliefs."

2. *Pages 204-205 A comment on YH's reply to Plantinga's first criticism: For someone's belief to be justified on the basis of the foundations, does the believer have to be able to argue that it is? If we say Yes then the failure of classical foundationalists to provide good arguments for (33) shows that their belief in (33) is not justified on the basis of the foundations; it is implausible to maintain that (33) is self-evident. On the other hand, if the answer is No then an evidentialist cannot use a believer's inability to offer good arguments for theism as a reason for saying that the believer is irrational. YH needs to push her thinking further.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I really appreciate it. I am going to rewrite the passage on pages 218-219:

"Plantinga's first criticism confronts classical foundationalists with a dilemma: for a person S's belief P to be justified on the basis of the foundations, does S have to be able to argue that P is justified on the basis of the foundation? If the answer is 'yes', then classical foundationalists have to provide good arguments to show their belief in (33) is self-evident,

but they haven't done so; if the answer is 'No', then an evidentialist cannot use a believer's inability to offer good arguments for theism as a reason for saying that the believer is irrational. I think the second horn of the dilemma has some force: if classical foundationalists cannot provide good arguments for their basic beliefs, why do evidentialists, whose philosophical grounds are rooted in classical foundationalism, require theists to provide good arguments for their basic beliefs? In other words, it is irrational for evidentialists to require believers to meet a criterion they are not themselves able to meet, for this violates the principle of parity. However, the second horn of the dilemma is weak.: although classical foundationalists fail to show that in a rational noetic structure basic beliefs will be self-evident or incorrigible or evident to the sense itself is neither self-evident nor incorrigible, it does not follow that the thesis cannot be justified in some other way. We might use, for example, some reasoning like inference to the best explanation to arrive at an epistemology using as data various self-evident particular judgements of rationality. This can lead to rational discussions among epistemologists, which we may take to be somewhat inconclusive. It would then be irrational for a person to reject a belief solely because it is excluded by some but not other theories arrived at in such an inconclusive discussion. Now, Classical foundationalists might be able to use such way to support their thesis, while, Plantinga hasn't showed that their thesis cannot be justified in such way. As Alston has pointed out, only if we have showed that the thesis that in a rational noetic structure basic beliefs will be self-evident or incorrigible or evident to the senses can be justified in none of the ways allowed by classical foundationalism can we get the conclusion that classical foundationalism is referentially incoherent. But, no one has showed this. (Alston, 1985b, p. 298) Thus. Plantinga's first criticism of classical foundationalism is not very successful."

3. *Page 239 YH's use (and perhaps Plantinga's use—I have not checked) of the quotation from Newman. As YH's pp. 143, 146, 244, 247 together make plain, Newman was rejecting not the idea that we require evidence for the relevant beliefs, but rather the idea that evidence must be demonstrative.*

Thank you very much for pointing out this. Newman was only rejecting the idea that evidence must be demonstrative, not that we require evidence for the relevant beliefs. Plantinga quotes Newman to reject the evidential conception of rationality, but he goes beyond Newman and argues that we don't need evidence at all for theistic beliefs. This is a significant difference between Newman's approach and Plantinga's.

4. *Page 242, final para YH says without qualification that Plantinga rejects natural theology, though on p. 202 YH has already backed away from this unqualified view. In Warranted Christian Belief Plantinga explains (p.98) that his early rejection of natural theology was based on his use of an improper standard for what counted as success. The book does not contain any statement rejecting natural theology.*

Sorry for the omission. I am going to acknowledge this in footnote 256:

"It should be noted that in his early writings Plantinga rejected natural theology. Later, he changed his attitude towards natural theology in his *Warranted Christian Belief*, where he admitted that his early rejection of natural theology was based on an improper standard (Plantinga, 2000, p. 69) and that natural theology has some worth in the believer's intellectual and spiritual life (Plantinga, *ibid.* p. 179n). However, he still holds that the theistic arguments provided by natura theology are very weak (Plantinga, ibid. pp. 175-176)."

5. *Page 243 YH has not given a clear account of her distinction between justifying a belief and the belief's being justified. She might like to respond to the following points. Since I can argue that many of Aristotle's biological beliefs (ie., believings) were justified even though they were false, I can presumably argue that his beliefs (ie., believings) were justified without arguing for the truth of what he believed. The expression 'justify a belief (ie., a believing)' has at least two meanings: 1. show that someone's past or existing belief was or is justified (whether or not it is true); 2. show that to someone that he will be justified if he acquire the belief that p, by giving him a good argument for the truth of p.*

Thanks for deepening my understanding of the distinction. I am going to rewrite the passage as follows on page 252:

"Justifying a belief has at least two meanings: 1) an activity of showing that someone's past or existing belief was or is justified, regardless of whether the belief was or is in fact true; 2) an activity of showing someone that he will be justified if he acquires a belief P by providing him a good argument for the truth of B. For example, when I justify a belief P, I may show that P is reliable, coherent or evidentially supported by another justified belief Q, regardless whether it is in fact true; or I am showing to a person S that s/he will be justified if s/he believes P by providing her/him evidence for the truth of P. While, a belief's being justified is the state of a belief's being true."

6. *Pages 247-248 Plantinga is not guilty of any fallacy involving circularity. (1) Re the early publications: suppose that you believe that there is a tree in the quad because you have just seen it. Your experience does not presuppose the belief: the experience generates the belief. Admittedly, there are cases you would not have some experience if you did not already have the relevant belief. But even here the experience may properly add to the warrant of your belief. (2) Re the later publications: There is no circularity in a theist's offering an account of how belief in God comes to be warranted, in terms that make reference to divine activity. All it means is that non-theists will disagree with the account. There would be circularity in a theist's offering an argument in favour of the existence of God where at least one premise asserted that God exists or was epistemically posterior to 'God exists'. But Plantinga does not do that. The quotation at the top page 249 suggests that Plantinga takes 'belief in God is properly basic' as a premise in his account of why belief in God is properly basic, ie., of what cognitive processes underlie and confer warrant on belief in God. But there is no circularity here, any more than in someone's taking 'Belief in such-and-such elementary proposition in logic is properly basic' as a premise in his account of why it is so.*

Thank you very much for drawing my attention to the important epistemic issue. Here, I mean Plantinga has been circular in terms of justification, not of warrant. Epistemic circularity is a problem of justification, not a problem of warrant. So, I agree that there is no circularity in Plantinga's account of warrant for belief in God. But, there is circularity in his account of justification for belief in God: according to Plantinga, belief in God is epistemically justified because it is properly basic, which is immediately justified by experiences, such as reading the Bible, etc. Now, If I don't believe in God or haven't been convinced that there is a God, when I read the Bible I may think the biblical stories, just like any other mythologies from other religions, are not true, therefore, from the experience of reading the Bible, I am not immediately justified to believe that God exists and He is speaking to me. Only if I firmly believe that God exists I can immediately believe that He is speaking to me upon reading the Bible. It is true that the experience can add warrant to the belief, but here we are talking about whether the experience can immediately justify the belief. When I am seeing a tree in front of me I immediately believe that there is a tree in front of me. The belief is immediately generated by the experience; while, when I am reading the Bible, I do not immediately believe that God exists unless I have already had the belief. My belief in God is not immediately generated from the experience because the former is prior to the latter.

I am going to add a footnote on page 257 to make it clear that Plantinga's approach is circular in terms of justification, not of warrant:

"It should be noted that epistemic circularity is a problem of justification, not a problem of warrant. So, Plantinga's approach is circular merely in terms of justification, not of warrant."

7. *Page 249 Footnote 205 conflates relativism about truth with relativism about justification. There are links between them, but they should be treated as distinct. Plantinga does not hold either view. When he says that different groups of people will disagree about whether such-and such beliefs are cases of proper basicality, that does not*

commit him to the view that such disagreement is rationally irresolvable. (If YH disagrees with me on this point, let her argue for her view. Her failure to do so in the thesis illustrates her tendency to not ask sufficiently fine-grained questions about the positions she is explaining and evaluating.)

Thank you very much for clarifying the two types of relativism. I agree with you that Plantinga does not commit himself to epistemological relativism about truth. I am going to rewrite the passage (page 259) to explain the two types of epistemological relativism and make it clear that Plantinga does not commit himself to epistemological relativism about truth, but epistemological relativism about justification:

"There are two types of epistemological relativism: a) relativism about truth; b) relativism about justification. The former holds that whether a belief is true or not is relative because there is no absolute criterion for truth; the latter holds that whether a belief is justified or not is relative because there is no absolute criterion for justification. These two types of relativism are not separate from each other and they are linked together.

Now, Plantinga does not commit himself to epistemological relativism about truth, for when he says that different groups of people will disagree about whether such-and-such beliefs are cases of proper basicality, that does not commit him to the view that such disagreement is rationally irresolvable. But, he commits himself to epistemological relativism about justification. When Plantinga says that different groups of people will disagree about whether such-and-such beliefs are cases of properly basicality, he thinks that the disagreement is irrelevant to justification, and, therefore, there is no need to looking for rational solution to the disagreement. According to him, different communities can have their own criteria for justification and each of them can only be responsible for its own. I think this is a form of relativism about justification. Disagreement about epistemic criteria among communities is certainly relevant to justification and one cannot only be responsible to its own and ignore the disagreement because it provides an undercutting defeater to one's own justification."

8. *Pages 250-251 Plantinga can surely say: (1) Believers in the Great Pumpkin and the Great Oz are typically violating their epistemic duties because they are neglecting to examining count-evidence, critically scrutinise of their beliefs, etc. Maybe it is in principle possible that there are believers in the Great Pumpkin who have not been violating an epistemic duty. Nevertheless some Christians, even one whose belief in God is properly basic, may be able to argue in a non-circular way that his belief is epistemically superior to belief in the Great Pumpkin (Apollo, Athena, etc) (2) Believers in the Great Pumpkin and the Great Oz are typically not warranted in holding their beliefs, whether or not they are fulfilling their epistemic duties. This is because their beliefs arise as a result of the wrong kinds of causes. Of course these believers may deny that this is so. The matter is one that is open to rational discussion via arguments that do not beg the question.*

Thank you very much for highlighting the important issue. I fully agree with your points. However, I am not arguing that if belief in God is properly basic for theists, belief in the Great Pumpkin is properly basic for the believers and the latter has the same epistemic status as the former. What I am arguing here is that Plantinga's relativism about justification opens a door for all other irrational beliefs: if a criterion for justification is community-based and disagreement about criteria among communities is irrelevant, then belief in the Great Pumpkin (all other irrational beliefs) can have a claim to truth. The devotees of these beliefs can say that they have their own criteria and a set of examples to confirm these criteria and they are not responsible to others. I am going to include a footnote on page 260 to make my point more clear.

9. *Page 253 YH's contrast between Newman and Plantinga in terms of the difference between all-things-considered justification and prima facie justification is surely mistaken. Newman's case for theism is defeasible. Inferences to the best explanation are defeasible. (Maybe theism looks good on the basis of consideration to do with conscience, but looks unconvincing when points are also considered—eg. The problem of evil.)*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. When I say that Newman's approach provides an all-things-considered justification for belief in God, I mean that the approach provides a phenomenologically adequate and theoretically convincing justification for the belief, and there are no knockdown undercutting defeaters for the justification. The Freud-Durkheim-Mackie explanations of the source of the prescriptivity of conscience are merely rebutting defeaters and they do not constitute knockdown undercutting defeaters to Newman's. Concerning the legitimacy of Inferences to the Best Explanation, objections to the inference, such as van Fraassen's, are answerable. And if there is any problem with the inference, it is not a problem merely for Newman's explanation—it is a problem for all scientific explanations based on the inference. Concerning the problem of evil, it is only a prime facie reason against belief in God. And if it is a problem, it is not a problem merely for Newman's explanation—it is a problem for all theistic explanations. Overall, the degree of defeasibility of Newman's approach is very low. Comparing with Plantinga's approach, Newman's approach is much more resilient, weighs much more on the epistemic scale and lays a much more solid rational foundation for theism.

Perhaps, the characterization of Newman's approach as 'all-things-considered justification' is a bit too strong. I am going to replace it with 'a highly resilient justification' and add a passage there to explain what a highly resilient justification is on page 267:

"A highly resilient justification is an epistemic justification which provides a strong epistemic support to a belief so that the belief is beyond reasonable doubt relative to all bodies of evidence which are probable. It has much more epistemic weight than merely *prima facie* justification."

Part Three: My Responses to Examiner C

General responses:

Thank you very much for your valuable time spent on commenting this thesis. I am deeply gratitude, from the bottom of my heart, to your positive, encouraging and constructive comments, which not only have helped me greatly to enhance my critical thinking ability and to improve the quality of this thesis, but also have strengthened my confidence in achieving my goal.

Specific responses to each of comments:

1. *[Abstract] Question of fitness: Can you say whether Newman's resemblance to the Reformed epistemologists is rooted in common sources or whether it is a chance homology. Furthermore, why is it that they both arrive at the same conclusion though with different theological project?*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I think Newman's resemblance to the Reformed epistemologists is rooted in common philosophical sources, not in a chance homology. Although they have different theological projects to complete, Newman and the Reformed epistemologists hold similar epistemological principles, which lead them to arrive at the same conclusion.

2. [pp 1-2]: *Is it clear that the ontological argument is question begging? Kant may think so, but there are other versions, Hartshorne's, Plantinga's and others. Do all these suffer for the same problem?*

Thank you very much for pointing out this. I mean the standard version of the ontological argument formulated by Kant is question-begging. I am going to add a footnote on page 1

to acknowledge that there are other versions, such as Hartshorne's and Plantinga's, which do not suffer for the question-begging problem.

3. [p.3]: *As thoroughly as possible define 'moral phenomenology' up front. The reader needs a definition (however provisional) as background to the rest of your argument.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I am going to include a footnote on page 3 to define 'moral phenomenology':

"By 'moral phenomenology' I mean the study of moral phenomena which investigates, analyses and interprets the structure and contents of concrete moral experience and tries to bring out the metaphysical/epistemological significance of moral experience; in contrast with, on the one hand, the pure conceptual analyses of moral terms or propositions, and, on the other hand, the pure description of moral experience regardless of its metaphysical significance and suspending all moral beliefs that transcend the phenomena of moral consciousness."

4. *I like your critiques of Kant's deontological argument.*

Thank you very much for the encouraging comment.

5. [p. 4]: *There is a vast literature on the natural fallacy. Again, it is not a close question. Include a note that reflects the complexity of this argument and then provide a sketch of the reasons you think it is a fallacy (against those who deny it is a fallacy).*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I am going to include a footnote on page 5 to address the issue:

"It has been long-debated whether it is a fallacy to infer 'is' from 'ought' or 'ought' from 'is'. Some philosophers, for example, John R. Searle (1964, 1969), argue that we can

legitimately infer 'ought' from 'is' because factual statements have a normative dimension. Other philosophers, for example R. M. Hare (1969), argue that we cannot legitimately infer 'ought' from 'is' because they belong to different logical domains. So far, the debate has not been closed up.

I think it is not fallacious to infer 'ought' from 'is' because values and facts, though distinctive from each other, are not completely apart and the former supervenes on the latter. However, I do think it is fallacious to infer 'is' from 'ought' because 'ought' presupposes 'is' and so if we infer 'is' from 'ought' we beg the question."

6. *[p. 5] What of the other places where Newman takes up such issues of conscience? At least, the Oxford University sermons should be mentioned/cited in support of your argument. [p. 5 N. 16] The Grammar (as you know) was a part of a larger projected metaphysics that was never completed. Some would say the Grammar does not provide sufficient information about Newman's whole metaphysical project? It is a fragment of his epistemology and contains no criteriology at all. [p. 15 N. 16]*

Thank you very much for drawing my attention to the important issue. The other places where Newman takes up such issues of conscience are *The Parochial and Plain Sermons, The Oxford University Sermon,* and *The Apologia pro Vita Sua.* I am going to mention them in footnote 22, page 7.

I am going to add the following passage in footnote 20 on page 5

I agree that *The Grammar* was a part of Newman's larger projected metaphysics that was never completed. Nevertheless, I think it is the most important philosophical work done by Newman because it has integrated his early philosophical thoughts and ideas and thoroughly explicated his basic philosophical principles, and from it we can sketch the framework of his whole metaphysical project. Thus, we cannot regard it as merely a fragment of Newman's epistemology and containing no criteriology at all.

7."*...The experience of conscience is more universal, less controversial than religious experience, and more importantly, unlike religious experience, it does not presuppose the belief in the existence of God." Do you intend to so narrow religious experience that it does not include the experience of Buddhists and Taoists? It is clear that they do not have a belief in God or gods. Aren't you falling subject to the fallacy of assuming that which you must prove by asserting this? [p. 7] Also, some would dispute the connection between religious experience and moral experience and would argue the former is broader than the latter.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. It is true that Buddhists and Taoists do not profess a belief in a supernatural being, but, they believe in an afterlife and in a supernatural, mysterious force which is the ultimate source of the universe and controls the operation of the universe, These beliefs, if pushing further, can rationally lead to a belief in a supernatural being who is the creator and administrator of the universe. So, I do not think Buddhism and Taoism are a problem for my claim. I agree that some people take the experience of conscience as a part of their religious experience. But there are a large proportion of people who have the experience of conscience, but not religious experience. This is why I say that the experience of conscience is more universal than religious experience.

I am going to address the issue on page 8.

8. [p. 10] *Reliance on secondary authorities (like Sillem) means an argument for authority. You identify two Aristotelian themes in Newman according to Sillem. Can you identify the Aristotelian passages which are the sources for Sillem's identification of Aristotelian themes in Newman? It's always best to return to original sources to establish these generalizations.*

Thank you very much for pointing out this. I am trying to establish the connection between

Reid and Newman. I think it is important to mention Sillem there. I am going to include the Aristotelian passages which are the sources for Sillem's identification of Aristotelian themes in Newman on page 11.

9. [p. 14-15] *Again, the same question may be raised with regard to Sillem's identification of Butler's influence on Newman. Back to the sources!*

Sorry for the omission. I am going to include the sources for Sillem's identification on page 14.

10. [p. 17] *Newman's example of a polygon N sides whose sides are multiplied to ∞ becomes a circle. Is this an example of math induction or probability? If the former, then Newman's example is not apt. You must engage Newman's thought more critically, here.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I am going to add a paragraph there to address the issue on page 17:

"One may take Newman's above example as an example of mathematical induction, not of probability, because, on the surface, the example takes the form of mathematical induction: for any polygon P and its sides n, when n tends to be infinite, p gradually becomes a circle.

Now, if Newman uses the example as a mathematical induction, he cannot legitimately say that it warrants the conclusion 'as good as proved', 'amounting to a proof', and it cannot be otherwise (*G. A.* p. 244).

I think Newman uses the example as one of probable reasoning, not a mathematical induction, because by using the example he is illustrating the likelihood of a polygon to become a circle when its sides tend to be infinite. Also, from the context in which Newman uses the example, we can determine that Newman uses the example as one of probable reasoning: preceding the example, Newman says: "I consider, then, that the principle of

concrete reasoning is parallel to the method of proof which is the foundation of modern mathematical science, as contained in the celebrated lemma with which Newton opens his *Principia* (*G. A.* pp. 243-244). Later, he comments that Newton uses the logical form of reductio ad absurdum in establishing his lemma (*G. A.* 244-245). The lemma Newman mentioned here is Newton's Lemma 1 in his *Principia*, which states: "Quantities, and the ratios of quantities, which in any finite time converge continually to equality, and before the end of that time approach nearer to each other than by given difference, become ultimately equal. If you deny it, suppose them to be ultimately unequal, and let D be their ultimate difference. Therefore they cannot approach nearer to equality than by that difference D; which is contrary to the conclusion."[288] From here, we can clearly see that Newman uses the example of polygon as one of probable reasoning, not a mathematical induction.

For Newman, probable reasoning takes the logical form of reductio ad absurdum, that is, if we suppose the conclusion be otherwise it will be against the antecedent probability, so the conclusion cannot be otherwise. This is why he thinks probable reasoning can reach a conclusion 'as undeniable', 'as if it were proved', and 'amounting to a proof'".

11. *In your citation of Plantinga "Newman echoes Reid," This does not establish a historical connection but a homology in their thinking. The point of this chapter, as I understand it, is to establish historical influences, which this does not. A note about historical influence would not be misplaced, I think.*

Thank you very much for pointing out this. I am going to add a passage on pages 20 to specify Reid's influences on Newman in terms of certainty about our ordinary beliefs:

"Plantinga cited the passage from the Grammar where he thinks Newman echoed Reid: 'Nor is the assent which we give to facts limited to the range of self-consciousness. We are sure beyond all hazard of a mistake, that our own self is not the only being existing; that

[288] See: Newton (1725): Section I: "Method of first and last ratios" in Book I: The Motion of Bodies", p. 25.

there is an external world; that it is a system with parts and a whole, a universe carried on by laws; and that the future is affected by the past. We accept and hold with an unqualified assent, that the earth, considered as a phenomenon, is a globe; that all its regions see the sun by turns; that there are vast tracts on it of land and water; that there are really existing cities on definite sites, which go by the names of London, Paris, Florence and Madrid.' (G. A. pp. 133-134) Does this passage suggest a homology in Reid's and Newman's thinking, or reflect Reid's influence on Newman? I think from this passage we can see Reid's influence on Newman: a) Reid gives a very similar example, in his Essays on the Intellectual Powers, to illustrate that non-demonstrative reasoning can lead to certainty which is as sure as demonstrative reasoning: "That there is a city as Rome, I am as certain as of any proposition in Euclid; but the evidence is not demonstrative, but of that kind which philosophers call probable. Yet, in common language, it would sound oddly to say, it is probable there is such a city as Rome; because it would imply some degree of doubt or uncertainty"(Reid, 1785, VII, iii, 482b); b) Newman did extensive studies on Reid's Inquiry and Essays, and he must know Reid's this passage and his thinking. Thus, we cannot say it is merely a homology in their thinking."

12. *[p. 20] You need to distinguish between Foundationalism and classical Foundationalism as set and subset in a note, here. Otherwise, a reader might find an (apparent) contradiction between Plantinga's denial of it and your affirmation of Foundationalism in Reid and Newman.*

Thank you for the suggestion. I am going to include a footnote on page 21:

"The foundationalism in Reid and Newman is not, as we shall see, the classical type of foundationalism, which is a subset of foundationalism. Classical foundationalism requires that basic beliefs at the foundation are self-evident or evident to the sense, or incorrigible, and the inferencial relation between the foundation and the beliefs basing on the foundation is strictly deductive or inductively valid. The foundationalism in Reid and Newman is a weak version of foundationalism."

13. *[Note 25 p. 21] Explain the difference between an idea and a representation.*

Thank you very much for the suggestion. I am going to explain the difference as follows (page 22):

"The word 'idea' has several referents. It can refer to the content/thought of the mind, or a mental representation of an object. An idea, in the former sense, is a concept; while, in the latter sense, it is an image or impression of an object left in the mind. Reid uses the word 'idea' in the latter sense.

14. [pp.22] *Can you illustrate Reid's distinction between sensation and perception with respect to a tree? It's clear enough with regard to pain but what about objects in the external world? It would make the case clearer to apply it to the same conscious content.*

Thank you very much for deepening my thinking. I am going to add a footnote (note 43 page 23) to illustrate Reid's distinction between sensation and perception with respect to a tree:

"Here, Reid is using two different things—one mental and another external—to distinguish perception from sensation. Is perception different from sensation with respect to the same external object, such as a tree? When I see a palm tree through my window, for example, I have a perception of the tree which is tall, straight, and the leaves are green and gently waving in the wind. At the same time, I also have certain sensation, such as the greenness and movement of palm tree leaves, etc. in my mind. Now, the object of my perception is the tree external to my mind and when the tree is chopped I cannot have a perception of it any more; while the object of my sensation is the greenness, movement of the palm tree leaves reflected in my mind and when the tree is chopped I can still have the sensation impressed in my mind. Thus, my perception of the tree is different from my sensation of the tree."

15. [p.22] *Object of sensation and sensation are not real. If not real, what? Certainly conceptually distinct. What is the status of conceptual distinction?*

Thank you very much for commenting on this. I agree with you that at least there is a conceptual distinction between the object of sensation and sensation itself. However, I don't think Reid denies this. When he says the distinction is not real he means that the difference between the object of sensation and sensation, unlike the difference between the object of perception and perception, cannot be distinguished metaphysically because the object of sensation is the same as the content of sensation. When we feel a pain in the head, for example, the content of our feeling is exactly same as the pain felt; after we take pain-killer the pain disappears and we have no pain-feeling in the head any more. Metaphysically, the object of sensation and the content of sensation cannot be distinguished as different entities or relations. It is in this sense that Reid says the distinction between the object of sensation and sensation is not real. I am going to add a footnote (note 44 page 23) to highlight your point.

16. *I am not sure the complete Coperhaver quotation on p. 26 goes much further in explaining the distinction between mediate and immediate realism. Can you explain what "intrinsic character' is vs. "immediate relation?" This needs some exposition, perhaps in a note.*

Thank you very much for the suggestion. Instead of the complete quotation, I am going to paraphrase what Coperhaver says about the distinction between mediate and immediate realism and add a note to explain 'intrinsic character' and 'extrinsic relation' (page 26):

"(Coperhaver) argues that mediation is not the dividing line between direct and indirect realist and it is the way how mediating entities represent external objects that is the dividing line between direct and indirect realists. For indirect realists, mediating entities represent external objects via intrinsic characters; for direct realists, mediating entities

represent external objects via extrinsic relations (Coperhaver, ibid. p. 62). By "intrinsic characters" Coperhaver means the characters of mediating entities which are internal to the mind; by "extrinsic relations' she means the relations of external objects which are external to the mind. I agree with Coperhaver that there must be mediating entities or relations between perception and external objects, and, thus, what divides direct and indirect realists lies in the way how mediating entities or relations represent external objects, not whether there are mediating entities or relations between them. For example, when we perceive a rose, there must be certain mediating entities, such as our senses of sight, touch, or smell, between our perception and the rose. Otherwise, we will be unable to perceive it."

17. *Your qualification on p. 28 "our perception as a mental power, is reliable, not that ..." is very good, I think.*

Thank you very much for your encouraging comment.

18. [p. 29] *'Hypothetical realism 'is not explained in a way that is clear. Is that all there is to it? Seems trivial. What are the evidences for it? How are they established?*

Thank you very much for pointing out this. I am going to rewrite this passage to explain the reason why Meynell refers Newman's theory of perception as "hypothetical realism" and go back to the original source to see if Meynell's comment can be justified (pages 29-30):

"By 'hypothetical realism' Meynell means the theory which "admits that we perceive nothing but our own sensations which are subjective', but "postulates an external object as a hypothesis to account for the sensation", without proving the existence of such object (Dessain, *ibid.* p. 312). The reason why Meynell takes Newman's theory of perception as hypothetical realism is because Newman, in the *Grammar,* holds that we perceive an external object instinctively from sensation, we infer the existence of the external world from individual sensible phenomena by instinctive perception, without the proof of logical inference (*G. A.* p 48). Now, Meynell comments, sensation is subjective and it does not

give the objective reality because, to be objective, a thing must produce resistance and 'there is no such thing as a sensation of resistance," so, the belief in the external world inferred from sensation, without a proof is merely a hypothesis (Dessain, vol. XXIV, pp. 306-307, 312). Thus, he thinks that Newman holds a hypothetical realism (Dessain, *ibid.* pp. 306-307).

I think Newman does not only hold a hypothetical realism, but also a direct realism. This is because he doesn't use *sensation* in the idealistic sense of the term that Meynell understands. He uses the term *sensation* in the sense of experience, which obviously contains resistance and, thus, is objective (*Dessain*, ibid. p. 309). Sensation, according to Newman, is not purely subjective and it reveals the objective reality; and the belief that there is an external world is gained from sensible phenomena by the Illative Sense, not by pure logical inference. Thus, it is an absolute truth, not merely a hypothesis. So, Newman doesn't only hold a hypothetical realism, but also a direct realism.[289]

19. *[p. 30 3rd full paragraph, 1st sentence] 'proposition' not 'propositions.'*

Thank you very much for pointing out the mistake.

20. *[p. 31, 1st full paragraph], 'foundationalism' is misspelled.*

Thank you very much for pointing out the mistake.

21. *[p. 33] Howard-Snyder's argument:; "every cognitive state with content would be in need of justification. But this consequence is false." Why false? Provide a brief synopsis of his reasoning in a footnote.*

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[289]Newman made this clearly in his reply to Meynell: " 'Hypothetical realism,' yes—if conclusions are necessary conditional. But I consider Ratiocination far higher, more subtle, wider, more certain than logical Inference—and its principle of action is the 'illative Sense,' all which I treat of towards the end of the volume. If I say that ratiocination leads to absolute truth, am I still a hypothetical realist?" (Dessain, *ibid.* p. 309)

Thanks for drawing my attention to the important issue. I am going to add a footnote (note 57 page 35) to explain why Howard-Snyder thinks BonJour's premise 2 is false:

"Howard-Snyder's reasoning against BonJour's premise 2 is that not every cognitive state with representational content is in need of justification. He distinguishes an assertive cognitive state/aspect from a non-assertive cognitive state/aspect and argues that only an assertive cognitive state/aspect is in need of justification because it involves a commitment to the truth or obtaining of its content. A non-assertive cognitive state/aspect is not in need of justification because it does not involve a commitment to the truth or obtaining of its content. It is not the representational content of a cognitive state that entails its need to be justified, but its assertive aspect. Thus, although it has a representational content, an experiential state is not in need of justification because it does not have an assertive aspect. According to Howard-Snyder, BonJour seems to have confused the assertive aspect of a cognitive state with its representational content when he argues that an experiential state is in need of justification (Howard-Snyder, 1998, pp. 173-174)."

22. *[p. 34] Very top of page 'generate' for 'generates' and 'transmit' for 'transmitting'.*

Thank you very much for pointing out these mistakes.

23. *[p. 34] Your discussion of reason, here is very interesting. Reason as you have it is very much like the Greek aitia. A cause/reason for something being (as it is). Expand this discussion a bit. You are on to something important, I think.*

Thank you very much for the encouraging comment. I am going to try to expand it as follows on pages 36-37:

"... The reason for my belief is not propositional or propositional-like, but a cluster of

experience: my experience of the flash of lightning in the dark sky and the sounds of cracking thunder and gusty wind give me a sufficient reason to believe that there is a storm coming. I don't need any proposition(s) or a proposition-like cognitive state to justify the belief. Can a rational person accuse me of being arbitrary or irrational to hold such a belief without a propositional reason? This example shows that there is an end of epistemic justification, at which foundationalists can exit from the so-called infinite regress.

Klein may reply that, in the above example, my experience is merely the cause of my belief, not the reason for my belief because the cause of a belief is different from the reason for the belief—they belong to different logical realms. So, I still need a proposition or propositional-like cognitive state to justify my belief. Otherwise, I would be arbitrary or commit myself to infinitism.

I think the reason for a belief and the cause of the belief cannot be completely apart. A cause is something which brings something else into being and at the same time serves as grounds for believing the existence of that thing. Using above example, my experience of the flash of lightning in the dark sky and the sounds of cracking thunder and gusty wind not only causes me to believe that there is a storm coming but also serves as grounds for my belief that there is a storm coming. It is in this sense that a cause can be a reason for a belief.

From above discussion, we can see that Klein's dilemma, fails on the same grounds as BonJour's."

24. *[p. 35, 2nd full paragraph] You have "construes." Do you want "constitutes" or something like it?*

Thank you very much for pointing out the mistake. I mean "constitutes".

25. *[p. 38] "Or-here's yet a third possibility—does ...." Longer parenthetical dashes.*

Thank you very much for pointing out the mistake.

26. *[p. 39] Your disagreement with Wolterstorff and Kant is not clear. Provide a paragraph of explanation.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I have changed this part according to Examiner B's comment. I am quoting his comment and my responses here:

"Page 39 YH's argument against Wolterstorff is feeble. For the cluster of opinions of the multitude is not the same as what we all do and must take for granted in our daily lives. A better argument against Wolterstorff would be that his (b) is ruled out by the quotation she gives on p. 37 from Reid's VI, ii, 425b.

Thank you very much for the valuable comment and suggestion. I am going to rewrite the passage as follows (page 41):

I do not agree with Wolterstorff's interpretation here, for this interpretation is ruled out by what Reid has said about common sense, that is, common sense is a branch of reason which makes non-inferential judgments on things (1785, VI, ii, 425b).

It is worth to note Kant's interpretation of Reid's common sense here. According to Kant, Reid's common sense has nothing to do with human reason, but a cluster of opinions of the multitude. Therefore, Kant has made severe criticisms to Reid's appealing to the common sense and thought that it is but "an oracle when no rational justification for one's position can be advanced" and 'it is but an appeal to the opinion of the multitude, of whose applause the philosopher is ashamed, while the popular charlatan glories and boasts in it" (Kant, 1783, 'Introduction", p. 7).

As we have seen above, for Reid, common sense is a part of human reason, that is, non-

inferencial, reason, the product of which is rational consideration, not a cluster of uncritical opinions shared by the multitude. Thus, Kant has misinterpreted Reid's common sense and his criticisms of Reid's appealing to common sense are inadequate."

27. *[pp. 38-39] Wolterstorff is misspelled a number of times in the text. Please correct.*

Thank you very much for pointing out these mistakes. I have corrected them.

28. *[p. 46. 3rd full paragraph, pg. bottom] Do you mean to say "these first principles are not infallible they are only contingent truths"? Explain their contingency after their fallibility.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I mean, for Reid, what these first principles assert are not infallible, thus, these first principles that assert them are only contingent truths. I am going to rewrite the passage as follows (page 48):

"According to Reid, what these first principles assert are not infallible, thus, these first principles that assert them are only contingent truths. Our consciousness, memory, reasoning, for example, can make mistakes, and, therefore, the first principles that assert them are not necessary truths, but only contingent truths. However, for Reid, the fallibility of our mental faculties does not imply that they are fallacious."

29. *[pp. 51-52] A comparison between Reid and Newman w/r to first principles would be helpful right here.*

Thank you very much for the valuable suggestion. I am going to include a comparison between Newman's Proposition 1 and Reid's Principle 3 and Principle 7 (pages 52-53):

> "To see this, let us have a look at Reid's Principle 3, Principle 7 and Principle 12, and Newman's Proposition 1 and Proposition 5 again:

Reid's Principles:

3. Another first principle I take to be—That those things did really happen which I distinctly remember.

7. Another first principle is—That the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious.

12. The last principle of contingent truths I mention is, That, in the phenomena of nature, what is to be will probably be like to what has been in similar circumstances.

Newman's Propositions:

1. Sometimes our trust in our powers of reasoning and memory, that is, our implicit assent to their telling truly, is treated as a first principle.

5. Another of these presumptions is the belief in causation.

We can immediately see the differences between Reid and Newman here. In Principle 3, Reid uses an active voice "I take", not a passive voice "is taken". Also, he firmly believes the reliability of memory and reasoning in Principle 7; while, in Proposition 1, Newman uses a passive voice "is treated", not an active voice "I treat" or "I take". Also, he uses a time measure word sometimes to modify our trust in our powers of reasoning and memory is treated as a first principle. In Principle 12, Reid takes the law of causation as one of principles of contingent truths; While, in Proposition 5, Newman uses the phrase "another of these presumptions", not "another of these first principles". Obviously, he takes the law of causation merely as a presumption, not a first principle. From these differences we can clearly see that Newman is in disagreement with Reid that our trust on powers of memory and reasoning, and our belief in causation are first principles. In the following, I am going

to explain why Newman doesn't take our trust on powers of memory and reasoning, and our belief in causation as first principles."

30. *[pp. 51-53] How can #5 be a first principle in light of your discussion of Newman on p. 53? It would seem to be based on prior first principles. Explain. Your explanation on p. 55 of how a 1st principle can be both self-evident and the result of inductive generalization deserves further discussion because it is important. Explain (with an example) the difference between psychological and epistemic immediacy and why psychological immediacy is adequate.*

Thank you very much for these valuable comments. I am going to explain them on pages 55, 57-58:

"From above we can see that Newman obviously doesn't take Proposition 5 as a first principle and only takes it as a presumption. He challenges those philosophers, including Reid, who take our belief in causation as a first principle by questioning their ground or reason for taking up the position. Now, on what ground or reason do Reid and other philosophers take our belief in causation as a first principle? Is it the unfailing uniformity of nature? It cannot be, says Newman, for the unfailing uniformity of nature is the very point which has to be proved (*G. A.* p. 55).

The ground or reason for Reid and other philosophers to take our belief in causation as a first principle is some prior first principles, such as, there are space and time in the universe; every event in the universe occurs at certain time within certain space and it is governed by certain law. To assume otherwise will be contrary to our intuition."

I am going to extend my explanation of 1st principle as follows:

"It seems that there is an inconsistency between Newman's characterizations of first principles here: if a first principle is self-evident, in the sense that it is epistemologically

immediate, it cannot be the result of inductive reasoning; if a first principle is the result of inductive reasoning, it cannot be self-evident in the sense of epistemic immediacy. To determine whether there is an inconsistency here it is very important to understand in what sense Newman uses the term 'self-evident'.

I take it that by 'self-evident' Newman means psychological immediacy, not epistemic immediacy. Psychological immediacy refers to the immediate apprehension of the truth of the proposition in question, without being conscious of any argumentation; while, epistemic immediacy refers to the immediate apprehension of the truth of proposition in question without inference of any kind involved. It should be noted that psychological immediacy does not imply epistemic immediacy, that is, the immediate apprehension of the truth of a proposition in question without being conscious of any argumentation does not imply that there is no inference of any kind involved. Take an example, a fine physician, by looking at his patient's face, immediately diagnoses that the patient is suffering from iron deficiency. The physician reaches the diagnosis immediately without being conscious of any reasoning process in his mind. This does not imply that, however, there is no reasoning of any kind involved in the diagnosis. Suppose the patient doubts the physician's diagnosis by asking why he thinks she is suffering from iron deficiency. The physician explains to the patient that because her face is very pale and eyelids are very dark, these indicate the shortage of iron in the blood system. When the physician reached the diagnosis he wasn't conscious of any mental processes of reasoning at all, just immediately reached the conclusion. Is his diagnosis justified without being conscious of reasoning processes in his mind? In other words, is the physician's psychological immediacy adequate for his diagnosis? I think so, for, the physician, due to his expertise and experience, doesn't need to make conscious reasoning in his mind in order to reach a diagnosis and his immediate diagnosis is warranted by his expertise and experience.

From above example, we have seen that psychological immediacy does not imply epistemic immediacy. Now, as I understand, Newman uses the term 'self-evident' in the sense of psychological immediacy, not epistemic immediacy. Since psychological

immediacy does not imply epistemic immediacy, there is no inconsistency between Newman's characterizations of the first principles being self-evident and being the result of inductive reasoning."

31. *[p. 57] As stated above, a sketch of a taxonomy of the kinds of Foundationalism presented earlier would help further your argument.*

Thank you very much for the valuable suggestion again. I have done so.

32. *[p. 58] 'The' before '[S]ceptical' in the last paragraph bottom.*

Thanks for correcting the mistake.

33. *[p. 59] 'anti-sceptical' for 'anti-scepticism'?*

Thanks for correcting the mistake.

34. *[p. 59, Note 49] "scepticism cannot be an answer." 'What Reid attacks ... ."*

Thanks for correcting the mistake.

35. *[p. 62] Explain Wittgenstein's notion of acting as the "bottom" of language games. This is an important difference, I think.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment and suggestion. I am going to include a footnote on page 65 to explain this:

"According to Wittgenstein, language does not always convey thoughts because, for a large class of cases, the meanings of words lie in their uses in the language (P. I. 43). There are countless uses of words in daily life and in different contexts they have different meanings.

He calls various uses of language as "language-games", which is meant that speaking of language is part of an activity, not asserting that there are objects which correspond to words in the language. Wittgenstein uses the example of playing chess to illustrate this: "We only understand the statement 'This is the king' if we know the rules of chess and thereby understand the context of surroundings which give the terms their meaning" (P. I. 31). For Wittgenstein, religious and ethical languages are typical examples of those languages whose meanings lie in their uses in certain contexts. Thus, religious and ethical beliefs, to him, have no truth values, and to believe them is simply to acting according to certain rules and there is no need of theoretical justification of them. That is, acting is the foundation of these beliefs."

36. *[p. 63] 'anti-sceptical' for 'anti-sceptic'.*

Thanks for correcting the mistake.

37. *[p. 66] The problem, as I see it, is that Reid's maintaining the certainty of Rome's existence may be considered questionable because a phenomenological account of what that certainty is/how that experience is felt is not provided.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I am going to include a footnote on page 69 to highlight this point:

"Reid's account of Rome's existence may be considered questionable because a phenomenological account of what that certainty is/how that experience is felt is not included. In a very similar example, Newman includes a phenomenological explanation of what that certainty is/how that experience is felt, which makes his account of certainty through non-demonstrative reasoning better than Reid's."

38. *[p. 67] You know, of course, that Newman uses the same metaphor of rope and filaments? It would be useful to compare this passage with Reid, if not here, elsewhere. A*

footnote, perhaps.

Thank you very much for the valuable suggestion. I am going to include a footnote on page 70) to highlight that Newman uses a similar metaphor to illustrate the strength of probable reasoning, and then compare Newman's analogy with Reid's in the text:

"Newman uses a very similar metaphor as Reid's to illustrate the strength of probable reasoning. In a letter to J. Canon Walker, Newman uses a cable to represent probable reasoning and illustrates that the strength of probable reasoning is like the strength of a cable: a cable is made up of a number of separate threads and each of them is feeble, yet together as sufficient as an iron rod. Likewise, probable reasoning, which is assemblage of probabilities, separately insufficient for certainty, but together, is irrefragable (Dessain, C. S & Gornall, T. 1978, XXI, p. 146). We can see that Newman, like Reid, takes probable reasoning as sufficient for certainty. However, I think Newman gives more credit to probable reasoning than Reid, for he uses a cable to represent probable reasoning, while Reid uses a rope—a cable is certainly stronger than a rope and, therefore, bears more weight than a rope. Moreover, Newman maintains that where a probable reasoning is sufficient for the conclusion, one would be irrational and unreasonable if one demands a rigid demonstration, just as one demands an iron bar when a cable is sufficient for bear the weight (ibid.)."

39. *[p.69] "It seems puzzling" Explain the difficulty before you resolve it. Also, don't be afraid to disagree with Newman. Genius that he was, you might have a better idea.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I am going to rewrite the passage as follows (page 73-74):

"It seems puzzling that Newman takes the logical form of probable reasoning as the reductio ad absurdum. As we know, the probability P of the occurrence of an event e, i.e. P (e) ranges from zero (impossibility) to one (certainty), depending on the proportion of

actual occurrence to the total number of possible occurrence. Thus, in a probable reasoning, only if P (e) = 1 the conclusion arrived through the reasoning is certain; while, in a reasoning by the reductio ad absurdum, the conclusion arrived does not range from impossibility to certainty. It is certain unconditionally. Apparently, probable reasoning and the reductio ad absurdum take very different logical forms. How can Newman legitimately take the logical form of probable reasoning as the reductio ad absurdum?

I understand that the reason Newman takes the logical form of probable reasoning as the *reductio ad absurdum* is: in concrete matter when converging probabilities are so great as reaching a certain degree that we cannot help to accept the conclusion, which is beyond the reasonable doubt and it is irrational to deny the conclusion because it will lead to the rejection of the available converging probabilities. We can use The Neyman-Pearson's method used in testing hypotheses to justify Newman here: according to this method, to argue for hypothesis H, we calculate the probability of the actual data given *not-H*. If this probability is below a given threshold (eg 1%) then we treat this as a reductio ad absurdum of not-H. (S. Kotz & N. L. Johnson, 1985, p. 226)"

40. *[72] Does what you say about Reid and Newman and the naturalistic fallacy refute your own earlier characterization of it? Why not? This is why you need an earlier note on this matter to cover your bases.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I understand why you asked me to add a note to characterize the naturalistic fallacy in an earlier comment.

41. *[pp. 80-82] I would like to suggest that the naturalist and the providential reading of Newman's epistemology are correlative to the Thomist reading of Newman and the Augustinian reading of Newman.*

Thank you very much for the valuable suggestion. I am going to include a footnote on page 83) to highlight this point:

"Here, I am trying to give a naturalistic interpretation of Newman's epistemology along the British naturalist tradition that Newman apparently belongs to. This does not, however, exclude other interpretations of Newman's epistemology along other readings. The naturalistic interpretation of Newman's epistemology is, in fact, corresponding to the Thomist reading of Newman. One can give a providential interpretation of Newman's epistemology along the Augustinian reading of Newman."

42. *[pp.83ff.] First paragraph 'epistemologist' or 'epistemological'?*

Thanks for pointing out this. I mean 'epistemologist', not 'epistemological'.

43. *[p. 85] For St. Thomas, syderesis as habit can only be infallible if habitually well-formed. It is not infallible in an absolute sense.*

Thank you very much for pointing out this. I am going to include a footnote on page 88 to highlight this point:

"It should be noted that, for St. Thomas, syderesis as habit can only be infallible if habitually well-formed. It is not infallible in an absolute sense."

44. *[p. 83] "Part One [:] The Etymology ..."*

Thanks for correcting the mistake.

45. *[p. 86] "Part [T]wo [:] Various Conceptions ..."*

Thanks for correcting the mistakes.

46. *[pp. 89 & 103, 1st full paragraph (top page)] what happened to moral resolve as a*

fourth element of conscience? Why does it drop out? Should you folded it into #6 or should it remain a separate feature? Explain.

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I have folded moral resolve into the sense of duty, because, phenomenologically, the sense of duty has two components: a) to recognizing the duty; b) having a desire or will to perform the duty. If we treated moral resolve separately from the sense of duty, it would not be phenomenologically adequate. Also, I think that without moral resolve the sense of duty will lose its paramount significance in morality. I am going to add a note (note 106 page 102) to highlight this.

47. *[p. 89] As per your discussion on this page: What do you make of St Thomas's and Aristotle's claims that the more automatic a moral decision, the more virtuous? Here the judgement would seem to be so quick as to be automatic.*

Thank you very much for deepening my understanding of the issue. I think there are two interpretations: First, the moral agent Aristotle and St Thomas consider are different from ordinary moral agents like us—they are much more perfect than us. Therefore, the more autonomous their decisions are, the more virtuous. Second, they use the word 'automatic' in the sense of the Greek word automatos (acting independently), not in the sense of the modern English word 'automatic'(acting quickly, without conscious thought). Understood in the Greek sense of the word 'automatic', Aristotle's and St Thomas' claim implies the significance of self-deliberation when making a moral decision, which is certainly morally intelligible. Only if the word 'automatic' is understood in the sense of acting quickly, without conscious thought, what Aristotle and St Thomas claim is morally unintelligible because a moral decision which is made more automatically has more chances to be a wrong decision, which, apparently, has less virtue than a moral decision made with more deliberation, which has a better chance of leading us to right decisions.

I am going to add a footnote (note 195 page 199) to highlight your point.

48. *[pp. 92-93] With regard to the imperative aspect of conscience: What happens when one whose authority one admires judges one's behaviour to be immoral? Is this without imperative impact on one's conscience? Can't one feel guilt because one has been indicated by a virtuous model? Unravel this complicating example.*

Thank you very much for highlighting the important issue. I am going to include a footnote (note 197 page 203) to address this:

"Of course, the authority one admires has impact on the imperative aspect of one's conscience and one can feel guilt because one's behaviour has been indicated as being immoral by the authority one admires. This doesn't undermine, however, my position here. This is because the judgement delivered by the authority would be same as the judgement delivered by one's conscience, otherwise, one would not admire the authority."

49. *[p. 94] Bottom paragraph: There is something odd about the example you provide. Is this a question of it not being a judgement of conscience or of it being a defective judgement of conscience? How would characterizing it as the latter change your analysis?*

Thank you very much for pointing out this. This is a question of it not being a judgement of conscience. To further reply to Ryle's claim that one's conscience cannot make a judgement on others' conduct, I am *conceding* that there are cases in which one's judgement is not a judgement of conscience because the judgement does not have an effect on one's action and emotion. But this does not imply that one's conscience cannot make judgement on others' conduct—if one does not only make a judgement on another's conduct but also acts upon the judgement, the judgement is a judgement of one's conscience.

50. *[pp. 101-103] Very perceptive analysis of moral emotions.*

Thank you very much for the compliment.

51. *[p. 103] Top partial paragraph: "But if the emotions Oakley ... were also to include ... then it would be hard ... ." inelegant.*

Sorry for the awkward wording. I am going to rewrite the passage as follows (page 107):

"I think Oakley should include the emotions that constitute a bad conscience in his discussion, such as shame, guilt, remorse, etc. because these emotions have paramount moral significance and play a central role in morality."

52. *[p. 104] 'when we are in love with them over a long time.' for 'in the case of long-period love.'*

Sorry for the awkward wording. I am going to change the sentence as follows (page 109):

"It is true that we do not always have bodily feelings every moment when we are in love with someone over a long time."

53. *[p. 107, 1st full paragraph] 'still persist' for 'still persists', 'feelings' for 'feeling'?*

Thanks for correcting these mistakes.

54. *[p. 109] 'T' in theory to be captalized.*

Thanks for correcting the mistake.

55. *[p. 114] "Chapter 3 [:] Newman's Conception of Conscience" Conscience may not be learned but may it be strengthened by learning?*

Thank you very much for pointing out this. Yes, conscience can be strengthened by

learning. This is why moral education is important. I am going to include the following passage on page 125-126):

"To say that conscience is an original element in human nature does not exclude that conscience can be strengthened by learning. One's conscience can be and needs to be fostered and strengthened through learning in order to function properly. Otherwise, it can become dysfunctional…"

56. *[p. 116] Newman argues outside the Grammar that conscience can be diminished by no use or bad use.*

Thanks for pointing out this. I am going to highlight this on page 125.

57. *[p. 118, 1st top incomplete paragraph] How does the last sentence of this paragraph relate to what precedes it? Explain the connection in the body of your dissertation at some length.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I am going to rewrite the passage (pages 124-126):

"From the above discussion we have seen that conscience, in Freud, is identified with the superego, and the operation of the superego is non-cognitive and unconscious. We can, therefore, draw the conclusion that the Freudian's conception of conscience is not a moral conscience, for a moral conscience, as I have argued in Chapter 2, must be cognitive, conative and emotive.

Newman's conception of conscience, as we will see in the following sections of this chapter, is very different from the Freudian conception of conscience: it is a mental capacity which has ontological status in human mind and it is a moral conscience which is cognitive, conative and emotive. Thus, the Freudian account of the origin of conscience

cannot undermine Newman's claim to the originality of conscience in human nature.

The developmentalist conception of conscience takes conscience as merely a learned phenomenon produced by upbringing or socialization, no ontological element involved in. I think this is incorrect. Conscience cannot be merely a learned phenomenon produced either by upbringing or by socialization, no ontological element involved in. This is because that if conscience were merely a learned phenomenon produced by upbringing or socialization and there is no ontological element involved in, a society would have no foundation for morality: a most vicious person shouldn't be blamed for her/his moral character because, by supposition, it is her/his upbringing or socialization, not her/his nature, that is responsible for her/his moral character. From this, we can see that conscience must be rooted in human nature and it is, as Newman says, an original element in human nature.

To say that conscience is an original element in human nature does not, however, exclude that there is a developmental condition for the proper function of conscience. One's conscience needs to be fostered and developed in order to function properly,[290] just as one's language capacity needs to be fostered and developed in order to be able to use language. This does not, however, undermine the originality of conscience in human nature. Without the original element in human nature, human beings cannot, no matter how much training they have had, make moral judgement, have moral emotion, etc., just as a species that lacks innate language ability, no matter how much training they are given, cannot use language.

From above discussion, we can draw the conclusion that the developmentalist conception of conscience, which identifies conscience as merely a learned phenomenon, cannot undermine Newman's claim to the originality of conscience."

58. *[p. 119] "Part Two [:] The Nature of Conscience*

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[290] Newman argues outside the *Grammar* that conscience can be diminished by no use or bad use. See his *The Oxford University Sermons* (Newman, 1843)

Sorry for making the mistake.

59. *[p. 121] Middle of page: Good conclusion!*

Thanks for the compliment.

60. *[pp. 119-123] First, how do you square Newman's avoidance of the word "power" as designating conscience with your own attempt to call it such? Second, how is a capacity same or different from a power? Explain what a capacity is here and how it avoids the extension of power.*

Thank you very much for drawing my attention to the important issue. I am going to include a footnote (note 127 page 129) to explain this:

'As we know, Newman is engaging in a phenomenological investigation of conscience to gain a real assent to existence of God. Thus, his interest is the phenomena of conscience as a mental state or act, not the abstract concept of conscience as a mental power or faculty. And also, in disagreement with Reid, Newman thinks it is improper to say that we can trust our mental powers or faculties because we have no direct experience of mental powers or faculties, but mental states or acts. This is why he avoids the use of the word 'power' or 'faculty' to designate conscience. This does not, however, imply that Newman denies the ontological status of conscience as a mental power or faculty. We can see this from his claim that human beings by nature have a conscience and his comparison of conscience with other mental powers, such as memory, reasoning etc. Thus, I insist that the nature of conscience, for Newman, is a mental power or faculty or capacity. The words "power", "faculty" and "capacity" here refer to a mental ability. I deliberately choose the word "capacity" to designate conscience, instead of "power' or 'faculty' because it contains the closest meaning of 'ability', and also, it is dispositional, which does not have the implication of activeness that the word 'power' has, neither the implication of

entitativeness that the word 'faculty' has, so that it can avoid some objections to the ontological status of conscience."

61. *[p. 123] "Boekraad" for "Beokkraad" [recheck spelling of this last name.]*

Sorry for making the mistake. I have checked the spelling. It is 'Boekraad".

62. *[pp. 119-135] Very interesting and illuminating. Your reading of conscience in Newman throughout part 2 is very helpful.*

Thank you very much for the compliment.

63. *[p. 129] "Part Four [:] Three-Fold ..."*

Sorry for omitting the punctuation repeatedly.

64. *[p. 136] "Chapter 4 [:] ... Part One [.] ..."*

Oh! I omitted the punctuation again.

65. *[pp. 137-138] What is the relationship between your discussing of real assent/propositions and Newman's Neoplatonism? What is the Neoplatonic understanding of the relationship between images and the real? How is this a neglected dimension of Newman's epistemology?*

Thank you very much for drawing my attention to the very important issue in Newman studies. I am going to include a footnote (note 140 page 144) to address this issue:

"My discussion of real assent/propositions is devoid of Newman's Neoplatonism because I am trying to interpret Newman within the British naturalist/empiric tradition. However, if

we interpret Newman within the Augustinian tradition we can see the Neoplatonic elements in his epistemology, which has been neglected due to different readings of Newman.

According to Neoplatonism, the universe consists of the hierarchy of the One, Intellect and Soul. The One is the ultimate source of the whole universe; the Intellect consists of abstract entities (Plato's Forms), making up the intelligible world which is the realm of the real, and is unchanging and non-spatial. The Soul consists of the World-Soul and the souls of individuals at different levels and is responsible for the sensible world which is unreal, changeable image of the intelligible and has spatial extension. Thus, according to Neoplatonism, images are merely reflections of Forms and they are neither necessary nor sufficient for being real. (Cf. Craig, 1998, vol. 7, pp. 456-462)"

66. *[p. 139] "does not involve" at top of page.*

Sorry for making the mistake.

67. *[p. 148] "Newman very much values ..."*

Thanks for the suggestion.

68. *[p. 149] "Part Two [:] Newman's ..."*

Sorry, I have omitted the punctuation again.

69. *[p. 150] Note 114: "h_n" and subscripts throughout.*

Thanks for pointing out the error. I am going to correct it.

70. *[p. 153-154] I think you are right in saying that Sillem's employing the term*

intentionality to describe Newman's instinctive perception does not solve the problem. However, I think you might be able to provide such a solution by taking a look at what phenomenologists mean by the intentionality of perception.

Thank you very much for the valuable suggestion. I am going to add a footnote (note 166 page 162) to acknowledge that one might be able to provide a phenomenological solution to Newman's problem:

"One might be able to provide a phenomenological solution to Newman's problem from instinctive perception to believe in the existence of God by looking at what phenomenologists mean by the intentionality of perception. According to phenomenologists, all mental acts are directed towards objects. Knowing, for example, is aware of something towards which the mental act is directed. This characteristic of directedness of consciousness is called, initially by Husserl, "intentionality" of consciousness. Among mental acts, perception is typically intentional. Seeing, for example, is always towards something (a tree, a river, a mountain, etc.) that the mental act is directed.

Now, the feeling of conscience, as a mental state or act, like perception, must be towards something that is its intentional object, which causes us to feel guilty, ashamed, remorse, etc. when we have done something morally wrong. We do not feel as such, sincerely, towards an earthly object. This object must be, thus, a supernatural being."

71. *[p. 156] What does 'adequate' mean here? Does it mean sufficient or necessary? Why is the hallucination of an apple not interchangeable with its perception? If it is, then how can it be a proof? Put another way, why is the hallucination of an apple not adequate evidence for one's belief that there is an apple? If so, it cannot be reliable. What you say on p. 159 does not address the possible corrigibility of a hallucination of God.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I am going to add a footnote (note 168

page 164) to address this:

By 'adequate' here I mean 'appropriate and accurate in conformity of a belief to truth'. When I say "one's sensory experience of certain sort, such as the sensations of redness, roundness, sweet scent, fruit-like texture, etc, is adequate evidence for one's belief that there is (are) an apple(s) in front of him, I presuppose the perceiver's cognitive faculties and the relevant cognitive environments in which they operate are normal, so that the product of which is reliable. So, hallucination is excluded as adequate evidence for certain belief, for the sensory data one has in hallucination is either a product of abnormal cognitive faculties or a product of abnormal cognitive environments."

72. *[p. 158] 'Part Three [:] ..."*

Sorry. I have done it again.

73. *[p. 160] How (if at all) would the following modification change your argument: "The pale face and hot forehead of my child ..., but these are not adequate reasons for one to believe he is ill."*

Thank you very much for pointing out this. Here, I am arguing that, if the cause of a belief has nothing to do with the reason of the belief, we will encounter in an absurdity. I am not really changing my argument (page 170).

74. *[p. 160, Note 123] You've duplicated the text, I think.*

Thanks for pointing out this. On page 33 I have appealed Howard-Snyder (1998) to support my argument against BonJour, not Howard-Snyder (2002).

75. *[p. 163, middle paragraph] According to Thomistic theory of intentionality, this is precisely how perception functions.*

Thanks you very much for pointing out this. I am going to include a footnote (note 176 page 172) to highlight this point:

"The information theory can be interpreted in terms of Thomistic theory of intentionality. According to this theory, perception is intentional and it conveys information beyond immediate sensory data, and our mind reaches right up to the reality through sensory data. What makes a sensation of an object to be of that object is that it is an individual occurrence of that very form or nature which occurs in that object in the special way, which Aquinas calls esse intentionale. For more details about Thomistic theory of intentionality, please see Anscombe, G.E. M. & Geach, P. T. (1961), pp. 94-97."

76. *[p. 164-165] "Bravo !" for your defence of objectivity of emotions. Music can be the abstraction of objective emotion producers, can it not?*

Thank you very much for the compliment. Certainly, music can be the abstraction of objective emotion. This is why good music can move us. The power of music lies in the objective emotion of producers, not the sound itself. The sound is only a vehicle of the objective emotion of producers.

In addition, I think not only the emotions of producers are objectively directed, but also the emotions of the listeners of music are objectively directed. When we listen to Beethovon's *Fur Elise*, for example, we feel the tender, yet intense, affection of the composer towards the person whom he admires or loves, which stirs up our emotions. We have these emotions not because we are too sentimental, but because there is something external to us which causes us to feel as such.

I am going to add a footnote (note 178 page 175) to highlight this.

77. *[p. 168] "Chapter 5 [:] ..."*

Sorry, I have done it again.

78. *[p. 172, Note 129] "Newnan's view is very ..."*

Thank you very much for pointing out this

79. *[p. 174, middle paragraph] Parse sentence "... not something a priori." "[P]henemonological investigation ... ."*

Thank you very much for pointing out this I am going to correct it.

80. *[p. 176] Very nice conclusion.*

Thank you very much for the compliment.

81. *[p. 178] In the abductive syllogism, please provide subscripts.*

Sorry for making these mistakes. I am going to correct them.

82. *[p. 180, bottom paragraph] 'is far from intuitive; it is even counterintuitive."*

Sorry for these mistakes. I am going to correct them.

83. *[p. 181] The first full paragraph. "The probability of a theory ... complicated." What do you mean by complicated? I can see your point if you mean more and more exceptions are introduced, but it's not clear that you mean this.*

Same paragraph: Again, what the "adequacy" mean here? Are you not simply introducing sufficiency as a property and thus arguing tautologically?

Explain the content of the qualitative virtues.

Thank you very much for the valuable comments. I do mean that the probability of a theory must tend to become zero if more and more assumptions are introduced. I am going to rewrite the passage on page 191:

"Without simplicity, for example, a theory is unlikely to be true because the probability of theory must tend to be zero as more and more assumptions are introduced."

I am going to include a footnote (note 190) to explain the meaning of 'adequacy" and the content of the qualitative virtues:

By "adequacy" I mean "the accuracy of fitting data in conformity of a belief to truth", not "sufficiency" *per se*.

The contents of the qualitative virtues such as adequacy, coherence and cogency are those epistemic properties which make a belief or theory to be true."

84. *[p. 183] "Part Three [:] Objections ..."*

Sorry for making the mistake again and again.

85. *[p. 189] 'is predominant in contemporary thought" for "is very predominant in the contemporary times.*

Thank you very much for the correction.

86. *[p. 186-189] I may have missed the point of this argument, but why not has it both ways: an intrinsic and extrinsic component to conscience/values so that sets can be tested*

coherently by the other. Your discussion seems to be a resurrection of autonomy vs. heteronomy of the will argument in Kant.

Thank you very much for the comment. Here, I am arguing that conscience cannot be objective-intrinsically prescriptive in Mackie's sense (that is, the to-be-done-ness or not-to-be-done-ness of certain action is involved in that kind of action in itself and it is a reason for doing it as for refraining from it), for the notion of objectively intrinsic prescriptivity is incoherent.

Conscience can be intrinsically prescriptive in the sense that it makes decisions basing on its own judgement whether certain action ought to be done or ought not to be done. But, this is not to say that the to-be-done-ness or not-to-be-done-ness is involved in that kind of action in itself and it makes demands on us. The intrinsic prescriptivity of conscience must have an external source—social or supernatural. According to Examiner B's comments, I have re-written this part. Please see pages 194-198.

87. *[p. 193] "Chapter 6 [:] A comparison ..."*

Sorry for the omission again.

88. *[p. 195, note 145] 'classical foundationalism' for 'classical foundationism'*

Sorry for making the mistake.

89. *[p. 199, top of page] As I understand Calvin's position, technically the obscuring of the sensus divinitatis cannot be cleared without sin's being cleared by grace, yet sin provides no excuse for those who claim to lack "proof for God's existence because they are sinners."*

I agree with you. In addition, I think that rational proofs for the existence of God (such as

the argument from design) may have an instrumental value in Calvinistic theology—to help sinners to see and understand God's workmanship of the universe. Without them, sinners may not be able to see nor understand it due to their sins.

90. *[p. 202] Top paragraph: 'in their writing [s] ...'*

Thanks for your correction.

91. *[p. 205] Middle paragraph: 'can we get' for 'we can get'*

Thanks for the correction.

92. *[p. 206, top of page] 'is not based' for 'does not have base'*

Thanks for the correction.

93. *[p. 206, Note 159] 'methodist' for 'Methodist' (this is unhappy designator, I think.)*

Thanks for the correction. Yes, I agree with you that it is an unhappy designator because it can be confused with 'nonconformist' of religious denomination.

94. *[p. 210, middle paragraph] should read: "distinguished accessililism and mentalism as varieties of internalism"*

Thanks for the correction.

95. *[pp. 224 & 226, second to last paragraph; p. 230, bottom paragraph] Very interesting conclusion about Plantinga.*

Thank you very much for the compliment.

96. *[p. 231] Top of page: 'faculties which produce' for 'faculties which produces'*

Thanks for the correction.

97. *[p. 232] "Part Three [:] The Reformed ..."*

Thanks for the correction.

98. *[p. 237] "Part Four [:] The Similarities ..." <Bring this to the top of the next page>*

Thanks for the correction.

99. *[p. 240, top paragraph] Again, very nice point.*

Thank you very much again for the compliment.

100. *[p. 241, Note 194] 'are good ones ...' for '... is good ones ...'*

Thanks for the correction.

101. *[p. 242] Top paragraph: "a belief" OR "a piece of knowledge" you choose which, not both.*

Thanks for pointing out this. I intend to say "what makes a true belief a piece of knowledge is ..." So, I choose "a piece of knowledge".

102. *[pp. 242-255] Your conclusion after all of the preceding argumentation, is something of a tour de force.*

Thank you very much for the very encouraging compliment. Philosophically speaking, I am only a pupil, even a kindergartener. I need to learn more from you and other philosophers.

103. *[p. 244, Note 198] 'propositional' for 'prepositional'*

Sorry for making the mistake.

104. *[p. 248, first partial paragraph] in your discussion of the circularity of Plantinga's appeal to design function, I'm not sure it is circular, if taken as a description of his ontology of knowledge. As an epistemic vindication, perhaps.*

2nd paragraph: Also, have you really established that conscience is universal? What about sociopaths or robopaths? Are they exceptions to this universality?

Thank you very much for highlighting the important epistemological issue. Here, I mean Plantinga has been circular in terms of justification, not of warrant. Epistemic circularity is a problem of justification, not a problem of warrant. So, I agree that there is no circularity in Plantinga's account of warrant based on design function. But, there is circularity in his account of justification for belief in God based on design function: according to Plantinga, belief in God is rational because it is a properly basic belief; the belief is a properly basic belief because it is a result of proper functioning or our cognitive faculties in the right environment; the belief is a result of proper functioning of our cognitive faculties in the right environment because it is produced according to the design plan that designed by God. We can clearly see there is circularity here.

I am going to include a footnote (note 263 page 257) to make it clear that Plantinga's approach is circular in terms of justification, not of warrant:

"It should be noted that epistemic circularity is a problem of justification, not a problem of warrant. So, Plantinga's approach is circular merely in terms of justification, not of

warrant."

Re your 2nd point: here I mean among proper-functioning and mature human beings the experience of conscience is universal. Sociopaths do not have the experience of conscience because their conscience doesn't function properly. They cannot be counter-examples to my claim, just as a blind cannot be a counter-example to the universality of experience of vision.

105. *[p. 252, Note 208] "...based on their ..." for "...basing on their..."*

Thanks for the correction.

106. *[p. 254] Close the gap between points #1 and #2.*

Thanks for the correction.

107. *[p. 254] Good point about Newman's vocabulary. His peculiar use of language needs a 'heads up" throughout your paper. It is a chief cause of confusion because he does not use technical philosophical words without transforming their meaning.*

Thank you very much for the compliment. It is one of objectives of my thesis to define Newman's philosophical terms from the contexts of his philosophical sources, themes and purposes. I admit that Newman's philosophical terminology and writing styles are different from the traditional analytical philosophers'. Sometimes, his terminology and writing styles are so peculiar that some philosophers think he is not a good philosopher. I think this is an unfair judgement on him. In my view, whether a philosopher is a good one or not depends on whether s/he has made a substantial contribution in deepening or broadening the understanding of certain philosophical issue, or advancing or exploring the philosophical inquiry of certain field, not simply on her/his terminology or writing style.

I think we should note that Newman is not only a philosopher, but also a poet, a writer, and a historian, and his philosophical terminology and writing styles are, thus, heavily influenced by his literary and historical terminology and writing styles.

108. *[p. 255] For a theologian like myself, there is something odd about your saying that Newman 'is a pioneer of the contemporary Reformed Epistemology," especially since Newman's theology of God, revelation and sin is so different from the Calvinian features which Reformed epistemologists are so intent upon defending. Can you think of a slightly less jarring way of making the same point?'*

Sorry for causing the confusion. The point I am trying to make here is that: Newman pioneered the epistemological enterprise that the reformed epistemologists are engaging in, which breaks away from the mainstream of traditional epistemology and develops broader epistemic conceptions and norms. I am going to replace the last sentence with this (page 269).

Responses to other more general comments about the manuscript:

1. Thank you very much for the comment. I am going to paraphrase some of the long citations. The reason why I have cited many passages is that I think citations are more persuasive than paraphrases. And also, I really like the languages of some citations. They are so beautiful!

2. *Has Newman an epistemology or as Sillem maintains is it a phenomenology of assent? It seems to me that you must explain up front clearly in which sense and how you are denying Sillem's claim and excavating Newman's epistemology.*

Thank you very much for the valuable comment. I am going to include a footnote (note 185 page 182) to explain in which sense and how I deny Sillem's claim about Newman's epistemology:

"I firmly believe that Newman has an epistemology, which is most evidently shown in his The *Grammar of Assent*, and it is the most valuable part of Newman's philosophy. I deny Sillem's treatment of it as a phenomenology of assent in the sense that the treatment simply takes Newman's phenomenological investigation of assent as a psychological description of assent and failed to see that Newman is drawing epistemological principles from phenomenological investigation.

As we can see from his *Grammar*, Newman is different from, on the one hand, the traditional analytical philosophers, who hold that there is a logical gulf between phenomenology and epistemology; on the other hand, the phenomenologists, who simply give phenomenological descriptions, suspending all beliefs beyond them. He maintains that there is no logical gulf between phenomenology and epistemology and phenomenological investigation has a normative dimension. Sillem's treatment fails to appreciate these important epistemological principles that Newman commits to."

3. *Does the author know the work of Frederick Aquino on Newman? Critical engagement of Aquino's interpretation will be useful for your future career, I think. Especially since your treatment is more uncompromisingly faithful to Newman than his is.*

Thank you very much for drawing my attention to Frederick Aquino's work. I was unaware of the work until you recommended it to me. Sorry for the omission. I have obtained a copy of his "Modalities of Reasoning: The Significance of John Henry Newman's Thought for Shaping Accounts of Rationality" and studied it. I am going to add the following reflections at appropriate places in my thesis (please see pages 5, 6, 73, 153, 154, 269):

"Aquino's work has thoroughly analysed the nature of Newman's thoughts on two modes of reasoning (implicit reasoning and explicit reasoning) and the Illative Sense presented in *The Oxford University Sermons* and in *The Grammar*, evaluated the significance of Newman's account of rationality and provided an approach to fuse Newman's

epistemological ideas with contemporary work in epistemology. To a large extent, I agree with his analyses and evaluation. In fact, I have many similar views about Newman's epistemology. However, there are a few points about which I disagree with him.

First, when discussing Newman's analogies of probable reasoning as a cable and strict demonstration as an iron bar, Aquino suggests that Newman's analogies might be improved by equating formal inference with a chain, informal inference with a cable, and natural inference with a bar (Aquino, *ibid.* p. 100). I think this suggestion is inappropriate, for it fails to understand Newman's intention of using these analogies here. By using the analogies Newman is arguing that whenever probable reasoning is enough for a conclusion it is irrational to demand a strict demonstrative reasoning for it. His intention is to reject the evidentialist objection that belief in God is irrational because it cannot be supported by strict demonstrative reasoning, not to argue that natural inference and informal inference have more epistemic weight than strict demonstrative reasoning. Obviously, Newman does not deny the epistemic weight of demonstrative reasoning, but only stresses its limit to certain provinces of human inquiry.

Second, when he discusses Newman's thoughts about the roles of implicit reasoning and explicit reasoning, Aquino says that Newman is committed to the following epistemic principle: A is entitled to believe p, if B supplies reliable media of knowledge. Though B may furnish reasons for believing p, there is no need, and perhaps, no possibility, that A 'should be able to cite them, let alone articulate them, on demand.' (Aquino, 1998, pp. 81-82) I think this principle fails to reflect the grounds that Newman holds for his position that there is no need for A to cite the reasons for his/her believing in B. In fact, Newman is holding that: A is entitled to believe p, if p is formed by A's right use of his illative sense. Even if B, which supplies reliable media of knowledge, may furnish reasons for believing p, there is no need, and perhaps, no possibility, that A should be able to cite them, let alone articulate, on demand, for p is reliably formed. We can see this from his example of the peasant who is weather wise: the peasant is entitled to believe that tomorrow's weather will be fine because his belief is well formed by his illative sense basing on his previous

experience and expertise about weather conditions. There is no need for him, and he is unable, to cite the reasons for his belief.

Third, when relating Newman's thought to contemporary work in epistemology Aquino takes them as two different horizons, and, therefore, need to be fused "into an informed understanding of how modalities of reasoning factor into the process of forming and sustaining Christian beliefs." (Aquino, *ibid.* p. 98) In my view, Newman's thought and contemporary work in epistemology are not two different horizons, but the same horizon (i.e. rationality) with different historical backgrounds. So, what we need to do is not to fuse them into together, but to absorb the valuable parts of the former into the latter.

Fourth, when summarizing his proposal Aquino says: "I recognize that Newman, on the whole, did not write as a systematic thinker. Rather, Newman understood most of his works as a response to some specific occasion. Thus, development seems to be a logical outcome of studying his thought." (Aquino, *ibid.* p. 94) It seems to me this statement suggests that Newman's works are fragmental and disjointed, and lacks integrity, and therefore, there is a need of development in studying Newman's thought. If this is what is really meant, I think Aquino hasn't done justice to Newman. I admit that Newman often writes for certain specific occasion and his works employ different philosophical style, method and terminology from analytical philosophers, but this does not entail that he does not write as a systematic thinker. From *The Oxford University Sermons* to *The Grammar of Assent*, we can see a continual and systematic development of Newman's major philosophical thoughts and ideas, and that his works are integrated into a holistic unity. In my view, any interpretation or development of Newman's thought must take this as its starting-point.

Fifth, when evaluating Newman's contribution Aquino says: 'the contribution of Newman, then, lies in expanding options for understanding the complexity of the process in which Christians form and sustain beliefs. I think this evaluation has understated Newman's contribution. Newman's contribution is not only to Christian religious epistemology, but

also to epistemology in general. Although Newman's goal is to reject the evidentialist objection and justify the Christian beliefs, he has in fact explored a broad spectrum of epistemic issues and provided a broader conception of rationality."

4. *When necessary, always use long dashes '—'(not '-') to set off parenthetical observations. There are many places where shorter dashes are used, sometimes causing confusion.*

Thank you very much for pointing out this. I am going to correct all of these mistakes.

Appendix III My Responses to the Examiners' Further Questions and Comments

My Responses to Dr Aquino's Further Questions and Comments

General Response:

I am very gratitude to Dr Aquino's further questions and comments on my thesis, which have further deepened my understanding of some troublesome issues in Newman Studies, and to his magnanimous tolerance towards my critical reflections on his work, which has given me an opportunity to express my views on these issues.

Specific responses:

1. *[Abstract] The first sentence ("There are numerous valuable insights on Newman's epistemology of religious belief in the existing philosophical literature") is both vague and a weak way of bringing the reader into the nature of the project. In fact, the first paragraph could be tighter and more focused.*

Thanks very much for the valuable comment. I am going to improve the first paragraph to make it tighter and more focused:

"Newman's epistemology of religious belief generates a great philosophical interest due to its relevance to contemporary discussion of the epistemology of religious belief, especially, its relevance to reformed epistemology. In this thesis, I attempt to re-examine Newman's epistemology of religious belief, especially his argument from conscience to belief in God, and try to bring out its significance to the contemporary discussion on the epistemology of religious belief and to show the advantages of Newman's approach over the reformed epistemologists' approach through an analytical and comparative study."

2. *[Abstract] The second paragraph is a bit too strong. Does YH show, from primary sources, that "Newman's ideas were greatly influenced by Thomas Reid"?*

Thanks for the comment. I admit that there are no primary sources (Newman's open admission of Reid's influence on him) to support my statement, but this does not entail that Newman's philosophical ideas were not influenced by Reid. From reading Reid's and Newman's philosophical works we can see a lot of similarities between them—their view on perception, the foundation of knowledge, the role of reasoning, their anti-sceptical approach and naturalized epistemology, etc. We cannot assume the similarities as merely coincidences, given that Newman did extensive studies on Reid and both apparently inherited the British naturalist tradition.

3. *[Abstract] "Newman's approach to the justification of belief in God based" should be changed to "Newman's approach to the justification of belief in God is based"*

Thanks for the comment. I am going to correct it.

4. *[p.5] Why pick moral experience over conceptual analysis as a basis for justifying the existence of God? YH presupposes this move without showing why the former is better than the latter.*

Thanks for the comment. On page 4 I have explained why moral experience is better than conceptual analysis as a basis for justifying the existence of God:

"First, the mere conceptual analysis of moral beliefs cannot provide a forceful argument for the belief in the existence of God, for: (1) Whether God exists is a factual question, not a conceptual one, mere conceptual analysis lacks the force to convince people to believe that there is in fact a God and cannot settle the question; (2) Conceptual analysis can only provide a justifying reason for believing in the proposition that God exists. It seldom actually motivates one to believe in the proposition. One may acknowledge the logic of conceptual

analysis but still withhold assent to the existence of God. To believe in the proposition that God exists, unlike believing in an ordinary proposition, not only a justification, but also a motive is needed; (3) Mere conceptual analyses, without the sustenance of moral phenomenology, are vulnerable to moral scepticism. They can be easily rejected by moral scepticism, such as Mackie's sort, on the ground that because moral beliefs are false, it does not follow that there exists a God, a conclusion drawn from conceptual analyses of moral beliefs."

5. *[p.7] The reference to conscience functioning in the same way as perceptual experience and belief in an external world needs to be unpacked. YH rightly points to the connection between moral conscience and other belief-forming processes, but she never really unpacks this insight and the subsequent block quotations. In fact, she has the tendency to string together a lot of quotations without ample philosophical reflection and argumentation. Consequently, the thesis, at times, reads more as a descriptive overview than as a tightly honed argument followed by extensive clarification and elucidation.*

Thanks very much for the valuable comment. I am going to add the following paragraph there to unpack this point:

"Conscience for Newman, as we will see in chapter 3 of this thesis, is a mental capability which originates, like our other metal capabilities such as perception, memory, reasoning, etc. in human nature. According to him, our experience of conscience is like, in particular, our perceptual experience—it is intentional and has a claim to objectivity, and the belief-forming process of the former is same as the belief-forming process of the latter as well: as certain objects are presented to our senses we immediately form the belief that these objects exist, when moral facts are presented to our conscience and generate certain emotions we immediately form the belief that there is a Supreme Ruler or Judge."

6. *[p. 8] The first sentence makes a general claim about the need to reconsider Newman's appeal to conscience, though it does not offer specific reasons for why this is an important interpretive move.*

Thanks for the valuable comment. I am going to add some specific reasons for why this is an important interpretive move:

"An adequate interpretation and assessment of Newman's approach enable us to see its epistemic importance and advantages over other approaches. Newman's approach, as we shall see, shifts away from the traditional approaches based on conceptual analyses and appeals to concrete human experience—the experience of conscience. It has advantages over the traditional approaches: conceptual analyses are weak in terms of justification of belief in God for they lack motivational force. It also has advantages over the reformed epistemologist approach based on religious experience: the experience of conscience is more universal and less controversial than religious experience, and the former approach is, thus, far more philosophically attractive than the latter approach."

7. *[Chapter 1] The appeal to Sillem throughout the chapter is a good secondary source but YH needs to solidify her case with greater focus on primary sources (e.g., Newman's letters). For example, YH's claim that "Newman did an extensive study of Aristotle's Rhetoric, the Poetics and the Nicomachean Ethics" is a bit of an overstatement and a claim that she does not substantiate through primary resources but through an appeal to authority (e.g., Sillem).*

Thanks very much for the valuable comment. I am going to add some primary sources here to support my claim.

8. *The first chapter reads more like a collection of quotations than as an analytical honed argumentation. It could be reduced to a tight examination of the relationship between Reid and Newman while acknowledging other influences.*

Thanks for the comment. The aim of Chapter 1 is to bring out some major influences on Newman, such as Aristotle, Butler and, especially, Reid, not every source of Newman. I have focused on Reid because the influence of Reid on Newman is rather controversial and unorthodox. I try to use a comparatively contextual study to establish the connection between Reid and Newman, and to see that Reid and Newman hold some very alike epistemic principles. This is why there are a fair bit of quotations. I think they are important to support my position, as there are no primary sources (Newman's own open admission of Reid's influence) to support my position. I am trying to add some analytical arguments there to strengthen my position.

9. *[p. 82] YH rightly argues that Newman's epistemology is "essentially naturalistic." However, she also argues that it is "non-providential" (p. 81) but never really shows this to be the case in Newman's thought. The appeal to the "common voice of mankind" in the Grammar functions more as criticism of Locke's construal of rationality than as a statement about a "non-providential" form of naturalism. YH acknowledges that a providential theme shows up in Newman's thought (p. 82), though she does not elaborate on this point. I am not sure about the connection here between Newman's attack on skepticism and his "non-providential" naturalism. She contends that Newman's reply to skepticism is grounded in the natural function of the mind, not in his theistic commitment. However, Newman's assumption that the mind is wired for truth presupposes a teleological orientation, which I think for him is ultimately grounded in the reality of God. Newman's work on education (e.g., The Idea of a University) presupposes such a move. YH suggests but does not elaborate on the point that "Newman's theism plays an explanatory role, not a justificatory role in his epistemology" (p. 84). Moreover, YH does not qualify the kind of naturalism that Newman endorses (e.g., methodological naturalism, ontological naturalism, and so on). Certainly, Newman's hints of realism about truth (as YH rightly acknowledges) and his sacramental principle (informed by Clement of Alexandria and Origen) seem to acknowledge the role of providence and challenge a position of metaphysical naturalism. After three quotations (pp. 81-82), YH concludes with a rather*

vague statement ("What Newman says here clearly expresses a naturalistic epistemological view"); no exposition or argumentation accompanies this claim. In fact, I find this to be a recurring problem in the thesis. Tighter arguments would make YH's claims stronger, especially informed by a closer reading of Newman's main points.

Thanks very much for highlighting the important issue. I still firmly believe that (a) Newman's epistemology, as presented in the Grammar, is naturalistic, not providential in the sense that he does not appeal to God as a justifying reason for our epistemic beliefs and practices. Anyone tries to interpret his epistemology in the Grammar as providential is to undervalue the importance of the Grammar as a philosophical work; (b) Newman's attack on skepticism is grounded in his epistemological naturalism, not his theistic commitment.

Throughout my thesis, I am trying to provide a non-providential interpretation of Newman's epistemology along the British naturalistic tradition to which Newman apparently belongs. Of course, there is a connection between Newman's theistic commitment and his epistemology. But, Newman doesn't intend to import his theistic commitment to justify his epistemic principles in the *Grammar*.

I admit that I should have qualified Newman's naturalism as methodological naturalism, not ontological naturalism. I am going to add some explanations on pages 81-82 to strengthen my statement "What Newman says here clearly expresses a naturalistic epistemological view".

10. *[p. 178] The opening sentence ("There are many disputes about the nature of this argument") is vague and weak. Moreover, again YH introduces an interpretation with minimal rationale of why she disagrees with it. She simply disagrees with the interpretation and her responses are largely descriptive commentaries (e.g., her use of Sillem as a support). In addition, she includes a block quotation from Cameron, flowed by references to Grave and Jay Newman, as a way to evaluate a counter-proposal (p. 179). This seems to go on for several pages.*

Thanks for the comment. In Part One of Chapter 5 (pp178-185), I attempt to review and evaluate various interpretations of Newman's argument to bring out the rational for my interpretation (Part two of Chapter 5).

11. *[p. 192] After a lengthy overview of relevant literature, YH concludes, "Newman's argument from conscience, as an inference to the best explanation, is successful." However, she never really unpacks this conclusion. In fact, her next section on possible objections Newman's inference to the best explanation (pp. 194-204) is a distraction from her claim.*

Thanks for the valuable comment. I am going to improve this.

My conclusion that Newman's argument from conscience, as an inference to the best explanation, is successful is drawn from my previous analyses of the phenomena of conscience, my defence of the validity of the inference to the best explanation and my replies to some typical objections. I have realized that I should have been replied possible objections before drawing the conclusion. Thus, I am going to add the following paragraph on page 192 and put my replies to possible objections right after this paragraph and then draw the conclusion:

"Having argued for the legitimacy of an inference to the best explanation, I am going to defend the second step of Newman's argument from conscience. As I have interpreted at the beginning of this section, the second step of Newman's argument is based on an analysis of the phenomena of moral conscience and relying on an inference to the best explanation to justify the belief in the existence of God. In the following, I am going to show that Newman's argument is successful by replying some typical objections to it."

(My replies to some typical objections)

"We have seen from the above that Mackie and others have failed to refute Newman's explanation of the experience of conscience: Phenomenologically, conscience is prescriptive. On the one hand, it cannot be objectively intrinsically prescriptive for objective intrinsic prescriptivity is incoherent. The prescriptivity of conscience demands a personal being as its explanation; on the other hand, it cannot be subjectively intrinsically prescriptive for subjective intrinsic prescriptivity deprives it of its authority. Therefore, there must be a personal being beyond conscience itself that is the origin of the prescriptivity of conscience; the sociological explanation cannot be an appropriate explanation of the prescriptivity of conscience for it cannot explain the overriding force of conscience which is beyond human interest. Therefore, there must exist an all-good, all-powerful and all-knowing supernatural personal being that is the origin of the prescriptivity of conscience.

In the above, I have argued for the validity of an inference to the best explanation and the supernatural explanation of the prescriptivity of conscience. Now, I am in the position to conclude that Newman's argument from conscience, as an inference to the best explanation, is successful: phenomenologically, conscience is prescriptive. The prescriptive characteristics of conscience are so peculiar that no earthly object can best explain them. Thus, they require the existence of an all-good God as their best explanation."

11. *[p. 205] YH's description of Reformed Epistemology is a bit vague. She recognizes that Alston does not fit a neat description, but does not elaborate on or clarify the following statement: "William Alston's reformed epistemologist position is different from the formers' in that it does not reject the traditional arguments for the existence of God" (p. 205).*

Thanks very much for pointing out this. Initially, I followed other philosophers in classifying Alston as a reformed epistemologist. Later, I realized that Alston is different from other reformed epistemologists—he does not reject classical foundationalism, adequate evidence for belief in God and the traditional arguments for belief in God. However, Alston has a position which is somewhat similar to the reformed epistemologists'. I am going to add a note there to explain this. I am going to add a note there to explain this.

12. *[p. 206] I am not sure that Locke comes out precisely in the same way as do Clifford, Russell, Flew, and Blanshard on the ethics of belief. The link here may be evidentialism, but YH does not nuance the differences or at least mention them. The statement that "Some of them even argue that believing in God is immoral" is vague; the ethics of belief, as I understand it, links rationality with a commitment of responsibilism. Perhaps, this is the connection among the above-mentioned figures that YH has in mind.*

Thanks for the comment. Yes, the reason that I group Locke with Clifford, Russell, Flew and Blanshard is due to their evidentialist epistemic responsibilism. I admit that there are differences between Locke and the latter philosophers: Locke links evidence with epistemic responsibility, thus, regards a person who entertains a belief beyond the support of evidence as epistemically irresponsible, not morally irresponsible, while the latter philosophers link evidence with epistemic responsibility and moral responsibility, thus, regard a person who holds a belief beyond the support of evidence as epistemically irresponsible and morally sinful, for example, Clifford. This is why I said "Some of them even argue that believing in God is immoral". I am going to add a note there to highlight the difference between Locke and the latter philosophers.

12. *[p. 214] I am not sure that I would summarize William Alston's work as a project engaged in "positive apologetics."*

Thanks for the valuable comment. I have realized that it is improper to refer Alston's work

as a project engaged in "positive apologetics" because it has much more value than merely engaging in "positive apologetics". I am going to change my position here.

13. *[p. 248] The reference to Wolterstorff's comment about the entrenched status of classical foundationalism for many centuries and YH's astonishment about the omission of Newman from Wolterstorff's piece is unfair. I agree that some of the Reformed Epistemologists would do well to place Newman in their narratives about the history of epistemology.*

Thanks for the comment. However, on page 248 I didn't refer to all the Reformed Epistemologists, but Wolterstorff's comment—the comment suggests that the Reformed Epistemologists are the 'pioneers' to recognize and tackle the problem of classical foundationalism. Obviously, this is not the case.

14. *[p.249] Though Newman certainly appeals to what is currently called externalism; he includes a component of internalism in the Grammar. So, I am not sure whether Newman's "criteria of knowledge" is exclusively "externalist" (p. 249). His notion of complex assent makes no sense from an exclusively externalist point of view. Rather, the presupposition here is that epistemic duty implies the capacity to explore how one knows what one knows.*

Thanks for highlighting the important issue again. I still think that Newman's epistemology as presented in the *Oxford University Sermons* and in the *Grammar* is essentially externalistic. His epistemology is not internalistic in terms of the theories of justification because he holds that explicitly internal mental processes are neither necessary nor sufficient for justification (US, pp. 258-259); it is not internalistic in terms of knowledge either, for he holds that one can have certain knowledge without involving conscious reasoning process, for example, perceptual knowledge.

I agree that Newman does not deny the role of explicit reason and complex/reflex assents in epistemic practice, but the role, for him, is not to make a belief true or to make a true

belief a piece of knowledge, rather to show the grounds or investigate the process of reasoning why we hold a certain belief to convince ourselves or others; or to discard a false belief or confirm a belief in order to reach a conviction/certitude (*GA*, pp. 142-143; 145, 147). I don't think that Newman has supposed that it is everyone's epistemic duty to explore how one knows and what one knows, rather, it is the epistemic duty for the educated minds to explore how one knows and what one knows: "...I consider that, in the case of educated minds, investigations into the argumentative proof of the things to which they have given their assent, is an obligation, or rather a necessity." (*GA*, p 145)

15. *[p. 268] The context of the reference in Aquino ("the contribution of Newman's epistemology ...in expanding options for understanding the complexity of the process in which Christians form and sustain beliefs " in Modalities of Reasoning: The Significance of John Henry Newman's Thought for Shaping Accounts of Rationality") is to place Newman's epistemology of Christian belief within the terrain of epistemic particularism. In this regard, Newman unapologetically starts from a Christian standpoint (the particular) and moves from there to a more comprehensive (the general/common voice of humanity) understanding of human cognition and ways of knowing. In Chisholm's categories, Newman does not seem to operate from a Methodist epistemology. This seems obvious in his criticism of Locke and Descartes. For example, Newman rejects the Cartesian method of doubt as the starting point for assessing the process of belief-formation.*

> *[The preference to begin with universal doubt] is of all assumptions the greatest, and to forbid assumptions universally is to forbid this one in particular. Doubt itself is a positive state, and implies a definite habit of mind, and thereby necessarily involves a system of principles and doctrines all its own . . . Of the two, I would rather have to maintain that we ought to begin with believing everything that is offered to our acceptance, than that it is our duty to doubt everything. The former, indeed, seems the true way of learning (GA, 294).*

Newman, of course, recognizes that in the process of reasoning we discover and discard errors. However, faulty reasoning does not justify complete distrust of our ratiocinative powers. The same logic, for example, applies to the reliability of memory. Though our memory fails us occasionally, we still depend on it as a reliable source for acquiring knowledge. Newman's main contention here is that an account of belief-formation should not begin from a perspective of universal doubt. Analysis of belief-formation ought to be critical, but not skeptical; philosophical investigation, which proceeds from a certain perspective, reflects critically on pre-philosophic opinions we already possess. Within real-world environments, reliable belief-forming processes, instantiated in communally established practices, furnish the proper context for examining the nature and function of our constitutive faculties. Any normative inquiry must account for these practices

Thanks very much for the explanation. I agree that Newman is not a methodist, but he is not a pure particularist either: he starts from individual, concrete matters which are common to human beings and tries to draw epistemic principles which can be applied to any epistemic community. To interpret him as a pure particularist is to undermine his value.

Dr Quino's original statement seems to suggest that Newman is a pure particularist and the value of his contribution is limited within the Christian communities. To me, this is somewhat a relativist interpretation of Newman. This is why I add my critical reflection on the statement.

Some Substantive Concerns

1. *[p. 5f.] Newman as a Systematic Thinker. Most scholars have categorized Newman as a contextual thinker or more precisely as a particularist. As Jamie Ferreira has pointed out, Newman fits in the naturalist tradition of philosophy along with Locke, Reid, and Hume. Fundamental to this move is the resistance to apriori systematizing, not opposition to synthetic thinking that emerges from concrete human experiences. In this regard, YH*

shows no familiarity with recent scholarship on this point. In fact, Newman's particularism may be one reason why many have failed in the past to appreciate his contribution to religious epistemology (for a helpful discussion here, see Basil Mitchell, "Newman as a Philosopher," in Newman after a Hundred Years, ed. Ian Ker and Alan G. Hill). YH also misunderstands and misrepresents the nature of the quotation from Aquino ("Modalities of Reasoning"). The point here is to recognize that Newman's epistemology of Christian belief is grounded in what philosophers today call particularism, and, in this sense, he does not operate as a systematic thinker with a fully worked out philosophical system or does not impose a general methodology on the problem at hand. YH seems acknowledge Newman's particularism and so her objection here seems problematic [p. 249].

I offer one example. In the Grammar, Newman criticizes Locke's approach to rationality primarily because it proceeds more from an a priori view of human cognition than from the world of facts. Instead of going by the testimony of psychological facts, and thereby determining our constitutive and our proper condition, and being content with the mind as God has made it, [Locke] would form [people] as he thinks they ought to be formed, into something better and higher, and calls them irrational and indefensible, if (so to speak) they take to the water, instead of remaining under the narrow wings of his own arbitrary theory" (GA, 139f.). In the first chapter of the Grammar, Newman states the following: "in this Essay I treat of propositions only in their bearing upon concrete matter, and I am mainly concerned with Assent; with Inference, in its relation to Assent" (GA, 29). In a letter to William Froude (April 29, 1879), Newman says, "Nothing surely have I insisted on more earnestly in my Essay on Assent, than on the necessity of thoroughly subjecting abstract propositions to concrete. It is in the experience of daily life that the power of religion is learnt . . . And I repeat, it is not by syllogisms or other logical process that trustworthy conclusions are drawn, such as command our assent, but by that minute, continuous, experimental reasoning, which shows baldly on paper, but which drifts silently into an overwhelming cumulus of proof, and, when our start is true, brings us on to a true result."

Furthermore, recognizing that Newman does not write as a systematic thinker does not imply that his works are "fragmental" (perhaps YH means fragmented), "disjointed," and lack "integrity" [p. 5f.]. Clearly Newman sees the urge to connect various pieces of data as the work of the illative sense. However, he begins with the concrete and then presupposes a philosophical habit of mind, the cultivated illative sense, as fundamental to seeing the mutual relation of things. YH admits that one link between Newman and Reformed Epistemology is the focus on "concrete experience" and, in this regard, YH misses the subtlety of Newman's move from the concrete to the more comprehensive, thereby rendering something holistic that demonstrates the "power of viewing many things at once as one whole, of referring them severally to their true place in the universal system, of understanding their respective values, and determining their mutual dependence" (The Idea of a University, 103).

As Terrence Merrigan (Clear Heads and Holy Hearts: The Religious and Theological Ideal of John Henry Newman) and others have shown, Newman's epistemology does not follow one trajectory or school of thought; it is profoundly dynamic, contextual, synthetic, and existential. The failure to discern both the complexity of his thought and his appropriation of diverse resources perhaps explains why people from various perspectives employ Newman to support their positions and polarize the theological landscape. Conversely, Newman's ability to hold in tensile unity apparently opposite tendencies and concerns comes with the territory of being grounded in the concrete. In addition, Newman's overall thought presupposes development as a fundamental way of thinking, given that this is how he imagines Christian doctrine (e.g., The Development of Christian Doctrine) and the formation of a philosophical habit of mind (e.g., The Idea of a University). In fact, the Grammar is a development of antecedent insights in the University Sermons. The "holistic unity" is a goal of the philosophical habit of mind, but not one completely evident in Newman's contextual analysis of the conditions under which Christian belief is rationally acceptable. In fact, the problem of securing a standard of justification, independent of communally established practices, remains an

unresolved issue in the University Sermons and in the Grammar. Newman's own admission of the problem, and as others have shown, certainly opens up the possibility for constructive work in this area (e.g., Aquino, Communities of Informed Judgment and Wainwright, Reason and the Heart: A Prolegomenon to a Critique of Passional Reason, Basil Mitchell, "Newman as a Philosopher").

Thanks for the comment. In the footnote 20 on page 5, I didn't intent to question Dr Aquino's statement that Newman is not a systematic thinker (in the sense of systematizing theories starting from some principles, following a strict methodology, to certain conclusions), and the statement that there is a need of development of Newman's thought, but the logical connection between the two statements.

I never said that Newman is a systematic thinker (in the sense of systematizing). In fact, I have made very clear in the Introduction that the starting-point of Newman's approach is concrete human experience—the experience of moral conscience, which has special values compared with the traditional approaches, of the Kant's. I understand Newman's synthetic thinking that emerges from concrete human experience and have attempted to bring out its special values in my thesis.

What I try to defend here is that Newman is a systematic thinker, in the sense that his writing, on the whole, has a framework and each part is integrated to the framework, and displays as a holistic unity, not fragmented, disjointed. To clear up the issue, let me cite what I have said on p. 5 (f20):

"When summarizing his proposal on Newman, Frederick D. Aquino says: 'I recognize that Newman, on the whole, did not write as a systematic thinker. Rather, Newman understood most of his work as a response to some specific occasion. Thus, development seems to be a logical outcome of his thought." (Aquino, 2003, p. 94) It seems to me this statement suggests that Newman's works are fragmental and disjointed, and lacks integrity, and therefore, there is a need of development in studying Newman's thought. If

this is what is really meant, I think Aquino hasn't done justice to Newman. I admit that Newman often writes for certain specific occasion and his works employ different philosophical style, method and terminology from analytical philosophers, but this does not entail that he does not write as a systematic thinker. From The University Sermons to The Grammar of Assent, we can see a continual and systematic development of Newman's major epistemological principles and ideas, and that his works are integrated into a holistic unity. In my view, any interpretation or development of Newman's thought must take this as its starting-point."

Clearly, here I use the word 'systematic' in the sense 'of being a holistic unity', as against fragmented, disjointed, lacking integration among the parts, not 'systematizing'. From what Dr Aquino' says in the passage cited above, he seems to use the word 'systematic' in this sense. Perhaps, I misunderstood him—he actually uses the word in the sense of 'systematizing'. But now, there is a logical problem here: how can Dr Aquino legitimately draw that development seems to be a logical outcome of Newman's thought from Newman is not systematic thinker? It is illogical to develop Newman's thought just because he is not a systematic (in the sense of systematizing) thinker. I do not deny that there is a need of development when studying Newman's thought, but not out of reason that he is not a systematic (systematizing) thinker.

2. *The Problem of Common Measure: YH's comments about the problem of common measure seem inaccurate. She rightly argues that Newman is not a relativist; he presupposes a realist conception of truth. However, the challenge, for Newman, is showing how the illative sense satisfies the epistemic conditions of justification beyond the appeal to the illative sense as a personal criterion. Her quotation from the Grammar [p. 263] does not resolve the epistemic dilemma; rather it seems to exacerbate the problem, especially when Newman identifies the locus of epistemic reflection in each person's own center—illative sense. Certainly, Newman hints at the possibility of finding greater levels of agreement outside of an appeal to the personal insights of the illative sense. However, he never unearths this hint in the Grammar.*

Moreover, the reference to Wainwright is not a description of Newman's solution. Rather, Wainwright's move is a constructive suggestion, showing that proper use of the illative sense involves maturation of the illative sense, which Newman acknowledges but does develop fully in the Grammar. Aquino (Communities of Informed Judgment), for example, has tried to extend Newman's appeal to personal illation to communal and social dimensions through recent work in virtue and social epistemology.

The personal dimension of the illative sense, along with the presumptive nature of first principles, complicates the goal of achieving a common standard of justification. Cultivation of the illative sense may lead people to form different opinions about the same subject matter. Since the illative sense operates in all modes of reasoning, differences are bound to occur. First principles with which we reason are "very numerous and vary in great measure with the persons who reason, according to their judgment and power of assent, being received by some minds, not by others, and only a few of them received universally" (GA, 66). "Moreover, all reasoning is from premisses and those premisses arising (if it so happen) in their first elements from personal characteristics, in which men are in fact in essential and irremediable variance with one another, the ratiocinative talent can do no more than point out where the difference between them lies, how far it is immaterial, when it is worth while continuing an argument between them, and when not" (GA, 283). In concrete matters, the ultimate criterion for determining whether our inferences yield truth or error belongs to "the trustworthiness of the illative sense" (GA, 281). It "appeals to no judgment beyond its own, and attends upon the whole course of thought from antecedents to consequents, with a minute diligence and unwearied presence" (GA, 283). Since determining converging probabilities depends on personal judgment, the cumulative force of evidence on any matter may affect people differently. Concrete experiences shape evaluation of evidence and impede the effort toward consensus. They are "spontaneously present to me, and with the aid of my best illative sense, I only do on one side of the question what those who think differently do on the other. As they start with one set of first principles, I start with one another" (GA, 318).

> *Multitudes indeed I ought to succeed in persuading of its truth [Christianity] without any force at all, because they and I start from the same principles, and what is proof to me is a proof to them; but if any one starts from any other principles but ours, I have not the power to change his principles, or the conclusion which he draws from them, any more than I can make a crooked man straight. Whether his mind will ever grow straight, whether I can do anything towards its becoming straight, whether he is not responsible, responsible to his Maker, for being mentally crooked, is another matter; still the fact remains, that, in any inquiry about things in the concrete, men differ from each other, not so much in the soundness of their reasoning as in the principles which govern its exercise, that those principles are of a personal character, that where there is no common measure of minds, there is no common measure of arguments, and that the validity of proof is determined, not by any scientific test, but by the illative sense (GA, 321)*

As Newman clearly recognized, the appeal to the illative sense as the criterion of justification does not solve disputes; rather, it simply illustrates the importance of judgment, both uncultivated and cultivated, in forming beliefs. The illative sense is multifaceted. Its uncultivated form is "an intrinsic and personal power, not a conscious adoption of an artificial instrument or expedient." However, the cultivated illative sense is something more than implicit reasoning, common sense, and good sense. The judgment of prudent people ("judicium prudentis viri," "phronesis," or "sagacity") is key for developing the illative sense (GA, 251, 271, 277-280). The tacit dimension of the illative sense may be included in belief-formation but the cultivated form necessitates "the perfection" of the illative sense (GA, 271). Newman, therefore, distinguishes the illative sense as "a natural uncultivated faculty" from its cultivated form (GA, 261).

Thus, complex assent is a responsible outgrowth of educational and social commitments. In fact, Newman contends that "educated minds" have an epistemic responsibility ("obligation" or as he puts it "a necessity") to investigate "the argumentative proof of the things to which they have given their assent" (GA, 160). The fallible nature of complex assent does not undermine our quest for truth. Rather, it suggests that acquired habits such as epistemic humility help determine whether practices yield true beliefs over false ones. Intellectual pride misses the aim of complex assent. The focus here seems to be more on the habitual process of belief-formation than on the state of believing. The motivational level of self-reflexivity implies that desire for truth is derivative of the intellectual character of the epistemic agent, not the other way around. Complex assent, then, differs from simple assent in that it uncovers cognitive infelicities and determines whether a proposition yields true beliefs or false beliefs. Intellectual repose (psychological dispositions) is insufficient for certitude; it must comport with the objective features of the world (GA, 293). "The conclusiveness of a proposition is not synonymous with its truth. A proposition may be true, yet not admit of being concluded: it may be a conclusion and yet not a truth" (GA, 158).

YH may be right that a criterion exists in some non-epistemic sense; however, this does not resolve the epistemic problem. Newman, as YH rightly points out, appeals to the illative sense as a criterion, but he also recognizes that the personal dimension here complicates the problem of adjudicating radically different claims. A quick glance at the Grammar confirms such a problem and Newman's own recognition that a solution is not immediately forthcoming.

Thanks for the comment. Let me clarify my position. I never said that Newman has resolved the problem of common measure by discovering the illative sense in our epistemic practice. What I have said is that Newman does not deny that there is a common measure and he strives for finding it—he finds the illative sense after the detailed phenomenological analyses of our epistemic practice Although he sees that the personal dimension of the illative sense complicates the process of search for a

common measure, Newman thinks that cultivating the illative sense through education, intellectual development can reduce the gap between personal differences. Here, I have seen Newman's epistemic optimism: there are objective truths and human mind is wired for truth, though there are difficulties, we can reach for them. Dr Aquino agrees with me that Newman is not a relativist about justification, and then, he must admit that Newman holds that there is an objective common criterion for truth. Otherwise, there would be an inconsistence in his position.

3. *Epistemic Dependence: The principle (A is entitled to believe p, if B supplies reliable mediums of knowledge) fits the current discussion about the social conditions of knowledge and the role that epistemic dependence plays in forming and sustaining beliefs. Though B may furnish reasons for believing p, there is no need, and perhaps, no possibility, that A should be able to cite them, let alone articulate them, on demand. The point here is that Newman allows for epistemic dependence as a basis of belief-formation. Newman's epistemology of religious belief allows for a combination of externalist and internalist accounts, as the Grammar shows. Perfection of our constitutive faculties is the fulfillment of a sacred duty. Achieving this goal is inextricably tied to proper "acquisition of knowledge, of which inference and assent are the immediate instruments" (GA, 274). This occurs by means of careful training within a community context. Accumulation of knowledge takes place within a social context and varies according to the intellectual complexion of the individual. The mind does not passively acquire knowledge but actively masters fields of knowledge; subsequently, it makes apt judgments about concrete matters. Within a social context, people of informed judgment impart knowledge to a community of inquirers.*

> *Instead of trusting logical science, we must trust persons, namely, those who by long acquaintance with their subject have a right to judge. And if we wish ourselves to share in their convictions and the grounds of them, we must follow their history, and learn as they have learned. We must take up their particular subject as they took it up, beginning at the beginning, give*

ourselves to it, depend on practice and experience more than on reasoning, and thus gain that mental insight into truth, whatever its subject-matter may be, which our masters have gained before us. By following this course, we may make ourselves of their number, and then we rightly lean upon our own moral or intellectual judgment, not by our skill in argumentation (GA, 269).

Informed judgment is context-dependent and person-specific. Proper employment of the illative sense requires a social transmission of tested experience and of perfected modes of knowledge. The claim here is that only after having pursued such a course of learning from recognized experts can the individual come to rely upon his own personal moral or intellectual judgment. Newman follows Aristotle's observation that skillful judgment comes from giving "heed to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of the experienced, not less than to demonstrations, from their having the eye of experience, they behold the principles of things" (GA, 268). At first, Newman's focus on the social conditions of cognitive development seems to conflict with his stress on the laws of the mind. Human cognition, however, is a dynamic process in which cognitive agents ascertain from empirical observation reliable belief-forming processes for fulfilling their epistemic duty.

Interestingly, YH cites a part of this passage on page 11, referencing Newman's study of Aristotle, though she never connects this with the problem of the common measure and with the illative sense as the personal criterion. She adds, "Personal elements play a great role in the process of gaining knowledge" (p. 11). I wonder how this recognition resolves the epistemic problem of common measure?

Thanks very much for the clarification of the epistemic principle. Without the clarification, it seems that Newman holds an epistemic principle which smuggles irrationalism. This is why I put a comment in footnote 154 on page 153: "According to Aquino, here Newman is committed to the following epistemic principle: A is entitled to believe p, if B supplies reliable media of knowledge. Though B may furnish reasons

for believing p, there is no need, and perhaps, no possibility, that A 'should be able to cite them, let alone articulate them, on demand.' (Aquino, 2003, pp. 81- 82) I think this principle fails to reflect the grounds that Newman holds for his position that there is no need for A to cite the reasons for his/her believing in B. In fact, Newman is holding that: A is entitled to believe p, if p is formed by A's right use of his illative sense. Even if B, which supplies reliable media of knowledge, may furnish reasons for believing p, there is no need, and perhaps, no possibility, that A should be able to cite them, let alone articulate, on demand, for p is reliably formed. We can see this from his example of the peasant who is weather wise: the peasant is entitled to believe that tomorrow's weather will be fine because his belief is well formed by his illative sense basing on his previous experience and expertise about weather conditions. There is no need for him, and he is unable, to cite the reasons for his belief." My comment is consistent with Dr Aquino's above point that Newman allows for epistemic dependence as a basis of belief-formation.

Now, from the epistemic principle Newman commits we can see that he rejects internalism about justification. Newman also rejects purely internalistic account of knowledge since he holds that we can have knowledge without involving conscious reasoning processes. To say this is not, however, to deny his recognition of the role of complex/reflex assents in our epistemic practice. As I have said before, the role of complex/reflex assents, for Newman, is not to make a belief justified or to make a true belief a piece of knowledge, but to discard a false belief or confirm a true belief in order to gain certitude. Newman made a sharp distinction between knowledge and certitude—the former does not require conscious reasoning, while the latter does: "Philosophers are fond of enlarging on the pleasures of Knowledge, (that is, Knowledge as such,) nor need I here prove that such pleasures exist; but the repose in self and in its object, as connected with self, which I attribute to certitude, does not attach to mere knowing, that is, to the perception of things, but to the consciousness of having that knowledge. (*GA*, p. 155) I agree that Newman admits the role of inference (complex/reflex assent) in acquisition of knowledge, but this does not justify that he

has an internalist account of knowledge, for what makes a true belief a piece of knowledge, according to him, is some external property or relation, not inference (complex/reflex assent) itself.

I don't think Newman's recognition of the role of personal elements in our epistemic practice conflicts with his searching for a common measure. Personal elements, such as one's experience, skills, education and training (including moral education and development), etc., when properly employed, can enhance one's understanding of other epistemic agents and reduce the gap between them, and develop one's intellectual duty to pursue a common criterion for truth. Only if Newman assumes that personal elements can only lead to polemics does Newman's recognition of personal elements conflict with his searching for a common measure. Apparently, Newman didn't make this assumption. Again, if we agree that Newman holds that there are objective truths and human mind is wired for truth, we must agree that he holds that there is an objective common measure. Otherwise, we will incur in a paradox.

My Responses to Dr Ryba's Further Comments:

General Responses:

I am very gratitude to Dr Ryba's further evaluation and comments on my thesis, which have reconfirmed the originality and quality of this thesis, and his recommendation of this thesis to an award of PhD and publication, which encourages me to take further studies in Newman.

Specific responses:

1. *[p. 8, note 24] I still think the claim in this footnote needs to be tempered. I think the claim that the Buddhists and Taoists can be led rationally to Theism is a matter of faith or hope but cannot be demonstrated. I would suggest expressing it conditionally. By*

the way, the Buddhists have a whole apologetic literature directed against Theists, and they sometimes makes use of Western philosophers like Hume. They do not find our rational arguments for a supreme being plausible. The discipline of Fundamental Theology takes up such difficulties in a dialogical way so that it is not just a matter of Western analytical philosophers arguing among themselves.

Thanks for the comment. When I say that Buddhists' and Taoists' beliefs can be rationally led to theism I do not mean this can be proved by demonstrated reasoning. What I mean is: if we hold the following beliefs a) there is a supernatural force which commands the operation of the universe; b) there is an after-life which will reward the virtues and punish the vices of this life, the best explanation of these beliefs is theism because it is more intelligible than that of Buddhism and Daoism. However, I admit that the issue whether Theism or Buddhism/Daoism is more intelligible is not settled and whether individual Buddhists and Taoists can be rationally led to theism is a matter of faith or hope.

Period after 'universe' in footnote. 'if pushed further' for 'if pushing further' in same note, though as I said above I would dispute this claim. It is, I think, too strong.

Thanks. I am going to correct the punctuation and try to soften my claim.

2. *[p. 17, expanded note 35] Again, I still think you've not made clear why Newman's argument about a polygon is a probabilistic argument and not an example of math induction. Unless I am missing something, your citing Newton DOES NOT cinch the matter. His is not an argument from probability but seems to be a version of the reductio ad absurdum argument with math induction as its background. Whatever Newton's argument form, he is clearly not appealing to probability. I think you can save your discussion in a way compatible with Newman's point by simply arguing that math induction and probable inference can reach the same conclusion, just as paper logic and non-demonstrative (probable) reasoning can. How you cast*

Newman's arguments about increasing the number of vertices of a polygon until it becomes a circle as a form of probable reasoning is beyond me. Maybe you have an idea. Maybe Newman was wrong or maybe he has something else in mind which you are missing.

Thanks very much for the comment. I have re-read Newman's example of polygon and the context in which he gives the example and Newton's Lemma 1 that Newman cited there. I still think Newman uses the example as a probable reasoning, not a mathematical inductive reasoning, because he is talking about the role of probable reasoning there and citing the method Newton uses in his Lemma 1, which, I think, is of probable reasoning. Let's look at Newton's Lemma 1 again: "*Quantities, and the ratios of quantities, which in any finite time converge continually to equality, and before the end of that time approach nearer to each other than by any given difference, become ultimately equal...*" mathematical induction does not *converge continually* to certain point, while probable reasoning does.

I believe that Newman would not deliberately use the example as a mathematical induction. Otherwise, it would weaken his position. This is why I try to interpret the example as a probable reasoning.

3. *The section on the historical influences on Newman is improved.*

Thanks very much.

4. *[p. 61, bottom] 'Descartes' for 'Des Cartes' to keep things consistent.*

Thanks very much. I have corrected it.

5. *[p. 73, note 86] I like the note you have added. It seems an accurate assessment.*

Thanks very much.

6. *[p. 87] Provide a citation form Thomas' corpus to authorize this claim.*

Thanks very much. I am going to cite a passage from St Thomas to authorize this claim.

7. *[p. 101, note 106] But why would the separation of the recognition of and the desire to perform duty not be phenomenologically adequate? Say why in a sentence.*

Thanks very much for the comment. I am going to add the reason why the separation of the recognition of and the desire to perform duty would not be phenomenologically adequate:

"Phenomenologically, the recognition of a duty and the desire to perform the duty in the sense of duty are linked together. For example, when a parent recognizes that it is his/her duty to provide best possible education for his/her children, he/she will have, spontaneously, the desire to perform the duty, even if there are difficulties which prevent the parent to perform the duty. The recognition of and the desire to perform the duty is phenomenologically inseparable."

8. *[p. 171, note 176] This is a very useful footnote, I think.*

Thanks very much for the comment.

9. *[p. 181, note 185] Likewise.*

Thanks.

10. *[p. 198, note 185] Likewise.*

Thanks.

11. *[p. 210, note 206] Likewise.*

Thanks.