Chapter 3: Newman's Conception of Conscience

In this chapter, I am going to examine Newman's conception of conscience to show that it belongs to the type of conception that I have argued for in chapter 2, that is, conscience involves three elements: cognition, conation and emotion.

Part One: Newman's View on the Origin of Conscience

According to Newman, conscience is a simple element in human nature (Newman, 1843, p. 183), a constituent element of the human mind (Newman, 1850, 2, p. 248) and human beings by nature have a conscience (*G. A.* p. 80). This shows that conscience, for Newman, is an original element in human nature.

The originality of conscience in human nature is a very important characteristic of Newman's conception of conscience. But, nowhere in his writings did Newman develop an argument for the originality of conscience. He only assumes, in the *Grammar*, that human beings by nature have a conscience:

> ...I repeat, what I am directly aiming at, is to explain how we gain an image of God and give a real assent to the proposition that He exists... in order to do this, of course I must start from some first principle; –and that first principle, which I assume and shall not attempt to prove, is that... we have by nature a conscience. (*G. A.* p. 80)

Critics thus raise objections to Newman. Jay Newman, for example, criticizes him as assuming too much what should be argued and then takes the developmentalist conception of conscience as a counter-example to Newman's assumption:

> Newman does not expect his assumption to be challenged, ... But perhaps Newman is being too presumptuous, ... and many thinkers have argued that we have to be trained to develop a conscience... And it is certainly not obvious that conscience is an irreducible or inexplicable phenomenon, one that cannot be explained away in terms of more basic elements, such as belief, reason, memory, and desire. (Jay Newman, 1989, p. 72)

Now, let's have a look at why Newman just assumes that human beings by nature have a conscience and does not develop an argument for the originality of conscience.

As we have seen in chapter 1, Newman holds that there are some first principles which are self-evident, known instinctively to be true and serve as the absolute self-justifying starting-points for our reasoning. They do not need arguments of any sort to support them. For him, that human beings by nature have a conscience is one of these principles and there is no need of an argument to prove it.

Jay Newman further objects that we sometimes hear people saying that a certain person has no conscience, so it is not true that human beings by nature have a conscience (Jay Newman, 1989, p. 72). I think this is not a valid objection to Newman. As we will see in the later section, conscience, for Newman, is one of the mental capacities, like reason, memory or imagination. To say that human beings by nature have a conscience, for him, is to say that human beings by nature have this mental capacity. A mental capacity is a disposition, that is, an ability to do something that one is able to do at any time if s/he wants to do, but not necessarily exercising it at every moment.[118] Now, to say that someone has no conscience does not mean that the person lacks, by nature, the mental capacity, but that the person does not exercise the capacity when s/he is morally required.[119] We often

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[118]The word disposition, as I have mentioned in chapter 2, has two senses: (a) a tendency or inclination to behave in a certain way; (b) an ability to do something which one is not necessarily actually doing but one is able to do at any time if one wants to do. Here, I use word in the latter sense.

[119]Kant explains away the locution that someone has no conscience in this way: "when it is said that this man has no conscience, this means he does not heed its dictates. For if he really had none, he would not impute to himself anything done in according with duty, nor reproach himself for anything done contrary to it; and thus he would

use the locution "you have no conscience" to blame someone for her/his failing to do what the moral principles require. If this person has no, by nature, conscience, why ought s/he to be blamed? That there are some people who have no conscience does not provide a counter-example to the thesis that conscience is a mental capacity we have by nature, just as that there are some people who have no memory because of alcohol abuse does not provide a counter-example to the thesis that memory is a mental capacity we have by nature.[120]

In the following, I am going to examine the developmentalist account of conscience to see if it undermines Newman's claim to the originality of conscience in human nature.

The developmentalist account of conscience claims that conscience is not an innate element in human nature and it is merely a product of upbringing or socialization. Among the developmentalists' account of conscience, the Freudian conception of conscience is representative. Thus, I am going to examine it in detail see if it undermines Newman's claim to the originality of conscience in human nature.

According to Freud, "Conscience is no doubt something within us, but it has not been there from the beginning." (Freud, 1933, p. 61) Small children are amoral and have no conscience. Their consciences are developed under the influence of their parents. Freud identifies conscience with the *super-ego* (Freud, *ibid.* p. 60). According to him, the human mind is composed of three parts: *id*, *ego* and *super-ego*. *Id* generates wishes, desires, impulses, etc. and transforms physiological needs into mental representations. The *ego* integrates the demands of the *id* and it "represents what may be called reason and common

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not even be able to conceive of the duty of having a conscience" (Kant, 1785, p. 59). According to Kant, insofar as every man is a moral being, he has conscience originally within him. Being bound to have a conscience would be like having a duty to recognize duties (Kant, *ibid.* p. 59).

[120] One might object to Newman's thesis that human by nature have a conscience by appealing to the anthropologist findings that there are some cultures which are not in any other respect obviously dehumanised or sub-human, but where there seems no conscience. Eskimos, for example, kill old people in order to save food for the young but they do not feel guilt. One way to reply this is that conscience takes different forms in different culture, with varying emotions of shame, of guilt, perhaps even embarrassment dominating.

sense, in contrast to the *id*, which contains the passions" (Freud, 1923, p. 25) The *super-ego*, i.e. conscience, represents external restrictions introjected into oneself and prevents the *ego* from realizing dangerous *id* impulses: "The ego is simply obeying the warning of the pleasure principle. On the other hand, we can tell what is hidden behind the ego's dread of the super-ego, the fear of conscience." (Freud, 1923, p. 47) The superego originates from the repression of Oedipus complex which is a stage in the normal 'sexual' development of human beings (Freud, 1923, p. 34).[121] The role which the superego plays later in life is at first played by an external power, by parental authority. The influence of parents dominates the child by granting proofs of affection and by threats of punishment, which, to the child, mean loss of love, and which must also be feared on their own account. This objective anxiety is the forerunner of the later moral anxiety; so long as the former is dominant one needs not to speak of superego nor of conscience. It is only later that the secondary situation arises, which we are far too ready to regard as the normal state of affairs; the external restrictions are introjected, so that the superego takes the place of the parental function, and henceforth observes, guides, and threatens the ego in just the same way as parents acted to the child before (Freud, 1933, p. 62).

I think the Freudian conception of superego is not a moral conscience. As I have argued in chapter 1, a moral conscience, which the phenomenology of moral experience reveals to us, has three attributes: cognitive, conative and emotive. The operation of a moral conscience involves making moral judgements or reflecting upon the moral beliefs one has. It is conative, that is, involves a disposition to do what one judges as morally right and to avoid what one judges as morally wrong. It is emotive, that is, involves emotions of guilt or shame or remorse after one has done something morally wrong. The emotions are based upon one's own judgement that the thing one has done is morally wrong, not upon the

[121]According to Freud, young children are erotic and affectionate to the parent of the opposite sex, with a corresponding ambivalence of hate, fear, and admiration for the parent of the same sex. In order to overcome incest, a boy develops the rudiments of a conscience. A young child's ego 'sees' that the id impulses, incestuous in nature will lead to pain and hence the id impulses are repressed (Freud, 1923, pp. 34-36). The process of repression does not involve deliberation, reasoning or choice; there is only the bare "perception" by the ego of threat of pain and distress. It is automatic and unconscious (Freud, *ibid.* p.52).

judgements of others or external authorities. While the *superego*, as many critics of Freud have rightly argued, is non-cognitive.[122] The operation of the superego does not involve making any moral verdicts or judgements. Although it sometimes attaches itself to moral beliefs it refuses any critical reflection upon the beliefs and merely blindly accepts them. The superego is not conative either. Since the obedience to the superego is merely an obedience to parental authority and the like, its operation is passive, automatic, even unconscious. Although the operation of the superego involves emotions, the emotions are not moral ones. As we have already seen in chapter 1, a moral emotion consists of three components: one's own moral judgement, feeling and a desire to behave in certain way. Since the operation of the superego does not involve one's own moral judgements, the emotions involved in it are not moral emotions. The guilt-feeling arising from the operation of the superego is merely an 'unconscious affect' and it has nothing to do with one's own moral judgments.

A critic might argue that the Freudian account is an *error thesis* to the effect that what seems to be cognitive and conative is merely the result of the super-ego. One way to reply this is that we can make a phenomenological distinction between conscience and superego, especially in those cases where conscience tells us to go against all we were brought up to respect. Consider a conscientious traitor who sincerely believing his or her own nation is at fault supports the enemy. Such a person suffers from a guilt-feeling but nonetheless acts in good conscience. Part of the phenomenological difference might be that the guilt-feelings are spontaneous but that a kind of calm returns on careful reflection.

From the above discussion we have seen that conscience, in Freud, is identified with the superego and the operation of the superego is non-cognitive and unconscious. We can, therefore, draw the conclusion that the Freudian conception of conscience is not a moral conscience, for a moral conscience, as I have argued in Chapter 2, must be cognitive, conative and emotive. While, Newman's conception of conscience, as we will see in the

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[122]See, especially, John W. Glaser, S.J. (1971), pp. 30-47 and David H. Jones (1973), pp. 85-114.

following sections of this chapter, is very different from the Freudian conception of conscience: ontologically, it is a mental capacity which has a legitimate place in human mind, like our other mental capacities, such as memory, reason, etc.; phenomenologically, it is involves moral judgement, a sense of duty and moral emotion. It is a moral conscience. Thus, the Freudian conception of conscience cannot undermine Newman's claim to the originality of conscience in human nature.

The developmentalist conception of conscience takes conscience as merely a learned phenomenon produced by upbringing or socialization, involving no ontological element. I think this is incorrect. Conscience cannot be merely a learned phenomenon produced either by upbringing or by socialization, with no ontological element involved. This is because if conscience were merely a learned phenomenon produced by upbringing or socialization without any ontological element, a society would have no foundation for morality: the most vicious person shouldn't be blamed for her/his moral character because, by supposition, it is her/his upbringing or socialization, not her/his nature, that is responsible for her/his moral character. From this, we can see that conscience must be rooted in human nature and it is, as Newman says, an original element in human nature.

To say that conscience is an original element in human nature does not, however, exclude the position that there is a developmental condition for the proper function of conscience. One's conscience can be and needs to be fostered and strengthened through learning in order to function properly. Otherwise, it can become dysfunctional. As Newman has pointed out, outside the *Grammar,* conscience can be diminished by no use or bad use. So, education, training and experience are necessary for its strength, its growth, and due formation (Newman, 1850).[123] This is just as one's language capacity needs to be fostered and developed in order to be able to use language. However, the developmental condition for the proper function of conscience does not undermine the originality of conscience in human nature. Without the original element in human nature, no matter how much

[123]For the details about Newman on the role of education in the formation of conscience, please see: V. F. Blehl, 1980.

education and training they have received, human beings cannot develop a moral sense and a sense of duty, and put them in good use, just as no matter how much education and training they have received, a species that lacks innate language capacity cannot develop language skills and properly use them.

From above discussion, we can draw the conclusion that the developmentalist conception of conscience, which identifies conscience as merely a learned phenomenon, cannot undermine Newman's claim to the originality of conscience.

Part Two: The Nature of Conscience in Newman

There are many places in Newman's writings where conscience is dealt with.[124] But nowhere does he give a full description of the nature of conscience.[125] Sometimes Newman speaks of conscience as a mental faculty, a mental capacity; sometimes he speaks of conscience as a feeling, a mental act. What is the nature of conscience in Newman? Is it one of the mental capacities or a mental act?

In many cases, Newman speaks of conscience as a feeling, a mental act:

> I have certain feeling on my mind, which I call conscience. (Newman, 1859, p. 103)

> There are few persons anywhere who deny it, that in the breast of everyone

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[124]According to John Jago, S. M., there are four places in Newman's writings in which special emphasis is put upon the topic of conscience: *The Apologia Pro Vita Sua* (autobiographical information about conscience), "The Parochial and Plain Sermons" and "The Oxford University Sermons" (the place of conscience in Newman's spirituality), the *Grammar of Assent* (analysis of the assent given in the act of belief and its relationship with conscience) and the "Letter to the Duke of Norfolk" (moral supremacy and inviolability of the genuine conscience). See: Jago (1981), pp. 61-74.

[125]The reason for this is that Newman's dealing with conscience is not for its theoretical interest, that is, not to construct a theory of conscience, but to bring out the theistic implication of the operation of conscience. His way to the belief in God is not through the nature of conscience, but through the act of conscience. Thus, Newman leaves the nature of conscience unspecified.

> there dwells a feeling or perception, which tells him the difference between right and wrong, and is the standard by which to measure thoughts and actions. It is called conscience. (Newman, 1849, p. 83)

> Conscience has a legitimate place among our mental acts; as really so, as the action of memory, of reasoning, of imagination, ... (*G. A.* p. 80)

These descriptions seem to suggest that the nature of conscience, for Newman, is a feeling, a mental act. There is a passage in the *Grammar of Assent* that seems to confirm that this is his view. In the *Grammar*, Newman associates conscience with memory, reasoning, but, according to him,

> we cannot properly be said to have any trust in memory and reasoning as faculties. At most we trust in particular acts of memory and reasoning. We are sure there was a yesterday, and that we did this or that in it; we are sure that three times six is eighteen, and that the diagonal of a square is longer than the side. So far as this we may be said to trust the mental act, by which the object of our assent is verified; but, in doing so, we imply no recognition of a general power or faculty, or any capability or affection of our mind, over and above the particular act. (*G. A.* p. 47)[126]

Now, if conscience is merely a feeling, a mental act, it cannot be an original element in human nature, a constituent of the mind, for mental acts themselves cannot be constituents of human mind. Only mental capacities or powers which produce these mental acts can be original elements of our nature. We have already seen that Newman holds that conscience is an original element in human nature. Thus, the nature of conscience, for Newman, ought

[126]In fact, Newman is not suspecting the existence of mental capacities. His point is that mental capacities are indivisible from its acts. We know we have certain mental capacities through their acts, not by direct experience of them: "We know indeed that we have a faculty by which we remember, as we know we have a faculty by which we breathe; but we gain this knowledge by abstraction or inference from its particular acts, not by direct experience" (*G. A.* p. 47).

not to be a feeling, a mental act. Otherwise, the two positions would be inconsistent.

According to Grave, conscience in Newman is to be resolved into what are customarily referred to as its acts and states, without ontological commitment. This is no harm to Newman's doctrine of the originality of conscience in human nature:

> Nothing else in Newman's thought is affected by a resolution of conscience into a class of our mental acts and states. In particular, the doctrine that conscience is 'a simple element in our nature', 'a constituent element of the mind' is unaffected; for these expressions are not intended to designate an agency; their import is that conscience is underivable from anything else in the constitution of the mind and as little the product of our upbringing as reasoning and remembering are. (Grave, 1989, p. 31)

I think that if conscience in Newman were to be resolved into mental acts or states, Newman's doctrine that conscience is a simple element in our nature would be affected. For a mental act or state is occurrent and transitory. It cannot be a simple element in our nature and a constituent element of the mind. I admit that the import of these expressions is that conscience is underivable from anything else in the constitution of the mind and as little the product of our upbringing as reasoning and remembering are. But if conscience in Newman is to be resolved into mental acts or states, without ontological commitment, it is hard for Newman to defend this position. For mental acts or states can be derived from something else or the product of our upbringing. Only a mental faculty or capacity cannot.

In fact, Newman does not resolve conscience into mental acts and states. The nature of conscience, for him, is one of mental capacities.[127] We can justify this from his association of conscience with our other mental capacities:

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[127]A mental capacity is an ability that our mind possesses. It is dispositional and when in operation it manifests itself as two different modes—mental states or mental acts. For example, memory, as a mental capacity, can manifests as mental acts, such as remembering, or mental states, such as information storage, etc.

> as our powers of reasoning, as our sense of the beautiful, and other intellectual endowments. (Newman, 1950, 2, p. 248)

Though he associates conscience with the *action* of memory, of reasoning, of imagination in the *Grammar* (*G. A.* p. 80), Newman's point is that conscience is one of capacities or powers of human mind, just as reason, memory and imagination are. We can justify this from his further association of conscience with the sense of the beautiful:

> Conscience has a legitimate place among our mental acts; ... as the action of memory, of reasoning, of imagination, or as the sense of the beautiful. (*G. A.* p. 80)

The sense of the beautiful itself is, obviously, one of mental capacities, rather than a mental act. Only an actual exercise of it can be called a mental act. For example, when we say someone has the sense of the beautiful, we mean that the person has a capacity to appreciate or understand the aesthetic value of nature, art works, or the human body, etc. We do not mean that the person has a mental act. Only if the person is actually appreciating the aesthetic value of a piece of work of art, the person can be said to have a mental act. We can conclude, therefore, that the nature of conscience, for Newman, is one of mental capacities, rather than a mental act.[128]

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[128] One might raise a query as to how I can square Newman's avoidance of the word "power" as designating conscience with my own attempt to call it such. Let me explain this. As we know, Newman is engaging in a phenomenological investigation of conscience to gain a real assent to existence of God. Thus, his interest is the phenomena of conscience as a mental state or act, not the abstract concept of conscience as a mental power or faculty. And also, in disagreement with Reid, Newman thinks it is improper to say that we can trust our mental powers or faculties because we have no direct experience of mental powers or faculties, but only with mental states or acts. This is why he avoids the use of the word 'power' or 'faculty' to designate conscience. This does not, however, imply that Newman denies the ontological status of conscience as a mental power or faculty. We can see this from his claim that human beings by nature have a conscience and his comparison of conscience with other mental powers, such as memory, reasoning etc. Thus, I insist that the nature of conscience, for Newman, is a mental power or faculty or capacity. The words "power", "faculty" and "capacity" here refer to a mental ability. I deliberately choose the word "capacity" to designate conscience, instead of "power' or 'faculty' because it contains the closest meaning of 'ability', and also, it is dispositional, which does not have the implication of activeness that the word 'power' has, neither the

Now, the nature of conscience, for Newman, is one of mental capacities. But why does he often speak of it as a feeling, a mental act, as the *action* of memory, of reasoning, of imagination, not as *memory*, *reasoning* and *imagination*? The reason is that, phenomenologically, conscience manifests as a feeling, a mental act, just as memory, reasoning and imagination do. What we directly experience are certain feelings or mental acts, not the capacity itself. However, he did not resolve conscience into mental states or acts. His point is that conscience, as a mental capacity, is indivisible from its acts. We know we have the capacity through its mental acts. It is Newman's view that conscience, dispositionally, is a mental capacity and when actualized it is a feeling, a mental act.

Many Newman scholars fail to see that the nature of conscience for Newman is a mental capacity, which is an original element in our mind; when actualized it is a feeling, a mental act. Thus, they take Newman's description of conscience as a feeling or mental state as a curious or weak description. Sillem, for example, takes the description as curious:

> it is curious that Newman should talk of 'an act of conscience', for we might well ask ourselves if he would not have been better advised to treat conscience as he describes it as a state or permanent frame of mind, and to have explained that its emotional states are no mere transitory feelings. (Sillem, 1965, p. 399)

Boekraad take it as a weak description:

> Undoubtedly we sometimes feel that this is a weakness in Newman's description, and ask why he does not make more of the fact that it belongs to our nature to have a conscience? (Boekraad, 1955, p. 255)

I think, as long as we understand that the nature of conscience for Newman is a mental

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implication of being a concrete entity that the word 'faculty' has, so that it can avoid some objections to the ontological status of conscience.

capacity and when actualized it is a feeling, a mental act, the description is no longer curious or weak.

Part Three: The Operation of Conscience according to Newman

Newman employs these terms to characterize the operation of conscience: intuition, instinct, instinctive perception, etc. He gives the following example to illustrate the operation of conscience:

> that this instinct of the mind recognizing an external Master in the dictate of conscience, and imaging the thought of Him in the definite impressions which conscience creates, is parallel to that other law of, not only human, but of brute nature, by which the presence of unseen individual beings is discerned under the shifting shapes and colours of visible world. Is it by sense, or by reason, that brutes understand the real unities, material and spiritual, which are signified by the lights and shadows, the brilliant ever-changing calidoscope, as it may be called, which plays upon their retina? Not by reason, for they have not reason; not by sense, because they are transcending sense; therefore it is an instinct. (*G. A.* p. 84)

This example seems to suggest that Newman takes the operation of conscience as, not an intellectual act, but similar to what St. Thomas calls *vis aestimativa*, the faculty in animals to discover what is good and what is bad for their welfare, without any intellectual instrument.[129]

Now, if the act of conscience is an instinct similar to that of *vis aestimativa*, in what sense, can Newman claim that it is a judgement of reason, an intellectual act? Dr. Meynell, the

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[129] In human beings, such a faculty is called the *vis cogitative* (Aquinas, 1273, I, q. 78, a. 4, ob. 5; q. 81, a. 2 and 3; q. 88, a. 2; q. 115, a. 4; I-II, q. 51, a. 3).

first commentator of the *Grammar of Assent*, criticises Newman's use of the word 'instinct'. Meynell says:

> I do not like *instinct* in philosophy, and would apply Occam's razor to all of them, as asserted of intelligence. If this surprises you, I cannot help it. I know what I mean when I say that the brutes have instinct, because I have so myself *quatenus* animal. I wink my eyes e.g. instinctively, e.g., spontaneously, because if it depended on me, I should forget to do it and should go blind. Instinct, I say, is not an intellectual act. I even hold that in animals, instinct and intelligence are in inverse ratio. The more intelligence an animal has the less instinct, because he wants it less. Bees and ants are full of instinct; but a dog has fewer, and man fewest. The intelligence which belongs to instinct is not in the subject of it but in Author—i.e., in God. I do not, then, understand what is meant by saying that we infer our sensations to an external object by an instinct. (Dessain, 1973, vol. XXIV, p. 307)

To determine whether Newman is justified in characterizing the operation of conscience as an instinctive act, we need to ascertain in what sense he uses the word instinct. Ordinarily, 'instinct' is used to denote an innate faculty or capacity, existing in all members of a species, to behave as such, without intellectual instrument and training. For example, when we say that *flying* is an instinct of birds; *swimming* is an instinct of fish, etc. we use the word 'instinct' in this sense. Newman does not use the word 'instinct' in this ordinary sense. He uses the word in a different way: to denote the immediacy of realizing particular objects without assignable media. Newman made this explicitly in his reply to Meynell:

> By instinct I mean a realization of a *particular*; by intuition, of a *general* fact—in both cases without *assignable* or *recognizable* media of realization. Is there any word I could use instead of instinct to denote the realization of particulars? (Dessain, *ibid.* p. 309)

This interpretation is also supported by Newman's characterization of natural inference and its application to the act of conscience.[130] Newman characterizes natural inference as a simple act, not a process, as if there were no medium interposed between antecedent and consequent, and the transition from one to the other were of the nature of an instinct,—that is, the process is altogether unconscious and implicit (*G. A.* pp. 250-251). According to him, natural inference is of the nature of an instinct:

> if by instinct be understood, not a natural sense, one and all the same in all, and incapable of cultivation, but a perception of facts without assignable media of perceiving. (*G. A.* p. 254)

We can see from above that the word 'instinct' used by Newman to characterize the act of conscience refers to the immediacy of recognizing particular objects, without consciousness of mental processes.[131] The immediacy is characterized by psychological spontaneity, not a logical one. Psychological immediacy is characterized by being unconscious of mental processes, that is, no mental process of any kind is felt. Logical immediacy is characterized by being non-inferential, that is, no inference of any kind is involved. Psychological immediacy does not imply logical immediacy, that is, being unconscious of mental processes does not imply that there is no inference of any kind involved.[132] Thus, the word 'instinct' in Newman is used to denote the psychological

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[130]Newman classifies inference as formal inference, informal inference and natural inference. Formal inference is verbal reasoning from proposition to proposition. Its full form is the Aristotelian syllogism (*G. A.* p. 200). Informal inference is the cumulation of probabilities, independent of each other, arising out of the nature and circumstances of the particular case which is under review (*G. A.* p. 219). Natural inference differs from informal inference in so far as in the latter the probable arguments, which converge to one definite conclusions, are explicitly recognized to some extent though not in every detail, whereas in natural inference there is no explicit awareness of the antecedents at all (See: Kaiser, F. J., 1958, p. 127).

[131]It becomes clear that why Newman analogizes the act of conscience to the *vis aestimative*: the act of conscience is similar to the *vis aestimative* in its spontaneity.

[132]This important distinction is made by S. Grave (Grave, 1989, p.16, p. 46). I agree with Grave that in interpreting Newman's language of immediacy, such as 'sense', 'intuition', 'perception', 'instinct', etc. the distinction between logical and psychological immediacy needs to be kept constantly in mind and trying to construe the language of immediacy in every instance as asserting only psychological immediacy, not logical immediacy. However, this interpreting policy faces some difficulties. Sometimes the words *perception* and *instinct*, in Newman, seem to denote logical immediacy: "perception comes to me *through* my senses—therefore I cannot call it *immediate*. If it were not for my senses, nothing would excite me to perceive-but... I perceive by

immediacy, not logical immediacy. This interpretation can be further seen from the following passage in the *Grammar*:

> We reason when we hold this by virtue of that; whether we hold it as evident or as approximating or tending to be evident, in either case we so hold it because of holding something else to be evident or tending to be evident. In the next place, our reasoning ordinarily presents itself to our mind as a simple act, not a process or series of acts. We proceed by a sort of instinctive perception, from premise to conclusion. *I call it instinctive, not as if the faculty were one and the same to all men in strength and quality (as we generally conceive of instinct), but because ordinarily, or at least often, it acts by a spontaneous impulse, as prompt and inevitable as the exercise of sense and memory.* We perceive external objects, and we remember past events, without knowing how we do so; and in like manner we reason without effort and intention, or any necessary consciousness of the path which the mind takes in passing from antecedent to conclusion. (*G. A.* p. 198; *italic* added)

Since the word 'instinct' in Newman signifies only psychological immediacy and psychological immediacy does not imply logical immediacy, the act of conscience, which is characterized by Newman as an instinctive act, is not irrational, mysterious or blind impulse. Newman's view that the act of conscience is an instinctive act is thus compatible with his view that the act of conscience is a rational, intellectual act, whose operations admit of being surveyed and scrutinized by reason (Newman, 1843, X, p. 83).

Newman holds that the operation of conscience involves reason. The reason, however, is implicit, not explicit. Explicit reason involves consciously inferential processes from

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instinct (as I call it) without *argumentative* media, *through* my senses, but not logically *by* my senses" (Dessain, 1973, vol. XXIV, p. 314.) Here, the words 'perception' and 'instinct' denote logical immediacy. I conjecture that this is due to Reid's influence. In Reid, psychological immediacy implies logical immediacy, for Reid says: "When I hear a certain sound, I conclude immediately without reasoning, that a coach passes by. There are no premises from which this conclusion is inferred by any rules of logic. It is the effect of a principle of our nature, common to us with the brutes." (Reid, 1764, IV, 1, 117b)

premises to conclusion while implicit reason is a simple act, not a process, as if there were no medium interposed between antecedent and consequent, and the transition from one to the other were of the nature of an instinct (*G. A.* p. 250). He uses several examples to illustrate what an implicit reasoning is:

> A peasant who is weather wise may yet be simply unable to assign intelligible reasons why he thinks it will be fine tomorrow; and if he attempts to do so he may give reasons wide of the marks; but that will not weaken his own confidence in his prediction. His mind does not proceed step by step, but he feels all at once and together the force of various combined phenomena, though he is not conscious of them. (*G. A.* p. 252)

In implicit reasoning, the mind passes promptly from one set of facts to another, not only without conscious media, but also without conscious antecedents (*G. A.* p. 253). According to Newman, implicit reason is a synthetic power of the mind in judging in concrete matters, that is, the 'illative sense':

> I have already said that the sole and final judgement on the validity of an inference in concrete matter is committed to the personal action of the ratiocinative faculty, the perfection or virtue of which I have called the Illative Sense, a use of the word 'sense' parallel to our use of it in 'good sense', 'common sense', a 'sense of beauty', etc. (*G. A.* p. 263)[133]

In concrete matters, "It is the mind that reasons, and that controls its own reasoning, not any technical apparatus of words and propositions. This power of judging and concluding, when in its perfection, I call the Illative Sense." (*G. A.* p. 268) Newman uses Aristotle's

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[133]According to Newman, the Illative Sense has a personal character (*G. A.* pp. 274-275). This shows that personal element, for Newman, has an epistemic value. The view that personal element has an epistemic value is elaborated by a number of contemporary philosophers, such as H. H. Price, Keith Lehrer, Gilbert Harman, etc. See: Price (1969), pp. 471-473; Lehrer (1974), p. 212; Harman (1973), pp. 18-19.

phronesis to illustrate the illative sense. *Phronesis*, according to Aristotle, is a faculty which guides the mind in matters of conduct, that is, it is the practical wisdom (*G. A.* pp. 268-269).

Although Newman uses "the ratiocinative faculty", "practical wisdom", "personal gift", etc. to characterize the Illative Sense, the *nature* of the Illative Sense, is neither a special faculty, nor an intuition, nor a purely personal gift or talent,[134] but an intellectual capability which can make final judgements and conclusions in concrete matters through assessing antecedent, cumulative probabilities in particular circumstances and particular subject-matter, where formal logical reasoning has no use. This interpretation can be established by Newman's comparison of the word 'sense' in the Illative Sense with the word 'sense' in 'good sense', 'common sense' and a 'sense of beauty'.[135]

Newman attaches great importance to the Illative Sense: "...in no class of concrete reasoning... is there any ultimate test of truth and error in our inferences besides the trustworthiness of the Illative Sense that gives them its sanction..." (*G. A.* p. 273) Therefore, it is our duty to strengthen and perfect the Illative Sense (*G. A. ibid.*).[136]

To sum up, we have seen from the above that Newman describes the operation of conscience as instinctive perception, 'instinctive' here is used to signify only psychological immediacy, not logical immediacy. Implicit reasoning, guided by the Illative Sense, is involved in the operation of conscience. Thus, the operation of conscience is not super-rational, epistemologically mysterious.

In the above, I have discussed the originality, nature and operation of conscience according

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[134] Charles F. Harrold defines Newman's Illative Sense as "the spontaneous divination by the mind in concrete matters that a conclusion is inevitable if it is felt to be 'as good as proved', even though not determined by a process of reasoning logically complete." (Harrold, 1947, p. xvii) I think it is inappropriate to define Newman's Illative Sense in this way because Newman says nothing about Illative Sense as the spontaneous divination of the mind. Also, it may suggest that the operation of the Illative Sense is mysterious.

[135] Cf. Blehl, *ibid.* p. 145.

[136] I will further discuss Newman's Illative Sense in Part Six, Chapter 6 of this thesis.

to Newman. In the following I am going to show that Newman's conception of conscience is three-fold, that is, it involves cognitive, conative and emotive components.

Part Four: Newman's Three-Fold Conception of Conscience

In this section, I am going to examine Newman's analyses of the phenomena of conscience, to show that conscience, for him, is three-fold: cognitive, conative and emotive.

The feeling of conscience, Newman analyses, being a certain keen sensibility, pleasant or painful, self-approval and hope, or compunction and fear, is twofold: it is a moral sense, and a sense of duty; a judgement of the reason and a magisterial dictate (*G. A.* p. 80).[137] Although the feeling, according to him, is an indivisible act, it involves two aspects: a moral sense and a sense of duty: "Of course, its act is indivisible, still it has these two aspects, distinct from each other, and admitting of a separate consideration." (*G. A. ibid*) He then goes on to explicate this:

> Though I lost my sense of the obligation which I lie under to abstain from acts of dishonesty, I should not in consequence lose my sense that such actions were an outrage offered to my moral nature. Again; though I lost my sense of their moral deformity, I should not therefore lose my sense that they were forbidden to me. (*G. A.*, p. 80)

This passage, as Grave says, is difficult to interpret, for "It can seem to contradict the remark which it immediately follows; according to which the act of conscience has, indivisible, two aspects, one determinative of what is to be done, the other magisterially requiring that it be done." (Grave, 1989, p. 63) He interprets Newman as contrasting a morality with a moral sense but without conscience, and a morality with conscience but no moral sense:

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[137] Newman starts his analyses from the feeling of conscience. This is because, as I have said above,

> Take Newman to be contrasting a morality with a moral sense but without conscience, and a morality with conscience but no moral sense, and there is no longer a problem about the relationship between what he is now saying and what he has just said. In the morality without conscience the moral deformity of an action will be perceived, but there will be no sense of obligation (at least none of the kind brought by conscience) to abstain from it. In the morality without a moral sense there will be a sense of forbiddingness, but it will not be occasioned by a perception of moral obliquity ... These moralities are only what might have been. We have both a moral sense and a conscience; or, Newman chooses to say, the moral-sense and the magisterial are aspects of the unitary act of conscience. (Grave, *ibid.* p. 64)

To determine what Newman is saying in the above passage, I think it is useful to see what immediately follows. Following the passage quoted above, Newman says:

> Thus, conscience has both a critical and a judicial office, and though its promptings, in the breasts of the millions of human beings to whom it is given, are not in all cases correct, that does not necessarily interfere with the force of its testimony and of its sanction: its testimony that there is a right and a wrong, and its sanction to that testimony conveyed in the feelings which attend on right or wrong conduct. (*G. A.* p. 81)

Now, if Newman is contrasting a morality with a moral sense but without conscience, and a morality with conscience but no moral sense, how can he abruptly draw the conclusion from the contrast that conscience has both a critical and a judicial office? Thus, I present another interpretation. In the above passage, Newman is not positively stating that the sense of the moral deformity of dishonesty can be separated from the sense of the obligation to abstain from it and the sense of the obligation to abstain from dishonesty can

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phenomenologically conscience manifests as a feeling, a mental state.

be separated from the sense of the moral deformity of dishonesty. For this is contrary to his position that the act of conscience has two indivisible aspects. What Newman is doing is negatively to defend his position that the act of conscience has the two aspects, by supposing that even if, in some cases, one lost his sense of duty, he should still have a moral sense, and one lost his moral sense, he should still have a sense of duty. As a whole, the act of conscience has the two aspects.

According to Newman, the cognitive aspect of conscience has two elements: a moral sense and a judgement of reason. What is meant it by *moral sense* in Newman? Is it used within the tradition of the 18-century British Moral-Sense Theory? To answer this, we need to examine that theory.

There are two types of the Moral-Sense Theory. One is the subjective type, according to which, the moral sense consists of merely a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind induced by the contemplation of an action, or sentiment, or character and that to be morally good or evil is just to induce a particular kind of feeling. The moral sense, in this type of Moral-Sense Theory, is non-cognitive. Another is the objective type, according to which, the moral sense, like sense-perception, is independent of our feelings. The rightness or wrongness of an action, the goodness or badness of a person's character is independent of any feelings induced in us by the contemplation of an action or character of that sort. Moral sense, according to this type of the theory, is cognitive: it ascertains the rightness or wrongness of an action and goodness or badness of a person's character. Though there are differences between them, the two types of moral-sense theory commonly hold that the moral sense operates both with logical immediacy, that is, non-inferentially, no deductive step is taken, no reason adduced, and with psychological immediacy, that is, no mental process of any kind is experienced as gone through (Grave, *ibid*, pp. 45-46).

From what he says we can see that Newman's notion of moral sense belongs to the objective type of the Moral-Sense theory:

> as there are objects which, when presented to the mind, cause it to feel grief, regret, joy, or desire, so there are things which excite in us approbation or blame, and which we in consequence call right or wrong; ... (*G. A.* p. 80)

Though sometimes it has the appearance of the subjective type of the Moral-Sense Theory: the moral sense is "an intellectual sentiment: a sense of admiration and disgust, of pleasure or pain." (*G. A.* pp. 80, 83)

Now, Newman couples 'a judgement of reason' with 'a moral sense'. Is he illustrating 'a moral sense' by 'a judgement of reason'? We have already seen that Newman's notion of moral sense belongs to the tradition of the Moral-Sense Theory, that is, it operates with logical immediacy, that is, no reasoning or inferences involved. If Newman is illustrating "a moral sense' by 'a judgement of reason', his notion of moral sense cannot belong to the tradition of the Moral-Sense Theory, for a judgement of reason, certainly, involves reasoning and inference. I think that Newman is in fact stating that the cognitive aspect of conscience is not merely a moral sense, that is, not mere a sense of the fittingness or deformity of actions, involving moral approval or disapproval, but also a judgement of reason. The reason is, however, implicit, not explicit. A judgement of reason is a practical judgement, by which we judge what, here and now, is to be done as being good, or to be avoided as evil (Newman, 1850, pp. 254-255).

According to Newman, conscience is not merely cognitive: a moral sense, a judgment of reason, but more importantly, it is conative: a sense of duty, a magistrial dictate. The latter is its primary and most authoritative aspect; it is the ordinary sense of the word (*G. A.* p. 81). Newman criticizes 'moral sense' philosophers in his time for treating conscience as merely a moral sense, a sense of moral approving or disapproving which can be reduced to a sentiment, like a sense of beauty or taste, is an affection towards what is beautiful and aversion from what is deformity. Newman makes a distinction between conscience and a sense of beauty or taste:

> Taste and conscience part company: for the sense of beautifulness, as indeed the Moral Sense, has no special relations to persons, but contemplates objects in themselves; conscience, on the other hand, is concerned with persons primarily; and further, taste is its own evidence, appealing to nothing beyond its own sense of the beautiful or the ugly, and enjoying the specimens of the beautiful simply for their own sake; but conscience does not repose on itself but vaguely reaches forward to something beyond self, and dimly discerns a sanction higher than self for its decisions, as is evidenced in that keen sense of obligation and responsibility which inform them. (*G. A*, p. 82)

As we have seen, Newman himself associates conscience with the sense of the beautiful at several times. However, he does this only in so far as both conscience and the sense of the beautiful are natural endowments. For him, conscience is different from the sense of the beautiful in an important aspect: the sense of the beautiful has no special relations to persons, the cause of it is its immediate object and has no intimate bearing on our emotions, such as reverence, awe, hope, specially fear; while conscience is concerned with persons primarily, the cause of conscience is not its immediate object and has an intimate bearing on these emotions (*G. A*. pp. 81-82).[138] Conscience here, which is different from the sense of the beautiful or taste, is taken to be the sense of duty, not the moral sense. The moral sense, for Newman, as for the Moral-Sense philosophers, is an intellectual sentiment, like the sense of the beautiful or taste. It has no special connection with emotions. While, the sense of the duty, according to Newman, is closely connected with emotions:

> Conscience has an intimate bearing on our affections and emotions, leading to us to reverence and awe, hope and fear, especially fear, a feeling which is foreign for the most part, not only to Taste, but even to the Moral Sense, except in consequence of accidental associations. (*G. A*. p. 82)

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[138]Here, I do not fully agree with Newman's remarks on the sense of beauty. The sense of beauty does have relations to persons and have intimate bearing on our emotions. This is obvious in the cases of contemplating human beauty. Consider the cases of our contemplation of natural beauty, say, a sublime mountain, we do relate it to an animate being who is higher than ourselves and feel reverence towards her/him.

He takes very seriously the emotions aroused after one has done one's duty, such as, pleasure, hope, self-approval, etc., and the emotions aroused after one has failed to do one's duty, such as, fear, guilt, remorse, shame, etc.:

> these emotions constitute a specific difference between conscience and our other intellectual sense,—common sense, good sense, sense of expedience, taste, sense of honour, and the like, ... (*G. A.* p. 82)

It is because conscience is emotional that it always involves the recognition of a living object, towards which it is directed.

In the above we have seen that the nature of conscience, for Newman, is a mental capacity, when manifested it is a feeling, a mental act. This mental act is three-fold: cognitive, conative and emotive. However, Newman did not show how the cognitive aspect of conscience works in his phenomenology of conscience. This is because his primary concern is to bring out the theological implication of the phenomena of moral obligation and moral emotion, not because there are no phenomena associated with the cognitive aspect of conscience.

In the following chapter, I am going to examine and evaluate Newman's approach from conscience to the justification of belief in the existence of God.

Chapter 4: Newman's Approach to the Justification of Belief in the Existence of God[139]

As I have mentioned in the Introduction, Newman departs from the traditional approach to the justification of belief in God, which looks for abstract arguments for the belief in the existence of God, and anchors his approach on concrete moral experience. Before investigating Newman's approach, it is necessary for us to look at the reasons why Newman departs from the traditional approach.

Part One: The Reasons for Newman's Departure from the Traditional Approach to the Justification of Belief in the Existence of God

One of the reasons for his departure from the traditional approach to the justification of belief in the existence of God is that the traditional approach, for Newman, is weak and it fails to provide a motivational reason for the belief in the existence of God, for it deals with only abstract arguments. According to him, abstract arguments, which deal with logical relations among notions, lack of psychological force and therefore can only lead to a notional assent, not a real assent, to the existence of God. To fully understand this we need to look at Newman's distinction between notional and real assent.

Newman distinguishes between notional and real assent. According to him, a notional

[139]Newman's conception of God belongs to the traditional type, that is, God is personal, all good, all-powerful and all-knowing: "I speak then of the God of the Theist and of the Christian: a God who is numerically One, who is Personal, the author, Sustainer, and Finisher of all things, the Life of Law and Order, the Moral Governor; One who is Supreme and sole; like Himself, unlike all things besides Himself, which all are but His creatures; distinct from, independent of them all; One who is self-existing, absolutely infinite, who has ever been and ever will be, to whom nothing is past or future; who is all perfection, and the fullness and archetype of every possible excellence, the Truth Itself, wisdom, Love, Justice, Holiness; One who is all-powerful, All-Knowing, Omnipresent, Incomprehensible. These are some of the distinctive prerogatives which I ascribe unconditionally and unreservedly to the great Being whom I call God." (*G. A.* p. 77) The typical objections to the traditional conception of God appeal to the anthropomorphic conception and the problem of evil. See: Edward H. Madden (1968).

assent is the apprehension of a notional proposition. A notional proposition contains common names, which stand for the abstract, the general, and the non-existing (*G. A.* p. 33); while a real assent is the apprehension of the real proposition. A real proposition contains singular nouns, which represent units and individuals external to us (*G. A.* p. 57). Sometimes, Newman uses notional assent and real assent to refer to different modes of apprehension of the same proposition: a notional assent is an act of mind accepting a proposition, following upon acts of inference, and other purely intellectual exercises; and it is an assent to a large development of predicates, correlative to each other, or at least intimately connected together... (*G. A.* p. 57) That is, a notional assent is merely an intellectual acceptance of an abstract proposition; while a real assent is an act of mind to accept a proposition, following upon experience and imagination.[140]

According to Newman, a real assent is brought about in three ways: 1) the mind is informed by direct experience or information about the concrete; 2) The mind can have a real apprehension of the past by means of the faculty of memory which consists in a present imagination of things that are past; 3) The third way of reaching a real apprehension is 'by an inventive faculty' i.e. 'the faculty of composition'. Thus, a real assent has these characteristics: 1) an image is involved; 2) the image is presented to the mind by the imagination; 3) real assents are of a personal character. Since an image is presented to the mind by imagination in a real assent, a real assent is stronger than a notional assent.[141]

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[140]I agree with Hick that Newman's distinction between notional apprehension/assent and real apprehension/assent is two kinds: one is of logic and another is of psychology. Newman distinguishes them first in terms of a real propositions and notional propositions. The distinction rests upon a formal division between singular and general propositions. The distinction thus belongs to the province of logic; Newman also distinguishes them in terms of modes of apprehending propositions: "the same proposition may admit of both these interpretations at once, having a notional sense as used by one man, and a real as used by another". The distinction now becomes a psychological one (Hick, 1988, p. 73).

[141]My discussion of real assent/propositions is devoid of Newman's Neoplatonism because I am trying to interpret Newman within the British naturalist/empiric tradition. However, if we interpret Newman within the Augustinian tradition we can see the Neoplatonic elements in his epistemology, which has been neglected due to different readings of Newman. According to Neoplatonism, the universe consists of the hierarchy of the One, Intellect and Soul. The One is the ultimate source of the whole universe; the Intellect consists of abstract entities (Plato's Forms), making up the intelligible world which is the realm of the real, and is unchanging and non-spatial. The Soul consists of the World-Soul and the souls of individuals at different levels and is responsible for the sensible world which is unreal, changeable image of the intelligible and has spatial extension. Thus, according to Neoplatonism, images are merely reflections of Forms and they are

Newman stresses the role of mental images in assent. According to him, mental images make apprehension of a proposition more vivid, and therefore, strengthen assent to it (*G. A.* p. 58).[142] A mental image presents to the mind a picture of the object of the proposition and makes apprehension of it more vivid than merely abstract notions do. The vividness of apprehension then renders our belief in the proposition stronger and more intense, so that we cannot help to give a full assent to the proposition. There is a psychological connection between vividness of apprehension and intensity (strength) of assent.[143] We are inclined to give more intense or stronger assents to propositions that are vividly apprehended than those that are not vividly apprehended. A mental image, due to its vividness, can strengthen assent, even if it may not be a true image of something.

Newman also thinks that mental images can motivate belief and lead to actions (*G. A.* pp. 62, 63, 68). The impressiveness and vividness of mental images can exerts a psychological force, the latter motivate one to assent, even if the evidence is not sufficient for the assent.[144] Mental images can also stimulate emotions and have the power of the concrete upon the affections and passions, the latter cause actions. Mental images can arouse our emotions, such as, hope and fear, likes and dislikes, appetite, passion, affection, the stirrings of selfishness and self-love, etc. which are motive powers of actions.[145]

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neither necessary nor sufficient for being real. (Cf. Craig, 1998, vol. 7, pp. 456-462)

[142]According to Ryle, there are two senses of 'vivid'. One means 'lifelike'; another 'intense', 'acute' or 'strong' (Ryle, 1945, p. 250). The word 'vivid' in Newman, I think, possess both meanings and the two meanings are not separate. Distinctness or lifelikeness, according to him, has a causal connection with intenseness, acuteness or strength.

[143]Newman rejects Locke's theory of degree of assent (cf. R. A. Naulty, 1973, pp. 453-457). However, he admits that in one sense we can talk about the strength of assent, that is, in the sense that the presence or absence of images in apprehension leads people to speak of strong or weak assent.

[144] I think Newman is right here. Most of our beliefs are so inextricably connected with attitudes and emotions that it is not possible to have merely a fairly high degree of assent. This would then explain the role of vividness, not as justifying a belief but as rending it the sort of belief for which partial assent is inappropriate.

[145]Newman rightly sees the role of emotions in belief and action: emotions not only strengthen belief but also motivate action. For contemporary discussion about the role of emotions in epistemology and ethics see: Christopher Hookway (2003), pp. 78-96, where Hookway has discussed the role of emotions in epistemic evaluation by comparing the role of emotions in moral evaluation.

According to Newman, the pure intellect does not lead to action, nor the imagination either, yet the imagination has the means, which the pure intellect has not, of stimulating those powers of the mind from which action proceeds... the images in which real assent lives, representing as they do the concrete, have the power of the concrete upon the affections and passions (*G. A.* p. 68). This is why he holds that a notional assent is weak. A notional assent does not involve an image of the object believed, therefore, cannot arouse emotion towards the object. There is a causal connection between images and emotion: emotions, such as, love, hatred, hope and fear, are always accompanied by the image of the object loved, hatred, hoped or feared.

Due to the role of the mental image, a real assent is more strong and effective than notional assent: the perception of objects external to us affects us more strongly than our apprehension of notions:

> intellectual ideas cannot compete in effectiveness with the experience of concrete facts". Images and experiences strike us individually as the notions abstracted from them do not. In a real assent, experiences and their images strike and occupy the mind and exert a psychological force and make an impression on the mind that nothing abstract can rival. It is in human nature to be more affected by the concrete than by the abstract. (*G. A.* pp. 29, 30)

A real assent is, thus, more vivid, impressive and effective, in other words, stronger than a notional assent.

Newman values very much the role of mental images in assent. However, he does not exaggerate the role. He sees that the vividness of mental images does not warrant the existence of the object which these images represent:

> the fact of the distinctness of the images which are required for real assent, is no warrant for the existence of the objects which those images represent. A

> proposition, be it ever so keenly apprehended, may be true or may be false. If we simply put aside all inferential information, such as is derived from testimony, from general belief, from the concurrence of the senses, from common sense, or otherwise, we have no right to consider that we have apprehended a truth, merely because of the strength of our mental impression of it... An image, with the characters of perfect veracity and faithfulness, may be ever so distinct and eloquent an object presented before the mind...but, nevertheless, there may be no external reality in the case, corresponding to it, in spite of its impressiveness. (*G. A.* pp.61-62)

According to him, to assent to a proposition, we need a more legitimate reason than merely the impressiveness or vividness of mental images. A mental image is the cause of the intensity of an assent, not the reason for the assent:

> When I assent to a proposition, I ought to have some more legitimate reason for doing so, than the brilliancy of the image of which that proposition is the expression. That I have no experience of a thing happening except in one way, is a cause of the intensity of my assent, if I assent, but not a reason for my assenting... here I am not speaking of transgressions of rule any more than of exceptions to it, but of the normal constitution of our minds, and of the natural and rightful effect of acts of the imagination upon us, and this is, not to create assent, but to intensify it. (*G. A.* pp. 62-63)

We can see that, for Newman, the role of mental images is to render our apprehension of the proposition more vivid and stir up our emotions, and then motivate our assent or strengthen our assent to the proposition. Although the image itself does not warrant the truth of the proposition and more legitimate reasons are required for justifying the proposition, it can exert a psychological force that a notional assent cannot.

Now, we can understand why Newman departures from the traditional approach to the

justification of belief in God: it only deals with abstract arguments and abstract arguments, due to their divorce from concrete images and experience, lack motivational force and can only lead to, at best, a notional assent to the belief in God, which is merely an intellectual apprehension of the notion of God.[146] He remarks: "I have no intention of denying the beauty and the cogency of the arguments... but I question much, whether in matter of fact they make or keep men Christians." (Newman, 1843, p. 74) He attacks William Paley, one of his contemporary Christian writers who provides arguments for the Christian beliefs in his *Evidences of Christianity*: "If I am asked to use Paley's argument for my own conversion, I say plainly I do not want to be converted by a smart syllogism; if I am asked to convert others by it, I say plainly I do not care to overcome their reason without touching their heart." (*G. A.* p. 323)[147] "My method of argument", he continues, "differs from that adopted by Paley in his *Evidences of Christianity.*" (*G. A.* p. 322) What Newman is interested in is the method of argument which can lead to a real assent to the existence of God. As Jay Newman has rightly observed: "For years Newman had felt that the traditional scholastic proofs only bring men to notional religious belief at best; the more 'concrete' argument from conscience had always been Newman's preferred proof of theism." (Jay Newman, 1989, p. 71)

Newman's departure from the traditional approach to the justification of the belief in the existence of God is also a reaction to the evidentialist challenge in his time.

During Newman's time, the *dominant* view about rationality in Western thinking was the Cartesian conception of rationality, that is, strictly demonstrative reasoning.

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[146] Besides lacking of motivational force, the traditional approach, according to Newman, involves an infinite regress and eventually leads to scepticism: "Life is not long enough for a religion of inferences; we shall never have done beginning, if we determine to begin with proof. We shall ever be laying our foundations; we shall turn theology into evidences, and divines into textuaries. We shall never get at our first principles. Resolve to belief nothing, and you must prove your proofs and analyze your elements, sinking farther and further, and finding 'in the lowest depth a lower deep,' till you come to the broad bosom of skepticism" (*G. A.* p.72).

[147] Newman does not reject syllogisms in general. As Johannes Artz has observed: "Newman does not undervalue logically formulated proof; on the contrary, he uses syllogisms himself. What he rejected is only the over-valuation of verbal inference and argumentation'' (Artz, 1976, p. 275).

This conception of rationality underlaid evidentialism.[148] According to evidentialism,[149] it is not rational for a person to hold a certain belief unless s/he holds it on the basis of other belief(s) which give the belief in question adequate evidential support. A belief is evidentially supported if and only if it is inferred by demonstrative reasoning. Applied to religious beliefs, evidentialism infers that it is irrational for one to believe in God unless one holds the belief on the basis of other belief(s) which give the belief adequate evidential support. From evidentialism the evidentialist challenge is derived: it is irrational for one to believe in God unless one holds the belief on the basis of other belief(s) which give the belief adequate evidential support; there is no adequate evidential support for the belief in the existence of God (none of traditional arguments for the existence of God is demonstrative/deductively valid); therefore, it is irrational to believe in God.

John Locke was among the first to launch the evidentialist challenge in the seventeenth century. In his *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, Locke explicated the evidentialist view:

> He that would seriously set upon the search of truth, ought, in the first place, to prepare his mind with a love of it. For he that loves it not will not take much pain to get it, nor be much concerned when he misses it. There is nobody, in the commonwealth of learning, who does not profess himself a lover of truth,—and

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[148] According to Plantinga, evidentialism is rooted in classical foundationalism (Plantinga, 1983a, pp. 48, 62). He characterised classical foundationalism as claiming that a belief P for a person S is epistemically justified (or warranted) if and only if P is either properly basic or derived from a properly basic belief(s) Q by means of a sequence of properly basic inference(s) R, where a properly basic belief is one which is either self-evident or evident to the senses for S, and a properly basic inference is one which is analytical, demonstrative or deductively valid (Plantinga, 1993a). Later, Plantinga modified this characterisation in his *Warranted Christian Belief* and characterises it as claiming that a person *S* is justified in accepting a belief *p* if and only if *either* (1) *p* is properly basic for *S*, that is self-evident, incorrigible, or Lockeanly evident to the sense for *S, or* (2) *S* believes *p* on the evidential basis of propositions that are properly basic and that evidentially support *p* deductively, inductively, or abductively (Plantinga, 2000, pp. 93-94). I will discuss classical foundationalism in details in Part Two, Chapter 6.

[149] According to Kenneth Konyndyk, there are two versions of evidentialism, a normative version and a structural version (Konyndyk, 1989, p. 99). According to William Alston, evidentialists include both those who reject the belief in God because they think that there are no adequate reasons for the belief and who accept the belief in God only because they think that there are adequate reasons for the belief (Alston, 1985a).

there is not a rational creature, that would not take it amiss, to be thought otherwise of. And yet, for all this, one may truly say, there are very few lovers of truth, for truth sake, even amongst those who persuade themselves that they are so. How a man may know, whether he be so, in earnest, is worth inquiry; and I think, there is this one unerring mark of it, viz. *the not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance than the proofs it is built on will warrant.* Whoever goes beyond this measure of assent, it is plain, receives not truth in the love of it, loves not truth for truth-sake, but for some other by-end. For the evidence that any proposition is true (except such as are self-evident) lying only in the proofs a man has of it, whatsoever degrees of assent he affords it beyond the degree of that evidence, it is plain all that surplusage of assurance is owing to some other affection, and not to the love of truth; it being as impossible that the love of truth should carry my assent above the evidence that is to me that it is true, as that the love of truth should make me assent to any proposition for the sake of that evidence which it has not that it is true; which is in effect to love it as a truth, because it is possible or probable that it may not be true. (Locke, 1690, Book IV, xix p. 384)

According to Locke's evidentialist view, one ought not to believe a proposition which is not adequately evidentially-supported, and believing a proposition without adequate evidence is irrational and epistemically irresponsible.[150]

In order to show that the belief in God is rationally justified, Newman rejects the evidentialist conceptions of rationality and justification, according to which, deductively

[150]Locke's position has been developed as a deontological conception of justification, the conception that epistemic justification is a matter of fulfilling epistemic duty or responsibility. The primary epistemic duty, according to the deontological conception, is to believe on adequate evidences (Chisholm, 1977). There are many other conceptions of epistemic justification, such as, the conception that epistemic justification is a matter of reliability of our cognitive processes (Goldman, 1979), the conception that epistemic justification is a matter of evaluation of how well one has fulfilled one's epistemic goals (Lehrer, 1974), the conception that epistemic justification is a matter of providing adequate evidences for the belief in question (Alston, 1989), etc.

valid, formal demonstrative reasoning is the only criterion of rationality (justification).[151] According to him, it is untrue that demonstrative reasoning is the only provider of rationality (justification). Non-demonstrative reasoning can provide one with rationality (justification).[152] Newman appeals to Locke's own view on probability to reject his evidentialist criterion of rationality (justification). In his chapter "On Probability", Locke says:

> Most of the propositions we think, reason, discourse, nay, act upon, are such as we cannot have undoubted knowledge of their truth; yet some of them border so near upon certainty, that we make no doubt at all about them, but assent to them as if they were infallible demonstrated, and that our knowledge of them was perfect and certain. (Locke, *ibid*, Book V, xv, p. 365)

And in his chapter on 'The Degree of Assent', Locke repeats:

> These probabilities rise so near to certainty, that they govern our thoughts as absolutely, and influence all our actions as fully, as the most evident demonstration; and in what concerns us, we make little or no difference between then and certain knowledge. Our belief thus grounded, rises to assurance. (Locke, *ibid*)

From what he says about probability here, it seems that Locke rejects the view that demonstrable or deductively valid reasoning is the only provider of rationality (justification). But, according to his evidentialist position, one ought not to believe propositions which are not evidentially supported. Newman sees Locke as being inconsistent:

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[151] In his *The Oxford University Sermons* and *The Grammar of Assent*, Newman challenged this narrow conception of rationality and tried to provide a broader conception of rationality.

[152] Newman calls demonstrative reasoning as formal reasoning or formal inference and non-demonstrative reasoning as informal reasoning or informal inference.

> How then is it not consistent with right reason, with the love of truth for its own sake, to allow in his words quoted above, certain strong 'probabilities' to 'govern our thoughts as absolutely as the most evident demonstration'? How is there no 'surplusage of assurance beyond the degrees of evidence' when in the case of those strong probabilities, we permit 'our belief, thus, grounded, to rise to assurance', as he pronounces we are rational in doing?" (*G. A.* p. 123)

It might be that Locke is asserting that non-demonstrable reasoning provides a practical rationality, not a speculative rationality, and it therefore leads to practical certainty, not speculative certainty. If so, Newman's criticism of Locke misses the point. But, why does non-demonstrable reasoning provide only a practical rationality, not a speculative one, and why cannot it lead to speculative certainty? Locke should have provided an argument to support his position.

According to Newman, probability or non-demonstrative reasoning can provide one with speculative rationality and it can lead to speculative certainty. As we have seen in Chapter 1 of this thesis, Newman disagrees with Butler that probability can only lead to practical certainty and maintains that probability can legitimately lead to speculative certainty. In a note attached to a letter to Hutton, who reviewed the *Grammar* in the *Spectator*, Newman makes his view clearly:

> The Article uses the word 'practical' throughout. There is a sense in which I should admit the word, but also a sense I should not. We commonly use the word in opposition to speculative, when we use it of arguments, i.e. of what is sufficient, not for belief, or assurance of truth, but for action. But I mean to assert that probable arguments may lead to a conclusion which is not only safe to act upon, but is to be embraced as true. (Dessain, 1973, vol. XXV, p. 114)

The evidentialist criteria of rationality, according to Newman, are too strict, too narrow. They do not allow a lot of ordinary beliefs to be rational, to be justified, and to be true.

There are lots of beliefs in ordinary matters which are non-demonstrable, but they are rational, justified beliefs and their truth are beyond reasonable doubt: "there are many truth in concrete matters, which no one can demonstrate, yet every one unconditionally accepts..."(*G. A.* pp. 120-121) For example, there are no demonstrative proofs for the beliefs "Britain is an island",[153] "there exists an external world", "I shall die", etc. these beliefs are nevertheless rationally justified and we are completely certain about their truth. The justification of these beliefs and our certainty about them, according to him, are based on non-demonstrative reasoning.

Now, according to Newman, the belief that God exists, like the beliefs that Britain is an island and there exists an external world, is not demonstrable, it is nonetheless rational. For it can be justified by non-demonstrative reasoning, in other words, by informal, implicit reasoning.

Newman takes the role of implicit reasoning in concrete matters very seriously. According to him, implicit reasoning and explicit reasoning are two distinct mental processes, the former is "the original process of reasoning", that is, the process by which the mind forms beliefs immediately from available data without being conscious of the media, and the latter is "the process of investigating our reasoning by which the mind reflects, analyses and gives an account of the original reasoning process (Newman, 1843, pp. 258-259).[154] Explicit reasoning does not, thus, make a belief true and it is not essential for a belief to be rational: "All men reason, ... but all men do not reflect upon their own reasonings, much

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[153] Anthony Kenny uses a similar example as Newman's to reject the evidential view that the confidence with which we maintain our judgments should be in proportion to the evidence which we have for them: "There are some judgments such as 'there is such a place as Australia' which are much more certain than any evidence which we might adduce in support of them. Therefore, we do not need evidence for them". See Kenny (1983), p. 18.

[154] For detailed analyses of Newman's thought about the role of implicit and explicit reasoning, please see Frederick D. Aquino's "Modalities of Reasoning: The Significance of John Henry Newman's Thought for Shaping Accounts of Rationality". In this article, Aquino has thoroughly analysed the nature of Newman's thoughts on two modes of reasoning (implicit reasoning and explicit reasoning) and the Illative Sense presented in *The University Sermons* and in the *Grammar*, evaluated the significance of Newman's account of rationality and provided an approach to fuse Newman's epistemological ideas with contemporary work in epistemology (Aquino, 2003)

less reflect truly and accurately, so as to do justice to their own meaning; ...In other words, all men have a reason, but not all men can give a reason (Newman, *ibid.*).[155] In concrete matters, such as religion, implicit reasoning plays a primary role[156]and explicit reasoning, that is, deductively or inductively-valid reasoning, is not necessary for justification. Newman criticises those who have confounded implicit reasoning and explicit reasoning, and have exaggerate the role of explicit reasoning in concrete matter (Newman, 1843, XIII, p. 259; *G. A.* 120).

It should be noted that Newman admits the role of explicit reasoning in showing the reason or evidence for a belief (Newman, 1843, XIII, p. 253; *G. A.* pp.142-143). However, he sees its limit in concrete matters: "No analysis is subtle and delicate enough to represent adequately the state of mind under which we believe, or the subjects of belief, as they are presented to our thoughts." (Newman, 1843, p. 267) There are many places in the *Grammar*, where Newman has made this point: "The reflex assent does not immediately touch us; it is purely intellectual, and taken by itself, has scarcely more force than the recording of a conclusion'. (*G. A.* pp. 162-163) "...in reasoning on any subject whatever, which is concrete, we proceed, as far indeed as we can, by the logic of language, but we are obliged to supplement it by the more subtle and elastic logic of thought; for forms by themselves prove nothing." (*G. A.* 272) For him, it is implicit reasoning, which is the original process of reasoning and it contains the grounds for a belief, that is the primary provider of justification in concrete matters.

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[155]According to Aquino, here Newman is committed to the following epistemic principle: A is entitled to believe p, if B supplies reliable media of knowledge. Though B may furnish reasons for believing p, there is no need, and perhaps, no possibility, that A 'should be able to cite them, let alone articulate them, on demand.' (Aquino, 2003, pp. 81- 82) I think this principle fails to reflect the grounds that Newman holds for his position that there is no need for A to cite the reasons for his/her believing in B. In fact, Newman is holding that: A is entitled to believe p, if p is formed by A's right use of his illative sense. Even if B, which supplies reliable media of knowledge, may furnish reasons for believing p, there is no need, and perhaps, no possibility, that A should be able to cite them, let alone articulate, on demand, for p is reliably formed. We can see this from his example of the peasant who is weather wise: the peasant is entitled to believe that tomorrow's weather will be fine because his belief is well formed by his illative sense basing on his previous experience and expertise about weather conditions. There is no need for him, and he is unable, to cite the reasons for his belief.

[156]At the end of *The Oxford University Sermon* XIII, Newman made this point very clearly: "...the reasoning and opinions which are involved in the act of faith are latent and implicit;...(Newman, 1843, P. 277)

Newman thinks that it is irrational to demand a demonstrative reasoning for religious belief when non-demonstrative reasoning is sufficient for it. In a letter to John Walker, he writes:

> An iron rod represents mathematical or strict demonstration; a cable represents moral demonstration, which is an assemblage of probabilities, separately insufficient for certainty, but when put together, irrefragable. A man who said 'I cannot trust a cable. I must have an iron bar', would, in *certain given cases*, be irrational and unreasonable—so too is a man who says I must have a rigid demonstration, not moral demonstration of religious truth. (Dessain, 1971, vol. XXI, p. 146)

In the above, we have seen that Newman rejects the evidentialist conception of justification, especially, its application to religious beliefs.

It should be noted that Newman's rejection of the evidentialist conception of justification for religious belief should not be associated with religious irrationalism or fideism.[157] Religious irrationalists or fideists completely reject the role of reason in religious domain. They take religion as either a purely sentimental matter or a 'language game'. Wittgenstein, for example, hold that religious beliefs are sort of language-games, forms of life. For him, to the question "why do you believe this", the only reply which the religious believer can give is "This is what we do". There is no sense in seeking justification for them. [158] "What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—forms of life". (Wittgenstein, 1953, IIxi, 226e) "Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a 'proto-phenomenon'. That is, where we ought to have said: *this language-*

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[157] Since he rejects the analytical mode of rationality, Newman is often associated with irrationalism. See: Jay Newman (1989), p. 4.

[158] Malcolm, Hudson, Phillips, etc. have developed Wittgenstein's position. These philosophers hold that any religious language, like a game, has its own rules. Non-believers do not fully understand what believers are saying because they are not familiar with the rules of religious language-games. Only those who fully participate in such a game can really know its rules. See: Malcolm, N. (1960); Hudson, W. D. (1974) and (1975); Phillips, D. Z. (1970). Kai Nielsen refers these philosophers as 'Wittgensteinian Fideists'. Cf. Nielsen (1967).

game is played" (Wittgenstein, 1953, I, 167e, 654)

The reason why Wittgenstein denies justification for religious belief is that faith or religious belief, according to him, has no propositional content: religious belief is not a matter of describing, reporting or forecasting events, thus, analysis of the apparent propositional content of religious beliefs is beyond the point. Religious beliefs are not the kind claims for which evidence and grounds are relevant:

> It has been said that Christianity rests on an historical basis. It has been said a thousand times by intelligent people that indubitability is not enough in this case. Even if there is as much evidence as for Napoleon. Because the indubitability wouldn't be enough to make me change my whole life...
>
> Unshakeable belief will, not by reasoning or appeal to ordinary grounds for belief, but rather by regulating in all the believers life. (Wittgenstein, 1972, p. 54)

Wittgenstein holds that religious beliefs and ordinary beliefs have different logic. Thus, to construe them as assertions of belief in ordinary matters of fact, and to inquiry after evidence for them is to misunderstand their logic.[159]

Unlike Wittgenstein, Newman very much values the rational justification for religious beliefs. He sees that belief in propositions, such as that God exists are at the core of religious faith (*G. A.* p. 76).[160] They have propositional content. Thus, reason is needed to

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[159]Jordan Gurnutt have recently argued that Wittgenstein does not reject all approaches to the justifications of religious beliefs, but only a particular approach, that is, looking for speculative proof of religious beliefs. In rejecting Yong Huang's position that Wittgenstein holds a coherent view of the justification of religious beliefs (cf. Huang, 1995), Gurnutt argues that Wittgenstein holds a foundationalist view of the justification of religious beliefs: the foundation of the justification of religious beliefs is personal experience and his foundational view is evident in his "Culture and Values". Cf. Gurnutt (1998).

[160]John Hick rejects this position of Newman. According to Hick, faith is not essentially a matter of believing theological propositions. See: Hick (1988), Part II.

scrutinize them. Early in *The Oxford University Sermons*, Newman says:

> Reason has a power of analysis and criticism in all opinion and conduct, and that nothing is true or right but what may be justified, and in a certain sense, proved by it, and undeniable, in consequence, that unless the doctrines received by Faith are provable by Reason, they have no claim to be regarded as true. (Newman, 1843, X, p. 82)

In the *Grammar*, he makes clearly the point that religion should be under the control of reason "... in religion the imagination and affections should always be under the control of reason." (*G.A.* p. 92)

Newman only rejects a particular view of rational justification for religious beliefs, according to which demonstrative reasoning is the only provider of justification. He maintains that non-demonstrative reasoning is the prime provider of justification for religious beliefs. Using Newman's own terminology, it is not formal, explicit reasoning, but informal, implicit reasoning which is the provider of justification for religious beliefs.[161] The informal, implicit reasoning is as reliable as formal, explicit reasoning.[162]

We can see from above discussion that Newman does not deny the role of demonstrable reasoning in general and he only points out its limitation. According to him, if demonstrative reasoning is the only truth-provider, many ordinary beliefs, which are true to any sane human being, would be excluded from the stock of true beliefs.[163]

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[161] It should be noted that Newman does not deny the role of explicit reasoning in showing what one knows and how one knows through the act of complex assent. His contentions are that explicit reasoning is not a precondition to form rational beliefs, and explicit and implicit reasoning play distinctive roles. In concrete matters, such as religion, implicit reasoning plays the primary role.

[162] There is a distinction between informal reasoning and implicit reasoning in Newman. The former denotes inferences which are non-demonstrative or non-deductively valid, such as probable inferences, induction, inference to the best explanation, etc. The latter denotes the grounds for a belief, as in cases of perception. Informal reason may be consciously being aware of, while implicit reason is not consciously being aware of.

[163] I think here Newman made an important contribution to epistemology.

In the above, we have looked at the reasons why Newman departs from the traditional approach and adopts a new approach to the justification of belief in the existence of God. In the following, I am going to investigate and assess Newman's approach.

Part Two: Newman's Approach to the Justification of belief in the Existence of God

As we have already seen, for Newman the traditional approach to the justification of belief in the existence of God fails on two grounds: first, it fails to provide a proper justifying reason for the belief in God, for it is rooted in an inadequate conception of justification; second, it fails to provide a motivational reason for the belief in God, for it deals with only abstract arguments. Thus, Newman sets it as his task to look for not only a proper justifying reason but also a proper motivational reason for the belief in the existence of God.

According to Newman, the real grounds for the belief in the existence of God lies in the moral experience, that is, the phenomena of conscience. The phenomena of conscience, for him, provide not only a justification but also a motivation for the belief in the existence of God: the phenomena of conscience "avail to impress the imagination with the picture of a Supreme Governor, a Judge, ... and is the creative principle of religion, ... " (*G. A.* p. 84)

There are two steps in Newman's approach to the justification of the belief in the existence of God: The first step is based upon an analogy between the way to form the belief in the existence of the external world and the way to form the belief in the existence of God; The second step is based upon what we now would call an inference to the best explanation.[164] I

[164]An inference to the best explanation is a type of non-deductive inference. It is also called 'abduction', 'the method of hypothesis', 'hypothetical inference', 'the method of elimination', 'eliminative induction' and 'theoretical inference'. Gilbert Harman is the first philosopher who uses the term 'the inference to the best explanation'. Harman has clearly explained the inference: "In making this inference one infers from the fact that a certain hypothesis would explain the evidence, to the truth of that hypothesis. In general, there will be several hypotheses which might explain the evidence, so one must be able to reject all such alternative hypotheses before one is warranted in making the inference. Thus, one infers, from the premise that a given hypothesis would provide a 'better' explanation for the evidence than would any other hypothesis, to the conclusion that the given hypothesis is true." (See: Harman, 1965, pp.88-89) I schematize an inference to the best explanation like this:
(1) There is a phenomenon *e*;

am going to consider the first step in the following section and the second step in chapter 4.

According to Newman, the belief in the existence of God is actually formed from mental phenomena—the phenomena of conscience, rather than from sensible phenomena:

> Now certainly the thought of God, as theists entertain it, is not gained by an instinctive association of His presence with any sensible phenomena; but the office which the senses directly fulfill as regards creation, that devolves indirectly on certain of our mental phenomena as regards the Creator. Those phenomena are found in the sense of moral obligation. (*G. A.* p. 79)

He then goes on to show how the belief in the existence of God is formed from the phenomena of conscience:

> As from a multitude of instinctive perceptions, acting in particular instances, of something beyond the senses, we generalize the notion of external world, and then picture that world in and according to those particular phenomena from which we started, so from the perceptive power which identifies the intimations of conscience with the reverberations or echoes (so to say) of an external admonition, we proceed on to the notion of a Supreme Ruler and Judge, and then again we image him and His attributes in those recurring intimations, out of which, as mental phenomena, our recognition of His existence was originally gained. (*G. A.* p. 79)[165]

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(2) There are hypotheses $h_1, h_2, \ldots h_n$;
(3) h_n can explain e more adequately than $h_1, h_2, \ldots h_{(n-1)}$;
(4) Therefore, h_n is the best explanation of the phenomena e, thus, it is rational to believe in h_n. I will discuss the legitimacy of inference to the best explanation later.

[165] This analogy appears in several places. In chapter 4 on notional assent, Newman uses this analogy: "As then we have our initial knowledge of the universe through sense, so do we in the first instance begin to learn about its Lord and God from conscience; and as from particular acts of that instinct, which makes experiences, mere images (as they ultimately are) upon the retina, the means of our perceiving something real beyond them, we go on to draw the general conclusion that there is a vast external world, so from the recurring instances in which conscience acts, forcing upon us importunately the mandate of a Superior, we have fresh evidence of the existence of a Sovereign Ruler, from whom those particular dictates which we experience proceed". (*G. A.* pp.

We can see here that, according to Newman, our belief in God formed from the phenomena of conscience is like our belief in the external world formed from sensible phenomena—both are instinctively gained. Thus, the justification of the former is same as the justification of the latter and they have same epistemic status. If the latter belief is epistemically justified, so is the former belief.

Critics of Newman raise many objections to this analogy. Copleston, for example, made this objection:

> But it can be objected that belief in God is not a natural belief comparable to that in the existence of an external world. We cannot help believing in practice that bodies exist independently of our perception; but there does not seem to be any such practical necessity to believe in God. (Copleston, 1967, p. 516)

Cameron made a similar objection:

> The analogy between trusting our senses and trusting our tendency to religious faith breaks down because there is no general human tendency to religious faith, at least not in any form which would have satisfied Newman, whereas we all trust our senses. (Cameron, 1962, pp. 211-12)

I take it that by the analogy Newman is not arguing that the belief in God, as the belief in the existence of the external world, is a natural belief or human tendency, but showing that the way the belief in the existence of God is formed is the same as the way the belief in the existence of the external world is formed. As our belief in the existence of the external world is formed from the instinctive perceptions that there are things beyond sensations,

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48-49) In a letter to Meynell, when he explains the characteristics of the act of conscience Newman also uses this analogy: "Next, that the dictate of conscience, which is natural and the voice of God, is a moral *instinct*, and its own evidence - as the *belief* in an external world is an *instinct* on the apprehension of sensible phenomena." (Dessain, 1973, vol. XXIV, p. 294)

our belief in the existence of God is formed in the same way, that is, upon instinctive perceptions that there is a personal being beyond the intimations of conscience. *Instinct* in Newman, as I have interpreted in chapter 2, is not used to denote a natural tendency to behave in a certain way, but to denote immediate apprehension of particular things, without conscious argumentation. The analogy between the belief in the existence of God and the belief in the existence of the external world, thus, is not that the former is a natural tendency as the latter is, but that the belief in the existence of God, as the belief in the existence of the external world, is immediately gained based on perception, without conscious argumentation.[166] The above criticisms are, therefore, misapplied to Newman.

Jay Newman objects that the analogy is not an exciting one, for

> when we have a sensation of redness, we normally associate that sensation with a 'thing', we regard the sensation as corresponding to one of the qualities of that substance or object. If Newman is to make a fair analogy, he should see us as associating our 'intimations' of rightness and wrongness with things that have the qualities of rightness and wrongness, acts, and not with a supreme ruler and judge. Newman may feel that God is the cause of our sense of guilt in the way that the (redness of the) apple is the cause of our sensation of redness; but this analogy is also not so exciting, because not only must Newman regard God as the cause of all things, but he has not established that only God can be the immediate cause of our intimations of conscience. (Jay Newman, 1989, pp. 75-76)

I think that Jay Newman's objection cannot apply to Newman. Although, as we have seen in chapter 2, conscience, for Newman, has two aspects: a moral sense, a judgement of reason; a sense of duty, a magisterial dictate and the latter aspect is connected with moral

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[166]For Newman, the belief in the existence of God is instinctively gained, that is, with psychological immediacy, without conscious argumentation. This does not amount to saying that the belief is epistemologically mysterious. Just as in cases of perception, though there are no conscious argumentations involved, perceptual beliefs are justifiable.

emotion, he does not take conscience as a moral sense or a judgement of reason, but as a sense of duty, a magisterial dictate or moral emotion when he comes to show how we can form the belief in the existence of God and an image of God:

> Here I have to speak of conscience in the latter point of view, not as supplying us, by means of its various acts, with the elements of morals, such as may be developed by the intellect into an ethical code, but simply as the dictate of a authoritative monitor bearing upon the details of conduct as they come before us, and complete in its several acts, one, by one. (*G. A.* p. 81)

The intimations of conscience, thus, are not the intimations of rightness and wrongness, but of duty, magisterial dictate. And duty, magisterial dictate and moral emotion are correlative with a person. It is legitimate, therefore, for Newman to associate our intimations of conscience with a personal being rather than with things or acts that have the qualities of rightness and wrongness.

Due to his use of the phrase 'instinctive perception' in the analogy, some scholars interpret Newman as arguing that our belief in the external world is nothing more than a blind instinctive conviction, so is the belief in the existence of God. This is not, as Sillem has observed, Newman's view. But, Sillem interprets Newman's use of the word 'instinct' as "only employing a pedestrian word to speak of what... many phenomenologists of today call 'the intentionality of consciousness', namely that the mind thinks in terms of real beings because its proper object is not mere sensations, but existent beings." (Sillem, 1969, p. 70) Sillem's interpretation, as Grave remarks, does not bring us closer to seeing how Newman thought we come by our belief in an external world. Nor, without some development of the notion of the intentionality of consciousness that would leave Newman far behind, would a view be indicated less vulnerable to dismissal on the ground that it presents this belief as a blind conviction (Grave, 1989, p. 71).[167] Grave gives his own

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[167]One might be able to provide a phenomenological solution to Newman's problem from instinctive perception to believe in the existence of God by looking at what phenomenologists mean by the

interpretation:

> To all appearances, it is Newman's view that we come by our belief in the existence of a material reality beyond the impressions of sense, through 'instinctive perception', in an operation as epistemologically mysterious as that by which—this he certainly does maintain—we divine the existence of individual enduring beings behind their phenomenal presence. (Grave, *ibid.* p. 71)

This interpretation, I think, does not make Newman's use of 'instinctive perception' less vulnerable to dismissal, either. It is also inconsistent with the interpreting policy Grave recommends, that is, in interpreting Newman's uses of immediacy words, such as intuition, instinct, etc. we try to construe the language of immediacy in every instance as asserting only psychological immediacy, not logical immediacy (Grave, *ibid.* p. 47). I think if we follow the interpreting policy, that is, by 'instinctive perception' Newman means 'the immediate apprehension of an object, without conscious argumentation' (it denotes only psychological immediacy, not epistemic immediacy), the belief in the existence of God formed from the phenomena of conscience is not an epistemologically mysterious, blind conviction.

In the above, I have argued that by the analogy Newman is showing that the way to form the belief in the existence of God from the phenomena of conscience is same as the way to form the belief in the existence of external world from sensible phenomena—both are instinctively gained, thus it has the same epistemic status as the latter: if the latter is

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intentionality of perception. According to phenomenologists, all mental acts are directed towards objects. Knowing, for example, is aware of something towards which the mental act is directed. This characteristic of directedness of consciousness is called, initially by Husserl, the "intentionality" of consciousness. Among mental acts, perception is typically intentional. Seeing, for example, is always towards something (a tree, a river, a mountain, etc.) that the mental act is directed. Now, the feeling of conscience, as a mental state or act, like perception, must be towards something that is its intentional object, which causes us to feel guilty, ashamed, remorseful, etc. when we have done something morally wrong. We do not feel as such, *sincerely*, towards an earthly object. This object must, thus, be a supernatural being.

epistemically justified, so is the former.

Newman does not, however, further discuss how the belief in the external world is justified based on sensory perception, analogically, how the belief in the existence of God is justified based on the experience of conscience. One feels that there is a gap in Newman's discussion about the analogy between our belief in the external world through sensory perception and our belief in the existence of God through experience of conscience. In the following, I am going to fill the gap Newman left by appealing to Chisholm's theory of justification of perceptual beliefs based on sensory experience.[168]

In his *Perceiving*, Chisholm has offered a theory of justification of perceptual beliefs based on sensory experiences. According to him, one's sensory experiences of certain sort are adequate evidences for his particular perceptual belief:

> whenever any subject S is 'appeared blue to', S has *adequate evidence* for the statement or hypothesis that he is thus being appeared to. And, more generally, whenever any subject is appeared to in one of the ways we have been talking about, then that subject has adequate evidence for the statement or hypothesis that he is being appeared to in that particular way. (Chisholm, 1957, p. 66)

Chisholm's theory of justification of perceptual belief can be extended as: whenever a subject S has certain sensory experience, then S has adequate evidence for her/his belief that the object, which causes such sensory experience, exists. Take an example, whenever I have sensory experience of redness, roundness, apple-scent, etc. then I have adequate evidence for my belief that there is an apple in front of me. Now, we can appeal to this theory to justify our belief in the existence of the external world.[169]

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[168]Plantinga has provided a version of justification of belief in the existence of God by modeling on Chisholm's theory of justification of perceptual beliefs. See chapter 6 of this thesis.

[169]By 'adequate' here I mean 'appropriate and accurate in conformity of a belief to truth'. When I say "one's sensory experience of certain sort, such as the sensations of redness, roundness, sweet scent, fruit-like texture, etc, is adequate evidence for one's belief that there is (are) an apple(s) in front of him, I presuppose the perceiver's cognitive faculties and the relevant cognitive environments in which they operate are normal, so

One might appeal to the Adverbial Theory of Perception to object to this expansion. According to this theory, the nature of sensory experience is the way or mode of sensing. What are taken as objects of awareness are to be understood as ways of being aware of. Thus, if one says that he is perceiving a tree or an apple, one is to speak of sensing treely or red-roundly, instead of speaking of being aware of something red and round, or of a tree.[170] The experience is merely a way of sensing, not directed at or about or of an apple or tree, thus, it is not an adequate evidence for one's belief that there is an apple or tree.[171]

I think that the Adverbial Theory is incorrect,[172] for it treats sensory experience as non-intentional, objectless. Sensory experience, as it shows us in our daily life, is intentional[173], that is, it is directed at, or about or of something of certain kind. My sensation of a red apple in front of me, for example, is directed at, or about, or of the red apple in front of me. It is the existence of the red apple in front of me which causes me to have such sensation. Likewise, my sensation of a green tree outside of my window is directed at the green tree outside of my window. It is the existence of the green tree outside of my window causes me to have such sensation. In the normal conditions, we cannot have such sensations without the existences of the objects. The adverbial theory cannot explain the objective characters of our sensations (Bach, 1982. p. 148, p.151).

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that the product of which is reliable. So, hallucination is excluded as adequate evidence for certain belief, for the sensory data one has in hallucination is either a product of abnormal cognitive faculties or a product of abnormal cognitive environments.

[170] See: C. J. Ducasse (1951). According to him, to sense a blue appearance is to sense *bluely* just as to dance the waltz is to dance *waltzly* (Ducasse, *ibid.* p. 259).

[171] According to Butchvarov and Alston, we cannot attach any independent sense to the adverbs. The only way we can make sense out of 'sensing treely' is to take it as a curious reformulation of being sensorily aware of a (putative) tree, we cannot have any genuinely alternative concept of a tree-like way of sensing. See: Butchvarov (1980), Alston (1990), p. 75.

[172] There are some adverbialist elements in Newman's theory of perception. Thus, one might interpret him as an adverbialist and argue that he cannot justify the belief in the existence of God by appealing to the analogy between perceptual experience and experience of conscience, for perceptual experience, according to the adverbialist view, is objectless. As I have argued in Chapter 1, Newman is a direct realist, not an adverbialist. I admit that *if* Newman *were* an adverbialist, the first step of his approach to the justification of the belief in the existence of God would fail. However, the second step, that is, the inference to the best explanation of phenomena of conscience would be intact (see chapter 5 of this thesis).

Now, by modeling on the extended Chisholm's theory of justification of perceptual beliefs, we can justify the belief in the existence of God based on the experience of conscience: as one's sensory experience of certain sort (such as the sensations of redness, roundness, apple scent, etc.) is adequate evidence for one's belief that there is (are) an apple(s) in front of him, one's experiences of conscience (such as the experience of the magisterial dictate that do the right and avoid wrong and the emotions of guilt, shame, remorse, etc.) is adequate evidence for one's belief that there is a God speaking to him, disapproving him, etc.[174]

One may hold that the way one's experience of conscience supports one's belief that there is a God is different from the way one's sensory experience of certain sort supports one's belief that there is a tree in front of one, for the former is more like auditory experience, while the latter is based on visual experience. Visual experience is *directly* about the object, while auditory experience is not. Therefore, the analogy is not valid. I think the difference between visual experience and auditory experience doesn't undermine the validity of the analogy. Take an example: upon hearing a flute-sound, one believes that there is someone playing a flute. Although one's auditory experience is not about the player but the flute-sound, nevertheless, based on the auditory experience, one is justified in believing that there is a person playing a flute. Now, one's experience of conscience is not directly about God, nevertheless, one is justified to believe that there is a God speaking to him, disapproving what he has done, etc. based on the experience, just as one is justified to believe that there is someone playing a flute based on his auditory experience of the flute-sound.

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[173] See J. R. Searle (1983) for detailed explanation of the intentionality of perception.

[174] One may raise an objection to the analogical argument: from the analogy we can only draw, legitimately, the conclusion that the experience of the magisteria dictate is evidence for the belief that there is some person or group of persons with magisterial authority, not that the magisterial authority could be possessed only by God, which requires a separate argument. Fortunately, Newman's argument from conscience, as I interpret it, is not only based on the analogy, but also based on an inference to the best explanation, which offers a separate argument for the belief that the magisterial authority could be possessed only by God (please see Part Two, Chapter 5 of this thesis).

In the case of an inference from the auditory experience of the flute-sound to the belief that there is a flute-player, the object that the belief is about is not directly perceived in the experience. Thus, there is certain inference involved in the transition from the experience to the belief. Usually, the inference takes the form of causal explanation: unless there is someone playing a flute, one cannot hear a flute-sound; one is hearing a flute-sound; therefore, one is justified in believing that there is someone playing a flute. However, the inference is seldom a conscious one. One spontaneously reaches the belief from the experience, without conscious argumentation. Only when the credential of the belief is questioned, does the inference become a conscious one.[175]

Likewise, in the case of the inference from the experience of conscience to belief in the existence of God, the object that the belief is about is not directly perceived in the experience. Thus, there is a causal explanation involved in the transition from the experience to the belief: the magisterial and emotional characters of conscience in us are such as require for their exciting cause an intelligent being. As Newman says:

> we are not affectionate towards a stone, nor do we feel shame before a horse or a dog; we have no remorse or compunction on breaking mere human law. If the cause of these emotions does not belong to this visible world, the Object to which his perception is directed must be Supernatural and Divine ... (*G. A.* p. 79)

By inference to the best explanation, we are justified to believe in the existence of God from the experience of conscience. However, like that from the auditory experience of a flute-sound to the belief in a flute-player, ordinarily the inference from the experience of conscience to the belief in God is an unconscious one. Only when the credential of the belief is questioned, does the inference become a conscious one.

In the above, I have argued, by appealing to Chisholm's theory of the justification of

[175]For a detailed explanation of this point, cf. William Alston, 1990, p 88.

perceptual belief, that the belief in the existence of God based on the phenomena of conscience can be justified by analogizing it with the justification of perceptual beliefs based on sensory experience. In the following, I am going to discuss some objections which might be made to it.

Part Three: Objections to the Justification of the Belief in God Based on the Experience of Conscience

First, I am going to consider some general objections made to the justification of perceptual beliefs based on sensory experience, for the justification of the belief in God based on experience of conscience is modeled on the justification of perceptual beliefs based on sensory experience.

A standard objection made to the justification of perceptual beliefs based on sensory experience is that sensory experience can be deceiving and therefore cannot be adequate evidence for perceptual belief. For example, if one is at a mirage and seems to see a lake, one's visual experience is not adequate evidence for one's belief that one is seeing a lake.

I think this objection is not a valid one. The fallibility of sensation should not be taken as a case against its reliability, for in most cases our sensation is reliable and provides us with knowledge about the external world. Just as the fact that our memory sometimes makes mistakes should not be taken as a case against the reliability of our memory, for in most cases, our memory is reliable and provides us with knowledge about the past. It is true that our sensations do deceive us on occasion. But, we can, in principle, by using them, discover and correct our errors.

Davidson and BonJour made another objection to the justification of perceptual beliefs based on sensory experience. According to Davidson and BonJour, no relation of a belief to a non-propositional experience could be epistemically justifying since experience is non-doxastic, belief is doxastic, and thus they are distinct from one another. So, the justification

of a belief cannot be based on sensation or appearance.

According to Davidson, in order to justify perceptual beliefs from appearances, we need first to explain two things:

> what, exactly, is the relation between sensation and belief that allows the first to justify the second? And, why should we believe our sensations are reliable, that is, why should we trust our senses? (Davidson, 1986, p. 310)

Davidson thinks that the relation between the appearance and the belief is a causal relation which cannot be the basis of justification:

> The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sensation are not beliefs or other propositional attitudes. What then is the relation? The answer is, I think, obvious: the relation is causal. Sensations cause some beliefs and, in this sense, are the bases or grounds of those beliefs. But a causal explanation of a belief does not show how or why the belief is justified. (Davidson, *ibid.* p. 311)[176]

Concerning the first question, I think, the relation between sensation and belief is not merely causal, but also epistemic. Take an example: by looking at my son's pale face and

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[176] Recently, Daniel Howard-Snyder has persuasively argued that Davidson's argument is unsound (Howard-Snyder, 2002, p. 525). Howard-Snyder reconstructs Davidson's argument like this:

1. Necessarily, the relation between an experience and a belief is causal.
2. Necessarily, a causal explanation of a belief does not show how or why the belief is justified.

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3. So an experience cannot justify a belief. (1,2)

Then, he confronts the argument with a dilemma: If we understand premise 1 as the claim that, necessarily, the only relation between an experience and a belief is causal, then it is false. Noncausal relations between experience and belief are a dime a dozen. However, if we understand premise 1 as the claim that, necessarily, one among many relations between an experience and a belief is the causal relation, then the argument is a non sequitur. If we understand premise 1 as the claim that, necessarily, the only relation between an experience and a belief is causal, then it is false. Noncausal relations between experience and belief are a dime a dozen. However, if we understand premise 1 as the claim that, necessarily, one among many relations between an experience and a belief is the causal relation, then the argument is a non sequitur. There is no other way to understand premise 1; either way, then, the argument is unsound. (Howard-Snyder, *ibid*)

feeling his forehead, I believe that he is ill. My sensation does not only cause my belief, but also supports my belief and gives a ground for my belief. If the relation between sensation and belief were only causal and causes had nothing to do with reasons, I could say: "the pale face and hot forehead of my child cause me to believe that he is ill, but that is not a reason for me to believe that he is ill." Obviously, this is absurd. Though causes are different from grounds, they are not completely apart and irrelevant. This is because the phenomenal realm and logical realm are not completely apart and irrelevant. They are related to each other. As Alston points out, it is a mistaken to hold that "to say that someone has adequate reasons for a certain belief is to say nothing about the causes of his coming to have the belief, and to say that someone's belief is due to certain causes is to say nothing about the reasons that he might or might not have for it;" "Of course a reason cannot be a cause, nor can a cause be a reason. They exist in logically different realms. But that does not mean that a statement about reasons cannot have implications concerning causes and vice versa." (Alston, 1964, p. 90)

Our sensations and perceptual states are, in fact, one particular type of reasons for our perceptual beliefs. For it is our sensations and perceptual states which reveal the reality and it is through our sensations and perceptual states that we form true perceptual beliefs about the external world. As W. Lycan has rightly argued, perceptual states are one type of reasons on which beliefs are based and it seems always appropriate to describe any of the cognitive and perceptual states on which beliefs are based as being reasons in a useful wider sense (Lycan, 1988, p. 95).

Concerning the second question, our sensations are not purely subjective and they inform us about the external world. Though our sensations sometimes deceive us, they are, in principle, reliable and provide us with correct information about the external world. The fallibility of sensation in particular cases cannot be taken as a decisive argument against the reliability of sensation as a whole. So, we should not distrust our sensations just because they are sometimes misleading.

BonJour raises a dilemma for the theory of justification of belief based on appearance. Consider the elements and structure of an actual justificatory situation: there is a particular perceptual belief which is supposed to be justified, in which a certain specific given content is present, for example, that I seem to see something red; Second, that a red element is actually present in the experience of the person in question; Third, the immediate apprehension or direct experience of the experiential content in question (the apprehension that a red element is present must be grasped or apprehended by the person if he is to have a reason for accepting the basic belief). It is the apprehension of the given content that primarily does the job of justifying the basic belief. Now, BonJour asks: is the nature of the apprehension of the given content cognitive or non-cognitive, judgmental or non-judgmental? Does it involve the cognitive thesis or assertion that there is a red element present or not? If the apprehension of the given content is cognitive or judgmental, then it is easy to see how it can, if epistemically acceptable, provide a justification for the belief in question, while at the same time it is difficult or impossible to see why it does not itself require justification in order to be thus acceptable. If it is non-judgmental and non-cognitive, then the problem is reversed: there is no apparent need for the apprehension to be justified since it involves nothing like an assertion or thesis, but also no apparent way for that apprehension to provide any sort of epistemic justification for the belief (BonJour, 1985, p. 75).

BonJour's dilemma is based on the suppositions that what can do the job of justifying beliefs must be themselves propositional attitudes and propositional attitudes themselves need to be justified. Thus, the apprehension of the given content, no matter propositional or not, cannot be the basis of justification. In reply to Davidson, I have already shown that appearance (sensation) can be the basis of justification. Thus, it is not the case that what can do the job of justifying beliefs must be themselves propositional attitudes.

In his "Appearance can be deceiving", Jack Crumley further argues that appearance plays no role in the epistemic justification of perceptual belief since appearances are irrelevant to the content of perceptual beliefs. He distinguishes between appearance contents and

perceptual belief contents. Intuitively, the content of perceptual belief is type characterized or type identified. In describing or ascribing the content of belief, we say what the belief is about by invoking certain types or kinds. Such type identification occurs at a fully intentional level. That is, at such a level the relevant appeal is to belief states (Crumley, 1991, p. 236). Besides type identification, there is the token identification of the content of the perceptual belief. The token identification consists in identifying the object of perception without yet classifying it as of a certain kind. Now, as non-doxastic contents, appearance contents cannot type identify the object of perception. Appearances are not even necessary for token identification. This is due to the fact that the characterization of the appearance content itself depends on the type characterization of the content of perceptual belief (Crumley, *ibid.* p. 240).

One way to handle the objection is to appeal to information theory, according to which, sensory experience carries information which is relevant to the content of perceptual belief. Alston has clearly explained this: on hearing a doorbell, one comes to believe that there is someone who pressed the bell. The sensory experience (hearing the door bell) carries the information that the bell was pressed (Alston, 1990, p. 80). Although the experiences are non-doxastic, they carry the information of the object which the belief is about. Steven L. Reynolds gives another example to explain this: that experience conveys information of the object that the belief is about is like "in somewhat the way that a dinosaur footprint in rock conveys information about the dinosaur. The rock isn't about the dinosaur, but by looking at it we can learn about the dinosaur." (Reynolds, 1991, p. 291) The appearance (a dinosaur footprint) that carries the information (a dinosaur existed) justifies us to believe that there had once been dinosaur there. Even if we admit that the appearance only causes the belief, not justifying it, we could still justify the belief by an inference to the best explanation of the appearance (Reynolds, *ibid*).[177]

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[177]The information theory can be interpreted in terms of Thomistic theory of intentionality of perception. According to this theory, perception is intentional and it conveys information beyond immediate sensory data, and our mind reaches right up to the reality through sensory data. What makes a sensation of an object to be *of that object* is that it is an individual occurrence of that very form or nature which occurs in that object in the special way, which Aquinas calls *esse intentionale*. For more details about Thomistic theory of intentionality, please see Anscombe, G.E. M. & Geach, P. T. (1961), pp. 94-97.

One may accept that perceptual beliefs can be justified by means of sensory experience, but objects that the belief in God cannot be analogically justified by means of the experience of conscience. For there is a fundamental difference between sensory experience and the experience of conscience: sensory experience has a real connection with the external world, so it is reliable; while experience of conscience (such as the emotions of guilt, of shame, etc.), unlike sensory experience, has no real connection with the external world and thus cannot provide us with information about external world. Therefore, it cannot be taken as adequate evidence for the belief in God.

This objection is rooted in a traditional view that emotions are subjective: they are either pure bodily feelings of the subject or projections of the subject's desires, preferences or perspectives. Descartes, for example, takes emotions as private mental states and thinks that the objects of emotions are 'all in the mind' and have nothing to do with the outside world (Descartes, 1649, p. 26). Some contemporary philosophers have developed this view. Anthony Kenny, for example, holds that emotions, unlike perception but like sensations, do not give us information about the external world. However, sensations, says Kenny, can give us information about our own bodies, whereas emotions in themselves, do not even do that (Kenny, 1963, p. 54). Robert Solomon takes emotions as our "subjective world" which involves standpoints or perspectives (Solomon, 1973, 66ff.)

I do not agree with this purely subjective account of emotion. First, contrary to what Kenny says above, sensations do give us information about the external world. Our sensation of redness, for example, gives us the information that there is something external to us which is red. Although, sometimes, our sensations deceive us, they do provide us with information about the external world. Second, emotions provide us not only the information about the external world but also the information about ourselves. One's emotion of fear, say, does not only give one the information that there is something fearful to her/him, but also that one's own mental or bodily states.

Emotions, as Ronald de Sousa has persuasively argued, using the analogy of emotion with sensory perception, are not purely subjective and they have a claim to objectivity. Sousa distinguishes four different senses of subjectivity: (1) phenomenology: what it's like is what one experiences; (2) projection: the properties attributed to the object are merely shadows of our own attitudes or choices; (3) relativity: the properties attributed to the objects are really produced by relations between the object and the observer; (4) perspective: anything we know or perceive is known or perceived from a given point of view. Now, in the phenomenological sense and the relativity sense of the subjectivity, emotions are not purely subjective. Some philosophers have claimed that emotions could be identified with their felt qualities.[178] But perception also usually has felt qualities while perception is also standardly objective. And on some views, in fact, the phenomenal quality simply is how the objective properties conveyed appear from that perspective, whether we know it or not. So the quale factors out into two aspects, one of which is subjective in the sense of perspective relativity... and the other of which is simply objective information conveyed by the sensory 'transducers' whose function it is to convert physical quantities into representations (Sousa, 1987, p. 150). From the phenomenological qualities we can predicate the objects themselves. Relativity is not subjectivity. Many properties of substances are relative while being wholly objective.

Now, are emotions purely subjective in the projection or perspective sense? I think they are not. Like sensory experience, emotions are involuntary. In normal circumstances (that is, when we are sane), we cannot choose to have a certain emotion, as we cannot choose to have a certain sensory experience. When we lose our beloved ones, say, we feel sorrow, heart-broken, anguish, etc. and we cannot choose to feel delighted, joyful, etc. (unless we are mentally ill). We feel as such, not because we want to be so but because there is a fact to cause us to be so. Emotions, thus, are not purely subjective and they have a claim to

[178]As we have seen in chapter 2, emotions cannot be identified merely with bodily sensations. They involve beliefs. It is the beliefs which make the experience object-directed and so lift them to a level of complexity above that of just isolated feelings or sensations (cf: Lyons, 1980, p. 39). Thus, felt qualities in emotions are not counter-examples to the objectivity of emotions.

objectivity.[179]

I admit that different people may react emotionally in very different ways to the same external situation, depending on differences of belief about the context, or differences in their life histories, personalities, and fatigue levels. But this does not show that emotions are purely voluntary, simply out of one's choices; it only shows that emotions are the products of one's personal circumstances. As we know, one's personal circumstances are not voluntary, and, therefore, emotions produced by these circumstances are not voluntary.

There is an objective appropriateness or inappropriateness (adequacy or inadequacy) in emotional responses, especially, in moral cases. Take an example, if Bill is an evil man and Alice loves him just because of his evil character and Cathy does not love him because she hates his evil character, we would think that Alice's emotional response towards Bill is morally inappropriate and Cathy's is morally appropriate. Let me borrow Williams' example again: if the lorry driver, after running down the child, didn't feel regret at all, and, on the contrary, he felt delighted because he was absolved from responsibility, we would think the driver's emotional response is inappropriate, even morally defective, don't we?

An appropriate emotion, like perception, does provide us information about the outside world. For example, if I feel fearful in an appropriate circumstance, my fear tells me that there is something that is fearful to me; If I feel angry, my anger indicates that there is something at which my anger is directed. Sometimes, our emotions give us the wrong information, but this does not undermine the objectivity of emotion, just as sometimes our

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[179]Some people might object that the emotion generated by music is not objectively directed, for we could have a certain emotion by listening a piece of music, without a proper object towards which the emotion is directed. I think the emotion generated by music is objectively directed. Music can be the abstraction of objective emotion. What causes our emotion when we listen a piece of music is not the sound itself, but the objective emotion of the composer (this is why good music can move us). The sound is only a vehicle of the objective emotion of the composer. When we listen to Beethoven's *Fur Elise*, for example, we feel the tender, yet intense, affection of the composer towards the person whom he admires or loves, which stirs up our emotions. We have these emotions not because we are too sentimental, but because there is something external to us which causes us to feel as such. Thus, emotions generated by music are objectively directed.

perception gives us wrong information but they do not undermine the objectivity of perception.

Moral emotions are, especially, objectively appropriate. If I feel guilt, my guilt-feeling must be towards something, say, my wrong doing to an innocent person. The emotion is, normally, a reaction to outside stimulation.[180] Experience of conscience (construed as the emotion of guilt, shame, remorse, etc.), like sensory experience, thus has a connection with the external world.[181]

One may accept the justification of perceptual beliefs based on sensory experiences and the similarity between sensory experience and experience of conscience, but still object that the belief in God cannot be analogically justified based on experience of conscience. For in the case of sensory experience, for example, one's auditory experience of a flute-sound, leading to the belief that there is a flute-player who is playing a flute, the existence of a flute-player is necessary for explaining one's auditory experience of a flute-sound. Thus, one's belief that there is a flute-player who is playing a flute can be justified based on one's experience of the flute-sound; while, in the case of the experience of conscience, the existence of God is not necessary for the explanation of the experience of conscience. There is the explanation, that is, the sociological explanation for one's experience of conscience. Thus, the belief in God cannot be justified based on one's experience of conscience. I am going to reply this objection in the next chapter.

In this chapter, I have first looked at the reasons why Newman departs from the traditional approach to the justification of the belief in God and then started to investigate his own approach. On my interpretation, there are two steps in Newman's approach to the

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[180] One may feel guilt due to her/his mistaken belief that s/he has done something morally wrong. This is not, however, a valid objection to the objectivity of moral emotion, because, on the whole, our guilt-feeling is object-directed and, therefore, is appropriate.

[181] Although moral emotions, such as remorse, respond not to actual wrongdoing but to believed wrongdoing, for actual wrongdoing is its intentional object and believed wrongdoing is its cause, there is still a strong connection between the actual wrongdoing (the intentional object of emotion) and the emotional response because the cause of emotional response (believed wrongdoing) has a strong connection to the actual

justification of belief in God—the first step is via an analogy between our experience of conscience and perceptual experience and the second step is via an inference to the best explanation of our experience of conscience. I have defended the first step of Newman's approach to justifying the belief in the existence of God by basing it on the analogy between the belief in the existence of the external world and the belief in the existence of God and further developed Newman's approach by appealing to Chisholm's theory of justification of perceptual beliefs. In the following chapter, I am going to look at the second step of Newman's approach to the justification of belief in the existence of God.

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wrongdoing.