CHAPTER 5

Case Study Analysis

Introduction

Thus far this study has outlined the major theoretical positions that dominate the field of international relations theory, arguing that there exists a significant gap between the realist accounts of the nature and dynamics of relations between states which is founded upon a particular materialist conception of international politics, and that proposed by the constructivist approach which privileges the ideational dimension. Within this gap there exists 'space' for a synthetic approach, which critically combines the brute materialist position of the realist accounts with the mutually constitutive and contingent ideational propositions of the social constructivists. It is this 'space' that has been explored here through the *via media* of the small state intervention case studies. Within each case study, structural, systemic, and unit level factors, have been considered in an holistic approach to analysis that is neither predisposed toward the realist 'logic' of anarchy and power relations, nor the constructivist idealism, but which strives to engage all levels of explanation in its attempt to elucidate the nature of the dynamics at play. By denying the realist privileging of structure over agency, this investigation has attempted to populate the theoretic 'space of possibility', between the material and ideal, with a discursive account of the nature of relations between non-great power states.

The three case studies examined here took place over a twenty-year period in different locations, under different international structural conditions, and within different political and socio-cultural contexts, yet each was an example of military intervention by a small or non-great power state into the affairs of another smaller state, and each demonstrated the necessity of a more inclusive and synthetic theoretical approach. Each case displays particular aspects of the interstate dynamic of intervention, and each demonstrates a different set of motivations and rationale which contextualised the decision to intervene, and the decision-making process that led to those interventions. Similarly, each case study illustrates how changing historical circumstances, and the influence of the 'systemic culture' that constituted the international normative framework, shaped the way these interventions were interpreted by other states at the time, and how the states involved justified their actions to the international community

and their domestic constituents. While the circumstances under which the interventions took place are peculiar to each, and the reasons for intervening are the product of the particular historic circumstances in which they occurred, there are some common themes and characteristics amongst these cases that serve to highlight the key constructivist arguments concerning the ideational basis of systemic structure, the mutually constitutive nature of relations between agent and structure, and the nature of state identities.

This chapter will continue the examination of each case study in turn, attempting to answer the fundamental questions of *why these states resorted to military intervention* and *how their actions may be interpreted and understood within a coherent theoretical framework.* Through an examination of why these small states intervened it will be shown that, as originally proposed, the current body of realist theory does not accurately or sufficiently account for the dynamics between small states primarily because of its narrow materialist conception of power, interests, and interstate relations, and its exclusively 'causal' focus on relations which ignores the 'constitutive' nature of the relations between agent and structure. Furthermore, to the extent that realism assumes that interests are exogenous and given within the anarchic structure of the international system, rather than endogenous and socially constructed, it fails to provide an appropriate account of the actions of the small states in the interventions discussed. Indeed to the degree that realism denies the possibility of 'culture as structure' within the community of states, it fails to account for the non-material social forces that shape and give meaning to the behaviour and identities of states. Conversely the constructivist approach by and large is theoretically underspecified to the extent that as yet it has not developed a coherent theoretical account of interstate dynamics. Although they argue cogently that 'ideas matter', without an enunciated conception of how the material and ideational are bound in a mutually constitutive relationship, the constructivist position lacks explanatory force.

Case Study One

Tanzania's intervention into Uganda began in the closing weeks of 1978. It was the product of the interaction of a variety of factors both proximate and distant, and had its roots in a number of underlying systemic (structural/cultural) and unit level conditions. The intervention was not an attempt by Tanzania to influence or shape the balance of power in regional sub-Saharan Africa or to further some regional hegemonic pretensions of power by

Tanzania, still less was it an effort to influence the global balance of power. The conventional realist materialist explanation of military intervention provides little insight into the dynamics of the relationship between Tanzania and Uganda that led to this episode, nor does it contribute substantially to an understanding of the nature of the interests that motivated such action, nor the constitutive role of identity and interests that shaped the relationship between Uganda and Tanzania. More significantly however, Chapter Two argued that, in addition to this wide range of systemic and unit level factors, historically contingent conditions that occasioned the uniquely conceived identities of the states precipitated the manifestation of this intervention and that internationally shared norms and values formed the contours of the regional and international environment in which the intervention took place, such that the motivation and justification, for the intervention are made sensible only by reference to the historical circumstance and normative environment in which it took place.

To sustain this argument the foregoing discussion of the Tanzanian intervention has shown that both material and ideational, global and regional contextual elements, have proven significant in creating the particular historical circumstance within which this episode took place, and that a wide range of ideational contributory influences from colonial territorial boundary formation, to deep seated ethnic cleavages, have also proven at some level significant in precipitating events in the particular manner evidenced. The evidence of this case study also suggests that historically particular African conceptions of inter-state diplomacy and legitimate state behaviour have been influential in the manifestation of the relationship between Tanzania and Uganda and those states in regional proximity. It also indicated that the role of individuals and social and political elites shaped the political environment and determined the conception of state interests that Tanzania and Uganda pursued during this episode. Finally through an examination of justifications offered, it concludes that Tanzania attempted to legitimise its actions within the international community not by rejecting the normative framework that existed at the time, but by appealing rather to the social normative domain, by pleading 'special case' in their particular circumstances, and by pushing for reform to the regional and possibly international understanding of the boundaries of state sovereignty and non-intervention. The role of ideas, intersubjective values, and norms, both within the state and within the community of states, therefore, appear to have been particularly significant in shaping the political environment, and in conditioning the envelope of political possibility within which the states could act in this situation.

In this discussion several facts are readily apparent. Firstly, the conventional realist proposition that states intervene for materialist balance of power considerations is manifestly insufficient and inappropriate in this case. Regardless of which conception of balance of power is utilised, be it classical European balance of power, the description of an equilibrious situation, or a broader systemic notion of global power alignment, the notion of power balance is a poor explanatory model for the circumstance in eastern Africa in the late 1970's. Although subject to the overarching bipolar global circumstance and great power competition over the African continent as previously noted, the actual great power interest and influence in this conflict was marginal at best, and certainly not a primary causal factor. East African states were simply not a significant feature in any great power balance of power contestation at the time. Neither Tanzania nor Uganda was acting as a client state of the great powers – or any other powers – nor did they represent any significant major power interests. The outcome of this intervention was not the subject of major power influence and no interests outside of the two states involved appear to have been directly effected or at stake in the episode. Similarly, there is no evidence that this conflict was part of a regional contest for power or re-alignment of material interests and influence. Although it must be noted that a constructivist approach would posit significance in the constitutive role of the great powers in shaping the identities of Uganda and Tanzania as 'small states' which would condition relations between them and the great powers, and between each other to the extent that identity shapes behaviour.[547] In this case Tanzania's identity as 'small African state' would condition not only its interests but would shape how it reacted to other small African states, such as its neighbouring states, and how it would react to pressure from other states, great or small. The neighbouring states, although concerned with the implications of the intervention were not substantially involved or implicated. Even Libya, which was militarily involved, had only superficial interest and stake in the conflict and soon quit the region once their ineffectual forces had been routed.

Although Libya did have a wider pan-African Arab agenda in its dealings with Uganda, these proved to be opportunistic and short-lived, representing no serious commitment to balance of power interests in the region. Even between the protagonist states, the conflict although settled through the application of force, was never really a contest or struggle for power between them. Tanzania was not striving to annex or subdue Uganda, and

[547] Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," p. 51.

despite Amin's rhetoric he had no serious designs on Tanzania and was very probably incapable of substantial strategic manoeuvring to overcome Tanzania in any case. In terms of balance of power, the Tanzania/Uganda intervention exhibited almost none of the characteristics that conventional realist theory would predict. Similarly an appeal to the concept of balance of power does not offer any explanatory insight as to the how or why of Tanzania's actions nor does such appeal serve to contextualise the events into a sensible framework of systemic interaction.

Okoth[548] however, would disagree. In an article titled *The OAU and the Uganda-Tanzania War 1978-79* he argues that:

> Tanzania was now both politically and economically isolated in the region, it sought to create a situation in which the balance of power would once more be in its favour. The solution was to join with a former ally by restoring Obote to power in Uganda, so that the two (Tanzania and Uganda) would once more outweigh Kenya in East Africa. In essence, therefore, the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda was a question of geopolitics and balance of power in East Africa, in which the OAU was out-manoeuvred[549].

On its face this appears an appealing power politics argument, however, Okoth's assertions do not accord well with the facts. Far from regaining a position of regional economic and geopolitical dominance, Tanzania suffered severe economic hardship and achieved no increase in its geopolitical standing within the immediate region. This outcome was not simply the poor result of an ambitious agenda however, as Nyerere was well aware of the costs associated with military action into Uganda and prepared his public for this in several public speeches and announcements early in 1979. Tanzania was under no illusion that intervention into Uganda would bring anything but economic hardship, loss of life, and damage to its regional standing. Trading relations with Kenya were damaged further by the intervention, and Obote was deliberately not installed as a friendly government in Uganda for the reasons described earlier. Tanzania acted to remove Amin's odious regime because it was perceived as odious, not because it stood in the way of Tanzania's regional geopolitical or economic aspirations. Contrary to Okoth's assertions, Tanzania and Uganda did not subsequently reform an alliance against Kenya in East Africa and the East African Community that he refers to became a defunct and largely irrelevant organisation.[550]

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[548] Okoth, "The Oau and the Uganda-Tanzania War, 1978-79."
[549] Ibid.
[550] The EAU whilst in operation was a significant factor in the relationship between Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya and its existence and operation shaped the nature of relations between these states between 1967 and

Regional geopolitics were certainly not the motivation for Tanzania's actions and Okoth's balance of power argument simply imputes motives and interests that were not the prime considerations in this episode.

But what of the more general argument from realist precepts that this contest was essentially about material state interests – most particularly security – expressed through power transactions? If this line of reasoning is pursued, for the purposes of this study temporarily suspending the constructivist objections to realism's exclusively material conception of interests, and allowing them rather to be conceived in terms of power and survival only, the argument is still unsupportable. The realist argument may be advanced along the lines of – Tanzania ultimately intervened in Uganda to rid itself of a troublesome neighbour so as to enhance its national security. Yet what real security threat did Amin's regime pose to Tanzania? Although relatively well equipped, Ugandan forces were numerically inferior to Tanzania's, and despite the constant rhetoric about Tanzanian aggression and the need for Uganda to defend itself, Tanzania would most surely have realised that this was mostly hollow talk aimed at distracting attention away from Uganda's internal problems. Certainly Tanzania's subdued military posture in the border region at the time of the Ugandan invasion lends credibility to the notion that Tanzania did not seriously believe it faced an existential threat from Uganda. Nor did it act like it believed it faced a perceived threat from Uganda. Even if the threat was merely perceived by Tanzania and not existential at all, her military posture would have been one of active defence – this was not the case in 1978.

Yet surely the fact that Uganda did invade is clear evidence that Uganda posed a substantive threat to Tanzanian national security even if Tanzania did not perceive it to be so or react accordingly? Even this undisputable fact however, does not necessarily mean that Uganda posed an existential material threat to Tanzania's security. The reason for this apparent anomaly lies in the motives behind Uganda's invasion in the first place. The invasion was the accidental result of Amin's clumsy attempt to divert attention away from the mutinous state of his military as a consequence of the widespread dissatisfaction and unrest among his troops over pay and conditions, rather than as a result of any particular Ugandan interest in maximising its power relation against Tanzania. Although Amin would opportunistically make territorial claims against the Kagera salient, this was not part of a

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1977. By the time of the intervention however, its significance had substantially diminished and certainly was

rational calculus of national interests. In fact it was not even a part of an irrational calculus of national interests, if indeed it represented the advancement of any interests it would have been of the narrow and ill-conceived interests of Amin himself. Uganda did not posses the capacity for any serious power struggle with Tanzania - its military was factious and in disarray and Amin's real security concerns and the focus of his attention were internal not external. No doubt Amin represented a 'wild card' actor and any prudent neighbour would take some precautions against his unpredictability, however these precautions would not amount to the desire to overthrow his government and decimate his army. Tanzania's response to Uganda's invasion was not simply the result of Tanzania acting to ensure its security by neutralising an existential threat, rather it was the result of *inter alia* fundamental humanitarian and philosophical concerns that Nyerere harboured. The threat that Uganda did pose to Tanzania was a moral and ethical one as a result of Amin's brutal regime. The threat that Nyerere perceived was to the people of Uganda not those of Tanzania. It was not simply Tanzanian state interests, as realism conceives them, that drove Nyerere to intervene in Uganda but, *inter alia,* humanitarian interest in the plight of the oppressed Ugandan people. Even after Tanzania's immediate retaliation for Uganda's invasion into the Kagera it was fundamentally a concern for the plight of the people of the region should the Tanzanian forces withdraw that kept them in Uganda and eventually precipitated, in a convoluted manner, the subsequent overthrow of Amin's regime.

While there can be no doubt that following the Kagera invasion, security concerns were an influential factor in Tanzania's decision to retaliate and ultimately intervene in Uganda, they did not constitute the primary motive for the subsequent overthrow of Ugandan rule, and as such conventional realist theory has limited explanatory power in this example. Indeed a realist calculus would suggest that Tanzania would act rationally to maximise its power or at least act in a fashion such that its interests were advanced in the end sum. The intervention into Uganda however, very nearly bankrupted Tanzania – and this was not the inadvertent result of poor decision-making. Almost from the outset Nyerere had steeled his people for the economic hardship the intervention was going to inflict upon the already very poor nation. Despite this, Tanzania pursued its principled position concerning the rights of the Ugandan people as fellow Africans. Again it was the ideational and moral dimensions, and Tanzania's self-perceived identity as an 'African state', rather than simple power

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not the motivation to the intervention that Okoth suggests.

considerations that were most significant in the eventual decision to intervene and the subsequent military actions.

Some critics of Tanzania's actions have suggested that it was always Tanzania's intent to eliminate Amin and to install a government, probably Obote's, that was sympathetic to, or a puppet of, the Tanzanian government.[551] The available evidence does not support such assertion. Nyerere went to considerable lengths not to become involved in the post-Amin Ugandan politics, specifically using his association with Obote to persuade him to remain outside of the selection process for the new Ugandan government. Nyerere consistently acted to remain distant from Ugandan political machinations and to remain objectively neutral from the process himself. The subsequent Ugandan governments were manifestly autonomous from Tanzanian influence and were of Ugandan creation. Following the complete ousting of Amin, Tanzania was anxious to withdraw entirely from Uganda, but at the insistence of President Lule, then President Binaisa, they remained *in situ* to provide police and security functionality to the reconstituting state. Finally, Tanzania consistently sought no territorial or political gains from the intervention save the removal of Amin's regime.

At the unit level, the considerable significance of the personalities involved has already been noted, and it is reasonable to question whether Tanzania would have intervened to the extent that it did had Julius Nyerere not been President. As has been discussed, Nyerere's commitment to Pan-African socialism and his concern for the Ugandan people were most certainly significant in Tanzania's decision to punish Amin. It is of course not possible to know if another Tanzanian leader would have reacted in similar fashion, but probably only a leader with Nyerere's popularity, commitment to his principles, and strong moral purpose would have been able to lead the Tanzanian people on such a costly endeavour. While the role of national leaders is always of some influence in relations between states, it is difficult to imagine this conflict occurring as it did with any one other than Nyerere at the helm. This is of course somewhat problematic for a systematic only explanation of affairs. Without appeal to significant unit level causal factors such as the roles and personalities of national leaders, any systematic approach is going to provide explanation at a level of abstraction that may omit substantial important criteria. Notwithstanding the parsimonious simplicity and elegance of systemic explanation, in cases such as the

[551] Okoth, "The Oau and the Uganda-Tanzania War, 1978-79."

Tanzania/Uganda conflict they are most certainly insufficient on their own. A purely systematic approach in this instance would have failed to acknowledge the significance of the precedence that Nyerere's actions constituted.

It has been noted that regional and international reaction to Tanzania's action were somewhat mixed. Regionally Nyerere had clearly transgressed the African Union's conventions regarding non-intervention and he had also defied African norms of territorial integrity and state sovereignty. Internationally too he had transgressed widely accepted principles regarding non-intervention and sovereignty, yet he was not universally condemned for his actions. Noting the strong reaction of some African states with whom Tanzania had past difficulties, the general reaction was one of public disapproval but private acceptance. Western states in particular while disapproving of the possible precedent Tanzania had set acknowledged that in this circumstance a consequentialist approach was more appropriate. Because of the 'unique' circumstances they argued, Tanzania's action were justified and therefore did not warrant the disapprobation that other episodes, such as Vietnam's intervention, incurred.

The application of these heretofore 'universally' held principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty, it appeared was conditional, and perhaps subject to other *Realpolitik* considerations. It would of course be naïve to think that internationally held principles such as these had not always been subject to interpretation and selective application – especially by the great powers – but in this instance it was the contraventional actions of a small and not at all influential state that was being accommodated, if not openly condoned. In the case of Tanzania's transgression of the non-intervention principle it would appear that the absence of overriding great power interests allowed this episode of intervention to pass by without undue attention, and as no major power was interested in pursuing the matter in international fora such as the UN, it was rather quickly brushed aside. Although it would certainly be premature and unsustainable to argue that the Tanzanian intervention precipitated a shift in international normative convention concerning state sovereignty - with hindsight it may be possible to identify this episode as being significant in heralding a trend in international sentiment toward the vulnerability of state sovereignty to appeals of humanitarian concern. At the very least Tanzania's actions challenged the conventional norms of what is and what is not permissible within state boundaries, and how the international community should and should not respond in cases of such manifest abuse of the rights of citizens. According to the schema

of international norm dynamics that Finnemore and Sikkink propose, Tanzania acted as a 'norm entrepreneur' in attempting to re-define the boundaries of the accepted norms of non-intervention and state sovereignty.[552] The normative framework was challenged in this circumstance, and perhaps because of the unique peculiarities of the situation, although a new norm was not universally adopted within the community of states, the actions of Tanzania were accommodated and to degree internalised by member states of the international community. Certainly it may be argued that the lack of great power interest in this episode, as discussed above, uncomplicated matters somewhat such that a certain clarity of thought was possible which enabled the humanitarian aspects of Tanzania's actions to be de-coupled from the wider political considerations. Thus in the absence of complicating geopolitical considerations Tanzania's intervention may be seen as a test case for the genuine boundaries of the state sovereignty – non-intervention debate.

It may also be noted that the international norms and shared values that legitimate the principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty are historically contingent and socially constructed to the extent that they are shaped by historic circumstances and are the result of socially agreed standards of behaviour and shared values – in this instance the particular conjunction of the absence of great power influence and humanitarian necessity allowing for the tacit acceptance of Tanzania's actions. It is possible also one may argue, to trace a line of continuity within the development of international norms and international practice, that stems from Tanzania's actions in Uganda to present day conventions and understanding of humanitarian intervention. Such argument of course assumes that these internationally accepted norms and shared values are significant in relations between states – a purely materialistic systemic approach, such as much of conventional realist theory which sees interests and the logic of structure as exogenously given, however, would dispute this. It may therefore be argued that this episode of intervention by a non-great power demonstrates that not only are unit level factors significant in, and must be included in, any theoretical explanation of events, but that socially constructed and historically contingent ideas such as norms and shared values within the international community are likewise significant to the ways in which states interact. Clearly in this episode the brute material forces of power and security are causally insufficient to account for Tanzania's actions and explanation must be

[552] Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change."

sought in the complex of ideas, inter-subjective values, and norms that constituted the nature of relations between these African states.

Although Nyerere ultimately contravened the extant conventions of non-intervention he did so on the basis of what he believed were the fundamentally *a priori* superior grounds of humanitarian concern. For Nyerere the sovereign right of states to be free from fear of intervention by external powers, although a powerful and fundamental right, was still subordinate to the lives of the citizens who comprised the state. In acting therefore, against the international norms of the day he did so mindful of the import of his actions but convinced of the higher moral standing of his position. On its face this would appear to reinforce the realist argument that the norms and conventions of the international community are in reality powerless against state interests, which will always trump these weak constraining forces if 'push comes to shove'. However, a more subtle reading of the events will suggest that firstly, it was not Tanzanian 'state interests' that trumped international norms or conventions, but a superior, albeit not at the time widely accepted, principle of the protection of human rights. Tanzania did not intervene because its material interests dictated that it do so regardless of international convention, rather it intervened for reasons that had very little to do with its material interests, but were morally founded. Secondly, the international norms and conventions were a major factor in Nyerere's decision to intervene, and although ultimately he acted against the conventions of the day he did so with a vision of future norms and values that placed the value of human life above the rights of the state in exceptional circumstances. Although the extant conventions did not prevent Tanzania from acting, they were not entirely powerless. Tanzania intervened in full knowledge and understanding of the possible repercussions that this contravention could bring upon its head – the possibility of international sanction weighed heavily on Nyerere, yet he acted despite this, not 'regardless' of it. In this instance, the role of international norms, conventions, and shared values was integral to the intervention taking place. The realist account therefore, which is largely dismissive of such factors misses a large and important component of why this intervention took place, and is consequently inadequate in providing an accurate and reliable explanation.

In terms of another core realist tenet - that of power - this case study also poses some difficulties for a conventional realist account. Whether an offensive, defensive, or status quo realist position is adopted, power, as the currency of transaction and the motive to action, is

the fundamental causal factor identified in each realist position. States act either to increase their absolute power position, or to maintain an equilibrious power balance, depending on the realist position considered, nonetheless power is of utmost concern to realists and can most always be identified as the significant motive force in analysing interactions between states. In the conflict between Uganda and Tanzania however, while the interaction did eventually find expression through the application of force in a clear display of power, as a motive force, power was demonstrably not a major factor. Uganda at the time was a state in rapid decline. Social, political, and economic order were in disarray and Amin's grasp on power was growing increasingly tenuous. In such circumstance power, as a national resource, was dissipating and Uganda's relative power standing with Tanzania was steadily slipping behind. Tanzania meanwhile was maintaining an even keel neither increasing nor decreasing its power quotient. An explanation therefore, that suggests that Tanzania intervened primarily to increase its relative power position over Uganda, or to increase its absolute power is misguided.

Tanzania had no need to act in anyway to enjoy the decline of Uganda's power – it was assured anyway. It is of course possible that Tanzania misread the signs of Uganda's decline or that she grew impatient and wished to accelerate the process, however none of these suggestions accord with the subdued defensive Tanzanian military posture in 1978 as discussed previously. Similarly it should be noted that during the intervention, and as a result of it, Tanzania did not act to increase her power. She made no territorial or resource claims against Uganda, nor did she install a puppet government compliant to Tanzanian policy. The pursuit of increased material power simply was not a prime consideration in Tanzania's decision to intervene. Again the narrow realist materialist conception of interests has proven inadequate to account for this intervention and further confirms the need to look to the ideational foundation of this dispute.

Some time was also taken in this study to develop the notion that at the time of this intervention there existed what has been termed a 'permissive environment', and that this condition was significant in the conduct of the intervention in the manner in which it occurred. As has been rehearsed, it was proposed that because of the benign neglect of the great powers to this part of East Africa at the time, Tanzania had the opportunity to intervene without significantly upsetting or disturbing the great power game. The significance of this line of reasoning for this thesis is that it is proposed that the conduct of this intervention, the

reaction to it, and the consequences of it, were to large degree determined, influenced and shaped by the systemic conditions at the time and the particular historic circumstances that led to the state of affairs as they existed. That is, that not only did systemic condition influence these events, but that the particular historical circumstance that brought Uganda and Tanzania to the point of conflict that existed in 1978 represent a unique confluence of ideational as well as material conditions that precipitated the intervention. This historical contingency is imposed upon the systemic argument and acts to modify it by insisting that system analysis is preconditioned by, and limited by, historical circumstance. Systemic analysis therefore is meaningful only to the extent that it acknowledges the central role of historical contingency. The international system and the apparent law like properties that regulate its behaviour do not operate independent of history – the law like properties, to the extent they exist at all, are a result of, not independent of, historical circumstance, and systemic theory therefore, that does not adequately account for this relationship, is misguided and overstated. This historical contingency however, is not just limited to the historical circumstances of material conditions, but also to the peculiar state of shared values and socially constructed norms and ideas. The ideational condition/context of Tanzania and Uganda at the time of this intervention constituted a 'unique' point in the life of the identities of these states and the matrix of shared ideas and values that constituted the 'culture' of the society of states at that point in time. This 'culture' included international conventional norms regarding humanitarian necessity and state sovereignty, as well as regional norms of post-colonial territorial integrity and non-intervention. Realist theory therefore is sufficient to explain any given situation only to the extent that it acknowledges and includes such historically contingent factors. Just as it is proposed that evolving norms and shared values are influential in understanding how states interact, so too it is proposed that the particular historical circumstances and systemic conditions are significant in any explanation of international relations.

In summary therefore, it would appear that in the case of Tanzania's intervention into Uganda, conventional realist theory with its reliance on balance of power as explanation for intervention, is manifestly insufficient. Not only did Tanzania not intervene for reasons of balance of power, national security, or state power maximisation, but also it would appear that a strong case could be made that ideational concerns were the prime motivation behind her actions. Furthermore that these ideational factors constituted the development and progress of evolving norms and shared values concerning the role of interventions, the limits

to state sovereignty, and the need for multilateral action through supra-national organisations to prevent egregious abuses of human rights. Although clearly transgressing the established African conventions regarding these matters, and defying the OAU's charter between states, Tanzania's actions represented a challenge to these values and norms that would eventually progress the international re-evaluation of these shibboleths. So too did it illustrate the importance of historical context to systemic analysis as the vital qualifier to theoretic supposition.

The Tanzania/Uganda case study is therefore, an instructive example of the limits of realist theory as it currently stands in the explanation of small state acts of intervention. A more satisfactory account of the dynamics and apparent law like properties of non-great power interaction therefore, is one that fundamentally shifts its focus from the exclusively material properties of the agents, the structure, and the system, to one that is inclusive of the ideation properties of states and the mutually constitutive nature of the relationship between agent and structure. Further a more inclusive realist/constructivist synthesis will acknowledge the historically germane unit level factors and the roles and function of evolving norms and inter-subjective values as expressions of the 'culture' of the state system which indeed constitutes the structure of that system.

Case Study Two

Consistent with all of the case studies, the fundamental question this second case study sought to answer was *why did [Vietnam] intervene militarily into Cambodia in the manner it did in the closing weeks of 1978*? In addressing this question a range of significant causal linkages and historical conditions have surfaced each contributing to the eventuality of Vietnam's use of force. The Vietnam case study briefly investigated each of the most significant of these influences, global context, regional context, actors, reactions, justification and so on, separating the issues and examining each in some detail. Ultimately however, such deconstruction leads only so far, and in arriving at some definitive conclusions regarding the question, these pieces must be re-constructed. Whilst theory strives for simplicity and parsimony, seldom can complex situations be satisfactorily explained if we disregard the complex interplay of dynamics and influences that form the intricate matrix of historic context and action. The Vietnamese intervention is a case where this intricate matrix is obvious. To try to tease out the systemic level big issues of power relations, state interests,

and structure, leads to a distortion of the real event. The realist response framing its discourse in such language of power, interests, and structure alone is consequently partial at best. To rearrange Porter's argument: while the particular configuration of external conditions and influences in 1978 placed Vietnam and Cambodia in a particularly constituted conjunction of competing great power influences, it was the peculiar ideological, geopolitical, historico-emotional and national security concerns at the sub-systemic level that proved most significant in precipitating and shaping the events of 1978.[553] Although propelled and manipulated by the global and regional level confluence of power interests, especially in regard to the primacy of great power rivalry between the Soviets and the Americans, and the efforts of the US and China to forestall or thwart further Soviet penetration into Southeast Asia, it was primarily the unit level dynamics and the power of ideas that shaped the relations between Vietnam and Cambodia, not only providing the proximate cause of the conflict, but in shaping the means of its prosecution also.

As Porter notes: "In the first months of 1978, Vietnam's border war with Kampuchea, its support for Pol Pot's opponents in Kampuchea, the geopolitical conflict between Vietnam and China, the conflict over the Hoa in Vietnam and the socialist reforms of capitalist trade in South Vietnam all converged to form a new and combustible political mixture."[554] Add to this the history of animosity and conflict between the states, the antipathy between the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese communists, and the dynamics of xenophobia, paranoia, and extreme nationalism displayed by the Khmer Rouge, and a picture of the interconnectedness and contingency between significant causal and constitutive relations becomes apparent. Certainly the distinction between global contextual factors and regional influences is useful in demonstrating how the local level factors take place within the wider milieu of power politics, and are shaped and directed by those overarching conditions and influences, but also how the global context is interpreted by the regional actors and how in turn the global context is influenced by local factors. Thus a complex and dynamic interaction occurs between not only global and regional elements, but between systemic and unit level factors as well. This dynamic interaction exists not only in the causative nature of these relations, but in their constitutive nature as well.

One aspect of the conflict that has only briefly been treated but which is significant in addressing the question of why Vietnam intervened, is the claim that Vietnam acted in self-

[553] Porter, "Vietnamese Policy and the Indochina Crisis," p. 71.

defence and could have been judged so in international law. Much has been made of the ongoing border dispute between Cambodia and Vietnam and the savage actions by the Khmer Rouge, in particular upon the civilian Vietnamese population in the border regions. The peculiar significance of the 'minimum border position' for the Khmer Rouge has been noted, as too has the colonial legacy of poor border demarcation, however, the extent to which the Kampuchean aggression posed material security threat to the Vietnamese usually attracts little attention. The Vietnamese forces by 1978 constituted, with the exception of China, by far the most capable and experienced military in Southeast Asia. The provocation by the Khmer Rouge consequently is usually cast in light of grossly inferior forces causing some localised mayhem in the border region, clearly not constituting a real threat to Vietnamese national security, and this has tended to obscure the seriousness of the threat that Kampuchea's hostilities posed to Vietnam. Yet several authors have maintained that Kampuchea's actions amounted to a serious and persistent threat to Vietnam and that Vietnam's response was not only justifiable in terms of self-defence but also proportional and reasonable.[555] Klintworth, Wheeler, Rowley and Evans in particular propose this line of argument and it is persuasive. Agreeing that Kampuchea had not responded to Vietnamese advances of negotiation, threats of escalation, nor border reprisals, it posed a persistent threat that was likely to continue until stopped by force. Following Brownlie's argument that: "it is not unreasonable to allow a state to retaliate beyond the immediate area of attack when the state has sufficient reason to expect a continuation of attacks from ... the same source."[556] Klintworth contends that the invasion and subsequent installation of a new government represented reasonable and proportional response to Kampuchea's continued threat. It was the actions of the regime in Phnom Penh that constituted the ongoing threat to Vietnamese security, life, property, and economic conduct, and it was therefore, the activities of the regime that needed change. In the face of the failure of all previous attempts by Vietnam to modify Phnom Penh's behaviour, the regime itself became a legitimate target. As Klintworth writes: "given the kind of relationship that, according to most accounts, Vietnam had to endure when Pol Pot ruled Phnom Penh, the invasion and occupation of Cambodia, in my view, was a reasonable act of self-defence."[557] This conclusion brings to the fore the *prima*

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[554] Ibid., p. 99.
[555] Evans and Rowley, *Red Brotherhood at War: Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos since 1975,* Klintworth, *Vietnam's Intervention in Cambodia in International Law.*
[556] Klintworth, *Vietnam's Intervention in Cambodia in International Law*, p. 27.
[557] Ibid., p. 28.

facie case for Vietnam's intervention into Cambodia. Despite the hostile international reaction, despite the overarching great power dynamics that so shaped Indochina during this period, and despite this history of differences and animosity between the states, Vietnam had legitimate and immediate reason, by virtue of the manifest threat to its security, to act as it did in 1978. This fact is generally disregarded in analysis of this intervention by those seeking explanation in terms of great powers, ancient hatreds, or regional power dynamics. Although only a piece of the complex whole, the threat to Vietnam's national security is a vital factor in understanding Vietnam's actions.

Throughout Chapter Three a number of issues were discussed which often have been proposed in the literature as the primary cause of the occasion of the 3rd Indochina war. Without exception all have been rejected here as individually insufficient explanation, although their combined force has been acknowledged. Each of these is briefly discussed in turn here. Most realist accounts of this event highlight the notion that the 3rd Indochina war was an archetypical proxy war fought between the great powers over influence and control in Southeast Asia. This is the global balance of power argument writ large, in which Vietnam and Kampuchea although not typical client states, were brought to hostilities by the influence of the great powers as the Soviet Union attempted to spread its presence throughout Indochina and was opposed by China and the USA. The argument has been well rehearsed previously, but as noted, evidence of great power instigation is simply not forthcoming. Although the great powers did contest the region and heavily influenced events in Indochina, this intervention cannot be properly understood simply as an example of proxy war.

Similarly the regional application of the balance of power argument is not supported by available evidence. This line of reasoning is usually alloyed with the expansionist Vietnamese, and Indochina federation arguments, and again the most plausible explanation is that the rhetorical use of language of federation, expansion, and hegemony was politically manipulated to depict the Vietnamese as such, thus serving the political purposes of the Kampucheans and Chinese. There is little evidence to support the claim that Vietnam sought a long-term presence in Cambodia and such assertions are counterfactual to Vietnam's economic capacity and political doctrine. The Indochina federation philosophy had long ceased to be either, a viable expression of Vietnamese communist ambition, or a necessary strategy in the fight against capitalism.

The ancient hatreds argument similarly gives a very poor causal account of events in 1978. Although the history of conquest and animosity is undeniable, the specious determinism of this line of argument is unsupportable. Vietnam did not intervene into Cambodia because the hatred and fear that the Cambodians held for the Vietnamese provoked open conflict. Although the Khmer Rouge deliberately propagated a campaign of racial vilification to inflame passions and motivate the Khmer population, this was essentially the political use of myth to perpetuate fear for short-term political goals. No doubt many a Khmer soldier fought all the more fiercely because of his animosity towards the Vietnamese, and so too did the Khmer Rouge party purge all members expressing even the slightest sympathy with the Vietnamese, but as an explanation of why this conflict came about the argument is unconvincing.

Finally, the argument most comprehensively advanced in the work of Morris - that the political culture embodied in the paranoid chiliastic regimes in Kampuchea and Vietnam best explains the outbreak of conflict - is also unconvincing. Although no doubt paranoia and xenophobia contributed to the behaviour of the Khmer Rouge in their relations with Vietnam, to suggest that the real fears of national security, border contest, and fundamental differences in ideology were manifestations inherent in their political culture is too great a leap of psycho-sociological supposition. Morris ignores the role of misperception, miscalculation, and misunderstanding in relations between antagonistic states and imputes irrationality as the primary genesis of conflict. Too much of what transpired between Vietnam and Cambodia can be satisfactorily accounted for in terms of material power, ideas of security and how best to achieve it, and complex conceptions of national interests, to accept Morris' simplistic assertion that political culture and irrationality are to blame, and although interesting, his argument is unconvincing.

The distinction between global and regional contextual elements that this case study template employs is valuable not only in that it facilitates analysis of the material, but also in that it enables one to analytically exploit the distinction between systemic and structural factors and unit level elements, and to elucidate the theoretical 'space' between them. Only by a consideration of both structure and agency can one gain a sufficient appreciation of the dynamics of this intervention, and even then these elements are insufficient without a clear understanding of the distinction between the material and the ideational, and the historically contingent influences such as the role of norms, shared values, and pluralistic institutional

influence. A contemporary realist explanation of the 3rd Indochina war is demonstrably insufficient to adequately account for this intervention, and in general terms, as an example of small state intervention, the Vietnamese intervention into Cambodia represents a very poor fit with conventional materialist realist theory.

In the Tanzanian intervention international norms, conventions, and shared values played a significant role in the decision to intervene and the subsequent conduct of that intervention. In the Vietnam example similar norms and values appear to have been far less influential. It is usually argued that Vietnam intervened in the face of stiff international opposition to its actions and that it flouted the norms and conventions of international society. Yet this argument may in fact be unduly coloured by the rhetoric of the great powers, particularly the US and China. Although clearly Vietnam did contravene the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention, it did so for reasons that were arguably overwhelming and immediate, and while Vietnam's two wars argument has been debunked, it is so only to the extent that the so-called 'revolutionary war' was clearly instigated and manipulated by Vietnam. The other claim of self-defence in the border war, as has been discussed, has been argued in favour of Vietnam. As Wheeler[558] noted, the fact that Vietnam attempted to justify its actions to the international community indicates the salient importance of international legitimacy to Vietnam, and the explicit acceptance of its need to be seen to be abiding by the rules. The norms and conventions of sovereignty and non-intervention were important to Vietnam but more so in its eyes, was the need to secure its borders and remove the persistently aggressive Khmer Rouge regime. Vietnam's two wars argument highlights the dilemma it faced in acting as it did to intervene, knowing full well the disapprobation it would suffer as a result. The two wars argument is an attempt by Vietnam to gain some measure of credibility within the international community, and indicates the significance of the ideational and cultural dimension of relations between states.

Equally as significant was the international reaction, which for the majority of states was manifest in their condemnation, not of the act of aggression, but of the contravention of the norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention. Although some of this was disingenuous, masking great power material interests in the area, it is pertinent that states expressed themselves through international fora and institutions in terms of norms and shared values. While realists argue that Vietnam's action demonstrated the weakness of restraint that

[558] Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*.

norms and values hold over states, and that the pluralist language used by states was used only to hide their 'real' power interests, the consequences of their actions and the probable international response surely weighed heavily on Vietnamese decision makers, especially given the parlous economic condition of their country. Their decision to intervene indicates their desperation and perhaps their miscalculation of the consequences rather than the insufficiency of the restraining power of norms, values, and international opinion. In either event the Vietnamese leadership must have been aware of the potential cost of defying the international community, yet chose to intervene and suffer the consequences. What motivated Vietnam it seems clear was not the ambition of expanded regional powers, but a range of ideational, as well as material factors, including *inter alia,* the fundamental ideological differences between the communist parties, and the threat to national security that the Khmer Rouge's continued existence posed.

While the Vietnamese did not claim to be intervening on humanitarian grounds - and as Wheeler points out, realists would argue that states do not intervene primarily for humanitarian reasons[559] - they did seek to exploit the genocidal nature of Pol Pot's regime as justification in the court of international opinion. The Vietnamese were careful to expose to the international community the brutality and horror of the Khmer Rouge regime once they had captured Phnom Penh and although this was rejected by states as insufficient cause for Vietnam to intervene in the affairs of sovereign Cambodia, it represented a serious attempt by Vietnam to introduce a moral dimension to their actions. Clearly the value of principles and ideals within the international community was recognised by the Vietnamese, and they appealed to these in order to bolster their claims of legitimacy.

Wheeler[560] and Klintworth[561] argue that not only did Vietnam's actions constitute a legitimate humanitarian intervention but also that even if such was not Vietnam's motivation, the effect was still a legitimately humanitarian outcome.[562] The rejection of Vietnam's intervention by Western states highlights both their realist suspicions that any state might legitimately intervene on humanitarian grounds, and their fears that such action by states would undermine interstate order. Arguing that legitimating humanitarian intervention would " make the continued existence of various regimes dependent on the judgement of their neighbours", France reflected the paramount concern for states at the time – that of the

[559] Ibid., p. 105.
[560] Ibid.
[561] Klintworth, *Vietnam's Intervention in Cambodia in International Law.*

independence and sovereignty of states.[563] As Leifer suggests: "the fundamental problem for international society is that an act of military intervention is deemed, in principle, to threaten the independence of all states. Therefore, all governments have in principle at least, a general and equal interest in opposing all intervention, even if justified on ethical grounds."[564]

It could be argued that in 1979 the notion of humanitarian intervention had not yet come of age and that the primacy of state independence and sovereignty were still paramount to the society of states. The norms and shared values of this time did not extend to intervention on moral grounds, and states that contravened such principle were subject to disapprobation and sanction. Yet while Vietnam was being roundly condemned for its unlawful and illegitimate aggression, Tanzania's action barely raised a challenge. While the idea of a permissive international environment has been proposed previously in the case of Tanzania's intervention, for this lack of interest by the international community, it may also be proposed that by the same dynamic, Vietnam's actions were hostilely received. For if Tanzania's case represented a permissive environment, then Vietnam's constituted a contested one. Contested in the first place by the great powers. Contested not only militarily in Indochina, but also diplomatically in the UN, and rhetorically in the international community. The fact that Vietnam should be so condemned, not just by the US and its allies, but also by most Western states and even non-aligned states, suggests a process of influence, legitimisation and sharing within the society of states in which the values and interests of the most powerful are disproportionately absorbed and legitimated by the community.

The values espoused by the US and the West came to hold a position of pre-eminence within the international community, forming the basis of "legitimate" norms and values. Small and non-aligned states, fearful of any precedent that may diminish their sovereignty, and desiring the protection that the non-intervention principles afforded weak states, argued vociferously against Vietnam's actions. This is a clear case of self-interest in the international arena, yet the US and China – with far less to fear from external threat - also employed this pluralist language to condemn Vietnam and were successful in rallying other states to this position. This suggests that whether or not this behaviour was disingenuous, the great powers recognise the utility and value of international norms and conventions as a form of "soft power". Not all states gave equal weight to these values, with most Eastern states aligning

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[562] Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*.
[563] Ibid., p. 107.
[564] Leifer, "Vietnam's Intervention in Kampuchea: The Rights of the State V. The Rights of People," p. 149.

themselves with the Soviet position, suggesting that structure, in this case the bipolar Cold War structure, may indeed influence the norms, values, and legitimating function of the international community. The fact that great powers can shape the legitimising processes within the international community suggests that rather than standing apart from, and in opposition to, what are usually considered power relations in the realist sense, the norms, values, and conventions of the international community are part of the complex dynamics that regulate interactions between states. Thus the relationship between structure and norms, values and principles, in the international community is complex and historically contingent. This relationship, the constructivists insist, is in fact mutually constitutive, in that norms and values shape and condition material power relations, and *vice versa*, and that together the contingent values, norms, and identities, of the states, and the brute material conditions, constitute the 'culture' of the international community and the 'structure' of the international system.

If the role of norms, values, and conventions therefore was significant in this episode so too was this event contingent on a raft of historical circumstances. The evidence of this case study has shown that in order to explain events like this intervention, theory must acknowledge the role of historical contingency, not in a sense of historical determinism in which the event is seen as the culmination of circumstances that inevitably led to the intervention taking place, but in the sense that although structure conditions the manner in which states interact, and provides the framework in which states exist, thus determining the nature of relations between agents, that structure itself is historically conditioned and ideationally constituted.

This understanding sees the significance of historic circumstance extending both outside of structure - greater than and prior to structure - and within structure - determined by structure and subordinate to it. In Vietnam's intervention into Cambodia this contingency emerged in the extra-structural myth and historical relations between the states of Indochina, and inter-structurally, in the dynamics of the consequences of the 2nd Indochina war and the internal political machinations of China, as but a few examples.

The pattern of conquest, tributary relationship, and contest, between China and the Indochina states was as much a product of the geographic and ethnic conditions since civilisation began in the region, as it was of the political conditions that developed during its long history. These circumstances and shared histories have shaped the nature of the relations

between these states long before the global, or even regional, structural context emerged. Thus it may be claimed that China's imperious attitude to Vietnam that propelled their relationship into estrangement, was the product of their long and at times antagonistic history, rather than a consequence of China's rise to great power status and its relations with the US and the USSR. In failing to acknowledge such pre-conditioned circumstances, realist theory misleadingly attributes to power relations and dynamics, what is more properly understood as an outgrowth of extra-structural historic circumstance.

Likewise the inter-structural phenomenon of the 2nd Indochina war is misrepresented by realist theory. It has been said that there would have been no 3rd Indochina war without a 2nd Indochina war, and similarly no second without a first. Had the US not pursued its war in South Vietnam into Cambodia through its operation 'Sideshow' bombing campaign, it is possible that the Khmer Rouge would not have become the force they did. If so, relations with Vietnam may not have developed as they did, and ended the way they did in 1978-79. Had the internal Chinese political manoeuvrings following Moa's death and the subsequent upheavals surrounding the 'gang of four' not so shaped relations between China and Vietnam, Vietnam may not have turned to the Soviets for aid, and the US and China may not have grown so fearful of Soviet penetration into Southeast Asia and so forth. Even within the extant structural conditions, historically contingent events shaped and propelled the relations between Vietnam and Cambodia in ways that realist theory could neither predict nor adequately explain, in terms of power, states, anarchy or interests. This episode, upon examination, reveals *inter alia,* the criticality of the linkages between theoretic account and historical contingency and the need for the realist position to adopt a more historically conditioned approach.

Like the Tanzanian case, the Vietnamese intervention into Cambodia highlights the significant theoretical gap that exists between realist accounts of the power relations between states in exclusively material terms, and the ideational explanation proposed by a constructivist approach. Explanation based wholly on recourse to the brute material dynamics between Vietnam and Cambodia, is as unsatisfactory as it is inaccurate. The complexity and contingency of the relations and politics between these two states, and between them and surrounding states and the international community, evidences the importance of the roles of ideas, norms, shared values, and principles in shaping and conditioning not only the dynamics of the relations between these states, but the nature of those relations also. The power of ideas

and identity, in addition to the brute material dynamics, in shaping the interests and behaviour of these small states, has been elucidated in this study through the discussion of the constitutive and causal roles of individuals, ideologies, cultural histories and regional and global political context. Although the interplay of the interests and identities of the great powers and their influence in shaping the context of the Indochina experience has been noted, this case study has highlighted the extent to which Vietnam's and Cambodia's state interests were contingent upon a wide range of ideational as well as material factors, and how they were the product of social construction within the wider cultural milieu of the international community.

Case Study Three

As with the previous case studies the fundamental question Chapter Four sought to answer was *why this small state intervened*, and in this case specifically, *why did Australia lead an internationally comprised military intervention in to East Timor in September 1999?* In order to make sense of the events in 1999 however, it was necessary to outline the recent history of East Timor since the Indonesian invasion of 1975 and Australia's role in that history culminating in September 1999. Although Australian involvement in East Timorese affairs stemmed to a large degree from the decisions made by the Whitlam government in 1975, its intervention into the territory eventuated predominantly as a consequence of more recent changes in Indonesia's political circumstance, Australia's policy towards East Timor, and the global structural changes resulting from the end of the Cold War and the relative demise of the Soviet communist bloc. These changes produced shifts in both the political circumstances surrounding East Timor and the evolving normative values that framed the moral and humanitarian context to the dispute. With these shifts came opportunity, and with opportunity came expectations – these expectations in the form of normative pressure to act – precipitated Australia's intervention.

Undoubtedly the most proximate change that facilitated the intervention was the change in domestic political circumstances in Indonesia. With Suharto's political demise, following the Asian economic crisis of 1997 - 98, and the ensuing *reformasi* movement in 1998, the opportunity arose for a change in form and character of the Indonesian government. Habibie's weak political situation, and the mounting clamour for reform, meant that issues that were previously off any political agenda for change, suddenly become vulnerable to

reform. East Timor's incorporation into Indonesia was just such a case. Growing international and domestic awareness of the situation in East Timor, the disquiet at the military's heavy-handed domestic behaviour, and dire economic conditions, cumulatively brought increasing pressure on Habibie to 'do something' regarding the province. Seen primarily as an economic drain, and most recently as a source of international embarrassment, East Timor presented Habibie with the opportunity to be rid of a troublesome and expensive province whilst, at little apparent political cost, placating the domestic reform movement and international criticism. His offer of 'special autonomy', then subsequent proposal to free the territory if it so chose, provided the Australian government likewise the opportunity that it needed to put to rest an unsightly skeleton from the past. Moving quickly to capitalise on what was most probably a fleeting opportunity, the Australian government engaged Indonesia and the UN to progress a genuine act of self-determination for the East Timorese people.

One can only speculate that had Suharto not lost political control, or had a different successor taken his place, whether East Timor's position would have changed and whether Australia would ever have transformed its foreign policy and acted as it did. It is difficult to imagine, without the diplomatic opportunity that arose, Australia having the sense of moral outrage, fortitude, and leverage sufficient to challenge Indonesia over the matter. Although uncomfortable with its *de facto* and *de jure* recognition of Indonesia's incorporation, as time progressed, the strength of the *'fait accompli'* reasoning in Australia would probably have continued to strengthen as Falintil resistance in the East Timorese territory continued to dissipate.[565]

Nonetheless the opportunity afforded by the changing circumstances in Indonesia present only half of the story. Opportunity and motive being necessary for action, it is the motive behind Australia's actions that provide the most interesting and theoretically significant tale. This study identified seven major motives and factors that shaped Australia's response and directed its decision-making: humanitarian concerns, international and domestic political considerations, domestic public pressure, security concerns, regionalism, evolving international norms and shared values, and moral considerations. While these factors are separated here for discussion they are closely interrelated and show significant overlap in some situations.

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[565] Perhaps in much the same manner as Australia had strengthened its resolve not to comment on Papua, much less intervene – suggesting East Timor was something of an exception to the rule.

As Minister Downer indicated, Australia's actions were motivated primarily by humanitarian concerns; at least this is what the government proffered as its justification. The violence, destruction, and suffering that reached crescendo in the post-ballot period shocked and moved the Australian government to action, clearly unable to stand the wholesale slaughter of innocent East Timorese at the hands of TNI and the militia. Yet as has been noted, Australian intelligence had provided the government with a very accurate picture of what was happening in East Timor, certainly since the Dili massacre in 1991, and in fact since 1974, albeit with less fidelity. The Australian government had quite precise information as to the nature of the atrocities in East Timor, who had perpetrated them, and who had commanded and directed these deliberate and orchestrated military operations. The claim to have intervened on humanitarian grounds subsequently appears shaky indeed. Given that Australian officials were aware of what was occurring it is interesting to speculate whether there was some sort of threshold of human rights abuses above which the government decided to act, or if in fact it was some sort of cumulative pressure that built up under the weight of evidence until action was deemed necessary, in any event it certainly cast cynical light on the government's sanctimonious justifications of its actions. Although perhaps the case is not so damning as it might appear. Although the government's failure to publicly disclose or act upon this information is unconscionable in hindsight, before Habibie's historic moves to reopen the East Timorese issue it would have been diplomatically very courageous of Australia to reveal such details (much less act upon them). In the context of the continued importance of the relationship with Indonesia and Australia's history of complicity in the whole sorry affair, suddenly confronting Jakarta over the matter could not but be seen by Indonesia as an aggressive and hostile diplomatic move likely to irreparably damage relations between the countries.

The obvious and considerable tension between an historic policy of appeasement and accommodation due to the status of the Indonesian relationship, and the humanitarian need to stop the violence, had in the absence of a significant 'trigger' paralysed successive Australian governments. The stubborn resistance of Fretilin and the resistance movement had meant that, contrary to the hopes of various Western governments, the 'East Timor matter' had not just 'blown over' or disappeared quietly. Indonesia's failure to deal decisively with the resistance and increasing media attention and coverage of the situation meant that the issue just would not go away. The opportunity therefore that Habibie's policy shift afforded was eagerly grasped by the Australian government, keen to not only to remedy a 'running sore' in

relations with Indonesia, but to decisively deal with a morally problematic situation. The claim to have intervened on humanitarian grounds is *prima facie* a sustainable case although clearly the matter is more complicated and sinister than the Australian government disclosed. Nonetheless the fact that Australia did intervene to put an end to unconscionable violence and rapine says something about the state of international norms, shared values, and what was viewed as legitimate international action at the time.

Before exploring these matters however, it is useful to discuss first the other motives and influences that shaped Australia's response. As Cotton suggested, there was a domestic political dimension to Australia's policy shift that led to the intervention, as well as the regional and global political considerations that shaped this response. Domestically there was 'blood on the hands' as it were of both major political parties – both having since 1975 acted with complicity in Indonesia's illegal annexation and repression in the territory. Political point scoring was therefore limited between the parties in the lead up to the policy shift on East Timor, however, with the public statements by Laurie Brereton following his visit to East Timor in April 1999, there was perhaps a sense of urgency put into the government's action.[566] Although Oakes derides Brereton's actions in leaking intelligence reports linking TNI and militia violence as unhelpful and insensitive, the fact that Australia had not acted on, nor disclosed, such information no doubt put an onus on the government to act positively in the future towards a genuine settlement favourable to the East Timorese.[567] Politically the Howard government was most vulnerable in the period following Habibie's rise to power and prior to the decision to intervene in September. During this period the government was open to attacks such as that launched by Brereton, in a time when heightened public interest and outrage over events in East Timor meant that the government's actions and policy were under intense scrutiny. During this period of accelerated diplomatic activity, in which the government felt extremely sensitive over its past actions and in its delicate dealings with Jakarta, it had to present a public face of complete disclosure whilst trying to keep at arm's length the mounting public pressure for action. Until such time as the UN and international support for a multinational force was secured and announced, the Government had to tread a fine line between reaction to domestic public pressure and continued negotiation with Indonesia. Once the announcement was made that Australia would be leading an intervention in to the territory, the weight of the Government's 'high moral ground' and apparent

[566] Laurie Oakes, "Brereton Fails to Focus on Big Picture," *The Bulletin*, May 4, 1999.
[567] Ibid.

humanitarian credentials could be brought into effect maximising its domestic political advantage.[568] Notwithstanding the fact that the Government enjoyed full bipartisan support on the East Timor intervention, the coalition clearly gained much more political advantage out of the exercise than the opposition.

Internationally, the political manoeuvrings were just as intense. Acutely aware of the need for widespread support to legitimate an interventionary force, Australia worked assiduously to garner such backing, particularly within South East Asia. Mindful of ASEAN sensitivities to interference and aware of Australia's somewhat 'outsider' status in the region, the government worked hard to forge ASEAN consensus and commitment. Ultimately it was successful in its efforts as twenty-two nations joined in coalition to form INTERFET, but it is telling that Australia would not act unilaterally and sought regional and international support as the foundation of legitimacy. In sharp contrast to the other intervention cases, which entailed unilateral action, the Australian led intervention was deliberately multinational and would not have proceeded without such basis.[569] Although conceivably, Australia could have acted unilaterally – preferably with UN backing – it did not seriously consider this for several reasons. Firstly, in terms of diplomatic fallout with Indonesia, the risks to Australian interests were simply too great. Unilateral action would have left Australia regionally isolated and open to all sorts of criticism and it would have undoubtedly irreparably damaged relations with Indonesia, which would have worked against Australia's security and economic interests. Secondly, the basis of humanitarian intervention is that abuses have occurred that have outraged the moral consciences of others – presumably everyone else – thus response to these abuses should be international and widespread. Unilateral humanitarian intervention therefore should only be countenanced when it is the only possible option available, that is, in situations in which only one state is in a position materially to act effectively or in a timely manner. Given Australia's history of complicity such a case could never be credible or successfully sustained – and surely the Government was aware of this.

As noted earlier, a significant influence in the Australian decision to intervene was the pressure brought to bear on the government as a result of the public outrage over the situation

[568] Having asserted this, there were however, considerable risks to the bilateral relationship with Indonesia were the Government to 'capitalise to the hilt' on the moral high ground over East Timor. Indeed critics have argued that with a view to short-term domestic political advantage, the Howard government was excessive in its 'triumphalism' in a way that was offensive to other Asian states and counter-productive to its regional relationships. (I am indebted to Dr Karin von Strokirch for bringing this point to my attention)
[569] DFAT, "East Timor in Transition 1998 - 2000: An Australian Policy Challenge," p. 133.

in East Timor. This type of public sentiment that Coral Bell refers to as "hue and cry", can at an international level, Bell would suggest, be of sufficient force as to persuade governments to alter or rethink their policies.[570] The 'hue and cry' phenomenon of course is foundational to the rationale of the United Nations, and forms the cornerstone of liberal international theory - in the form of the power of international opinion and legitimacy to shape state action. In the case of East Timor, the 'hue and cry', following the 1975 invasion was to little effect – primarily because the Western powers, especially the US, Australia and the UK, refused to join in international condemnation of the actions and so the 'hue and cry' fell to something more akin to a mere plaintive moan – easily ignored by Indonesia. Following the Dili massacre, and the opening up of the territory a margin to international media, the 'hue and cry' began to be faintly heard abroad. The persistent work of various NGOs such as Asia Watch and Amnesty International and the dogged efforts of individuals like José Ramos-Horta, kept the matter alive in the international community and, as the pace of events quickened with Suharto's departure, the 'hue and cry' rose finally to a clamour. As Coral Bell writes:

> As far as East Timor is concerned, however, there was also the point that government authority in Jakarta seemed almost to dissipate into thin air in late September – early October [1999], as the crisis reached 'crunch point'. President Habibie had hardly any support, no one knew who the next President and vice President would be, the Suharto dynasty was discredited, the economy was still in shambles, and the generals (luckily) were not up to mounting a coup.[571]

The 'hue and cry' in the international community had no doubt played a major role in changing the policy and direction of the Indonesian government. In Australia that clamour had a special resonance, a result of Australia's history of relations with East Timor since 1942 and as a consequence of its proximity and sense of immediacy the crisis engendered. The pressure on the Australian government only intensified with time. As 1999 progressed it was this pressure that proved decisive in the Government's decision to lead the military intervention.[572] Paul Hainsworth insists that the intervention was a direct consequence of both

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[570] Bell, "East Timor, Canberra and Washington: A Case Study in Crisis Management," p. 172.
[571] Ibid.: p. 173.
[572] It is pertinent to note that the Australian government would most certainly have undertaken considerable electoral 'cost/benefit' analysis in weighing its decision to intervene. In its most crude form the 'hue and cry' to the government represented voter sentiment, inaction would cost the government votes, whereas a failed intervention would likewise cost them dearly at the next election. It was not until circumstances were conducive to a favourable outcome – Indonesian agreement, UN authorisation, multinational force etc – that the government decided it could act with success. A similar phenomenon occurred in 1995 over the announcement

local and international pressure and posits that: "it is arguable whether this 'eleventh hour' interventionism would have taken place at all without the strong chorus of outrage and condemnation from civil society around the globe."[573]

The 'hue and cry' of public outrage therefore was a significant and influential factor in the intervention taking place. This is a dynamic that is not acknowledged by realist theory and represents the power of ideas to animate states and shape state behaviour. At the national level, as in the public pressure brought to bear on the Howard government to do something about East Timor, this 'hue and cry' dynamic might be seen theoretically as simply unit level factors influencing domestic politics, however, of significance are the ideas that underpin the outrage and the shared values which constitute the motive force to action. Realist theory accords little significance to such factors, arguing rather that in the final analysis states will act in ways that they see as in accordance with their (material) national interests – how they are determined therefore, is not of particular importance to realists, only the fact that in the end those interests always come out to be more or less the same – national survival, economic prosperity, and relative power quotient. Unit level and ideational dynamics such as domestic politics, public opinion and the like are of little consequence to the realist analysis and so do not figure in their theoretical account. As will be demonstrated later however, the relation between these unit level factors and the formation of state interests is of particular significance in this case of intervention and in any theoretical account of small state intervention.

At the international level this 'hue and cry' and its ability to influence the behaviour of states is directly at odds with narrow materialist realist conceptions of state interests and interstate relations. The role of international public opinion in this case appears to have operated through two distinct modalities: as refracted through individual state policies, that is how this pressure changed the policies of individual states like Australia, and as represented through the pressure brought to bear through NGOs and international institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and the UN. The liberal or institutionalist account of such a dynamic of course maintains that this kind of international community normative power is critical in relations between states. This is the norms, conventions, and 'international society' argument writ large, whereby international majority opinion articulated through international

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by the French government to resume nuclear testing in the Pacific. The then labor government only acted when public outrage was of such magnitude that it would clearly be very unpopular for it not to make a stance.

[573] Hainsworth, "Conclusion: East Timor after Suharto - a New Horizon," p. 206.

institutions like the UN can modify relations between states and shape the contour of the international political landscape albeit still within the construct of an exclusively materialist distribution of capabilities.[574] In this case study this notion appears to be well supported, however, it has also been highlighted how this 'hue and cry' is but one of a number of significant influences that shaped this intervention, and it is stressed that to place too great an emphasis on this factor alone is as dangerous as the realist position of attributing it too little.

The role of public pressure and its relationship to international norms, institutions, and state interests will be more fully discussed later, however, it would certainly appear that in this post-Cold War scenario there was far more at play than simply material state interests or balance of power considerations influencing the intervention in East Timor.

As noted earlier there was an interesting and influential regional dynamic to this intervention, whereby, the response to the crisis was handled by and large at a regional level within the framework of a notion of security 'regionalism'. As Bell again writes:

> Both Kosovo and East Timor were, in essence, regional crises in small, resource-poor provinces, which are not of much strategic or economic importance except to their close neighbours. So it was appropriate that the crisis management was also militarily regional... If you compare the relatively effective action in those two crises with other all to numerous humanitarian crises round the world, like Rwanda, or the Sudan and Algeria, the importance of regional capacity for action becomes abundantly clear.[575]

Australia's decision to intervene was, amongst the other important factors, influenced by this notion of regionalism and by the inability of the global international institution of the UN to act in a timely manner. Although, as noted, Australia suffered a somewhat peculiar and marginalised status amongst its Asian neighbours, it still played a significant role in regional affairs, and its identification with the region and its understanding of this 'identity' shaped the manner in which it behaved. With the deepening of the crisis in East Timor it became obvious that a timely and appropriate intervention could and should only come from within the region. In addition, the lack of great power engagement in the issue added impetus to the US agenda of having local states manage the affairs of regions in which the US had but peripheral interest. Consistent with its conception of regional and global identity, Australia was eager also to act as a good ally to the US and as a good international citizen; hence it was forthright in leading action into East Timor. This sense of regional identity and responsibility

[574] Wendt, "Identity and Structural Change in International Politics," p. 5.
[575] Bell, "East Timor, Canberra and Washington: A Case Study in Crisis Management," p. 174.

worked both in the US' favour – such that it could achieve results to its liking with minimal risk or expense, and to the region's favour, as the regional member states can be seen to be effectively managing their own affairs whilst forestalling any external great power interference – an acknowledged objective of ASEAN. Thus this sense of regionalism, as a form of particular state identity association, acted positively to give impetus to Australia's decision to lead the intervention and for many of the regional states to join in partnership with this coalition.

Although perhaps not a major factor in its decision to intervene, Australia's security concerns, also gave weight to the importance of its actions. As James Cotton notes:

> On this understanding of Australian foreign policy, the Timor commitment was consistent with the national interest in two respects: Australian forces were being used in the service of international institutions and with Indonesian consent to assist the East Timorese to realise the choice they made in an internationally supervised ballot, and these forces, by suppressing violence were restoring regional order and ending uncertainty.[576]

At the heart of Australian relations with Indonesia since its inception in 1949 was Australia's conception of the strategic significance of the archipelago to its security. Even after the Cold War and the diminishing of the perceived communist threat from the north, the Indonesian archipelago was seen as critical to Australian security and friendly relations with Jakarta were consequently of vital importance. In addition to Whitlam's pessimism regarding the apparent viability of small states it was on the basis that Indonesia's security and integrity were of paramount importance to Australia's security, that he supported Indonesia's illegal incorporation of East Timor.[577] These security concerns continued to influence Australian foreign policy regarding Indonesia through the 1980s and 1990s and shaped also the decision of the Howard government to act in 1999. Significantly, although intervention into East Timor would clearly sour relations with Jakarta, the Howard government acted to 'restore regional order' and 'end uncertainty' in the territory, as Cotton noted, thus enhancing Australian security through regional stability. Consistent with this rationale Australian policy had taken considerable measures to reassure Indonesia and other regional states that East Timor represented a unique case, and that it was not advocating or looking to support

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[576] James Cotton, "The East Timor Commitment and Its Consequences," in *The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996 - 2000*, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 231 - 232.
[577] Salla, "Australian Foreign Policy and East Timor," p. 162.

regional secessionist ambitions as a rule. Security therefore, as the realist account would insist, was a serious factor that shaped Australia's decision to intervene, however, as has been highlighted, it was not the primary consideration and the notion of material security worked hand in hand with concepts of identity and ideas of security.

The final motives for Australia's intervention that are considered here are perhaps the most interesting for this study, the role of norms and expectations, and the moral dimension to the decision. Again it is Bell who most succinctly notes the normative shift evidenced in Australia's actions when she writes:

> ..it was, like Kosovo, an illustration of a process of normative shift in the society of states. It is hard to explain the decisions make in Canberra on any other basis. To put the outcome in the bluntest *real politik* terms, those decisions of September 1999 meant that Canberra exchanged an easy quasi-alliance with an emerging power of 211 million people for a fragile and probably conflictual relationship with a very vulnerable small nation of 800,000. [578]

Bell clearly identifies what appears to have been a substantial shift in the normative framework of the international community – that a country like Australia would intervene into (what Indonesia would see as) the internal affairs of so large a neighbouring state, defying the strong international and regional norms of non-intervention, for reasons that are primarily humanitarian and morally based. As has been discussed, this shift was possible only in the structurally realigned post-Cold War order, but nonetheless in stark contrast to the previous case studies in which the conventions of non-interference and state sovereignty trumped moral and humanitarian concerns from the international community's perspective, this intervention took place in an emerging normative context in which such priorities appeared reversed. The fact that firstly, Australia would contemplate a humanitarian intervention into the affairs of so important and large a neighbouring state, and second, that such an intervention would not only be sanctioned by the international community but positively expected by them, illustrates that a major realignment of international norms had taken place. Leaving aside for now the questions of why and how such a shift had occurred, it is significant to note that it was this shift and the international expectation that it brought with it that underpinned Australia's decision to intervene.

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[578] Bell, "East Timor, Canberra and Washington: A Case Study in Crisis Management," p. 175.

It is not easily possible to conceive Australia leading an international intervention into East Timor without the precedents of Kosovo, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Somalia that had established the paths of humanitarian interventionism in the post-Cold War environment, nor is it possible to imagine the support for East Timorese self-determination without the considerable shift in international opinion regarding the rights of ethnic minorities and the rights of people to determine their own political future.[579] The fact that such a shift has occurred, and the consequences of this shift for the nature of relations between states, are problematic for the realist account. On the face of it Australia's decision to intervene runs counter to realist prediction and is very difficult to account for in terms of power, anarchy and a narrow conception of state interests.

Similarly the moral dimension to Australia's decision is outside of the normal explanation of interstate relations put forward by realist theory. As the amoral domain of interaction between states – international relations are not subject to moral deliberation in the realist account. The logic of power relations is, according to realism, beyond and distinct from the moral relations between individuals, and so moral considerations are not germane to an understanding of international politics. The insufficiency, self-serving nature and deception of this paradigm have increasingly been challenged by the recent works of various scholars[580] and are highlighted in this case study in which it can be argued that despite the political and other considerations influencing the Australian decision, the action of the Government represented a repudiation of the pragmatic policy decisions of the past for a deliberately principled stance in which the morally correct decision to support the East Timorese people was upheld. Even apart from the consideration of the rights of the East Timorese to a genuine act of self-determination, it was manifestly clear to the Australian people and Government that what had been done to the people of East Timor was morally wrong, and that once aware of it, they were morally obliged to put an end to it when the opportunity presented itself. In the realist account such consideration is considered insignificant and transitory at best. In this episode it would appear that this was not entirely the case. Unfortunately the Australian government's claim to have acted on humanitarian

[579] While this shift has undoubtedly occurred, it is not an unqualified one. The application of the right of peoples to self-determination for example is still very selectively applied and is more often pursued through some form of autonomy or compromise than outright self-determination. The interplay between normative behaviour and power politics is highlighted in the way in which such new or evolving norms are applied, to whom they are applied, and when such moves are successful or not.

[580] Richard Ned Lebow and Noam Chomsky are two good examples of this line of challenge. Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance*. Lebow, *The Tragic Vision of Politics*.

grounds was weakened by the fact that, as has been argued elsewhere, the government had specific knowledge of what had been occurring in East Timor, and had for so long acted neither morally nor in a humanitarian fashion. The argument therefore that Australian actions were morally based consequently appears challenged. However, two significant factors must be considered. Firstly, although the Australian government had known about the abuses of human rights for a considerable period of time and had barely commented much less acted to stop them, does not alter the fact that when they did act it was in large part because of morally (or at least normatively) motivated reasons. Although late, the ultimate response was based on moral humanitarian concerns. The Australian government's past inaction is still morally suspect, but their decision to intervene was not. Of significance here it would appear that this study has conflated humanitarian action with moral precept. While the two may not always be synonymous, it is argued that in the realm of international politics, normative precepts, that is the shared values and principles of the international community, equate to a moral dimension. This moral dimension inheres the 'culture' of the international system in the form of a set of bounded situational ethics. Secondly, of particular significance is that what had precipitated the Australian government's decision was the shift in the international normative context. What was seen as appropriate state action by the community of states had changed from centuries of previous practice such that to intervene on humanitarian grounds was now an internationally accepted moral standard. This would appear to be a case of international moral relativism, whereby the moral standards of international behaviour are not fixed or absolute, but determined by shared and agreed values. The link consequently, between this value relativity and historical contingency is evident, and, as has been argued in this study, the failure to adequately account for this historical contingency in its theory, is perhaps one of the most persistent criticisms of realism. This linkage between moral relativity, or situational ethics, international legitimacy, and historical contingency will be explored later, suffice it to note here that the East Timor case study highlights this linkage and its importance for international relations theory.

Together all of these factors influenced and shaped Australia's response to the situation in East Timor. Together they provided the context, the rationale, the imperative, and the material, and political framework in which the Australian Government chose to intervene militarily into East Timor. What is clear amongst this dynamic mix of factors however, is that the notion of material balance of power or Australian hegemonic pretensions were simply not significant factors. Although regionalism was influential, the idea that Australia was

attempting to assert itself as a regional hegemon or was hoping to alter the regional balance of power in its favour clearly is not a useful framework for explanation. As Downer insists:

> Yet, the self-evident humanitarian nature of our actions in 1999 did not prevent unfounded – and rather absurd – criticisms of Australia's role and motives. Some of the more offensive observations have hinted that Australian action was essentially hegemonism cloaked in the mantle of human rights. Others have implied that underlying economic imperatives drove Australian decision-making. Such assertions are manifestly untrue, and a genuine affront to the good faith which framed Australia's response to the East Timor crisis.[581]

Although Foreign Minister Downer could hardly be considered an impartial commentator on foreign policy decision-making, this study has found no evidence to contradict his claims, and certainly no conclusive evidence to suggest that balance of power or any other realist material explanation of intervention at all satisfactorily accounts for this episode.[582] Plainly put, this is another example of small state interventions in which conventional realism provides an insufficient, inadequate, and unconvincing explanation.

Analysis of this intervention has highlighted several theoretically significant points that indicate the insufficiency of the realist account of international dynamics to the relations between small states which bears further elucidation here. In particular an examination of this intervention has demonstrated that a number of dynamic and interrelated factors at both the structural and unit level of analysis were significant in shaping the decision to intervene and the manner and framework in which that intervention was conducted. Fundamentally it has been argued that Australia intervened as a result of a re-conceptualisation of its interests, facilitated by changed global circumstances and the opportunity offered as a result of changes in the Indonesian domestic political situation. This re-conceptualisation of interests is seen as a dynamic relationship between the fundamental and enduring interests of security, economic

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[581] Downer, "East Timor - Looking Back on 1999," p. 4.

[582] In particular the matter of the Timor Gap Treaty is sometimes raised as the basis of Australia's economic interest in East Timor. As was noted earlier arguments have been advanced that suggest that Australia's economic interests would be best served by continuing to appease Indonesia thus remain within the Timor Gap Treaty regime, and on the other hand that Australia's interests would be better served by dealing with a weak independent East Timor over the Gap than with Indonesia. Neither case is conclusive and both appear somewhat cynical arguments suggesting that economic interests trump all other concerns in the matter. While the economic implications of the Treaty would have been at least a consideration in government deliberations there is no evidence to suggest that the government came down strongly in favour of either case, or that in fact either case could be proved to be viable. It would appear that eventually Australia's access to the resources in the Gap would be secure in either eventuality – if Indonesia remained in control over the territory or if an act of self-determination took place. Certainly it would be in Australia's interests that no matter what the outcome, stability was restored as soon as possible so that exploration and exploitation of the resources could proceed in conditions of some certainty.

welfare, and freedom, the structural conditions in which those interests are pursued, and the role of the international community in shaping and legitimating those interests in the existing international political circumstances. For Australia the changes in structural context with the end of the Cold War and the passing of any perceived immediate threat from the north meant that the 'imperatives' of security that had dictated the shape of relations with Indonesia since 1949 had been transcended. Similarly, with the distancing of the US from its past practices of support to repressive and authoritarian regimes under the Cold War context, the global accommodation of such regimes had substantially declined and the international mood of intolerance to oppressive rule had hardened. With the lead primarily from the US, fuelled perhaps by a re-invigoration of the new Wilsonianism and European liberal institutionalism, normative changes within the international community meant that many states' foreign policies were open to review. Similarly, the rise in humanitarian interventionism legitimated multinational action against abusive regimes. Australia's security interests therefore, were no longer simply predicated on friendly accommodating relations with Indonesia. Its national interests also came to reflect those of the movement within the international community towards humanitarian interventionism and human rights advocacy, thus casting its policy on East Timor in an entirely different light.

It is this dynamic between systemic structure and the legitimating function of international society that is poorly represented in realist theory. Realism tends to treat state interests as essentially fixed and ahistoric. By reducing almost to the banal, state interests in terms of security and power, realism assumes that interests are fixed only by the anarchic conditions and logic of international politics. The manifest normative shift towards humanitarian interventionism and its impact on Australian foreign policy, in the case of East Timor, gives lie to the sufficiency of such an approach to state interests. Clearly something shifted in Australia's understanding of its interests for it to be able to place intervention into East Timor above its relationship with Indonesia. The evidence of the analysis of this intervention is that what changed was Australia's understanding of what were the boundaries of internationally legitimated state interests, and what was the relevant framework for internationally accepted state behaviour. That is, the fundamental interests of survival and security had persisted, but belief in how those interests could legitimately be pursued had fundamentally changed as well as the prioritisation of other state interests. In constructivist terms the ideational content of interests and the cultural nature of systemic structure were clearly evident in Australia's behaviour. In this case the importance of human rights and the

right to self–determination of peoples were elevated substantially in the hierarchy of state interests and acceptable state behaviour, leading to the legitimisation of the military intervention to prevent human rights abuses and to enable an act of self-determination to be implemented. Interestingly as has been indicated earlier, that legitimacy was typically conferred only when multinational action could be assured. Most probably this was a result of the resistance that states exerted in response to the threat to their territorial sovereignty posed by the new interventionism. Unilateral intervention on humanitarian grounds was too dangerous a precedent to be accepted by small and weak states, so too was the opportunity to abuse this power that humanitarian justification offered to powerful states on the pretext of human rights. Multi-nationalism also had the added bonus of risk and cost mitigation and sharing which improved the likelihood of such joint action occurring and succedding.

In this light therefore, it is possible to understand Australia's intervention as Australia trying not only to act in a principled fashion, but also to do so in a manner that would enhance its international credentials whilst operating in a multinational arrangement so as to minimise the adverse impact on its relationship with Indonesia consistent with its identity as regional player and global moral agent. In this context, Australia's decision should not be seen as being forced upon it by the pressure of new international norms that legitimated humanitarian intervention, so much as that Australia acted as it did, and was encouraged to do so, as consequence of a permissive/encouraging international normative context, and its identification with the legitimacy of such.[583] The significance of this distinction is that it avoids the 'need' to assign significant force to the norms and conventions of international practice when clearly such force is not in evidence. That is, perhaps the greatest realist criticism of liberal institutionalism is that it tries to afford to institutions and norms, coercive power that they manifestly do not enjoy. As example the fact that Indonesia could defy UN resolutions regarding East Timor for a quarter of a century with little material consequence, indicates how weak those institutional powers can be, especially when the great powers do not throw the weight of their influence behind enforcing these institutional resolutions. With

[583] There is a considerable body of literature concerning legitimacy in international relations including amongst others: Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 2 (1981), Thomas Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy among Nations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," *International Organisation* 53, no. 2 (1999), Claude Inis, "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations," *International Organisation* 20, no. 3 (1966), Christian Reus-Smit, "Obligation and the Political Authority of International Law," in *working paper 2002/2, Department of International Relations, Australian National University* (Canberra: 2002).

a shift in the normative framework however, that legitimated action against human rights abusers, the environment was conducive to action being taken against such states. Australia was encouraged, supported and even expected by that normative framework to take action against Indonesia, rather than compelled to do so. Her self-perceived identity led her to internalise this normative framework and to recognise its legitimacy. Rather than norms and conventions forcing states to behave in particular fashion, the legitimacy that these norms and values enjoy, and the legitimacy that the international community inheres, means that states want to comply and positively seek to enact and abide by them. The process can be conceived as one of 'cultural pull' rather than 'material push'.

In failing to take account of the legitimating role of the international community, and the manner in which state interests are shaped by that legitimisation, realism fails to adequately account for the ideas that animate the behaviour of states, such as Australia, in this episode. Realism's explanatory power is diminished to the extent to which it refuses to incorporate this 'constructivist' function of the international community and the social process of interest formation.

Interestingly the role of the US as *the* great power is, although significant, nowhere near as important as was the role of the great powers in the previous cases. As has been discussed, this in no small part was the result of the structural changes in the global balance of power resulting from the end of the bipolar Cold War era, and the impact this change had on the dynamics of regional power relations, and the role of the US in different regional forums. Indonesia's invasion of East Timor, which began the whole sorry episode, was largely the result of the global political circumstances arising from the Cold War rivalry as discussed, the conclusion to that story had little to do directly with the actions of the great powers, and still less to do with balance of power at either the global or regional level. There is no sense that any of the states involved were acting as 'proxy states' for the great powers, and indeed the whole notion of 'proxy states' had diminished in the absence of an overriding great power rivalry.[584] Although great power manipulation of small states was certainly to endure as a persistent feature of global politics, in the circumstances surrounding the East Timor case such great power interest was not a relevant factor.

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[584] Although it was earlier claimed that Australia wanted to act as a good ally to the US, this is not the same argument as Australia acting as a proxy state of the US. Australia's desire to be seen in favourable light by the US is not the same as it acting as a client state for US interests.

In the absence therefore, of any great state balance of power interests in this dispute, a realist explanation might turn to regional balance of power dynamics as the underlying logic to this intervention. Again however, the weight of evidence of this argument is simply not persuasive. Australian security interests in maintaining a regional balance of power had been predicated on the continued stability and viability of the Indonesian archipelago. A fragmented and destabilised Indonesia was seen as a threat to regional security and Australian interests, but instability in East Timor was likewise viewed as counter-productive to regional security. Australian interests therefore, would be best served by either, a subdued and incorporated East Timor, or a final and amicable settlement to the autonomy proposal. The dilemma that faced Australia was that the continuing violence in East Timor clearly posed an ongoing threat to Australian interests, but a decision to intervene would surely carry even greater risk to its interests, in terms of the fall-out of the damaged relations with Indonesia. The realist might argue that at this point Australia reasoned that its interests would be better served by intervening to end the 'running sore' than by risking continued violence and instability. Certainly by the time the ballot had taken place, and violence was rampant in East Timor, and was being widely reported in world media, Australia's interests would have been best served by bringing an end to the conflict, and by being seen as a strong regional player. However, in first deciding to revise its long-standing policy on East Timor once Habibie had assumed office, Australia must surely by this logic have been acting counter to its interests to encourage Habibie to negotiate a settlement with the East Timorese, and risk further unrest across the archipelago. Had Australia's interests only been material, then it is reasonable to assume that it would have remained mute on the matter, as it had done for the previous quarter of a century. The best explanation for Australia's actions was that it was the shift in the normative framework of international opinion and a concomitant shift in Australia's ideational framework that facilitated and prompted Australia's *volte-face,* and it is this dimension of regional power dynamics that is not accounted for in realist explanation. Undoubtedly, considerations of Australia's interests were foundational to its decision to intervene but, as has been argued, it was the re-conceptualisation of those interests in light of the dynamic international normative framework that precipitated Australia's change of policy and subsequent action to intervene.

Comparative Analysis

Having examined in some detail each case study individually, attempting to draw some analytical conclusions as to why these small states intervened in each case, it remains to compare these to see if there may be similarities or differences between them that may prove to hold further theoretical significance. Through comparative analysis it is proposed that the findings of this study may be extrapolated to extend to other cases of intervention, and other forms of small state interaction, thus building through a process of inductive reasoning a general case against the sufficiency of the realist position, toward a realist/constructivist synthesis.

The discussions of each case study have outlined the bases for each particular episode of intervention and have highlighted the complexity and contingency of each example and the theoretical gap between the material and ideational accounts. From these discussions it is possible to identify a range of commonalities across the three cases as well as numerous distinct differences also. It is argued here that these commonalities confirm the insufficiency of current realist explanation, demonstrating that small state interventions appear to differ from those that directly involve great powers, and that the dynamics of these interventions are manifestly not accounted for by realist theory. It has been an assumption of this study that the realist account of great power relations is a reasonably accurate, portrayal of the material forces and dynamics that exist between great powers and that as a result it can be seen as essentially a theory of great power relations because the brute material conditions of great power relations lend themselves to the simplistic and mono-dimensional material analysis that the realist accounts provide. The examination of small state interventions however, has thus far confirmed that these material mechanics and dynamics are manifestly insufficient to account for the complex and contingent relations between states.

In particular the evidence contained in the differences between the case study examples further supports the claim that the realist account is inadequate an explanation of small state intervention, particularly to the degree that realist theory simplifies and universalises state interests and dynamics across the range of possible state conditions. That is, that the manner in which realism parsimoniously simplifies interests, power, and anarchy leads it to provide an inadequate and insufficient account of small state interactions in which there exists a high degree of variability within these criteria.

Across the three case studies a number of common themes are apparent and which to varying extent have shaped the nature of the interventions, the environment in which they took place, and the motivation behind their occurrence. The first of these is the manner in which in each episode it was evident that causal factors at both systemic/structural level and at the unit level were significant in shaping the interventions. In a broad sense the realist account, particularly the structural realist position, posits the motive force behind interactions between states firmly within the material structural domain. Interventions as one form of interstate interaction therefore, are the result of the material dynamics within the structural context and are precipitated by particular structural conditions. In all three of these examples however, this has not been the case, rather causal and constitutive factors at both the structural and unit level have shaped and influenced these interventions. In each case in fact a high degree of unit level influence was evident with these factors being dominant in two of the cases, whereby the primary causes have arisen out of the unit level in global contexts that saw little direct role for material systemic influence.

In the case of Tanzania's intervention, the crisis that arose was the product of a range of issues between the destructive regime of Idi Amin and the socialist oriented and progressive government of Julius Nyerere. In particular, it was the excesses of the Amin regime and its appalling human rights record that so incensed Nyerere that he chose, despite the regional and international political risks and costs, to act to end those atrocities. The role of the individual as was shown, was particularly significant in shaping this intervention. Concomitantly the roles of structure and the dynamics of power and security were less important. Indeed in the structural sense the Ugandan/Tanzanian intervention can almost be conceived to have taken place outside the mainstream great power rivalry context that existed at the time. The 'permissive environment' that was described depicted a global condition in which neither of the great powers had any particular interest in either Uganda or Tanzania at the time, and so to large degree, matters in that part of the continent fell outside of the dominating influence of the bipolar Cold War context. Although it may be argued that the structural condition permitted this intervention to occur in the manner in which it did, it is difficult to conceive how it positively precipitated the situation, that is, although the permissive environment was a factor that shaped the intervention, it is not one that would cause such an event. A structural realist account of this intervention would prove to be particularly unsatisfactory and this would be the direct result of its failure to adequately acknowledge the role of unit level and ideational factors.

Similarly a realist account that emphasised the role of material power relations, state interests, and security, as the prime causes of the conflict between Uganda and Tanzania, would largely miss the point. Clearly as the evidence has shown in this first case study, the prime motives behind this intervention fall outside the usual realist scheme of explanation and lie largely within the unit and ideational level of understanding.

In the case of the Vietnamese intervention into Cambodia, the role of unit level and ideational factors is also substantial. Unlike the Tanzanian situation however, the Indochina intervention took place in a region of the globe that was highly contested by the major powers, and had been for decades. At the intersection of Soviet, American, and Chinese spheres of influence, Indochina itself was the product of external powers vying for control over the strategically important region amidst the great power rivalry between East and West. This global context overlays a regional and unit level context that was equally as convoluted and dynamic and together formed an intricate matrix of interrelations in which it was not possible to separate out individual causal and constitutive factors without destroying the interconnectedness of the whole. Although the configuration of external conditions set a unique stage for the Vietnamese intervention to take place upon, it was the particular ideological, historical, and national security concerns at the unit and ideational level that precipitated the conflict and intervention. Together these systemic and unit level influences shaped the political, social, and economic context surrounding the intervention, and together make sense of this episode.

The history of relations between Vietnam and Cambodia were also complex and multi-faceted, including the ideological and cultural differences between the Khmer and Vietnamese communists, and the particular conceptions and manifestations of nationalist sentiment between the peoples. This history of relations bore directly on the development of the conflict between the two states, as too did the peculiar personalities of the Cambodian and Khmer Rouge leadership, which pushed to extreme the xenophobic nationalist sentiment of both the Khmer and Vietnamese people. Faced with such a complex and interrelated matrix of causal factors, realism is manifestly inadequate to portray the nuanced and highly contingent nature of this intervention. Without complete acknowledgement of the relationship between structure and agent, and the ideational dynamics of this case, any theoretic account would be superficial at best, and wrong at worst. On the strength of this evidence alone it is

clear that a conventional realist account of the Vietnamese intervention into Cambodia in 1978 is insufficient.

The final case study also highlights the complex, contingent and interconnected nature of the structural, ideational, and unit level factors that contributed to the Australian led intervention into East Timor. The evidence of case study three highlighted the historically contingent nature of the opportunities that arose as a result of changes in the Indonesian domestic political circumstance, that led to the foreign policy changes of the Australian Government, and the subsequent repercussions of these changes. The opportunities that arose as a result of Habibie's succession to power in Jakarta, were themselves the product of global changes in the post-Cold War great power circumstance, and they led directly to a chain of events on the ground in East Timor that precipitated the violence and destruction, particularly in late 1999. The case study identified seven major factors that shaped Australia's decision to intervene, they included: humanitarian concerns, political considerations at both the domestic and international level, public pressure, security concerns, the impact of regionalism, evolving international norms, and ethical considerations. Together with the changes to the global dynamics these factors represent the contingent and highly interrelated structural, ideational, and unit level factors that shaped this intervention. Again, it is clear that in order to adequately understand why this intervention took place it is necessary to seek explanation at both the systemic, ideational, and unit level, and to explore the intricacies and relational dynamics between these levels of analysis. Although the gross changes to the international system, and the evolving normative framework that was operative at that level, shaped the context in which this intervention took place, it was the particular conjunction of historical circumstance, domestic politics, public pressure and ethical imperative that provided the proximate cause and modality of the conflict. Again the important roles of key individuals and their ideas and behaviour proved crucial to events occurring as they did. This is especially evident in the role of B.J. Habibie and his decision to re-open the autonomy discussions with East Timor. The unique confluence of his weak political position, the reform pressure to change policy, and the particular Indonesian domestic political circumstance following Suharto's demise, produced the peculiar situation that Habibie found himself in, and the extraordinary response he made to that circumstance. At the systemic level the significance of this peculiar situation is not captured within any theoretical framework of explanation, and consequently the realist account, which emphasises structure over agent, is concomitantly weakened, as it is in the other case studies also.

Another common factor in all three case studies, as has been alluded to, is that each intervention was to some degree shaped or impacted by great power influence. This is a subtly different consideration to the foregoing discussion which noted that systemic, ideational, and unit level factors were significant in each case study. Great power influence acknowledges that, in line with the realist position, international relations are dominated by the actions and influences of the great powers, and in these examples of small state intervention, this influence was evident even if not always a major consideration. In the case of Tanzania the intervention took place in what was termed a 'permissive environment' in which great power disinterest allowed this intervention to take place without their direct involvement. This highlights the contingent nature of interstate dynamics on the overarching influence of the great powers, for whereas as was often the case during the Cold War, where conflicts involving client or aligned states were suppressed by the great powers (for great power reasons of state), in this case there was no restraint upon these two states who were free to pursue their autonomous decision-making.

In the case of the Vietnamese-Cambodian intervention almost the opposite was the case. The great powers were directly and substantially involved in the events in Indochina and to degree the root cause of the conflict was grounded in the conditions that the great power rivalry precipitated in the region and the legacy of their involvement in the 2nd Indochina conflict. In this case not only did the bipolar structure, dominated by the great powers, shape the intervention, but also the caprice and animosity of the US and China, as great and rising powers, towards Vietnam directly affected relations between these states and added impetus to the slide to open conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam.

In the final case the role of the great powers was more ambiguous and tangential to the events at issue. Although a substantial player in the events that led to Indonesian annexation of the territory, the US remained somewhat distant from the intervention in 1999 offering only minor direct assistance although applying some diplomatic pressure behind the scenes. Nonetheless, as the sole superpower, any pressure exerted by the US had considerable impact, and certainly the fact that it withdrew its support to Indonesia opened the way for others to act, and it undercut Indonesian resolve to remain steadfast in East Timor.

At this point it would appear that no matter what the great powers do, remain disinterested, actively engaged or more passively engage, in the affairs of small states they will be held responsible for events occurring as they do. To an extent this is the case and in

fact perhaps is just the point. Great power influence is pervasive and significant and not much occurs around the globe without their involvement or conscious disengagement from. However, there is a critical distinction between recognising the pervasive influence (as distinct from mere material power) of great powers in all international affairs, and constructing a theory of international relations with equates all international interaction with the brute material relations of the great powers. Although great powers do possess the power to, and do, influence virtually all relations between states, there is far more to international relations than the dynamics of great power material relations. Influence here is a far more extensive concept than simply the dynamics of material power relations. Influence embodies also the ideational and constitutive domains whereby the ideas, values and conventions that accompany great power states are themselves a substantive and pervasive motive force.[585] Also the constitutive nature of relations between great powers and others, in which identities are mutually conditioned and behaviour similarly is mutually shaped, is, as the constructivist approach suggests, itself a major force in relations between states. As has been demonstrated in these case studies a satisfactory account of the dynamics of small state intervention requires a far more inclusive and nuanced explanation than that provided by contemporary realist theory with its materialist ontology and exclusively causal epistemology.

Another area of commonality between these three cases (which was not deliberately used as a criteria for selecting these examples of intervention) is that in each case the intervention saw the removal or fall of an odious regime or occupation. Each case also had in hindsight legitimate claims to justification on the basis of humanitarian need, although as has been noted only the East Timor case was so justified explicitly. The removal of Idi Amin, the overthrow of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge, and the ousting of the TNI in East Timor all served to liberate oppressed populations from unpopular and abusive rule. As has been discussed however, only the Australian led intervention seriously justified its action on the basis of humanitarian concerns and this fact is directly related to the standing of humanitarian intervention as a legitimate form of state action in the international community at the time of the interventions. In 1978 – 79 humanitarian intervention had little currency in the international community, and it certainly was afforded far less 'weight' as a legitimate position than did the historically strong proscription against intervention and paramountcy of

[585] Both Joseph Nye and Christian Reus-Smit have developed the concepts of 'soft power' and 'influence' in their works on American hegemony. Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only*

state sovereignty. The influence of this contemporary international normative framework is evidenced throughout the three case studies in which this framework not only shapes the international and domestic context in which the interventions took place, but it also conditioned the international response to those interventions, which thereby reinforced the normative structure as it stood in each circumstance.

Tanzania did not ever claim such basis for its actions, although Nyerere's moral stance on the plight of the Ugandan population was abundantly clear. In fact Nyerere in his own words was conflicted between intervening to save lives, in contravention of the norms and conventions prohibiting such, and respecting the sovereignty of the state of Uganda. Clearly however, his purpose was to end the oppressive rule of Amin and he felt that in exceptional circumstances the international conventions, that he staunchly supported must be transgressed for a higher purpose. Fortunately for Tanzania world condemnation was muted for the variety of reasons as discussed, however, it was clear that within the constraints of the Cold War environment, the notion of humanitarian intervention as legitimate and superior to the principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty would not enjoy widespread international support and certainly would not attract unanimous support in the UN.

The situation with Vietnam was somewhat similar although the international reaction was almost the opposite of that experienced by Tanzania. In overthrowing the Khmer Rouge regime, the Vietnamese were welcomed by the Khmer people as liberators as they marched into Phnom Penh. The international community, however, almost universally condemned their action as transgressing the norms of non-intervention and breaching the sovereignty of Cambodian territory. In retrospect, two things are clear about the Vietnamese intervention and international reaction to it. Firstly, the intervention did oust the genocidal regime of the Khmer Rouge, no doubt saving the lives of many thousands of Cambodians. At the time there was little understanding of the true extent of the murderous activities of the Khmer Rouge, and what information that was available was largely discredited by the West as a result of the anti-Vietnamese sentiment in the following the 2nd Indochina war. Exactly what the West, and the US in particular, knew about the situation inside Cambodia is contentious, however, as has been discussed, there have been strong cases made by Klintworth *et al* that the Vietnamese intervention served profoundly humanitarian ends, even if such was not their stated objective at the time.

Superpower Can't Go It Alone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), Christian Reus-Smit, *American Power*

The second point that is clear about this case is that given the animosity of the US, China, and the West towards Vietnam at the time, there was no way that its intervention into Cambodia was going to be received in the West in anything but a hostile fashion. In sharp contrast to the international reaction to Tanzania's actions, Vietnam was widely condemned and subject to considerable international sanction. Yet both states acted to remove oppressive and abusive regimes, albeit in contravention of international norms, at almost exactly the same point in history. The context of the international normative framework was unchanged between episodes yet the selective application of censure consistent with those norms is starkly displayed between the two cases. The explanation lies in the powerful influence that the West, most particularly the US, and China had upon the body of international opinion. As has been argued, following the 2nd Indochina conflict, the US and China did everything within their powers, including military action by the Chinese, to punish and sanction Vietnam and to discredit them in the international community. The clear implication of the success of these powerful states in swinging international opinion and influencing the manner in which the international norms and conventions were applied to Vietnam, is that what influence and coercive force these norms and conventions may hold, is subject to the discretion and influence of the powerful states. Not only therefore do the dominant states shape the formation and legitimisation of norms and 'shared values', but also they can decisively influence how, when and to whom they apply. This highlights what Wendt calls the 'rump materialism' of the constructivist approach, in which he argues that: "brute material forces have some effect on the constitution of power and interests, and as such my thesis is not ideas *all* the way down."[586] Ideas therefore matter, but so too do the brute material conditions of power. In this case the powerful states can and do exert substantial influence on the normative framework, conforming it to large degree to their wishes, depending on the extent of their 'influence' in the international community.

In the case of Vietnam the full force of the censure powers of the international community were brought to bear upon Vietnam consistent with the wishes of the US, China, and the West. Recalling the memoires of Ambassador Moynihan in the East Timor case – the UN served exactly that purpose the US wished it to serve. As a small state therefore, Vietnam was powerless to alter this fact but it is interesting to note that whatever ultimately motivated

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and World Order (Cambridge: Polity, 2004).

[586] Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 96.

Vietnam to intervene outweighed what must surely have been a fairly predictable response by China and the West.

The situation in East Timor is at once more complex yet simple. The global bipolar environment had been superseded by the unitary dominance of the US and the convoluted web of relations that characterised the great power rivalry had largely been replaced by other relations no longer predicated on the logic of ideological contest. In South East Asia however, the matrix of relations between Australia, Indonesia, the US and the regional states was still a complex and convoluted situation. The historic accommodation of Indonesian action by the West underwent substantial challenge in the light of the nature of its persistent abuses in East Timor, and the changing international norms of humanitarian intervention. By 1999 the precedent to intervene in the internal affairs of sovereign states on the basis of human rights and humanitarian action, was established. Intervention on such basis had already occurred, albeit with varying degrees of success and international support, in Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Haiti, and although by no means an uncontested philosophy, humanitarian intervention had certainly successfully challenged the paramountcy of non-intervention and state sovereignty. Within this new context therefore, the multinational intervention into East Timor was not only widely accepted as a legitimate and proper response to the situation in East Timor, but it was seen as an expression of the new internationalisation of human rights and the solidarity of the UN.

Australia's actions therefore, evoked a fundamentally different reaction to those of the previous case studies, yet can still be considered to have effected a similar net result – that is the liberation of the oppressed people of East Timor from the tyranny of occupation. The humanitarian outcome of this intervention is unchallenged, and although the motives for Australia's intervention may not have been entirely altruistic, the end result was a positive one for the East Timorese.

All three case studies therefore have given example of intervention that was justifiable *post facto* as humanitarian, and although only the Australian case was publicly justified on this basis at the time, all three illustrate the common theme that these small states intervened for dynamics not easily accounted for by realist theory. No state, realism would argue, intervenes for purely humanitarian reasons, and although these states may not entirely have done so either, it is significant that the humanitarian dimension is common to all. Small states

indeed may be more likely to intervene only when reasons other than pure self-interest or hegemonic balance of power consideration are at stake, that is for reasons of ideas not power.

What if anything therefore is the significance of these commonalities for a theory of international relations? In answering this it is necessary first to question whether these commonalities might not just be shared by these examples of intervention but also between all cases of small state intervention. Clearly it is beyond the scope of this study to survey all instances of small state intervention, but some universality of these common themes may be reasonably proposed given the nature of these commonalities and what may be reasonably inferred about the international system. Most significantly it would seem reasonable to extrapolate that great power influence is significant in all cases of small state intervention to the extent that great powers manifestly influence all relational dynamics between states, either directly/actively such as in the Vietnam case, or indirectly/passively as in the Tanzanian and Australian cases. In either event if it is assumed that great powers do 'influence' (in its broader ideational sense) all interventions, and further that as has been demonstrated here, great power dynamics alone do not adequately account for the cases of small state intervention, that it may be reasonable to suggest that great power material dynamics alone will also prove inadequate for all other cases of small state intervention. Such proposition however, is contingent upon these other examples of small state intervention also sharing in common with these three examples, the reasons why the great power realist account is inadequate. Namely that both unit, ideational, and system level factors are significant, that the role of individuals and organizations is significant, and that extra-systemic ideational factors such as the role of international institutions, norms and conventions are likewise significant.

From the discussion thus far, and what is generally understood of the international system, this claim would appear to be a reasonable one. There would appear to be no good reason to assume that the three contingent conditions above would apply only to the three cases discussed and that they should not be universally applicable. Again proof of such is beyond this study however, if one proceeds with this line of argument it would seem logical to conclude that small state interventions do exhibit certain common characteristics – as a function of *inter alia* the nature of the international system and of the dynamics that shape state interaction – and that they manifest behaviour not accounted for by exclusively material explanation. Consequently the realist account of great power interventions does not

adequately translate to an accurate account of small state interventions. Thus the adequacy of the realist account of the dynamics between states is fundamentally challenged.

It may further be proposed that if indeed these contingent factors are applicable to all small state interventions, might not the same be true for all other interventions also, that is interventions that include great powers. If this case were to be demonstrated then a reasonable proposition would hold that in fact the realist account of intervention is inadequate even for great power cases thus weakening the claim of realism as an adequate theory of international relations in general. Such claim is not pursued here, although certainly the veracity of the realist account for small state dynamics is. What remains therefore in a comparative analysis of these three case studies is to examine any significant differences between these episodes and comment on the possible theoretic significance of these.

The most obvious difference is the nature of the Australian led intervention into East Timor. Unlike the unilateral actions of the other two states, Australia's actions took place within the framework of a UN sanctioned multinational force that oestensibly was 'invited' into East Timor by the Indonesian government. This unilateral – multilateral distinction is significant, and is based primarily in the different international normative context that existed in 1999 as opposed to the late 1970s. While humanitarian intervention had come to enjoy apparent widespread international support – except from those states at the receiving end of such intervention – is was a particularly conceived form of humanitarian intervention that was seen as most legitimate and legal, namely multinational intervention. As has been discussed, multi-nationalism was seen as legitimate for a number of reasons including, it protected states against aggressive unilateral action by states masking their actions as humanitarian, it most satisfactorily shared the risks and costs of intervention, and it represented the united action of the community of states. The legitimacy that this form of intervention enjoyed meant that Australia's actions could be portrayed, not as the pursuit of Australia's interests in East Timor, but as the pursuit of internationally agreed norms of behaviour concerning human rights and humanitarian necessity.

Clearly for the realist account this is problematic. Here we find an example of a state intervening militarily, not on the basis of the pursuit of state interests, balance of power, or hegemonic design, but oestensibly in the cause of internationally agreed values concerning the rights of individuals. For the realist therefore, Australia's claims either have to be rejected as falsely masking some deep-seated national interests in East Timor or Australia's self-

interested power maximisation in the region, or it must admit the possibility of cooperative international action in the pursuit of a normative agenda. The evidence examined in this case study would not support the rejection of Australia's claims nor suggest that Australia's balance of power considerations had more than a negligible role. Thus the realist account must admit significant causality that falls outside of its scheme of explanation.

The significance therefore of this different manifestation of small state intervention is not only that it reflects the changing normative framework that existed between the cases, and realisms inability to satisfactorily account with this, but also that in all three cases, despite the differences, realism manifestly fails to fully explain the peculiar dynamics of small state intervention. Thus the argument of this thesis is not just limited to unilateral small state interventions that took place under the global conditions extant at the time of the Tanzanian and Vietnamese cases, but also in the significantly changed circumstances surrounding the East Timor case. This considerably increases the applicability of the central claims of this study and adds further weight to the argument that small state dynamics are substantively different to those involving great powers.

Another difference between the case studies is the duration of the interventions. In the Australian and Tanzanian cases the intervening forces were quickly removed from the territory as soon as their immediate objectives were accomplished, in part so as to ensure there could be no mistake that these forces were sent to meet certain objectives only – and were not intended as an occupying force of some permanency. The exception of course is Vietnam's subsequent ten-year presence in Cambodia. Vietnam presented convincing argument as to why this occupation was necessary citing the swift return of the still active Khmer Rouge were they to leave sooner, however, this occupation was roundly condemned in the West and was subject to ongoing UN resolutions. The evidence in this case study however, finds in favour of Vietnam's claims. Given the ongoing international support to the Khmer Rouge after their overthrow, even in the full light of the atrocities they committed, Vietnam's presence in Cambodia, if unpopular, certainly prevented the return of that murderous regime and maintained stability allowing the Heng Samrin government to establish itself. It should also be noted that in East Timor even though INTERFET departed on schedule the multinational UN force they handed over to still comprised some Australian troops who remained *in situ* until mid 2006.

It is possible for the realist argument to claim that Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia is evidence that despite their rhetoric, Vietnam really intervened to seize political power and territory in Cambodia in the pursuit of long held national interests of regional power dominance. Such would be a reasonable argument if indeed the Vietnamese claims concerning the Khmer Rouge's immanent return could have been dismissed. However, as has been argued this was manifestly not the case. Vietnam's voluntary and early (ahead of the internationally agreed schedule) withdrawal from Cambodia also adds credibility to their stated intention of remaining only so long as they needed to ensure the survival of the new government, and it is apparent in hindsight, that indeed the Vietnamese had no option but to remain or see the return of the Khmer Rouge and the fall of the new government.

The final significant difference between the case studies concerns in a general sense the historical circumstances that surrounded each episode. As obvious as it is that no two cases of intervention take place within the same historical circumstance, it is a fact that to a large extent realism's parsimonious theory tends to dismiss. The case against realism's apparent ahistoricity has already been outlined and will be considered again in further detail later, however at this point it is germane to note how significantly the peculiar historical circumstances surrounding each case shaped the course of events that followed. Each intervention took place within vastly different local historical context and represented a certain point in the unique history of each state involved, yet as has been suggested there existed sufficient commonality between them to enable some theoretically significant inductions to be drawn. In the case of Tanzania it is possible to make sense of Nyerere's intervention only by firstly comprehending the history of relations between Uganda and Tanzania, and the history of the rise to power of the unique characters of Amin and Nyerere. Similarly the impact of colonisation, de-colonisation and the processes of African state formation, all uniquely contribute to the eventuality and nature of this intervention.

In the Vietnamese case a different set of historical circumstances, relations, and personalities acted to shape events in Indochina culminating in the intervention in December 1978. Those circumstances were unique to this episode, and as this study has shown there were so many peculiar factors that precipitated this conflict that it is not reasonable to generalise these elements to merely the dynamics of power relations and state interests. The last case study similarly was framed by the unique historical circumstance that led to Indonesia's invasion of East Timor, Australia's complicity in that for twenty-three years, and

its eventual reversal of policy following a similarly unique chain of events in Indonesian domestic politics.

What is significant in this is all three case studies are uniquely contextualised in their particular histories. A theoretical account of these episodes consequently, if it is to be sufficient, accurate, and comprehensive, must acknowledge the highly contingent nature of these interventions as products of unique historic circumstance. Formulating a theoretic account that is both sufficiently specific and yet simultaneously sufficiently general, so as to be universally applicable, of course is the crux of the dilemma. One fact this study has demonstrated however, is that by denying the historical contingency of state dynamics, and by ignoring the unit level and extra-systemic factors that shape these interventions, the realist theoretic account has moved further away from a sufficient explanation than towards one.

In summary the comparative analysis of these three case studies has highlighted several key areas that sustain the thesis of this research. Firstly, it has demonstrated through the commonalities across the case studies, that neither an exclusively structural nor exclusively materialist approach to these interventions will furnish a comprehensive and accurate account. In all three cases the importance of agent level analysis and examination of the ideational nature and content of relations between states, was apparent in order to properly understand the dynamics that shaped these interventions. In particular the power of ideas as the base motivators of state behaviour, regardless of brute power conditions, was shown to be of paramount importance, and that rather than being simply a product of material relations, structure, in fact is far more conditioned by ideas, inter-subjective values, and conventions. In all three case studies the evidence demonstrated that the conventional materialist realist account does not provide a sufficient explanation of the dynamics and contingent nature of relations between states. With its ahistorical simplification of process, and its reduction of interests to base material power dynamics, realism failed to distinguish the significant differences in the circumstances and motivations of these states, leading to a level of generality that lacked any fine grained explanatory power.

Although the realist account did specify the causal dynamics resulting from the material conditions, it failed to acknowledge, let alone detail, the constitutive nature of the relations between these states. The fact that the type of relations that these states enjoyed was substantially shaped by the identities they assumed and by their mutually constitutive interaction, is entirely missing from the realist approach, and as these case studies

demonstrate, this constitutive as well as causal dynamic is essential to fully understanding interstate politics. Finally these case studies have evidenced the significant role of culture, as structure, in conditioning what is politically possible in any given material context. The norms, ideas, and shared values that form the basis of the culture of the community of states, in the examples of small state intervention, were at least as significant in shaping these relations as were the brute material conditions.