Appendix A

Balance Of Power Theory: A Brief Overview

The following pages briefly overview four of the major balance of power theorists' work on the history and meaning of the concept of balance of power. As a theory of diplomatic relations balance of power has a history that stretches back to the earliest histories of antiquity in the works of Polybius and Aristotle, yet today it is most often associated with 18th century Europe and modern realism. The following synopsis of the works of Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight, Hedley Bull and Edward Vose Gulick gives evidence of the rich history of balance of power and illustrates that as a theory of international politics it is anything but a settled an uncontentious idea.

Herbert Butterfield

Butterfield and Wight's 1966 edited work *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*[616] provides some the clearest and most persuasive literature on balance of power theory available. In this work Butterfield details his investigations into the genealogy of balance of power theory, arguing essentially that, balance of power as a theory of systemic interstate relations is not as ancient a concept as had been often been supposed, but has its roots in the experiences of the aggrandizement of Louis XIV and the concept of forces rising and falling, balance and equilibrium, amongst states in the late 17th century. The constant references in diplomatic dispatches, state papers, and treaties, to the doctrine of balance of power, also gives evidence that the War of Spanish succession during

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[616] Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in Theory of International Politics* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1966).

this period represented perhaps the first time states consciously struggled with each other according to the dictates of the doctrine of balance of power.[617]

Of significance during this period were the works of Françoise Fenélon, who as Butterfield suggested, presented an argument of sophistication and significance that substantially advanced the notion of balance of power in Europe.[618] Fenélon's work involved three main arguments, first that powers that rise to predominance will tend to act with impunity in their own interests, second, that universal dominion is a tendency that all states will follow, and third, that balance of power should be an overriding law of state behaviour.[619] The last of these, involves the elevation of balance of power as a *raison d' état* above internal state concerns and projected the concept from mere description of reality to normatively imperative status.[620] Now possibly for the first time, Butterfield suggested, states were not only conscious of their own egoistic interests but were capable of imagining the international system as a system of states, and acting so as to preserve the balance and equipoise of the international order.

The lessons of history were not lost on 18th century Europe, and the constant reminders of the aggressions of Louis XIV, and later, the vastness of the Swedish Baltic empire, gave gravity to the doctrine of international balance. Looking even further back, the European states were reminded of the horrors of the Wars of Religion, and still further back, the Roman Impirium and the lessons of unbridled state power. The balance of power system therefore, became reified as the only way to ensure survival of all, particularly small and vulnerable states. This idea of unequal power distribution as a positive good, that is that states could and should exist with different capabilities and powers, which through diplomatic

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[617] Ibid.
[618] Ibid.
[619] Ibid.

enterprise could be balanced, was reflected in the work of Fredrick Gentz in *Fragments upon the Balance of Power in Europe.*[621] This work too became something of a landmark in the field of balance of power theory, with its assertion that an unequal distribution of power was in fact easier to sustain than an equal one, and that "balance of power not only guaranteed the existence of small states, but assured them of a certain autonomy, a power of independent action".[622]

Butterfield discussed two interpretations of the concept that were of practical application. First, that "the principle of the balance of power tended to the preservation of the status quo, putting a brake on territorial changes",[623] and second that this tendency to balance of power was extrapolated in some versions to infer a desirable rigidity or 'constitution' of state arrangements in Europe. In the final analysis, Butterfield, as do all of the pre-neorealist balance of power scholars, expressed balance of power as a deliberate and purposive act of statesmanship. In his words: "I should infer from all of this that an international order is not a thing bestowed upon by nature, but is a matter of refined thought, careful contrivance and elaborate artiface".[624] Balance of power as a manifestation of international order was the result of a long (several centuries) development of state self-consciousness and evolution to nationhood that represented, not the only possible configuration of international actors, but one that more or less preserved the autonomy and existence of all states. For Butterfield, balance of power was not an inevitable condition of states' existence but a particular one resulting from the long and varied historical and ideational experiences of the states of

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[620] Ibid.
[621] Frederick von Gentz, *Fragments Upon the Balance of Power in Europe* (London: Peltier, 1806). Gentz asserted that if Europe were divided into states that were of equal power it would actually be harder, not easier, to establish between them anything like a balance of power.
[622] Butterfield and Wight, eds., *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in Theory of International Politics.*
[623] Ibid.
[624] Ibid.

Europe (in particular) interacting and reacting to each other, and the concomitant technological, social, political, and religious developments during the course of this history.

Martin Wight

In his studies Wight identified nine distinct interpretations of the term "balance of power" that he had distilled from the works and deeds of scholars, statesmen, and practitioners of foreign policy, particularly in Europe, since the 15th century. Wight began his work by stating what for any student of balance of power quickly becomes evident, that: "the notion of the balance of power is notoriously full of confusions, so that it is impossible to make any statement about the 'law' or principle of the balance of power that will command general acceptance."[625] He then proceeded to identify what he believed to be the three primary sources of this confusion. First that the metaphor 'balance' itself is an equivocal and plastic concept that has been applied in different sense in different occasion. Second, there had existed a consistent overlap and confusion between the normative and descriptive uses of the phrase. Balance of power as an idea, meant as Wight described it, two things:

> It is, first, a system of foreign policy: a system which the agents in international politics uphold, neglect, or repudiate in favour of some other supposed system. It is secondly, a historical law or theoretical principle of analysis, which spectators of international politics derive from or apply to their reflection on international politics.[626]

Finally, Wight suggested the impartial judicial detachment required to 'weigh' balances of power was problematic, in that international agents who make such assessment are not impartial or detached judges.[627] The upshot of these three fundamental sources of confusion was that the idea of balance of power had historically been used to convey nine distinct meanings:

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[625] Ibid.
[626] Ibid.
[627] Ibid.

1. An even distribution of power
2. The principle that power ought to be distributed evenly
3. The existing distribution of power. Hence, any possible distribution of power.
4. The principle of equal aggrandizement of the Great Powers at the expense of the weak.
5. The principle that our side ought to have a margin of strength in order to avert the danger of power becoming unevenly distributed.
6. (When governed by the verb 'to hold') A special role in maintaining an even distribution of power.
7. (When governed by the verb 'to hold') A special advantage in the existing distribution of power.
8. Preponderance, and
9. An inherent tendency of international politics to produce and even distribution of power.[628]

Of particular note amongst these, Wight inferred that in its original sense, "balance of power" was primarily descriptive, giving expression to what was really a very complex and perhaps temporary arrangement of states' capabilities, intents, and interests. The second understanding is the converse normative sense that might follow from the first. The transition from 'is' to 'ought' is, Wight suggested, almost insensible and was derived at least partially from some sense that balance of power inferred stability, peace, and order thus was a desirable good condition of international affairs. From this general understanding of the interstate condition, Wight described how the term came to be associated with those powers most able to influence it, the Great Powers, and how eventually it was interpreted as the principal of equal aggrandizement of these powers.[629]

Finally, Wight argued, it was possible to trace how the idea of balance of power, as a description of international affairs, evolved from one of equal or even distribution of powers to one meaning any possible distribution of power. In a very neat summation, Wight suggested that in this sense of "balance of power", meaning "possessing predominance", the idea had so contorted that it meant the opposite of its original diplomatic sense of equilibrium and had returned to its pre-diplomatic sense of 'authoritative control'.

The final position that Wight described, and one that is of special relevance in this study, is the sense that balance of power means "an inherent tendency of international politics to produce an even distribution of power".[630] In this usage of the term, Wight suggested that balance of power was seen as a "kind of sociological law (that) had tended to replace the balance of power as moral and legal principle" [631] in effect the balance of power came to be "almost synonymous with the states-system itself".[632] For Wight, balance of power constituted a conscious brake on the natural inclination of every state to pursue power maximization, as a result of the enlightened consciousness of statesmen, that is, through the power of ideas. Thus through a long process of historic experience, enlightened reflection has shown that balance of power is a strategy for survival, whilst still allowing the surreptitious pursuit of power over the long term.

In the final analysis, Wight's examination of the idea of balance of power constitutes a sophisticated argument concerning the nature of power and the pursuit of it by states within the international environment. Within this work it is possible to find foreshadowed the roots of neo-realist and offensive realist thought, and it is possible to find that the 'idea' of balance of power is itself a dynamic and enduring concept that may change and evolve in response to forces whose roots lie in some domain other than the mere anarchic and material structure of the system.

Edward Vose Gulick

Gulick's seminal examination of *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* is a classical piece of systematic analysis in which the author not only traced the development of the 'idea' of

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[628] Ibid.
[629] Ibid.
[630] Ibid.
[631] Ibid.
[632] Ibid.

balance of power, and the evolution of its practice in Europe over two centuries but, more substantially analysed the assumptions, aims, means, and corollaries of the principle itself.[633]

Gulick began his study with a discussion of the assumptions, largely unconscious yet crucial to the operation of the principle, that underpin the balance of power system. The first and most general of these is that a system of states exists, in which independent states of relatively equal power are more or less connected with one another so as to constitute a system.[634] The second fundamental assumption is implied from the first, that of a generally accepted framework of the system in question which is bounded in both extent and number of constituents. The third assumption was that of the relative homogeneity of the states which constituted the system, while the final assumption concerned the 'mechanistic philosophy' of the time, which, enabled the development of a rational system of estimating power.

The primary and most fundamental aim of the balance of power in Europe, according to Gulick, was to ensure the survival of independent states, but he noted that the term took on two distinct connotations. They were the normative desirability of balance of power, and the tendency to perceive it as a natural and persistent law of international politics. Although not explicit, Gulick's work foreshadowed the distinction that can, and subsequently was (Butterfield, Wight), made between the merely descriptive and the normative connotations of the concept and the possible ramifications of these interpretations. In perhaps the most novel section of Gulick's work, he turned to an examination of the means by which states come to effect the balance of power. He elucidated nine corollaries of balance of power: the need for state vigilance, the usefulness of alliances, the role of intervention, states holding the balance,

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[633] Although Gulick's work predates that of Butterfield and Wight by around a decade, it is considered here after their work because it represents a more developed analysis and argument, thus fitting the "developmental" theme of this section.
[634] Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power*.

the need for mobility of action, reciprocal compensation of powers, preservation of components (moderation), coalitions, and recourse to war.

Perhaps Gulick's greatest contribution to a coherent understanding of the theory and practice of balance of power is embodied in his subtle yet forceful appreciation of the tension between the historic contingency of balance of power practice and theory, and the tendency of balance of power to constitute a 'law' of international politics. While later theorists would abstract from reality the theoretic principles of balance of power as a systemic dynamic, and others identify its roots in the inherent quest for power in human nature or the logic of state power maximization, Gulick carefully limited any such prognostication to the particular historic circumstances that he was examining. His study revealed that balance of power as theory and practice reached its zenith in the operation of 18th and 19th century European statecraft, and that it did so as the result of coincidence of a range of social, political, economic, and historic forces and circumstances that may or may not ever intersect again. As a particular epoch in the broad sweep of history, the interstate relations in Europe during this period and the manifestation of the logic of balance that it exhibited, Gulick suggested, should be interpreted for what he believed it was, an idealistically motivated pragmatic approach to interstate relations, to go any further may be to inflate the concept too much.

Hedley Bull

Bull's 1977 work *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*[635] is an examination of world order and how it is maintained, and as such approaches the idea of balance of power less from an historical case study approach as from a theory of world politics perspective. He conceived this system as an anarchical society of states that possesses order and functions according to certain practices, conventions, and norms so as to maintain

its order, and ultimately, its survival. Within this frame of reference, Bull approached balance of power as one of the mechanisms by which societal order is maintained, thus ascribing to it a scope and character at once more global and persistent than Gulick's European approach.

Bull suggested that there are several ways of distinguishing between differing types of balances, and that these differences are significant. The first distinction is that between a simple balance of power – that between just two powers – and complex balances – balances between more than two powers or between blocs of power. The second is that between the general balance of power and what he terms local or particular balances of power. The general balance that Bull refers to is the condition of the entire system such that no one power is preponderant on the global scene, while the local or particular balances are those which exist regionally around the globe.

Following these distinctions, Bull suggested that it was also necessary to distinguish between balance of power that exist subjectively, and those that exist objectively. The problem of maintaining the balance of power, he suggested, "is not merely one of ensuring that a military balance exists, it is also a problem of ensuring there exists *belief* in it."[636] Thus Bull hints at the ideational nature of balance of power, not just as a systemic arrangement resulting from brute material conditions, but the result of the conscious and purposive action of states. It also acknowledges the difficulties in measuring power distribution and the subjective nature of foreign policy based on material power perception.

The fourth distinction that Bull was concerned to recognize was that between balances of power that are fortuitous and those are contrived. He suggests, certainly from the treaty of Utrecht in 1713 to the present, that the balance of power has operated in this broadest and

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[635] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

most sophisticated sense of a means of system perpetuation and equilibrium that is both self-conscious and desirable. Historically, Bull suggested, balance of power fulfilled three primary functions; the existence of a general balance of power which served to prevent the system from being transformed into a universal empire by conquest of the strongest; the existence of local balances of power which protected the independence of states from absorption or domination by the local preponderant power; and the existence of both the general and local balances of power which provided conditions in which institutions which require international order to exist have been able to operate.

Bull's examination of balance of power, as a process by which world order is maintained, is a significant contribution to the theory of balance of power. In arguing that the "European balance of the nineteenth century was only one historical manifestation of a phenomenon that has occurred in many periods and continents..."[637] Bull enlarged the notion of balance of power from an explanation of a particular historical circumstance, to a self-conscious mechanism that states' utilize to sustain historically contingent order in world affairs. Similarly by acknowledging the ideational nature of the dynamic, Bull enlarged the concept of balance of power from a material mechanistic dynamic to one that displayed a constitutive and contingent nature.

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[636] Ibid. emphasis added.
[637] Ibid.

Appendix B

Case Study Template

In order to ensure each case study was analysed systematically and along the same criteria a case study template was developed. This template guided the discussion within each case study as the 'minimum' criteria, and it sought to encompass; systemic and unit level analysis, and material and ideational factors consistent with the thesis of this research.

<u>Case Studies</u>
- Tanzania into Uganda 1979
- Vietnam into Cambodia 1979
- Australia into East Timor 1999

Global Context

a. According to which criteria can the states involved be characterised as small or middle powers?
b. What were the global international relations conditions at the time of the intervention?
c. Who were the major global actors at the time?
d. What role did the major global actors play in the events of this intervention?
e. To what extent did the global context/circumstance influence/precipitate the intervention?

Regional Context

a. What were the regional conditions between the states at the time of the intervention?
b. Who were the significant regional actors involved?
c. Were there any peculiarly local conditions/circumstances that significantly influenced events?
  - i.   Ethnicity?
  - ii.   Tribalism?
  - iii. Domestic politics?
  - iv.   Nationalism? Etc
d. What were the domestic political conditions within the states involved?
e. What was the history of relations between the states?

Individuals and Organisations

a. Were there any particularly significant individual actors in the episode?
b. What role did they play in the eventuality of the intervention?
c. What role did the political elite play?
d. What role did the public and public opinion play?
e. Were there any particularly significant non-state organisational actors involved?
f. Were there any overarching ideological issues/contextual elements that were significant?

The Intervention

a. What was the background to the intervention?
b. Was there a particular trigger to the intervention?
c. What is the sequence of events that constitute the intervention?

The Decision

a. What was the process that resulted in the decision being made to intervene?
b. What individuals/groups etc were involved in the decision making process?
c. What interests did the state claim the intervention would serve- or what rationale was used to justify the decision to the members of the state?
d. Was there substantial debate or contest over the decision to intervene?

The reaction

a. What was the immediate regional reaction?
b. What was the international reaction?
   i.   Major and non major powers reaction
   ii.   Media reaction
   iii. Diplomatic reaction
c. Was the matter subject to international forum discussion – such as the UN?
d. What was the state of affairs following the intervention?

The Justification

a. What were the justifications that the intervening state offered for their actions?
b. To whom did they justify their actions?
c. What account did the recipient state give?
d. What state interests were offered as justification? – or what was the goal of the intervention?

Analysis

a. What theoretic issues does this intervention raise?
b. Does realist theory appear to give adequate explanation to this intervention?
c. Does constructivist theory give adequate account of this episode?
d. Are there theoretic inadequacies, insufficiencies or inconsistencies in this episode?
e. How does this intervention fit within the case study collective? Is this intervention similar to the others?

Appendix C

Uganda: A Brief Chronology

1971

25 Jan   Idi Amin deposes Milton Obote and seizes power as President of Uganda.

Ethnic cleansing of Ugandan military as Langi, Acholi and Itesot soldiers murdered. Up to 6000 killed.

Ugandan military twice cross into Tanzanian territory, with Ugandan Air Force bombing the Kagera salient.

1972

Amin expels non-citizen Asian from Uganda.

Continued ethnic cleansing of military.

Sep   Britain halts all aid to Uganda.

7 Oct   Mogadishu Agreement signed between Uganda and Tanzania.

1973

May   Amin and Nyerere meet face to face at OAU summit in Addis Ababa.

Nov   First Soviet military mission to Uganda.

1975   Land laws introduced to allow seizure of any property not "developed". Peasant land holdings seized by Amin cronies and elite.

Amin claims (unsupported) Tanzania had invaded Uganda in July 1974 and Sep 1975.

1978

May   Amin again accuses Tanzania of military incursions into Uganda.

Sep   Increased Ugandan military activity on Tanzanian border.

Ugandan military aircraft repeatedly infringe Tanzanian airspace.

Oct   US Congress imposes trade embargo on Uganda

9 Oct   First Ugandan troops cross into Tanzania

10 Oct   Ugandan Mig fighters bomb Kagera region. Artillery fire also into region.

18 Oct   Ugandan Mig fighters attack city of Bukoba, the regional commercial and administrative centre of the Kagera district.

26 Oct   Radio Uganda claims "Tanzanian invaders driven out of Uganda."

30 Oct   Main force of Ugandan troops numbering in the thousands cross into Tanzania in the Kagera. Widespread looting, rape and destruction follow.

10 Nov	Tanzania begins to mobilise forces in Kagera in response to Ugandan incursion.
1979	
21 Jan	Main body of Tanzanian forces begin retaliatory intervention into Uganda in the Kagera.
	OAU condemns Tanzanian action. Nyerere lashes out at OAU for failing to condemn Amin's aggression.
	OAU delegation conduct Nairobi talks, no agreement reached although Nyerere proposes his 'four points' for ending the war.
25 Feb	Ugandan town of Masaka captured by Tanzanian forces.
14 Mar	Entebbe captured.
22 Mar	Moshi unity conference convened
10 Apr	Tanzanian forces enter Kampala
3 Jun	All of Uganda occupied by Tanzanian military. Cessation of major military action.
19 Jun	Godfrey Binaisa takes oath of Presidential office of Uganda.
1980	
Apr	Majority of Tanzanian forces withdrawn from Uganda, only those requested by President Binaisa for security and order remain.

Tanzania

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Uganda

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Appendix D

Vietnam: A Brief Chronology

1953	Sihanouk wins limited independence from France
1954	Ho Chi Minh's army defeats the French at Dien Bien Phu. Geneva Conference on Indochina recognises Cambodia's neutrality and orders withdrawal of the Communist Viet Minh and Khmer Rouge to Hanoi.
1955	Cambodia holds elections. Sihanouk abdicates in favour of his father, forms his own party and sweeps the election.
1955-1960	Cambodian communists concentrate on organizing in Phnom Penh and rural areas.
1960	Marxist-Leninist party, the Workers' Party of Kampuchea founded in Phnom Penh (renamed Communist Party of Kampuchea in 1966)
1963	Saloth Sar becomes head of Workers' Party at second congress. Party leaders leave Phnom Penh for country to build movement in maquis.
1965	United States combat troops into Vietnam. Sihanouk breaks relations with United States.
1966	Sihanouk allows Vietnamese communists use of border areas and seaport. United States mounts frequent raids across the border.
1967	Peasant led insurrection against rice tax in Samlaut. Sparks communists decision to wage armed struggle against Sihanouk. Sihanouk's armed forces crush uprising.
1967-70	Sihanouk responds against the small Khmer Rouge force. Khmer Rouge numbers grow to around 5000.
1969	United States mounts secret, bombing campaign against Vietnamese targets inside Cambodia. Nixon announces 'Guam' doctrine on future American commitments in Asia.
1970	*March 11* large numbers of Cambodians demonstrate against Vietnamese communist presence in country. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong embassies are sacked in Phnom Penh. *March 18.* Sihanouk is deposed by Lon Nol, Sirik Matak and Chang Heng, whilst he is on a trip to Moscow and Beijing. *March 23* In Beijing Sihanouk announces formation of a National United Front of Kampuchea with the Khmer Rouge. *May 5* In Beijing Sihanouk announces formation of a government in exile, the Royal National Union Government of Kampuchea. *May 6* China, North Vietnam and North Korea break diplomatic relations

with Cambodia.
October 9 Khmer Republic is proclaimed in Phnom Penh.

1972   Lon Nol is elected president of the Khmer Republic.

1973   *Jan 27* The Paris Agreement on ending the war in Vietnam is signed.
Cambodian Communists refuse to negotiate.
Khmer Rouge assume majority of fighting in Cambodia while Vietnamese
forces retreat to border areas.
United States resumes intense bombing campaign of Cambodia.
Aug 15 United States congress forces cessation of bombing campaign.

1974   *Jan 6* Khmer Rouge open 1974 dry season offensive. Khmer Rouge win
control over the insurgency movement, purging communists returned from
North Vietnam and ethnic Vietnamese.

1975   *Jan 1* Khmer Rouge launch annual dry season offensive against Lon Nol
forces.
Apr 17 Khmer rouge enter Phnom Penh and begin to empty the capital and
other major cities.
Apr 30 Vietnamese communists take Saigon.
May 12 – 15 Cambodian naval forces capture the U.S container ship
Mayaguez. United States bombes ports and mainland in retaliation.
Khmer Rouge revolution concentrates on establishing all people in rural
cooperatives. By July the communists have begun setting up party and
government offices in Phnom Penh. At the end of the year the communists
order the second evacuation of city people from the Southwest to the
Northwest and other northerly ports.
Sep 9 Sihanouk returns to Phnom Penh after a five year absence.

1976   *Apr 4* Sihanouk resigns as head of state.
The government of Democratic Kampuchea is publicly announced headed
by Pol Pot as Prime Minister.
Mao Zedong dies.
Beginning of execution of party figures over the question of party ties to
Vietnam.
Khmer rouge complete their purge of Northern zone.

1977   Khmer Rouge internal purges intensify.
Kampuchea initiates border clashes with Thailand and Vietnam. Border
clashes with Vietnam intensify.
Purge of Northwestern zone begins.
Jul Vietnam and Laos sign a friendship treaty which the Khmer Rouge
contend is a cornerstone of Vietnamese goal of establishing an Indochinese
federation.
Sep Pol Pot declares publicly that Kampuchea is communist.
Nov 18 – 19 Vietnam forces crush Kampuchean division at Snoul.
Dec 3 Vietnamese halt advance 10 miles inside Kampuchean border
Dec 21 Vietnamese resume offensive and drive up to 70 miles into
southern Kampuchea. Vietnam denounces atrocities committed by Khmer
Rouge against Kampuchean population.
Dec 31 Kampuchea suspends relations with Vietnam.

1978   Vietnamese forces withdraw from Kampuchean interior. Khmer Rouge
                forces claim victory in border war.
                Khmer Rouge continues purge of Eastern zone.
                Dec 2 Vietnam radio announces the formation of Kampuchean National
                United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS).
                Dec 25 Vietnam launches major multi-axis offensive against Khmer
                Rouge forces.

1979   *Jan 7* Vietnamese forces and KNUFNS forces capture Phnom Penh.
                Jan 8 Vietnamese announce the establishment of the People's
                Revolutionary Council to govern Kampuchea headed by Heng Samrin.
                Feb 16 Heng Samrin government signs a friendship treaty with Vietnam.

Indochina

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Appendix E

East Timor: A Brief Chronology

1974

25 Apr	Salazarist regime in Lisbon deposed by Armed Forces Movement. Colonies granted right to self-determination.
5 May	Adam Malik assures Ramos Horta that Indonesia will support East Timorese independence.
6 Sept	Whitlam and Suharto meet at Wonosobo.
Dec	TNI sets up *Operasi Komodo*.

1975

20 Jan	UDT and Fretilin form coalition
26 May	UDT withdraws from coalition following Indonesian pressure.
11 Aug	UDT seize power in Dili.
18 Aug	Armed conflict with Fretilin breaks out.
16 Oct	TNI assault on Balibo – Maliana region. Five newsmen murdered by TNI at Balibo.
7 Dec	Indonesia launches full scale invasion of East Timor.

1976

Aug	Suharto legislates East Timor incorporation into Indonesia. Relief agencies report 100,000 Timorese killed since invasion.

1978

20 Jan	Australia recognizes *de facto* Indonesian occupation of East Timor.

1979

June	Australia recognizes *de jure* Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor.

1985

9 Dec	Australia and Indonesia announce joint plans to develop Timor gap petroleum resources

1991

|	
12 Nov	TNI. Troops kill more than 200 persons in Santa Cruz shooting

1992

20 Nov	Xanana Gusmao arrested by TNI

1998

| | 21 May | Suharto forced to resign to be succeeded by B.J. Habibie. |
| July | | Habibie makes autonomy proposal to East Timorese. TNI generals plan militia organizations to counter support for independence.. |

29 Dec Howard writes to Habibie urging him to address East Timorese self-determination.

1999

27 Jan Habibie announces he will grant independence if autonomy proposal fails.

Feb	Militia violence erupts in various parts of territory.
6 Apr	Liquicia massacre
17 Apr	Massacre at house of Manuel Carrascalão.
5 May	Tripartite agreement between Indonesia, East Timor and Portugal signed in New York.
4 June	UNAMET mission begins in East Timor.
16 Jul	
- 4 Aug	Voter registration.
30 Aug	Popular consultation ballot takes place.
4 Sep	Election results announced with 78.5% voting against Indonesian autonomy proposal. TNI/militia violence begins with most foreigners fleeing province.
Sep	Massacres at: Ave Maria church in Suai, 200 killed Bishop Bello's house Maliana over 50 killed Oecussi, over 70 killed Lautem, nuns, brothers and Indonesian journalist killed. Security Council authorizes INTERFET.
19 Sep	Cosgrove arrives in Dili. INTERFET deployment begins next day. Xanana Gusmao returns to East Timor
19 Oct	MPR formally accepts referendum outcome.
25 Oct	UN Security Council establishes UNTAET.
1 Nov	Last Indonesian troops leave East Timor.

2000

23 Feb INTERFET transfers military command to UNTAET, and begins to withdraw.

East Timor

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