Ch. 5: The Ephesus excavations

Du hast einst über die Grenzen hinaus das große Ephesosunternehmen ... zu neuem Leben erweckt und hast es betreut als heiligen Besitz geistiger Art ... Voll größter Dankbarkeit haben wir Deiner an Deinem 70. Geburtstag zu gedenken. Aber so wie ich, kann es keiner tun, weil ich mehr als alle anderen, nicht nur das, was Du getan hast, kenne, sondern auch um die große, glühende Liebe weiß, aus der heraus Dein ganzes Tun geflossen ist.1

5.1. Archaeology at Ephesus: background to its revival

Archaeology, particularly with regard to Christianity, had appealed to Deissmann since boyhood, and in 1889 he wrote that during his studies at Berlin (1888) he ‘benutzte ... u. a. die gute Gelegenheit im christlichen Museum der Universität unter Leitung des ehrwürdigen Professor D. Piper eine längst betriebene Liebhaberei in wissenschaftliche Bahnen zu lenken, die christliche Archäologie’.2 And again, two years later: ‘Mit besonderem Dank muss ich hier noch der archäologischen Vorlesungen des inzwischen verstorbenen Herrn Professor D. Piper gedenken’.3 At another time he recalled that he had ‘in jüngeren Jahren einmal die Gelegenheit gehabt die Ausgrabungen fränkischer Gräber bei Heidelberg zu beobachten ...’,4 an experience that evidently impressed him enough to remember it some three decades later. Thus, when Deissmann first set eyes on Ephesus he was struck by its historical value; and within less than a year of visiting the site for the second time in 1909 he was preparing the ‘Paulus lectures’ for Uppsala (see ch. 4.3), in which, spread throughout his text, he mentioned the ancient city some 28 times.

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1 Keil, letter to GAD, 5.10.1936. For a full transcript of this letter see Appendix 9, g (IV).
2 GAD’s ‘Lebenslauf’, 27.3.1889; see Appendix 1, b. Ferdinand Piper was a church historian who originated the study of Christian monuments from antiquity (Monumentale Theologie) and founded the Berlin University’s Christian Museum, as well as the internationally first Christian-Archaeological Institute.
3 GAD’s ‘Lebenslauf’, 14.4.1891; see Appendix 1, a.
4 GAD’s address entitled, ‘Rede des Rektors der Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität beim Goldenen Doktorjubiläum des Herrn Geheimrat Professor Dr. Gustaf Kossina’, 2.8.1931.
Although Ephesus had stirred the imagination of travellers for centuries, until the late 1860s this once ‘first and greatest Metropolis of Asia’ was no more than a huge expanse of rubble and scattered ruins which reminded visitors of the city’s glorious past. It was well known that the great temple of Artemis had once stood here, but its exact location remained elusive. Edmund Falkner, while not the first to attempt a drawing of the city’s general layout, produced in 1845 the first useful map that correctly identified many of its ruins. It was almost a quarter-century later when the British engineer John Turtle Wood (1821-90) finally discovered the Artemision’s marble floor, buried beneath seven metres of detritus. He was backed by the British Museum, but the undertaking had to be terminated in 1874 due to technical problems; nevertheless, the museum authorised him to purchase an allotment of land believed to include the Artemision. Fourteen years passed before David George Hogarth (1862-1927) resumed the excavations (1904-5) – also on behalf of the British Museum – but he had the advantage of employing a massive steam pump, similar to what was being used in the goldmining industry. Hogarth’s sluicing work brought to light many artefacts; yet he, too, never found the temple’s Altar – ultimately discovered and unearthed some distance to the west by Anton Bammer (1965-68). The earlier, narrowly-focused British excavations had been driven chiefly by romantic notions about ‘old world treasures’; and the discovery of the ‘biblical’ temple of Diana (Acts 19:28) was viewed more in terms of a prestigious national scoop for Britain than an academic contribution to the understanding of ancient civilisations.

The first Austrian who excavated at Ephesus with scientific methodology was Otto Benndorf (1838-1907), professor for classical archaeology at Vienna. The president of the Unterrichtsministerium, Dr. Paul Gautsch (1851-1918), had urged that a large-scale archaeological venture should be sought, to raise the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s international prestige, upon which Benndorf suggested Ephesus as a possible site. He was soon able to secure the cooperation of Carl Humann (1839-96), who ‘acted as a sort

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5 Wiplinger/ Wlach, 2.
7 Wiplinger/ Wlach, 5, 13.
8 A. Bammer, Das Heiligtum der Artemis von Ephesus, Graz, 1984, 9.
9 Later Freiherr von Frankenthurn (1890), and three times prime minister of Austria.
of academic consul general for archaeological affairs in the Orient’ and whose ‘expert report was the basis for the work that followed in Ephesus’.

In 1894 Humann formulated a comprehensive technical proposal, including plans and budget forecasts for excavations, upon which the Austrian government purchased 340,000 m² of land at Ephesus and an old light rail track with 14 wagons. Through Humann’s engineering and drainage experience they made good progress within the first season (1895) and by 1913 had at least partially excavated and examined an impressive number of structural relics. Less than two years after Austria’s first campaign Kaiser Franz Joseph I (1830-1916) granted a request from Gautsch to establish an archaeological institute at Vienna (15.3.1897), with Benndorf as its first director. By that time the latter had already obtained the good favour of the Turkish sultan, not only to unearth Ephesus, but also to export any discoveries to their new museums at Vienna.

However, the empire’s archaeological opportunity for cultural enrichment was short-lived, for with the onset of WWI funding was terminated and the work lapsed. The postwar era brought no better prospects either; and Josef Keil, who – as already mentioned earlier (see ch. 4.1) – was secretary of the ÖAI, wrote to Theodor Wiegand:

> Leicht ist das Leben für uns nicht; wir haben ja nur eine möblierte Zweizimmerwohnung [i.e. a single bedroom] (mit Küchenbenützung [i.e. shared kitchen]) und unser Gehalt ist augenblicklich weit schlechter als der eines Universitätsassistenten … Daß ich unter diesen Umständen auch zu Hause gar vieles helfen muß, können Sie sich vorstellen … wenn auch manche Stunde so für die Wissenschaft verloren geht. Im Institut habe ich jetzt die ganze Rechnungsführung, für die früher ein Beamter des Ministeriums zugeteilt war, zu machen; das braucht wieder gar manche Stunde …

Even five years later Keil’s salary was still a mere M. 400 per month, for in reality, Austria was bankrupt, as it had been reduced to a mere quarter of its former size, and its

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10 Wiplinger/ Wlach, 12.
11 This entailed two separate fields adjacent to the British one. Ibid., 14.
12 These included parts of the Artemision, the harbour gymnasium, harbour gates and theatre; a circular monument on Panayır Dağı, the city’s water supply, the Arcadian and halls of Verulanus; the commercial agora, Celsus library, Curetes street and the hall of Nero; the church of the Virgin Mary, the Magnesian gate, State agora, stadium and the temple of Serapis. Ibid., 14.
13 Gautsch, letter to Benndorf, 7.9.1896, in Bammer, 23.
14 Keil, letter to Wiegand, 2.5.1922. For a transcript of this letter see Appendix 5, a.
15 Keil, letter to Wiegand, 12.5.1927. He also commented that the M. 400 ‘… ja freilich etwas höher zu bewerten sind, weil das Leben hier etwas billiger ist, aber bei einem, der nicht einmal eine Wohnung hat, ist der Unterschied nicht groß’.
economy was in tatters. The consequent lapse in excavations at Ephesus after the 1913 season was far more than a temporary setback for its archaeological progress, because much of the ÖAI’s initial work was being undone again or permanently lost through annual flooding, vigorous vegetation growth, fires and persistent looting (see ch. 5.2).

Not until 1921-2, during the short Greek occupation of Western Asia Minor, did some limited archaeological investigations resume (at the St. John’s basilica), led by Georgios A. Sotiriou (1880-1965). However, with Greece’s defeat by Turkey he was forced to terminate the work in 1922, with more than half of the basilica still buried. Before departing he was able to store a large number of small sculptures and architectural fragments in an unused mosque at Ayasoluk. Unfortunately, this building was soon taken over by Turkish immigrants (Muhajirun) and, except for a few heavy blocks, all but disappeared. A year later Keil informed Wiegand that besides Sotiriou the ÖAI had lost all contact with Ephesus and no one seemed to know the site’s present condition.

By now Vienna also faced an increased risk of having its excavation rights for Ephesus rescinded by Turkey. Indeed, a few months later, when the American Society for Archaeological Research in Asia Minor attempted to obtain a similar permit, they reported that ‘the present attitude of the Turkish Government towards foreigners and foreign concessions is such that a written agreement from them is out of the question’.

5.2. Raising awareness and funding

In a prospectus Deissmann wrote early in 1925, with the aim of promoting awareness of the plight of Ephesus, he declared:

For some years this situation [the disintegration of the Ephesus site] has been a peculiar problem and anxiety to me. I have been at Ephesus twice, in 1906 and 1909, and have been able to appraise the really exemplary work done by the Austrian Institute. Repeatedly I have turned the attention of

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16 He published his findings in two reports in Archäologikon Delton, 1922.
19 See also Gerber, ‘Gustav Adolf Deissmann (1866-1937) and the revival of archaeological excavations at Ephesus after the First World War’. 
students … to these excavations … More and more I have occupied myself with the Ephesian problems ….

Yet despite his concerns regarding the site’s postwar fate he was unable to do anything about it, in view of the economic chaos in Germany that gave him a salary of 90 billion Marks, while the wages of a printer’s assistant rose from 50 to 850 million within a single month. Besides regularly highlighting Ephesus’ plight to his students, Deissmann could do little else until the protracted series of political and economic crises had settled. But in spring 1925 he was able to launch a promotional campaign within the USA by mailing out his prospectus, ‘Excavations in Ephesus’, explicitly written for an American readership. A few months later he explained the reasons for his keen engagement with Ephesus:

Umfassende Studien haben mich seit Jahren zu der Überzeugung gebracht, daß wir von einer weiteren Erforschung der ungeheuren Trümmerstätte wesentliche Aufschlüsse … erhalten müßten. Ich habe mich daher entschlossen, dieser Aufgabe näher zu treten …

Initially, Deissmann had contacted Keil and the ÖAI with his idea. Not only was he on friendly terms with Keil, but the latter was arguably the world’s best living authority on Ephesus; moreover, the ÖAI was the only body licensed by the Turkish authorities to undertake excavations there. Consequently, Deissmann proposed that they draw up a joint plan to recommence archaeological work in autumn 1926, for which he himself would raise the necessary finance, while Keil would organise a professional team.

A few months later Keil was employed by the American Society for Archaeological Research in Asia Minor, to make a surface survey of Cilicia. During that trip he detoured to make his first brief inspection of Ephesus since 1913, which enabled him to send Deissmann an up-to-date report on its condition.

The site turned out to be in far greater jeopardy than they had presumed. Before the mid-1980s, when the Turkish government raised the road level between the ancient city and the Kaystrons, the ruins were subject to annual flooding, which scoured and inundated many vulnerable structures, reburying them metres-deep under enormous

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20 This undated prospectus is entitled, ‘Excavations in Ephesus’.
21 Ministerial remittance note, 20.11.1923, and Schmidt-Ott, circular to Notgemeinschaft committee chairmen, 29.9.1923.
22 GAD, letter to Reichsministerium des Innern, 31.7.1925; see Appendix 5. b.
23 GAD’s letter, 31.7.1925; see Appendix 5. b.
24 These investigations resulted in J. Keil/ A. Wilhelm, Denkmäler aus dem rauen Kilikien, MAMA III, Manchester, 1931.
25 GAD, letter to Richardson, 16.12.1925. For a transcript see Appendix 5. c.
amounts of silt. Rampant vegetation covered everything else and did much damage to exposed masonry, which, in turn, was severely compounded by the traditional practice of burning off. Two earthquakes had also occurred in Western Anatolia during recent years: one in November 1919, the other in November 1924 – irreversible structural harm was only a matter of time. But perhaps the most pressing problem was the imminent threat of wholesale plundering.

Keil’s letter explained how in 1923, as a result of Turkey’s struggle for democratic independence, Ephesus’ nearby village of Ayasoluk had been razed to the ground and its Greek residents expelled. *Muhajirun* then proceeded to build a new town on the rubble and renamed it Selçuk; but their steady influx triggered a growing demand for building materials, of which an obvious source existed in the stones and marble slabs of the nearby ruins.

Keil’s bleak prognosis for Ephesus was independently corroborated by an earlier American report that concerned Anatolia more broadly:

> Up to the present time the ruins of Asia Minor have been relatively undisturbed, owing to the fact that cities of any size are rare, and that the thinly scattered population is largely composed of peasant-farmers. Except in a few centres there has been little building, and consequently the ancient sites have been left comparatively unpillaged. Now, however, the great wave of ‘progress’ that is sweeping over the country cannot but be fatal to the remains of antiquity. The wide-spread desire for modern improvements that is characteristic of the new Turkey will bring about the transformation of the old centres into modern towns, with the consequent use of ancient sites as places from which building materials may be extracted. The development … and the carrying out of … exploitation of the country will thus bring destruction to the antiquities throughout the whole region.  

The signatories to this report added weight to the argument of urgency, for they included the secretary of the American Archaeological Survey of Asia Minor, Harold Wilmerding Bell (1885-1947); the director of the Geographical Society and US chief territorial adviser at the Versailles conference, Isaiah Bowman (1878-1950); the classicist and archaeologist, William Hepburn Buckler (1867-1952); the chairman of the American Archaeological Survey of Asia Minor and in 1919 member of the American peace negotiating commission, David Magie (1872-1966); the curator of ethnography at

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26 From a 13-page report entitled ‘Memorandum concerning a proposed archaeological survey of Asia Minor’ (p. 4-5), it is undated but an attached cover-letter from Buckler to Richardson is dated 15.6.1923.
the American Museum of Natural History, Clark Wissler (1870-1947); and William Linn Westermann (1873-1954), professor of history at Columbia University.

*       *       *

Between December 1914 and November 1921 Deissmann produced the *Evangelischer Wochenbrief*, of which, until 1917, an English edition, the *Protestant Weekly Letter*, was sent to a carefully selected clientele throughout the United States (see ch. 7.2). One effect of these bulletins was that he had a wide international circle of highly influential friends, among them the Episcopalian bishop of New York State West, Charles Henry Brent (1862-1929), who was also on the eight-member board of trustees for the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund in New York.²⁷

Deissmann met Brent for the first time at the Stockholm Universal Christian Conference on ‘Life and Work’ in August 1925 (see ch. 8.4), when both men were elected to the eight-member subcommittee for international relations. No records exist of their private discussions, but it is certain that the topic of Ephesus must have come up. For three months later Brent wrote to Deissmann that he had contacted Beardsley Rumel (1894-1960), director of the Rockefeller Fund, and that the latter had invited Deissmann to send details concerning his salvaging plans for Ephesus to Willard S. Richardson (1866-1952),²⁸ the Fund’s secretary and private spiritual advisor of John Davison Rockefeller Jr. (1874-1960), son of the world’s first billionaire.

Brent’s suggestion to Deissmann is worth noting, since he was apparently motivated by precedent, for Richardson had once before been approached for support of a comparable archaeological expedition in Anatolia by William Buckler. On 28 December 1922 the latter had presented a decisive paper at New Haven to ‘a Joint Meeting of the American Historical Association and the Archaeological Institute of America’. In its detailed report he shrewdly predicted that as a result of Turkey’s fundamental political changes Anatolia would soon present archaeological opportunities, where ‘Americans can do such work on a scale which European scholars cannot at present afford, and this fact

²⁷ John Davison Rockefeller, Sr. (1839-1937) established the Fund in 1918, in memory of his wife, Laura Celestia Spelman Rockefeller (1839-1915); it was merged with the Rockefeller Foundation in 1929. Brent was born and educated in Canada (Ontario), but emigrated to America in his early twenties.

²⁸ GAD’s letter, 16.12.1925; see Appendix 5, c.
throws upon us the burden of a duty’. 29 Within six months of this paper he had submitted a plan to Richardson for a large-scale systematic archaeological surface survey of Asia Minor (see ch. 5.2), which Rockefeller’s Committee on Benevolence conditionally funded to one quarter of the proposed cost. 30

In keeping with Brent’s advice, Deissmann wrote a letter to Richardson, in which he outlined Ephesus’ deteriorating condition and projected a cost of US$ 20,000 for one season’s work. 31 With it he also included his prospectus, ‘Excavations in Ephesus’, as well as Keil’s informative booklet, *Ein Führer durch die Ruinenstätte und ihre Geschichte*. 32 But although Richardson’s initial reply was sympathetic he offered scant hope of financial assistance. In actual fact, while Deissmann was waiting for a definitive response, Thomas Baird Appleget (1893-1982), the new secretary of Rockefeller’s Committee on Benevolence, wrote to Harold Bell on another matter, but added that they had received Deissmann’s proposal, and then surprisingly advised: ‘Mr. Richardson and I would like the opportunity of conferring with you in regard to the possibility of the work at Ephesus being taken over by the American Society’. 33 Bell’s answer two days later tactfully sidestepped this suggestion by requesting a personal meeting instead, after which the matter was dropped. Another month went by before Appleget sent Deissmann the answer he had hoped for, namely that Rockefeller was willing to contribute US$ 10,000, provided he could raise an equivalent amount from German sponsors. 34 The decision was strongly influenced by Bell’s recommendation that the project was worthy of Rockefeller’s support and that ‘the excavation should, by all means, be completed. The abandonment of such a task once begun always involves a great loss in effort and results’. 35

Long before Appleget’s news arrived Deissmann had also lobbied vigorously for support within Germany itself, for although he was unaware of the former’s radical idea, he knew that Italy had also been making strong efforts to claim a stake in Ephesus.

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29 Buckler, paper, 28.12.1922.
30 The report (see above n. 26) proposed four teams for a duration of five years, with an estimated total annual cost of US$ 20,000. See also Richardson, letter to Buckler, 29.6.1923.
31 GAD’s letter, 16.12.1925; see Appendix 5, c.
33 Appleget, letter to Bell, 8.1.1926.
34 Appleget, letter to GAD, 8.2.1926.
35 Memorandum, entitled, ‘Deissmann excavation project at Ephesus’, 28.1.1926.
since the end of WWI. Accordingly, he first sought advice from the president of the Notgemeinschaft für Deutsche Wissenschaft, Friedrich Schmidt-Ott (1860-1956). However, Deissmann had no intention to involve the Notgemeinschaft itself, for as chairman of its Theological Committee he thought it inappropriate to compete for funds with the Archaeological Committee, but the powerful and diplomatically highly experienced Schmidt-Ott was his best source of advice when it came to fundraising.

Possibly on the latter’s suggestion Deissmann had also discussed the matter with Hermann Strathmann (1882-1966) who, in turn, sent a letter to Martin Schiele (1870-1939), the Reichsminister des Innern, in which he strongly commended Deissmann’s proposal. Nevertheless, his appeal was direct and smacked strongly of nationalism; furthermore, he imprudently emphasised: ‘es handelt sich nur um einen einmaligen Beitrag’ of M. 40,000. Schiele was unimpressed, however, and passed the letter on to Schmidt-Ott. As a result, Strathmann met again with Schiele and this time suggested that the support could be shared between the Auswärtiges Amt, the Reichsministerium des Innern and the Notgemeinschaft.

It is against this background that Deissmann made his first formal presentation on behalf of Ephesus at the Reichsministerium des Innern, where he met with the Ministers Richard Donnevert and Georg Gürich on Monday 27 July. Here he explained his plan and forecast that the undertaking would require SUS 20,000 per season, of which he

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38 GAD’s letter, 31.7.1925; see Appendix 5, b.

39 A theologian and parliamentarian for the conservative Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DNVP). Strathmann saw the Ephesus project primarily as an opportunity to advance German scholarship.

40 Schiele was also a representative of the DNVP.

41 Strathmann, letter to Schiele, 10.7.1925 (Italics my own).

42 Memorandum to Schmidt-Ott, 24.7.1925.
hoped the Department would contribute half. He stressed that the prospects of obtaining the balance ‘durch meine akademischen und kirchlichen Beziehungen in Nordamerika’ were good, provided he could first secure tangible German support.\textsuperscript{43}

Two days after presenting his proposal Deissmann had an appointment with Max von Stockhausen, personal adviser to Reichskanzler Hans Luther (1879-1962), and later that day showed a collection of Ephesus slides to some American visitors in the hope of interesting them in the venture.\textsuperscript{44} That Friday he formalised his discussion with the Ministers in a letter ‘... [um] das Wichtigste hierdurch schriftlich zu wiederholen’\textsuperscript{45}

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When Deissmann first conceived the notion of possibly being able to revive the Ephesus excavations, it was based on his assumption that he had sound prospects for raising the required funds, on account of his many influential and international connections, particularly in the United States. Since these were predominantly subscribers to the Protestant Weekly Letter, or professional friends and, therefore, typically Protestants in positions of wide-ranging influence, the prospectus was written with an overtly Christian orientation. Its central argument proposed that ‘the significance of Ephesus for the history of Apostolic Christianity is far greater than was formerly supposed’. Moreover, it affirmed that Deissmann’s primary objective was an investigation of ‘... the early Christian ruins in Ephesus, especially those early churches, which have not yet been excavated’.\textsuperscript{46}

From this it would be easy to stigmatise Deissmann as a mere fundraising theologian, who made use of his international connections to seek archaeological authentication for the Christian cause. This was exactly what some Germans had feared at the outset of his campaign, and the grounds for any such misgivings were not unfounded. For his letter to the Reichsministerium des Innern outlined that he, in conjunction with the ÖAI,

\textsuperscript{43} GAD’s letter, 31.7.1925; see Appendix 5, b.
\textsuperscript{44} AK, 29.7.1925; see also memorandum, 24.7.1925
\textsuperscript{45} GAD’s letter, 31.7.1925; see Appendix 5, b.
\textsuperscript{46} The prospectus is signed very formally: ‘Professor Adolf Deissmann, Hon. D. theol. (Marburg), Hon. D. D. (Aberdeen, St Andrews, Manchester), Corresponding Member of the Archaeological Institute of the German Reich, Professor of New Testament Interpretation, Director of the Berlin New Testament Seminar, University of Berlin.’ ‘Excavations in Ephesus’.
had formulated ‘ein Programm der Kooperation’ that was not only accepted by them but
‘... meinem Wunsch entsprechend, vorwiegend auf die Probleme der christlichen
Geschichtswissenschaft eingestellt’.47

His motivation stemmed in the first instance from the significant possibilities Ephesus
could offer for research related to early church history; however, the underlying
rationale for the tone of the prospectus was not his personal beliefs but his American
target audience. Nonetheless, his particular interest in the city’s Christian remains did
not diminish his enthusiasm for anything else it had to offer. For ever since he
published Bibelstudien in 1895 he had repeatedly stated in his philological works that he
rejected any idea of a dichotomous approach to the study of the ancient world, instead
he argued:

Man kann den Aberglauben der Kaiserzeit nicht in die verschiedenen
Kategorien heidnisch, jüdisch und christlich einteilen. So deutlich hebt sich
an manchen Punkten nicht einmal der Glaube des Heiden und Juden von
dem des Christen ab.48

Similarly – as has already been stated (see ch. 4.1) – he did not elevate his ‘theological’
study tour of 1909 above the ‘classical philological’ one he undertook in 1906. At any
rate, Deissmann’s prospectus had already specified that the excavations would also
entail work ‘concerning the old Ionic city’,49 and in the accompanying letter he
expressly stated that it was to be ‘an endeavor to make for international research both
for the secular and holy history ...’.50 Similarly, in his letter to the Reichsministerium
des Innern he made it known that he had decided ‘dieser Aufgabe [i.e. Ephesus
excavation] näher zu treten, die insbesondere auch indirekte Bereicherung unseres
Wissens betrifft, die wir aus den sonstigen (nichtchristlichen) Resten erhoffen dürfen’.51
Besides, any suggestion to the contrary could only cast aspersions on the academic
integrity of the ÖAI, which is why Keil was sting to remark:

... [ich] wundere mich, daß man mir immer von auswärt so schreibt, als
hätte er nur für die christlichen Monumente von Ephesos Interesse und
wollte uns von den antiken abhalten usw. Es ist fast als ob jemand solche
Nachrichten, die ja wirklich der Wahrheit ganz zuwider laufen, absichtlich
in die Welt setzte. Mir gegenüber hat Deissmann von Anfang an einen ganz

47 GAD’s letter, 31.7.1925; see Appendix 5. b.
48 Bst., 25.
49 ‘Excavations in Ephesus’.
50 GAD’s letter, 16.12.1925; see Appendix 5. c.
51 GAD’s letter, 31.7.1925, see Appendix 5. b.
anderen Standpunkt eingenommen, wenn er auch natürlich auf das Christliche nicht verzichten kann, das ja schon wegen der Propagandakraft volle Berücksichtigung finden muß.\footnote{Keil’s letter. 12.5.1927.}

Some had evidently construed Deissmann’s enthusiastic interest for Ephesus as driven by an amateurish romanticism; and the point can legitimately be made that he was a romantic at heart (see ch. 4.2). This was a personal characteristic that sometimes impinged on his literary style and occasioned such oddly expressed sentiments as: ‘Die Welt des Paulus die Welt des Ölbaums!’\footnote{\emph{Paulus}, 26. GAD’s romantic inclination can \textit{se} detected in the AK as well, although \textit{not} as frequently as might be expected. On 12.9.1908, for example, he noted that while spending some time on the island of Rügen by himself, he carved the letter ‘H’ (for Henriette) into a tree trunk and the following afternoon returned once more to it. On 3.7.1933 he wrote, ‘erster Spatenstich zum Neubau’, referring to the commencement of an extensive reconstruction of the Deissmann’s weekend-house at Wünsdorf – which he had evocatively christened ‘Anatolia’. See also ch. 2, n. 138 and ch. 9, nn. 85, 93.} However, while Deissmann was not a trained archaeologist, it would be too far-fetched to infer a connection between his romantically inclined personality and a dilettante antiquarianism. Keil’s strong rebuttal of any such allegations certainly demonstrates that he perceived his colleague’s archaeological rationale as beyond reproach, an assessment that is particularly relevant, since it was he who had once elucidated for Wiegand what he understood as the \emph{sine qua non} for all archaeology and history:

\begin{quote}
So wie Geschichte, mag sie welche Periode immer darstellen wollen, doch nur dann ihrer Aufgabe gerecht wird, wenn sie auf universalihistorischer \textit[sic] Grundlage aufgebaut ist, das heiβt, jede Periode und jede Stätte im Zusammenhang mit der zeitlichen und räumlichen Umgebung erfaßt, so ist es Aufgabe jeder größeren Ausgrabung, die gesamte Umgebung mit allen ihren historischen Problemen mit einzubeziehen, so wie Sie es getan haben … Sie [haben] gezeigt, dass auch die Ausgrabungen im Sinne der Universalhistorie gemacht und geleitet werden können.\footnote{Keil’s letter. 2.5.1922; see Appendix 5, a.}
\end{quote}

Evidently, Keil believed Deissmann’s proposition (see above, ch. 5.2) to deserve serious merit – even within his Christian-oriented framework – and considered any suggestions which might imply that it was no more than the romantic fancy of an enthusiastic theologian as mean-spirited.

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Besides his Christian perspective, Deissmann had, perhaps less judiciously, also raised a point that could be interpreted as Germanocentric:

Die deutsche Wissenschaft hat bis 1914 (und noch nachher) das antike Kleinasien in vorbildlicher Weise erforscht ... Die geplante Kooperation zwischen mir selbst und Wien würde (obwohl natürlich ebenso sehr ein neuer Anfang für das österreichische Schwester-Institut) einen Neubeginn dieser deutschen Arbeit bedeuten.\footnote{GAD’s letter, 31.7.1925; see Appendix 5, b.}

After Schiele had forwarded Strathmann’s endorsement to Schmidt-Ott (see above, ch. 5.2), the latter thought it prudent to call on Wiegand’s expertise for advice, since he was chairman for the \textit{Notgemeinschaft} committee for \textit{Kunstwissenschaften} and the organisation’s specialist adviser on archaeological matters.

Wiegand received both Strathmann’s letter and Deissmann’s submission for consideration, but in his official report ignored the former and focused solely on the content of the latter’s proposal. Although the request had come from the \textit{Notgemeinschaft} Wiegand also mailed a copy of his recommendation to the ÖAI to seek further information. He expressed concern about parts of Deissmann’s plan, and cautioned that it would be methodologically inadmissible for the excavators to confine themselves to a single (i.e. Christian) epoch at a complex archaeological site such as Ephesus.\footnote{Wiegand, report to Notgemeinschaft, 16.8.1925. For a transcript see Appendix 5, c.} But what troubled him most was that he interpreted Deissmann’s letter to suggest the Ephesus work would no longer be an Austrian but a German enterprise, under Austrian supervision. Nonetheless, Wiegand’s unease seemed primarily caused by the wording of Deissmann’s letter itself, rather than his actual objective. For earlier, when they had discussed the matter in private, he had evidently given his verbal assent to his friend, since the latter would otherwise scarcely have written to the \textit{Reichsministerium}: ‘beide Herren [i.e. Wiegand and Strathmann] stimmen dem Plan freudig zu’.\footnote{As did the general secretary of the DAI, Martin Rodenwaldt (see below, ch. 5.4); see also GAD’s letter 31.7.1925, Appendix 5, b.} Nevertheless, it was Wiegand’s letter ‘dessen Stellungnahme sich ganz mit der \textit{Notgemeinschaft} deckt’\footnote{Schmidt-Ott’s memorandum, 20.8.1925.} that convinced Schmidt-Ott to decline any financial assistance at that time.

Despite their friendship and occasional exchange of professional ideas, Wiegand’s high archaeological profile and experience carried considerably less weight with Deissmann in respect to the work at Ephesus than Josef Keil’s extensive archaeological experience...
of the site. The former met Keil first during his 1906 study tour (see ch. 4.1), where a lifelong friendship had began to develop between them. Now in 1925 it was Keil with whom Deissmann planned the renewed excavations and whose scientific methodology and experience influenced his archaeological thinking the most.

However, although Wiegand seemed to have misinterpreted Deissmann’s intent to some degree, it was understood clearly by the ÖAI. For its director, Emil Reisch (1898-1933), had quickly replied to Wiegand’s report, that Keil would not only be directing the entire expedition on his own, but that they regarded it as a wholly Austrian undertaking in all respects – including any publications rights. However,

Innertalhal des Rahmens dieses österreichischen Unternehmens haben wir uns selbstverständlich gerne bereit erklärt, Herrn Prof. Deissmann einen von ihm noch zu bestimmenden Anteil an den gestellten Aufgaben zu selbstständiger Bearbeitung zu überlassen.\(^5^9\)

Reisch’s letter also emphasised that their archaeological work would not at all be restricted to Ephesus’ Christian remains, although the choice of actual sites ‘sollte wohl so getroffen werden, dass die vorwiegend en frühchristlichen Objekten interessierten Kreise der Geldgeber ihre Befriedigung finden würden’. It was not unreasonable for the ÖAI to consent to this agreement, since the expected American funding was to come from (as yet unspecified) Christian sponsors who offered a practical means to resume excavations. But Reisch went a step further and suggested:

Es würde natürlich eine vom Institute mit besonderer Dankbarkeit begrüsste Stärkung der Position des Institutes bedeuten, wenn die deutsche Notgemeinschaft, die österreichische Unternehmen schon so vielfach gefördert hat, sich bereit finden würde, die neue ephesische Grabung im Sinne eines österreichischen Unternehmens durch Gewährung eines Beitrages zu unterstützen, sodass wir nicht mehr ausschliesslich oder fast ausschliesslich mit amerikanischen Geldern arbeiten würden.\(^6^0\)

Although Reisch did not misinterpret Deissmann’s intent, he had gained the wrong impression regarding his fundraising strategy, since the latter had already specified that American capital would be conditional on substantial commitments from German sources.\(^6^1\)

Wiegand forwarded Reisch’s reply to Schmidt-Ott, since, in effect, it constituted a funding request for the Notgemeinschaft. This time the latter’s memo, written to the

\(^{59}\) Reisch, letter to Wiegand, 20.8.1925. For a transcript see Appendix 5. f.

\(^{60}\) Reisch’s letter, 20.8.1925.

\(^{61}\) See Appendix 5. b.
Reichsministerium des Innern, was much less diplomatic, for he protested with unconcealed indignation:

Eine Hilfe der Notgemeinschaft möchte ich nach dem Inhalt seines letzten Schreibens überhaupt in die letzte Linie rücken. Es ist kaum zulässig, wenn die Oesterreicher sich der Mittel der Notgemeinschaft als einer für sie bestimmten Einrichtung bedienen. Die Notgemeinschaft hat beschlossen, dass österreichische Unternehmen nur ganz ausnahmsweise, soweit sie unbedingt dem Kreis der deutschen Forschung angehören ... in Betracht gezogen werden dürfen.62

His reply also affected how the Reichsministerium des Innern viewed the case. Thus, despite Deissmann’s initial efforts, no firm pledges of any consequence seemed likely to be forthcoming from Germany. Yet four months later when the latter wrote to Richardson,63 his tone was sanguine, even though the letter showed signs that he had made little progress in his fund raising quest thus far. It was not until 17 January that he received the news ‘that three German donors together promised for the Ephesus Fund 25,000 Marks (that is about 6000 $) on condition that I would receive the same sum from America’.64 It is not clear what tipped the balance in his favour, although it appears that it might have been due to his determination (and realistic prospects) to raise the funds mainly from overseas’ sources. This would likely have caused concern that Ephesus might be turned into an American project, with the concomitant possibility of significant historical artefacts being shipped abroad. Nevertheless, despite Deissmann’s use of the word ‘promised’ any such gifts were in fact still very tentative, and seven weeks later he wrote more cautiously that ‘begründete Hoffnung besteht’.65

Thus, three weeks before Rockefeller’s conditional offer, three separate German sponsors had already given an equally conditional agreement that they could provide a total of M. 25,000 – provided Deissmann would raise a corresponding sum from America.66 To avoid a stalemate, diplomacy was of paramount importance!

The three German benefactors included the Reichsministerium des Inneren and the Notgemeinschaft, with a pledge of M. 10,000 each, and the Auswärtiges Amt whose offer of M. 5000 was almost perfunctory.67 However, to reach Rockefeller’s condition

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63 See Appendix 5. b.
64 GAD, letter to Brent, 18.1.1926.
65 GAD, letter to Schmidt-Ott, 5.3.1926. For a transcript see Appendix 5. g.
66 GAD’s letter, 18.1.1926.
67 GAD’s letter, 5.3.1926; see Appendix 5. g.
of M. 42,000 (US$ 10,000) Deissmann now had numerous meetings with high-ranking diplomatic figures, among them the Kultusminister Carl Heinrich Becker (1876-1933); the Ministerialrat Richard Donnevert; the Ministerialrat and soon to be Ministerialdirektor Reinhold Richter (1874-1946); the Generalsekretär of the DAI, Martin Karl Gerhart Rodenwaldt (1886-1945), and Friedrich Schmidt-Ott, also a former Staatsminister.

Despite Schmidt-Ott’s initially negative reaction (see above, ch. 5.2), Deissmann was able to clarify the situation in person, and a few days later followed it up with a handwritten explanatory letter in which he informed him of Rockefeller’s decision, and addressed his earlier objections by stressing that the initiative originated from himself (i.e. Deissmann) and not from Vienna. He concluded by suggesting:

> Dass diese Kooperation auch Wirkungen hätte, die, ohne dass man viel davon spricht, für unser Verhältnis zu Österreich überhaupt wohltätig wären, brauche ich nicht zu sagen. Ich darf nur wiederholen, was ich neulich andeutete, dass auch die preuß. Regierung mich zu meiner Bitte ermutigt hat. Herr Min.-Direktor Professor Richter wird Ihnen das gerne bestätigen …  

How much bearing this letter had on the Auswärtiges Amt is uncertain, but five weeks later they decided to treble their contribution to M. 15,000, although to avoid political speculations in the press their involvement was to be kept discreetly quiet.

Thus, together with a modest contribution of M. 5000 from the ÖAI, and M. 2600 from the Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Deissmann had now succeeded in raising a total of M. 42,600 (US$ 10,095) and with it fulfilled Rockefeller’s stipulation. Accordingly, on 30 April 1926 Appleget sent a bank draft for US$ 10,000 to the ÖAI.

Right at the outset of his campaign Deissmann had created a provisional trust fund for Ephesus to facilitate and manage prospective donations, and had also drawn attention to this in his prospectus. Now that financial support was assured this fund was formalised on Friday 16 April under an Austrian-German partnership agreement. Keil and his wife travelled to Berlin from Vienna for the occasion. Reisch had also been invited and was expected to be amongst the dozen or so guests at the Deissmanns’ home for a

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68 GAD’s letter, 5.3.1926; see Appendix 5. g.
69 Auswärtiges Amt, letter to Schmidt-Ott, 7.4.1926.
71 Appleget, letter to GAD, 30.4.1926.
celebratory dinner,\textsuperscript{72} but was unable to attend, and Deissmann informed him by letter of their proceedings.\textsuperscript{73} The meeting itself was held at the Oxwärigtes Amt, chaired by the Ministerialdirektor Friedrich Heilbron, and attended at least by Deissmann, Donnevert, Keil, Rodenwaldt, Schmidt-Ott and Wiegand. They resolved to name Deissmann’s fund the ‘Treuhänderschaft Ephesus-Grabung’, and appointed four trustees for its administration: Reisch, Wiegand, Rodenwaldt, and Deissmann as chairman, an honorary position he occupied uninterruptedly until his death.\textsuperscript{74}

* * *

Keil’s task of organizing an effective archaeological team had turned out more difficult than expected, and he felt compelled to write to the well-connected Wiegand for advice. In his letter he confided that his greatest misgiving for a successful undertaking was the Institute’s lack of archaeologically experienced architects, since the Ephesus veteran Wilhelm Wilberg – who had taken part in the early campaigns from 1899-1908, 1911 and 1913 – was now too old for this kind of work.\textsuperscript{75} Thus far, Max Theuer (1878-1949), a professor of architecture and Dekan at the Technische Hochschule in Vienna, had apparently not yet become a contender in Keil’s mind, since he wrote in another letter to Wiegand more than four months later that his most recent prospect, Hans Hörmann, was unsuitable because of a possible career move to Bayern.\textsuperscript{76} Even though the latter joined the team in 1927, 1928 and 1930, Wiegand eventually settled on Theuer for the 1926 season.

For his junior colleague Keil selected Franz Miltner (1901-59), a barely 25-year-old Viennese archaeologist who had recently distinguished himself with his work on the

\textsuperscript{72} That day (15.4.1926) GAD wrote in the AK: ‘8 A.brot [i.e. Abendbrot] bei uns, geladen: Reisch, Keil + Fr., Wiegand + Fr., Schrader + Fr., Michaelis, Hillers 2, Rodenwaldts 2. Hiller, Keil/Reisch, Deißmann, Rod [enwaldt], Wiegand, He [ilbr?]. Donnevert, Schmidt-Ott.’

\textsuperscript{73} GAD, letter to Reisch, 24.4.1926. For a transcript see Appendix 5, h.

\textsuperscript{74} On a 1937 letterhead for the ‘Treuhänderschaft Ephesus-Grabung’, a cross is drawn besides the names of the deceased trustees Reisch and Wiegand, and the Viennese archaeologist Camillo Praschniker (1884-1949) and Josef Keil are added (in handwriting) as trustees. GAD to the Forschungsgemeinschaft, 29.1.1937.

\textsuperscript{75} Keil, letter to Wiegand, 26.12.1925.

\textsuperscript{76} ‘In Berlin hat Rodenwaldt Reisch gegenüber Bedenken geäußert, Hörmann zu engagieren, weil er schwerlich mehr als für eine Kampagne verfügbär wäre. Er suche einen Posten in Bayern und würde einen solchen wahrscheinlich in absehbarer Zeit erhalten und damit natürlich nicht mehr abkommen können’. Keil, letter to Wiegand, 10.5.1926.
amphitheatre at Petronell-Carnuntum near Vienna, and in 1925 had accompanied Keil
to Turkey to assist with inscriptive work for the American surface survey of Cilicia
(see above, ch. 5.2). As it turned out, he proved to be an excellent choice, since he
became an integral part of every Ephesus campaign until 1931 and again from 1954 to
his untimely death in 1959.

One unexpected member of the team was the Turkish archaeologist Ahmet Aziz Öğan
(1888-1956), who was normally referred to as Aziz Bey. As Turkish commissioner for
archaeological excavations (and later general director of Istanbul’s Museums) he had
been attached to the Ephesus campaign as a result of negotiations between the Turkish
government and the Austrian chargé d’affaires, August Kral. Constant political
uncertainties\(^{77}\) had compelled Turkey to call a halt on all archaeological work and travel
by foreigners within Western Anatolia in 1926; and as late as May it appeared that
Ephesus was to suffer yet another year’s delay.\(^{78}\) However, Kral was able to obtain the
government’s acquiescence, by urging that the campaign should go ahead under the
aegis of the Smyrna Museum, with Aziz acting as official leader, although in practice he
worked in full cooperation with the ÖAI. This arrangement worked so well that almost
a decade later Deissmann wrote that:

\[
\text{... Aziz Öğan [der] in den ersten Jahren als türkischer Ausgrabungskom-
missar in Ephesus unser Mitarbeiter war, hierdurch in sehr freundschaftliche
Beziehungen mit uns getreten ist ...}^{79}
\]

That this amicable relationship had already been formed at the start of the 1926
campaign is evident from Deissmann’s letter to Wiegand, written one week after he
arrived at Ephesus:

\[
\text{Herr Aziz Bey ist ein überaus angenehmer Hausgenosse. Ich glaube, dass
hier in Ephesus die formelle Leitung des Unternehmens durch die türkische
Unterrichtsverwaltung so, wie die Dinge liegen, große Vorteile für die
Sache hat.}^{80}
\]

The fifth member of the team was Deissmann himself. Despite his lack of practical
archaeological experience, his role in the 1926 expedition was not insignificant, nor did
he overstate it when he wrote to Schmidt-Ott:

\[^{77}\text{For an allusion to this see GAD’s report, 1.6.1935; Appendix 5, d.}\]
\[^{78}\text{Keil, letter to Wiegand, 10.5.1926.}\]
\[^{79}\text{GAD’s report, 1.6.1935; see Appendix 5, d.}\]
\[^{80}\text{GAD, letter to Wiegand, 23.10.1926.}\]
5.3. 1926 Ephesus expedition

The first fully organised Austrian excavation team returning to Ephesus since 1913 started work at the beginning of September 1926; however, Deissmann was not able to join them for another six weeks. For even though the Ministry had approved a small stipend of M. 1500 towards his personal expenses and granted him sabbatical leave for the entire winter-semester, his holidays only began on 1 October.

The working party had already done most of the necessary groundwork during these first weeks, including clearing and restoring the Institute’s badly neglected headquarters in nearby Selçuk, hiring an initial gang of 40-50 labourers, and clearing the overgrown vegetation from the most affected ruins. Six days after Deissmann arrived and saw the fully operating activities on the site he had so passionately campaigned for, he wrote to Wiegand:

Ich bin hier nach guter, wenn auch sehr umständlicher Reise in bestem Wohlein gelandet und auf das Freundschaftlichste von allen Genossen aufgenommen worden ... Haus [i.e. ÖAI headquarters in Selçuk] gut instande, die Arbeit im vollem Gang mit schönen Erfolgen. Dass sich Keils Hypothese über die Lage der ionischcr Stadt bestätigt hat, wirst Du wohl schon durch ihn gehört haben, ... Dass es nach vielen Enttäuschungen schließlich doch gelungen ist, diese Thür [i.e. to Ephesus] wieder offen zu machen, ist eine der größten Freuden meines Lebens.

The euphoric tone of this letter betrays more than mere proud or romantic pleasure in what he had achieved; it intimates that he regarded the 1926 season as the beginning of a long-term archaeological undertaking of which he would be an integral part. For in the same letter he also confided that he was already in the process of writing to the American sponsors, in an endeavour to obtain their renewed financial backing for 1927. Two days later he sent a report from Selçuk, addressed to Beardsley Rumf and Thomas Appleget, in which he detailed the team’s work and results of the past seven weeks.

81 GAD’s letter, 5.3.1926; see Appendix 5. g.
82 Kultusministerium, letter to GAD, 17.5.1926. Compare this to Keil’s monthly salary of M. 400, see Keil’s letter, 12.5.1927.
83 The extended leave was granted to enable GAD also to accept an invitation for a lecture-tour in the USA between Jan. and Mar., but this had to be postponed due to illness; see ch. 8.5.
84 GAD’s letter, 23.10.1926. ‘Thür’ is an allusion to 1 Cor. 16:8-9: ‘But I will stay on at Ephesus until Pentecost, because a great door ... has opened to me.’
gave the program for the rest of the season and stressed the importance of the enterprise’s ongoing character. He concluded with the hope ‘to come to the States in January 1927. And then I have the intention to visit you and to tell you more about Ephesus’.\(^85\) This visit was not so much intended to report on what was achieved during the 1926 season, but rather to make a case for ongoing financial support. Shortly thereafter he wrote in another letter to an English friend: ‘I began this new period of my life in a new inspiration [sic], being here for many weeks and participating in the new excavation work of the Vienna Institute ...’.\(^86\)

During his first two weeks he worked closely with Josef Keil and Franz Miltner, familiarizing himself with the site and the archaeologists’ methodology. He also compared Sotiriou’s four-year-old photographs of the St. John’s basilica with the ransacked state of the partially excavated edifice that existed, and became so appalled at the difference that he reported:

‘It is a pity to say that the inhabitants of the Turkish village Seltchouk (formerly called Ayasoluk) have plundered and are still plundering these venerable ruins in a horrible measure when they are erecting their houses and stables, most of them being “Muhadschirs” (Turkish immigrants and refugees) who have no houses when they arrive.’\(^87\)

Already in an earlier letter to the Notgemeinschaft he had stressed that almost all of the basilica’s marble flooring and a large section of a tiled wall had been removed, while much of the remaining marble architecture lay toppled over and smashed.\(^88\) However, within two weeks of his arrival he had rediscovered most of the missing items from Sotiriou’s work (see ch. 5.1) – fitted into various stone walls in the neighbourhood of the old Mosque – and with Aziz’s energetic intervention, in conjunction with local authorities, he was able to recover several wagonloads of artefacts.\(^89\) The two men also cleaned up the St. John’s ruins and catalogued, packaged and stored all loose or broken pieces with the ones they had located.

\(^85\) Letter, dated 25.10.1926.
\(^86\) GAD, letter to Bell, 14.11.1926.
\(^87\) GAD, letter to Applegate, 21.2.1927 (parentheses his own).
\(^88\) GAD, grant application to Notgemeinschaft, 7.2.1927.
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Figure 5: Map of Ephesus

For the next month Deissmann worked almost daily with Millner at the Seven Sleepers' caves\(^90\) on the rocky north-eastern slopes of Panayır Dağ, and 'barely visible above the deep layer of rubbish which encompassed [it]'\(^91\). By employing 130 labourers\(^92\) they were able to remove more than 500 m\(^3\) of rubble per day, but the sheer size of the project proved too large for a single season's work. Nevertheless, what they uncovered exceeded all expectations, since it proved not only to be an extensive Christian necropolis but also a centuries-long pilgrimage site. As Deissmann explained:

Almost all the types of graves already known to us through explorations made in the other catacombs of the Mediterranean world were found here also: trough graves with arches (arcosolia), graves in niches, with many

\(^90\) Christian and Muslim traditions share the myth of how during the Decian persecution (249-51), seven young men escaped into one of the local caves, where they were sealed in on the Emperor's order. The youths fell into a deathlike sleep, but God reawakened them two centuries later. When the 'new' Emperor Theodosius II (408-50) came to see this miracle, he hailed them as living proof of bodily resurrection. Later, after dying a natural death, they were buried in the same cave, and Theodosius commissioned a basilica to be built over their tombs. It was also believed that Mary Magdalene and the '300 fathers' lay buried in the same place. The necropolis continued to be sought out by pilgrims until at least the 13\(^{th}\) century. Keil, 'XII. Vorläufiger Bericht', 285.

\(^91\) GAD, 'The excavations in Ephesus 1925'.

\(^92\) Keil, 'XII. Vorläufiger Bericht', 289. The labourers were primarily Muhajirs, 'from Crete, Macedonia and other regions which formerly belonged to Turkey'; GAD, 'The excavations in Ephesus 1926'.
burial places above one another, walled sunken graves, loculi, and various other types.

Furthermore, he regarded the church itself as a uniquely built ‘cemetery-church for the cult of the Seven Boys and biblical Saints, who are buried in special chapels lying just north of the building’ . On Monday, 22 November – the penultimate field-day and four days before leaving Selçuk – a hole opened up amongst the rubble and gave way to a large subterranean passage. The entrance was hastily cleared and revealed what both Keil and Deissmann described as a catacomb, with numerous burial alcoves on both sides. The next day they also discovered an apse, but were forced to refill the entry immediately ‘with rubbish in order to save it against robbery till the next campaign in fall 1927’. Although the entire necropolis had been raided centuries earlier, it still yielded:

Wandmalereien, Münzen der verschiedensten Epochen und Graffiti, die bis in die Kreuzfahrerzeit hinein zu reichen scheinen, eine Anzahl von Grabplatten mit Inschriften und vor allem Tonlampen ... von denen mehrere Hunderte aus den Gräbern geborgen werden konnten.

Factory marks and symbolic decorations in the lamps – by the season’s end amounting to more than 1900 – showed that most of the approximately 170 variants had been locally manufactured during a considerable time span and brought to the site by Christians, Muslims and Jews. In addition, the wall paintings, graffiti and inscriptions provided a tangible record of Ephesus’ religious history and spanned a full millennium. Nothing comparable to this cemetery complex had so far been found elsewhere in Asia Minor.

* * * *

Three weeks after arriving at Ephesus Deissmann wrote in his diary: ‘Ephesus ... früh zum Prätorium + Stadion ... erhielt ein Diplom’. The original of this handcrafted Diploma is no longer extant, although it has survived in the form of a photograph held at the ÖAI. It consisted of a seven-piece collage, with each of the six outer panels

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93 GAD, ‘The excavations in Ephesus 1926’.
94 GAD’s letter, 21.2.1927; also Keil, ‘XII. Vorläufiger Bericht’, 292.
apparently hand painted, and a central photograph of the five-member excavation team.\footnote{Dr. Manfred Kandler from the ÖAI informed me that with the exception of the central photo, ‘Alles andere scheint mit Pinsel und Feder und vielleicht Wasserfarben gemacht worden [zu] sein’. He has also confirmed my hypothesis that the artist was very probably Max Theuer. Email, 7.3.2006.}

This photograph was taken in front of the ÖAI’s headquarters entrance at Selçuk, and shows – besides the date of Deissmann’s birthday and two damaged Roman statues\footnote{Now in the archaeological museum at Selçuk. Published by J. Inan/ E. Rosenbaum (1966), and E. Atalay (1989).} – the five members of the excavation team (from the left): Franz Miltner, Adolf Deissmann, Josef Keil, Ahmet Aziz Oğan and Max Theuer.

Figure 6: Diploma collage in honour of Deissmann’s role in the Ephesus excavations
Chapter 5: The Ephesus excavations

The uppermost panel depicts a westward view from the theatre (extending past the Arcadiané), with the silted harbour and the Pagos Astyagu (left) on the western tip of Bülbul Dağ. The telltale protrusion (top left) shows the Hellenic watchtower (or lighthouse?), traditionally also known as ‘Paul’s prison’, and forms part of the city wall’s extreme west. In 1906 Deissmann gained from there one of his first unforgettable impressions of Ephesus’ vast expanse and archaeological wealth (see ch. 4.1).99

The inscription on the left, composed in careful imitation of ancient Greek, and whose lettering style reflects that of the early Roman imperial period, was almost certainly drafted by Josef Keil (standing at rear of photo).

It reads:

\[ \text{ν ειρά μητρόπολις} \\
\text{τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ νεο-} \\
\text{κόρος τῆς Ἀρτέμι-} \\
\text{δος καὶ τῆς παναγί-} \\
\text{ας καὶ τοῦ Ἠγίου Ἰω-} \\
\text{άννου Ἐφεσίων πό-} \\
\text{λις Ἡ τούς τοῦ μεγά-} \\
\text{λου ἀποστόλου Παύ-} \\
\text{λου θείους λόγους} \\
\text{ἀκούσασα καὶ δια-} \\
\text{δοῦσα εἰς σωτηρίαν} \\
\text{τοῦ κόσμου ἐπείμησεν} \\
\text{Ἀδωλῖρον Δεισδήμανν} \\
\text{ἐξήκουσα ἐπὶ ἄφο-} \\
\text{τῆς ἐνεχεξαν καὶ ἀφ-} \\
\text{λίς καὶ τῆς εἰς αὐ-} \\
\text{τὴν ἀδιάλειπτον} \\
\text{leaf ἔνεγκεσίας leaf} \]

The bottom left panel shows a votive relief of Cybele standing with two lions between Zeus and Hermes.100 Deissmann discussed this relief briefly in an article,101 although – possibly because of the absence of the flat hat normally associated with Hermes – he identified the figure on the left as Attis. An entry in his diary on 26 October 1926 simply states: ‘Nische Relieffragment mit Löwen gefunden ...’; whether this refers to himself or someone else as the discoverer is inconclusive, but since this particular relief

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99 For a striking modern photographic comparison see Wipflinger/ Wlach, photo 29, and colour plate 8.
100 LIMC, 8.1.750; pl. at 8.2.508.
was photographically reproduced on his diploma it implies his involvement in its location. This hypothesis is confirmed by Keil’s report, for there he discussed similar votive reliefs and included a photo of what appears to be the same one painted in the diploma. Moreover, he explained that two of these had been discovered in the town of Selçuk during the 1926 season,¹⁰² which is a clear allusion to Deissmann’s recovery work of the missing sculptures and architectural fragments from the Johannine basilica (see ch. 5.3).

The pannel on the lower right portrays a griffin clasping an animal (young lion?) in its clutches, and most probably represents a second rediscovery by Deissmann, since, similar to the Cybele relief, it also depicts a plate that was originally unearthed by Sotiriou and later taken away to Selçuk.¹⁰³

In between these two reliefs is a second painting, this one of the Byzantine citadel on the Ayasoluk hill, northeast of Ephesus and seen from the less commonly presented south. The ruins of St. John’s basilica were still only partially excavated at that time, but are shown in the foreground; the various houses belong to the northerly outskirts of Selçuk. A photo taken from the narthex amongst these ruins towards the northwest exists in Keil’s ‘XII. Vorläufiger Bericht’ (64) and shows the large white structure and cypress. There he described the building as a formerly Muhajir-occupied Greek Orthodox church that had been evacuated by Turkish authorities and turned into a museum for artefacts related to the basilica (53).

All these border designs, including the honorific inscription in Greek, are part of the aesthetic intent of the diploma. However, it is the German text on the right that is particularly informative, as it identifies Deissmann as the pivotal individual who – together with Keil – made possible the rescue of ancient Ephesus:


Despite this honorific gift from his colleagues, which recognised Deissmann’s unique contribution for Ephesus, his significant achievement has by now become practically forgotten. So much is this the case, that a reasonably recognisable picture of him (see


¹⁰³ G. Sotiriou, Delitio 7, 1922, 177. H. Hörmann, ‘Die Johanniskirche’, FiE, 4, 3, 1951, 254 (with Taf. 58, 5). I owe the identification of this relief to Dr Kandler.
Fig. 7 and detail of it at Fig. 8) – published in a full-page photograph in *Ephesus, 100 years of Austrian Research* – failed to be identified by its authors and was also placed within the wrong era – 1895-1913.\(^{104}\) Furthermore, the book fails to make any mention of him, since the authors were apparently unaware of the critical role he played for both Ephesus and the ÖAI itself.

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In his first correspondence with Wiegand from Ephesus Deissmann happily reported: ‘Herrlichstes Wetter, unerhörte Trockenheit, keine Mücke und kein Fieber im Dorf.’\(^{105}\) He had been advised that mosquitoes were not going to be a problem and that

\(^{104}\) Wiplinger/Wlach, 35, photo 42.

\(^{105}\) GAD’s letter, 23.10.1926.
precautionary measures were unnecessary. But one week before leaving Selçuk he wrote in his diary: ‘Ephesus; Siebenschläfer (Arbeitstag trotz Fieber)’. It had started insidiously and he kept working until the last day of the campaign, when he was suddenly struck with a bad case of malaria. For three days he lay sick in a hotel in Smyrna, before he was able to travel by train to Istanbul. When he arrived there on Monday 29 November he ‘... found an asylum in the German pastor’s home, where I have been very ill, the fever being high and enervating’. According to his itinerary he was scheduled to give numerous lectures on his homeward journey – in Sofia, Belgrade and Novisad – but he was forced to cancel them, as he spent almost two weeks recuperating in Istanbul. His doctors also ‘strictly prohibited’ his planned lecture tour of America, and Deissmann acquiesced: ‘being past sixty I could not be disobedient and gave up the carefully prepared journey’.

However, this did not deter him from campaigning for greater public awareness about Ephesus, which also included some radio talks transmitted by Germany’s first radio broadcaster, ‘Funktunde’.

5.4. 1927 Ephesus expedition

The initial two months of the 1926 expedition had required relatively few labourers, which, together with the organisers’ cooperation and strict frugality, allowed the season to be concluded M. 30,000 (US$ 7000) below budget. This surplus was immediately earmarked for the following year, however, one week after his arrival at Ephesus Deissmann had already written his first ‘on-site’ report to Beardsley Rum and Thomas Appleget, in an attempt to secure adequate funding for 1927.

You see that this first new campaign is a very hopeful beginning. For future work there is besides many other objects one undertaking of a really unique character and world-wide importance: the excavation of the Church [sic] of St. John the Divine ... more than half ... is concealed still in the big rubbish masses of the centuries ... there is a hope that this Church of St. John when

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106 GAD, letter to Gyllenberg, 10.6.1929.
107 GAD’s letter, 21.2.1927.
108 Ibid. For his subsequent tour in 1929 see ch. 8.5.
109 The AK is inconclusive, but there are four separate entries in reference to radio talks given by GAD: 10.4.1927 (Ephesus excavations), 16.4.1927 (Ephesus excavations), 23.12.1929 (ecumenism), 20.12.1930 (German students). Germany entered the age of radio broadcasting on 29.10.1923 with ‘Radiostunde Berlin’. In March 1924 the program was renamed ‘Funktunde’ and ten years later this became ‘Reichssender Berlin’.
110 GAD’s grant application, 7.2.1927.
fully excavated may be perhaps the most remarkable ruin of that classic period of Justinianic Art.\footnote{111}

Back in Berlin after the excavation season ended, Deissmann met with Schmidt-Ott on 13 January to discuss future support for the Ephesus excavation, and made a case for the Notgemeinschaft to continue its financial backing. The next day he telephoned Ministerialrat Donnevort, and after a second conversation on the 24\textsuperscript{th} they arranged to meet on Saturday 29\textsuperscript{th}. Immediately following this – and for the same purpose – he also had an appointment with Legationsrat Terdenge at the Auswärtiges Amt, and two days later invited several guests to his home, among them Schmidt-Ott and Donnevort. Since Deissmann was scheduled to present a public lecture at the Archaeological Society\footnote{112}, the next evening, it is highly likely that the topic of Ephesus would also have been discussed at their informal meeting. Coincidentally, the lecture was held on the same day he had originally been scheduled to give the Woodward lecture at Yale in America, and he was still under doctor’s order to avoid any exertion until fully recuperated from malaria. Nevertheless, as his letter to the Notgemeinschaft a week later shows, he was far from being idle:

Ich hatte bereits die Ehre, den hohen Stellen, die das Unternehmen hier gefördert haben, mündlich eingehenden Vortrag darüber zu halten, unterstützt durch eine Anzahl von Photographien und Plänen, habe dann auch in der Archäologischen Gesellschaft Berlin am 1. Februar dieses Jahres einen ungewöhnlich stark besuchten Lichtblickvortrag darüber gehalten …\footnote{113}

According to his diary Deissmann had given his audio-visual presentation the heading, ‘Der Wiederbeginn der Ausgrabungen in Ephesus 1926’, thereby indicating his long-term hopes for the task. And now that the door to Ephesus’ future had once again been opened, he wanted to maintain the momentum of popular and scholarly interest. Thus, in the same letter he formally urged the Notgemeinschaft to repeat its backing for at least one more season.

Upon this, Schmidt-Ott prompted Wiegand to invite Keil to Berlin, to address the ‘Vereinigung der Freunde antiker Kunst’ at the Staatliche Kunstbibliothek on Saturday afternoon, 12 March, while he himself organised an executive meeting at the Notgemeinschaft offices for that morning. Invited were the Reichsministerium des

\footnote{111}{GAD’s letter, 25.10.1926.}
\footnote{112}{The ‘Archäologische Gesellschaft zu Berlin’ was founded in 1842 as a private but closely connected arm of the DAI. Almost all of Berlin’s archaeologists belonged to it, but it was also open to interested non-professionals, such as GAD. I owe this information to Dr. Antje Krug of the DAI.}
\footnote{113}{GAD’s grant application, 7.2.1927.}
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_Innern_ (probably Donnevert), the _Auswärtiges Amt_ (Terdenge or Heilbron), Rodenwaldt, Wiegand, Deissmann, Keil and Reisch.\textsuperscript{114} Each trustee of the ‘Treuhandenschaft Ephesus-Grabung’ was present, which was of some consequence, since all three former sponsors had agreed to extend their backing for a minimum of two more years,\textsuperscript{115} but there was also unanimity ‘dass die Notgemeinschaft von jetzt ab die Führung der Hilfsaktion hat …’.\textsuperscript{116} This decision did not relieve Deissmann altogether of his mediatory role, but gave the _Notgemeinschaft_ a better opportunity to coordinate the German patrons. It was very good news for the ÖAI, since the move indicated an obvious readiness of the benefactors to extend funding beyond the 1927 season.

While German backing seemed thus assured, it amounted to only half the required budget estimate without Rockefeller’s contribution, but in Deissmann’s letter to Appleget – written three weeks earlier\textsuperscript{117} – he had already informed him ‘that there is a well founded hope that the German and Austrian patrons shall contribute again a considerable amount for 1927 as they did in 1926’. In it he had pointed to the remarkable successes of the previous excavations, and included a progress report as well as a concise summary of their plans for the next campaign, in an effort to win over Rockefeller to fund the expedition for 1927. However, he added that since there was a financial surplus from the previous season (see above, ch. 5.4), the trustees had authorised him to ask that Rockefeller’s contribution ‘may be specifically designated for the great task of the excavation of the St. John’s basilica in Ephesus’. Deissmann also sent a copy of his letter to Charles Brent who, in turn, wrote to Appleget that Deissmann was a ‘notable personality’, whose initially expressed anticipations for Ephesus had been fully justified by the discoveries during the 1926 season, and advised, ‘… that it is worth Mr. Rockefeller’s earnest consideration as to whether he could not again aid in this valuable work’\textsuperscript{118} Deissmann’s friendly and informative letters had already made a good impression on Appleget, who replied four days later: ‘I must confess that something of [Deissmann’s] unusual personality you describe had gradually emerged during our correspondence’, and assured Brent that his commendatory letter would ‘be

\textsuperscript{114} Schmidt-Ott, invitation, 28.2.1927.
\textsuperscript{115} Schmidt-Ott, memorandum to Reichsministerium des Innern, 14.7.1927.
\textsuperscript{116} GAD’s letter, 8.3.1927. Also, GAD, letter to Appleget, 4.4.1927.
\textsuperscript{117} GAD’s letter, 21.2.1927.
\textsuperscript{118} Letter, dated 4.3.1927.
included in any consideration of the matter”.\footnote{Letter, dated 8.3.1927.} Subsequently, Rockefeller’s board of trustees resolved – on his behalf and under the same stipulations as the previous year – to contribute US$ 10,000 for the forthcoming season.\footnote{Memorandum, 10.3.1927.} Nevertheless, as Appleget wrote to Deissmann the next day, Rockefeller neither wished to designate his gift to specific aspects of the undertaking, nor did he ‘feel it is wise for him to contribute regularly to such enterprises’. What, then, persuaded him to repeat his donation at all? Appleget gave the credit to Deissmann’s savoir-faire, as well as the tangible successes achieved during the 1926 season: ‘We were very much interested in the account which you gave us of the previous excavations and thoroughly appreciate the importance of the results’.\footnote{Appleget, letter to GAD, 11.3.1927.}

Appleget’s letter was mailed a day before the seminal executive meeting at the Notgemeinschaft offices (12 March), and in Deissmann’s subsequent reply of appreciation he made the somewhat superfluous point that he received it several days after that meeting – evidently meaning it to be registered that the German patrons’ appraisal of the undertaking was not connected to Rockefeller’s decision.

Now that financing was assured Reisch wrote to Deissmann:

> Es ist mir eine ganz besondere Freude, Ihnen im Namen des österreichischen archäologischen Institutes den Empfang der neuen großen Spende des Herrn Joh Rockefeller jor [sic] bestätigen zu können, die wir in erster Linie Ihren unermüdlichen Bemühungen um die Weiterführung der Ephesosgrabung zu verdanken haben, und durch die uns nunmehr eine sichere finanzielle Grundlage für die Durchführung der großen Arbeiten gegeben ist, welche wir für die heurige und die nächstjährige Kampagne in Aussicht genommen haben.\footnote{Letter, dated 7.5.1927.}

Reisch had every reason to be pleased. But all was not well at the ÖAI; for while Josef Keil was assuredly their pivotal authority on Ephesus he had found conditions at Vienna increasingly difficult to tolerate, and that same week despondently confided to Wiegand:

> Vor einigen Tagen habe ich nun den Ruf für Greifswald und eine Einladung zu einer Besprechung in Berlin erhalten; mein Schicksal wird sich also entscheiden. Daß ich nicht leicht und nicht gern von Wien weggehe, wissen Sie und verstehen Sie auch zu würdigen. Aber ich war geradezu deprimiert, wie Reisch in seiner Unterredung mit mir von Anfang an gleich den Standpunkt zur Basis der Diskussion machte, daß er mich zwar ungern
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... verliere, aber daß er leider nur ganz bescheidene und nur materielle Verbesserungen erreichen könne. Bei der Universität ist nichts zu machen usw. Ich bin schließlich mit dem Gefühl geringsten Wertes weggegangen ... 25 Jahre habe ich dann fast Oesterreich in Krieg und Frieden gedient! Ergebnis: 400 Mark monatlich ... Zu dumm, daß ich mich innerlich doch etwas kränke.\textsuperscript{123}

He accepted the Chair at Greifswald (commencing 1 December 1927) and remained there for eight years before resuming his position at Vienna in 1936. Despite his move to North Germany he continued to lead the expeditions at Ephesus on behalf of the ÖAI, for his disillusionment was not with the Institute or the University but with the Government-imposed stringent economic conditions under which he was expected to work.

* * *

The leaders of the team for the 1927 campaign consisted of the same group as in 1926. However, contrary to Keil’s earlier fears that an apparent lack of suitable architects might defeat the project (see ch. 5.2), Hans Hörmann had now been engaged to join them as well,\textsuperscript{124} thus providing Keil with a second architect.

Their archaeological objectives for this season were threefold: firstly, to complete their work at the Seven Sleepers’ necropolis; secondly, to begin uncovering and investigating the large but previously unexplored building near the stadium (then still thought to be the praetorium); and thirdly, to complete the excavation of the St. John’s basilica.\textsuperscript{125} They had agreed that these three goals were so urgent that ‘auf deren Erledigung mit allen Mitteln hingearbeitet werden mußte’.\textsuperscript{126}

Deissmann left Berlin on 28 August and, after first spending a full day at Smyrna, where he met with Keil and Aziz, reached Ephesus on 6 September.\textsuperscript{127} Miltner was already there (possibly with Theuer); Keil and Aziz arrived two days later, and Hörmann another five days after that.

\textsuperscript{123} Keil’s letter, 12.5.1927.
\textsuperscript{124} ‘Als neue Hilfskraft war Regierungsbauamtman Dr. Hans Hörmann aus Passau gewonnen worden ...’. Keil, ‘XIII. Vorläufiger Bericht’, 6.
\textsuperscript{125} GAD’s letter, 21.2.1927.
\textsuperscript{126} Keil, ‘XIII. Vorläufiger Bericht’, 7.
\textsuperscript{127} This time, as in subsequent seasons, he protected himself against malaria with regular doses of quinine; see ch. 5.3.
Miltner was again put in charge of excavations at the Seven Sleepers’ site, with Deissmann working alongside him for the first week. During the past months the former had done some preliminary work on the cave’s plethora of lamps,\(^{128}\) while Deissmann agreed to compile and evaluate its literary traditions.\(^{129}\) Thus, the latter had written to Rendel Harris earlier in the year:

> Now I am engaged in a research about the Seven Sleepers of Ephesus … I would be very much interested if you could give me some hints concerning English books or articles about the ἔπτυσ ταῦτα δεξιά.\(^{130}\)

However, it appears that his project never advanced past the research stages, since he failed to publish anything of substance concerning the tradition,\(^{131}\) but a letter from Keil to Wiegand, written four months later, may shed some light on the likely cause of this:

> Deissmann … war wohl in der letzten Zeit mit der Bischofskonferenz überlastet und wird die Niederlage, die er wenigstens bei der zweiten Lesung davongetragen hat, wie ich fürchte schwerer tragen als notwendig wäre.\(^{132}\)

As pivotal as the excavation, preservation and historical evaluation of ancient Ephesus were for Deissmann personally, he was also a leading figure in the ecumenical movement and participated in numerous church synods and conferences.\(^{133}\)

While Miltner and Deissmann worked on the necropolis Keil and Theuer sank an experimental trench at the ‘praetorium’, but as soon as the Seven Sleepers project drew to a close Deissmann began to assist Keil with fragmentary building inscriptions.\(^{134}\) These, together with the discovery of a frigidarium, conduits and heating ducts, made it apparent that this building was not a praetorium but the gymnasium of Publius Vedius Antonius.\(^{135}\) Three weeks later progress was impeded by a delay in the arrival of stronger lifting equipment and a week of inclement weather. Moreover, a Turkish army convoy appeared on the site and – despite the ÖAI’s arrangement with both the Government and the Smyrna Museum (see ch. 5.2) – confiscated a roll of film.\(^{136}\) Nonetheless, the following day Hörmann was able to recommence the previous season’s

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\(^{128}\) Published only in 1937, as ‘Das Cömeterium der Sieben Schläfer’. *Fei*, 4, 2, 93-200.


\(^{130}\) GAD, letter to Harris, 15.1.1927.

\(^{131}\) In ‘Das wiedererstehende Ephesus’ GAD wrote two paragraphs about it, and added two photos from the Seven Sleepers’ grotto and one with four of its lamps.

\(^{132}\) Keil’s letter, 12.5.1927. See also ch. 8.4.

\(^{133}\) See ch. 8.1 introductory paragraph.

\(^{134}\) Keil, ‘XIII. Vorläufiger Bericht’, 36, n. 20.


\(^{136}\) So the AK: Aziz and Keil appear to have been in Smyrna at that time.
work at the St. John’s basilica, with Deissmann assisting, particularly in regard to the inscriptions. A full excavation of the entire structure would have been too complex and costly, but they were able to unearth the narthex completely, and also dig experimental trenches to discover the building’s pre-Justinian foundations and make an accurate ground plan. Since Deissmann was due back in Berlin for the winter semester he was only able to spend about two weeks at the basilica before leaving Ephesus on Friday 21 October.

* * *

When Deissmann arrived at Istanbul three days later the general director of the city’s Museums and member of the Turkish Parliament, Dr. Halil Edhem (1861-1938) – of whom Keil had previously written that he was ‘stets ein gütiger Berater’ for their team – invited Deissmann to a private tour of the Topkapi Sarayi. He led him to a large room with several long tables, on which were spread out

Pergament- und Papier-Codices, aufgerollte Pergament-Rotuli und einzelne unzusammenhängende Pergamente größten Formats ... meist mit griechischer oder lateinischer Schrift, die großen Blätter mit herrlichen Landkarten geschmückt ... es war unschwer zu erkennen, daß es sich hier um Teile der legendenumrankten Sera-Bibliothek handeln müsse. Infolge ihrer seither ungünstigen Lagerung waren diese Reliquien durch Feuchtigkeit und andere Zerstörungsursachen zum Teil in einem sehr bedenklichen Zustand.

In earlier correspondence with Appleget Deissmann had described the size of this collection as follows: ‘there I saw hundreds and thousands big and small fragments of parchment and paper manuscripts in many different languages ...’. Halil had especially brought them for Deissmann from the cellar of the ‘Schatzhau$, and offered to lock it all away again until the following year, provided he would accept a formal

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137 So the AK. Some of these inscriptions were printed in Keil, ‘XIII. Vorläufiger Bericht’, 62-5.
139 The ÖAI concluded their work a month after.
141 Literally ‘Cannongate Palace’. Built in the 15th century, the renowned palace is located on the Seraglio Point.
142 Forschungen, 3.
invitation to catalogue them and undertake some preliminary textual research.\textsuperscript{144} Halil also showed him the perilously decayed 5\textsuperscript{th} century Studios Monastery near the Golden Gate (Porta Aurea), and asked if he could perhaps use his connection with Rockefeller to raise some financial assistance for its preservation.

Once back in Berlin, Deissmann wrote the abovementioned letter to Appleget (see n. 143) in reference to Halil’s manuscript proposal, and also emphasised that the ancient Christian ruin was about ‘to fall to the ground if [Halil] cannot immediately take care of some repairs’. It was only a modest request for 2000 Turkish pounds (US$ 1000), to be equally divided between building repairs and manuscript preservation, but he concluded: ‘I could control myself [sic] next fall the utilization of this sum for the purposes indicated. But Dr. Halil Bej is a personality worthy of the highest confidence’.\textsuperscript{145} The reason for this request lay in the fledgling Republic’s budget priorities for comprehensive sociopolitical reform; and although Halil had tried to raise these funds himself the Turkish government had turned him down.

The Rockefeller Foundation’s initial reaction was also not enthusiastic, since they reasoned that ‘there are other buildings throughout the world, which require similar protective measure and other manuscripts which need protection’. Nevertheless, they decided to grant Deissmann’s request, on the grounds that ‘friendly negotiations with the Director of the Turkish Museum in Istanbul might open up avenues of information or approach which would later be useful’.\textsuperscript{146}

\section*{5.5. 1928 Ephesus expedition}

Since the executive meeting in March 1927 had effectively provided the ÖAI with a guarantee of financial support for two successive archaeological seasons, and sufficient funds remained from Rockefeller’s second grant, resources were assured for 1928 without involving the latter. The Notgemeinschaft – now acting as designated liaison for the three German patrons – had already transferred an initial donation of M. 15,000 to the Ephesus Trust Fund in July 1927, and a month later another M. 7500 came from the Reichsministerium des Innern, but another M. 12,500 were needed. When Deissmann reminded Schmidt-Ott of this the latter advised that he should contact the

\textsuperscript{144} 
\textit{Forschungen}, 3.

\textsuperscript{145} GAD’s letter, 26.1.1928.

\textsuperscript{146} Memorandum, 16.2.1928.
Auswärtiges Amt himself. A month later, with the balance still not reached, Deissmann wrote a similar letter to both the Auswärtiges Amt and the Reichsministerium des Innern, upon which the former transferred M. 7500 to the trust, but for the remaining M. 5000 Donnevert (Reichsministerium des Innern) redirected Deissmann back to the Notgemeinschaft. As late as July, when the ÖAI was trying to finalise preparations for the third expedition, this contribution was still not forthcoming. Again Deissmann contacted Schmidt-Ott, appealing that the money – which the ÖAI had expected at the beginning of July – should be paid ‘baldtunlichst’.\(^{147}\)

Appleget happened to be in Europe during that summer and there took the opportunity to meet Deissmann for the first time.\(^{148}\) The latter immediately updated him on Halil’s work and how Rockefeller’s donation had made it possible to clean all the manuscripts and place them between protective sheets of glass. He also gave Appleget some recent photographs Halil had sent of the Studios Monastery, and said that his Turkish friend had ‘done wonders’ with the money, but ‘could profitably employ another thousand [dollars] in order to brace the tottering walls [of the Studios Monastery] and complete the cleaning process’.\(^{149}\) Appleget’s subsequent report, on behalf of Deissmann, to Rockefeller’s advisory board was favourably received and resulted in an additional donation of US$ 750, with another US$ 250 kept in reserve should it be needed.

On his way to Ephesus in mid-October Deissmann made a four-day stopover at Istanbul to see Halil and make a preliminary assessment of the Topkapi Sarayi’s non-Islamic manuscripts, which the latter had again prepared for him to view. As a consequence of this Deissmann gave him the assurance ‘... den Versuch zu machen, Mitarbeiter zu gewinnen, um mit ihrer Hilfe die allerdringendsten Arbeiten in Angriff zu nehmen’.\(^{150}\) By ‘Mitarbeiter’ he had in mind primarily Hugo Ibscher (1874-1943), conservator at the Egypt Museum in Berlin and Europe’s foremost expert on papyrus preservation, with whom he hoped to return to Istanbul in 1929.\(^{151}\) To help with this, and at the same time enable Deissmann to seek collegial assistance with manuscript identification, Halil gave him numerous photographs of the material. Within ten days after returning to Berlin

\(^{147}\) GAD, letter to Schmidt-Ott, 12.7.1928.

\(^{148}\) A precise date cannot be established, except that they met between late June and mid-July.

\(^{149}\) Appleget, letter to Richardson, 6.8.1928.

\(^{150}\) Forschungen, 6.

\(^{151}\) Forschungen, 7. Ibscher, a bookbinder by trade, was largely self-taught, but had received an honorary doctorate from the University of Hamburg for his innovative preserving methods, and was in constant demand in museums throughout Europe.
Deissmann dictated a typed letter to Eduard Schwartz on another matter (see ch. 4.3), but appended the following handwritten paragraph:

Ich habe hier inzwischen noch viele Feststellungen über die von mir gesehenen Codices etc im Serbia gemacht; ich war dort ohne alle Hilfsmittel und in großer Hetze. Bitte betrachten Sie gütigst die vorläufigen Mitteilungen als streng vertraulich. Ich möchte in jedem Fall vermeiden, dass die Sache in den internationalen Klatsch kommt, ehe ich augeklärt [sic] habe, was ich aufklären kann.\footnote{GAD’s letter, 7.12.1928.}

The reason for his caution was that the Turkish Ministry of Education had quietly commissioned him with the preservation, ordering and cataloguing of the library’s non-Islamic items, and until his findings would be published (see ch. 5.7) Halil kept any access to the entire collection restricted.\footnote{Forschungen, 6.}

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The new season at Ephesus began during the first week of September, with the same team as in 1927, and concluded eleven weeks later. The objectives were again threefold: finalizing the St. John’s basilica excavation; investigating the extent of the gymnasium; and searching for pre-Hellenic remains of the city.\footnote{Keil reported that up to 250 laborours had been employed, and: ‘Dank intensiver reibunglosener Zusammenarbeit aller Beteiligten ist dieses Programm in 11 Grabungswochen bewältigt worden’, ‘XIV. Vorläufiger Bericht’, ÖJh., 25. Beiblatt, 1929, 8.}

Deissmann himself arrived on 21 October, as he had prior speaking engagements at the Church of England congress in Cheltenham and also at the University of Wales in Bangor. However, within hours of his arrival at Ephesus he was at the basilica’s site, and from Keil’s report it is clear that excavations were still in full swing at that time, since the ruin lay buried beneath up to 6 m. of rubble:

Es hat zehnwöchentlicher schwierigster und angestrengtester ... Arbeit bedurft, ehe diese Schutt- und Trümmermassen ... auf vier von verschiedenen Seiten und auf verschiedenem Niveau herangeführten Feldbahlinien abtransportiert und damit die Voraussetzungen für eine Aufnahme und ein genaues Studium des justinianischen Bauwerkes wie der darunter befindlichen Reste älterer Anlagen geschaffen waren.\footnote{Keil, ‘XIV. Vorläufiger Bericht’, 11.}
In a letter which Deissmann wrote to Appleget, just before leaving Ephesus, he assessed the basilica’s excavation as the season’s ‘most important result’, but advised that ‘the technical difficulties were very great’.

This was partly due to the sheer size of the multi-storied building (100 x 65 m.), and partly because of its position on the southern slope of the Ayasoluk hill.

Although details are sketchy regarding Deissmann’s activities at Ephesus that year, he did work on the basilica’s newly-found inscriptions, as well as in the nearby museum (Johannes Haus). His practical involvement with the archaeological work can also be gauged from the ÖAI’s official report, in which Reisch highlighted the ‘... Bedeutung der Grabung [viz. the basilica], an deren glücklicher Durchführung neben Hörmann auch Keil, Deißmann und Miltner ihren vollgemessenen Anteil haben’. However, much of the second week of November was wet, with heavy rain and thunderstorms, which helped in the discovery of several sarcophagi, but created a hazard among the ruins. Early in the morning on the second last day of the season (15 November) a section of a stone floor shifted and fell on Hörmann, resulting in a compound fracture of his right leg and subsequent evacuation to Smyrna hospital.

The weekend before the accident Deissmann, Aziz and Theuer had travelled to Pergamon to visit Wiegand. He took them on a tour of the site, in the hope of interesting Deissmann to use his connection with Appleget and Rockefeller to raise funds for the excavation of Pergamon’s former Hadrianic Temple of Serapis, which had been converted into a Christian church during the 4th century and dedicated to St. John. This dedication gave it a somewhat tenuous sociohistorical connection with the

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156 GAD, letter to Appleget, 17.11.1928. In a memorandum, dated, 19.3.1929, Appleget later noted that, in addition to the substantial structural excavation, ‘they have discovered some very good pieces of statuary and a remarkable variety of manuscripts – some fifty in total number and including something from Ovid, Homer, the cosmography of Ptolemy, as well as inscriptions on walls and pillars made by Christian pilgrims.’ Memorandum, entitled: ‘Excavations at Ephesus, conversation: Dr. Adolf Deissmann’. It is uncertain what to make of these comments. Keil’s report is silent about MSS, whose survival in swampy soil is unimaginable. Perhaps GAD had mentioned the Istanbul MSS to Appleget, who confused them with finds at Ephesus.

157 A ground plan, drawn by Hans Hörmann in Jan. . 931, shows that a further 30 m. of foundations had been discovered, bringing the total length of the building to 130 m. See Wiplinger/Wlach, 50.

158 Reisch, ‘Bericht über die Gesamtsitzung des Österreichischen Archäologischen Institutes 1930’, ÖJb., 26, Beilblatt, 1930, 309. GAD was a corresponding member of the DAI since 1922, but on Wiegand’s initiative became a full member in 1928. I am indebted for this information to Dr. Antje Krug of the DAI.

159 So the AK; see also Keil, ‘XIV. Vorläufiger Bericht’, 6, 51.

160 Packard, letter to Wiegand, 28.10.1929. The request was denied on policy grounds. Arthur W. Packard was an administrator of the Rockefeller Foundation.
St. John’s basilica at Ephesus. But, although Deissmann somewhat reluctantly agreed to raise the matter with Appleget he emphasised to the latter that he wanted the Foundation ‘to consider Ephesus as the first interest’.\(^{161}\) His continuous appeals to Rockefeller’s generosity could easily become interpreted as being exploitative, a possibility he had diplomatically tried to avoid, and a year later he explained to a close friend:

Ich habe ... bei verschiedenen Verhandlungen mit einem Vertrauensmann des Mr. John Rockefeller jun. [i.e. Appleget] den Eindruck erhalten ... dass die Verwaltung der Rockefeller Stiftung recht zurückhaltend geworden ist, namentlich wenn von ein- und derselben Seite [i.e. Deissmann] verschiedenartige Anträge gestellt werden. Ich selbst hatte wegen der ja seit Jahren gewährten Unterstützung für die Ausgrabungen in Ephesus hauptsächlich zu verhandeln. Diese Verhandlungen sind noch nicht zum Abschluss gekommen. Ich hatte ausserdem noch zwei andere Aufträge [Halil and Wiegand], durch die natürlich der Hauptauftrag Ephesus betreffend nicht besonders günstig beeinflusst wurde ... und ich hatte das deutliche Gefühl, dass ich durch eine Häufung meiner Bitten schliesslich jede einzelne gefährdete.\(^{162}\)

5.6. 1929 Ephesus expedition

Three months after Deissmann returned to Berlin he boarded a steamer bound for New York to commence a two-month speaking tour in the USA (see ch. 8.5). There he met Appleget on several occasions, and two days before returning to Germany discussed with him the need for ongoing funding for Ephesus. The next day several copies of Keil’s archaeological report for 1928 arrived in the mail and Deissmann immediately posted two of them to Appleget, accompanied by a letter, in which he wrote:

According to the program made with you yesterday, I now have the honour to ask Mr. John Rockefeller jun., in behalf of the Board of Trustees of the Ephesus Excavation, kindly to renew his generous support of $ 10,000, which he gave twice, in 1926 and 1927, for the next Ephesus campaign beginning on September 1., 1929.\(^{163}\)

What Deissmann did not know was that as a result of his last meeting with Appleget the latter had immediately written a memorandum, in which he affirmed:

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\(^{161}\) Appleget, memorandum, 19.3.1929, entitled: ‘Excavations at Ephesus, conversation: Dr. Adolf Deissmann’.

\(^{162}\) GAD, letter to Keller, 10.5.1929. Adolf Keller (1872-1963), was a leading Swiss ecumenist whom GAD befriended at the Helsingborg ecumenical conference in 1922, and by 1928 was addressing him with the ‘Du’ form. GAD, letter to Keller, 30.11.1928.

\(^{163}\) GAD, letter to Appleget, 24.4.1929. For a transcript see Appendix 5. i.
The secretary [i.e. Appleget] is very favourably inclined toward continuation of these contributions and is planning to present the matter to the Advisory Committee as soon as possible without waiting for Deissmann’s formal request.\textsuperscript{164}

On his recommendation the Advisory Committee took a decisive step, for the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial had recently been merged with the Rockefeller Foundation; the Committee determined to ‘relieve the Foundation of the Deissmann project’, but renew support for another year by themselves, adding that

\ldots this technical referring of border line cases between the Foundation and the Advisory Committee is a necessary and entirely advisable procedure \ldots [and] is helpful to the Advisory Committee in defining its field.\textsuperscript{165}

On 29 May Appleget sent Deissmann the news that Rockefeller had agreed to contribute a further US$ 10,000 under the same conditions as in previous years, but indicated that their support might soon be discontinued.\textsuperscript{166} Indeed, two years later, when Deissmann wrote another request for Rockefeller to renew his support for the 1932-33 seasons, the Advisory Committee advised that

Mr. Rockefeller has carried on the interest [of Ephesus] for a long enough period, and that this is as good a time as any to terminate the interest, although the decision will not come to Dr. Deissmann at a particularly happy time for him.\textsuperscript{167}

The allusion to bad timing refers not only to the Depression, but also to Deissmann’s University duties as Rektor and Prorektor, which prevented his active participation at the excavations (see ch. 9.1). However, even though the German sponsors had indicated their ongoing support early in 1929, it took Deissmann over a month before he was able to reply to Appleget’s letter of 29 May, declaring:

Meanwhile I was very busy to fulfil the conditions mentioned in your letter and am glad to say that I have had a full success. I secured in cash the amount of $ 10,000 (=RM 42,000.-) from other sources.\textsuperscript{168}

The Ephesus Trust Fund and the ÖAI had agreed that the new resources were sufficient for the 1929 as well as the 1930 season. To reach their required M. 42,000 the

\textsuperscript{164} Appleget, memorandum, entitled, ‘Excavations at Ephesus, conversation: Dr. Deissmann’, 23.4.1929.
\textsuperscript{165} Appleget, letter to Vincent, 28.5.1929. George Edgar Vincent (1864-1941) was president of the Foundation (1917-29). Its primary objective was public welfare and the betterment of living standards.
\textsuperscript{166} Appleget, letter to GAD, 29.5.1929. The New York Stock Exchange collapsed five months later (see ch. 9.1), however, the Benevolence Committee had questioned ongoing support already in March: ‘We wonder if it would not now be well to consider how far we plan to go in the future’. Appleget’s memorandum, 19.3.1929.
\textsuperscript{167} Packard, memorandum to Appleget, 13.7.1931.
\textsuperscript{168} GAD, letter to Appleget, 6.7.1929.
Notgemeinschaft contributed M. 20,000,\(^\text{169}\) while the Auswärtiges Amt and the Reichsministerium des Innern each provided M. 7500, and a further M. 7000 came from the ÖAI.

The principal working team in 1929 consisted of Aziz, Keil, Miltner and Theuer. Hörmann was absent, although whether this was due to his injury is not certain; and Deissmann, having worked at Sofia and Istanbul for the past five weeks (see ch. 5.7), could only spend seven days at Ephesus. He had no inkling that this would be his last journey to the site,\(^\text{170}\) but fortuitously both Henriette and their 18-year-old son Gerhard were able to accompany him – an experience the latter still remembers keenly, almost eight decades later. During that week Deissmann worked on various inscriptions at the gymnasion and the fishermen’s association stele of Neronian date, from the τελωνίαν της ξυπνητής found near the harbour.\(^\text{171}\)

## 5.7. Forschungen und Funde im Serai

When Deissmann accepted Halil’s invitation to work at the Topkapı Sarayi in 1929 he had intended not only to win over Hugo Ilscher for the specialised restoration and preservation tasks, but also to engage the help of his wife Henriette and youngest son Gerhard, which is why they accompanied him on this journey. It seems Deissmann had taken Strachan’s reprimand to heart – made two decades earlier, when he omitted Henriette’s name from the credits in Licht vom Osten (see ch. 2.4) – for in Forschungen he now wrote:

> Auch die Hilfe meiner Frau und meines Sohnes Gerhard kann ich hier nicht verschweigen. Sie war beträchtlich. Sie bestand in Arbeiten der Reinigung, der Paginierung, der Identifizierung von Fragmenten und der Katalogisierung. Das vorläufige Verzeichnis der Gesamtbestände, das ich vor unserer Heimreise im Serai hinterlassen konnte, hätte ich ohne diese Mitarbeit nicht zustande gebracht.\(^\text{172}\)

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\(^\text{169}\) With an added caveat that their second M. 10,000 for the 1930 season would be reviewed, since the other two patrons ‘weit hinter dem Anteil der Notgemeinschaft zurückbleiben’. Schmidt-Ott, letter to GAD, 22.7.1929.

\(^\text{170}\) GAD, letter to Kultusministerium, 15.8.1933; see Appendix 5, j.


\(^\text{172}\) Forschungen, 11-12.
While many of the codices had already been sighted and described by others, Halil brought much fresh material and also allowed Deissmann unrestricted access to search for overlooked texts in every room of the hitherto largely inaccessible Topkapı Sarayı complex. This included the subterranean treasure chamber, two large secret crypts beneath it, and a third one even further down and accessible only via a trap door, as well as the massive cellars of the Bagdad-Kiosk itself. Deissmann was able to confirm Emil Jacobs’ earlier supposition that the entire collection belonged to the private library of the conqueror of Constantinople, Sultan Mehmet II (1432-81). The polyglottic collection included incunabula, codices, rotuli, parchments and fragments; manuscripts from classical and Christian authors, cultic texts, grammars, lexica and ancient maps.

Of this last category an international sensation was created when a sizable section from Piri Re‘is’ world map was discovered, since it provided the only known (partial) copy of Christopher Columbus’ lost chart and, therefore, tangible evidence on how the latter visualised the world. While Deissmann studied Mehmet’s collection he had noticed the Sultan’s penchant for geography and asked Halil to search the palace for any maps which might thus far have been disregarded. Upon this Halil found an old bundle that included an extraordinary Turkish parchment map and brought his find to Deissmann on 9 October. Coincidentally, the German orientalist Paul Ernst Kahle (1875-1964) happened to be in Istanbul at that time, but Deissmann had succeeded in coopting him to assist with the identification of Seragliensis 101-12 (eleven liturgical and one Samaritan Pentateuch MSS). He was working with him the day before, but now, with Halil’s permission, he showed him the ancient map (Seragliensis 87). Kahle was singularly qualified to make a formal appraisal, for only three years earlier he had published Piri Re‘is’ sailing manual, ‘Bahrije’, and now he quickly recognised that this map was based on a lost chart of Christopher Columbus (1451-1506).


174 See Appendix 5. k for a synopsis of GAD. H. Wegener, eds., Die Armenbibel des Serai; Rotulus Seragliensis Nr. 52, Berlin, 1934. On the question of how GAD came to be selected for this cataloging task, see Forschungen, 1-8.

175 Piri Re‘is (c. 1470-1554) was an Ottoman admiral, writer and cartographer. See also P. Lunde, ‘Piri Reis and the Columbus Map’, Aramco World, 43, 3, 1992, 48-59. Also, Forschungen, 111-22. For GAD’s account of its discovery see Appendix 5.1

176 See Appendix 5.1. The AK gives the date of the actual discovery as Tue., 8th.
Although Deissmann credited Kahle with the identification and interpretation of the map and Halil with its discovery, this find was a significant coup in which he, too, shared an integral part. Kahle published his findings only two years later, in a paper at the International Orientalist Congress at Leiden.\(^{177}\) Deissmann had originally intended to publish the results of his own work in the Topkapı Sarayi in 1931, but attributed the two-year delay to his Rectorat.\(^{178}\) While this was undoubtedly the main reason, a contributing factor lay also in the belated date of Kahle’s publication of the map. For Deissmann had, of course, to rely on specialist research for his own lengthy analysis of it,\(^{179}\) and a perfunctory treatment of this historic find would have broken the trust that Halil and the Turkish Ministry of Education had placed in him.

*Forschungen* is a 144-page book dedicated to Halil and is well presented, with a useful index. Deissmann makes it clear that his work was based on that of Emil Jacobs (1868-1940),\(^{180}\) director of the Prussian State Library, although the latter never set foot in the Topkapı Sarayi and himself relied very considerably on the 16th century account of Dominico Yerushalmi (1552-1622).

*Forschungen* was the first attempt at a complete index of the library’s non-Islamic material, and is divided into two sections. Part one gives an overview of the library’s history, architecture, previous inventories and literary character, while part two consists of 127 separate textual listings – consisting of a total of 20,000 folia – descriptions and select exposés. Deissmann cautiously referred to this second half as ‘Verzeichnis’ rather than ‘Katalog’, since his criterion for what constituted a scholarly catalogue was high, and the book, by his own estimation, fell short of it.\(^{181}\) The vital cleaning and

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178. See Appendix 5, m.

179. Besides Kahle, he also credited Eugen Oberhummer (1859-1944), since they planned to publish the map jointly, ‘in einer großen wissenschaftlichen Publikation’: *Forschungen*, 113-4; but this failed to eventuate.


181. ‘Mit Absicht nenne ich die folgende Liste Verzeichnis, nicht Katalog. Ich habe eine hohe Vorstellung vom Wesen eines wissenschaftlichen Katalogs und möchte nicht den Anschein erwecken, als entspräche diese Liste dem, was mir persönlich bei einem Kataloge vorschwebt. An die knappe mir im Serai zur Verfügung stehende Zeit gebunden und diese Zeit zu einem guten Teil noch für die unaufschiebbaren technischen Arbeiten der Reimigung und vorläufigen Konservierung der Handschriften benötigend, konnte ich nicht mehr erreichen, als diese erste zusammenfassende
preservation tasks, particularly of the badly damaged but valuable 13th century Ptolemy
codex (Seragliensis Nr. 57), had taken more time than expected and curtailed his textual
research, making a thorough cataloguing impossible within the limited time frame.
Instead, he considered his work as merely a first ‘zusammenfassende Aufnahme’, thus
accounting for the volume’s somewhat unbalanced title.

5.8. Ephesus after 1931

Despite the cessation of the Rockefeller funding, a limited Ephesus expedition was
made possible in 1932 largely with the help of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.182
Although Deissmann was no longer able to take part in any excavations after 1929, and
Rockefeller’s backing seemed – as Schmidt-Ott glumly expressed it – ‘endgültig
fehlgeschlagen’,183 his enthusiastic support for the city remained undiminished.

During the spring of 1932, when the vice-president of the Rockefeller Foundation’s
Europe branch, Selskar Michael Gunn (1883-1944), was in Berlin on another matter,
Deissmann arranged to meet him, and gained his sympathy for Ephesus. This resulted
in an appointment with David Harrison Stevens (1884-1980), the Foundation’s new
director at Paris. Thus, one month later Deissmann travelled by train to France, with the
sole purpose of interesting Stevens in continuing Rockefeller’s financing of the Ephesus
work through the latter’s Europe office. They met in the afternoon of 17 May, and that
night Deissmann was back on the train to Berlin – without a positive answer. Yet
despite Schmidt-Ott’s pessimism, the ongoing Great Depression (see ch. 9.1) and
Germany’s increasing sociopolitical uncertainties, Deissmann still maintained the hope
of raising sufficient money for an expedition in 1933, and in December wrote to Paul
Zingerle (1868-1947), Vizedirektor of the ÖAI,

... dass ich infolge einer von mir in Paris herbeigeführten Konferenz mit
dem Leiter der Sektion für klassische Altertumswissenschaft bei der
Rockefeller-Stiftung zu New York begründete Aussicht zu haben glaube,
eine wenn auch wieder bescheidener Expedition nach Ephesus 1933 zu
finanzieren. Die seither von mir flüssig gemachten Mittel kamen, wie Sie
wissen werden, aus der Privatschatulle des Mr. John Rockefeller. Solche

182 The Notgemeinschaft was renamed ‘Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft’ in December 1929.
183 Schmidt-Ott, letter to Reisch, 4.8.1931.
privaten Mittel kann unser Wohltäter künftig nicht mehr zur Verfügung stellen.\textsuperscript{184} Deissmann’s redoubled fundraising efforts can partly be attributed to his own plan of returning to Ephesus briefly before the winter semester. \textit{Forschungen} had been published earlier that year, and as a result the Turkish Ministry of Education had invited him back to Istanbul to examine and catalogue a quantity of recently located Greek manuscripts, including a biblical codex. By the end of March Deissmann wrote to Reisch:

Ich hatte alles daran gesetzt, dass diese Pariser mündliche Aussprache zustande käme, weil ja eine einzige Stunde eines solchen persönlichen Austausches oft grösseren Erfolg hat als eine über viele Wochen sich erstreckende Korrespondenz … Ich hatte dann nach langem Warten die Freude, dass die Rockefeller Foundation sich bereit erklärte, für die Kampagne der Treuhänderschaft Ephesus-Grabung einen Betrag von 2.500.- Dollars zurückzulegen.\textsuperscript{185}

Thus, on 15 August he made an application to the Ministry, ‘in der zweiten Septemberhälfte 1933 wiederum eine Forschungsreise nach Bulgarien und der Türkei anzutreten’.\textsuperscript{186} His travel expenses were already paid for by a non-specified foundation, and his diary entry for 1 September reads: ‘Für Sept. + Oktober ist ein 2-bettiges Zimmer im Institut von Istanbul für uns reserviert’; Henriette was evidently planning to accompany him again.

Thus far the Deissmanns had their residency at Prinzregentenstrasse 6 in Wilmersdorf, Berlin, but on 3 July – in preparation for their retirement to Wünsdorf\textsuperscript{187} – they began extensive reconstruction and development work on their weekend house and property, which led to a last minute cancellation of their journey on account of unexpected building complications.\textsuperscript{188} Disappointed, Deissmann wrote to his colleague and former student Martin Dibelius (1883-1947).\textsuperscript{189}

Meine Forschungsreise nach Bulgarien, Konstantinopel und Ephesus habe ich auf nächstes Jahr verschieben müssen, da ich durch die Bauarbeiten in Wünsdorf noch auf Wochen hinaus hier festgehalten werde.\textsuperscript{190}

\begin{flushleft}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{184} Dated 5.12.1932.
\textsuperscript{185} GAD, letter to Reisch, 30.3.1933.
\textsuperscript{186} GAD’ letter, 15.8.1933; see Appendix 5. j.
\textsuperscript{187} See ch. 9. n. 93.
\textsuperscript{188} One example is the building inspector’s rejection of the construction on 4 September (so the AK).
\textsuperscript{189} Dibelius, GAD’s most prominent doctoral graduate (1910), became a pioneer in NT form criticism and held the ordinarius Chair of NT at Heidelberg. He wrote to GAD for his 70th birthday that he had been ‘der erste, der bei Ihnen die venia legendi eröffnet’. Letter, dated 7.11.1936; held privately.
\textsuperscript{190} Dated, 13.9.1933.
\end{flushleft}
The journey never eventuated. Rockefeller’s Foundation had redirected his generosity elsewhere, and in May 1934 Deissmann wrote to Schmidt-Ott that because of the ‘wohl noch längere Zeit andauernden schwierigen Finanzlage …’ the Ephesus excavations would have to be suspended for that year. Nevertheless, he urged that it was ‘dringend notwendig … um den vorläufigen Abschluss verantworten zu können’ that a number of urgent tasks be completed on site. Wiegand commended Deissmann’s proposal to Schmidt-Ott by declaring, ‘das zu diesem Zweck von Geheimrat Professor Deissmann vorgelegte Programm entspricht diesen Forderungen in allen Punkten’. Keil himself considered a scientifically responsible conclusion so important that he wrote to Wiegand for advice:

Gewiss wird sich Deissmann auch schon in derselben Sache an Sie gewendet haben; ich bin ihm so dankbar, wie er sich für die Sache abmüht. Aber ich muss doch noch versuchen seine Bemühungen bei Ihnen persönlich zu unterstützen … Kann ich selbst [bei der Forschungsgemeinschaft] meine Sache vertreten, mündlich, mit aller mir zur Verfügung stehenden Beredsamkeit oder ist es besser, wenn im Stillen durch Deissmann der Versuch gemacht wird, damit nicht etwa politische Schwierigkeiten wachgerufen werden?

Indeed, two weeks later it was Deissmann who, in a three-page letter to the Forschungsgemeinschaft, made his case for the necessity of an appropriate closing campaign for Ephesus and detailed its costing and general objectives. He had already made one last but unsuccessful attempt by the Rockefeller Foundation earlier that year. However, the Turkish government donated M. 7000, and on 20 June the Forschungsgemeinschaft acceded to Deissmann’s request and matched that grant.

It was on Deissmann’s initiative that excavations resumed at Ephesus, and it was again he – much inspired by a lecture Keil gave in Berlin on 15 May 1934 – who proposed (and made sure) that these excavations were not terminated abruptly, as they had been.

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191 ‘Die Rockefeller-Foundation [hatte] erklärt, dass sie ihre Aufgabe begrenzen müsse und Ausgrabungen in Zukunft voraussichtlich ausserhalb ihres Interessengebietes fallen würden.’ GAD’s report, 1.6.1935; see Appendix 5, d.
193 Letter, dated 29.5.1934.
194 Keil, letter to Wiegand, 17.5.1935.
195 GAD’s report, 1.6.1935; see Appendix 5, d.
196 Wiegand, letter to GAD, 29.4.1935.
in Sotiriou’s case, but that they were drawn to a prudently planned conclusion that would provide a sound basis for future archaeological research.

Wir würden unseren beträchtlichen moralischen Kredit bei der türkischen Wissenschaftsverwaltung in nicht geringem Masse gefährden, wenn wir, zu einer vorläufigen längeren Unterbrechung der Ephesus-Arbeit genötigt, unsere Grabungsobjekte in einem z.T. halbfertigen Zustand hinterliessen. Es ist doch in höchstem Grade wünschenswert, dass die türkische Behörden uns das einzigartige Forschungsfeld Ephesus für eine fernere Zukunft weiterbelassen.\textsuperscript{197}

5.9. Conclusion

Deissmann was once aptly described as the ‘Seele des Planes’ for the renewed Ephesus excavations.\textsuperscript{198} But although it may be pointless to speculate what this important archaeological site would be like today without his timely and tireless initiatives, which he maintained until his death (see ch. 5.2), it is certain that immeasurable historical losses were being avoided because of his proactive determination to preserve this city’s ancient remains. Today, four million visitors are drawn to Ephesus each year, resulting in a huge public exposure, summed up in the words of Dr. Wilfried Seipel, director-general of the Kunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna: ‘Ephesus has done more, in these [past] 100 years, than any other city on the west coast of Turkey to further the understanding of ancient civilization’.\textsuperscript{199}

Deissmann had first come in contact with the ruins of Ephesus during his two study tours of 1906 and 1909 (see ch. 4.1-2), and was so struck by its far-reaching potential for postclassical scholarship that this became the primary motive which underpinned his later involvement with the city’s excavation. His conviction that it was archaeological re\textit{alia} that formed the strongest material link for the understanding of the language, thinking and culture of the postclassical Greek world led him to believe that this could also provide a way to grasp more accurately the meaning of the NT itself. That the ÖAI, and especially Keil – whose professional contribution to Ephesian archaeology was second to none – took Deissmann seriously is evident in that they made him an integral part of their excavation teams for four successive seasons. Although untrained in archaeology and, therefore, not on the same level of proficiency as Keil and Miltner,

\textsuperscript{197} GAD’s report, 1.6.1935; see Appendix 5, d.
\textsuperscript{198} Strathmann’s letter, 10.7.1925.
\textsuperscript{199} Wiplinger/ Wlach, vii.
he was nevertheless kept fully ‘in the loop’ at all times, both by Keil and the Institute’s directors. In spite of the fact that Deissmann was prevented from participating in excavations after 1929, he continued as chairman of the ‘Treuhänderschaft Ephesus-Grabung’ fund until his death (see ch. 5.2).

In recognition of Deissmann’s unique role for Ephesus – and by extension for the ÖAI itself – the latter bestowed on him full membership of the Institute on 5 June 1930.\(^\text{200}\) No words could conclude this chapter more fitly and authoritatively than those expressed by Keil on the occasion of Deissmann’s 70\(^{th}\) birthday.

Es wäre schrecklich, wenn sich die Grenze des Staates als eine Grenze der Freundschaft oder der geistigen Zusammenarbeit äußern wollte. Es kann ja aber, Gott sei dafür gedankt – nicht sein! Du hast einst über die Grenzen hinaus das große Ephesosunternehmen dem Deine und unsere Liebe galt, zu neuem Leben erweckt und hast es betreut als heiligen Besitz geistiger Art, für den unter deutschen Menschen keine Grenze bestehen kann. Voll Dankbarkeit haben wir 1926 Deinen 60. Geburtstag in der ‘Metropolis’ gefeiert. Voll größter Dankbarkeit haben wir Deiner an Deinem 70. Geburtstag zu gedenken. Aber so wie ich, kann es keiner tun, weil ich mehr als alle anderen, nicht nur das, was Du getan hast, kenne, sondern auch um die große, glühende Liebe weiß, aus der heraus Dein ganzes Tun geflossen ist. Um diese glühende Liebe weiß ich selbst, weiß auch meine Frau. An sie denken wir an Deinem Ehrentage und es ist uns, ob alles, was Dir an Ehrungen und Auszeichnungen gegeben wurde und gegeben werden kann, nichts ist im Vergleich zu ihr.\(^\text{201}\)

Keil’s allusion to international political changes reveals that Deissmann celebrated his 70\(^{th}\) birthday, not as a decade earlier (see ch. 5.3) in visionary anticipation for what Ephesus might bring to scholarship, but in an era of national and personal anxiety about the future. The following chapters are designed, therefore, to place him firmly into his contemporary context, and aim to demonstrate how this versatile scholar, in search of archaeological realia that might deepen his understanding of the NT, came to be involved at an international level in work of a social, cultural and ecumenical nature.

\(^{200}\) Membership certificate, dated 15.7.1930. The ÖAI had already made him a full member in 1928. See n. 158.

\(^{201}\) Keil’s letter, 5.10.1936 (italics mine); see Appendix 9, g (IV).
Part 3

Deissmann in his contemporary context

Figure 9
Gustav Adolf Deissmann, portrait in oil, January 1930
Ch. 6: From postclassical Greek to *Sozialpolitik*¹

[Deissmann ist] eine Persönlichkeit ... die, an keine Formeln der Schule gebunden und durch keine Parteirücksichten eingeengt, sich mit großer Selbstständigkeit bewegt."²

6.1. Political awakening

Since this chapter focuses on Deissmann’s political development within the context of contemporary early 20th century Germany, it is inevitable that a variety of significant political or historical questions of that time will be touched upon. However, the subject is Deissmann, not German political history, for which reason I shall only treat these topics inasmuch as they bear on and are relevant to the overall focus of this dissertation.

When Deissmann accepted the position of ordinarius as successor to Bernhard Weiss in Berlin the religious press attacks were severe, but not unexpected (see ch. 2.4). He had made his controversial début into Prussia’s conservative capital of Wilhelmine imperialism as a provincial liberal theologian, whose primary contribution to academic progress seemed to be no more than a reformist agenda of Greek philology, which the city’s devout traditionalists believed to be tantamount to a violation of Prussian orthodoxy itself.³ Compounding this was his active involvement with what the editor of the *Reichsbote* termed ‘revolutionäre Sozialdemokratie’,⁴ and which Otto von Bismarck (1815-98) contemptuously branded as ‘the party of subversion’.⁵

The enormously far-reaching Lutheran-Hegelian *Zweireichelehre⁶* dominated almost completely every aspect of Prussia’s collective sociopolitical psyche. This caused any

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¹ Except in citations, I shall generally use the English term ‘social politics’ as an exact equivalent of the German *Sozialpolitik*.
² Wendland, *DLZ*, 3148.
⁶ See ch. 8, n. 3.
unorthodox activity in support of the broader working classes to be regarded as a sign of
disloyalty or dissent – particularly among the 7000 aristocrats who dominated the city –
and, therefore, a threat to Germany’s politically unified but socioreligiously unstable
nation. Thus, when Deissmann wrote to Moulton about his appointment to Berlin, he
asserted: ‘Man hat mich aber hauptsächlich politisch angegriffen, da ich hier
[Heidelberg] auf Seiten der Arbeiter gestanden habe’. 7

Having been raised and educated primarily within the provincial and for the most part
Roman Catholic Grand Duchy of Baden, 8 he had acquired personal experience with
what he termed ‘menschliche[s] Elend’ amongst the rural Lahn-valley communities. 9
Despite the boom years (1896-1905) which followed in the wake of the trade policies of
Bismarck’s successor, Chancellor Graf Georg Leo von Caprivi (1831-99), Germany’s
working classes continued to face harsh socioeconmic conditions, especially in rural
regions. In contrast, Deissmann’s earlier years at Heidelberg seemed almost carefree,
and he described them as ‘jene reichen Jugendtage’, when neither he nor his immediate
colleagues – with the possible exception of Max Weber – possessed sufficiently
developed political foresight to be concerned about their country’s growing
international isolation. 10 This did not mean, though, that Deissmann was politically
disengaged; such a position would have been almost untenable for any turn-of-the-
century German academic. 11 For as a professor he was obliged to swear a Beamteneid,
based – even in that predominantly Roman Catholic part of Germany – on Luther’s
doctrine of the two kingdoms, by vowing:

Ich schwöre Treue dem Großherzog und der Verfassung, Gehorsam dem
Gesichte, des Fürsten wie des Vaterlandes Wohl nach Kräften zu befördern

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7 GAD’s letter, 19.2.1908. See also ch. 2, n. 127.
8 In 1890 Roman Catholics made up 62% of Baden’s population, as against 36% Lutheran and 1.6%
Jewish.
9 SD, 7.
10 SD, 21.
11 Some three decades later, when nationwide student protests gave rise to the question of ‘wieweit die
Politik an den Hochschulen ... eine Stelle haben soll’, Justizrat Ernst Heymann pointed out: ‘Es ist
sehr bequem dies damit abzutun, daß man die Hochschulen als Stätte der Wissenschaft und ihrer
Lehre von der Politik loszulösen fordert ... Man kann auch nicht ... den studentischen Korporationen
und Vereinigungen die politische Erörterung und die Pflege politischer Gesinnung verbieten. Damit
stellte man sie ungünstiger als die Massen der jungen Arbeiter und Angestellten, obwohl gerade die
geistig besonders gut Vorgebildeten sich früh mit dem politischen Leben der Nation vertraut zu
und überhaupt alle Pflichten des mir übertragenen Amtes gewissenhaft zu erfüllen, so wahr mir Gott helfe.\(^{12}\)

The reference to the national welfare (‘Vaterlandes Wohl’) was in no way intended for the benefit of the working classes with whose plight Deissmann had been sympathising since his youth. Instead, it demanded full dedication to the State itself – that is to say the abstract Rankean\(^{13}\) concept of the State as a divine ‘idea’ – which, thus deified, endowed ‘the State’ with extraordinary power over individuals. This was theologically reinforced and justified by Luther’s dogma that monarchies rose and fell in accordance with God’s providential will, making the Kaiser, as God’s appointed \textit{paterfamilias} of Germany, the \textit{summus episcopus} of the Lutheran Church.

Deissmann’s father had a somewhat unorthodox yet strongly conservative Lutheran \textit{Weltanschauung},\(^{14}\) which had left an understandable mark on Deissmann’s personal life. However, his sociopolitical consciousness received its first awakening only at the age of 21, during a summer semester’s study at Berlin in 1888, where he happened to see both the frail Kaiser Wilhelm I,\(^{15}\) as well as Bismarck. He had, in fact, come to the imperial city during what would later be remembered as the chaotic \textit{Drei-Kaiser-Jahr}.\(^{16}\)

When the nearly 91-year-old Wilhelm died on 9 March, he was immediately succeeded by his liberal son Friedrich Wilhelm (Kaiser Friedrich III) – on whom the hope of a constitutional monarchy had rested, reflecting that of Britain – but after ruling Prussia for only 99 days he died of throat cancer. This was a fateful historical occasion, for on 15 June his young and impulsive son Wilhelm II took over the throne. Alexandra Richie, in her \textit{History of Berlin}, expressed it graphically:

> It was a tragedy for Germany that William came to power ... Max Weber called him the ‘Imperial Clown’; Bismarck complained that he was like a balloon pushed around by sudden gusts of wind, and even the once

\(^{12}\) Verhandlung, 11.10.1897. This document provides details of the formal part of GAD’s induction proceedings.


\(^{14}\) ‘In den innerkirchlichen Kämpfen stand mein Vater entschieden rechts ... Für die mechanischen Verwaltungsgeschäfte des Pfarramts und der Schuleitung ... hat er mit zunehmendem Alter immer mehr unter ihnen geseufzt und auch die Behörden seufzen lassen ... Durch seine energisch protestantische Stellungnahme in der Diaspora kam er wiederholt in langwierige Preßfleden und politische Prozesse, aus denen er nicht ohne Narben, aber siegreich hervorging.’ \textit{SD}, 4-5.

\(^{15}\) \textit{SD}, 6. Although GAD referred to him there as F-riedrich, he was generally known as Wilhelm I (full name Wilhelm Friedrich Ludwig), who died 9.3.1888.

\(^{16}\) A catchy mnemonic soon appeared in schools, and characterised the three sovereigns as follows: ‘Wilhelm I. war der greise Kaiser, Friedrich III. der weise Kaiser und Wilhelm II. der Reisekaiser.’ The term ‘Drei-Kaiser-Jahr’ appears to be an allusion to CE 69 and Tacitus’ year of the four Emperors (i.e. Galba, Otho, Vitellius and Vespasian), \textit{Historiae}, 1.2.
indulgent Queen Victoria called him a 'hot-headed, conceited, and wrong-headed young man, devoid of all feeling'. When his father died the young prince moved fast ... erasing the memory of his hated parents and destroying anything which might threaten his authority ... the military was given a free hand in the city, and civilians had to get used to being jostled by arrogant officers in the streets ... Liberals were silenced ... [and] instead of turning into a liberal democratic state Berlin had become the centre of an ever larger military machine.\textsuperscript{17}

When Deissmann arrived in this city it was filled with every kind of gaudy uniform,\textsuperscript{18} and a display of social arrogance was common, in stark contrast to how he had come to perceive life in the provinces. Although this jolting encounter with the effects of Berlin’s escalating militarism lasted only a few months, it left ‘eine tiefe Narbe’ in him – intensified by the mysterious suicide (in Berlin) of his very close Hessian friend Wilhelm Rückert.\textsuperscript{19}

Feeling socially isolated, Deissmann sought frequent Sunday refuge with his Uncle Theodor Halbey,\textsuperscript{20} a Jurist and Vortragender Rat in the Ministerium des Innern, who was engaged in the process of revising the ordinances for Prussia’s rural communities. While Deissmann did not elucidate, it can certainly be extrapolated from Selbstdarstellungen that this senior governmental servant must have shared many political thoughts with his young nephew, especially since he intimated that Halbey ‘... mir viel Vertrauen schenkte’.\textsuperscript{21} In the same pages he also recalled his semester’s study in Berlin and described it as ‘eine unerhört erregte Spanne Zeit, voll neuer Eindrücke aus dem sozial und politisch damals maßlos aufgewühlten Leben der Hauptstadt’.\textsuperscript{22}

What he alluded to was not only a detached observation of Prussia’s political instability at that time, but rather that it was there where his first contact with the effects of Alfred Stoecker’s factional movement took place (see ch. 6.2), and the earliest beginnings of his own sociopolitical philosophy began to take shape. For shortly before the end of his

\textsuperscript{17} A. Richie, Faust’s Metropolis: a history of Berlin, New York, 1998, 202-3. But compare with C. Clark, Kaiser Wilhelm II, Edinburgh, 2000, who writes: ‘Wilhelm once announced to a group of admirals: “All of you know nothing, I alone know something. I alone decide.” If we assume that the Kaiser was congenitally deranged then we will read these remarks literally, as evidence to a deluded world-view. But we could also read the same remarks situationally. The German Kaiser was surrounded by people ... whose expertise posed a threat to his personal authority over the many domains under his nominal control.’ 22.

\textsuperscript{18} Later satirised by the German playwright Carl Zuckmayer, in ‘Der Hauptmann von Köpenick’ (1931).

\textsuperscript{19} See also Appendix 1, b, where GAD indicated that they had both been members of the same theological fraternity (‘Vereinsbruder’).

\textsuperscript{20} Married to the only sister of GAD’s mother, Amalie Rullmann (1838-1915).

\textsuperscript{21} SD, 7.

\textsuperscript{22} SD, 6.
life Deissmann fondly remembered these particular student days in Berlin for the political direction they had given him:

Wer die von Stöcker entfachte Bewegung als Berliner Student und nachmals als junger Dozent und Geistlicher miterlebt hat, wie sie die Massen aufrüttelte und eine Auslese von Arbeitern, Theologen und anderen Akademikern, Bürgern und Bauern herausstellte in die Zeit, wie sie im Namen des Evangeliums den Kampf um die Seele des Volkes aufnahmen gegen die kosmischen Mächte des Materialismus und des Mammonismus, des Klassenkampfs und der Vaterlandslosigkeit, blickt auf diese Jahre immer als auf Lichtpunkte seiner Jugend mit Dankbarkeit zurück.  

The last phrase highlights that it was this summer semester of 1888 in Berlin – more than paternal influences during his youth – which gave the impetus for his later involvement with social politics at Heidelberg. Moreover, it indicates that Deissmann had been showing an interest in Christian social politics for some time before he came in contact with Friedrich Naumann’s movement (see ch. 6.2).

6.2. Social Democracy: the Naumann connection

The closing decades of the 19th century had thrown Prussia into grave social turbulence, in which the rift between industrialists and the working classes had become so strong that organised reactions were inevitable and gave rise to trade unions and socialist parties. Thus, in 1863 the Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein (ADAV) was formed by Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-64), followed six years later by the more Marx-oriented Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei (SDAP), led by August Bebel (1840-1913). These two parties coalesced in 1875 to form the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, better known as SPD, and today Germany’s oldest political party.

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23 GAD, Reinhold Seeberg, ein Gedächtniswort, Stuttgart, 1936, 33.
24 Although he credited his mother for having helped him through those ‘stormy days of Anti-Semitism’, an allusion to his stay in Berlin. Pr Wi., 26.2.1916, 1.
25 The vociferous Prussian historian Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-96) was able to declare that workers were ‘poor and should remain so … the millions must plough and hammer and plane in order that the several thousand may carry on scientific research, paint and govern … [but] the masses must for ever remain the masses.’ Richie, 179.
28 Carsten, 68-74.
However, Bismarck felt so threatened by its leftist principles of social equality and shared wealth that he outlawed it three years later, by pushing his anti-socialist legislation (Sozialistengesetz) through parliament. 29 That same year the court chaplain Adolf Christian Stoecker (1835-1909) – a passionate monarchist who feared that the Church was losing touch with the working classes and their poor social conditions – founded the Christlich-Soziale Arbeiterpartei (CSAP). 30 A demagogue, he aimed to gain the support of workers through the party’s conservative Christian social policies and overtly anti-Semitic propaganda in direct opposition to the SPD. Nevertheless, in 1883 Stoecker, too, fell foul of Bismarck, who forced him to cease all political activities. However, after the Chancellor’s dismissal by the Kaiser on 18 March 1890, and the repeal of the Sozialistengesetz, 31 the SPD was decriminalised and gained the support of 1.5 million voters. 32 Stoecker immediately resumed his political career through the Deutschkonservative Partei, which he successfully won over to his anti-Semitic ideology, and began to organise mass rallies, in his aspiration for a church-centred social democratic coalition. On 28 May he became a founding member of the Evangelisch-Sozialer Kongress (ESK), 33 which was established to deliberate on Germany’s social problems from the perspective of Protestant ethics.

Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919) met Stoecker for the first time in 1880, 34 and the following year invited him to address a student rally at Leipzig to launch the Verein deutscher Studenten.

Die bewegende Kraft [für diesen Verein] wurde der temperamentvolle junge Historiker Diederich Hahn, ein Niedersachse; neben ihm Naumann … Naumann erstrebte Stoeckers Mitwirken und erreichte auch dessen grundsätzliche Bereitwilligkeit. 35

A few years later Naumann gained first-hand experience of the harsh social effects of industrialisation, initially while working as a Protestant social worker in an orphanage near Hamburg (1883-5) and later as Pfarrer in Langenberg, in the industrial Erzgebirge

29 Ibid., 82.
31 On 25.1.1890, but only effective from 30.9.1890.
32 Richle, 180.
33 Others were: Adolf Wagner, Ludwig Weber and Adolf Harnack, the latter presided annually over the congress from 1902-11.
35 Ibid., 52-3.
(1886-90). Despite Stoecker’s notoriously polemical anti-Semitism, Naumann remained a keen admirer of the man and his progressive Christian political ideologies, although in 1887 he wrote to Martin Rade:

> daß ich kein blinder Bewunderer bin, haben Sie ... gewiss gesehen ... Seine Theologie ist mir wertlos ... aber trotz allem und allem, er hat seinen Zauber für mich nicht verloren, denn er ist ein Mann voll christlicher Kraft, wie ihn Berlin braucht ... Er lässt mich bisweilen an das Wort denken, das Calvin von Luther gesagt haben soll: und wenn er mich einen Teufel nennete, ich würde ihn ehren.  

Naumann himself saw no reason for opposing Stoecker concerning the Jews, since his own ideology differed only by degrees from the latter’s basic contention that Germany was on the verge of _Verjudung_. This racially motivated fear that Jews were corrupting the German nation with genetically inferior blood, materialistic work ethics, shallow morals and greedy financial practices had begun to permeate the city of Berlin during the 1880s and soon spread throughout Prussia. In fact, the increasing Jewish preponderance in the business and financial sector had troubled Naumann as well, but he centred his political theories rather on what a cooperation of Germany’s liberal democratic forces could achieve socially than on blaming an ethnic minority for the nation’s socioeconomic disparity. Thus, despite his unfavourable personal attitude towards Berlin’s prominent Jewish entrepreneurs, he steered away from reducing Prussia’s socioeconomic crisis to the one-dimensional racist platform on which Stoecker had chosen to run his campaign. However, Naumann was also a member of several Protestant workers’ unions and, similar to Stoecker, hoped to fuse the various progressive organizations into a large-scale coalition for social reform, based on Christian instead of Marxist principles and functioning as a Protestant alternative to the SPD.

Nevertheless, the fundamental difference between Stoecker and Naumann was ultimately one of age – the conservative Stoecker being a quarter-century older than

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36 Heuss, 55-7, 70-4.
37 Ibid., 69.
38 It had been gaining momentum since the stock market crash of 1873, which was blamed primarily on the Jews.
39 Naumann had argued: ‘Eine Unmasse Kraft verzehrt sich im internen Kampf der Parteien und Personen ... Solange die Parteien sich gegenseitig aufheben, ist das Recht des Reichstages, seinerseits Gesetze vorzuschlagen, beinahe ein schlummerndes Recht.’ Demokratie und Kaisertum, 54.
Naumann – which is why the latter tended to appeal more to the younger generation, nicknamed ‘Die Jungen’,\textsuperscript{41} men like Max Weber, Bernhard Weiss’ son Bernhard Wilhelm Johannes Weiss (1863-1914), and Deissmann. By 1895 a rift had developed between Naumann and Stoecker, yet the latter still wrote to Naumann: ‘Schenkt es Ihnen Gott, was er uns versagt hat, daß Sie eine große Arbeiterpartei zu bilden vermögen, so wird sich niemand mehr freuen als ich …’\textsuperscript{42} But the formation of an independent political party seemed premature to Naumann, and he cautioned: ‘Wir sind zur Parteibildung noch lange nicht fertig, und ich warne stets, sich zeitiger in den Kampf zu stellen, als die Kräfte beisammen sind’.\textsuperscript{43} The following spring Stoecker resigned from both the conservative party and the ESK.

After launching \textit{Die Zeit}, an official newspaper for national socialism based on Christian principles, Naumann organised a conference at Erfurt from 23 to 25 November 1896, to which non-conservative Christian socialists – Deissmann among them – were invited, and the \textit{Nationalsozialer Verein} was formed. Naumann’s initial proposal to name it a ‘Politischer Verein als Vorbereitung zu einer Partei’ shows that this was not the setting up of a political party. Rather, it was an association whose express aim was to raise both awareness and support, so that they could put forward a new political party at the federal elections in 1898.\textsuperscript{44} That summer they were able to present candidates in eleven constituencies, with Naumann himself standing for both Jena and Frankfurt am Main, but with a total count of only 27,200 votes not one of them succeeded.\textsuperscript{45} Afterwards Deissmann wrote consolingly to Naumann:

\begin{quote}
Unsere Sache steht in den Anfängen; wir haben kein Geld, keine Presse, keine geschulten Massen. Aber wir haben eins: Glauben. Wir haben deshalb keine Ursache, an unserer Sache zu verzweifeln ... Dass Sie selbst nicht gewählt sind, beklage ich freilich auf's tiefste und mit mir viele an den deutschen Hochschulen, aber ... halten Sie fest an unserer Sache, lassen Sie sich nicht entmutigen, bieten Sie wie seither allem Spott, aller Achtung, aller Verlumdung, aller Verblendung die Stirn! Es kommt auch Ihr Tag!'\textsuperscript{46}
\end{quote}

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\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 111. Stoecker’s followers were labelled ‘Die Alten’.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 122.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 129.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 130-1.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 142.
\textsuperscript{46} Letter, dated 20.6.1898. Heuss appears to have been unaware of this letter. For a transcript see Appendix 6, a.
Naumann’s biographer and first president of the German Republic (1949-59), Theodor Heuss (1884-1963), claimed that Deissmann ‘seit der Jugend dem Gestorbenen [Naumann] nachgefolgt war …’.\(^{47}\) This is incorrect, since he was more than 21 years old when he first encountered Stoecker’s church-centred socialism in Berlin, while Naumann was still a Pfarrer in the faraway Saxon town of Langenberg. It is, in fact, highly improbable that Deissmann ever met Naumann before June 1890 at the earliest, when the latter had moved to Frankfurt to take up his new position as chaplain for the Home Mission (i.e. Evangelischer Verein für Innere Mission).\(^{48}\) It was from there that Naumann’s political ascent began, although rather inauspiciously at first, since he became almost immediately incapacitated by severe asthma attacks. This debility had already prevented him from participating in the first ESK on 28 May 1890, and subsequently almost forced him to resign from his new position.\(^{49}\) It was May 1891 before he was fit and confident enough to immerse himself fully into his task – just in time for the second ESK – and it was very likely there where the two men met for the first time.

Both Stoecker and Naumann were working towards the formation of a Christian Social-Democratic Party to represent Germany’s disadvantaged working classes from an essentially Lutheran perspective. They hoped to gain sufficient political impact with it to bring about socioeconomic changes, but their movement lacked ongoing solidarity. As Deissmann observed:

> Es ist leider nicht gelungen, dieser Bewegung die ursprüngliche Einheitlichkeit zu erhalten. Aber die von ihr ausgegangenen Sonder-Organisationen, die kirchlich-soziale Stöckers selbst und nach ihm Seeberg, und die national-soziale des Stöckerschülers Friedrich Naumann, haben, wie sie den gleichen harten Widerstand namentlich aus der Schwerindustrie erlebten, doch auch weiterhin gemeinsam dazu beigetragen, das nationale und soziale Gewissen des evangelischen Deutschland wachzunehmen und zu schärfen.\(^{50}\)

Deissmann made a neat distinction here between Stoecker’s extreme right-wing and ideologically driven socialism (espoused by Reinhold Seeberg) and Naumann’s progressive evolutionary socialism, which he increasingly began to follow as the latter’s political profile developed. For he genuinely believed that Naumann was able to offer

\(^{47}\) Heuss, 534.  
\(^{48}\) Ibid., 98.  
\(^{49}\) Ibid., 91-2.  
\(^{50}\) GAD, Reinhold Seeberg, 33.
Germany an innovative program for political, social and economic reform that would be rooted within broadly Christian principles. The old imperialist *laissez-faire* policies of industrial capitalism were already being challenged effectively by the SPD, but Naumann’s push towards a Protestant, balanced and nationally integrated social system appealed to the young Marburg theologian, who sympathised more with employees than employers. Thus, no sooner had Deissmann taken up his new position as *Pfarrer* in Herborn (see ch. 1.5), than he ran foul of the district’s church authorities because of his political activities, which were perceived as plebeian agitation by the local conservative Lutheran council.

Als ich dann 1895 die Universität verließ und an das Theologische Seminar (Predigerseminar) zu Herborn ging ... ließen [sic] mir in wissenschaftlichen Dingen völlige Freiheit: nur meiner sozialpolitischen Betätigung (es waren damals die Tage der nationalsozialen Bewegung) war der seinerseits übrigens selbst als Parteipolitiker hervorgetretene juristische Konsistorialpräsidient wenig gewogen und suchte mich vor „Agitation“ zu warnen, deren Beginn er so zu bestimmen unternahm, daß von einer bestimmten Kilometerzahl vom Kirchenspielort ab die erlaubte politische „Arbeit“ aufhöre und die unerlaubte „Agitation“ anfange.\(^ {51} \)

This amusing anecdote alludes to a noteworthy aspect of Deissmann’s early involvement with Naumann. For, although he preached in churches and lectured at Universities, to think of the young theologian as a public political agitator is demonstrably out of character. Deissmann was well known for his quiet and self-possessed personality; besides, his speaking style was peculiarly solemn, so much so that his students nicknamed him ‘ein Scheich’.\(^ {52} \) One of them later reminisced:

> Er war eigentlich immer mit einer gewissen unnahbaren Feierlichkeit umgeben, vielleicht eine unbewußte Abwehrhandlung eines zarten und fast schüchternen Gemütes ... Auch in den Seminarsitzungen ging es feierlich zu.\(^ {53} \)

His persona simply did not fit that of a political *provocateur*; but this raises the obvious question why, then, he was put under such pressure to cease ‘agitation’?

In December 1894 – not long before Deissmann received this cautionary advice – Naumann launched the weekly paper *Die Hilfe*.\(^ {54} \) It was published as a ‘mouthpiece’ and forum for younger Christian social democrats – specifically labourers, tradesmen

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51 *Ev. Wbr.*, 15.2.1919, 4.
52 ‘... Deißmann mit seiner ruhigen Art – immer „feierlich wie ein Scheich“, pflegte die jüngere, respektlose Generation damals von Deißmann zu sagen.’ O. Dibelius, ‘Verkämpfer des Jahrhunderts der Ökumene’. Further to GAD’s personality, see also ch. 9, nn. 88, 100.
53 Harder/ Deissmann, 5.
54 Until 1902 this was subtitled: ‘Gotteshilfe, Selbsthilfe, Staatshilfe, Bruderhilfe’. Heuss, 111-3.
and farmers – although ‘in zweiter Linie [auch für] Gebildete, die sich für eine volkstümliche Behandlung der sozialen Frage interessieren’. While I was unable to discover whether Deissmann received a copy of the paper’s first edition, the consistory president’s strange warning to refrain from political activities outside a set radius from the Herborn church seems to imply that the ‘agitation’ of the young Pfarrer appears to have consisted of no more than distributing Die Hilfe among the farmers of the rural villages Hörbach, Sinn and Hirschberg (see ch. 1.5). He considered them ‘meine Dörfer’, as they belonged to the Herborn parish and he was responsible for their general welfare. They were primarily made up of ‘Kleinbauern und zwergbäuerlichen Hüttenarbeiten’, and precisely the target audience Naumann sought to reach.

Not long after that first warning he received a second one, this time from Berlin itself and, oddly enough, from his former teacher Bernhard Weiss. There was an almost darkly comical side to it, as Deissmann recalled:


The notion of a connection between Weiss’ admonition and Carl Ferdinand von Stumm-Halberg (1836-1901) might appear somewhat tenuous at first, but Deissmann’s reference to the ‘Aera Stumm’ almost certainly implies that Stumm, a passionately authoritarian member of the Prussian parliament and a rigorous suppressor of the rapidly growing social democratic movement, had prompted the aged Weiss. In his role as Vortragender Rat to the Kultusministerium the octogenarian was closely connected with the Reichstag, and it would have been ir both their ideological interests to dissuade Weiss’ former student from taking this political direction.

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55 Ibid., 114.
56 SD, 18.
57 Like GAD, Johannes Weiss was one of the founding members of Naumann’s Nationalsozialer Verein.
59 GAD’s commemorative address, 26.6.1927.
Stumm was satirically nicknamed ‘Herrschener von Saarabien’, an allusion to his excessively ostentatious lifestyle, and because of his quasi-monarchical opposition to the rise of social democracy in the Saarland. Thus, he enforced an obscure industrial ruling from 1877 that decreed the dismissal of any one known to fraternise with social democrats; even reading papers suspect of socialist content was sufficient cause. Towards the end of 1894, shortly after Stumm had come in contact with Naumann, this same law was also applied to anyone reading Die Hilfe, in an all-out effort to gag the political voice of the latter’s movement, even though it was widely divergent from the SPD. During January and early February Stumm followed this up with a string of vituperative speeches on the scourge of social democracy, in which he fallaciously equated Naumann’s ideology with that of the SPD, but attacked it as ‘noch viel gefährlicher’. This then, was the political context in which Bernhard Weiss came to see Deissmann to try and deter him from further associating with Naumann.

It was hardly coincidental that Deissmann received two such dissuasive admonitions at the very outset of his short-lived parish ministry, especially since both came from strongly conservative royalists and Stumm sympathisers. The Reichstag – under the influence of Stumm – evidently deemed the young state employee to be building up too much momentum towards the left, and was anxious to stop him from drawing the kirchentreue Herborn parish further in that direction, for this could have led to a state-wide swing against the centre-right throughout the newly industrialised Hessen.

Deissmann’s ardent participation at this early stage in Naumann’s rise to politics is of some consequence, as he must have been convinced of the merits of the latter’s sociopolitical philosophy even before Naumann himself had completely grasped its full potential. Deissmann’s staunch belief that Naumann’s liberal Christian socialism could bring about sweeping socioeconomic changes in Germany are expressed unmistakably in a letter he wrote to Hermann Cohen.

Wenn irgend etwas, dann gestattet das Erstarken des sozialen Geistes einen hoffenden Ausblick aufs neue Jahrhundert. Ich weiß nicht welchen Grad von Interesse Sie seither der an den Namen Naumann sich knüpfenden Bewegung geschenkt haben; jedenfalls hat dieselbe eine gewaltige Kraft, gewaltiger als ihr selbst noch zum Bewußtsein gekommen ist. Und ohne pro Domo reden zu wollen, glaube ich sagen zu dürfen, dass mir aus dieser Pforte dereinst ein gut Teil der Schaffenslust kommen wird, in die sich der soziale Drang

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60 Heuss, 115.
61 Ibid., 117.
einfügen wird. Die inhaltsschweren Sätze Ihres Programms sind eine
gewissensschließlich Legalisierung unserer Bewegung ... 62

It would take another ten months before the Nationalsozialer Verein was formed and,
except for Die Hilfe, no formal political organ had thus far been set up by Naumann or
his followers. Yet Deissmann wrote of their loose association not only in superlative
terms but also referred to it as ‘unsere Bewegung’, thus overtly siding with the political
left.

More than a quarter-century later he related how this quasi-social revolutionary
ideology had affected the Weltanschauung of Naumann’s followers, including himself.
It instilled in them an optimistic confidence that a nationally unifying, socioeconomic
reform was possible and could be brought about by their movement.

Wir waren im übrigen ganz hingegangen einer unerschütterlichen nationalen
Zuversicht und setzten unsere Kraft hauptsächlich dafür ein, der schweren
inneren Gefährdung der deutschen Einheit, die durch das Auseinanderstreben
der handarbeitenden Massen und der „bürgerlichen“ Gesellschaft gegeben
war, zu begegnen. 63

In 1897, when he was appointed to the Chair of NT theology at Heidelberg, the right-
wing press attacked him in much the same way as they were to do eleven years later
when he accepted Bernhard Weiss’ Chair at Berlin; but Deissmann wrote
philosophically:

Die in einigen Blättern gegen meine Berufung [nach Berlin] erschienenen
Artikel haben mir den Gedanken nahegelegt, Ihnen mitzuteilen, dass genau
dieselben Artikel auch bei meiner Berufung nach Heidelberg 1897 erschienen
sind; ich vermisste nur das damals benutzte Argument, ich sei ein
langweiliger Dozent. Von den konservativen Kreisen Badens damals mit
starkem Misstrauen aufgenommen, habe ich in den zehn Jahren meiner
Wirksamkeit mit einer grossen Zahl konservativer Badener freundliche, ja
freundschaftliche Beziehungen anknüpfen können ... 64

The conservatives’ strong distrust of Deissmann was based on the grounds that he had
once been a ‘nationalsozialer Parteiführer’ 65 and ‘ein ausgesprochener Parteimann von
der Linken’. 66 This charge, however, seems to have arisen from a probable confusion
between Naumann’s Nationalsozialer Verein, which Deissmann chaired at Heidelberg

aus dem Nachlaß Adolf Deissmann’s’, ZNTHG, 9, 7002, 319.
63 SD, 21.
64 Gad, letter to unknown recipient (possibly Ludwig Elster), 17.1.1908.
66 ‘Der neutestamentliche Lehrstuhl in Berlin’, Das Reich, 2.2.1908. For some of Gad’s refutations,
see Gad, letter to Kultusministerium, 25.2.1908, and Reichsbote, 26.6.1908.
until 1903, and an actual political party, of which he never was a leader. Yet this misconception was at the heart of several newspaper articles written in reaction to his appointment at each University.

Bernhard Weiss – whose son Johannes, too, was a member of the Nationalsozialer Verein – understood the difference well, which is why he was able to defend Deissmann as a man whom he knew intimately ‘und von dem ich konstatieren muss, dass er einer der wenigen unter den hervorragenden Theologen ist, den man in keiner Weise als „Partheimann“ bezeichnen kann’. 67 Although this apologia was written in 1908, it was meant to silence the allegation of the theologian Ernst Bunke (1866-1944). 68 While the latter undeniably propagated a false report it is true that Deissmann was one of the region’s leading proponents of Christian social-democracy, especially before 1903.

By the time Deissmann had moved to Heidelberg (1897) he had already developed a strong sense of social justice and civic duty. Accordingly, when he was nominated to chair the city’s coal cooperative in October 1900 he immediately wrote a letter to the University Senate, and despite taxing health problems 69 requested that they permit him to accept. 70

This honorary office was by no means his only civic role at Heidelberg, for he also became engaged in the local politics of the town council and took on the role of acting director of the academic volunteer ambulance corps. 71 Unfortunately, sizeable documentary lacunae make a more detailed assessment of this part of Deissmann’s life quite problematic. However, a lacunary entry in his diary on 4 December 1901 suggests that he was on that day elected Kreisratsabgeordneter, and in Selbstdarstellungen he wrote of ‘Beteiligung am öffentlichen Leben als Stadtverordneter und als Berater in gemeinnütziger genossenschaftlicher Arbeit’. 72 The latter position is a reference to the

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69 The AK shows that he was suffering from recurring migraines.
70 ‘[Ich bitte] um hochgeneigte Genehmigung zur Führung des Vorsitzes im Aufsichtsrat der Heidelberger Kohlen-Einkaufs-Genossenschaft ... Ich bemerke dabei, daß diese Stelle für mich weder mittelbar noch unmittelbar mit einem Gewinn oder einer Belohnung verbunden ist.’ GAD, note to University Senate, 17.10.1900.
71 Pr.WL, 6,12.1914, 3.
72 SD, 22.
coal cooperative of which he was a member until 1908, but he was also an active city councillor, even after the disbanding of the Nationalsozialer Verein in 1903.

On 16 June that year, when Naumann failed the second time to win a mandate for the Nationalsozialer Verein at the polls, he wrote an essay entitled Die Niederlage in which he declared:

Wenn wir (trotz aller Mühe) verloren haben, so bedeutet das: wir sind nicht imstande, die neue Partei zu gründen. Das ist eine bittere Klarheit, aber es ist Klarheit. Jetzt handelt es sich nicht mehr um den weiteren Versuch, Partei zu sein, sondern es handelt sich nur noch um die Vertretung eines politischen Gedankenganges ... Es ist wahrscheinlich, dass wir die Form unserer Arbeit ändern müssen ....

While this prompted considerable dissension within the troubled association, Naumann led the remaining adherents – Deissmann among them – to join forces with the left liberal Freisinnige Vereinigung of Theodor Barth (1849-1909) who, incidentally, also happened to be one of the leaders of Germany’s Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus (or Abwehrverein), a political organization established in 1890 to fight rising anti-Semitism.

Five days earlier Naumann had been awarded an honorary doctorate of theology from the University of Heidelberg. The proposal came from Deissmann, who was dean of the Theological Faculty for that year. It was supported by Troeltsch and accepted, but only after some opined that Naumann

aus guten Gründen eigentlich gerade kein Theologe, sondern ein praktischer Held des Glaubens und des Opfers gewesen ist, da er in die weltliche Mission seine reine und herrliche Glaubens- und Liebenskraft einströmte....

The timing of the award also ensured that it took on a certain ‘demonstrativen Zug’, as Heuss observed, for, ‘war nicht eben das Scheitern eines Versuches offenbar geworden, der seinen Einsatz im Religiösen genommen hatte?’. An oblique allusion to Naumann’s failed attempt seems also to occur in a letter Deissmann wrote some years later, where he claimed:

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73 Heuss, 191.
74 The decisive meeting was held on 29-30.8.1903, when 111 of the 187 representatives voted in favour of the coalition.
75 It cooperated closely with the Deutsche Demokratische Partei (DDP), among its members, also Theodor Mommsen.
77 Heuss, 158.
Ich habe niemals einen Hehl daraus gemacht, dass ich das gegen das Zentrum gerichtete Stichwahlabkommen des badischen Grossblocks 1905 gebilligt habe. Die ganze Universität (mit ganz geringen kuriösen Ausnahmen) hat es gebilligt, im eigenen Interesse der Wissenschaft ...  

Heidelberg had been Germany’s southwest centre for the national-socialist movement for several years, and Deissmann’s letter, although referring to a ballot some two years later, implies that the Theological Faculty as a whole would have been in support of Naumann, if only for their own interests. The corollary of this honorary doctorate, therefore, is that it can be seen as a symbolic gesture of the Faculty’s solidarity with his Christian sociopolitical ideology.

In the lead-up to Baden’s State elections in Oct. 1905 the Social Democrats and Liberals had managed to forge an agreement to combine forces against the conservative centralists and thereby succeeded in defeating them. Two days later, the Heidelberger Tageblatt reported:


Predictably, Deissmann’s public endorsement aroused an adverse reaction amongst the conservatives, who berated him in the press for selling out to the ‘Revolutionspartei’ – that is the SPD – and for backing their alliance with the Liberal Party against the conservative central powers of Berlin. Yet surprisingly his response appeared somewhat lacklustre and merely referred to the new coalition as a political ‘Akt der Notwehr’ against the ‘drohende Zentrums-Herrschaft’, not a word was mentioned regarding Naumann.

The explanation is that Deissmann had already began to distance himself somewhat in public from his friend’s political course towards federal politics, although they remained well disposed to each other in private. While the University staff was

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78 GAD’s letter, 25.2.1908.
79 SD, 22.
81 Ibid.
generally in favour of the newly formed coalition for their own academic interests. Deissmann backed the move because he saw in it the only way forward to more equitable socioeconomic conditions for what he referred to as the ‘unteren Schichten unseres Volkes’. 82

As late as March 1906 Deissmann’s name still appears on Heidelberg’s voting sheets for the election of the ‘geschäftsleitenden Vorstandes der Stadtverordneten’, where he was the only academic listed. 83 However, three weeks after this election he embarked on his life-changing study tour with the Heidelberg philologists (see ch. 4.1) and after his return wrote to Wiegand that he had reassessed his sociopolitical involvement and determined to resign from some of his more time-consuming positions in order to focus more specifically on his Greek lexicon.

Eine Wirkung meiner Reise war übrigens bei mir der Entschluß, mich jetzt ganz auf meine wissenschaftliche Arbeit zu konzentrieren und die Nebendinge praktischer, besonders sozialpolitischer Art, die mich viel Zeit und Kraft gekostet haben, in der nächsten Zeit lieber anderen zu überlassen. 84

This did not mean that he withdrew from politics altogether, for his diary shows that, with the exception of 1906, he continued to attend the irregularly convened meetings of the local national socialists until February 1908. Moreover, once his appointment to Berlin became apparent, the press-attacks – a though focusing primarily on his past role as chairman of the Nationalsozialer Verein – also held against him his then still-current position as Stadtverordneter and his presiding over the coal cooperative board. 85 Having thus stood actively ‘aufseiten der Arbeiter’ for almost two decades, 86 once he came to Berlin Deissmann began to withdraw from party politics.

6.3. Naumann’s vision of European integration: Mitteleuropa

In August 1911, when Deissmann sent Naumann a copy of his Paulus, the latter read the book in one sitting and immediately wrote a warm letter back in which he expressed open doubts about his friend’s apostolic portrait, but remarked:

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83 Stimm-Zettel. 7.3.1906.
84 GAD’s letter. 4.7.1906.
86 GAD’s letter. 19.2.1908.
durch Ihr buch [sic] ist der Wunsch, Sie endlich einmal wieder ordentlich sprechen zu können bei mir sehr lebhaft geworden. Ich ... komme, wenn es Ihnen passt, ausserordentlich gern zu Ihnen.\textsuperscript{87}

In fact, he hoped to make a visit within the next fortnight, but Deissmann was on a two-week recreational holiday in Wennigstedt on the north Frisian coast. It served as a convenient stopover on his way to Scotland. where -- as one of three representatives from the University of Berlin sent to participate in the 500\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the University of St Andrews -- he would receive his honorary doctorate of divinity in a special graduation ceremony on 14 September.\textsuperscript{88} Thus, Naumann’s visit was postponed to 25 November, but during the following years he stayed at Deissmann’s house ‘Anatolia’ on several other occasions. Deissmann continued to hold his colleague in highest regard even after he himself had long ceased to be active in party politics.

On the afternoon of the same day we were favored with a visit from Berlin: our old friend, the sociologist and politician Dr. Friedrich Naumann, a member of the Reichstag, together with his wife, took occasion to find a few hours of recreation in the midst of our rural tranquillity, between two busy sessions of Parliament. Through his “Mitteleuropa” Dr. Naumann has become one of our leaders in political thought during the present period. This book of his aroused a general European discussion, especially participated in by England. This debate we continued in miniature last Sunday under our roof. Out of the inexhaustible rich store of his experiences during the war, our guest lavished upon us gift after gift, one thing suggesting the other. His journey to Bulgaria, his interviews with Austrian and Hungarian politicians, the internal affairs in the politics of our own country during the past months, formed the centre of our discussion.\textsuperscript{89}

Deissmann understood very clearly Naumann’s principal idea of a socioeconomic­ly peacefully integrated central Europe as expounded in his controversial but visionary book \textit{Mitteleuropa}.\textsuperscript{90} As the German historian Fritz Fischer (1908-99) pointed out, the basic concept of a United States of Europe had been mooted since von Caprivi’s time,\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{87} Naumann, letter to GAD, 25.8.1911.
\textsuperscript{88} Rachel M. Hart, of the University of St Andrews Library, informed me (email, 20.2.2002) that ‘there appears to be no copy of a laureation address and the local press does not cover the honorary graduation ceremony in any detail due to the volume of honours bestowed. It may have been that there was no detailed lauration of every individual in what must have been very long ceremonials.’ The AK, too, provides only scant particulars of the ceremonies for what was his third honorary doctorate.
\textsuperscript{89} Pr. WL, 4.10.1916, 2-3.
\textsuperscript{90} Berlin, 1915 (October).
\textsuperscript{91} e.g. by economists such as Heinrich Herkner (1843-1932) and Albert Schäffle (1832-1903), as well as Wilhelm II himself. Fischer, \textit{War of illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914}, New York, 1975, 7.
but Naumann’s plan was considerably less radical, in that he argued for an entirely voluntary and systematic integration process.92

His fundamental assumption can be summed up in his postulate: ‘Der Geist des Großbetriebes und der überstaatlichen Oransation hat die Politik erfasst’,93 Isolated or smaller European nations would, therefore, become less and less competitive on the world’s stage unless they entered some kind of federation or alliance. He hypothesised that – quite apart from war-strategies94 – since France and Great Britain had formed an *entente cordiale* in the west (1904), reinforced by Russia in the east (1907), the governments of this triple *entente* would shun an economic alliance with Germany for the foreseeable future. The kernel for a central European integration would, therefore, have to begin first with a successful union between Germany and the Austro-Hungarian empire, before other European states could be invited to join. Importantly, Naumann emphasised that any participating states would have to maintain their political and cultural sovereignty, and warned:

> Will man das Neue einen Staatenbund nennen [sic], so wird man seinen Charakter treffen, doch soll er kein Bundesstaat werden. Das zweite würde zwar sachlich viel mehr sein als das erste, aber es würde nicht zustande gebracht werden können.95

He conceded that it would be an enormously complex task and, ‘keineswegs kann dazu ein einzelner Akt oder Beschluß ausreichen. Ein Menschenalter wird mindestens daran zu tun haben’.96

Yet after the war Naumann’s book came to be seen as evidence of German imperialism, an erroneous perception that still exists among some writers of German history. An example is the otherwise astute Alexandra Richie (1998), who assumes that the 299-page treatise is ‘a pamphlet … which envisaged Germany taking enormous chunks of Europe’.97 Even Fischer wrongly yoked Naumann together with those who ‘proclaimed the kernel of the new world power to be “German Mitteleuropa” from Spitzbergen to

92 For a salient excerpt from *Mitteleuropa* see Appendix 6, b.
94 Germany’s Weltpolitik had already caused three crises, 1905, 1908 and 1911.
96 Ibid., 5.
97 Richie, 271.
Chapter 6: From post-classical Greek to *Sozialpolitik*

the Persian Gulf*, and his book *Mitteleuropa* as ‘a remarkable, but yet thoroughly unrealistic flight of fancy’. 98

In contrast, however, Deissmann unequivocally took Naumann’s side and defended both the author and his idea by making the case that...

... dessen Buch alles andere war als ein Programm des gierigen Imperialismus. Was Friedrich Naumann wollte, war die freundschaftliche politische und soziale Organisation der von der Vorsehung in diesen Ebenen und auf diesen Bergen und an diesen Strömen aufs engste zusammengeführten und aufeinander angewiesenen Nationen und Nationalitätensplitter zu einer in Solidarität lebendigen und durch Solidarität gesicherten Völkerfamilie. 99

While Naumann’s hypothesis may, indeed, once have appeared to be an ‘unrealistic flight of fancy’, his basic idea – under the wider framework of globalization – has, through an ongoing process since 1957, now been largely realised in the European Union.

6.4. Deissmann’s political disengagement

One result of Germany’s ruinous military defeat was the formation on 16 November 1918 of the new left-liberal *Deutsche Demokratische Partei*. Deissmann became one of its founding members and signatory to its *Gründungsaufruf* (16 November 1918), and proudly declared:

> Mit innerer Freudigkeit konnte ich mich daher mit vielen anderen zu einem Bekenntnis vereinen, das morgen veröffentlicht werden soll: „In diesem Augenblick der Wehen, die Deutschlands Leib und Seele erschüttern, damit, wie wir erhoffen, ein neues lebensstarkes Reich geboren werde, dürfen alle, die für das Landes Schicksal eine Verantwortung in sich fühlen, nicht einsam, vereinzelt abseits bleiben ... Wir stellen uns rückhaltlos dem Volk, seinem Willen und seinen Vertretern zur Verfügung. Wir wollen nach besten Kräften, wo man uns braucht, der werdenden Gestaltung dienen.“100

Naumann was not involved in establishing this party, but two months later he allowed himself to be nominated as primary candidate; and on 22 July 1919, five weeks before his death, was elected as the Party’s first president and took a seat in the *Reichstag*.

Notwithstanding Deissmann’s unshaken belief in the national social democratic ideology and his personal friendship with Naumann, the profound social and

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98 Fischer, *Germany’s aims*, 160, 208. Naumann specifically warned against such expansionist thinking; see Appendix 6, b.


psychological impact of the war years had increasingly redirected his attention from social politics to *Völkerverständigung*, through conciliatory ecumenism. Moreover, he had begun to harbour doubts regarding the wisdom of their former decision in 1903, when they chose to disband the *Nationalsozialer Verein* and merge with Theodor Barth. By 1925 – with the hindsight of more than two decades – he concluded that this union had been an error of political judgment, and acknowledged, ‘dass sie [die nationalsoziale Bewegung] ... sich parteimäßig organisiert hatte, halte ich heute für einen Fehler’.

Eight years later Deissmann wrote in a frank and detailed letter to his friend Karl Ludwig Schmidt (1891-1956) what is, in effect, an ‘obituary’ for his own political life.


Wer seinerzeit mit Friedrich Naumann die grosse national-soziale Idee begriffen, für sie gearbeitet und gelitten hat, wer dann beim Kriegsaußbruch die praktische Verwirklichung eines nationalen Gesamtdeutschland ohne Unterschied der Klassen erlebt hat, fühlt sich, wenn er die Bewegungen von heute gewissenhaft prüft, gleichermassen angezogen und abgestossen. Das ist bei mir der Fall und ich stehe daher still aber doch hellaufig auf der Warte. Die Erbweisheit der Engländer “wait and see” ist in solcher Seelenverfassung die zunächst gebotene. Vor allen Dingen muss man als Akademiker zunächst abwarten, wie die nächsten Neuberufungen ausfallen werden. Erst dann wird man sich ein Urteil bilden können.

His despondency vis-à-vis ‘die Bewegungen von heute’ is an allusion to Hitler’s steady rise and recent appointment (six weeks earlier) as chancellor of Germany, which resulted in a rapid upsurge for his *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (NSDAP, later nicknamed Nazi). Deissmann’s irresolute ‘wait and see’ approach now stood in contrast to his youthfully optimistic worldview before the turn of the century.

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101 *SD*, 22.  
102 Schmidt was GAD’s assistant before becoming Privatdozent. In 1921 he accepted a Chair of NT at Giessen, moved in 1925 to Jena, and from 1929 was NT professor at Bonn. See also below, n. 105.  
103 GAD, letter to K.L. Schmidt, 17.3.1933; it is written in ‘Du’ form.
when he wrote to Hermann Cohen that Naumann’s social politics would offer ‘einen hoffenden Ausblick aufs neue Jahrhundert’.\(^\text{104}\) Thus, his long association with social politics had fizzled out to disappointment with Germany’s political trends and a cautiously ambivalent foreboding of what could transpire under Hitler’s new regime.\(^\text{105}\)

In retrospect, it can be said with a fair degree of confidence that it was Naumann’s political ideology – much more so than Stoecker’s – that gave Deissmann the impetus to plunge himself into social politics at Heidelberg. Naumann’s social philosophy had exerted a very tangible influence on Deissmann’s adult life, which reached its political zenith during his tenure at Heidelberg and also motivated him to participate in local politics and communal affairs.\(^\text{106}\) Nevertheless, he did not regard his earlier political involvement as an end in itself, but rather as a logical extension of his linguistically-centred studies into the social and religious history of early Christianity, to which he had dedicated himself for some eighteen years prior to moving to Berlin.

### 6.5. Belgian Invasion, and First Cracks in Confidence

At the outbreak of WWI it was six years since Deissmann had left Heidelberg, but his long involvement there with Naumann’s *Sozialdemokratie* had given him a mistaken sense of his own perspicacity about Prussian *Weltmachtpolitik* and prompted him to make the somewhat naïve claim that

> I consider myself competent to pass judgment on [the political questions of the war] ... The material [i.e. quantity] of information which stands at the disposal of the German public is very large, both as referring to official documents and as regarding unofficial news of various kinds.\(^\text{107}\)

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\(^\text{104}\) GAD’s letter, 6.2.1896, in C. Nottmeier, ‘Hermann Cohen und Adolf Deissmann’.


\(^\text{107}\) *Pr. WL*, 3.7.1915, 3.
Such confidence in governmental transparency derived from his inexperience with Berlin’s centralist government. For political information had long been under the control of the Kaiser and subject to censorship.\textsuperscript{108}

Four weeks after Germany invaded Belgium (4 Aug. 1914) and triggered England’s declaration of war, a group of 29 leading Lutherans and theologians from 15 different cities throughout Germany signed an\textit{ Aufruf} addressed to Protestant Christians abroad.\textsuperscript{109} It was first published in Germany on 4 September 1914\textsuperscript{110} and also appeared in British and American newspapers – one of its 29 signatories was Adolf Deissmann.\textsuperscript{111}

However, this\textit{ Aufruf} was not merely a misguided attempt at averting further escalation of the war; on the contrary, it served to give notice of the nation’s will to fight aggressively under the banner of German Protestantism – that is national Protestantism\textsuperscript{112} – and for her\textit{ Kultur, Weltaufgabe or Weltmission}, which was nothing less than Germanic Christianisation of the world. Thus the\textit{ Aufruf} justified the war as a God-given opportunity for the imperialistic aspiration of the\textit{ Reichstag}, under the guise of national self-defence.

\textit{In heiliger Begeisterung, Kampf und Tod nicht scheuend, sind wir alle im Augenblick zu Gott einmütig und freudig bereit, auch unser Letztes für unser Land und unsere Freiheit einzusetzen.}\textsuperscript{113}

This proclamation triggered what might be described as a ‘paper war’ of protestations between Germany, Britain and later also France (and to a lesser degree the United States).\textsuperscript{114} Thus, on 23 September a British reply was published that paid tribute to

\textsuperscript{108} Richie, 222.
\textsuperscript{110} In\textit{ Allgemeine Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirchenzeitung.}
\textsuperscript{111} The fundamental tenet of this\textit{ Aufruf} was that foreign powers (i.e. France, Britain and Russia) had concocted a protracted and ‘planmäßiges Lügengewebe, das den internationalen Telegraphen-Verkehr beherrscht’, to blame Germany for the war. The proclamation sought to counter this with an assertion that it was Germany who had been keeping the international peace for the past 43 years and, therefore, ‘daß wir die Verantwortung für das furchtbare Verbrechen dieses Krieges und alle seine Folgen ... abweisen dürfen und müssen.’ Besier, \textit{Quellen- und Arbeitsbuch}, 40-5.
\textsuperscript{112} For an analysis of this phenomenon see D.R. Borg, ‘German national Protestantism as a civil religion’, \textit{International perspectives on church and state}, M. Mor., ed., Omaha, 1993, 255-67.
\textsuperscript{113} Besier, \textit{Quellen- und Arbeitsbuch}, 42.
\textsuperscript{114} \textit{Pr.WL.}, 15.4.1916, 1-3. The first edition of GAD’s bulletins (i.e. \textit{Pr.WL}, and \textit{Ev.Wbr.}) appeared only three months later, which explains the scarcity of references to this topic.
the German signatories as men of integrity and highest esteem internationally, but the undersigned expressed incredulity at their German colleagues’ ignorance concerning the political lead-up to the war. They stopped short of accusing them of antagonistic deception or at the least historical negligence, and emphasised that England valued the ‘principle of truth’ higher than maintaining peace at all costs.\footnote{Besier, Quellen- und Arbeitsbuch, 45-52.} This rebuttal was signed by 42 churchmen, of whom two names stood out: Deissmann’s good friend James Moulton (see ch. 1.4), and Sir William Ramsay who had advised him in the planning of his second study tour to the Levant (see ch. 4.2).

Each side professed that a desire for mutual understanding based on Christian love was motivating their proclamations, but the nationalistic propaganda machinery and counter-information manoeuvres in Berlin, London and Paris had heated public emotions to such a pitch of chauvinism, even xenophobia, that any such proclamations or protestations were doomed to be ineffectual.

On 4 October another Aufruf was published,\footnote{\textit{Der Text des Aufrufs „An die Kulturwelt!” wurde entworfen von Ludwig Fulda, er wurde in Beratung mit H. Sudermann u. a. überarbeitet, er wurde in Thesenform gebracht von dem dichterisch ambitionierten freisinnigen Berliner Bürgermeister Georg Reicke.” B. v. Brocke, cited in J. v. Ungern-Sternberg, \textit{Der Aufruf „An die Kulturwelt!”}; das Manifest der 93 und die Anfänge der Kriegspropaganda im Ersten Weltkrieg; mit einer Dokumentation, Stuttgart, 1996, 14.} This one with 93 of Germany’s most influential minds adding their signatures, of whom only thirteen were theologians.\footnote{Besier, Quellen- und Arbeitsbuch, 78-83. The tenor was belligerent, and the first sentence underpinned their rationale that it was ‘... Lügen und Verleumdungen, mit denen unsere Feinde Deutschlands reine Sache in dem ihm aufgezwungenen schweren Daseinskampfe zu beschmutzen trachten’. But although Moulton opposed the first proclamation Deissmann signed this one as well, together with such luminaries as Wilhelm Dörpfeld, Friedrich von Duhn, Adolf von Harnack, Friedrich Naumann, Theodor Wiegand and Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf. It was translated into fourteen Western languages and liberally distributed in the neutral countries, in an attempt to counteract six specific ‘Lügen und Verleumdungen’ by Germany’s enemies.\footnote{Ungern-Sternberg, 18.}
That Deissmann endorsed both proclamations is especially significant in the light of his particularly close ties with Britain,\textsuperscript{119} and also because he belonged to a small minority of Germans who was very familiar with both the spoken and written forms of English.\textsuperscript{120} Besides these strong personal connections, he had received three honorary doctorates – from Aberdeen (26.9.1906), St Andrews (14.9.1911) and Manchester (29.6.1912) – and had visited the country on at least five separate occasions, during which he gave numerous lectures.\textsuperscript{121} Moreover, he knew that his philological work was better appreciated and understood in Britain than on the continent.\textsuperscript{122} Why then, would he lend his name – and apparently unqualified support – to these two nationalistic and blatantly provocative Aufrufe?\textsuperscript{123}

To gain an understanding of Deissmann’s own mindset at that time we should not think in terms of academic incompetence or intentional nationalistic duplicity, as this would be anachronistically censorious, given the then prevailing propaganda, economic sanctions and threatening military buildup throughout Europe. The Wilhelmine mantra of an international conspiracy against Germany and its concomitant imperative of national defence seemed, in fact, logical, even on the evidence of the triple entente (1905) and French and British economic sanctions alone.\textsuperscript{124} For these had become increasingly severe since 1897 and added weight to the imperialistic argument that


\textsuperscript{120} He first learnt the language at the Wiesbaden Gymnasium (1879-85).

\textsuperscript{121} i.e. Sept.-Oct. 1906 (see ch. 2.3); July-Aug. 1907 (see ch. 2.5); Sept. 1911 (see AK); Mar. 1912 (see ch. 8.1) and June 1912 (to receive his Hon. D. D. from Manchester University, see AK).

\textsuperscript{122} See GAD’s letter, 19.2.1908.

\textsuperscript{123} For the perceived threat from Russian see below, c. 6.5.

\textsuperscript{124} In July 1897 Britain renounced their mutual ‘Most Favored Nation’ treaty of 1865, in response to Germany’s new policy of Weltpolitik and rapidly developing commercial power. Their embargoes became a major factor in the naval expansion plan of Alfred von Tirpitz (1844-1930). For an analysis of how Germany’s Weltpolitik contributed to the WWI, see Fischer, War of illusions, and Fischer, Germany’s aims.
Germany was destined to advance on a God-ordained, sociopolitical Sonderweg.\textsuperscript{125} The first signs of a crack in Deissmann’s nationalistic confidence are becoming apparent one month after the publication of the October Aufruf.\textsuperscript{126} For in mid-November, while giving a public Kriegsrerae in Berlin, he preached that there was another side to Germany that should not be ignored, meaning the working classes and wider provincial public whose historical and political knowledge was sketchy. He intimated that their simple belief in God’s providence and the idea of a divine mandate for the Kaiser was beginning to be extremely strained as the war kept dragging on.\textsuperscript{127} He also reminded his hearers that ‘eine nicht geringe Zahl’ of these German citizens had dreaded the prospect of an international conflict, and that the (later much sensationalised) vaterländische Begeisterung during the so-called Augusterlebnis was not an all-encompassing national phenomenon.

Es ist ganz zweifellose, daß für eine nicht geringe Zahl von Einzelmenschen der Krieg wie eine religiöse Katastrophe gewirkt hat. Ein Zusammenknicken unter der Überlast der persönlichen Sorge war bei manchen der Verlassenen die fast natürliche Wirkung des Krieges. Ich kann ein Bild nicht los werden, ein Bild, das manchem vielleicht nichts sagt, mir aber ein typisches geworden ist: am Abend nach der Mobilmachung, auf dem Anhalter Bahnhof, dessen Hallen wie ein brandendes Meer erbrausten von dem Wogenschwall vaterländischer Begeisterung, eine kleine gebückte Frau aus der handarbeitenden Schicht mit einem Ausdruck tiefsten Entsetzens auf dem totenblassen Gesichte ihren Zug suchend, wie das Gespenst der Sorge durch die Hallen der jubelnden Kraft fuschend, – diese Unbekannte hatte Schwestern und Brüder der inneren Not genug, und was ist alles seit jenem Abend dazugekommen, seit die Verlustlisten das andere Gesicht des Krieges täglich unter uns enthüllt haben!\textsuperscript{128}

He freely admitted to being troubled by what he now saw as a typical reaction to the war: ‘tiefstes Entsetzen’ among the popular working classes. Initial Siegeslust could

\textsuperscript{125} i.e. the theory that Germany’s modernization would be accomplished in a different way to other nations, by avoiding the sociopolitical pitfalls of both Russia’s despotism in the east and liberal democratic governments in the west. Thus, instead of national reforms brought about by revolutionary ‘grass-roots’ movements from ‘below’, Germany would transform itself methodically ‘from above’, through authoritarian militarism, thus becoming superior to all other forms of government. See also Moses, ‘Justifying war as the will of God: German theology on the eve of the First World War’, Colloquium, 31.1, 1999, 3-7.

\textsuperscript{126} He was not alone in this; see Ungern-Sternberg, 61-80.

\textsuperscript{127} Fischer wrote: ‘A campaign which, according to the original calculations, should have been successfully concluded in two months, having failed. Germany was . . . faced with the threat of a war of exhaustion for which she was neither armed nor economically prepared, and in which there was no guarantee of final victory.’ Germany’s aims, 184; see also, 95-120. Riché cites the Kaiser, who promised his departing troops: ‘You will be home before the leaves have fallen from the trees’, Riché, 268.

never reverse the horrifying testament of the Verlustlisten. The Schlieffen Plan had collapsed at the Marne, with Germany’s ‘invincible’ furor teutonicus\(^{129}\) being forced to retreat (9-11 September), and to dig themselves in for a defensive stand along the Lower Aisne River. Trench warfare had begun, and with it an unthinkable and unwinnable war of attrition.

Although Germany’s bourgeoisie may well have believed their Reich to be God’s supreme Erzieher of the nations, as Ferdinant Kattenbusch (1851-1935) had reasoned,\(^{130}\) or imagined it to be the chosen ‘hammer of God’, as John Moses noted,\(^{131}\) the spiralling cost of human suffering was beginning to change Deissmann’s attitude. While remaining unapologetically patriotic he nevertheless began to feel ambivalent about the war’s unfolding, since his humanitarian empathy for the common people juxtaposed with his patriotic trust in what he thought to be God’s chosen Government caused him considerable inner conflict.

Werfen wir keine Steine in die Häuser, welche Szenen dumpfen, fassungslosen Schmerzes, Augenblicke auch des religiösen Zusammenbruchs erlebt haben! Wie würden wir dastehen, wenn wir selbst so getroffen wären, wenn wir selbst monatelang uns in der Ungewißheit über einen Vermißten quälen müßten, selbst Herd und Heim besitzlos als Flüchtlinge vor den Kosaken verlaßen müßten?\(^{132}\)

This sombre admonition proved to be amazingly prescient, for without realising it he accurately presaged what his own family would suffer during WWII, when his son Paul (1911-45) became missing in action, and his aged and by then widowed Henriette was forced to flee their home (see ch. 2.6).

Eight months after delivering this address he wrote:

But I admit that I am liable to error, and that my soul stirred by the tremendous vibration of the general upheaval about me may look at some things in a different way than I would if that quiet, objective mood were prevalent to which we are accustomed under normal conditions.\(^{133}\)

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\(^{130}\) M. Greschat, ‘Krieg und Kriegsbereitschaft im deutschen Protestantismus’, Bereit zum Krieg: Kriegsmentalität im wilhelminischen Deutschland 1890-1914. Beiträge zur historischen Friedensforschung, J. Düffer/ K. Holl, eds., Göttingen, 1986, 44. Kattenbusch was professor of systematic theology at Halle; see also ch. 8.1.

\(^{131}\) Moses, ‘Justifying War’, 8.

\(^{132}\) Deutsche Reden, 7.

\(^{133}\) Pr. WL, 3.7.1915, 6.
Deissmann’s gravest ‘error’ in respect to WWI was doubtless his signing of the two Aufrufe – especially the second one that rejected German culpability for the invasion of Belgium. However, by 15 April 1916 – and partly as a result of a personal visit in January by Charles Stedman Macfarland (1866-1956), the General Secretary of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States – Deissmann began to question the wisdom of the original German wording, since its English translation had significantly altered the intended tenor. Macfarland pointed out to him that the English version declared that international Christian fellowship with Germany was ‘now irreparably destroyed …’, which Americans understood to mean ‘impossible for all future’, whereas the German text had simply stated ‘Wenn diese Gemeinschaft jetzt heillos zerbrochen ist’. In an attempt at ameliorating this translational blunder Deissmann used his Protestant Weekly Letter to explain:

The word “heillos” does not mean “unheilbar, “unwiederherstellbar” … but is a synonym for “awfully”, “terribly” … Our declaration speaks of a “schier” [i.e., “fast” (almost)] “unheilbaren Riss” in Teutonic Protestantism; the translation on the other hand makes of this a “simply incurable rent” … It would be of little use to still ask whether this intensification of the German terms could have been avoided in the translation …

Five weeks before he signed the first Aufruf Russia had begun its pre-emptive mobilisation against Austria, and Deissmann – like Naumann and most German academics, students and metropolitan bourgeoisie – considered this sufficient justification for Germany to come unbidden to Austria’s aid, in what they perceived to be a defensive war against a mutual aggressor. For it was no secret that Russia had primed its people with the martial sentiment: ‘We are preparing for a war in the west … The whole nation must accustom itself to the idea that we arm ourselves for a war of annihilation against the Germans’.

Indeed, this military threat from the east, heightened by their French and British triple entente allies in the west, gave further credence to the rationale that Germany was being ‘encircled’ and, therefore, forced to

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134 A close friendship had developed between GAD and Macfarland through the Pr.WL. Macfarland represented some thirty US Christian denominations, which included 125,000 separate congregations. Pr.WL., 15.1.1916, 5.
135 It appears that GAD has not seen the English version, indeed, it may be questioned whether he has seen the German one, for ‘deutlich war damals immerhin schon, daß viele Unterschriften auf telegrafische Aufforderung hin ohne Kenntnis des Textes gegeben worden waren’. Ungern-Sternberg, 13-14.
136 Ev. Wbr., 15.4.1916, 2.
137 Pr.WL., 15.4.1916, 2. Bracketing GAD’s own.
138 From a Russian military journal, cited in S.B. Clough, et al., European history in a world perspective: Modern times, 1975 (1964), 1449. See also Heuss, 349.
take offensive action. Russia was perceived to be such an ominous peril that the _Auftrag_ condemned their ‘sabre rattling’ as the war that ‘der Zar als den Entscheidungskampf gegen Germanum und Protestantismus öffentlich proklamiert hat’. This national fear became the basis of the widespread support for both Kaiser and _Kanzler_ when Berlin declared war on Russia (1 August), and underlies the conviction behind the two _Aufträge_ which Deissmann signed. John Moses summarised this phenomenon perceptively:

What has emerged very strongly is that there was an unshakable conviction among German Protestant pastors and theologians that Almighty God had undoubtedly been at work in guiding the destiny of the nation, in particular protecting it from the depredations of the degenerate, Papalist French twice during the nineteenth century (1806-1815 and 1870-71). These views not only served to heighten the perception of Germany as the homeland of the Reformation but also to give rise to the notion of German “choseness” by Almighty God to uphold genuine Christian values in a world of enemies, and in turn led to the evaluation of the German nation as “God’s nation” with the task of both defending true Christian values and of punishing those nations which offended against it.

Deissmann had an innate inclination for stepping into conceptually new territory, and for being in the vanguard of such intellectual developments where he thought he could make a difference. Signing the two proclamations presented him with what he thought to be a peaceful pilot initiative that would allow him to declare publicly his patriotic allegiance to ‘King and Country’, while using his international reputation in Germany’s moral defence. It was, however, a badly misjudged decision and one he increasingly came to regret as the war became protracted (see below, ch. 6.5).

Belgium’s neutrality in perpetuity had been recognised by international law since January 1831. Thus, when news reached England that Germany had given Belgium an ultimatum to permit their armies free passage through the neutral’s territory, the British cabinet sent a counter-ultimatum to Berlin via their Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen (1847-1924), to withdraw the ultimatum forthwith or face the consequences. The _Reichskanzler_, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg (1856-1921), harangued Goschen and argued that the step taken by His Majesty’s Government was terrible to a degree, just for a word “neutrality,” a word which in wartime had so often been disregarded – just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was going to make war.

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139 Bester, *Quellen- und Arbeitsbuch*, 42.
on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her.\footnote{141}

Thus, when German soldiers opened battle at Liège on the morning of 4 August, England immediately declared war on Germany. Yet the entry in Deissmann’s diary for that day merely states: ‘Reichstag einstimmig; England erklärt uns den Krieg’. He was heartened by the Government’s unanimity, for not only had the Reichskanzler been able to win over the recalcitrant SPD, but the Kaiser dramatically announced: ‘Ich kenne keine Parteien mehr, ich kenne nur Deutsche’.\footnote{142} That same day von Bethmann Hollweg, speaking in the Reichstag about the Belgian invasion, openly confessed: ‘Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law …’, but justified their act by reasoning that, ‘The wrong – I speak openly – the wrong we thereby commit we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained’.\footnote{143} However, as the war continued to take its toll and these aims proved unattainable Deissmann began to revise his erstwhile high regard for the nation’s leadership; his conscience increasingly stirred by the chancellor’s prewar confession of having committed the nation to an international moral contravention.

Je länger ich nun meinerseits während des Krieges über dieses Unrecht nachgedacht habe, um so furchtbarer und verhängnisvoller ist es mir erschienen, und weder die Tatsache, daß unsere Heeresleitung in der größten Not handelte, noch der Umstand, daß das Verhalten unserer Gegner zu den Neutralen prinzipiell das gleiche Unrecht in sich schloß, haben mir, obwohl sie mir zuerst großen Eindruck gemacht hatten, auf die Dauer genügt, um die quärende Erkenntnis zu sammeln, dass wir mit dem Einmarsch in Belgien eine schwere Schuld auf uns geladen haben. Wenn ich das erst heute nach Wiederherstellung der Redefreiheit öffentlich sagen kann, so fühle ich nur darin ein Gefühl der Gewissensentlastung, daß wir uns durch die Regierung des Prinzen Max\footnote{144} schon zu jeder Wiedergutmachung bereit erklärt haben.\footnote{145}

Public ‘Redefreiheit’, particularly freedom of press, was restricted under the Kaiser since the beginning of his reign, through strict censorship laws which prohibited political criticism.\footnote{146} As a consequence of the outbreak of WWI, these laws were expanded and applied rigorously, particularly to published material, which also

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\footnote{142}{Cited in a speech written by Adolf von Harnack and presented at Karlsruhe (14.12.1914) by Prinz Max von Baden (see below, n. 144), Ev. Wbr., 24.12.1917, 9.}
\footnote{143}{Snyder, 340-1.}
\footnote{144}{Prinzen Max von Baden (1867-1929), transitional Reichskanzler from 3.10 - 9.11.1918.}
\footnote{145}{Ev. Wbr., 16.11.1918, 3-4.}
\footnote{146}{Richie, 222.}
restricted the content of Deissmann’s *Wochenbriefe* to some degree (see ch. 7.3). Immediately after censorship was repealed a number of Germany’s Christian organizations united and sent representatives to Berlin, where a committee ‘zur Prüfung der moralischen Verantwortung im Kriege’ was established. Deissmann explained:

> Ich habe in der ersten Versammlung dieses Ausschusses ein ausführliches Referat über die belgische Frage erstattet und darin ganz den Standpunkt vertreten, den ich sofort nach der Revolution auch in meinem Wochensbrief Nr. 91/92 [16 Nov. 1918] ... kundgetan hatte.\(^{147}\)

Gerhard Besier claimed that upon the lifting of censorship Deissmann changed his views regarding Belgium ‘in plötzlichem Sinneswandel’, thus implying political opportunism for his motive.\(^{148}\) In actual fact, Deissmann’s change of heart resulted from a genuine process of politically enlightened rethinking and not mere expediency. This can readily be verified by referral to his correspondence with various influential Swiss – including the editor of *Semeur Vaudois*, Roger Bornard, one of his critics – ‘... denen ich während der beiden letzten Jahre wiederholt hatte andeuten müssen, daß ich während des Krieges außerstande sei, z. B. die Verletzung der belgischen Neutralität so zu besprechen, wie es notwendig sei’.\(^{149}\) Indeed, until October 1915 Deissmann endorsed Germany’s action against Belgium on at least four separate occasions,\(^{150}\) but between November 1915 and December 1918 the topic was no longer raised.\(^{151}\) Now, however, that censorship had ceased to obstruct intellectual expression he took pains to explain,

> daß es insbesondere eine Ehrenpflicht unseres Volkes ist, Belgien für die Folge unseres unrechtmäßigen Einnmarsches zu entschädigen. Nachdem ich am Anfang des Krieges infolge unvollständiger und irreführender Informationen die belgische Frage anders beurteilt hatte, habe ich mir allmählich unter schweren inneren Kämpfen jene Überzeugung errungen

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\(^{147}\) *Ev.Whr.*, 13.3.1919, 6.


\(^{149}\) *Ev.Whr.*, 16.11.1918, 3.

\(^{150}\) *Pr.WL*, 3.7.1915, 4; 14.8.1915, 4; 25.9.1915, 1; 30.10.1915, 1.

\(^{151}\) However, in the unpublished *Ev.Whr.*, 15.1.1915 (see ch. 7, n. 97), there is a brief comparison between German and Belgian wages on p. 11.
und ihr sofort nach Wiederherstellung der Redefreiheit auch Ausdruck
gengeben.\textsuperscript{152}

The question, therefore, whether Deissmann was deliberately party to calculated
political rationalisation in regard to the Belgian invasion, as Besier implies, can be
answered in the negative. While he was considered to be a leading theologian, in 1914
this was primarily based on his philological achievements in the Greek of the NT and
not on theological, philosophical, historical, or political investigations he had made. He
had erred by signing the two nationalistic proclamations, but in this he was no
exception, for besides him the second Aufruf was signed by no fewer than nine previous
and three future Nobel Laureates.\textsuperscript{153}

6.6. Conclusion

Deissmann had never seen himself as a politician, nor did he aspire to be one. Instead,
his political attachments were not only a natural adjunct to his theologically-grounded
social philosophy, but also provided him with comparative analogies for his research
into the social history of early Christianity. In other words, it can be said that a ‘quasi-
symbiotic’ connection existed between his sociopolitical and his theological persona;
but on the question, whether it was his political or his faith-based social conscience that
developed first, one must conclude that it was the latter which fed the former. Indeed,
at Naumann’s memorial service this is exactly what Deissmann attributed to him, when
he spoke of how his friend’s Christian-based social conscience had affected and
changed his followers, including Deissmann himself, and woken them up to the
practical reality of their country’s social disparities.

Weite Strecken unseres Innenlebens waren unbestellt und unfruchtbar, und
dem theologischen Schaffen fehlte die Blutwärme, weil wir jenseits der
Wirklichkeit arbeiteten, jenseits des jeder Paragraphierung spottenden
lebendigen Lebens. Da danken wir es vor allem Friedrich Naumann, daß er
uns aus der vergangenheitssatten Stille der Studierstuben auf die Plattform
der wogenden und tosenden Wirklichkeit sozialer Aufgaben und sozialen
Kampfes gestellt hat ...\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Fr. Wbr.}, 20.12.1918, 5. See also: 16.11.1918, 3; 20.11.1918, 5; 27.3.1919, 5; 31.10.1919, 9.
\textsuperscript{153} 1901, Wilhelm Conrad Röntgen (Physics); 1901, Emil von Behring (Medicine); 1902, Emil Fischer
(Chemistry); 1905, Adolf von Baeyer (Chemistry); 1905, Philipp Lenard (Physics); 1908, Paul
Ehrlich (Medicine); 1908, Rudolf Eucken (Literature); 1909, Wilhelm Ostwald (Chemistry); 1911,
Wilhelm Wien (Physics). Future Laureates who also signed were: 1915, Richard Willstätter
(Chemistry); 1918 Fritz Haber (Chemistry); 1918, Max Planck (Physics).
\textsuperscript{154} \textit{Fr. Wbr.}, 30.8.1919, 5-6.
This chapter has shown that Deissmann did not limit his thinking to questions concerning the ancient world, but that he also applied himself for some two decades to the task of social reform in Wilhelmine Germany, and did so through political engagement. Between 1908 and 1914, however, his interest in social politics became increasingly overtaken by a larger concern for international Völkerverständigung which he began to pursue during the war through the writing of a regular bulletin: the Evangelischer Wochenbrief. In the next chapter I will investigate this endeavour, and present a general analysis of these bulletins as well as of Deissmann’s motives for producing them.