

PhD Thesis

*Avenues of Influence: The Roles of Epaminondas, Iphicrates, Xenophon and Philip in
the Rise of Macedonia.*

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**Word count: 82,207 (from Introduction to Conclusion, including footnotes but
excluding references)**

Date of submission: 19th September, 2018.

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to investigate and account for Philip's role in the rise of Macedonia from faltering rural backwater to *hegemon* of Greece. Sources, both ancient and modern, regularly credit the king's success to the knowledge he obtained whilst a young hostage in Thebes. This orthodoxy, however, begins to falter when it is considered that Epaminondas' diplomatic and military achievements were somewhat less formidable than have been represented.

A number of obstacles present themselves to a study of this nature. Other than the significant deficiencies and biases in the sources, the psychological aspect of the inquiry presents a challenge. Philip himself left no memoirs and so some conclusions must rely on circumstantial evidence and weight of probability. Such an approach might be considered less than ideal, but it should be remembered that historians rarely, if ever, are presented with untainted, unequivocal evidence.

Three foci, therefore, form the basis of this thesis. The first centres on Epaminondas to ascertain if the achievements of the *boiotarchos* made him worthy of emulation. Next is considered the potential for Iphicrates and Xenophon to have been the inspiration for Philip's reforms. Finally, the character of the king is analysed to determine the role he himself played in Macedonia's ascendancy.

What becomes clear is that the foundation for Philip's diplomatic and military expertise was not acquired whilst a hostage at Thebes. Instead, a very strong case can be made that the Athenians Iphicrates and Xenophon were important influences in the fields of military reform and statecraft respectively. It is also determined that Philip's personal qualities contributed significantly to his kingdom's eventual domination of Greece.

This investigation's conclusions are important for a number of reasons. Uncritical acceptance of biased sources, it is argued, have long bolstered Epaminondas' reputation beyond that of his achievements, amongst them being the inspiration behind Philip's success. Such a belief not only does violence to the cachet of Iphicrates and Xenophon, but also Philip himself. This discussion, therefore, represents, in some small way, an attempt to "set the record straight".

Foreward

Investigating ancient Greece is a discipline not without idiosyncratic conventions. The first is that Greece itself is, of course, a modern identity which in antiquity comprised upwards of one thousand *poleis*, most with their own governments, armies, and sometimes currencies. In this thesis, therefore, “Greece” is employed as a term of convenience rather than geo-political status as it is today.

Another anomaly exists with the rendition of Greek into English. In keeping with tradition, place-names in this dissertation are usually Latinized – hence, for example, “Chaeronea” instead of “Khaironeia” – although there is no claim to complete consistency. Similarly, technical terms are generally transliterated Greek rather than their English equivalent, so that *doru*, for example, is preferred to “spear”.

Determination of dates with high levels of accuracy (or even certainty) can also present challenges. Deficiencies in the evidence aside, meaningful equivalency is hampered by inconsistencies in the lunar calendars of ancient Greece and their modern solar counterpart. Dates, however, are integral to modern analyses and so are here provided in the familiar Gregorian format. As this thesis focusses almost exclusively on events before the Common Era, all dates are BC unless otherwise indicated.

A final comment on the scope of investigation into Macedonian military development is appropriate. Readers may notice the lack of discussion on naval warfare. Philip most certainly possessed a navy but it was very much an ancillary force. Its role in the emergence of Macedonia under Philip was negligible at best; non-existent by some reckonings. As such, naval developments do not feature in this study but beckons as an intriguing area for future research.

Acknowledgments

An expression of sincerest gratitude is extended to all those who have directly and indirectly assisted in this undertaking. Firstly are the supervisors who have kindly and selflessly overseen my doctoral studies over the years, foremost amongst them Associate Professor Matthew Dillon at the University of New England. Matthew's advice, in particular, has been invaluable and ultimately appreciated (albeit not always initially accepted with the good grace it deserved). There is no doubt his challenges stimulated greater thought and deeper research – the final outcome being all the better for that. Matthew's expertise and eye for detail are beyond reproach so that any errors and deficiencies that may exist are something for which I take full responsibility. Tribute is also due to the staff at the university's Dixon Library for their supreme professionalism in fulfilling innumerable requests for obscure research material with diligence and efficiency.

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Chapter 1

Methodology

I. Intention and Scope

Plutarch has it that following the Battle of Chaeronea (338) in an act of drunken *hubris*, Philip II of Macedon staggered around the battlefield amongst the shattered bodies of his enemies and laughed.¹ The tradition itself is a hostile one but if there was any basis to the myth, Philip's reaction was more likely one of hysteria and guilt at having survived – a phenomenon regularly attested to by and about those who have endured armed conflict.² For Philip was no “mindless barbarian” and the enormity of his achievement – the subjugation of Greece, something that had eluded even the might of the Persian Empire – must have been tinged with the regret his hegemony could not have been achieved by more peaceful means.³

Yet a deed of significant magnitude it remained. When Philip had ascended the throne twenty-one years earlier, his situation was a precarious one. Macedonia was a land rich in men and resources but with a history of instability and tumult. Philip's family, the Argeads, had ruled for three hundred years but whilst the line may have been secure, the individual was not. Between 399 and 392, due to either assassination or court intrigue, there had been five Argead kings and political instability continued to be endemic. Philip himself was third in line to the throne having been preceded by his brothers Alexander II (assassinated in 369) and Perdiccas III, who was killed in battle ten years later.⁴

¹ Plut. *Dem.* 20; Pownall 2010: 57; Green 1991: 77; Roberts 1982: 368; Baynham 1994: 39; O'Brien 1994: 7, 25; Fox 2015c: 358-359; Hammond & Griffith: 1979 605; Worthington 2013: 252-253; McQueen 1995a: 163. A similar tradition is represented in Diod. Sic. 16.87.1.

² Hom. *Od.* 8.520-534; Hdt. 1.82, 7.232; Soph. *Euryp.* 210.47-48; Xen. *An.* 2.6.7; Tritle 2004: 325-326, 328, 331 n11; 2007: 338; 2013: 281-282; Rawlings 2009b: 537; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 102-103; Shay 1994: 21; Raaflaub 2008: 483; Sánchez & Zahavi 2018: 163-164, 166.

³ For Philip as a Philhellene – Aeschin. 2.42; Dem. 19.308; Worthington 2008: 222; 2014: 68-69; Gabriel 2010: 18; Cawkwell 1978b: 50; Hanink 2014: 70; Sawada 2010: 407; Hardiman 2010: 507-508; De Blois & van der Spek 1997: 101.

⁴ Diod. Sic. 15.77.5, 16.2.1-5; Hammond 1994b: 7-9; Worthington 2008: 13-14; 2013: 49; Sidnell 2006: 75; Posma 2015: 120, 132; Kremydi 2015: 165; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 175; King 2018: 49, 54; McQueen 1995a: 182-183.

There were also external dangers. The Chalcidian city-states under the leadership of Olynthus had gained a foothold in Macedonia and were showing an ever-increasing willingness to involve themselves in the kingdom's affairs.⁵ The real threat to the realm, however, was the constant spectre of invasion from the Balkan tribes, especially the Dardanians. Philip's father – Amyntas III – had twice been expelled by the Illyrians, the first time in 393/2 and then again in 383/2, but their menace peaked in 359.⁶ Invading from the north, the Dardanian king Bardylis achieved a resounding victory over the Macedonians in which Perdiccas III – the then king, and elder brother of Philip II – fell along with 4,000 of his troops. Bardylis then began occupying northern Macedonia and was poised to invade the south aided and abetted by the Paenonians who, taking advantage of the crisis, had begun ravaging the area.⁷

Impoverished, wracked with menace from within and without, and with an army decimated by a catastrophic defeat, Philip II inherited a kingdom on the verge of collapse.⁸ Yet in a remarkably short period of time he not only eliminated the threat to his realm but went on to consolidate and expand his dominions, along the way transforming Macedonia into a military powerhouse with a series of innovative and far-reaching reforms. Philip's victory at Chaeronea, then, was notable not only for bringing relative peace between the

⁵ Tod 111=R&O 12; Tod 1950: 32-33; Worthington 2008: 13, 25; Hammond 1994b: 7-9; Heskell 1997a: 172; Ellis 1976: 42; Cawkwell 1978b: 27; Borza 1990: 184-185; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 56.

⁶ 393 – Isoc. *Dis.* 6.46, Diod. Sic. 14.92.3-4; Norlin 1928: 373 nd; Hamilton 1986: 240; Posma 2015: 121; Fox 2015a: 221; Roisman 2010: 159; Greenwalt 2010: 284; Cartledge 1987: 269; King 2018: 56. 383/2 – Diod. Sic. 15.19.2; March 1995: 280; Roisman 2010: 159; King 2018: 56. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.11-13; Posma 2015: 122; Fox 2015a: 225; Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2015: 276 document the Olynthians were responsible for driving out Amyntas in 383.

⁷ Diod. Sic. 16.2.4-6; Green 1991: 22; Posma 2015: 132; Fox 2015a: 269; Roisman 2010: 164; Müller 2010b: 166, 167; Greenwalt 2010: 289-290; Griffith 1965: 129; Cawkwell 1978b: 29; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 188; King 2018: 71-72; Anson 2010b: 54, 57.

⁸ Diod. Sic. 16.2.4-5; Hammond 1994b: 22; Edson 1980: 35; Ellis 1976: 44-45; 1980b: 36; Dell 1980: 90; Borza 1990: 201; English 2009b: 22; Griffith 1935: 8-9; McQueen 1995b: 323; Worthington 2013: 49-50, 55; King 2018: 62-64, 70; LaForse 2010: 554-555.

Greek city-states but relegating in one decisive action the hoplite, dominant on the field of battle for three and a half centuries, to the periphery of future conflicts.

How this was achieved has rarely, it is suggested, been given the careful attention it deserves. Where explanation is attempted, the focus is all too often on military achievements and whence they derived. Conclusions are as ingenious as they are improbable, with even Homer believed to have been influential in the meteoric rise to military supremacy of the Macedonian state.⁹ Overwhelmingly, however, convention – both ancient and modern – has it that Philip received his instruction in the art of war from the Thebans Epaminondas and Pelopidas and that together they provided the inspiration for the future king's revision of Macedonia's war machine.¹⁰

It is the position of this thesis that suggestions such as these (and the Boeotian connection in particular) do not stand the scrutiny of a close, unbiased evaluation and should be abandoned. Instead it is suggested that there is a very strong circumstantial case to be made for the hitherto largely overlooked Athenians Iphicrates and Xenophon as important influences on Philip.

Military reform, however, does not occur in a vacuum and so this study also investigates the social, political, economic and geographical factors behind the rise of Macedonia. Analysis reveals that, just as much as military might, it was the king's ability to forge Europe's first nation-state and utilise wisely its wealth of resources – together with

⁹ Diod. Sic. 16.3.2; Lendon 2005: 122-123; Wheeler 2007a: 27, 59; van Wees 2004: 185; McQueen 1995a: 67. Walbank 1957: 587 acknowledges the Homeric connection but rightfully dismisses it.

¹⁰ Indicative of the sentiment – Diod. Sic. 16.2.3; Plut. *Pel.* 26.4-5; Just. 6.9.6-7; Worthington 2008: 17-18; Warry 1995: 69; Snodgrass 1967: 116; Connolly 2012: 36; Ducrey 1986: 238; Hammond 1994b: 10; 1997b: 357, 371; Davis 2013: 20; Cawkwell 1972: 254; 1978b: 27; Buckler 1980: 3; McQueen 1995a: 64; Müller 2010b: 169; Gabriel 2009: 1; 2010: 25; Snodgrass 1967: 116; Ashley 1998: 5-6; Sage 1996: 167; Carey *et al.* 2005: 64; Hanson 1999b: 110. Bosworth 1988a: 5-19; Matthew 2015: 23-46 present a more holistic explanation for Macedonia's rise but their findings are necessarily restricted in depth and scope.

astute yet relentless diplomatic endeavour – that enabled Philip to transform a tottering edifice into *hegemon* of Greece.

II. Sources

In validating the thesis, a number of methodological approaches were adopted. Each was undertaken with the intention of obtaining a detailed understanding for the practice of warfare during the fourth century, as well as the role played by Philip in the advancement of his realm. As would be expected, this entailed analysis of data derived from a wide variety of sources, each offering valuable insights yet also presenting potential problems. A review of every evidentiary item consulted is impossible within the scope permitted but what follows is a synopsis, albeit in the full knowledge that, as with any panoptic statement, exceptions can exist. However, it is also the case that the value of generalizations – by definition – is that they hold true in the majority of instances and so underpin the methodological approach adopted in this investigation.

As most of scholarship's knowledge of history derives from literary sources, ancient texts are a major point of reference in this thesis.¹¹ From the outset, however, this imposes limitations on any investigation; especially one that centres on military history. Of primary concern is that only a tiny fraction of what was written has survived – less than three per cent by one estimate – and nothing that is original has come down from the first generation of Alexander historians.¹² Surviving works, therefore, represent an accident of history,

¹¹ Marincola, 2007a: 3; 2009: 13; Whitmarsh 2009: 77; Funke 2010: 161; Blanshard 2010a: 11; Pitcher 2009: viii.

¹² Survival rate – Marincola 2007a: 1-2; Rood 2007: 147; Bravo 2007: 522; Stadter 2007: 529; Engels 2007: 542; Rhodes 2010c: 26; 2010d: 46; Forsén 2010: 64; Harrison 2010a: 378; Easterling 1985: 36, 40; Kirk 1985a: 42; Armstrong 2016: 29-30. Estimate of 2-3% – Schepens 2007: 54; Armstrong 2016: 30. Alexander historians – Marincola 2007a: 1; Rhodes 2010c: 31; Nicolai 2007: 23; Zambrini 2007: 211; Cartledge 1997: 34.

sometimes more reflective of their popularity in antiquity rather than the composition's quality.¹³

Records, where do they exist, are not without difficulties. In the first instance, the manuscripts themselves can be problematic. Invariably written on papyrus, they are frequently damaged.¹⁴ Furthermore, it should be remembered that in almost every instance, manuscripts are not original works but scribed copies.¹⁵ Not only does this leave open the possibility – almost inevitability – of errors but also mistranslation, paraphrasing, or the inability of copyists to represent content within its cultural context.¹⁶ “Improvements” by way of interpolation or omission by later editors can detract further from the intentions of the original author.¹⁷ Matters are also complicated by the fact that manuscripts frequently do not survive intact but are pieced together from incomplete collections of much later editions, many of which are often in less than perfect condition.¹⁸ In some cases, Speusippus' *Letter to Philip II* for example, there are also disputes over authenticity and authorship.¹⁹

¹³ Nicolai 2007: 18; Rhodes 2010b: 33; 2010c: 26; Whitmarsh 2009: 79; Illinois Greek Club 1923c: 363; McKechnie & Kern 1998: 24; Marincola 1996: xxx; Jones 1928: xxxiv; Easterling 1985: 20, 29, 35; Bury 1909: 151.

¹⁴ Plin. *HN* 13.74-79; Bowman 2009: 37-38; Harding 2006b: 4; McKechnie & Kern 1998: 3-4; Norlin 1928: xlvi; West 1994: ix; Dillery 1998: 35-36; Easterling 1985: 17; Knox 1985b: 4-5; Segal 1985a: 179, 186; Marincola 1996: xii, xx; Pitcher 2009: 2; Del Corso 2016: 11; Armstrong 2016: 32.

¹⁵ Harding 2006b: 7; McKechnie & Kern 1998: 3-4; Norlin 1928: xlvi; Shipley 2011b: 1; Jones 1926: xxvii; 1928: xxxiv; West 1994: ix; Dillery 1998: 35; Marchant 1925: xliii-xliv; Knox 1985b: 5; Easterling 1985: 23; Stray 2010: 3.

¹⁶ Errors – Str. 13.1.54; Harding 2006b: 7-8; Shipley 2011b: 2; Jones 1928: xxxiv; Easterling 1985: 20; Whitmarsh 2009: 79. Mistranslation – Rance 2018: 310, 357; Woodman 2007: 134-135, 141; Whitmarsh 2009: 80-81; Bowman 2009: 40; Gomme 1959: 30-31; Hornblower 1996: 8; Shipley 2011b: 2; Jones 1926: xi; Scott-Kilvert 1973: 11-12; Dillery 1998: 37; Gabriel 2012: xiv; Osborne 2010a: 43; Hardwick 2010: 57-58.

¹⁷ Shipley 2011b: 2-3; Rance 2018: 310, 357; Rhodes 1993: 53; 2010d: 46; Whitmarsh 2009: 79; Hornblower 1996: 6-7, 14, 17; Adams 1988: xxii; Norlin 1928: xlvi-xlvii; Jones 1928: xxxiv; Easterling 1985: 31; Stray 2010: 3; Illinois Greek Club 1923b: 240-241; 1923c: 365.

¹⁸ Rhodes 1993: 2-4; Whitmarsh 2009: 79; Adams 1998: xxi-xxii; McKechnie & Kern 1998: 3-4; Jones 1926: xxvii; 1928: xxiv; Dillery 1998: 35; Whitehead & Blyth 2004: 40; Easterling 1985: 40; Stray 2010: 3-4; Marchant 1925: xliii-xliv; Illinois Greek Club 1923b: 40; 1923c: 364-365.

¹⁹ Adams 1988: xxii; Funke 2010: 161; Easterling 1985: 20, 22; Stray 2010: 4; Sandbach 1985: 480-481; Barron & Easterling 1985a: 138-139; Wender 1973b: 89; Crombie 2013: 14; Field 2013: 199.

In considering the literary evidence there are further methodological difficulties such as the purpose, reliability, and potential for bias inherent in each source. Greek histories, for the most part, were written by an elite, for a privileged audience.²⁰ They are also, largely, focussed on Athens and – to a lesser extent – Sparta, so that the record marginalises (or silences altogether) important sections of the Greek world including women, the poor, slaves and “barbarians”.²¹ Further clouding the historical record is the fact that antiquity’s historians all had motives that went well beyond the mere recording of events.²² Some told outright lies (and admitted to it) whereas others such as Plutarch – notably, but by no means exclusively – wrote for the purpose of moral education.²³ A third group produced compositions simply for the entertainment of their readers.²⁴

Also problematic is the inclusion in many sources of speeches, the presence of which represent a challenge for the modern commentator.²⁵ As with many ancient texts, that orations were not – in the main – verbatim reproductions but included to fulfil didactic

²⁰ Marincola 1997: 23; 2009: 13; Dyson 2009: 66; Bury 1909: 209-210; Whitmarsh 2009: 77, 83; Gabba 1981: 50; Blanshard 2010a: 10; Moreland 2006: 137; Munn 2017: 13-14; Breisach 2017: 18.

²¹ Hutchinson 2000: 26; Hunt 2007: 110-111; Harding 2007: 180; Gomme 1959: 41; Osborne 2010b: 96; Harrison 2010b: 99; Munn 2017: 15, 17-18. The term barbarian is here used in its Greek sense – in other words, someone from outside of the Greek-speaking world.

²² Polyb. 9.1-2; Str. 1.2.9; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.8.1-4; Cartledge 1987: 56; Whitby 2007: 57; Flower 2017b: 306; Nicolai 2007: 13-14; Dewald 2007: 98; Rutherford 2007: 510-511; Bravo 2007: 519-520; Morgan 2007: 556; Bosworth 1995: 10-11; Walbank 1957: 6-7; Rhodes 2010c: 28; Marincola 2009: 17-18; Gabriel 2012: xiii; Bury 1909: 233; Blanshard 2010a: 9; Rutherford 2012: 17.

²³ Lies – Polyb. 2.56; Str. 2.3.5; Ael. 3.18; Luc. *Hist. conscr.* 1.4; Hornblower 1997: 59; Walbank 1957: 261-262; Gabba 1981: 54; Morgan 2007: 557-558, 560. Moral education – Polyb. 1.1, 35, 10.21; Nicolai 2007: 13-14; McQueen 1995a: 4; Bosworth 1995: 8; Walbank 1957: 16; Rhodes 2010c: 28, 30-31; Gabriel 2012: xiii; Bury 1909: 244; Ligota 1982: 1; Connor 1985: 468; Marincola 1997: 26. Plutarch as a moral biographer – Plut. *Alex.* 1; Shrimpton 1991b: 16; Sears 2013: 21-22; Gomme 1959: 54-55; Hamilton 2002b: xliii-xliv; Waterfield 2004: 84; Rhodes 2010c: 33; Scott-Kilvert 1973a: 10-11; Bury 1909: 154; Roberts 2017: xxii; Roisman 2017: 351; Worthington 2013: 5.

²⁴ Polyb. 15.36; Diod. Sic. 1.3.5-6; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.2; Marincola 1997: 2-3, 24; McQueen 1995a: 5; Ligota 1982: 1; Connor 1985: 466-467; Momigliano 1978: 8; Breisach 2007: 18; Gilmour 2011: 30-31; Finley 1959: 14; Luce 1997: 119, 132; Walbank 1967: 496.

²⁵ Thuc. 1.22.1; Rhodes 2010c: 29; Finley 1972: 25-26; Cartwright 1997: 6; Hornblower 1996: 24, 85; 1997: 59; 2007: 39; Blanshard 2010a: 18; Momigliano 1978: 6; Luraghi 2017: 91; Roberts 2017: xix; Hirsch 1985: 30; Gomme 1959: 140.

purposes, is to be expected.²⁶ Most ancient chroniclers – Thucydides, for example – go beyond judicious editing and sometimes report what could (or should) have been said, rather than what actually was.²⁷ The difficulty faced by moderns is to discern fact from (educated) fiction and although speeches had to have had at least some basis in reality, how much and what is unprovable.

Therefore, as valuable as the works of ancient historians remain, it is important that these records are complemented with other sources, each of which offer valuable insights – yet at the same time present their own challenges. Archaic poets represent one such avenue of research – not least because they preserve a record of an age otherwise almost non-existent in the literary tradition.²⁸ The works of Homer – if indeed they are the corpus of a single identity and not a collective memory recorded as Greece emerged from its Dark Age – are an example. Although the Greeks themselves had no doubts about Homer’s historicity, it is generally (although by no means universally) believed that the *Iliad* dates to the eighth century but maintains traditions of the Mycenaean Period around four hundred

²⁶ Common practice – Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.56; Plut. *Alex.* 1; Arr. *Anab.* 2.12.8, 4.20.2-3, 7.1.6; Finley 1959: 12-13; Anderson 2001: 155; Whitby 2007: 58; Marincola 2001: 79, 83; 2007b: 119-120; Cartwright 1997: 7; Wallace 1964: 251-252; Bury 1909: 112, 114, 117. Not verbatim reproductions – Thuc. 1.22.1; Polyb. 12.25; Arr. *Anab.* 5.27.1; Bury 1909: 230; Marincola 2007b: 120; Immerwahr 1985b: 446; Cartwright 1997: 6-7; Walbank 1967: 384-385.

²⁷ Thuc. 1.22.1; Marincola 2007b: 121, 125; Rhodes 2010c: 29; Finley 1972: 26; Cartwright 1997: 6, 24; Hornblower 1996: 84-85; 1997: 59-60; Gomme 1959: 140; Bury 1909: 109; Niedzielski 2017: 41; Porciani 2007: 331.

²⁸ Hes. *Op.* 379-439, 469-495; Bury 1909: 3-4; Knox 1985b: 5; Thomas 1995: 104-105; Osborne 2010b: 92; Dihle 1994: 24; Wender 1973a: 19-20; Hose & Schenker 2016: 3; Del Corso 2016: 12, 18.

years earlier.²⁹ Nevertheless, with careful examination the works of poets such as Homer and Tyrtaeus yield glimpses of warfare as practiced in the early seventh century.³⁰

Yet caution is required as very little work from the Archaic Age has survived beyond fragments, so calling into question the representativeness of remnants.³¹ That which is extant suggests that many bards were transmitters of myths and legends whose purpose was the moral education of their audience.³² It is also to be acknowledged that the archaic poets were not historians but authors whose compositions exaggerated, embellished and dramatized great deeds for performance in a public arena.³³ They represented, therefore, a commemoration (as opposed to analysis) of events and personalities.³⁴

It is a similar situation surrounding evidence derived from playwrights, another source drawn upon in this investigation. In the first instance it should be acknowledged that the preponderance of survivals are Athenian and so, in the majority of cases, represent the

²⁹ Homer's historicity – Hdt. 2.53; Thuc. 1.3.3, 9.4, 3.104.4-6; Cartwright 1997: 13, 16; Hornblower 1997: 17, 33, 530; Gomme 1959: 98, 109; Bury 1909: 2, 104; Raaflaub 2006: 449; Winnington-Ingram 1985a: 283; Kirk 1985a: 42; 1985b: 110; Long 1985a: 246; Hadas 1962: 1; Luce 1997: 1. *Iliad* written eighth century – Hdt. 2.53; Davison 1962: 149; Prevas 2002: 17; van Wees 2004: 7; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 84; Cartwright 1997: 13; Scanlon 2015: 6. Seventh century – Marrou 1982: 3; Miller 2004: 2; Hall 2013: 11. Mycenaean anachronisms – Marrou 1982: 4; Prevas 2002: 17; Dihle 1994: 8.

³⁰ Hom. *Il.* 13.341-342, 477-495, 497-505; Tyrtaeus 10.1, 15, 22, 30; 11.4, 11-14, 24-26; Pl. *Ion* 531D; van Wees 2004: 155, 171-172; 2009: 139, 149; Schwartz 2009: 120, 123; Kagan & Viggiano 2013b: 48; Viggiano 2013: 119; Hunt 2007: 109; Hanson 2000: 42; Stewart 2014: 232; Cartledge 1977: 25; Matthew 2009: 397, 408; Raaflaub 2013c: 10 n38; West 1994: x, xii; Segal 1995a: 169; Barron & Easterling 1985a: 130-131.

³¹ Thomas 1995: 105; West 1994: ix; Knox 1985d: 146; Barron & Easterling 1985a: 106; Wender 1973a: 11; Scanlon 2015: 11; Armstrong 2016: 31; Tsagalis 2017: xiii; Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 52; Fowler 1992: x.

³² Transmitters of myth – Hes. *Theog.* 26-52; West 1994: viii; Kirk 1985a: 89; 1985b: 111; Segal 1995a: 167, 171, 180; 1995b: 225; Barron 1985: 95-96; Barron & Easterling 1985b: 108; Raaflaub 2006: 450; Thomas 1995: 107; Breisach 2007: 14. Moral education – Theog. 869-872; Isoc. *Dis.* 2.43; Marrou 1982: 3-4, 12; Amemiya 2007: 6; Knox 1985d: 149; Segal 1985a: 171; 1985b: 223; Barron & Easterling 1985a: 140, 143; Thomas 1995: 104.

³³ Exaggeration – Thuc. 1.10.3; Hornblower 1997: 35; Cartwright 1997: 16; Marincola 2001: 12; Rhodes 2007: 56; 2010c: 36; Finley 1972: 17; Hirsch 1985: 126; Raaflaub 2006: 449; Knox 1985b: 15; Rutherford 2012: 14, 16. Public performance – Hom. *Od.* 8.254; Knox 1985b: 4; 1985d: 147; Barron 1985: 104-105; Barron & Easterling 1985d: 106; Segal 1985a: 165; Thomas 1995: 106-107, 109, 111-112; Breisach 2007: 6-7.

³⁴ Hom. *Il.* 2.484; *Od.* 3.203-204; Theog. 237-239, 245-247; Pind. *Ol.* 10.86-94; *Pyth.* 3.112-115; Aristot. *Poet.* 9.1451b4-7; Marincola 2001: 14, 18; Rutherford 2007: 505; Segal 1985b: 223; Thomas 1995: 114, 116; Breisach 2007: 6; Scanlon 2015: 11-12, 14.

perspective of that *polis*.³⁵ Like poets, playwrights were also prone to exaggeration for dramatic or comedic effect.³⁶ Tragedians, in particular, generally looked to myth as a source of inspiration and there was a tendency to moralise – especially on the dangers of *hubris*.³⁷ However, playwrights were often contemporaries of, and thus commented on, current events.³⁸ Supernatural elements aside, Aeschylus’ *Persae*, for example, was written in 472 to commemorate the Battle of Salamis, an event in which the tragedian was a participant.³⁹ Aristophanes, arguably the greatest exponent of Old Comedy, lived during the time of the Peloponnesian War and whilst a number of his works savaged the conflict and its leading figures, they also contained information pertinent to the study of military practices in Classical Greece.⁴⁰ *Peace*, for example, is – in part – a scathing condemnation of the war and its poor leadership, and yet the play yields valuable confirmation for the existence of the *othismos aspidon*, an area of some controversy amongst modern scholars.⁴¹

Another source drawn upon in this thesis was the works of orators, especially Demosthenes and Aeschines. A fuller discussion on the relative worth of these texts can be found in Section III below but some general comments on the value of speeches as

³⁵ Rhodes 2010c: 37, 40; Gould 1985: 265; Vellacott 1961: 17; Rutherford 2007: 504; Henderson 1998a: 11-12; Armstrong 2016: 31; Hall 1997: 125; Chou 2012: 44-45; Revermann 2006: 125.

³⁶ Pl. *Ion* 535C-E; Gell. 6.5; Amemiya 2007: 62; Sears 2013: 17-18; Rutherford 2007: 51; Gomme 1959: 37; Knox 1985a: 339; Winnington-Ingram 1985a: 291; Handley 1985b: 373; Long 1985d: 540; Gould 1985: 280; Vellacott 1961: 18; Henderson 1998b: 222; Barrett 1964: 14; Hammond 1956: 39.

³⁷ Aesch. *Pers.* 742, 759, 822-843; Winnington-Ingram 1985a: 282, 283-285; 1985b: 258; Gould 1985: 266, 270-271; Knox 1985a: 319, 323-324; Immerwahr 1985a: 432; Sommerstein 2008b: 5, 7; Vellacott 1961: 7-8; Rutherford 2007: 505-506; Hadas 1962: 1-2; Scanlon 2015: 14.

³⁸ Sommerstein 1973: 14; 2008a: xi; 2008b: 1, 14; Sears 2013: 16-17; Rhodes 2010c: 39; Gomme 1959: 38; Knox 1985a: 317, 319-320, 333-334; 1985c: 344; Handley 1985c: 374-375; Roberts 2017: xxii; Henderson 1998a: 15-16.

³⁹ Aesch. *Pers.* 249-255, 272-273; Sommerstein 2008a: xi, xiii; 2008b: 1, 3-4; Vellacott 1961: 7, 17; Rood 2007: 153; Rutherford 2007: 505; Fagles & Stanford 1977: 13; Hammond 1956: 39; Kirk 1955: 84; Favorini 2003: 106.

⁴⁰ Rhodes 1987: 157; 2010c: 39; Gomme 1959: 38; Handley 1985a: 356-357; 1985c: 378; Henderson 1998a: 12, 14-15; Sommerstein 1973: 14-15; Barrett 1964: 28; Hadas 1962: 8; Bugh 1998b: 107; Zumbrennen 2004: 660; Munn 2017: 11.

⁴¹ Aristoph. *Pax* 1274.

historical sources is here called for. Firstly, it should be acknowledged that their purpose was to persuade rather than inform and so authors would employ distortion, misdirection – even lies – to sway an audience.⁴² Another concern is that speeches were often revised after delivery, raising serious doubts about how closely the later written version followed that which was actually delivered.⁴³ In some cases, however, orators were contemporaries of events upon which they commented and so potentially represent a valuable source of information on issues of the times.

The final collection of literary texts consulted in the research of this thesis was the works of philosophers. As with other written genres, philosophical treatises did not concern themselves with history but instead dwelt on topics such as immortality of the soul, morality, and politics.⁴⁴ They also sought to provide an explanation of the natural world and the way that it was.⁴⁵ Yet judiciously read, the musings of antiquity's philosophers remain sources from which valuable historical details can be mined.⁴⁶ Pythagoras and Aristotle, for example, were profitably consulted in this thesis' discussion on ancient education (Chapter 3, I. Education).

⁴² Cic. *Brut.* 42; Worthington 2013: 7; Steel 2009: 68, 70; Kennedy 1985: 505, 509, 518, 521, 525; Amemiya 2007: 62; Rhodes 2010c: 33; Adams 1988: vii-viii, xvii; Nicolai 2007: 21; Sears 2013: 18-19; Buckler 2000: 148; Harding 1987: 25; Dyck 1985: 43; Munn 2017: 7.

⁴³ Howan 2008: 24; Sears 2013: 18-19; Rhodes 2010c: 33; Steel 2009: 72-73; Kennedy 1985: 506, 510, 512; Worthington 2013: 7, 220-221; Whitmarsh 2009: 78; Adams 1912: 5, 7, 21; Pearson 1975: 215.

⁴⁴ Not historians – Aristot. *Poet.* 9.1451b6; Bury 1909: 184, 186; Osborne 2010a: 44-45; Sandbach 1985: 484, 491; Long 1985d: 536. Immortality – Pl. *Phd.* 76C-77D, 82C-83D, 88A; Cic. *Tusc.* 1.17.39; Ov. *Met.* 15.158-159; Gell. 4.11.14; Iambl. *VP* 14; Diog. Laert. 8.4-5, 14; Porph. 19, 26, 45; Phot. 6; Sandbach 1985: 487-488; Long 1985b: 628; Osborne 2010a: 41; Stanley 2010: 89, 256-257; Kahn 2001: 2, 4, 66; Morrison 1958: 201-202. Morality – Pl. *Resp.* 344b-c; Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 10.1.1-4; Bury 1929: 7; Long 1985a: 246, 256; Sandbach 1985: 486; Osborne 2010a: 41; Tarrant 1993: xxviii; Sinclair 1981: 13; Gill 1999: xvii, xxxvi. Politics – Aristot. *Pol.* 1292b22-1293a34; Bury 1909: 179; Long 1985a: 246; Sandbach 1985: 481, 491; Osborne 2010a: 41, 43; Rhodes 1993: 9; Sinclair 1981: 13; Saunders 1981: 29, 33.

⁴⁵ Pl. *Ti.* 86E-87B; Long 1985a: 249-250, 253-254; 1985b: 627-628; 1985c: 528, 532; Tarrant 1993: xxx; Rhodes 1993: 7; Osborne 2010a: 41; Sandbach 1985: 493; Bury 1929: 4-5, 14; Broadie 2012: 1-2; Breisach 2007: 9; Luce 1997: 8.

⁴⁶ Osborne 2010a: 47; Sandbach 1995: 491, 494; Tarrant 1993: x; Saunders 1981: 29, 38; Gill 1999: xii-xiii; Armstrong 2016: 30-31; Long 1999: 11-12; Guthrie 1969: 266; Taylor 2001: 200; Pritzl 2013: 23-24.

Literary sources aside, other forms of evidence were also examined as part of this investigation's methodological process. One of these was epigraphy, which has been rightly recognised as a major source of knowledge from which the written record may be complemented.⁴⁷ The Athenian Tribute Lists as evidence for Athenian control of the Delian League and consequent establishment of thalassocracy is but one example.⁴⁸ Just as with ancient texts, however, inscriptional evidence requires careful handling. Because the majority of (Classical Greek) remains are Athenian, issues of representativeness arise.⁴⁹ Finds are often fragmentary and badly damaged so that reconstruction is required, a difficult process and one that can leave content inconclusive.⁵⁰ Nor, until Hellenistic times, were the Greeks particularly meticulous record keepers, with consequent errors and omissions (especially concerning figures) presenting difficulties for modern commentators.⁵¹ Precise dating can sometimes pose problems: Athenian decrees can be dated reasonably securely if the name of an *archon* is included (a practice not regularly adhered to until c.420) but on occasion may have to be determined on letter forms – a notoriously unreliable methodology.⁵² Questions, therefore, sometimes exist over authenticity and purpose. Antiquity also produced its share of forgeries and even if the term

⁴⁷ Cartledge 1987: 71; Whitby 2007: 71; Sears 2013: 22; Gomme 1959: 30; Rhodes 2010c: 45; 2010d: 49; Marincola 2007a: 3; Cooper 2008: 9; Bodel 2001a: 1; 2001b: xvii-xviii; Liddel & Low 2013: 1-2, 9-10, 13; Cook 1987: 7.

⁴⁸ M&L 39=Tod 30; Cook 1987: 7; Meiggs & Lewis 2004: 83-84; Tod 1933: 52, 54-55; Paarmann 2004: 77; Scafuro 2013: 404; Figueira & Jensen 2013: 491-492; Rhodes 2010d: 48-49; Rowe 2009: 25.

⁴⁹ Cartledge 1987: 72; Rhodes 2010c: 45; Rhodes & Osborne 2003b: xvi; Cooper 2008: 8; Cook 1987: 6, 14; Strauss 2013: 26; Pownall 2013: 287; Raaflaub 2010: 390-391; Lee 2010b: 481; Meyer 2013: 454.

⁵⁰ Sears 2013: 23-24; Rhodes 1986: iii; 2010d: 46; Rhodes & Osborne 2003b: xv; Gomme 1959: 30-31; Harding 2007: 180; Cooper 2008: 5-6; Liddel & Low 2013: 6, 8-9; Cook 1987: 15-16, 18.

⁵¹ Rhodes & Osborne 2003b: xv, xxi-xxii, xxv; Rhodes 1986: iii; 2010d: 47-48, 52; Cartledge 1987: 71; Sears 2013: 23; Cook 1987: 33; Crosby & Young 1941: 64; Pownall 2013: 287.

⁵² Rhodes & Osborne 20=Tod 118; Sears 2013: 23; Cook 1987: 14; Rhodes 1986: 52-53; 2008: 500, 503; Meiggs 1966: 86-87, 89; Tod 1933: 51; Vickers 1996: 172, 174.

“fake” is a little harsh when applied to, for example, the Themistocles Decree, it remains true that for that particular inscription the composition was intentionally archaized.⁵³

Despite these potential drawbacks, epigraphic evidence represents a valuable contribution to the historical record. In the first instance, inscriptions were usually on marble or bronze, making them expensive but at the same time far more durable than records documented on papyrus, leather or wood – alterations are also easily detectable (usually).⁵⁴ Because inscriptions were used for public announcements, they represent a near-contemporary record of laws, decrees, alliances, as well as important people and the honours granted them.⁵⁵ It is also possible to gain an insight into the lives of less exalted individuals: the Dexileos Monument, for example, commemorates the death of a young Athenian *hippeus* whilst coincidentally providing modern historians with important information about cavalry’s role at the Battle of Nemea and societal attitudes towards the elite following their support of the Thirty Tyrants.⁵⁶

Another invaluable reference for this investigation was the archaeological record. Artefacts, however, can also be problematic. Discoveries often lack a context and so may be difficult to date accurately.⁵⁷ Objects such as pottery frequently convey mythological themes and may portray heroic or idealised images – the nude hoplite on grave stelae is but

⁵³ Forgeries – Hdt. 1.51; Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 154; How & Wells 2008: 88; Rhodes 2007: 57; 2010d: 50; Rowe 2009: 25; Liddel & Low 2013: 16, 19; Chambers 1958: 312-313. Themistocles Decree – M&L 23; Rhodes 2010d: 50; Fornara 1967: 425; Chambers 1962: 306-307; Meiggs & Lewis 2004: 50; Rowe 2009: 26.

⁵⁴ R&O 22; *IG* ii² 212, ll. 44-48=R&O 64=Tod 167; *IG* ii² 226, ll. 19-27=R&O 70=Tod 173; *IG* ii² 237, ll. 31-39=R&O 77=Tod 178; Sears 2013: 22; Rhodes 1986: iii; 2010d: 45, 51; Rowe 2009: 25; Gomme 1959: 31; Rhodes & Osborne 2003b: xiv; Cooper 2008: 2; Bodet 2001b: xvii; Cook 1987: 6.

⁵⁵ *IG* ii² 334=R&O 81; R&O 20=Tod 118; *IG* ii² 141 ll. 4-11=R&O 21=Tod 139; Sears 2013: 22; Rhodes 1986: iii; 2010d: 45-46; Gomme 1959: 30; Rhodes & Osborne 2003b: xiii; Rowe 2009: 25-26; Cooper 2008: 2.

⁵⁶ *IG* ii² 5222; *IG* ii² 6217=R&O 7B=Tod 105; Fields 2003: 108, 124; Rhodes 2010d: 71; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 42-43; Tod 1933: 19-20; Lattimore 2010: 472; Hurwit 2007: 35-36; Bugh 1998b: 136-137, 139.

⁵⁷ Sears 2013: 24; Foxhall 2013: 197-198; Hanson 2013: 256; Orton *et al.*, 1993: 189; Whitley 2001: 72-73; Shaw 2003: 19-20; Biers 1992: 70, 74; Snodgrass 2006: 52, 56.

one example.⁵⁸ Furthermore, as with any text, finds are subject to the same biased or contentious interpretations as literary sources.⁵⁹

Yet artefacts such as these are rightly recognized as not only a complement to the written record but also as a source for which there is little surviving testimony in literary texts.⁶⁰ Some survivals – weapons for example – provide physical remains from which conclusions can be drawn and recreations fashioned in an effort to test effectiveness.⁶¹ Archaeological discoveries can also assist in illuminating an hitherto unknown historical record. Importantly, for this inquiry, this is particularly true of Macedonia where recent excavations (such as those at Aigai) have been enlightening – with further significant finds likely.⁶²

Numismatic evidence also contributed to this investigation. Beginning in the mid-sixth century and continuing through until *circa* second century AD, the Greek numismatic record spanned eight centuries.⁶³ Moreover, the evidence is enormously broad-based. Although possessing a common denomination, each *polis* (*c.* 1,000 by some estimates) had the right to strike its own coinage and many did so, with the result that millions of individual coins have survived into the modern era.⁶⁴ As a source, however, coins also require

⁵⁸ Hanson 2013: 256; Gaebel 2002: 59; Matthew 2012a: 31-32, 34-35, 37; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 3, 79; Aldrete *et al.* 2013: 23, 86; Jarva 2013: 396; Anderson 1970: 32-33; Lee 2010b: 481; Goette 2009: 197-198; Ma 2008b: 245; Geddes 1987: 308; Hurwit 2007: 46, 46 n56.

⁵⁹ Osborne: 2018: 34, 45; Hall 2014: 28-29; Cook 1997: 263.

⁶⁰ Sears 2013: 24; Cartledge 1987: 73; Whitby 2007: 71; Marincola 2007a: 3; Forsén 2010: 75, 77; Dyson 2009: 59; Hornblower 1996: 9; Blanshard 2010a: 11; James 2013: 93; Whitley 2010: 15; Osborne 2010b: 92; Moreland 2006a: 137-138; Rhodes 2010b: 33.

⁶¹ Whitby 2007: 73-75; Whitley 2010: 17; Aldrete *et al.* 2013: 24; Lee 2010b: 504; Schwartz 2013: 157; Hanson 1993a: 78 n1; 1993c: 8; 2000: 48; Matthew 2012a: 2, 4-5, 15.

⁶² Whitley 2010: 16-17; Anson 2010c: 6; Dahmen 2010: 43; Hardiman 2010: 505-506, 517; Borza 1982b: 26; Hatzopoulos 2015b: 60-61; Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2015: 271-272; Andronikos 1980b: 188-189.

⁶³ Rhodes 2010d: 55; Meadows 2009: 49; Kroll 2008: 14-15, 24, 36; 2012: 35-36; Metcalf 2012: 9; Martin 1996: 260; von Reden 1997: 156; Kraay 1964: 78-80; Howgego 1995: 6, 25; Price 1974: v.

⁶⁴ Individual issuances – Pl. *Resp.* 371b; [Aristot.] *Mag. Mor.* 1194a18-26; Whitley 2001: 193; Metcalf 2012: 9; Martin 1995: 274; 1996b: 262; Hansen & Nielsen 2004: 144; Hansen 2006b: 52. One thousand *poleis* – Walter 2009: 518; Hedrick 2009: 394; Wiemer 2013: 55; Mack 2015: 9; Hansen & Nielsen 2004: 14, 54;

circumspect interpretation. Essentially propagandistic in nature, they were intended to promote the prestige of the state (or individual) that struck them. This was especially true of commemorative issues which were minted to celebrate a particular achievement or convey a message (Chapter 4, V. Statecraft). This in itself can be useful in determining social and political aspects of the issuing identity as well as providing insights into official policy.⁶⁵ In some cases, corroborative information can also be gleaned from numismatics. For example, the reverse of a silver stater minted at Pamphylia (420-370) depicts a slinger about to release his missile. A careful examination of the coin reveals the individual is wearing a *chiton* and helmet – possibly Chalcidian. No other protective accoutrement is visible. This is but one example where numismatics provides important supporting evidence in the study of Greek warfare – in this case, panoply of Classical *sphendonetai*.

A slightly more controversial methodology embraced by this investigation is that of experimental (or forensic) archaeology, including the findings of reenactors. Aldrete and Matthew have produced valuable studies but, as with every other source, considered judgment is required in the evaluation of findings.⁶⁶ Issues can arise from sloppy methodology or cavalier treatment of what little information the historical record contains, but by paying careful attention to existing evidence and application of rigorous experimental methodologies, findings can fill gaps in existing knowledge. Reenactors can also give insight into practical uses and limitations of weapons. Most scholarly participants pay extremely careful attention to detail in an effort to maximise authenticity of experience

Hansen 2006b: 77; 2008: 260, 262. Roberts 2017: 5; Barley 2015: 44 estimate 1,500 *poleis* in the fifth century. Surviving numbers – Williams & Meadows 2010: 173.

⁶⁵ Cartledge 1987: 72; Marincola 2007a: 3; Meadows 2009: 48; Dahmen 2010: 42; Martin 1995: 266; 1996b: 264, 266-267; von Reden 1997: 154; Millett 2010: 493; Figueira 1998: 4, 248; Howgego 1995: 39, 44, 62.

⁶⁶ Aldrete's *Reconstructing Ancient Linen Body Armor* is a detailed study into the history, construction and effectiveness of the *linothorax*. Matthew's *A Storm of Spears* comprehensively investigates phalanx warfare, with particular emphasis on the *doru* and its impact on combat. Results from field trials were important in the conclusions of both authors.

– although as has been wryly noted, very few recreationists have seen active military combat and they are not (thankfully) actually trying to kill each other.⁶⁷

A final word on methodology lies with modern literary sources. Academic interest in Greek warfare has always been strong but has undergone something of a boom in recent decades – a search of “hoplite” on JStor yields 2,447 results and Google Scholar 11,900 “hits”. For this reason, seminal works by established and respected scholars such as Anderson, Anson, Bosworth, Buckler, Cartledge, Cawkwell, Ellis, Hammond, Heckel, Krentz, Lazenby, Pritchett, Rhodes and Tuplin (amongst many others) have been valuable points of reference. So too have been more recent but equally diligent academics including Carney, Gray, Hanson, Hornblower, Marincola, Matthew, Pritchard, Sekunda and van Wees. Although in some circles it may be fashionable to dismiss as quaint or unsophisticated analyses from previous centuries, commentators such as Bury, Delbrück, Henderson, Smith and Tarn also appear in the bibliography. After all, their observations – based on careful study of the ancient sources – are still relevant and useful. Such diversity of material inevitably results in a raft of possibilities but also empowers the researcher to make their own informed interpretations.

III. Philip II and the Literary Sources

Any study whose purpose was to evaluate the rise of Macedonia under Philip, especially when analysing the role played by Athens and Athenians, would examine the works of Isocrates and Demosthenes, and in the process secure a wealth of information.

⁶⁷ Insight – Gabriel 2012: xvii; James 2013: 114-115; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 14-15, 129, 189; Krentz 2013: 138; Hanson 1993a: 78 n2; 2000: 56; Markle 1997: 334, 336; Matthew 2012a: xx-xxi; Aldrete *et al.* 2013: 7-8; Donlan & Thompson 1976: 340-341; Marsden 1969: 4; Murray *et al.* 2011: 11-12, 14-15; Bakas 2014: 137-138. Qualified approval – Gabriel 2012: xvii; James 2013: 114-115; Krentz 2013: 139.

However, use of these and similar sources – Aeschines, Hyperides and Lycurgus for instance – can be problematic as the views reflected were those of orators and politicians with an Athenocentric perspective of events.⁶⁸ Isocrates, for example, was a Panhellenist academic who, despite regarding himself a philosopher, transcended a rather blurred line between teacher, rhetorician and businessman.⁶⁹ He was also an incorrigible pamphleteer who composed no less than three open letters to Philip, all of which urged a Panhellenist crusade against Persia. The first of these occurred in 346 with *Address to Philip* – originally an oration – and was followed by *Letter to Philip I* and *Letter to Philip II* in 342 and 338 respectively.⁷⁰

Despite all his calls for martial action, however, Isocrates himself was a military novice with little to no field experience and a weak grasp of strategic considerations. For example, his petitions urging Philip on towards invasion of Asia highlighted the rhetorician's fundamental ignorance of grand strategy: that until the king could be certain of Macedonia's security, a Hellenistic crusade was a long way from being a priority.⁷¹ Isocrates further demonstrated his strategic naivety when, following the serious injury Philip incurred whilst campaigning against the Illyrians in 345/4, he wrote to the king

⁶⁸Hammond 1994b: 11; Cawkwell 1978b: 18; Errington 1990: 72; Millett 2013: 48, 52; Engels 2010: 86; Powell 1995: 245; Ferrario 2017: 71, 71 n65; Worthington 2013: viii-ix, 122; Buckler 2000: 148.

⁶⁹ Panhellenist academic – Norlin 1928: x, xx; Hammond 1994b: 11; Marrou 1982: 80-81; Harrison 2009: 218; Thonemann 2009: 222; Rhodes 2010b: 28; Olbrycht 2010: 348; Ferrario 2017: 79, 81; Worthington 2013: 176; Cartledge 1987: 185; Roberts 2017: 348. Philosopher – Isoc. *Dis.* 12.31-32, 271; Norlin 1928: xxvi; Marrou 1982: 80-81; Ferrario 2017: 59. Businessman – Isoc. *Dis.* 15.161-162; Plin. *HN* 7.30.110; Norlin 1928: xix; Marrou 1982: 82; Lee 2017: 31; Worthington 2013: 18, 27; Roberts 2017: 348; Cartledge 1997: p.33.

⁷⁰ Isoc. *Dis.* 5.16; Isoc. *Ep.* 2.11; 3.3; Norlin 1928: xviii, xxx, 244; Green 1982: 130; 1991: 47; Gabriel 2010: 174; Cawkwell 1978b: 112; Marrou 1982: 87; Rhodes 2010b: 28; Natoli 2004b: 52-53; Thonemann 2009: 222; Cartledge 1987: 375; Ferrario 2017: 79, 81.

⁷¹ Green 1982: 130; Gabriel 2010: 174-175; Errington 1990: 51, 65, 88, 101; Fox 2015c: 354; Hammond 1994b: 117-118; Markle 1976: 83; Worthington 2008: 166-167; 2014: 104; Ellis 1976: 92; Olbrycht 2010: 348.

chiding him for risking his own life in such trivial endeavours and encouraged caution.⁷² Apart from completely misreading the importance such campaigns played in safeguarding borders, the admonition showed a failure to appreciate Macedonian tradition that dictated Philip lead his men from the front, not only to maintain morale but retain their respect and his own position as king.

Another of the Attic Orators whose works provide valuable insight into the relationship that existed between Philip and the southern Greeks was Demosthenes, perhaps the leading Athenian rhetorician of the fourth century.⁷³ Demosthenes was a confirmed patriot and politician but he also positioned himself to be the archenemy of Philip, whom he regarded as the greatest of all threats to Greek liberty.⁷⁴ He may indeed have had a point, but his attacks on the king were tainted by bias and, at times, outright lies.⁷⁵ Like Isocrates, Demosthenes was not a man of great military insight as evidenced by his myopic belief expressed in the *Philippics* that Macedonia could be defeated in a contest of arms. A more considered assessment would have revealed the stark reality: that the *poleis* were too fragmented and obsessed with independence to ever oppose Philip successfully.⁷⁶

⁷² Isoc. *Ep.* 2.3-4, 6; Gabriel 2010: 174; Cawkwell 1978b: 112; Hammond 1994b: 117; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 473; Natoli 2004b: 53; Markle 1976: 88; Riginos 1994: 115; Ellis 1976: 143; Konstan 2004: 121.

⁷³ Cic. *Brut.* 35; Dion. Hal. *Is.* 3.20; Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.22, 1.39; Plut. *Dem.* 3, 6; Plin. *Ep.* 9.26.8; Worthington 2013: 342; Cooper 2000a: 224-225; Harding 1987: 25-26; Rhodes 2010c: 34; MacDowell 2009: 1; Cooper 2000: 227; van der Blom 2010: 282; McQueen 1995a: 125.

⁷⁴ Patriot – Plut. *Dem.* 13, 18; Worthington 2000: 3; 2013: ix, x, 3; Buckler 2000: 118, 147. Politician – Plut. *Dem.* 3, 5, 12; Worthington 2000: 3; 2013: ix, x, 3; Harding 1987: 28, 36. Arch-enemy – *Dem.* 15.24; 23.121; Plut. *Dem.* 12, 16; Worthington 2000: 3; 2008: 71; 2013: viii, x, 3; Engels 2010: 86; Harding 1987: 26; Rhodes 2010c: 34.

⁷⁵ *Dem.* 2.5, 9, 14-15, 16; 3.17; Polyb. 18.14; Plut. *Dem.* 16; Hammond 1994b: 11; Worthington 2008: 71, 76, 90; 2013: 7, 342; Errington 1990: 72; Rhodes 2010b: 27; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 475; Buckler 2000: 148; Harding 1987: 25; Dyck 1985: 43.

⁷⁶ Defeat of Macedonia – *Dem.* 4.4-8, 10; 6.19; 9.65; Plut. *Dem.* 17; Worthington 2008: 144; 2013: 121-122. Fragmented nature of the Greek *polis* system – Aelian, 1; Pl. *Leg.* 626a-e; Worthington 2008: 71, 73; 2013: 51, 264; Green 1991: 71; Raaflaub 2013a: 82-83, 85; Ager 2013: 506-507; McQueen 1995b: 328, 334; Lomas 1995: 347.

Neither was Demosthenes any great strategist: his call for a standing force to counter Philip's advances in the north could not have been financed even had the *demos* been foolish enough to make the attempt. Furthermore, despite Athens' decisive defeat at Chaeronea, Demosthenes steadfastly refused to accept Macedonian military superiority, crediting Philip's victory to luck and the incompetency of the Theban commander Theagenes.⁷⁷ Demosthenes' lack of military insight was not limited to the actions of Philip – he also greatly underestimated the ability and determination of Alexander, to the very great cost of Thebes.⁷⁸ Nor it would appear, despite the bluster, did Demosthenes have the courage of his convictions when as a hoplite in the Athenian contingent at Chaeronea, he fled the battlefield, abandoning his *aspis* in the process.⁷⁹ Perhaps the best that can be said about Demosthenes is also true for other rhetoricians such as Isocrates: their testimony was a contemporary view involving individuals and events of direct relevance to this inquiry, but one that must be regarded with suitable and circumspect caution.

In addition to political speeches and letters there also remain the manuscripts of annalists such as Ephorus, Theopompus, Callisthenes and Marsyas Macedon – all contemporaries of Philip who wrote histories. The challenge facing modern commentators is that there is no extant copy of their works so that where they do survive, it is either as fragments or in the records of others. Consequently, the main literary sources available

⁷⁷ Military adventurism – Dem. 4.16-20; Worthington 2008: 72-73, 81; Cawkwell 1963b: 50-51; Pritchard 2012: 46; Gabrielsen 1994: 113-114; Parke 1933: 147, 147 n7, 232; Worthington 2013: 121-122. Luck and incompetency – Dem. 18.245; Worthington 2008: 151; 2013: 301; Harding 1987: 36.

⁷⁸ Din. 1.24; Diod. Sic. 17.3.1-4; Plut. *Dem.* 23; Arr. *Anab.* 1.10.4-5; Chroust 1967a: 245-246; Worthington 2013: 318; Ashley 1998: 175, 179; Heckel 2009b: 29; Bosworth 1988a: 33, 194-195; Green 1991: 136, 149; O'Brien 1994: 52, 54; Sealey 1993: 203; Trevett 1999: 199.

⁷⁹ Plut. *Dem.* 20; Aeschin. 3.152, 157, 175, 181; Worthington 2008: 151; 2013: 251, 297, 318; Green 1991: 76; O'Brien 1994: 25; Buckler 2000: 147; Harding 1987: 27; Guler 2014: 135; Nemeth 2015: 11; Beneker 2016: 157; King 2018: 96; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 92.

today for the student of Phillip II are Diodorus Siculus and Justin, both of which are problematic.

Diodorus' *Library of History* was probably written over the thirty year period that followed his move to Rome in 56 whence he began collecting material for his life's work, a universal history of the known world from its mythological creation down to 58 – the beginning of Caesar's Gallic wars.⁸⁰ Comprising forty books, the work was voluminous and although only Books 1-5, 11-20 and a number of fragments survive, its oft stated intention to provide moral and political instruction is clear.⁸¹ However, the *Library of History* was an epitome and it is well acknowledged that the veracity of Diodorus' work is best judged by the quality of the historian whom he summarised – unfortunately this is not always apparent.⁸² That being said, Book 16 (the volume that treats the life of Philip) – as was undoubtedly the case for Books 11 to 15 – is believed to follow, in the main, Ephorus of Cyme who in the first half of the fourth century himself composed a universal history of twenty-nine books.⁸³ Opinions of Ephorus' worth vary, being regarded by some as an historian of the highest order commendable for his careful research, and by others as a

⁸⁰ Diod. Sic. 1.4.1, 4.7; Drews 1962: 383; 1963: 247-248; Rhodes 2010b: 25-26; 2010c: 31; Marincola 2007c: 176; Anson 2010c: 8; Asirvatham 2010: 106; Stylianou 1998: 17, 22; McQueen 1995a: 2.

⁸¹ Diod. Sic. 1.2.1-5, 11.3.1, 38.6, 13.15.1, 14.1.1-3, 31.15.1; Drews 1962: 383-384; English 2009b: x; Nicolai 2007: 22; Marincola 2007c: 176, 178; Asirvatham 2010: 106-107; Luce 1989: 28; Stylianou 1998: 3-4, 5, 17; Roisman 2017: 349; McQueen 1995a: 2, 4, 8-9.

⁸² Diod. Sic. 1.3.3-4, 6-7; Hammond 1994b: 12; Buck 1994: xvii, 83; Gomme 1967: 3; Rhodes 2010c: 31; Marincola 2007c: 177; Gabba 1981: 59; Hammond 1991a: 502; Westlake 1954: 300-301, 304-305; Stylianou 1998: 1-2. Other chroniclers epitomised by Diodorus included: Timaeus – Drews 1962: 384; Rhodes 2007: 62; Parker 2004: 50; Westlake 1954: 300-301; Stylianou 1998: 2, 14; Meiggs & Lewis 2004: 61. Hieronymus – Drews 1962: 384; Stylianou 1998: 2, 13; Simpson 1959: 370, 371-372. Polybius – Drews 1962: 384; Vattuone 2007: 196; Stylianou 1998: 2, 8, 23; Marincola 2001: 148. Posidonius – Drews 1962: 384; Marincola 2007c: 177-178; Pelling 2007: 251; Fisher 2010b: 59; Stylianou 1998: 2.

⁸³ Hammond 1991a: 506; 1994b: 12; Pownall 2003: 113, 117; Pearson 1943: 48; Drews 1962: 389-390; 1963: 247-249, 254; Worthington 2008: 212; Shrimpton 1991b: 12; Marincola 2007c: 172, 176; Parker 2004: 29, 49-50; Stylianou 1998: 6, 8; Cartledge 1987: 67; McQueen 1995a: 11.

mediocre chronicler notable for his dull style, excessive moralising and ignorance of military tactics.⁸⁴

Whatever the case, Diodorus also drew on ancillary works for his history of Philip, one of which was by Demophilus, Ephorus' son. Demophilus' work recorded the Sacred War – an event not documented by his father – and was incorporated into Ephorus' history as Book Thirty.⁸⁵ The other chronicler that with any certainty Diodorus was known to have epitomised was Diyllus, who wrote a universal history of twenty-six or twenty-seven books covering the years 357-297.⁸⁶ Diodorus relied on the work for information on events following the siege of Perinthus (341/0) – the point where Ephorus ended his commentary – and although well regarded by Plutarch, what remains of Diyllus' chronicle indicates an author with a close interest in scandal.⁸⁷ From Diodorus, therefore, the modern commentator is presented with a work derived, in the main, from an annalist whose value even in antiquity was disputed and two secondary writers of adequate but unspectacular ability.

⁸⁴ Favourable opinion – Jos. *Ap.* 1.12; Pownall 2003: 142; Hammond 1994b: 13, 15; Cawkwell 1978b: 18; Drews 1962: 384. Research – Polyb. 12.27; Str. 9.3.11; Pownall 2003: 120. Unfavourable – Polyb. 12.28; Diod. Sic. 1.39.7-8, 39.13; Str. 7.3.9; Plut. *Mor.* 803B; Buck 1994: xvii, 103; Pownall 2003: 120; Pearson 1943: 49, 56; Palaima & Tritle 2013: 739. Dull – Pownall 2003: 120. Excessive moralising – Pownall 2003: 115, 123, 141; Cartledge 1987: 68; Dillery 1995: 129-130. Tactical failings – Polyb. 12.25f; Pearson 1943: 49-50; Buckler & Beck 2008: 59; Gray 1980: 323; Marincola 2007b: 129; 2007c: 174; Gomme 1959: 45; Walbank 1967: 393.

⁸⁵ Diod. Sic. 16.14.3; Ath. 6.232d; Hammond 1991a: 508; 1994b: 12-13; Drews 1962: 389-390; 1963: 253; Rhodes 2010b: 26; Worthington 2008: 212; Shrimpton 1991b: 12; Marincola 2007c: 172; Tuplin 2007b: 163-164; Stylianos 1998: 12; McQueen 1995a: 11.

⁸⁶ Diod. Sic. 16.14.5; Ath. 6.155a; Pearson 1943: 43; Rhodes 2010b: 26; Hammond 1991a: 500 n13, 504, 506; Worthington 2008: 212; Ellis 1981: 105; Tuplin 2007b: 164; Stylianos 1998: 96-97; McQueen 1995a: 13.

⁸⁷ 341 – Diod. Sic. 16.76.5; Hammond 1991a: 504, 508; 1994b: 13; Bosworth 1971: 95; Rhodes 2010b: 26; Stylianos 1998: 98; Tuplin 2007b: 163-164; Drews 1963: 255 n33. Plutarch – Plut. *Mor.* 862B; Hammond 1990: 265; Hershbell 1993: 145; Westlake 1938: 72; Pearson 1943: 43. Diyllus' interest in scandal is likely derived from his reporting of a bribe paid by the Athenians to Herodotus – Diyllus *FGrHist* 73 F 3=Plut. *Mor.* 862B; Hammond 1994b: 13; Mosshammer 1973: 11-12; Hershbell 1993: 145; Waterfield 2009a: 486; Ostwald 1991: 138.

Justin's record as it relates to Philip is detailed in his Books VII, VIII and IX. The work itself dates from the second century AD at the earliest and is, for the most part, an epitome of an earlier work by Trogus – the *Historiae Philippicae* – a history of forty-four books written during the reign of Augustus (27BC – AD14).⁸⁸ Like Diodorus, Justin also drew on other histories in the composition of his own, including Marsyas of Pella.⁸⁹ Born c.356, Marsyas compiled a chronicle of Macedonia in ten books – the *Makedonia* – that documented the history of his homeland from its mythological beginnings to 331.⁹⁰ Remaining fragments indicate that Books III – VII described events from 368-339 and reveal a pro-Macedonian but serious historian with a very close interest in the political affairs of Greece.⁹¹

Another source consulted by Justin was Satyrus, known for his catalogue of Philip's wives and their role in the king's foreign policy.⁹² Little is known of Satyrus other than that he was a Peripatetic and biographer who wrote a life of Philip, probably around the beginning of the second century, but from the fragments of his work that remain, it is clear

⁸⁸ Justin – Watson 2012: 5; Buckler 1996: 385; Malloch 2005: 91; Rhodes 2010b: 26; Hammond 1991a: 501; 1994b: 12; Westlake 1954: 299-300; Zambrini 2007: 211; Levene 2007: 277; Develin 1994: 4. Anson 2010c: 8 dates Justin to the third or fourth century AD. Rhodes 2010b: 26, 29 concedes a date of between 200 and 400 AD. Worthington 2008: 212 acknowledges the controversy and places Justin's epitome between the second and fourth centuries AD. Gilley & Worthington 2010: 186-187 acknowledges a fourth-century date for Justin is possible. Trogus – Just. Pref 4; Watson 2012: 5; Malloch 2005: 91; Rhodes 2010b: 26; Gilley & Worthington 2010: 186; Hammond 1994b: 109; Worthington 2008: 212; English 2009b: xvi; Connor 1967: 141; Zambrini 2007: 211; Levene 2007: 277, 287; Develin 1994: 2, 6.

⁸⁹ Hammond 1991a: 501, 505; 1994b: 14; 1997a: 177 n3; 2000b: 143 n11; Asirvatham 2010: 101; Vasilev 2015: 114; Gabriel 2010: 254 n13.

⁹⁰ As a slightly older contemporary of Alexander III (born 356), a birth date for Marsyas of the early 350s is a reasonable assumption – Hammond 1991a: 501; 2000b: 143 n11; Harding 2006b: 26; Heckel 1986a: 302; Hammond & Walbank 2001: 27. The *Makedonia* – Marsyas *FGrHist* 135-136 T 1; Diod. Sic 20.50.4; Hammond 1990: 262; 1991a: 501; 1997a: 177 n3; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 35; Heckel 1980: 444; Worthington 2008: 210-211; Harding 2006b: 27; Engels 2010: 85; Sprawski 2010: 128-129.

⁹¹ Books – Marsyas *FGrHist* 135-136 F 1; Heckel 1980: 451; Rhodes 2010b: 23. Pro-Macedonian but serious – Marsyas *FGrHist* 135-136 T 2; 135-136 F 20; Hammond 1991a: 501; Heckel 1980: 448, 451, 454; Harding 2006b: 27.

⁹² Ath. 13.557b-e; Hammond 1983b: 90; 1991a: 502; 1994b: 14; Tronson 1984: 116.

Satyrus' interest was in moralising and sensationalism rather than an objective documentation of events.⁹³

Similar circumstances surround Justin's use of Theopompus' *History of Philip*, which he derived either from Trogus or the *History* itself.⁹⁴ A student of Isocrates, during the middle part of the fourth century Theopompus wrote a *Hellenica* of twelve books covering the years 411 to 394.⁹⁵ Only nineteen fragments of the work have survived into the modern era but the work was of sufficient value to have earned the patronage of Philip II and as a result, Theopompus spent time at the king's court during the late 340s.⁹⁶ Whilst there, Theopompus began writing his *Philippica*, a work of fifty-eight books that had the year 360 as its starting point and whose central focus was Philip II.⁹⁷ Essentially a biography, *Philippica* was notable for its many digressions and recordings of fabulous tales, but probably most notorious for the malevolent condemnation of Philip's morality.⁹⁸

⁹³ Peripatetic – Ath. 13.556a; Tronson 1984: 117; West 1974: 280, 281-282, 286; Jones 1970: 195. Biographer – Ath. 12.541c; Tronson 1984: 117; Hammond 1991a: 502; Borza 1990: 206; Jones 1970: 195. Sensationalism – Tronson 1984: 118, 121; Hammond 1991a: 502; West 1974: 279-280.

⁹⁴ Shrimpton 1991b: 121, 125; Hammond 1983b: 91; 1991a: 507; 1994b: 14; Marincola 2007c: 175; Connor 1967: 141; Fox 2015a: 214; Develin 1994: 6, 74 n1.

⁹⁵ Student of Isocrates – Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 6; Cic. *De Or.* 2.13.57; Shrimpton 1977: 128, 138; 1991b: 9; Connor 1967: 139; Marincola 2007c: 172; Bruce 1970: 87, 87 n10; Markle 1976: 94; Harding 2006b: 28; Cartledge 1987: 67; McQueen 1995a: 106. *Hellenica* – Polyb. 8.11; Natoli 2004a: 150; 2004b: 57; 150; Shrimpton 1991b: xvii, 5, 13, 29; Bruce 1970: 88; Tuplin 2007b: 161-162, 163, 166-167; Westlake 1954: 291; Harding 2006b: 29; Cartledge 1987: 68; Walbank 1967: 86.

⁹⁶ Nineteen fragments – Shrimpton 1991b: 29; Bruce 1970: 93. Shrimpton 1991b: xiii helpfully explains that Theopompus' works survive both as *Fragments* (F) and *Testimonia* (T). *Fragments* are original remains written by Theopompus himself whereas *Testimonia* are references, summaries and descriptions of his work recorded by other ancient sources. Patronage and presence at court – Pownall 2010: 58; Fox 2015c: 350; Natoli 2004b: 57; Shrimpton 1991b: 5; Sprawski 2014a: 3; Hammond 1991a: 507; Bruce 1970: 103.

⁹⁷ Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 T 17; Polyb. 8.9, 11; Diod. Sic. 16.3.8; Shrimpton 1977: 136; 1991b: xv, 5, 58; Hammond 1991a: 503; Bruce 1970: 88; Connor 1967: 151; Parker 2004: 40; Harding 2006b: 29; Worthington 2013: 5; Rhodes 2010b: 27; Walbank 1967: 86; McKechnie & Kern 1998: 11.

⁹⁸ Digressions – Shrimpton 1977: 128, 136; 1991b: 90-92; Bruce 1970: 96, 97; Westlake 1954: 288, 294; Wardman 1960: 406; Christ 1993: 51-52. Tales – Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 64; Cic. *De Or.* 1.5; Plut. *Mor.* 370A-C; Ael. *VH* 3.18; Diog. Laert. 1.8-9; Shrimpton 1977: 128; 1991b: 16, 19-20; Bruce 1970: 89, 91, 97-98; Wardman 1960: 406; Marincola 2007c: 175-176; Saïd 2007: 78, 84-85; Morgan 2007: 560-561. For a convenient summary of *Philippa's* chapters – Shrimpton 1991b: 60-63 Table 1. Condemnation of Philip's morality – Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 27; 115 F 81; 115 F 225a; 115 F 225b; Polyb. 8.11; Ath. 4.166f-167c, 6.261a; Watson 2012: 8; Cawkwell 1978b: 18; Hammond, 1991a: 502-503; 1994b: 15; Shrimpton 1991b: 6, 58, 65, 165-167; Fox 2015a: 214; 2015c: 350; 2015d: 385; Rhodes 2010b: 27; Asirvatham 2010: 102, 104; Müller 2010b: 174; Ellis 1980a: 154; Worthington 2008: 211-212; Natoli 2004a: 143; 2004b: 57;

Prudently, Theopompus delayed publication until c.323 – thirteen years after the death of his former patron.⁹⁹

In antiquity, as now, Theopompus' worth as an historian has been vigorously debated. What must certainly be acknowledged is that he was a contemporary of Philip and had first-hand knowledge of the king's court – at least during the 340s. Regarded by some (including himself) to have been meticulous in his collection of data, Theopompus was considered as generally accurate in his recording of historical events and that he was much read in antiquity is testified by the surviving *Testimonia*, four hundred of which remain.¹⁰⁰ For some, Theopompus ranked in the second tier of historians behind Herodotus and Thucydides, and he has been regarded as an important influence in the development of biography.¹⁰¹ Not everyone, however, has been as glowing in their evaluation. Amongst other failings, Theopompus has been dismissed as a moralistic serial plagiarist prone to inordinate divagation and lacking an appreciation for the fundamentals of warfare.¹⁰²

As a result of the deficiencies in their sources, therefore, the record as it relates to Philip in both Diodorus Siculus and Justin is insecure and the gaps existing in their epitomes

Pownall 2010: 58; Shrimpton 1977: 123, 135; Connor 1967: 134, 138, 153; Bruce 1970: 95; Eckstein 2013: 332.

⁹⁹ Natoli 2004b: 59; Fox 2015a: 214; 2015c: 350; Worthington 2008: 211; Shrimpton 1991: 6-7; Parker 2004: 41; Harding 2006a: 135; Flower 1994: 31-32.

¹⁰⁰ Meticulous – Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 181a; 115 T 20a; Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 6; Ath. 3.85a-b; Bruce 1970: 90, 98; Wardman 1960: 407; Marincola 2007c: 174-175; Christ 1993: 50; Schepens 2007: 49-50. General accuracy – Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 T 20a; Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 6; Hammond 1991a: 507; Shrimpton 1991b: 30, 181. Much read – Bruce 1970: 86; Marincola 2007c: 175; Eckstein 2013: 335; Shrimpton 1991b: 175; Christ 1993: 48; Westlake 1954: 288, 301; Morgan 2007: 560-561.

¹⁰¹ Second in rank – Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.74; Cic. *De Or.* 2.13.57; Bruce 1970: 88. Biography – Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 6; Connor 1967: 142, 152; Marincola 2007c: 174; Baynham 1998a: 17; Momigliano 1971: 63. Flower 1994: 148-149 does not regard Theopompus' work as biography.

¹⁰² Moralistic – Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 T 20a; 115 T 25a; Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 333; Polyb. 8.9-11; Plut. *Lys.* 30; Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 6; Luc. *Hist. conscr.* 59; Walbank 1962: 1; 1967: 86-87; Harding 2006b: 29; Fox 2015a: 214; 2015c: 350; 2015d: 385; Rhodes 2010b: 27; Asirvatham 2010: 102, 104; Müller 2010b: 174. Plagiarist – Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 T 27; Shrimpton 1991b: 9, 16, 37, 71; Bruce 1970: 107; Christ 1993: 50; Gray 1981: 321; McKechnie & Kern 1998: 11. Diversions – Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 6; Shrimpton 1991b: 20-21; Bruce 1970: 89; Christ 1993: 49; Marincola 2007c: 174-175; Wardman 1960: 406-407. Lack of military knowledge – Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 T 32; 115 T 33; Polyb. 12.25f; Plut. *Mor.* 803B; Shrimpton 1991b: 25; Marincola 2007b: 129; 2007c: 175; Walbank 1967: 393.

significant, especially as it regards military theory and practice. To fill those silences there is sometimes a temptation to look beyond the era of Philip to later writers for nuggets of information that can be anachronistically applied. That there are dangers inherent in such a methodology is obvious but a close study of several such texts and the historical context that surrounded their production suggests that, in some cases at least, information obtained may be judiciously applied with acceptable levels of certainty.

Sources such as Arrian, for example, detail the exploits of Alexander III and so contain a wealth of information on the composition, tactics and strategies of the Macedonian army post 336. Arrian details that the two primary sources for his history were Ptolemy and Aristobulus, probably in that order of preference.¹⁰³ If indeed so, the choice was a wise one for not only had Ptolemy attended Macedonia's "School of Generals" – the Royal Page School – but he was also one of Alexander's life-long companions and an experienced, trusted commander.¹⁰⁴ A veteran of Granicus, Issus, Hydaspes, and also entrusted with what transpired to be a successful independent command against Bessus, he was one of only seven *somatophylakes* – Alexander's personal and full-time bodyguards.¹⁰⁵ Ptolemy's history, perhaps composed in his old age, has not survived, but was certainly written by one well-placed within, and familiar with, the Macedonian war machine.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Arr. *Anab.* Preface 1-2; 2.12.6, 3.3.3-5, 4.14.1-3, 5.14.5, 6.2.4; Brunt 1976c: 535, 559; 1976d: xxix-xxx; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 414; Worthington 2014: 314; Green 1985: 155; Matthew 2015: 283; English 2009b: xii; Hamilton 2002a: lx; Zambrini 2007: 217; Bosworth 1995: 6; Momigliano 1978: 12.

¹⁰⁴ Ptolemy as Page – Ellis 1976: 162; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 402; Gabriel 2010: 49. Contemporary – Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.5; Plut. *Alex.* 10; Worthington 2014: 111, 283; Green 1991: 55, 101; Bosworth 1998a: 22; 1995: 6; Hamilton 2002b: 27.

¹⁰⁵ Granicus – Arr. *Anab.* 1.14.6; Bosworth 1980: 120. Issus – Arr. *Anab.* 2.11.8; Green 1991: 232; Worthington 2014: 169; Matthew 2015: 282. Hydaspes – Arr. *Anab.* 5.13.1; Curt. 8.13.18-19, 23, 27, 14.14-15. Bessus – Arr. *Anab.* 3.29.6-30.3; Green 1991: 355; Bosworth 1980: 376; 1988a: 108, 268-269; Worthington 2014: 222. *Somatophylakes* – Arr. *Anab.* 3.27.5, 4.16.2; Heckel 2009b: 47; Weber 2009: 91; Gabriel 2010: 49, 249; Green 1991: 355; Bosworth 1980: 366; 1988a: 104, 276 n59; Errington 1969: 237.

¹⁰⁶ Ptolemy's history – Arr. *Anab.* Preface 1.2; Brunt 1976d: xxi; Baynham 2009: 296; Bosworth 1988a: 297; Worthington 2014: 313; Meeus 2009: 245; Matthew 2012a: xiv. For a much earlier composition – Errington 1969: 241. Roisman 1984: 385 in a comprehensive review of scholarship has pronounced the matter

The dilemma presented by histories such as Arrian's is how much, if anything, of the information they contain on Alexander's armies can be legitimately applied to Philip's. Two considerations in particular suggest probably quite a lot. In the first instance there is the argument of necessity. Alexander had no need to make any wholesale reforms to the army he inherited from his father. Since the fifth century, the hoplite had shown itself to be far superior to any infantry the Persians could field and the Macedonian phalangite had comprehensibly defeated the Greek citizen-soldier armies at Chaeronea. Alexander could therefore be secure in the knowledge that Philip's phalanx would be more than a match in any contest with Darius that involved either Persian infantry or hoplite hirelings – a fact of which the Greek mercenary captain Memnon was well aware.¹⁰⁷

Similarly, by 336 Macedonia possessed a first class cavalry which, ably supported by Thessalian horsemen, had first demonstrated its effectiveness at the Battle of Crocus Field (352) and then again in 338. Although doubtless supremely confident in his cavalry's ability, Alexander may also have gambled that his chances of success in the initial stages of his Asia campaign were enhanced by the superiority of Macedonian weaponry and armament to those of the Persian light horse. If so, it was an inspired decision as the lethargy of Persia's mobilisation meant that Darius' elite divisions were not deployed until Gaugamela (331).¹⁰⁸

Even had Alexander felt that the army bequeathed him by Philip was in need of reform, it is difficult to see when this could have occurred. In the three years that followed

unsolvable. For the credentials of Ptolemy – Brunt 1976d: xxx; Bosworth 1988a: 297; Worthington 2014: 313; Roisman 1984: 384; Rhodes 2010c: 32.

¹⁰⁷ Diod. Sic. 17.18.2; Arr. *Anab.* 1.12.9; Brunt 1976b: 449; Bosworth 1988a: 6, 16, 39; Worthington 2014: 144; Schwartz 2009: 144-145; Gaebel 2002: 193; Griffith 1935: 3; Parke 1933: 21, 179; Nawotka 2010: 151.

¹⁰⁸ Aristobulus *FGrHist* 139 F 17; Arr. *Anab.* 3.8.2-6, 15.1; Curt. 4.12.6-12; Bosworth 1980: 289-290, 293; 1988a: 39, 57, 76-77; Worthington 2014: 142, 187; Delbrück 1975: 212; Heckel 1997: 203; 2008: 75; Briant 2002: 865; Hamilton 2002b: 85.

Philip's assassination in 336, Alexander was fully occupied with matters more pressing than fine-tuning what was already a highly effective military machine. An immediate priority was to secure his position, commencing with the elimination of potential rivals and threats. As alleged conspirators, Arrhabaeus and Heromenes were the first to be executed, followed soon after by Amyntas (son of Perdiccas) and Attalus – although the latter was seemingly in revenge for a personal affront.¹⁰⁹

Having consolidated control, Alexander then moved rapidly to maintain Macedonia's hegemonic role in Greece. In 336 Acarnania, Ambracia and Aetolia all defected from the League of Corinth and in that same season, the new king was forced to undertake an expedition into Thessaly in order to secure his position as *archon* of the Thessalian League.¹¹⁰ The following year (335) was no less demanding of Alexander's time and energies with three campaigns being mounted, beginning in the spring with an expedition against the Thracians and Triballians.¹¹¹ Subjugation of Illyria occupied Macedonian troops from June to August, followed in October by the quashing of Thebes' rebellion.¹¹² Throughout 334 Alexander was again fully occupied, this time with the

¹⁰⁹ Arrhabaeus and Heromenes – Diod. Sic. 17.2.1; Plut. *Alex.* 10; Arr. *Anab.* 1.25.1; Just. 11.5.1-2, 12.6.14; Green 1991: 112, 115; Badian 1963: 248; Hamilton 1965: 122; Saunders 2006: 10; Bosworth 1971: 96, 102; 1980: 160; 1988a: 26; Heckel 2009b: 26. Amyntas – Plut. *Mor.* 327C; Curt. 6.9.17, 10.24; Just. 11.5.1-2, 12.6.14; Green 1991: 141; Badian 1963: 249; Hamilton 1965: 122; Fredricksmeyer 1990: 308; Heckel 2009b: 27; Bosworth 1988a: 27; Gilley & Worthington 2010: 190. Attalus – Diod. Sic. 17.2.4-6, 5.1; Plut. *Alex.* 9; Curt. 7.1.3; Just. 11.5.1-2, 12.6.14; Ath. 13.557d-e; Bosworth 1971: 104; 1988a: 27; Heckel 2009b: 27; Green 1991: 115, 119-120; Badian 1963: 249-250; Hamilton 1965: 122; Heckel 1977: 11; Fredricksmeyer 1990: 308; Gilley & Worthington 2010: 191; King 2010: 387.

¹¹⁰ Defections – Diod. Sic. 17.3.3-5; Dem. 17.4; Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.4, 10.1-2; Heckel 2009b: 28; Poddighe 2009: 101; Chroust 1967a: 245; Worthington 2013: 277; Tod 1950: 301; Bosworth 1980: 76. Thessaly – Diod. Sic. 17.4.1; Just. 11.3.1-2; Polyæn. 4.3.23; Bosworth 1988a: 28; Heckel 2009b: 28; O'Brien 1994: 46; Graninger 2010: 317; Worthington 2013: 277-278; King 2018: 137.

¹¹¹ Arr. *Anab.* 1.1.4; Heckel 2009b: 28; Bosworth 1988a: 32; Errington 1990: 56; Gaebel 2002: 183; Green 1991: 124-130; Hamilton 1965: 122-123; Fredricksmeyer 1990: 308; Ellis 1971: 21; O'Brien 1994: 49-50; Fox 2015d: 387-388; Gilley & Worthington 2010: 191; Greenwalt 2010: 294; Chroust 1967a: 245; Webber 2001: 10.

¹¹² Illyrians – Arr. *Anab.* 1.5.1-5, 7.5-7; Green 1991: 131-135; Hamilton 1965: 123; Fredricksmeyer 1990: 308; Bosworth 1988a: 32; Heckel 2009b: 29; Thomas 2010: 78; Gilley & Worthington 2010: 191; Chroust 1967a: 245. Thebes – Str. 9.2.5; Diod. Sic. 17.9.4-5; Just. 11.3.6-7; Plut. *Alex.* 11; Paus. 9.23.5-6; Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.1; Bosworth 1988a: 32; Heckel 2009b: 29; Green 1991: 143-147; Hamilton 1965: 123; Fredricksmeyer

invasion of Asia which commenced in springtime and was followed by relentless campaigning until the Battle of Issus in November 333.¹¹³

With such constant and pressing demands placed on Alexander's army it seems unlikely any major reforms could have been affected, even had they been necessary – which in any event they were not. Therefore, on balance, and with suitable caution, it is the position of this thesis that details concerning the composition and tactical deployments of Alexander's armies down to the Battle of Issus may also be reasonably viewed as holding true for those of Philip's later years.

Another major discrepancy impeding the study of Macedonian military practice in the age of Philip is the lack of extant sources detailing how a phalanx was actually organised. In an effort to remedy this paucity of knowledge, some modern commentators have turned to the military treatises of later writers, especially Aelian and Asclepiodotus. To ascertain the validity of this methodology it is necessary to evaluate both the authors and their sources.

By his own admission, Aelian, who wrote in the second century AD, was no military expert but he composed for those with field experience and his treatise – at least to his own mind – detailed the workings of a Macedonian phalanx at the time of Alexander and the *Diadochoi*.¹¹⁴ A Greek who lived in Rome, Aelian likely drew from Asclepiodotus (first century BC) – a philosopher and military theorist with no firsthand combat experience but one who was nevertheless an intelligent and thoughtful writer whose value lies in the fact

1990: 308; O'Brien 1994: 52-53, 54; Thomas 2010: 78; Gilley & Worthington 2010: 191-192; Chroust 1967a: 246.

¹¹³ Invasion of Asia – Diod. Sic. 17.1.1; Arr. *Anab.* 1.11.3; Bosworth 1988a: 35; Heckel 2009b: 30; Gilley & Worthington 2010: 192. Campaigning – Arr. *Anab.* 1.20.2, 23.7-8, 24.3-5, 27.5; Diod. Sic. 17.21.7, 22.1-2, 24.1-4, 28.1; Heckel 2009b: 31-32; Lendon 2005: 119; Bosworth 1988a: 44-45, 49-50; O'Brien 1994: 65, 67, 68-70.

¹¹⁴ Aelian, *Introduction*, 1; Matthew 2012b: 137 n3; Bosworth 2012: viii-ix, xiii; Stadter 1978: 118; Duhaime 1988: 143, 144; Spaulding 1933: 664; Dillon-Lee 1814: liv; Wrightson 2015b: 65-66.

that he clearly consulted military handbooks now lost, including those written by Posidonius of Rhodes (c.135-51).¹¹⁵ Because of this, Asclepiodotus may be regarded as a valuable source for tactical and organisational aspects of the Macedonian phalanx.¹¹⁶ Aelian also consulted material from other military authors including Iphicrates (c.418-353), Polybius (c.200-118) and, importantly for the purposes of this paper, Evangelus (third century).¹¹⁷

Not only was Evangelus a near contemporary of Philip's, he was clearly a military author of some standing who counted amongst his readership the *strategos* Philopoemen (253-183) – highly respected then as now.¹¹⁸ The general was a keen student of military theory and in the manoeuvring of the phalanx in particular.¹¹⁹ Indeed, one of the reforms Philopoemen introduced into the Achaean army was heavy infantry modelled along the lines of the Macedonian phalangite that, like its counterpart, fought in phalanx formation.¹²⁰ Much more than simply a theoretical tactician, Philopoemen was a highly talented general who in 207 against Machanidas at the third Battle of Mantinea, led his newly commissioned phalangites to comprehensive victory over an army of Spartan heavy infantry.¹²¹

¹¹⁵ Posidonius – Aelian, 1; DeVoto 1993: ii; Matthew 2012b: xiv; 2012c: 80 n2; 2015: 256; Illinois Greek Club 1923b: 230-231; Wrightson 2015b: 67, 76-77; Cawkwell 1989: 383; Devine 1983: 201 n2; Rance 2018: 299; Duhaime 1988: 143; Bosworth 2012: xiii-xiv; Spaulding 1933: 662; Stadter 1978: 118; Hammond 1996a: 365.

¹¹⁶ Spaulding 1933: 662; Wrightson 2010: 72, 72 n3; 2015b: 66, 90; Duhaime 1988: 139-140.

¹¹⁷ Asclepiodotus, Iphicrates and Polybius – Aelian, 1; Matthew 2012c: 80 n2; Wrightson 2015b: 67. Evangelus – Aelian, 1; Matthew 2012c: 80 n2; Wrightson 2015b: 67.

¹¹⁸ Reader of Evangelus – Plut. *Phil.* 4.4; Aelian, 1; Arr. *Tact.* 1; DeVoto 1993: 96 n2; Matthew 2012b: 138 n5; Dillon-Lee 1814: 4; Wrightson 2015b: 67; Smith 1853a: 318; Wheeler 1998: 8 n30; 2010: 21; Lendon 2005: 147. Fame – Polyb. 10.22; Plut. *Phil.* 1.1, 15.1; Paus. 4.35.4, 8.49.1; Machiavelli 2008: 14; Walbank 1979b: 13; Smith 1853a: 318; Stadter 2009: 459; Lendon 2005: 147; Williams 2004: 258-259; Adcock 1957: 96; Swain 1988: 335-336, 339.

¹¹⁹ Plut. *Phil.* 4.4-6, 11.1; Wheeler 1988: 8; 2010: 21; Smith 1853a: 318; 21; Lendon 2005: 147; Williams 2004: 260-261, 275-276.

¹²⁰ Polyæn. 6.4.3; Plut. *Phil.* 9.1-2; Paus. 8.50.1; Anderson 1967: 104; Williams 2004: 260; Snodgrass 2013: 92-93; Griffith 1935: 105, 318; Matthew 2015: 419-420 n220; Sage 1996: 211; Cartledge & Spawforth 2002: 60-61; Harthen 2016b: 446; Smith 1853a: 319.

¹²¹ Mantinea – Plut. *Phil.* 10.2-4; Delbrück 1975: 247-248; Montagu 2006: 108; Swain 1988: 335; Cartledge & Spawforth 2002: 61; Chrimes 1949: 26-27; Eckstein 1995: 31; Harthen 2016b: 446; Smith 1853a: 319.

Philopoemen again demonstrated his mettle when in 201 at the Battle of Tegea, he was able to assemble his army into battle order and claim victory against Nabis, despite being taken by surprise on unfavourable ground.¹²²

Another source Aelian claimed to have consulted for his *Tactics* was Pyrrhus of Epirus (c.319-272).¹²³ There is no reason to doubt the assertion, for as well as being one of the leading commanders in antiquity – up with Alexander III in the opinion of Hannibal – Pyrrhus composed a number of military treatises.¹²⁴ Like Philopoemen, the Epirote was no mere academic theorist and had fought in and against Macedonian phalanxes, notably at the Battle of Ipsus (301) and again in 289 against Pantauchus.¹²⁵ Pyrrhus' most famous contests, however, were with Rome and here too the Macedonian phalanx was deployed – firstly during 280 near Heraclea in Lucania where Pyrrhus achieved the first of his hollow victories; the second came at Asculum the following year.¹²⁶ In both cases, phalangites were present as they were again for Pyrrhus' 278 campaigns in Sicily against Carthage – although their numbers must have been sorely depleted.¹²⁷

¹²² Plut. *Phil.* 14.5; Cartledge & Spawforth 2002: 66; Harthen 2016b: 446; Smith 1853a: 319.

¹²³ Aelian, 1; Matthew 2015: 256; Illinois Greek Club 1923a: 13; Dillon-Lee 1814: 4; Morton 2010: 118.

¹²⁴ Outstanding ability – Plut. *Pyrrh.* 8; Just. 25.5.3-6; Paus. 4.35.4; Matthew 2012b: 138 n5; Dillon-Lee 1814: 4; Smith 1853a: 615; Mahaffy 2014: 65. Hannibal's view – Plut. *Pyrrh.* 8; *Flam.* 21.3; App. *Syr.* 12.10; Dillon-Lee 1814: 4; Smith 1853a: 615; Wylie 1999: 298. For a qualified view of Pyrrhus' abilities – Griffith 1935: 63-64; Gabbert 2016: 469; Wylie 1999: 298. Compositions – Cic. *Fam.* 9.25; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 8; Aelian, 1; Arr. *Tact.* 1; Chaniotis 2013: 446-447; Illinois Greek Club 1923a: 13; Matthew 2012b: 138 n5; Morton 2010: 118; Wheeler 2010: 29, 35 n107; Wylie 1999: 298.

¹²⁵ Ipsus – Plut. *Pyrrh.* 4; *Demetr.* 29; Smith 1853a: 610; Gabbert 2016: 469; Will 1984: 106; Mahaffy 2014: 65; Champion 2014: 159; Wylie 1999: 301; King 2018: 224; Abbott 1877: 82-83. Pantauchus – Plut. *Pyrrh.* 7; *Demetr.* 41; Smith 1853a: 611; Wylie 1999: 303; Abbott 1877: 102.

¹²⁶ Heraclea – Diod. Sic. 22.6.2; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 17; *Mor.* 184C; Just. 18.1.4-7; Sidnell 2006: 165-166; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 154; Delbrück 1975: 298-299; Smith 1853a: 612; Griffith 1935: 61, 62; Wylie 1999: 306. Asculum – Plut. *Pyrrh.* 21; *Mor.* 184C; Sidnell 2006: 166-167; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 154; Delbrück 1975: 299-300; Smith 1853a: 613; Griffith 1935: 61, 62; Wylie 1999: 307; Abbott 1877: 154-155; Rosenstein 2012: 48-49.

¹²⁷ Sicily – Diod. Sic. 22.10.1-4; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 22; *Mor.* 184C-D; Just. 23.3.1-4, 9; Griffith 1935: 61, 62-63; Gabbert 2016: 469; Wylie 1999: 307-308; Abbott 1877: 156, 167-168; Rosenstein 2012: 49.

Clearly Aelian (and probably Asclepiodotus) drew on impeccable sources for their treatises on military tactics. Yet as with Arrian's *Anabasis*, the conundrum is how much of what is contained in these handbooks can be attributed or applied to the phalanxes of Philip. An obvious response is that it is impossible to say. Yet a closer, more considered opinion suggests there are important clues to the phalanx's organisation and tactical abilities that took place under Philip.

It has been argued above that until November 333 there had been no significant reorganisation of the Macedonian army. That being so, the Macedonian phalanx – especially during the latter part of Philip's reign – must have not only been highly disciplined and well organised but also adaptive and flexible. This is certainly the impression given by Aelian, Asclepiodotus and Arrian who indeed represent a phalanx able to perform a wide array of complex manoeuvres with ease and efficiency, something made all the more possible by a highly structured chain of command. Any formation capable of carrying out the most difficult of all military manoeuvres – the feigned retreat, so admirably executed by the Macedonians at Chaeronea – could surely have had little difficulty in completing the deployments detailed in these later *tactica*. Therefore, unless the information contained in the treatises of Aelian, Asclepiodotus and others can be securely attributed to a later period (such as the discussions on elephants or scythed chariots), what remains of their accounts on the workings of Macedonian phalangite formations and deployments may be judiciously attributed, at least in part, to the reforms of Philip.

Chapter 2

Warfare in the

Classical Period

I. Panoply and the Phalanx

Philip's subjugation of Greece was confirmed by the victory of Macedonia's "new-model army" over its opponents' more traditional forces. Many academics believe that this was due to military insights the king acquired as a teenage hostage in Thebes. Because it is a central contention of this thesis that Philip received very little in the way of meaningful instruction (explicit or otherwise) during his time in Boeotia, this chapter examines how warfare was prosecuted by *poleis* during the first half of the fourth century. Such a study will provide an overview of what constituted standard military practice at the time of Philip's detention, and thereby a means by which Theban influences (if any) may be determined. Investigated are the tentative steps of *poleis* in the recruitment of truly combined arms forces and an increasingly professional approach towards warfare – involving both their own citizen levies and employment of mercenaries. The range of tactics and manoeuvres commonly employed by *strategoï* are next analysed, followed by a discussion on siege-craft. There is then an appraisal of the shift by *poleis* towards grand strategy as a means by which specific objectives could be achieved. Because, however, heavy infantry constituted the cornerstone of Greek armies, this chapter opens with an investigation into hoplite panoply and the phalanx.

Unquestionably the defining item of hoplite accoutrement was the *aspis*, introduced in all likelihood around 750-700.¹ Credited in antiquity as the invention of rival brothers warring for the throne of Argos, it was sometimes referred to as an Argive shield.² *Aspides*

¹ Kagan & Viggiano 2013a: xi; Cartledge 1977: 13; 2013b: 77; Connolly 2012: 37; Yalichev 1997: 83; Krentz 2013: 148; Hanson 1993a: 65; 2000: 27; 2013: 257; Schwartz 2009: 102; van Wees 2009: 125; Wheeler 1993: 129; Snodgrass 1964a: 116; Hale 2013: 176.

² Invention of the shield – [Apollod.] 2.2.1; Plin. *HN* 7.56.200; Lendon 2005: 10; Viggiano 2013: 124; Lorimer 1947: 128. Argive shield – Ael. *VH* 3.24; Everson 2004: 120, 122; Snodgrass 1967: 54, 95; Connolly 2012: 37; Jarva 2013: 397; Echeverria 2012: 292-293; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 29, 61-62. For the

had a circular wooden core made from poplar or willow and were typically between eighty and one hundred centimetres in diameter, although one remnant suggests a span of over one hundred and twenty centimetres.³ It is possible that the width was determined by the length of the hoplite's left forearm, as it was this part of the limb that manipulated the shield's use.⁴ However that may have been, the *aspis* should perhaps be best regarded as designed to afford its bearer cover from shoulders to the knees – indeed perhaps even the entire leg, as evidence exists that some shields had a leather apron attached to their lower rim, thus providing the hoplite with extra protection.⁵ Corresponding to the variation in size, the shield's weight also seems to have fluctuated. Modern conclusions range from 6.2 kilograms to 6.8 kilograms, with upper estimations placing the weight of the *aspis* at between seven and eight kilos.⁶ Whatever the case, it is probable that shields were regarded as heavy by those who carried them; unsurprisingly, as even on the lightest estimate they were around ten percent of the bearer's weight.⁷

Another important item of panoply was the *doru* (spear), a hoplite's primary weapon. Between 2.3-2.5 metres long and with a shaft of around 2.5 centimetres in

role played by Caria in the development of the Greek shield – Hdt. 1.171; Str. 4.2.27; van Wees 2004: 72; How & Wells 2008: 149; Snodgrass 1964a: 115-116.

³ Core – Plin. *HN* 16.77.209; Krentz 2007b: 69; 2013: 136; Schwartz 2009: 28; 2013: 158; Matthew 2015: 94; Anderson 1970: 16; Snodgrass 2013: 92; Lazenby & Whitehead 1996: 31. Diameter estimates: 80-90 cm – Connolly 2012: 15; Pritchett 1971: 147; van Wees 2004: 48; 2009: 126; Waterfield 2009b: 4; Lazenby 2012: 40. 90-100cm – Schwartz 2013: 157; Snodgrass 1967: 53; Lee 2007: 111; 2010b: 481; Hanson 1993a: 68; Anderson 1970: 15, 17; Wheeler 1993: 129; Ray 2012: 8. 120cm – Schwartz 2009: 31; Matthew 2012a: 40; 2015: 94.

⁴ Pritchett 1971: 148; Cartledge 1977: 13; Matthew 2012a: 41, 42-43; 2015: 97; Anderson 1970: 17; Schwartz 2002: 34; 2009: 32; Fink 2014: 32.

⁵ Trunk and upper legs – Tyrtaeus 11.21-24; Pritchett 1985: 40; Connolly 2012: 53; Matthew 2012a: 95. Leather apron – Jarva 2013: 398-399; Schwartz 2009: 34; Hutchinson 2000: 27; van Wees 2004: 48; Anderson 1970: 17; Gorkay 2002: 49-50, 56.

⁶ Between 6 and 7 kilograms – Sekunda 2000: 10; van Wees 2004: 48; 2009: 126; Wheeler 2007a: xxvii; Matthew 2015: 15; Lee 2007: 111; Waterfield 2009b: 4; Ray 2012: 8. Up to 8 kg – Rawlings 2009a: 247; Hanson 1993a: 69; 2000: 65; Schwartz 2013: 161; Rusch 2011: 16; Krentz 2013: 138; Lee 2010b: 481; Viggiano 2013: 116.

⁷ Heavy – Xen. *An.* 3.4.47-48; Raaflaub 2013b: 100; Hale 2013: 190; Snodgrass 2013: 92; Hanson 2013: 266; Schwartz 2013: 169. Weight ratio – Schwartz 2013: 160-161; Lee 2010b: 481; Hanson 2013: 266.

diameter, it weighed an estimated 1-1.8 kilograms.⁸ Spearheads were cast mainly from iron although examples of bronze have also been recovered. Heads were usually fitted to the shaft by way of a tubular socket and held in place with a rivet or nail, although some may have been secured with an adhesive – possibly pitch.⁹ Homer’s repeated references to “ashen spears” – μέλῖα or ἐϋμμελίης – indicates that ash (*Fraxinus ornus*) was probably the preferred material for shafts but pine or olive may, at times, have been a functional alternative.¹⁰ Leather strips were wound around the haft to enhance the hoplite’s grip – an important consideration given the level of perspiration generated in battle.¹¹

The spear itself was intended as a thrusting rather than missile weapon. How the blow was delivered remains a matter of conjecture although most commentators accept what has come to be known as the overhead and low stances. In the former position, the *doru* was held raised above the head ready to strike downwards, with the enemy’s neck a primary target.¹² Hoplites that adopted a low stance situated the spear somewhere between the ribcage and thigh in preparation for an underarm thrust that targeted an opponent’s abdomen and genitals.¹³ A recent theory contends there was a third stance, hitherto overlooked. Termed the underarm position, it is hypothesised that the spear was held tucked

⁸ Luginbill 1994: 59; Cartledge 1977: 15; Anderson 1970: 37; 1993: 22; Hanson 2000: 84; Matthew 2012a: 11; 2015: 2, 11; Konecny 2014: 30; Sekunda 2000: 13; 2014a: 134; Hutchinson 2000: 27; van Wees 2004: 48; Lee 2010b: 483; Lazenby 2012: 40.

⁹ Schwartz 2009: 82; Jarva 2013: 409; Matthew 2012a: 3-4; Anderson 1970: 37; 1993: 23-24; van Wees 2004: 48; Lee 2010b: 483; Hanson 2000: 84; Snodgrass 1967: 96-97.

¹⁰ Hom. *Il.* 2.544, 4.47, 19.390, 22.225; Hanson 2000: 84; Cartledge 1977: 15; Sekunda 2000: 13; Anderson 1970: 37; 1993: 23; Schwartz 2009: 81-82; Matthew 2012a: 6; Sidnell 2006: 32.

¹¹ Schwartz 2009: 83; Matthew 2012a: 13; Ray 2009: 10; 2012: 7; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 14; Sekunda 2000: 14.

¹² Lazenby 2005: 93; Cawkwell 1989: 381, 385; van Wees 2004: 189; Pritchett 1985: 60; Cartledge 1977: 15 n35; Anderson 1970: 88; 1993: 32; Schwartz 2009: 90; Lee 2013: 154; Greenhalgh 1973: 74; Hutchinson 2000: 27; Hanson 2000: 84; Snodgrass 1965: 115; Viggiano & van Wees 2013: 64; Lorimer 1947: 82-83, 94.

¹³ Tyrtaeus 10.21-27; Matthew 2012a: 16; Anderson 1970: 88; 1993: 31; Cartledge 1997: 35; Lazenby 2005: 92; Pritchett 1985: 60; van Wees 2004: 189; Krentz 2013: 141-142; Hanson 2000: 84; Snodgrass 1965: 115; Lorimer 1947: 83, 110.

beneath the armpit and in this way had the enemy's chest as its main target.¹⁴ Of course, the *doru* might also have been thrown but most likely in an act of desperation rather than as a premeditated tactic.¹⁵

Hoplite spears were also fitted with a *sauroter*. This heavy bronze butt-spike was 5-20 centimetres long and in addition to acting as a counterbalance to the spearhead, thus making the weapon more manageable, served a variety of purposes.¹⁶ For example, having a butt-spike allowed the spear to be set upright in the ground, a convenient at-ease position that also helped protect the shaft from splintering and decay.¹⁷ Offensively, the *sauroter* was used for stabbing a fallen enemy, the heaviness of the spike making it ideal for penetrating armour – although this has recently been contested.¹⁸ Moreover, as it was not uncommon for spear shafts to be broken in the course of an engagement – or spearheads snapped off by opponents – a butt-spike provided a useful backup, affording an otherwise useless haft at least some offensive capabilities.¹⁹ A final purpose suggested for the *sauroter* was as a means by which the overall mass of the *doru* could be increased, so improving the weapon's ability to penetrate armour.²⁰

¹⁴ Matthew 2009: 400, 405; 2012a: 16, 110-111; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 19-20.

¹⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.20, 4.6.11, 5.4.52; Anderson 1993: 20; 2001: 76; Underhill 2012: 150. Murray *et al.* 2011: 1, 16; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 13 whilst acknowledging the *doru* was primarily a thrusting weapon, conclude that with the assistance of a throwing loop (*ankyle*) a spear could be thrown a distance of up to twenty-four metres.

¹⁶ Hdt. 7.41; Hanson 1993a: 71; 2000: 84; Schwartz 2009: 83; Rusch 2011: 16; Anderson 1993: 24; Ray 2012: 7; Murray *et al.* 2011: 3. Matthew 2009: 40; 2012a: 12; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 14-15 argue the *sauroter* was intended to shift the *doru*'s point of balance towards the rear of the spear.

¹⁷ Hom. *Il.* 10.153; Hanson 1993a: 71; 2000: 84; Cartledge 1977: 15; Schwartz 2009: 83; Matthew 2012a: 147; Anderson 1970: 37; 1993: 24; Lee 2010b: 483; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 14.

¹⁸ Cartledge 1977: 15; Sekunda 2000: 16; Snodgrass 1967: 56; Hanson 1993a: 73; 2000: 86; Schwartz 2009: 184; Hutchinson 2000: 27; Waterfield 2009b: 4; Anderson 1970: 37; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 137. Matthew 2012a: 163 doubts the effectiveness of the *sauroter* in penetrating armour. Anderson 1993: p.24 offers qualified support of the suggestion.

¹⁹ Hdt. 7.224, 9.62; Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.14; Eur. *Phoen.* 1396-1399; Diod. Sic. 15.86.2; Pritchett 1985: 56; Snodgrass 1967: 80; Jarva 2013: 410; Schwartz 2009: 89; Hanson 1999b: 38; 2000: 85, 165-166; Sidnell, 2006: 33; Waterfield 2009b: 9; Cartledge 1977: 15; Lee 2010b: 483; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 11, 14. Matthew 2012a: 158-159 stresses only under the most desperate of circumstances.

²⁰ Matthew 2012a: 138.

In addition to the *doru*, hoplites carried a sword, although it was very much a secondary weapon.²¹ Despite the fact that Greek terminology is often imprecise, there appears to have been three main designs. The first was the *xiphos*. Made from iron and with a leaf-shaped blade, this short double-edged thrusting sword was up to eighty centimetres long.²² More of a dagger than a sword was the *enchiridion*. Ideal for close fighting, it was the preferred option of the Spartans.²³ Another sword type was the *machaira*, also known as a *kopis*. Originating in the sixth century, the weapon gained popularity in the fifth and possessed a single, curved blade around sixty-five centimetres long.²⁴ It appears to have been employed primarily in a back-handed slashing action, which implies that *machairai* were most effective in open combat or when used by cavalry – which indeed was what Xenophon recommended.²⁵

An additional item of hoplite accoutrement was the cuirass, which, by the end of the fifth century, was a linen design known as the *linothorax*.²⁶ Over the course of the fourth century, *linothorakes* continued in service although lighter and less expensive variations such as the *spolas* became more common.²⁷ Another variant that appeared c.379 was the

²¹ Hdt. 7.224; Diod. Sic. 15.86.2; Pritchett 1985: 56; Holladay 1982: 94; Schwartz 2009: 92; Hanson 1999b: 38; 2000: 165; Matthew 2015: 127; Anderson 1993: 22, 25; Cartledge 1977: 15; Lee 2010b: 483; Ray 2009: 10; 2012: 7-8.

²² Hom. *Il.* 10.255; *Od.* 16.80; Aesch. *PV* 846; Anderson 1970: 37, 130; Schwartz 2009: 85-86; Jarva 2013: 411; Sidnell 2006: 33; Rusch 2011: 16; Anderson 1993: 25-26; Lee 2010b: 483; Cartledge 1977: 15; Ray 2009: 10; 2012: 8; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 21-22; Pritchett 1985: 60-61.

²³ Plut. *Lyc.* 19; *Mor.* 191E, 216C, 241F; Pritchett 1985: 61 n184; Cartledge 1977: 15; Anderson 1970: 38; 1993: 27; 2001: 76; Schwartz 2009: 93; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 22; Lee 2010b: 483.

²⁴ Plut. *Ages.* 35; Cartledge 1977: 15; Anderson 1970: 37; 1993: 26; Matthew 2015: 125; Rusch 2011: 16; Lee 2010b: 483; Snodgrass 1967: 97; Connolly 2012: 63; Schwartz 2009: 86; Jarva 2013: 411; Ray 2009: 10.

²⁵ Xen. *Eq.* 12.11; Snodgrass 1967: 97; Anderson 1970: 37; Schwartz 2009: 86; Ray 2009: 18; 2012: 8; Worley 1994: 139; Sidnell 2006: 33; Spence 1995: 54; Gaebel 2002: 29, 29 n56; Ducrey 1986: 91.

²⁶ Connolly 2012: 37; Hanson 1993a: 76; 2000: 77; 2013: 266; Warry 1995: 35; Schwartz 2009: 73; Sidnell 2006: 30-31; Matthew 2015: 194; Trundle 2004: 121; Lendon 2006: 88; Anderson 1970: 22-23; Lee 2013: 482; Lazenby 2012: 41; Rees 2016: xii; Richardson 1996: 92; Lorimer 1947: 132.

²⁷ Xen. *An.* 3.3.20; Aen. *Tact.* 29.4; Nep. 11.1.4; Anderson 1970: 22-23; Everson 2004: 152, 159; Schwartz 2009: 70; Trundle 2004: 121; Aldrete *et al.* 2013: 61; Cartledge 1977: 14; Hunt 2007: 115, 117; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 43; Jarva 2013: 407.

hemithorakion, a breastplate that, whilst obviously lighter than a full cuirass, offered no protection to the wearer's back. Jason of Pherae was credited with its invention and the innovation seems to have been widely adopted by his troops. To what extent *hemithorakia* were used outside of Thessaly is unknown, although they appear to have been embraced on some level.²⁸ A number of modern commentators believe that during the first half of the fourth century, body armour was abandoned in favour of a *chiton* or simply a *chlamys*.²⁹ Evidence for this observation, however, is mainly monumental – grave *stelae* in particular – and so the portrayals were likely heroic representations rather than depictions of reality.³⁰

Hoplites also wore helmets. The signature Corinthian style had been largely superseded by the fourth century, replaced with designs that permitted increased vision and hearing. One example was the *pilos*. First worn by Spartans in the fifth century but adopted during the fourth by many other *poleis*, it remained in continuous service through to c. 150.³¹ Another style that became widespread in the fourth century was the Attic. Evolved, in all likelihood, from the Chalcidian design of the sixth century, the Attic helmet had hinged cheek-pieces and although retained the ear openings of its predecessor, dispensed with the nose-piece.³²

²⁸ Plut. *Pel.* 9.3, 11.1, 33.2; *Mor.* 596D; Pollux, 1.134; Polyæn. 4.3.13; Snodgrass 1967: 110; Jarva 2013: 407; Sprawski 2014b: 110; Sekunda 1994: 183 Plate 202; Bell 1981: 35; Trundle 2004: 121; Matthew 2015: 120.

²⁹ Anderson 1970: 26-28; Schwartz 2009: 97; Everson 2004: 114; Sekunda 2000: 58; Lee 2013: 148; Hunt 2007: 116 Figure 5.4; van Wees 2004: 48; 2007: 294.

³⁰ Jarva 2013: 396; Anderson 1970: 32-33; Matthew 2012a: 34-35, 37; Aldrete *et al.* 2013: 86; Lee 2010b: 481; Goette 2009: 197-198; Ma 2008b: 245; Geddes 1987: 308; Hurwit 2007: 46, 46 n56.

³¹ Thuc. 4.34.3; Arr. *Tact.* 3; Gomme 1956b: 475; Everson 2004: 136, 181; Anderson 1970: 29; Schwartz 2009: 57-58; Cartledge 1977: 14; Hunt 2007: 116 Figure 5.4; Matthew 2012a: 108; van Wees 2004: 48; Lee 2010b: 482-483; Ma 2008b: 244. Matthew 2015: 105, 110 contends that the relatively inexpensive cost associated with production of the *pilos* made it an ideal issue in Sparta and Macedonia where panoply was supplied at state expense. For state supply of panoply in Sparta see also – Xen. *Lac.* 11.2-3; Rusch 2011: 16; Golden 1998: 26; Trundle 2004: 123; Roberts 2017: 21.

³² Everson 2004: 183; Snodgrass 1967: 94; Connolly 2012: 61-63; Schwartz 2009: 55, 63; Matthew 2012a: 109; Ma 2008b: 244; Stupperich 1994: 96; Fraser 1922: 105; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 41.

Because a hoplite's accoutrement rendered him ill-suited for single combat, formal military engagements were decided by a massed array of heavy infantry fighting together in close order. Known as a phalanx, the formation was ordered not in rows but by files, each commanded by an officer (*lochagos*) who fought at its head.³³ Thucydides provides a record of how a Spartan phalanx was organised, although the testimony is far from clear.³⁴ What appears to have been the case is that at the Battle of Mantinea (418), Sparta's army consisted of seven *morai* (divisions) each comprising four *lochoi* (companies) that were under the command of a *lochagos*. *Lochoi* were further divided into *enomotia* (platoons) led by an *enomotarch*. *Enomotiai* were typically arranged – if Mantinea is any indication – in files of four, each eight hoplites deep.³⁵ By Leuctra (371), however, the Spartan phalanx appears to have undergone a change in which the number of *morai* was reduced to six, each of which was successively organised into four *lochoi*, eight *pentekostys* (units of fifty) and sixteen *enomotiai*.³⁶

The testimonies of Thucydides and Xenophon are not, of course, any indication that the Spartan model was adopted by other *poleis*. Be that as it may, what can be regarded as certain is that ranks and files of the Greek phalanx were extensions of the friendships and kinships of individual hoplites. This, combined with the natural Greek competitiveness,

³³ Asclep. 2.2; Connolly 2012: 15, 37, 38; Warry 1995: 34, 36; Lee 2004: 291; van Wees 2004: 98, 186; Kagan & Viggiano 2013b: 8-9; Anderson 1970: 100; Hanson 2000: 28; Cawkwell 1989: 378, 380; Echeverria 2012: 308; Fraser 1942: 15; Singor 2009: 84-85 n14; Crowley 2012: 63, 171.

³⁴ Testimony – Thuc. 5.68.2-3. For shortcomings in Thucydides' testimony – Cartledge 1987: 430; van Wees 2004: 246-247; Anderson 1970: 227; Lazenby 2012: 8; Cawkwell 1983: 386; Singor 2009: 69; Figueira 1986a: 179; Whitby 2007: 68; Krentz 2007a: 156; Hornblower 2008: 181-182.

³⁵ Thuc. 5.66.3, 68.3; Matthew 2012a: 168-169; van Wees 2004: 98, 245; Connolly 2012: 40; Cartledge 1987: 41-42, 427; Lee 2010b: 484; Anderson 1970: 228-229; Lazenby 2012: 10, 57; Singor 2009: 69-70; Figueira 1986a: 179-180; Krentz 2007a: 156; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 107, 113.

³⁶ Xen. *Lac.* 11.4; van Wees 2004: 98, 247-248; Connolly 2012: 40; Cartledge 1987: 427-428, 430-431; Lee 2010b: 484; Anderson 1970: 225-226; Lazenby 2012: 6-7; Figueira 1986a: 200, 212; Krentz 2007a: 156.

ensured troops fought with motivation and enthusiasm not only to protect themselves, but also family and comrades.³⁷

Hoplite battles – by the Classical Age – were decided in a shoving match (*othismos aspidon*) in which rival armies would seek victory by “steamrolling” through their opponent’s phalanx, with hoplites of the front rank using their shields to drive against, and hopefully over the top of, their immediate opponents.³⁸ There is some measure of controversy, however, surrounding what, exactly, the stratagem entailed.³⁹ Although it is true there is no explicit record detailing how battles were waged, collective testimony leaves little doubt about the existence and nature of the *othismos*. Thucydides notes, for example, when describing the clash of phalanxes at Delium:

τὸ δὲ ἄλλο καρτερᾷ μάχῃ καὶ ὠθισμῷ ἀσπίδων ζυνειστήκει (Thuc. 4.96.2-3).

The rest were engaged in stubborn conflict, with shield pressed against shield (trans. Smith, 1919).

Similarly, Xenophon in his account of Coronea states:

ἐξὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ παρέντι τοὺς διαπίπτοντας ἀκολουθοῦντι χειροῦσθαι τοὺς ὀπισθεν, οὐκ ἐποίησε τοῦτο, ἀλλ’ ἀντιμέτωπος συνέρραξε τοῖς Θηβαίοις: καὶ συμβαλόντες τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐωθοῦντο, ἐμάχοντο, ἀπέκτεινον, ἀπέθνησκον (Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.19).

³⁷ Onos. 24; Polyae. 2.3.11; Hanson 2000: 121, 124; Goldsworthy 1997: 9; Waterfield 2009b: 7; Crowley 2012: 44-45; Lee 2010b: 483; Rawlings 2007: 211; van Wees 2007: 291-292, 293; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 112; Fink 2014: 51-52.

³⁸ Cartledge 1977: 16; Lazenby 2012: 46; Holladay 1982: 94; How 1923: 121-122; Luginbill 1994: 52; Schwartz 2009: 183-184; Sekunda 2000: 27; Hanson 1999b: 38; 2000: 28, 38; 2013: 263-264, 269; Trundle 2004: 119-120; Hutchinson 2000: 27, 151; Anderson 1970: 176; Waterfield 2009b: 7; Kagan & Viggiano 2013b: 8, 19, 27; Hale 2013: 178.

³⁹ Dissenting voices include – Cawkwell 1978b: 151-153; 1989: 376-377, 385-386; Fraser 1942: 15-16; Krentz 1985b: 56, 60-61; van Wees 2004: 152, 184-185; 189-190; Matthew 2012a: 205, 208-209, 211-213, 214.

For while he might have let the men pass by who were trying to break through and then have followed them and overcome those in the rear, he did not do this, but crashed against the Thebans front to front; and setting shields against shields they shoved, fought, killed, and were killed (trans. Brownson, 1918).

Xenophon reiterates the information in his tribute to Agesilaus, tersely recording:

καὶ συμβαλόντες τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐωθοῦντο, ἐμάχοντο, ἀπέκτεινον, ἀπέθνησκον (Xen. *Ages.* 2.12).

Thrusting shield against shield, they shoved and fought and killed and fell (trans. Marchant, 1925).

Certainly if any credence is given to Polyaeus' anecdote that Epaminondas implored his hoplites for "one step more" (ἐν βῆμα χαρίσασθέ μοι, καὶ τὴν νίκην ἔξομεν) then the inference is that the call was issued to a phalanx engaged in the *othismos*.⁴⁰ One academic has rejected Epaminondas' entreaty as a "figurative exhortation".⁴¹ The position is untenable. It is unlikely, to say the least, that when fighting for his very life and with the battle's outcome in the balance, the *boiotarchos* would consciously reach for idiom in order to implore his troops into a final effort. Even if that was so, it can hardly be expected that an infantryman, engaged in a life and death struggle, had time to process any command other than one that was literal: effective orders are those that are unambiguous. By calling for "one step more", therefore, Epaminondas was surely exhorting his hoplites to take a pace forward in their struggle with the Spartan phalanx – in other words, "push harder!"

⁴⁰ Epaminondas' plea – Polyaeus. 2.3.2; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 203 n20; Luginbill 1994: 56; Ray 2012: 64; Buckler 2013: 661-662; Hanson 1999b: 55; Roberts 2017: 359; Matthew 2012a: 228.

⁴¹ Matthew 2012a: 228, 230.

Although not a military man in the same way as Thucydides or Xenophon, Aristophanes nevertheless confirms that the *othismos aspidon* both existed, and was widely understood, when he has one of his characters recall:

οἱ δ' ὅτε δὴ σχεδὸν ἦσαν ἐπ' ἀλλήλοισιν ἰόντες, σὺν ῥ' ἔβαλον ῥινοῦς τε καὶ ἀσπίδας ὀμφοαλοέσσας (Aristoph. *Pax* 1274).

And when in their advance they had come together at close quarters, they dashed their bucklers together and their shields massive in the middle (trans. Henderson, 1998).⁴²

With consistent reference to shield upon shield and subsequent shoving, the ancient sources confirm the orthodox position that the *othismos aspidon* – “push of shields” – unpinned phalanx warfare, at least as far as it was practiced by *poleis* from the mid fifth century. Indeed, the pronounced concave design of the *aspis* made the *othismos* an effective tactic as it allowed the bearer to shelter “inside” his own shield in order to bring his full weight to bear on the enemy, and at the same time use his weapons.⁴³ Hoplites behind the leading row used their shields to push forward on those in front, thus generating additional impetus.⁴⁴

Arranging the phalanx by vertical files contributed to the effectiveness of the *othismos*. Each file was headed by an officer behind whom was stationed the best performed and most experienced hoplites. The front ranks, therefore, constituted seasoned campaigners who could be best counted upon to maintain a steady front in the face of an

⁴² Matthew 2012a: 207 recognises the source but observes that no reference is made to a specific battle.

⁴³ Xen. *Cyr.* 7.1.33; Prevas 2002: 33; Hanson 2000: 68, 175; 2013: 258; Schwartz 2009: 192-193; Fink 2014: 49-50; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 16; Holladay 1982: 96; Viggiano 2013: 114; Roberts 2015: 224.

⁴⁴ Xen. *Mem.* 3.1.8; Asclep. 5.2; Anderson 1993: 15; Lazenby 2004: 89-90; 2005: 97; Hanson 2000: 28; 2013: 258; Sekunda 2000: 27; Kagan & Viggiano 2013b: 27; Hall 2013: 15.

advancing enemy, and withstand the initial clash of the phalanxes as they came together.⁴⁵ Suspect and untried hoplites were stationed in the middle of the files, allowing them to add weight to the shove but prevented from fleeing the field by veteran troops positioned at the rear.⁴⁶

To further the phalanx's effectiveness as a fighting formation, the army's elite contingent was usually stationed on the right wing.⁴⁷ The hoplite, it will be remembered, carried his *aspis* on the left arm, thus leaving his right side exposed. As a result, an individual's natural inclination was to protect his own vulnerable flank by trying to shelter as much of himself as possible behind the shield of the man next to him. This accounted for Thucydides' observation that opposing phalanxes crabbed to the right as they approached each other. Positioning the army's elite and most experienced troops on the phalanx's right flank, therefore, afforded the best possible protection for the formation as a whole – provided they maintained station.⁴⁸

II. Emergence of Combined Arms Forces

Although conservatism, an inherent trait of the military, dictated that heavy infantry fighting in phalanx formation remained the basis of Greek warfare, Xenophon's *anabasis* provided lessons to those astute enough to interpret them, and contributed towards a greater

⁴⁵ Xen. *Lac.* 11.5; *Mem.* 3.1.8; Luginbill 1994: 59; Anderson 1993: 15; Hawkins 2011: 415; Ridley 1979: 515; Pritchard 2010: 18; Lazenby 2005: 97; Fink 2014: 52; Brice 2012: 143.

⁴⁶ Xen. *Mem.* 3.1.8-9; *Cyr.* 3.3.40-42; Asclep. 5.2; Hanson 2000: 29; Matthew 2015: 213; Ridley 1979: 515; Anderson 1970: 174; Hall 2013: 15; Lazenby 2005: 97; Fink 2014: 52; Brice 2012: 143.

⁴⁷ Hdt. 9.26-28; Holladay 1982: 94; How & Wells 2008: 521, 720; Cartledge 1987: 221; Kagan & Viggiano 2013b: 9; Schwartz 2009: 172, 179; Roisman 2017: 5, 15, 292; Wheeler 2007b: 216; Hanson 1999b: 47; Fink 2014: 47; Brice 2012: 143.

⁴⁸ Thuc. 5.71.1; Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.22-23; Plut. *Ages.* 18; How 1923: 121; Hanson 2006: 139-140; Rusch 2011: 17; Golden 1998: 25; Holladay 1982: 94; Waterfield 2009b: 6; Rahe 1980: 83; Schwartz 2009: 271; Cartwright 1997: 217; Wylie 1992: 119; van Wees 2009: 127; Cartledge 1977: 13; 1987: 220.

trend that began in the early fourth century – the emergence of combined arms forces: diversified armies in which auxiliary troops played an ever-increasing role.⁴⁹ Thus the *hippeus* attained burgeoning importance on the Classical Greek battlefield. Indeed, major *poleis* came to view cavalry as an essential element of their armies, even if its potential was not always realised fully.⁵⁰

During the fourth century, a number of city-states commissioned cavalry squadrons for the first time. Argos, for example, had no cavalry tradition but by 370 had acquired a division of *hippeis* for their invasion of Phlius, a *polis* that also had a *corps* of horsemen.⁵¹ Similarly Corinth, who had not possessed cavalry in the fifth century, had by the fourth a squadron that first saw action when they, together with the Athenian *hippeis*, were deployed as scouts monitoring the return of Epaminondas' Thebans from their 369 invasion of the Peloponnese.⁵² Elis was another *polis* that had responded to the advantages of cavalry by commissioning a force of its own in 365 and one that three years later was present at the Battle of Mantinea.⁵³

States in which the history of cavalry had been strong also reacted to the increased potency an effective mounted division provided armies. One example was Thessaly, where the internecine wars of the seventh century had reduced the capacity of the tetrarchies to field the huge numbers of cavalrymen it had in previous centuries. By the end of the sixth

⁴⁹ Burliga 2012: 68; 2014: 68; Sealey 1956: 193-194; Trundle 2004: 49; 2010b: 140, 152; Hanson 1998: 210; 1999a: 340; Ducrey 1986: 108; Sage 1996: 141-142.

⁵⁰ Polyæn. 3.9.22; Lendon 2005: 92; Wheeler 2007a: lix; Worley 1994: 123; Sidnell 2006: 23, 73; Hutchinson 2000: 102-103; Sage 1996: 47; van Wees 2004: 67; Serrati 2013a: 329; Lee 2010b: 493.

⁵¹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.4, 21-22; Spence 1995: 4-5, 6-7; MacLaren 1934: 133; Gaebel 2002: 134; Hanson 1998: 124; Frazer 2012a: 78; Hutchinson 2014: 228; Willekes 2015: 49.

⁵² Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.52; Spence 1995: 5; Gaebel 2002: 132-133; Hutchinson 2000: 107; Stroud 1971a: 139; Russell 2013: 476; Bugh 1998b: 146.

⁵³ Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.14-15; Diod. Sic. 15.85.7; Spence 1995: 7-8; Sidnell 2006: 71; English 2012: 110; Roisman 2017: 331, 333; Worley 1994: 148-149; Schwartz 2009: 262; Rees 2016: 123.

century they could only field 1,000 *hippeis* in response to a Peisistratidae plea (511) – a mighty force in comparison with other *poleis* but modest by Thessalian standards.⁵⁴ Thessaly recovered and the importance of cavalry was recognised clearly by fourth-century dynasts such as Jason of Pherae who in 375 boasted having 6,000 horsemen under his own command, and being able to call upon another 2,000.⁵⁵

As with the hoplites' panoply, cavalry accoutrement also underwent some significant developments. Athens' short-lived *hippotoxotai* squadron aside, the main offensive weapon of a cavalryman was the spear, of which there were two different varieties – one being the *akontion* (javelin).⁵⁶ The other was a long, thin thrusting spear similar to the hoplite *doru* and possibly known by the same name – but hereafter referred to as a *kamax* to keep the distinction.⁵⁷ During the fourth century, the primary weapon appears to have been the *akontion*, which was hurled at the enemy – a tactic borrowed from the Persians.⁵⁸ As the *kamax* was too long and awkward to be thrown effectively, the presumption is that it was used for stabbing at opponents during close combat.⁵⁹ Like some hoplites, the *hippeus* also carried a *machaira* as a secondary weapon.⁶⁰ The sword was

⁵⁴ Hdt. 5.63; Spence 1995: 23; 2002: 356; Sidnell 2006: 29; Xydopoulos 2012: 22; Larson 2000: 218; Strootman 2012: 52; Anderson 1961: 126, 129; Tarn 1930: 56; Hyland 2003: 128.

⁵⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.8, 19; Spence 1995: 24; 2002: 186; Gaebel 2002: 132; Rusch 2011: 191; Sprawski 2014b: 95; Best 1969: 125; Hansen 2011: 243; Yalichev 1997: 164; Parke 1933: 102.

⁵⁶ Xen. *Eq.* 12.1213; *Eq. mag.* 1.25; Spence 1990: 99 n54; 1995: 50; Bugh 1998b: 222; Greenhalgh 1973: 126, 128; Gaebel 2002: 29, 59; Sidnell 2006: 31; van Wees 2004: 65; Hunt 2007: 118; Fields 2003: 110; Lee 2010b: 491; Saacke 1942: 327.

⁵⁷ Xen. *Eq.* 12.12; Snodgrass 1967: 104; Spence 1990: 99 n54; 1995: 49-51; Greenhalgh 1973: 148; Sidnell 2006: 32; Fields 2003: 109, 109 n6; van Wees 2004: 65; Gaebel 2002: 29.

⁵⁸ Xen. *Eq. mag.* 1.6, 21, 25, 3.3, 6; *Eq.* 8.10, 12.12; Snodgrass 1967: 109; Worley 1994: 139; Warry 1995: 37; Hutchinson 2000: 185; Spence 1995: 49-50; Sidnell 2006: 32-33; Gaebel 2002: 29.

⁵⁹ Xen. *Eq.* 12.12; Spence 1990: 99 n51; 1995: 52-53; Lee 2010b: 491; Gaebel 2002: 29; Worley 1994: 139; Sidnell 2006: 32; Anderson 1961: 150-151.

⁶⁰ Xen. *Eq.* 12.11, 12 n1; Spence 1990: 99 n54; 1995: 54; Gaebel 2002: 29; Greenhalgh 1973: 129; Sidnell 2006: 33-34; Fields 2003: 110; van Wees 2004: 65; Lee 2010b: 491; Hirsch 1985: 87.

popular and important from the late fifth century, due in part to the regular breakages during combat of the *kamax* and *akontion*.⁶¹

By the fourth century, *hippeis* wore body-armour – something that reflected their increasingly active role in battle.⁶² Accoutrement comprised headgear and, judging by Xenophon’s recommendation, the Boeotian helmet was seemingly the most practical and widely favoured option. Based on the design of a civilian riding hat and similar in basic shape to the *pilos*, it included a brim and flange that protected the cheeks and neck, whilst still providing its wearer with an excellent field of vision.⁶³

Linothorakes were adopted by cavalrymen during the latter part of the fifth century, although the *spolas* – possibly for reasons of cost – began to appear around 400.⁶⁴ The cavalry cuirass was a slightly modified version of that worn by the hoplite and included a linen shoulder-piece, bronze scales for additional protection, and a gorget (neck protector).⁶⁵ There is also evidence to suggest that at least some cavalrymen wore a heavier corselet, possibly a plate or muscle cuirass.⁶⁶ Other items of cavalry armour included *pteruges*, and “The Hand” – a gauntlet that protected the arm of the rider from fingers to

⁶¹ Xen. *Eq.* 12.11; *Hell.* 3.4.14; Spence 1995: 54, 56; Worley 1994: 128, 139; Gaebel 2002: 29, 117; Anderson 1961: 152; Sidnell 2006: 33-34; Nefedkin 2006: 12; Everson 2004: 177, 189; Snodgrass 1967: 109; Hutchinson 2000: 186; Lee 2010b: 491.

⁶² Anderson 1970: 27; Everson 2004: 164; Spence 1995: 61; 2002: 89; Sidnell 2006: 30-31, 73-75; Hunt, 2007: 118.

⁶³ Xen. *Eq.* 12.3; *Hell.* 7.5.20; Snodgrass 1967: 109; Worley 1994: 139; Gaebel 2002: 29; Sidnell 2006: 30; Hutchinson 2000: 184; Fields 2003: 109; van Wees 2004: 65; Sekunda 2000: 59; Everson 2004: 136; Anderson 1960: 8; 1961: 147-148; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 41.

⁶⁴ Everson 2004: 152; Worley 1994: 139; Aldrete *et al.* 2013: 87; Lee 2010b: 491; Sidnell 2006: 31; Anderson 1961: 142, 144. Aldrete *et al.* 2013: 58-61 argue that the *spolas* cannot be considered armour in the generally accepted sense of the term but concede the garment might have provided rudimentary protection for its wearer.

⁶⁵ Xen. *Eq.* 12.2; Everson 2004: 152; Snodgrass 1967: 109; Worley 1994: 139; Sidnell 2006: 31; Hutchinson 2000: 184; Anderson 1960: 8; 1961: 143-144.

⁶⁶ Xen. *An.* 3.4.47-48; *Hell.* 7.2.21; Everson 2004: 165; Anderson 1961: 143; 1970: 27; 143; Spence 1995: 24, 31, 61-62; 2002: 66; Parke 1933: 69 n1; Sidnell 2006: 30; Worley 1994: 139.

shoulder.⁶⁷ Some horsemen also wore *embades* (heavy riding boots) that covered the foot and extended to the knee.⁶⁸

Better-protected *hippeis* allowed *poleis* to assign their cavalry a more active combat role than simply safeguarding the phalanx. A major function of mounted troops in the fifth century, for example, had been to screen infantry withdrawal, thus minimising losses in the event of defeat.⁶⁹ Although there was a continuation of the tactic during the fourth century, innovative commanders found ever more diverse ways in which to deploy their *hippeis*. One such stratagem was the stationing of cavalry squadrons in front of phalanxes, which allowed a general to protect his own infantry by mounting a pre-emptive attack on an opponent's horsemen. The tactic could negate enemy cavalry altogether by driving it from the field – a result achieved by Pelopidas at Cynoscephalae in 364 – or perhaps even force the *hippeis* back onto their own phalanx, so disrupting its effectiveness – something achieved by the Thebans at Leuctra in 371.⁷⁰ Possessing an effective mounted division was also beneficial in the event attacks by enemy cavalry actually materialised. Agesilaus, for example, when at Narthacium (Thessaly) in 394 *en route* to Sparta from Asia and suffering

⁶⁷ *Pteruges* – Xen. *Eq.* 12.4; Sidnell 2006: 30; Aldrete *et al.* 2013: 87. Gauntlet – Xen. *Eq.* 12.5, 7; Schwartz 2009: 78; Gaebel 2002: 29; Hutchinson 2000: 184; Worley 1994: 139; van Wees 2004: 66; Spence 1995: 63; Anderson 1961: 149-150.

⁶⁸ Xen. *Eq.* 12.10; Spence 1995: 24, 60; Everson 2004: 166; Gaebel 2002: 29; Sidnell 2006: 30; Fields 2003: 110; Worley 1994: 139; van Wees 2004: 66; Lee 2010b: 491; Anderson 1961: 149.

⁶⁹ Thuc. 5.73.1, 6.70.3; Diod. Sic. 15.85.7; Winter 1990: 4; Sidnell 2006: 45; Konecny 2014: 29; Hutchinson 2000: 73, 101; Cartledge 1987: 214; Sage 1996: 47; Rees 2016: 50; Kagan 2005: 239, 277; Gaebel 2002: 101; Gomme & Andrewes 1970: 346.

⁷⁰ Cynoscephalae – Plut. *Pel.* 32.2; Diod. Sic. 15.80.4; Buckler 1980: 176-177; Gaebel 2002: 136; Sidnell 2006: 66; Roisman 2017: 318, 320; Schwartz 2009: 252; Montagu 2015: 93. Leuctra – Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.13; Montagu 2006: 139; Schwartz 2009: 257; Gaebel 2002: 130; Worley 1994: 144-145; Lazenby 2012: 185; Buckler 1980: 64; Sidnell 2006: 65; Cartledge 1987: 240; Cawkwell 1972: 262; Matthew 2012a: 223.

continual harassment by the local cavalry, was conspicuously proud of his own mounted troops who comprehensively defeated and drove off their more illustrious foe.⁷¹

Another example of the expanded role being filled by cavalry was in that of reconnaissance, a practice generally neglected in Classical warfare except by the most experienced of generals.⁷² As warfare became increasingly sophisticated, however, so the need to stay abreast of an enemy's whereabouts and the terrain upon which operations were being conducted became recognised. Thus cavalry was deployed in reconnoitring topography and enemy troop movements.⁷³

During the fourth century there were increased occurrences of *poleis*, including Thebes, complementing the ranks of their cavalry with *hamippoi* – light infantry that was trained to operate in conjunction with *hippeis*.⁷⁴ First mention of the unit in the historical record was made in connection with Gelon of Syracuse, who offered 2,000 such infantry to assist in the war against Xerxes (480) but in mainland Greece, *hamippoi* are not securely attested until 419/18 when a Boeotian contingent supported the Argive-led revolt against Sparta.⁷⁵ Armed with a javelin, dagger (probably a *xiphos*) and wearing a felt or bronze

⁷¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.4-9; Plut. *Ages.* 16; Gaebel 2002: 121; Sidnell 2006: 53; Rusch 2011: 171; Hutchinson 2000: 104-105; Cartledge 1987: 218, 362; Harrison 1913: 132; Anderson 1961: 152; 1974: 30; Montagu 2015: 85-86; Ray 2012: 24.

⁷² Neglecting reconnaissance is well attested in the sources. Typical is the first Battle of Mantinea (418) – Thuc. 5.66.1; Krentz 2007a: 160; Rees 2016: 48; Schwartz 2009: 259; Rusch 2011: 110; Lazenby 2004: 120-121; 2012: 153; Kagan 2005: 234-235; Hanson 2006: 153; Henderson 1927: 324-325; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 106-107.

⁷³ Xen. *Eq. mag.* 4.4, 5, 16; *Cyr.* 5.4.4; *Lac.* 13.6; Onos. 6.7-8; Ducrey 1986: 102; Spence 1995: 133, 151; Lee 2010b: 492; Hunt 2007: 119; Krentz 2007a: 160; Saacke 1942: 332; Bugh 1998b: 222; Sidnell 2006: 23, 30; Ray 2009: 18.

⁷⁴ Athens – Xen. *Eq. mag.* 5.13, 9.7; [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 49.1; Lee 2013: 156; Spence 1995: 58; Bugh 1998b: 173; Sekunda 1986: 54; Rhodes 1993: 566. Sparta – Plut. *Ages.* 10; Spence 1995: 59; Sekunda 1986: 53. For an indication of the trend – Xen. *Eq. mag.* 5.13; *Hell.* 7.2.4; Spence 1995: 21, 59; Sekunda 2014b: 61; Serrati 2013a: 29; Lee 2010b: 493; 2013: 156; Krentz 2002: 30; Gaebel 2002: 139; Bugh 1998a: 86; Pascual 2007: 50.

⁷⁵ Gelon – Hdt. 7.158; Spence 1995: 30; Lee 2013: 156; Sekunda 1986: 53; 2014b: 61; How & Wells 2008: 613-614. Mainland Greece – Thuc. 5.57.2; Spence 1995: 60; Lee 2013: 156; Sekunda 1986: 53; 2014b: 61; Bugh 1998b: 173; Worley 1994: 62; Delbrück 1975: 152; Gomme & Andrewes 1970: 79-80; Sidnell 2006: 61; Rusch 2011: 106; Pascual 2007: 50 n35; Krentz 2002: 30.

pilos, *hamippoi* accompanied cavalry into battle on the run by holding onto the horse's mane, tail or trappings – although the possibility that an individual *hamippos* may, on occasion, have doubled behind a *hippeus* should not be discounted.⁷⁶ Deployment of *hamippoi* such as that by Epaminondas at Mantinea provided a number of advantages that contributed towards the strike power of cavalry offensives.⁷⁷ Having light infantry hidden amongst horses augmented the attack with not only an element of surprise, but added substantial weight to the intensity of missile assaults that could be delivered upon an enemy.⁷⁸ *Hamippoi* were also skilled in close-quarters action where they were effective in neutralising both opposition *hippeis* and their mounts – a grisly task accomplished either by missile attack or the *xiphos*.⁷⁹

The fourth century also saw the continuation of a trend that began in the Peloponnesian War – the return to favour of *psiloi* (light infantry).⁸⁰ *Psiloi* were certainly deployed in the conflicts of the seventh and sixth centuries but had occupied a subordinate role to the heavy infantryman, a position to which they remained relegated until the great civil conflict of the fifth century.⁸¹ Coming from societal or ethnic groups whose members

⁷⁶ Panoply – Buckler 2013: 659; Sekunda 1986: 53, 54. Accompanying the cavalry charge – Worley 1994: 62; Lee 2013: 156; Spence 1995: 59; 2002: 159; Sekunda 1986: 53; Sidnell 2006: 61; Hutchinson 2000: 102; van Wees 2004: 66; Rees 2016: 123.

⁷⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.23-25; Diod. Sic. 15.85.45; Spence 1995: 21; 2002: 199; Bugh 1998b: 150; Buckler 1985: 134; Gaebel 2002: 139; Roisman 2017: 17, 332; Pascual 2007: 50 n35; Rhodes 1993: 566; Rees 2016: 123, 126; Stylianos 1998: 516-517.

⁷⁸ Xen. *Eq. mag.* 5.13, 8.19; Spence 1995: 59, 60; 2002: 42, 169; Gaebel 2002: 140; Hanson 1999b: 48; Roisman 2017: 332-333; Buckler 1980: 218.

⁷⁹ Sekunda 1986: 53; Spence 1995: 60; 2002: 169; Roisman 2017: 332; Ray 2009: 152.

⁸⁰ Connor 1988: 27-28; Sidnell 2006: 58; Pritchard 2010: 50; Spence 1995: 140; Serrati 2013a: 325; Lee 2010b: 486; van Wees 1995: 162; Hanson 2006: 90-91.

⁸¹ Tyrtaeus 11.35-38; Snodgrass 1967: 85; Lazenby 2005: 106; Whatley 2007: 316; Serrati 2013a: 325; Schwartz 2009: 121; Hunt 2007: 120; Krentz 2002: 29; van Wees 2004: 62, 173; Kagan & Viggiano 2013b: 46, 48.

could not afford the armour of a hoplite, *psiloi* acted as skirmishers, whose main role was to probe opposing phalanxes for weakness.⁸²

One such group were the peltasts (*peltastai*): mercenaries who spread to Greece from their Thracian and Macedonian homelands.⁸³ *Peltastai* were named after the small, light shield (*pelte*) that they invariably carried into battle which was usually, but not always, crescent-shaped and made of a wicker frame covered in animal skin, probably either goat or sheep.⁸⁴ Troops also wore a war-cloak (*zeira*), high boots (*embades*), and fox-skin cap (*alopekis*) which afforded not only some level of additional protection but also a defence against the elements. A peltast's main offensive weapon was the spear, the most common varietal being the javelin that, like the cavalry *akontion*, was 1.1-1.6 metres long and often used in conjunction with a throwing loop (*ankyle*) positioned at the centre of the shaft to improve both accuracy and range.⁸⁵

Another group of *psiloi* who re-emerged as a result of the Peloponnesian War was *toxotai* (archers). Like other *psiloi*, *toxotai* were stigmatised by what was regarded as their inferior brand of courage. Euripides may well have encapsulated the attitude of many in his denigration of Heracles' use of the bow – a coward's weapon – and for the hero's failure to stand amongst the ranks of his friends and face the enemy's spear.⁸⁶ Perhaps Greek

⁸² Thuc. 4.33.1-2, 6.69.2; Diod. Sic. 15.32.4; Hanson 1998: 23; 2000: 136; 2006: 91; Connor 1988: 27; Gomme 1956b: 475; 1959: 15; Winter 1990: 7; Trundle 2010b: 142; Spence 1995: 115; Serrati 2013a: 325; van Wees 1995: 162; Dillery 1995: 29. Hanson 1998: 20-21, 210; 2006: 91 also offer a strong argument for the use of *psiloi* as ravagers.

⁸³ Snodgrass 1967: 78; Warry 1995: 50; Trundle 2004: 47; Stoyanov 2015: 426; Sears 2013: 3, 234; Lee 2010b: 486; Hanson 2006: 91; Hunt 2007: 120, 135; van Wees 2004: 62; Williams 2004: 263.

⁸⁴ Hdt. 7.75; Diod. Sic. 15.44.3; Lendon 2005: 93; Snodgrass 1967: 78; Warry 1995: 50; Konecny 2014: 31; Sprawski 2014b: 108; Trundle 2004: 47, 50; Stoyanov 2015: 429; Webber 2001: 38; Casson 1977: 4; Trundle 2010b: 152; Griffith 1981: 162; Sears 2013: 234, 271; Best 1969: 3.

⁸⁵ Hdt. 7.75; Xen. An. 4.3.28, 5.2.12; Snodgrass 1967: 80; Warry 1995: 50-51; Matthew 2012a: 27-28; Sprawski 2014a: 107; Sears 2013: 234; Best 1969: 5-6; Lee 2010b: 487; Hunt 2007: 120; Harris 1963: 28-29, 35; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 13.

⁸⁶ Eur. *Heracl.* 145-180. Other indications for contempt of the bow – Hdt. 7.226; Thuc. 4.40.2; Did. 6.40-44; van Wees 2004: 65; Gomme 1956b: 480-481; Hanson 1999b: 38; Trundle 2010b: 145; Miller 2010: 314;

reticence was also due to the weapon's limited effectiveness against hoplite opponents and indeed a recent study has shown that arrows fired at even very short distances were incapable of penetrating a *linothorax*.⁸⁷ Yet there must have been some military value to the bow, probably against light troops such as enemy *psiloi*, a supposition corroborated by modern research that confirms the deadliness of *toxotai* against unprotected opponents.⁸⁸ Whatever the case, military pragmatism outweighed old prejudices in at least some city-states and it was not long before *toxotai* again took their place in the armies of *poleis*. Sparta, for example, retained 300 *toxotai* at the Battle of Nemea (394), even if they were Cretan mercenaries, antiquity's acknowledged masters of the bow.⁸⁹

Perhaps because of the limitations of *toxotai*, the Classical Period saw a gradual rise in importance of *sphendonetai* (slingers). Slings – whose origin ancient sources credit to either the Aetolians or Syro-Phoenicians – were highly effective.⁹⁰ Not only was their range further than the javelin or bow, they possessed greater stopping power due to the gravity of the wounds their pellet inflicted (including skull fractures and ballistic trauma).⁹¹ The standard panoply of the slinger was his weapon – usually made from a variety of material including horsehair, linen, dried gut or sinew – and a leather bag in which he carried his

Best 1969: 26, 127; Harding 2006a: 157; Waterfield 2009b: 10; Hunt 2007: 127, 135; Gabriel & Metz 1991: 69.

⁸⁷ Aldrete *et al.* 2013: 103-104, 105, 113, (Plate 8); Ray 2009: 16; Gabriel & Metz 1991: 68, 72; Hunt 2007: 122; Gabriel 2015: 34. Blyth 1977: 180-181, 188, 193, 195 arrives at a similar conclusion for bronze armour.

⁸⁸ Thuc. 3.98.1; Aldrete *et al.* 2013: 103, 120, 121 Table 1; Gabriel & Metz 1991: 67, 70, 72; Lee 2010b: 489; Hunt: 2007: 122-123; Lazenby 2004: 62; Tritle 2010: 78.

⁸⁹ Presence of *toxotai* – Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.16; Hunt 2007: 122; Spence 2002: 220; Ray 2012: 22; Anderson 1970: 143; Rees 2016: 62; Schwartz 2009: 270; Lazenby 2012: 163. Cretan expertise – Pl. *Leg.* 625d; Paus. 1.23.4; McLeod 1965: 13; Trundle 2004: 53, 118; Hanson 2009: 209; Lee 2010b: 489; van Wees 1995: 162; English 2012: 27; Hunt 2007: 122.

⁹⁰ Aetolians – Str. 8.3.33; Pritchett 1991: 23; Hawkins 1847: 99; Brown 1973: 113. Phoenicians – Plin. *HN* 7.56.201; Pritchett 1991: 27; Matz 1995: 15; Nossov 2009: 37.

⁹¹ Range – Xen. *An.* 3.3.8; Str. 8.3.33; Onos. 19; Cass. Dio 49.26.2; Echols 1950: 228; Pritchett 1991: 56; Adcock 1957: 15; Ashley 1998: 48; Hutchinson 2014: 233. Wounds – Verg. *Aen.* 9.586-589; Ov. *Met.* 2.726-729; Cels. *Med.* 7.5.4; Arr. *Tact.* 15; Gell. 1.16; Veg. 1.51; Ma 2010: 427; Pritchett 1991: 56; Korfmann 1973: 40; Gabriel & Metz 1991: 30.

missiles.⁹² A number of ancient societies were noted for their proficiency with the weapon including the Acarnanians, Balearic Islanders, and Thessalians – although it was the Rhodians who were unquestionably antiquity’s experts in the use of the sling.⁹³

Use of a leaden pellet (μολυβδίζ), together with their expertise in handling the weapon, gave Rhodian slingers an outside range of perhaps 350 metres – although the effective distance was probably closer to 100 metres.⁹⁴ In any event, the distance the islanders achieved with their shot was twice that of their opponents, something that was to prove of great benefit to the retreating Ten Thousand of Xenophon whose own Cretan archers proved inadequate against the missile troops of Mithradates.⁹⁵

III. The Professional Age

Integration of *psiloi* into the armies of city-states was reflective of a greater trend discernible during the fourth century – an appreciation for the potential of light infantry and their consequent deployment in ever-increasing numbers. It was to meet this expanding

⁹² Echols 1950: 227; Snodgrass 1967: 84; Warry 1995: 42; Foss 1975: 26; Waterfield 2009b: 123; Lee 2010b: 489; Hutchinson 2014: 233; Denny 2011: 11.

⁹³ Acarnanians – Thuc. 2.81.8; Hunt 2007: 136; Henderson 1927: 133; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 147; Hornblower 1997: 364; Hawkins 1847: 99; Lee 2010b: 489. Balearic Islanders – Polyb. 3.33; Diod. Sic. 5.18.3-4; Str. 3.5.1; Veg. 1.16; Cartledge 1987: 315; Roisman 2017: 232; Hawkins 1847: 99; Rawlings 2009b: 535; Echols 1950: 228; Kelly 2012: 275; Korfmann 1973: 38. Thessalians – Thuc. 4.100.1; Diod. Sic. 15.85.5; Pritchett 1991: 57; Lazenby 2004: 90-91; Rees 2016: 25; Hawkins 1847: 99; Rawlings 2009a: 240. For a comprehensive list see Pritchett 1991: 54, 55. Rhodians – Xen. *An.* 3.3.17; Pritchett 1991: 47; Campbell 2011: 693; Trundle 2004: 53, 118; Lee 2010b: 489, 490; van Wees 1995: 162; Ma 2004: 511; Echols 1950: 227; Rahe 1980: 83; Hutchinson 2000: 74; Kelly 2012: 275; Waterfield 2009b: 123; Foss 1975: 26.

⁹⁴ Lead pellet – Xen. *An.* 3.3.17; Pritchett 1991: 47; Campbell 2011: 693; Trundle 2004: 53, 118; Lee 2010b: 489, 490; van Wees 1995: 162; Ma 2004: 511; Echols 1950: 227; Rahe 1980: 83; Hutchinson 2000: 74; Kelly 2012: 275; Waterfield 2009b: 123; Foss 1975: 26. Range – Warry 1995: 42; Connolly 2012: 49; Foss 1975: 27; Lawrence 1979: 39; Kelly 2012: 280; Korfmann 1973: 37; Denny 2011: 12. Hunt 2007: 123; Lee 2010b: 490; Echols 1950: 228 state the effective range as two hundred metres.

⁹⁵ Xen. *An.* 3.3.15; Snodgrass 1967: 84; Pritchett 1991: 9; How & Wells 2008: 918; Echols 1950: 228; Kelly 2012: 281; Waterfield 2009b: 123; Hyland 2003: 133; Korfmann 1973: 37; Foss 1975: 26.

demand for *psiloi*, and *peltastai* in particular, that *poleis* turned to another phenomena of the fourth century; the mercenary.⁹⁶

One after-effect of the Peloponnesian War was that there existed a large pool of trained, experienced men.⁹⁷ For many, mercenary service was the only form of livelihood available. In some cases, this was due to the economic ruination of the *polis* brought about by destruction of agricultural land or disruption to trade and commerce.⁹⁸ Political instability also played a role in the growing number of mercenaries, with coups and counter-coups generating many exiles and fugitives.⁹⁹ No doubt there were also some individuals who, having known nothing but war, had grown to like it and actively sought out a mercenary existence. Others may have been attracted by a sense of adventure, material gain or perceived personal obligations.¹⁰⁰ Money, of course, was also a factor and rates of pay – at least during the late fifth and early fourth centuries – were attractive. The rank and file were paid as much as a skilled craftsman (around twenty-five Attic *drachmai* a month); captains earned double, and generals received quadruple the base rate.¹⁰¹

Whatever the reasons, many offered themselves as soldiers-for-hire and so widespread was the use of mercenaries that they featured in virtually all military struggles

⁹⁶ Trundle 2004: 7, 36, 51; 2007: 481; Sealey 1956: 193-194; English 2012: 82; Dillery 1998: 26; Serrati 2013a: 328; Parke 1933: 20-21; Griffith 1935: 3-4.

⁹⁷ Worley 1994: 129; English 2012: 52; Trundle 2004: 58; Yalichev 1997: 119; Hutchinson 2000: 23; Parke 1933: 18-19; Dillery 1998: 26; Walter 2010: 15; Lee 2010b: 494.

⁹⁸ Xen. *An.* 6.4.8; Isoc. *Dis.* 4.167-168; Ober 1985: 46; Worley 1994: 130; Miller 1984: 154; Yalichev 1997: 119-120; Parke 1933: 228; Cartledge 1987: 316-317; Hunt 2007: 142-143; Roberts 2017: 322; Lee 2010b: 493; 2017: 25; 493; Anderson 1961: 134.

⁹⁹ Isoc. *Dis.* 9.8-9; Miller 1984: 154; Griffith 1935: 3-4, 238; Parke 1933: 20, 227; Lee 2017: 18; Yalichev 1997: 125; Brice 2012: 108; Trundle 2004: 166.

¹⁰⁰ Xen. *An.* 2.6.1-5, 17-18, 21-22, 3.1.4, 7.8.23; *Hell.* 6.1.6; Plut. *Ages.* 22; Worley 1994: 130-131; English 2012: 52; Trundle 2004: 64-65, 77, 98; Yalichev 1997: 119, 126; Parke 1933: 18, 228; Hunt 2007: 143.

¹⁰¹ Mercenary pay – Xen. *An.* 2.6.21, 5.6.23, 7.2.36, 6.1, 7; Sekunda 2013: 203; English 2012: 51; Trundle 2004: 63; Griffith 1935: 295-296; Roy 1967: 309; 2004: 267; Waterfield 2009b: 82; Hunt 2007: 129. Pay rate of around one *drachme* per day a for skilled craftsmen – Hall 2013: 15; Amemiya 2007: 72; Michell 2014: 131; Pritchard 2015a: 4; Kyriazis & Zouboulakis 2004: 120; Arvanitidis & Kyriazis 2013: 227; Howgego 1995: 20.

involving Greeks from the end of the Peloponnesian War to the Hellenistic Period.¹⁰² Although not all mercenaries were *psiloi*, quality light infantry was what most city-states lacked and so it was these troops – especially *peltastai* – that the *poleis* of Greece employed. It is true that mercenaries did not always enjoy a comfortable relationship with their employers and had a reputation for untrustworthiness.¹⁰³ However, the advantages offered by professional soldiers were often too great to be overlooked. For *poleis* with expansionist ambitions, mercenaries offered an attractive alternative to citizen-soldiers – especially hoplites – who, with their agricultural commitments, were either unwilling or unable to campaign abroad, particularly for extended periods.¹⁰⁴ Another appeal was that, although initially an expensive proposition, the cost of hiring mercenaries dropped dramatically over the first half of the fourth century so that by 350, the standard rate of pay was four *oboloi* a day – around half that commanded fifty years earlier.¹⁰⁵

It is not surprising, therefore, that many city-states availed themselves of the benefits offered by mercenaries. One such *polis* was Sparta that, although possessing what amounted to a highly trained standing army, nevertheless increasingly contracted mercenary troops in its fourth-century campaigns, especially those outside the Peloponnese. Early in the century, the remnants of Xenophon's Ten Thousand featured

¹⁰² McKechnie 1994: 297, 301; Bugh 1998b: 160; Marrou 1982: 65; Delbrück 1975: 149; Waterfield 2009b: 81; Parke 1933: 20; Cartledge 1987: 314; Kagan & Viggiano 2013b: 10; van Wees 2004: 75.

¹⁰³ Thuc. 7.29.3-5; Pl. *Leg.* 630a-b; Isoc. *Dis.* 5.120-122; 8.44; Aen. *Tact.* 12.4; Xen. *An.* 5.5.5-6, 6.2.4-8, 7.1.7, 15-19; Dem. 2.28; 4.24; Ducrey 1986: 134; Briant 2002: 788; Trundle 2013: 335; Marrou 1982: 65; English 2012: xiv; Best 1969: 126-127; Waterfield 2009b: 81; Roy 2004: 276; Azoulay 2004a: 295; van Wees 2004: 75; Hunt 2007: 127.

¹⁰⁴ Harvest dictating campaigning – Thuc. 2.57.2; Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.4; How 1923: 120, 126; Lazenby 1993: 238; Hardy 1926: 348 n3; Gomme 1956a: 164; Rusch 2011: 80; van Wees 2004: 106; Krentz 2007a: 171; Lazenby 2004: 49, 51, 67, 208; Henderson 1927: 35; Hanson 1998: 32-33, 36; Ober 1985: 47, 64. Autumn (Northern September – December) was harvest season, a busy time for the farmer – Borza 1990: 26; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 256; van Wees 2004: 102; Spence 2002: 5.

¹⁰⁵ Miller 1984: 155; Pritchett 1959: 24; English 2012: 14, 16, 96; Trundle 2004: 91, 98; Griffith 1935: 298; Parke 1933: 85, 233; Cartledge 1987: 316; Sage 1996: 156. Dem. 4.28 suggests mercenaries could be retained on a daily wage of two *oboloi* plus whatever can be realised from pillaging, an idea accepted by Trundle 2013: 344.

prominently amongst Lacedaemonian campaigns in Asia Minor. In 399, for example, 5,000 of Thibron's 12,000 force were Cyreans.¹⁰⁶ Both Dercylidas and Agesilaus (who took command in 396) boosted the numbers of *psiloi* mercenaries in Sparta's service – which was already substantial if Draco's use of 3,000 hired *peltastai* to devastate the Mysian plain in 397 is anything to go by.¹⁰⁷

As well as for deployment on distant campaigns, the fourth century saw Sparta turn to mercenary auxiliaries for the specialist skills they possessed. Thrace and north-west Greece were major recruiting grounds for peltasts but it is more likely that Sparta's enlistments came from closer to home – especially Acarnania.¹⁰⁸ The experience these troops acquired in the rugged terrain of their home *chora*, together with the inherent mobility of light infantry, made them ideal mountain fighters. It comes as little surprise, therefore, that Spartan commanders regularly deployed *peltastai* in such a fashion. Ahead of his attack on Thebes (379) Cleombrotus, for example, used his mercenary *psiloi* as an advance guard to secure passage into Boeotia through one of the region's more obscure passes.¹⁰⁹

Another function performed by *peltastai* on the Spartan payroll was as support for the hoplite phalanx. In 382, for example, Teleutias – half-brother of Agesilaus – led a

¹⁰⁶ Term the Cyreans, coined by Xenophon himself, refers to the 10,000 mercenary force employed by Cyrus who in 401 attempted to usurp the crown of Artaxerxes II – Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.20; Flower 2012: 14; Trundle 2004: 45; Yalichev 1997: 120; Dillery 1995: 41; 1998: 26; Lee 2010b: 493; 2017: 28; Prevas 2002: 218; Parke 1933: 24. Composition of Thibron's army – Xen. *An.* 7.6.1; 8.24; Diod. Sic. 14.37.1-3; Parke 1933: 43; Trundle 2013: 333; Westlake 1986: 411; Rusch 2011: 156; English 2012: 82; Sears 2013: 116; Hutchinson 2000: 14; Bradley 2010: 527; Anderson 2001: 119; Dillery 1998: 25; Cawkwell 1979b: 13; Best 1969: 79; Bonner 1910: 97; Cartledge 1987: 355; Dillery 1995: 91, 103.

¹⁰⁷ Isoc. *Dis.* 4.144; Ober 1985: 46; Parke 1933: 44-45; Westlake 1986: 420; Best 1969: 80; Dillery 1995: 107; Whitehead 1991: 113 n49; Anderson 1970: 303 n33.

¹⁰⁸ Thuc. 2.79.4, 4.28.4, 123.4, 129.2, 5.6.4, 7.27.1; Xen. *An.* 1.1.9, 2.6; Anderson 1970: 115; Parke 1933: 26; Best 1969: 101; Williams 2004: 263; Radin 1911: 57; Griffith 1950: 241.

¹⁰⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.14; Munn 1993: 139-140; Buck 1994: 82, 88; Hutchinson 2000: 148; Anderson 1970: 132; Howan 2008: 4, 22; Holladay 1982: 98.

combined arms expeditionary force against Olynthus comprising a significant number of mercenary *psiloi*.¹¹⁰ A formal encounter in which Teleutias coordinated hoplites, cavalry and *psiloi*, enjoyed initial success and the Olynthian army was only saved from total defeat by the proximity of the city walls.¹¹¹ However, the following season Teleutias allowed himself to be provoked into a reckless attack during which his mixed force became scattered: the result was his army's destruction and own death.¹¹²

Use of mercenaries was an indicator of another major development in the fourth century – the increasingly professional approach to warfare being adopted by *poleis*. An example of this maturing approach was the emergence of elite bands comprising citizens for whom soldiering was a primary occupation. Spartiates excepted, the hoplite was, in essence, a citizen militiaman whose commitments to his farm and the autumn harvest meant that campaigns of even forty days were regarded as unusual.¹¹³ For many smaller landholders who worked the soil without the assistance of slaves or a hired workforce, farming was physically exhausting leaving little free time (or desire) to drill; something that in any event was deemed unnecessary as the predominant view was that it took no great talent to participate in phalanx warfare.¹¹⁴ Skill at arms was only regarded as vital if the

¹¹⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.37-39; Diod. Sic. 15.22.1-2; Lazenby 2012: 48; Yalichev 1997: 158-159; Best 1969: 112; Ober 1985: 46; Buckler & Beck 2008: 93; Ray 2012: 43; Millender 2006: 249.

¹¹¹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.40-43; Gaebel 2002: 124-125; Rusch 2011: 185; Sidnell 2006: 55; Best 1969: 112-113; Underhill 2012: 178; Rice 1974: 177; Westlake 1983: 20; Ray 2012: 45; Hutchinson 2014: 101-102; Roberts & Bennett 2014: 200.

¹¹² Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.4-6; Diod. Sic. 15.22.2; Anderson 1970: 127-128; Gaebel 2002: 125; Duff 2011: 60, 64; Winter 1990: 12; 2003: 211; Rusch 2011: 186; Schwartz 2009: 274; Curteis 1890: 17; English 2012: 92; Best 1969: 113-114; Dillery 1995: 219-220.

¹¹³ 40 days – Thuc. 2.57.2; Ober 1985: 36, 41; How 1923: 126; Kagan 2005: 76; Hardy 1926: 348 n3; Gomme 1956a: 164; Thorne 2001: 234, 245; Roisman 2017: 135-136; Lazenby 2004: 38.

¹¹⁴ Thuc. 2.39.4; Xen. *Cyr.* 2.1.16, 3.9-11; Anderson 1970: 85; 1993: 31-32; Schwartz 2009: 91; Marrou 1982: 37; Sidnell 2006: 38; Trundle 2004: 56; Waterfield 2009b: 7-8; van Wees 2004: 89-90; Serrati 2013a: 318.

phalanx collapsed and individuals were forced to fight for their lives outside of the formation.¹¹⁵

Yet as the fourth century progressed, there was a growing awareness by *poleis* of the benefits to be derived from institutionalised training. One such city-state was Thebes, where commissioning of the Sacred Band (*hieros lochos*) signalled an appreciation of the combat potential inherent in a specialist, highly trained *corps*. The Boeotians had possessed such a squad with the so-called “charioteer and footman” contingent that formed the front line of their phalanx at Delium (424) – although the division appears to have been disbanded not long after the battle.¹¹⁶

In 379, following Sparta’s expulsion from the Boeotian *polis*, Thebes restored an elite element into her army with the formation of the Sacred Band under the command of Gorgidas.¹¹⁷ Its 300 members were stationed at the Cadmea – the citadel of the *polis* – where they received specialist training and support at the state’s expense; the unit’s small size and prolonged separation from the citizen body fostered a strong *esprit de corps*.¹¹⁸ Another factor that contributed to the Band’s unity was its composition. Unlike previous elite contingents, the *hieros lochos* was not based on kinship ties but instead, on the premise that individuals would fight more fearlessly in the presence of a lover, comprised 150 pederastic couples.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁵ Pl. *La.* 182a-b; *Leg.* 815a; Anderson 1993: 29; Lendon 2005: 41; Greenhalgh 1973: 74; Roisman 2017: 15; Cawkwell 1989: 381, 385; Cook 1989: 60; Waterfield 2009b: 7; Fink 2014: 44.

¹¹⁶ Diod. Sic. 12.70.1; Hilbert 2012: 91; van Wees 2004: 59; Buck 1994: 110; Rusch 2011: 100; Parke 1933: 91; Anderson 1975: 178; Lazenby 2004: 88; Leitao 2002: 144; Rzepka 2009: 18 n37.

¹¹⁷ Plut. *Pel.* 18.1, 19.3; Polyæn. 2.5.1; Parke 1933: 91; Buck 1979: 94; Pritchett 1974: 222; Anderson 1970: 89-90; Hilbert 2012: 91; Buck 1994: 110; Cartledge 1987: 377; Roberts 2017: 343; Roisman 2017: 281.

¹¹⁸ Plut. *Pel.* 18.1-3; Holladay 1982: 95; Hilbert 2012: 91; Buck 1994: 110; Parke 1933: 91-92; Roberts 2017: 343; Roisman 2017: 282; Cary 1926: 191; Serrati 2013a: 329-330; Hunt 2007: 144; Anson 1985: 246-247.

¹¹⁹ Plut. *Pel.* 18.1, 5; Polyæn. 2.5.1; Ath. 13.12; Parke 1933: 91; Buckler 2013: 659; Hilbert 2012: 91; Schwartz 2009: 176; van Wees 2004: 195; Demand 1982: 86, 98; Marrou 1982: 28; Sidnell 2006: 62; Rusch 2011: 188; Roisman 2017: 282.

Under Gorgidas, the Sacred Band members were distributed along the entire front line of the phalanx to give it a “cutting edge” but following his death in 375, after which command was transferred to Pelopidas, the *corps* was reunited into a single unit whose primary purpose was to destroy the enemy elite and their leaders.¹²⁰ That same year, the Sacred Band enjoyed a famous victory at Tegyra where it defeated two Spartan *morai*. Despite being outnumbered four to one and only supported with a small force of cavalry, the Thebans routed the Lacedaemonians, killing both *harmosts* in the process.¹²¹ The Sacred Band went on to play a key role in Epaminondas’ victory at Leuctra in 371 and continued as an elite unit of high reputation until 338 when at Chaeronea they suffered their first and final defeat, killed to a man by the forces of Philip, who promptly acknowledged their worth.¹²²

An increasingly professional approach to warfare marked by state-funded contingents such as the Sacred Band of Thebes, coincided with a similar evolution in the role of *stratego*i. As in so many other areas, it is Athens that provides the clearest example. In the early fifth century, *stratego*i were elected – one from each of the city-state’s ten tribes – but under the overall command of a *polemarchos*.¹²³ The role of a *strategos* combined both martial and political responsibilities, albeit that military policy was determined by the *demos*.¹²⁴ By c.487/6, however, the office of *strategos* had surpassed that of the

¹²⁰ Cutting edge – Plut. *Pel.* 19.3; Davis 2001: 26; Roisman 2017: 282; Ray 2012: 52; Hunt 1998: 38; Hamilton 1991: 209.

¹²¹ Diod. Sic. 15.37.1; Plut. *Pel.* 16.1-2, 17.2-4, 19.3; Anderson 1970: 163-164; Buckler 2013: 665-666; Buck 1994: 99; Parke 1933: 92; Roberts 2017: 343; Roisman 2017: 285; Montagu 2006: 64.

¹²² For the role of the Sacred Band at Leuctra and Chaeronea – Chapter 3, VI: *Case Study*.

¹²³ M&L 18; [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 22.2; Plut. *Cim.* 8; Hamel 1998: 79-80; Creasy 2013: 129; Stanton 1990: 167, 169; Hammond 1969: 112; Amemiya 2007: 37; Gabrielsen 1994: 214; Jones 1952: 13; Roberts 2017: 14.

¹²⁴ Isoc. *Dis.* 8.54-55; Diod. Sic. 12.39.5; Plut. *Phoc.* 7.5; *Per.* 24; Pritchett 1974: 59; Hamel 1998: 5, 12; Samons 2013: 270; Mitchell 2010: 376; McQueen 1995b: 328; van Wees 2004: 99; Lazenby 2004: 11.

polemarchos as the most important post in Athens.¹²⁵ *Strategoï* could be re-elected as often as they were able to convince the voters of their worthiness and although the *demos* continued to determine foreign policy, a *strategos* could exert a powerful influence on its direction.¹²⁶

The authority of fifth-century *strategoï* went beyond their persuasive abilities, however, and in fact commanders possessed wide-ranging powers in the field, including a fair degree of latitude in determining how policy objectives were to be realised.¹²⁷ In exceptional cases they could also enact diplomatic and military decisions without reference to the *ecclesia*.¹²⁸ Notwithstanding these discretionary powers, a *strategos* was not guaranteed protection from criticism or prosecution if his actions ignored instructions from the *demos*, were flawed, or unpopular.¹²⁹

During the early fourth century, possibly with an eye on empire, Athens enacted reforms intended to improve the overall quality of its military commanders.¹³⁰ For example, although ten *strategoï* continued to be appointed, they were chosen from the entire citizen

¹²⁵ Buckley 2010: 144; Hammond 1969: 116, 118-119; Hamel 1998: 79; van Wees 2004: 99; Hunt 2007: 128; Lazenby 2004: 12; Brisson 2013: 94; Mitchell 2010: 376.

¹²⁶ Thuc. 1.127.3; Plut. *Per.* 24, 29; Buckley 2010: 144; Mayor 1939: 47; Hamel 1998: 13, 32; Roberts 2017: 23; Roisman 2017: 12, 58; Lazenby 2004: 12; Brisson 2013: 94; Samons 2013: 270-271; Mitchell 2010: 376; Kagan 2005: 47-48.

¹²⁷ See, for example, the contrasting plans of the *strategoï* Alcibiades, Nicias and Lamachus for the prosecution of the war with Syracuse (415) – Thuc. 6.26.1, 47.1-50.1; Plut. *Nic.* 14; *Alc.* 20; Kagan 2005: 268-270; Henderson 1927: 359-360; Lazenby 2004: 138; Roberts 2017: 197; Rees 2016: 159-160; Cartwright 1997: 241; Hanson 2006: 206-207; Brice 2013: 626-627.

¹²⁸ See, for example, the negotiated settlement at Potidaea (430/29) – Thuc. 2.70.1-4; Diod. Sic. 12.46.6-7; Gomme 1956a: 204; Hanson 2006: 172; Roberts 2017: 89; Lazenby 2004: 41; Kagan 2005: 85; Cartwright 1997: 124. That the *strategoï* were nonetheless censured for their leniency – Thuc. 2.70.4; Pritchett 1974: 30, 47; Hornblower 1997: 357; Cartwright 1997: 124; Lazenby 2004: 41; Roberts 2017: 89.

¹²⁹ See, for example, the fate of victorious *strategoï* following the Battle of Arginousai (406) – Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.1-34, 2.3.32; Kagan 2005: 462-465; Lang 1990: 24, 28; 1992: 267, 277; Roberts 1977: 107; 2017: 269, 275-276; Rusch 2011: 143; Harris 1989: 264; van Wees 2004: 234; Krentz 2007a: 176; Roisman 2017: 12, 197; Lee 2017: 24; Ferrario 2017: 69; Lazenby 2004: 234-235.

¹³⁰ Athens' desire for empire – Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.10; And. 3.15; Mossé 2014: 30; Marshall 1905: 1-2; Buck 1994: 37; Rhodes 2012: 114, 115; Steinbock 2013: 253; Schepens 2012: 230; Figueira & Jensen 2013: 486; Welwei 2010: 538.

body rather than on the previous one candidate per tribe model.¹³¹ The change was an important one because it helped ensure aspirants were elected on military ability rather than purely tribal connections.¹³² *Strategoï* were also assigned specific duties, allowing them to develop specialist skills and fields of expertise. Of the ten Athenian generals, one commanded foreign expeditions that involved the deployment of hoplites, another oversaw the defence of the *chora*, and a third administered the trierarchy – an ancient Athenian system whereby wealthy citizens furnished and maintained *triereis* as part of their civic duty.¹³³ The defence of Piraeus was deemed important enough to justify the attention of two *strategoï*, leaving the remaining five available for various other duties regarded as sufficiently crucial by the *demos*.¹³⁴

Broadening the base from which talented generals could be elected, and the opportunity for those appointed to develop military expertise, contributed to the increasingly prevalent view that *strategoï* were the single most important part of an army.¹³⁵ It also gave rise, in Athens at least, to professional commanders whose careers were spent in the service of their *polis*. Chares and Timotheus were such men but there was no better example than that of Chabrias, whose contribution to the military affairs of his native state

¹³¹ Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.16-18; Dem. 4.26; Aeschin. 3.13; [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 61.1; Ober 1985: 89; Salmond 1996: 47; Hansen 1986b: 223, 228; Hunt 2007: 128; Mitchell 2010: 376; Moore 1975: 300; Rhodes 1993: 678.

¹³² Rhodes 2002: 89 nM; Parke 1933: 73; Hansen 1986b: 224; Cook 1988: 68; Sinclair 1988: 48; Hamel 1998: 16 n35; Mossé 2014: 26-27; Nippel 2016: 18.

¹³³ *IG* ii² 204 ll. 19-21; *IG* ii² 1629; [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 61.1; Ober 1985: 89; Hamel 1998: 16, 28, 30; Hunt 2007: 128; Rhodes 1986: 7; 1993: 678; Harding 1988: 64; Cargill 1995: 141; Sinclair 1988: 48; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 524.

¹³⁴ Tod 156=*IG* ii² 123; [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 61.1; Rhodes 1980: 314; 1993: 678, 682; Cargill 1995: 139; Sinclair 1988: 48; Fine 1983: 396; Hamel 1998: 16 n34; Tod 1950: 166.

¹³⁵ Xen. *An.* 3.2.29-30; Plut. *Pel.* 2.1; Polyæn. 3.9.22; Wheeler 1993: 145; Cartledge 1987: 207; Rhodes 1986: 7, 39. Iphicrates supposed analogy that the general represented the “head” of an army’s “body” is instructive – Plut. *Pel.* 2.1; Polyæn. 3.9.22; Hunt 2007: 127-128; Mebane 2016: 196; Hanson 2005: 33; Lendon 2005: 92, 106; Rihll 2018: 265, 282; Barley 2018: 192.

spanned five decades and who – through his success – brought considerable wealth and prestige to Athens.¹³⁶

Little wonder, perhaps, that the *polis* recognised Chabrias’ contributions with numerous accolades including a decree honouring his achievements, and bestowment of a golden crown.¹³⁷ In or around 375, a monument in the Athenian *agora* was also erected in celebration of Chabrias’ services to his city-state.¹³⁸ The statue has survived in only a few fragments and so its exact form is disputed. Ancient sources – albeit not contemporary – suggest that, reminiscent of his “tearless” victory over Agesilaus, Chabrias was depicted kneeling with shield and spear.¹³⁹ Some modern historians, however, believe the *strategos* was sculpted standing in an “at ease” position with spear held vertically and shield resting against the knees. Another, somewhat controversial suggestion, is that the depiction had Chabrias in an “on-guard”, close-order stance with *doru* angled forward.¹⁴⁰ However that it may have been, the reward was a fitting one for a professional soldier who gave nearly forty years service to his *polis*.

¹³⁶ Diod. Sic. 15.34.5; Pritchett 1974: 73-75; Anderson 1970: 57; Pritchard 2012: 51; Robbins 1918: 370. Demosthenes catalogues 3,000 prisoners, 110 talents, seventy ships including at least twenty *triereis*, and the capture of seventeen cities – Dem. 20.77, 78, 80.

¹³⁷ Dem. 20.84-85, 86; 24.180; Sealey 1955: 80; 1993: 60; Woodhead 1962: 266; Burnett & Edmonson 1961: 89; Lambert 2012: 4; Shear 2007: 110-111.

¹³⁸ Aeschin. 3.243; Dem. 24.180; Aristot. *Rh.* 3.10.7; Nep. 12.1.3; Matthew 2012a: 217; Woodhead 1962: 258; Burnett & Edmonson 1961: 80, 87, 91; Sears 2013: 37-38; Stroszeck 2005: 313; Ma 2013: 5; Shear 2007: 110; Sealey 1993: 60; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 105.

¹³⁹ Diod. Sic. 15.33.4; Nep. 12.1.2-3; Polyae. 2.1.2; Burnett & Edmonson 1961: 89; Buckler 1972: 474; Anderson 1963: 413; Sears 2013: 37-38; Shear 2007: 111, 111 n81; Sealey 1993: 60.

¹⁴⁰ Matthew 2012a: 219.

IV. Evolution of Tactics

Appreciation of the tactical aspects of Greek warfare has, in some quarters, been inhibited by the impression that warfare was fair and open but corrupted over the course of the fifth century, a view held by ancient and modern commentators alike.¹⁴¹ Classical Greeks supposedly possessed distain for non-confrontational methods of fighting such as ambush, with surprise and other methods of deception frowned upon as a means of gaining advantage.¹⁴² In practice, however, *poleis* were not in the least averse to resorting to any number of tactics, some of dubious morality, in order to gain an advantage over their opponents.¹⁴³

Xenophon summed up the pragmatic (and more realistic) approach to battle by commenting that the greatest advantages in war were gained through trickery. Deception in times of conflict, he observed, was proper and just. Not only was it lawful, it was praiseworthy.¹⁴⁴ Xenophon wrote many of his treatises pertaining to warfare in the latter stages of the Classical Age but examples where deception was employed for military gain abound both before and during the period.¹⁴⁵

One such stratagem was night offensives. In c.509, during an armed incursion into Phocian territory, the forces of Thessaly received a severe mauling at the hands of their

¹⁴¹ Thuc. 3.82.3-8; Krentz 2009: 172; Gomme 1956a: 373-374; Sidnell 2006: 28; Hutchinson 2000: 26; Cartledge 1987: 207; Hanson 2009: 202; Pritchett 1974: 186; Holladay 1982: 97; Hornblower 1997: 479-480.

¹⁴² Thuc. 4.86.5-87.1, 126.5-6; Eur. *Phoen.* 710-753; Spence 1995: 170; Hanson 2000: 13; 2009: 202, 220, 229 n32; Burliga 2014: 74; Bertosa 2014: 113; Krentz 2007a: 167; 2009: 168; Lendon 2005: 42; Holladay 1982: 179.

¹⁴³ That Greeks had a tradition of employing deception and falsehood – Hom. *Il.* 4.391-398, 10.205-214, 400-429, 13.276-287, 18.513-540; *Od.* 13.290-295, 14.191-359, 19.165-202; Hdt. 1.63, 5.86, 6.37, 77-78; Plut. *Mor.* 223A-B; Plut. *Sol.* 9; Frontin. 2.9.9; Polyæn. 1.8.1, 14.1, 15.1; Just. 2.8.1-5; Krentz 2009: 172, 183-185; Hirsch 1985: 19-20; van Wees 2004: 131-132; Pritchett 1974: 180-183 Table 7.

¹⁴⁴ Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.27-29, 34, 39; *Hell.* 3.4.12; *Ages.* 1.17, 6.5-7; *Eq. mag.* 5.9-11; van Wees 2004: 133; Burliga 2014: 74-75; Krentz 2009: 169; Lendon 2005: 86; Hesk 2000: 114; Bayliss 2009: 232.

¹⁴⁵ The exact dating of Xenophon's works is problematic but many are generally agreed to fall during the first half the fourth century – Thesis: 233 n63, 234, 234 n69, 242 n99.

opponents. Initially things had gone well for the Thessalians, who had blockaded their ancient enemy in Parnassus. On the suggestion of their soothsayer Tellias, however, the Phocians covered themselves in whitewash before launching a night attack on their unsuspecting opponents. Taken by surprise and believing they were set upon by ghosts, the Thessalians broke and fled; 4,000 of their number were slaughtered by the rampaging hoplites of Phocis.¹⁴⁶

Surprise attacks were another form of deception. For example, *c.*494 the Spartan king Cleomenes in his Sepeia campaign against Argos, overwhelmed and slaughtered 6,000 resting Argive hoplites after luring them into a false sense of security with a ruse.¹⁴⁷ Ambushes were also commonly employed. In 429 the Stratians, when faced with a combined invasion force of Chaonians and various Peloponnesian *poleis*, saved their city by ambushing the enemy's vanguard. The defeat and subsequent collapse in morale forced abandonment of the offensive.¹⁴⁸

The Greeks also made free use of lies and half truths. A cold-blooded example of semantic manipulation occurred in 429 at Notium. Besieged by previously exiled forces under Paches, Hippias – the general commanding the defending garrison – was induced into a peace conference under the promise he would be returned safely to the city. This he was, but not before being placed under arrest by Paches, who, seizing the opportunity to

¹⁴⁶ Hdt. 8.27; Paus. 10.1.3-5; Montagu 2006: 26-27, 57; van Wees 2004: 131; How & Wells 2008: 662; Buck 1979: 116; Pritchett 1974: 163; Krentz 2009: 177, 184; Lateiner 1990: 233; Loucas 1989: 98-99; Christopoulos 1991: 220.

¹⁴⁷ Hdt. 6.77-78, 7.148; Plut. *Mor.* 223A-B; Montagu 2006: 58; Rusch 2011: 35; van Wees 2004: 135; Hughes 2010: 235; Pritchett 1974: 158-159; Krentz 2002: 28; Hendriks 1980: 344-345; Jackson 2000: 295, 299; Anderson 1965: 2 n13; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 62-63.

¹⁴⁸ Thuc. 2.81.2-82.1; Diod. Sic. 12.47.5; Gomme 1956a: 216; Kagan 2005: 91; Pritchett 1974: 180; Henderson 1927: 132-133; Lazenby 2004: 44; Barley 2018: 196; Montagu 2006: 45.

attack his now leaderless opponents, successfully took the town. True to his word, Paches returned Hippias unharmed to Notium, where he was promptly executed.¹⁴⁹

Another aspect that challenges the commonly held view about the one-dimensional nature of hoplite warfare involved the use of topography. In 404, for example, Thrasybulus, emboldened by the fact that his troops occupied an elevated position, vigorously joined battle with the numerically superior army of the Thirty Tyrants. Reminding his men that whilst troops could not easily discharge missile weapons when attacking uphill, they themselves were not so handicapped and thus enjoyed an enormous tactical advantage. Thrasybulus then launched the attack and routed his opponents.¹⁵⁰

Not only did *stratego*i need to be wary of – and prepared to implement – the unexpected, management of the phalanx was not as simplistic as might be first thought. Despite what some modern commentators believe, commanding an army was most certainly not as straightforward as setting two opposing phalanxes on a collision course and waiting for them to “slug it out”.¹⁵¹ In the first instance, a *strategos* needed to get his army to the field of battle. One fundamental skill a commander required, therefore, was the ability to march his phalanx in an orderly fashion (sometimes at night), over a variety of topographies, and in a number of formations – including single file. *En route* to Nemea (394), for example, the Spartan commander Aristodemus demonstrated such expertise, maintaining the integrity of his column despite encountering rugged terrain and strong

¹⁴⁹ Thuc. 3.34.2-3; Polyaen. 3.2.1; Hanson 2006: 100; Westlake 1975a: 110; Merckouris 2010: 3; Kokaz 2013: 108; Krentz 2009: 171, 187; Karavites 1979: 900; Lazenby 2004: 54.

¹⁵⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.15; Pritchett 1985: 79; Anderson 1970: 190-191; 1993: 21; Best 1969: 41-42; Roberts 2017: 291; Schwartz 2009: 168-169, 191; Buck 1998: 77-78; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 186; Roberts & Bennett 2014: 60.

¹⁵¹ Cartledge 1977: 16; Hanson 1993b: 4; Lazenby 2005: 104, 108; Moore 2013: 458; Schwartz 2009: 180-181; Connor 1988: 13; Carney 1996: 21; Hutchinson 2000: 180; How 1923: 122; Roisman 2017: 16; Samons 2006: 275; Serrati 2013a: 323.

opposition from Corinthian *psiloi*. In doing so, he seized the initiative from the Athenian coalition which was embroiled in argument over tactics and leadership.¹⁵²

Formal hoplite battles were invariably decided by the *othismos aspidon*, and so breaching an opponent's line was a major tactical objective. One way to do this was with the arraignment of troops. It has been rightly noted that deciding the depth to width ratio of his phalanx was one of a general's main decisions.¹⁵³ A *strategos* might choose to array his troops in greater depth in an effort to conceal the army's size, or to improve self-confidence and steadiness in the face of an enemy.¹⁵⁴ A deeper phalanx also increased the force behind the initial clash, adding to the effectiveness of the *othismos* that followed.¹⁵⁵ This appears to have been the Theban plan at Nemea. Waiting until it was their turn to command and thus be stationed on the right wing (so avoiding a confrontation with the Spartan contingent), the Boeotians initiated battle by advancing obliquely and, according to Xenophon, "exceedingly deep".¹⁵⁶

What Xenophon meant exactly by "exceedingly deep" in his description of the Theban phalanx remains unclear. Thebes had deployed a formation twenty-five deep at Delium (424) and Xenophon himself relates that the Athenians under Critias were more than fifty deep against Thrasybulus at Piraeus (403).¹⁵⁷ Is it to be inferred that at Nemea the

¹⁵² Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.13-15; Buckler 2013: 665; Rees 2016: 61, 63; Rusch 2011: 168; Lazenby 2012: 162, 165; Anderson 1970: 142-143; Buckler & Beck 2008: 124; Pritchett 1985: 74; Sabin 2013: 112.

¹⁵³ Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.13, 18; Hanson 1993b: 5; Lazenby 2005: 98; Matthew 2012a: 176; Davis 2013: 5; Buckler 2013: 665; van Wees 2000: 98; Rees 2016: 62-63; Rawlings 2007: 84; Konijnendijk 2014: 131.

¹⁵⁴ Frontin. 2.3.12; Arr. *Tact.* 11; Polyae. 2.10.4; Pritchett 1971: 141; Matthew 2012a: 177; Krentz 1985b: 60; 2007b: 170; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 120-121; Ray 2009: 11; 2012: 9; Konijnendijk 2014: 137.

¹⁵⁵ Diod. Sic. 17.26.4; Arr. *Tact.* 11; Matthew 2012a: 177; Hanson 1999b: 46; Kagan & Viggiano 2013b: 8; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 121; Lazenby 2005: 98-99; Ray 2012: 9; Stylianou 1998: 552; How 1923: 122; Holladay 1982: 94; Pritchett 1985: 71.

¹⁵⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.18; Anderson 1970: 144; Schwartz 2009: 169, 270; Munn 1997: 72; Buck 1994: 45; Rees 2016: 63; Lazenby 2012: 166; Buckler 2013: 665; Montagu 2006: 133.

¹⁵⁷ Delium – Thuc. 4.93.4; Gomme 1956b: 564; Kagan 2005: 168; Hanson 2006: 130; Gaebel 2002: 98; Matthew 2012a: 174, 175; Buckler 2013: 664; Schwartz 2009: 169; Rusch 2011: 100; Roberts 2017: 144; Hornblower 1996: 300. Piraeus – Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.11; Buckler 2013: 664; Matthew 2012a: 174, 179; Hutchinson 2000: 123; Anderson 1970: 176; 2001: 55-56; Underhill 2012: 69.

Boeotian phalanx was deeper still? It is impossible to say, apart from the fact that the depth of Thebes' phalanx was well beyond that of the sixteen agreed to by her allies.¹⁵⁸ Whatever the case, by deepening her own phalanx, Thebes shortened the whole coalition line, leaving it vulnerable to a broadened enemy front.

Extending the line was a stratagem sometimes employed in order to give the impression of greater numbers.¹⁵⁹ It could, however, also be enacted in an attempt to encircle the enemy. This was Aristodemus' counter to the Theban advance at Nemea. Commanding an army of 23,000 hoplites, he faced an enemy of perhaps 24,000.¹⁶⁰ Because, however, the Thebans had shortened the coalition front, it was outflanked. Aristodemus advanced his army inclining it to the right, so that by the time he engaged the opposing Athenians, the Spartan line extended well beyond the allied flank. The Lacedaemonians then wheeled left taking the Athenians from the side and behind, claiming victory and inflicting a large number of casualties.¹⁶¹

Of course, broadening the front of a phalanx could also be used as a defensive tactic. Instances of this are rare, probably because it came at the expense of thinning the centre –

¹⁵⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.18; Buckler 2013: 665; Schwartz 2009: 270; Underhill 2012: 126; Matthew 2012a: 174 Table 17; Rees 2016: 63; Rusch 2011: 168; Lazenby 2012: 165; Buckler & Beck 2008: 124. Rusch 2011: 168; Lazenby 2012: 165; Buckler 2013: 665; Montagu 2006: 133 intimate the Theban phalanx was twenty-five deep but certainty is impossible.

¹⁵⁹ Hdt. 6.11; Xen. *An.* 1.2.15; Polyæn. 4.6.19; Pritchett 1971: 141; Matthew 2012a: 178; Luginbill 1994: 51; Schwartz 2009: 168.

¹⁶⁰ Spartan army – Diod. Sic. 14.82.10, 83.1; Anderson 1970: 143-144; Schwartz 2009: 270; Underhill 2012: 125; Rusch 2011: 168; Montagu 2006: 133; Buck 1994: 45. Rees 2016: 62 estimates 20,000 men, a figure similar to that of Lazenby 2012: 163 who surmises 18,000-19,000. Athenian army – Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.17; Anderson 1970: 144; Schwartz 2009: 270; Underhill 2012: 122, 125; Rees 2016: 62; Rusch 2011: 168; Lazenby 2012: 164; Montagu 2006: 133; Buck 1994: 45.

¹⁶¹ Diodorus records 1,100 Lacedaemonians and 2,800 opponents – Diod. Sic. 14.83.1; Schwartz 2009: 271; Rees 2016: 66; Rusch 2011: 169; Lazenby 2012: 168; Anderson 1970: 147; Montagu 2006: 134; 2015: 85; Ray 2012: 24. Plutarch simply states Spartan losses were “light” and their enemy’s “heavy” – Plut. *Ages.* 16. Xenophon’s count of eight Spartan casualties and 10,000 coalition troops reads as impossibly one-sided – Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.1; *Ages.* 7.5; Ray 2012: 24; Schwartz 2009: 271; Montagu 2015: 85; Lazenby 2016: 168; Anderson 2001: 163; Dillery 1995: 117.

meaning the formation became vulnerable to the *othismos*. Nevertheless, it is clear that Greek commanders realised that sometimes the risk had to be taken. It was for this reason that in the pre-battle manoeuvres at Mantinea in 418, King Agis of Sparta attempted to extend his line. Observing that the Mantinean front stretched beyond his own left wing and fearing he would be outflanked, Agis ordered several of his contingents across from the centre to counter the imbalance. For reasons that remain obscure, the orders were not executed and the Spartan left wing was outmanoeuvred and badly mauled.¹⁶² Although in this instance the defensive manoeuvre was not carried out, that the tactic itself was recognised as an option by which to address a disparity in the widths of opposing phalanxes is obvious.¹⁶³

Broadening or deepening the formation were not the only tactical decisions that needed to be considered when deploying troops. Another was determining the width between individual files within the phalanx. In certain circumstances a manoeuvre known as the *pyknosis* could be affected. Drawing together the files of the phalanx in order to condense the formation, a *pyknosis* was employed primarily when advancing upon an enemy in order to increase the shock effect of the attacking troops and subsequent likelihood of punching through opposition ranks.¹⁶⁴ The exact nature of the *pyknosis* and consequent change in the space between files is the subject of debate. Ancient sources indicate a standard gap of 0.9 metres but these refer to much later Macedonian phalanxes

¹⁶² Thuc. 5.71.1-72.4; Montagu 2006: 63, 127-129; Schwartz 2009: 136, 259-260; van Wees 2004: 246; Hanson 2006: 156-157; Kagan 2005: 236-237; Lazenby 2004: 123; 2012: 156-157; Gomme 1956a: 386; Thorne 2001: 240; Anderson 1970: 71-72; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 109.

¹⁶³ Pritchett 1971: 142; van Wees 2004: 246; Kagan & Viggiano 2013b: 9; Lazenby 2004: 123; 2012: 160; Schwartz 2009: 136, 163; Cartwright 1997: 217; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 108.

¹⁶⁴ Thuc. 1.63.1; Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.18; Diod. Sic. 15.86.4; Plut. *Pel.* 17.2; Luginbill 1994: 60; Matthew 2009: 406, 408 Table 1; 2012a: 180 Table 18; Roisman 2017: 285; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 203 n19.

deployed in intermediate order.¹⁶⁵ Whilst some modern historians are content in applying these figures to earlier hoplite formations, others are less comfortable in doing so.¹⁶⁶ Whatever the exact nature of the *pyknosis*, it is clear that on occasions a commander drew his troops together in close formation in order to achieve a specific purpose. The Thebans, for example, employed the tactic at Coronea in 394 in an effort to break through the Spartan line, and Pelopidas used it to rout a Spartan army at Tegyra in 375.¹⁶⁷

Changing the face his phalanx presented to an enemy was another stratagem a *strategos* might employ. As performed by Agesilaus against the Thebans in 394 at Coronea, one means by which this could be achieved was the execution of a counter-march (*exeligmos*) to confront an enemy in the rear.¹⁶⁸ Another, in theory at least, was to wheel the phalanx either left or right – (*klisis*) – in order to meet an unexpected attack from the flanks.¹⁶⁹

*Stratego*i also needed to decide whether, or when, to employ the hoplite charge (*dromos*). Utilised for the first time at Marathon in 490, it involved the phalanx advancing upon the enemy at speed rather than in a measured pace.¹⁷⁰ In the Classical Period the tactic

¹⁶⁵ Asclep. 4.3; Aelian, 11; Arr. *Tact.* 12; Pritchett 1971: 151-152; Krentz 1985b: 50-51; 2013: 140; Matthew 2012a: 53, 179; Schwartz 2009: 158; Fink 2014: 48; Cawkwell 1989: 381; Goldsworthy 1997: 15.

¹⁶⁶ Accepting – Viggiano & van Wees 2013: 58; Pritchett 1971: 154; Matthew 2012a: 51, 53, 179; Lazenby 2012: 171. Uncertain – Krentz 1985b: 51; 2013: 140; Cawkwell 1989: 382-383; Goldsworthy 1997: 15-16; Schwartz 2009: 158-159; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 118. van Wees 2004: 185 states a gap of 1.8 metres between hoplites.

¹⁶⁷ Coronea – Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.16-19; Buckler & Beck 2008: 64; Rusch 2011: 174; Hutchinson 2000: 34; Anderson 2001: 164; Luginbill 1994: 60; Matthew 2012a: 180 Table 18; Lazenby 2012: 170-171; Goldsworthy 1997: 25. Tegyra – Plut. *Pel.* 17.2; Goldsworthy 1997: 25; Anderson 1970: 164; Buckler 2013: 665-666; Hilbert 2012: 114; Roisman 2017: 285.

¹⁶⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.18; Ages. 2; Plut. *Ages.* 18; Anderson 1970: 106; Buckler & Beck 2008: 64; Rusch 2011: 19, 173; Yalichev 1997: 151; Parke 1933: 47; Schwartz 2009: 248; Rees 2016: 77; Lazenby 2012: 170-171; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 117.

¹⁶⁹ Xen. *Lac.* 11.9-10; Anderson 1970: 108; Rusch 2011: 19; Krentz 2007a: 160.

¹⁷⁰ Hdt. 6.112; Luginbill 1994: 58; Lazenby 2005: 90; How & Wells 2008: 522; Sears 2013: 244, 246; Yalichev 1997: 90; Evans 1993: 285-286; Marsh 2007: 34; van Wees 2004: 180; Matthew 2012a: 200; Krentz 2002: 36.

was to become the norm for many *poleis*.¹⁷¹ The charge began between 140-200 metres from the opponent's line; a distance outside the range of the enemy missiles, but close enough to be sustained without critically fatiguing the individual.¹⁷² Thus against missile troops – especially archers and slingers – the tactic limited hoplites' exposure to hostile fire, so reducing potential casualties.¹⁷³ By advancing on the run, a phalanx also increased the physical shock when contacting the enemy, so allowing the *othismos* a greater chance of success.¹⁷⁴

Yet despite these advantages, the manoeuvre could be problematic. Charging meant that the phalanx could lose its cohesion as files closed on the enemy at different times and speeds.¹⁷⁵ Gaps that were vulnerable to exploitation could thus appear in one's own formation, the very thing an attacking general was trying to achieve in the enemy's ranks.¹⁷⁶ Because of the potential for disaster, not all armies practised the tactic. Spartans, for example, for the most part, avoided the *dromos*. Instead they generally marched on the enemy at a measured pace, kept in step by the music of *salpinges* – or possibly the *aulos* – played specifically for the purpose.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷¹ Thuc. 4.96.1, 6.98.4; Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.23, 4.3.17; Onos. 29.1; Luginbill 1994: 58; Pritchett 1985: 73; Kagan 2005: 169; Hanson 2006: 128; Waterfield 2009b: 8-9; Matthew 2012a: 200, 223; van Wees 2009: 126; Cartledge 1977: 16.

¹⁷² Diod. Sic. 14.23.1-2; Hanson 2000: 30, 144; McLeod 1965: 8; Luginbill 1994: 58; Lazenby 2005: 90; Anderson 2001: 110; van Wees 2004: 188; 2009: 126; Schwartz 2009: 263-264; Wylie 1992: 126; Donlan & Thompson 1976: 342; How 1923: 124.

¹⁷³ Diod. Sic. 14.23.1-2; Sears 2013: 44; Rahe 1980: 81; Hunt 2007: 122; How 1923: 124; Wylie 1992: 126; Fink 2014: 155; How & Wells 2008: 522.

¹⁷⁴ Luginbill 1994: 57-58; Schwartz 2009: 197; Waterfield 2009b: 9; Hanson 2000: 156; Cartledge 1977: 16; Anderson 1970: 70-71; Donlan & Thompson 1976: 343. Matthew 2012a: 225 refutes the idea.

¹⁷⁵ Thuc. 5.70.1, 6.97.3-4; Xen. *An.* 1.8.17-18, 19; Hanson 2000: 140, 142; Matthew 2009: 412 Table 3; 2012a: 200; Goldsworthy 1997: 10; Evans 1987: 105; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 129; Hornblower 2008: 185.

¹⁷⁶ See, for example, the Battle of Miletus (411) – Thuc. 8.25.2-3; Hanson 2000: 142; Kagan 1987: 61; 2005: 412-413; Spence 2016: 374; Roberts 2017: 225; Ray 2009: 241; Montagu 2015: 75; Hornblower 2002: 182.

¹⁷⁷ Thuc. 5.70.1; Plut. *Lyc.* 22; Polyæn. 1.10.1; Paus. 3.17.5; Lazenby 2005: 90; 2012: 35, 70; Matthew 2012a: 198; Schwartz 2009: 196; Knottnerus & Berry 2002: 24; Marrou 1982: 21; Hanson 1999b: 46-47; 2000: 99; Rusch 2011: 18, 113; Yalichev 1997: 108; Viggiano & van Wees 2013: 65; Kagan & Viggiano 2013b: 15; Luginbill 1994: 58; Cartledge 1997: 16; Hornblower 2008: 185.

Another tactical deployment with which *strategoï* needed to be familiar was the hoplite square (*plaision*). The formation was essentially defensive in nature and used by an army in retreat, especially if under attack by cavalry and missile fire.¹⁷⁸ Hoplites comprised the formation's sides, thus protecting their own light troops, non-combatants and the baggage-train that were all stationed in its centre.¹⁷⁹ When attacked, these auxiliaries – together with the younger, more mobile hoplites – would charge and disperse any enemy light infantry that ventured too close.¹⁸⁰ The formation could be a remarkably efficacious one. Brasidas, for example, used the tactic to extricate himself and his army from an awkward situation in 423 following an aborted attempt to quell the revolt of the Lynkestai warlord Arrhabaeus.¹⁸¹

V. Siege Warfare

Until the significant advances in fourth-century siege warfare by Dionysius of Syracuse and later Philip II of Macedon, Athenians were the reputed experts in siege-craft.¹⁸² On what basis that renown was founded is unknown but certainly there were a number of options available for besieging armies in their quest to subdue enemy fortifications. One of these was circumvallation, which entailed building a wall around the

¹⁷⁸ Thuc. 4.125.2, 6.67.1, 7.78.2; Xen. *An.* 3.2.36, 3.6; Wylie 2007: 434; Matthew 2012a: 197; Sidnell 2006: 52-53; Sekunda 2014b: 51-52; Anderson 2001: 129; Best 1969: 58; Lee 2007: 54, 89; 2013: 156; Sternberg 1999: 195; Spence 1990: 99; Lazenby 2004: 163; Krentz 2007a: 159.

¹⁷⁹ Thuc. 6.67.1, 7.78.2; Xen. *An.* 3.2.36, 3.6; Wylie 2007: 434; Gomme & Andrewes 1970: 343, 457; Lazenby 2004: 163; Krentz 2007a: 159; Lee 2007: 54, 89, 155; 2013: 156; Brice 2013: 629-630; Sternberg 1999: 195.

¹⁸⁰ Thuc. 4.125.2-3; Xen. *An.* 3.4.3-5; Wylie 2007: 434; Gomme 1956b: 614; Best 1969: 59; Whitby 2004: 230; Lee 2007: 158; 2013: 157; Spence 1990: 99; Hornblower 1996: 395.

¹⁸¹ Thuc. 4.125.1-128.3; Rusch 2011: 101; Sekunda 2014b: 51-52; Best 1969: 29-30; Whitby 2004: 230; Krentz 2007a: 159; King 2018: 39-40; Lazenby 2004: 97-98; Hornblower 1996: 395-396, 400-401.

¹⁸² Hdt. 9.70; Thuc. 1.102.1-2; Rawlings 2009a: 241; Nossov 2012: 31; Gomme 1959: 301; Rusch 2011: 72; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 445; Pritchard 2010: 20; Lazenby 2004: 42; Rihll 2018: 271; Hornblower 1997: 159.

target *polis* with the intention of cutting the inhabitants off from reinforcements and supplies, thereby starving them into submission.¹⁸³

Because, however, circumvallation was time-consuming and expensive, prosecuting forces sometimes turned to other means. One such stratagem involved tunnelling which could, for example, be employed with the intention of collapsing a section of a city's outer *enceinte*, either by undermining large sections of the wall itself or removal of its foundations.¹⁸⁴ This technique was employed successfully in 409 by the Carthaginians at Himera and also in 318, when at Megalopolis the Macedonians collapsed three towers and a large section of wall to force their way into the city.¹⁸⁵

Siege mounds (*choma*) were another method employed in an effort to breach the defences of a *polis*. The objective was to create a ramp that provided a means for going over, rather than under, the *enceinte*. Archidamus' attempt at Plataea (429) was the first recorded instance of a Greek army constructing a *choma*, although the ease with which the Plataeans overcame the threat suggests it may not have been a tactic with which *poleis* were unfamiliar.¹⁸⁶

Attackers also had a number of siege weapons at their disposal including a primitive form of flame-thrower that could be used against combustible defences such as wooden walls. The Boeotians employed such a device in 424 to recapture Delium from the Athenians and Brasidas used a similar weapon in his successful assault on Lecythus that

¹⁸³ Warry 1995: 48; Kagan 2005: 284; English 2009b: 1; van Wees 2004: 142; Roberts 2017: 202; Brice 2013: 631; Lazenby 2004: 34; Ober 2005: 187; Pope 2016: 261; Melville & Melville 2008: 157-158.

¹⁸⁴ Aen. Tact. 37.1, 8; Bettalli 2018: 178; Ducrey 1986: 168; Adcock 1957: 59.

¹⁸⁵ Himera – Diod. Sic. 13.59.8; Youngblood 2006: 2; Montagu 2015: 78; Evans 2013: 94; Murray 2012: 81. Megalopolis – Diod. Sic. 18.70.5; Kistler 2007: 54; 2011: 66; Tarn 1930: 109; Abbott 1877: 50-51; Adams 1993: 209; Gaebel 2002: 212.

¹⁸⁶ Thuc. 2.75.1-6; Winter 1971a: 307; Nossov 2012: 32; Kern 1999: 104-105; Warry 1995: 48-49; Seaman 2013: 648; Chaniotis 2013: 444; Foster 2009: 370; Gomme 1956a: 206; Hanson 2006: 169; van Wees 2004: 142; Lazenby 2004: 42; Melville & Melville 2008: 157-158.

same year.¹⁸⁷ Battering rams, which were usually fitted with a protective shed, were another option. Despite a tradition – probably anachronistic – that has the *krios* first deployed in Greek warfare by Miltiades in the assault on Paros in 489, credit for the dubious honour should probably lie with Artemon, who designed a ram for Pericles in his successful siege of Samos (440/439).¹⁸⁸

Another engine, and one whose origins lay in the East, was the *helepolis*, the rudimentary design of which is credited by some to the ninth-century Assyrians.¹⁸⁹ The machine was a multi-storeyed siege tower that was mounted on a (probably) six-wheeled undercarriage and contained an internal staircase and gangplank which allowed assault troops to attack over the *enceinte* of *poleis*.¹⁹⁰ These formidable machines with a then height of between ten and fourteen metres, were introduced to the Greek world in 409 by the Carthaginians at the siege of Selinus.¹⁹¹ Their potential was immediately obvious to some and only eleven years later in 398, Dionysius I used *helepoleis* of his own against the Carthaginian stronghold of Motya, albeit by that time the Syracusan had developed engines that were fifteen to eighteen metres high.¹⁹²

Invention of artillery was another landmark development in the history of fourth-century siege warfare. The first such device was the *gastraphetes*, the early prototypes of

¹⁸⁷ Delium – Thuc. 4.100.1-4; Kern 1999: 112; Nossov 2012: 189; Warry 1995: 62; Kagan 2005: 169; English 2009b: 94-95; van Wees 2004: 142; Krentz 2007a: 179; Roberts 2017: 146; Lazenby 2004: 91; Lee 2010b: 497-498. Lecythus – Thuc. 4.115.2; Kern 1999: 112-113; English 2012: 49; Hornblower 1996: 354.

¹⁸⁸ Paros – Nep. 1.7.3; Lawrence 1979: 42. Samos – Diod. Sic. 12.28.2-3; Plut. *Per.* 27; Plin. *HN* 7.56.201; Rawlings 2009a: 241; Lawrence 1979: 42, 419; Whitehead & Blyth 2004: 81; Harding 2006a: 234; Roisman 2017: 116.

¹⁸⁹ Assyrians – Winter 1971a: 110 n20; Nossov 2012: 103; Lawrence 1979: 37; Youngblood 2006: 1; Melville & Melville 2008: 146, 155; Tracy 2000: 9; Gabriel & Metz 1991: 37.

¹⁹⁰ Diod. Sic. 14.51.6-7; Apollodorus *Mechanicus*, 164, 166; Campbell 2003b: 6; Nossov 2012: 104; English 2009b: 12; van Wees 2004: 142; Winter 1994: 34; 2006: 184; Roisman 2017: 250.

¹⁹¹ Diod. Sic. 13.54.7; Caven 1990: 33; Winter 1971a: 311, 316; 2006: 184; Campbell 2005: 24; Lawrence 1979: 37; Roisman 2017: 250; Murray 2012: 81; Ober 2005: 195 n25; Kern 1999: 164.

¹⁹² Diod. Sic. 14.51.1; Winter 1971a: 326 n93; Winter 2006: 184; Nossov 2012: 103; Lawrence 1979: 37-38, 42-43; English 2009b: 11-12; Roisman 2017: 250; Marsden 1969: 51.

which were essentially hand-held crossbows that fired iron-tipped wooden bolts forty to sixty centimetres long.¹⁹³ Usually thought to have been invented *c.*399 by the engineers of Dionysius of Syracuse, they were first deployed at the siege of Motya in 398/7.¹⁹⁴ With a bow made from sinew, wood and horn, early *gastrophetai* were much more accurate than orthodox *toxon* and had an effective range of 200-300 metres, a twenty-five percent increase over conventional bows.¹⁹⁵

Despite its lukewarm reception in some quarters, the development of artillery continued.¹⁹⁶ One such advance was the *oxybeles* which appeared *c.*375, apparently invented by Zopyrus of Tarentum.¹⁹⁷ *Oxybelai* incorporated a hand-operated winch to facilitate cocking, and a permanent base upon which it was mounted.¹⁹⁸ The innovations allowed for larger and more powerful *toxai* and although requiring consequently heavier stocks for support, provided improved range.¹⁹⁹ Like *gastrophetai*, early *oxybelai* fired bolts but were later modified to shoot small stone balls.²⁰⁰ It is likely that stone-throwing

¹⁹³ Diod. Sic. 14.50.4; Heron, 75; Marsden 1969: 5; Fields 2006: 52; Nossov 2012: 134; Lawrence 1979: 43, 45; Campbell 2011: 680; English 2009b: 2; Kinard 2007: 2-3; Tucker 2015: 25.

¹⁹⁴ Dionysius – Diod. Sic. 14.42.1, 50.4; Lewis 1999: 159; Marsden 1969: 43, 49, 54; Ober 1987: 569; Campbell 2011: 679-680; Nossov 2012: 133; Hacker 1968: 42-43; English 2009b: 1-2; 2012: 154; van Wees 2004: 142; Roisman 2017: 243. Crete – Plin. *HN* 7.56.201. Assyria thence Crete – Alexander 1946: 210-211; Antikas *et al.* 2004: 75.

¹⁹⁵ Marsden 1969: 12; Ober 1985: 570; 2005: 191; Nossov 2012: 134; Antikas *et al.* 2004: 75; Kinard 2007: 3; Kern 1999: 178; Tucker 2010: 463; 2015: 25; Maher 2017: 56.

¹⁹⁶ See, for example, the reaction of Archidamus (368/7) – Plut. *Mor.* 191D; Marsden 1969: 65; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 445; Cartledge 1987: 46, 325; van Wees 2004: 116; Roisman 2017: 243-244; Ober 2005: 191-192; Keyser 1994: 32; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 59; Campbell 2003a: 7.

¹⁹⁷ Biton, W62, W65; Nossov 2012: 135; Hacker 1968: 37; Lewis 1999: 160; Tucker 2010: 463; 2015: 25; Lee 2010b: 498. Campbell 2003a: 6 dates Zopyrus to *c.*400.

¹⁹⁸ Nossov 2012: 34; Marsden 1969: 13-14, 43; Lawrence 1979: 43; Antikas *et al.* 2004: 75; Hacker 1968: 37; Kinard 2007: 3-4.

¹⁹⁹ Marsden 1969: 14-15; Kinard 2007: 4; Tucker 2010: 463.

²⁰⁰ Biton, W45, W49; Marsden 1969: 15, 61; Nossov 2012: 34, 135; Lawrence 1979: 44; Winter 1994: 34; Hacker 1968: 41; Tucker 2010: 463; 2015: 25.

machines such as these were deployed in 354 by Onomarchus to rout the forces of Philip II.²⁰¹

Because of the bellicose mindset of city-states, the *poleis* of ancient Greece were, for the most part, ringed by fortifications of considerable significance. Indeed among the major states it was only Sparta, in an expression of confidence and enduring military reputation, that refused fortification until the second century.²⁰² With most cities well-protected, prosecuting a siege represented a prohibitively expensive task for most *poleis*. Athens' siege of Potidaea (432), for example, took over two years and cost 2,000 talents – one third of the city's total reserve.²⁰³

There was also the human cost to consider. Numbers of citizen soldiers were small by modern standards and consequently precious. Indeed one modern commentator has calculated that most city-states had less than 800 eligible citizens upon which to draw.²⁰⁴ Siege operations were therefore simply too costly in manpower terms for the majority of *poleis* to even contemplate.²⁰⁵ Little wonder, then, that many rejected sieges in favour of a far safer and more cost effective method: engineering betrayal from within through the

²⁰¹ Polyæn. 2.38.3; Marsden 1969: 14; Nossov 2012: 135; English 2009b: 3; Matthew 2015: 20; King 2018: 78; Keyser 1994: 33; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 59; Buckler 1989: 47, 68; Hornblower 2002: 203.

²⁰² Plut. *Lyc.* 19; Cartledge 1987: 234, 335; 2003b: 57; Lawrence 1979: 116, 121; Frederiksen 2011: 25; Hanson 1999b: 82; Wycherley 1976: 39, 40; Rusch 2011: 212; Hutchinson 2000: 244.

²⁰³ Cost of the siege – Thuc. 2.70.2; Gomme 1956a: 43; Kagan 2005: 85; Hanson 2006: 97, 178; Amemiya 2007: 102; Pritchard 2012: 43; Gabrielsen 2007: 265; 2013: 334; English 2012: 46; van Wees 2004: 236; Roberts 2017: 88. Diod. Sic. 12.46.4 (technically correctly) states more than 1,000 talents. Athens' reserves in 431 a nominal 6,000 talents – Thuc. 2.13.3; Diod. Sic. 12.40.2; Gabrielsen 1994: 116; 2013: 335; Gomme 1956a: 28, 44; Kagan 2005: 61; Amemiya 2007: 92; Pritchard 2015a: 6; Arvanitidis & Kyriazis 2013: 226, 236; Lazenby 2004: 14.

²⁰⁴ Eight hundred citizens – Fields 2006: 46. van Wees 2004: 7 enumerates up to 1,000 citizens whereas Roberts 2017: 5 nominates a “few hundred”. Hansen 2006b: 76 records twenty percent of *poleis* had fewer than 1,000 citizens. Wiemer 2013: 55 reaches a similar conclusion for Hellenistic Age *poleis*.

²⁰⁵ Ridley 1979: 512; Ober 2005: 187; Ashley 1998: 73; van Wees 2004: 139; Sage 1996: 107.

manipulation of disaffected groups, a stratagem recognised by citizenry, *strategoï* and military theorists alike.²⁰⁶

Some *poleis*, however, remained committed to the prosecution of sieges and the fourth-century tendency towards combined arms forces, together with the growing expertise of both men and their commanders, meant that operations became not only ever-more professional but also conducted with specialist troops such as increasingly mobile hoplites, *psiloi*, and mercenaries, the ready supply of which allowed armies of much greater size to be fielded. As a consequence, sustained attacks in strength could be conducted on multiple points of a city-state's fortifications, so exerting great pressure on defensive resources – thus enhancing the chances of success.²⁰⁷ Mercenary troops could also be mobilised in high-risk operations where casualties would be beyond that sustainable, or acceptable, to citizen armies.²⁰⁸

Missile troops, invariably mercenary, also played a role in the changing nature of siege warfare as their increased presence in armies of investment provided cover for attacking forces. Prior to defenders being subjected to a barrage of arrows and shot, even poorly defended defensive structures were regarded as near impervious to assault by infantry.²⁰⁹ By pinning down defenders, attacking *strategoï* were able to utilise ever-more mobile and agile hoplites to launch full scale assaults with some expectation of success.²¹⁰

²⁰⁶ Aen. Tact. 1.3-7, 2.7-8, 11.1-15, 12.1-5, 14.1-2; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.7, 4.4.7, 5.3, 5.2.9, 27-31, 7.2.5-6; Phil. 4.72; Nossov 2009: 37; Ober 1985: 44; Fields, 2006: 52; Chanotis 2013: 441; Kern 1999: 120; Kagan 2005: 284; Wheeler 2007a: lvi; English 2009b: 1; Sears 2013: 108; Seaman 2013: 647; Rees 2016: 130-131; Lee 2010b: 498; Sage 1996: xxviii.

²⁰⁷ Diod. Sic. 13.59.7; Winter 1971a: 112; van Wees 2004: 139; Kern 1999: 166; Sinclair 1966: 252-253; Wintjes 2012: 35; Caven 1990: 33.

²⁰⁸ Ridley 1979: 512; Seaman 2013: 642; Fields 2006: 50; Hacker 1968: 42; Krentz 2007a: 178; van Wees 2004: 139; Caven 1990: 34; Ober 2005: 187; Sage 1996: 107.

²⁰⁹ See, for example, Athens' Long Walls – Thuc. 1.93.6, 2.13.7; Winter 1971a: 157, 238; Brunt 1965: 264; Fields 2006: 19; Berkley 2010: 64; Gomme 1956a: 39-40; Roberts 2017: 38-39; Kagan 2005: 9.

²¹⁰ Use of *toxotai* in the prosecution of sieges – Xen. *An.* 5.2.12; Kern 1999: 164; Lee 2010b: 489; Pearson 1984: 5-6; Caven 1990: 33; Winter 1971a: 311; Marsden 1969: 51; Anderson 1970: 138; Rees 2016: 176-

Such practice is evidenced on The Nereid Monument c.390-380. Designed as a tomb for Erbinna of Xanthos, the “lesser podium frieze” depicts the prosecution of a siege. Of note are the archers providing covering fire for hoplites climbing a scaling ladder propped against the city’s walls. Although equipped with *aspis* and helmet, the hoplites otherwise lack body armour, allowing for greater agility and speed of ascent.

It was this (albeit slight) shift in favour towards the prosecuting army that forced engineers to rethink how best to defend their *poleis*. Changes began with the *enceinte* itself. Early defensive walls were probably little more than stockades, no doubt constructed from wood, which was cheap and easily fashioned.²¹¹ These inherent advantages meant that some city-states, including Delium, continued to use timber walls well into the fifth century.²¹² There is even some evidence to suggest that timber constructions survived into the fourth century, if Aeneas Tacticus’ advice on how to protect them from incendiary devices is accorded any credit.²¹³

Wooden walls, however, did have a number of disadvantages including susceptibility to fire and the need for regular maintenance. They also proved inadequate against the growing number and diversity of engines and machines. These shortcomings led to the widespread adoption of alternative construction materials such as mudbrick and stone. Mudbrick structures offered a number of advantages to a *polis*. Not only were the

177; Prevas 2002: 154; Ober 2005: 181. Use of *sphendonetes* – Thuc. 4.100.1; Lee 2010b: 490; Rees 2016: 176-177; Pritchett 1991: 57-58.

²¹¹ Hom. *Il.* 7.449, 12.27-20, 258, 263-264; Winter 1971a: 74; Lawrence 1979: 160, 208, 275; Frederiksen 2011: 22, 78-80, 100. Athens’ “wall” at this time appears to have been a thorn hedgerow – Hdt. 7.142; Robertson 1987: 10; Bowden 2005: 101.

²¹² See, for example, Delium (424) – Thuc. 4.90.2; Lawrence 1979: 161; Gomme 1956b: 559; Rees 2016: 25; Kagan 2005: 169; Roberts 2017: 146; Lee 2010b: 497-498; Matthew 2011: 27; Mayor 2009: 219; Nossow 2012: 190; McAllister *et al.* 2005: 18 n24.

²¹³ Aen. Tact. 33.3; Kern 1999: 182; Dinu 2017: 290; Fox 2018: 40; Rance 2018: 319 n85; Krentz 2007a: 179; Frederiksen *et al.* 2016: 181.

bricks themselves quick to make, doing so required no great skill, meaning that they were very cost-effective.²¹⁴ Furthermore, if properly cured and maintained regularly – typically by the use of render – mudbrick structures were fire and weatherproof; they could also, to some degree, withstand earthquakes, a regular occurrence in Greece.²¹⁵ Another advantage provided by the elasticity of the material was its relative ability to absorb the impact of shock thus making it better than stone at withstanding assault by siege engines.²¹⁶

Agesipolis' siege of Mantinea (385), however, exposed mudbricks' susceptibility to compromise by water and so the fourth century saw stone become the predominant material for new constructions, to the point where – post 400 – the majority of newly commissioned *enceintes* were of masonry design.²¹⁷ Although expensive, the attraction was no doubt the material's durability. Limestone was a common choice because the stone used was quarried locally, but its quality varied from site to site.²¹⁸

As the design of walls evolved, so too did their battlements. Simple screens can be dated to the late Bronze Age but by the first half of the sixth century, a crenellated parapet with square merlons had become widespread.²¹⁹ Introduction of artillery into Greek warfare at the beginning of the fourth century necessitated innovations to battlement architecture to better protect defenders. Thus the crenellated design was superseded by a roofed mudbrick

²¹⁴ Fields 2006: 10; Lawrence 1979: 212; 1996: 175; Maher 2017: 34; Pope 2016: 255.

²¹⁵ Fields 2006: 10; Lawrence 1979: 211; Maher 2017: 35; Pope 2016: 255. Use of render – *IG ii² 1664 ll. 13-14*; Gourley 2018: 254; Pope 2016: 255; Weir 1995: 252, 254 n23; Kern 1999: 91.

²¹⁶ Paus. 8.8.8; Apollodorus *Mechanicus*, 157-158; Lawrence 1979: 152, 213; Gomme 1959: 16 n4; Wycherley 1976: 44; Nossov 2012: 96-97; Maher 2017: 35; Underhill 2012: 180; Pope 2016: 257; Frazer 1898: 205; Kern 1999: 91; Spence 2002: 157.

²¹⁷ Agesipolis – Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.4-5; Phil. 4.8; Diod. Sic. 15.12.1-2; Paus. 8.8.7-8; Fields 2006: 57, 60; Lawrence 1979: 337; Maher 2015: 16; Rusch 2011: 183; Cartledge 1987: 226; van Wees 2004: 139; Roberts 2017: 340; Dillery 1995: 208; Frazer 1898: 205. Popularity of stone – Winter 1971a: 69; Lawrence 1979: 213, 421; 1996: 175; Müth 2014: 111; van Wees 2004: 139; Frederiksen 2011: 41; Weir 1995: 252; Pope 2016: 262; Ober 2015: 43.

²¹⁸ Winter 1971a: 77-78; Fields 2006: 10; Lawrence 1979: 213; 1996: 175; Lee 2010b: 496; Ober 2005: 173.

²¹⁹ Winter 1971a: 138; 1979: 494; Lawrence 1979: 356-357; Frederiksen 2011: 40, 80, 102; Wycherley 1976: 41; Pope 2016: 254, 261; Suha 2009: 119; Maher 2017: 77; D'Amato 2016: 788.

or stone screen wall around two metres high that incorporated firing apertures protected by shutters.²²⁰

Emergence of effective siege machinery, such as the ram and tension artillery, resulted in the growing importance of towers as defensive structures and a consequent increase of their incorporation into curtain walls.²²¹ Not only did they strengthen the *enceinte*, towers also allowed a greater concentration of flanking fire on troops and engines attacking the wall, as well as staging posts for forward-fire.²²² It also meant that in the event of a breach, towers remained a secure platform from which to inflict casualties upon the enemy. This in turn necessitated that the towers themselves were taken, further complicating the task of (and potential casualties to) assaulting forces.²²³

The growing significance of towers in the defence of the *polis* led to modifications in design, including experimentation with shape. Towers were usually rectangular because they were relatively cheap and easy to build. Messene, for example, certainly had squared towers but there were also semi-circular structures which provided defenders with better vision and a wider field of fire. The curved design was not only inherently stronger than a rectangular one but also more resistant to artillery missiles, which were more likely to glance off a rounded surface.²²⁴

Towers also became higher. Messene's ruins indicate an upper-level firing platform around ten metres high, so providing artillery with a superior angle of projection and

²²⁰ Winter 1971a: 140; Lawrence 1979: 356, 368-370; Ober 2015: 43; Nossov 2009: 20; D'Amato 2016: 788. Nossov 2009: 20 indicates that crenellations were still in use during the fourth century.

²²¹ Aristot. *Pol.* 1330b32; Winter 1971a: 155; 1994: 29, 33; Berkley 2010: 74-75; Frederiksen 2011: 99; van Wees 2004: 139; Ober 2015: 43; Lawrence 1996: 176; Bakhuizen 1992: 141.

²²² Winter 1971a: 155; 1971b: 416; Lawrence 1979: 35-36; Fields 2006: 16; Frederiksen 2011: 56; Wycherley 1976: 42; Sage 1996: 108; Frazer 1898: 203.

²²³ Vittr. 1.5.4; Gourley 2018: 255; Winter 1971a: 156; 1994: 33; Ober 2005: 181; Bakhuizen 1992: 141.

²²⁴ Phil. 1.2-4; Fields 2006: 37; Marsden 1969: 139-140, 143-144; Lawrence 1979: 78-379, 382, 386; 1996: 176; Nossov 2009: 21.

consequently greater range to that achievable from less elevated structures.²²⁵ Remains confirm that rather than loopholes, many towers were fitted with window-sized apertures that could be shuttered. The wider openings allowed for a greater field of fire and effective deployment of up to four *gastraphetai*.²²⁶

Messene's towers are an indication that defensive architecture responded – and responded rapidly – to advances in siege warfare. Another example can be seen in the development of city gates. Early gates of wood were barred and could be locked with some form of bolt and key arrangement.²²⁷ Sometimes as an additional security measure, the bars were plated with iron to prevent them from being destroyed easily or sawn through.²²⁸ The changing nature of warfare in the fourth century meant that improvements needed to be made, including the introduction of a portcullis that could be employed rapidly as a first line of defence whilst the gate itself was closed and secured.²²⁹

Gatecourts were another defensive structure that appeared over the course of the fourth century. In the event the main gate was breached, a gatecourt provided additional protection to the *polis* by trapping enemy troops within an enclosed courtyard where they could be conveniently dispatched by missiles fired from towers sited on each of its corners.²³⁰ Postern gates also became more important. As engines became ever-more a factor in the prosecution of sieges, defence of the *polis* sometimes required an aggressive

²²⁵ Marsden 1969: 130-131; Fields 2006: 36; Gourley 2018: 254. Winter 1990: 10-11 calculates that a missile fired from a height of fifty feet (15.2 metres) will travel seven times further than one fired at five feet (1.5 metres). Admittedly Winter was discussing arrows fired by archers but the principle of calculation is sound.

²²⁶ Marsden 1969: 130-131, 134, 139; Ober 1987: 573; Fields 2006: 36-37, 39; Müth 2014: 116; Winter 1971a: 165-167; Lawrence 1979: 399.

²²⁷ Aen. Tact. 18.1-22, 19.1, 20.1-5; Winter 1971a: 206 n4, 259; Lawrence 1979: 261; van Wees 2004: 138; Pretzler 2018a: 82-83; Rihl 2018: 269; Bettalli 2018: 169; Handford 1926: 181.

²²⁸ Aen. Tact. 20.2; Winter 1971a: 261; Stronk 1995: 153.

²²⁹ Aen. Tact. 39.3; Winter 1971a: 264; Lawrence 1979: 262; Nossov 2009: 25; Toy 1985: 17; Wheeler 1998: 901; McNicoll & Milner 1997: 8, 8 n60.

²³⁰ Winter 1971a: 214, 217; Wycherley 1976: 42-43; Ober 2005: 185; Pope 2016: 267; Nossov 2009: 27; Frazer 1898: 203-204; Gourley 2018: 250; Maher 2017: 86.

approach. Posterns were a key element of this more bellicose mindset as they permitted defenders not only to make surprise sorties against attacking troops, but also destroy or capture machines.²³¹

Construction of defensive outworks, particularly the *fosse*, was another response to the deployment of enemy engines. By the fourth century, moats were a regular feature and their design increasingly substantial as they came to be recognised as an effective barrier to siege engines.²³² Fourth-century Athens, for example, constructed a ditch at least eight metres wide and four metres deep to protect the lower lying sections of her circuit. It is likely a parapet was built along the *fosse*'s inner edge behind which was mounted artillery, further adding to its defensive capabilities.²³³

VI. Development of Strategy

Modifications in the design of curtain walls, towers, gates and outworks represented a tangible response by *poleis* to growing sophistication in the prosecution of sieges. Yet an equally important intangible that manifested itself in the treatise of Aeneas Tacticus also occurred during fourth century – the development of strategy and a more aggressive attitude towards the defence of the city-state.²³⁴ Tacticus detailed a number of measures that demonstrated a growing willingness to take the fight to the enemy. There was, for example, the recommendation that advanced positions of strategic importance be occupied in order

²³¹ Aen. Tact. 23.1-5; Arr. *Anab.* 1.20.4, 9; Winter 1971a: 235, 239-240; 1994: 33; Kern 1999: 122; Lawrence 1979: 303, 336-337; Maher 2015: 36; Hanson 2006: 193; Wycherley 1976: 42; Konecny 2014: 16; Pope 2016: 261; D'Amato 2016: 788; Nossov 2009: 25, 27.

²³² Xen. *Hell.* 4.7.6; Aen. Tact. 37.1; Warry 1995: 64; Winter 1971a: 271-272, 285; Lawrence 1996: 175; Ober 2015: 43; Frederiksen *et al.* 2016: 181 n41; Ashley 1998: 78.

²³³ Aeschin, 3.236; Winter 1971a: 276; Lawrence 1979: 277, 282-283; 1996: 175; Fields 2006: 24; Munn 2010: 207; Frederiksen *et al.* 2016: 181 n40; McNicoll & Milner 1997: 211.

²³⁴ Kern 1999: 122; Nossov 2012: 37; Krentz 2007a: 170; Barley 2015: 45, 51.

that a forward defence of the *polis* could be mounted.²³⁵ Tacticus also advocated a “scorched-earth” policy in the face of an invasion including the destruction of foodstuffs, contamination of water supplies, and the spoliation of the countryside in order to slow an enemy’s advance.²³⁶ Furthermore, there were suggestions on how to harry an enemy in the field. These included the deployment of a city-state’s cavalry and *psiloi* troops in ambush operations, or as an attack force against dispersed troops engaged in plundering.²³⁷ Aeneas Tacticus also gave detailed instructions on how to conduct successful sallies against enemy encampments positioned outside the walls of a *polis*.²³⁸

Another development was the utilisation of economic warfare as a means to pressure a city-state into surrender. Although *epiteichismoi* continued to be used by some *poleis* in the first few decades of the fourth century, it was soon replaced by the systematic, sustained ravaging of the territory of a defending *polis*.²³⁹ The potential of this strategy was posited by Xenophon in the 370s but by that time was a reflection of existing practice.²⁴⁰ Destruction of a city-state’s holdings was, of course, a long established stratagem but had been a short-term tactic intended to provoke a set-piece battle. It was not until the fourth

²³⁵ Aen. Tact. 16.16-19; Barley 2018: 182, 188, 193.

²³⁶ Aen. Tact. 8.1-5; Kern 1999: 121; Nosssov 2012: 243; Pretzler 2018b: 158; Barley 2018: 188; Hanson 1998: 117.

²³⁷ Aen. Tact. 16.4-7, 12-13; Kern 1999: 121; Nosssov 2012: 37; Barley 2015: 46-47, 52; 2018: 185, 198; Bettalli 2018: 167; Rawlings 2007: 147.

²³⁸ Aen. Tact. 23.1-5; Kern 1999: 121; Pretzler 2018b: 158.

²³⁹ Elea – Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.29-30; Diod. Sic. 14.17.11-12; Paus. 3.8.3-5; Ober 1985: 38; Venning 2015: 88; Underhill 2012: 89; Roberts & Bennett 2014: 74; Westlake 1983: 19; Parke 1932: 44. Metropolis – Diod. Sic. 15.30.5; Ober 1985: 38; Westlake 1983: 21; Duszynski 2016: 67; Buckler 2003: 244. Corcyra – Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.7-8; Ober 1985: 38; Rusch 2011: 192-193; Westlake 1983: 21. Phliasiensians – Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.1; Ober 1985: 38-39; Westlake 1983: 21-22; Sealey 1976: 407.

²⁴⁰ Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.13; Hanson 1998: 12. See Agesilaus’ 389/8 campaign against Acarnania as an example – Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.1-13, 7.1; Plut. *Ages.* 22; Ober 1985: 39-40; van Wees 2004: 122; Rusch 2011: 180; Cartledge 1987: 225-226; Underhill 2012: 148, 150; Tuplin 1993: 74; Ferrario 2014: 248; Pascual 2009: 88; Buck 1994: 57; Hutchinson 2000: 159.

century, and the widespread inclusion of *psiloi* into the armies of *poleis*, that ravaging became a viable strategy.²⁴¹

Adoption of a systematic strategy of economic destruction by a growing number of city-states meant that it became increasingly desirable to protect the *chora*, resulting in a changed attitude towards border security. Following the Peloponnesian War, a number of *poleis* – Athens foremost amongst them – adopted integrated strategies that combined the more traditional, aggressive approach to warfare with defensive measures, the purpose of which was to secure the integrity of the *chora* against foreign invasion.²⁴² In Athens' case, the reasons for this new strategic approach were both typical of many *poleis*, yet also unique to the Attic capital. Athens, however, had particular reason to embrace a defensive strategy. There appears to have been a very real fear of invasion as a result of the failure of Periclean strategy in the Peloponnesian War. The *polis*-orientated “island” policy had regarded the land as indefensible and so it was abandoned in favour of a defence of the city.²⁴³ As a result, the *chora* had been devastated, leaving an indelible impression upon the minds of the *demos*.²⁴⁴ For Athens, too, loss of thalassocracy meant an increased importance was placed on the resources of its *chora*.²⁴⁵

²⁴¹ Aen. Tact. 16.4; Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.2-3; 5.4.42; Isoc. *Dis.* 4.144; Plut. *Ages.* 31; Hanson 1998: 21, 24-25; 2006: 91; Barley 2018: 187-188; Parke 1933: 44-45; Westlake 1986: 420; Best 1969: 80; Dillery 1995: 107; Whitehead 1991: 113 n49; Anderson 1970: 303 n33.

²⁴² Ober 1989: 294; 2005: 189; 2015: 43; Fields 2006: 25; Hanson 1998: 81; Munn 1993: 109, 187; Caraher 2010: 410; Serrati 2013a: 326.

²⁴³ Thuc. 1.143.5; Ober 1985: 52; Spence 1990: 91; Kagan 2005: 51-52; 2010: 52-53; Hanson 2006: 44; Gomme 1959: 461; Burke 1992: 221-222; Mitchell 1991: 171; Pritchard 2010: 21; Lazenby 2004: 32; Henderson 1927: 42.

²⁴⁴ Aristoph. *Eccl.* 591-593; Lys. 34.8-10; Isoc. *Dis.* 8.86; Ober 1985: 51-52; Berkey 2010: 73; Kagan 2005: 487-488; Strauss 1986: 43-44, 45; 2007: 242; Martin 2013: 206-207, 211; Metaxas 1955: 67; Bryant 1996: 236.

²⁴⁵ Xen. *Vect.* 1.1-8; Ober 1985: 17, 19; Strauss 1986: 44. For Athens' post Peloponnesian War financial woes and remedial steps see Thesis: 300-303.

It was for these reasons that from the 370s Athens actively pursued a strategy of frontier defence, the emphasis of which was on excluding the enemy altogether rather than defeating an invasion force already in control of the *chora*.²⁴⁶ In order to implement the new policy successfully, the Athenians initiated a number of internal reforms. One of the first steps was to create an office whose specific responsibility was overseeing the defence of the Attic countryside. The position was known as “General of the Chora” and the appointment was made from one of the ten annually elected *strategoï*.²⁴⁷ In c.378 the *ecclesia* also approved a number of fiscal reforms, including the introduction of a property tax and creation of the Theoric Fund in order to finance infrastructure necessary to maintain an effective frontier defence.²⁴⁸

Athens further sought to protect the integrity of its own *chora* by taking steps to guard mountain passes that provided access into Attica. The potential for a forward defence of this nature was recognised by Xenophon in the first third of the fourth century as part of an overall strategy for the protection of the *polis* and it is tempting to speculate if his treatises were not in some way influential.²⁴⁹ *Peltastai* and other light troops were ideal for this new strategy but suitable measures needed to be put in place to ensure they operated at maximum effectiveness. These included a high level of training in the use of missile

²⁴⁶ Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.25-28; Hanson 1996: 300; 1998: 95; McCredie 1966: 88; Anderson 1970: 132; van Wees 2004: 128; Ober 1985: 74-75, 77; Strauss 2007: 242; Garland 2001: 42.

²⁴⁷ *IG ii²* 204 ll. 19-20; Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.10-11; [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 61.1; Ober 1985: 89; 1989: 295; Mitchel 1961: 348; Munn 1993: 4, 193; Rhodes 1993: 679; Bosworth 1988a: 293; Cargill 1995: 45; Chandler 1926: 8.

²⁴⁸ Ober 1985: 99; 1989: 295. That an *eisphora* was imposed in 378 is certain although by 354 it had not been collected fully. Introduction of a Theoric fund in 354 is debated. Following the Social War, Eubulus controlled such a reserve but whether that was a new or existing *Theorica* is unclear. The fund of Eubulus' tenure undoubtedly had provision for discretionary financing of military infrastructure although border fortifications are not specifically mentioned.

²⁴⁹ Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.25-27, 6.10-11; *Hier.* 10.5; *Cyr.* 3.2.4; *Vect.* 4.43-44; Ober 1985: 77; 2005: 189; Munn 1993: 3, 187; 2013: 36. Other ancient commentators to recognise the benefits of a defensive strategy – Aen. *Tact.* 16.16-18; Aristot. *Pol.* 1326b26-1327a11.

weapons; the ability to maintain a presence in the field for extended periods of time; and to serve beneath a perpetual (or at least a long-term) commander under whom a strong *esprit de corps* could be fostered.²⁵⁰ It is likely that Athens' new strategic direction drove the reform of the ephebic system that can be convincingly dated to the late 370s.²⁵¹ Certainly the youthful and fit eighteen to twenty year olds that participated in the *ephebeia* were trained in a range of equipment that suited a role not only as patrol and garrison troops but also potentially in mountain warfare.²⁵² With such skills, the stationing of second-year *ephebes* to border forts such as Eleutherae, Phyle and Eleusis was a sound tactical decision.²⁵³

In order to protect her frontiers, Athens also constructed a number of fortresses at key access points. Determining when exactly work began in earnest on these installations has proven problematic for modern historians but in any event the policy seems to have been well established by the 360s.²⁵⁴ Whatever the case, sites were chosen for their suitability both as watch posts and protection against incursion.²⁵⁵ The fortress at Phyle, for example, was situated in a position where it could act as a lookout station northwards over

²⁵⁰ So the career of Chabrias and *peltastai* at Eleutherae – Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.14, 54; Diod. Sic. 15.29.7, 30.5; Pritchett 1974: 73-74; Sealey 1956: 187; Howan 2008: 14-15; Anderson 1970: 132; Yalichev 1997: 158; Dillery 1995: 230-231.

²⁵¹ *Ephebes* as *peltastai* – Ober 1989: 94, 295; Munn 1993: 188; Hansen 1986a: 48-49; 1999: 109; van Wees 2004: 94. For the *ephebeia* dating to 370s – Aeschin. 1.49; 2.167; Ober 1985: 77, 93; Albanidis 2013: 5; Sekunda 2013: 200; Reinmuth 1952: 35 n5; Harris 1988b: 213; Pritchard 2012: 54; Harding 1988: 63-64.

²⁵² [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 42.1, 3-5; Aeschin. 2.167; Xen. *Hier.* 10.5-7; Ober 1985: 90-91; Fields 2006: 29; Hanson 1998: 82; Rhodes 1993: 497-498, 506, 508; Kennell 2015: 180; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 453.

²⁵³ *IG ii²* 1156; Aeschin. 2.167; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 42.4; McCredie 1966: 89; Mitchel 1961: 348; Munn 1993: 4; Rhodes 1993: 508; Ober 1985: 98; Polinskaya 2003: 86, 93, 100-101; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 456; Harding 1988: 64 n11; 2015: 76.

²⁵⁴ Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.10; Harding 1988: 64; 2015: 76; Hanson 1998: 97-98; Berkey 2010: 73, 86 n44; Ober 1985: 97, 99, 191; 2005: 190; 2015: 43; 190; Lattimore 1997: 259-260; Daly 2015: 27, 33, 35; Lee 2010b: 496.

²⁵⁵ Ober 1985: 137, 139; McCredie 1966: 88; Caraher *et al.* 2010: 411. Forts and garrisoned towers could help prevent the escalation of minor territorial disputes into open warfare – Munn 1993: 29; van Wees 2004: 28; Buckler & Beck 2008: 23-24, 45. For an ancient perspective on the importance of private land and property refer Pl. *Leg.* 843a; *Resp.* 373d-e; Aristot. *Pol.* 1330a14; Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.3; *Hell. Oxy.* 18.3; Plut. *Phoc.* 9; Paus. 3.9.9; Buck 1994: 31-32; Cook 1989: 64; Hanson 1999b: 37; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 64.

the lower Skourta plain, as well as south to the Athenian plain. It also guarded the access road that provided the most direct route between Thebes and Athens.²⁵⁶ In addition to defending passes and controlling lines of communication, forts also acted as forward staging areas against potential invasions and as supply depots for border patrols or armies in the field. An obvious secondary function might be to act as a refugee station for those fleeing invasion, although it was by no means certain that everyone could count on their protection.²⁵⁷

Another defensive measure undertaken by Athens was the construction of a network of rural towers. These were significant structures, up to ten metres high in some cases, and being made from limestone or sometimes marble, intended as permanent structures.²⁵⁸ Ruins of a number of examples survive today, including the Mazi Tower near Oinoe that dates to *c.* mid fourth century. Apertures for both artillery and archers indicate that a military purpose was the fortification's primary function although rural towers also made ideal watch-posts and could act as signal stations. Over fourteen metres high and visible to the three major garrison forts in the area – Eleutherae, Myoupolis and Kavasala – the Mazi Tower's size and accommodation of artillery suggests its intended purpose was to defend the Oinoe Road, a major military highway.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁶ Ober 1985: 116, 145-147; Lawrence 1979: 175; McCredie 1966: 88-89; Munn 1993: 9; Lee 2010b: 496; Ducrey 1986: 162, 165; Pope 2016: 265; Buck 1998: 71; Oliver 2007: 144.

²⁵⁷ Staging posts – Ober 1985: 137, 141, 145, 154, 155; Chandler 1926: 13, 15; McCredie 1966: 88. Places of refuge – Aen. Tact. 10.1; Dem. 18.37-38; Plut. *Them.* 10; Ober 1985: 199-200; Hanson 1998: 113-114, 116; McCredie 1966: 84, 92-93; Munn 1993: 27; Pritchett 1991: 357.

²⁵⁸ Hanson 1998: 74-75; Ober 2015: 43; Langdon 1982: 95; Herman 2006: 48; Oliver 2007: 146.

²⁵⁹ Limiko – Ober 1985: 147; Vanderpool 1978: 240, 242; Munn 2010: 208; Camp 1991: 198; Chandler 1926: 18; Russell 1999: 148. Langdon 1982: 97-98; Goette 2001: 75 believe Limiko to be a farm tower. Mazi – Ober 1985: 55-156; Lawrence 1979: 189; Fields 2006: 27-28; Camp 1991: 198; Goette 2001: 75. Langdon 1982: 98 classes Mazi a watchtower. Velatouri – Ober 1985: 157; Camp 1991: 198.

Field walls were a further manifestation of defensive strategy. Intended to protect prime farmland from the ravaging of an enemy, the potential of fieldworks was well recognised in the fourth century but remained a defensive luxury only available to larger *poleis* due to the expense in building and maintaining such structures.²⁶⁰ Furthermore, suitable topography was required to ensure that the wall could not be encircled or circumvented altogether.²⁶¹ Even when these conditions were met, the effectiveness of field walls relied upon having adequate numbers of specialist troops – in particular hoplites, cavalry and *psiloi* – to allow the mounting of successful operations and also an adequate defence of the structure if needed.²⁶²

Fourth-century Athens met all these requisites and indeed possessed a field wall of considerable stature constructed from local limestone. Approximately 4.3 kilometres in length, the appropriately named Dema Wall (*dema* in English translates as “link”), was up to 2.0 metres high in places and ran between Mount Aigaleos and Parnes – a distance of 2.95 kilometres.²⁶³ Two main gateways (and possibly a third, which has not survived from antiquity) that were 2-3 metres wide, punctuated the structure and were situated in the central section of the wall, so allowing for movement of legitimate traffic through the pass.²⁶⁴ In fact the term “wall” is somewhat of a misnomer as the ancient fieldwork was not a continuous barrier but a series of fifty-three overlapping bulwarks that were 1.5-2.0 metres high and up to 1.8 metres thick. By intention, the design created a series of metre-

²⁶⁰ Potential – Dem. 6.23; Pl. *Leg.* 760e, 778e; Munn 1993: 56; 2013: 37. Expense – Dem. 6.24; Hanson 1998: 86.

²⁶¹ Hanson 1998: 87.

²⁶² Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.39; Hanson 1998: 87-88, 226; Munn 1993: 48-50, 52; Jones *et al.* 1957: 180; Ray 2012: 51.

²⁶³ Translation – Munn 1993: 11; Jones *et al.* 1957: 152; Ray 2012: 51. Specifications of the structure – Hanson 1998: 84; Lawrence 1979: 163; McCredie 1966: 63, 96; Munn 1993: 11-12, 38; 2010: 208; Jones *et al.* 1957: 152, 156, 160; Cooper 2000b: 169; Ray 2012: 51; Eliot 1976: 267; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 52.

²⁶⁴ Munn 1993: 40; Jones *et al.* 1957: 161-162, 169; Eliot 1976: 267.

wide sally-ports that opened to the north, ensuring defenders emerged from behind the wall with their shields presented towards the enemy and so in good order to conduct sorties.²⁶⁵

Records concerning the Dema Wall have not survived from antiquity, leading to much speculation amongst modern commentators as to the date of the fieldwork's construction and its purpose.²⁶⁶ Certainly the wall was well within Attic territory and so should be regarded not as a means of border protection, but as a secondary line of defence designed to protect Athens' most valuable agricultural asset – the rich Athenian plain (and beyond that the *polis* itself) – against a threat from the west.²⁶⁷ The question is from whom – the answer to which is dependent upon when the wall was erected. Archaeological remains are inconclusive but one theory advocates a date sometime in the later part of the fourth century, so coinciding with the Athenian defeat at Chaeronea and the frenzied preparations for what was anticipated to be a Macedonian invasion.²⁶⁸

A more plausible hypothesis argues for a date in the first quarter of the fourth century and deduces that the conflict most likely to have been the catalyst for the planning of a defensive wall was the Boeotian War of 378-371.²⁶⁹ Should this have been the case, the fieldwork was built to protect against a Spartan invasion of Attica, with Sphodrias' aborted raid (378) conceivably initiating construction.²⁷⁰ If this speculation is correct, so too might be supposition that, based upon his experiences as a mercenary commander in

²⁶⁵ Munn 1993: 38, 47; McCredie 1966: 63-64; Jones *et al.* 1957: 156, 159, 167-168; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 52; Ray 2012: 51; Eliot 1976: 267; Spring 2015: 62.

²⁶⁶ Hanson 1998: 84 n11; Munn 1993: 11; McCredie 1966: 65; Jones *et al.* 1957: 152-153.

²⁶⁷ Hanson 1998: 84, 84 n11; Munn 1993: 37-38, 98, 102; Jones *et al.* 1957: 156, 175-176; Thorne 2001: 248; Spring 2015: 63.

²⁶⁸ Athenian panic – Dem. 18.173; Lycurg. 16-17; 37, 39, 44; Jones *et al.* 1957: 189; Liddel 2018: 132. Proponents of the Dema Wall as a response to the Macedonian threat include – Anderson 1970: 135; McCredie 1966: 65; Jones *et al.* 1957: 189; Ober 1985: 219; Cartledge 2013a: 51.

²⁶⁹ Munn 1993: 46, 91, 102; 2013: 37; Harding 2015: 76; Lee 2010b: 496; Camp 2001: 141; Oliver 2007: 144; Ray 2012: 50-51.

²⁷⁰ Hanson 1998: 227; Berkey 2010: 72, 73; Munn 1993: 103, 111, 118, 124; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 52.

Egypt, the Athenian *strategos* Chabrias may have had some role in the design of not only the Attic fieldwork, but also the field wall in Boeotia.²⁷¹ However that may have been, the new strategy of frontier defence was pursued actively by the Athenian *demos* from c.385 to 340. Remarkably effective, it should be noted that during this period Athenian territory suffered only one minor incursion – the aborted raid of Sphodrias in 378.²⁷²

Be that as it may, the defensive approach adopted by Athens to maintaining territorial integrity was soon to be rendered obsolete. The strategy had been founded on the premise that well-fortified positions, hitherto virtually impregnable, would be able to delay an enemy long enough for reinforcements to arrive and secure the *chora* against invasion.²⁷³ Like *epiteichismoi*, however, the grand strategy of border defence was overtaken by Philip II's innovations, whose technological breakthroughs provided Macedonian armies with the necessary advances in siege-craft, and speed on the ground, that proved ultimately decisive.²⁷⁴

VII. Conclusion

It is one of this thesis' central contentions that whilst a hostage at Thebes, Philip acquired very little, if any, insight into what might be regarded as innovative military

²⁷¹ Chabrias in Egypt – Dem. 20.76; Diod. Sic. 15.29.2, 42.2-3; Nep. 12.2.1-3; Plut. *Ages.* 37; Munn 2013: 135, 135 n9; Pritchett 1974: 72-73, 76; Trundle 2004: 106, 151; Sealey 1956: 186-187, 192; English 2012: 89-90; Sears 2013: 38, 129; Yalichev 1997: 156; Parke 1933: 59, 62. Contribution to construction of field walls – Munn 1993: 150-151; 2013: 36-37; Hanson 1998: 227; Jones *et al.* 1957: 176; Ray 2012: 51; Spring 2015: 63.

²⁷² Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.20-21; Diod. Sic. 15.29.5-6; Plut. *Pel.* 14.2-3; *Ages.* 24; Ober 1985: 5; 2005: 190; Hanson 1998: 100; Cawkwell 1976: 78; Lazenby 2012: 176; Munn 1993: 195; 2013: 18; Harding 1988: 379-380.

²⁷³ Ober 1985: 75-76, 218; McCredie 1966: 88; Oliver 2007: 144; Müth *et al.* 2016: 9; Fachard 2016: 209. Munn 1993: 21; Cooper 2000b: 157 n13 argue that border fortifications were unsuccessful in delaying invasion. Perhaps – but success or failure is no measure of original *intent*.

²⁷⁴ Ober 1985: 219; 1994: 25; 1999: 70; 2005: 190-191; Westlake 1983: 12, 23; Winter 1994: 29; Hanson 1998: 218-219, 222; Jones *et al.* 1957: 189; Oliver 2007: 145.

practice. In order to determine the validity of this position, it was necessary, therefore, to background how warfare was prosecuted by *poleis* down to the early fourth century. Such a review not only provides a basis for determining to what extent Philip's supposed inspiration – Epaminondas – can be considered a pioneering practitioner of war, but also the degree to which the conventions of hoplite warfare influenced the king's later reforms.

What the study revealed was that throughout the Classical Period, Greek warfare underwent a slow evolution. Hoplites equipped with *aspis*, *doru*, helmet, and cuirass dominated the battlefield, albeit there was a trend for protective armour to become lighter – or discarded – as the advantages of greater infantry mobility emerged. Set-piece encounters, in which hoplites battled in opposing phalanxes, remained the decisive element of most campaigns. Victory was obtained when one side disintegrated their enemy's formation – usually by means of the *othismos* – and took possession of the battlefield.

Although – for most *poleis* – hoplites retained their primacy, city-states increasingly fielded combined arms forces. *Poleis*, including Argos and Corinth, commissioned cavalry squadrons and others with a longer *hippeis* tradition (such as Thessaly), increased existing *corps*. Somewhat paradoxically, cavalry troops became more heavily armoured, something that reflected their increasingly active role in combat. *Linothorax* and *pteruges* were common with gauntlet, gorget and *embades* also worn for protection.

Use of *psiloi* such as *peltastai*, *toxotai* and *sphendonetai* – mainly mercenaries – also became widespread. Following the Peloponnesian War, there existed a large pool of itinerant, disenfranchised troops. As a consequence, professionals were often regarded as a relatively affordable alternative to citizen armies. Mercenaries were deployed typically in support of the phalanx (or cavalry) and, because they were considered expendable, in

high-risk operations such as sieges, raiding and ambush. Paid professionals also possessed expertise in fields such as archery, slinging and artillery – specialist skills not commonly available in a citizen-body. Furthermore, mercenaries – because they lacked distractions such as the harvest – were available to fight year-round.

Coinciding with the hire of soldiery was a more professional approach to warfare by *poleis*. The (un)enthusiastic amateur whose preparation for combat was limited to informal training regimes such as *hoplomachia*, *pyrrhichios*, hunting and gymnastics, was evermore complemented by elite, fulltime *corps* such as Thebes' Sacred Band. The early fourth century (at least in Athens) also saw the rise of career *strategoi* such as Timotheus, Chares, Iphicrates, and Chabrias – who served his *polis* for nearly forty years.

Agonal aspects of battle have been rightly noted by modern commentators but the concept of “warfare by the rules” has often been overstated. Instances abound where canny leaders have variously resorted to surprise, ambush, night-attacks and misinformation in order to secure victory. Increasingly, too, generals had a role to play in the success of their army through a range of basic manoeuvres – including deployment of the phalanx, *pyknosis*, *dromos*, and utilisation of the *plaision*.

If conventional warfare was marked by gradual change, the same cannot be said for siege warfare, which underwent significant advances. Mercenary troops allowed for evermore vigorous and sustained assaults and the presence of missile troops – especially *toxotai* and *sphendonetai* – covered attacks by mobile hoplites and an increasingly diverse range of siege machinery. Prosecution of sieges continued utilising tried and true methods such as circumvallation, tunnelling and battering rams, but the development of hitherto unknown engines provided innovative commanders with further options to which they could turn in efforts to capture *poleis*. Examples included the *helepolis* and artillery such

as *gastraphetai* and *oxybelai*. Significantly, siege machinery – an innovation embraced by autocrats such as Dionysius I of Syracuse and Philip II of Macedonia – was not widely adopted by the Greek city-states.

Poleis instead responded to more effective siege weapons by correspondingly efficacious innovations in fortification design. Primary amongst these was the *enceinte*, constructed initially of mudbrick but by the fourth century usually of stone. Screen battlements became standard and were fitted with shuttered apertures to accommodate the positioning of *oxybelai*. Towers were also incorporated into the *enceinte* to provide greater strength and allow an improved field of fire. Initially rectangular, semi-circular towers became preferred because although more difficult and expensive to construct, better resisted bombardment and permitted greater enfilading fire to be directed upon attacking forces. Architectural innovations such as gatecourts and (re)introduction of the *fosse* meant that gates and gateways became better defended and more secure. Posterns were used increasingly to allow offensive raids – an indication of the progressively aggressive responses by *poleis* to enemy siege operations.

As well as tactical innovations, the early fourth century was also marked by the concept of grand strategy and subsequent transition from operations of limited objectives dictated by seasonal considerations, to campaigns of much greater ambition. The change can be well seen in the prosecution of economic warfare in which systematic, sustained ravaging was undertaken with the specific strategic objective of collapsing permanently an enemy's will to resist. Another instance of grand strategy is evidenced by the decision of some *poleis* to prevent invasion rather than try to defeat an enemy already occupying the *chora*. It was in an attempt to secure its borders that Athens, for example, constructed a network of frontier forts and watchtowers including installations at Eleutheræ, Phyle and

Mazi. *Psiloi* were also detailed to secure mountain passes, hitherto largely unprotected. Within the *chora* itself, larger *poleis* sometimes constructed fieldwalls in an attempt to protect valuable agricultural holdings from invading armies. Athens, for example, built the Dema Wall to protect from Spartan incursion.

Undoubtedly, the first half of the fourth century witnessed some important changes in the way wars were fought in ancient Greece. It needs to be recognised, however, that warfare remained predominantly (although not exclusively) the domain of heavy infantrymen whose defining armaments were the *aspis* and *doru*. By virtue of its victory at Leuctra, Thebes (for a brief time at least) eclipsed Sparta as Greece's leading exponent in the art of war but it should not be forgotten that the Boeotian *polis* was a hoplite state and fought accordingly. It was into this environment that the young Philip was thrust. To what extent it impacted his teenage mind is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 3

Philip at

Thebes

I. Education

It is this chapter's purpose to assess the oft-drawn correlation between Thebes and Philip's eventual rise to *hegemon* of Greece. Whether the king acquired an appreciation for the benefits of diplomatic endeavour whilst a young hostage is considered, as well as what, if any, influence Epaminondas had on Philip's appreciation of tactics. Because of the king's innovative expertise in the prosecution of siege warfare, the likelihood of Philip acquiring insights in this field is also considered. Finding tangible connections lacking in all areas, the focus turns to panoply in a (vain) effort to establish a definitive Theban link in Macedonian military development. Undertaken next is a comparative analysis of the century's two defining battles – Leuctra and Chaeronea – that again demonstrates the military disconnect between Philip and Epaminondas. The discussion closes with an examination of *poliorcetics*, the outcome of which points further to a lack of Theban influence in Philip's military practices. Because, however, it is one of this thesis' central arguments that Philip learnt very little during his detainment in Thebes, the chapter opens with an investigation into what educational opportunities awaited future empire-builders in the Boeotian *polis*.

As a very young boy Philip had (probably) been a prisoner of the Illyrians: that as an adolescent he had been a hostage at Thebes is indisputable.¹ Beyond that, there is little agreement. Dispute exists over whose ward the prince was: although there is a tradition for Epaminondas – or even his father – Pammenes remains the most likely candidate. The representation, however, of Philip and Epaminondas as childhood contemporaries is

¹ Illyrians – Diod. Sic. 16.2.2; Just. 7.5.1; Bradford 1992: 6; Dell 1980: 91; Borza 1990: 189, 189 n28; Posma 2015: 125; Fox 2015a: 231; Roisman 2010: 161; Greenwalt 2010: 287; McQueen 1995a: 63. Fox 2015e: 257 contends Philip was around thirteen when taken by the Illyrians. Thebes – Dem. 19.135; Diod. Sic. 15.67.4; Plut. *Pel.* 26.4; Ael. *VH* 13.7; Just. 7.5.2; Buckler 1980: 118; Cawkwell 1978b: 27; Bradford 1992: 6, 8; Errington 1990: 36; Anson 1985: 247; McQueen 1995a: 63.

certainly a falsehood.² Most academics concur with the sources that state Philip enjoyed the Boeotians' hospitality for three years but the future king's age during his period of detention is hotly debated.³ Several scholars advocate that Philip was fifteen when sent to Thebes, although others contend that he may have been as young as thirteen.⁴

The sources are typically vague. Plutarch, in his *Lives*, recounts:

Οὗτος ἦν Φίλιππος ὁ τοῖς Ἑλλησιν ὕστερον πολεμήσας ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας, τότε δὲ παῖς ὄν (Plut. *Pel.* 26.5).

This was the Philip who afterwards waged war to enslave the Greeks, but at this time he was a boy (trans. Perrin, 1917).

Justin contributes:

Quae res Philippo maxima incrementa egregiae indolis dedit, siquidem Thebis triennio obses habitus prima pueritiae rudimenta in urbe severitatis antiquae et in domo Epaminondae, summi et philosophi et imperatoris, deposuit (Just. 7.5.3).

² Epaminondas – Just. 7.5.3; Drews 1962: 388. Father of Epaminondas – Diod. Sic. 16.2.3; Bradford 1992: 9. Pammenes – Plut. *Pel.* 26.5; Green 1991: 15; Rusch 2011: 211; Zahrt 2009: 22; Heskell 1997a: 178; Buckler 1980: 118, 134; Ashley 1998: 5; Gabriel 2010: 24; Worthington 2008: 17; Buckler & Beck 2008: 224; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 205; Borza 1990: 190; Markle 1978: 486; Lendon 2005: 122; Fox 2015e: 259; McQueen 1995a: 63. Contemporary falsehood – Diod. Sic. 16.2.3; Drews 1962: 388; King 2018: 71; McQueen 1995a: 64. Hanson 1999b: 52-53 has Epaminondas as forty years old in 379 making him around fifty during Philip's time at Thebes.

³ Three years – Plut. *Pel.* 26.4-27.4; Just. 6.9.7, 7.5.3; Errington 1990: 40; Curteis 1890: 22; Borza 1990: 195; Griffith 1970: 73; Markle 1978: 4; Fox 2015e: 262. Four years – Heskell 1997a: 178.

⁴ Fifteen – Green 1991: 15; Gabriel 2010: 3, 24. Hammond & Griffith 1979: 186 nominate 14 or 15. Thirteen – Ellis 1976: 43; Worthington 2008: 17; 2013: 54; 2014: 27; Borza 1990: 190; Guler 2014: 129. Müller 2010b: 166 merely notes Philip was a teenager. Matthew 2015: 32-34 summarises aspects of the debate, concluding Philip was “quite young”. Matthew makes the further point that important areas of consideration, in addition to Philip's age, are what educational instruction he was afforded and whether or not the prince was in a position to have observed, and had the capacity to process, Theban military practices. For an extended discussion on these topics see Thesis: Chapter 3, especially 95-97, 105-112, 207-208.

Kept as a hostage at Thebes for three years, Philip spent the earliest stages of his boyhood in a city characterized by old-fashioned austerity and in the home of Epaminondas, the great philosopher and general (trans. Yardley, 1994).

A clue to understanding Philip's age from these two sources is Plutarch's use of *παῖς* (*pais* or boy) and Justin's derivative *puer*. *Paides* were generally regarded as making the transition into adulthood at about seventeen years of age, although sometimes an intermediate term – *ageneioi* (beardless youths) – was used to differentiate boys in their late teens.⁵ Roman *pueri*, on the other hand, ceased to be children once they had adopted the *toga virilis*, a ceremony that took place at the discretion of the *paterfamilias*, but usually around the child's sixteenth birthday – although a younger age was possible.⁶ From Plutarch it can only be deduced that Philip was no older than sixteen but Justin allows greater precision. As *pueri* remained *impuberes* (minors) until the onset of puberty – typically twelve or thirteen – and Justin narrates that Philip was in his earliest stages of boyhood (*prima pueritiae*) whilst a hostage, the likelihood is that the Macedonian was 13-14 years old.⁷ Controversy also exists over the exact dates of Philip's circumscription. Ancient sources hint his incarceration was synchronous with Macedonia's Theban alliance

⁵ Seventeen – Miller 2004: 14; Golden 1998: 105; 2015: 3; Kennell 1999: 251-252; Petermandl 2014: 239. *Ageneioi* – *IG* ii² 2311; Pind. *Ol.* 9.88-90; Petermandl 2014: 239; Miller 2004: 14; Golden 1998: 104; 2004: 4; 2015: 58, 104.

⁶ *Toga virilis* – Plut. *Mor.* 37C-D; Crowther 2010: 208; Harrill 2002: 266; Miller 2019: 162. Age 15-17 – Plut. *Marc.* 4; Dolansky 2008: 48; Marshall 1963: 146; Harrill 2002: 55; Miller 2019: 162; Wheeler 1925: 4. Fourteen or younger – Tac. *Ann.* 12.41; Anon. *Comm.* 2, 12; Marshall 1963: 146; Hiesinger 1975: 113-114; Aveline 2004: 462; Smith 1853b: 532 although these were heirs to emperors and so perhaps atypical.

⁷ Smith 1853b: 636; Tomkins & Lemon 1869: 196; Crofts 2002: 94, 211; Muirhead 1947: 75; Berger 2008: 495; Ellis 1976: 43.

(369) but some believe the prince's time in Boeotia commenced 368/7.⁸ As Philip was born 383/2, the earlier date better fits with his probable age of thirteen or fourteen.⁹

Philip, current wisdom dictates, received a broad education whilst at Thebes – including instruction in philosophy (Pythagoreanism) and the virtues of self-discipline.¹⁰ He also gained, according to many modern commentators, an insight into how diplomacy could be utilised for political gain but, perhaps unsurprisingly, it is assumed that military matters dominated Philip's formative educational experiences.¹¹ Yet unless it is to be assumed that as a thirteen or fourteen year old boy, Philip roamed the Cadmea osmotically observing the Sacred Band undergoing drill, or perhaps cunningly interrogating unsuspecting Thebans with an agenda of future conquest in mind (as Alexander III at an even earlier age was supposed to have done with a Persian embassy), an opportunity must have existed for Philip to have received a formal education during his time as hostage.¹²

Without question, Macedonia provided young men with such an opportunity by way of the Royal Page School. Although foundation of the institution has sometimes been credited to Philip, it was well established by his time and possibly in existence from the

⁸ 369 – Diod. Sic. 15.67.4; Plut. *Pel.* 27.3-4; Just. 7.5.3; Munn 1997: 90-91; Ellis 1976: 43, 45; Ducrey 1986: 238; Matthew 2015: 34; Heskell 1997a: 178; Posma 2015: 125. 368/7 – Gabriel 2010: 3, 24; Worthington 2008: 17; Curteis 1890: 22, 23; Borza 1990: 190; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 186, 205; Fox 2015e: 259; Hammond 1994b: 9, 10; 1997b: 356; Grant 2017: 165 n68.

⁹ Paus. 8.7.6; Just. 9.8.1; Gabriel 2010: 3; Hammond 1997b: 357; Cawkwell 1978b: 27; Worthington 2008: 15; 2014: 25; Greenwalt 2010: 285 n16; King 2018: 98 n1.

¹⁰ Diod. Sic. 16.2.3; Plut. *Pel.* 26.5; Just. 6.9.7; Heskell 1997a: 178; Bradford 1992: 9; Gabriel 2001: 89; 2010: 24; Matthew 2015: 34; Allen 2006: 48.

¹¹ Diplomacy – Grainger 2017: 18; Green 1991: 16; Heskell 1997a: 178; Buckler 1980: 134; Hammond 1994b: 10; Cawkwell 1978b: 27; Buckler & Beck 2008: 224; Curteis 1890: 23; Budin 2004: 81; Bradford 2001: 101; Worthington 2008: 18. Military – Green 1991: 15-16; Heskell 1997: 178; Hammond 1994b: 10; Cawkwell 1978b: 27; Ashley 1998: 5, 23; Gabriel 2010: 24-25; Errington 1990: 40; Hammond & Griffith 1969: 205, 425; Curteis 1890: 23; Markle 1978: 486; Lendon 2005: 122; Ducrey 1986: 94, 238; Anson 1985: 247.

¹² Alexander – Plut. *Alex.* 5; *Mor.* 342B-C; Buckler & Beck 2008: 244; Green 1991: 37-38; Hammond 1994b: 130; Hamilton 1965: 118; Fox 2015c: 356; Olbrycht 2010: 352.

early fifth century – the legacy of a strong Persian influence in the region (c.512-479).¹³ Be that as it may, the School was certainly in operation by the time of Archelaus I (413-399), although Philip II may be correctly regarded as the monarch responsible for expanding and formalising its purpose as an academy for future elites.¹⁴

Boys entered the Royal Page School at fourteen and remained there until eighteen years old.¹⁵ The number of annual enrolments is unknown but included the sons of Companions and leading Macedonian families – including the royal household.¹⁶ For example, Alexander III's childhood friends Ptolemy (son of Lagos); Perdikkas (son of Orontes); and Cassander (son of Antipater) were all fellow Pages with ancestral lands in Upper Macedonia.¹⁷ Another Page – Hephæstion, son of Amyntor – was born in Pella, the

¹³ For Philip as founder – Arr. *Anab.* 4.13.1; Sekunda 2010: 452; Fox 2015a: 220; Borza 1990: 249; Worthington 2008: 30; Bosworth 1998a: 7; 1995: 90-91; Ellis 1976: 161; Heckel 1986b: 279; Carney 1981: 227; Saunders 2006: 6; Fox 2015d: 371. Well established by Philip II – Aristot. *Pol.* 1311a36; Diod. Sic. 14.37.6; Val. Max. 3.3.ext1; Curt. 8.8.3; Ael. *VH* 12.43; Hammond 1990: 261-262, 264; 1994b: 9. Persian influence – Hdt. 5.18, 7.108, 185; Heckel 1986b: 281; Weber 2009: 86; Sprawski 2010: 135, 137-138, 143; Sekunda 2010: 447; Rusch 2011: 29; Mari 2015a: 85; Olbrycht 2010: 345; How & Wells 2008: 582; Natoli 2004a: 118.

¹⁴ Archelaus – Curt. 8.6.2; Gabriel 2010: 48; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 168 n1; Sawada 2010: 404. Philip – Arr. *Anab.* 4.13.1; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 401, 401 n1; Worthington 2008: 30; King 2010: 381 n23; 2018: 114; Sekunda 2010: 452; Fox 2015a: 215; 2015d: 371; Pownall 2010: 63; Fredricksmeier 1982: 93; Bosworth 1995: 91.

¹⁵ Fourteen at entry – Arr. *Anab.* 4.13.1; Hammond 1990: 266, 284; 1994b: 41; Heckel 1986b: 283; Ashley 1998: 28; Gabriel 2010: 48; Worthington 2008: 30; 2014: 38. Bosworth 1995: 91 describes fourteen as a “reasonable guess”. Carney 1981: 228 nominates mid teens. Eighteen at exit – Hammond 1990: 266, 284; 1994b: 41; Ashley 1998: 28; Gabriel 2010: 48; Worthington 2008: 30; 2014: 38. Heckel 1986b: 283 posits an upper age of thirty for Pages.

¹⁶ Two hundred – Gabriel 2010: 48-49; Hammond 1990: 266; 1994b: 41; Worthington 2008: 30-31. Hammond & Griffith 1979: 401 advocates only eighty-five Pages. Sawada 2010: 405; Heckel 1986b: 281 regard the figure as unknowable. Sons of Companions and the Royal family – Diod. Sic. 17.65.1; Arr. *Anab.* 4.13.1; Curt. 5.1.42; Ael. *VH* 14.49; Gabriel 2010: 48-49; Hammond 1994b: 41; Worthington 2008: 30; Bosworth 1988a: 7; 1995: 91; Pownall 2010: 63; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 396, 401, 650; Ellis 1976: 161; Ashley 1998: 27; Heckel 1986b: 280; Saunders 2006: 6; Carney 1981: 227; Müller 2010a: 26, 234 n7; Fox 2015d: 371.

¹⁷ Ptolemy – Plut. *Alex.* 10; Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.5, 6.28.4; Fildes & Fletcher 2002: 23; Heckel 1986b: 284, 284 n23; Hamilton 1965: 120 n8; Ellis 1976: 161; Green 1991: 55; Saunders 2006: 6; de Vries *et al.* 2004: 8. Heckel 1985: 288-289; 1986a: 301 express reservations about Ptolemy as an immediate contemporary of Alexander. Perdikkas – Arr. *Anab.* 6.28.4; Heckel 1985: 288; 1986b: 280, 289; Saunders 2006: 6; Sawada 2010: 404. Cassander – Ellis 1976: 161; Green 1991: 55; de Vries *et al.* 2004: 8; Stoneman 2004: 16; Adam-Veleni 2015: 547.

kingdom's capital since having been extended that honour by Archelaus I c.400.¹⁸ Sons of allies and other important foreigners were also admitted into the Royal Page School. Thus under Philip II, Alexander of Epirus – nephew of King Arybbas and brother of Olympias – Nearchus, who was born in Crete; and the brothers Erigyus and Laomedon who hailed from Mytilene on Lesbos, all became Royal Pages (*basilikoi paides*).¹⁹

Pages' duties were many and varied but centred firmly around the king. One of the more important roles was to act as a Royal bodyguard, although given the gravity of the task it has been reasonably argued that this responsibility was only granted to Pages in their final year – that is, when seventeen years of age.²⁰ Protection of the Royal personage occurred both in battle – as evidenced by the page Pausanias who died in 337 defending Philip II against King Pleurias of Illyria – and also whilst the king slept, which is how the disgruntled page Hermolaus intended to assassinate Alexander (327).²¹

Another important responsibility of Pages was to accompany Macedonian kings on the hunt.²² Craterus, for example, attended Archelaus I (413-399) and Hermolaus squired

¹⁸ Arr. *Anab.* 6.28.4; Saunders 2006: 6, 7; Ellis 1976: 161; Green 1991: 55; de Vries *et al.* 2004: 8; Heckel 1980: 455; 1985: 288; 1986b: 289, 293; Stoneman 2004: 16; Fildes & Fletcher 2002: 23; Hauben 1972: 62; Palagia 2000: 168.

¹⁹ Alexander of Epirus – Diod. Sic. 16.72.1; Paus. 1.11.3; Just. 8.6.5; Green 1991: 38; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 505; McQueen 1995a: 148; Hammond 1994b: 51, 120; Worthington 2008: 70; 2013: 127; Zahrt 2009: 13; Fox 2015c: 353; Greenwalt 2010: 292-293. Nearchus – Tod 182; Diod. Sic. 19.69.1; Plut. *Alex.* 10; Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.5; *Ind.* 18.10; Green 1991: 101; Saunders 2006: 8; Bosworth 1988a: 7; Heckel 1985: 285; Hamilton 1965: 120 n8; 2002b: 26; Zambrini 2007: 214. Erigyus and Laomedon – Diod. Sic. 18.3.1; Plut. *Alex.* 10; Just. 13.4.12; Green 1991: 101; Bosworth 1988a: 7; Heckel 1985: 285; Hamilton 1965: 120 n8; 2002b: 26-27.

²⁰ Bodyguards – Diod. Sic. 17.65.1; Arr. *Anab.* 4.13.2, 4; Curt. 5.1.42, 8.6.3; Karunanithy 2013: 97; Hammond 1994b: 41; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 396; Ashley 1998: 27; Carney 1981: 227. Seventeen – Karunanithy 2013: 97; Hammond 1980b: 167; 1990: 266, 284.

²¹ Pausanias – Diod. Sic. 16.93.4-6; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 156, 473, 684; Worthington 2008: 182; 2014: 114; Hammond 1994b: 176; Gabriel 2010: 236; Heckel 1986a: 303; 1986b: 280; Bradford 1992: 161. Hermolaus – Arr. *Anab.* 4.13.5; Curt. 8.6.3; O'Brien 1994: 140-141; Gabriel 2010: 49; Hammond 1994b: 41; Worthington 2014: 234; Heckel 1986b: 280; Karunanithy 2013: 191; Ashley 1998: 27; Carney 1981: 226; Müller 2010a: 26.

²² Arr. *Anab.* 4.13.1-2; Curt. 5.1.42, 8.6.4, 7, 8.3; Ashley 1998: 27; Carney 1981: 227; Müller 2010a: 27; Heckel 1986b: 280; Hammond 1990: 262-263; 1994b: 41; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 156; O'Brien 1994: 145; Sawada 2010: 392; Bosworth 1995: 93.

for Alexander III in his pursuit of boar.²³ Hunting was a chaotic and dangerous affair, with the very real possibility of fatal injury (accidental or otherwise). For fear of assassination, therefore, Macedonian kings were only accompanied on the chase by princes and Pages – individuals who enjoyed the highest levels of trust; this was a protocol that was not always foolproof as Archelaus I discovered to his cost, and so nearly did Alexander III.²⁴

It was also the duty of Royal Pages to wait on the king's table.²⁵ As a youth and Page Amyntas II, for example, served Aeropos III (398-395) before briefly assuming the kingship several years later (394/3).²⁶ Pages also played a role as an attendant groom, assisting the king to mount his horse in preparation for battle and seeing to his arms. Aretis, for example, may well have fulfilled this function for Alexander III.²⁷ These intimate associations with the sovereign, sometimes reputedly extending to pederasty, helped generate both personal loyalty towards the monarchy and foster a strong *esprit de corps* amongst the Pages themselves.²⁸

²³ Craterus – Diod. Sic. 14.37.6; Hammond 1990: 263; Roisman 2010: 157; Sawada 2010: 399; King 2018: 51; Borza 1990: 177. Hermolaus – Arr. *Anab.* 4.13.2; Curt. 8.6.7; Carney 1981: 226; Müller 2010a: 27; Bradford 1992: 161; O'Brien 1994: 145-146; Heckel 2008: 594; 2009b: 46; Sawada 2010: 400, 403; Bosworth 1995: 93-94.

²⁴ Whether by accident or deliberate intent is unclear, but what is certain is that Archelaus I met his death at the hands of his page Craterus. For accidental death – Diod. Sic. 14.37.6; Hammond 1990: 262-263; Mari 2015a: 92; Sawada 2010: 399. For assassination – Aristot. *Pol.* 1311a36; Ael. *VH* 8.9; Hammond 1990: 263; Greenwalt 1999: 182; Borza 1990: 177; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 154, 167-168. For undetermined – Hatzopoulos 1986: 283; Roisman 2010: 157-158. Fox 2015a: 215 acknowledges Archelaus was murdered but believes involvement of Royal Pages impossible. For Alexander III – Plut. *Alex.* 55; Arr. *Anab.* 4.13.3-7; Curt. 8.6.7-30; Green 1991: 378; Carney 1981: 226; Hamilton 2002b: 154; Bosworth 1995: 93-94.

²⁵ Curt. 5.1.42, 8.6.5; Ael. *VH* 14.49; Worthington 2014: 38; Gabriel 2010: 49; Ashley 1998: 27; Hammond 1980b: 167; Pownall 2010: 63; Leveque 1980: 181; Sawada 2010: 392, 395; Palagia 2015: 486; Ma 2015: 525.

²⁶ Ael. *VH* 12.43; Hammond 1980b: 168; 1990: 263; Hatzopoulos 1986: 282; Devine 1996: 280; Spawforth 2017: 84-85; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 169.

²⁷ Mounting the horse – Arr. *Anab.* 4.13.1; Curt. 5.1.42, 8.6.4; Hammond 1990: 263; Heckel 1986b: 280, 283; Ashley 1998: 27; Gabriel 2010: 49; Karunanithy 2013: 97; Sawada 2010: 404; Bosworth 1995: 93. Aretis – Arr. *Anab.* 1.15.6; Hammond 1990: 268; Karunanithy 2013: 182; Bosworth 1980: 122.

²⁸ Pederasty – Aristot. *Pol.* 1311a36; Just. 8.6.5-6, 8; Hammond 1990: 263, 263 n7; 1994b: 41, 176; Heckel 1986b: 280; Sawada 2010: 404, 406; Ogden 2010: 212. Loyalty – Curt. 8.6.5; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 401; Heckel 2009a: 71; Errington 1990: 100; Müller 2010b: 170; Sawada 2010: 405. *Esprit de corps* – Hammond 1994b: 41; Cawkwell 1978b: 39; Gabriel 2010: 49; Sidnell 2006: 79.

Certainly the Royal Page School acted as a hostage mechanism guaranteeing the good behaviour of the boys' families but its primary purpose was to provide and prepare the future leaders of Macedonia and its territories.²⁹ One method by which this was achieved was in the development of a first-rate officer *corps*. Boys were trained for battle in a number of ways, one being through participation in the Royal hunt, an activity that – in the minds of the ancients at least – employed the same weapons and skill-sets as combat.³⁰ Another was to accustom Pages to the harshness and discipline that was synonymous with military life. Educational practice in Macedonia was the same as elsewhere in Greece with pupils often beaten for even minor transgressions – although in the case of the Royal Pages, the administration of discipline was the sole prerogative of the king.³¹ Philip II had a reputation for being very severe on his wards, having Aphthonetus flogged for deserting his post in order to obtain a drink, and Archedamus put to death for removing his armour without authority.³² Alexander III appears to have been equally harsh if his treatment of Hermolaus' transgression is any indication.³³

Thus by the time Pages left the institution in their eighteenth year they were tough men, expert in arms and ready for battle. Some were destined to become Companion

²⁹ Curt. 8.6.2; Cawkwell 1978b: 39; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 401; Pownall 2010: 63; Heckel 2009a: 71; Worthington 2008: 31; 2014: 38; Carney 1981: 227; Weber 2009: 86; Saunders 2006: 6; Müller 2010a: 26; Ellis 1972: 12; 1976: 162; 1980b: 45; Sidnell 2006: 79.

³⁰ Training – Ael. *VH* 14.49; Karunanithy 2013: 97; Worthington 2008: 30-31; 2014: 38; Carney 1981: 227; Gabriel 2010: 19; Ashley 1998: 28; Pownall 2010: 63; Leveque 1980: 181. Association of hunting with martial skills – Xen. *Lac.* 4.7; *Cyn.* 1.18, 12.1-5, 7-9; *Cyr.* 1.2.9-11; 6.28-40; Pl. *Leg.* 763a-b; *Soph.* 219e, 222a-c; *Prt.* 322b; Aristot. *Pol.* 1256b20; Plut. *Lyc.* 12; Ath. 1.18a; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 156; Karunanithy 2013: 31, 97; Gabriel 2010: 49; Müller 2010a: 28; Barringer 2001: 10-11, 14, 204.

³¹ Curt. 8.6.7, 8.3; Müller 2010a: 27; 2010b: 170; Heckel 1986a: 303; 1986b: 280; 2009a: 79; Hammond 1990: 262; 1994b: 41; Worthington 2014: 235; Ashley 1998: 27; Gabriel 2010: 49; Carney 1996: 28; Sidnell 2006: 79; Sawada 2010: 406.

³² Reputation – Hammond 1980b: 167; 1990: 264-265; Müller 2010a: 27. Aphthonetus – Ael. *VH* 14.49; Hammond 1990: 264-265; Green 1991: 20; Sawada 2010: 404. Archedamus – Ael. *VH* 14.49; Hammond 1990: 265; 1994b: 41; Heckel 1986b: 280; Ashley 1998: 27; Gabriel 2010: 49; Sawada 2010: 404.

³³ For striking down a boar during a Royal Hunt, Alexander confiscated Hermolaus' horse and had the Page whipped – Arr. *Anab.* 4.13.2; Curt. 8.6.7; Heckel 1986b: 280; Müller 2010a: 27; Carney 1981: 226; 1996: 27-28; O'Brien 1994: 146; Sawada 2010: 400, 404; Bosworth 1995: 94.

Cavalry (*hetairoi*) whereas others, primarily those from Upper Macedonia, joined the Foot Companions (*pezhetairoi*).³⁴ Individuals who demonstrated outstanding ability, such as Philip (brother of Leonnatus), were drafted into the Royal Hypaspists – an elite Royal Guard numbering perhaps three hundred.³⁵ Further indication of the military prowess attained by Royal Pages is that it was from their ranks that the *somatophylakes* (personal bodyguards) were drawn. In Philip II's reign, the guard was seven in number and at the time of his death in 336 included Lysimachus, Leonnatus and perhaps Perdikkas, son of Orontes.³⁶ Alexander III continued, for a time at least, to utilise *somatophylakes*, although in 325 increased their number to eight. As with Philip, Alexander entrusted former Pages to fulfil the role including his childhood friends Ptolemy, Hephæstion and Perdikkas.³⁷

It was not just military instruction, however, that young men obtained at the Royal Page School; they also received tuition in disciplines that would enhance their administrative skills. Thus Pages were educated in the liberal arts including reading and writing.³⁸ Socrates (who declined), was invited to the Macedonian court but the record indicates that under Perdikkas III (368-359), Pages may well have learnt geometry and philosophy from Euphraeus of Oreus, a pupil of Plato who had secured an appointment as

³⁴ *Hetairoi* – Hammond 1989: 68 n3; 1990: 266, 272, 285; 1994b: 186; 1998a: 422; Ashley 1998: 28; Ellis 1972: 12; Sidnell 2006: 79; Heckel 1986b: 284. *Pezhetairoi* – Arr. *Anab.* 3.13.5-6; Hammond 1990: 285; Heckel *et al.* 2010: 104.

³⁵ Heckel 1986b: 286; Sidnell 2006: 79; Milns 1982: 125-126; Brunt 1963: 27; Hammond 1991b: 404-405; 1998a: 408; Sekunda 2010: 450. For notable feats of endurance by the former Page Philip, brother of Lysimachus – Curt. 8.2.35-39; Karunanithy 2013: 183; Kucewicz 2011: 35; Heckel 1986b: 293.

³⁶ Seven in number – O'Brien 1994: p.33; Sekunda 2010: 459; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 403; Ashley 1998: 28; Hammond 1994b: 176; Gabriel 2010: 235; Weber 2009: 87. Lysimachus, Leonnatus and Perdikkas – Diod. Sic. 16.94.4; Arr. *Anab.* 6.28.4; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 689, 689 n2; Gabriel 2010: 234; Hammond 1991b: 400, 403, 406; 1994b: 176; Bradford 1992: 163; Heckel 1986b: 291; O'Brien 1994: 33.

³⁷ Ptolemy – Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.6, 27.5, 4.8.9, 13.7, 6.28.4; Hammond 1991b: 397, 406; Heckel 1986b: 279, 289; Ashley 1998: 28; O'Brien 1994: 189; Bosworth 1980: 283; 1995: 61. Hephæstion – Arr. *Anab.* 6.28.4; Heckel 1986a: 302; 1986b: 279; Ashley 1998: 28; O'Brien 1994: 189. Perdikkas – Arr. *Anab.* 6.28.4; Heckel 1986a: 302; 1986b: 279; Ashley 1998: 28; Hammond 1991b: 397, 406; O'Brien 1994: 189.

³⁸ Curt. 8.6.4; Hammond 1990: 268, 278 n54, 284; 1994b: 41; Carney 1981: 227; Hamilton 1965: 119; Strootman 2013: 45; 2014: 136-137, 139; Cohen 2010: 131; Gabriel 2010: 19, 48-49.

advisor to the Macedonian king – a position that did not save him from being executed in 342/1 under the orders of Philip II.³⁹ Although he may have disapproved of Euphraeus’ politics, Philip obviously saw the advantages of providing Pages with an academic education and Aristotle found the invitation impossible to resist when it eventually came.⁴⁰ It is from his tuition of the young prince Alexander that best insight can be obtained into the intellectual development of Pages.

As was usual for School inductees, Alexander commenced his tenure as a Royal Page (in 342) aged thirteen or fourteen.⁴¹ Under the tutelage of Aristotle, the young prince received instruction in ethics, eristics, politics, geography, dialectic, metaphysics and (probably) geometry.⁴² Just as with his father Philip II, medicine was also an area of interest.⁴³ Aristotle was known to have particularly valued drawing (which he considered to hone observational skills); literacy (important for the general administration of one’s affairs); physical training (including drill with the sword, bow, as well as javelin); and music – which was regarded as an appropriate relaxation for a gentleman – and so it is a

³⁹ Socrates – Diog. Laert. 2.25; O’Brien 1994: 26; Hammond 1994b: 41; Oldfather 1926: 287; Bentley 1836: 189-190; Green 1985: 155. Geometry and Philosophy – Isoc. *Dis.* 12.26; Ath. 11.508e; Bosworth 1988a: 21; Merlan 1954: 73-74, 75; Laurie 1894a: 428. Euphraeus – Ath. 11.508e; Markle 1978: 486; Chroust 1967b: 33, 35; Cawkwell 1978a: 53; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 206; Natoli 2004b: 39-40, 97. A competing tradition has Euphraeus’ death as suicide – Dem. 9.59-61; Brunt 1969: 251; King 2018: 88. Natoli 2004b: 40 n91 makes a reasonable point that Euphraeus may have chosen suicide to being taken alive.

⁴⁰ Diog. Laert. 5.4, 10; Sinclair 1981: 13; Hammond 1994b: 41; Gabriel 2010: 19, 49; Ellis 1980a: 85; Chroust 1967b: 35; Lee 1987: 20; Green 1985: 157; Merlan 1954: 60; Hamilton 1965: 118; Kosmetatou 2000: 36 n9; Daniels 1995: 18; Stoneman 2004: 16; Retsas 2009: 165; Fildes & Fletcher 2002: 21; Heckel 1986a: 302.

⁴¹ Although Alexander’s birth can be securely dated to July 356, the month he commenced his studies with Aristotle cannot be definitely determined – hence the uncertainty as to prince’s exact age upon entering the Royal Page School. Plut. *Alex.* 7; Diog. Laert. 5.10; Bosworth 1988a: 20; Hammond 1994b: 130; Brown 1949: 227; Gabriel 2010: 49; Ellis 1980a: 85; Green 1991: 54; Merlan 1954: 60; Hamilton 1965: 118; Fredricksmeyer 1990: 301; de Vries *et al.* 2004: 8; Tierney 1942: 222; Robb 1943: 204; Matthew 2015: 33.

⁴² Isoc. *Ep.* 5.3-4; *Dis.* 12.26; Plut. *Alex.* 7; Gell. 20.5.2-4; Ath. 11.508e; Bosworth 1988a: 21; Tierney 1942: 226; Green 1991: 57, 61; de Vries *et al.* 2004: 8; Saunders 2006: 7; Merlan 1954: 63, 73-76; Robb 1943: 209; Laurie 1894a: 428; Fildes & Fletcher 2002: 23; Gilley & Worthington 2010: 188.

⁴³ Diod. Sic. 17.103.6-8; Plut. *Alex.* 8, 41; Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.5; *Ind.* 15.11; Curt. 9.8.22-27; Just. 12.10.3; Green 1991: 61; de Vries *et al.* 2004: 8; Stoneman 2004: 16; Retsas 2009: 166-167, 168; Fildes & Fletcher 2002: 23; O’Brien 1994: 20, 164, 177-178; Gilley & Worthington 2010: 188; Hamilton 2002b: 108-109; King 2018: 122.

reasonable assumption Alexander also received instruction in these areas.⁴⁴ Certainly the prince was an accomplished musician at an early age.⁴⁵

How typical the curriculum was for all Pages – the young man was a prince of the realm and heir apparent after all – is impossible to say, although when Aristotle published a treatise on metaphysics Alexander (then king) chastised his former tutor for having made the discipline part of the public domain, suggesting at least, that this had been an area of study reserved for an exclusive few.⁴⁶ Alexander's time at the Royal School lasted until 340 when at age sixteen and acting as regent for Philip II, who was campaigning against Athenian interests in the Hellespont, the prince was called into action to suppress a rebellion by the Maedi in Thrace – something he achieved with consummate ease.⁴⁷

Such was the Royal Page School under Philip; an institution that quickly and quite rightly developed a reputation for being a *seminarium ducum praefectorumque* (training-school of generals and governors).⁴⁸ Without question, the system produced its fair share of military men of outstanding ability including – apart from Alexander himself – Craterus (designated successor to Parmenion) and Perdikkas, who, following Alexander's death in 323, was appointed Royal Treasurer and regent to the heir-apparent Arrhidaeus.⁴⁹ The school was also, however, responsible for developing men with outstanding administrative

⁴⁴ Aristot. *Pol.* 1337b23, 1338b2, 1338a13, 1338a37; Green 1991: 43; Tierney 1942: 226; Laurie 1894a: 428; 1894b: 488-489; 1895: 31; 488-489; Robb 1943: 209, 211; Saunders 2006: 7; Marrou 1982: 133, 139.

⁴⁵ Aeschin. 1.168; Plut. *Per.* 1; Green 1991: 45; Fildes & Fletcher 2002: 18, 20; de Vries *et al.* 2004: 6; Gilley & Worthington 2010: 188; Gabriel 2010: 8; Guth 2015: 337; Harris 1985: 378; Müller 2017: 255.

⁴⁶ Plut. *Alex.* 7; Gell. 20.5.4-5; Green 1991: 57; Merlan 1954: 74-75; Stoneman 2004: 16; Hamilton 2002b: 19; Boas 1953: 83; Bagley 1992: 232 n4.

⁴⁷ Plut. *Alex.* 9; Bosworth 1988a: 21; Green 1991: 62, 65; Tierney 1942: 223; de Vries *et al.* 2004: 8-9; Fredricksmeyer 1990: 301; Badian 1963: 244; O'Brien 1994: 23-24; Fildes & Fletcher 2002: 24-25; Müller 2010b: 180; Gilley & Worthington 2010: 189; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 558; Hamilton 1965: 119; 2002b: 23; Worthington 2013: 233; King 2018: 90, 134.

⁴⁸ Polyb. 8.12; Curt. 5.1.42, 8.6.6; Heckel 1986b: 281; 2009a: 71; Gabriel 2010: 48-49; Ellis 1976: 162; Hammond 1994b: 186; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 401-402; Müller 2010b: 170; Sawada 2010: 405.

⁴⁹ Diod. Sic. 18.23.2-3; Nep. 18.3.2-3; Just. 13.2.5, 4.5; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 402; Ashley 1998: 28; Heckel 1977: 13; 1986b: 291-292; Saunders 2006: 6, 7-8, 34; Wheatley 2009: 56, 60; Lattey 1917: 321; Anson 1992: 39-40; O'Brien 1994: 209, 254.

talent including individuals such as Leonnatus (son of Antreas from Lynkos) who, as satrap of Lesser Phrygia, demonstrated himself not only capable of provincial rule, but also of harbouring regal ambitions.⁵⁰ Other ex-Pages who succeeded in achieving monarchical status – other than Philip himself – included Amyntas II (394); Alexander of Epirus (350); and the Diadochi kings Cassander (306/5) Ptolemy (305), and Seleucus (305).⁵¹ Clearly, in the Royal Page School Macedonia possessed an outstanding institution well practised in the preparation of young men for both the physical and intellectual prosecution of warfare and its outcomes.

Such then were the educational opportunities for children of the Macedonian elite; but what of Thebes? Many Athenians of the Classical Period had a low opinion of Boeotians and their intellects.⁵² Eels and swine were employed in unflattering allusion and Theban misogyny was a commonly held (if not necessarily accurate) belief – a tradition that survived in later accounts.⁵³ Thebes' reputed backwardness was manifested in the city-state's apparent lack of concern for the education of its citizens and moral degeneracy,

⁵⁰ Development of administrative talent – Just. 13.1.12-13; Ashley 1998: 28; Gabriel 2010: 49; Hammond 1994b: 41, 186; Leveque 1980: 181; de Vries *et al.* 2004: 8. Leonnatus – Plut. *Eum.* 3.3-5; Arr. *Anab.* 3.5.5, 6.28.4; Just. 13.4.16, 5.14-15; Heckel 1985: 288; 1986b: 284, 292; Wheatley 2009: 59, 60; Anson 1992: 476; Gilley & Worthington 2010: 205; Adams 2010: 210.

⁵¹ Philip II – Hammond 1994b: 9; Bradford 1992: 8. Amyntas II – Ael. *VH* 12.43; Hammond 1980b: 168; 1990: 263; Hatzopoulos 1986: 282; Devine 1996: 280; Spawforth 2007: 84-85; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 169. Alexander of Epirus – Dem. 7.32; Diod. Sic. 16.72.1; Just. 8.6.6-8; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 505; Vlasto 1926: 154 n1; Hammond 1994b: 121; Errington 1990: 44; Carney 1992: 178; O'Brien 1994: 35; Sidnell 2006: 77; Rhodes 2010b: 35; Müller 2010b: 176; Greenwalt 2010: 293; Dell 1980: 95. Cassander – Diod. Sic. 19.52.1-5, 20.53.3-4, 100.2; Nep. 18.13.3; Just. 15.2.12; Wheatley 2009: 62; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 402; Gattinoni 2010: 113; Simpson 1957: 371; Adam-Veleni 2015: 547. Ptolemy – Diod. Sic. 20.53.2-3; Nep. 18.13.3; Plut. *Demetr.* 18; Just. 15.2.11; App. *Syr.* 9.54; Fildes & Fletcher 2002: p.23; Wheatley 2009: 57, 61; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 402; Saunders 2006: 8, 56; Heckel 1985: 288; Lattey 1917: 330. Seleucus – Diod. Sic. 20.53.2-3; Nep. 18.13.3; Plut. *Demetr.* 18; App. *Syr.* 9.55; Wheatley 2009: 61-62; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 402; Lattey 1917: 330.

⁵² Plut. *Mor.* 995E; Buck 1994: 1, 8; Demand 1982: 3, 49; Berman 2009: 510; Debnar 1996: 97; Freeman 1939: 151; Iversen 2007: 381; Lord 1927: 501; Sparkes 1967: 116; Bintliff & Snodgrass 1985: 125.

⁵³ Eels – Aristoph. *Ach.* 860-958; Paus. 9.24.2; Hanson 1999b: 23-24. Swine – Pind. *Ol.* 6.90; Ath. 10.417c-418b; Demand 1982: 10; Berman 2009: 510; Hanson 1999b: 23; Sparkes 1967: 116; Slater 1969: 88. Misogyny – Pl. *Symp.* 182b; Nep. 7.11.3-4; 15.5.2-3; Plut. *Mor.* 575E; Plut. *Alc.* 2; Demand 1982: 72, 79; Debnar 1996: 97.

which allowed man and boy to live together as a married couple – or so it was believed.⁵⁴ Certainly the *polis* had a notorious reputation for pederasty which probably dated to the vaguely historical relationship that supposedly existed between the Theban Laius and Chrysippus, son of Pelops.⁵⁵

Equally distasteful and alarming to Classical Greek eyes was the very strong connection of Boeotia with acrimony and violence, so much so that Pericles likened the Theban propensity for self-destruction to an ilex tree (holm oak) and the plant's inability to co-exist with other flora.⁵⁶ Mythology (or from a Greek perspective, the venerable past) also contributed to Boeotia's notoriety – it had, after all (in some ancient traditions at least), a close connection to Dionysus, not only god of wine and wine-making but also ritual madness and religious frenzy.⁵⁷ Furthermore, it was the site of Mount Cithaeron where followers of Dionysus (maenads) possessed by divine madness, supposedly dismembered livestock – and the unfortunate Pentheus.⁵⁸ Theban discord was also represented in the mythos of Polynices and Eteocles, sons of the Theban king Oedipus; cursed by their father for a lack of respect, the brothers fulfilled the prophecy when they fought each other to the death for the state's crown.⁵⁹

⁵⁴ Xen. *Lac.* 2.12; Str. 9.2.2; Cic. *Rep.* 4.4.4; Hanson 1999b: 23; 2010: 94, 95; Pownall 2003: 132; Davis 2013: 8; Percy 1996: 26, 129, 190.

⁵⁵ Xen. *Lac.* 2.12; Pl. *Symp.* 182b; *Leg.* 636b-c; Cic. *Rep.* 4.4.4; Plut. *Pel.* 19.1; Demand 1982: 65, 94-95. Laius and Chrysippus – Ael. *VH* 13.5; [Apollod.] 3.5.1; Grimal 1990: 97; Harlick 1998: 16, 27.

⁵⁶ Pericles' reference – Aristot. *Rh.* 1407a; Hanson 1999b: 24; Buck 1994: 2, 110; Cartledge 1987: 277; Beck 2014: 19; Martin 2016: 160; Tracy 2009: 29; Vickers 2015: 151.

⁵⁷ H. Hom. 7.35-40; 26.7-13; Eur. *Bacch.* 275-284, 298-303; *Phoen.* 655-657; Diod. Sic. 4.3.4-5; Ov. *Met.* 3.527-530; Grimal 1990: 128; Harlick 1998: 25; Seyffert 1957: 191; Burkert 1985: 161-162, 164-165; Grube 1935: 38, 41-42; Henrichs 1978: 136; 1984: 205, 212; Kraemer 1979: 57; Schechner 1961: 124-125.

⁵⁸ Eur. *Bacch.* 26-38, 1106-1147, 1226-1242; Str. 9.2.23; Ov. *Met.* 3.701-733; [Apollod.] 3.5.1-2; Paus. 9.5.4; Seyffert 1957: 192, 370; Grimal 1990: 255, 338; Harlick 1998: 60-61; Burkert 1985: 165; Grube 1935: 38, 47, 51; Henrichs 1978: 122-123; Hamilton 1974: 144; Burnett 1970: 20, 27; Bongers 2002: 83; O'Brien 1994: 2-4.

⁵⁹ Aesch. *Sept.* 785-822; Eur. *Phoen.* 871-878, 1389-1424; Soph. *Ant.* 67-69; *OC* 1530-1584; [Apollod.] 3.5.9, 6.8; Paus. 9.5.12-13, 25.1-2; Harlick 1998: 42, 64-66; Grimal 1990: 365-366; Buck 1994: 2; Demand 1982: 58; Seyffert 1957: 226, 502; Golden 2015: 100; Braun 2004: 127.

Boeotian belligerence, however, was not merely confined to the quasi-mythological past; it was frequently witnessed by the hostility that existed between the region's *poleis*, especially in aggressive Theban attempts at hegemony. Plataea, for example, was twice destroyed during the Classical Period at the behest of Thebes (426 and 373) and in 423 Thespieae's walls were levelled, an action repeated in 371.⁶⁰ So too Orchomenus; initially rescued from destruction following the Battle of Leuctra (371) by the intervention of Epaminondas, the *polis* found no such saviour in either 364 or 346 when it was razed by the armies of Thebes.⁶¹

Yet despite its invidious reputation as a belligerent rural backwater, Boeotia did have a tradition of intellectualism. Hesiod (*c.*700), whose works were preserved on a lead tablet at Mount Helicon, was a first generation Boeotian – even if he wasn't overly enamoured with the climate.⁶² Pindar (*c.*518-*c.*438) the great lyric poet, who wrote many of his famous victory odes between 479-457, was Boeotian born, as was Corinna of Tangara – famous for once having defeated her more celebrated compatriot in competition.⁶³ As

⁶⁰ Plataea (426) – Thuc. 3.68.1-3; Buck 1994: 14; Gomme 1956a: 356; Hammond 2000a: 83; Munn 1997: 68; Shrimpton 1971b: 315; Demand 1982: 41; Hornblower 1997: 463; Lazenby 2004: 56; Kagan 2005: 114. Plataea (373) – Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.1; Diod. Sic. 15.46.4-6; Paus. 9.1.8; Shrimpton 1971b: 315; Hammond 2000a: 89; Bakhuizen 1994: 310, 313; Camp 1991: 202; Buck 1994: 104; Iversen 2007: 398, 411. Thespieae (423) – Thuc. 4.133.1; Buck 1994: 18; Demand 1982: 42; Buckler 1980: 14, 20; Hanson 2006: 160; Cartledge 1987: 279. Thespieae (371) – Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.1; Paus. 9.14.2; Buckler 1980: 21, 46; Buck 1994: 104; Bosworth 1988a: 14; Bakhuizen 1994: 316; Munn 1997: 81; Roebuck 1948: 80; Rusch 2011: 194; Foxhall 2013: 198-199. Cartledge 1987: 379 contends 373/2. Diod. Sic. 15.46.6, 51.3, in what is almost certainly a doublet, places the second destruction of Thespieae at 374.

⁶¹ Intervention of Epaminondas – Diod. Sic. 15.57.1; Plut. *VP Pel.* 1.1; Paus. 9.15.3-4; Bakhuizen 1994: 323; Cawkwell 1972: 208; Buckler 1993: 107; Hanson 1999b: 55; Buckler 1980: 66; Roisman 2017: 298, 307. Destruction of 364 – Diod. Sic. 15.79.3-6; Paus. 9.15.3-4; Bakhuizen 1994: 317 n29, 323; Hanson 1999b: 108; Buckler 1980: 20, 184; 1993: 107; Buck 1994: 120-121; Munn 1997: 93; Buckler & Beck 2008: 219; Roebuck 1948: 80. Razed in 349 – Aeschin. 2.104, 141; Paus. 9.37.8, 10.33.9; Bosworth 1988a: 14; Hammond 1994b: 94, 205-206 n10; Gabriel 2010: 169; Hammond & Griffith 1997: 346.

⁶² Hesiod – Hes. *Op.* 634-645; Str. 9.2.25; Hanson 1999b: 17, 24, 36; Buck 1994: 1; Golden 2015: 4, 102; Demand 1982: 11, 69; Marrou 1982: 9; Cook 1962: 31. Mount Helicon – Paus. 9.31.4; Davison 1962: 151. Hesiod's poor opinion of Boeotia – Hes. *Op.* 639-640; Str. 9.2.25; Bintliff & Snodgrass 1985: 125; Borza 1990: 26.

⁶³ Pindar as Boeotian – Ael. *VH* 13.7; Paus. 9.23.2, 25.3; Robinson 1981: 95; Hanson 1999b: 17, 24, 26; Buck 1994: 1; Berman 2007: 21; 2009: 510; Iversen 2007: 181; Freeman 1939: 150-151, 155; Slater 1969: 88, 91; Cook 1962: 31; Bowra 1969: ix; Laurie 1894b: 489-490. Dates of odes – Bowra 1969: 10; Demand

might be expected from a region with a strong connection to lyric poetry, Boeotians were also associated closely with music and the playing of musical instruments. Thought to temper violence inherent in the Theban character, one such implement was the lyre, although from the fifth century the quintessential Boeotian instrument was undoubtedly the *aulos* (oboe) – somewhat ironically as its attribution to Athena suggests an Attic origin.⁶⁴

Further evidencing Thebes' cultural standing as something more than a rustic outpost was the status of the *polis* as the centre for Pythagoreanism on mainland Greece, a reputation that no doubt began with the arrival of Lysis and Philolaus – disciples of Pythagoras who had fled to Thebes in the mid fifth century following persecution of the sect in southern Italy.⁶⁵ Pythagoreans believed in the transmigration of souls (metempsychosis or reincarnation in modern parlance) as well as the harmony of numbers being the underlying principle of existence.⁶⁶ They also adopted a way of living based on Pythagoras himself which entailed the practice of frugality in both eating and drinking, as

1982: 28; Freeman 1939: 145-146; Marrou 1982: 39; Segal 1985b: 227. Corinna of Tanagra – Plut. *Mor.* 347F-348A; Ael. *VH* 13.25; Paus. 9.22.3; Demand 1982: 85, 90; Bowra 1931: 4-5; Hanson 1999b: 17, 24; Skinner 1983: 9-10, 18 n6; Allen & Frel 1972: 26-28; Segal 1985b: 239-240. Modern scholarship is somewhat equivocal about Pindar and Corinna as contemporaries. For Corinna in the late third century – West 1970: 278, 286; 1990: 553. On the impossibility of securely dating Corinna's work – Henderson 1995: 35-36; 1989: 32; Collins 2006: 18 n2-3; Segal 1985b: 239-240.

⁶⁴ Music as a calming influence – Plut. *Pel.* 19.1; Demand 1982: 86; Roberts 1895: 33. Lyre – Paus. 9.5.7-8, 8.4; Demand 1982: 87. *Aulous* – Pl. *Prt.* 318C; Str. 9.2.18, 20; Plut. *Alc.* 2; Plin. *HN* 16.66.168-171; Paus. 4.27.7, 9.12.5-6; Ath. 14.631e; Demand 1982: 86-87; Marrou 1982: 134. Connection to Athena – Pind. *Pyth.* 12.7-8; Aristot. *Pol.* 1341a26; Demand 1982: 87.

⁶⁵ Centre of Pythagoreanism – Pl. *Phd.* 61D-E; Aristot. *Rh.* 1398b; Demand 1982: 114; Morrison 1958: 207; Veljan 2000: 260; Kahn 2001: 49; Buckler 1993: 105. Persecution of Pythagoreans – Plut. *Mor.* 583A-B; Diog. Laert. 8.7, 39; Iambl. *VP* 35, 55; Demand 1982: 39, 70; Kahn 2001: 75; Veljan 2000: 260; Hanson 1999b: 56; Morrison 1958: 202, 208; Fideler 1987: 37-38; Stanley 2010: 91.

⁶⁶ Transmigration – Pl. *Phd.* 88A; Cic. *Tusc.* 1.17.39; Ov. *Met.* 15.158-159; Gell. 4.11.14; Iambl. *VP* 14; Diog. Laert. 8.4-5, 14; Porph. 19, 26, 45; Phot. 6; Demand 1982: 70, 73; Stanley 2010: 89, 256-257; Kahn 2001: 2, 4, 66; Morrison 1958: 201, 202; Hanson 1999b: 57; Fideler 1987: 31; Swanson 1958: 21. Harmony of numbers – Aristot. *Metaph.* 986a; Iambl. *VP* 29, 47-52; Diog. Laert. 8.10, 12, 25; Phot. 3-4; Drake 2010: 27, 30; Stanley 2010: 142-143, 147-148; Demand 1982: 70; Buckler 1993: 106; Veljan 2000: 259; Kahn 2001: 3, 26; Fideler 1987: 20-22, 32; Hanson 1999b: 57-58.

well as moderation in sex.⁶⁷ Tradition is confused over the sect's attitude towards the consumption of flesh, with some commentators believing Pythagoreans were strictly vegetarian.⁶⁸ It would appear, however, that whilst not generally an advocate of a meat diet, Pythagoras himself did sanction eating the remains of sacrificial animals not offered to the gods.⁶⁹

What becomes clear, therefore, is that there existed an intellectual framework that provided an opportunity for Theban children to receive an education of some quality. Without question, Boeotian *poleis* had “primary” schools, and they appear to have been well-established. The *polis* of Mycalessus, small even by Greek standards, had more than one facility – an inference which can be drawn from Thucydides’ harrowing description of the 413 massacre that occurred at the village’s *largest* school.⁷⁰ Attic intellectual chauvinism, therefore, may well have had its roots not in the fact that Boeotian *poleis* lacked schools, but that the vast majority of students left – as was common practice amongst societies for whom agriculture was the primary focus – when around ten years of age to work in the fields or attend herds.⁷¹ Without question Boeotia – “dance-floor of Ares” – with its wide plains and fertile soils was renowned in antiquity for the quality and diversity of crops produced.⁷²

⁶⁷ Diod. Sic. 10.7.1-2; Iambl. *VP* 3, 30, 31; Diog. Laert. 8.9, 19, 22-24; Ath. 10.418e-f, 419a; Porph. 34; Buckler 1993:107; Stanley 2010: 48, 70, 124; Drake 2010: 21-22; Kahn 2001: 21; Prince 2010: 436; Demand 1982: 70; Veljan 2000: 259; Fideler 1987: 30.

⁶⁸ Ov. *Met.* 15.70-89, 155-159, 477-478; Diog. Laert. 8.13, 19, 33; Stanley 2010: 47, 124, 256, 262-263; Hanson 1999b: 57; Fideler 1987: 19; Veljan 2000: 259; Swanson 1958: 22; Bowie 1995: 468.

⁶⁹ Plut. *Mor.* 729C; Gell. 4.11.2, 11.6-7; Ath. 10.481f; Iambl. *VP* 16, 17, 24; Porph. 34; Phot. 1; Kahn 2001: 9, 147-148; Bowie 1995: 478 n63; Rives 2011: 197; Parker 2010: 143; Riedweg 2002: 69; Zhmud 1997: 235.

⁷⁰ Thuc. 7.29.3-5; Buck 1994: 3; Criore 2015: 150; Quinn 1995: 571, 573; Laurie 1894a: 424-425; Hornblower 2008: 597, 599; Gaebel 2002: 106; Gomme & Andrewes 1970: 409; Bowersock 1965: 135-136.

⁷¹ Pl. *Resp.* 540e; Lys. 20.11; Aristot. *Pol.* 1310a22; Golden 2015: 29-30; Pounds 1969: 143.

⁷² Fertility – Aristoph. *Ach.* 872-884; Eur. *Phoen.* 645-648; Theophr. *Hist. pl.* 8.4.5, 9.10.3; Str. 9.2.1; Plin. *HN* 18.12.63; Paus. 9.28.1; Bintliff & Snodgrass 1985: 125, 139; Buck 1979: 1, 3; Hanson 1998: 205;

Details of higher educational opportunities at Thebes are hazy but a surviving tradition that Epaminondas received a “state education” suggests that some level of program was in place for those with sufficient aptitude, application and affluence.⁷³ Exercise formed part of the curriculum but a Theban education, however, was not just limited to gymnastics. Instruction in academic subjects was also provided and it might be imagined the teachings of Pythagoras dominated “secondary” and “tertiary” level studies. Pythagorean curriculum, in the broad sense, centred upon arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music as well as physical activities such as running, wrestling and other trials of strength.⁷⁴ Epaminondas, for example, was a Pythagorean although the tradition that the *boiotarchos* was a pupil of Lysis is not without chronological difficulties.⁷⁵ Some commentators insist that Epaminondas learnt only the fundamentals of the philosophy and was not a devotee – a five year initiatory process.⁷⁶ Whatever the case, the Theban general certainly exhibited all the traits indicative of a Pythagorean education. In addition to playing both *aulos* and lyre, he was reportedly fond of singing and dancing.⁷⁷ Abstentious in nature, Epaminondas was also a known enthusiast of physical activity and like all

1999b: 17-18; Demand 1982: 7-8; Gomme 1911/12: 209-210. Dance-floor of Ares – Plut. *Mor.* 193E; *Marc.* 21; Munn 1997: 104; Kalliontzis 2014: 367; Scott-Kilvert 1973a: 7; 1973b: 12.

⁷³ Nep. 15.2.1; Cooper 2000b: 174; Wallace 2015: 167; Stewart 2009: 78; Colby 1926: 123.

⁷⁴ Academic subjects of study – Cic. *Rep.* 1.10.16; *Tusc.* 4.2.3-4; Plut. *Mor.* 384A; Quint. *Inst.* 9.4.12-13; Ath. 4.184e; Iambl. *VP* 25-26, 29; Porph. 30; Phot. 1, 11-14; Stanley 2010: 184-186; Kahn 2001: 13, 40, 153; Fideler 1987: 34; Marrou 1982: 75; Demand 1982: 89; Morrison 1958: 201, 203-204, 212. Gymnastic curriculum – Iambl. *VP* 21; Porph. 15; Stanley 2010: 130.

⁷⁵ Epaminondas a Pythagorean – Diod. Sic. 16.2.3; Nep. 15.2.2-3; Just. 7.5.3; Pausanias, 9.13.1; Ath. 4.184e, 10.419a; Hanson 1999b: 28, 53; Davis 2013: 3; Drews 1962: 388; Bradford 1992: 9; Buckler 1993: 104-105. Pupil of Lysis – Diod. Sic. 16.2.3; Nep. 15.2.2; Plut. *Mor.* 583C; Ael. *VH* 3.17; Paus. 9.13.1; Iambl. *VP* 35, 55; Diog. Laert. 8.7; Buckler 1993: 105-106; Hanson 1999b: 56; Demand 1982: 70, 80; Stanley 2010: 91; Kahn 2001: 49, 75; Shrimpton 1971b: 316; McQueen 1995a: 63.

⁷⁶ Iambl. *VP* 17; Porph. 37; Buckler 1993: 105-106; Stanley 2010: 121, 126; Kahn 2001: 8; Fideler 1987: 31; McQueen 1995a: 64.

⁷⁷ Nep. 15.2.2; Ath. 4.184e; Iambl. *VP* 25; Buckler 1993: 106; Shrimpton 1971a: 56; 1971b: 316; Williams 1995: 531; Stem 2009/10: 124, 134; Nikitaras *et al.* 2008: 1, 3; Roisman 2017: 275.

Pythagoreans was active and influential in politics – even if his manoeuvrings demonstrated a less than perfect understanding of the finer art of diplomacy.⁷⁸

Antiquity had little doubt that Epaminondas' Pythagorean instruction was the reason for his success and that Thebes' failure to maintain her hegemony was because subsequent leaders lacked comparable training and education.⁷⁹ A more critical analysis, however, reveals this interpretation to be erroneous. Epaminondas' tactics were based on past experiments rather than Pythagorean insight – even his strategy to invade the Peloponnese was not novel, having been proposed over twenty years before by Timolaus of Corinth.⁸⁰

Furthermore, the policies of the *boiotarchos* hardly enjoyed unanimous support.⁸¹ The decision to engage the Spartans at Leuctra was only decided by the last minute arrival of fellow general Brachyllides and his casting vote in favour of Epaminondas.⁸² Despite the famous outcome, Epaminondas himself was prosecuted twice a mere two years later (369) by compatriot Meneclidas, a politician who derived his support from popular acclaim rather than a narrow faction. Undoubtedly acquitted on the first occasion, the outcome of the second trial is less certain but what is clear is that Epaminondas was not elected

⁷⁸ Abstentious – Nep. 15.3.1-3, 4.2-3; Plut. *Mor.* 192D-E, 585A, 1127A; Ath. 10.419a; Buckler 1993: 107; Hanson 1999b: 54, 56. Physical activity – Nep. 15.2.4-5; Plut. *Pel.* 7.3; *Mor.* 788A, 1127A-B; Hanson 1999b: 54-55; Wooyeal & Bell 2004: 22. Politics – Iambl. *VP* 7, 9, 27, 32; Diog. Laert. 8.3, 40; Porph. 21; Demand 1982: 70; Hanson 1999b: 57; Kahn 2001: 6-7; Morrison 1958: 201-202; Veljan 2000: 259; Fideler 1987: 19; Drake 2010: 36; Stanley 2010: 80, 83-84. For a full discussion of Epaminondas' diplomatic initiatives – Thesis: 114-117, 121-124.

⁷⁹ Reason for Epaminondas' success – Aristot. *Rh.* 1398b; Diod. Sic. 15.50.5-6; Nep. 15.2.2-3; Hanson 1999b: 58-59, 60, 118; Buckler 1993: 104-105; Morrison 1958: 207; Shrimpton 1971b: 316. Failure of future leaders – Polyb. 20.4; Nep. 7.11.1; Str. 9.2.2, 5; Hanson 1999b: 51; Gomme 1911/12: 189; Walbank 1979a: 66-67.

⁸⁰ For Epaminondas' tactics being previously employed – Thesis: 184-190. Timolaus' proposal – Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.12; Hanson 1999b: 76-77; Buck 1994: 44, 141 n6; Rusch 2011: 167; Hutchinson 2000: 152; Echols 1953: 217; Cartledge 1987: 384.

⁸¹ Diod. Sic. 15.53.3; Plut. *Mor.* 542C; *Pel.* 24, 28; Cary 1924: 182-183; Cawkwell 1972: 265-266; Hanson 2010: 106; Cartledge 1987: 310, 312; Roisman 2017: 276, 304, 309.

⁸² Paus. 9.13.6; Cawkwell 1972: 265; Buck 1994: 114; Hammond 2000a: 93; Rusch 2011: 195; English 2012: 102; Roberts 2017: 357; Roisman 2017: 290; Tod 1933: 93.

boiotarchos in 368.⁸³ Securing funding for his invasions of the Peloponnese was also a constant challenge for Epaminondas – for example, the *boiotarchos* was forced to accept ten talents from the Eleans as partial subsidy for Thebes’ first offensive.⁸⁴ Discontent with Epaminondas’ leadership may well have stemmed from doctrine. Pythagoreans were oligarchic by nature and generally opposed to *stasis*, beliefs that manifested in Epaminondas’ refusal to take part in the liberation of Thebes until Leontiades had been removed, and his lenient attitude towards Orchomenus.⁸⁵

How much, or even what exactly, Philip learnt during his time at Thebes must therefore remain a matter of some speculation. It is likely that he would have received, like Epaminondas, a Pythagorean education encompassing literacy, mathematics, music and gymnastics. However, Philip’s age – he returned to Macedonia at sixteen – meant that at best, the prince would have received but formal instruction in only the fundamentals of these disciplines. Besides, the Macedonian was decidedly un-Pythagorean by nature and whilst definitely no simple rustic, if whilst hostage Philip did indeed embrace the sect’s values and beliefs, it was something he later kept well hidden.

II. Strategy

Clearly, the formal educational opportunities that would have provided Philip with an intellectual platform from which to assert hegemony over Greece were limited. Nowhere

⁸³ Diod. Sic. 15.72.2; Nep. 15.5.2-3, 7.1-2, 8.1-5; Plut. *Pel.* 25.4; *Mor.* 194C, 540E, 805C; Ael. *VH* 13.42; Paus. 9.14.7; Cawkwell 1972: 266-267, 277; Buckler 1980: 133, 141-143, 149; Buck 1994: 111; Cary 1924: 184; Hanson 1999b: 53, 105.

⁸⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.19; Plut. *Mor.* 193B-C; Cawkwell 1972: 267; Hanson 1999b: 76; 2010: 104; Roisman 2017: 299; Hamilton 1991: 222; LaForse 2010: 547.

⁸⁵ Oligarchic – Diog. Laert. 8.3; Demand 1982: 70-71; Buckler 1993: 106. Opposed to *stasis* – Diog. Laert. 8.23; Iambl. *VP* 34, 75; Porph. 22; Buckler 1993: 107. Liberation of Thebes – Nep. 15.10.3; 16.4.1; Plut. *VP Pel.* 1.3; Buckler 1993: 107; Hanson 1999b: 57. Leniency towards Orchomenus – Diod. Sic. 15.57.1; Plut. *VP Pel.* 1.1; Paus. 9.15.3-4; Bakhuizen 1994: 323; Cawkwell 1972: 208; Buckler 1980: 66; 1993: 107; Hanson 1999b: 55; Roisman 2017: 298, 307.

is that more evident than in Epaminondas' formulation and implementation of his Spartan strategy. An effective Theban policy concerning the Peloponnesian *polis* was made necessary by events that had taken place during the 370s. In 378, hostilities broke out between a Theban/Athenian alliance and Sparta – an animosity that festered on until in 371 a peace conference was convened in Lacedaemonia, perhaps at the behest of the Persian king Artaxerxes II.⁸⁶ Matters became personal when Epaminondas, a *boiotarchos* at the time, clashed with Agesilaus over the terms under which participants validated the treaty.⁸⁷ Epaminondas' actions amounted to an untenable challenge (at least in Spartan eyes) to their control over the subjugated peoples of Lacedaemonia and led directly to the Battle of Leuctra, with Sparta's subsequent defeat.⁸⁸

Thebes' victory, however, was far from decisive strategically: admittedly Leuctra had damaged Sparta but the *polis* remained far from crippled and with time the potential for full recovery existed, especially given that its power base in Messenia and Laconia remained unaffected, something Epaminondas well recognised.⁸⁹ Orthodox belief is that in anticipating this latent threat, the *boiotarchos* reduced Sparta to a regional power well-contained by hostile *poleis* founded in key locations.⁹⁰ A closer analysis, however, reveals the Theban's efforts were not quite as decisive as they have been represented.

⁸⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.12; Diod. Sic. 15.50.4; Buckler 1980: 46, 68; Buck 1994: 111-112; Sealey 1956: 189-190; Roos 1949: 266; Cartledge 1987: 306, 379; Ryder 1963: 238, 238 n5; Mosley 1965: 263-264.

⁸⁷ Diod. Sic. 15.50.4-5, 52.1-2; Nep. 15.6.4; Plut. *Ages.* 27-28; Cawkwell 1972: 264; Buckler 1980: 55; Buck 1994: 112-113; Munn 1997: 83; Hammond 2000a: 89-90; Sealey 1956: 190.

⁸⁸ Plut. *Ages.* 28; Paus. 9.13.2; Cawkwell 1972: 264; Scott 2010: 107; Bury 2015: 573-574; Roisman 2017: 287; Everitt 2016: 405; Rockwell 2017: 100-101; Buckler & Beck 2008: 42.

⁸⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.8-11; Paus. 9.14.4; Cawkwell 1972: 266; Buckler 1980: 104, 109, 202; Roy 1971: 569; Hanson 2010: 97, 103-104. It was also in the interests of Thebes' enemies (Athens for example) that Sparta remain strong – Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.33, 7.1.1-14; Diod. Sic. 15.63.2; Harding 2015: 37; Hornblower 2002: 247; LaForse 2010: 548; Roy 1971: 574; Underhill 2012: 263.

⁹⁰ Paus. 9.15.6; Zahrnt 2009: 13; Bosworth 1988a: 13; Cawkwell 1976: 62; 1978b: 15; 1979a: 7; Errington 1990: 71; Maher 2015: 15; Müth 2014: 105; Hamilton 1997: 56.

Epaminondas' Peloponnesian strategy has often been associated with the (re)foundation of Mantinea, Messene and Megalopolis – *poleis* hostile to Sparta whose strategic situations and inherent ill-disposition could be relied upon to check future Lacedaemonian ambition. Mantinea was sited on an important access route within the Peloponnese and in 386 had been accused by Sparta for disloyalty during the Corinthian War – a specious charge.⁹¹ The real reason for Lacedaemonian ire was the geographic location of the *polis*, its democratic government, and the city-state's close ties at the time with Argos – Sparta's ancient enemy.⁹² Mantinea lost its independence in 385 following an invasion led by Agesipolis, the result of which saw the fortifications of the *polis* demolished and its citizens relocated into four newly created villages.⁹³ Following the Spartan defeat at Leuctra, however, Mantinea was rebuilt and reinhabited – despite the vehement objections of the Lacedaemonians.⁹⁴

Epaminondas' second invasion of the Peloponnese saw the re-foundation of Messene, a feat achieved by the Theban army and its engineers in apparently just eighty-five days.⁹⁵ The *polis*, and consequent control of Messenia itself, represented a limitation of sorts to the revival of Sparta as the region's rich farmland supported Spartiate holdings – its loss doubtless led to the impoverishment of some Spartans with consequent forfeiture

⁹¹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.1-2; Kennell 2010: 137; Underhill 2012: 179; Rusch 2011: 183; Roberts & Bennett 2014: 192-193; Tuplin 1993: 88-89; Hack 1978: 219-220; Ray 2012: 41.

⁹² Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.18; Kennell 2010: 137; Roisman 2017: 277; Bradford 2011: 165; Roberts & Bennett 2014: 192; Hornblower 2002: 203-204.

⁹³ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.4-7; Buckler 1980: 70; Welwei 2010: 539; LaForse 2010: 546; Figueira & Jensen 2013: 494; Ager 2013: 508; Rusch 2011: 183; Roy 1971: 570; Cartledge 1987: 259; Underhill 2012: 180, 285.

⁹⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.3-5; Maher 2015: 17; Buckler 1980: 70-71; Roy 1971: 570, 572; Cawkwell 1976: 72; Beck 2000: 13.

⁹⁵ Din. 1.72-73; Buckler 1980: 28, 86-87; Munn 1997: 88; Roy 1971: 573; Cawkwell 1972: 264; Müth 2014: 108; Hanson 1999b: 99-101; Rusch 2011: 204; Cartledge 1987: 35, 63, 385; Beck 2000: 16-17; LaForse 2010: 547; Cooper 2000b: 176.

of citizenship status.⁹⁶ Messene also had important strategic and symbolic value. Located as it was on the slopes of Mt Ithome (the centre of resistance during the Messenian wars of the eighth and seventh centuries, as well as the helot revolt of 465), the *polis* controlled territory to Sparta's west and provided a rallying point for helots and *perioikoi*, two groups with much to gain by the containment of Spartan territorial ambitions.⁹⁷

A year later (368) the *polis* of Megalopolis was founded in southwestern Arcadia.⁹⁸ The impetus for the city-state's establishment was provided by Arcadian defeat in the Tearless Battle earlier that year.⁹⁹ Built to protect the approaches of southwest Arcadia from Lacedaemonian invasion, Megalopolis became the Arcadian League's meeting place and home to many surrounding communities united in their hostility towards Sparta.¹⁰⁰

Collectively these three *poleis* had an impact on the revival of Sparta following its defeat at Leuctra, although the degree to which they inhibited the military capabilities of the *polis* – and Epaminondas' role in their creation – is easy to overstate. For example, despite the contention of commentators (both ancient and modern) of Theban instigation, the re-foundation of Mantinea and subsequent *synoikismos* was an initiative of the Mantineans themselves (probably in response to the urging of Lycomedes) – although other

⁹⁶ Importance of Messenia – Plut. *Ages.* 34; Fields 2006: 33; Buckler 1980: 86; Hutchinson 2000: 25; Maher 2015: 15, 18; Cartledge 2003b: 228. Role of land in Spartan citizenship – Buckler 1980: 86; Hanson 2010: 98, 105; Hutchinson 2000: 24; Hodkinson 2009: 66; Hansen 2009: 439.

⁹⁷ Mount Ithome – Thuc. 1.101.2; Paus. 1.29.8, 4.27.6; Fields 2006: 33; Buckler 1980: 86-87; Munn 1997: 88; LaForse 2010: 547; Hornblower 1997: 158. Unification of helots and *perioikoi* – Diod. Sic. 15.66.1; Plut. *Pel.* 24.5; Paus. 4.26.5-7; Cartledge 2003b: 228; Buckler 1980: 86.

⁹⁸ Diod. Sic. 15.72.4; Maher 2015: 15, 17-18; Roy 1971: 571, 591; Lazenby 2012: 194; Rusch 2011: 207; LaForse 2010: 548. For a date of 371/0 see – Paus. 8.27.8; Hornblower 1990: 71; Cooper 2000b: 176; Frazer 1898: 307.

⁹⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.28-31; Diod. Sic. 15.72.4; Buckler 1980: 107; Roy 1971: 577-578, 591; Lazenby 2012: 194; Rusch 2011: 206-207; Beck 2000: 15.

¹⁰⁰ Dem. 16.4; Diod. Sic. 15.72.4; Paus. 8.27.1, 3-4; Buckler 1980: 107; Roy 1971: 578; Maher 2015: 17-18; Cartledge 1987: 262; 2003b: 233; Brodersen 2010: 111; Lattimore 2010: 473; LaForse 2010: 547-548.

Peloponnesian states assisted with labour and funds.¹⁰¹ Similarly, the Boeotian *boiotarchos* has been credited with active involvement in the construction of Megalopolis.¹⁰² However, whilst Epaminondas and Thebes doubtlessly approved of the foundation of the *polis*, the real credit for its coming into existence (and construction) lay with the Arcadians.¹⁰³

Even claims that the re-foundation of Messene, an action unquestionably attributable to Epaminondas, contributed to the collapse of the Spartan military system may be somewhat exaggerated. Certainly the *polis* was located in a strong defensive position and represented a clear threat to Spartan lines of communication.¹⁰⁴ However, if their actions in the Tearless Battle (368) were anything to go by, the military worth of Messenian troops was questionable – especially initially.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, the impact on the Spartan army as a result of Messenia’s restoration, so often regarded as decisive, also deserves closer examination. Despite vast territorial holdings, Spartiate numbers had never been great – perhaps eight to ten thousand at most.¹⁰⁶ *Oliganthropia* had long been recognised as a problem for Sparta and its endless campaigns did nothing to alleviate the situation, so that by the Battle of Mantinea (418) it has been plausibly adduced the total number of Spartan citizens did not exceed three thousand.¹⁰⁷ Nearly fifty years later there were

¹⁰¹ Claims of Epaminondas’ role – Paus. 8.8.10, 9.14.4; Fields 2006: 33; Hamilton 1997: 56; Maher 2015: 15, 17. Initiative of Mantineans and others – Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.3, 5; Cawkwell 1976: 72; Roy 1971: 570; Maher 2015: 42; Hanson 1999b: 82, 101; Cartledge 1987: 261, 383; Underhill 2012: 255.

¹⁰² Paus. 9.14.4; Fields 2006: 33; Cartledge 2003b: 233; Cawkwell 1972: 254; Maher 2015: 18; Hamilton 1997: 56; Beck 2000: 11; Roy 1971: 578.

¹⁰³ Diod. Sic. 15.72.4, 94.1; Paus. 6.12.8; 8.27.1-7; Diog. Laert. 3.23; Buckler 1980: 108; Roy 1971: 578; Cawkwell 1976: 72; Hornblower 1990: 71; Hanson 1999b: 101; Beck 2000: 14.

¹⁰⁴ Defensively strong – Polyb. 8.8, 12; Plut. *Demetr.* 33; Paus. 4.31.5; Müth 2014: 116-118; Fields 2006: 33, 36; Walbank 1967: 79; Whitley 2001: 315; Luraghi 2008: 217. Threat to communications – Maher 2015: 15, 18; Cartledge 2003b: 228; Hutchinson 2014: 157; Stewart 2018: 380; Luraghi 2008: 288.

¹⁰⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.28-32; Polyb. 4.32; Diod. Sic. 15.72.4; Plut. *Ages.* 33; Buckler 1980: 216-217; Roy 1971: 557; Müth 2014: 110 n14; Hanson 1999b: 109-110; Hutchinson 2000: 25.

¹⁰⁶ Hdt. 7.234; Aristot. *Pol.* 1270a34; Cawkwell 1983: 385; Christesen 2006: 57; Lazenby 2012: 3; Cartledge 1987: 37, 167; 2003b: 72, 137; van Wees 2004: 248; Harley 1934: 130; Hall 2000: 75; Hawkins 2011: 405; Hanson 1999b: 66; Rusch 2011: 20; How & Wells 2008: 651; Yalichev 1997: 84.

¹⁰⁷ Spartan *oliganthropia* – Aristot. *Pol.* 1270a11; Hamilton 1986: 245; Cawkwell 1983: 385, 390; Cartledge 2002: 135; Pomeroy 2002: 42; Stewart 2018: 378; Buckler & Beck 2008: 13. Estimates of Sparta’s citizen

probably no more than 1,500 full Spartiates eligible for military service with the consequence that at the Battle of Leuctra (371), Sparta's infantry contingent in an army of 10,000 comprised a mere 700 citizen-hoplites.¹⁰⁸

Whatever the exact figures, two important points should be recognised. The first is that the decline in Spartiate numbers was a well-established trend that long predated Epaminondas and his anti-Spartan policies. The second, as will be demonstrated, was that Sparta for some time had recognised manpower shortages were an issue and taken steps to maintain both the size and quality of her army through the increasing inclusion of non-Spartiates into the military. One such group were the *perioikoi*, who had a long-established tradition of serving with the Spartan army and during the fifth and fourth centuries their importance appears to have increased.¹⁰⁹ At Plataea (479), for example, 5,000 *perioikoi* were brigaded separately to, but alongside, the Spartans on the prestigious right wing of the phalanx, demonstrating they could be relied upon to both fight and fight well.¹¹⁰ Individual *perioikoi* also held high commands within the navy. Diniadas, for example, commanded a Spartan squadron in its operations against Methymna and Mitylene in 411.¹¹¹

population varies – Cawkwell 1983: 385, 385 n2 calculates 2,100-2,500. Cartledge 1987: 167-168, 355; van Wees 2004: 249; Gomme 1959: 101 (using Thuc. 5.68.2-3 as the basis of the calculation) contend 3,000 total Spartiates, 900 of which took part in the battle. Yalichev 1997: 84 estimates 4,000 Spartiates by 400.

¹⁰⁸ Estimates of Spartan numbers vary – For no more than 1,000 see Aristot. *Pol.* 1270a11; Cawkwell 1983: 385; Cartledge 1987: 167, 355, 382; 2003b: 226; van Wees 2004: 249; Bosworth 1988a: 13; Harley 1934: 130; Rusch 2011: 21; Sekunda 2014b: 59. For 1,500 see Christesen 2006: 57; Hamilton 1997: 58; Hanson 1999b: 66; How & Wells, 2008: 651. For 1,200 at most see Hawkins 2011: 418. For seven hundred Spartiates at Leuctra – Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.15; Cawkwell 1976: 83; 1983: 385; Lazenby 2012: 23, 186; Hawkins 2011: 401; Sekunda 2014b: 58.

¹⁰⁹ Hdt. 9.11, 29; Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.8-9; Isoc. *Dis.* 12.180; Cawkwell 1983: 387; Christesen 2006: 57; Lazenby 2012: 22; Cartledge 1987: 16; 2003b: 137, 195; Hawkins 2011: 402-403; How & Wells 2008: 651; Ridley 1974: 288; Wade-Gery 1944: 125.

¹¹⁰ Hdt. 9.28; Hammond 1986: 247; 1996b: 18 n50; Lazenby 1993: 216, 237; 2012: 120, 131, 134; Yalichev 1997: 94; Cawkwell 1983: 386; Ridley 1974: 288 n23; Wade-Gery 1944: 119, 126 n4; Braun 1994: 43; Cartledge 1987: 40; van Wees 2004: 84; 2007: 277.

¹¹¹ Thuc. 8.22.1-2; Cawkwell 1983: 393; Lazenby 2004: 177; 2012: 28; How & Wells 2008: 651; Cartwright 1997: 277; Hornblower 2008: 810; Hodkinson 1993: 154; Hammond 1895: 39.

Another body of non-citizens conscripted by the Spartans were helots, employed in a military capacity at least since the second Persian War (480-479). According to some modern commentators, this was as *psiloi* stationed in the phalanx's rear which thus allowed the Spartans to field wider formations but at the same time maintain the normal depth of eight rows.¹¹² As the conflict escalated and casualties rose, Sparta also deployed helots in various campaigns during the Peloponnesian War and with growing reliance, sometimes promoting them to frontline troops. Brasidas, for example, was given seven hundred helots equipped as hoplites and used them to great effect in Thrace during the 420s.¹¹³

As Spartan manpower decreased, communities such as *neodamodeis*, *hypomeiones*, *nothoi* and *mothakes* – hitherto on the fringe of Spartan society – were incorporated ever-increasingly into the Lacedaemonian army.¹¹⁴ *Neodamodeis*, for example, together with a contingent of helots, were deployed at Mantinea (418) and several years later in 413 Eccritus commanded a similar force of six hundred whose mission was the relief of Syracuse.¹¹⁵ *Neodamodeis* were also assigned for combat in Euboea when in 412 a force of

¹¹² Light troops – Hdt. 9.28-29, 85; Paus. 4.11.1; Hammond 1986: 247-248; 1996: 16-17; Lazenby 1993: 227; Schwartz 2009: 139; Matthew 2012a: 178-179; Rusch 2011: 13; How & Wells 2008: 722-723; Cawkwell 1989: 388; Talbert 1989: 24; Braun 1994: 43; Roisman 2017: 18. In the phalanx – Hunt 1997: 133; 1998: 33; Sekunda 2013: 212; van Wees 2004: 181.

¹¹³ Thuc. 4.80.1-2, 5.67.1; Gomme & Andrewes 1970: 35; Talbert 1989: 25; Moore 2013: 461; Fisher 2010a: 330; Lee 2010b: 493; Welwei 2010: 530; van Wees 1995: 176 n28; Cartwright 1997: 186-187, 217; Cawkwell 1983: 392; Lazenby 2012: 59; Rusch 2011: 99; Kagan 2005: 171; Jordan 2005: 56; Cartledge 1987: 39, 322.

¹¹⁴ *Neodamodeis* – Thuc. 4.80.1-2; Hawkins 2011: 410; Cawkwell 1983: 388; Christesen 2006: 57, 59; Lazenby 2012: 22; Cartledge 2003b: 190, 195; Hamilton 1997: 59. *Hypomeiones* – Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.6; Lazenby 2012: 22, 24; Hawkins 2011: 416; Cawkwell 1983: 388. *Nothoi* – Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.9; Cawkwell 1983: 388, 398; Cartledge 1987: 28. *Mothakes* – Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.7, 9; Plut. *Ages.* 20; Plut. *Phoc.* 20; Ael. *VH* 12.43; Ath. 6.271e-f; Cawkwell 1983: 394; Cawkwell 1976: 63, 73; Lazenby 2012: 26-27.

¹¹⁵ Mantinea – Thuc. 5.67.1; Kagan 2005: 236; Wade-Gery 1944: 118; Hornblower 2008: 175. Syracuse – Thuc. 7.19.3; Lazenby 2004: 5, 153; 2012: 78; Kagan 2005: 300; Cawkwell 1983: 393; van Wees 2004: 45; Gomme & Andrewes 1970: 35; Rusch 2011: 118; Yalichev 1997: 110; Jordan 2005: 56-57; Cartledge 1987: 40; Brice 2013: 634.

three hundred under Alcamenes and Melanthus were detailed to assist the islanders' revolt from Athens – although the troops were eventually deployed in Lesbos instead.¹¹⁶

Not only was Sparta willing to create new divisions to enhance her military capacity, she was also prepared to supplement her army's numbers with mercenaries as the need arose. Brasidas' army set forth to campaign in the Chalcidice not only with 700 *neodamodeis*, but also a further 1,000 hoplite mercenaries he himself had raised in the Peloponnese.¹¹⁷ Along the way he also employed a force of Thracian peltasts and used them with good effect during the Chalcidian campaign of 424/3 in specialist operations such as garrison detail. Under the command of Polydamidas, for example, Brasidas committed three hundred of his peltast mercenaries, together with five hundred hoplites, to the defence of Mende.¹¹⁸ The mobility of *peltastai* that made them crack assault troops was also employed by Brasidas at the Battle of Amphipolis to rout the Athenian right wing after it had successfully held off the Spartan's hoplites.¹¹⁹ Mercenaries featured prominently in the campaigns of Dercylidas and Agesilaus during the early years of the fourth century and indeed comprised a contingent of the Spartan army at Leuctra.¹²⁰

What becomes increasingly apparent, therefore, is that an objective review of Epaminondas' strategies reveals serious deficiencies in both skilful application and

¹¹⁶ Thuc. 8.5.1-2; Cartwright 1997: 273; Jordan 2005: 56-57; Talbert 1989: 26 n4; Lazenby 2004: 5; 2012: 29; Hornblower 2008: 761, 763; Kagan 1987: 28; Gomme & Andrewes 1970: 12.

¹¹⁷ Thuc. 4.78.1; Rusch 2011: 99; Parke 1933: 16; Lazenby 2004: 91; 2012: 59; Rusch 2011: 99; Kagan 2005: 171; Harley 1942: 72; Cartledge 1987: 39, 322; Roberts 2017: 141; Henderson 1927: 267.

¹¹⁸ Thuc. 4.123.4; Kagan 2005: 180; Rusch 2011: 101; Parke 1930: 42; Harley 1942: 77-78; Gomme 1956a: 386; Thorne 2001: 240; Lazenby 2004: 97; Henderson 1927: 279.

¹¹⁹ Thuc.5.10.5-8; Lazenby 2012: 48; Rusch 2011: 102; Best 1969: 34; Wylie 2007: 439-440; Mitchell 1991: 182, 184-185; Anderson 1965: 4; 1970: 179-180; Schwartz 2009: 172, 238; Kagan 2005: 185-186; Gomme 1956b: 639-640, 653-654; Yalichev 1997: 106-107.

¹²⁰ Dercylidas and Agesilaus – Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.2, 16, 4.16, 23, 4.1.3, 21, 2.5; Diog. Laert. 2.51; Yalichev 1997: 148; Hutchinson 2000: 14; Anderson 2001: 146; Parke 1933: 44-45; Cartledge 1987: 210, 211; Underhill 2012: 90. Leuctra – Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.9; Lazenby 2012: 179; Buckler 2013: 660; Hawkins 2011: 411; Anderson 1970: 196 n2; Westlake 1986: 423.

outcomes. Long-established Spartan military reforms, intended specifically to expand the base from which military manpower could be drawn, were clearly successful and although there may have been as few as six hundred full Spartiates following Leuctra, within ten years the *polis* could muster over seven thousand hoplites – 1,800 of whom took part in the second Battle of Mantinea (362).¹²¹

In respect to the containment of Sparta through the creation of hostile *poleis*, it can be seen that in the foundation of Mantinea and Megalopolis, Epaminondas' involvement was at best peripheral. Messene should be regarded as a qualified success. It is true that Sparta lost control over significant tracts valuable agricultural land, but the much anticipated helot revolt did not occur and in fact Laconian helots remained remarkably loyal. For example, in 369 – in response to the promise of freedom – six thousand answered the call in defence of Sparta.¹²² If this, along with other events such as the thwarted conspiracy of the *hypomeiones* Cinadon (398), suggests anything at all it is that what helots and other marginalised members of Spartan society really wanted was freedom within the system, not freedom from it.¹²³

Epaminondas' policy for the containment of Sparta, therefore, can at best be described as a limited strategic success. Philip's achievements as the result of mature, patient, careful and intelligent application of grand strategy will be detailed (Chapter 4, IV.

¹²¹ The total strength of 7,200 men is derived from the information in Xenophon that on the eve of the second Battle of Mantinea, Sparta's army comprised twelve *mora*. Traditionally a *mora* comprised 600 men – Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.12, 7.5.10; Hawkins 2011: 409; Buckler 1980: 202; Anderson 1970: 222; Lazenby 2012: 191; Rusch 2011: 118; Konecny 2014: 19. Sekunda 2014b: 57-58 nominates 576 men plus officers. For Spartan numbers at Mantinea (based on the assumption that each of the three Sparta *mora* present were at their nominal strength of 600 men) – Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.10; Lazenby 2012: 195-196; Anderson 1970: 222.

¹²² Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.28-29; Cawkwell 1983: 390-391; Christesen 2006: 59; Lazenby 2012: 193; Rusch 2011: 203; Fisher 2010a: 332; Talbert 1989: 37; Cartledge & Spawforth 2002: 3-4; Pauw 1980: 86; Millender 2015: 127; Cartledge 1987: 164, 176, 385; Roisman 2017: 301-302.

¹²³ Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.11; Hanson 1999b: 71; Hawkins 2011: 421-422, 423; Lazenby 2012: 25; Buckler 1980: 85; Cawkwell 1983: 391-392; Cartledge 1987: 170; Roberts 2017: 324. Hornblower 2009b: 73; Kennell 1995: 14; Talbert 1989: 22, 31; Rusch 2011: 13-14, 98; Anderson 2001: 154 comment that tensions between Spartans and (especially Laconian) helots were probably over-exaggerated.

Statecraft) but are worthy of anticipation: *archon* of Thessaly, control of the *amphictyony*, presidency of the Pythian Games, *hegemon* of the Corinthian League, and *strategos autokrator* of the combined Greek armies in their war on Persia. Given Epaminondas' modest accomplishments by comparison, it is difficult to see what meaningful lessons in strategy Philip can have received during his time in Thebes as a young man in his mid-teens.

III. Diplomacy

Aside from a nuanced understanding of strategy, another skill that modern scholarship widely supposes Philip to have developed during his time as an adolescent in Thebes was appreciation for the value of diplomacy.¹²⁴ Philip II's expertise in statecraft and his preference for artful negotiation over naked force has been well recognised by both ancient and modern commentators. Yet is it fair to assign this insight to his time as a hostage in Boeotia? A considered examination of Theban diplomacy during the early 360s is instructional, and in particular Epaminondas' relations with the Peloponnesian states.

As has been demonstrated, Epaminondas' strategy of encirclement as a means of tempering Spartan aggression could only expect limited success at best. Perhaps recognising this reality, the *boiotarchos* also turned to diplomacy in an effort to curtail Sparta's revival. Realising that outright control of the Peloponnesians was untenable, Epaminondas sought instead to create a series of alliances with *poleis* in the region that were committed to preventing the re-emergence of Sparta as a dominant power.¹²⁵ Two

¹²⁴ Grainger 2017: 18; Green 1991: 16; Heskell 1997a: 178; Buckler 1980: 134; Hammond 1994b: 10; Cawkwell 1978b: 27; Buckler & Beck 2008: 224; Curteis 1890: 23; Budin 2004: 81; Bradford 2001: 101; Worthington 2008: 18; Yenne 2010: 12.

¹²⁵ Diod. Sic. 15.62.5; Cartledge 2003b: 227; Cawkwell 1972: 268; Maher 2015: 15; Buckler 1980: 73, 109, 221; Munn 1997: 87; Roy 1971: 576; LaForse 2010: 547-548; Ruzicka 1998: 62; Beck 2000: 11.

examples were Elis and Argos, both of whom entered into treaties with Thebes despite their oligarchic constitutions seemingly being at odds with the more democratic model favoured by the Boeotians.¹²⁶ Epaminondas' most important ally, however, was the Arcadian League, established during 370 in an effort to secure collective protection against Spartan aggression.¹²⁷ A confederation of some potential, the League possessed a standing army of 10,000 but although Epaminondas himself has sometimes been regarded as pivotal in the alliance's foundation, Tegea and Mantinea were the real driving forces.¹²⁸

By 366, however, Epaminondas and the Boeotian Confederacy were at odds with the League over the position of *hegemon* – a situation exacerbated by Thebes' clumsy overtures to Arcadia's rival Achaia.¹²⁹ Although the two powers remained allies officially until 362, the Boeotian position had been compromised and the Arcadians quickly turned elsewhere for security. For example, in 366 – independent of Thebes – the Arcadian League entered into discussions with Athens, negotiations that were confirmed by an alliance in 365.¹³⁰ Bumbling diplomacy also antagonised other Peloponnesian city-states, to the extent

¹²⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.42; Dem. 16.12; Diod. Sic. 15.62.3; Cawkwell 1972: 268; Buckler 1980: 72-73; Harding 2015: 152; Maher 2015: 15, 17; Beck 2000: 14; Roy 1971: 573.

¹²⁷ Buckler 1980: 72-73; Maher 2015: 15, 17; Cawkwell 1972: 256 n4; Roy 1971: 569, 586; Thompson 1983: 149; Beck 2000: 14; 2001: 361-362; McInerney 2013: 471.

¹²⁸ For the League's army (or *Eparittoi*) – Ephorus *FGrHist* 70 F 215; Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.22; Diod. Sic. 15.62.2; Buckler 1980: 71; Pritchett 1974: 223; Parke 1933: 92-93, 93 n1; Sekunda 1986: 46; Rusch 2011: 208; Griffith 1935: 237-238; Cartledge 1987: 391; Rzepka 2009: 23. Credit paid to Epaminondas – Din. 1.73; Paus. 8.27.2. Tegeans and Mantineans – Roy 1971: 570-571; Beck 2000: 13. Individuals from antiquity closely associated with the league's formation include Kallibios and Proxenos of Tegea – Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.6; Maher 2015: 17; Buckler 1980: 108; Underhill 2012: 255. Also Lycomedes of Mantinea – Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.23-24; Diod. Sic. 15.59.1, 62.1-2, 67.2; Thompson 1983: 155; Maher 2015: 17; Buckler 1980: 70-71, 106, 108; Beck 2000: 13; Underhill 2012: 274.

¹²⁹ Ties – Diod. Sic. 15.62.3-4; Beck 2000: 11; Cawkwell 1972: 265-266; Hammond 2000a: 81 n4; Roy 1971: 573; Thompson 1983: 149. Strained relations – Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.26, 32, 39; Roy 1971: 592; Buckler & Beck 2008: 136; Buckler 1980: 185-186, 188; Cawkwell 1972: 268; Thompson 1983: 159; Roisman 2017: 313, 314, 323.

¹³⁰ *IG* ii² 112= Tod 144; Dem. 16.8-10; Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.2; Roy 1971: 581, 588; Buckler 1980: 195-196; Thompson 1983: 159; Schwenk 1997: 26; Worthington 2013: 100; Tod 1950: 137; Bury 2015: 612; Fine 1983: 586.

that in 362 Mantinea and Elis (both former allies of the Boeotian Confederacy) fought with Sparta against Thebes.¹³¹

The Battle of Mantinea resolved nothing in the struggles between leading Greek *poleis* for the hegemony of Greece and if anything left a political landscape more confused than ever.¹³² It is hardly surprising that Epaminondas' diplomatic initiatives struggled in their effectiveness. Thebes lacked the manpower and resources necessary to establish a hegemonic position.¹³³ Possibly because of this, the Theban system of alliances established by Epaminondas did not include mechanisms by which a common policy could be shaped and implemented (or a recalcitrant ally disciplined), leaving attempts to destroy the *mirage Spartiate* the best that could be hoped for.¹³⁴

It should also be acknowledged that Epaminondas' use of alliances was hardly original. Treaties (both *epimachiai* and *symmachiai*) between *poleis* to secure advantage had been in existence since the sixth century.¹³⁵ The Spartan-dominated Peloponnesian League, for example, dated from this time and the Athenian-led Delian League was founded in 478 to punish Persian aggression. In both instances the hegemonic *polis* sought to exploit the alliance to achieve their own political agendas.¹³⁶ In such light should Epaminondas'

¹³¹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.18; Diod. Sic. 15.84.1, 4; Paus. 8.8.10; Anderson 1970: 221; Buckler 1980: 213; Lazenby 2012: 196; Yalichev 1997: 165-166; Schwenk 1997: 26-27; LaForse 2010: 550; Roy 1971: 595; Rusch 2011: 208; Cartledge 1987: 391.

¹³² Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.27; Str. 9.2.39; Diod. Sic. 15.89.1; Sidnell 2011: 73; Walter 2010: 16; LaForse 2010: 544; Rusch 2011: 210; Schwartz 2009: 262; Anderson 1970: 224; Buckler 1980: 221; Gray 2010a: 559; 2010b: 16; Dillery 1995: 22, 35; Cartledge 1987: 274, 391-392; Lee 2017: 35; Luraghi 2017: 90.

¹³³ Buckler 1980: 2, 13, 224-225; Hanson 1999b: 108; 2010: 106, 109; Buckler & Beck 2008: 139; Bosworth 1988a: 14; Cawkwell 1972: 274-275.

¹³⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.39-41; Buckler 1980: 2, 73, 222; 2003: 306, 333; Cawkwell 1972: 254, 275; Buckler & Beck 2008: 137-138; Hanson 1999b: 6; Buckley 2010: 446-447.

¹³⁵ van Wees 2004: 12-15, 72; Mosley 1971: 322; Yates 2005: 65; Cawkwell 1993: 372; Walter 2010: 19; Boak 1921: 378; Rawlings 2013: 6; Kaplan 2006: 145-146.

¹³⁶ Peloponnesian League – Thuc. 1.18.2-19.1, 76.1; Finley 1972: 607; Hanson 1999b: 67; Hamilton 1997: 58; Buckler 1980: 222; Cawkwell 1976: 71-72; Larsen 1932: 141; Kagan 2005: 4-5; Yalichev 1997: 81, 84; Figueira & Jensen 2013: 481; Walter 2010: 19; Cartledge 1987: 9-10, 87, 260; van Wees 2004: 13-14, 23. Delian League – Thuc. 1.96.2-97.2; [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 23.4-5; Finley 1972: 608; van Wees 2004: 14, 23,

diplomacy thus be regarded: not as a sophisticated and innovative approach worthy of emulation but a failed opportunity to capitalise on the victory at Leuctra.¹³⁷

If, therefore, Philip did indeed derive an appreciation for the power of patient diplomacy from an external agency, it did not come from Thebes. In fact, the king's models (if models there were) likely came from much closer to home and none better than fellow Aegead Perdicas II and in his association with Athens. Certainly the king maintained a dynamic relationship with the Greek *polis*, but one based on suspicion and fear.

In 437, for example, Athens established a colony at Amphipolis to control exploitation of the region's mineral, timber and grain resources, and later developed a presence in Strymon which encroached upon Macedonia's eastern borders, thus threatening the kingdom's mineral and timber revenues.¹³⁸ Such actions were highly provocative, so much so that by 434 Macedonia was at war with Athens and her northern allies who included Derdas (the king of Elimeia) and Philip – Perdicas' own brother.¹³⁹

Concerned at being the full focus of Athenian military might, the Macedonian king moved to diffuse the threat and in 432 counselled Sparta to undertake hostilities against Athens; he simultaneously urged Corinth to agitate Potidaea into revolt.¹⁴⁰ Perdicas also incited the Chalcidians and Bottiaean into rebellion against Athenian control.¹⁴¹ In

31-32; Jackson 1969: 13-14; Lattey 1940: 191, 199; Pounds 1969: 137; Gomme 1959: 272, 280; Pritchard 2010: 17; Yalichev 1997: 96, 99, 101; Ager 2013: 506; Walter 2010: 19; Cartledge 1987: 298.

¹³⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.27; Isoc. *Dis.* 5.50, 53-55; 6.60-61; Plut. *Lyc.* 30; Shrimpton 1971b: 310-311; Cawkwell 1976: 62; Anderson 1970: 224; Hanson 1999b: 107.

¹³⁸ Amphipolis – Thuc. 1.100.3; Diod. Sic. 12.32.3; Hammond & Griffith 1997: 122; Borza 1990: 137-138; Rusch 2011: 100; Mari 2015a: 87-88, 89; Roisman 2010: 147; Worthington 2013: 50, 64; King 2018: 9. Strymon – Borza 1990: 139-140; Chambers 1986: 140; Green 1991: 2, 8, 28; Gabriel 2010: 43-44.

¹³⁹ Thuc. 1.57.2-3; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 122; Borza 1982a: 13 n26; 1990: 139-140; Errington 1990: 16, 19; Cole 1974: 57, 61; Psoma 2015: 114; Alexander 1962: 276; Hoffman 1975: 369-370; Beaumont 1952: 64. Roisman 2010: 146, 147 dates the war to 433.

¹⁴⁰ Thuc. 1.57.4; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 122; Borza 1990: 141-142; Cole 1974: 62; Errington 1990: 18; Chambers 1986: 140-141; Gomme 1959: 209; Roisman 2010: 147; Curteis 1890: 12; King 2018: 36.

¹⁴¹ Thuc. 1.57.5; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 122; Borza 1990: 142; Errington 1990: 18; Cole 1974: 62; Chambers 1986: 140-141; Gomme 1959: 209; Posma 2015: 114; Roisman 2010: 147; King 2018: 36; Lazenby 2004: 26.

response, Athens dispatched thirty ships and one thousand hoplites under the *strategos* Archestratus, who successfully rendezvoused with the forces of Derdas and Philip to capture Macedonian Therme.¹⁴²

In 431 Perdiccas performed an about-face when he became an Athenian ally under an agreement brokered by Nymphodorus (brother-in-law of the Odrysian king Sitalces) in which for assisting Phormio's Athenian campaign against Chalcidice, Macedonia was returned control of Therme.¹⁴³ For the next two years an uneasy peace existed although tensions remained as Athens manoeuvred to secure the territorial integrity of Methone, which had defected from Macedonia in *c.*434.¹⁴⁴ The motives of the *polis* were hardly altruistic – Methone had become a tribute-paying asset in the Athenian empire and a potential staging-post for future operations against Perdiccas.¹⁴⁵

Macedonian diplomatic manoeuvrings were again in evidence during 424 when Perdiccas and the Chalcidians invited Sparta into the region in order to foster revolt against Athens – a result that brought about an immediate renewal of hostilities. Perdiccas' actions may have appeared foolhardy but his secret agenda was the subjugation of Arrhabaeus of Lynkos, a local warlord who had been seeking to shrug off Macedonian control. As a potential ally for the realm's enemies, an independent Lynkos (Lynkestis) represented a

¹⁴² Thuc. 1.57.6, 59.2, 61.2-4; Borza 1990: 142; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 122; Gomme 1959: 213; Roisman 2010: 147; Alexander 1962: 265; Hoffman 1975: 370; Meritt *et al.* 1950: 322.

¹⁴³ Thuc. 2.29.4-7; Hammond & Griffith 1997: 123-124; Borza 1990: 143-144; Errington 1990: 19-20; Cole 1974: 64; Chambers 1986: 142-143; Gomme 1956a: 213, 214; Posma 2015: 115; Roisman 2010: 147; Curteis 1890: 12; King 2018: 37; Lazenby 2004: 37-38.

¹⁴⁴ *IG* i³ 61 ll. 16–29, 47–51=M&L 65; Meiggs & Lewis 2004: 179; Errington 1990: 20; Borza 1990: 148-149; Hammond & Griffith 1997: 125, 127; Hoffman 1975: 365; Rhodes 2010b: 34; Fox 2015e: 267; Meritt *et al.* 1950: 319.

¹⁴⁵ *IG* i³ 61 ll. 16–29, 47–51=M&L 65; Meiggs & Lewis 2004: 179-180; Hammond & Griffith 1997: 124, 127; Borza 1990: 149; Errington 1990: 20; Cawkwell 1978b: 37; Fox 2015e: 268; Mattingly 1961: 155, 164; Meritt *et al.*, 1950: 135-136, 145.

clear threat that needed to be addressed.¹⁴⁶ Unaware of Macedonian aims, Sparta responded by dispatching an army under Brasidas, who upon discovering Perdiccas' true intentions refused to support the king's ambitions – whereupon the Macedonian reduced his level of support to the Spartan.¹⁴⁷ The king soon realised his gaffe and the pair seem to have reconciled as later that year, in the wake of Amphipolis' capture, Perdiccas was on hand to assist Brasidas win over a number of Chalcidian cities.¹⁴⁸

Responding to royal diplomatic guile, in 423 Brasidas joined Perdiccas in a campaign against Arrhabaeus that although successful initially, ended in debacle and humiliating defeat.¹⁴⁹ As a result, the king regarded the Spartan *strategos* as an enemy and immediately reopened negotiations with Athens, the outcome of which was a formal alliance.¹⁵⁰ As a short-term expedient, the treaty offered some very real benefits. By preventing reinforcements from reaching Brasidas through Thessaly, the accord curtailed the Spartan's actions in Macedonia's sphere of interest and stabilised Perdiccas' western frontier.¹⁵¹ It also reopened the lucrative Athenian market for sales of Macedonian

¹⁴⁶ Thuc. 4.79.2, 82.1-83.6; Borza 1990: 150; Cole 1974: 67; Errington 1990: 21; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 129; Chambers 1986: 143; Roisman 2010: 150-151; Greenwalt 2010: 282; English 2012: 46; King 2018: 38.

¹⁴⁷ Thuc. 4.83.1-6; Hammond & Griffith 1997: 129; Borza 1990: 151; Errington 1990: 22; Cole 1974: 67; Chambers 1986: 143; Kagan 2005: 179-180; Gomme 1956b: 551; Posma 2015: 116; Roisman 2010: 151; Greenwalt 2010: 282-283; English 2012: 46-47.

¹⁴⁸ Thuc. 4.107.3; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 130; Borza 1990: 151; Errington 1990: 22; Cole 1974: 67; Chambers 1986: 144; Gomme 1956b: 580; Posma 2015: 117; King 2018: 39.

¹⁴⁹ Thuc. 4.124.1-125.1; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 130-131; Borza 1990: 152; Cole 1967: 68; Errington 1990: 22; Chambers 1986: 144; Gomme 1956b: 613, 617; Sekunda 2010: 448; Rusch 2011: 101; Posma 2015: 117; Roisman 2010: 151-152; Greenwalt 2010: 283; Hammond 1981: 211; King 2018: 39.

¹⁵⁰ Thuc. 4.128.5, 132.1-2; Borza 1990: 153; Errington 1990: 22-23; Cole 1967: 68-69; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 131; Chambers 1986: 144-145; Gomme 1956b: 618, 621; Roisman 2010: 152; Posma 2015: 117; West & Meritt 1925: 61; King 2018: 40.

¹⁵¹ Thuc. 4.132.2, 5.13.1; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 131; Borza 1990: 154-155; Cole 1967: 69; Graninger 2010: 311; Morrison 1942: 64, 74 n2; King 2018: 40; Bury 2015: 452; Chambers 1986: 144-145.

timber.¹⁵² There followed a series of *volte-faces* between the Greek *poleis* and by 414 Perdiccas was back in the Athenian camp participating in a joint attack on Amphipolis.¹⁵³

In or around 413 Perdiccas died but a close review of his diplomatic policies reveals that for at least twenty years the wily king succeeded in playing Athens and Sparta off against each other in a successful effort to maintain Macedonian independence.¹⁵⁴ Perdiccas needed to tread a careful path. Athens was an aggressive imperialist and a strong presence in the region would have threatened Macedonian sovereignty. Sparta posed less of a threat in this regard but an association with the Lacedaemonians provided fewer opportunities for trade, especially in timber – a critical consideration given Perdiccas' chronic shortage of mineral wealth.¹⁵⁵

It is true that one unforeseen consequence of the king's vacillations was the rise of Chalcidian aspirations for independence that under the leadership of Olynthus would so bedevil his successors in the fourth century.¹⁵⁶ However, given that throughout his reign Macedonia lacked internal unity and a sufficiently powerful army to follow a military solution, Perdiccas and his diplomacy deserves considerable credit for weakening the Athenian empire in the northern Aegean, whilst simultaneously preventing the rise of

¹⁵² Borza 1990: 154; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 133; Gomme 1956b: 622; Mari 2015a: 90; Roisman 2010: 152; Hoffman 1975: 368; King 2018: 36.

¹⁵³ Athenian retaliation – Thuc. 6.7.3; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 133; Borza 1990: 157; Cole 1967: 70; Fuqua 1965: 178; Hornblower 2008: 311. Alliance – Thuc. 7.9.1; Cole 1967: 70; Errington 1990: 23; Borza 1990: 157; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 133; Gomme & Andrewes 1970: 386; Roisman 2010: 154; Westlake 1953: 188; King 2018: 40.

¹⁵⁴ Death – Hammond & Griffith 1979: 134; Borza 1990: 157; Errington 1990: 24; Cole 1974: 71; Roisman 2010: 154; King 2018: 41, 48 n120; Hammond 1992b: 85; Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2015: 274; Heskell 1997a: 169; Palairot 2015: 23.

¹⁵⁵ Importance of timber to the Macedonian economy – Borza 1982c: 2; 1990: 55-56; Worthington 2014: 22; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 119, 157; Hammond 1994b: 113; Errington 1990: 7-8; Millett 2010: 474, 484; Hatzopoulos 2015a: 48; Fox 2015a: 234; Kottaridi 2015: 312; Roisman 2010: 156; King 2018: 42, 60; Cole 1974: 64.

¹⁵⁶ Diod. Sic. 15.19.2; Borza 1990: 159, 184; Chambers 1986: 145; Posma 2015: 126; Roisman 2010: 147; Heskell 1997a: 172-173; Cartledge 1987: 268-269, 273; King 2018: 36, 56-57.

Spartan hegemony.¹⁵⁷ If, therefore, Philip II felt the need for instruction in the benefits of patient, pragmatic diplomacy, Perdiccas II's example was surely a more effective model than that provided by the only modestly successful Epaminondas.

IV. Tactics

Many modern scholars believe that Philip received his schooling in the fundamentals of battlefield tactics whilst a hostage at Thebes. Some conclude that this was primarily through the first-hand observation of training exercises and drills conducted by the Theban army, and the Sacred Band in particular.¹⁵⁸ Other academics, probably basing their opinion on Diodorus Siculus and Justin, believe the tutelage of Epaminondas to have been an influential factor in the development of Philip's military education.¹⁵⁹ The matter is highly contentious, however, due in large part to the ambiguity of the sources that becomes apparent when read closely. Diodorus Siculus, for example, states:

τοῦ δ' Ἐπαμεινώνδου Πυθαγόριον ἔχοντος φιλόσοφον ἐπιστάτην συντρεφόμενος ὁ Φίλιππος μετέσχεν ἐπὶ πλεῖον τῶν Πυθαγορίων λόγων. ἀμφοτέρων δὲ τῶν μαθητῶν προσενεγκαμένων φύσιν τε καὶ φιλοπονίαν ὑπῆρξαν ἐκάτεροι διαφέροντες ἀρετῆ· ὧν Ἐπαμεινώνδας μὲν μεγάλους ἀγῶνας καὶ κινδύνους ὑπομείνας τῇ πατρίδι παραδόξως τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος περιέθηκεν, ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος ταῖς αὐταῖς ἀφορμαῖς χρησάμενος οὐκ ἀπελείφθη τῆς Ἐπαμεινώνδου δόξης (Diod. Sic. 16.2.3).

¹⁵⁷ Borza 1982a: 13 n26; 1990: 159; Errington 1990: 18; Green 1991: 8; Posma 2015: 118-119.

¹⁵⁸ Errington 1990: 40; King 2018: 71; Ashley 1998: 5, 23; Heskell 1997a: 178.

¹⁵⁹ Hammond 1994b: 10; Cawkwell 1978b: 27; Gabriel 2010: 24-25; Curteis 1890: 23; Green 1991: 15-16; Grant 2017: 118, 165 n68; Yenne 2010: 12.

Since Epameinondas had as his instructor a philosopher of the Pythagorean school, Philip, who was reared along with him, acquired a wide acquaintance with the Pythagorean philosophy. Inasmuch as both students showed natural ability and diligence they proved to be superior in deeds of valour. Of the two, Epameinondas underwent the most rigorous tests and battles, and invested his fatherland almost miraculously with the leadership of Hellas, while Philip, availing himself of the same initial training, achieved no less fame than Epameinondas (trans. Oldfather, 1954).

Similarly, Justin records:

...et Philippus, obses triennio Thebis habitus, Epaminondae et Pelopidarum uirtutibus eruditus... (Just. 6.9.7).

...and Philip, kept as a hostage for three years in Thebes where he was trained in those qualities possessed by Epaminondas and Pelopidas... (trans. Yardley, 1994).

Matthew has rightly pointed out that Diodorus' and Justin's comments are far from clear and could just as easily imply academic tutelage as military training.¹⁶⁰ In pairing Philip's education with Pythagorean philosophy, however, Diodorus' narrative tends to suggest the prince received moral – rather than military – instruction. Justin is far more nuanced, with much depending on the translation of *uirtutibus*. 'Qualities' is a valid interpretation but so too is 'strength', 'valour' and 'heroism' – all of which have military connotations. Frustratingly, *uirtus* can also be translated as 'excellence', 'worth' and (moral) 'virtue' – terms perhaps better suited to describe the results of a Pythagorean education.

¹⁶⁰ Matthew 2015: 34.

Another source sometimes cited is Plutarch, who, on first reading, does appear to suggest that – at the very least – Philip paid attention to, and later remembered, Epaminondas’ military feats.¹⁶¹ Plutarch records:

Οὗτος ἦν Φίλιππος ὁ τοῖς Ἑλλησιν ὕστερον πολεμήσας ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας, τότε δὲ παῖς ὢν ἐν Θήβαις παρὰ Παμμένει δίαίταν εἶχεν. ἐκ δὲ τούτου καὶ ζηλωτῆς γεγονέναι ἔδοξεν Ἐπαμεινώνδου, τὸ περὶ τοὺς πολέμους καὶ τὰς στρατηγίας δραστήριον ἴσως κατανοήσας... (Plut. *Pel.* 26.5).

This was the Philip who afterwards waged war to enslave the Greeks, but at this time he was a boy and lived in Thebes with Pammenes. Hence he was believed to have become a zealous follower of Epaminondas, perhaps because he comprehended his efficiency in wars and campaigns... (trans. Perrin, 1927).

A close reading, however, reveals the uncertainties inherent in Plutarch’s testimony. Phrases such as γεγονέναι ἔδοξεν (“was believed to have”) and ἴσως κατανοήσας (“perhaps because”) cast doubt on the very notion that Philip was an admirer of Epaminondas at all, much less a zealous one. With the historical record proving inconclusive, therefore, consideration should be given to the opportunities that might have existed for Philip to have received some form of schooling in tactics whilst at Thebes.

Certainly it can be imagined that the Sacred Band were drilled in the military arts and, by the fourth century, there appears to have been at least a rudimentary training system

¹⁶¹ Hammond & Griffith 1979: 205, 425; Worthington 2008: 17; Markle 1978: 486; Hammond 1997b: 355-356; Müller 2010: 169 cite Plutarch in accepting the influence of Epaminondas on a young Philip, but also consider that first-hand observation was a factor.

for youths on the cusp of eligibility for military service.¹⁶² As in Athens, gymnasia no doubt provided an appropriate facility for the readying of elite hoplites for it is unquestionable that gymnastics were an important element in the conditioning of Theban infantrymen.¹⁶³ Indeed Thebes had two gymnasia – the Gymnasium of Heracles located to the south of the *polis* just outside its gates; and the Gymnasium of Iolaus situated within the walls of the lower city, not far from the hero's tomb where pederastic couples took their vows of fidelity.¹⁶⁴

Potentially, the king had much to learn as Epaminondas was undoubtedly a skilful – sometimes even inspired – field commander. For example, the *boiotarchos* on many occasions demonstrated that he was a master of deception. One tradition has it that whilst campaigning in Arcadia c.385, Epaminondas disguised his troops as women in order to infiltrate and seize a town (possibly Mantinea) that had previously resisted other forms of assault.¹⁶⁵

Perhaps a more historically secure demonstration of Epaminondas' taste for covert operations occurred in 369 when, as a preliminary to his invasion of the Peloponnese, he led his troops on a night march of thirty stades (around 5.4 kilometres) to force the Onaenan

¹⁶² Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.23; Nep. 15.2.1-5; Plut. *Mor.* 788A; Just. 6.9.7; Cawkwell 1983: 398; Hammond 2000a: 92-93; Bury 2015: 614; Lendon 2005: 352 n26.

¹⁶³ Military applications in Athens – Aristoph. *Pax* 353-357; Pl. *Leg.* 813d-e, 832d; Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.16; *Ages.* 1.25; *Eq. mag.* 3.1, 6, 14; Reinmuth 1952: 47; Forbes 1945: 37-38; Demand 1982: 14; Miller 2004: 193-195; Golden 1998: 27; Wycherley 1976: 144; Dillery 2004: 263. Thebes – Pl. *Leg.* 636b; Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.23; Diod. Sic. 15.39.1, 50.5, 69.3, 17.11.4; Plut. *Pel.* 7.3; *Mor.* 192C-D, 639F-640A, 788A; Hammond 2000a: 92; Hanson 1999b: 80-81, 86; Laurie 1894b: 502; Davis 2013: 3; van Wees 2004: 276 n7.

¹⁶⁴ Gymnasium of Heracles – Paus. 9.11.7; Arr. *Anab.* 1.8.3-4; Demand 1982: 14, 52; Marconi 2015: 187; Bosworth 1980: 82. Tomb and gymnasium of Iolaus – Pind. *Ol.* 9.98-99; Plut. *Pel.* 18.4; *Mor.* 761D-E; Paus. 9.23.1; Demand 1982: 14, 52, 94-95; Antela-Bernardez 2015: 96 n2; Figueira 1986b: 429.

¹⁶⁵ Disguised as women – Frontin. 3.2.7; Whitehead 2007: 299. For tradition of Epaminondas' presence in Arcadia during 385 – Plut. *Pel.* 4.4-5; Paus. 9.13.1; Cawkwell 1972: 257; Buck 1994: 63; Hanson 1999b: 52; Tuplin 1984: 353; Hack 1978: 217 n21; Shrimpton 1971a: 58; Roisman 2017: 277.

Pass at Corinth with a dawn assault against the defending Spartans and Pelleans.¹⁶⁶ The *boiotarchos* again resorted to deception during the fourth invasion of the Peloponnese (362) when he launched an attack on Sparta itself after a night march from Tegea.¹⁶⁷ Shortly afterwards at the battle of Mantinea, Epaminondas once more utilised the element of surprise – firstly in the creation of a dust-cloud in order to mask his deployments, and then by manoeuvring his troops in such a way that the Spartans were twice deceived into thinking he was declining battle. When the Boeotian army finally and unexpectedly did advance, the result was disarray in the Lacedaemonian ranks.¹⁶⁸

Epaminondas also revealed that he was not beyond concocting lies and half-truths to manipulate morale. Prior to the battle of Leuctra, for example, in what transpired to be a successful attempt to bolster his army's confidence, the *boiotarchos* fabricated a number of religious omens. His removal of arms from the Temple of Heracles and subsequent claim that this signified the hero was preparing to lend his support to the Theban cause was but one example.¹⁶⁹ In a similar vein, Epaminondas also manipulated prognostications to provide favourable interpretations in support of his chosen course of action. His public declaration that an ancient Spartan atrocity foretold of their defeat at Leuctra was such an instance.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.15-16; Diod. Sic. 15.68.3-5; Frontin. 2.5.26; Polyæn. 2.3.9; Pritchett 1974: 161; Buckler 1980: 94-95; Lazenby 2012: 194; Munn 1993: 54; 1997: 88; Rusch 2011: 205; How & Wells 2008: 680; Hutchinson 2000: 142.

¹⁶⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.9-10; Polyb. 9.8; Diod. Sic. 15.82.6; Plut. *Ages.* 34; Buckler 1980: 209-210; Pritchett 1974: 169; Anderson 1970: 222; Gaebel 2002: 138; Rusch 2011: 208; Lazenby 2012: 195; Cartledge 1987: 391; Westlake 1975b: 32, 35; Matthews 1974: 164; Walbank 1967: 129.

¹⁶⁸ Dust – Frontin. 2.2.12; Polyæn. 2.3.14; Whitehead 2007: 298; Buckler & Beck 2008: 124; Roisman 2017: 329. Manoeuvrings – Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.21-22; Sidnell 2006: 68-69; Worley 1994: 148; Holladay 1982: 96; English 2012: 110-111; Hutchinson 2000: 150; Roisman 2017: 329, 332.

¹⁶⁹ Diod. Sic. 15.53.3-4; Frontin. 1.11.16; Polyæn. 2.3.8; Whitehead 2007: 298-299; Lazenby 2012: 180; Davis 2013: 11; Ducrey 1986: 267; Buckler 1980: 62; Hilbert 2012: 150-151; Graff 2014: 54; Hammond 1998b: 410; Buckler 2013: 660.

¹⁷⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.7; Diod. Sic. 15.52.5-6; Frontin. 1.12.5-7; Polyæn. 2.3.12; Anderson 1970: 194; Lazenby 2012: 180; Davis 2013: 11; Hammond 1998b: 410; Strauli 2011: 161-162; Westlake 1939: 13; Buckler 2013: 659-660.

Further evidence of Epaminondas' ability as a general can be seen in the level of training and discipline he imposed both upon his men and himself. The Theban was well-known for favouring drills in order to prepare his army for the rigours of campaigning.¹⁷¹ Whilst it is true that Epaminondas also had his men focus on conditioning exercises such as running and gymnastics (as opposed to boxing and wrestling), his training regime was clearly effective in improving the fettle, and mettle, of the Theban army as the winter invasion of the Peloponnese (370/69) demonstrated.¹⁷² In sharing the hardships of his men, Epaminondas doubtless earned their respect and even if the tradition that he executed a sleeping sentry is strongly reminiscent of Iphicrates and perhaps somewhat anecdotal, the fact that it existed at all was testament to the exacting level of discipline the *boiotarchos* expected of himself and his troops.¹⁷³

Clearly Epaminondas was well-versed in a wide variety of military stratagems and indeed had employed many with a commendable degree of success. What is equally true, however, is that tactics such as surprise, misinformation, and strict discipline were hardly new to Greek warfare. What, then, of the tactical acuity supposedly attained by Philip from Thebes' leading *boiotarchos*? Perspicacity should have dictated very little because, as one academic has observed astutely, it is hard to imagine why a *polis* would impart military insights to someone with whom it might well experience future conflict.¹⁷⁴ Common sense,

¹⁷¹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.19; Plut. *Mor.* 192C-D, 788A; Pritchett 1974: 219, 221; Cawkwell 1972: 262; 1983: 398; Anderson 1970: 161; Cornell 2002: 30.

¹⁷² Fitness training – Nep. 15.2.4-5, 5.4; Plut. *Mor.* 788A; Polyæn. 2.3.6; Davis 2013: 3; Pritchett 1974: 215; Anderson 1970: 161; Bannard 2015: 483; Manning 1917: 77; Slowikowski 1989: 72 n14; Cornell 2002: 30. Winter invasion of 370/69 – Cawkwell 1983: 398; Rusch 2011: 202; Cuff 1954: 259; Buckler 1980: 75; Cartledge 1987: 164; Lazenby 2012: 192; Hanson 2010: 97; Roisman 2017: 299.

¹⁷³ Plut. *Fab.* 27.2; Frontin. 3.12.3, 4.3.6; Chrissanthos 2013: 317; Hamel 1998: 60. Similarities to Iphicrates – Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.28; Nep. 11.2.1-3; Frontin. 3.12.2; Polyæn. 3.9.34-35; Anderson 1970: 121; Konijnendijk 2014: 88; Konecny 2014: 20; Delbrück 1975: 151; Pritchett 1974: 117, 122-125; Sears 2013: 122, 280; Parke 1933: 78; Chrissanthos 2013: 316-317.

¹⁷⁴ Matthew 2015: 33.

however, often has very little to do with warfare but circumstances again suggest that Epaminondas' influence has been overstated. Whilst the record in relation to Thebes is hazy, there is a hint that military training did not begin until a boy's late teens. Nepos states:

Postquam ephebus est factus et palaestrae dare operam coepit, non tam magnitudini virium servivit quam velocitati; illam enim ad athletarum usum, hanc ad belli existimabat utilitatem pertinere (Nep. 15.2.4-5).

As soon as Epaminondas attained military age and began to interest himself in physical exercise, he aimed less at great strength than at agility; for he thought that the former was necessary for athletes, but that the latter would be helpful in warfare (trans. Rolfe, 1984).

Military age (*ephebus*), of course, is imprecise but practices in other *poleis* are suggestive. Enrolment in the Athenian *ephebia*, for example, did not commence until *paides* were eighteen.¹⁷⁵ Spartan *paidiskoi* were of a similar age.¹⁷⁶ If, as argued, Philip was 14-16 years of age whilst hostage in Thebes (possibly even 13-15), then he was almost certainly far too young to have received any level of formal military instruction.¹⁷⁷

Not only did the prince's youthful status make it unlikely he derived any meaningful education in the art of combat, so too does a close analysis of Philip's own innovations enacted later as king. Undoubtedly his most decisive tactical refinement involving infantry was the feigned retreat. The stratagem entailed an oblique advance so as to engage initially with only one end of an enemy's line. Once the opposing force was committed fully, a

¹⁷⁵ Pl. *Resp.* 537b; [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 42.1-2; Marrou 1982: 66; Pritchard 2013: 78; Griffith 2015: 46; Kyle 2015: 235; Oliver 2007: 175; Jones 1957: 82, 106; Reinmuth 1952: 40; Spence 2002: 138.

¹⁷⁶ Cartledge 2003a: 87-88; Harley 1934: 139; Ducat 2006: 101; Tazelaar 1967: 152; Hodkinson 2002: 104.

¹⁷⁷ A conclusion supported by Ellis 1976: 43-44. Hammond 1997b: 356; Grant 2017: 165 n68 acknowledge the argument in the works of other scholars.

gradual, controlled retreat was affected, the objective of which was to draw a section of the enemy's phalanx into an advance, in the process creating a breach in the line through which cavalry could strike. Once achieved, the retreat was halted and attack resumed on an adversary whose formation by this time was in disarray. Technically difficult, the manoeuvre was only made possible by the discipline and high level of professionalism of the Macedonian army under Philip.¹⁷⁸ Some academics regard the manoeuvre as impossible but the source is unambiguous.¹⁷⁹ Polyaeus records:

Φίλιππος ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ παρατασσόμενος Ἀθηναίοις εἴξας ἐνέκλινεν. στρατηγὸς Ἀθηναίων Στρατοκλῆς ἐκβοήσας 'οὐ γρη' ἀποστῆναι προσκειμένους, ἕως ἂν τοὺς πολεμίους κατακλείσωμεν ἐς Μακεδονίαν' οὐκ ἀνῆκε διώκων. Φίλιππος εἰπὼν 'οὐκ ἐπίστανται νικᾶν Ἀθηναῖοι' ἐπὶ πόδα ἀνεχώρει συνεσπασμένην ἔχων τὴν φάλαγγα καὶ ἐντὸς ὄπλων πεφυλαγμένος. μετ' ὀλίγον ὑπερδεξίων τόπων λαβόμενος, παραθαρρύνας τὸ πλῆθος, ἀναστρέψας εὐρώστως ἐμβάλλει τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ λαμπρῶς ἀγωνισάμενος ἐνίκησεν (Polyaen. 4.2.2).

After drawing up his formation against the Athenians at Chaeronea, Philip yielded and gave way. An Athenian general, Stratocles, shouted "We must not stop pressing them until we shut the enemy in Macedonia," and he did not give up the pursuit. Philip, saying "The Athenians do not understand how to win," retreated gradually, keeping his phalanx drawn together and protected by shields. A little later, gaining some high ground, encouraging his troops, and turning around, he attacked the Athenians vigorously and, fighting brilliantly, he conquered (trans. Krentz & Wheeler, 1994).

¹⁷⁸ Gabriel 2010: 69-70; Ashley 1998: 23, 158; Serrati 2013b: 182; Wrightson 2015a: 61; Green 1991: 75; Brice 2012: 248; English 2009a: 8; Lonsdale 2007: 43.

¹⁷⁹ Delbrück 1975: 181-182; Buckler & Beck 2008: 257.

Polyaenus is very clear in detailing how Philip ordered the slow, disciplined retreat of his phalanx (ἐπὶ πόδα ἀνεχώρει συνεσπασμένην ἔχων τὴν φάλαγγα) followed by a decisive counter-attack (παραθαρρύνας τὸ πλῆθος, ἀναστρέψας εὐρώστως ἐμβάλλει τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις). There is, therefore, no need to doubt that the Macedonians mastered the manoeuvre, and could execute it with great effect. What is equally probable, in light of the historical record's silence, is that this was not a tactic ever practiced by Epaminondas – or Thebes – and so cannot be attributed to insights Philip supposedly derived from his time as a hostage in Boeotia.

Mastery of complex tactical manoeuvres was due, in part, to Philip's organisation of the phalanx which went far beyond anything evidenced in the Boeotian *poleis*. It is true that there were weaknesses with the Macedonian formation. Although requiring protection, particularly on the flanks, this was something Philip recognised clearly and countered by stationing *psiloi*, *hypaspistai* or cavalry on his wings.¹⁸⁰ The phalanx was sometimes also regarded as inherently forward-facing and only able to operate on level ground or its integrity of form would be severely compromised.¹⁸¹

Such views, however, are usually based on later commentators who were describing the phalanxes of Hellenistic armies, which were arrayed considerably deeper and whose *sarissai* were longer than those of Philip.¹⁸² A closer reality is that the Macedonian phalanx was much more mobile than its hoplite counterpart – due in part to the intensive training

¹⁸⁰ Polyb. 18.32; Liv. 44.41; App. *Syr.* 6.35; Arr. *Tact.* 9; Cawkwell 1978b: 33; Curteis 1890: 35; Delbrück 1975: 179; Rawlings 2013: 24; Matthew 2016b: 437; Sage 1996: 216; Nawotka 2010: 50; Heckel 2008: 17; Ashley 1998: 153.

¹⁸¹ Forward-facing – Polyb. 18.29-30; Heckel *et al.* 2010: 105; Markle 1977: 332; Matthew 2016b: 437. Level ground – Polyb. 18.31; Plut. *Aem.* 16.5; Dillon-Lee 1814: 59; Markle 1977: 332; Sage 1996: xxvi; Sidebottom 2004: 86; Sage 2013: 221; Anson 2010b: 65; Walbank 1967: 591.

¹⁸² Later influences – Rawlings 2013: 24; Markle 1977: 331; Bosworth 1988b: 5; Sidebottom 2004: 86; Wrightson 2015b: 83-84. For a full discussion of the *sarissa* and its variation in length see Thesis: 151-166.

and rigid discipline of its phalangites, and highly organised structure.¹⁸³ Units were organised in multiples of sixteen, this being the number of phalangites in a single file which thus corresponded to the standard depth of the formation as a whole. These *dekads* were commanded by a *dekadarch* – the army’s best soldiers – a title which suggests that the phalanx was initially ten phalangites deep before it underwent later reform.¹⁸⁴ A “file-closer” (*ouragos*), chosen for his brave and stead-fast nature, was stationed at the rear of each file ensuring the column would maintain its structure once combat was engaged.¹⁸⁵

Four *dekads* comprised a *tetrachia*, each under the command of a *tetrarch*, and two *tetrachia* a *taxiarchia*, each led by a *taxiarch*.¹⁸⁶ Two *taxiarchia* constituted a *syntagma* – a unit of 256 men under the command of a *syntagmatarchos*.¹⁸⁷ Four *syntagmata* combined to form a *chiliarcha* each of which was organised along regional lines and commanded by a *chiliarchos*. Four *chiliarchai* constituted a *phalangarchia* under the jurisdiction of a *phalangarches*, and two *phalangarchiae* – 8,192 men organised in 512 files of sixteen phalangites – comprised a *diphalangia*, sometimes referred to as a *meros* or *keras*.¹⁸⁸ A

¹⁸³ Mobility – Parke 1933: 155; Gabriel 2010: 67; Heskell 1997a: 181; Montagu 2006: 28; King 2018: 120. Discipline – Borza 1990: 204; Cawkwell 1978b: 33-34; Heskell 1997a: 180. For Philip as a strict disciplinarian see Hammond 1980b: 167; 1990: 264-265; Müller 2010a: 27. Perhaps the ultimate example of phalangite discipline under Philip (including the feigned retreat) was evidenced at Chaeronea – see Thesis: 134-136, 194.

¹⁸⁴ *Dekads* – Aelian, 5, 13; Asclep. 2.1, 7; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 420; Ashley 1998: 38; Matthew 2015: 257-258, 263, 274, 339; King 2018: 109; Wrightson 2010: 86 Figure 1. Later reform – Gabriel 2010: 63, 66, 96-97; Cawkwell 1978b: 33; Bosworth 1988a: 260; Sekunda 2010: 447; Matthew 2015: 259-260, 274, 379.

¹⁸⁵ Aelian, 5, 14; Asclep. 2.2; Arr. *Tact.* 12; Matthew 2009: 399; 2015: 258; 2016b: 436; Wrightson 2010: 72, 76; Mahan 1862: 11; Ashley 1998: 39.

¹⁸⁶ Aelian, 9; Asclep. 2.8; Arr. *Tact.* 10; Dillon-Lee 1814: 47 n2, 48 n3; Ashley 1998: 39; Serrati 2013b: 184; Matthew 2015: 276; 2016b: 436; Hatzopoulos 1996: 453; Wrightson 2010: 86 Figure 2; Mahan 1862: 10-11.

¹⁸⁷ Aelian, 9; Asclep. 2.8; Arr. *Tact.* 10; Dillon-Lee 1814: 48 n4; Ashley 1998: 39; Serrati 2013b: 183-184; Matthew 2015: 276; Curteis 1890: 35; Wrightson 2010: 76, 86 Figure 2; 2015b: 83; Mahan 1862: 11.

¹⁸⁸ Aelian, 9; Asclep. 2.10; Arr. *Anab.* 1.22.7, 4.30.6, 5.23.7; *Tact.* 10; Brunt 1976d: lxxvii; Serrati 2013: 184; Matthew 2015: 276; 2016b: 436-437; Wrightson 2010: 86 Figure 2; 2015b: 82; Mahan 1862: 10.

single *diphalangia* was one wing of the formation: two combined constituted an entire phalanx.¹⁸⁹

This high level of structure and associated chain of command allowed the Macedonian phalanx, or even the regiments and battalions within it, to adopt a wide range of formations to suit tactical requirements quickly and efficiently. For example, it is generally accepted that the standard space between phalangites in open or normal formation was four cubits (approximately 1.8 metres).¹⁹⁰ With little difficulty this could be transitioned into a compact configuration (*pyknosis*) where each man occupied two cubits (around 0.9 metres).¹⁹¹ Arrayed thus, the phalanx's first few ranks were slightly offset, allowing five rows of *sarissai* to extend beyond the front line, so presenting a layered barrier of spearheads to the enemy.¹⁹² This represented a significant advantage over the hoplite formation as the Macedonian phalanx was able to engage its Greek counterpart with a greater number of spear-points long before hoplites could bring their *dorata* to bear.

It has also been observed astutely by a number of scholars that the length of the *sarissa* reduced the likelihood of “shield on shield” contact with an enemy. Thus, in a contest between infantry phalanxes, *sarissai* prevented hoplites from being able to close with the more lightly armed phalangites and overwhelm them in an *othismos* contest.¹⁹³ Out of formation, the phalangite was ill-equipped for single combat, so rendering the

¹⁸⁹ Asclep. 2.10; Serrati 2013b: 184; Matthew 2016b: 436-437; Wrightson 2010: 86 Table 2.

¹⁹⁰ Aelian, 11; Asclep. 4.1; Dillon-Lee 1814: 60 n1; Ashley 1998: 38; Cawkwell 1989: 382; Matthew 2015: 142; Wrightson 2010: 80; Manti 1992: 37.

¹⁹¹ Polyb. 12.19; Aelian, 11; Asclep. 4.1, 3; Dillon-Lee 1814: 60 n2; Cawkwell 1978b: 33; 1989: 382; Ashley 1998: 38; Gabriel 2010: 66; Matthew 2015: 142, 147; Wrightson 2010: 80; Manti 1992: 37; Walbank 1967: 586, 588; Bosworth 1980: 59.

¹⁹² Polyb. 18.29-30; Liv. 44.41; Lendon 2005: 121; Gabriel 2010: 66; Ashley 1998: 36; Hammond 1994b: 19; Matthew 2010: 354-355; Everson 2004: 175; King 2018: 112.

¹⁹³ Ray 2012: 91; Champion 2014: 8; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 150-151; Grote 1872: 10; Billows 1995: 13.

superior length of the Macedonian *sarissa* in preventing the *othismos aspidon* of even further significance.¹⁹⁴

Another deployment, the invention of which has been credited to Philip, was the *synaspismos* (συνασπισμόν) or “locked-shield” formation.¹⁹⁵ The compactness of the *synaspismos* was pronounced, with tactical treatises documenting that the space between phalangites was one cubit (roughly forty-five centimetres).¹⁹⁶ Considerable academic controversy, however, surrounds the viability of the *synaspismos* as a functional entity. Many objections are centred on the perceived impossibility of phalangites in battle panoply to manoeuvre successfully within the close confines of the order detailed in the sources.¹⁹⁷

One modern commentator, on the calculation that a fully equipped phalangite in oblique stance and with *sarissa* held at waist level, has argued that to merely deploy, a minimum distance of seventy-two centimetres was required between men.¹⁹⁸ A number of factors, however, need to be taken into consideration when evaluating this claim. The first is the diameter of the phalangite *pelte* (shield), acknowledged generally to have been 60-70 centimetres in diameter.¹⁹⁹ Such a modest size required that shields needed only to have overlapped 15-25 centimetres in order to accommodate the *synaspismos* – a possibility confirmed by forensic archaeology.²⁰⁰ Further objection to the formation’s validity on

¹⁹⁴ Unsuitability of the *sarissa* in single combat – Thesis: 138-139, 165 n303.

¹⁹⁵ Diod. Sic. 16.3.2; Hammond 1994b: 25; Gabriel 2010: 66; Bosworth 2010: 100; Müller 2010b: 168; Schwartz 2009: 165; Krentz 1985b: 54; Lendon 2005: 123-124.

¹⁹⁶ Aelian, 11; Asclep. 4.1, 3; Du Plessis 2019: 169; Cawkwell 1978b: 33; Ashley 1998: 38; Matthew 2015: 142; Krentz 2013: 140; Wrightson 2010: 80; Manti 1992: 37; Gabriel 2010: 66; Schwartz 2009: 165; Connolly 2012: 77.

¹⁹⁷ Matthew 2012b: 149-150; 2015: 142-156; Pritchett 1971: 154; Cole 2018: 70, 201; Cawkwell 1989: 383 n25.

¹⁹⁸ Matthew 2015: 144, 144 Fig. 12, 145.

¹⁹⁹ For a discussion of the *pelte* – Thesis: 166-167.

²⁰⁰ Du Plessis 2019: 173, 179; Schwartz 2009: 165-166; Wrightson 2010: 80 n33.

spatial grounds is removed if alternatives to the positioning of the *sarissa* are considered. It is true that when wielded at waist height, the pike posed an impediment to the interlocking of *peltai*.²⁰¹ If, however, it can be accepted that in a *synaspismos* formation, the phalangite held his weapon in an elevated position (at shoulder height, for example), the stumbling block is overcome.²⁰²

An objection that the *sarissa* was probably too heavy to be held in this way would appear to be groundless.²⁰³ European pikemen in seventeenth-century armies wielded a weapon of near identical dimensions to Macedonian *sarissai* in such a fashion, something confirmed by both drill manuals of the age, modern re-enactments, and forensic archaeology.²⁰⁴ Potentially, in fact, an over-the-shoulder stance may have been advantageous, as it not only made the enemy's unprotected face a natural target, it also enabled a phalangite to strike at his opponent's torso.²⁰⁵

Other scholars have argued against the *synaspismos* on the basis that phalangites would have been unable to manoeuvre effectively in intervals of only one cubit. Instead, they claim, a realistic interval was two cubits – 90-96 centimetres.²⁰⁶ Polybius seemingly lends some measure of support when, in describing the Macedonian phalanx, he states:

ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ μὲν ἀνὴρ ἴσταται σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐν τρισὶ ποσὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐναγωνίους
πυκνώσεις... (Polyb. 18.29).

²⁰¹ Du Plessis 2019: 173-174, 173 Figure 1, 179; Matthew 2012b: 150; 2015: 145.

²⁰² Du Plessis 2019: 175, 175 Figure 3, 175 Figure 4, 181. Bar-Kochva 1989: 6 allows for the possibility.

²⁰³ Matthew 2015: 144-146, 151.

²⁰⁴ European armies – Du Plessis 2019: 176-177, 177 Figure 5; Schwartz 2013: 166-167; De Gheyn 1608: Figures 14, 19, 24, 28-30; McCormack 1993: 14. Re-enactments – Du Plessis 2019: 177 Figure 6.

Interestingly, Matthew who doubts *sarissai* were wielded at shoulder height, relates an anecdote where a European re-enactment group did just that with a replica sixteenth-century pike – Matthew 2015: 452 n 29. Forensic archaeology – Du Plessis 2019: 177-181, 180 Figure 11.

²⁰⁵ Du Plessis 2019: 175-176, 180-181; McCormack 1993: 14.

²⁰⁶ Matthew 2015: 147-154; Bar-Kochva 1989: 7-8; Dillon-Lee 1814: 60 n3; English 2009a: 21.

For since, when it has closed up for action, each man, with his arms, occupies a space of three feet in breadth... (trans. Paton, 2010).

Polybius' testimony, however, should be read closely in conjunction with that of the tactician Ascepiodotus who writes:

τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν δίπηχυ κατὰ πύκνωσιν, ἔφηγν, ἐπωνόμασται, τὸ δὲ πηχυαῖον κατὰ συνασπισμόν. γίνεται δὲ ἢ μὲν πύκνωσις, ὅτ' ἂν ἡμεῖς τοῖς πολεμίοις τὴν φάλαγγα ἐπάγωμεν, ὁ δὲ συνασπισμός, ὅτ' ἂν οἱ πολέμοιοι ἡμῖν ἐπάγονται (Asclep. 4.3).

I have stated that of these two spacings the one of two cubits is called 'compact spacing' and the one of a single cubit 'with locked shields.' The former is used when we are marching the phalanx upon the enemy, the latter when the enemy is marching upon us (trans. Illinois Greek Club, 1923).

Asclepiodotus is unambiguous, being at pains to point out that a “compact” (πύκνωσιν = *pyknosis*) formation in which the space between phalangites is two cubits (approximately ninety centimetres or three feet), is distinct from a “locked shield” (συνασπισμόν = *synaspismos*) deployment, where the interval was only one cubit. Polybius' choice of πυκνώσεις when describing the battle order of the phalanx, therefore, is in agreement with Asclepiodotus, who informs that the *pyknosis* was employed when in attack, whereas the *synaspismos* was a defensive formation.

It may very well be, however, that when in *synaspismos* formation, the phalanx was more flexible than some modern commentators credit. Ancient sources detail that arrayed in *synaspismos*, the phalanx possessed strong defensive capabilities, a view that finds

agreement with many academics.²⁰⁷ It should also be noted that by adopting the *synaspismos* and holding the *sarissa* vertically, phalangites were able to conduct a number of wheeling manoeuvres including the *klisis*.²⁰⁸ Arrian also suggests to some scholars that the Macedonian phalanx was capable of offensive operations whilst in *synaspismos* formation. When detailing the battle of the Hydaspes river (326), he states:

... αὐτὸς μὲν Ἀλέξανδρος περιβάλλει ἐν κύκλῳ τὴν ἵππον τῆ πάσῃ τάξει, τοὺς πεζοὺς δὲ
ξυνασπίσαντας ὡς ἐς πυκνοτάτην ζύγκλεισιν ἐπάγειν τὴν φάλαγγα ἐσήμηνε (Arr. *Anab*
5.17.7).

...*Alexander himself threw his cavalry in a circle around their whole division [Porus' elephants], and then gave a signal for the infantry to lock shields, concentrate into the most compact mass possible and advance the phalanx* (trans. Brunt, 1976).

Arrian's choice of ζύγκλεισιν in describing how the Macedonian's locked their shields, called to mind for a number of academics the formation described by Diodorus and Asclepiodotus, leading them to reach the conclusion that Alexander employed the tactic at Hydaspes.²⁰⁹ Arrian, however, does not use the specialist term συνασπισμόν, and so doubt has been expressed that the *synaspismos* was utilised as an offensive tactic against Porus by the Macedonians.²¹⁰ Concern can be alleviated somewhat by accounts in Plutarch and Polyaeus, where συνασπισμοῦ is employed to allude to phalangites with interlocked shields

²⁰⁷ Aelian, 11; Asclep. 4.3; Arr. *Tact.* 11; Gabriel 2010: 66; Manti 1992: 37-38; Matthew 2015: 143; Sekunda 2014b: 51; Cawkwell 1978b: 33; 1989: 382; Pritchett 1971: 153-154; Du Plessis 2019: 169, 176; Cawkwell 1989: 382.

²⁰⁸ Aelian, 32; Asclep. 12.9; Matthew 2012b: 150; 2015: 35, 143; Bosworth 1980: 71; Hammond 1980c: 59 n24; Cole 2018: 201.

²⁰⁹ Warry 1995: 73; Connolly 2012: 66, 83; Ashley 1998: 325-326, 327; Bosworth 1996: 16, 19; Montagu 2006: 153 all indicate that Alexander's infantry advanced with "locked shields".

²¹⁰ Matthew 2015: 147-148, 407 n202.

engaged in manouevres that suggest the formation was something more than defensive.²¹¹ Neither author, of course, was a military man in the professional sense, and so the precision of their vocabulary selections might be questioned. The matter, therefore, remains far from clear, and is probably unsolvable, but what should not be doubted is that Philip, as Diodorus records, was responsible for the introduction of the *synaspismos* formation.

Tactical innovations, however, were not just limited to the infantry; under Philip, cavalry's importance in the winning of battles ever-increased.²¹² In part, this was made possible by the superiority of the mounts themselves which were both larger and stronger than those of the southern Greeks.²¹³ At between thirteen and fourteen hands (134-144 centimetres), Greek animals were not huge, resembling something akin in size to the modern pony.²¹⁴ Under Philip, however, there appears to have been a conscious effort to improve the overall quality and size of cavalry mounts with a selective breeding program conducted at Pella, where was situated a royal stud of 30,000 mares and 300 stallions.²¹⁵ Here, Macedonian horses – whose bloodlines traced to the famous Persian Nisaeen breed – were interbred with stock from Thessaly, Thrace and Illyria.²¹⁶ Of particular value

²¹¹ Plut. *Aem.* 19.1; *Flam.* 8.4; Polyae. 4.2.2. Modern scholarship to acknowledge the ancient sources' use of the term include Pritchett 1971: 151-152; Matthew 2015: 147, 443 n38; Du Plessis 2019: 168, 169; Cawkwell 1989: 383 n25.

²¹² Brunt 1976d: lxxix; Spence 1995: 27, 177; Ducrey 1986: 91; Gabriel 2009: 3, 2010: 77; Bosworth 1988a: 262; Delbrück 1975: 180; Matthew 2015: 37, 371-372; Müller 2010b: 169; Lee 2010b: 492, 503; LaForse 2010: 555.

²¹³ Cawkwell 1978b: 159; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 109; Gabriel 2009: 3; 2010: 74; For a contra view see Markle 1977: 334 who estimates Macedonian animals as 13.2-14.2 hands, the same height as a Thessalian pony.

²¹⁴ Six horse breeds are indigenous to Greece. The figures quoted likely relate to the Thessalian (Pindos) pony, the premier breed in ancient Greece – Antikas 2008: 35; Gaebel 2002: 19, 21; Hutchinson 2000: 102; Green 1991: 18. Anderson 1961: 15, 82; Hyland 2003: 126; Willekes 2016: 7 estimate between fourteen and fifteen hands. Hunt 2007: 119 states fifteen hands at most.

²¹⁵ Str. 16.2.10; Errington 1990: 26; Sukenik 1950-1951: 541; Karunanithy 2013: 66; Hyland 2013: 493; Fox 2015d: 376; Fields 2003: 111 n10; Guler 2016: 77; Sidnell 2006: 85.

²¹⁶ Nisaeen – Hdt. 7.40, 9.20; Arr. *Anab.* 7.13.1; Green 1991: 18; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 109; Hyland 2013: 493; Sidnell 2006: 86; How & Wells 2008: 558. Other stock – Diod. Sic. 4.15.3; Bradford 1992: 136; Karunanithy 2013: 66; Hyland 2013: 493; Fox 2015d: 376. Evidence of a breeding program is also indirectly evidenced in Philip's willingness to pay thirteen talents for a Thessalian stallion of exceptional

appeared to have been Scythian animals as evidenced by Philip's capture of 20,000 horses during the campaign of 339 and his determination to return them to Macedonia.²¹⁷

In keeping with his revision of the infantry, Philip also adopted innovatory cavalry deployments in order to achieve tactical objectives. As with so many of the king's reforms, however, it is difficult to make a case that they had any connection to his time as a Theban hostage. One example is that of the cavalry wedge. Some academics advocate that Thebes had been experimenting with the formation and that it was employed by Epaminondas at the Battle of Mantinea.²¹⁸

Such a belief is founded presumably on the commentary of the battle documented in Xenophon's *Hellenica*, where it is stated:

καὶ μὴν τοὺς ἰππέας οἱ μὲν πολέμιοι ἀντιπαρετάξαντο ὥσπερ ὀπλιτῶν φάλαγγα βάθος ἐφεξῆς καὶ ἔρημον πεζῶν ἀμίππων· ὁ δ' Ἐπαμεινώνδας αὖ καὶ τοῦ ἰππικοῦ ἔμβολον ἰσχυρὸν ἐποίησατο... (Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.23-24).

Again, while the enemy had formed their horsemen like a phalanx of hoplites,—six deep and without intermingled foot soldiers,—Epaminondas on the other hand had made a strong column of his cavalry... (trans. Brownson, 1921).

Much depends on the interpretation of the term ἔμβολον (*embolon*). It is true that ἔμβολον can be read as “wedge”, but an equally valid translation is “ram [of a *trieres*]” –

stature (later dubbed Bucephalus by Alexander) – Plut. *Alex.* 6; Arr. *Anab.* 5.19.5; Anderson 1930: 12; Gilley & Worthington 2010: 188; Millett 2010: 483 n40; Green 1991: 43.

²¹⁷ Just. 9.2.16; Karunanithy 2013: 69-70; Cawkwell 1978b: 159; Gaebel 2002: 24, 157; Fox 2015d: 376; Sidnell 2006: 20, 85; Millett 2010: 490; Ellis 1976: 186; Worthington 2013: 236; King 2018: 94; Guler 2016: 77.

²¹⁸ Sidnell 2006: 71, 79; Rees 2016: 125; Devine 1983: 201; Rawlings 2007: 88.

in other words, a shape that is oblong, or column-like, in appearance. Ancient sources make it clear that this should be the preferred interpretation when they detail that, apart from the Thesalians who preferred the rhomboid shape, the leading states of Greece deployed cavalry in a square formation.²¹⁹ Asclepiodotus informs:

Ταῖς δὲ τετραγώνοις Πέρσαι τε καὶ Σικελοὶ καὶ Ἕλληνες ἐχρῶντο διὰ τὸ ἐν τούτοις δύνασθαι ζυγεῖν τε ἅμα καὶ στοιχεῖν τὰς εἴλας. πλὴν Ἕλληνες ἑτερομήκει τῷ πλήθει τὴν εἴλην ἐναλλάττοντες τῇ ὄψει τὸ σχῆμα τετράγωνον ἀπεδίδοσαν (Asclep. 7.4).

The Persians, Sicilians, and Greeks regularly used the square formation since it can hold the squadrons in both rank and file; but the Greeks modified the squadron formation by making it an oblong in mass, while giving it to the eye the appearance of a square (trans. Illinois Greek Club, 1923).

Asclepiodotus' observations are confirmed in the later *tacticas* of both Aelian and Arrian. Aelian states:

ταῖς μέντοι τετραγώνοις ἐχρήσαντο Πέρσαι τε καὶ Σικελοὶ καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων οἱ πλεῖστοι, πεπεισμένοι καὶ τὴν σύνθεσιν ἔχειν εὐχερεστέραν καὶ τὴν συνίππευσιν καὶ τὴν χρεῖαν [πολλῶ] βελτίω (Aelian 18).

The Persians, the Sicilians and, generally speaking, the Greeks used square formations, being of the opinion that they were more easily formed and better suited to the easy preservation of the formation and general use (trans. Matthew, 2012).

²¹⁹ Thessalian rhomboid – Asclep. 7.2; Aelian 18; Arr. *Tact.* 16; Gaebel 2002: 118; Spence 1993: 109; 2002: 357; Worley 1994: 30, 32; Hutchinson 2000: 109, 226; 2014: 147; Ashley 1998: 32; Hyland 2003: 147; Ray 2009: 19; Lee 2013: 153.

Arrian corroborates:

ταῖς δὲ δὴ τετραγώνοις τάξεσι Πέρσαι μάλιστα ἐχρήσαντο, καὶ οἱ ἐν Σικελία βάρβαροι καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ ἰππικώτατοι (Arr. *Tact.* 16).

The Persians especially use square formations, the barbarians in Sicily and nearly all the most skilful horsemen of the Greeks (trans. DeVoto 1993: 67).

All three sources also inform their readers that although the Greeks preferred square cavalry formations, they were sometimes oblong in appearance due to the horse itself being twice as long as it is wide.²²⁰ In other words, by using the term ἔμβολον, what Xenophon is describing at Mantinea is not the advance of a Theban cavalry wedge, but that of the Boeotian contingent in a rectangular column.

Indeed, the ancient sources make it clear that rather than have derived his inspiration for the cavalry wedge from Thebes, Philip obtained the idea from the Thracians and Scythians, who pioneered the formation.²²¹ The wedge's effectiveness was enhanced by stationing elite horsemen on the formation's cutting edge and positioning experienced leaders at its point, thereby improving manoeuvrability.²²² Although the intention of the wedge was undoubtedly to breach enemy phalanxes, how this was actually achieved is a matter of scholarly debate. One academic insists that by harnessing an equine's instinctive herd mentality, horses could be trained to exercise a controlled charge against an intact

²²⁰ Asclep. 7.4; Aelian 18; Arr. *Tact.* 16.

²²¹ Asclep. 7.3; Aelian, 18; Arr. *Tact.* 16; Lendon 2005: 98; Spence 1995: 27, 104; Gabriel 2010: 42; Worthington 2008: 27; Gaebel 2002: 181; Sekunda 2010: 451; Sidnell 2006: 20, 79; Matthew 2015: 45; Webber 2001: 41; Sears 2013: 179; King 2018: 112; Sears & Willekes 2016: 1025-1026.

²²² Aelian, 18; Asclep. 7.3; Arr. *Tact.* 16; Lendon 2005: 98; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 414; Worley 1994: 157; Ashley 1998: 30; Gaebel 2002: 181; Sidnell 2006: 20, 40, 80; Guler 2016: 77; Hammond 1989: 60; 1998a: 406-407; Markle 1982: 106-107.

phalanx with a reasonable expectation of victory.²²³ Other scholars, together with the testimony of Arrian, offer support to the view that cavalry could be deployed successfully against infantry formations.²²⁴

Arrian, in his *Tactica*, certainly appears to add credence to this conclusion:

Φίλιππος δὲ ὁ Μακεδῶν καὶ Μακεδόνας ταύτη τῇ τάξει χρῆσθαι ἐπήσκησεν. ὠφέλιμος δὲ καὶ αὕτη δοκεῖ ἡ τάξις, ὅτι ἐν κύκλῳ οἱ ἡγεμόνες τεταγμένοι εἰσὶ, καὶ τὸ μέτωπον ἐς ὄξυ ἀποληγὸν εὐπετῶς πᾶσαν τάξιν πολεμίαν διακόπτειν παρέχει, καὶ τὰς ἐπιστροφάς τε καὶ ἀναστροφάς ὀξείας ποιεῖσθαι δίδωσιν. (Arr. *Tact.* 16).

Philip of Macedon trained the Macedonians to use this formation [the wedge], which is especially effective because the leaders are drawn up in a circle and the front of the wedge tapers away to a point. This makes it easy to cut its way through any enemy formation and allows it to wheel swiftly round or back (Campbell 2004a: 132)

Arrian appears to be unequivocal, stating that a tapered wedge formation (τὸ μέτωπον ἐς ὄξυ ἀποληγὸν) provided cavalry with two telling advantages. Not only did it enhance the division's effectiveness by allowing wheeling manoeuvres to be conducted rapidly and efficiently (τὰς ἐπιστροφάς τε καὶ ἀναστροφάς ὀξείας), it also enabled cavalry to penetrate enemy formations successfully (πᾶσαν τάξιν πολεμίαν).

²²³ Herd mentality – Sears & Willekes 2016: 1032-1033, 1035; Willekes 2015: 48, 55-56; 2016: 187. Training – Xen. *Eq. mag.* 2.5, 9.10-11; Sears & Willekes 2016: 1033-1034; Willekes 2015: 54-55; 2016: 136-137, 187. Controlled advance – Sears & Willekes 2016: 1033; Willekes 2015: 50-51; 2016: 161-162, 188. Success of wedge – Sears & Willekes 2016: 1018, 1025-1027, 1033, 1035.

²²⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.2, 2.8.9, 10.3-4; Worley 1994: 162-163; Sidnell 2006: 20, 40, 80; Markle 1977: 339.

Yet the view remains somewhat controversial. Conventional wisdom has it that such a stratagem was impossible as horses will not attack an unbroken infantry formation.²²⁵ Instead, it is argued, cavalry could only be relied upon to exploit breaches in enemy lines created by the infantry.²²⁶ Exactly how that was achieved remains a matter of some contention. Some commentators believe that it was through a headlong charge into the enemy phalanx.²²⁷ Others argue for a controlled advance, reasoning that because horses instinctively engage in shoulder-barging, it was the continuous push of the animal – combined with the attack from an elevated position of a lance or sabre-wielding cavalryman – that breached enemy lines.²²⁸ It is a point well-made that even a heavily armoured hoplite at sixty-six kilograms and 1.7 metres in height, stood little chance of preventing a beast of similar stature, but weighing around five hundred kilograms, from forcing its way into the phalanx, so disrupting its structure.²²⁹

Reconciliation between the opposing points of view may at first seem unlikely but might be found in the testimonies of Aelian and Asclepiodotus, both of whom are somewhat more equivocal than Arrian. When discussing the advantages of various cavalry formations, Asclepiodotus informs his audience that the Macedonians adopted the wedge invented by the Scythians and Thracians because:

²²⁵ Hdt. 9.18; Tarn 1948a: 181; Brunt 1976d: lxxx; Hammond 1980c: 32 n63; 1998a: 406; Gabriel 2010: 78; Rahe 1980: 87; 1981: 85-86; Ashley 1998: 29; Gaebel 2002: 156, 156 n44; Sidnell 2006: 10, 41, 43, 46; Matthew 2015: 385-386; Hutchinson 2000: 103; Waterfield 2009b: 3.

²²⁶ Rahe 1980: 86; Borza 1990: 203; Gabriel 2010: 69; Heskell 1997a: 180; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 214; Gaebel 2002: 181; Hammond 1990: 274-275; Sekunda 2010: 451.

²²⁷ Markle 1977: 339; 1982: 105, 111 n55; Serrati 2013b: 188-189; King 2018: 112.

²²⁸ Shoulder-barging – Arr. *Anab.* 1.15.2; Gabriel 2010: 80; Worthington 2014: 36; Gaebel 2002: 158; Sidnell 2006: 10; Willekes 2015: 55. Continuous push – Arr. *Anab.* 1.15.4; Gabriel 2010: 77-78; Worley 1994: 162, 217 n38; Bosworth 1980: 59; Willekes 2015: 52-53, 55; 2016: 187; Spence 1995: 108-109.

²²⁹ Arr. *Anab.* 1.2.5-7, 15.1; Gabriel 2010: 74, 78-80; Markle 1977: 339; Hammond 1980c: 58; 1989c: 5; Bosworth 1980: 59; Sears & Willekes 2016: 1034; Willekes 2016: 187.

...ῶν ἐμβόλων βραχὺ γινόμενον ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ῥομβοειδῶν, ὧνπερ ἥμισυ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐμβολοειδές, ῥάστην ἐποίει τὴν διίππευσιν, μετὰ τοῦ καὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας προβεβλῆσθαι τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ τὰς ἀναστροφὰς...(Asclep. 7.3).

...the front of the wedge formation is narrow, as in the rhomboid, and only one-half as wide, and this made it easiest for them [the Macedonian cavalry] to break through...(trans. Illinois Greek Club, 1923).

Aelian, in similar fashion, records that Philip, as part of his military reforms, had his cavalry adopt the wedge rather than square formation because he believed:

...τὴν γὰρ χρεῖαν ἐνεργεστέραν ταύτας ἔχειν μᾶλλον τῶν τετραγώνων ὑπέλαβον διὰ τὸ κύκλω τὸς ἡγεμόνας τεταχθαι, τὸ δὲ μέτωπον βραχὺ τι γινόμενον καὶ τὴν [διίππευσιν] εὐχρηστον ποιεῖν διὰ τοῦ τυχόντος διαστήματος καὶ τὴν ἀναστροψὴν [καὶ] ἐπιστροψὴν σύντομον (Aelian 18).

...the wedge formation more useful than the square ...[because] with such a narrow frontage, the motions of the squadron are easily performed and it passes swiftly through any given space (trans. Matthew, 2012).

What the tacticians seem to be implying is that the wedge made it easier for cavalry to charge infantry formations, especially – but not exclusively – if there was a gap of which they could take advantage. In other words, horsemen were capable of attacking successfully an unbroken phalanx, but the task was simpler if a breach could be first affected. As this

interpretation accommodates the testimonies of Arrian and the views of many modern scholars on the role of Philip's cavalry at Chaeronea, it is therefore accepted.²³⁰

V. Macedonian Panoply

Philip's army likely had its genesis sometime between 365 and 360 when, as a prince of the realm, he received the governorship of a province (possibly Amphaxitis) from Perdiccas III (368-359) – perhaps at the advice of Euphraeus – where he raised and equipped a force that was to be the basis for future conquests.²³¹ Recently returned from Boeotia and brimming with newfound knowledge and insights (so most would advocate), this “blank canvass” was surely the ideal opportunity for Philip to mould an army in the image of the dominant hoplite force he had observed at Thebes. An analysis of Macedonian panoply helps reveal this was far from the case.

Unlike *poleis*, whose hoplites were responsible for supply and maintenance of their own equipment, the Macedonian monarchy oversaw production and issue of arms to the country's troops. This convention appears to have begun with Archelaus I (413-399) and successive kings, including Philip II, continued the policy.²³² Although the initial issuances were probably modest, Philip's capacity to equip his men with quality panoply corresponded with the increasing resources under his command and the means to finance

²³⁰ Chaeronea (338) is rightly regarded as Philip's tactical masterpiece and the result of years of military development. For a full analysis of the battle see Thesis: 192-195.

²³¹ Ath. 11.506e-f; Markle 1978: 486; Worthington 2013: 54, 57; 2014: 28; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 207; Green 1991: 20; Chroust 1967b: 34; Sekunda 2010: 450; Matthew 2015: 31; Fox 2015c: 336; 2015e: 268; Roisman 2010: 163; Hatzopoulos 1996: 178; Curteis 1890: 24; Natoli 2004a: 148; 2004b: 35-36, 37, 39; Guler 2014: 129; Parke 1933: 157.

²³² Archelaus I – Thuc. 2.100.2; Hatzopoulos 2015b: 58; Green 1991: 9; Karunanithy 2013: 41; Errington 1990: 25; Everson 2004: 187; Edson 1980: 23; Sage 1996: 165. Philip – Diod. Sic. 16.3.1; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 421; Gabriel 2010: 64; Karunanithy 2013: 41-42; Hammond 1996a: 366; Sekunda 2010: 449; Trundle 2004: 124; King 2018: 108.

their supply.²³³ The location of Macedonia's centre of manufacture has not as yet been located with certainty but it is probable the main armoury was at Pella, with workshops later established at Amphipolis and Philippi.²³⁴ Wherever they may have been, the importance of centralised control in the production and distribution of arms should not be underestimated, as it made possible with relative ease both the standardisation of equipment and dissemination of innovative weaponry.

Perhaps the most important example was that of the infantry *sarissa*, a pike whose length required that it be wielded with both hands.²³⁵ Although it is the contention of this dissertation that the weapon was introduced into the Macedonian army during the reign of Philip, the timing of its inception is a matter of controversy and so the debate is worth examining in some detail.²³⁶ A few scholars contend that it was one of Philip's ancestors – Alexander I – who should be credited with the weapon's invention.²³⁷ Philip was not the first Macedonian king to undertake military reforms. Anaximenes records that a Macedonian "Alexander" reorganized his infantry and named them *pezhetairoi*.²³⁸ Thucydides also notes that Archelaus I (413-399) restructured the military – including the arming of infantry.²³⁹ Neither source, however, mentions the introduction of innovative

²³³ Karunanithy 2013: 42; Delbrück 1975: 179; Greenwalt 2010: 290; Sekunda 2010: 449-450; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 424; King 2018: 112.

²³⁴ Karunanithy 2013: 42, 45; Whitley *et al.* 2005-2006: 55; Stoyanov 2015: 431.

²³⁵ Polyb. 18.29; Liv. 37.42; Pritchett 1985: 57; Snodgrass 1967: 118; Hammond 1994b: 19; Worthington 2008: 27; Ashley 1998: 36; Matthew 2015: 1, 15, 133-156; King 2018: 112; LaForse 2010: 555; MacQueen 1995b: 326; Brunt 1963: 27 n5; Walbank 1967: 587; Du Plessis 2019: 170.

²³⁶ Ober 2015: 286; McQueen 1995a: 66-67; King 2018: 110-111; Markle 1977: 327; 1999: 243, 243 n38, 243 n39; Greenwalt 2010: 290; Brice 2012: 29; Everson 2004: 187; Edson 1980: 23 agree Philip introduced the *sarissa* but do not nominate a date. Bosworth 1988a: 10; Griffith 1980: 59 regard it "highly probable" that the *sarissa* was Philip's innovation.

²³⁷ Müller 2010b: 168-169; Fox 2015e: 260 n15; Heinrichs & Müller 2008: 294-295 raise the possibility that Alexander I developed the *sarissa*. Matthew 2015: 4-9, 18 acknowledges the scholarship but rejects it.

²³⁸ Anaximenes *FGrHist* 72 F4; Roisman 2010: 162; Müller 2010b: 168; Sekunda 2010: 447-448; Bosworth 2010: 99; Fox 2015e: 260; Brunt 1976a: 151; Heckel 2013: 163; English 2009a: 3-4; Matthew 2015: 4, 7, 10, 19.

²³⁹ Thuc. 2.100.2; Hatzopoulos 2015b: 58; Mari 2015a: 91; Green 1991: 9; Karunanithy 2013: 41; Errington 1990: 25; Brunt 1976a: 152; Borza 1990: 166; Matthew 2015: 7.

weaponry, surely something to be expected in an armament as noteworthy as the *sarissa*.²⁴⁰ Whilst an *argumentum ex silentio* (in itself) should not be regarded as conclusive, it does – in the absence of corroborating archaeological evidence – constitute sufficient grounds to reject the theory of the weapon’s existence prior to Philip.

What the scant archaeological record does indicate, however, is that the *sarissa* was almost certainly in existence during his reign – although when it was introduced is contested. Finds at Vergina, Olynthus and Chaeronea are often used as the basis for opinions and are thus worthy of close scrutiny. The Vergina artefacts, consisting of two lance-heads, a butt-spike, and a “connecting tube”, were recovered by archaeologist Manolis Andronicos from beside a tumulus grave. Andronicos, who dated the items to c.330-320, believed they had been abandoned by robbers in search of more valuable objects.²⁴¹ Weighing ninety-seven grams, so-called “Lance-point B” measured 27.3 centimetres and was identified as coming from an ordinary hoplite *doru*.²⁴² Because of its enormous size – fifty-one centimetres long and 1.235 kilograms in weight – Andronicos pronounced the other spearhead, “Lance-Point A”, that of a *sarissa*.²⁴³ A number of academics have accepted his conclusion.²⁴⁴

Agreement, however, is not universal. Matthew demonstrates convincingly that a spearhead that size is not compatible with the weapon’s point of balance, which he calculates to be ninety-six centimetres from the rearward end of the *sarissa*.²⁴⁵ Asclepiodotus and Aelian both confirm that a phalangite’s grip occupied the rear two cubits

²⁴⁰ For further discussion on infantry reform prior to Philip II see Thesis: 261-263.

²⁴¹ Andronicos 1970: 96; Matthew 2015: 49; Markle 1977: 325; 1982: 88.

²⁴² Andronicos 1970: 98, 101; Markle 1977: 325; Matthew 2015: 52. Matthew 2015: 54-55 contends a javelin-head.

²⁴³ Andronicos 1970: 98, 102; Markle 1977: 325; 1982: 91; Matthew 2015: 52; Sekunda 2012: 14.

²⁴⁴ Gabriel 2010: 65; Markle 1977: 325; Manti 1992: 36; English 2009a: 20; Griffith, 1980: 65; Bosworth 1988a: 260; Heckel 2008: 16.

²⁴⁵ Matthew 2015: 81-90 but especially 81-83, 82 Fig. 3; 2016a: 126.

(90-96 centimetres) of the *sarissai*, which indeed is close to a natural spacing between hands when holding and wielding the weapon.²⁴⁶ Polybius, however, indicates that *sarissai* were held four cubits from the end.²⁴⁷ He states:

... κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀρμογὴν τὴν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν δεκατετάρων, τούτων δὲ τοὺς τέτταρας ἀφαιρεῖ τὸ μεταξὺ τοῖν χεροῖν διάστημα καὶ τὸ κατόπιν σήκωμα τῆς προβολῆς ... (Polyb. 18.29)

... *from which we must subtract the distance between the bearer's two hands and the length of the weighted portion of the pike behind which serves to keep it couched—four cubits in all—* ... (trans. Paton, 2010).

Matthew is likely correct in his assertion that Polybius' figures are confused, rightly pointing out that gripped in such manner, the projecting rear of the *sarissa* would hinder the deployment of phalangites when in a phalanx formation.²⁴⁸ As well as being at odds with later sources, Polybius' testimony is also contrary to the (admittedly scarce) archaeological record. A bronze plaque from Pergammon, possibly commemorating the battle of Magnesia (190), appears to vindicate Asclepiodotus and Aelian by depicting two Macedonian phalangites holding their weapons in the manner both tacticians describe. Unfortunately the artefact has been lost, leaving only a pen-and-ink drawing made by Alexander Conze *c.* 1913 for modern analysts to interpret. Whilst the illustration is of high

²⁴⁶ Two cubits – Asclep. 5.1; Aelian, 14; Matthew 2012b: 154 n5; 2015: 83. Natural spacing – Polyb. 18.29; Aelian, 14; Matthew 2015: 84-85, 84 Fig. 4; Bar-Kochva 1989: 6-7.

²⁴⁷ A number of modern scholars concur – Ashley 1998: 36; Snodgrass 1964b: 118; English 2009a: 21; Bar-Kochva 1989: 6-7; Sekunda 2012: 16.

²⁴⁸ Matthew 2015: 85, 85 Fig. 5.

quality, like the Kinch tomb drawing, small inaccuracies are possible and so caution needs to be exercised in pronouncing the evidence conclusive.²⁴⁹

The placement of the grip, and therefore the weapon's point of balance, becomes significant when estimating the size and weight of the *sarissa* head. By means of a mathematical formula, Matthew has calculated that a weapon armed with 'blade' and butt-spike such as those claimed by Andronicos to be from a *sarissa*, would have a point of balance about half way down the shaft, making the weapon almost impossible to use.²⁵⁰

Several scholars have also rejected Andronicos' findings on the basis that a passage from the *Cynegetica* of the Augustan poet Gratticus mentioning the *exigui dentes* ("small teeth") of Macedonian *sarissai* supports the case for a 'blade' of modest dimensions.²⁵¹ The conclusion is somewhat troubling on a number of levels. It should, in the first instance, be remembered that Gratticus was not a chronicler but a poet. The methodological difficulties of deriving evidence from sources such as these have been addressed in Chapter One, but it is enough here to be reminded that poets often sought just as much to entertain and impart moral lessons upon their audience as to inform.²⁵²

This is evident with a critical examination of the passage, which reads:

quid, Macetum immensos libeat si dicere contos? quam longa exigui spicant hastilia dentes!
(Grat. *Cyn.* 117-118).

²⁴⁹ Matthew 2015: 84-85, Plate 7; Markle 1999: 248, 249 Figure 54; Sekunda 2012: 5; Taylor 2016: 81-83, 83 Fig. 3, 85.

²⁵⁰ Matthew 2015: 81-83, 82 Fig. 3.

²⁵¹ Matthew 2012a: 244 n15; 2015: 53; 126, 2016a: 126; Sekunda 2001: 15-16.

²⁵² Duff & Duff 1935: 145-146; Green 2018: 7-8; Green 2007: 49-50 acknowledge that this, in part, was Grattius' intention as well.

What if I choose to speak of the enormous Macedonian pikes? How long are the shafts and how small the teeth which furnish their spikes! (trans. Duff & Duff, 1935).

It can be seen from the passage that Grattius' point was not that *sarissa* heads were small in an absolute sense, rather that they were so in relation to the excessive length of the weapon itself. Unsurprising, when it is remembered that the size of *sarissai* peaked at sixteen cubits (7.68 metres) during the mid-Hellenistic period.²⁵³ On that basis, to describe even a fifty centimetre head as "small" would hardly be out of place. This raises the further possibility that Grattius' reference to the size of the "teeth" was employed as a comedic understatement, intended to elicit from his audience wry recognition of the weapon's imposing nature.²⁵⁴ After a close reading, therefore, what becomes apparent is that there are serious doubts concerning the validity of employing Grattius' reference in determining the length of a *sarissa* head.

It has also been suggested that, based on a close study of the Alexander mosaic and a wall painting from the Kinch Tomb, Lefkadia, "Lance-Point A" is actually the butt of a cavalry *sarissa* (*xyston*), although the theory does not yet appear to have received widespread support.²⁵⁵ Both sources present potential objections to such a conclusion. Problematic for the modern commentator is that the original Kinch Tomb painting (c. late fourth century) is now lost and survives only in a drawing made by the archaeologist who excavated the site.²⁵⁶ What the reproduction appears to depict is a Macedonian cavalryman

²⁵³ Polyb. 18.29; Aelian, 14; Polyaen. 2.29.2; Matthew 2015: 66-68, 69 Table 2, 77 Table 3, 78 Table 4; English 2009a: 17; Connolly 2012: 69; Sekunda 2007: 329; Nawotka 2010: 25; Markle 1977: 324.

²⁵⁴ For the Roman reaction to the *sarissa* phalanx see Thesis: 166 n308 below.

²⁵⁵ Matthew 2015: 54.

²⁵⁶ Bugh 2020: 75; King 2018: 116; Pollitt 1986: 45; Anson 1987: 112.

equipped with a *xyston*.²⁵⁷ Its rearward section is clearly visible although the impression of the weapon's head is not discernible due to the original image's damaged nature. If accurate, what the illustration shows, however, is a weapon whose end is arguably more akin to the *sauroter* of a hoplite *doru* than the leaf-like "blade" recovered at Vergina.²⁵⁸ The Alexander mosaic (c.100) is equally unhelpful, as the section that shows what is (presumably) the rear end of Alexander's *sarissa* has been largely destroyed.²⁵⁹ Although it could be deduced that the lance is "tipped with a large blade-like butt", the same description can be applied to the head of the *xyston*, and with considerably greater certainty as the image is preserved clearly.²⁶⁰

A further objection raised to Andronicos' designation of "Lance-point A" as a *sarissa* head has been that 'blades' of such a large size would have rendered the weapon too cumbersome for combat and so the remains represent specialist or ceremonial adaptations.²⁶¹ For Sekunda (largely on the evidence of the Alexander mosaic), combat *sarissai* had a small diamond-shaped head around 10-15 centimetres long.²⁶² The suggestion seemingly carries some merit until the potential shortcomings and ambiguities of the source are taken into consideration. The first of these is to what extent the mosaic is an accurate reproduction of the painting commissioned by Cassander. Many historians

²⁵⁷ Subject matter – Bugh 2020: 75-76; Matthew 2015: 54; Markle 1982: 90-91; King 2018: 117-119, 118 Figure 5.2; Palagia 2017: 185 Fig. 11.5; Gaebel 2002: 170. Date – Bugh 2020: 74; Matthew 2015: 54; Markle 1982: 91; King 2018: 116; Palagia 2017: 182.

²⁵⁸ Resemblance to the Vergina artefact – Matthew 2015: 54. Markle 1982: 91; Gaebel 2002: 170 use the term butt-spike, confirming the similarity to a *sauroter*.

²⁵⁹ Date – King 2018: 155 Figure 7.3; Dunbabin 1999: 43; Cohen 2010: 163 Figure 73; Palagia 2018: 147; Kleiner 2013: 150; Bowden 2014: 1; Stewart 1993: 131. Missing details – Bugh 2020: 74; Gaebel 2002: 169; Dunbabin 1999: 41 Figure 1; Manti 1992: 33; Markle 1977: 333; 1982: 105; Matthew 2015: Plate 4.

²⁶⁰ Matthew 2015: 54 describes the butt on the mosaic thus.

²⁶¹ Sekunda 2001: 16, 20-21; 2012: 14. Snodgrass 1967: 119 states the head of a *sarissa* "would not have been large".

²⁶² Sekunda 2001: 16, 18; 2010: 450.

consider it to be a reasonably faithful copy, but the influence of Roman traditions should not be discounted.²⁶³

Even allowing an exact facsimile, another consideration is the mosaic's subject matter, the focus of which is a cavalry engagement – and the confrontation between Alexander and Darius in particular.²⁶⁴ Prominent in the background are what a number of scholars interpret to be the *sarissai* of Macedonian *pezhetairoi* threatening to encircle Darius and his retainers, although this is contested.²⁶⁵ Sekunda has employed this assumption in calculating the length of the weapon's head based on its similarity in size to Darius' hand.²⁶⁶ The depth and perspective employed by the artist in the creation of the mosaic, however, is unknown and impossible to estimate with any level of accuracy. As a result, the application of ratios in calculating the size of background objects in relation to those in the foreground becomes highly problematic.²⁶⁷

Scholarly opinion is also divided over which battle is depicted. Many analysts believe that the mosaic celebrates the Macedonian victory at Issus (333) but there remains a case for Gaugamela (331). Some academics even contend that no specific event is recorded and that the mosaic is a generic pictorial celebration of the Macedonian victory over Persia.²⁶⁸ The matter is of some importance to Sekunda's thesis. Following his heavy defeat at Issus, it is recorded that Darius began retraining his inferior troops and outfitting

²⁶³ Roman influences – Kousser 2010: 531; Bowden 2014: 3-4; Miller 2000: 52. Reasonably faithful – Kleiner 2013: 150; Dunbabin 1999: 41-42; Devine 1995: 377; Cohen 2010: 162-163; Childs 2018: 93.

²⁶⁴ Subject matter – Nawotka 2010: 171; Gaebel 2002: 169-170; Hölscher 2004: 23, 26; Palagia 2018: 147; Stewart 2003: 43-44; Manti 1992: 33; Kleiner 2013: 150; Stewart 1993: 131; Badian 1999: 79-80.

²⁶⁵ Sekunda 2001: 16; Manti 1992: 33; Taylor 2016: 87; Dahm 2019: 54; Bowden 2014: 1; Mihalopoulos 2009: 288. Stewart 1993: 131, 134, 138-139 argues the spears belong to members of the Macedonian cavalry.

²⁶⁶ Sekunda 2001: 16.

²⁶⁷ Sekunda 2001: 16; Manti 1992: 34.

²⁶⁸ Issus – Manti 1992: 33; Markle 1977: 333 n46; Dahm 2019: 54; Kleiner 2013: 150; Devine 1995: 377; Stewart 1993: 134-138. Gaugamela – Cheshire 2009: 84; Badian 1999: 80-81, 89-90 n16. Generic celebration – Pollitt 1986: 46; Roisman & Yardley 2011: 562. Bowden 2014: 3; Mihalopoulos 2009: 288; Dunbabin 1999: 41; Palagia 2017: 177; Cohen 2010: 163 express uncertainty.

them with improved panoply, including long spears and swords.²⁶⁹ If, then, the mosaic details the battle of Gaugamela, the weapons depicted in the background could just as easily be the long Persian spears issued by the Great King, and not Macedonian *sarissai* at all.²⁷⁰

Despite the doubts inherent in “evidence” from poetry and partially surviving artworks, a strong case can be made for the combat *sarissa* possessing a much shorter and lighter point than the artefact discovered by Andronicos. A twenty-nine centimetre iron spearhead unearthed at Olynthus, for example, was declared by its excavator to be that of a *sarissa*.²⁷¹ A number of scholars agree, although others remain unconvinced.²⁷² Far more conclusive evidence, however, was recovered from Chaeronea, where in 1902 several much-corroded spearheads measuring between between thirty-one and thirty-eight centimetres were excavated from the Macedonian *polyandrion*.²⁷³ The ravages of time and corrosion have made determining the artefacts’ original dimensions problematic, but nonetheless a number of scholars regard their size and shape as well-suited to that of a battlefield *sarissa*.²⁷⁴

The possibility that these were *doru* spearheads can be rejected safely, firstly on the basis of size. Whilst it is true there was no such thing as a universal length, the average size of the head on a *doru* is generally estimated at 20-30 centimetres long.²⁷⁵ Indeed, the so-called “J style” blade – termed the hoplite spear “par excellence” – was 27.9 centimetres in

²⁶⁹ Diod. Sic. 17.53.1; Nawotka 2010: 217; Briant 2002: 799; Bosworth 1988a: 78; Delbrück 1975: 211; Grant 2017: 124, 168 n104; Badian 1999: 80-81.

²⁷⁰ Badian 1999: 80. Markle 1977: 333 n46 acknowledges the possibility but dismisses it as “wrong”.

²⁷¹ Robinson 1941: 412-413.

²⁷² Agreement – Matthew 2015: 89; Snodgrass 1967: 119; Lee 2001: 15-20. Reservations – Nawotka 2010: 26; King 2018: 111; Markle 1978: 487-488; Hammond 1980c: 53 n4.

²⁷³ Matthew 2015: 53; Sekunda 2001: 16; Pritchett 1985: 138; Markle 1977: 325-326; Cooley 1904: 132-133; Sears & Willekes 2016: 1020.

²⁷⁴ Matthew 2015: 89; Worthington 2008: 152; Rahe 1981: 84; Pritchett 1985: 138; Gaebel 2002: 155; Hammond 1994b: 217 n6; Sears & Willekes 2016: 1021; Ma 2008a: 75; Cooley 1904: 133.

²⁷⁵ Schwartz 2009: 82; Fink 2014: 34; Anderson 1993: 23.

length, 3.1 centimetres wide, and 153 grams in weight.²⁷⁶ In fact, one of the more common types of hoplite spearhead, judging by the number of remains recovered, was the “M style”, with an average length of around eighteen centimetres.²⁷⁷ Both styles, therefore, are much shorter than the artefacts recovered from the *polyandrion*, thus rendering them *doru* remains unlikely.

The lance-heads’ discovery amongst remains in a Macedonian mass grave further confirm that these were remnants of *sarissai*. It is incongruous that excavations would recover Greek remains from a tumulus constructed for Philip’s men. What is far more likely, is that as Macedonians cremated the dead with their weapons, what has been recovered are the remains of *sarissai* used by phalangites in the battle itself.²⁷⁸ Consequently, on the strength of archaeological finds, and those at Chaeronea in particular, it is accordingly the position of this thesis that the length of a functional *sarissa* head during Philip’s reign measured somewhere between thirty and thirty-five centimetres. The conclusion fits well with the weapon’s hypothesised point of balance. Matthew calculates that if held ninety-six centimetres from its end, a twelve cubit *sarissa* with a 1,070 gram butt-spike would require a head of 174 grams.²⁷⁹ *Doru* heads recovered at Olympia that “average” nearly twenty-eight centimetres in length and weigh 153 grams, would seem to indicate that the weightier *sarissa* ‘blade’ could be expected to be longer, thus comparing favourably with the finds at Chaeronea.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁶ *Par excellence* – Snodgrass 1964b: 123; Matthew 2009: 400 n33; 2012a: 3-4; 2015: 53; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 13. Dimensions – Matthew 2012a: 3, 4 Table 1; 2015: 53, 228; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 14; Fink 2014: 34; Markle 1977: 325; Andronicos 1970: 98, 101.

²⁷⁷ Size – Snodgrass 1964b: 127. More common – Snodgrass 1964b: 128; Matthew 2012a: 3; 2015: 53. Bardunias & Ray 2016: 14 merely notes *doru* spearheads were small. Matthew 2015: 53 states that the ‘M style’ blade was smaller than the ‘J style’, but does not supply dimensions.

²⁷⁸ Cooley 1904: 133; Worthington 2008: 152; Pritchett 1958: 308; 1985b: 138; Ma 2008a: 74; Hammond 1989: 57.

²⁷⁹ Matthew 2015: 88-91, 88 Fig. 7, 91 Table 5.

²⁸⁰ Size of the *doru* spearheads – Thesis: 158-159, 159 n276-277.

Archaeological evidence, therefore, confirms securely the introduction of *sarissai* occurred in Philip's reign and that the weapon was deployed at Chaeronea, but does not – by itself – indicate an early or late date. A close study of the literary sources may suggest a way out of the impasse. Diodorus details Philip's reform of the Macedonian army following the Illyrian invasion (359) thus:

Οἱ δὲ Μακεδόνες διὰ τε τὴν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ συμφορὰν καὶ διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐπιφερομένων κινδύνων ἐν ἀπορίᾳ τῇ μεγίστῃ καθειστήκεισαν. ἀλλ' ὅμως τηλικούτων φόβων καὶ κινδύνων ἐφεστώτων Φίλιππος οὐ κατεπλάγη τὸ μέγεθος τῶν προσδοκωμένων δεινῶν ...ἐπενόησε δὲ καὶ τὴν τῆς φάλαγγος πυκνότητα καὶ κατασκευὴν, μιμησάμενος τὸν ἐν Τροίᾳ τῶν ἡρώων συνασπισμόν, καὶ πρῶτος συνεστήσατο τὴν Μακεδονικὴν φάλαγγα (Diod. Sic. 16.3.1-2).

The Macedonians because of the disaster sustained in the battle and the magnitude of the dangers pressing upon them were in the greatest perplexity. Yet even so, with such fears and dangers threatening them, Philip was not panic-stricken by the magnitude of the expected perils...Indeed he devised the compact order and the equipment of the phalanx, imitating the close order fighting with overlapping shields of the warriors at Troy, and was the first to organize the Macedonian phalanx (trans. Oldfather, 1954).

Diodorus' choice of phrase is instructive. In recording that Philip ἐπενόησε δὲ καὶ τὴν τῆς φάλαγγος πυκνότητα καὶ κατασκευὴν (devised the compact order and the equipment of the phalanx), Diodorus is indicating clearly that some new element of panoply was introduced following the disaster of Bardylis' invasion. "Devised" (ἐπενόησε) hardly constitutes an appropriate description if all that is being referred to was the rearming of infantry with Greek accoutrement that had been around for centuries. Diodorus then

confirms that he is indeed discussing Philip’s organization of a peculiarly Macedonian phalanx (Μακεδονικὴν φάλαγγα) – in other words, one defined by the use of *sarissai*.

Another literary source who recorded Philip’s military reforms was Polyaeus, who stated that:

Φίλιππος ἤσκει τοὺς Μακεδόνας πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων, ἀναλαβόντας τὰ ὄπλα τριακόσια στάδια πολλάκις ὀδεύειν φέροντας ὁμοῦ κράνη, πέλτας, κνημίδας, σαρίσας καὶ μετὰ τῶν ὀπλῶν ἐπισιτισμὸν καὶ ὅσα σκευὴ καθημερινῆς διαίτης (Polyaen. 4.2.10).

Philip was training the Macedonians before the dangers. He made them take up their arms and march often three hundred stades carrying helmet, shield, greaves, sarissa, and in addition to their arms, rations and all gear for day-to-day existence (Hammond 1980: 55).

A careful reading of Polyaeus’ commentary both confirms and enhances that of Diodorus. Polyaeus, of course, records explicitly that Macedonians possessed *sarissai* and that they were trained in their use “before the dangers” (πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων). The phrase is seemingly ambiguous until it is recalled that Diodorus documented Macedonia’s “expected perils” (προσδοκωμένων δεινῶν) occurred at the very beginning of Philip’s rule. Read together, what Diodorus and Polyaeus suggest, therefore, is that very early in his reign – possibly from the outset – Philip re-equipped the Macedonian army with *sarissai*, a conclusion supported in this thesis and by many academics.²⁸¹

Keen scholarly debate also surrounds the weapon’s construction, a situation exasperated by a lack of unequivocal physical remains and a dearth of unambiguous

²⁸¹ Anson 2010a: 87; Hammond 1980c: 54-55; 1997b: 366; Fox 2015c: 341; Sekunda 2010: 449; Gabriel, 2010: 62; English 2009a: 4; Rahe 1981: 87; Markle 1999: 243; McQueen 1995a: 66-67. Matthew 2015: 34-35 rejects the argument on the basis that Diodorus does not explicitly mention *sarissae* as included in Philip’s reforms. Matthew, however, is reading Diodorus in isolation and not in conjunction with Polyaeus. Müller 2010: 168-169 acknowledges Diodorus’ passage but finds it inconclusive.

information in the literary sources. Many academics contend that the shaft of the *sarissa* was made from the wood of a male cornel tree (*Cornus mas L.*) – a strong, hardy and elastic material available readily throughout Macedonia. Such an opinion, where acknowledged, is usually based on a passage in Theophrastus’ *Historia plantarum (Enquiry into Plants)*.²⁸²

Because it is a key piece of evidence, the passage is worth examining in detail.

Theophrastus states:

τὸ δ’ ὕψος τοῦ ἄρρενος δώδεκα μάλιστα πηγέων, ἡλικὴ τῶν σαρισσῶν ἢ μεγίστη· τὸ γὰρ ὅλον στέλεχος ὕψος οὐκ ἴσχει (Theophr. *Hist. pl.* 3.12.2).

The height of the ‘male’ tree is at most twelve cubits, the length of the longest Macedonian spear, the stem up to the point where it divides not being very tall (trans. Hort, 1916).

What a careful analysis reveals clearly is that Theophrastus was informing his audience that the male cornel tree is twelve cubits high (5.5 metres) and to assist his readers visualise its size, compares it to the length of a Macedonian *sarissa*. Nowhere does Theophrastus actually state that the weapon was made from cornel wood.²⁸³ Indeed, the only unequivocal literary source derives from Statius, a poet of the first century A.D., who declared that Macedonian *sarissai* were made from ash (*Fraxinus ornus*).²⁸⁴ Deriving evidence from the works of poets is not without methodological difficulties, but need not be dismissed summarily for all that, and Statius’ observation has found (qualified)

²⁸² Anderson 1993: 22-23; Ashley 1998: 36; Gabriel 2010: 64; Hammond 1994b: 19; Markle 1997: 324; Manti 1992: 32; Bosworth 1980: 122; English 2009a: 17; Nawotka 2010: 25; Matthew 2015: 60.

²⁸³ Matthew 2012c: 81, 83, 86; 2015: 60; Sekunda 2001: 23-25; 2012: 13-16; Grant 2017: 167 n91; Head 2016: 13.

²⁸⁴ Stat. *Theb.* 7.269.

acceptance with a number of academics.²⁸⁵ A circumstantial case can be made in support of this view. Ancient sources reveal that the benefits of ash in the manufacture of weapons had been long recognised. Homer refers to “ashen spears”, as does Tyrtaeus.²⁸⁶ Pliny also records the material’s superiority over other woods (including *Cornus mas L.*) in the production of spears.²⁸⁷

The trees’ botanical characteristics perhaps further suggest that ash was a better choice than cornel. Reconstructions suggest that the haft of the *sarissa* was approximately 5.5 metres long and four centimetres in diameter – although slightly tapered towards either end.²⁸⁸ It was, as a consequence, an object of some size. Ash trees can grow 10-12 metres in height and possess a long, straight trunk, characteristics well-suited to the production of *sarissai* shafts.²⁸⁹ By comparison, as Theophrastus observed astutely, the trunks of cornel trees were not very tall, leading to the conclusion by some modern scholars that they were too short to have been used in the production of *sarissai*.²⁹⁰ To some extent, however, this objection is overcome if it is accepted – as some academics believe – that infantry *sarissai* were constructed in two parts and joined by way of an iron sleeve.²⁹¹ Although the theory lacks conclusive verification in the archaeological record, conjecture that the design

²⁸⁵ Sekunda 2001: 22-24, 30; 2007: 259; 2010: 450; Strauss 2003: 143; Matthew 2015: 63-64. Snodgrass 1967: 119 believes *sarissai* shafts were “probably” made from ash wood.

²⁸⁶ Homer – Hom. *Il.* 2.543, 5.655, 13.13.597, 19.390, 22.225; Tyrtaeus 19.7-9.

²⁸⁷ Plin. *HN* 16.84.228; Sekunda 2001: 23; Matthew 2015: 63.

²⁸⁸ Length – Thesis: 164, 164 n297. Diameter – Connolly 2012: 70, 77; Snodgrass 1967: 119; Markle 1977: 324; 1982: 91; Matthew 2015: 66; Sekunda 2001: 16; Bosworth 1980: 62. Walbank 1967: 587 records a diameter of five centimetres tapering to three centimetres.

²⁸⁹ Caudullo & de Rigo 2016: 100; Tenenbaum & Holmes 1994: 115; Wilson 1847: 257; Meehan 1872: 143.

²⁹⁰ Theophr. *Hist. pl.* 3.12.2; Thomas 2010: 71, 71 n20; Sekunda 2001: 24-25; Matthew 2015: 60. Thomas 2010: 71 is less definitive stating cornel was “probably” not used in the *sarissa*.

²⁹¹ Connolly 2012: 69; Gabriel 2010: 65; Ashley 1998: 36; Worthington 2014: 34; Markle 1977: 323; 1982: 90; Sidnell 2006: 81; Matthew 2012c: 87 n35; 2015: 56, 62; King 2018: 110-111; Roisman 2012a: 5; Bosworth 1980: 62-63.

allowed for the weapon's easier transportation and repair is a sensible one.²⁹² Until further evidence comes to light, therefore, perhaps what can best be accepted is the suggestion that *sarissa* shafts were made from a variety of timbers – including cornel and ash – depending upon the dictates of circumstance.²⁹³

Confusion also surrounds the weapon's exact length during Philip's reign, with argument clouded by the fact that over its two hundred year use, the measurements of *sarissai* varied considerably as Hellenistic armies experimented to achieve tactical advantages over their opponents.²⁹⁴ There is, furthermore, debate surrounding the cubit – the unit of measurement provided by sources in recording the length of the weapon.²⁹⁵ What a close analysis does reveal, however, is that by the end of the third century, *sarissai* were typically sixteen cubits long (7.68 metres) but were reduced to fourteen cubits (6.72 metres) shortly thereafter.²⁹⁶ The evidence also confirms that during the reign of Philip, the weapon was between ten and twelve cubits long (4.8 and 5.5 metres) – a figure supported by a number of modern commentators.²⁹⁷

²⁹² Gabriel 2010: 65; Matthew 2015: 56-57, 163; Markle 1977: 323, 336. Matthew 2015: 62 comments that the sleeve may also have been useful in affecting repairs to the shaft and to redistribute the weight to the weapon to provide its correct point of balance.

²⁹³ Matthew 2015: 63-64; King 2018: 111.

²⁹⁴ Polyb. 18.29; Aelian, 14; Polyæn. 2.29.2; Matthew 2012c: 80; Everson 2004: 175; King 2018: 111-112; Manti 1992: 31-32, 38; Markle 1977: 323; 1982: 110 n34; Campbell 2016: 49-50; Walbank 1967: 586-587.

²⁹⁵ Matthew 2012c: 93-94; 2015: 69-70, 77 compellingly argues for a cubit as forty-eight centimetres. Markle 1977: 323; 1982: 89; Campbell 2016: 49; Du Plessis 2019: 171 intimate forty-five centimetres. Tarn 1930: 15-16; Manti 1992: 39-40 argue for the length of the Macedonian cubit as thirty-four centimetres.

²⁹⁶ Third century – Polyb. 18.29; Polyæn. 2.29.2; Aelian, 14; Manti 1992: 31; Matthew 2012c: 82; 2015: 77; Connolly 2012: 69; Snodgrass 1967: 69; Markle 1977: 323; Walbank 1967: 587. Second century – Polyb. 18.29; Aelian, 14; Manti 1992: 31-32; Ashley 1998: 35; Everson 2004: 175; Matthew 2012c: 82; 2015: 77; Walbank 1967: 587. To further confuse understanding Aelian, 12; Hammond 1994b: 19 give the length of the *sarissa* as no shorter than eight cubits (3.84 metres). Matthew 2012b: 151-152 n4 argues this figure is a misunderstanding by Aelian of his source Asclepiodotus.

²⁹⁷ Asclep. 5.1; Arr. *Tact.* 12; Gabriel 2010: 65; Cawkwell 1978b: 33; Manti 1992: 31, 41; Bradford 1992: 10; Everson 2004: 175; Hammond 1980c: 53; Markle 1977: 323-324; 1978: 492; 1982: 87; Worthington 2008: 27; Matthew 2012c: 94; 2015: 77-78; Walbank 1967: 586-587.

Another feature of the *sarissa* was an iron *sauroter* weighing approximately one kilogram.²⁹⁸ Providing a counterweight for such a potentially unwieldy weapon was doubtless the primary function of the spike but secondary benefits were also realised.²⁹⁹ For example, the butt-spike allowed the *sarissa* to be set securely into the ground and braced in anticipation of charging opponents (or their mounts), transfixing themselves upon its head.³⁰⁰ Like its hoplite counterpart, the butt-spike also allowed the weapon to be “planted” when not in use – so reducing the risk of the shaft rotting.³⁰¹

At around five metres long and with a total weight estimated at 6.5 kilograms, the *sarissa* was, therefore, a formidable weapon.³⁰² Despite its impressive design, however, the length and weight of the *sarissa* meant that the weapon was not ideal for all conditions of battle, including skirmishing and single combat.³⁰³ Nor was the weapon particularly efficient in forested terrain where environment imposed restrictions on its wielding.³⁰⁴ Such a circumstance also occurred during siege warfare and especially in the street fighting that followed the breach of defences, as Alexander’s troops discovered when prosecuting the siege of Thebes in 335.³⁰⁵

²⁹⁸ Diod. Sic. 17.35.7; Markle 1977: 323-324; Manti 1992: 36; Gabriel 2010: 65; Connolly 2012: 77; Sekunda 2001: 33; Sidnell 2006: 81; Matthew 2012c: 87 n5; 2015: 41, 51, 91; Borza 1987: 115 n34; Ma 2008a: 75; Roisman 2012a: 5; Bosworth 1980: 62.

²⁹⁹ Polyb. 18.29; Hammond 1994b: 19; Markle 1977: 324; 1982: 90; Manti 1992: 31; Matthew 2015: 51, 236; King 2018: 110. Walbank 1967: 587 denies the existence of a butt-spike.

³⁰⁰ Luc. *Dial. Mort.* 439-440; Markle 1977: 324; 1982: 90; Manti 1992: 31; Sidnell 2006: 81; Matthew 2015: 12, 234, 238; Webber 2001: 39; King 2018: 110; English 2009a: 16, 56.

³⁰¹ Sekunda 2001: 30, 33; Matthew 2015: 237.

³⁰² Connolly 2012: 65; Gabriel 2010: 65, 70; Ashley 1998: 36; Worthington 2014: 34; Markle 1977: 324; Manti 1992: 41. King 2018: 112; Walbank 1967: 587; DeVoto 1993: 96 n5; Bosworth 1988a: 260 estimate between 5.5 and 6.5 kilograms. Matthew 2015: 91 indicates 5.5 kilograms.

³⁰³ Diod. Sic. 17.100.6-7; Curt. 9.7.19-22; Markle 1977: 332; 1982: 103; Hammond 1980c: 53; Green 1991: 126; Matthew 2015: 59, 134; Manti 1992: 34; Hollenback 2009: 29; Anson 2010b: 65; Bosworth 1988a: 260.

³⁰⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 1.5.12; Markle 1978: 493; 1982: 99; Anson 2010b: 65; Ashley 1998: 169; Heckel 2009b: 28; Montagu 2015: 100; Green 1991: 127; Bosworth 1988a: 29; Hammond & Walbank 2001: 36.

³⁰⁵ Diod. Sic. 17.11.3-4; Markle 1982: 102-103; Lee 2001: 20; 2010a: 150; Wrightson 2010: 78, 90 n62; Hammond 1980c: 53; 1997b: 368.

Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the advantages provided by the *sarissa* to troops in formal combat were overwhelming. Although Aelian's observation that *sarissai* varied in length in order to present the enemy with an even front may safely be given little credence, the weapon's extended reach protected phalangites behind an almost impenetrable wall of iron.³⁰⁶ Furthermore, as *sarissai* of the rear ranks were held at an angle above those in front, they helped shield phalangites from missiles, so providing fair protection against enemy *psiloi* – providing the formation's integrity was maintained.³⁰⁷ Because of its weight and length, the iron spearhead was armour-piercing, contributing to its overall potency and terrifying effect on enemy morale.³⁰⁸ The pike also assisted in compensating for the Macedonian infantryman's lack of armour, something that rendered him vulnerable in hand-to-hand combat.³⁰⁹ To avoid this possibility, phalangites were trained to grasp the weapon with a double-handed grip and engage the enemy using a jabbing (or thrusting) motion, relying on the extended reach of the *sarissa* to neutralise the enemy before close contact could be made.³¹⁰

Because infantry *sarissai* required both hands to hold, a phalangite's shield – the “so-called” Macedonian *pelte* – differed considerably to that of a hoplite's *aspis*. In the first instance, it was less concave in design.³¹¹ This allowed the *pelte* to be carried by a strap

³⁰⁶ Aelian's comment – Aelian, 14. Convincingly rejected on the basis of the necessity for standardisation – Matthew 2012b: 155 n9; 2015: 79-80; Hammond 1996a: 366.

³⁰⁷ Polyb. 18.30; Markle 1978: 496; Matthew 2015: 160-161, 187-188; 2016: 437; Hammond 1980c: 53; 1989b: 60; Wrightson 2010: 84; Anderson 1970: 176; 1993: 31; Gabriel 2010: 66; Ashley 1998: 37; Cawkwell 1978b: 33; Serrati 2013b: 183; Snodgrass 1967: 118; Walbank 1967: 588.

³⁰⁸ Armour-piercing – Diod. Sic. 17.84.4; Plut. *Aem.* 20.1-2; Sekunda 2001: 13-14; Matthew 2015: 225-235; Hammond 1989: 60; Gabriel 2010: 65-66. Morale – Diod. Sic. 17.4.4; Plut. *Aem.* 19.1, 20.2; *Alex.* 33; App. *Syr.* 4.19; Arr. *Tact.* 12; Worthington 2008: 27; Gabriel 2010: 65-66; Karunanithy 2013: 177; Cawkwell 1978b: 34; Matthew 2015: 218-219, 380; 2016: 436.

³⁰⁹ For the vulnerability of phalangites in close-quarters combat – Liv. 44.41; Plut. *Aem.* 20.4-5; Matthew 2015: 339; Spence 2002: 272; Montagu 2015: 135; Lendon 2005: 209.

³¹⁰ Curteis 1890: 35-36; Cawkwell 1978b: 34; Hammond 1980c: 53; 1989b: 60; Matthew 2015: 167, 181; Worthington 2008: 27.

³¹¹ Asclep. 5.1; Aelian, 12; Hammond 1980c: 56; Markle 1977: 326; 1982: 92; 1999: 250; Hammond 1996a: 365; Matthew 2015: 94.

(*ochane*) that went around the bearer's neck and enabled the phalangite to march comfortably with the shield on his back.³¹² When combat became imminent, the *pelte* was pulled to the front where it was held across the body, secured in place by the *ochane* and a band that fitted over the phalangite's left arm.³¹³ Archaeological records are paltry but it is commonly accepted that the *pelte* was made from bronze, or perhaps wood with a bronze facing, and fitted with a leather interior, possibly dyed.³¹⁴ Weighing an estimated five kilograms, its diameter is generally held to have been between sixty and seventy centimetres, although a smaller size has been postulated.³¹⁵ Macedonian shields also sported an embossed design. A common pattern consisted of a series of concentric semicircles situated around the outer edge of the *pelte*. At the shield's centre was a circle that contained one of a limited number of images, possibly an indication of the unit to which the phalangite belonged.³¹⁶

Another innovation in Macedonian weapons' development under Philip – and one derived from the infantry *sarissa* – was the *xyston* (cavalry lance). Like its phalangite counterpart, controversy surrounds the weapon's exact specifications. Most scholars accept

³¹² Plut. *Cleom.* 11.2; *Aem.* 11.1; Lendon 2005: 124; Snodgrass 1967: 118; Connolly 2012: 79; Gabriel 2010: 64; Hammond 1994b: 19; Everson 2004: 178; Markle 1977: 326; 1982: 92; Matthew 2015: 96, 100; Sekunda 2010: 463.

³¹³ The matter is of some contention: some commentators believe the *pelte* simply hung around the phalangite's shoulder or neck – King 2018: 112; Lendon 2005: 124; Hammond 1997b: 367; Worthington 2008: 27; Markle 1977: 326; 1982: 87; Bosworth 1988a: 260. Matthew 2015: 95-96, 98, 100; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 421; Snodgrass 1967: 118; Everson 2004: 178; Du Plessis 2019: 170, 178 advocate the presence of an armband.

³¹⁴ Bronze – Asclep. 5.1; Aelian, 12; Cass. Dio 78.7.1-2; Connolly 2012: 79; Markle 1982: 92. Bronze facing – Anderson 1976: 3; Gabriel 2010: 64; Ashley 1998: 35; Everson 2004: 178; Hammond 1996a: 365; Matthew 2015: 94, 101; Du Plessis 2019: 170, 178. Leather interior – Karunanithy 2013: 112; Hammond 1996a: 365; Anderson 1976: 3.

³¹⁵ Size of 60-70cm – Asclep. 5.1; Aelian, 12; Hammond 1994b: 19; 1996a: 365; Connolly 2012: 79; Snodgrass 1967: 117; Gabriel 2010: 64; Worthington 2008: 27; Ashley 1998: 35; Karunanithy 2013: 108; Matthew 2015: 76, 93; King 2018: 112; Du Plessis 2019: 171. 50-60 cm – Pritchett 1971: 148, 148 n19; Wrightson 2010: 80 n33. Matthew 2015: 94 calculates the weight of the *pelte* at 2.5 kilograms.

³¹⁶ Everson 2004: 178; Karunanithy 2013: 108-109; Hammond 1996a: 366; Matthew 2015: 103-104; Markle 1999: 247; Anson 2010a: 88; Spence 2002: 315.

that the *xyston* was fitted with both iron head and butt-spike, together with Arrian's testimony that the lance was made from cornel wood.³¹⁷ When recounting the actions of Macedonian cavalry at the Battle of Granicus River, Arrian writes:

καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἐπλεονέκτουσιν ἤδη οἱ σὺν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τῆ τε ἄλλῃ ῥώμῃ καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ καὶ ὅτι ξυστοῖς κρανεῖνοις πρὸς παλτὰ ἐμάχοντο (Arr. *Anab.* 1.15.5).

Already, however, Alexander's men [the cavalry] were getting the best of it, not only through their strength and experience but because they were fighting with cornel-wood lances against short javelins (trans. Brunt, 1976).

Whilst there is general acceptance amongst scholars of Arrian's testimony, much debate surrounds the lance's overall length. Some commentators ascribe to the theory that the Macedonian cavalry fought with a standard infantry *sarissa* and so were equipped with a weapon up to five and a half metres long.³¹⁸ Another position is that a lance of such length would have been impractical for mounted troops and so contends that the *xyston* measured in the order of 4.5 metres.³¹⁹ When cited, such claims are often based on the Alexander mosaic, which, it is argued, provides evidence for a *xyston* of similar length to the *sarissa*.³²⁰

³¹⁷ Gabriel 2010: 75; 2015: 35; Worley 1994: 156; Sekunda 2001: 38; 2010: 469; Hammond 1980c: 63; Sidnell 2006: 80, 83; Matthew 2015: 60; Fox 2015d: 375; Walbank 1957: 708; Bosworth 1980: 122; Gaebel 2002: 161-162, 170; Markle 1977: 324; 1982: 105.

³¹⁸ Ducrey 1986: 94; Ashley 1998: 333; Hammond 1980c: 63. Bosworth 1988a: 262; Smith 1869: 128 believe only the *sarissophoroi* fought with an infantry-style *sarissa*.

³¹⁹ Markle 1977: 333; 1982: 87, 104-105; Smith 1869: 128; Brice 2012: 29; Bugh 2020: 75. Borza 1990: 205; Brunt 1963: 27 n5; Roisman 2012a: 6; Worthington 2008: 29; 2014: 36; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 413; Heskell 1997a: 180 merely note the *xyston* as being shorter than the infantry *sarissa*. Gaebel 2002: 169 acknowledges the possibility but urges caution, concluding that Macedonian *sarissai* probably varied in length.

³²⁰ Markle 1977: 333; 1982: 105; Hammond 1980c: 63. Bugh 2020: 74 conveniently summarises the point.

Markle was a prominent advocate of a long cavalry lance and so his thesis is worthy of close examination. Whilst acknowledging the mosaic's damaged condition (the area that would have shown the rear section of Alexander's weapon has been destroyed), Markle deduces the rearward portion of the lance must have been the same length as the visible front segment on the basis that Macedonians "always held the middle [of the *xyston*] with one hand".³²¹ On the (unjustified) assumption that the Persian standing by Darius' chariot was 170-180 centimetres tall, and therefore the spear he was holding is somewhere around two metres long, the forward section of Alexander's lance (which is longer again), was over two metres in length. Markle concludes that as Macedonian cavalymen invariably gripped their weapons in the centre, the rear section of Alexander's lance must be the same length, hence making the complete *xyston* around 4.5 metres long.³²²

Markle's argument falters on several fronts. In the first instance, there is Arrian's unambiguous assertion that the Macedonian cavalry fought with lances made from cornel wood (ξύστὸν κρανέινος). As has been discussed, the *Cornus mas* did not grow sufficiently high to provide a shaft anywhere near 4.5 metres long, much less one in excess of five metres. Also problematic for Markle's thesis is that it appears Macedonian cavalymen did not always hold their *xyston* in the middle of the shaft. The Kinch image – for example – (even allowing for the questionable nature of its details), shows clearly the rider gripping his weapon about two-thirds of the way down.³²³ Furthermore, several academics make the point that the mosaic portrays, behind and to the left of Alexander himself, a Macedonian

³²¹ Markle 1977: 333; 1982: 87, 105.

³²² Markle 1977: 333; 1982: 105.

³²³ Gaebel 2002: 170; English 2009a: 57; King 2018: 117 Figure 5.2; Sidnell 2006: 83; Matthew 2015: Plate 3. The same positioning of the grip is arguably demonstrated in the Alexander mosaic – Matthew, 2015: Plate 4; Sidnell 2006: 83.

hetairos employing an overarm thrust to deliver a blow at a Persian cavalryman.³²⁴ Exactitude is impossible, but the observation argues for a shorter rather than longer weapon, as reproductions of the *xyston* have indicated that a lance fifteen feet (4.5 metres) long is extremely difficult to wield over the shoulder with one arm.³²⁵ Markle also fails to take into account the subtext inherent in the mosaic. It is outside the scope of this dissertation to analyse fully the propaganda elements present, especially as they pertain to Alexander, but the possibility of the Macedonian king's heroic representation should not be ignored. Of direct relevance is the tradition of assigning weapons of exaggerated dimensions to heroes in order to confirm outstanding military ability. Some academics argue plausibly that it is in such a light that the size of Alexander's *xyston* should be viewed.³²⁶

Another group of scholars have advanced the theory that Macedonian cavalrymen carried a lance of much shorter dimensions. Whilst this was almost certain, what should be rejected, however, is the proposition that the *xyston* was two metres long, the approximate size of a Persian cavalry javelin (*palton*=παλτόν).³²⁷ Such a suggestion is at odds with Arrian, who makes a point of contrasting the long Macedonian *xysta* against the shorter *palta* (παλτά).³²⁸ Arrian's testimony receives some level of confirmation from the Kinch tomb illustration. Such is the ambiguity of the source, however, academics derive conflicting conclusions from their reading of the evidence. Markle, for example, attempts

³²⁴ English 2009a: 58; Sekunda 2001: 38-39.

³²⁵ Markle 1977: 334, 335 Fig. I, 336. English 2009a: 18; Sidnell 2006: 82 n* contend that a *xyston* of 4.5 metres would be extremely difficult to wield.

³²⁶ Heroic tradition – Thesis: 225-226. Applicable to the Alexander mosaic – Mihalopoulos 2009: 288; Stewart 1993: 140-142; Bowden 2014: 1; Gaebel 2002: 170-171. Stewart 1993: 139-140 also argues the *sarissa* is intended to draw attention to the image of the dead tree, a symbol for the demise of the Persian empire. For a contra view on Alexander's heroic portrayal in the mosaic – Badian 1999: 79-83; Pollitt 1986: 46; Bugh 2020: 74.

³²⁷ Two metres – Ellis 1976: 56; Green 1991: 18. Length of *palton* – Ashley 1998: 60; Head 2016: 86.

³²⁸ Arr. *Anab.* 1.15.5; Ashley 1998: 197; Sekunda & Warry 1998: 72; Nefedkin 2006: 14; Hammond 1980a: 85; Warry 1995: 75; Sabin 2013: 132; Gaebel 2002: 161-162.

to employ the image to support his contention for a lance 4.5 metres long.³²⁹ Gaebel, based on the size of the horse's head in relation to the *xyston*, has estimated more realistically the length of the weapon to be between 8.1 and 9.2 feet (2.5 - 2.8 metres).³³⁰ Sekunda, on the other hand, determined the lance to be 9.5-10 feet long (2.9 - 3.0 metres), although he does not articulate the basis for his calculation.³³¹

Be that as it may, the suggestion that the *xyston* was slightly in excess of three metres long has merit. As noted, a difference in length between Persian and Macedonian lances of one metre (or slightly more), supports Arrian's observation of the marked difference in size between *xysta* and *palta*. It also accommodates anthropometric considerations evidenced in the tomb frieze drawing – that is, if they can be afforded any level of credence at all. For example, cavalry horses in ancient Greece were around fourteen hands high (1.44 metres).³³² Employing that as an approximating ratio, a maximum length for the *xyston* of 3.3 metres can be deduced (if it is allowed that the lance is, as it appears to be, around 2.3 times the horse's height). Of course, there are so many variables associated with this calculation that the outcome can only be regarded as indicative.

Two further considerations, however, suggest the Macedonian *xyston* may have been between 3.0 - 3.5 metres long. The first is that (although difficulties do exist with anachronistic comparisons), such a figure equates closely to that of “modern” cavalry lances from the nineteenth century.³³³ More tellingly, the hypothesis is consistent with the

³²⁹ Markle 1977: 90-91, 104.

³³⁰ Gaebel 2002: 168-170. English 2009a: 56-59 arrives at a similar conclusion although employing a different rationale.

³³¹ Sekunda 2001: 38. Gabriel 2010: 75; 2015: 35 also estimates the *xyston* was nine to ten feet long, without indicating why.

³³² Thesis: 143, 143 n214.

³³³ Larsen & Yallop 2017: 14; Lefroy 1864: 93; Strachan 1985: 57; Anglesey 1973: 100 n*. It should, however, be noted that there was no universal length for the weapon, with size ranging from 2.75-4.8 metres – Anglesey 1973: 99-100; Sidnell 2006: 82. It has, however, been observed correctly that “modern”

cornel tree's morphology. Therefore, whilst recognising that the lack of conclusive evidence renders certainty impossible, on weight of probability it is accepted tentatively in this discussion the *xyston* likely measured 3.0 - 3.5 metres in length – a conclusion reached by several modern commentators.³³⁴

An important secondary weapon carried by both Macedonian infantry and cavalry was a sword which, like the hoplite, was either a *xiphos* or *machaira*. Fourth-century archaeological remains indicate the Macedonian *machaira* varied in length between thirty-five and seventy-seven centimetres, although it is probable the infantry variant of the weapon was fifty centimetres or less.³³⁵ An ancillary weapon initially, it may well have been the case that the sword's importance increased with the invention of the *sarissa*. As has been discussed, the infantry pike was primarily a stabbing weapon with armour-piercing capabilities. It is very possible, therefore, that upon finding its mark the *sarissa* could not have been easily withdrawn from the victim. In such cases, the weapon must have been rendered virtually unusable after the first strike, forcing the phalangite to abandon it and continue combat with the sword.³³⁶

The growing prominence of Macedonian cavalry in deciding battles also contributed to an increased focus on proficiency with the sword. The *xyston* could (and did) break, leaving a horseman vulnerable to attack.³³⁷ Furthermore, in the *mêlée* that followed the engagement of cavalry forces, a sword would have been far more effective than a

cavlymen enjoyed the advantage of stirrups and high saddles, thus a more secure seat, so allowing for the use of longer weapons – Sidnell 2006: 82.

³³⁴ Sidnell 2006: 83-84; Cole 2018:104; Head 2016: 215.

³³⁵ Gabriel 2010: 64, 76; 2015: 35; Karunanithy 2013: 139; Connolly 2012: 79; Everson 2004: 177; Sidnell 2006: 84; Barnes 2005: 355 n23.

³³⁶ Diod. Sic. 17.11.3; Markle 1982: 99; Matthew 2015: 205.

³³⁷ Diod. Sic. 17.20.4-5; Plut. *Alex.* 16, Arr. *Anab.* 1.15.6; Gaebel 2002: 163; Green 1991: 178; Ashley 1998: 33, 197; O'Brien 1994: 63; Curteis 1890: 99; Hammond 1980a: 85.

lance.³³⁸ Little wonder, then, that Alexander went to the trouble of training himself in the use of the weapon.³³⁹ Evidently *hetairoi* (Companion Cavalry) were also accomplished in handling the *machaira*; Cleitus, for example, used his to save Alexander's life at Granicus.³⁴⁰ Archaeological finds also indicate that a cavalry version of the *xiphos* was used during the fourth century. Like the cavalry *machaira*, the *xiphos* had an iron blade sixty to seventy centimetres long and was weighted towards the tip, indicating it was intended to be wielded primarily in a slashing action. Its straight edges, however, meant that – unlike the *machaira* – the *xiphos* was also an effective stabbing weapon.³⁴¹

Another item of panoply borne by Macedonians was the cuirass. That *hetairoi* wore some type of corselet is certain although the exact nature of the armour is disputed – indeed it is possible different forms were employed depending upon conditions.³⁴² For wealthy officers it appears that a muscle cuirass of bronze with *pteruges* was the preferred item of panoply.³⁴³ There is also the possibility that muscle cuirasses of iron may have been worn, although the archaeological evidence is slight and restricted to one surviving example discovered at Prodromi in southern Epirus. The find has been dated to *c.*330 and the use of metal cuirasses at this time is suggested in the literary tradition.³⁴⁴

³³⁸ Arr. *Anab.* 1.15.4; Markle 1977: 334; 1982: 100; Fox 2015d: 375.

³³⁹ Plut. *Alex.* 16, 32; O'Brien 1994: 96; Markle 1982: 99.

³⁴⁰ Diod. Sic. 17.20.7; Plut. *Alex.* 16; Arr. *Anab.* 1.15.8; Curt. 8.1.20; Karunanithy 2013: 139; Gaebel 2002: 161, 163; Gabriel 2010: 76; 2015: 35; Retsas 2009: 166; O'Brien 1994: 63; Markle 1982: 100; Sidnell 2006: 96; Fox 2015d: 375; Worthington 2014: 149.

³⁴¹ *Xiphos* – Karunanithy 2013: 137; King 2018: 119; Sidnell 2006: 84. Length of cavalry *machaira* – Everson 2004: 177; Connolly 2012: 79; Karunanithy 2013: 139; Gaebel 2002: 163; Sidnell 2006: 84.

³⁴² Thuc. 2.100.5; Arr. *Anab.* 1.25.2; Hammond 1998a: 415; King 2010: 385-386; Sekunda 2010: 448, 467, 469; Ellis 1976: 56; Worthington 2008: 29.

³⁴³ Plut. *Alex.* 16; Karunanithy 2013: 90; Everson 2004: 190; Snodgrass 1967: 119; Worley 1994: 156; Ashley 1998: 29; Gaebel 2002: 161; Sekunda 2010: 467, 469; Hammond 1998a: 406, 406 n5.

³⁴⁴ Karunanithy 2013: 90; Everson 2004: 187; Jarva 2013: 405-406. Literary tradition – Xen. *Eq.* 12.1; Plut. *Demetr.* 23; Suet. *Calig.* 52; Jarva 2013: 406; Andronikos 1980a: 364.

Linen or leather corselets, similarly fitted with *pteruges*, were worn by at least some cavalry units.³⁴⁵ On Pausanias' observation about the ineffectiveness of linen breastplates against iron weapons, several commentators have argued that such corselets provided insufficient protection for heavy cavalry in their evolving role of frontline troops, and were therefore better suited to the light horse.³⁴⁶ Slight evidence also exists for composite corselets. The Alexander Mosaic, for example, depicts the king wearing body armour of this design at the Battle of Issus. Caution is required, however, as the mosaic itself is a first-century Roman copy of painting by Philoxenus of Eretria that was commissioned by Cassander, son of Antipater and then king of Macedonia (305-297).³⁴⁷

Archaeological evidence exists for the existence of iron corselets although how widespread their use was remains impossible to ascertain. Arms and armour crafted from weapons-grade iron were expensive in the Hellenistic period due to the inherent difficulties in their manufacture, suggesting they must have been (at the very least) accessible to only the extremely wealthy.³⁴⁸ That being so, special mention should be made of a composite iron cuirass recovered from the tomb of Philip II in Vergina. Fitted with gold trappings, the corselet was fashioned from sheets of iron that were five millimetres thick and covered with leather and cloth.³⁴⁹ The plates themselves were hinged together to allow the wearer some degree of movement; remains of *pteruges* were also detected.³⁵⁰ Given the obvious expense

³⁴⁵ Arr. *Tact.* 4; Karunanithy 2013: 90-91; Worthington 2008: 29; Sidnell 2006: 84; Hammond 1989: 60; Gleba 2012: 47.

³⁴⁶ Paus. 1.21.7; Borza 1987: 112; Gleba 2012: 46-47. For a contra view – Aldrete *et al.* 2013: 142-143.

³⁴⁷ Plin. *HN* 35.36.110, Karunanithy 2013: 92; Borza 1987: 111; Andronikos 1980a: 364; 1993: 144; Matthew 2015: 54; Palagia 2015: 478. Aldrete *et al.* 2013: 14, 50, 89 regard the mosaic as displaying Alexander wearing a *linothorax*. Markle 1982: 96 nominates a composite cuirass.

³⁴⁸ Sanev & Juhel 2011: 157, 163, 167; Borza 1987: 113; Everson 2004: 187; Matthew 2015: 121; Aldrete *et al.* 2013: 69-70; Andronikos 1980a: 364; Delides 2016: 234-235.

³⁴⁹ Borza 1987: 111, 112 n25; Everson 2004: 189, 192; Karunanithy 2013: 90, 92; Andronikos 1980a: 364; 1980b: 220; 1993: 142; Caskey 1978: 345.

³⁵⁰ Andronikos 1980b: 220; 1993: 142; Karunanithy 2013: 92; Everson 2004: 192.

in production and decorative intricacy of the corselet, there remains the question of whether this was functional armour or ceremonial dress.

If it can be assumed safely that cuirasses (of some description) were worn by Macedonian cavalry, its use by infantry troops is far less certain. Polyaeus, albeit a second-century rhetorician of the Common Era, did not include a corselet amongst items carried by phalangites on training marches, so creating the impression the item was not essential panoply. This has led to the view that body armour was not worn by infantry troops – due, in part, to expense.³⁵¹ There is much to support such a position. It will be remembered, for example, that the Macedonian state supplied a soldier's accoutrement and in the early years of his reign, Philip did not possess the economic capacity to equip his infantry fully.³⁵² Nor, in a predominantly agrarian economy, did peasant phalangites possess sufficient resources to provide their own panoply in the way that Greek hoplites could.³⁵³ Furthermore, a number of modern scholars argue, body armour was rendered largely redundant because of the level of protection afforded by the *sarissa* to infantrymen deployed in phalanx formation.³⁵⁴

An opposing theory posits that during the early years of Philip's reign, rank and file infantry wore a linen cuirass called a *kotthybos* and that later this was improved to a leather design.³⁵⁵ Philip is said to have issued corselets to both cavalry and infantry immediately

³⁵¹ Polyaeus. 4.2.10; Markle 1977: 327, 328 n30; 1982: 94; Snodgrass 1967: 117; Hammond 1980c: 55-56; Sekunda 2010: 449; Milns 1967: 510 n12; Ellis 1976: 56; Worthington 2008: 27.

³⁵² Diod. Sic. 16.3.1; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 421; Gabriel 2010: 64; Karunanithy 2013: 41-42; Hammond 1996a: 366; Sekunda 2010: 449; Trundle 2004: 124; King 2018: 108; Matthew 2015: 40, 110; Fox 2015d: 375; Anson 2010b: 64; McQueen 1995a: 66.

³⁵³ Ducrey 1986: 86, 90; Gabriel 2010: 64; Hammond 1994b: 19; 1996a: 366 n13; Delbrück 1975: 175; Milns 1967: 510; 1971: 188.

³⁵⁴ Worthington 2008: 27; Ashley 1998: 35; Markle 1977: 327; 1982: 94; Sekunda 2010: 449; Delbrück 1975: 179; Milns 1967: 510; Bosworth 1988a: 260.

³⁵⁵ Connolly 2012: 80; Anson 2010a: 83; Gabriel 2010: 64; Everson 2004: 195; Matthew 2015: 116, 121-122. Aldrete *et al.* 2013: 15; Bosworth 1988a: 260 argue Philip's phalangites were equipped with *linothorakes*. Heckel 2005: 193 n11; 2013: 168 believes *linothorakes* were issued to *hypaspistai*.

prior to the Battle of Chaeronea (338) and it appears secure that phalangites during Alexander's time possessed a cuirass (probably leather) – although this was much later during the India Campaign (326) and after the great riches of the Persian empire had fallen under Macedonian control.³⁵⁶ This uncertainty has led a number of modern historians to believe that only officers and the front ranks of phalangites wore body armour and this by way of a *thorax* or *hemithorax*, possibly in the form of a metal-plated cuirass.³⁵⁷ Probably the soundest observation is that although on current evidence a definitive conclusion as far as the wearing of corselets by Macedonian phalangites during Philip's era is not possible, *en masse* use seems unlikely.³⁵⁸

One article of body armour that was certainly worn by both cavalry and infantry were *knemides*.³⁵⁹ Macedonian greaves protected the wearer's leg from the top of the knee to the instep but with a thickness of five millimetres, they were heavier than the Greek equivalent. This made them more functional but less elastic and so a garter strap was required to ensure they remained in place against the leg. For comfort, *knemides* were lined with soft leather or felt, possibly red, which was stitched or glued into place.³⁶⁰

The final significant item of panoply was a helmet. Whilst there is no doubt Philip's troops wore headgear of some description, the exact nature of the design is yet another area of scholarly debate.³⁶¹ Evidence for the standardisation of helmets is lacking, but because

³⁵⁶ Chaeronea –Everson 2004: 193. India – Diod. Sic. 17.95.4; Curt. 9.3.21-22; Everson 2004: 193; Aldrete *et al.* 2013: 14, 160; Heckel 1992: 63-64; 2008: 123; Green 1991: 413; King 2018: 170. Cass. Dio 78.7.1-2 suggests Alexander's phalangites wore *linothorakes*.

³⁵⁷ Polyæn. 4.3.13; Connolly 2012: 80; Gabriel 2010: 64; Ashley 1998: 35; Everson 2004: 194; Serrati 2013b: 183; Matthew 2015: 120-121.

³⁵⁸ Karunanithy 2013: 106.

³⁵⁹ Polyæn. 4.2.10; Arr. *Tact.* 3; Sekunda 2010: 449; Gabriel 2010: 64; Hammond 1994b: 19; 1998a: 406, 406 n5; Worthington 2008: 27; Karunanithy 2013: 112; Heckel 2013: 168; Matthew 2015: 123; Bosworth 1988a: 260.

³⁶⁰ Karunanithy 2013: 112-113; Everson 2004: 195; Matthew 2015: 123.

³⁶¹ Polyæn. 4.2.10; Matthew 2015: 104-114; Sekunda 2010: 449; McQueen 1995a: 66; Hammond 1980c: 55-56; 1997b: 366; Gabriel 2010: 86; Hanon 2005: 39; Nawotka 2010: 28.

of its relatively inexpensive production cost and prevalence in hoplite armies, several academics contend that the *pilos* was worn by members of the infantry.³⁶² Widespread use of the design, however, appears not to have occurred until the reign of Alexander III, if the much later testimonies of Cassius Dio and Iulius Africanus are accorded any credence.³⁶³

Dio, writing in the third century A.D. states:

Ῥώμη στῆσαι, φάλαγγά τε τινα ἐκ μόνων τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐς μυρίους καὶ ἑξακισχιλίους συντάξαι, καὶ αὐτὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τε ἐπονομάσαι καὶ τοῖς ὅπλοις οἷς ποτὲ ἐπ' ἐκείνου ἑκέχρηντο ὀπλίσαι· ταῦτα δ' ἦν κράνος ὠμοβόειον, θώραξ λινοῦς τρίμιτος, ἀσπίς χαλκῆ, δόρυ μακρόν, αἰχμὴ βραχεῖα, κρηπίδες, ξίφος (Cass. Dio 78.7.1-2).

He [Roman emperor Caracalla] organized a phalanx, composed entirely of Macedonians, sixteen thousand strong, named it "Alexander's phalanx," and equipped it with the arms that warriors had used in his [Alexander's] day; these consisted of a helmet of raw ox-hide, a three-ply linen breastplate, a bronze shield, long pike, short spear, high boots, and sword (trans. Cary, 1914).

Dio's record that Alexander's infantry wore a leather *pilos* finds confirmation in the record of Iulius Africanus, who, writing around the same time as Dio, notes:

Ὀλίγα δὲ τούτῳ παρεποίησαν οἱ ἐπίγουοι Μακεδόνες διὰ τὸ τῶν πολέμου ποικίλου κοιῆν καὶ κατὰ βαρβάρων καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τῆν ὀπλοῖν ἐπισκευασαυτες· σημείου <τὸ> ἐλευθέρας τῶν μαχομέου τὰς ὄψεις ὑπὸ πύλῳ Λακωνικῷ ἐν τῇ Μακεδονικῇ

³⁶² Sekunda 2010: 499; Matthew 2015: 105, 110.

³⁶³ Matthew 2015: 110; Karunanithy 2013: 100; Bosworth 1988a: 260 accept the testimonies of Dio and Iulius Africanus.

γεγενη̃σθαι·καλοῦσι δὲ χρῆμα καὶ ἐπιτήδευμα <τοῦτο> τὸ τοῦ στρατιώτου βασιλέως (Afric. Cest. 1.1.36-40).

The Macedonians who came later made some slight alterations to this equipment, and because the nature of their warfare was varied, fashioned armament for use jointly against both the barbarians and against one another. A case in point: the vision of the combatants was unobstructed through the use of the Laconian helmet in the Macedonian army. They assign <this> use and practice to the soldier king [Alexander III] (trans. Adler, 2012).

Read together, Dio and Africanus make a compelling case for the *pilos* becoming the norm under Alexander, rather than Philip. Several scholars, therefore, contend it was the distinctive Phrygian helmet – or the very similar Thracian headpiece – that was standard issue under Philip.³⁶⁴ It is true that both helmets offered the wearer an excellent field of vision and little audio impediment, whilst still affording a reasonable level of protection.³⁶⁵ Confirmation is lacking, however, in the ancient record, which has led to the very sensible suggestion that Philip’s phalangites may have worn a variety of helmet designs as their personal preferences and financial circumstances allowed.³⁶⁶ If this was so, potential designs – in addition to the *pilos*, Phrygian and Thracian – included the Chalcidian, Attic and Boeotian.³⁶⁷ Whatever helmet individual phalangites settled upon, bronze was the primary material used in manufacture; although a find from the tomb of Philip II at Vergina was crafted from iron. As with the corselet, the extent to which headpieces manufactured

³⁶⁴ Ducrey 1986: 88; Connolly 2012: 70. Matthew 2015: 108 acknowledges the argument, but rejects it for lack of definitive evidence.

³⁶⁵ Advantages – Sidnell 2006: 84; Matthew 2015: 108-109, 112, 184-185.

³⁶⁶ Karunanithy 2013: 103; Matthew 2015: 111-112; Everson 2004: 180. Lloyd 1997: 170; English 2009a: 7 declare the debate unsolvable.

³⁶⁷ Matthew 2015: 104-108, 111-112; Connolly 2012: 70; Everson 2004: 180; Snodgrass 1967: 125.

from this particular material were worn is unknown, although archaeological finds are rare.³⁶⁸

A similar level of controversy surrounds the helmets of Philip's cavalrymen. Some academics contend that the king's *hetairoi* wore the Phrygian design, whereas others advocate for the Boeotian.³⁶⁹ A third group of scholars, whilst accepting helms were worn, do not commit to the type.³⁷⁰ As with the debate surrounding infantry helmets, the paucity of conclusive evidence makes certainty impossible. The case for the Phrygian design appears based on a single stone relief of uncertain date from Pelinna, Thessaly.³⁷¹ Portrayals of *hetairoi* dressed in Boeotian-style helmets on archaeological finds such as the Alexander mosaic and Alexander sarcophagus, whilst slightly more secure in their provenance, are nevertheless depictions from well past Philip's time. It is true that Xenophon praised the benefits of the Boeotian helmet and as it is this thesis' contention that the Athenian was an influential figure in the king's military thinking, Philip may well have preferred his cavalry be equipped in this fashion.³⁷² *Hetairoi* were powerful and wealthy individuals, however, and the likelihood that the king diplomatically allowed his Companions some degree of latitude in their choice of helmet is worth entertaining.

Whatever the case, there is no question that in his choice of accoutrement, Philip signalled a marked departure from the traditional hoplite panoply of *poleis*. Gone were the

³⁶⁸ Hammond 1994b: 19; Worthington 2008: 27; 2014: 35-36; Sanev & Juhel 2011: 164; Matthew 2015: 109; Christesen & Murray 2010: 439; Andronikos 1980a: 364; 1993: 144; Everson 2004: 181.

³⁶⁹ Phrygian –Everson 2004: 180; Sekunda 2010: 467, 469; Sekunda & Warry 1998: 9; Sekunda & McBride 1984: 5. Boeotian – Snodgrass 1967: 125; Connolly 2012: 72.

³⁷⁰ Hammond 1989: 60; 1998a: 405-406 notes that cavalry helmets were “metal” but provides no further details. Ducrey 1986: 93-94; King 2018: 107; Grainger 2007: 26 merely record that Philip's cavalry wore helmets. Ellis 1976: 56; Worthington 2008: 29; Gabriel 2010: 74 advocate iron helmets. English 2009a: 7 states that at some point a change from Phrygian to Boeotian helmets occurred, but does not nominate a date. Sidnell 2006: 84 suggests both helmet types were worn.

³⁷¹ Sekunda & McBride 1984: 5; Sekunda & Warry 1998: 9.

³⁷² Xen. *Eq.* 12.3.

signature *aspis* and *doru*, replaced instead with *pelte* and revolutionary *sarissa*. Similarly, the traditional cavalry *akontion* and *kamax* were abandoned in favour of the *xyston*, a lance of significantly greater length. From where Philip derived inspiration for his pioneering reforms in arms and armament will be discussed in the following chapter, but what emerges as obvious is that it was not from Epaminondas or Thebes.

VI. Case Study: Leuctra and Chaeronea

Further confirmation of the military disconnect between Philip and Thebes can be found in a close analysis of the confrontations at Leuctra (371) and Chaeronea (338). As with many of antiquity's battles, details surrounding the conflict at Leuctra are sketchy and shrouded in controversy, with some later accounts influenced by what one scholar has termed "The Epaminondas Tradition".³⁷³ What is reasonably certain is that the Peloponnesian army under the command of Cleombrotus numbered around ten thousand, the backbone of which were four *morai* of Lacedaemonian hoplites (2,400 men if the divisions were at full strength) but only seven hundred Spartiates – Sparta's military elite.³⁷⁴ Also present was a mercenary force (probably *peltastai*) of unknown number and a company of Phocian *psiloi*.³⁷⁵ One thousand cavalry, regarded correctly as being of inferior quality, complemented the infantry contingents.³⁷⁶ Commanding the 6,000-7,000

³⁷³ For a discussion concerning the value of ancient sources on Leuctra and rise of the "Epaminondas Tradition" see Appendix I.

³⁷⁴ Plut. *Pel.* 20.1; Schwartz 2009: 257; Gaebel 2002: 130; Buckler 1980: 63; Anderson 1970: 196-197; Sage 1996: 138; Lazenby 2012: 179; Montagu 2006: 137; Rusch 2011: 195; Cartledge 1987: 238. Polyæn. 2.3.8 has the Peloponnesian army at 40,000 – a claim that can certainly be rejected. For four *morai* – Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.1; Schwartz 2009: 257; Worley 1994: 141. For 2,000 Lacedaemonians – Montagu 2006: 137. For 700 Spartiates – Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.15; Schwartz 2009: 257; Anderson 1970: 196; Buckler 2013: 658.

³⁷⁵ Mercenaries – Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.9; Lazenby 2012: 179; Buckler 2013: 660; Anderson 1970: 196 n2; Schwartz 2009: 257; Rusch 2011: 195; Worley 1994: 141; Roisman 2017: 291. Phocians – Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.9; Anderson 1970: 196; Lazenby 2012: 179; Delbrück 1975: 169 n2; Strauli 2011: 163; Rusch 2011: 195; Worley 1994: 141.

³⁷⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.10-11; Plut. *Pel.* 20.1; Montagu 2006: 137; Gaebel 2002: 129; Buckler 1980: 62-63; 2013: 667; Worley 1994: 142; Sage 1996: 138; Anderson 1970: 196; Rusch 2011: 197; Roberts 2017: 357.

strong confederate army of Boeotia – around half of whom were Theban veterans, including Pelopidas and the three-hundred strong Sacred Band – was the *boiotarchos* Epaminondas.³⁷⁷ Up to one thousand high-quality cavalry, probably supported by *hamippoi*, augmented Boeotian ranks.³⁷⁸

Prior to the battle's commencement, Sparta deployed her troops in customary fashion. Ranks were arrayed twelve deep and Cleombrotus, together with the Royal Bodyguard (*Hippeis*), was stationed on the right of the line; Peloponnesian allies were positioned on the left.³⁷⁹ In an unconventional move, Epaminondas stationed his less dependable and reluctant allies on the Boeotian right with orders not to engage.³⁸⁰ This has sometimes been regarded a sign from the *boiotarchos* as a lack of faith in the confederate infantry, although a more generous interpretation might be that they were assigned the responsibility of pinning the Peloponnesian forces, thus both protecting the Theban flank and preventing assistance being rendered to the Lacedaemonians.³⁸¹ Epaminondas massed Thebes' veterans in a phalanx fifty deep and opposite Cleombrotus – that is, on the Boeotian left.³⁸² Pelopidas and the Sacred Band were stationed in front of the Theban phalanx.³⁸³

³⁷⁷ Diod. Sic. 15.52.2; Nep. 16.4.2-3; Schwartz 2009: 257; Anderson 1970: 197; Lazenby 2012: 177, 179; Hilbert 2012: 148; Montagu 2006: 137; Straeuli 2011: 163; Sage 1996: 138; Munn 1997: 83; Delbrück 1975: 167; Worley 1994: 142; Buckler 2013: 659.

³⁷⁸ For 1,000 Boeotian cavalry – Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.10, 12; Gaebel 2002: 130; Sage 1996: 138; Worley 1994: 144; Delbrück 1975: 169 n2; Schwartz 2009: 257. For 700 – Lazenby 2012: 179. Buckler 2013: 659 contends that whilst the notional number of Theban cavalry was 1,000, only 600 *hippeis* took the field at Leuctra. For the presence of *hamippoi* – Buckler 1980: 63; 2013: 659.

³⁷⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.12; Schwartz 2009: 257; Gaebel 2002: 130; Buckler 1980: 63; 2013: 660; Lazenby 2012: 181; Sidnell 2006: 63; Rusch 2011: 197-198; Cartledge 1987: 240; Worley 1994: 142; Roberts 2017: 358; Roisman 2017: 292; Matthew 2015: 275.

³⁸⁰ Diod. Sic. 15.55.2; Paus. 9.13.8; Anderson 1970: 200; Straeuli 2011: 164; English 2012: 103; Rusch 2011: 198; Buckler 1980: 63; Rees 2016: 112.

³⁸¹ Montagu 2006: 139; Delbrück 1975: 166, 169 n2; Davis 2013: 13, 17; Buckler 2013: 668; Buckler & Beck 2008: 125; Lendon 2005: 107; Pritchett 1974: 193; Matthew 2012a: 235.

³⁸² Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.12; Diod. Sic. 15.55.1-2; Montagu 2006: 138; Schwartz 2009: 257; Luginbill 1994: 60; Lendon 2005: 107; Pritchett 1974: 193; Cawkwell 1983: 399; Buckler 1993: 106; Gomme 1956b: 564; Sidnell 2006: 63; English 2012: 102-103; Cartledge 1987: 240; Worley 1994: 142; Matthew 2015: 29-30.

³⁸³ Nep. 16.4.2; Plut. *Pel.* 19.3, 23.2, 4; Montagu 2006: 138; Delbrück 1975: 168 n2; Lazenby 2012: 182; Buckler 1980: 63; Hilbert 2012: 151; Hanson 1999b: 48; 2007: 510; Anderson 1970: 217; Rusch 2011: 198.

Clearly Epaminondas was intending to deliver a knock-out blow by defeating the elite Lacedaemonian contingent, leaving himself free to then roll up the Peloponnesian line – thus his stated tactic to “crush the head of the snake” was an apt analogy.³⁸⁴

Hostilities commenced with a cavalry skirmish. Curiously, both commanders posted cavalry in front of their respective phalanxes. *Hippeis* were usually stationed on the infantry’s flanks as protection against encirclement but it has been reasonably conjectured that at Leuctra they were deployed in order to screen pre-battle manoeuvrings.³⁸⁵ Certainly it seems a sensible conclusion that Epaminondas would have wanted to disguise the unusually deep Theban phalanx and positioning of the elite Sacred Band, just as Cleombrotus might have hoped to conceal his intention to outflank the Boeotian left.³⁸⁶

Whatever the case, the superior Theban horse quickly routed the Spartan cavalry, forcing it back onto its own ranks and throwing the phalanx into confusion.³⁸⁷ Epaminondas then began an oblique advance against the Lacedaemonians at which point Cleombrotus, despite the disruption to his ranks caused by the defeated cavalry, ordered the extension of his own line in order to envelope the oncoming Thebans.³⁸⁸ The attempted manoeuvre

³⁸⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.10; Polyae. 2.3.15; Davis 2013: 13, 19; Lazenby 2005: 98, 100; 2012: 181, 183; Cawkwell 1972: 260; Hanson 1999b: 61; Sidnell 2006: 63, 65; Rusch 2011: 198; Cartledge 1987: 240, 380; Buckler 2013: 661; Matthew 2012a: 235; Rees 2016: 111.

³⁸⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.10; Lazenby 2012: 185; Montagu 2006: 139; Gaebel 2002: 130-131; Anderson 1970: 215; Buckler & Beck 2008: 124; Buckler 2013: 661; Worley 1994: 144; Hilbert 2012: 151.

³⁸⁶ Epaminondas’ need for disguise – Worley 1994: 145; Lee 2010b: 486; Rees 2016: 112. Cleombrotus’ reasons for concealment – Worley 1994: 144-145; Anderson 1970: 216; Rusch 2011: 198; Buckler 2013: 661; Hilbert 2012: 151.

³⁸⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.13; Montagu 2006: 139; Schwartz 2009: 257; Gaebel 2002: 130; Worley 1994: 144-145; Lazenby 2012: 185; Buckler 1980: 64; Sidnell 2006: 65; Cartledge 1987: 240; Cawkwell 1972: 262; Matthew 2012a: 223; Underhill 2012: 247.

³⁸⁸ Plut. *Pel.* 23.2; Buckler 2013: 661; Montagu 2006: 139; Davis 2013: 16; Buckler & Beck 2008: 122; Rusch 2011: 198; Matthew 2012a: 223; Roisman 2017: 292, 294; Underhill 2012: 247.

reduced the already disorganised Spartan ranks into chaos, whereupon Pelopidas and the Sacred Band charged and breached the Lacedaemonian phalanx.³⁸⁹

Sparta's hoplites fought well and with their usual discipline before unsustainable losses forced their eventual retreat. Those that perished included Cleombrotus himself, his *polemarch*, and leading members of the Spartiate command.³⁹⁰ Leuctra's pivotal moment was undoubtedly the death of the Spartan king – the fall of a commander often being a decisive (and not uncommon) factor in the outcome of a battle, as Epaminondas' own demise at Mantinea was to demonstrate later.³⁹¹ Xenophon's claim that up until that point Sparta had been winning may have been somewhat optimistic, although it should be noted that the Spartan *hippeis* were able to retrieve the king's body whilst the battle raged and that despite their victory, the Theban *boiotarchoi* were less than enthusiastic about chancing their arm in a second contest without reinforcements from Jason of Pherae.³⁹²

However that may have been, the final outcome of Leuctra was undisputed: Thebes and Epaminondas had achieved a decisive victory over Sparta and its Peloponnesian allies. Claims of four thousand Lacedaemonian deaths may be regarded as exaggerated but reports of one thousand casualties seem likely.³⁹³ Tragically, from a Spartan perspective, four

³⁸⁹ Nep. 16.4.2-3; Plut. *Pel.* 23.2-4; Schwartz 2009: 257; Montagu 2006: 139; Gaebel 2002: 130; Worley 1994: 144; Cawkwell 1972: 262; Buckler 1980: 64; 2013: 661; Buckler & Beck 2008: 122; Lee 2010b: 486; Underhill 2012: 247.

³⁹⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.13-14; Diod. Sic. 15.56.2; Hanson 2007: 513; Davis 2013: 15; Rusch 2011: 198-199; Montagu 2006: 139; Schwartz 2009: 258; Cartledge 1987: 241; Worley 1994: 144-145; Lee 2010b: 486; Roberts 2017: 359.

³⁹¹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.25; Diod. Sic. 15.87.2; Nep. 15.9.1-2; Hanson 2007: 513, 514 n30; Davis 2013: 18; Lee 2010b: 486; Buckler 1980: 218; Schwartz 2009: 262; Cartledge 1987: 391; Worley 1994: 172; Rees 2016: 112-113.

³⁹² Contest over Cleombrotus' body – Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.13; Diod. Sic. 15.55.5-56.1; Montagu 2006: 139; Munn 1997: 84; Lazenby 2012: 186; Roberts 2017: 359; Roisman 2017: 295-296; Rees 2016: 112; Underhill 2012: 247. Jason – Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.22-24; Lazenby 2012: 187; Yalichev 1997: 165; Hutchinson 2000: 238-239; Parke 1933: 103; Cartledge 1987: 308.

³⁹³ Four thousand – Diod. Sic. 15.56.4. One thousand – Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.15; Plut. *Ages.* 28; Paus. 9.13.12; Lazenby 2012: 186; Buckler 1980: 64; Hanson 1999b: 74; Rusch 2011: 197; Krentz 1985a: 18; Rees 2016: 114; Underhill 2012: 248.

hundred of the seven hundred Spartiates present at Leuctra died along with their king – this at a time when the number of full citizens may have numbered only one thousand.³⁹⁴ As might be expected, Boeotian losses were considerably lighter – forty-seven is certainly unrealistically low although three-hundred may well have been nearer the mark.³⁹⁵

Admirers of Epaminondas, both past and present, see in Leuctra evidence of the Theban's genius. Indeed the roll-call is an impressive one including an emperor, a consul, eminent commanders, and historians both ancient and modern.³⁹⁶ Even Xenophon, possibly his staunchest critic, was forced to profess grudging admiration for the abilities of the *boiotarchos* as a general.³⁹⁷ Dissenting voices are in the minority, although a close examination of Epaminondas' career suggests that such reservations are indeed well-founded, with many of the innovations credited to the Theban proving to be untenable.

One example was the decision to array his phalanx fifty rows deep, a stratagem that could hardly be described as novel. Thebes had experimented with depth before and in fact the tactic dated back to Delium (424) when the Boeotians had arrayed twenty-five deep.³⁹⁸ In 394 at the Nemea river, Thebes had also formed-up “very deep”, which within context

³⁹⁴ Spartiate casualties – Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.15; Montagu 2006: 139; Schwartz 2009: 258; Sage 1996: 138; Lazenby 2012: 186; Buckler 1980: 64; Davis 2013: 16; Sidnell 2006: 66; Rusch 2011: 197; Sekunda 2014b: 58-59; English 2012: 104; Worley 1994: 145; Lee 2010b: 486. For Spartiate population of 1,000 – Aristot. *Pol.* 1270a11; Cawkwell 1983: 385; Cartledge 1987: 167, 355, 382; 2003b: 226; van Wees 2004: 249; Bosworth 1988a: 13; Harley 1934: 130; Rusch 2011: 21; Sekunda 2014b: 59.

³⁹⁵ Forty-seven – Paus. 9.13.12; Schwartz 2009: 258; Roisman 2017: 296; Underhill 2012: 248. Hanson 1999b: 74 designates a “few dozen”. Three hundred – Diod. Sic. 15.56.4; Montagu 2006: 139; Lazenby 2012: 186; Krentz 1985a: 18; Rees 2016: 114; Underhill 2012: 248. Roisman 2017: 296 regards the figure as too high.

³⁹⁶ Emperor Hadrian – Paus. 8.11.8. Consul – Cic. *Tusc.* 1.2.4. Ancients – Polyb. 6.43; Diod. Sic. 15.81.1-4, 87.5-6, 88.1-4; Plut. *Tim.* 36; *Phil.* 3.1; Paus. 8.11.9; Just. 6.8.2-12. Examples of modern commentators include – Buckler 2013: 657; Cawkwell 1972: 254-255; 1976: 83; Anderson 1970: 158, 199; Cartledge 2003b: 227; Whitby 2004: 242; Hanson 1999b: 283; 2007: 517-518; 2010: 93, 113 n1; Adcock 1957: 24.

³⁹⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.8, 5.18; Gray 2010a: 556; Pelling 2017: 257; Flower 2017b: 308; Underhill 2012: xxviii; Westlake 1975b: 23; Cawkwell 1972: 254-255.

³⁹⁸ Thuc. 4.93.4; Lazenby 2012: 181; Hanson 2007: 505; Luginbill 1994: 60; Anderson 1970: 159; Gomme 1956b: 564; Buck 1994: 45; Cartledge 1987: 220; Roberts 2017: 144.

meant a depth of more than sixteen ranks.³⁹⁹ Epaminondas' rationale in arraying his phalanx excessively deep was doubtless to increase the power of the *othismos* in order to "steamroll" his Spartan opponents.⁴⁰⁰ Yet the effectiveness of such a tactic is at best questionable, as the kinetic energy of a phalanx was created by hoplites only as far back as the twenty-fourth row – thereafter no additional force was generated for the *othismos*, irrespective of how deep the formation.⁴⁰¹ Indeed, deeper than usual phalanxes could in some circumstances represent a liability to *strategoï* as the narrow front presented an opportunity for encirclement and also disarray. It is perhaps telling to note that the Hellenistic phalanx – the ultimate manifestation of the formation – although at times arrayed thirty-two deep, had a standard operational depth of sixteen and a functional minimum of only eight.⁴⁰²

Epaminondas is also lauded for his decision to position his veteran troops on the Boeotian left wing, thereby pitting them against Sparta's elite in an effort to achieve a decisive result.⁴⁰³ It should be noted, however, that neither was this a novel tactic. Pausanias had considered such a stratagem at Plataea (479) when, on the basis of Athens' success at Marathon, he attempted to match the contingent from the *polis* against Persian opponents.⁴⁰⁴ Even if on this occasion the tactic remained unrealised, it was certainly employed in 425 at Solygeia by the Corinthians seeking a victory over an invasion force

³⁹⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.18; Anderson 1970: 209; Luginbill 1994: 60; Lazenby 2012: 181; Buck 1994: 45; Cartledge 1987: 220; Roberts 2017: 332; Rees 2016: 63; Ray 2012: 22-23; Konijnendijk 2018: 135 Table 5.

⁴⁰⁰ For a discussion on the *othismos aspidon* and its role in hoplite warfare – Thesis: 40-43.

⁴⁰¹ Hanson 2007: 506; Devine 1983: 207; Buckler 1985: 141; van Wees 2004: 190-191. Hutchinson 2000: 237; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 135-136 contend the impulsion factor was limited to sixteen rows.

⁴⁰² Polyb. 18.30; Asclep. 2.1; Aelian, 4; Arr. *Tact.* 5, 9; Ducrey 1986: 77; Gomme 1956b: 564; Matthew 2012a: 172, 175; 2015: 258; Barnes 2005: 357; Tarn 1930: 13; Pietrykowski 2009: 214; Pritchett 1971: 135, 138; Walbank 1967: 588.

⁴⁰³ Cawkwell 1972: 260-261; Buckler 1985: 142; 2013: 669; Davis 2013: 19; Adcock 1957: 25; Lazenby 2012: 182; Roisman 2017: 293; Welwei 2010: 540; LaForse 2010: 545.

⁴⁰⁴ Hdt. 9.46-48; Hanson 2007: 507; Matthew 2012a: 269 n50; Rusch 2011: 59, 129-130; Solmsen 1944: 250-251; Wardman 1959: 59; Cartledge 1987: 240. How & Wells 2008: 732-733; Lazenby 1993: 231 regard the tradition as unlikely.

from Athens.⁴⁰⁵ It is true that Corinth's decision led to inglorious defeat but greater success was enjoyed by Teleutias at Olynthus (382) and Pelopidas at Tegyra in 375 – assuming that in the latter instance the Spartan *polemarchoi* followed tradition and stationed themselves on the right of their own phalanx.⁴⁰⁶

Another reason Epaminondas has received kudos in some scholarly quarters is the belief that Leuctra represented the first example of a coordinated operation between infantry and cavalry.⁴⁰⁷ The claim is a doubtful one. There is no record in the sources that after the opening skirmish, Theban cavalry played any further role in the battle – indeed Plutarch's account fails to make any mention of the division at all beyond an initial enumeration.⁴⁰⁸ There is also the strong possibility that Epaminondas' action in deploying his horse was a reaction to Spartan manoeuvres rather the implementation of a preconceived battle plan.⁴⁰⁹ Even had that not been the case, precedents for coordinated infantry and cavalry operations – albeit of a limited nature – had long been established with Solygeia (425), Delium (424) and Pactolus River (395) but three examples.⁴¹⁰

Further evidence of Epaminondas' tactical genius is sometimes cited in his pioneering development of the infantry wedge. Proponents of the view often point to the

⁴⁰⁵ Thuc. 4.43.2; Stroud 1971b: 229; Hanson 2007: 507; Gomme 1956a: 386; Thorne 2001: 240; Lazenby 2004: 80; Konijnendijk 2018: 120, 121 Table 3; Hornblower 1996: 201.

⁴⁰⁶ Teleutias – Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.40; Hanson 2007: 507; Gaebel 2002: 124; Rusch 2011: 185; Sidnell 2006: 55; Underhill 2012: 188. Pelopidas – Plut. *Pel.* 17.3; Hanson 2007: 505; Anderson 1970: 164; Buckler 2013: 665-666; Hilbert 2012: 115; Rusch 2011: 191; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 184-185.

⁴⁰⁷ Hilbert 2012: 153; Straeuli 2011: 163, 166; Worley 1994: 141; Buckler & Beck 2008: 281; Schwartz 2009: 258. Buckler 2013: 661 goes as far to say that cavalry spear-headed the Theban attack.

⁴⁰⁸ Plut. *Pel.* 20.1, 23.1-4; Gaebel 2002: 131; Worley 1994: 144; Lazenby 2012: 185; Buckler 1980: 64; Anderson 1970: 210; Hanson 2007: 508; Davis 2013: 14; Roisman 2017: 294; Rusch 2011: 198.

⁴⁰⁹ Hanson 2007: 508-509; Gaebel 2002: 130; Lazenby 2012: 185, 187; Rusch 2011: 198; Rees 2016: 111-112.

⁴¹⁰ Solygeia – Thuc. 4.44.1; Hornblower 1996: 202; Lazenby 2004: 80; Schwartz 2009: 280. Delium – Thuc. 4.93.2, 4, 96.5-6; Diod. Sic. 12.70.1-2; Kagan 2005: 169; Montagu 2006: 79; Schwartz 2009: 243; Hanson 2006: 130; Sidnell 2006: 47-48; Lazenby 2004: 90. Pactolus River – Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.23; Underhill 2012: 108.

records of Aelian and Xenophon as evidence of the practice.⁴¹¹ Because the matter is hotly contested, an examination of the testimonies is in order. Aelian maintains:

οὕτως γοῦν Ἐπαμινώνδας ὁ Θηβαῖος πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους μαχομένος ἐν Λεύκτραις πυκνώσας εἰς ἔμβολον τὸ στράτευμα κατεκράτησε πλείστης δυνάμεως (Aelian 47).

At Leuctra, Epaminondas the Theban, throwing his men into a wedge in intermediate-order, defeated the Lacedaemonians (trans. Matthew, 2012).

Xenophon, in his *Hellenica*, is regarded as also describing a wedge formation when outlining Epaminondas' advance at Mantinea. He notes:

ὁ δὲ τὸ στράτευμα ἀντίπρωρον ὥσπερ τριήρη προσῆγε, νομίζων, ὅποι ἐμβαλὼν διακόψει...(Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.23).

Meanwhile Epaminondas led forward his army prow on, like a trireme... (trans. Brownson, 1918).

Aelian, it must be remembered, was writing perhaps five hundred years after the event, leading one scholar to ponder if the tactician had not confused his account of Leuctra with events at Mantinea.⁴¹² Whilst possible, a more serious objection is that Aelian's interpretation does violence to the record of Xenophon (a contemporary of the battle), Plutarch and Nepos whose combined recounts detail the Thebans in a column fifty deep and headed by the Sacred Band that projected in advance of the Boeotian line. What Aelian

⁴¹¹ Leuctra – Buckler 1985: 134; Devine 1983: 201; Ducrey 1986: 77; Krentz 1985b: 59. Mantinea – Pritchett 1985: 467; Buckler 1985: 134; Schwartz 2009: 261; Lloyd 1908: 14; Sidnell 2006: 69; Underhill 2012: 306; Matthew 2012a: 197; 2012b: 181-182 n1; Ducrey 1986: 77; Rees 2016: 125-126.

⁴¹² Matthew 2012b: 181-182 n1. Pritchett 1985: 67 n202; Lloyd 1908: 14 also express reservations about use of the wedge at Leuctra.

appears to have done is describe what one academic has termed a “stepped-wedge” – a smaller body of men (the Sacred Band) stationed in front of the main phalanx, but both arrayed in quadrilateral formations.⁴¹³

Nor is the meaning of *embolon* as secure as might first be thought. It has been seen that ἔμβολον can be taken to mean “wedge”, but equally translated as “ram”, so that what Xenophon was actually alluding to in his description of the Theban phalanx was the rectangular ram on the prow of a Greek warship (a view shared by Brownson’s 1918 translation). In other words, the image Xenophon attempted to convey was that the significantly deeper Theban contingent stood in advance of the Boeotian line in the same way that a ram extended beyond a *trieres*.⁴¹⁴

It should also be wondered what advantage a wedge formation would provide hoplites. Advocates argue it allowed the Thebans to better penetrate the Spartan phalanx and afforded a greater level of protection to their own flanks.⁴¹⁵ Such arguments are specious. A phalanx arrayed in echelons would have been no more able to affect a half-turn to address a flank attack than if in columns and in fact probably was in greater danger of collapse. Furthermore, an apex such as might be found on a wedge-shaped phalanx would be prone to envelopment as it exposed the leading echelons to assault by a numerically superior enemy, thus blunting the point of attack and defeating the whole purpose of the tactic.⁴¹⁶

⁴¹³ Matthew 2012b: 181-182 n1.

⁴¹⁴ Buckler 1980: 217; 1985: 135-136; 2013: 668; Anderson 1970: 326-327 n3; Goldsworthy 1997: 13 n51; Davis 2013: 14.

⁴¹⁵ Aelian, 47; Arr. *Tact.* 11; Worley 1994: 212-213 n64; Davis 2013: 14; Devine 1983: 201, 207-208, 216; Krentz 1985b: 60-61 n40; Hanson 2007: 504; Dillon-Lee 1814: 153; Campbell 2004b: 4.

⁴¹⁶ Buckler 1985: 140-141; Goldsworthy 1997: 13.

A further misconception concerning Epaminondas' generalship at Leuctra was his supposed pioneering use of reserves.⁴¹⁷ It should be remembered when evaluating this claim, however, that no ancient account attested specifically to a reserve, let alone assigned the responsibility to the Sacred Band, whose deployment in Leuctra can be determined securely as in front of the Theban phalanx.⁴¹⁸ In any event, even had Epaminondas created a reserve force, the tactic was hardly innovative. For example, at Solygeia (425) the Corinthians deployed reinforcements when battling the Athenians and the following year the Theban Pagondas did the same at Delium.⁴¹⁹ Brasidas also posted a force of reserves at Amphipolis (422) as did the Athenians in 415 at Syracuse.⁴²⁰ Similarly, when about to engage the cavalry of Pharnabazus, the Cyreans (reportedly at the urging of Xenophon) stationed reinforcements at the rear of their phalanx to provide support if it was required.⁴²¹

When subjected to close scrutiny, therefore, it is clear that most of the tactical innovations and manoeuvres that history has credited to Epaminondas had in fact been employed before. One aspect of Leuctra, however, for which no precedence seemingly exists, was the oblique advance of the Theban line. Closing on the enemy in this way provided the veteran Theban contingent the opportunity to join with (and hopefully

⁴¹⁷ Cawkwell 1972: 261; Devine 1983: 208.

⁴¹⁸ Plut. *Pel.* 23.2-4; Hanson 2007: 510; Buckler 1985: 141 n24; 2013: 669; Lazenby 2012: 181; Davis 2013: 20; Buckler & Beck 2008: 114, 115; Rees 2016: 111.

⁴¹⁹ Solygeia – Thuc. 4.43.4; Hanson 2007: 509-510; Gomme 1956b: 492; Thorne 2001: 240; Lazenby 2004: 80; Schwartz 2009: 280; Ray 2009: 179; Konijnendijk 2018: 115. Delium – Thuc. 4.96.5; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 26, 28; Kagan 2005: 169; Roberts 2017: 145; Rees 2016: 23; Gaebel 2002: 98; Lendon 2005: 81.

⁴²⁰ Amphipolis – Thuc. 5.9.7; Hanson 2007: 509-510; Anderson 1970: 179-180; Schwartz 2009: 238; Kagan 2005: 185-186; Lazenby 2004: 102; Roberts 2017: 153-154. Syracuse – Thuc. 6.67.1; Kagan & Viggiano 2013b: 9; Kagan 2005: 277; Lazenby 2004: 143; Hornblower 2008: 471.

⁴²¹ Xen. *An.* 6.5.9; Anderson 1970: 180; Hutchinson 2000: 181; Griffith 1935: 5; Prevas 2002: 180; Whitby 2004: 240; Lee 2004: 314; Best 1969: 69.

overwhelm) the elite troops of the Spartan right before the weaker wing of the Boeotian army engaged.⁴²²

Yet even this seemingly unique battlefield stratagem accorded to Epaminondas is shrouded in controversy. Xenophon, the sole surviving contemporary account of Leuctra, mentioned nothing of an oblique advance.⁴²³ Plutarch's account of the battle (in all likelihood derived from Callisthenes) suggests that the entire Boeotian army marched in position following a line oblique to the Spartan front, before wheeling to face the enemy.⁴²⁴ By contrast, Diodorus Siculus (probably epitomising Ephorus) recorded nothing unusual in the way that Epaminondas took the field but that his line was in echelon due to the fact that the Boeotian contingents withdrew or refused contact (under orders) in order to avoid engaging the advancing Peloponnesians.⁴²⁵ Pausanias noted simply that the confederate troops were reluctant to stand their ground and gave way when attacked.⁴²⁶ Along similar lines, some modern commentators offer the suggestion that the oblique advance was accidental, created as the confident Theban contingent advanced more rapidly upon the enemy than their less enthusiastic allies, so inadvertently creating a staggered front.⁴²⁷

Clearly, therefore, it cannot be said with any degree of certainty that Epaminondas employed intentionally an oblique advance at Leuctra to achieve tactical advantage. What then can be made of his abilities? A close examination of Epaminondas' career reveals a

⁴²² Hilbert 2012: 152; Cawkwell 1983: 399; Davis 2013: 17; Warry 1995: 62; Cartledge 1987: 240; van Wees 2004: 196; Schwartz 2009: 258; Hammond 1980c: 62; Roisman 2017: 293; Lloyd 1908: 12-13; Matthew 2015: 43.

⁴²³ Hanson 2007: 511.

⁴²⁴ That Plutarch derived his account of Leuctra from Callisthenes – Buckler & Beck 2008: 111; Buck 1994: xvii; Hanson 2007: 517. Account – Plut. *Pel.* 23.1; Montagu 2006: 140; Cawkwell 1972: 261; Buckler 1985: 138-139; Hanson 2007: 511; Matthew 2012a: 235; Rusch 2011: 198; Hilbert 2012: 151.

⁴²⁵ Diod. Sic. 15.55.2; Cawkwell 1972: 261; Montagu 2006: 140; Sage 1996: 138; Buckler 1980: 63; 1985: 134, 138; Lazenby 2012: 182; Hilbert 2012: 151-152; Hanson 2007: 511; Worley 1994: 144; Rusch 2011: 198.

⁴²⁶ Paus. 9.13.9; Hanson 2007: 512; Lazenby 2012: 182.

⁴²⁷ Davis 2013: 18; Goldsworthy 1997: 24-25; Hanson 2007: 511; Lazenby 2012: 187; Rusch 2011: 198; Rees 2016: 112; Roberts & Bennett 2014: 266.

more than capable general – arguably the best of his generation – and one prepared to employ a wide array of tactics and manoeuvres in the prosecution of warfare. It is also evident, however, that Epaminondas was no great innovator and it has been well noted above that nothing the *boiotarchos* did (or was alleged to have done) at Leuctra was without precedent, a sentiment echoed by Polybius in his criticism of Timaeus’ battle narratives. In a backhanded compliment of sorts, Polybius observes:

ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς Λεύκτροις κίνδυνος ἀπλοῦς γεγονὼς καὶ καθ’ ἓν τι μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως οὐ λίαν ἐκφανῆ ποιεῖ τὴν τοῦ συγγραφέως ἀπειρίαν. ... (Polyb. 12.25f)

It is true that the battle of Leuctra, a simple affair in which only one part of the army was engaged, does not make the writer’s [Timaeus’] ignorance very conspicuous... (trans. Patton, 2010).

Polybius’ obvious hostility towards Timaeus is often commented upon. Less so is his description of Leuctra, which he dismisses tellingly as a “simple affair” (ἀπλοῦς γεγονὼς), thereby confirming that the battle could be considered so unremarkable that even a “hack” such as Timaeus could not misreport it. Such an observation rightly sheds further doubt on the view that Leuctra showcased Epaminondas’ innovative approach to tactics and deployment.

During his time at Thebes, therefore, Philip can have learnt few military tactics that might be legitimately regarded as original. To ascertain, however, if Epaminondas’ prosecution of a set-piece battle taught the future king anything at all – and regardless of how it was achieved, Leuctra was a significant Theban victory – an examination of how Philip fought his one great formal action is in order.

At the Battle of Chaeronea (338), the Macedonian army consisted of 2,000 cavalry and 30,000 infantry including 6,000 *psiloi* from Thessaly and 1,000 *hypaspistai* of the Royal Guard; the balance were *pezhetairoi*.⁴²⁸ Philip deployed his *psiloi* on the (Macedonian) right where the hilly terrain best suited their method of combat and they could be used to counter allied light infantry.⁴²⁹ His cavalry, which probably consisted of both Macedonian and Thessalian horsemen (although no ancient source attests the presence of a levy from Thessaly) and led ostensibly by Alexander – but very probably assisted closely by Parmenion and Antipater who were there with him – was stationed on the left flank, opposite the Sacred Band of Thebes.⁴³⁰ Between the two wings, Philip, as was usual, stationed himself with the *hypaspistai*, who were arranged alongside the *pezhetairoi*. The depth of the Macedonian formation is nowhere recorded specifically but may be regarded reasonably as ten ranks, in keeping with the reorganisation of the phalanx under Alexander II.⁴³¹

Of the Athenian-Theban alliance, the only unit whose numbers can be attested to with any certainty was the Sacred Band with its three hundred hoplites.⁴³² Diodorus Siculus records that Athens despatched its entire army against Philip, to which Demosthenes adds a confederate force of Euboeans, Achaeans, Corinthians, Thebans, Megarians, Leucadians, and Corcyraeans. Also present were fifteen thousand mercenaries (probably *psiloi*) and two

⁴²⁸ Diod. Sic. 16.85.5; Gabriel 2010: 215; Hammond 1994b: 149; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 596; Worthington 2008: 147; 2014: 85; Ashley 1998: 153; Ellis 1976: 198; Green 1991: 72, 74; Roberts 1982: 36; Schwartz 2009: 239; Sekunda 2010: 468; Bradford 1992: 143; Davis 2001: 30; Sabin 2013: 126.

⁴²⁹ Hammond 1994b: 152 Fig. 9, 153; Worthington 2008: 149; 2014: 87 Map 6; Green 1991: 74; Schwartz 2009: 239; Tucker 2011: 33; Ashley 1998: 153; Gabriel 2010: 218.

⁴³⁰ Diod. Sic. 16.86.1; Gabriel 2010: 217; Hammond 1994b: 153; Ellis 1976: 198; Worthington 2013: 249; 2014: 86; Fredricksmeier 1990: 307; Hamilton 1965: 120; Green 1991: 74; O'Brien 1994: 25; Sidnell 2006: 77-78; Gilley & Worthington 2010: 189; Guler 2014: 133-134; Bradford 1992: 144; Sabin 2013: 127.

⁴³¹ Frontin. 4.1.6; Matthew 2015: 274, 275; Montagu 2006: 145; Gaebel 2002: 217; Gabriel 2010: 63. Bardunias & Ray 2016: 163 suggests a depth of ten or twelve.

⁴³² Plut. *Alex.* 9; Hammond 1994b: 148; Worthington 2008: 147; 2013: 249; Green 1991: 73; Schwartz 2009: 239; Tucker 2011: 33; Davis 2001: 29; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 161.

thousand cavalry – figures confirmed by Plutarch.⁴³³ Diodorus asserts Philip’s army was numerically superior, whereas Justin claims the allied army was far larger; the conflicting claims probably indicate that both forces were around the same size.⁴³⁴ Certainty is impossible and it seems likely the mercenary contingent was vastly inflated, but in what appears a reasonable reconstruction it has been suggested that the core of the Greek alliance comprised around 28,000 hoplites: 10,000 from Athens; a contingent of 6,000 from the confederacy (which included 2,000 Achaeans); 10,000-12,000 infantry from Thebes; and 5,000 mercenary *psiloi*.⁴³⁵ Critically, however, despite the parity in numbers, the allied commanders were of modest ability as well as inexperienced in Macedonian tactics and methods of fighting.⁴³⁶

It is probable that the allied hoplite phalanx was arrayed in the customary depth of eight.⁴³⁷ Athenian troops were stationed on the left which enabled their flank to be protected by the *psiloi*, Haemon Stream, and “Hill 77”.⁴³⁸ Theban hoplites occupied the right wing whose flank was anchored by the Sacred Band and protected by the Cephisus river and its

⁴³³ Dem. 18.237; Diod. Sic. 16.85.2; Plut. *Dem.* 17; Schwartz 2009: 239; Bugh 1998b: 166; Green 1991: 73; Sidnell 2006: 77; Sabin 2013: 127.

⁴³⁴ Diod. Sic. 16.85.5; Just. 9.3.9; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 599; Errington 1990: 83; Green 1991: 72; Roberts 1982: 368; Tucker 2011: 33; Ashley 1998: 153; Worthington 2014: 85, 86; Guler 2014: 133.

⁴³⁵ Athens – Hammond 1994b: 148; Gabriel 2010: 215; Schwartz 2009: 239. Worthington 2013: 249 numbers Athenian forces as “at least 6,000”. Achaea – Ashley 1998: 153; Cawkwell 1980a: 108; Gabriel 2010: 215; Worthington 2013: 249. Thebes – Schwartz 2009: 239; Worthington 2008: 147; 2013: 249; 2014: 85; Gabriel 2010: 214-215; Ashley 1998: 153. Mercenary numbers – Gabriel 2010: 214-215; Hammond 1994b: 148-149; Schwartz 2009: 239; Tucker 2011: 33. Worthington 2013: 249 enumerates 2,000 mercenaries.

⁴³⁶ Diod. Sic. 16.85.6-7, 88.2; Gabriel 2010: 215-216; Hammond 1994b: 150; Guler 2014: 134; Bradford 1992: 143; Tucker 2011: 33; Worthington 2008: 150; 2013: 250; Sabin 2013: 127; McQueen 1995a: 160.

⁴³⁷ Hammond 1994b: 151. Bardunias & Ray 2016: 161 suggests a depth of twelve. For eight as the standard depth of the hoplite phalanx – Pritchett 1971: 137; Schwartz 2009: 8, 167; Matthew 2012a: 174, 177; Rusch 2011: 58; Holladay 1982: 94; Hutchinson 2000: 26; van Wees 2004: 185; Goldsworthy 1997: 2; Lee 2010b: 483; Roberts 2017: 19; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 107.

⁴³⁸ Pritchett 1958: 309; Hammond 1994b: 151-152; Schwartz 2009: 239; English 2012: 123; Guler 2014: 133; Davis 2001: 29; Worthington 2013: 249. These were possibly Acarnanian troops, known to have fought on the Athenian side – *IG ii²* 237=Tod 178=R&O 77; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 382; Tod 1950: 234.

marshes. The position was a strong one and had been chosen to negate the superior Macedonian cavalry.⁴³⁹

In the opening phase of the battle, Philip's light infantry routed the allied *psiloi* and although they played no further part in the battle, the victory enabled Philip to advance his right on the oblique securely and in *synaspismos* formation against the Athenians.⁴⁴⁰ Shortly afterwards, the Macedonian centre and cavalry began a delayed advance against the Theban lines. Once contact with the Athenian wing had been established firmly by the Macedonian right, Philip began a staged retreat in which his troops began to withdraw, so inviting the Athenians to advance – an opportunity they found irresistible.⁴⁴¹ This created a breach in the allied front through which Alexander and the cavalry attacked (no doubt in wedge formation), enabling them to fall upon the rear of the Thebans who were pinned in place by the Macedonian centre.⁴⁴² As this was happening, Philip halted his staged retreat, counterattacked, and quickly rolled up the Athenian phalanx, killing 1,000 of their number and taking a further 2,000 prisoner.⁴⁴³ Diodorus Siculus records that many Boeotians also died or were taken captive, including the Sacred Band who were killed to a man: a testament to their bravery was later to be marked by the Lion Statue of Chaeronea, within whose ambit 254 skeletal remains were discovered in 1880.⁴⁴⁴

⁴³⁹ Hammond 1980c: 60; 1994b: 151-152; Worthington 2008: 147, 149; 2013: 249; Schwartz 2009: 239; English 2012: 123; Guler 2014: 133; Hilbert 2012: 199; Davis 2001: 29; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 161.

⁴⁴⁰ Polyæn. 4.2.2; Hammond 1980c: 60; 1994b: 154; Ashley 1998: 154; Pritchett 1971: 152; Schwartz 2009: 240; Matthew 2015: 43; Tucker 2011: 34.

⁴⁴¹ Polyæn. 4.2.2; Gabriel 2010: 219; Worthington 2008: 150; 2013: 250; Ashley 1998: 154; Bradford 1992: 144-145; Schwartz 2009: 240; Green 1991: 75; Guler 2014: 134; Hammond 1980c: 60-61; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 600; Tucker 2011: 34; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 164-165.

⁴⁴² Diod. Sic. 16.86.2-4; Plut. *Alex.* 9; Bradford 1992: 145; Worthington 2008: 150; 2013: 250-251; Green 1991: 75-76; O'Brien 1994: 25; Sidnell 2006: 78; Gilley & Worthington 2010: 189; Hanson 2000: 161; Guler 2014: 134; Müller 2010b: 177; Hilbert 2012: 200-201; Hammond 1980c: 60-61.

⁴⁴³ Diod. Sic. 16.86.4-5; Ashley 1998: 155; Bradford 1992: 145; Montagu 2006: 70; Schwartz 2009: 240; O'Brien 1994: 25; English 2012: 124; Guler 2014: 134; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 603; Hammond 1980c: 60; Tucker 2011: 34; Davis 2001: 30; Worthington 2013: 250-251.

⁴⁴⁴ Diod. Sic. 16.86.5-6; Str. 9.2.37; Paus. 9.10.1, 40.10; Worthington 2008: 150; Pritchett 1958: 311; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 598, 598 n6; Green 1991: 76; Hanson 1999b: 21; 2005: 36; English 2012: 124;

The significance of Chaeronea was profound. Not only was it one of the most decisive battles of the ancient world, the contest established securely Macedonian dominance in Greece.⁴⁴⁵ Perhaps less well recognised, however, were the battlefield innovations inherent in Philip's victory. Testimony to the infantry's supreme discipline and training was the feigned retreat of the Macedonian right, regarded as the most difficult of all battlefield manoeuvres to execute. Furthermore, the battle demonstrated Philip's tactical mastery of his cavalry with its successful attack and decisive victory over Theban infantry, the best troops in Greece at that time.⁴⁴⁶

Chaeronea was also important because for the first time it introduced the so-called "hammer and anvil" tactic and its devastating effectiveness when executed effectively.⁴⁴⁷ Alexander was to later refine his father's innovation by flanking both sides of his phalanx with cavalry but the principle remained essentially the same – it was the phalangite's role to engage and occupy the opponent's infantry whilst Macedonian horsemen drove their opposite number from the field, thus rendering the enemy formation vulnerable and extended pursuit possible.⁴⁴⁸ It was a tactic employed and with great effect by Alexander throughout his Asian campaign and especially at the great formal engagements of Granicus (334), Issus (333) and Gaugamela (331).⁴⁴⁹

Hamilton 2002b: 23; Hilbert 2012: 202; Tucker 2011: 34; Sabin 2013: 126; Ma 2008a: 72-73; Krentz 2007a: 175; King 2018: 96.

⁴⁴⁵ Lycurg. 50; Just. 9.3.11; Ashley 1998: 155; Worthington 2008: 151; 2013: 254; Buckler 1994: 111; Burke 1983: 68; Tucker 2011: 34; Davis 2001: 27; Cartledge 1987: 43; King 2018: 95.

⁴⁴⁶ Plut. *Dem.* 17; Arr. *Anab.* 1.9.6; Brunt 1976d: xlvi; Zahrnt 2009: 24; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 600, 613; Worthington 2008: 150; 2013: 186; Gabriel 2010: 215; Markle 1978: 491; Henderson 1927: 240.

⁴⁴⁷ Lloyd 1997: 189; Borza 1990: 203; McCartney 2013: 56; Worthington 2008: 27; Ellis 1976: 56; Lee 2010b: 503. Matthew 2015: 37 makes the telling point that Philip II placed emphasis on his cavalry as a strike weapon.

⁴⁴⁸ Arr. *Anab.* 1.2.5-6; Brunt 1976d: lxxx; Bosworth 1988a: 41, 60; Matthew 2015: 371, 375, 400; Griffith 1935: 315; Ellis 1978: 11; Lee 2010b: 503; Hanson 2005: 37.

⁴⁴⁹ Use – Ashley 1998: 23; Spence 1995: 27 n125; Bosworth 1988a: 43; Gaebel 2002: 192; Sidnell 2006: 93; Matthew 2016b: 437. Granicus – Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.2; Davis 2013: 28; Matthew 2015: 371-372; 2016: 437. Issus – Arr. *Anab.* 2.11.1-3; Worley 1994: 166; Lloyd 1997: 190; Davis 2013: 31-32, 38; Lendon 2005:

A careful study of Leuctra and Chaeronea reveals much to the critical observer about the way Epaminondas and Philip prosecuted set-piece battles. Interestingly, the similarities are few and far between. For example, Philip chose to position himself with his crack troops on the right of the phalanx (as was traditional) not the left as Epaminondas had done. Nor did the king elect to deploy any deeper than the usual ten(?) ranks. Despite the presence of *psiloi*, Leuctra was very much a contest between two hoplite armies evenly equipped in standard fourth-century panoply. The Macedonian phalangites at Chaeronea, however, fought with innovative weapons – especially the *sarissa* – which proved a decided, if not decisive, advantage over the hoplites of Thebes and Athens. Furthermore, Leuctra was, in essence, an infantry battle whereas at Chaeronea, cavalry was an integral part of Philip's battle plan. Rather than a skirmishing force that played no great role beyond defeating their immediate opponents, Macedonian cavalry were deployed against Greece's best infantry with the express objective of affecting a breach in the Theban line. A final difference concerns the battlefield manoeuvrings of the two armies. Epaminondas' oblique advance may have been a preconceived strategy – equally it may have been accidental. By contrast, Philip's decision to position his line on the oblique was undoubtedly deliberate and his execution of the feigned retreat beyond anything that Epaminondas could have achieved – even had he conceived of it.

The weight of evidence is conclusive and points to significant differences in how the two men fought their battles. As such, it permits several possibilities when assessing the impact Epaminondas had on the military instruction of the future Macedonian king. One is that Philip either learnt nothing at all about the art of war whilst a ward of Thebes,

124; O'Brien 1994: 77; Matthew 2015: 371-372; 2016: 437. Gaugamela – Davis 2013: 37; Lendon 2005: 125; Matthew 2015: 372; 2016: 437; English 2012: 137.

or alternatively had forgotten everything that his captors may have imparted to him. The latter seems unlikely – Philip was an intelligent man who embraced innovation keenly, especially in relation to the military. Macedonian advances in artillery and siege engines were clear evidence of that. What seems more probable is that Philip studied and later evaluated closely all that Thebes had taught him and, finding little of any great innovation or benefit, turned elsewhere for ideas on military reform.

VII. Siege Warfare and Fortifications

Whilst not unblemished, Philip's reputation as innovative and expert in the prosecution of sieges is deserved. It is well documented that Philip preferred to seize cities by bribery rather than siege and it seems likely that the quip attributed to him that any fortress could be taken if able to be reached by a mule laden with gold was authentic.⁴⁵⁰ Greek *poleis* were unquestionably susceptible to betrayal, with greed just as much a motivational factor as personal vendettas or philosophical and political allegiances.⁴⁵¹ Success in the capture of Pydna (357) and Olynthus (348) attests securely to the long reach of Philip's inducements on occasion.⁴⁵²

The case for bribery as the major contributing factor in the fall of cities, however, can easily be overstated, as it is clear that Philip was well capable of capturing *poleis* by force if required to do so. For example, despite the obvious rhetoric of Demosthenes, the Macedonians carried Amphipolis by siege in 357 and did the same to Potidaea a year

⁴⁵⁰ Dem. 18.19; Diod. Sic. 16.53.3, 54.3; Green 1991: 33; Ober 2005: 191; Connolly 2012: 280; Campbell 2005: 31; Perlman 1976: 223; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 334; McKechnie 1994: 302. Mules – Cic. *Att.* 1.16.12; Brunt 1969: 247; English 2009b: 1; Rihll 2018: 282.

⁴⁵¹ Ober 2005: 187; Kagan 2005: 284; Wheeler 2007a: lvi; English 2009b: 1; Sears 2013: 108; Seaman 2013: 647; Rees 2016: 130-131; Lee 2010b: 498; Sage 1996: xxviii; Ashley 1998: 73.

⁴⁵² Pydna – Diod. Sic. 16.8.2-3; Dem. 1.5; 20.63; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 356. Olynthus – Hyp. *Fr.* F19; Diod. Sic. 16.53.2; Bradford 1992: 63; Gabriel 2010: 154; Cawkwell 1978b: 85; Posma 2015: 134; King 2018: 82; Tod 1950: 193; Nankov 2015: 1; McQueen 1995a: 123.

later.⁴⁵³ In 354, Philip took Methone (where he famously lost an eye) and in 342 successfully stormed Pandosia, Bucheta and Elataea.⁴⁵⁴

One of the reasons for Philip's success in prosecuting sieges was his use of artillery for which he, together with Dionysius I of Syracuse, can take credit in advancing during the first half of the fourth century.⁴⁵⁵ Only they (and the Phocians for the short period the Delphic treasury was under their control) had sufficient cash reserves to experiment with artillery, and the personal ambition which required the ability to capture cities.⁴⁵⁶ To this end, both men had, or attracted, engineers with appropriate expertise and experience who were then tasked with the development of siege machinery.⁴⁵⁷

In the case of Philip, this manifested itself in the creation of an engineering "school" which was established *c.*350 in Pella. The first body of its kind, the *corps*' primary role was to develop weapons that would advance the prosecution of siege warfare. From 340, the unit was headed by Polyeidus the Thessalian, whose outstanding contribution to Philip's cause was the invention of the torsion catapult.⁴⁵⁸

⁴⁵³ Amphipolis – Tod 150=R&O 49; Diod. Sic. 16.8.2; Cawkwell 1978b: 36; Gabriel 2010: 112; Worthington 2008: 42; Campbell 2005: 31; Fox 2015c: 347; LaForse 2010: 555; McQueen 1995b: 328; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 244. Potidaea – Fox 2015c: 347; Müller 2010b: 171; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 250; Natoli 2004a: 131; Tod 1950: 151.

⁴⁵⁴ Methone – Diod. Sic. 16.31.6, 34.5; Campbell 2005: 31; Worthington 2008: 48; Cawkwell 1978b: 36; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 255; Natoli 2004a: 131; Harding 2006a: 234; McQueen 1995b: 328. Loss of eye – Dem. 18.67; Just. 7.6.14; Worthington 2008: 49. Pandosia, Bucheta and Elataea – Dem. 7.32; Cary 1926: 189; Müller 2010b: 186; Cawkwell 1978b: 142; McQueen 1995a: 155; Ryder 1994: 245.

⁴⁵⁵ Athenaeus Mechanicus, 10; Marsden 1969: 58-59; Winter 1971a: 322; Chantiotis 2013: 446; Serrati 2013b: 193; Campbell 2011: 681; Sekunda 2010: 451; Whitehead & Blyth 2004: 83-84; English 2012: 154; Parke 1933: 69; Harding 2006a: 216.

⁴⁵⁶ Need for cash reserves – Marsden 1969: 58; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 445; Campbell 2011: 681, 681 n31; Winter 1971a: 220, 318; Sekunda 2010: 451. Ambition – Marsden 1969: 58; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 445; Serrati 2013a: 330; Sekunda 2010: 451. Keyser 1994: 32 suggests a third alternative: the inherent military conservatism of Greek *poleis*.

⁴⁵⁷ Dionysius – Diod. Sic. 14.42.1; Athenaeus Mechanicus, 10; Winter 1971a: 315-316; Marsden 1969: 58; Serrati 2013b: 193; Keyser 1994: 31; Caven 1990: 95.

⁴⁵⁸ Vitruvius 10.13.3; Athenaeus Mechanicus, 10; Campbell 2005: 31; Kern 1999: 198; Worthington 2008: 31; Ellis 1976: 174; Gabriel 2010: 88, 92; Hammond 1994b: 133-134; Serrati 2013b: 193; Sekunda 2010: 451; Whitehead & Blyth 2004: 84; Lewis 1999: 159; McQueen 1995b: 327; Fox 2015d: 375; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 446; King 2018: 113.

Torsion catapults derived their power not from the bow as did tension artillery but from rope springs manufactured out of sinew or hair.⁴⁵⁹ Polyeidus' prototype models emerged in the mid fourth century with the so-called "Mark I" and "Mark II" versions, both of which fired bolts.⁴⁶⁰ The "Mark II" catapult first saw service in 340 at the sieges of Perinthus or Byzantium and was more powerful than its brief predecessor as it possessed a frame of greater efficiency, thus enabling the springs to be more strongly tightened.⁴⁶¹

Post 340, Philip's engineers developed a third version of the torsion catapult whose main modifications were the use of washers to alleviate contact between the springs and the frame, and wider hole carriers which allowed the arms of the bow to be pulled further back.⁴⁶² Consequently, the "Mark III" catapult was able to transfer greater power to the projectile than its predecessors, resulting in increased range and killing efficiency.⁴⁶³ Whilst it is important to note that this model represented the zenith of artillery technology under Philip (and was still a bolt-firing device), it was undoubtedly a forerunner to the stone-throwing versions invented *c.*334 by the engineers of Alexander and deployed so successfully in the siege of Tyre (332).⁴⁶⁴

⁴⁵⁹ Polyb. 4.56, 5.89; Heron, 81-82; Marsden 1969: 2, 17; Ashley 1998: 77; Kern 1999: 239-240; Campbell 2003a: 9-10; Nossov 2012: 38; Lewis 1999: 159, 162; English 2009b: 3; van Wees 2004: 142; Hornblower 2007: 44; Lee 2010b: 498; Walbank 1957: 512-513, 621.

⁴⁶⁰ Marsden 1969: 18 designates the catapult frames as "Mark I" and "Mark II". Date – Ober 2005: 192; Marsden 1969: 43, 58, 60; Fields 2006: 25; Nossov 2012: 145; Lee 2010b: 498; Campbell 2011: 681. Bolts – Marsden 1969: 43; Griffith 1980: 62; English 2009b: 3-4.

⁴⁶¹ Perinthus/Byzantium – Athenaeus *Mechanicus*, 10; Diod. Sic. 16.74.4-5; Campbell 2005: 31; Cawkwell 1978a: 55; Worthington 2008: 31; Hammond 1994b: 133; Gabriel 2010: 96; Whitehead & Blyth 2004: 83-84; McQueen 1995a: 151, 186; 1995b: 327; Keyser 1994: 36-37, 38. Greater power – Marsden 1969: 18; Stoyanov 2015: 433.

⁴⁶² Heron, 83; Marsden 1969: 20-21, 43; Campbell 2003a: 13; 2011: 683.

⁴⁶³ Marsden 1969: 43; English 2009b: 4; Campbell 2011: 683.

⁴⁶⁴ Bolt-firing – Heron, 74-75; Marsden 1969: 43; Ashley 1998: 78; Griffith 1980: 62; Kern 1999: 199; English 2009b: 3. The first recorded use of stone-throwers by Macedonian forces occurs at the Siege of Halicarnassus in 334 – Arr. *Anab.* 1.22.2; English 2009b: 3, 42; Keyser 1994: 42-43; Bosworth 1980: 148. Tyre – Diod. Sic. 17.42.7, 43.1-3, 45.2; Arr. *Anab.* 2.22.6-7; Marsden 1969: 22, 43; Griffith 1980: 62; Nossov 2012: 40; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 446; English 2009b: 83-84. Keyser 1994: 45-46; Campbell 2011: 682, 682 n35 question the effectiveness of stone-throwing catapults at this time.

Be that as it may, even a bolt-throwing catapult could be highly effective if deployed appropriately; not to batter down fortifications but instead as an anti-personnel piece. In 353, for example, Philip's army suffered a rare defeat when routed by a Phocian ambush that deployed older stone-throwing tension catapults – probably *oxybelai* – to collapse his phalanx before launching an infantry attack that drove the Macedonians from the field.⁴⁶⁵ Artillery was also an effective means by which battlements could be swept clear of defenders in order to allow the deployment of siege engines in relative safety.⁴⁶⁶ Philip himself employed his catapults in such a fashion during the siege of Perinthus (340).⁴⁶⁷ Alexander made similar use of his artillery when at Pelion (Pelium) in 335, he laid down covering fire so allowing his troops to withdraw safely across a river, despite enemy pursuit.⁴⁶⁸ Artillery pieces were remarkably accurate and even if unsuccessful in immediately killing their intended target, certainly possessed the ability to inflict grievous wounds. In 340, for example, Antigenes, a young soldier in the service of Philip at Perinthus, was struck in the eye by a catapult bolt but survived and went on to serve Alexander in Asia.⁴⁶⁹ Similarly, in 332 during the siege of Gaza, Alexander himself was sorely wounded when hit by a bolt (probably fired from a tension piece) that penetrated both shield and breastplate before lodging in his shoulder.⁴⁷⁰

⁴⁶⁵ Polyaeen. 2.38.2; Gabriel 2010: 128-129; Ober 2005: 191; Nossov 2012: 38; Keyser 1994: 33; Marsden 1969: 14; English 2009b: 3; Matthew 2015: 20; King 2018: 78.

⁴⁶⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 1.20.8; Gabriel 2010: 92; Nossov 2012: 38; English 2009b: 16; Keyser 1994: 30, 43; Winter 2006: 184; Kinard 2007: 3; Tucker 2010: 463; 2015: 25.

⁴⁶⁷ Diod. Sic. 16.74.3-4, 75.2-3; Marsden 1969: 100-101; Keyser 1994: 38; Nossov 2012: 38; Bradford 1992: 116; Campbell 2003a: 9; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 572-573; Worthington 2008: 131; Ellis 1976: 176; McQueen 1995a: 151.

⁴⁶⁸ Arr. *Anab.* 1.6.8; English 2009b: 5-6, 32; Keyser 1994: 40-41; Hammond 1974: 84; Fuller 2003: 189; Ashley 1998: 173; Green 1991: 133-134; King 2018: 141; Hammond & Walbank 2001: 46.

⁴⁶⁹ Plut. *Alex.* 70; *Mor.* 339B (here referred to as Tarrias); Marsden 1969: 101; Heckel 2013: 164; Hamilton 2002b: 196; Bradford 1992: 118; Baynham 2009: 298.

⁴⁷⁰ Arr. *Anab.* 2.27.2-3; Curt. 4.6.17-20; Marsden 1969: 95-96, 96 n1; O'Brien 1994: 85; English 2009b: 96-97; Harding 2006a: 242; Bosworth 1980: 259; 1988a: 68; 1996: 22; Retsas 2009: 167 Table 3.

Philip's success in the prosecution of sieges was not limited solely to his use and development of artillery. Another reason, in part, was his utilisation of a wide range of siege operations in an effort to breach fortifications. In some cases, these were methods with which the Greek world was well familiar. Thus Macedonian troops made use of scaling ladders throughout 355/4 during the siege of Methone, in 352 at Pharcedon, and against Perinthus (340).⁴⁷¹ Fortifications of the two latter *poleis* were likewise attacked with battering rams; so too the walls of Amphipolis in 358/7.⁴⁷² Philip also deployed sappers in an effort to undermine defensive curtain walls of invested *poleis* – Perinthus for example – although whether these troops were levies of Macedonian citizens, subject nations, or mercenaries is not known.⁴⁷³

Nor was Philip reticent about the use of innovation to conclude siege operations successfully. *Helepoleis* were employed at Perinthus and although the technology was not new – the engine had been used by the Carthaginians (in 409) and Dionysius (in 398) – at thirty-five metres, the height of Philip's machine was nearly double that of previous models and represented a significant advance in design.⁴⁷⁴ The work was possibly that of Polyeidus, who in 340 invented a variety of ram-tortoises to assist in the siege of Byzantium.⁴⁷⁵ Details of his designs have not survived but Polyeidus' pupil Diades, possibly inspired by his

⁴⁷¹ Methone – Polyæn. 4.2.15; Bradford 1992: 38; Worthington 2008: 48-49; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 256-257. Pharcedon – Polyæn. 4.2.18; Bradford 1992: 48; Keyser 1994: 35. Perinthus – Diod. Sic. 16.75.3; Bradford 1992: 116; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 572.

⁴⁷² Methone – Diod. Sic. 16.74.3-4; Connolly 2010: 280; Gabriel 2010: 193; McQueen 1995a: 151. Amphipolis – Diod. Sic. 16.8.2; Bradford 1992: 15-16; Gabriel 2010: 112; Borza 1990: 213; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 237; Worthington 2013: 63; King 2018: 74; Keyser 1994: 35.

⁴⁷³ Perinthus – Diod. Sic. 16.74.3; Connolly 2012: 280; Gabriel 2010: 91, 193; Ellis 1976: 176; Cawkwell 1978b: 136; Hammond 1994b: 134; Kinard 2007: 8; Quinn 2016: 503.

⁴⁷⁴ History of *helepoleis* – Thesis: 72. Perinthus – Diod. Sic. 16.74.3; Connolly 2012: 280; Gabriel 2010: 91, 193; Hammond 1994b: 133; Lawrence 1979: 49; English 2009b: 12; van Wees 2004: 142; King 2018: 91; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 573; Ellis 1976: 176; Cawkwell 1978b: 136; McQueen 1995a: 151.

⁴⁷⁵ Athenaeus Mechanicus, 10; Vitruvius 10.13.4, 6; Nossov 2009: 91; Campbell 2003b: 4, 16; Lawrence 1979: 50; Whitehead & Blyth 2004: 83-84; Cuomo 2011: 312.

master's prototypes, produced a ram-tortoise that incorporated a turret upon which artillery was mounted.⁴⁷⁶

Philip, therefore, had a wide variety of means available in order to prosecute sieges effectively. This was not, however, the only reason for his success and one often overlooked aspect was the efficiency with which operations were conducted. The Macedonian king was a prodigious besieger of towns and cities, capturing successfully thirty-two settlements in the Thracian/Chalcidian region alone.⁴⁷⁷ In such circumstances where time was of the essence, Philip's greatest asset was the efficiency with which the array of devices at his disposal could be brought to bear.⁴⁷⁸ For example, to facilitate the rapid deployment of machines, siege engines were pre-fabricated and assembled on the spot, rather than having to be built from scratch.⁴⁷⁹ Furthermore, the army was organised into contingents that attacked in relays, thus permitting assault troops to be both fresh and high in morale – as well as enabling around the clock operations.⁴⁸⁰

The result of Philip's efficiencies was, in many situations and by Greek standards, an unprecedentedly rapid conclusion to operations. This is perhaps best evidenced when viewed in comparison with the Athenian capture of relatively modest Samos (366/5), an operation that took ten months but was still regarded as noteworthy.⁴⁸¹ By comparison, not ten years later in 357, Amphipolis fell to the Macedonians within a few months and in 356

⁴⁷⁶ Athenaeus *Mechanicus*, 13; Vitruvius 10.13.6; Nossov 2009: 91; Campbell 2003b: 17; Fox 2015d: 375; Cuomo 2011: 330; McQueen 1995a: 186.

⁴⁷⁷ Dem. 9.26; Campbell 2005: 31; Cawkwell 1978b: 37, 85; Fox 2015d: 372; Worthington 2008: 79; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 365; van Wees 2004: 116.

⁴⁷⁸ Dem. 9.5; Cawkwell 1978b: 162; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 444-445; Kern 1999: 198-199; Hammond 1994b: 133; Gabriel 2010: 91.

⁴⁷⁹ Polyaeus 4.2.20; Cawkwell 1978b: 163; Hammond 1994b: 214 n2.

⁴⁸⁰ Diodorus Siculus 16.8.2, 74.2-3; Nossov 2009: 38; Kern 1999: 198; Ellis 1976: 176; Worthington 2008: 131; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 572; Sinclair 1966: 254; King 2018: 91; Ashley 1998: 140.

⁴⁸¹ Dem. 15.9; Isocrates *Dis.* 15.108, 111; Nepos 13.1.2; Cawkwell 1978b: 162; van Wees 2004: 236; Winter 1994: 32; Rawlings 2007: 171; Heskel 1997b: 27; Pritchett 1974: 102; Ashley 1998: 74; Gabrielsen 2007: 269; Pritchard 2012: 57.

Potidaea was taken after a similar period of time.⁴⁸² Philip demonstrated that these were not isolated successes when the following season (355/4) he also reduced Methone in a matter of months.⁴⁸³ The speed with which these *poleis* fell was staggering by ancient standards, especially when it is considered Athens had taken two years (432-430) and 2,000 talents to capture Potidaea.⁴⁸⁴

Despite his obvious ability in the prosecution of sieges, however, not all of the operations undertaken by Philip were successful. His two more spectacular failures occurred during 340, first at Perinthus and later that same year at Byzantium.⁴⁸⁵ The main reason the *poleis* were able to withstand the siege was that they received reinforcements by sea – both from each other, Athens, and the Persians, looking to contain Philip’s ambitions.⁴⁸⁶ This provided a timely reminder, if indeed it was needed, that the prospect for success in any investment was largely dependent on countering the possibility of relief for those under siege. Another contributing factor to Philip’s failure was the limitation of Macedonian artillery which at this point, incapable of demolishing stone fortifications, had not reached its full potential as an assault weapon that it was later to do under Alexander.⁴⁸⁷

⁴⁸² Amphipolis – Diod. Sic. 16.8.2; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 237; Borza 1990: 213; Ashley 1998: 136; Worthington 2008: 41; 2013: 63; Gabriel 2010: 112. Potidaea – Diod. Sic. 16.8.3; Did. 13.20-24; Bradford 1992: 19; Ellis 1976: 71; Kern 1999: 200; Harding 2006a: 243; Ashley 1998: 127; King 2018: 75; Worthington 2008: 46; Gabriel 2010: 113.

⁴⁸³ Diod. Sic. 16.34.5; Worthington 2014: 43; Buckler 1989: 185; 1994: 176-177; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 256-257; Gabriel 2010: 123; Ellis 1976: 258 n56.

⁴⁸⁴ Thuc. 2.70.2; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 248; Ober 2005: 187; Krentz 2007a: 180; McQueen 1995b: 328; Gomme 1956a: 43; Kagan 2005: 85; Hanson 2006: 97, 178; Amemiya 2007: 102; Pritchard 2012: 43; Gabrielsen 2007: 265; 2013: 265.

⁴⁸⁵ Diod. Sic. 16.77.2; Campbell 2005: 31; Gabriel 2010: 194; Ober 2005: 196 n46; Müller 2010b: 176; English 2012: 140; Parke 1933: 177-178; Winter 1994: 32; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 356; Keyser 1994: 38; Marsden 1969: 100-101; Nossov 2009: 38.

⁴⁸⁶ Diod. Sic. 16.75.1-2, 77.2; Zahrnt 2009: 18; Errington 1990: 55; Olbrycht 2010: 349; English 2012: 140; Parke 1933: 177-178; Worthington 2013: 233-234; King 2018: 91; McQueen 1995a: 154.

⁴⁸⁷ Ashley 1998: 78; Ober 2005: 192. For the development of stone-throwing artillery under Alexander and its use at Halicarnassus – Arr. *Anab.* 1.22.2; English 2009b: 3, 42; Keyser 1994: 42-43; Bosworth 1980: 148. Effectiveness of catapults at Tyre – Diod. Sic. 17.42.7, 45.2; Arr. *Anab.* 2.22.6-7; Marsden 1969: 22, 43; Griffith 1980: 62; Nossov 2009: 40; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 446; English 2009b: 83-84.

As with the prosecution of sieges, Philip also made use of innovation to enhance the defence of his realm. The historical record is slight but indicates that Philip was as adept in the construction of fortifications as their destruction. As late as 429, Macedonian towns were rarely, or adequately, fortified. In the face of invasion, settlements tended to be abandoned by their populations who for protection retreated into the relatively secure mountainous highlands, a strategy probably followed until Philip.⁴⁸⁸ Very early into his reign, however, Philip undertook a fortification program to fulfil clear strategic objectives. Following his election as *archon* of Thessaly in 352, for example, he began strengthening the defences of towns such as Gonnoi (in Perrhaibia) that lay on the state's northern border with Macedonia and controlled access to the kingdom from the south.⁴⁸⁹ Towns in Magnesia were also fortified; more than likely this was confined to the key settlements in the north that protected the Pass of Tempe and those in the south that provided access to the Pagasitic Gulf.⁴⁹⁰ Similarly, in 339/8 Philip fortified Elataea as a prelude to his planned invasion of Boeotia.⁴⁹¹

Philip also founded military outposts in order to consolidate gains made at the expense of defeated enemies. In 350, for example, a chain of fortified settlements including Astraea, Dobera, Kellion and Melitousa was established along the northwest border with Illyria and around 341 Beroi, Philippopolis, Masteira and Cabyle were founded in the Hebros Valley, central Thrace, to protect Macedonian interests in the region.⁴⁹² Such

⁴⁸⁸ Inadequate fortification – Thuc. 2.100.1-2; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 198; Millett 2010: 480. Abandoned – Thuc. 2.100.1; Diod. Sic. 12.50.5; Arr. *Anab.* 7.9.2; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 24, 147; Lawrence 1979: 172; Roisman 2010: 150.

⁴⁸⁹ Ellis 1976: 85-86; Graninger 2010: 323.

⁴⁹⁰ Dem. 1.22; 2.11; Ellis 1976: 85; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 222, 287, 541; Errington 1990: 63, 65; Graninger 2010: 314; Buckler 1996: 382-383; Natoli 2004a: 111; Sprawski 2014a: 3.

⁴⁹¹ Dem. 18.169, 174-176; Guler 2014: 132; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 589-590; Müller 2010b: 176; Gabriel 2010: 206; King 1955: 369; Cawkwell 1978b: 142; Ryder 1994: 244.

⁴⁹² Illyria – Fox 2015c: 344; Worthington 2014: 72; Dell 1967: 97; 1980: 95; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 654; Errington 1990: 42; Ellis 1980b: 45; Hammond 1981: 214. Hebros Valley – Dem. 8.44; Diod. Sic.

strategic planning was also behind the Macedonian seizure of Crenides, founded by the Thasians in 360 but annexed by Philip in 356 and renamed Philippi. Well beyond Macedonian borders, it acted as a stronghold that not only controlled the route between Amphipolis and Neapolis but also a number of extremely rich gold mines.⁴⁹³

With locations that were easily defensible and included a strong acropolis, sites chosen by Philip's engineers for the (re)foundation of settlements (such as Philippi), were in many ways reminiscent of the locations chosen by the Dark Age Greeks. So too were the defensive principles with curtain walls normally following a natural line of defence such as a plateau, coastline, or crest of a ridge and an indented continuous circuit constructed in stone, with coursed dry-jointed ashlar masonry usually the dominant style.⁴⁹⁴ Defensive walls were strengthened by the inclusion of either rectangular or semi-circular towers – in some cases both designs were employed. Each style afforded advantages to defenders: the latter was more resistant to catapult attack and provided a wider field of fire; rectangular designs were less difficult and cheaper to build.⁴⁹⁵

Despite for the most part following standard Greek designs, Philip was also responsible for the introduction of several innovations in defensive architecture. It is known, for example, that his chief engineer Polyeidus invented a saw-toothed system of fortification that utilised pentagonal rather than rectangular or semi-circular towers. The design consisted of a zigzag trace in which the projecting portions of the curtain wall were

16.71.1-2; Ellis 1976: 167-168; 1980b: 45; Dell 1980: 98; Worthington 2013: 214; 2014: 76; Errington 1990: 53; Fredericksmeier 1979: 51; Cawkwell 1978b: 44; Delev 1998: 5; McQueen 1995a: 147.

⁴⁹³ Diod. Sic. 16.8.6-7; Parke 1933: 159; Ellis 1976: 167; Worthington 2008: 45; Gabriel 2010: 66; Errington 1990: 48; Bosworth 1988a: 8; Green 1991: 31; Kremydi 2015: 160; Fox 2015c: 353; Koukouli-Chrysanthaki 2015a: 438, 445; Loukopoulou 2015: 469.

⁴⁹⁴ App. B. Civ. 4.105; Winter 1971a: 36, 81; Koukouli-Chrysanthaki 2015b: 441; Finegan 2015: 102; Davies 1963: 95; Hellerman 2005: 65.

⁴⁹⁵ Phil. 1.2-4; Fields 2006: 37; Marsden 1969: 139-140, 143-144; Lawrence 1979: 378-379, 382, 386; 1996: 176; Nossov 2009: 21.

protected by a tower; gateways were situated in the recesses.⁴⁹⁶ By their very shape, pentagonal towers limited the size of artillery batteries that could be deployed and restricted the field of fire against frontal assaults.⁴⁹⁷ They provided, however, excellent platforms from which to attack the flanks of an enemy and their rounded walls meant missiles were more likely to be deflected harmlessly.⁴⁹⁸ Thus the advantage provided by the design was that it allowed defenders greater enfilading fire on the enemy and that attacking forces had to destroy the tower in order to affect a breach in the curtain. Even if achieved, the tower's advanced position relative to the main trace meant that a secondary wall could be built quickly, thus protecting the integrity of the *enceinte*.⁴⁹⁹

That Polyeidus' design was more than theoretical is evidenced by remains discovered near modern Saint Erasmus on Lake Ohrid, known in ancient times as Lake Lychnitis. The site itself marked the location of Philip's north-western border with Illyria and was built to control the surrounding territory which was rich in fisheries, forests, agricultural land as well as silver and copper mines.⁵⁰⁰ Inner fortifications of the outpost date from early in Philip's reign and reflect conventional design with a bastion protected by a two metre wide wall and a tower that guarded its narrow entranceway.⁵⁰¹ Later improvements demonstrate a number of advances in military architecture including the addition of a second, much larger bastion defended by a trench which was added to better protect the entire position.⁵⁰² The outer defences consisted of an ashlar-style curtain three

⁴⁹⁶ Phil. 1.44; Marsden 1969: 148-149; Lawrence 1979: 349; Winter 1971a: 116, 118; 1971b: 425; Heffner 1926: 206; Rizos 2011: 458; Nossov 2009: 17, 19; Warry 1995: 91; McNicoll & Milner 1997: 13.

⁴⁹⁷ Winter 1971a: 195; Marsden 1969: 149-150.

⁴⁹⁸ Phil. 1.3-4; Marsden 1969: 149; Winter 1971a: 195; Nossov 2009: 17, 20.

⁴⁹⁹ Winter 1971a: 117; Nossov 2009: 17; Lawrence 1979: 387.

⁵⁰⁰ Hammond & Griffith 1979: 652, 654; Millett 2010: 493; Hammond 1981: 200-201, 203, 210; King 2018: 33; Kremydi 2012: 288.

⁵⁰¹ Hammond & Griffith 1979: 653; Winter 1971a: 99; Karunanithy 2013: 45; Hammond 1994b: 54; 1981: 207.

⁵⁰² Hammond & Griffith 1979: 653; Hammond 1994b: 54-55.

metres thick and 240 metres long, incorporating four towers that projected seven metres beyond the wall. Although it is unclear if they were pentagonal, the trace is without question the saw-tooth design credited to Philip's chief design engineer.⁵⁰³

The king's appreciation of poliorcetics was obviously well-developed but whether this expertise had its origins in Thebes is unlikely. It is true that an unusual aspect of Epaminondas' generalship was his talent and ability to oversee the construction of sophisticated defensive structures. Messene was a fortification that owed its foundation to the *boiotarchos* but the Theban also demonstrated an awareness for the value of border forts and watchtowers in protecting the integrity of the Boeotian *chora*.⁵⁰⁴ Examples include the towers of Evangelistra, Askra and Mavrovouni, all constructed to protect the Helicon region of Boeotia and the border with Phocis.⁵⁰⁵ Another was a fortress at Siphai near what is now modern Alyki. Built in c.371-362 as part of Epaminondas' fortification program, the installation was one of a network intended to protect Boeotia from attacks launched across the Gulf of Corinth.⁵⁰⁶ Remains of the Siphai tower still exist and with their provision for artillery and multi-storey design, demonstrate a clear resemblance to those at Messene.⁵⁰⁷ Whether Eleutheræ can also be attributed to Epaminondas, as some contend, is doubtful – although the fortification would have protected Boeotia from Athenian invasion just as easily as a Theban attack on Attica.⁵⁰⁸

⁵⁰³ Hammond & Griffith 1979: 653.

⁵⁰⁴ Border forts and watchtowers – Buckler 1980: 67; Cooper 1986: 195; 2000b: 156, 163; Ober 1987: 577; Camp 2000: 46.

⁵⁰⁵ Paus. 9.29.2; Camp 1991: 196-197, 199; Whitley *et al.*, 2005-2006: 62; Pritchett 1982: 149, 158; Knapp 1983: 163; Thomas & Conant 2003: 146, 148; Buck 1979: 10; Frazer 2012b: 150.

⁵⁰⁶ Ober 1987: 569, 577, 580; Konecny & Ruggendorfer 2014: 736 n1, 739, 740; Oldfather 1916: 346; Cooper 2000b: 180; McInerney 1999: 354 n32.

⁵⁰⁷ Ober 1987: 577-578; Camp 1991: 200; 2000: 46; Cooper 1986: 195; 2000b: 180; Konecny & Ruggendorfer 2014: 739.

⁵⁰⁸ Eleutheræ as a Boeotian fort – Paus. 1.38.8; Cooper 1986: 195; 2000b: 157; Camp 1991: 199, 202; 2000: 46. That control alternated with Athens – Str. 9.2.31; Paus. 1.38.8; Camp 1991: 200; Chandler 1926: 9; Hanson 1998: 98-99; Buck 1994: 28; Howan 2008: 17-18; Taplin 2010: 238.

What should be noted, however, was that as proficient as Epaminondas may have been in the construction of fortifications, it appears that he was far less accomplished in the successful prosecution of sieges. Epaminondas failed in 369, for example, to take the relatively insignificant Peloponnesian *polis* of Gytheum, abandoning the attempt after only three days, and was unsurprisingly unsuccessful in an assault against Corinth.⁵⁰⁹ Nor could he capture Sparta, despite the *polis* being without either city walls or a citadel.⁵¹⁰ In 369 Epaminondas did not even make an attempt and in 362 the Theban was foiled by the determination of the defenders after hours of street-fighting.⁵¹¹ In part this may have been because of his failure to employ either siege engines or artillery – at least as far as the surviving record is concerned – despite *gastraphetai*, *oxybelai* and *helepoleis* being employed in assaults on *poleis* since the early fourth century. Perhaps, like Archidamus, Epaminondas’ possessed a strong hoplite ethos that prohibited him from deployment of “unmanly” technology.⁵¹² Whatever the case, the reticence of the *boiotarchos* to embrace siege engines and machines is a further indication that the likelihood Philip acquired military insights from Thebes was slight.

⁵⁰⁹ Gytheum – Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.32; Buckler 1980: 85, 99; Hanson 1999b: 93; Kennell 2010: 146; Cartledge 1987: 385; Underhill 2012: 263. Corinth – Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.18-19; Diod. Sic. 15.69.1-3; Buckler 1980: 100; Munn 1997: 90; Roisman 2017: 308; Underhill 2012: 273.

⁵¹⁰ Sparta was famed in antiquity for its lack of an *enceinte* – Plut. *Lyc.* 19; Cartledge 2003b: 57; Lawrence 1979: 116, 121; Frederiksen 2011: 25; Hanson 1999b: 82; Wycherley 1976: 39, 40; Rusch 2011: 212; Hutchinson 2000: 244; Cartledge 1987: 234, 335.

⁵¹¹ 369 – Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.27; Plut. *Ages.* 32; Polyæn. 2.3.5; Warry 1995: 60; Munn 1997: 88; Hanson 1999b: 91; Rusch 2011: 203; Cartledge 1987: 234, 384. 362 – Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.11-13; Diod. Sic. 15.83.3-5; Plut. *Ages.* 34; Lazenby 2012: 195; Buckler 1980: 211; Hanson 2006: 91; Rusch 2011: 208-209; English 2012: 109; Cartledge 1987: 235-236; Roisman 2017: 325-326.

⁵¹² Archidamus – Plut. *Mor.* 191D; Marsden 1969: 65; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 445; Cartledge 1987: 46, 325; van Wees 2004: 116; Roisman 2017: 243-244; Ober 2005: 191-192; Keyser 1994: 32; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 59; Campbell 2003a: 7.

VIII. Conclusion

This chapter investigated the long-established but rarely challenged belief that the basis for Philip's and Macedonia's rise to prominence had its genesis in the knowledge and insights the young prince acquired whilst a Theban detainee in the early 360s. Epaminondas and his innovative approach to warfare, so the theory goes, was instrumental in the formation of Philip's diplomatic and military acumen that he was to so expertly harness in his conquest of Greece. An objective and carefully considered study, however, reveals this to be far from so.

In the first instance, there was the problem of opportunity. Philip arrived in Thebes a boy of thirteen or fourteen and returned to Macedonia aged no older than sixteen. During that time, he probably obtained a rudimentary Pythagorean education but was far too young to have received any degree of formal military instruction. In any event, Thebes lacked an institution along the lines of Macedonia's Royal Page School by which such knowledge might have been imparted.

It is, therefore, hard to see how Philip's time as hostage in any way laid the intellectual platform for the king's *forte* – statecraft. It is true that following Leuctra, Epaminondas had formulated a strategy of encirclement in an effort to contain Spartan ambition and limit the opportunity of the *polis* to reassert itself in Peloponnesian affairs. It is also fair to say that the policy was only partially successful, as Sparta's post-Leuctra revival proceeded to the point where at Mantinea – a scant nine years later – they fought the Thebans to a stalemate. It was a similar situation concerning Epaminondas' diplomatic manoeuvres which, at best, can be described as heavy-handed: at worst, bumbling. His network of alliances, intended to assist in the curtailment of Sparta, should only be regarded as limited in their

achievements and, as it transpired, were short-lived. Epaminondas' clumsy approach quickly alienated many and ensured that at Mantinea a number of former allies fought against him.

With the long-held belief that Philip acquired the basis for his diplomatic skills whilst at Thebes proving untenable, the investigation next focussed on what tactical percipencies he may have gained. There, too, it is difficult to detect evidence of a correlation between the prince's time in Boeotia and the acquisition of unique military practice. Epaminondas certainly had a thorough grasp of stratagems and demonstrated his tactical proficiency on many occasions. Over-emphasised, however, is the reputation of the *boiotarchos* as a pioneering tactician. Many of his deployments (for example, deepening of the phalanx; use of reserves; coordination of infantry and cavalry) were imitative, not innovative. There is even a strong case to be made that the infantry wedge and oblique advance, supposedly employed for the first time by Epaminondas, are based on either a misreading of the sources or occurred as a result of circumstance rather than any preconceived plan.

Philip's victory at Chaeronea, by contrast, demonstrated the king's tactical genius. A deliberate oblique advance, combined with a feigned retreat – the most difficult of all manoeuvres – was employed to affect a breach in the Greek line. Into this charged the Macedonian *hetairoi* (in wedge formation), that proceeded to dismantle their hoplite opponents who were held in place by *pezhetairoi*. This was a prelude to the so-called “hammer and anvil” stratagem so effectively employed by Alexander in his Asian campaigns. Such tactical sophistication was, at any time, well beyond the capacity (or knowledge) of Theban forces, further undermining the supposition Philip gained his military efficacy when hostage in Boeotia.

It should also be remembered that Macedonian troops of the line were phalangites, not the traditional infantry that dominated armies of the *poleis*. Epaminondas' infantry were hoplites, heavy infantry equipped with *aspis* and *doru*. These defining items of accoutrement were introduced c.750 and had remained unchanged down to Chaeronea, and beyond. It might be expected that an impressionable adolescent, overwhelmed by a reputation as formidable as Epaminondas', would have enthusiastically embraced the hoplite model for his infantry. This, however, was not the case. Philip revolutionised warfare when, very early into his reign, he introduced the *sarissa*, a pike whose reach and double-handed grip were to make both *aspis* and *doru* redundant. It was a similar circumstance with cavalry. Theban cavalry were armed with *kamax* and *akontion*, both standard weapons for *hippeis* of Greek *poleis*. Philip's *hetairoi* were equipped with a *xyston*, a shorter version of the infantry *sarissa*. With a length of three metres, the weapon provided a significant reach advantage in close-quarters combat against both cavalry and hoplites alike. The marked dissemblance to Greek accoutrement, therefore, further demonstrates the lack of a Theban influence in Philip's military reforms.

An absence of Epaminondas' effect on Macedonian military development is also evidenced in the domain of polioretics. The *boiotarchos* certainly deserves credit for pursuing actively a policy of frontier defence with the construction of a number of border forts and towers, although it should be remembered that from the 370s Athens had also been engaged in a similar program. Wherever it was that the strategy originated, it was one emulated by Philip, who in the same way made a concerted effort to enhance the security of his realm. Fortification of Macedonian towns – hitherto largely undefended – was enhanced by innovative architectural designs such as a saw-tooth trace that incorporated pentagonal towers.

It is with construction of defensive installations, however, that any similarity between Philip and Epaminondas in the field of poliorcetics ends. There is no suggestion in the historical record that Thebes made any contribution to siege warfare. Indeed, Epaminondas' notable lack of success in operations against unfortified or poorly protected *poleis* suggests a reluctance (or inability) to utilise technology, despite the fact that by the time he assumed the office of *boiotarchos*, *helepoleis* and *gastraphetai* had been deployed successfully for well over twenty years. Rejected also by Epaminondas was the *oxybele*, invented c.375.

The contrast to Philip could not be more pronounced and lends further credence to the argument that the king's grounding in war-craft had little to do with his time in Thebes. Philip was both aggressive and innovative in his prosecution of siege warfare. Not only proficient in the use of traditional technologies such as scaling ladders, rams and sapping, Philip embraced new developments including *gastraphetai* and *oxybelai*. He can also be credited with enhancing the design of *helepoleis*. Philip's greatest contribution to siege weaponry, however, should be regarded as the torsion catapult, invented by Polyeidios under royal patronage.

What this chapter has demonstrated is the established belief that Philip's military and diplomatic acumen was acquired whilst a hostage at Thebes cannot be supported by an objective review. The evidence is, admittedly, circumstantial, but compelling. Too young to have received any meaningful level of military or diplomatic instruction, Philip can have observed very little that was not either established practice or for which better role-models existed. This is evidenced in the king's subsequent developments in tactics, panoply and siege warfare, all of which were at variance to Theban military convention. It is, therefore, how Philip achieved dominion over the *poleis* that the investigation now turns.

Chapter 4

Philip II: A

Northern Sunburst

359-336

I. An Athenian Association?

In the absence of any meaningful connection to Thebes, this chapter examines alternate explanations for Macedonia's ascent to hegemonic status. As king, Philip himself deserves considerable credit for seizing the military and political opportunities that transformed his realm into Greece's leading state. Then, as now, the diversity of Philip's army has been recognised as fundamental to his success and so one objective of this chapter is to investigate how the creation of a combined arms force impelled Macedonia's rise.¹ Another is determining the extent to which professionalism played a part in the king's victories. Because Philip's successful creation of Europe's first nation-state was a notable element in his ability to wage war successfully, this factor is therefore evaluated. Considered also is the king's expertise in statecraft – the art of government. Because, however, it is one of this thesis' central arguments that it was from Athens, not Thebes, that Philip derived his inspiration for military reform, this chapter begins by discussing the potential influence of Iphicrates and Xenophon.

One Athenian with whom Philip enjoyed a long (and often overlooked) association was Iphicrates and his military reforms that, it is argued, helped shape Philip's development of Macedonian *pezhetairoi*. Iphicrates' contribution to the military affairs of Athens spanned five decades, yet very little record has survived in connection with the early years of his life other than that he was the son of an shoemaker.² It is likely that Iphicrates' first experience of action came at nineteen years of age when in 394 he fought with distinction

¹ Success due to diversity – Dem. 9.49; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 428-429; Serrati 2013b: 190; Gaebel 2002: 82, 149; Hanson 2005: 33; Gabriel 2010: 58; Worthington 2008: 30-31; Ashley 1998: 7-8; Bosworth 1988a: 10; King 2018: 111-112; McQueen 1995b: 327-328.

² Plut. *Mor.* 187A; Pritchett 1974: 62; Mitchell & Rhodes 1996: 27; Elder 1870: 616; Sears 2013: 120; Parke 1933: 52; Taylor 2001: 65 n17; Strauss 1986: 133; Ray 2012: 59. Sealey 1956: 184, 192 notes Iphicrates had "humble beginnings".

in a naval engagement – probably the combined Athenian-Persian operation against the Spartan fleet at Cnidus that ended Lacedaemonian hopes of maritime hegemony.³ Iphicrates next served his *polis* in the Corinthian War, where from 393-390 he commanded various units of mercenary *peltastai*.⁴ It was during this time that the famous victory over the Spartan *mora* was achieved but in the 389 campaign, Iphicrates resigned his commission after a disagreement with the Athenian *demos* over matters of strategy. It is probable that by this time Iphicrates' position was that of *strategos*.⁵

Athens recognised clearly that his talents as a general were too great to waste, as in 388 Iphicrates was again elected a *strategos* and despatched with 1,200 *peltastai* to the Hellespont, where he was charged with the recovery of the strategically vital region from the Spartan Anaxibius. Iphicrates was successful (at least temporarily) in his assignment, typically deploying his *psiloi* in a series of raids before finally ambushing Anaxibius' force, killing the *nauarchos* in the process.⁶ Ten years later (377/6) and as a *strategos* acting under instructions from his *polis*, Iphicrates was deployed to Egypt with orders to assist the Persian satrap Pharnabazus reconquer the province.⁷ Thereafter as general he regularly served his city-state in arenas such as Coreyra (373/2); Corinthia (370/69); and Macedonia, where he was assigned the capture of Amphipolis (368-365).⁸ Iphicrates' final duty to

³ Plut. *Mor.* 187A; Pritchett 1974: 62; Mitchell & Rhodes 1996: 28; Sealey 1956: 184; Elder 1870: 616; Sears 2013: 120; Yalichev 1997: 156; Parke 1933: 52.

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.15; Diod. Sic. 14.86.3, 91.3; Just. 6.5.2; Pritchett 1974: 62; Holladay 1982: 102; Pascual 2009: 81; English 2012: 87; Elder 1870: 616; Lee 2010b: 488; Welwei 2010: 538.

⁵ Diod. Sic. 14.92.1-2; Pritchett 1974: 63 n22; Sealey 1956: 184; Hamilton 1972: 29, 34, 36-37; Elder 1870: 617; Sears 2013: 130-131; Thompson 1985: 55 n23; Strauss 1986: 156; Smith 1853a: 617.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.34-39; Frontin. 1.4.7, 2.5.42; Pritchett 1974: 64; Rusch 2011: 179-180; Pascual 2009: 88; Sekunda 2014a: 141; Thompson 1985: 56; Sealey 1956: 186; English 2012: 88; Hamilton 1972: 29; Seager 1967: 113; Elder 1870: 617; Sears 2013: 121-122, 281; Yalichev 1997: 153-154.

⁷ Diod. Sic. 15.29.4, 41.3; Nep. 11.2.4; Plut. *Art.* 24.1; Polyae. 3.9.38; Sekunda 2014a: 127; Mitchell & Rhodes 1996: 28; Sealey 1956: 192; Wheeler 2012: 157; Trundle 2004: 150; Elder 1870: 617; Griffith 1981: 163; Sears 2013: 126, 129; Yalichev 1997: 156-157.

⁸ Coreyra – Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.13-14; Diod. Sic. 15.47.7; Polyae. 3.9.55; Bertosa 2014: 115; Mitchell & Rhodes 1996: 28; Sealey 1956: 187, 192; Woodhead 1962: 261; English 2012: 97; Pritchard 2012: 54; Robbins

Athens was probably in the Social War of 356/5, and although charged with treason, he was speedily acquitted. Iphicrates died soon after in c.353.⁹

Without doubt, however, his finest hour was in 391 at the Battle of Lechaeum. Taking advantage of some incredibly nonchalant Spartan leadership, the Athenian attacked a Spartan hoplite regiment as it passed the walls of Corinth on its way back to base having just completed successfully an escorting mission.¹⁰ Using “hit and run” tactics, Iphicrates’ troops wore down and defeated the Spartan *mora*, killing 250 of the 600 contingent. Victory was achieved through the astute use of peltast mobility although Sparta contributed to its own defeat through over-confidence, lack of light infantry, and mismanagement of the late-arriving Lacedaemonian cavalry, which was deployed only to repel *psiloi* attacks rather than drive the light infantry from the field completely. It should also be noted that, as at Sphacteria in 425, Iphicrates’ troops were supported by a hoplite contingent which – although taking no active part in the battle – probably covered the *psiloi* during their tactical retreats and deterred pursuit by Spartan cavalry.¹¹ However that may have been, the victory

1918: 383; Elder 1870: 617; Sears 2013: 282. Corinthia – Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.49; Elder 1870: 617; Sealey 1956: 194; Robbins 1918: 384-385; Sears 2013: 132; Gourley 2018: 241. Macedonia – Dem. 23.149; Aeschin. 2.27-29; Pritchett 1974: 71; Sekunda 2014a: 141; Harris 1988a: 47; 1988b: 213 n10; Mitchell & Rhodes 1996: 28; Cawkwell 1984: 334; Sealey 1956: 193, 193 n111, 196, 198; Elder 1870: 617; Sears 2013: 127.

⁹ Isoc. *Dis.* 15.129; Diod. *Sic.* 16.21.3-4; Nep. 11.3.3; Polyæn. 3.9.15; Pritchett 1974: 72; Sealey 1955: 74; 1956: 199; Curteis 1890: 41; Mitchell & Rhodes 1996: 28; Harris 1989: 271; Elder 1870: 617-618; Sears 2013: 129; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 241.

¹⁰ In what was probably an attempt to avoid bringing shame onto the Sparta *polemarchos* (or his surviving family) Xenophon omits to record the name of the commander in his account of the battle. From Plutarch, however, it is known his name was Bias – Plut. *Mor.* 219C; Sekunda 2014b: 53; Burliga 2014: 67; Cartledge 1987: 224.

¹¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.11-17; Gaebel 2002: 121-122; Sidnell 2006: 59; Rusch 2011: 178; Konecny 2014: 10, 16, 19-20, 24-26, 29; Schwartz 2009: 255-256; Sekunda 2014b: 56; Burliga 2014: 69-71; Delbrück 1975: 152; Sears 2013: 280, 284.

rightly belonged to Iphicrates' *peltastai* and was regarded as equally stunning by Sparta and her enemies alike.¹²

The *strategos* clearly enjoyed the confidence of his *polis* and even though the length of his career was atypical, his martial qualities were aligned clearly with the fourth-century ideals and expectations for those who served in positions of command. It was Xenophon (again) who articulated these attributes in a number of treatises and although he more than likely had Agesilaus in mind when assembling his critique, Iphicrates could have equally "filled the bill".¹³ Not only did the general's imposing physical size and deportment command admiration, so too did his endurance (as attested by his decision to go barefoot and poorly clothed in order to emulate the hardships his men suffered during winter campaigns) – something that no doubt endeared him to his troops and maintained morale.¹⁴ Furthermore, Iphicrates demonstrated himself more than willing to, wherever possible, initiate stratagems rather than react to those of the enemy. Such tactics included ambushes, forced marches under the cover of darkness, and ruses of misinformation.¹⁵

Iphicrates may by nature have had a fiery temperament but this was subsumed by his good judgment in military matters.¹⁶ The *strategos* was a notoriously strict disciplinarian and even if the story of his summary execution of a sleeping sentry was

¹² Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.7, 9-10, 18; [Dem.] 13.22; Dem. 23.198; Din. 1.75; Nep. 11.2.3; Plut. *Ages.* 22; Trundle 2013: 334; Gaebel 2002: 122; Konecny 2014: 11, 41; Burliga 2014: 66; Konijnendijk 2014: 84; Bertosa 2014: 113.

¹³ For a discussion of Xenophon's views on leadership and command see Thesis: 235-239, 249-256. That Iphicrates was regarded as praise-worthy – Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.32, 39; Diod. Sic. 15.88.2; Sears 2013: 118, 273; Wheeler 1993: 145; Parke 1933: 74 n2; Gray 2010a: 556; Knox 1985e: 137.

¹⁴ Physicality – Nep. 11.3.1; Platts 1825: 331; Pritchett 1974: 63. Endurance – Polyæn. 3.9.34; Wheeler 1993: 145; Barley 2018: 191.

¹⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.33-39; Frontin. 1.5.24, 2.1.6, 12.4, 4.7.23; Polyæn. 3.9.5, 6, 8, 18, 33, 41, 46; Anderson 1970: 129; Konecny 2014: 40; Sears 2013: 273, 281; Wheeler 1988: 39.

¹⁶ Temper – Diod. Sic. 14.92.2; Pritchett 1974: 63. Good judgment – Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.39; Polyæn. 3.9.2, 9, 17; Gray 2010a: 556; Rahn 1971: 506-507; Tuplin 1993: 161; 2017: 351; Underhill 2012: 234-235.

anecdotal, a willingness to censure is clear.¹⁷ This devotion to discipline also extended to drill, where Iphicrates took every opportunity to ensure his forces were battle-ready.¹⁸ For example, whilst *en route* to the relief of Corcyra, he had his men maintain high levels of fitness by having them row rather than sail. Because there was also a reasonable expectation his fleet would encounter the more experienced Spartan navy during the voyage, Iphicrates drilled his troops in activities designed to improve their nautical skills. In this way, when the enemy was sighted it was engaged with a high level of confidence and victory the result.¹⁹

Martial exploits aside, Iphicrates has also been credited with the reform of hoplite panoply, although considerable controversy surrounds both timing and nature of the modifications recorded in the sources. A major obstacle to understanding fully the nature of these changes is that no literary source from antiquity attests explicitly to the deployment of Iphicratean *peltastai*, leading some commentators to reject the remodelled *psiloi* as a myth.²⁰ Others regard the changes as well-established by c.390.²¹ Some scholars contend reform of the peltast panoply was evolutionary, occurring gradually throughout the 370s, whereas yet another coterie believe the conversion to have been so complete that all *peltastai* were henceforth *ersatz* (pseudo) hoplites.²²

¹⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.28; Nep. 11.2.1-2, 4; Frontin. 3.12.2; Anderson 1970: 121; Konijnendijk 2014: 88; Konecny 2014: 20; Delbrück 1975: 151; Pritchett 1974: 117, 122-125; Sears 2013: 122, 280; Parke 1933: 78; Chrissanthos 2013: 316-317; Hamel 1998: 60, 62; Cartledge 1987: 224; Hunt 2007: 143-144; Barley 2018: 191.

¹⁸ Nep. 11.2.2, 4; Konecny 2014: 20; Sears 2013: 280; Parke 1933: 82; Lendon 2005: 105; Platts 1825: 331; Pritchett 1974: 124; Rahn 1971: 506; Gray 2010a: 556.

¹⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.27-36; English 2012: 99; Hutchinson 2000: 132-133; Anderson 2001: 170; Buxton 2016: 175; Best 1969: 107; Hirschfeld 2009: 389; Lazenby 1987: 171; Krentz 2007a: 162; Dillery 1995: 29, 169-170.

²⁰ Sekunda 2014a: 129 n10; Griffith 1981: 162, 163 n8, 167; Konijnendijk 2014: 89-90; Best 1969: 103-104, 110; Holladay 1982: 102; Trundle 2004: 51; 2010b: 156-157.

²¹ Konijnendijk 2014: 86; Elder 1870: 616-617; Montagu 2015: 87; English 2012: 87, 100.

²² Evolutionary – English 2012: 100; Parke 1933: 81. *Ersatz* hoplites – Sekunda 2007: 328; 2014a: 137; Charles 2012: 13; English 2012: 100; Parke 1933: 80.

A close reading of the two sources that document Iphicrates' reforms does, however, assist in determining a date for their introduction. Diodorus informs:

προσλαβόμενον οὖν αὐτὸν τὴν ἐν τῷ Περσικῷ πολέμῳ πολυχρόνιον ἐμπειρίαν τῶν στρατιωτικῶν ἔργων, ἐπινοήσασθαι πολλὰ τῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον χρησίμων, καὶ μάλιστα περὶ τὸν καθοπλισμὸν φιλοτιμηθῆναι (Diod. Sic. 15.44.1).

Hence we are told, after he had acquired his long experience of military operations in the Persian War [with Egypt], he devised many improvements in the tools of war, devoting himself especially to the matter of arms (trans. Oldfather, 1954).

Nepos, drawing on Ephorus, confirms:

Cum ante illum imperatorem maximis clipeis, brevibus hastis, minutis gladiis uterentur, ille e contrario peltam pro parma fecit...(Nep. 11.1.3-4).

While before he became commander they used very large shields, short spears and little swords, he on the contrary exchanged peltae, or Thracian shields, for the round ones...(trans. Rolfe, 1984).

Nepos notes merely that it was not until after Iphicrates had been an *imperator* (*strategos*) – an office he held a number of times – that his reforms were enacted. Diodorus' testimony, however, states unambiguously that Iphicrates derived the inspiration for his revisions from experience obtained as an officially sanctioned mercenary captain assisting Pharnabazus suppress an Egyptian revolt. Read together, both sources make it clear that it was following Iphicrates' Egyptian campaign that changes to peltast panoply were

instituted. The Athenian's involvement with the war ended in 373, providing a *terminus post quem* of c.373/2 for the introduction of his innovations.²³ A date of 390, therefore, can be rejected on not only the testimony of Diodorus and Nepos, but also Xenophon, whose narrative of Lechaeum indicates clearly that Iphicrates' *psiloi* threw javelins rather than attacked with a pike.²⁴

Other accounts that record peltast involvement raise questions about the longevity of the new accoutrement. That it was adopted in some measure is attested to by Diodorus who states:

τὴν δὲ δοκιμασίαν ἢ χρεία διαβεβαιοῦσα τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τῷ τῆς πείρας ἐπιτεύγματι δόξης ἠξίωσεν (Diod. Sic. 15.44.3).

The actual use of these arms confirmed the initial test and from the success of the experiment won great fame for the inventive genius of the general (trans. Oldfather, 1954).

It is Xenophon, however, who suggests *psiloi* continued to be equipped in traditional panoply. He writes:

...ὥς εἶδον οἱ προθέοντες τοῦ Ἀρχιδάμου πελτασταὶ τοὺς ἐπαρίτους ἔξω τοῦ σταυρώματος...(Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.22).

...as soon as the peltasts who were running on ahead of Archidamus caught sight of the Epariti outside the stockade... (trans. Brownson, 1918).

²³ Iphicrates' return to Athens 373 – Diod. Sic. 14.43.5; Sears 2013: 130; Sekunda 2014a: 130; Ray 2012: 59-60; Stylianos 1998: 345; Brice 2012: 85. Matthew 2015: 11, 16, 18 nominates a date of 374, although this is in violence to the record of Diodorus Siculus 15.44.1 (see pp.219-220 above).

²⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.17, 5.13-15; Bertosa 2014: 123; Sekunda 2014a: 137; Konecny 2014: 23-25; Burliga 2014: 70; Parke 1933: 80; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 141; Gaebel 2002: 122; Lazenby 2012: 174; Rees 2016: 97-98.

Xenophon was detailing events from the siege of Cromnus (365) where Archidamus' *peltastai* charged uphill to attack the *eparittoi* of Arcadia, an unlikely action if the *psiloi* were hefting a lengthy pike.²⁵

Further confirmation of the peltast's traditional equipment is evidenced three years later at the battle of Mantinea (362) where *psiloi* on opposing armies were described as throwing javelins rather than fighting as phalangites.²⁶ Diodorus' account notes:

αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν ὀλίγους εἶχον ἀκοντιστάς, οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι τριπλασίους σφενδονήτας καὶ ἀκοντιστάς τοὺς ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν Θεσσαλίαν τόπων ἀπεσταλμένους (Diod. Sic. 15.85.4).

Indeed they had only a few javelin-throwers, whereas the Thebans had three times as many slingers and javelin-throwers sent them from the regions about Thessaly (trans. Oldfather, 1954).

As the battle neared its conclusion, and in describing Epaminondas' death, Diodorus informed his readers that:

πολλῶν δὲ καὶ πυκνῶν φερομένων βελῶν, τὰ μὲν ἐξένευε, τὰ δὲ διεκρούετο, τινὰ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἐξαιρῶν τούτοις ἠμύνετο τοὺς ἐπιφερομένους (Diod. Sic. 15.87.1).

As the missiles flew thick and fast about him, he [Epaminondas] dodged some, others he fended off, still others he pulled from his body and used to ward off his attackers (trans. Oldfather, 1954).

²⁵ Running uphill – Sekunda 2014a: 138; Rusch 2011: 207-208; Lazenby 2012: 195; Schwartz 2009: 249-250; Montagu 2015: 92. This has been confirmed by a number of scholars who note that the pike's use required *peltastai* to fight as phalangites, thus (inadvertently) hinting at the troops' reduced mobility – van Wees 2004: 197, 303 n66; Matthew 2015: 16; Sekunda 2007: 329; 2014a: 132; Yalichev 1997: 161; Best 1969: 139-140, 142.

²⁶ Sekunda 2014a: 138; Schwartz 2009: 262; Sears 2013: 277; Rees 2016: 126; Roisman 2017: 335.

Diodorus' perhaps overly heroic recount of Epaminondas' demise is tempered by the slightly more sober Nepos, who nevertheless confirmed the essential details:

...occisis fortissime ipsum Epaminondam pugnantem, sparo eminus percussum, concidere viderunt (Nep. 15.9.3).

...they [the Spartans] saw Epaminondas himself fall valiantly fighting, struck down by a lance hurled from afar (trans. Rolfe, 1984).

What these accounts suggest collectively, is that sometime post 373 *poleis* experimented with equipping *peltastai* in the fashion Iphicrates advocated, but very quickly – perhaps as soon as 365, certainly by 362 – abandoned the idea. Perhaps needed to be given more credence than it has received, therefore, is the suggestion that the Iphicratean reforms represented a short-lived “initial test” (δοκιμασίαν) in panoply that – as far as *poleis* were concerned – realised no appreciable benefit.²⁷

If Greece did indeed reject Iphicrates' ideas, what of the possibility they were embraced by Philip in the late 360s?²⁸ Some items of panoply detailed in the sources bear a close resemblance to those of Macedonian *pezhetairoi*. The most complete description of Iphicratean accoutrement is supplied by Diodorus who records:

...ἀμφοτέρων εὖ στοχασάμενος, τοῦ τε σκέπειν ἰκανῶς τὰ σώματα καὶ τοῦ δύνασθαι τοὺς χρωμένους ταῖς πέλταις διὰ τὴν κουφότητα παντελῶς εὐκινήτους ὑπάρχειν...ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ δόρατος καὶ τοῦ ξίφους εἰς τὸναντίον τὴν μετάθεσιν ἐποίησατο ἠΐξῃσε γὰρ τὰ μὲν δόρατα

²⁷ Diod. Sic. 15.44.3; Rhodes 2010a: 159.

²⁸ Sekunda 2007: 329; 2010: 449; 2014a: 142; Lendon 2005: 413; Wheeler 2007a: 59; Anderson 1970: 131; Rusch 2011: 211; Parke 1933: 156; van Wees 2004: 196 all postulate Iphicrates as influential in Philip's reforms.

ἡμιολίῳ μεγέθει, τὰ δὲ ξίφη σχεδὸν διπλάσια κατεσκεύασεν...τάς τε ὑποδέσεις τοῖς στρατιώταις εὐλύτους καὶ κούφας ἐποίησε, τὰς μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἰφικρατίδας ἀπ' ἐκείνου καλουμένας (Diod. Sic. 15.44.2-4).

these [aspides] he discarded and made small oval ones of moderate size...As regards spear and sword, he made changes in the contrary direction: namely, he increased the length of the spears by half, and made the swords almost twice as long...He made soldiers' boots that were easy to untie and light and they continue to this day to be called "iphicratids" after him (trans. Oldfather, 1954).

Nepos both confirms and complements Diodorus:

...ille e contrario peltam pro parma fecit—a quo postea peltastae pedites appellantur—ut ad motus concursusque essent leviores, hastae modum duplicavit, gladios longiores fecit. Idem genus loricarum mutavit et pro sertis atque aeneis linteas dedit (Nep. 11.1.4).

...he on the contrary exchanged peltae, or Thracian shields, for the round ones (for which reason the infantry have since been called peltasts), in order that the soldiers might move and charge more easily when less burdened. He doubled the length of the spear and increased that of the swords; he changed the character of their breastplates, giving them linen ones in place of bronze cuirasses or chain armour (trans. Rolfe, 1984).

What the sources reveal, and which finds agreement with many academics, is that Iphicrates' reforms included supplanting the *aspis* with a *pelte* (μεγάλαις ἀσπίσι χρωμένων

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δυσκινήτων ὄντων, συνεῖλε τὰς ἀσπίδας καὶ κατεσκεύασε πέλτας συμμέτρους), and issuance of linen rather than bronze corselets (sertis atque aeneis linteas dedit).²⁹ The hoplite *xiphos* appears to have retained its place as a secondary weapon although its length was almost doubled (ξίφη σχεδὸν διπλάσια).³⁰ Iphicratean infantry also wore refashioned boots, named *iphicratids* (ἰφικρατίδας).³¹ More contentious, however, are the specifications of the modified spear. Diodorus' statement that Iphicrates increased the length of the *doru* by fifty per-cent (δόρατα ἡμιολίῳ μεγέθει) cannot be reconciled easily with Nepos, who records it was doubled (hastae modum duplicavit). The *impasse* might be resolved by mapping backwards. It will be remembered that the hoplite *doru* was 2.3-2.5 metres long and Philip's *sarissa* 4.8-5.5 metres. If, as will be demonstrated, Iphicrates was instrumental in the development of the Macedonian *pezhetairoi*, Nepos' testimony that the Iphicratean pike was twice as long as the standard spear should be preferred on this occasion – a conclusion reached by many, but not all, academics.³²

What, then, of this thesis' contention that Iphicrates played an important role in Philip's military reforms? Certainly the Athenian was a highly experienced commander who had fought in many theatres of war, and with the stunning success at Lechaeum to his credit. Furthermore, Iphicrates, as has been seen, possessed many personal qualities that

²⁹ *Pelte* – Matthew 2012c: 96; 2015: 11, 15; Anderson 1963: 412; 1970: 129; Lendon 2005: 413; Elder 1870: 616; Trundle 2010b: 156; van Wees 2004: 197; Sears 2013: 283; Yalichev 1997: 161. Linen corselets – Matthew 2012c: 96; 2015: 11, 16; Lendon 2005: 413; Elder 1870: 616; Sekunda 2014a: 136; Bertosa 2014: 116; Sprawski 2014b: 110; van Wees 2004: 197; Sears 2013: 283; Aldrete *et al.* 2013: 14.

³⁰ Matthew 2015: 11; Anderson 1963: 412; 1970: 130; Lendon 2005: 413; Sekunda 2014a: 132, 135; Elder 1870: 616; Bertosa 2014: 116; Trundle 2010b: 156; Delbrück 1975: 151; Griffith 1981: 164; Sears 2013: 283; Yalichev 1997: 161.

³¹ Matthew 2012c: 96; 2015: 11; Anderson 1963: 412; 1970: 130; Lendon 2005: 413; Sekunda 2014b: 135; Elder 1870: 616; Bertosa 2014: 116; Trundle 2010b: 156; Karunanithy 2013: 84; van Wees 2004: 197; Griffith 1981: 164; Sears 2013: 283; Yalichev 1997: 161.

³² Matthew 2012c: 95, 96-97; 2015: 11, 14-15; Sekunda 2014a: 134; Champion 2014: 8. Bertosa 2014: 116; van Wees 2004: 121; Ray 2012: 59; Anderson 1970: 130; Lendon 2005: 413 detail the Iphicratean pike as 12-16 feet in length.

made him a formidable leader of men. It was, however, as an innovator of panoply, that Iphicrates had his greatest impact in Macedonian military development.

As will be discussed, Macedonian heavy infantry carried both *pelte* and *xiphos*, and albeit the wearing of corselets is far from certain, sources hint at the existence of *linothorakes* during Philip's reign. Such items of accoutrement were, however, well-established by the mid fourth century and could hardly be considered unusual, unlike the Iphicratean pike, arguably the most radical departure from traditional hoplite panoply. The long spear should be regarded as a forerunner to the *sarissa*, a weapon that defined the Macedonian pike-phalanx which was to revolutionise the way battles were waged.³³

Philip can be credited with the introduction of the *sarissa* into the Macedonian army but from whence the idea was derived is often overlooked. That Philip gained military inspiration from Homer's *Iliad* is a view held by a number of modern scholars, and one that dates to antiquity.³⁴ Although not a history in the modern understanding of the term, Homer's *Iliad* documents the existence of long spears in Dark Age societies, recording that Hector's lance (*δόρυ*) was eleven cubits (five metres) long and Ajax's boarding-pike (*ξύστων μέγας*) a less believable twenty-two cubits.³⁵ Homer here, though, was writing for literary effect. The size of Ajax's weapon is clearly in deference to heroic tradition and although it should be acknowledged that the length of Hector's pike matched that of Philip's *pezhetairoi*, context indicates it was intended as a device to enhance the Trojan's regal status.

³³ Matthew 2015: 1; Ober 2015: 286; Gabriel 2010: 69; 2015: 144; Brice 2012: 146; Sage 1996: 169.

³⁴ Polyb. 18.29; Diod. Sic. 16.3.2; Lendon 2005: 123-124; van Wees 2004: 185; McQueen 1995a: 67; Bosworth 2010: 100.

³⁵ Dark Age connection – Gabriel 2010: 65; Wheeler 2007a: 27; Lendon 2005: 122-123, 354 n15; Frazer 1983: 129; MacDonell 1936: 117; Sherratt 1990: 810; Kwapisz & Malesińska 2008: 119-120 n9; Muellner 1990: 69; Lorimer 1947: 124. Hector – Hom. *Il.* 6.319-320. Ajax – Hom. *Il.* 15.677-678.

Polybius (18.29) gave further weight to a Homeric connection when, in describing the Macedonian phalanx, he invoked the *Iliad*:

φράξαντες δόρυ δουρί, σάκος σάκεϊ προθελύμῳ:

ἀσπίς ἄρ' ἀσπίδ' ἔρειδε, κόρυς κόρυν, ἀνέρα δ' ἀνήρ:

ψαῦδον δ' ἰππόκομοι κόρυθες λαμπροῖσι φάλοισι

νευόντων, ὡς πυκνοὶ ἐφέστασαν ἀλλήλοισιν (Hom. *Il.* 13.130-133)

locking spear by spear, shield against shield at the base, so buckler

leaned on buckler, helmet on helmet, man against man,

and the horse-hair crests along the horns of their shining helmets

touched as they bent their heads, so dense were they formed on each other (trans. Lattimore, 1961).

Polybius' intention was to describe the appearance of a Hellenistic phalanx in close formation and by recalling the *Iliad* certainly conveys a powerful image of the crush of men that a phalanx in *pyknosis* must have entailed. There is not, however, anything in Homer's description that can be regarded as singularly Macedonian. In fact, use of the terms δόρυ and ἀσπίς (*doru* and *aspis*) calls to mind hoplite, rather than phalangite, panoply. Indeed, in the battle that follows, spears are both thrown and thrust at opponents, suggesting a weapon more akin to an *akontion* than a traditional hoplite *doru*.³⁶ This is further reinforced by Homer's narration of an earlier duel that took place between Ajax and Hector in which long spears (δολιχόσκιος ἔγχος) were thrown and then wielded one-handed in single

³⁶ Hom. *Il.* 13.145-195.

combat.³⁷ Clearly whatever it may have been Homer was alluding to in his description of a “far-shadowing spear”, it was not a pike, which cannot be flung, or brandished with one hand. Any claim, therefore, of a connection between the *Iliad* and Philip’s introduction of the *sarissa* may be rejected safely.

Instead, this thesis contends, it was Iphicrates who may very well have been instrumental in the king’s decision to equip his infantry with a pike. Certainly the Athenian was familiar with the weapon and it has long been thought that he derived the idea from first hand observation of its use when seconded to Pharnabazus (c.377-373).³⁸ Whilst warriors of Achaemenid Egypt had a tradition of fighting with “long spears” – something Iphicrates doubtlessly observed on campaign – an Egyptian connection is somewhat problematic. For Egyptian infantry, who also carried a full-length shield, a pike would have proved impossible to wield. Sources further indicate that, on occasion, Egyptians used “long spears” in maritime warfare (as indeed was the case with Homer’s heroes) and yet the length of a full-sized pike meant the risk of fouling on a ship’s rigging would have made the weapon of marginal value – at best.³⁹ On the other hand, a hoplite *doru*, which was considered long by ancient chroniclers (especially in comparison to the shorter Persian version), was routinely used in conjunction with a full shield – and in marine warfare – indicating that a weapon of around 2.5 metres best suits the Egyptian context.⁴⁰ What the

³⁷ Hom. *Il.* 7.244-262.

³⁸ Diod. Sic. 15.44.1; Konijnendijk 2014: 85, 88, 91; Anderson 1963: 412; 1970: 129-130; van Wees 2004: 197; Bertosa 2014: 122; Sekunda 2014a: 129; Rahe 1981: 87; Sears 2013: 283; Matthew 2015: 13.

³⁹ For the use of a full-length shield and “long spear” by Egyptian soldiers and marines – Hdt. 7.89; Xen. *An.* 1.8.9, 6.2.10, 7.1.33; Anderson 1970: 130, 167; How & Wells 2008: 575; Markle 1978: 487; Rahe 1980: 84 n15; Fischer-Bovet 2013: 218; Lee 2013: 149; Yalichev 1997: 87; Hutchinson 2000: 212; Matthew 2015: 13, 411 n66.

⁴⁰ That *trierei*s routinely numbered amongst their contingent two hoplites armed, presumably, with a *doru* – Thuc. 1.49.1-3, 6.43.1; Plut. *Them.* 14; Pritchard 2010: 19; van Wees 2004: 210; Hanson 2006: 242; Gabrielsen 1994: 106-107; Cartwright 1997: 19; Jones 1952: 17; Charles 1948: 182; Strauss 2000: 316; Yalichev 1997: 98.

ancient texts, therefore, were probably describing when commenting on the “long spear” of Egypt, was a weapon akin to the “modern” boarding-spear (espontoon or spontoon), sometimes referred to as a half-pike. Indeed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the current millenium, boarding-spears approxiamately two metres in length (the same as a hoplite *doru* and somewhat less than half that of Philip II’s *sarissa*) were employed routinely by marines of the world’s navies.⁴¹

An ancient people whose panoply bore a far closer resemblance to that of the Iphicratean peltast was the Chalybes, traditional inhabitants of eastern Anatolia.⁴² Famous in antiquity for their production of near steel-quality iron, they were documented by Xenophon as the most difficult of all opponents encountered by the Cyreans.⁴³ With a pike fifteen cubits long (twenty-two feet or 6.7 metres), a linen corselet with plaited cord *pteruges*, *knemides*, helmet and *xiphos*, the panoply of Chalybes infantry bore an uncanny similarity to that carried eventually by Macedonian *pezhetairoi*.⁴⁴ Given their fame in antiquity, and the Achaemenid preference for recruitment of Anatolian mercenaries, it must be regarded as at least a possiblilty that Iphicrates was aware of the Chalybian reputation and the panoply of its warriors.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Length of the boarding-spear – Dean 1937: 177; Hand & Read 1917: 266; Oakeshott 2000: 56; Meyrick 1829: 104; Peterson 2000: 98.

⁴² Hdt. 1.28; Xen. *An.* 4.7.15, 5.5.1; Str. 11.14.5; Anderson 2001: 135-136; De Boer 2006: 68; Thonemann 2009: 225; Drews 1976: 26-27, 27 n73-74; D’Alfonso 2012: 185; Leloux 2016: 41; Woolley 1946: 179; Maxwell-Hyslop 1974: 145; Alpern 2005: 44; Matthew 2015: 42-43.

⁴³ Production of high-quality iron – Aesch. *PV* 714; *Sept.* 729-732; Apoll. Rhod. 2.373-376; Str. 12.3.19, 23; Catull. 66.47-50; Copeland 1977: 205; Drews 1976: 26, 30; Vassileva 1998: 75; Phillips 1968: 385; Richardson 1934: 556 n5, 558, 568 n6; Shipley 2011a: 158. Opponents of Cyreans – Xen. *An.* 4.7.15; Anderson 2001: 136; Prevas 2002: 145; Lee 2013: 149.

⁴⁴ Pike – Xen. *An.* 4.7.15-17; Anderson 2001: 136; Matthew 2015: 12-13; Sekunda 2014a: 134; Hutchinson 2000: 80. Corselet – Xen. *An.* 4.7.15-16; Anderson 2001: 136; Jarva 2013: 407; Lee 2013: 149; Hutchinson 2000: 80; Aldrete *et al.*, 2013: 13. *Knemides* – Xen. *An.* 4.7.16; Anderson 2001: 136; Lee 2013: 149; Prevas 2002: 145; Hutchinson 2000: 80. Helmets – Xen. *An.* 4.7.16; Anderson 2001: 136; Lee 2013: 149; Prevas 2002: 145. *Xiphos* – Xen. *An.* 4.7.16; Anderson 2001: 136; Prevas 2002: 145.

⁴⁵ Chalybian mercenaries – Xen. *An.* 4.4.18; Sekunda 2014a: 134; Tiratsian 1981: 164; Tuplin 2004a: 176; 2007a: 13-14; Lee 2007: 34; Blomfield & Monk 2012: 399.

Some Thracian tribes were also known to have utilised a long thrusting spear as an instrument of war.⁴⁶ Philip II, for example, was wounded by a Triballian *sarissa*, and although some modern historians believe the injury to have been inflicted by a *xyston* or even one of the king's own men, the existence of a Thracian pike should be regarded as secure.⁴⁷ As he did with Philip, Iphicrates had long-established and close connections with Thrace. Early in the fourth century, the Athenian had served the Thracian king Cotys and later (c.386) married one of his daughters.⁴⁸ The relationship then underwent a twenty-year hiatus but in 365/4, after being replaced by Timotheus following his failure to capture Amphipolis, Iphicrates rejoined the court of his father-in-law and, in a battle for control of the Chersonesus, fought a defensive naval action against Athens.⁴⁹ Buoyed by the success, Cotys was eager for his son-in-law to prosecute a more aggressive policy in the war.⁵⁰ With probably an eye to the future, Iphicrates declined the directive and withdrew diplomatically from Cotys' presence: first to Antissa on Lesbos and then in c.363 to Drys in Thrace.⁵¹

Iphicrates was now in a delicate position. Temporarily *persona non grata* in Athens, he had also made a dangerous enemy out of Cotys. Under such circumstances, that he

⁴⁶ Dem. 18.67; Did. 12.65, 13.3-7; Plut. *Mor.* 331B; Luc. *Dial. Mort.* 439-440; Rahe 1981: 86; Best 1969: 7, 103-104, 139, 141; Matthew 2015: 12; Konijnendijk 2014: 86; Webber 2001: 39; Riginos 1976: 117; Hammond 1980c: 63; Griffith 1981: 162; Anson 2010b: 60; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 149.

⁴⁷ Triballians – [Dem.] 13.3-7; Did. 12.65, 13.3-7; Plut. *Mor.* 331B; Just. 9.3.2; Rahe 1981: 86; Matthew 2015: 12, 58; Webber 2001: 39; Harding 2006a: 240-241; Worthington 2013: 236. *Xyston* – Markle 1978: 489-490; Gabriel 2010: 13. Own men – Hammond 1994b: 136-137; Worthington 2008: 140; 2014: 80.

⁴⁸ Served Cotys – Dem. 23.130-132, 135, 156; Webber 2001: 9; Delev 1998: 6; English 2012: 90; Harris 1989: 265; Stoyanov 2015: 437; Sealey 1956: 186; Parke 1933: 55, 127. Married a daughter – Dem. 23.129; Nep. 11.3.4; Sen. *Con.* 6.5; Ath. 4.131a; Sealey 1956: 186 n69; Harris 1989: 267, 269; Webber 2001: 9; Sekunda 2014a: 141; Bertosa 2014: 123; Trundle 2004: 150; Kallet 1983: 242; Sears 2013: 42, 118, 126.

⁴⁹ Replaced by Timotheus – Aeschin. 2.28-29; Dem. 23.149; Diod. Sic. 15.71.1; Kallet 1983: 239, 244; Harris 1989: 265; Pritchard 2012: 56 n249; Sears 2013: 128. Rejoined Cotys – Dem. 23.130-132; Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 105; Ath. 12.532b; Harris 1989: 266, 269, 271; Elder 1870: 617; Sears 2013: 42, 118, 128; Best 1969: 117; Parke 1933: 127.

⁵⁰ Dem. 23.131-132, 135; Pritchett 1974: 66; Harris 1989: 266-267; Elder 1870: 618; Yalichev 1997: 160; Parke 1933: 127; Sears 2013: 135; Trundle 2004: 151.

⁵¹ Antissa – Dem. 23.132; Harris 1989: 266; Elder 1870: 618; Parke 1933: 127. Drys – Dem. 23.131-132; Harris 1989: 266; Elder 1870: 618; Trundle 2004: 133, 151; Shrimpton 1991b: 77; Sears 2013: 128-129, 215; Parke 1933: 127; Isaac 1986: 129; Loukopoulou 2004: 878.

should turn to Philip for protection was a logical, almost foregone, conclusion. Iphicrates had connections to the Macedonian king which extended back to 378 when he was adopted by Amyntas III.⁵² Following Amyntas' death in 367, links were forged further when Iphicrates intervened in the struggle for succession at the behest of the dowager queen Eurydice. Driving out the usurper Pausanias, the Athenian thereby secured the crown for Perdiccas III, Philip's brother.⁵³

Furthermore, the two men were in close geographic proximity to each other at the time of Iphicrates' self-imposed exile. Drys, which had been an Athenian tributary in 422/1 paying an annual *phoros* of one talent, was a Greek *emporion* located on the Samothracian coastline close to Cape Serrhion.⁵⁴ Well-navigated in ancient times due to the mystery cult on the island of Samothrace, pilgrims were attracted to the region from all around the northern Aegean, including Macedonia.⁵⁵ The cult predated Herodotus, who was an initiate, but found popularity from the fourth century with the Argeads, especially Philip II who – together with his wife Olympias – themselves were worshippers of the Mysteries.⁵⁶ Its proximity to Samothrace ensured a voyage from Drys to Macedonia was a comfortable one and indeed was likely only a few days by sea to Amphaxitis, a major town in Mygdonia

⁵² Aeschin. 2.26-28; Fox 2015a: 223; 2015e: 258; Matthew 2015: 16-17; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 177; Karunanithy 2013: 27; Sekunda 2014a: 141; Borza 1990: 183; Curteis 1890: 20; Roisman 2010: 160; Sears 2013: 126-127.

⁵³ Aeschin. 2.26-29; Diod. Sic. 16.2.8; Nep. 11.3.2-3; Fox 2015e: 258; Roisman 2010: 160; Curteis 1890: 22; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 184, 204; Karunanithy 2013: 27; Sekunda 2014a: 141-142; Borza 1990: 193; Rahe 1981: 87; Carney 2010a: 417; 2010b: 51; Ellis 1976: 43; Bradford 1992: 8; Posma 2015: 125; Gabriel 2010: 4; Zahrt 2009: 11; Hatzopoulos 1996: 472; Sears 2013: 127-128.

⁵⁴ Pseudo-Skylax, 67.3; Archibald 2010a: 162-163; Hansen 2006a: 4, 9, 10, 14; Loukopoulou 2004: 878; Meritt *et al.* 1950: 217, 313; Isaac 1986: 129; Tiverios 2008: 114-115.

⁵⁵ Dillon 1997: 26, 29; Engels 2010: 97; Christesen & Murray 2010: 441; Blakely 2012: 54; Millett 2010: 502; Mowery 2011: 113-114.

⁵⁶ Fifth century and before – Hdt. 2.51-52; Aristoph. *Pax* 277; Diod. Sic. 5.48.1-49.6; Dillon 1997: 70; Burkert 1985: 282; Graham 2002: 234, 249; Blakely 2012: 53; Ure 1951: 196. Popularity in fourth century – Carney 2006: 13; Dillon 1997: 70, 282; Hertzberg *et al.* 2010: 1. Philip II and Olympias – Plut. *Alex.* 2; Blakely 2012: 54; Müller 2010b: 170; Hertzberg *et al.* 2010: 1; Carney 2000b: 63, 257 n 29; 2006: 12, 94; Greenwalt 1988: 94; Mowery 2011: 115; Hamilton 2002b: 2.

where Philip was stationed from 365-360.⁵⁷ Once belonging to the Paeonians, Mygdonia straddled the Axios River on the Thracian marches.⁵⁸ It is widely held that whilst in Amphaxitis, Philip first began to develop and train his “new model army” which he was to employ so effectively against Bardylis in 358.⁵⁹

That Iphicrates played a role in the amelioration of Philip’s infantry militia should therefore be considered likely. From 363-357 Iphicrates was in the political wilderness, living a precarious existence in Drys at the whim of Cotys, whom he had defied. At much the same time (365-360) Philip, whilst governing Mygdonia from Amphaxitis, was looking to reconstitute his army – and infantry in particular – into an effective fighting force. Both men stood to gain from an association. Iphicrates no doubt felt that Philip “owed him a favour” for saving Perdiccas’ crown in 367 and his “brother’s” protection would be adequate recompense until the opportunity arose for a return to Athens (as it did in 357). Philip, on the other hand, could only benefit from having recourse to one of the most experienced military minds of the time. Perhaps the much-maligned Diodorus was correct after all: Iphicrates did introduce so many improvements into warfare that listing them would have been tedious: *πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα τῶν χρησίμων εἰς τὰς στρατείας κατέδειξε, περὶ ὧν μακρὸν*

⁵⁷ Calculating sailing times accurately is somewhat problematic. Hdt. 4.86 indicates a distance of 130,000 fathoms (128 nautical miles = 665 stades) was possible in a day and night’s travel. Pseudo-Sylax, 69; Shipley 2011a: 154; 2011b: 8 record 500 stades per day but acknowledge the figure is formulaic. A sailing time may be deduced from the voyage of Saint Paul the Apostle, whose journey in the first century AD from the Alexandria Troas to Neapolis (a distance of around 150 nautical miles and therefore approximately that of Drys to Amphaxitis) took two days with the wind and five days against it. Two days – The Bible, *Acts*, 16.11; Pollock 2012: 122; McDonald 1940: 19; Wilson 1998: 135; Merriam 2004: 78; Bruce 1990: 356; Wilson 2016: 231; Mowery 2011: 120-121; McRay 2003: 139, 141. Five days – The Bible, *Acts*, 20.6; Merriam 2004: 168; Bruce 1990: 356; Wilson 2016: 231.

⁵⁸ Thuc. 2.99.4; Str. 7.frag.11; Errington 1990: 6; Hatzopoulos 1996: 106; Thomas 2010: 76; Sprawski 2010: 133; Faklaris 1994: 613 n32; Borza 1990: 47; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 55, 59.

⁵⁹ Developing army at Amphaxitis – Ath. 11.506e-f; Markle 1978: 486; Curteis 1890: 24; Worthington 2013: 54, 57; 2014: 28; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 207; Green 1991: 20; Chroust 1967b: 34; Sekunda 2010: 450; Matthew 2015: 31; Fox 2015c: 336; 2015e: 268; Roisman 2010: 163; Hatzopoulos 1996: 178; Natoli 2004a: 148; 2004b: 35-36, 37, 39; Guler 2014: 129; Parke 1933: 157.

ὄν εἶη γράφειν.⁶⁰ Unfortunately for the *poleis*, it was only Philip that had the foresight to implement them.

From wherever it was that Iphicrates derived his inspiration – whether the Chalybians or Triballians – that he was influential in Philip’s revision of the military is all but certain – and likely collusionary. Albeit inadvertent, another Athenian whose contribution to the rise of the Macedonian war-machine – hitherto largely unheralded – was Xenophon; and in particular his treatises on leadership and command. In light of the ancient sources’ silence on the matter, whether or not Philip II concerned himself with these works requires a close evaluation of their value as manuals for reform and what connections, if any, existed between Xenophon’s observations and measures the Macedonian king implemented.

Another important consideration is the originality of Xenophon’s work. It seems likely memoirs – such as that written by the shadowy Sophraenetes the Stymphalian – were in circulation by the mid fourth century but it was Xenophon, together with Aeneas Tacticus (an exact contemporary) who pioneered the military didactic.⁶¹ Aeneas, however, as his appellation implies, concerned himself primarily with tactical aspects of warfare whereas Xenophon – as will be seen – whilst certainly detailing stratagems, also emphasised military theory and grand strategy.⁶² For someone such as Philip who wished to gain insights into

⁶⁰ Diod. Sic. 15.44.4.

⁶¹ Sophraenetes – Stephanos of Byzantium *FGrHist* 109 FF 1-4; Flower 2012: 19, 31; Dillery 1998: 7; Almagor 2012: 29; Cawkwell 1979b: 17; Lee 2017: 33; Tsagalis 2009: 454. Xenophon and Aeneas as pioneers – Murray 2012: 283; Bettalli 2018: 175, 175 n39; Tejada 2004: 140-141; Waterfield 2009b: 187; Shipley 2018: 59-60; Dillery 1998: 12-13; Illinois Greek Club 1923a: 7 n1. Slim evidence also exists for a military handbook written by Iphicrates, although its nature and content is unknown – Aelian, 1; Dillon-Lee 1814: 5; Matthew 2012c: 80 n2; 2015: 454 n4; Stadter 1978: 125. Arr. *Tact.* 1 states it was not the Athenian *strategos* but another of the same name. DeVoto 1993: 96 n3 dates this unknown Iphicrates to the third century.

⁶² Xenophon’s focus – Tejada 2004: 141; Campbell 2004a: 22; Gera 1993: 72, 72 n152; Carlier 2010: 341; Luvaas 2004: 61; Christesen 2006: 48; Hunt 1998: 145, 147, 154.

how to improve his military's effectiveness, Xenophon's corpus, therefore, was one of the few sources of (written) material available. Prolifically diverse by ancient standards, the Athenian's works included *Cyropaedia*, *Hipparchicus* (*Cavalry Commander*), *Agésilas*, and *Hellenica* – all of which were in circulation by the 350s and so accessible to Philip.⁶³

The *Cyropaedia*, in particular, contained much of interest for those prepared to view it through a critical lens. Written for a Greek audience from the perspective of an intellectual who was not restricted by the confines of time or space, the work was considered an important text in antiquity.⁶⁴ Read by Scipio Aemilianus (185-129), Julius Caesar (100-44) and Cicero (106-43), it was also known to Cato the Younger (95-46).⁶⁵ Connections to the earlier Macedonian elite are somewhat tenuous. Some modern scholars believe it to have been adopted as a model by later Hellenistic kings – including the *diadochi*.⁶⁶ Alexander III read Xenophon (whether this included the *Cyropaedia* is unknown) although Eunapius' gush that the king owed his success to the Athenian can be regarded safely as an exaggeration.⁶⁷

⁶³ *Hipparchicus* authored c.365 – Marchant 1925: xxviii; Bugh 1998a: 86; Stoll 2012: 250; Spence 1995: 224; Worley 1994: 211 n44; Anderson 1961: 180 n6. Christesen 2006: 62 postulates a date of early 350s. *Agésilas* written 360/59 just after the Spartan's death – Cawkwell 1979a: 15, 20; Marchant 1925: xviii; Lipka 2002: 9; Cartledge 1987: 55; Lee 2017: 33; Dillery 2017: 202. *Hellenica* is generally reckoned to be one of Xenophon's final works with a completion date in the 350s – Cawkwell 1979a: 17-18, 21-22; Flower 2012: 27; Gray 1991: 201; Lipka 2002: 9; Badian 2004: 38, 43, 45; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 260, 260 n2; Dillery 1998: 6; Lee 2017: 33.

⁶⁴ Audience – Pl. *Resp.* 498d-499b; Nadon 2001: 27, 27 n5; Due 1989: 10, 20, 234; Hirsch 1985: 70-71; Tatum 1989: 59; Stadter 2010: 372-373, 375, 387; Tuplin 2004b: 20; Whidden 2007: 563. Importance in antiquity – Due 1989: 9; Field 2012: 723; Miller 1914: xii; Sancisi-Weerdenburg 2010: 439.

⁶⁵ Scipio Aemilianus and Julius Caesar – Cic. *Fam.* 9.25; *Ad Q. Fr.* 1.1.23; *Tusc.* 2.26.62; Suet. *Iul.* 87; Machiavelli 2008: 14; Nadon 2001: 4, 14; Due 1989: 10, 241-242; Tatum 1989: 42; Anderson 2001: 3; Miller 1914: xii; Cawkwell 1979b: 47; Flower 2017a: 2; Humble 2017: 417, 422. Cicero – Cic. *Fam.* 9.25; *Ad Q. Fr.* 1.1.23; *Tusc.* 2.26.62; *Brut.* 112; *Cato* 22.79-81; Tatum 1989: xiv, 9, 210; Anderson 2001: 2-3; Miller 1914: xii; Whidden 2007: 553; Stadter 2010: 379, 379 n20; Gray 2010b: 4; Marchant 1925: x, xx; Cawkwell 1979b: 47; Flower 2017a: 2; 2017b: 303; Humble 2017: 417, 422; Luraghi 2017: 99. Cato the Younger – Marchant 1925: xi; Miller 1914: xiii.

⁶⁶ The importance of a regal appearance and stature provides one possible example – Xen. *Cyr.* 8.1.40-41; Duris of Samos *FGrHist* 76 F 14; Plut. *Demetr.* 41; Ath. 12.535a-536a; Tuplin 2004b: 20; Farber 1979: 514; Wallace-Hadrill 1982: 33-34; Newell 1983: 890 n1.

⁶⁷ Arr. *Anab.* 2.7.8-9; Eunap. *VS* 1.453; Olbrycht 2010: 352; Hirsch 1985: 146; Anderson 2001: 1; Tatum 1989: xiv, 12, 238; McGroarty 2006: 107; O'Brien 1994: 51; Spence 1995: 72; Waterfield 2009b: 211; Prevas 2002: 225; Fox 2004a: 1; Grethlein 2012: 36-37; Whitby 2007: 59; Flower 2017b: 324; Hall 2017: 450.

An obvious starting point in determining the *Cyropaedia* as a potential “blueprint” for Philip’s military reforms is the date of its composition. The consensus of modern scholarship is that the text was a late piece but its exact dating is problematic. Xenophon was born perhaps *c.*429 and reported by Diogenes Laertius to have died in 360/59 – the time of Philip’s accession to the Macedonian throne.⁶⁸ Diogenes’ record is a clear fallacy but on the basis that *Cyropaedia* predated *Hellenica* (a work finalised *c.*357-355), common agreement is for a composition date of the late 360s/early 350s.⁶⁹ This being the case, *Cyropaedia*’s publication coincided with Philip’s rise to power – making it, at the very least, available for the king’s perusal.

If the timing is suggestive, what then of content? *Cyropaedia* is a work whose purpose and complexity is often under-appreciated. Certainly the text was not intended as an historical record – at least as it is understood today.⁷⁰ Modern commentators have seen *Cyropaedia* as fulfilling the criteria of many genres including a romantic biography of Cyrus the Great (580-529); a prototype romance-drama novel; an ethno-geographic record of Eastern cultures; a philosophical treatise intended to provide a moral exemplar on how individuals should live their lives; and most original of all, a warning against a Pan-Hellenic crusade targeting Persia.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Born – Miller 1914: vii; Cawkwell 1979a: 8; 1979b: 12; Dillery 1998: 3-4; Luraghi 2003: 7; Leshem 2016: 227; Johnstone 2010: 146 n42; Huss 2010: 276 n59; Lee 2017: 17; Flower 2012: 19; Waterfield 2009b: 37; Rhodes 2010c: 30. Death – Diog. Laert. 2.56; Lee 2017: 17.

⁶⁹ Fallacy – Anderson 2001: 192; Cawkwell 1979a: 15; Badian 2004: 33-34, 40; Dillery 1998: 6; Hutchinson 2000: 15; Waterfield 2009b: 37. *Hellenica* – Badian 2004: 38, 43, 45; Cawkwell 1979a: 17-18; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 260, 260 n2; Dillery 1998: 6. Date for *Cyropaedia* – Anderson 2001: 2, 152 n1; Hutchinson 2000: 201; Badian 2004: 48; Christesen 2006: 56; Tuplin 2013: 72; Gray 2010b: 7, 7 n32; Reichel 2010: 418; Flower 2012: 29; Lipka 2002: 9; Prevas 2002: 225.

⁷⁰ Due 1989: 19, 89; Tatum 1989: 4, 68; Christesen 2006: 50; Tuplin 2013: 69, 74; Miller 1914: viii, ix-x; Reichel 2010: 421; Newell 1983: 897; Nadon 1996: 364; Gray 2010b: 3; Lendon 2006: 82; Ambler 2001: 1, 3. For a contra view – Bowie 2017: 406; Flower 2017b: 302; Tamiolaki 2017: 189.

⁷¹ Romantic biography – Xen. *Cyr.* 1.1.6, 3.1, 17-18, 4.1-4, 8.7.1-5, 25-26; Christesen 2006: 47; Reichel 2010: 420; Due 1989: 14, 25, 50-51; Tatum 1989: 37; Miller 1914: viii; Nadon 2001: 27, 27 n4, 28-29; Johnstone 2010: 140; Sancisi-Weerdenburg 2010: 439; Whidden 2007: 539; Waterfield 2004: 81. Prototype

In truth, *Cyropaedia* was all of those things, none of which were likely to have been of any concern to Philip. Of much greater interest, however, was the pragmatic advice proffered, for the work was intended (amongst other purposes) as a political didactic.⁷² The treatise, for instance, demonstrated how personal and political ambitions might be achieved through terror and the manipulation of others.⁷³ The use of fear to ensure obedience, for example, is revealed in the dialogue between Cyrus and Tigranes, son of an Armenian king on trial for treason. Tigranes argues that, if spared, his father's gratitude would render him more valuable to Cyrus and that dread of reprisal would guarantee his future loyalty – and so it transpired.⁷⁴ Manipulation of others is well demonstrated by Cyrus in his relationship with Panthea and her husband Abradatas, king of Susa. Captured by the Persians, Panthea turned to Cyrus for protection against the unwanted affections of Araspas, to whose care she had been entrusted. Cyrus intervened but engineered Panthea's gratitude so that she persuaded her husband to defect. Now a loyal subject, Abradatas was eventually killed fighting in the Persian front line against his former countrymen. Having outlived her usefulness, Cyrus then precipitated the suicide of the grief-stricken Panthea.⁷⁵

novel – Xen. *Cyr.* 4.6.11, 5.1.2-18, 6.1.33-44, 3.14-20, 35-36, 4.2-11, 7.1.29-32, 3.2-16, 4.1; Gray 2010b: 3; Bowie 2017: 406; Stadter 2010: 368-369, 388-390, 392; Christesen 2006: 47; Hutchinson 2000: 37; Whidden 2007: 539; Nadon 2001: 24; Due 1989: 26, 31, 91; Sancisi-Weerdenburg 2010: 439; Miller 1914: viii; Lendon 2006: 82; Reichel 2010: 420, 423, 425-426, 438; Tatum 1989: xiv; Pease 1934: 439. Ethnographical record – Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.16, 3.2, 4, 4.27, 5.2.17, 8.1.40-42, 8.16-19; Due 1989: 35-36; Reichel 2010: 420; Stadter 2010: 369; Hirsch 1985: 89-90; Azoulay 2004b: 150. Moral exemplar – Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.3, 6-8, 3.10-11, 6.6, 2.2.23-24, 8.3.40-44, 49-50, 8.3-7; Sancisi-Weerdenburg 2010: 439; Stadter 2010: 375, 379. Warning – Carlier 2010: 366; Rood 2004: 316.

⁷² Xen. *Cyr.* 1.1.1-3, 8.8.2; Nadon 2001: 26, 140-142, 152; Christesen 2006: 47; Due 1989: 47; Miller 1914: xi; Gray 2010b: 3; Whidden 2007: 539-540; Lendon 2006: 82; Farber 1979: 498; Field 2012: 736; Newell 1983: 889-890; Weathers 1954: 317; Hirsch 1985: 64-65, 67; Johnson 2005: 203, 205.

⁷³ Ambitions – Xen. *Cyr.* 1.1.6, 4.6, 12-13, 2.2.19-21, 4.5.39, 6.8-10, 8.1.40; Machiavelli 2003: 2.13; 2008: 16; Nadon 1996: 362, 367; 2001: 7, 17; Newell 1983: 889-890; Christesen 2006: 55; Whidden 2007: 547; Tatum 1989: 21, 31, 34, 37, 62, 68, 71, 233; Farber 1979: 498, 501; Sage 1994: 165.

⁷⁴ Xen. *Cyr.* 3.1.21-25; Tatum 1989: 135-136, 141-142; Nadon 2001: 78-80; Higgins 1977: 48-49; Field 2012: 731; Newell 1983: 891, 898-899; Gera 1993: 95-96; Reisert 2009: 29.

⁷⁵ Xen. *Cyr.* 6.1.45-47, 3.35-36, 4.6-9, 7.1.29-32, 3.10; Ambler 2001: 14; Tatum 1989: 71, 95-96; Whidden 2007: 551-552; Stadter 2010: 391; Baragwanath 2010: 44, 46, 50, 55-56; Carlier 2010: 343 n38; Nadon 2001: 153-154.

It has been seen that Philip was not above the use of terror to achieve political ambitions. Rivals, including the king's own brothers, were eliminated to consolidate his position and the *poleis* of Olynthus (348) and Thebes (338) razed ruthlessly, and their populations enslaved, in an abject lesson on the folly of defiance. Similarly, Philip was an expert in manipulation. For example, in 357 when besieging Amphipolis, the Macedonian king allayed Athenian fears and potential intervention by promising that in exchange for a free hand against Pydna, the Edonian *polis* would be returned to Athens. Both cities were captured but Philip reneged on the deal – if ever he had any intention of honouring it.⁷⁶

In addition to being a political commentary, Xenophon also composed the *Cyropaedia* as a military treatise – although it may well be true that the intended recipient of Xenophon's didactic was Sparta, and its need to reform.⁷⁷ It is undoubtedly the case that some of *Cyropaedia's* content was generic and representative of standard military practice by the mid fourth century. For example, the importance of hunting as a means by which to acquire martial skills was widely acknowledged, as was the need for physical endurance.⁷⁸ There was, however, much about military theory articulated in *Cyropaedia* that might well be considered innovative. The concept of an elite military meritocracy (“peers” or *entimoi*) whose position of power and privilege was dependent on the *largesse* of the monarch, for

⁷⁶ Dem. 7.27; 23.116; Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 30a; Diod. Sic. 16.4.1, 8.2-3; Polyae. 4.2.17; Worthington 2013: 62-63, 113; 2014: 30, 42; Green 1991: 29; Müller 2010b: 168, 171; Curteis 1890: 37-39; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 238, 240; King 2018: 74; Rhodes 1986: 12; Tod 1950: 150-151, 172; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 244.

⁷⁷ Military treatise – Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.26-36, 41-43; Machiavelli 2003: 2.12; Anderson 1970: 170; 2001: 3; Stadter 2010: 393; Lendon 2006: 82; Newell 1983: 896, 898; Azoulay 2004b: 159; Tuplin 2013: 81; Nadon 1996: 364; Hirsch 1985: 67, 87; Hutchinson 2000: 180; Christesen 2006: 47, 55; Due 1989: 26; Tatum 1989: 86-87; Pease 1934: 436, 439; Millett 2013: 65; Rusch 2011: 211; Sekunda 2013: 207; 2014b: 52; Gaebel 2002: 304-306. Sparta the intended target – Christesen 2006: 47; Johnson 2005: 183, 183 n12, 194 n23; Anderson 1970: 165-166; Tamiolaki 2017: 180, 180 n31; Hutchinson 2000: 229-230.

⁷⁸ Hunting – Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.10, 4.5, 7-8, 6.28, 8.1.34; Machiavelli 2003: 3.39; Nadon 2001: 41, 130, 172-173; Azoulay 2004b: 165; Hutchinson 2000: 182; Due 1989: 106-107; Johnstone 2010: 149. Physical endurance – Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.12, 6.17, 2.1.20, 8.1.36-38, 6.12; Nadon 2001: 58; Due 1989: 108-109; Hutchinson 2000: 190-191; Whidden 2007: 545.

instance, was a novel one within the Greek *polis* system.⁷⁹ Xenophon explored the benefit of such an innovation through the career of Pheraulus, a commoner who, by exceptional ability and loyalty to Cyrus, received great honours for his fidelity.⁸⁰

Admittedly Cyrus' *entimoi* (at least initially) were elite infantry troops, but the Persian soon converted them into a cavalry *corps* with whom the Macedonian *hetairoi* bore more than a passing resemblance. It will be remembered that under Philip, the Companion Cavalry comprised an elite meritocracy of eight hundred who, like Parmenion (and Cyrus' Pheraulus), owed their positions of wealth and power to the king's favour. Of particular interest to *hetairoi* was land and in return for their fealty, Philip was careful to reward his Companions with holdings newly acquired by conquest. The reallocation of Olynthian territory that occurred following the destruction of the *polis* in 348 was but one example.

Also implicit within the instructions of the *Cyropaedia* was the need for receptiveness to military innovation, as what had always been so, was not necessary perfect.⁸¹ Foremost amongst Xenophon's suggestions were the benefits associated with arming and retraining (at state expense) infantry militia.⁸² Self-evidently this would lead to an increase in the size of the army but also, Xenophon reasoned, raise the infantry's status to that of an elite entity, thereby improving morale and so combat effectiveness.⁸³ Although it was clear Xenophon envisaged a hoplite model, he nevertheless advocated the importance

⁷⁹ Xen. *Cyr.* 1.5.9, 6.18, 2.1.3, 13, 22-24, 2.21, 3.4, 15-16, 3.3.6, 4.1.3, 6.2.6, 7.5.35-36, 85, 8.1.39, 2.2, 7, 7.7; Nadon 2001: 39, 75-76, 108; Due 1989: 75, 209-210, 214; Tatum 1989: 206; Azoulay 2004b: 161-162; Carlier 2010: 342, 347, 352-353; Tuplin 2013: 76; Ambler 2001: 5-6, 15; Johnson 2005: 187; Baragwanath 2010: 63; Stadter 2010: 376; Hirsch 1985: 101.

⁸⁰ Xen. *Cyr.* 2.3.7-15; 8.3.2, 5-8, 36-38, 46-50; Ambler 2001: 5; Tatum 1989: 95, 204-205, 207-208; Nadon 1996: 365; 2001: 71-72, 76, 150; Due 1989: 73-74; Field 2012: 730.

⁸¹ Xen. *Cyr.* 1.5.8-11, 6.26-34, 3.3.31-32, 46-47, 7.5.70; Machiavelli 2008: 24; Nadon 1996: 365-366; 2001: 55-56; Hutchinson 2000: 203; Due 1989: 94, 181; Tatum 1989: 122-123.

⁸² Xen. *Cyr.* 2.1.7-9, 15-18; Johnson 2005: 183; Nadon 1996: 366; 2001: 61-62; Tatum 1989: 119; Christesen 2006: 49, 63.

⁸³ Xen. *Cyr.* 2.1.11-13, 19; Johnson 2005: 187; Nadon 2001: 63-64.

of training this new infantry body in advanced tactical manoeuvres – such as the feigned retreat.⁸⁴

Just as Xenophon's Cyrus armed and retrained his infantry, so did the Macedonian king. Equipped with a state-supplied *sarissa*, *pelte* and possibly a leather corselet, Philip transformed a hitherto part-time militia of questionable military value into phalangites. Drilled to a high level of expertise and manoeuvre (including the feigned retreat), the newly constituted heavy infantry derived status from their title of *pezhetairoi*, an appellation deliberately intended to draw favourable comparisons with the elite *hetairoi*. Morale and standing of the Foot Companions was enhanced by Philip's preference to fight on foot with his new division.

Further amongst Xenophon's many observations was the importance of logistics.⁸⁵ In the pages of *Cyropaedia*, Cambyses lectured Cyrus on the significance of maintaining independent control of an army's supplies. Father counsels son that soldiers without rations are prone to revolt and so the procurement of provisions should be a priority.⁸⁶ Cyrus remembered the advice when, despite a comprehensive victory over the Assyrian army, his first concern was to attend to his commissariat.⁸⁷ A similar sentiment was expressed when planning for the advance into India. Cyrus cautioned his *entimoi* that troops would need to carry enough food for fifteen days and that as part of their preparation, they accustomed themselves to drinking water rather than wine.⁸⁸

⁸⁴ Hoplite model – Xen. *Cyr.* 2.1.16, 3.17-18, 8.5.10-12; Nadon 1996: 366; 2001: 65, 74; Hutchinson 2000: 197, 211; Christesen 2006: 47; Johnson 2005: 182. Manoeuvres – Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.37, 43, 2.1.20, 3.21-23, 4.2-3, 3.2.8-9, 7.5.3-6, 8.5.15; Hutchinson 2000: 203.

⁸⁵ Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.9-11, 2.2.3-4, 4.2.34, 6.2.25-39; Due 1989: 94; Nadon 2001: 93; Anderson 2001: 131; Hutchinson 2000: 190; Stadter 2010: 393; Pease 1934: 437-438; Carlier 2010: 341-342.

⁸⁶ Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.9-11; Due 1989: 94-95; Nadon 2001: 67; Gera 1993: 60-61; Pritchett 1971: 30; Seretaki & Tamiolaki 2018: 235.

⁸⁷ Xen. *Cyr.* 4.2.34-39; Due 1989: 96; Nadon 2001: 93.

⁸⁸ Xen. *Cyr.* 6.2.25-29; Pease 1934: 437-438; Stadter 2010: 393; Hutchinson 2000: 194.

Philip appears to have emulated Cambyses' advice when he had his men transport their own equipment whilst on campaign.⁸⁹ Reduced in both the number of wagons and non-combatants, Philip's armies became more mobile and able to exploit the element of surprise to their own advantage. Like Cyrus, the Macedonian king also made his troops responsible for the transportation of their own basic rations, with each soldier required to carry enough flour to last thirty days.⁹⁰ Streamlining the baggage train in this manner allowed Philip to march his army from Pelion to Thebes – a four-hundred kilometre journey he completed in thirteen days.

The *Cyropaedia* also made clear the benefits that could be derived from siege engines – including the capture of heavily fortified towns and, interestingly, as platforms from which missile support could be afforded to advancing troops. Fitted with galleries and battlements, each of Cyrus' towers carried twenty men who inflicted significant casualties on the enemy.⁹¹ Similar towers, Xenophon noted, were deployed prior to the Persian's attack on Sardis, although the move was a ruse to deflect attention from a night assault on the citadel.⁹² Reference is also made to the construction of battering rams and other siege engines – the task's importance reflected by the appointment of the skilled Adusius to oversee operations.⁹³

Xenophon's advice on siege-craft was mirrored in Philip's own reforms and the attention he afforded to siege equipment. Philip, for example, signified clearly he

⁸⁹ Frontin. 4.1.6; Polyæn. 4.2.10; Gabriel 2010: 84; Pritchett 1971: 50; 1974: 229; Parke 1933: 158; Sekunda 2010: 449; 2016: 163; Carney 1996: 25; Hammond 1980c: 56-57.

⁹⁰ Frontin. 4.1.6; Pritchett 1971: 50; 1974: 229; Gabriel 2010: 86-87; Karunanithy 2013: 31, 180; Engels 1980: 21 n3; Sekunda 2010: 464-465; 2016: 163; Hammond 1983a: 27; Carney 1996: 25; Parke 1933: 158; Hanson 2005: 38-39; McQueen 1995a: 66.

⁹¹ Siege engines – Xen. *Cyr.* 6.1.20-22, 53-55; Hutchinson 2000: 210; Anderson 1970: 171.

⁹² Xen. *Cyr.* 7.2.2-3; Hutchinson 2000: 206.

⁹³ Xen. *Cyr.* 7.4.2.

appreciated the advantages inherent in prosecuting sieges efficiently with the establishment of an engineering *corps* in Pella (c.350) under Polyeidus. There the Thessalian oversaw the design of the king's most potent siege equipment including ram-tortoises, *helepoleis*, and *oxybelai*. Philip used towers manned with missile troops in the assaults on Perinthus and Byzantium (340), although the attacks were unsuccessful on both occasions. The worth of *helepoleis* and other engines can, however, be evidenced in Philip's prodigious success in actions against numerous other *poleis*.

Cyropaedia also recognised the potentially decisive role inherent within cavalry.⁹⁴ The treatise, for example, intimated that prospects of defeating an opponent's phalanx were enhanced if both horsemen and infantry were deployed jointly.⁹⁵ This is demonstrated most clearly in the account of the fictitious Battle of Thymbrara. Cyrus' army was arrayed with heavy infantry in the centre, behind which were positioned *psiloi*. Cavalry was stationed on each wing with a further division hidden in the rear. Scythed chariots were drawn up in front of the phalanx and on the flanks. Outnumbered and outflanked by the forces of Croesus, Cyrus nevertheless secured victory by engaging the enemy with his heavy infantry and then, after triumphing over the Lydian cavalry, using his own horsemen to roll up Croesus' line.⁹⁶ The *Cyropaedia* also advocated cavalry be employed aggressively in the pursuit of a defeated enemy in order to punctuate victory, as indeed was the case in Cyrus' success over the Assyrians.⁹⁷

⁹⁴ Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.10, 4.1.11, 19, 2.23-24, 28, 31; 7.1.19-20; Hutchinson 2000: 186, 226; Nadon 2001: 58, 91, 101; Due 1989: 58, 181; Christesen 2006: 49; Tatum 1989: 123-124; Johnson 2005: 189.

⁹⁵ Combined arms force – Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.10, 7.1.19-20; Hutchinson 2000: 226; Nadon 2001: 58, 101; Due 1989: 181.

⁹⁶ Xen. *Cyr.* 6.3.21-26, 31, 34, 7.1.4, 24-27, 32-37; Anderson 1970: 179, 189, 400-401; Johnson 2005: 191-192; Gaebel 2002: 306-307; Konijnendijk 2014: 175-176.

⁹⁷ Xen. *Cyr.* 4.1.11, 19, 2.23-24, 31; Nadon 2001: 91; Due 1989: 58; Hutchinson 2000: 186; Christesen 2006: 49; Tatum 1989: 123-124; Johnson 2005: 189.

Xenophon's belief that cavalry played a decisive role on the battlefield – especially if deployed by a wise commander and in conjunction with heavy infantry – was also evidenced in the actions of Philip. *Pezhetairoi* and *hetairoi*, for example, operated together in the defeat of Bardylis (358), but Chaeronea (338) was Philip's most accomplished victory. In both cases, the battles' turning point occurred when Macedonian cavalry succeeded in effecting a breach in the enemy phalanx. Like Cyrus, Philip also on occasion employed the extended pursuit. Victories over Bardylis and at Crocus Field (352) were both emphasised by the Macedonian cavalry who rode down fleeing enemies in order to maximise casualties.

The benefits of military reform are also explored in the *Anabasis*, another of Xenophon's didactics. In part an autobiography, the backdrop of which is a failed attempt by the Achaemenid prince Cyrus to usurp the crown of his brother Artaxerxes, the narrative recounts the adventures of a Greek mercenary army as it fought its way home from the heart of the Persian empire. Like the *Cyropaedia*, the *Anabasis* was regarded highly in antiquity, counting amongst its readers Alexander III (the Great), Tacitus and Arrian of Nicomedia.⁹⁸ Whilst its exact date of composition has proved difficult to determine, the parameters suggested by modern academics indicate that, like Xenophon's other treatises, the *Anabasis* was available for Philip to have read if he was so inclined.⁹⁹

Similar also to the *Cyropaedia*, the *Anabasis* was composed with a variety of purposes in mind. It was, in part, an *apologia* and so some scholars have seen the work as either an effort by Xenophon to rescue his achievements from oversight, or to counter an

⁹⁸ Alexander III – Eunap. *VS* 1.453; Hall 2017: 450; Flower 2012: 173. Tacitus – Luraghi 2017: 99. Arrian – Arr. *Cyneg.* 1.4; Phot. 58; Luraghi 2017: 99; Bosworth 1988b: 104-105; Smith 1853a: 351; Bowie 2017: 409-410, 414; Stadter 1967: 155-156.

⁹⁹ *Anabasis* composed c.380s-360s – Cawkwell 1979a: 11, 15; 1979b: 16; 2004: 47; Hirsch 1985: 15; Dillery 1995: 59, 94; 1998: 9; Flower 2012: 29; Lee 2017: 33.

earlier account by Sophocles in which he was accorded a minor role.¹⁰⁰ Xenophon features prominently in his own chronicle and so in some respects the *Anabasis* does resemble a memoir of the writer's early military career, and from Tissaphernes' seizure of the Greek generals in particular.¹⁰¹ The apologetic tone of the text extends itself in other ways. It can, for example, be seen as a riposte to derogatory remarks such as those made by Isocrates, who belittled the Cyreans' achievements and motives.¹⁰² It might also be regarded, in part, as an attempt by Xenophon to clear himself of a demagoguery charge, an especially serious allegation as far as the Spartans were concerned.¹⁰³

Another purpose ascribed to the *Anabasis* was as a vehicle for Xenophon to issue political statements. One of these is the criticism of Athens for what was, in his eyes, wrongful banishment.¹⁰⁴ The circumstances surrounding Xenophon's exile are murky but there is strong reason to believe that he was expelled, just as Socrates had foretold, for his role in Cyrus' rebellion.¹⁰⁵ In his narrative, Xenophon is at great pains to point out that he – along with the Greeks in general – was ignorant of the true purpose behind the expedition, in this way chiding the Athenians for their injustice.¹⁰⁶ Another item of political agenda that can be read into the *Anabasis* is that of Panhellenism. At the time he was writing his chronicle, Xenophon was developing Panhellenist sentiments. It

¹⁰⁰ *Apologia* – Dillery 1995: 64; 1998: 9; Ferrario 2017: 74; Flower 2012: 31, 117. Rescue from oversight – Parker 2004: 135; Anderson 2001: 83. Rebut minor role – Dillery 1998: 7-8; Cawkwell 1979b: 18-19; Flower 2012: 32; Lee 2017: 28, 33.

¹⁰¹ Cawkwell 1979b: 18; Flower 2012: 12; 2017: 2; Rood 2017: 446.

¹⁰² Isoc. *Dis.* 4.145-148; Cawkwell 1979b: 18; Ferrario 2017: 81; Flower 2012: 31-32, 171; Dillery 1995: 63; Trundle 2004: 60-61.

¹⁰³ Xen. *An.* 7.6.4-5; Cawkwell 1979b: 18; Tuplin 2017: 349.

¹⁰⁴ Allusions to banishment – Xen *An.* 5.3.7, 7.7.57; Erbse 2010: 487; Ferrario 2017: 78; Gray 2010b: 13; Bradley 2010: 543-544.

¹⁰⁵ Xen. *An.* 3.1.5; Paus. 5.6.5; Diog. Laert. 2.58; Erbse 2010: 486; Flower 2012: 21, 23; Gray 2010b: 13; Bradley 2010: 544; Higgins 1977: 22.

¹⁰⁶ Xen. *An.* 1.1.5-11, 2.1, 3.1-6, 20-21, 3.1.10; Erbse 2010: 487, 489, 492; Cawkwell 1979b: 18.

would be wrong to regard the *Anabasis* wholly in this light but traces are present.¹⁰⁷ One very important aspect of the concept, for example, was the seizure of Persian land for the relocation of renegade mercenaries and the Greek poor.¹⁰⁸ On a number of occasions Xenophon showed himself to be receptive to the idea but he also at one point expressed reservations, in particular the risk that Greeks will be seduced by the luxuries of the East and forget their own identity.¹⁰⁹

Whatever the Athenian's true reasons were for composing the *Anabasis*, it was likely that Philip maintained very little interest in any of them – beyond those that had direct bearing on his own situation. One of these must have been how it was that the Cyreans, leaderless and in the heart of enemy territory, facing hostile peoples, terrain and climatic conditions, survived largely intact an epic fifteen-month journey that took them first north through Armenia to Trapezus, on to the Black Sea, and then west to the relative safety of Chrysopolis on the Bosphorus.¹¹⁰

A careful analysis reveals that among many interconnected factors, it was the combined arms nature of the army that enabled the Ten Thousand, as they became known conventionally, to remain a functional and formidable fighting entity in a wide variety of circumstances, against an equally diverse succession of opponents.¹¹¹ Far from being a uniform body, Cyrus' Greeks were made up of various contingents, including hoplites – of

¹⁰⁷ Xen. *An.* 1.5.9, 7.3-4, 3.1.21, 2.24-26; Cawkwell 2004: 67; Ferrario 2017: 81; Dillery 1995: 60-61, 63; Flower 2012: 171.

¹⁰⁸ Xen. *An.* 3.2.25-26; Isoc. *Dis.* 5.118-122; Cawkwell 1979b: 23; Dillery 1995: 62, 94; 1998: 27-28; Flower 1994: 84; 2012: 181, 183-184.

¹⁰⁹ Favourable view – Xen. *An.* 3.1.21, 2.23-24, 5.6.15-16, 6.4.3-6; Dillery 1995: 62; Marincola 2017: 116; Ma 2004: 339. Reservations – Xen. *An.* 3.2.24-25; Dillery 1995: 62; Flower 2012: 182; Marincola 2017: 116; Ma 2004: 339-340.

¹¹⁰ Length of journey – Lee 2007: 3; 2010b: 493; Fox 2004a: 21; Cawkwell 1979b: 11.

¹¹¹ Term “Ten Thousand” – Flower 2012: 14; Trundle 2004: 45; 2013: 333; Bonner 1910: 97, 99; Prevas 2002: 12; Nussbaum 1967: 2; Gray 2010b: 12, 14; Erbse 2010: 477, 482; Ma 2004: 505, 509; Bradley 2010: 521, 526; Griffith 1935: 5; Parke 1933: 23; English 2012: 54; Yalichev 1997: 122.

which there were 10,400 just prior to Cunaxa.¹¹² Certainly the heavy infantrymen enjoyed notable successes against their opponents that confirmed their value to the army as a whole. In the set piece battle at Cunaxa, for example, Artaxerxes' Persians twice broke and fled rather than engage with their hoplite opponents, as was also the case with native levies in Carduchia, Armenia and Bithynia.¹¹³

For many Greeks, Xenophon's account of hoplite success against light infantry would have merely confirmed existing military doctrine. Yet what the experience of the Ten Thousand revealed to a more discerning analyst (including in all probability – as will be demonstrated – Philip II), was that although important as they were to the Cyrean army, an exclusively hoplite force possessed weaknesses. Foremost amongst these was its vulnerability when out of formation, such as might occur on broken ground or when individual troops were engaged in plundering or foraging.¹¹⁴ It was such a circumstance, for example, that enabled Pharnabazus' cavalry to slaughter five hundred hoplites of Neon's scattered army who were engaged in pillaging local villages.¹¹⁵ Nor was the phalanx completely impervious to attack. Because the hoplite carried his shield on the left, the formation's right flank was notoriously exposed, and so vulnerable. Missile troops such as

¹¹² Xen. *An.* 1.7.10; Gaebel 2002: 110, 110 n1; Sekunda 2014a: 128; Trundle 2004: 6; Hutchinson 2000: 43; Anderson 2001: 99; Parke 1933: 41; Waterfield 2009b: 3; Prevas 2002: 89; Bonner 1910: 97 n1; Rahe 1980: 79, 81-82; Roy 1967: 302; Wylie 1992: 123.

¹¹³ Artaxerxes – Xen. *An.* 1.8.17-19, 10.10-11; Whitby 2004: 225; Waterfield 2009b: 16, 19; Prevas 2002: 95, 99; Marsh 2007: 35. Carduchi – Xen. *An.* 4.2.7-8; Prevas 2002: 138; Waterfield 2009b: 138; Best 1969: 63; Anderson 1970: 80. Armenia – Xen. *An.* 4.3.21; Waterfield 2009b: 140. Bithynia – Xen. *An.* 6.5.27-28; Prevas 2002: 181; Yalichev 1997: 143; Best 1969: 69.

¹¹⁴ Xen. *An.* 6.3.4-5; Aristot. *Pol.* 1297b12; Gaebel 2002: 115; Thorne 2001: 247-248; Hutchinson 2000: 88; Rahe 1980: 84-85; Schwartz 2009: 160; Lee 2007: 39, 69; 2013: 154-155; Rey 2010: 40, 43; Burliga 2014: 76; Holladay 1982: 94; English 2012: 71; Prevas 2002: 172; Wylie 1992: 119-120.

¹¹⁵ Xen. *An.* 6.4.24; Yalichev 1997: 143; Hutchinson 2000: 89; Best 1969: 69; Lee 2007: 39; Waterfield 2004: 170; Prevas 2002: 178-179; Roy 1967: 319; 2004: 272; Parker 2004: 135, 145; Whitby 2004: 235; Dillery 1995: 89.

toxotai and *sphendonetai*, if allowed to operate at close range, could also inflict serious damage – as could *akontistai*.¹¹⁶

Against these threats the phalanx required auxiliary troops if it was to avoid destruction and it was their presence within the Cyrean army that, as much as the hoplite core, contributed to its survival. Numbering around 2,500 at Cunaxa, one such group was the *peltastai*.¹¹⁷ Although under the right set of circumstances peltasts could be very effective troops in their own right and were to later, on occasion, achieve significant victories over heavily armoured opponents including hoplites, they lacked the collective weight to be successful regularly against heavy troops in set piece encounters.¹¹⁸ Instead, the usual role of the *peltastes* was to protect the phalanx's flanks against cavalry, and in this role they acquitted themselves well at Cunaxa, driving off Tissaphernes' charge with volleys of javelins.¹¹⁹

A further deployment for which peltasts' mobility made them suited ideally – as evidenced by the Cyreans' success over Orontas at Centrites River – was in the pursuit of defeated opponents.¹²⁰ Perhaps most importantly for the Ten Thousand, however, was that the speed and relative agility of *peltastai* enabled the Greeks to outmanoeuvre their opponents and gain important tactical advantages. It was in this way, for example, that when faced with entrapment and destruction on the Mesopotamian plains, Cyrean peltasts

¹¹⁶ Xen. *An.* 3.3.7-11; 6.3.4-9; Best 1969: 68-69; Whitby 2004: 239; Rahe 1980: 83; Pritchett 1991: 9; Anderson 1970: 115; Prevas 2002: 123-124; Waterfield 2009b: 123.

¹¹⁷ Xen. *An.* 1.2.9, 5.4.25, 7.10; Sekunda 2014a: 128; Yalichev 1997: 124; Hutchinson 2000: 43; Anderson 2001: 99; Best 1969: 46; Parke 1933: 41; Lee 2007: 65; Waterfield 2009b: 3; Prevas 2002: 89; Roy 1967: 302; 2004: 284; Wylie 1992: 123.

¹¹⁸ Perhaps the best example of peltast effectiveness occurred at Lechaeum when Iphicrates defeated a *mora* of Spartan hoplites, inflicting a 40% casualty rate – Thesis: 216.

¹¹⁹ Xen. *An.* 1.8.4-5, 10.7-8; Rahe 1980: 83; Waterfield 2009b: 16; Whitby 2004: 226; Wylie 1992: 126; Hewitt 1919: 248-249; Rees 2016: 222; Delbrück 1975: 154.

¹²⁰ Xen. *An.* 4.3.22; Best 1969: 62; Waterfield 2009b: 136; Hutchinson 2000: 87.

– in a deadly race with Tissaphernes’ troops – stole the high ground, thus allowing the Ten Thousand to escape into Carduchia.¹²¹ *Peltastai* also made a number of other significant contributions to the survival of the Greeks. It was the peltasts, for example, that thwarted an ambush attempt by Tiribazus, and their speed that routed a combined force of Chalybians, Taochians and Phasians which was blocking a mountain pass.¹²² *Peltastai* were also instrumental in the defeat of the Colchians, their swiftness and agility again enabling them to take advantage of a division in the enemy’s ranks.¹²³

Other *psiloi* that proved themselves of great value to the Cyrean army were long-range missile troops. Included in the Ten Thousand was a small force of some two hundred Cretan *toxotai*, the expert archers of antiquity.¹²⁴ Against the Persians, however, Cretan bowmen possessed a weapon of inferior range, thus limiting their effectiveness.¹²⁵ As a result – and on Xenophon’s proposal – a squad of two hundred Rhodian *sphendonetai* was organised and equipped.¹²⁶ In combination with the *toxotai*, the slingers (whose range was twice that of the Persian archers) not only provided important protection against cavalry but also missile troops, something the hoplites and peltasts had been unable to do.¹²⁷

¹²¹ Xen. *An.* 3.4.43-49; Yalichev 1997: 138-139; Hutchinson 2000: 75-76; Best 1969: 60-61; Waterfield 2009b: 124; Prevas 2002: 127-128; Flower 2012: 132.

¹²² Tiribazus – Xen. *An.* 4.4.18-21; Hutchinson 2000: 77-78; Best 1969: 63; Waterfield 2009b: 140. Chalybians *et al.*, – Xen. *An.* 4.6.22-27; Hutchinson 2000: 86-87; Best 1969: 63-64; Waterfield 2009b: 143; Prevas 2002: 143-144; Lee 2007: 34; Grethlein 2012: 31.

¹²³ Xen. *An.* 4.8.16-19; Delbrück 1975: 150-151; Hutchinson 2000: 85-86; Best 1969: 64; Whitby 2004: 238; Anderson 1970: 108-109; Ray 2012: 11-12.

¹²⁴ Xen. *An.* 1.2.9; McLeod 1965: 13; Pritchett 1991: 54; Trundle 2004: 118; Hutchinson 2000: 42-43; Lee 2004: 314; 2007: 95; Whitby 2004: 217; Roy 1967: 299, 307; 2004: 266; Radin 1911: 58.

¹²⁵ Xen. *An.* 3.3.7, 15; Yalichev 1997: 137; Prevas 2002: 124; Echols 1950: 228. Hutchinson 2000: 75 attributes the greater range of the Persian archers to the use of longer arrows.

¹²⁶ Xen. *An.* 3.4.16-18; Foss 1975: 26; Trundle 2004: 118; Hutchinson 2000: 74; Best 1969: 59; Lee 2004: 314; 2007: 55; Waterfield 2009b: 123; Whitby 2004: 217-218; Anderson 1970: 115; Erbse 2010: 491; Roy 1967: 290.

¹²⁷ Range – Xen. *An.* 3.3.16-17; Echols 1950: 227-228; Yalichev 1997: 138; Waterfield 2009b: 123; Rahe 1980: 83; Pritchett 1991: 9; Ashley 1998: 48; Hyland 2003: 133.

A final contingent that contributed to the Cyreans' survival was the cavalry squadron. Hastily cobbled together and on captured mounts, the cavalry was created in response to the mauling the Greeks were receiving from Tissaphernes' light troops.¹²⁸ Initially led by Lycius, it was later commanded by Timasion.¹²⁹ Although numbering only fifty, the division nevertheless played an important role in the harassment of skirmishers, pursuit of routed opponents, and reconnaissance of enemy territory.¹³⁰

What the Ten Thousand represented, therefore, was a combined arms force in which each division contributed to the survival of the army as a whole. Sometimes, as has been seen, it was an individual unit that proved the difference but there were also a number of occasions when it was a combination of the divisions' strengths that enabled the Greeks to defeat their opponents.¹³¹ In avoiding destruction, the Cyreans provided an insight into the future of warfare for anyone perceptive (or interested) enough to appreciate it. What the *Anabasis* foreshadowed was the demise of battles waged by talented and enthusiastic hoplite amateurs. Beckoning in their stead were combined arms forces of professional, well-trained troops capable of fighting – and defeating – a wide range of opponents in any theatre of operations.

¹²⁸ Xenophon – Xen. *An.* 3.3.16-19; Yalichev 1997: 137-138; Hutchinson 2000: 74; Best 1969: 59; Waterfield 2009b: 123; Whitby 2004: 217; Erbse 2010: 491; Prevas 2002: 124.

¹²⁹ Lycius – Xen. *An.* 3.3.20; Best 1969: 59; Waterfield 2009b: 123; Fox 2004a: 11; Radin 1911: 56; Roy 1967: 305; Flower 2012: 88. Timasion – Xen. *An.* 6.3.22, 5.28; Roy 1967: 292; Lee 2007: 58; Prevas 2002: 173; Flower 2012: 36.

¹³⁰ Numbers – Xen. *An.* 3.3.20; Lee 2004: 314; 2007: 55; Waterfield 2009b: 123; Prevas 2002: 124; Anderson 1970: 115. Skirmishers – Xen. *An.* 3.3.16; Waterfield 2009b: 51; Hutchinson 2000: 73. Pursuit – Xen. *An.* 3.3.19, 4.5, 6.5.28; Gaebel 2002: 114; Hutchinson 2000: 73; Best 1969: 59, 62, 69; Prevas 2002: 181. Reconnaissance – Xen. *An.* 6.3.10, 14.

¹³¹ Mithradates – Xen. *An.* 3.4.4-5; Whitby 2004: 231; Worley 1994: 127; Prevas 2002: 124; Anderson 1970: 116-117; Hutchinson 2000: 74-75; Waterfield 2009b: 123; Yalichev 1997: 138; Gaebel 2002: 114. Drilae – Xen. *An.* 5.2.11-15; Best 1969: 65-66; Prevas 2002: 153-155; Whitby 2004: 239. Mossynoecians – Xen. *An.* 5.4.22-26; Best 1969: 66-67; Prevas 2002: 157-158; Whitby 2004: 239; Anderson 1964: 177; 1970: 138. Bithynians & Spithridates – Xen. *An.* 6.5.25-31; Prevas 2002: 180-181; Best 1969: 69.

As will be discussed more fully in Section II that follows, Xenophon's lesson was well-learned by Philip II. In the same way that hoplite heavy-infantrymen were the foundation of the Cyrean army, so *pezhetairoi* under Philip became the cornerstone of Macedonia's infantry divisions. *Hypaspistai* and *asthetairoi*, equipped differently to *pezhetairoi*, fulfilled specialist operations unsuited to a *sarissa-wielding* phalangite. Macedonian infantry was complemented by an improved *hetairoi* which, armed with *xyston* and fighting in wedge formation, was able to breach successfully hoplite phalanxes, even if intact. *Prodromoi* and *sarissophoroi* fulfilled auxiliary roles as scouts and skirmishers, much the same duties performed by the small – but effective – cavalry contingent of the Ten Thousand. Just as *psiloi* were integral to the survival of the Cyreans, so too did they perform important functions in Philip's armies. *Peltastai*, *toxotai* and *sphendonetai* all featured in the prosecution of sieges and, as skirmishers, secured the Macedonian flanks in set piece battles. Although the *Anabasis*' message about the effectiveness of a combined arms force was recognised by some of the great military minds of the mid-fourth century, it remained one not embraced fully until done so by Philip, who at Chaeronea (338), demonstrated its efficacy when his army of *pezhetairoi*, *hypaspistai*, *hetairoi*, *psiloi* and (probably) Thessalian light cavalry proved too strong for their largely hoplite opponents.

Another subject of considerable interest to Xenophon was that of leadership and the art of command. These areas were examined consistently in many of the Athenian's works but found their best expression in the *Cyropaedia* and *Anabasis*, which provided readers with models for future and present leaders to emulate.¹³² Of greatest importance, according

¹³² Xen. *Cyr.* 1.1.3, 6, 3.1, 17-18, 6.7-8, 21-24, 4.2.38-45, 5.1.24-28, 3.46-50, 8.2.15-23, 5.24-25; *An.* 1.5.7-8, 8.24-29, 9.1-31, 2.6.1-30, 3.1.38, 2.7; Cic. *Ad Q. Fr.* 1.1.22-23; Machiavelli 2003: 3.20, 22; 2008: 14; Nadon 1996: 362; 2001: 5 n21, 10; Due 1989: 16-17, 25, 94, 117; Reichel 2010: 421; Tatum 1989: xv, 77-78; Tuplin 2013: 70; Hirsch 1985: 71; Gray 2010b: 3; Carlier 2010: 331; Stadter 2010: 370; Miller 1914:

to Xenophon, was piety, for the gods were ultimately architects of victory and leaders but instruments of divine will.¹³³ Worthy commanders solicited the gods' favour, not only through ritual purifications and burial of dead but also by paying close attention to omens and signs made known.¹³⁴

If Philip did not model himself upon at least some of Xenophon's characterisations of an ideal leader, the coincidence is remarkable. As chief priest, the king was doubtless prominent in the public daily ritual of sacrifice for the protection of Macedonia and its people. Other important duties included the organising of religious festivals and interpretation of omens (sometimes in consultation with a *mantis*).¹³⁵ Macedonian kings were also responsible for the lustration of the army as it departed on campaign.¹³⁶ Admittedly the role was institutionalised but there is nonetheless no reason to doubt Philip's religious sincerity, as demonstrated by his patronage of the cult of the Great Gods at Samothrace, and his consultation of the Pythia over the planned invasion of Persia.¹³⁷ The

xii; Hutchinson 2000: 19, 39; Ambler 2001: 1; Dillery 1998: 11-12; Gray 2010b: 12; Ferrario 2017: 74, 78; Tuplin 2017: 349; Flower 2012: 118; Marincola 2017: 108.

¹³³ Piety – Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.3, 6.1.47, 7.5.57, 8.1.23-25; *An.* 3.1.8, 2.9, 4.3.8-9, 5.3.5, 7-9, 13, 7.8.20-23; *Ages.* 1.34, 2.13, 15, 17, 3.2, 10.2, 11.1-2; *Eq. mag.* 1.1-2, 3.1, 5.14; Hutchinson 2000: 111; Due 1989: 193; Ambler 2001: 13; Farber 1979: 501; Marchant 1925: xix n2; Stoll 2012: 252, 255; Seager 2001: 387; Flower 2016: 89, 91-93; Buxton 2016: 166. Architects of victory – Xen. *Cyr.* 2.4.18-19, 3.2.3-4, 6.4.12-13, 7.1.1, 5.35; *An.* 3.1.5-7, 2.12, 5.18, 4.6.23-26, 8.25; *Eq. mag.* 5.14; Due 1989: 93; Tatum 1989: 121; Bowden 2004: 239; Dillery 1998: 13. Divine instruments – Xen. *Cyr.* 1.5.14, 2.1.1, 8.3.11-15, 24-25, 7.3; *An.* 4.5.4, 6.1.22-24, 4.9, 12-14, 5.21, 7.2.14-15; Nadon 2001: 126-127; Hutchinson 2000: 188; Bowden 2004: 239.

¹³⁴ Xen. *Cyr.* 1.5.6, 6.1-2, 44, 2.1.1, 4.18-19, 3.2.3, 5.4.21, 23, 6.3.1, 4.12-13, 7.5.34; *An.* 3.1.11-12, 4.2.23, 3.13, 5.4, 5.2.9-10, 24, 7.34-35, 6.1.22-23, 4.9, 20-22, 5.2, 7.8.4-6, 10, 20; *Eq. mag.* 9.8-9; *Hell.* 3.4.15; *Mem.* 1.4.14-15; *Ages.* 1.34, 2.13, 15, 17, 3.2, 10.2, 11.1-2; Anderson 2001: 132-133; Hutchinson 2000: 46, 49-50, 111; Due 1989: 193, 205; Cawkwell 1979b: 10-11; Waterfield 2009b: 165; Prevas 2002: 164-165; Parker 2004: 142. Ambler 2001: 13; Farber 1979: 501; Marchant 1925: xix n2; Stoll 2012: 252, 255; Seager 2001: 387; Flower 2016: 89, 91-93.

¹³⁵ Diod. Sic. 17.16.3-4; Curt. 4.6.10; Arr. *Anab.* 1.11.1, 7.25.2; Christesen & Murray 2010: 440-441; King 2018: 380; Gabriel 2010: 8, 21; Hammond 1994b: 182; Worthington 2008: 12; Ellis 1976: 24; Anson 2008: 135; Bradford 2001: 102.

¹³⁶ Liv. 40.6; Curt. 10.9.11-12; Gabriel 2010: 7; Green 1991: 6; Christesen & Murray 2010: 440-441.

¹³⁷ Patronage – Cole 1984: 16; Palagia 2015: 477; Burkett 1993: 147; Wescoat 2003: 114; 2015: 185; 2017: 179. Delphi – Diod. Sic. 16.91.2-3; Paus. 8.7.6; Scott 2014: 163-164; Christesen & Murray 2010: 441; Bradford 1992: 159; Worthington 2008: 169-170; McQueen 1995a: 172; Gabriel 2010: 233; Fredricksmeyer 1982: 90.

king was also careful to exhibit reverence with the retrieval and proper burial of the dead, regarded as requisite if the deceased's soul was to enter Hades.¹³⁸ Fulfilling religious obligations to the fallen also reassured survivors that the same privilege would be accorded to them: thus honouring the dead played an important role in maintaining morale and unity amongst the living.¹³⁹ If anything, the sacredness of this responsibility appears to have been even more important to the Macedonians whose cremated remains were interred, together with their weapons, in a resting place marked by a tumulus (*polyandrion*), the great size of which reflected their honoured status.¹⁴⁰ Philip accorded this highest of accolades to his men who died fighting Bardylis (358), at Chaeronea (338) and presumably following Crocus Field (352).¹⁴¹

In his writings, Xenophon also articulated that a leader should exploit kindness and clemency as a means by which to create obligation and gratitude.¹⁴² It was, furthermore, a commander's responsibility to provide for his troops' needs, paying particular attention to food and shelter, as well as medical assistance.¹⁴³

¹³⁸ Retrieval of the dead – Hom. *Od.* 11.71-76; Hdt. 1.30; Thuc. 7.75.3; Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.31, 2.3.32, 35; Pl. *Menex.* 234C; Diod. Sic. 13.101.1, 15.35.1; Plut. *Sol.* 21; Onos. 36.1; Ath. 5.218a; Vaughn 2005: 40-41, 44; Tompkins 2013: 532. Hades – Hom. *Il.* 23.71-74; Soph. *Ant.* 519; Burkert 1985: 197; Prevas 2002: 118; Conway & Stannard 2011: 860; Adams 2007: 7.

¹³⁹ Eur. *Supp.* 536-541; Diod. Sic. 17.21.6; Onos. 36.1; Vaughn 2005: 41-42, 57; Burkert 1985: 191; Rosivach 1983: 202; Carney 1996: 25; Rusch 2011: 18.

¹⁴⁰ Importance – Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.5, 2.12.1; Curt. 5.4.3; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 151; Greenwalt 1986: 216; Christesen & Murray 2010: 431; Hammond 1992b: 26; Carney 2015: 121 n56. Tumulus – Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.5; Hammond 1989: 57; 1992c: 29; O'Brien 1994: 64.

¹⁴¹ Bardylis – Diod. Sic. 16.4.7. Chaeronea – Diod. Sic. 16.86.6; Lloyd 1997: 186; Hammond 1989: 57; Ma 2008a: 72; Markle 1977: 325; Pritchett 1958: 308; Rahe 1981: 84.

¹⁴² Xen. *Cyr.* 1.1.5-6, 3.1.27-28, 31-32, 2.12-13, 5.3.31-32, 4.11-12, 7.2.27-29, 8.2.19-23; *An.* 1.9.23; *Ages.* 1.19, 21-22, 37-38, 6.8, 11.10; Due 1989: 193; Nadon 2001: 5; Weathers 1954: 320; Lendon 2006: 91-92; Whidden 2007: 544-545; Newell 1983: 899; Ambler 2001: 4, 7-8, 13-14; Buxton 2016: 173-174, 185, 188.

¹⁴³ Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.10-11, 15-16, 18, 23-23, 42, 2.1.21, 3.3.9, 6.1.23, 8.2.24-25, 4.6; *An.* 2.6.8, 4.5.7-9, 5.16-18; *Mem.* 3.1.6, 2.1-4; *Eq. mag.* 6.3; *Hell.* 5.1.14; Due 1989: 94-95, 165-166, 232; Nadon 2001: 5, 89, 118; Hutchinson 2000: 54-55, 131, 189; Tatum 1989: 52; Carlier 2010: 342.

Philip, too, was not beyond exercising such virtues. Notwithstanding his well-deserved reputation as a strict, even harsh disciplinarian, the king was generous in *largesse* for the deserving and unfortunate. Despite being slandered by the impoverished Nicanor, for example, the king won back the Companion's loyalty by ameliorating his plight with a gift.¹⁴⁴ In a similar circumstance, Philip bestowed money to Pythias, a disgruntled soldier who had fallen on hard times and was struggling to feed his family. The discrete gesture brought immediate gratitude and devotion.¹⁴⁵ Provision of Aesculapian care was also a recommendation that Philip was careful to follow – even if his rough handling of Menecrates suggests less than venerable respect.¹⁴⁶ Indeed, Macedonian kings had a history of providing for the medical needs of their subjects, a praxis established – or continued – by Perdiccas II (c.452-413) and Amyntas III (c.393-370), who employed the medical services of Hippocrates of Cos and Nicomachus (the father of Aristotle) respectively.¹⁴⁷ There is some suggestion Philip may have introduced innovations such as the Spoon of Diocles (*kyathiskos*), an instrument supposedly invented by Critobulus of Cos and used to treat the king's eye wound at Methone.¹⁴⁸ Troops injured by arrows and bolts may have received similar specialist care for their injuries and although such considerations may be viewed as little more than a gesture by modern standards, probably engendered a feeling of gratitude from the troops and a corresponding lift in morale.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁴ Plut. *Mor.* 177D-E; Bradford 1992: 49-50.

¹⁴⁵ Frontin. 4.7.37; Ptol. 2.15.4; Bradford 1992: 50-51; Tsouras 2004: 7; Sekunda 2010: 465.

¹⁴⁶ Frontin. 4.7.37; Ael. *VH* 12.57; Ath. 7.288d-e; Greenwalt 1986: 217; Karunanithy 2013: 165; Fox 2015c: 362; Serrati 2008: 89; Fishwick 1987: 44.

¹⁴⁷ Hippocrates – Roisman 2010: 154; Sawada 2010: 407; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 149; Greenwalt 1986: 217; Errington 1990: 224. Nicomachus – Diog. Laert. 5.1; Greenwalt 1986: 217; King 2018: 51, 90; Errington 1990: 224; Fox 2015a: 233.

¹⁴⁸ Diod. Sic. 16.34.5; Plin. *HN* 7.37.124; Karunanithy 2013: 165; Prag 1990: 239-240; King 2018: 122; McQueen 1995a: 102. Invention of the *kyathiskos* is sometimes credited to Diocles of Carystus – see Cels. *Med.* 7.5.3; Greenwalt 1986: 218-219; Lascaratos *et al.* 2004: 256, 257-258; Prag 1990: 240-241.

¹⁴⁹ Karunanithy 2013: 164; Greenwalt 1986: 221; Carney 1996: 28.

Another quality regarded as important by Xenophon was in the demonstration of superior martial skills, which he deemed was another way by which a general could motivate his troops. Termed πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα προκόπτει τι εἰς τὸ μὴ καταφρονεῖσθαι (stepping stones to respect) in *The Cavalry Commander*, Xenophon listed feats of ability such as expert horsemanship, and throwing a javelin with skill and accuracy whilst mounted, as means by which a *hipparch* could acquire repute.¹⁵⁰ Any leader, however, was expected to possess a masterly understanding of tactics in order to enhance his army's chances of victory and prevent him from making reckless decisions that endangered men's lives. To this end, the consummate *strategos* should be proactive in the field, being at all times prepared to seize the initiative from the enemy by any means – including that of intelligence-gathering and deception.¹⁵¹ Such qualities, according to Xenophon, would ensure the troops' willingness to obey their leader.¹⁵²

Philip's individual expertise (or deficiencies) with weapons is nowhere testified explicitly in the sources but his many campaigns and fondness of drill – in which he presumably participated – makes an assumption of the king's proficiency in arms justified. Philip's fitness and strength are also attested by his enthusiasm for wrestling, including a contest with the *pankratiast* Menagetes.¹⁵³ By any standards, the king was a master tactician

¹⁵⁰ Xen. *Eq. mag.* 6.4-5; Stoll 2012: 254; Buxton 2016: 164, 174; Spence 1995: 70, 78, 89; Lendon 2005: 75; van Wees 2004: 93; Ferrario 2017: 72. Xen. *Cyr.* 1.3.15, 4.4-5, 4.3.9-13, 15-21, 5.1.15, 8.3.25 also alludes to the importance of expert horsemanship in a leader.

¹⁵¹ Intelligence – Xen. *Cyr.* 3.3.48, 6.1.24-25, 2.2, 11, 7.5.2, 8.2.10-12; *An.* 4.1.23-25, 4.15-18, 5.36, 6.1-3, 17, 5.4.3-10; *Eq. mag.* 4.4-7; Hutchinson 2000: 68-71, 198-199; Anderson 1970: 172; Waterfield 2009b: 134; Fox 2004b: 184-185. Deception – Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.27, 2.4.17, 21-22; *An.* 4.2.2, 3.20-21, 29-33, 6.11-13, 5.2.26-27; *Mem.* 3.1.6; *Ages.* 1.16-17, 6.5-6; *Hell.* 3.4.11-12, 20-21, 5.4.48-49; *Eq. mag.* 5.2-3, 9-12, 7.14, 8.18; Hutchinson 2000: 149-150, 182, 187, 199; Hirsch 1985: 42; Stadter 2010: 393.

¹⁵² Xen. *Eq. mag.* 6.6; *Hell.* 7.5.19-22; *Mem.* 3.1.6-7; Anderson 1970: 95; Hunt 1998: 145; Stoll 2012: 255; Buxton 2016: 171-172, 176; 2017: 325, 331; Spence 1995: 74; Cartledge 1987: 207; Baragwanath 2017: 164; Waterfield 2006: 145.

¹⁵³ Polyaeus. 4.2.6; Gabriel 2010: 6-7; Hammond 1994b: 186; Adams 2003: 210; 2014: 336; Bradford 1992: 51; Roisman 2015: 78.

but perhaps less appreciated was his ability to devise low-risk stratagems in order to achieve advantage over his enemies without resorting to a pitched battle – and consequent loss of life. Such a situation occurred during 340/39 in the aftermath of the aborted siege of Byzantium when Philip seized the unexpected opportunity to capture 230 ships that were laden with grain and bound for Athens. Profits from the sale of the cargo netted seven hundred talents but the resultant Athenian response trapped the Macedonian fleet of around 180 vessels in the Propontis. Unwilling to risk a naval engagement against a superior force, Philip arranged for a letter detailing a Thracian revolt and request for support fall into enemy hands. Chares, the Athenian admiral, believed the ruse and immediately decamped to support the non-existent Thracian cause, leaving the Macedonian fleet to escape unharmed.¹⁵⁴

Incredibly, the same ploy was employed successfully little more than a year later and again involved Chares, who, together with Proxenus and 10,000 mercenaries, had been detailed with securing the Gravia Pass, a vital gateway to central Greece. Philip was prosecuting the Fourth Social War on behalf of the Amphictyonic Council but needed a quick resolution in order to prevent organised opposition. After being denied this by the presence of Chares' force, Philip again arranged for the Athenians to intercept a letter – this time supposedly from Antipater – that requested the king's urgent assistance in suppressing yet another Thracian revolt. As if in response to the communication, Philip withdrew from his position, seemingly to return to Macedonia. Believing the danger to be over, Chares relaxed his guard but in doing so allowed the pass to be forced by an army under Parmenion,

¹⁵⁴ Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 292; Frontin. 1.4.13; Did. 10.50-60; Hammond 1994b: 134-135; Worthington 2008: 133-134; 2013: 234-235; Bradford 1992: 120; Millett 2010: 490; Amemiya 2007: 81; Harding 2006a: 213; King 2018: 92.

who surprised the Athenians by appearing unexpectedly on the scene after a forced night-march.¹⁵⁵

Xenophon was also careful to point out that the role of the commander was not limited simply to the selection and implementation of tactics: his ability to manage troops properly was another important element in determining the performance of an army on the battlefield. A key aspect of this was the capacity to motivate his soldiers, in which leading by example was critical.¹⁵⁶ One way this could be achieved, according to Xenophon, was by the commander sharing in the hardships of his men.¹⁵⁷ Another was in being a positive model in all things, but especially bravery, endurance, personal appearance, and demeanour.¹⁵⁸ Remaining accessible to the rank and file was important but maintaining high levels of personal and collective discipline was also critical, even if that meant individuals suffered for the army's greater good.¹⁵⁹

Philip possessed, or was careful to cultivate, these attributes. One such quality was personal bravery. The king led from the front and had the wounds to prove it, being injured in battle four times, three gravely. Philip's first serious wound occurred in 354 at the siege

¹⁵⁵ Polyae. 4.2.8; Worthington 2008: 146; 2013: 247; Bradford 1992: 141; Ellis 1976: 197; Ashley 1998: 150-151; Roberts 1982: 367; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 593-594; Guler 2014: 132-133; Parke 1933: 153; Davis 2001: 29; King 2018: 95.

¹⁵⁶ Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.13, 25, 8.1.36, 38, 2.22; *An.* 2.3.11-12, 3.4.47-49, 4.4.11-13, 7.3.45-46; *Ages.* 1.27, 2.7-8, 6.4; *Hell.* 3.4.18; Due 1989: 95-96, 194-195; Nadon 2001: 170-171; Hutchinson 2000: 53-54, 60-61, 137; Lendon 2006: 89; Azoulay 2004b: 165; Anderson 2001: 123, 125; Erbse 2010: 492; Stoll 2012: 254; Buxton 2016: 187; Cartledge 1987: 207.

¹⁵⁷ *An.* 2.3.10-11, 3.4.47-49, 4.4.12-13, 7.3.45-46; Xen. *Ages.* 5.1-3; Hanson 2000: 111; Buxton 2016: 187; 2017: 325; Erbse 2010: 491-492; Ferrario 2017: 78; Marincola 2017: 109.

¹⁵⁸ Bravery – Xen. *Cyr.* 1.4.8, 18, 20-22; *An.* 2.3.10, 3.1.37; *Eq. mag.* 2.6; *Ages.* 2.12-13, 6.1, 11.9; Seager 2001: 386. Endurance – Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.25, 8.1.36; *An.* 2.3.11, 3.1.37, 4.47-49; Due 1989: 96, 195; Nadon 2001: 170; Hutchinson 2000: 60-61; Anderson 2001: 123. Appearance – Xen. *Cyr.* 3.1.41, 6.1.6, 4.2-4, 7.1.2, 8.1.40-42, 3.14; *An.* 3.2.7; Anderson 2001: 124; Azoulay 2004b: 165.

¹⁵⁹ Accessibility – Xen. *Cyr.* 2.2.1, 3.19, 22, 6.1.1, 2.13, 7.5.54-55; *An.* 4.3.10-12, 7.6.35; *Hell.* 1.1.30, 5.1.14; *Ages.* 9.1-2; Anderson 2001: 126; Hutchinson 2000: 68; Azoulay 2004b: 158; Stoll 2012: 255; Buxton 2016: 187-188; Waterfield 2006: 145; Flower 2012: 134. Discipline – Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.20-25, 5.1.8, 16, 7.5.80; *An.* 2.6.9-11, 3.4.46-49, 4.4.12-13, 5.8.1-14; *Ages.* 5.1-5, 6.2, 10.2; *Hell.* 4.8.18-19, 5.2.6, 6.1.16; *Mem.* 2.1; *Eq. mag.* 1.25; Due 1989: 94, 179-180; Nadon 2001: 5, 89; Johnstone 2010: 137; Stadter 2010: 390-391; Hindley 2010: 77-79; Hutchinson 2000: 59, 135; Weathers 1954: 319; Stoll 2012: 255; Buxton 2016: 173.

of Methone where he lost his right eye after being shot by an archer.¹⁶⁰ In 345/4 he suffered a broken collarbone whilst on campaign against the Ardiaei of Illyria, and against the Thracian Triballi (339) Philip received a thigh wound from a pike that killed his horse and left the king with a pronounced limp for the rest of his life.¹⁶¹ At this time he further suffered a fractured hand or wrist, probably as a result of falling from the dying steed.¹⁶²

Philip was also careful to convey an accessible and humble demeanour. In a bid to prevent alienating his men, for example, the king was mindful not to flaunt his authority. Addressed as Philippos Amyntou Makedonios (or simply Philippos Makedonios), the only sign of formal respect required in the king's presence was that a speaker remove his helmet when addressing the Assembly.¹⁶³ No doubt to emphasise his "common touch", Philip also ensured that he was seen to be accessible and not beyond reproach. In this way, for example, he allowed himself to be berated by an old woman with whom he had initially declined an audience, and rebuked by Machaetas for having fallen asleep during his trial.¹⁶⁴

What investigation reveals, therefore, is a close correlation between Xenophon's treatises and the development of Macedonia under Philip. In the final analysis, the impact of Xenophon's writings on Philip's approach to kingship and empire are impossible to prove. It may well have been that some of the monarch's actions and philosophies were

¹⁶⁰ Dem. 18.67; Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 52; Did. 12.44-49; Diod. Sic. 16.34.5; Plut. *Alex.* 3; Just. 7.6.14; Ath. 6.248f; Gabriel 2010: 10; Worthington 2008: 49; Riginos 1994: 105; Fredricksmeyer 1990: 305; Lascaratos *et al.*, 2004: 256; Cook 2005: 195, 196; Hamilton 2002b: 6; McQueen 1995a: 101-102.

¹⁶¹ Collarbone – Dem. 18.67; Did. 12.64; Fredricksmeyer 1990: 305; Gabriel 2010: 11; Riginos 1994: 115; Worthington 2008: 108; Hatzopoulos 1982: 28; Lascaratos *et al.* 2004: 256; Harding 2006a: 238. Thigh – Dem. 18.67; Plut. *Mor.* 331B; Did. 13.4-6; Just. 9.3.2; Ath. 6.248f; Riginos 1994: 116; Gabriel 2010: 12-13; Green 1991: 69; Fredricksmeyer 1990: 305; Lascaratos *et al.* 2004: 257; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 583; Harding 2006a: 240-241.

¹⁶² Dem. 18.67; Gabriel 2010: 13; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 583; Bartsiakos 2000: 512, 514 n5; Riginos 1994: 105.

¹⁶³ Gabriel 2010: 6, 21; 2015: 12; Hammond 1992b: 64.

¹⁶⁴ Old woman – Plut. *Mor.* 179C-D; Hammond 1994b: 185; Bradford 1992: 10; 2001: 102, Anson 2008: 136 n17; Adams 1986: 47-48; Roisman 2012b: 136; Tetlow 2005: 166. Machaetas – Plut. *Mor.* 178F-179A; Bradford 1992: 49; Adams 1986: 48; Roisman 2012b: 135, 144; Tetlow 2005: 166.

procédure opératoire normalisée of the times. What can be deduced, however, is that the parallelism between the musings of Xenophon and the *modus operandi* of the Macedonian king was, at times, too great for pure coincidence. That Philip was aware of, and sometimes followed, the Athenian's works (especially the *Cyropaedia* and *Anabasis*) should therefore be accepted with a fair degree of certainty.¹⁶⁵

II. A Combined Arms Force

Whatever degree of influence Iphicrates and Xenophon had on Philip's plans for empire, and circumstances suggest that it was surely consequential, acknowledgment is also due that the king himself – and his array of formidable personal qualities – played a significant role in Macedonia's rise. It is, therefore, to the measures Philip implemented in pursuit of that objective this discussion now turns, beginning with the king's foresight – informed by a close reading of Xenophon's *Anabasis* – in creating a combined arms force.

Philip's army was a heterogeneous host comprised not only of heavy infantry, cavalry and *psiloi*, but also (in time) specialist troops such as engineers and experts in siege operations – a role often performed by mercenaries.¹⁶⁶ The essential component in the Macedonian military, however, was its horsemen. Macedonia had a strong tradition in cavalry and Philip had a deliberate policy to increase numbers.¹⁶⁷ Absorption from conquered territories contributed to the expansion but Philip was also careful to enrol non-

¹⁶⁵ Christesen 2006: 63; Gaebel 2002: 150, 308 acknowledge potential for *Cyropaedia* to have been read by Philip.

¹⁶⁶ Dem. 9.49; Spence 1995: 140, 172; Runciman 1998: 744; Gabriel 2010: 53, 67; Hanson 2005: 32; 2009: 204.

¹⁶⁷ Thuc. 1.61.4, 2.100.5; Brunt 1976d: xxxv; Spence 1995: 26, 176; Best 1969: 140; Snodgrass 1967: 114; Worley 1994: 155; Sidnell 2011: 29; Gaebel 2002: 57; King 2018: 107-108; Müller 2010b: 169; Griffith 1965: 129.

Macedonians based on loyalty and ability.¹⁶⁸ In this he was successful and numbers rose steadily throughout his reign. In 358, for example, Philip was able to field only 600 horse against the Illyrian king Bardylis.¹⁶⁹ Just six years later in 352, he commanded a cavalry force of 3,000 against Onomarchus at the Battle of Crocus Field – albeit that this included a Thessalian division.¹⁷⁰ At Chaeronea (338) Philip fielded 2,000 cavalry, although this figure also comprised an allied contingent of unknown size.¹⁷¹ Philip's strategies to increase his cavalry survived his assassination and in 334 Alexander's invasion of Asia included 1,800 heavy cavalry (all Macedonian), the same number of Thessalians, as well as 900 Thracian and Paenonian light horse.¹⁷² A further one thousand five hundred horsemen remained in Europe with Antipater for deployment in the event of unrest in the *poleis*.¹⁷³

Under Philip, there were three distinct divisions of cavalry, with arguably the most important of these being the *hetairoi*. The term itself probably originated with Alexander I (498-454) and applied to a small group of councillors who, on the basis of their martial ability, were chosen to accompany the king on campaign.¹⁷⁴ Numbers grew gradually as the *hetairoi* developed into a social and military elite tied closely to the Crown because

¹⁶⁸ Theopomp. *FrGrH* 115 F 224; Polyb. 8.9, 11; Ath. 4.167a-b; McQueen 1995b: 327; Shrimpton 1991b: 165-166; Gabriel 2010: 47; Ellis 1976: 27; King 2018: 382.

¹⁶⁹ Diod. Sic. 16.4.3; Hammond 1980c: 58; 1994b: 26; Worthington 2008: 26; Gaebel 2002: 148; Green 1991: 24; Sekunda 2010: 449; Fox 2015d: 376; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 213; LaForse 2010: 555; Müller 2010b: 183; Anson 2010b: 57.

¹⁷⁰ Diod. Sic. 16.35.4; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 410; Griffith 1965: 129; Ellis 1980b: 40; Parke 1933: 137; King 2018: 78; Gabriel 2010: 136; Worthington 2008: 63; Ashley 1998: 120; McQueen 1995a: 105.

¹⁷¹ Diod. Sic. 16.85.5; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 410, 437; Schwartz 2009: 239; Gaebel 2002: 154; Green 1991: 72; Sekunda 2010: 468; Roberts 1982: 367; Griffith 1965: 129.

¹⁷² Diod. Sic. 17.17.4; Gaebel 2002: 161; Sekunda 2010: 452, 454; English 2009b: 40; Brunt 1963: 35-36; Griffith 1965: 129; Rzepka 2008: 49, 51-52; 2015: 132; Hammond 1998a: 408; Heckel 2008: 25.

¹⁷³ Diod. Sic. 17.17.5; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 408; Sekunda 2010: 454; Brunt 1963: 35; Yalichev 1997: 173; Rzepka 2008: 52 n35; 2015: 132; Gilley & Worthington 2010: 200.

¹⁷⁴ Anaximenes *FrGrHist* 72 F4; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 158-159; Green 1991: 9; Brunt 1976a: 152-153; Milns 1976: 87; Sekunda 2010: 447.

of the extensive land holdings granted in reward for distinguished military service.¹⁷⁵ In Philip's time, the Companions comprised a core of 800 *Macedones* and others, such as Parmenion, who had earned the honour either through loyalty, ability or social standing.¹⁷⁶

Hetairoi were arranged along territorial or ethnic lines into squadrons of two hundred (or multiples thereof) and equipped as heavy cavalry.¹⁷⁷ As such, Companions wore a corselet, usually of bronze, possibly sometimes of leather or linen, with perhaps the very elite possessing cuirasses of iron; *pteruges* appear to have been standard.¹⁷⁸ Held in place with a chin strap, Thracian or Boeotian helmets were the usual form of headwear for *hetairoi*: *knemides* rounded out the defensive accoutrement.¹⁷⁹ The primary offensive weapon of the Companions was the *xyston* but they also carried a *machaira* or cavalry *xiphos*, usually worn high on their waist's left so as to be easily accessible when mounted.¹⁸⁰

Philip also created a division of light cavalry, designated either *prodromoi* or *sarissophoroi* depending upon the function they fulfilled.¹⁸¹ Whilst it is true that these contingents were not anywhere mentioned in the ancient sources in association with the

¹⁷⁵ Elite – Gabriel 2010: 47-48; Borza 1990: 205; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 409; Ellis 1976: 26. Ties – Plut. *Alex.* 15; Ath. 6.261a; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 409; Griffith 1965: 134; Bradford 1992: 12; Cawkwell 1978b: 38-39, 58; Edson 1980: 15, 42; Karunanithy 2013: 65; Ashley 1998: 29; Sekunda 2010: 468.

¹⁷⁶ Core – Bradford 1992: 129; Ellis 1976: 26-27; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 408; Hanson 2009: 209; Gabriel 2010: 47; Strootman 2013: 41. Parmenion – Isoc. *Dis.* 5.19; Polyb. 8.10; Gabriel 2010: 47; Cawkwell 1978b: 38; Bradford 1992: 128; Ellis 1980b: 42; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 395; Walbank 1967: 85.

¹⁷⁷ Arr. *Anab.* 1.2.5, 18.1; Brunt 1976d: xxxvi; Worley 1994: 155; Cawkwell 1978b: 32; Gabriel 2010: 73; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 411; Sekunda 2010: 452; Rzepka 2008: 40-41; Brunt 1963: 41, 42; Sidnell 2006: 78; Bosworth 1980: 58-59.

¹⁷⁸ Thuc. 2.100.5; Plut. *Alex.* 16; Snodgrass 1967: 119; Worley 1994: 156; Ashley 1998: 29; Karunanithy 2013: 90-91; Worthington 2008: 29; Fox 2015d: 375; Brunt 1976a: 151; Lonsdale 2007: 60.

¹⁷⁹ Helmet – Snodgrass 1967: 119-120; Worley 1994: 156; Ashley 1998: 29; Hammond 1998a: 406; Warry 1995: 82; Karunanithy 2013: 89-90; Stoyanov 2015: 431; Lonsdale 2007: 60. *Knemides* – Hammond 1994b: 19; 1998a: 406; Worthington 2008: 27.

¹⁸⁰ *Xyston* – Arr. *Anab.* 1.15.5, 7-8; Snodgrass 1967: 119-120; Gabriel 2010: 4, 75; Hammond 1994a: 19; Worthington 2008: 29; Sekunda 2001: 37. Sword – Snodgrass 1967: 119; Gabriel 2010: 75; Ashley 1998: 29; Ducrey 1986: 94; Worley 1994: 156; Karunanithy 2013: 137; Fox 2015d: 375.

¹⁸¹ Arr. *Anab.* 1.14.1, 7, 3.12.3; Curt. 4.15.13; Bosworth 1988a: 262; Serrati 2013b: 189, 191; Brunt 1963: 27; Markle 1982: 105; Burn 1965: 145; Bugh 1998a: 87; Heckel 2008: 25.

king, they may be regarded securely as his innovation as the *corps* were already established at the time of Alexander's 335 Balkan campaign.¹⁸² Cavalrymen for the squadrons were recruited from the tribes of Thrace (including the Odrysians) as well as regions of Upper Macedonia such as Paeonia.¹⁸³

Sarissophoroi served as lancers, where their mobility made them well-suited either for operations on rugged terrain or, as was the case at Granicus River in 334, act as protection for the flanks of the less agile *hetairoi*.¹⁸⁴ As suggested by their title, (*sarissophoroi* translates as "sarissa-bearer"), members of the division were equipped with a cavalry *sarissa* (*xyston*).¹⁸⁵ *Prodromoi* functioned as scouts, performing reconnaissance roles or operating as an advance guard in order to avoid unexpected hostile contact. In set-piece battles, *prodromoi* fought as skirmishers whose role was the harassment of enemy forces.¹⁸⁶ Their weaponry is less certain but was probably the *akontion*.¹⁸⁷ Because of their combat roles, the suggestion that Macedonian light horsemen wore items of protection – including a leather or linen corselet and metal helmet – is a sensible one.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸² Arr. *Anab.* 1.2.6; Hammond 1980c: 63; 1989b: 63; 1998a: 406; Cawkwell 1978b: 35; Brunt 1963: 27; King 2018: 114-115; Sekunda 2010: 454; Bugh 1998a: 87.

¹⁸³ Diod. Sic. 17.17.4; Arr. *Anab.* 3.12.4; Cawkwell 1978b: 35; Hammond 1989: 63; 1998a: 411, 417; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 412, 432; Gabriel 2010: 73; Gaebel 2002: 172-173; Brunt 1963: 27; Sekunda 2010: 454; Bosworth 1980: 303; 1988a: 260.

¹⁸⁴ *Sarissophoroi* as lancers – Arr. *Anab.* 1.2.6, 13.1, 14.1; Ellis 1976: 27; Markle 1982: 87; Brunt 1963: 27; King 2018: 115; Ashley 1998: 32; Bosworth 1980: 110; Worthington 2014: 36. Broken terrain – Asclep. 7.1; Cawkwell 1978b: 35; Hammond 1998a: 406, 417. Granicus River – Arr. *Anab.* 1.14.1; Hammond 1980c: 63; 1998a: 417; Brunt 1963: 27.

¹⁸⁵ *Xyston* – Markle 1978: 492; 1982: 87, 104; Worthington 2008: 29; 2014: 36; Heskell 1997a: 180; Borza 1990: 205; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 413; Cawkwell 1978b: 35; King 2018: 113, 115.

¹⁸⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 1.12.7, 13.1, 3.7.7; Worthington 2008: 29; 2014: 36; Gabriel 2010: 73; Cawkwell 1978b: 35; Worley 1994: 156; Gaebel 2002: 173, 174; Markle 1978: 492; 1982: 105; Bugh 1998a: 87; Brunt 1963: 27; Bosworth 1980: 110; 1988a: 260.

¹⁸⁷ Hammond 1998a: 406; Markle 1978: 492; 1982: 87, 104-105; Serrati 2013b: 189.

¹⁸⁸ Worley 1994: 156; Karunanithy 2013: 86, 88.

Philip's armies also included contingents of allied cavalry, the most important of which were the Thessalians, long acknowledged as the leading horsemen in Greece.¹⁸⁹ Like the Macedonians, Thessalian *hippeis* were equipped with both cuirass and helmet – exclusively Boeotian it would seem – as well as a *machaira*. Their main armament, however, was the *akontion*, of which two were carried: one being thrown and the other retained as a stabbing weapon.¹⁹⁰ *Hippeis* from Thessaly served Philip well for many years, first in 352 at the Battle of Crocus Field where they comprised a significant number of the 3,000 horsemen present and were regarded as influential in the victory.¹⁹¹ It is probable that Thessaly also supplied cavalry at the Battle of Chaeronea (338), although their numbers and role is uncertain.¹⁹²

Another key aspect of the Macedonian military machine addressed by Philip was the development of quality heavy infantry. From time immemorial, Macedonia had lacked foot soldiers of any worth and with no hoplite tradition had relied instead on a peasant militia which was poorly armed and untrained.¹⁹³ Arguably one of Philip's most important reforms was to fashion a disciplined, well-drilled body of troops that can rightly be regarded as the infantry's rank and file.¹⁹⁴ Termed *pezhetairoi* (Foot Companions), the division was

¹⁸⁹ Diod. Sic. 17.17.4; Gabriel 2010: 53; Ashley 1998: 31-32; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 410. Thessalian cavalry pedigree – Hdt. 7.196; Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.9; Plut. *Mor.* 760E-F; Worley 1994: 28-29; Greenhalgh 1973: 148; Sidnell 2006: 24; Graninger 2010: 306; Spence 2010a: 123; Lendon 2006: 88; Best 1969: 124; Hunt 2007: 117-118; Gaebel 2002: 57; Snodgrass 1981: 101, 108.

¹⁹⁰ Gabriel 2010: 53; Ashley 1998: 31-32; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 410; Spence 1995: 24; Lonsdale 2007: 40.

¹⁹¹ Diod. Sic. 16.35.4-5; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 410, 436; English 2012: 118; King 2018: 78-79; Griffith 1965: 129; Ellis 1980b: 40; Parke 1933: 137; Gabriel 2010: 133-134, 136-137; Worthington 2008: 63; Ashley 1998: 31; Gaebel 2002: 151-152; Hammond 1980c: 60; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 143.

¹⁹² Ellis 1976: 197; Worthington 2013: 249; 2014: 86; Sidnell 2006: 77; Sabin 2013: 126; Griffith 1965: 129; Sekunda 2010: 468; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 162.

¹⁹³ Gabriel 2010: 61; Best 1969: 140; Worthington 2014: 32; Rey 2010: 48; Hammond 1990: 272-273; Hatzopoulos 1996: 267; Griffith 1935: 8; King 2018: 110.

¹⁹⁴ Snodgrass 1967: 115; Hammond 1994b: 150; Lendon 2005: 125; Ashley 1998: 35; Worthington 2014: 34; Bosworth 1988a: 245; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 414; Sekunda 2010: 450; Matthew 2015: 5-6; Fox 2015c: 341; Yalichev 1997: 171; King 2018: 109.

not Philip's creation but that of one of his "Alexander" predecessors. The sources are ambiguous, leading some historians to suggest it was Alexander I (498-454) who made the initial attempts at reform, whereas others, pointing to the incomplete implementation of the changes, theorise that Alexander II (371-369) – Philip's elder brother – was more likely to be deserving of the credit.¹⁹⁵ Alexander III can safely be discounted as a possibility on the testimony of Demosthenes, who indicates clearly that the division was in existence before 349, which was when the *Second Olynthiac* was delivered.¹⁹⁶

The dilemma is an interesting peripheral debate and so worth examining briefly. In a surviving fragment from his *Philippica*, Theopompus – when presumably discussing the origins of the *pezhetairoi* – explains that:

Θεόπομπός φησιν ὅτι ἐκ πάντων τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐπίλεκτοι οἱ μέγιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι ἐδορυφόρουν τὸν βασιλέα καὶ ἐκαλοῦντο πεζέταιροι (Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 348)

Theopompos says that the biggest and strongest men chosen from all the Macedonians were bodyguards for the king and were called the Foot Companions (Brill's New Jacoby).

Anaximenes, whose testimony survives in similarly fragmented form, outlines the creation of the *pezhetairoi* in a slightly different fashion:

¹⁹⁵ Alexander I – Sekunda 2010: 447; Ellis 1976: 53, 251-252 n36; Erskine 1989: 391; Fox 2015e: 260, 260 n15; Brunt 1976a: 151, 153. Alexander II – Hammond 1990: 273-274; Gabriel 2010: 61; Bosworth 2010: 99; Markle 1978: 485; Heskell 1997a: 174; Worthington 2008: 27; Buckler 1980: 112; Matthew 2015: 10; Griffith 1965: 128.

¹⁹⁶ Dem. 2.17; English 2009a: 4; Sekunda 2010: 450; Heckel 2013: 163; Hammond 1991b: 404 Matthew 2015: 19-22.

Πεζέταιροι· Δημοσθένης Φιλιππικοῖς. Ἐναξιμένης ἐν ᾧ Φιλιππικῶν περὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου λέγων φησὶν· «ἔπειτα τοὺς μὲν ἐνδοξοτάτους ἵππεύειν συνεθίσας ἐταίρους προσηγόρευσε, τοὺς δὲ πλείστους καὶ τοὺς πεζοὺς εἰς λόχους καὶ δεκάδας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς διελὼν πεζεταίρους ὠνόμασεν, ὅπως ἑκάτεροι μετέχοντες τῆς βασιλικῆς ἐταιρίας προθυμότατοι διατελῶσιν ὄντες (Anaximenes *FGrHist* 72 F 4).

Demosthenes in his Philippika [Dem. 2.17] mentions them. Anaximenes in Book 1 of his Philippika when talking of Alexander states: 'Then, after training the most renowned men to serve as cavalry, he gave them the name of hetairoi; but the majority, that is, the foot, he divided into lochoi and dekades and other commands, and designated them pezhetairoi. He did this in order that each of the two groups, by sharing in the royal Companionship, should be always exceedingly loyal to him' (Brill's New Jacoby).

By singling out their physical prowess – and connection to the king himself – Theopompus would seem to be suggesting *pezhetairoi* were royal bodyguards, an elite and therefore coveted position. Anaximenes, by contrast, indicates that Foot Companions were numerous enough to form different divisions, thus implying they were troops of the line rather than an exclusive meritocracy. The matter is perhaps unsolvable but what the testimonies do confirm is that *pezhetairoi* (in some fashion) existed at least as far back as 369.

Be that as it may, it was unquestionably Philip, as he had done with the cavalry, who followed an aggressive recruitment campaign intended to extend the Companion system in order to boost the infantry's standing and confer upon it a professional status.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁷ Hammond 1994b: 9; Heskell 1997a: 174; Worthington 2014: 33; Edson 1980: 15; Bosworth 1973: 245; Erskine 1989: 391; King 2010: 382; 2018: 109; Strootman 2013: 41; Anson 1985: 247; 2008: 136.

Drawn from Upper Macedonia, recruits were deployed in battalions that were organised along regional lines.¹⁹⁸ *Pezhetairoi* were armed with *sarissai*, with the *xiphos* carried as a backup for close-quarters combat, or in the event the pike was rendered inoperable.¹⁹⁹ Defensive items of panoply included helmet, *knemides* and Macedonian *pelte* described previously.²⁰⁰ Corselets were probably not worn: the likelihood was that in the early stages of the unit's history neither phalangite nor the state could afford to provide them.²⁰¹ As the *corps* became more established, heavy body armour was recognised as an impediment to the infantry's speed and manoeuvrability as well as being superfluous in light of the protection afforded by the *sarissa* to phalangites when in phalanx formation.²⁰²

If not for their creation, Philip deserves considerable recognition for moulding the *pezhetairoi* into a highly-disciplined body of heavy infantry that became the backbone of his army. An infantry unit for which the king can take credit in commissioning, however, was the *hypaspistai* (ὕπασπισται or "Shield Bearers").

It is true that Macedonian infantry of this name first appears in Arrian's *Anabasis* but there can be little doubt the division was in existence prior to Philip's death. In detailing Alexander's 336/5 campaign against the Illyrians at Pelion, Arrian states:

¹⁹⁸ Lendon 2005: 125; Gabriel 2010: 54, 67, 217; Hammond 1994b: 37; Rzepka 2008: 40-41; King 2018: 120; Sekunda 2010: 456; Burn 1965: 142, 144; Bosworth 1971: 98.

¹⁹⁹ Polyb. 18.29; Diod. Sic. 17.11.3; Asclep. 5.1; Aelian, 12; Cass. Dio 78.7.1-2; Worley, 1994: 72; Ashley 1998: 35; Markle 1982: 99; Hammond 1991b: 414; Heckel 2005: 191; Kleymenov 2015: 67; Matthew 2015: xix, 6-7, 38, 47, 93-129.

²⁰⁰ Polyae. 4.2.10; Anson 2010a: 83; Snodgrass 1967: 117-118; Worley 1994: 72; Ashley 1998: 35; Milns 1967: 510; McQueen 1995a: 66; Matthew 2015: 38, 41, 93-104.

²⁰¹ Snodgrass 1967: 117; Ashley 1998: 35; Best 1969: 140; Milns 1967: 510; King 2018: 112, 120; English 2009a: 25, 31; Worthington 2014: 33. Sekunda 2010: 458 believes composite cuirasses were worn. Matthew 2015: 41, 114-121 concludes that corselets were worn but that the material of which they were made varied according to the social and financial circumstances of the individual.

²⁰² Polyb. 18.29-30; Milns 1967: 510; Snodgrass 1967: 117-118; Anderson 1993: 31; Gabriel 2010: 66; Ashley 1998: 37; Cawkwell 1978b: 33; Serrati 2013b: 183; Matthew 2015: 160-161; 2016: 437; Anderson 1970; Hammond 1989: 60; Walbank 1967: 588.

Ἀλέξανδρος δέ, ἐπειδὴ ἀπηγγέλθη αὐτῷ, ὅτι κινδυνεύουσιν οἱ τε ἵππεῖς καὶ τὰ ὑποζύγια, εἰ νύξ αὐτοὺς καταλήψεται, αὐτὸς μὲν ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς τε ὑπασπιστὰς καὶ τοὺς τοξότας καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας καὶ ἵππεας ἐς τετρακοσίους ἐβόηθει σπουδῇ (Arr. *Anab.* 1.5.10).

When it was reported to Alexander that the cavalry and baggage animals would be in danger, if night overtook them, he himself went with the hypaspists, archers and Agrianians and some four hundred horsemen at full speed to their aid...(trans. Brunt, 1976).

It has been maintained elsewhere in this thesis that during the early period of his reign, Alexander had neither the time nor need to reform significantly the army he had inherited from his father.²⁰³ In selecting *hypaspistai* for this critical mission, Alexander indicated that he had great faith in the unit, suggesting that it had an established and proven track record. In what seems to be the most likely scenario, therefore, it is here argued the contingent was formed once Philip had become well-established in his reign and secured sufficient resources necessary to fund their foundation and continuance.²⁰⁴

To the extent that when going into battle the king sometimes stationed himself in their ranks, the unit can be viewed as a Royal Guard.²⁰⁵ Under Philip, the division numbered 1,000 and became a fulltime professional force that constituted the infantry's finest.²⁰⁶ As Macedonian infantry numbers grew, so did the ranks of *hypaspistai*, and by 334 a further

²⁰³ Thesis: 26-28.

²⁰⁴ That the hypaspists existed under Philip – Milns 1967: 511; 1971: 186-187; Sekunda 2010: 450; Hammond 1989: 62; 1991b: 403-404, 405, 414; Anson 1985: 247; Worthington 2008: 29; Gabriel 2010: 71.

²⁰⁵ Diod. Sic. 16.86.1; Arr. *Anab.* 1.8.4; Ellis 1976: 53; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 416; Ducrey 1986: 91; Gabriel 2010: 71; Ashley 1998: 40; Milns 1967: 511; Hammond 1991b: 414; 1995a: 125; Fox 2015c: 342; Sekunda 2010: 450.

²⁰⁶ Size – Gabriel 2010: 235; Hammond 1994b: 150; Anson 1985: 248; Ellis 1980b: 40; King 2018: 121. Elite status – Brunt 1976d: lxxvii; Sekunda 2010: 454; Ellis 1976: 27, 53; 1980b: 40; Gabriel 2010: 71, 107-108; Anson 1985: 248; Lendon 2005: 121, 125; Ashley 1998: 40; Rzepka 2008: 45.

two brigades, each numbering one thousand, had been commissioned – although whether this was under the orders of Philip or Alexander is contested.²⁰⁷

The panoply with which *hypaspistai* were outfitted is a source of much debate amongst modern historians. One theory has it that they were equipped identically to the *pezhetairoi*, and thus armed with the *sarissa*.²⁰⁸ Justification for this view is based ultimately on Arrian who, when documenting Alexander’s campaign against Ariobarzanes (330), narrates that the king dispatched his “heavier-armed troops” with Parmenio before advancing with the Macedonian foot, a force that included *pezhetairoi* and the *hypaspistai*.²⁰⁹ It should be noted, however, that in distinguishing *pezhetairoi* and *hypaspistai* from heavy infantry, Arrian does not necessarily indicate that the two divisions were identically armed. Indeed, he implies somewhat the opposite when in recording Alexander’s advance on the Cilician Gates (333), it is documented that the “heavier-armed foot-battalions” remained in camp whilst the *hypaspistai* accompanied a force of light infantry in the king’s successful forcing of the pass.²¹⁰

Another viewpoint is that *hypaspistai* were equipped as hoplites.²¹¹ Supporters of the argument sometimes point to the inclusion of *aspis* in the battalion’s title as an indication that troops carried a hoplite shield and therefore, presumably, the other main

²⁰⁷ Philip – Gabriel 2010: 71; Milns 1971: 189, 193. Alexander –Ashley 1998: 40; Ellis 1976: 27, 53; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 416; Fox 2015c: 342; Anson 1985: 247; 2010c: 63, 66. Worthington 2008: 29; Bosworth 1988a: 259; Hammond 1991b: 405, 1994b: 150; Tarn 1948b: 148, 150 merely note that Alexander’s army included 3,000 *hypaspistai*. In keeping with this thesis’ contention that Alexander made very few changes to the army he inherited from his father, it is considered probable that the expansion of *hypaspist* numbers occurred under Philip.

²⁰⁸ Milns 1967: 510; 1971: 186-188; Snodgrass 1967: 115; Anson 1985: 247; Bosworth 1988a: 260; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 417-418; English 2009a: 29-30.

²⁰⁹ Arr. *Anab.* 3.18.1-5; Milns 1967: 510, 510 n9.

²¹⁰ Arr. *Anab.* 2.4.3; Heckel, 1992: 17; Tarn 1948a: 23; Bosworth 1988a: 55; Ashley 1998: 217.

²¹¹ Markle 1977: 327, 329; 1982: 97-99; Heckel 2008: 26; 2013: 168; Sekunda 2010: 454-455; Anson 2010a: 82; Kleymenov 2015: 67; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 149; Spence 2002: 167; Everson 2004: 177; Curteis 1890: 36; Brice 2012: 147; Matthew 2015: 36, 418 n207; Ray 2012: 89-90.

items of hoplite panoply, including the *doru*.²¹² *Aspis* is a term synonymous with the shield of the Greek hoplite, but it need not necessarily be connected with Macedonian *hypaspistai*. Indeed, it has been well pointed out that *ὑπασπισται* or its derivative can have a meaning that equates to “attendant” or “bodyguard”.²¹³ Euripides, for example, described Iolaus as a *ὑπασπίζων* of Heracles, and Xenophon used the term *ὑπασπιστής* in conjunction to his servant.²¹⁴ Similarly, when recounting Alexander’s campaigns of 335, Arrian records:

Λάγγαρος δὲ ὁ τῶν Ἀγριάνων βασιλεὺς ἤδη μὲν καὶ Φιλίππου ζῶντος ἀσπαζόμενος
Ἀλέξανδρον δῆλος ἦν καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπρέσβευσε παρ’ αὐτόν, τότε δὲ παρῆν αὐτῷ μετὰ τῶν
ὑπασπιστῶν, ὅσους τε καλλίστους καὶ εὐοπλοτάτους ἀμφ’ αὐτὸν εἶχε (Arr. *Anab.* 1.5.2).

Langarus, king of the Agrianians, had shown his regard for Alexander even in Philip’s lifetime, had been on an embassy to him personally, and was now in attendance on him with the finest and best-armed hypaspists he had... (trans. Brunt, 1976).

Agrianians were *peltastai* of some repute and so for their king to be surrounded with a hoplite-style guard is difficult to reconcile. What makes far more sense in Arrian’s use of *ὑπασπιστῶν*, is that Langarus presented himself to Alexander accompanied by his most impressive-looking attendants (bodyguard).

Another argument offered in support of the arming of *hypaspistai* as hoplites is that the circumstances surrounding their deployment often required troops that were both relatively mobile, but at the same time better protected than *pezhetairoi*.²¹⁵ Alexander’s

²¹² Matthew 2015: 36; Everson 2004: 177; Ray 2012: 89; Markle 1977: 329.

²¹³ Milns 1971: 187; Anson 1985: 247; Ashley 1998: 39; Hammond & Griffiths 1979: 415-416.

²¹⁴ Eur. *Heraclid.* 215-216; Xen. *An.* 4.2.20; Anson 1985: 247.

²¹⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 1.1.9; Curt. 5.3.3-9; Matthew 2015: 418 n207; Sekunda & McBride 1984: 27; Ashley 1998: 271; Heckel 2005: 193-194, 194 n13; Howe 2015: 88.

choice of *hypaspistai* over the Foot Companions in operations where stamina and speed were essential suggests, however, that – in certain circumstances at least – the Shield Bearers were more lightly armed than *pezhetairoi* troops.²¹⁶ This hints at the main function of *hypaspistai*, which was to provide a link between the mobile cavalry divisions positioned on the wings and the slower-moving Foot Companions, who were inevitably stationed in the Macedonian centre.²¹⁷ In this way, *hypaspistes* divisions provided Philip with a high level of tactical flexibility. Not only did they afford protection to the flank of the *pezhetairoi*, thus permitting a cavalry advance with little risk to the infantry, but also when stationed between battalions of Foot Companions, allowed controlled forward and backward movement of the line without compromising its integrity. Such versatility enabled Philip to execute the ultimately decisive feigned retreat at Chaeronea.²¹⁸ In light of these conflicting accounts, therefore, perhaps the most sensible suggestion is that *hypaspistai* were cross-trained in a variety of arms' types, including the *sarissa* as well as *doru* and *aspis*.²¹⁹ From this thesis' perspective, such a view is significant because if, as acknowledged by many scholars and argued above, it is accepted that the *hypaspistai* were a creation of Philip's, it lends further weight to the dissertation's contention that the *sarissa* was introduced during his reign.

²¹⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 1.5.10, 2.4.3, 3.21.7-9, 23.3; Anson 2010a: 82; Sekunda 2010: 454; Worthington 2008: 29; Cawkwell 1978b: 34; Hamilton 1955: 218-219. Several modern commentators advocate that, on occasion, hypaspists were equipped as peltasts – Ashley 1998: 40; Parke 1935: 156.

²¹⁷ Snodgrass 1967: 115; Gabriel 2010: 71; Ashley 1998: 40; Cawkwell 1978b: 34; Ellis 1976: 53; Delbrück 1975: 179; Heckel 2008: 26; 2013: 164-165; Matthew 2015: 36; Yalichev 1997: 171; Hanson 2005: 32; Lonsdale 2007: 39; Spence 2002: 167.

²¹⁸ Polyæn. 4.2.2; Worley 1994: 69; Hammond 1980c: 60-61; Roberts 1982: 368, 368 n9; Matthew 2015: 43; Tarn 1930: 13; Markle 1977: 329, 332; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 165; Ray 2012: 90.

²¹⁹ Cross-trained – Gabriel 2009: 41; 2010: 71-72; Ashley 1998: 40; Anson 2010a: 84; Markle 1978: 491. *Aspis* – Griffith 1980: 59. *Sarissa* and *doru* – Diod. Sic. 17.100.6; Curt. 9.7.19; Worley 1994: 72; Snodgrass 1967: 119; Markle 1978: 491 n44; Spence 2002: 167; Cawkwell 1978b: 34.

The final innovation wrought on the Macedonian infantry was the creation of the *asthetairoi*. Like the *prodromoi* and *sarissophoroi*, the unit is first mentioned in the historical record in conjunction with Alexander but the battalion was almost certainly created by Philip.²²⁰ Whilst the etymology of the term is unclear, it can be interpreted securely as an indication the division comprised infantry recruited from Upper Macedonia and that its tactical role was a specialist one.²²¹ The *asthetairoi* were outfitted in hoplite panoply with the apparent intention to create a division more mobile than *pezhetairoi* but better protected than the *hypaspistai*.²²² Such a unit could be deployed in order to better protect a phalanx's flanks or provide increased versatility in situations where the *sarissa* was deficient. An example was in the case of sieges, where mobile but heavily armed troops were well-suited for the storming of a breach and street-fighting that followed – indeed it was in this context that *asthetairoi* were most commonly utilised.²²³

Philip's policy of fostering the growth of quality infantry was spectacularly successful. In 359, Perdikkas III – together with 4,000 of his troops – were slaughtered by Bardylis. It has been estimated that this represented between a third and one half of Macedonia's available military capacity at the time.²²⁴ By 358, however, a scant twelve months later, Philip was able to defeat the Illyrian king with a force that included 10,000 infantry – a significantly greater number than in any previous Macedonian army.²²⁵

²²⁰ Arr. *Anab.* 2.23.2, 4.23.2, 5.22.6, 6.6.1, 21.3, 7.11.3; Bosworth 1973: 250; 1980: 251-252; 1995: 330; Sekunda 2010: 457; Anson 2010a: 87; Fox 2015d: 374; Hammond 1978a: 131; 1989b: 63; 1991b: 404.

²²¹ Gabriel 2010: 217; Hammond 1989: 63; 1990: 274; 1991b: 404; 1994b: 36; Anson 2010a: 87; Ellis 1976: 246 n28; 1980b: 40; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 428, 713; Bosworth 1973: 250; 1995: 154-155, 330; Rzepka 2008: 41; Kleymeonov 2015: 68-69.

²²² Anson 2010a: 82, 84-85, 87; Kleymeonov 2015: 67, 71.

²²³ Arr. *Anab.* 2.23.2, 24.3, 4.23.1-3, 5.22.6-23.2, 6.6.1-5; Anson 2010a: 84-85; Matthew 2012a: 54; Sekunda 2010: 457; Kleymeonov 2015: 71, 74.

²²⁴ Diod. Sic. 16.2.4-5; Ellis 1976: 47; Green 1991: 22; Sekunda 2010: 449; Millett 2010: 487; Roisman 2010: 164; Müller 2010b: 166; Greenwalt 2010: 289; Hammond 1994a: 14.

²²⁵ Diod. Sic. 16.4.2-7; Borza 1990: 202; Ellis 1976: 53; Worthington 2014: 38; Sidnell 2006: 76; Matthew 2015: 25; Müller 2010b: 183; Greenwalt 2010: 290; Griffith 1935: 9; 1965: 129; 1980: 59; LaForse 2010: 555; Hammond 1980c: 58; Anson 2010b: 63.

Recruitment continued to be implemented successfully and at the Battle of Chaeronea (338), Philip fielded 30,000 infantry, most of which were Macedonian.²²⁶ As was the case with cavalry numbers, Philip's enlistment policies continued to bear fruit after his death so that by 334, Alexander's invasion force contained 24,000 Macedonian phalangites, with another 12,000 left in reserve with Antipater.²²⁷

In addition to the various conventional infantry and cavalry divisions, Philip's armies also incorporated *psiloi*, often, but not exclusively, comprised of levies from subject peoples who fought under Macedonian officers.²²⁸ *Toxotai* comprised one such unit and whilst many were mercenaries from Crete and Scythia, it is probable that contingents of ethnic Macedonians numbered amongst their ranks.²²⁹ *Sphendonetai* were also included in Philip's army and although many were likely foreign hirelings, it appears ethnic troops also featured.²³⁰ Another important infantry division were the *peltastai* of the various Thracian tribes that had been brought under Macedonian control. These included the Odrysians, Illyrians and Agrianes – the latter *corps* assuming particular importance during the time of Alexander.²³¹ As in the armies of Classical Greece, *psiloi* played little part in set piece

²²⁶ Diod. Sic. 16.85.5; Matthew 2015: 25; Ellis 1976: 198; 1980b: 40; Schwartz 2009: 239; Griffith 1935: 12; 1965: 129; Gabriel 2010: 215; Hammond 1994b: 149; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 596; Worthington 2008: 147; 2014: 85; Ashley 1998: 153; Green 1991: 72, 74; Roberts 1982: 36; Sekunda 2010: 468; Bradford 1992: 143.

²²⁷ Diod. Sic. 17.7.4-5; Worthington 2014: 38; Ellis 1976: 34, 54; Griffith 1965: 133; 1980: 59; Green 1991: 156-157; Rzepka 2008: 43; Sekunda 2010: 457; Gilley & Worthington 2010: 200; Burn 1965: 143-144.

²²⁸ Gabriel 2010: 70; Hammond 1994b: 123; Ellis 1976: 171; Sekunda 2010: 451; King 2018: 112; Burn 1965: 144-145; McQueen 1995b: 326; Ray 2012: 130; Bosworth 1988a: 263; Worthington 2008: 30.

²²⁹ *Toxotai* – Dem. 9.49; Diod. Sic. 17.17.4; Gilley & Worthington 2010: 192; Sekunda 2010: 451; Millett 2010: 488. Cretans – Arr. *Anab.* 1.8.3-4; Curt. 3.9.9; Serrati 2013b: 190; Snodgrass 1967: 115; Gabriel 2010: 184; Hammond 1994b: 113; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 431; Sekunda 2010: 451; Sidnell 2006: 77; Bosworth 1980: 83. Scythians – Gabriel 2010: 70; Worthington 2014: 38. Macedonians – Arr. *Anab.* 1.2.4; Brunt 1976d: lxx; Bosworth 1988a: 263; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 430-431; Sekunda 2010: 451, 458-459; Griffith 1935: 15.

²³⁰ *Sphendonetai* – Snodgrass 1967: 115; Hammond 1994b: 123; Lee 2001: 11, 13; Korfmann 1973: 41; Kelly 2012: 282; Nankov 2015: 2. Macedonians – Arr. *Anab.* 1.2.4; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 430; Lee 2001: 16.

²³¹ Odrysians – Diod. Sic. 17.17.4; Sidnell 2006: 77; Heckel 2008: 26; Millett 2010: 492. Illyrians – Diod. Sic. 17.17.4; Heckel 2008: 26; Millett 2010: 492. Agrianes – Arr. *Anab.* 1.14.1; 3.13.5; Curt. 3.9.9;

infantry battles past the initial skirmishing phase, but were nevertheless valuable troops whose main role lay in protecting the flanks of the phalanx against attack from cavalry and enemy missile troops, as well as operations on broken or mountainous terrain where their mobility made them effective.²³²

Another important element in the Macedonian war machine was its inclusion of mercenary troops. Philip had a reputation for employing mercenaries on a scale unseen previously in mainland Greece but although he did employ professional troops, the case has often been overstated and the Macedonian army remained essentially a national one.²³³ When Philip did draw on mercenaries they were, in the main, assigned specialist missions where the likelihood of high casualty rates made the use of citizen troops unacceptable. It also appears, like *poleis*, that Philip placed no great trust in his hired levies and was careful to ensure they were led by Macedonian officers; Calas, for example, commanded a unit of mercenaries in Philip's expeditionary force against Persia.²³⁴

Mercenaries were also deployed on operations abroad such as the establishment and maintenance of regimes friendly to Philip.²³⁵ Thus, for example, hired troops were involved in Macedonian-sponsored coups and coup attempts in Messenia, Argos, Megara and Euboea.²³⁶ In similar fashion, soldiers of fortune were allocated to details that entailed

Snodgrass 1967: 115; Gabriel 2010: 70; Worthington 2008: 30; Cawkwell 1978b: 35; King 2018: 112; Burn 1965: 145; Devine 1986: 268; Heckel 2008: 26.

²³² Arr. *Anab.* 1.1.11, 6.6, 14.1; Hammond 1994b: 153; Worthington 2008: 149; Ashley 1998: 154; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 432; Parke 1933: 156; Bosworth 1980: 117.

²³³ Use of mercenaries – Dem. 9.49, 58; Diod. Sic. 16.8.6-7; Gabriel 2010: 70; Cawkwell 1978b: 35; Bradford 1992: 58, 112; Anson 1985: 246; McQueen 1995a: 186. National army – Snodgrass 1967: 115; Anson 1985: 246; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 439-440; Yalichev 1997: 171; Griffith 1935: 10; McQueen 1995a: 186.

²³⁴ Calas – Diod. Sic. 17.7.10; Hammond 1994b: 113; Parke 1933: 162, 179; Milns 1978: 376; McCoy 1989: 424; Brunt 1963: 34.

²³⁵ Parke 1933: 163; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 439; Anson 1985: 246; Yalichev 1997: 172; Griffith 1935: 12.

²³⁶ Messenia and Argos – Dem. 6.15; Did. 1.5-9; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 439, 478; Griffith 1935: 10; Parke 1933: 163; Harding 2006a: 103. Megara – Dem. 19.87; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 439, 478-479; Griffith 1935: 10-11; Parke 1933: 163. Euboea – Dem. 9.33, 58; 19.204; Parke 1933: 163-164; Cawkwell

extended service and as such were often used as occupation troops.²³⁷ Phocis, for example, was garrisoned with Philip's mercenaries; so too was the strategically important *polis* of Nicaea, which controlled the pass of Thermopylae.²³⁸ Siege warfare was another area where mercenaries were often employed. Sometimes this was in a specialist role such as the manning of artillery, whereas on other occasions it was in high risk operations including assaults on breaches and subsequent street fighting, such as occurred in 353/2 with Philip's capture of Pharcedon.²³⁹ Mercenary troops were also part of the Macedonian expeditionary force under Parmenion that in 336 spearheaded the invasion of Asia – another operation where high numbers of casualties were a real possibility.²⁴⁰

A further tangible benefit to Philip of having a significant mercenary force at his disposal was that it allowed him to conduct multiple operations in the same season – or at least in rapid succession. In all, Philip waged twenty-eight campaigns during his reign and in 356 alone was engaged in three theatres of war.²⁴¹ The first of these was the siege of Potidaea, prosecuted successfully by Philip himself. Shortly afterwards, and in response to an appeal from the settlement's inhabitants threatened by a Thracian invasion, the Macedonian king moved speedily to seize Crenides opportunistically (which he later

1980a: 105; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 439, 478-479; Markle 1976: 92; English 2012: 124; Yalichev 1997: 172; Griffith 1935: 10-11; Harding 2006a: 104.

²³⁷ Gabriel 2010: 70; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 439; Anson 1985: 246; Cawkwell 1978b: 48; English 2012: 125; Griffith 1935: 12; King 2018: 112.

²³⁸ Phocis – Dem. 19.81; Parke 1933: 163. Nicaea – Dem. 9.32; Did. 11.25-29, 45-49; Parke 1933: 163; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 587; Harding 2006a: 224, 227-228; Worthington 2014: 68; Müller 2010b: 176; Cawkwell 1963a: 207.

²³⁹ Artillery – Adcock 1957: 22; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 448. Assaults – Polyæn. 4.2.18; Gabriel 2010: 21, 70; Parke 1933: 162; Hammond 1994b: 113; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 439.

²⁴⁰ Diod. Sic. 16.91.2, 17.7.10; Just. 9.5.8; Polyæn. 5.44.4; Ellis 1976: 219; Ruzicka 2010: 9; Zahrnt 2009: 25; Heckel 2009b: 27; Badian 1963: 246, 247, 249; Müller 2010b: 179; Olbrycht 2010: 350; Brunt 1963: 34; English 2012: 124.

²⁴¹ Karunanithy 2013: 4; Müller 2010b: 171-172; Griffith 1965: 134; Dell 1980: 94; Gabriel 2010: 7; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 246-247; McQueen 1995a: 85.

renamed Philippi).²⁴² Whilst engaged in these campaigns, Philip was still able to call on sufficient troops – many no doubt mercenaries – to provide Parmenion with the necessary manpower to repel an attempted Illyrian invasion.²⁴³

III. Professionalism

What becomes apparent, therefore, is that Macedonia's rise was due, in some measure, to the king's foresight in recognising the superiority of a truly combined arms force over the one-dimensional armies of *poleis* in which hoplites, cavalry and *psiloi* operated as separate entities rather than a fully integrated whole. Philip's personal qualities and their contribution to Macedonian hegemony are further in evidence with the determination he displayed in raising the professionalism of his military to a standard that exceeded that of the largely amateur armies of the city-states. In part, this was achieved by making military service an attractive proposition for Macedonian citizens. One obvious method was through financial incentives and under Philip, soldiering became a paid profession. *Pezhetairoi* earned twenty-five *drachmai* a month and *hypaspistai* one *drachme* daily; cavalrymen were paid three *drachmai* per day although from this they had to support their horse.²⁴⁴

Above the basic wage there were also extra-ordinary awards for ability and bravery. Sometimes this was realised as a permanent increase in remuneration as in the case of “ten

²⁴² Potidaea – Dem. 4.35; Diod. Sic. 16.8.5; Plut. *Alex.* 3; Hammond 1994b: 247; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 246; Natoli 2004a: 131; Hamilton 2002b: 8; McQueen 1995a: 75. Crenides – Hammond & Griffith 1979: 247; Bosworth 1988a: 8; Green 1991: 31; Bellinger 1964: 29; Sidnell 2006: 77; Koukouli-Chrysanthaki 2015a: 439; Dahmen 2010: 49; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 257.

²⁴³ Plut. *Alex.* 3; Just. 12.16.6; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 246-247; Zahrt 2009: 13; Green 1991: 1-2; Bosworth 1988a: 9, 291; Greenwalt 2010: 291; Müller 2010b: 172; Dell 1980: 94; Errington 1990: 42; Hamilton 2002b: 8; Worthington 2013: 65; King 2018: 76; Tod 1950: 170.

²⁴⁴ *IG* ii³ 329; Diod. Sic. 17.64.6; Curt. 5.1.45; Gabriel 2010: 83; Ellis 1976: 54; Worthington 2008: 30; 2014: 33; Sekunda 2010: 465; Tarn 1922: 201.

stater men” and “double-pay men”, who received forty and fifty *drachmai* per month respectively.²⁴⁵ Cash payments, financed by the capture of booty, were also made to those who had distinguished themselves on campaign.²⁴⁶ Such a grant, funded by the sale of captives, was made in 348 following the fall of Olynthus.²⁴⁷ Another much prized reward, especially amongst the Companion troops, was land.²⁴⁸ Recognising this, estates were awarded by Philip from the holdings of conquered populations, such as the redistributions that followed the sacking of Methone.²⁴⁹ Tangible benefits for military service and excellence in the field not only attracted recruits on the basis of financial reward but also that of social advancement. In enabling these ambitions to be realised, Philip not only increased the size of his armies, he also generated amongst his troops strong feelings of loyalty.²⁵⁰

This move towards professionalism led in some quarters to the rather simplistic observation that Philip achieved his success solely because he was able to maintain an army in the field permanently.²⁵¹ It is true that Philip was not limited by seasonal restrictions in the way that hoplite armies were; he could, and did, campaign all year round.²⁵² For

²⁴⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 7.23.3; Gabriel 2010: 83; Ellis 1976: 54; Ellis 1980b: 40-41; Bosworth 1988a: 273; Sidnell 2006: 78; McQueen 1995b: 327. Sekunda 2010: 465 points out that these pay rates applied by the end of Alexander’s reign and that an earlier rate of pay for *hypaspistai* was one *drachme* per day. English 2012: 16; Trundle 2004: 96 note that Alexander paid *hypaspistai* 40 *drachmai* per month.

²⁴⁶ Diod. Sic. 16.53.3, 75.3-4, 86.6; Karunanithy 2013: 100; Sekunda 2010: 465; Worthington 2014: 33; Psoma 2012b: 84.

²⁴⁷ Diod. Sic. 16.53.2-3; Millett 2010: 496; Samuel 1988: 1276; King 2018: 82; Hammond 1994b: 52; Bradford 1992: 63-64; McQueen 1995a: 124.

²⁴⁸ Dem. 19.145; Plut. *Alex.* 15; Ath. 6.261a; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 366; Hammond 1994b: 39; Worthington 2008: 30; Ellis 1976: 55; Sekunda 2010: 468; King 2010: 380; 2018: 82; Fox 2015d: 373; Hamilton 2002b: 37.

²⁴⁹ Diod. Sic. 16.34.5; Bradford 1992: 63-64; Hatzopoulos 1996: 180, 181; Ashley 1998: 126; Cawkwell 1978b: 37; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 357, 361; Worthington 2013: 69; King 2018: 77; Millett 2010: 490, 492; McQueen 1995a: 101.

²⁵⁰ Dem. 2.17; Diod. Sic. 16.93.9; Frontin. 4.7.37; Worthington 2014: 38; Sekunda 2010: 465; Ellis 1976: 8; Gabriel 2010: 54; King 2010: 380; Carney 1996: 28; Fox 2015d: 373; Errington 1990: 100.

²⁵¹ Dem. 8.11; 9.50; Sekunda 2010: 450-451; Curteis 1890: 34; Anson 1985: 246.

²⁵² Year-round campaigning – Dem. 8.44; 9.50; 18.235; Runciman 1998: 744; Griffith 1980: 59; Sekunda 2010: 450-451; King 2018: 94; Ellis 1966: 639; Gabriel 2010: 14, 122; Buckler 1989: 181-185; McQueen 1995a: 186.

example, the 358 Paeonian offensive commenced early spring and continued into summer with the invasion of Illyria – a campaign that concluded with the defeat of Bardylis.²⁵³

Philip conducted operations in Scythia during the winter of 339, whereas his invasion of Boeotia that culminated in the Battle of Chaeronea took place in the late summer of 338.²⁵⁴

Having professional troops under his command also provided Philip with the opportunity to train his army in a way that was impossible with citizen militias – a process that was continual and ongoing throughout his reign.²⁵⁵ Macedonian troops drilled all year round and rigorously, with forced marches in full kit of up to fifty-nine kilometres at a time not unusual.²⁵⁶ Punitive measures for disobeying orders were applied ruthlessly and even small luxuries such as taking a warm bath were discouraged.²⁵⁷ Philip himself appeared to have been particularly keen on arms' drills which he made into competitions, thus creating an intense rivalry between divisions to outdo one another, both on the parade ground and in battle.²⁵⁸

Importantly, Macedonian professionalism under Philip also extended into logistics – one critical aspect of which was meeting the troops' nutritional needs. This was not an insignificant challenge, as to produce the requisite amount of protein and number of

²⁵³ Diod. Sic. 16.4.1-4; Zahrnt 2009: 13; Greenwalt 2010: 290; Ellis 1980b: 38; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 212-213; Hammond 1981: 212; King 2018: 72; Gabriel 2010: 104.

²⁵⁴ Scythia – Just. 9.2.1-14, 3.1-3; Müller 2010b: 176; Gabriel 2010: xiii; King 2018: 94; Delev 2015: 51. Battle of Chaeronea – Plut. *Cam.* 19.5; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 594, 596; Müller 2010b: 177; Heckel 2009b: 26; Palagia 2010: 33; Bosworth 1988a: 16; Green 1991: 73; Ellis 1976: 197; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 160.

²⁵⁵ Diod. Sic. 16.3.1; Pritchett 1974: 228-229; Parke 1933: 157; Gabriel 2010: 84; Carney 1996: 24-25, 28; McQueen 1995b: 327; Ashley 1998: 36; Worthington 2014: 36; Hammond 1980c: 56, 63.

²⁵⁶ Diod. Sic. 16.3.1; Polyæn. 4.2.10; Worley 1994: 159; Karunanithy 2013: 22, 31; Pritchett 1974: 213; Gabriel 2010: 84; Hammond 1994b: 26; Matthew 2015: 162, 211; Parke 1933: 158; King 2018: 110; Sekunda 2010: 449; Hanson 2005: 39; McQueen 1995a: 66.

²⁵⁷ Punishment – Polyæn. 4.2.3; Ael. *VH* 14.49; Sekunda 2010: 451; Karunanithy 2013: 31. Luxuries – Polyæn. 4.2.1; Ael. *VH* 14.49; Karunanithy 2013: 22; Carney 1996: 27; Griffith 1935: 247; Parke 1933: 158.

²⁵⁸ Diod. Sic. 16.3.1; Karunanithy 2013: 22; Lendon 2005: 129; Hammond 1994b: 150; Parke 1933: 157; Müller 2010b: 168; Worthington 2014: 38; Carney 1996: 28; McQueen 1995a: 66.

calories for a soldier on active duty required 1.8 kilograms of grain per day.²⁵⁹ In addition, a daily water ration of no less than two litres per man was needed in order to retain functional hydration levels.²⁶⁰

Hoplites of Classical Athens were required to organise their own supplies (including transportation) for the initial stages of a campaign.²⁶¹ The length of time this amounted to varied from one day to a week, depending upon the operation.²⁶² It was thereafter the responsibility of the *strategoí*, in conjunction with the state, to provision the army for up to a thirty day period.²⁶³ After that – or even earlier if the *strategos* was a disorganised one – troops were forced to acquire supplies by whatever means possible. One option was to purchase stores from local markets or rely on donations from sympathetic settlements.²⁶⁴ Prices were often extortionate, however, and even with the greatest of goodwill, most towns and villages could only support an army for a limited period.²⁶⁵ Foraging (or pillaging, depending on perspective) provided another means by which supplies could be acquired. At times a viable proposition, it was nonetheless a dangerous practice as troops dispersed

²⁵⁹ Engels 1980: 124; Gabrielsen 1994: 120. Rawlings 2007: 75; Ashley 1998: 80; Gabriel & Metz 1991: 23 calculate approximately 1.5 kilograms of food per combatant. Holoka 1997: 341; Roth 1999: 67 advocate one kilogram of food. Hdt. 7.187; Thuc. 4.16.1; Thorne 2001: 235; Michell 2014: 132; Roth 1999: 19; Hornblower 2008: 169 indicate one *choinix* of wheat or two *choinices* of the less nutritional barley.

²⁶⁰ Engels 1980: 125; Waterfield 2009b: 107; 341; Holoka 1997: 341; Matthew 2015: 131; Gabrielsen 1994: 120; Roth 1999: 37; Ashley 1998: 80. Gabriel & Metz 1991: 23 estimate 2.61 litres per man under adverse climatic conditions.

²⁶¹ Lys. 16.14; Pritchett 1971: 32; Connor 1988: 11; Anderson 1970: 47; Alcock 2006: 207; Hanson 1999a: 249; Rawlings 2007: 158; 2013: 14; Crowley 2012: 151 n126; Lee 2013: 145.

²⁶² One day – Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.18; Anderson 1970: 48; Pritchett 1971: 32. Three days – Aristoph. *Pax* 312; *Ach.* 197; Pritchett 1971: 34; Ridley 1979: 521; Sekunda 2013: 206; van Wees 2004: 104; Lee 2010b: 494; Christ 2001: 403; Anderson 1970: 48. Five days – Plut. *Phoc.* 24; Polyæn. 3.12.1; Anderson 1970: 48; Pritchett 1971: 33. Seven days – Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.41; Anderson 1970: 48; Pritchett 1971: 33.

²⁶³ Tod 72; *IG* i³ 83 ll. 20-25; Thuc. 2.10.1, 5.47.6, 6.22.1; Gomme 1956a: 12-13; Pritchett 1971: 32; Anderson 1970: 48, 52; Serrati 2013a: 318, 323; Sage 1996: 55.

²⁶⁴ Hdt. 7.176; Thuc. 1.62.1, 6.44.1-3; Xen. *An.* 4.8.22, 8.24, 6.1.1, 2.2-3; *Hell.* 7.2.17-18; Diod. Sic. 13.3.4; Sekunda 2013: 209; Rawlings 2013: 14, 15; van Wees 2004: 105; Pritchett 1971: 45; Gomme 1956a: 13, 252; 1959: 219; Gomme & Andrewes 1970: 45; English 2012: 75-76; Trundle 2004: 88; Lee 2007: 22; Hutchinson 2000: 43, 56, 58; Anderson 2001: 90; Griffith 1935: 269; Dillery 1995: 67, 79.

²⁶⁵ Prices – Xen. *An.* 4.8.8; Anderson 1970: 51; 2001: 90; van Wees 2004: 105; Hutchinson 2000: 43; Lee 2007: 24. Limited ability – Xen. *An.* 4.8.8; Dalby 1992: 24; Pritchett 1971: 42; Lee 2007: 24.

over large expanses were vulnerable to attack.²⁶⁶ In desperate circumstances, therefore, troops were forced occasionally to eat their own pack animals.²⁶⁷

Less is known about the logistical organisation of the Spartan army although it appears the *polis* sometimes provided for the long-term provisioning of its armies.²⁶⁸ Agesilaus, for example, carried with him six months' worth of supplies when he invaded Asia.²⁶⁹ This may not, however, have been standard practice – Agesilaus was a Spartan king – as neither Dercylidas (399) nor Teleutias (386), both of whom commanded armies of invasion, were awarded provisions by the *ephoroi*.²⁷⁰

A further logistical consideration faced by commanders of Classical armies was providing for the many non-combatants who routinely accompanied the troops. Some such as entertainers, prostitutes and children were of little military value other than perhaps in boosting morale.²⁷¹ Traders (*laphyropolai*), often appointed by the state, also travelled with armies of invasion seeking to acquire cheaply the spoils of war – including human chattels – from troops eager for ready cash.²⁷² Other non-combatants provided a far more supportive

²⁶⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.27-28, 2.2, 5.1.13-24, Pritchett 1971: 39; Rawlings 2013: 15; Ridley 1979: 521; Lee 2007: 22-23; Dillery 1995: 67, 79. Vulnerability – Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.27-28, 3.2.3-5; *An.* 3.5.2, 6.4.24; Diod. Sic. 14.25.8; van Wees 2004: 106; English 2012: 74; Hutchinson 2000: 201; Anderson 2001: 116; Lee 2007: 39; Hornblower 1997: 249.

²⁶⁷ Xen. *An.* 1.5.5-6; Plut. *Art.* 24.1; Lee 2007: 24; Shrimpton 1991a: 17; Hutchinson 2000: 43; Anderson 1970: 51; 2001: 90; Bassett 2002: 448; Dillery 1995: 68, 79.

²⁶⁸ Thuc. 3.1.3, 5.72.3; Xen. *Lac.* 11.2, 13.4; *Hell.* 5.4.17; Pritchett 1971: 42; van Wees 2004: 105; Cartledge 1977: 17; 128, 205; Hammond 1983a: 29, 30, 31; Mojsik 2011: 88; Gomme 1956a: 252; Sekunda 2014b: 59-60.

²⁶⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.3; Pritchett 1971: 44; Cartledge 1987: 213-214.

²⁷⁰ Dercylidas – Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.26-28, 2.2; Pritchett 1971: 39; Westlake 1986: 409. Teleutias – Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.14; Anderson 1970: 54-55; Gray 2007: 345.

²⁷¹ Xen. *An.* 4.3.30, 6.1.12; *Hell.* 3.4.22; Ath. 13.572f; Connor 1988: 11; Hindley 2010: 83; Golden 1998: 1-2; Dalby 1992: 18; Sekunda 2016: 163; Gabriel & Metz 1991: 25; Lee 2007: 267.

²⁷² Xen. *Cyr.* 6.2.38-39; *An.* 4.1.12-14, 5.4, 6.3.3; *Ages.* 1.21; *Hell.* 3.2.26, 4.1.26; Diod. Sic. 14.79.2; Plut. *Ages.* 31; *Mor.* 209C; Connor 1988: 11; Sekunda 2016: 163; Pritchett 1971: 90; 1991: 425-426, 429; Rawlings 2013: 13.

role to military operations: carpenters, bakers, stonemasons, leatherworkers and smiths were regarded as essential on campaign.²⁷³

Another body of men that travelled with hoplite armies were attendants. Athenian infantrymen were accompanied by at least one *skeuophoros* (baggage carrier).²⁷⁴ Usually slaves, *skeuophoroi* performed a variety of duties including carrying a hoplite's provisions, personal effects, weapons and armour.²⁷⁵ Hoplite attendants assisted wounded troops from the battlefield and although it appears that they were not required to take an active combat role, casualties are recorded; whether this was as a result of collateral damage or because they were occasionally pressed into service during emergencies is not attested.²⁷⁶

Spartan hoplites on campaign were also attended by servants, and although the Lacedaemonian *skeuophoroi* performed the same basic duties as those of their Athenian counterparts, they sometimes participated in battle.²⁷⁷ At Plataea, for example, Herodotus recounts that the 35,000 helot attendants were equipped as light-armed auxiliaries and despite the fact that their role in combat is not actually attested, casualties would suggest they were involved in some way with the fighting.²⁷⁸ Evidence exists, however, that Spartan

²⁷³ Thuc. 6.22.1, 44.1; Xen. *Cyr.* 6.2.37; Connolly 2012: 44; Kagan 2005: 268; Anderson 1970: 45; Gomme & Andrewes 1970: 259, 311; Pritchett 1971: 41-42; Brice 2013: 624-625.

²⁷⁴ Hdt. 7.229; Thuc. 3.17.4, 7.75.5; Theophr. *Char.* 25.4; Sekunda 2000: 20; Pritchett 1971: 49-50; Ducrey 1986: 202; Hanson 2000: 62; Hammond 1983a: 27; Sidnell 2006: 57; How & Wells 2008: 630; van Wees 2004: 68; Krentz 2007a: 152; Sekunda 2016: 163; Ray 2009: 15; Hunt 1997: 134.

²⁷⁵ Slaves – Paus. 1.32.3, 7.15.7; Spence 2002: 326; Pritchett 1971: 51 n120; Ridley 1979: 510 n8; Sekunda 2000: 20; 2013: 207; 2016: 163; van Wees 2004: 70-71; Sears 2013: 247. Duties – Thuc. 7.75.5; Xen. *An.* 4.2.21; *Hell.* 4.8.39; Hanson 2000: 61-62; Sekunda 2000: 20; 2013: 207; 2016: 163; van Wees 2004: 68; Pritchett 1971: 51; Krentz 2007a: 152; Sage 1996: 58; Lee 2007: 256.

²⁷⁶ Thuc. 4.101.2; Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.9; Pritchett 1971: 50-51; Gomme 1956b: 571; van Wees 2004: 68-69; Hansen 2011: 251; Ridley 1979: 510 n8; Lee 2007: 256; Holladay 1982: 96 n13.

²⁷⁷ Basic duties – Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.14, 8.39; Lazenby 2005: 89; Sage 1996: 58; Lee 2007: 25; van Wees 2004: 68. Active role – Hdt. 9.29, 85; Thuc. 4.80.3, 7.58.3; Ducrey 1986: 215; Lazenby 2012: 59; Cartledge 1987: 137-138; Gomme & Andrewes 1970: 440; How & Wells 2008: 724; Hunt 1997: 133; Talbert 1989: 23-24; Hansen 2011: 251.

²⁷⁸ *Helot* presence – Hdt. 9.10, 29; Paus. 4.11.1; Rusch 2011: 58, 65; Hansen 2011: 242; van Wees 2004: 181; Talbert 1989: 24; Hammond 1996b: 16-17; Matthew 2012a: 178-179; How & Wells 2008: 722-723; Cawkwell 1989: 388; Braun 1994: 43; Roisman 2017: 18. Casualties – Hdt. 9.85; Lazenby 1993: 227; Roberts 2015: 144; Hunt 1997: 130; 1998: 33; Kelly 1981: 33; How & Wells 2008: 751.

skeuophoroi did not always take an active combat role. When recounting the events surrounding Pylos (425), Thucydides informs:

καὶ διέβησαν μὲν καὶ ἄλλοι πρότερον κατὰ διαδοχὴν, οἱ δὲ τελευταῖοι καὶ ἐγκαταληφθέντες εἴκοσι καὶ τετρακόσιοι ἦσαν καὶ Εἴλωτες οἱ περὶ αὐτούς· ἦρχε δ' αὐτῶν Ἐπιτάδας ὁ Μολόβρου (Thuc. 4.8.9).

Several detachments had before this time crossed over, one group relieving another; the last to do so—and this is the force that was captured—numbering four hundred and twenty, besides the Helots who accompanied them, and they were under the command of Epitadas son of Molobrus (trans. Smith, 1919).

Later he adds:

Ἀθηναίους δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἀνδράσι σῖτον ἕαν τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ Λακεδαιμονίους ἐσπέμπειν τακτὸν καὶ μεμαγμένον, δύο χοίνικας ἐκάστῳ Ἀττικὰς ἀλφίτων καὶ δύο κοτύλας οἴνου καὶ κρέας, θεράποντι δὲ τούτων ἡμίσεια (Thuc. 4.16.1).

The Athenians were to permit the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to send flour to the men on the island, a fixed amount and already-kneaded, for each soldier two quarts of barley-meal and a pint of wine and a ration of meat, and for each servant half as much (trans. Smith, 1919).

What Thucydides indicates is that Spartan hoplites – at least in the Pylos campaign – were accompanied by helots, who acted as attendants rather than auxiliary troops.²⁷⁹ This

²⁷⁹ Pritchett 1971: 49; van Wees 2004: 68; Samons 2006: 534; Hansen 2011: 251; Hornblower 1996: 169.

is implied firmly by Thucydides' use of the term *θεράποντι* (servant), a designation with decidedly civilian – as opposed to military – connotations.

Be that as it may, as a result of *skeuophoroi* and many other non-combatants, even a very small Greek army had a very large baggage-train.²⁸⁰ This reduced its speed of advance – a limitation compounded by the fact that when on campaign, armies often required the transportation of heavy items such as tents, timber, and cooking fuel; something upon which pack animals (inevitably bovids), either on their backs or by cart, were relied upon to achieve.²⁸¹ Compared to other beasts of burden, oxen are slow-moving, able to manage only 11-13 kilometres per day.²⁸² Soft hooves meant that they were unable to trek long distances and could only be worked for five hour shifts, significantly less than the eight hours a horse or mule could endure.²⁸³ Furthermore, like the troops, pack animals had nutritional requirements that needed to be met: each beast required 4.5 kilograms of fodder per day and at least the same weight again in grain – that in addition to a minimum daily water ration of twenty litres.²⁸⁴

Logistical constrictions such as those discussed had a negative impact upon the tactical objectives of *strategoï* in many ways. If it is allowed, for the purposes of example, that even a modest army of 10,000 troops was accompanied by 3,300 non-combatants and 400 beasts, a simple calculation reveals that each day 21,960 kilograms of grain and 26,600

²⁸⁰ Thuc. 7.75.4-5, 78.2; Kagan 2005: 316; Ober 2005: 175; Connor 1988: 11; Gomme & Andrewes 1970: 452; Hutchinson 2000: 43; Gabriel & Metz 1991: 25; Hornblower 2008: 711, 1065.

²⁸¹ Xen. *An.* 3.3.1, 4.1.13; Arr. *Anab.* 1.3.6, 19.9; Polyæn. 4.2.20; Sekunda 2000: 21; Hammond 1983a: 29; Engels 1980: 12, 16-17, 17 n19; Anderson 2001: 122; Best 1969: 58; Gabriel & Metz 1991: 24.

²⁸² Gabriel 2010: 85; Engels 2013: 353. Gabriel & Metz 1991: 24 document sixteen kilometres under ideal conditions. Krentz 2007a: 153; Rawlings 2007: 75 document 15-32 kilometres per day.

²⁸³ Engels 1980: 15, 2013: 355; Rawlings 2007: 75; Gabriel & Metz 1991: 24-25. For endurance of the horse – Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.15-17; Spence 1995: 36-38; Gaebel 2002: 138; Buckler 1980: 212; Worley 1994: 146.

²⁸⁴ Engels 1980: 8, 15, 18; Waterfield 2009b: 107; Krentz 2007a: 162; Roth 1999: 66-67 Table IV. Thorne 2001: 245 calculates 6.8 kilograms of fodder and 11 kilograms of grain. Krentz 2007a: 153 notes equids consume between seven and eight kilograms of fodder per day.

litres of water were required to meet human dietary needs. Combined with the 3,600 kilograms of fodder and 8,000 litres of water needed by pack animals, *strategoï* of hoplite armies were faced with the challenge of securing 25,560 kilograms of grain and 34,600 litres of water every day of the campaign.²⁸⁵ Such demands not only dictated when offensives took place but also how long an army could remain in the field. Agis' 425 invasion of Attica, for example, lasted only fifteen days until it was aborted when provisions were exhausted.²⁸⁶ Logistical considerations also dictated the lines of march available to invasion forces, so severely curtailing the element of surprise as a tactical advantage.²⁸⁷

Philip was clearly aware of the logistical limitations that restricted the effectiveness of Classical Greek armies and devised innovations to improve efficiency. It has already been seen that in order to “streamline” his baggage-train, Macedonian soldiers were required to carry the greater part of their own accoutrement. This was in addition to the thirty days' worth of flour, equating to around forty kilograms in weight, each phalangite was expected to bear. Philip also did away with ox-drawn wagons when he became one of the first to employ equids as pack animals.²⁸⁸ The move was an intelligent one. Macedonia possessed few oxen and existing stock was reserved for agricultural purposes: in any event, equids proved able to transport one hundred kilograms of baggage fifty kilometres a day and on half the forage required by an ox.²⁸⁹ Philip also reduced to a minimum the number

²⁸⁵ Non-combatants – Lang 1992: 26. Animals – Lee 2007: 136. Hanson 1999b: 86 calculates an army of 70,000 would have required 1.5 million pounds of grain, forage and water per day.

²⁸⁶ Thuc. 4.6.1-2; Pritchett 1971: 38-39; Kagan 1974: 223; 1981: 108-109; 2005: 139; Smith 1853a: 72; Gomme 1956b: 441; Hanson 1998: 135-136.

²⁸⁷ Ober 2005: 175.

²⁸⁸ Plut. *Mor.* 178A, 790B; Frontin. 4.1.6; Gabriel 2010: 85; Pritchett 1971: 50; Ashley 1998: 26; Karunanithy 2013: 173; Sekunda 2010: 465; 2016: 163; Carney 1996: 25; McGroarty 2006: 117; Parke 1933: 158; Hanson 2005: 38; Gabriel & Metz 1991: 26.

²⁸⁹ Ox numbers – Gabriel 2010: 85; Worthington 2008: 30. Equine efficiency – Ashley 1998: 26, 81; Gabriel 2010: 85-86; Engels 2013: 355; Thorne 2001: 243; Roth 1999: 66-67 Table IV; Gabriel & Metz 1991: 25.

of non-combatants that accompanied his armies. Cavalrymen were allowed one attendant each whereas the infantry was permitted only one servant (whose role it was to carry ropes and grain mills) per ten soldiers.²⁹⁰

As a result of these reforms, the Macedonian baggage-train was much reduced in size, so presenting Philip with a number of tactical advantages over opponents well-accustomed to the limitations of hoplite armies.²⁹¹ Very importantly was the speed with which Philip's armies could travel. Xenophon's Cyreans had demonstrated that a hoplite force, even under ideal conditions and in short bursts, could only travel at around 3.25 kilometres per hour, or around twenty-six kilometres in a day's march.²⁹² Philip – at least on the expectation of Demosthenes – was capable of nearly double that over short distances and even on extended forced marches cover five hundred kilometres in thirteen days – an average speed of 4.8 kilometres per hour.²⁹³ Another advantage of a smaller baggage-train was that it improved the army's range before it was forced to halt for supplies. The thirty days' worth of flour carried by each man meant that Philip's armies (providing water was available) had an operating range of 576 kilometres from its supply source.²⁹⁴ Not only that, but they could traverse paths and passes previously regarded as unusable – as

²⁹⁰ Frontin. 4.1.6; Pritchett 1971: 50; 1974: 229; Gabriel 2010: 86; Sekunda 2010: 464-465; 2016: 163; Hammond 1983a: 27; 1994b: 26; Carney 1996: 25; Parke 1933: 158; Hanson 2005: 38.

²⁹¹ Ashley 1998: 26-27; Ober 2005: 191; Engels 2013: 356; English 2009b: 30; Hanson 2005: 39; Gabriel 2009: 3; 2010: 58.

²⁹² Ridley 1979: 515; Waterfield 2009b: 106; Krentz 2007a: 161.

²⁹³ So Demosthenes' claim that Philip could march from Chaeronea to Athens (a modern journey of 140 kilometres) in three days – Dem. 18.195; Krentz 2007a: 161. Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.4-7; English 2009b: 35; Gilley & Worthington 2010: 191; O'Brien 1994: 53; Worthington 2014: 131; Green 1991: 142; Cawkwell 1978b: 157; Hamilton 1965: 123 indicate that in 335 Alexander III marched from Pelion (modern Gorna Gorica, Albania?) to quash the Theban rebellion: a journey of thirteen days and four hundred kilometres; a speed of 3.8 kilometres an hour if an eight hour day is assumed.

²⁹⁴ A calculation based on an eight hour day with an average speed of 4.8 kilometres per hour and allowing for the return journey. Ashley 1998: 82 arrives at a similar figure but with an undisclosed method of calculation.

evidenced by Philip's winter campaign in Thrace (342/1).²⁹⁵ This increase in speed and range enabled Macedonian generals the very real military advantage of surprise – an element exploited to good effect in 356 by Parmenion over the Paenonians and Illyrians, again at Elataea (339), and during 338 with Philip's invasion of Boeotia.²⁹⁶

Another way in which Philip improved the professionalism of his military was in the quality of its leadership. Although as king he ultimately decided upon strategy and policy, Philip was careful to surround himself with a cadre of talented commanders and advisors.²⁹⁷ Such a group had the potential to assist with the formulation of long-term strategies, help resist “knee-jerk” reactions to temporary setbacks (as happened against Onomarchus in 354), or counsel moderation in the face of success – like that at Chaeronea.²⁹⁸

Whilst it was traditional practice for Macedonian kings to appoint an inner circle – the original *hetairoi* – Philip was either extremely lucky (but more likely adept) in his choice of advisors.²⁹⁹ The foremost example was Parmenion, who by 359 was a *basileus* (king) of Pelagonia in Upper Macedonia and a powerful individual in his own right.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁵ Demos. 8.44-45; Hammond 1994b: 124; Gabriel 2010: 185; Cawkwell 1978b: 117; King 2018: 89; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 557; Ellis 1976: 166-167; Worthington 2008: 133-134; Ashley 1998: 139.

²⁹⁶ 356 – Diod. Sic. 16.22.3; Plut. *Alex.* 3; Gabriel 2010: 114; Hamilton 2002b: 8. 339 – Ober 2005: 191; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 589; Guler 2014: 132; Worthington 2008: 141-142; 2013: 241-242; Cawkwell 1978b: 142; Hammond 1994b: 144; Gabriel 2010: 206. 338 – Dem. 18.169; Diod. Sic. 16.84.2-3; Ober 2005: 191; Adcock 1957: 77; Harding 2006a: 226; McQueen 1995a: 156-157.

²⁹⁷ Plut. *Mor.* 177C-D; Gabriel 2010: 56, 84; Hammond 1994b: 185-186; Strootman 2013: 41, 43; LaForse 2010: 554; Anson 2010c: 10; King 2010: 382; Sawada 2010: 404; Carney 2010a: 414; McQueen 1995b: 327; Griffith 1965: 134.

²⁹⁸ Plut. *Alex.* 11; Arr. *Anab.* 1.24.4-5, 5.25.2; Curt. 4.11.1; Just. 9.4.1-3; Polyæn. 2.38.2; Gabriel 2010: 56-58; Hammond 1994b: 186; Mitchell 2010: 379; Sawada 2010: 396; Ashley 1998: 29; Mari 2015a: 79; Fox 2015c: 358.

²⁹⁹ Tradition – Hammond 1994b: 159; Bosworth 1988a: 7; Strootman 2013: 41; Mitchell 2010: 379; Anson 2010c: 10; King 2010: 382; Sawada 2010: 392; Hatzopoulos 2015a: 49.

³⁰⁰ Dell 1980: 94; Ellis 1976: 60; Müller 2010b: 180-181, 183; Greenwalt 2010: 294; Hammond 2003: 25; Badian 1964: 193; King 2018: 74. That *basileus* equates in status to that of king – King 2010: 375-376; Lazenby 2004: 12; Mitchell 2010: 378; Funke 2010: 181-182; Strootman 2013: 50; Luraghi 2013: 131, 133-134; Wallace 2013: 192.

Parmenion provided excellent service for Philip and in 336 (along with Attalus) was entrusted with command of the advance guard in the invasion of Asia.³⁰¹ Another of the king's inner circle trusted completely by Philip was Antipater.³⁰² A competent general, Antipater's real *forte* appears to have been administration and it was as regent that he governed Macedonia on Alexander's behalf until the king's death in 323.³⁰³

IV. Creation of a Nation-State

Just as Philip's foresight and determination were critical in establishing a highly professional combined arms force, so too was the energy and vision he displayed in moulding Macedonian nationhood. In this respect, the king's policies reflected the requirement for resources and territory necessary to fuel future expansion. Equally important – but not universally recognised – was that in order to be effective, assets needed to be mobilised efficiently and employed where and when they were most required. Just as much as through military supremacy, therefore, Macedonia's position of dominance was made possible by Philip's ability to forge a strong nation-state that enabled him to realise fully the potential of the resources at his command.³⁰⁴

³⁰¹ Victories – Diod. Sic. 16.22.3; Plut. *Alex.* 3; Zahrnt 2009: 13; Hamilton 2002b: 8; Greenwalt 2010: 291-292; Müller 2010b: 172; McQueen 1995a: 85. Only general – Plut. *Mor.* 177C; Stark 1958: 103; Bradford 1992: 53; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 688. Command – Diod. Sic. 16.91.2; Just. 9.5.8; Polyæn. 5.44.4; Cawkwell 1978b: 177; Green 1991: 32, 98; Brunt 1963: 34; Bosworth 1986: 115; O'Brien 1994: 34; Matthew 2015: 282; King 2018: 97; McQueen 1995a: 171.

³⁰² Plut. *Mor.* 179B; Bradford 1992: 95; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 681; Davis 2013: 23; Ellis 1981: 124; Heckel 2008: 561; Greenwalt 2010: 294; Gilley & Worthington 2010: 189; Müller 2010b: 174.

³⁰³ Military ability – Diod. Sic. 17.63.1-3; Curt. 6.1.1-16; Heckel 2009b: 37; Worthington 2013: 289; King 2018: 162, 180-181. Service of Alexander – Diod. Sic. 17.8.4, 65.1; Just. 11.7.1; Arr. *Anab.* 1.11.3; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 681; Bosworth 1988a: 35; Loukopoulou 2015: 471; Gilley & Worthington 2010: 199; Greenwalt 2010: 295; Worthington 2013: 283; King 2010: 375; 2018: 151, 178-179.

³⁰⁴ Just. 8.6.1-2; Cawkwell 1978b: 49; Rzepka 2008: 56; Karamitrou-Mentessidi 2015: 95, 97; Hatzopoulos 2015a: 45; Lacey 2015: 1-2; Ellis 1976: 92; Oliver 2010: 304-305; LaForse 2010: 352-353; Griffith 1965: 127.

Philip's achievement was truly remarkable, especially given the fractured nature of the realm he inherited and its humble origins. According to the oldest etiological myth, the kingdom had its beginnings in the seventh century with Perdiccas, a descendent of Temenus (himself the first Heraclid king of Argos) founding the Argead dynasty, members of which ruled for the next four hundred years.³⁰⁵ Macedonia's capital under Perdiccas was at Aegae and it remained so until Archelaus I transferred his court to Pella *c.*400.³⁰⁶ Archelaus' motives for the move are unclear but it has been observed that the new capital (in antiquity) had both access to the sea and was at the crossroads of the fledgling nation's main trade routes.³⁰⁷

It was from Aegae, however, that Perdiccas' descendents embarked upon an aggressive policy of expansion so that by the first half of the sixth century, Macedonia had subdued the regions of Pieria and Bottia, which henceforth became the heartland of the kingdom – a region that came to be known as Lower Macedonia.³⁰⁸ As such, the realm extended from the foothills of Mount Olympus, the Pierian Mountains, Mount Bermion and Mount Barnous east to the Thermaic Gulf including Lake Loudiake as well as the

³⁰⁵ Seventh century – Borza 1982a: 8; 1990: 176; Hatzopoulos 1996: 464; 2015a: 43, 47; Edson 1980: 10; Ellis 1976: 35; Worthington 2014: 14; King 2010: 378; Mari 2015a: 81; Sprawski 2010: 130; Thomas 2010: 67; Zahrnt 2009: 7. Perdiccas – Hdt. 8.137-138; Thuc. 2.99.3; Hatzopoulos 2015a: 47; 2015b: 56; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 3; Curteis 1890: 9; Mari 2015a: 81; Karamitrou-Mentessidi 2015: 95; Borza 1982a: 9; Sprawski 2010: 127; Engels 2010: 90; How & Wells 2008: 705-706. Temenus – Thuc. 2.99.3; Hatzopoulos 2015a: 47; Mari 2015a: 83; Asirvatham 2010: 101; Cartwright 1997: 132; Gomme 1956a: 246; Hornblower 1997: 375.

³⁰⁶ Aegae – Hammond & Griffith 1979: 7; Karamitrou-Mentessidi 2015: 94; Engels 2010: 90; Hatzopoulos 1996: 105-106; 2015a: 47; Worthington 2014: 14; Drougou 2015: 244; Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2015: 272, 276. Pella – Karamitrou-Mentessidi 2015: 94; Engels 2010: 92; Gabriel 2010: 36; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 6, 139-140, 150; Curteis 1890: 5; Hatzopoulos 1996: 466; Edson 1980: 23; Ellis 1980a: 164; Akamatis 2015: 393-394; Millett 2010: 480; Roisman 2010: 156.

³⁰⁷ Str. 7.frag.20, 23; Posma 2015: 124; Heskell 1997a: 169; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 150; Borza 1990: 41-42, 167-169; Greenwalt 1999: 160-161, 173; Errington 1990: 26; Akamatis 2015: 393; Roisman 2010: 156; King 2018: 8, 34, 43.

³⁰⁸ Thuc. 2.99.3; Str. 7.frag.20; Hatzopoulos 1996: 105, 169; Edson 1980: 10; Engels 2010: 87; Borza 1990: 29, 79-80; 1995: 57; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 55; Mari 2015a: 81, 84; Sprawski 2010: 133; Thomas 2010: 67, 74; Zahrnt 2009: 7; Dell 1980: 91; Gomme 1956a: 246; Cartwright 1997: 132.

Emathian Plain, an alluvial expanse formed by the rivers Haliacmon, Loudias and Axios.³⁰⁹ Resource rich, the holdings encompassed waterways abundant in fish, as well as fertile agricultural land suitable for the cultivation of cereals, vegetables and fruit.³¹⁰ Pasturage made possible not only the raising of cattle but more importantly, from the Macedonian standpoint, cavalry horses.³¹¹ Stands of high-quality timber were available for harvesting, with minerals such as copper and iron accessible in modest quantities.³¹² Lower Macedonia also, however, contained notorious marshes which contributed to endemic and virulent malaria in the swamplands – a situation that existed until very recent times.³¹³

Further Macedonian expansionism occurred in the early fifth century under Alexander I who, exploiting the void that followed Persian withdrawal from the region in 479, succeeded in both the acquisition of territory eastwards as far as the Strymon River and to the west of Mount Bermion.³¹⁴ Remote from Aegae and valuing their independence, the kingdoms of Upper Macedonia (as it became known) did not submit willingly but were

³⁰⁹ Mountains – Hatzopoulos 2015a: 45; 2015c: 236; Mari 2015a: 81. Emathian Plain – Hdt. 8.138; Thuc. 2.99.4; Str. 7.frag.20; Hatzopoulos 2015a: 45; Ellis 1976: 29; Hammond 1994b: 5; Mari 2015a: 81, 83; Sprawski 2010: 132-133; Curteis 1890: 5; Karamitrou-Mentessidi 2015: 94; Engels 2010: 87; Griffith 1965: 125; Gabriel 2010: 33; Worthington 2008: 6; Thomas 2010: 67-68; Greenwalt 2010: 279; Borza 1982c: 1; 1990: 31.

³¹⁰ Fisheries – Hdt. 5.16; Ael. *NA* 15.1; Ath. 3.77d-e; Thomas 2010: 70; Gabriel 2010: 44; Koukouli-Chrysanthaki 2015a: 159; Hammond 1995b: 173; Kremydi 2015: 159. Fertile plain – Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.16; Hatzopoulos 2015a: 48; Thomas 2010: 72; Kremydi 2015: 159; Gabriel 2010: 33; Worthington 2008: 6; 2014: 14; Ellis 1976: 33; Borza 1982c: 1; Fox 2015a: 234; Adam-Veleni 2015: 545-546; Hatzopoulos & Paschidis 2004: 798.

³¹¹ Eur. *Bacch.* 565-575; Thomas 2010: 70, 72; Kremydi 2015: 159; Ellis 1976: 33; Hammond 1994b: 5; 1998a: 416, 425; Worthington 2008: 6; Freeman 2011: 3; Spence 1995: 26; Archibald 2010b: 340; King 2018: 34.

³¹² Timber – Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.16; Hammond 1994b: 5; Worthington 2008: 6; Borza 1990: 38, 55; 1995: 66; Adam-Veleni 2015: 545-546; Kottaridi 2002: 78. Minerals – Thomas 2010: 72; Adam-Veleni 2015: 545-546; Hammond 1994b: 5; King 2018: 33.

³¹³ Hatzopoulos 2015a: 45; Thomas 2010: 67, 70; Borza 1982c: 17-18; 1990: 14, 31, 41, 44, 253; 1995: 57, 59, 70-71; Hammond 1995b: 174; Worthington 2008: 7; Heskell 1997a: 167; Hatzopoulos & Paschidis 2004: 798.

³¹⁴ Strymon – Hammond & Griffith 1979: 62, 69; Mari 2015a: 84, 86; Sprawski 2010: 133; Hatzopoulos 1996: 106; 2015c: 236-237; Edson 1980: 11, 15; Kremydi 2015: 161. Upper Macedonia – Thuc. 2.99.3; Str. 7.7.8, frag.12; Hatzopoulos 2015a: 45; Borza 1990: 30-31; Karamitrou-Mentessidi 2015: 94-95; Gomme 1956a: 247.

forced eventually into a greater Macedonian confederation with Alexander at its head.³¹⁵ To the east, the lands of Mygdonia and Krestonia were also added to the kingdom.³¹⁶ Thus by the end of his reign, Alexander I had succeeded in acquiring the territories of Lynkos (Lynkestis) including the Plain of Florina, Pelagonia, Paeonia, Elimeia, Eordaia, Almopia and Orestis.³¹⁷

Following Alexander's death in 454, the union largely collapsed, with Upper Macedonia in particular – although under the nominal control of Aegae – enjoying a fair degree of independence until reincorporated firmly and finally by Philip II. Lynkos, for example, was reintegrated *c.*358, as was Paeonia around the same time.³¹⁸ At some point Eordaia was reunited with Lower Macedonia, possibly in 350 when Orestis was restored to the Macedonian fold; Mygdonia was likewise coalesced *c.*348.³¹⁹ Philip, however, did not

³¹⁵ Just. 7.4.1-2; Thomas 2010: 74-76; Hatzopoulos 1996: 176; 2015a: 45; Ellis 1976: 36-37; Errington 1990: 41; Greenwalt 2010: 282; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 103; Borza 1990: 124; Sprawski 2010: 140-141.

³¹⁶ Mygdonia – Thuc. 2.99.4; Hatzopoulos 1996: 106, 170; 2015a: 45; 2015c: 237; Thomas 2010: 76; Sprawski 2010: 133; Bradford 1992: 5; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 62, 99; Errington 1990: 6, 12; Zahrnt 2009: 8; How & Wells 2008: 412. Krestonia – Thuc. 2.99.6; Hatzopoulos 2015a: 45; Thomas 2010: 75; Bradford 1992: 5; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 62, 99; Errington 1990: 6, 12; Zahrnt 2009: 8; Borza 1990: 119; Hornblower 1997: 375.

³¹⁷ Lynkos – Str. 7.frag.12; Mari 2015a: 83; Karamitrou-Mentessidi 2015: 94-95; Cawkwell 1978b: 36; Thomas 2010: 74; Worthington 2008: 6-7, 35; Hatzopoulos 2015a: 45; Bradford 1992: 5; Dell 1980: 94; Fox 2015c: 345; 2015d: 371; Bosworth 1971: 97, 99. Pelagonia – Str. 7.frag.12a; Karamitrou-Mentessidi 2015: 94-95; Thomas 2010: 74; Worthington 2008: 6-7, 35; Dell 1980: 94; Bosworth 1971: 98; Ellis 1976: 60; Errington 1990: 41. Paeonia – Thuc. 2.99.4; Hatzopoulos 1996: 106; 2015c: 237; 106. Elimeia – Str. 7.frag.12a; Mari 2015a: 83; Karamitrou-Mentessidi 2015: 93, 94-95; Thomas 2010: 74; Worthington 2008: 6-7, 35; Hatzopoulos 2015a: 45; Bradford 1992: 5; Bosworth 1971: 97-98, 101; Cawkwell 1978b: 36; Ellis 1976: 35; Borza 1990: 124. Eordaia – Thuc. 2.99.5; Hatzopoulos 2015a: 45; Karamitrou-Mentessidi 2015: 95; Borza 1990: 124; Errington 1990: 6; Bradford 1992: 5; Sprawski 2010: 133; Edson 1980: 15; Hornblower 1997: 375. Almopia – Thuc. 2.99.5; Bradford 1992: 5; Sprawski 2010: 133; Edson 1980: 15; Thomas 2010: 75. Orestis – Str. 7.frag.12a; Hatzopoulos 2015a: 45; Thomas 2010: 74; Karamitrou-Mentessidi 2015: 94-95; Bosworth 1971: 97-98; Hornblower 1997: 375.

³¹⁸ Lynkos – Diod. Sic. 16.8.1; Cawkwell 1978b: 41; Worthington 2008: 34; Bradford 1992: 15; Dell 1980: 94; Fox 2015c: 344-345; 2015d: 369; Ellis 1976: 58; Hammond 1994b: 117; Zahrnt 2009: 13; Borza 1990: 36, 210; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 652; King 2018: 73. Paeonia – Dem. 1.23; Isoc. *Dis.* 5.21; Diod. Sic. 16.4.2, 22.3; Cawkwell 1978b: 30; Worthington 2008: 33; 2014: 39; Bradford 1992: 13-14; Dell 1980: 95; Fox 2015d: 369; Zahrnt 2009: 13; Greenwalt 2010: 290; Curteis 1890: 24; Errington 1990: 41; Müller 2010b: 169; King 2018: 73.

³¹⁹ Eordaia – Cawkwell 1978b: 36; Worthington 2008: 6-7; Fox 2015d: 368; Hatzopoulos 1996: 207. Orestis – Fox 2015d: 368; Cawkwell 1978b: 36; Borza 1990: 210; Errington 1990: 41; Worthington 2008: 6-7, 35; Hatzopoulos 1996: 463. Mygdonia – Dem. 1.13; Hatzopoulos 1996: 190-191, 476.

restrict his expansionist policies to the recovery of territories held previously but also moved to include marchlands into his new nation-state. To the east the lands of Odomantike, Edonis, Sintike, Pieris and Bisaltia (including the great prize of Amphipolis, taken by siege in 358) were incorporated into the kingdom whilst in the west, the addition of Tymphaia and Parauaia extended Macedonian territory to Mount Pindos.³²⁰

Philip's ambitions for the expansion of Macedonia also extended to the acquisition of territory at the expense of foreign powers, in particular Illyria, Thrace and Chalcidice. Nullifying the threat of Illyria had been a priority of Philip's early years and was, in part, achieved by the defeat of the Dardanian king Bardylis in 358, a victory that returned Macedonian territory in the northwest and secured the Paeonian border.³²¹ Probably realising that a long-term conquest was almost impossible, Philip turned to "war by marriage" when in 357 he wed Olympias, niece of the then Dardanian king Arymbas – and daughter of the previous monarch Neoptolemus.³²² One tradition has it as a love-match but however unlikely that may have been, the union succeeded in its diplomatic intention with the Illyrian front remaining quiet for over a decade.³²³ By 345, however, the Dardanians again became a priority with a punitive campaign mounted by Macedonia for reasons now lost.³²⁴ In 342, Philip resolved the problem of his western borders once and for all when he

³²⁰ Eastern borders – Thuc. 2.99.3-4; Diod. Sic. 16.8.2; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 62, 99, 237; Sprawski 2010: 133; Thomas 2010: 75; Zahrt 2009: 8; Errington 1990: 6, 12; Hatzopoulos 2015a: 45-46; Borza 1990: 119; Bradford 1992: 5. Western marches – Hammond 1994b: 120; Cawkwell 1978b: 36; Errington 1990: 41; Hatzopoulos 1996: 463; 2015a: 45; 463; Thomas 2010: 75; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 507; Worthington 2008: 6-7; Bosworth 1971: 97.

³²¹ Fox 2015c: 335; Greenwalt 2010: 290-291; Ashley 1998: 111-113; King 2018: 72-73; Montagu 2015: 94; Worthington 2013: 60; 2014: 39.

³²² Impossibility of conquest – Hammond & Griffith 1979: 470; Greenwalt 2010: 292; Errington 1990: 42; Hatzopoulos 1996: 207; Eckstein 2010: 228. War by marriage – Ath. 13.557b-e; King 2018: 73; McQueen 1995a: 70. Marriage to Olympias – Hammond & Griffith 1979: 305-306; Greenwalt 2010: 292; Errington 1990: 43; Worthington 2014: 40; Hammond 1994b: 120; King 2018: 77; McQueen 1995a: 148.

³²³ Love-match – Plut. *Alex.* 2; Hamilton 2002b: 3; Tronson 1984: 123; Cummings 1940: 49; Bosman 2011: 98. Scepticism – Carney 1992: 173; 2006: 12; Hammond 1993: 11.

³²⁴ Dem. 1.13, 23; 4.48; Isoc. *Dis.* 5.21; Diod. Sic. 16.69.7; Just. 8.6.3; Greenwalt 2010: 292; Hammond 1994b: 115; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 469-471; Dell 1980: 95; McQueen 1995a: 145.

deposed the reigning monarch Arybbas and installed Alexander Molossus as a client king.³²⁵

Construction of a Macedonian nation-state also came at the expense of Thrace when in 356 Philip acquired land as far east as the Nestos River, a region that included Crenides and its valuable agricultural plain – although the area was not formally included into the Macedonian kingdom until the Antigonid era (306-168).³²⁶ In 353, Philip reduced the Thracian king Cersobleptes to vassalage status and formally annexed his realm in the late 340s.³²⁷ Around the same time, Philip was also making territorial acquisitions in the Chalcidice, including the lands of Bottike and Athemous.³²⁸ Full control of the region was achieved with the destruction of Olynthus in 348.³²⁹

Considerable benefits accrued from Philip's aggressive expansion of the Macedonian state; the most apparent being the amount of land under its direct control.³³⁰ Prior to the gains of Alexander I – and later Philip – Macedonia (the Emathian Plain aside, in which malaria was prevalent) suffered from a shortage of cultivable agricultural land.

³²⁵ Dem. 7.32; Diod. Sic. 16.72.1; Just. 8.6.4, 6-8; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 505; Hammond 1994b: 121; Errington 1990: 44; Carney 1992: 178; O'Brien 1994: 35; Rhodes 2010b: 35; Müller 2010b: 176; Dell 1980: 95; Cawkwell 1978b: 42; Borza 1990: 211; Ashley 1998: 111.

³²⁶ Thracian lands – Str. 7.frag.33; Fox 2015d: 367, 369; Errington 1990: 47-48; Hatzopoulos 1996: 476-477; Dell 1980: 96; Borza 1990: 44, 46; Koukouli-Chrysanthaki 2015b: 437; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 246. Antigonid annexation – Fox 2015d: 369; Hatzopoulos 1996: 71, 184-185, 186; 2015a: 46; Archibald 2010b: 333.

³²⁷ Vassalage – Dem. 23.183; Archibald 2010b: 333; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 282-283; Dell 1980: 94; Müller 2010b: 173; Worthington 2013: 114-115. Annexation – Diod. Sic. 16.71.1-2; Just. 8.3.6; Dell 1980: 98; Müller 2010b: 176; Errington 1990: 53; Worthington 2008: 122-123; 2013: 213-214; 2014: 76; Hammond 1994b: 122, 124; Cawkwell 1978b: 44; Ashley 1998: 139; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 357-358; Zahrt 2009: 16; Thomas 2010: 78; Fox 2015c: 335; Loukopoulou 2015: 467.

³²⁸ Hatzopoulos 1996: 476; 2015a: 45; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 368; Errington 1990: 6; Bradford 1992: 5; Fox 2015a: 223.

³²⁹ Dem. 19.266; Hammond 1994b: 62, 113; Worthington 2013: 115, 132-133, 142; 2014: 60; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 376; Müller 2010b: 171, 173; Errington 1990: 47, 50-51; Gabriel 2010: 155; Ashley 1998: 130; Posma 2015: 134; Curteis 1890: 6; King 2018: 82.

³³⁰ Worthington 2013: 1, 215; 2014: 14; Gabriel 2010: 115 contend Macedonia doubled in size under Philip whereas Hatzopoulos 1996: 476; 2015a: 46 state that by the 340s the kingdom's area trebled. Thomas 2010: 76, with a figure that appears suspiciously precise (and sequential), calculates Macedonia increased from 17,200 to 43,210 square kilometres due to Philip's imperialism. Bosworth 1988a: 10 states the kingdom was 20,000 square kilometres following incorporation of Upper Macedonia.

Development of existing holdings by kings (including Philip) in an effort to alleviate some of the problem included the regulation of water courses with dikes and canals to minimise flooding, as well as the draining of swampland.³³¹ Such measures, although to some degree helpful, lacked the scale necessary to transform the Macedonian state into a nation, something achieved only by Philip's acquisition of vast territories that provided the long-term economic benefits necessary to stimulate the economy and break the transhumant subsistence of Upper Macedonia.³³²

Gaining control of new mineral resources, for example, enhanced greatly both the power and wealth of Philip's Macedonia – and the king himself.³³³ Two sites in particular became of enormous importance to the economy. The first of these was Mount Pangaeon and its surrounds – including Crenides – snatched by Philip in 356. Already well-known for the richness of its silver deposits, it was under Philip that Crenides became a major gold-producing centre, with the Pangaeon mines yielding 1,000 talents of the precious

³³¹ Dikes and canals – Worthington 2008: 110; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 659; Gabriel 2010: 51; Hatzopoulos 2015a: 48; Hammond 1994b: 112; 1995b: 174. Draining swampland – Hammond 1994b: 112; Worthington 2008: 110; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 659; Errington 1990: 48; Gabriel 2010: 39, 51; Hatzopoulos 2015a: 48; Ellis 1976: 32; Borza 1982c: 16. That Philip II drained land around Crenides in an effort to make the area more habitable – Theophr. *Caus. pl.* 5.14.5-6; Cawkwell 1978b: 47; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 358, 659; Ellis 1976: 69; Borza 1982c: 16; Borza 1990: 48, 215; Thomas 2010: 69; Koukouli-Chrysanthaki 2015a: 445; Millett 2010: 493; King 2018: 10, 34. Borza 1995: 66, 78 n33 acknowledges that whilst Philip II was probably responsible for reclaiming land around Crenides, he lacked both the technology and purse to emulate the feat on a large-scale basis. Borza may be somewhat uncharitable in his estimations. Egyptians had possessed the technology to manipulate the flow of watercourses as had the Persians. Motivated by similar concerns to the Macedonians (reclamation of land and containment of malaria), Mycenaean Greeks also constructed irrigation canals and drained lakes. Contemporary with Philip, the Euboean Chaerephanes contracted to drain the swamp-like Lake Ptechae. It would seem, therefore, that there was no inherent impediment to Philip and his predecessors undertaking similar works. Egypt – Hdt. 2.138, 149; Diod. Sic. 1.50.5-51.1; Str. 17.1.37; How & Wells 2008: 258. Persia – Hdt. 1.189-191; 7.22-25; Diod. Sic. 11.77.2-3; How & Wells 2008: 547; Karastathis *et al.* 2001: 29. Mycenaeans – Str. 9.2.16-18; Buck 1979: 38, 169; Koutsoyiannis & Angelakis 2004: 2. Chaerephanes – Striagka & Pantouvakis 2003: 2216; Koutsoyiannis & Angelakis 2004: 3; Wilson 2008: 311-312.

³³² Economic stimulus – Arr. *Anab.* 7.9.2-3; Borza 1982c: 16; 1990: 216; Worthington 2014: 43, 116; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 658-659. Transhumant lifestyle – Arr. *Anab.* 7.9.2; Cawkwell 1978b: 47; Hammond 1994b: 112; Worthington 2008: 6; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 23; Gabriel 2010: 34; Hatzopoulos 1996: 105; 2015a: 47; 2015c: 236; Ellis 1976: 38; Borza 1990: 79-80; Thomas 2010: 71; Millett 2010: 477; Kottaridi 2002: 75.

³³³ Cawkwell 1978b: 47; Worthington 2014: 39; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 157; Hatzopoulos 2015a: 48; Borza 1982c: 8-9; 1990: 53; Fox 2015d: 367; Kremydi 2015: 160; Griffith 1965: 128.

metal per annum.³³⁴ Another major mining region that fell under the control of Philip c.356 was Mount Dysorum in Krestonia. Also famous for its silver – Dysorum’s mines had provided Alexander I with a talent of the metal per day – the area contained significant gold deposits as evidenced by numerous mines and auriferous rivers such as the Echedoros.³³⁵

Macedonia itself was rich in mineral deposits and so by increasing his territorial holdings, Philip gained control over further sources of silver and gold. These included the Upper Macedonian domains of Paeonia, Lynkos (Lynkestis) and Eordaia.³³⁶ In the east Mygdonia, Chalcidice, Bisaltia, Pieris, Odomantike, and Edonis (which included the mines of Amphipolis) likewise yielded quantities of precious metals.³³⁷ Philip’s determined advances into Thrace also paid dividends when in 347/6 Cersobleptes’ mines fell under his control.³³⁸ Contemporary yields are unrecorded but in the fifth century Thracian mines provided sufficient output to enable Seuthes to extract 400 talents of gold and silver (presumably per annum) from his subjects and as much again in “gifts”.³³⁹ Alone of the

³³⁴ Silver – Hdt. 5.23; [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 15.2; Str. 7.frag.34; Borza 1982c: 10; 1990: 54; Ellis 1976: 33; Thomas 2010: 75; Sprawski 2010: 132, 140; Dahmen 2010: 42; Davies 1932: 155; Asirvatham 2010: 108-109; Lavelle 1992: 17; Michell 2014: 92. Crenides – Diod. Sic. 16.8.6-7; Str. 7.frag.34; Borza 1982c: 10; 1990: 49, 54; Thomas 2010: 75; Dahmen 2010: 41, 44; Davies 1932: 155; Asirvatham 2010: 108-109; Hammond 1994b: 82-83; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 70; Fox 2015c: 353; 2015d: 367; Gabriel 2010: 114; Griffith 1965: 127; Worthington 2008: 45-46; Loukopoulou 2015: 469; Sekunda 2010: 451; Strauss 1984: 424; Archibald 2010b: 334.

³³⁵ Dysorum’s silver – Str. 7.frag.34; Ellis 1976: 33; Borza 1982c: 9-10; 1990: 49, 54; Thomas 2010: 75; Millett 2010: 447; Sprawski 2010: 132, 140; Davies 1932: 152; How & Wells 2008: 412; King 2018: 31. Alexander I – Hdt. 5.17; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 58; Borza 1990: 53, 119; Cawkwell 1978b: 47; Ellis 1976: 33; Lavelle 1992: 12; Michell 2014: 95. Gold – Errington 1990: 8; Borza 1982c: 8-9; 1990: 123; Fox 2015d: 367; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 70; Worthington 2008: 7; How & Wells 2008: 412.

³³⁶ Paeonia – Str. 7.frag.34; Hammond & Griffith 2008: 70; Michell 2014: 92. Lynkos – Str. 7.7.8; Millett 2010: 493; Ellis 1976: 33; Worthington 2008: 34; Cawkwell 1978b: 47; Hammond 1994b: 117; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 71, 654. Eordaia – Str. 14.5.28; Michell 2014: 91; Davies 1932: 147.

³³⁷ Mygdonia – Hammond 1994b: 5; Worthington 2008: 7; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 70; King 2018: 9. Chalcidice – Müller 2010b: 171; Hammond 1994b: 62, 113; Worthington 2013: 143; 2014: 60; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 662; Borza 1982c: 11; 1990: 54, 219; Cawkwell 1978b: 47; Curteis 1890: 16; Zahrt 2009: 13; Millett 2010: 493; Kremydi 2015: 160. Bisaltia, Pieris, Odomantike and Edonis – Hdt. 7.95, 112; How & Wells 2008: 412; Worthington 2008: 7; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 70-72, 666; Borza 1990: 164; Cawkwell 1978b: 47; Zahrt 2009: 13-14; Lavelle 1992: 18; Delev 2005: 15; King 2018: 31.

³³⁸ Dem. 23.110; Just. 8.3.6; Hammond 1994: 83; 1994c: 367; Michell 2014: 91; Hopper 1961: 144; Strauss 1984: 424; Burke 1984: 117; 1985: 263; Gabrielsen 2013: 341; Archibald 2013: 103; King 2018: 79.

³³⁹ Thuc. 2.97.3; Cawkwell 1978b: 43; Millett 2010: 491-492; Webber 2001: 5; Casson 1977: 4; Hornblower 1997: 372. Hdt. 6.46 records that on its own, output from the mine at Scape Hyle opposite Thasos provided

ancient sources, Justin records that gold mines in Thessaly were seized, but whether the case or not, under Philip's stewardship control of mineral wealth contributed to the birth of a national state.³⁴⁰

Another important contributor to the kingdom's economic power was timber; along with minerals, the main source of monarchical revenue.³⁴¹ Macedonian lumber was regarded as amongst the best in Greece and over thirty species of millable timber were indigenous to the region, including fir – lumber most suited to the construction of *triereis*.³⁴² This made Macedonian wood (and wood products) a valuable commodity to any ship-building *polis* but especially Athens, to whom Macedonian kings had been supplying timber since the fifth century.³⁴³ Some idea of the resource's significance can be judged by the fact that between 480 and 410 the *polis* built 1,500 *triereis*, for which silver-fir (hull), oak (keels) and fir enough for 300,000 oars needed to be purchased.³⁴⁴

eighty talents per annum in gold. Thuc. 1.100.2; How & Wells 2008: 490; Cartwright 1997: 61; Gomme 1959: 295-296; Hornblower 1997: 154 also indicate the richness of the Scape Hyle mine.

³⁴⁰ Just. 8.3.12; Hammond 1994c: 367. Buckler 1996: 382 denies the presence of goldmines in Thessaly. For a discussion on the reliability of Justin's commentary – Chapter 1, III. Philip II and the Literary Sources.

³⁴¹ Borza 1982c: 2; 1990: 55-56; Worthington 2014: 22; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 157; Hammond 1994b: 113; Errington 1990: 7-8; Millett 2010: 474, 484; Hatzopoulos 2015a: 48; Fox 2015a: 234; Kottaridi 2015: 312; Roisman 2010: 156; King 2018: 42, 60.

³⁴² Best timber in Greece – Theophr. *Hist. pl.* 5.2.1; Borza 1982c: 1; 1990: 55; Worthington 2008: 7; Ellis 1976: 33; Millett 2010: 474; Kremydi 2015: 158; Heskell 1997a: 168. Thirty species – Theophr. *Hist. pl.* 3.3.1; Borza 1982c: 2; 1990: 55. Fir – Theophr. *Hist. pl.* 5.1.7-8; Borza 1982c: 2-3, 182; Millett 2010: 474, 484; Gabrielsen 1994: 140.

³⁴³ Valuable commodity – Worthington 2008: 7; 2014: 22; Borza 1982c: 3; 1990: 55, 195; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 186; Gomme 1959: 222. Athens – And. 2.11; Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.11; Gabriel 2010: 34, 43; Errington 1990: 9; Edson 1980: 16, 23; Borza 1990: 187; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 139, 178; Zahrt 2009: 10; Amemiya 2007: 83; MacDonald 1981: 141-142; Natoli 2004a: 120. Fifth-century sales – *IG* i³ 117=M&L 91; Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.11; Meiggs & Lewis 2004: 278; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 69 n2; Kremydi 2015: 159; Asirvatham 2010: 108; Hammond 1994b: 8; Borza 1982c: 7; 1990: 109, 113; MacDonald 1981: 142, 145; Gabrielsen, 1994: 133, 140; Rhodes 2013: 211. Timber by-products would have included such commodities as pitch (which was used for caulking) and resin, employed as a timber sealant – Theophr. *Hist. pl.* 5.1.6; Ellis 1976: 33; Borza 1990: 162; Gabrielsen 1994: 137, 139, 140-141; Natoli 2004a: 120; Chambers 1986: 140; Blanshard 2010b: 220; Roberts 2017: 25.

³⁴⁴ Importance of Macedonian timber – Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.11; Hamilton 1986: 242; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 178; Posma 2015: 113; Millett 2010: 484; Hatzopoulos 1996: 434. Fir – Theophr. *Hist. pl.* 5.1.7, 7.1; Fox 2015a: 222; Borza 1982c: 2-3; 1990: 56; Roberts 2017: 24-25. Oak – Theophr. *Hist. pl.* 5.7.2; Borza 1990: 56; Roberts 2017: 24; Henderson 1927: 103. Quantities – Borza 1990: 55-56, 154; Errington 1990: 7-8; Gomme 1956b: 622.

Macedonia's heartland of Pieria and Bottia possessed limited amounts of quality timber, but Philip's expansionism enhanced significantly the state's holdings – and subsequent wealth. In Upper Macedonia Tymphaia, Parauaia, Pelagonia and Lynkos (Lynkestis) all had well-established forests as did the more central regions of Almopia, Mygdonia, Krestonia and Chalcidice.³⁴⁵ Further east, the border states of Edonis and Pieris possessed vast stands of quality timber.³⁴⁶ Harvesting and sale of lumber not only realised immediate economic benefits but also long-term prosperity as the associated deforestation increased the quantity of arable land available for the cultivation of profitable crops such as figs, olives, grapes and grains – produce of quality famously grown in Krestonia, Chalcidice, Bisaltia, Edonis and Philippi.³⁴⁷

Economic gain was also derived from plunder. Philip practiced a rolling economy whereby the proceeds reaped from one campaign were used to finance another. Thus, when it suited him, Philip derived significant monetary gain from liquidating the proceeds of his conquests. Ransoming prisoners was one potential source of revenue as was the sale of defeated peoples into slavery – even an infirm, elderly soul had value.³⁴⁸ Consequently, significant economic gain must have been realised in 356 when the entire population of

³⁴⁵ Upper Macedonia – Hammond & Griffith 1979: 654, 660; Borza 1982c: 3; 1990: 36; Curteis 1890: 9; How & Wells 2008: 593. Central Macedonia – Borza 1982c: 19; 1990: 219; Curteis 1890: 16; Müller 2010b: 171; Worthington 2013: 143; 2014: 60; Ellis 1976: 33, 99; Thomas 2010: 75-76; Ashley 1998: 128; Gomme 1959: 222; King 2018: 9.

³⁴⁶ Hdt. 5.23; Borza 1982c: 3; 1990: 49; Ellis 1976: 32; Cawkwell 1978b: 47; Archibald 2010b: 334; Koukouli-Chrysanthaki 2015b: 438.

³⁴⁷ Arr. *Anab.* 7.9.2-3; Ath. 3.77e; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 659-660, 662; Borza 1982c: 13, 15; 1990: 23, 50, 52, 216; Koukouli-Chrysanthaki 2015b: 438; Errington 1990: 51; Kremydi 2015: 159; Gomme 1959: 222.

³⁴⁸ Exceptions applied, but in the fourth century the ransom of an “ordinary” individual raised between one and five *minai* – Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 5.7.1; [Aristot.] *Oec.* 1349b; Dem. 19.169; Diod. Sic. 14.102.2, 111.4; Pritchett 1991: 248-250; van Wees 2004: 283. Exceptions – Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.36; Aeschin. 2.100; [Dem.] 12.3; 53.7; Diod. Sic. 20.84.6; Pritchett 1991: 248-250; English 2009b: 38. The price commanded by a prisoner of war sold into slavery approximates that of ransoming – Xen. *Mem.* 2.5.2-3; Diod. Sic. 14.111.4, 15.47.7; Pritchett 1991: 243; Gomme 1967: 23; Hamilton 2002b: 31. Prices less than one *mina* – Thuc. 8.28.4; *IG* i³ 421 ll. 34-49=M&L 79A; Diod. Sic. 17.14.1, 4; Plut. *Alex.* 11; Pritchett 1991: 243-244; English 2012: 6; Lazenby 2004: 178; Meiggs & Lewis 2004: 247.

Potidaea was sold into slavery, and again in 348 from the sale of men and property following the sacking of Olynthus.³⁴⁹ A similar fate probably awaited 20,000 Scythians prisoners in the the process of being relocated to Macedonia (339) – before they were hijacked by the Triballians.³⁵⁰ It is hard to imagine anything but the same destiny awaited the wretched human cargo. Philip’s punitive Illyrian campaign of 345/4 secured significant quantities of plunder and in 340 a typical act of guile landed the Macedonian treasury with seven hundred talents from the sale of a captured Athenian grain fleet.³⁵¹

Other forms of income derived from Macedonian imperialism included the imposition of taxes on conquered states. This could be by way of a tithe (a levy of ten per cent on annual production) or possibly a yearly tribute remunerated in the form of cash or gifts.³⁵² Proceeds from the imposition of import and export duties were another source of Macedonian wealth under Philip. Cersobleptes supposedly derived two hundred talents from the control of ports in Thrace – a sum that was presumably surrendered to Philip upon Macedonian annexation in the late 340s – and no less valuable were the duties collected from Pagasae, the only seaport in Thessaly.³⁵³ Another revenue stream was derived from

³⁴⁹ Potidaea – Diod. Sic. 16.8.5; Millett 2010: 490; Bradford 1992: 19; Ashley 1998: 128; Ellis 1976: 72; Hammond 1994b: 33; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 250, 361; Worthington 2008: 46; King 2018: 75; Müller 2010b: 171. Olynthus – Dem. 19.196-197, 229, 305-306, 309; Hyp. Fr. F19; Diod. Sic. 16.53.2-3; Str. 10.1.8; Just. 8.3.11; Millett 2010: 490; Bradford 1992: 63; Ashley 1998: 126; Ellis 1976: 99; Hammond 1994b: 52; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 324, 326; Worthington 2008: 78; Curteis 1890: 53-54; Borza 1990: 218-219; Gabriel 2010: 155; Cawkwell 1978b: 90; Natoli 2004b: 47, 48 n118.

³⁵⁰ Just. 9.2.15, 3.1-3; Millett 2010: 490; Dell 1980: 98; Hammond 1994b: 111; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 582-583; Worthington 2008: 140; Worthington 2013: 236; 2014: 80; Ellis 1976: 186; Ashley 1998: 114; Guler 2016: 77.

³⁵¹ Illyria – Diod. Sic. 16.69.7; Millett 2010: 490; Ashley 1998: 114; Hammond 1994b: 115; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 473; Worthington 2008: 108; Cawkwell 1978b: 42. Grain fleet – Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 292; Did. 10.45-54; Millett 2010: 490; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 585; Worthington 2008: 133; Cawkwell 1978b: 138; Borza 1990: 224; Zahrt 2009: 18; Pritchett 1991: 468.

³⁵² Tithe – Dem. 19.89-90; Diod. Sic. 16.71.2; Worthington 2008: 124; 2013: 214; Parke 1933: 159; Bradford 1992: 93; Millett 2010: 491; Hatzopoulos 1996: 431; Ashley 1998: 139; Anson 1985: 246; Gabriel 2010: 39, 203; Hammond 1994b: 137. Tribute – Ellis 1976: 85; Cawkwell 1978b: 43; Errington 1990: 53.

³⁵³ Thrace – Dem. 23.110; Burke 1984: 117; 1985: 263; Gabrielsen 2013: 341; Archibald 2013: 103; King 2018: 79. Thessaly – Dem. 1.22; Just. 11.3.2; Parke 1933: 159; Gabrielsen 2013: 339; Archibald 2013: 103; LaForse 2010: 556; Anson 1985: 246; Rhodes 2010b: 29; Graninger 2010: 315; Millett 2010: 487.

levying feudal dues upon the Macedonian aristocracy. Rewarding individuals who demonstrated loyalty and military prowess with the confiscated lands of vanquished populations was standard practice for Macedonian kings. The move not only bound the recipient closely to the crown but also obliged the payment of a tithe in cash or kind, thus further enriching the monarchy.³⁵⁴

Through his expansionist policies, therefore, Philip acquired control over substantial mineral, timber, agricultural as well as taxation assets so that, although lacking revenue in the early stages of his reign, by the end of it Macedonia had become the wealthiest region in Greece.³⁵⁵ Such riches contributed to the establishment of a Macedonian nation-state in a number of ways. On an immediate and somewhat superficial level, steady income permitted the achievement of limited military goals. From 356, for example, control of Crenides' mines allowed for the hiring of mercenaries to prosecute operations abroad; financed, by ancient standards, a large standing army; and supported military reforms such as the development and standardization of panoply.³⁵⁶ Revenues from newly acquired territories also helped bankroll Philip's infamous program of bribery and *largesse*, regarded by some as the cornerstone to his diplomatic successes.³⁵⁷

Of greater consequence, access to large quantities of renewable capital enabled Philip to develop a national infrastructure to unite his fledgling state. One such example

³⁵⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.5; Parke 1933: 159; Adam-Veleni 2016: 24; Roisman 2010: 156; Millett 2010: 491; Pritchard 2015a: 59; Bosworth 1980: 126.

³⁵⁵ Isoc. *Dis.* 5.15; Gabriel 2010: 36; Borza 1882c: 1; Cawkwell 1978b: 47; Sekunda 2010: 449; Natoli 2004b: 32; McQueen 1995b: 324; Sealey 1993: 3.

³⁵⁶ Hire of mercenaries – Diod. Sic. 16.8.7; Gabriel 2010: 114; Borza 1982c: 11; 1990: 215; Cawkwell 1978b: 48; Sekunda 2010: 451; Millett 2010: 493; Errington 1990: 48; Fox 2015d: 367; Miller 1984: 156; Anson 1985: 246; Trundle 2004: 8, 81. Finance a standing army – Dem. 8.11; 18.235; Millett 2010: 496; Gabriel 2010: 45-46; Fox 2015d: 367; Strauss 1984: 418; Adcock 1957: 67; Anson 1985: 246; Parke 1933: 159-160.

³⁵⁷ Dem. 18.295; Diod. Sic. 16.37.2; Fox 2015d: 367; Borza 1982c: 11; Strauss 1984: 418; King 2018: 32; Müller 2010b: 173; Worthington 2014: 117; Jönsson & Hall 2005: 137.

was the creation of an extensive network of roads throughout the kingdom. As a result of Persian occupation, Macedonia possessed at least one major thoroughfare that survived from the fifth century – the Royal Road of Xerxes, which extended from the Danube Basin into southern Greece via the Thermaic Gulf. Transversing the Nestos, Strymon and Hebros Rivers, the route was obviously well-maintained and still in use down to the time of Alexander III.³⁵⁸ Further construction of a communications network was undertaken by Archelaus I (413-399) as a means to open up Macedonia for settlement and allow the rapid deployment of troops; he also built a series of fortresses to protect the integrity of his kingdom.³⁵⁹ With a greater supply of capital readily at hand, Philip was able to emulate and then exceed the achievements of his ancestor, so facilitating troop movement to meet the threat of invasion and even further exploitation of Macedonia's natural resources. Not only did he establish forts to secure borders in the far-flung regions of his new kingdom – Herakleia Lynkou (Heraclea Lynkestis) for example – Philip also expanded the existing network of roads and bridges to link frontier outposts with the major cities of the interior, and resource towns with ports.³⁶⁰ In doing so, he connected Herakleia Lynkou in Upper

³⁵⁸ Hdt. 7.115, 131; Arr. *Anab.* 1.5.5; Hatzopoulos 2015a: 46; Borza 1990: 107; Loukopoulou 2015: 470; O'Brien 1994: 59-60; How & Wells 2008: 586; Delev 2005: 18; Bosworth 1980: 67-68.

³⁵⁹ Roads – Thuc. 2.100.2; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 140; Ellis 1976: 41; Cawkwell 1978b: 22, 46; Errington 1990: 1, 25; Heskell 1997a: 169; Bradford 1992: 4; Zahrt 2009: 8; Millett 2010: 480; Sekunda 2010: 448; Borza 1990: 166; Archibald 2010b: 327; Mari 2015a: 91; Curteis 1890: 12; Roisman 2010: 156; Hatzopoulos 1996: 23; 2015b: 58; Markle 1978: 485. Fortresses – Thuc. 2.100.2; Roisman 2010: 156; Millett 2010: 480; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 145-146; Ellis 1976: 41; Borza 1990: 166; Gabriel 2010: 39, 52; Brunt 1976a: 152; Hornblower 1997: 375-376.

³⁶⁰ Fortresses – Diod. Sic. 16.71.2; Borza 1990: 212; Gabriel 2010: 39; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 304; Hammond 1994b: 112; Worthington 2008: 110; Loukopoulou 2015: 468-469; Ellis 1976: 57. Herakleia Lynkou – Cawkwell 1978b: 40-42; Borza 1990: 210; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 304, 653-654. Roads – Cawkwell 1978b: 46-47; Gabriel 2010: 51; Hammond 1994b: 112; Worthington 2008: 110; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 140, 163.

Macedonia with Amphipolis, a thoroughfare several centuries later incorporated by the Romans into the via Egnatia.³⁶¹

Having created the infrastructure for nationhood, Philip then embarked upon a series of administrative reforms designed to unite the country further behind the crown. Rather than continue to brook a series of quasi-independent regions ruled by semi-autonomous *basileis*, never a recipe for stability, Philip organised greater Macedonia into four regions for administrative and military purposes. Perhaps inspired by the model of Thessaly's tetrarchies, and anticipating his reforms of that region's government in 343/2, Philip created the districts of Upper Macedonia, Bottia, Amphaxitis and Parastrymonia to oversee the implementation of executive (that is, Philip's) directives.³⁶² Recognising that monarchy ultimately rules through oligarchy, Philip was able to impose his will further through the appointment of *epistatai*, magistrates drawn from the local elite, who, deriving prestige from their status as a king's man, communicated royal policy.³⁶³

Macedonia, therefore, benefitted significantly from Philip's expansionist policies both in terms of resource acquisition and the subsequent unification strategies a strong economic base allowed the king to implement. The final aspect that enabled Philip to transform his kingdom into a truly international power was the realization of its military potential. As well as wealth, Philip's expansion of the Macedonian state brought under his

³⁶¹ Str. 7.7.4; Arr. *Anab.* 1.5.1, 11.3-4; Cawkwell 1978b: 46; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 91-92, 96, 100, 673 n4; Loukopoulou 2015: 470; Hatzopoulos 2015a: 46; Millett 2010: 483; Roisman 2010: 156; Bosworth 1980: 99.

³⁶² Districts – Hatzopoulos 1996: 253-254, 260, 474; 2015a: 49; 2015c: 239; Koukouli-Chrysanthaki 2015b: 428; Dahmen 2010: 54-55; Paschids 2006: 251; Hatzopoulos & Paschidis 2004: 794. Thessalian tetrarchies – Dem. 6.22; 9.26; Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 208; Gabriel 2010: 179; Hammond 1994b: 119; Ashley 1998: 133; Bradford 1992: 88; Worthington 2008: 111; 2014: 72; Graninger 2010: 316; Hatzopoulos 1996: 484; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 530.

³⁶³ Monarchy through oligarchy – Aristot. *Pol.* 1310a39; Syme 1939: 8; Ma 2015: 542; Markle 1976: 98. *Epistatai* – Ellis 1976: 38; Hatzopoulos 1996: 381, 384; Paschids 2006: 251-252, 259; Fox 2015d: 383. Later testament to the use of *epistatai* – Polyb. 4.76, 5.26, 20.5, 23.10; Liv. 34.48; Walbank 1957: 559; 1979a: 71-72.

control considerable tracts of pasturage necessary for the raising of high quality warhorses – important given the ongoing development of cavalry throughout Philip’s reign. In Upper Macedonia, for example, the regions of Paeonia, Tymphaia, Parauaia, and Lynkos (Lynkestis) were ideal for rearing horses, as were the more central districts of Almopia, Mygdonia and Chalcidice.³⁶⁴ In Macedonia’s east, Odomantike’s Strymon plain was valuable horse country and there is some suggestion Philip’s interest in Illyria was driven, in part, by a desire to control its grasslands.³⁶⁵

Additional territory also increased the citizenry under Philip’s control. The inclusion of areas such as Thrace, with its large number of inhabitants, added significantly to Macedonia’s populace as equally without doubt did the security and settlement brought about by Philip’s domestic policies – not for nothing has the king long been recognized as responsible for the urbanization of his nation.³⁶⁶ Modern estimates as to population growth during Philip’s reign are so disparate as to be meaningless but what is surely more significant is that Macedonia’s rapid expansion led to a corresponding increase in military capacity.³⁶⁷ The incorporation of Upper Macedonia, for example, boosted the number of troops at Philip’s disposal as did the annexation of Cersobleptes’ dominions – Thrace was

³⁶⁴ Paeonia, Tymphaia, Parauaia, and Lynkos – Hammond 1994b: 113; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 172, 191, 654, 660; Dell 1980: 95. Almopia, Mygdonia and Chalcidice – Dem. 19.266; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.14; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 368-369; Karunanithy 2013: 64; Hammond 1994b: 113; Thomas 2010: 75; Borza 1990: 219; Ashley 1998: 128; Fox 2015d: 373; Gabriel 2010: 33; King 2018: 7.

³⁶⁵ Odomantike – Str. 7.frag.33; Plut. *Cim.* 7; Lavelle 1992: 19. Illyria – Dem. 18.87, Hammond 1994b: 117, 120; Worthington 2008: 37.

³⁶⁶ Thrace – Thuc. 2.97.5-6; Str. 7.frag.47; Hammond 1994b: 125; Worthington 2008: 124; Gomme 1956a: 245. Urbanization – Arr. *Anab.* 7.9.2; Errington 1990: 1; Worthington 2008: 110; Sawada 2010: 392; Anson 2010c: 11, 19; Kottaridi 2015: 329; Gaebel 2002: 158; Millett 2010: 477, 480; Kremydi 2015: 161; Gabriel 2010: 2, 39; Hatzopoulos 1996: 473; Cawkwell 1978b: 39.

³⁶⁷ Population estimates – Hatzopoulos 1996: 40 merely (and safely) states Macedonians numbered in the “hundreds of thousands”. Ellis 1976: 34; Worthington 2008: 7; 2013: 1, 48; 2014: 14; Millett 2010: 477 estimate 500,000 whereas Gabriel 2010: 33, 82 states numbers rose from 500,000 to 1,000,000, a final figure agreed with by Ellis 1976: 150 (seemingly contradicting his own earlier estimate). Fox 2015d: 369 has Macedonia’s population as 2,000,000.

a large and well-recognized source of manpower.³⁶⁸ Some indication that the steady rise in Macedonia's military capacity was linked to territorial acquisition and the development of a strong nation-state can be seen in the size of armies fielded by Philip during the course of his reign. In 358, for example, in what must have been close to "scraping the bottle of the barrel", Philip was able to deploy 10,600 troops against Bardylis.³⁶⁹ Twenty years later in the critical Battle of Chaeronea, 24,000 Macedonian infantry and perhaps 2,000 cavalry took the field.³⁷⁰

Possibly, however, the greatest reflection of growth in military power can be seen in 334, just prior to Macedonia's invasion of the Persian Empire. Alexander III's army, at least initially, was inherited from his father and so numbers can be rightfully attributed to Philip's endeavours.³⁷¹ Typically, the sources disagree about the exact figures involved but what is discernible is that Alexander crossed the Bosphorus with at least 32,000 infantry (comprising 24,000 Macedonians) and soon joined with what remained of the 10,000 expeditionary force – which itself included something barely less than 3,000 phalangites.³⁷² Alexander's infantry was supported by 4,000-5,000 cavalry as well as contingents of allied

³⁶⁸ Hdt. 5.3; Thuc. 2.96.1-4, 97.5; Diod. Sic. 17.17.4; Ashley 1998: 135, 139; Millett 2010: 492; Loukopoulou 2015: 469; Hammond 1994b: 125; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 259; Worthington 2008: 144; Dell 1980: 91; Gomme 1956a: 246; How & Wells 2008: 406-407; Webber 2001: 3, 34; 2003: 529; Sears 2013: 32. Str. 7.frag.47 records that in the first century BC Thrace was still able to field 15,000 cavalry and 200,000 infantry, even after recent "devastations".

³⁶⁹ 10,000 infantry – Diod. Sic. 16.4.2-7; Borza 1990: 202; Ellis 1976: 53; Worthington 2014: 38; Sidnell 2006: 76; Matthew 2015: 25; Müller 2010b: 183; Greenwalt 2010: 290; Griffith 1935: 9; 1965: 129; 1980: 59; LaForse 2010: 555. 600 cavalry – Diod. Sic. 16.4.3; Hammond 1994b: 26; 1980c: 58; Worthington 2008: 26; Gaebel 2002: 148; Green 1991: 24; Sekunda 2010: 449; Fox 2015d: 376; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 213; LaForse 2010: 555.

³⁷⁰ Diod. Sic. 16.85.5; Gabriel 2010: 215; Hammond 1994b: 149; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 596; Ashley 1998: 153; Worthington 2008: 147; 2014: 85; Ellis 1976: 198; Green 1991: 72, 74; Roberts 1982: 36; Schwartz 2009: 239; Sekunda 2010: 468.

³⁷¹ Bosworth 1988a: 6, 270; Rzepka 2008: 53; Shrimpton 1991b: xvii-xviii; English 2012: 124; Griffith 1935: 12; Bardunias & Ray 2016: 149; Gaebel 2002: 285; Sage 1996: 182.

³⁷² Invasion force – Polyb. 12.19; Diod. Sic. 17.17.3-4; Plut. *Alex.* 15; *Mor.* 327d-e; Arr. *Anab.* 1.11.3; Just. 11.6.2; Bosworth 1980: 98; 1986: 115; 1988a: 35, 259; Griffith 1965: 129; Matthew 2015: 281; Heckel 2009b: 30; Green 1991: 156-157; Anson 1985: 248; Yalichev 1997: 174; Hamilton 2002b: 36; Walbank 1967: 371. Expeditionary force – Bosworth 1986: 116; 1988a: 35, 259; Green 1991: 156; English 2012: 126; Griffith 1935: 12-13.

horsemen.³⁷³ Remaining with Antipater in Europe were 12,000 infantry and 1,500 *hetairoi*.³⁷⁴

What the figures confirm was the growth in Macedonia's population under Philip had been such that the new nation could field an army of around 41,000 – four times the strength the king was able to muster in 358. Often overlooked (but no less important) was the national militia, predominantly phalangites, who were usually conscripted in a national emergency.³⁷⁵ Some understanding of the size of the reserve can be gleaned from the reinforcements drawn upon by Alexander III in his Persian wars, especially during the first three years of campaigning. In 334/3, for example, 8,000 infantry and 1,100 cavalry were dispatched from Macedonia and in 331 another 6,000 *pezhetairoi* and 500 *hetairoi* reserves mobilised eastward.³⁷⁶ It has been calculated that perhaps 30,000 infantry reinforcements were called upon by Alexander during the years 334-331 with as many as 42,000

³⁷³ Polyb. 12.19; Diod. Sic. 17.17.4; Plut. *Alex.* 15; *Mor.* 327d-e; Arr. *Anab.* 1.11.3; Just. 11.6.2; Heckel 2009b: 30; Bosworth 1980: 99; 1988a: 35; Fox 2015d: 376; Hamilton 2002b: 36; Griffith 1935: 12-13; Walbank 1967: 371.

³⁷⁴ Diod. Sic. 17.17.5; Sekunda 2010: 457; Bosworth 1986: 115; 1988a: 259; Millett 2010: 497; Griffith 1965: 129; Cawkwell 1978b: 48; Green 1991: 156; Gilley & Worthington 2010: 200; English 2009b: 40; Sidnell 2006: 127; Hammond 1989: 63.

³⁷⁵ That the state only called upon between 10-20% of its eligible population (that is, male citizens between nineteen and forty-nine) – Ellis 1976: 34; Gabriel 2010: 83; Karunanithy 2013: 5; Hammond 1998a: 63. The figure is validated by Hansen 2011: 241 who advocates a multiplying factor of six to extrapolate approximate civilian demographics from military figures. Hansen's work is a refinement of early demographers whose "rule of thumb" was a ratio of 4:1. In the case of Macedonia the ratio may be even higher due to, by and large, the absence of slavery which dictated troops were carefully levied in order to minimise the social and economic impact on landholders – Gabriel 2010: 37, 83; Griffith 1965: 134; Hatzopoulos 1996: 59; Millett 2010: 478.

³⁷⁶ In 334/3 3,000 infantry and 300 cavalry were sent to Alexander at Gordium – Arr. *Anab.* 1.29.4; Bosworth 1986: 118; Matthew 2015: 282; Hammond 1989: 62-63; Green 1991: 211; King 2018: 179; Walbank 1967: 371-372. Five thousand *pezhetairoi* and eight hundred *hetairoi* were dispatched later that year – Polyb. 12.19; Bosworth 1986: 118. Walbank 1967: 371-372 questions this second contingent of reinforcements. In 331 – Diod. Sic. 17.49.1, 65.1; Curt. 5.1.40-41; Bosworth 1986: 119; O'Brien 1994: 99; Hammond 1989: 64; 1994b: 112; King 2018: 179.

pezhetairoi and 5,600 cavalry drafted from Macedonia in the decade to 323.³⁷⁷ No *polis* was able to match such potential.³⁷⁸

Some understanding of just what a powerhouse Philip had created can be gained by comparing it to Athens, mainland Greece's next most vibrant economy. Attica – the Athenian *chora* – was c.2,500 square kilometres; enormous by Greek standards and among *poleis* surpassed only by Sparta and Syracuse.³⁷⁹ During the 350s, however, the *polis* was chronically short of cash – its revenue during the Social War (357-355) was only 130 talents per annum and by the end of the conflict, Athens' liquid assets were exhausted.³⁸⁰

In the days of empire, the *polis* had been able to rely upon *phoros* (monetary payments from “allies”) to fund policy initiatives, with tribute contributing perhaps 460 talents annually.³⁸¹ In 425, Athens trebled the *phoros* to 1,460 talents, although how much of that increase was actually collected is unknown (problems with obtaining the full amount of tribute from increasingly unwilling allies are well attested).³⁸² With the loss of her

³⁷⁷ Bosworth 1986: 120-121; Sekunda 2010: 466; Adams 2010: 209 n2. Yalichev 1997: 175; Parke 1933: 198 believe these reinforcements to have been mercenaries rather citizen levies.

³⁷⁸ Bosworth 1986: 122; Cawkwell 1978b: 48; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 216-217.

³⁷⁹ Cartledge 2003b: 8, 25; Dillon & Garland 1994: 289; Cavanagh 2009: 405; Lagia 2015: 120; Hansen 2006c: 11 n39; Rhodes 2013: 203; Lacey 2015: 4; Osborne 1995: 32.

³⁸⁰ Revenue of 130 talents – Dem. 10.37; Isoc. *Dis.* 8.21; Did. 8.1-4, 45-49; Arvanitidis & Kyriazis 2013: 226; Sakellariou 1980b: 121; Bosworth 1988a: 14-15; Cawkwell 1973: 54; Buckler & Beck 2008: 17; Pritchett 1991: 460; Gabrielsen 1994: 216; Jones 1952: 15; Burke 1984: 113. Resources exhausted – Dem. 13.27; 39.17; Isoc. *Dis.* 8.19, 47, 69; Xen. *Vect.* 2.6, 5.12; Müller 2010b: 172; Burke 1992: 209, 224; Cawkwell 1963b: 56, 61-62; French 1991: 35; Pritchard 2012: 22; Rhodes 1980: 310; Sealey 1955: 78; Pritchett 1991: 460.

³⁸¹ 460 talents – Thuc. 1.96.2; Diod. Sic. 12.40.2; Plut. *Arist.* 24; Finley 1972: 609-610; Gomme 1956a: 17; 1959: 273, 275; Hornblower 1997: 145-146; Jones 1952: 16, 27 n21; Chambers 1962: 27, 30. Thuc. 2.13.3; Plut. *Arist.* 24 (who acknowledges the figure to be Thucydides') indicate tribute in 431 to be 600 talents per annum, a figure accepted by some modern historians – Burke 1985: 253; 1992: 201-202; Finley 1978: 7; Gabrielsen 1994: 116; 2013: 335; Eddy 1968: 187-188, 195; Lacey 2015: 12; Lazenby 2004: 14.

³⁸² *Phoros* trebled – *IG* i³ 71=M&L 69; Plut. *Arist.* 24; Meiggs & Lewis 2004: 193; Finley 1972: 610; Gomme 1956a: 43; Wallace 1964: 254; Dillon & Garland 1994: 259; Cartwright 1997: 178; Eddy 1968: 194; Mitchell 1991: 170; McGregor 1935: 146. Shortfalls in payment of *phoros* – *IG* i³ 34=M&L 46; *IG* i³ 68=M&L 68; Thuc. 2.69.1, 3.19.1-2, 4.50.1, 75.1; [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 24.3; Meiggs & Lewis 2004: 119-120, 186-187; Chambers 1962: 28; Gomme 1956a: 17-18, 202-203, 279; 1959: 277; Dillon & Garland 1994: 259, 261-262; Cartwright 1997: 124, 138, 178.

thalassocracy, however, “voluntary” contributions (*syntaxeis*) had dwindled to sixty-seven talents per annum by 346 and further diminished to forty-five talents in 340.³⁸³

Attica contained mineral resources, foremost of which were the silver mines of Laureion, whose annual production reached its peak of 1,000 talents in 340.³⁸⁴ Unlike Macedonia, however, where mineral revenues belonged to the king, mining ventures in Athens were undertaken by individual entrepreneurs and so the vast majority of proceeds remained in private hands, save for a lease of 20-150 *drachmai* and a royalty of about four percent – both of which were paid to the *polis*.³⁸⁵ Revenue was also derived from import and export taxes (*pentekostai*). As with the silver mines, Athens realised income not from the direct imposition of duty but from the sales of leases to individuals who made a profit upon their exaction.³⁸⁶ In 402/1, for example, the rights to collections from Piraeus were leased to Agyrrhios for thirty talents but prior to the Lycurgan reforms of the 330s and 320s, it should be realised that Athens received probably no more than one hundred talents per annum from trade taxes.³⁸⁷

During the 340s, and in an effort to rectify Athens’ failing economy, Eubulus initiated a number of economic reforms and in fact succeeded in raising annual revenue to four hundred talents.³⁸⁸ It would seem that, in the main, this was done by increasing mining

³⁸³ Sixty-seven talents in 346 – Pritchett 1991: 462 n683. Forty-five talents by 340 – Dem. 18.234; Pritchett 1991: 462; Curteis 1890: 32; Rhodes 2013: 205 n14; Arvanitidis & Kyriazis 2013: 240.

³⁸⁴ Xen. *Vect.* 4.1, 3; Burke 1992: 202, 208; French 1991: 32; Rhodes 1980: 312; Hopper 1961: 139; Amemiya 2007: 30, 85.

³⁸⁵ R&O 36 ll. 40-82; [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 47.2; Xen. *Vect.* 4.4, 12; Amemiya 2007: 85, 97; Hopper 1961: 143, 148-149; French 1991: 36-37; Christesen 2003: 39, 45; Kaiser 2007: 466; Kyriazis & Zouboulakis 2004: 120; Michell 2014: 97, 104, 106; Jones 1952: 24; Crosby 1950: 192, 196-197; Rhodes 2013: 204; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 176, 178, 180-181.

³⁸⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.22; Underhill 2012: 5; Pritchett 1991: 462; Rhodes 2012: 113; Oliver 2010: 293, 301-302; Amemiya 2007: 97; Burke 1985: 258; 1992: 203; Gabrielsen 2013: 339; Howgego 1995: 93.

³⁸⁷ Dem. 35.29-30; And. 1.133; Rhodes 2012: 113; Burke 1985: 262; 1992: 202, 215, 225; French 1991: 31, 37; Oliver 2010: 302; Gabrielsen 2013: 341; Dillon & Garland 1994: 41.

³⁸⁸ Dem. 10.37-38; Isoc. *Dis.* 8.21; Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 166; Did. 8.1-4, 55-59; 9.5-6; Sakellariou 1980b: 121; Bosworth 1988a: 15; Amemiya 2007: 91; Cawkwell 1963b: 61-62; Pritchard 2012: 22; Rhodes

concessions, and stimulating trade – including upgrading the facilities of Piraeus, streamlining judicial process for disputes concerning commerce, and the suppression of piracy.³⁸⁹ Although a significant increase, it should be remembered that four hundred talents represented less than half that which Philip II received from his mining operations in Crenides alone – and indeed possibly only ten percent of the annual income the king had at his disposal.³⁹⁰

Athens' paltry revenues (by comparison with those of Macedonia) placed the *polis* at a potentially serious disadvantage when it came to countering Philip's expansionist policies. Armies were expensive and although detailed figures were not recorded (or survived), a few particulars remain that indicate just how costly funding the military actually was. For example, in 352, when the city-state deployed 5,000 infantry and 400 cavalry to check Philip at Thermopylae, the cost was 200 talents, even though the force was in the field for only a few weeks.³⁹¹

To help meet the shortfall between revenue and military commitments, Athens had recourse to the trierarchy.³⁹² Initiated in the early fifth century, a trierarch was responsible

1980: 312; French 1991: 38; Pritchett 1991: 460; Worthington 2014: 10; Burke 1985: 254; 1992: 203 n17, 215, 225; Gabrielsen 1994: 216; Jones 1952: 15, 24; Arvanitidis & Kyriazis 2013: 234.

³⁸⁹ Mining – Cawkwell 1963b: 64-65; Burke 1985: 258; Jones 1952: 24; Hopper 1953: 239, 251 n376; Crosby 1950: 190 n3; Burke 1984: 113, 117. Trade – [Dem.] 58.53-54; Din. 1.96; Cawkwell 1963b: 64; 1981: 48; Burke 1984: 113-114, 115; 1985: 259; Worthington 2013: 91.

³⁹⁰ Resentment of taxes – Aristoph. *Ran.* 1063-1068; Dem. 14.27; 22.44; Isoc. *Dis.* 7.54; Hyp. *Eux.* 36-37; Isae. 5.37-38; Theophr. *Char.* 22.3; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 261; Pritchett 1991: 481; Kaiser 2007: 449, 459; Michell 2014: 97; Gabrielsen 1994: 9, 55, 59; van Wees 2004: 235; Worthington 2013: 72. For the output of mines at Crenides – Diod. Sic. 16.8.6-7; Str. 7.frag.34; Borza 1982c: 10; 1990: 49, 54; Thomas 2010: 75; Dahmen 2010: 41; Davies 1932: 155; Asirvatham 2010: 108-109; Hammond 1994b: 82-83; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 70; Fox 2015c: 353; 2015d: 367. Philip's annual revenue of 4,000 talents – Sakellariou 1980b: 121.

³⁹¹ Dem. 19.84; Diod. Sic. 16.38.1-2; Just. 8.2.8; Sakellariou 1980b: 121; Pritchett 1991: 465; Müller 2010b: 173; Gabriel 2010: 140; Hammond 1994b: 49; Worthington 2014: 51; Bradford 1992: 45; Gabrielsen 2007: 257. Gabrielsen 2013: 334 theorises the cost of a "moderate expeditionary force" to be 200 talents per annum.

³⁹² Dem. 10.37; Isoc. *Dis.* 8.128; Theophr. *Char.* 26.6; Kaiser 2007: 447, 474; Pritchett 1991: 473; Gabrielsen 1994: 7-8, 35-36; 2013: 343; Pownall 2013: 293; Serrati 2013a: 327; Oliver 2010: 301; Lee 2010b: 502; van Wees 1995: 159.

for the maintenance of a *trieres* for the period of one year, a cost usually reckoned to be approximately one talent.³⁹³ The onerousness of the task, however, meant that by c.357-340 each of Athens' 1,200 wealthiest citizens were balloted into groups of twelve called *symmories* with each coterie responsible for financing three *triereis*, thus supporting (in theory at least) a fleet of three hundred warships.³⁹⁴

Athens may have had an overwhelming advantage in ships but any contest with a predominantly terrestrial power such as Macedonia (which had no navy of significance) would ultimately be decided upon the battlefield, not the brine. As with Macedonia, demographic data for Athens is frustratingly slight but what does emerge is that, once again, Philip's expansion placed his kingdom at advantage over the Attic *polis* when it came to troop numbers. As with its finances, Athens' population in the fifth century peaked in 431. Pericles (apparently) informed citizens that the *polis* could call upon 13,000 frontline hoplites and a further 16,000 "oldest and youngest" reserves.³⁹⁵ In addition, there were 1,600 *toxotai*, 1,200 cavalry and 300 *triereis* commissioned for duty, leading some

³⁹³ Early fifth-century – Hdt. 8.17; Aristoph. *Ran.* 1063-1068; [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 3.4; Plut. *Alc.* 1; Gabrielsen 1994: 1, 35, 176; How & Wells 2008: 659. Cost one talent – Dem. 21.155; 50.8-10; [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 22.7; Lys. 21.2; Polyæn. 1.30.6; Amemiya 2007: 94; Pritchard 2012: 28; 2015a: 51; Pritchett 1991: 473 n705, 484; Kaiser 2007: 459; Millett 1993: 186; Rhodes 2012: 120-121; Robbins 1918: 364; Gabrielsen 1994: 50, 97, 216.

³⁹⁴ Dem. 14.16-18; 18.106; 21.155; Isoc. *Dis.* 8.128; 15.145; French 1991: 38; Kaiser 2007: 459, 470; Rhodes 1993: 113, 680; 2012: 121; Amemiya 2007: 95; Gabrielsen 1994: 209, 211-212; 2013: 343; Worthington 2013: 20, 72, 87; Pownall 2013: 295-296.

³⁹⁵ Thuc. 2.13.6; Ridley 1979: 512; Winton 2007: 298; Watson 2010: 261; Hansen 2011: 243-244; Gomme 1956a: 34; 1967: 5; Cartwright 1997: 100, 106; Fawcus 1909: 23; van Wees 2004: 241. Diod. Sic. 12.40.4 states 12,000 frontline hoplites and 17,000 reserves. What is meant by "oldest and youngest" is much contested by modern commentators. There is general agreement the term "youngest" refers to those eighteen to nineteen years of age. Hot debate surrounds whether the upper age at which normal duty ceased was forty or fifty. Commentators who believe the latter to be the case point to the instance of Socrates, who fought at Delium when around forty-six years old. Thus "oldest and youngest" may be taken to read those males under twenty and over forty-nine. Thuc. 2.13.7; Ridley 1979: 511; Winton 2007: 298; Watson 2010: 261; Hansen 2011: 243, 247; Gomme 1956a: 34-35; 1967: 3-4, 5; Fawcus 1909: 23; Pritchard 2010: 22-23. Socrates – Pl. *Symp.* 221a-b; *La.* 181A-B; Ridley 1979: 511; Gomme 1927: 142; 1956a: 37; Fawcus 1909: 23.

commentators to believe that in 431 there were some 60,000 adult males in Attica available for military service.³⁹⁶

Although demographics for the fourth century are impossible to know with any degree of exactness, what appears certain is that there was a significant decline in the Attic population over the course of the Peloponnesian War. As a result, it appears that by late in the fourth century there was a combined total of only 31,000 *metoikoi* and citizens eligible for duty.³⁹⁷ Whatever the actual figures may have been, however, what remains clear is that even at her peak, Athens possessed but a fraction of the manpower under Philip's control.

V. Statecraft

With the assets he had created – a highly trained and disciplined military equipped with superior weapons' technology, a combined arms army fully capable of operating efficiently in any manner of conditions, a professional attitude towards all aspects of soldiering, innovative tactics, an approach to both offensive and defensive siege warfare that was unmatched by his contemporaries, and a kingdom whose manpower and resources was unparelled by the standard of *poleis* – Philip was well placed to subjugate Greece by purely military means had he wished. Instead the king demonstrated his pragmatism and

³⁹⁶ *Toxotai* – Thuc. 2.13.8; [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 24.3; Gomme 1956a: 41; Jones 1952: 17; Hornblower 1997: 257; Pritchard 2010: 19; Trundle 2010b: 149; Spence 2010: 111; van Wees 2004: 237; Hunt 2007: 122; Roberts 2017: 71; Roisman 2017: 123; Thompson 1967: 484; Rhodes 1993: 303. Cavalry – Thuc. 2.13.8; [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 24.3; Watson 2010: 261; Hansen 2011: 243; Gomme 1956a: 40; Fawcus 1909: 24. *Triereis* – Thuc. 2.13.8; Diod. Sic. 12.40.4; Watson 2010: 261; Finley 1978: 7; Gabrielsen 1994: 126; Jones 1952: 16; Burke 1985: 257 n34; Hornblower 1997: 257. Sixty thousand citizens in 431 – Watson 2010: 261-262; Gomme 1967: 47; How & Wells 2008: 464; Pritchard 2010: 6, 22; 2015b: 120; Lagia 2015: 120; Rhodes 2013: 203; Arvanitidis & Kyriazis 2013: 439.

³⁹⁷ Decline in population – Amemiya 2007: 27, 36; Pritchard 2010: 22; 2015b: 120; Watson 2010: 261; Rhodes 2012: 113; 2013: 203; Gomme 1967: 7, 12; Jones 1952: 18; Cavanagh 2009: 416; Lagia 2015: 120; Arvanitidis & Kyriazis 2013: 439. 31,000 – Diod. Sic. 18.18.5; Ath. 6.272c; Michell 2014: 20; Pritchett 1991: 467; van Wees 2011: 95; Gomme 1967: 18-19; How & Wells 2008: 463; Jones 1952: 18; Lacey 2015: 8.

perspicacity in the application of statecraft – matching ends to means – in order to secure primacy.

On many different occasions, for example, the king demonstrated himself master of *Realpolitik*, beginning with the elimination of rivals – both immediate and potential – in order to consolidate his rule. Upon acceding to the throne in 359, Philip promptly had his half-brother Archelaus murdered and likely exiled his other half-siblings, Menelaus and Arrhidaeus – although it is possible that the brothers fled to Olynthus hoping to avoid the executioner (ancient sources are silent on this point).³⁹⁸ If so, it was to be only a temporary reprieve as in 348 they disappeared from the pages of history following Philip's successful assault on the *polis*. The reason given for the unprovoked attack was that Olynthus had given asylum to the royal pair.³⁹⁹ In 359 Philip also put to death another potential rival, the one-time puppet king Argaeus (392/1) who made a bid for the crown with Athenian backing. The coup attempt collapsed in the face of a united Macedonian response and the would-be usurper given up to Philip by his own troops.⁴⁰⁰ The final threat removed by Philip, also in 359, was that of the pretender Pausanias who, for a time at least, enjoyed support from the Thracian king Berisades. Clearly the royal had no great attachment to his potential protégé as he readily executed Pausanias in response to a bribe from Philip.⁴⁰¹

³⁹⁸ Archelaus – Just. 7.6.3, 8.3.10; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 315, 699; Gabriel 2010: 5, 99; Worthington 2008: 21; Heskell 1997a: 179; Müller 2010b: 167; Fox 2015c: 341; Ellis 1973: 352; Hatzopoulos 1986: 281. Menelaus and Arrhidaeus – Gabriel 2010: 5, 149; Hammond 1994b: 51; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 315, 699; Fox 2015c: 341; Ellis 1971: 19; 1973: 353.

³⁹⁹ Just. 8.3.10; Worthington 2008: 79; Gabriel 2010: 156; Errington 1990: 50; Green 1991: 45; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 699, 701; Psoma 2015: 134; Ellis 1971: 19; 1973: 354; Fox 2015c: 341; Müller 2010b: 173.

⁴⁰⁰ Argaeus' kingship – Dem. 23.121; Diod. Sic. 16.3.5; Hammond 1994b: 25; Worthington 2008: 25; Müller 2010b: 167; McQueen 1995a: 65. Coup attempt – Diod. Sic. 16.3.5-6; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 211-212; Gabriel 2010: 44, 100-103; Parke 1933: 143-144; Fox 2015c: 336, 337-338; Müller 2010b: 167; Ellis 1971: 19; Greenwalt 2010: 290; Hatzopoulos 1996: 178; King 2018: 71-72.

⁴⁰¹ Diod. Sic. 16.3.4; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 210; Worthington 2008: 25; 2013: 56; Ellis 1971: 19; Müller 2010b: 167; Hatzopoulos 1996: 178. Fox 2015c: 336-337; Ellis 1980b: 38 name the Thracian ruler as Cotys.

If the Macedonian king showed few qualms over the elimination of individuals, neither did he demonstrate any compunction about inflicting atrocities on a much grander scale in order to intimidate potential enemies or weaken their resolve to resist. Philip sent such a message in 348 after his capture of Olynthus. The *polis* counted a population of perhaps 10,000 but had rejected Macedonian terms for surrender. Indiscriminate killings, enslavement of survivors, taking of hostages, and banishments all followed its capitulation. Olynthus itself was razed to the ground and its territories distributed by Philip amongst his Companions.⁴⁰² The siege was also notable as probably the first occasion the king made use of tension artillery. Judging from the size of bronze bolt-heads recovered from the site (many inscribed ΦΙΛΙΠΠΟ or “Philip”), these were probably *oxybelai* but the possibility that modified stone-throwing catapults were also deployed as anti-personnel devices should not be ruled out.⁴⁰³ Clearly the impact of artillery was not decisive – the *polis* fell through treachery – but its potential must have been apparent judging by Philip’s ongoing commitment to the development of siege engines, including Polyeidus’ torsion catapult.

Another example occurred with Thebes in 338 following the Battle of Chaeronea. The *polis* was an ally of Philip’s but had rejected his request for support (or neutrality at the very least) in the impending contest with Athens and sided against him.⁴⁰⁴ Macedonian retaliation was brutal and intended to be instructive. Theban prisoners were sold as slaves and the bodies of the dead ransomed off – but only once in a state of advanced

⁴⁰² Dem. 9.26; Diod. Sic. 16.53.2-3; Worthington 2008: 78-79; Ashley 1998: 130; Posma 2015: 134; Tsigarida 2015: 153; Kremydi 2015: 161; Fox 2015d: 372; Hatzopoulos 1996: 195; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 326; Bradford 1992: 63; Worthington 2014: 60; Borza 1990: 218-219.

⁴⁰³ First occasion – Hagerman 2014: 100; King 2018: 113; Sekunda 2010: 451; Keyser 1994: 36. *Oxybeles* – Nawotka 2010: 35; King 2018: 113; Hammond 1994b: 133; Worthington 2008: 31; Sekunda 2010: 451; Stoyanov 2015: 433; Lee 2001: 15 n4; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 447; Snodgrass 1967: 117.

⁴⁰⁴ Dem. 18.175, 213, 218; Aeschin. 3.148-151; Plut. *Dem.* 17; *Mor.* 851B; Zahrnt 2009: 19; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 589-590; Cawkwell 1978b: 143-144; Buckler 1989: 100; Roebuck 1948: 75, 75 n16; LaForse 2010: 557; Müller 2010b: 176-177.

decomposition. The Cadmea was occupied and there followed exile and execution of citizens vitriolic in their opposition to Macedonia. Anti-Theban populations such as those from Orchomenus, Plataea and Thespieae were repatriated back to their traditional *chora* where they could be counted on to keep a close watch on their long-time rivals.⁴⁰⁵

A less dramatic, but equally effective example of Philip's statecraft was matrimony – in fact it was observed by Athenaeus (drawing from Satyrus), and not without an element of truth, that the king “made war” by marriage.⁴⁰⁶ Philip had seven, possibly eight wives, the order of which is disputed but that they were betrothed for political gain is not.⁴⁰⁷ His first, in 359, was Phila of Elimiotis, a populous northern canton and an important buffer state against the Illyrians.⁴⁰⁸ The union not only secured Elimiotian support in the war against Bardylis but provided an opportunity for the eventual annexation of the region.⁴⁰⁹ Sometime during 358, Philip married Audata – the daughter (or perhaps granddaughter) of the recently defeated Bardylis.⁴¹⁰ Doubtless the Macedonian king was looking to secure the subsequent peace treaty and confirm an alliance with his enemy – or perhaps forestall the potential threat of future invasions.⁴¹¹

⁴⁰⁵ Diod. Sic. 16.87.3, 17.13.5; Just. 9.4.6-9; Paus. 4.27.10, 9.1.8; Cawkwell 1978b: 167; Worthington 2008: 154; 2013: 255; Ashley 1998: 156-157; Errington 1990: 85; Green 1991: 80; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 610-611.

⁴⁰⁶ Ath. 13.557b; Borza 1990: 206; Worthington 2008: 4; Green 1991: 26-27; Bosworth 1988a: 6; Badian 1963: 244, 245; McQueen 1995b: 330; Tronson 1984: 116; Gabriel 2010: 15.

⁴⁰⁷ Seven – Ath. 13.557b-e; Worthington 2008: 172-174; Borza 1990: 207; Fredricksmeyer 1990: 300; Carney 1992: 171; Ellis 1976: 211; Tronson 1984: 116; Edson 1980: 21. Possibly eight – Gabriel 2010: 4, 15-16; 2015: 14; Hammond 1992b: 32; 1994b: 41, 170-171.

⁴⁰⁸ Ath. 13.557c; Ellis 1976: 38; 1981: 112; Gabriel 2010: 4; Worthington 2008: 19; Green 1991: 27; Karamitrou-Mentessidi 2015: 109; Müller 2010b: 169; Greenwalt 2010: 290; Tronson 1984: 116. Fox 2015c: 342; Bosworth 1971: 101 have Phila as Philip's second wife behind Audata.

⁴⁰⁹ Hammond & Griffith 1979: 40; Bosworth 1971: 101; 1988a: 6; Fox 2015c: 342-343; Müller 2010b: 169; Greenwalt 2010: 290.

⁴¹⁰ Ath. 13.557c; Gabriel 2010: 15; Worthington 2008: 23; Green 1991: 26; Fox 2015c: 342; Müller 2010b: 169; Greenwalt 2010: 291; King 2018: 72. Bosworth 1971: 101; Ellis 1981: 111-112 have Audata as Philip's first wife and Philia as second. McQueen 1995a: 65, 70 expresses uncertainty.

⁴¹¹ Gabriel 2010: 15; Bosworth 1971: 101; Ellis 1976: 48; 1981: 37; Dell 1980: 94; King 2018: 72; Tronson 1984: 121; Müller 2010b: 169; Greenwalt 2010: 291.

Political considerations were also behind marriage to Philinna of Larissa (358) as the union secured Macedonia's southern borders and formed the basis of an accord with the Thessalian League in order to counter the growing threat of Pherae.⁴¹² Similarly, Philip's marriage to Olympias (c.357) – daughter of Neoptolemus I and the future mother of Alexander – not only secured an alliance with the Molossian king but also created an important buffer state on Macedonia's north-western border with Illyria. An added consideration was that it eroded Molossia's Athenian connections, so weakening the influence of a rival in a politically sensitive region.⁴¹³ Philip's fifth wife (353/2) was Nicesipolis, another Thessalian. This latest bride was highly placed in Pherae society – possibly a niece of Jason – and Philip's obvious motive was to strengthen his hold in the region by winning over the key *polis* of Pherae.⁴¹⁴

Some historians believe that in 340 Philip married an unknown daughter of the Scythian king Atheas.⁴¹⁵ Whilst not universally accepted, the claim is possible in light of Atheas' request for Macedonian aid, for which the promise was inheritance. The union may also have been intended to consolidate Philip's claim to the Scythian crown after a falling-out between the two men had resulted in war and death of Atheas in battle.⁴¹⁶ Whether historical or not, what is accepted are Philip's final two marriages, one of which occurred in 339 to Medea (Meda) the daughter of Cothelas, king of the Getae – again to secure an

⁴¹² Ath. 13.557c; Just. 9.8.1; Griffith 1970: 70; Worthington 2008: 37; Gabriel 2010: 16; Ellis 1976: 61; LaForse 2010: 573; Fox 2015c: 345; Müller 2010b: 170; Graninger 2010: 314; McQueen 1995a: 79.

⁴¹³ Ath. 13.557d; Plut. *Alex.* 2; Just. 7.6.10-12; Gabriel 2010: 16; Ellis 1976: 61; Worthington 2008: 19, 37; Green 1991: 29-30; Müller 2010b: 170-171; LaForse 2010: 573; Fox 2015c: 347, 353; Carney 1992: 170; 2006: 5, 13; O'Brien 1994: 13; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 305-306.

⁴¹⁴ Ath. 13.557c; Gabriel 2010: 16; Ellis 1976: 84; Worthington 2008: 64-65; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 278; Müller 2010b: 173; Graninger 2010: 314; Ellis 1981: 112; Tronson 1984: 122; McQueen 1995a: 108.

⁴¹⁵ Gabriel 2010: 16; Hammond 1978b: 336; 1980b: 167; 1982: 123; 1994b: 136; Hammond & Griffith 2015: 584.

⁴¹⁶ Just. 9.2.5-14; Gabriel 2010: 16; Hammond 1994b: 136; Ellis 1976: 185-186; Ashley 1998: 148; Bradford 1992: 135-136; King 2018: 94; Delev 2015: 51; Worthington 2008: 139; Errington 1990: 56; Rolle 1980: 126-127.

alliance.⁴¹⁷ The Macedonian king's final espousal was to Cleopatra (337) and is often believed to have been driven by lust.⁴¹⁸ In part this may have been true but it should also be noted that his new wife was the ward of Attalus, a powerful Macedonian aristocrat and that Philip, with his existing wives past child-bearing age, may very well have wanted further heirs to secure the dynasty.⁴¹⁹ Political considerations were never far from Philip's mind.

Equally important in the realisation of the king's strategic goals was his colonisation program. Philip was well-noted for his settlement of hostile or strategically important regions in which indigenous populations were relocated forcibly or else retained to work the land for their new colonial masters.⁴²⁰ It was a policy employed initially in relation to the kingdom's north-eastern border with Thrace, when in 356 Philippi (formerly Crenides) became Macedonia's first colony.⁴²¹ As has been noted previously, the annexation provided Philip with control of the region's mines and was followed by establishment of further colonies in Oesyne (c.346) and Cabyle (sometimes Calybe) around 342.⁴²² Both foundations were intended to facilitate territorial security although Cabyle may well have

⁴¹⁷ Ath. 13.557c-d; Worthington 2008: 124; Gabriel 2010: 16; Ellis 1976: 166-167; 1981: 112; Dell 1980: 98; Tronson 1984: 122-123; Green 1982: 144-145. Fox 2015b: 32 has a date of 341/0.

⁴¹⁸ Ath. 13.557d; Plut. *Alex.* 9; Fredricksmeyer 1990: 301; Worthington 2013: 265; 2014: 109; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 677; Gabriel 2010: 16; Carney 1992: 173; O'Brien 1994: 29-30; Müller 2010b: 179; Borza 1990: 208; Hamilton 2002b: 24.

⁴¹⁹ Ath. 13.557d; Plut. *Alex.* 9; Gabriel 2010: 16; Ellis 1976: 211, 213, 215; 1981: 119-120; Green 1991: 89; Badian 1963: 246; Hamilton 1965: 121; Carney 1992: 173-174; O'Brien 1994: 30; Borza 1990: 208; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 676, 677; Hamilton 2002b: 24.

⁴²⁰ Colonisation program – Aristot. *Pol.* 1310b31; Diod. Sic. 16.71.1-2; Errington 1990: 42; Millett 2010: 492; McQueen 1995a: 147. Relocations – Just. 8.5.7, 6.1-2; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 38, 111; Gabriel 2010: 50-51; Hammond 1994b: 109; Ellis 1980b: 44; Delev 1998: 5; King 2018: 87, 89; McQueen 1995a: 147.

⁴²¹ Diod. Sic. 16.3.7-8, 8.6-7, 22.3; Plut. *Alex.* 3; Worthington 2008: 46; Millett 2010: 492; Archibald 2010b: 333-334; Hammond 1988: 384; Anson 2013: 63.

⁴²² Mines of Philippi – Worthington 2008: 46; Hammond 1994b: 35; Cawkwell 1978b: 45; Gabriel 2010: 114; Thomas 2010: 75; Asirvatham 2010: 108-109; Müller 2010b: 172; LaForse 2010: 555. Oesyne – Hammond 1994b: 110; Archibald 2010b: 334. Cabyle – Dem. 8.44; Str. 7.6.2; Cawkwell 1978b: 44; Loukopoulou 2015: 468; Delev 1998: 5; Nankov 2015: 4; Millett 2010: 492.

provided a location to which undesirable elements of Macedonian society could be transported.⁴²³ In 341 another outpost – Philippoupolis – was founded to consolidate Macedonian gains in the area and secure control of the Axios Valley, a long-time Thracian invasion route.⁴²⁴ It seems likely that Philippoupolis also provided a relatively secure and remote destination for the relocation of social outcasts and potential subversives.⁴²⁵ Macedonia's colonisation program was applied to other sensitive areas of the kingdom. For example, in order to counter the north-western threat of Illyria, Philip transplanted entire populations in and out of the region.⁴²⁶ Polyaeus relates how Philip's use of guile achieved such a strategic goal when the king brought to a sudden and relatively bloodless halt his campaign against the Sarnousii (345/4), a Dardanian tribe. Under the pretence of a peace conference, Philip lured the Dardanians into what was instead a trap from which 10,000 prisoners were taken and subsequently transported within Macedonian borders. The Illyrian void was filled by Macedonian peasants who were relocated into key colonies such as Astraea, Dobera, Kellion and the Kavadarci region of Paeonia.⁴²⁷

If the cost of Philip's colonisation program in terms of human misery can be put to one side, the policy's pragmatism had much to commend it (from a Macedonian standpoint). Not only did it increase the wealth and power of the state but also provided the opportunity to disperse concentrations of populations hostile to Philip's rule, or strengthen

⁴²³ Dem. 8.44; Str. 7.6.2; Ellis 1972: 12-13 n5; 1980b: 45; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 557; Green 1991: 62; Dell 1980: 91; Paschids 2006: 257; Delev 1998: 5-6.

⁴²⁴ Diod. Sic. 16.71.2; Plin. *HN* 4.11.41; Gabriel 2010: 50, 185-186; Cawkwell 1978b: 44; Ellis 1972: 15; Millett 2010: 492; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 354; Loukopoulou 2015: 468; Nankov 2015: 4.

⁴²⁵ Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 110; Plut. *Mor.* 520B; Plin. *HN* 4.11.41; Errington 1990: 58; Ellis 1972: 12; Bradford 1992: 93; Gabriel 2010: 51. The association of Philippoupolis with an undesirable element can be traced to one of the colony's former names – Poneropolis (Rogue-Town).

⁴²⁶ Just. 8.5.7-8; Gabriel 2010: 177-178; Worthington 2008: 109; Ellis 1972: 15; Hammond 1981: 212; Millett 2010: 492; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 660-662.

⁴²⁷ Polyaeus. 4.2.12; Hammond 1994b: 111, 115-117; Bradford 1992: 87; Fox 2015d: 374; Ellis 1972: 16; 1980b: 42; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 661. Transplants – Gabriel 2010: 50; Worthington 2008: 110; Hammond 1994b: 54, 110-111.

those favourably disposed towards it.⁴²⁸ Forced immigrations obviously increased the state's population base and therefore, in time, its potential military capacity – especially in infantry troops.⁴²⁹ Finally, and probably most significantly, by amalgamating peoples of disparate cultures and ethnicities – albeit through coercion initially – Philip contributed to the development of a common sense of national unity and identity that was distinctively Macedonian.⁴³⁰

Clearly, in pursuit of his ambitions, Philip could be both a ruthless and brutal politician. He was also, however, capable of demonstrating equally well both humility and mercy, as evidenced by his treatment of Athens following Chaeronea. The tradition towards Philip in the immediate aftermath of the battle is certainly hostile, with the king painted as displaying intemperance at best or *hubris* at worst.⁴³¹ There was one dissenting voice to this tirade of invective which records that Philip was careful not to be excessive in his revelry (and cause to celebrate he had) for fear of causing lasting offense to those who had suffered defeat – Thebes obviously excepted.⁴³²

The observation was an astute one, made even more telling by the king's leniency towards Athens that suggested a well-thought-out strategy which sought to avoid further alienating the *polis* if at all possible. In what has become termed the Peace of Demades, Philip ordered an immediate cessation of hostilities and returned the cremated remains of the Athenian dead. Two thousand prisoners of war were released without ransom and the city remained unoccupied, its navy left intact. Athenians even gained territorially when the

⁴²⁸ Cawkwell 1978b: 45; Ellis 1972: 15-16; 1976: 230-231.

⁴²⁹ Ellis 1980b: 42; Brunt 1963: 37.

⁴³⁰ Hammond & Griffith 1979: 662; Ellis 1980b: 45; Gabriel 2010: 39, 52.

⁴³¹ Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 236; Demad. 9; Diod. Sic. 16.87.1-2; Plut. *Dem.* 20; *Mor.* 715C; Philostr. *VA* 7.2; Ath. 10.435b; Pownall 2010: 57; Green 1991: 77; Roberts 1982: 368; Baynham 1994: 39; O'Brien 1994: 7, 25; Fox 2015c: 358-359; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 605; Worthington 2013: 252-253.

⁴³² Just. 9.4.1-3; Worthington 2008: 153; Green 1991: 80; Ellis 1976: 295 n75; Hammond 1994b: 156.

disputed town of Oropus was restored to their control following a period of Theban occupation.⁴³³ With some justification it has been observed that in the treatment of a defeated enemy, the generosity of Macedonian terms was remarkable.⁴³⁴

Philip's motivations for leniency have been much debated. A charitable explanation has it that the king was unable to bring about the destruction of a city he much admired. It is true that Philip was a Graecophile with an appreciation for Athenian high culture but sentiment had played little part in previous affairs of state.⁴³⁵ Closer to the mark may have been that the king needed to come to terms quickly as it was unlikely his army could have prosecuted swiftly a successful siege against such a large, well-defended city as Athens that was demonstrating every determination to resist. From a strategic standpoint, an expeditious settlement made sense as even if Philip may have triumphed eventually, he could not chance a long, drawn out siege in which he would lose momentum or run the risk of Greek counter-operations – a lesson well learnt at Perinthus.⁴³⁶

Whatever place sentimental or strategic factors Philip entertained in formulating his policy towards Athens, it seems most likely that, again, it was political considerations that took priority. There were excellent reasons to refrain from inflicting punitive punishments upon the *polis*. In the first instance, a strong Athens, especially one that was well-disposed towards Macedonia, would make an excellent buffer state to check any future ambitions

⁴³³ Diod. Sic. 16.87.3; Plut. *Phoc.* 16; Paus. 7.10.5; Worthington 2008: 155-156; Ashley 1998: 156; Cawkwell 1978b: 167; Bradford 1992: 149; Ellis 1976: 199; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 326-327, 608; Errington 1990: 84; Green 1991: 79; Roberts 1982: 368-369; Roebuck 1948: 81; Müller 2010b: 177; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 372, 400.

⁴³⁴ Plut. *Dem.* 22; Sakellariou 1980a: 141; Zahrt 2009: 242; Roebuck 1948: 82; Schwenk 1997: 30; Worthington 2013: 257; Errington 1990: 84-85; Curteis 1890: 78; Bradford 1992: 148; Gabriel 2010: 224; Ashley 1998: 156.

⁴³⁵ Graecophile – O'Brien 1994: 26; Warry 1995: 69; Gabriel 2010: 18-19; Cawkwell 1978b: 50. Admirer of Athens – Plut. *Mor.* 178A; Worthington 2008: 98; 2013: 258; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 619-620; Cawkwell 1978b: 56-57.

⁴³⁶ Dem. 18.248; Brunt 1976d: lvi; Heskell 1997a: 185; Green 1991: 78; Roebuck 1948: 80; Hamilton 2002b: 33; Ashley 1998: 156; Hammond 1994b: 155-156. For Philip's failure at Perinthus – Thesis: 203.

harboured by Thebes, which had proved an unreliable ally.⁴³⁷ Doubtless Philip also had need of the Athenian navy for his invasion of Asia, which required both the fleet and *polis* in a healthy position.⁴³⁸ Perhaps too, the Macedonian king was aware that even when seemingly down and out, Athens was a resilient and therefore dangerous foe. In 395/394, for example, the city began rebuilding her Long Walls, a mere ten years after being forced to destroy them.⁴³⁹ The security afforded by the fortifications contributed to Athens' active pursuit of empire which culminated in the Second Athenian Confederacy (378-355).⁴⁴⁰ With such restless energy – something long recognised as an Athenian trait – the fostering of goodwill rather than hostile memories made sound political sense.⁴⁴¹ Whatever the reasons for Macedonia's generous terms, Athenians were quick to express their gratitude, honouring Philip with a statue in the *agora* and conferring citizenship upon both the king and his son.⁴⁴²

In similar fashion, Philip manipulated individuals by creating a sense of obligation. Sometimes this involved the establishment of a client king who, supported by Philip, was thus beholden to him in order to maintain a position of power and privilege. An example

⁴³⁷ Worthington 2008: 156; 2014: 98; Müller 2010b: 177; Guler 2014: 135; Gabriel 2010: 225-226.

⁴³⁸ Diod. Sic. 16.60.5; Griffith 1965: 127; 1980: 76; Worthington 2013: 258; 2014: 98; Cawkwell 1978b: 167; Heskell 1997a: 185; Ellis 1982: 49; Zahrt 2009: 20-22; Montagu 2006: 30; Green 1991: 78; Brunt 1969: 262; Markle 1974: 268; Müller 2010b: 177; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 461, 619.

⁴³⁹ Destroyed – Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.23; Str. 9.1.15; Cartledge 1987: 280; Underhill 2012: 156. Rebuilt – *IG* ii² 1656; *IG* ii² 1657= Tod 107A & B=R&O 9; Isoc. *Dis.* 5.64; Dem. 20.72; Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.9; Nep. 9.4.5; Lawrence 1979: 155; Theodoraki 2011: 116; Berkey 2010: 69-70; Buck 1994: 47-48, 50; Cook 1988: 81; French 1991: 24; Gomme 1967: 39; Pascual 2009: 85; Seager 1967: 104; Cartledge 1987: 293, 362; Tod 1950: 23, 89; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 47.

⁴⁴⁰ *IG* ii² 96= Tod 126=R&O 24; Tod 127; Tod 146; Diod. Sic. 15.28.2-5; Cawkwell 1978b: 69; Worthington 2014: 9-10; Brock 2010: 94; Lee 2010b: 500; Rhodes 2010d: 49; Cawkwell 1973: 47-48; 1981: 41, 47; Roberts 2017: 344-345; Rhodes 1986: 4; Tod 1950: 67-69, 90, 142-143; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 146, 148, 209.

⁴⁴¹ Restless energy – Thuc. 1.70.3-9; Worthington 2008: 156; Berkey 2010: 59, 70; Kagan 2010: 54; Gomme 1959: 231; Strauss 2013: 28, 30; Walter 2009: 515; Raaflaub 2010: 388; Hornblower 1997: 114; Cartwright 1997: 42.

⁴⁴² Plut. *Dem.* 22; Paus. 1.9.4; Norlin 1928: xliv; Worthington 2008: 157; Ellis 1976: 200; 1981: 129-130; Green 1991: 79, 84; Fredrickmeyer 1979: 39 n1; Baynham 1994: 39; O'Brien 1994: 26; Paspalas 2015: 190.

was Alexander Molossus of Epirus. In 350, Philip reduced Arybbas, joint king of the Molossians, to vassal status and removed his twelve year old nephew Alexander to Macedonia where, although a hostage, he was enrolled in the Royal Page School.⁴⁴³ Eight years later (342), Arybbas was deposed and after expanding Molossian territory by conquest, Philip installed the young man on the throne.⁴⁴⁴ Ties were further consolidated in 337 when following the potentially disastrous altercation with his son and wife Olympias (sister of Alexander Molossus), Philip countered the possibility of internecine plots by brokering a marriage between his own daughter Cleopatra and the Epirite king – so binding Alexander even more closely to him.⁴⁴⁵

The familiarity between the Macedonian king and his client has been regarded in some quarters as a lascivious one in which the older man bought the favours of his ward with promises of wealth and power.⁴⁴⁶ Whilst no stranger to pederastic affairs, it is clear Philip's primary motivations in his relationship with Alexander were political. Epirus was a key strategic region that Philip needed to secure. The territory was rich in agricultural land well-suited as summer pasturage for Macedonian livestock – especially horses – and Arybbas' increasingly pro-Athenian leanings made his reign untenable. Establishment of a vassal king, therefore, provided both immediate advantages and greater prospects of long-

⁴⁴³ Just. 8.6.4-5; Hammond 1994b: 51, 120; Worthington 2008: 70; 2013: 127; Zahrnt 2009: 13; Fox 2015c: 353; Greenwalt 2010: 292-293; Dell 1980: 95; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 306; King 2018: 80; Rhodes 1986: 18.

⁴⁴⁴ Dem. 7.32; Diod. Sic. 16.72.1; Just. 8.6.4-7; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 505; Hammond 1994b: 121; Errington 1990: 44; Carney 1992: 178; O'Brien 1994: 35; Sidnell 2006: 77; Rhodes 2010b: 35; Müller 2010b: 176; Greenwalt 2010: 293; Dell 1980: 95; Markle 1976: 96; Worthington 2013: 210; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 352-353.

⁴⁴⁵ Diod. Sic. 16.91.4; Hammond 1994b: 172; Worthington 2008: 177; 2013: 266-267; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 682; Badian 1963: 246; Green 1991: 97; Hamilton 1965: 121; O'Brien 1994: 35; Fox 2015d: 385; Greenwalt 2010: 293-294; King 2018: 135; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 355; McQueen 1995a: 173.

⁴⁴⁶ Just. 8.6.6; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 505; Carney 1992: 178; Sawada 2010: 404; Errington 1990: 44; Bradford 1992: 91; Hammond 1991a: 500; 1994b: 121; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 353-354; Tod 1950: 215.

term security.⁴⁴⁷ Philip's wisdom in binding Alexander even closer to the Macedonian throne paid dividends both during and after his lifetime, with Epirus remaining loyal to the crown following the estrangement of Olympias, and intrigues pursuant to his own assassination.⁴⁴⁸

Perhaps not as lavishly as represented in the sources, bribery was also employed by Philip upon those who were in a position to serve Macedonian interests and its role in the capture of cities has already been discussed.⁴⁴⁹ In like manner, the king's gold was spent wisely in 359 buying off an impending invasion by Agis of Paeonia and the same year securing the death of the pretender Pausanias.⁴⁵⁰ On a grander scale, Philip used bribery to ferment existing rivalries endemic in the *polis* system and in doing so weakened the ability of the city-states to counter his advance.⁴⁵¹ In 348, for example, Olynthus fell from within due to factionalism that was fuelled by Macedonian gold, and that same year – in a tactic intended to keep Sparta's attention away from the Sacred War and firmly on its own backyard – monies were lavished in an attempt to create disorder in the Peloponnese.⁴⁵² The policy was a successful one, sometimes spectacularly so, as evidenced in the case of

⁴⁴⁷ Land – Hammond 1994b: 120; Worthington 2008: 37, 117; 2013: 210; Thomas 2010: 77. Security – Dem. 7.32; Diod. Sic. 16.72.1; Worthington 2008: 116; Greenwalt 2010: 291-292, 294; McQueen 1995a: 148.

⁴⁴⁸ Just. 9.7.7; Hammond 1994b: 172; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 682; Errington 1990: 44; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 355; Greenwalt 2010: 292-293; McQueen 1995b: 330; Cawkwell 1978b: 179; Bosworth 1988a: 22; Worthington 2008: 177.

⁴⁴⁹ Reservations – Polyb. 18.14; Agnew 2016: 21; Nichols 2019: 173; Thornton 2011: 49; Perlman 1965: 226, 231. Capture of cities – Dem. 18.19; Diod. Sic. 16.53.3, 54.3; Green 1991: 33; Ober 2005: 191; Connolly 2012: 280; Campbell 2005: 31; Perlman 1965: 223; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 334; McKechnie 1994: 302.

⁴⁵⁰ Agis – Diod. Sic. 16.3.4; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 210-212; Worthington 2008: 24; Heskell 1997a: 179; Cawkwell 1978b: 29; Bradford 1992: 12; Fox 2015c: 341; Dell 1980: 95; LaForse 2010: 555. Pausanias – Cawkwell 1978b: 29; Bradford 1992: 12; Ellis 1976: 49; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 210.

⁴⁵¹ Dem. 8.40; 18.19, 48, 61, 247, 295-296; 19.300, 342; Diod. Sic. 16.8.6-7; Just. 8.1.3; Worthington 2008: 202; Bradford 1992: 56, 96; Green 1991: 31; Fox 2015c: 355; Müller 2010b: 173-174; Millett 2010: 496.

⁴⁵² Olynthus – Dem. 19.265; Diod. Sic. 16.53.2; Bradford 1992: 63; Gabriel 2010: 154; Cawkwell 1978b: 85; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 323; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 249. Peloponnese – Dem. 18.19; 19.10-11, 26; Aeschin. 2.79; Polyb. 18.14; Hamilton 1982: 71; McQueen 1995b: 334-335; Walbank 1967: 568.

Elis, where in 343 a pro-Macedonian oligarchy seized power after slaughtering the ruling democracy.⁴⁵³

Although not strictly speaking involving bribery, Philip's *largesse* amongst people of importance from foreign states and *poleis* within the context of a *xenos* or "guest-friend" relationship, undoubtedly created feelings of obligation.⁴⁵⁴ Many people of influence and power enjoyed the *xenia* (hospitality) of Philip and reciprocated with favours asked or anticipated of them, whether by passing on intelligence or promoting Macedonian agendas in their own assemblies.⁴⁵⁵ It should be remembered, however, that although Philip's network of those beholden to him was extensive – Demosthenes' "Black List of Traitors" details twenty-eight prominent individuals and implies there were many more – it was probably nowhere near the extent represented, as the Athenian politician regarded anyone who disagreed with him as corrupt.⁴⁵⁶

Nevertheless, that Philip had mouthpieces ready to promote his policies is well attested. Some who enjoyed the patronage of the Macedonian king returned the favour by appealing to their benefactor's sensitivities. In his dissertations Theopompus, for example, regularly attacked the philosopher, for whom he knew Philip had no great fondness.⁴⁵⁷

⁴⁵³ Dem. 19.260, 294; Paus. 4.28.4, 5.4.9; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 499-500; Ellis 1976: 151; Cawkwell 1978b: 126; Bradford 1992: 88; Ryder 1994: 242; 2000: 75; Hamilton 1982: 79, 81; Lott 1996: 34; Wallace 2018: 48.

⁴⁵⁴ Diod. Sic. 16.3.3; Gabriel 2010: 93; Bosworth 1988a: 9; Perlman 1965: 226-227; Fox 2015c: 358; Azoulay 2004a: 290; King 2018: 82-83; Strootman 2013: 47; McQueen 1995a: 125-126; 1995b: 331-332. Dem. 19.139 details how Theban ambassadors, when offered a bribe by Philip, virtuously rejected it.

⁴⁵⁵ Dem. 18.295; Polyb. 18.14; Plut. *Mor.* 178B-C; Hammond 1994b: 81; Bosworth 1988a: 6-7; Gabriel 2010: 93; Tritle 1995: 229-230, 233; Ellis 1980a: 152; Stamatopoulou 2007: 222; Nawotka 2010: 19-20, 354; Sato 2015: 211-212; McQueen 1995a: 126; Walbank 1967: 567.

⁴⁵⁶ Black list – Dem. 18.295; Polyb. 18.14; Walbank 1967: 566; Ryder 1994: 230, 232. Demosthenes' view of opponents – Aeschin. 2.144; Polyb. 18.14; Cic. *Att.* 1.16 12; Cawkwell 1978b: 80, 122-123; 1980a: 104, 110; Bradford 1992: 64; Errington 1990: 72, 78; Perlman 1976: 233; Harding 1987: 27, 27 n11; McQueen 1995a: 125; Ryder 1994: 230.

⁴⁵⁷ Attacks – Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 259; Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 275; Speus. 12; Ath. 12.508b-d; Natoli 2004a: 150-151; 2004b: 58-59; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 207; Shrimpton 1977: 139; 1991b: xvii, 6, 11; Westlake 1954: 297; Connor 1967: 149. Philip's dislike of Plato – Ath. 11.506e; Natoli 2004b: 32,

Royal pique was probably the result of Plato's diatribe against Archelaus I (413-399) – a former king and Philip's ancestor – who in the *Gorgias* was described as a parricide, despot and son of a slave.⁴⁵⁸ In 348, however – and perhaps in ironic magnanimity – Philip, upon learning of Plato's death, was said to have honoured the philosopher – although the means by which he did so are unknown.⁴⁵⁹

Although eager to have an association with Greece's leading intellectuals, the king was also judicious in his patronage, perhaps in the process rendering royal favour even more desirable. An obvious example was Speusippus, an Athenian and nephew of Plato, who had succeeded his uncle as head of The Academy. In a letter Speusippas petitioned Philip's support both for himself and the school, something withheld due to a feud that had arisen following the *Gorgias*' publication.⁴⁶⁰ Delivered by Antipater of Magnesia, whom Speusippas represented as a serious historian, the appeal was couched by way of support for the Magnesian's thesis which was that Philip had legitimate claim to the lands he had acquired through conquest.⁴⁶¹

The basis of Antipater's position was the long-held, so-called "Hero Argument" which acknowledged the rightful inheritance of spear-won territory first won in heroic antiquity – in Philip's case by his "ancestor" Heracles. A not uncommon rationale, similar grounds had also been employed to justify Heraclid rule in Sparta, and by extension the

38; Rhodes 2010b: 28. For a discussion of Theopompus' worth as a source – Chapter 1, III. Philip and the Literary Sources.

⁴⁵⁸ Pl. *Grg.* 471a-d, 525c-d; Hammond 1994b: 43; Vickers 1994: 110; Baynham 1998b: 143; White 1990: 126 n1.

⁴⁵⁹ Magnanimity – Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 294; Diog. Laert. 3.40; Ael. *VH* 4.19; Worthington 2013: 258; 2014: 69; Riginos 1976: 198; Everitt 2016: 423; Ntinti 2012: 185; Fortenbaugh 2011: 497. For a contra view – Natoli 2004b: 38 n87.

⁴⁶⁰ Petition for support – Speus. 5; Natoli 2004a: 125; 2004b: 65; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 206-207, 515; Worthington 2008: 104, 121-122; 2014: 27, 69-70; Müller 2010b: 175; Squillace 2010: 74; Rhodes 2010b: 29; Shrimpton 1991b: 10; Sprawski 2014a: 13; Markle 1976: 80, 93.

⁴⁶¹ Speus. 1, 3, 5; Natoli 2004a: 110-111, 117, 123-124; 2004b: 66-67, 72-73; Shrimpton 1991b: 10; Sprawski 2014a: 5, 13; Markle 1976: 94; Rhodes 2010b: 29; Müller 2010b: 175.

coveted (unsuccessful) reclamation of Messene.⁴⁶² Precedence, Speusippas argued, therefore justified some of Philip's more controversial actions including the subjugation of Amphipolis, which had long before been conquered by Heracles and bequeathed to his descendants – the current kings of Macedonia.⁴⁶³ Identical logic supported Macedonian gains in the Chalcidice (including Olynthus) and a similar argument justified Philip's expulsion of Phocis from the Delphic Amphictyony and subsequent acquisition of its voting rights.⁴⁶⁴ Despite obvious willingness to incur the wrath of his fellow Athenians by legitimizing Macedonian actions, Speusippus was unsuccessful in his bid for royal patronage – perhaps Philip's magnanimity towards Plato's legacy was not that indubitable after all.⁴⁶⁵

The prudent use of propaganda represented another means by which Philip was able to exploit his position as head of state in order to enhance his own reputation. No greater statement of Macedonia's new standing was that of the Royal Palace, constructed by Philip c.343.⁴⁶⁶ Built near modern Vergina and covering an area of 12,500 square metres, the palace occupied seven terraces over the foothills of the Pieria Range; an elevation that ensured the royal residence would be visible from the entire surrounding plain.⁴⁶⁷ Although the superstructure was mudbrick, the walls were rendered in a high-quality marble stucco,

⁴⁶² Isoc. *Dis.* 6.18-19; Speus. 6; Diod. Sic. 4.33.5; Paus. 2.18.7; Natoli 2004a: 126, 128; 2004b: 69, 72; Grimal 1990: 192, 195, 289; Seyffert 1957: 283, 413; Burkert 1985: 211; Sprawski 2014a: 7-8; Müller 2010b: 175.

⁴⁶³ Speus. 3, 5-6, 7; Natoli 2004a: 127; 2004b: 21, 30, 68, 71; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 515; Squillace 2010: 74; Müller 2010b: 175; Markle 1976: 80-81, 94; Sprawski 2014a: 5-6.

⁴⁶⁴ Chalcidice – Speus. 5; Natoli 2004a: 123-124, 125; 2004b: 76; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 514-515; Squillace 2010: 74; Markle 1976: 95; Sprawski 2014a: 3. Voting rights – Dem. 19.128, 327; Speus. 8; Natoli 2004a: 137-138; 2004b: 73, 76-77, 98; Squillace 2010: 74; Sprawski 2014a: 9-10, 12; Markle 1976: 80-81, 95-96; McQueen 1995a: 135.

⁴⁶⁵ Philip is alleged to have honoured Plato upon hearing of the philosopher's death – Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 294; Diog. Laert. 3.40; Ael. *VH* 4.19; Worthington 2013: 258; 2014: 69; Riginos 1976: 198; Everitt 2016: 423; Ntinti 2012: 185; Fortenbaugh 2011: 497. For a contra view – Natoli 2004b: 38 n87.

⁴⁶⁶ Attraction of the court – Fox 2015d: 383-384; Ma 2015: 537-538; Kottaridi 2015: 303, 305, 333. That Philip built the Royal Palace – Miller 2016: 288-289; Carney 2010b: 50; Nielsen 2001: 172.

⁴⁶⁷ Miller 2016: 289; Kottaridi 2002: 76; 2015: 297; Carney 2010b: 50; Greenwalt 1999: 158; Borza 1990: 253-254.

creating the impression that real stone had been used throughout.⁴⁶⁸ Two-storeyed *stoas* surrounded a *peristyle* courtyard that seated up to 3,000 visitors and there were several *andrones* (banqueting rooms) that, including their antechambers, could seat up to 550 men.⁴⁶⁹ The palace also contained numerous valuable artworks including mosaics (of which 1,450 square metres survive), foremost amongst them a depiction of Zeus' abduction of Europa.⁴⁷⁰ Included in the complex was, ironically, an imposing theatre where Philip met his death in 336 – but not for nothing has his creation been regarded as amongst the greatest buildings in Classical Greece.⁴⁷¹

Along with ostentatious displays of wealth, the king's self-promulgations often had close religious associations. Arguably his most effective was the Philippeion at Olympia. The monument itself was commissioned by the king in 338/7 to commemorate his victory at Chaeronea, although it was probably not completed until after his assassination in 336.⁴⁷² Not strictly speaking a temple, the monument's circular design nevertheless identified the structure as a *tholos*, whose shape was commonly associated with sacred buildings. The Philippeion consisted of an eighteen column outer colonnade that surrounded an inner wall of eight engaged columns near which were displayed statues of Philip, his parents Amyntas

⁴⁶⁸ Kottaridi 2015: 311.

⁴⁶⁹ Miller 2016: 289; Kottaridi 2015: 297, 300, 321, 323, 325; Carney 2010b: 50-51.

⁴⁷⁰ Diod. Sic. 16.92.5; Kottaridi 2002: 76; 2015: 298, 394; Drougou 2015: 249; Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2015: 287; Tomlinson 2006: 168.

⁴⁷¹ Diod. Sic. 16.93.1-2; King 2018: 98; Gabriel 2010: 234; Miller 2016: 289; Kottaridi 2015: 327, 332; Carney 2010b: 50; Borza 1990: 253, 255-256; Hammond 1994b: 176; Worthington 2008: 181-182; 2013: 268; Heckel 2008: 560; Müller 2010b: 182.

⁴⁷² Commissioned – Paus. 5.20.10; Fredericksmeier 1979: 53-54; Palagia 2010: 33; Pownall 2010: 55; Worthington 2008: 164; Green 1991: 81; Müller 2010b: 181; Hardiman 2010: 508; Carney 2000a: 24; Miller 2004: 224. Completed – Worthington 2008: 165; Valavanis 2004: 118; Fredericksmeier 1979: 53; Carney 2000a: 25.

III and Eurydice, wife Olympias, and son Alexander. The king was situated in the centre of the group to emphasise his importance.⁴⁷³

Philip's purpose in having the *tholos* built has been much debated. Certainly it was intended to be seen by as wide an audience as possible. The monument was situated in the *temenos*, an area reserved normally for statues and buildings that honoured gods and heroes. Combined with its unusual shape and location – every visitor to the games (the main stadium held 40,000 but on any given day the total attendance may have been as many as 80,000) had to pass through the *temenos* – the Philippeion could hardly have avoided being noticed.⁴⁷⁴ Adding to the splendour of the architectural design were the statues of the royal family, crafted as they supposedly were from chryselephantine – materials normally reserved for the depiction of gods.⁴⁷⁵

This has led some modern commentators to believe the building signalled Philip's intention to establish himself as an object of cult worship.⁴⁷⁶ The argument is a strong one and even if the centrepieces were of gilded marble – elements commonly used in mortal effigies – it is questionable whether the difference would have been discernible to the casual spectator.⁴⁷⁷ Regardless of whether or not the Philippeion signalled its creator's divine

⁴⁷³ Paus. 5.20.9-10; Hammond 1982: 120; Borza 1990: 250; Valavanis 2004: 118; Worthington 2008: 164; 2014: 107; Green 1991: 81; Fredericksmeier 1979: 53-54; Hardiman 2010: 508; Baynham 1994: 38; Carney 2000a: 24-25; Swaddling 2015: 24; O'Brien 1994: 28; Müller 2010b: 181.

⁴⁷⁴ Stadium of 40,000 – Sweet 1987: 4; Golden 1998: 57; Valavanis 2004: 144; Crowther 1999: 585; Kyle 2015: 109; Swaddling 2015: 30. 80,000 attendance – Gribble 2012: 59; Kyle 2015: 127. Luc. *Anach.* 10; Swaddling 2015: 7, 52 state “thousands” watched the Games. Epict. 1.6.26-27; Guttmann 1986: 15 indicate an overcrowded and noisy environment without mentioning numbers. Situation of Philippeion – Worthington 2008: 165; Müller 2010b: 181; Hardiman 2010: 509; Carney 2000a: 24; Miller 2004: 224; Swaddling 2015: 25.

⁴⁷⁵ Paus. 5.17.4, 20.9-10; Bradford 1992: 155; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 694; Hammond 1982: 120; Fredericksmeier 1979: 53; Müller 2010b: 181; Hardiman 2010: 508; Baynham 1994: 38; Carney 2000a: 24; 2010a: 417; Miller 2004: 224; Swaddling 2015: 25, 99; O'Brien 1994: 28.

⁴⁷⁶ Fredericksmeier 1979: 55; 1982: 94; 1990: 307; Carney 2010b: 46; Green 1991: 81-82; Badian 1963: 247; Christesen & Murray 2010: 442.

⁴⁷⁷ Gilded marble – Palagia 2010: 37-38; Worthington 2008: 165, 231; Müller 2010b: 181; Hardiman 2010: 508; Paspalas 2015: 189; Carney 2015: 89; Varner 2015: 156.

aspirations, it was most certainly a show of power and intended to elevate the king's status and prestige within the Greek community.⁴⁷⁸

A probable secondary purpose was to cultivate popularity by reminding people about Philip's sporting achievements at the Olympic festivals with which he was associated.⁴⁷⁹ The Olympic Games were of enormous cultural and religious significance throughout the Greek world and perhaps no event more so than the chariot races, where victory or sponsorship of a winning team was regarded as a statement of wealth and prestige; it also contributed significantly to the victor's standing, not only within their own *polis* but the international Greek community.⁴⁸⁰ Philip was careful to capitalise on this public-relations opportunity. As king, and so with Macedonia's full resources under his control, fiscal constraints could hardly have been a consideration and Philip was involved in some capacity at three consecutive Olympics. The first was in 356 when his entry won the prestigious *keles* (horse-race).⁴⁸¹ In 352 Philip returned (as a sponsor) and was again victorious, this time in the *tethrippon* (four-horse chariot race) – the festival's blue-ribbon competition ever since its introduction in 680.⁴⁸² Four years later Philip financed yet another successful entry in the Olympic chariot event although interestingly, this was the slightly less prestigious *synoris* (two-horse event).⁴⁸³ Perhaps Philip felt that after two

⁴⁷⁸ Borza 1990: 228, 250; Worthington 2008: 164-166, 231; 2013: 254; 2014: 107-108; Valavanis 2004: 118; Carney 2000a: 25; Miller 2004: 224; Gabriel 2010: 23; Hammond 1994b: 191.

⁴⁷⁹ Hammond & Griffith 1979: 694; Borza 1982a: 13; Fox 2015c: 364; Swaddling 2015: 24; Lapatin 2001: 117; Kyle 2015: 226.

⁴⁸⁰ Epict. 1.6.27-29; Luc. *Anach.* 10; Valavanis 2004: 19, 23, 150; Borza 1990: 228; Gribble 2012: 47, 51, 71; Heskell 1997a: 182; Golden 1998: 170; Swaddling 2015: 81; Bowra 1969: x. For examples – Pind. *Ol.* 1; *Ol.* 2; *Ol.* 3; Hdt. 6.103; Thuc. 6.16.2; Isoc. *Dis.* 16.25, 32-34; Plut. *Alc.* 11; Bugh 1998b: 36; Kyle 2015: 107, 123; Gomme & Andrewes 1970: 246; Miller 2004: 28, 77, 128, 153; Robinson 1981: 82, 92.

⁴⁸¹ Plut. *Alex.* 3; Natoli 2004a: 140; Hatzopoulos 2015b: 66; Karunanithy 2013: 65; Palagia 2010: 33; Heskell 1997a: 182; Valavanis 2004: 118; Fox 2015c: 353; Borza 1982a: 13; Adams 2014: 335.

⁴⁸² Plut. *Alex.* 4; Karunanithy 2013: 65; Palagia 2010: 33; Hatzopoulos 2015b: 66; Anson 2010c: 19; Borza 1982a: 13; Adams 2014: 335. Date of introduction – Paus. 5.8.7; Greenhalgh 1973: 27; Green 1991: 2; Kyle 2015: 121; Miller 2004: 23, 75; Golden 1998: 64-65; Swaddling 2015: 54, 83.

⁴⁸³ Plut. *Alex.* 4; Karunanithy 2013: 65; Palagia 2010: 33; Hammond & Griffiths 1979: 665; Miller 2004: 223; Fox 2015c: 364; Anson 2010c: 19; Borza 1982a: 13; Hammond 1994b: 114; Adams 2014: 335.

victories his international reputation was secure, for even if the financial burden of prosecuting the Third Sacred War was beginning to be felt, surely someone with pockets as deep as his could have afforded the capital needed to finance a four-horse team.⁴⁸⁴

Whether this was indeed the case or Philip simply tired of the whole venture – there is no record of any further involvement in the Olympic Games beyond 348 – Macedonian currency provided yet another means by which the king elevated his status in the Greek community. Whilst their effectiveness as a propaganda tool has sometimes been overstated, it is equally valid to regard the issuance of coins as a symbol of standing that conveyed important religio-political messages.⁴⁸⁵ For example, tetradrachms (silver coins) issued early in Philip's reign (*c.*359) emphasised the relationship between the state and Zeus by incorporating a thunderbolt – an iconic symbol of the deity – into their design.⁴⁸⁶ Macedonians had a strong connection with Zeus as the mythological founder of their state but equally significant, from Philip's perspective, was that the god also had ties with the ruling dynasty who claimed descent from Heracles – Zeus' son by Alcmena.⁴⁸⁷ The coins were therefore a reminder that not only was Macedonia favoured by the greatest of all Olympians, so too were his descendants, the Temenidae. Tetradrachms of Philip post 348 continued the Zeus motif with the obverse sporting the deity's head but their main purpose was to commemorate the king's Olympic victories. Depicted on the reverse astride a horse

⁴⁸⁴ Eight talents – Diod. Sic. 13.74.3. Five talents plus additional costs – Isoc. *Dis.* 16.46; Gribble 2012: 55-56; Pritchard 2013: 71; Raubitschek 1948: 202. Golden 1998: 169; 2014: 262 acknowledges the anomaly in the sources.

⁴⁸⁵ Overstated – Borza 1990: 127, 127 n68, 173 n29; Millett 2010: 493-494; Worthington 2008: 48.

⁴⁸⁶ Ellis 1976: 237; le Rider 1980: 48; Lianou 2010: 129-130; Valavanis 2004: 23; Hammond 1994b: 114; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 665; McQueen 1995a: 186.

⁴⁸⁷ Isoc. *Dis.* 5.105; Speus. 3; Lianou 2010: 130; Worthington 2014: 15, 22, 91; Edson 1980: 24; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 3; Errington 1990: 2-3; Borza 1982a: 11; Roebuck 1948: 76, 85; O'Brien 1994: 22; Mari 2015b: 455.

was a naked child carrying a palm frond in his right hand, an honour reserved for an Olympic champion.⁴⁸⁸

Perhaps the best known of Philip's coins were *philippeioi*; gold stater coins that entered circulation sometime in the 340s.⁴⁸⁹ An early issue featured the head of Apollo on the obverse which alluded to the king's Pythian presidency (346), one of the honours accorded Philip for his role in the Third Sacred War in which he positioned himself as the god's protector and avenger. On the stater's reverse was an image of a *biga* (two-horse chariot) under which was the king's name; the image was clearly an allusion to the Olympic victory of 348.⁴⁹⁰ As with their silver counterparts, therefore, *philippeioi* were far more than simply a medium of exchange; they were a statement concerning the wealth and prestige of their issuer.⁴⁹¹

It should also be acknowledged, however, that currency was a means through which political and economic dominance might be obtained and extended by its issuers.⁴⁹² Money, for example, has long been recognised as the driving force of war.⁴⁹³ Philip was well

⁴⁸⁸ Plut. *Alex.* 4; Ellis 1976: 235, 237; Palagia 2010: 33; Rhomiopoulou 1979: 24; Melville-Jones 2006: 30; Miller 2004: 218-219; Hammond 1994b: 114; le Rider 1980: 50; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 664; Hamilton 2002b: 9; Howgego 1995: 66; Mørkholm 1991: 41-42. Price 1979: 240; Müller 2010b: 172 date the tetradrachms to 356.

⁴⁸⁹ Price 1979: 234; Howgego 1995: 48; le Rider 1980: 49; Ellis 1976: 235; de Callatay 2012: 176-177; Green 1991: 31; Dahmen 2010: 52; McQueen 1995a: 76; Mørkholm 1991: 41. Bellinger 1964: 36; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 663 hypothesise 356 as the earliest date of issue whereas Fox 2015d: 368 states between 355 and 352.

⁴⁹⁰ le Rider 1980: 49; Ellis 1976: 237; Worthington 2014: 66; de Callatay 2012: 177; Rhomiopoulou 1979: 24; Fox 2015c: 364; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 664-665; Natoli 2004a: 140; Hamilton 2002b: 12-13; McQueen 1995a: 77.

⁴⁹¹ de Callatay 2012: 177; Perlman 1965: 57; Worthington 2008: 82; Bernstein 2000: 42-43; Snodgrass 2003: 273-273; Snowball & Snowball 2005: 15, 25.

⁴⁹² Power – Aristot. *Rh.* 1.5.7; [Aristot.] *Oec.* 1345b; Borza 1990: 126; Worthington 2008: 48; Howgego 1995: 41; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 670.

⁴⁹³ Plut. *Cleom.* 27.1; Tac. *Hist.* 2.84; Trundle 2010a: 227, 245; Mahaffy 2014: 222; de Callatay 2013: 91.

cognisant of the fact and had used Macedonian silver to both hire mercenaries and finance a large (by contemporary standards) standing army.⁴⁹⁴

Perhaps more importantly, however, was that a strong currency provided a means by which economic growth could be achieved.⁴⁹⁵ Because its true value was related to weight and purity, standardisation was crucial in promoting trade by providing a reliable medium of exchange.⁴⁹⁶ Philip was careful to ensure that Macedonian coinage was of the highest reputation. His *philippeioi*, for example, were based on the Attic gold standard, surely no coincidence for Athenian “owls” had been the dominant currency in the eastern Mediterranean since c.500.⁴⁹⁷ Similarly, his tetradrachms were modelled on the Thraco-Macedonian silver standard, which was also used by the Chalcidian League.⁴⁹⁸ Although enjoying nowhere near the circulation of Athenian “owls”, Thracian tetradrachms were well-established and widely accepted, as were those of the League.⁴⁹⁹

As well as stimulating trade and the economy, standardising currency was also a symbolic representation of unity, so providing local populations with the sense of identity and belonging.⁵⁰⁰ In some cases this was neither benign nor voluntary and Philip was not

⁴⁹⁴ Mercenaries – Diod. Sic. 16.8.7; Borza 1990: 216; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 664; Millett 2010: 495. Army – Hammond & Griffith 1979: 670-671; Millett 2010: 493 n80, 496; Gabriel 2010: 114; Müller 2010b: 184.

⁴⁹⁵ Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 5.5.14; Borza 1990: 130, 173 n29; Worthington 2008: 48; Millett 2010: 495; Ober 2015: 271; Snowball & Snowball 2005: 16.

⁴⁹⁶ Medium of Exchange – Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 5.5.14; Borza 1990: 127; Kremydi 2015: 165-166; Fox 2015d: 368; Millett 2010: 493-494; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 663; Worthington 2008: 46, 48, 70, 78-79; Gabriel 2010: 114; Bernstein 2000: 42; Snowball & Snowball 2005: 14, 16; Price 1974: 23.

⁴⁹⁷ Attic standard – Hammond & Griffith 1979: 663; Dahmen 2010: 49, 51; Ellis 1976: 237; Snowball & Snowball 2005: 16; Kremydi 2015: 166-167; Mørkholm 1991: 8, 41, 43; Price 1974: 16, 23. Owls – Howgego 1995: 50, 97; Gabrielsen 2013: 347; Rhodes 2010d: 55; Oliver 2010: 291; Strauss 1984: 426; 2013: 28; Figueira 1998: 35; Kroll 2009: 196-197, 199.

⁴⁹⁸ Hammond & Griffith 1979: 663; Dahmen 2010: 51-52; Kremydi 2015: 166; Ellis 1976: 235; Snowball & Snowball 2005: 14, 16; Mørkholm 1991: 41; Psoma 2016: 104, 114 n199; Price 1974: 16, 21.

⁴⁹⁹ Thrace – Howgego 1995: 96; Psoma 2016: 104; Strauss 1984: 426; Kroll 2009: 200; von Reden 2010: 208. Chalcidian League – Dahmen 2010: 48; Psoma 2016: 104; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 664; Price 1974: 21; Kraay 1976: 138.

⁵⁰⁰ Howgego 1995: 43; Jönsson & Hall 2005: 79; Figueira 1998: 252; Trundle 2010a: 252.

beyond utilising currency as an expression of hegemony. The king, for example, abolished Molossian coinage when in 350 he reduced Arybbas to vassalage status, and in 348 the issuances of the Chalcidian League were discontinued following the fall of Olynthus.⁵⁰¹ Always duplicitous, Philip was sometimes careful to pay attention to appearances and so occasionally allowed striking in order to create the illusion of independence – whilst still maintaining firm political control. Such was the case in Thessaly and Delphi, where, late in Philip's reign, the *amphictyony* was granted the right to mint coins.⁵⁰²

Accessibility underpins acceptance and certainly the king made every effort to ensure his issuances were circulated as widely and efficiently as possible. He was, for example, the first European monarch to have multiple royal mints, so helping facilitate the rapid distribution of coins throughout his expanding domains.⁵⁰³ Pella began producing tetradrachms from c.359 and Amphipolis c.356.⁵⁰⁴ Philip's capital, Pella, was a natural choice for the location of a royal mint. As a hotly contested former Athenian colony captured by storm only a year before, Amphipolis was a less obvious selection – until it is remembered the strategic proximity of the *polis* to Thrace and the Chalcidice, both of which possessed strong currencies that Philip no doubt wished to (and eventually did) supercede.

By such means, then, was Philip able to harness currency to enhance both his own position and that of Macedonia. In light of the widespread circulation of Athens'

⁵⁰¹ Molossia – Worthington 2008: 70; 2014: 58; Gabriel 2010: 147; Hammond 1994b: 211 n10. Chalcidian League – Worthington 2008: 79-79; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 664; Ellis 1976: 235, 237; Kraay 1976: 138, 146; Cahill 2002: 57; Price 1974: 22.

⁵⁰² Thessaly – Howgego 1995: 48; Ellis 1976: 236-237, 238; Dahmen 2010: 49 n33; Kraay 1976: 117, 132. *Amphictyony* – Howgego 1995: 48; Scott 2014: 159; Mørkholm 1991: 85; Weir 2007: 187; Psoma 2012a: 165; Kroll 2011: 237; Kraay 1976: 122; Roebuck 1948: 79.

⁵⁰³ Kremydi 2015: 165; le Rider 1980: 57; Holt 2016: 159; Koukouli-Chrysanthaki 2015b: 440; Price 1974: 22; Kraay 1976: 146.

⁵⁰⁴ Pella – Str. 7.frag.20; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 664; Kremydi 2015: 167; Ellis 1976: 235, 237; le Rider 1980: 48, 52; Mørkholm 1991: 42; Price 1979: 230, 232. Amphipolis – Kremydi 2015: 165, 167; Mørkholm 1991: 42; Ellis 1976: 237; le Rider 1980: 52; Price 1979: 230, 232; Koukouli-Chrysanthaki 2015b: 417-418.

tetradrachms, it may be an optimistic claim that Philip's coinage was the strongest currency in Europe.⁵⁰⁵ Testament to the effectiveness of the king's monetary policy, however, can be witnessed in the enormous popularity of Philip's coinage which saw posthumous production continue well into the third century and imitations minted by other realms, including the Celts.⁵⁰⁶

Be that as it may, it was Philip's skilful and relentlessly pragmatic statecraft that more often than not achieved successes unlikely to have been made possible by military supremacy alone. Perhaps the best example is in the Macedonian king's annexation of Thessaly – possibly his greatest diplomatic achievement. Philip's interest in Thessaly was hardly surprising given the region's great importance in the formulation of Macedonian foreign policy. With the potential to provide access by which Athens, Thebes or a southern coalition could attack, a restless and ambitious power on Macedonia's southern border was not in the interests of national security.⁵⁰⁷

Not only did Thessaly therefore represent a threat to Macedonian territorial integrity, it also constituted a prize of considerable value. Just as the region provided a corridor through which an offensive against the kingdom might be launched, so it offered a gateway for a potential Macedonian invasion of southern Greece.⁵⁰⁸ Furthermore, the combined Thessalian tetrarchies had significant military forces at their disposal – including

⁵⁰⁵ Claim – Hammond & Griffith 1979: 663; Hammond 1984b: 114; Ober 2015: 271; Kremydi 2015: 166; Müller 2010b: 184.

⁵⁰⁶ Mørholm 1991: 28, 28 Figures 2.4 & 2.5; Howgego 1995: 10, 103; Davies 2002: 115; Thonemann 2015: 11, 25, 28-29; Laing 1970: 122; von Reden 2010: 59-60; Price 1974: 23, 25; Kraay 1976: 147.

⁵⁰⁷ *Xen. Hell.* 6.1.11; Gabriel 2010: 117-118, 120-121; Worthington 2008: 36; Borza 1990: 220; Ellis 1976: 85; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 219; Cawkwell 1978b: 59; 1980b: 78; Roisman 2010: 160; Errington 1990: 63.

⁵⁰⁸ Gabriel 2010: 121; Buckler 1989: 64; Müller 2010b: 173. Thessaly provided Philip with an advanced station from which to launch an invasion of Boeotia and Attica as indeed was the case in 338 when Macedonian troops seized control of the Gravia Pass – Polyæn. 4.2.8; Worthington 2008: 146; 2013: 247; Bradford 1992: 141; Ellis 1976: 197; Ashley 1998: 150-151; Roberts 1982: 367; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 593-594.

an excellent cavalry – much needed by Philip following the massacre of Perdiccas III and the Macedonian army in 359 by Bardylis.⁵⁰⁹ Thessaly was also regarded as a wealthy state, something always of interest to aspiring dynasts but especially those looking to finance a significant mercenary retinue – as indeed was the case with Philip in the early years of his reign.⁵¹⁰

Philip's involvement with Thessalian politics began in 358/7 at the invitation of Cineas of Larissa who was seeking to exploit a power vacuum left by the assassination of Alexander of Pherae.⁵¹¹ Bitter rivals, Larissa was hegemon of the Thessalian League at the time and tradition has it that Cineas' entreaties resulted in Philip's intervention at the head of a large mercenary army, with the subsequent overthrow of local tyrannies.⁵¹² More likely is the claim by some modern commentators who argue that Philip lacked the funds so early into his reign to stage a military operation of this magnitude, and that his involvement (if it occurred at all) was probably limited to brokering some form of diplomatic solution between the hostile factions.⁵¹³ Whatever the case, Larissan overtures provided Philip with a legitimate foothold in Thessalian politics which the king exploited to the full with a wide

⁵⁰⁹ For Jason of Pherae's initial estimate of 6,000 cavalry and 10,000 hoplites see Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.8; Bradford 1992: 23; Rusch 2011: 191; Curteis 1890: 19; Hyland 2003: 137. For Jason's revised estimation of 8,000 cavalry, 20,000 hoplites and a huge number of *peltastai*, see Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.19; Hansen 2011: 243; Sprawski 2014b: 95; Yalichev 1997: 164; Best 1969: 125; Parke 1933: 102. For 3,000 horse and a large peltast army fifteen years after the death of Jason – Isoc. *Dis.* 8.118; Sprawski 2014b: 95. That on any level Thessalian military might may be regarded as significant – Gabriel 2010: 118-119, 121; Worthington 2008: 36; Ashley 1998: 131; Borza 1990: 221; Cawkwell 1978b: 58; 1980b: 78.

⁵¹⁰ Isoc. *Dis.* 8.117; 15.155; Plut. *Mor.* 181B; Cawkwell 1980b: 78-79; Graninger 2010: 306-307, 315; Millett 2010: 491; Archibald 2000: 212-213; Fleck & Hanssen 2006: 129 n28, 131, 134; Howe 2003: 133-134; 2011: 19; 133-134; Bradford 1992: 23; Ellis 1976: 84; Sakellariou 1980b: 121; McQueen 1995b: 335.

⁵¹¹ Diod. Sic. 16.14.1; Zahrnt 2009: 14; Gabriel 2010: 120; Hammond 1994b: 29; Cawkwell 1978b: 61; Bradford 1992: 24; Ellis 1976: 61; Graninger 2010: 314; Müller 2010b: 170; Fox 2015c: 345; Griffith 1970: 67-68; Martin 1982: 62; Tronson 1984: 116.

⁵¹² Diod. Sic. 16.14.1-2; Worthington 2008: 35; 2013: 61; Hammond 1994b: 30; Ellis 1976: 61; McQueen 1995a: 78; Zahrnt 2009: 14; Gabriel 2010: 120; Cawkwell 1978b: 61; Bradford 1992: 24; Graninger 2010: 314; Müller 2010b: 170; Fox 2015c: 345.

⁵¹³ Gabriel 2010: 120, 269 n6; Buckler 1989: 62; Errington 1990: 60; Ehrhardt 1967: 297-298; McQueen 1995a: 78; Ryder 1994: 47.

range of political manoeuvrings. These included the commitment of local aristocrats to the Macedonian throne through *largesse*, *xenia*, marriage, and a policy of moderation towards the previous ruling elite deposed as a result of Philip's machinations.⁵¹⁴

With the outbreak of the Third Sacred War in the autumn of 356, Philip's involvement in the affairs of Thessaly deepened. The catalyst was a dubious charge levelled by the Amphictyonic Council against Phocis at the behest of Thebes.⁵¹⁵ Phocian resistance was led by Philomelus who raised thirty talents and with it an army of 5,000 mercenaries. Seizing Delphi, he then raided Locris, in the process acquiring much booty.⁵¹⁶ In 355, Philomelus appropriated the Delphic treasuries and hired 10,000 mercenaries with which he first defeated the army of Locris and later that same year a 6,000 strong Thessalian expeditionary force.⁵¹⁷ Impressed by the early successes, Pherae entered into an alliance with Phocis but in the process alarmed the Thessalian League to the extent that its member states turned again to Philip – who promptly invaded Pherae and captured the port town of Pagasae, citing it as a threat to Macedonian security.⁵¹⁸

Pheraean confidence in Phocis proved somewhat misplaced as at the Battle of Neon (355), Philomelus took his own life following defeat at the hands of an alliance headed by Boeotia (under the stewardship of Pammenes), Locris and the Thessalian League: the scope

⁵¹⁴ Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 162; Polyae. 4.2.19; Ath. 6.260b-c; Gabriel 2010: 16, 120-121; Ellis 1976: 84; O'Brien 1994: 9; Shrimpton 1991b: 169; Bradford 1992: 48; Grainger 2017: 33.

⁵¹⁵ Diod. Sic. 16.23.2-4; Paus. 10.2.1, 15.1; Scott 2014: 149; Buckler 1989: 15, 21; Ashley 1998: 115; Bradford 1992: 31; Cawkwell 1980b: 82; Curteis 1890: 42-43; Yalichev 1997: 167; Worthington 2013: 95; King 2018: 77; Rhodes 1986: 13; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 270.

⁵¹⁶ Diod. Sic. 16.25.1-2; Ashley 1998: 117; Bradford 1992: 32, 33-34; Buckler 1989: 23-24; Scott 2014: 149; Curteis 1890: 43; English 2012: 115; Yalichev 1997: 167; Parke 1933: 134; Worthington 2013: 95.

⁵¹⁷ Diod. Sic. 16.30.1-2; Str. 9.3.8; Buckler 1989: 37-38; Hammond 1994b: 46; Worthington 2008: 56; Ashley 1998: 117; Müller 2010b: 172; English 2012: 116-117; Yalichev 1997: 167; Parke 1933: 134.

⁵¹⁸ Dem. 18.48; Diod. Sic. 16.31.6; Gabriel 2010: 120, 124; Hammond 1994b: 46; Worthington 2008: 58; Ashley 1998: 120; Cawkwell 1978b: 61; Buckler 1989: 64-65; Zahrnt 2009: 14; Errington 1990: 60; McQueen 1995a: 104; Müller 2010b: 172-173; Graninger 2010: 314; Griffith 1970: 79-80.

of the confederate victory gave rise to the premature belief that the war was all but over.⁵¹⁹ Immediately, however, the Phocians elected Onomarchus to replace Philomelus and in 354 the newly voted *strategos autokrator* enjoyed success in his first campaign, forcing Locris out of the war and invading Boeotia.⁵²⁰ Later that year Onomarchus defeated Philip himself in two separate battles, the second time so resoundingly the king was forced into a strategic withdrawal from Thessaly altogether.⁵²¹

In 353, however, Philip was back and as *archon* of the Thessalian League.⁵²² The honour was one conferred by an ally grateful for the king's response to the League's appeal for assistance and doubtless Philip was also keen to avenge his earlier defeats when presented with the chance.⁵²³ His opportunity came in 352 with the Battle of Crocus Field. Phocis and its general had financed their participation in the war by plundering the treasures of Delphi, so condemning themselves in the eyes of many Greeks as impious temple-robbers.⁵²⁴ Immediately prior to engaging in battle, Philip ordered his troops wear laurel crowns, thus positioning himself and his men as saviours of Apollo whose sanctuary the

⁵¹⁹ Diod. Sic. 16.31.3-5; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 264; Buckler 1989: 44-45; Buckler & Beck 2008: 225; Parke 1933: 135; Ashley 1998: 118-119; Worthington 2008: 56; 2013: 96; 2014: 48; Gabriel 2010: 126-127; Ellis 1976: 76; McGregor 1950: xx-xxi; Londey 2016b: 445.

⁵²⁰ Paus. 10.2.5; Just. 8.1.8-9; Gabriel 2010: 127; Hammond 1994b: 47; Bradford 1992: 36-37; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 267; Parke 1933: 135-136; Ashley 1998: 119; Worthington 2008: 56-57; 2013: 96; Ellis 1976: 78; Buckler 1989: 72; McGregor 1950: xx-xxi; Harthen 2016a: 399. Onomarchus as *strategos autokrator* – Diod. Sic. 16.36.1; Paus. 10.2.6; Buckler 1989: 47; 2003: 408; Sealey 1976: 445; González 2013: 94; Buckley 2010: 456; Bradford 1992: 37.

⁵²¹ Diod. Sic. 16.35.2; Polyæn. 2.38.2; Gabriel 2010: 127, 132; Hammond 1994b: 47; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 268; Worthington 2008: 58; 2014: 44-45, 48; Müller 2010b: 172-173; English 2012: 118; Griffith 1935: 10; Parke 1933: 136; Ashley 1998: 119; Cawkwell 1978b: 61; Graninger 2010: 314; Ellis 1976: 79; King 2018: 78.

⁵²² Isoc. *Dis.* 5.20; Diod. Sic. 16.35.4; Polyæn. 2.38.2; Just. 8.2.1-2; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 221, 277; Cawkwell 1978b: 60-61; Müller 2010b: 173; Gabriel 2010: 20; Worthington 2008: 103; Bradford 1992: 23, 39; Ellis 1976: 83; Griffin 1970: 73; Heskell 1997a: 183; Graninger 2010: 314.

⁵²³ Request for assistance – Dem. 18.47-48, 295; Diod. Sic. 16.31.6; Gabriel 2010: 24; Errington 1990: 62; Müller 2010b: 172-173; Graninger 2010: 314; Griffith 1970: 79-80.

⁵²⁴ Diod. Sic. 16.25.2-3, 35.6, 64.1-3; Just. 8.1.10; Buckler 1989: 75-76; Ehrhardt 1966: 230; Vaughn 2005: 45; Rosivach 1983: 194, 206; Müller 2010b: 175; McInerney 2013: 472-473.

Phocians had “ruthlessly” desecrated.⁵²⁵ The artifice probably also boosted the morale of the Macedonian troops, likely to have been understandably edgy from their comprehensive defeat the previous season.⁵²⁶ As it happened, Philip’s victory was total and the Phocians’ sacrilege permitted the ritual drowning of 3,000 prisoners taken in the battle’s aftermath.⁵²⁷

Although the Third Sacred War was effectively over, there had been no formal surrender and so in 352, at the request of the Boeotians, Philip made what amounted to a token attempt to prosecute further the conflict with Phocis.⁵²⁸ In reality, however, Macedonian interests were best served by the king’s decision to let the war drag on for as long as possible whilst the *poleis* exhausted themselves in pointless internecine conflict; they promptly obliged.⁵²⁹ Yet in pursuit of his policy, Philip had to balance delicately a range of diplomatic objectives. He needed to be seen as prosecuting enthusiastically the war against sacrilegious Phocis – especially by the Thessalians, the majority of whom hated the Phocians – but at the same time pursue covertly his own agenda, which was to secure Pherae as a means by which to control Thessaly itself.⁵³⁰

Philip’s manoeuvrings during the Third Sacred War were an unqualified success and as a result, the king was regarded by the Thessalians themselves as the saviour of their

⁵²⁵ Just. 8.2.3-4; Gabriel 2010: 22, 135; Worthington 2008: 61; Hammond 1994b: 47-48; Fox 2015c: 357; Müller 2010b: 173; Shrimpton 1991b: 158; Buckler 1989: 75; Bradford 1992: 43; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 274; LaForse 2010: 556; Baynham 1994: 38.

⁵²⁶ Hammond & Griffith 1979: 275; Ellis 1976: 79; Worthington 2008: 62; 2014: 44; Hammond 1994b: 47; Gabriel 2010: 131-132; Müller 2010b: 173; Martin 1981: 190; King 2018: 78.

⁵²⁷ Diod. Sic. 16.35.6; Buckler 1989: 75; Gabriel 2010: 126, 135; Hammond 1994b: 48; Worthington 2008: 63; 2014: 48; Parke 1933: 137; Ellis 1976: 82-83; Londey 2016a: 220; LaForse 2010: 556.

⁵²⁸ Dem. 6.13; Diod. Sic. 16.38.1-2, 58.1-3; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 279-280; King 2018: 79; Ashley 1998: 120; McQueen 1995a: 109.

⁵²⁹ Diod. Sic. 16.58.2; Buckler 1989: 113; Bradford 1992: 70; Ellis 1976: 103; Griffith 1980: 73; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 280; English 2012: 119; King 2018: 84; Hamilton 1982: 67-68; Hammond 1994b: 49; Gabriel 2010: 139; McQueen 1995a: 133.

⁵³⁰ Prosecution of hostilities against Phocis – Ashley 1998: 122; Cawkwell 1978b: 110; Buckler 1989: 106, 113. Designs of Pherae – Gabriel 2010: 138; Hammond 1994b: 48; Worthington 2008: 64; Ashley 1998: 120; Buckler 1989: 79.

confederacy.⁵³¹ Marriage to Nicesipolis in 353/2, and tempered reprisals against those few detractors who had made themselves known, consolidated Philip's position as the leading man of Thessaly: a status confirmed by his position of *archon* for life.⁵³² The appointment can rightly be regarded as a great diplomatic achievement, and one pivotal in the development of Macedonian policy.⁵³³ Not only was he the lone foreign king so honoured, the office permitted Philip to organise Thessaly's internal affairs to suit himself – and with the acquiescence of the Thessalians themselves.⁵³⁴ As *archon*, Philip also commanded the confederacy's sizeable armed forces and acquired access to all state revenues, including a ten percent tithe on agricultural production and the taxes collected from the port of Pagasae.⁵³⁵

Further honours were forthcoming in 346 following the conclusion of the war when the Amphictyonic Council allocated voting rights held previously by Phocis to Philip, a decision that effectively gave the king control of the *amphictyony*.⁵³⁶ At the same time, he

⁵³¹ Isoc. *Dis.* 5.20; Dem. 1.22; 2.11; 6.22; 8.62; 9.26; 18.43; 19.260; Diod. Sic. 16.69.8; Gabriel 2010: 140; Hammond 1994b: 48-49; Borza 1990: 220; Cawkwell 1978b: 115; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 287, 293; Errington 1990: 67.

⁵³² Marriage – Ath. 13.557c; Gabriel 2010: 16, 139; Hammond 1994b: 48; Graninger 2010: 314; Müller 2010b: 173; Worthington 2008: 64; Grainger 2017: 33-34. Reprisals – Hammond 1994b: 48; Gabriel 2010: 139; Scott 2014: 154; Worthington 2008: 64. Election as *archon* – Cawkwell 1978b: 49, 62; Gabriel 2010: 140; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 289; Müller 2010b: 73; Graninger 2010: 314; Worthington 2008: 65; 2013: 107; Ellis 1976: 83.

⁵³³ Hammond & Griffith 1979: 285, 293; Griffith 1970: 78; 1980: 59; Gabriel 2010: 140; Graninger 2010: 314.

⁵³⁴ Foreign king – Just. 11.3.2; Gabriel 2010: 140; Worthington 2008: 65; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 294; Hammond 1994b: 48-49; Ellis 1976: 84. Arrangement of Thessalian affairs – Diod. Sic. 16.38.1; Gabriel 2010: 139; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 533-534; Worthington 2008: 65; Buckler 1996: 386; McQueen 1995a: 109.

⁵³⁵ Armed forces – Worthington 2008: 65; 2013: 107-108; Ellis 1976: 84; McQueen 1995a: 109; Billows 1990: 31; King 2018: 78; Errington 1990: 62; Ashley 1998: 166; Scholten 2005: 140. Revenues – Dem. 1.22; Just. 11.3.2; Worthington 2008: 65; 2013: 108; Bradford 1992: 48, 88; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 285, 289; Gabriel 2010: 139-140; Ellis 1976: 85; Graninger 2010: 314-315; Millet 2010: 491; Hammond 1994b: 49.

⁵³⁶ Tod 172.A=R&O 67, col. 1, 23-24; Dem. 19.111; Speus. 8; Diod. Sic. 16.60.1; Paus. 10.8.2; Gabriel 2010: 20; Hammond 1994b: 94; Bradford 1992: 81; Roebuck 1948: 77; Hatzopoulos 2015b: 63; Müller 2010b: 175; Graninger 2010: 315; Natoli 2004a: 111; 2004b: 30-31; McQueen 1995a: 135; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 340, 342; Tod 1950: 212.

was also awarded the presidency of the Pythian Games.⁵³⁷ Such was his standing that in 343/2 Philip, without objection, re-established the Thessalian tetrarchies under the administration of those loyal to himself – a move that effectively made Thessaly a Macedonian satellite.⁵³⁸ It was a similar situation in 339 when Philip was appointed commander of the Amphictyonic army in the Fourth Sacred War: no other person had the same diplomatic status that made them a viable alternative.⁵³⁹ It is true that these honours followed in the wake of military success but what is important to note is that again they were not wrested from an enemy as part of a settlement but bestowed as reward by appreciative allies.

A year later and in the aftermath of Chaeronea, Philip demonstrated further his expertise in statecraft with the foundation of what the Greeks themselves probably referred to as *to koinon ton Hellenon* (“the Community of the Greeks”) but has become known to modern scholars as the League of Corinth.⁵⁴⁰ After settling with individual *poleis* such as Thebes and Athens, Philip then called a conference with the intention of imposing a Common Peace (*koine eirene*) upon the city-states.⁵⁴¹ Such was the king’s standing at this time that all those “invited” to attend did so, with the exception of Sparta which Philip –

⁵³⁷ Dem. 5.22; Diod. Sic. 16.60.2; Gabriel 2010: 20; Hammond 1994b: 94; Worthington 2008: 103; 2013: 181, 183; Bradford 1992: 82; Miller 2004: 223; Hatzopoulos 2015b: 66; Graninger 2010: 315; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 450; King 2018: 86.

⁵³⁸ Reform of the tetrarchies – Dem. 6.22; 9.26; Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 208; Gabriel 2010: 179; Hammond 1994b: 119; Worthington 2008: 111; Ashley 1998: 133; Bradford 1992: 88; Worthington 2014: 72; Errington 1990: 67-68; Graninger 2010: 316; Hatzopoulos 1996: 484; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 530; Natoli 2004b: 79. Satellite status – Dem. 9.26; Hammond 1994b: 49; Ashley 1998: 32; Green 1991: 47; Graninger 2010: 315; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 534.

⁵³⁹ Dem. 18.151; Aeschin. 3.129; Gabriel 2010: 20; Hammond 1994b: 142; Heskell 1997a: 185; Ellis 1976: 190; Miller 2004: 223-224; Roebuck 1948: 78; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 588; Parke 1933: 152; Worthington 2013: 238-239.

⁵⁴⁰ Anon., *P.Oxy.* I 12=*FGrHist* 255 F 5; Hammond 1994b: 163; Worthington 2008: 159; 2013: 262; 2014: 100; Gabriel 2010: 230, 231.

⁵⁴¹ Conference – Müller 2010b: 177; Hammond 1994b: 160; Ryder 2003: 75; Worthington 2008: 158; 2013: 262; Grainger 2007: 63; McQueen 1995a: 169. *Koine eirene* – *IG* ii² 236 ll. 3-6=Tod 177=R&O 76; Just. 9.5.1-2; Müller 2010b: 178; Hammond 1994b: 160; Ryder 2003: 76; Worthington 2008: 158-159; Grainger 2007: 63; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 377.

after launching a punitive invasion – relegated to the periphery of Greek affairs with an isolationist strategy.⁵⁴²

Ancient sources represent the formation of the League and adoption of its constitution as one synchronous event.⁵⁴³ It seems unlikely, however, that ambassadors from the *poleis* would have been given *carte blanche* to endorse Philip’s proposals without them first being considered, and so it is probable that a second meeting occurred in 337, at which time the League was ratified.⁵⁴⁴

Fragment *a* below, is that which survives from what was probably an Athenian copy of the oath sworn by the League’s participants. Found on the Acropolis, the inscription has been damaged heavily and although much remains lost, most academics are in common agreement that scholarly endeavours by A. Wilhelm and others have led to a restoration that is almost certainly accurate.⁵⁴⁵ The fragment reads:

1 [. 26] I [. . 6 . .]
[. 21 Ποσ]ειδῶ . . 5 . .
. 22 ς ἐμμεν[ῶ]
. 22 νον[τ]ας τ
5 [. 18 οὐδ]ἔ ὄπλα ἐ[π]οί[σω ἐ]-
[πὶ πημονῆι ἐπ’ οὐδένα τῶν] ἐμμενόντ[ω]ν ἐν τ-

⁵⁴² Polyb. 9.28; Plut. *Mor.* 218F, 219F, 233E, 235B; Just. 9.5.3; Paus. 3.24.6, 5.4.9; Müller 2010b: 177-178; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 625; Worthington 2013: 262; 2014: 99; Gabriel 2010: 229; Roebuck 1948: 88-89; Cartledge & Spawforth 2002: 16; McQueen 1995a: 168.

⁵⁴³ Diod. Sic. 16.89.3; Just. 9.5.1-2.

⁵⁴⁴ Hammond 1994b: 160; Worthington 2008: 159-160; Müller 2010b: 178; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 376. For a contra view – Tod 1950: 226, 227; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 626, 630; McQueen 1995a: 169-170.

⁵⁴⁵ Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 376; Tod 1950: 224-225; Hornblower 2002: 259; Rhodes 1986: 23; 2010b: 35; Dixon 2014: 20; Ager 1996: 39-40. Worthington 2008: 162 argues the inscription could record a treaty that concluded the war between Macedonia and Athens (340-338).

[οἷς ὄρκους οὔτε κατὰ γῆν] οὔτε κατὰ [θ]άλασ-
 [σαν· οὐδὲ πόλιν οὐδὲ φρο]ύριον καταλήψομ-
 [αι οὔτε λιμένα ἐπὶ πολέ]μωι οὐθενὸς τῶν τ-
 10 [ῆς εἰρήνης κοινωνούντ]ων τέχνηι οὐδεμι-
 [αῖ οὔτε μηχανῆι· οὐδὲ τ]ὴν βασιλείαν [τ]ὴν Φ-
 [ιλίππου καὶ τῶν ἐκγόν]ων καταλύσω ὁδὲ τὰ-
 [ς πολιτείας τὰς οὔσας] παρ' ἐκάστοις ὅτε τ-
 [οὺς ὄρκους τοὺς περὶ τ]ῆς εἰρήνης ὤμνυον·
 15 [οὐδὲ ποιήσω οὐδὲν ἐνα]ντίον ταῖσδε ταῖς
 [σπονδαῖς οὔτ' ἐγὼ οὔτ' ἄλ]λωι ἐπιτρέψω εἰς
 [δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἐάν τις ποεῖ τι] παράσπονδ[ον] πε-
 [ρὶ τὰς συνθήκας, βοηθήσω] καθότι ἂν παραγ-
 [γέλλωσιν οἱ ἀεὶ δεόμενοι] καὶ πολεμήσω τῶ-
 20 [ι τὴν κοινήν εἰρήνην παρ]αβαίνοντι καθότι
 [ἂν ᾗ συντεταγμένον ἐμαυ]τῶι καὶ ὁ ἡγε[μῶ]-
 [ν κελεύηι 12 κα]ταλείψω τε. .] (IG ii² 236=Tod 177=R&O 76)

 2 *Oath. I swear by Zeus, Earth, Sun, Poseidon, Athena,
 Ares, all the gods and goddesses. I shall abide by the
 peace(?) and I shall not break the agreement*
 5 *(with Philip?), nor take up arms*
against any of those who abide by
the oaths(?), neither by land nor by sea;

*nor shall I take any city or guard-post
nor harbour, for war, of any of those
10 participating in the peace, by any craft
or contrivance; nor I shall overthrow the kingdom
of Philip and his descendants, nor the
constitutions existing in each state when
they swore the oaths concerning the peace;*
15 *nor shall I myself do anything contrary to these
agreements, nor shall I allow anyone else as far as possible.
If any one does commit any breach of the treaty concerning the agreements,
I shall go in support as called on by those who are wronged (?),
and I shall make war against
20 the one who transgresses the common peace(?)
as decided by the common synedrion and called on by the hegemon;
and I shall not abandon the . . . (Rhodes and Osborne 76).*

What the restoration reveals is that a number of the treaty's conditions aligned with what had become standard by the latter part of the fourth century. It was, for example, expected that signatories would abide by the League's decisions and obey the orders of a *hegemon* (ll. 3-5). Although not mentioned by name, it is clear that the appointed *hegemon* (ἡγεμῶν) was Philip (l. 21), a distinction achieved – in appearances at least – by election.⁵⁴⁶ Although an honour, the position itself was not an unusual one – *hegemones* had been

⁵⁴⁶ Dem. 18.201; Polyb. 9.33; Diod. Sic. 16.89.1-3, 91.2; Plut. *Mor.* 240A-B; Hammond 1994b: 161, 167; Worthington 2008: 160; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 626, 630; Müller 2010b: 178; Perlman 1985: 154, 171-172; McQueen 1995a: 169-170; 1995b: 324; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 377; Walbank 1967: 172; Tod 1950: 226, 227.

selected in previous alliances and confederations such as the Second Athenian League (378/7).⁵⁴⁷ Like the Athenian Confederacy, the League of Corinth was enforced by a *synedrion* (ll. 20-21) that convened once a year, or when summoned by the *hegemon*.⁵⁴⁸ Other similarities to previous Common Peaces included the condition that *poleis* were to remain free and autonomous (ll. 5-10, 15-16), with the right to retain their existing forms of government (ll. 12-14). As was also usual, a member's territorial integrity was protected by a joint oath to unite in the punishment of transgressions (ll. 17-20).⁵⁴⁹

The threat of a united military response was doubtless a strong deterrent to unilateral aggression. One ancient source details the combined forces of the city-states to have been 200,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry, a figure supported by several academics.⁵⁵⁰ Whilst Justin's figures may be safely dismissed as theoretical (at best), the fact that with Philip as *hegemon*, the League could rely on the formidable Macedonian army in any military action it might be required to undertake.⁵⁵¹

Despite these antecedents, the League of Corinth is regarded as a revolution in diplomacy and thus a worthy example of Philip's expertise in statecraft.⁵⁵² The king's genuine innovation was that he had the *poleis* swear against committing any hostile acts,

⁵⁴⁷ Diod. Sic. 15.28.4; Dmitriev 2011: 75, 382; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 99; Sealey 1993: 55; Schwenk 1997: 21; Lee 2010b: 500; Hamel 1998: 108.

⁵⁴⁸ Athenian *synedrion* – Diod. Sic. 15.28.3-4; Sealey 1976: 410; 1993: 10, 55; Rhodes 1986: 4; 1992: 39; Hamel 1998: 108. Permanent council – Polyb. 9.33; Just. 9.5.2; Tod 1950: 227; Müller 2010b: 178; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 625, 627, 635; Worthington 2013: 263; 2014: 100; Hammond 1994b: 160; Gabriel 2010: 229; Cawkwell 1978b: 171. Yearly – Hammond & Griffith 1979: 635, 639; Worthington 2013: 263; 2014: 100. Summoned – Hammond & Griffith 1979: 635, 642; Ellis 1976: 209, 300 n146; Ashley 1998: 425; Tarn 1948b: 377.

⁵⁴⁹ Corroborating support for the treaty's terms – [Dem.] 17.2, 6, 8, 10, 15-16, 19; Plut. *Phoc.* 16; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 625, 627, 632-633; Hammond 1994b: 161-162; Worthington 2013: 263; 2014: 100; Gabriel 2010: 230-231; Ryder 2003: 75-76; Tod 1950: 225-226, 227, 264-265.

⁵⁵⁰ Just. 9.5.6; Hammond 1994b: 161, 164; Worthington 2008: 163; Nawotka 2010: 112; Dixon 2014: 20.

⁵⁵¹ Doubting Justin's accuracy – Hammond & Griffith 1979: 632; Cawkwell 1978b: 173-174; Grainger 2007: 63; Ashley 1998: 425. Macedonian support – Gabriel 2010: 231; Worthington 2008: 161; Cawkwell 1978b: 172; Müller 2010b: 178; Grainger 2007: 63.

⁵⁵² Müller 2010: 178; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 625; Tod 1950: 229; Worthington 2008: 161; 2013: 263-264; 2014: 99, 100-101; Hammond 1994b: 163-164; Gabriel 2010: 232; Ryder 2003: 75; Larsen 1944: 160.

not just against Macedonia but also him personally – and his successors (Il. 11-12).⁵⁵³ By requiring city-states direct their oath of loyalty to an individual, Philip secured on-going Macedonian control for both himself and his heirs. This was evidenced clearly when, following the death of his father, Alexander, on the basis of the League's terms, laid claim to leadership of the Greeks.⁵⁵⁴ *Poleis* had little choice but to recognise the legitimacy of his claim and Alexander was acknowledged grudgingly as *hegemon* and *strategos autokrator* for the invasion of Persia.⁵⁵⁵ No better example of Macedonian authority was apparent than when Alexander used these positions within the League to ensure Thebes' destruction following its unsuccessful revolt in 335.⁵⁵⁶

Philip's intention was doubtfully to secure control over Greece and in this he succeeded.⁵⁵⁷ His ability, however, to make palatable the unacceptable provides further evidence of his diplomatic expertise. Some academics advocate that the League represented the end of destructive internecine wars and created a unified but independent system in which *poleis* benefitted from stability and increased prosperity.⁵⁵⁸ Whilst it was true that, by the fourth century, the Greeks themselves recognised the benefits of a permanent, free peace, the League constituted anything but – although Philip's guile ensured Macedonian control remained carefully disguised, or at least a reality that *poleis* could overlook

⁵⁵³ See also – Tod 1950: 225, 227; Worthington 2013: 262-263; 2014: 100; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 337; Müller 2010: 178; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 625, 634; Borza 1990: 226; Hammond 1994b: 160-161; Ellis 1976: 206; Perlman 1985: 169.

⁵⁵⁴ Diod. Sic. 17.2.2, 4.1, 4.9; Just. 11.2.5, 3.1-2; Arr. *Anab.* 2.14.4; Poddighe 2009: 100, 103; Wallace 2011: 151; Brice 2012: 41; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 376; Worthington 2014: 126.

⁵⁵⁵ *Hegemon* – Anson 2013: 132; Poddighe 2009: 101, 103; Hornblower 2002: 263; O'Brien 1994: 52; Dmitriev 2011: 90; Hamilton 2002b: 29, 33. *Strategos autokrator* – Diod. Sic. 17.4.9; Plut. *Alex.* 14; Arr. *Anab.* 1.1.2-3; Just. 11.2.5; Anson 2013: 132; Poddighe 2009: 103; Hamilton 2002b: 29, 33.

⁵⁵⁶ Diod. Sic. 17.14.4; Plut. *Alex.* 11; Arr. *Anab.* 1.9.9; Just. 11.3.8-10; Wallace 2011: 150, 151; Dmitriev 2011: 91-92; O'Brien 1994: 52; Hamilton 2002b: 30-31; Poddighe 2009: 108; Hornblower 2002: 263; Grainger 2007: 69; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 379.

⁵⁵⁷ Müller 2010b: 178; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 645-646; Worthington 2008: 161, 163; 2013: 264; 2014: 100-101; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 378; Nawotka 2010: 55-56; Olbrycht 2010: 350; Gilley & Worthington 2010: 189.

⁵⁵⁸ Hammond 1994b: 162, 164; Gabriel 2010: 230; Perlman 1985: 153; Müller 2010b: 178.

conveniently.⁵⁵⁹ There was not, for example, any Macedonian presence on the *synedrion*, giving the illusion at least, that the *poleis* controlled the council.⁵⁶⁰ Philip, however, was mindful to make provision that the League’s meetings were supervised by a “watching official” (φυλακὴ τεταγμένους), a representative who reported proceedings back to him directly.⁵⁶¹ Very little is known about these office-holders but the supposition that they were either Macedonians, or Greeks sympathetic to the king, is a sound one.⁵⁶² Indeed, it might be imagined that these officials played a role not dissimilar to individuals who acted as the “eyes” and “ears” of Cyrus the Great, reporting back to the Great King anything deemed worthy of his attention, a detail documented, interestingly, in the pages of Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia*.⁵⁶³

Philip further deflected Greek attention away from its subordinated status by the promotion of a Panhellenic campaign against Persia, the stated objective of which was the liberation of Greek cities in Asia Minor.⁵⁶⁴ Seemingly popular with the *poleis*, the undertaking led to a further (and as it transpired, final) honour, when in 336 Philip was appointed by the League (not himself) as *strategos autokrator* with full powers of command.⁵⁶⁵ Although ostensibly in revenge for Persia’s fifth-century invasions, Philip’s

⁵⁵⁹ Recognised benefits – Isoc. 5.73, 80; 8.16; Aristot. *Pol.* 1296a22-b1; 1327b18-37; And. 3.17-19; Plut. *Ages.* 16; Nawotka 2010: 55; Dmitriev 2011: 70; Eckstein 2006: 41; Hunt 2010: 262; Cartledge & Spawforth 2002: 6; Ager 2013: 507.

⁵⁶⁰ Müller 2010b: 178; Worthington 2013: 263; 2014: 100; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 377; Ashley 1998: 425; Green 1991: 86; Hammond & Walbank 2001: 59.

⁵⁶¹ Tod 187 l. 13=R&O 80; [Dem.] 17.15; Tod 1950: 241; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 639, 640, 642-643; Perlman 1985: 169, 173; Poddighe 2009: 104; Sealey 1993: 200.

⁵⁶² Hammond & Griffith 1979: 644.

⁵⁶³ Xen. *Cyr.* 8.2.10-12; Briant 2002: 344; Bradford 2001: 56; Azoulay 2004b: 151 n20; Pelling 2017: 246; Lu 2015: 127; Carlier 2010: 357; Keller 1911: 258.

⁵⁶⁴ Polyb. 3.6; Diod. Sic. 16.89.3; Just. 9.5.5; Müller 2010b: 178; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 626, 631; Worthington 2008: 160; 2013: 264; Fox 2015c: 357; King 2018: 97; Bradford 1992: 152; Gabriel 2010: 232; Fredricksmeyer 1982: 85.

⁵⁶⁵ *IG ii²* 236= Tod 177; Polyb. 9.33; Diod. Sic. 16.60.5, 89.2-3; Gabriel 2010: 20, 231; Fredricksmeyer 1982: 89; Cawkwell 1978b: 176; Bradford 1992: 159; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 630; Roebuck 1948: 74; Hatzopoulos 2015b: 66, 70; Müller 2010: 178; Borza 1990: 226; King 2018: 97; Rhodes 1986: 23; Tod 1950: 229; McQueen 1995a: 169-170; Walbank 1967: 172.

true motives were more likely closer to home. It has been suggested, for example, that the king wanted revenge for Persian interference in Macedonian affairs, in particular Artaxerxes' support for Perinthus during the siege of 340/39. Certainly this was the reason given by Alexander to Darius in rejecting the Persian's request for the return of his family, who had been taken hostage following the Battle of Issus.⁵⁶⁶ The supposition is not entirely without merit. Philip may well have been tempted by a distant, foreign campaign in order to keep occupied a dangerous army and ambitious nobility, and revenge was potentially as good a pretext as any.⁵⁶⁷

More likely, however, was the king's desire to expand his realm, and with it his own wealth and power.⁵⁶⁸ It may have been Philip had little choice in the matter. Despite significant income, the king's considerable financial commitments and part-dependency on a rolling economy, made future conquests highly desirable.⁵⁶⁹ If the state of the Macedonian treasury inherited by Alexander provides any indication, it would appear that by 336 Philip was approaching – if not already in – dire financial straits. In 334, for example, Alexander had only seventy talents in his coffers and was 200 talents in debt. Indeed, such was the shortage of funds that the new king was forced to borrow another 800 talents from his Companions in order to finance the Macedonian invasion of Asia Minor.⁵⁷⁰

If Parmenion's advice to Alexander urging acceptance of terms that promised 10,000 talents and all land west of the Euphrates was any reflection of his former king's

⁵⁶⁶ Revenge – Worthington 2008: 168; 2014: 104; Sealey 1993: 200. Excuse – Arr. *Anab.* 2.14.5; Bosworth 1988a: 64; Briant 2002: 689; Yenne 2010: 50-51; Tarn 1948a: 37; Waters 2014: 200.

⁵⁶⁷ Ellis 1976: 208; Müller 2010b: 179.

⁵⁶⁸ Polyb. 3.6; Müller 2010b: 178-179; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 631; Fredricksmeier 1982: 90; Worthington 2008: 160, 168-169; 2013: 265; Ellis 1976: 209; Nawotka 2010: 68; Dmitriev 2011: 94.

⁵⁶⁹ Philip's reputation for spending – Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 224; Just. 9.8.6; Ath. 4.167a-b; de Vries *et al.* 2004: 23; Palairot 2015: 33; Martin 2013: 240; Worthington 2008: 169.

⁵⁷⁰ Aristobulus *FGrHist* 139 F 4; Duris of Samos *FGrHist* 70 F 40; Onesicritus *FGrHist* 134 F 2; Plut. *Alex.* 15; *Mor.* 327D; Curt. 10.2.24; Arr. *Anab.* 7.9.6; Just. 9.8.6; Worthington 2008: 169; 2013: 265; Nawotka 2010: 110; Ashley 1998: 377; Hamilton 2002b: 36-37.

intentions, it was unlikely Philip's objective was conquest of the Persian empire; rather the acquisition of Asia Minor and its associated wealth represented the extent of his ambition.⁵⁷¹ In this regard, the League of Corinth provided Philip with the domestic stability essential for a profitable attack on the western territories of the Great King.⁵⁷² Philip, of course, was assassinated before his strategy could be realised fully but the League itself survived his death and indeed continued to operate as a mechanism by which Macedonia controlled the *poleis* under the guise of freedom and autonomy.

VI. Conclusion

In the previous chapter it was demonstrated the well-established dictum that Philip's time as a hostage at Thebes laid the foundation for the king's later subjugation of the *poleis* must be regarded as untenable. That being the case, this section of the thesis investigated alternative explanations for the rise of Macedonia to a position of hegemony. Rather than a Boeotian influence, it is argued that the Athenians Iphicrates and Xenophon, as well as the inherent acuity of Philip himself, should be recognised instead as the significant contributors to Macedonian ascendancy.

Iphicrates' role as an innovator is much debated by academics but his potential as an influence on Philip's military reforms receives far less consideration. Puzzlingly so, since the Athenian's martial credentials were impressive. Not only was he a talented and dedicated *strategos* whose career spanned forty years, Iphicrates was the victor of Lechaeum, Athens' outstanding success of the Corinthian War. It was for his innovative

⁵⁷¹ Diod. Sic. 17.54.1-5; Plut. *Alex.* 29; *Mor.* 180B; Curt. 4.11.1-14; Val. Max. 6.4 ext 3; Arr. *Anab.* 2.25.1-3; Worthington 2008: 169-170; Hamilton 2002b: 76-77; Nawotka 2010: 69; Müller 2010b: 179.

⁵⁷² Gabriel 2010: 231; Worthington 2008: 159, 166; Bosworth 1988a: 17-18; Grainger 2007: 64; Zahrnt 2009: 25; Perlman 1985: 168; Green 1991: 86.

infantry reforms, and experimentation with the *doru* in particular, that his influence on Philip's military thinking is most in evidence.

A critical review of the sources indicates the Athenian's experimentation with panoply probably occurred *c.*373/2, at which time his infantry were equipped with *pelte*, *linothorax*, *iphicratids* and *knemides*. Although by the fourth century none of these items could be considered revolutionary, the replacement of the signature *doru* with a five-metre pike – an idea likely obtained from the Chalybes of eastern Anatolia – was. Indeed, the Chalybian accoutrement bore a very close resemblance to that adopted eventually by Macedonian *pezhetairoi*, perhaps unsurprisingly given Xenophon's endorsement of the Chalybes' effectiveness against Greek forces.

Historical and geographical considerations provide further bases for the supposition of Iphicratean influence in Philip's military reforms. The Athenian's connections to the Macedonian royal house extended back to 378, when he interceded in a successionist struggle to secure the throne for Perdicas – Philip's brother. Although only around four years old at the time, the young prince doubtless grew up with recounts of the intrigue and his family's obligation to Iphicrates would have been well-recognised.

That the two men were acquainted is nowhere documented in the sources but accepted as a premise of this thesis. Historical links aside, there is also a compelling case to be made based on personal circumstance and geography. At the time Philip was commissioning a “new-model army” from his base in Amphaxitis, Iphicrates was in perilous self-imposed exile in Drys – a mere two days' voyage to the north. It may have been a coincidence that one of ancient Greece's greatest military reformers was accessible to Philip, but it was a resource the king could not have let go untapped.

If Iphicrates can be credited with influencing the functional aspects of Philip's military reforms, then equal recognition needs to be accorded to Xenophon for providing an intellectual framework around which a hegemonic position could be obtained. During the first half of the fourth century, Xenophon wrote a number of didactics – the *Cyropaedia* and *Anabasis* foremost amongst them – that an intelligent and critical reader such as Philip might have utilised easily as a blueprint for empire. Although there is no evidence that the king ever read any of Xenophon's treatises, the Athenian was regarded highly in antiquity and enjoyed a wide and prestigious audience, including Philip's own son Alexander. It is the weight of coincidence, therefore, that demonstrates the connection between Philip's actions and the leadership doctrine found in Xenophon's didactics.

The Athenian's interests were as diverse as they were myriad, and so his *Cyropaedia* included advice on everything from the manipulation of individuals to the logistical needs of entire armies. Admittedly some of what was contained in Xenophon's works can be regarded as both common sense and normal practice for the times. Many of Philip's more notable reforms, however, betray the likelihood that the king implemented at least some of Xenophon's recommendations. Creation of a military meritocracy, establishment of high-quality heavy infantry, attention to logistics, the benefits of siege weapons, and the potential for cavalry to be a decisive factor on the battlefield were all not only detailed in the *Cyropaedia*, but featured prominently among Philip's ameliorations.

Inferences of Xenophon's influence on Philip can be found further in the *Anabasis*, and in particular the value of a combined arms force. Xenophon's memoir demonstrated clearly that an army in which heavy infantry was supported with effectively integrated divisions of *psiloi* and cavalry, was highly efficacious in both a wide variety of terrain and against a diverse range of opponents.

In addition to revision of the military, Xenophon also addressed the topos of leadership and philosophy of command. Particularly prominent themes in both the *Cyropaedia* and *Anabasis*, it can be argued that, taken individually, few of Xenophon's reflections could be considered untrodden ground, but Philip's detailed attention to the principles of leadership suggests strongly that the king placed a high value on the Athenian's recommendations. In this way, for example, Philip was careful to express publicly his piety, clemency and empathy. Physical and intellectual superiority were also defining characteristics of Xenophon's ideal commander, qualities both possessed and cultivated by the king in order to reinforce his own leadership credentials.

Determining the influence of both Iphicrates and Xenophon on the reforms of Philip is, therefore, of significant importance to this thesis. Not only did the Athenians represent the genesis of a revolutionary outlook on the study and practice of warfare – as later emulated by Philip – but a departure from the tried and true (but tired) approach of Epaminondas.

The final factor in the rise of Macedonia was Philip himself. Nations are not forged, nor empires won, solely on the basis of theoretical modelling – or even military might. It was in this respect that Philip should be accorded considerable recognition for maximising the talents he possessed in order to transform his realm into an ancient “superpower”. First amongst these was his foresight in creating a truly combined arms army. Centred on the *hetairoi*, Philip fashioned a first-class cavalry that included the more mobile *prodromoi* and *sarissophoroi*. Also incorporated into the Macedonian ranks were light horsemen from allies and conquered peoples, so providing Philip with a formidable cavalry that constituted his army's strikeforce. The king also deserves recognition for the development of *pezhetairoi*. Although not responsible for their initial commissioning, Philip can take credit

for transforming a Macedonian militia of negligible military value into a highly-trained heavy infantry. Complementing the *pezhetairoi* were *hypaspistai* and *asthetairoi*, divisions created or reconstituted by Philip for the support of his heavy infantry.

Cavalry and infantry were augmented by *psiloi* such as *peltastai*, *toxotai* and *sphendonetai* who, in addition to specialist roles, also protected the formations of their more orthodox counterparts. The final element of Philip's combined arms force was mercenaries. Not only did hired troops allow the king to conduct operations in multiple theatres simultaneously, they provided the manpower necessary for high-risk operations (such as sieges) and protracted campaigns abroad. Mercenaries were also often employed in the operation of another of Philip's innovations – a comprehensive and formidable siege train.

It was, therefore, the king's foresight in creating a genuine combined arms force that provided Macedonia with an army in both size and scope that *poleis* simply could not match. Another of Philip's important traits was determination, and in particular the king's resolve to professionalise the prosecution of warfare. In a move that differentiated the Macedonian army from the (generally) amateur warriors of *poleis*, Philip made soldiering a paid – and potentially lucrative – occupation. The reform brought a number of benefits, including a greater enthusiasm for military service, higher levels of training and discipline, and a standing army that could be deployed in operations year-round.

As part of the drive for professionalism, Philip also streamlined his army, paying particular attention to logistics. Integral to the innovation was a reduction in the size of the baggage train by minimising the number of non-combatants that inevitably accompanied ancient armies. The result of Philip's professional approach was a well-trained and disciplined standing army, high in morale and competently led. Capable of operating with

a speed and efficiency unmatched by *poleis*, Philip's determination to transform his army into a professional fighting force was instrumental in the rise of Macedonia and an initiative for which the king himself deserves considerable credit.

If Philip's foresight and determination were responsible for his nation's rise, so too was his energy and vision in forging a unified entity out of what had been little more than a collection of fractious states. From divided beginnings, the king vigorously consolidated – and then expanded upon – the dominions bequeathed by his predecessors. Added to the heartland of Pieria and Bottia were the kingdoms of Upper Macedonia, with territory from Illyria, Thrace – and the entire Chalcidice – added eventually to the realm. The benefits of Philip's aggressive expansionist vision were considerable. Not only did it bring under Macedonian control vast tracts of agricultural land, but also extensive mineral resources, especially silver and the gold-rich Pangaeon region. Equally important were the reserves of timber, much sought-after by *poleis* – Athens in particular – for the construction of *triereis*.

Conquest also meant revenue, whether from the sale of captured chattels such as plunder or humanity, or imposition of taxes such as tithes, tribute, duties or feudal dues. However they were obtained, proceeds were channelled intelligently by Philip into measures such as systematic corruption, the hire of mercenaries, construction of infrastructure, and financing a sizeable standing army – all of which further strengthened his nation. Financial gain was not the only advantage Macedonia derived from Philip's vision. Equal benefits were obtained from both the rapid and significant population growth that accompanied territorial acquisition. Critical amongst these was increased military capacity, and in particular troop numbers, that enabled the mobilisation of not only large armies but also a significant reserve.

Philip's tireless efforts created a nation whose resources were unparalleled (by Greek standards), although it was his mastery of statecraft that enabled the king to realise the potential inherent in the "superpower" he was forging. Arguably he could have adopted a purely bellicose approach but Philip's pragmatism and perspicacity allowed him to realise his ambitions without having to resort to high-risk military solutions – unless absolutely necessary. Philip's pragmatism first demonstrated itself in the initial stages of his reign when, to consolidate his position, he engaged in executions and mass-murder. Cynically utilising marriage for alliances and political gain, the king also followed an aggressive colonisation and relocation program intended to disperse hostile populations and secure marchlands.

No mindless barbarian, Philip also allowed – when it suited him – his perspicacity to dictate solutions. Clemency, such as demonstrated towards Athens following Chaeronea, brought long-term rewards, as did the judicious use of propaganda. The Royal Palace, Philippeion and Olympic participation all bolstered Philip's status and reputation within the wider Greek community. The issuing of currency further emphasised the king's right to rule by accentuating divine connections to a mythological past but its true worth was in the creation of an economic hegemony by establishing Philip's tetradrachms and *philippeioi* as the region's dominant currency.

Shrewd diplomatic opportunism also allowed Philip to elevate his standing and that of his realm. Exploitation of circumstances surrounding the Third Sacred War, for example, enabled what amounted to the annexation of Thessaly – with the approbation of the Thessalians themselves. Associated honours included *archon* of the Confederacy, control over the Amphictyonic Council and presidency of the Pythian Games. Philip's, and Macedonia's, hegemonic status was ultimately confirmed by the League of Corinth where,

with a personal oath of loyalty, the king ensured the *poleis* were not only bound to him, but also his descendents. A campaign to liberate Greek city-states in Asia Minor fuelled Panhellenic ambition, diverting conveniently the attention of *poleis* away from their own subjugation, so allowing Philip to pursue his own hidden agendas – not least the enrichment of Macedonia and himself.

It is, therefore, clearly evident that in addition to the influences of Iphicrates and Xenophon, it was the king's personal qualities – openness to suggestion, foresight, determination, energy and vision, as well as pragmatism and perspicacity – that, far more than Epaminondas and Thebes, contributed to Macedonia's rise to a position of primacy.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

This thesis' purpose was to identify from where Philip derived the inspiration that enabled him to transform his dysfunctional backwater realm into a position of hegemony. Because the almost universally accepted view is that this was due to the king's time as a teenage hostage in Thebes, the inquiry focused attention on the validity of this orthodoxy – and ultimately rejected it. Other avenues of influence were therefore investigated – including the hitherto largely overlooked Iphicrates and Xenophon. It was concluded that a very strong circumstantial case could be made that these two Athenians played significant roles in the formation of Philip's ideas on military reform and application of statecraft. Even his greatest detractors from antiquity, however, were forced to admit that the king was a unique individual, and so the study closed with an examination of Philip's personal qualities and how these contributed towards the transformation of Macedonia into an ancient superpower.

Identifying correctly the factors behind Philip's achievements, and dispelling the Theban connection in particular, contributes – in some small way – to an important duty of the historian: the ongoing search for historical truth. In this respect, this thesis constitutes an attempt to draw attention to a misconception founded in antiquity, but still very much accepted today, that has represented Epaminondas and his achievements – impressive in some respects – as well beyond those that can be supported by a close analysis of the evidence. Known in some academic circles as the “Epaminondas Tradition”, the distortion dates from the second half of the fourth century and the laudatory treatment accorded by ancient historians to Thebes and its heroes, the *boiotarchos* amongst them.

Failure to recognise the sources' inherent bias, and the context that surrounded their production, not only elevates undeservedly the reputation of Thebes

and Epaminondas, it also diminishes the stature of others whose roles in the rise of Macedonia are marginalised or silenced. If indeed it was the case, as this discussion contends, that Iphicrates' experimentations with panoply were more than a military curiosity, and Xenophon's didactics on statecraft – albeit inadvertently – contributed to Macedonian hegemony, their role requires acknowledgment. Similarly, acceptance of the overwhelmingly hostile representation in the surviving sources of Philip as a barbarian despot, perpetuates ancient Greek chauvinisms and detracts from the king's own formidable personal qualities.

It was in an effort to “set the record straight”, therefore, that this investigation began with what constituted standard practice in fourth-century Greek warfare. This avenue of inquiry was important as it provided a basis against which the actions and abilities of Epaminondas could be measured, as well as a means to determine any interconnectedness with Macedonian praxes. What was determined was that Greek warfare in the Classical period was synonymic with the hoplite, a heavy infantryman who emerged *c.* 700 and was to dominate battlefields for three centuries.

Bearing panoply which included *aspis*, *doru*, *pilos* and *linothorax*, hoplites fought in phalanxes, with victory in battle decided by *othismos aspidon* and subsequent destruction of the enemy formation. Much controversy surrounds how, or even if, the *othismos aspidon* took place. The collective testimonies of men of military experience such as Thucydides and Xenophon, supported by references in the works of Aristophanes and Polyaeus, however, all allude to a clash of phalanxes and subsequent “push of shields”, leaving little doubt that the *othismos aspidon* was the defining and decisive aspect of battle.

Although heavy infantry continued to reign supreme in both ideology and on the battlefield, the first half of the fourth century nevertheless saw slow advances in how war was waged. Tentative moves towards truly combined arms armies were undertaken, with major *poleis* introducing or expanding cavalry divisions. Mercenary *psiloi* such as *toxotai* and *sphendonetai* were also utilised increasingly; often these troops were deployed in high-risk operations such as sieges, where heavy casualty rates were expected.

Over the course of the fourth century, *poleis* themselves became more professional in their approach to warfare with the commissioning of full-time elites (including Thebes' Sacred Band). Emergence of career *stratego*i provides further evidence of the determination of some *poleis* to improve the overall standard of their military. Athens, for example, enacted reforms to help ensure that its *stratego*i were chosen for their ability rather than political expediency. As a result, high calibre individuals such as Timotheus, Iphicrates and Chabrias emerged to serve their *polis* long and well.

Concurrent with the increasingly professional approach of the *poleis* to warfare was a gradual evolution in tactics. Ancient and modern sources alike sometimes emphasise the agonal aspects of battle, but enough testimony survives to suggest "warfare by the rules" may have been little more than an ideal, with surprise attacks, ambushes, misdirection and misinformation all employed regularly in an effort to gain military advantage over an opponent. Similarly, the view of some scholars that tactics factored little in the outcome of battles cannot be supported. Although the *othismos* was decisive, a *strategos* certainly had a tactical role to play in facilitating opportunities to engineer or exploit an opponent's weakness.

Arraignment of the phalanx was one such consideration, as was determining its depth and breadth. When, and if, to employ a range of manoeuvres or formations – including the *pyknosis*, *exelimos*, *klisis*, *dromos* and *plaision* – were also decisions a *strategos* might need to make, either in defence of his own phalanx or the attack of an enemy's.

If tactical development may be considered slow, rapid advances occurred in siege warfare. Mercenary *psiloi* allowed assaults to be more vigorous and sustained. New technologies such as *helepoleis*, *gastraphetai* and *oxybelai* further enhanced chances of success. *Poleis* countered with increasingly sophisticated fortifications including stone *enceintes*; towers of innovative design; gatecourts; and posterns. *Oxybelai* also became an essential defensive component.

A final aspect notable of fourth-century Greek warfare was the emerging concept of grand strategy and the transition from single-season offensives with limited goals, to campaigns of much greater duration and ambition. This change in strategic mindset within some *poleis* was evidenced in the willingness to engage in economic warfare – the intention of which was to bring about the complete collapse of an opponent. As a result, a far more aggressive approach was adopted towards armies of invasion, even to the extent where the destruction of one's own *chora* was considered an option. Wealthier *poleis*, Athens foremost amongst them, also put in place defensive measures intended to protect their frontiers. Securing of mountain passes, as well as construction of border forts, watchtowers and fieldwalls were included amongst steps taken to prevent invasion, or minimise its impact.

Such praxes, therefore, constituted Greek military orthodoxy in the fourth century, the dominant exponent of which – from 371 to 338 – was the Boeotian *polis*

of Thebes. It is a point worth remembering, as one of this thesis' purposes was to question the well-established belief that Philip's diplomatic and military expertise had its genesis during the time the Macedonian was a hostage in Boeotia.

Central to this aspect of the investigation was Philip's age at the time of his detainment. The sources are typically vague and much centres on modern interpretations of the terms *παῖς* and *puer*. Definitive age delinations did not exist in the ancient world any more than they do in the present-day, but it is argued in this thesis that the testimonies of Plutarch and Justin, when read together, indicate that Philip was thirteen or fourteen when he arrived at Boeotia, and sixteen when he left. Educational opportunities that awaited young men of that age were limited in Thebes. Whilst not the rural backwater it was often made out to be, the *polis* nevertheless lacked any institutionalized training such as Macedonia's Royal Page School, and so it seems likely Philip received but a rudimentary Pythagorean education that included instruction in literacy, mathematics, music and gymnastics. It is hard to see how this most basic of groundings, at such an early age, could have in any way sown the seeds of Philip's future successes.

Similarly difficult to pinpoint is any indication of Epaminondas' influence on the Macedonian prince's intellectual development. Philip's preference (and flair) for statecraft has been well recognized but connections with his detainment are hard to determine. The literary evidence is deceptive, with praise for the aims of Epaminondas not always divorced from their realisation, despite there often being a disparity between the two. In the area of strategy, for example, it may very well have been that the intention of the *boiotarchos* was to isolate Sparta and so reduce it to insignificance. A considered analysis of post-Leuctra events, however, indicates that

Epaminondas' strategy was far from successful. Sparta had fielded 2,400 hoplites at Leuctra, and although it is true only 700 hundred were Spartiates, the distinction was of negligible military importance: no one questioned the bravery and determination with which the entire infantry contingent had fought. Yet despite Epaminondas' policy of Spartan isolationism, the *polis* undertook military reforms so that by the Battle of Mantinea (362), its military capacity had expanded to 7,200 hoplites – hardly testimony to the success of Theban strategy.

Claims of Epaminondas' telling contribution to Philip's fledgling diplomatic skills are similarly dubious. Following his victory at Leuctra, Epaminondas' was the dominant voice in Boeotian foreign policy during the prince's tenure at Thebes, yet the example of the *boiotarchos* was by no means noteworthy. It is, again, important to review the sources critically to distinguish between intent and achievement. Epaminondas did well to recognise Thebes lacked the manpower and resources to maintain a hegemonic role in the Peloponnese without support and wisely established a series of alliances in an attempt to contain Sparta. Clumsy and heavy-handed political manoeuvrings, however, soon alienated some members of the Boeotian Confederacy so that by 362 – a mere nine years after Leuctra – a number fought with Sparta against their former Theban ally, including, incredibly, Mantinea, a long-time enemy of Sparta and one of the three *poleis* around which Epaminondas had formulated his Peloponnesian strategy.

Viewed in an objective light, it becomes clear that Epaminondas' achievements in the field of diplomacy hardly constituted a model for emulation. If indeed Philip drew on anyone as a model of political artfulness, this thesis argues, it was his ancestor Perdiccas II, not Epaminondas. For close to forty years, and from a

position of military weakness, Perdiccas played off successfully Athens and Sparta, in the process not only maintaining the independence of his own realm, but expanding its territories. Although not without leaving the makings of a dire legacy, the rise of Olynthic aspirations in particular, Perdiccas presented a superior example of diplomatic guile and subtlety for Philip to follow.

Thebes' clumsy political manoeuvres and Epaminondas' lack of diplomatic skill argues strongly that Philip acquired little, if anything, of value that contributed to his later expertise in statecraft. Close scrutiny of the evidence also reveals that another long-held belief – that Philip's military acumen was a product of his time as a hostage at Thebes – is not beyond challenge. Doubts are again raised by the question of Philip's age. Nepos indicates that Thebes provided some form of training for those of military age, without indicating specifically how old that was. Based on the ages of Athenian *epeboi* and Spartan *paidiskoi*, however, it seems probable that Thebans were at least eighteen before they began their military instruction. It will be remembered that Philip was sixteen when he returned to Macedonia and therefore unlikely to have received any form of education in the military arts during his time in Boeotia.

It is also questionable whether Epaminondas' reputation as an innovative tactician was deserved. That he was a talented general is without doubt and his track record demonstrated a command over many facets of Greek warfare as practiced in the fourth century. Records of earlier conflicts demonstrate, however, that many of the deployments supposedly pioneered by Epaminondas had indeed been utilised previously. Both Thucydides and Xenophon, for example, provide evidence that a “very deep” formation, the positioning of elite troops on the phalanx's left,

coordinating infantry and cavalry in attack, and the use reserve forces were established protocols by the first quarter of the fourth century. Even Epaminondas' much celebrated infantry wedge, thought by many scholars to have been employed for the first time at Leuctra, is not secure in the historical record, with much depending on how the key word ἔμβολον (*embolon*) is interpreted. "Wedge" is one translation but Xenophon's simile in which the formation is compared to the ram of a *trieres* – that is, a rectangular formation in advance of the main body – is to be preferred as testimony from a contemporary of the battle who was well-placed to access eye-witness testimony.

Serious questions arise, therefore, about what, if any, influence Epaminondas and Thebes could have had on Philip's development as a student of war. That there was little, is supported by the tactical innovations the king later wrought on his army – most of which were without correlation in Theban practices. Foremost amongst these was the feigned retreat, regarded by some academics as impossible technically. Polyaeus, however, leaves little doubt that the Macedonians mastered the manoeuvre and that it was the decisive element in the king's victory at Chaeronea. Under Philip, the role of cavalry was developed and their innovative deployment made the division an increasingly decisive element in the outcome of battles. Crucial in this was the introduction of the wedge, a configuration that allowed cavalry troops to attack infantry formations. A number of historians view the deployment as unfeasible, claiming a horse's instinct for self-preservation would have prevented the animal from charging an intact phalanx. Other scholars, however, including those with a background in horsemanship, contend that by harnessing the animal's herd mentality, horses could be trained to execute a controlled charge against hoplites.

The belief is supported by the *Tactica* of Arrian, where it is stated Macedonian cavalry was effective in breaching enemy formations. Arrian's testimony finds support in the records of Asclepiodotus and Aelian, both of which indicate the wedge enabled cavalry to charge successfully an unbroken phalanx.

Philip's reforms to the panoply of Macedonia's armed forces also argue against any Boeotian influence on the king's military efficacy. Rather than emulate Thebes (or any other *polis*), the king fashioned instead a "new model army" unlike any seen previously in the city-states. Arguably his most important innovation was the introduction of the infantry *sarissa*, although considerable debate exists surrounding the weapon. Archaeological remains, however, especially those discovered at Chaeronea, confirm securely that *sarissai* were employed by Philip's phalangites, with the testimonies of Diodorus and Polyaeus indicating that it was probable the king introduced the weapon at the beginning of his reign.

Controversy also surrounds the dimensions of *sarissai* and the material with which they were made. Experimentation with the pike's length by later Hellenistic kings has clouded the issue somewhat, but Asclepiodotus and Arrian indicate the length of the *sarissa* in Philip's time was 10-12 cubits (4.8-5.5 metres). Archaeological remains (again, those from Chaeronea providing compelling evidence) indicate that the pike's head was manufactured from iron and between thirty and forty centimetres long. Theophrastus' much-quoted passage has led to the common belief that *sarissai* shafts were constructed from cornel wood, but this interpretation is almost certainly erroneous. Ancient sources indicate instead that *Cornus mas L.* (ash tree) was a more likely material, as do the biological characteristics of the plant itself. Philip was also responsible for the introduction of

a cavalry *sarissa* (*xyston*). Arrian states unequivocally the *xyston* was constructed from cornel wood and implies that they were well over two metres long. Modern estimates of length vary but based on the morphology of the cornel tree, and dimensions of “modern” cavalry lances, the suggestion of three metres is compelling.

An obvious disparity in the approaches of Epaminondas and Philip to poliorketics also makes it difficult to reconcile the idea that the king’s appreciation for war-craft was formed in Thebes. Epaminondas should be accorded credit for the construction of a number of defensive fortifications and installations intended to provide Boeotia with protection from invasion, although this occurred at the same time Athens was engaged in a similar undertaking. There is nothing, however, to suggest that Thebes contributed anything to the advancement of siege warfare, or even embraced available technology. The historical record remains silent on Epaminondas’ use of siege engines such as *helepoleis* and *gastraphetai*, and indeed *oxybelai*. Perhaps the hoplite ethos was behind the decision, but whatever the reason, Thebes’ ability to prosecute siege operations successfully was inhibited severely with poorly, and even unfortified, *poleis* managing to withstand Boeotian attack.

In stark contrast to Epaminondas, it is well-recorded that Philip embraced siege technology, conducting siege operations actively and aggressively (when required to do so). That the king made use of traditional siege engines is documented securely as was his utilisation of newer technologies such as *gastraphetai* and *oxybelai*. Philip obviously recognised the advantages offered by advanced siege weaponry and c.350 founded an engineering “school” in Pella, where, under the supervision of Polyeidus the Thessalian, existing designs were enhanced and new machines created, including the torsion catapult. Although not without its failures,

the Macedonian approach was nevertheless a paradigm shift in poliorcetics and provides yet more substance to the position that neither Epaminondas nor Thebes played any formative role in the development of Philip's military acumen.

That no Boeotian connection was evidenced, this investigation next sought to identify the true bases for Macedonia's rise to supremacy. One explanation identified credibly was that of external influences – not of Epaminondas and Thebes as is usually believed – but the Athenians Iphicrates and Xenophon. Iphicrates, it is argued, was influential in Philip's development of the *pezhetairoi*, although it is acknowledged this hypothesis is derived from weight of probability. Most scholars accept that the Athenian experimented with panoply, although opinion varies as to the nature and timing of these innovations. Diodorus and Nepos reveal that the Iphicratean peltast was clad in a *linothorax*, wore *iphicratids* and was armed with a pike around five metres in length. The *aspis* was abandoned in favour of the smaller *pelte*. Their combined testimonies also date convincingly Iphicrates' reforms to c.373/2, but together with Xenophon, hint that they were something of a failed experiment within the *polis* system, which by 362 had abandoned them in favour of traditional methods of warfare.

Iphicrates' experimental accoutrement, however, bore a close resemblance to that adopted by Philip's *pezhetairoi*. The argument that this was the result of collusion between the two men is enhanced when it is remembered that Iphicrates had well-established ties with the Macedonian royal house that extended back to 378 when he became Philip's adopted brother, bonds that were doubtless strengthened when in 367 the Athenian intervened to secure for Perdiccas the Macedonian throne. By 363 Iphicrates was living in low-profile on Drys, but a few days' voyage from

Philip who, based in Amphaxitis, was reconstituting an army of his own. Whether from familial ties, *xenia*, or expediency can never be known but that Philip's *pezhetairoi* resembled Iphicrates' remodelled *peltastai* down to their signature *sarissa*, is surely beyond coincidence.

Xenophon's connection to Macedonian military reform is less tangible, but present nonetheless. A prodigious author, the Athenian retained a close interest in *topoi* of authority and military reform, both of which were addressed regularly in his works. The *Anabasis*, *Hipparchicus*, *Agesilaus*, and *Hellenica* all examined the theory of command; the *Cyropaedia* in particular represented a didactic on reorganisation of the armed forces and practice of statecraft. Areas of discussion included the use of terror, manipulation, military reform, the importance of logistics, siege-craft, decisiveness of cavalry, and, significantly, leadership and the art of command. That Philip paid careful attention to Xenophon's didactics can also be inferred from the *Anabasis*, which detailed the advantages inherent in a combined arms force, something the king was very careful to emulate in his own military revisions.

What a close review of Philip's actions over the course of his reign reveals, therefore, is an adherence to the counsel contained in Xenophon's body of works – the *Cyropaedia* and *Anabasis* in particular – that stretches the boundaries of coincidence. A noted Athenophile with a keen mind, access to Xenophon's treatises, and an appreciation for the subtleties of power, it can be no surprise that Philip's actions and reforms were influenced heavily by the Athenian's works.

Having rejected the role of Thebes and Epaminondas, and made a strong circumstantial case for the importance of Iphicrates and Xenophon, this thesis closed

with an investigation into the role Philip himself played in his kingdom's rise to hegemony. Surviving sources that recount the king's personality are almost always derogatory, but an impartial survey of his achievements reveal Philip possessed a formidable array of character traits that enabled him exploit opportunities to best advantage.

Important amongst these was foresight, and the consequent decision to restructure his army into a truly combined arms force. Macedonia had an ancient cavalry tradition but Philip improved the division by increasing *hetairoi* numbers, as well as adding *prodromoi* and *sarissophoi* to fulfil specialist tactical objectives. Priority was also placed on improving the quality of Macedonian infantry. Testimony from Theopompus and Anaximenes dates the commissioning of *pezhetairoi* prior to Philip, but the king deserves credit for reconstituting the division into highly-trained troops of the line. *Hypaspitai* and *asthetairoi* divisions were likewise created which, together with *psiloi*, were utilised as support for the main divisions of cavalry and infantry, or in specialist roles. Philip's use of mercenaries is often overstated but nonetheless attested and indeed played an important role as garrison troops, or in extended operations abroad.

Another of the king's key character traits was determination, and in particular his relentless efforts to place the military on a professional standing. Troops were well-paid, which not only created a sense of loyalty to the crown, but also made soldiering a full-time occupation, thereby permitting improved levels of training and discipline. Under Philip, professionalism also extended into the field of logistics, leading in turn to a reduction in the size of the baggage train and number of non-combatants, something that had hampered the range and speed with which hoplite

armies could operate. A professional military requires quality leadership, and Philip's determination to improve his army extended beyond the rank and file to include the appointment of outstanding commanders, foremost amongst them Parmenion and Antipator. Later, Craterus, Perdikkas, Cassander, Ptolemy, Seleucus, and, of course Alexander III, all emerged as talented generals who had benefitted from the training they received at Macedonia's Royal Page School.

In addition to the qualities of foresight and determination, Philip's energy and vision proved key in Macedonia's rise to hegemony. The king pursued tirelessly an aggressive policy of expansion in which he re-established control over Upper Macedonia, as well as adding new territories such as Chalcidice and Thrace to his realm. By doubling the size of his kingdom, Philip not only secured the resources necessary to fund future endeavours but also modernise. Of particular importance was acquisition of control over the gold-rich region of Pangaeon and the mines of Thrace, that – together with deposits in Krestonia – yielded thousands of talents per annum in precious metals. Lumber was another significant source of wealth for Macedonia's monarchs and the incorporation of Upper Macedonia, as well as eastern territories such as Edonis, placed vast stands of quality timber under Philip's control. More land also meant a greater subject population, which translated to an expansion of the military – quadrupling in fact – as well as establishment of a significant militia reserve. The magnitude of the impact Philip's energy and vision had in forging Europe's first nation-state cannot be overstated. Not only did he create an economic and military juggernaut that no city-state (individually or collectively) could resist, the king possessed the wisdom to invest in the infrastructure and administrative

reforms necessary to maximise the impact of the resources he had brought under his control.

It was, however, Philip's skill in statecraft –informed expertly by his own pragmatism and perspicacity – that enabled Macedonia's potential to be realised fully. Actions of expediency included the elimination of rivals both real and potential, mass-murder, as well as the cynical use of marriage for diplomatic gain, complemented by an aggressive colonisation program and policy of forced relocation. Philip, however, was nowhere near the uneducated barbarian represented in a number of ancient sources and the king was well-capable of demonstrating perspicacity when he deemed it warranted. Athens, for example, benefitted from extra-ordinarily lenient terms following Chaeronea, although it was political factors that stayed the king's wrath rather than humanitarian considerations. Similarly, Philip lavished his wealth shrewdly in creating ties of personal obligation. Demosthenes' claims concerning the ubiquitous nature of Philip's corrupting influence can be regarded as exaggerations, but it remains true that, at times, bribery, *largesse*, *xenia* and patronage all secured favourable outcomes for Macedonian endeavours. Judicious use of propaganda also demonstrated Philip's percipience. An imposing palace at Aegae, the Philippeion, and Olympic victories were all reminders to the greater Greek community of his achievements and credentials to rule. So, too, was Macedonian currency, although a far more important function was its role in laying the foundation for economic hegemony.

Expert diplomacy was another means in which Philip demonstrated unmatched shrewdness. Thessaly, annexed in what amounted to a bloodless coup, was subjugated with the willing contrivance of the Thessalians themselves, and

victory in the Third Sacred War gave Philip control over the Amphictyonic League, as well as presidency of the Pythian Games – both important repositories of religious authority. It was *to koinon ton Hellenon* (the League of Corinth), however, that cemented Philip's, and Macedonia's, hegemonic status amongst the Greeks. Although containing a number of clauses that by the fourth century had become standard in treaties of Common Peace, archaeological remains of a copy of the oath given by *poleis* reveal the revolutionary stipulation that the pledge was sworn to Philip and his successors, rather than the Macedonian state. In doing so, the *poleis* surrendered their independence permanently but Philip was intelligent enough to ensure the reality was disguised carefully. One such misdirection was the very popular campaign proposed against Persia, which not only led to further honours for the king, but also provided an opportunity to bring additional wealth and land under Macedonian control.

What has been demonstrated clearly by this thesis, therefore, is the long-held belief that Macedonia's hegemony can be traced to Philip's time as a hostage in Thebes is beyond the bounds of credibility. The king unquestionably drew on influences many and varied: but Thebes was not one of them. Iphicrates was almost certainly behind the reform of Macedonian *pezhetairoi*, including key changes to panoply. It is argued further that Xenophon – albeit inadvertently – also played an important role in the development of Philip's thinking. The Athenian's military and philosophical didactics, the *Cyropaedia* and *Anabasis* in particular, indicate a very close correlation between Philip's reforms and leadership style – too close in fact for the explanation of coincidence to be comfortably accepted. Most of the credit, however, must lie with the king himself and the admirable array of personal qualities

he applied diligently in the service of his realm. Theopompus' famous back-handed compliment was tellingly accurate: *Europe had never produced such a man as Philip.*

Appendix

APPENDIX I

The “Epaminondas Tradition”

Given that, to the critical eye at least, although Epaminondas can rightly be regarded as a highly talented *boiotarchos*, “innovative” and “genius” are epithets that can hardly be justified in relation to his deployments at the battle of Leuctra in 371. How then, is it that these qualities have for nearly two and a half millennia been associated with the Theban? The answer surely lies in the ancient sources and the creation of a so-called “Epaminondas Tradition”.¹

Xenophon provides the only (imperfect) contemporary account of the battle although later chroniclers Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch and Pausanias also supplied commentaries on the action.² Diodorus’ account was derived from Ephorus; Plutarch sourced his primarily from Callisthenes and Ephorus, but also acquired part of his material from Xenophon.³ Pausanias may have obtained his information from Plutarch so that, other than Xenophon, Ephorus and Callisthenes are ultimately the record for Epaminondas’ feats at Leuctra.⁴

To appreciate the significance of this fact, it is first necessary to understand the historical context of the 370-360s – a time of strained relations between Athens and Thebes when memories of old antagonisms were being revived.⁵ Athenians had good reason to be suspicious of Thebes – at the end of the Peloponnesian War (404) Thebes had lobbied Sparta vigorously for Athens’ destruction, a resentment doubtless rekindled by the

¹ A term seemingly first coined in Shrimpton 1971b: 318; Hanson 2007: 504 n3, 517 n39.

² Xenophon as sole extant account – Hanson 2007: 504; Anderson 1970: 205; Delbrück 1975: 168 n2; Gaebel 2002: 130; Buckler & Beck 2008: 123; Devine 1983: 205.

³ Diodorus – Buckler 2013: 658; Hanson 2007: 517. Plutarch – Buckler 2013: 658; Hanson 2007: 517; Buckler & Beck 2008: 100, 112; Hammond 2000a: 90; Buck 1994: xviii.

⁴ Hanson 2007: 517; Westlake 1939: 12; Cawkwell 1972: 255. Tuplin 1984: 346, 357 disagrees and argues Pausanias’ account is based on contaminated Plutarchan material.

⁵ Dem. 14.33-34; Shrimpton 1971b: 314; Brunt 1969: 245.

Boeotians' annihilation of Plataea in 373.⁶ The *polis* was a long-time friend and ally of Athens which, alone of the Greek states, had stood by the Attic capital at the Battle of Marathon.⁷ Furthermore, Thebes' actions in razing the Boeotian *polis* and enslaving its population were in direct contravention to the Covenant of Plataea, which guaranteed the integrity of the small city-state following its role in the second Persian War.⁸ Plataea had suffered doubly at the hands of Thebes, having also been destroyed at the Boeotians' insistence in 427/6.⁹

Another source of mistrust was Thebes' diplomatic missions to Persia during 367/6, the result of which made the *polis*, in Athenian eyes at least, medizers – something for which the Boeotians had been condemned following the second Persian War.¹⁰ In 366 Thebes further estranged Athens with the seizure of Oropus and her attempted detachment of Byzantium, Rhodes and Chios from the Second Athenian Confederacy during 364/3.¹¹ Clearly, Athens had little reason to warm towards Thebes or things Theban. Interestingly,

⁶ Thebes lobbying Sparta – Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.19, 6.5.36; Isoc. *Dis.* 14.31; Dem. 19.65; Plut. *Lys.* 15; Kagan 2005: 479; Hanson 2006: 287; Buckler & Beck 2008: 33; Sage 1996: 133; Demand 1982: 44; Buck 1994: 25; Cook 1988: 62, 68. Destruction of Plataea – Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.1; Diod. Sic. 15.46.4-6; Paus. 9.1.8; Shrimpton 1971b: 315; Hammond 2000a: 89; Bakhuizen 1994: 310, 313; Camp 1991: 202; Buck 1994: 104; Iversen 2007: 398, 411.

⁷ Hdt. 6.108; Nep. 1.5.1; Just. 2.9.9; Paus. 1.32.3, 9.1.3; Hammond 1992a: 149; 2000a: 80; How & Wells 2008: 524.

⁸ Thuc. 2.71.1-4; Diod. Sic. 11.29.1; Plut. *Arist.* 21; Gomme 1956a: 205; Debnar 1996: 96-100; Hammond 1992a: 145; 2000a: 83; Hornblower 1997: 358; Lazenby 2004: 56; Kagan 2005: 114; Roberts 2017: 108.

⁹ Thuc. 3.68.1-5; Hammond 2000a: 83; Munn 1997: 68; Shrimpton 1971b: 315; Gomme 1956a: 357; Demand 1982: 41; Iversen 2007: 390, 411.

¹⁰ Diplomatic missions – Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.33, 39-40; Diod. Sic. 15.76.3; Plut. *Pel.* 30.1-7; Shrimpton 1971b: 314; Cawkwell 1972: 256; Munn 1997: 89; Buckler & Beck 2008: 130; Roy 1971: 578, 592; Ruzicka 1998: 62; Hanson 1999b: 107; Perlman 1976: 228. Condemnation of Thebans – Hdt. 7.132, 205, 9.15; Thuc. 3.62.1; Shrimpton 1971b: 314; Hammond 2000a: 82; Munn 1997: 89; Buck 1979: 128; Demand 1982: 2, 25-26; Debnar 1996: 99; Iversen 2007: 396; Hanson 1999b: 25; How & Wells 2008: 594-595.

¹¹ Oropus – Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.1; Diod. Sic. 15.46.4, 76.1; Brunt 1969: 247; Shrimpton 1971b: 315; Bakhuizen 1994: 320; Roy 1971: 581; Munn 1997: 80-81; Buckler 1980: 194. Byzantium *et al.*, – Isoc. *Dis.* 5.53; Diod. Sic. 15.79.1; Plut. *Phil.* 14.2; Buckler & Beck 2008: 175, 196; Buckler 1980: 162; Ruzicka 1998: 60-61; Berthold 1980: 41-42; Sealey 1955: 75; Cartledge 1987: 311; Tod 1950: 52, 178; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 270, 318.

this is reflected in the writings of leading Athenians whose hostility towards the Boeotian *polis* is overt and their treatment of Epaminondas noticeable by its silence.¹²

During the 330s, however, there was somewhat of a rapprochement between the two powers precipitated by Thebes' decision to abandon her alliance with Philip II and side with Athens at Chaeronea.¹³ Sympathies were perhaps further heightened when the Boeotian *polis* was herself destroyed in 335 by the forces of Alexander III.¹⁴ Be that as it may, there was a decided change in the Athenian perception of Thebes from that of enemy to friend – a sentiment picked up on by writers such as Callisthenes and Ephorus (whose works date from c.340-335) and continued down to the 320s by later authors such as Dinarchus.¹⁵

A notable exception to this heightened pro-Theban sentiment was the decision of the *polis* to erect a permanent *tropaion* following Leuctra – an action roundly condemned.¹⁶ Yet despite this undeniable blemish on the city-state's record, Ephorus and contemporary Attic writers were concerned with the glorification of Thebes through her greatest hero Epaminondas; a view transferred into the record of later commentators such as Diodorus

¹² Isoc. *Dis.* 5.50, 53-55; 6.61; 14.1, 4, 7, 9; Dem. 18.18; Aeschin. 2.104; 3.133; Plut. *Lyc.* 30; Shrimpton 1971b: 310-311; Osborne 2016: 172; Buckler 1980: 275-276; Steinbock 2013: 102-103, 125-126. Athens' tepid response to Epaminondas' victory at Leuctra – Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.19-20; LaForse 2010: 548; Christ 2012: 159; Hornblower 1991: 171; Bauslaugh 1991: 201.

¹³ Aeschin. 3.137-151; Dem. 18.168-188, 211-217; Din. 1.12; Diod. Sic. 16.85.1-4; Plut. *Dem.* 18; *Pel.* 18; Just. 9.3.4-6; Shrimpton 1971b: 315; Bakhuizen 1994: 323; Munn 1997: 100; Worthington 2008: 144; Buckler & Beck 2008: 275; Ashley 1998: 152; Gabriel 2010: 207-208; Brunt 1969: 245; Green 1991: 70; McQueen 1995a: 158.

¹⁴ Str. 9.2.5; Plut. *Alex.* 13; Paus. 9.23.5-6; Shrimpton 1971b: 315; Bakhuizen 1994: 335; Munn 1997: 104; Iversen 2007: 412; Buckler 1980: 277; Worthington 2013: 318; Bayliss 2011: 154.

¹⁵ Callisthenes and Ephorus – Diod. Sic. 15.79.2, 88.4; Straeuli 2011: 159; Shrimpton 1971b: 313-314, 315-318; Cawkwell 1972: 254, 274. Dinarchus – Din. 1.24, 72-73; Shrimpton 1971b: 313-314; Steinbock 2013: 212; Worthington 2013: 318.

¹⁶ Tod 130; Isoc. *Dis.* 6.10; Diod. Sic. 13.24.5-6; Cic. *Inv.* 2.23.69-70; Plut. *Mor.* 273C-D; Munn 1997: 85-86; van Wees 2004: 136; Frazer 2012b: 51; Stroszeck 2005: 312; Breij 2009: 359; Hornblower 2009a: 44; Dayton 2006: 111.

Siculus, Plutarch and Pausanias – and one which has remained largely unchallenged in the modern era.¹⁷

¹⁷ Polyb. 6.43; Diod. Sic. 15.81.1-4, 87.5-6, 88.1-4; Cic. *Tusc.* 1.2.4; Plut. *Tim.* 36; *Phil.* 3.1; Paus. 8.11.8; Just. 6.8.2-13; Hanson 1999b: 283; 2007: 517-518; 2010: 93, 113 n1; Shrimpton 1971b: 317-318; Drews 1962: 389; Adcock 1957: 24; Stylianou 1998: 120. It should also be noted, however, that three other *boiotarchoi* – Xenocrates, Theopompus and Mnasilaos – claimed or were credited with at least as a significant role in the Theban victory at Leuctra as Epaminondas – Tod 130=R&O 30; Hanson 2007: 516; Tod 1950: 93; Rhodes & Osborne 2003a: 150-151.

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