

UNIVERSITY OF NEW ENGLAND

**ECONOMIC STATECRAFT IN THE ANCIENT GREEK
WORLD**

A Dissertation submitted by

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ABSTRACT

The thesis provides a detailed thematic analysis on the use of economic statecraft in the ancient Greek world during the late Archaic and Classical periods. Economic statecraft is the use of economic measures by a state to influence the attitudes and behaviours of other states. Economic measures can be categorised as either trade-based or capital-based. Trade-based economic measures included tariffs, boycotts, export prohibitions and the provision of strategic trade goods. Capital-based economic measures comprise gifts and loans of money, bribery, tribute, other capital payments, preferential taxation and selective coin design. For the purposes of this thesis, the ancient Greek world comprised all Greek states as well as those non-Greek states with which they regularly engaged. Greek states included those in mainland Greece, the Aegean, Asia Minor, Sicily and Magna Graecia. The relevant non-Greek states were primarily Macedonia and Persia.

Three hundred and twenty-five potential examples of economic measures were analysed to determine whether they could be classified as economic statecraft. Given the results of this analysis, the thesis tests three hypotheses about the extent that states in the ancient Greek understood, valued and applied economic statecraft. The three hypotheses, which were all testable as well as being potentially falsifiable, created a spectrum of the application of economic statecraft. The thesis concludes that economic statecraft was commonly, but not regularly used to influence the attitudes and behaviours of other states, with some economic measures more often used than others. The evidence substantiates the view that ancient states understood they had available a range of economic measures to influence other states and had the mechanisms needed to make the necessary decisions about their application.

States in the ancient Greek world were more nuanced in their economic statecraft than many scholars may have thought. From a slow start in the late Archaic period, economic statecraft, in all its types, was consistently applied by a variety of states throughout the Classical period. As a form of influence, economic statecraft supplemented traditional military responses, by providing alternative options when circumstances suited their use. The thesis demonstrates that most forms of trade-based and capital-based economic measures did not suddenly appear in the modern world, but have a pedigree of over 2500 years.


Certification of Dissertation

I certify that the ideas, results, analyses and conclusions reported in this dissertation are entirely my own effort, except where otherwise acknowledged. I also certify that the work is original and has not been previously submitted for any other award.



26 Jul 2022

ENDORSEMENT



Supervisor

Acknowledgements

This thesis results from a life-long interest in ancient history that had me aspiring, at age 12, to become an archaeologist. My interest was further sparked by a passionate high school teacher in the early 1970s who made the ancient Greek and Roman world come alive.

My interest was rekindled through formal study, whilst still working full time, that took the form of a BA at UNE in the 1980s that included both ancient and modern history. I put further formal study on hold until 2005 when, after retiring from full time employment, I enrolled in a Masters of History at UNE entirely focused on ancient Greek history. On its successful completion, and after formally studying a few years of the Greek language at UNE, I was able to successfully enrol in this PhD.

I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to my supervisors, Professor Matthew Dillon, Clemens Koehn and Tristan Taylor, but especially Matthew for his constant support over an extended period. His critical questioning, review of multiple drafts and informed commentary pushed me to make this thesis much better than it ever would have been without him.

Finally, thanks to my wonderful wife Shane for her support to me over the last six years whilst I laboured in the arcane world of ancient Greek interstate relations.

Notes to Readers

Dates

All dates are BCE (Before the Common Era) unless otherwise stated.

Place Names

Place names follow the spelling in the Barrington Classical Atlas except where their common spelling is so familiar that using the Barrington spelling would create confusion eg Athens rather than Athenae, Corinth rather than Corinthus.

Peoples Names

The names of ancient Greeks fall into two categories. The most familiar ones are given in their common form to avoid confusion, so Thucydides rather than Thoukudides. Where names are used with either 'os' or 'us' endings, the 'os' ending is preferred, except when the 'us' form is widely used.

Greek words

Where a Greek word is first used within the thesis, its meaning is explained and it is provided an italicised English transliteration. The italicised transliteration is then only used as necessary within the thesis, including other chapters. The Greek word is not provided when the term is first used in subsequent chapters. The exception for italicisation is Greek coin names for which the convention is not to italicise.

Journal abbreviations

Journals are abbreviated in accordance with the conventions in *L'Annee Philologique*. Where a journal does not appear in *L'Annee Philologique*, its full name is used.

Definitions

Appendix 1 provides a glossary of technical terms used throughout the thesis.

Citing ancient sources

The abbreviations for ancient sources are those used within the Perseus Digital Library. Where a source does not appear in Perseus, traditional abbreviations are used.

Citing modern scholarship

This thesis adheres to the UNE Footnoting Reference (History) style guide for footnoting and the bibliography.

The author/editor names provided in footnotes and the List of References mirrors their form in the relevant document, noting that some authors/editors change the way their name is presented in different documents.

The spelling and capitalisation of book and article titles mirror their form in the original book or article.

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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

Ἐπειδὴ πᾶσαν πόλιν ὁρῶμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν, καὶ πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἀγαθοῦ
τινος ἕνεκεν συνεστηκυῖαν

*Observation tells us that every state is an association and that every association is
formed with a view to some good purpose' (Aristot. Pol. 1252a1)*

Strategic Context

In commenting on the formation of states, Aristotle recognised that throughout recorded history, people had banded together in families, tribes, cities and states to achieve common goals. His 'good purposes' often included aspirations to autonomy and self-sufficiency from other states. But what Aristotle did not go on to discuss was how ancient states usually needed to engage with other states for their mutual protection, to acquire the necessities of life and to improve their prosperity. Peoples in the ancient Greek world were no different, regardless of whether they lived in tribal states, city-states or kingdoms. No evidence exists from the ancient historians and philosophers that any ancient state could exist in isolation from its neighbours or from more distant states. Even if a state aspired to remain left alone, being adequately self-sufficient, in reality they would be targeted by other states seeking political and economic advantage.

Ancient literature reveals predatory states always existed, who sought to expand their territories, to claim new resources or to otherwise control or influence other states.¹ Even in the absence of predatory states, neighboring states often had problematic relationships with territorial disputes being common. One only needs to review the clashes between Athens and Megara, or Thebes and the Phocian states, to understand how difficult were such geographically-close relationships in the ancient Greek world. Even those states which at

¹ Bresson argued that predatory actions were a defining characteristic of the ancient Greek world and '...why war as a means of winning booty or increasing available agricultural land always remained a "rational" objective for many small city-states, right down to the end of the Hellenistic period.', see A. Bresson, *The Making of the Ancient Greek Economy: Institutions, Markets, and Growth in the City-States*, Princeton, 2016, p. 418.

different times wanted to remain politically neutral could still be targeted by other states.² Further, even in the absence of foreign threats, states often sought to engage with other states to improve their security and economic prosperity.

In response to ongoing threats and opportunities, states usually had several strategic objectives, many of which could only be achieved by engaging with other states. In modern international relations, the sum of these objectives, and the strategies to achieve them, form a state's 'foreign policy'. Such policy may be documented, at least to the extent that states are prepared for their objectives and methods to be on the public record.³ Nevertheless, the foreign policies of many modern states, especially their enduring strategic objectives, can only be inferred by their behaviours over time. States in the ancient Greek world were no different in having enduring strategic objectives that flowed from their geopolitical circumstances: their geography, population, resources and neighbours. These objectives, which could persist over decades if not centuries, were overlaid with a state's desired responses to short-term threats and opportunities.

To achieve their strategic objectives, states could apply a range of measures to influence the attitudes and behaviours of other states. They could apply force to defeat enemies or help allies, use diplomacy and propaganda, or apply economic measures to achieve their desired goals. This thesis will focus on the latter category by examining the extent to which states in the ancient Greek world employed economic measures against other states. The thesis will examine the various forms of economic measures, both trade-based and capital-based, discuss their application to the ancient Greek world and analyse their use by various states over time. The analysis of individual applications will be drawn together to provide a variety of holistic perspectives. Overall, the thesis will demonstrate that during the late Archaic and Classical periods, a diverse range of economic measures were consistently applied by a variety of states to help achieve their desired political and economic outcomes. Although not as popular a means of influence as warfare, economic measures were a recognised and well-used part of a state's toolbox of potential responses to its strategic needs, opportunities, threats and challenges.

² For examples of the problems faced by neutral states, see Robert A. Bauslaugh, *The Concept of Neutrality in Classical Greece*, Berkeley, 1991.

³ For example, elements of Australia's foreign policy can be inferred from published documents such as the Foreign Policy White Paper 2017.

Literature Review

To define this thesis' scope and methodology, one first needs to situate the proposed research within the context of existing scholarship. To provide context, one should start broadly by reviewing the scholarship on interstate relationships, then narrowing to focus on the literature relevant to the use of economic measures by states against other states. Once this scholarship has been examined, the review can narrow its focus to the scholarship relevant to ancient Greek interstate relations, ancient economic matters and the use of economic measures to achieve an ancient state's objectives.

Interstate relations

Modern scholars have developed a mature appreciation of modern interstate relations, although no consensus exists on the language that best describes the relevant concepts and practices. Specialist dictionaries provide different definitions of such terms as 'statecraft', 'foreign policy', 'foreign relations' and 'diplomacy', with scholars defining such terms to suit their own purposes. For example, Baldwin usefully described 'statecraft' as the '... selection of means for the pursuit of foreign policy goals', whilst Barston considered diplomacy is '...concerned with the management of relations between states and between states and other actors'.⁴ Missiou-Ladi opined that diplomacy is the method by which a state seeks to attain its objectives in foreign policy.⁵ From a practitioner's perspective, the career British diplomat, Gore-Booth, considered '...that foreign policy is what you do and diplomacy is how you do it'.⁶

Despite these definitional challenges, the study of interstate relations has acquired the status of an academic discipline, with the available literature ranging from textbooks synthesising the entire sweep of relevant ideas to more specialised books, monographs and journal articles. Some specialist works focus on the schools of international statecraft, such as various Realist schools, the Constructionists and Institutionalists, the Liberals and the English School.⁷ Other writers specialise on matters such as international law, international trade and

⁴ David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, Princeton, 1985, p. 8 and R.F. Barston, *Modern Diplomacy*, London, 2006, p. 1.

⁵ Anna Missiou-Ladi, 'Coercive diplomacy in Greek interstate relations', *CQ*, 37, no. 2, 1987, p. 336.

⁶ Paul Gore-Booth, *With Great Truth and Respect*, London, 1974, p. 15.

⁷ For one commentary on the history of the discipline see Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations*, New York, 1955, p. 28ff.

capital flows, whilst others focused on interstate conflict or cooperative interstate arrangements such as the United Nations.

Economic statecraft

Narrowing the focus, there is neither a single unifying theory on the use of economic measures to influence other states nor consensus on the terms to describe their use. Some writers use the term ‘economic statecraft’ whilst others prefer ‘economic diplomacy’ or ‘commercial diplomacy’, with no agreement on their definitions.⁸ For example, debate continues on whether studies of statecraft and diplomacy should focus on the methods and process of decision-making or also consider policy content. But if this thesis uses the term ‘economic statecraft’ to describe how states use economic measures to influence other states, then one can confidently say the theory of economic statecraft is centuries old. The relationship between foreign policy goals and economic resources was discussed by Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Locke, Bacon, Montesquieu, Hume, Smith, Kant, Hamilton, List, John Stuart Mill, Woodrow Wilson, John Maynard Keynes and many others.

As one modern scholar of economic statecraft argued, a nation must draw on economic matters to both cooperate and compete with other states.⁹ Economic statecraft can both coerce other states and ensure their continued freedom from coercion by other states. Practitioners of economic statecraft recognise a state’s dependencies on, and vulnerabilities to, economic pressure or external support. On the other hand, a state that can tolerate external pressures can exert its own pressures, inducing or compelling other states to make decisions favourable to its vital interests.

Modern scholars have investigated several strands of economic statecraft relevant to this thesis. The first relevant strand is a state’s level of ‘stateness’, which considers, inter alia, its autonomy and legitimacy.¹⁰ The second strand is the ability of a state to target not just another state’s leaders, but to influence the attitudes of powerful domestic interest groups, who will, in turn, put pressure on their government. The next strand is the research into the extent a state’s government will be influenced by economic measures that do not directly

⁸ For example, economic statecraft has been defined as the ‘study of economics as an instrument of politics’. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, p. 3. For an explanation of economic diplomacy see Nicholas Bayne and Stephen Woolcock (eds.), *The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision-Making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations*, Farnham, 2011, p. 4ff.

⁹ Chas W. Freeman, *The Diplomat's Dictionary*, Washington, 1997, p. 45.

¹⁰ Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Norrin M. Ripsman, ‘A political theory of economic statecraft’, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 4, 2008, p. 371.

affect its strategic goals.¹¹ Equally relevant to this thesis is the study of the balance that occurs between the utility of economic statecraft and a state's geopolitical interests such as sovereignty, security and territorial integrity. Another relevant strand is the body of research which investigates the success of economic statecraft, especially sanctions, and the trade-offs a government takes between achieving its political objectives and any adverse effects on its own economy.¹² Finally, scholars have studied how economic statecraft can send political signals that isolate or weaken other states. Collectively, these research strands demonstrate how prudently targeted economic statecraft can influence foreign leaders to make specific changes, adopt desirable behaviors and attitudes, or refrain from objectionable behaviours.

Ancient interstate relations

If the scholarship on contemporary interstate relations and economic statecraft is comprehensive, scholarship into their application to the ancient Greek world is much less so. Such lack of attention is not new, since no ancient writer, historian or philosopher wrote thematically about how ancient states engaged with each other, their foreign policies and diplomatic techniques. Low accurately reflected the scholarly consensus by stating the '...classical Greeks had no particular interest in, still less anything of great importance to say about, the practice of relations between states.'¹³

Little evidence exists that states in the ancient Greek world had a firm notion of a system of international law amplifying or constraining interstate relations.¹⁴ The philosophers,

¹¹ For example, Blanchard paraphrased Pape's argument in stating 'economic sanctions are never truly successful because states are unwilling to trade important political objectives for mere economic considerations'. Blanchard and Ripsman, 'Economic statecraft', p. 375.

¹² There are at least three schools of thought in judging the success of economic statecraft: the 'economic liberals', the 'realists' and the 'conditionalists'. For a discussion of these schools see Blanchard and Ripsman, 'Economic statecraft', p. 373.

¹³ Polly Low, *Interstate Relations in Classical Greece: Morality and Power*, Cambridge, 2007, p. 2.

¹⁴ Nevertheless, there were socio-religious norms relevant to warfare such as the retrieval of bodies and some conventions when states arranged arbitrations to resolve interstate disputes. See David J. Bederman, *International Law in Antiquity*, Cambridge, 2001; Martin Wight, 'The states-system of Hellas', in *Diplomacy*, Christer Jonsson and Richard Langhorne (eds.), London, 2004, p. 60, D. Roebuck, *Ancient Greek Arbitration*, Oxford, 2001 and Adriaan Lanni, 'The Laws of War in Ancient Greece', *Law and History Review*, 26, no. 3, 2008, pp. 469-89. Further, Sheets argued more broadly that '... customary law, or rather a consciousness of it shaped policy decisions by the government of Greek states', see Sheets, George A. 'Conceptualizing International Law in Thucydides', *AJPh*, 15, no. 1, 1994, p. 70.

such as Plato and Aristotle, focused on internal matters, writing on what it meant to be a *πόλις* (polis, *πόλεις* - poleis (pl.)) and the nature of statehood. For example, in the *Republic*, *Laws* and other works, Plato explored the forms of states, their governments and the types of people within any society: those who work, those who protect and those who govern. Writing later, Aristotle, in the eight books of his *Politics*, considered various state constitutions and provided his views on the ideal state.¹⁵ He wrote little about interstate relations apart from a passage implying that citizens owning land on a state's frontiers may want to remain peaceful with their foreign neighbours.¹⁶

Given their focus on internal politics, neither Plato nor Aristotle discussed the characteristics of a state necessary to create foreign policies or make decisions aimed at influencing other states. For example, Wight correctly argued that only three pages of the 300 pages of Plato's *Republic* deals with international relations.¹⁷ Instead, both writers focused on the role of war as a means of influence. Aristotle pointed out war is a natural mode of acquisition whilst Plato, in his *Phaedo*, said all wars are undertaken for the acquisition of money.¹⁸ In the *Laws*, Plato, also has Clinias stating '...every state is, by a law of nature, engaged perpetually in an informal war with every other state'.¹⁹ Many states were not just proud of their military achievements during war but also critical of leaders and politicians who criticised war as an unworthy activity.²⁰

Ancient historians supported the views of Plato and Aristotle by demonstrating war's importance in achieving a state's objectives. The first recorded wars were in the eighth century, resulting from rivalries about fertile land.²¹ Wars as a form of interstate engagement remained endemic with Athens, for example, at war on average more than two out of every three years from the Persian Wars to Chaeronea, never being at peace for ten consecutive

¹⁵ Aristot. *Pol.* 1275a and 1277a.

¹⁶ Aristot. *Pol.* 7.1330a.

¹⁷ Wight, 'States-system', p. 60.

¹⁸ Aristot. *Pol.* 1256b1 (cf. *Oeconomicus*, 1343a) and Plat. *Phaedo* 66c. Despite Plato's assertion one can find examples of wars where at least one party was not primarily motivated by the potential for economic acquisition, such as Sparta in the Peloponnesian War.

¹⁹ Plat. *Laws* 1.626b as translated by R.G. Bury in Plato. *Laws*, Volume I: Books 1-6, Loeb Classical Library 187, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1926.

²⁰ For one commentary on this attitude, see D. Pritchard, *Public Spending and Democracy in Classical Athens*, Austin, 2015, pp. 117-9.

²¹ See discussion at Kurt A. Raaflaub, 'Politics and interstate relations in the world of early Greek poleis: Homer and beyond', *Antichthon*, 31, 1997, p. 23.

years.²² Nevertheless, ancient historians, primarily Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon, provided evidence of many other types of interstate activities, with Low correctly arguing Thucydides demonstrated knowledge of ‘... the practicalities of interstate interaction’.²³ Other scholars are sometimes less complimentary. For example, in her thesis on Macedonian foreign policy, Giuliodori rightly considered Xenophon ‘... gives almost no evidence at all regarding Macedonian foreign policy during this period’.²⁴

Turning to modern scholarship about ancient interstate relations, the starting point is the debate on whether ancient states were sufficiently sovereign to engage with other states.²⁵ Sovereignty remains a complicated concept, covering power relationships both internal to the state and with respect to other states. The focus of its application to this thesis is the degree of independent action possible by any state in dealing with other states. In summary, most scholars correctly consider that ancient states, at least in the Classical period, had sufficient sovereignty through centralised decision-making bodies that could control territory, exercise power over their people and apply physical violence where necessary.²⁶ These decision-making bodies ranged from the ἐκκλησία (*ekklesia*) and βουλή (*boule*) of ancient democracies through to monarchs and tyrants with absolute power and authority.²⁷ Moses Finley correctly noted that within states, these forms of ancient governments had ‘... infinite room for state intervention’ with no relevant legislative, religious or other constraints.²⁸

²² As summarised at Joseph Nicholas Jansen, ‘After Empire: Xenophon’s *Poroi* and the Reorientation of Athens’ Political Economy’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Texas, 2007 p. 279. Also see comments at Moshe Berent, ‘Anthropology and the classics: War, violence, and the stateless polis’, *CQ*, 50, no. 1, 2000, p. 257.

²³ Low, *Interstate Relations*, p. 224.

²⁴ Holly Giuliodori, ‘The foreign policy of Macedon c513 to 346 BC’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Glasgow, 2004, p. 17.

²⁵ Appendix Three outlines the debate about the sovereignty of ancient states.

²⁶ For one set of arguments about the link between the concept of a polis, autonomy and independence see Mogens Herman Hansen, ‘The autonomous city-state: Ancient fact or modern fiction?’, in *Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis*, Mogens Herman Hansen and Kurt Raaflaub (eds.), Stuttgart, 1995, p. 43.

²⁷ For the Athenian citizen bodies, see various sections spread throughout Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* For example, chapters 43-49 contain material relevant to the boule. An inscription, found in Chios, ascribed to a date about 600, refers to a Chian *boule*, apparently working alongside an aristocratic council. C. Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution to the end of the Fifth Century B.C.*, Oxford, 1952, p. 95. For one comment on the relative slowness of decision-making within democracies, see Dem. 19.185-86. In comparison, monarchs and tyrants could seek advice from, and be influenced by, ad hoc advisors or formal advisory bodies. For a discussion of the role of assemblies with Macedonia, see Julia Heskell, ‘The foreign policy of Philip II down to the Peace of Philocrates’, unpublished Ph.D thesis, Harvard, 1987, p. 12.

²⁸ M.I. Finley, *The Ancient Economy*, Berkeley, 1999, pp. 154-5.

Despite these centralised decision-making bodies, whether or not a particular state had sufficient sovereignty to apply economic statecraft depended on its strategic circumstances. A state was sufficiently sovereign unless its independence was constrained by its voluntary choice to enter a federation/league or was limited by a more powerful state. In reality, the degree of autonomy exercised by any ancient state in their interstate engagement was on a spectrum, with some states having more ability to make independent decisions than others. Whilst there were many states with unfettered decision-making, the Copenhagen Polis Centre identified hundreds of examples of what it termed ‘dependent *polis*’. Nevertheless, these states, politically dependent on other states, still had the ability to make decisions about influencing other states.²⁹

Putting the sovereignty debate to one side, many historians have written on the history of ancient interstate engagements, either as part of thematic histories or focused historical commentaries. But few scholars have focused their attention on the mechanisms and practices of interstate relations. Worthy of note are Adcock/Mosley writing on diplomacy, Low on interstate relations, Ager on interstate arbitration, Bauslaugh on state neutrality, Karavites on interstate morality, Missiou on interstate reciprocal generosity and Philipson on ancient international law.³⁰ The use of arbitration amongst states has also been effectively documented by modern writers such as Roebuck and Ager.³¹ Although these authors write in detail on their specific interests, overall little scholarship exists on the objectives of ancient Greek states, and how they influenced other states to help achieve these objectives.

²⁹ The Copenhagen Polis Centre's Inventory identified 1,035 poleis during the Archaic and Classical periods, not all of which existed at the same time. M. Hansen and T. Neilsen, *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis*, Oxford, 2004. Amongst these poleis it identified 14 types of dependent polis. Mogens Herman Hansen, 'A typology of dependent poleis', in *Yet More Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis*, Thomas Heine Nielsen (ed.), Stuttgart, 1997, p. 29. Note that some authors, such as Archibald, comment that the Inventory only recognises one model of polis, namely the 'Hellenic' model, which does not adequately describe other settlements such as the 29 settlements in ethnically mixed Sicily which were not Greek or Hellenised, see Z. Archibald, *Ancient Economies of the Northern Aegean: Fifth to First Centuries BC*, Oxford, 2013, p. 61.

³⁰ Frank Adcock and D.J. Mosley, *Diplomacy in Ancient Greece*, London, 1975; Low, *Interstate Relations*; Sheila Ager, *Interstate Arbitrations in the Greek World, 337-90 BC*, Berkeley, 1996; Bauslaugh, *Concept of Neutrality*; P. Karavites, 'Greek interstate relations and moral principles in the fifth-century BC', *PP*, 39, 1984; Anna Missiou, 'Reciprocal generosity in the foreign affairs of fifth-century Athens and Sparta', in *Reciprocity in Ancient Greece*, C. Gill et al. (eds.), Oxford, 1998; Coleman Phillipson, *The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, Volume 1 - Primary Source Edition*, London, 1911. Examples of other texts or articles on specific diplomatic matters include L. Loddo, 'Political exiles and their use of diplomacy in classical Greece', *Ktema*, 44, 2019 and S. Perlman, 'Greek diplomatic tradition and the Corinthian League of Philip of Macedon', *Historia*, 34, no. 2, 1985.

³¹ Roebuck, *Arbitration and Ager, Interstate Arbitrations*.

Ancient economics and economic statecraft

Focusing on economic statecraft as one form of interstate influence, ancient and modern scholarship remains scattered. No surviving ancient Greek literature specifically focused on state economies or the inter-relationships amongst them. Of course, whether such texts were written but subsequently lost is unknown. All that can be said is no surviving fragment indicates the prior existence of such texts on state economies. But one should not read too much into this absence. As Mattern argued, Rome, arguably a more economically advanced state, ‘... produced no theoretical or technical treatise on any aspect of economic or fiscal activity except agriculture.’³²

Instead, ancient Greek literature on economic matters relevant to interstate relations falls within two genres, with the first being those literary texts describing the economic decisions individuals make during their daily lives. This genre recognises that although the word ‘economics’ is Greek in origin, its meaning was originally limited to the running of the household. The first of these texts, Hesiod’s *Works and Days* described a farmer’s practical considerations in deciding whether to buy and operate a farm.³³ Hesiod stressed the importance of seaborne trade as a risky source of profit and wealth.³⁴

Later writers in the Classical Period, who commented on household economic management, included Eryxias, Arius Didymus, Callicratidas, Hierocles and Philodemus.³⁵ But the most important was Xenophon, who by the mid fourth century had written his major work focused on economic matters, the second dialogue of *Oeconomicus*, which employed the form of a Socratic dialogue to discuss household economics.³⁶ Whilst all these texts had a

³² Susan P. Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate*, Berkeley, 1999, p. 123.

³³ Leshem argued earlier texts by Xenocrates and Antisthenes have not survived, see Dotan Leshem, ‘The ancient art of economics’, *The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought*, 21, no. 2, 2014, pp. 204-5.

³⁴ Hes. *W&D*, lines 632 and 686.

³⁵ See discussion at Leshem, ‘Ancient art’, pp. 205-8. Note the later first century work by Bryson, came too late to inform politicians in the Classical period.

³⁶ For a discussion of Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus* in the context of his other works, see Figueira, Thomas J. ‘Economic thought and economic fact in the works of Xenophon’, in *Xenophon: Ethical Principle and Historical Enquiry*, Fiona Hobden and Christopher Tuplin (eds.), Leiden, 2012, pp. 665–87.

household focus, they discussed considerations applicable to a state's economic management.³⁷

The other genre of relevant economic literature were those texts, written by ancient philosophers and historians, which discussed the application of economic matters to internal state politics. Despite Michell's comments about philosophers not understanding economic theory, some insights can be gleaned.³⁸ For example, Plato's *Republic* reinforced the importance of self-sufficiency, whilst still recognising the need for foreign trade as a necessary evil. Plato considered 'It would be almost impossible to build the state itself in the sort of place where there is no call for imported goods'.³⁹ Later, in the *Laws*, he implied that an ideal state should be sited far from good harbours, since trade '... renders the city faithless and loveless, not to itself only, but to the rest of the world as well.'⁴⁰

Moving to Aristotle, Diogenes Laertius implied that he wrote a separate treatise on wealth but it has not survived.⁴¹ The first book of Aristotle's *Politics* contains sections on economic matters relevant to state politics.⁴² Like Plato, Aristotle considered *poleis* were created partly for reasons that would now be termed economic self-sufficiency, recognising the need for, and importance of, both imports and exports.⁴³ Based on Athenian practice,

³⁷ For a modern text which discusses the nexus between economics and household economics, see Moritz Hinsch *Ökonomik und Hauswirtschaft im Klassischen Griechenland*, Stuttgart, 2021. Hinsch analyses both the role and theory of the household in ancient Greek economies, as well as exploring how household economics affected the operation of markets.

³⁸ Michell argued, 'To read into the writings of the Greek philosophers a conception of economic theory which is recognisable to-day is a vain endeavour. Their thought was entirely dominated by ethical ideas; there was an absolute separation of the ideas of right and wrong in human conduct from that of economic advantage' and disadvantage.', see H. Michell, *The Economics of Ancient Greece*, Cambridge 1957, p. 34.

³⁹ Plato *Rep.* 2.370e as translated by Christopher Emlyn-Jones, William Preddy in the Plato. *Republic*, Volume I: Books 1-5, Loeb Classical Library 237, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2013. For further discussion of Plato's views on the economy, see Schofield, M. 'Plato on the economy' in M.H. Hansen (Ed.), *The Ancient Greek City-State: Symposium on the Occasion of the 250th Anniversary of the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, July, 1-4 1992*, 1993, reprinted in Schofield, M. *Saving the City: philosopher-kings and other classical paradigms*, London, Routledge, 1999, pp. 61-71.

⁴⁰ Plato *Laws* 4.705 as translated by R.G. Bury in Plato. *Laws*, Volume I: Books 1-6, Loeb Classical Library 187, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1926.

⁴¹ D.L. 5.12.

⁴² Noting Cartledge argued this work did not demonstrate any proper economic analysis. For a discussion on how Aristotle's theories supported Polanyi's view that the economy was embedded in societal constructs, see Karl Polanyi, 'Aristotle Discovers the Economy', in *Trade and Markets in the Early Empires: Economies in History and Theory*, Karl Polanyi et al. (eds.), Glencoe, Illinois, 1957.

⁴³ Aristot. *Pol.* 1.1252b and 6.1321b. For further discussion, see A. Bresson, 'Aristotle and Foreign Trade', in *The Ancient Greek Economy: Markets, Households and City-States*, Edward M. Harris, David M. Lewis and Mark Woolmer (eds.), Cambridge, 2016, pp. 41-65. Bresson argued that Aristotle considered foreign trade '... a clear and absolute necessity', p. 45.

Aristotle also argued for public officials to have defined roles in supervising the markets, overseeing contracts and ensuring good order.⁴⁴ He commented on the sources of state revenues, stating the most important revenue arises from the special products of the country.⁴⁵ Aristotle also considered a state's leaders must be proficient in some economic matters, namely understanding state revenues, imports and exports.⁴⁶ Specifically, he considered a leader needed to know when grain imports were required so he could decide whether to make trade-related agreements.⁴⁷

Like the philosophers, the ancient historians displayed some understanding of economic matters relevant to interstate relations. Herodotus' knowledge is hard to assess, since his economic references are scattered through his history, not revealing any informed understanding of their importance. In contrast, Thucydides, despite a focus on the political motives for events, revealed sufficient material to argue he understood economic activity and the importance of economic measures in dealings between states. Some examples are revealing. Early in his work he mentioned commerce, agriculture, capital and the importance of rich soils, also recognising the acquisition of wealth was a valid state objective.⁴⁸ Thucydides understood the concept of a commercial *emporion*, recognising that good land favoured enrichment of individuals, and the supply of capital and need for commerce drove location decisions and the need to create walled cities.⁴⁹ His portrayal of Pericles' speech demonstrated an awareness of the value of economic self-sufficiency, whilst other parts of his *History* indicated that states understood the basics of agricultural and trade practices such as the principle of comparative advantage.⁵⁰ For example, Sicilian states concentrated on grain exports to densely settled areas like Athens, whilst in contrast Athens and other states could focus on where they had a comparative advantage in products such as olives, wine and ceramics.⁵¹ Thucydides also demonstrated that an awareness that economic motives could drive a state's actions. In discussing the Athenian fleet sent to Sicily he commented that the

⁴⁴ Aristot. *Pol.* 6.1321b.

⁴⁵ Aristot. *Econ.* 2.1346a, recognising that this text is usually regarded as a pseudepigraph, possibly written by one of his students.

⁴⁶ The other important topics were war and peace, defense of the county and legislation, see Aristot. *Rh.* 1.4.4. For a discussion of the fiscal expertise required of Athenian leaders, see John Davies 'Athenian Fiscal Expertise and Its Influence', *MediterrAnt*, 7, 2004, pp. 491-512.

⁴⁷ Aristot. *Rh.* 1.4.11.

⁴⁸ Thuc. 1.13.1.

⁴⁹ Thuc. 1.13.5, 1.2.4, 1.7.1 and 1.8.3.

⁵⁰ For one example, see Thuc. 2.38.2.

⁵¹ As sensibly argued by Ian Morris, 'Economic growth in ancient Greece', *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 160, no. 4, 2004, p. 733. For further commentary on regional specialisations, see, for example, Bresson, *Making*, pp. 120-2 (grains), pp. 122-7 (wines), pp. 127-8 (olives) and pp. 190-4 (textiles).

motive for the expedition was to prevent the export of Sicilian corn to the Peloponnese.⁵² And, of course, he described a major example of the use of economic statecraft, that is the Megarian decree which will be analysed in Chapter Four.⁵³

In comparison, Xenophon's *Hellenika* provides only the occasional reference to economic matters, such as the importance of the grain supply to various states.⁵⁴ From this text one can also infer ancient leaders had an adequate understanding of taxation principles including tariffs on interstate trade.⁵⁵ Leaders also recognised the economic benefits of tribute and that bribery was an effective means of influencing persons from other states.⁵⁶ Further inferences can be drawn about the degree of economic understanding by ancient leaders from Xenophon's *Ways and Means*, in which he demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of state financial management and the realities of economic interdependence amongst states.⁵⁷ As Ober succinctly argued, Xenophon '...articulated relationship between open access, incentives for foreign traders and value of increased trade to state'.⁵⁸ He also demonstrated the Greeks understood how monetary circulation functioned, implying knowledge of supply and demand as it related to the relative values of gold and silver.⁵⁹ Importantly, and of direct relevance to this thesis, Xenophon recognised the importance of interstate trade, both to raise revenue through expanded harbour and market dues, and as an opportunity to create both peaceful relations and bonds of friendship between states.⁶⁰ He also understood the value of

⁵² Thuc. 3.86.4.

⁵³ Thuc. 1.139-44.

⁵⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.2 and 6.1.11.

⁵⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.22, 2.4.25 and 6.2.1.

⁵⁶ See Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.8-9 and 3.5.1.

⁵⁷ For example, in Xen. *Ways* 4.40 he stated 'On the other hand, if you think that the burdens imposed during the late war make it impossible for you to contribute anything at all - well, keep down the cost of administration during the next year to the amount that the taxes yielded before the peace; and invest the balances over and above that amount, which you will get with peace, with considerate treatment of resident aliens and merchants, with the growth of imports and exports due to concentration of a larger population, and with the expansion of harbour and market dues, so that the investment will bring in the largest revenue.', see translation by E. C. Marchant and G. W. Bowersock in *Xenophon. Hiero. Agesilaus. Constitution of the Lacedaemonians. Ways and Means. Cavalry Commander. Art of Horsemanship. On Hunting. Constitution of the Athenians*, Loeb Classical Library 183, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1925.

⁵⁸ Josiah Ober, *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece*, Princeton, 2015, p. 248.

⁵⁹ Xen. *Ways* 4.10. Nevertheless, little evidence exists to argue that politicians understood the need to keep an adequate volume of coins in circulation.

⁶⁰ See discussion at Jansen, 'After Empire' p. 236 n68 and p. 249 citing Xen. *Ways* 3.4, 5.1 and 6.1.

exporting bullion to pay for imported goods.⁶¹ Further, like Aristotle, Xenophon recognised that any aspiring politician had to understand the grain supply.⁶²

For a final comment on Xenophon's works, one can refer to a monograph by Figueira written in 2012.⁶³ Whilst he focused on critiquing Finley's commentary on Xenophon, Figueira argued that while Xenophon lacked 'a concept of the economy', he was sensitive to economic phenomena, understood the need for 'purposive, opportunistic decision-making' and was arguably the earliest 'extant management consultant'.⁶⁴

Epigraphic evidence does not markedly assist the drawing of inferences about the extent of economic understanding within ancient states. Apart from the monetary agreement between Mytilene and Phokai, which will be discussed in Chapter Six, no late Archaic or Classical inscriptions devoted themselves exclusively to interstate commercial agreements.

Nevertheless, interstate commercial relationships are sometimes found as commercial clauses within treaties or other interstate agreements, such as *συμμαχία* (*symmachia*) and *ισοπολιτεία* (*isopoliteia*). Examples of such commercial arrangements will be discussed in later chapters. Suffice to say that they indicate a degree of economic understanding consistent with what can be inferred from the ancient literature.

Within modern scholarship, no books or journal articles take a thematic approach to ancient economic statecraft. At best, the occasional relevant comment is provided in books or articles exploring economic histories or specific events of interstate engagement. Other comments can be found in books that whilst focused on modern economic statecraft, considered case studies from the ancient world.⁶⁵

Debates about the ancient economies

If there is little modern scholarship on ancient economic statecraft, more has been more written about the context for its application, that is economic matters in the ancient world. Such scholarship started with the 'oikos' debate in the nineteenth century, in which historians

⁶¹ See discussion at Jansen, 'After Empire' p. 4.

⁶² Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.13.

⁶³ Figueira, 'Economic thought and economic fact', pp. 665–87.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 683–4.

⁶⁵ Such as Baldwin's comments on the Megarian decree at Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, pp. 150–4.

like Rodbertus (1864-7) and Bücher (1893) argued that ancient economies were analogous to large household economies. Their arguments were refuted by contemporaries, such as Meyer (1895) and Beloch (1902) who considered ancient economies were smaller, immature forms of modern economies, focused on revenue-raising and the needs of their citizens as consumers.⁶⁶ The ‘oikos’ debate continued into the twentieth century, expanding its scope beyond the degree of sophistication of ancient economies (the ‘primitivist-modernist’ debate) to whether they had a separate existence to societal constructs (the ‘substantivist-formalist’ debate). Given substantivists were often primitivists and formalists were often modernists, some scholarship confusingly refers to a single substantivist/primitivist-formalist/modernist debate.

The substantivists, such as Polanyi and later Hasebroek, argued that ancient economies were a social construct fundamentally different from modern capitalist market economies, and thus cannot be validly compared or analysed using modern economic theories. Applying economic anthropology concepts, Polanyi diminished the role of markets, arguing that an ancient state’s economy was ‘embedded’ within a framework of socio-political institutions and networks, rather than being a separate sphere of activity.⁶⁷ Substantivists considered trade and other economic activity occurred for reasons distinct from pure profit-making, such as honour, status and state welfare. This substantivist approach placed non-market trade, and thus traders, to the edges of ancient society. Further, using Weber’s concept of a ‘consumer city’, substantivists posited that cities had little production and exchange and thus were a drain on a state’s resources.⁶⁸

Turning to the primitivist argument, Hasebroek considered agriculture formed the basis of Classical Greek economies, with no grounds for assuming trade and production interested

⁶⁶ For summaries of this early debate, see M. Austin and P. Vidal-Naquet, *Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece: An Introduction*, Berkeley, 1973, pp. 3-5 and Harry W. Pearson, 'The Secular Debate on Economic Primitivism', in *Trade and Markets in the Early Empires: Economies in History and Theory*, Karl Polanyi et al. (eds.), Glencoe, Illinois, 1957, pp. 3-11.

⁶⁷ See general discussion in Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, New York, 1944 and specific discussion of ancient Greece in Karl Polanyi, *The Livelihood of Man*, New York, 1977, pp. 145-272. Also see Karl Polanyi, 'The Economy as Instituted Process', in *Trade and Markets in the Early Empires: Economies in History and Theory*, Karl Polanyi et al. (eds.), Glencoe, Illinois, 1957. As Engen later argued, 'An economy is embedded when it is governed by mechanisms that are intertwined with other social and political relations. Such is the case for example, in an economy in which prices are arbitrarily fixed by governmental decree.' D. Engen, *Honor and Profit: Athenian Trade Policy and the Economy and Society of Greece, 415-307 B.C.E.*, Ann Arbor, 2010, p. 23.

⁶⁸ Max Weber, *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilisations*, London, 1976.

the citizen body.⁶⁹ For Hasebroek, ancient citizens were political men and Greek states never developed any economic or commercial policies.⁷⁰ He argued that states had no real interest in trade, it being merely one income source for the investment of their capital.⁷¹ Importantly, as it relates to this thesis, he considered economics and trade did not determine a state's foreign policy.⁷² He argued that the so-called commercial policy of ancient states focused simply on the supply of necessities, such as grain and timber, and with enriching their treasuries.⁷³

The substantivist and primitivist arguments were championed by Moses Finley in his seminal 1973 work *The Ancient Economy*, which was influenced by Weber's concepts in books like *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilisations*.⁷⁴ Finley's book generated a flurry of support and criticism, but as Morris argued, summing up Finley's views is difficult.⁷⁵ Applying socio-anthropological approaches to Weber's concepts, Finley considered that socio-political status, rather than wealth, was the main driver of ancient economies. That is, economic activity was subordinated to the pursuit of social status. Finley considered an ancient economy could not be studied in the ways modern economies are studied, given there were no price-setting markets, no concept of investment, no economic thought, no profit motive for its own sake and with economic policies being no more than the satisfaction of material wants.⁷⁶ Further, Finley controversially asserted that coinage had an almost incidental role in a state's financial management.⁷⁷

Collectively, Finley and the substantivists rejected the notion of a 'homo economicus' in the ancient world, namely a person who rationally chooses activities which most efficiently maximize profits. They argued that the domination of socio-political life suppressed any

⁶⁹ Johannes Hasebroek, *Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece*, New York, 1933, p. 96 and p. 100.

⁷⁰ Hasebroek, *Trade and Politics*, p. 30.

⁷¹ Hasebroek, *Trade and Politics*, p. 43 and p. 102.

⁷² Hasebroek, *Trade and Politics*, p. 100.

⁷³ Hasebroek, *Trade and Politics*, p. vii and p. 102. Austin and Vidal-Naquet, *Economic and Social History* pp. 113-16. For example, in arranging large scale corn imports, Athens did not appear concerned about their effect on Attic corn producers.

⁷⁴ Finley, *Ancient Economy*. Note that Weber's book was originally published in German in 1897.

⁷⁵ The Morris foreword to Finley, *Ancient Economy*, p. xix.

⁷⁶ Ian Morris, 'The Athenian economy twenty years after the Ancient Economy', *CPh*, 89, no. 4, 1994, p. 352. Finley, *Ancient Economy*, p. 160.

⁷⁷ A comment at Kenneth A. Sheedy, *The Archaic and Early Classical Coinages of the Cyclades*, London, 2006, p. 5, analysing Finley's commentary at Finley, *Ancient Economy*, pp. 166-9 and pp. 196-7.

ability for ancient peoples to rationally make economic decisions. Instead, they posited a ‘homo politicus’, who sought to maximise his socio-political status.⁷⁸

Whilst many elements of Finley’s argument have widespread acceptance, other writers have taken task with some of its elements, considering them too general, oversimplified and dismissive of epigraphic, numismatic and archaeological evidence. For example, historians from the late 1980s sometimes used archeological evidence to document examples of market-based economic activity that were much greater than argued by Finley.⁷⁹ The alternative formalist position, championed by such scholars as Rostovtzeff, Starr, and Hopper, argued that the economies of ancient Greek states were a functionally segregated sphere of activity with a profit-maximizing, want-satisfying rationality. They were less developed than modern economies, but only differed in degree of scale, with sufficient sophistication to allow their analysis by modern market-based economic theories. A substantivist would say, for example, that the fourth-century Peiraieus’ emporium was clearly rational, profit-maximizing and disembedded from societal constraints.⁸⁰ As Engen rightly argued, seeking profits through trade existed then as it does now and, vice versa, trade for non-profit motives occurs now as it did in the ancient Greek world.⁸¹

Regardless of the criticism, most post-1973 scholars recognised they could not ignore Finley’s ideas in shaping their contribution to the ongoing debate. Thus, many scholars did not argue against the importance of political power and social status, but were more positive about the degree of rational, income-maximising economic activity that took place within Finley’s framework. Further, writers such as Millett, Garnsey and Möller attempted to reconcile Finley’s arguments about the importance of status in economics with the modernist approach. This modernist approach highlighted evidence of functioning markets similar to modern economies and the intentional creation of conditions that promoted economic activity, such as banking, credit arrangements and an economic legal framework.

Most contemporary historians are no longer motivated by debates about whether ancient economies were ‘primitive’ or ‘modern’, ‘substantive’ or ‘formal’. Many consider the debates

⁷⁸ See discussion at Paul Christesen, ‘Economic rationalism in fourth-century BCE Athens’, *G&R*, 50, no. 1, 2003, p. 31 and p. 35.

⁷⁹ For example, the works of Greene, Harris, Mattingly and Salmon cited at Michael E. Smith, ‘The archaeology of ancient state economies’, *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 33, 2004, p. 75.

⁸⁰ Paul Cartledge, ‘The economy (economics) of ancient Greece’, in *The Ancient Economy*, W. Scheidel and S. von Reden (eds.), Edinburgh, 2002, p. 26.

⁸¹ Engen, *Honor and Profit*, p. 36.

to have been long, bitter, an obstacle to inspiration and ultimately fruitless.⁸² Thus, much twentieth-century historical and economic scholarship is more varied in its form and content, applying developing concepts like new institutional economics, behavioural economics and game theory.⁸³ Relevant scholarship that has brought about a post-Finley shift has been written in many languages and scattered across multiple books, journals, conference proceedings, monographs and archaeological reports.⁸⁴ Major post-Finleyan scholarship by, in particular, Alain Bresson and J.K. Davies, was supplemented by the works of Graham Oliver, Zosia Archibald, Vincent Gabrielsen, Edward Harris and several others. This new scholarship continues with Josiah Ober accurately describing a twenty-first century renaissance in the study of ancient Greek economic history.⁸⁵

Scholarship on matters relevant to this thesis range from general economic histories such as the *Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World*, to specialist economic books of which three excellent examples are Austin/Vidal-Naquet's *Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece: An Introduction*, Meiggs' *Trees and Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean World* and Manning's *The Open Sea*. Rounding out the scholarship is a plethora of articles in specialist journals by authors such as Brunt, MacDonald, Morris, Psoma and Michael Smith.⁸⁶ These articles cover matters as diverse as the Megarian decree, the strategic importance of timber, economic growth, economic archaeology and the minting of coins. The latter numismatic studies comprise hoard studies, state-based analyses and other studies that have considered coin circulation, as well as coinage's effects on politics, trade and other forms of economic behaviour.

No longer focused on previous substantivist/primitivist - formalist/modernist debates, modern scholars have debated diverse economic matters. However, like the modern scholarship on interstate relations, these debates on ancient economies are only partly relevant

⁸² J.G. Manning, *The Open Sea: The Economic Life of the Ancient Mediterranean World from the Iron Age to the Rise of Rome*, Princeton, 2018, p. 21.

⁸³ For example, Manning posits *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World* uses New Institutional Economics as its organising principle, see Manning, *Open Sea*, p. 29.

⁸⁴ Manning, *Open Sea*, p. 60.

⁸⁵ Ober, *Rise and Fall*, p. 5.

⁸⁶ P.A. Brunt, 'The Megarian decree', *AJPh*, 72, no. 3, 1951, pp. 269-282; Brian R. MacDonald, 'The Phanosthenes decree taxes and timber in late fifth-century Athens', *Hesperia*, 50, no. 2, 1981, pp. 141-46; Morris, 'Economic growth', pp. 709-42; Smith, 'Archaeology'; Selene E. Psoma, 'Choosing and changing monetary standards in the Greek world during the archaic and classical periods', in *The Ancient Greek Economy, Markets, Households and City-States*, E. Harris et al. (eds.), New York, 2016, pp. 90-115; Smith, 'Archaeology'.

to this thesis. Given no constraints on how states could intervene, any decision by states not to do so must either have resulted from inadequate knowledge of economic management or a deep-seated reluctance to intervene. Such reasons would equally apply to the ability of states to apply economic statecraft against other states.

With respect to the potential lack of economic knowledge, Finley argued that there was ‘... enough empirical knowledge, without generalised concepts and theories, for ad hoc decisions in one or another situation’.⁸⁷ With respect to a state’s attitudes towards economic matters, a perceived lack of interest in managing a state’s internal economy, as first argued by Hasebroek, does not imply a concurrent lack of interest in using economic statecraft against other states.⁸⁸ That is, a state does not require an internally focussed trade policy to realise the efficacy of applying economic statecraft. Similarly, a state’s leaders might not attempt to manage, or intervene in, its own economy, but could still use economic statecraft to achieve its desired outcomes. Of course, if a state’s leaders had no discernible interest in their internal economy, then it would be difficult to argue they would employ economic statecraft to achieve economic objectives. But one could still argue that they employed economic statecraft to achieve desired political objectives.

Continuing this line of argument, no scholar has assessed the likelihood of a state having policies to deal economically with other states if it had no internal economic policies. Other lines of relevant questioning which have not been pursued are: To what extent does an economy need to be developed in order to be a suitable target for economic statecraft by other states? What forms of governments, in terms of their authority and decision-making processes, allowed states to make decisions about their interests, how to manage those interests and how to apply economic statecraft against other states? Does the form need to be sophisticated, consistent and well founded?

Bringing together the threads of this literature review and situating the thesis within relevant modern scholarship exposes the paucity of relevant research into ancient interstate economic relations. No modern scholar has thematically studied, in any depth, the use of economic statecraft by ancient states in the Greek world when engaging with other states.

⁸⁷ Finley, *Ancient Economy*, p. 155.

⁸⁸ See the counter view at Engen, *Honor and Profit*, p. 22, who argued the states’ ‘...only interest in trade was political and consumptive, namely, to ensure the import of necessary goods for the citizenry and to obtain revenue from taxes on trade, neither of which served the productive interests of traders’.

Such a thematic study would help to provide completeness to current scholarship and provide rationales for some types of ancient interstate engagement. Understanding how states applied economic statecraft helps to illuminate how they competed and cooperated with each other.

Despite the paucity of relevant research, modern scholarship has provided material that will influence and shape the thesis; the language used, concepts applied and debates interpreted. The scholarship contributes to better-focused research questions, allows the research methodology to be designed and creates a framework within which the results can be analysed.

Methodological Challenges

If this literature review has identified a valid need for further research, what then are the methodological challenges? Four such challenges are worth discussing. First, evidence about economic activity and economic relations amongst ancient states remains scarce. Second, how to make effective use of this scarce evidence, in particular as it relates to the intent of states. Next, having to deal with the Athenocentricity of the collective evidence. Fourth and finally, how to resolve the problems in applying modern economic and political concepts to ancient societies. Each of these methodological challenges will be discussed in turn, to determine how the research in this thesis should be shaped or constrained.

Challenge 1 – Obtaining sufficient evidence about ancient interstate relations

Literary, epigraphic, numismatic and archaeological evidence collectively reveals the type and frequency of ancient Greek interstate relations. Interpreting each of these types of evidence has its own challenges, some of which are common to any research while others are more relevant to this thesis. Collectively, the challenge is that for some events no evidence may exist to corroborate or contest both their historicity and relevance. For a few of these events the uncertainties may be so great as to prevent meaningful speculation.

Literary evidence

A search of the Perseus Digital Library revealed about 1900 literary references to ancient Greek alliances, treaties, decrees and other forms of interstate engagement. But few of

these would be relevant to the research questions given most ancient writers were unskilled or uninterested in understanding economic matters. The historical accounts by Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Diodorus, Polybius and writers whose works have only survived as ‘fragments’, did not stress economic actions and the motives for them.⁸⁹ The search also revealed gaps in other forms of literary evidence, such as the complete absence of any fifth-century mercantile speeches that could inform an understanding of interstate trade. Whilst such speeches exist for the fourth century, this later century lacked the complete plays of writers like Aristophanes, which provided a comedic perspective on some late fifth-century and early fourth-century economic matters.⁹⁰ Nevertheless, fragmentary comedic sources often provided information on the economy.⁹¹

What literary evidence exists provides the usual challenges including understanding the extent to which the author’s motives compromise the evidentiary value. Further, the value may be compromised by the way authors gathered information, especially when they did not write contemporaneously with the described events or needed to rely on earlier writers.⁹² Further, of particular concern for this thesis is that much evidence of relevant fourth-century matters, especially interstate bribery, comes from Athenian legal speeches, which were never intended to be objective, but rhetorically designed to further the orator’s goals. Similarly, philosophical texts on economic matters often indicate not what happened, but the writer’s perspective of how things should happen.

A writer’s silence on a specific relevant matter, in an otherwise comprehensive account, can also be problematic. One needs to be careful in arguing from silence, since there may be so many potential reasons why any writer failed to mention specific events. For example, Thucydides’ lack of comments on some key economic matters, such as the major tribute

⁸⁹ For example, Thucydides only occasionally mentions economic matters such as the commentary at Thuc. 1.13.5 about Corinth’s commercial advantages.

⁹⁰ Although as Brunt accurately opined ‘It is doubtful how far sober history can ever be reconstructed from the jests of comedy.’ Brunt, ‘Megarian decree’, p. 273. Nevertheless, as Taylor rightly argued ‘... in order to be a successful comic poet, the accusations must have had at least some basis in reality, otherwise the Athenian audience would have not found it funny, indeed they would not have had a clue what he was talking about’, see Claire Taylor, ‘Bribery in Athenian Politics Part I: Accusations, Allegations, and Slander’, *G&R*, 48, no. 1, 2001, p. 55.

⁹¹ For one collection of such fragments, see John Maxwell Edmonds, *The Fragments of Attic Comedy: After Meineke, Bergk, and Kock*, Leiden, 1957.

⁹² For example, one needs to be especially careful in considering the works of Plutarch, Pausanias and Diodorus as authoritative. Diodorus’ value depends on the extent to which he relied on authoritative texts such as the Oxyrhynchus Historian. Of relevance is Nissen’s Law about historians who focus on a single source, discussed at Luke Pitcher, *Writing Ancient History: An Introduction to Classical Historiography*, London, 2009, pp. 72-8.

reassessment in 425, requires attention.⁹³

Epigraphic evidence

Epigraphy, comprising treaties, decrees and other inscriptions, remains critical to the study of ancient interstate relations.⁹⁴ Between 300-400 ancient Greek treaties are mentioned in various literary sources.⁹⁵ Of these, Bengtson's 1962 epigraphic corpora *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums* records only 78 inscribed treaties from 700 to 338, comprising 58 Athenian and 20 non-Athenian treaties.⁹⁶ Other inscriptions relevant to this thesis exist within a wide range of epigraphic corpora, such as *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum* (SIG), *Inscriptiones Graecae* (IG) and *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* (SEG).⁹⁷ Many of these corpora are available online through, for example, Attic Inscriptions Online (AIO), the Packard Humanities Institute and the SEG online database.

Several modern scholars have written on the challenges of using epigraphy, most of which apply to all research projects.⁹⁸ These challenges include interpreting inscriptions with missing or worn segments, interpreting epigraphic fragments, deciding between equally possible alternative translations, determining their objectivity and reading too much from gaps in readable inscriptions.⁹⁹ Dating can also be problematic, especially when relying on officials with common names or alphabet character forms, as evidenced by the ongoing

⁹³ Thucydides' failure to mention the tribute reassessment is discussed in Chapter Five. Kallet-Marx challenged the consensus criticism of Thucydides' failure to mention the tribute reassessment of 425 in Lisa Kallet-Marx, *Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides' History 1-5.24*, Berkeley, 1993, pp. 164-70.

⁹⁴ The French epigraphist Louis Robert (1904–85) described inscriptions as the ancient historian's '... fountain of youth', see Louis Robert, *Die Epigraphik der klassischen Welt*, Bonn, 1970, p. 21.

⁹⁵ The lack of *stelai* for literary-referenced treaties, such as the Peace of Nicias and the Thirty Years' Peace, is also problematic. But treaties in stone being taken down if their terms were broken may explain why no copies now exist for failed treaties. Other summaries of inscribed treaties for specific periods include that provided by Lambert at S. Lambert, 'Inscribed treaties ca. 350-321: An epigraphical perspective on Athenian foreign policy', in *Studies in Greek Epigraphy and History in Honor of Stephen V. Tracy*, G. Reger et al. (eds.), Paris, 2010. The existence of other treaties can be inferred from random comments spread throughout ancient literature.

⁹⁶ Sarah Bolmarcich, 'The afterlife of a treaty', *CQ*, 57, no. 2, 2007, p. 487.

⁹⁷ New editions of IG are published irregularly, so SEG publishes annual updates of new finds and scholarly work on existing inscriptions.

⁹⁸ For example, the well-known text: A.G. Woodhead, *The Study of Greek Inscriptions*, Cambridge, 1959.

⁹⁹ Which is widely known as creating 'history from square brackets', a term coined by Badian. John Bodel (ed.), *Epigraphic Evidence: Ancient History from Inscriptions*, London, 2001, p. 52. For an example of a difficult inscription, IG II² 219 concerns Athenian honours c345/4, to Elaious in the Chersonese, a member of the Second Athenian League. But one cannot determine the rationale for any honours and their form. See Lambert, 'Inscribed Treaties', p. 157.

debate on when ‘4 barred *sigmas*’ were introduced into Attic epigraphy.¹⁰⁰ Complicating matters, forged *στῆλαι* (*stelai*) may confuse an understanding of interstate relations.¹⁰¹

Directly relevant to this thesis are more specific epigraphic challenges, the first being that epigraphy relevant to important economic matters is scarce. Unfortunately, many economic records such as customs accounts and tax records were considered not worthy of long-term retention and thus were usually recorded on perishable materials such as wooden boards. With regard to the minting of coins, only a few important epigraphic examples exist, primarily confined to Athens.¹⁰²

Next, the challenge remains of understanding what messages the person who commissioned inscribed treaties wanted to send to the ancient reader. Finally, interpreting vague inscriptions remains challenging. For example, one potentially useful source of epigraphic evidence about interstate relations is the wide variety of honorific decrees concerning foreigners. However, at least for Athenian decrees, most inscriptions vaguely described the reason for the honour. Vague examples include: ‘... well disposed towards the Athenian People’ (*IG II³ 1 322*) and ‘displays his good will towards the Athenians’ (*IG II² 1 343*). Further, some *stelai* can be vague or indeed silent on important agreements between states. For example, when Athens allied with the Thracian, Paionian and Illyrian kings, the *stelai* referred to agreed terms without stating the terms.¹⁰³

Numismatic evidence

Numismatic evidence has a special importance given the thesis’ focus on economic statecraft. Most numismatic evidence results not from controlled excavations but from the chance discovery of hoards buried in antiquity for any number of reasons.¹⁰⁴ Discovered hoards have been analysed by numismatic scholars to form conclusions about minting practice, the circulation of coins within and amongst specific states, and the intent of states in

¹⁰⁰ As Lambert argued, it is no longer considered the three-barred sigma disappeared from about 450, see S. Lambert, ‘Two Inscribed Documents of the Athenian Empire: The Chalkis Decree and the Tribute Reassessment Decree’, 2017, www.atticinscriptions.com, p. 8.

¹⁰¹ Even Herodotus knew inscriptions could be forged., see Hdt. 1.51.3-4.

¹⁰² Important Athenian examples include Nikophon’s law on silver coinage (375/4) and the recently published law of Ephialtes (354/3), both discussed later in this thesis.

¹⁰³ *IG II² 127* (*SG³ 96*, Tod 157).

¹⁰⁴ Peter Gerritt van Alfen, ‘Pant’agatha: Commodities in Levantine-Aegean Trade During the Persian Period, 6-4 th c. B.C.’, unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Texas, 2002, p. 29.

minting specific coins types. Some well-known tomes provide hoard contents, such as the *Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards*, supplemented by multiple hoard-specific journal articles.¹⁰⁵

Several scholars warn about the difficulty in using numismatic evidence, especially since few mints have been comprehensively studied. For example, Van der Spek usefully explained the care needed in using coin hoards to identify trade, at times when coins primarily circulated to pay mercenary troops.¹⁰⁶ Allocating coins to specific types and weight standards requires care as does trying to date coins exactly.¹⁰⁷ More importantly, although one can specify the size, material and design of minted coins, the coins themselves provide no direct evidence of why minting states chose coin sizes, materials and designs.¹⁰⁸ Consequently, coins remain a valuable form of evidence although great care must be taken in using numismatic evidence to justify or refute any developed hypotheses.¹⁰⁹

Archaeological evidence

Archaeological evidence, from accidental finds or deliberate excavations, comprises both humanly made or modified portable objects (artifacts) and organic/environmental remains (ecofacts).¹¹⁰ Like other forms of evidence, interpretations based on archaeological finds can be open to debate, but, as Morris argued, are defensible when one applies defined rules, uses empirical testing, and does not claim chronological precision.¹¹¹ In analysing both artifacts and ecofacts, the most common challenge is the treatment of ‘silences’, that is the lack of archaeological findings. Care must be taken only to use such silences as evidence if they result from detailed investigation.¹¹²

¹⁰⁵ Margaret Thompson *et al.* (eds.), *An Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards*, New York, 1973.

¹⁰⁶ Noting the comment made in relation to the Hellenistic period, applies equally to previous periods. Walter Scheidel *et al.* (eds.), *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World*, Cambridge, MA., 2007; Robartus J. Van Der Spek, 'The Hellenistic Near East', in *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World*, Walter Scheidel *et al.* (eds.), Cambridge, 2007, p. 423.

¹⁰⁷ Coin types are subjectively inferred from found specimens. For one example, Davis/Sheedy argued several coins allegedly minted by Miltiades on the Attic-Euboic standard were actually based on the Persian standard. Gillan Davis and Kenneth Sheedy, 'Miltiades II and his alleged mint in the Chersonesos', *Historia*, 68, no. 1, 2019.

¹⁰⁸ For example, in Athens both the council (βουλή – boule) and assembly (ἐκκλησία - ekklesia) had a role in minting decisions, see P. van Alfen, 'Hatching Owls: The Regulation of Coin Production in Later Fifth-Century Athens', *Quantifying Monetary Supplies in Greco-Roman Times*, 2011, p. 134. No relevant decrees exist except for the two Coinage decrees discussed in Chapter Six.

¹⁰⁹ For one book, explaining how to use coins as sources for the Athenian empire, see Lisa Kallet and John H. Kroll, *The Athenian Empire: Using Coins as Sources*, Cambridge, 2020.

¹¹⁰ Colin Renfrew and Paul Bahn, *Archaeology: Theories, Methods and Practice*, London, 2012, p. 49.

¹¹¹ Morris, 'Economic growth', p. 714.

¹¹² Robin Osborne, 'Archaeology and the Athenian empire', *TAPhA*, 129, 1999, p. 321.

Further, archaeological evidence is not always useful for understanding trade, since it usually only identifies final destinations rather than tracing transportation routes.¹¹³ Nevertheless, some site-specific agriculture, mining and smelting evidence may have evidentiary value to relevant matters in this thesis. Of concern is that archaeological evidence is unlikely to throw direct light on the use of economic statecraft and the motivations of states. The availability of economic resources, as revealed by archaeology, does not automatically result in their use in economic statecraft.

Challenge 2 - Athenocentricity

This thesis will require care when generalising from the Athenocentricity of relevant evidence, given that almost all such evidence either concerns Athenian diplomatic/economic activity or activity directly connected to Athens. For example, more than 20,000 Attic inscriptions on stone exist, created by public bodies and individuals. They were produced continuously from late Archaic times, dwarfing the number of inscriptions from other states.¹¹⁴ In contrast, some states of interest did not often inscribe decrees and treaties. For example, only one Macedonian federal decree survives on a *stèle*.¹¹⁵

Further, evidence relevant to other states is often reported by Athenian writers or epigraphic scribes. As Low perceptively commented, ‘It is possible to hear the voices of the allies... but they are audible only as reported by the Athenians’.¹¹⁶ Thus, for example, evidence about states providing grain as a form of economic statecraft is usually sourced from speeches delivered in Athenian courts. The only information provided is that which the speechwriter considered relevant to the orator’s argument. Similarly, most of the evidence about Macedonia’s use of its timber supply, as a form of economic statecraft, is written from

¹¹³ Charikleia Papageorgiadou and Eleni Gkadolou, ‘Archaic coin hoards and maritime connectivity in the Eastern Mediterranean’, in *Port Cities of the Aegean World: Coins, Seals and Weights*, Ceren Unal et al. (eds.), Manisa, 2018, p. 268. Note that more complete information on trade routes may be obtained from the analysis of transport amphoras, see Tania Panagou ‘Patterns of Amphora Stamp Distribution: Tracking Down Export Tendencies’, in *The Ancient Greek Economy: Markets, Households and City-States*, Edward M. Harris, David M. Lewis and Mark Woolmer (eds.), Cambridge, 2016, pp. 207-29; Chavdar Tzochev ‘Markets, Amphora Trade and Wine Industry: The Case of Thasos’, in *The Ancient Greek Economy: Markets, Households and City-States*, Edward M. Harris, David M. Lewis and Mark Woolmer (eds.), Cambridge, Press, 2016, pp. 230-53 and Mark L. Lawall, ‘Transport Amphoras, Markets, and Changing Practices in the Economies of Greece, Sixth to First Centuries BCE’, in *The Ancient Greek Economy: Markets, Households and City-States*, Edward M. Harris, David M. Lewis and Mark Woolmer (eds.), Cambridge, 2016, pp. 254-76.

¹¹⁴ S.D. Lambert, ‘Attic epigraphy’, in *Oxford Handbook of Greek Epigraphy*, N. Papazarkadas (ed.), Oxford, 2016, p. 1.

¹¹⁵ M.B. Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions Under the Kings I: A Historical and Epigraphic Study*, Paris, 1996, p.367. The counter argument that such inscriptions did not survive or have not been found is discounted.

¹¹⁶ Low, *Interstate Relations*, p. 250.

the perspective of Athens' efforts to secure access to, or control, Macedonian timber.

Athenocentricity is not always a negative when there is no direct evidence for other states. As Borza highlighted, Athens can sometimes act as a model for understanding other states' behaviours with similar economic needs.¹¹⁷ Thus, although inferring other states' perspectives remains problematic, analogies drawn from Athenian perspectives can sometimes illuminate.¹¹⁸

Challenge 3 – Making effective use of scarce evidence

Given the scarcity and Athenocentricity of relevant evidence, the next challenge is ensuring it is used effectively. As Glotz opined almost a century ago, 'In ancient history there is no quantitative truth, or very little'.¹¹⁹ Therefore, giving appropriate weight to contradictory or inconsistent evidence will be critical. This thesis will need to push the evidence without being speculative and avoid the 'positivist fallacy', according to which the importance of a class of evidence in antiquity is correlated with how much survives.¹²⁰ Where a quantitative analysis is provided, the thesis will recognise that if more examples appear, the numbers will change.

This thesis will also need to weigh the evidentiary value of literary, epigraphic, numismatic and archaeological material, collectively offering a range of perspectives of varying historicity. One cannot generalise about their evidentiary weights since they will vary according to the issue under analysis. Importantly, following Lambert's lead, this thesis recognises the need to shift from the traditional attitude of treating *stelai* as simply a means of filling in details in the literary record, towards realising their distinctive historical perspective.¹²¹ For many of the research questions in this thesis the shift must occur given how little relevant evidence exists in literary sources. One cannot create defensible

¹¹⁷ Eugene N. Borza, 'Timber and politics in the ancient world: Macedon and the Greeks', *PAPhS*, 131, no. 1, 1987, p. 32.

¹¹⁸ For example, Hopper argued that 'Despite the fact that the economic concerns of Athens are central to the theme of this book, a variety of details are known relating to other Greek states, which seem to show that their preoccupations were the same as those of the Athenian State.' R. Hopper, *Trade and Industry in Classical Greece*, London, 1979, p. 9.

¹¹⁹ Gustave Glotz, *Ancient Greece at Work: An Economic History of Greece: From the Homeric Period to the Roman Conquest*, London, 1926, p. 2.

¹²⁰ As discussed in Paul Cartledge, 'Trade and Politics' revisited: Archaic Greece', in *Trade in the Ancient Economy*, P. Garnsey et al. (eds.), London, 1983, p. 12.

¹²¹ Lambert, 'Attic epigraphy', p. 13.

hypotheses about the use of economic statecraft simply from ancient literature.

The 'intent' of states

One final matter is how to assess the intent of states in their desire to influence other states. For if an intent to influence cannot be defensibly inferred, then the engagement was not a form of economic statecraft. Evidence about intent will almost inevitably be missing, since epigraphic evidence does not usually explain the rationale for a treaty, alliance or decree. Similarly, numismatic and archaeological evidence remain silent on what motivated ancient states. Even though no ancient writer described the foreign policies of ancient states, literary evidence offers some glimpses and insights. For example, using Thucydides' description of the *pentekontaetia* one could infer some characteristics of Spartan foreign policy.¹²²

Given this lack of direct evidence, one must infer a state's intent. Where a state provides monies or other benefits, with no direct economic value to the initiating state, an intent to influence can defensibly be inferred. More difficult are those engagements in which a state obtains monies from another state, such as through tariffs or tribute. Given these forms of engagement directly raise revenue for the initiating state, it is more difficult to argue that the states also intended to influence the targeted state's attitudes and behaviours. Complicating matters is Finley's useful distinction between 'economic policy' and 'unintended economic consequences'.¹²³ That is, sometime states economically benefitted from decisions without ever having sufficient understanding that desirable economic outcomes would result from their actions. They may have had no conscious policy to achieve specific economic outcomes and thus were pleasantly surprised when such outcomes occurred.

In response to these difficulties, this thesis applies Baldwin's logic, who usefully argued:

*'A reasonable way to proceed is to ask what the usual effects of a technique are, whether there is reason to suspect that policy makers are aware, at least in a general way of these effects, and whether such effects are intended.'*¹²⁴

¹²² Including the specific comment about Spartan foreign policy at Thuc. 1.19.

¹²³ Finley, *Ancient Economy*, p. 55 and p. 164.

¹²⁴ Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, p. 49.

That is, if evidence exists for the use of economic statecraft and one could argue states recognised the effects of such statecraft, then *prima facie* economic statecraft occurred.

Where intent can be inferred, this thesis will be careful in assigning a single motive to a state's actions, given multiple motives may be relevant. Care will also be taken in drawing conclusions about a states' propensity to use economic statecraft from a single or few activities. As Giuliadori commented, just because something was done once does not mean it was done often, because unique circumstances may have driven a state to act in a way it normally would not consider.¹²⁵ Informed conjecture will only be used to the extent necessary to explain evidence.

Challenge 4 - Applying modern terms and concepts

Discussing economic statecraft in ancient interstate relations cannot avoid the use of some modern diplomatic/economic terms and concepts, but their relevance and application may sometimes be problematic. As Weber commented, scholars need to be sensitive to language used in '... analyzing economic institutions of the premodern world'.¹²⁶ In the same vein, several scholars, such as Cartledge, adopted the useful linguistic term 'observer concepts', previously applied in anthropology, to describe concepts applied to ancient economics from modern economics.¹²⁷ Given economics is a modern subject with recently created terms and concepts, it is not surprising the ancient Greeks had no words for a variety of abstract economic concepts.¹²⁸ Thus in considering what terms to use, as Morley rightly argued, 'The problem is that there is no truly neutral, non-anachronistic terminology which we could use instead; even if we use the ancients' own terms, we have to translate them and understand them in terms of our own experiences and knowledge.'¹²⁹

Consequently, this thesis will take care in making hypotheses using terms, concepts and arguments sourced from modern literature. Available Greek terms remain useful, noting many words are notoriously polysemic, as well as undergoing diachronic development, with ongoing discussion about their nuanced meanings. For example, a debate continues about the

¹²⁵ Giuliadori, *'Foreign policy of Macedon'* p. 2.

¹²⁶ Manning, *Open Sea*, p. 5.

¹²⁷ Paul Cartledge *et al.* (eds.), *Money, Labour and Land: Approaches to the Economies of Ancient Greece*, London, 2002, p. xviii.

¹²⁸ For example, as von Reden argued, the ancient Greeks had no word precisely matching the word 'money'. Sitta von Reden, *Money in Classical Antiquity* Cambridge, 2010, p. 6.

¹²⁹ Neville Morley, 'Economic and social history', in *A Companion to Ancient History*, A. Erskine (ed.), Malden, 2009, p. 118.

meaning of the term ἔλλιμενιον (*ellimenion*) where differing contexts can suggest alternative meanings as either a harbour due or custom duty.¹³⁰

Where Greek terms do not exist, the thesis will apply a carefully selected set of observer terms. The key observer concepts to be used are ‘economic statecraft’ and ‘economic measure’, neither of which have any equivalent terms in ancient sources. This thesis will also need to take care in applying modern arguments to analyse relationships amongst ancient states. For example, current scholarship that personal friendships do not markedly influence international agreements may be inappropriate to the ancient Greek world, where influential friendships could transcend political divisions and geographical boundaries.

Methodology

All these challenges influence the methodology employed in this thesis to explore the use of economic statecraft in the ancient Greek world. This methodology begins with an understanding of the key concepts and terms to be used, progresses to the aim and scope of the thesis, and then identifies the hypotheses to be tested. Next, the argument’s structure is developed that will allow the defensible testing of hypotheses. Finally, a thesis chapter format will be created that allows the argument to be effectively documented.

Key Concepts and Terms

To analyse how ancient states influenced other states, one could apply modern concepts and terms, tailor these modern concepts and terms, or create new ones. Given the previous discussion about methodological challenges, the chosen approach, when no suitable Greek terms are available, is to tailor modern concepts and terms.

Statecraft vs diplomacy

The first decision is whether to use the terms ‘statecraft’ or ‘diplomacy’, given their blurred and overlapping definitions. This thesis will use the term ‘statecraft’ to describe a state’s selection of the methods used to achieve its objectives through engagement with other states. In the use of this term, and in the absence of defensible alternative taxonomies, this

¹³⁰ For a discussion of this term, see Aurelie Carrara, ‘Tax and trade in ancient Greece: About the *ellimenion* and the harbour duties’, *REA*, 116, no. 2, 2014, p. 464.

thesis will use Baldwin's model which recognises four types of statecraft: military, propaganda, diplomatic and economic.¹³¹ Military statecraft refers to 'influence attempts relying primarily on violence, weapons or force', whilst propaganda refers to 'influence attempts relying primarily on the deliberate manipulation of verbal symbols.'¹³² Baldwin argued that diplomacy is the third kind of statecraft in which international influence attempts rely primarily on negotiation. His last category, economic statecraft, '... refers to influence attempts relying primarily on resources which have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money.'¹³³ In practice, as Baldwin recognised, states mix and match these types of statecraft. For example, states may use diplomacy, by negotiating before, after and during the application of economic or military statecraft. Similarly, attempts to influence other states using propaganda may draw on economic principles.

Policy objectives

Economic statecraft aims to further a state's long-term strategic political, social, military and religious objectives. Appendix Two provides a consolidated list of the strategic objectives that applied to states in the ancient world. To achieve these objectives, states aspired to a diverse range of short-term tactical objectives that, if achieved, collectively contributed to achieving the strategic objectives.¹³⁴ Importantly, when a state used economic statecraft to achieve an objective, that objective does not need to be economic. That is, for example, economic statecraft may have been chosen to help create a specific political, social, military or religious effect.

In any application of economic statecraft, a state may be seeking to achieve multiple objectives against one or more target states. Multiple objectives are classifiable by their

¹³¹ Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, pp. 13-4.

¹³² Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, p. 13.

¹³³ Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, pp. 13-4.

¹³⁴ One of the finest examples from the ancient literature of the consideration of strategic objectives is Demosthenes' speech 'On the Crown', made during Athens' strategic circumstances in the 340s. During this speech, Demosthenes asked: 'What course of action was proper for a patriotic citizen who was trying to serve his country with all possible prudence and energy and loyalty? Surely it was to protect Attica on the sea-board by Euboea, on the inland frontier by Boeotia, and on the side towards Peloponnesus by our neighbours in that direction; to make provision for the passage of our corn-supply along friendly coasts all the way to Peiraeus; to preserve places already at our disposal, such as Proconnesus, Chersonesus, Tenedos, by sending succour to them and by suitable speeches and resolutions; to secure the friendship and alliance of such places as Byzantium, Abydos, and Euboea; to destroy the most important of the existing resources of the enemy, and to make good the deficiencies of our own city.' Dem. 18.301-2 as translated by C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince in *Demosthenes, Orations, Volume II: Orations 18-19: De Corona, De Falsa Legatione*, Loeb Classical Library 155, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1926.

importance as primary, secondary or tertiary objectives.¹³⁵ They can also be characterised by whether the influencing state aimed to achieve a physical effect on the state being targeted or simply to influence its government's attitudes or behaviours. In the latter category, a state could desire to change, or reinforce, the target state's attitudes, expectations or create a propensity for its future behaviour. Economic statecraft may also be targeted at changing the image of the state initiating the statecraft. According to Robert Jervis, '... a desired image can often be of greater use than a significant increment of military or economic power. An undesired image ... can be a handicap almost impossible to overcome.'¹³⁶

Who is targeted by economic statecraft?

In analysing any application of economic statecraft to achieve policy objectives, one first needs to understand who or what actors can be targeted.¹³⁷ In modern economic statecraft, the main targets are the government of an autonomous nation state or alliances/groupings of such states. However, sometimes the citizens of a specific state can also be targeted, with the intent that the citizens would put pressure on their government to change its policies or actions. To the extent that international non-governmental organisations can place pressure on state governments, they can also be targeted.

This modern approach can be applied to the ancient Greek world in that states could target other states, alliances of states, empires, confederacies or leagues. Less opportunity existed to target non-state organisations, except to the limited extent religious associations could operate independently of their member states. In two specific circumstances states can also target the citizens, or groups of citizens, of a particular state. In the first instance, the initiating state could apply an economic benefit to a citizen, or citizen group, knowing the benefit would be recognised by, and be of value to, the government of the targeted state. In the second instance, an adverse economic measure applied against a state's trading community would be recognised by the government of the targeted state, as having adverse effects on the state.¹³⁸

Sometimes a state could apply economic statecraft against multiple states, which

¹³⁵ James Barber quoted in Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, p. 17.

¹³⁶ Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, p. 99.

¹³⁷ Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, p. 18.

¹³⁸ In modern interstate relations one can usually separate the concept of a state from its citizens, but this distinction is blurred in ancient Greek democracies with Low having argued that the '... divisibility of state from its citizens is questionable'.¹³⁸ Thus, as Low correctly concluded, actors are sometimes the state, sometimes groups of individuals, and sometimes an individual', see Low, *Interstate Relations*, p. 59, n92 and p. 256.

generates the need to differentiate, where possible, between the primary targets and secondary targets. Sometimes the primary target may be unclear. For example, when a state wants to make an example of another state, it also targets ‘onlooker’ states. These onlooker states may sometimes be the primary target since influencing their perceptions may be more important than changing the behaviour of the state subject to the adverse economic measure.¹³⁹

Economic measures

The term ‘economic measure’ has been used throughout this chapter, but the time has come to define and explain it. A measure is a convenient term to describe a way, means, instrument, lever or technique used to influence another state. Of all the types of measures, economic measures comprise measures that fall within the long-standing definition of economic matters, namely measures relevant to the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services. This explanation corresponds with long-standing usage within the classic economic textbooks and is consistent with the descriptions used by most contemporary economists. In the modern world the scope of such economic measures comprises trade flows and capital flows, both positive and negative.

¹³⁹ Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, p. 17.

The economic measures relevant to the ancient Greek world are summarised in Table 1.

Table 1
Economic Measures
Applicable to the Ancient Greek World

	Positive measures	Negative measures
Trade	Favourable tariffs eg duties on imports from the targeted state lower than those from other states	Unfavourable tariffs eg duties on imports from targeted state higher than those from other states
	Granting permission (eg through licenses) to import specific products from, or export them to, the targeted state	Prohibition (embargo) or quantitative restrictions on exports to targeted state
	Subsidies for exports to, or imports from, the targeted state	Prohibition (boycott) or quantitative restrictions on imports from targeted state
	Direct state-to-state purchase of goods and services from the targeted state	Deliberate sale of exports at markedly reduced prices to disrupt economy of target state (dumping)
	Gifts to states	
	Offering to sell strategic good to targeted state	Purchase of goods in order to deny them to the targeted state (preclusive buying)
	Selection of coinage	Bans on doing business with states who trade with the targeted state
	Promises of the above	Threats of the above
Capital Flows	Providing or increasing monies (eg grants, loans, diplomatic gifts, booty and bribery) to targeted state	Impounding assets owned by the targeted state (expropriation)
	Favourable taxation of assets of targeted state	The termination, reduction or slow-down of aid to targeted state
		Unfavourable taxations of assets of targeted state
	Promises of the above	Withholding (non-payment, late payment, or reduced payment) of financial obligations due to the targeted state
		Requirement for tribute and other payments
		Fines
		Threats of the above

This summary comprises almost all the measures recognised in modern literature as well as payments of tribute and other interstate payments. Only three types of modern

economic measures have been excluded given their lack of relevance to immature ancient economies. First, the granting or withdrawal of ‘most favoured nation’ status does not apply given its modern genesis in interstate trade. Next, with respect to capital flows, ancient states had not developed governmental insurance to protect foreign investors from the risks of investing in other states. The final economic measure not used in the ancient Greek world was the placing of restrictions on the import or export of capital from the targeted state or providing incentives for the movement of capital. Such restrictions and incentives did not occur because ancient state economies were too immature for them to be characterised by interstate capital flows. There is no evidence, during the late Archaic and Classical periods, that capital, even in the form of basic money transfers, regularly flowed between states as occurs in modern internationally-integrated state economies. That is, such a restriction was simply not available to ancient states as an economic measure.

Also, worthy of note, economic measures do not include military activity to attain economic resources or prevent trade, such as acquiring land, looting or the seizing of grain ships.¹⁴⁰ These exemplify military statecraft with an economic aim/effect.¹⁴¹

The remaining economic measures are retained because they were likely to have been available for application in the ancient Greek world. Each can be examined in turn.

Trade-based economic measures

From the late Archaic period, ancient states were familiar with the concept of taxation as it applied to citizens and other peoples under their authority.¹⁴² The variety of direct and indirect taxes imposed by various states implied a sound understanding of revenue-raising

¹⁴⁰ For example, Philip's seizure of Athenian grain-ships, see Dem. 10.34-11.5 and 17.20. The incident is the subject of Alain Bresson's chapter L'attentat d'Hiéron et le commerce grec in Alain Bresson, *La cité marchande*, Ausonius Éditions, 2000, pp. 131-49, available at <https://books.openedition.org/ausonius/7695>. Ps. Xen. Const. Ath. 2.12 also discussed the potential use of military force to prevent exports. At an earlier date, as argued by Rogowski, Athens's continuance of the war against Persia, after victories at Salamis and Plataea, could be considered to be military statecraft to achieve economic objectives, namely securing the important eastern trade routes such as those to the Black Sea. R. Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments*, Princeton, NJ., 1989, p. 143.

¹⁴¹ War as a means of interstate influence was not just applied to attain a political effect, but sometimes was applied to achieve economic outcomes. For example, in the 330s Philip of Macedonia detained about 200 Athenian grain-transport ships in the Bosphorus, with the intent to pressure Athens through constraining its food supply. A further example was Athens' campaign against Eion, converting it into an Athenian colony and trading station (ἐμπόριον - emporion) in order to gain access to resources in its hinterland. Looking more widely, one could argue that Athens' war with Thasos was an economic war to gain control of the Thasian mines and trade. Similarly, Kallet validly argued that Athens' attack on Skyros in 470/69 was intended to take control of that state's maritime revenue.

¹⁴² For one summary of ancient Greek taxation, see Vincent Gabrielsen, 'Finance and Taxes', in *A Companion to Ancient Greek Government*, Hans Beck (ed.), 2013, pp. 332-48.

within regions under the taxing state's authority.¹⁴³ No great conceptual leap occurs from extending such taxation on one's own citizens to trade-based taxation, through what are now termed tariffs. Similarly, no impediments existed to ancient states applying export/import subsidies. The only uncertainty is whether the degree of economic understanding held by ancient states was sufficiently mature so governments could envisage the possibility of using such tariffs and subsidies, not only to raise revenue, but to influence other states.

Turning to export prohibitions/restrictions, no feature of ancient economies prevented their application. States only required a basic economic understanding to realise a state could prevent or constrain certain goods being exported from their state, such as timber, wheat or silver. The obvious rationale for such prohibitions or restrictions was to ensure a state retained an adequate supply of strategic goods for its own use. A large intellectual leap was not required to understand such prohibitions or restrictions could be applied for other reasons, such as influencing other states. Likewise, whilst an understanding of the ability to license the import and export strategic goods, required some sophistication, no feature in the ancient Greek world constrained or prevented such licensing. Given ancient states would have understood they were able to prevent the export of strategic goods, they would also have understood their ability to sell or gift such goods. Of course, states required knowledge of what goods were actually strategic, but such knowledge would likely to have been widely known. For example, all maritime states would have understood the importance of timber as a strategic resource.

Turning to the final category of trade-based economic measures, whether or not ancient states could dump goods, undertake preclusive buying or introduce business bans is problematic. The use of such measures required a more sophisticated economic understanding that likely existed in ancient states, even amongst those with fiscal expertise. The ability to dump goods or preclusively buy them also required a degree of government control that may not have been available in most, if not all, ancient states. Thus, the *prima facie* case is such measures were not available.

¹⁴³ Noting Gabrielsen's comment that the modern distinction between direct and indirect taxes has no equivalent in ancient practices, see Gabrielsen, 'Finance and Taxes', p. 336. Whether or not such a distinction existed is not relevant to this thesis.

Capital-based economic measures

Of the capital-based economic measures, gifts and loans of money, payment of contributions and bribery were well suited to the ancient Greek world. The gifting of money between individuals and groups had a long-standing tradition that could equally be applied between states. Similarly, available evidence demonstrates a long history of intrastate commercial loans that peaked in the maritime loans to facilitate fourth-century trade.¹⁴⁴ No large mental leap was required by a state's leaders to offer such loans to other states. Similarly, no characteristic of the ancient Greek world prevented the ability of specific states, especially hegemonies, from understanding they could require states under their control to make payments. Finally, the evidence demonstrates a substantial history of internal bribery within a state.¹⁴⁵ The value of offering bribes to people from other states, and trying to maintain the secrecy of such transactions, would have been well understood by a state's leaders. Few would argue any feature of the ancient Greek world would have prevented the application of such interstate bribery.

More uncertain in their potential application to the ancient Greek world were fines, preferential taxation and the freezing/appropriation of another state's assets. Fines were well known as being available to punish people within a state, but they could only be applied against other states if two conditions were satisfied. First, that the fining state had the authority to enforce payment, either militarily or through some interstate agreement. Second, in the absence of such compulsion or agreement, the fined state would choose to pay because if they did not, the fining state could stop doing something of value to the fined state. Any finding such conditions existed in the ancient Greek world will be discussed in Chapter Five.

Finally, whilst taxation was well-understood, preferential taxation of another state's citizens was less so. Nevertheless, evidence exists that ancient states understood the value of granting ἀτέλεια (*ateleia*), namely freedom from taxation to its favoured citizens.¹⁴⁶ The extension of *ateleia* to citizens of foreign states was not a large conceptual leap, but whether this leap could be extended to include unfavourable taxation of foreign citizens is uncertain.

¹⁴⁴ For one writer commenting on the so-called bottomry loans, see Alfonso Moreno, *Feeding the Democracy: The Athenian Grain Supply in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC*, Oxford, 2007, pp. 285-99 and p. 301.

¹⁴⁵ For numerous examples of bribery within the Athenian state, see Kellam Conover, 'Bribery in classical Athens', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Princeton, 2010.

¹⁴⁶ For one useful discussion of *ateleia*, see Lene Rubinstein, 'Ateleia grants and their enforcement in the classical and early hellenistic periods', in *Greek History and Epigraphy: Essays in Honour of P.J. Rhodes*, L. Mitchell and L. Rubinstein (eds.), Swansea, 2009.

Similarly, the taking of a foreign state's land and assets after military victory was well-established in the ancient world. But a conceptual leap would be necessary to understand that foreign assets could be frozen or appropriated in peacetime. Further, such an economic measure presupposes states had considerable assets worth seizing in regions controlled by other states. The evidence of the ancient world is that unlike modern times, when states could own land or have financial assets in other states, such state-owned foreign assets did not exist.

The use of coinage as an economic measure required a sophisticated economic understanding. In particular, state leaders needed to understand how a state's coins could potentially be used in foreign jurisdictions. Whether or not any state has such understanding depended on specific circumstances. But the selection of face designs and coin weights was a common activity and thus it is not unreasonable to posit minting states understood their coin design choices may affect other states.

Aim and Scope

These key concepts now help enunciate the thesis' aim and scope. The thesis aims to provide a detailed thematic analysis on the use of economic statecraft in the ancient Greek world. The primary research question is:

During the late Archaic and Classical periods, to what extent did states in the ancient Greek world use economic statecraft to help achieve their desired objectives?

For the purposes of this thesis, the ancient Greek world comprised all Greek states as well as those non-Greek states with which they regularly engaged. Greek states included those in mainland Greece, the Aegean, Asia Minor, Sicily and Magna Graecia. The relevant non-Greek states were primarily Macedonia and Persia.

The time period under consideration in this thesis comprises the late Archaic period, starting from about the 550s, and the Classical period, which lasted until the death of Alexander the Great in 323. The reason for this decision is two-fold. First, no defensible evidence for economic statecraft exists for the early Archaic period. Second, the early Archaic period is the one in which most states properly achieved statehood in a socio-political sense, so this thesis does not need to argue that early Archaic states had sufficient statehood to exercise economic statecraft.

In achieving the thesis aim, some sensible scope exclusions need stating. This thesis will not consider whether a state's foreign policy objectives and tactical goals were appropriate given their political and socio-economic circumstances. Neither will the thesis explore the success or otherwise of economic statecraft in specific circumstances. This exclusion is imposed because the overwhelming view of modern scholars is that any analysis must consider all the other forms of influence used against the same target state at the same time. Such an analysis would not be feasible given the thesis' length constraints. Nevertheless, where defensible, the thesis will discuss the efficacy of specific applications of economic statecraft not accompanied by other forms of statecraft.

Hypotheses

The next step in the chosen methodology is to identify the hypotheses to be tested in analysing the extent ancient states applied economic statecraft. The three hypotheses, which are all considered testable, as well as being potentially falsifiable, are:

Hypothesis 1. States in the ancient Greek world had little understanding of the value or use of economic statecraft. There is no evidence for the regular use of economic measures to influence the attitudes and behaviours of other states.

Hypothesis 2. States in the ancient Greek world were aware of the value of economic statecraft to influence other states. Evidence exists for the continued and widespread use of economic measures to influence the attitudes and behaviours of other states.

Hypothesis 3. The use of economic statecraft by states in the ancient Greek world lies somewhere in the middle ground between the first two hypotheses, with evidence such measures were commonly, but not regularly used to influence the attitudes and behaviours of other states.

Testing these hypotheses requires care in identifying valid examples of economic statecraft. In valid examples the state, or someone the state recognised as being able to act on its behalf, initiated the economic measure. Validity also requires that the state directly targeted another state or acted indirectly through an individual 'middleman' in providing the benefit or sanction to the targeted state. Finally, a valid exercise of economic statecraft would provide confidence the state applying the economic measure recognised the usual effects of such a

measure and intended those effects to occur. The validity of any example would depend on the evidence.

Analysis of Specific Applications

The analysis of potential incidents of economic statecraft, in later chapters, will consider the characteristics of both the initiating and targeted states and the context within which they engaged. The analysis of context will consider both the political situation at the time and the economic conditions applying to the relevant states. The types of questions that will be answered during the analysis are considered in the following paragraphs.

Initiating states. The range of questions to be asked about the initiating states include: What objectives were states trying to achieve in the use of economic statecraft? What trade products/resources were available to the state that could be used as economic measures? Were economic measures used in isolation or in combination? Was economic statecraft used as part of a planned foreign policy or was its application opportunistic? To what extent were some subjects of a state targeted rather than the state itself? To what extent did a state engage with their prominent citizens, who may have had a personal relationship with leaders of foreign states.¹⁴⁷ Did a state's citizen choose to take an action that influenced other states, without prior approval from his government, hoping they would be supportive after the event?

Targeted states. The questions that will inform the analysis of targeted states are: Why was the state targeted by economic statecraft? To what extent was it susceptible to the applied economic measure?

Context. The answers to some questions determine the contexts in which specific examples of economic statecraft occurred. Such questions include: What was the relationship between the initiating and targeted states? What was the relative economic, military and economic power between or amongst them?

¹⁴⁷ For a discussion on how prominent Athenians may be construed as acting on behalf of the state in economically desirable regions, but using military/political measures, see Lisa Kallet, 'The origins of the Athenian economic "arche"', *JHS*, 133, 2013, p. 52.

Thesis Structure

An eight-chapter thesis structure best suits the chosen aim, scope and research methodology. This first chapter has established the context and reason for the research by situating the topic within relevant scholarship. It also examined the methodological challenges, the methodology chosen to reflect these challenges, the aim and scope of the thesis and the hypotheses under investigation.

The next five chapters will examine, in turn, all the types of economic measures. Chapter Two will investigate the use of trade tariffs, restrictions and boycotts, whilst Chapter Three will complete the review of trade-related economic measures by examining the selling/gifting of strategic goods. Chapter Four will next examine how ancient states used gifts or loans of money and bribery. Chapter Five will discuss the remaining capital-based economic measures, namely fines, the imposition of tribute and preferential taxation. Chapter Six will then review how states used their coinage to help achieve their political and economic objectives.

The thesis will finish with a penultimate chapter that integrates and works through the implications of the findings made in Chapters Two through to Chapter Six. An integrated analysis will examine the breadth of identified examples from various perspectives. From the utility perspective it will examine several matters, the first being the type of state objectives achievable, totally or in part, by economic statecraft. Second, it will decide whether the use of economic statecraft depended on the form of the relationship between states and their relative power. Next, why some economic measures were more popular than others and whether some states were more susceptible to economic statecraft than others. In particular, the chapter will review whether a state's economic maturity affected its suitability as a target for economic measures. Finally, the chapter will consider whether economic measures were not applied in specific circumstances when, at face value, they could have been and should have been applied.

From the process perspective this chapter will consider how the use of economic statecraft varied amongst different states especially when they had different types of governments. It will also examine whether the application of economic statecraft evolved

over time. Next to be considered is the relative importance of creating and sustaining goodwill compared to more tangible benefits. It will then examine why a state would engage with the subjects of a targeted state and to what extent did a state's subjects initiate economic measures on behalf of their state. It will also analyse the extent to which states considered the effects of economic statecraft on their internal economy.

The final chapter will provide conclusions that bring together the various streams of analysis in the preceding chapters. It will then identify what further research should be undertaken to better understand the contribution of economic statecraft to interstate relations in the ancient Greek world.

Conclusion

By applying this structure to the chosen research methodology, the thesis will argue the ancient Greek states, and their major neighbours, were sufficiently sophisticated to understand they could not always remain isolationist and needed, for various reasons, to engage with other states. They understood one means of influencing other states was through economic statecraft, which was regularly applied throughout the late Archaic and Classical periods. The ancient states used economic statecraft primarily to achieve their political outcomes, but their application was usually not sophisticated. Measures were usually applied randomly and not always logically, in that those available measures, well suited to specific circumstances, sometimes were not applied. Nevertheless, the use of economic statecraft was an important and useful tool when states in the ancient Greek world engaged with other states.

The research performed in this thesis, and the resultant findings about economic statecraft, contribute to the ongoing discussion about the way ancient states engaged with other states to achieve their desired objectives. The thesis formed will help illuminate this important element of interstate relations in ancient Greece by supplementing relevant scholarship. Such developed knowledge of ancient interstate engagement practices would also potentially provide a more informed understanding of contemporary economic interstate relations.

CHAPTER TWO

TRADE TARIFFS, EXPORT RESTRICTIONS AND BOYCOTTS

Introduction

Having learnt, in the previous chapter, the meaning of the term ‘economic measure’ and how it applied to the ancient Greek world, this chapter will identify and analyse the actual application of some trade-related economic measures. The measures discussed comprise tariffs, export restrictions and prohibitions, market dumping, import/export subsidies, business bans and preclusive buying. For each type of measure, all its potential applications will be identified and analysed. The discussion on each application starts with the assumption that the conditions discussed in Chapter One, with respect to sovereignty and intent, were satisfied. Thus, for example, this chapter will not discuss whether each and every initiating state had sufficient sovereignty to apply economic statecraft. Instead, sovereignty will only be discussed by exception when the evidence indicates a state did not have adequate autonomy to exercise economic statecraft.

For each application by a specific state, the analysis will describe the state’s strategic context and, as far as the evidence allows, an explanation of what the state attempted to achieve. In particular, when the evidence allows it, a distinction will be made between those applications primarily aimed at influencing other states and those primarily revenue-raising applications in which influencing other states was only a secondary consideration. The chapter will conclude with a few findings specifically focused on the application of this initial set of trade-related economic measures. A holistic analysis of all the trade-based measures, capital-based and coinage-based measures will occur in Chapter Seven.

Tariffs

The first trade-related economic measure comprises tariffs, namely taxes levied by states upon goods as they cross state boundaries.¹ Modern scholarship differentiates between three tariff categories: export duties, import duties and transit duties. Given such tariffs are often payable at ports and harbours, they are differentiated from harbour dues designed as service charges to compensate states for providing and maintaining port facilities.²

Export duties are levied on goods leaving the exporting state on their way to foreign markets. Such duties are paid to the exporting state by traders wanting to remove the goods from the jurisdiction of the exporting state. In modern commercial practice the magnitude of export duties may vary depending both on the type of goods and the intended export destination. That is, in theory, an exporting state may increase the duty for goods intended for specific foreign markets. But, in reality, such varying duties are unlikely given traders can declare goods are destined for a lightly-taxed importing state and then redirect them once they have left the jurisdiction of the exporting state.

In contrast, import duties are levied by a state on goods arriving into its jurisdiction with the intent to be sold within its markets. The people who pay the duties are the traders who bring in the goods upon which the duties are imposed. Of course, these traders will usually recoup the paid duties through increased prices imposed on the eventual purchasers of the goods. Like export duties, the magnitude of import duties may depend both on the type of good and the state from which they were exported.

¹ For a discussion of tariffs and their application in modern interstate relations, see various sections in Robert C. Feenstra and Alan M. Taylor, *International Trade*, New York, 2014, but primarily Part Four, Chapters 8 and 9. For an early discussion of maritime tariffs in ancient Greece, see Julie Vélissaropoulos, *Les Naoclères Grecs. Recherches sur les institutions maritimes en Grèce et dans l'Orient hellénisé*, Geneva, 1980. Whilst the latter book concentrates on Greek maritime merchants, it does discuss tariffs, primarily in Chapter VI.

² Bresson provides a wide-ranging discussion of tariffs (what he terms 'customs duties') in the ancient Greek world, see A. Bresson, *The Making of the Ancient Greek Economy: Institutions, Markets, and Growth in the City-States*, Princeton, 2016, pp. 286-95 and pp. 307-9. For a discussion of harbour dues in ancient Greece, see Aurelie Carrara, 'Tax and trade in ancient Greece: About the ellimenion and the harbour duties', *REA*, 116, no. 2, 2014, p. 444. For example, *IG I³ 8* may concern a harbour duty at Sounion, see discussion at Attic Inscriptions Online. For commentary on the sometimes difficulty in distinguishing between tariffs and related charges for services, see Nicholas Purcell, 'The Ancient Mediterranean: The View from the Customs House', in *Rethinking the Mediterranean*, Harris, W.V. (ed.), Oxford, 2005, pp. 205-6.

Finally, transit duties are levied on goods exported from one state, crossing through the jurisdiction of another state, and are finally imported into another state. As the name implies, transit duties are levied by the state which controls the territory through which the goods pass. This state may be the same as either the importing or exporting state if they control foreign territories. Such control of foreign territories was common in the ancient Greek world, as will become evident during later analyses.

Any study of modern tariffs can differentiate amongst import duties, export duties and transit duties. In contrast, categorising tariffs remains difficult in the ancient Greek world because the evidence is not always available. Where the evidence allows, tariffs will be categorised, but the analysis focuses on each tariff's purpose. Feenstra and Taylor make clear tariffs may be levied to either raise revenue for the state or to protect domestic industries.³ Of course, a tariff aimed at raising revenue may provide protection and a tariff levied to protect local industries will generate revenue. But importantly, tariffs may also be introduced as an economic measure to influence the behaviours and attitudes of foreign states.⁴

Athens

Both literary and epigraphic evidence exists demonstrating Athens introduced tariffs within Attica and other regions it controlled in the Classical period. Whilst the dating of some tariffs is uncertain or disputed, precise dating is usually not required to understand the use of tariffs as an economic measure. The following discussion will divide these Athenian tariffs into four categories: Peiraiean tariffs, Bosphoran tariffs, empire-wide tariffs and the tariffs evidenced by the so-called fourth-century 'grain-tax law'. All these tariffs related to seaborne trade and whilst one might surmise tariffs were also imposed on land traffic, most likely when a trader entered a city gate or at state's land borders, the evidence for such tariffs is obscure and unable to be comprehensibly analysed.⁵

³ Feenstra and Taylor discuss both reasons, see Feenstra and Taylor, *International Trade*, Part 4, Chapters 8 and 9.

⁴ Equally arguably, a state's decision not to impose tariffs may be a form of economic statecraft aimed at creating goodwill amongst trading states. Alternatively, it may have created other undesirable perceptions. For example, Strabo reported Cyme's inhabitants were ridiculed for their stupidity since, according to some writers, they did not collect tariffs at their port for three hundred years from the city's foundation, see Strab. 13.3.6.

⁵ Transporting goods by land was also a more expensive option than sea travel and would have been minimised as far as possible.

Peiraiean tariffs

Athens enforced tariffs in the Peiraieus although the date at which they were first applied is unknown. Four fifth-century sources refer to, or imply, Peiraiean tariffs. The first literary reference occurred in Aristophanes' *Wasps* produced in 422. In describing Athenian revenue sources, a young Athenian called Bdelycleon commented that Athens has available the '...the taxes and the many one percents, court dues, mines, markets, harbors, rents, proceeds from confiscations'.⁶ Although not expressly mentioned, the reference to harbours would at least refer to the Peiraieus, but no tariff quantum was specified.

Further evidence for Peiraiean tariffs exists in both ancient epigraphy and literature. An Athenian inscription, commonly called the Phanosthenes' decree (*IG I³ 182*) and dated between 420 and 405, encouraged traders to import oars by exempting them from a 1% tax (*ἑκατοστή* - *ekatoste*).⁷ Next, Pseudo-Xenophon's *Constitution of the Athenians*, in a section on Athenian revenue sources, commented that the *ekatoste* in the Peiraieus brings in revenue for the city.⁸ But a later source, Andocides' speech *On the Mysteries* likely dated to about 415, cited a larger quantum with Agyrrhios being the chief contractor for the 2% customs duties (*πεντεκοστή* - *pentekoste*).⁹ The Perseus Digital Library commentators opined these duties were levied on all imports and exports at the Peiraieus, but such precision cannot be inferred just from Andocides' speech.¹⁰

⁶ Aristoph. *Wasps* 658 as translated by Jeffrey Henderson, *Aristophanes. Clouds. Wasps. Peace*, Loeb Classical Library 488, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998. Olsen justifiably argued that market/harbour revenues to the state resulted from the sale of the rights to collect taxes, see S.D. Olsen, 'Some Overlooked Athenian Economic Vocabulary', *Prometheus*, 43, 2017, p. 88.

⁷ The decree was published and extensively discussed in Walbank, 'Athenian Proxemies of the Fifth-century BC', Toronto and Sarasota, 1978, pp. 313-24. Later detailed discussion has only occurred at Brian R. MacDonald, 'The Phanosthenes decree taxes and timber in late fifth-century Athens', *Hesperia*, 50, no. 2, 1981, p. 141. Phanosthenes was likely to be the Andrian who came to Athens c411, becoming a citizen and eventually a general in 407/6.

⁸ Ps. Xen. *Const. Ath.* 1.17 as discussed at Carrara, 'Tax and trade', p. 448.

⁹ Andoc. 1.133. A later mention of a *pentekoste* in a different context occurred in *IG II² 334* dated c335/4 as discussed at Vincent Gabrielsen, 'Finance and Taxes', in *A Companion to Ancient Greek Government*, Hans Beck (ed.), 2013, p. 339. For a summary of *pentekoste* references, see Peter Fawcett, "'When I squeeze you with eisphorai': Taxes and tax policy in classical Athens", *Hesperia*, 85, 2016, p. 186.

¹⁰ Note 1 for Andoc. 1.133 at www.perseus.tufts.edu. MacDowell cited D. M. Lewis in *Hesperia* xxviii (1959), p. 244, who suggested the tax on imports was not the only tax known as a *pentekoste*, see Douglas MacDowell, *Andokides On the Mysteries*, Oxford, 1962, p. 158.

The fourth-century evidence for Peiraean tariffs comprises two references from Demosthenes (the first likely a pseudo-Demosthenes), one from Lycurgus and one from Xenophon. In *Against Neaera* (c348) and *Against Lacritus* (c351), Demosthenes commented about the payment of 2% harbour duties.¹¹ Similarly, in Lycurgus' *Against Leocrates* (c331), Leocrates is accused of seriously harming the 2% tax in which he had an interest.¹² The final fourth-century evidence is from Xenophon, who alluded to harbour revenues in his *Ways and Means* without specifying a quantum.¹³

Putting aside the discussion about its quantum, were these Peiraean tariffs used by Athens as a form of economic statecraft? Apart from their value in raising revenue, tariffs sent a strong message to other states about the extent to which the state controlled territory. Why would such a message apply to the Peiraieus, part of Athens and undeniably within its control? Taken in isolation, or as a collected set, the literary references provide no evidence the Peiraean tariffs were anything more than a revenue-raising mechanism. They were non-discriminatory, neither favouring nor burdening any specific state. Placing non-discriminatory tariffs on exports and imports would not influence the behaviour of foreign states nor send any message that Athenians favoured certain states. Further, the message that Athens could enforce tariffs because the Peiraieus was under its control, was an unnecessary political message.

The Phanosthenes' decree, as an example of tariff relief, does not support an alternative view that tariff reductions at the Peiraieus were used by Athens as a form of economic statecraft. Athens only provided tariff relief to people importing oars, with the reduced tariff payable before it could eventually be recouped through payment by the persons buying the oars. Thus, the persons most benefitting were the Athenian buyers, either the τριήραρχος (*trierarch*) charged with equipping a boat or the Athenian state itself. Oar importers would

¹¹ Dem. 59.27 and Dem. 35.29. Modern scholarship on the speeches does not discuss these tariffs.

¹² Lyc. 1.19. For an old but still valuable discussion of this speech, see A. Petrie (ed.), *Lycurgus: The Speech Against Leocrates*, Cambridge, 1922.

¹³ Xen. *Ways*. 4.40. Karl Polanyi considered Xenophon's originality in *Ways and Means* was that he considered wealth, power and security could be the product of peace rather than war, see Karl Polanyi, *The Livelihood of Man*, New York, 1977, p. 196. Xenophon advocated a state could improve its revenue through internal means rather than predatory behaviour against other states. See J. Dillery, 'Xenophon's Poroi and Athenian Imperialism', *Historia*, 42, no. 1, 1993, p. 9.

only have benefitted if they were not sufficiently resourced to afford paying full-rate tariffs before recouping these costs. Such money-poor traders may have been more likely to import oars under reduced tariffs. The key question is whether these oar importers included foreign traders. The only specific mentions of oar importers in the ancient literature were Athenian citizens, so proving tariff relief would hardly have influenced foreign states. Even if foreign oar traders existed, one would be hard pressed to argue the tariff relief was aimed at influencing the foreign states from which they came.

Bosphoran tariffs

For much of the late fifth-century, Athens controlled shipping through the Bosphorus by the application or threat of physical force. Although not Athenian territory, the precondition existed for Athens to levy tariffs, specifically transit duties, since traders could not avoid payment by sailing a different route between the Black Sea and the Aegean. The first epigraphic evidence for tariffs is the so-called ‘Kallias decrees’ usually dated c434/3, which discussed, inter alia, funds ‘...from the proceeds of the ten per cent’.¹⁴ The Attic Inscription Online commentators opined that this may have been a tax on trade, possibly through the Bosphorus given the specific references to 10% transit dues, discussed later in this chapter.¹⁵ Whilst such a supposition is arguable, the decree does not mention the Bosphorus and used in isolation one cannot defensibly argue that it referred to a tariff. A little more confidence in the existence of Bosphoran tariffs can be inferred from *IG I³ 62*, dated 426, which mentions the Ἑλλησποντοφύλακες, that is officials controlling shipping through the Hellespont.¹⁶ One could infer that such control included the collection of tariffs although that may have been performed by contracted toll-farmers.¹⁷

¹⁴ *IG I³ 52*, also called OR 144, translated and discussed at Robin Osborne and P.J. Rhodes (eds.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions 478-404 BC*, Oxford, 2017, pp. 250-7. This inscription is subject to scholarly debate about its purpose and dating, see L. Kallet, ‘The Kallias decree, Thucydides, and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war’, *CQ*, 39, 1989 and L. Samons, ‘The ‘Kallias Decrees’ (‘IG’ i(super 3) 52) and the inventories of Athena’s treasure in the Parthenon’, *CQ*, 46, 1996. Such debate does not extend to the meaning of the 10% tax/tariff. Hopper also argued that the earliest mention of 10% was in *IG I² 32*, see R. Hopper, *Trade and Industry in Classical Greece*, London, 1979, p. 75.

¹⁵ AIO commentary on *IG I³ 52* at www.atticinscriptions.com. Gabrielsen also formed this view, see V. Gabrielsen, ‘Trade and tribute: Byzantium and the Black Sea straits’, in *The Black Sea in Antiquity: Regional and Interregional Economic Exchanges*, V. Gabrielsen and J. Lund (eds.), Aarhus, 2007, p. 293.

¹⁶ Inscription provided at Packham Humanities Institute website of Greek inscriptions, see www.inscription.packham.org. Hopper argued that the *Hellespontophylakes* were introduced between 428 and 426 based on the likely terminus post quem and terminus ante quem, see Hopper, *Trade and Industry*, p. 75.

¹⁷ Gabrielsen outlined their likely responsibilities at Gabrielsen, ‘*Trade and tribute*’, p. 292 and p. 295.

Xenophon provides secure literary evidence of Bosphoran tariffs, reporting that in 410/9, when the Athenian fleet fortified Chrysopolis, it established a custom house and Athens began to collect 10% transit duties (δεχάτη- *dekate*) on all vessels sailing from the Black Sea.¹⁸ Whilst clearly a new customs house, on the other side of the Hellespont from Byzantium, whether this was a new tariff or just a different location for collecting a pre-existing tariff remains uncertain. Most likely, Athens relocated its customs house after losing control of Byzantium to Sparta in 411.¹⁹

Whether tariffs were paid by traders both entering and leaving the Black Sea is confused by Polybius' later comment that the establishment of Chrysopolis was the first time that tariffs were levied on ships sailing into the Black Sea.²⁰ Uncertainty also exists as to whether this 10% tariff was different to a 5% tax mentioned by Thucydides, discussed later in this chapter, or just the cumulative effect of this tax. The 10% tariff may have comprised a 5% levy on ships coming into Chrysopolis and a 5% levy on the same ship leaving Chrysopolis. Insufficient evidence exists to form a defensible position, but the quantum does not affect consideration of the tariffs as a potential application of economic statecraft.²¹

These transit duties were primarily revenue-raising, but equally important they sent a clear political message to other states that Athens controlled the Bosphorus and foreign traders could only gain access to the Black Sea by recognising Athens' right to impose tariffs. That is, the transit duties were neither designed to prevent other states accessing the Bosphorus nor make them reconsider their own trade routes to the territories surrounding the Black Sea. The tariffs simply represented an economic measure intended to make other states recognise, in a tangible and financial way, the supremacy of Athenian seapower. The political

¹⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.22 and Diod. 13.64.2. Given their textual similarity, Diodorus may have used the more-detailed Xenophon section as one of his sources. Diodorus' use of Xenophon as a source is discussed in various modern scholarship, such as Phillip Harding, *Diodoros of Sicily: Bibliothek Historike Volume 1*, Cambridge, 2021, pp. xlii-xliv.

¹⁹ Consequently, for some unknown period, traders may have paid tariffs at both Spartan-held Byzantium and Athenian-held Chrysopolis, see discussion at Gabrielsen, 'Trade and tribute', p. 311.

²⁰ Plb. 4.44.4. In his commentary, Walbank considered Polybius' language should be interpreted as tolls being levied in both directions, see F.W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, 1, Oxford, 1957, Vol. 1, p. 497. Note that at 4.47.1, Polybius stated a toll in 220 covered exports from the Black Sea, recognising practices may have differed to the fifth-century tariff.

²¹ For one summary of the quantum debate, see Z. Archibald, *Ancient Economies of the Northern Aegean: Fifth to First Centuries BC*, Oxford, 2013, p. 243, n127 which cites scholarship by Rhodes/Osborne, Harris, Bresson and Magnetto.

message would have been reinforced by the presence of highly visible Athenian escort warships to protect traders who had paid the transit duties.²² Such economic statecraft, based on the threat of Athenian seapower, was strong again in 390 when the Athenian, Thrasybulos, once again let out contracts to collect the *dekate* at Byzantium for ships sailing into the Bosphorus from the Black Sea.²³

How long the Bosphoran *dekate* lasted is uncertain. Despite a reference in Demosthenes' *Against Leptines* c355/354, Athens' ability to levy Bosphoran tariffs was unlikely to have survived Spartan naval victories in 387 and the conditions of the Kings Peace.²⁴ No strong evidence exists for Athenian tariffs in the Bosphorus after this date, although an argument has been made the honorary decree *IG II² 133* for Philiskos from Sestos of 355/4 provided evidence for Athenian control of the Hellespont including potential transit duties.²⁵ Further, one can infer Athenian tariffs c343 from Demosthenes' comments on the Athenian general Diopieithes' mission to the Chersonnese.²⁶

Unlike the Peiraiean tariffs, Athens' Bosphoran transit duties were more than an effective means of raising revenues. They reinforced the clear political message of Athenian dominance over these important territories on a critical trade route between Greece and the Black Sea. To supplement this message, Athens could influence the attitudes and behaviours of specific states through targeted tariff relief. But whilst such relief would be an effective form of economic statecraft, only two documented examples exist.

First, Athens provided tariff relief to Methone, an Eretrian colony near to Macedonia on the western coast of the Thermaic Gulf, which was subject to a Macedonian trade boycott discussed later in this chapter. In about 427-4, Athens allowed Methone duty-free import of a fixed quantity of grain through the Bosphorus, possibly up to 1000 μέδιμνοι (*medimnoi*) per year.²⁷ The *Hellespontophylakes* were directed not to prevent the duty-free export and also to

²² See discussion at Gabrielsen, 'Trade and tribute', pp. 304-7.

²³ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.27.

²⁴ Dem. 20.60. See the argument supporting the end of this tariff, referencing ancient sources, in R. Stroud, 'The Athenian grain-tax law of 374/3 B.C.', *Hesperia Supplements*, 29, 1998, p. 83.

²⁵ A claim by Matthaiou as discussed at Fawcett, 'Eisphorai', p. 161.

²⁶ Dem. 8.9.

²⁷ *IG I³ 61*. The date of the Methone decree is contested. Note that each Attic *medimnos* of wheat weighed about 33 kg., see Alfonso Moreno, *Feeding the Democracy: The Athenian Grain Supply in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC*, Oxford, 2007, Appendix 1.

prevent anyone impeding Methonian traders. Further, Methone was exempted from such obligations as might be imposed on the allies by Athenian decrees, unless they specified Methone by name. Consequently, Methone's tariff relief may have extended to other broad-based Athenian tariffs. The ships exporting the grain were also exempt, which may have included freedom from tariffs for other types of imported goods carried in the same ship.

Why did Athens exempt Methone from its Bosphoran tariff? Most scholars, such as Mattingly and Giuliiodori, consider Athens provided the relief to allow Methone cheap access to Black Sea grain when it could not access grain through Macedonia and the Chalcidice because of a Macedonian land-based blockade.²⁸ Thus, the Athenians simply provided some financial relief for Methone as well as potentially Athenian protection of their grain ships sailing through the Bosphorus.

Athens used tariff relief as a form of economic statecraft aimed at influencing Methone, a state located in a region in which Athens was trying to counter Macedonian influence. In its ongoing political and military engagements with Macedonia, Athens desired to increase the number of states allied against Macedonia. Athens needed Methone to remain loyal and look favourably towards Athens, noting Methone was already in debt for its tribute payments before Athens exempted it from the tariff.²⁹ Athens could not rely on Methone simply because it was a tribute-paying ally, since there was no guarantee such allies would support Athens when requests for their assistance were made.³⁰ Athens needed to increase the backlog of Methonian goodwill (ἔθνοια - *eunoia*) hence this indirect offer of financial support at a time when it would have been particularly valuable to Methone.³¹

²⁸ H. Mattingly, 'The Methone decrees', *CQ*, 11, no. 2, 1961 and Holly Giuliiodori, 'The foreign policy of Macedon c513 to 346 BC', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Glasgow, 2004, p. 55.

²⁹ *IG I³* 61. For the likely date of Methone becoming an Athenian ally, see Mattingly, 'Methone decrees', p. 163. Note that Athens' relief to the tribute debt mentioned in the inscription is discussed in Chapter Five.

³⁰ Methone likely paid tribute from 432/1 as discussed at Osborne and Rhodes (eds.), *GHI*, p. 291.

³¹ The term goodwill is '... encapsulated to some degree in the Greek term *eunoia*, which could range in meaning from benevolence and goodwill to affection, and for which a more precise translation depends on context', see Lynette G. Mitchell, 'Φιλία, εὐνοία and Greek interstate relations', *Antichthon*, 31, 1997, p. 28. *Eunoia* was closely linked with gift-giving, with the expectation of a positive response from those states to whom *eunoia* was provided. For Isocrates, the cultivating of *eunoia* was the most important aim of a state's foreign policy: 'For it is a much greater glory to capture the goodwill of cities than their walls', see Isoc. L. 2.21 as translated by George Norlin in *Isocrates with an English Translation* in three volumes, William Heinemann, London, 1980.

In the second example of tariff relief, Athens, modelling concessions on the privileges provided to Methone, in the late 420s granted Chalcidian Aphytis the right to import, tariff free, up to 10,000 *medimnoi* of grain a year.³² The rationale for this economic measure was likely the same reason for providing tariff relief to Methone. Aphytis was south of Poteidaia on the westernmost prong of the Chalcidice peninsula and thus in the sphere of Macedonian influence. Athens likely calculated the financial detriment resulting from lost tariff revenue would have been worth the price of increasing the likelihood of Aphytian support to Athens in its dealing with a potentially hostile Macedonia.

Empire-wide tariffs

Whether or not Athens imposed empire-wide tariffs before 413 is open to speculation based on imprecise epigraphic and literary evidence. For example, in 446/5 or 424/3, Athens placed conditions on Chalcis with respect to both the payment of tribute and its paying of taxes, including the granting of tax exemptions.³³ As discussed by the *AIO* commentators, as well as Tod and Meiggs/Lewis, the inscription is obscurely worded, with uncertainty about whether the concessions were provided to Chalcis' citizens or just foreigners living within Chalcis.³⁴ Whilst the inscription discussed relief from Athenian taxation and thus was a form of economic statecraft, evidence is not strong, despite the *AIO* commentator's conjecture, that the relief was relevant to Athenian empire-wide tariffs. The non-trade related taxation concessions in this inscription will be discussed in Chapter Five.

Thucydides provided the most credible evidence for an Athenian empire-wide tariff. In 425, Athens increased the tribute payments to improve funding for its Peloponnesian War. In 413, given financial pressures resulting from ongoing military operations, Athens replaced its tribute payments with a geographically-broad, ad valorem 5% tariff (*εἰκοστή* - eikoste) upon

³² *IG* I³ 62 discussed at Osborne and Rhodes (eds.), *GHI*, p. 293. The decree's dating remains contentious, but is not overly relevant to this thesis.

³³ *IG* I³ 40.

³⁴ See *IG* I³ 40 commentary at www.atticinscriptions.com; Tod 42 at M. Tod (ed.), *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the end of the Fifth Century B.C.*, Oxford, 1946, pp. 82-86; ML 52 translated and discussed at R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century*, Oxford, 1969, pp. 138-144. See also S. Lambert, 'Two Inscribed Documents of the Athenian Empire: The Chalkis Decree and the Tribute Reassessment Decree', 2017, www.atticinscriptions.com, pp 19-31. For the argument, that the taxes were tariffs rather than taxes on foreigners living in Chalcis, see Christophe Pebarthe, 'La perception des droits de passage à Chalcis ("IG" I3 40, 446 A.C.)', *Historia*, 54, no. 1, 2005.

all imports and exports by sea.³⁵ Whether or not the *eikoste* applied to trade in the Peiraeus remains debatable. Bissa is most likely correct in arguing that it did not, given the tariff replaced tribute payments and Athens did not pay tribute.³⁶ Thucydides expressly stated that these tariffs were introduced in the face of Athenian financial embarrassment with the belief they would increase Athenian revenue. In modern economic parlance, ongoing collection of this tariff improved Athens' cash-flow.³⁷

For how long Athens collected the *eikoste* remains uncertain. Aristophanes referred to an *eikoste* collector in his play *Frogs* written in 405, but the tariff would not likely have survived the end of the Peloponnesian War.³⁸ If so, the tariff may have restarted in 391, given the Athenian 5% tax on Thasos and Klazomenai.³⁹ Whilst one cannot be definitive about whether the tax was a tariff, a reference to Thrasybulos, discussed earlier with respect to Bosphoran transit duties, provides a strong positive indication that it was a similar rated tariff.⁴⁰ Whether the tax applied to other states is not knowable. Even less certain are the arguments the *eikoste* may have been collected after the Kings Peace in 387 and was imposed periodically from c370 to at least 357.⁴¹ The continuance of the *eikoste* during the period of the Second Athenian Confederacy (378-355) was *prima facie* incompatible with the introduction of the allied σύνταξις (*syntaxis*) within the Second Athenian Confederacy, although recognising Peiraean tariffs did exist side-by-side with fifth-century tribute payments.

³⁵ Thuc. 7.28.4. For a detailed discussion of the *eikoste*, see Vincent Gabrielsen "'Mankind's most secure and durable institution': State, Credit, Trade, and Capital Accumulation in the Classical-Early Hellenistic Aegean", in *Infrastructure and Distribution in Ancient Economies*, Bernhard Woytek (ed.), Vienna, 2018, pp. 26-32 and pp. 38-9.

³⁶ Maria Areti Errietta Bissa, 'Governmental intervention in foreign trade in archaic and classical Greece', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University College London, 2008, p. 161.

³⁷ Different views exist on whether the *eikoste* was successful in raising more revenue. For one positive view, see Gabrielsen, 'Mankind's most secure and durable institution', pp. 27-8.

³⁸ Aristoph. *Frogs*, Line 363.

³⁹ For Thasos, see *IG II² 24* with a translation provided at P. Harding (ed.), *From the End of the Peloponnesian War to the Battle of Ipsus*, Cambridge, 1985, p. 39. For Klazomenai, see *IG II² 28*, also numbered RO 18 with translation and commentary at P. Rhodes and R. Osborne (eds.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions 404-323 BC*, Oxford, 2003, pp. 76-9.

⁴⁰ Diod. 14.94.2 also mentions Thrasybulos collecting revenue from Athenian allies, but noting Diodorus spreads Thrasybulos' naval expedition over two years with a year between them. See discussion at Jose Pascual, 'Xenophon and the Chronology of the War on Land from 393 to 386 B.C.', *CQ*, 59, no. 1, 2009, p. 76.

⁴¹ For commentary on the duration of the tax, see Michael B. Walbank, *Athenian Proxenes of the Fifth Century B.C.*, Toronto and Sarasota, 1978, pp. 321-4.

Before examining whether Athens provided relief for the *eikoste*, one should also examine whether the tariff only aimed at raising revenue. To the extent the tariff was non-discriminatory, one cannot argue a variable tariff rate provided targeted political messages to different states. But non-discrimination was itself an important political message, that Athens treated every state the same with no unequitable favouritism. But, equally important, as an economic measure it reinforced, in the subject states, Athens' dominant fifth-century authority to levy such tariffs, and enforce their collection, anywhere in the empire. Further, as Figueira rightly argued, regular payments of the *eikoste* allowed Athens' allies to demonstrate their loyalty, by their traders continually subsidising the allies' military forces rather than deciding, once per year, whether to pay the tribute and if so, how much to pay.⁴²

This political message of Athenian authority would have been contentious if the *eikoste* continued to be levied during parts of the fourth century. Despite Athens trying not to repeat fifth-century imperial behaviours, such as the κληρουχία (cleruchy), other states would have looked unfavourably on the continuance of an *eikoste*. Levying a geographically extensive *eikoste* sent the message Athens was in control with an expectation that its right to levy the tariff would be accepted. However, the lack of an indication in the literary sources that the *eikoste* provoked any fourth-century adverse reaction, further places in doubt whether such an tariff was in place for an extended period, especially during the Second Athenian Confederacy.

Occasionally, Athens provided targeted messages through imposing tariffs which supplemented the generic political messages. For example, the previously mentioned tax on Klazomenai in 387/6 resulted from Athens decreeing that if the Klazomenians paid this tariff then Athens would give Klazomenai free rein to deal with the dissidents at Chyton with no Athenian interference.⁴³ Why would Athens allow this and why would Klazomenai agree? As discussed earlier, Athens' imperial agenda desired states recognise Athens' right to collect tariffs and other taxes, as one indication of their recognition of Athenian hegemony. Apart from gaining the revenue, Athens would have benefitted from a friendly Klazomenai in Ionia. In offering and accepting the condition, Klazomenai must have recognised Athens could have

⁴² T. Figueira, 'The imperial commercial tax and the finances of the Athenian hegemony', *IncidAntico*, 3, 2005, p. 108.

⁴³ *IG II²* 28. Chyton was a city inland from Klazomenai, which was on an island, but later connected to the mainland by Alexander the Great, see Paus. 7.3.9.

physically interfered if it so desired with respect to Chyton and thus the cost of the tariffs would be a small price to pay to deal with the dissidents free of Athenian interference.

No definitive examples exist of Athens providing tariff relief from the *eikoste*. Nevertheless, on two occasions Athens gave tariff relief to Athenian taxes affecting foreign traders. The Phanosthenes' decree discussed earlier was distinctive in Athens not targeting goods from a specific state, but providing tariff exemption for a specific good, namely oars imported into Athens from any source. Whether or not these tariffs applied more broadly than the Peiraean tariff remains unknown. Regardless, the tariff exemption did not provide value as an economic measure for the same reasons discussed earlier with respect to the relief from Peiraean tariffs.

The second tariff relief occurred sometime during the period 350-325 when Athens granted the Achaeans exemption from taxation on all goods.⁴⁴ The fragmentary inscription provides no certainty on who was given the exemption. It may have applied to all Achaeans or just those who had provided some service to Athens. One also cannot be specific about whether the relief applied to Athenian-imposed tariffs or other taxes. In the absence of such crucial information, one cannot be specific about Athens' intent, although undeniably such tariff relief would have created Achaean *eunoia* towards Athens.

Grain tax Law

The final Athenian tariff under consideration was the so-called 'grain tax' law of 374/3 proposed by Agyrrhios to provide grain for the Athenian people.⁴⁵ The purpose of the law remains debated. Most scholars, such as Stroud, argued it required payment in grain, rather than cash, with two rates: a δωδέκατη (*dodekate*), literally 'one-twelfth' that is an 8 $\frac{1}{3}$ percent tax and a *pentekoste* (2%) tax.⁴⁶ A contrary view of some merit, as voiced by Hansen, is the law did not concern taxation, but regulated the transportation, storage and sale of the grain.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ IG II³ 1 393.

⁴⁵ Agora I 7557, also termed RO 26 with commentary at Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, pp. 118-29.

⁴⁶ Stroud, 'Athenian grain-tax law', p. 82.

⁴⁷ M. Hansen, 'A note on Agyrrhios' grain-tax law of 374/3 B.C.', in *Greek History and Epigraphy: Essays in Honour of P. J. Rhodes*, L. Mitchell and Rubinstein, L. (eds.), Swansea, 2009, pp. 145-53.

Scholars have debated the form and application of these two taxes. Neither was likely to be a tax on production since there were no such taxes in Classical Athens. Most consider the *pentekoste* was a tariff either payable on grain leaving the islands (Skyros, Lemnos and Imbros) or payable as an import tax in Athens.⁴⁸ But the form of the *dodekate* remains uncertain given the 8 1/3 % tax rate had no parallels. For example, Harris conjectured the *pentekoste* was an import duty of the island whilst the *dodekate* was a transit duty that encouraged traders to supply grain for the local market but not trans-ship it to other markets.⁴⁹

The change to how the taxes were collected could not be considered economic statecraft since it only applied to Athenian tax-farmers, with no relevance to the behaviours and attitudes of foreign traders. But could the pre-existing tariffs, revealed in this grain-tax law, be considered a form of economic statecraft? That is, were the two tariffs also able to influence the specific behaviours of foreign traders who were either providing grain to the islands or trans-shipping grain through the islands? Answering this question is problematic given the uncertainty about the application of the two taxes, especially the *dodekate*. Nevertheless, the tariffs would have changed the behaviour of foreign traders in a way beneficial to the Athenian economy. At the least one can posit, as described earlier for previous tariffs, that by creating tariffs for these islands, Athens was reinforcing the message they were under Athens' political and military control. Whether such a message needed reinforcement, given the Athenian *cleruchies* on the islands is moot, especially given there were no overt threats to Athenian control in the 370s. Further, there is no evidence any traders from specific foreign states received relief from these two taxes in a form that positively disposed them towards Athens.

Having discussed Athens' use of tariffs as economic measures, let us now turn to other states for which evidence of tariffs exists. Starting with Macedonia, these states also comprise Corinth, the Cimmerian states, Crete, Keos, Histiaia, Miletus, Teos and Byzantium.

⁴⁸ For example, as argued in Stroud, 'Athenian grain-tax law'.

⁴⁹ See argument in E. Harris, 'Notes on the new grain-tax Law', *ZPE*, 128, 1999, pp. 269-72.

Macedonia

Apart from timber and sometimes silver, Macedonia was not a major exporter of trade products to Greek *poleis* and foreign states. Macedonia's willingness to supply its timber and mineral resources, to influence foreign states, will be discussed in Chapter Three. What will be discussed in this chapter is the evidence for Macedonian tariffs and the potential for these tariffs, and any relief provided from them, to be used by Macedonia as a form of economic statecraft.

Macedonia was on one of the potentially several trade routes between mainland Greek states and the regions east and northeast of Macedonia, namely Thrace, the Hellespont and the Black Sea.⁵⁰ Products, such as salted fish, could be transported from the Black Sea through Macedonia's littoral zone and Greek states exported products, like Athenian olive oil, to the Black Sea through Macedonian waters.⁵¹ In response to this trade through Macedonian waters, four pieces of evidence exist for Macedonian tariffs, all in the fourth century. Where the tariffs were collected remains unknown, but likely at the main harbours of Pydna and Therme.

The first evidence for broad-based tariffs is an inscription c393 in which the Macedonian king Amyntas III, who reigned only in 393, entered a treaty with the community of Chalcidian cities led by Olynthos.⁵² The treaty, aspirationally for a period of fifty years, took the form of a standard defensive alliance in which both parties undertook to support each other if any enemy entered their territory. As well as providing timber licences, which will be discussed in Chapter Three, the Chalcidians, who presumably were able to log some

⁵⁰ Other 'open-sea' routes likely existed, but Davis explained that evidence of specific routes sailed by Greek ships simply does not exist, see Danny Lee Davis, 'Commercial Navigation in the Greek and Roman World', unpublished PhD thesis, University of Texas, 2009, p. 77. Davis' thesis successfully argued that ancient mariners did not always need to hug the shoreline.

⁵¹ For an example of a fifth-century fish reference, see Hermippos, *Comic Testimonia and Fragments*, F63 available within the Loeb Classical Library. For olive oil, see *Plut. Sol.* 24.1.

⁵² Discussed at *Tod GHI* 111 and Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, pp. 54-8. This treaty is also discussed at MacDonald, 'Phanosthenes decree', p. 143. Note that some scholars argue Callistratos' time in the Macedonian court was during Philip's reign, see summary at Julia Heskell, 'The foreign policy of Philip II down to the Peace of Philocrates', unpublished Ph.D thesis, Harvard, 1987, p. 92, n69.

Macedonian forests, could export timbers to other states, provided they told Amyntas and paid him duties. As a secondary provision, the treaty also promoted general trade between Macedonia and the Chalcidians, allowing the export and transport of ‘other things’ with the payment of normal tariffs.⁵³

Of the remaining evidence, the first occurred in the 360s, when Pseudo-Aristotle described how Callistratos, a former Athenian statesman, supported Perdikkas III (368-359) by increasing the value of the sale of Macedonian harbour duties from 20 to 40 *τάλαντα* (talents), most likely per annum.⁵⁴ The second example dates from 349 when Demosthenes implied that Phillip II (reigning 359-336) received tariffs collected in the harbours and markets of Thessalia.⁵⁵ One could reasonably assume he would not have done so if he was not also collecting tariffs from Macedonian harbours, which were easier to enforce and collect. To this evidence of broad-based trade tariffs one must add the tariffs applicable to the export of Macedonian timber. Contracts for timber exports would have required the king’s approval, with a considerable export tariff normally applied.⁵⁶ The export of Macedonian timber, discussed in Chapter Three, was sufficiently substantial to make collecting duties worthwhile. Finally, *Syll*³ 135b provides evidence for fourth-century tariffs, for export and transit, imposed by the Macedonian kings.⁵⁷

Considering the many decades under consideration, collectively these tariff references are scanty. Nevertheless, one can reasonably infer tariff collection was ongoing, rather than just applying in the exact periods of the available evidence. An understanding of the value of tariffs for revenue-raising was widely understood in the ancient Greek world and it would be defensible to argue such knowledge was held by the Macedonian kings and their advisors.

Did such Macedonian tariffs have any political purpose as a form of economic statecraft? Austin/Vidal-Nacquet argued that they did not, considering Macedonia’s taxation

⁵³ In this context, ‘transport’ is the carriage of goods through a state, but destined for a third party, as discussed at Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, p. 57.

⁵⁴ Aristot. *Econ.* 2.1350a. For an elaboration of Callistratos’ role and its timing, see Carrara, ‘Tax and trade’, pp. 454-6.

⁵⁵ Dem. 1.22 with Justin commenting that the Thessalians handed over their public revenues to Alexander, see Just. 11.3.2.

⁵⁶ Tod GHI 129 with commentary at M. Tod (ed.), *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions Volume II From 403 to 323 B.C.*, Oxford, 1948, pp. 90-2. Also see discussion at Eugene N. Borza, ‘Timber and politics in the ancient world: Macedon and the Greeks’, *PAPHS*, 131, no. 1, 1987, p. 41.

⁵⁷ Cited at Gabrielsen, ‘Finance and Taxes’, p. 340.

policies, including its tariffs, were only aimed at securing revenues.⁵⁸ Supporting this perspective is the absence of any evidence that Macedonia discriminated between states in applying these tariffs. That is, Macedonia neither provided exemptions nor varied the tariffs in order to exert political influence in specific circumstances. For example, the treaty with the Chalcidians provided no financial concessions, with both parties liable to pay normal tariffs. Thus, whilst the promotion of trade created through this treaty would have benefited both parties, tariff reductions were not used to create additional *eunoia*.

Given that Macedonia did not manipulate its tariffs to influence other states, the final matter in considering the defensibility of Austin/Vidal-Nacquet's argument is whether one can argue Macedonian tariffs, of themselves, constituted economic statecraft. The tariff quantum is unknown, but they were likely to be *ad valorem*, that is non-discriminatory, consistent with all other ancient tariffs. If so, one could argue payment of Macedonian tariffs by traders from foreign states was a means for Macedonia to assert its *de facto* authority to enact such tariffs and to enforce actions if tariffs were not paid. That is, by imposing tariffs, Macedonia sent a clear message to other states that Macedonia's control of its territories and territorial waters meant foreign states could only trade through Macedonia at the pleasure of the Macedonian king and upon payment of the imposed tariffs.

But how strong was this potential message? Macedonia could theoretically impose transit duties as it saw fit, provided it could exercise sufficient military control of the harbours through which such trade passed. With respect to taking the proceeds of tariffs from Thessalian ports, the political message to Thessalia was clear, namely Macedonia was able to act hegemonically. For the other tariffs the message was not so strong. Harbours could be controlled through land-based forces, but control of the littoral zone was more difficult given the relative weakness of Macedonia's navy. At the extreme, foreign traders could avoid any transit duties by not docking at Macedonian-controlled harbours during their journey. Whether this was feasible would depend on the weather and other trip-by-trip variables. Consequently, the political message from Macedonia that accompanied its tariffs was weaker than the political message Athens was sending by collecting tariffs, for there was little doubt about Athens' ability to enforce collection. Nevertheless, a Macedonia unsure of its ability to

⁵⁸ M. Austin and P. Vidal-Nacquet, *Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece: An Introduction*, Berkeley, 1973, pp. 118-23.

enforce tariff collection would have nothing to lose by enacting tariffs, for at the least it would put doubt in the mind of foreign traders about Macedonia's ability to enforce them.

Corinth

Corinth had a reputation as a major trading state during the Classical period, situated at a strategic point on long-standing maritime trade routes.⁵⁹ It was also a transit hub for the exports of inland Peloponnesian states, arriving by land and departing by sea. To facilitate cross-isthmus trade, the sixth-century tyrant Periander likely built an eight-kilometre-long paved dragway (δίολκος - *diolkos*) allowing both military and trading ships to be hauled across the isthmus.⁶⁰ He also built a new artificial harbour at Lechaion to supplement the existing natural harbour at Kenchreai.⁶¹ Given its two harbours and the *diolkos*, Corinth was in a prime position to impose tariffs, especially transit duties, on the existing trade networks.

The ancient evidence for whether Corinth imposed tariffs remains scant, especially since as Pettegrew argued the *diolkos* was hardly a portage 'superhighway'.⁶² Arguably, Thucydides implied land-based tariffs, but the inference does not easily extend to maritime trade.⁶³ Similarly, Strabo commented about duties on land trade to and from the Peloponnesus without mentioning maritime transit duties.⁶⁴ Further, a fragment of the Constitution of the Corinthians, whilst not specifically mentioning the *diolkos*, commented that Periander taxed his markets and harbours.⁶⁵ From Herakleides one can also infer Periander only imposed taxes on the market and harbours, and presumably the *diolkos*.⁶⁶

⁵⁹ For example, Thuc. 1.13.5. Gomme notes Thucydides says nothing about Corinth being on an isthmus route between two seas, see A.W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 3 vols, Oxford, 1945, Vol 1, p. 123.

⁶⁰ D.L. 1.99. Other mentions of the *diolkos* include Strabo. 8.2.1/8.6.22, Plb. 4.19/5.101 and Thuc. 3.15.1. Werner argued that there may have been an earlier but less well-built slipway, see Walter Werner, 'The largest ship trackway in ancient times: the Diolkos of the Isthmus of Corinth, Greece, and early attempts to build a canal', *JNA*, 26, 1997, pp. 99-100. According to written ancient sources, only warships and not merchant vessels were transported, with debate ongoing about whether merchantmen were also dragged across the Isthmus. For example, Bresson argued against this possibility for fully-laden merchantmen, see A. Bresson, *The Making of the Ancient Greek Economy: Institutions, Markets, and Growth in the City-States*, Princeton, 2016, pp. 93-4.

⁶¹ Dion. *Calliph.* 108-9 as discussed at C. Muller, *Geographi Graeci Minores*, 2 vols, Paris, 1855, Vol 1, p. 238.

⁶² D. Pettegrew, 'The *diolkos* of Corinth', *AJA*, 115, no. 4, 2011, p. 552.

⁶³ Thuc. 1.13.5.

⁶⁴ Strabo 8.6.20.

⁶⁵ Aristot. fr. 611.20 as provided at Valentinus Rose, *Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta*, Leipzig, 1886. p. 375.

⁶⁶ Herakleides Pontikos *FHG.* 2.213.5.

Perhaps the strongest argument in favour of tariffs is that whilst Lechaion supported Corinthian-based traders, the *diolkos* was not favourable to these traders since they already had access to both Saronic and Corinthian Gulfs. The *diolkos* favoured rival trading states by allowing them to better compete with Corinth. By this logic, Corinth built the *diolkos* primarily to raise revenue through the imposition of tariffs. One can then argue, as Salmon did, that Corinth's first mintings were likely to facilitate the payment of these tariffs.⁶⁷

If this evidence allows one to defend the hypothesis that Corinth imposed tariffs, then we should ask the similar questions as were asked about Macedonian tariffs and their potential use as economic statecraft. The starting point is whether the imposition of tariffs sent a political message to other states about Corinthian control of the isthmus. Whilst such an argument could be made, one could also argue the message was unnecessary. Corinthian control of the isthmus was never in doubt during the Classical period. Further, as for Macedonia, no evidence exists Corinth provided any tariff relief or preferential treatment for specific states using its harbours and the *diolkos*.⁶⁸ Thus, the argument that Corinthian tariffs were also used as an economic measure is weak and, as Periander intended, Corinthian tariffs were only aimed at revenue raising. If traders or military ships from other states decided to cross the isthmus, the *diolkos* and its tariffs could not be avoided.

Cimmerian Bosphorus

The kingdom of the Cimmerian Bosphorus, on the north shore of the Black Sea, was well suited to producing high-quality grains. Given Athens' reliance on grain imports, in the first half of the fourth-century Athens established friendly diplomatic relationships with the ruling Spartokid dynasty. As Demosthenes stated in *Against Leptines*, Athens imported an equal amount of wheat from this region '...equal to the whole amount from all other places of export'.⁶⁹ Athens cultivated its friendship with this foreign state, making awards to the Spartokids: Leucon (389/8-349/8) and his successors Spartokos II (349/8-344/3) and Paerisades I (349/8-311/0), recognising them as perpetual benefactors worthy of Athenian

⁶⁷ J. Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth: A History of the City to 338 BC*, Oxford, 1984, p. 171.

⁶⁸ Recognising that unlike Athens, evidence about Corinth, especially epigraphy, remains slim.

⁶⁹ Dem. 20.31. For further discussion on this volume, see Mirko Canevaro, *Demostene, Contro Leptine: Introduzione, Traduzione e Commento Storico*, Berlin, 2016, pp. 56-7.

citizenship, regular gold crowns at the Great Panathenaea festival as well as personal exemptions from Athenian citizen taxes and obligations.⁷⁰ These and other incentives provided by Athens will be discussed in Chapter Five.

The Spartokids use of their abundant grain resources as an economic measure will be discussed in Chapter Three. This section identifies that the Spartokids used tariff relief as a supplementary form of economic statecraft. Through their emporia of Pantikapaion and Theodosia, Leucon gave priority of lading to the export of Cimmerian grain for all ships bound for Athens, not just Athenian ships. He also waived the normal one-thirtieth export tariff (τριακοστή - triakoste).⁷¹ Depending on the dating of Isocrates' *Trapezitikus*, this tariff was confirmed and renewed by subsequent Cimmerian monarchs.⁷² Providing tariff exemptions and priority of lading incentivised grain importers by increasing the competitiveness of Cimmerian wheat compared to, for example, wheat Athens imported from Egypt. Increased sales of more competitively priced wheat, even with the reduced tariffs, would have benefited the Cimmerian royal economy over the long-term. But it was also of strategic advantage to sell the wheat at reduced costs to generate *eunoia* within importing states over an extended period. However, one cannot be definitive about the duration of the tariff exemptions provided to Athens. For example, Moreno argued that the Spartokids may have temporarily cancelled the tax exemption during a war with the Scythians c330. The argument for cancellation centres on Demosthenes' statement that Paerisades published the decree, which would have been unnecessary if it had not been previously cancelled.⁷³

This example of the Spartokids providing tariff relief as an economic measure was not isolated. In a later fourth-century example, likely in the 360s or early 350s, the Spartokids provided wheat to Mytilene through a complicated reduction in the normal payable tariffs.⁷⁴ Tariff relief was provided in two forms. The Mytileneans were given the right to pay a single 1/60th tax which was one half of the normal *triakoste* export duty. Additionally, Mytilene had

⁷⁰ Dem. 20.29-40.

⁷¹ Dem. 20.31, 20.32 and 34.36.

⁷² Isoc. 17.57.

⁷³ Dem. 34.36 as discussed at Moreno, *Feeding the Democracy*, p. 191. For a more detailed discussion, see Stanley M. Burstein, 'I.G. II2 653, Demosthenes and Athenian Relations with Bosphorus in the Fourth Century B.C.', *Historia*, 27, no. 3, 1978, pp. 431-3.

⁷⁴ This inscription, Tod 163 (SIG 212+), is discussed at Tod (ed.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions Vol. II*, pp. 185-6.

to pay a 1/90 tax as an ἀρχεῖον - *archeion*' whose meaning is uncertain, up to amounts of 100,000 *medimnoi*.⁷⁵

The rationale for this tariff relief is uncertain given no obvious advantage to the Cimmerians in creating Mytilenean *eunoia*. No history of conflict existed between the two states nor did Mytilene have resources needed by the Cimmerians. Mytilene did not have the ability to threaten Cimmerian interests except as part of a hostile coalition with major powers. Thus, the tariff relief may have had no role as an economic measure, but simply was an attempt to increase Mytilenean demand to the extent that overall revenue increased despite the reduced tariffs. Or perhaps, but less likely, the Cimmerians tried to promote *eunoia* to reduce the likelihood that Mytilene would join a hostile coalition against them.

Crete

The only evidence of tariffs being imposed by Cretan states concerned the neighbouring cities of Knosos and Tylisos. In about 450 they and the mainland state of Argos entered into some form of alliance or pact. Several matters were agreed including the following clause which only affected trade between the Cretan cities and not Argos, 'There shall be export from Knosos to Tylisos and from Tylisos to Knosos; if (a Tylissian) exports beyond, he shall pay the same (taxes) as the Knosians; goods from Tylisos shall be exported to wherever they wish.'⁷⁶ One can infer the two cities could export to whomever they wished, including the other party, but if the Tylisians wished to use Knosos as a transit hub, then they would have to pay the same tariffs as the Knosians. Interestingly, no reverse agreement was in place requiring any exports by Knosian traders beyond Tylisos to pay Tylisian tariffs.

Could this import/export arrangement be considered a form of economic statecraft? The answer partly depends on whether Tylisos was a dependency of Argos. If so, the arrangement could have protected Tylisian trading interests from imposed trading requirements by Knosos. If not, and the two cities wanted simply to normalise peaceful relations, then one way to do so was to offer each other economic benefits. Normally, *eunoia*

⁷⁵ See discussion at Bissa, '*Governmental intervention*', pp. 199-200 and A Heisserer, 'IG XII, 2, 1 (The monetary pact between Mytilene and Phokaia)', *ZPE*, 55, 1984, p. 121.

⁷⁶ GHI 126 as discussed at Osborne and Rhodes (eds.), *GHI*, pp.146-54. Also referred to as ML42 discussed at Meiggs and Lewis, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, pp. 99-105.

might be generated through attractive tariff relief and mutually advantageous trade arrangements. But in this situation, Tylisian traders were not offered reduced rates. The explicit confirmation that normal tariffs would apply reinforced the political message from the stronger Knosos that even though the states had reached an arrangement, Tylisos was not worthy of any preferential treatment compared to the tariffs paid by its own traders.

Keos and Histiaia

About 364 the island of Keos, after its revolt from Athens, entered into a political arrangement with Histiaia in northern Euboea.⁷⁷ Rhodes and Osborne rightly considered the states created rights of *isopoliteia*.⁷⁸ Amongst various conditions concerning citizen rights, the two states agreed they should enjoy identical import/export conditions, presumably including tariff rates, as well as security for their traders. In this context, the proposed tariff arrangement was an economic measure used by both states to increase the attractiveness of the mutually desired outcome, namely an effective, well-functioning interstate arrangement. Although the import/export clause was unlikely to have been the critical incentive for the agreement, like most positive economic measures it improved the attractiveness of the proposal to both states.

Miletus

Likely before 334, Miletus and Sardis provided each other's citizens freedom of movement and trade, but not freedom from taxes.⁷⁹ One cannot argue this agreement was based on arrangements that could be characterised as an economic measure. Later, about 330, Miletus entered an *isopoliteia* with Olbia, a city on the Black Sea originally colonised by Miletus. Apart from establishing judicial parity between their citizens, both states agreed to exempt their citizens from some taxes, including tariffs for the import and export of goods from each other's ports.⁸⁰ As a caveat, the exemptions did apply to citizens residing outside the two cities. These two cities were not in conflict, so the granting of tariff relief was not

⁷⁷ Tod 141 (SIG 172+) at Tod (ed.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions Vol. II*, p. 123.

⁷⁸ Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, p. 200.

⁷⁹ SIG³ 273 cited at Hopper, *Trade and Industry*, p. 197 with text in *Sylloge inscriptionum graecarum*, ed. Wilhelm Dittenberger. 3rd edn., eds. Friedrich Hiller von Gaertringen, Johannes Kirchner, Hans Rudolf Pomtow and Erich Ziebarth. 4 vols. Leipzig, 1915-1924.

⁸⁰ RO 93 at Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, pp. 470-3.

part of a package of measures intended to overcome long-standing enmity. Nevertheless, tariff relief still acted as an economic measure in that it formed one part of a package of incentives designed to generate *eunoia* and make the *isopoliteia* attractive to both states.

Teos

Teos was a small coastal state in Asia Minor for which an inscription, dated c470, required its magistrates to make several annual imprecations.⁸¹ One category of people subject to the imprecations were those Teans, presumably wealthy merchants, who distributed foodstuffs. The imprecation aimed to prevent the merchants hindering grain being imported to Teos by forcing up grain prices during periods of grain scarcity. Given its focus on imprecations, this inscription did not indicate Teos was providing tariff relief to those importing grain from other states. Thus, in the absence of other evidence in this inscription and other epigraphy/literature, no argument can be made that Teos used grain tariffs as an economic measure.

Andros

The island state of Andros most likely imported grain in the second half of the fourth-century and offered incentives to importing traders. One relevant inscription, dated to either the fourth or third century, indicates that on one occasion Andros received discounted grain, for which the benefactor was provided a gold crown.⁸² However, no epigraphic or other evidence indicates Andros provided tariff relief as an economic measure.

Samos

Similarly, whilst Samos also imported grain in the fourth century, it did not provide favourable tariffs to importers. Instead, it preferred to rely on honours provided to importing traders, including the grant of citizenship.⁸³ The Samos 36 inscription exemplifies such grants of citizenship, but no evidence of economic benefits, such as tariff relief that could be characterised as an economic measure.

⁸¹ Commentary at ML 30 at Meiggs and Lewis, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, pp. 62-6. Also Tod 23 at Tod (ed.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, pp. 27-31.

⁸² IG XII(5) 714 discussed at Gary Reger, 'The Date and Historical Significance of IG XII v 714 of Andros', *Hesperia*, 63, no. 3, 1994, pp. 309-21. Reger strongly argued for a third-century date.

⁸³ McCabe, Samos 36 available at www.epigraphy.packhum.org.

Byzantium

According to the Aristotlean *Economics*, when food and funds were scarce Byzantium forced trading ships sailing out of the Black Sea into its harbour, to pay a 10% tariff on their cargo's value.⁸⁴ The date and duration of the tariff is unknown, but may have occurred several times during the fourth-century when Byzantium was not controlled by a hegemonic state.⁸⁵ The primary motivation for the tariff was to generate revenue but it was used as an economic measure to the extent it helped ensure an adequate grain supply by allowing foreign traders to make payments in grain.

Erythrai/Atarneus

In the period 350-342, the Ionian state of Erythrai and Aelioan Atarneus entered a defensive alliance.⁸⁶ The alliance inscription referred to an import/export rate of 2%. Interestingly, the states agreed it could be waived if Erythraian belongings, including its flocks, were deposited rather than being sold, provided that property was retrieved within 30 days of the peace occurring and was not sold. That is, limited tariff relief was offered as a form of economic statecraft to make the alliance more attractive to both states.

Asia Minor

Tariffs were not confined to maritime trade routes. Aristotle recorded that Alexander III appointed Antimenes of Rhodes as a superintendent of highways in the province of Babylon. Antimenes restored an ancient law imposing a 10% tariff on all imports.⁸⁷ Once again no evidence exists that this tariff was designed to do more than raise revenue, since its use within internal provinces of Asia Minor, all controlled by Alexander, provided no opportunity to use the tariff as an economic measure against other states. At the best, it simply reinforced amongst foreign traders the reality of Alexander's territorial control.

⁸⁴ Aristot. *Econ.* 2.1346b.

⁸⁵ For a discussion of Byzantium's actions, see Gabrielsen, 'Trade and tribute', pp. 312-3.

⁸⁶ RO 68 at Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, pp. 342-5. See also Tod 165 at Tod (ed.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions Vol. II*, pp. 188-90.

⁸⁷ Aristot. *Econ.* 1.1352b.

Other states

Many other states likely imposed import/export tariffs, especially where they could exploit an unavoidable coastal location or land route. Nevertheless, evidence only exists for a small fraction of potential taxing states. During the Classical period, Kyparissia, Keos, Delos and Kimolos imposed 2% import/export tariffs.⁸⁸ Xenophon recorded that Olynthos possessed revenues from many ports and trading places.⁸⁹ Aeschines commented that Amphissa collected payments from ships sailing into its harbour.⁹⁰ Mende collected so much harbour and related taxes that they did not need to tax land/house owners.⁹¹ To these one can add Demosthenes' comments that Kotys I of Thrace could generate up to 200 talents per annum from emporia in his territories, presumably from tariffs and other taxes.⁹² Similarly Naucratis in Egypt applied different tariffs dependent on the type of ships.⁹³ Strabo recorded Krisa levied duties on imports from Sicily and Magna Graecia.⁹⁴ In the fourth century, Xanthos may have granted some form of tariff privilege with respect to several states, but one cannot be certain given the mutilated inscription.⁹⁵ Insufficient evidence exists to determine whether any of the states used these tariffs, or provided relief from them, as a form of economic statecraft. The tariffs were likely designed simply to raise revenue. However, a treaty between the Cretan cities of Olous and Lato applied tariffs.⁹⁶ Their inclusion in a treaty implies they could be considered an exercise of economic statecraft.

To finish this section on tariffs one notes that over 90 years ago, Burn posited the existence of so-called archaic 'trade leagues' amongst states to facilitate trade amongst

⁸⁸ *IG V i* 1421, line 5; *IG II²* 404, line 16 and *IG II²* 1128, line 22; *IG II²* 1635, line 38 and *IG XII ix* 44, line 3.

⁸⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.16.

⁹⁰ Aeschin. 3.113.

⁹¹ Aristot. *Econ.* 2.1350a.

⁹² Dem. 23.110.

⁹³ For a detailed discussion, see Peter Gerritt van Alfen, 'Pant'agatha: Commodities in Levantine-Aegean Trade During the Persian Period, 6-4 th c. B.C.', unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Texas, 2002, pp. 182-4.

⁹⁴ Strab. 9.3.4.

⁹⁵ Inscription provided at Jean Bousquet, 'Une Nouvelle Inscription Trilingue a Xanthos?', *RA*, 1, 1986, pp. 101-6 and discussed at Bresson, *Making*, p. 199.

⁹⁶ Busolt, *Griech. Staatsk.* i, 613 cited in H. Michell, *The Economics of Ancient Greece*, Cambridge 1957, p. 256.

themselves.⁹⁷ He discussed three loosely-knit associations which provided friendly ports to traders from their states. But in the absence of any evidence of tariff exemptions for league members or other specific benefits, they are not considered an exercise of economic statecraft.

Findings on Tariffs

Some initial findings can be made about the tariffs discussed in this chapter. The concept of tariffs was well understood in the ancient Greek world and widely applied, with transit dues the most common tariff form. In deciding the quantum of tariffs, no state differentiated between imports and exports, with both equally taxed. Although the examples discussed in this chapter demonstrate that states enacted tariffs to generate revenue, they could also be manipulated to influence the behaviours and attitudes of the states being taxed. The most common mechanism of influence was for a state to provide relief of transit duties, in full or in part. Relief from the other forms of tariffs was less common, with only one example of relief from a Peiraean import tariff being used as an economic measure to promote oar imports.

Apart from revenue-raising, imposing tariffs sent a clear political message the enacting state was powerful enough to enforce their collection, especially transit duties, through the application or threat of military force. Further, as evidenced by some examples, a state could use tariffs as an economic measure by promising other benefits if a targeted state accepted the tariff. By paying the tariff, and obtaining the benefit, the taxed state recognised the power of the tariff-enacting state. Additionally, targeted tariff relief could create in the state whose traders were taxed, a sense of *eunoia* towards the taxing state. The final method for the use of tariffs as an economic measure was the setting of different rates in different markets. For example, after the *eikoste* was established throughout the Athenian empire, the smaller 2% rate in the Peiraeus would make exports and imports from the latter more financially attractive to foreign traders.

⁹⁷ A. Burn, 'The So-Called 'Trade-Leagues' in Early Greek History and the Lelantine War', *JHS*, 49, 1929. The Lelantine War between Chalcis and Eretria during the Archaic period was the first, according to Thucydides, to generate alliances for both states, see Thuc. 1.15.3.

Export Restrictions

Having discussed the use of tariffs as economic measures by several states, one can now turn to the next type of trade-based economic measures, namely export restrictions. In theory, such restrictions included complete prohibitions, commonly called embargos, or quantitative restrictions on the volume of exports to targeted states. Whilst a state may apply such restrictions on its own traders, they could also restrict traders in other states under their control. Whilst tariff relief, in whole or in part, sent a positive message to targeted foreign states, export restrictions made clear a state's displeasure.

Athens

Only four examples exist of export restrictions imposed by Athens during the late Archaic and Classical periods. The first, in the sixth century and attributed to Solon but possibly not by him, prohibited the export of agricultural produce from Attica apart from oil.⁹⁸ Davis argued that Plutarch possibly mentioned this alleged law to explain the economic reality that Athens did not export much agricultural produce apart from olive oil.⁹⁹ Attica, one of the driest regions in mainland Greece, was not suited to large-scale grain production, but was suited to the production of olive oil. In modern economic parlance, Athens had a strong comparative advantage in olive oil production that warranted its export.

Even if genuine, this prohibition would not have been designed as an economic measure against other states, nor as a protectionist measure, but as an attempt to restrain large landowners who might otherwise sell their grain surpluses overseas, when the grain price was higher outside Athens allowing greater profits. That is, this restriction aimed to ensure there was sufficient local produce, especially wheat and other grains, during periods of famine or need. Preventing the export of grains or wines, even if enforceable, was not aimed at trying to influence the attitudes and behaviours of foreign states.

In the second example, from Aristophanes and Pseudo-Xenophon, Athens prohibited the export of certain ship-related products, namely timber, leather oarport sleeves, sails and

⁹⁸ Plut. *Sol.* 24.1.

⁹⁹ G. Davis, 'Dating the drachmas in Solon's laws', *Historia*, 61, no. 2, 2012, p. 132.

pitch.¹⁰⁰ One might infer from their wording that the prohibition only affected enemy states who were Athens' naval competitors. This prohibition represented a clear example of economic statecraft to limit the maritime strength of competing naval states.

The third Athenian example occurred during the Second Athenian Confederacy, likely after the reintegration of the four cities of Keos into the confederacy after their rebellion. A more precise dating is not possible. Athens reinstated a prohibition on the export of Kean red ochre (μίλτος - *miltos*), sometimes translated as 'ruddle', to anywhere except Athens and then only on ships authorised by Athens.¹⁰¹ Athens was concerned that allowing the uncontrolled use of other states' ships would have allowed such states to circumvent the export prohibition.

Ochre, comprising iron oxide mixed with clay and sand, was possibly used for colouring pottery, construction stones and ropes, for ship maintenance and painting and for medical purposes.¹⁰² Although some ochre was available from the Laureion mines in Attica, it was neither available in sufficient quantity nor of adequate quality. The best ochres (yellow, purple and red) came from Keos with various other states supplying lower quality ochres.¹⁰³

The primary purpose of the export restriction was to satisfy Athens' requirements for Kean *miltos* at the expense of the demand in other states. That is, the restriction was primarily an economic measure designed to create an economic, rather than a political, effect. Whether the supply of Kean *miltos* could meet the demands of both Athens and its trading competitors remains unknown, but by enacting a prohibition Athens aimed to diminish the capabilities of other Greek cities. Athens may well have provided Kean *miltos* to its allies, by allowing shipment from Athens, but no evidence exists to support this hypothesis.

¹⁰⁰ Aristoph. *Frogs* 362 and Ps. Xen. *Const. Ath.* 2.12.

¹⁰¹ RO 40 (IG II² 1128) discussed at Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, pp. 204-9. The inscription is also termed Tod 162 which was discussed at Tod (ed.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions Vol. II*, pp. 181-5. The decree was enacted by the three Kean communities of Karthaia, Koresia and Ioulis.

¹⁰² Hdt. 3.58.2 and Dioskorides, *De Mat. Med.* 5.96, 126 sect. 5. Note also Aristoph. *Ach.* 21 which comments on '... the vermillioned rope'. For a discussion of the likely uses of *miltos*, see Ephraim Lytle, 'Farmers into Sailors: Ship Maintenance, Greek Agriculture and the Athenian Monopoly on Kean Ruddle (IG II² 1128)', *GRBS*, 53, 2013, pp. 520-9. Lytle argued that Athens may have considered that *miltos* had value in protecting timbers from rot and woodboring larvae (p. 549).

¹⁰³ For comments on all types of ochres, see Theophrastus, *On Stones*, 51-5.

The secondary purpose of this restriction should not be ignored. By enforcing the prohibition, Athens sent a message to unfriendly states it had the power to constrain markets within its empire in ways deleterious to them. Thus, such states needed to remain aware of what Athens could achieve through economic measures when they were considering taking adverse actions against Athens, such as attempts to leave the confederacy. For this restriction only *miltos* was affected, but the principle of restricting exports from territories under Athenian control could equally apply to any trade products, including strategic goods such as grains and metals.

Evidence for a fourth Athenian export prohibition was provided by Demosthenes in the 340s. In his speech *On the False Embassy*, he reported on a law proposed by Timarchus which made the conveyance of arms or ships' tackle to Philip of Macedonia a capital offence punishable by death.¹⁰⁴ Whether this law was enacted remains unknown, but its intent was to reduce Macedonia's military capability. Further, the law was designed to send a clear message to the Macedonian king that Athens could enact prohibitions targeted to hurt Macedonia either militarily or economically. The impact of this law, if enacted, on the attitudes of the Macedonian king was likely not strong, given Macedonia's ability to obtain arms from a variety of other sources than Athens.

Macedonia

Macedonia may have twice introduced export prohibitions, with both applied to its timber resources. The first is speculative, based on an argument made by Borza that by 357, with Amphipolis under Macedonian control, Athens did not have access to Macedonian timber.¹⁰⁵ He based this hypothesis on a supposed degradation in the Athenian fleet. Whether this degradation resulted from an export prohibition by Macedonia or for other reason remains unknown. Borza then further hypothesised the Macedonian peace proposals of 346 and 344 may have included the offer that Athens could access Macedonian timber.

One can extend Borza's argument to consider the potential for Macedonia to use timber export prohibitions as a form of economic statecraft. Given the importance of Macedonian

¹⁰⁴ Dem. 19.286.

¹⁰⁵ Borza, 'Timber and politics', p. 46.

timber, discussed in Chapter Three, any such export prohibition would likely reduce the capability of, and thus the threat from, the Athenian navy. Such a prohibition would have been especially effective if enacted at a time when Athenian timber stockpiles were diminished. One could further hypothesise any prohibition in place at the time of the peace proposals may have already reduced Athens' naval capability and reinforced its need for ongoing high-quality timber. Thus, a Macedonian offer to renew Athenian access, as opposed to the implied threat of an ongoing prohibition, would have made them more receptive to other Macedonian conditions during the peace discussions.

The second Macedonian example, which is more firmly based in epigraphy, occurred during the reign of Alexander the Great. Whilst absent in Asia, he likely delegated Antipater the king's right to allow timber exports.¹⁰⁶ A fragmentary inscription of c335/334 revealed Macedonia prevented the sale of timber from around Mount Dysoron until an embassy from Alexander arrived.¹⁰⁷ Why this temporary prohibition was necessary and for how long it lasted remains unknown. One can only conjecture that Alexander was concerned about a pending potential export of timber to a potentially hostile state. Putting in place a temporary prohibition allowed Alexander's embassy to examine the proposed export more closely before deciding whether to allow it to proceed. Borza logically opined the prohibition was in place until the naval situation in the Aegean was clarified.¹⁰⁸

Other states

The only other recorded examples of export restrictions were by Teos and Selymbria. The Tean decree c470-460, discussed earlier in this chapter, forbade grain exports. As far as one can infer its rationale, it did not constitute economic statecraft rather an intent to retain sufficient grain supplies for its own citizens.¹⁰⁹ Similarly, according to the Pseudo-Aristotlean *Economics*, in about 360 Selymbria also prohibited grain exports, but this restriction does not appear to be targeted at influencing the attitudes and behaviours of foreign states. Instead,

¹⁰⁶ As implied at Thphr. *Char.* 25 in which the braggart claims to have letters from Antipater allowing duty-free timber exports.

¹⁰⁷ The inscription is housed at the archaeological museum at Philippi and is provided at N. Hammond, 'The king and the land in the Macedonian kingdom', *CQ*, 38, no. 2, 1988.

¹⁰⁸ Borza, 'Timber and politics', p. 47.

¹⁰⁹ Discussed at Bresson, *Making*, p. 393.

when faced with financial problems Selymbria tried to maximise the revenue to the state from the eventual sale of its grain.¹¹⁰

Findings on Export Restrictions

The major ancient states, which had the power to impose and enforce export restrictions, were aware they could apply them in specific circumstances. Whilst export restrictions could apply to all sorts of trade goods they were usually only applied to prevent competing states gaining access to strategic materials, with the prime example being the use of timber for military shipbuilding purposes. In imposing export restrictions, states were usually not simply trying to achieve a specific strategic effect, but also making clear, as a political message, their power to disrupt the desired trade practices of other states. Nevertheless, the use of export restrictions was not common in the ancient Greek world.

Trade Boycotts

Moving from export prohibitions, this next section will discuss the evidence for three potential trade boycotts in the ancient Greek world. The evidence for the first (Athens) is convincing, whilst for the other two (Macedonia and Aegina/Argos) the evidence is much less compelling.

Athens

The only known example of an Athenian trade boycott was the so-called Megarian Decree c433.¹¹¹ Later, in 417/16, Athens blockaded Macedonia in response to the perceived betrayal of Athens by Perdiccas, who joined the alliance of Argos and Sparta.¹¹² But this was not a trade boycott, rather it was likely a blockade for military purposes.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Discussed at Bresson, *Making*, p. 395.

¹¹¹ The argument for multiple decrees is not relevant to this thesis. In 1951 Brunt argued that the accepted date is either 433 or 432. See P.A. Brunt, 'The Megarian decree', *AJPh*, 72, no. 3, 1951, p. 269. There have been no serious attempts since then to argue for another date.

¹¹² Thuc. 5.83.4. Hornblower detailed attempts to translate the section so as to infer there was no blockade, see Simon Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides Volume III: Books 5.25-8.109*, Oxford, 2008, p. 214.

¹¹³ For the difficulties of a military blockade, see Gomme, *Commentary*, Vol. IV, pp. 153-4.

The Megarian decree has not survived as an inscription, so its terms must be inferred from other evidence. Further, Thucydides provided the only first-hand evidence for the decree, so one needs to piece together his disparate comments in order to understand the timeline for its enactment.¹¹⁴ The timeline starts in 446/5 when the 30 Years Peace was sworn between Athens and ‘the Spartans and their allies’, which according to Thucydides was ‘entered into after the affair of Euboea’.¹¹⁵ The Euboean affair referred to that island’s revolt, along with Megara, from the Athenian alliance.¹¹⁶

In 433, during the debate about Corcyra, the Corinthian envoys referred to unfavourable Athenian conduct towards Megara. This conduct may have referred to the Megarian decrees or alternatively refers to Athens accepting Megara as an ally in 457/6 after a dispute with Corinth. This alliance was not popular with Corinth since previously Megara was allied to Sparta and Corinth. Indeed, Thucydides stated that the creation and garrisoning of the long walls in Megara was the principal cause of Corinthian hatred towards Athens.¹¹⁷

A year later, in 432/1 during an assembly of Sparta’s allies, the Megarians complained they were excluded from the ports of the Athenian Empire and market of Athens in breach of the 30 Years Peace.¹¹⁸ In the same year, Pericles, speaking to the Athenians about the Megarian decree said, ‘You must leave no lingering suspicions in your own minds that you went to war over a trifle’.¹¹⁹ Pericles also stated that Athens would allow Megara the use of Athenian markets and its harbours when Sparta suspends its acts against resident aliens.¹²⁰ Later the same year, the Spartans’ second embassy to Athens argued that war might be prevented if it revoked the Megarian decree, but Thucydides stated that Athens was not inclined to revoke the decree.¹²¹ Its declared rationale was Megarian cultivation of

¹¹⁴ Thuc. 1.139.1.

¹¹⁵ Thuc. 1.87.6 and 1.115.1. See also Diod. 12.7 and Paus. V.23.4. For a discussion of the Peace, see Gomme, *Commentary*, Vol 1 pp. 347-9.

¹¹⁶ Thuc. 1.114.1. Gomme pointed out that all the Euboean cities likely paid their tribute in the spring of 446, so they must have seceded after this date, see Gomme, *Commentary*, Vol. 1 p. 340. For another discussion of this Thucydides’ section, see Simon Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides Volume I: Books I-III*, Oxford, 1991, pp. 184-5.

¹¹⁷ Thuc. 1.103.4. Gomme also mentioned the Athenian occupation of Pegai, see Gomme, *Commentary*, Vol. 1, p. 305.

¹¹⁸ The best evidence that Megara was a Spartan ally is provided in the listing of allies at Thuc. 2.9.2.

¹¹⁹ Thuc. 1.140.4 as translated at Jeremy Mynott, *Thucydides: The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians*, Cambridge, 2013, p. 84.

¹²⁰ Thuc. 1.144.2.

¹²¹ Thuc 1.139.2.

consecrated ground and unenclosed border land, as well as harbouring runaway slaves from Athens, but Athens had a broader grievance after losing control of Megara.¹²²

Given these various comments by Thucydides, or words placed into speeches by him, modern scholars have debated both the scope of the Megarian Decree and whether the decree breached the terms of the 30 Year Peace. This peace has not survived in inscription so one cannot definitely state the Megarian decree was a breach, especially given the comment by Pericles there was ‘... nothing in the treaty to prevent (it).’¹²³ Nevertheless, Kagan strongly argued that it did not.¹²⁴ Whether there were multiple related decrees is also contentious.¹²⁵ Scholars have also argued whether the decree was a pretext for Athenian aggression or a reasonable, moderate response to Megarian provocation, especially given the argument, based on Plutarch *Per.* 30.2, that the decree followed an earlier decree in which a herald was to be sent to Megara to make the Athenian case. Further debates have occurred about the decree’s contribution to the eventual Peloponnesian War. Was it a major cause or just a preliminary skirmish for a war that was always going to occur or indeed was already in progress? The scope of the economic boycott has been debated, particularly whether exclusion from the ‘harbours of the empire’ included the Peiraieus. Some writers, such as de Ste Croix, argued that it did not based on the premise that Attica was not part of the Athenian empire.¹²⁶ Further, given that Thucydides’ use of the term ἀγορᾶ (agora) may imply a broader definition than simply ‘market-place’, there is debate about whether exclusion from the Athenian agora extended beyond an economic punishment.¹²⁷

Putting aside these specific debates, one can analyse the decree as a classic use of economic statecraft designed to influence both the capabilities and attitudes of foreign states. The first relevant discussion is whether Athens intended to inflict serious economic harm on Megara, or indeed economic ruin. Despite Aristophanes’ comic portrayal of Megarian starvation and hardship in his 425 play *Acharnians*, de Ste Croix justifiably argued that it was not enacted to harm the Megarian economy seriously.¹²⁸ According to Thucydides, the decree

¹²² Thuc. 1.139.2. Gomme commented on the legality and ethics of harbouring runaway slaves. Gomme, *Commentary*, Vol. 1, p. 449.

¹²³ Thuc. 1.144.2.

¹²⁴ D. Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*, Ithaca NY, 1969, pp. 266-7.

¹²⁵ For example, G. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, London, 1972, p. 225ff.

¹²⁶ de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, p. 287.

¹²⁷ This debate was summarised at Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, p. 424.

¹²⁸ See Aristoph. *Ach.* Line 524 and de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, pp. 252-89.

prohibited the Megarians from accessing other markets and harbours. Nevertheless, as French argued, Thucydides' description of the decree did not prohibit traders from other states bringing trade goods to Megara or taking trade goods from Megara to other markets.¹²⁹

The decree's economic impact on Megara remains unknown, given the lack of knowledge about Megara's dependence on trade with Athens and her allies, and whether Athens enforced the boycott through siege or blockade. No information is available on the extent to which Megarian trade with Corinth and other states would have softened the impact. The decree's joint impact with the Charinus Decree, recorded by Plutarch, is also unknown.¹³⁰ The latter decree promised death to all Megarians who set foot in Attica and required the generals (στρατηγοί - strategoi) to swear an oath to invade the Megarid twice each year.

If not enacted to impose serious economic harm on Megara, the decree's intended outcome remains debatable. The Athenian intent was unlikely an attempt to force Megara to rejoin the Athenian alliance. Nevertheless, as argued by de Ste. Croix, Athens may have intended to humiliate the Megarians, not only Megarian traders.¹³¹ Legon posed another rationale, arguing the decree intended to disrupt or frustrate the timber trade to Athens' potential foes. Legon made the conjectural argument that Megara played a key role in procuring and shipping timber from Macedonia and Thrace to Corinth and Peloponnesian naval states.¹³² Corinth needed timber to rebuild its fleet after defeat by Corcyra in 435.¹³³ In this argument, which Legon classified as 'plausible but circumstantial', the Megarian Decree would have greatly reduced the shipping of timber to these states via Megara. Bissa made a similar, but more specific argument, in which the decree limited the likelihood of strategic supplies, specifically oars, entering the Peloponnese for the looming war.¹³⁴

Is the hypothesis by Legon and Bissa defensible or are other interpretations possible? The decree, as described by Thucydides, would not have prevented Megarian traders

¹²⁹ A. French, 'The Megarian decree', *Historia*, 25, no. 2, 1976, p. 245.

¹³⁰ Plut. *Per.* 30.3. For further commentary on the Charinus decree, see P. Stadter, 'Plutarch, Charinus, and the Megarian Decree', *GRBS*, 25, no. 4, 1984.

¹³¹ de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, p. 284.

¹³² R. Legon, *Megara: The Political History of a Greek City-State to 336 B.C.*, Ithaca NY, 1981, p. 220.

¹³³ Thuc. 1. 29-30.

¹³⁴ Bissa, 'Governmental intervention', p. 180.

collecting timber from, for example, Macedonia and Thrace and taking such timber direct to Corinth or the Peloponnesian states. None of these markets, in which timber was picked up or delivered, were part of the ‘harbours of the empire’, so unless the norm was that such timber, raw or manufactured into oars, was trans-shipped through Megara itself, the decree would not have disrupted the trade in strategic materials. In summary, this hypothesis is not supported by other scholars given its basis, as Legon admits, in circumstantial evidence.

From an economic perspective, the decree was more likely an attempt to force Megara to be self-sufficient in agriculture for a period of time, which would have adversely impacted the well-being of its citizens without ever threatening starvation. In doing so the Athenians aimed to use an economic measure as a middle course between doing nothing in response to the perceived or actual Megarian actions and a military attack which would unarguably breach the Peace, this generating adverse responses from several unfriendly states. By responding in a manner knowingly designed not to be a breach of the 30 Years Peace, Athens created messages to other unfriendly states, with a reduced likelihood of generating adverse military action. Nevertheless, as Kagan rightly argued, this moderate approach was not risk-free since Megarian complaints to Sparta may have generated an immediate Spartan military response.¹³⁵

Who were these target states and what were the messages that Athens was sending to them? First, to Megara, Athens sent the message it could have inflicted severe economic punishment, but consciously chose not to. That is, the decree was a warning to Megara to return to Athenian favour and not to support Athens’ enemies or next time there could be irreparable economic punishment. To Sparta, Athens demonstrated its sea power available to enforce the boycott and thus weaken Sparta’s ally, Megara. That is, the message to Sparta was that in further dealing with its allies, especially during councils of war against Athens, both Sparta and its allies should be clearly aware of the extent of Athens’ seapower, which allowed Athens to make various graduated political and economic responses. Athens demonstrated it was moderate in its actions this time, but should not be pushed otherwise stronger responses were available. Although no evidence exists Athens blockaded Megara, states could infer Athens was capable of doing so. That is, any state should remain aware that going to war against Athens created the risk of economic blockades.

¹³⁵ Donald Kagan, *Thucydides: The Reinvention of History*, London, 2009, p. 64.

Athens also sent political messages to other states. To Corinth and other Spartan allies, Athens warned they should remain wary of Athens' sea power. If they offended Athens, as had Megara, a similar or more damaging Athenian response might happen to them. Quarrelling with Athens may lead to Athenian seapower being applied against them. Further, these states needed to recognise that allies may not be reliable in any actions against Athens, because these allies may fear becoming a target of Athens in similar ways to its actions against Megara. In contrast, the message sent to Athens' allies was they could rely on Athenian seapower to defend them in times of need. That is Athens, would remain a loyal ally who would support friendly states when they were wronged.

Macedonia

The only example of Macedonian behaviour that could be interpreted as a trade boycott requires an inference from Athens' Methone decrees. Perdiccas, the Macedonian king, excluded the people of Methone from entering Macedonia whilst also preventing them sailing through Macedonia's coastal waters, presumably for local trade or to access other locations. The decree records two separate Athenian delegations to Perdiccas did not convince him to lift the restrictions, motivating the Athenian tariff exemptions discussed earlier.

This Macedonian action bears some elements common with the Megarian decree, but insufficient evidence exists to categorically state it was a trade boycott of Methone. For example, because trade was not specially mentioned, uncertainty exists whether Macedonia prevented Methone from exporting goods to Macedonia and indeed using Macedonian waters to export goods to other states. Whilst any prohibition of Methonians entering Macedonia would naturally apply to Methonian traders, it would not at face value apply to foreign traders bring Methonian goods to Macedonia. Further, the boycott did not prevent Methone from trading with other states, provided they could do so by avoiding Macedonian waters.

Assuming Macedonia implemented some limited form of trade boycott, its goals were unclear. Most likely, Macedonia pressurised Methone to cut-off friendly relations with Athens and recognise Macedonian suzerainty. The form of the pressure demonstrated Macedonia could inflict economic hurt on Methone in a form short of military action. Similar to Athens' motives in enacting the Megarian decree, Macedonia was demonstrating to both friends and potential enemies its ability to apply and enforce non-military measures against other states. Unfortunately for Macedonia, the resultant Athenian support to Methone would

have the reverse effect to the one Perdiccas intended, reinforcing Methone's friendly relations with Athens rather than forcing Methone to break them.

Aegina and Argos

Herodotus reported the Argives and Aeginetans banned the introduction of Attic products into their temples, requiring their citizens to drink out of only native earthenware.¹³⁶ Whilst this boycott most likely grew of a long-standing feud between these states and Athens, their motive, apart from an obvious demonstration of hostility, was uncertain. Athenian pottery exports were extensive so its exports to Argos and Aegina for temple use were unlikely to be large enough to decrease severely the overall Athenian export market. If they were then the boycott was an effective message to Athens saying that although they could not hurt Athens militarily, Argos and Aegina had economic measures at their disposal of which Athens should be cognisant. But given the impact on Athenian exports was not large, and pottery was hardly a strategic good, then the message was much more muted.

Thasos

The only other example of a possible trade boycott was a law enacted by Thasos, likely in the early fourth-century, which prohibited Thasian ships importing foreign wine from a large specified region.¹³⁷ Whether a missing clause also prohibited wine imports using foreign ships is unknown. Like the Macedonian boycott discussed earlier, the decree, at face value, would not have prevented foreign ships circumventing the boycott. Further, there is insufficient evidence to indicate the boycott was intended as a form of economic statecraft aimed to influence other states. It was more likely a protectionist measure aimed at Thasian wine production.

Findings on Trade Boycotts

Trade boycotts, of which the most famous is the Megarian Decree, could be used to achieve specific economic effects as well as sending a strong political message to the targeted

¹³⁶ Hdt. 5.88.

¹³⁷ IG XII Suppl. 347, II available at www.epigraphy.packham.org and discussed at Leopold Migeotte, *The Economy of the Greek Cities: From the Archaic Period to the Early Roman Empire*, Berkeley, 2009, p. 152.

and onlooking states without the enacting state needing to progress into full-blown military action. Thus, boycotts provided states the ability to make graduated responses that may or may not be followed by more severe forms of statecraft. Despite the utility of trade boycotts, they were rarely used in the ancient Greek world.

Other economic measures

The scope of this chapter, discussed in its introduction, was to consider four other forms of trade-related economic measures, namely market dumping, export/import subsidies, business bans and preclusive buying.

First, there is no evidence any ancient state applied market dumping, the deliberate sale of exports at markedly reduced prices to disrupt the economy of targeted states. Neither is there any evidence of import/export subsidies as financial incentives aimed at attracting imports to, or exports from a state. Thirdly, no state in the ancient Greek world banned any type of business in a foreign state from trading within its borders.

No state appeared to perform preclusive buying, targeting the purchase of goods in order to deny them to other targeted states. One could argue Athens' monopoly of *Kean miltos* was a form of preclusive buying in that any ochre shipped privately to Athens automatically became Athenian property and was unavailable for direct sale to other states. But this Athenian monopoly is better characterised as an export restriction and was adequately discussed under that category.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the use of specific trade-related economic measures used by ancient states to influence the capabilities, attitudes and behaviours of other states. It has also made some initial findings on each form of economic measure. Chapter Three will next examine the remaining, and arguably most valuable type of trade-related measure, namely the gifting and sale of strategic goods amongst states. Later chapters will discuss capital-related economic measures. Chapter Seven will synthesise the findings in all these chapters to draw conclusions about how states created integrated economic measures to achieve their desired strategic objectives.

CHAPTER THREE

SELLING AND GIFTING OF STRATEGIC MATERIALS

Introduction

This chapter completes the analysis of trade-related economic measures by considering how some states leveraged their ownership of strategic materials. Strategic materials were those goods vitally important to ancient states, allowing them to feed their population, mint their own coins, and provide adequate military forces to defend their territories. Such strategic materials comprised wheat and other grains, warship materials such as specific woods, pitch and ochres, other weapons, and the precious metals required to mint coins.¹

Not all states needed to acquire strategic materials from other states. If a state was blessed by available reserves in its own home territory (*χώρα* - *chora*), or other areas it controlled, then it was not a target for other states willing to provide such strategic materials as a means of influence or control. For example, a state with sufficient agrarian land to feed its own population would not likely be targeted by grain-rich states. Further, a state would not be targeted if it did not need specific materials for strategic purpose. Thus, for example, a land-based state, not wanting to create its own maritime fleet, would not be influenced by another state offering hard-to-obtain shipbuilding materials, such as the right type of wood to make ship masts or oars.

¹ The thesis will not consider other popular products, such as salt, given that although highly desirable, they are not considered strategic material. For a discussion of the salt trade, see Walter Scheidel *et al.* (eds.), *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World*, Cambridge, MA., 2007, pp. 342-66 and Cristina Carusi "Vita humanior sine sale non quit degere": demand for salt and salt trade patterns in the ancient Greek world', in *The Ancient Greek Economy: Markets Households and City-States*, Edward M. Harris, David M. Lewis and Mark Woolmer (eds.), Cambridge, 2016, pp. 337-54.

Chandezon analysed the great challenges that small states experienced in becoming, or remaining, self-sufficient, discussing, inter alia, Aristotle's comments about autarkic difficulties.² Given the reality that most states were small, as explained in *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis* and in *Jenseits von Athen und Sparta*, they were, prima facie, vulnerable to economic statement by larger, well-resourced states.³

Strategic materials, available to a state in excess of its own requirements, could be sold or gifted to other states. The sale of such materials was no different to trade in any other goods, although more critical to the importing state. Gifting was a traditional means of influence through the Archaic period, albeit usually between key individuals rather than state-to-state. Further, gift-giving was usually applied in specific contexts such as marriages and the creation/renewal of friendship ties (*ξενία -xenia*). Hesiod wrote of 'gift-eating chiefs' whilst Homer described, in the *Iliad*, how Agamemnon attempted to influence Achilles through cities that will '... honour him like a god with gifts'.⁴ Hesiod also provided evidence of the relationship between gift-giving and trade.⁵ Herodotos provided other examples of gift-giving designed to influence, such as Croesus of Lydia providing gifts to the Delphic sanctuary.⁶

To understand how strategic materials were utilised as economic measures by certain states, this chapter will now analyse specific types of such materials. The analysis will start with grains, move on to timber and precious metals, and conclude with weapons. In examining examples of the use of each type of strategic material as an economic measure, the circumstances of the sale or gift will be discussed, as well as the outcomes the states providing the materials were trying to achieve. For each of these strategic materials the

² Christophe Chandezon 'Les petites cités et leur vie économique. Ou: comment avoir les moyens d'être une polis?', *Topoi*, 18, 2013, pp. 37–65.

For Aristotle's comments, see Arist. Pol. 7.4.1326b. Note also the relevant comments by the 'Old Oligarch' at Ps. Xen. *Const. Ath.* 2.12.

³ M. Hansen and T. Neilsen *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis*, Oxford, 2004; Hans-Joachim Gehrke *Jenseits von Athen und Sparta: Das Dritte Griechenland und seine Staatenwelt*, Munich, 1986. See also discussion at Mogens Herman Hansen, *Polis: An Introduction to the Ancient Greek City-State*, Oxford, 2006, especially Chapter 12.

⁴ Alternatively translated as '... bribe-swallowing lords', see Hes. *WD.* 38-9. See also Hom. *Il.* 9.149-155.

⁵ For a discussion of archaic trade, including commentary on Hesiod, see van Wees, H. 'The Economy', in Kurt A. Raaflaub and Hans van Wees (eds.), *A Companion to Archaic Greece*, West Sussex, 2009, pp. 444-67.

⁶ Hdt. 1.50-51 and 1.87, the latter referencing Croesus' gifts to Apollo.

chapter provides some initial findings that will later be integrated into the broader discussions in Chapter Seven.

Grain as strategic material

Grain dependence

Grains, primarily wheat and barley, were a strategic material attractive to those states which had insufficient production to feed their populations.⁷ Whether any state required grain imports depended on several variables, including its population, the availability of arable land, seasonal rainfall and climatic variability. States which produced beyond their own needs could target states with insufficient internal production. They could also target states which did not maximise their local production because of their desire for better grains available from other states. But several factors constrained the use of grains as an economic measure. First, grain was a perishable resource susceptible to fungi and other contaminants during transport and storage. If used to influence other states, grain needed selling or gifting within weeks, or at best a few months of harvesting.⁸ Second, arable land was more often in diffused ownership, cultivated by numerous private individuals. The ability of a state to acquire the surpluses of diverse farmers depended on the extent a state could control its citizens. Arguably, a monarch could more easily centralise grain stockpiles through directing grain to royal granaries. Creating centralised surpluses was also easier for those states who allowed their citizens to pay taxes using grain.⁹ This adaptation of the system of ἀπαρχαί (*aparchai* - first fruits), which was also used in non-exporting states, had the potential to provide the state with disposable grain surpluses.

Debate continues about the scale of, and need for, grain imports by ancient states. Calculating a state's dependency requires, as Whitby insightfully argued in the context of Athens, several complex assumptions about carrying capacity, productivity, population and

⁷ Theophrastos discussed the different types of cereals, see Thphr. *HP* 8.4. For a modern discussion of the types of grain and their Greek terms, see A. Bresson, *The Making of the Ancient Greek Economy: Institutions, Markets, and Growth in the City-States*, Princeton, 2016, p. 120.

⁸ For a discussion of grain problems, see Peter Gerritt van Alfen, 'Pant'agatha: Commodities in Levantine-Aegean Trade During the Persian Period, 6-4 th c. B.C.', unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Texas, 2002, p. 89, n238.

⁹ Such as the Athenian grain-tax law discussed in Chapter Two.

grain consumption.¹⁰ Further, evidence of grain imports does not always imply long-term subsistence problems for they could simply be a response to annual production variabilities, or even the desire for, and market access to, better quality grains than could be grown locally.¹¹ Nevertheless, evidence exists for large-scale imports during food crises, caused by climate-induced crop shortages, with such shortages becoming more common in the fourth century.¹² Shortages were common for wheat and leguminous crops and less so for barley which could be grown in poorer soils and with lower rainfalls.¹³ States that likely had regular fourth-century grain shortages, or at the least needed to import grain, included Athens, Corinth, Klazomenai, Selymbria, Andros, Chios, Samos, Teos and possibly Lesbos.¹⁴ The Peloponnesian states, especially Sparta, were likely less dependent since in good years sufficient grain was grown, primarily in Laconia, Messenia, Elis and maybe the Argolid. Nevertheless, even these states may have needed grain imports during famines.

Attica relied on grain imports being one of the driest areas of Greece with a large population, poor soils and high probability of harvest failure.¹⁵ The extent of the annual

¹⁰ Michael Whitby, 'The grain trade of Athens in the fourth century BC', in *Trade, Traders and the Ancient City*, H. Parkins and C. Smith (eds.), London, 1998, p. 103.

¹¹ As van Alfen argued, Athens initially considered wheat '... as a luxury foodstuff to be used alongside, or if possible, in place of indigenous barley.', see van Alfen, 'Pant'agatha', p. 86. Aristophanes sneered at barley in comparison to wheat at Aristoph. *Wasps* 717-8. Garnsey argued Athenian demand for foreign grain was driven not by severe shortages but by a desire for better quality wheat, see P. Garnsey, *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World: Responses to Risk and Crisis*, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 50-1 and 99-105. For the counter view see Moreno, *Feeding the Democracy*, p. 319. In the late Archaic period possibly only bread made from wheat was eaten by wealthy Athenians, but was gradually eaten more widely, see Bresson, *Making*, p. 121. Theophrastus reported on Attica's excellent reputation for producing barley, see Thphr. *HP*. 8.8.2.

¹² Garnsey lists likely dates for Athenian food crises at Garnsey, *Famine*, pp. 157-9. See also a summary of the dates of likely food shortages at Alfonso Moreno, *Feeding the Democracy: The Athenian Grain Supply in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC*, Oxford, 2007, p. 311.

¹³ For a discussion of different grains, see Bresson, *Making*, pp. 120-1.

¹⁴ An extensive list of literature concerns the food supply of states in the ancient Greek world. For a detailed analysis of Athenian demand, see Moreno, *Feeding the Democracy*, Chapter 1. For a work focused on early Hellenistic Athens, but with insights relevant to the late Classical period, see G.J. Oliver, *War, Food, and Politics in Early Hellenistic Athens*, Oxford, 2007. For references, either express or implied, of Athenian grain traffic see Xen.*Hell.* 1.1.35, 2.1.17, 5.1.28, 5.4.60 and 6.1.11; Dem. 4.34, 17.20, 18.87. Klazomenai is also mentioned at Aristot. *Econ.* 2.1348b. Other relevant books and articles include Garnsey, *Famine*, Part III; J. Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth: A History of the City to 338 BC*, Oxford, 1984, p. 130; E. Bloedow, 'Corn supply and Athenian imperialism', *AC*, 44, no. 1, 1975, p. 28, n44. For an example of an Athenian inscription referring to a grain shortage, see RO 95 (*IG* II² 360) discussed at P. Rhodes and R. Osborne (eds.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions 404-323 BC*, Oxford, 2003, pp. 478-86. See also the 'Teian imprecations' inscription discussed in Chapter Two.

¹⁵ See relevant comments at Thuc. 1.2.3 and 1.2.5 with commentary by Simon Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides Volume I: Books I-III*, Oxford, 1991, p. 12; Strabo 9.1.8; Dem. 20.29-41; Isoc. 17.57.

Athenian grain shortfall remains uncertain as is the date in which Athens started importing grain. Some evidence is clear, such as Xenophon commenting the Spartan blockade of the Peiraieus in 405 prevented grain imports and brought starvation to Athens.¹⁶ Much later, in the mid fourth-century, various speeches by Demosthenes revealed the extent of Athens' vulnerability to grain shortages.¹⁷ In 355/4 he commented that Athens '... relied on imported grain more than any other nation', reminding the Athenians it was every patriotic citizen's duty to take care of grain shipments to the Peiraieus.¹⁸ In response, by the late fourth century the assembly's agenda included formal discussion of the grain supply.¹⁹

Athens and other states, whilst trying to attract gifts and imports of grain from generous foreign states, especially in periods of food shortage, recognised their susceptibility to political pressures from the exporting states. Thus, some states did all they could to ensure their desired grain supply, for example by creating a public fund and entrusting officials to use these funds to acquire grain.²⁰ Athens, in particular, was anxious to employ every means at its disposal to ensure its desired supply, including processes to both subsidise and stabilise grain prices. Through a series of so-called grain laws, Athens regulated that grain was not to be imported to any port but the Peiraieus, making it a capital offence for persons resident in Athens to do so.²¹ Further, Athens used targeted cleruchies to secure its grain supply in specific regions.²²

Despite taking measures to guarantee the grain supply, many states requiring foreign grain remained susceptible to other states using their grain surpluses as an economic measure. The states for which evidence exists comprise the Black Sea states, the Sicilian states, Egypt, Cyrene and some minor exporters. After discussing these states, this section will conclude with a unique example, where Athens used another state's grain as an economic measure to influence one of its allies. Interestingly, although Macedonia was a major grain producer one

¹⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.9-11.

¹⁷ One example is at Dem. 35 (*Against Lacritus*).

¹⁸ Dem 20.31 with the comment repeated at Dem. 18.87. See also comment at Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.13.

¹⁹ Aristot. *Const. Ath.* 43.4.

²⁰ For a detailed summary of the responsibilities of the Athenian grain officials, see Appendix 4 of Moreno, *Feeding the Democracy*.

²¹ There are seven laws relating to the grain trade from Athens, with an excellent summary provided at Maria Areti Errietta Bissa, 'Governmental intervention in foreign trade in archaic and classical Greece', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University College London, 2008, pp. 218-33. Ancient texts describing elements of the grain laws include Lys. 22.6, Dem. 34.37, 35.50-1, 56.6 and 56.11, Lyc. 1.27, Aristot. *Const. Ath.* 51.4.

²² See discussion in Chapter 3 of Moreno, *Feeding the Democracy*.

cannot find evidence of grain exports during the Classical period. Only in the Hellenistic period did Macedonia provide grain to other states.²³

Black Sea states

Given its climate and rainfall, especially on the north and west coasts, the Black Sea region was well-suited to grain production. By the late fifth or early fourth century, the Black Sea states became an important grain source for several Greek states.²⁴ In particular, the kingdom of the Cimmerian Bosphorus, ruled by the Spartokid dynasty, was a major fourth-century grain supplier to Athens. According to Demosthenes, Leucon, the Spartokid king from 393-353, provided Athens with large quantities of wheat annually, through his two main emporia at Pantikapaion and Theodosia.²⁵ After the reign of Spartokos II and Paerisades ended in 344/3, no firm evidence exists to support the continuation of this grain trade. Thus, the export of grain to Athens by the Cimmerian Bosphorus lasted for about a century.

Private traders handled the Athenian grain trade although Athens protected the grain ships and regulated the grain trade once the grain reached the Peiraieus. At that stage, officials supervised and controlled the local buying and selling of grain.²⁶ So how could the Spartokids, providing permission to private traders, believe providing grain would eventually influence the Athenian state? The answer is revealed in Demosthenes' comment that Athenian traders obtained Cimmerian permission to export grain and receive an exemption from duty in the name of their state.²⁷ Second, the Athenian state knew the Cimmerian Bosphorus was providing grain exports, as evidenced by its formal recognition of Leucon as

²³ For example, in 283/2 BC, Athens honoured Philippides who arranged through King Lysimachos of Macedonia, a gift of 10,000 Attic *medimnoi* of wheat, see *IG II³ 1 877*.

²⁴ Xen. *Ec.* 20.27.

²⁵ Demosthenes in his speech Against Leptines (Dem. 20.31-2) stated that Athens imported 400,000 *medimnoi* per annum from the Bosphorus. A debate continues about whether this amount came solely from the Cimmerian Bosphorus or the whole Black Sea region. The arguments are outlined at Joseph Nicholas Jansen, 'After Empire: Xenophon's *Poroi* and the Reorientation of Athens' Political Economy', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Texas, 2007, p. 179. For other perspective on the debate about how much grain was provided, see R. Hopper, *Trade and Industry in Classical Greece*, London, 1979, pp. 91-2; G.J. Oliver, *War, Food, and Politics*, pp. 18-22 and Mirko Canevaro, *Demostene, Contro Leptine: Introduzione, Traduzione e Commento Storico*, Berlin, 2016, pp. 56-7. The dates of Leucon's reign remain contentious, with one alternative being from 387/6 to 347/6, see discussion at Julia Heskell, 'The foreign policy of Philip II down to the Peace of Philocrates', unpublished Ph.D thesis, Harvard, 1987, p. 136.

²⁶ Aristot. *Const. Ath.* 43.4; Dem. 18.301-2.

²⁷ Dem. 34.36.

a benefactor, provided with citizenship rights but exempt from the liturgy obligation.²⁸ Further, in 347/6, Androtion sponsored an Athenian decree honouring Leucon's sons for continuing the relationship through support to Athenian private traders. The decree provided the sons with the same rights as Leucon as well as golden crowns for renewing Athenian import privileges.²⁹

The wheat may not have been gifted but sold at a reasonable price, supporting the argument that the primary driver for the sale was the revenue generated for the Spartokids rather than any intent to influence Athens.³⁰ The revenue comprised both the grain price as well as any revenues from import/export duties. Other flow-on economic benefits occurred, namely the increased volume of Greek imports to the Black Sea. Greek traders brought Aegean cargoes to the Black Sea for sale before transporting grain on the return trips.³¹

When a state gifted such strategic resources there is no such argument, unless one can argue ancient states acted through pure altruism. But even if a desire to raise revenue and promote trade were the Spartokids' major motivations, one should not discount their desire to provide a valuable service to Athens, not for altruistic reasons but to create enduring *eunoia*. Why would this be so? Athens was never a military threat to the Spartokid regime, even though the Spartokids had taken Nymphaion from Athens towards the end of the Peloponnesian War.³² Further, no evidence exists Athens considered it could take military control of the Cimmerian wheatfields, in the way that it had attempted, in the fifth-century, to take military control of timber-rich regions in Thrace. Given the ongoing Spartokid friendship and its reliability as a source of supply, military action with an unknown likelihood of success was not prudent. Nevertheless, any state tries to minimise the number of potential enemies and create the conditions in which foreign states could become future allies. The

²⁸ Dem. 20.30.

²⁹ *IG II² 212 (SIG³ 206)* with detailed discussion at Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, pp. 318-24. In *SEG 53-218ibis*, comment is made that Veligianni and Terzi studied the repetitive crowning of benefactors, with it occurring only once in the Classical period (*IG II² 212*), becoming more common during the Hellenistic period but only in the northern parts of the ancient Greek world, namely Thrace and the Black Sea.

³⁰ As argued at Scheidel *et al.* (eds.), *Cambridge Economic History*, p. 382.

³¹ For examples of such trade, see Dem. 34 and Dem. 35. For the volume of such trade, one is informed by Didymos' commentary on Demosthenes, analysed in chapter 7 of Alain Bresson *La cité marchande*, Ausonius Éditions, 2000. Philip seized, at the one time, 230 ships bound for Athens, but presumably having all sailed from the Aegean on the outbound journey.

³² An act which can be inferred from Aeschin. 3.171.

Spartokids would have understood that continuing to provide grain to Athens would have reduced the likelihood Athens would consider supporting any military action against them. Further, the Spartokids would have realised future threats may arise in which the help of a powerful state like Athens could be critical, or at the worst, simply useful. Creating Athenian *eunoia*, even if it was secondary to raising much-needed revenue, was worthwhile.

Athenian friendship also created more tangible benefits for the Spartokids. First, Demosthenes implied some form of immunity to the Cimmerian leaders who owned assets in Athens.³³ Second, the inscription honouring Leucon's sons indicated Athens provided the ships' officers sought by the Cimmerians.³⁴ That is, the Cimmerians directly benefitted from Athenian naval expertise, which would have been of enduring value given their reign over a coastal kingdom. Third, providing grain would also have created Athenian attitudes supportive of the various Cimmerians residing in Athens during the Classical Period.³⁵ Finally, the inscription also implied that Athenian *eunoia* might also have provided benefits to the Cimmerians in obtaining unspecified goods and service from Athenian markets.

The Black Sea states, including the Cimmerian Bosphorus, may also have provided grain to other Greek states, but the ancient evidence for such trade remains meagre. For example, Demosthenes recorded that on one occasion Cimmerian grain arrived in Akanthos.³⁶ But in this circumstance the Cimmerians did not provide the grain knowing it was going to the Chalcidice, for the trader was an Athenian, Lampis, who diverted a shipment the Cimmerians would have thought destined for Athens. The only other specific early reference to grain exports is Herodotus' comment that in 480 Xerxes observed grain ships bound for Aegina and the Peloponnese.³⁷ Archaeological evidence does not indicate a major

³³ See Dem. 31/34/40 which are not clear on the form of the immunity, whether they be freedom from taxation or freedom from duty to perform a public service, although the latter would have been of questionable benefit since Leucon and his sons were honorary citizens, living away from Athens.

³⁴ RO 64 (*IG II² 212*) translated and discussed at Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, pp. 318-24. A debate exists as to the type of crewman provided by Athens, either publicly-owned slaves who rowed on Athenian warships or free-citizen, non-rowing crew such as the helmsman, bow officer and their assistants. For a summary of the arguments see D. Engen, *Honor and Profit: Athenian Trade Policy and the Economy and Society of Greece, 415-307 B.C.E.*, Ann Arbor, 2010, p. 212.

³⁵ Isocrates talked of 'citizens of Pontus' resident in Athens, see Isoc. 17.5.

³⁶ Dem. 34.36.

³⁷ Hdt. 7.147.2. Note Hdt. 6.5.3 and 6.26.1 also mention ships leaving the Black Sea in 494, for which one could infer they were grain ships.

grain trade with the Black Sea early in the fifth-century.³⁸ Whether or not this early trade existed, no substantive evidence exists for such trade continuing through the Classical Period. If the trade was ongoing, as has been argued for the Cimmerian Bosphorus, the most likely rationale for supplying grain to Aegina and the Peloponnesian states was to raise revenue, with a lesser motive to generate *eunoia* within the states supplied with grain. Generating *eunoia* amongst these states was less important in this instance than valuing Athenian *eunoia*. No Peloponnesian state, apart from Corinth, had maritime power able to threaten the Black Sea states or project seapower in their support. Thus, creating *eunoia* within Peloponnesian states was not likely to have ever been of any practical advantage to the Black Sea states. Whilst Aegina had a second-tier maritime capability, any feeling of *eunoia* towards the Spartokids would unlikely to have led to practical assistance.

Sicilian states

Sicily was renowned for its abundant grain supplies, with Thucydides using a speech by Nicias to describe the Sicilians having the advantage of home-grown grain.³⁹ During the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides recorded that Sicilian states exported grain to, at least, the Peloponnese.⁴⁰ By the fourth century, Sicilian grain also reached Athens.⁴¹ But although one could argue Sicily could use its grain surpluses to generate *eunoia* with the Peloponnesians and later Athens, specific evidence, of uncertain historicity, exists for only one occasion in which a Sicilian state attempted to use its grain resources directly to influence foreign states. Herodotos recorded that in 481 the Syracusan tyrant Gelon offered to provide grain for the whole Greek army until the end of the Persian War.⁴² This offer was conditional on him being given a significant command within the Greek forces. The Spartan and Athenian ambassadors rejected this demand so Gelon did not provide the grain. Nevertheless, whilst unsuccessful with his primary target states, the attempt had an important second-order effect

³⁸ See the series of archaeological texts cited at Scheidel *et al.* (eds.), *Cambridge Economic History*, p. 364. A similar conclusion is drawn at Moreno, *Feeding the Democracy*, p. 161. Note that Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.35, is the earliest direct reference to Athenian imports of grain from the Black Sea. No evidence indicates that grain from the Cimmerian Bosphorus reached Athens before the reign of Leucon's father, Satyrus I (433/2-389/8).

³⁹ Thuc. 6.20.4.

⁴⁰ Thuc. 3.86.4. Hornblower considered the primary importer was Corinth, see Hornblower, *Thuc. Volume I*, p. 493.

⁴¹ For example, see Dem. 32.4 and Dem. 56.9.

⁴² Hdt. 7.158.4-5.

in demonstrating to the various Sicilian states the extent of Gelon's power and influence.⁴³ Of course, for that political message to have been received, Gelon's offer would need to have been public knowledge.

Egypt

Insufficient evidence exists to argue an independent Egyptian state supplied grain to the Greek states in the late Archaic period. Later, during the Classical period, Egypt may have provided grain on six occasions.⁴⁴ The first instance, according to Diodorus, occurred when Erechtheus provided grain to Athens at a time of famine, after which he was made king.⁴⁵ No evidence suggests Egypt providing this grain was anything more than altruistic.

The next grain export occurred c445, when Psammetichos may have gifted 30,000-40,000 *medimnoi* of grain to Athens.⁴⁶ Such a gift, although partially altruistic, was more likely to have been influenced by the occasional Athenian military forays in Egypt. Egypt would have desired a friendly Athens less likely to take adverse military action against them.

The next occasion requires an inference from Thucydides that Egypt (and Libya) also provided grain to Sparta and its allies during the Peloponnesian War. No evidence exists to infer Egypt was trying to influence Spartan behaviours and attitudes.⁴⁷ Next, in 396 the Egyptian king, Nephereus, in response to a request for an alliance from the Spartans, gifted 500,000 *medimnoi* of grain.⁴⁸ If one takes Diodorus at face value the gift of grain was used as an economic measure not to ally with Sparta but still create *eunoia*. For the final example,

⁴³ For a discussion about Gelon's motives, see F. de Angelis, 'Going against the grain in Sicilian Greek economics', *G&R*, 53, no. 1, 2006, pp. 37-8.

⁴⁴ For discussions about the evidence of grain from Egypt, see Bresson, *Making*, p. 411 especially n116 and Garnsey, *Famine*, pp. 125-7. Note that Polanyi mentioned a possible another occasion based on a scholion on Aristophanes' *Wasps* 716, when the Egyptian king, Amasis, sent Athens a large quantity of barley during a famine, see Karl Polanyi, *The Livelihood of Man*, New York, 1977, p. 220. This instance remains unmentioned by other scholars.

⁴⁵ Diod.1.29.1.

⁴⁶ Discussed at Garnsey, *Famine*, pp. 125-7 which provides, inter alia, problematic evidence from Plutarch (Plut. *Per.* 37.3) and a scholion on Aristophanes, *Wealth* 178 available at the online F. Dübner, *Scholía Graeca in Aristophanem*, Paris, 1877 (repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1969). The scholion indicates that in the early fourth century, c390, the Athenians, being short of grain, requested grain from the Egyptian king, also proposing friendship and alliance. Three thousand measures were sent. Note that this gift may have come from Libya.

⁴⁷ Thuc. 4.53.3 and 8.35.2.

⁴⁸ Diod. 14.79.4.

Demosthenes recorded Athenian grain was sourced from Egypt in the mid fourth-century, but there exists no evidence to argue Egypt provided grain other than to raise revenue.⁴⁹ One cannot defensibly infer fourth-century Athens was either a threat to Egypt, or a potential ally, that required Egypt to attempt to generate Athenian *eunoia* through providing grain.

Cyrene

Cyrene, in northern Africa, controlled a *chora* conducive to cereal production.⁵⁰ In the 320s, Cyrene provided 43 gifts of grain including 41 to Greek states, including the biggest shipment to Athens during a period of famine.⁵¹ Although Cyrene could charge whatever price it wanted for such grain, Bresson demonstrated the price was likely well below what they could have demanded.⁵² Cyrene's motive for providing grain to so many states remains uncertain. Were the Cyreneans, as Bresson argued, being altruistic in not exploiting the famine? Was the motive simply to raise revenue or was the primary aim the *eunoia* generated within the states receiving their gifts? The latter is more likely the motive by the oligarchs who controlled Cyrene, given such wide-ranging gifts could not aim to create any specific response amongst so many different states, many of whom were not friendly to other gift recipients. As Rhodes/Osborne correctly argued, at least some of Cyrene's gifts had political motives, given the allocations to Alexander the Great's relatives, but discerning other motives depends on knowing, which we do not, the exact years in which Cyrene supplied the grain.

Other states

The only mainland states capable of generating regular grain surpluses, at least in the fourth century, were Thessaly and Epirus.⁵³ But their surpluses may have been small given Cyrene also provided the Thessalians with a small gift of wheat in the 320s.⁵⁴ No evidence exists these states used any grain surpluses as an economic measure. Similarly, although Boeotia was grain-rich, the sources provide no indication that, for example, Athens received

⁴⁹ See Dem. 56.5-6 and 56.9 as well as mention of Egyptian grain exports at Aristot. *Econ.* 2.1352a.

⁵⁰ First implied by Herodotos in his description of the colonising Therans in Libya, see Hdt. 4.158.

⁵¹ RO 96 (SEG ix 2) translated and discussed at Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, pp. 486-93. For one discussion, see Garnsey, *Famine*, pp. 159-61.

⁵² A. Bresson, 'Grain From Cyrene' in *The Economies of Hellenistic Societies: Third to First Centuries BC*, Oxford, 2011, pp. 66-95.

⁵³ For Thessaly, see Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.56 and 6.1.11. For Epirus, see Lyc. 1.26. Note Garnsey's comment that even Thessaly experienced occasional grain deficits, see Garnsey, *Famine*, p. 162.

⁵⁴ RO 96 (SEG ix 2) translated and discussed at Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, pp. 486-93.

Boeotian grain. Further, although Euboea likely provided grain to Athens, its control by Athens for extended periods mitigated against the use of grain as an economic measure.

Herodotos recorded that early in 479, before Persia entered mainland Greece, Sparta offered to feed Athens for the duration of the coming conflict given the loss of two Athenian harvests.⁵⁵ The source of the offered grain remains obscure. Herodotos did not indicate whether Athens took up this offer, but it was clearly an attempt at economic statecraft to help convince Athens to join the coming war against Persia.

States in Thrace, Chalcidice and parts of Asia Minor may also have supplied grain but there is almost no evidence of its use as an economic measure.⁵⁶ The only possible example was an Athenian inscription of 349/8 honoured Orontes, the Persian satrap of Mysia, for providing grain to an Athenian military expedition operating in the northern Aegean.⁵⁷ Although Athens paid for the grain from the Stratiotic Fund, Persia most likely wanted simply to raise revenue, although one cannot discount its short-term effect on generating Athenian *eunoia*.

Cyprus had sufficient grain reserves to generate surpluses in years of good harvest, but the only available evidence of Cypriot exports is the reference by Andocides to King Evagoras providing Cypriot grain to Athens in the late fifth century after the Sicilian disaster.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, although they had grain surpluses, no evidence exists Cyprus used them as an economic measure to influence other states. Further, it is not known if examples of grain provided to Athens during fourth-century famines at reduced prices was actually Cypriot grain or grain from other states, such as Egypt, shipped by Cypriot merchants.⁵⁹

The states of Magna Graecia may have provided grain to mainland Greek states, including Athens, but as Michell correctly argued the references remain obscure.⁶⁰ Given this

⁵⁵ Hdt. 8.142.4.

⁵⁶ See discussion about wheat from Asia Minor at H. Michell, *The Economics of Ancient Greece*, Cambridge 1957, pp. 264-5.

⁵⁷ IG II³ 295 discussed at Bresson, *Making*, p. 400.

⁵⁸ Andoc. 2.21. This was the same Evagoras who was the subject of a speech by Isocrates, see Isoc. 9.

⁵⁹ See Michell, *Economics*, pp. 262-3.

⁶⁰ See the discussion at Michell, *Economics*, pp. 259-60 including the comment about Pliny quoting a lost work of Sophocles, see Plin. *Nat.* 18.12.

obscurity, no evidence exists they used grain as an economic measure against any Greek states.

Athens

To finish this section, one can examine whether Athens ever used grain as an economic measure. As already discussed, it did not have surpluses necessary to exert influence by providing its own grain to other states. Nevertheless, on one occasion it used another state's grain as an economic measure. Chapter Two analysed these circumstances, when in the 420s Athens decreed Black Sea grain, whose precise origin remains unknown and presumably but not explicitly destined for Athenian markets, could be sent to Methone which was subject to a Macedonian blockade.⁶¹ The use of the accompanying tariff relief as an Athenian economic measure, and the intended political message to Methone, has already been discussed. Suffice to say the primary act to create Methonian *eunoia* and support against Macedonia was the provision of grain, with tariff relief being an important but secondary contributor. Methone could act as a base for any future Athenian military action against Macedonia as well as providing port access to any available timber supplies. Interestingly, what is not known is whether the Black Sea states supplying the grain were aware their exports had been diverted and if they did know, whether they would have objected. One could presume they would not have been concerned, given their intent to influence Athens was not harmed by Athens using the grain to create *eunoia* in Methone.

Findings on Grain

Grain was the least reliable strategic material given it was not always available to export to other states. For example, even the Black Sea grain-producing states produced much less in some years due to climatic or other problems. Such variability led Polybius to comment that grain was sometimes exported from Black Sea states and sometimes imported to them.⁶² Nevertheless, major grain-producing states could create regular grain surpluses that could be used to influence other states.

⁶¹ /G I³ 61.

⁶² Plb. 4.38.

Most states with major grain surpluses were at the periphery of the Greek world, which constrained their ability to use their surpluses as an economic measure. The further away these states were from the states they wanted to target, the more their grain exports needed to be attractive. For example, the Cimmerian Bosphoran kingdom was the furthest from mainland Greece than any other grain-producing regions around the Black Sea. Thus, once it established *eunoia* and other benefits through the regular supply of its grain, the kingdom had less discretion to cancel or reintroduce grain exports in response to specific strategic circumstances. Any sustained attempt to withhold supplies might have led, for example, to Athens seeking more reliable suppliers. Athens could do so because there were many potential grain suppliers unlike, for example, timber, for which there were few suitable suppliers of shipbuilding timber. Thus, in strategic terms, supplying grain remained a long-term economic measure, aimed at sustaining *eunoia* over many years rather than being applied tactically in certain scenarios.

To provide a long-term supply, sometimes a state needed to sustain grain exports even when it suffered its own grain shortages. As Braund argued, a state's rulers may subordinate their subjects' need for grain to the need for uninterrupted export to other states.⁶³ Thus, Isocrates claimed the Spartokids continued exports to Athens during a grain shortage in which they turned away other states' ships.⁶⁴ Indeed, providing grain during its own shortages may have been more effective an economic measure, and created more *eunoia*, than supplying grain when surpluses were available.

Timber as strategic material

The use of timber

Ancient states used timber for shipbuilding, constructing buildings and to create the charcoal necessary for heating and smelting.⁶⁵ Construction standard timber (for ships and buildings) needs to be differentiated from that timber unsuitable for this purpose but suitable

⁶³ D. Braund, 'Black Sea grain for Athens? From Herodotus to Demosthenes', in *The Black Sea in Antiquity: Regional and Interregional Economic Exchanges*, V. Gabrielsen and J. Lund (eds.), Aarhus, 2007, p. 58.

⁶⁴ Isoc. 17.57.

⁶⁵ An early description of using timber for domestic use is provided at Hes. *WD*. 420-435.

for charcoal production.⁶⁶ Whilst all applications were useful, especially to those states with large public building programs, for maritime states shipbuilding timber was a critical strategic material.⁶⁷ Different species were used for different shipbuilding purposes. Shipwrights used oak for keels and fir/pine/cedar for masts, oars and planking.⁶⁸ Meiggs compared the merits of fir and pine, concluding shipwrights preferred fir, but valued good pine more than poor fir. Further, they prized timber suitable for oars since each they shaved oars from a single piece of timber over 4m in length before fitting their blades.⁶⁹

The demand for timber

Maritime states demanded an enduring supply of high-quality, shipbuilding timber, unlike the usual one-off timber demand for major public work programs.⁷⁰ States aspiring to exercise naval power needed both a large supply for initial fleet-building and replacement timber as ships were lost or decayed through normal wear and tear.⁷¹ For example, Thucydides recorded Nicias' concerns about rotting timbers during the Sicilian campaign.⁷² Major shipbuilding programs were also needed to restore a fleet to its previous size after a

⁶⁶ For a discussion of charcoal-suitable timber, see Douglas Olson, 'Firewood and Charcoal in Classical Athens', *Hesperia*, 60, no. 3, 1991, pp. 411-20. Note that some types of timber unsuitable for construction, such as torchwood, was likely used for nocturnal fishing, see Ephraim Lytle, 'Fishing with Fire: Technology, Economy and Two Greek Inscriptions', *Historia*, 67, no. 1, 2018, pp. 61-102.

⁶⁷ Indeed, Plato commented that in an ideal city there should be '... no good fir or mountain pine, not much cypress, and little coastal pine which shipwrights have to use for the interior parts of merchant vessels, because this would encourage trade, the great corrupter, see Plato *Laws* 705c. Other references to timber being supplied for non-shipbuilding purposes are Tod 196 (*SEG IX 2+*), *IG I³ 1454*; and *IG XII 1 977* (Tod 110) indicating that the Eteokarpathians provided cypress for a temple to Athena. For a modern discussion of shipbuilding timbers in the ancient Greek world, see Konstantinos Karathanasis, 'A Game of Timber Monopoly: Atheno-Macedonian Relations on the Eve of the Peloponnesian War', *Hesperia*, 88, 2019, pp. 714-20. For a description of Athenian shipbuilding requiring timber, see Vincent Gabrielsen 'Financial, human, material and economic resources required to build and operate navies in the classical world', in *The Sea in History - The Ancient World*, Philip De Souza, Pascal Arnaud, and Christian Buchet (eds.), Suffolk, Boydell Press, 2017, pp. 429-30.

⁶⁸ Thphr. *HP*. 5. 7.1-3 and other ancient writers as discussed at R. Meiggs, *Trees and Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean World*, Oxford, 1982, p.118 ff. Another ancient source that mentioned shipbuilding timbers is Aristoph. *Kn*. 1300-10. Note that cedar only became readily available to the Greek states after Alexander's conquests of Syria.

⁶⁹ For a description of trireme oar types, sizes and shapes, see J.S. Morrison and J.F. Coates, *The Athenian Trireme: The history and construction of an ancient Greek warship*, Cambridge, 1986, pp. 172-6.

⁷⁰ As one example, even a fourth-century Athens, with no empire, maintained a large fleet of 283 ships in 357/356 rising to 417 in 325/324, see Vincent Gabrielsen, 'Finance and Taxes', in *A Companion to Ancient Greek Government*, Hans Beck (ed.), 2013, p. 334.

⁷¹ For example, shipworm as mentioned at Thphr. *HP*. 5. 4.4.

⁷² Thuc. 7.12.3-5. For further commentary, see Simon Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides Volume III: Books 5.25-8.109*, Oxford, 2008, p. 562.

disastrous defeat or major storm.⁷³ States with fleets also required a constant supply of oars, which were more prone to damage in combat than the ships themselves.

Shipbuilding programs were also necessary when a state wanted to increase its fleet size to prepare for a specific threat. For example, the demand for imported timber would have increased during the years before the Peloponnesian war as states prepared for an uncertain military future. In preparation for war, maritime states also needed to increase their timber reserves in their dockyards.⁷⁴ Given this ship loss and delay, Barker justifiably argued for a 20-year life expectancy of Athenian warships and thus Athens required at least twenty new triremes each year.⁷⁵

Did states needing timber have their own resources?

One can defensibly generalise that the ancient states most needing shipbuilding timber had the least available from their own resources. In the fifth century these major maritime states were Athens, Corinth, some Aegean island states and some states of coastal Asia Minor. Johnson credibly argued that most of the important sea-powers in the ancient world had no sustainable forests within their own territorial boundaries.⁷⁶ For example, although Athens had some forested regions it had exhausted its supplies by the fifth century and thus had insufficient native resources to provide shipbuilding timber of the type and quantities it required. Worsening the situation, some scholars argued that in the regions under direct Athenian control, especially the Aegean islands, the forests had mainly disappeared by the sixth century.⁷⁷

Maritime states requiring ship-building timber from external sources had two strategic objectives. First, they needed to secure an adequate and sustainable timber supply. Second,

⁷³ For example, Thucydides' mention of storm damage to Athenian ships in 412/1, see Thuc. 8.34.1.

⁷⁴ For example, Johnson argued, without any counter view proposed by more recent scholars, that at the start of the Peloponnesian War, Corinth's hopes for an effective maritime contribution were dashed because it had not built-up sufficient timber reserves in its dockyards, see A. Johnson, 'Ancient forests and navies', *TAPhA*, 58, 1927, pp. 203-4.

⁷⁵ P. Barker, 'From the Scamander to Syracuse: Studies in ancient logistics', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of South Africa, 2005, p. 57. Note the counter view that trying to calculate the 'standard life' of a trireme is futile, see Gabrielsen, 'Build and Operate Navies', p. 433.

⁷⁶ Johnson, 'Ancient forests', p. 209. van Alfen provided a counter view, not well evidenced, that Corinth could access timber from Arcadian and Achaean forests as well as its Ambracian colony, see van Alfen, 'Pant'agatha', p. 99.

⁷⁷ For example, Johnson, 'Ancient forests', p. 199.

they needed to do all they could to prevent potentially hostile states from acquiring timber to build their own warships. Deciding whether another state was potentially hostile remained difficult in ancient Greece, given how regularly alliances were formed and dissolved.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, some states had enduring ‘potential enemies’ even though they sometimes entered temporary alliances with them.

States could achieve these two objectives in several ways. Military options were sometimes available to secure timber-rich regions. Such options needed to be exercised carefully since they would tend to reduce the likelihood of future access through non-military means. That is, a state with a reputation for taking what it wanted by force, would be less well-received in trying to negotiate economic access to strategic resources.

A state desiring timber, but refraining from using force, could enter an agreement with the timber-producing state, either an alliance or something less, containing a term allowing import of timber from the other state and/or prohibition of timber exports to potentially hostile states. Such terms would have come with a quid pro quo, either detailed in the agreement or otherwise understood by both states. For example, the importing state may tacitly agree to look favourably on other initiatives by the exporting state, or refrain from taking actions it otherwise may have taken.

Alternatively, a state desiring timber could provide economic incentives to timber-exporting states. States could directly target such incentives at the merchants of a timber-producing state, if such merchants had an independent freedom to provide timber without state constraints. Such freedom was unlikely given the value of timber as a strategic resource and a timber-producing state’s consequent desire to control its supply. Ensuring timber could not be traded through commercial markets removed any likelihood timber might be provided to states through means other than conscious decisions by the leadership of the timber-producing state. Further, some importing states controlled traders bringing timber to their ports. For example, as discussed in Chapter Two, Athens required that timber arriving in its ports could not be exported.⁷⁹

Viewed from the reverse perspective, a state with timber excess to its internal needs had

⁷⁸ See the analysis in D. Mosley, ‘On Greek enemies becoming allies’, *AncSoc*, 5, 1974, pp. 43-50.

⁷⁹ Ps.-Xen. *Const. Ath.* 2.12.

several options to use timber as an economic measure. It could create *eunoia* within an ally or friendly state through providing excess timber. The degree to which such arrangements provided an economic benefit to the timber-exporting state would have varied. That is, the timber could be sold at market rates, discounted rates or even gifted.

In providing timber to other states, the state owning the timber had two broad options. It could provide access to its forests near suitable coastal areas so other states could harvest the timber and build ships near the source of the timber. For example, in the fifth-century Alcibiades implied that the potential for shipbuilding in Magna Graecia where timber was plentiful.⁸⁰ Further, Thucydides reported the Spartan general Brasidas made preparations to have triremes built on the Strymon during its Spartan occupation.⁸¹ The timber-owning state needed to take care in providing such ongoing, long-term access and local shipbuilding rights, to prevent the local people and infrastructure becoming an entrenched colony of the ship-building state. Alternatively, the timber-owning state might allow access to forests that could be harvested with the timber transported to a foreign state's shipyards. This option suffered from the disadvantage that ships could be built onsite throughout the year, but timber could only be safely shipped during the suitable sailing seasons.⁸²

Further, states wanting to build ships on foreign soil needed to consider the duration of any agreement and the cost-effectiveness of developing local shipbuilding infrastructure. They also needed to consider whether the host state, or other states, could seize such infrastructure. Given trees could be harvested faster than the timber could be used, the shipbuilding state also had to consider how and where to stockpile timber for curing and eventual use, thus reducing the likelihood hostile states could seize the timber stockpile. They needed to balance such considerations against the difficulty and cost of transporting timber to shipyards in their own *chora*, often over long distances.⁸³ Shipbuilding states also needed to be aware that hostile states could interdict or blockade the shipping of cut timbers, which argued for building at the timber's source.

⁸⁰ Thuc. 6.90.3.

⁸¹ Thuc. 4.108.6 and also mentioned at Diod. 12.68.4. Both writers do not say that Brasidas built triremes, but made plans to do so. In contrast, Hornblower provided an alternative translation of *παρεσκευάζετο* as 'began to build', see Simon Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides Volume II: Books IV-V.24*, Oxford, 1996, p. 345.

⁸² For specialist comment on ancient sailing seasons, see James Beresford, *The Ancient Sailing Season*, Brill, Leiden, 2013. Beresford explores a variety of relevant topics, including the Mediterranean climate, the technology of ships and their sails, and ancient navigation.

⁸³ For a description of timber transport options, see Gabrielsen, 'Build and Operate Navies', pp. 430-1.

If this summarises the options through which a timber-rich state could use timber as an economic measure, what was the reality? The evidence for timber being used as an economic measure is dominated by Macedonian activity. This state will be discussed first followed by a summary of what is known about the export of timbers by other states.

Macedonia

Timber resources. From its earliest days, Macedonia had vast stands of excellent shipbuilding timber, especially on the Olympus-Pierian massif.⁸⁴ Later territorial acquisitions made available the large forests in and near the Strymon river valley.⁸⁵ These locations held significant reserves of fir and mountain pine, whose relative ship-building value was described by Theophrastus.⁸⁶ Importantly much Macedonian timber remained easily accessible, close to its coast, such as the Pierian forests near Methone and Pydna and the timber on Mount Kissos near Therme.

Were there timber competitors? Macedonia competed with other timber suppliers to provide high quality timber to ship-building states. For example, evidence exists, express or inferential, that in the Classical period Athens also imported timber from Crete, Samos, Cnidus, Corinth and Thurii.⁸⁷ Further, as argued by Meiggs, Cilicia, Syria and Phoenicia in the Persian empire had timber surpluses available for export.⁸⁸ Parts of Thrace were also well-timbered and there were rich timber reserves in the coastal regions of the Black Sea, Magna Graecia and Sicily.⁸⁹ But despite these alternative sources, Macedonia remained the closest supplier of excellent quality shipbuilding timbers for the mainland Greek states.

Did Macedonia need much timber? Before analysing Macedonia's ability to provide timber to other states, one must understand its internal demand. During the Classical period,

⁸⁴ For a discussion of Macedonian shipbuilding timber, see Karathanasis 'A Game of Timber Monopoly', pp. 718-20.

⁸⁵ As discussed at Eugene N. Borza, 'Timber and politics in the ancient world: Macedon and the Greeks', *PAPhS*, 131, no. 1, 1987, p. 39.

⁸⁶ Thphr. *HP*. 5.1.3-11.

⁸⁷ See discussion at Meiggs, *Trees and Timber*, p. 351.

⁸⁸ See Meiggs, *Trees and Timber*, p. 353. Psoma made an argument, based on numismatic evidence, that Cilicia could have provided timber to Athens, see S. Psoma, 'Athenian owls and the royal Macedonian monopoly on timber', *MHR*, 30, no. 1, 2015, p. 8. See also comments at Thphr. *HP*. 4.5.5 and Strabo 11.2.15, 11.2.17-18, 12.2.10 and 12.3.12.

⁸⁹ With respect to Thrace, see Hdt. 5.23.2.

Macedonia did not require a strong fleet, instead concentrating its military efforts on maintaining an army to protect its vulnerable frontiers.⁹⁰ Indeed, when Alexander III led his expedition to Asia, in the absence of a Macedonian fleet he relied on ship contributions from other Greek states. Not until Macedonia's Hellenistic monarchs started to develop their own fleets, did Macedonia need to marshal timber for its own maritime use. Until then, the only internal threat to Macedonia's timber supplies were its mines and smelting operations, with their inexhaustible demand for fuel. Macedonia needed to manage carefully its use of timber fuels to prevent forests in mining areas becoming denuded.

Having briefly established the context in which Macedonia could supply timber, one can turn to the specific examples of Macedonian timber exports, best examined chronologically under each monarch. To begin, Meiggs suggested Macedonia may first have given Athens access to Macedonian timbers during the time of the Peisistratids, but this conjecture was based on the visit by Peisistratus to Macedonia, whilst in exile from Athens, in the mid sixth century.⁹¹ There is no supporting evidence and thus any hypothesis that Macedonia supplied timber as an economic measure can be safely rejected.

Alexander I

Debate continues on whether Alexander I, who reigned 498-454, provided ship-building timber to Athens in the 480s in support of Themistocles' ship-building program.⁹² No evidence exists on how Athens accessed timber for this program prior to the Persian wars. Neither Herodotos nor the Aristotelean *Ath. Pol.* mention the timber's source. The conjectural argument is made as follows. First, there were no viable sources of timber available to Athens at that time apart from Macedonian timber. Second, although the Persian fleet controlled the coast from the Chersonesos to Mount Athos, the Persians did not control all the Macedonian coast, so some forests could have been harvested without Persian knowledge.⁹³ Finally, in 480 Athens honoured Alexander I as a *proxenos* and benefactor.⁹⁴ Although Herodotos made

⁹⁰ The only reference to possible Macedonian naval operations is the wording of *IG I³ 61* concerning the possible trade boycott of Methone discussed in Chapter 2, see Karathanasis 'A Game of Timber Monopoly', p. 710.

⁹¹ Meiggs, *Trees and Timber*, p. 123 and p. 193.

⁹² Hdt. 7.144.1; Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 22.7. Rhodes made no comment about the timber's source at P.J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Constitution: Written in the School of Aristotle*, Liverpool, 2017, p. 255.

⁹³ An argument made at N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia Volume II*, 3 vols, II, Oxford, 1979, p. 69.

⁹⁴ Hdt. 8.136.1.

no mention of the reason for the benefaction, Athens had no reason to recognise Alexander as a benefactor apart from supplying timber.⁹⁵

The counter-view, as argued for example by Meiggs, is Macedonia could not have provided timber to the Athenians and the timbers were sourced from southern Magna Graecia, supplemented by timbers from Attica and Euboea.⁹⁶ Meiggs argued that Macedonia would not have risked Persian displeasure by providing timber to Athens and even if it had, the Persians would have physically prevented timber exports. Borza's counter-counter-argument is also defensible, so without clear evidence, neither Meiggs nor Borza's hypothesis can be confirmed.⁹⁷

If Macedonia had indeed provided the timber, its motives deserve analysis. If the timber was sold rather than gifted, Macedonia would have been motivated by gaining valuable revenue. This benefit would have been substantial if Athens had paid directly in Laureion silver. The use of precious metals as an economic measure by Athens is discussed later in this chapter, whilst Chapter Six discusses Macedonia's ability to mint coins from available precious metal resources. The major non-economic motive presumed Macedonia knew the expanded Athenian fleet aimed to counter Persian aggression. Providing timber would have been in Macedonia's strategic interest, through supporting states trying to remove Persian dominance in the Aegean. Further, providing timber to Athens for such an important purpose would have created some store of Athenian *eunoia* by demonstrating Macedonian solidarity with Athens in removing Persia's regional dominance. Such a motive would not have been likely if Macedonia could have foreseen the future problems it would face from overwhelming Athenian seapower sustained, in part, by Macedonian timber.

Later, one could infer Athens sought direct access to Macedonian timber through its attempts to establish a colony, c465/4, at Ennea Hodoi on the lower Strymon.⁹⁸ If so, Alexander was well placed to use his timber as an economic measure against Athens. But

⁹⁵ For example, Borza, 'Timber and politics', p. 41.

⁹⁶ Meiggs, *Trees and Timber*, pp. 123-5.

⁹⁷ Borza, 'Timber and politics', p. 42.

⁹⁸ As Thucydides implied, the colony did not survive aggression by Thracian tribesmen, see Thuc. 1.100.3. For relevant discussions, see A.W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 3 vols, Oxford, 1945, Vol. 1, p. 297 and Hornblower, *Thuc. Volume I*, pp. 155-6.

what would have been his desired outcome? Giuliodori hesitantly argued that Alexander I wanted to improve trade relations with southern Greece, specifically Athens, which she argued has supporting numismatic evidence.⁹⁹ Nevertheless, insufficient evidence exists to argue confidently that, apart from the possibility of his support to Themistocles, Alexander I used timber as an economic measure against any Greek state.

Perdiccas II

No evidence exists for timber's use as an economic measure by Alexander's successor, Alcetas II, who reigned from 454-48. In contrast, Perdiccas II, who reigned from 448-413, made effective use of Macedonian timber reserves. The first possible literary reference to the export of Macedonian timber to Athens occurred in Hermippos' play, *Phormophoroi*.¹⁰⁰ Soon after, Thucydides recorded Perdiccas entered a treaty with Athens which, inter alia, allowed the export of oars to Athens.¹⁰¹ Perdiccas declared he would help the Athenians to the best of his power permitting no one to export timber for oars except to the Athenians. Perdiccas likely entered the treaty at the instigation of Athens, given the comments by Thucydides that Athens was seeking allies and Perdiccas did indeed join the Athenians in an expedition against the Chalcidians.¹⁰² Macedonia's strategic interests would require an alliance with Athens at this time to reduce the likelihood of Athenian interference in Macedonian territory and to diminish the increasing threat of Chalcidian influence. Thus, providing oars was an effective 'sweetener' to Athens, given the need, discussed earlier, for constant oar replacement. The obvious question is why the arrangement was confined to oars rather than a broader range of shipbuilding timbers. The evidence does not allow this question to be answered, but two hypotheses are feasible. First, that Athens was already successfully accessing most timbers from Macedonia or other sources, except for timber suitable for oars, with no need to negotiate further imports. Second, that providing a complete range of timbers to Athens was not something Macedonia was prepared to do, since it could directly facilitate

⁹⁹ Holly Giuliodori, 'The foreign policy of Macedon c513 to 346 BC', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Glasgow, 2004, p. 27.

¹⁰⁰ Fragment 63 line 8. Although the implication remains vague, see John Maxwell Edmonds, *The Fragments of Attic Comedy: After Meineke, Bergk, and Kock*, Leiden, 1957, p. 305.

¹⁰¹ Thuc 2.29.6 and IG I³ 89, the latter available at www.packhum.org. Hasebroek dated this decree to 423/2 BC, but there are alternative datings, see Johannes Hasebroek, *Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece*, New York, 1933, p. 141.

¹⁰² Thuc. 2.29.6.

an expanded Athenian fleet.¹⁰³ Providing just oar timber, to replenish damaged oars, was a Macedonian compromise to keep Athens in its favour. Unfortunately, evidence does not exist to choose between these hypotheses.

Later in Perdiccas' reign access to Macedonian timber may have influenced Athenian support to Methone, an ally at the head of the Thermaic Gulf. As discussed in Chapter Two, in the context of tariff relief when Methone was subject to Macedonian trade restrictions, Methone was given preferential treatment in several Athenian decrees of the 420s.¹⁰⁴ Meiggs argued that Athens also engaged with Macedonia, on Methone's behalf, to allow Methone access to Macedonian timber.¹⁰⁵ Although no direct evidence exists for the hypothesis, one can hypothesise that Athens could have gained access to timber from Pieria, a southern coastal region of Macedonia, not directly but through Methone. Thus, any Macedonian restriction on Methone's access to timber had a flow-on effect to Athenian access. Athens' solution may have been not only to convince Macedonia that Pierian timber should flow freely, but also Macedonian timber exports to Athens should be allowed through Methone. Such timber access would have contributed to a positive Athenian attitude towards Macedonia, which was in its strategic interests. Mattingly provided a useful further analysis of the decree, but he did not address this possibility.¹⁰⁶ But one does not know whether Macedonia provided such timber access and thus one cannot argue conclusively it did so as an economic measure to influence Athens' attitude and behaviours.

Archelaus I

The accession of Archelaus I in 413 provided a Macedonian monarch who appeared more open than his predecessor to treating Athens amicably. Giuliadori argued that Archelaus maintained an alliance with Athens throughout his reign, but whether he did is unknowable.¹⁰⁷ The evidence often cited is an Athenian inscription honouring Archelaus, but

¹⁰³ Karathanasis provides a detailed discussion of Perdiccas' likely strategy in restricting Athenian timber access, see Karathanasis 'A Game of Timber Monopoly', pp. 708-14.

¹⁰⁴ ML 65 (IG I² 57) discussed at R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century*, Oxford, 1969, pp. 176-80.

¹⁰⁵ Meiggs, *Trees and Timber*, p. 356.

¹⁰⁶ H. Mattingly, 'The Methone decrees', *CQ*, 11, no. 2, 1961, pp. 154-65. See also comments at Borza, 'Timber and politics', p. 43, n47.

¹⁰⁷ Giuliadori, *Foreign policy of Macedon* p. 62. Although, no other scholar has proposed a counterview, one should not infer their agreement.

whilst it does not mention any alliance, it does discuss the provision of oars and shipbuilding materials and may imply Athenian shipbuilding in Macedonia.¹⁰⁸ In 411 Archelaus may have allowed Andocides, an Athenian exiled in Cyprus, to export timber suitable for making oars to the Athenian fleet at Samos. Through his family's hereditary connections to the Macedonian king, Andocides was permitted to enter Macedonia, cut-down and transport as many suitable trees as he wished. The evidence comes from a self-aggrandizing speech by Andocides aimed at convincing the Athenians to let him return from exile.¹⁰⁹ The claim must have had some substance otherwise his Athenian audience would have seen through him. Nevertheless, Andocides remained in exile.

Despite his hereditary connections, Macedonia would not have allowed timber access just to please Andocides, but surely would have known the end-user. Athenian democracy was in a weakened state given the Four Hundred had seized power at Athens and Archelaus would have known such largesse to the democratic elements would be well received. But how did he know oar spars would be provided to the democratic fleet at Samos? Presumably Andocides would have told him, since it is unlikely Archelaus would have allowed the timber export without confidence in knowing the end-user.

One could argue Archelaus would have supported an oligarchic Athens rather than a democratic one, and thus should have not provided timber to its democratic elements. Archelaus would have known a powerful, democratic Athens, with a healthy fleet, threatened him more than an oligarchic Athens. Ultimately, one does not know whether his provision of timber was anything more than an excellent revenue-raising opportunity, a genuine desire to help Athens and create ongoing *eunoia*, or simply the exercise of a pre-existing agreement which would have been inappropriate to dishonour.

Later in Archelaus' reign, probably between 410-407, Athens honoured Antiochides and Phanosthenes for supplying oars to its fleet.¹¹⁰ Antiochides remains unknown, but

¹⁰⁸ IG I³ 117, also OR 188 (IG I² 105) discussed and translated at Robin Osborne and P.J. Rhodes (eds.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions 478-404 BC*, Oxford, 2017, pp. 530-5. IG I² 105, also categorised as ML 91, is discussed at Meiggs and Lewis, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, pp. 277-80.

¹⁰⁹ Andoc. 2.11.

¹¹⁰ IG I³ 183 as discussed at Brian R. MacDonald, 'The Phanosthenes decree taxes and timber in late fifth-century Athens', *Hesperia*, 50, no. 2, 1981.

Phanosthenes may have been the Andrian living in Athens who served as an Athenian general in 407/6.¹¹¹ They were both private traders, so at first blush do not provide examples of Macedonia supplying timber to influence Athens. But Archelaus would have been aware of the end-user of the provided oars, even though he dealt through intermediaries.

About the same time, in 407/6, the fragmentary Attic decree *IG I³ 117* mentioned earlier honoured Archelaus for supplying Athens with both ship timber and oar timbers. Given the lines 16-17 ‘... whatever ships the ship-builders send from Macedonia’, the decree implied that Macedonia allowed Athenians to build trireme hulls in Macedonia which could be towed to the Peiraieus for final fit-out. Whether this was part of an extended Athenian fleet rebuilding program, after the Sicilian disaster six years previously, remains unknowable.

Why would Archelaus have provided timber to Athens including through its intermediaries Antiochides and Phanosthenes? Apart from revenue-raising, the likely answer is such timber exports would help satisfy Macedonia’s strategic objective to maintain amicable relations with Athens thus reducing the likelihood of Athenian aggression. Archelaus would have known that as recently as 417/6, in response to Macedonia joining the Spartan/Argive alliance, Athens tried to blockade Macedonia and in 416/5 raided it.¹¹² Amphipolis was openly hostile to Athens, so Athens may have considered other military means of gaining access to Macedonian timber. Further, although Macedonia was not under any direct threat from Sparta or its allies, it may have considered a supportive Athens provided insurance against other potential military threats.

Amyntas III

For the five short-reigning monarchs after Archelaus, no evidence exists of timber being exported, let alone used as an economic measure. Indeed, no direct evidence indicates any agreements with other states. However, Amyntas III, who reigned from 393/2 to 370/369, entered a treaty early in his reign with the community of Chalcidian cities led by Olynthos.¹¹³ The treaty was first discussed in Chapter Two with respect to its tariff provisions. Both

¹¹¹ As discussed at M. Walbank, ‘Honors for Phanosthenes, Antiochides and their associates’, *Hesperia*, 45, no. 3, 1976, p. 293.

¹¹² Thuc. 5.83.4 and 6.7.3. Thucydides noted at 5.80.2 that although Perdiccas agreed to an alliance with Argos and Sparta in 418/7, he did not break with Athens at that time.

¹¹³ RO 12 (*SIG³ 135*), translated and discussed at Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, pp. 54-8.

parties agreed how to form alliances with neighbouring states, namely Amphipolis, Akanthos, Mende and the Bottiaeanes. Since these states were hostile, or potentially hostile to Olynthos, the treaty required both parties not to enter independent friendships with these states, but to decide whether they should attach themselves jointly.

Amyntas III entered the treaty facing threats to Macedonian territory, such as from the Illyrian tribes to the west. He needed to offer something more in return for Chalcidian support. The primary solution was to provide Chalcidians with access to Macedonian timbers suitable for general building, but also shipbuilding timber and pitch.¹¹⁴ Whilst the Chalcidians may have had access to timber from other regions, Macedonia was the closest source of high-quality shipbuilding timber. Not only could the Chalcidians use these timbers for their own fleets, but the agreement allowed them to export timber to other states, provided they told Amyntas and paid tariffs. From the requirement for the Chalcidians to inform Amyntas, one can infer he could prevent timber exports to his potential enemies.¹¹⁵

Whether the Chalcidians would have entered the defensive alliance without getting access to Macedonian shipbuilding materials is unknowable. One could argue such access was more important than military support from Macedonia, or vice versa, but neither position could be easily defended. Suffice to say the Macedonian use of timber as an economic measure made the treaty more desirable to the Chalcidians. Regardless, eventually this treaty faltered, with Borza arguing it was due to Chalcidian ambitions.¹¹⁶

The next instance of Amyntas III using timber as an economic measure may have occurred c375. According to Xenophon, Polydamus of Pharsalus, during a speech in Sparta, implied that Macedonia was the primary source for Athens obtaining timber.¹¹⁷ Hammond argued that the timber was used for fleet reconstitution and Borza considered Athens was dependent upon Macedonian timber in the mid 370s.¹¹⁸ During the same period, Amyntas III

¹¹⁴ Pitch is one of the trireme-related, trade-restricted commodities mentioned in Aristoph. *Frogs* 362ff. As a general waterproofing compound, pitch found use in a number of applications, including roofing of buildings, but its primary importance was in shipbuilding, especially as an effective, lightweight underside coating on triremes. For modern commentary, see Meiggs, *Trees and Timber*, pp. 467-71. For some ancient commentary on pitch, see Thphr. *HP*. 9.2.1-8 and Pliny *Nat.* 16.23.

¹¹⁵ Note Pseudo-Xenophon's comment about forbidding exports to wherever any of our enemies are, see Ps. Xen. *Const. Ath.* 2.12.

¹¹⁶ Borza, 'Timber and politics', p. 45.

¹¹⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.11.

¹¹⁸ Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia Vol II*, p. 178 and Borza, 'Timber and politics', p. 45, n57.

entered into an alliance with Athens, presumably seeking its support against threatening state.¹¹⁹ Whilst the inscription does not expressly mention access to Macedonian timber, Tod has argued that through this treaty Athens secured its access to ship-building timbers.

Amyntas III would have supplied ship-building timbers to Athens for the same reason as his predecessors. Maintaining amicable arrangements with Athens at this time, and the potential for Athenian support to Macedonian territorial integrity, was critical to a Macedonia potentially threatened by various enemies, especially the Chalcidian cities.

One final example of Amyntas III allowing timber exports warrants discussion. In c372 he permitted export to the Athenian general Timotheus, with the latter shipping the timber to Athens using Philondas, a Megarian living in Athens.¹²⁰ Whilst Demosthenes does not expressly mention shipbuilding timber, Borza argued that he provided timber sufficient for several triremes.¹²¹ The rationale for this export to a private person, albeit an Athenian general, has been discussed in previous examples. Consistent with its treaty obligation to Athens, Amyntas III would have known the end-user of the ship-building timber was the Athenian state. Providing the timber created *eunoia* in Athens that increased the likelihood Athens would honour its treaty obligations.

Perdiccas III

For the four kings that followed Amyntas III, the only inferential evidence for the use of timber as an economic measure relates to the reign of Perdiccas III (365-360). Borza argued that when the Macedonian relationship with Athens soured, and Macedon allied with Thebes, Macedon provided shipbuilding timber for Epaminondas' new Boeotian fleet. Borza's argument referred to scholarship by Hammond, citing a decree of the Boeotian League dated 365 and discovered near Leuctra.¹²² One must make a series of inferences for his conclusion to follow, each of which is refutable. Nevertheless, if such timber had been

¹¹⁹ Tod 129 (IG II² 102) as discussed at M. Tod (ed.), *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions Volume II From 403 to 323 B.C.*, Oxford, 1948, pp. 90-2.

¹²⁰ Dem. 49.26-30.

¹²¹ Borza, 'Timber and politics', p. 46.

¹²² Borza, 'Timber and politics', p. 46 especially n. 59 which cites further commentary at Paul Roesch, 'Un décret inédit de la ligue thébaine et la flotte d'Épaminondas', *REG*, 97, 1984, pp. 45-60. That such timber supply to the Thebans was 'probable' is mentioned at Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia Vol II*, p. 186 and also Psoma, 'Athenian owls', p. 5.

provided it would have been an obvious use of timber as an economic measure to make the alliance more attractive to the Thebans. Thebes was more likely to honour its alliance obligations if it recognised the value of Macedonian timber exports.

Philip II

Despite all that is known about the next monarch, Philip II, who reigned 359-336, one can only infer evidence of his timber exports. Borza argued that Philip would have prevented Athens from accessing Macedonian timber, before the peace proposals of 346-344 and the formation of the League of Corinth, to reduce the military threat posed by the Athenian fleet. Based on this hypothesis, Borza considered the Athenian naval decline in the 360s-50s could have resulted from limited access to northern timber. Nevertheless, he recognised Cawkwell's view that Athens' navy remained adequately strong.¹²³

During the peace discussions themselves, which extended intermittently until 342, no evidence exists that Philip II sweetened his proposals by offering Athenian access to Macedonian timber. But later, after the formation of the League of Corinth, Johnson argued that Athens retained her fleet and was still able to access northern timber.¹²⁴ The basis for this conclusion is uncertain, given the 338/7 inscription for the League does not include any provision relevant to trade amongst the League's members.¹²⁵ No other relevant literary or epigraphic evidence exists apart from an inscription from the reign of Alexander III discussed below. Nevertheless, providing timber would have been a sound strategy if Philip wanted Athens to have a strong fleet, that could support the League by controlling southern Greece. That is, although Philip did not need to offer timber to improve the attractiveness of the League, providing Athens with the timber to maintain its fleet would have been desirable to Athens even if its fleet was only used to do Philip's bidding.

Alexander III (the Great)

Philip's successor, Alexander the Great (336-323), may only have used Macedonian timber twice as an economic measure. First, whilst he was in Asia, his home-based

¹²³ Borza, 'Timber and politics', p. 46.

¹²⁴ Johnson, 'Ancient forests', p. 205.

¹²⁵ *IG II² 236*, see also *RO 76 (Svt. 403)* as translated and discussed at Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, pp. 372-9.

commander Antipater appears to have had the authority to exercise control of the royal timber.¹²⁶ Nevertheless, an un-numbered Macedonian inscription of c335/334, now housed at the archaeological museum at Philippi, prevented the sale of timber from the Mount Dysoron region until an embassy from Alexander arrived.¹²⁷

The reason for the prohibition and its duration are unknown, but one may speculate that Alexander was trying, despite the obvious difficulties, to keep Antipater under close control, ensuring he did not provide shipbuilding timber to potential enemies. Second, an Athenian inscription of about 325/4 referred to the import of oars by the Athenian orator Demades.¹²⁸ Presumably this export would also have been authorised by Antipater, or Alexander, and would have been consistent with Alexander's approach to provide shipbuilding timbers only to those fleets supporting his objectives or those which would not pose a military threat to him.

Other states

Various states provided timber to other states in the ancient Greek world, but insufficient evidence exists to argue they did so for any other reason than raising revenue. For instance, Psoma posits, based on hoard evidence of Athenian silver tetradrachms, that Athens accessed Cilician timber.¹²⁹ But one cannot sensibly discuss whether the Cilician states tried to influence Athens, and if so, for what desired outcome.

The Persian king, together with his satraps, controlled reserves of suitable ship-building timber in western Asia Minor. Nevertheless, no evidence exists they allowed access to mainland Greeks apart from an example late in the Peloponnesian War. In 410, when Sparta tried to challenge Athenian power at sea, the Persians gave Sparta access to the timber on Mount Ida allowing it to build new ships at Antandros.¹³⁰ Providing timber was consistent with the broad range of economic assistance provided to Sparta by Persia for use against

¹²⁶ Thphr. *Char.* 23.4. In commenting on the references to Antipater in 'The Boastful Man', Diggle argued he was granting freedom for Macedonian export duties, see James Diggle, *Theophrastus Characters*, Cambridge, 2004, p. 437.

¹²⁷ See discussion of this inscription at Borza, 'Timber and politics', p. 47.

¹²⁸ *IG II²* 1629.

¹²⁹ Psoma, 'Athenian owls', p. 2.

¹³⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.25. Thucydides also mentioned Mt Ida's timber at Thuc. 4.52.3. For a discussion of Antandros and the role of its dependency Aspaneos as the timber market, see Strab. 13.1.51.

Athens, given the Persian king wanted, according to Xenophon, to make war on Athens.¹³¹ Having primacy in this Persian assistance were the funds to be discussed in Chapter Four. Nevertheless, providing funds to buy timber was of no use if Sparta could not buy Persian timber. Thus, providing direct access to Persian timber was a necessary prerequisite for Spartan shipbuilding.

Findings on Timber

States understood the strategic value of their timber reserves, so they used them not just to raise revenue but to influence the receiving states. Consequently, states tried to ensure private traders could not sell timber so export decisions were state-controlled. Such enduring state control remained necessary given the ability to use timber as an economic measure was time-sensitive, being constrained by variable demand and the availability of other suppliers. Thus, for example, although Macedonia was a major supplier of timber to Athens, it did not provide timber during extended periods of the Classical Age. Psoma effectively summarised when these periods occurred during the fifth and fourth centuries.¹³² In some of these periods Macedonia may have sought to use its timber as an economic measure, but the circumstances were not conducive.

Further, simply because conditions suited the use of timber as an economic measure did not always result in its application. For example, no examples exist of Philip using his timber supplies to exert influence on foreign states, even though such states still required high-quality timber. The reasons timber was not used remain speculative, but Philip may have chosen to focus on other means of influence, such as diplomacy, bribery and military measures. That is, he may have decided his desired strategic outcomes were more likely satisfied by measures other than the supply of timber to other states.

In deciding whether to use shipbuilding timber as an economic measure, states needed to be aware it may end up with potential enemies. Thus, for example, Herodotos stated that the Persians were aware of the danger of providing timber to some Greek states which were

¹³¹ Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.9 discussed at Peter Krentz, *Xenophon Hellenika I-II.3.10*, Oxford, 1989, pp. 94-5.

¹³² Psoma, 'Athenian owls', pp. 1-9.

potential enemies.¹³³ Accordingly, states wanting to use timber to create *eunoia* needed to balance short-term benefits against the potential adverse long-term results of providing the timber. For example, Macedonian kings remained aware of the dangers of contributing to the sustainment of a powerful Athenian fleet which could threaten Macedonian territorial interests. Of course, as discussed earlier, sometimes a state could not effectively foresee a state receiving timber in the present would become a future enemy.

The final findings about the use of timber as an economic measure closes out the earlier discussion on the ways through which the timber could be provided. In the absence of specific evidence, one cannot be confident which options were selected. Thus, although evidence exists that sometimes states built ships onsite, as Athens sometimes did in Macedonia, one can only conjecture whether at other times states transported timbers to their usual shipbuilding sites. Similarly, although sometimes states provided timber as part of a formal interstate agreement, evidence to understand the exporting arrangement usually does not exist. On firmer ground, more confidence exists that when a state provided shipbuilding timber to a foreign state's private citizens, it did so knowing the eventual end-user.

Precious Metals as Strategic Material

Demand for precious metals

The ancient Greeks required, and thus traded, a variety of metals including iron, copper, bronze and tin.¹³⁴ Of these metals only precious metals, comprising mined gold, silver and electrum, formed into bars/ingots (bullion) or coins, represented a strategic material.¹³⁵ As a trade product, traders could exchange precious metals for imported goods, in the form of bullion or coins. In particular, silver could be traded anywhere and still receive a good price. For example, Xenophon described the attractiveness of the Athenian silver trade, usually provided in the form of coins, to private traders because of the insatiable demand for silver by many states:

¹³³ Hdt. 5.23.

¹³⁴ For example, for iron and copper see Ps. Xen. *Const. Ath.* 2.11, for bronze, see Andoc. 2.11 and for tin see Hdt. 3.115.

¹³⁵ For a counter view, see references to Boardman and Gill at M. Treister, *The Role of Metals in Ancient Greek History*, Leiden, 1996, p. 259.

...if they do not want to ship a return cargo of goods, it is sound business to export silver; for, wherever they sell it, they are sure to make a profit on the capital invested.¹³⁶

The primary strategic end-use for precious metal exports, was to allow importing states to mint coins in either gold, silver or electrum.¹³⁷ How coins were used as an economic measure in their own right will be discussed in Chapter Six. A state remained responsible for minting coins and thus procurement of the required precious metal was an important state concern. States needing precious metals to mint coins could obtain supplies through their own mines, through buying bullion, through the spoils of war or confiscations, through loans from rich temples or by restamping acquired foreign coins.¹³⁸

For a state to have its own precious metal sources was eminently desirable since it ensured an ongoing supply until its mines were exhausted. Unfortunately, many states had to obtain precious metals from elsewhere, often from long-distance suppliers. Consequently, states with available excess bullion or minted coins could use their surpluses to influence those states requiring precious metals. The states that had access to their own silver sources included Athens, Persia, Smyrna, Siphnos, Thasos, possibly Lampsakus and Samos, and the Milesian colonies in the Black Sea and the Propontis such as Abydos and Trapezus.¹³⁹ The latter two states were able to access gold or electrum through mines on their own *chora* or by trading with local tribes who had their own mines.¹⁴⁰ States requiring regular silver imports included Aegina, Corinth, Chios, Sicilian states and various Cycladic states. States known to

¹³⁶ Xen. *Ways* 3.2. Note also Aristophanes' earlier comment in 405 about the value that Athenian owls were held in by Greeks and barbarians, see Aristoph. *Frogs* lines 723-4.

¹³⁷ Electrum, an alloy of gold and silver, was mainly used in northwest Asia Minor, the Asian Propontis and parts of the Black Sea, see T. Figueira, *The Power of Money: Coinage and Politics in the Athenian Empire*, Philadelphia, 1998, p. 106.

¹³⁸ For gold, the sources were reef gold, 'placer gold' and alluvial gold, see Hopper, *Trade and Industry*, p. 169. Restamping foreign coins was a common method of obtaining the necessary precious metals. For a comprehensive description of coins' usefulness as a commodity with several examples of overstriking, see Clare Rowan, 'Coinage as commodity and bullion in the western Mediterranean, ca. 550 – 100 BCE', *MHR*, 28, no. 2, 2013, pp. 105-27. For a description of ancient silver sources, see John F. Healy, *Mining and Metallurgy in the Greek and Roman World*, London, 1978, pp. 53-5.

¹³⁹ The major source of precious metals in the Cyclades was the island of Siphnos, whose mines were exhausted by the end of the late Archaic period. Nevertheless, modern geological research indicated other Cycladic islands had small silver deposits, see Kenneth A. Sheedy, *The Archaic and Early Classical Coinages of the Cyclades*, London, 2006, p. 19 and G. Davis, 'Mining money in late archaic Athens', *Historia*, 63, no. 3, 2014, p. 257. For comments on gold and silver mines see Hdt. 6.47.1-2 and Thuc. 1.100.2. Gomme commented on the likelihood that the Thasian gold was alluvial, see Gomme, *Commentary*, Vol. 1, p. 295. Magna Graecia had silver deposits, but they were not exploited during the periods under consideration, see Rowan, 'Coinage', p. 107.

¹⁴⁰ For example, see Strab. 11.2.19 and 11.14.9.

have needed gold imports to sustain their minting needs included Chios, Rhodos, Cyzikus, Kios, Ephesos, Miletus, Phokai, Samos and Teos. Of those states having access to their own mines, only a few had sufficient precious metals surpluses to use them as an economic measure. These states will now be discussed in turn.

Athens

Athens had access to silver from its Laureion mines as well as bullion from mines under its control around the Aegean.¹⁴¹ Indeed, Aeschylus commented that Athens had a spring of silver, a treasure chest in the earth.¹⁴² Although the Athenian state owned the underground ore veins the mine operations were performed by private businesses. In the fourth century, and most likely in the fifth century, the state's public magistrates (*πωληταί* – *poletai*) sold mining leases.¹⁴³ The silver produced was also taxed by the state.¹⁴⁴ Leaseholders had to negotiate agreements with the surface owners who would have expected a return. Their lease payments could likely be made in bullion which then became available

¹⁴¹ For a comprehensive breakdown of Aegean silver sources, see Treister, *Role of Metals*, p. 182ff. Insights can also be gleaned from Josiah Ober, *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece*, Princeton, 2015, p. 168; Thuc. 1.100.2 and 1.101.3; Hdt. 6.46.3 with commentary at Lionel Scott, *Historical Commentary on Herodotus Book 6*, Leiden, 2005, pp. 205-6. For an overview of the Laureion operations, see Hopper, *Trade and Industry*, pp. 170-189 with archeological evidence for continual mining in the decade after Marathon. For discussion of silver purity, see Healy, *Mining and Metallurgy in the Greek and Roman World*, p. 218. For the detailed discussion of fragments from Laureion mining leases, included names of leases, the name of mines, their locations and boundaries, lease length and prices, see Margaret Crosby, 'The Leases of the Laureion Mines', *Hesperia*, 19, no. 3, 1950, pp. 189-297 and Margaret Crosby, 'More Fragments of Mining Leases from the Athenian Agora', *Hesperia*, 26, no. 1, 1957, pp. 1-23.

¹⁴² Aesch. *Pers.* 238.

¹⁴³ Leases were awarded to private individuals at public auction for a certain period of time as detailed in Chapter 47 of the pseudo-Aristotelean *Constitution of the Athenians*. See also Christophe Flament, 'The Athenian Coinage, From Mines to Markets', *Journal of Ancient Civilizations*, 34, no. 2, 2019. Note RO 36 (*SEG* xii 100) of 367/6 includes an epigraphic record of Athenian mining leases. Note also Gil Davis' comments that '...it is not necessary to assume the state owned the silver beneath the ground in order to tax it. It is more logical to envisage a contractual relationship between the land owner and the mining entrepreneur albeit within a regulatory framework imposed by the state.', see 'Davis, 'Mining money', p. 276. For a discussion of silver mine prices, see K.M.W. Shipton, 'The Prices of the Athenian Silver Mines', *ZPE*, no. 120, 1998, pp. 57-63. For the likelihood that similar practices occurred in the previous century, Aristophanes' sausage seller wanted to traffic in mines, see Aristoph. *Kn.* line 362.

¹⁴⁴ See discussion at Lisa Kallet and John H. Kroll, *The Athenian Empire: Using Coins as Sources*, Cambridge, 2020, pp. 26-7.

for minting into coins and other purposes.¹⁴⁵ Leaseholders could also bring their own bullion to state mints for conversion into coins after payment of minting fees.¹⁴⁶

Through the Laureion leases and other mines, the Athenian state acquired bullion, primarily silver and to a much lesser extent gold. The use of bullion to mint coins will be discussed in Chapter Six. However, Athens also could use its silver surpluses as an economic measure against other states in its own right. Xenophon made clear this export could occur as bullion or minted silver coins.¹⁴⁷ Lead-isotope testing has demonstrated silver from Laureion represented a significant portion of late Archaic and likely early Classical coins minted by Corinth, Chios and even Aegina despite their history of political enmity.¹⁴⁸ Accepting minted coins as a trade good appears an unusual practice if the importing state did not intend to circulate Athenian coins for use within areas under its control. One potential explanation is the import of Attic coins provided a guarantee of the silver's place of origin and purity.

Given this pamphlet focused on Athenian revenues, Xenophon did not mention the use of surplus silver to influence other states. One could argue that given the high foreign demand for silver by many states, Athens did not need to intervene except to create and assure an adequate supply for export and to control to whom the silver was provided. In classical Athens, private individuals arranged the trade in exportable quantities of silver to foreign markets. Of course, if the Athenian state was unaware of large private silver exports then it could not use the silver exports as an economic measure.

¹⁴⁵ A contestable argument has also been made that leaseholders had to provide the state with some percentage of mined silver, see Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, p. 27. Further discussion of this requirement occurs in recent scholarship on the law of Ephialtes (375/4), see Edward M. Harris 'Notes on the New Law of Epicrates from the Athenian Agora', *ZPE*, 222, 2022, pp. 75-77. The context of Harris' article was the addition of further scholarship to the original publishing of Ephialtes' law, see M.B. Richardson 'The Law of Epikrates of 354/3 B.C.', *Hesperia*, 90, no. 4, 2021, pp. 685-746.

¹⁴⁶ For a detailed description of Athens' access to Laureion silver, see Loren J. Samons, *Empire of the Owl: Athenian Imperial Finance*, Stuttgart, 2000, pp. 202-4 and P. van Alfen, 'Hatching Owls: The Regulation of Coin Production in Later Fifth-Century Athens', *Quantifying Monetary Supplies in Greco-Roman Times*, 2011, pp. 128-47.

¹⁴⁷ For a discussion comparing the value of Athenian silver exports as bullion and coin, see P. van Alfen, 'Xenophon Poroi 3.2 and Athenian "Owls" in Aegean-Near Eastern Long Distance Trade', in *I Ritrovamenti Monetari e Processi Storico-Economici nel Mondo Antico*, M. Asolati and G. Gorini (eds.), Padova, 2012, pp. 11-32.

¹⁴⁸ N.H. Gale *et al.*, 'Mineralogical and geographical silver sources of archaic Greek coinage', in *Metallurgy in Numismatics: Royal Numismatic Society Special Publication No. 13*, D.M. Metcalf (ed.), London, 1980. For a discussion of lead-isotope testing to assess silver sources, see Healy, *Mining and Metallurgy in the Greek and Roman World*, p. 218.

A lack of such knowledge remained unlikely, given private traders could not have exported large quantities of Athenian silver without the knowledge, and thus the tacit approval of the state. Examining Athenian silver exports to Corinth and Egypt is informative. Corinth was a major target for Athenian precious metals, since archaeological and literary evidence provides no evidence of mines within the Corinthian chora. As previously mentioned, isotope analysis of Corinthian coins provides evidence that until the Peloponnesian War Athens supplied much of the silver used for Corinthian minting.¹⁴⁹ Supplies ceased or were severely constrained during that war, implying the Athenian state intervened to prevent some exports, including silver, to Corinth. Such intervention appears defensible given no state would intentionally allow strategic resources to flow to a foreign state with which it was at war. The less likely alternative was that many private traders decided to stop trading with Corinth on their own volition. Another major export target was Egypt which like Corinth had no silver resources of its own. Evidence of silver exports to Egypt exists in the large amount of Athenian bullion and coins discovered in Egyptian hoards.¹⁵⁰

Athens exported silver to both these states primarily to raise revenue but also to contribute to their *eunoia* towards Athens. That Corinth had some *eunoia* was especially important given the several reasons why Corinth would not be well-disposed towards Athens. In times of peace this desire to create *eunoia* in Corinth and Egypt would have likely overcome the argument that a strategic resource as important as precious metals should not have been exported to a major trading rival. In times of war, when *eunoia* remained noticeably absent, a cessation of silver exports was the natural consequence.

Macedonia

At different stages of its expansion, Macedonia had surplus precious metals for potential use as an economic measure against other states. Macedonia had no silver/gold mines until Alexander I conquered the land containing the Bisaltic mines previously held by Thracian tribes. Some of these deposits were sizable with Herodotos recording Alexander

¹⁴⁹ See the various numismatic texts cited at Bissa, 'Governmental intervention', p. 44, n. 93. See also C. Howgego, *Ancient History from Coins*, London, 1995, p. 25.

¹⁵⁰ See descriptions of relevant hoards at Z. Archibald, *Ancient Economies of the Northern Aegean: Fifth to First Centuries BC*, Oxford, 2013 and in Thompson M. *et al.*, *An Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards*, New York, 1973.

obtained a talent a day from a silver mine near Lake Prasias.¹⁵¹ By Philip's reign, he owned mines at Lake Prasias, the area around Mount Pangaion, the Echeidorus River, the Axios River, Mount Stratonike, Dardania, Tranupara and Mount Dysoron.¹⁵² Control of specific mines ebbed and flowed. For example, numismatic evidence indicates Macedonia did not control the Bisaltic mines during the periods c452-445 and c434-33 to 415.¹⁵³ Further, Hammond argued that at some stage after 464 the neighbouring Edones captured and held for some time the Lake Prasias silver mine.¹⁵⁴

Philip rapidly expanded bullion production, primarily from the Mount Pangaion gold mines. In 357 he captured the mining town of Krenides, through which he was able to acquire large sums of gold/silver bullion, raising 1000 talents, presumably per annum.¹⁵⁵ His successor, Alexander the Great, continued to access and exploit gold/silver mines. Taking mining specialists on his conquests he found both silver and gold in India.¹⁵⁶

These significant reserves provided funds to allow Macedonia's kings, especially Philip, to bribe foreign officials, with this form of economic measure to be discussed in Chapter Four. No other evidence exists that Macedonia, during the late Archaic and Classical periods, provided precious metals to other states to influence their behaviours or attitudes. In particular, Macedonia did not likely provide bullion, either gold or silver, to other states so they could mint their own coinage, although they could have acquired and melted Macedonian coins.

Lydia

At least in the Archaic period, Lydia had extensive gold and silver mines, primarily the Pactolus River deposit at Salihli, but also on the slopes of Mount Tmolus near the Cayster

¹⁵¹ In Strab. 7. fragment 34, Strabo mentioned the range of Thracian gold mines. For Herodotos' comment, see Hdt. 5.17.

¹⁵² A summary is provided at Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia Vol II*, p. 107. See also p. 70 for locations that were regularly mined. Herodotos mentioned Xerxes marching past the Pangaeian gold/silver mines in 480, see. Hdt. 7.112. Herodotos also mentioned gold mines at Daton, see Hdt. 9.75. See also Healy, *Mining and Metallurgy in the Greek and Roman World*, p. 46. The location of Mount Dysoron is disputed, see Archibald, *Ancient Economies*, pp. 66-7.

¹⁵³ Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia Vol II*, p. 120.

¹⁵⁴ Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia Vol II*, p. 108.

¹⁵⁵ Diod. 16.8.6-7.

¹⁵⁶ Strab. 15.1.30.

River.¹⁵⁷ Herodotos commented that the mines were directly exploited by the Lydian kings who controlled the disposition of bullion surpluses excess to their internal requirements.¹⁵⁸ In the late Archaic period, Sparta sought to buy gold direct from Croesus, the Lydian king, rather than using private intermediaries. Sparta wanted to use the gold to create a statue of Apollo, but in response to this request Croesus gifted the bullion to Sparta.¹⁵⁹ His motive was not declared by Herodotos, but could have been an attempt to impress the Greeks with his wealth. Alternatively, he may have wanted to be considered by the Greeks as part of a panhellenic world. But equally likely, the gifting was an attempt to create *eunoia* in Sparta towards Lydia that could later be exploited. Indeed, Herodotos recorded that about 548/7 Sparta militarily allied with Croesus, at his request, mentioning it had become indebted to him for providing the bullion. One should not infer Sparta allied with Croesus simply because he gave them bullion, but arguably it was a factor in considering whether an alliance was in their strategic interest.

Lydia also provided electrum, commonly used in sixth-century coins, to neighbouring Greek states in Asia Minor. Whether electrum was sold or gifted remains unknown. The Lydian intent in providing electrum, apart from the potential revenue-raising, was most likely to maintain close relations with the Greek states, so they might both support Lydia in times of trouble whilst also marginally reducing the likelihood that they would pose a threat to the Lydian state.

Other states

Several other ancient states may have used precious metals as an economic measure. Salmon used numismatic evidence to argue Persia provided bullion to Corinth in the 390s allowing Corinth to mint coins.¹⁶⁰ Despite Persian support to Sparta during the Peloponnesian War, by the 390s Persia must have considered its best interests laid with supporting states opposing Sparta, including Corinth. Providing bullion would likely have also funded Corinth's military, not just allow minting, although the numismatic evidence indicates Corinth used the bullion for this purpose.

¹⁵⁷ See Hdt. 1.93.1 with mention of gold dust washing down from Mount Tmolus. See also Strab. 13.1.23 and 13.4.5.

¹⁵⁸ Hdt. 1.51 and 6.125.

¹⁵⁹ Hdt. 1.69.4.

¹⁶⁰ See various numismatic texts cited at Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, p. 354.

Siphnos, a wealthy state during the sixth century, mined both gold and silver in large quantities.¹⁶¹ During the late Archaic period, it likely provided silver to Aegina given metal analysis indicates 18% of Aeginetan coinage was minted from Siphnian silver.¹⁶² No evidence exists Siphnos provided precious metals in the Classical period, most likely because its mines were exhausted or insufficient timber was available for mine workings.¹⁶³ Although its reason for providing silver to Aegina remains unknown, one can reasonably hypothesise that Siphnos provided it both as a trade product used in exchange for Aeginetan goods as well as to create Aeginetan *eunoia* towards Siphnos. But no further analysis is possible given the absence of specific evidence about the political relationship between Siphnos and Aegina in the late Archaic period.

Turning to other non-Greek states, one can briefly consider the use of bullion by the Thracian tribes, Dacia, the Ural/Altai tribes, the Illyrian tribes, the Black Sea tribes, Cyprus, Euboea, and Chalcidian states. First, the Thracian tribes held extensive gold deposits although many were taken over in the Classical period by an expanding Macedonia. Nevertheless, they retained access to some mines such as the gold deposits in the Hebros River, with the nearest Greek states being Maroneia and Ainos.¹⁶⁴ Thracian tribes may have provided silver to Athens that was used for minting in the time of Peisistratus.¹⁶⁵ Later, despite Athenian attempts to settle and thus control gold mining areas, the Thracians were able to supply bullion to Greek states under commercial trade arrangements.

Similarly, Dacia had rich gold deposits at several sites including Alburnus Major.¹⁶⁶ Hoard evidence suggests Dacian tribes, such as the Chalybes and the Taochoi, provided bullion to Histria and Macedonia in the Classical period. They may also have provided bullion to the nearest Greek *poleis* at Trapezus and Amisus.¹⁶⁷ Further, the Ural/Altai mountain tribes controlled gold deposits. The nearest states which were potential export targets for this bullion were in the Cimmerian Bosphorus, namely Pantikapaion and

¹⁶¹ Hdt. 3.57-9 including comments about the Siphnian treasury at Delphi. See also comments at Paus. 10.11.2.

¹⁶² See the various numismatic texts cited at Bissa, 'Governmental intervention' p. 50, n122.

¹⁶³ See discussion at Hopper, *Trade and Industry*, p. 170.

¹⁶⁴ Plin. *Nat.* 33.21.

¹⁶⁵ Hdt. 1.64.1 speaks of 'revenues' from Thrace.

¹⁶⁶ See the numismatic texts cited at Bissa, 'Governmental intervention', p. 56, n. 143.

¹⁶⁷ As Bissa implied at Bissa, 'Governmental intervention', pp. 55-6.

Theodosia.¹⁶⁸ Moving to Illyria, Kagan argued that the silver mines controlled by Illyrian tribes were a major source of bullion for Corinthian minting.¹⁶⁹ Similarly, the Black Sea tribes may have provided bullion to Kyzikos, Phokai and later Mytilene. Euboea could access a small gold deposit near Karystos, Cyprus had at least one gold mine and the Chalcidian states had access to gold/silver deposits including Mount Stratonike and the Lagkadas basin.¹⁷⁰

Insufficient evidence exists to argue that any of these states used their precious metal resources as an economic measure against other states. They likely used any bullion, excess to their own requirements, as a revenue-generating trade product. Their trade relationships are not sufficiently understood to posit they would have recognised that exporting precious metals would have engendered *eunoia* within the importing states of a magnitude useful in later times of interstate conflict.

Findings on Precious Metals

No Greek state had large gold mines in its *chora*, but several had considerable silver mines. Some of these silver-producing states could use their precious metals to influence other states. The states subject to influence were those that needed to acquire sufficient precious metals, primarily through trade, to mint coins. Most states necessarily imported the metal from long-distance suppliers.

Providing precious metals to other states was not as effective an economic measure as providing grain and timber. Whilst all states needed an ongoing supply of grain to feed their people and maritime states required a regular supply of shipbuilding timbers to maintain their fleets, they did not require a regular supply of precious metals. The evidence shows, as will be further discussed in Chapter Six, that many states only chose to mint irregularly, sometimes with decades between coinage issues. Thus, a state wishing to influence another state through supplying precious metals to allow minting needed to target carefully those states which had more urgent minting needs. This knowledge would not always have been available to states with surpluses of precious metals. Importantly, states wanting to gift

¹⁶⁸ The first Greek contact with this area was by Aristeas, see Paus. 1.24.6.

¹⁶⁹ D. Kagan, 'Economic origins of the Corinthian war (395-387 B.C.)', *PP*, xvi, 1961, p. 334.

¹⁷⁰ See the various numismatic texts cited at Bissa, 'Governmental intervention', p. 44, n96/98 and p. 54.

precious metals needed to consider whether the targeted states might use it to generate military capabilities that could, if circumstances changed, be used against them. In this consideration, precious metals were similar to timber and weapons, in contrast to grain which could not be used against the exporting state.

Weapons as Strategic Material

The only type of manufactured goods that could be considered strategic and thus usable as an economic measure was weapons, particularly warships. That is not to say states did not also provide land-based weapons, but such gifts were much less likely to influence. Providing land-based weaponry to the armies of other states occurred commonly through the Classical period and would have contributed to the military outcomes desired by the providing state. Each specific example does not warrant specific attention.¹⁷¹ In comparison, building and equipping warships was costly and time-consuming compared with generating land forces. Nevertheless, despite the potential for gifts and loans of warships to be regularly used as an economic measure, only six examples exist during the late Archaic and Classical periods.

During an Athenian war against Aegina c490, Corinth sold or possibly hired twenty triremes to Athens at a low price apparently since custom did not allow them to be provided as a gift. The Athenians added these triremes to their own fleet of fifty ships which they used to defeat the Aeginetans.¹⁷² Corinth and Aegina competed for naval supremacy in the Saronic Gulf, so Corinth was likely more interested in short-term harm to Aegina than from any fleeting friendship with Athens. Athens and Corinth were not natural allies, but this use of weapons as an economic measure occurred during a period in which their relationship was close.¹⁷³ It also occurred before Themistocles' shipbuilding program rapidly increased the Athenian navy and thus its maritime threat to Corinthian interests.

In 405 Athens, after defeat at Aegospotami, honoured Samos as the only state which had not revolted from the Delian League.¹⁷⁴ Inter alia, the Athenian decree granted to the

¹⁷¹ For one example, Athens initially provided weapons to the Theban army in 335 for use in its revolt against Macedonia, see Diod. 17.8.5-6 and Plut. *Dem.* 23.1.

¹⁷² Hdt. 6.89 and 6.92. For a detailed discussion of this sale, see Scott, *Book 6*, pp. 323-4.

¹⁷³ Thuc. 1.41.2.

¹⁷⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.6.

Samians the Athenian triremes at Samos.¹⁷⁵ Both Osborne/Rhodes and Tod posit these were probably the twenty ships Canon and Philocles left at Samos.¹⁷⁶ Regardless, the gift of valuable warships would have helped cement ongoing Samian loyalty to Athens during a difficult period for Athens.

The next example occurred in 396 at the same time as the previously discussed grain gift to Sparta by Nephereus, the king of Egypt. According to Diodorus, Nephereus also gifted 100 triremes.¹⁷⁷ The rationale for providing triremes extended further than just creating *eunoia*, since Egypt wanted to suppress Persian influence in the southern Mediterranean. Given Sparta was at war with Persia at that time, the gift would help Sparta achieve a military outcome desirable by both Sparta and Egypt. Further, Egypt would not have been concerned by Spartan naval power to the extent it had had previously been concerned by a threat from Athenian seapower.

The remaining gifts occurred in the modification fourth century. In c358 Tisiphonos, tyrant of Pherai allied with Thebes after reaching a related settlement with Philip II of Macedonia. As part of the Theban agreement, Tisiphonos provided them with ships for their expedition to Euboea. Although Euboea was not a likely threat, the gift would have helped establish Theban *eunoia* towards Pherai.¹⁷⁸ The next example occurred in 341/0 when Athens lent an unknown number of ships to Chalcis for potential use against Philip II of Macedonia. The loan can be inferred from *IG II²* 1629 lines 516-20.¹⁷⁹ The purpose of this loan was a clear example of economic statecraft being used to further Athens' military interests, in this case supporting another state against an expanding Macedonia. The final example occurred in 333 when the Persian king, or perhaps his satraps, provided Agis III, king of Sparta, with

¹⁷⁵ The inscription (OR 191, *IG II²* 1), with translation and commentary provided at Osborne and Rhodes (eds.), *GHI*, pp. 550-4. Also Tod 96 (*IG I²* 126) discussed at M. Tod (ed.), *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the end of the Fifth Century B.C.*, Oxford, 1946, pp. 231-4.

¹⁷⁶ Diod. 13.104.2.

¹⁷⁷ Diod. 14.79.4.

¹⁷⁸ For a description of Tisiphonus coming to power, see Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.35-37. For the gift of ships, see Schol.Arist.Panath. 179.6 cited at Heskell, 'The foreign policy of Philip II down to the Peace of Philocrates', Appendix to Chapter V, n34, p. 112.

¹⁷⁹ For a discussion of the strategic circumstances, see Aesch. 3.89-105 and Dem. 18.87. For a discussion of the loan's circumstances, see Vincent Gabrielsen, 'Naval and Grain Networks in Fourth-century Athens', in *Communities and Networks in the Ancient Greek World*, Claire Taylor and Kostas Vassopolous (eds.), Oxford, 2015, pp. 184-6.

ships.¹⁸⁰ According to Diodoros, Agis used them to sail to Crete where he captured cities and then required them to take the Persian side in its struggle against Macedonia. Thus, the Persian intent in providing the ships was clear, supporting a military outcome favourable to Persian interests.

Findings on Weapons

The small number of examples of a state providing weapons to another state markedly limits the extent one can generalise about this type of economic measure. All that can be said is providing weapons was effective as a means of influence. Providing timber could allow a state to build ships, whilst providing bullion could allow a state to mint which would create long-term benefits. But providing ships, or other weapons, created the desired end-product without delay. Thus, states directly receiving weapons would have been well received by the targeted state, creating immediate *eunoia* and potential reciprocal obligations.

Conclusion

This chapter completes the initial discussion about trade-related economic measures which started in Chapter Two. Collectively all these measures provided diverse means by which states could influence the attitudes and behaviours of other states. The trade-related measures discussed in this chapter could be applied positively to engender valuable *eunoia* in friends and potential enemies, or negatively to coerce other states into taking actions in the interests of the state applying the measure.

Importantly, states without the means, including available strategic resources, to apply trade-based economic measures had other options in using economic statecraft to influence other states. These alternative capital-related economic measures, identified and outlined in Chapter One, will now be discussed in the following chapters.

¹⁸⁰ Diod. 17.48.2.

CHAPTER FOUR

GIFTS, LOANS AND BRIBERY

Introduction

Capital-based economic measures comprise the various applications of ‘capital’, applied either positively to reward or negatively to punish other states. Within a state’s toolbox, such measures usefully augment the trade-based economic measures discussed in previous chapters. The capital-based economic measures discussed in this chapter are gifts of money, loans of money and bribery. The remaining capital-based measures will be discussed in Chapter Five. Gifts, loans and bribery are discussed in turn, with the chapter making some initial findings on their application within the ancient Greek world.

Gifts are unilateral money transfers with no requirement that the state receiving the gift has to repay the providing state, although the gifts may be accompanied by an expectation of reciprocity. In comparison, loans of money have to be repaid, typically with interest. Loans can be a form of preferential treatment if the receiving state cannot borrow from elsewhere or the loaning state charges an interest rate lower than other potential loan providers. Finally, the meaning of bribery’ as a form of money gift is discussed later in this chapter.

Gifts or Loans of Money

Utility of gifts and loans

Money, in the form of coins or bullion, remains the most flexible of economic measures given the recipient state can use it to purchase many different types of products and services. Accordingly, rich states can use money to influence other states, or help them achieve their own strategic objectives. Various states will be discussed in turn, noting private loans by individuals to states, although common, will not be discussed given their irrelevance to the

attempts by one state to influence another.¹ The states to be discussed are Persia, Macedonia, Athens, Sparta and eight other minor states.

Persia

Given its vast reserves of coins and bullion, the Persian king and his satraps were able to provide monetary gifts to states, either to achieve a specific effect or put the receiving state into a state of ongoing obligation.² Although no evidence exists for Persian loans, Persia provided money as politically-motivated gifts to Greek states from the 420s until its conquest by Alexander the Great.

The earliest example of Persian gift-giving was not described by either Herodotos or Thucydides, but was mentioned by several fourth-century orators and later, Plutarch.³ Soon after the Persian defeat at Salamis, Xerxes sent his representative, Arthmios, to the Peloponnesus carrying Persian gold. Several oratorical speeches mention an Athenian decree denouncing Arthmios for bringing Persian gold to the Peloponnesian states.⁴ The specific Persian motive remains unknown as does whether the attempt was successful. This instance of possible gift-giving may be the first example of Persia recognising it could influence Greek states by means other than defeating them in battle or threatening military action. One could reasonably speculate that Arthmios tried to prevent ongoing Peloponnesian support to any alliance of Greek states aimed at preventing Persia's expansion or threatening Persia's territorial integrity.⁵

¹ For one example of a loan to a state by private moneylenders, see the inscription discussed at W. Wallace, 'Loans to Karystos about 370 B.C.', *Phoenix*, 16, no. 1, 1962, pp. 15-28. One might suspect that states preferred receiving private loans given they did not create interstate *eunoia*, but insufficient evidence exists for this hypothesis to be defensible.

² For example, the description of Persian wealth at Hdt. 5.49.5-7. For a modern discussion of Persian wealth as it related to gift giving, see D. Lewis, 'Persian gold In Greek international relations', in *Selected papers in Greek and Near Eastern history*, P. Rhodes (ed.), Cambridge, 1997, pp. 369-79.

³ Aeschin. 3.258; Dem. 9.41-3, 19.271-2; Din. 2.24-5; Plut. Them. 6.3. Strabo, in criticising the earlier Greek historian Damastes (FGrH 5 Damastes T7) reported on a Greek embassy to Persia, possibly before the Peloponnesian War, see Strab. 1.3.1 as discussed at E. Rung, 'War, peace and diplomacy in Graeco-Persian relations from the sixth to the fourth century BC', in *War and Peace in Ancient and Medieval History*, P. de Souza and J. France (eds.), Cambridge, 2008, p. 34. Note that earlier c571, according to Herodotos, Oriotes, the Persian satrap of Sardis, lured Polycrates the tyrant of Samos to Persia with the promise of money and then killed him, see Hdt. 3.120-5. This offer is not considered an example of economic statecraft.

⁴ See Dem. 9.41-42, Dem. 19.271, Aeschin. 3.258 and Din 2.24-6.

⁵ Little modern scholarship has focussed on Arthmios' mission since M. Cary, Arthmios of Zeleia, *CQ*, Vol. 29, Issue 3-4, 1935, pp. 177-80. Nevertheless, his mission is briefly discussed in various thematic studies such as Andrea Giannotti's *'Debating Honor in Fifth*

One must wait about 50 years for further examples of Persian gift-giving. These examples begin not with Persia initiating gifts, but Greek states seeking Persian gold. In 432/1 Thucydides recorded that the Spartan king, Archidamos, realised the Peloponnesians did not have the resources necessary to win any war with Athens.⁶ Thucydides recorded that both Athens and Sparta wanted to send embassies to Persia seeking assistance, presumably because they both recognised they had insufficient local resources.⁷ He then recorded several instances of Greek embassies to Persia seeking financial support. First, in 430, a Peloponnesian embassy, intending to convince the Persian king to provide funds and join the war, was intercepted in Thrace by the Athenians who executed its members.⁸ Later, in 425/24, the Athenians arrested Artaphernes, a Persian, who had been sent by the king to Sparta. According to Thucydides, Artaphernes intended to advise that his king would receive Spartan ambassadors provided they spoke plainly and did not relay conflicting needs as had previous Spartan embassies.⁹ In the same year, Aristophanes mentioned an Athenian embassy to the Great King about the provision of Persian gold, but whether or not such gold was provided cannot be ascertained from the text.¹⁰

Later, in 413/12, Sparta was visited by separate envoys from the Persian satraps Pharnabazos and Tissaphernes.¹¹ After considering their competing proposals, the first seeking support from a Spartan fleet and the latter from a Spartan army, the Spartans accepted Tissaphernes' proposal. Consequently, in 412-411, Sparta negotiated three treaties

Century BCE Athens: Towards a Comparative and Intradisciplinary Approach, Primerjalna književnost, Vol. 44 (2), 2021, pp. 39-52.

For a summary of relevant scholarship on the dating of the contentious Athenian decree outlawing Arthmios, see Yusuru Hashiba, 'Athenian Bribery Reconsidered: Some Legal Aspects', *The Cambridge Classical Journal*, 52, 2006, p. 72, n44.

⁶ Thuc. 1.80.3-4. Note the comment at Aristot. *Pol.* 1271b about the Spartans' reluctance to tax themselves. Further comments by Thucydides about Sparta's financial resources can be found at Thuc. 1.19 and 1.121.3.

⁷ Thuc. 2.7.1.

⁸ Thuc. 2.67.1-5. For a brief discussion of Athenian responsibility and motive, see A.W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 3 vols, Oxford, 1945, Vol. 2, p. 201.

⁹ Thuc. 4.50.1-2. Hornblower opined that Artaxerxes' comments could have been a diplomatic way of saying that if Sparta wanted financial help they must forego territorial claims in Asia Minor, see Simon Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides Volume II: Books IV-V.24*, Oxford, 1996, p. 207.

¹⁰ The description of the embassy is spread across Aristoph. *Ach.* 43, 65 and 100.

¹¹ Thuc. 8.5.4-5 and 8.6.1. For a detailed discussion of both embassies, see Gomme, *Commentary*, Vol V, pp. 12-20. For a detailed description of the two Persian satraps and their relative rank, see Simon Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides Volume III: Books 5.25-8.109*, Oxford, 2008, pp. 764-9.

with the Persian king in quick succession, promising to recognise Persian control of the Greeks in Asia Minor if compensated by Persian financial support.¹²

In 411, separate to the Peloponnesian War, Xenophon recorded that the satrap Pharnabazos gave monies to Hermokrates when he was banished from Syracuse. Wanting to return to power in Syracuse he was provided with enough funds, according to Diodorus, to build five triremes and hire a thousand mercenaries.¹³ Deciphering a Persian motive apart from any friendship between the two is difficult. Given Syracuse posed no credible threat to Persian interests, no obvious reason exists for the gift apart from Pharnabazos creating some *eunoia* in a Hermokrates-led Syracuse that might be useful in the future.

Returning to the Peloponnesian War, in 407 Sparta first received money direct from the Persian king rather than from his satraps. Xenophon recorded that a Spartan embassy led by Boiotios had won everything they had asked for from the king.¹⁴ The king's son, Cyrus, provided the Spartan admiral, Lysander, with 500 talents, promising more from his own funds if that was insufficient.¹⁵ After some negotiation, Cyrus confirmed the treaty between Persia and Sparta required Persian payment of 3000 drachms per month for each ship the Spartans wished to maintain.¹⁶ After further discussion Cyrus raised the pay to four ὀβολοί (obols) per day per sailor along with back pay.¹⁷ In 405, Cyrus provided additional funds from the Persian treasury including tribute he had raised.¹⁸ Xenophon recorded that at the end of the war Lysander had 470 talents of silver remaining from the monies provided by Persia.¹⁹ Xenophon did not detail the quantum of funds provided by the Persians, but the fourth-century orators Andocides and Isocrates, state it was at least 5000 talents, presumably of silver.²⁰ Whether this figure is accurate or an exaggeration remains unknowable.

¹² Thuc. 8.18.1-3 and 8.37.1-5. For a discussion of whether these arrangements were formalised treaties or preliminary agreements recorded in draft by Thucydides, see Hornblower, *Thuc. Volume III*, pp. 801-2 and pp. 855-7.

¹³ Diod. 13.63.2. Less detail is provided at Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.31.

¹⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.2.

¹⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.3.

¹⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.5.

¹⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.7. Krentz argued that Xenophon may have exaggerated Cyrus' generosity, see Peter Krentz, *Xenophon Hellenika I-II.3.10*, Oxford, 1989, p.136.

¹⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.14.

¹⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.8.

²⁰ Isoc. 8.97 and Andoc. 3.29.

Persia provided funds to Sparta during the Peloponnesian War to increase the likelihood that the war's outcomes were favourable to Persian strategic interests. In the absence of express Persian aims, two dimensions inferable from Thucydides and Xenophon are worthy of discussion. First, Persia wanted a victor that was less likely than its opponent to threaten Persian territorial interests especially those in Asia Minor. To that end, Sparta was the preferred victor since its fleet, without ongoing Persian funding, would not represent the scale of future threat posed by a victorious Athenian fleet. Further, Sparta's history of isolationism probably gave Persia confidence that it was less likely than Athens to intervene in Asia Minor. But simply supporting Sparta was insufficient, since an all-powerful Sparta may have become a threat to Persia despite its history. Thus, Persia likely aimed to reduce the likelihood of any Greek state being sufficiently powerful to threaten its interests in Asia Minor. Xenophon recorded a comment by Tissaphernes, based on advice from Alcibiades, that the Persians should ensure no Greek state became strong, but rather they all be kept weak by fighting amongst themselves.²¹ Thus, Persia probably desired that both warring sides wear themselves out. Persia wanted Sparta to win, but it did not want a victorious Sparta to be militarily powerful. To this end one could argue that for several years Tissaphernes delayed many payments of agreed funds in order to prevent a quick Spartan victory, extending the war and thus weakening both sides. Lewis also argued that Cyrus' decision to make the payments was likely predicated on the Greeks agreeing not to interfere with the Persian hegemony over the Greek cities of Asia Minor, who paid tribute to the Persian king.²² Cartledge and Seager/Tuplin have expressed a logical counter view that such a non-interference clause remain conjectural.²³

By the start of the fourth century, Persia's previous success in keeping Asia Minor free of Greek military forces was under threat. Whilst Athens remained non-threatening, in the early fourth century Spartan forces led by Agesilaus campaigned against the Persians in Ionia, ostensibly to make the Greek cities in Asia autonomous.²⁴ Another situation had arisen

²¹ Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.9.

²² D.M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia: Lectures delivered at the University of Cincinnati, Autumn 1976 in Memory of Donald W. Bradeen*, Leiden, 1977, pp. 124-5.

²³ For example, see Robin Seager and Christopher Tuplin, 'The Freedom of the Greeks of Asia: on the Origins of a Concept and the Creation of a Slogan', *JHS*, 100, 1980, p. 144 especially n. 36.

²⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.5.

in which, given the inadequacy of Persian military forces, Persia could use its funds as an economic measure to remove the Spartan threat.

In 396/5 the Rhodian Timocrates was despatched, with gold equivalent to fifty talents of silver, to agitate first in Corinth then Athens, Thebes and Argos, for these states to attack Sparta.²⁵ Xenophon stated that the Sardian satrap Tithraustes sent him, most likely on behalf of Pharnabazos or the Persian king himself. Whilst support to a non-threatening Sparta in the late fifth century was in Persian interests, by the early fourth century the situation had markedly changed. Xenophon recorded the money was distributed in Thebes, Corinth and Argos with Athens taking no share, implying Athens had pre-existing hegemonical ambitions that did not need fuelling by Persian gold.²⁶ In Plutarch's contrary view, recognising the uncertainty of his fourth-century sources, the money was distributed among the popular leaders in Athens and Thebes.²⁷ Regardless of who received the money, given the military threat to Sparta funded by Persian gold, Agesilaus was recalled from Asia Minor after Athens and Thebes started hostilities against Sparta. Persian gold had again proven to be an effective economic measure.²⁸

By 394, after the victory of the Persian fleet commanded by Konon, Persia had reduced the Spartan threat to Asia Minor. To consolidate its position, Pharnabazos, accompanied by Konon, sailed to various parts of mainland Greece and the Aegean islands exhorting the anti-Spartan coalition to carry on the war against Sparta. Once again he provided Persian funds as an incentive, leaving as much money as he could.²⁹ Pharnabazos then despatched Konon to Athens, providing him with further funds to help rebuild the Long Walls.³⁰ But why would

²⁵ See Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1-2 as well as Paus. 3.9.8, Plut. *Art.* 20, Diod. 14.84.5 and the *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* (*Hell. Oxy.* 7.2-5 and 18.1); For an unrelated mention of Tithraustes, see Diod. 14.80.6-7. For a discussion of Corinth's response, see D. Kagan, 'Economic origins of the Corinthian war (395-387 B.C.)', *PP*, xvi, 1961, p. 339. Krentz correctly argued that 50 talents would have been insufficient incentive for war unless other strong reasons existed. He opined, based on Plut. *Ages.* 15.8, that the money could have been more than 50 talents, see Peter Krentz, *Xenophon Hellenika II.3.11 - IV.2.8*, Oxford, 1995, p. 195.

²⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1-2 with Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.10 commenting on the Corinthian use of the monies. *Hell. Oxy.* 7.2 states the money was accepted at Athens.

²⁷ Plut. *Ages.* 15.6.

²⁸ For a discussion of the context for these Persian gifts, the likely recipients, possible timing inaccuracies and the contribution of the Persian money to the eventual war, see Krentz, *Hellenika* 2, pp. 194-6.

²⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.8 and Polyæn. *Strat.* 1.48.3.

³⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.9. For scholarship on Konon's travels in this period, see Jose Pascual, 'Konon, the Persian Fleet and a Second Naval Campaign in 393 BC', *Historia*, 65, 2016, pp. 14-30.

Persia provide funds to help Athens, one of the few states whose naval power had the potential to threaten Persian interests in Asia Minor and who had a record of doing so? The potential threat posed by a militarily resurgent Athens was less significant than the existing imminent danger posed by Agesilaus' presence in Asia Minor and the ongoing Spartan threat.

The influence of the Persian gift, on the willingness of the Greek states to go to war against Sparta, was assessed differently by Xenophon and the author of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*. The former implied that the Persian money was a primary cause of the resultant war. The latter considered sufficient enmity already existed towards Sparta and thus one can infer Persian gold simply funded the pre-existing hostility.³¹ Regardless, as Kagan rightly argued, the offered Persian gold, with the possibility of future gifts, allayed the fear of those propertied classes who would normally carry a war's financial burden.³² Athens did not need to levy a new *eisphora* and neither did Corinth or Thebes have to introduce war taxes. Persian gold was an effective economic measure because it removed uncertainty in the anti-Spartan states of how to fund their enmity towards Sparta.

Four further potential fourth-century examples exist of Persian funds being used as an economic measure against Greek states.³³ First, Polybius stated that Sparta, in negotiating the Peace of Antalcidas c387, betrayed the other Greeks for Persian money in order to secure its supremacy over the Greeks.³⁴ Polybius argued that Sparta needed external funds to finance military expeditions outside the Peloponnesus against other Greeks given it could not generate sufficient funds from its own resources. Persia's clear interest was to create a common peace to prevent threats to Persia's territorial integrity and providing funds to Sparta remained a small price to pay for this desirable strategic outcome.³⁵

³¹ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1-2 and *Hell. Oxy.* 7.2 as discussed at Kagan, 'Economic origins', p. 328. McKechnie/Kern opined that the latter author's intent was to dispel a mistaken belief bribery was responsible for the creation of war parties at Athens and elsewhere, see P.R. McKechnie and S.J. Kern, *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, Oxford, 1988, p. 135.

³² Kagan, 'Economic origins', p. 328.

³³ Noting these three do not include embassies to Persia for which there is no evidence of resultant gifts or loans, such as the Athenian embassy which travelled via Phoenicia and was assisted by Strato, the King of Sidon, see Tod 139 (*IG* I² 141) discussed at M. Tod (ed.), *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions Volume II From 403 to 323 B.C.*, Oxford, 1948, p. 118.

³⁴ Plb. 6.49.

³⁵ For the context and outcomes of the Kings Peace, a plethora of scholarship exists over the last 100 plus years, with an early example being G.E. Underhill, 'Athens and the Peace of Antalcidas', *CR*, 10, no. 1, 1896, pp. 19-21 and a more recent example being Daniel Beckman, 'King Artaxerxes' Aegean Policy', *Journal of Persianate Studies*, 10, no. 1, 2017, pp. 1-25.

Second, Xenophon recorded that in 368 Philiskos arrived at Delphi with funds from the Persian satrap Ariobarzanes, attempting to arrange a peace between Thebes and Sparta.³⁶ Unsuccessful, Xenophon implied that he used the monies to buy mercenaries and wage war on Sparta's side. That is, no evidence exists that payments of Persian monies were made to states to influence the outcome of alliance negotiations, rather they were used for specific military activities. The subsequent negotiations at Susa in 367, involving several Greek states provided no evidence that Persian funds were applied to achieve any desired outcomes.³⁷

Next, in 351, the Persians provided Thebes with 300 talents of silver at the Thebans request to allow them to continue their war against the Phocians.³⁸ Lewis commented funding was necessary to counter the Phocians' monetary resources, much of which had been obtained through pillage of the Delphic treasury.³⁹ The Persian motive for supporting Thebes is not clear since neither of the participants had historically threatened Persian interests. Most likely, Persia considered Thebes would support Persian interests in Asia Minor, given providing the funds would create an ongoing *eunoia* within Persia.

The final example occurred in 333 when the Persian king provided Agis III, king of Sparta, with monies.⁴⁰ The Persian motive in providing these resources was clear, namely to support Sparta in its military operations against Alexander the Great. The Persian king would have understood that Alexander might eventually pose a threat to Persian interests in Asia Minor and beyond. Providing funds to Sparta would at the best help it defeat Macedonia and at the worst result in a militarily weakened Macedonia less able to threaten Persia.

Macedonia

During the late Archaic and Classical periods, only one possible example exists of Macedonia providing financial support to Greek states. Such support is distinct from the use of bribery by Macedonian kings which will be discussed later in this chapter. This single

³⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.27.

³⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.39 and Diod. 15.76.

³⁸ Diod. 16.40.1-2. Diodorus made clear Artaxerxes readily agreed to the Theban request, without explaining why.

³⁹ Lewis, '*Persian gold*', p. 377. See also the discussion at Josiah Ober, *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece*, Princeton, 2015, p. 240.

⁴⁰ Diod. 17.48.2 does not state quantum, but Arrian *Anab.* 2.13.6 states that 30 talents were supplied. See further discussion at Aleksandar Simić, 'The Preparation of Spartan King Agis III for the War with Macedonians', *Akropolis, JHS*, 1, 2017, pp. 121-8. The accompanying gift of warships was discussed in Chapter Three.

example, which may have occurred during the reign of Philip II, needs to be inferred from scant evidence rather than being based on clear statements made in ancient sources. Whilst historians debate whether Philip II involved himself in the Euboean rebellion of 348, and if so in what form, Heskell argued, as did Giuliiodori, that Philip II provided financial support to Euboea, especially Chalcis.⁴¹ Philip had both tactical and strategic reasons to foment revolt. Providing funds to influence the outcome, rather than providing military support, made logical sense given Philip's forces were fully engaged in the Chalcidice. Diverting his troops would have threatened his desired military outcomes in that region. Instead, Philip may have been able to provide finances that helped the Euboean rebellion, thus creating difficulties for Athens, whilst not overtly signaling that Macedonia desired a successful Euboea revolt.

Although the revolt was unsuccessful, in the short term it diverted Athenian military attention away from supporting the states in the Chalcidice fighting against Macedonian annexation. In the longer term, a successful revolt would have engendered Macedonian support in some Euboean states against the growing influence of Athens. Thus, Heskell's argument makes logical sense but the absence of direct evidence makes its corroboration difficult.

Athens

Only three examples exist for Athens providing monetary gifts or loans to other states. All concerned loans given that Athens, unlike Persia, did not have the financial reserves for large-scale financial gift-giving to other states. The first example occurred c423 when an Athenian decree recorded that Methone, an Athenian ally, was in debt to Athens.⁴² The circumstances of the loan and its amount are not recorded, but one could legitimately surmise Methone sought funds to help them counter ongoing harassment from Perdikkas.⁴³ The other forms of Athenian support to Methone, and their rationale in the context of Macedonian interference, have already been discussed in Chapters Two and Three. Providing a loan

⁴¹ For a summary of the competing scholarship, see T.T.B. Ryder, 'The diplomatic skills of Philip II', in *Ventures into Greek History*, Ian Worthington (ed.), Oxford, 1994, p. 432 and Holly Giuliiodori, 'The foreign policy of Macedon c513 to 346 BC', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Glasgow, 2004, pp. 184-7. Cawkwell and Blunt (P.A. Brunt, 'Euboea in the Time of Philip II', *CQ*, 19, no. 2, 1969, p. 249) rejected the idea of Philip's involvement, whilst Griffith and Momigliano argued for it.

⁴² OR 150 (*JG* I² 57) provided and translated at Robin Osborne and P.J. Rhodes (eds.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions 478-404 BC*, Oxford, 2017, pp. 286-93.

⁴³ As discussed at Giuliiodori, 'Foreign policy of Macedon', p. 52.

simply supplemented the previously discussed trade-related economic measures intended to influence Methone to provide ongoing loyalty to Athens.

The final two examples occurred c410 or soon afterwards. An Athenian inscription honoured Neapolis in Thrace for remaining loyal to Athens when attacked by the Thasians.⁴⁴ The inscription details a financial loan although the arrangements and recipients are open to interpretation. Figueira justifiably argued that the loan was provided to fund Neapolis' military activities against Thasos.⁴⁵ The loan's rationale is not in doubt for Athens needed to demonstrate its ongoing support in a form directly useful to Neapolis. Later, c407, Athens entered into a treaty arrangement with Selymbria, on the Propontis' north shore, after its revolt from Athens. Various examples of favourable treatment included a possible cancellation of its debts to Athens.⁴⁶ This cancellation may refer to outstanding tribute payments, which are discussed in Chapter Five, but could possibly apply to outstanding loans to Athens. Regardless, the cancellation was an effective economic measure helping to reconstitute Selymbrian *eunoia* towards Athens.

Although these are the only examples of Athenian financial gifts or loans directly to states, Athens did have an extensive fourth-century record of providing gifts of small monetary value to honour key citizens of other states. The gifts were not designed to provide specific economic benefits to the recipients, but were of a monetary value reflecting the honour being provided. In one study of such gifts, Lambert identified over 160 instances during the period 352/1-322/1.⁴⁷

Amongst this large number of examples one finds the gold crowns provided to the Spartokids so they would, as discussed in Chapter Three, '... take care of the despatch of

⁴⁴ IG I³ 101 available at Attic Inscriptions Online.

⁴⁵ T. Figueira, 'The imperial commercial tax and the finances of the Athenian hegemony', *IncidAntico*, 3, 2005, p. 105.

⁴⁶ IG I³ 116 termed ML 87 in R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century*, Oxford, 1969, pp. 267-9. SEG 51-1103 comments on D.Knoepler publishing Eretrian proxeny and citizenship decrees with an exhaustive commentary.

⁴⁷ S. Lambert, 'Athenian state laws and decrees, 352/1-322/1: III Decrees honouring foreigners A. Citizenship, proxeny and euergesy', *ZPE*, 158, 2006, pp. 115-58 and S. Lambert, 'Athenian state laws and decrees, 352/1-322/1: III Decrees honouring foreigners B. Other awards', *ZPE*, 159, 2007, pp. 101-54.

corn as their father did'.⁴⁸ Gold crowns, usually worth 1000 drachms, were not of large monetary value but were an important honorific. Similarly, Athens provided gold crowns to loyal Acarnanians so they would continue supporting Athens.⁴⁹ Further, in 403/2 Athens provided gold crowns to Poses of Samos and his sons, indirectly providing an incentive for Samos, a long-term ally of Athens, to remain loyal to Athens whilst Athens helped Samos negotiate its future with Sparta.⁵⁰ Finally, in 369/8 Athens provided gold crowns to Dionysius of Syracuse.⁵¹ Athens used this gift as one part of a package of influence techniques aimed at convincing Dionysius, and thus Syracuse a former Spartan ally, to also ally with Athens.

One other incident sheds light on the use of Athenian financial gifts or loans as an economic measure. In this example Athens did not provide the monies but instead negotiated so as to prevent another state supplying funds to other states. During the Archidamian War, Athens entered a military agreement with Halieis, strategically located on the southern coast of the Argive peninsula. The agreement required, inter alia, that Halieis did not '... supply money to the enemies'.⁵² Interestingly, no equivalent requirement was placed on Athens which reflected the power imbalance between the two states. No obvious explanation exists for why Athens was worried about Halieis' limited ability to provide funds to Athens' enemies. No such equivalent requirement exists in any other Athenian interstate agreement.

Sparta

If Athens only provided monetary gifts or loans on a few occasions, Sparta only did so once. In 403, Lysander persuaded Sparta to lend 100 talents to the 'Thirty' in Athens, for use against Thrasybulos and the exiled democrats who had occupied the Peiraeus.⁵³ Providing a loan was in Sparta's interest in that it would help prevent democracy, usually unfavourable to

⁴⁸ RO 64 (*IG II² 212*) provided and translated at P. Rhodes and R. Osborne (eds.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions 404-323 BC*, Oxford, 2003, pp. 318-24. Note that a later third-century inscription, *IG II² 653*, also implied that bronze statues were erected in Athens to the Cimmerian kings, but these were not of monetary value to them.

⁴⁹ P.J. Rhodes, *Greek Historical Inscriptions 359-323 B.C.*, Original Records No. 9, London, 1971, p. 24.

⁵⁰ RO 2 (no *IG* or *SIG* reference) translated at Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, pp. 12-7.

⁵¹ RO 33 (*IG II² 103*) provided and translated at Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, pp. 160-4.

⁵² *IG I³ 75*. The decree is provided and discussed at S. Lambert, 'Attic inscriptions in UK collections: Fitzwilliam Museum Cambridge', 2018, www.atticinscriptions.com, p. 10. The only other modern commentary appears to be that provided at A.P. Matthaiou, 'Studies in Attic inscriptions and the History of the Fifth Century BC', unpublished PhD thesis, Latrobe University, 2009, pp. 164-7.

⁵³ The loan amount is described at *Isoc.* 7.68 and *Lys.* 12.59. Demosthenes, in his speech 'Against Leptines' (*Dem* 20.11) refers to the loan, but not the amount. Xenophon narrated the context for the loan at *Xen. Hell.* 2.4.10-28.

Spartan interests, returning to Athens. Ultimately, the dispute within the Athenian factions was resolved peacefully through the intervention of Pausanias, the Spartan king, who was not a friend of Lysander. The Spartans sent envoys to demand repayment of their loan with the restored Athenian assembly enacting a decree accepting responsibility for the repayment.⁵⁴

Other states

Ancient evidence provides examples of monetary gifts or loans provided by, or sought from, eight other states, namely Pelagonia, Tenedos, Perinthus, Samos, Thebes, Rhodes, Elis and Pherai. Each of these will now be examined in turn.

Pelagonia. In 363/2, Menelaus, most likely related to the king of the Pelagonians, provided Athens with funds as contribution to its war against the Chalcidians.⁵⁵ Whether he did so as a private individual or as an agent of the king is unknown. Given the Pelagonians were threatened by Chalcidian expansionism, the gift would have provided an incentive to Athens to prosecute its war against the Chalcidians in ways supportive of Pelagonian territorial interests.

Tenedos. During the Macedonian attack on cities in the Propontis and surrounds in 340/39, the island state of Tenedos provided a loan to support Athenian attempts to relieve besieged cities.⁵⁶ Tenedos was a long-standing Athenian ally so providing financial support was not unusual. Nevertheless, Tenedos recognised their funds would help prevent Macedonian expansionism which may eventually have extended to threaten Tenedos. Providing the funds would also have increased the likelihood that in any future dealings with Tenedos, Athens would look favourably upon that small state. Such favourable treatment occurred almost immediately, in that the Athenian decree, recognising the monies, provided that Tenedos would be free of all impositions including the *syntaxeis* discussed in Chapter Five, until the loan was repaid.

⁵⁴ Dem. 20.11, Isoc. 7.68 and Arist. *Const. Ath.* 40.3.

⁵⁵ RO 38 (*IG II² 110*) translated and discussed at Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, pp. 192-6. Note that Pelagonia was later absorbed into the Macedonian kingdom. What little is known about Menelaus is detailed by Rhodes/Osborne at pp. 194-5.

⁵⁶ RO 72 (*IG II² 233*) translated and discussed at Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, pp. 358-61. The loan is also discussed at Tod 175 (*SIG 256*), see Tod (ed.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions Vol. II*, pp. 219-23.

Perinthus. Aristotle recorded that Perinthus, a Samian colony on the Propontis, refused to provide a loan requested by Cotys I, king of Thrace from 383–359.⁵⁷ Cotys wanted the funds to raise an army, but the Perinthians did not consider such a loan would be in their interests, even though it may have temporarily appeased the ongoing Thracian threat. The Perinthians had to reconsider when Kotys placed some of their citizens in custody, threatening not to release them until the loan was provided. Aristotle does not record the outcome of this threat, so one does not know whether the loan was eventually provided under coercion. If so, the loan would have hardly created any enduring *eunoia* from Cotys.

Samos. Herodotos provided another example of a loan not offered but demanded with unpleasant consequences if not provided. In c524, the Cycladic state Siphnos refused to provide a ten-talent loan demanded by a threatening Samos.⁵⁸ The Siphnians would likely not have wanted to set a precedent for providing funds under coercion, especially to Samos which had been raiding Siphnos since the sixth century. In response to the refusal the Samians set about ravaging their lands. After defeating the Siphnians in battle, the Samians exacted from them the increased amount of a hundred talents. The provision of this sum under coercion, and thus not a loan, would not have created any enduring *eunoia* within Samos.

Thebes. In 404/403, Thebes may have provided financial aid to Athenian exiles. If so, Thebes did not use the gift/loan as an economic measure to influence a foreign state, but to support a group of people who may eventually return to some political influence or control of the state. The Thebans would have considered that if the exiles returned to power, they would look favourably towards Thebes. The relevance of this example to interstate loans is further complicated by Kagan's argument the funds were provided by Ismenias, the leader of the anti-Spartan faction in Thebes. Given Ismenias was not in full control of Thebes, one could legitimately argue the loan, if indeed it occurred, was not provided on behalf of the state.⁵⁹

Rhodes. A decree of uncertain date, but possibly from the latter fourth-century, indicates Rhodes provided Argos an interest-free loan of a 100 talents to restore its city walls

⁵⁷ Aristot. *Econ.* 2.1351a.

⁵⁸ Hdt. 3.58.

⁵⁹ Discussed at Kagan, 'Economic origins', p. 331, based on the comments about Ismenias supporting them with his private means, see Justin. *Epitome* 5.9.8.

and increase the size of its cavalry.⁶⁰ The Rhodians would have considered such a loan was useful in creating *eunoia* amongst the Argives, with whom they shared kinship. Nevertheless, the specific circumstances in which such *eunoia* would have been valuable to Rhodes are uncertain.

Elis. Elis may have provided funds to other states on three occasions. First, in 435 Elis may have contributed money to an initiative by Corinth to relieve Epidamnos.⁶¹ This contribution would have been in Elis' strategic interests as a member of the Peloponnesian League. Second, Xenophon reported that in 370 the Eleans provided Mantinea with three talents as a contribution to the construction of a city wall.⁶² In the same year, they also provided a loan of 10 talents to Thebes to help them finance their military support to Mantinea and Elis.⁶³ Once again, Elis' strategic interests aligned with the promotion of Mantinean and Theban interests against Sparta.

Pherai. Plutarch recorded that in the 360s Athens took money from Alexander the tyrant of Pherai as well as erecting a bronze statue of him as its benefactor.⁶⁴ Plutarch did not discuss the reason why Alexander would make payments to Athens and what he wanted in return. If Alexander made such payments they may have simply have been intended to reduce the likelihood that Athens would intervene in Alexander's affairs, given ongoing Pheraean aggression towards Athens including military raids on Attica.

Loans by sanctuaries and temples

Not only states had the ability and necessary funds to make loans to states. Some *amphictyones* managing sanctuaries controlled considerable wealth acquired through gifts and dedications to their honoured gods as well as rents from sacred properties.⁶⁵ Although

⁶⁰ The decree is discussed at Lynette G. Mitchell, 'Φιλία, εunoia and Greek interstate relations', *Antichthon*, 31, 1997, p. 39.

⁶¹ Thuc. 1.24.1–27.2. Thucydides stated that they were asked for money, without specifically stating they provided funds.

⁶² Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.5.

⁶³ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.19.

⁶⁴ Plut. *Pel.* 31.4 with no relevant commentary at Aristoula Georgiadou, *Plutarch's Pelopidas: A Historical and Philological Commentary*, Stuttgart, 1997, pp. 212-3.

⁶⁵ For instance, Pausanias recorded that the Siphnians were ordered by their god to pay a tithe on the revenues from their gold mines, see Paus. 10.11.2. The best-known *Amphictyony* was based in Delphi whilst another was based on the cult of the sea-god Poseidon in the Peloponnese at Kalaureia.

their major expenditure was funding religious rituals, the larger sanctuaries had sufficient surplus funds, which their administrators preferred not to lie dormant, to provide loans to both individuals and states.⁶⁶ This section will explore whether there is evidence to suggest the two major sanctuaries, namely at Delphi and Delos, provided loans to specific states for reasons other than simply wanting to generate funds through interest payments.⁶⁷ In particular, this section will examine whether the motives for such loans was an attempt by states controlling the sanctuaries to influence other states. Loans provided by Athenian sanctuaries to Athens itself are not considered since such loans are not relevant to economic statecraft.⁶⁸

Delian Sanctuary

Control of the Delian sanctuary dedicated to Apollo often changed during the Classical period. Originally managed by the Delians, by 410, after the Athenian intervention on Delos during the Archidamian War, the sanctuary was managed by a board of four Athenian *amphictyones*.⁶⁹ After the Athenian defeat by Sparta, control was passed back to the Delians, but the Athenians regained control in 394 after Konon's victory at Cnidus.⁷⁰ When controlled by Athens, the sanctuary's *amphictyones* needed to ensure it functioned in Athens' interests whilst not bringing discredit. Bonnin described the situation most clearly, positing that to obtain a loan from Delos states had to demonstrate loyalty to Athens.⁷¹

⁶⁶ See discussion and citing of further references at Lambert, 'Attic inscriptions in UK collections: Fitzwilliam Museum Cambridge', p. 27. Such loans were attractive since they were often at lower interest rates than charged by money-lenders.

⁶⁷ Other sanctuaries provided loans such as the fifth-century sanctuary of the goddess Nemesis in Rhamnous in northeast Attica, which made loans at interest. Over one four-year period it lent between 8 and 10 talents, see *IG I³ 248* (available at www.packhum.org) and discussed at A. Bresson, *The Making of the Ancient Greek Economy: Institutions, Markets, and Growth in the City-States*, Princeton, 2016, p. 279. However, insufficient evidence exists to analyse the loans by minor sanctuaries in the context of economic statecraft.

⁶⁸ For example, *IG I³ 369* reveals extensive Athenian borrowings from Athens' sacred treasuries. For discussion of Athens' borrowing from Athenian temple treasuries, see Sitta von Reden, *Money in Classical Antiquity*, Cambridge, 2010, p. 168 and P. van Alfen, 'Hatching Owls: The Regulation of Coin Production in Later Fifth-Century Athens', *Quantifying Monetary Supplies in Greco-Roman Times*, 2011, p. 131. Thucydides also had Pericles referring to borrowing of money from temples, even using Athena's gold ornaments if necessary, see *Thuc.* 2.13.5.

⁶⁹ As discussed at Lambert, 'Attic inscriptions in UK collections: Fitzwilliam Museum Cambridge', pp. 25-6. Note that from 374/3 they are joined by five Andrians who continued in office for a four-year period through to 371/0.

⁷⁰ See *IG II² 1635 (a-BA)* for a description of the Athenian *amphictyones* between 377-3. Tod also discussed this inscription (Tod 125) at Tod (ed.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions Vol. II*, pp. 72-82.

⁷¹ G. Bonnin, 'Phoroi, syntaxeis, and loans from Delian Apollo: The Cyclades under Athenian financial imperialism', in *Hegemonic Finances: Funding Athenian Domination in the 5th and 4th Centuries B.C.*, T. Figueira and S. Jensen (eds.), Swansea, 2019, p. 152.

No evidence exists for the sanctuary providing loans to states during the fifth century.⁷² Further, no evidence exists of loans to other states during the short period of Delian independence. Evidence of specific Delian loans is only available for the fourth-century period in which the sanctuary was under Athenian control. Inscriptions record that loans were made at a standard 10% interest rate, primarily to Aegean states and particularly to those within the Cyclades.⁷³ States for which loans were provided, but the receiving states' purposes were not specified, included Keos, Mykonos, Syros, Siphnos, Tenos, Ikaros, Paros, Seriphos, Ios, Karystos and Andros.⁷⁴

However, one can reasonably speculate the likely rationale for some loans was that the Athenian *amphictyones* wanted to relieve financial pressure on neighbouring states in the period when they were required to make *syntaxeis* payments. That is, Athens, through the *amphictyones*, recognised Athens' interests required allies not to default on payments and thus they provided loans to ensure default did not occur. Further, the *amphictyones* did not usually apply pressure to those states whose loan debt payments fell into arrears. For example, only Seriphos and Ios, both small borrowers, paid all their interest due and some states, such as Andros, never paid any interest.⁷⁵ Further, the *amphictyones* loaned money to loyal states in situations where their ability or willingness to repay the loan was uncertain. That is, the sanctuary sometimes provided new loans to states, such as Paros, Seriphos and Karystos, whilst they still had not repaid debts from previous loans.⁷⁶ Records show Paros was the state most heavily in debt but still receiving loans, at one stage owing four talents and 1830 drachms in unpaid interest.⁷⁷ Yet despite these incomplete loans, in 341/0 Paros inscribed a decree honouring the *amphictyones* for providing a further loan of five talents.⁷⁸

⁷² For a discussion of Delian finances, see Brian Rutishauser *Athens and the Cyclades. Economic Strategies 540–314 BC.*, Oxford, 1993, pp. 170–86.

⁷³ IG I³ 402 constitutes the first evidence. See also Tod 135 (IG II² 1635) discussed at Tod (ed.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions Vol. II*, pp. 72–82 which outlines the interest on loans paid by ten cities, all of which were on neighbouring islands; as well as the failure to make interest payments by other states with loans.

⁷⁴ Accounts of the *Amphiktyones* of the Sanctuary of Apollo on Delos, discussed at Lambert, 'Attic inscriptions in UK collections: Fitzwilliam Museum Cambridge'. For example, von Reden stated '... the island of Paros, for example, was continuously indebted to Apollo from the beginning of the fourth century to 341', see von Reden, *Money*, p. 169.

⁷⁵ Lambert, 'Attic inscriptions in UK collections: Fitzwilliam Museum Cambridge', p. 27.

⁷⁶ IG XII 5.113 and IG II² 1635.

⁷⁷ Lambert, 'Attic inscriptions in UK collections: Fitzwilliam Museum Cambridge', p. 27.

⁷⁸ IG XII 5 discussed at Lambert, 'Attic inscriptions in UK collections: Fitzwilliam Museum Cambridge', p. 27.

In summary, the Athenian *amphictyones* provided loans to help achieve two specific strategic effects, namely ongoing loyalty to Athens and the constant flow of payments from states which otherwise, if not for the loan, might have defaulted on their *syntaxeis* payments. While as Rutishauser argued, the extent of funding was never large, loans were likely useful to help to ensure regular *syntaxeis* payments.⁷⁹ These payments financially benefitted Athens' ability to fund the military forces required to defend the confederacy.

Delphic Sanctuary

The Delphic sanctuary was administered by an *amphictyonic* council originally representing many different ethnic units. Each member state sent one or more representatives (a *πυλάγορος* – *pulagoros*) with authority to vote on the state's behalf. Pausanias detailed the original tribes and described some changes to council membership over time.⁸⁰ Aeschines detailed the content of the *amphictyonic* oath and Strabo described the types of matters relevant to their consideration.⁸¹ The states exercising the major influence varied over time.⁸² Hornblower correctly argued that the Thessalians exerted major influence, especially in the fourth century.⁸³ Although designed to transact religious matters, the *amphictyony* also provided loans to Greek states, but with arguably more independence than its Delian equivalent.⁸⁴ The Delphic sanctuary with its oracle, was embedded in the polis of Delphi and was physically located in the city centre. As a religious rather than political association, the oracle was not often used as an arbiter of interstate disputes and Westermann argued that the *amphictyones* had little influence or standing as a court of reference for interstate

⁷⁹ Rutishauser goes on to argue that the sanctuary treasury '... could never have provided a financial base for Athenian imperialism in either century, see Rutishauser, *Cyclades*, p. 172.

⁸⁰ According to Pausanias the original members were the Ionians, Dolopes, Thessalians, Aenianians, Magnesians, Malians, Phthiotians, Dorians, Phocians and Locrians, see Paus 10.8.2.

⁸¹ Aeschin. 2.115 and Strab. 9.3.7.

⁸² For example, Thucydides stated that c451 that Sparta marched out on a sacred war and became master of the temple at Delphi, placing it in hands of the Delphinians. Then Athens became its masters, placing it in the hands of the Phocians, see Thuc. 1.112.5.

⁸³ For example, the Thessalians held the presidency by tradition (Syll. 3 175) and thus could influence the motions put to all members, see S. Hornblower, *The Greek World 479-323 BC*, London, 2011, p103. Hornblower also considered the influence of Sparta to be illuminating, being only able to influence decisions through '... the 'Dorians of the Metropolis', a small people in central Greece', see Hornblower, *Greek World*, p. 28.

⁸⁴ For a detailed discussion of the Delphic *amphictyony's* political role, see S. Hornblower, 'Did the Delphic amphiktiony play a political role in the classical period?', *MHR*, 22, no. 1, 2007, pp. 39-56. For one inscription of their accounts, see Tod 169 (SIG 244A-E) at Tod (ed.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions Vol. II*, pp. 200-5.

arbitration.⁸⁵ Nevertheless, the sanctuary was showered with rich gifts aimed at influencing its prophecies.⁸⁶ The *amphictyony* was subject to the influence of its member states, several of whom at various times tried to exercise control or maximise their influence over it both during and between its spasmodic meetings.⁸⁷ But as a distinct entity, which could be said to have co-existed with the system of states, the *amphictyony* was also theoretically able to influence other states through the selective provision of loans. Such loans were usually provided for four-year periods at 10% per annum interest with loan periods often extended.⁸⁸

Three Delphic examples are worth discussing in the context of economic statecraft. First, Thucydides recorded one occasion when states looked to Delphi for loans. During an 432/1 assembly in Sparta, discussing preparations for the coming war with Athens, the Corinthian delegate commented that funds could be raised by obtaining loans from Delphi.⁸⁹ Whether or not Delphi provided loans remains unknown, but the Corinthian delegate must have known of loan precedents that justified his comment. Thucydides provided insufficient evidence to decide whether the sanctuary would have provided funds to the Corinthians, either because of any long-standing support to Corinth and its allies or if the sanctuary considered an Athenian defeat was in its best interests. One does not know whether the sanctuary's traditional desire to create revenue through loan interest would have been influenced by its knowledge about how any funds provided to Corinth and its allies would be used.

The remaining two examples occurred in the 370s. Epigraphic evidence demonstrates the Keans, some or all of the four major cities of Karthaia, Koresia, Ioulis and Poiessa, incompletely repaid a Delphic loan.⁹⁰ Once again, insufficient evidence exists to determine why the Keans wanted the funds and why Delphi would provide them apart from being an

⁸⁵ W. Westermann, 'Interstate arbitration in antiquity', *CJ*, 2, no. 5, 1907, p. 205 with no later scholarship arguing to the contrary.

⁸⁶ For example, the huge range of gold and other gifts provided by Croesus as described at Hdt. 1.50-1.

⁸⁷ For one discussion of the influence of specific states, such as Thebes, see Hornblower, 'Delphic amphiktiony' including at page 49 the Spartan attempts at control after 480. At page 43, Hornblower argued that Thebes and its allies exercised control over at least 22 out of 24 votes after Leuctra, with '... the normal view is that the *Amphiktiony* now started to operate in a political, and specifically pro-Theban, way.' Further discussion occurs at J. Davies, 'Finance, Administration, and Realpolitik: The Case of Fourth-Century Delphi', in *Modus operandi. Essays in honour of Geoffrey Rickman*, M. Austin et al. (eds.), London, 1998, pp. 1-14.

⁸⁸ von Reden, *Money*, p. 169.

⁸⁹ Thuc. 1.121.3.

⁹⁰ Discussed at Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, p. 200.

investment opportunity to raise revenue for the sanctuary. Finally and also during the 370s, the Delian sanctuary provided loans to the Euboean state of Karystos. Wallace demonstrated from epigraphical analysis that the Karystians owed monies to the sanctuary because for several years they failed to make interest payments on the loaned capital. He conjectured Karystos wanted the loan to fund public works or to allow minting of its own coinage.⁹¹ Whether the sanctuary had a strategic motive for providing the loan is even less clear. One could argue it was mere revenue-raising, but the lack of interest payments for several years confounds the argument. Nevertheless, the sanctuary would not have known about the future default at the time of loan and later had little recourse in dealing with a defaulting debtor, apart from refusing to provide them further loans. Can then one argue there was more to the loan than revenue-raising and it was in the Delians' strategic interests to fund the Karystians? No obvious rationale is evident given the strategic circumstances of the 370s.

Findings on Money Gifts

The earlier discussion identified Persia as the pre-eminent exponent of providing money gifts to influence ancient Greek states. Persia provided gifts of money to allow Greek states to go to war with each other or to create other circumstances advantageous to Persian interests. The Persian king expediently played off stronger and weaker Greek states to sustain a balance of power amongst them, so they were never strong enough to challenge Persian hegemony in Asia Minor, which included many Greek states along the Ionian, Carian and other coasts.⁹²

After its unsuccessful military attempts to conquer Greece between 490-479, a primary Persian strategic goal was to protect its Asiatic mainland from external threats. Persian kings and their satraps recognised they could help achieve this goal by judiciously supporting different Greek states, subsidising their war efforts against other states to keep them occupied and not focused on threatening Persia. Persia recognised that Greek states needing financial support were attracted to such gifts, particularly when engaged in wars against wealthy opponents. When threats finally eventuated from a Greek state, as they did at the start of the

⁹¹ Wallace, 'Karystos', p. 28.

⁹² As argued, for example, at Kagan, 'Economic origins', p. 322. For a discussion of the 'Greeks of Asia', see Seager and Tuplin, 'Freedom of the Greeks'.

fourth century, the Persian fallback strategy was to provide money to that state's enemies, who could then distract that state from threatening Persia.

The few examples of other states providing money gifts, such as Macedonia, Athens and Sparta, also demonstrated the value of money as an economic measure. Although not used to sustain a balance of power amongst competing states, these states provided money in circumstances where other states needed those funds to help achieve an outcome aligned to the interests of the gifting state. Thus, for example Macedonia's interests were compatible with the Euboean rebellion and Athens wanted to keep Methone loyal and free from Macedonian domination.

Findings on Loans

Loans could also be an effective economic measure, albeit not as attractive as gifts given the need for their eventual repayment. However, only a handful of examples exists of states directly providing loans during the late Archaic and Classical periods. In all these examples the state providing the loan was reacting to immediate circumstances in which the loan could help achieve the state's short-term interests. Thus, for example Tenedos loaned Athens money in order to counter the immediate threat from Macedonia. Similarly, Thebes may have loaned money to Athenian exiles given their return to power would have favoured Theban interests.

Turning to the provision of loans from sanctuaries, one can only discern a strategic approach at Delos for the period in which Athens controlled the Delian funds. Athens used these funds as an imperialistic tool in the fourth century, providing loans to cash-strapped states in order to ensure their ongoing loyalty. Access to loans could also be ceased to influence those states whose loyalty to Athens was wavering.

Bribery

What is bribery?

An earlier section of this chapter discussed how states used monetary gifts to influence the behaviours of other states. In some circumstances, providing monetary gifts could be

mischievously characterised as bribery, although the distinction between a legitimate gift and an intent to bribe remains blurred.⁹³ How then should one distinguish between them as they apply to ancient states? First, gifts are usually well-publicised with no direct obligation attached although clearly the gifting state wanted to create *eunoia* and an obligation of reciprocity when next the state receiving the gift considers actions that affect the gifting state.⁹⁴ In contrast, bribes are not publicised and are targeted at a specific individual rather than the state. Importantly, the bribing state wants the person receiving the bribe to take a specific course of action favourable to the bribing state, without disclosing the bribe's influence. Clearly the bribing state must be careful in selecting someone who could, as Demosthenes commented, '... τῶν πραγμάτων δεδωκός', namely to deliver the goods.⁹⁵ Thus, the targeted individual needed to be someone who could influence a state's decisions or actions, either politically, economically or militarily.⁹⁶

Evidence for bribery is never clearcut.⁹⁷ Epigraphic evidence would not be created and because the parties wanted to keep any act of bribery a secret, third parties would be less likely to know when it occurred. Impartial historians might provide comment, but more likely accusations occurred in politically motivated speeches by the enemies of those supposedly bribed, who are trying to present them as dishonest and untrustworthy. One must be careful of simply relying on biased commentators, but where multiple sources make comment analysis is on firmer ground. Nevertheless, even multiple comments must be carefully interpreted given routine accusations of politicians being bribed.

This section will focus on bribery by states, but recognising bribes were usually facilitated by individuals on behalf of their states, or by those who thought they had the interests of their state at heart. Before considering examples of interstate bribery, one should

⁹³ For some ancient sources discussing the nature of bribery, see Dem. 8.71 and 18.114; Din. 3.22.

⁹⁴ For example, Aristagoras' offer of a large sum of money to the Persians to subdue Naxos in c500 would not constitute a bribe, see Hdt. 5.31.2.

⁹⁵ Dem. 19.137. MacDowell's translation '... deliver the goods' implies the need to target someone who controlled events, see Douglas M. MacDowell, *On the False Embassy*, Oxford, 2000, p. 115.

⁹⁶ Thus, examples of attempt to bribe oracles, although they were sometime influential, are not considered. In this latter category falls examples like Plutarch's claims, based on Ephorus, that the Spartan Lysander bribed oracles at Delphi, Dodona and Ammon, see Plut. *Lys.* 25.3.

⁹⁷ For example, Harvey provided a list, which he recognises may not be complete, of ancient sources mentioning bribes and ambiguous passages where an allusion to bribery may or may not be intended, see F.D. Harvey, 'Dona Ferentes: Some Aspects of Bribery in Greek Politics', *History of Political Thought*, 6, no. 1/2, 1985, pp. 114-7.

first understand the Greek attitude to bribery. In Plato's *Republic*, Socrates takes an extreme position, banning citizens of his ideal city from taking any bribes.⁹⁸ In contrast, Perlman argued that most Greeks only considered accepting bribes a crime when it resulted in the person accepting the bribe making decisions or taking actions detrimental to his state.⁹⁹ He based his hypothesis partly on comments in speeches by various orators, including the speech, attributed to the Athenian orator Demades, *On the 12 Years*. Demades said 'It is not the giving of the bribe that distresses us but the action of the man who takes it, if it is directed against our interests.'¹⁰⁰ Similarly, in *Against Demosthenes*, Hyperides commented that 'For to take money is not so serious as to take it from the wrong source, and the private individuals who took the gold are not so culpable as the orators and generals.'¹⁰¹ Hyperides implied that such public figures were held to a higher moral standard than private individuals.

Conover provided a comprehensive analysis of attitudes towards bribery, at least in Classical Athens, and discussed the nuances of the various Greek terms used.¹⁰² Like the French language, ancient Greek had no specific word for 'bribe', only for the word gift (δῶρον – *doron*: plural δῶρα - *dora*). When Greeks wanted to describe a gift in a way implying a bribe they did so through context. But they also sometimes used the word δωροδοκία (*dorodokia*), to mean receiving a gift in anticipation of some bad outcome.¹⁰³ That is, bribery did not exist unless a bad outcome, from the state's perspective, would eventuate.

⁹⁸ Plat. *Rep.* 3.390d.

⁹⁹ S. Perlman, 'On bribing Athenian ambassadors', *GRBS*, 17, no. 3, 1976, p. 224. A rhetor could be impeached if he made speeches contrary to the state's interest because he was bribed, see Hyp. 4.8.

¹⁰⁰ Translation of Demad. 1.21 by J. O. Burt in *Lycurgus, Dinarchus, Demades, Hyperides. Minor Attic Orators, Volume II: Lycurgus. Dinarchus. Demades. Hyperides*, Loeb Classical Library 395, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1954. The term 'interests' was formed from the present participle συμφέρετος. Note the argument that Demades did not write this speech at I. Worthington, 'The context of [Demades] On the twelve years', *CQ*, 41, no. 1, 1991. Another speech cited by Perlman is Dem. 19.293-5.

¹⁰¹ Translation of Hyp. 5.6 by J. O. Burt in *Lycurgus, Dinarchus, Demades, Hyperides. Minor Attic Orators, Volume II: Lycurgus. Dinarchus. Demades. Hyperides*, Loeb Classical Library 395, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1954, pp. 517-9.

¹⁰² Kellam Conover, 'Bribery in classical Athens', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Princeton, 2010, pp. 14-5.

¹⁰³ Conover, 'Bribery', p.14. This meaning is confirmed by Liddell/Scott in the Greek Word Study Tool, whose δωροδοκία entry is: A taking of bribes, freq. in Oratt., as And.4.30; δωροδοκίαν καταγνῶναι τινας Lys. 21.21; -"ἰσκατηγορεῖν" Aeschin.2.3: pl., *ibid.*; also, giving of bribes, corruption, in pl., D.C.39.55, 50.7. Note that in some texts, other words are used to imply bribery. For example, Herodotus used this term only once (6.72.1) and Thucydides never at all. Alternative expression included taking silver or money. See also discussion at Lisa Hill, 'Conceptions of Political Corruption in Ancient Athens and Rome', *History of Political Thought*, 34, no. 4, 2013, p. 567 and Harvey, 'Dona Ferentes', pp. 82-4.

Conover also argued that bribery allegations were rife in Classical Athens, with over 450 accusations in extant oratory, tragedies, comedies and histories.¹⁰⁴ He calculated that about 6-10% of important Athenians were put on trial for accusations of bribe-taking, and about half were convicted.¹⁰⁵ Although many of these allegations occurred entirely within Athens, several concerned bribery by states.¹⁰⁶ The seriousness with which Athenians viewed bribery was further evident by the variety of legal actions that could be applied against alleged bribers, with Hashiba providing a comprehensive summary.¹⁰⁷ At least Athens legislated about bribery.¹⁰⁸

Bribery by Persia

Given its extensive silver and gold reserves, Persia was alleged to have used bribery as an economic measure against key leaders in various Greek states, including Athens, Sparta and other states in the Peloponnese. These allegations will be analysed in chronological sequence and where possible Persia's desired strategic outcomes will be identified.

The first accusation of Persian bribery, of extremely doubtful historicity, occurred in 489 when Miltiades may have been accused of being bribed to withdraw from Paros.¹⁰⁹ Such bribery fits within economic statecraft as a means to prevent military action inimical to Persian interests. The second example of potential Persian bribery may have occurred in

¹⁰⁴ Conover, 'Bribery', p. 4. Note that Athens was not alone in its prevalence of bribery, with Thucydides commenting, for example, that it was impossible to get anything done with the Odrysians without giving a present, see Thuc. 2.97.4.

¹⁰⁵ Conover, 'Bribery', p. 21. Note that in *Against Meidias* (Dem. 21.113), Demosthenes referred to a law against bribery for which the penalties were disenfranchisement and property confiscation.

¹⁰⁶ Sometimes, bribery allegations did not make clear whether the alleged bribery was by a state or on behalf of a state. For example, in the early fourth century, Lysias accused the general Ergocles of both bribe-taking and embezzling, with no clarity on whom provided the bribes, see Lys. 28.3 and 29.5, although one can infer Philip at Dem. 19.180.

¹⁰⁷ Hashiba, 'Athenian Bribery'.

¹⁰⁸ For a summary of relevant Athenian laws, such as *εἰσαγγελία* (*eisangelia*), mentioned for example at Hyp. 4.7, and the punishments for those found guilty, see Douglas M. MacDowell, 'Athenian Laws about Bribery', *RIDA*, 30, 1983, pp. 76-8. For a discussion of the ambiguity of Athens' law against bribery, see Harvey, 'Dona Ferentes', p. 113. Interestingly, Taylor insightfully concluded that Classical Athens had not so much a bribery culture as an accusation of bribery culture, see Claire Taylor, 'Bribery in Athenian Politics Part II: Ancient Reaction and Perceptions', *G&R*, 48, no. 2, 2001, p. 168.

¹⁰⁹ Only Cornelius Nepos alleged Persian bribery, see Nepos *Milt.* 7. Herodotus, Diodorus, Demosthenes and Plutarch mention the context and/or the 50-talent fine but do not allege bribery, see Hdt. 6.132-6, Diod. 10.30, Dem. 26.6 and Plut. *Cim.* 4.3

479.¹¹⁰ Herodotos commented that the Persian commander Mardonius sent an envoy, Alexander, to persuade the Athenians to ally with Persia.¹¹¹ Later, Isocrates wrote about the same embassy commenting that his ancestors rejected Mardonius' gifts.¹¹² In his online Perseus commentary of Isocrates, Norlin, who provided the Loeb translation, stated that the attempt to bribe the Athenians was revealed by the cited Herodotos reference.¹¹³ Nevertheless, a reading of this and subsequent sections in Herodotos indicates no overt or implied mention of bribery. Alexander simply outlined the benefits to Athens of an alliance. The basis of Isocrates' comment remains unknown, but his use of the term δωρεά could be interpreted as the privileges that would accrue to Athens. Interestingly, Herodotos also commented that whilst Mardonius marched to Greece with his army in 479, the Thebans advised him to divide Hellas and achieve victory by sending money to the most powerful men in the Greek cities.¹¹⁴ However, Mardonius apparently refused this bribery proposal because of a fierce desire to capture Athens.¹¹⁵ Further, Herodotos also commented that in 479 Mardonius may have bribed Lycidas, a member of Salamis' Council of Five Hundred, to support the Persian proposal.¹¹⁶ If there was truth in both the bribery attempts, then the Persian motive was clear. After its calamitous naval defeat at Salamis, getting the Athenian fleet to support its aims in Greece was the highest Persian priority.

A year later in 478, during the Greeks' war with Persia, Plutarch commented that the Spartan commander Pausanias allegedly took a bribe of 500 talents from Xerxes to betray Sparta.¹¹⁷ The Spartans eventually acquitted him of the charge. Plutarch's source for this assertion remains unknown, but was likely an unreliable fourth-century source hostile to Pausanias' interests and willing to invent slanders. Herodotos does not mention this alleged bribery. Similarly, Thucydides adversely commented on Pausanias' conduct, leading to his

¹¹⁰ Earlier examples exist of Greeks betraying their state to the Persians, such as the Eretrians Alcimachos and Philagros, but no evidence exists that they were bribed to do so, see Hdt. 6.101 and Edward M. Harris, 'Demosthenes' Speech Against Meidias', *HSPH*, 92, 1989, pp. 117-36.

¹¹¹ Hdt. 8.136.

¹¹² Isoc. 4.94.

¹¹³ Commentary on Hdt. 8.136 at www.perseus.tufts.edu.

¹¹⁴ Hdt. 9.2.3.

¹¹⁵ Hdt. 9.3.1.

¹¹⁶ Hdt. 9.5.2. Lycidas was stoned to death by his fellow Athenian councillors. He later became the subject of a poem by John Milton. His 'memorable' death is discussed in Conover, 'Bribery', pp. 258-9 and Ove Strid, 'Voiceless Victims, Memorable Deaths in Herodotus', *CQ*, 56, no. 2, 2006, p. 398.

¹¹⁷ Plut. *Para.* 10 (that is Plutarch's *Parallela minora*).

recall to Sparta, but does not mention bribery.¹¹⁸ Nevertheless, if true, the Persian motive was clear-cut, for bribery of a senior military commander was a direct method to help Persia achieve its desired military outcomes.

Demosthenes alleged the next possible example of Persian bribery when commenting on the negotiations for the so-called ‘Peace of Callias’, an extremely tendentious scholarly topic. This Peace may have occurred in 449 or in the 460s after the battle of Eurymedon between the Delian League and Persia.¹¹⁹ Demosthenes accused Callias of receiving a bribe from the Persian king, for which Callias came close to being put to death in Athens. Instead, Athens allegedly fined him 50 talents because he was said to have taken bribes during his embassy.¹²⁰ The Peace’s existence remains controversial and of doubtful historicity, primarily because Thucydides makes no mention of it. Further, if the bribery occurred the Persian king’s motive is unclear given how favourable the Peace appeared to Athens and the other Greeks. Demosthenes recorded how the Peace severely constrained the freedom of movement of the Persian King’s forces.¹²¹ That is, arrangements which seriously favoured Persian strategic interests, in the absence of clear reasons for this outcome, would lend weight to the bribery allegation. In the absence of such evidence, bribery was unlikely despite the details provided by Demosthenes, including the size of Callias’ fine. One likely explanation, as argued by Perlman, was that Demosthenes’ allegation referred to another embassy.¹²²

For the next example of potential Persian bribery one returns to Thucydides. He recorded that c454 Artaxerxes, the Persian king, sent Megabazos to provide money to the Peloponnesians to invade Attica with the intent that the Athenians would withdraw from Egypt.¹²³ Thucydides implied that money was provided with no successful outcome, whilst Diodorus commented that the Spartans did not accept the money.¹²⁴ Consequently,

¹¹⁸ Thuc. 1.95.3-5.

¹¹⁹ Dem. 19.273.

¹²⁰ Note again the interpretation of the term δῶρα as gifts constituting a bribe. MacDowell argued that the magnitude of the bribe was likely five talents given the Athenian requirement for a ten-fold fine, see MacDowell, ‘Athenian Laws’, p. 59.

¹²¹ Dem. 19.273. The Persians were not to approach within a day’s ride of the coast nor sail with a ship of war between the Chelidonian islands and the Blue Rocks.

¹²² See footnote 17 of Perlman, ‘Bribing ambassadors’, p. 230.

¹²³ Thuc. 1.109.2 and Diod.11.74.5. Noting that although some translations use the term ‘bribe’, Thucydides did not use the term δῶρα.

¹²⁴ Diod.11.74.6. Hornblower opined this statement was probably a guess, see Simon Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides Volume I: Books I-III*, Oxford, 1991, p. 175.

Megabazos was recalled with the remaining funds. The alleged bribe's rationale was clear in that the strong Athenian military presence in Egypt, allied with the Egyptians who had revolted from Persian rule, threatened the success of Persian plans to return Egypt to Persian subjugation. Removing the Athenians by non-military means was preferable to the resources required to apply successful military force. Nevertheless, the Persians eventually applied the latter option with complete success.¹²⁵

During Athens' conflict with Samos in 440-439, Plutarch alleged that Pissouthnes, the Persian satrap who favoured Samos, tried to bribe Pericles with 10,000 gold *στατήρες* (staters) which he refused.¹²⁶ The attempt would have been typical of using economic statecraft to prevent undesirable military action.

Much later in the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides recorded another instance of bribery which does not fit neatly within the category of interstate bribery. In c412/1, the Persian satrap Tissaphernes, advised by Alcibiades, bribed the foreign captains and generals of the fleet opposing Athens and its allies, to agree with reduced rates of Persian pay.¹²⁷ Thucydides recorded that this bribe proved an effective inducement except for the Syracusans, with their general Hermocrates opposing the pay rates on behalf of all. Consequently, the Persians paid the fleet at a greater daily rate per man. This bribery was unusual given its desired outcome was not that the people who were bribed took action inimical to their states' interest, but as their states' representatives they did not oppose Persian fiscal frugality.¹²⁸

Plutarch recorded one other fifth-century attempt against the Athenian Cimon, by the Persian Rhoesaces, who had deserted from his King.¹²⁹ If he had indeed deserted, then this would not be an example of interstate bribery, but Hornblower raised the possibility that he was Artaxerxes' agent.¹³⁰ The desired outcomes of this bribery attempt remain unclear and Plutarch recorded that Cimon rejected the offer. One cannot rule out that Plutarch invented

¹²⁵ Thuc. 1.109.2.

¹²⁶ Plut. Per. 25.2 with the context described in Thuc. 1.115-7.

¹²⁷ Thuc. 8.29.2 and 8.45.3.

¹²⁸ For a discussion of potential Persian bribery of fleet commanders, focusing on the Spartan commander Astyochus, see Caroline Faulkner, 'Astyochus, Sparta's Incompetent Navarch?', *Phoenix*, 53, no. 3/4, 1999, pp. 206-21.

¹²⁹ Plut. *Cim.* 10.8-9.

¹³⁰ Hornblower, Thuc. Volume I, p. 175 commenting on a view previously offered by Blamire.

this story to promote Cimon's virtue, but it does illuminate the ancient attitude towards bribery.¹³¹

The first fourth-century example of Persian bribery allegations concerns Epicrates, one of the leaders of the restored democracy, who took part in an embassy to Persia c394 shortly after the battle of Cnidus. He was accused of taking bribes from the Persian king, but was never tried for bribery.¹³² Perlman discussed the merits of the arguments for and against the allegations. One argument against is that the allegation, made many years after the embassy, confused his participation in the embassy to Persia with a later embassy to Sparta (c392). In this embassy he, together with other ambassadors, was subject to specific criticisms, including bribery and sentenced to death in absentia.¹³³ The motive for any Persian bribery remains unclear, because what the Persian king tried to get Epicrates to agree to during the embassy cannot reasonably be inferred from the meagre available evidence.

In the next example, provided by Xenophon, in 382 Ismenias, a Theban ambassador to Persia, was tried and executed at Thebes for taking bribes from a Persian satrap.¹³⁴ The Persian's reason for bribing Ismenias is unknown, but one can infer from Xenophon's comments he aimed to create disunity and disorder amongst the Greek states. Such a strategy remained consistent with Persia's usual strategic desire to prevent Greek states from uniting against it. Next, in 371 at a conference in Sparta aimed at ending conflict between Sparta and Athens, Kallistratos, an Athenian representative, adversely commented on rumours that Antalcidas might bring money from the Persian king.¹³⁵ Interestingly, neither Xenophon, nor other sources, provided further commentary on whether bribery actually occurred.

Later, according to Demosthenes in his speech *On the False Embassy*, in 367 the Persian king provided a 40-talent bribe to Timagoras.¹³⁶ The latter was an Athenian

¹³¹ Whilst recognising that Plutarch wrote in the 1st/2nd century CE.

¹³² For one example, see Plut. *Pel.* 30.7 with no relevant commentary at Georgiadou, *Pelopidas*, p. 208. Epicrates' bribery was also implied by Athenaus at *Ath.* 6.58 and *Lys.* 27.3-4 which states Onomasas, an otherwise unknown person, was convicted.

¹³³ For the Spartan incident, see Dem. 19.277-9 with relevant discussion about the merits of the bribery allegations at Perlman, 'Bribing ambassadors', p. 230, Barry S. Strauss, 'The Cultural Significance of Bribery and Embezzlement in Athenian Politics', *AncW*, 11, 1985, p. 69 and I. Bruce, 'Athenian Embassies in the Early Fourth Century B.C.', *Historia*, 15, no. 3, 1966, pp. 278-9.

¹³⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.35.

¹³⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.12.

¹³⁶ Dem. 19.136-37. For other references to Timogoras, see Dem. 19.31 and 19.191.

ambassador sent to Persia at the same time as a Theban delegation led by Pelopidas. Timagoras' intent was to counter Theban influence on the Persian king. Demosthenes repeated a rumour rather than making a defensible allegation, so the fine size may be exaggerated. Importantly, although Xenophon provided considerable detail about the embassy, he does not mention bribery as one of the grounds for Timagoras' eventual execution.¹³⁷ Writing later, Plutarch provided considerable detail about the multitude of gifts that Timagoras took, but then reaffirmed the Athenians were not concerned about him taking gifts.¹³⁸

If the bribery occurred, the Persian king's motive for targeting Timagoras remains unclear given the king decided to support Theban interests. One possible motive was to ensure that Timagoras reported back to the Athenian people in a way that justified the King's decision. Such a motive would imply the King was overly concerned how he was perceived in Athens. Such concern was unlikely to have been so important as to justify a large 40-talent bribe.¹³⁹

Later in the fourth century, c339, Demosthenes himself was accused of receiving Persian bribes and acting in a way detrimental to Athenian interests in its dealings with Macedonia. His political opponent, Aeschines, argued in his speech *Against Ctesiphon* that Persian gold fuelled Demosthenes' opposition to Macedonia.¹⁴⁰ Aeschines alleged that initially the Persian king tried to provide 300 talents to the Athenian people, but when unsuccessful he provided Demosthenes with a smaller 70-talent bribe.¹⁴¹ Aeschines also argued that the Athenian alliance with Thebes resulted from Demosthenes' oratory influenced by Persian gold.¹⁴²

¹³⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.36-8.

¹³⁸ Plut. *Pel.* 30.6 with commentary at Georgiadou, *Pelopidas*, p. 207 and Plut. *Art.* 22.5-6.

¹³⁹ No collated list of bribe amounts has been created, but a 40-talent bribe to an individual would rank highly.

¹⁴⁰ Aeschin. 3.156, 3.173, 3.209, 3.239-40 and 3.259. For one commentary on Aeschines' rhetorical strategy, within which the comments about Demosthenes are made, see Fiona Hobden, 'Imagining Past and Present: A Rhetorical Strategy in Aeschines 3, *Against Ctesiphon*', *CQ*, 57, 2007.

¹⁴¹ Aeschin. 3.239.

¹⁴² Aeschin. 2.141-3, 3.143, 3.149 and 3.239. For a discussion of this alliance, see D. Mosley, 'Athens' alliance with Thebes 339 B.C.', *Historia*, 20, no. 4, 1971, pp. 508-10. See also adverse comments at Din. 1.20.

Putting aside that Demosthenes' political rival made the allegations, and thus they were hardly objective, one can understand the Persian motive. The Persian bribery was likely motivated by the Persian need for supportive politicians within key Greek states. The Persians would likely have understood that, of all the Athenian politicians, Demosthenes was most likely able to sway the assembly in a way favourable to Persia's strategic objectives. These interests were to create allies inimical to Macedonia or at least avoid or delay any Macedonian interest in Persian territories. Such a delay would occur if Macedonia, which the Persians knew was a potential enemy, remained pre-occupied with a threat from Athens and other Greek states.

The final potential instance of Persian bribery in the Classical period occurred c333. In the context of Persian aggression against the Greeks, Diodorus recorded that the Persian commander, Memnon, freely distributed bribes to many Greeks to win them over to the Persian side.¹⁴³ Unfortunately for Persia, his sudden death cruelled their military hopes. This bribery provides an example of monies being provided not to prevent a direct military threat, but to increase the likelihood of a successful military outcome by reducing the number of Greek states opposed to Persia.

Bribery by Macedonia

Although some scholars cite possible instances of bribery by Macedonian kings before Phillip II, little or no evidence substantiates almost all these assertions.¹⁴⁴ The ancient evidence reveals only one definitive allegation of bribery attempted on behalf of the Macedonian state up to and including the reign of Perdiccas III.¹⁴⁵ Plutarch commented that in 463/2 the Athenian general Cimon, after defeating Thasos, was charged with bribe-taking for not attacking Macedonia, presumably with the bribe provided by Alexander I.¹⁴⁶ The Athenian assembly found him guilty, but he was supposedly later acquitted by the Areopagus court. If Plutarch's account can be trusted, since it was likely drawn from a fourth-century

¹⁴³ Diod. 17.29.4. For a discussion of the military context, see Stephen Ruzicka, 'War in the Aegean, 333-331 B. C.: A Reconsideration', *Phoenix*, 42, no. 2, 1988, pp. 131-51.

¹⁴⁴ For example, Giulliodori's assertion that Perdiccas II bribed an attacking Thracian force, see Giulliodori, 'Foreign policy of Macedon', p. 54.

¹⁴⁵ Note Thucydides recorded that in 429/8 Perdiccas secretly won over Seuthes by the promise of marriage to his sister, together with a rich dowry, see Thuc. 2.101.5. This form of encouragement should not be considered bribery.

¹⁴⁶ Plut. *Cim.* 14.2-15.1. Indirect references are also made at Plut. *Per.* 10.5, Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 27.1 and Nepos. *Cim.* 3.1.

source, and such bribery occurred, the Macedonian motive would have been clear, namely to prevent the military threat posed by Athenian forces under Cimon.¹⁴⁷

Repeated accusations were made against Phillip II in the fourth century.¹⁴⁸ Demosthenes made the most comprehensive set of allegations in his speech ‘On the Crown’, cataloguing 29 separate individuals purportedly bribed by Philip’s money.¹⁴⁹ In other speeches, further Greek politicians were named or implied.¹⁵⁰ All these accusations will not be individually analysed for they have been adequately discussed in modern scholarship.¹⁵¹ Instead the analysis will focus on Philip’s rationale for providing bribes to citizens of foreign states. Dating the bribery allegations, as best one can, indicates they mostly occurred early in his reign when, surrounded by potential enemies and only with an embryonic military capability, he targeted the leading politicians of several Greek states. He had firm ideas on the range of initiatives needed to develop his army, but they needed time to mature. Therefore, he turned to bribery to provide the necessary breathing space.

First, Diodorus recounted how he used corrupting gifts and promises to convince the Paionians to maintain peace.¹⁵² Similarly, Philip bribed the Thracian king, most likely

¹⁴⁷ For one argument about believing Plutarch on this matter, see Valerij Gouschin, ‘Plutarch on Cimon, Athenian Expeditions, and Ephialtes’ Reform (Plut. Cim.14–17)’, *GRBS*, 59, 2019, pp. 38-40.

¹⁴⁸ For example, Hyperides’ comment on Philip’s buying influential citizens in many states, see Hyp. 5.3 and Diodorus’ comments that Philip’s bribes induced many Greeks to betray their states, see Diod. 16.8.7 and 16.54.2. Note also the likely Pseudo-Demosthenes 12 which purports to be a letter from Philip in which he states it would be easy, at a trifling expense, to stop the abuse of politicians who attack him, see Dem. 12.20. For a discussion of this statement’s veracity, see Jack Cargill, ‘Demosthenes, Aischines, and the Crop of Traitors’, *Ancient World*, 11, 1985, p. 84. Philip’s reputation survived into Roman times, with Cicero commenting about Philip providing little donkeys laden with gold, see Cicero *ad Atticum* 1.16.12.

¹⁴⁹ Demosthenes provided 27 names at Dem. 18.295 and a further two at Dem.18.48. To this list must be added his claims against Aeschines (see Dem. 19 and mentioned at Plut. *Dem.* 15, with another implication at Dem. 18.20 (see counter view at Aeschin. 1) and Pythocles at Dem. 18.285. For other Demosthenic bribery references in this speech, see 18.44-46, 18.51-2, 18.175 and 18.297. For bribery comments in *On the False Embassy*, see 19.167, 19.140, 19.231 and 19.259. For Polybius’ defence of the alleged traitors, see Plb. 18.14. See also discussion at Ryder, ‘The diplomatic skills of Philip II’, p. 248. Note that Demosthenes had commented Philip was unsuccessful in trying to bribe him, see Dem. 19.166 and Dem 19.222. Note also comments by Demosthenes about Philip’s use of agents such as Neoptolemos, see Dem. 5.6.

¹⁵⁰ See Dem. 6.34, 19.10, 11, 167, 189, 225, 229, 233 and 314.

¹⁵¹ For example, Julia Heskell, ‘The foreign policy of Philip II down to the Peace of Philocrates’, unpublished Ph.D thesis, Harvard, 1987.

¹⁵² Diod. 16.3.4. For a discussion of the Paionians and this potential bribery, see Irwin L. Merker, ‘The Ancient Kingdom of Paionia’, *Balkan Studies*, 6, no. 1, 1965, p. 43. Note Ober also opined that Philip paid off the Illyrians, but without providing supporting evidence, see Ober, *Rise and Fall*, p. 268.

Berisades, who was supporting a threatening Pausanias.¹⁵³ Even when the Macedonian army was better developed and organised, Philip continued to use bribery understanding its targeted use could complement his newly developed military capacity. He had no money shortage given he had captured the important mining town of Crenides during his early campaigns in Thrace. Indeed, according to Diodorus, Philip liked to declare he had enlarged his kingdom far more by the use of gold than of arms.¹⁵⁴ For example, both Demosthenes and Diodorus commented that in 348 he bribed the chief officials of the Olynthians, namely Euthycrates and Lasthenes, capturing Olynthus through their treachery.¹⁵⁵ Diodorus also commented that Philip acquired Mekyberna and Torone without a battle through treasonable surrender, implying bribery rather than specifically mentioning it.¹⁵⁶ Dinarchus also alleged Philip bribed three Theban politicians in 338, Timolaos, Proxenos, and Theagenes, leading to Thebes' downfall.¹⁵⁷

Several ancient historians and speechwriters accused Philip of providing bribes during a confusing period of many accusations and counter-accusations.¹⁵⁸ At one extreme, Hyperides stated that the whole of Greece was corrupted by men who were accepting bribes from Philip against their states' interests.¹⁵⁹ Similarly, Diodorus commented, most likely based on the works of Ephorus, that Philip's extensive coinage supplies facilitated bribery to achieve his foreign policy goals, inducing many Greeks to betray their native lands.¹⁶⁰

Hyperides was so ill-disposed to Philip's bribery practices that he prosecuted Philocrates for alleged bribery, which allegedly occurred when the latter took part in Athenian embassies to Philip in 346.¹⁶¹ Philocrates went into exile. With respect to this impeachment, Demosthenes commented on the likely extent of Philip's bribery, doubting that

¹⁵³ Diod. 16.3.4.

¹⁵⁴ Diod. 16.53.3 with similar comments at Diod. 16.8.7.

¹⁵⁵ Dem. 8.40, Diod. 16.53.2 and Hyp. *Fragment B*.19.1.

¹⁵⁶ Diod. 16.53.2.

¹⁵⁷ Din. 1.26 and Din. 1.74. See Worthington's comments that whilst Dinarchus implicated Demosthenes in the Thebans' misdeeds, Dinarchus may be guilty of rhetorical slander, see Ian Worthington, *A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus: Rhetoric and Conspiracy in Later Fourth-Century Athens*, Ann Arbor, 1992, p. 241.

¹⁵⁸ As plausibly argued by Cargill, evidence of bribery by Philip is incomplete, ambiguous and contradictory, especially the conflicting statements by Demosthenes and Aeschines, see Cargill, 'Crop of Traitors', pp. 76-7. For further discussion of the merits of this allegation, see John R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism*, Princeton, 1976, pp. 148-50.

¹⁵⁹ Hyp. 6.10.

¹⁶⁰ Diod. 16.8.6-7.

¹⁶¹ Dem. 19.116. See other references at Hyp. 4.29, Aeschin. 2.6 and 3-89-81, and Din. 1.28.

bribing Philocrates alone would have been effective, unless he was so persuasive he could sway several of his nine fellow ambassadors who had not been bribed.¹⁶²

Demosthenes continued being critical of Philip's penchant for bribery. In his *Funeral Speech* he made a veiled allegation by stating there was much folly among the Greeks, 'not unmixed with slackness' [κακία - kakia] with 'slackness' viewed by some scholars as an euphemism for bribe-taking.¹⁶³ Further, in his speech *On the Halonnesus*, Demosthenes argued that Philip will sail around the islands and '...under pretence of protecting them from pirates, bribe the islanders to revolt from you (namely Athens).¹⁶⁴ Demosthenes also alleged that Aristogeiton, an Athenian, had taken the pay of Philip's agents.¹⁶⁵ Insufficient evidence exists to determine what specific service Aristogeiton was supposed to perform.

Whilst alleging his fellow orators received bribes from Philip, Demosthenes received counter claims that he also received bribes. These allegations did not concern monies received from Macedonia or any other state, and thus are not potential incidences of interstate bribery. For example, Plutarch alleged Demosthenes was successfully bribed, for 20 talents, by Harpalos, Alexander's treasurer, who had fled seeking sanctuary from Alexander in Athens c324.¹⁶⁶ This incident did not represent bribery by the Macedonian state.

Some of Demosthenes' other contemporaries were also alleged to have received bribes from Philip. In particular, Demades supported Philip's war against Olynthos in a way reflective of him having been bribed by Philip. Demades was also instrumental in arguing for

¹⁶² Dem. 19.116.

¹⁶³ Dem 60.18. Also mentioned at Hyp. 10. In the Perseus Digital Library Online Loeb translation by DeWitt, the editors comment that Blass compares Dem. 18.20, where "folly" is used as a euphemism for 'slackness.'. Note Liddell Scott's definition of the term κακία includes the meaning 'moral badness'.

¹⁶⁴ Dem 7.15. Some scholars, such as Milns, have argued that *On Halonnesus* was not written by Demosthenes, with Milns arguing it probably belonged to the violently anti-Macedonian Hegesippus, see R.D. Milns, 'The Public Speeches of Demosthenes', in *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator*, I. Worthington (ed.), London, 2000, p. 205.

¹⁶⁵ Dem. 25.37 recognising the debate whether this speech was actually written by Demosthenes.

¹⁶⁶ Plut. Dem. 25. See also Din. 1.4 and 3.2; Diod. 17.108; Hyp. 5.3/4/6/7 and Just. 13.5.9. According to Dinarchus, Demosthenes proposed that the money brought by Harpalos should be kept on the Acropolis until requested by Alexander, see Din. 1.68. Analysing the Harpalos affair is complicated, with much scholarship on matters mostly irrelevant to this thesis. For examples of relevant scholarship, see Ryder, 'The diplomatic skills of Philip II', pp. 317-8 and Ian Worthington, 'The Harpalos affair and the Greek response to the Macedonian hegemony', in *Ventures into Greek History*, Ian Worthington (ed.), Oxford, 1994, pp. 329-30 and Claire Taylor, 'Bribery in Athenian Politics Part I: Accusations, Allegations, and Slander', *G&R*, 48, no. 1, 2001, p. 62-4.

the peace treaty between Athens and Macedonia.¹⁶⁷ If Philip had indeed bribed Demades his motive aimed to influence the form of the treaty so that it supported Macedonian interests. This treaty, whose terms did not advantage Athens, provided Macedonia the necessary breathing space to remove other military threats. Like Demosthenes, Demades and others were also put on trial and fined for bribery by Harpalos, allegedly for taking 6000 gold staters. As previously discussed, this incident did not constitute bribery by the Macedonian state.¹⁶⁸

In summary, whilst Philip likely used bribery soon after his accession to counter threats against Macedonia, for most of his reign he bribed as part of a campaign to extend Macedonian control of, or influence over, other states. His use of bribery was facilitated by a ready supply of Macedonian gold from its rich mines. Whilst many allegations were likely unfounded, sufficient evidence exists to reveal Philip consistently used bribery as an effective form of economic statecraft. He bribed Greek politicians to convince them to speak in his interests during meeting of their assemblies, either by arguing for no action against Macedon or delaying what might otherwise have been timely state responses to Macedonian aggression. When such bribery was disclosed, with its recipients subject to punitive actions, such disclosures also further Philip's interest, by sowing uncertainty amongst the leaders of other states about which politicians were acting in the state's interests. Thus, his use of bribery to influence the behaviours of foreign states was unique in the ancient Greek world for its breadth of application to achieve strategic outcomes.

Bribery by Athens

The discussion about Macedonian bribery may have created the impression Athenian statesmen were the usual targets of bribery by other states. Not surprising, given Athens was such an important state whose actions affected many other states. Nevertheless, evidence exists that on possibly five occasions Athens, or at least Athenians, may also have used bribery as a form of economic statecraft. The distinction between state bribery and bribery by individuals on behalf of state has already been made. Chapter 7 will expand this discussion as it relates to bribery by different types of governments.

¹⁶⁷ Dem. 18.285.

¹⁶⁸ Din. 1.89.

The first reference to bribery by Athens did not concern a direct bribe to citizens of another state, but Herodotus' comment that in c511 the Alkmeonids bribed the Delphic oracle to help convince visitors to help free Athens from the Peisisratids.¹⁶⁹ The constant prophecies convinced Sparta to take military action.

Second, Herodotos mentioned an allegation that in 491, Kleomenes, one of the Spartan kings, was bribed by Athens to arrest Aeginetans who had submitted to Persia.¹⁷⁰ Although of doubtful historicity, the Athenian motive was clear, namely to achieve a desired political outcome that may not have been possible through other means. Next, Herodotos recorded that Themistocles, the Athenian admiral at the battle of Artemision in 480, used a bribe of eight talents to prevent the Spartan and Corinthian commanders from leaving the battlefield in fear of the size of the Persian fleet.¹⁷¹ Putting aside the debate whether the size of these bribes was realistic, and the historicity of the circumstances, note that Herodotos commented the bribe recipients were convinced the funds were provided by Athens whilst Plutarch recorded that the Euboeans sourced the funds.¹⁷² Regardless of whether the intent to offer the bribe originated in Euboea, Athens, or Themistocles acted on behalf of the Athenian state, the motive was clear-cut, being another example of bribery to achieve an immediate military outcome.

Thucydides recorded a fourth example of Athenian bribery when in 446 the Spartan general Pleistoanax, who had marched into Attica as far as Eleusis and Thrius, ravaged the country before unexpectedly returning his army to Sparta.¹⁷³ Sparta subsequently banished him after accusations he had taken a bribe to leave Attica.¹⁷⁴ Such a successful bribe, if it had occurred, was of direct military benefit to Athens which was thus free to deal with the Euboean revolt without having to engage simultaneously the Spartan army. However, this and other bribery allegations against campaigning generals may reflect an inability to understand

¹⁶⁹ Hdt. 5.63.1-3. The incident was also mentioned at Aristot. *Const. Ath.* 19.4.

¹⁷⁰ Hdt. 6.50.2.

¹⁷¹ Hdt. 8.5.1-2.

¹⁷² Hdt. 8.5.3 and Plut. *Them.* 7. This incident was discussed at Conover, 'Bribery' p. 42, n26, citing earlier scholarship by Cawkwell, Wallace, Podlecki, Frost, Kurke, Blösel, Baragwanath, Fomara, Cresci Marrone and Balot.

¹⁷³ Thuc. 1.114.2 and 2.21.1.

¹⁷⁴ Thuc. 2.21.1 and repeated at 5.16.3. Gomme stated that the real bribe to Pleistoanax was the offer to surrender or to discuss the surrender of Megara, Troizen and Achaia, see Gomme, *Commentary*, Vol. 2, p. 74. See also Plut. *Per.* 22.3. Note that Plutarch stated that the bribe was provided to Cleandridas, Pleistoanax' adviser, see Plut. *Per.* 22.2 and Plut. *Nic.* 28.3.

other reasons for generals not taking specific military actions, such as logistics problems, lack of resources, widespread illness, poor weather and even incompetence.¹⁷⁵

Next, Diodorus alleged that during the Peloponnesian War, Pericles bribed Clearchos, called Cleandridas by Thucydides, to forego a planned raid into Attica.¹⁷⁶ Sparta condemned Clearchos to death, but he spent his life as an exile in Thurii in Magna Graecia, reflecting harsh Spartan attitudes towards military corruption.¹⁷⁷ No other ancient source mentioned this bribery nor is the source of Diodorus' account known. If true, the motive was again clear-cut being yet another example of bribery to prevent an imminent military threat. This alleged bribery by Pericles was not the only example mentioned in the ancient literature. Plutarch recorded that Theophrastos considered that Pericles, before the war, staved off its start by conciliating Spartan officials with annual 10-talent payments, but the historicity is doubtful.¹⁷⁸

Aristophanes implied that Athens bribed Sparta to agree to the Peace of Nicias in 421, but this allegation, although a clear example of economic statecraft, remains unsubstantiated by any other ancient source.¹⁷⁹ Finally, in 408, the Athenians may have bribed Anaxilaos, a Byzantine, to let the Athenians into his city, although Xenophon does not specifically mention bribery.¹⁸⁰

Interestingly, three of the seven examples of potential Athenian bribery targeted Spartan generals in order to prevent them pursuing military action adverse to Athens' interests. No examples exist of Athenian bribery targeted to create treaties, form alliances or influence the political actions of other states. One might infer Athens was not well-disposed towards bribery as a form of economic statecraft, only applying it in dire military circumstances as previously outlined. Alternatively, pro-Athenian writers may have been less willing to mention Athenian bribery than bribery by other states. Whether such hypotheses

¹⁷⁵ See discussion at Harvey, 'Dona Ferentes', pp. 99-100.

¹⁷⁶ Diod. 13.106 and Thuc. 6.93.2, noting Thucydides does not mention any bribery.

¹⁷⁷ For example, Demosthenes' comment that Sparta never used money to buy an advantage from anyone, see Dem. 9.48.

¹⁷⁸ Plut. *Per.* 23.1 discussed in some detail at Gomme, *Commentary*, Vol. 1, p. 341. Further, an Andocides' comment on using bribery to purchase Sparta's acquiescence, likely refers to these payments by Pericles, see Andoc. 3.38. See also bribery implication at Aristoph. *Cl.* 858.

¹⁷⁹ Aristoph. *Peace* 618 line 618-24.

¹⁸⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.19. Anaxilaos justified his actions for reasons other than personal gain.

are defensible could be the subject of further research. Unarguably, given Athens' politico-economic power, it had access to a greater range of economic measures than any other state and thus would have had less need to resort to bribery when other forms of statecraft would likely be more successful.

Bribery by other states

Turning from Athens, the accounts of Herodotos and Diodoros provided several examples of possible bribery by other states. These include allegations against Miletus, Argos, the Euboeans, Thessalian states, Tyrrhenian cities, Syracuse, Carthage, Chios and Rhodes, Phocis, Amphissa, Chalcis, Eretria and Oreos, Sicyon, Thebes, Sparta and an unknown state.

Miletus. In 499, according to Herodotos, as another example of Spartans being bribed, Aristagoras, the tyrant of Miletus, attempted to bribe the Spartan king Cleomenes, to help the Ionians against the Persians.¹⁸¹ Cleomenes refused the bribe of 50 talents when told about the three-month journey from the Ionian coast to the Persian king. The bribery was an attempt to achieve a Milesian objective, namely freedom from Persian suzerainty, although the Milesians would have been unsure whether a triumphal Sparta would have attempted to control or otherwise place restrictions on Miletus.

Argos. According to Herodotos, whilst noting his potential bias, in c494 the Spartan king Cleomenes was bribed not to capture Argos, when he might easily have done so.¹⁸² If true, like several other states Argos used bribery to avert an undesirable military outcome.

Euboea. In the earlier discussion about Athens, this chapter discussed Themistocles' possible bribery of allied commanders at Artemision. Herodotos recorded the Euboeans initiated the bribery in 480 when fearing the allied Greeks would depart the battlefield. The Euboeans allegedly gave Themistocles, the Athenian commander, 30 talents on the condition the Greek fleet would remain and fight to defend Euboea.¹⁸³ At face value, this bribe and Themistocles' subsequent bribery attempt were effective given the Greeks remained at

¹⁸¹ Hdt. 5.51.1-2.

¹⁸² Hdt. 6.82.

¹⁸³ Hdt. 8.4.2.

Artemision and subsequently defeated the Persians. Whether they would have remained, in the absence of the bribe, remains unknowable.

Thessaly. Herodotos reported that in the 470s Leutyichidas, the Spartan king at the head of a Spartan army in Thessaly, was bribed, presumably by the Thessalians, not to subjugate their territory.¹⁸⁴ This was yet another example of bribery aimed at removing a military threat by a foreign state.

Tyrrhenia. Diodorus recorded that in the mid fifth century the states bordering the Tyrrhenian Sea resorted to bribery. Faced with maritime attacks from the Syracusan admiral Phayllos, in response to supposed Tyrrhenian piracy, they bribed him to return to Sicily before he could accomplish anything worthy of mention.¹⁸⁵ In this case the bribery, whilst of short-term benefit to the Tyrrhenians in removing a direct military threat, did not have any enduring benefit. Syracuse exiled Phayllos, and replaced him with another admiral who led a successful campaign against the Tyrrhenian states.

Syracuse. Thucydides commented that in 424 Athens either banished or fined three Athenian generals (Pythodoros, Sophocles and Eurymedon) because they had taken bribes. Thucydides implied that Syracuse offered the bribe so the generals would depart Sicily when they might have subdued it.¹⁸⁶ Whether or not this occurred, the Syracusan motive was clear with the bribery their preferred method of averting an immediate military threat.

Carthage. Yet another example of bribery to counter a direct military threat may have occurred during the Fourth Sicilian War (383-376) between Carthage and the Greek states of Sicily. Diodoros reported that the Carthaginians, who had suffered military defeats, offered a bribe of 300 talents to Dionysios, the Syracusan tyrant, if he allowed their remaining troops to return home unhindered.¹⁸⁷ In response, he only allowed their citizen troops to withdraw secretly at night, knowing the Syracusans and their allies would not accept any terms overly

¹⁸⁴ Hdt. 6.72.

¹⁸⁵ Diod. 11.88.4.

¹⁸⁶ Thuc. 4.65.3. For further analysis which discussed the context and other reasons for the generals actions, see Gomme, *Commentary*, Book 3, pp. 526-7. For a discussion of this incident in the context of the accountability of Athenian generals, see Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, *Accountability in Athenian Government*, Madison, 1982, pp. 124-41.

¹⁸⁷ Diod.14.75.1.

advantageous to Carthage.¹⁸⁸ According to Diodoros, Dionysios' motive in modifying the bribe's conditions was to retain a threat from Carthage that would keep the Syracusans occupied and not interested in asserting their freedom.¹⁸⁹

Chios/Rhodes. Dinarchus noted that c356/5 during the battle of Embata, Chios and Rhodes provided bribes to the Athenian general Timotheos, who when charged by Athens acquiesced to the penalties imposed.¹⁹⁰ The purpose of the alleged bribery remains unstated but was most likely to prevent Timotheos, who had several previous military successes, from taking military action against these two states.

Phocis. Diodorus stated, likely based on fourth-century historians, that in the 350s the Phocian general Onomarchos used Delphic gold and silver to bribe the leaders of many cities during the Third Sacred War, even the Thessalians.¹⁹¹ The specific outcomes sought are not clear, but the overall intent was to use bribery to circumvent the need for military force.

Amphissa. Later, in c343, one returns to allegations that Demosthenes received bribes from the Amphissians. He was acting as an official Athenian representative (*pulagoros*) to the *amphictyonic* council at Delphi. Speaking over ten years later, his rival, Aeschines, accused him in great detail of accepting a 2000 δραχμά (drachma) bribe from Amphissa.¹⁹² The effect desired by the Amphissians, at least according to Aeschines, was Demosthenes making no mention of the Amphissians in the council assembly. Further, Aeschines alleged Demosthenes was provided with an ongoing annual bribe of twenty μναĩ (minas), so that during his activities in Athens he would aid the Amphissians in every way. If this latter allegation was true, it is the only example of an ongoing bribe in the ancient Greek world. The motive for the alleged bribery can be inferred from Aeschines' speech. According to him, the Amphissians had made improper use of sacred land and did not want to have Demosthenes raise this matter during the council assembly.¹⁹³ The bribery's credibility remains in doubt given Athens had several *pulagaroi* in attendance including Aeschines. One

¹⁸⁸ Diod 14.75.2.

¹⁸⁹ Diod. 14.75.3.

¹⁹⁰ Din. 1.14 and 3.17. Worthington's analysis indicated no evidence existed to support the allegation, see Worthington, *Dinarchus*, pp. 148-56. See also Diod. 16.21.4 and Nep. *Tim.* 3.5 who also mention allegations against Iphicrates and the role of Menestheus.

¹⁹¹ Diod. 16.33.2-3.

¹⁹² Aeschin. 3.113-4, 3.125 and 3.237.

¹⁹³ Aeschin. 3.114.

could legitimately ask why only Demosthenes was targeted by bribery, unless one could infer his opinion would have swayed the other *pulgaroi*.

Chalcis, Eretria and Oreos. Not content with this allegation against Demosthenes, in the same speech *Against Ctesiphon*, Aeschines alleged that in about 340 the states of Chalcis, Eretria and Oreos bribed Demosthenes. They wanted him to move a motion in the Athenian *ekklesia* so these states would not need to contribute financially to the joint cause against Macedon.¹⁹⁴ The motive for the alleged bribery is clear since a successful vote would have been of obvious financial benefit to these states. Whether this allegation was true remains indeterminable even though Aeschines provided corroborating detail on how the bribe was paid off in instalments, whilst also citing the wording of a decree by the people of Oreus about Demosthenes' shameless acceptance of bribes.¹⁹⁵ No corroborating evidence exists for an allegation made in the context of a raft of negative slurs by Aeschines against Demosthenes.¹⁹⁶ Ultimately, Demosthenes was vindicated by the Athenian people after making his speech *On the Crown*.¹⁹⁷

Sicyon. Xenophon reported that Euphron, on becoming tyrant of Sicyon in 368, secured the support of his Arcadian and Argive allies by bribing some of them as well as providing them with mercenary support.¹⁹⁸ This example of bribery as economic statecraft exemplified its value in creating short-term benefits to the bribing state. Further, in 366 he intended to bribe the Thebans to remove their governor from the Sicyon acropolis, but was assassinated before he could completed the bribery attempt.¹⁹⁹

Thebes. Xenophon opined that in 378 the Thebans may have used bribery to persuade Sphodrias, a Spartan commander, to raid Attica.²⁰⁰ Their intent was to use bribery as the means to induce Athens to go to war against Sparta, which at the time was in Thebes' strategic interest.

¹⁹⁴ One talent was allegedly paid by each of the three states, see Aeschin. 3.103.

¹⁹⁵ Aeschin. 3.104-5.

¹⁹⁶ For one argument why Aeschines' allegation was unfounded, see Brunt, 'Euboea', pp. 254-5.

¹⁹⁷ See discussion at Harvey, 'Dona Ferentes', p. 100.

¹⁹⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.46.

¹⁹⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.3.4-12.

²⁰⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.20 and then a specific mention of bribery at Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.30.

Sparta. Diodorus opined that in the early fifth century, Sparta bribed Themistocles' political opponents to make accusations against him.²⁰¹ No other ancient source alleged Spartan bribery, so the historicity remains dubious. Nevertheless, such bribery if it had occurred was intended to create a political effect conducive to Spartan interests, namely the removal of Themistocles' influence. Further, during the battle of Aigospotamoi, several sources referred to bribery of the Athenian Adimantus to betray the Athenian fleet.²⁰² Such bribery was typical of economic statecraft aimed to create a specific military outcome. Later, Theopompus commented on rumours that Sparta bribed the Theban general Epaminondas to leave Laconia in 369.²⁰³ If so, it represented yet another example of bribery used to create a specific military effect. As Harvey argued, Theopompus may have invented the story, indeed Plutarch made specific comment on the unlikelihood of Theopompus' allegation.

An unknown state. Lysias stated that in 387 the Athenian Thrasybulos was successfully bribed, with the outcome that Athens lost her Boeotian allies and the Athenian fleet was betrayed.²⁰⁴ Lysias does not mention or imply the briber. If this occurred it represents another example of bribery being used to achieve political and military outcomes. Harvey analysed the allegation in some detail, correctly concluding the allegation was untenable and cannot be reconciled with both Xenophon's account and epigraphic evidence.²⁰⁵

Bribery as a norm? To conclude this section on bribery, one can consider an interesting case study raised by Thucydides. He recorded that during the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 413, Nicias considered that if he raised the siege of Syracuse and returned to Athens, the Athenian soldiers would allege their generals had been bribed by the Syracusans to betray their state.²⁰⁶ That is, although Thucydides does not allege bribery, he created the

²⁰¹ Diod. 11.54.4. Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos discussed Spartan support against Themistocles without alleging bribery, see Plut. *Them.* 23 and Nepos *Them.* 8.2.

²⁰² Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.32, Paus. 4.17.3 and 10.9.11 (also mentioning bribery of Tydeus).

²⁰³ Theopomp. *FGrH* 115 F 323. For Xenophon's comment on the Theban army leaving Laconia, see Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.50.

²⁰⁴ Lys. 26.23.

²⁰⁵ Harvey, 'Dona Ferentes', pp. 91-2 citing evidence including Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.26-7.

²⁰⁶ Thuc. 7.48.4. Hornblower characterised Nicias' view as an alternative counterfactual scenario, see Hornblower, *Thuc. Volume III*, p. 636.

impression that bribery, or at least allegations of bribery to discredit political rivals, was considered the norm in interstate relations.

Findings on Bribery

Differentiating between gifts and bribes remains as difficult for modern scholars as it was for the ancient Greeks. Even more difficulties applied when Greek states engaged with a foreign monarchy, such as the Persian king, with an established practice of gift-giving. Gifts offered in accordance with custom could be misunderstood, especially if valuable. Further, bribery allegations did not always reveal misconduct, sometimes just being made as a means to hurt one's enemies. For example, late fourth-century Athenian statesmen regularly labelled their opponents as being on Philip's payroll in order to cast slurs on their policies.

The examples discussed in this chapter demonstrate bribery could be a successful economic measure if the bribe was carefully targeted. Identifying the most suitable recipients in democratic states was especially problematic. States wanting to use bribery needed to target someone influential in the democratic assembly or who could at least move and argue a motion that would likely to be seriously considered. Or they could target a military leader operating away from his *chora*, with a degree of independence and ability to take the required action whilst disguising its motivation. A state could also target another state's visiting ambassador, especially if that ambassador had some delegated authority to take independent decisions. However, as Perlman noted, democratic Greek states would not usually target ambassadors given the scrutiny applied to their reception. Thus, as he argued at least for Athens, allegations of bribery against ambassadors were almost all confined to monarchical Persia and Macedonia.²⁰⁷

Like other forms of capital-based economic measures, bribes could also be used tactically or to further a state's strategic goals. In the former category, Athens sometimes bribed Spartan generals to counter immediate military threats. With respect to the latter, Philip used bribery as a sophisticated element of his foreign policy over several years.

²⁰⁷ Perlman, 'Bribing ambassadors', p. 225.

Conclusion

Capital-based economic measures involving direct money payments, to influence the behaviours and attitudes of states, were popular given money's inherent flexibility. Money only compares unfavourably to receiving other material when the state receiving the money could buy what it needed because that product was not available on the market. For example, providing funds to allow a state to acquire ship-building timbers was of no use if the timbers were not available because timber-rich states will not provide them. In all other situations the state providing the gift, loan or bribe would know its attractiveness because it could be used for a range of purposes.

However, other forms of capital-based measures were available within a state's toolbox that could be equally effective. For an analysis of these other capital-based measures one must now turn to Chapter Five.

CHAPTER FIVE

TRIBUTE, OTHER CAPITAL PAYMENTS AND PREFERENTIAL TAXATION

Introduction

The remaining types of capital-based economic measures comprise mandated capital payments, such as tribute, *syntaxeis* and fines, as well as preferential taxation and other economic benefits. Like the capital-based economic measures discussed in the previous chapter, these types were applied both positively and negatively. As a negative economic measure, tribute, *syntaxeis* and fines were imposed by states who usually had the ability to enforce their payment. In contrast, from the positive perspective, states could waive, reduce or delay required payments in order to create *eunoia*. They could also preferentially tax citizens of foreign states as well as providing them other economic benefits. In this chapter each of these measures are discussed in turn, with evidence examined to determine the extent that specific applications were intended as types of economic statecraft. For each measure, some initial findings will be made that will inform the holistic discussion in Chapter Seven.

Tribute

Why tribute?

Greek hegemonies requiring states to make regular monetary payments may have based their payments on the pre-existing imperial models of Lydia and Persia.¹ Regardless of their inspiration, these payments, usually translated as ‘tribute’ (*phoros*), were first and foremost

¹ Hdt. 1.6.2, 27.1, 3.89-96 and 6.42.2. See commentary at M. Trundle, ‘Coinage and the Transformation of Greek Warfare’, in *New Perspectives on Ancient Warfare*, G. Fagan and M. Trundle (eds.), Leiden, 2010, p. 238. Van Wees discussed ‘tribute states’ and how Archaic Greece drew heavily on Near Eastern models for public finance, without specifically mentioning tribute, see Hans van Wees *Ships and Silver, Taxes and Tribute: A Fiscal History of Archaic Athens*, London, 2013, p. 14 and p. 30. Whilst Davies discussed some characteristics of the pre-Athenian empire, he does not discuss the influences of Athenian tribute, see Davies, J.K. ‘Corridors, cleruchies, commodities, and coins: the prehistory of the Athenian empire’ in A. Slawisch (ed.) *Handels- und Finanzgebaren in der Ägäis im 5. Jh. V. Chr.*, Istanbul, 2013, pp. 43-66.

an effective means of raising revenue.² Nevertheless, the requirement for states to pay sent them a powerful political message and the hegemon could also manipulate the payments to influence the attitudes and behaviours of the paying states. This section examines the tribute-requiring behaviour of Athens during the Classical period as well as other states imposing tribute.

Athens

Thucydides recorded that in 478 Athens formed a new anti-Persia alliance. Allies were required to either provide ships or contribute tribute to pay for the fleet designed to protect them from the Persian threat.³ Eventually only seven states supplied ships; namely the five states on Lesbos, plus Chios and Samos, with the latter losing this option after its unsuccessful revolt. That is, in theory, Athens designed tribute not as a tax, but payment in place of naval service. Athenian officials, starting with Aristeides who performed the first assessment, calculated the amount payable by any specific state.⁴ Athenian officials, the Ἑλληνοταμίαι (*Hellenotamiai*), elected by the Athenians to administer the tribute, reassessed tribute payments in the years of the Great Panathenaea, as well as making extraordinary reassessments in 443/2 and 425/4.⁵

The method of calculating the tribute payable by any state remains unknown and subject to ongoing debate.⁶ The method likely took into account some combination of a state's territorial size, population, relevant industries, agricultural potential, mines, wealth, trade and economic capacity. For example, the decree reassessing tribute payments in 425/4 expressly commented on the impact of unproductive land on the quantum of payments.⁷ The final calculated amount must have been a figure which Athens considered the state could pay, since they would not have stipulated an unaffordable amount. Importantly, the method of

² Noting the term *phoros* was confined to payments made to hegemons.

³ Thuc. 1.96.1-2.

⁴ Thuc. 5.18.5 and Plut. *Arist.* 24.1-3. Pausanias also commented that before Aristeides all the Greeks were immune from tribute, see Paus. 8.52. See also Aristot. *Const. Ath.* 30 for mention of treasurers managing the tribute.

⁵ For the *Hellenotamiai*, see *IG I²* 65 lines 17-18.

⁶ The most recent scholarship comprehensively analysing the likely options is at L. Nixon and S. Price, 'The size and resources of Greek cities', in *The Greek City: From Homer to Alexander*, O. Murray and S. Price (eds.), Oxford, 1990, pp. 137-52.

⁷ See Line 22 of OR 153 (*IG I²* 63) translated with commentary at Robin Osborne and P.J. Rhodes (eds.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions 478-404 BC*, Oxford, 2017, pp. 308-22 especially p. 311.

calculation could have considered non-economic factors, such as the extent to which Athens wanted to favour or punish any specific state.

Debates also continue over the amounts paid by any specific state. One starts at the Athenian Tribute Lists (ATL) which recorded the 1/60 of the tribute provided annually to Athena.⁸ Interpreting the ATL payments reveals a large disparity between state payments, with only one fifth paying more than a talent. Nixon/Price calculated that in 441 only 29% of the contributors provided 86% of the total payments.⁹ However, some scholars posit the ATL payments represented the surplus funds returned to Athens after some tribute was used within the paying state to, inter alia, maintain the alliance's fleets and garrisons.¹⁰ For example, Athenian naval squadrons or alliance armies based at major allied states could draw their pay and other funds from that state's tribute. The alternative would be that the tribute would be shipped to Athens each year and then returned to where it came to pay for local expenditures.¹¹ The argument that the ATL only recorded surplus funds both neatly explains the differences in the amount some states paid year-to-year and the debated anomalies between the ATL payments and payments mentioned by the literary sources, primarily Thucydides and Xenophon.¹² If a valid argument, the ATL payments are not usable to calculate the total contributions by any state.

Putting to one side the debate about calculating tribute quantum, Athens clearly imposed the tribute to raise revenue. Nevertheless, part of the Athenian argument was that it helped achieve the stability necessary for tribute-paying states to remain or become economically prosperous. For an example of this argument, one could refer to Isocrates' speech *Panthenaicus* in which he says tribute-paying states should be grateful to Athens

⁸ For one such ATL inscription, see OR 153 (IG I² 63) at Osborne and Rhodes (eds.), *GHI*, pp. 308-22.

⁹ Nixon and Price, 'Greek cities', p. 143.

¹⁰ For two examples of scholarship discussing the discrepancy, see A.W. Gomme, 'Thucydides II.13.1', *Historia*, 2, no. 1, 1953 and C. Fornara, 'Thuc. 2.13.3: 600 T. of tribute', in *Gestures: Essays in Ancient History, Literature, and Philosophy Presented to Alan L. Boegehold. On the Occasion of his Retirement and his Seventy-Fifth Birthday*, G Bakewell et al. (eds.), Oxford, 2003, pp. 251-7.

¹¹ For one example of the arguments made against this alternative interpretation, see R. Unz 'The surplus of the Athenian phoros', *GRBS*, 26, no. 1, 1985, p. 30.

¹² Ancient literary works and inscriptions, which provide evidence to fuel the ongoing debate, include Thuc. 1.96 and 2.13, Plut. *Arist.* 24; Dem. 23.209, Paus. 8.52 and IG I² 63. Gomme provided commentary at A.W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 3 vols, Oxford, 1945, Vol. 2, pp. 43-6 and Hornblower commented at Simon Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides Volume I: Books I-III*, Oxford, 1991, pp. 143-7.

which advanced them to a state of prosperity.¹³ Whether tribute-paying states believed this message is not discernible from the ancient evidence, except to the extent that revolts by allies implied a lack of gratitude. Of particular interest is whether this tribute, the first payable by Greek states to another Greek state, created what Kallet-Marx called ‘...an effective signifier of barbarian despotism’.¹⁴ Such a view of tribute may have been particularly held by those Greek states who had previously paid tribute to the Persian king, especially if the amount of tribute matched that previously assessed by Persia.

Allowing states to pay tribute rather than provide ships represented a shrewd Athenian strategy when applied to those states that could do either. As Nixon/Price summarised, 71% of the 205 contributors in 441 paid one talent or less, with any payment less than one talent insufficient to provide even one trireme.¹⁵ Making tribute payments was easier, but decreased a state’s bargaining power. A state with ships taking part in a combined fleet had more influence than one whose payments were combined with other payments to build and crew Athenian ships.

Having established that most states provided tribute to Athens, one can now examine whether Athens manipulated these payments to influence tribute-paying states. Such potential manipulation must be differentiated from tribute adjustments explainable by a state’s obvious change in economic circumstances. For example, Ainos’ ability to pay markedly decreased from the middle of the fifth century given it was no longer on the major trade route to the Black Sea. Its tribute was reduced to 10 talents from 445, quickly dropped to four talents and then reduced to zero from 437 onwards.¹⁶ In theory, Athens could have manipulated payments by several means such as providing exemptions from paying tribute, capping payments for specific states, using reassessments as a bargaining chip with certain states and allowing states to delay their tribute payments. Through any of these means, Athens could create a sense of loyalty and *eunoia* within a state. Alternatively, Athens could punish states by imposing punitive tribute payments.

¹³ Isoc. 12.69. Modern scholarship on this speech focuses on its rhetorical and philosophical techniques rather than its reflection of contemporary attitudes.

¹⁴ Lisa Kallet-Marx, *Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides’ History 1-5.24*, Berkeley, 1993, p. 347.

¹⁵ Nixon and Price, ‘Greek cities’, p. 143.

¹⁶ See relevant ATL entries.

From the initial introduction of tribute, Athens allowed some allies not to make payments because they were considered, as Thucydides recorded, independent allies (ξυμμαχων οἱ αὐτόνομοι).¹⁷ These states, based on an analysis of the ATL and comments by Thucydides, were those on Chios, plus the Methymnaeans, other Lesbian states, the Argives, Corcyraeans, Cephallenians, and Zacynthians.¹⁸ This exemption from tribute sent a clear political message, both to that state and other states, that they had sufficient independence from Athens not to be subject to the tribute requirement. These states initially provided ships and hoplites in support of operations against Sparta and its allies.

The exemption status of the Corcyraeans, Cephallenians and Zacynthians requires consideration. Thucydides recorded, in a speech by an Athenian ambassador Euphemos in 415, that Athens did not require some island states to pay tribute because they occupied convenient positions around the Peloponnese.¹⁹ Strassler argued that Euphemos was referring to those three states.²⁰ Thucydides mentioned no other rationale for not paying tribute leaving open the question why they were not subjugated by Athens and required to pay tribute. Their convenient position would remain if the states were under Athenian military control. Perhaps the rationale was that Athens assessed the loss of revenue by foregoing tribute was counterbalanced by these states remaining amenable to Athenian fleet access. The cost of subjugating them and maintaining garrisons, which would have been difficult and costly, might have exceeded the foregone tribute revenue.

The next potential example of exemption from tribute could be inferred from Cleonymos' decree likely dated to 426/5.²¹ Although primarily relevant for revealing revised methods to ensure tribute collection, the decree also discussed Samos and Thera as special cases. Osborne and Rhodes put forward the possibility that neither state paid tribute at the time.²² Whilst the rationale for Samos not paying as a previous independent ally appears sensible, the reason for exempting Thera remains unclear. Thera paid tribute by 425/4 as

¹⁷ For use by Thucydides of the term 'independent allies', see Thuc. 6.69.3 and 7.57.3. Gomme discussed the different status of Athenian allies at A.W. Gomme *et al.*, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, IV Books V.25-VII, Oxford, 1970, pp. 434-5.

¹⁸ Thuc. 3.15.1 and Thuc. 7.57.7.

¹⁹ Thuc. 6.85.2.

²⁰ Strassler's argument was likely based on Thuc. 7.57.7, see R. Strassler (ed.), *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, New York, 1996, p. 408, n. 685.2c.

²¹ OR 152 (IG I² 65) translated and discussed at Osborne and Rhodes (eds.), *GHI*, pp. 300-7.

²² Osborne and Rhodes (eds.), *GHI*, p. 307.

indicated in Thudippos' decree, so perhaps it was simply a temporary dispensation to create *eunoia* in Thera after being forced to join the Delian League in c430.²³ Another possibility is that both states made other payments to Athens to recompense existing debts, so Athens remained careful not to create ill-will by also requiring tribute payments. Bonnin also posited, quite defensibly, that Thera may have been given special dispensation to keep it loyal, because it was at the extreme southern end of the zone into which Athens had recently expanded its control.²⁴ Accordingly military action against a rebellious Thera, a Dorian state, would have been time consuming and expensive.

Two more examples of tribute not being paid are worthy of comment. As discussed by Unz, the important naval base at Naupactus on the north coast of the Corinthian Gulf paid no tribute. Similarly, according to the ATL, Amphipolis, which Thucydides described as an important revenue source, paid no tribute.²⁵ The rationale for these exemptions cannot be clearly determined, although one could posit that given their strategic locations Athens considered the exemptions would create required *eunoia* worth more than the foregone revenue. Of course, this strategy eventually did not work for Amphipolis which left the Confederacy.

Sometimes Athens decided to forego tribute payments not to reward a state but because it could impose an alternative form of hegemonic power. For example, Thucydides recorded that in 427, after subjugating those Lesbian states that had revolted the previous year, Athens did not impose tribute. Instead, Athens divided their land into three thousand parts allotted to Athenian settlers, who retained their Athenian citizenship (κληρουχία - cleruchy).²⁶ Whether the tribute revenue foregone was balanced by the taxes imposed on the cleruchs cannot be determined from the ancient evidence.

²³ OR 153 (IG I² 63) translated and discussed at Osborne and Rhodes (eds.), *GHI*, pp. 308-22. In this decree the total quantum of tribute was reached not only by raising the contributions from almost every city paying tribute, but also by listing cities that had not paid for years and even some that had never paid at all.

²⁴ G. Bonnin, 'Phoroi, syntaxeis, and loans from Delian Apollo: The Cyclades under Athenian financial imperialism', in *Hegemonic Finances: Funding Athenian Domination in the 5th and 4th Centuries B.C.*, T. Figueira and S. Jensen (eds.), Swansea, 2019, p. 143.

²⁵ Thuc. 4.108.1.

²⁶ Thuc. 3.50.2. For commentary on cleruchies, see Hornblower, *Thucydides*, Volume I, pp. 440-1.

Having decided that a state should pay tribute, Athens could achieve specific political effects by deciding how much it should pay. To understand how political considerations influenced state payments one can examine those states whose payments appear unusual both in the initial determination and the major tribute reassessment in 425/4.²⁷

One option to create *eunoia* was for Athens to cap payments at a figure less than a state should arguably have paid based on relevant considerations. The first potential example of Athenian tribute capping was Thasos. Herodotos recorded that in 491 the Thasians usually derived 200 talents annually from their mines, peaking at 300 talents.²⁸ Yet until the tenfold increase in tribute from 442/1, Thasos only paid three talents. By any method of calculation, a three talent and then revised 30 talents payment, the most payable by any state apart from Aegina and Paros, represented lenient treatment even after Athens gained control of Thasos' mainland mines.²⁹ Another theory is that Thasos paid much more than three talents through other payment mechanisms such as indemnities after its revolt but the total amount was characterised as tribute only from 442/1.³⁰ One possible rationale was that Athens recognised the Thasians would never be a stalwart ally given their revolt from the alliance c465 and its subsequent forced return.³¹ In calculating the increased tribute amount payable from 442/1, Athens would have understood that the Thasians were extremely sensitive about the control of their island mines and their ability to use its revenues for its own purposes.³² Any attempt to make Thasos pay more may have placed unacceptable pressure on its willingness to remain in the alliance despite having to pay much less tribute than it was able. Given this scenario, capping Thasos' tribute payment was an effective economic measure aimed at achieving a specific strategic outcome.

²⁷ For one discussion, see Nixon and Price, 'Greek cities', pp.138-55. Further, the wording of *IG I³ 39*, a decree applying to an unknown Euboean state, implied that a subject state could try to persuade Athens of the most appropriate payment. The AIO editors date this decree to either 446/5 or 424/3.

²⁸ Hdt. 6.46.3 with commentary at Lionel Scott, *Historical Commentary on Herodotus Book 6*, Leiden, 2005, p. 206.

²⁹ For a further discussion of Thasos' tribute payments and their dating, see Christophe Pebarthe, 'Thasos, l'empire d'Athènes et les emporia de Thrace', *ZPE*, 126, 1999, pp. 131-54.

³⁰ See summary at Osborne and Rhodes (eds.), *GHI*, p. 106. See also discussion at Loren J. Samons, *Empire of the Owl: Athenian Imperial Finance*, Stuttgart, 2000, p. 104.

³¹ Thuc. 1.100.2.

³² The rationale for the 10-fold increase remains unknown to modern scholars although suggestions have been made, see Osborne and Rhodes (eds.), *GHI*, p. 106 and Christophe Pebarthe, 'Thasos, L'Empire d'Athenes', 1999, pp. 131-54.

Similarly, Selymbria paid tribute at a conventional rate except in the 435/4 and 433/2 tribute lists when it paid only 900 drachms. Meiggs/Lewis were likely correct when they argued that the decreased payments reflected Selymbria's position on the border between the Athenian empire and the Odrysian kingdom.³³ Consequently, a reduced tribute payment would have contributed to ongoing *eunoia* towards Athens at a time when Selymbria's loyalty was especially valuable to Athens.

Other potential examples of tribute capping include some island states. Whether Athens based the amounts payable on a subjective assessment of their prosperity or to send a political message remains unknowable. For example, Naxos, never paid more than 15 talents while its neighbour Paros paid 30 talents.³⁴ The most likely reason for the larger Parian payment was its prosperous marble industry rather than any attempt to punish Paros or favour Naxos.³⁵ However, sometimes the rationale is less clear-cut. For example, Hephaistia on Lemnos paid twice the tribute as Myrina the other state on the island. The former was better situated for trade, but equally the Athenians may have chosen to favour Myrina. What outcome Athens would have aimed to achieve is not discernible from the ancient evidence.

A further interesting example concerns the Euboean state of Karystos which paid 12 talents in 454/3, 7.5 talents in 451/0 and then only five talents the next year.³⁶ Brock discussed the rationale for the two-fold reduction in detail, positing it would not have been because Karystos was simultaneously making other payments such as indemnities.³⁷ He speculated that one reduction resulted from a *cleruchy* on Karystos whilst the other may have resulted from Athenian vessels being exempted from harbour taxes at Karystos' main port at Geraistos.³⁸ If the latter applied, it would be the only example of such an economic trade-off between two states. Although tribute evidence is notoriously difficult to interpret, an alternative argument is that the initial tribute assessment aimed to punish Karystos, with the punitive element gradually reduced over time.

³³ R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century*, Oxford, 1969, p. 269.

³⁴ OR 153 (*IG* I² 63) translated with commentary at Osborne and Rhodes (eds.), *GHI*, pp. 308-22.

³⁵ References to Parian marble include Hdt. 3.57.3 and 5.62.3.

³⁶ B. Meritt *et al.*, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, Oxford, 1939-53.

³⁷ R. Brock, 'The tribute of Karystos', *EMC*, XL, no. 3, 1996, which discusses earlier relevant scholarship by Meritt, Wade-Gery, McGregor and Meiggs.

³⁸ Brock, 'Karystos', p. 328. Given the speculation, this example was not discussed in Chapter Two.

Two final examples of tribute assessment are worthy of note. Eddy posited that the reduced tribute paid by Mylasa in Caria after 446, from one talent to a lower amount was likely a concession provided by Athens at a time when Mylasa's willingness to stay in the alliance waivered.³⁹ Later, the reassessment in 425/4 markedly increased tribute payments by most states.⁴⁰ For example, the tribute required from Kythnos, Mykonos and Naxos doubled, some states (Andros and Rheneia) were tripled, Syros was quadrupled and Tenos paid five times its previous payment.⁴¹ Yet this same reassessment halved the required payments of two Cycladic states, Pholegandros and Sikinos.⁴² Insufficient evidence exists to posit a rationale for the reduction apart from Athens' desire to provide favourable treatment to these states for their continued loyalty.

Increasing tribute during reassessments, whilst clearly aimed at providing more revenue, could also negatively affect the behaviours and attitudes of paying states. For example, in 425 the small island state of Melos refused to pay a punitive tribute amount of 15 talents, demanded by Athens for Melos' refusal, despite Athenian pressure, to join the alliance. Melos defied Athens and nine years later Athens finally acted, attacking the island, killing all males and selling the women and children as slaves.⁴³ Although the end result was no ongoing tribute from Melos, Athens needed to send a message to other tribute-paying states that they must continue paying or face dire consequences. Thucydides made several comments about the Athenian attitude towards rebellious islands, with the most uncompassionate viewpoint displayed in a speech by Kleon in the context of discussions about the fate of Mytilene.⁴⁴

Another example of tribute being used as an economic measure concerned Colophon. At ML 47 (*IG I² 14/15*), Meiggs and Lewis discussed the situation in 447/6 when Athens may have reduced the required payment by Colophon and other states because it established an

³⁹ S. Eddy, 'Some irregular amounts of Athenian tribute', *AJPh*, 94, no. 1, 1973, p. 56.

⁴⁰ The extent to which this reassessment increased tribute is contested. For one view, see Kallet-Marx, *Money*, p. 166.

⁴¹ As discussed in Bonnin, 'Phoroi', pp. 137-8.

⁴² Bonnin, 'Phoroi', p. 139.

⁴³ Thuc. 5.116.4. For one discussion of Melos' circumstances, see Gomme *et al.*, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, Vol IV, pp. 190-2.

⁴⁴ Thuc. 3.37-40.

Athenian colony nearby.⁴⁵ Presumably, the reduced payment was intended to create *eunoia* in the paying states towards the colony, which may have taken over some Colophonian farming land.

A state could appeal its tribute quantum through a special court established in Athens in 430.⁴⁶ Athens could use these appeals or other ad hoc interstate negotiations as a bargaining chip to achieve its desired outcomes. In the latter category, for example, Thucydides recorded Aegina began paying tribute when subjugated by Athens in 457.⁴⁷ A degree of Aeginetan independence was restored under the terms of the 30 Years Peace of 446 provided that Aegina agreed to continue paying tribute to hegemonic Athens.⁴⁸

Thucydides recorded another example of tribute payments being used as bargaining chip in interstate agreements. In 422/1, as part of the Peace of Nicias between the Athenians, Spartans and their allies, all parties agreed the cities given up to the Athenians, namely Argilos, Stageira, Akanthos, Scolos, Olynthos and Spartolos, should remain independent and only pay the original tribute amount assessed by Aristides. The cities would remain neutral unless they decided to ally with Athens.⁴⁹ Further, the Athenians and their allies would not engage in war with them provided they kept paying tribute. This passage creates some difficulties in that it implies these states would pay tribute even though they were not Athenian allies. That is, the Athenians used tribute payments to send the political message that if it was paid, then the paying states would not be punished and would retain their traditional freedoms. Such an application of tribute neatly fits Ober's description of tribute as the payment of '... protection money to a stable hegemon'.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ Meiggs and Lewis, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, pp. 121-5.

⁴⁶ As discussed at L. Kubala, 'The main rules of tribute payment in mid 5th Century Athenian arche according to Cleinias decree', *Graeco-Latina Brunensia*, 20, no. 1, 2015, p. 71, n22. For a fragmentary, but still revealing, example of a speech arguing the quantum of payments, see Antiphon's *On the Tribute of Samothrace* available within the Loeb Classical Library.

⁴⁷ Thuc. 1.108.4.

⁴⁸ As evidenced in OR 119 (*IG* I³ 259, *IG* I³ 270 and *IG* I³ 278) translated with commentary at Osborne and Rhodes (eds.), *GHI*, pp. 94-108.

⁴⁹ Thuc. 5.18.5. For a discussion of these states as tribute payers, see Gomme, *Commentary*, Book III, p. 669 and Simon Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides Volume II: Books IV-V.24*, Oxford, 1996, p. 476.

⁵⁰ Josiah Ober, *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece*, Princeton, 2015, p. 202.

As another example of tribute used as a bargaining chip, Anderson/Dix argued that the Eteokarpathians likely appeared on the ATL in c434/3 after a negotiated agreement resulting in their voluntary payment of tribute whilst still retaining some autonomy.⁵¹ That is, in this argument the Eteokarpathians considered their best interests aligned with joining the Athenian alliance and receiving ongoing Athenian protection. Whilst Athens would have wanted them to pay tribute, the amount payable would have one of the elements negotiated in the agreement.

Xenophon recorded a further example of tribute influencing interstate agreements. In 408 the Athenians besieged Chalcedon, which had revolted from the alliance and was now supported by Sparta and Persia. The Athenians negotiated an arrangement with Pharnabazos that prevented Athens continuing the war against Chalcedon. In return, the latter would pay to the Athenians the tribute they had previously paid and the arrears owed.⁵² That is, the Athenians were offered a financial incentive that would prevent further military losses at a stage of the war in which it needed to preserve its military forces.

Another way for Athens to use tribute as a means of influence was to favourably treat a state in tribute arrears. The most striking example was Methone in c427/6, which as discussed in previous chapters was experiencing financial difficulties due to the Macedonian blockade. Athens provided favourable treatment of Methone's arrears in return for its ongoing support of Athens.⁵³ The broader Athenian objectives in applying positive economic measures against Methone were discussed in Chapter Four.

Another means of influence available to Athens, through its tribute collection, was to facilitate sub-hegemonies within the alliance. Athens could allow some states to collect tribute from other states on behalf of Athens through *συντελεῖς* (*syntely*) and *ἀπόταξις* (*apotaxis*) arrangements. *Syntely* was a group of tributaries headed by a regional hegemon and *apotaxis* was the dissolution of such tributary groupings.⁵⁴ Jensen discussed this tribute

⁵¹ *IG I³ 1454* as discussed at C. Anderson and T. Dix, 'Small states in the Athenian empire: The case of the Eteokarpathioi', *SyllClass*, 15, 2004, p. 11.

⁵² *Xen. Hell.* 1.3.9, but not mentioned by Diodorus.

⁵³ OR 150 (*IG I² 57*) translated with commentary at Osborne and Rhodes (eds.), *GHI*, pp. 286-94.

⁵⁴ See S. Jensen, 'Rethinking Athenian imperialism: Sub-hegemony in the Delian league', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 2010, p. ii. Jensen provides further background for these terms at Sean R. Jensen, 'Tribute and *Syntely* at Erythrai', *CW*, 105, no. 4, 2012, p. 479, n1.

collection approach in detail demonstrating Athens' willingness to tolerate regional hegemonies, especially those with long-standing claims, if they did not threaten Athenian interests. He provided the example of Mytilenaian-controlled Aktaian states in the Troad and Mysia which in the mid-420s comprised at least fourteen cities.⁵⁵ This approach allowed sub-hegemons to influence the method of collecting tribute in their own interests. As Jensen correctly argued, the Delian League did not hinder some Greek states aspiring to maintain their own spheres of influence within the Athenian hegemony.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, no evidence exists that Athens allowed sub-hegemons to access the tribute paid by subordinate states.

Syntely/*apotaxis* arrangements allowed Athens to create *eunoia* in sub-hegemons, especially given they could manipulate arrangements to reduce their own payments. However, Athens did not apply syntely/*apotaxis* arrangements consistently. Arguably, Athens did not use them as an effective means of influence, only using them as an administrative convenience in tribute collection, being more efficient than receiving multiple individual payments. Further, as Jensen correctly argued, they would not have been an effective means of control or coercion in isolation of other non-economic measures such as garrisons, influencing local officials and the threat of armed intervention.⁵⁷

One final Athenian practice in tribute collection is worth discussing, namely the repeated naval expeditions despatched to collect tribute from tardy payers or those states in arrears. Thucydides mentioned four such expeditions to diverse locations.⁵⁸ Not all scholars consider these expeditions were focussed on tribute collection even though many translations use this term, instead arguing that they were state-sponsored piracy, extorting monies by the threat of force in times of specific financial need.⁵⁹ Aristophanes made reference to these tribute-collecting ships within his *Knights*, indicating this practice was well known at Athens.⁶⁰ Regardless of whether the expeditions collected tribute, unrelated monies or both, they represented another example of economic statecraft by Athens. By collecting or

⁵⁵ Jensen, 'Sub-hegemonies', p. 1. He also commented that 14 cities in the Troas were listed in the assessment decree of 425/24 (*JG* 1³ 71) assessed at about 50 talents, see Jensen, 'Sub-hegemonies', p. 215.

⁵⁶ Jensen, 'Sub-hegemonies', p. 1.

⁵⁷ Jensen, 'Sub-hegemonies', p. 45 and p. 226. For a detailed discussion of one syntely/*apotaxis* arrangement concerning Erythrai, see Jensen, 'Erythrai', pp. 479-96.

⁵⁸ Thuc. 2.69.1, 3.19.1, 4.50.1 and 4.75.1.

⁵⁹ For example, see Kallet-Marx, *Money*, pp. 200-2 who discussed previous relevant scholarship by Garlan and Haas.

⁶⁰ Aristoph. *Kn.*, lines 1070-71.

extorting funds from unwilling states, they reinforced the clear political hegemonic message of Athens' military supremacy in the region.

Persia

Darius' kingdom was organised into satrapies with each having an annual requirement to pay tribute.⁶¹ Darius also imposed payments on those Greek states under his suzerainty. Xenophon recorded a speech of Polydamos of Pharsalus explaining how Persian kings received tribute from mainland and island cities.⁶² Whilst the tribute was primarily revenue-raising, it would have also been an effective means of demonstrating Persia's hegemony.

Given that Persia exacted tribute during almost the entire Classical period, it would have had the opportunity, like Athens, to manipulate tribute payments to influence the behaviours and attitudes of paying states. However, almost no evidence exists of such tribute manipulation. The only potential examples are evidenced by two comments by Xenophon. First, in 407 the Spartan embassy led by Boiotios reached an agreement with the Persian king that sparked a modern debate about whether it allowed Greek states to remain autonomous provided they paid Persian tribute.⁶³ Second, Xenophon commented that c395 the Persian king would give autonomy to the Greek cities of Asia if they paid tribute as they had done previously.⁶⁴ That is, in both these examples the Persian king used tribute payments to advance Persian strategic objectives as well as a bargaining chip to help Greek states achieve their desired outcomes.

Other states

Ancient writers commented that Crete, Elis, Thebes, Orchomenos, Larisa, Sparta, the Odrysian kingdom, Thessaly, the Illyrians and Syracuse imposed tribute at some time during

⁶¹ Hdt. 3.89-97. See also references to Persian tribute at Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.14.

⁶² Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.12.

⁶³ Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.1-7 with the debate involving arguments summarised at Peter Krentz, *Xenophon Hellenika I-II.3.10*, Oxford, 1989, p. 125, who cites Lewis D.M., *Sparta and Persia*, Leiden, 1977, pp. 124-5, Cartledge, P., *Sparta and Lakonia*, London, 1979, p. 266 and Robin Seager and Christopher Tuplin, 'The Freedom of the Greeks of Asia: on the Origins of a Concept and the Creation of a Slogan', *JHS*, 100, 1980, p. 144, n. 36.

⁶⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.25. For a general discussion of Persian tribute, see David Stronach and Antigoni Zournatzi, 'Odrysian and Achaemenid Tribute: Some New Perspectives', Eighth Annual Conference on Thracology, 2000, pp. 333-43.

the late Archaic and Classical periods. Evidence for the first four states is confined to Strabo. According to Strabo, earlier writers, apart from Ephoros, considered the tyrannical Cretan ruler Minos exacted tribute. Of course, Minos is now considered a mythical king predating the late Archaic period, but this commentary provides a paradigm on how tribute was viewed. Strabo implied that such tribute was imposed on the people of Attica.⁶⁵ At this stage Athens had no warships, so was incapable of resisting Minos' powerful fleet.⁶⁶ Whilst clearly revenue-raising, Minos also sent an overt political message to Athens and other states about Minoan hegemony. Strabo's reference is too fleeting to understand whether Minos manipulated the required payments in order to influence the attitudes and behaviours of paying states.

Strabo also recorded, without providing information indicating a date, that the Peloponnesian state of Elis, a Spartan ally, razed many other towns and imposed tribute upon those inclined to maintain their independence.⁶⁷ This claim remains unsupported by other writers and cannot be dated. However, Strabo's explanation for imposing tribute implied that the Elians realised making a troublesome state pay tribute effectively demonstrated Elis' hegemonic power.

Finally, Strabo commented that the Thebans always paid tribute to the Orchomenians and their tyrant Erginos.⁶⁸ Strabo does not provide evidence either to date this purported tribute payment during the late Archaic period or to provide a rationale for its payment. Supporting evidence does not occur in any other ancient sources. Thus, in the absence of any evidence one can only suppose that if the tribute was paid it was aimed at simply raising revenue whilst sending a political message about the dominance of the state exacting the tribute. A similar conclusion must be drawn, given the lack of evidence sufficient to form a contrary view, about Strabo's comment that Larisa also exacted tribute-like payments until controlled by Philip II of Macedonia.⁶⁹

⁶⁵ Strab. 10.4.8.

⁶⁶ As described in Plat. *Laws* 4.706a-b.

⁶⁷ Strab. 8.3.30 which has not been subject to focussed modern scholarship.

⁶⁸ Strab. 9.2.40.

⁶⁹ Strab. 9.5.19.

According to both Strabo and Diodorus, Sparta imposed tribute. Strabo commented that Sparta exacted tribute from the Laconians, whilst Diodorus recorded that after 404 the Spartans required tribute from its conquered peoples, collecting more than 1000 talents annually.⁷⁰ In the absence of supporting evidence from other writers both claims are unlikely to be well founded. Further, Diodorus' claim would have Sparta ignore one of the key complaints against hegemonic Athens by its subservient states. Thucydides expressed the counter view that Sparta's policy was not to exact tribute from other states, but to secure their subservience by other means.⁷¹ Nevertheless, Thucydides commented that Sparta's allies were sometimes asked to provide specific contributions to campaign finances.⁷² Epigraphic evidence exists for such contributions to Sparta's war fund.⁷³

To round out the discussion about tribute as an economic measure, Thucydides recorded that the Odrysian kingdom exacted tribute from fellow barbarian nations and from Greek cities in the late fifth century. In the reign of Seuthes (424-c411) the estimate of annual tribute was 400 talents.⁷⁴ Further, Xenophon recorded that in 375, Jason of Thessaly imposed tribute on all the subject cities of Thessaly, that had been assessed in the time of Scopas.⁷⁵ Similarly, according to Diodorus, the Illyrians forced Amyntas of Macedonia to pay tribute after he was defeated.⁷⁶ Diodorus also commented that Syracuse exacted severe tribute from its subjected Sicel population.⁷⁷ Although these examples would have reinforced the dominate of the states imposing tribute, no evidence is available to decide whether they manipulated payments to influence the paying states.

⁷⁰ Strab. 8.5.4 and Diod. 14.10.

⁷¹ Thuc. 1.19.1. In discussing this section, Hornblower commented on the Spartan preference for establishing oligarchies supportive of Spartan interests and the problems of their haphazard monetary contributions, see Hornblower, *Thucydides*, Volume I, p. 55.

⁷² Thuc. 2.7.2.

⁷³ SIG³ 84 (also termed OR 151) translated and discussed at Osborne and Rhodes (eds.), *GHI*, pp. 294-301.

⁷⁴ Thuc. 2.97.3.

⁷⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.19.

⁷⁶ Diod. 16.2.2.

⁷⁷ Diod. 12.30.1.

Syntaxeis

Why syntaxeis?

When independent states combined for a common purpose, they sometimes agreed to regular payments towards their common goals.⁷⁸ This section discusses the extent, if any, that *syntaxeis* were manipulated to achieve political effects. Regular *syntaxeis* were distinct from both tribute payments and ad hoc payments made by states to fund specific military campaigns. Examples of ad hoc payments included contributions provided by members of the Hellenic League against Persia, the 355-351 contributions to the Boeotians to fund the Sacred War and the various funding requests made by Sparta to its allies during the Peloponnesian War.⁷⁹ The latter included payments in 431 by Sparta's Italian and Sicilian allies and a required payment of 32 talents from Rhodes in 412/1 after it was forcibly removed from the Athenian alliance.⁸⁰ Other examples were an inscription c427 recording contributions to the Spartan war effort, Aeschines' mention of contributions, 343/2 or 342/1, related to the coming war against Philip and treaty agreements which include specific pay to troops.⁸¹

Boeotia

In the absence of an overtly hegemonic state, manipulating *syntaxeis* to achieve desired political effects was difficult, but not impossible. Perhaps the first example of payments being levied on states within a federation was the Boeotian states paying a contribution based on their population.⁸² The Oxyrhynchus Historian and other sources provide insufficient information to understand how these payments were administered, so unfortunately one

⁷⁸ Given many states made more than one payment, the convention is to talk about contributions in the plural.

⁷⁹ For the Hellenic League, see Plut. *Arist.* 24.1. For other examples, see Tod 160 (SIG 201) discussed at M. Tod (ed.), *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions Volume II From 403 to 323 B.C.*, Oxford, 1948, pp. 177-9, Dem. 18.237 and Thuc. 1.18.2.

⁸⁰ Thuc. 2.7.2 and Thuc. 8.44.4. With respect to 2.7.2, Hornblower discussed whether Thucydides' language implied that a fixed sum was sought, see Hornblower, *Thucydides, Volume I*, p. 244. With respect to 8.44.4, Gomme commented the latter amount would have been insufficient to support the required ships, see Gomme *et al.*, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, Vol. V, p. 92.

⁸¹ ML 67 (IG V 1) at Meiggs and Lewis, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, pp. 181-4, Aeschin. 3.92-3 and Tod 183 (IG II² 329) at Tod (ed.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions Vol. II*, pp. 240-1.

⁸² *Hell. Oxy.* 16.1-3. See also comments at Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.33 and Thuc. 5.38.2-3.

cannot comment on the extent the payments were used by the regional Boeotian government to influence individual state behaviours.⁸³

Athens

In contrast, more evidence exists to discuss whether contributions were manipulated in the fourth-century Second Athenian Confederacy. In preparing to form the Confederacy, the Athenian assembly passed the so-called Aristoteles decree in 378/7, which specified that states wishing to ally with Athens would not pay tribute.⁸⁴ Athens needed a clear statement given the repugnance in which the fifth-century Greek states held tribute payments. However, whilst this prospectus, designed to attract allies, made no mention of *syntaxeis* or the provision of military forces, by 373 allies made financial contributions.⁸⁵ Unlike the fifth-century tribute payments, lists of specific state-by-state contributions are not available.

Why the *syntaxeis* was introduced and the method of calculating payments remains unclear from the ancient literature and epigraphy.⁸⁶ Importantly, *IG II² 43* did not describe the workings of the syndedrion, indeed only mentioning it in the context of selling the seized property of Athenians.⁸⁷ One could argue that at least the initial payment by any specific state was agreed by a majority of Athens' allies, but whether such arrangements continued remains uncertain. Although these contributions may have started as voluntary payments, Isocrates' speech *On the Peace* implied that Athens pressured states to make timely payments. Commenting on inappropriate Athenian behaviours, Isocrates painted a negative picture of Athenians sailing the sea with many triremes, compelling various states to pay

⁸³ McKechnie/Kern provided commentary on the Boeotian constitution but did not discuss their administration of payments apart from a discussion on who paid councillors, see P.R. McKechnie and S.J. Kern, *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, Oxford, 1988, pp. 159-60. Bruce provided similar commentary, see I.A.F. Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, Cambridge, 1967, pp. 157-64.

⁸⁴ RO 22 (*IG II² 43*) line 23 translated with commentary at P. Rhodes and R. Osborne (eds.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions 404-323 BC*, Oxford, 2003, pp. 92-105.

⁸⁵ For examples, see Isoc. 7.2.

⁸⁶ For example, no mention occurs in Diodorus' description of the Confederacy's workings, see Diod. 15.28 or Xenophon's account of the relevant period, see Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.34-6.3. Neither can one make relevant inferences from various inscriptions admitting states to the Confederacy, for example *IG II² 42/96*.

⁸⁷ *IG II² 43* lines 35-45.

contributions.⁸⁸ Similarly, Aeschines commented on the 'wretched islanders' from whom Athenian admirals collected 60 talents in *syntaxeis*.⁸⁹

No ancient writer or inscription provided evidence from which one can infer that Athens manipulated the quantum of payments to send targeted political messages to states within the confederacy. But did Athenian pressure on late payers constitute a simple political message about Athens' pre-eminence within the confederacy? From one perspective, chasing late payers was necessary simply to ensure that sufficient funds remained available for the confederacy's common purposes. For instance, Rhodes/Osborne argued that RO 39 (*IG II² 111*) may have been an example of an inscription in which Athens, in 363/2, put in place arrangements to have a state, namely Ioulis, pay an outstanding *syntaxeis* payment of three talents.⁹⁰ Isocrates also recorded how carefully Athens collected tardy payments. In his speech, *Antidosis*, he described the Athenian general Timotheos giving states advance warning that he was visiting with his fleet to collect their contributions, in order to prevent disquiet and confusion.⁹¹

Nevertheless, Bonnin argued, unfortunately without disclosing his evidence, that after the Social War (357-5) such annual collections may have been taken from states who had not agreed the amounts, becoming closer in form to the tribute of the previous century.⁹² If one accepts this defensible argument such enforced collections by Athenian admirals of unagreed contributions would have indeed reinforced the political message of de facto Athenian hegemony within the confederacy. However, sometimes enforcing payments had unwanted effects. For example, the payments placed on Thracian Ainos eventually led it to ally with Philip.⁹³

⁸⁸ Isoc. 8.29.

⁸⁹ Aeschin. 2.71.

⁹⁰ Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, pp. 196-203. Further discussion is provided at Tod 142 (*IG II² 111*) at Tod (ed.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions Vol. II*, pp. 128-9.

⁹¹ Isoc. 15.123.

⁹² Bonnin, 'Phoroi', p. 147.

⁹³ Dem. 58.37-8.

Macedonia

Whether or not Macedonia required the states forming the League of Corinth to pay *syntaxeis* in the latter part of the fourth century remains unknown. The introduction of *syntaxeis* would have been consistent with previous leagues or confederacies, even those led by a hegemonic state. Further, such payments would not have created an overly adverse political message amongst the paying states if the quantum and method of payment was agreed, without coercion, within the league's synhedrion. However, the relevant inscription makes no reference of such payments agreed by the synedrion or unilaterally by Macedonia.⁹⁴ Diodorus commented that Philip accumulated supplies for the proposed military campaign against the Persians and prescribed how many soldiers each city should contribute, but whether these supplies included set funds provided by each state is unknown.⁹⁵

Findings on Tribute and Syntaxeis

Hegemonic states could impose tribute not just to raise revenue but to influence the behaviours and attitudes of the paying states. To that end tribute was an effective economic measure that challenged the valued autonomy of paying states. Requiring tribute from other states sent a clear political message that the hegemon restricted their autonomy, especially when the hegemon had complete discretion to determine the quantum of payment and purposes for which the tribute was used. At the extreme, to some states, a requirement to pay tribute was seen as mark of subjection.

The hegemon could also influence short-term attitudes by manipulating both the quantum of payments for specific states or defer payments to create *eunoia*. In particular, Athens was able to reduce payments by some states knowing that such reductions would create the *eunoia* that Athens wanted in specific circumstances. Further, states at risk of rebellion could be given favourable financial treatment to promote their loyalty or otherwise create an expectation of being in the hegemon's debt. Further, by not requiring some states to pay tribute at all, such as those on Chios, the Methymnaeans and other Lesbians, a firm political message was sent to all about the status of those states within the Athenian alliance.

⁹⁴ The inscription is provided at RO 76 (IG II² 236) with translation and commentary provided at Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, pp. 372-9.

⁹⁵ Diod. 16.89. See also Just. *Epitome* 9.5.

In comparison to tribute, *syntaxeis* did not always send a message of political control provided the paying state had some say in both the quantum of payments and the purposes for which the funds were used. In that sense, they were not usually used as an economic measure to influence other states. Nevertheless, pressure placed on paying states to make timely payments did reinforce the political message about the power of the alliance's leading states.

Further, the payment of tribute or *syntaxeis* could sometimes be justified by the state requiring payment as a contribution to the protection of smaller states. Protection took two forms, the first was against the military threat from larger predatory states. However, states like Athens could also offer protection of a smaller state's merchants and trading networks from piracy.⁹⁶

Fines

Fines imposed by one state on another state are the final type of capital-based economic measures discussed in this chapter. Whilst always revenue-raising, imposing fines could also influence the future behaviours of the fined state. Of course, the ability of one state to fine another state and reasonably expect payment, needed agreement between the states. The small number of fine agreements were limited to interstate agreements, the imposition of fines as part of loan agreements and the ability to fine as part of tribute arrangements.

Fines as part of interstate agreements

During the Classical period, only four examples exist of fines being allowed in interstate agreements. First, Xenophon commented Sparta could fine any Peloponnesian League members who failed to supply the required ad hoc financial or military contributions.⁹⁷ However, no evidence exists that such fines were imposed. Whether such

⁹⁶ For a discussion of piracy, see Vincent Gabrielsen 'Economic activity, maritime trade and piracy in the Hellenistic Aegean', *REA*, 103, 2001, pp. 219–40. For a broader discussion of tribute, see Vincent Gabrielsen, "Mankind's most secure and durable institution": State, Credit, Trade, and Capital Accumulation in the Classical-Early Hellenistic Aegean', in *Infrastructure and Distribution in Ancient Economies*, Bernhard Woytek (ed.), Vienna, Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2018, pp. 25–43. In the former, he discusses the nexus between piracy, trade networks and naval hegemony. In the latter he commented that a prime service purchased by the payment of tribute was the protection of maritime traffic (p. 30).

⁹⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.21 discussed at C. Galatas, 'Allies for all times? A study on the disintegration of Greek interstate alliances in the classical period', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, McGill University, 2008, p. 21.

finances provided an effective incentive to paying on time would have depended on the owing state's strategic circumstances. Second, c500 a treaty between Elis and Heraia included a term where treaty infractions would invoke a fine of one talent of silver, paid by the transgressing state to the Olympian Zeus.⁹⁸ Once again, there is no evidence such a fine was ever imposed. The fine aimed to motivate the states to comply with the treaty terms, but the likelihood that such a potential fine would make compliance more likely would depend on the size of the fine. Given the propensity of the Greek states to break treaties, one could argue that a one talent fine was ineffectual especially when no means existed to enforce its payment. Third, in the mid fifth century, Oeantheia and Chalaenum may have agreed that if either illegitimately seized the goods of each other's traders, a four-drachms fine would be paid with the potential for further penalties.⁹⁹ No record exists that enforcement of such a small fine was ever necessary. Finally, as agreed by states participating in the Olympics, Thucydides recorded that Elis fined Sparta 2000 minas for a breach of the Olympic truce.¹⁰⁰ Once again, the fine aimed to reduce the likelihood of truce infractions but it was unlikely to have been a serious deterrent, evidenced by Sparta's refusal to pay. Nevertheless, as a result of non-payment Elis excluded Sparta from competing in the games.

Fines as part of interstate arbitrations

As Ager explained, decisions by states to submit to arbitration involved a promise to abide by the arbitrator's judgement.¹⁰¹ If either state failed to accept the arbitrator's decision they sometimes could be fined. Such arbitral fines could be agreed in order to influence the likely behaviours of the state but as for other types of fines, their likely success depended on whether a state's strategic circumstances overrode any concern about paying fines. Although several arbitrations took place during the late Archaic and Classical periods, evidence exists for only one fine being proposed by the arbitrator as a direct outcome of an agreed

⁹⁸ ML 17 (SIG 9+) provided at Meiggs and Lewis, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, pp. 31-3. This fine is also discussed at Penny Low, *Interstate Relations in Classical Greece: Morality and Power*, Cambridge, 2007, p. 116.

⁹⁹ C. Phillipson, *The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome Volume 2*, London, 1911, p. 358, mentioning an inscription on a bronze tablet in the British Museum, with cited commentary by Hicks, Michel, Von Scala, Rangabe, Ott and Dareste.

¹⁰⁰ Thuc. 5.49.1. For a discussion of the circumstances, see Simon Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides Volume III: Books 5.25-8.109*, Oxford, 2008, pp. 124-9 and S. Hornblower, 'Thucydides, Xenophon, and Lichas: Were the Spartans Excluded from the Olympic Games from 420 to 400 B. C.?', *Phoenix*, 54, no. 3/4, 2000, pp. 212-25.

¹⁰¹ Sheila Ager, *Interstate Arbitrations in the Greek World, 337-90 BC*, Berkeley, 1996, p. 10.

arbitration. Such arbitral fines became more common in later periods.¹⁰² Plutarch recorded that in the early fifth century Themistocles arbitrated a dispute between Corinth and Corcyra about the status of Leucas. He decided that Corinth should pay Corcyra 20 talents and from henceforth administer Leucas as a common colony of both cities.¹⁰³ Plutarch provided no evidence to indicate whether the fine was paid, but one might infer that he would have made mention if Corinth failed to pay. Although not an insignificant amount, the fine would unlikely have changed Corinthian attitudes towards Leucas and later events in the fifth century indicates the potential for other fines through agreed arbitrations did not influence Corinth's adverse behaviours towards Corcyra in the face of conflicting strategic requirements.

Fines as part of loan agreements

The Delphic Amphictyony could also impose fines if a state defaulted on its loan repayments. Once again, the fine acted as an incentive for prompt payment of an existing loan. In theory, the threat of a fine could be considerable, since although the Amphictyony could not enforce payment it could choose not to make further loans to a defaulting state.¹⁰⁴ But no evidence exists that any fine was ever imposed and thus one cannot argue that such fines sent specific political messages or were manipulated to influence the behaviours of the defaulting state.

Fines as part of tribute arrangements

With respect to tribute arrangements, hegemonic states had the potential to fine states for late payments, as well as having the ability to fine officials responsible for assessing tribute payments.¹⁰⁵ As Eddy argued, the ATL provides no evidence that Athens fined states and no other evidence exists for other hegemon fining states for defaulting on tribute

¹⁰² See discussion in W. Westermann, 'Interstate arbitration in antiquity', *CJ*, 2, no. 5, 1907, pp. 205-6. For example, in the Hellenistic period Halos and Thebes agreed to accept a fine of five silver talents for failure to comply with the arbitrated outcome, see Ager, *Interstate Arbitrations*, p. 10. Later, a fine was discussed in the third-century Mantinean arbitration of a dispute between Argos and the Achaeans mentioned at Plut. *Arat.* 25.

¹⁰³ Plut. *Them.* 24. Note that Corcyra subsequently recognised Themistocles as a public benefactor, see Thuc. 1.136.1.

¹⁰⁴ As discussed at Low, *Interstate Relations*, p. 117.

¹⁰⁵ For the example of being able to fine officials, see *IG* I³ 71 line 10, but there appears to be no modern scholarship focused on the fining of officials. For references to the fining of Athenian officials, see Aristot. *Const. Ath.* 4.3, 8.4, 30.6, 45.1, 48.1 and 48.4.

payments.¹⁰⁶ Having recognised the absence of firm evidence, Eddy then hypothesised that some irregular tribute payments could well have been fines for late payments in previous years. Whilst his hypothesis cannot be confirmed, any decision by Athens to impose fines would have been made carefully as a targeted incentive for states to make the required payments, but not so onerous that it would further alienate states whose loyalty was wavering.

Fines imposed by sanctuaries

The ancient literature provides two examples of fines imposed by sanctuaries. After its success at Leuctra in 371, the Thebans sought a vote by the Delphic *amphictyones* to condemn and fine Sparta for its seizure of the Theban acropolis.¹⁰⁷ Sparta was fined 500 talents and then after its failure to pay in the period laid by law, double that amount.¹⁰⁸ This fine did not generate the desired Spartan attitude given Diodorus recorded that the Spartans declared the large fine was an unjust judgement by the Delphic *amphictyones*.

The Delphic *Amphictyony* imposed a large fine on Phocis in 357 for the offence of cultivating sacred land.¹⁰⁹ Phocis refused to pay and the Third Sacred War broke out, lasting until 346. The Phocians seized the Temple of Apollo in Delphi which allowed them to use the acquired monies to pay for a large mercenary army. In hindsight the *amphictyones* may have realised that fining Phocis was not the best option to influence its future behaviour. Nevertheless, after their eventual defeat, the Phocians were, inter alia, required to make an annual payment of 60 talents until they had paid back all the monies pillaged from the sanctuary.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ Eddy, 'Irregular amounts', p. 63.

¹⁰⁷ The dates for the seizure and votes are uncertain. For a discussion of possible dates and the circumstances of the fine, see S. Hornblower, 'Did the Delphic amphiktion play a political role in the classical period?', *MHR*, 22, no. 1, 2007, pp. 43-4.

¹⁰⁸ Diod. 16.29.

¹⁰⁹ Diod. 16.23.

¹¹⁰ Diod. 16.60.2. See also RO 67 (*SIG* 3 230) with translation and commentary at Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, pp. 336-42. Much scholarship exists for the causes of the Third Sacred War including books (such as John Buckler's *Philip II and the Sacred War*, Brill, London, 1989), articles (such as Nicholas Hammond's 'The Meaning of οἱ ἀργυρολογέοντες and the Beginning of the Third Sacred War', *Historia*, 52.3, 2003, pp. 373-7) and an unpublished PhD thesis by Neil Hackett ('The Third Sacred War', University of Cincinnati 1970). This scholarship does not discuss the fine as a form of economic statecraft.

Other fines

Two other examples of states being fined exist in the ancient literature, First, Herodotos recorded that in 490 Argos imposed a fine of 1000 talents on Aegina and Sicyon, with each state to pay 500 talents.¹¹¹ The basis of this fine remains unknown. Scott discussed three possibilities, namely political bluster, anti-oligarchic messaging and lastly for religious justifications.¹¹² As Scott rightly argued, the fine could not have been enforced militarily and no evidence indicates payment. Later, at an unknown date in the mid fourth century, Demosthenes recorded that Athens had the potential, through a decree, to fine the Melians 10 talents because they had allowed pirates to use their harbours.¹¹³ Demosthenes made no mention of whether the fine was enforced, whether it was paid and whether it motivated the Melians to prevent future access by pirates.

Findings on Fines

Although evidence exists for a few situations in which states were able to fine other states, hardly any examples exist of fines being imposed. A state could not rely on the state being fined simply paying up without taking other action. As Phocis demonstrated, when fined by the Delphic *Amphictyony*, a fined state could react in unpredictable ways not conducive to the desired outcomes of the state levying the fine. Although one does not know whether Phocis' extreme reaction was the exemption to a norm of orderly payment, imposing fines were likely not an effective type of economic measure in the ancient Greek world.

Other financial payments

Other forms of financial payments existed, for example an interstate agreement involving payments between Elis and Lepreon. Thucydides recorded that after a successful, likely fifth-century, war against a common enemy, the Eleans gave up their claim to half the conquered territory if the Lepreates paid one talent annually to Olympian Zeus.¹¹⁴ Gomme

¹¹¹ Hdt. 6.92.2.

¹¹² Scott, *Book 6*, p. 331.

¹¹³ Dem 58.56.

¹¹⁴ Thuc. 5.31.2.

characterised this payment as an annual rent.¹¹⁵ Lepreon stopped paying during the Peloponnesian War, resulting in an unsuccessful Spartan arbitration.¹¹⁶ The token rent payment appeared sufficient motivation for the Eleans to give up their claim, although one does not know the size or usefulness of the acquired land.

Other capital payments could be enforced by a victorious state on those defeated. According to Diodorus, Gelon, the tyrant of Syracuse, exacted a payment of 2000 talents from Carthage after his victory in 480, demonstrating that unsuccessful military action could have adverse economic consequences.¹¹⁷ Later, reparations of 1200 talents were paid by Samos to Athens after its unsuccessful military challenge in 440.¹¹⁸ Similarly, in the 460s Athens required Thasos to repay the cost of its siege although Thucydides did not specify the size of the payment.¹¹⁹ Imposing such reparation payments, even by instalments, would have sent a clear political message to Samos and Thasos, and other states considering a challenge to Athens, that such actions would have economic as well as political consequences. However, whether this message was consistently sent is unknown. Although Byzantium revolted with Samos in 441/0 and was eventually returned to tribute-paying status, Thucydides does not comment on whether it paid reparations.¹²⁰ If it did not, one must surmise other overriding considerations affected Athens' decision.

Preferential taxation and other economic benefits

The final type of capital-based economic measures was a state providing capital-based benefits to citizens of foreign states. These benefits included preferential taxation and allowing foreign citizens to acquire land or houses in the territory of the granting state (ἔγκτησις - *enktesis*). Other benefits, including ἀσυλία (*asylia* - protection of person and/or goods from seizure), are considered a legal benefit rather than a form of economic statecraft,

¹¹⁵ Gomme *et al.*, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, p. 28 and discussed at James Roy, 'Thucydides 5.49.1-50.4: the Quarrel between Elis and Sparta in 420 B.C., and Elis' Exploitation of Olympia', *Klio*, 80, no. 2, 1998, pp. 360-8.

¹¹⁶ Thuc. 5.31.3.

¹¹⁷ Diod. 11.26.

¹¹⁸ Thuc. 1.117.3. The Athenian treaty with Samos after its defeat does not mention the amount of reparations, see ML 56 (*IG* 1² 50) at Meiggs and Lewis, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, pp. 151. Note that Diodorus mentioned reparations for the siege of 200 talents, see Diod. 12.28.3.

¹¹⁹ Thuc. 1.101.3.

¹²⁰ Thuc. 1.115.5.

even though it would reduce trading risks.¹²¹ Preferential taxation could markedly vary in scope from *ateleia* for a specific tax to universal tax exemptions, with Rubinstein providing a major study.¹²² Whilst examples of these benefits are not common, some examples are worthy of analysis to help build a complete picture of economic measures used in the ancient Greek world. The states for which evidence exists are Delphi, Ephesus, Athens, Olbia, Keos and other states. Other states created juridical agreements relevant to the status of each's citizens but such examples of *σύμβολα* (*symbola*) are not discussed unless they included specific economic terms.¹²³ This section will also not consider decrees by Athens in which it created juridical arrangements for the treatment of foreign traders, usually in the form of equal treatment with Athenians in the settlement of legal suits. Various examples of such decrees, such as the one concerning Phaselis, are discussed in detail by Hopper.¹²⁴ Whilst such arrangements would have an economic benefit to the traders of foreign states, they are not examples of economic statecraft.

Delphi

About 550, the Delphians, in response to ongoing gifts received from Croesus, decreed that the Lydians visiting the oracle would be exempt from the usual visitor taxes (*atelia*).¹²⁵ In his gift-giving Croesus followed the example of his predecessor, Alyattes, and earlier

¹²¹ For a discussion of *asylia*, see D. Engen, *Honor and Profit: Athenian Trade Policy and the Economy and Society of Greece, 415-307 B.C.E.*, Ann Arbor, 2010, pp. 183-7. Other scholarship which, inter alia discusses *asylia*, includes Eleni Alexandri and Stergiani Tzirivtzi, 'Hiketeari and *Asylia* in Ancient Greek Mythical and Political Thought', *Vergentis*, 9, 2019, pp. 171-200 and, although for a later period, Rigsby, Kent J., *Asylia: Territorial Inviolability in the Hellenistic World*, University of California Press, 1996. For a discussion of Athenian decrees providing legal protections, which also could reduce trading risks, see Alan S. Henry, *Honours and Privileges in Athenian Decrees*, Hildesheim, 1983, pp. 163-91.

¹²² Lene Rubinstein, 'Ateleia grants and their enforcement in the classical and early hellenistic periods', in *Greek History and Epigraphy: Essays in Honour of P.J. Rhodes*, L. Mitchell and L. Rubinstein (eds.), Swansea, 2009, pp. 115-43. For Athenian *ateleia*, see also Henry, *Honours*, pp. 241-5.

¹²³ For the classic study of *symbola*, see Philippe Gauthier, *Symbola Les étrangers et la justice dans les cités grecques*, Nancy, 1972. Migeotte considered that such *symbola* including economic terms included Miletus and Priene in Ionia, and Gortyn and Lato in Crete, see Leopold Migeotte, *The Economy of the Greek Cities: From the Archaic Period to the Early Roman Empire*, Berkeley, 2009, p. 160. For Miletus/Priene, see Gauthier, *Symbola*, pp. 306-7 and for Gortyn/Lato, see Gauthier, *Symbola*, pp. 292-3. Note that Gauthier argued that these were third-century *symbolas*.

¹²⁴ R. Hopper, 'Interstate Juridical Agreements in the Athenian Empire', *JHS*, 63, 1943, pp. 35-51. For a broader discussion of Athenian commercial law, see Edward E. Cohen, 'Commercial Law', in *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law*, Michael Gagarin and David Cohen (eds.), Cambridge, 2005, pp. 290-304.

¹²⁵ Hdt. 1.54.2.

Lydian kings.¹²⁶ Whilst this preferential taxation was, from one perspective, no more than repaying Croesus' largesse, it also continued to promote mutual goodwill with the Lydian ruler. The Delphians would have recognised Croesus could provide more and more gifts, albeit aimed at his own influence attempts as discussed earlier in this chapter.

Ephesus

In 409, during the latter stages of the Peloponnesian War, the Ephesians granted *ateleia* to those citizens of Syracuse and Selinus who wanted to reside in Ephesus.¹²⁷ The tax exemption was provided as immediate gratitude to those two states, who had helped Ephesus fight off an Athenian assault. However, the ongoing tax exemption would have helped reinforce ongoing warm relations with these two states that could have been of future strategic benefit to Ephesus.

Athens

According to Calhoun, Peisistratus, a tyrant of Athens during the Archaic period, entered treaties with other Greek states to create amicable trade relations.¹²⁸ Unfortunately, he cited no ancient sources so whether these treaties occurred remains conjectural with no modern scholarship offering support. On surer evidential ground, in the fourth century Athens provided economic benefits to citizens of foreign states. Athens honoured foreigners in ways designed to both recognise their past contributions and influence the likelihood they would continue future behaviours of benefit to Athens.¹²⁹ In one study, Lambert identified that between 352/1 and 322/1 there were at least 107, and possibly up to 163, decrees honouring foreigners. At least 51 decrees provided a mix of citizenship, *ateleia*, *προξενία* (*proxenia*) and

¹²⁶ Hdt. 1.14 and 1.25.

¹²⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.10.

¹²⁸ G. Calhoun, *The Business Life of Ancient Athens*, Rome, 1926, p. 29.

¹²⁹ For a discussion of the 'economy of honours' within Athens, see Mirko Canevaro, *Demostene, Contro Leptine: Introduzione, Traduzione e Commento Storico*, Berlin, 2016, Chapter 10.

economic benefits such as *enktesis*.¹³⁰ Lambert accurately called such decrees ‘monumentalised diplomacy’ by Athens.¹³¹

The types of honours and recognition included those with merely honorific value that elevated their social status but with no real monetary value, such as official commendations, *proxenia*, *εὐεργεσία* (*eurgesia*), *ξενία* (*xenia*) in the Prytaneion, seats in the theatre for the Dionysia, bronze statues and inscribed *stelae*.¹³² But they also included honours with economic benefits such as *ateleia*, *enktesis* and gold crowns.¹³³ The latter were typically worth up to one thousand drachms each.¹³⁴ Athens awarded gold crowns on at least thirteen of the thirty-four occasions when honours and privileges were provided for trade-related services¹³⁵ Further, on one occasion it provided a different form of economic benefit, allowing Lyco of Achaëa to import goods wherever the Athenians ruled, except for a certain maritime gulf.¹³⁶ Athens provided these economic benefits with the intent they would be recognised and appreciated by the foreigners’ parent state.

Atelieia or other forms of preferential taxation included exemptions from the usual taxation on *metics* and from harbour taxes.¹³⁷ For example, in c367 as part of honouring Strato the king of Sidon, Athens granted specific *atelia* rights to Sidonians who temporarily

¹³⁰ S. Lambert, 'Athenian state laws and decrees, 352/1-322/1: III Decrees honouring foreigners A. Citizenship, proxeny and eurgesia', *ZPE*, 158, 2006 and S. Lambert, 'Athenian state laws and decrees, 352/1-322/1: III Decrees honouring foreigners B. Other awards', *ZPE*, 159, 2007.

¹³¹ Lambert, 'Athenian Laws and Decrees Part A', p. 117.

¹³² For description of bronze statues, see Engen, *Honor and Profit*, pp. 164-8. Engen also provided a listing of trade-related honours at Engen, *Honor and Profit*, pp. 225-9. For a discussion of the wording of Athenian decrees for providing commendations, see Henry, *Honours*, pp. 1-21. Similarly, Henry discussed decrees awarding *proxenia* and *eurgesia* at pp. 116-62.

¹³³ For a discussion of gold crowns, as distinct from olive, myrtle or ivy, see Henry, *Honours*, pp. 22-5. Sometimes, these financial benefits were not needed by honourands, but were provided to create *eunoia*. For example, Canevaro argued, based on Dem 20.41, that Leucon did not need Athenian exemptions but would have seen cancellation as an affront, see Canevaro, *Demostene*, p. 80.

¹³⁴ See Henry, *Honours*, pp. 24-5.

¹³⁵ See further analysis at Engen, *Honor and Profit*, pp. 104-5 and pp. 156-64. Recipients of gold crowns granted by the Athenian assembly were free to keep them, see Aeschin. 3.47.

¹³⁶ *IG I³ 174*, available at www.inscriptions.packhum.org and mentioned at P. Stadter, 'Plutarch, Charinus, and the Megarian Decree', *GRBS*, 25, no. 4, 1984, p. 364.

¹³⁷ Dem. 20 (Against Leptines) includes a major discussion of Athens' tax exemptions, as analysed in Chapter 7 of Mirko Canevaro, *Demostene, Contro Leptine: Introduzione, Traduzione e Commento Storico*, Berlin, 2016.

settled in Athens for the purposes of trade, exempting them from *metic* taxes.¹³⁸ Sometimes, Athens provided a benefit to help achieve a specific outcome. For example, in 403 the Athenian Ten granted tax equality with Athenian citizens (*ισοτέλεια -isoteleia*) to any foreigners who would fight with them against the men of the Peiraeus.¹³⁹ Such foreign citizens were most likely resident aliens who were subject to the *μετοίκιον (metoikion)*, a special Athenian tax. Similarly, Demosthenes implied that the granting of *ateleia* to Thasian citizens who expelled a Spartan garrison and admitted Thrasybulos, c389/88.¹⁴⁰ These financial incentives were targeted at individuals rather than trying to influence their parent states. One would be hard pressed to argue such exemptions would have created sufficient *eunoia* in the foreign states to influence their future behaviours.

Pečirka reviewed Attic inscriptions granting *enktesis*, identifying about 35 fifth-century examples.¹⁴¹ The practice became less popular in the fourth century with only four examples.¹⁴² Unfortunately, many decrees make it difficult to ascertain who were given grants and for what reasons. Nevertheless, enough clear examples exist to conclude grants were sometimes linked to religious observance and sometimes provided for secular purposes. In the first category are examples such as Athens granting the Thracians, c 429/8, the right to build a temple in Attica and the Kitians, in 333/332, granted permission to found a sanctuary to Aphrodite.¹⁴³ Secular grants included a 410/409 grant to several possible *metics* for unspecified services and, in 338/337, Athens allowed Akarnanian exiles *enktesis* in Athens.¹⁴⁴ Engen argued that from about 350, Athens extended the grant of *enktesis* beyond recognising political and military services.¹⁴⁵ His analysis indicates Athens granted *enktesis* on four of the thirty-four instances on which it honoured trade-related services.¹⁴⁶ The honourands were all

¹³⁸ Tod 139 (IG II² 141) at Tod (ed.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions Vol. II*, pp. 116-9. For a more detailed discussion, see de Lisle, 'Attic Inscriptions in UK Collections Ashmolean Museum Oxford', 2021, pp. 9-12.

¹³⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.25. For a broader discussion of Athenian *isoteleia* grants, see Henry, *Honours*, pp. 246-9.

¹⁴⁰ Dem. 20.59.

¹⁴¹ J. Pečirka, *The Formula for the Grant of Enktesis in Attic Inscriptions*, Prague, 1966. Acknowledging the debt to Pečirka, Henry provided further discussion at Henry, *Honours*, pp. 204-40.

¹⁴² Pečirka, *Grant of Enktesis*, p. 138.

¹⁴³ IG II² 1283 and II² 337 discussed at Pečirka, *Grant of Enktesis*, pp. 122-30 and pp. 59-61 respectively.

¹⁴⁴ IG I² 110 discussed at Pečirka, *Grant of Enktesis*, pp. 18-21 and IG II² 237 with the latter being RO 91 with translation and commentary at Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, pp. 462-6.

¹⁴⁵ Engen, *Honor and Profit*, p. 194.

¹⁴⁶ Engen, *Honor and Profit*, p. 192.

professional traders rather than foreign leaders, who were often given Athenian citizenship which allowed them to own land without a grant of *enktesis*.¹⁴⁷ Further, in his *Poroi*, Xenophon also advocated the use of *enktesis* to stimulate economic prosperity.¹⁴⁸

Were such grants of *enktesis* aimed at influencing the states to whom the citizens receiving the benefit belonged? Such an aim was unlikely for at best the grants had a marginal influence, creating a diffused form of *eunoia* rather than aiming to induce specific responses by the parent states. More likely, the motive for most grants was simply to reward individual foreigners who had provided valuable services to Athens. However, one grant of *enktesis* to Acarnanian political exiles sent a more direct message of support for their military contribution to Athens.¹⁴⁹ Rather than aiming to create *eunoia* in the state from which the exiles came, the grant sent a message that Athens did not support its political regime.

Olbia

The Pontic state of Olbia granted *ateleia* to several citizens of foreign states sometime in the fourth century, although the privilege only exempted them from taxes on imports and exports.¹⁵⁰ Unfortunately, insufficient information exists to state confidently the Olbians' motivation. Most likely, they wanted the recipients to continue supporting Olbia but the exemptions would not likely have generated substantial *eunoia* in their parent states. Further, in c330 Olbia reaffirmed a traditional arrangement with its founding state Miletus.¹⁵¹ Amongst a package of benefits provided to Miletans wanting to live in Olbia was exemption from taxation (*ateleia*) as there was before. Whilst the range of exempted Olbian taxes remains unclear, such a benefit would have helped promote ongoing emigration from Miletus, likely of benefit to both states.

¹⁴⁷ For example, see Dem. 20.35-40 about citizenship granted to the Spartokid, Leucon.

¹⁴⁸ Xen. *Ways* 2.6. As Jansen, argued, Xenophon considered *enktesis* would increase both the quality and quantity of metics in Athens, see Joseph Nicholas Jansen, 'After Empire: Xenophon's *Poroi* and the Reorientation of Athens' Political Economy', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Texas, 2007, p. 295.

¹⁴⁹ *IG II² 237 of 338/7* discussed at Pečirka, *Grant of Enktesis*, pp. 49-51.

¹⁵⁰ As detailed and discussed at Rubinstein, 'Ateleia', p. 123, n37.

¹⁵¹ RO 93 (*SIG³ 286*) translated and discussed at Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, pp. 470-3. Also known as Tod 195 discussed at Tod (ed.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions Vol. II*, pp. 270-2.

Other states

When some ancient sources comment on close relations between states, one cannot tell whether such closeness extended to specific economic arrangements. Thus, for example, Herodotos' comments about the sixth-century closeness between Miletus and Sybaris provided no indication of economic statecraft.¹⁵² However, other interstate agreements provided economic benefits to each state. In c364, Keos and Histiaia concluded a treaty which provided Histaiaians with the same rights of export from, and import into Keos, as Keans, and vice versa.¹⁵³ Later, in c330, a treaty between Miletus and Sardis created reciprocal rights for each other's traders to enter the other city, both for themselves and for anything they imported or exported.¹⁵⁴ Finally, possibly in the late fourth century, Magnesia and Phocaea agreed the Phocaeans' right to export to and import from Magnesia.¹⁵⁵ All these arrangements would have created ongoing *eunoia* to help consolidate amicable relations between the states.

States could also promote their trade routes without offering specific tariff relief to other states. For example, Macedonia, on the trade routes between the Bosphorus and mainland Greece, could create conditions for trade to occur smoothly. Rather than close its waters to foreign shipping, Macedonia could promote the use of its waters for trade.¹⁵⁶ The Macedonian littoral zone was not attractive for large scale trade emporia, with only Methone and Therme, at the western and eastern extremities of the Thermaic Gulf, being suitable as harbour towns.¹⁵⁷ Nevertheless Macedonia could provide safe access to trade passing the Macedonian coast and provide numerous safe havens for small-scale cabotage, so ships could dock when needed.¹⁵⁸ Such support to trade was likely well received by those states at both ends of the trade routes.

¹⁵² Hdt. 6.21.

¹⁵³ Tod 141 (*JG XII 9*) discussed at Tod (ed.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions Vol. II*, pp. 123-5.

¹⁵⁴ *SIG 273* translated at P. Harding (ed.), *From the End of the Peloponnesian War to the Battle of Ipsus*, Cambridge, 1985, p. 145. Also discussed at Migeotte, *Economy of the Greek Cities*, p. 159.

¹⁵⁵ A. Bresson, *The Making of the Ancient Greek Economy: Institutions, Markets, and Growth in the City-States*, Princeton, 2016, p. 288.

¹⁵⁶ As Borza explained, 'So, too, with one's waters, which were closed to foreigners unless otherwise stipulated. The concept of "freedom of the seas" is a modern idea, arrived at painfully and after centuries of conflict.', see Eugene N. Borza, 'Timber and politics in the ancient world: Macedon and the Greeks', *PAPhS*, 131, no. 1, 1987, p. 50.

¹⁵⁷ As mentioned in N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia Volume II*, 3 vols, II, Oxford, 1979, p. 142 but not subject to more focused scholarship.

¹⁵⁸ Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia Vol II*, p. 142.

Findings on Preferential taxation and other benefits

Providing preferential taxation or other benefits to another state was a less effective economic measure than gifts or loans given they did not provide immediate funds needed by the state being targeted. Nevertheless, such benefits were valuable as part of a package of broader benefits agreed between states. That is, this form of economic measure contributed to creating *eunoia* in other states which could be relied upon in future circumstances. The discussed examples, such as Ephesus providing economic benefits to citizens of Syracuse and Selinus, demonstrate the utility of these benefits as a form of economic statecraft.

Conclusion

This chapter, and those that preceded it, have discussed specific examples of states using both trade and capital-based economic levers in their attempts to influence other states. Some initial conclusions have been drawn about the scope and utility of these measures that will be furthered analysed and integrated in Chapter Seven. In particular, this chapter has found that states in the ancient Greek world were able to impose and manipulate tribute, *syntaxeis*, fines and other financial payments both to coerce or create *eunoia* in other states.

One other form of economic measure remains to be discussed, namely the use of a state's coinage as a means of influence. Whilst from one perspective the use of coinage is capital-based, the breadth of its application deserves its own chapter. Thus, to coinage this thesis will now turn in Chapter Six.

CHAPTER SIX

COINAGE

Introduction

Coinage facilitated the interstate trade discussed in Chapters Two and Three as well as the capital payments analysed in Chapters Four and Five. However, states could make coinage decisions as a type of economic measure in their own right, using coins to make political statements and influence the attitudes and behaviours of other states. This chapter will examine the types of minting decisions states could make and how such decisions helped achieve their politico-economic outcomes. But before delving into this examination, one must first understand what coins represented in the ancient world and who minted them.

A coin is a form of money having an intrinsic or a fiduciary value, conforming to a specific material, weight, shape and size, and stamped on its faces with a design approved by the issuing authority.¹ Initially minted from electrum, Lydia likely first produced coins in the late seventh century with Greek states minting from the early sixth century.² Although some of these late Archaic period coins were minted by private individuals, by c500 almost all coins were produced by states.³ Minting in silver, which began c560-550, became dominant,

¹ For one explanation of the basic characteristics of money, see Seaford's comments discussed at J.G. Manning, *The Open Sea: The Economic Life of the Ancient Mediterranean World from the Iron Age to the Rise of Rome*, Princeton, 2018, p. 195. Also see C. Howgego, *Ancient History from Coins*, London, 1995, p.1. For Aristotle's view on money as a stamped metal object, see Aristot. *Pol.* 1.1257a.

² Electrum is an alloy of gold and silver, with the gold content varying between about 40-70% depending on the mint. Debate continues whether coins were independently invented in other places than Lydia, such as China and India. See commentary in Manning, *Open Sea*, p. 200. Debate also continues about who was the first to coin in silver, Lydia or Aegina, with Herodotos claiming priority for Lydia, see Hdt, 1.94.1. See also discussion at P. van Alfen, *An Introduction to Archaic Coinage*, Working Paper: v.31.12.2014, 2014, p. 6.

³ Howgego, *Coins*, p. 3 and p. 42. Some evidence exists that rich individuals paid state mints to strike coins from the bullion supplied from the individual, see C. Howgego, 'Why did ancient states strike coins?', *NC*, 150, 1990, p. 19. Note that occasionally individuals continued to mint coins for specific purposes, for example the bronze coins minted by the Athenian general Timotheus for military payments discussed at K. Sheedy, 'The emergency coinage of Timotheus (364-362 B.C.)', in *Contributions to Numismatics in Honor of Basil Demetriadi*, U. Wartenberg and M. Amandry (eds.), New York, 2015. Note also that in the Hellenistic period, some coins were issued in the name of gods, with the minting authority unclear, see Selene Psoma, 'Panegyris Coinages', *American Journal of Numismatics*, 2008, p. 246.

but by the end of the Classical period states had minted in silver, gold, electrum, bronze, iron and copper.⁴ The first Greek states to mint were likely Aegina, Athens and Corinth, followed by a rapidly increasing number of minting states across the Greek world.⁵ The most regular minters were likely to have been Athens, Syracuse, Aegina, Taras and Akragas.⁶

Ancient states minted for diverse reasons. The initial motivation was likely as a convenient means to pay for official expenditures within a state as well as make payments to other states.⁷ Within states, payments included those for military purposes, for jury duty, to purchase food for free or subsidised distribution, for cash handouts to the populace, to buy labour and materials for public works, for paying public servants and to fund festivals and games. Payments to other states included gifts, bribes, ransoms, tribute, loans, subsidies, duties and indemnities. Coins also allowed easier payment of taxes.

Designing coins

A state deciding to mint its own coins had to make several decisions the collective outcome of which determined the coin's value, attractiveness and usefulness.⁸ First, would it

⁴ T. Figueira, *The Power of Money: Coinage and Politics in the Athenian Empire*, Philadelphia, 1998, p. 549.

⁵ van Alfen, *Archaic Coinage*, 2014, p. 11. Kroll posits numismatic evidence indicating the earliest minting dates for Corinth and Athens were c575 and c550 respectively, with Aegina also minting in the sixth century, see J. Kroll and N. Waggoner, 'Dating the earliest coins of Athens, Corinth and Aegina', *AJA*, 88, 1984, pp. 339-40. About 85 Greek states minted in the late Archaic period with about 56 still minting a century later, see R. Weir, 'Interpretation and imitation of classical Greek coin types', *RBN*, no. XXVIII, 2010, p. 127.

⁶ Weir, 'Interpretation and imitation', p. 160.

⁷ A valuable summary is provided at T. Martin, 'Why did the Greek "polis" originally need coins?', *Historia*, 45, no. 3, 1996, pp. 258-9. For the views of some ancient writers see Hdt. 1.94.1, Aristot. *Pol.* 1257a-b, Plat. *Rep.* 3.417a and Plat. *Laws* 5.742. Note bullion could still be used to make payments. For example, Thuc. 6.8.1 recorded that in 415 the Athenians brought 60 talents of uncoined silver from Sicily to pay their ship crews.

⁸ An early commentary on coins was by the seventh century CE writer, Isidore of Seville, who considered the three criteria defining a coin were its weight, composition and type (face design), see *Etymologiae sive Origines* 16.18 cited at R. Weir, 'Interpretation and Imitation of Classical Greek Coin Types', in *Marburger Beiträge zur antiken Handels-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte*, Band 28 2010, Verlag Marie Leidorf, 2011, p. 125. See also comments at J. Melville Jones, *Testimonia Numaria Vol II*, London, 2007, p. 43. Of course, for a state having made its initial minting decisions, the triggers for reviewing and possibly changing coin designs were, as summarised by Figueira, leadership changes, subordination to another state, its currency being discredited, facilitating new markets or intentional demonetisation, see T. Figueira, *Aegina: Society and Politics*, Salem NH, 1981, p. 116. Debate continues on who made minting decisions and the mechanisms by which they were made, noting the absence of comment in, for example, the pseudo-Aristotelian Constitution of the Athenians.

mint from gold, silver, iron, copper or alloys such as electrum, billon and bronze?⁹ If using a precious metal, could the state acquire sufficient quantities and if so, what fineness would be applied?¹⁰ Second, what sizes, shapes and weights would be selected for each of the desired denominations? Would a state be best served by duplicating the coin sizes and weights created by another state or by creating its own weights? Third, what designs would be applied to the coin's two faces?¹¹

A state needed to decide its required denominations usually arranged in a hierarchy of values. In the ancient world each state usually minted in various denominations, with varying names like στατήρ (stater), ἔκτη (hekte), obol and drachma.¹² Relative exchange values amongst the denominations varied, usually depending on their material and weight. Importantly, the nominated value of ancient coins was not expressly marked, so users were expected to know or estimate, the worth of any specific coin.¹³

As discussed later in this chapter, selection of the coin weights was critical to their attractiveness. Selecting a weight standard not commonly used within a desired trading network did not prevent a coin's use, since traders were competent in evaluating the relative values of different coins.¹⁴ Numismatists posit there were several standard weight

⁹ Other metals may also have been used, see Melville Jones, *Testimonia*, p. 249. For example, Dionysius I of Syracuse may have minted tin coins, although no examples exist, see J. Melville Jones, *A Dictionary of Ancient Greek Coins*, London, 1986, p. 141. Billon is an alloy primarily composed of a non-precious metal such as copper together with gold or silver, see discussion at Lorenzo Lazzarini, 'A Contribution to the Study of the Archaic Billon Coinage of Lesbos', in *Coins in the Aegean Islands: Proceedings of the Fifth Scientific Meeting, Mytilene 2006*, P. Tselekas, (ed.), Athens, 2010, pp. 83-110.

¹⁰ Fineness is the degree to which a precious metal is pure. Most ancient Greek silver and gold coins were minted at about 98% fineness. Mints could deliberately add impurities to make the coin harder. Note that silver used in specific coins did not need to come from the same source, with spectrometric analysis indicating that some coins were minted from bullion from different mines in different locations.

¹¹ Numismatists call the more important face the 'obverse' and the other the 'reverse'. The principal device or image is known to numismatists as the 'type'. As minting techniques improved at the end of the late Archaic period, designs began appearing on the reverse face, see D. Sear, *Greek Coins and Their Values*, London, 1978, p. xxi.

¹² For a description of the range of terms used to describe various denominations, see Melville Jones, *Dictionary*, pp. 71-4.

¹³ States were aware that for gold and silver coins (compared to mixes like electrum) users could assess their value visually or through a touchstone. States usually issued a coin at a value slightly more than its intrinsic worth to recoup the minting costs (seigniorage).

¹⁴ For example, as evidenced by Athenaeus' comment about a fishmonger in Athen. 6.225a-b (*Deipnosophistae*), Kassel & Austin PCG 5 Diphilos F67, Kassel, R. & Austin, C., *Poetae Comici Graeci*, vol. 5, Berlin, 1986.

standards.¹⁵ Some of these major standards, shown in Table 1, were markedly consistent whilst others varied over time.¹⁶

Standard	Drachma	Stater	Comments
Aeginetan	6.1g	12.0-12.4g	
Attic-Euboic	4.3g	8.64g	Tetradrachm c17.2-3g and hekte of 2.68g
Chian	3.9g	7.8g	Tetradrachm 15.6g
Corinthian	2.9g	8.6g	Coins known as Pegasi
Lydo-Milesian	2.4g	14.2g	Oldest standard created in Lydia with fractions of this weight down to 1/96th of a stater.
Persian	5.6g	8.36g (gold daric) and 5.6g (silver siglos)	Introduced by Darius I.
Phocaic	2.68g	16.5g (archaic) - 16.15 (classical)	Divided on the duodecimal system. Popular for electrum coins.

Table One: Major Weight Standards

Having chosen the required hierarchy of denominations, states determined the coin sizes by applying either the chosen weight standard or their own weight system. In doing so, states needed to decide further whether a coin's nominal value would match its actual bullion value, or whether to overvalue the coins by making them weigh slightly less than their

¹⁵ For a list of some other standards, see Melville Jones, *Dictionary*, pp. 240-2 and Selene E. Psoma, 'Choosing and changing monetary standards in the Greek world during the archaic and classical periods', in *The Ancient Greek Economy, Markets, Households and City-States*, E. Harris *et al.* (eds.), New York, 2016. Debate continues over the existence of some weight standards, such as the so-called Thraco-Macedonian standard. Psoma has successfully argued that characterising the weights used by various states in Thrace and Macedonia as a standard is not helpful, see S. Psoma, 'Did the so-called Thraco-Macedonian standard exist?', in *Contributions to Numismatics in Honor of Basil Demetriadi*, U. Wartenberg and M. Amandry (eds.), New York, 2015. For a summary of archaic mints and the standards they used, see Sitta von Reden, *Money in Classical Antiquity* Cambridge, 2010, pp. 206-8.

¹⁶ Numismatists do not always agree on the precise weights for any specific standard, but the ones shown in this table are representative. For a summary that basically aligns with Table 1, see Lisa Kallet and John H. Kroll, *The Athenian Empire: Using Coins as Sources*, Cambridge, 2020, pp. 148-9.

bullion value.¹⁷ Greek silver and gold coinages derived about 95% of their monetary value from their bullion value with the rest based on the unwritten guarantee from an issuing state that it would be redeemed by that state if not exchangeable elsewhere.¹⁸ For coins made from non-precious metals, the coin size and weight were not important, since the coin's value was entirely set by the issuing state's unwritten guarantee of redemption. That guarantee remained strongest when the coin was used within the issuing state and less strong elsewhere. A state wanting its coins to be only used within its own borders, did not need to ensure the coin's bullion value matched its nominal value. In contrast, a state wanting its coins to be attractive in foreign markets needed to ensure its coins' nominal values closely matched their bullion value.¹⁹

To complete a coin's design, a state needed to decide the images or inscriptions placed on both the obverse and reverse faces.²⁰ Good designs enhanced a coin's attractiveness, so a state needed to choose carefully. It could choose a design well known as representative of the minting state or it could choose designs sending a clear political message, both to its own citizens and to foreign states. Coins with effective face designs contributed to internal state cohesion by becoming symbols of sovereign political identity, civic pride and community unity.²¹ But they could also send political messages to other states. As Finley stated, quoting Keynes, coins could be used as a '... political phenomenon, a piece of local vanity, patriotism or advertisement'.²²

Having designed its individual coins, a state then needed to decide how many coins should be put into circulation. This decision was constrained by the availability of the chosen

¹⁷ Some overvaluation occurred naturally as coins became worn during their use. For a discussion of overvaluation and its motives, see Melville Jones, *Dictionary*, pp. 168-70.

¹⁸ That is, the coin's precious metal content was 95% of the nominal value of the coin. For everyday purposes, Greeks seem to have assumed the purity of officially minted coins was essentially the same.

¹⁹ Of course, if a coin's bullion value was more than its nominated value, its owner would likely melt it down for the bullion.

²⁰ Noting that sometimes the coin shape could express the design, as evidenced by the Olbian coins shaped as a leaping dolphin, see Frank L. Holt, *When Money Talks: A History of Coins and Numismatics*, Oxford, 2021, p. 24.

²¹ For a discussion of the importance of expressing sovereignty in decisions to mint coins, see T. Martin, *Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece*, Princeton, 1985. For a more recent article focusing on modern monetary unions and sovereignty, whose conclusions also apply to the ancient Greek world, see Robert A. Mundell, 'Monetary Unions and the Problem of Sovereignty', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 579, 2002, pp. 123-52.

²² M.I. Finley, *The Ancient Economy*, Berkeley, 1999, p. 166. Although he also concluded by saying they had '... no far-reaching importance'.

material and the mechanisms available within the state to circulate coins. Having made this initial decision, over time a state needed to consider how much further minting need occur in order to vary the supply of coins in circulation, to replace worn coins and, when desirable, to rebadge existing coins with new face designs.

A state making these coinage decisions needed to consider both its internal needs and whether it wanted its coinage used by other states and their traders. A state had two considerations in making decisions about the coins' external use. The first is whether its coin designs would promote its own trade by making coins attractive to traders from other states when trading outside the territory of the minting state.²³ Foreign traders were reluctant to use a state's coins if they were not sufficiently available and widely accepted by other traders in other trading areas outside the minting state's control. If a state's coinage was not widely accepted, traders would be under pressure to exchange these coins for more accepted coins, increasing their transaction costs.²⁴ Thus, if a state wanted to mint widely accepted coins, sometimes termed 'trade coins', they needed to mint coins of adequate quality, of acceptable weights and in sufficient volumes.²⁵ A state could also choose to mint 'token' coins of poorer metal content, guaranteed by the state's government for use in its local markets.²⁶

The second consideration was whether a state could promote the use of its coins to foreign states for making their state payments. These payments could be made to the state that minted the coins, to third-party states and even to the paying state's own citizens. Whether such promotion was feasible depended on a range of considerations that will be explored later in this chapter.

²³ What Plato termed common Hellenic coinage (κοινὸν δὲ Ἑλληνικὸν), see Plat. Laws 5.742a.

²⁴ Given moneychangers charged a 5-7% fee for their services, see R. Strassler (ed.), *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, New York, 1996, p. 621. For further discussion of money changing, see Otto Morkholm, 'Some Reflections on the Production and Use of Coinage in Ancient Greece', *Historia*, 31, no. 3, 1982, p. 296.

²⁵ States had also to be aware of a maxim, currently called Gresham's Law, that when coins of reduced actual value circulate, but nominally the same value as better-quality coins already in circulation, the better coins will tend to leave the market to be hoarded or melted into bullion, see Melville Jones, *Dictionary*, p. 99.

²⁶ For example, an inscription from Olbia decreed that within the city only the city's own silver and bronze coinage was allowed to be used, see von Reden, *Money*, p. 76, n. 37. For the argument why Olbia took this decision, see Morkholm, 'Reflections', p. 295. Note the inscription also provided penalties for trading in other currencies.

Review of states

Scope

Having explained the types of decisions to be made by minting states, the next section of this chapter will examine the decisions actually made. Only a sample of minting states are individually considered given an analysis of the hundreds of minting states would be prohibitively lengthy. Instead, the analysis will begin by studying several important minters, namely Aegina, Athens, Macedonia, Persia and Corinth. Next will come a discussion of other states that chose to align with pre-existing weight standards, grouped by the relevant standard. To round out the analysis, this section will examine several states that chose not to align with an existing standard. All these analyses will focus on the extent that each state designed its coinage to influence the attitudes and behaviours of other states.

Aegina

Aegina was one of the first Greek states to mint coins, using silver most likely sourced from Siphnos and Laureion.²⁷ Sustained minting was possible given its maritime fleet could regularly import sufficient silver bullion.²⁸ Aegina produced the most substantial, arguably the only substantial, sixth-century silver coinage.²⁹ Aeginetan minting gained momentum from around 530-525 and then from around 515 the output became extensive.³⁰ The coins were primarily of large denominations useful for interstate trade although fractions were minted for internal use.³¹

As an early minter, Aegina could likely only choose to emulate the pre-existing weight standard of Lydia. Instead, Aegina chose to mint at weights now known as the Aeginetan

²⁷ The Aeginetans likely began to mint shortly after the initial Lydian silver issues, see Kroll and Waggoner, 'Earliest coins', pp. 335-9. Uncertainty exists as to the extent Aegina used Siphnian silver with silver possibly being obtained from other sources, see Figueira, *Aegina*, pp. 144-9.

²⁸ As argued at C.H.V. Sutherland, 'Corn and coin: A note on Greek commercial monopolies', *AJPh*, 64, no. 2, 1943, p. 140.

²⁹ As argued for example, at Howgego, *Coins*, p. 25.

³⁰ K Sheedy, 'Aegina, the Cyclades, and Crete', in *The Oxford Handbook of Greek and Roman Coinage*, W. Metcalf (ed.), Oxford, 2012, p. 107.

³¹ For one summary of Aeginetan coins, see Sheedy, 'Aegina', pp. 105-27.

standard, with the design of a sea turtle on the obverse face.³² This design promoted no obvious political message apart from that Aegina had sufficient political autonomy to mint its own coins.

Given Aegina's importance as an Aegean emporium, facilitated by its large merchant fleet, the likely motivation for minting was to facilitate trade with other states. That is, Aegina chose to mint coins in a way making them attractive to foreign traders in various markets outside its territory. This desired outcome eventuated with Aeginetan coins becoming a prolific trade coinage in the second half of the sixth century. Their popularity continued outside Aegina even after other trade coins became available. Aeginetan coins circulated throughout the eastern Mediterranean and are well represented in hoards found in the Levant and Egypt.³³

The output of Aeginetan coinage, which had been considerable until around 490, greatly reduced after 479 but continued after its defeat by Athens in 457.³⁴ Nevertheless, the volume of Aeginetan coins remaining in circulation in the fifth-century was a constant irritating reminder to Athens of Aegina's former greatness.³⁵ Some late fifth-century examples are illustrative. First, probably during the Archidamian War, Chios contributed to a Spartan war fund with Aeginetan staters.³⁶ Second, even when hostility between Athens and Aegina clouded the Athenians' view of Aegina's coins, such coins were still used in Athens. Next, Athens was compelled to recognise Aegina's currency when dealing with Argos and Mantinea, who both used Aegina's coins. Finally, an alliance of 420 amongst Athens, Argos, Mantinea and Elis specified military allowances were to be paid in Aeginetan 'turtles'.³⁷

³² van Alfen, 'Archaic Coinage', 2014, p. 11.

³³ Sheedy, 'Aegina', p. 107.

³⁴ Sheedy, 'Aegina', p. 108. Kallett/Kroll discussed whether minting after the defeat by Athens exhibited a change in the famous turtle face, see Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, pp. 76-77.

³⁵ As argued at H. Mattingly, 'The Athenian coinage decree', *Historia*, 10, no. 2, 1961, p. 184.

³⁶ *IG V i 1* lines 9-10 translated and discussed as OR 151 at Robin Osborne and P.J. Rhodes (eds.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions 478-404 BC*, Oxford, 2017, pp. 294-300. See also ML 67 discussed at R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century*, Oxford, 1969, pp. 181-4.

³⁷ *IG I³ 83* lines 23-4 discussed at Osborne and Rhodes (eds.), *GHI*, (OR 165), pp. 386-91. The arrangement was also described at Thuc. 5.47.5.

Athens

Athens' earliest coinage, minted in the second half of the sixth century and termed Wappenmünzen by numismatists, comprised electrum and silver coins of multiple denominations, weights and face designs.³⁸ Athens designed these coins primarily for use within its *chora* with no evidence they travelled to far from Attica. Nevertheless, some electrum coins were based on the Phocaic standard indicating a willingness to make some coins attractive to foreign traders. Later, Athens decided to mint silver coins of varying denominations at weights not used by other minting states such as its commercial rival Aegina.³⁹ These weights, which were used throughout the Classical period, are now termed the Attic-Euboic standard.⁴⁰ After some experimentation with face designs, very late in the sixth century Athena's head was used as the obverse face design and the Athenian owl placed on the reverse face.⁴¹ As Kraay argued, these 'owls' were almost devoid of minted fractions and thus intended for foreign trade.⁴²

By choosing to create its own coin weights, Athens differentiated itself from rival states. It relied on the attractiveness of Athenian goods being sufficient to overcome any perceived problems in other states using a new currency at non-standard weights.⁴³ Critical to sustaining the coins' attractiveness to foreign traders was Athens' ability to mint in large

³⁸ For a summary discussion of the Wappenmünzen, see P. van Alfen, 'The coinage of Athens, sixth to first centuries B.C.', in *The Oxford Handbook of Greek and Roman Coinage*, W. Metcalf (ed.), Oxford, 2012, pp. 89-90. The production of Athenian coinage started around the time Peisistratus consolidated his tyranny in 546, see C. Kroll and Waggoner, 'Earliest coins'. Jongkees summarised Athenian electrum coinage at J.H. Jongkees, 'Notes on the Coinage of Athens', *Mnemosyne*, Third Series, 12, no. 2, 1944, pp. 87-98. Note Athenian electrum coinage is part of Macquarie University's 'Early Attic Coin Project'.

³⁹ van Alfen, 'Coinage of Athens', pp. 88-104. For a period, Athens continued to mint Wappenmünzen fractions for domestic use, see G. Davis, 'Law, money, and the transformation of Athens in the sixth century B.C.E.', Macquarie University, 2011, p. 78. For a summary of the discussion on why Athens changed its minting practices, see Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, pp. 15-16.

⁴⁰ For summaries of this standard, see Melville Jones, *Dictionary*, pp. 35-6 and Psoma, 'Monetary standards', pp. 98-9. For an excellent summary of Athenian 'owl' minting, see Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, pp. 13-38.

⁴¹ The exact date is unknown, with van Alfen positing 'owls' were introduced between c515 and 505, see van Alfen, 'Archaic Coinage', 2014, p. 13.

⁴² Kraay, C., 'Hoards, small change and the origin of coinage', *JHS*, 84, 1964, p. 87. Interestingly, Athens continued to mint fractional electrum coins in the late fifth century, see discussion of rationale at G. Davis, 'Athenian electrum coinage reconsidered: Types, standard, value, and dating', *NC*, 175, 2015, pp. 1-9.

⁴³ For example, see the comment in Aristophanes' *Frogs* (721-3) that Athenian coins were the finest of all coins amongst Greeks and barbarians.

quantities, making its coins widely available. Such large-scale minting was possible in the fifth century given the regular silver supply from its Laureion mines as well as foreign coins received as tribute that could be reminted. In the early Classical period, especially after 450, Attic minting likely exceeded the combined output of all allied mints.⁴⁴

The high volume of Athens' minting helped markedly to reduce the volume of foreign coins used within its fifth-century *arkhe*. Through flooding markets with high quality, widely-accepted Athenian coins, Athens ensured market liquidity and lowered transaction costs.⁴⁵ The reduced demand for other states' coins increased the likelihood states would cease or reduce minting. Kallet/Kroll provided an effective summary of the changed minting practices of allied states, recognising that more than half of the 43 allied states minting at the formation of the alliance, ceased to mint during the second quarter of the fifth century.⁴⁶ Of the states still minting, many only minted in small denominations for domestic use, thus not competing with Athenian coins for interstate trade. The only states relatively unaffected by the large volume of Athenian coins were those minting electrum coins for use in trading regions, such as in the northeastern Aegean, that traditionally favoured such coins. But as Figueira argued, even those states who minted electrum coins probably made their military payments, other than military pay, in Attic silver.⁴⁷ With respect to military pay, Van Alfen noted Athenian-aligned combatants preferred payment in Athenian coins.⁴⁸

Athens' *phoros* system also contributed to the primacy of Athenian coins within its hegemony. First, although allies were not compelled to do so, most chose to acquire sufficient Athenian tetradrachms to make their annual payments, which could be achieved by

⁴⁴ Figueira, *Power of Money*, p. 192.

⁴⁵ Ober estimated the Athenian mint produced 12-24 million silver drachma annually, see Josiah Ober, *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece*, Princeton, 2015, p. 204. For a summary of the means by which states could reduce transaction cost, see Table 2.1 in J. Ober, 'Access, fairness and transaction costs: Nikophon's law on silver coinage (Athens, 375/4 B.C.E)', in *Law and Transaction Costs in the Ancient Economy*, D. Kehoe *et al.* (eds.), Ann Arbor, 2015, p. 55.

⁴⁶ Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, pp. 67-71, noting some states resumed minting after lengthy stoppages.

⁴⁷ Figueira, *Power of Money*, p. 182.

⁴⁸ Van Alfen implied this outcome from Thuc. 8.29.1, Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.6-7 and 2.3.8, but the implication is debatable, see P. van Alfen, 'Mechanisms for the Imitation of Athenian coinage: Dekeleia and mercenaries reconsidered', *RBN*, no. CLVII, 2011, p. 85. At least, one can infer Athenian coins had become the common money for naval accounting and payments, see Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, p. 32.

accepting Athenian coins for the many payments made to the state.⁴⁹ Second, as previously mentioned, Athens' receipt of foreign coins withdrew them from circulation where they could be reminted into Athenian coins.⁵⁰ The ATL detail those states paying in non-Attic coinage, including payments in Cyzizene staters and coins based on the Aeginetan standard.⁵¹ Other payments in non-Athenian currency included the thirteen or more states which, during the first period of assessment, likely paid in Persian or local Carian currency.⁵²

Athens' ability to create a dominant currency was assisted by Athenian traders providing Attic silver tetradrachms as a trade product in their own right. Such coins were primarily destined for those states wanting silver but without adequate supplies from local mines.⁵³ As mentioned in Chapter Three, Xenophon wrote in the 350s that the coins of Athens were exceptionally profitable to export and this statement could equally have applied in the fifth century. Athens' silver coins became so commercially dominant they were even used by Athens' enemies. Persia may have used Athenian coins to fund the Peloponnesian fleet and Athenian coins formed a large proportion of the collected monies Lysander sent to Sparta in 404.⁵⁴

In using its own coins to promote its trade and trumpet its political dominance, Athens was not overly threatened by its practice of allowing subservient states to both mint their own coins and use other states' coins. Such a practice was well established at the foundation of the

⁴⁹ T. Figueira, 'Economic integration and monetary consolidation in the Athenian arkhe', in *Moneta, Mercanti, Banchieri. I precedent Greci e Romani dell'Euro*, G. Urso (ed.), Pisa, 2003, p. 86.

⁵⁰ Indeed, a wider argument is that Athens even reminted the treasury of the Delian League when it arrived in Athens, see David M. Lewis, 'The Athenian coinage decree', in *Selected papers in Greek and Near Eastern History*, P. Rhodes (ed.), Cambridge, 1997, p.127. Note on rare occasions Athens retained foreign coins to make its own payments. For example, between 421-418 Athens paid its own and allied forces using Lampsacene, Aeginetan and Cyzicene coins, see S. Eddy, 'Some irregular amounts of Athenian tribute', *AJPh*, 94, no. 1, 1973, p. 490, n. 8.

⁵¹ Eddy, 'Irregular amounts', p. 58 and T. Figueira, 'The imperial commercial tax and the finances of the Athenian hegemony', *IncidAntico*, 3, 2005, p.126.

⁵² Eddy, 'Irregular amounts', p. 59.

⁵³ For example, a decree of the mid fourth century from Olbia on the Black Sea stipulated the import and export of any amount of coined gold and silver was to be free of duty, see Howgego, *Coins*, p. 94. See also Figueira, *Power of Money*, p. 26 and Martin, *Sovereignty*, p. 210.

⁵⁴ Thuc. 8.29.1-2, Xen. *Hell.* 1.5-7 and 2.3.8, and Plut. *Lys.* 16. See also discussion at J. Kroll, 'What about coinage?', in *Interpreting the Athenian Empire*, J. Ma et al. (eds.), London, 2009, p. 199. Kallet/Kroll commented on the inference that Athenian coins were so popular, cities paid tribute to the Persian king using Athenian coins, see Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, p. 33 citing Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.14.

Delian League.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, at some time in the second half of the fifth century, Athens decided that limits needed to be placed on foreign coins used by states subject to its hegemony and so enacted a coinage decree.⁵⁶ The decree affected silver but not electrum coins with the most likely reason, as Mackil/van Alfen argued, that electrum had a more restricted and specialized use than silver coins.⁵⁷ Whether or not the decree covered any fractional silver coins used only within a state is debatable with Kallet/Kroll discussing whether or not such silver coins must have, for practical reasons, been outside the decree's scope.⁵⁸ Although some wording of the decree remains uncertain, states under Athenian control were to bring their existing silver coins to the Athenian mint, for melting and reminting as Athenian coins, which were returned after Athens deducted a minting fee.⁵⁹

Debate continues about Athens' motives for the decree, with Lewis best summarising the debate as at 1997.⁶⁰ Since then, scholars fall broadly into two camps, with some arguing the decree represented an imperialist act by a hegemon intending to control its subject states.⁶¹ The revisionist viewpoint, effectively championed by Figueira, argues the decree

⁵⁵ Figueira, *Power of Money*, p. 65.

⁵⁶ The decree (OR 155 – IG I³ 1453) is provided with translation and commentary at Osborne and Rhodes (eds.), *GHI*, pp. 328-37. Whilst the decree is often called the 'Coinage Decree', it also covers standards for weights and measures. The decree's dating is contested. Proposed dating ranges from the 450s to 414, with a date in the 420s most likely. Arguments for and against certain dates consider literary evidence such as Aristophanes' *Frogs* 1040-1042, epigraphic evidence (such as the three-bar sigma dating) and numismatic evidence. Surprisingly, Thucydides does not mention the decree. Early modern scholarship on the decree included E.S.G. Robinson, 'The Athenian Currency Decree and the Coinages of the Allies', *Hesperia Supplements*, 8, 1948. For more recent scholarship on discrepancies amongst the fragments, including differing requirements, see Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, pp. 117-8. As van Alfen stated, nothing about the decree is uncontested, see P. van Alfen, 'Hatching Owls: The Regulation of Coin Production in Later Fifth-Century Athens', in *Quantifying Monetary Supplies in Greco-Roman Times*, 2011, p. 142.

⁵⁷ E. Mackil and P. van Alfen, 'Cooperative coinages', in *Agoronomia: Studies in Money and Exchange Presented to John Kroll*, P. van Alfen (ed.), New York, 2006, p. 218, n. 60. As Robinson argued, no noticeable break occurred in the electrum coinage of Cyzicus, Mytilene, or Phocaea, see Robinson, 'Athenian Currency Decree', p. 325.

⁵⁸ Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, pp. 116-7.

⁵⁹ Ellithorpe correctly argued, based on epigraphical and literary evidence, that the '... fees for minting and exchanging currency respectively, were prime revenue generating sources for a state that possesses a highly desirous currency', see C. Ellithorpe, 'Athenian mercantilism: A new approach to the Athenian coinage decree and the law of Nicophon', *Journal of Ancient History and Archaeology*, 6, no. 3, 2019, p. 66. For discussion of the minting fee, see Morkholm, 'Reflections', p. 292 and Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, p. 115.

⁶⁰ Lewis, 'Coinage decree', p.128. Other debates are more specific, such as whether the decree prohibited independent allies (Samos, Chios and Lesbos) from minting silver coins, see M. Finley, 'The fifth-century Athenian empire: a balance sheet', in *Imperialism in the Ancient World*, P. Garnsey and C. Whittaker (eds.), Cambridge, 1978, p. 120.

⁶¹ For example, as part of Athens' 'commercial imperialism' as argued by Mattingly, 'Athenian coinage decree', pp. 187-8.

was aimed at more modest outcomes, namely converting some foreign coins into Athenian owls and ensuring Athenian coins were accepted throughout the empire. Revisionists argue an imperialistic decree would have covered all coins, not just the important silver coins. That is, the revisionists argue the decree merely codified prevailing circumstances rather than being a means of tightening Athens' imperialistic control.⁶² The revisionist argument is sound, based on evidence that many states within the Athenian empire had already grown accustomed to using Athenian coins and had stopped minting even before the start of the Delian League in 478.⁶³

Assignment of a single motive to this decree is inappropriate, given Athens likely had multiple objectives.⁶⁴ Examining the decree's characteristics reveals the extent to which Athens attempted to influence foreign states. First, regardless of whether one accepts the revisionist approach, the decree was at least a political declaration by Athens asserting its ongoing power to issue such decrees. By requiring all subject states to use its coins, Athens' message to the states subject to its hegemony was that Athens' authority was ubiquitous with the power to regulate their internal economic activities. If not an exercise in power politics as described by Finley, it was at least a declaration of such power by denying states the right to mint their own coins, a traditional element of autonomy.⁶⁵ To those states not subject to Athenian hegemony the political statement was equally clear, namely Athens dominated a vast empire of states with constrained local autonomy.

Two alternatively worded decrees would have created economic benefits without making these strong political statements. Athens could have decreed that Athenian silver coins could not be rejected throughout the empire whilst still allowing the use of foreign coins.⁶⁶ Alternatively, to reduce transactional costs, Athens could have allowed states to mint

⁶² Figueira, *Power of Money*, p. 15.

⁶³ Although about sixty of Athens' 205 allied states minted between 480 and 400, by the time of the decree their numbers had markedly dropped. For a description of the gradual cessation of minting, see Figueira, 'Economic integration', pp. 73-5. Nevertheless, no evidence exists to indicate a widespread cessation of minting amongst League members, although sometimes cessation is difficult to gauge given most states were not regular minters, only minting when necessary.

⁶⁴ For example, Kallet/Kroll argued the decree made 'rational economic sense' whilst also projecting Athens' political authority, see Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, p. 143.

⁶⁵ Finley, 'Balance sheet', p. 120.

⁶⁶ Figueira argued the decree should be interpreted this way, see Figueira, *Power of Money*, p. 46.

their own coins provided they were based on the Attic-Euboic weight standard.⁶⁷ Whilst still making a political statement, this latter potential decree would have sent a markedly weaker message about the reduced autonomy of subject states.

Apart from making a political statement, the decree aimed to create economic benefits for Athens by influencing the behaviours of foreign states and their traders. First, Athens designed the decree to raise funds during a period of falling tribute payments. Athens now needed to strike silver coins for its whole *arkhe* and thus Athens profited from the need for foreign states to arrange for Athens to either mint new coins for their use or remint existing foreign coins into Athenian coins, both with the accompanying minting fee.⁶⁸ From the wording of the decree, this minting fee has been inferred to be 3-5% of the silver's intrinsic value.⁶⁹ Second, the decree had the potential to simplify tribute collection if states previously paying in foreign coins started paying with Athenian coins.⁷⁰ Finally, and most importantly, the decree helped attract foreign traders to Athens, since traders requiring Athenian coins could best obtain them by bringing goods to Athens for purchase. Sunderland argued that by this means the decree supported Athenian attempts to control the grain trade.⁷¹

Although these desired political and economic benefits were valuable to Athens, some were not fully realised. Scholars argue the decree was impractical and difficult to enforce, with no evidence Athens applied sanctions against non-complying states.⁷² No numismatic evidence exists to indicate the simultaneous closure of multiple mints. As von Reden argued, 50% of the minting members within the *arkhe* ceased minting between 478 and 445, with

⁶⁷ As proposed at Howgego, *Coins*, p. 45.

⁶⁸ Lewis, 'Coinage decree', p. 125. The minting charge was the charge imposed by a mint to cover the expense of minting metal into coins.

⁶⁹ See Melville-Jones Melville Jones, *Testimonia*, p. 69 for a discussion about likely minting charges. Ellithorpe, paraphrasing Martin, characterised the decree as a massive 'revenue enhancement act', see Ellithorpe, 'Athenian mercantilism', p. 62.

⁷⁰ For many years, electrum coins were accepted in paying Athenian tribute, for example, see *JG I*³ 259. Lewis discussed the extent the tribute payments were paid in Cyzicene electrum staters, see Lewis, 'Coinage decree', p. 128. For a discussion of electrum payments in the Hellespont, see Figueira, *Power of Money*, pp. 275-9. Being paid in a mix of foreign coins was inconvenient since it required, as Martin argued, '... annually changing officials in charge of the tribute to check constantly on the fineness, the weight, and the authenticity of unfamiliar coinages and to calculate their value in Athenian coinage to see if each city was paying its assessed tribute in full', see Martin, *Sovereignty*, p. 202.

⁷¹ Sutherland, 'Corn and coin', p. 144.

⁷² Mattingly, 'Athenian coinage decree', p. 185.

10% more ceasing if one considers states minting denominations smaller than the drachma.⁷³ But irregular minters may have stopped production for other reasons. The states experiencing the greatest interruptions were Abdera, Ainos, Chios, Cnidus, Colophon, Cos, Samos, Teos, and Thasos.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, many states continued to mint coins, including Ambracia, Chalcis, Karystos, Histiaia, Cyzikus, Phocaea and Mytilene.⁷⁵ Further, hoard evidence suggests several important mints in northern Greece did not markedly cease production, placing more non-Attic coins in circulation.⁷⁶ Kallet/Kroll discussed whether Athens would have intended to disrupt such states which minted silver coins to trade with states, such as the Thracian tribes, outside the *arkhe*.⁷⁷ Strong arguments also exist that Athens had to provide some formal dispensations to the decree because of extenuating political circumstances. For example, the main Thracian mints were allowed to keep minting, so these states would remain loyal to Athens whilst being threatened by both the Spartan Brasidas and the Odrysian Empire.⁷⁸ Similarly, Athens allowed Akanthos to maintain her coinage during a period of autonomy granted after its rebellion.⁷⁹ In both situations, Athens chose not to enforce the decree as an economic measure to achieve economic objectives, given successful enforcement may have prevented the achievement of a more important objective, namely continued loyalty to Athens.⁸⁰

Returning to Athens' minting practices, only in the last few years of the Peloponnesian War, when Athens was in desperate financial straits, did it resort to other expedients than minting silver coins. By melting the Acropolis' Nike gold statues, Athens minted gold staters

⁷³ von Reden, *Money*, p. 75. Another summary of the minting of members of the Athenian *arkhe* is at table 3.1 at Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, pp. 68-9.

⁷⁴ Ellithorpe, 'Athenian mercantilism', p. 63.

⁷⁵ Figueira argued there were 11 mints, which he named, that strongly counter-indicate any prohibition on the minting of silver, see Figueira, *Power of Money*, p. 71 and p. 176. See also Howgego, *Coins*, p. 48 and Maria Areti Errietta Bissa, 'Governmental intervention in foreign trade in archaic and classical Greece', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University College London, 2008, p. 271.

⁷⁶ Note, as Howgego argued, '...the type of evidence we have for the chronology of such coinages (hoards and die-studies) means short gaps in production (say up to ten years) might be impossible for us detect', see Howgego, *Coins*, p. 45.

⁷⁷ Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, p. 117.

⁷⁸ Mattingly, 'Athenian coinage decree', p. 186. Paunov argued the sporadic minting by Thracian kings may demonstrate their coins were intended to demonstrate their authority rather than satisfying economic needs, see E. Paunov, 'Introduction to the numismatics of Thrace, ca. 530 BCE-46CE', in *A Companion to Ancient Thrace*, J. Valeva *et al.* (ed.), 2015, p. 274.

⁷⁹ Mattingly, 'Athenian coinage decree', p. 186.

⁸⁰ For one considered discussion of the decree's success (or not), see Ellithorpe, 'Athenian mercantilism', p. 65.

and fractions thereof to make interstate payments from 407/6.⁸¹ A year later, Athens minted silver-plated bronze tetradrachms and drachms for domestic use rather than debasing the quality of its silver trade coins. Through this emergency measure, high-quality silver coins could still circulate within its empire, be used for military expenditures and thus remain popular within foreign states.⁸²

Athens restarted minting silver coins in the 390s and likely demonetised its emergency bronze coinage by 393.⁸³ The pre-eminence of Athenian coins reduced during the fourth century, but studies of coins from 852 hoards dating from 550-300 indicate the numbers and geographical dispersion of Athenian coins remained greater than any other state.⁸⁴ Only when Macedonia minted silver coins under Alexander the Great, was there a major rival to Athens' ubiquitous coins.⁸⁵ Athenian coins remained widely accepted even during fiscal crises. For example, Kroll showed that after the Social War a nearly bankrupt Athens likely demonetised its coins and then reminted poor quality, large denomination silver coins.⁸⁶ These unsightly coins were erratically shaped and too small to display the complete face designs. Although such coins may have been rejected by some foreign states and their traders, hoard evidence shows the decline in coin quality did not markedly affect foreign demand for them.

In 375/4 Athens enacted another coinage decree (the decree of Nikophon) which was carefully worded to ensure it did not invoke memories of the fifth-century coinage decree.⁸⁷

⁸¹ Loren J. Samons, *Empire of the Owl: Athenian Imperial Finance*, Stuttgart, 2000, p. 282 and Figueira, 'Imperial commercial tax', p. 108. See also Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, pp. 130-5.

⁸² Kroll, 'What about coinage?', p.199 discussing Aristophanes' *Frogs* lines 725-6. At some time in the very late fifth century or early fourth century, copper coins may also have been used and then withdrawn from circulation, see Aristoph. *Eccl.* 816-7.

⁸³ Demonetisation is a declaration a currency is no longer legal tender. For a comic view of demonetization, which provides evidence for the date of demonetisation, see Aristoph. *Eccl.* 815-24. For the context for Aristophanes' comments in this play, see Alan H. Sommerstein, *Aristophanes Ecclesiazusae*, Oxford, 2007.

⁸⁴ Ober's study of 146,099 coins discussed at Weir, 'Interpretation', p. 130.

⁸⁵ J. Kroll, 'The reminting of Athenian silver coinage, 353 B.C.', *Hesperia*, 80, 2011, p. 248.

⁸⁶ In 355 the annual state revenue had fallen to 130 talents (Dem. 10.37), well below the threshold to meet state expenses, see Kroll, 'Reminting', p. 229 and p.238, and Peter Fawcett, "'When I squeeze you with eisphorai': Taxes and tax policy in classical Athens", *Hesperia*, 85, 2016, p.187.

⁸⁷ A translation and commentary is provided at RO 25 (SEG xxvi 72) in P. Rhodes and R. Osborne (eds.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions 404-323 BC*, Oxford, 2003, pp. 112-8. Note debates continue on some of its terms. For example, did it mandate payments to government in Attic coins and sellers must receive payment in Attic coins approved by government officials? Such an intent would likely have been in the minds of its drafters even though there was no contemporary criticism of the fifth-century decree by

Unlike the fifth-century decree, the extant problem being addressed was the widespread imitation of Athenian coins. Unscrupulous traders also caused problems by using counterfeits or falsely classifying genuine Attic coins as counterfeits to profit from predatory bartering with the coins' owners. Athens required a public slave (δοκιμαστής - *dokimastes*), to assess and validate the quality of all silver coinage used in Athenian markets regardless of whether they were Athenian or foreign coins.⁸⁸ Debate continues on whether the decree affected just the Peiraieus or also the Athenian agora. Whilst the decree would have provided some benefits to local Athenian traders, it was primarily an economic measure aimed to attract traders from foreign states to trade with confidence in Athenian markets.⁸⁹ The decree also aimed at preventing a wider coinage problem for Athens, namely that foreign states might start rejecting the use of Athenian coins in their own markets if Athenian coins were randomly rejected in Athenian markets. Before the decree, foreign traders were known to have rejected Athenian coins of unknown provenance.⁹⁰ The decree aimed to provide monetary certainty by confirming only good coins, both Athenian and foreign, would be allowed to remain in circulation. Whilst counterfeit coins would be removed from circulation, foreign coins, minted in good faith as genuine imitation of Athenian coins, could likely have remained in use although this interpretation remains controversial.⁹¹ The decree allowed a *dokimastes* to authorise their mandatory acceptance just like silver coins minted in Athens.⁹² The decree also penalised traders who refused to accept Athenian silver coins.

Thucydides or any other writer, nor any mention of the earlier decree in the list of prohibited fifth-century measures in the charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy, see *IG II² 43* and *Diod.* 15.28.

⁸⁸ Although Athens aimed to have foreign states use its coins, foreign coins were legally used in Athens for private business, including the coins of Aegina, Chios and Cyzikus, see Figueira, *Power of Money*, p. 57.

⁸⁹ See Ellithorpe, 'Athenian mercantilism', pp. 65-6 for other arguments for the decree's motivation, especially the protection of Athens' minting revenues.

⁹⁰ R. Stroud, 'An Athenian law on silver coinage', *Hesperia*, 43, no. 2, 1974, p. 185. Ellithorpe argued Stroud's view was not widely supported given the inscription only required good silver to be restored to its owner, and said nothing about what happened to these coins after they had been declared foreign and restored, see Ellithorpe, 'Athenian mercantilism', p. 65.

⁹¹ For a summary of this debate, see commentary on AIO 819 at atticinscriptionsonline.com. For the argument that imitations could not be used, see T. Buttrey, 'The Athenian currency law of 375/4 B.C.', in *Greek Numismatics and Archaeology: Essays in Honour of Margaret Thompson*, O. Morkholm and N. Waggoner (eds.), Wetteren, Belgium, 1979. For another discussion of the decree, based on van Alfen's seven categories of coins, see Ober, 'Access', p. 60ff. See also A. Bresson, *The Making of the Ancient Greek Economy: Institutions, Markets, and Growth in the City-States*, Princeton, 2016, p. 271. For a coin approvers' judgment matrix, see Ober, 'Access', p. 64. For another view on who could use foreign coins of good weight, see Morkholm, 'Reflections', pp. 293-5.

⁹² At lines 10-13, the decree provided precise instructions to the *dokimastes*. See also arguments at Ellithorpe, 'Athenian mercantilism', pp. 64-6.

A final matter relevant to Athenian coins concerned the prevalence of imitation owls, previously mentioned in the context of Nikophon's decree. Although minted from the sixth century, they were primarily a fourth-century phenomenon. Imitations were not common in mainland Greece and the Aegean, but prevalent in the Near East, Egypt, Arabia and central Asia.⁹³ Weir analysed the fifth-century imitations showing they were not meant to deceive traders by using poor metals and reduced weight.⁹⁴ Indeed, most state mints producing imitative owls stamped the faces with inscriptions or symbols which clearly identified their minting location. Such practice continued into the fourth century with many states minting imitations in small denominations, at local weight standards, for use within their own domestic markets.⁹⁵ These imitations did not concern to Athens given the coins were not designed as counterfeits. Instead, such imitations benefitted Athens since they spread the message of Athenian commercial dominance in markets not normally exposed to Athenian coins.

Macedonia

Within Macedonia, only the king had the authority to mint coins, using the abundant silver deposits discussed in Chapter Three.⁹⁶ Debate continues on the weight standards used by various kings with a consensus forming that no specific Thracian-Macedonian weight standard existed. Instead, Macedonia used several existing standards.⁹⁷ Minting first occurred during the reign of Alexander I, using silver from the Lake Prasias deposits.⁹⁸ Rather than mint on a single weight standard, Alexander I minted coins at different weights to facilitate trade within different trade networks.⁹⁹ For example, four of Alexander's tetradrachms were

⁹³ For example, Persia, after it reconquered Egypt in 343, started minting imitation owls, see van Alfen, 'Imitations', p. 72. Such imitations were also minted in Bactria, see van Alfen, 'Imitations', p. 369. Tools for the creation of imitation owls were also found in Sicily, see discussion at Clare Rowan, 'Coinage as commodity and bullion in the western Mediterranean, ca. 550 – 100 BCE', *MHR*, 28, no. 2, 2013, p.108. For a discussion of the popularity of Athenian owls in Egypt, see Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, p. 37.

⁹⁴ Weir, 'Interpretation', p. 139.

⁹⁵ For example, as van Alfen argued in van Alfen, 'Imitations', pp. 55-93.

⁹⁶ N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia Volume II*, 3 vols, II, Oxford, 1979, p. 113. No evidence exists of Macedonian coins minted by anyone apart from the kings.

⁹⁷ See discussion at Psoma, 'Thraco-Macedonian standard' and D. Raymond, 'Macedonian Regal Coinage to 413 B.C.', *Numismatic Notes and Monographs*, 126, 1953, pp. 18-42.

⁹⁸ J. Roisman and I. Worthington (eds.), *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*, Chichester, 2010, p. 477 and Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia Vol II*, p. 84.

⁹⁹ Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia Vol II*, pp. 108-9, which summarised Alexander I's coins. For a detailed discussion of coin types, see Raymond, 'Regal Coinage', pp. 43-60.

the equivalent of three Athenian tetradrachms, which made them useable in trade accepting Attic weight coins, albeit they were not as easy to use as if they had minted on the Attic-Euboic standard.¹⁰⁰ Similarly, Macedonia could trade with states using coins it minted on the Lydo-Milesian standard, with each of Alexander's large 29g oçtadrachms exchangeable for two Lydo-Milesian staters.¹⁰¹ Other Macedonian coins were interchangeable with Persian weight coins, facilitating Macedonian trade in eastern markets.¹⁰²

The kings directly after Alexander continued to mint, but sometimes created coins not easily exchangeable with coins used by Macedonia's trading partners. For example, for a period under Perdiccas II (448-413), Macedonia minted highly debased silver coins that were not suitable for trade with Athens or other states which preferred using coins on the Attic-Euboic standard.¹⁰³ The debasement was likely due to a silver shortage resulting from Macedonia's loss of the Bisaltic mines discussed in Chapter Three. Given this shortage, he also minted a token coin, composed of brass mixed with tin, used only used internally within Macedonia.¹⁰⁴ Nevertheless, he did continue minting light tetrobols equivalent in weight to Athenian triobols.¹⁰⁵ Perdiccas also provided the first opportunity for Olynthus to mint coins since the Persians were expelled in 479, designed to create *eunoia* towards Macedonia and counter Athens' influence.¹⁰⁶

Perdiccas' successor, Archelaus (413-399), had sufficient silver to resume minting high-quality silver coins.¹⁰⁷ He regained control of the Basaltic mines and was also able to remint Attic coins provided in payment for Macedonian timber.¹⁰⁸ Importantly, in deciding what coins to mint, he considered their appeal within foreign markets. First, he issued coins based on the Attic-Euboic weight standard, favouring and thus stimulating trade with Athens.

¹⁰⁰ See Raymond, 'Regal Coinage', pp. 109-110.

¹⁰¹ J. Kagan, 'Notes on the coinage of Mende', *AJN*, 26, 2014, p. 12.

¹⁰² D. Raymond, 'Macedonian Regal Coinage to 413 BC', *Numismatic Notes and Monographs*, 124, no. 6, 1952, p. 20ff.

¹⁰³ Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia Vol II*, p. 120.

¹⁰⁴ Polyæn. *Strat.* 4.10.2.

¹⁰⁵ See discussion of Perdiccas' minting at Raymond, 'Regal Coinage', pp. 165-6.

¹⁰⁶ See discussion at Raymond, 'Regal Coinage', p. 165.

¹⁰⁷ W. Greenwalt, 'The production of coinage from Archelaus to Perdiccas III and the evolution of argead Macedonia', in *Ventures into Greek History*, I. Worthington (ed.), Oxford, 1994, p. 113.

¹⁰⁸ Indeed, no Athenian coins have been found in Macedonian/Thessalian hoards from the Classical period, see Margaret Thompson *et al.* (eds.), *An Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards*, New York, 1973.

He also minted coins based on the contemporary Persian weight standard, with the intent Macedonian larger coins could be used in Asia Minor markets.¹⁰⁹ But at some stage Archelaus discontinued minting large trade coins, introducing lighter staters than those used by Athens and other trading partner in neighbouring Thessaly and the Chalcidice. These coins, not based on any pre-existing weight standard, may have created a closed monetary zone within his kingdom.¹¹⁰ To support this closed zone, he also minted a token coinage, suitable only for small-value domestic transactions.¹¹¹

Greenwalt argued that Archelaus minted on these new weights because of the growing commercial threat from the Chalcidic League. His new coins made the exchange of Macedonian and Chalcidic coins cumbersome. To Macedonia's advantage, its new coins would not have markedly inhibited trade with Athens given two of Archelaus' new staters could be exchanged for five Athenian drachms.¹¹² But this potential exchange value would not have been critical, since the likely trade between Athens and Macedonia was one-sided. Macedonia primarily sold goods to Athens, which means Attic coins mainly flowed to Macedonia rather than Macedonian coins flowing to Athens.

Archelaus' monetary reforms provided much needed revenue to reform Macedon's defences and make the state militarily viable.¹¹³ But equally, as discussed with respect to Athens, his coins both facilitated trade in different markets and indicated to foreign states the growing prosperity and importance of the developing Macedonian state.

Subsequent Macedonian kings minted coins reflecting the financial distress Macedonia suffered due to repeated invasions.¹¹⁴ Aeropus (399-396) minted only in copper, whilst Pausanias (393) only added heavily debased silver coins.¹¹⁵ Amyntas III (392-370) attempted to recover the reputation of Macedonian coins, but was not able to sustain their purity. His earliest staters were 75% silver, degrading in later issues to less than 10% silver. No evidence

¹⁰⁹ Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia Vol II*, p. 138.

¹¹⁰ Greenwalt, 'Production of coinage', p. 110.

¹¹¹ Greenwalt, 'Production of coinage', p. 108. For the influences on Archelaus' bronze coinage, see Rowan, 'Coinage', pp. 110-11.

¹¹² Greenwalt, 'Production of coinage', p. 113.

¹¹³ Some military innovations can be inferred from the description of the invasion of Sitalces at Thuc. 2.100.1-2.

¹¹⁴ Greenwalt, 'Production of coinage', p. 121.

¹¹⁵ Holly Giuliodori, 'The foreign policy of Macedon c513 to 346 BC', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Glasgow, 2004, p. 179 and Greenwalt, 'Production of coinage', pp. 119-20.

exists that Amyntas' son and successor, Alexander II, minted silver coins during his short reign (370-368).

No significant minting changes occurred until Philip II's reign (359–336) when Macedonia minted silver tetradrachms with the head of Zeus on the obverse face.¹¹⁶ This design was likely chosen to reinforce Philip's belief in his divine ancestry as well as appealing to Greek states.¹¹⁷ His tetradrachms were also designed to be attractive to other states trading in foreign markets. Indeed, his coins circulated broadly becoming, for example, the dominant currency in the Peloponnese during the second half of the fourth century.¹¹⁸ From about 345 he also minted Attic-Euboic standard gold coins, known as Philippoi, designed to be attractive in diverse foreign markets. These coins displayed the head of Apollo, intended to mark Philip's close relationship with Delphi and his desire to lead all Greece.¹¹⁹ Local mints produced coins on other standards for use within Macedonia's internal markets.

When Philip became a hegemon, his policy towards the coins of subject states mirrored the fifth-century Persian policy of never attempting to suppress or constrain their coinage decisions. For example, he did not suppress mints east of the Strymon, with Thessalian mints continuing to issue Larisan silver drachms.¹²⁰ Philip's policy towards foreign coins was consistent with his broad approach to subjugated states, remaining respectful of their customs and practices. The political message this coinage policy send to subject states was his respect for their autonomy, at least to extent to the extent it did not threaten the Macedonian hegemony. His strategic interests required him not to create unnecessary discontent in subject states.

The attractiveness of Macedonian trade coins continued to grow during the reign of Alexander III (the Great), who decided to mint silver coins based on the Attic-Euboic weight

¹¹⁶ A tetradrachm of c. 14.52g, taken over by Philip from the substantial silver coinages of Amphipolis and the Chalcidian League, see O. Morkholm, *Early Hellenistic Coinage: From the Accession of Alexander to the Peace of Apamea (336-188 B.C.)*, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 41-2. In 1977, Georges Le Rider published a first and only comprehensive study of the coins of Philip II.

¹¹⁷ P. Tselekas, 'Philip II in Olympia: An old coin find revealed anew', in *χάδιν. Τιμητικός τόμος για τη Στέλλα Δρούγου*, M. Giannopoulou and C. Kallini (eds.), Athens, 2016, p. 716.

¹¹⁸ Tselekas, 'Philip II', p. 724.

¹¹⁹ von Reden, *Money*, p. 31.

¹²⁰ As demonstrated by hoard evidence, see Howgego, *Coins*, pp. 40-8.

standard.¹²¹ This decision, coupled with the increasing availability of Macedonian coins, led to them becoming more popular than Athenian tetradrachms and other coins in eastern markets. In some markets, such as Cilicia, Macedonian coins also began to usurp the popularity of the previously dominant Persian ‘double-sigloi’ coin.¹²² Alexander’s coins also began to dominate eastern Mediterranean markets and those in Magna Graecia and Sicily.

Like his father, Alexander respected local customs, making no attempt to mandate the exclusive use of his coins or constrain minting by other states. He preferred to send a message, through his coins, of Macedonia’s power whilst still respecting the limited autonomy of other states. Like fifth-century Athens, he primarily relied on minting highly-recognisable, high-fineness coins, available in large volumes and to be voluntarily used by foreign traders. This high-volume minting was facilitated by his seizure of the Persian king’s bullion reserves. Alexander’s coins were so popular they were often imitated, such as the copies minted within the Danubian region. Alexander’s gold coins were also used as a model for other states’ gold coins in central and western Europe.¹²³

Persia

After defeating the Lydian kingdom in the mid sixth century, Cyrus the Great of Persia continued to mint silver and gold coins little changed from the Lydian coins known as κροῖσοι (*croeseids*). But c520, Darius the Great introduced new coins, both gold δαρεικοί (*darics*) and silver σίγλοι (*sigloi*), at weights which are now termed the Persian weight standard.¹²⁴ The decision to mint coins at new weights was likely a result of the dearth of pre-existing weight standards in the late sixth century, with those existing not necessarily well known within Persia. Most likely the new weights were chosen to create a new widely acceptable trade coin. That this Persian standard survived without change during the Classical period indicates Darius chose well.

¹²¹ Howgego, *Coins*, p. 50 and Maria Linda Pessolano, ‘The Gold Coinage Of Alexander’s Lifetime’, undated, www.academia.com, p. 3. Alexander also continued to mint gold coins in the name of his father to maintain trade with tribes, to the north of Macedonia, who preferred Philip’s gold coins, see Morkholm, *Coinage*, p. 43.

¹²² See discussion at Howgego, *Coins*, p. 50. A double-sigloi weighed about 10.06g and thus was worth as much as two separate siglos.

¹²³ As discussed, for example, at Howgego, *Coins*, p. 10.

¹²⁴ J. Bodzek, ‘Achaemenid Asia Minor: Coins of the satraps and of the great king’, First International Congress of the Anatolian Monetary History and Numismatics, 2013, p. 60.

The Persian kings allowed various Persian governors (satraps) and officials to mint ‘satrapal coinage’.¹²⁵ By doing so they sent a positive message of limited autonomy within the Persian empire. The issuing officials decided the coin design, material and weights best suited to the monetary networks within which they wanted to operate. Satrapal coins were minted primarily for local use, to fund military operations and as means of conveying prestige.¹²⁶ They were designed neither to compete with royal coinage nor be used for long-distance trade.

Despite their freedom of minting choice, almost all satraps minted on the Persian weight standard.¹²⁷ The primary driver for this choice was that regardless of who they fought against, many soldiers expected payment in Persian-weight coins. Thus, for example, Pharnabazus and Datames minted double sigloi during campaigns against Tachos the rebellious satrap of Egypt. Even during some revolts against the Great King, satraps issued Persian-weight coins. For example, during his revolt in the late 360s, Datames issued two double sigloi.¹²⁸

Darius and following Persian kings did not impose their coins on subject states as a political statement of their limited autonomy. Such states included the Greek states in Asia Minor such as Miletus, Ephesus and Phocaea. Whilst Persia would have promoted local minting in order to make tribute payments to the Persian king, it did not interfere with the choice of coin weights and face designs.¹²⁹ Despite the ability of subjected Greek cities to use whatever coins suited them, Persian coins became widely accepted in many of these Greek cities. Further, some subject states minted coins similar to Persian coins. For example, in the fourth century Cilician and Cypriot states minted silver and gold coins respectively that were equivalent to the Persian darics or sigloi.¹³⁰ Nevertheless, sometimes the king thought the similarity was taken too far, as evidenced by Herodotos’ story that Darius took offence when

¹²⁵ Bodzek, ‘Coins of the satraps’, p. 63.

¹²⁶ Bodzek, ‘Coins of the satraps’, p. 73.

¹²⁷ Bodzek, ‘Coins of the satraps’, p. 61 and van Alfen, ‘Archaic Coinage’, 2014, p. 7. One exception was the silver tetradrachms minted by the satraps Sabakes and Mazakes in Egypt, see Michael Alam, ‘The Coinage of the Persian Empire’, in *The Oxford Handbook of Greek and Roman Coinage*, William E. Metcalf (ed.), Oxford, 2012, p. 79.

¹²⁸ See discussion at Psoma, ‘Monetary standards’, pp. 102-3, citing Polyæn. *Strat.* 7.21. for a description of Datames’ military actions.

¹²⁹ P. Tselekas, ‘Observations on the silver coin production and use in the Chalcidike during the fifth century BC’, *BCH*, 2011, p. 173 and Howgego, *Coins*, p. 47.

¹³⁰ Howgego, *Coins*, p. 47.

Aryandes, the governor of Egypt, issued silver coins emulating royal gold coins.¹³¹ On the other hand, Artaxerxes was not concerned that Egyptian silver coins, minted after the king put down a revolt, had Athenian designs based on the Attic-Euboic standard.¹³² Persian kings were also tolerant of foreign coins circulating within Persian markets. For example, they recognised Greek coins were best suited for some transactions, so remained content Cyzicene electrum coins were used when trading with Black Sea states.¹³³ Further, in dealing with Greek states in the late fifth century, the Persians chose to use silver coinages of Greek mintage.¹³⁴

Corinth

Corinth was one of the first mainland states to mint coins, possibly motivated in the late sixth century by the need to provide coins suitable for the payment of tariffs at its two harbours and the *diolkos*.¹³⁵ Corinth chose to mint on its own weights, most likely because so few minting states could be emulated. Whilst they could have minted at the same weights as Athenian coins, copying the weights used by a major commercial rival was never likely. Corinthian coins, later called ‘Pegasi’ because of their face design, were lighter in weight than their Athenian equivalents, requiring the calculation of relative values during money-changing.¹³⁶ They were also exchangeable, after some easy calculations, for coins based on the Aeginetan standard.¹³⁷

Corinth sustained a regular although sometime erratic minting output, including minting for its dependent colonies like Ambracia.¹³⁸ Its output was only affected, in any serious way, in the early days of the Peloponnesian War. As a consequence of dependence on

¹³¹ Hdt. 4.166.

¹³² Howgego, *Coins*, p. 47.

¹³³ Howgego, *Coins*, p. 47.

¹³⁴ See discussion at Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, p. 128.

¹³⁵ As discussed at J. Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth: A History of the City to 338 BC*, Oxford, 1984, p. 171.

¹³⁶ For example, the mention of staters at Thuc. 3.70.4 is usually inferred to be Corinthian staters. See Simon Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides Volume I: Books I-III*, Oxford, 1991, p. 470 for his suggestion Thucydides meant gold staters worth 20 drachms.

¹³⁷ As first commented on by Gustave Glotz, *Ancient Greece at Work: An Economic History of Greece: From the Homeric Period to the Roman Conquest*, London, 1926, p. 122.

¹³⁸ P. van Alfen, ‘Metoikêsis and archaic monetary coordination: Teos-Abdera and Phokaia-Velia’, *Proceedings: First International Congress of the Anatolian Monetary History and Numismatics*, 2013, p. 642.

Attic silver, bullion supplies must have been restricted or shutdown such that Corinth could not sustain its usual minting output. In response, Corinth reached agreements allowing other states to mint its coins. For instance, in the 430s Leucas, Ambracia, Anactorium and at least two other mints minted Pegasi.¹³⁹ Such minting franchises occurred again in the late fourth century, when, as argued by Mackil/van Alfen, Pegasi were minted at 15 different mints, primarily Corinthian colonies, in western Greece, southern Magna Graecia and Sicily.¹⁴⁰

Corinthian staters and drachms remained popular amongst other states, especially in the fourth century, when they were used within Sicily, Magna Graecia and Corinthian colonies in western Greece.¹⁴¹ Such use often transcended political differences. For example, Corcyra allowed the use of Corinthian coins alongside its own coins, even though it was no friend of Corinth.¹⁴² The economic benefit to Corcyra outweighed the political statement made by allowing Corinthian coins to circulate.

Corinth's minting decisions were primarily trade-focused, to create well-accepted trade coins useable in a range of trade networks. In this aim, Corinth was less successful than its commercial rival Athens, partly because the Corinth did not have access to sufficient silver to mint on Athens' scale. Nevertheless, Corinthian coins remained popular as both a medium of exchange and as basis for states minting imitations or their own coins on the same weight standard.¹⁴³

States adopting existing weight standards

After this discussion of major states that created their own coin weights, one can now turn to those states who minted on pre-existing standards. The standards considered are the Lydo-Milesian, Aeginetan, Phocaic, Chian, Attic-Euboic, Corinthian, Persian and Rhodian.

¹³⁹ E. Mackil and P. van Alfen, 'Cooperative Coinage', in *Agoronomia: Studies in Money and Exchange Presented to John H. Kroll*, New York, 2006, p. 207. See also Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, pp. 83-4.

¹⁴⁰ Mackil and van Alfen, 'Cooperative Coinage', p. 207. For further discussion of Pegasi in Magna Graecia and Sicily, see Rowan, 'Coinage', p. 108.

¹⁴¹ States may have used itinerant Corinthian engravers rather than dies being made in Corinth and then transported to the minting states.

¹⁴² Indeed, Kallet/Kroll discussed how Corcyra's idiosyncratic approach to minting differed to the practices of many other Corinthian colonies in the region, see Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, p. 84.

¹⁴³ At least nine cities in Sicily and Magna Graecia were minting them, see Stroud, 'Silver coinage', p. 170.

For each of these standards, the focus will be on the rationale for the decisions by minting states. The major rationales were sending political messages and the extent to which states considered adopting specific standards would improve their coins' attractiveness in foreign markets.

Lydo-Milesian standard

The Lydo-Milesian standard, created by Miletus for its electrum and early silver coins, was subsequently adopted by several neighbouring and regional states. These states included Erythrai, Ephesus, Cycladic states such as Paros and Melos, Poseidion, Klazomenai, Teos, Samos, Cnidus, as well as Lindos and Ialysos on Rhodes. The primary motive for choosing to mint on this standard was to trade within pre-existing networks using coins based on this standard.¹⁴⁴ But sometimes other motives existed than trade. For instance, Paros' adoption of the standard was likely influenced by its closeness to Miletus, given Herodotus mentioned Parian arbitration at Miletus.¹⁴⁵ Milesian colonies may also have been demonstrating their solidarity with their founding state.

Some northern Aegean states also adopted the Lydo-Milesian standard even though they were not Milesian colonies. For example, several Chalcidic cities such as Torone, Sarmylia and Argilos minted on this standard for their early silver issues.¹⁴⁶ Further, some Thracian cities, such as Dikaia and Maroneia, used a reduced version of the Lydo-Milesian standard for their fractional electrum coins and Olynthus minted small denomination coins on this standard.¹⁴⁷ For all these northern states, their rationale was to make their coins attractive to Milesian and other traders. They all had important trade links with Miletus which imported ship building timbers, wine and silver from regional states.

Sometimes, states minted on this standard even after the destruction of Miletus c494 and the removal of Milesian trade links.¹⁴⁸ Lampsacus minted one issue of staters using this

¹⁴⁴ According to Psoma, trade occurred in '... fish, wine, cabbages, balsam, raisins, figs and other agricultural products as well as metals, bread, honey, marble and sponges', see Psoma, 'Monetary standards', p. 91.

¹⁴⁵ Hdt. 5.28-31.

¹⁴⁶ Psoma, 'Monetary standards', p. 91. For commentary on Olynthos, see Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, pp. 99-100.

¹⁴⁷ Psoma, 'Monetary standards', p. 91.

¹⁴⁸ As argued by Psoma about the decline in the standard's attractiveness, see Psoma, 'Monetary standards', p. 93.

weight standard for an unknown reason.¹⁴⁹ Akanthos began minting on this standard c 424, converting from the Attic-Euboic standard, when Brasidas convinced it to revolt from Athens.¹⁵⁰ The motivation for the change was to distance itself politically from Athens. Nevertheless, changing the weight standard allowed Akanthos to share coins within the trade networks with other Chalcidic states which still minted on this weight standard.¹⁵¹

Trade was once again the motive for Alexander I of Macedonia, who adopted a reduced version of this standard for his tetradrachms and fractional coins. His coins were thus attractive to Chalcidian traders, especially wine merchants, whose own states minted on this standard. This minting decision was, as Psoma argued, not affected by the need to fund any joint military action with Chalcidian cities.¹⁵²

Aeginetan standard

The Aeginetan standard, created by Aegina, became the most widely used standard during the late Archaic period, surviving for many decades into the Classical period.¹⁵³ The standard's importance quickly declined from 457 when Athens absorbed the island into its *arkhe*. Many states minted on the Aeginetan standard for at least some part of their minting history, particularly in the fourth century.¹⁵⁴ Whilst popular amongst many Peloponnesian states in the fifth century, after the Theban victory Leuctra, most Peloponnesian states minted on this standard, given it was also used by Thebes.¹⁵⁵ The notable exceptions were Corinth and some of its neighbours.

The standard was also applied by Delphi, the Phocians, Locrians and by Achaean states for their earliest coins, by the Boeotian states such as Tanagra, by Euboean states for a period until a shift in their allegiance to Athens; by Elis, Malis, Cyme, Theodosia, the Opuntian Locrians, Sicyon, Larisa, Orthe, the cities of Thessaly; and the federal coinages minted by

¹⁴⁹ Melville Jones, *Dictionary*, p. 129.

¹⁵⁰ Kagan, 'Mende', pp. 10-11 and p. 14. See also, Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, pp. 99-101.

¹⁵¹ Kagan, 'Mende', p. 16.

¹⁵² Psoma, 'Monetary standards', p. 92.

¹⁵³ Melville Jones, *Dictionary*, p. 2.

¹⁵⁴ See the table 2.1 at Figueira, *Aegina*, p. 81 for a summary of states minting coins on the Aeginetan standard and when they minted.

¹⁵⁵ For a discussion of the relevant literary sources, see G. Davis, 'Dating the drachmas in Solon's laws', *Historia*, 61, no. 2, 2012, p. 138.

Phocis, Thessaly and Boeotia.¹⁵⁶ Thasos and Abdera likely minted on a slightly reduced version of the standard.¹⁵⁷ Further, most of the Cycladic states minted on this standard after the end of the Athenian *arkhe*, including Cnidus, Paros, Keos, Naxos and Siphnos, with the notable exceptions of Delos and Melos. The Cretan states also minted coins on this standard or at a weight easily exchangeable with Aeginetan weight coins.¹⁵⁸ Teos converted from the Milesian to the Aeginetan standard before the end of the sixth century. Finally, the short-lived Amphictyonic coinage, minted in Delphi during 336-34, was also based on the Aeginetan weight standard.¹⁵⁹

As for the Lydo-Milesian standard, trade motivated many states to mint on the Aeginetan standard. From the late Archaic period, ubiquitous Aeginetan traders formed well-organised trade networks within which Aeginetan coins, or those of similar weights, were well-accepted and circulated in large volumes.¹⁶⁰ Every state that aligned its coins on this standard enlarged the size of its potential trading zones.

Despite trade being the primary motive, alternative rationales exist for some states adopting the Aeginetan standard. Some states minted on this standard to demonstrate political solidarity with Aegina rather than its main trading rival, Athens. Thus, for example, some Peloponnesian states minted Aeginetan weight coins even though for some period Aegina was a tributary state of Athens. The other rationale, most likely only a secondary consideration, was that paying soldiers, especially Peloponnesian soldiers, using coins based on the Aeginetan standard, was a well-accepted practice.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁶ Orthe used the Aeginetan weight standard for its main numismatic output, see E. Georgiou, 'The Coinage of Orthe', in *Kairos: Contributions to Numismatics in Honor of Basil Demetriadi*, U. Wartenberg and M. Amandry (eds.), New York, 2015, p. 63. See Figueira, *Power of Money*, p. 41, p. 77 and p. 122 and von Reden, *Money*, p. 70.

¹⁵⁷ Abdera's tristaters/octadrachms were based on the Aeginetan weight standard. Further, the coinages of neighbouring tribes (Ichna, Bisaltai, Orreskioi) were also likely based on a reduced version of the Aeginetan standard, see U. Wartenburg, 'Thraco-Macedonian bullion coinage in the fifth century B.C.: The case of Ichnai', in *Kairos: Contributions to Numismatics in Honor of Basil Demetriadi*, U. Wartenberg and M. Amandry (eds.), New York, 2015, p. 352.

¹⁵⁸ von Reden, *Money*, p. 84.

¹⁵⁹ E. Raven, 'The amphictyonic coinage of Delphi, 336-334 B.C.', *NC*, 10, no. 37/38, 1950, p. 11. For another discussion of this coinage, see J. Davies, 'Finance, Administration, and Realpolitik: The Case of Fourth-Century Delphi', in *Modus operandi. Essays in honour of Geoffrey Rickman*, M. Austin et al. (eds.), London, 1998, p. 8.

¹⁶⁰ See Ephorus cited at Strab. 8.6.16 for comment on minting silver Aeginetan coins.

¹⁶¹ Figueira, *Power of Money*, p. 160. Noting that coins designed, at least partly, to pay soldiers must also be usable in the markets in which soldiers traded.

Phocaic standard

The Phocaic standard was one of the less widely used major weight standards in the ancient Greek world. Its first application, the electrum coins of Phocaea, were not well received in many major states being perceived as of poor value.¹⁶² Nevertheless, even Athens was prepared to accept such coins when in dire financial circumstances.¹⁶³ Despite this negative attitude towards Phocaeian coins, several states adopted the Phocaic standard, including Ainos in Thrace, Dardanos, Phocaeian colonies in southern Magna Graecia such as Velia and Massalia, and Velia's neighbour, Poseidonia.¹⁶⁴ The standard was also adopted by, or likely influenced the coinages of, the Greek cities of Campania, with a slightly reduced version adopted by Cyme and Neapolis. Emporiae, another Phocaeian colony also minted on this standard.¹⁶⁵ Further, the standard may have influenced the fractional coinages of Aeolis, Troas and Mysia.¹⁶⁶ Mytilene also used the standard for its electrum coins through arrangements with Phocaea that will be discussed later in this chapter. Importantly, Cyzicus, the Milesian colony in Mysia, used the standard in minting its famous staters from the mid fifth century and for most of the fourth century. Cyzicene staters became the most popular trade currency in the Black Sea.

Trade motives dominated the rationale of those states choosing to mint on the Phocaeian standard. Such a motive is no more evident than Cyzicus' choice of a face design, which used a tuna fish on its earliest electrum fractions. For Phocaeian colonies, these trade motives were supplemented by a political statement of enduring close ties with Phocaea. Such loyalty need not have been to the detriment of local trade networks, if neighbouring states also chose, like Poseidonia did, to also mint on the Phocaeian standard.

¹⁶² Melville Jones, *Dictionary*, p. 186 and Eddy, 'Irregular amounts', p. 54.

¹⁶³ As in payments by Rhoiteion as discussed at Eddy, 'Irregular amounts', p. 54.

¹⁶⁴ Psoma, 'Monetary standards', p. 107. For a discussion of Massalian and Velian coins, see Rowan, 'Coinage', p. 112 and p. 113 respectively.

¹⁶⁵ Pere Pau Ripolles and Jean-Albert Chevillon, 'The Archaic Coinage of Emporion', *NC*, 173, 2013, p. 3.

¹⁶⁶ Psoma, 'Monetary standards', p. 93.

Chian Standard

In the sixth-century, Chios dabbled with minting coins on the Aeginetan, Attic-Euboic and Lydo-Milesian weight standards.¹⁶⁷ By the fifth century Chios finished such experimentation, deciding to create its own standard, minting various denominations primarily in silver, but also in electrum.¹⁶⁸

For most of the fifth century, no other state minted on the Chian standard. The first to do so was Rhodes after its *συνοικισμός* (synoecism) in 408/7, but its rationale, including whether it provided trade advantages, can only be speculated. Soon after Chios provided financial support to Sparta c405/4, many states supporting Sparta adopted the standard.¹⁶⁹ This adoption eventually spread to most Greek cities in Thrace, Bithynia, Mysia, Troas, Aeolis, Ionia, Cos, Caria, Smyrna, Colophon, Iasos and Idyma, Ainos and Thasos, Abydos, Miletus, Assos, Tenedos, Erythrai as well as those in Paphlagonia and possibly Lydia.¹⁷⁰ Abdera and neighbouring Maroneia minted on a reduced version of the standard, whilst some electrum staters of Mytilene and Lampsacus were also likely minted on the Chian standard.¹⁷¹ Samos also used this standard in the fourth century. As discussed earlier, states under Persian suzerainty continued to use this standard, especially during the fourth century. Interestingly, Persian satraps sometimes used this standard to mint coins for use in making military payments.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁷ A. Ellis-Evans, 'Mytilene, Lampsakos, Chios and the financing of the Spartan fleet (406-404)', *NC*, 176, 2016, p. 6. Chios was a rich and highly monetized state funded by substantial wine production.

¹⁶⁸ One-third staters of 2.6 g were struck from the 430s and these were the coins Thucydides (8.101.1) refers to as *tessarakostai*, see C. Roebuck, 'The grain trade between Greece and Egypt', *CPh*, 45, no. 4, 1950, p. 140. For commentary on Thucydides' mention of the fortieths, see Gomme, *Commentary*, Vol V, p. 346 and Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, p. 128.

¹⁶⁹ Thuc. 8.101.1. See discussion at Ellis-Evans, 'Financing the Spartan fleet', p. 14 and commentary at Simon Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides Volume III: Books 5.25-8.109*, Oxford, 2008, pp. 1043-4.

¹⁷⁰ Psoma, 'Monetary standards', p. 105. For example, all the 1000+ coins found in hoards deposited in Halicarnassus, c. 341/0, were minted on the Chian standard, see von Reden, *Money*, p. 80.

¹⁷¹ Roebuck, 'Grain trade', p. 240 and Ellis-Evans, 'Financing the Spartan fleet', p. 8.

¹⁷² Psoma, 'Monetary standards', p. 109.

Meadows argued that the Spartan admiral Lysander popularised the Chian weight standard because it suited his military funding needs.¹⁷³ Chian-weight coins were easily exchangeable with Aeginetan weight coinages used at the time by Sparta's Peloponnesian allies, the sigloi used by Sparta's Persian backers, as well as coins minted on the Lydo-Milesian or Attic-Euboic standards.¹⁷⁴ Regardless of this initial motivation, most states continuing to mint on this standard into the fourth century were motivated by the need for a trade coinage suitable for long-distance trade, rather than the need to show political solidarity with each other. Cities adopting the standard were likely linked by trade networks, traditionally using Chian-weight coins, because they were easily exchanged for other popular trade currencies.

Attic-Euboic standard

The Attic-Euboic standard was one of the most popular weight standards, even though it was not commonly used in Asia Minor, Thrace, the Black Sea and Lycia.¹⁷⁵ By the end of the Classical period, states that were minting, or had minted on the standard or a slightly modified version, included Macedonia, the Euboean states once aligned to Athens in the early 350s, Chalcis, Epirus, Karystos, some Cycladic states such as Tenos and Delos, Torone, Sermylea, Magnesia, Argilos and Ialysos on Rhodes, the cities of Cyrenaica, Apollonia, Mesambria, Klazomenai, Samos, Sigeion, Mende, Akanthos, Cos and Elaia. Mytilene and neighbouring states minted fractional coins on this standard.¹⁷⁶ The standard was also used towards the end of the sixth century by Sicilian states such as Syracuse, Himera, Gela, Aitna and Leontini, and by non-Greek Molossoi and Chaones tribes.¹⁷⁷ Even an unknown Persian satrap, possibly Tissaphernes, minted silver tetradrachms on this standard. As van Alfen argued, by the end of the fourth century this standard had become the most important single standard in the eastern Mediterranean.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷³ As discussed at Ellis-Evans, 'Financing the Spartan fleet', p. 11. For additional commentary, see Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, pp. 136-9.

¹⁷⁴ Eight Chian drachms equated to five Aeginetan drachms, whilst three Chian drachms equated to two sigloi, see Roebuck, 'Grain trade', p. 240.

¹⁷⁵ Gillan Davis and Kenneth Sheedy, 'Miltiades II and his alleged mint in the Chersonesos', *Historia*, 68, no. 1, 2019, p. 17. For a complete list of states, see von Reden, *Money*, Appendix 2.

¹⁷⁶ See discussion at Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, pp. 95-8.

¹⁷⁷ van Alfen, 'Archaic Coinage', 2014, p. 17. Both tribes minted some coins with Athena's head, see C. Papaevangeou-Genakos, 'The monetary systems of Epirus', in *Numismatic History and Economy in Epirus During Antiquity*, 2007, p. 132.

¹⁷⁸ van Alfen, 'Archaic Coinage', 2014, p. 11.

Understanding the motive for all these states choosing to align their coins on the Attic-Euboic standard must begin with the recognition by states that it would facilitate improved trade, especially in the eastern Mediterranean. van Alfen opined that when various states chose to align on this single standard, they created an informal Attic-Euboic monetary zone creating regional efficiencies.¹⁷⁹ For example, Torone, Sermylia and Argilos used it after abandoning the Lydo-Milesian standard, a decision explained by the impact ubiquitous Athenian tetradrachms had on international trade.¹⁸⁰ Alexander III discarded traditional Macedonian coin weights after recognising the pervasiveness of the Attic-Euboic standard in markets of value to Macedonia.¹⁸¹ Ranging further afield, even Syracuse chose to mint on this standard because it could be used in the native Sicel trade networks.¹⁸²

Supplementing trade-based motives, adopting the Attic-Euboic standard sometimes also satisfied military and political needs. Amongst Athens' allies, being able to make military payments in Attic-weight coins facilitated the support of Athens and its allied forces. Politically, choosing to mint on this standard communicated solidarity with Athens, which was important for some of its allies in either its fifth-century *arkhe* or fourth-century confederacy. However, sometimes the political motivation for the standard's adoption was not to show support for Athens. For instance, by choosing the standard, but using Macedonian symbols on its faces, Alexander likely intended to indirectly usurp the popular Athenian 'owls'.¹⁸³

Corinthian standard

States minting on the Corinthian standard likely included Corinthian colonies such as Leucas, Ambracia, Anactorium, Corcyra, Argos Amphiloichikon, Apollonia and Dyrrhachium. Other states included Cephallenia, Zacynthus, Phleious, Pheneos and Kleonai, the cities of Acarnania and the Achaean colonies of Southern Magna Graecia.¹⁸⁴ Further, the early coins of Gela, Selinus and Akragas were Corinthian-weight staters.¹⁸⁵ The standard's

¹⁷⁹ P. Van Alfen, 'Problems in the political economy of ancient Greek coinage', *Notae Numismaticae*, 7, 2012, p. 29.

¹⁸⁰ Tselekas, 'Silver coin production', p. 171.

¹⁸¹ Weir, 'Interpretation', p. 138.

¹⁸² van Alfen, 'Archaic Coinage', 2014.

¹⁸³ Weir, 'Interpretation', p. 138.

¹⁸⁴ For a discussion of how some Sicilian states used Corinthian Pegasi directly, see Rowan, 'Coinage', p. 109 and p. 116.

¹⁸⁵ Rowan, 'Coinage', p. 107.

adoption by Corinthian colonies was unlikely to have been a Corinthian requirement, given not all its colonies minted on this standard. For example, Poteidaia minted coins on the Attic-Euboic standard, whilst Syracuse, Corinth's most famous settlement, usually minted on other standards.¹⁸⁶

Most cities minted on this standard to serve their own trading needs. For example, Psoma argued that coins on the Corinthian standard facilitated the grain trade with Sicily.¹⁸⁷ Corinthian-weight coins also helped fund Corinthian military operations such as the war against Corcyra. Sometimes there were specific reasons. For instance, Salmon argued that a consideration for Leucas choosing this standard was the benefit of using Corinthian-weight coins for payment at the Corinthian *diolkos* discussed in Chapter Two.¹⁸⁸

Persian standard

Some Greek states within Asia Minor, with the freedom to make their own minting decisions, chose to mint coins on the Persian weight standard. They were most likely motivated by their ties with the Persian Empire and the volume of trade for which Persian-weight coins were the preferred medium of exchange. For example, Lampsacus in Mysia issued both gold, silver and electrum coins on the Persian standard. Ephesus, Phaselis and Colophon also applied this standard even though many other Ionian states did not adopt it.

At various times during the Classical period many other Greek states outside Asia Minor also chose to adopt the Persian standard.¹⁸⁹ These states included Kos, Halicarnassus, Ainos, Amisus, Trapezous, Astacus, Heraclea in Bithynia, Perinthus in Propontic Thrace and states of the Thracian Chersonnese such as Kardia.¹⁹⁰ A lighter version of the Persian standard was adopted by Nymphaion, Chersonnesus, Pantikapaion in the Cimmerian Bosphorus, as well as Theodosia and Phanagoreia. Decisions to mint on this standard, by

¹⁸⁶ Note the uncertainty whether one Corinthian coin was a double Corinthian stater or an Attic tetradrachm, see Psoma, 'Monetary standards', p. 101.

¹⁸⁷ Psoma, 'Monetary standards', p. 100.

¹⁸⁸ Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, p. 275.

¹⁸⁹ Psoma, 'Monetary standards', p. 106.

¹⁹⁰ Davis and Sheedy, 'Miltiades II', pp. 20-21. Kardia had trade links with Ainos, which would have motivated it to mint coins at the same weights.

Greek states not subject to Persian suzerainty, reflected they were still trading within Persian-influenced networks dominated by the use of Persian-weight coins.

Other states

Reviewing the minting choices by some other states provides further insights into the ways states made coinage decisions to influence the behaviours of other states and their traders. Whilst many states adopted a pre-existing weight standard, for common trade or political or motives, other states made their decision influenced by their specific circumstances. The states to be discussed are Rhodes, Lampsacus, Sparta, Melos, Byzantium, Cyzikus, Kythnos and the states of Magna Graecia.

Rhodes

After the synoecism of the Rhodian states in 408, the resultant state no longer minted coins based on the Attic-Euboic standard. Instead, it minted coins at new weights, including the Chian standard, that made its coins less attractive amongst other states and their traders.¹⁹¹ Whilst there is insufficient evidence to understand the rationale properly, the decision was most likely intended to help convey a political message of independence, albeit recognising it may have created adverse economic benefits.

Lampsacus

Lampsacus minted coins on various weight standards, such as the Persian, not to send political messages but to be attractive within specified trade networks. Further, Lampsacus minted gold staters on its own standard. These coins became internationally recognised and a popular trade coin in foreign markets.¹⁹² For example, Byzantium contributed 584 Lampsacene gold staters (as well as 16 Attic silver drachms) to the Boeotians for the conduct of the fourth-century Sacred War.¹⁹³

¹⁹¹ For a discussion on whether the new Rhodian weights (drachma c 3.9g) may have been adapted from the Chian weight standard, see Howgego, *Coins*, p. 95. See also discussion at K. Sheedy, 'Asia Minor in the Archaic and Classical Periods', *A Survey of Numismatic Research*, 65, 2009, p. 10 regarding the eventual withdrawal of Rhodian tetradrachms of Chian weight.

¹⁹² J. Kroll, 'Minting for export: Athens, Aegina, and others', in *Nomisma: la circulation monétaire dans le monde grec antique*, BCH Supplement 53, T. Faucher et al. (eds.), Athens, 2012, p. 34. Thompson argued Lampsacene coins were likely considered of equivalent value as the Phocaeian and Mytilenean staters, see W. Thompson, 'The Official Tariff of the Kyzikene Stater at Athens', AC, 40, no. 2, 1971, p. 581.

¹⁹³ Howgego, 'Striking coins', p. 12.

Sparta

Sparta did not mint coins during the late Archaic and Classical periods, even though it had the capacity to do so, especially after victory in the Peloponnesian war when it had access to sufficient bullion and coins from other states. Consequently, Sparta could not use coins to send political messages, promote trade or act as common currency for payments amongst the Peloponnesian League.¹⁹⁴ Further, Sparta discouraged, and at one time prohibited, the coins of other states to circulate within Spartan controlled territory.¹⁹⁵ Spartiates were prohibited from owning coins, with a literary tradition that Lycurgus introduced this prohibition, making cumbersome and inconvenient iron bars the means of storing wealth.¹⁹⁶ No recognisable specimen of such a currency has survived.

Melos

Melos minted on an existing weight standard, but one that constraining their coins' attractiveness within some trade networks. The Cycladic islands were among the first of the Greeks to mint silver coins, perhaps as early as around 540, with most coins minted on either the well-accepted Aeginetan or Attic-Euboic standards. However, Melos chose to use the less popular Lydo-Milesian standard. until minting ceased with the Athenian takeover in 416.¹⁹⁷ Consequently, no Melian coins have been found outside the island. Insufficient evidence exists to understand the motive for using the latter standard, that is to understand whether it was intended as a strong symbol of political autonomy or indeed whether undeterminable economic benefit flowed to Melos.

Byzantium

Byzantium only minted silver coins, based on either the Chian or Persian standards, from very late in the fifth century. Previously it remained content to use the coins of other

¹⁹⁴ Ober, *Rise and Fall*, p. 228. Sparta did not mint coins until the third century. For one description of Sparta's attitude towards wealth in its various forms, see Plut. *Lyc.* 9.1-4.

¹⁹⁵ Ober, *Rise and Fall*, p. 142.

¹⁹⁶ Plut. *Lyc.* 9.1-5. For further mentions of Spartan iron currency, see Plb. 6.49. See discussions at Melville Jones, *Dictionary*, p. 121; Melville Jones, *Testimonia*, Vol 2, p. 213; Figueira, *Aegina*, pp. 76-7 and Jacqueline Christien, 'Iron money in Sparta: Myth and history', in *Sparta Beyond the Mirage*, Anton Powell and Stephen Hodkinson (eds.), Swansea, 2002, pp. 171-90.

¹⁹⁷ Figueira, *Power of Money*, pp. 68-9.

states.¹⁹⁸ However, it also likely produced unusual iron coins, no examples of which have survived given iron deteriorates.¹⁹⁹ Whilst the iron coins were not designed for use in foreign markets, Byzantium could impose their use on foreign traders within its *chora*. This imposition was possible given its critical geographic location prevented many traders from avoiding trading in Byzantium.²⁰⁰ When Byzantium needed to make interstate payments it used the coins of other states. For example, Byzantium contributed 16 Attic silver drachms to the Boeotians for the conduct of the Sacred War between 355-351.²⁰¹

Cyrene

Sometimes the rationale for minting on a specific standard remains unknown. For example, the earliest coins minted in Cyrene at the end of the sixth century were based on the Attic-Euboic weight standard. Some scholars argue that given Cyrene's political ties to the Peloponnese, Cyclades, and Crete, one would have expected minting on the Aeginetan standard. Van Alfen discussed the minting rationale and arguments against the Attic Euboic being chosen to facilitate long-distance trade.²⁰² He argued that little direct or circumstantial evidence suggests that Cyrene selected the Attic-Euboic weight standard to facilitate trade with the Euboians or Athenians.²⁰³

¹⁹⁸ The dating of minting in Byzantium remains debated, see discussions at Melville Jones, *Testimonia Vol II*, p. 181, N. Cross, 'Silver coinage, symmachia, and interstate society: Byzantium and Athens in the classical age', *Distant Worlds Journal*, 4, 2020, p. 178 and L. Nixon and S. Price, 'The size and resources of Greek cities', in *The Greek City: From Homer to Alexander*, O. Murray and S. Price (eds.), Oxford, 1990, p. 153 and p. 158. The reason for not minting in silver may have been the plentiful supply of foreign coins and because accessing silver bullion was difficult, the nearest supply being 250 km away at Astyra, see Cross, 'Byzantium and Athens', p. 179.

¹⁹⁹ Aristoph. *Cl.* 249. Note also the emergency issue of iron coins at Klazomenai in the fourth century, see Melville Jones, *Dictionary*, p. 121.

²⁰⁰ Other states also restricted foreign coins. For example, at Olbia and Chersonesos only the local coinage could be used in buying and selling, see H. Michell, *The Economics of Ancient Greece*, Cambridge 1957, p. 228.

²⁰¹ Howgego, 'Striking coins', p. 12.

²⁰² P. van Alfen, 'The Beginnings of Coinage at Cyrene: Weights Standards, Trade, and Politics', *Vth International Congress of Numismatics and History of Coinage*, 2016, p. 15.

²⁰³ van Alfen, 'Beginnings of Coinage', p. 25.

Cyzikus

Cyzikus, in the Propontis, created electrum coins at its own weights in a wide range of denominations.²⁰⁴ These coins survived as a popular trade currency until the time of Alexander the Great, being especially dominant in the Black Sea and Propontis.²⁰⁵ Merchants seeking grain and other commodities at Black Sea ports were obliged to do most of their business using Cyzicene coins. In comparison, these were not the dominant currency in Hellespont markets, but circulated alongside Athenian, Persian, and even local currencies.²⁰⁶

Cyzicene coins were widely used by many states, including Athens, being found in hoards in South Russia, Romania, Bulgaria and Athens.²⁰⁷ Many other states chose to make payments using Cyzicene coins, including tribute payments to Athens.²⁰⁸ The Athenians even allocated a sum of Cyzicene gold staters to their own trierarchs for operations off Argos in 418/417.²⁰⁹ Other states, for example Chios and Mytilene, designed their coins with faces that one can infer would make them attractive in those trading regions where Cyzicene staters were the preferred currency. Further, the Odrysian kings used Cyzicenes for trade and taxation revenues until replaced by the Macedonian gold staters minted by Philip II.²¹⁰

Apart from the trade value of Cyzicene coins, Cyzicus sometimes chose face designs to demonstrate its close relationship with Athens, especially in the fifth century. Several issues depicted Athenian mythology and, possibly after Athens' coinage decree, Cyzicus issued Athenian weight electrum coins faced with Athenian owls and their own tuna fish design.²¹¹

²⁰⁴ Cyzicene staters weighed 16g and Cyzicene hektai (1/6th of a stater) weighed 2.5 gr. For a discussion about the relative value of Cyzicene staters compared to other currencies, see Thompson, 'Kyzikene Stater', p. 588 and Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, p. 43.

²⁰⁵ Howgego, *Coins*, p. 8. Cyzikus also minted small-denomination silver coins for its internal use.

²⁰⁶ Eddy, 'Irregular amounts', p. 53.

²⁰⁷ Eddy, 'Irregular amounts', p. 50. For two centuries the Cyzicenes were a standard currency in the Hellespont and all over the Pontic area, see A. Bresson, 'Electrum coins, currency exchange and transaction costs in Archaic and Classical Greece', *RBN*, 140, 2009. pp. 8-9.

²⁰⁸ In *IG I³* 259 (454), payments in Cyzicene staters were listed separately.

²⁰⁹ *IG I²* 302 lines 16-19 (OR 170) lists the disbursement of at least 4,000 Cyzicene staters.

²¹⁰ Paunov, 'Numismatics of Thrace', p. 268.

²¹¹ See Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, pp. 140-1.

Kythnos

Kythnos, an island in the western Cyclades, minted coins of unusual weight not corresponding to any existing standard. Instead, the chosen weights appeared to be easily exchangeable with coins based both on the Aeginetan standard and the Attic-Euboic standard. Sheedy correctly suggested the Kythnians chose a weight and fractional denominations that ‘fitted’ the two systems and in doing so were able to accommodate the various weight coins they were offered in trade.²¹²

Magna Graecia and Sicily

Several Greek states in Southern Italy, including Caulonia, Croton, Metapontum, Poseidonia, Sybaris, and Taras, minted coins at distinctive weights not used anywhere. The motive for choosing these weights was to facilitate trade amongst themselves rather than foreign markets, with hoard evidence showing these coins were rarely used outside of southern Magna Graecia.²¹³ In contrast, the Greek colonies in Sicily usually used the weight standard of their mother cities.²¹⁴

Delphic Amphicytony

During the fourth century, the Delphic *Amphicytony*, during short issues, minted silver coins on the Aeginetan standard, bearing its own name and produced by melting other states’ coins.²¹⁵ No evidence exists they circulated widely outside Delphi and there were probably just used for *Amphicytony* payments such as paying for building construction.²¹⁶ Apart from

²¹² K Sheedy, 'Some thoughts on the Cycladic mints of Kythnos and Seriphos', in *Διεθνής Διημερίδα Νομισματικής «Μάντω Οικονομίδου» Αθήνα, 20–21 Απριλίου 2016 Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου Της Ζ΄ Επιστημονικής Συνάντησης Αφιερωμένης Στη Μνήμη Της Μάντως Οικονομίδου*, E. Papaefthymiou (ed.), Athens, 2018, p. 74. These coins nearly all weighed 4 g and thus could pass as Aeginetan standard tetrobols or light Attic-Euboic drachms (4.3 g).

²¹³ van Alfen, 'Archaic Coinage', 2014, p. 14. See also discussion in Psoma, 'Thraco-Macedonian standard', p. 167.

²¹⁴ von Reden, *Money*, p. 71.

²¹⁵ For a discussion of *Amphicytonic* coins and their dating, see Kroll, 'Reminting', p. 229; S. Dmitriev, 'The rise and quick fall of the theory of ancient economic imperialism', *The Economic History Review*, 62, no. 4, 2009, p. 32; Howgego, 'Striking coins', p. 6 and P. Kinns, 'The Amphictionic Coinage Reconsidered', *NC*, 143, 1983, p. 2.

²¹⁶ S. Psoma, 'Profitable Networks: Coinages, Panegyris and Dionysiac Artists', *MHR*, 22, no. 2, 2007, p. 241. For a further discussion of the relationship between Siphnian coins and various weight standards, see Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, pp. 51-2.

displaying the independence of the *Amphicytony*, no evidence exists they were used as an economic measure to influence trade.

Siphnos

Siphnos first minted silver coins during the period c540-525, with their silver staterers minted on the Aeginetan standard.²¹⁷ However, in the fourth century, and likely unique amongst the Cycladic states, it produced one issue of gold coinage, a drachm or hemi-stater on the Attic weight standard.²¹⁸ The rationale was likely to allow Siphnians to trade effectively in trade networks that commonly used Attic-weight coins. Alternatively, as discussed by Sheedy *et al*, Siphos may have minted the coins for use in its *syntaxeis* to Athens discussed in Chapter Five.²¹⁹

Monetary Agreements

Apart from the means already discussed, other means were available for states to use their coinage as an economic measure. One such means was to enter into a monetary agreement with other states, with such agreements motivated by a mix of political, economic, military or religious reasons. Sometimes such arrangements resulted from metoikesis, the voluntary relocation of states, which may have resulted in monetary coordination.²²⁰ The economic motivations included a desire to facilitate trade amongst the minting states as well as simplifying taxation payments. Shared minting arrangements also allowed the sharing of accrued profit through designated minting charges.

Many monetary agreements can be inferred from hoard studies but usually the evidence is not conclusive.²²¹ States minting similar coins could result from interstate agreements, but sometimes were simply one state imitating the coins of another. As Mackil/van Alfen argued,

²¹⁷ Kenneth A. Sheedy *et al*, 'Elemental Composition of Gold and Silver Coins of Siphnos', in *Metallurgy in Numismatics 6: Mines, Metals, and Money: Ancient World Studies in Science, Archaeology and History*, Kenneth A. Sheedy and Gillan Davis (eds.), London, 2020, p. 156.

²¹⁸ Sheedy *et al*, 'Siphnos', pp. 151-2.

²¹⁹ Sheedy *et al*, 'Siphnos', pp. 152-3.

²²⁰ See discussion at van Alfen, 'Metoikesis', p. 632. For a broader study of metoikesis, especially its motives, see Nancy H. Demand, *Urban Relocation in Archaic and Classical Greece: flight and consolidation*, Norman, 1990 and van Alfen, 'Metoikesis'.

²²¹ For a discussion of the monetary unions that have been posited, see Mackil and van Alfen, 'Cooperative Coinage', pp. 201-3. Further, circumstantial evidence exists for a monetary union in southern Italy, see van Alfen, 'Archaic Coinage', 2014, pp. 15-6.

the premise that shared types indicates cooperative arrangements is questionable, especially when only based on numismatic evidence.²²² Thus, for example, using common coins as evidence for a Boeotian confederacy during the late Archaic period remains fraught.²²³ Similarly questionable is whether a monetary union existed between Byzantium in Thrace and Chalcedon in Bithynia, which minted similar silver coins at the end of the fifth century.²²⁴

Similarly, the mints at Karthaia, Ioulis, and Koresia on Keos, sometime in the decade 520-510, decided to add a common symbol, a dolphin, to their independent coins. Rather than a monetary union, it probably signified an agreement that coins of each state would be accepted as legal currency (and not simply bullion) throughout the island.²²⁵ Further, the common billon coinage of the Lesbian states, for trade use amongst themselves, may indicate some sort of cooperative federal agreement.²²⁶ Likewise, the decision of the Chalcidians to issue some joint coins c424 indicated their intent to express solidarity against Athens.²²⁷

The political arrangements between Teos in Asia Minor and its colony, Abdera in Thrace, remains uncertain, but there were similarities amongst their coin face designs indicating some form of monetary arrangement, even though they were minted on different weight standards with no common alloys and denominations.²²⁸ As van Alfen argued, the arrangement was symbolic of long-standing ties between the two states but had little economic significance.

The only monetary agreement with clear epigraphic evidence was a bilateral agreement between Phocaea, a polis on mainland Asia Minor, and Mytilene on Lesbos, about 80 km to

²²² Mackil and van Alfen, 'Cooperative Coinage', p. 205.

²²³ Noting Chapter Five mentions other evidence for such a confederacy.

²²⁴ For a discussion of minting by Chalcedon, see Inci Turkoglu, 'The civic coinage of Chalcedon', *Proceedings: First International Congress of the Anatolian Monetary History and Numismatics*, 2013, pp. 589-91. Arguably, Chalcedon minted coins, at different times, on the Rhodian, Attic-Euboean and Persian standards.

²²⁵ See Kenneth A. Sheedy, *The Archaic and Early Classical Coinages of the Cyclades*, London, 2006, p. 3. Sheedy noted the Babelon suggestion that the '... intermittent use of the dolphin as a subsidiary symbol could be taken as evidence of a commercial and monetary league in the Cyclades, such as existed between Phocaea and Lesbos.'

²²⁶ See Lazzarini, 'Lesbos Billon', pp. 83-111.

²²⁷ See discussion at Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, p. 100.

²²⁸ See discussion at van Alfen, 'Metoikesis', pp. 637-9.

the north.²²⁹ This agreement, which cannot be dated more precisely than the latter half of the fifth century, was the most enduring cooperative monetary arrangement known from antiquity, producing 189 coin issues over two centuries.²³⁰ The agreement did not apply to all the coins minted by the two states, only to their electrum hektai (one-sixth staters), weighing about 2.5g and based on the Phocaic standard.²³¹ The states agreed the gold/silver ratio to be used and that they would share their minting, so each state produced coins in alternate years for use by both states. The Mytileneans obtained, by lot, the right to mint first.²³²

A political motive for the agreement was unlikely, given the lack of political support each had previously provided to each other.²³³ Nor can such a shared political motive be inferred from the face designs, since these remained at the discretion of each city.²³⁴ Further, no evidence exists the two states needed a common coin to fund any joint military expenses.

In the absence of a political motive, some scholars justifiably argue that the agreement was simply a joint profit-making arrangement between the two states, through producing coins attractive in regions which traditionally preferred electrum coins.²³⁵ The intrinsic value of electrum coins could be varied by varying the ratio of gold to silver, allowing profits to be generated in regions where the coins were traded at their nominal value. By pooling their resources, and ensuring the coins were minted at stable weights and alloys, the two states could better compete with the popular Cyzicene electrum coins.

²²⁹ An inscription IG XII 2, 1 found at Mytilene in 1852, see Tod 112 discussed at M. Tod (ed.), *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions Volume II From 403 to 323 B.C.*, Oxford, 1948, pp. 34-6. For further discussion, see J. Healy, 'Notes on the monetary union between Mytilene and Phokaia', *JHS*, 77, no. Part 2, 1957, p. 267.

²³⁰ Some commentators consider the agreement renewed long-standing arrangements. See, for example, A Heisserer, 'IG XII, 2, 1 (The monetary pact between Mytilene and Phokaia)', *ZPE*, 55, 1984, pp. 119 and 123. See also Mackil and van Alfen, 'Cooperative coinages', p. 212.

²³¹ The staters of Phocaea mentioned in Thuc. 4.52.2 refer to coins weighing about 16.1 grams and minted from electrum. Phocaeian electrum staters were probably worth about twenty-four Athenian drachms, see Strassler (ed.), *Thucydides*, p. 251 and Ellis-Evans, 'Financing the Spartan fleet' p. 1. van Alfen commented the purpose for minting much joint electrum coinage is unknown, see van Alfen, 'Metoikesis', p. 633.

²³² Heisserer, 'Monetary pact', p. 116.

²³³ For example, there is no evidence the Phocaeans took any supporting action when Mytilene revolted from Athens in 428.

²³⁴ Where arguments have been made for other monetary agreements, states typically minted a common obverse design with the reverse designs denoting the individual states.

²³⁵ Primarily, Thrace, the Propontis, and the Black Sea, see Mackil and van Alfen, 'Cooperative Coinage', p.213. For a discussion of profit margins in minting electrum coins, see Mackil and van Alfen, 'Cooperative Coinage', p. 217 and Martin, *Sovereignty*, p. 208.

Another cooperative monetary agreement occurred soon after the Peloponnesian War when several Ionian and island states minted a common coinage.²³⁶ The weight of the stater equalled three Chian drachms or two Persian sigloi. The agreement had been generated by Lysander's initiatives discussed earlier in this chapter. Another potential monetary agreement for which little evidence exists, but is proposed by certain modern writers, occurred between Thasos and Paros.²³⁷ Insufficient evidence exists to determine whether both these agreements represented economic statecraft, although one can argue that any interstate agreement to raise revenue would create *eunoia*.

Findings

Having examined the minting decisions made by a cross section of major and minor states, what conclusions can be drawn? The first conclusion recognises that states did not often directly participate in trade, leaving trade to the initiative and enterprise of individual private citizens and metics, and with wealthier citizens providing various form of finance. Nevertheless, states wanted this trade to be successful and thus they provided coins designed to maximise its chance of success. In minting these coins, states had alternative approaches, from which they could select the approach best-suited to their circumstances.

The first of these approaches was to design coins to make them attractive in the markets of interest to the minting state and its traders. If the coins were designed for foreign markets in which their use could not be imposed, then the coins needed to be designed so they would overcome a natural reluctance to accept new foreign coins.²³⁸ The easiest method was to mint coins using materials and a weight standard popular in the specific markets because their widespread use reduced transaction costs. In summarising the advantages of common weight standards, Psoma commented that such standards expanded markets and improved commercial relations by facilitating the exchange of coins amongst merchants from different

²³⁶ The obverse of all coins displayed Heracles strangling snakes whilst each state chose its own reverse design, see von Reden, *Money*, p. 80.

²³⁷ For example, Kagan's argument as discussed by van Alfen at van Alfen, 'Metoikesis', p. 646, n66.

²³⁸ Charikleia Papageorgiadou and Eleni Gkadolou, 'Archaic coin hoards and maritime connectivity in the Eastern Mediterranean', in *Port Cities of the Aegean World: Coins, Seals and Weights*, Ceren Unal et al. (eds.), Manisa, 2018, p. 265. As an example of prejudice, see the comments in Aristoph. *Ach.*, line 515.

states.²³⁹ In providing such coins, states had to mint at consistent weights and purity so the coins were attractive because of their actual bullion value. To sustain the attractiveness of their coins, states also had to keep sufficient new coins in circulation to counter debasement by natural wear and tear and the coins' removal from the relevant markets.

This chapter discussed multiple examples of states minting on existing weight standards, by far the most popular approach. Importantly, a single state with sufficient bullion could mint on different standards for different markets. The alternative was to mint coins that were not the same weights used in the targeted markets but were easily exchangeable. In the absence of any formal exchange rates amongst coins, its weight and material primarily determined its attractiveness. Thus, if a state's coin could be directly exchanged, for example, for two well-accepted foreign coins, then *ceteris paribus*, the new coin may be attractive. But a coin worth an unusual fraction of an accepted coin may not be taken up in a specific market.²⁴⁰ Thus, for example, in a market dominated by Aeginetan weight coins, a state could choose to mint on this standard. Alternatively, it may choose to mint on the Chian standard, with two Chian tetradrachms, weighing up to 31.2g, considered equivalent to five Aeginetan drachms.

A more uncertain approach was to mint at new weights and adequate purity, circulating sufficient quantities with the intent the coins would become acceptable in specific markets as a recognised trade coin. States understood the need to secure the largest possible circulation, so their coins were always available in sufficient quantities for use by the traders of foreign states.²⁴¹ Maintaining sufficient circulation was not something achievable solely by the minting state, but needed the assistance of private individuals. As Kroll argued, at least in Athens private citizens introduced coins into trade markets through their private trade dealings. That is, the volume of coins minted was less a matter of state policy and more based on commercial imperatives. But Kroll recognised that minting and the introduction of coins into circulation required collaboration involving private as well as governmental

²³⁹ Psoma, 'Monetary standards', p. 90. Psoma also argued a common weight standard between states also facilitated military finances, tribute and other interstate payments.

²⁴⁰ For example, sometimes *electrum hektai* were considered roughly equivalent to Attic tetradrachms, see Figueira, 'Economic integration', p. 79.

²⁴¹ For example, see the discussion by Xenophon at Xen. *Ways* 4.10 about economic supply and demand in connection with the values of precious metals.

participation.²⁴² Given the imperative to circulate coins in large volumes, the approach of trying to create new trade coins was usually only available to minting states with large bullion supplies. Thus, for example, Athens could generate sufficient quantities of its ubiquitous silver tetradrachms for them to become the most popular trade coinage in several markets.

If the minting state controlled a targeted market, another approach was available. Most of these markets fell within the state's chora, so there was no need to design the coins to be attractive to foreign traders. The minting states could simply impose the use of the coins, either as the only allowable coin or in competition with foreign coins. Thus, for example, Byzantium imposed iron coins on internal markets that many foreign traders could not avoid. Even when more traditional coins were minted, a state did not need to sustain consistent weights and purities. The state simply had to guarantee the value and provide sufficient circulation so any allowable foreign coins did not play a disproportionate role in market transactions.²⁴³

Another variation of this approach, only available to hegemonies who could control markets in subject states, was to impose their coins on subservient states. Mandating a single hegemonic coinage would have made a political statement of internal cohesion. Nevertheless, most hegemonic states did not suppress the coinage of subordinate states with a sliding scale of interference in minting decisions.²⁴⁴ In particular, neither Persia, Athens nor Macedonia took this approach during the period under review.²⁴⁵ But exceptions occurred, such as Croton dictating the designs of coins minted by Sybaris after the latter's defeat in 510.²⁴⁶

The second defensible conclusion is that trade was not always the motive for a state's minting decisions. Whilst promoting trade was the primary driver for most minting states,

²⁴² Kroll, 'Minting for Export', p. 37.

²⁴³ Figueira, 'Economic integration', p. 72. Further, Figueira argued (p. 76) most states could not sustain a monopoly for its own coins in local markets.

²⁴⁴ For example, Martin discussed the incorrect but common opinion that the end of minting specific coins, when corresponding to the minting state being subordinated politically to a more powerful state, must have been because the coinage was suppressed. He discussed the case of Thessaly in which such a supposition was incorrect, see Martin, *Sovereignty*, p. 13.

²⁴⁵ Although conjecture remains in some circumstances, such as Hammond's view that Athens prevented Macedonia from issuing coins in a defined period, see Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia Vol II*, p. 133.

²⁴⁶ van Alfen, 'Archaic Coinage', 2014, p. 16.

sufficient evidence exists to demonstrate states understood the propaganda value of their coins, using them to make political statements such as their ongoing political power and stability.²⁴⁷ At the extreme, states could choose to demonstrate political solidarity by using the coins of another state, as was displayed by various states subject to Persian suzerainty, but free to make their own coinage decisions. Nevertheless, a state's voluntary adoption of another state's coins, instead of minting its own, was not common. Usually, political statements were simply made by choosing face designs emblematic of the minting state, with greater importance given to consistent designs on the obverse face. Until inscriptions were placed on coin faces from the late fifth century, the designs needed to be instantly recognisable to express clearly the intended political statement. Whilst experimentation always occurred, by c475 about 89% of early and persistent minters had standardised on one or two designs.²⁴⁸ Such standardisation focused on coins intended for use in foreign markets, with lower-value coins intended for local consumption less likely to have consistent face designs.²⁴⁹

Before discussing the political effect of face designs one should recognise their trade value. Choosing a design recognisably from a specific state was important in providing confidence in the coin's provenance, that it was both a valid coin and minted in accordance with the purity standards of the minting state. But equally, perhaps of greater importance was that face designs sent overt political statements about the state's power, autonomy, independence and identity. Thucydides referred several times to the importance of financial strength to Athens as a symbol of its power.²⁵⁰

Some examples of carefully chosen face designs are illustrative. As Howgego related, 'The coins of Elaeusa, Seleucia, Laodicea, Tripolis, and Ascalon all blazoned their new autonomy.'²⁵¹ Prior to the Peloponnesian war, Poteidaia, whilst still likely a tribute-paying member of the Athenian *arkhe* minted coins expressing solidarity with Corinth.²⁵² Shortly

²⁴⁷ Noting van Alfen argued the iconography of Greek coins were less explicitly political than Roman coins, see Van Alfen, 'Problems', p. 23.

²⁴⁸ Weir, 'Interpretation', p. 127.

²⁴⁹ Weir, 'Interpretation', p. 127.

²⁵⁰ Thuc. 1.122.1, 143.5, 2.13.2 and 3.46.3.

²⁵¹ Howgego, *Coins*, p. 41.

²⁵² See discussion at Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, p. 86.

after 371 Stymphalos, an Arcadian state, minted coins displaying Artemis on the obverse and a fighting Herakles on the reverse. The design choice has been interpreted as sending a clear message to a defeated Sparta that liberty has vanquished Spartan tyranny.²⁵³ Further, Rhegion and Samos shared common coin symbols promoting their connection.²⁵⁴ Similarly, after 405, seven states in Asia Minor formed a pro-Spartan alliance, sharing a symbol of Heracles on one face.²⁵⁵ In contrast, at one time the coin face designs of Aineia, Assos, Dardanos, Eliaia and Ialysos sent a message of political loyalty to another state, namely Athens.²⁵⁶ Another political statement could be a decision to mint coins dissimilar to those previously dominant. For example, after the Peloponnesian War, some states allied to Sparta minted tridrachm silver coins, arguably as an overt rejection of Athens' dominant tetradrachms.²⁵⁷

For colonies, the classic example of coin designs demonstrating solidarity with the founding state were the various Corinthian colonies in northwest Greece, which proudly displayed the Pegasi symbol on their coins' obverse, coupled with a letter or monogram indicating the minting state.²⁵⁸ In contrast, some states that could claim to be Athenian colonies did not display Attic symbols.²⁵⁹ Indeed, apart from Attic imitations, only Mytilene used Attic symbols in two separate single years of minting electrum hektai.²⁶⁰

Other political statements could be sent by the sharing of face designs by minting states within a league. For example, members of the Boeotian League shared the design of the Boeotian shield. Indeed, Fowler argued that the use of this symbol by Tanagra, for its coins minted c479 to 456, was designed to indicate it was issuing coins on behalf of all the Boeotian states as the leader of the league.²⁶¹ Interestingly, and not easily explained as an

²⁵³ Weir, 'Interpretation', p. 135.

²⁵⁴ Weir, 'Interpretation', pp. 144-5.

²⁵⁵ Howgego, *Coins*, p. 63.

²⁵⁶ Figueira, *Power of Money*, p. 73. For Ialysos, see also Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, p. 64.

²⁵⁷ Colin P. Elliott, 'The Role of Money in the Economies of Ancient Greece and Rome', in *Handbook of the History of Money and Currency*, S. et al. Battilossi (ed.), Singapore, 2018, p. 5.

²⁵⁸ Weir, 'Interpretation', p. 141.

²⁵⁹ Weir, 'Interpretation', p. 141.

²⁶⁰ For the later issue, the coins displayed both Athena's head and a standing owl, see Weir, 'Interpretation', p. 142.

²⁶¹ B. Fowler, 'Thucydides 1.107-108 and the Tanagran federal issues', *Phoenix*, II, no. 4, 1957, p. 170.

exception to the display of the shield, Orchomenos displayed sprouting grain on 99% of its coins.²⁶²

Sometimes minting states chose not to send political statement through their face designs. For example, some designs chosen by Mytilene, Lampsacus and Chios did not make a statement about the war that motivated their minting.²⁶³ Similarly, when Mytilene and Phocaea minted electrum hektai, under the agreement previously discussed, they used about 200 different face designs, which led Weir to comment that their ‘... tireless variety is deliberately contrived to thwart any sort of political interpretation’.²⁶⁴ As a final comment on face designs, their propaganda impact should not be overestimated since most Greek states never minted.²⁶⁵ As Martin insightfully argued, these states could not have had such a poor self-image that they forbade minting.²⁶⁶

The third conclusion recognises minting well-accepted coins could be profitable for the minting state. Most scholars agree ancient states could generate substantial profits from minting popular coins through the income received from charging minting fees to at least cover the cost of production (seigniorage).²⁶⁷ That is, the greater a coin’s popularity amongst foreign traders the more coins needed to be minted with the accompanying minting fees. At the extreme, as evidenced by the agreement between Phocaea and Mytilene, states could engage other states to share minting for their mutual economic benefit.

Once a state realised its weight standards and face designs were attractive, either to facilitate trade or fund joint military activity, they maintained them. As argued by Flament, states minting successful coins were not likely to intervene except in clearly deteriorating

²⁶² Weir, 'Interpretation', p. 137.

²⁶³ Ellis-Evans, 'Financing the Spartan fleet', p. 15.

²⁶⁴ Weir, 'Interpretation', p. 135.

²⁶⁵ Further, for example, by 431, nearly 200 tributary states or over two-thirds of the Athenian allies had never minted in precious metals, see Figueira, 'Economic integration', p. 75. On the same theme, Kallet/Kroll stated that of the approximately 200 communities subject to or allied with Athens, only 68 are known to have minted between 478 and 404, see Kallet and Kroll, *Coins as Sources*, p. 39.

²⁶⁶ Martin, 'Coins', p. 262.

²⁶⁷ See discussion in Van Alfen, 'Problems', p. 21 which discusses overvaluation of coins, through collected minting fees, as a primary motivations for coining. Note that a state, like Athens, minting popular coins, was much less constrained in its ability to import goods given other states were willing to hold the popular coins.

situations.²⁶⁸ The most obvious example is Athens, whose basic design of the owl coinage continued until Athens stopped minting silver coins in the first century.²⁶⁹ The likely only times a state made such decisions non-voluntarily was when occasionally coerced to adopt a different design by a political hegemon.

Debate continues on whether states' minting decisions were primarily economic or politically based, that is to promote trade and generate profits or to proclaim political statements. Both are forms of economic measures, with most states based their decisions on a mix of these motivations. For any state the success of its minting decisions varied markedly. At one extreme lied Athens which by the height of its imperial power, as Kroll rightly argued, minted silver coinage that strengthened both its commercial and political power.²⁷⁰ At the other extreme, were many states whose coins sent clear political messages but were not well accepted in foreign trade markets. Overall, only a handful of states minted coins that were accepted internationally and thus functioned as truly effective economic measures.

Conclusion

This chapter ends the analysis of different forms of economic measures: trade-related, capital-based and coinage. In particular, this chapter has discussed the various methods used by states, in their coin design, to influence other states, especially their community of traders. Unlike other types of measures, such coinage influence is almost always aimed positively, except for the coercive fifth-century Athenian coinage decree.

Whilst each chapter has made some initial findings, the next chapter will examine the ways that states integrated these measures to influence other states. That is, whilst examining various types of economic measures on isolation, greater insights are available when all measures are considered holistically and from a variety of different perspectives.

²⁶⁸ Christophe Flament, 'The Athenian Coinage, From Mines to Markets', *Journal of Ancient Civilizations*, 34, no. 2, 2019, p. 202.

²⁶⁹ van Alfen, 'Archaic Coinage', 2014, p.14.

²⁷⁰ Kroll, 'What about coinage?', p. 205.

CHAPTER SEVEN

DISCUSSION

Introduction

The preceding chapters described all the individual instances, for which evidence exists, of economic statecraft possibly being applied in the ancient Greek world until the end of the Classical Period. Appendix Four collates all of the 325 instances, in a broad chronological order, and categorises each from two perspectives, First, whether the instance was from a historicity viewpoint, ‘highly likely’, ‘likely’ or ‘unlikely’.¹ Second, using the same categories, whether the instance was a valid application of economic statecraft. These categorisations indicate that only 37 instances were unlikely from the historicity perspective, leaving 288 examples worthy of further analysis. Of these, a further 33 were unlikely to have been a valid example of economic statecraft, so are also excluded.

Earlier chapters described and analysed each of the remaining 255 examples in isolation. This chapter will now take a holistic view, analysing them from a variety of perspectives. Considered collectively, these various perspectives will answer the primary research question, namely ‘During the late Archaic and Classical periods, to what extent did states in the ancient Greek world use economic statecraft to influence other states in order to help achieve their desired objectives?’

The analysis will examine the types of economic measures applied, the categories into which they could be placed for better characterisation, the relative incidence of their use and the rationale for some measures being applied more often than others. Understanding the rationales will be informed by an explanation of the circumstances under which trade-based and capital based economic measures would be attractive. The analysis will continue by examining the application of economic statecraft from the perspectives of both the initiating

¹ The allocation into the three categories reflects an assessment of their historicity. Note that care has been taken in counting instances so as not to inflate their number. For example, whilst there may have been periods in which Athens’ Bosphoran tariff was not in operation, this tariff is only counted once.

and targeted state, the use of third parties, the considerations taken by states in selecting appropriate measures and the extent to which they communicated the measures to targeted states.

The chapter will next consider temporal perspectives, discussing whether the application of economic statecraft varied or otherwise evolved over time. To conclude the thematic analysis, questions will be asked and answered on a range of perspectives including the extent to which objectives were achievable, totally or in part, by using economic measures, the relative incidence of economic statecraft compared to other forms of statecraft, and whether states did not apply economic statecraft in specific circumstances that at face value seemed well suited to their application.

Scope and incidence of economic measures

Chapter One explained the range of economic measures considered in modern scholarship, to which were added payments of tribute and other interstate payments, forms of economic measures arguably unique to the ancient world. Of all these economic measures, only three were excluded given their lack of relevance to immature ancient economies.² Given these exclusions, 20 potential types of economic measures remained, comprising 12 trade-related measures and eight capital-related measures theoretically possible in the ancient Greek world.

Examining the 255 likely or highly likely examples of valid economic statecraft, reveals states applied 15 of the 21 potential measures during the late Archaic and Classical periods. That is, as discussed in Chapter One and now borne out by the evidence, the understanding of economic matters in the ancient world, and the workings of the ancient economies, was sufficiently mature to provide ancient states access to most of the economic measures identified in modern literature. Further, the strategic circumstances facing the ancient states under consideration provided them with the opportunity to apply most of these economic measures.

² As discussed in Chapter One, the granting or withdrawal of 'most favoured nation' status, governmental insurance and restricting/incentivising the movement of capital were not applicable to the ancient world.

First, the six economic measures never applied deserve attention to understand why they were not applied. The first such measure was the impounding or expropriation of another state's assets, usually money in all its forms, owned by the targeted state within territories controlled by the initiating states. One can understand why this measure was never applied. Although nothing prevented ancient states owning assets in foreign states, for example land under *enktesis* arrangements, such ownership did not occur in practice.³ Further, instances of one state's capital being held with the banking systems of foreign states did not occur until many centuries later. In the absence of such assets, the decision to impound or expropriate such assets was not available to a state seeking to apply this form of economic statecraft.

The rationale why the second economic measures was not applied is equally explainable. If a state did not own assets within a foreign state, then the foreign state could not unfavourably tax those assets. Although ancient states could theoretically own assets in other states, such ownership did not become common until later centuries. Similarly, examples of a state applying unfavourable taxation against another state's assets did not occur until much later in recorded history.

Turning to the third economic measure never applied, no state withheld regular voluntary payments to foreign states, stopped a planned series of payments or reduced the quantum of ongoing voluntary payments. The rationale becomes obvious given the evidence reveals all the examples of loans or gifts provided by one state to another comprised one-off payments, rather than an ongoing series of payments. Why regular payments by instalments did not occur remains uncertain, but was unlikely to have been because ancient states did not have sufficient economic maturity to understand payment by instalments was possible.⁴ Neither is there a valid argument that financial arrangements were structured to prevent regular ongoing payments. Indeed, the requirement for some states to make regular annual tribute payments or other forms of regular compulsory contributions demonstrates ancient

³ Note foreign citizens could own assets within a foreign state, as evidenced by the decrees which allowed, for example, foreign shrines to be established.

⁴ The only example of payments by instalments was the Phocian fine payments discussed in Chapter Five.

states understood the value, in certain circumstances, of ongoing rather than one-off payments.⁵

The next economic measure, for which there no evidence exists, was the deliberate sale of exports at markedly reduced prices to disrupt the economy of the targeted state, a practice commonly termed as ‘dumping’. There are two likely reasons why ancient states did not dump goods even though, as discussed in Chapter One, such a practice remained theoretically available. First, the advantages of selling goods at reduced prices, to create a specific effect on another state’s economy, was likely a poorly understood concept or simply had not occurred to the ancient Greeks. Equally important, ancient states did not possess sufficient surpluses of desired goods to dump them in the quantities necessary to disrupt the economies of other states.

The penultimate type of economic measure, for which no evidence exists for its application, was agreements for the direct state-to-state purchase of goods from targeted states. Such lack of evidence resulted from the reality of interstate commerce in the ancient Greek world in that trading purchases were not made directly by states but by individuals from that state. Such individuals were sometimes authorised to act on behalf of the state within its *chora*, such as the Athenian grain buyers who from the 350s procured grain with public money during food crises. Alternatively, as discussed in Chapter Three, a state’s citizens could make purchases on their own initiative, knowing to do so would create goodwill towards them by their state. In the latter category lies, for example the Athenians such as Phanosthenes and Antiochides, who purchased timber from Macedon with the pre-existing intent the eventual end-user of the timber would be the Athenian fleet.

The final economic measure not applied in the ancient Greek world was trading bans on states trading with the targeted state. Whilst there is no valid reason why such a measure could not have been applied, trading bans never occurred. For example, whilst the Megarian decree banned Megarian traders, there was no complementary ban by Athens on other states continuing to trade with Megara in full knowledge of Athens’ ban. Nor was there any attempt by Athens to cease its allies trading with Megara. Of course, an Athenian refusal to trade with

⁵ The unilateral decisions by some states to withhold tribute payments, or make smaller than required payments, to send political messages to their hegemon as discussed in Chapter Five, are not considered here because the payments were not voluntary.

states, trading with Megara, would have been practically difficult, first in identifying the traders from other states in breach and then implementing trading bans. The evidence does not allow a firm conclusion, but perhaps Athens considered the cost and difficulty of such complementary bans outweighed the benefits they offered. That is, as discussed in Chapter Two, the Athenian wanted simply to send a political message to Megara rather than destroying its economy. For the latter aim to have been achievable, complementary Athenian bans on other trading states would have become necessary. Even then, they would only have been effective if the banned states considered their relations with Athens were worth more than continuing to trade with Megara.

Categorising economic measures

The earlier chapters demonstrated that evidence exists for the application of the remaining 14 economic measures, with each now discussed in turn, from the most common to the least used. Of course, one could argue the relative incidence of each measure was based on surviving evidence, and if our knowledge of the ancient world was complete, the real relative incidences may have been quite different. But such an argument could be made about almost every analysis in the ancient world, so must be discounted.

As an aid to understanding their intended purpose, each measure will be placed into one of three categories. The first category, termed ‘goodwill generators’, comprised those economic measures primarily designed to create ongoing *eunoia* in the targeted state, towards the state applying the economic measure. The targeted state need not believe it had some immediate need to respond reciprocally, but had some form of enduring obligation to act in the other state’s interests, to support that state in its future endeavours, or at least not oppose its future initiatives. A prime example of this form of measure, as discussed in Chapter Three, was Macedonia’s ongoing supply of timber to Athens and its occasional supply to the Chalcidians.

The second category, termed ‘short-term support’, comprised those economic measures aimed at providing the targeted state something desirable to them, whether it was a strategic good or money, for their short-term benefit. By its nature this type of measure could be very influential if it allowed the targeted state to help defend its territory, feed its population or improve its economic wellbeing in a way not possible if the measure had not been applied.

Whilst short-term supporting measures would also create *eunoia* in the targeted state, the main aim of the initiating state was to help the targeted state achieve its short-term objectives. A prime example of a measure falling within this category, analysed in Chapter Four, was Sparta providing ten talents in 403 to the Athenian tyrants in order to fund their struggle against the democratic elements. The primary intent was not to create an enduring obligation amongst Athens' oligarchic elements even though such goodwill would have been generated. Other examples included the Persians providing monies to Sparta c387, also discussed in Chapter Four, so the Spartans would support favourable Persian outcomes in the Peace of Antalcidas. Of the various trade-related economic measures discussed in Chapter Four, perhaps the example that most readily falls into this category was the provision of grain to states in famine, such as Cyrene's provision of grain, at reduced prices, to 41 Greek states in the 320s.

The third category, termed 'coercive measures', comprised those measures that did not provide any physical goods, but were designed solely to send a specific political message or signal to targeted states. Usually measures in this category were associated with coercive attempts to affect the targeted state adversely, from which the intended message became obvious. The Megarian decree, analysed in Chapter Two, exemplified the type of economic measures within this category. The messages intended to be sent by embargoes, and other forms of trade restrictions, include creating a sense of isolation in the targeted state, or simply seeking a re-examination of the targeted state's policies and behaviours towards the initiating state and its allies. Further, the application of embargoes could simply be intended to send the message that the initiating state was restrained on this occasion, choosing to use economic measures rather than military force, but may not feel so constrained in future if the targeted state did not change its attitudes or behaviours. Used in this way, such coercive economic measures were sometimes a veiled threat of the potential for future military force. Importantly, the creation of these attitudes and behaviours did not require the coercive measure, such as a tariff, embargo or restriction, to have any appreciable economic effect on the targeted state.

Coinage. The selection of a state's coinage to help achieve specific strategic outcomes was the most common economic measure in the ancient Greek world, with Chapter Six discussing 54 examples. Coinage decisions fall within the short-term support category. They provided, for example, the means for states to enter desired trade networks. That coinage was

so common an economic measure was to be expected given the large number of minting states and the almost universal need for state coinages. Whilst, as discussed in Chapter Three, very few states had strategic goods in sufficient quantities to provide them to other states, many states had the ability to mint, designing their coins not only to be of economic utility within their own economies, but also to influence the use of the coins by foreign states and their traders. Not only the large and powerful states could apply this measure with Chapter Six demonstrating smaller states, such as Aegina in the sixth century, and later Lampsacus and Cyzikus, were able to create ‘trade coinages’ commonly used in various regions of the ancient Greek world.

Strategic goods. The provision of strategic goods to a targeted state was the next most common form of economic measure used in the ancient Greek world, with evidence for 44 examples. Most applications of this measure intended to be ‘goodwill generators’, but as mentioned above they occasionally fell within the ‘short-term support’ category. Interestingly, this measure was more often used by foreign states against Greek states than vice versa. When Greek states used this measure, they primarily did so to exert influence on other Greek states, with Chapter Three providing only one example of an application against a non-Greek state, namely Athenian provision of silver bullion to Egypt. The most likely reason for it being applied more often by non-Greek states was that the Greek states, which were usually geographically smaller than foreign states, did not have, except arguably for Athenian silver supplies at its Laureion mines, the excess inventory of strategic foodstuffs, timber and precious metals to apply regularly this form of economic measure.

Why was providing strategic goods such a common form of economic measure? The most likely reason is it was the form of economic measure of most direct benefit to the targeted state, the one most likely to create enduring *eunoia*. Whilst other measures provided monetary or indirect benefits, a state’s ability to build warships, feed its population or receive other strategic goods was of immense value in achieving its own enduring strategic outcomes. Simply, providing money remained valuable, but of little utility if the required strategic goods were not available through the state’s trading networks. Thus, a state directly receiving such strategic goods would view the providing state most favourably, especially when they were regularly supplied. In the absence of competing compelling exigencies, the targeted state would likely do all it could to keep in the good favour of the state supplying the strategic goods.

Tribute. A variety of different states applied the 30 examples of tribute discussed in Chapter Five. As previously discussed, apart from its primary revenue-raising function, tribute intended to create a subservient mindset in the paying states. But worthy of comment were the 14 examples where hegemonic states manipulated tribute payments to create a certain influence on the paying states. Tribute manipulation was usually applied as a goodwill generator but occasionally fell within the coercive category of economic measures. Athens was the master at this form of influence, with Chapter Five discussing 13 specific examples. For example, Athens may have reduced the required payment by Colophon to create *eunoia* towards a nearby Athenian colony.

Bribery. Bribery of a targeted state's officials and citizens, in order to influence the actions of that targeted state, was the fourth most common form of economic measure. Bribery usually fell within the short-term support category. Of the 29 examples of interstate bribery discussed in Chapter Four, 15 examples exist of foreign states using bribery against Greek states, with the most common exponent being Phillip II of Macedonia against the Greeks. This measure was usually aimed at influential politicians of the targeted state, but Chapter Four analyses several examples of generals being targeted in order to change what would have been their normally desired military action. Bribery was a popular measure because if done well, with the right person being targeted, it could achieve a direct and measurable effect. Rather than simply creating goodwill in the targeted state, which is all that could be achieved by several measures yet to be discussed, effective bribery could stop an alliance, subvert proposed military action or prevent hostile action against the initiating state.

Tariffs. The use of tariffs, both favourable and unfavourable, was the next most commonly used form of economic measure in the ancient Greek world, with Chapter Two discussing 24 examples. Tariffs usually fall within the coercive category aimed at sending specific political messages to the targeted states. However, examples of tariff relief were goodwill generators to generate amicable trading relations amongst states. One would expect tariffs to be popular given their primary role to generate revenue for the taxing state. Most tariffs were applied by Greek states against the traders of other states, with 18 examples, but there were also six examples of tariffs being applied by non-Greek states. But one should not infer the Greeks were more likely to impose tariffs, since this analysis does not consider tariffs imposed by non-Greek states against the traders of other non-Greek states. Tariffs were

usually applied by powerful states able to enforce them through the threat of military force or when, like Byzantium, they were in a favourable strategic position that could not be avoided.

Gifts of money. Providing gifts of money to a state, as distinct from bribery of its officials or prominent citizens, was the next most common form of economic measure, with Chapter Four discussing 23 examples. Depending on a gift's specific circumstances, it could be considered either a goodwill generator or a form of short-term support. As Baldwin argued, 'Direct monetary payment is one of the most common ways for some people to get other people to do things they would not otherwise do'.⁶ Money gifts remained popular because they gave the receiving state the absolute discretion on how to use the provided funds. That is, there is no evidence in the ancient Greek world of 'tied' gifts, in which the money was provided on the condition it will be used for a specific purpose. Money gifts were especially valuable if provided at a time of obvious need, such as when a state wanted to enter a building program or desired funding for military ventures.⁷ In 16 examples foreign states provided money to influence Greek states and in seven examples Greek states provided monies. The foreign states who applied this form of economic measure were Macedonia, Persia, Lydia, Pelagonia and Pherai. With respect to the Greek states, Chapter Four showed Athens usually provided gifts, with only one example from another Greek state, namely Sparta.

Loans. The next most common economic measure was the provision of loans, with 13 examples discussed in Chapter Four. As for gifts, loans were sometimes goodwill generators or a form of short-term support. The evidence shows this measure was only used by ancient Greek states when aiming to influence other Greek states. No evidence exists foreign states used loans as an economic measure against Greek states. The most likely reason was that the major foreign states, Macedonia and Persia, had the monetary reserves to provide monies as outright gifts, as previously discussed, with no additional need to generate revenue from a loan paid back with interest. Monetary gifts were more effective in influencing the targeted state since they would have created more goodwill than a loan arrangement in which states eventually repaid the monies.⁸

⁶ David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, Princeton, 1985, p. 43.

⁷ For example, the Pelagonian loan to Athens in 363/2 discussed in Chapter Four.

⁸ Such as the loan provided by Tenedos to Athens in 340/39, discussed in Chapter Four.

Fines. With respect to interstate fines, a coercive measure analysed in Chapter Five, nine examples exist, seven by Greek states, two by the Delphic Amphictyony and one imposed by an arbitrator on behalf of a Greek state. In all cases the fined state was Greek, indicating that some agreement was necessary in order to increase the likelihood the fine would be paid.

Preferential taxation. Chapter Five discussed eight instances of preferential taxation, seven by Greek states and one by the Delphic *Amphictyony*. There were all primarily applied as goodwill generators. Preferential taxation was often coupled with other economic benefits to create *eunoia* useful for ongoing engagement with the targeted state.

Other measures

The remaining types of economic measures did not occur sufficiently frequently to provide a meaningful rating of their incidence. Chapter Two discussed four examples of states in the ancient Greek world using export restrictions as a form of economic measure, with three being applied by Athens and one by Macedonia. Export restrictions fall within the coercive category of economic measures. All placed restrictions on strategic goods, such as timber, grains and weapons.⁹ Interestingly, no examples exist of states restricting the export of precious metals. One possible reason was there was no need to declare such a restriction given the few mines within any state were firmly under its control with no ability of foreign states to access them. Nevertheless, in the absence of a state-decreed restriction, no obvious restriction prevented, for example, Athenian citizens with Laureion leases exporting silver as private individuals to foreign states in bullion form. Whilst one cannot argue such export never occurred, no evidence exists to support such individual-based export practices give the lack of any meaningful incentive to do so.

As discussed in Chapter Five, there were five examples of states developing formal amicable trade relations. These types of economic measures were primarily goodwill generators. Three instances were by Greek states and two by Macedonia. Chapter Five also

⁹ The exception was the Athenian prohibition on ruddle discussed in Chapter Two.

discussed the six examples of other capital payments, all coercively imposed by Greek states to reflect their power over other specific states. Chapter Two discussed three examples of coercive trade boycotts, two by Greek states including the Athenian-imposed Megarian Decree, with the remaining example by Macedonia in its banning of Methone traders from its territorial waters.

For the granting of preferential economic arrangements, another goodwill generator that may also provide short term support, Chapter Five analysed two examples, both by Greek states. Whilst one (between Keos and Histiaai) was narrowly focused, the Athenian practice of *enktesis* was targeted broadly at citizens from various foreign states. For the practice of *syntaxeis* to provide economic benefits and generate goodwill, Chapter Five only discussed one valid example, namely that occurring during the Second Athenian Confederacy. Further, as discussed in Chapter Two, there is only one example of coercive preclusive buying, namely the purchase of goods in order to deny them to other states. Athens attempted to secure a monopoly on the use of Kean ochres.

The low incidence of preclusive buying warrants further discussion given some strategic goods, such as ship-building timber, would have been suitable targets for such an economic measure. For example, why did Athens not try to buy more timber than needed in order to prevent competing maritime states from accessing the timber? Did Athens never envisage preclusive buying was possible? More likely Athens understood its potential, but realised Macedonia had so much timber that cornering the market would have been impossible. Athens would also have likely realised Macedonia would prevent preclusive buying in order to retain sufficient supplies in order to use timber as an economic measure whenever the situation proved favourable to do. Athens may also have considered the expenditure necessary to purchase more timber than it needed was not an effective use of its monetary reserves.

Although many incidences occurred in which states applied different economic measures in isolation, only one example exists for a state, faced with specific circumstances, simultaneously applying multiple forms of economic statecraft. This example, discussed in Chapters Two and Three, was the Cimmerian Bosphorus providing a strategic good, namely wheat to Athens, whilst simultaneously offering tariff relief. This scenario was likely not the only one in which the use of multiple economic measures was possible. Perhaps the lack of

further examples reflects the reality that the simultaneous application of multiple measures required considerable economic understanding. However, if one looks beyond a specific circumstance, then one could argue some states applied multiple measures, to achieve their objectives, over a considerable period of time. The pre-eminent example was the use by Athens of multiple forms of economic measures in the second half of the fifth century. Athens was able to apply tariffs, manipulate tribute payments and make coinage decisions to help achieve its strategic objectives. Whilst the use of these measures may not be considered ‘integrated’ in the way modern states combine different measures, their use reveals a degree of sophistication in understanding that multiple economic measures could collectively help achieve specific strategic results.

Given the small sample set, this analysis of relative incidences represents an indicative rather than an absolute ordering of the 15 applied economic measures. The analysis reveals some measures were often used whilst others were only occasionally applied. In summary, the relative incidence of different types of economic measures depended on their utility in a range of circumstances, their availability to the initiating state, the degree of difficulty in applying the measures and the right circumstances presenting themselves.

Initiating states

Now being aware of the relative incidence of the types of economic measures, the analysis can turn to examine in more detail the characteristics of the states applying these measures. The factors considered are: their type of government, their economic maturity, their decision-making process, their use of economic measures in trade, whether measures were planned or opportunistic, whether they were applied during treaties, alliances or day-to-day statecraft, and which state initiated the measures. This section will also examine why economic measures were not applied in circumstances suited to them and why some major states rarely used economic measures.

Type of government

Collectively, all the identified examples of economic statecraft demonstrate all forms of government applied economic measures, including the multiple democracies spread across the ancient Greek world, oligarchies such as Corinth and monarchies such as Macedonia and

Persia. The fact all differing government types are represented should not surprise, given a state's ability to consider, and its ability to apply economic measures, should not be affected by its type of government. Every form of government contained political leaders, either singular or in groups, who could and did make decisions about their state's strategic objectives, how to manage those objectives and how to engage with foreign states in pursuance of those objectives.

Even when ancient states were subject to a hegemon, their governments were not so strictly controlled that they had no discretion to make foreign policy decisions. The evidence showed they could engage with the hegemon and other states and thus could choose to use economic statecraft to influence this engagement. Loans could be provided and coinage decisions could be commonly made. Similarly, even when states gave up a degree of independence to join a league or federation, some decision-making was retained by individual states.¹⁰

Monarchies or oligarchies, had much greater scope for using bribery as a tool of statecraft, given they could more successfully keep bribes secret. Within democracies, such as Athens, institutional features, such as publicly held assembly policy discussions, markedly reduced the likelihood of bribery. Such democracies might use private individuals to bribe on behalf of their state, or the latter may bribe on their own volition, but such individuals had markedly less capacity to fund effective bribes.

Economic maturity

The typical state in the ancient Greek world did not need a mature or sophisticated economy to understand and apply most of the identified economic measures. The detailed commentary in Chapters Two through Six provides evidence that not only the largest and economically mature states applied economic statecraft. Indeed, evidence exists that at least 68 different states employed economic measures, with some states using a variety of types multiple times during the late Archaic and Classical periods. Athens was the most proficient user (64 examples), but the other large states, Macedonia (40 examples) and Persia (27 examples), were also regular users. The number of applications by the other states then drops

¹⁰ See Mogens Herman Hansen, *Polis: An Introduction to the Ancient Greek City-State*, Oxford, 2006, pp. 130-1 for a brief discussion about one major federation, the Boeotian Federation, as it was organised in the period 447-386.

markedly. An analysis of Appendix Four also demonstrates the number of trade-based economic measures (90 examples) was close to the number of capital-based measures (111 examples) and more than coinage-based economic measures (54 examples). This comparable use of trade-based and capital-based measures belies any strong argument that ancient states, arguably except non-trading Sparta, were more familiar with trade-based measures and thus had the economic maturity to better understand the potential impacts of the former.

Decision-making

The evidence does not allow a definitive explanation about how ancient states decided to apply economic statecraft. No literary work details examples of such state decision-making and whilst epigraphy may record the application of specific measures, it does not detail how the decisions were made. For even the most famous example of a coercive economic measure, the Megarian decree, Thucydides provides no evidence of how Athens decided to take action against Megara. Was it, as is most likely, a decision of the Assembly informed by a motion of the *boule* or some other mechanism? All that can be argued is that each decision would likely to have been taken in accordance with the usual process for that state, such as democratic vote after discussion in the relevant assembly. Within democracies, some scholars have argued that decision-making relying on *rhetoires* for information on which to base decisions, could not have been structured to create and sustain a complex foreign policy.¹¹ By this logic, decision-making about the application of economic statecraft would have been problematic. An alternative view downplays the importance of *rhetoires*, given the cumulative experience of the citizen body. As Harding argued, ‘... credit for the coherence and consistency of Athenian foreign policy belongs to the People in the Assembly.’¹² In this alternative view, decisions about applying economic statecraft could well have been within the competence of democratic decision-making bodies.

Within democracies, the need for personal economic knowledge was arguably strongest, since leaders needed to be convincing to those citizens who did not automatically follow their lead, when faced with conflicting policies advocated by different speakers.¹³

¹¹ Phillip Harding, 'Athenian foreign policy in the fourth century', *Klio*, 77, 1995, p. 106 citing a study by Hugh Montgomery, n9.

¹² Harding, 'Athenian foreign policy', p. 125.

¹³ As Pritchard argued, the public speakers advised the financial advantages/disadvantages of each proposal to the people, see D. Pritchard, *Public Spending and Democracy in Classical Athens*, Austin, 2015, p. 22. For example, in the 430s Pericles told the

Davis argued that fiscal expertise existed within Athens with politicians becoming more professional over time.¹⁴ Similarly, Harding convincingly argued that such professionalism entered Athenian politics in Kleon's time, possibly earlier, once competing political factions strove to convince the people to follow their policies.¹⁵ At the least, ancient leaders were aware of the various revenue sources for a state: plunder; tribute, gifts from other states, taxation on the import/export of goods, rental of state lands and commercial investment. They were also aware that trading networks were interconnected and the state needed to ensure the continued supply of strategic goods, particularly those needed to feed their populations. Much less obvious was their understanding of, and interest in, managing the exports of agricultural and manufactured goods to foreign states. Nevertheless, some states devoted time to such economic matters during regular meetings of their citizen bodies. Although there is no mention in Thucydides and Xenophon's histories of assembly debates about commercial matters, the Aristotelean *Constitution of Athens* indicated a standing item on the agenda of the principal monthly meeting of the Athenian *ekklesia*, at least in the fourth century, to discuss the food supply.¹⁶ In the Hellenistic period, similar annual reviews occurred in Samos but whether they started in the Classical Period and if so, in what form, is unknown.¹⁷ The importance of economic expertise, at least within Athens, can also be inferred from Aristotle's *Athenaion Politeia* which indicated that, unlike most officials, financial positions were elected.¹⁸ These elected specialists would have worked closely with the citizen bodies providing economic advice as necessary.

assembly about Athens' financial position with respect to the coming war with Sparta. (Thuc. 2.13.3-5 cf. Plut. *Per.* 14.2). For a discussion on the arguments for and against the collective wisdom of the people when assembled, see J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People*, Princeton, 1989, pp. 163-5.

¹⁴ John Davies 'Athenian Fiscal Expertise and Its Influence', *MediterrAnt*, 7, 2004, pp. 491-512. Davies provided a historical study focusing on increasing expertise in taxation (both internal and external) as a form of revenue raising. He stressed the ongoing innovation that occurred in Classical Athens (p. 505), the ability of the Athenian political class to '... to devise ever more elaborate resource-raising systems' (p. 508) and that they collectively (and competitively) possessed a '... knowledge of fiscal possibilities and techniques probably unrivaled anywhere else in the Mediterranean' (p. 508).

¹⁵ Harding, 'Athenian foreign policy', p. 122, n 91.

¹⁶ Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 43.4. Rhodes commented that grain was not mentioned specifically by Aristotle in Aristot. *Pol.* 4.1298a3-7, see P.J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Constitution: Written in the School of Aristotle*, Liverpool, 2017, p. 350. Further comments can be found at Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.6 and 3.6.13, Aristot. *Rhet.* 1.4. 7-13, Ar. *Eq.* 773-776 and Lys. 30.22. For the role of the boule, see Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 47.1 with commentary at Rhodes, *Athenian Constitution*, pp. 364-5.

¹⁷ Syll.³ 976 translated in M.M. Austin, *The Hellenistic World From Alexander to the Roman Conquest: A selection of ancient sources in translation*, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 247-50. For a discussion of this decree, see Daniel J. Gargola, 'Grain Distributions and the Revenue of the Temple of Hera on Samos', *Phoenix*, 46, no. 1, 1992, pp. 12-28.

¹⁸ Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 43.1 with a discussion of financial officials at Rhodes, *Athenian Constitution*, pp. 345-7.

Whether other states in the ancient Greek world had similar arrangements is not known, but it would be surprising if the governments of such states did not also have the ability to call on economic expertise as required. In particular, monarchs could decide to apply economic measures based on advice from their council or specialist advisers. They did not need to be personally knowledgeable, but simply needed mechanisms to gain access to such knowledge, either through relying on experts within the states, borrowing experts from abroad, or adopting foreign economic concepts from other states.¹⁹ For example, as discussed in Chapter Two, at some periods Macedonia's kings used Athenian experts to advise on economic matters.

Decision-making was complicated by the reality that sometimes decisions to take certain actions were not formally made by the state itself, but by citizens on behalf of the state. In the relevant examples discussed in previous chapters and summarised in Appendix Four, individuals initiated the economic measure wanting to either ingratiate themselves with their state or altruistically thinking they could benefit their state. In the latter category, for example, lies the various bribery attempts by individuals on behalf of their state, as discussed in Chapter Four. Insufficient evidence exists for every cited example to confirm whether the individual was acting as an agent of the state or self-initiated the bribery for altruistic motives. For example, as discussed in Chapter Four, whether Harpalos bribed Demosthenes c324 as an agent of the Macedonian state, or just as one of its citizens trying to provide advantage to Macedonia, cannot be determined. Of course, the application of economic statecraft by citizens on behalf of the state constrained the range of available economic measures. That is, citizens could bribe or provide loans, or facilitate the supply of strategic goods, but could not enact tariffs, mint a state's coinage or enact trade boycotts.

Planned or opportunistic?

Another useful perspective on economic statecraft is whether states carefully planned measures to achieve specific objectives or just made opportunistic decisions. In the absence

¹⁹ For example, some fourth-century kings borrowed economic ideas from Athenian fiscal institutions, especially for taxation, see Josiah Ober, *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece*, Princeton, 2015, pp. 283-5 and N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia Volume II*, 3 vols, Oxford, 1979, p. 187 for the use of Athenian experts by foreign states. From the other perspective, see Ober, *Rise and Fall*, p. 283, n32 for commentary on Athens' use of experts in its economy.

of documented foreign policies, or literary references to such policies, answering this question remains problematic. One could argue trade-related measures were usually planned but capital-based measures, especially bribery, were more opportunistic. Coinage decisions represented the exception to this generalisation about capital-based measures since they needed considered development. But just because most decisions were arguably opportunistic, does not mean they were inconsistent with the achievement of a state's relevant strategic objectives. Some examples are noteworthy. As analysed in Chapter Four, Philip II of Macedonia likely bribed various Athenian politicians to prevent Athenians agreeing on a means to counter Macedonian expansion. As discussed in Chapter Three, although not explicit in the evidence, a likely motive of the Cimmerian Bosphorus providing wheat to Athens was not only to raise revenue, but also to create goodwill within Athens to reduce the likelihood Athens would threaten the territorial integrity of the Bosporan kingdom. In the absence of any other overriding strategic imperative, Athens would not have needed to threaten Bosphoran territoriality when it could obtain sufficient food from them peacefully and at subsidised prices.

To understand the extent that economic statecraft was planned, one can also examine the extent to which economic measures were applied as part of the process of states building coalitions and alliances, to maintain the balance of power or facilitate regular interstate economic intercourse. Only six out of the 255 valid instances fall into this category, indicating that the overwhelming use of economic measures, apart from coinage decisions, occurred in the course of day-to-day statecraft. The reason negotiations for alliances and treaties did not commonly consider economic measures can only be inferred. Most likely, the incentives for states to form alliances were overwhelmingly political such as a response to actual or imminent threats from a third party.²⁰ In such circumstances there was likely little value in one or more of the allying states offering an economic 'sweetener' to conclude the alliance. Similarly, states considering a treaty, usually after a period of protracted conflict, would not usually require any additional economic incentive to do so. Thus, as discussed in Chapter Five, the only treaties containing economic terms were commercial treaties or treaties creating *isopoliteia*.

²⁰ But not always, as evidenced by the Cretan states of Knosos and Tylisos entering some form of alliance or pact with Argos in about 450, although the rationale is not known.

Further inferences can be drawn about the planned and coordinated use of economic statecraft by Athens. After taking control of the Delian League in the fifth century, Athens coordinated various economic measures and other forms of statecraft, to achieve its own political and economic objectives. Kallet termed the method used to achieve Athens' economic power as '... economic control for self-interested economic advantage'.²¹ These economic measures, discussed in previous chapters, comprised a mix of coercive and positive measures that extended Athens' zone of economic influence. Coercive economic measures were used to punish trading states with whom Athens was displeased, of which the Megarian decree was the prime example. Positive measures, such as tribute reductions, either rewarded states or provided incentives for ongoing *eunoia* towards Athens.

In the fourth century, no longer having the ability to rely on its previous imperial power backed by the threat of force, Athens increased its reliance on positive economic measures. In particular, fourth-century Athens had to develop new ways to attract foreign traders, with the primary aim of reducing their transactional costs. Xenophon articulated the need for open access and the need to provide incentives to foreign traders. To attain its economic objectives, Athens needed to become an attractive market for foreign exporters. One way to achieve this aim was by reducing tariffs, which could be a powerful incentive to traders. Athens would earn less tax revenues, but these may be offset by the increase in total wealth entering Athenian markets. But interestingly, there are no fourth-century examples of such Athenian tariff reductions.

Not all fourth-century examples of Athenian economic measures were positive. Sometimes Athens decided to apply negative trade-related measures, such as its attempts to secure a monopoly on the export of Kean ochres. Apart from the advantage to its own economy through such a monopoly, Athens intended that other states would receive the clear message of Athenian power and its consequent ability to create such monopolies at will. But whether this measure helped achieve Athens' strategic objectives remains uncertain. It clearly wanted to gain an economic advantage in the use of the ochres. But the evidence does not allow any conclusions as to whether this advantage, if actually achieved, outweighed the negative impact of reduced *eunoia* towards Athens by those states who no longer had access to important material. This economic measure was potentially dangerous to Athens. In the

²¹ Lisa Kallet, 'The origins of the Athenian economic "arche"', *JHS*, 133, 2013, p. 55.

fourth century it did not have the military power to respond to threatening situations caused by the ill-will created by negative economic measures.

Economic statecraft and trade

A state's geography substantially influenced its economics, setting the preconditions for the availability of local resources, what a state could grow and the difficulties and available mechanisms for trade. Given these preconditions, one important perspective is whether the use of economic statecraft to influence trade was broadly-based or just confined to exceptional circumstances such as ensuring the food supply in times of shortages. The starting point for any analysis is recognising that the idea championed by Hasebroek, that Greek elites did not participate in trade because of aristocratic attitudes, has been overturned by an increasing body of evidence.²² Whilst trade was often directly performed by long-term, non-citizen residents (μέτοικοι - metics), the wealthier private citizens had an increasing role in facilitating and funding such trade.²³ Both private citizens and formed merchant associations had established relations with distant trading partners using private, rather than state-owned, merchant fleets. There is no evidence states directed or promoted trade with specific states, rather merchants were left to their own devices to choose the regions in which they traded and the form of their preferred trading networks. Ongoing use of these networks provide them with familiarity with foreign trading needs.

Despite the reality trade was managed by a state's private citizens, governments had diverse economic means to protect, limit, encourage or regulate trade. Clearly state governments encouraged trade to maximise the revenue raised from it through taxation and other means.²⁴ As a means of encouraging trade, governments could try to attract traders to

²² See discussion at J.G. Manning, *The Open Sea: The Economic Life of the Ancient Mediterranean World from the Iron Age to the Rise of Rome*, Princeton, 2018, p. 231. Herodotos remarked that of all the Greeks, the Corinthians despised artisans the least, see Hdt. 2.167.2.

²³ See discussion at C.H.V. Sutherland, 'Corn and coin: A note on Greek commercial monopolies', *AJPh*, 64, no. 2, 1943, p. 147, n65.

²⁴ As discussed in Thomas W. Gallant, 'Crisis and response: Risk-buffering behavior in hellenistic Greek communities', *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 19, no. 3, 1989, p. 411. Although this article related to Hellenistic states, the taxes likely applied in the Classical period. For example, at Cos, taxes were imposed on '...the sale of wool, wheat, beans, bread, fish, wine, and incense.' At Teos, taxes were imposed on '... plow oxen, sheep, pigs, pack animals, slaves, timber, charcoal, beehives, gardens, wool, and woollens', see Gallant, 'Crisis and response', p. 411, n35 noting that like Cos, these Hellenistic taxes likely applied during the Classical period.

their harbours and *emporía*. To make their markets attractive, large states, such as Athens, could offer a well-regulated central market for exchange for both bulk and luxury goods, well supplied with coinage, using standard weights and measures, with first-rate docks, storage areas and transport access, as well as local wealth to buy imported goods.²⁵

States could also encourage trade by making available strategic resources owned or controlled by the state, such as timber, precious metals and grain. The degree to which the state owned or controlled such resources depended on the form of the state. In monarchies, the property of the king was clearly distinct from that of his subjects, with most monarchs able to control the state's strategic resources. In oligarchies and democracies the distinction between state-owned and private resources was less clear-cut. Whether or not a state owned or otherwise controlled natural resources or produced goods depended on a range of circumstances specific to the state. For those states controlling strategic resources, they could encourage economic activity by providing or renting out public property for economic activity, lease the right to work in and export products from publicly owned mines and make available agricultural products grown on state-owned land.

Finally, a state could regulate both trade and internal economic matters by enacting laws aimed to protect or encourage economic activity.²⁶ The most well-known regulations are the price control measures imposed in fourth-century Athens, which attempted, inter alia, to constrain profit margins.²⁷ As Salmon argued, whilst a state could often not control the price of wholesale, imported goods, they could regulate to ensure what their citizens paid was not exorbitant compared to the wholesale price. That is, they could regulate to ensure that '... neither millers nor bakers made excessive profits.'²⁸ Apart from several Athenian price regulation laws discussed in earlier chapters, other examples include a fourth-century regulation from Erythrai which specified how wool was to be sold, and another regulation

²⁵ Ober, *Rise and Fall*, p. 203 especially n28.

²⁶ See Leopold Migeotte, *The Economy of the Greek Cities: From the Archaic Period to the Early Roman Empire*, Berkeley, 2009, p.144f for a summary of various forms of market controls.

²⁷ For one discussion, see A. Bresson, *The Making of the Ancient Greek Economy: Institutions, Markets, and Growth in the City-States*, Princeton, 2016, pp. 254-6 and 394. Bresson accurately stated that the price controls '... were based on the principle that the retailer's profit margin should not be excessive' (p. 255).

²⁸ John Salmon, 'The economic role of the Greek city', *G&R*, 46, no. 2, 1999, p. 157.

from Delos appertaining to the sale of wood and charcoal.²⁹ In Samos the government established a permanent fund to make loans, using the interest to purchase cereals for free distribution to citizens. These loans could also be made to merchants wishing to import cereals.³⁰ Some states also made special judicial provisions so traders could conveniently access the law courts when there were disputes.³¹

As well as encouraging, limiting or regulating trade, most ancient state governments had a clear role in using economic measures to help assure the food supply, especially in times of shortages. Private suppliers of grain were honoured by the state. Some states designated grain buyers who were provided public funds to import grain from foreign states.³² Once purchased, such grain was distributed in accordance with defined conditions.³³ Whilst providing grain to needy other states is an exemplar of economic statecraft, buying states could also choose their suppliers so as to influence them. The extent to which this type of economic statecraft occurred was analysed in Chapter Three.

In summary, states used economic statecraft to intervene in external trade, interventions which usually exhibited rational decision-making designed to protect its citizens from adverse circumstances. Where a state, like Athens, had power to do so, government intervention in its economy could become institutionalised, at least to the extent they created the conditions for effective trade and legislative protections especially during food crises. Nevertheless, as previously argued, there was no concept a state should be interested in growing an economy, so for most states, citizens and *metics* wishing to trade, or engage in economic activity, were not constrained by elaborate state restrictions.³⁴ Economic statecraft was usually undertaken to stimulate imports, not exports, with no convincing evidence governments tried to understand the connections between imports and exports. But there were various attempts to control risk, what Christesen terms ‘risk buffering’, especially

²⁹ Gallant, 'Crisis and response', p. 159, n46 and n47.

³⁰ Salmon, 'Economic role', p. 159, n51.

³¹ Salmon, 'Economic role', p. 164, n67.

³² For one discussion of the problems arising with grain importers and grain dealers, see Lys. 22.

³³ For example, RO 26 (*SEG* xlvii 96) translated with commentary at P. Rhodes and R. Osborne (eds.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions 404-323 BC*, Oxford, 2003, p.118.

³⁴ T. Figueira, *The Power of Money: Coinage and Politics in the Athenian Empire*, Philadelphia, 1998, p. 31.

during food shortage crises, where states tried to ensure that when their citizens required imported cereals to survive, such cereals were available on the market.³⁵

Choosing not to apply economic measures

Another valuable perspective considers whether economic measures were not applied in circumstances that at face value seemed well suited to their application. For example, although most treaties did not contain trade-related or other commercial arrangements, one might have expected some negotiations between states would have contained economic measures. Whilst many examples remain relevant, a few are illuminating. The Athenian treaty with Rhegion may have benefitted from economic statecraft given the developing economic relationship between the two states. Similarly, when Athens reaffirmed its alliance with Leontini in 433/2, economic arrangements might have provided value, but there is no evidence that they were applied.³⁶ Athens' alliance with Argos, Elis and Mantinea in 420 suited economic agreements as a means to strengthen the proposed relationship, but the treaty does not include any commercial terms.³⁷

Similarly, Philip's extended negotiations leading to the Peace of Philocrates in 346 involved no discussions of economic measures applied to increase the likelihood of the outcome sought by Macedonia.³⁸ The most likely explanation is that Macedonia's political and military strength was an overwhelming incentive for states to agree to the proposed Peace with no economic incentives necessary. Similarly, when Philip created the League of Corinth in 338/7, no economic measures were necessary. No method exists to determine from the available evidence whether the potential use of such measures was considered in creating these treaties and discarded or never received consideration.

³⁵ For one explicit discussion of the importance of risk, see the Demosthenic speech *For Phormio* (Dem. 36.11) as discussed at Paul Christesen, 'Economic rationalism in fourth-century BCE Athens', *G&R*, 50, no. 1, 2003, p. 49.

³⁶ *IG* I³ 54.

³⁷ *IG* I³ 83.

³⁸ For a description of the stages of these negotiations, see Julia Heskell, 'The foreign policy of Philip II down to the Peace of Philocrates', unpublished Ph.D thesis, Harvard, 1987, pp. 228-36.

States not applying economic measures

To conclude this section on those states that applied various economic measures, Appendix Four demonstrates some economically mature states did not regularly use them. Corinth provides the most obvious example, with only six examples during the entire late Archaic and Classical periods. Corinth faced several situations in which one might have expected it to apply economic statecraft. For example, in 421 Corinth tried to restart the Peloponnesian War after the Peace of Nicias by creating a new coalition led by Argos.³⁹ No evidence exists that Corinth attempted to apply economic statecraft to attract potential members even though Corinth was a powerful trading state. Of course, the absence of evidence does not prove economic measures were not used. But potential reasons for the lack of economic statecraft can be inferred. Given the cost of the Peloponnesian war, Corinth may simply not have had any surplus funds to apply. Equally important, Corinth lacked the strategic goods, such as minerals, grains and timber, that could be offered to states it wanted to influence. Corinth remains representative of many economically mature states in which such maturity was an insufficient precondition to the actual application of economic statecraft. Whilst such states could apply a range of coercive measures, such as tariffs and export prohibitions, they often lacked the resources to apply the positive economic measures needed to convince other states to align with their interests and objectives.

Targeted states

What now can be said about the characteristics of states being targeted by economic statecraft? The first perspective is the extent to which they were targeted in isolation or as part of a group of states. The statistics gleaned from Appendix Four illuminate. For trade-related economic measures, 62% of the recorded instances targeted individual states with the remainder targeted at broad collections of states, such as all states which traded with the initiating state. For capital-related economic measures, the split was more pronounced, with 88% of incidences targeted at individual states. The latter split is understandable in that only the richest states, specifically Macedonia and Persia, had the capital reserves to target

³⁹ Kagan analysed Corinthian diplomacy at D. Kagan, 'Corinthian diplomacy after the peace of Nicias', *AJPh*, 81, no. 3, 1960.

multiple states with gifts of money, loans or bribes. Even then, these rich states preferred to target individual states.

For the use of coinage as an economic measure, states usually targeted a range of trading states, although there are nine examples where coinage decisions were targeted at specific states. These latter instances usually occurred when a state designed its coinage in order to send a political message to a specific state. For example, as discussed in Chapter Six, in the sixth century Leucas and Ambracia designed their coins so as to generate goodwill at Corinth. Similarly, the monetary agreement between Phocaea and Mytilene, discussed in Chapter Six, was only designed to influence each other rather than a broader range of states.

The second perspective examines the degree of economic maturity for a state to be a suitable target for economic statecraft. The answer depends on the economic measure being considered. At one end of the spectrum, no degree of economic maturity was required when bribery was used against a state, except for a basic understanding about the usefulness of money. Similarly, loans could be targeted at specific states knowing the money offered would always be considered of value, especially when the targeted state was actively seeking a loan.

Other economic measures required the targeted state to have greater economic maturity. For example, the trade-based economic measures required targeted states to have basic trading structures in place in order for the applied economic measures to have any appreciable effect. Similarly, the use of coins as an economic measure would have no value if the targeted states did not require circulating coinage within their internal economies or trade networks. Sparta remains the prime example of a state likely immune to a range of trade and capital-based economic measures. Finally, hegemon wishing to apply tribute as a coercive economic measure would need confidence the targeted states had internal economies which would generate sufficient revenue to pay the tribute.⁴⁰

From another perspective, a lack of awareness in the targeted state about the potential effect of economic measures did not always make the state any less suitable a target. For example, some scholars have argued ancient Greek states had no awareness of the concept of

⁴⁰ Hence, for example, the care taken by Aristides in the first assessment for Athens.

‘protection’ to help stimulate their internal economies.⁴¹ Accordingly, Athens’ willingness to receive large-scale grain imports did not appear to consider that whether it threatened the viability of some Attic grain producers and whether they could still sell their grain. Thus, the lack of awareness of the effect of this economic measure, targeted at Athens, did not influence the degree of *eunoia* generated towards those foreign states, such as the Cimmerian Bosphorus, offering and providing the grain.

For some economic measures, the policies of some states affected their suitability as a potential target. For example, a state desiring to be more self-sufficient was a less desirable target for those states aiming to supply strategic goods as an economic measure. States seeking self-sufficiency would try to do all they could to prevent becoming dependent on the state providing the strategic goods, examining alternative means of acquiring the goods. As shown in Chapter Three, at the extreme, and as Athens tried in the fifth century, states could attempt military action to take control of the geographic areas in which the strategic goods, such as timber, could be accessed. But for those states which did not have specific strategic resources in their *chora* or territories under their control, no amount of desire for self-sufficiency would have reduced their suitability as a target for this economic measure. Accordingly, as discussed in Chapter 3, a state’s size, location and geography heavily influenced its ability to become self-sufficient. Therefore, most small cities were highly vulnerable to trade-based economic statecraft by larger or resource-rich states.

States wanting to offer strategic goods as a form of economic measure would consider the extent to which targeted states had regular or permanent resource shortages within their own *chora* or controlled territories. Those states which had guaranteed sources of supply of strategic goods, including from trusted long-term allies, were not sensible targets for this form of economic measure. Thus, for example, Athens would never have been considered a suitable target for a state wanting to use its own silver resources as an economic measure. States with shortages, but reliant on trusted allies, were not necessarily excluded from being potential targets. Attracting a state away from a long-term dependency could be valuable to the initiating state. For example, Corinth was always a susceptible target for the offer of bullion and precious metals since it did not have any significant mines within its own small *chora* or other areas under its control.

⁴¹ Such as argued in H. Bolkestein, *Economic Life in Greece's Golden Age*, Leiden, 1958, p. 137.

Another perspective in examining targeted states is whether their suitability as a target for economic statecraft depended on their relative power, military or economic, compared to the initiating state. Perhaps the most comprehensive study of state characteristics that influenced relative power was performed by Hansen-Neilsen in their *Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis*.⁴² The *Inventory* can be used to compare the sizes, populations, territories and some economic information about any states that would allow a basic comparison of their relative power. From this starting point, a more nuanced comparison could be performed by supplementing the *Inventory* with other source data.

Relative power amongst states was important for coercive measures. Military enforcement of such measures was often needed which would be ineffective against more militarily powerful targeted states. Similarly, a coercive economic measure might invoke a hostile military or economic response by the targeted state. Thus, for example, the application of restrictions or boycotts on an economically powerful state might generate counter economic measures destructive to the economy of the state first applying the economic measure. Such an option was not available to Megara when faced with the coercive measures applied by Athens discussed in Chapter Two. Care also needed to be taken when applying economic measures against states in economic or financial distress, but still militarily powerful. States offering resources to such states would have needed to consider whether the targeted state might consider obtaining the resources by force, rather than paying for them even at reduced costs.

In contrast, states considering positive economic measures did not need to be concerned about their relative power balance with the targeted state. For instance, a positive economic measure could be used by a hegemon against a state it controlled to create *eunoia* in the weaker state. Examples include, as discussed in Chapter Five, the various relaxations of tribute payment by Athens in the fifth century. From the other perspective, a subservient state could still apply positive economic measures against a hegemon or more powerful state in order to give the subservient state some strategic advantage in its future dealings with the

⁴² M. Hansen and T. Neilsen, *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis*, Oxford, 2004. Further discussion on state sizes, populations, demographics and economies occurred in Mogens Herman Hansen, *Polis: An Introduction to the Ancient Greek City-State*, Oxford, 2006.

hegemon. Examples include, as discussed in Chapter Six, subservient states aligning their coinage to mirror that of their hegemon. Similarly, minor states could bribe major states in order to achieve a certain effect, such as the instance, discussed in Chapter Four, of Euboea bribing the Athenians to remain at Artemision in 480. Of course, two states of equal power could also find economic measures attractive in certain circumstances. For example, two states considering a pact of *sympoliteia* and similar agreements would likely include economic measures in the negotiations to convince the other state of the economic value of the agreement.⁴³ Such an example was mentioned in Chapter Five between Miletus and Priene.

The relative power between initiating and targeted states was particularly interesting, especially when states applied economic statecraft against a former enemy. Mosley described the reality in which states could easily switch between being friends and enemies, and quite often did so.⁴⁴ Consequently, positive economic measures did not need to be large for them to play their part when such switches occurred. Positive economic measures were valuable given that for some states, considering long-standing enemies as friends and allies required some period passing in which trust could develop. Agreeing mutual positive economic measures could help create such trust, through developing common economic interests.

Having discussed a state's suitability for targeting, what did states do to reduce their susceptibility to economic statecraft? States more reliant on trade for their economic prosperity were more susceptible to trade-based economic measures, but the answer was not to reduce their reliance on trade. Instead, some states, for which most examples concern Athens, established controls on their markets, characterised by regulations and state officials who oversaw trade, to reduce the likelihood another state could take advantage of major shortfalls in strategic goods. Another form of control was developing close relationships with favoured exporters to give themselves some control of the supply of strategic goods. Establishing these relationships, as Athens did with the Cimmerian princes, did not prevent the latter from exercising economic statecraft in the supply of their goods, but they did allow states not to give too much in return to the initiating state. Such proactive influence was not seen for weaker states, which were more susceptible to such economic statecraft.

⁴³ See example at Rhodes and Osborne (eds.), *GHI 404-323 BC*, p. 62.

⁴⁴ D. Mosley, 'On Greek enemies becoming allies', *AncSoc*, 5, 1974.

A final question relevant to targeted states is whether they responded to being targeted by counter-applying whatever economic measures were available to them. The incidences discussed in previous chapters show most targeted states did not, with a few notable Athenocentric exceptions. For example, as discussed in Chapter Three, grain-rich states targeted Athens, to influence Athenian attitudes and behaviours towards them. In response, Athens provided minor economic benefits to the rulers of the grain-exporting states, supplementing other political and honorific benefits. Nevertheless, these minor forms of economic statecraft were likely secondary to the diplomatic statecraft used by Athens to increase the prestige of such rulers in the eyes of their own populations and those of other states.

Use of third parties

The majority of economic measures were applied directly by a state against another state, such as the example, discussed in Chapter Four, of Peirinthus providing a loan to the Thracian tribes in order for the latter to raise an army. Only a few examples exist of the use of third parties. Nevertheless, these third parties were important in the application of some types of economic measures, especially when the form of the economic measure required it to be applied through intermediaries. Two scenarios for the use of a third party deserve exploration.

In the first scenario, the initiating state uses a third party to apply the measure in an attempt to influence the targeted state. For example, a state could deal through an intermediary, usually one of its prominent citizens, who may have had a personal relationship with leaders or influential citizens of the targeted state. Such examples are discussed in Chapters Three and Four, including the various use of third parties to offer bribes. As discussed in Chapter One, the role of the third party as an agent of government becomes blurred when the evidence is unclear whether the third party proactively applied the economic measure, ostensibly acting on behalf of his state but with the intent of gaining favour with his state. Such third agents could, for example, be political exiles seeking to return eventually to their homeland, like the instance involving Andocides discussed in Chapters Two and Three.

In the second scenario, the state targeted an economic measure at an individual or class or people, such as traders, in the targeted state. For positive rather than coercive measures the initiating state would have needed confidence the intended benefit, coupled with the intended political message, would flow-on to the government of the targeted state. For example, when a state provided licenses to export strategic resources, they worked through third parties, usually citizens of the targeted state. The initiating state knew that the major benefit would be received by the state, rather the specific individual who used the license. The prime examples, as discussed in Chapter Three, were the instances of Macedonia providing timber licenses to individual Athenians, such as Phanosthenes and Andocides, knowing the inevitable end-user of the timber was the Athenian fleet. Macedonia would have understood these individuals did not need timber for their own use to, but could be used by them to ingratiate themselves to the Athenian people. The self-publicity demonstrated by Andocides reflects a desire by licensees to be widely held in repute as valuable citizens. That is, Macedonia likely had confidence providing timber to an individual Athenian citizen would likely create a reciprocal amount of *eunoia* towards Macedonia by the Athenian state.

For coercive trade-related economic measures applied against third parties, whether or not the targeted state needed awareness of the measure depended on its type. Almost all tariff-related economic measures were applied against the traders of the targeted state with the knowledge that the accompanying political messages, discussed in Chapter Two, would eventually be received by the governments of the targeted traders. Similarly, boycotts and prohibitions were directed at a state's traders with the state's government able to assess that cumulatively their traders were adversely impacted.

Like trade-related economic measures, whether or not states applied capital-based economic measures through third parties depended on the type of measure. Some measures were better suited to direct state-to-state engagements. For example, states would not provide monetary gifts to a citizen of the targeted state in the hope they would pass the monies to the state itself. Thus, as discussed in Chapter Four, in 363/2 Pelagonia provided funds directly to Athens as a contribution to the latter's war against the Chalcidians. Similarly, Macedonia likely provided funds directly to Euboea to support its rebellion. Further, in those situations in which two states engaged with a mutually agreed view to improve their economies, there was usually no need for third parties. For example, the relations between Olbia and Miletus c330, discussed in Chapter Two, did not require a third-party mediator. Rather the mutually applied

economic measures would have been likely negotiated by groups of official ambassadors from each state.

The use of coinage as an economic measure could be targeted at third parties or applied directly against targeted states. In the absence of state-controlled trade, the minting state primarily targeted the traders of foreign states. As discussed in Chapter Six, by targeting a state's traders, the minting state provided an indirect influence on foreign states. Nevertheless, hegemonic states could use coinage-related economic measures to target foreign states directly, as was evidenced by Athens' fifth-century coinage decree discussed in Chapter Six.

Bribery was the form of economic measures that consistently used third parties, both to provide the bribe and receive it. Given the impossibility of bribing a whole state, initiating states used a third party to offer bribes to key politicians and officials with the intent they would be able to influence the other decision makers.⁴⁵ Thus, for example, at least according to Plutarch, Macedonia may have used Harpalos to target Demosthenes. As discussed in Chapter Four, states could also offer bribes to generals, with the aim they would take military action inconsistent with his state's intent. In this category falls the Thessalian bribery of Leutychidas, the Spartan king at the head of a Spartan army. In all these examples, the initiating state would not want the other state to know of the bribery since such knowledge may have allowed them to counter the intended outcome.

Selecting the appropriate economic measure

Selecting the best economic measure to apply in specific circumstances was likely as difficult for states in the ancient Greek world as it is for modern governments. Any state considering the application of economic statecraft would want to match a measure to both its enduring strategic objectives, current alliances and short-term circumstances. Initiating states also needed to have confidence any intended political messages were likely to be correctly received and understood by targeted states. That is, a state considering a positive economic measure, such as providing gifts or loans, would want confidence the offer was interpreted as indicating positive support toward the recipient state even though it may not imply the initiating state approved of all the policies and actions of the targeted state. In comparison, a

⁴⁵ Noting the discussion in Chapter Four that whether a state approached a third party to offer the bribe on its behalf is usually unclear.

state considering coercive economic measures would need to assess the likely extent the targeted state, as well other states, viewed the measure as an expression of hostility. If the initiating state simply wanted to send a message of disapproval, but the message was interpreted as outright hostility, then the economic measure may have unintended consequences. Thus, for example as discussed in Chapter Three, Sparta and Corinth viewed the Megarian decree as an indication of broad Athenian hostility arguably contributing to outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.

To select trade-based economic measures, states needed to understand the circumstances in which positive measures would be attractive and negative measures would be successful. To provide an obvious example, there would have been no point in the Cimmerian Bosphorus offering grain to Athens at reduced prices if Athens was adequately self-sufficient in grain. Similarly, there would have been no point in two cities creating amicable trading relations, such as the Miletus and Sardis relationship discussed in Chapter Five, if there was no economic imperative for the two states to trade because they had better markets for their goods with other states. Similarly, Macedonia facilitating trade in its coastal waters, as discussed in Chapter Two, was of dubious value if there was no need for other trading states to use those waters to travel between their markets. But states also needed to understand the value of the proposed measure both to themselves and the targeted states. For example, states considering the creation of amicable trading arrangements, through treaties, would have needed to understand such arrangements would allow the other state's citizens and *metics* to trade in situations from which they may have otherwise been excluded.

Considering whether to offer strategic goods to specific states created its own set of considerations. As a generalisation, the geographic distribution of strategic resources in the ancient Greek world established the demand for such resources by specific states. Almost no state, arguably apart from Macedonia, had access to all the strategic resources it needed. Such strategic resources were inevitably natural rather than manufactured, since most states were capable, if there was a strategic imperative, of creating the necessary manufacturing industries. As an extreme example, if for some unusual reason pottery became a strategic resource, then all states could create pottery industries.

Thus, a state considering the offer of strategic resources to other states needed to be confident of two matters. First, that they either owned or had the ability to control the

resources, or at least control any surpluses after its internal use or allocation to its citizens. Fortuitously, as discussed in Chapter Three, several states both owned and controlled a range of strategic resources such as mines and forests. For example, the Lydian kingdom owned the gold mines that allowed bullion to be used by Croesus as an economic measure when dealing with the Spartans as discussed in Chapter Three. The Persian kings owned and controlled the gold mines that allowed them to use bullion as an economic measure against various Greek states. Similarly, the kings of Macedonia controlled the timber resources available for foreign sale. Even Athens, which leased the private use of its silver mines such as Laureion, obtained sufficient silver to allow, as discussed in Chapters Three through Six, silver to be used for coinage and for other economic measures.

States also required confidence as to whether they had sufficient strategic resources to offer them as economic measures. That is, could they use the resources without severely disadvantaging its own internal interest and the needs of its citizens? Many states would likely to have been careful to ensure a declared surplus, especially for grain, was not needed within the state before offering it to other states. All forms of government in the ancient Greek world, including tyrants such as Dionysios in Syracuse, understood the need to keep their citizens adequately fed. To do otherwise might create internal unrest and dissent threatening their hold on power.

States needed not to be overconfident about the quantum of strategic goods they needed to sell or gift to be sufficiently attractive to targeted states. That is, a threshold of supplied strategic goods existed below which no worthwhile *eunoia* would be generated. Determining the threshold would not be simple, but required careful judgement by the initiating state. Fortuitously, the evidence discussed in Chapter Three demonstrates states blessed with strategic resources usually had large surpluses. Nevertheless, an arguably common mindset amongst ancient states might have generated overconfidence in the quantum of strategic resources required to achieve certain effects. In the context of cities rebelling against unwanted hegemonies, Thucydides commented that rebelling cities commonly believed they possessed sufficient resources, either internally or with its allies, to be successful.⁴⁶ Whilst this belief does not specifically apply to the offer of strategic goods as economic measures, the mindset may equally have applied.

⁴⁶ Thuc. 3.45.6.

Having identified whether an adequate quantum of strategic goods could be offered, states also needed to understand the potential adverse effects of their supply. In particular, they needed to consider whether targeted states could use the goods against them. Such adverse use was unlikely when providing grain, but needed consideration when minerals or shipbuilding timber were offered. For example, although no explicit evidence exists for such considerations by Macedonian kings, they would likely to have considered the balance between the potential *eunoia* generated within Athens from the receipt of Macedonian timber and the possibility that providing timber for use in Athenian ships would increase Athens' effectiveness in acting militarily against Macedonia.

Where states could provide strategic goods through different mechanisms, initiating states needed to carefully select the best mechanism. A poor selection might not make clear which state was providing the benefit and may even allow the targeted state to obtain the goods by other means, in order to avoid creating *eunoia*. Two primary mechanisms existed, the first being a state licenses to citizens of the targeted state to enter its territory to harvest or mine the resources. The foreign citizens could be given the option to either transport the resources in their raw form for use elsewhere, use them to build or manufacture products on site and then transport them away, or stockpile raw products for later use. The duration of the licence might be for a set period of time, for a set quantum of goods, or for unlimited period of access. As discussed in Chapter Three, this mechanism was often used for providing shipbuilding timber, but was not used for grains or minerals. The mechanism created no uncertainty in the state receiving the strategic goods about which state was the source.

In the second mechanism a state would allow its own traders to harvest or mine the resources and transport them to the targeted state for sale. These citizens would need to know the type, size, shape and quantity of goods attractive to the targeted state. In this mechanism the onus for arranging transport was placed on its own traders, which could be problematic. The other complication was the state required confidence the targeted states knew their provision of the goods was an intentional economic measure seeking to create *eunoia* or generate a reciprocal obligation. If the targeted states simply thought they were taking advantage of normal trading by the initiating state's citizens, without any involvement or approval by the state owning the resources, then no *eunoia* may have flowed. As discussed in

Chapter Three, states did not often use this method for timber, but it was often used in the provision of grains and minerals.

Turning from the provision of strategic goods to gifts of money the initiating state would need to decide whether to tie the gift to a particular purpose or allow the receiving state to use the monetary gift as it saw fit. Of all the gifts discussed in Chapter Four, no evidence exists that states tied gifts to specific outcomes with the likely explanation being tied one-off monetary gifts could not be effectively enforced. Only gifts provided in instalments could be effectively tied, with the receiving state understanding later instalments could be cancelled if the gift was not used for the defined purpose. But as discussed in Chapter Four, states never provided monetary gifts in instalments.

One question worth asking is whether tied monetary gifts would have made a difference to the *eunoia* created in the targeted state. Whilst a definitive answer is not possible, one can reasonably speculate tied gifts would likely have created less *eunoia* since the receiving state had less freedom of discretion in its use of the money. But positing a hypothetical case study in which tied gifts would have been valuable remains problematic. For example, in 396/5 when Persia provided monies to Corinth, Athens, Thebes and Argos, the broad purpose of the gift was to assist their war against Sparta, an activity benefiting Persian interests. In providing the gift, Persia would have had sufficient confidence the gift would not be used by the receiving states, for example, to purchase grain or build infrastructure.

Communicating economic measures

Having selected the appropriate economic measure, and considered the best mechanism for its application, states then needed to decide whether to communicate the measure to the targeted states. Whilst ambassadors or heralds could have formally announced an intent to apply an economic measure, as regularly occurred for other events, no evidence exists such announcements ever occurred during the late Archaic and Classical periods. Of course, such announcements may have occurred, but ancient historians never considered they were worth recording. Thus, it is unknowable whether the Megarian decree was first announced through the sending of heralds, or whether Megarian traders first knew about the boycott when they may have encountered blockading Athenian ships.

Most likely, only specific coercive economic measures, like the Megarian decree, needed to be proactively communicated to the affected states. Other negative measures, such as the imposition of tariffs, would have become obvious when traders tried to pass through a certain zone and were met by the nominated collectors, such as the Athenian *Hellespontophylakes*. Similarly, traders engaging in a certain tariff-controlled market would have become aware, at least by word-of-mouth, of the designated payments. For most positive economic measures, however, no prior announcement would have been necessary. States offering gifts or loans would have advised the targeted states directly. Decisions about coin design would have become obvious to traders as the coins increased in circulation. Of course, decisions to offer bribes would not have been announced at all.

Achieving strategic objectives

The preceding discussion has examined the characteristics of both those states applying economic measures and those states being targeted. As discussed in earlier chapters the initiating states would have applied such measures in order to help achieve their strategic objectives. Worth recalling, a state's strategic objectives usually could be characterised as follows. First, retaining territorial integrity through the protection of its borders. Second, ensuring the food supply to its citizens. Third, increasing domestic prosperity and fourth, creating a degree of economic self-sufficiency. In deciding courses of action, a state would sometimes need to consider trade-offs amongst these objectives. For example, to the extent that domestic prosperity requires states to specialise in production according to their comparative advantage, decisions to import products may not be compatible with economic self-sufficiency.

The question now worth asking is which of these objectives could be achieved, totally or in part, by using economic statecraft. The short answer is the use of any economic measure could contribute to achieving all these strategic objectives. This generalisation, however, needs unpacking to better understand the value of specific economic measures.

The first nuance is that the use of economic measures in the ancient Greek world was sufficiently analogous to their modern-day use to argue no strategic objective was likely achievable solely by applying economic statecraft. A state wishing to achieve a certain objective would ideally have combined any proposed economic measure with other forms of

statecraft, such as military force, diplomacy and propaganda. The evidence does not allow a case-by-case understanding of the extent that ancient states considered various forms of statecraft in response their strategic circumstances. Nevertheless, some conclusions can be drawn.

The application of economic statecraft was comparatively as common as other forms of statecraft. Appendix Four lists 255 examples of valid economic measures applied in the late Archaic and Classical periods. In the period up to 362, Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon collectively reveal 396 examples of military action and 227 examples of diplomatic interchanges.⁴⁷ Calculating the number of propaganda examples is much more problematic and would require detailed analysis. Nevertheless, such propaganda activities are unlikely to approach the quantum of examples available for the other types statecraft.⁴⁸ Whilst this comparison remains broad, one could be justified in stating military and diplomatic actions were not the overwhelmingly preferred form of statecraft compared to the application of economic statecraft. Nevertheless, considering military/diplomatic action that occurred from 362 until 323, military action had primacy. Interestingly, Herodotus reinforced the primacy of military action when having the Persian Mardonius comment c485 that the Greeks had the habit of starting wars senselessly in their ‘...wrongheadedness and folly’.⁴⁹

Why might military statecraft have been preferred to economic statecraft? One explanation focuses on the attitudes and mindsets of ancient Greeks to the value of, and honour acquired in warfare. Other explanations are less subjective. For example, military force, if successful, usually created an immediate effect except when it led to long, drawn-out wars between states of comparable military power.⁵⁰ Thus, powerful states needing an immediate political or economic effect tended towards applying military force. But for those states capable of applying military force, its application remained expensive in terms of people, money and other resources. Thus, some examples in previous chapters concern the application of economic statecraft to achieve desired outcomes without the immediate resort to military force, in situations in which such force could have been applied. One such set of

⁴⁷ Calculated through reading the texts and counting relevant examples.

⁴⁸ Noting the several examples of states using coin designs partly as propaganda value as discussed in Chapter Six.

⁴⁹ Hdt. 7.9b as translated by A.D. Godley in Herodotus, *The Persian Wars, Volume III: Books 5-7*, Loeb Classical Library 119, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1922.

⁵⁰ With the primary example of a sustained war of attrition being the Peloponnesian War.

examples, discussed in Chapter Four, concerned states providing monetary gifts to support the targeted state's military preparations, rather than directly providing military support themselves. Further, a state, not requiring an instant effect on the targeted state might have been willing to give a carefully selected economic measure a chance to succeed, knowing military force could be applied later if needed. Apart from the often-cited Megarian decree, the various bribery attempts also fall into this category of economic measures which forestalled the need for expensive military action.

States did not need military force, or at least the implied threat of force, as a backup to positive economic measures. But some forms of negative economic measures could only be applied successfully if backed by military force, the overt threat of force or an understanding by the targeted states that military force could be applied at any time. For example, traders would not pay tariffs if they considered non-payment would be left unpunished. Athenian tariffs applied in the Bosphorus were only collected because paying traders knew non-payment may invoke an Athenian military response. Trade embargoes discussed in Chapter Two, such as the Argives and Aeginetans banning the use of Attic pottery, or the Megarian decree, would be ignored if the targeted state considered the bans would not be enforced. Nevertheless, just because an economic measure could be militarily enforced, did not automatically result in such enforcement. The fifth-century Athenian coinage decree, discussed in Chapter Six, provided a prime example. Despite the uncertainty about its dating, other states continued minting, in contravention of the decree, with no evident political or military response by Athens.

The relationship between economic statecraft and military statecraft was especially important for small, militarily-weak states. Such states could not usually exercise effective military statecraft in isolation, needing to rely on joining larger military alliances. Nor could they usually seek to apply coercive economic measures on their own given the likelihood of overwhelming military action against them in reply. Whilst such states could apply diplomacy or propaganda, their use of economic statecraft had to rely on positive economic measures. They needed to establish close relationships, sometimes through agreed treaties with other trading states, often in an attempt to guarantee their supplies of important imported resources. Examples discussed in earlier chapters involved Teos, Mytilene, Klazomenai and Methone, which demonstrated even small states could apply economic measures effectively in specific circumstances.

Economic statecraft could also work hand-in-hand with military statecraft. Perhaps the pre-eminent example of a state integrating both forms of statecraft to achieve its desired objectives was Athens during the period of the Delian League. Through military statecraft it created the baseline conditions for peaceful and successful trade, providing protection to the economic activities of its subject states. Having established these peaceful conditions it then, through various economic measures, exploited the trade both for its own financial advantage as well as signalling its political dominance.

Putting aside the nexus between economic statecraft and military statecraft, the various forms of economic measures had excellent utility in helping to achieve some strategic objectives, but less so for others. For example, the few export prohibitions known to us, such as Athens' various prohibitions on grain exports discussed in Chapter Two, or Teos' prohibitions on grain exports in 470, aimed to feed their populations, create economic prosperity and some self-sufficiency, rather than supporting territorial integrity. Other forms of negative economic measures, such as tariffs, could also help create economic prosperity through raising revenue. But, as foreshadowed earlier, ancient states had no concept of protection, with no evidence any economic measure was ever aimed at producing this outcome.

For the objective of maintaining territorial integrity, economic statecraft usually had only second or third order effects. Thus, positive economic measures were useful in creating peaceful relations between states, which were important to most states desiring to maintain their territorial integrity. For example, as discussed in Chapter Three, the Cimmerian Bosphorus' voluntary support to Athens reduced the likelihood of Athenian aggression to secure its grain supply. Even hegemonies wanting to consolidate their control expanded applied positive trade-based economic measures to maintain peace and thus help preserve their territorial integrity.

States undertook several economic measures to create amicable trading relations with other states. Such relations usually relied on a functioning system of trade in which goods reliably reached their destination. To that end, such established and valuable trading arrangements could even sometimes survive open hostilities amongst the relevant states. Creating amicable trading relations helped sustain peace and reduced the likelihood of threats

occurring to a state's territorial integrity. Of course, the evidence indicates positive economic measures could never remove such threats. Many examples of interstate conflict occurred in the Classical period despite the benefits accruing to combatant states through peaceful economic relations amongst them.

Negative economic measures could also indirectly contribute to a state's territorial integrity, through states sending political messages about what regions they considered they controlled. For example, applying tariffs implied a state's authority over a territory rather than over the people who lived in it. Thus, whilst tariffs did not directly achieve territorial integrity, their application sent a clear signal to other states that the state applying the tariffs considered they controlled the territory in which the tariffs were applied. Of course, such political signals were not always sufficient to prevent overt threats by other states. For example, Athens' ability to impose tariffs through its control of the Bosphorus did not survive Spartan military threats in the final years of the Peloponnesian War.

As a final comment on the ability of economic statecraft to resolve political tensions amongst states, interestingly no examples exist of economic measures being used as a negotiating tool between states engaging each other to resolve such tensions. Similarly, no examples exist of economic measures being used in interstate arbitrations or mediations to reconcile competing political needs or to create win-win situations for the two states. Why this would be so remains unanswerable, for there are no obvious reasons why economic measures would not have utility in such situations. Perhaps it reveals a mindset in the ancient Greek world towards economic measures worthy of further investigation.

Temporal perspective

The final perspective in this analysis of economic statecraft is whether its application varied over time during the late Archaic and Classical periods. Appendix Four details economic measures spread over at least three centuries, with 26 examples in the sixth century or earlier, 124 in the fifth century and 101 in the Classical period of the fourth century. At face value, states more regularly applied them in the Classical period, but one must be wary given evidence for any late Archaic period activity is always problematic compared to the markedly greater evidence for all activities in the Classical period. Nevertheless, almost all modern scholars would argue interstate relationships were more sophisticated in the Classical

period, so one would expect to see greater variety in the methods used by states to influence their neighbours, friends and enemies.⁵¹

The rough similarity in the number of valid incidences between the fifth century and the Classical period of the fourth century, especially given the large number of measures applied by Macedonia, indicates no marked increase in the use of economic statecraft as ancient states became more economically sophisticated over the course of the Classical Period. One potential reason is that many states, including Athens, had less available resources in the fourth century. A possible additional reason is that in the fourth century, military statecraft was still being applied at a rate consistent with the fifth century.⁵² States less interested in going to war, to achieve their strategic objectives, should have been more open to applying economic statecraft to achieve those objectives. But the evidence does not demonstrate any such nexus, whilst recognising no evidence exists for states considering economic statecraft but then rejecting its application.

Nor does the evidence demonstrate any marked temporal change in the form of any specific economic measure. States developed no new forms of trade-based or capital-based measures with no evidence of increasing sophistication in their application. For example, the forms of tariffs remained unchanged during the Classical period whilst no new mechanisms were developed for the provision of strategic goods. This lack of marked temporal change in the frequency and sophistication of economic measures likely indicates a potential unwillingness to change what states considered to be of enduring value in specific circumstances. Fast forward 2000 years and the similar set of measures are still in use, albeit with some additional measures as previously discussed that were not possible in the ancient Greek world.

The enduring use of most economic measures, in similar but sometimes different circumstances, implies ancient states would have considered them to have utility. If states

⁵¹ For example, see the analysis in Polly Low, *Interstate Relations in Classical Greece: Morality and Power*, Cambridge, 2007.

⁵² Nevertheless, using Thucydides and Xenophon as indicators of military activity, there were at least 216 military clashes in the fifth century and 96 in the fourth century up to 362. That is, the rate of military activity was slightly higher in the fourth-century period until 362. As a narrower example, Syracuse experienced 27 outbreaks of civil war in the period c670-279, see Hansen. M., *Polis: An Introduction to the Ancient Greek City-State*, Oxford, 2006, p. 126.

kept employing the same forms of economic measures one can infer their previous success warranted their further application. Further, if similar measures continued, then one might have expected their later applications would have incorporated lesson learned from their successful previous use, rather than repeating the use of previously unsuccessful measures. However, whether such lessons were learned is not discernible from the available evidence. Some institutional memory may have existed of previous applications, especially if those applications were in recent memory. But states were unlikely to learn and retain the lessons of successful or unsuccessful applications made outside such collective memory.

Worthy of note is that states in the fourth century did not repeat some measures applied in the fifth century. For example, no states applied trade boycotts and no fourth-century coinage legislation existed analogous to Athens' fifth-century coinage decree.⁵³ The evidence does not allow a specific rationale for their discontinuance to be determined. Most likely some types of economic measures were only of value in specific strategic circumstances and if those circumstances did not occur again, then the economic measure could not be applied. More specifically, no fourth-century state displayed the politico-economic circumstances in which coercive coinage legislation would have been of value in achieving their strategic objectives. In contrast, all other forms of economic measures, such as tariffs, gifts, loans, the provision of strategic goods and minting decisions, did not need narrowly specific circumstances and thus had wider application across the entire Classical period.

Final comments

This chapter began with the intent of examining the 255 identified instances of valid economic statecraft from a variety of different perspectives. The asking and answering of a series of relevant questions has allowed a better understanding of the considerations taken into account by states contemplating their application. The perspectives of targeted states are now more fully understood, as is the use of third parties and the utility of economic measures as a means of achieving different strategic objectives. Nevertheless, whilst this chapter has made numerous findings about economic statecraft in the ancient Greek world, it has not made any attempt to provide a truly holistic perspective. Elements of such a perspective are becoming clearer but have not yet been integrated. Neither does this chapter answer the 'so

⁵³ Noting the prospectus of the Second Athenian Confederacy made clear no arrangements would be enacted with respect to matters considered coercive in the fifth century.

what?' question necessary to understand the value of economic statecraft in a world in which ancient states needed to continually engage with each other. For such a holistic perspective, one must now turn to this thesis' final chapter.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

Introduction

The economic historian J.G. Manning opined that history explains persistence and change over time.¹ What can one then say about the persistence of economic statecraft in the ancient Greek world and how its applications varied over the course of the late Archaic and Classical periods? In particular, what conclusions can be drawn from the findings discussed in the previous chapter? This chapter will provide such conclusions, but first a recap of the thesis is warranted. The recap will focus on whether the aim, scope and methodology identified in Chapter One proved suitable, sensible and achievable. Validating the earlier sections of this thesis provides confidence the conclusions made in this chapter are defensible.

Literature Review

The thesis began with a literature review examining the modern scholarship on three matters relevant to the role of economic statecraft in the ancient Greek world. First considered was the theory and practice of relations amongst states. Next was their degree of economic understanding that would inform how they could achieve their desired strategic objectives through economic statecraft. Finally, the review examined the scholarship on the use of economic statecraft by ancient states as a means of influence.

The review revealed much scholarship on interstate military conflict in the ancient Greek world, with less written about diplomacy amongst states. However, almost no scholarship exists that holistically examines the extent ancient states used economic statecraft in an attempt to influence the attitudes and behaviours of their neighbours, friends and enemies. This topic has not exercised the minds of scholars of ancient Greek history. At best,

¹ J.G. Manning, *The Open Sea: The Economic Life of the Ancient Mediterranean World from the Iron Age to the Rise of Rome*, Princeton, 2018, p. 83.

some specific books and articles on interstate politics have indirectly commented on a few well-known examples of economic measures, such as the Megarian decree.

The literature review also revealed that whilst some types of economic understanding were not evident, such as the value of protecting local industries, sufficient economic understanding existed to underpin a wide range of available economic measures. Ancient Greek states understood economic fundamentals even though they could not enunciate modern economic theory. That is, the review provided sufficient justification to argue, regardless of the primitivist/modernist and formalist/substantivist debates, that ancient states had sufficient understanding of economic matters to apply economic statecraft.

Aim/Scope

This thesis aims to provide an improved understanding of interstate relations in the ancient Greek world by examining economic statecraft, a form of statecraft which had not yet been systematically studied. To place bounds on the scope of this modern concept, Chapter One defined all relevant terms, including the term ‘economic measures’. The chapter explained the types of economic measures available in the ancient Greek world, comprising measures common to modern interstate relations and some economic measures unique to the ancient world.

Chapter One posited a range of secondary questions relevant to the primary research question, ‘During the late Archaic and Classical periods, to what extent did states in the ancient Greek world use economic statecraft to influence other states in order to help achieve their desired objectives?’. These secondary questions were answered, to the extent possible from the evidence, in Chapter Seven. Some questions could be definitively answered whilst others required informed speculation. Where such speculation occurred, care was taken to ensure the evidence was not stretched beyond credibility.

Methodological challenges

Chapter One also discussed the thesis’ methodological challenges. Before discussing the research findings it is opportune to ask whether these challenges were overcome. The answer, further elaborated below, is that the challenges did not markedly impede the required

research and the formulation of the findings outlined in Chapter Seven. The chosen methodology, discussed in Chapter One, proved to be suitable in answering both the primary and secondary research questions.

Sufficient evidence

The first methodological challenge was to obtain sufficient evidence about ancient interstate relations. As the analyses in Chapters Two through Six confirmed, only a small fraction of the 1900 identified literary references were relevant to the research questions. Nevertheless, sufficient evidence existed on which to base findings, with any gaps filled by informed speculation. The analysis in previous chapters identified where speculation occurred, with care taken to ensure findings remained defensible. Further, in analysing ancient sources, proper and complete consideration was given to modern scholarship.

This literary evidence provided an important contribution to understanding 55% of the 255 valid applications of economic statecraft. The major histories were the primary contributors, but for a few applications Aristophanes' comedies provided insights. Author biases and information gathering methods, for instance as applied within judicial speeches, were taken into account in considering the extent to which specific examples of interstate activities could be correctly characterised as economic statecraft. Further, major silences on important matters were given appropriate weight. Finally, in almost all cases the literary sources did not discuss the rationale for applying economic measures in preference to other forms of statecraft, so such rationales had to be carefully inferred from the initiating state's strategic context.

Epigraphic evidence proved valuable in identifying and analysing about 34% of the 255 valid applications of economic statecraft. Worn or missing stele segments proved non-critical to understanding the evidence. Dating uncertainties also proved not worrisome given the exact dates of specific applications of economic statecraft were usually not important. Vaguely worded inscriptions, lacking detailed content, remained the major concern, especially those providing honours to foreigners who had provided some benefit to Athens. As foreshadowed in Chapter One, this vagueness created uncertainty as to the provided services and whether the Athenian response represented economic statecraft.

Sufficient numismatic evidence existed to provide an informed view for 25% of the 255 valis examples of economic statecraft. Whilst Chapter Six discussed some difficulties in allocating some coins to specific weight standards, deciding this allocation was not a problem for most coins. Sufficient hoard evidence also existed to understand how coins circulated throughout various markets in the ancient Greek world. Further, minting studies allowed a view on whether coins circulated in sufficient quantities to become attractive to traders from foreign states.

Finally, apart from coin hoards, archaeological evidence did not prove useful in providing evidence relevance to this thesis. Nevertheless, some site-specific agriculture, mining and smelting evidence had evidentiary value in understanding the context in which economic statecraft was applied.

Athenocentricity

Chapter One cautioned about the need for careful judgements based primarily on Athenocentric evidence. In response to this challenge, the findings in Chapter Seven took care to recognise the two types of resultant analytical errors: the biases of Athenian writers and inappropriate generalisations when most applications concerned Athens. In contrast, Athenocentricity was not a serious concern in discussing coinage-based economic measures, since the numismatic evidence from other states usually spoke for itself. Similarly, Athenocentricity was not a consideration in the numerous applications of economic statecraft evidenced by epigraphic evidence from other states.

Making effective use of scarce evidence

Chapter One highlighted the need to give appropriate weight to sometimes contradictory or inconsistent evidence. The analyses in previous chapters, whilst respectful of previous interpretations, pushed the evidence without being indefensibly speculative or falling foul of the 'positivist fallacy'. On balance, the thesis recognises that relevant evidence, whether literary, epigraphic, or numismatic, provides a range of perspectives of varying historicity. Their combined evidentiary value depended entirely on the specific application of economic statecraft under discussion.

Applying modern concepts

The final challenge discussed in Chapter One was the need to take care in applying modern terms and concepts. As stated in Chapter One, such language remains unavoidable where no equivalent words were available in the ancient Greek world. The analyses throughout this thesis have sought to be sensitive to language, so when modern terms and concepts are used to describe the various types of statecraft and economic measures, they remain defensible, not purporting motivations or practices unknown to the ancient world. Where possible, original Greek terms were woven into the discussion, making clear where their meaning is unclear or disputed. Overall, the careful selection of modern terms proved useful, without opening the research to allegations of inappropriate ‘observer’ concepts.

Summary of Findings

Chapters Two through Six analysed the different potential applications of both trade-based and capital-based economic measures. The analysis considered all available evidence to determine, where possible, whether a particular state initiative warranted its classification as economic statecraft. Sometimes, one can be highly confident in classifying a specific application as an economic measure. Trade boycotts and export restrictions fall into this category. In contrast, some potential applications, such as tariffs, were case-by-case dependent. Whilst all tariffs were designed to raise revenue, they did not always have a more sophisticated purpose, namely to send political messages to the traders of other states.

In previous chapters the analyses also collectively demonstrate ancient states had an enduring need to influence the attitudes and behaviours of other states in order to achieve their enduring strategic objectives, especially ensuring their territorial integrity and ongoing prosperity. The evidence substantiates the view that ancient states understood they had available a range of measures available in their attempts to influence other states. Most of the potential economic measures outlined in Chapter One were available for application in the ancient world and were sufficiently understood by state governments. Further, in almost all scenarios, ancient states were sufficiently sovereign to use these economic measures to influence others states.

Chapter Seven examined all the applications of economic statecraft from various perspectives. From this discussion one has a clearer view of the categories of economic measures, the relative incidence of their use and why, the use of third parties and the considerations taken by states in matching appropriate measures to their strategic circumstances. Further, analysis from the perspective of initiating states indicated they recognised how a range of economic measures were available. From the opposite perspective, the analysis demonstrated that sometimes targeted states were sometimes able to reduce their vulnerability to being targets of economic statecraft. Chapter Seven also demonstrated that from a slow start in the late Archaic period, economic statecraft, in all its forms, was consistently applied by a variety of states throughout the Classical period. Interestingly, no marked increase in their application occurred in the fourth century, apart from bribery.

Three conditions affected a state's ability to apply most forms of positive economic measures. First, states required an adequate understanding of the measure's utility and potential effects. Second, was the availability of what a state wanted to offer, such as gifts/loans of strategic goods, or money and coins suitable for trading or state payments. Third, states needed strategic circumstances favouring the application of economic statecraft. All conditions needed to be satisfied simultaneously. The evidence demonstrates that states sufficiently understood economic statecraft, but, for example, economic statecraft was of no value when strategic circumstances did not suit their use. From the reverse perspective, having propitious strategic circumstances, without access to the required goods or money, remained equally valueless.

Positive measures

If these three conditions were satisfied, some positive economic measures were designed to assist the targeted states achieve a specific outcome, whilst states simply designed others to create only *eunoia*. The provision of strategic goods remained especially useful. Timber and bullion, if care was taken not to exhaust forests and mines, could be regularly available to the initiating state. Similarly, if a state had an adequate manufacturing base, it could provide regular gifts of weapons.

In contrast, for most states, grain was the least reliable strategic good, subject to seasonal unavailabilities preventing the necessary surpluses being available to export.

However, during good grain seasons more states had surpluses than those with available timber or minerals. Nevertheless, though more states had the potential to create *eunoia* through the regular supply of grain, they had less discretion to turn grain exports on and off in response to specific strategic circumstances. Thus, in strategic terms, supplying grain was primarily a long-term economic measure, aimed at creating long-term influence, rather than being applied tactically in response to specific short-term strategic circumstances.

Turning to bullion, Chapter Three demonstrated that some states were able to use their own mines to provide bullion to influence other states. No Greek state had significant gold mines within its *chora*, but a few had considerable silver mines. Trade was the usual means of acquiring sufficient bullion to mint coins and most states necessarily imported the metal from long-distance suppliers. Importantly, compared to grain and timber, providing bullion was not as effective an economic measure. Whilst states needed an ongoing supply of grain to feed their populations, and a regular supply of shipbuilding timbers to maintain their fleets, they did not require a regular supply of bullion. Many states were prepared to mint irregularly, sometimes with decades between coinage issues.

The final strategic good, namely weapons, was primarily a useful means of short-term influence. Providing timber could allow a state to build ships, but providing ships, or other weapons, created the desired end-product with no delay. Thus, gifts of weapons from other states would have been very well received, creating immediate *eunoia*.

Gifts of money should have been a popular form of influence given the inherent flexibility of money. Money only compares unfavourably to other material when the receiving state cannot use it to buy what they need, because that product or service is not available on the market. However, money was not always available in the quantities required for economic statecraft to be effective. Nevertheless, it could be an effective economic measure, with Persia the pre-eminent exponent of providing monetary gifts to influence ancient Greek states during the Classical period. The few examples of other states providing money gifts, such as Macedonia, Athens and Sparta, also demonstrated the value of money as an economic measure. Although not used to sustain a balance of power amongst competing states, they all provided money in circumstances where the receiving states needed funds to help achieve an outcome clearly in the interests of the gifting state.

Loans could also be an effective economic measure, albeit not as attractive as gifts given the need for their eventual repayment. But there were only a handful of examples of states providing such loans during the Classical period. In all examples the state providing the loan was reacting to immediate circumstances, in which the loan could help achieve the state's short-term interests. In comparison, one can discern a strategic approach to the provision of loans through sanctuaries, as least for the period in which Athens controlled the Delian funds. In the fourth century, Athens used these funds as an imperialistic tool, providing loans to cash-strapped states in order to ensure their ongoing loyalty. Access to loans could also be ceased to influence those states whose loyalty to Athens wavered.

Bribery was a successful economic measure, justifying Ober's comment that '... Greeks were not strangers to incentives'.² Philip of Macedonia became the pre-eminent exponent, using bribery as a sophisticated element of his foreign policy over several years. Such bribes required careful targeting, especially in democratic states with diffuse decision-makers.

Providing preferential taxation or other benefits to another state did not provide the immediate funds needed by the state being targeted. Consequently, they were a less effective economic measure than gifts, loans or bribery. Nevertheless, such benefits could be valuable as part of a package of broader benefits agreed between states. That is, this form of economic measure contributed to creating *eunoia* in other states could prove useful in future circumstances. Thus, for example, Ephesus provided economic benefits to some citizens of Syracuse and Selinus in order to promote *eunoia* within these cities. In contrast, whilst tribute and related payments were negative economic measures, discussed later, hegemonic states could manipulate their quantum or defer payments as a form of positive economic measure. The *eunoia* created could influence the short-term attitudes and behaviours of subject states.

Turning to the final positive economic measures, namely coinage selection, what conclusions can be drawn from the findings in Chapter Seven? First, that states were sophisticated in their minting choices, recognising carefully designed and minted coins,

² Josiah Ober, *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece*, Princeton, 2015, p. 112.

especially with respect to the chosen weight standard, were both profitable and contributed to a state's trading prospects. Most states remained content to mint on existing weight standards applicable to their major trading network. But, for those states possessing adequate bullion supplies, they could mint on different standards for different markets. For states not possessing adequate bullion, but needing to trade in markets with different weight standards, the compromise was to mint single weight coins easily exchangeable with popular weights in different markets. Finally, in designing coinage to promote trade, states realised they could also make political statements, either trumpeting their independence, or loyalty to other states.

Further, extremely few states could attempt to dominate the coinage in a particular trade network. Where the territory in which the market existed was controlled by a single state, that state could simply mandate the use of its coinage. Such an approach was rare amongst the Classical period hegemon, but exercised by specific states such as Byzantium. If no state controlled the territory of a market, it needed to mint desirable coins in huge quantities. Such an economic measure required large bullion supplies and the ability to create a coin of excellent reputation.

Negative measures

Turning to negative economic measures, not all the conditions and considerations applied as they did for positive economic measures. Tariffs, export prohibition, boycotts and tribute payments neither required the initiating state to have sufficient stocks of money nor other strategic goods. All a state needed was the military strength to coerce the payments or enforce the measures. Nevertheless, states still had to decide whether the strategic circumstance suited the use of the measure and whether their desired strategic outcomes were more likely to be satisfied by measures other than economic statecraft. They also needed to consider the potential reactions of the targeted state. The evidence provides no record of such deliberations before the application of economic statecraft, but they have must have occurred. Thus, for example, export restrictions could have been used to for all types of trade goods but were usually only applied to prevent competing states gaining access to strategic materials, with the prime example being the use of timber for military purposes.

For negative measures, states also understood their ability to manipulate them to create positive economic measures. Tariff reductions and exemptions could create *eunoia*, influencing the behaviours and attitudes of the states being taxed. Similarly, states could adjust the timing and quantum of tribute payments to favour states, reducing the likelihood of undesirable behaviours.

Was economic statecraft a success?

Chapter One cautioned about analysing the success, or otherwise, of some applications of economic statecraft, given the impossibility of acquiring sufficient evidence to explain the relative impacts of various forms of statecraft applied at the same time. For example, although much more has been written about the Megarian decree than any other application of economic statecraft, one cannot confidently state it was an Athenian success or failure. Nevertheless, now all the applications have been discussed, some comments can be made. First, that it would have been unlikely ancient states would have applied any specific economic measure if they did not have at least some degree of confidence of its likely success. This confidence may have been engendered by previous successful applications or a belief it would likely succeed in the relevant circumstances.

Commenting on whether states applied economic statecraft successfully is made much simpler when states applied economic measures in isolation of other forms of influence. Several of the applications discussed in Chapters Two through Six fall into this category. Coinage minting decisions were the first worth discussing, with the evidence demonstrating most of these decisions led to successful outcomes. One becomes less confident for the other forms of capital-related economic measures. Perhaps one can be reasonably confident about the utility of bribery with the evidence showing many bribes were successful. In contrast, whether gifts or loans of money succeeded usually remains indiscernible, since, as discussed earlier, states did not tie gifts or loans to the completion of a specific activity. Whether the *eunoia* generated had any lasting effect remains usually unknowable.

Turning to trade-based economic measures, one must be more circumspect about the likely success of providing strategic goods. For example, an argument can be mounted that it was a successful long-term strategy for Macedonia when providing timber or the Cimmerian princes providing wheat. But determining whether one-off provisions of timber, wheat or

minerals was successful remains problematic, given the likely desired outcome was to generate *eunoia* within the targeted state. Was the *eunoia* actually created and if so how was it useful and how long did it last? The evidence does not allow conclusions to be formed.

For tariffs, trade exemptions and boycotts, one can be more definitive. These measures, and the implied ability of a state to enforce payment, did send a definitive message of a state's territorial control. Can one then argue, in the absence of the territory being militarily threatened, their use as economic measures succeeded? Perhaps, but more likely a state's perceived ability to enforce these economic measures militarily was the dominant form of influence. In comparison, one can more confidently argue for the success of other economic measures, such as preferential taxation arrangements used to create amicable relations between states, in that the treaties including such measures were implemented.

Finally, one can consider the contribution tribute payments made to influence paying states, especially when the hegemon manipulated the quantum and timing of the payments to achieve specific effects. Whilst one must be careful in making generalisations, Chapter Five provided several examples of Athens successfully creating such effects.

From another perspective, any analysis of success must only evaluate the effect on the targeted state rather than considering non-related economic benefits for the initiating state. Economic measures can be divided into two categories. The first comprises the measures that could have no other purpose apart from influencing other states. In this category one would place bribery, gifts of money or providing strategic goods. For example, bribery had no other purpose but to influence, with no direct economic benefit to the initiating state. The success of such measures, as previously discussed, must be analysed case-by-case. In contrast, the second category comprises those measures that could have had multiple motivations. Such measures included tariffs, tribute and coinage decisions. For example, tariffs were primarily revenue raising and only secondarily a means of influence, but providing tariff reductions or exemptions was of no economic benefit to the state. This category of measures was usually successful in raising revenue but such a consideration should not influence the measure's success as an application of economic statecraft.

One can also comment on the most prolific users of economic statecraft, namely Athens and Macedonia. Athens regularly applied tariffs, loans and gifts of money, economic

prohibitions, and preferential economic arrangements with some states. Further, Athens employed tribute as an innovative economic measure and minted coins in ways that increased its economic prosperity whilst sending clear political messages to allies and other states. Although there were some exceptions, one can generalise to say Athens' use of these economic measures successfully contributed to the achievement of its strategic objectives, specifically achieving economic prosperity and a degree of self-sufficiency. Whilst Athens did not regularly employ all forms of economic measures, they were applied enough to recognise that Athens understood their utility in specific circumstances.

Macedonia was the second most prolific user of economic measures after Athens, most well-known for its continued use of shipbuilding timber as a valuable strategic good. Its applied economic measures did not, in isolation, allow it to achieve its strategic objectives, but they made an important, if not quantifiable, contribution.

Hypotheses

Chapter One foreshadowed that three hypotheses would be tested in analysing the extent states in the ancient Greek applied economic statecraft. The three hypotheses, which were all testable as well as being potentially falsifiable, created a spectrum of the application of economic statecraft. Each of these hypotheses will now be discussed in turn, noting the literary and other evidence provided in earlier chapters is adequate to select the most defensible hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1 posited that states in the ancient Greek world had little understanding of the value or use of economic statecraft, with no evidence for the regular use of economic measures to influence the attitudes and behaviours of other states. The analysis provided in Chapters Two through Six, coupled with the findings discussed in Chapter Seven, allows this hypothesis to be discounted. The evidence reveals a sufficient understanding of the value of economic statecraft by a large range of small and large states, both Greek and foreign. Further, evidence exists that economic measures were applied throughout the period under consideration, especially during the Classical period. Some larger states used economic statecraft at a frequency which could be assessed as regular, whilst its application by other states was more spasmodic. As discussed in Chapter Seven, the frequency of application often depended on the availability of resources by the initiating state. The state also needed to

encounter a specific strategic environment conducive to the application of a specific economic measure.

Hypothesis 2 posited that states in the ancient Greek world were aware of the value of economic statecraft to influence other states, with evidence existing for the continued and widespread use of economic measures to influence the attitudes and behaviours of other states. The evidence, as presented and discussed in previous chapters, does not support this hypothesis. Whilst there were many examples of ancient states understanding the value of economic statecraft in specific circumstances, one could not defensibly argue economic statecraft was applied continually throughout even the Classical period. That is, the application of economic measures was common but patchy, with several periods in which no measures were applied, even when arguably, conditions were suited to their application. Further, one cannot defend the statement in the hypothesis that the use of economic measures was widespread even amongst even the major Archaic or Classical states. At the best, one could argue for their widespread use by Athens and Macedonia, caveated by the reality that different economic measures were applied at different times with some measures only intermittently applied. But, as discussed in Chapter Seven, a similar argument, supporting Hypothesis 2, cannot be made for any other state in the ancient Greek world.

Hypothesis 3 formed the middle ground between the previous two hypotheses. The available evidence confirms that this hypothesis is defensible in that the discussion in previous chapters justifies the view economic statecraft was commonly, but not regularly used to influence the attitudes and behaviours of other states. Chapter Seven's analysis of the application of economic measures, by many different states during the late Archaic and Classical periods, demonstrates a sufficient degree of commonness, albeit some forms of economic measures were much more commonly used than others. In particular, the provision of strategic goods, the use of coinage decisions and the considered use of bribery were commonly used. Whilst the other forms of applied economic measures were less commonly used, their application was sufficient to justify the hypothesis.

Given the analysis in the previous chapters, this thesis' conclusion about these hypotheses should be predictable. Most states had sufficient knowledge to understand the various economic measures and the governmental mechanisms to make the necessary decisions about their application. Not all states had access to all the types of trade-based and

capital-based economic measures, since many types required access to sufficient surpluses of strategic goods. Other forms of measures, such as tariffs, exemptions and boycotts were only available if the state had the military power to guarantee their effectiveness.

What value?

The ancient literature relevant to interstate relations, supplemented by epigraphic and numismatic evidence, provides only limited insight on the techniques states used to influence other states. Where such techniques are subject to comment by historians such as Herodotos, Thucydides and Xenophon, the exact forms of applied statecraft, together with the motivations for applying specific measures, is usually not clear. Only in Thucydides' speeches does a reader obtain some indication of what is going through the minds of state leaders. But even then, no insight is provided into why measures were selected. Why did Macedonia consider it could influence Athens by providing timber? Why did Athens prefer the Megarian decree to direct military action? The ancient writers provide no insight, at the best offering tantalising comments from which one can try to create defensible speculations. Along the same lines, modern scholarship has not been insensitive to economic statecraft, but simply has only provided passing insights whilst writing about other themes. However, given the paucity of relevant evidence, the findings of this thesis do not remove any existing 'gap' in modern scholarship. Nevertheless, the gap has diminished.

Why should one know about economic statecraft in the ancient Greek world? Perhaps because such an indication reveals states in the ancient Greek world were more nuanced in their statecraft than many may have thought. Yes, war remained important, but equally valuable to know is that other forms of statecraft were considered and applied when the circumstances suited their use. Such evidence of ancient economic statecraft in the ancient Greek world also contributes to assembling a more-informed history to the use of economic statecraft across the centuries. Most forms of trade-based and capital-based economic measures did not suddenly appear in the modern world, but have a pedigree of over 2500 years. Tariffs and the ability to apply export prohibitions were considered of value then as they are today. Bribery continues. The use of gifts and loans, both of money and strategic goods also had their genesis a long time ago. Further, understanding economic statecraft in the ancient Greek world also allows modern historians to understand better how ancient states

managed risk. The various forms of statecraft, of which economic statecraft played a role, represented one of a state's responses to risk.

Where to from here?

In the course of research, this thesis raised several interesting questions about the application of economic statecraft in the ancient Greek world during the late Archaic and Classical periods. The thesis does not answer all these questions given its length constraints and that they were not essential to the primary research question. Nevertheless, given their answers would allow a fuller understanding of the context for applying economic statecraft, they are worthy of further research.

The first perspective would identify who first initiated the use of different types of economic measures and why they were first used. Arguably, the only economic measure for which this question has been answered was states' minting decisions. Moving to other measures one could ask, for example, which state first thought trade embargoes would successfully apply pressure on foreign states. On a related theme, did ancient Greek states exhibit some characteristic that created conditions for the continued use of economic statecraft compared to other civilisations like the Assyrians or Egyptians?

Another set of potential research questions could focus on better understanding the circumstances suited to the application of economic statecraft. Such question sets would consider, *inter alia*, the specific contexts in which both trade-based and capital-based economic measures would be considered effective. Further, focusing more closely on specific states might better illuminate the context for economic statecraft. For instance, one could ask why states, with similar strategic circumstances and access to resources, markedly varied in their application of economic statecraft. On the same theme, one could explore the reasons why some major states rarely used economic statecraft.

Moving to a deeper analysis of initiating states, one could research why they applied economic statecraft in preference to other forms of influence. Greater understanding could also be achieved by considering the following questions, for which this thesis provides only partial answers. How confident did a state need to be that its use of economic statecraft would

actually influence the targeted state in comparison with potential other forms of statecraft? Why were specific states targeted by economic statecraft? What was the effect of the applied measures and was it what was intended by the initiating state? To what extent did the targeted state try to reduce its vulnerabilities? What was the balance between economic statecraft being used coercively or to create 'win-win' situations? To what extent were economic measures applied positively with a mutually agreed view to improve the economies of negotiating states? Of course, when this further research was exhausted for the late Archaic and Classical periods, one could expand the time period under consideration to analyse the use of economic statecraft in the Hellenistic period. One could then further expand the research to consider all the influence methods used by states in the ancient Greek world.

Conclusion

States needed grains to feed their populations, timber to construct and maintain warships, precious metals to mint their own coins, and other specialist products. They also required money to buy needed goods and fund their regular wars. Since money and strategic goods were not always available to them in areas they controlled, many states were susceptible to their use as economic measures by other states. From the reverse perspective, powerful states could also impose both positive and negative economic measures, enforceable by the application or threat of military force.

Bissa demonstrated any conclusion that ancient states, including those in the Greek world, intervened in economic matters only occasionally and usually associated with crises was too narrow. States intervened more regularly in a range of contexts, correctly concluding that governments did not just intervene in extreme and exceptional circumstances.³ This thesis has shown such intervention extended into the world of interstate relations. With respect to trade, the evidence from minerals, timber and grain suggests states were open to the use of economic measures to influence other states and did so regularly. Such trade-based economic statecraft supplemented capital-based measures. Both forms of economic statecraft matured over time whilst not following a gradual linear progression, developing ad hoc as

³ Maria Areti Errietta Bissa, 'Governmental intervention in foreign trade in archaic and classical Greece', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University College London, 2008 p. 280.

states considered its use to meet unexpected and sporadic challenges.

This thesis demonstrates that during both the late Archaic and Classical periods, a diverse range of economic measures was consistently applied by a variety of states to help achieve their desired strategic outcomes. These outcomes could be political or economic. States were able to directly apply economic statecraft towards their friends, enemies and those states not easily characterisable as either. They could apply the measures directly or through third parties.

Importantly, this thesis does not overstate the use of, and importance of, economic statecraft. As Chapter Seven explained, it was always a numerically less common form of applied statecraft compared to military statecraft. But the value of economic statecraft in interstate relations should not be assessed by numbers alone. Whilst military action was always possible in a broad range of scenarios, economic statecraft required more subtle application. A state could attack with often little preparation, but a state needed to think harder about whether economic statecraft was the best form of influence. Depending on the type of economic measure, economic statecraft only had utility in specific circumstances that sometimes were never faced by many states. Further, it was never applied in circumstances that *prima facie* appeared conducive. For example, many interstate alliances were formed without any discussion of economic incentives. Nevertheless, despite these limitations, economic statecraft was a recognised and well-used part of a state's toolbox of potential responses to its strategic needs, opportunities, threats and challenges.

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Appendix 1

Glossary

This glossary is provided to explain the technical terms as they are used in this thesis, noting that some terms have other meanings in different contexts.

acephalous state

A state in which its external policy and engagement with other states is not directed by political leaders

ad valorem tax

A tax whose amount is based on the value of a transaction or property being traded

ancient Greek world

The regions comprising all Greek states as well as those non-Greek states with which they regularly engaged. Greek states included those in mainland Greece, the Aegean, Asia Minor, and some parts of Sicily and Magna Graecia. The relevant non-Greek states were primarily Macedonia and Persia, and to a lesser extent Egypt and the northern tribal states.

asylia

protection of person and/or goods from seizure

ateleia

freedom from taxation, usually specified in terms of specific taxes

boycott

A refusal to buy products from a state as a means of expressing strong disapproval

bullion

Bulk non-ferrous precious metal, usually gold or silver, that has been refined to a high standard of elemental purity and cast into bars/ingots, but not coined.

business ban

The banning of a specific business from a targeted state from trading within the targeting state

capital

The money needed to produce goods and services

coin

A form of money, usually made from a precious metal, which conforms to a weight/size standard and is stamped with some design

comparative advantage

The ability to provide goods at a lower cost than competitors

debasement

The action or process of reducing the quality or value of something, typically coins

dekate

A tariff assessed as 10% of the value of traded goods

demonetisation

The act of declaring a currency no longer legal tender

diolkos

A paved dragway allowing ships to be hauled on land between two bodies of water

diplomatic statecraft

The method by which a state seeks to attain its foreign policy objectives relying primarily on negotiation

dumping

A form of economic statecraft in which goods are exported at artificially low prices to disrupt the economy of targeted states

economic measure

A specific type of economic statecraft, either trade-based or capital-based

economic statecraft

The method by which a state seeks to attain its foreign policy objectives relying primarily on resources which have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money

eikoste

A tariff assessed as 5% of the value of traded goods

eisphora

An extraordinary property tax levied on citizens and metics in time of war

ellimenion

Either a tariff or harbour dues for services provided

embargo

The forbidding of trade with another state

enktesis

the right granted to certain foreigners to acquire and own land and houses within the territory of the state

emporion

A place where trade could occur, usually under supervision with taxes collected

eunoia

A range in meaning from benevolence and goodwill to affection, and for which a more precise translation depends on context

eurgesia

the doing of good deeds, so often the title given to a public benefactor

export duty

A tariff levied on goods leaving the exporting state

foreign policy

A state's strategic objectives, and the strategies used to achieve them

hellespontophylakes

Athenian officials controlling shipping in the Hellespont including overseeing the collection of tariffs

hellenotamiai

The ten magistrates appointed by the Athenians to receive and administer the tribute payments of the allied states

hoard

An aggregation of two or more coins (or other valuables) put away by their owner with the intent of recovery

import duty

A tariff levied on goods arriving into a state's jurisdiction with the intent to be sold within the jurisdiction

loan

A thing that is borrowed, especially a sum of money, that is expected to be paid back with interest, although no-interest loans are possible.

medimnos

A weight measure corresponding to about 33 kg

metic

A foreigner granted the right to reside within a state for a sufficiently long period to pay relevant taxes

military statecraft

Influence attempts relying primarily on violence or the threat of military force

onlooker state

A state not directly targeted by economic statecraft but for whom the targeting state intended to send a deliberate political message

pentekoste

A tariff assessed as 2% of the value of traded goods

preclusive buying

The targeted purchase of goods by a state in order to deny them to the targeted state

propaganda statecraft

Influence attempts relying primarily on the deliberate manipulation of verbal symbols

national security

The security and defence of a state, including its citizens, economy, and institutions, from a range of threats

restamping

The reminting of existing coins by overstriking them with new designs

seigniorage

The profit made by a state by issuing coins, especially the difference between the face value of coins and their production costs

sovereignty

The supreme power or authority of the state

statecraft

The selection of means used to achieve a state's objectives through engagement with other states

strategic material

Material of critical importance to a state's economic or military viability

strategic objectives

The collection of long-term political, social, military and religious objectives desired by a state

symbola

interstate agreement or treaty

syntaxis

The payment of contributions to achieve the goals of the grouping of states

tariff

A tax on imports or exports paid to the state by the importer or exporter of the goods

taxation

The imposition of a financial obligation on a state's citizens, residents or transiting people, by a taxing authority, usually a government

trade

An exchange of goods in which a desire for profit is the motive of one party or both

transit duty

A tariff levied by a state on goods transiting through its jurisdiction on their way to a final destination

tribute

Payments imposed on states, usually by a hegemon

Appendix 2

Strategic Objectives in the Ancient Greek World

Modern strategic analysis recognises the existence of various enduring strategic objectives which inform a state's foreign policy and its ongoing engagement with other states. Not every objective applies fully to each and every state, but any state, depending on its strategic circumstances, would apply most of them. The objectives remain enduring because they are shaped by a state's geography, its demographics, resources and neighbours, and thus are not overly subject to the vagaries of individual state leaderships. Nevertheless, the extent and vigour to which individual states pursue these objectives varies markedly.

The strategic objectives relevant to states in the ancient Greek world are as follows:

Objective 1: To preserve the state's territorial integrity from external threats, especially those parts of the state with strategic resources. Interstate engagement strategies used to achieve this objective include:

entering alliances, where necessary to deter aggression

aiming to foster internal strife in neighbouring regions so that their occupants were too preoccupied with internal problems to be a viable threat

preventing imperialist powers setting up local bases from which attacks could be mounted upon the state's territory

acquiring and holding land that improved its defensibility

aiming to deny, as best it could, the supply of strategic materials to states considered a threat

making potential enemies aware that the state was militarily viable

sustaining access to strategic resources

Objective 2: To protect a state's citizens from external threats. Interstate engagement strategies used to achieve this objective are similar to those discussed in Objective 1.

Objective 3: To preserve the security and authority of the state's government. Interstate engagement strategies used to achieve this objective include:

creating and preserving a reputation as a well-respected, if not externally feared government not viewed as collaborators with non-Greek states

where appropriate, maintaining a balance of power between allies and enemies

identifying and preventing coups, both internal and externally generated or supported

Objective 4: To provide sufficient food to feed their population to prevent internal threats from a disaffected hungry populace. Where a state was not economically self-sufficient, through adequate internal production to satisfy a state's demand, interstate engagement strategies used to achieve this objective include:

ensuring sufficient imports from foreign states

protecting the supply chains for food imports

Objective 5: To ensure domestic economic prosperity by maximising their revenues within the state's economic constraints.¹ Engagement strategies used to achieve this objective include:

identifying and implementing all available forms of taxation of citizens of foreign states

¹ For a relevant discussion, see Carl Hampus Lyttkens, 'Reflections on the origins of the polis: An economic perspective on institutional change in ancient Greece', *Constitutional Political Economy*, 17, 2006, p. 38.

selling state-owned goods to foreign states

exploiting international economic opportunities where and when they arose

maintaining economic relations with other states on reasonable terms

acquiring and holding foreign territory to gain access to strategic resources or
facilitate the flow of trade

where possible, requiring direct payments from other states, whether termed φόρος
(phoros) or σύνταξις (syntaxeis), depending on the form of their hegemony

countering economic constraints implemented by other states

Appendix 3

Sovereignty in the Ancient Greek World

Any analysis of sovereignty in the ancient Greek world starts with the modern debate as to whether ancient states were truly ‘states’ as modern international relations defines the term. In 1995, Rhodes asked whether Athens and other Greek *poleis* were acephalous, able to be differentiated from their citizens, given Thucydides’ constant references to peoples (eg ‘the Athenians’) rather than a state (‘Athens’).¹ Rhodes rightly argued that ancient Greek *poleis* were not acephalous, even though citizen-based collective decision-making was a critical feature of Greek democracies.² In 2000, the political scientist Berent provided the counter view by arguing that whilst civilised ancient Greek *poleis* were different from the stateless tribal societies studied by anthropologists, they were still stateless.³ To make his argument, Berent started with Weber’s definition of a state as an agency possessing the monopoly of legitimate violence. His argument’s key tenets were that *poleis* were decentralised, were not an instrument for the appropriation of surplus production, and were a community of warriors with no ability to enforce conscription.

In 2006, Hansen continued the sovereignty debate when he argued that many ancient Greek *poleis* lacked the features found in modern developed states.⁴ Nevertheless, he considered *poleis* were still ‘states’ if they had a defined territory, specific peoples and a system of political institutions with the ‘... sole right to define and enforce a legal order within the territory over the population’.⁵ He considered that ancient Greek *poleis* displayed these characteristics and thus were not stateless.

In 2009, Anderson complicated the debate by commenting that the scholarship consensus viewed *poleis* as neither state-based nor stateless, but a fusion of the two. Anderson argued that that a *polis* possessed a state-like corporate personality ‘... quite

¹ P.J. Rhodes, ‘The “acephalous” polis?’, *Historia*, 44, no. 2, 1995, pp. 153-67. Herodotus did the same as Thucydides when, for example, he referred to ‘the Spartans’. Hdt.1.82 and 5.74.

² Rhodes, ‘Acephalous polis?’, p. 167.

³ Berent, ‘Stateless polis’, p. 286.

⁴ Mogens Herman Hansen, *Polis: An Introduction to the Ancient Greek City-State*, Oxford, 2006, p. 58.

⁵ M. Hansen, ‘Was the Polis a State or Stateless Society?’, in *Even More Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis*, H. Nielsen (ed.), Stuttgart, 2002, p. 21.

distinct from the living, breathing citizens who happened to instantiate it at any particular time'.⁶ Drawing from Hobbes, he took issue with Weber's definition of a state, but still argued that at least in Classical Athens, this threshold for statehood was passed comfortably.⁷ More recently, in support of Anderson, Ober also placed himself on the side of statehood, arguing that attempts to define a *polis* as an acephalous society were misguided.⁸

Some groupings of peoples never established all the characteristics of a state, remaining what has been called an 'ethnos' state.⁹ Example of such ethnos states included Thracian tribes such as the Bisaltae and the Edones. A collective leadership, such as tribal councils, governed the ethnos, which could take all the decisions states make, such as waging wars, making treaties, minting coins and levying taxes. Thus, ethnos states exhibited sufficient sovereignty to apply economic statecraft.

If all forms of states in the ancient Greek world exhibited sufficient sovereignty to apply economic statecraft, one then needs to determine whether their sovereignty was compromised when they banded together for political, military or religious reasons. By the later fourth century, half of the states on the Greek mainland formed part of federal leagues.¹⁰ The answer depended, case-by-case, on the extent to which a state's ability to make decisions was devolved, by agreement, to the 'government' of the federation, league or confederacy.¹¹

The final form of political grouping that warrants consideration were the ἀμφικτυονία (amphictyones), religious-based organisations with a degree of independence from the tribes or states that formed or influenced them. Some powerful *amphictyones*, such as the Delphic *Amphictyony*, could lay claim to defacto sovereignty, operating co-extensively with states,

⁶ Greg Anderson, 'The personality of the Greek state', *JHS*, 129, 2009, p. 1.

⁷ Anderson, 'Personality', p. 18.

⁸ Although unfortunately he did not provide any substantiating argument. Ober, *Rise and Fall*, p. 331.

⁹ For a discussion of ethnos states, see Austin and Vidal-Naquet, *Economic and Social History*, pp. 78–81 and Garnsey and Morris, 'Risk and the polis', p. 101.

¹⁰ Ober, *Rise and Fall*, p. 243.

¹¹ Noting Hansen's comments that the information known about state rights within federations is primarily from the hegemonic Boeotian federation and the Chalcidic federation, see Mogens Herman Hansen, 'A typology of dependent poleis', in *Yet More Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis*, Thomas Heine Nielsen (ed.), Stuttgart, 1997, p. 30. For an insight into the Boeotian constitution, see *Hell. Oxy.* 16.2-4, *Xen. Hell.* 5.1.33; *Thuc.* 5.31.6 and 5.36-8 (esp. 38.2-3); Gomme, *Commentary*, Vol 4 p. 42 and Simon Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides Volume III: Books 5.25-8.109*, Oxford, 2008, pp. 89-90.

through their own decision-making councils.¹² Chapter Five discusses the extent to which *amphictyones* applied economic statecraft through the application of capital-based economic measures.

¹² The Delphic *Amphictyony* comprised the twelve tribes who organised and maintained the religious affairs at Apollo's sanctuary at Delphi. For one summary of the *amphictyony*, see Wight, 'States-system', p. 61. For a list of the tribes that formed the *amphictyony*, see C. Phillipson, *The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome Volume 2*, London, 1911, p. 5.

Appendix 4

Consolidated List of Economic Measures

LSN	Date	Initiating state	Target state(s)	Type	Description	Economic statecraft?	Historicity	Source - literature	Source - epigraphy	Numismatic evidence
1	Late Archaic/Classical	Larisa	Unknown states	T	Tribute as reflection of Larissan dominance	HL	L	Yes	No	No
2	Late Archaic/Classical	Naucratis	Trading states	TA	Import/export tariffs	UL	L	No	Yes	No
3	550	Delphic Amphiktyony	Lydia	PT	Exemption from local taxes and fees	HL	L	Yes	No	No
4	c524	Siphnos	Samos	L	Refusal to make loan but forced to provide larger loan	L	L	Yes	No	No
5	520-510	Kean states	Themselves	C	Common face design to create acceptance as legal currency	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
6	c511	Athens	Delphic oracle	B	Bribery of oracle to convince visitors to help free Athens	HL	L	Yes	No	No
7	c510	Croton	Sybaris	C	Dictating coin design	HL	L	No	No	Yes
8	c500	Elis and Heraea	Elis and Heraea	F	Mutually agreed fine to deter treaty infractions	HL	L	No	Yes	No

9	6th C	Boeotian confederacy	Themselves	C	Common coins to facilitate trade?	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
10	6th C	Orchomenos	Thebes	T	Tribute as reflection of Orchomenian dominance	HL	L	Yes	No	No
11	6th C	Lydia	Delphi	GM	To influence Delphic oracle	HL	L	Yes	No	No
12	6th C	Athens	Trading states	ER	Prohibition on agricultural exports apart from olive oil	UL	UL	Yes	No	No
13	6th C	Leucas	Corinth	C	Coin selection to allow use at diolkos?	L	L	No	No	Yes
14	6th C	Lydia	Sparta	SG	Croesus provided bullion	HL	L	Yes	No	Yes
15	6th C	Aegina	Trading states	C	Coin selection to promote trade and declare autonomy	HL	HL	Yes	Yes	No
16	6th C	Lydia	Trading states	C	Coin selection to promote identity and facilitate trade	HL	HL	Yes	No	Yes
17	6th C	Siphnos	Aegina	SG	Provision of silver bullion for minting	L	L	No	No	Yes
18	6th C	Thrace	Greek states - possibly Maroneia and Ainos	SG	Provision of bullion for minting	L	L	No	No	Yes
19	6th C	Thrace	Athens	SG	Provision of silver bullion for minting	L	L	Yes	No	Yes
20	6th C	Lydia	Greek states	SG	Provision of electrum to neighbouring states for minting coins	L	L	No	No	Yes

21	6th C	Athens	Various states	ATR	Peisistratus entering agreements with other states	HL	UL	No	No	No
22	6th C	Miletus	Sybaris	ATR	Close relationships	HL	L	Yes	No	No
23	Mid 6th C	Macedonia	Athens	SG	Provision of shipbuilding timber to Peisistratids	HL	UL	No	No	No
24	Late 6th C	Persia	Trading states	C	Coin minting on Persian standard	HL	HL	Yes	No	Yes
25	Late 6th C	Athens	Trading states	C	Decision to mint on modified Euboic standard	HL	HL	Yes	Yes	Yes
26	6th C - 5th C	Lesbian states	Lesbian states	C	Common billon coins indicating cooperative agreement	L	L	No	No	Yes
27	6th C - 4th C	Various states	Trading states	C	Coin minting on Aeginetan Standard to improve trade	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
28	6th C - 4th C	Erythrae	Trading states	C	Selection of Lydo-Milesian standard	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
29	6th C - 4th C	Ephesus	Trading states	C	Selection of Lydo-Milesian standard	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
30	6th C - 4th C	Sparta	Laconia and subservient states	T	Tribute as reflection of Spartan dominance	HL	UL	Yes	No	No
31	6th C - 4th C	Thasos	Paros	C	Possible monetary agreement	UL	L	No	No	Yes
32	6th C - 4th C	Poseidion	Trading states	C	Choice of Lydo-Milesian standard	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
33	6th C - 4th C	Sparta	Trading states	C	Prohibition on use of coins	HL	HL	Yes	No	Yes

34	6th C - 4th C	Byzantium	Trading states	C	Imposition of iron coins on foreign traders	HL	L	Yes	No	Yes
35	6th C - 4th C	Klazomenai	Trading states	C	Choice of Lydo-Milesian standard	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
36	6th C - 4th C	Corinth	Users of harbours and diolkos	TA	Transit dues	L	L	Yes	No	No
37	6th C - 4th C	Cyzikus	Trading states	C	Choice of own electrum standard	HL	HL	Yes	Yes	Yes
38	6th C - 4th C	Miletus	Priene	ATR	Symbola	UL	L	Yes	No	No
39	6th C - 4th C	Gortyn	Lato	ATR	Symbola	UL	L	Yes	No	No
40	6th C - 4th C	Corinth	Trading states	C	Choice of own standard	HL	HL	Yes	No	Yes
41	6th C - 4th C	Melos	Trading states	C	Choice of Lydo-Milesian standard which constrained trade	L	HL	No	No	Yes
42	6th C - 4th C	Lampsacus	Trading states	C	Minting gold coins on own standard	HL	HL	Yes	Yes	Yes
43	499	Miletus	Sparta	B	Attempted bribery of Cleomenes to help Ionians against Persians	HL	L	Yes	No	No
44	c494	Argos	Sparta	B	Bribery of Cleomenes to avert capture of Argos	HL	L	Yes	No	No
45	491	Athens	Sparta	B	Bribery of Kleomenes to arrest Aeginetans	HL	UL	Yes	No	No
46	c491	Thessaly	Sparta	B	Leutychidas bribed not to subjugate Thessalian territory	HL	L	Yes	No	No

47	490	Argos	Aegina and Sicyon	F	Fining for undesirable activities towards trade?	HL	L	Yes	No	No
48	c490	Corinth	Athens	SG	Provision of weapons	HL	HL	Yes	No	No
49	489	Persia	Athens	B	Bribery of Miltiades to withdraw from Paros	HL	UL	Yes	No	No
50	481	Syracuse	Greek states	SG	Offer of provision of grain	HL	L	Yes	No	No
51	c480	Persia	Peloponnesian states	GM	Money provided by Arthmius	HL	HL	Yes	No	No
52	480	Athens	Sparta/Corinth	B	Bribery by Themistocles to prevent commanders leaving battle of Artemisium	HL	L	Yes	No	No
53	480	Euboea	Athens	B	Bribery of Themistocles to remain at Artemisium	HL	L	Yes	No	No
54	480	Syracuse	Carthage	OP	2000 talent payment after military victory	L	L	Yes	No	No
55	480	Syracuse	Carthage	OP	Victory by Gelon allowed 2000 talent payment as reflection of Syracusan dominance	HL	L	Yes	No	No

56	c480	Cimmerian Bosphorus	Greek states including Aegina	SG	Provision of grain	UL	UL	Yes	No	No
57	480s	Macedonia	Athens	SG	Provision of shipbuilding timber by Alexander I	HL	UL	Yes	No	No
58	c470	Teos	Trading states	TA	Grain tariffs	UL	L	No	Yes	No
59	Early 5th C	Sparta	Athens	N	Bribery of Themistocles' political opponents	HL	UL	Yes	No	No
60	Early 5th C	Corinth	Corcyra	OP	Payment of 20 talent indemnity after interstate arbitration	HL	HL	Yes	No	No
61	Early 5th C	Macedonia	Trading states	C	Alexander I mints coins based on varying standards to promote trade in different networks	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
62	479	Persia	Athens	B	To seek Athenian alliance	HL	UL	Yes	No	No
63	479	Sparta	Athens	SG	Offer to feed Athens for length of prospective war with Persia	HL	L	Yes	No	No
64	479	Persia	Salamis	B	Possible bribery of Lykidas, a council member	HL	L	Yes	No	No
65	478	Persia	Sparta	B	For Pausanias to betray Sparta	HL	UL	Yes	No	No
66	470-460	Teos	Trading states	ER	Prohibition on grain export	UL	HL	No	Yes	No

67	463/2	Macedonia	Athens	B	To prevent Cimon attacking Macedonia	HL	UL	Yes	No	No
68	460s	Persia	Athens	B	Bribery of Callias during negotiations for 'Peace of Callias'	HL	UL	Yes	No	No
69	460s	Athens	Thasos	OP	Payment to repay cost of military siege	L	HL	Yes	No	No
70	457	Athens	Aegina	T	As a condition of autonomy	HL	HL	Yes	Yes	No
71	c455	Egypt	Athens	SG	Provision of grain by Psammetichos	L	L	Yes	No	No
72	454	Persia	Peloponnesian states	B	To invade Attica and so draw off the Athenians from Egypt	HL	L	Yes	No	No
73	450s	Athens	Karystos	T	Reduced tribute	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
74	c450	Knosos	Tylosos	TA	Mutual agreement on tariffs	L	HL	No	Yes	No
75	Mid 5th C	Macedonia	Athens	SG	Provision of shipbuilding timber by Perdiccas II	L	L	Yes	No	No
76	Mid 5th C	Athens	Delian states	T	Provide for defence	HL	HL	Yes	Yes	No
77	Mid 5th C	Athens	Chios and other states	T	No requirement to pay tribute	HL	HL	Yes	Yes	No
78	Mid 5th C	Corinth	Corcyra	F	20 talent fine imposed by Themistocles as arbitrator	HL	L	Yes	No	No
79	Mid 5th C	Syracuse	Sicel tribes	T	Tribute as reflection of Syracusan dominance	HL	L	Yes	No	No

80	Mid 5th C	Athens	Sparta	B	Spartan officials provided annual bribes by Pericles to stave off war	HL	UL	Yes	No	No
81	Mid 5th C	Macedonia	Athens	SG	Provision of timber for oars by Perdiccas II	HL	HL	Yes	Yes	No
82	Mid 5th C	Oeantheia and Chalaëum	Oeantheia and Chalaëum	F	Mutually agreed fine for illegal seizure of goods	HL	L	No	Yes	No
83	Mid 5th C	Elis	Lepreon	OP	Annual payment as term of division of conquered land	HL	L	Yes	No	No
84	Mid 5th C	Athens	Thasos	T	Capping of tribute payment	HL	L	No	Yes	No
85	Mid 5th C	Tyrrhenian states	Syracuse	B	Bribery of Phayllos to cease attacks	HL	L	Yes	No	No
86	447/6	Athens	Colophon	T	Reduced tribute payment given establishment of nearby Athenian colony	L	L	No	Yes	No
87	446	Athens	Sparta	B	Pleistoanax bribed to lead army out of Attica	HL	L	Yes	No	No
88	After 446	Athens	Mylasa	T	Tribute reduction to create loyalty	HL	L	No	Yes	No
89	446/5 or 424/3	Athens	Chalcis	TA	Freedom from tariffs	HL	L	No	Yes	No
90	440	Athens	Samos	OP	Reparation payments of 1200 talents after defeat of Samos	HL	HL	Yes	No	No

91	440/39	Persia	Athens	B	Failed attempt to bribe Pericles	HL	L	Yes	No	No
92	435	Elis	Corinth	GM	As a contribution to relief of Epidamnos	HL	L	Yes	No	No
93	435-2	Athens	Selymbria	T	Reduced tribute payment to create goodwill	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
94	434/3	Athens	Eteokarpathioi	T	Negotiated payment to enter arkhe	HL	L	No	Yes	No
95	c433	Athens	Megara	TB	Megara excluded from the ports of the Athenian Empire and market of Athens	HL	HL	Yes	No	No
96	432	Delphic Amphiktyony	Corinth	L	Discussion of potential loans	HL	L	Yes	No	No
97	c430	Macedonia	Methone	TB	Methone could not use Macedonian waters	L	L	No	Yes	No
98	430s/420s	Persia	Sparta and allies	GM	Support in early phases of Peloponesian War	L	HL	Yes	No	No
99	c430-c411	Odrysian kingdom	Vassal Greek states	T	Tribute as reflection of Odrysian dominance	HL	L	Yes	No	No
100	427	Athens	Lesbian states	T	No tribute, but cleruchies	HL	HL	Yes	Yes	No
101	427/6	Athens	Methone	T	Favourable treatment of payment arrears	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
102	427-4	Athens	Methone	TA	Tariff relief when providing grain	HL	HL	No	Yes	No

103	426	Athens	Samos and Thera	T	Not paying tribute	HL	L	No	Yes	No
104	425	Athens	Melos	T	Implications of failure to pay	HL	HL	Yes	Yes	No
105	425/4	Athens	Various states	T	Tribute reassessments to create loyalty or reinforce subservience	HL	L	No	Yes	No
106	424/3	Athens	Halieis	GM	Halieis not to provide funding to Athens' enemies	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
107	424	Syracuse	Athens	B	Bribery of three Athenian generals to lift siege	HL	L	Yes	No	No
108	c424	Chalcidian States	Trading states	C	Demonstrating political solidarity against Athens	L	HL	No	No	Yes
109	424	Akanthos	Athens	C	Change from Attic-Euboic to Lydo-Milesian standard to send message of distancing from Athens	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
110	423	Athens	Methone	L	Methone was in debt to Athens	HL	L	No	Yes	No
111	422	Athens	Argilos et al	T	Tribute as a form of protection money	HL	L	Yes	Yes	No
112	421	Athens	Sparta	B	Bribery to agree to peace of Nicias	HL	UL	Yes	No	No
113	420	Elis	Sparta	F	Fined for breaking Olympic truce	HL	HL	Yes	No	No

114	c420	Macedonia	Athens and Methone	SG	Provision of shipbuilding timber by Perdiccas II	L	UL	No	No	No
115	420s	Athens	Methone	SG	Diversion of Black Sea grain	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
116	420s	Athens	Trading states	C	Coinage decree	HL	HL	Yes	Yes	Yes
117	420s	Athens	Mytilene	T	Syntely agreed to support sub-hegemony	L	L	No	Yes	No
118	Late 420s	Athens	Aphytis	TA	Tariff relief when providing grain	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
119	415/4	Athens	Sparta	B	Clearchas bribed not to invade Attica	HL	L	Yes	No	No
120	412/1	Persia	Sparta	GM	Support in Peloponesian War through treaties	HL	HL	Yes	No	No
121	412/1	Persia	Various states	B	Bribery of fleet to accept reduced pay rates	UL	HL	Yes	No	No
122	c411	Persia	Syracuse	GM	To build triremes and hire mercenaries	HL	L	Yes	No	No
123	411	Macedonia	Athens	SG	Provision of oar timber through Andocides for the Samos fleet	HL	HL	Yes	No	No
124	410/409	Athens	Neapolis	L	Loan provided to fund their military activities against Thasos	HL	L	No	Yes	No
125	410-407	Macedonia	Athens	SG	Archelaus provided shipbuilding timber through intermediaries	HL	HL	No	Yes	No

126	410	Persia	Sparta	SG	Provision of shipbuilding timber	HL	HL	Yes	No	No
127	409	Ephesus	Syracuse and Selinus	PT	Ateleia to citizens wanting to reside in Ephesus	HL	HL	Yes	No	No
128	408	Athens	Chalcedon	T	Agreement to pay tribute to forego military action	HL	L	Yes	Yes	No
129	c408	Athens	Selymbria	L	Cancellation of debts	HL	L	No	Yes	No
130	408	Rhodes	Trading states	C	Choice of unusual weight standards after the synoecism of the Rhodian states.	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
131	408	Athens	Byzantium	B	Bribery of Anaxilaos to open city gates	HL	L	Yes	No	No
132	407/6	Macedonia	Athens	SG	Archelaus provided shipbuilding timber	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
133	407	Persia	Sparta	GM	Payments to Spartan admiral Lysander	HL	HL	Yes	No	No
134	405	Sparta	Athens	B	Bribery of Adimantus (and others?) at Aegospotamoi	HL	L	Yes	No	No
135	405	Athens	Samos	SG	Gift of ships	HL	HL	Yes	No	No
136	405	Persia	Sparta	GM	Ongoing support by Cyrus during Peloponnesian War	HL	HL	Yes	No	No
137	404/3	Thebes	Athens	L	Monies provided to Athenian exiles to support their return to power.	HL	L	Yes	No	No

138	403	Athens	Foreigners	PT	Ateleia to foreigners supporting the 10	L	HL	Yes	No	No
139	403/2	Athens	Samos	GM	Gold crowns to help convince long-term ally to remain loyal	L	HL	No	Yes	No
140	403	Sparta	Athens	L	100 talents to 'Ten Tyrants' for use against democrats	HL	HL	Yes	No	No
141	Late 5th C	Athens	Naval competitors	ER	Export prohibition on oar pads, sails and pitch	HL	L	Yes	No	No
142	Late 5th C	Persia	Athens	B	Bribery attempt by Rhoesaces of Athenians	UL	L	Yes	No	No
143	Late 5th C	Macedonia	Trading states	C	Archelaus mints on standards designed to create closed monetary zone	L	HL	No	No	Yes
144	Late 5th C	Athens	Corinth	SG	Reduced bullion exports during Peloponnesian War	HL	HL	Yes	No	No
145	Late 5th C	Athens	Oar Importers	TA	Freedom from tariffs	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
146	Late 5th C	Egypt	Sparta and allies	SG	Provision of grain	L	L	Yes	No	No
147	Late 5th C / early 4th C	Macedonia	Trading states	C	Archelaus mints coins on Persian Standard	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
148	Late 5th C / early 4th C	Macedonia	Trading states	C	Archelaus mints coins on Attic-Euboic Standard	HL	HL	No	No	Yes

149	5th C	Sparta	Peloponnesian League states	F	Fines to deter member states' failing to provide contributions	HL	HL	Yes	No	No
150	5th C	Elis	Vassal states	T	Tribute as reflection of Eleian dominance	HL	L	Yes	No	No
151	5th C	Cimmerian Bosphorus	Peloponnesian states	SG	Provision of grain	UL	UL	Yes	No	No
152	5th C	Sparta	Peloponnesian League states	S	Contributions to reflect Spartan hegemony	L	UL	Yes	No	No
153	5th C	Athens	Myrina	T	Favoured treatment compared to other Lemnian state	L	L	No	Yes	No
154	5th C	Athens	Egypt	SG	Bullion exports	L	L	No	No	Yes
155	5th C	Corinth	Various states	C	Agreements to allow other states to mint Corinthian coins	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
156	5th C	Byzantium	Calchedon	C	Common coins to facilitate trade?	L	L	No	No	Yes
157	5th C	Athens	Trading states	TA	Proceeds of the 10%	HL	HL	Yes	Yes	No
158	5th C	Chios	Athens	C	Decision to create own standard	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
159	5th C	Various states	Athens	C	Minting on Aeginetan standard to demonstrate political solidarity with Aegina	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
160	5th C	Athens	Naupactus and Amphipolis	T	Not paying tribute	HL	HL	No	Yes	No

161	5th C	Samos	Trading states	TA	Tariffs with honours to traders	UL	L	No	Yes	No
162	5th C ?	Cycladic states	Trading states	C	Choice of Lydo-Milesian standard	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
163	5th C ?	Krisa	Trading states	TA	Imports from Magna Graecia and Sicily	L	UL	Yes	No	No
164	5th C ?	Teos	Abdera	C	Similar face designs symbolic of long standing ties	L	HL	No	No	Yes
165	5th C ?	Egypt	Athens	SG	Provision of grain in time of famine	L	L	Yes	No	No
166	5th C ?	Olous	Lato	TA	Mutual tariffs as part of agreement	L	L	No	Yes	No
167	5th C ?	Argos and Aegina	Athens	TB	Boycott of Attic products in temples	L	L	Yes	No	No
168	5th C and 4th C	Various states	Trading states	C	Choice of Phocaeen standard to improve trade and/or display political solidarity	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
169	5th C and 4th C	Cilician states	Athens	SG	Provision of shipbuilding timber	HL	UL	No	No	No
170	5th C and 4th C	Illyrian tribes	Corinth	SG	Provision of silver bullion for minting coins	L	L	No	No	Yes
171	5th C and 4th C ?	Mende	Trading states	TA	Import/export tariffs	UL	L	Yes	No	No
172	5th C and 4th C ?	Amphissa	Trading states	TA	Import tariffs	UL	L	Yes	No	No
173	5th C and 4th C ?	Thrace	Trading states	TA	Import/export tariffs	UL	L	Yes	No	No
174	5th C and 4th C ?	Olous	Lato	TA	Tariff provisions in treaty	L	L	No	Yes	No

175	5th C and 4th C?	Xanthos	Trading states	TA	Import/export tariffs	UL	L	No	Yes	No
176	5th C and 4th C?	Kythnos	Trading states	C	Minting of coins of unusual weights	L	HL	No	No	Yes
177	5th C and 4th C?	Kyparissia	Trading states	TA	Import/export tariffs	UL	HL	No	Yes	No
178	5th C and 4th C?	Keos	Trading states	TA	Import/export tariffs	UL	HL	No	Yes	No
179	5th C and 4th C?	Delos	Trading states	TA	Import/export tariffs	UL	HL	No	Yes	No
180	5th C and 4th C?	Kimolos	Trading states	TA	Import/export tariffs	UL	HL	No	Yes	No
181	5th C and 4th C	Dacian tribes	Histria, Macedon, Trapezus and Amisus	SG	Provision of gold bullion	L	L	No	No	Yes
182	5th C and 4th C	Ural/Altai tribes	Pantikapaion and Theodosia	SG	Provision of gold bullion	L	L	No	No	Yes
183	5th C and 4th C	Black Sea tribes	Kyzikos, Phokaia, Mytilene	SG	Provision of gold bullion	L	L	No	No	Yes
184	5th C and 4th Cs	Persia	Vassal Greek states	T	Tribute to allow degree of autonomy	HL	L	Yes	No	No
185	5th C and 4th C	Various states	Athens	C	Face design suggesting loyalty to Athens	HL	HL	No	Yes	Yes
186	5th C and 4th C	Phocaea	Mytilene	C	Monetary agreement	HL	HL	No	Yes	Yes
187	5th C and 4th C	Macedonia	Trading states	TA	Tariffs placed on export of timber	HL	L	No	Yes	No
188	5th Cand 4th C	Persia	Vassal states	T	Tribute as reflection of Persian hegemony	HL	HL	Yes	No	No

189	5th C and 4th C	Persia	Satrapies	C	Allowing minting by satraps	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
190	5th C and 4th C	Persia	Vassal states	C	Decisions not to impose Persian coins	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
191	5th C and 4th Cs	Macedonia	Trading states	ATR	Openness of Macedonian coastal waters to traders	L	L	Yes	No	No
192	5th C and 4th C	Various states	Trading states	C	Choice of Lydo-Milesian standard	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
193	5th C and 4th C	Various states	Trading states	C	Choice of Chian standard to improve trade and/or display political solidarity	HL	HL	Yes	No	Yes
194	5th and 4th Cs	States in Boeotian Federation	States in Boeotian Federation	S	Contributions agreed amongst member states	UL	HL	Yes	No	No
195	5th C and 4th C	Various states	Trading states	C	Choice of Attic-Euboic standard to improve trade and/or display political solidarity	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
196	5th C and 4th C	Various states	Trading states	C	Choice of Corinthian standard to improve trade and/or display political solidarity	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
197	5th and 4th C	Athens	Foreigners	PE	Various examples of enktesis	L	HL	Yes	Yes	No
198	5th C and 4th C	Byzantium	Trading states	TA	10% tariff to help increase grain supply	L	L	Yes	No	No

199	5th C and 4th C	Various states	Trading states	C	Choice of Persian standard to improve trade and/or display political solidarity	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
200	5th C and 4th C	Athens	Trading states	TA	Peiraiean tariffs - likely 2%	UL	HL	Yes	Yes	No
201	5th C and 4th C?	States of Magna Graecia	Themselves	C	Choice of unusual coin weights to facilitate trade amongst themselves	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
202	5th C and 4th C?	Macedonia	Trading states	TA	Tariffs for export and 'passage' (transit)	L	L	Yes	No	No
203	5th C and 4th C?	Samos	Trading states	TA	Grain Tariffs	UL	L	No	Yes	No
204	5th C and 4th C?	Olynthos	Trading states	TA	Import/export tariffs	UL	L	Yes	No	No
205	Late 5th C	Cyprus	Athens	SG	Provision of grain	UL	L	Yes	No	No
206	Late 5th C	Sicilian states	Peloponnesian states	SG	Provision of grain	L	L	Yes	No	No
207	Late 5th C	Athens	Various states	T	Forced collection of tribute or other monies	L	L	Yes	No	No
208	Late 5th C	Ionian states	Themselves	C	Minting of common coinage	L	L	No	No	Yes
209	Late 5th C and 4th C	Athens	Trading states	TA	Bosphoran tariffs - dekate (10%)	HL	HL	Yes	Yes	No
210	Late 5th/4th C	Athens	Trading states	TA	Arkhe-wide tariff - eikoste (5%)	HL	HL	Yes	No	No
211	396/5	Persia	Corinth, Athens, Thebes, Argos	GM	Promote war against Sparta	HL	HL	Yes	No	No

212	396	Egypt	Sparta	SG	Provision of 100 triremes	HL	L	Yes	No	No
213	396	Egypt	Sparta	SG	Provision of grain	HL	L	Yes	No	No
214	c394	Persia	Anti-Sparta coalition	GM	Funds to help continue war against Sparta	HL	HL	Yes	No	No
215	c394?	Persia	Athens	GM	To rebuild Long Walls	HL	HL	Yes	No	No
216	c394	Persia	Athens	B	During Athenian embassy to Persia, bribery alleged against Epicrates	UL	UL	Yes	No	No
217	393	Macedonia	Chalcidians	ATR	Treaty to promote trade	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
218	393	Macedonia	Chalcidians	TA	Treaty with normal tariffs	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
219	390s	Persia	Athens	B	Bribery of Epicrates and fellow ambassadors to Sparta	HL	UL	Yes	No	No
220	390s	Persia	Corinth	SG	Provision of bullion for minting coins	L	L	No	No	No
221	389/88	Athens	Thasos	PT	<i>Ateleia</i> to Thasian citizens who expelled a Spartan garrison	HL	L	Yes	No	No
222	387/6	Athens	Klazomenai	TA	Tariff payment in exchange for Athens not interfering with respect to Chyton	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
223	387	Unknown	Athens	B	Bribery of Thrasybulos	HL	UL	Yes	No	No

224	c387	Persia	Sparta	GM	Support favourable Persian outcomes in Peace of Antalcidas	HL	L	Yes	No	No
225	c383-378	Carthage	Syracuse	B	Bribery of Dionysius to allow Carthaginian troops to return home	HL	L	Yes	No	No
226	382	Persia	Thebes	B	Bribery of Ismenias, a Theban ambassador to Persia	HL	L	Yes	No	No
227	Early 4th C	Macedonia	Chalcidians	SG	Amyntas III provided shipbuilding timber/pitch	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
228	Early 4th C	Illyrian tribes	Macedonia	T	Tribute as reflection of Illyrian dominance	HL	L	Yes	No	No
229	Early 4th C	Cimmerian Bosphorus	Athens	SG	Provision of grain	HL	HL	Yes	Yes	No
230	378	Thebes	Sparta	B	Bribery of Sphodrias to invade Attica	HL	L	Yes	No	No
231	c375	Macedonia	Athens	SG	Amyntas III provided shipbuilding timber	HL	L	Yes	Yes	No
232	375	Athens	Trading states	C	Coinage decree	HL	HL	Yes	Yes	Yes
233	374/3	Athens	Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros	TA	Grain tariffs	L	HL	No	Yes	No
234	c372	Macedonia	Athens	SG	Amyntas III provided shipbuilding timber through intermediaries	HL	L	Yes	No	No

235	370	Elis	Mantineia	GM	Three talent contribution for building city wall	L	HL	Yes	Yes	Yes
236	370	Elis	Thebes	L	10 talent loan to help fund military support	HL	HL	Yes	No	No
237	370s	Delphic Amphiktyony	Keos' states	L	Incomplete payment by Keans, but purpose of loan unknowable	UL	HL	No	Yes	No
238	370s	Thessaly	Vassal states	T	Tribute as reflection of Jason's dominance	HL	L	Yes	No	No
239	370s	Delos	Karystos	L	Loan to possibly fund public works or minting	L	L	No	Yes	No
240	370s	Delphic Amphiktyony	Keans	L	Loan to Kean states with purpose unknown	UL	L	No	Yes	No
241	370s	Delphic Amphiktyony	Karystos	L	Loan possibly for minting or public works	UL	HL	No	Yes	No
242	369/8	Athens	Syracuse	GM	Gold crowns to tyrant Dionysius as part of package to ally with Athens	L	HL	No	Yes	No
243	369	Sparta	Thebes	B	Bribery for Theban army to leave Laconia	HL	UL	Yes	No	No
244	368	Persia	Thebes, Sparta	GM	Philiskos took Persian monies to peace negotiations between Sparta and Thebes	HL	L	Yes	No	No

245	368	Sicyon	Arcadians and Argives	B	Bribery of Sicyon's allies by its tyrant, Euphron.	HL	L	Yes	No	No
246	367	Persia	Athens	B	Bribery of Timogoras an Athenian ambassador	HL	UL	Yes	No	No
247	c367	Athens	Sidon	PT	No metic taxes for Sidonians visiting Athens	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
248	366	Sicyon	Thebes	B	Euphron attempts to remove Thebans from Sicyon acropolis	HL	L	Yes	No	No
249	365-60	Macedonia	Boeotia	SG	Perdiccas III provided shipbuilding timber	HL	L	No	Yes	No
250	c364	Keos	Hestiaia	TA	Mutual agreement on tariffs	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
251	c364	Keos	I	PE	Reciprocal import/export rights	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
252	363/2	Pelagonia	Athens	GM	Contribution to Athens' war against the Chalcidians	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
253	360	Macedonia	Thrace	B	To prevent the Thracians supporting Pausanias	HL	L	Yes	No	No
254	360s	Pherai	Athens	GM	Payments by Alexander but motive unknown	L	L	Yes	No	No
255	360s or 350s	Cimmerian Bosphorus	Mytilene	TA	Tariff reductions for wheat exports	UL	HL	No	Yes	No

256	360s	Macedonia	Trading states	TA	Macedonian harbour dues	HL	L	Yes	No	No
257	c360	Selymbria	Trading states	ER	Prohibition on grain export	UL	L	Yes	No	No
258	360s?	Delphic Amphiktyony	Sparta	F	Fined 500 talents for seizure of Theban acropolis	HL	L	Yes	No	No
259	358	Pherai	Thebes	SG	Gift of ships	HL	L	Yes	No	No
260	357	Delphic Amphiktyony	Phocis	F	Fined for cultivating sacred land	HL	L	Yes	No	No
261	c356	Chios and Rhodes	Athens	B	Bribery of general Timotheos perhaps not to take military action	HL	UL	Yes	No	No
262	350s	Phocis	Various states	B	To prevent military action	HL	L	Yes	No	No
263	c350-321	Athens	Cimmerian Bosphorus	GM	Gold crowns for grain trade	L	HL	Yes	Yes	No
264	350-320	Athens	Various states	PT	Ateleia and/or economic benefits to citizens of various states	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
265	351	Persia	Thebes	GM	To allow Thebes to continue their war against Phocia	L	L	Yes	No	No
266	349/8	Persia	Athens	SG	Provision of grain to Athenian military expedition in northern Aegean	L	HL	No	Yes	No
267	340s	Athens	Macedonia	ER	Prohibition on arms and ships' tackle	HL	L	Yes	No	No

268	340s	Macedonia	Athens	B	Bribery of Demades to create treaty terms favourable to Philip	HL	L	Yes	No	No
269	Mid 4th C	Macedonia	Trading states	C	Minting of silver tetradrachms by Philip II	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
270	Mid 4th C	Athens	Melos	F	Fine for allowing pirates to use their harbours	HL	L	Yes	No	No
271	Mid 4th C	Athens	Three Kean cities	ER	Restriction on ochre exports from Keos	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
272	Mid 4th C	Macedonia	Trading states	C	Choice of Chalkidian standard and minting of gold phillipoi	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
273	Mid 4th C	Illyria	Macedonia	T	Tribute enforced after defeat of Amyntas	HL	L	Yes	No	No
274	Mid 4th C	Macedonia	Trading states	TA	Macedon collected dues from Thessalian harbours/markets	L	L	Yes	No	No
275	Mid 4th C	Macedonia	Athens	B	Payment to Aristogeiton for unspecified purpose	HL	UL	Yes	No	No
276	Mid 4th C	Egypt	Athens	SG	Provision of grain	UL	L	Yes	No	No
277	Mid 4th C	Macedonia	Paionians	B	Gifts to maintain peace	HL	L	Yes	No	No

278	Mid 4th C	Macedonia	Trading states	C	Choice of Attic-Euboic standard with Macedonian symbols to usurp popularity of Athenian owls	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
279	Mid 4th C	Macedonia	Olynthos	B	Bribing of chief officials to capture cities	HL	L	Yes	No	No
280	Mid 4th C	Macedonia	Torone and Meikyberna	B	Treasonable surrender by cities implying bribery	HL	L	Yes	No	No
281	Mid 4th C	Macedonia	Illyrian tribes	B	To prevent incursions into Macedonia	HL	L	Yes	No	No
282	Before 334	Miletus	Sardis	ATR	Mutual trading benefits	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
283	c357	Macedonia	Athens	ER	Prohibition on timber export	HL	UL	Yes	No	No
284	350-325	Athens	Achaean states	TA	Freedom from tariffs	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
285	350-342	Erythrai	Atarneus	TA	Mutual tariff relief as part of alliance	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
286	346	Macedonia	Athens	B	Bribery of Philocrates as part of Athenian embassy	HL	UL	Yes	No	No
287	c346-4	Macedonia	Athens	SG	Philip II prevented the export of shipbuilding timber	HL	UL	No	No	No
288	343	Amphissa	Athens	B	Bribery of Demosthenes to support Amphissan interests	HL	UL	Yes	No	No

289	341/0	Athens	Chalcis	SG	Loan of ships	HL	L	No	Yes	No
290	340/339	Tenedos	Athens	L	Loan to support Athenian attempts to relieve cities besieged by Macedonia	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
291	c348	Macedonia	Euboean states	GM	Support rebellion against Athens	HL	UL	Yes	No	No
292	c342 onwards	Macedonia	Athens	SG	Philip II provided shipbuilding timber	HL	L	No	No	No
293	340	Chalcis, Eretria and Oreos	Athens	B	Bribery of Demosthenes to vote against financial contributions	HL	UL	Yes	No	No
294	c339	Persia	Athens	B	Bribery of Demosthenes to influence Athenian attitudes towards Macedonia	HL	UL	Yes	No	No
295	338	Macedonia	Thebes	B	Bribery of three generals	HL	UL	Yes	No	No
296	c335/334	Macedonia	Trading states	SG	Temporary prevention of timber exports from Mount Dysoron	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
297	c335/334	Macedonia	Trading states	ER	Temporary prohibition on timber export	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
298	333	Persia	Sparta	SG	Gift of ships	HL	L	Yes	No	No
299	333	Persia	Sparta	GM	Provision of money and ships	HL	L	Yes	No	No

300	333	Persia	Greeks	B	Persian commander, Memnos, distributed bribes amongst opposing Greeks	HL	L	Yes	No	No
301	c330	Miletus	Olbia	TA	Mutual agreement on tariffs	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
302	c330	Olbia	Miletus	PT	Ateleia to citizens living in Olbia	L	HL	No	Yes	No
303	c330	Miletus	Sardis	PT	Possible reciprocal tariff relief	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
304	325/4	Macedonia	Athens	SG	Provision of oars through intermediaries	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
305	320s	Cyrene	Greek states	SG	Provision of grain	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
306	Late 4th C	Macedonia	Trading states	C	Choice of Attic-Euboic Standard by Alexander III	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
307	Late 4th C	Rhodes	Argos	L	Interest free loan of 100 talents	L	L	No	Yes	No
308	Late 4th C	Magnesia	Phocaea	ATR	Mutual agreement on tariffs	L	L	No	Yes	No
309	Later 4th C	Macedonia	Athens	SG	Provision of shipbuilding timber	HL	L	Yes	No	No
310	4th C	Perinthus	Thrace	L	Decision not to provide a loan requested to allow raising of an army	HL	L	Yes	No	No
311	4th C	Macedonia	Various Athenian politicians	B	Attempts by Philip to further Macedonian interests	HL	L	Yes	No	No

312	4th C	Macedonia	League of Corinth states	S	Contributions to reflect Macedonian hegemony	L	UL	Yes	Yes	No
313	4th C	Xanthos	Unknown states	TA	Tariff privileges	UL	L	No	Yes	No
314	4th C	Athens	Second Confederacy states	S	Athenian pressure to pay voluntary contributions reflects Athenian dominance	L	HL	Yes	No	No
315	4th C	Cimmerian Bosphorus	Athens	TA	Waiving tariff for wheat exports	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
316	4th C	Andros	Trading states	TA	Grain tariffs	UL	L	No	Yes	No
317	4th C	Sicilian states	Athens	SG	Provision of grain	L	L	Yes	No	No
318	4th C	Cimmerian Bosphorus	Akanthos	SG	Provision of grain	UL	HL	Yes	No	No
319	4th C	Thasos	Trading states	TB	Banned import of foreign wine	UL	L	No	Yes	No
320	4th C	Macedonia	Thessalian states	C	Allowed states to continue minting	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
321	4th C	Egypt	Trading states	C	Imitating Athenian coins to facilitate trade	HL	HL	No	No	Yes
322	mid-late 4th C	Athens	Acarnarnia	GM	Gold crowns in recognition for ongoing support	L	HL	No	Yes	No
323	Late 4th C	Delian sanctuary	Various states	L	Loans to states prepared to support Athenian interests	HL	HL	No	Yes	No
324	Late 4th C	Babylon	Trading states	TA	10% tariff by Alexander on land trade in province of Babylon	UL	L	Yes	No	No

325	Late 4th C	Egypt	Athens	SG	Provision of grain by Amasis	HL	UL	Yes	No	No
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