CHAPTER ONE - ON THE ANTIQUITY OF US: CONCEPTIONS OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

To an ordinary human being, love means nothing if it does not mean loving some people more than others.

George Orwell

Introduction

The ontological question in International Relations may be stated simply: what is the nature of the interacting units in global politics? This question has to be addressed, at least implicitly, by any theory of International Relations. In the first three chapters, this thesis looks at some of the main aspects of the ontological issue in International Relations, including the need for a greater focus on, and specification of, "the actor". To begin with, in this chapter, I survey the International Relations literature in the broad, exploring how different theoretical schools may be distinguished by their differing treatments of the ontological question. I suggest that many of the assumptions and implicit understandings inherent in the theoretical strands are shared. In particular, it is impossible to avoid some recognition of the group unit.

Differences between the various schools may be described with reference to their treatment of this putative collective entity. More than one school, following the Weberian precedent in sociology, denies its existence altogether, but these are then forced to accommodate the concept some other way: as a 'fiction' (Carr 1946:149), or by stating that people behave "as if" collective entities existed (Wight, C. 2004:269). Others focus on the fluid, ephemeral nature of collectives, stressing time and process, culture and narrative (for example Bevir and Rhodes, 2008).

There is a great deal more continuity among theoretical schools than is commonly acknowledged. Realists, for example, argue that the struggle for power is a constant in human affairs (Burchill & Linklater 2005:1), while critical theorists and postmodernists, who see themselves as opposed to realists, point to the use of language and the social construction of narratives, boundaries and knowledge as a means of domination of the

many by the few (eg Cox 1981). Both posit a world of relentless repression, mitigated by a detached perspective, balance and an appeal to a higher morality. Both regard group entities as concepts rather than as material realities.

Similarly, as Maria Zehfuss has shown, the critical/constructivist campaign against the 'rationalist' enemy is a largely one-sided affair:

> … we are told time and again that this debate is happening and that it is crucially important. And yet we do not find exchanges between rationalist and constructivist scholars in key journals (Zehfuss 2002:4)

This leaves constructivists open to the charge of 'taking identities in relation to [mythical] Others, casting them into corresponding counter-identities, and playing out the result' (Wendt, Alexander 1999:21)

In short, theorists themselves adopt language and take positions with the effect of categorising themselves and others. As part of the process, it is necessary to distinguish certain groups from other groups, and to favour or privilege some over the rest. The downside of this is the 'differentiation, mutual ignorance, colonizing strategies, and amnesia' (Bigo & Walker 2007:5), that sometimes distorts debate within and between schools of International Relations theory. This construction of divisions is a striking phenomenon. It illustrates some of the very aspects of human affairs which are of interest here.

Questions of deep ontology and human cognition look like common threads linking schools of International Relations theory. Such questions cannot be avoided, and should not, because they have useful things to contribute to International Relations, as I explain further in Chapter Two. Each of the various categories of International Relations theory resolves, avoids or accommodates the question of the group-unit in a different way. Thus the commonality is located in the points of difference. They agree over what they disagree on, which is the existence, nature and/or motivations of the collective entity. It is true, however, that many of these theoretical commonalities are implicit. Some theorists deny the existence of aspects of world politics which they then are unable to

avoid taking into account. This is the case with E.H. Carr's 'fiction of the group person', mentioned above (Carr 1946:149), derived from Hobbes' fictionalised Leviathan (Donnelly 2005:32-33).

This chapter, and the thesis more broadly, devotes more space to realism and to constructivism than to many other branches of theory which might be considered relevant. There are three reasons for this. One is that it is useful to narrow the focus as much as possible, the second is that it seems these perspectives have the greatest potential for mutual understanding, and the third is that, if it were possible to find commonalities between the two, these would be expandable to other schools.

Narrowing the focus is a methodological approach, explicating commonalities between these two branches of theory in the expectation that they might be applied to others. The second point, that realism and constructivism show a great potential for mutual adaptation, is borne out in the literature. Several important constructivists, including Ruggie and Wight, describe their theories as developments of neorealism. Constructivism and neorealism share structural concerns. Furthermore, even classical realists describe a much more nuanced picture of power relations than they are often given credit for. Thirdly, many of the underlying ontological assumptions of the two schools are shared among others as well, meaning that such connections may be usefully extrapolated.

Debate among scholars in many ways reflects differences in the scope of their perceptions as to the limitations of society. This provides a suitable structure for this chapter, along the following lines. Realists like Morgenthau reacted to the universal-brotherhood-of-man argument put forward by early International Relations scholars and policy advocates (Angell 1933(1908)) by arguing for the restriction of human loyalty, community, and therefore morality, to the nation-state (Morgenthau 1967:225-260). The state, defined by these emotional and political allegiances, then naturally seemed like the obvious unit of analysis.

Neorealists expanded the theoretical terrain to encompass the political environment in which states form and operate – anarchy – without expanding the moral or emotional scope of community (Waltz 1979:62-3,104). States-system theorists (Wight, M. 1977), as well as the English School, expanded their conception of the boundaries of community along with their theoretical concerns, arguing that a society comprised of states (Bull 1977) was indeed a full-fledged society, while Marxists and world-system theorists drew their boundaries on a different, class-based map (Wallerstein 1991). Critical theorists examined the discursive processes by which such boundaries are drawn (Cox 1981:129,134). Constructivism was a development of, as well as a reaction to, neorealism, maintaining its key structuralist concerns, while overlaying a Durkheimian emphasis on social, as opposed to purely political, structures. Constructivists sought to combine these points of view by examining the social nature of such seemingly concrete concepts as interest and anarchy (Copeland 2000:188; Kratochwil 1987; Wendt, Alexander 1992).

Now, the constructivist orthodoxy (Kratochwil 2000) is being challenged by those who argue for an even less articulate motivational set. The importance of affect, or emotion, intuition and narrative in the legitimation of institutions and in policy-making has been recognised (Maxwell 1994; Denemark 1999; Crawford 2000; Zehfuss 2001; Jackson 2004a; Lebow 2005; Ross 2006; Kaplan 2007). Evolutionary theory has been applied to International Relations (Modelski & Poznanski 1996; Thayer 2000; Thompson 2001a), but I have not seen the relationship of affect to legitimacy and then to social and strategic ontology fully explored in International Relations theory. This chapter is about the attempts, implicit or explicit, of the various broad theoretical classes of International Relations theory to account ontologically for the 'group unit' in global politics. The next chapter will investigate the utility of some ideas from the disciplines of sociology and the theory of mind and cognition, as well as evolutionary theory, to see if they shed light on the ontological question in International Relations.

Classical Realism: morality and the state

The conventional history of the formal study of International Relations in the twentieth century begins with the ideal. Utopians like Angell, who considered the necessity of

national defence a "Great Illusion" (1933(1908)), dominated the field in its early-century beginnings, while in practice the League of Nations and Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points embodied and expressed the hopes of the world.

Of course the real story of the development of International Relations is more complicated, arising as it does out of a many-faceted discourse, as has been noted by Bell (2005) and others. Some argue that 'imperialism and internationalism, not idealism and realism, were the dominant themes when international relations first began to take on the characteristics of a professional field of inquiry' (Long and Schmidt, quoted in Bell 2005:634). It is true, however, that Carr, Morgenthau and Kennan presented themselves as reacting against the prevailing, idealist worldview (Bell 2005:633-634; Carr 1946:5-10; Morgenthau 1950).

Morgenthau and Kennan are two of the founders of modern realism (Kennan 1985; Morgenthau 1950, 1967). Carr (1946) may also be thought of as a foundational thinker in the school, even though he himself could not be classed as strictly a realist. He beautifully articulated the realist position, even though he advocated an admixture of utopianism. He saw the two as reactions to one another, and in creative tension. 'The characteristic vice of the utopian', he wrote, 'is naivety; of the realist, sterility' (Carr 1946:12).

Realists argued that, in the end, the need for national defence is not an illusion, but a necessity of life (Kennan 1985:205). Clearly it is a necessity of life for the nation, which observation exposes the relationship between ontology and political views. Utopians thought the state an artificial impediment to the realisation of the natural, homogeneous condition of humanity. Realists, though they could conceive of a world without nation-states, could do so only in the imagining of a plausible distant future (Carr 1946:225-231; Morgenthau 1967:9). For them the nation state was the only possible guarantor of personal liberty.

To be fair to Carr, he did stress the importance of the 'group unit' to any future global political arrangement. However, even he described this unit as fictional:

> The fiction of the group-person, having moral rights and obligations and consequently capable of moral behaviour, is an indispensable instrument of modern society; and the most indispensable of these fictitious group-persons is the state (Carr 1946:149).

A group-unit and a group-person are not necessarily the same thing, of course, but the latter may be seen as the legal-institutional expression of the former. If these are attributes of the same entity, one might expect other, perhaps definitive, attributes to be discernible.

It was Morgenthau who set out the basic modern-classical realist principle of the state pursuit of 'interest defined as power,' (Morgenthau 1967:5) this being his definition of the realm of international politics, and therefore, in his view, a universal feature thereof. The economic realm, by contrast, he described in terms of the pursuit of interest defined as wealth (Morgenthau 1967:5). Denmark has criticised Morgenthau for this separation of politics from other issues (1999:46-47). Morgenthau, like Waltz after him, defends the approach on grounds of its usefulness as a theoretical abstraction (1967:5,8).

'Human nature'

Classical realists posit a human drive for dominance which must be taken into account in the building of international institutions. Both Morgenthau and Carr argued not so much that the drive for domination was itself all-powerful, but that any political arrangement which did not take it into account was doomed to failure (Burchill & Linklater 2005:1). Since the state was becoming the sovereign carrier of this drive within the extant institutional framework, it was entirely sensible to examine it as a principal object of study.

The drive is not universal; it does not need to be. Arguments regarding "Human Nature" should take this into account. The urge to dominate – *animus dominandi* (Thayer 2000:125) – is not a universal aspect of the nature of human individuals, or of states. In any given group, however, a certain percentage will possess it, and this is enough for it to be a universal driver of human affairs (Bloom 1993:6). Importantly, it is in the nature of contexts, rather than of units.

Classical realists frequently display a certain disdain when discussing what they think of as the naïveté and ill-thought moralising of utopian idealists (Carr 1946:8-10; Morgenthau 1950:834). This is often seen in discussion of the early history of the formal discipline of International Relations. World War I was the last paroxysm of the imperial distribution of jurisdiction, although the effects were slow to materialise, and a bloody end it was.

The first university International Relations departments reacted to the horrors of WWI by proposing, along with US President Woodrow Wilson, the possibility of the establishment of institutions which would accommodate and resolve differences without resort to war (Carr 1946:11-40). In 1939, when Carr had almost completed his book on the Twenty Years Crisis, this initial liberal institutional idealism had given way in the academy to a bleaker outlook, and in practice to a further decade or more of crisis. By the end of WWII, the basic idea of nationalism – that the state should be the formal executive expression of "its" nation – had achieved dominant status (Anderson 1983:2-3). Few questioned the principle that the nation should have its state and that that state should be sovereign. It was a dangerous world, and the motivation of self-preservation comes to the fore in such circumstances.

But what is this self, that must be preserved? It cannot be individuals, as evidenced by the sheer scale of the willingness to die for... what? Realists saw that it was states doing the self-preservation and striving for dominance. Therefore, the ontology derived from this conception of motivation revolves around states and their imperatives. The contradiction in Carr is that, while he calls the idea of the group-person a fiction, he also points to the nature of the group-unit as the defining feature of the international or world political landscape. Like Morgenthau, he mentions this in the context of some barely imaginable, future, non-state-centric global polity (Carr 1946:149). For the moment, the state is indispensable.

Realists, then, identify an essentially amoral collective drive for dominance in the name of the fictional group person, represented by the state, and try to accommodate it in some arrangement whereby it can be blunted by countervailing forces, thus allowing

the moral imperatives of peace, stability and justice room to play. Implicit in this is the rejection of Adam Smith's 'hidden hand', or the 'harmony of interests'. Carr, indeed, is quite explicit in stating that Darwinian selection and *laissez-faire* Smithism entail vast suffering. In his view there is no 'harmony of interests' (Carr 1946:12) in the raucous survival of the fittest. The question is, the fittest what? And as a corollary on the question of motivation, what does "fit" mean in this context?

While realists acknowledged the non-existence of any universal moral code, they argued for universally relevant drives, as we have seen (Donnelly 2005:32-33). For Morgenthau, all politics is about power. There are, he provisionally proposed, three possible state policies of power: keeping it (policy of the status quo); expanding it (imperial policy); and/or, demonstrating it (policy of prestige) (Morgenthau 1967:36-37). What did Morgenthau mean by power? He defined it broadly, and acknowledged the importance of the emotions – particularly 'popular' emotions - but recognised them only as an impediment to the realisation of a rational ideal of state interest (1967:7). He called power one of the 'most difficult and controversial problems of political science' (1967:25fn), but defined it quite clearly as a 'psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised'. This power is given by the latter to the former for reasons of expectation, fear, respect and love. This is consistent with a critical or constructivist theory, particularly when Morgenthau said that respect and love may be given not just to a 'man' but also to an office, such as the Islamic caliphate; in other words, part of an institutional organisation (1967:27). It is clear that the "human nature" relevant to realist IR resides in the collective, even if it is fictional.

Morality and ontology

In describing how the moral concerns of classical realists are related to their view of the nature of the world, this section will lay a foundation for making a similar argument regarding other schools of thought. Classical realists see the state as the location of rights and the protector of justice – even 'arbiter of morality' (Carr 1946); that is, classical realists have a moral intent derived from their ontology. So do constructivists, who see identity as the arbiter of legitimacy; so do liberals and cosmopolitans, who take the enlightenment abstraction of the individual as the yardstick.

The point is that the relation between morality/legitimacy and ontology is unavoidable. It may be clarified by distinguishing between two different ideal-types of legitimacy, which Fred D'Agostino calls normative and empirical (D'Agostino 2005:15). A given action or policy may be judged morally right. This judgment is subjective, relative and based in a normative system of values. The action or policy will have normative legitimacy, depending on who is making the judgment. If a policy or action attracts approval, on the other hand, such support is an empirical feature of the world. This kind of legitimacy may, in principle, be quantified, and may help to denote an entity. Thus subjective judgements regarding morality or normative legitimacy translate into measurable, empirical legitimacy.

Empirical legitimacy is evident when a particular social arrangement or action enjoys the support of a population, restricted, or not, by whatever criteria, whereas normative legitimacy is of a more deontological kind, being justified by some recourse to supposedly absolute values (D'Agostino 2005:15). An individual or group might regard something as normatively legitimate – morally right – even though it cannot be said to have much empirical legitimacy, since no-one else agrees with her or them. This could possibly tell us something, rather vague as yet, about the nature of the generic political unit: it has a moral code; ideas about legitimacy are part of its make-up.

Carr developed the understanding that ethics is a product or instrument of politics, rather than the other way around (Carr 1946:22). The project of idealists like Wilson of institutionalising what they saw as universal moral principles fell apart, according to realists, because this morality and ethics, far from being universal, was universally contingent upon interest (Carr 1946:63,87). The nature of the carrier or subject of this interest is the essential question.

Collective entities are significant in two ways here. On the one hand, people may act in the interests of collective entities, and on the other, some argue, such collectives constitute individuals and their interest, as well as constraining the means by which they may go about furthering it. That morality derives from the collective interest is

one way to put it; a more controversial formulation is to suggest that the collective determines morality *and* interest.

Realists do not argue that states should simply ignore moral and ethical considerations. Rather, they make the case that workable international institutions must take into account the downsides of human motivation, in particular the drive for domination (Carr 1946:97; Donnelly 2005:30-31; Ruggie 1998:7). It seems sometimes as though realists deplore the "higher" motives of people, for justice, say. However, this is to misread the case. What they argue, and this goes for Machiavelli as much as for Morgenthau or George Kennan, is that one should not rely on or assume the goodwill or sense of justice of others (Donnelly 2005:30), not that one should abandon it oneself. Much of the cynicism directed towards realists comes from the idea that they are manipulating people's darker angels for their own ends. While this may indeed be true of practitioners of politics, what modern classical realism recommends are ways of blunting or accommodating these more destructive impulses. Realists see moral "abstractions" as an impediment to good policy. In this they recognise that moral considerations are a constraint on princes (Morgenthau 1967:235).

It is important to remember that despite their – particularly Morgenthau's – striving for hard-nosed rationality, realists advocated for what was, in the end, a moral purpose (Morgenthau 1967:7). Morgenthau sought to demonstrate that policy developed by statesmen in accordance with moral 'abstractions' had immoral consequences. (Morgenthau 1950:854). The statesman, in other words, has a different morality, (Morgenthau 1950:834): 'The equation of political moralism with morality and political realism with immorality is ... untenable. The choice is not between moral principles and the national interest, devoid of moral dignity, but between one set of moral principles... and another' (Morgenthau 1950:853-854). He claims his preferred set is based in 'political reality', but more precisely it is based in the reality of his conception of the shape of the global political world: that it is made up of nation-states, and that 'the basic fact of international politics is the absence of a society able to promote the interests of the individual nations' (Morgenthau 1950:854). The association between legitimacy, morality and social ontology is plain to see.

Realism is, *inter alia*, a theory of how to develop foreign policy (Carr 1946:5; Morgenthau 1967:7). Morgenthau noted explicitly that realism has a normative, as well as theoretical, purpose (1967:7): to recommend policy for a peaceful, stable world. Therefore, the question of morality, or legitimate behaviour and "right living" is the driving force behind even the most cynical and supposedly unemotional of theoretical strands. This is not surprising, since this question of the good life has been around since the beginning of political thought. Many realists believe that, not only *do* states pursue their interests, defined as power, but that this is what they *should* do; that it is best for the whole of the world that states should behave this way. There are two aspects to this and they are indicative of the realist ontology.

First, it is a harsh, anarchic world, and statesmen cannot be expected to fix its evils. Their responsibility is to the polities which fall under their control, and since the contemporary state (in whatever era) is the epitome of human political achievement, it must be protected first, for any other political good to follow. The location of rights and powers, the arbiter of justice, the buckstop of responsibility and the ontological unit delineate and define each other.

Second is the Smithian concept of the 'harmony of interests' (Carr 1946:45). Realists[*] in the field of international relations believe that the pursuit by states of their naked strategic interests, undistorted by 'intoxication with moral abstractions' (Morgenthau 1950:834), indirectly benefits all states, and therefore all humanity, by ensuring stability through balances of power. This expresses one of the dangers of classical realism as a policy guide: the belief that the pursuit of moral ends can be achieved through amoral – or immoral – means. Practitioners like US Vice President Dick Cheney even explicitly endorse and advocate a marriage of state interests with immorality:

> VICE PRES. CHENEY: We also have to work … the dark side … spend time in the shadows…. it's going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal….

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[*] Again, Carr himself was not one, and did not believe in the harmony of interests, though he explains the concept clearly.

> [Meet the Press's Tim] RUSSERT: There [has] been … reluctance to use unsavory characters, those who violated human rights, to assist in intelligence gathering. Will we lift some of those restrictions?
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> VICE PRES. CHENEY: Oh, I think so. … It is a mean, nasty, dangerous, dirty business out there, … we need to make certain that we have not tied [our] hands…
>
> MR. RUSSERT: These terrorists play by a whole set of different rules. It's going to force us, in your words, to get mean, dirty and nasty in order to take them on, right? (Whitehouse 2001)

In Vice President Cheney's case, the ordinary morality of everyday life is subordinate to that of the state (or at least of *his* state), which presupposes an ontology of states as prior to individuals. Mention of a set of rules is telling, in that it indicates the competition of institutions and systems of legitimation. 'These terrorists', do not accept the state-based ontology and its derivative moral code. This is remarkably resonant with the Islamic doctrine of defensive jihad invoked by some members of the caliphist movement (Blanchard 2007), including Osama bin Laden (Blanchard 2007; Bowden 2007:15). Both sides argue that these Others are especially threatening to us because they do not accept or follow our most important rules: those of contestation. This means that 'we' are not only permitted but obliged 'to use any means at our disposal'.

Twentieth-century realists harked back to two main thinkers, Machiavelli and Thucydides. Machiavelli, like Cheney, advocates a different morality, applicable to the prince, distinct from the everyday morality of normal people (Machiavelli 1979(1532):126-128). In more recent times this position has been articulated by George Kennan (1985:205-206) and also Treitschke, who argues explicitly that the state is not to be judged by the same moral code as individuals (quoted in Donnelly 2005:50). Theorists from outside the realist camp, like Mary Maxwell, have attributed this split moral personality of people versus the collective to the evolutionary biology of social life (Maxwell 1994:386).

Morgenthau calls Machiavelli's notion of the separate morality of the prince rational (Morgenthau 1967:10)[*]. However, he says, policy-makers must pursue this rational

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[*] Plato, with his idea of a separate community of 'guardians', had proposed institutionalising something similar in the Republic (1987:67-69).

policy in terms of its 'own moral and practical purposes' (1967:8), rejecting the idea of universal values, at least as far as international politics is concerned. Once again, morality is located and contained within the state.

In practice, Kennan, among many others, certainly did see a morality in statecraft distinct from everyday morality (Kennan 1985:205-206). In Alexander Hamilton's formulation, and the sentiment can be attributed to realists in general, the moral imperative of the good of the nation, relative to that of individuals, 'is much stronger upon the former than upon the latter' (quoted in Morgenthau 1950:841). He means the state is the container or location of a higher morality than that of "the individual", newly invented in the Enlightenment. State interest trumps individual interest.

As Kratochwil was to point out, realists' rationality is a form of moral endorsement, rather than any property of policy itself (1987). Kratochwil argued that when realists, or anyone else for that matter, said a policy was rational, what they really meant was that they agreed with it, or it "made sense" (see below for a fuller account). Morgenthau thus called a policy rational when it was pursued in the best interests of the state, which he saw as the legitimate executor of the interests of the collective, or nation.[*] 'The state thus comes to be regarded as having a right to self-preservation which overrides moral obligation', says Carr (1946:160), echoing Hamilton's defence of US neutrality in the War of the First Coalition: 'Self preservation is the first duty of a nation' (quoted in Morgenthau 1950:841).

Carr (1946:153) sourced the view of the amorality of state behaviour to Machiavelli, which was to misunderstand Machiavelli, who actually admonished the prince to do good in preference to evil where possible (Machiavelli 1979(1532):127), and separated morality from the prudential, political sphere, as did Morgenthau. For Treitschke the terrible thing about Machiavelli's advice was the 'lack of content of the state, which exists only in order to exist,' (quoted in Carr 1946:89). Of course, realists regard existence – or survival – as the primal, and only necessary, objective of states or of any other actor. According to evolutionary theory, as we shall see in Chapter Two, the

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[*] He himself did not use the terms state and nation in this precise way.

phenomenon manifests itself in a more subtle and less straightforward fashion. In any case, Machiavelli's city-state is not devoid of moral content. He refers to the 'Roman people' in his section on the relative wisdom of the masses and princes. He does so in terms of honour, corruption, humility and arrogance:

> while the Roman republic endured without corruption, it [the people] never obeyed humbly nor ruled arrogantly; on the contrary, it held its position honourably through its institutions and magistrates (Machiavelli 1979 (1531):282).

Here Machiavelli is clearly referring, as he and others often do, to a human entity which is not an individual. Not only that, but this entity has attributes: personality, interest, a sense of honour and the capacity, among others, to make strategic judgements.[*][†] Here we note that Machiavelli recognised at least two realities in this passage. One was the existence of a collective entity, and the other that this entity was a subject of moral considerations.

Thus the question of interest leads directly to that of motivation, then to legitimacy and ultimately ontology. And since, to realists in IR, states were the principal, if not the only discernible current actor, it was state interests and morality that concerned them. The implications of morality and legitimacy go much deeper than this, however. Justifications for realist state-based legitimisation have an important implication. State legitimisation is constitutive. If there is a human morality different from that of the individual, then there must be some entity, conceptual or corporal, that contains, judges, arbitrates and defines this morality. This is the object of global political ontology.

Hamilton did not think that self-preservation was always 'the first duty of a nation'. Later in the same document, he makes this statement, which is a better approximation to the deeper reality: 'To defend its own rights, to *vindicate its own honour*, there are

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[*] '… when it was necessary to band together against some powerful man … it did so; when it was necessary to obey the dictators and the consuls for the public welfare, it did so'. (Machiavelli 1979 (1531):282).

[†] The importance of capacity is revealed in light of the Background, a concept explained in Chapter Two.

occasions when a nation ought to hazard even its own existence.' (quoted in Morgenthau 1950:842 italics added). Morgenthau wrote of the 'policy of prestige', and had trouble keeping contempt out of his narrative voice as he described the 'empty formalisms' and 'aristocratic atavism' involved (Morgenthau 1967:69). Prestige thus relates to political legitimacy – on the level of moral support – while honour is judged with regard to absolutes. Honour is not a requisite of international power politics. There is something else at work here, a higher loyalty even than state survival; for Hamilton, it is more important that his state be honourable than that it be at all. Perhaps they are the same thing, and honour is constitutive, in some way. Later this notion will be related to the difference between affirmation, which provides motive, and attachment, which is an ontological mechanism. For now, it serves to illustrate the incomplete nature of classical realism. Classical realism cannot account for this higher moral purpose.

Morgenthau posits three layers of morality: domestic, international and a supranational, universal or cosmopolitan ethics, to which lip-service is paid by states, as they ruthlessly pursue their nationalist objectives. (1967:244-245). Hedley Bull describes these as the Hobbesian, Kantian, and Grotian levels or types of society (Bull 1977:51) and Martin Wight outlines a similar division (Wight, M. 1977:38-39). It seems clear that the moral code changes according to the level of analysis and differing ontological markers.

In *The Prince*, Machiavelli pointed to the use of mercenaries as a sign of feebleness in a great power, calling them 'useless and dangerous'. He put his warning in terms of moral weakness (1979(1532):116-120). Mercenaries are 'disunited, ambitious, without discipline, disloyal ... they have no fear of God and no faith in men' (1979(1532):116).

Once again this points up the connection between morality and political legitimacy, strategy and the integrity of the collective.[*] Integrity is the appropriate word here, given

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[*] This caution about mercenaries is a point policy-makers would do well to note, now that 'privatised security' is beginning to raise questions about the integrity of the state (Bernstein, et al. 2000).

its double meaning as both moral and ethical consistency and wholeness or physical incorruption. For theorists, this reinforces the proposition that morality is constitutive of polities, through the mechanism of political legitimacy.

Some realists acknowledge that their theory is abstract (Morgenthau 1967:7-8) in its separation of politics from economics and point out that no purely political person can exist. Nevertheless the theoretical abstraction is rooted in conceptions of the collective as the source of morality and power, and of the collective, or at least a formal representation thereof, as the principal unit of analysis and ontological basis of International Relations. For classical realists, it was the state.

Realist emphasis on the state coincided with, and was part of, a more general conceptual move from empire to nation-state which was to have profound effects on the strategic shape of the world. These effects arguably included the replacement of the Ottoman Empire, and its Sultan-Caliph, with a system ostensibly based on national sovereignty. For realists the nation-state was seen as the best way to achieve the necessary balance of opposing moral certitudes and thus limiting the concentration of power. The nature of, and desire for, power were therefore other preoccupations of realists, but these were derived from the ontology of the state.

If states are a specific iteration of a generic human collective entity, then it would seem logical to inquire further into the nature of this entity. Classical realism's focus on states has limited its scope as a social theory of global politics, but many of its insights into state behaviour and its relationship to morality and legitimacy might be usefully applied to other social entities. Importantly, these include not just non-state actors such as NGOs, corporations, criminal and terrorist groups, but also larger entities such as states-systems, "civilisations", sacral communities and international institutions such as Westphalian anarchy. Clearly, the Islamic caliphate is one such entity.

Neorealism: anarchic structure

Waltz pointed out that, in the end, whatever political actors may be like individually, the results of international interaction in a society of states with an anarchic structure will

be similar. In other words, context has distinct effects on the very nature of the units in global politics. While Morgenthau emphasised a Balance of Power Theory as a prescriptive theory of foreign policy, Waltz utilised it more as an analytical theory of outcomes (Waltz 1979:119-122). Whatever states do, in other words, as long as they do it within an anarchical framework, a balance of power will be the likely attractor, meaning that, even though an actual balance will never occur, the tendency will be towards a never-quite-achieved equilibrium (Waltz 1979:123).

Hence differentiation into something resembling states is no illusion, but an inescapable fact of global political ontology. Furthermore, however states begin – whatever they are "like" – through competition they will come to resemble one another, externally at least. Qualitative differentiation and role specialisation are the marks of hierarchical societies. The society of states is anarchic, and so similarity is the tendency (Waltz 1979:97). One might argue that this is so in action if not in internal structure: some states are democracies, others are dictatorships, etc. However, the phenomenon of navies in landlocked polities shows that some aspects of state structures – those with international relevance – come to resemble one another (Ruggie 1998:14-15). These states may possess identical navies in order, like teenagers dressing alike (Waltz 1979:75), to express and assert their individuality. The context and mechanism of interaction has a profound effect on the nature of the interacting units.

Neorealism has been accused of neglecting the cultural aspects of individual state identity (Ruggie 1998:13-18), an accusation which seems distinctly unfair when Kenneth Waltz, the founder of neorealism, spends a good deal of his seminal work explaining that his purpose is the abstraction of certain aspects of structure, and that the theory therefore does not deal with state identity or culture. This does not mean it is not important, only that his object of analysis for theoretical purposes is not the cultural aspects of states, but the influence of anarchy upon them (Waltz 1979:46).

Waltz agrees with classical realists that states must look out for themselves. They must be ever-ready to defend themselves and to promote their interests, ruthlessly and at considerable opportunity cost if need be. The reason is that they can rely on no other

entity to look out for them. However, he emphasises that this anarchic situation differs markedly from the domestic state realm, where individuals may, at least in theory, rely on the government and legal system to protect their basic interests, thus allowing specialisation 'without concern for developing the means of maintaining their identity and preserving their security in the presence of others' (Waltz 1979:104). In Waltz's conception, the domestic analogy is deeply flawed. The ontology of the global political unit is heavily dependent upon its context: international anarchy. The context of domestic state politics is fundamentally different from the world in which states themselves exist. He explores the influence of this universal anarchy on the state and global politics.

Waltz is charged with atomist/structuralist inconsistency by constructivists, notably Ashley (Ashley 1984:241-242), but can be defended in these terms: he criticises others for taking the domestic political system as "certain" when it is no such thing. This appears to answer some of his own critics. He is not, as they say, taking the state-as-unitary-actor idea for granted at all. He is distinguishing between system-level theory and unit-level description. The attributes of individual states do not constitute a structural *explanation* (Waltz 1979:42). Waltz is much concerned with theory and its abstract nature, arguing that abstraction is a necessary attribute of theory. This is both inevitable and desirable, he says, since whereas laws may be observed, theories to explain them must be constructed. 'Explanatory power ... is gained by moving away from "reality", not by staying close to it' (1979:7). He does not deny the importance of internal state organisation, culture or identity, he merely quarantines it from his structuralist theory.

Repetitive patterns of polity-formation, universal anarchy, and establishment of institutions

The question, then, goes to why states behave in the same manner, roughly, even though they have very different political and cultural constitutions (Burchill & Linklater 2005:5; Waltz 1979:39). The main ontological proposition of neorealism is that the similarities in constitution and behaviour between states are attributable to anarchy. Another possible explanation is that if they did not behave similarly, we would not call them

states. Waltz begins down the path toward evolutionary theory in International Relations, explained further in Chapter Two, by pointing out the influence of the environment on the actors within it. The actors are still the principal drivers, but they are also acted upon. The system is a product of the cumulative actions of the actors, and the actors are shaped and selected by the system. The argument later becomes the formal 'Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations' (Wendt, A.E. 1987).

Neorealism is not concerned with morality, or ethics, in the way classical realism is. Waltz describes mechanisms and processes while seeking to avoid prescription. Moreover, in their bracketing[*] of culture and identity, and their emphasis on the deterministic aspects of structure, neorealists leave morality out of their theory even as an object of study of the theory itself. This exposes the incompleteness of the theory which, again, is not to say that neorealism has nothing to tell us. Neorealism is complete in its own terms, in that it explains everything it sets out to explain, but it does not explain global political ontology, or fully specify a generic unit or actor. Crucially, as Ashley points out, in neorealism 'political strategy is deprived of its artful and performative aspect' (1984:260) prompting him to consult rhetoric and other cultural instruments as a form of strategy, and lending weight to the call for a more poetic realism.

To sum up, Waltz is often criticised for the abstraction of his theorising, especially his bracketing of particular states' identities and the non-rational aspects of power (Ashley 1984:260), as well as the influence of normative considerations on state action (Ruggie 1998:15). However, he goes to great lengths to justify this by arguing that all theory is abstract and limited, and he is not the only one who argues this (Donnelly 2005:30,33; Waltz 1979:1-14). Structural realism is explicitly a particular theory about structure and should be criticised as such. A theory of influence of one aspect of world politics need not be rejected because it fails to account for every other aspect (Denemark 1999:67). What Waltz describes anticipates Searlean institutional causality, as well as evolutionary theory, applied to International Relations.

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[*] Bracketing means quarantining or setting-aside some aspects of theory in order to focus on another one or more (See Neumann 1996:165).

The main differences between classical and structural realism, then, are in their emphases. The ontology is similar, and is based on a similar conception of motivation: self-preservation and domination, which are sometimes indistinguishable. Classical realists include honour and prestige in their theory. More importantly, they consider the state as – currently – the principal actor in world politics, and so they consider its actions to be the most useful thing to study. Structural realists agree that the state is the main driver, but they see the context of this action as a major, if not defining, aspect of world politics, and so they select it as their object of analysis. This is not to say that the differences are not significant, but to seek commonality by suggesting that they are differences of perspective, and might be reconciled by a fuller specification of the interacting units in global politics. Ontology involves not only the nature of units, but the way in which they are formed. Realist focus on states, neorealists on anarchy. Both are essential for political ontology.

Liberalism, cosmopolitanism and neoliberal institutionalism

Liberalism is perhaps the broadest stream of thought in politics and International Relations, as well as the dominant paradigm in global political discourse (Ruggie 1982). As with other schools, it may be defined by its ontological and normative foundations. Liberals based their politics and their political theory on the individual human being as the be-all and the end-all of politics, both as the atomic unit and as the centre or location of rights and justice. Cosmopolitans essentially agreed, but added another layer, that of humanity-as-a-whole, so that consideration for the good of this cosmopolis forms the other pole of political obligation.

Neoliberal institutionalists added a third layer of importance in global politics by concentrating on international institutions, like regimes, and new kinds of polity such as the European Union. They began to explore ideas like that of "pooled sovereignty" and the notion of the multiperspectival polity (Rosenberg 2006:323). In this way they developed innovative ideas regarding the nature of political units, but as far as neo-liberal institutionalists were concerned these larger polities should have the purpose of ensuring states rights and thus guaranteeing individual rights and freedoms. Ruggie

argued that neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism 'share very similar analytical foundations' (Ruggie 1998:9), particularly in that anarchy is taken for granted.

Ruggie pointed out the critical point that states and their identities and interests are taken for granted 'a priori and exogenously' (Ruggie 1998:9) in neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, unexplained by the theory. This is because of the structural and utilitarian focus of these schools of thought. Neorealists focussed on potential use of force leading to state focus on relative gain, whereas neoliberal institutionalists focussed on institutional impediments of anarchy to cooperation even where common interests occur.

Liberals adopted the good of the individual as the focus of their normative and theoretical concerns. Cosmopolitans proposed an abstracted humanity as a source of legitimacy and as a reason for extending the Golden Rule to all of its members. Neoliberal institutionalists sought to theorise international institutions as a means of ensuring or protecting individual rights. All three derive from the enlightenment invention of the individual as an abstracted unit and actor in politics and international politics. This was a new type of actor or idea, and cosmopolitans and liberals of various kinds extended the abstraction to these other new types of abstracted unit: humanity-as-a-whole and institutions. Once again we can see the normative and theoretical concerns converging around ontology. These perspectives are discussed further in Chapter Three, with regard to the question of 'ontological security' (Steele, Brent J. 2007).

World and state system theory and the English School

Structural realists saw systemic influence on state behaviour as being derived from the brute fact of anarchy. Hedley Bull disputed this stark picture of anarchy among sovereign states (1977:24-40), as did Emmanuel Wallerstein (1991:162-163). Harking back to Hugo Grotius, these theorists noted that states interact with each other. They ape each other. They develop international law and institutions. They have rules, including unspoken rules, and even rules of conflict and war. They form, in short, a society (Wight, M. 1977:39), and a society influences its constituents not just by the

threat of punishment or reward, or the imperatives of survival, but by the glue of fellow-feeling, as Morgenthau had pointed out in his definition of political power (Morgenthau 1967:26-27). The interesting element for these theorists, then, is this society. The difference between neorealists and international societists is in the ontology of the context of state action. For neorealists, it is essentially an absence; for those who take global society as their principal object of analysis, the international context is very much a thing in itself, and not just any thing; a moral being (Wight, M. 1977:21-49).

Where Morgenthau had denied the possibility of a universal ethics on the grounds that there is no universal society to carry it (Morgenthau 1967:493), these theorists began to develop the idea that morality, and particularly legitimation, is a far more complex thing than simple notions of good and evil (Wight, M. 1977:153). Institutions like war or class were defined as sets of rules, applicable in specific circumstances. The same actor, whether individual or state, may subscribe to several of these, and act and moralise differently according to which is appropriate at the moment. This is one way of accounting for the discrepancy between individual and group morality. It is not really individual, just derived from a different group conception. In this way the differing moral systems to which an individual might subscribe may be seen as indicative of the differing group units to which she belongs.

Reproduction requirements of entities and systems other than states

World system theory posited a global society whose members are individuals, arranged in classes (Wallerstein 1991). Analysts of state systems proposed an international society whose members are states (Bull 1977; Wight, M. 1977). Both streams regarded the system as a whole (Wendt, A.E. 1987:339) as the basic object of their ontology. Context was taken as the focus of analysis in International Relations, but in contrast to neorealism, various contexts were themselves seen to be units, and their 'reproduction requirements' (Wendt, A.E. 1987:339) could thus be postulated as the driving factor.

Hedley Bull distinguishes between three different conceptions of world politics. Realists, he says, are essentially Hobbesian, regarding states as existing in a perpetual war of all against all. There is a universalist, Kantian worldview, which regards states as

a false abstraction, a means of imposing power structures on the universal community of mankind.* Bull himself seeks to articulate the Grotian idea of a community of states; the internationalist view (Bull 1977:23-27). Bull is the headmaster of The English School, which advances neorealism a step further by taking this international society as its object of analysis.

In this way, International Relations became the study of political society at a higher level of analysis than the state. It is not quite as simple as this, of course, since the actors in international society are not the same as those within the state, contradicting the domestic analogy. Also, Bull, like Waltz, claimed to be elucidating only one aspect of the international system. He attributed equal importance to the Hobbesian and Kantian elements – which he saw as being in competition with the element of international society (Bull 1977:51) – even as he focused on the Grotian. Again, as with other streams, the English School is distinguished by its treatment of the ontology of the group, reflected in the theory's principal unit of analysis: international society.

In the universalist community posited by Immanuel Wallerstein and the world system theorists, on the other hand, states are conceived as masks for the real players. Classes and other economic divisions are the authentic group actors, states the instruments of their interest. Interest in this case may be defined as wealth *or* power; they are means to each other. The state is not really the most important thing; classes are, or divisions of labour. (Wallerstein 1991:162-180).

Big-picture, state system analysts such as Martin Wight found it useful to theorise societies formed of states, yet less than coterminous with the world: suzerain systems; hegemonic systems; the Westphalian system (1977:110-152). Groups of states bound together by common cultural heritage could be seen as themselves group-units, repositories of moral capital and sources of legitimacy. These broader cultural and political groupings could even enter into deadly conflict with one another, and could be defined by that conflict (Alkopher 2005).

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* This could be roughly connected with world system theory, in which powerful classes are seen as the "real" players.

State system theorists took a step further when they saw that these finite systems constitute entities themselves in the form of bi- or multi-polar, hegemonic or suzerain systems. A crucial component of these systems is moral. This must be the case since all such systems depend upon political legitimacy for their existence, and political legitimacy arises from moral judgements. The office of Holy Roman Emperor oversaw the legitimational aspects of Westphalia, having given up its temporal power (Wight, M. 1977:27-28). In the Eastern Mediterranean, the caliphal office continued in its religious legitimational function even after it was merged with the temporal Sultanate. Martin Wight rules out describing relations between the Seljug Sultanate, the Fatimid Caliphate and their satellites as systems of states. He does so on the grounds of a lack of 'a common ethos or ideology' (Wight, M. 1977:26). Thus a common ethos is part of several definitions of state system (Wight, M. 1977:23-24)[*] and therefore of at least one type of political unit.

Here we see a further development of the ontology of International Relations. As this group of theorists began to focus on features in the landscape of global politics other than states, they derived an ontology of class, or culture, or society (of states) from a conception of human motivation resting in *ethos*, thereby freeing International Relations from its attachment to the state, and lining it up for the sociological turn.

Critical theory and postmodernism: language, narrative and boundaries

Critical theorists saw that all of these units of analysis became units by virtue of the boundaries drawn around them. The mechanism of the drawing of boundaries therefore became their own object of study. Postmodernists in particular argued that these boundaries were simply linguistic constructs designed to perpetuate the dominance of the arbiters of language. Linguistic constructs could be deconstructed, so the project of critical international theorists is often characterised by them as one of emancipation (Linklater 2001:23; Rae 2002:19; Wyn Jones 2001:3-4;9).

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[*] The ancient Greek word *ethos* means group identity or spirit, a linguistic reflection of the derivation of legitimacy from collective identity.

Critical theory continued the great assault on the state as object of inquiry in International Relations, accusing mainstream International Relations theorists of fetishizing states and state boundaries (Devetak 2005:147). Critical theorists saw these boundaries, correctly, as a constructed means of delineating realms of moral obligation, and therefore as a licence for subjugation and oppression. The danger here was in imagining that the boundaries were therefore somehow not real (Cox 1981:126; Zehfuss 2002:36), and that they served no other function than domination.

State boundary-drawing as a mechanism of power operates in at least two ways. Within the state, sovereignty gives to the state a monopoly on legitimate force, including violence, and hence a licence for state-classes – that is, the class of people who act on behalf of the state (Elsinhas, quoted in Cox 1981:151) - to dominate. They do this by constructing and using language in ways that constrain the conceptual ability of the dominated to break free. The very terms they use, critical theorists argued, serve to give power to the dominant class. This aspect of class-consciousness shows the continuity between Marxism, World system theory and critical theory (Cox 1981:130-138).

Cox, after his critique of perspective-bound sub-dividers (1981:126), proceeded to sub-divide his opponents from his own, 'stand apart' perspective (1981:130-135), thereby drawing a conceptual boundary between himself and them. The process of drawing such boundaries, and their more or less fluid nature, are suitable objects of study in many fields. The criticism of Cox is that this is a very different thing from saying that the "real world" is somehow without boundaries. As Searle points out, concepts are an intrinsic feature of the world (Searle 1995:11), and when it comes to the social world, concepts may well be constitutive, as will be discussed in later chapters. Once again the problem lies in ontology. Boundaries are unavoidable in any conceptual scheme devised by humans; the nature of particular iterations is essentially arbitrary. The main point here is that even such high-end thinkers as Cox cannot help but categorise people – that is, theorists – and privilege some categories over others.

It may be, in some technical way, true to say that the real world is undifferentiated, and that it is only in the process of knowing it that we abstract categories. However, if the

material world is an undifferentiated mass there can be no ontology. The human body has many interfaces with the world around it: the air we breathe, the sweat that evaporates, information that we receive and emanate unconsciously. It is thickly interwoven with its surrounds. Just where one might draw the line between self and other is a moot point. Some might argue that the fact there *is* a boundary may be demonstrated in the attempt to walk through a wall. However, conceptual processes of categorisation are evident as soon as anyone tries to describe the event. If the social world is a seamless web, there can be no social ontology.[*]

Cox refers to a 'genuine populism' as opposed to one 'manipulated by political leaders' (1981:151). He does not further distinguish between the two. US funding for *Otpor*! (Resistance!), the anti-Milosevic opposition movement in the former Yugoslavia (Cohen 2000) is a case in point. Was this a genuine populist uprising, or was it being manipulated by "outside interests" against the popular, nationalist will? It is impossible to separate the two, and the only way to do so, conceptually, would be to measure the genuineness of adherents' support. A similar argument could be made for nationalism in Turkey, which eventually replaced the caliphate there (for the time being, at least). The point is that, whatever judgments theorists may make regarding the motivations for support, the end result is the same: public support is constitutive of political group units, whether or not their constituents also feel some dissonance with another set of rules, derived from another group. The distinction outlined above between normative and empirical legitimacy is vital here, since it allows us to distinguish between objective political support and our own moral judgment.

Critical theory, in sum, derived an ontology of essentially arbitrary border-making through language use and conceptual manipulation from a conception of motivation not dissimilar to that of realists. One problem for critical theorists is that if categorisation is

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[*] This includes an ontology of the text. To say that there is 'nothing outside of the text' (Derrida, quoted in Zehfuss 2002:10) acknowledges an 'outside' and ignores causality and history. The text is a caused system, thus a boundary is drawn around it (Searle 1995:6), and therefore there is an outside. Otherwise the text is meaningless (which, of course, they often are).

disabled, amorphousness is all that remains, and there is nothing left to study. Another, self-referential problem is that if critical theorists delegitimise boundaries, then they are unable to distinguish themselves from their realist and other opponents. The main point to be made here, however, is that critical theory, like others, illuminates mainly one aspect of social units: boundaries. With regard to global political ontology, critical theory seems incomplete.

Constructivism: identity

Constructivists argued that even the so-called brute fact of sovereignty itself is a construction, a product of ideational factors; that cognitive, intentional mechanisms of identity-construction, such as those described by Searle (Searle 1983, 1995), underlie every aspect of inter-polity interaction. Moreover, the identities thus constructed are highly rewarding objects of ontological analysis, as well as a location of rights.

Constructivism may be loosely seen as an amalgam of critical theory and postmodernism (Wyn Jones 2001:12) with the structural aspects of neorealism. Ruggie identified a revival of interest in Emile Durkheim's work among International Relations scholars who shared the great sociologist's view that, in Ruggie's words, 'social totalities are the appropriate unit of analysis for the study of collective phenomena' (1983:261-2). At that stage the challenge to classical realism from structuralists was coming from two flanks: on the one hand, world-system theorists like Wallerstein who emphasised the capitalist world economy as the basic structure; and on the other neorealists who saw political anarchy and the 'horizontal organisation of authority relations' (Ruggie 1983:263) into states as the defining context of international organisation. Waltz in particular, as we have seen, saw the condition of anarchy as generative of repetitive patterns of state behaviour (Waltz 1979:66).

Ruggie praised Waltz's work (Ruggie 1983:272) before taking him to task over his failure to account for transformation and change in the international system. Transitions from one system of fundamental institutions to another are dangerous periods, by definition involving instability. They can be caused when one or more locations of power combine both the material means and the expansionary or

hegemonic ambition to press the case for revolutionary change. This combination was present in the Napoleonic Empire, the Nazi eruption, and Soviet Russia and is a driving force on both sides of the "Long War" between the US, its allies, and its various Islamist enemies.[*] It was as a result of such a change that the Ottoman Empire was destroyed during World War I, and its overarching legitimator, the caliphate, was abolished in 1924.

The fact remains that the (often unsuccessful) drive toward unification, the impulse to impose a value-set universally, is part of the selection mechanism of evolutionary inter-polity development, and is also part of the motive engine of such systems. Occasionally such revolutionary impulses lead not just to changes in the system but to changes in the nature of the system (Ruggie 1983:271). Such moments of imbalance fall back, however, to more stable arrangements in the face of strategic necessity. Each bout of systemic conflict resolves to a situation in which competing powers come to some formal or informal cooperative settlement. These settlements, established post-hoc, are necessarily contingent and unstable. Thus permanent balance is never quite achieved, but serves as an attractor in a system of perpetual, if long-term, systemic flux. The only plausible alternative to this mechanism is unification.

Constructivists accused neorealism of being unable to account for these more fundamental changes, which punctuated the systemic equilibrium. Ruggie advocated 'amendments to [Waltz's] theory' (1983:273) amounting to a more sociologically oriented ontology of International Relations, regarding group units in a deeper way, as institutional rule-structures which express or embody norms and values associated with Searle's 'collective intentionality' (Searle 1995:23-26). On a state-systemic level, Ruggie pointed out the difference between the medieval and the modern systems:

> The modern system is distinguished from the medieval not by the "sameness" or "differences" of units, but by the principles on the basis of which the constituent units are separated from one another. If anarchy tells us that the political system is a segmental realm, differentiation tells us on what basis this segmentation is determined (1983:273-4 original emphasis).

[*] For an elaboration of this argument see Fraser (2006)

On this interpretation, the system is both a context and an entity in its own right. At this stage I am claiming that, for example, a states-system such as the European Union provides a context within which states are formed, recognised and legitimized. However the Union is also a political-strategic entity in its own right, the current debate over common security and defence policy notwithstanding. Thus, the EU is both a context – within which states and other actors are created, defined and enabled – and an entity which may expand or contract, gain or lose support, be vilified or affirmed.

One of the gurus of constructivism, Alexander Wendt, explicitly took 'Waltz's structuralism … as my starting point' (1999:15). We have seen that Ruggie praises and approves of Waltz's work, before pointing out its limitations. Thus constructivism quite explicitly rests on a continuum with neorealism. More accurately, to repeat, it can be seen as an amalgam of aspects of neorealism, critical theory and postmodernism, stressing the importance of ideational factors, while maintaining a bedrock of scientific rigour, manifested in Wendt and others' application of 'scientific realism' to the field.[*]

The 'poverty of neorealism' is attributable, in Richard Ashley's view (1984), to flip-flopping between structuralism as regards individual states and atomism when it comes to international systems. In other words, while neorealism regarded international structure as a defining influence which imposes constraints, this structure was seen as merely the result of the actions of states-as-actors (Wendt, A.E. 1987:336-340) which themselves, however, are conceived as independent, sovereign and unitary, rather than a turmoil of competing interests, identities and jurisdictions (Ashley 1984:248; Ruggie 1998:3).

The fact of boundaries, then, since they are inescapable, is not so rewarding an object of study as the mechanisms by which they are drawn and, even more crucially, how the particular conceptions of identity they contain are constructed. Waltz made a highly convincing argument about the nature of states, but it was still an argument about

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[*] This is not to suggest that critical theorists were not rational. In Wyn Jones's view, their arguments are based on a logical stripping-away of assumptions, which can be seen as the epitome of rationality (Wyn Jones 2001:3).

states. A similar argument, regarding the influence of the institutional environment on the shape of players in it, could and should be made more broadly, constructivists argued (Denemark 1999:45). The domestic and individual analogies are relevant here: in what ways does the community shape the individual, and in what ways does the community of states, as opposed to global anarchy, shape the nature and policies of states? Neorealists, in Ruggie's view, neglected 'the role of culture as an instrument of social mobilisation or in generating threat perceptions' (Ruggie 1998:17).

Because perceived threats to institutional rule-structures, norms and value-systems – aggregated as culture, or collective identity – provoke the most dramatic and consequential reactions, collective identity is a vital driver of policy on a state-systemic structural level as well as at state level. On the positive side, collective identity also has a deep effect on possibilities for security communities, as particular poles' 'magnetism' draws other states to engage in peaceful dispute resolution on grounds of common identity (Mattern 2001:354). For example, the European Union's potentially inclusive conception of collective identity has played a crucial role in the expansion of its political and strategic reach (Fraser 2005). This even extends to the possibility of Turkey's membership (Rumelili 2004).

Constructivism's more detailed description of international institutional systems: foundational values as generic capacities

Martin Wight had given a comprehensive, more or less empirical, study of systems of states before Reus-Smit began to really take them apart to examine their constituent elements (Reus-Smit 1997, 1999; Wight, M. 1977). Martin Wight describes a rather particular thing he called a states-system, comprising a system of nominally equal states. He outlines the origin of the term in various legal descriptions of Europe from the 17th to the 19th centuries (Wight, M. 1977:21). 'One way of pursuing' clarification of the theory of state systems, he wrote, 'is to ask what these systems have in common and extend the list' (Wight, M. 1977:22). The intention of this thesis is to broaden this question to include other types of entity in global politics. Reus-Smit found that, so far from being usefully described as anarchic, systems of states were richly institutionalised cultural expressions of moral purpose. This included those, such as the

Westphalian system or the ancient Greek city-state system, which were ostensibly anarchic.

The assertion that no-one tells teenagers to dress alike (Waltz 1979:75) can be heavily disputed, given the revenues of the fashion industry, and this is a good illustration of the difference between neorealists and those who further developed the theory. Because Waltz sees no formal command-structure, he sees no coercion. In a social milieu, teenagers certainly may suffer for non-conformity. Sanctions are imposed by an informal institution of approval, and this institution seems like an active participant.

Reus-Smit applied this kind of thinking to IR, pointing to the influence of identity, as expressed in institutional purposes, on the formation of distinct state-systems (Reus-Smit 1999), as well as on states themselves. This system-level identity revolves around a 'hegemonic belief in the moral purpose of the state' (Reus-Smit 1999:6). I will argue later that legitimacy is derived ultimately from collective identity (see also Fraser 2005), and the same can be said of moral purpose. Reus-Smit outlined the mechanism by which principles and agreed criteria of sovereignty as well as accepted mechanisms of justice, derive from conceptions of moral purpose (Reus-Smit 1999:7). Reus-Smit also criticised rationalists, neorealists among them, for their views – or lack thereof – on the nature of the state:

> States have been imagined as individuals writ large, as autonomous, free and equal actors, each rationally pursuing their own exogenously determined interests (Reus-Smit 2002:9).

Reus-Smit, like Ruggie putting the lie to Waltz's neorealist claim regarding continuity of outcomes, pointed out that the ancient Greek, renaissance Italian, absolutist European and modern state systems 'engaged in different institutional practices under the same structural conditions' (Reus-Smit 1997:560), especially that of anarchy. However, it cannot be the case that state systems in such widely separated historical and geographical situations arose under the same conditions, with the exception of universal anarchy. Hence this theoretical abstraction must be taken as an illustration of a particular aspect of international relations: the influence of cultural considerations,

like identity, on systems of interaction among states. In this respect a theory based on such an abstraction is incomplete, like Waltz's structuralism.

Moreover, Reus-Smit distinguishes between the four systems on the basis of particular characteristics of a tiny set of common core features. These core features are the fundamental international institutional values: a principle of sovereignty and a norm of procedural justice, as well as, binding them together, a shared conception of the 'moral purpose of the state' or of organised political entities (Reus-Smit 1997:356). Thus systems may be distinguished by their differing institutional manifestations of these fundamental values, but this does not alter the fact of the *generic* nature of the *capacity* for determining value. At the deeper level, the continuity remains. This suggests one potentially fruitful line of enquiry into global political ontology, to be picked up later: that capacities are indicators of entities.

Again, those elements common to all state systems are, in Reus-Smit's evaluation, a shared conception of the moral purpose of politics, a principle by which sovereignty may be allocated, and a norm of procedural juridical decision-making (Reus-Smit 1997:356). Of course these elements are also definitive, so that any situation in which a group of polities interacts, if it lacks one of these elements, falls outside the theory. A conceptual distinction could be made between system and structure and between universal and institutional anarchy. This would mean that a system is intended and designed, whereas structure is simply what happens. Institutional anarchy, in one view, is a system. It has been designed by human intentionality. In this same view, universal anarchy is structure. It exists whether we humans like it or not. There is another way of combining these that produces institutional structure, which will be discussed in some detail in Chapter Three.

Agency and its relationship to structure

The agent-structure problem, as it is often known, is a major concern of constructivist International Relations scholars. Constructivist writers such as Ruggie, Ashley, Wendt and Reus-Smit did not reject the importance of structure *per se*, only the poverty of the neorealist conception thereof (Ashley 1984:233-237). As they explored these aspects of

politics, constructivists began to see that the sense of collective identity and intentionality was everywhere, at every level, even in the structure itself. It follows that collective identity and intentionality are an important part of any social ontology.

At one stage of Ashley's ground-breaking paper he states the subtle differences between structuralist and atomist views of the whole:

> The structuralist posits the possibility of a structural whole – a deep social subjectivity – having an autonomous existence independent of, prior to, and constitutive of the elements. By contrast, the atomist conception describes the whole precisely in terms of the external joinings of the elements, including emergent properties produced by the joinings … Clearly, in this conception, the whole has no existence independent of the parts taken together (Ashley 1984:254-255).

Ashley also took the neorealist movement to task regarding the sterility of its notions of structure (Ashley 1984:255). He criticised Waltz specifically for his understanding of international structure:

> … not as a deep, internal relation prior to and constitutive of social actors but as an external joining of states-as-actors who have precisely the boundaries, ends and self-understandings that theorists accord to them on the basis of unexamined common sense (Ashley 1984:255).

Alexander Wendt (Wendt, A.E. 1987) argued that neorealists' individualist ontology regarding the state also undermined their surface claims to 'strong structural and anti-reductionist commitments' (Wendt, A.E. 1987:343). Contrasting neorealism with the then-fashionable world-system theory, he accused them both of confusion regarding units of analysis:

> Thus, neorealists reduce the structure of the state system to the properties and actions of its constituent elements, states, while world-system theorists reduce state (and class) agents to the effects of the *reproduction requirements* of the capitalist world system. (Wendt, A.E. 1987:339, emphasis added)

Because of this, 'neorealists' individualist conceptualisation of system structure is … too weak to support a social theory of the state,' (Ruggie 1998:3). Wendt proposed a 'structurationist' approach (Wendt, A.E. 1987:355), based on the work of the social

theorist Anthony Giddens (particularly Giddens 1984), that gives equal ontological weight and priority to both agent and structure, thereby reconciling the neorealist conception of the unitary state with the lower-level observations of a less-than-unitary bureaucracy, as well as democracy, dissent and decision-making processes.

Others applied this structurationist position – which 'overwhelmed the study of International Relations' (Arts 2000:513) – to regimes, and to the activities of non-state actors. It is true that they often focused on non-state actors who might be said to be "good guys" – non-government organisations, international institutions, regulatory regimes – rather than what might be termed strategic actors, particularly those which are in competition with the formal international system itself. Structuration theory sought to reconcile the agent-structure problem, and at the same time resolve the dichotomy between determinism, 'weak in theorizing about "the subject"' and voluntarism, which had little to contribute to the understanding of institutions (Arts 2000:523).

Thus came the useful distinctions among group, organisation and institution, which Colin Wight describes. His is a rigorous ontology, in which a possible flaw may be that it stretches itself too far in order to get around the group-unit question. He defines organisations as consisting 'of an embodied formal structure of interlocking positions, roles and relations,' which is in need of human beings to fill these positions and fulfil the associated roles (Wight, C. 2006:202). The human beings who do so are a group, and they bring with them to their positions a moral agency which is lacking in the "empty" organisational structure. An institution, in Wight's view, following Bull, is 'a custom, practice, relationship or behavioural pattern of importance in social life' (Wight, C. 2006:202), which is not the same thing as an organisation, although organisations may become institutions, and the two are often confused (2006:202-203). The point is that of all these terms – group, organisation or institution, even 'structuratum': 'structured organisational and institutional ensemble,' (Jessop, quoted in Wight, C. 2006:220) – none is adequate for a complete international political ontology, in my view. They refer to aspects or attributes of something which they do not specify, although each one may provide clues as to the nature of this putative entity. This thesis does not attempt to

define or specify this entity, only to point out the incompleteness of the theory here, and to explore whether such a definition might be possible or worthwhile.

Identity and rationality as drivers of politics

Scholte, without specifically referring to constructivism, summed up its attitude to identity:

> The construction of identity, personal and collective, is a pervasive and crucial aspect of social life. Identity figures in all human interests, activities, norms and social structures. The historical record is replete with instances where people have killed and been killed in the assertion of their sense of self. The need for recognition – to define oneself (or who one wants to become) and to have that identity acknowledged by others – is a first-order preoccupation in social relations. The pursuit of identity ranks alongside, and is deeply interconnected with, quests for subsistence, power, communion and knowledge. At its core human existence is, amongst other things, a process of forging identity (Scholte 1996:38-39).

Clearly, organisations, groups and institutions are crucial facilitators of this construction of collective identity. But it must also be the case that a sense of moral purpose and agency, provided by the collective, is just as integral as the rules and relationships of the structure. The question is, integral to what? We might say an entity is composed of a group, arranged in an organisation, following institutional rules, and this gets us some way toward describing or specifying such a beast, but not very far.

Kratochwil argued that not only ethics or morality, but indeed the whole conception of rational interest, is itself contingent upon identity (Kratochwil 1987). Constructivists illustrated the connection between collective legitimation and interest by appropriating the stag hunt analogy from realists. This involves, say, five agents setting off in search of a stag. Each member of the group also has the option of catching a hare, taking care of himself at the expense of the others, since five are needed to bring down a stag. Game-theoreticians and liberals then calculate the members' several interests in terms of cooperation and collaboration. The analogy ignores the importance of sociability, including emotion and morality/legitimacy (Kratochwil 1987:316; Ruggie 1998:2). The stag-hunting party is not only formed of units but is itself a unit. Therefore its component parts cannot be entirely free, as long as they are members of it (Gilbert

1989:244); they may or may not be free to leave it. It is easily conceivable that a person might starve rather than turn their back on their companions.[*] Kratochwil uses this argument to illustrate the contingent, essentially emotional and group-derived nature of rational interest (Kratochwil 1987) and this, of course, undermines any useful notion of a universal set of interests.

Here then, are the bones of the constructivist ontology, derived from a conception of motivation involving norms, rules and identity-constructs. This is seen in the early constructivist pre-occupation with international institutions as a way of constraining state behaviour. But these look like simply more aspects, features or facets. The ontology is still incomplete. Interest-defined-as-x is an intentional phenomenon. As such it is dependent on a basic, non-intentional capacity for calculating interest. The question of what it is that possesses this capacity remains open.

After constructivism: emotion, motivation and evolution

Finally, in the beginnings of a potentially post-constructivist move, but still part of the sociological turn in International Relations, there has a been a recognition that it is possible to lay aside established patterns of thought, for example the putative separation of agent and structure. As we will see, this move has significant implications for several other important issues in International Relations, in particular the levels-of-analysis question and that of the line between the ideal and the material. Here I will set out some basic aspects of this nascent theoretical trend which have been raised in the International Relations literature and which will be explored in much more detail in later chapters.

Among International Relations scholars there was an explosion of interest in identity in the 1990s as the post-Cold War, globalising world threw up a range of new nationalist claims (Scholte 1996:39-43), most dramatically illustrated by a series of savage and

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[*] The Northern Irish Republican Bobby Sands starved himself to death specifically in order that his group be granted separate political status. This is a stark example, others of which are not hard to find.

bloody ethnic wars and genocides. It is an interesting question as to which was the more significant in the causal factors for this orgy of national collective-identity formation and its associated carnage. Perhaps it was the lifting of the lid on "ancient enmities" hitherto effectively suppressed by the Cold War. Or it may have been a reaction to the loose moorings of globalisation, which made those unsettled by a cosmopolitan outlook yearn for more concrete, local forms (Scholte 1996:46). A more ominous proposition also arises: that the identity-formation and the carnage are associated. Expulsion, genocide, mass rape, assimilation or enslavement of another group may be a corollary of the intense bond felt between self-conscious members of a community (Rae 2002:3). Social connection, in this view, would be the main driving force behind the worst crimes of humanity. These are not new issues for students of nationalism, but may be usefully applied to global political ontology more broadly.

Emotion, contestation and sources of legitimacy

During earlier discussion of classical realism, we saw the idea that power is conferred through the mechanism of legitimation, and is closely related to social ontology. The critical theorist Cox recognises this when he distinguishes between genuine populist movements and the kind 'manipulated' by leaders (Cox 1981:151). He implicitly values the one more highly than the other, thus revealing his own, possibly unconscious, idea of where legitimation comes from: it comes from below, from the mass of undifferentiated individuals.

It is possible to distinguish between proximate and ultimate sources of legitimacy. Proximate sources are those mentioned by the actors claiming legitimacy: God, 'the people', procedure, a particular conception of the moral purpose of the state. Constructivist and critical theory leads to the conclusion that ultimately all of these are narrative expressions of group identity. This indicates another point of commonality among International Relations theories. It is also a good illustration of the term "essentially arbitrary". The ultimate source of legitimacy is generic, arising out of a capacity and a need located in the collective. Proximate sources of legitimacy are therefore essentially arbitrary: there is an infinite list of things that might be taken as a socially-ordained legitimation mechanism.

Wendt recently noted 'the almost complete absence in International Relations theory of emotions as objects of analysis' (Wendt, Alexander 2004:312). Searle hypothesises belief and desire as basic intentional states. In particular, intentionality, he says, 'is a case of desire, given certain beliefs' (Searle 1983:34-35). Since collective intentionality is a basic building block of collectives, and collectives are the arbiters of legitimacy, we can see that legitimation, including rational interest-calculations, is at heart a matter of collective intuition and affect, or emotion associated with action. This important idea will be further explained in the next chapter.

All this seems to point to the conclusion that legitimation derives from emotion. Later I will argue that collective capacities are the vital middle layer between the material and the cognitive worlds. We can outline the process in the following way. What causes affirmative emotions in the individual – including the ecstasy of participating in communal violence or genocide associated with state-formation – is bonding with the group. Whatever facilitates and legitimates that bonding therefore seems right, at least in the moment, as in the case of rioting mobs, whose 'motivation toward extreme action is the reward-in-itself of the euphoria of crowd contagion' (Bloom 1993:12). Ideally, bonding around rightness squares with some well-thought-out moral code or procedural justification system, or formal code of law, but that is a preference of mine, not a requisite of the mechanism itself. In cases of conflict, the intuitive often wins out over the abstract, including allegedly rational ideas of material interest, in terms of normative attitudes and action.[*] This accounts for Maxwell's 'dual code of morality' (Maxwell 1994:379) and it is what Gibbon was pointing to when he wrote that 'a law, however venerable be the sanction, cannot suddenly transform the temper of the times' (1989 (1776-1788):256).

However, it is worth pointing out that even where intuition trumps abstraction, when determining interest they are still both derived from the collective. It may be that formal and informal codes come into conflict, but there is no moral code simply derived from

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[*]Insights and empirical data from the burgeoning field of behavioural economics, as we will see in Chapter Two, show that intuition also often overrides not just moral but rational, interest-based economic calculations. See (Kahneman 2003)

an individual, without reference to any conception of a collective, or at least categories of people. What we think of as right is what makes us feel good about "us". The "good" may be a negative good, such as the feeling of tenuous security derived from the sense of being protected from an ever-threatening world. It is interesting to note here the wildly inaccurate estimations people commonly make about their exposure to danger, especially in light of Ruggie's comments regarding the absence of an account of threat-perception in neorealism. There is little emotional payoff in being vividly aware of the danger of bathroom accidents or heart disease. There is a very big payoff in terms of connection with the group, and therefore for the group identity, if its members are all intensely anxious about communism or terrorism (Glassner 2000). In these circumstances, often, people turn inward, to the collective, and this makes them feel secure: safe, clearly defined and right.

D'Agostino's argument regarding legitimacy draws on John Rawls' idea of 'constitutional fundamentals' (Rawls, quoted in 2005:25-26), or the basic processes and principles that may be agreed on before more controversial substantive policy questions are addressed. Rawls proposed a social arrangement dividing realms of legitimation into the public and private. A Rawlsian pluralist legitimation system involves a public arena, in which normative questions may be contested, and a sovereign individual moral judgment, which is protected by the state. In these, what D'Agostino calls 'Rawlsian social arrangements', the public sphere of contestation produces political legitimacy, even though many of the participants may have conflicting personal, normative ideas of the legitimate.[*]

In this case, if one particular idea of normative legitimacy comes to dominate, then political legitimation is, at best, indiscernible, and often absent. Therefore contestation is the heart of political legitimacy.[†] This is an interesting argument in light of Gilbert's

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[*] This might be related to the special bonding that takes place during communal violence, when normally-taboo acts –feeding humans to wild creatures, mass rape, immolation of babies, digging out the living hearts of prisoners of war – are carried out publicly. It could be read as asserting the dominance of the collective over the individual consciences in the audience.

[†]In this work, I use the term legitimacy to mean political legitimacy, unless otherwise stated.

identification of public statements as constitutive of plural subjects (Gilbert 1989:195-202).

On one hand the necessity for contestation requires an arena, and/or object of contention, which must be regarded as important. On the other hand, one reason it must be regarded as important is that this realm of contestation provides a means and a system of identification of those who are doing the contesting, both individual and collective. In other words, public contestation looks like a central constitutive element of political units. This is a clue to the nature of the caliphate.

Evolutionary theory applied to ontology in IR

Because evolutionary theory is most often associated with biology, there exists the idea that its application to the social or other fields can be no more than analogous. However, the evolutionary paradigm is...

> distinguished by a well-grounded intellectual tradition in almost all the major disciplines, among them sociology (Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Talcott Parsons), archeology (Gordon Childs), and philosophy (Karl Popper, Donald Campbell)... economics ... Thorstein Veblen, Friedrich von Hayek, and Joseph Schumpeter. Evolutionary economics has experienced a particularly notable growth in recent years. (Modelski & Poznanski 1996:315)

Evolutionary theory has also attracted attention in International Relations, although not as much as it deserves, especially since 'evolutionary theory may be applied ... to some of the central issues in international politics' (Thayer 2000:125). There is so far only an embryonic literature on evolution in International Relations theory, to which this thesis is intended to contribute. Here, then, I introduce this literature in preparation for developing and expanding some of its ideas.

There are at least three ways in which evolutionary theory has been applied to International Relations. One derives from biology, leading through evolutionary psychology and sociobiology to international politics. This is a bottom-up approach that sees states and other collective actors as forged by the various complementary strategies of individual 'survival machines' (Richard Dawkins, quoted in Thayer

2000:132) constituting the species. Another perspective suggests that the phenomenon of coevolution – the entwined evolution of more than one context or entity – is relevant both to the practical world of global politics and the theoretical world of International Relations (Modelski 1996:322).

A third perspective derived from evolutionary theory, however, would see a more top-down approach, viewing conceptions of collective identity – and their institutional expressions – themselves as an evolving genus. In this view, the mass of individual intentionalities provides the medium in which ideational clients develop and evolve. Greater theoretical clarity regarding the ideational ontology of institutional structures could not be more relevant to current events, as will be demonstrated later with reference to the case of the caliphate. That is why my emphasis here is on the top-down approach.

Evolutionary theory in the form of sociobiology has been proposed as a more 'scientific' method of explaining human behaviour, particularly for 'understanding the causes of egoistic and dominating behaviour of individuals' (Thayer 2000:125). Thayer utilises this insight to provide realism with a 'stronger' foundation. This has led to the association of this kind of bottom-up application of evolutionary theory with realism, though it is not clear why this should be the case, since domineering behaviour is not universal, and plenty of other types of behaviour – such as resistance to domination – might equally be explored with reference to evolutionary theory.

Evolutionary theory is also accused of, or associated with, determinism, needlessly. Whereas structural determinism sees events as the result of structural circumstances, sociobiological determinism would regard human actions as driven by innate evolutionary drives in the individual. A top-down evolutionary approach might be accused of a kind of collective determinism.

However, I will argue, none of these views, in any less than radical formulation, is inconsistent with individual will. Human will is predicated on the existence of humanity, after all, and all the structural and biological factors that go with it. For example

Maxwell, as we have seen, draws her connection between the collective and the moral code, even though:

> I do not agree that evolutionary biology has any authority to determine what is morally right or wrong. Granted, our biology gave us the ability to construct the very categories "right" and "wrong" in the first place ... But what we inherited, essentially, was not the specific ethical rules, but rather the ability to work out our social relations, according to some scheme ... Moral rules were invented by humans and they reflect compromises where interests conflict. (Maxwell 1994:386).

She makes a strong claim, at the same time pointing to the theoretical importance of the difference between the generic and the specific. But the question remains as to what it is that is evolving. The people? The moral code? The collective entity itself? Perhap all three are, as well as International Relations theory itself, and this leads us to the concept of coevolution.

Coevolution is the recognition that the evolution of one species – to use the biological analogy – affects the evolution of others. As far as International Relations is concerned, Modelski, following Spencer (Modelski 1996:322), proposes that coevolution across the four realms of the human world – 'physical, biological, social and cultural' – holds promise as a paradigm of global politics.

An emphasis on transformation and change has been a consistent concern of scientific realist and structurationist International Relations. Ruggie pointed in particular to the seismic shift – from medieval to modern organisational principles – known as the Peace of Westphalia. (1983:273) He argued that neorealism could not account for such changes. This made it ahistorical.

Change, and particularly 'long-term institutional change at the global level', argued Modelski and Poznanski, 'can best be understood as an evolutionary process,' (1996:316). They also advocated a shift of paradigms from what they saw as one based in the natural sciences and mechanics to one derived from biology, thus:

> … moving from statics to dynamics. Analysis then moves from a time-free to a time-prone reality that implies irreversibility and thus opens the way to history. While mechanics assumes determinism, biology focuses on probabilities and chance (Modelski & Poznanski 1996).

Certainly, 'evolutionary arguments cannot evade the need to examine historical change' (Thompson 2001b:125).

Continuity between constructivism and evolutionary theory is evident, as is the potential for evolutionary theory to reconcile constructivism with its predecessors as mainstream theory. Thompson pointed out that the evolutionary theorist is free to focus on any of a range of units: 'an evolutionary paradigm does not privilege a type of actor or a type of problem' (Thompson 2001b:2). The paradigm itself is not an analogy from biology. For the same reason it is usefully applicable to the generic, as well as the specific.

Conclusion: Ontology as politics

For an evolutionary theory to work, there must be some entity that evolves. The insights into ontology described above, from some of the main threads of International Relations theory, imply, but leave undescribed or unrecognised, their subject. This thesis argues that there is a lacuna here which is a detailed, systematic description of the defining features of a generic unit in global politics. It might be argued that there is no such animal, that the actors in global politics are so various as to defy description, and that therefore there is no need for a generic definition. This argument has some merit. However, the fact that scholars may use terms like "the actors in global politics" and be understood, is evidence that there is some degree at least of commonality. There must be at least one defining feature.

Critical theorists and then constructivists took the ideas of the English School one step further by arguing that international society, while formally anarchic, was so only because people had constructed it that way: 'Anarchy is what states make of it,' (Wendt, Alexander 1992). Critical theorists argued that the institution of anarchy had been constructed the way it had specifically, if not explicitly, in order to maintain the

domination of the many by the few. This was obviously true of states as well, and particular states in particular, and so the state itself came to be regarded as a useful object of analysis. Against Waltz, Ruggie argued that it did indeed matter what specific states were like, especially hegemonic states like the United States after World War II (Ruggie 1998:14).

This feeds into the debate regarding the 'personhood of the state' to which an issue of the *Review of International Studies* was dedicated in 2004 and another in 2008. Alexander Wendt argues there that states are indeed persons, not just in a legal way, like corporations, but 'in at least one important sense: they are "intentional" or purposive actors' (Wendt, Alexander 2004:291). Here we see the idea of purpose, or goals, as a definitional attribute of persons. This is where subjecthood and/or consciousness comes in, since it is necessary in order to conceptualise a goal, or ideal end-state. This point is vital in the distinction between subject and object and in the definition of agency on the one hand and non-agentive functionality on the other (see Chapter Two for further discussion).

If this is the case, if the individual is a construct of the collective, and vice versa, then clearly morality, legitimacy and interest are also constructs, contingent upon cognitive processes. It can be seen, though, that there is something missing here, some idea of a subject or entity that decides, and that cannot simply be several individuals.

Could it be, as the catchphrase went, 'ideas all the way down'? Wendt, the originator of this phrase (Burchill & Linklater 2005:5), placed a qualification on it at least once (Wendt, Alexander 1999:20). There is a material universe as well as one of ideas. One promising possibiliy is to interpose a layer of capacities between the material and the cognitive.

In the next chapter, the idea of the 'plural subject' (Gilbert 1989:2) on the one hand, and Searle's proposed resolution of the question of the "group mind", on the other, provide signposts to potentially useful areas of ontological inquiry in evolutionary theory. There is no attempt to make any contribution to these fields, but to examine some concepts

from the 'longstanding controversy between 'individualism' and 'holism' about social groups' (Gilbert 1989:3), and to test these concepts' usefulness to International Relations. This is not the first time. Others, notably Bloom, Ruggie and Wight, have already applied these ideas to International Relations theory. This thesis seeks to contribute by exploring the relationship between affective motivation and the ontology of a generic political unit.

To sum up, we can see how structural realism, the English School and constructivism form a bridge between classical realism and a post-constructivist, evolutionary, or "poetic realist", approach and how the progression moves along the lines of the ideational foundation of institutionalised anarchy and the bringing of institutional capacities, invisible to classical realists, into the light. But it was already there in classical realism.

Governments act in part because they have the capacity to act, and because they develop a notion of state interests based on moral purpose. Classical realism reacts against the idea that foreign policy should be based around moral imperatives, but this is itself a value judgement based on an emotional endorsement, a 'rational' assessment of the 'interest' of the state (Kratochwil 1987), which is subordinate to moral purpose. And the subject of foreign policy, the prince, is the carrier of collective moral purpose. The important question is whether *all* collective agencies, not just states, are carriers of moral purpose. At first glance it would seem so, since they depend on political legitimacy for their constitution.

Various theoretical schools have examined different aspects of the Durkheimian social unit as it relates to International Relations. A clearer specification of a generic political unit and some of its basic drives could help to knit together some of these threads, but the need must first be recognised, and pointing it out is the purpose of this thesis.

CHAPTER TWO – TRANSDISCIPLINARITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: INCORPORATING INSIGHTS

This dignity is a terrible encumbrance to you,
for it has of late been ever at war with your interest.

Edmund Burke, in opposition, addressing the
British Parliament during the American Revolution

Introduction

In building a heuristic model of agency, structure and their implications for geopolitical ontology, insights from fields outside International Relations will be useful. Work in the philosophy of mind, in sociology, and in evolutionary theory can surely be incorporated usefully into a theory of International Relations. This has already begun, particularly with regard to John Searle (1995) and his theories regarding the construction of social reality. It is mistaken, as Barkin points out, to call constructivism a theory of International Relations (2003:325). It is more useful to say that constructivist IR theory is an application of constructivist philosophy to IR. Ruggie, a foundational constructivist in IR, casts his work as an application of Searle's theory to the discipline.

Denemark recommends what he calls transdisciplinarity (Denemark 1999:53), pointing out that politics, including world politics, cannot be isolated from social, economic and other factors. This kind of holistic theoretical approach accords with a holistic view of human affairs, but Denemark approvingly cites Bohman, who is not actually advocating a formally holistic philosophical approach. Rather, Bohman recommends a constructivist solution to the problem of indeterminacy. Indeterminacy

> is by itself a good reason to reject both holistic and individualist one-sided explanations of norms or any other social phenomenon: structures neither determine nor condition actors simply to reproduce them, nor do actors simply create or constitute the conditions under which they act. Instead, action and structure are linked in diverse ways … (quoted in Denemark 1999:68).

Denemark then takes one step further on the path to an evolutionary approach by adding the element of chaos: 'complex, non-linear phenomena' (1999:68), involving long term, iterative cycles (1999:62).

Constructivists have demonstrated that rational calculations of material interest are embedded in social – including emotional and biological – factors, and that these come first, in a logical sense. Whether these factors themselves are serving some other purpose looks like a useful question to examine. Perhaps they are productive components of ontological mechanisms, processes or phenomena that constitute some thing. Perhaps, in other words, emotional attachment can be constitutive of collectivities, or social wholes.

There are several clues to lead us toward an understanding of ontological mechanisms in global politics. Since we are examining collectives, whose components appear to be corporally independent, it seems reasonable to accept that their 'building blocks ... are ideational as well as material' (Ruggie 1998:33), and to examine the construction of these ideational factors in detail. The other side of this is to pay some attention to the corporal aspect as well. In other words, there is more to social groups in their entirety than concepts. Insights from other fields should not be quarantined from use. In particular it seems obvious that sociology will offer useful perspectives on what is, after all, its core study, that of groups. Since the subject is humanity, a biological phenomenon, we expect biological factors, such as the tendencies of evolution, to come into play. However, it must be remembered that evolutionary theory is not exclusive to biology. While human beings are indeed creatures, with needs and drives related to their biology, here I am more concerned with the effects of evolutionary processes on social wholes, including their conceptual or ideational side.

The question of legitimation and that of constitution are inseparable. In the case of formal institutions, it is immediately clear that there can be no such thing which does not have at least some community of people who affirm it as legitimate. That is, there can be no formal institution which does not enjoy some degree of empirical legitimacy, even if it is provided by only a small elite. The proximate source of this legitimacy may

be stated in constitutional documents, or sworn to in ceremonies, or formally marked in a multitude of ways. Gilbert (1989) demonstrates that such public agreement is constitutive of the plural subject, and here there may be a clue to the ultimate source of legitimacy. The proposition is that whatever the community may *say* it derives its legitimacy from, ultimately legitimacy may be affective, deriving from this process of constituting or affirming a larger body. In this case legitimation would be an ontological mechanism, as well as a cognitive and social one. This points to proposition regarding the nature of the units in global politics.

Insights into the incompleteness of current theories may also be gained from the natural sciences, particularly evolutionary theory, since world politics is particularly illustrative of 'non-linear, cyclical and evolutionary processes' (Denemark 1999:71). For example, it may be that the drive for affirmation is related to plural-subject survival and reproduction only indirectly. The emotional charge may be the motivator; survival of the collectivity a by-product. These propositions will be further elaborated.

Searle's principal work in this regard is *The Construction of Social Reality* (1995), in which he discusses institutional reality by way of 'social facts'[*] and their relationship to institutions. Margaret Gilbert's contribution comes from her book, *On Social Facts* (1989), in which she proposes that there exist in the social world 'plural subjects' of action and thought. The potential application of this work to the agent-structure problem in International Relations can be clearly seen when we use a definition of action involving subjectivity, and remember that collective actors are one of the main units of analysis in International Relations.

Rather than making any contribution to the theory of mind or to sociology, I seek to draw ideas from those fields that will be useful to the study of global politics. This has been common practice for some time, with Alexander Wendt as an example of those reflectivist writers who deploy scientific concepts in social theory. Bell argues that a turn toward the biological sciences is about to begin. (He disapproves: 'as with the social Darwinist project, [ideas from evolutionary psychology] are at base politically

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[*] Durkheim invented the term. (1953:37).

indeterminate, open to multiple and contradictory readings'. (Bell 2006:504)). This should not deter us from exploring them, since the same could be said about many other social entities, including states.

Development of a post-constructivist realism[*] would involve a turn away from the critical pre-occupation with borders and boundary-making and a stronger focus on what is within the boundaries. Hypothesising an entity like the caliphate, given its many guises, is a useful test of the proposition that vernacular understandings of ideational entities should be an important focus in International Relations. It seems safe to say that most of those who support re-establishment of the caliphate are not Islamic scholars, historians or theorists. Therefore, the question of what it actually is that they are supporting becomes more interesting. People are not generally aware of the processes of boundary-making they engage in. However, the fact that people may be unaware of these processes makes them all the more intriguing to the observer. Searle makes this point more than once, even going so far as to suggest it has prompted his exploration of institutional facts (Searle 1995:xi,21,47). From him, then, we can gain a much clearer picture of the conceptual mechanisms at work, and of the relationship between the individual mind and constructed social wholes.

Searle

Searle proposes 'a general theory of the ontology of social facts and social institutions', based around the 'explanatory force of the constitutive rules of human institutions, given the puzzling fact that the agents in question are typically unconscious of the rules' (1995:xi). This observation, that humans are typically unaware of much of the rich network of institutional and constitutive rules in which the humans themselves are formed, has profound implications for International Relations theory. If a member of a nation, for example, is unaware of the constitutional structure of that nation, or of nations in general, what does this mean for nationalism? In what medium or form does this nation reside?

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[*] Barkin calls it realist constructivism (Barkin 2003)

The question then points to the Durkheim/Weber dichotomy in sociology, between those who accept the possibility of a human entity which is not an individual, and those who do not. On the one hand the nation is conceived as *sui generis*, exogenous to individuals and having immense influence over them. On the other it is thought of as a fiction, or functional delusion, by which individuals guide their behaviour, "as if" such beings existed. This is the problem of reification: treating emanations or emergent phenomena as real. Reification is one of the big contested questions in IR. In particular, as we have seen, it is a major point of contention between empiricists on the one hand and scientific realists on the other.

Searle begins to reconcile these points of view by locating the collective in the individual. To do so he must explore the theory of mind and cognition, examining those attributes of individual human consciousness which allow it to both conceive of and "swim" in collective institutions at the same time. This would seem to lend weight to the Weberian side of the sociological argument, since, far from being *sui generis*, 'social reality is created by us for our purposes' (Searle 1995:4). This may be the case, but it is also true that social reality pre-exists any given individual, or at least is reconstituted from received templates, so perhaps the word 'created' should be "modified" or "adapted".

Collective intentionality and status-function

Searle's ontological explorations provide two key insights for my purposes. These are important because they provide clues as to the nature of a putative generic unit in global politics. One is the distinction between collective and individual intentionality, and the other is the existence of status-functions, functions performed by some entity by virtue of its assigned status.

The existence of collective intentionality within an individual consciousness points the way toward reconciliation of the singularism-holism debate in International Relations. It does this by providing a basis for the conclusion that the collective is endogenous to individuals, while at the same time retaining its ontological status as a whole. Looking at

this from another perspective gives a clue to the nature of, especially, the conceptual side of group bonding, including subconscious and emotional responses and tendencies.

The other key insight from Searle is the existence of status-functions, relating to institutional reality. For political science, and International Relations in particular, the importance of status-functions principally relates to the nature of offices within institutional structures. The caliph is powerful not principally because of any personal quality, but because of his status as caliph, and the functions assigned to that office. However, status-functions are much more widely applicable than just to offices, as we shall see. Nevertheless, the concepts of opportunity structure, evolutionary niche and political organisation are related, and are related to global political ontology, and this relationship may be inspected via the notion of status function.

The concept of intentionality is integral to this argument. Intentionality, Searle says, may be thought of as "directedness" or "aboutness", having 'conditions of satisfaction' (Searle 1983:10). Individuals exhibit intentionality when they assign functions, because they are attributing a kind of purpose to the activity in question, which may be either agentive or non-agentive. Status function entails a secondary, or assigned, intentionality. That is, the functioning entity itself has not taken on its role, but has been assigned it by a human. This type also contains a 'special category of those entities whose agentive function is to symbolize, represent, stand for, or – in general – to mean something or other'. (Searle 1995:23).

Non-agentive functions are still dependent upon intentionality 'because they are naturally occurring causal processes to which we have assigned a purpose' (Searle 1995:23). Searle examines the assignment of function to one consequence of the heart's beat: that it pumps blood. It is a question of attribution of value as to the most desirable outcome. We say that the heart's function is to pump blood, but we could equally say that the blood's function is to exercise the heart. In both cases, an intentional state, the observer's, is a necessary part of the definition of function, even though the function itself is non-agentive – nobody suggests the heart itself is conscious or intentional. Nevertheless, the fact that the heart pumps blood does have the consequence of keeping

the individual alive. The individual may then reproduce. This is a mechanism that is neither good nor bad, and may or may not be purposive, or self-sustaining. The mechanisms that survive are the self-sustaining ones. It is not necessary or reasonable to assign a value or function, in the sense of teleological purpose. So without the intentionality of the observer, there is no function, even though the causal relationship between heart and circulation remains. An observer, however, retains the capacity to ascribe function, even *post hoc*. Thus theorists may choose under which criteria – or purposes in this case - to assess certain phenomena. Specifically, we may assess strategic and ontological mechanisms in terms of their survival value for their subjects, if any may be discerned, even as we remember that it is we who choose to assess them on these terms. The terms are not absolute, but relative to the purposes we theorists ascribe.

This is where evolution comes in. There may be one possible attribute of collectivities – that they typically act to bolster their material interests, say – of which some possess more than others, and which contributes to longevity. A desire to survive is another obvious example, but these are non-agentive causal relationships, not teleological purposes, or functions. People assign those. It is my contention that the overriding, generic assigned purpose of inter-polity interaction is to affirm the statuses, values and purposes people have assigned to the particular collective in question. Furthermore, this provides a useful way of measuring and assessing grand strategy and global politics in general.

The lucidity of Searle's explanation of collective intentionality makes it worth quoting at some length. Collective intentionality means more than cooperative behaviour. Members of a collective must ...

> ...have a capacity for collective intentionality... they share intentional states such as beliefs, desires and intentions. ... Obvious examples are cases where *I* am doing something only as part of *our* doing something. ... If I am a violinist in an orchestra I play *my* part in *our* performance of the symphony. (Searle 1995:23, original emphasis)

This is related to what Gilbert calls participant agency (1989:422) and also may be compared with Colin Wight's second type of agency: agency *for*, or *on behalf of*, discussed further in Chapter Three.

There is, however, more to it than that.

> There is a deep reason why collective intentionality cannot be reduced to individual intentionality. … No set of "I Consciousnesses" even supplemented with beliefs, adds up to a "We Consciousness". The crucial element in collective intentionality is a sense of doing (wanting, believing, etc.) something together, and the individual intentionality that each person has is derived *from* the collective intentionality that they share … (Searle 1983:24-25 original emphasis)

The whole is not just more than the sum of the parts, it is of a different type. Thus, just as individual intentionality assigns intentional function to, for example, money, so it does also to the collective. Collective intentionality is conceived by intentional individuals, but it is not the same thing as individual intentionality. Individuals assign intentionality – including agentive and non-agentive function, belief, desire and interest – as well as possessing it. This is not to say that the collective's intentionality is an illusion, only to describe the mechanism by which it is achieved.

Searle laments that

> …it has seemed that anybody who recognizes collective intentionality as a [logically] primitive form of mental life must be committed to the idea that there exists some Hegelian world spirit, a collective consciousness, or something equally implausible. The requirements of methodological individualism seem to force us to reduce collective intentionality to individual intentionality. It has seemed, in short, that we have to choose between reductionism, on the one hand, or a super mind floating over individual minds. I want to claim, on the contrary, that the argument contains a fallacy and that the dilemma is a false one. It is indeed the case that all my mental life is inside my brain, and all your mental life is inside your brain, and so on for everybody else. But it does not follow from that that all my mental life must be expressed in the form of a singular noun phrase referring to me. The form that my collective intentionality can take is simply "we intend," "we are doing so-and-so," and the like. In such cases I intend only as part of our intending. The intentionality that exists in each individual head has the form "we intend".(1995:25-26).

Gilbert, as we shall see, also discusses this sense of togetherness, but disagrees with Searle regarding the possibility of reduction: 'facts about collectivities will, at some level, "reduce to" facts about individual human beings' (1989:417). However, this is true, for her, only in a certain sense, in that individuals are driven by their intentional states, from wherever they might be derived. It is individual acts of will, incorporated into collective acts of 'pooled will', that constitute collectivities. Individuals decide when the collective interest overrides their own. This is not the same as a methodological individualism which denies even the possibility of a pooled will, collective intentionality, or collective agency.

Then there is the remarkable fact that 'functions may be imposed quite unconsciously, and the functions once imposed are often ... invisible' (Searle 1995:21). For example, money has been assigned a function as a medium of exchange, and there are many examples of otherwise worthless artefacts being given this function, but most people who use money do not think of it this way. In general it is thought to have intrinsic value. In this case, however, the value and function is specifically designed by an agent, or agency: '*someone* must be capable of understanding what the thing is for, or the function could never be assigned.'(Searle 1995:21). Similarly with collectives. *Someone* must publicly invent the state. There must be some initial creative act, but after that, states may well function on their own momentum. Regime theorists have called this phenomenon 'institutional stickiness' (Krasner, quoted in Mattern 2001:356), but it also applies to less formal collectives like the nation.

Money also comes under a special category of function, called status-function, which underpins much of institutional reality. Printed pieces of paper are able to operate as a means of exchange because they are given the status "money". Similarly, individual persons are given power over others by virtue of their status as officers of state, for example, and so the state looks, from this angle, like a system of offices, which are opportunities for individuals to gain status. The usefulness of the concept of niches, derived from evolutionary theory, should become clear. A niche is a place in a system which may be occupied by some entity. In biology, it refers to a mode of life that is able to maintain itself by exercising a particular behavioural and morphological pattern in a

particular ecosystem. Also clear is the need to affirm the system of assignment of status and associated functions, from the point of view of those who gain status from it.

Subjectivity, objectivity and reality in the absence of function

Now we understand Searle's reference to one of the challenges faced by theorists in attempting to describe aspects of reality:

> … once there is no function, no answer to the question, What's it for? we are left with a harder intellectual task of identifying things in terms of their intrinsic features without reference to our interests, purposes and goals. (Searle 1995:4)

A further challenge is to describe *social* entities without ascribing functions to them, even when it is clear they pursue goals and possess interests. Here the conceptual differentiation between attachment and affirmation is useful. In simple terms, attachment binds the individual to the collective, but this may be a positive or negative bond, or may be manipulated or even coerced. Affirmation refers to the affirmation of the collective both as a collective and as superior – honourable, powerful, venerable – or at least recognised as equal in a normative system of equals. The operations of attachment and affirmation are more complex than this, but this will suffice to describe the basic concepts for now. Attachment is constitutive, whereas affirmation provides motivation.

Theorists might necessarily project some purpose or function onto social reality, but it is important to remember that that is what is happening. Social reality may be constructed with purposes in mind, but they are usually purposes other than the construction of social reality. The thing, if it is constituted, exists as an object, whether or not we attribute a function to it, even though it may be constituted with a purpose in mind.

In distinguishing between intrinsic and observer-relative facts, Searle highlights the importance of subjectivity in the construction of reality, and the assignment of function. He describes two different ways of thinking of subject and object, 'epistemic and ontological' (1995:8). Epistemically, subjective and objective refer to kinds of

statements, or judgements, as in the difference between a statement of relative quality as against a statement of testable fact.[*] Ontologically, however, subject and object are two different types of thing. Pain is subjective, mountains objective (1995:8).

Subjectivity and objectivity also look centrally important to limning a silhouette of the collective unit in IR. Subjectivity is a prerequisite for some types of agency and for action – a different thing, as we shall see. Objectivity is the other half of intentionality, and raises the question as to whether a group unit may be thought of as an object at all and, if so, whether this constitutes it as a "thing" or nothing more than a concept in the minds of individuals.

Then there is that which we refer to with nouns, "a subject" or "an object". Other nouns are "subjectivity" and "objectivity", seen as intrinsic features of some entity. In principle, it seems, all these might be observed, and theorised, objectively.

Not all reality, of course, is socially-constructed, although one might put the case that all the *knowable* world is, and the relationship between the two kinds of fact, intrinsic and observer-relative, is not straightforward: 'acts of observing are themselves intrinsic' and so 'it is not strictly speaking correct to say that the way to discover the intrinsic features of the world is to subtract all the mental states from it', because intentionality, the mental state, is itself an intrinsic feature of the world (Searle 1995:11). Similarly, a desire for survival, a capacity for attachment, and a desire *and* capacity for affirmation, are mental states, and hence intrinsic features of the world.

Another possible way to see it is to think of objectivity and subjectivity as attributes, aspects of a typology of social beings but insufficient in themselves: some social entities exhibit subjectivity, some objectivity. The same entity might do both at different times, that is, might act at some moments, and merely behave at others.

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[*] Rembrandt was a good painter, as against, Rembrandt lived in Amsterdam. This is Searle's example (1995:8)

From this line of argument we can see that the assignment of function requires a value-set, or system of beliefs, and, says Searle, always has the effect of conferring some power on some person or persons (1995:94), in the case of political organisations, through their offices. The assignment of social function must be completed in the context of institutional reality, so the establishment of institutions is essential to the distribution of power. Here is one plausible purpose of institutions, a function which is often assigned to them by theorists.

Naturally, if these status-functions assign some power, and they are dependent upon conscious design by some individual, this individual - or his/her family, tribe, class, dynasty, sacral or epistemic community - is likely to be the one on whom the power is conferred. However, again, it is not quite so simple. The functionality may be assigned, but, as Searle's argument makes clear, it is the institutional and organisational context which makes this assignment possible, and necessary, as well as vice versa. Thus the existence of an organisation or institution is itself a causal factor in the assignment of function. In a very real sense it is the institution which allocates power, through the agency of individuals acting in its behalf. Jackson goes so far as to suggest that, by this mechanism of acting-on-behalf, the institution becomes an actor (Jackson 2004:281) (see Chapter Three for further discussion).

The caliphate, for example, was instituted to serve a particular purpose – to solve problems associated with the death of the Prophet – from the perspective of those who did the instituting. Taking this as a purpose, or goal, we can say that the caliphate had the function of solving these problems, among others including assigning power. But this assignment of function is relative to a set of values, associated with power, order and legitimacy. The caliphate was then adapted to the needs of the community and, it might be said, took on a life of its own. This is another way of assigning a function to it associated with survival and reproductive requirements. If we as theorists cease to ascribe this function, it becomes more difficult to find something to describe. However, this is an essential step to take in the development of an evolutionary approach to International Relations, because it clears up a common misconception: that a desire or drive for survival is necessary for evolutionary mechanisms to operate. Such a desire

may help, but is not necessary, and contributes to longevity only indirectly. Attachment may be necessary, affirmation and a desire for collective survival only help.

The Background, capacity and experience

Searle specifically argues that institutional structures are central to the construction of social reality, providing the Background of shared meanings in which individuals invent themselves and their worlds (Searle 1995:27). On an organisational level, making rules-about-something is intentional, the capacity to make rules is Background. That is, the organisation – or other collectivity – possesses a capacity for making rules, which capacity constitutes part of its Background. For A and C to agree on X, they must have the capacity for agreement, and this is as true for organisations as it is for individuals. The Background, then, is a set of inchoate capacities like the capacity to make moral judgements, to experience emotions, or to act as part of a larger group. This is a different thing from saying that the Background itself possesses a capacity for moral judgement.

Capacity is a useful term since it has two slightly different meanings. One on hand it means the ability to perform some action, and on the other has a sense of space, or volume, which may or may not be filled. When a capacity is exercised, or an office filled, the addition of an object produces intentionality. What is not intentional is experiential: the undifferentiated, unanalysed, intuitive and affective experiences and capacities of everyday life.

In this view institutions, arranged in organisations, do not only allocate power, they also provide a context and a means with which to describe the world, and they have the capacity to engender facts in the world, such as the fact of the value of money, or the fact of Cardinal Ratzinger becoming Pope Benedict XVI. And by providing the language and the facts, and the lifeworld, organisational structures enable the assignment of status, upon which they are dependent for existence.

This can lead to some observations of what might be common to all institutional structures, including actors in international relations:

> … the enormous complexity of the body of institutional reality has a rather simple skeletal structure. This is not surprising, given the rudimentary apparatus we have to work with. We have nothing but the ability to impose a status, and with it a function, by collective agreement or acceptance (Searle 1995:112).

There is another type of unassigned, non-agentive functionality which applies more particularly to evolutionary mechanisms and to sociology. For example, to state that the concentration or distribution of power is an effect of institutions, such as that of money, or marriage, is not the same thing as to say that this is their purpose. Although intuitively it would seem to follow, the connection is not necessary. Huntington, for example, makes the argument that these processes may be constitutive of civilisations, without such an intention ever necessarily being present (Huntington 1993:48).

This is a profoundly important point for International Relations and political theory in general, leading to the proposition, for example, that members of ruling elites (well, some at least) are not intentionally concentrating power to themselves, but that their behaviour, including the insensible assignment of status and functions, leads to this incidental consequence of consolidating their power. The example of aid donor and recipient states is a good one, in which the intention to help, even in those cases where it is genuine, may have the unintended outcome of entrenching the asymmetrical relationship. We might dispute the level of intent in particular cases, but the point remains that this possibility exists. Intent is not necessary.

In Searle's assessment, most forms of human conflict involve, indeed require, collective intentionality: shared values and goals (1995:23). For Gilbert, there is another step, in that these shared values and goals, given certain conditions, allow groups of human beings to form 'plural subjects'. The movement for re-establishment of the caliphate is one such. The proposition I am emphasising here is that there is also such a thing as a plural or common object, also potentially a physical-corporeal entity, bound by conceptual factors. The caliphate itself is an example.

In the section after next, I will argue that these entities are subjected to the mechanisms and forces of evolution. Over historical time, such mechanisms have allowed informal, everyday institutional concepts to develop into entities which are not only 'candidates

for the role of foundational concepts of social science', but 'may surprise us with their complexity, beauty and theoretical utility' (Gilbert 1989:4-8).

Gilbert

Margaret Gilbert's work is particularly relevant to the argument here because she accounts for subjectivity in social collectives, and collaterally for the existence of such collectives. Gilbert's 'plural subject' is defined and explained in sociological terms, but is clearly useful to global political ontology. Specifically, it presents some propositions regarding subjectivity that are applicable to the question of whether collectivities like institutional structures have a capacity for action, or agency. As Gilbert says, 'In order meaningfully to engage in political philosophy, one needs an accurate social ontology,' (1989:436). The question of accuracy is problematic, but still, the exploration should be revealing.

Gilbert's book (1989) begins with a defence of the vernacular, and an outline of the Durkheim/Weber split in sociology. Everyday, commonplace understandings are clearly of great importance to the sociologist, being the most influential. Ruggie made a similar point when he wrote that both Durkheim and Weber rejected utilitarianism 'on the grounds of its methodological individualism and because it failed to encompass normative self-understandings of the ends, in addition to merely the means, of social action' (Ruggie 1998:32). Onuf, too, reiterates the argument in a metatheoretical way when he suggests that the 'routine' senses of International Relations and of Politics constitute the respective fields (1989:1).

Certainly, '… the impression that the individual is dominated by a moral reality greater than himself: namely, collective reality' (Durkheim 1952:38), entails some understanding by the individual of that greater moral reality. However, this is unlikely to be a highly examined position. In Chapter Four I show it is largely reliant on affect for definition. Indeed, as Searle has pointed out, most people are unaware of the establishment or maintenance of the complex institutional environments they inhabit. Informal institutional structures may arise spontaneously, without conscious planning or articulation, before being formalised. This is especially so in the case of international

institutions, such as that of third-party mediation in ancient Greece, or Westphalian sovereignty in Europe. These are strategic accommodations brought about by adherence to foundational values, which then produce rules of the particular institution (see Reus-Smit 1997). They may also be formalised as organisations, or black-letter institutions like statute law and at several stages some public statement is required.

Common knowledge and social ontology

Articulation also plays an important role in the formation of plural subjects, as described by Gilbert, since they are reliant upon public understandings and common knowledge. A nation cannot be a nation without someone, somewhere declaring it to be such, and others publicly agreeing. An office cannot be filled without there being some public statement of agreement or decision on the appointment, however restricted may be the audience. It is an indication of the breadth of Gilbert's theory that she describes similar mechanisms in all social groups that qualify as a 'collectivity'. These include the example of an agreement by two travellers to travel 'together' (Gilbert 1989:162), with all of the understandings that go along with that term. Such understandings may be complex and subtle, but they will be agreed to with some intersubjective interchange between the two travellers, even if only a raised eyebrow.

Shared intersubjective understandings are obviously vital to any agreement secured and acknowledged with a gesture. Gilbert examines the idea of 'common knowledge' and its associated phenomenon of quasi-readiness. This last involves conditional readiness based on agreement; it has an "I am if you are" construction, as well as an implication that "we will if we need to". The two travellers agreeing to travel together may implicitly enter into an understanding that traveller A will be ready to defend traveller B in case of attack, on condition, or at least on the understanding, that traveller B is also quasi-ready, in this way (Gilbert 1989:185-186). They may play different roles, with differing expectations, for example according to gender, but the point remains. This kind of common knowledge is equally important to more formal institutions and organisations such as marriage and the national state.

Gilbert sets out two very important reasons why social ontology is necessary to political philosophy. One is that it allows another set of criteria to be brought to bear on the judgement of political arrangements. These are 'nonrelational' criteria regarding how well the polity itself is achieving its goals, as opposed to 'relational' terms regarding the relationship of the polity to the individual (Gilbert 1989:436-437), or how well the group serves the needs of the individual. This is not to privilege or favour one or the other assessment, but to provide another way of looking at political affairs. Although Gilbert doesn't particularly address the question, the application of these ideas to geostrategy and International Relations appears clear when we consider the goals of strategic or geopolitical action. The question, "is this strategy working?" cannot really be answered in relation to an individual, even in the case of dictators.

The other reason why social ontology is important to political philosophy and International Relations involves the question of political obligation, and here Brad Wray's comments on Gilbert's work are relevant. Wray refines some of Gilbert's ideas regarding common knowledge or belief and invokes 'acceptance' as a more useful term (Wray 2001). While belief is an important part of social construction, he argues, it is not the same as acceptance. Acceptance, in this view, is defined by its subservience to a policy of some kind:

> I do not deny that plural subjects behave in ways which are consistent with their believing the collectively accepted view. But, the views plural subjects adopt are frequently the consequence of a policy to deem, posit or postulate something [to assign some function or status]. And, the goals of the plural subject determine what they "collectively believe". Proper beliefs are not like this. That is, they are not tailored to our goals.(Wray 2001:325)

While this last claim may be disputed, the point remains that acceptance by individuals of the group's belief presupposes commitment to the group, on whatever grounds, and therefore an obligation to it. The question of belief, or acceptance, in other words, is secondary to obligation. The obligation is based on attachment, reluctant or otherwise; motivated by fear, perhaps, or "manipulation by outside interests", or a lack of any alternative identity-group to which to attach. Attachment comes first, logically. Only then comes acceptance, by members of the group, of the group's goals, beliefs and values.

Wray characterises this as being the group itself accepting, rather than believing, what is necessary for collective goals to be achieved (Wray 2001:319). We can take a step further and suggest that once enough of the right members of the group have accepted that the collective believes, then it does so. More precisely, the collective endogenous to the individual heads is *conceived as* having such-and-such a belief, and so the corporeal manifestation of the group raises its hands to vote, for example. There are plausible examples of this kind of thing, of the collective overriding the wishes or beliefs of a majority, or even totality, of its constituents. Members of a cabinet might agree to a particular policy setting on electoral grounds, even though none of them individually believes it to be desirable.

Institutional rationality and ontological security

Reus-Smit has also written on the subject of political obligation as related to international law. He argues that international law is not accepted because it is enforced, but is complied with and enforced (on the minority of transgressors) because it is accepted (2002:7).

Here is an example where the domestic analogy seems, at first glance, to fall down, since there is no power such as a domestic police force to enforce international law. However, Searle makes an almost identical point regarding domestic policing powers of states: that police are not able to enforce laws outside a general acceptance that the law should be obeyed (1995:117). International law is indeed upheld and complied with, even in the absence of a coercive mechanism, mainly by common accord. Most states, like most citizens, obey the law most of the time. In both cases, when they do not, and (sometimes) sanctions are imposed, they are imposed through a mechanism based on common acceptance, even when exercised through formalised coercive means.

There is something, then, that both enables this enforcement and decides when it should be imposed, and it cannot be the law itself, and it is not the state, since states are subject to the same rules. It may be individuals, or individuals acting in concert, but only through their status as members of an organisation. For example, a police officer may

arrest someone. There is even provision for citizen's arrest, but this power does not reside in a biological individual, but the office of police officer or citizen.

Reus-Smit was arguing for another approach to the study of politics, based on the idea of 'institutional rationality'. In this view, the building of international institutions is a reaction to the problem-solving needs not just of rational actors, but also of 'institutions that permit the constitution, stabilisation and demonstration of legitimate social identities' (2002:29). Thus the rationality of institutional structure is based on more than calculations of material or straightforwardly strategic interests. This question is related to that of the necessity or otherwise of goals in the formation of collectivities.

While many suggest that goals are a necessary prerequisite for the formation of a group unit, Gilbert argues that a goal is not required, since, in any given situation, people in groups will form plural subjects, willy-nilly, whether they intend to or not. In this view, such collectivities arise because it could not be otherwise, given the nature of human beings in groups. The argument might be reconciled by pointing out that, if humans need institutions, and form them whether needed or not, then establishing a collectivity with rules and a sense of identity is a goal in itself. Mitzen argues this:

> Individuals need to feel secure in who they are, as identities or selves. Some, deep forms of uncertainty threaten this identity security. The reason is that agency requires a stable cognitive environment[*]. Where an actor has no idea what to expect, she cannot systematically relate ends to means, and it becomes unclear how to pursue her ends. Since ends are constitutive of identity, in turn, deep uncertainty renders the actor's identity insecure. Individuals are therefore motivated to create cognitive and behavioral certainty, which they do by establishing routines (Mitzen 2006:342).

Against this it might be pointed out again that people are often unaware of the routine institutional practices they perform, and so plural subjects exist and develop of their own volition, regardless of the wishes of their constituent parts. I will return to this subject in greater depth in Chapter Four.

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[*] This point should be borne in mind when contemplating the outcome of the Cairo Congress on the caliphate question. See Chapter Five.

The difficulty is to pin down whether such a systemic entity can be a subject. Gilbert believes so: 'there is an important and theoretically respectable sense in which collectivities can act, and, indeed, think, have attitudes and hold principles of their own' (1989:15). She proceeds by making a distinction between 'individual human being' and 'singular agent'. She examines the nature of the agent involved in the singularist, Weberian individual. She notes that singularists suppose that individual will and reason is prior. However, since one is born as part of a plural subject, (family, nation) or can join one for no particular reason other than to be part of one, actually plural subjecthood is prior, or at least,

> it seems possible, then, that the order envisaged by the singularist be reversed. Starting their conscious life perceiving themselves as group members with an understanding of group goals, values and beliefs, humans could tend to use these as filters for selecting out acceptable personal goals (1989:425).[*]

In this case, she argues, we-ness, or group-consciousness, may exist even in the absence of individual self-consciousness. The thought, "we are doing X" exists independently of the thought, "I am doing Y (as part of X)".

> We might say that for there to be a singular agent is for there to be a system which contains as a crucial element a conception of the system. This conception of the system powers the system in the sense that it is the precise nature of this conception which leads to acts of will and physical motions.
>
> Now, how is this complex system, the singular agent, different in kind from the plural subject? (1989:433)

The idea of a complex system as singular agent, and vice versa, seems likely to be exactly what is needed to move the agent-structure debate in International Relations forward, since it incorporates both the collective actor and the multifaceted unit. In this context the singular agent would be most obviously the state, but any unit in International Relations that possesses agency may be thought of as a singular agent. Here we have an image of the political unit, individual or collective, as a mass of

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[*] Compare this to the Confucian idea of the individual as *constituted by*, not *constitutive of*, the collective.

competing influences, derived from various systems to which the unit belongs, and from its own particular nature.

Having distinguished between consciousness and self-consciousness, Gilbert maintains that the "we" in the schema "I am doing Y (as part of (we are doing X))" is indeed self-conscious. The question of group self-consciousness, however, while fascinating, is not necessary to apply these ideas to International Relations. What Gilbert is describing here is the collective actor, and it is a subject, even if we deny it self-consciousness. It seems reasonable, once we have granted this, to look for an object, especially if we distinguish between action and behaviour (as I do in Chapter Four). Once we do that, we can see that, far from requiring self-consciousness, an institutional object need not even be conscious at all in order to occupy space and carry out physical motions. We may also reasonably ascribe functional interests to them, on the basis outlined in the section on evolutionary international relations.

Examples of plural subjects range in scope from the two travellers to states and beyond, but all include some kind of acknowledged agreement among members of the collectivity. This agreement need not imply any great understanding of the nature of the institution. Public acknowledgment of membership of a particular family, for example, does not presuppose any deep knowledge of the nature of families. During the *khutba* sermon, at Friday prayers, Muslims declare allegiance to the caliph (Kennedy 2004:202), a public statement of common purpose which, consistent with Gilbert's theory, binds them together as a plural subject, at least in this matter, even if they disagree on all else, including the very nature of the office itself, as well as the criteria and method of selection of its incumbent.

Gilbert mentions sex and dancing, as well as conversation, sport and group musical performance as examples of the formation of plural subjects. She points out that these are often described as beautiful, and provoke very strong feelings of unity and completeness (1989:224). Other examples of plural subjecthood include mob behaviour and communal violence, which produce the feeling known as ecstasy. Such bonds are an essential part of military culture, indispensible for operational success, and are often

described as the most intense of soldiers' lives (Keegan 1993:xv). The strength of such bonds may account for the fervour of Islamic warriors in many of their iterations. However, Gilbert also argues that these feelings of being at one, etc, while they may be very strong, are not constitutive. Even if that were so, they are unquestionably a powerful motivator.

Once again there is the importance of subjectivity in the construction of the social world. In both the Weberian, or singularist, and the Durkheimian, or intentionalist, social views, 'individual human beings must see themselves in a particular way in order to constitute a collectivity' (Gilbert 1989:12). This means that intentionality is logically prior to collectivities.[*] Intentionality is the condition of having an object, and thus it presupposes subjectivity. The difference between the two great schools regards whether a next step is necessary. The Weberian would suggest 'that the conceptual scheme of singular agency is adequate for sociology'(Gilbert 1989:14). For Durkheim, the collective not only exists, but is logically prior to individuals. As Gilbert puts it, 'people must perceive themselves as members of a *plural subject*' (1989:13 original italics). Thus, as we will see with regard to the agent/structure problem in International Relations, the question is one of logical or ontological priority. A conceptually similar solution is possible in both areas.

Another consideration arises with regard to objective organisational offices, such as the caliphate. If the existence of a group-subject depends on or is marked and affirmed by its adherence to an institutional object, then plainly the desire for survival of the subject is extended to the object from which it draws its definition and affirmation. It must be added that not all Muslims agree that there should be a caliph or a caliphate. Some believe the caliphate is irrelevant to Islam. According to this notion, nothing that was not stated or practiced by the Prophet can be sad to be prescribed in Islam. Since Mohammed made no formal arrangements for his succession, and the caliphate was established only after his death, the caliphate cannot be mandated by Islam. See Chapter Five for more discussion.

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[*] Gilbert uses the wording 'intentions (broadly construed)'. I believe "intentionality" is more precise.

Darwin, teleology and evolutionary functionality

Evolutionary International Relations

Here I will sketch a top-down evolutionary theory of International Relations. This will be useful as a basis for later elaboration of ideas relating to reification and motivation. It begins with the statement of tentative first principle: the first, or primitive, effect of policy is to define an entity, us, in just the same way that the first effect of experience is to define an individual, me, which then either perpetuates itself and its line, or does not. The basic hypothesis here is that collective intentions cause collective identity. A group of people agreeing on some (including moral) purpose, even mere survival, constitutes that group as a unit of identity and as a polity. Constitution may provide a strategic goal in and of itself. I suggest that this is the case with regard to the caliphate.

The state is constituted as a formal institutional representation of an informal social fact: collective identity in the form of nationhood, say, or cityhood or of a particular, enfranchised class, or adherents to a particular set of values. A shared intentionality defines this manifestation of collective identity. Imagination comes first. As Anderson (1983) has so powerfully argued, in large measure things are the way they are, as far as the political and social arrangements of human beings are concerned, because we imagine them that way.

A vital part of this self-constitution involves an appeal for recognition and legitimation by other actors in the system. Ruggie puts it differently, criticising neo-utilitarians for their neglect of first principles, or the 'foundational question' of how states develop identities. Both of these theorists agree that a state can become a state only by consent of other states. This recognition requires some overarching institutional framework (Ruggie 1998:1-6). That is, the attributes of statehood are conferred by and through the state system.

Which of these dynamics is an intrinsic element of all state systems, inherent in the nature of social grouping, and which is a culturally specific arrangement, and hence open to challenge and redefinition? Clearly, those elements which inhere in inter-polity interaction must remain as long as there are more than one or two polities, while those

formal, ostensible aspects which provide specific institutional contexts may be adapted to evolving situations. Hence, an evolutionary analysis would hypothesise formal institutions as culturally specific representations of specific informal conceptions of collective identity.

The basic outline of the paradigmatic evolutionary mechanism strongly evokes structural realist accounts of world politics, with the addition of a concern with change, consistent with constructivism.[*] It involves a model in which self-replicating units change over time through one means or another. In biology the means include mutation and genetic intermingling; in global politics they might include technological, organisational and political innovation, along with myriad cultural features. Units change in a context, which includes members of the same and other species, and features of this context decide, or select, which traits, units and types of unit survive. Immediately it is evident that context has a great effect on the shape of the units, since features or traits that are selected for will tend to be enhanced, while those which do not assist with survival and reproduction will tend to atrophy and become vestigial, or disappear. However, since the context is also made up of other units, the context, too, evolves as the units change shape to suit the circumstances. This is the mechanism of coevolution, mentioned by Darwin in his introduction to *On the Origin of Species* and demonstrates that not only does the selective context affect the shape of the units, the reverse is also true in a very real sense. The changing nature of units and types of unit shapes, ~~even determines~~ and may even determine, the nature of the context. This effect is enhanced in the socially constructed world of global politics where, for example, the particular cultural concept of the moral purpose of the state has a determining effect on what types of state may be conceived, let alone realised.

There is a generic, baseline goal which is a requirement of all social individuals, and that is self-identification. Institutional structure, it may be seen, dictates, or at least heavily influences, what kinds of individual may be constructed, the actions that individual may

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[*] As Thompson puts it, 'From an evolutionary perspective, the dust never settles. Dust in motion is the norm' (Thompson, W. R. 2001:4), This makes its quintessence hard to grasp, but Thompson's statement should be qualified by the concept of punctuated equilibrium: the dust settles, but not all of it, and not forever.

take while remaining part of the system, and what kind of goals those actions are taken towards. This can be seen as the mechanism of construction of an instance of the abstracted individual I have just described. Even if it is the case that only the individual, corporal human subject may act, it still holds that these individual subjects conceive of themselves and their interests as abstractions (Wight, C. 1999:131). The conclusion that it is possible for socially constructed abstractions to have interests is important, as we will see.*

An evolutionary International Relations, or grand strategy, would focus on the ever-fluid formation and affirmation of political-social units. Policy and strategy can be analysed according to their effectiveness in terms of maintaining, expanding or reinforcing particular conceptions of collective identity differentiated according to proximate and ultimate sources of legitimacy.

Gilbert describes one of the assumptions of sociological functionalism: 'that all societies (and smaller social groups?) have a goal or end-state, namely, the preservation of their own existence' (1989:173). This echoes Waltz's 'radical simplification' regarding the purposes of states: 'I assume that states seek to ensure their survival.' (1979:91). Gilbert explores the idea in more depth. Members of a group 'prefer that the group survive than that it disband' (1989:235). The desire is contingent, and it is not true of all individuals or groups. Still, as Durkheim showed, even though membership of some groups can make the individual *less* likely to survive, by making him more likely to commit suicide, this doesn't much affect the survival of the group. It may even be functional for it. It is also far from unusual for members of a group to be willing to sacrifice their lives in the interests of the collective, going as far as to intentionally commit suicide, as with some terrorism operations. And even a formally recognised state might in some cases 'hazard its existence' on a matter of principle, as Hamilton advocated. Thus these deeper values

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* The impossibility of subjecthood has been argued: 'I can speak about myself in reference to individual facts, but when I try to go beyond their contents to ask about some indivisible core or permanent substratum of subjectivity unifying those data in an identical self, my questions become as meaningless as any other metaphysical question'. (Kolakowski, quoted in Wight 1999:139,endnote 17). This is a significant observation in light of any hypothesis of collective self-consciousness.

outrank even the survival of the group, as was the case with the Melians.[*] This is evidence that the mechanism of attachment as an instrument of group survival is imperfect, indirect and actuarial, just like many other evolutionary phenomena.

As far as International Relations is concerned, the relevance of evolutionary theory has been demonstrated by Thayer (2000), who argues that some of the unsatisfactory axia of realism – "man's" inherent evil or compulsion to dominate, for example – may be replaced by an understanding of evolutionary social mechanisms. Thayer 'submit[s] that the egoistic and dominating behaviour of individuals, which is commonly described as "realist," is a product of the evolutionary process' (2000:125). Again, not all individuals display this type of behaviour, but enough do to make it a universal feature of political life, and hence of interest to students of politics. This is an example of evolutionary theory applied in a bottom-up way, through sociobiology, seeking to account for drives and other characteristics of biological individuals.

It is important to distinguish here between evolutionary theory and social Darwinism. This is relevant since many realists contend that not only *do* states pursue their rational, material self-interest, but this is what they *should* do as well. In other words, there is not only a descriptive but a prescriptive aspect to realism in some of its guises. Social Darwinists advocate that not only do the strong survive, but it is the purpose of life to dominate, and that only through deadly struggle can the human species reach its full potential. This is a fanciful, teleological (but functional) argument, often bound up with Romantic notions of destiny. Evolutionary theory, in its theoretical form, rejects teleological purpose.

Driving teleology out

Searle observes that one of 'Darwin's greatest achievements was to drive teleology out of the account of the origin of species' (Searle 1995:16). The key point here is that a

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[*] In Thucydides' account, the Melians choose almost-certain death over enslavement, which would entail the end of their existence as a collective entity; that is, they forego their survival as individuals in order to affirm their collective existence, if only temporarily. Hamilton must have read the work.

desire to survive is not a pre-requisite for survival. Waltz's assumption that states desire survival may or may not be true. In the end this intention or goal is only tangentially relevant to the longevity of conceptions of collective identity or their institutional expressions. On the Darwinian account, as Searle puts it, there is 'no intrinsic purpose whatever to the origin and biological survival of biological species' (1995:16). This is not the same thing as saying that individuals of the species do not desire survival, only that this is a secondary factor. In other words, it is an attribute of the species, which may or may not be functional in an evolutionary sense. However, it is fair to say that some traits, functional delusions such as a sense of collective honour, may well be magnified over time as a result of selection.

Given the similarity of the terms, it is necessary to distinguish sociological and evolutionary functionality from Searle's notion of function. The commonality lies in evolutionary mechanisms. The difference is a question of perspective and agency. Function is assigned by an observer, based on a set of values and assumptions regarding purpose. Sociological functionalism derives from the idea that those attitudes and behaviours which enhance the group's, and/or their own, longevity are functional, in the sense that they continue to function or operate.

Every human individual is a member of a group. She is born as one, and her personality, language, attitudes and beliefs are formed in context. Some attitudes and behaviours will enhance the cohesion of the group, some will detract from it. This is not the same as saying that their purpose or intent is survival. 'Survival', in Searle's words, 'is not a goal that is pursued but simply an effect that happens' (1995:143). Such an entity may or may not desire survival, but this is irrelevant in its essence to the fact of survival. That is to say, it is only tangentially relevant. Even though a desire for survival might assist, such a desire is not a prerequisite for survival. We have been warned by Searle of the difficulty of discarding function, and the difficulty of defining entities without it.

Teleology retains the sense of a purpose of social life – that the social group survive, prosper, attain perfection in the sight of God, Karl Marx or Adam Smith – and ascribes the existence of certain social phenomena to it. The evolutionary refinement is to

remove the Searlean sense from function. Evolutionary functionalism, or fitness, requires not that the social group have *a desire* to perpetuate itself, and a successful strategy for doing so, merely that survival be the result of its behaviour, regardless of its desire.

Clearly a desire for survival improves one's chances, in an actuarial sense, as against some other entity that has no such desire. But this is true only obliquely. In this pared-back vision there is room for the idea that identification, recognition and affirmation of the group, rather than its physical survival, is the immediate, essentially affective, goal or motivational driver of global politics. It may also be an effective mechanism for survival of the group, but that is not its main purpose. Hence a universal purpose of groups might be proposed, that is not a rational desire for survival. This is what Mitzen calls 'ontological security' (2006).

Two-step causality and Darwinian selection

When realists attribute a desire for material and strategic gain to strategic players, they are assigning a Searlean function to those players. That is, the theorist is attributing the behaviour of strategic actors to a desire for material gain, power and survival. But material gain, expanded social power and survival are effects that happen, and the behaviour that leads to them is not necessarily directed towards that end. A case in point is the consequence of a desire for security, as in the accidental empire described by Fuller:

> It would appear that though Nature's goal is concord, her driving force is discord. Thus, the tribe, by striving to remain a tribe, through inter-tribal warfare becomes a multi-tribal community or people. Similarly, a people, striving to remain a closed community, through inter-community wars becomes a nation, and a nation, striving to remain a nation, through international wars grows into an empire. (Fuller 1970:21).

Institutional behaviour that is actually directed toward the affirmation of legitimacy of institutions, and the social connectedness of individuals who adhere to those institutions, may incidentally enhance the influence and longevity of those institutions, or it may not.

This sets us up for an explanation of the mechanism of Darwinian selection in shaping conceptions of collective identity which, after all, are also formed within a social-institutional context. Again Searle's explanation of this two-step process is too succinct and precise to be overlooked.

> Instead of saying, the person *[or state]* behaves the way he does because he is following the rules of the institution, we should just say, First (the causal level), the person behaves the way he does, because he has a structure that disposes him to behave that way; and Second (the functional level), he has come to be disposed to behave that way, because that's the way that conforms to the rules of the institution (Searle 1995:143).

In other words, the unit is selected by its context, which selection moulds the shape of the unit's species over generations. Put yet another way, institutional context shapes the mechanisms by which its constituent units are produced, and then selects the units which best conform to its rules, or reproduction requirements. In my view, "state" or even "generic unit of interaction in global politics" may be substituted for "person" in this formulation. Searle goes on:

> ...the mechanism *[of causation]* has evolved precisely so that it will be sensitive to the rules. The mechanism explains the behaviour, and the mechanism is explained by the system of rules, but the mechanism need not itself be a system of rules. I am .... Urging the addition of another level, a diachronic level, in the explanation of certain sorts of social behaviour. (Searle 1995:143)

This diachronic – *that is, historical or developmental* – explanation revolves around the notion of institutional structure, which may be distinguished from anarchic structure (as explained in Chapter Three).

Another attribute of some collectives might be excessive pride, which leads them stubbornly to defend their separateness, even at the expense of their existence, as did the Melians, an example of individuals working to affirm a conception of collective identity at the expense not only of their own interests, but of the existence of the collective itself.

Osama bin Laden could easily have chosen to live a quiet life in prosperous comfort among his family, and probably would have enjoyed considerable power and luxury in that context, in contrast to the ascetic life he has led since 1980, when he arrived in Peshawar and set up, with help from the US and Pakistani intelligence services, 'a guesthouse for Arab recruits to *jihad* against the Soviet Union [c]alled *Sijill al-Qaeda*' (Lawrence 2005:xii). He is clearly not working for his own material gain, but in the perceived interests of an objective social/institutional entity, the '*ummah*/caliphate, and perhaps for his place in history (Lawrence 2005:xii,xv,xvii), delivered by the esteem of his supporters and the condemnation of his enemies.

The problem of reification

The problem of reification is the question of whether an example of the type of entity just described, such as the caliphate or the caliphist movement, can be said to be "real". Singularists, empiricists and methodological individualists warn urgently of the dangers of reification. Theorists thereby force themselves into a position of claiming that things happen "as if" such collective entities exist, while simultaneously denying the possibility of their existence. Searle is scathing:

> the 'as if' intentionality doesn't explain anything. As-if intentionality has no causal power because it does not really exist (Searle 1995:146).

The point remains that the discussion of ideational factors must be clearly related to political events in the physical world. What caused the rise of the '*ummah* in the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh century? One answer might be "Mohammed did", but if we include Mohammed himself as a member of the collective, as a part of the mechanism, the question remains.

If reification, making real, is a characteristic of a certain brand of International Relations theory, we must guard against it, or argue for it. In order to do either it is impossible to escape the question of the nature of reality and in particular social reality, and this is essentially the empiricist/scientific realist debate. Jackson addresses it by using the example of a house. A collection of materials arranged in a certain way is one thing, but when we say, "this is a house", such statements are 'integrally wrapped up with the

production and reproduction of the entities to which they only apparently refer: this is a house only because we act as if it were and thereby *make it so*' (Jackson 2004:283 original italics). Consequently, even if we could dismiss the idea of a collective subject, that of a collective or common object is unavoidable. Reification works.

If we allow the possibility of collective intentionality, it is easy to allow the idea of group intent, and therefore of collective agency endogenous to individuals. We can all agree on this, individualists and structuralists alike. The point of disagreement comes with the next step, which must be addressed from an objective point of view.

The question must be addressed objectively because those doing the addressing are individuals – theorists – and therefore on the face of it are not privy to the experience of being a collectivity, even though they might know well what it is to be *part of* a group. How could we detect such a thing, given that we cannot experience a subjectivity other than our own?

Perhaps it could be measured by its effects, the scientific realist approach. This would mean examining drives and events, in this case motivation and action. Does the collective as a whole possess agency, or only its constituent members, who possess collective agency in individual iterations? It may be impossible to prove that a collective subject exists, but it also seems to be impossible to prove the negative, that it does not. A lack of proof does not, however, preclude a search for evidence.

Conclusion

Insights from the theory of mind, sociology and evolutionary theory have allowed us to lay the foundations for a heuristic model. By applying social constructivist philosophy to International Relations this chapter has shown constructivism's usefulness as a means of reconciling the problem of reification. Similarly, sociological ontology has been shown to help with both the question of reification and that of collective action. Finally, evolutionary theory has been shown to be applicable to these debates in International Relations in two ways: first, by showing that a desire to survive is not a prerequisite for survival, while the attachment of some individuals is indeed necessary to constitute a

collective; second, by pointing out that attributes – among them a desire for survival – are magnified through selection.

Does a group of individuals, sharing a collective intentionality and intent, objectively constitute a distinct corporeal and ideational entity, which could be called a collective actor? This question of the existence of a collective subject or object can be seen, like attempted resolutions of the agent-structure problem, as an ideological, political or emotional choice theorists make, rather than a philosophically rigorous position (Wight, C. 2006:62). The possibility of structure being personified, or displaying agency, forces the theorist to accept the possibility of a singular human entity that is not an individual human being, and this seems to be unacceptable to many. However, it is not, as Searle says, necessary to believe in a 'super mind' (Searle 1995:25) in order to concede the possibility of collective intentionality or agency. As we have seen, such intentionality is endogenous to individuals, and indeed it is conceivable that an individual might intentionally (in both senses) act upon collective goals, without ever displaying individual intentionality.

In this case, the interests of that individual and those of the collective of which he is a part coincide. This is not always the case, depending on what we think of as interest. If an individual's interest always lay in self-preservation, the argument could be made that singular calculations of interest are enough to cause people to behave collectively, to solve problems associated with survival. But this is patently not the case, since incidents of individuals sacrificing themselves for altruistic reasons abound.

If, on the other hand, we think of the individual's interest as primarily serving that of the collective, then these seemingly altruistic actions make sense. It is not necessary for one or other of these to be exclusively the case. Sometimes people act on their own, self-perceived interest, and sometimes they act on behalf of the "greater good". The issue that remains unresolved is the nature of the subject of this greater good.

Searle's notions of what goes on in individual heads assist in understanding the constitution of plural subjects in Gilbert's formulation. Evolutionary theory leads us to

the question, not just of how these entities are formed, but of how they develop and the attributes they may come to possess. These concepts will be useful during subsequent discussion of the agent/structure problem in International Relations and the nature of strategic actors in international systems.

CHAPTER THREE - WARP, WEFT AND WIGHT: CONTEXT, ACTION, BEHAVIOUR AND THE ONTOLOGICAL SIDESTEP

> *After setting out the true principles of political right, and trying to establish the state on those principles, I should complete my study by considering the foreign relations of the state, including international law, commerce, the rights of war and conquest, public law, leagues, negotiations, treaties and so forth. But all this would represent a new subject too vast for my weak vision…*
>
> Rousseau
> Conclusion, The Social Contract

Introduction

The problem of agency and its relation to structure has occupied the minds of theorists for some time. This deeper philosophical question is tied to the question in International Relations of the nature of the state and of state action in particular. As Wight points out, much of the difficulty lies in the definitions used for agency and structure. Some solutions have involved the attempt to reconceptualise both, but these have run into the problem of indeterminacy (Wight, C. 1999). It follows that a solution of this problem may be sought in determining the nature of some thing that might account for both agency and structure. It may be possible to combine the idea of conceptions of collective identity with that of evolutionary functionality. Consciousness, subjectivity or the ability to conceptualise idealised outcomes may define agency; they are not prerequisites of interested behaviour. The definition of agency in these terms is a relatively arbitrary construct of theorists, but, even if it were not, it would remain the case that a capacity for agency, like consciousness, subjectivity, etc. is an attribute.

Ulrich Franke and Ulrich Roos have suggested a terminological reconceptualisation, beginning from the idea that 'states do not act, human beings do' (2005:3). They mean specifically 'the individual human being, ... the single actor [imbued] with corporeality, intentionality, reflexivity and a consciousness about the finiteness of life,' although they reject methodological individualism (2005:3-4). They urge us to accept the term and notion of the state as 'structure of collective act*ing*' (Franke & Roos 2005:1 original emphasis). This is one way of attempting to sidestep the apparent problem in

concluding that structures may act. The problem is only apparent, in my view, because it presupposes its conclusion: that only 'the individual human being' may act. This chapter proposes another, ontological, sidestep.

The question of the direction of causality is one of the main aspects of the agent-structure issue, tapping as it does into some of the more profound intellectual dichotomies in the social sciences. The argument between methodological individualism and methodological structuralism or holism is one example, over whether units constitute an explanation *of* systems or may be explained *by* them. Another is the debate over the weight that should be accorded to material and ideational factors in the social world (Emirbayer & Mische 1998:1003).

This last feeds into the question of motivation, which some argue is a marker of agency (Wight, C. 2006:147). Motivation certainly implies interests, of which human beings have several kinds. Clearly material interests including food and shelter are powerful motivators, but a strong argument can be made that there are other, ideational motivators that are even more powerful.

Finally, questions of consciousness, subjectivity and intentionality – as opposed to evolutionary functionality related to behaviour – cannot be avoided. They cannot be avoided because they are definitional aspects of action and some types of agency, as will be discussed below.

These dichotomies, or dualities, undergird the agent-structure problem because a commitment to elevate one or the other in each case affects the range of possibilities for resolution. If we prioritise the individual, we risk failing to see how structure affects his very nature, whereas focussing only on structure is dancing with determinism. If we dismiss the ideational, a whole range of effects remains unexplained, while the only place to measure these effects is in the material world.

It must be remembered, in this context, that "resolution" of the problem is only one possible outcome of the discussion. Another might be the development of a different

perspective which relieves the problem of the need for resolution; a sidestep, in other words. Colin Wight suggests a fruitful area of enquiry in social ontology (2006:89), even though he disagrees with Gilbert on the question of whether 'social entities can themselves be agents that possess mental states and perform actions' (Wight, C. 2006:201).

Wight takes a position of what he calls ontological individualism, which he distinguishes from methodological individualism, because it allows the usefulness of structural or holistic thinking, but suggests that 'there are no purely methodological accounts: for X to be the explanation of Y requires an account of both X and Y'. The various methodological approaches 'already embody deep ontological commitment' (Wight, C. 2006:94). Agency causes structure, or structure causes agency. An ontological account of both agency and structure is required in either case (Wight, C. 2006:94). Such an account of either cannot be given without taking the other into account: agency requires structure, and *vice versa*.

The lack of a robust account of agents and actors has also meant a lack of attention to the ontological imperatives that inhere in the concept of collective identity, and which apply to the question of motivation. Shannon criticises Wendt for a perceived neglect of the question of agency, partly resulting from Wendt's assumption of a single dominant cause, or driver of agents, in the politics of recognition (Shannon 2005:584). These issues will be discussed further in Chapter Four, when this preparatory discussion should make them clearer.

Every theory of International Relations, and much besides, implicitly or explicitly addresses the agent-structure dynamic. As Colin Wight remarks it 'is an issue with which all approaches must grapple' (Wight, C. 1999:110). Franke and Roos point out that theories of International Relations will be constructed around the researcher's solution or accommodation (2005:2fn) of the agent-structure question.

This chapter will examine the contours of the agent-structure discussion as it relates to states, systems of states and the international political environment, developing Waltz's

neorealist position alongside the reactions to it from constructivists. The reason for this is to show the similarities in modelling between agents/units and structure/systems. In the end it is hard to distinguish between what is an actor and what is structure, and this difficulty leads to the proposition that they are not two separate types of thing, but two different features, aspects or capacities of some other thing, which has yet to be fully identified or specified in International Relations. The first and second parts of this chapter come together in the third when we consider the relationship between a group, collectivity or plural subject on the one hand, and institutional and organisational structure on the other, as well as their interaction with their constituent parts.

On the question of motivation, as both Ruggie's and Reus-Smit's arguments make clear, anarchy is not the only factor in determining the nature of global politics. Conceptions of legitimacy related to collective identity play a key role in shaping the fundamental institutional practices of international systems (Reus-Smit 1997, 1999; Ruggie 1997). Either states or their representatives act; that is, they decide – according to values, and ideas about function – to take a certain course of action. These actions constitute the motive force for the whole system, and they are decided upon according to conceptions of interest and legitimacy, as we shall see. It might be possible to identify some motivation, *sine qua non* in global politics; in other words some kind of human drive without which human collectives could not exist or interact.

The question of state agency and its relationship to intentionality is clearly a vital part of this argument, related to state, or institutional, identity. This will be explored, and a distinction will be made between agency, action and behaviour. The distinction illuminates the precise nature of the state as an institutional structure, incapable of agency in its own right, perhaps, but behaving by enabling and motivating proxy agents to act in its interests. In Jackson's view, and mine, this amounts to the same thing (Jackson 2004:286-287). This is not to exclude the possibility of collective agents, but to distinguish them conceptually from institutional structures, while at the same time allowing the unmistakable power of these structures to be theorised without simply defending a pre-existing position in the debate. In this way the thesis attempts to reconcile agency and structure by describing both as attributes of some social entity, which I do not presume to describe here.

The "problem"

Debate over the agent-structure problem has been carried out in the International Relations literature mainly between structuralist neorealists on the one hand and constructivists, who emphasise the importance of identity, involving norms, values and socially constructed conceptions of rational interest, on the other. The problem was brought to prominence in International Relations with the publication of Alexander Wendt's 'The agent-structure problem in international relations theory' (1987), which Barnett has identified as one of the foundational texts of the application of constructivism to International Relations (Barnett 2005:254-256).

The "problem" initially presents itself as one of deciding between the relative causal priority of structure or of agency and of defining both terms. The structurationist solution put forward by Giddens, Bhaskar, Wendt and others has it that while 'structures are not time-bound, not limited to the consciousness of living human beings,' nevertheless, it is only through the activities of actors and/or agents that structures are maintained and developed (Cerny 2000:437). Thus the problem is more about untangling the relationship than about weighting one and the other.

Wendt specifically cast his paper as a reaction to the structuralist aspects of neorealism and world-system theory. The agent-structure problem in International Relations has been characterised in similar terms to those Gilbert deploys with regard to sociological ontology. In this case structuralism, rather than singularism, is opposed to the constructivist, intentionalist explanation. Bieler and Morton characterise the debate in stark terms by asserting that one side 'denies human beings any autonomy' and the other 'completely ignores … structures' (2001:7). They go on to suggest, however, that the relationship is dialectical, employing Anthony Giddens' idea that agency and structure are two sides of the same coin (2001:7). If this is the case, the nature of the coin remains uncertain, or perhaps 'radically indeterminate' (Wight, C. 1999:112).

There is another debate as to whether structures such as the state are capable of acting, or, to frame it another way, whether the state is an agent, actor or structure. This is a decision which is not – and cannot really be – based on scientific reasoning. As Wight

remarks, it is a question of 'object specification' (Wight, C. 2006:62) and hence is both ontological and ideological. Once again the nature of the object is unclear. Of course, it must be unclear before it is specified; however, if each specification entails a solution to the agent-structure problem, as Wendt suggests, (1987:337), it 'is an issue that must be dealt with by all approaches', and hence is political, rather than scientific (Wight, C. 2006:63) See Chapter Four for further discussion of this question.

There are several perspectives that may be usefully brought to bear on the question of agency and structure. On the constructivist side, scientific realism has been distinguished from and opposed to the empiricist, rationalist, neo-utilitarian account, as we have seen. Questions regarding agency and structure are integral to the opposition between these schools, so there is no doubting the importance of the matter. It is intimately tied up with a number of other axiomatic classifications:

> A variety of recent attempts to rethink the relationship between structure and agency have argued that the Kantian dichotomy between ideal and material realms-together with parallel distinctions between free will and necessity, voluntarism and determinism-must be replaced by an outlook that regards these elements as reciprocally constituting moments of a unified social process. (Emirbayer & Mische 1998:1003).

This notion of process as ontological solution is a compelling, yet incomplete answer to the ontological question. Chapter Four will describe a developing perspective that questions the need for a rationalist/constructivist divide. This could be seen as the most important divide in the discipline, but an alternative to the image of levels of structure and agency seeks to answer the question, "what is it?" with regard to actors in global politics in a more specific way. I am not trying to answer the question here, but to open it up. Of course, this discussion must begin with a definition, or at least some elaboration, of what is meant by structure and what is meant by agency.

Structure: context and construction

There are two main ways to think of structure: as contextual and as constructed. These are not exclusive categories. Context may be pre- or extra-human, as in the case of geography, but it may also be provided by the actions of human beings, as in the socio-

political world. Structure in this second case, as a creation of human beings, may be further divided, conceptually, into that which is agreed upon, or designed, and that which comes about spontaneously. The first is institutional structure, the second may result from balances of power, for example.

Structure, then, is a term which can be used to cover a number of different types of entity, including organisations and institutions, which provide context for different types of unit. The concept of structure can help us to explore not only structural or systemic, but also unit-level phenomena. Set these ideas beside aspects of evolutionary theory, as explained in Chapter Two, and the relationship should become clearer.

These are different ideas about structure. We now turn to examine the difference between an institutional structure and an actor, or agent. Applying this to International Relations, the most obvious place to start is with the state. Much discussion has been devoted to the subject, and yet there seems to be no real consensus as to whether the state does indeed act, or not. As discussed in the last chapter, most people who specifically address the question say not, yet it is difficult not to talk "as if" it does. If states do not act, how is it that they go to war, or develop international institutions, or, indeed, the more informal context of anarchy? This leads to the levels-of-analysis question, with which the agent-structure problem is closely associated (Brighi 2004:5) and often confused. The distinction between the levels-of-analysis and agent-structure arguments is illuminating from both sides, and also has implications for the domestic analogy, since, if the domestic politics of states are one level in the system, they will display similarities, and be interconnected, with other levels.

Levels of analysis

David Singer opens the bidding on levels of analysis, focussing on two that are relevant to International Relations, 'the international system and the national sub-systems'. He allows for many more, however, as he accuses International Relations scholars of neglecting the subject:

> We have, in our texts and elsewhere, roamed up and down the ladder of organizational complexity with remarkable abandon, focusing upon the total system, international organisations, regions, coalitions, extra-national associations, nations, domestic pressure groups, social classes, elites and individuals as the need of the moment required. (Singer 1961:21).

Interesting here is his inclusion of individuals as a level of analysis on a par with all the others, as is common in introductory International Relations texts. As Wight points out, both methodological and ontological individualism would seem to suggest a separate status for individuals (Wight, C. 2006:102-118). All of the other entities mentioned in the list are group, organisational or institutional entities. If we were to concede that only conscious, intentional individuals are capable of acting, then every other level "above" that of the individual would have to be excluded from the possibility of agency. This would mean that all of these other levels were not actors, or agents, but structures of one kind or another.

However, Wight argues, individuals are not a level of analysis in International Relations. They are present at every level (Wight, C. 2006:111). Coalitions, for example, are formed by agreement between the representatives of states, who are individual human beings, acting in their capacity as office-holders. This idea distinguishes the agent-structure problem from the question of levels of analysis, since individual agents may be acting on behalf of structural entities at various levels.

To point out, however, that individuals are *not* present on at least one level, is to distinguish between institutional structure, designed by humans, and that structure which results from the clash of opposing ontologies. Competition between members of the same system is one thing. Intertribal raiding was an accepted part of economic and political life in the Arabian Peninsula, for example, until fairly recently. Such units may compete with one another without altering or undermining the system of tribes. This is an institutionalised system. With the arrival of the Muslims, however, as we shall see, a different method of dividing up the world comes into play, and at that point there is no overarching institution set of rules to regulate this conflict. At the global contextual level, there is anarchy.

Anarchy and institutions

At the "highest" or largest level there is no individual human being, because there is no humanity. There is only a context in which authority, legitimacy and identity must be established by humans.* This is global or universal anarchy, and bears some conceptual resemblance to the state of nature in political theory, notably that of Hobbes and Rousseau. This is what Waltz means by structure. In neorealists' imagination, anarchy is the defining principle of international politics (Waltz 1979:61). They agree with Rousseau:

> Since no man has any natural authority over his fellows, and since force alone bestows no right, all legitimate authority among men must be based on covenants (Rousseau 1968 (1762):53)

On an international level, one may substitute "state" or "sovereign states" for 'man' or 'men'. Another problem with language occurs here. To suggest that authority is "established by humans" seems to imply that humans are somehow prior – ontologically, biologically, chronologically and/or logically – to these structural aspects of the social world. However, several theorists comment on the longevity, or *longue duree* , of institutional structures (Brighi 2004:5; Cerny 2000:437; Lawson 2008:13).

There was no Adam and Eve. There was no human being who sprang, fully formed, from the earth and had then to form institutions and means of cooperation, social and psychological connections, and systems of legitimation. There has never been a human individual who was not formed, to some extent at least, within a social-institutional milieu. Individuals who are isolated from birth, if they live at all, do not grow into fully-formed human beings without care or attention.

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* Some critical theorists and radical social constructivists argue that geography itself is a social construct, given meaning only by language. The meaning may be constructed; the landscape remains, meaningless and undescribed perhaps, extant nonetheless. Furthermore, 'social reality in general can be understood only in light of the distinction' between itself and non-intentional, intrinsic reality (Searle 1995:12-13).

Global anarchy may be thought of as both ever-present and never-actualised, since, again, there is never a case of human beings existing without institutional legitimation and definition of one sort or another. The condition of global anarchy simply forces us to concede that these principles of right behaviour and legitimating mechanisms are human-made, that there is no other source of authority than humanity itself.

The relevant point for political ontology is that proximate sources of legitimacy cited by players in the power game, though essentially arbitrary, are always underpinned by a deeper ultimate source. By 'essentially arbitrary' I mean that there is no intrinsic reason to choose one over another, since they are all invented. Utility in terms of longevity and reproduction will select them, but the product of the (hypothetical) initial creative act is arbitrary in its essence, like random biological mutation.

Anarchy, of the Waltzian, non-institutional type is an example of a pre-existing structural feature of the world, like geography, and I refer to it as universal anarchy. Although it seems quite clear at first that a structure such as geography, or this kind of anarchy, cannot be said to act, it certainly, in the neorealist view, has many effects. For example Waltz argues that states will tend to grow alike to each other, and that similar patterns of behaviour will repeat themselves, due to imperatives that inhere in the situation (Waltz 1979:65-67).

There is another idea of anarchy, however, which constructivists have mobilised to criticise Waltz, and which might be called institutional or Westphalian anarchy. Anthony Giddens, when he uses the term structure, is not referring 'to the descriptive analysis of relations of interaction which "compose" organizations or collectivities, but to the system of generative rules and resources' (Giddens, 1976: 127), and, he says, 'I treat structure, in its most elemental meaning at least, as referring to such rules (and resources)' (Giddens, 1984:17). This applies to institutional structure particularly, since rules are a defining attribute or feature of institutions. By resources he means not material resources, but social and conceptual resources including legitimacy and the capacities of office.

The idea of rules as resources may be elucidated in the difference between constitutive and regulative rules (Searle 1995:27). Regulative rules are those which regulate some pre-existing activity. Searle uses the example of traffic, which exists prior to any rules being made about it. The rules become necessary as the traffic increases. Constitutive rules are exemplified by the rules of chess, or other games, without which the game could not exist.

The peace of Westphalia marking the end of the Thirty Years War in Europe is commonly cited as the beginning of the modern state system (for example Roshchin 2006:601). This series of agreements established the principle of sovereign jurisdiction defined by territory and embodied in the royal Sovereign. It thus inaugurated some of the most basic rules of the modern international world – non-interference, territorial integrity, sovereignty and, as an inevitable corollary of multiple locations of sovereignty, anarchy in the international realm.[*] These rules were regulatory, in the sense that they formalised a pre-existing strategic situation, but they were also constitutive, because they established a system and a culture of international relations. In other words, Westphalian sovereignty is not as sovereign, or the system as anarchistic, as it seems.

This type of anarchy is very different from the universal anarchy described above. For one thing, it is presided over by a system of religious legitimation of royal houses which puts the lie to the principle of "no higher power". It is a constructed anarchy, 'under the common roof of shared values and universal standards of action' (Hans Morgenthau, quoted in Ruggie 1998:5) closely interwoven into the social and political fabric of a particular time and place, despite its claims to universality. This is an international institutional structure, designed by humans. However, it is designed to reflect a strategic situation which not one of them would have preferred. This is important because it demonstrates the possibility of institutions arising through human action, but without any intention, anywhere, of creating that particular institutional structure.

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[*] The main treaty document itself reads more like a list of real-estate settlements, and it seems clear that its framers did not think they were establishing permanent principles of the kind described, or an international system that would last for several centuries.

Of course, there was inter-polity politics well before the Westphalian system of royal states. Martin Wight points out that both the Byzantine Emperor and the Late Abbasid Caliphate retained high legitimational powers even as they lost most, or all, of their temporal sway:

> As the Islamic empire decayed and its provinces became independent, self-made sultans and emirs as far afield as the Slave Kings of Delhi continued to apply to a titular caliph for a diploma of investiture (Wight, M. 1977:23).

Later he explains the decline of the Holy Roman Emperor's political power, which was also coincident with the office's elevation as a source of sovereignty. He describes the caliphate as a 'world empire, a universal state, or in its decline a suzerain state-system' (1977:29,35).

Some have argued that the establishment of international institutions is a result of state problem-solving. The assumption is that states seek to secure their interests, and in so doing come into contact with other states, with one of several results: absorption, annihilation or cooperative settlement. Interaction poses problems for states: gaining access to needed resources; protecting their territorial integrity; advancing their power; protecting trade routes; predicting the behaviour of other states. These problems may be solved by competition, collaboration or cooperation. This involves the establishment of rules and procedures based on interest and conceptions of moral purpose; in other words, institutional structures designed in order to get around the '[c]ollective action problems that inhere in anarchy' (Ruggie 1998:1; see also Reus-Smit 1999). But since these problems are indeed inherent in anarchy, the other way of putting this argument is to say that institutional structures come about because it could not be otherwise; they could not *not* come about. Universal anarchy is a vacuum that must be filled. Institutional anarchy is one way to fill it, but there are plenty of others.

Very different institutional structural arrangements may be produced under similar circumstances. For example, the city-states of ancient Greece or Renaissance Italy each developed different structural solutions to the problems of anarchy among groups of nominally sovereign states (Reus-Smit 1999:5-7). This is a key part of the constructivist

critique of neorealism, since Waltz predicts that states in similar situations – and they are all in a context of universal anarchy – will tend to develop similarly. Constructivists argue that the diversity of institutional arrangements, described by Reus-Smit, contradicts this putative predictability.

However, these arrangements are based on a set of generic institutional values (Reus-Smit 1997:565-567), which may be seen as capacities, which exist in all sets of polities of roughly equal power, and which must be filled in particular fashion each time the situation arises. As Ruggie explains it, the form of international order is not the same as its content (Ruggie 1982:382). Thus Reus-Smit's differing systems have differing particular conceptions of the moral purpose of the state, but they all have a capacity to have such a conception, and they could not function as state systems without one.

Again, this is what is meant by essentially arbitrary: the conditions arise that allow a conception of collective identity to develop, and so one does, but the particular nature of each iteration is arbitrary, until it is selected or deselected by circumstance. The Westphalian settlement, and the caliphate in some of its guises, may be seen as structural iterations of this generic set of institutional values. Such sets are a clue to ontology.

The conception of collective identity is one aspect or attribute of such iterations. Thus a particular state system, the early caliphate, for example, does not evolve so much as develop, from the Caliphate of the Rightly Guided Caliphs to the Middle Abbasid. After this point there existed several caliphates at once, as will be described in greater detail in Chapter Five. From then until the Ottoman reunification, we can plausibly say that what evolves is the species, *caliphate,* part of the genus, *state system,* of the family *institutional representation of collective identity*. But this is not quite right; the biological analogy falls down, because a more precise characterisation is that nothing evolves. Evolution happens, and produces various types of unit, given different contexts and motive forces. There have been, as we shall see, many iterations of the caliphate.

Material, ideal and identity

Another problem associated with the agent-structure problem is that of the relative weight that should be given to material and ideational factors in International Relations. This represents one of the great divides. As Ruggie puts it, the constructivist reaction to neorealism,

> … attributes to ideational factors, including culture, norms and ideas, social efficacy above and beyond any functional utility they may have, including a role in shaping the way in which actors define their identity and interests in the first place (1998:4).

In this way, 'social constructivism seeks to account for what neo-utilitarianism [neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism] assumes: the identity and/or interests of actors' (Ruggie 1998:4). These actors, in some constructivist views, are not only individuals, but include states, bringing into play the idea of state identity. Ideational factors, therefore, like individuals, are present at every level of political analysis.

It is interesting that Ruggie seems to consider a 'role in shaping the way … actors define their identity' to be 'above and beyond any functional utility'. It seems more appropriate to say that identity and interest presuppose self-identification. Self-definition, or constitution, would seem to be logically prior to functionality.

Then there is the proposition that it is not ideas *all* the way down. Wendt sees a clear difference between himself and Waltz, in that Waltz conceives of structure as material whereas Wendt sees it as socially constructed:

> The most important move is to reconceptualise what international structure is made of. In my view it is exactly what Waltz says it is not: a social rather than a material phenomenon. … this leads to an idealist view of structure as a "distribution of knowledge" or "ideas all the way down" (or almost anyway)[*] (Wendt, Alexander 1999:20).

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[*] There is a relationship here to cosmology. The theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking tells the story of a lady interjecting at a Bertrand Russell lecture: '"What you have told us is rubbish. The world is really a flat plate supported on the back of a giant tortoise". The scientist gave a superior smile before replying, "What is the tortoise standing on?" "You're very clever young

The 'almost' refers to the material basis of life. Human beings, after all, are themselves material. However, there is something that mediates between the material substance of the physical self and intentional, cognitive constructs. To illustrate, loyalty may be identified as a key aspect of human affairs. Anderson is intrigued by the phenomenon of loyalty-unto-death regarding the nation (1983:7). Loyalty-to is intentional (and may be constitutive); the capacity for loyalty is Background. People devoted this kind of loyalty to collectives long before the nation became the principal ideal-type of human polity. It could be that, at base, the institutional Background is unconscious and affective. We would have to judge whether common knowledge or common feeling comes first.

States occupy territory, often demarcated by geographical features. Wars are fought by armies, often causing large-scale physical destruction. Monuments, public buildings and defensive fortifications are constructed, if not by, then at least for, politically-defined collectives. The material world is not "under" the ideational, against what is implied by Wendt's '"ideas all the way down" (or almost anyway)', the material world, too, is present at every level of international structure. This means that neither the ideal nor the material are themselves levels of analysis. This is true even if we rule out social groups as unified corporal entities, which I do not. It also means that constructed collectivities may exist at, and comprise, at least several levels. An illustration is the comprehensive nature of the caliphate system. When it is seen to include shari'a law and Muslim practice, it prescribes everything from ablutions to family relations and all the way up to legitimation practices for entire state systems.

Taking this larger view, as Denemark points out, makes it clear that ''politics' and 'polities', but not 'states' should rest at the heart of our analyses' (1999:45,56,58). Farrands, too, notes that forms of collective identity other than the nation-state have become increasingly important in the field (Farrands 1996:13). This is consistent with the move from International Relations to global politics, including the activities of non-state, and even non-institutional players, including social movements (see for example Githens-Mazer 2008), like the caliphate re-establishment movement.

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man, very clever," said the old lady. "But it's tortoises all the way down!"' (1988:1). Hawking uses the tale to illustrate the incomplete and recursive nature of our existing cosmology.

In the case of institutional structures, even though they are not directly designed, nevertheless capacities for desire, belief and intentionality drive the process, on the face of it. This leads to the structurationist search for 'analytically distinct patterns or sets of constraints and opportunities which systematically link structures and actors' (Cerny 2000:437). Agency is a more difficult idea to pin down than structure and, perhaps consequently,

> Although no final resolution will ever be accepted, as this [agent-structure problem] is a perennial philosophical conundrum, what is accepted is that IR theory currently provides much more insight into structure than agency. This is a severe theoretical handicap, for to lack a robust concept of the ''agent'' in IR means to be at a disadvantage when trying to explain or project significant change and noteworthy creativity (Hudson 2005:4).

This echoes not only the call for a better understanding of actors, but other constructivists' concern, mentioned earlier, that structural realism cannot account for transformations in the world system (for example Ruggie 1983:273,285).

Chances are: opportunity structure

Another important type of structure is opportunity-structure, which might be seen as an aspect of all human-made structures. Opportunity structures are important because:

> The manner in which individuals and groups in the political system behave, … is not simply a function of the resources they command, but of the openings, weak spots, barriers, and resources of the political system itself. (Eisinger, quoted in Adamson 2005:553)

Openings include offices, which carry status, and capacities, which require objects . This is related to the evolutionary notion of niches, the idea that things happen because they can.

Thus the opportunity opened up by the weakness of the Byzantine and Persian Empires in seventh century Arabia can be seen as a causal factor in the rise of Mohammed, in just the same way that a vacuum may be said to be a causal factor in the inrush of matter

that fills it.[*] Adamson has explored this notion with regard to the competition between political Islam and the liberal world order in post-Cold War Central Asia (Adamson 2005).

An organisation is an example of a structure of opportunity, in the sense that it is a structure of niches, or offices, which confer status, and therefore capacities, on the individuals who occupy them. Not only that; organisations also shape those individuals in the longer term through the process of institutional selection. One difference is that organisations are typically deliberately constructed to suit a particular goal.

To say that structure may be *explained* with reference to individual agency is not the same as saying structure is *caused* by individual agency. Wight takes a position of what he calls ontological individualism, which he distinguishes from methodological individualism, because it allows the usefulness of structural or holistic thinking (Wight, C. 2006:94).

In sum, leaving aside the physical world-as-structure, which both enables and constrains, what is left is the interplay of actors and/or agents, under universal anarchy. 'Anarchy,' in a famous phrase, 'is what states make of it' (Wendt, Alexander 1992), and states have, in some instances, made a formal arrangement of institutionalised anarchy. This, however, has always been based on deeper normative and affective foundations, and institutionalised anarchy is not the only superstructure which may be supported in this way. Other institutional structures, such as sacral or epistemic communities under unified spiritual and temporal leaders, arise in other circumstances, even though the underlying capacities are generic. Motivation, as we shall see, may also be generic, with particular iterations.

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[*] The vacuum, it must be understood, is only a causal *factor*, since it is the pressure from outside, not the vacuum itself, that causes the inrush. However, it could/would not happen – there wouldn't be an imbalance of pressure – in the absence of the vacuum, even though the vacuum itself is an absence. Another good analogy is the river bed, which doesn't precisely cause the river – it could be said to be caused by it – but nevertheless dictates its course and speed. In Australia, many would say the river bed *is* the river.

Agency and action

All of this structure-building is carried out by actors or agents, whether they be states, other collective actors, like social movements, or exclusively individuals. It is clear, then, that any understanding of social and international structure aside from universal anarchy must take the motivations of these actors into account. The first task, however, is to identify and categorise them. One way might be through the concept of agency, one of their defining attributes.

It is uncontroversial to state that policy-makers and others frequently speak and operate *as if* collectivities not only existed but were capable of having beliefs, attitudes, policies and characters. Indeed the concept of national character is one of the underpinnings of many types and manifestations of nationalism. State identity is also a central concern of constructivism in International Relations (Reus-Smit 1999:5; Ruggie 1998:28-33). Even realists, however, argue for states as rational maximisers of interest-defined-as-power. They accept the concept of collective - that is, state – action, at least implicitly.

Intentionality, action and behaviour

To begin, agency must be distinguished from several similar, but distinct notions: intentionality, action and behaviour. Then we may critically examine Wight's three different facets of agency itself, which he calls agency$_1$, agency$_2$ and agency$_3$, as compared with Emirbayer and Mische's 'disaggregation' of the idea into three 'elements' (1998:970-971). This process will show that agency is not only a question of ontology, but is closely related to: legitimacy, through its implication of responsibility; interest, because of its corollary of the existence of some interested being; and emotion, since all subjects capable of conceiving a goal are also subject to affective states which influence their conceptions of interests, of rationality and of right behaviour when choosing among goals.

Seemingly all agree that actors and the concept of agency have not been given enough attention in the discipline, and that confusion abounds regarding their meaning (see for

example Hudson 2005; Jackson 2004a; Shannon 2005; and especially Emirbayer & Mische 1998). The discussion regarding agency arises out of the individualist turn of the Enlightenment and the emergence of a Lockean conception of agency that 'affirmed the capacity of human beings to shape the circumstances in which they live' (Emirbayer & Mische 1998:964-5). The term is thus closely associated with others, such as 'selfhood, motivation, will, purposiveness, intentionality, choice, initiative and creativity' (Emirbayer & Mische 1998:962). It is also associated with legitimacy, freedom and responsibility. Freedom, in this conception, is the ability to make moral choices between imagined future states to be worked towards (Emirbayer & Mische 1998:962-965). In other words, it is the ability to take responsibility for actions; the free agent is also the responsible agent.

This idea of a freely-created intent is the key to Wight's distinction between agency and action. If the outcome or end-state is imagined, there must be some entity capable of imagining it. In other words, if intent is intentional, and its object is this end-sate, then there must be some subject of that object, and this subject must be able to conceive of a goal and a plan to achieve it. The subject of action in this case of intentionality, then, must be self-conscious, whereas agents may or may not be. We know this, because we know that the formulation "we are doing" does not necessarily entail "I am doing". This derives from the idea of attention as a determinant, or constitutive, of consciousness. If an individual in a given moment is focussed entirely on the collective goal – what we are doing – it may be said that the formulation "I am doing x" is not relevant, or even extant as a concept. If so, the individual does not exist in this moment. Because of the experiential nature of attention this can only ever be an inference made from the evidence of behaviour, even if the behaviour includes statements of intent. Concepts such as 'flow' are relevant, denoting the loss of self involved in close attention. In Islam, as Abdul Aziz Said explains, "[t]he integration of personality [with the 'ummah] is realized through the disintegration of self" (Said 1979:64). That is, an individual is fully realised only when he or she is subsumed by the community.

An agent could, in principle, be conscious of the we-part, without being conscious of – i.e. attending to – the I-part. However, it is not possible for theorists to decide objectively which entity is conscious, reflective or subjective. Because of the

experiential nature of attention this can only ever be an inference made from the evidence of behaviour, even if the behaviour includes statements of intent. Concepts such as 'flow" are relevant, denoting the loss of self involved in close attention. In Islam, as, Abdul Aziz Said explains, "[t]he integration of personality [with the '*ummah*] is realized through the disintegration of self" (Said 1979:64). That is, an individual is fully realised only when he or she is subsumed by the community.

Three types and three elements of agency

Wight advances three types of agency in an attempt to provide an alternative to dominant conceptualisations about a real-world social ontology characterised by complexity (Wight, C. 1999:111). Emirbayer and Mische disaggregate agency into iterational, projective and practical-evaluative elements. These differing taxonomic breakdowns may be usefully compared, in order that we be clear about what kind of agency is being discussed. This is important because it holds out the possibility of reconciling the structure-as-actor problem through ontology by permitting the characterisation of both structure and agency as attributes, aspects, features or facets of a generic political unit. Wight's second type of agency, a kind of agency-on-behalf, is also particularly relevant to this question, even though it will be revealed, in the end, as a somewhat misleading notion.

Agency$_1$ Wight attaches to the responsible self, or 'free subject' which, while heavily socially constructed, is nevertheless demonstrably a subject of action, belief and normative judgement and reflection:

> I am also aware that 'I' am not an autonomous subject, but navigate my social field through a set of structural formations and a network of heterogeneous discourses, which are not of my own creation. Yet, still, I think to myself, who is it who is cognizant of this? (Wight, C. 1999:131)

Goff and Dunn make a similar point about social construction (see below), and the same question arises in relation to state action, or that of any other actor in global politics:

who or what is it that acts?* There are several possible answers. One, as we have seen, is that only individuals act. This is based on the Enlightenment idea of free will, and is most prominently at work in Emirbayer and Mische's projective element of agency, 'the imaginative generation by actors of possible future trajectories of action' (1998:971). It is also present, however, in the practical-evaluative element, 'the capacity of actors to make practical and normative judgements among alternative possible trajectories of action' (1998:971).

Note that normative judgements are referential. Morality is intentional. Moral decision making is dependent upon some source of legitimacy, which must be identified and affirmed. This means that legitimacy is related to responsibility, self-consciousness and ontology through the question of agency.

Wight's second type of agency, agency$_2$, 'refers to the way in which agency$_1$ becomes an agent *of* something and this something refers to the socio-cultural system' (Wight, C. 1999:133). Individuals act, but they do so, in this context, as officers of the state or, more generally, as members of collectives that they conceive of either as objects or subjects. Another way to put it is that individuals act *on behalf of,* or *in the interests of* the state, as conceived by the individual. But of course, they operate on behalf of much more than just states. They draw their moral compass, and indeed their identities, from many more sources than the state. They occupy simultaneously myriad 'temporal-relational contexts,' (Emirbayer & Mische 1998:969) among them family, religion, state, tribe, nation. The ontological question in global politics is concerned with these contexts, because, if there is more than one of them, they should be definable, and their interactions may be discernible.

Agency$_3$ enables agency$_2$, and can be thought of as a capacity, such as that of an office in an organisation, which grants powers to agents$_2$. (Wight, C. 1999:133). In Searlean terms, an office can be seen as a status, which enables status-functions in the incumbent. Emirbayer and Mische's third element of agency is also directly related to the maintenance of institutions. The iterational element refers to the routine and

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* And, more controversially, can this actor be the subject of beliefs, or attitudes, as Gilbert claims?

habitual patterns of thought and practice 'giving stability and order to social universes and helping to sustain identities, interactions and institutions over time' (1998:971). Agency$_3$ and the iterational element are related in the sense that they both pertain to organisational or institutional aspects of agency which blur the boundaries of its definition, especially that between agency and structure.

Emirbayer and Mische insert agency into their schema by suggesting the 'selective reactivation by actors of past patterns of thought and action' (Emirbayer & Mische 1998:971). In other words, most of what happens is through habit and routine, but actors may decide which habits and routines, or subroutines, are activated. If the reactivation is selective, there must be some trace of projective and evaluative agency involved, but what if it is not? Similarly with agency$_3$. If it is merely the capacity provided by an institutional or organisational or temporal-relational context, it does not seem to concern 'events of which an individual is the perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, at any phase in a given sequence of conduct, have acted differently' which is Anthony Giddens' definition (quoted in Wight, C. 2006:142). Wight gets around this problem by distinguishing between agency and action.

If some entity intends to do something, and behaves in a manner designed to achieve that goal, then it is exercising agency. It should be clear by now that intent is not the same thing as intentionality, although it is an intentional state since it does have an object, in this case an end-state or imagined outcome. We can only say the entity is acting, on the other hand, if it has not only ascribed some meaning to that behaviour, but has reflectively and creatively developed and decided upon it among a range of options (Wight, C. 2006:262). However, this line is a tricky one to draw, and it is difficult to imagine a thing that might exercise agency without acting; that is, without creatively deciding. Habit, or instinctive behaviour, might be necessary for the survival of an intentional subject, but may at the same time be unconscious, or meaningless, to that subject. Or a subject might ascribe meanings and functions to such behaviour which are affectively significant, but unrelated to the behaviour's actual evolutionary effect, if any, as in the case of behaviour inspired by myths.

It seems clear that social entities, as opposed to biological individuals, say, are abstractions at least to some extent. The social aspect of an individual is an integral part of that individual. The interested self is an abstraction, identified in social interaction and carried by a corporal, biological individual which cannot survive without it. We may ascribe interests to this biological flesh, but it is we social abstractions who do so. It follows that, since individuals are abstractions, and individuals also possess interests, abstractions may possess interests, at the very least in terms of evolutionary functionality or survival. This is not to say that *all* abstractions possess interests, only that it is possible for at least some to do so. There is no reason why this should not include socially constructed abstractions of institutional structure. If we make a clear distinction between action and behaviour, we gain a clearer picture of the possible mechanisms at work. Socially constructed, self-conscious *subjects*, possessing self-hood, act. Institutional structures *behave,* but nevertheless possess evolutionary interests, by which actors may feel motivated to act.

Another issue that is often related to the agent-structure debate is that of the argument between voluntarism and determinism (Emirbayer & Mische 1998:1003). Structuralists are often accused of the latter, while they themselves warn of the 'voluntarist pitfall' (Arts 2000:514). Again this question relates closely to the definition and location of the subject of action. If institutional structures possess a capacity to act, then it would seem to follow that they are capable of influencing the course of events, at least at "lower levels" than themselves. This is not the only way they might influence, or even dictate the behaviour of other entities, however. Perhaps they do not need to act, because agents act for them. Agents take it upon themselves to act in the interests of institutional structures, by affirming them.

This describes the development of a kind of proxy-agency which, Jackson argues, causes the institutional structure to become an actor (see below). A related question is that of reification, which was addressed in Chapter Two. We saw then how the calling of a house a house is constitutive, in the sense that the speech act makes it so. Jackson argues similarly regarding international actors. Deeper than this, institutional structures also constitute, or at the very least select, actors. And if they select them, then, through the process of Searle's two-step causality, they also determine, over time,

the shape and motivations of actors. It is hard to distinguish this from action on the part of the bounded context of institutional structure. In this schema, the context or structure becomes an actor, but does not thereby cease being a context or structure.

Structure as actor and/or client

Now we may bring some of these themes together by considering the relationship between a group, collectivity or plural subject, and institutional or organisational structure (Franke & Roos 2005). Emirbayer and Mische describe the 'interpenetration' of structure and agents. Similarly, in advocating a conception of agents as 'embedded yet distinct from those structures that enable and constrain', Wight expresses his puzzlement at the attempt to integrate agent and structure, since the real surprise is 'how they could ever be treated in isolation' (Wight, C. 1999:110).

Franke and Roos suggest rejection of the term actor as applied to states, or other institutions, proposing instead 'structure of collective act*ing*' (2005:1 original emphasis), as mentioned in Chapter One. The state provides the means and the opportunity for certain individuals to act on its behalf, if they so desire and, crucially, if they meet the requirements of the state. This makes it seem like an objective structure but, as we have seen, it is frequently conceived as a subjective actor.

It is possible to say with certainty that a group of individuals is acting on behalf of some conception, or ideational construct, such as a state, even if we agree with Wight that 'social contexts, in and of themselves, do not act' (Wight, C. 2006:99). Jackson describes 'what Hobbes called "personation", the social process by which someone is empowered to speak on behalf of (or 'in the name of') an entity, *thereby making that entity an actor'* and argues this process should be the focus for International Relations theorists exploring the nature of actors (Jackson 2004:286-287 original emphasis). Jackson believes that the state is a process, rather than a fixed entity or essence. We can suggest that many members of the group conceive of this ideal, processual client entity as a subject, "we".

It is not possible to say, one way or the other, whether this ideational construct – "we" – is actually a conscious entity possessed of imagination and normative sense. As discussed, because this is a matter of object specification it is essentially a political decision. Gilbert makes a pretty comprehensive case, but it is here that the main bone of contention in the debate lies. It is certainly not possible to say with confidence whether such an entity has 'a consciousness about the finiteness of life,' (Franke & Roos 2005:4) especially as its life may extend well beyond that of any of its constituent members, or conversely, may be merely fleeting.

A group of individuals is not a structure, in the sense that it is used in this context. It may, however, occupy the spaces in a structure, that may be formal, informal, organisational or institutional. The classic illustration of this point is that of the officer of the state – an individual member of a group of people occupying spaces in an organisation – who adopts the formulation "I am not doing this, the state is doing it": the only-following-orders defence. Here we see the intimate relationship between responsibility and action. If an officer executes a sanction under orders, who is responsible? There are several possible responses.

One, the officer is acting, and is fully responsible for whether or not she decides to follow orders or protest. She imposes the sanction, which she may or may not agree with, because she actively supports and/or accepts the legitimacy of the process and/or source that generated the order. Or everyone around her does and she feels constrained to follow, in fear of incurring sanctions, up to death. But if this is the case, it would seem that her ability to act, as opposed to her mere agency, is diminished, because of the constraint. In this case her responsibility is also diminished, although she retains responsibility for her acquiescence, which is an action, since it is chosen in preference to resistance.

Two, the state is acting, and is responsible, since the officer carries the state in his head, and even though his physical body imposes the sanction, it is directed by an intentionality which is collective, and of a different nature from that individual's own intentionality.

Three, the officer acts, and is responsible, but is acting on behalf of an objective institutional structure of values, laws and norms. This structure, while contained in the officer's head in one sense, has not spontaneously grown there, but has been implanted, so to speak, by socialisation and by conscious choice in various mixes. It is very similar to the objective institutional structure carried in the heads of many other officers of the same state, and directs not only people but machinery, architecture and goods as well, through the actions of people. The officer is connected to this state by a range of different ties which are either formal – oaths of fidelity, a pay cheque, conscription – or informal and affective – honour, loyalty, sentimentality, fear or habit.

"State" in this illustration, may be applied to many other social and political entities. It may even apply to organisations which are not currently established, such as the caliphate, and to the movement for its re-establishment. Thus we see that the structure, while not acting, has provided the temporal-relational context in which the actor, the individual, has developed his or her normative and conceptual world, including sense of self, community, and obligation. This is collective identity in its international form. It provides not only the ability but also normative and affective motivation for action. It is often conceived as a subject, whether it is one or not. In reality, of course, '[s]ubjects acting in the name of the state are pulled by numerous opposing forces and in many contradictory directions' (Doty 2000:3), but this in no way diminishes the efficacy of the argument.

The ontological solution and the next step

Jackson makes a distinction between constitution and causation (2004:282). He also refers to the process of 'personation', and this bears repeating: 'the social process by which someone is empowered to speak on behalf of, (or "in the name of") an entity, *thereby making that entity an actor*' (2004-287 original italics).

In all three interpretations above, the officer is acting in the interests of an objective representation of some entity, and it is the nature of this entity that concerns global political ontology, and is the heart of the empiricist-scientific realist divide in International Relations.

Since agency may only be determined subjectively, we must ask whether this discussion can ever be resolved. From an empiricist point of view, whether it is the officer who is subjectively acting or the state, the outcome is the same, but, since we cannot see or touch the state, it cannot be said to be "real". Hence only individuals act. Scientific realism argues that, since there are clearly observable effects of this thing, there must be a thing there to be studied, or discovered. A third perspective might suggest that we *do* actually see and touch, or at least feel, the state. Touching a part of something subsumes touching the thing itself. If someone touches my hand they may be touching only a part of me, but they are also certainly touching me. If we touch piece of territory, or a state official, or even a monument or building of state, we are touching a part of the state, and we are therefore touching the state itself.

From the case of the caliphate, we can see that there are various ways of conceptualising and actualising collective identity. Most importantly for the argument here, there is a distinction to be made between the informal '*umma* and the formal – and highly contested - caliphate. '*umma* is often translated as nation, and the *Khilafah* is what is commonly referred to as the Islamic State. The language is mappable from one to the other, demonstrating the possibility of a broader application of these ideas regarding the state.

In particular, such thinking may be applied not only to the question of ontology but specifically to the 'need to reconceptualize the basic units of analysis' in the discipline of International Relations (Bernstein et al. 2000:69). I suggest one of these basic units should be the conception of collective identity which binds together social groups, organisations and institutions up to and including civilisations, in the Huntingtonian sense, or epistemic communities.

As Martin Wight is tempted to say, 'the Just War is the norm within the states-system, the Holy War the norm between states-systems' (Wight, M. 1977:34). Thus the states-system itself, as a cultural entity, may be seen as possessing the means and the motive of its own defence and expansion, even before taking the step of describing it as a subject or as a collective actor. This is certainly evident in the long history of contact

between Christendom and Islam, most often represented by the caliphate. Here we have the ontological sidestep, in which the propositions: that only members of a group may act; and, that the group itself acts, come together in the question of motivation and interest.

Conclusion

Chapter Three has suggested the need for an examination of the relationship between informal or emergent conceptions of collective identity and their evolutionary interest in organisational establishment. This ontological solution has been proposed as a useful way to approach some major issues in International Relations, including the agent-structure and levels-of-analysis questions. In teasing out some different views of agency, the chapter has begun to explore the idea that both agency and structure may be more usefully thought of as features of an as-yet-undefined generic global-political entity.

This work should assist in the further specification of actors which has been called for, by highlighting the basic ontological nature of generic strategic goals. The next chapter will explore how individuals and other putative, unit-level actors are motivated. As a priority, units must maintain and affirm social structures. By acting out the roles and exercising the capacities that structure encourages and requires, agents are enabled to act. It could be that, by pursuing goals in the interests of structural elements, units enable structures to act as well.

CHAPTER FOUR – 'THE MIRRORS OF PRINCES'*: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY, MOTIVATION AND ONTOLOGY

> *Lawrence: Friends, we've been foolish. Auda [abu Tayi, and his tribe, the Howeitat] won't come to Aqaba… for money... for Feisal... nor to drive away the Turks.*
> *He will come* (pause) *because it is his pleasure.*
>
> 'Lawrence of Arabia' Dir. David Lean 1962

Introduction

The proposition to be examined in this chapter is in two parts. One is that geopolitical actors seek identification, formal establishment and recognition of their institutions to affirm the indefinable group-sense that binds them. In doing so they seek to provide an object for the unit-level capacity for attachment, forming an intentional relationship. The other part is that these goals drive the ontological mechanisms in International Relations. Secondary goals encompass the defence, expansion, mercantile advancement or global dominance of those institutional structures. The theoretical approach derives from the work of Emile Durkheim, Christian Reus-Smit, John Ruggie, John Searle, Colin Wight, Margaret Gilbert and William Bloom (principally Bloom 1993; Durkheim 1952; Gilbert 1989; Reus-Smit 1999; Ruggie 1998; Searle 1995; Wight, C. 2006).

Identity has been an object of inquiry in International Relations, among many other fields, for some time. Constructivists put it at the centre of much of their theorising, as do some critical theorists. And even the most structurally-minded of neorealists would not exclude questions of culture and subjective feelings of affiliation from the broader social realm, however much they bracket collective identity for the purposes of abstract theorising. There is, however, only the beginnings of an examination of the concept of collective identity as a possible ontological solution to the agent-structure problem. This research agenda also has the potential to provide a generic answer to the question, "what are we fighting (for)?", which has implications for the theory and practice of

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* '… they agreed with what could be learned from the mirrors of princes: the common people are like a flock whose shepherd is the ruler. Or even worse: they are like wolves, as said Bishr b. al-Mu'tamir, wolves who are always in pursuit of their prey and profit'. (Ess 2001:160)

global politics. Furthermore, the question of collective identity is closely related to the levels-of analysis problem. In sum, the identification of a motivational first principle lying in the ontology of institutional structure may provide assistance with addressing a range of important theoretical questions, as well as facilitating strategic analysis.

Regarding the suggestion of identity as constructed, Goff and Dunn point out that it provokes 'the question, "by whom?" (or by what?)' (2004:6). In this they neatly encapsulate the relationship between identity and social or international ontology. They also illustrate the proposition that identity may be another facet or aspect of some collective entity. This would account for its propensity to change according to interest.

While Gilbert is making a sociological argument, she does also point out that 'a careful understanding of our vernacular ontology is essential to a satisfactory discussion of governmental legitimacy and "political obligation"' (Gilbert 1989:415). Reus-Smit poses a challenge for theory to account for the legitimacy of international institutions and law in light of actors' sense of political obligation (Reus-Smit 2002). Since I argue for collective identity as the ultimate source of legitimacy, and since, as I have said, such a vernacular ontology is embedded in practitioners' statements of purpose, clearly this careful understanding is essential to my argument, too.

Gilbert finds it 'tempting to argue that the *concept of a plural subject* is part of the genius of nature'. She goes on to say, 'plural subjects *themselves* are [nature's] crowning glory' (Gilbert 1989:414 italics added). Thus she makes a distinction between the concept and the thing itself. Here it must clearly be understood that the conception of collective identity contained in each individual head need not be identical, indeed cannot be identical, either with that contained in other heads, or with the thing-as-a-whole. This point necessitates a discussion of the difference between collective and individual identity, with which this chapter begins, examining conceptions of identity as both object and subject.

The chapter then explores the widely-acknowledged relationship between collective identity and conflict, revolving around the question, 'What are we fighting (for)?"

Among others (Goff & Dunn 2004:237), Abizadeh asks, 'Does collective identity presuppose an Other?' (2005), and there is the proposition that 'some or all discourses of ethnicity create a disposition to violence' (Fearon & Latin 2000:846). This point may be applied more broadly, to markers of identity other than ethnicity. A related question involves the circumstances under which a 'behavioural relationship of "Othering"' (Rumelili 2004:29) can develop. Some answers lead to the dialectical problem of ever-higher levels. As strategic accommodations are constructed, they form a new entity at the higher level; where can this process end? Can a better understanding of geopolitical ontology lead to a better understanding of the nature and causes of political conflict?

Next, the chapter examines the connection between affect, or emotion associated with action, interests and collective identity. Michael Ignatieff, in *Blood and Belonging*, reminds us that nationalists are, first and foremost, sentimentalists (Ignatieff 1993:6), but this is only one example of the deep foundations of identity to be found in the emotional markers of political and moral affirmation, including epic poetry, music, heraldry, regalia, rhetoric, historical narratives, architecture, dress, religion and ritual.

Finally, the relationship of legitimacy to collective identity and to evolutionary global politics is elucidated. If the group unit relies on some idea of legitimacy for constitution, and if the heart of legitimacy lies in contestation, as D'Agostino argues (2005:29), then those sources of legitimacy which are also efficacious objects and arenas of contestation, such as the caliphate, or, say, a national parliament, agora, diet, royal family or soviet, will tend to be the more successful in terms of evolutionary functionalism. Implications for grand strategy concern measuring the extent and intensity of acceptance of, and attachment to, institutional objects, and thus of a certain conception of the group unit.

An ontology of collective identity must distinguish it from individual identity; must distinguish subjective conceptions of collective identity from objective ideational constructions such as organisations; and, must distinguish the conceptual from the corporeal and material artefacts of these entities. All this comes together in the question

of motivation. The source of both legitimacy and attachment/identity must also provide a motivation for contestation. If it is to be included in the political, it must be important.

The first thing to do is narrow the field to one or two demonstrable propositions. One is that all politics, but particularly inter-polity politics, is based on an affective desire or need of individuals to be connected to a larger human entity which itself must be identified, legitimated and affirmed by some normative system. Put simply, this means that, at base, all (foreign) policy is ultimately designed to make "us" feel good about ourselves. The ontological question is about the nature of "us". The motivational question regards the meaning of "feel good" in this context. As we have seen, the feeling may be complex, but it is essentially about what Mitzen calls ontological security (2006), or security of connection.

The idea of identity: objectification, attachment and emotion

Before discussing collective identity, some explication is needed of identity itself. The question has been under discussion in the academy for quite some time; long enough, at least, for certain orthodoxies to develop, as Goff and Dunn point out. They identify several statements regarding identity which are generally assumed in a more or less automatic way in much of the literature, often appearing as qualifying warnings in work on the subject, without being closely examined:

> identities are constructed and multiple. Identities do not correspond to bounded and immutable categories. Rather, they are contested, informed by human perception, and constantly evolving in response to changing circumstances. Identities are relational, often if not always defined against an other. (Goff & Dunn 2004:3)

The word and the concept are used so promiscuously they lack clear meaning. Fearon lists fourteen definitions or explanations he has found despite the fact that, 'overwhelmingly, academic users of the word … feel no need to explain its meaning to readers' (1999:4). Goff and Dunn also complain of the lack of definition of the concept in the literature (2004:1).

There is a reason for this difficulty with definition. Fearon usefully distinguishes between identity as a social category and as used in the vernacular. In everyday language identity is a source of what he calls 'dignity or self-respect' (Fearon 1999:11). We can clarify this by referring to the distinction made earlier between attachment and affirmation. The relationship between the two gives a clue to the implications for motivation and for legitimacy. Elevation of the social category he belongs to naturally reinforces the self-respect, dignity, esteem, self-righteousness, nationalism – all the way up to hubris – of the individual himself. But none of this is possible without him being/feeling attached to that category. Thus the addition of positive affirmation to attachment leads to self esteem, while negative affirmation is not incompatible with attachment.

In this interpretation attachment is the exercise of a capacity, a non-, or pre-intentional phenomenon, part of Searle's Background, that set of capacities that permits intentional states to exist. The generic capacity for attachment is primitive, causing anxiety and other problems, including psychosis, if the capacity is not filled. The process of identity-formation consists of finding an intentional object for this subjective capacity. Preferably, this object will identify the self in a positive light, but this is not necessary.

This emphasis on a non-intentional capacity for attachment accounts for both the difficulty in pinning down a definition of identity, and the fact that a definition is often superfluous in everyday language since "everyone knows" – actually, feels – what it means (Fearon 1999:2). Such an approach can also account for the affective basis of collective identity, and therefore of legitimacy, and, not to stretch it too thin, for the intuitive basis of conceptions of rationality and interest.

Goff and Dunn focus on four 'given' features of identity. These are: alterity, referring to the complex ways in which self and other intermingle; fluidity, as against earlier notions of the fixed nature of racial or national identities; constructedness, which idea has become something of an unexamined orthodoxy; and, multiplicity, or the diversity of sources or memberships of identity which are present in any given individual (2004:4-8). However, even as we accept them, all of the above features require qualification.

Fluidity, for example, may be a condition of identity in principle, but even the idea of constant flux does not presuppose a constant *rate* of flux. Here the evolutionary idea of punctuated equilibrium comes into play (Cerny 2000:440; Hodgson 1996:400). Not all conceptions of identity, collective or individual, are changing all the time. Many are more or less settled for extended periods. Others require and receive constant reinforcement in the face of challenges. Contestation of conceptions of collective identity may cement opposing visions in place (Goff & Dunn 2004:242), an idea consistent with Keegan's point about warfare as a cultural phenomenon (Keegan 1993:xvi). In this view, conflict and war are sociologically functional because they reinforce and reaffirm their protagonists.

Rumelili (2004) has some interesting insights into alterity, although he does not favour the term. He offers alternative formulations of otherness or of threat, arguing in the case of the European Union that internal disunity, or the savagery and chaos of the recent past, may be seen as sufficiently other, in the sense of dangerous, unstable and ill-defined, to intertwine the warp and weft of post-war European identity. In this view the coal and steel agreement which preceded the union was an attempt at "othering" Europe's recent past of calamitous conflict. Devetak comments that Gothic narratives regarding monstrous others are ubiquitous, and are often used to justify policy (Devetak 2004). These narratives generate alterity from within the particular set of self-understandings.

Multiplicity, similarly, needs further refinement as an idea. The carriers of identity typically are involved in more than one. A human being may well be closely identified with a dozen conceptions of collective identity, including family, nation, regiment, football team, firm, religion, accent-, dialect- or language-group and many more. This gives the theorist the option of focussing on the 'identity-bearing entity' – the bottom-up approach – and finding that all such carriers, including collectives, bear more than one identity (Goff & Dunn 2004:240). The other option – the top-down approach – is to focus on conceptions of identity themselves and the ways in which they are not only contested, but constituted, reinforced, regenerated, and affirmed; in short, the ways in which they are constructed. This latter is my main concern, although it is also necessary to pay some attention to the functions identity serves for individuals.

The caliphate is a good illustration of some aspects of constructedness, and ways in which it may be qualified. There is no sense in which modern caliphists have invented the caliphate for their own purposes. The caliphate predates the modern movement. Therefore, it cannot be said that modern caliphists have invented the caliphate. Reinterpretation and even reinvention are not quite the same as inventing something from nothing. Caliphists have adopted, adapted, and actively decided to support their version of the caliphate, among a range of options, and they have certainly contested not only its nature but the criteria upon which the office might be filled. But something called the caliphate, whatever it is, has been around since the seventh century.

It seems perfectly reasonable to suggest that the entity, "the caliphate" has adapted, and transformed, and multiplied and reaffirmed *itself* during this time. This is just another way of saying the same thing. Both propositions, that caliphists have done it or that the caliphate has, are simply assigning a function and a direction of cause to naturally occurring, concurrent phenomena, and hence they may be seen as equally valid. I suggest, however, that this inversion is a useful way to describe the process, accounting as it does for some gaps in our understanding of the nature of the interacting units in global politics.

The caliphate survives as an ideal in the minds of a large section of the world community, including many who do not support re-establishment. This is not just a symbol, but, in many iterations, a richly textured, highly developed social, political and international system. Essentially contested it may be, but the contestation is part of the mechanism that produces and affirms the essence. However constructed it may be, in terms of evolutionary functionality it is highly successful.

The question of emotion and its relationship to legitimacy begins with the relationship of the individual to the collective. This relationship is mutually constitutive in some ways, but cannot be wholly so, since institutions and collectives pre-date any given individual (Cerny 2000:437). This means that individuals always form their identities, at least to some extent, within pre-existing social-institutional contexts. Consequently, as Bloom puts it,

> [w]ith the evolution of the human creature who is per se a social creature, and the concomitant lengthy and vulnerable infancy and childhood, a personality acceptable to the immediate social group is a simple necessity for social survival – social survival being synonymous with physical survival (1993:33).

George Herbert Mead makes an interesting distinction between the subjective I and the objective me, calling the 'me' a 'structure', which

> does not determine the expression of the 'I'… social control is the expression of the 'me' over against the expression of the 'I'. It sets the limits, it gives the determination that enables the 'I', so to speak, to use the me as the means of carrying out what is the undertaking that all are interested in (quoted in Bloom 1993:33).

It is possible to see this as an indication of the type of relationship that pertains between all social subjects ('I/we') and social objects ('me/us').

The conclusion of importance to the agent-structure debate in International Relations is that structure and agency, like individuals, ideas and artefacts, are present at every level of international organisation. Could this be because they are attributes of the units that make up the system? When Mead talks about the 'undertaking that all are interested in', he appears to imply some goal that "I", "me" and "we" are all working towards. A good candidate for a generic characterisation of such a goal would be affirmation of whatever it is that they all belong to.

Conceptions of collective identity

We come now to the distinction between individual and collective identity. Here I follow Bloom, who follows Freud and Mead, in distinguishing between 'the unique biological individual and the social individual' (1993:32). Except when stated otherwise, I am referring to the latter. Individual social human beings may be conceived of in at least three main ways: as free agents and independent actors; as nodal points in a larger network of social being; and, as containers of competing desires and beliefs, or even modes or centres of desire and belief, which are dominant at different times and in different configurations. These three conceptions of individuals may be understood as analogously relevant to larger social units – collective actors or institutional structures.

Is it more than an analogy? In other words, is there some generic commonality in the ontology of social entities?

Bloom (1993) has carried out useful work in this regard, showing how the beginnings of individuality, embedded as they are in experience, are dependent upon social contexts. This, however, requires the conceptualisation of the self as both subject and object. Drawing on Mead, Bloom points out the logical conundrum of the self-aware subject. The subjective self, as an experiencer and conceptualiser, may not become aware of itself in an intentional sense unless it has conceptualised itself as an object. Even though it might conceive of its "self" *as* a subject, such a conception remains an objective construct of the biological individual subject. Mead elaborates the point:

> The [social] individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly, from the particular standpoints of other individual members of the same social group, or from the generalized standpoint of the social group to which he belongs. For he enters his own experience as a self or individual, not directly or immediately, not by becoming a subject to himself, but only insofar as he first becomes an object to himself just as other individuals are objects to him or in his experience; and he becomes an object to himself only by taking the attitudes of other individuals toward himself within a social environment or context of experience and behavior in which both he and they are involved (Mead 1934:138).

It is not quite true to say that the individual does not 'experience himself' directly. Rather, it is only when an individual begins to be *self*-conscious, as opposed to merely being conscious, that these objective constructs become necessary. Self-consciousness depends on sociability. Subjectivity itself is a non-intentional state, which may be experienced, but cannot be explained or described without objectification, or defined without reference to an object.

This is certainly not to deny the existence of subjective experience. Indeed it is to elevate it to central importance, especially in the question of the relation of collective identity to emotion. The individual subject looks to the collective, and to other members of it, for definition and affirmation of its objective idea of itself-as-subject, which enables self-consciousness. If this idea is positive, and appropriate affirmation is received, it causes a subjective experience of security and attachment.

While the *constructs* of individual subject and objectified social body are intentional, the *capacity* for attachment is inchoate and non-intentional, the *experience* affective and inarticulate. This is the foundation of conceptions of interest and rationality. Like the landscape, the Background is there, whether or not it has been, or may be, described. The intentional part of this experience derives from the particular normative make-up of the collective, in the individual's objective conception. Clearly, if this conception of collective identity can also itself be affirmed and reinforced, this enhances the individual's subjective emotional state.

Subject and object are entailed in the individual human personality. The analogy with collective social entities remains. They are both conceived and contained in 'individual [biological] heads' (Ruggie 1998:20), sometimes as subjects, sometimes as objects, and both depend upon recognition. These conceptualisations provide the means and the motive for institutional action, which then constitutes an organisational agency of the conception of collective identity. The really difficult question is whether such a collective subject is a real feature of the world, or can only be theorised as an object-conceived-as-subject. To pose the question another way, does the collective have a non-intentional experience of subjectivity, in the way I can say with certainty that I do, or is it only conceived as a subject by individuals, and some theorists? The answer depends on identifying subjectivity from outside, which is more a matter of faith than evidence.

To propose a working definition, we could say that collective identity is a social structure that sometimes exhibits agency, or acts, but only ever by proxy. This definition requires immediate amendment, and in amending it, we may tease out a more accurate and precise definition, and also test the proposition as we go along.

The suggestion that conceptions of collective identity exhibit agency by proxy is open to challenge on three fronts. First, action, by definition, must be in some measure *sui generis*, so while the idea of some entity acting by proxy is reasonable, we must remember that it is also simply acting, in the sense of giving the initial impetus of motivation for proxies to act on the structure's behalf. In the case of institutional structures, however, we have seen how they affect their constituent agents from the

very beginning, by shaping their personalities, including drives and interests, if not their physical structure. Therefore, by providing such-and-such a social environment, the conception of collective identity causes agents to be formed who are, ideally, inclined to act on its behalf and in its interests.* This, therefore, in Jackson's view and mine, makes it an actor. He puts it like this: 'actors, from this perspective, are more like contested zones of ongoing debate [and 'the product of ... constitutive *practices'*] than like physical objects' (Jackson 2004:285 original italics). I argue that agency is an attribute, so an actor is simply any social unit which acts, but action might not be its most important feature or capacity. A capacity for attachment may be more decisive for survival.

The second challenge to the idea of institutional structures exhibiting agency, or acting, by proxy is that it suggests some separation between the institutional structure and its "proxy" agents. There is no such separation. This realisation removes the first problem as well. Causing is not the same as acting, so the idea that structure causes agents to be shaped in particular ways is not the same as the idea of structure acting. Structure causes agents to act, but the agents are also an inherent part of the structure; their intentionality is the medium in which conceptions of collective identity reside. Such a structure itself acting, and its constituent members acting on its behalf, are essentially the same thing. For analytical purposes, it is useful to distinguish among structure, agent and actor, but this distinction is an abstraction. All social structures are bound up with agents and all agents are similarly entwined with structure.

The third problem with the above definition lies in the difference between agency, action and behaviour. We have seen that agency requires only that some entity fix on a goal and move to achieve it, whereas action requires the entity to creatively determine a goal, among a range of conceivable alternatives, requiring conceptions of interest and function, and value judgments. Both of these are problematic when the subject is a collectivity of some kind, such as a social structure of collective identity. To suggest that collectives act is to imply that they may be capable of imagination, belief, value judgments, and so on. One way to answer this suggestion is, again, to point out that

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* If constituent agents are not so inclined, then in that case there is no social entity to be identified.

there is no separation between collectives and their constituent members, even though an individual may, and typically does, belong to more than one. Individual members of a collectivity believing, or more precisely accepting a collective belief (Wray 2001:235), and the collective believing, are indistinguishable in their essence. This remains the case despite the fact that, as we have seen, collective institutional entities may predate and outlive their constituent members.

It becomes a little more complicated, though, when we consider the possibility of a collective which "believes" or "desires" something none of its constituent members believe or desire. The formulation in an individual's mind of a concept of the collective is an integral part of the formation of the collective, but this does not make the concept identical to the thing. No member of a nation can conceive of the entire nation in all its detail, but this does not rule out the nation's existence.

An individual minister, for example, might accept and promote a cabinet position he himself does not endorse, and he is clearly making a distinction in his own mind between himself and the collective. This is an argument for the divisibility of the individual from the collective. It may be countered by suggesting that the individual and the collective are indivisible only in moments when the individual *is indeed* acting as part of a particular collective. In this view the minister is conceptually divisible from the human being, but not from the cabinet. The human being believes one thing, the minister accepts another; the cabinet acts.

However, again, I do not believe resolution of this controversial, and essentially political/ideological, debate is necessary to the current argument. I describe it here in order to make this very point: whether the collective exists in some objective measure or not, its behaviour has material consequences. This remains the case even if we decide that it is nothing but a concept. Such a concept, as an 'intrinsic feature of the world' (Searle 1995:11-12), would be a useful ontological object of study

Another way to address the question of collective action and belief is to distinguish between subjective and objective conceptions of collective identity. Institutional

structures of collective identity do not need to have imaginations, or be capable of belief, because their constituent members provide these capacities for them. But the constituent members are an integral part of the thing itself. We can conceive of such collective ideational entities as objects, subject to selection, and behaving by expanding, contracting, intensifying, weakening or disappearing. This is a more rigorous solution to the problem of the nature of collectives, avoiding the need for a political judgement regarding the existence of collective subjects. This leaves the question of collective belief open.

A more precise definition, or taxonomy, of conceptions of collective identity necessarily differentiates between them and their effects. Conceptions are conceptions, in this case finding material expression only in the concerted action of those who conceive of themselves as part of the collective. This conception causes, enables and/or encourages individuals to act in certain ways, during which action they may constitute a corporal expression or manifestation of the conception, which need not and often, especially in larger polities, will not be identical to the conception in most of the individual heads. The conception of collective identity will operate as a functional delusion, causing individuals to act in a way that manifests the conception. Or it will fail to do so, and disappear, since without such support it cannot, by definition, exist.

The state as person

For International Relations the question of whether the state possesses a "self" – whether it is a subject – has been an important focus of debate, especially since Wendt's contribution to the *Review of International Studies* special edition mentioned in the introduction, *The state as person in international theory* (2004). This was part of a discussion that had been going on for some time over whether the state could be thought of as a singular entity at all. Doty thinks not:

> The truth of the matter is that unitariness must be attributed to 'the state' in order for causality, prediction, and positive social science to work. What [Wendt's] Social Theory [of International Politics] demonstrates most forcefully, albeit unintentionally, is that 'the state', rather than being an essential entity that has desires, is itself a desire, a desire on the part of international relations scholars to secure our discipline. (Doty 2000:3)

We might say, consistent with the idea that reification works, that theorists, practitioners and people in general have successfully attributed unitariness to the state. From Searle we know that these attributions have the ability to change or create social reality.

Wendt argues that 'state persons are real in one important sense: they are "intentional" or purposive actors' (2004:291). In this passage Wendt seems to conflate the two senses of intentional, basing his argument on a philosophical physicalism 'compatible with the idea that collective intentions are real' (2004:291). This intentionality test is a somewhat restrictive criterion, seemingly limiting those who might argue for the *independent existence* of the nation or state to a defence of the *intentional capacity* of the polity, which is not the same thing.

Wendt also argued that, in general, scientific realists are opposed to Political or International Studies realists on this issue. The latter, he said, tend to fall into the individualist, singularist and reductionist camp (Wendt, Alexander 2004:289-291). Wight took a slightly different tack, arguing that scientific realism, applied to the ontology of international relations, 'allows us to … incorporate non-observable entities into our theories' (Wight, C. 2006:217). Such a non-observable entity, however, like the state, is 'real, but not empirical' (Wight, C. 2006:217). That is, in Wight's view, it is a concept, which may assist in the explanation of the effects of state behaviour, but does not constitute a measurable reality independent of those effects: 'We cannot observe it, though we can experience its power through the activities of its officials' (Wight, C. 2006:217). On the other hand, this object, according to Wight, is not merely 'linguistic, or conceptual', which we know *because* we may observe and interpret 'the concrete practices and organisations of government and the processes that constitute … the political system' (2006:217). This, as we have seen, is where sociological ontology may be usefully applied to the question of reification in International Relations theory.

Conflict and motivation

Abizadeh argues that an 'other' is not presupposed by collective identity (Abizadeh 2005), even if identity can be shown to be formed by dialogue. Since collectives contain

many individuals, he says, the necessary dialogue may take place within them, meaning it is not necessary between them. Thus,

> a collective identity can receive either the external recognition of an external other or the internal recognition of its own constituent parts, and the latter does not necessarily depend on the former (Abizadeh 2005:48).

This assertion is based on the idea that, in contrast,

> the recognition necessary to an individual's sense of self-hood must be external, because none of the constituent parts of the individual self would possess the independent agency needed for a normatively relevant act of recognition (Abizadeh 2005:48).

The problem with this formulation is that it assumes two things. One is that none of the 'constituent parts of the individual self' possess agency in sufficient quantity, or of sufficient quality (although it is not clear what 'independent' means in this context), to commit an act of recognition. The second assumption is that the constituent parts of collectives do possess such independent agency. As we have seen, the conception of collective identity may well be thought of as a "constituent part of the individual" as much as the other way around.

It is interesting that this act, according to Abizadeh, must be *normatively* relevant, which seems to indicate that relevant acts of recognition must have as their object not just an entity, but one with moral implications. These constructed social identities 'make certain practices possible but others unthinkable' (Dunn 2006 :370) not because of the practice itself, but because of who commits it and upon whom it is committed; because of who is the subject and who is the object of this intentional act. The practice of killing, to take an obvious example, is legitimate or not according to the status of killer and victim, which depends upon their social circumstances. A given individual could be a combatant, and therefore a legitimate target, one second, and a neutral non-combatant, casualty or prisoner, protected by law, the next.

Not only this, but such distinctions also carry affective weight contained in moral judgements:

> What makes the deaths of innocent people bad, then, is not their actual deaths, but the attitude and feelings of those who killed them (Rediehs, quoted in Fisk 2005:1140).

These attitudes and feelings are also often projected onto actors by observers, and this affects the observer's attitude to the death.

As far as collective recognition is concerned, it has long been axiomatic in International Relations, especially among constructivists, that state sovereignty is dependent on recognition by other states (Reus-Smit 1997:565; Wight, M. 1977:23). From the arguments of the previous chapter we can see that this really means individuals acting in their capacity as officers of the state, but still, such recognition would be impossible in the absence of the state. Moreover, as such officers recognise the sovereignty of other states, they simultaneously reinforce the system that ensures that of their own.

The logically primitive function – and purpose – of an individual is to identify itself, and the psychology of early childhood has shown that relationships formed in the early period of development are crucial to the formation of personality. Bloom explores this idea in some depth, relying on Abraham Maslow's pyramidal 'hierarchy of needs', the highest of which is 'self-actualisation'. In Mead's conception this would be self-objectification, since the unique feature of the self-conscious self is that it is its own object (Bloom 1993:31). This objectification comes about through interaction, practice and the internalisation of social roles. Attachment is fundamental to the social psychology of individuals, but also to the ontology of the "human individual" and it is achieved and maintained through affective connections with significant others and recognition by them, and by an objectified self.

Intuition, legitimation and rational interest

Kratochwil, echoing Gilbert's point about vernacular ontologies, argues for a 'non-cognitivist conception of rationality' itself, one in which what is seen as rational 'depends less on independently specified criteria than on what people *accept*, or *call* rational' (Kratochwil 1987:323 original emphasis). More specifically:

> what appears as a rational choice in a given situation is often less dependent upon the "objective" payoff structure the actors face than on the interpretation they give to the situation… [s]uch interpretations are largely governed by the actors' attitudes, which in turn are formed by general social "values". Consequently, any account which purports to explain a choice can only under very special circumstances ignore what might be termed "framing conditions" (1987:303 original emphasis).

A non-cognitivist theory of rationality, then, begins with the vernacular, and then 'tries to elucidate the criteria for calling an action "rational" under a variety of circumstances' (Kratochwil 1987:304). These criteria turn out to have much more to do with emotional and intuitive judgements and responses related to identity-attachment than they do to material interest.

This very strong argument for the relativity of rationality also has other implications. While Kratochwil criticises an instrumental rationalist position which 'misidentifies complex choices in institutional settings as goal-maximising choices under constraints' (1987:303), nevertheless attention to actors' interpretations must include their subjectively-determined goals. Once this determination of interest is made, if possible, strategy is more likely to appear rational, since its context and often subtle goals may be elucidated. Context often consists of a system of differentiation, at least in part.

If we postulate a goal of affirming and promoting a particular conception of collective identity, and system of differentiation, then many otherwise seemingly irrational actions may be reinterpreted as perfectly sensible. For example, the action of Mohammed Atta in flying an airliner into the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001, seemingly suicidally irrational in terms of individual material interest, makes perfect sense if the motivation is to protect and promote a collective conception of legitimation through the caliphate. One might object that the action was motivated by a desire to terrorise or punish the US and/or to make it change its policy. These are tactical aims; the overall strategic goal remains.

Of course, the effect of actions taken by individual or collective actors is not the same as the reason for them, and this is where emotion comes in. How does the individual come to see – or feel – the interests of the constructed collective to be more important than

his or her own survival? It is a question that has intrigued students of nationalism (Anderson 1983:7). One answer lies in the concept of transcendent preferences.

Kratochwil mentions the question of inheritance as an example of 'transcendent preferences' at work (Kratochwil 1987:320-322). In calling for a better theory regarding motivation, he indirectly points toward Searlean institutional causality when he argues that attention should be paid to transcendent preferences, 'highly generalised propensities' relating less to rational material interest than sentiment, and to 'wider societal values which create such propensities' (1987:305-6); that is, to the institutional context.

These general social values are derived from the actor's conception of collective identity, through the individuals' affective relationship with it. It is not always the case, of course, that individual actors see the particular collective goal as more important than their own. There is, for example, the freeloader, or 'free-rider problem' (Ashley 1984:246-247) or the question of dissent. Freeloaders occupy a parasitic niche in economic systems, contributing nothing, supposedly, but sustaining themselves by "playing the game" or by feeding on the leftovers. They nevertheless are attached to group units, they just may not be defined by the same system of differentiation.

Nor is it so that a given individual is always acting as a member of a particular collective. Any given individual human being will typically belong to several, and some to a multitude, of such identity-groups.

Neither point regarding the weakness or otherwise of attachment or devotion has an impact on the question of transcendent preferences. These affective preferences come into play when the individual *is indeed* acting and thinking as a member of a particular collective; the fact that he is not always doing so has no bearing on the matter. The various motivational pulls of different collectives and of individual interest are difficult to untangle in practice. However, whether members of a particular collective see themselves as members, and act in its behalf, may well have an effect on the existence of the collective unit.

Furthermore, even if an individual cares nothing for any entity larger than his own interest, nevertheless, he will have developed and been shaped by an institutional environment. Because of this, both his conception of what is in his own interest and his available means will be derived from that context. Consequently, as the freeloader selfishly bludges, or the conscientious objector registers his protest, they nevertheless insensibly support, or at least recognise, the institutional structure. For example, a pool of unemployed people may be necessary for the smooth functioning of capitalistic economies; losers may be necessary to define winners.

Reus-Smit advocates a reconception of the idea of 'institutional rationality' (Reus-Smit 2002:4) to resolve some problems over the question of political obligation in the international realm. Noting that 'narrow self-interest and fear of sanctions are insufficient on their own to sustain extensive cooperation' in the field of international law, he warns of the problem of 'interiority', which

> arises when the source of obligation is located within an aspect of a particular normative system, but where the theories in question lack the theoretical resources to account for the existence or legitimacy of the whole (Reus-Smit 2002:3).

From this we can see that the question of sources of legitimacy is fundamental to International Relations. An inference may be drawn from Gilbert's and Bloom's work that the foundations of legitimacy lie in the collective. I divide sources of legitimacy into proximate and ultimate sources, as I have explained, suggesting that the ultimate source of legitimacy always resides within actors' conceptions of collective identity (which does not stop them from acting "illegitimately" at times). This is consistent with Reus-Smit's proposed idea of a multi-faceted institutional rationality which involves…

> the negotiation and licensing of legitimate preferences and stratagems, the articulation and coding of principles of moral action and justice, and the constitution, stabilization and performance of socially-sanctioned identities (Reus-Smit 2002:4)

It follows that institutional rationality may be seen as the instigator, even while affect is the motivator, of transcendent preferences, since these preferences are taken in the interest of larger entities than individuals. A person bequeaths her fortune to her

offspring, not because it will benefit her, or her genes, but because she feels a sense of love and familial obligation to those offspring. Whatever the reason, the effect of this action is to promote and affirm the idea and existence of her family across generations. Thus institutional rationality is evident, but is unmistakably bound up with individual identity and intuitive, affective decision-making. Hence, conceptions of collective identity may account for the legitimacy of the institution as a whole, avoiding Reus-Smit's 'problem of interiority'(2002:3). [*]

Global politics and geostrategy

The most famous recent explication of these phenomena – transcendent preferences aligned with institutional rationality – at a global level comes from Samuel Huntington. He mentions Islam as one of his 'seven or eight' civilisational groupings (Huntington 1993:25).[†] Part of Huntington's hypothesis is that, in the post-Cold War world, the 'great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural' (Huntington 1993:22).

This assertion would have been unexceptional to Edward Gibbon, the great historian of east-west relations, an observation that lends weight to the idea that the end of the Cold War, so far from being the 'end of history' as Francis Fukuyama asserted (1992), was more like a resumption of it, after the interregnum of ideological conflict. But that would be to assume that the Cold War was indeed an ideological, as opposed to a cultural

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[*] Behavioural economics is useful to this argument in that it backs up its claims regarding intuition with a wealth of empirical evidence. In Daniel Kahneman's case it is also noteworthy that he does not dismiss reasoned judgement from the equation, but raises intuitive judgement to the same level of theoretical interest. Hence the theory of bounded rationality, in which the 'traditional separation between belief and preference in analysis of decision making is [seen as] psychologically unrealistic'. Could there also be a theory of bounded purpose, interest, or even teleology? Kahneman argues that 'what is natural and intuitive in a given situation is not the same for everyone: different cultural experiences favour different intuitions about the meaning of situations' (Kahneman 2003:1469). This point supports the proposition that the boundaries of this rationality coincide in important ways with those of conceptions of collective identity and political ontology.

[†] The others include: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and 'possibly African' (Huntington 1993:25).

conflict. Keegan argues that all warfare is cultural at base, which accounts for its ubiquity and its variety (Keegan 1993:xvi), and is consistent with the view that calculations of "rational material interest" are not the only, or even the most significant, factors in strategic judgements.[*]

Huntington describes the 'kin-country syndrome,'[†] a phenomenon which leads to 'civilisational rallying' in which antagonists in cross-civilisational conflicts attract support from other polities which are members of the same civilisation, thereby reinforcing the divide (Huntington 1993:35), and consolidating the bond between those who adhere to differing 'collective images of social order' (Cox 1981:136). This echoes Martin Wight's comment, quoted earlier, about holy war as the norm between state systems. The depth, strength and subtlety of feeling regarding collective identity are evident in this phenomenon, as is its relationship to interest and to ontology.

Since, Huntington argues, 'cultural characteristics', are less a matter of personal choice than those of ideology or material interest, the criteria for conflict have changed:

> In class and ideological conflicts, the key question was "Which side are you on?" and people could and did choose sides and change sides. In conflicts between civilizations, the question is "What are you?" That is a given that cannot be changed. (Huntington 1993:27)

This last claim can be heavily challenged, even leaving aside the point that an acknowledged member of a collective might not support such a conflict. The constructivist illumination of dynamic, narrative and discursive identity-construction immediately puts the lie to the idea that identities do not change. This remains the case whether the subject of the discourse is plural or individual (Fearon & Latin 2000:846). Empirical evidence includes the seventh-century rise of Islam, when many people changed who they were by subscribing to different criteria of identification. We have

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[*] Jurgen Schuster and Herbert Maier (2006) have explored reasons for European states' decisions on whether to support for the US-led Iraq invasion, inferring a mix of cultural and classical power-political motivations.

[†] He takes the term from H.D.S. Greenaway.

also seen this phenomenon in the case of the change from Ottoman Islamic to nationalist mechanisms of differentiation in the wake of abolition of the caliphate.

The more we consider the matter, it seems, the more Huntington's two questions – "Which side are you on?" and "What [or who] are you?" – are not so different from each other after all. The position becomes clearer when we consider the two different kinds of thing under discussion. The question "What are you?" may be answered in several ways apart from "an individual human being": "a container of identities" or "an agent of a greater construct", say. The question, "Which side are you on?" may be answered by a statement defining that greater construct, or the identity uppermost at the moment. The first answers are contingent, or generic, while the second group are particular and definite. Both questions may be answered in the form, "I am a member of X collective".

Affirmation is reflective: affirming the institutional context affirms the individual it defines. The domestic analogy is relevant with regard to international systems: affirmation of the system of identification, or 'mode of differentiation' affirms the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state, reinforcing those foundational values that underpin international organisation. Here, I suggest, is a large part of the motivation for some of the most important events in the twentieth century. WWII and the 1991 Gulf War are prominent examples, in both of which a prominent motivation for going to war was preservation of the system of state sovereignty and non-intervention.

Conclusion

The acceptance of the legitimacy of the nationalist means of differentiation among conceptions of collective identity paved the way for the material and strategic expansion of the Western powers into the Muslim Middle East, as will be described in Chapter Five. Auda abu Tayi's pleasure is derived from the esteem of his people, to whom he is a 'river'. Lawrence's task was to bring this tribe over to the service of the British Empire, but in order to do so he tapped into their enthusiasm in the cause of the nationalist ideal mode of differentiation.

This example, among many others, demonstrates the strategic efficacy of political legitimacy, and in particular of the power to legitimate the means of identification, or 'mode of differentiation'. Consequently, it is apparent that the capacity to define and control sources of legitimacy is a vital tool of big-picture strategy. Moreover, this prize ensures that such sources remain the arena and object of contestation, thus reinforcing their status. If the political is defined as that which is seen as important enough to be contested, then these legitimational and ontological mechanisms must be at its heart.

From these considerations we may begin to discern the outlines of a theory of subjective political actors and their relationship to objective institutional structures and organisations. We know at least that this relationship involves attachment, affect, conceptions of legitimacy, rationality and interest and structural-institutional selection mechanisms. We know that this relationship exists at all levels of the global political arena, and we can distinguish, at least conceptually, between its material and ideational manifestations.

CHAPTER FIVE – CASE STUDY: THE ISLAMIC CALIPHATE AND THE MOVEMENT FOR RE-ESTABLISHMENT

> *[T]his Congress makes an appeal to all the Muslims in the World and exhorts them not to neglect the question of the Caliphate, which is the soul and manifestation of Islam, but to work together for the establishment of the Caliphate…*

> Order of the day, Fourth Plenary Sitting
> Islamic Congress on the Caliphate Question, Cairo,
> May, 1926 (Toynbee 1927:88,90)

> *If you affirm principles which are not susceptible of application in our epoch, what will be the consequence?*

> Ath Tha'alabi Efendi
> Submission to the Third Plenary Sitting

Introduction

The Islamic caliphate's utility as a case study here arises in some degree from its indeterminacy. Questions regarding the nature of the caliphate encompass several of the most salient unresolved issues in International Relations. To what degree is it material or ideal? Is it structured? Is it acting, behaving or displaying agency? At what level of global political arrangements does it lie?

It is possible that further questions concerning the caliphate would cover matters that also relate to many other political entities, and perhaps to a generic model of a political entity. Does it have a purpose? How is it legitimised? Is it accepted or contested? Is it an object or a subject?

The most important question of all for global political ontology is whether it is possible that a generic unit of political interaction may be extrapolated from the caliphate. Can something like the caliphate be defined at all, or specified in any detail? In other words, is it an entity in its own right, or merely a conceptual attractor of some kind, or both?

Here I will use the caliphate to illustrate some of the points made so far. This is not original research on the caliphate or the movement for re-establishment. Rather, the intention is to focus a theoretical perspective on to a relatively well-known subject.

There is one question regarding the caliphate we can answer unequivocally: is it functional (in evolutionary terms)? The caliphate has been a conception, an object of contestation and a political institution, a rally-point, a mode of differentiation and a strategic goal.

The movement for formal re-establishment of a multi-state caliphate as an alternative world order, though potentially significant, is not deep. The mention of terrorism seems called for here, but the fact is that terrorism is a technique, not an ideology. Certainly, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, the leaders of al-Qa'ida, support this vision of world order, but only the tiniest, most extreme fraction of those who support shari'a law and khilafah supports the use of terrorism.

The influence of the caliphate, however, is felt in many aspects of international and domestic affairs in some of the most volatile and important strategic theatres on earth. The Islamic state, including the functioning of shari'a law and the system of religious and political administration, is based around the concept of *khilafah*, meaning viceregency, deputation or successorship. "In Islam, the state surrenders its sovereignty to God and accepts the position of Khilafah or Caliphate (viceregency)" (Said 1979:68). In this formulation, any Islamic state is a caliphate. This is not the same thing as a formal office of state, but, as Abdul Aziz Said shows, any movement for the establishment of an Islamic state must take the concept of the caliphate into account.

Indeed even Shi'ite Islamic polities*, such as Iran, have based their political structure on one derived from the caliphate, requiring a supreme religious leader overseeing and legitimising the day-to-day activities of government. These two positions were amalgamated, as we shall see, in the Ottoman Caliphate. The Shi'ite Iranian Imams do

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* The most prominent functioning Sunni Islamic state, applying Shari'a law, at present is the US's foremost Muslim ally in the Middle East, Sa'udi Arabia.

not call this office "caliph" but it occupies the space provided in the formal structure of the *Khilafah*. This office of "supreme leader", then, looks very much like an accommodation of the office of caliph within the *Shi'ite* version of the *Khilafah* state. The existence of this office shows that the caliphate, even as it is rejected, continues to wield considerable clout.

Thus the caliphate has well-defined supporters and opponents, who tell stories about it and accommodate its imperatives, according to their requirements. Over more than a millennium, it has supported, and been supported by, a thickly institutionalised social, political, legal and religious apparatus. In terms of its ability to attract intense support by providing a touchstone of identity, self-realisation and political legitimacy, the caliphate has unquestionably been highly successful and continues to be so to this day.

It is all these things, but whether it is one thing, an essence, and the question of what it is, if anything, remains problematic.

Proposition revisited

Before embarking on an analysis of the caliphate, let us briefly revisit the three-part ontology proposed in the introduction. The first part was that collective entities are endogenous to individuals as far as their conceptual or ideational aspects are concerned – even though they may be corporeal entities as well – and that they are based in emotion, before rationality or interest. We may qualify this, since we have seen that such collective conceptions may be endogenous to individuals in some senses, but are also exogenous, or prior, to any particular individual.

The second part of the proposition was that subjectivity and objectivity are among the attributes of collective entities and that, if this is the case, other attributes might be discerned. Sure enough, we have proposed a number of such attributes: structure, agency, moral purpose, a source of legitimacy, an object and means of contestation and a conception of collective identity.

The third part of the proposed line of ontological enquiry was that evolutionary forces operate on these collective entities, meaning that some are "fitter" than others, in terms of their ability to produce and influence individuals to act on behalf of the larger entity. Again, we may now qualify this hypothesis since, as we have seen, there are no grounds for separating the collective entity from the individual in any but a conceptual manner, or in time, as in the first part above. While the collective may be exogenous or prior to a particular individual, its composite parts remain integral to it at any given moment.

An analysis of the Islamic caliphate can assist us with this ontological enquiry by providing an object of study. The propositions just outlined provide a series of questions. Is the caliphate only a concept in the minds of individuals, or does it have some other type of existence, prior and exogenous to the individuals who constitute its current manifestation? Is it a subject, an object or both? Can it be said that the caliphate, or more precisely the species "caliphate", has been subject to evolutionary forces? Such forces should be discernible in their effects; particular traits or features of the caliphate should be explainable in this way.

The points made here relate to the caliphate and the re-establishment movement. I will refer to these throughout to make specific points, and deal with the office and the movement in detail in the last chapter. This case has been chosen because the movement's driving intellectual forces have a clear and formal agenda, including the establishment of a formal institution, and this facilitates analysis. Evolution is more fluid, and less easily quantifiable. Even existing formal institutions might be seen as functional illusions, never fully established, but nevertheless evolving in response to circumstances. Also, although most individuals belong to at least several institutional entities, many belong to only a few, or are weakly attached. This is even more true of informal institutions, like those of cultural identity. Thus, what will be said in relation to the caliphate might equally be applied in a more fluid way, as perhaps a fugue is to a canon, to the 'Ummah as a whole, and then in a more general way to the relationship between informal, subjective conceptions of collective identity and their imperative toward institutional formalisation.

The caliphate has been many things to many people. Unsurprisingly, given the motivations of politics, it has been made to serve a multitude of purposes. Its enemies portray 'a totalitarian Islamic empire', 'a violent political utopia … ruled according to … hateful ideology' (Bush 2006:par 10-11). On the other hand some of its proponents argue that no state can ever be legitimate in the absence of a caliphate, while others contend that the office is not necessary in Islam, since Islam is completed in the lifetime of the Prophet (Haim 1965:211). Still others accept the view that Islam enjoins good government, and the rule of shari'a law, not any particular type of government. Discontinuity, then, is easy to find, but surely all these versions must have something in common.

Mundane or divine?

It is well known that the concept of the caliphate itself is contested, and perhaps the most important point of difference as far as geopolitics is concerned is the question of whether the caliphate, as a system of government, is enjoined by Islam, or whether Islam may be accommodated within a system of national states, or any other political system which can deliver good government.

After the Muslims took Mecca from the Quraysh, they faced no more than tribal resistance. There was no need to give unto Caesar his due, because of the retreat of the Persian and Byzantine Empires. The Prophet was able to unite in himself, eventually, the spiritual leadership and the mundane administration of his newly-formed polity. This unification of the temporal and spiritual leadership of the '*ummah* under Mohammed provided a bone of contention that lasts to this day. Mohammed was a prophet and a prince*, but this did not necessarily mean that the prince must be a prophet, nor that the spiritual leader must concern himself with matters of state.

Either Islam is independent of the caliphate, and need not concern itself with government, or the caliphate is the earthly expression of the will of Allah. One of these

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* He was a prince only in the Machiavellian sense. Royalty and monarchy are disapproved in Islam.

conceptions of Islam permits it peaceably to co-exist with other visions of world order. The other envisages a unified political and religious system which encompasses every aspect of life and without which no polity may be called legitimate. This last is incompatible with the formal, secular world order of states as it currently stands. Clearly, if this national-state-based formal system, or its members, are seen as unable or unwilling to provide good government to the Muslim world, it will make such a system harder to defend.

To assess the power of the caliphate, the range of its influence and its strategic importance one need only survey the numerous organisations it supports, and which in turn support it. Before doing so, however, this chapter will examine some of the iterations of the caliphate from its origins to its abolition, with reference to the theoretical concerns already established, beginning with the creation of the Muslim community in the Arabian peninsula and the first caliphate. I then touch on the 'Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates. The diversification of the concept of the caliphate after the Middle Abbasid represents a shift from development to evolution. In other words the process changed from one of a single caliphate developing over time to one in which multiple caliphates competed in the global political environment. Eventually the caliphate was merged with the Ottoman Sultanate, marking a return to unification. Finally, I describe the circumstances of its abolition under Mustafa Kemal Attaturk in 1924.

The second part of the chapter surveys the re-establishment movement in such a way as to highlight the behaviour of the caliphate in its most purely idealised form. This illustrates some of the important issues raised in the theoretical sections of the thesis.

Part One: History of the caliphate to abolition

Mutation and innovation: Creation of the Muslim community and the first caliphate

There is a multitude of conceptions of the caliphate, and a wide range of more or less subtle differences of opinion regarding its nature. Various caliphates have been established and abolished over more than a millennium. The many versions branch from the stem of the Prophet Mohammed's establishment of a novel community in the

Arabian Peninsula in the seventh century CE[*]. In this section I will relate the story of the inception of the Muslim community, the '*umma*, and of the caliphate. This is necessary in the interests of historical background and also because the behaviour of putative entities such as the caliphate may be discerned best over large time-frames.

The section will connect the historical narrative to some theoretical issues which have already been raised. To begin with, there is the question of the weakness of the analogy with evolutionary biology. In Chapters Two and Three I explained that the application of evolutionary theory to International Relations need not be an analogy. As Modelski and Poznanksi put it, '[w]hat in biology is mutation, appears in economics and politics as innovation. What in biology is natural selection becomes in the social sciences a variety of selection processes' (1996:319). These are not analogies, but represent particular instances of similar mechanisms. The theory describes the mechanism. The case of the beginnings of the Islamic community is a good illustration.

Much, if not all, of this history was written after, often long after, the events it described. The Quran itself was put together from various sources under 'Uthman, the third caliph, twenty or thirty years after the Prophet's death (Peters 1994:257). The Sunna and Hadith (sayings, practices and manners of the Prophet) were memorised and recited for a century or more before being written down under the Abbasids. The accuracy of this history, then, is doubtful and much is contested, as we would expect.

No movement of people physically arrived in or left the Hejaz area of the Arabian Peninsula surrounding Mecca and Medina, in the seventh century CE, apart from the movement of Christian, Jewish and pagan merchants who traded their wares in and through Mecca. What Mohammed established there was a new conception of

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[*] The Islamic dating system begins from the 622CE *Hijra* (see below), but follows a lunar cycle, in which the year is eleven days shorter than in the western calendar (Kennedy 2004:xiv). Conversion tables are therefore necessary, and to avoid them I have used western dating, unless indicated. This calendar, however, is further evidence of the comprehensive nature of at least the Sunni Islamic prescription. The 'Sunna (trodden path)' offer 'guidance in all aspects of life: how to treat friends as well as enemies, what to eat and drink, how to make love and war' (Esposito 1998:11)

community, a new method of dividing the world. This is not to say that tribal allegiances fell away; they are still important today. The important thing as far as the case study's usefulness to the theoretical argument here is that a novel institutional presence arose in the conceptual niche provided by the ebb of Persian and Roman influence from the peninsula. As far as the still-Roman Byzantine Empire was concerned, as Edward Gibbon had it:

> While the state was exhausted by the Persian War, and the Church was distracted by the Nestorian and Monophysite sects, Mohammed, with the sword in one hand and the Koran in the other, erected his throne on the ruins of Christianity and of Rome. (Gibbon:VI 205)

This dramatic statement requires qualification, however.

In the desert Syrian borderlands, where imperial columns could not easily go, the influence of the two great empires was felt in the accommodations they made with the Arab tribes. A prolonged and savage war between the two poles lasted for more than twenty years, and a combination of plague, heresy and natural disasters served to weaken the hegemonic grip of Byzantium in Syria and Egypt (Kennedy 2004: Chapter One). The Persians took advantage of this weakness to invade Byzantium, initially with a good deal of success, but the eventual outcome of this war was the conquest of Persia by the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius, culminating in the deposition of the Persian King (Shah) Khusrau (Chosroes) II in 628.

The *coup de grâce* was administered to the ancient Persian polity by the Arabs in 636 with the fall of Ctesiphon and the end of the Sassanid line. Thus it was the rubble not only of Christian, Roman Byzantium in the peninsula, but also of the whole of Zoroastrian, Sassanid Persia, all the way to Transoxiana, which formed the road-metal of the Islamic state. After that, the caliphate replaced Persia as the opposing pole to Christian Europe; a living, densely institutionalised entity. At some times, arguably, it was the most advanced civilisation in the world.

Here we have a sociopolitical seed placed in a suitable context: a lively, unstable political arena in which the overarching strategic settlement was crumbling. This is

what is meant by a niche. Later sections will elaborate selection mechanisms, and make a distinction between development and evolution.

The Prophet

The story can begin in 610 AD, with the revelation of Mohammed and the persuasion of his senior wife, Khadijah binte Khuwaylid, the first to believe in Mohammed as God's messenger, and therefore the first convert to Islam. 'Ali was the first and Abu Bakr ibn Abi Quhafa the third male converts (Peters 1994:152). Both were to become caliphs. Abu Bakr's daughter, A'isha, also married Mohammed, and 'Ali was married to one of Mohammed's daughters, Fatima. All of Mohammed's wives have the title *Umm al Mu'minin* or mother of the faithful. The circle of those who agreed with Mohammed that he was the Prophet of Allah, the one God, expanded until, by the time of the *Hijra*, or Emigration (see below), twelve years later (Goldschmidt 1991:32-33) there were around seventy (Kennedy 2004:33) who became the Emigrants, or *Muhajirun,* (Glubb 1969).

This set of events was the initial creative act. It is possible to debate whether it was the result of free will, or even revelation, *sui generis* or a derivative development of earlier ideas. In other words, it is possible to argue over whether it was mutation or innovation. As we have seen when arguing that the application of evolutionary theory to International Relations is not an analogy, either mutation or innovation is consistent with evolutionary theory, so it is not necessary to debate the issue here.

Mohammed was a member of the family of *Banu* ("sons of") *Hashem*, a clan of the *Quraysh* tribe. The Quraysh were rulers of the city of Mecca, and the Hashem had been given the guardianship of the ancient pagan *Ca'aba* temple, which was later to form the core of the Great Mosque, and to provide the *qibla*, or direction Muslims face at prayer. The *Ka'aba* (Ca'aba), was the sanctuary of the pagan god, *al-ilah* – "the god" – who was regarded by the Quraysh and other Arabs in the Hejaz as the chief god of the pagan pantheon. The god and the temple, along with the *Hajj* pilgrimage associated with them, were some of the important parts of the pagan traditions taken over by Islam. The beginnings of Orthodox idolatry in the peninsula were not (Peters 1994:105-107,116).

From this comes the doctrine that the caliph should be a member of the Quraysh, preferably a Hashemite, which was the basis for the claim of Sharif Husayn Ibn Ali al-Hashemi, in the aftermath of the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in1924 (Teitelbaum 2000:412-424). The tradition remains of strategic importance to this day. Hussein and his son, Feisal – leader of the Arab Revolt and later King of Iraq – as well as the current rulers of Jordan and Syria, are all members of the same family.

The Quraysh were only one of a number of competing polities in the area. Previously these tribes had made various accommodations with the poles of the larger, imperial, system, and these had helped to stabilise the politics of the region, at least to the extent that conflicts were contained within the tribal system. Election of tribal leaders had been a more or less informal affair in much of the Arab world, with loose committees – *shura* – of elders and prominent members of the tribe electing one of themselves based on attributes of prowess, authority and general merit, according to the particular tribe's culture. Appointment was formalised by performance of the *Bay'ah* or declaration of allegiance. Primogeniture, the presumption of hereditary succession through the eldest male, was an innovation of the early 'Ummayyad Caliphs, more than half a century later. Thus Mohammed's claim to leadership and authority based on divine revelation was revolutionary.

It was also spectacularly successful, to the extent that 'Mohammed's authority within the *'ummah* was vastly greater than a traditional tribal leader's among his followers' (Kennedy 2004:47). He established a new mode of differentiation, on a new legitimational basis, with new ontological boundaries. Kennedy argues that this was part of its appeal, in that it allowed those on the second or third tier of power in the old system to move up to the first in the new (2004:58). These Arabs formed a ruling class in the several provinces of the Islamic territory but it was only over time that Islamisation, as opposed to political domination by a Muslim class, crept over the pagan, Zoroastrian and Orthodox and Monophysite Christian populations (Hawting 2000a:4).

This could happen because the bipolar system was vulnerable, due to the retreat of the two empires and the distraction of the Christian proselytisers. Mohammed can be seen

in this light as a 'norm entrepreneur' (Adamson 2005:548). Whether his revelation was genuine or not, the success of his mission depended on the structural context of opportunity, among other things including, not least, his own persuasive and military powers and judgment. Whether there had been a Prophet or not, the '*ummah* could not have arisen, or continued to rise, if the opportunity – niche – had not been there.

The establishment of the '*ummah*, or Muslim community, was not simply a challenge to the authority of the Quraysh at Mecca, but to the whole system of tribal identification and legitimation. This system no longer had the support of, nor was it any longer integrated with, the larger bipolar imperial system. In 622 came the Emigration (*Hijra* or *Hegira*), when Mohammed and his followers fled persecution by the Quraysh at Mecca and established themselves at Medina (Kennedy 2004:33). They thereby also abandoned the tribal system which had hitherto protected them, necessitating the Constitution of Medina, which formally established the '*ummah* as a separate political unit, on a new legitimational basis. Their flight was necessitated by the hostility of the established tribal power structures. Those who took part became known as the *Muhajirun,* or Emigrants (Kennedy 2004:33), the core of those who were later known as the Prophet's Companions. The *Hijra* is also the source of the first division in the '*ummah*, between the *Muhajirun* and the Medinan converts, the *Ansar*, or Helpers of Mohammed, later closely identified with Imam Ali, the fourth caliph (Kennedy 2004:75).

Conflict between these two groups formed one axis of internal contestation for the '*ummah* during the period of the *Khalifa al-Rashidun*, or Rightly-Guided Caliphs, the term used for the first four caliphs after Mohammed. Another axis of contestation was tribal, culminating in seizure of the caliphate by Mu'awiyah, a member of the Banu 'Ummaya, the other great clan of the Quraysh, from others whose claim lay in membership of the Banu Hashem, the prophet's clan. A third axis, the most interesting, stretched between these two systems or modes of differentiation. Thus the second caliph, 'Umar ibn al-Khattb, sought to promote the '*qurra*, the early adopters of Islam, over the *ansar* in a hierarchy of salary and tax treatment and appointments based on piety and time of conversion, while the third, 'Uthman, favoured the Quraysh and sought to alter the hierarchy to reflect the old tribal relationships.

Tribe might conflict with tribe, or Muslim class with class, but the third axis, running between these two modes of differentiation, is the most important here because it is a good example of competition between 'interpenetrated contexts' (Wight, C. 2006:111), and also because it gives some clues as to the nature of the contexts involved. Again the relationship between ontological and normative boundaries may be seen. The new binding mechanism of Islam filled capacities for attachment in a new way. A new *proximate* source of legitimacy, Allah, coincided with a new *ultimate* source of legitimacy in the '*ummah*, a conception of collective identity. By drawing definition and affirmation from a new source, he not only posed a challenge to established authority, but arguably created a new entity. If this is the case then the shape of this entity must be of close interest to students of International Relations theory. It should be possible to more tightly and systematically describe and define this entity.

Mohammed was not the only one in the area who claimed divine guidance. Another self-proclaimed prophet, Musilayman of the *Banu Hanifa*, following Mohammed's example, sought to come to terms with him on a division of power. Mohammed would not accept any dilution of his own authority nor that of his single deity. I have not space here to go into the details of Musilayman's defeat by the Islamic forces at the battle of Aqraba but it makes for an interesting exercise in counterfactual history if we imagine a different outcome (Kennedy 2004:53-5). This is also relevant to the question of evolution, since we see both the nature of the belief system and the circumstances of its inception, as well as a healthy dose of happenstance, having an effect on its survival. This is not to be confused with destiny, or teleology.

Early Muslim prowess in battle is legendary, and may overshadow the fact that much of the early success of Mohammed's project was decided by conversion, rather than martial zeal. Even the conquest of Mecca was achieved more through diplomacy and manoeuvre than violence (Esposito 1998:10). The leader at Mecca was a member of the Ummaya family, Abu Sufyan.* His conversion was the decisive factor, notwithstanding the tactical and strategic situation that led to it. These events illustrate the process of legitimation and differentiation being utilised as a strategic tool.

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* His son was the first Umayyad caliph, Mu'awiyah.

The conquest of Mecca also shows that institutional change in an individual head may have profound immediate and long-term effects. It is a striking phenomenon in the history of the Arabian Peninsula and Mesopotamia, among many other places, that through all the pagan, Orthodox, Zoroastrian and Islamic phases and the various empires and indigenous states that have moved in and out over the past three millennia, still the tribes remain, and remain as politically relevant today as they were in the beginning. I believe this phenomenon supports an evolutionary theory, but detailed argument is beyond the scope of this work. Suffice it to say that in the mind of Abu Sufyan, the tribal system of legitimation and differentiation was overlaid, or interlaced, with a new ontology.

From the taking of Mecca the strategic expansion of Islam seemed unstoppable, until 'by the end of his lifetime the Prophet had secured a measure of acknowledgement from most of the Arabian Peninsula', although much of this was less than enthusiastic (Kennedy 2004:45). Not everyone converted, of course. The Jews of Medina, for example, offered resistance, which was met with the expulsion of several Jewish tribes and the extermination of the male part of those who remained. Women and children were sold into slavery, in the normal way. This scenario, depressingly familiar in Europe, presents a contrast with the later, relatively cordial, relations between Muslims and Jews before the twentieth century. It is also consistent with Rae's proposition that these kinds of purges are part of the process of state-building, or polity-formation (Rae 2002:3). Toynbee advanced a similar argument (see below).

Khalifah al-Rashidun

It was not Mohammed but his successors, or *khalifa*, who carried the Islamic conquests to their apogee, although he was himself an experienced warrior (Keegan 1993:193). The Arabic word *khalifa* is variously translated as "successor" or "deputy". Some hold that all Muslims are *khalifa*, since all are deputies of Allah. In this case, "agent" would seem to be a plausible translation.

Kennedy articulates some of the questions arising from the death of Mohammed:

> … who should lead the ummah and what status and power should such a leader have? Was he to be the first among equals, like a tribal chief, … or was he to have a more real and effective power, even a measure of divine sanction…? Was he to be chosen by the community or by some process of hereditary succession within the Prophet's clan? If the question of leadership was in doubt, so too was [that of] who were to form the elite in the new community (Kennedy 2004:50)

The institution of the successorship was an attempt to solve these problems by deputing Mohammed's authority (and that of Allah) to one of the new elite, the *Muhajirun*.

Mohammed gave ambiguous signals as to who should succeed him, but during his final illness, allowed or appointed his father-in-law, Abu Bakr, to perform the Friday *Khutba* sermon, during which routine matters of administration were also addressed. This was taken by some as a sign of his anointment as successor (Muir 1963 (1898):4), but the outcome was attended by contestation from the very beginning over both the criteria and method for selection of its incumbent.

The case was settled in favour of the aged Abu Bakr by the support of 'Umar, who soon after, upon Abu Bakr's demise, became the second caliph. The solution may have been 'cobbled together', as Richard Hooker puts it (1996 online), or it may have been the result of time-honoured, though informal, tribal practices, as Arnold suggests (1965:20), referring to the traditional *shura*, or committee of appointment of tribal leaders. These are simply different perspectives on the same thing. In any case, the ancient practice of the *shura* adapted itself to the new value-set.

Soon after Abu Bakr, the first of the four *Khalifah al-Rashidun*, or Rightly-Guided Caliphs, had established himself in the position, the followers of the Prophet's son-in-law, 'Ali, protested. Ongoing disputation, in the absence of Mohammed's presence as a unifying force, sowed the seeds of the later establishment of an alternative identity-group. The party or sect of 'Ali, – *shia't 'Ali* – restricts the leadership of the Muslim community to an Imam, who must be a direct descendent of Mohammed through his daughter, Fatima, Imam 'Ali's wife. They eschew the Sunnite practice of informal election. (Afsaruddin 1999:2; Esposito 1998:43; Haim 1965:213,233).

It is unclear whether this dispute arose contemporaneously or was ascribed to the protagonists later. It is certainly one of the major schisms in Islam. Thus the first and most important split between Muslims happened over the issue of the caliphate. This is telling in light of the observation that contestation is crucial to the ontological mechanisms involved.

'Umayyad, Abbasid and other iterations: from development to evolution

Over a period of several centuries, Mohammed and his successors developed and spread – by the sword, by the Islamic scholarship called *ijtihad*[*], and by conversion – a complete social, political and legal system, based on the words, practices and teachings of the Prophet, later transcribed and compiled in the form of the *Hadith* and *Sunna.* This section describes the shift from the caliphate as a unique, unified system to the caliphate as a doctrine or 'theory' (Kennedy 2004:202), which could be used to establish a novel polity of a particular nature. The caliphate changed, in other words, from being a single entity, adapting itself to circumstances over time, and became a species. From progressing in a linear fashion through the Rashidun, 'Umayyad and Abbasid periods, it now changed, constituting a category of polity, from which specific iterations could be subjected to selection mechanisms. Here we see again that the application of evolution to global political theory is not an analogy, but a transdisciplinary utilisation of a theoretical perspective developed in one field in order to illuminate another, related, field.

The necessity of external expansion, to bind the tribes in Islam and to provide a substitute in an effort to quell the incessant inter-tribal raiding that had been part of economic life (Kennedy 2004:48),[†] led to the conquests of Egypt, Syria and Iraq; of Cordoba, eventually Constantinople and even, almost, Vienna (Keegan 1993:48,336).

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[*] *Ijtihad* is often translated as interpretation, but it is something more than that. It is interpretation of Islamic law (shari'a) with specific reference to the Qur'an and Hadith. Another source of guidance in life and exegesis is the *Sunna*, the traditional "practices" of the Prophet.. There are six major *Hadith*: *Sahih Bukhari, Sahih Muslim, Sunan Abi Da'ud, Sunan al-Tirmidhi, Sunana al-Sughra* and *Sunana Ibn Maja.*

[†] This inter-tribal raiding was made socially unacceptable by the proscription against Muslim-to-Muslim violence, one of many immediate effects of the new ontology/morality on lifestyle.

During the time of the *Khalifa al-Rashidun* the caliphate began to take shape as an embryonic state system, in Martin Wight's sense, with the caliph as the arbiter and source of the legitimate power of otherwise largely independent governors (*amirs*) in Iraq, Syria and Egypt under the Caliphs 'Umar and 'Uthman (Kennedy 2004:69). There were periods when Egypt was essentially sovereign, and Mu'awiyah, the governor of Syria, as we shall see, was clearly someone the caliph would cross at his peril. Nevertheless, all these formally acknowledged the ultimate authority of the caliph. Here we have a suzerain system, in Wight's terms, in which a central figure provides legitimacy and authority to leaders of subordinate states, which are nevertheless sovereign, nominally, *de jure*, and/or *de facto* (Wight, M. 1977:23).

The caliphate of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs – Abu Bakr, Omar, Othman and 'Ali – ended with the assassination of 'Ali and the taking of the caliphate by Mu'awiyah, the first of the 'Umayyad Caliphs. 'Uthman had also been assassinated. Although there had been 'civil' war (Esposito 1998:43) between them, Mu'awiyah does not seem to have been implicated in 'Ali's death.

The *Banu Umayya* were the rival clan to the *Banu Hashem* in the Quraysh tribe, and Mu'awiyah was the son of that Abu Sufyan whose conversion delivered Mecca to Mohammed. By the time he assumed the caliphate, Mu'awiyah had been governor of Syria for more than twenty years, and therefore had a stable base from which to 'assert not only his personal power but also the credibility of the caliphate and the unity of the Muslim community' (Kennedy 2004:82). The Ummayad caliphal dynasty was established at Damascus in Syria in 661 (Hourani 1991:490). It was overthrown nearly a century later by the Abbasids, who moved the capital once again, to Baghdad.

It was during the 'Umayyad Caliphate that the beginnings of the major branches of Islam - Sunni, shia and a third, *khwarijim*, or "outsiders" – began to distinguish themselves. Khwaraijism, for example, 'was elaborated and spread to eastern Arabia and North Africa' (Hawting 2000b:4). These three sub-groups of Islam, and a multitude of minor sects, orders, heresies and schools, defined themselves by their attitude to the caliphate and the Islamic state in general. The 'Umayyad Caliphate is called illegitimate by Shia

and Khwarijim, and by the beginnings of the Sunni *Ulema*, or scholarly class, because of their differing ideas of the legitimate grounds and methods for appointment.

The caliph was either "Successor of the Prophet" or "Deputy of God" (Crone & Hinds 2003:Chapter 2). At the beginning of the Ummayad Caliphate the title was changed from *Khalifah Rasul Allah*, Successor of the Prophet of God to *Khalifat Allah*, Deputy of God (Buzpinar 1996:60; Hawting 2000b:13), and there is plenty of debate about the meaning of the various titles (Crone & Hinds 2003:Chapter Two). This debate concerns not just the translation but the exact meaning of *Khalifa*: deputy or successor; of God or Mohammed? Crone and Hinds suggest 'it meant "deputy of God" from the start,' (2003:4-5) meaning, in some views, that all Muslims are Khalifah; but this, unsurprisingly, is contested.

Another innovation of the 'Umayya was the addition of the title *Amir al-Muminin*, or Commander of the Faithful, with its military overtones. Hawting makes the point that,

> [t]he spread of Islam … has to be viewed on two levels, that of its territorial expansion and that of its acceptance by the conquered non-Arab peoples from a variety of religious backgrounds (Hawting 2000b:6-7).

Islam makes a distinction between the *dar al-Islam* – house or domain of submission or peace – and the *dar al-Harb* – house of war, chaos or contestation (*jahiliyya*) – and since the *dar al-Islam* is defined, not by the religion of its inhabitants but by its laws and system of government, we can see that there is potential tension between these two arms, since the imperatives of domination are not the same as those of proselytisation. This tension between the political *Dar al-Islam* and the religious *'ummah* was exacerbated by dispute over the legitimacy of the caliphate in general and the 'Umayyad Caliphate in particular. Non-Arab, non-Muslim minorities were tolerated under the Umayyad *Dar al-Islam* (Hawting 2000b:8-9), but only insofar as they recognised their submission – *islam* – to Allah. Islam, like power, is seen by the conquering Arab elite as their possession, as of right, and they proceeded to concentrate power in the hands of Arab Muslims, restricting conversion and utilising selective taxation and appointments to salaried positions (Hawting 2000a:4-5).

By the time of the Umayyad dynasty, there was considerable tension between the Arabs and others as to who was permitted to adopt Islam. The openness of the early years under Mohammed extended only to Arabs. With the conquests, the problem of non-Arab claimants – *mawali* – came up. The dissenters who held to the doctrine of openness propagated the religion, while the *Dar al-Islam* was realised in exclusive terms by the Muslim or tribal elite – Qurayshi, 'Umayyad, Sufyanid. Islam as a religion expanded in this way in spite of, not because of, the 'Umayya. Another possible way of looking at it would be that the two fronts are different agents of the same entity.

The caliphate was, by the early part of the Abbasid period (750-1258), a fully-fledged, if diverse, state system, complete with legitimation source, principle of sovereignty, sense of moral purpose, established institutional practices and procedures, ceremonial, regalia, architecture and well-defined territory. Throughout the *Dar al-Islam* there was a common language, alongside all the local dialects, a common bureaucratic culture, and, crucially, a common poetic sensibility (Hourani 1991:49-50). During this period all Muslim governments, some entirely independent in every other way, acknowledged and derived their legitimacy and power from the 'theory of the caliphate' (Kennedy 2004:202).

There were several – early, middle and late – incarnations of the Abbasid Caliphate. After the Middle Abbasid there were periods of chaos, there were rival Sunni Caliphates - the 'Umayyad was re-established in Cordoba for over a century – there were alternative Sh'ite Imamates, as well as a Fatimid Caliphate claiming descent from the Prophet's daughter, Fatima, 'Ali's wife (see appendix). The middle Abbasid Caliphate, which declined more due to financial mismanagement than conquest, according to Kennedy, 'disintegrated into a bewildering variety of successor states' (Kennedy 2004:198; see also Hourani 1991:5).

After the sack of Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258 and destruction of the third and last Abbasid Caliphate, the term became a title to denote sovereignty, and 'the fundamental qualification for office [became] neither individual merit nor Qurayshite lineage nor (least of all) "spiritual power", but the command of sufficient force' (Toynbee 1927:32).

It retained its function as suzerain legitimator in some iterations, however. There was even a caliphate at Sokoto, in West Africa:

> The Sokoto Caliphate was a loose confederation of emirates that recognized the leadership of Usman Dan Fodio as "Commander of the Faithful." By mid-19th century there were about 30 emirates linked to Sokoto, including the large market state of Kano. The caliphate stretched from present-day Burkina Faso in the west, to Cameroun in the east. Emirates tended to their own political affairs, although succession disputes were often referred to Sokoto (Paden 2007:par. 5).

In sum, the period from establishment up until the end of the Middle Abbasid Caliphate is an example of several iterations developing one after the other in linear fashion. After this, it became an evolving species, with several examples existing simultaneously, and often in competition with one another. Each of these, however, had certain characteristics, traits that both defined it as a caliphate and enabled it to fulfil its reproductive requirements. Sometimes, of course, these requirements were not fulfilled; the Sokoto Caliphate is no longer with us.

Merging with the Ottoman Sultanate: adaptability and continuity

In finally re-unifying the office in a single person, the Ottomans were returning to the situation which had prevailed during the time of the first Caliphate. In conceptually separating its temporal from its spiritual dimension, however, they were adapting the office to their own strategic and political needs (Toynbee 1927:31-34).

The Ottomans used a doctrine of function to claim the post for themselves, exclusively, and to re-establish dynastic primogeniture, once they had gained control over much of the near and middle east. There is a view that there is no need for a caliphate, that the caliphate is a temporal office, and that any regime which provides good government, enforces shari'a law and protects the holy places is a legitimate government. Together with the view that the principle of hereditary Qurayshi entitlement had expired with the last of the *Khalifah al-Rashidun,* and the Ottoman possession of the holy places in the Hejaz, this doctrine allowed the Ottomans, by the time of their nineteenth-century constitution, to claim that:

the Exalted Ottoman Sultanate possesses the Great Islamic Caliphate, which is held by the eldest member of the Ottoman Dynasty in accordance with ancient practice. . . .His Imperial Majesty, The Padisah [Sultan], by virtue of the Caliphate, is the protector of the religion of Islam and the Ruler and Emperor of all Ottoman subjects (from the Ottoman Constitution, promulgated 23 December 1876 (quoted in Buzpinar 1996:60)).

The Ottomans welded the spiritual aspect of the caliphal authority to the sovereignty of the office of the Sultan, thereby laying the foundation for the myth of the caliph as a spiritual, rather than temporal ruler. This was a strategic settlement, and the reverse of the original position. The caliphate had begun as a settlement of the problem of whether Mohammed's temporal leadership was a part of his spiritual vocation, or whether they were separate. It thus begins as representing the temporal. The Ottomans, however, already had a temporal ruler, the sultan. What they were in need of was empirical legitimacy. By re-interpreting the caliphate as a spiritual office, they were able to join its authority to that of the sultan.

By the nineteenth century, then, the idea of the caliphate had changed markedly from its first iterations. So much so, that it might be argued that discontinuity is more evident than commonality. The idea of a spiritual caliphate was also in the wind in the early twentieth century (Teitelbaum 1998:105), and remains as one possible path to re-establishment. An exclusively spiritual caliphate, analogous to the papacy, is one possible outcome of the struggle which would present less of a challenge to the established United Nations-based system.

If this were to eventuate, the caliphate would have again adapted, or been adapted, to the circumstances of the times. Nevertheless the caliphate is still the Islamic caliphate. While it may be radically different in many ways, it also has a clear streak of continuity. Its behaviour in adapting itself to suit the circumstances of its milieu merely demonstrates its flexibility in meeting its survival and reproductive requirements. One tricky problem is to identify at what point it adapts itself so much that it ceases to be what it was. This is tricky because even as it changes, develops and evolves, some features, aspects or traits remain. Anyone seeking to classify such things would have to decide upon lines between one species and the next. It is still a proximate source of legitimacy, a touchstone of identity, a guide to right living (shari'a), and an object of

contestation; in short, a multi-faceted conceptual representation of a collective entity. There are clues as to some facets of a generic political unit. This is a demonstration of how evolutionary theory may be directly applied to International Relations, without being an analogy from biology.

In the later nineteenth century the caliphate had also became a matter of great interest and importance among the Western powers, especially Britain. They were aware that their 40 million Muslim subjects in India, and elsewhere, 'had gradually come to accept the [Ottoman] Sultan-Caliph as their religious head' (Buzpinar 1996:68), and that the opinion of this population might have a great effect on British political and strategic circumstances. Certainly,

> Indian Muslims' concern for the Ottoman Empire had been pronounced. Those retired civil servants of the British government in India viewed this development as a possible threat to British interests in India (Buzpinar 1996:68).

It was a threat to British interests in India if Muslims in that country began to subscribe to the caliphate as their political as well as spiritual head, because they would then be subscribing to an ontology that put the caliphate on a par with the western system of states, of which the British Empire was a part. The idea of the British authorising, legitimising or controlling a caliphate would be anathema in this view.

There was some support in Whitehall in the early part of the twentieth century for a caliphate based on the Sharif of Mecca, or at least, the British were keen that the Arabs should think so. In seeking help from the Arabs against the Turks, Lord Kitchener suggested that '[i]t may be that an Arab of true race will assume the Khalifate at Mecca or Medina' (quoted in Teitelbaum 1998:106). So while the British held out the promise of nationhood to the Arab Nationalists, they simultaneously offered the prospect of a Hashemite, Arab caliphate.

There is a certain irony in this, since what the British were offering was essentially a caliphate under the aegis, and reliant on the support, of the British Empire, whereas

many caliphists of today are happy to allow the nation-state its place, but only under the overarching legitimational umbrella of the caliphate.

Abolition

The spread of the nationalist framework in the former Ottoman lands was a slow process which reached its climax with the Turkish nationalist take-over of the instruments of government in Constantinople and the abolition of the Caliphate by the Law of 3rd March, 1924. In the latter part of the nineteenth century the pressure of the nationalist ideal was building. This was one of the reasons for western interest in the question, since the British were worried about the effect on their own Indian Muslim subjects if the caliphate were abolished, as we have seen. Another reason was that British and other strategists knew that the road to military and political control over the Middle East could be paved with the nationalist ideal.

The process of reconceptualisation, over several decades, was accompanied by extensive bloodshed, as Toynbee pointed out, notably the Armenian massacre of 1915. He and Heather Rae have both postulated that genocidal bloodshed is inevitable and inherent in the process of state-, and particularly nation-state-formation (Rae 2002:3), and the post-Great War carve-up of the Middle East into nation states was no exception. Toynbee pulled no punches:

> The overthrow of indigenous institutions was accompanied by the wholesale elimination of minorities from the population of the Islamic World; and the two phenomena were logically inseparable. Those institutions had grown up to meet the requirements of a society in which nationalities, organised on a non-territorial basis and interlocked in adjoining quarters of the same city and in alternate villages of the same countryside, corresponded in certain ways to the interdependent occupational groups in some single Western country rather than to the geographically segregated nations of the Western World. On the other hand, this geographical segregation of nations into solid homogeneous blocks was the environment which had produced the Western institution of the 'National State' - an order of society in which every state tended to become identified with some particular nation and every nation claimed a divine right to be established in a separate state. When the Western conception of nationality penetrated into the Islamic world, Islamic society was theoretically confronted with two alternatives. It might either refuse to try on a shoe which had been shaped for other feet, or it might mutilate itself for the sake of wearing Cinderella's slipper. In practice, however, it was impossible for the weaker society to remain impervious to the stronger

society's prestige and refuse to follow its fashions; and therefore the fate which brought Islam into contact with the West doomed Islamic society to turn and rend itself …,

"… the elimination of minorities, by massacre, eviction, flight or expatriation under treaty, was carried to completion during the years 1920-5" (Toynbee 1927:18-19)

The nationalist Mustafa Kemal Attaturk ("Father of the Turks") said of the caliphate during a five-day speech in 1927: 'it could only have been a laughing-stock in the eyes of the really civilised and cultured people of the world' (quoted in Haim 1965:219). Identifying nationalism with civilisation, culture, and progress seems to be accepting a Western view of the Muslim east as inferior, and needing to emulate or live up to standards of civilisation set by the West. A similar phenomenon occurred in the nineteenth century in Japan, with the Meiji Restoration. As Rumelili points out in his explication of the conditions conducive of a destructive 'behavioural relationship of 'othering' between self and other' (Rumelili 2004:29) the reaction of the group identified as "other" is crucial. He uses the case of European attitudes to Turkey joining the European Union, an interesting parallel. It is in resistance to Kemal's, and others', self-characterisation of inferiority or apprenticeship that some of the roots of the movement for re-establishment of the caliphate lie.

During the Great War the Western allies sought to move against the Ottoman Turks in any way they could. After the disaster in the Dardanelles in 1915, the focus shifted to Egypt and then the Levant. To secure the Allied advance's right flank in the Arabian Peninsula, the British supported the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire, assisting the Bedouin to strangle a large Ottoman force in Medina by harassing the Hejaz Railway. The Revolt was a secular Arab Nationalist movement, led by the Hashemite King Hussein and his son, Feisal, later King of Iraq. An Arab government in Damascus was later replaced by the British Mandate.

The practicalities of the nationalist revolution after World War I often took the form of local national movements resisting imperial domination on nationalist grounds, being defeated, and then being granted national statehood by the imperial powers (Toynbee 1927:9-11). In this way it might look as though the western powers were victims of the accidental empire syndrome described by Fuller (Fuller 1970:21). Also several of the

main and most effective actors on behalf of the nationalist ideal were not western imperialists but originally subjects of the Ottoman Calpih. Toynbee mentioned several examples (Kemal, Feisal and the Arab Nationalists), including that of the Wahhabi House of Saud in the Hejaz. He also points out that many of these settlements were due to policy competition between Western powers, and to the reluctance of Western powers to shoulder the costs of administration in the newly-conquered territories. The militants thought it was their own prowess, rather than Western policy-development, that led to their success, and were encouraged. The comparison with the Mujahideen success against the USSR in Afghanistan presents itself.

The Ottoman Sultanate was abolished on 1 November 1922 (Arnold 1965:179), at which time official policy was '… absorption of the Caliphate into the nation' (Haim 1965:210). This was facilitated by the Ottomans' distinction between the temporal and spiritual sides of the office, so that the nationalists were able to claim temporal political power without the more controversial step of abolishing the caliphate itself. This position, however, was untenable, and the Turkish Great National Assembly formally abolished the Ottoman Caliphate with the Law of 3rd March, 1924. Walter Littlefield commented in the New York Times:

> Here is the youngest and yet one of the oldest nations on earth deliberately annihilating the most powerful agent in its history. The reasons for such action must have been convincing indeed. Considering their source they invite the assumption that the Caliphate as administered by successive sultans of Turkey was, in truth, a myth (Littlefield 1924).

The Great National Assembly's authority to abolish the caliphate, and thus the act itself, was not recognised by many in the wider Islamic community. It is telling in this light that Littlefield refers to the caliphate as an 'agent' of the Turkish nation. The nationalist position, that the caliphate had been 'absorbed' into the nation, was untenable because many Muslims thought of the caliphate not as an agent of the Turkish nation but as an agent of the 'ummah.

Also, while this particular, Ottoman, Caliphate may have been abolished, this did not prevent others from claiming the title, as the Hashemite Sharif Husayn of the Hejaz unsuccessfully tried to do (Teitelbaum 2000). The claim of the Egyptian King Fuad was

explicitly opposed to the Egyptian Nationalists and supported by the '*ulema* of the university at al-Azhar. The King of Afghanistan was also a pretender, a point which has implications for the struggle there today, while the Iranian Shi'ite clerisy also wanted a say (Aboul-Enein 2006).

The House of Sa'ud, of the Najd area, near the Gulf of Arabia, and the Hashemite Sharif Hussein of Mecca went to war over control of the Hejaz, including the holy cities, Mecca and Medina, after the withdrawal of the Ottoman writ. In the ensuing chaos the Sa'ud saw an opportunity for expansion, but also recognised that they could not claim the caliphate for themselves, as the office, at least according to some doctrine, must go to a member of the Quraysh, preferably a Hashemi. Sharif Hussein claimed the title, and sought, with some hope of success, assistance from the Turkish nationalists or the Ottomans in the form of them bestowing the title upon him. His claim was ultimately settled against him by the arms of the puritan Wahhabi House of Sa'ud, led by Abdul Aziz al-Sa'ud. The Sa'ud then established control over the holy cities.

Abdul Aziz al Sa'ud was also aware that the Caliphate question was due to be discussed at a congress in Cairo the following year. He therefore left the question off the agenda of his own conference, called at Mecca in 1924, to formalise the result of the fighting. This conference justified the Sa'udi takeover of the holy places on the following grounds: the fact that the Sa'ud were now in strategic control of Mecca and Medina demonstrated their ability to provide good government, and the inability of the Quraysh, represented by Sharif Hussein, to do the same. This was a way for Sunnis to reconcile themselves to non-caliphal political authority. Here we have an example of the prevailing paradigm of political organisation, the modern nation-state, being adapted and used to stabilise and consolidate strategic gains. Thus the Hejaz war, among others, was a battle not just between the Sa'ud and the Hashem, but between the principle of national identity and the Islamic caliphate as legitimators of statehood and power. The House of Sa'ud is still known as the custodian of the holy cities.

The authority of the Congress on the Caliphate Question, held in Cairo in May, 1925, like that of the Great National Assembly, was disputed. Very few of the delegates were there

in any official capacity, and much of the Islamic world was entirely unrepresented. They were not recognised as agents of any legitimate institution and did not carry much in the way of plenipotentiary authority. Consequently they were unable to act, and the question was essentially left to hang. The congress did not find the office to be abolished, merely unoccupied and difficult to realise, as was the system of government, *Khilafah*, of which it is a vital part. At this stage, then, it had seemingly come to the end of its usefulness as a strategic instrument. Its lack of sufficient support demonstrated its failure to adapt to the new circumstances, and it became extinct, at least ostensibly.

The Third Plenary Sitting of the Congress gave advice that the caliphate was 'incapable of realization at the present time' (Toynbee 1927:89). The reason cited was the inability of the caliphate to fulfill the 'conditions laid down for it in the scriptures… the most important of the said conditions being ability to defend the possessions of the Faith in all Islamic countries and to put into execution the precepts of the Islamic Law' (Toynbee 1925:89). Undoubtedly, the strategic results of twenty years of turmoil in the area were the main obstacle to a Hashemite or Egyptian claim. The dominance of the western powers, mainly France and Britain, meant that the strategic outline agreed to by them *was* susceptible of realisation, with some modifications. So, even if the conference had managed to come to some settlement on the caliphate question, it is unlikely that the western powers would have allowed such a thing, unless of course, a friendly caliph could be installed at Mecca or Medina, and thus astride the British trade routes to India. But by this time the Sa'udis were in control of that area, and they had come to terms with the west on the nationalist principle.

Thus the caliphate was not susceptible of realisation because the paradigm of the nation-state had consolidated itself in the relevant territories. It might be argued that the paradigm was merely used by the strategic players to legitimate their gains, but this is not incompatible with the following view. The nationalist principle was already in the air. The Arab revolt was a nationalist movement, which was able to exploit the weakness of the Ottomans in the peninsula precisely because the office of Sultan-Caliph had been undermined by nationalists in Turkey itself. It was Turkish nationalists who finally abolished the *ancien regime* in Istanbul, thus creating the conceptual space to be contested by conflicts such as the Hejaz War. It was the principle which led the way, the

armies came later. It might be thought that it was the paradigms themselves which were competing here. This could be a clue as to the nature of both the caliphate and a generic unit in global politics.

The statement of the Caliphate Congress specifically cites the '[n]ationalistic' fragmentation of the 'Islamic countries and peoples' as a bar to re-establishment. The significance of this event to the current global strategic position cannot be overemphasised. 'Is it necessary [the document continues] to have an Imam with general authority over the Muslims when it is possible to have a just and regular government under another form?' – the other form being the nation-state, supported by a nationalist international paradigm (Haim 1965:216). The authors of the document argue that 'Islam did not prescribe a particular governmental system, but only that order and justice should prevail', according to Haim (Haim 1965:218). This was a continuation of an old debate over the purpose and function of the caliphate, going back at least to the beginning of the Ottoman version.

The foregoing demonstrates that the invasion of nationalism into the Ottoman Islamic territories was a precursor and a determinant of operational strategy, not a result of it. In both its general and in several particular forms the institution of nationalism – an idea of a mode of differentiation between polities – had spread, and consolidated itself in the minds of the inhabitants. This was the key strategic event; after it, the military-strategic outcome was inevitable. This phenomenon represented the triumph of an institutional system.

Nationalist success was heavily associated with Westernisation, as can be seen from detailed laws introduced discouraging the wearing of the fez and the veil and encouraging adoption of the three-piece suit and other trappings of the west (Toynbee 1927:730. Again, there is an interesting parallel here with the Meiji Restoration in Japan half a century before, when the end of the Shogunate was accompanied by the wholesale adoption of western modes of dress, along with industrial practices).

This situation is not dissimilar to that which prevailed at the time of the Prophet, when the Monophysite sensibilities of many of the people had already weakened their attachment to the Orthodox Church and Byzantium before Mohammed began his career. In the twentieth century it was supporters of the nationalist ideal who were the norm entrepreneurs, as the Muslims had been then. But if Islam prescribes 'just and regular government', the justice and regularity of the nationalist system has not been evident to many Muslims in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

Once again we see selection mechanisms at work. In the new epoch of national self-determination, the caliphate is not "susceptible of application". Its formally established aspect collapses, but something remains.

Part Two: Behaviour of the caliphate since abolition

Adaptation through idealisation

An analysis of the strategies and history of the caliphist movement since abolition will expose some of the difficulties in discerning the nature of the interacting units in global politics. This is because the caliphate in this context clearly illustrates many aspects of the argument. The caliphate at the moment cannot be said to be anything other than an idealised abstraction and, given the endless contention over its nature, an amorphous one at that. It cannot, then, on the face of it, be said to act, because it cannot confidently be said to develop, differentiate and choose between alternative courses of action. However, as we have seen, this requirement is waived when it comes to the idea of behaviour. An amorphous, idealised abstraction can behave in a number of ways that are uncontroversial. It can adapt and develop over time, combine with other ideas and spawn derivative offshoots. Most importantly for politics, it can influence some individuals, sometimes, to take it upon themselves to act on its behalf. In this part, I suggest that the caliphate, since the formal abolition of its Ottoman incarnation, has behaved in a variety of ways which have had more or less effect on its longevity as a live bone of contention. It has done so in a specifically grand-strategic and global context, at a time when, as a formal institution, it no longer exists in a formal political sense.

It is important to reinforce the distinctions here among action, agency and behaviour, and among consciousness, desire and ascribed interest. If I propose that the caliphate behaves in an interested manner, this is according to my idea of what its interests are, to wit, maintaining and increasing its capacity to exercise strategic and political influence, and to attract support. This is quite a different thing from arguing that the caliphate acts in the way that an individual human being acts according to interests devised by a self-conscious subject. Even to suggest that the caliphate might be a subject is different in important ways from suggesting that it is a conscious subject, which I do not. There is a further step, to self-consciousness, which is beyond any claims made here on behalf of the caliphate.

Anyone who doubts the significance of the movement for re-establishment of the caliphate need only contemplate the 3rd International Caliphate Conference in Jakarta on August 12, 2007. 'In contrast to the 5,000 attendees of the first such conference in May 2000, the 2007 conference drew over 90,000 participants from at least 39 different countries' (McLeod 2008:online). It was organised by the Indonesian branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir, the global Islamic "Party of Liberation", whose stated aim is re-establishment.

The status of the caliphate remains officially unresolved, leaving the way open for groups such as the Islamic Thinkers Society to declare that 'Muslims must make this realisation act as a spur to motivate them to take on the work for establishing of the Khilafah. ... Its re-establishment is a command in Islam' (online). While the ITS promotes 'intellectual and political non-violent means', others with the same goal, such as al-Qa'ida, advocate armed struggle. Some, such as the Taliban, have established tenuous Sunnite polities on the basis of the rule of shari'a law. Falling somewhere in the middle is *Hizb ut-Tahrir* (Party of Liberation), an organisation which has been accused of supporting terrorism, but which claims to be legitimately promoting a political agenda (online).

The call for re-establishment of the caliphate can be characterised as a call for "justice", as this comment from the Indian commentator Zafarul Islam Khan shows:

> Now, as far as the issue of Khilafah or the Caliphate is concerned, surely everyone is within his rights to democratically argue for what he or she believes as an ideal system, whether or not this is derived from religion. Thus, Marxists have their own version of the state, and Gandhiji called for 'Ram Rajya'. Interestingly, Gandhiji is on record as having said that in his view an ideal state would be one that would be like that which was ruled by the Caliph Umar, which Sunni Muslims believe to have been an ideal-sort of Caliphate or Khilafah. An ideal Khilafah is a system where the ruler is accountable to the people and rules in accordance with justice. What is wrong with that? … What a contrast, you will agree, to our present-day politicians, who seem to care nothing at all for the poor and the marginalized (Sikand 2008:2).

As always with calls for justice, this one begs the question of whose justice. Ideas about justice and legitimacy are deeply linked to social ontologies, as we have seen. In the above quotation, justice is explicitly linked with establishment of an ideal-type of state. Marxists do indeed have their own version or ontology of the state, and a sense of the legitimate exercise of power to go with it, and so do Muslims. For many, the caliphate – especially the domestic structure of the *khilafah* state – is the basis of their political ontology, and its re-establishment is a matter of justice, *ipso facto*, quite apart from the treatment of the poor and marginalised.

Significantly, the rise of this movement from WWII has not erased the nationalist fervour of the Arabs, but has found accommodation with it, so that, while Islamism may be seen as a reaction to the perceived failure of nationalism, it also, in some of its guises, incorporates it. Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, who derive their legitimacy from both Allah and the nationalist ideal, are good examples. Hamas is explicitly a 'nationalist' movement, though we should question the meaning of "nation" in this context (Hamas 1988:Articles Twelve, Thirteen). '*Ummah* is often translated as "nation".

Action on behalf

Institutions such as the caliphate are difficult to kill. While British propaganda – or at least, *Punch* magazine – might hail the entry of General Allenby into Jerusalem in 1917 as the final act in the long history of the Crusades[*], there remained this abstract rallying-

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[*] "In London, *Punch* published a memorable illustration which epitomized the great achievement. Captioned 'The Last Crusade', it showed Richard Coeur de Lion looking down towards Jerusalem and nodding contentedly, 'My dream comes true!'. As so often, *Punch* seemed to resonate with the

point of resistance. Appearances lent weight to Punch's claim, however. Within a decade of the fall of Jerusalem, the Ottoman Empire had utterly collapsed, the Sultanate and the Caliphate had successively been abolished, and the Hashemite claimant to the title of caliph, Husayn, had been defeated by the puritan Wahhabist forces of the House of Sa'ud, of the Najd or Nejd area north of the Hejaz.

Indicating the fracturing of support for the caliphate, at the time of the Cairo congress there were at least half a dozen claimants to the title (Haim 1965:232). Fracturing of support does not necessarily mean diminution of support. Indeed the fact that so many claimants were interested is evidence of the enduring power and adaptability of the office of caliph. The western ideational and physical invasion had shattered the unifying formal offices of the Islamic state, thereby opening it up to claimants from all sides. From its support base, or body of constituent elements, a range of alternative possibilities arises. From the point of view of the caliphate itself, this could be characterised as survival-oriented behaviour on its part: the behaviour of spawning a range of possible continuators increases the chance of one of them being successful. At first glance, this looks like the observer/theorist assigning a function to the behaviour of the caliphate. It seems to assume that the caliphate itself is somehow exercising its will in a desperate struggle for survival. However, this need not be the case. If teleology and function are removed from the argument, the behaviour remains, as does its effect of survival of the conceptual facets of the caliphate. As Darwin, Searle and others have emphasised, it is not necessary for the observer to assign function in order to detect evolutionary functionality.

Even though there has been little prospect for nearly a century of the Muslim world being united in one *Khilafah*,

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general mood: the allusion to the campaign in Palestine as the 'new' or the 'last' Crusade, and to the British soldiers fighting there as 'new' or 'modern' Crusaders, was widely disseminated…" (Bar-Yosef 2001:1).

> 'such as Muslim doctrine requires. Nevertheless, [many Muslims] cherish an ideal of some form of political and social organisation in which self-realisation may become possible for them in some system of civilization that is Muslim in character and expression. … Even when the doctrines of their faith have little hold upon them, they are still attracted by the glamour of a distinctively Muslim culture and long to break the chains of an alien civilisation. To these men, as much as to the others, this hope remains enshrined in the doctrine of the Caliphate (Arnold 1965:183).

The political descendents of 'these men' are the members of al-Qa'ida, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Jemaah Islamiyah and many other organisations. Calls for re-establishment of some form of caliphate come from a wide variety of sources, and a recent opinion poll found that '[l]arge majorities in most countries support the goals of requiring a strict application of shari'a, keeping out Western values, and even unifying all Islamic countries into a single Islamic state' (Kull 2007:1). Support for the re-establishment of the caliphate averaged 65% among ordinary Muslims in Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, and Indonesia. The caliphate has individuals, duly established lobby groups and think tanks, political parties, terrorist organisations and individuals working for its survival and acting in what they perceive to be its behalf and its interests.

Institutional change in individual heads

It could be said that modern Middle Eastern radical Islamism in some ways developed as a reaction to nationalism in general and Arab Nationalism in particular (Lewis 2002-107). The close relationship between nationalism and Islamism is reflected in the establishment and history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Established in 1928, Hassan al-Banna's organisation at one stage had more than half a million members (Munson 2001:487).

While the Muslim Brotherhood does not appear to have had a specific aim of establishing a multi-state caliphate, it is important because, as Munson says, it 'spawned many of the militant Islamic groups that exist today, including organizations such as Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, and Gamaat Islamiyah' (Munson 2001:487). Even so, and even though much alarm is expended on it, Munson goes on to point out that 'scholars still know very little about the remarkable rise of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood' (Munson 2001:487).

There came a moment, however, when there was a split between nationalist and more religiously-motivated sections of the movement. Politically, this was reflected in the split between Gemal Abdel Nasser's state-based conception of Pan-Arabism beginning in Egypt, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Philosophically we can see writers and thinkers like Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) turn from the national state as a source of legitimacy and identity and towards the idea of the Islamic state. Qutb began as a nationalist. He judged the nationalist project a failure in practice because of the increasing Westernisation of Arab culture and the continuing political and strategic influence of the Western powers (Appleby 2002:507). He felt he must redirect, or refound the identity which was protesting western dominance and support for Zionism (Calvert 2000:90). Thus the movement advanced by Qutb was a reaction against the West, and the Westernising influences on the '*ummah*, but also against the national state.

Qutb, intellectual river to the Sunni Islamist movement, was deeply concerned with collective identity-formation, explicitly attempting to differentiate an eastern, Egyptian identity from that of the West, including the regime of Nasser. (Calvert 2000:87-89) Nasser was a leading light of the Arab Nationalist movement, which can be distinguished from its Islamist successor by their respective proximate sources of legitimacy. Nationalists define themselves by their claim to statehood; statehood, or at least the self-determining sovereignty it brings, is an end in itself. Caliphists desire the state only as an instrument of God's will. Nationalists derive the legitimacy of their claim from their national status. Islamists see the state as legitimate only insofar as it acts according to the holy texts. Thus, as Qutb accused Arabs of succumbing to Western corruption, materialism and political secularism, he came to see the national state, in its capacity of identity-marker, as an instrument of Christian Crusade. Jihad, in this conception, became not only a defensive war against outsiders, but also a purgative internal struggle for control of the state, and of sources of legitimacy and identity, in the name of God (Lewis 2002:4-5).

Those who perceived the failure of the nationalist project in terms of Arab identity found themselves requiring some alternative. They did not need to cast about far to find one, because the *khilafah* had been there all along, waiting in the wings, a fully-developed organisational chart, ready to be implemented. It had, after all, only been

formally abolished within a single lifetime. The caliphate, in other words, had a thickly-developed carapace of survival mechanisms, to the extent that it was able to exercise significant geopolitical influence even while dormant.

Hizb ut-Tahrir, was established in 1953 on a platform of re-establishment of the caliphate, and given their ability to attract more than 90,000 people from all over the world to the conference on the re-establishment of the Caliphate held by Hizb ut-Tahrir in Jakarta in August, 2007, there has been no diminution of support (online). The party, whatever its reputation, claims to pursue a global political agenda not through violence, but by seeking to alter the conceptual institutional framework in the minds of individual Muslims, or 'to bring the Muslims back', from westernised political and cultural arrangements, 'to living an Islamic way of life under the shade of the Khilafah (Caliphate) State'. The party aims to do this 'following an exclusively political method' (Hizb ut-Tahrir 2007b).

The party's policy statement specifically eschews violence:

> Hizb ut-Tahrir adopts the methodology employed by the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) when he established the first Islamic State in Madinah. The Prophet Muhammad limited his struggle for the establishment of the Islamic State to intellectual and political work. He established this Islamic state without resorting to violence. He worked to mobilise public opinion in favour of Islam and endeavoured to sway the political and intellectual elites of the time. Despite the persecution and boycott of the Prophet Muhammad and the early Muslims, they never resorted to violence.
>
> The party is therefore proactive in disseminating the Islamic intellectual and political thoughts widely in Muslim societies so as to challenge the existing status quo ...(Hizb ut-Tahrir 2007b).

The claim that the early Muslims did not resort to violence is problematic to say the least. What we can say, however, is that any such violence is/was directed toward changing the conceptual environment, by replacing the tribal or national paradigm with one derived from the sacred.

Another collective actor which operates in defense of a conception of collective identity is al-Qa'ida. Al Qa'ida seeks, for the '*ummah,* formal institutional representation in the

form of the caliphate. This is what the members of Al-Qa'ida, Hamas and others conceive themselves to be doing, defending and acting on behalf of their community, under the doctrine of emergency defensive jihad. Because this Other does not recognize our system of differentiation, its members are not covered by the Golden Rule: do unto others as you would have them do unto you. In bin Laden's view, it is the very absence of centralised authority in the form of the caliphate that allows the declaration and prosecution of defensive jihad, justifying the set of techniques widely known as terrorism (Johnson 2002:12).

Bin Laden's enunciation of his strategy is a very clear example of this dynamic of individuals as well as collective actors operating in the name of a larger ideal institutional structure. 'Our nation ['*ummah*] is rich with many resources and capabilities and the absolutely most important is the Muslim person.' (Scheuer 2005) This statement assumes individuals as a possession and asset of the larger unit, the '*ummah*.

In sum, and to frame it another way, agents and agencies of the caliphate are operating on its behalf to change the form of statements of collective intentionality contained in individual heads. The change sought involves the referent of "we" in "we are doing X", which changes from "nation represented by national state" to "sacral community ('*ummah*) represented by *Khilafah*". If the party is successful in its aim, and this change takes place in enough individuals, the political and strategic transition from one to the other will be a foregone conclusion, although it may well be contested. In this case the caliphate will have successfully re-established itself, whether it has the capacity to intend to do so or not. Even then, however, International Relations cannot adequately describe it.

Idealised entity as source of legitimacy

In the philosophy of Hizb ut-Tahrir there can be no legitimate state in the absence of the caliphate. Note that it is the office which is important, more than the matter of who the individual might be who holds it; the party's material specifically rejects the idea of divine appointment (Hizb ut-Tahrir 2007a). Here is an example of an institutional

element, the office of Caliph, providing both a strategic goal – its re-establishment – and a proximate source of legitimation.

According to Hizb ut-Tahrir, the 'Caliphate system does not resemble any of the world's current political structures' (2007). However, Dr Nazreen Nawaz, women's spokeswoman for Hizb ut-Tahrir, interviewed on the BBC, Aug 14, 2007 describes the caliphate as more or less identical with a modern, liberal democracy:

> The caliphate is the Islamic system of governance, and it's based on particular principles, such as an elected ruler, accountable governance. Rule of law is very important, independent judiciary, but it's a system that implements the shari'a upon a society. Also very important are rights for women, such as education, political rights, economic rights, and the fact that people of other faiths should be able to live and be able to worship within that society. So, it's the Islamic governance system that implements the Shari'a upon a society.

She goes on to rehearse the argument that the Muslim parts of the world are controlled by tyrannies which are 'yes-boys to western governments', who 'allow the resources of the Muslim countries to be siphoned off to western companies,' and that the problem in the Muslim world is the attempt to impose a particularly western form of democracy. '... it's not just western liberalism that has a monopoly on elected rulership or on accountable government' (Nawaz 2007).

Here we can see that the fundamental difference between the caliphate and the principles of embedded mainstream liberal institutionalism, according to this statement by Dr Nazreen, is that of the sources of their legitimacy. (Indeed, it looks as though Dr Nazreen is justifying the 'implementation' of shari'a law by reference to liberal-individualist, rights-based ideals, and *vice versa*.) The important point here is that the difference is not in the outcomes, social, political or legal, but in the source of legitimacy. Excluding the particulars – the method of election, content of rights to be extended to the various groups Dr Nazreen mentions and extent of suffrage – is justifiable as an exercise because they are dependent and contingent and because they may be debated within each particular system. The ontological differentiation is that the *Khilafah* is Islamic, and therefore derives from a different source of legitimation from that of western liberalism. The clue to ontology is in the sources, not the outflows. The outflow

is *shari'a*, which may be interpreted infinitely; the proximate source of legitimacy is Allah; but ultimately it is the idealised conception of the specific collective, the '*ummah*, that constitutes the subject of this legitimation process.

Institutional abstraction as goal and motivator: spontaneous support

The emergence of so-called 'homegrown terrorism' in the US, Britain and Spain, among other places, exemplifies the phenomenon of an institution behaving in such a way as to attract support. If it were not for the existence of this ideal institutional end-state, providing a focus and goal for disaffected individuals, they would remain just that, disaffected individuals, of whom there are plenty. With the institution providing the emotional affirmation they crave, they join and constitute a serious geopolitical movement and a collective actor, rather than a collection of individuals. In the process, they help to define and affirm the institution, and promote its interests. This is why western authorities are so sensitive to parties such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, who are, on the face of it, merely exercising a democratic right to peacefully promote a certain political arrangement.

The caliphate, even though the office is not formally extant, still affects actors by providing them with the goal, the capacity and the normative justification for strategic action (Ayoob 2005:955). With this in mind, we can assess the strategy pursued by actors in terms of the benefit or otherwise to the conceptual structure they are trying to promote or protect. Acceptance and attachment are the true measures of strategic effectiveness. According to this heuristic, caliphist strategy has been highly successful.

This is not to exaggerate the threat to the national-state system, an ideal institutional structure which has gained a high degree of acceptance and actualisation. As the Hamas charter clearly shows, Islamism may be adapted to coexist with nationalism, just as the Islamic system of differentiation was superimposed on and adapted to the tribal. It is not the state *per se* that is at issue in the global Islamist strategic movement, but the basis on which the state should or can be legitimised. That this manifests itself in territorial disputes should not be surprising, since territory is a key part the state, as of many other institutional arrangements. Also, the definition of particular territorial

claims will be contingent upon their legitimational basis, as is most obviously the case with 'holy lands'. The strategic significance of this cannot be underestimated in the current context, as has been pointed out by Robert Pape (2005), who argues that suicide terrorism is universally a response to the perceived occupation of sacred territory by foreigners.

By providing a goal and a binding factor, and especially a means by which individuals might identify themselves as part of something larger, the caliphate has attracted support throughout the world, even though it is nothing more than an idealised abstraction at the moment. Some supporters, a tiny number by comparison, are willing to conduct terrorism operations. These groups may or may not have contact with each other. Islamist material is not hard to find, and anyone who wants to can claim to be acting in the higher cause of the caliphate, or Islamic state. Whether or not they are prepared to commit violence, however, the caliphate serves as a means of creating communities, and for that reason, these communities in turn support it, through various means.

Affimation

It may be the case that, as the Hamas charter states, 'under the wing of Islam followers of all religions can coexist in security and safety where their lives, possessions and rights are concerned' (Hamas 1988:Article Six), but only if the overarching authority, the source of legitimacy, is Allah: 'Peace and quiet would not be possible except under the wing of Islam' (Hamas 1988:Article Thirty-One). Similarly in Indonesia, the leader of the Jema'ah Islamiyah group, Abu Bakr Ba'asyir 'argued that the only way Indonesia could become a perfect society was for it to become a caliphate or Islamic state, governed under syariah law' (Franklin 2008:online). Both caliphists and secular liberal democrats – not to mention many Israelis, Christians and others – agree that there should be religious toleration, peace and human rights, but only under the aegis of their – our – favoured system. It seems safe to say that this motive of affirmation is the basic, primitive driver of not only this particular conflict, but grand-strategic conflicts in general. They are about material matters like territory, resources and power only

insofar as these lead to the primacy of a particular moral/ontological set. The affirmation is constitutive, as well as dynamic.

It is not only the caliphate's supporters who have an idealised notion of it. It has served some political forces well as a bogey-man:

> In redefining sovereignty in the wake of 9/11, the US initially targeted two categories of actors: failed states ...; and regimes which export terrorism and acquire weapons of mass destruction. This basically reflected the administration's rationalization of its attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively. As the insurgency in Iraq worsened, it came up with another target – this time a non-state actor, but with the aspiration to restore a pre-Westphalian state: the caliphate.(Acharya 2007:281)

This passage seems to suggest that the caliphate is a construction of US policy-makers, intent on whipping up 'caliphobia', although the author is by no means blind to the ambitions of caliphists. Nevertheless, Acharya's is a reasonable conclusion to draw, if we say that one facet or aspect of the caliphate is present in the minds of its enemies. This aids its longevity and power as a rallying cry, as pointed out by this anonymous online response to an article by Omer Mozaffar:

> What he [President Bush] has actually ended up doing, rather clumsily, is made this something that Muslims themselves (who were previously unaware of this idea) include ... as something to chant ... as a slogan in opposition to U.S. policies in the region (Mozaffar 2008:online).

Here we have what might be described as a defence-mechanism on the part of the caliphate: attack it, and it grows stronger.*

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* In this context it is worth mentioning the Taoist strategist Sun Tzu's thoughts on form.

Chapter VI... 27: Now an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strength and strikes weakness.

28: And as water shapes its flow in accordance with the ground, so an army manages its victory in accordance with the situation of the enemy.

29: And as water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions (Tzu 2005:152)

On a geopolitical level, attacking where the most resistance is to be found simply reinforces and reconstitutes that resistance. Strategists should also remember that a formal organisation is not the same thing as an informal conception of collective identity. As Farhana Ali says regarding the US missile strike which killed al-Qa'ida operative Abu Laith al-Libi, 'His death is a blow to Al Qaeda the organization but not Al Qaeda the movement' (Schmitt 2008:online). Given that the goal of al-Qa'ida is re-establishment of the caliphate, we may apply this to the caliphist movement. In other words, openly or directly attacking a subject-actor, even apparently successfully, may not be as effective as undermining or otherwise weakening an objective institutional structure, however idealised. Indeed, as in this case, it may have the effect of strengthening it.

Material effects

The relationship of social phenomena to the physical world can be seen in the link established by the Hejaz railway, which was constructed with voluntary subscriptions from the faithful. It ran not only from Damascus and the Mediterranean to the Arabian Peninsula, but also from the Ottoman Caliphate in Constantinople to the Muslim holy places at Mecca and Medina (Toynbee 1927:40). This was a metaphorical as well a physical link. It was this railway that enabled the Ottomans' claim to custodianship of the Hejaz, which is a key legitimator in the Islamic world. It was the subject of a congress at Mecca held by Abdul Aziz al-Sa'ud in 1924 to justify his own claim (Toynbee 1927:311-318). And it was this railway line the British Colonel T.E. Lawrence, as liaison officer with the Arab Revolt, repeatedly cut as part of the successful campaign to starve the Turkish garrison at Medina into submission.

It is not the physical position of the people that is important. If everyone in the Arabian peninsula, in the present day, accepted the same political legitimation system and system of states, there would be no conflict, even though the physical people themselves remained. To take an unlikely hypothetical example, if all of the foreign military personnel in the Arabian peninsula converted to Sunni Islam and accepted the legitimacy of Sharia and submission to the will of Allah, the strategic situation would be the same as if they all withdrew. Similarly, those Arabs and others who accept the

dominance and the assistance of the US cause no strategic problem for it, whereas those who feel it as an indignity to be resisted do.

The conflict is between corporeal people only insofar as they adhere to particular ideals and social constructions. Principles, institutions and other abstract markers of collective identity form one family of the taxonomy of strategic competition. Another is actors, the subjects of emotion and directedness. But collective actors, at least, are constituted within, and motivated and enabled by, this realm of constructed institutional value-sets. This can be seen in both the Napoleonic strategic imperative of 'psychological destruction of the enemy's will to continue resistance' (Chandler 2000:135). and in the rules regarding prisoners of war. An individual combatant ceases to be one when he or she publicly acknowledges a cessation of the desire, or at least ability or intention, to resist. This is a transference of membership from one collective subject to another. When a soldier ceases to be an active member of a military unit and becomes instead a prisoner, this shift of identity may have serious tactical consequences. Similarly, when a social group takes up an active resistance, and defines itself thereby, this may have serious strategic consequences. This is what Rumelili is referring to when he stresses the importance of the reaction of the "Other" (Rumelili 2004).

The idea that the physical position of individuals is not important requires qualification. Although it may be theoretically possible for a paradigm to invade a region in the absence of physical movement, this is very rarely the case. More usually, as with both the Islamic expansion in the seventh century and the nationalist one in the nineteenth and twentieth, the movement and behaviour of the abstraction is accompanied by sometimes large scale movements of people and equipment, and often by the destruction of infrastructural expressions of culture. Once again, we see that the material and the ideal are inseparable in practice, and might be included as attributes of a well-defined generic political unit.

Conclusion

Between its conception and the present day, the term 'caliphate' has, at some stage referred to just about every type of political arrangement, from loose tribal succession

arrangement to titular marker of sovereignty, empire, state system and finally idealized plausible world order. If it can be all these, and still be the caliphate, it follows that all these things have something in common. What is it? By attempting to answer the question, what is the caliphate, this chapter has led us further in exploring the plausibility or usefulness of the concept of a generic unit in global politics.

If we were to ascribe a function of survival to the caliphate – proposing that it exists in order to exist – we would say that its behaviour since abolition has been largely effective. It has raised awareness, recruited adherents and made itself prominent in the minds of many in diplomatic circles as well as the wider community. It has also put pressure on opposing or incompatible entities to defend themselves. But if we reject purpose and function, the story of its behaviour remains. This is what is meant by evolutionary functionality. The caliphate may or may not be trying to survive, but whether it is or not, it *has* survived as an ideal, as a goal, as a source of legitimacy, as a marker of identity and as an institutional abstraction.

It has survived in this way because people – individuals – are willing to support it. They do so for a multitude of specific reasons, including resistance to occupation, religious conviction, rationalisation of claims to political and social power, and because they don't know any different. All of these reasons are based on the need to affirm and legitimate these individuals in their social niches. It may also be about promoting the perceived interests of these individuals, but since the interests are predicated on the affective bases of their membership of a collective, their interests and those of the collective coincide. The existence of the caliphate is prior to individuals, and affects the intuition and affective states of some in such a way as to cause them to act on its behalf.

The caliphate has behaved as one would expect it to, given the theoretical framework being developed here. Having been born – out of random activity, from the need of a community for some touchstone of identity – and having survived the hazards of early life in the form of several decisive battles and a good deal of strategic and political maneuvering, it has grown more adept. Having been established and institutionalized, it

has provided a context in which supporters have become proxy agents. It has lent its authority to those who devote themselves to its cause.

CONCLUSION

> ***And yet...***
> ***What is this quintessence of dust?***
>
> William Shakespeare
> Hamlet, Act 2, Scene II

In the introduction I pointed to calls in the discipline of International Relations for a better specification of the actor in global politics. A growing realisation that an exclusive focus on states is inadequate has led to an interest in other types of players in the international field. I suggested in the introduction that an attempt to identify a generic unit of interaction in global politics might be useful, whether or not a definitive specification turned out to be possible. The problem of A post-constructivist approach was tentatively put forward, one which retained some key features of both classical and structural realism, but also incorporated ideas from other, pertinent disciplines. In particular the theory of mind, sociology and evolutionary theory were scouted for fertile ground. The introduction outlined the concept of evolutionary functionality, and suggested that it might be a more useful perspective than that of function, in the Searlean sense.

In Chapter One the broad outlines of International Relations theory were canvassed, relying on key texts from various schools. This process showed that differences between the various schools were often matters of perspective, rather than deep ontological incompatibilities, leading to the conclusion that all these theories might contain useful pointers for descrying a silhouette of the hoped-for specification of a generic global political unit. This is by way of pointing towards a research agenda, rather than coming to any conclusion about the nature of such a unit.

Chapters Two, Three and Four sought to clarify the shape of what seems to be a cloudy area in International Relations theory. By exploring some theoretical pathways from other fields, Chapter Two showed how they could be applied to international theory in order to clarify, and perhaps bridge, some of the major divides in the discipline. From

John Searle came the notion of collective intentionality as endogenous to individuals and an explanation of the concept of function, as opposed to evolutionary or sociological functionality. Searle also gave us the idea of the Background of generic capacities in which the potential for intentionality resides. The plural subject proposed by Margaret Gilbert, the sociologist, encompassing the concepts of common knowledge and social ontology, was related to the discussion in International Relations about institutional rationality and ontological security. Finally the evolutionary program of making teleology redundant by describing a two-step causality based around institutions, led to an outline of the problem of reification. Two-step institutional causality is predicated on the selective capacity of institutional context, which allows institutions to heavily influence, if not determine the nature, including drives, of their constituents.

I then undertook an examination, in Chapter Three, of one of the main unresolved questions in International Relations theory and social theory in general, the agent-structure question. Along the way the issues of levels of analysis, anarchy and its complex relationship with social institutions and social structure were shown to be related. Following Colin Wight's work, Chapter Three concluded by outlining an "ontological sidestep," avoiding the necessity of some "solution" to the agent-structure question. This envisaged an as-yet-undefined social entity, of which agency and structure are both attributes.

Chapter Four began to test this notion by evaluating what other attributes of such a generic entity might be divined. It outlined some ideas about social identity-formation, including important issues of objectification, attachment and emotion and their relation to intuition, legitimation and rational interest, not necessarily respectively. All of this may be approached through the matter of affirmative motivation, which is not only a social-psychological question, but an ontological one. Nor is motivation restricted to the realist struggle for power or material gain, since it is easy to find cases where group units have acted against their own material interests and in favour of affirmation of moral or honourable abstractions (Steele, Brent J 2007).

The case of the Islamic caliphate was mobilised in Chapter Five to illustrate some of the theoretical themes from earlier chapters. Part One of the chapter told the story of the caliphate from its inception to its formal abolition, elucidating points regarding social innovation, development and evolution. Various iterations of the caliphate were described and used to illustrate evolutionary principles such as adaptation and selection in a non-analogous fashion. In Part Two I took a somewhat different approach, describing development of the caliphate as an idealised entity from the point of view of its own behaviour. This part reinforced the point that the actions of the constituent agents of social entities, and action by social entities themselves are hard to distinguish. This proposition might be debated, but by describing what the caliphate does as behaviour, rather than action, an equally important point can be made more broadly palatable. At the very least, the *actions* of officer-agents collectively constitute the *behaviour* of the larger unit. In the same way, affirmation by individuals of specific social-institutional contexts might constitute those contexts as units.

Facets of the diamond

Theorists are looking from different angles, but what they are looking at is essentially the same: human beings drawing boundaries around (formal and informal) conceptions of collectivity and investing them with emotional and normative significance. What is within these boundaries, in a generic sense, has been under-theorised in International Relations, as have its motivations or drives. One question regards the nature of the entity so enclosed; whether it is 'real' or a constructed abstraction. Another question follows: does it matter? Given the mutually constitutive, intersubjective nature of such entities, interactions among them must be seen as part of strategic and international political ontology. For addressing these questions a more detailed and precise specification of the interacting units in global politics would be useful. I have not attempted to give such an account, but to emphasise the need for it and to attempt to discern a silhouette, or some indication of outlines.

The national principle of the state is only one mode of differentiation among groups. The modern state derives its legitimacy from 'its' nation. Each particular state derives its legitimacy from 'its' particular nation, and they are thus differentiated from each

other. But other groups do not recognise this system of legitimation. Al-Qa'ida, for example, claims legitimacy from Allah,* and seeks to legitimise state sovereignty by the establishment of a Mohammedan Caliphate in Arabia (bin Laden 2005:121). The group remains a strategic actor. What does it have in common with other non-nation strategic actors? Their respective modes of differentiation, sources of legitimacy and conceptual boundaries may be radically different. Nevertheless, they are groups of people, delimited from other groups of people and acting toward strategic goals. And while elites may theorise cognitively regarding legitimacy and strategy, they are motivated, in the end, not by theorising, but by intuition derived from emotion; not by knowing, but by feeling. The same applies to their followers, the ordinary members of the group, who are vitally important in terms of the constitution of the actor. Non-cognitive factors, in other words, play a vital role (Kratochwil 1987:323).

The possibility of reconciliation between several theoretical positions may be glimpsed with the realisation that states themselves have reproduction requirements, and so does the state system. Neorealists, if they indeed do as Ashley (1984:240) accuses them, fail to apply their own conceptual framework to states, seeing them as unitary and purposive, unlike anarchic state systems. This means neorealism tends to overlook the fact that states themselves are systems, also exist in a context of universal anarchy, and therefore have imperatives developed in them by a process of evolutionary selection.

The reduction involved in world-system theory is the result of an over-emphasis on economic matters. The reproduction requirements are not only those of the economic capitalist world system, but of the political system of states and, more fundamentally, of the requirements for identification/affirmation of states, of the system and of other manifestations and conceptions of collective identity.

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* There exists some tension, even in modern democracies, between the deity and the people as sources of legitimation for the state, provisionally resolved in the case of the US Pledge of Allegiance in the formula "one nation under God". God here is, however, a recent, anti-communist, addition, (1954) though arguably the sentiment is not (Cramer 2003; Greenberg 2002)

Realists noted that policy-makers who, suffering from 'the intoxication of moral abstractions', attempt to use the mechanisms of the state to pursue ideological or normative goals beyond it often caused more harm than they had sought to avert (Morgenthau 1950:834). They concluded that those who follow the functional imperatives of states, rather than of some abstracted humanity, do better. They do better, though, according to a cultural and moral yardstick to which the realist critics of utopianism themselves subscribed. The well-named reflectivist group of theories questioned the origin and meaning of this moral milieu and found institutions.

The Weberian would suggest 'that the conceptual scheme of singular agency is adequate for sociology' (Gilbert 1989:14). For Durkheim, the collective not only exists, but is logically prior to individuals. As Gilbert puts it, 'people must perceive themselves as members of a *plural subject*' (1989:13 original italics). Thus, as we have seen with regard to the agent/structure problem in International Relations, the question is one of logical or ontological priority. Because the question is similar, it seems reasonable to look for a conceptually similar solution in both areas, the agent-structure problem in International Relations and the Weber-Durkheim dichotomy in sociology.

Some clues are apparent in the aspects or attributes of a putative generic social unit which have been described. Structure is an attribute. It is clearly an attribute of states, and we have seen that it is also an attribute of larger and smaller political entities. It is also an attribute of idealised future states or conditions of the world. A capacity for agency is also an attribute. Some social entities may not possess the capacity, and those that do exercise it only at times. This might be one way to distinguish between emergent and established polities, as part of a more general classification of units in global politics.

The problem of indeterminacy comes when we attempt to answer this question: if agency and structure are attributes, what are they attributes of, in International Relations or global politics? There are many potential answers to this, and they can be found in both the corporeal and the ideal world.

The Ayatollah Khomeini, of Iran, accused the enemies of Islam, specifically colonialists, of having "managed to eliminate Islam's judiciary and political laws … replacing them with European laws" (Zeidan 2001:36). Here Zeidan presents evidence of the importance of the state in jihadist thought, but it is also evidence of the state being subject to the laws of Islam, Sharia and Hadith – or in other words, not sovereign. The source of affirmation and identity is not the state, the state is merely an expression thereof and a facilitator of strategy and social control based on other sources of legitimation (Zeidan 2001:36). The drive for formal institutional representation is another feature or attribute of the entity at hand. Actors need institutions: hence the movement for the caliphate.

It is telling that al-Qa'ida, as only one of a number of actors pursuing political strategies on behalf of a caliphate, has strengthened operationally in the last few years as the idea of re-establishment has gained metaphorical ground. Toynbee argued that the occupants of the caliphal office since 'Ali had held it by force(1927:29). This realist assumption fails to explain why so many were so keen to have the title. If force alone is sufficient to the exercise of power, there is no need for titles, especially when the incumbent himself is insincere in his beliefs. It might be argued that powerful people are motivated to accumulate titles by vanity or hubris, not in the interests of the longevity of the institution, and certainly, this is often the case. This, however, only serves to illustrate the point that these individual emotions serve the interest of the institution by leading these actors to perpetuate it. It also demonstrates the strategic and political utility of the titles themselves. Legitimacy is a strategic tool, and its mechanisms and sources are candidates as attributes of a generic global-political entity.

In Chapter One we saw that many of the main theoretical schools in International Relations seemed to be looking at the same thing from different angles. During the ensuing discussion I began to examine what some of the these different views might have in common, and how the different perspectives might complement each other. In particular, I have argued that a clearer specification of a generic unit of interaction in global politics may be drawn from this discussion. Some proposals may now be made regarding facets of this hypothetical diamond; following are seven such proposals.

First, the generic unit in global politics may have both ideal, or conceptual, and corporeal elements. Since adult biological human beings are physically independent of each other, any possibility of collectivity must depend upon conceptual or ideational mechanisms for binding. Similarly, it is not possible for a concept to exist in isolation from some carrier. The caliphate in one of its several heydays was a vast organisation of offices of various kinds, each of which was filled by a human being. A caliph cannot exist without a caliphate. However, there remains a moot, but vital, question as to whether the caliphate can exist without there being any recognised incumbent.

The second proposal is that a generic unit of political interaction must be structured, entailing capacities (offices) and 'proxy' agents (officers). As has been explained, structure enables agents by conferring status upon them, thus assigning powers to people. The system of statuses comprises the template of structure, while groups of individuals occupy these niches, thereby defining, identifying and, if they are fortunate, affirming those individuals. This, in turn, gives them a powerful motive to affirm the structure. This points to a fruitful area of further theoretical development, since a decision would have to be made as to whether the various groups agitating for the caliphate's re-establishment are *constituents* or *agents* of the caliphate, and how these may be differentiated from one another. This might be a good test of the developing theoretical framework.

Thirdly, the suggested generic actor is imbued with a *sense* of moral purpose, has no intrinsic, pre-ordained purpose of its own, but does have drives and tendencies. This is the anti-teleological argument put forward by evolutionary theory and by Searle. It is also closely related to Reus-Smit's arguments concerning the moral purpose of the state. The sense of moral purpose may be proposed as part of a mechanism of affirmation and attachment. Some conceptions of moral purpose turn out to be suicidal for individual members of a polity, as with some acts of caliphist terrorism, or for the polity itself, as in the case of the Melians. Even so, they still provide means for their subscribers to identify and affirm themselves. Either way, if we as theorists take this moral purpose to be a feature of the unit it may be seen as an ontological mechanism.

The fourth aspect of a putative generic polity is that it entails systems and processes of legitimation and decision-making, and is both contested and affirmed by these processes. This is closely related to the previous point. If moral purpose provides motivation, it also leads inevitably to contestation, even within individual heads, as conceptions of purpose collide. But conflict and contestation, as we have seen, are processes that lead to decisions with a high degree of empirical legitimacy, at least *post facto*, as the victors write the history. It follows that contestation is not only inevitable, but is also constitutive of, and a generic aspect of, political entities. In the case of the caliphate this is plain to see, as the various sects, branches and competing doctrines define themselves by their relationship to the caliphate, and in doing so define the caliphate itself. Different groups define it in often contradictory and competing ways, and when these come up against each other, the participants' sense of self is challenged. This they see as important; they are motivated to contest the matter, and the caliphate survives, in one form or another, or several. The caliphate, even in its current idealised form, entails a system of legitimation and contestation which keeps it alive.

Fifth, it may be thought of either as a subject, an object or both. Gilbert has made a rigorous case for the existence of plural subjects *per se*, and if she is correct, these also constitute an object, since they are an intrinsic, if hard to observe, feature of the world. Clearly if a collectivity has both corporal and material aspects, it must be seen as an object. Even if Gilbert was wrong, however, and no such plural subject exists as an independent feature of the world, it is inarguable that such subjects exist as ideas. In this case, collective entities are conceived by individuals, and may be conceived either as objects or subjects. Such conceptions are also, of course, intrinsic features of the world, as Searle pointed out. Undoubtedly the caliphate does things, so it is a subject of behaviour. Observers may assign a function to this behaviour, making it a subject of this function. It is also an object, in the sense that it is an intrinsic feature of the world, as well as being a goal.

Selectivity is the sixth proposed attribute. The political unit behaves by creating constituent components which act in the interests of the larger entity's survival imperatives (or doesn't survive). This is perhaps the most controversial proposition, since it seems to depend on acceptance of the idea of structure acting. This seems to

lead to the idea that contexts may act, which would imply they were conscious. As we have seen, many theorists restrict action to individuals, and the idea of social context as conscious actor would be quite a stretch. However, a social context is not only a context, it is also a conceptual world, an institution. Institutions provide context, in the way a cruise-ship might provide the context for a love-affair, without diminishing their status as objectively definable institutions. Once this is accepted, the argument proceeds: institutions select units and thereby subject them to evolutionary forces. This evolutionary mechanism produces units shaped according to the reproductive requirement of the institutional context. Hence the institution is behaving in such a way as to cause agents to act on its behalf. These agents, however, may also be intrinsic parts of the institution. Therefore the institution is itself acting. Again, the status of those groups currently acting in favour of re-establishment of the caliphate – whether they are agents, constituent units or both – would make an interesting test case for further explication.

Lastly, the social unit seems to exist at every level of the global political system. It is itself selected and moulded by larger forces as well as by the agency of its own constituents. This is relevant to the levels-of-analysis problem in International Relations, indicating as it does a much more complex, fluid and less stratified idea of levels, which looks more like a melange than a hierarchy. The generic unit exists as an entity in its own right, but is also made up of independent singular agents, and constitutes a node in a larger network. The caliphate is one among a set of competing socio-political systems, so it is part of a larger system. *Khilafa,* the Islamic state, is a comprehensive set of relationships and conceptions of right behaviour extending from the state-system to the intimate details of family life and worship. The movement for re-establishment of the caliphate encompasses actors at every level of global political interaction. All of this provokes questions regarding the idea of levels as a useful way of describing international interaction. Perhaps a two-dimensional, layered image of international structure is too restrictive, and more dimensions may be added.

These seven suggested features may or may not be a comprehensive set, but they suggest further areas to be explored and propositions to be tested. The quest then is to find some way to conceptually combine these, some unifying factors that might enable

us to identify and theorise the generic unit in IR. Clearly, further research is needed, since this thesis has not sought to precisely define a generic unit in global politics, but to examine the possibility of definition and to discern some key attributes.

The case can be set out more particularly. What causes an individual to carry out an action like the 2005 London underground suicide bombings? Causes are highly complex but, given the loose and disconnected nature of the network of radical Islamists, one can conclude that part of it was, like radical Islamism itself, 'not an organisation in the true sense of the word but only an idea' (Al-Bahri, quoted in Sutton and Vertigans 2006:108).

The London bombers were exposed to influences similar to those to which many other individuals were also exposed, but only they chose to act in this way. Thus, it might be argued that not only do they retain sole proprietary responsibility for their actions, it also cannot be said that these influences caused them to act. However, this is to focus too closely on these particular individuals. The influences they were exposed to acted on a community, a few members of which ended up acting in this way. Hence, it can be argued that the ideal of the caliphate caused, not so much these particular individuals, but a certain percentage of the affected community, to act on its behalf. In this conception the causal relationship is not so direct, but is nevertheless present and clearly powerful. Individuals retain full responsibility, but the abstraction has behaved in such a way as to cause them to act in its interest. The caliphate has behaved in such a way as to help cause other, independent actors – like the London bombers, Hizb ut-Tahrir, al-Qa'ida and others mentioned in this thesis –to begin working in its interests.

Social individuals, who are members of a group, occupy positions in organisations, and they and their network of institutional practices, values and facts, plus cultural and affirmative aspects, form some thing. It is not clear what the shape and basic nature of this entity is, nor is it easy to decide upon a useful generic term for it. The point of this thesis has been to argue that there is *something* there which has not been fully explained or defined in International Relations, and which may, in the end, not be precisely definable because it is based in non-intentional, affective capacities. In any case, implications for evaluation of the global political and strategic environment are

clear, with idealised mechanisms of identification and affirmation, such as the Islamic caliphate or the national state, competing for establishment and/or defending their dominant position. Whether or not conscious collective subjects exist, the most important units of global political interaction may well be indefinable abstractions ("the West"; "Political Islam"). The most important driver could be their capacity to recruit, condition, enable and motivate constituent individuals to affirm these larger units. In calling them the most important, I mean these abstractions and their institutional and corporal expressions form the ontological basis of global politics.

There are three possible answers to the question of what the caliphate is. It may simply be a concept, or indeed millions of concepts, each individual having a different idea of what it is. Collective action, in this individualist conception, would be a kind of Brownian motion of individuals, motivated by concepts of what the caliphate is which are unconnected in their essence. These concepts include those of its relative legitimacy, and of the desirability of re-establishment. This is the individualist position, and it does not fully account for such things as established institutional entities. At the other end of the spectrum, the caliphate could be seen as an entity, a "thing" with its own set of interests, which may even display agency of some kinds, actively encourages support, and exists prior and subsequent to any given individual or generation of individuals. Neither of these answers is satisfactory[*]. That is to say, neither is without serious objections. Neither could be a candidate for a complete ontology of internationally significant collectives.

The middle ground looks more promising, but still has serious problems, stemming from the fact that both of the above explanations are supported by good evidence, even though they are generally incompatible with each other. Here is a conundrum. Collective-action talk – in common parlance, in practitioners' rhetoric and even in the most sceptical individualists' implicit assumptions – is inescapable. This is because it makes sense; in other words it has explanatory weight, so much so that our modes of discourse are built around it. When it is subjected to intellectually rigorous analysis,

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[*] Brownian motion refers to fluid dynamics in physics. The conceptual connections here to the unresolved wave/particle problem of quantum mechanics are compelling.

however, it becomes much more problematical. It is easy to construct an account of the caliphate which includes action by it. If we were to allow the possibility that the caliphate has indeed acted over 1300 years to further its influence, improve its strategic position and shape and train agents, its life cycle would be easily explained. If we disallow this possibility – and rigorous thinking seems to indicate that we should – the task becomes much harder.

It becomes harder because we are then forced to account for the millions who have devoted their lives both in service and in death, enthusiastically or through coercion, to the cause of the caliphate throughout its history, and for those who continue to do so. Even more challenging is to account for the phenomenon of people whose identities have been defined in terms of their relationship to the caliphate. Hardest of all is to account for the fact that we seem unable to get such structuralist, collectivist ontologies out of our thinking, even when we try. If we exclude the possibility of action by the caliphate, then we must account for the actions of its agents. However, agents in the sense of Wight's agency$_2$ by definition cannot be actors *sui generis*. The source of the agency must lie elsewhere. The nature of this source remains unclear to us, particularly if we exclude the possibility of an interested collective entity. In attempting, as an exercise, to outline this theoretical entity, I have explored and opened up some central questions in IR, and found that the existing ontology of International Relations and inter-polity interaction is incomplete. This thesis has argued that an exploration of related research by others in the field, including Alexander Wendt, Colin Wight and John Gerard Ruggie, reveals this incompleteness. In the process, I have pointed the way toward some promising avenues of further exploration.

The evolutionary argument is that institutional structures are formed within anarchic structure; that some of them at least possess attributes, among them subjectivity or objectivity, among them also a desire to survive and, crucially, a drive among their constituents to identify and affirm the group as both extant and legitimate. This last, though, is a *sine qua non* for social groups and strategic actors. The other attributes make them more or less likely to survive. A desire to dominate the neighbours may lead to domination, but it may also lead to oblivion. A desire for, and mechanism for achieving, collective identification, recognition and attachment is a defining attribute, a

constitutive, ontological mechanism, without which the collective cannot exist, even in the moment. This remains the case even when this desire, or attribute, also leads to oblivion. It is the cessation of attachment by individuals that defines oblivion for the collective unit, therefore we may define the generic unit in International Relations with reference to affective attachment.

In this thesis I have sought to contribute further to scholarship regarding international and particularly global strategic affairs in the long term. Specifically, I have sought to explore an emerging perspective in which the strategic-political behaviour of global political units is conceptualised as only a part of their overall dynamic; a part, however, which is driven by the same ontological engine. Identification, attachment and affirmation are the common goals of this generic engine because they, unlike other drives including a desire for survival, are the essence, the definition, of collective social units.

In strategic terms, in the very basic case of gaining increasing influence at the expense of other entities, clearly this understanding is potentially decisive. If, for example, some state or state-system were being attacked by an emergent, non-state strategic player using unconventional means, the choice of strategic responses could be conditioned by these considerations. Directly attacking such a player with military means; demonising it; overstating its power and vilifying its agenda: all these, while satisfying, would be likely to strengthen, not weaken, such an adversary. Understanding the motivations of such a group might lead to a different strategy, one which sought to incorporate, rather than exclude; to consume, rather than destroy.

On the theoretical side, the emerging perspective I have sought to develop in this thesis has potential, I believe, to account for certain paradoxes, or circularities in International Relations theory, and for behaviours and phenomena in the world. Seemingly counter-interested behaviour like suicide terrorism may be elucidated, as may the motivations for insurgency. Here, in have sought to describe a way forward which I believe may lead to fertile theoretical ground. A poetic realism would emphasise a generic and extremely powerful interest in affective and emotional celebration and ontological security. It

combines realism and constructivism by pointing to the ruthless and hardnosed pursuit of affective goals associated with socially constructed entities.

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APPENDIX: THE CALIPHS, CALIPHATES AND IMAMATES

- **Abu Bakr** (632-634) father-in-law (Arabic, khalifah, [successor]), khalifat Rasul Allah, [successor to the Messenger of God]), **1st Caliph**
- **Umar I** (634-644) amir-al-mum-inin (Arabic, [commander of the believers], **2nd Caliph**
- **Uthman ibn Affan** (644-656) Muhammad's son-in-law, **3rd Caliph**
- **Ali Ben Abu Talib** (656-661) a cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad, **4th Caliph**

.			
(Shi'ites, Shi'a)		**(Kharijites, Kharijiyyah)**	**(Sunni, Sunnites)**
Ali Ben Abu Talib (656-661) (1st Imam) **al-Hasan** (661-669) (2nd Imam) **al-Husayn** (669-680) (3rd Imam) **Ali Zayn al-'Abidin** (680-713) (4th Imam) **Muhammad al-Baqir** (713-733) (5th Imam) **Ja'far al-Sadiq** (733-765) (or Jafar ibn Muhammad) (6th Imam)		. (c. 650 - c.720) Often called the Puritans of Islam, as they demanded purity of conscience as well as body. They tended to brand everyone who did not agree with them as unbelievers. A sub-sect, the Azraqites, believed in such rigid following of the Koran as to massacre large groups of Muslims who had allegedly committed	**Umayyad Caliphs** (661-750) - **Muawiyah I ibn Abu Sufyan** (661-680) related to Uthman - **Yazid I ibn Muawiyah** (680-683) - **Muawiya II ibn Yazid** (683-684) - **Marwan I** (684-685) - **Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan** (685-705) - **al-Walid I ibn Abd al-Malik** (705-715) - **Suleiman ibn Abd al-Malik** (715-717) - **Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz** (717-720) - **Yazid II ibn Abd al-Malik** (720-724) - **Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik** (724-743) - **al-Walid II ibn Abd al-Malik** (743-744) - **Yazid III ibn Abd al-Malik** (744) - **Ibrahim ibn Abd al-Malik** (744) - **Marwan II** (744-750) (end of Umayyad) (conquered by Abbasids 750)
(Ismailis, Isma'iliyyah) (Sevener Shi'ites) **Ismail** (died before, 760,) (7th imam, last for Ismailis) or **Muhammad**, his son (either is considered to still be alive, hiding) **(Fatimids)** (through Ismail) **Ubayd Allah al-Mahdi** (909-) **al-Qa'im**	**Twelver Shi'ites, Imamiyyah** (Ithna Ashariyya) **Musa al-Kazim** (765-799) (7th imam) **'Ali al-Rida** (799-818) (8th Imam) **Muhammad al-Jawad** (818-835) (9th Imam) **'ali al-Hadi** (835-868) (10th Imam) **al-Hasan al-'Askari** (868-874) (11th Imam) had student **ibn Nusayr** (d.868), began Nusayris, Nusayriyyah **Muhammad al-Mahdi** (12th Imam, last) (considered to still		

al-Mansur -972) **Moizz** (972-) **Al-Hakim** (3rd Fatimid Caliph) **Abu 'Ali al-Mansur al-Hakim** (985-1021) (6th Fatimid Caliph) **al-Mustansir** (-1094) **al-Mustali** (1094-) began Musta'liyyah he killed brother, **Nizar**, began Nizariyyah, Nizaris, Khojas (-1171) (overthrown by Saladin 1171) (but endures as the Druzes)	be alive, hiding) **(Buwayhids)** (945-) Adid (-1171) (conquered by Saladin 1171) **Ayyubids** Saladin (1171-1193) al-Adil (1193-1218) al-Kamil (1218-1238) (-1249) (conquered by Mamelukes 1249) **(Babis)** (1830-) Ali Muhammad Shirazi (-1850), started Babism Mirza Husayn Ali Nuri (c.1863), started Ba'hai	grave sins. Interestingly, Kharijites were very tolerant of non-Muslims.	**Umayyad Caliphs of Cordoba** (Spanish Umayyads) (929-1031) - Abd-ar-rahman I, escaped to Spain, 756-788 **Abd-ar-rahman III**, as caliph, 929-961 **Al-Hakam II**, 961-976 **Hisham II**, 976-1008 - civil war (1008-1028) **Mohammed II**, 1008-1009 **Suleiman**, 1009-1010 **Hisham II**, restored, 1010-1012 **Suleiman**, restored, 1012-1017 **Abd-ar-rahman IV**, 1021-1022 **Abd-ar-rahman V**, 1022-1023 **Muhammad III**, 1023-1024 **Hisham III**, 1027-1031 **Abbasid Caliphs of Baghdad (750-1258)** descendants of Prophet's uncle Abbas **Sunnites** **Abu'l Abbas Al-Saffah** 750-754 **Al-Mansur** 754-775 **Al-Mahdi** 775-785 **Al-Hadi** 785-786 **Harun al-Rashid** 786-809 **Al-Amin** 809-813 **Al-Ma'mun** 813-833 **Al-Mu'tasim** 833-842 **Al-Wathiq** 842-847 **Al-Mutawakkil** 847-861 **Al-Muntasir** 861-862 **Al-Musta'in** 862-866 **Al-Mu'tazz** 866-869 **Al-Muhtadi** 869-870

		• **Al-Mu'tamid** 870-892 • **Al-Mu'tadid** 892-902 • **Al-Muktafi** 902-908 • ??? (908, one day) • **Al-Muqtadir** 908-932 • **Al-Qahir** 932-934 • **Al-Radi** 934-940 • **Al-Muttaqi** 940-944 • **Al-Mustakfi** 944-946 • (by about 950, very little power) • **Al-Muti** 946-974 • **Al-Ta'i** 974-991 • **Al-Qadir** 991-1031 • **Al-Qa'im** 1031-1075 • **Al-Muqtadi** 1075-1094 • **Al-Mustazhir** 1094-1118 • **Al-Mustarshid** 1118-1135 • **Al-Rashid** 1135-1136 • **Al-Muqtafi** 1136-1160 • **Al-Mustanjid** 1160-1170 • **Al-Mustadi** 1170-1180 • **An-Nasir** 1180-1225 • **Az-Zahir** 1225-1226 • **Al-Mustansir** 1226-1242 • **Al-Musta'sim** 1242-1258 • (conquered by Mongols in 1258) **(Mamelukes)** (first Dynasty, Bahri) (1250-1382) (second Dynasty, Burji) (1382-1517) [two Caliphs, but just symbolic] (defeated by Selim, 1517)

From about the 13th century various monarchs throughout the Muslim world, particularly the Ottoman sultans, assumed the title caliph indiscriminately without regard to the prescribed requirements of the caliphate. The title held little significance for the Ottoman sultans until their empire began to decline. In the 19th century, with the advent of Christian powers in the Near East, the sultan began to emphasize his role as caliph in an effort to gain the support of Muslims living outside his realm. The Ottoman Empire collapsed during World War I (1914-1918). After the war, Turkish nationalists deposed the sultan, and the caliphate was finally abolished (March 1924) by the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

Source: BELIEVE Religious Information Source, http://www.mb-soft.com/believe/indexaz.html#other