

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

This study will review the initiation and implementation of a Training Management Package (TMP) for the logistic management of the East Timor Defence Force (ETDF) with a view to identifying the factors, which inhibit or facilitate the raising, training and sustaining of the ETDF.

The TMP is to produce a cradle-to-grave philosophy that must encourage and enable the ETDF to become self-sufficient, and manage, within the constraints dictated to them, the logistic functionality required for the day-to-day management of these military functions. (Australian Army, 2001, p. 4, Land Headquarters Concept for Mounting and Deployment of the ATST-EM.)

Initially the government of East Timor wanted the complete "Timorisation" of logistics and training to occur within five years and wished to be self-sufficient by 2006, by December 2005 both the Australian and New Zealand (NZ) Battalions had long departed and the NZ contribution to this mission now stands at one officer. (ETDF, 2001, Contracted Logistic Support, p. 1.)

The government requirement, while succinct, is not without numerous challenges when it is considered that in any one classroom of the ETDF there are three, perhaps four languages spoken (Tetum, Portuguese, English and Indonesian); logistic resupply was carried out by interdicting Indonesian patrols and tertiary educational qualifications were sparse. The role of developing the ETDF Headquarters was given to the NZ and Australian members of the Office of Defence Force Development (ODFD) within the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET). (Department of Defense, 2001, p. 3, ATST-EM and NZDFD-EM Reconnaissance Visit Report.)

The declaration of East Timor as a sovereign nation could hardly be more difficult. It is an extremely poor country, with a *per capita* income of about

USD \$300. This is equivalent to the income of the poorest states of mainland Southeast Asia, and that of Portugal's former African colonies, and below that of the small Pacific Island and Caribbean nations. This was compounded by the fact that about 70% of its building stock was substantially or partially destroyed in September-October 1999 and during that year East Timor's GDP is estimated to have dropped by about one-third. (Hill & Saldanha, 2001, pp. 3-4, East Timor Development Challenges for the World's Newest Nation.)

On top of this there was massive population resettlement and dislocation in that year and large refugee camps still exist across the border, although 100,000 East Timorese have moved back into East Timor. Many commercial operators and the technical expertise they employed fled in 1999 and are unlikely to return. (Hill & Saldanha, *op cit.*)

The country lacks high-level bureaucratic capacity as during the Indonesian period, senior echelons were dominated by non-Timorese; while U.N. officials occupied most senior positions until May 2002; the country has a constitutional and legal system in its infancy, and land ownership disputes are rife owing to the fact that land is held in Portuguese, Indonesian and Timorese land titles. (Hill & Saldanha, *op cit.*)

It was into this environment the NZ Defence Force (NZDF), which has become increasingly involved in peacekeeping operations, was mobilized. Over the last thirty years the NZDF has been involved in operations spanning the world, these have included Rhodesia, Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Sinai, Somalia, Bougainville, Kuwait, Cambodia, Laos, Sierra Leone, Angola, Solomon Islands and Mozambique. Further in 1975 the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Bill Rowling, stated that NZ would respond sympathetically to a request from the U.N. for assistance within East Timor. (Crawford, J. & Harper, G. 2001, p 15, Operation Timor.)

Ironically within the NZ Army, tours of duty within Angola, Mozambique or East Timor are known as the "Portuguese Battlefield Tours", as all are former Portuguese colonies, and NZ Army personnel have spent great periods of

time in these missions. From a training perspective there are several recurring themes in these operations, and in particular NZ's role. Firstly, that rightly or wrongly, peacekeeping has become an increased part of the military's role; some dichotomy exists as soldiers are not trained to be peacekeepers but are recognized as the most aptly-suited to carry out this role. (Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine, 2004, pp. 5-10.)

Secondly, training is an integral part of peacekeeping programs; if the guerilla soldiers are not trained to become self-sufficient they will resort to the law of the gun to survive, with the end result being chaos and anarchy, as Angola has proved for the last twenty-five years, and other separate U.N. missions have demonstrated. (Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine, 2004, pp. 5-9)

Lastly, it is crucial that training programs are effective, culturally aware and appropriate to the context. The researcher observed within Angola both Russian and Portuguese military units ostensibly peacekeeping in areas they had previously fought in. This, in the researcher's observations, bought the U.N. absolutely no credibility and total distrust from rebels and civilian populace alike. (Lessons Learned Cell, p. 21.)

In fact, the very scope of confusion, which surrounds peacekeeping, was demonstrated by the International Peace Academy, which described peacekeeping as a form of intervention:

"The prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace".

(Connaughton, R. 2001, Military Intervention and Peacekeeping, p 16)

Further, there are eight fundamental questions to be considered as part of the decision-making process towards military or humanitarian intervention:

Availability – whom can we send and is there a national interest or moral obligation to intervene, is there a real threat to international peace, security, the rule of law and humanitarianism, is there a clear aim, can the proposed mission succeed, how is success to be defined, can the conclusion – the end game – be envisioned; is there an exit strategy and how, therefore, may failure be defined and finally who pays? (Connaughton 2001, p. 55.)

Each of these of these questions have a direct relationship within the parameters of this dissertation, from two perspectives – the initial implementation of a peace intervention force called INTERFET and the subsequent transition into a U.N.-sanctioned mission called UNTAET, both were primarily ANZAC led and dominated and the latter had training teams assigned to stabilize East Timor from a military perspective. (Department of Defense, *op cit.*)

Availability for a mission always poses huge problems, soldiers are the best people to send on peacekeeping operations, and in fact peacekeeping is the antithesis for the roles for which they are trained. Unfortunately, in today's society there are few organizations, which knowingly and more importantly willingly send their workers into harm's way. The result in many cases is that developing world nations attempt to resolve the problems within developing world nations with a predictable outcome; this is exacerbated by the fact that the main income-gathering machine for some nations is *via* the U.N. The researcher noted that some cynics note that the U.N. is in fact a methodology by which the wealth of a few may be distributed for the common good to the many. (Lessons Learned Cell, 2003, p.15.)

East Timor had some 26 contributing nations, and while not denigrating the hard work of the majority, there were some nations that brought the worst aspects of their culture into theatre; to date there are peacekeepers imprisoned within East Timor who committed abhorrent crimes, were discharged from their army's and made subject to East Timorese Laws and imprisoned, which is not often the norm. (Researcher's Tour of Dili Prison, 2001).

The requirement for a national interest or moral obligation to intervene is currently a subject of increased debate within East Timor, and not the least because of the huge oil reserve within the Timor Gap, which is currently the subject of debate between Australia and East Timor. The East Timorese harbour some resentment of the fact that for 25 years, Indonesia's invasion went unchecked and largely unmentioned on the world stage. This was observed by the researcher to cause angst among the ANZAC fraternity who largely manned the entire ODFD. (Crawford, J. & Harper, G. 1996, p. 5. Operation Timor.)

The threat to international peace and humanitarianism is linked to the former invader – a fact realized by Australia and NZ. Indonesia has the largest standing army in the region and both armies' have confronted them before, albeit within Malaysia. The choice is to pacify or to confront the aggressors. The resultant interior instability within Indonesia provided an opportune moment to intervene, confront and provide humanitarian support – without intervention being seen as a malevolent force. (Centre for Defence Studies, 2000, pp 38-44.)

The clear aim is more difficult to ascertain, the U.N. seemed to be very clear as to what, where and how this was to be achieved and but unsure to how the ETDF should be moulded. The Portuguese were eager to re-establish their former 400-year dominance and the Portuguese asserted to the researcher that they planned to be in East Timor for many years. This aim seemed to be reinforced by the choice of Portuguese as the *lingua franca*, which was at all odds with the proportion of the population who could speak the language. The Australian Training Support Team, East Timor (ATST-EM) and the NZ Defence Force Development Team, East Timor (NZDFD-EM) was given clear indication of their mission and aims. (Department of Defence, 2001, ATST-EM & NZDFD-ET Reconnaissance Visit Report, pp. 2-12.)

Mission success and how this is defined will always be subject to debate; the ultimate aim this case is East Timor's internal stability and self-governance. However, this must not be swayed by financial or political master strategy –

former Portuguese colonies have a penchant for tying up huge U.N. resources and also for failure; for example, as in Angola and Mozambique - and the same mistakes the U.N. made there are manifesting themselves within East Timor. (Lessons Learned Cell, pp. 21-22.)

The rapid transit of indigenous peoples to a self-governing state is a truly altruistic goal, but not providing them with the tools to accomplish this leads to catastrophe. If the police and army are not raised, trained or sustained adequately they will fail. Not only will they fail, but also history indicates they will fail and resort to the lowest common denominator noted by the researcher in war-torn countries – the law of the gun. This is also aligned with propositions such as - “Can an acceptable conclusion be envisioned and is there an exit strategy and who pays?” This can be the question that often drives the entire rationale behind the raise, train and sustain methodology employed. It is a comment often made - that the U.N. is the only military growth industry not subject to the harsh realities of the world’s military-industrial complex. (Lessons Learned Cell, p. 35.)

The cost of getting things drastically wrong or causing further or greater instability is the further injection of funds and forces. This diverts the main effort away from East Timor’s self-sustenance to possible military intervention at inopportune moments for those countries in close geographical or political position to East Timor. The distinguished Australian historian Robert O’Neill had already commented “ the tragedy of an Indonesian take-over, would be that it would spark a guerilla war, which would remain a running sore at Australia’s front door for the next ten years”. (Crawford, J. & Harper, G. 1996, p. 15, Operation Timor.)

This study will outline how the mandate of the East Timor Transitional Authority (ETTA) in relation to matters logistic was achieved. ETTA noted that the mission of the ETDF was to “Defend East Timor, its people and its territory”, the tasks agreed-to specifically by the East Timorese leadership were to “defeat incursions, deter aggressors, and delay and harass an invader

until external help arrives: and support the government during natural disasters and other emergencies". (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p.44.)

This was further exacerbated by the fact that the triumvirate of training nations tasked with the provision of logistic support to East Timor were Australia, NZ and Portugal – nations East Timor believed deserted it in its hour of need, when Indonesia invaded. (Crawford, J. & Harper, *op cit.*)

Despite initial pessimism by some, there were some factors, which directly contributed to the population and world stage maintaining an optimistic outlook, these were: the unifying presence of three key political/religious figures – Xanana Gusmao and Nobel Laureates Bishop Carlos Belo and Jose Ramos Horta. Political tensions notwithstanding, an Angolan-style civil war is not likely to erupt as East Timor is recovering more quickly than practically any other war-torn economy in the recent past, this is partially due to the fact that there is much international goodwill, and aid flows are very large. (Hill & Saldanha, 2001, p. 3.)

There is also a sizeable diaspora with skills and money and a sense of pragmatism on economic policy pervades much of the putative Timorese leadership, as evidenced by the willingness to adopt some tough macroeconomic policy decisions. There is significant export potential, including oil and gas, coffee and tourism, and as a latecomer to the world stage, there is much to learn from the mistakes of other newly independent states. (Hill & Saldanha, 2001, p. 4.)

1.1 Context of the Problem

The aim of this study is to identify the factors, which facilitate and inhibit the raising, training and sustaining of the logistic support mechanisms for the ETDF. Reviewing training literature and analyzing planning literature to develop the strategic, operational and tactical requirements for the ETDF, will help accomplish this aim.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The cornerstone of East Timor's national strategy will be the successful integration of its foreign policy, economic development and security requirements. The underpinning principle here will be the involvement and membership in international organizations such as ASEAN and the Pacific Forum, and the development of solid bilateral relationships with friends in the region who possess an interest in the continuing development of an independent East Timor. (Hill and Saldanha, 2001, pp. 6 – 18.)

The logistic component of the ETDF is limited to approximately 5% of the total Army's strength, which equates to roughly 150 personnel. This breakdown highlights the focus of the ETDF personnel on performing the core functions of a defence force, with minimal regard to non-core military positions. The ETDF does not possess the corporate knowledge or personnel skill-sets required to undertake its own logistic management and delivery. It is therefore necessary to investigate other methods by which this can be done - either fully contracted-out to a commercial contractor, or operating as a part of the ETDF. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p.30.)

Simple matters, e.g., the embedding of external logistic agencies within the ETDF became increasingly complex and routine matters - e.g., the training of ETDF personnel within Australia and NZ - became almost impossible owing to the non-existent English language skills and health problems with the preferred incumbents. Both NZ and Australia were required to play key roles and without offending the sensibilities of trainers who were already in-country training, albeit at a standard, depth and breadth unacceptable to Australia and NZ for a variety of reasons.

The ETDF seemed oblivious to the procedural oversights being committed during training and were already considered poor cousins, relative to the training standards and facilities lavished upon the Police Force. Many NZ's and Australians noted that the lack of support proffered to the ETDF was a deliberate slight aimed at diminishing the role of the Army and increasing the

Police Force into a paramilitary force with all-encompassing powers. (Centre for Defence Studies, 2000, pp 37-38.)

This situation was further exacerbated by the initial unwillingness of the East Timor Government to appoint a Minister of Defence, who once chosen revealed a preference for the Education portfolio, which was not forthcoming.

The significance of these mounting problems was not lost on the ODFD partners as neither could afford, from a strategic perspective, for East Timor to become another Papua-New Guinea situation. From a sociological perspective there are many nations on the South Pacific Rim, which are inherently unstable from a military, financial and social perspective, e.g. Fiji, New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Bougainville. (Centre for Defence Studies, 2000, p. 38.)

If a blueprint for Training can be developed and templated across the broad spectrum, this may become the U.N. standard for the redevelopment of the developing world of the Pacific nations, for which Australia and NZ have ethical and moral obligations to support amid issues of regional stability. (Crawford, J. & Harper, G. p. 15 & 157)

1.3 Statement of Hypotheses

Three hypotheses were investigated during this dissertation:

Hypothesis One: The ETDF does not possess the corporate knowledge or personal skill sets required to undertake its own logistic management and delivery.

Hypothesis Two: These deficiencies of the ETDF will require to be rectified by formal training mediums within the specialist logistic spheres.

Hypothesis Three: The deficiencies of the ETDF will require large donor nation-input and shadow posting of ETDF soldiers alongside international staff to assist formal training.

1.4 Significance of the Problem

The U.N. has become increasingly embroiled in peacekeeping, peace making and peace enforcement operations worldwide. Peacekeeping aims to prevent conflict, or its resumption, the physical act of separation of hostile elements by a third party to allow negotiations to reach a political settlement. (The Army Field Manual, Volume 1, The Fundamentals, Part 1, The Application of Force, 1985, p.11.)

Peacekeeping has become an increasing part of the military's role and with this comes an increased training role, not only in teaching soldiers to become peacekeepers, but also in teaching soldiers to become teachers and, by proxy, ambassadors. (Crawford, J. & Harper, G. p. 157.)

Training of guerilla, rebel or "developing world" armies has also become a growth industry - in the first instance this responsibility comes under the auspices of donor nations, and in many instances these donor nations have become inexorably intertwined with the infrastructures of the developing nation - and hence the role they start to play is so important that mission creep becomes inevitable and any withdrawal of personnel becomes a political nightmare. (Lessons Learned Cell, pp. 38-39.)

Training programs developed for emerging nations are often developed out of synchronization of a country's capabilities, needs or wants. It is absolutely imperative that the training management packages are effective, culturally aware and appropriate in context. Donor nations must be suitably equipped and also be prepared to be in-location for the "duration" – transparency of operations is a huge issue, as is accountability. (Lessons Learned Cell, p. 21.)

A common fault in peacekeeping training operations is the templating of training from previous missions and the attempt to superimpose training packages, lessons learned and desired outcomes onto and into current operations – upon which a form of “cognitive dissonance” manifests itself when the training falls short of anticipated outcomes.

East Timor is in a precarious situation as Australia and NZ extricate themselves from the peacekeeping arena. NZ withdrew its battalion in December 2002 and Australia did the same in December 2003. The stability that these two donor nations instilled was made even more precarious when NZ withdrew members of the ODFD and initially offered no replacements – as this was the end of their mandated financial commitment.

NZ provided two officers within the ODFD, one was the Logistic Officer who managed and maintained all logistic standard operating procedures and managed and set up contracts for the entire support operation. The other was the Administrative Officer who developed all the human resources regulations and oversaw the payroll operations. The Australians provided a further three officers and this cadre staff was responsible for training the headquarters element of the ETDF, who would in less than a year be responsible for overall management of the 3000-strong ETDF.

1.5 Assumptions of the Study

The following assumptions are made in relation to this study: The ETDF will be a volunteer, apolitical defence force accountable to civilian oversight, the essential outcomes of the logistic training management package are that it be effective, affordable and sustainable, there will be an ongoing requirement for logistic support from donor nations; and the ETDF will be a Light Infantry Force of about 1500 Regulars and 1500 Reservists, with training, support and maritime elements.

1.6 Limitations of the Study

In the conduct of all the case studies there were limitations on the time available for the researcher to conduct the studies, because of existing work commitments and external timelines set for project completion. Access to the populations to be studied was limited because of a number of factors. In the conduct of the East Timor Study, access to the current members of the ETDF was limited because of time and monetary constraints. General access to other personnel required for data was reduced in duration because of conflicting priorities.

Some restrictions were imposed because of the security threat to the study team whilst operating in East Timor. Language and cultural differences between the researcher and study participants also influenced this study. In the East Timor analysis, there was also a significant external direction on the research team to produce a pre-determined political outcome. (Lessons Learned Cell, p. 21.)

The training strategy for the ETDF is an all-encompassing document, which by the very nature of training is an iterative process and should cover two major areas; syllabus training for basic and advanced training. The syllabus design for basic training was inclusive of the purely military skills, literacy and numeracy required to be brought to a single level, and all troops required to be trained on how to assist civil agencies in time of natural disasters, strikes, riots and unrest and the syllabus design for advanced training covers the multitude of corps, trade and specialist courses required for band-and-rank progression within the military.

This was unachievable in a dissertation this size and this study will be limited to the identification of the factors inhibiting and facilitating the raise, train and sustain factors developed from a Training Management Plan for the logistic infrastructure within the ETDF.

The logistic infrastructure has two clearly delineated components – the commercially outsourced logistic functions and the ETDF military functions. These are driven by capability, financial imperatives and resource constraints, which are mainly time and space.

Another subtle limitation was the distance the U.N. imposed, both overtly and covertly on supporting the ODFD, and indirectly the ETDF itself. This enigma will be further amplified within this dissertation, and it caused great angst among ODFD staff and ETDF personnel alike. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p. 19.)

1.7 Relevance of the Study

The logistic concept of operations is not bound by any convention or current norms of practice and may be initiated in any methodology so long as it is effective and efficient from a resource and financial perspective.

East Timor is broadcast as one of the most predominant U.N. success stories, and as such actively encouraged the initiation and instigation of policy and procedure that on previous U.N. Missions might have been seen as radical.

UNTAET also had the unique situation of following-on from Intervention Force East Timor (INTERFET), which was an Australian-led and Australia and NZ Army Corp (ANZAC) dominated force. This led to the situating of many logistic and financial strategies, aligned to common ANZAC doctrine, in place, albeit revised, revisited and reorganized once the bureaucratic machine which is the U.N. was firmly established in East Timor.

Both nations were, however, astute enough to remember the lessons of Vietnam and realized that the force of popular opinion could, and would, break the resolve of a determined but misinformed few. Both NZ and Australian military and civilian personnel were aware that ethnocentricity, both real or perceived would be poorly received and could potentially undermine any good work carried out, that said there were times when accusations were made of

bias and suggested courses of action were poorly received and reluctantly carried out.

Conclusion

East Timor was sobering experience for both NZ and Australia, and for the first time since World War Two there was conflict on our doorstep. For which intervention was required – rapid resolution to stabilize the situation was an imperative. Neither Australia or NZ could afford to leave a training vacuum in place, and to rectify this situation, immediate training and analysis measures were implemented to mitigate the immediate risk and to ensure that this training deficiency was addressed from a strategic perspective.

Chapter Two discusses the strategies required to raise, train and sustain the ETDF and includes the role that civilian contractors would play, in light of the dearth of experienced logisticians embedded within the ETDF.

Also discussed are the military doctrinal approaches to training and illustrations of how external agencies can be utilized to provide both synergy and robustness to the logistic processes without requiring large financial input.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides an overview of factors that are to be considered when designing a TMP. The literature review is discussed in three parts; part one discusses the military doctrinal approach to training, part two discusses the strategies outlining the raising, training and sustaining of the ETDF from a commercial perspective; and part three, discusses logistics.

Part One discusses strategies that outline the raising, training and sustaining of the ETDF and includes the Kings College Study on East Timor, an independently commissioned study, The ODFD Force Development Plan, Contractors on the Battlefield and the Contractor Statement of Requirements.

Part Two discusses the military doctrinal approaches to training, including: Competency Based Training Assessment, The Australian/NZ Army Training System, The Influence of the ATS on Defence, The Development of Needs Assessment, and The Army Capability Management System.

Part Three discusses Logistics, both from a military doctrinal perspective and from a civilian doctrinal perspective. This allows Parts One and Two to be put into perspective and then the Army Appreciation Process is overlaid to form a gap analysis, which clearly identifies areas that are critical, and/or single points of failure.

2.1 Independent Study on Security Force Options for East Timor

The Center for Defence Studies, King's College London visited East Timor in July 2000 and conducted a study with a threefold aim, these were: to address the future of FALANTIL, examine the feasibility and propose options for a future ETDF and analyze government aspects in relation to security and civil-military relations. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p. 5.)

When developing the transitional defence force requirements for East Timor the King's College Study Group developed a checklist of civil-military factors which were utilized in a range of other post-conflict situations. Given East Timor's complex past, the dynamic between the civilian and military actors needs to be continuously monitored, in particular by engaging as wide a range of actors as possible. Further there is a need for the establishment of specific committees dealing with defence and security issues, as well as oversight mechanisms for budgets. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p. 26.)

Within the executive there was the necessity for a civilian leader serving as commander-in-chief and to aid the oversight process there was the need for the defence budget and spending to be transparent. Constitutional and legal provisions highlighted that there was the need for a functional separation of the police and military and to aid citizen's security the question needed to be asked "do citizens of East Timor feel safe and protected from external abuses and threats? (This refers more to a psychological sense of security than one based on the actual reality of the ability of East Timor to defend itself against outside aggressors.) (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p. 31.)

Within areas of civil society the extent of civil society engagement in security-related issues had to be ascertained for example, are there NGOs run by civilians that address security concerns and do members of the military provide services that would otherwise be carried out by the civilian government?

From a purely military perspective do members of the Armed Forces have a role in internal security, and should the armed forces control industries that would otherwise be controlled by the private sector and does the military have responsibility for intelligence functions within a state? The final conundrum does the military serve as an employment safety net in a weak economy? (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p. 26.)

A key finding of the Study and one which is supported by this researcher, is that the ETDF's knowledge of defence management as it relates to a modern

armed force in a democratic country is understandably limited. A priority requirement for the ETDF is appropriate training in all aspects of defence management for selected individuals and specialist-function training for a larger group. Such training would expedite the requisite defence management skills and provide the foundation for best practice in terms of accountability and transparency in the new force. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p. 30.)

The ETDF, when raised, would be required to support four fundamental mission statements; to deter aggressors, to defeat incursion, to provide government support during crises short of armed conflict and to delay/harass an invader until external help arrives. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p. 44.)

The force requires being large enough and sufficiently well trained and equipped for aggressors to realize that East Timor could not be attacked without costs to themselves and then a dichotomy emerged – the force could not be so large or potent that it is thought to be aggressive, its posture must be entirely defensive.

Ideally, the government also wanted for support to be forthcoming in more tangible ways; firstly the force's manpower and engineering skills could be called upon for assistance during a natural disaster. Secondly, servicemen may have to act in place of a vital service (fire, ambulance, essential services, etc) during strike action. Lastly, the ETDF may have to step in to control disturbances, potentially and possibly armed, that are beyond the control of the Police. All these desirables are achievable, but come with a training overhead and can be a huge burden on the logistic infrastructure required to support them. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, pp. 44-45.)

2.2 Force Development Plan for the East Timor Defence Force

The Force Development Plan (FDP) for the ETDF was conceptualised following a meeting organised by the ODFD, Dr Roque Rodriguez, then Head

of the ODFD, and Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak, the Chief of Defence Force of the ETDF.

The FDP was the outline plan for a phased build-up of the ETDF including its recruitment, training, weapons, equipment and accommodation over a three-year period and for a further two years, leading to a relatively “steady-state”. It also sought to identify the related contributions and support to be requested from donor nations to achieve this, and then develop timelines for this external support required to bring the ETDF to a point where it became largely self-sufficient. (ATST-EM Visit Report, 2001, p.4.)

East Timor’s military strategy is derived from an analysis of the external strategic environment, the internal strategic environment and the nation’s historical experience. (Centre for Defence Studies, 2000, p.44.)

East Timor’s strategic environment is characterised by building solid bilateral relationships with nations in the region, as well as developing a role within the region through involvement in multilateral fora. East Timor’s external strategic focus will be on integrating its foreign policy, economic development and security requirements. East Timor’s military strategy will require a commitment to contribute to regional security; however, the focus for the immediate future will be confined to fulfilling the ETDF’s mission, which is to “Defend East Timor, its people and territories” (FDP, p. 14)

East Timor’s internal strategic environment is characterised by nation building and development. The ETDF will be the defence arm of the government’s security elements, subordinate to civilian control and responsive to government direction. Furthermore, the ETDF will need to work and co-ordinate with other government agencies, i.e. the civilian Police and Border Control Services. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p.45.)

To logistically support the force structure two models were considered. The first, that the ETDF conduct all logistic functions, and the second, that civilian contractors conduct the force logistics function. The preferred and most cost-

effective option, which is ever-increasingly being used by most worldwide military forces, is for selected logistics functions to be undertaken by a contractor, with management oversight provided by uniformed members of the logistic staff within ETDF Headquarters. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p.58.)

A Contractor-managed option was selected as it provided clear advantages, amongst these being that the logistic functions remain under the ETDF's control and are recognised as the commander's responsibility, while the service provider provides the physical logistic function. This was coupled with the fact that approximately 150 soldiers are required to be trained and employed in logistics roles, thus allowing more flexibility for the employment of uniformed personnel in tactical units, thus facilitating a good fighting soldier ratio. (ETDF, Contracted Logistic Support, pp. 23-24.)

A contractor can also provide an immediate logistics capability and allow for training of soldier logisticians while supporting a force-in-being as it is developed/trained and this contract will allow for consistent-quality support while contributing to East Timor's economy and provides a basis for further investment. A contract will further assist the economy by creating business opportunities and employment and potentially providing employment for ex-FALINTIL soldiers, working for the contractor while the contract operation will introduce training opportunities and new skills into the ETDF and East Timor in general.

2.3 Contractors on the Battlefield – The Doctrinal Dilemmas

Contractors have been present on battlefields since time immemorial; they have provided valuable service in modern situations ranging from contingencies in Somalia, Bosnia, Angola, and Mozambique and will be a familiar sight on battlefields of the future. (FM 100-10-2, pp. 1-10). Contractors have been present in civilian organisations within East Timor, on and off, mainly from northern Australia and Indonesia, and with the resurgence of the rebuilding of infrastructure, under U.N. auspices will be around for many years

to come. There are dilemmas facing the ETDF commanders, and indeed the ODFD, in relation to deployment of these contractors, those being, doctrinal and in terms of risk resolution.

The threats to security within the East Timor environment are economic, social, political and military by nature. These threats affect not only the ETDF but also the contractors operating internally and externally to that organisation. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p.38.)

Economic Threats. The Indonesian provinces to the west of East Timor are impoverished, with high population densities and overall development has lagged behind other areas within the region. The future development of the region is constrained by a lack of infrastructure and a seasonal cycle that limits development during the times of heavy monsoon rains and East Timor will be vulnerable to the economic instability of its local region. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p.39.)

Social Threats. East Timor is located in a region of great local social diversity and this is reflected internally in its own linguistic and social diversity. This and religious differences have ignited tensions among different ethnic groups in the past and dislocation of indigenous peoples added not only economic woes to the situation but fuelled widespread ethnic tension and sometimes outright conflict. (Center for Defence Studies, *op cit.*)

Political Threats. Behind much of the social unrest are political factors fuelled by economic troubles and these will exacerbate deteriorating economic and social conditions. Indonesia is currently chronically unstable and this instability allows for a return to military rule, this could in turn have severe implications for regional stability and security. (Center for Defence Studies, *op cit.*)

Military Threats. The ETDF realised early on in the situation that until it became a force in being and fully operational, it must place great stead in the U.N. for border security both to deter and protect their territory. The very nature of the terrain on the border makes it impossible to fully seal the border

without massive manpower and resource requirements and while it is generally perceived that the militia pose little threat to the ETDF, this is not the way the ETDF see the situation hence a minor border incursion has the potential to escalate into a critical border incident. (Center for Defence Studies, *op cit.*)

Having considered the threats now the rationale for contracting out must be considered and it is the researcher's belief that the rationale for employing contractors on the battlefield is based primarily upon financial reasons, some of which are politically motivated, and then in terms of economy of effort. Soldiers are expensive to train, expensive to deploy and expensive to keep current in the skills required on the modern battlefield, and this is exacerbated in East Timor's case, where the Army in early 2001 was in name only, and then latterly only raised at half-strength, with the majority being under training.

Contractors accordingly are employed to fulfil tasks that are deemed to be non-core, and to release soldiers from the administrative rear to the front. In the ETDF's case there are only 150 soldiers allocated for logistic positions out of a total 3000, thus the contracted option becomes extremely advantageous. These two reasons would however be negated if there was not a pecuniary advantage to be gained from contracting-out these tasks, or time and space imperatives driving the force down a particular path.

If we superimpose the Logistic Levels of War (US ALMC, Scope of Logistics, p. 11) on the ETDF scenario, particularly strategic logistics, the following definition provides added insight to another reason favouring contractors on the battlefield:

“Strategic logistics deals with mobilisation, acquisition, projecting forces, strategic mobility and the strategic concentration of logistics in the theatre base. It links the nation's economic base to its military operations in theatre.” (US ALMC, Scope of Logistics, p 11.)

The hypothesis offered here is that popular national support may eventuate, as a result of financial benefit, from the use of civilian contractors on the battlefield, as well as political support. That the ETDF has great civilian support and financial benefit to the community can only serve to strengthen its already-strong links within the country's infrastructure. There may be some doubt as to whether the term strategic is appropriate in this sense in relation to East Timor's size and the defensive role of the ETDF and possibly the diminutive term tactical or operational logistics should be used, however this does not change the principles involved.

Historically the U.N. has utilised Logistic Civilian Augmentation Programs (LOGCAP) since 6 December 1985, formalising a process, which has been an *ad-hoc* arrangement in many theatres of war. The goals of LOGCAP are to plan during peacetime for effective use of contractor support in a contingency, leverage global/regional corporate resources as facility and logistic services support multipliers, provide an alternative augmentation capability to meet facility and logistic service shortfalls and provide a quick reaction to contingency requirements. (FM 100-10-2, pp. 3-9.)

Thus in East Timor's case, the contractor may bring a plethora of knowledge and inherent training skills and capacity to the theatre of operations. This allows for synergy to be developed within the manpower and training spheres, and in the best-case scenario develops into a symbiotic relationship whereby ETDF personnel shadow-posted within the contractor environment can pick up invaluable trade skills in a realistic training environment.

The ODFD became intimately familiar with the terminology and definitions, which outline the type of contractor-support available by contingency and environment; these being contingency contracting which entails participation of military and other public, joint and allied elements to assist in emergency situations caused by war, natural disaster, terrorist or subversive activities, collapse of law-and-order or political instability. (FM 100-10-2, pp. 1-15)

Contingencies may be classified under three criteria: Major Theatre War

(MTW), in which contracting usually supplements or is part of robust Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS). Small Scale Contingencies (SSC) in which contracting often supplements CS and CSS capabilities limited by location, strategic lift or manpower ceilings and stability or support activities during which CS and CSS infrastructures are limited or non-existent and deployed forces increasingly rely on commercial or host nation support (HNS). (FM 100-10-2, p 1-15 – 1-16.)

Contracting environments are either mature or immature. Mature environments are those which are well established and in which contractors have a relative degree of safety within their area of operations, examples of these are Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Korea, Western Europe and the Multi-National Force of Observers in the Sinai. Immature environments are those in which, as a generalisation, the infrastructure of the country has been destroyed. This poses difficulties for contracting staff from financial and safety perspectives; examples of these are Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Angola, Bougainville and East Timor. (US ALMC Contracting and Logistic Planning LEDC, 1999, p. 2.)

East Timor's situation contained elements from within each of the listed contingencies or environments and training implications inevitably could and would be linked into contractor resolution of the issues at hand. The more logistic functionality that was contracted-out, the fewer requirements existed for the ETDF to develop TMP within the military training environment at Metinaro.

The researcher cautioned senior defence officials that excessive reliance on contractors could be a potential "Sword of Damocles" hanging over their heads. Whilst it removed discrete elements of logistic infrastructure away from the ETDF, and allowed for training to be designed, developed and implemented by a third party. It does not necessarily place the onus for that training upon the contractor, and, if stipulated as a requirement, there may be an additional cost, further would it adhere to the ETDF's or the contractors standards?

One of the biggest concerns facing the use of contractors on the battlefield is the fact that they are there to fulfil contractual obligations, return a profit and then apply the skills learned to the next contract. You cannot order a contractor to accept the same risk as a uniformed person does, and if contractors are utilised to provide critical, mission-essential commodities, this may require reorganisation or reassignment of military assets at inopportune times. (ADF, Civilian Contractors, 1999, p.186.)

2.4 Contractor Statement of Requirements

Having identified the potential dilemmas of having contractors on the battlefield, the ETDF now had to identify what and where the contractual support would lie. Within this concept is an implied requirement for training as part of the contract acceptance program, this being underpinned by risk mitigation and reduction in financial overheads. These are the top-level requirements for ETDF training and ease the identification of factors, which specifically facilitate or inhibit logistic support mechanisms therein. (ETDF, 2001, Contracted Logistic Support, pp. 1-4.)

To maximise combat effectiveness and the overall efficiency of the force, logistics support of the combat units will be contracted out. ETDF personnel will only be directly involved in those logistic functions carried out at the tactical units themselves, and accordingly, these units will only be established for the logistic personnel required to support that level of capability. ETDF personnel will also be employed within strategic planning and contract management roles within the force headquarters structure. (ETDF, 2001, Contracted Logistic Support, pp. 23-24.)

For logistic functions performed at the major camp level, or in second-line support of deployed tactical units, a commercial contractor will be employed. A single multi-activity commercial support contract is required, which will see the appointed contractor managing and delivering logistics support to the ETDF, in a partnering arrangement, with the contractor integral to the ETDF supply chain. The contract will cover support of ETDF operations throughout

East Timor, operating at all current and subsequent locations. (ETDF, 2001, Contracted Logistic Support, *op cit.*)

The activities to be included in the logistics contract include catering and ration support, supply services and warehousing, transportation, fuels, oils, lubricants and gas products, equipment maintenance, weapons and ammunition, facilities management, medical and dental Services, ETDF personnel training and ETDF government-furnished facilities and equipment. (ETDF, 2001, Contracted Logistic Support, pp. 23-26.)

These are extremely generic requirements and the requirements for this support within the military are similar the world over. As a generalization, the companies which tender for such contracts are generally staffed by former military officers and soldiers (e.g. Brown and Root, DynCorp and Halliburton), and this presented further training options to the ODFD. Either contract-out the entire logistics requirement, thus eliminating the entire training conundrum from the ETDF and redeploying soldiers identified within logistic realms into the other corps, or, maximise the synergy that will eventuate from interfacing with former military experts within the logistic contract and “shadow post” ETDF personnel within the civilian contract staff, hopefully neutralizing costs for both the ETDF and the contractor, and providing an effective and efficient Training medium in the process. (ADF, Civilian Contractors, 1999. pp.34-37.)

The option of contracting-out the entire logistic function is normally met with objections from everyone excluding the financiers, and normally does not stand up to rigorous debate, partially for some of the reasons outlined within the doctrinal dilemmas pertaining to contractors on the battlefield, and then from recognition and realization of the hole it leaves in the logistic military capability and the risk that this entails.

The option of co-opting uniformed personnel to assist the contractor, not only fulfills the contractual requirement of training ETDF personnel, but is also

seen as free labour, albeit in degrees only. This option does not leave a gap in capability, either, and was the preferred option of all ODFD staff.

The next problem was aligning the system of supply and responsibility for lesson plans. ETDF support personnel employed within the supply, driving, armourer, medical and fuel-handling roles required training in basic-to-advanced skill-levels within their respective trade groups. It is intended that much of this training be undertaken through formalized ETDF training programmes and through assistance from other nations. However, the opportunity exists for the contractor to assist specialist training by providing some basic trade tuition, plus opportunities for on-the-job training (OJT) consolidation and experience. (ETDF, Contracted Logistic Support, 2001. pp. 23-24.)

The contractor was then approached to provide basic trade training under supervision to ETDF personnel in the following areas:

- a. Transportation
 - (i). Driver training to licenced standards.
 - (ii). Vehicle daily inspection competence for drivers.
 - (iii). Basic vehicle field servicing.

- b. Supply/Warehousing
 - (i). Basic inventory management.
 - (ii). Receipt and dispatch procedures.
 - (iii). Inventory accounting system usage, including data entry.
 - (iv). Stocktaking procedures.

- c. Armourer
 - (i). Weapon storage procedures.
 - (ii). Weapon accounting system usage.
 - (iii). Basic weapon maintenance.
 - (iv). Weapon cleaning, and,

- d. Fuel handling
 - (i). Fuel storage and accounting procedures.
 - (ii). Fuel quality control and testing procedures.
 - (iii). Fuel spill-handling procedures.
 - (iv). Inventory accounting system usage. (ETDF, Contracted Logistic Support, 2001. *op cit.*)

Discussions then took place with the potential contractor staff to ensure that they understood the scope of the problem and several empirical examples were utilized as training mediums; the following examples were quoted.

Driver Training – the current driving practice within East Timor is to squeeze as many people as possible into any vehicle, the most memorable being a motorcycle with five people, including a breastfeeding mother, with a pig and a dog on the carrier and live chickens on the handlebars. It is normal practice to see Japanese sedan cars used as taxis - with up to ten people crammed inside and at least four people in the boot. If a vehicle has more than four gears or a high/low ratio, they will not be utilized.

Ration Training – The current mindset within the ETDF is to eat at every given opportunity. This is a hangover from their guerilla days and is common practice within that sphere. The researcher's predecessor issued the battalion (600 soldiers) with seven-days rations, in order to train them in rationing, storage, and field hygiene, they were delivered the rations on a Friday night and told the next resupply would be the following Friday. On Sunday morning the Supply Officer was rung and told "all the rations were gone and the men were hungry!"

Financial Training – The Battalion Commander at Los Palos informed the ODFD that he needed some petty cash to procure building supplies and pay for locally-employed civilians in his area of operations. Following a great deal of discussion within the ODFD, during which both NZ Officers stated their inclination to decline the request, it was unilaterally decided by the Chief of the ODFD to issue the officer with US\$500.00, payment was for items as stated,

only, and receipts were to be provided for proof-of-purchase. At the next battalion visit the officer requested more money and was asked for receipts and to show what he had bought, the Logistics Advisor was shown a bar fridge, a bottle of rum and cartons of cigarettes.

Equipment Husbandry – a donor nation (China) donated a second-hand field generator to the ETDF. As the instruction manuals and control boxes were written in Chinese characters the Logistic Advisor decided to have the generator serviced and load-checked prior to its issue to the battalion at Los Palos. The generator was also located on the back of an ETDF truck and weighed-in at approximately 1.5 tonnes, requiring a hoist to remove it from the truck to the ground at Los Palos. Instructions were given to not remove the truck and generator, and specifically not to connect the generator into the power reticulation system until a local contractor had serviced and measured the power output by voltage and hertz cycle.

At the next ODFD Monday meeting reports started filtering in of no power, rotting food and no water. Nothing was mentioned at the meeting by the battalion logistic officer and no action was taken until the contractor phoned the Logistic Advisor and asked where was the generator?. As both truck and generator had mysteriously vanished, the Logistic Advisor questioned both the battalion commanding officer and the logistic officer as to the truck's whereabouts - unknown was the reply.

Then a damage report appeared on the logistic advisor's desk from Telstra Australia stating that there was US\$97,000 worth of damage to the local Earth Station. Following a two-hour helicopter ride the Logistic Advisor reported back that the hired refrigerated freezer had been destroyed, all the rations (US \$10,000) were rotten, 100 fluorescent lamps and associated wiring was burnt-out, and 2.5 kilometres of wiring and a deep-well submersible pump were also burnt out, while the generator had been pushed two metres off the back of a truck and damaged. The ODFD was informed the culprit a local militia group L17, had broken into Los Palos, an armed-and-patrolled camp, and carried

out acts of sabotage, when in fact the generator was stolen by 1st Battalion Soldiers and wired into the camp grid.

Stores Ownership – owing to the communal nature of East Timor life the concept of singular ownership or title is a foreign concept. Thus, when the senior officers were issued ETDF vehicles they would not return them and utilized them for non-ETDF tasking. Similarly when a driver was issued a vehicle, when they went home or on leave they took the keys with them and would not relinquish control.

2.5 The Development of Competency Based Training (CBT) and Assessment (CBTA), a literature review of the main theories.

To assist armies in their training assessments, there are many tools available for the selection, design and implementation of training. This section of the dissertation will discuss a selection of tried-and-true methods and discuss their origins, strengths and weaknesses. NZ uses an Australian designed system CBTA. (Australian Army Manual of Land Warfare 3.4.4, Instructors Handbook, 2003, Chap 1, Para 1.4.)

During the TNA TOD within East Timor, both the researcher and another team member conducted discrete analyses and then compared their respective findings and anecdotal/empirical deficiencies. In the final reporting phase, two methodologies were utilized and each was further implemented as a “gross error staff check”, which is army parlance for ensuring that strengths and weaknesses were corroborated by two or more reliable methodologies.

If the findings contradicted one another, then the researcher noted whether bias, misinformation or misinterpretations of data were the culprits. (Training Policies and Procedures, 2005, Chap 1, Sect 7.)

The methodologies utilized were CBTA, which transformed into the Army Training System (ATS) (utilized by both Australia and NZ), and the Defence Learning Services Network Training System (DLSN). Each of these

methodologies will be discussed during this dissertation. Whilst the NZ and Australian armies have similar training methodologies based on American design principles, some debate ensued as to the appropriateness of superimposing these methodologies onto the ETDF. (Training Policies and Procedures, 2005, Chap 1, Sect 2.)

The researcher has carried out logistic instruction within all three armies, having attended the US Army senior Logistic Executive Development Course and having been on a Tour Of Duty to the Royal Australian Army Ordnance Centre as a Logistic Instructor. Noticeable differences between large and small-army training philosophies exist, as do certain idiosyncrasies for utilizing the most efficient training medium; for example, technical publications for modifications for mechanical/electrical equipment is published in text format within Australia and NZ. This format is deemed unacceptable within the U.S. Army and U.K. Army they utilize a publication in comic book form, which the researcher noted was a source of much derision amongst their ANZAC counterparts. This is where CBT represents a major shift away from traditional ideals to a system directed towards achieving workplace outcomes. (Australian Army Manual of Land Warfare 3.4.4, Instructors Handbook, 2003, Chap 1, Para 1.13.)

CBTA is not a new phenomena, it came to the fore during the Second World War (1939-45), when military imperatives drove requirements to train substantial workforces, underpinned by time constraints on new and developing skills/technology, which in turn required teaching practices to be revamped. NZ, Australia and the United States had vast rural economies during those times, and educational standards were rudimentary at best. (Training Policies and Procedures, 2005, Chap 1, Sect 2.)

What is important from an analysis perspective, within the ETDF environment, is the ability to look forwards and backwards at our training methodology, and to ascertain why it changed and how it changed – the key principle involved is that training has evolved to suit advances in technology, and as a consequence, if training is conducted in an environment whereby those

advances have not been made, or are still embryonic, there is the real chance of failure due to inappropriate mediums being utilized. (Training Policy and Procedures, 2005, Chap 1, Sect 3.)

The US Defence Forces build on these initial, rudimentary CBTA theories, and had implemented the first formalized CBTA system in training by the 1950s. CBTA has developed from those beginnings to today being the basis of the Australian and NZ Adult Education field. ANZAC forces had their first exposure to these tenets when exposed to their US counterparts during the Korean War. (Australian Army Manual of Land Warfare 3.4.4, Instructors Handbook, 2003, Chap 1, Para 1.5.)

Competencies are simply definitions of workplace actions and are predicated on the assumption that an output or job is made up of a number of smaller tasks. These tasks are generally observable and normally carried out in a logical sequence and have predictable patterns with a measurable outcome, now known as Key Performance Indicators. (Training Policy and Procedures, 2005, Chap 1, Sect 2.)

A problem encountered here with the military sector is that outcomes are not always measurable as they would be within a profit-oriented organisation, this makes it difficult to produce sound data on the benefits of adopting a specific training regime, or on a return on investment. Examples of some immeasurable outputs may be morale, attitude, or the tangible benefits of having an Army Band; these are difficult if not impossible to rate from a purely financial perspective.

A predominant problem with CBTA is that the development of published and endorsed competencies can tend to exclude workers who may have similar competencies that are not endorsed. It can also “objectify performance: it separates the subject (performer) from the object (performance)” CBTA is also notoriously difficult to apply to complex planning and decision making processes both of which will be required within the logistic parameters of the ETDF. (Foley 1995, Understanding Adult Education and Training, p. 177.)

For example in the military, a Corporal Section Commander in a Supply Company is a recognized trade; however, when viewed under a CBTA model they are a person qualified in the National Certificate of Storekeeping and Warehousing, holding a collection of some forty competencies. CBTA also tends to focus on individual competencies and their application as an individual; this negates group dynamics as an essential factor within all facets of military operations. This is important particularly when we consider that the smallest operating unit is the six-man squad and each person's tasks have circles of interdependence. (Australian Army Manual of Land Warfare 3.4.4, Instructors Handbook, 2003, Chap 1, Para 1.14.)

The development of CBTA has been a catalyst for the move to the scientific approach to training and development that has seen the rise of Systems Approaches to Training (SAT), often referred to within NZ as the Army Training System (ATS). The systems theory was developed in the 1960s by Von Bertalanffy and involves the development of a model, which explains the example under observation (Smith, 1992, Training and Development in Australia, p. 65.)

A model will always have inputs, a process, and outputs. These outputs are generally both quantifiable and qualifiable. The system is predicated around overt and covert control mechanism, i.e. disciplinary feedback, annual reporting, mentoring, and with some method of feedback analysis ensuring that the outputs are consistent, and allows modifications to be made to the inputs, when and if required. Further assessment is based entirely on demonstrable performance against well-defined standards. (Australian Army Manual of Land Warfare 3.4.4, Instructors Handbook, 2003, Chap 1, Para 1.15.)

This also has the additional benefit of having measurable resource inputs, i.e. time, Instructors, facilities and a measurable gain the organisation can expect as a result of training, normally stated as being effective and efficient. (Training Policies and Procedures, 2005, Chap 1, Sect 3.)

From a donor nation perspective, at the strategic level, and from a resource input level at the operational level, these measurable factors were extremely important. An application of such a model allows a plan to be formulated in a co-ordinated fashion from donor nations, and facilitates the outlining of any the deficiencies or gaps that would require input from the ETDF, and which may partially drive the number of logistic personnel required.

There are no doubts that the developments of the last fifty years have shaped the Australian and NZ Adult Education system and there have been parallel developments within the Australian and NZ armies. The Australian Government also resolved to adopt a national competency based approach to training in 1989. (Australian Army Manual of Land Warfare 3.4.4, Instructors Handbook, 2003, Chap 1, Para 1.4.)

2.6 Development of the Australian/NZ Army Training System

It is generally agreed that training design within the NZ Defence Forces commenced in earnest during World War Two, under the auspices of the UK MOD, and by completion of that war it reached a credible state for its time. However, post -World War Two, it had largely stalled at the level achieved during the war, as the Army refocused on commitments to South East Asia, namely Korea, Malaya, Malaysia, Borneo and South Vietnam. Then the Australian Army Training System, as contained in the Manual of Land Warfare Part Three was then adopted for use in NZ. (Training Policies and Procedures, 2005, Chap 1, Sect 2.)

Methodology quickly became redundant or outdated and training failed to keep pace with technology advances within both the military and civilian spheres. It could be argued that training in the open battlefields of Europe or the deserts of North Africa bore no resemblance to the enclosed spaces encountered in jungle warfare, nor did it accurately reflect the myriad of logistic problems these environments bring. In East Timor the NZ Army had to re-learn some early lessons learned, from their jungle fighting and training in South East Asia in the seventies. These lessons learned were validated

knowledge and experience derived from observations and historical study of military operations, exercises, activities and training. (Lessons Learned Cell, 2003, p vii.)

During the 1960s and 1970s with the advancement of the behavioural sciences, a number of major western armed forces adopted systems approaches to training. Australia and NZ followed the lead of the US and UK in the development of their models, producing many varying publications. This was a shotgun approach to training, one of which stated:

“An organisation, which changes over a quarter of its manpower every year, cannot afford ineffective training. There is no choice but to move with military technology and the new equipment that it produces, equipment becomes more complex and sophisticated yet man’s ability remains relatively constant. It follows that the training they receive must be more systematic and thorough - it must be based on an analysis of the precise tasks involved and the skills, judgment and knowledge associated with each. Training systems will provide this type of training.” (Australian Army Headquarters, *A Guide to Training Systems*, 1972, pp.6-1).

NZ used British training publications for much longer than Australia and it is suggested that this was largely due to NZ parochialism and the fact that following World War Two, a large number of ex-British Officers and Soldiers enlisted in the NZ Army and were dismayed at the “colonial” lackadaisical approach to matters disciplinarian – a “she’ll be right” attitude.

Concurrently there was a great deal of animosity to all things American as the majority of NZ men remembered when they were serving in Europe and Africa and the US Army was deployed to NZ to counter an increasing Japanese threat. The common adage “oversexed, overpaid and over here” reverberated on both sides of the Tasman.

A further problem for NZ training philosophy was that the trainers were not committed to following the pure ideology of either the British or American

doctrine and would take them both, read the Australian version and attempt to “Kiwify” the publications to suit our soldiers and our peculiar idiosyncrasies. This researcher notes that this lack of a holistic approach caused a hybrid training methodology to emerge, which adapted and changed to suit the training requirements of a small army. This had a measure of success when employed by NZ Forces deployed to train small, technologically simple armed forces that operating in austere environments.

After the extraction of NZ troops from South Vietnam in 1972, the NZ Army took a decisive step in the redevelopment of its training system and adopted the new US Army systems approach to training.

This also coincided with a philosophy which strayed from the dictum, “where England goes we follow”, and NZ followed the US Army into the Korean and Vietnamese deployments. Then the United Kingdom’s foray into the European Common Market effectively dried up much of NZ ’s exports overnight – so the US became NZ’s new trading partner, new training partner and a source of new technology and associated training paraphernalia. This US model was known as the Instructional Systems Development model (ISD). (US Army, *TRADOC Pamphlet 350-30*, 1975).

Both the NZ and Australian armies train their Training Development Officers and Training Design Warrant Officers from the same doctrine and utilise the same prime reference, which is designed, developed and printed in Australia and based upon US Army fundamental training principles. This model was further refined and adopted by all the US Military as the Interservice Procedures for Instructional Systems Development (IPISD). The IPISD model has five phases: Analyse, Design, Develop, Implement and Control. This systematic approach to training remained largely unchanged but has now been revised within NZ with conduct replacing implement and validate replacing control. (Training Policies and Procedures, 2005, Chap 1, Sect 2.)

These phases are sub-divided into twenty steps, which can also be further sub-divided (Gustafson & Branch 1997, Chap. 5). As illustrated in Figure 1.




Figure 1- Interservice Procedures for Instructional Systems Development . (Gustafson & Branch 1997, Chap. 5)

The original training pamphlets were not widely adopted by NZ Army Instructors as they were written in academic, behavioural sciences language and did not comply with the “KISS Principle” – “Keep it simple, stupid!”, and thus they were not easily understood. These complexities led to a perception, or misperception, that the NZ Army Training System had become too technical and unwieldy. Here military conservatism and external training advances were at odds; a fairly common situation, as noted by J.F.C. Fuller who wrote:

“The military man is the most conservative creature on earth. It is really dangerous to give him an idea because he will not adopt it until it is obsolete and then will not abandon it until it has nearly destroyed him.”
(Connaughton 2001, Military Intervention and Peacekeeping, p. 40)

One of the biggest dangers to establishing the factors that inhibit or facilitate the Raise, Train or Sustain of the ETDF, would be military conservatism – some senior military commanders are risk-averse, will not adopt new methodologies, abide by the adage, “we’ve always done it that way”, or will look to follow a path of least resistance which eventuates in quick, tangible results. This leaves the trainers or instigators of such plans, who are in location for the long haul, to fix up the downstream processes when they fail.

There tended to be, at some levels a natural aversion within some senior personnel who have served over 20 years for any form of academic skill or academic achievement. (currently 10 of the 16 logistic officers listed in the NZ Army List of Officers above the rank of Lieutenant Colonel have degrees, statistically this gets higher in the Major rank bracket, mainly as a preceding Chief of General Staff insisted that tertiary qualifications were necessary for a professional Army) Further there is a tendency for this aversion to be more prevalent among the Army than the other two services. Combine this with a natural tendency for conservatism then it becomes easier to understand why anything technical or academically cumbersome would be prone to failure, because the users would make it fail or develop regional, in-house versions.

Further reviews and subsequent refinement of the Army Training Model occurred during the 1980s and led to the development of additional handbooks to support the individual and collective training nature of the Army system.

The current ATS utilises a partially-revised instructional design model, which was first published in 1994. The ATS is a five-phase, CBTA and assessment, curriculum development and delivery model. The model's application is described as:

“...the systems approach to training provides a holistic methodology for initiating, designing, developing, delivering and evaluating training. The approach uses systems analysis techniques developed in/for, business and military organisations. It is output-based and requires that desired outputs be determined by analysis of workplace activities. These outputs determine training inputs, i.e. student type, curriculum and the learning strategy. The maintenance of systems-based training requires appropriate feedback loops to keep training relevant, effective and efficient.” (Australian Army, *Manual of Land Warfare 3.4.2 - The Handbook of the Army Training System*, 1997, pp. 1-1).

Figure 2 illustrates the interdependent relationship of the phases within the system.




Figure 2- Model of the Army Training System (ATS). (Australian Army, *Manual of Land Warfare 3.4.2 - The Handbook of the Army Training System*, 1997, pp. 1-4).

The analyse phase of the ATS is utilised “to arrive at a solution to a performance problem. A performance analysis is conducted to determine the appropriateness of a training or non-training solution, then a training analysis is conducted to determine exactly what training is required in outcome terms...” (Australian Army, *Manual of Land Warfare 3.4.2 - The Handbook of the Army Training System*, 1997, pp.1-2).

Thorough analysis of the literature provided to the training analysis team through the systems outlined in preceding and following paragraphs allowed a clear picture to be painted for the ETDF. It also allows for tasks to be broken down into functional areas, and this was how the ODFD Team initially carried out the requirements (in light of time and resource constraints). For every discipline there were two assigned operators who collated information, identified areas of overlap or interdependence and noted which prime reference (Literature Review) provided the background data.

This became an iterative process and was influenced by donor nation input, Host Nation Support, U.N. Support and the ever-expanding mission and aim

of the logistic contract. A plethora of checklists was produced which attempted to cater for every possible contingency – for the purpose of this dissertation the researcher will only focus on the logistic outputs, those being driver, storeman, communicator and medic trades.

Around this stage several major issues impacted on the project and threatened to overwhelm the analysis. Firstly, the researcher was directed to design and develop a structure for the Ministry of Defence; secondly, it was decided to immediately initiate the recruitment and training of a platoon of female soldiers, and thirdly, the statement of requirement for the logistic contract was rejected by the major parties that wished to perform the contract. The MOD was directly linked to funding, the contractor to capability and the recruiting to the training capacity therefore if the issues were not addressed holistically no progress would be made.

Figure 3 shows inputs, steps and outputs of the analysis phase of the ATS. Figure 4 shows the processes of the analysis phase of the ATS.

Inputs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❑ New or modified capability statement ❑ Doctrinal change ❑ Directives (Govt, Dept, Army etc) ❑ Investigation Reports / Recommendations ❑ Post-Exercise Reports / Recommendations ❑ Validation Reports / Recommendations ❑ Revision Plan ❑ Duty Statements / Job Descriptions ❑ Employment Specifications ❑ Civilian Training Package ❑ Competency Standards (military)
Processes	<p>Performance Needs Analysis</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❑ Needs analysis ❑ Job analysis <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Competency analysis ❑ Factor analysis ❑ Solutions analysis <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Cost-benefit analysis ■ Identify resources (assets) <p>Development of Validation Plan</p> <p>End of Phase Evaluation</p>
Outputs	<p>Design Brief</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❑ Statement / List of Needs ❑ Draft Employment Specification ❑ Competency Standard (amended / customised / new) ❑ Prioritised List of Factors ❑ Solutions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Cost-benefit Analysis ■ List of Resources (Assets) <p>Draft Validation Plan</p> <p>End of Phase Evaluation Report / Recommendations</p>

Figure 3 - ATS Analysis Model showing inputs, process and outputs.
(Australian Army, Training and Development *Handbook (Draft)*, 2000.)




Figure 4 - The processes of the analysis phase of the ATS. (Australian Army, Training and Development *Handbook (Draft)*, 2000.).

2.7 How the Army Training System influences Defence

The generic defence training model is the Defence Learning Services Network Training System (DLSN). The DLSN system is similar to the ATS in that it has five phases with each phase having an internal evaluation, quality assurance and continuous improvement process. Figure 5 shows the five phases of the DLSN are: Analysis, Design, Development, Conduct and External Evaluation.




Figure 5 - The Defence Learning Services Network Training System (DLSN) Model. (Department of Defence, *Training Systems Handbook, Version 1 (Provisional)*, 2001.)

A recurring theme within training is for trainers to utilize what is colloquially known as “situating the appreciation”, which in essence takes the desired end-state and reverse-engineers the solution to suit the current situation and assumes away many of the problems which detailed analysis unearths.

This was seen in action several times within the ETDF, normally used by instructors who were either newcomers to the training design approach or were under political/time constraints to resolve issues quickly and within a defined budget. Normally, as articulated in previous paragraphs, these designers were not in-theatre to pick up the pieces when training failed catastrophically.

Another simple methodology, often used by experienced trainers to analyze the results of internal evaluation is to apply the “so what?” philosophy to problems, and at first this can be found to be extremely irritating by those not versed in its utility.

An example of this in practice follows;

Situation- training timeframes require three weeks to train an individual in X task. However, the training facility is only free for two weeks. So what? – Either shorten the training or reduce the number of students.

We need six students to have the course run. So what? – We cannot reduce student numbers and cannot reschedule course – So what? – Students are in location over both weekends and at night – So what? – Weekends give four extra training days and plotting lessons at night makes up other day – So what? – Course can proceed and desired trained state of six soldiers will be met. Training solution provided *via* the appreciation process.

Figures 6 and 7 provide a detailed outline of the analysis phase. In these diagrams one can see the similarities between the DLSN analysis phase and the ATS analyse phase.

Process	Inputs	Outputs
Job Analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formal employment specifications • Duty statements • Selection criteria • Competency standards 	Current workplace group competency profiles
Performance Analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Performance appraisal data • Skills audit and analysis data • Existing training plans and or concept proposals • Vocational Education Training (VET) qualifications and statements of attainment data • Management and audit reports and reviews • Previous relevant training needs analysis • Evaluation reports from current (VET) • Occupational analysis reports • Data on the learners' educational background, learning styles • Workplace observations, interviews and group processes 	Competency profile of the learner's current competencies
Identification of the Performance Gap	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Current work group competency profile • Competency profile of the learner's current competencies 	Statement of performance needs
Feasibility Analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Statement of the performance needs • Data in existing VET • Data on other current and possible solutions addressing the needs, which may include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recruitment • Automation • Job rotation • Job exchange • Changing/enhancing the job • Relocating the work • Modifying the workplace • Re-engineering processes • Coaching • Mentoring • Design and development of new VET 	<p>1. Recommendation- most appropriate solution(s) to address the Statement of Performance needs.</p> <p>2. If VET forms part of the solution- Specifications of the VET requirement</p>

Figure 6 - DLSN Analysis Model showing inputs, process and outputs.

(Department of Defence, *Training Systems Handbook, Version 1 (Provisional)*, 2001.)




Figure 7 - The processes of the analysis phase of the DLSN. (Department of Defence, *Training Systems Handbook, Version 1 (Provisional)*, 2001.)

2.8 Needs Assessment Development

Army's tend to focus on the corporate good, as opposed to the individual good, and this brings some antagonism to the fore when plans are discussed comparatively. However, in most instances where initial planning is taking place, there are no human resource practitioners in location, as a consequence a great deal of human resource work is being carried out retrospectively within the ETDF, this however is beyond the immediate scope of this dissertation.

Following conduct of a detailed literature review, the researcher has noted two disparate approaches that can be considered in the conduct of any Needs Analysis in the context of Human Resources (HR). These have differing *foci*, one on the sum of the parts of a business, on the individual, and secondly, on the corporation or business requirements, normally utilized by personnel in the business re-engineering sphere.

Recent developments within the U.S. Army have developed this theme a stage further and link training into leadership style and to rewarding performance – which is the ultimate goal of training; to produce, mould or gel a product which is effective upon the battlefield. The two styles are “transactional reward leadership and transformational leadership” (Bass, 1998, pp. 64-65 & 174-175).

Transactional contingent reward leadership uses recognition and rewards for goals to motivate its members, some examples of transactional leadership statements being, “reward us when we do what we are supposed to do” and “direct attention towards failure to meet standards”. These focus on the individual's needs to be recognized and are important motivators. (Bass, 1998, pp. 5-13.)

The ETDF soldiers respond quickly and positively to such motivation, however ODFD Advisors have been quick to articulate the dangers of over-praise. Transformational leadership builds personal and social identification among its members with the missions and goals of the leader and organizations; this imbues personnel with the culture-of-the-group and emphasizes the importance of having a collective sense of mission; this in turn helps platoon members develop their strengths. Again, this was a great transformational tool to be utilized in the development of conventional military thought processes from those of a guerilla force. This culture change is a long-term development plan and the ODFD were making incremental in-roads within these spheres. (The Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine, 2004, p. 6-23.)

2.9 Job Analysis, Occupational Analysis and Task Analysis Development.

Within the ETDF a great deal of time was tied up in analyzing the requirements, real and perceived, that would be expected of a professionally-trained recruit. The ODFD trainers, having received similar training were generally agreed in their outputs and several even quoted similar readings to justify their end-states.

Kroehnert has written a plethora of books for trainers involved in adult education and his needs assessment philosophy is best summarised as: "If a person's life depended on them performing a skill and they could do it, but they don't, it's a management problem; if they couldn't do it, it's a training problem" (Kroehnert 2001, Basic Training for Trainers, p. 16). Army Trainers, conversely, would disagree with this analogy and reckon it to be a disciplinary problem, which inherently is a training issue, as the ultimate objective of all army training is to ensure military success across the range of deployment and operational possibilities identified within respective Army's Output Plans. (NZ Army Training Policies And Procedures, Para 1003.)

Kroehnert considers management problems to be outside the field of the trainer and if they are identified, they should be handed back to management.

This of course is difficult if the organisation is in structural genesis and the hierarchy has limited strategic management experience. In Kroehner's definition, Training problems are examined, isolated and articulated *via* means of a TNA. He goes on to describe a TNA as largely gathering information from people on the skills, knowledge and attitudes (SKA) they require for their job. This is a generic approach to needs assessment and has been developed in models called Job Analysis, Occupational Analysis and Task Analysis. (Kroehner 2001, Basic Training for Trainers, p. 16.)

One of the more influential theories that shaped our view of modern jobs are those of Frederick Taylor (Knights, Willmott & Collinson, 1985). He proposed that jobs could be viewed from a scientific management perspective by successfully dividing mental and physical labour. Applying Taylorism involved maximising decomposition of work tasks, separation of direct and 'indirect' labour, i.e. set up, preparation and maintenance tasks, and minimisation of the skill sets required of any task leading to minimum job-learning times (Knights, Willmott & Collinson, 1985, p. 11).

The last two factors are favoured from a financial perspective, but are looked on with distrust by military trainers in that they represent minimal credible training options, which may then be taken to represent the optimal solution. Further, two fundamental flaws in the set-up of training for U.N.-type scenarios are costs attributable to training, or the indirect costs and minimalist training.

In East Timor the funding allocated for the Metinaro Recruit Training Facility was arbitrarily capped by the International Affairs Department in Canberra, who had not even visited the site to ascertain its suitability; at a brief held at Training Command, Sydney their attitude was "it works in Darwin, it will work there!" To date it has been remodified, reworked and added to, as it was not future-proofed, nor was its design or layout suited to current expectations.

2.10 Defining Needs Assessment

Some important factors, often overlooked by “imported” training teams, are the cultural differences and perceptions of the personnel being trained. This factor alone caused more disagreement among the TNA team than any other and if these elements were not captured, broken into the sum of their parts and further analyzed, as factors either inhibiting or facilitating ETDF Training, they often compounded the problems that imparting information to the ETDF recruits already met with.

Analysis by definition means to ascertain the elements or break down the structure of an item. Using this fundamental precept as a building block, the focus of a needs assessment should be to find the elements providing Capability to an organisation. It should focus on the cause-and-effect that impact upon an organization’s capability and proffer solutions to those issues. Gagne defined needs assessment as “the procedure for identifying (and prioritizing) needs related to societal, organizational, and human performance”. ... “The needs are derived from the vantage points of the receiving systems and of the society.” (Gagne 1987, *Instructional Technology: Foundations*, p. 129.)

The importance of this statement cannot be emphasized strongly enough as it highlights the importance of the methodology and tools used for any needs assessment and was particularly important within the ODFD.

The strengths and weaknesses of these methodologies and tools will have great impact upon the value of a researcher’s findings. Experienced researchers involved in needs assessment over a number of years have consequently written a number of theories on the conduct and methodology for completing a needs assessment; most are orientated at a specific problem within an organisation and many fail to capture all the elements that make up the organizational capability. Thus the needs defined may simply be symptomatic of an issue or part thereof, and not address the cause of the need.

Another problem noted within the ODFD was the requirement for rapid resolution of issues and sometimes the lack of strategic direction that comes when a multi-national organisation is task-organized to resolve personnel, financial or logistic issues without an holistic overview or synchronization. This factor was exacerbated by continual postings in and out of the mission area as nations either withdrew or established their presence within East Timor.

2.11 Definition of Needs

Successful development of any needs assessment model requires that the researcher have a clear and unambiguous understanding of the range of definitions applicable to the specific needs assessment. It will also set limitations on study and the objective/s it attempts to address. Queeney (1995) has described needs "as discrepancies between actual condition or state and a desired standard." He goes on to articulate that "standards used to define needs vary greatly according to the purpose for which needs are being defined, the circumstances, and the person(s) defining them" (Queeney 1995, p. 3.)

Naturally, the most important data collection tool utilised within East Timor was human interpretation, but the lack of operational experience by some trainers caused this interpretation to be skewed and as a result training factors were oriented around optimal outcomes, such as students assimilating data as quickly as would be done within the trainer's routine area of operations, i.e., Australia or NZ. The results were lesson timings articulated within TMP's, which equate to financial overheads. These were often understated and then used by donor nations to formulate their extraction plans, often before the trainers had completed their training.

Within the ODFD there appeared to be a natural tendency to interpret needs based upon personal perceptions of problems or situations, and this caused some problems, particularly with military personnel not acclimatised to operating within austere environments. It is critical that assigned instructors understand the viewpoints of the training recipients, and this empathy cannot

be gained by short tours of duty or lack of familiarity with the raw products being utilised, those being recruits.

2.12 Types of Needs

Needs assessment can be readily aligned with the passage of information through military entities, and application of the age-old adage - "could know, should know and must know!" Queeney utilises the following definitions of needs that should be used to analysis the findings of any needs assessment, "perceived needs, are those individuals perceive they require (generally identified as skills rarely utilised or new to the organisation and requiring training), assessed needs, are those quantifiable, showing deficiencies (generally, skills regularly performed need training), felt needs, are those that people are conscious of but are loathe to discuss and expressed needs, are those people are willing to articulate and want addressed most". (Queeney 1995, pp. 82-83.)

To quantify the data, Queeney classified these as normative and comparative needs, these being, normative needs involve experts setting a standard of Skills, Knowledge and Attitudes (SKA) Analysis that must be met regardless of other peoples' performance in assessment or the context of assessment (e.g., a general knowledge test with a pass mark of eight out of ten is the standard achievement, where below this mark registers as having a normative need); and comparative needs, as when individuals/groups do not meet the level of other groups (for example an individual's score could be compared with the group average score and that set as the standard). (Queeney, p. 84.)

When the findings of a needs assessment can be quantified as a deficiency between the standard set and the actual performance it can be classified as a variance or discrepancy. However, the discrepancy must be reviewed to determine if it is a new educational need or a training maintenance issue.

Needs should also be reviewed to determine if they are a current issue or are being highlighted as an anticipated need. Whether anticipated needs can be

addressed will be determined by the financial constraints of the organisation. Against each type of need there will be a requirement to quantify the level of expenditure of resources an organisation is prepared to commit to resolve the need. An understanding of the *types* of needs can therefore be seen as important for the classification of any needs assessment data, and an understanding of the focus a client must have for their needs assessment.

To ensure alignment between efficiency and effectiveness there must be a clear and substantiated linkage between needs and capability; if we cannot justify a need there must be an inherent understanding that it can have no impact upon capability; if the opposite is true then any analysis carried out is flawed, this military capability can then be defined as the sum of force structure and preparedness.

Capability is broadly seen as having six Elements known by the acronym, POSTED. The POSTED Elements form the Army Capability Management System, which provide the fundamental framework for the management of capability within Army. These elements are; people, organisation, support and facilities, training, equipment and doctrine. (*The Fundamentals of Land warfare*, 1998, pp. 5-12.)

2.13 POSTED Impact Upon Capability

From a human performance perspective, the six POSTED elements have a significant impact on capability. These elements and their relationship to needs assessment are amplified below.

People (P). Soldiers are an army's scarcest and most valuable resource, they are central to operations in peace and war. The fundamental building blocks for skill development within Army are trades. Trade structures provide the means by which Army develops competency, usually grouped by functions in technologically related areas and by operating environment.

Trades provide a means of progressing from operator to supervisor, where

increased expertise, understanding, leadership and management skills are required to meet the demands of the job. Typically, this occurs through a combination of training, job experience, and personal development, increasing responsibility and appointments in different functional areas over a career spanning up to twenty years. People link at the personal level of a needs analysis and are the foundation for any capability.

Organisation (O). Organizations provide strength and direction to the employment of individuals. The Army performs a range of disparate and complex tasks in support of broader ETDF requirements. Its organisation must therefore be both flexible and adaptable to fulfill those tasks. Peacetime structures aim at sensible groupings that aid training effectiveness, and we are mindful that organizations that fight together should train together. Organizations link-in at the organizational level of a needs analysis and are the framework of any capability.

Support and Facilities (S). Support and facilities provide the tools for the application of individuals' skills. Support and facilities link-in at the organizational level and are the mortar that binds any capability.

Training (T). Training is a specific and significant process for the development of competency. Training within Army can be skills, trade and/or career based. Training can be either formal through a structured program in schools, units, civilian institutions, etc, or can be informal through unstructured sessions. Training usually requires a combination of methods and media and the process is dependent on the assumed level of skill of the learner, motivation, their style of learning, resource availability and outcomes required at the conclusion of training.

Equipment (E). Provides the tools that personnel use to provide capability, and,

Doctrine (D). Doctrine provides the principles, procedures, practice, tactics and techniques by which Army operates to achieve military objectives.

Doctrine captures “professional experience” and best practice within the NZ cultural and environmental context, doctrine defines the way different parts of the military organisation interact and standardizes procedures and practice. Most military training is conducted within the context of approved doctrine. Doctrines link at the organizational level of needs assessment and are the keystone of any capability.

2.14 Defining Military Logistics

Having discussed the “how and why” of the problem, it is now appropriate to assess the “what” of the problem. We have discussed training methodology in order to ascertain the factors which will inhibit or facilitate the raise, train and sustain of the ETDF, these considerations must not only be adapted, superimposed or initiated for the ETDF, but the third part of the jigsaw – the key logistic principles which underpin the entire study must be clearly delineated.

Discussion on military logistics will always eventuate in someone making the bold statement that military logistics is different. The present researcher is not a proponent of that view; indeed our outcomes are different, in that the mission statement of an army could read as - **“to export violence to the battlefield”**. Armies are not profit-oriented; they don’t make money, they spend it. However, the majority of the relevant business decisions are made along fiscal lines and the business outcomes are dictated by government and logistic principles to support those outcomes. Matters begin in a nation’s military-industrial complex and at a bare minimum tie into a country’s economy (if either exists).

While administration embraces the whole field of logistics, personnel management and the internal management of units, logistics is concerned with the more limited area of moving and sustaining forces. The aim of logistic support is to ensure that the commander has the necessary resources available at the right time and place to allow him the greatest possible operational freedom in the choice of plan and implementation. This is an ideal

situation and in war rarely achieved – thus in peacetime and in war often compromises must be made in order for the best use to be made of logistic assets. The temptation to ignore logistic constraints and take an administrative gamble to pursue a desired goal, which is operationally desirable, may end in disaster. Military graveyards are full of soldiers dead as a result of ambitious plans failing because they were not backed with adequate logistic resources. (The Army Field Manual Volume 1, The Fundamentals Part 1 The Application of Force, 1985 England, p, 62)

There are five functional principles of and pertaining to logistics, known by the acronym SCEFF: Simplicity, Co-operation, Economy, Foresight and Flexibility. (The Army Field Manual, *op cit.*)

Simplicity relates to the use of simple plans and well-practiced Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) to survive the stress of intensive operations and the sudden demands of an emergency or an unexpected situation. Too many agencies and interrelated activities multiply the risk of breakdown in the logistic system. Standardization agreements facilitate administrative support between allies or training organizations, and it is along these lines that the ODFD staff moulded the support infrastructure for the ETDF.

Co-operation during deployment, operations or planning exercises, including developmental work, is paramount. The Operations, Intelligence, Personnel and Logistic staffs must all work together as closely as possible. In the case of the ETDF, many of the international staff held dual roles in these positions, so by default, not design, this process was embedded in the ETDF hierarchy. Some initial problems were noted when the Armada (Navy) attempted to divorce itself from the logistic infrastructure, being designed and to develop separate SOPs and supply chain management routing.

Economy of scale and economy of effort require good management within the logistic realm to ensure that resources available are maximized and put to best use. Historically, armies utilized a “just in case” stocking philosophy: instead of “just in time” resulting in huge inventories, requiring huge financial

input, large and complex storage facilities and an inordinate amount of manpower to manage the scale of operations. This led to logistic personnel requirements overshadowing the combat personnel requirements, and the ratio of support staff to combat arms became disproportionate. The ETDF was limited to 5% being logistic staff, and this drove the ETDF to minimalist logistic policies.

Foresight: during operations the success or failure can be entirely dependent on timely pre-positioning or availability of logistic resources. Similarly in peacetime, foresight in the form of accurate and timely planning is based on both empirical and forecast activities and ensures that logistic support is in the right quantity, in the right place and at the right time. Risk-mitigation factors utilized by the ODFD were *via* means of donor nation support and the depth and breadth of the Logistic Statement of Requirement for outsourcing of non-core and core activities.

Flexibility ensures that logistic response is timely and appropriate; it requires balanced distribution of assets throughout the theatre and well planned resupply or evacuation routes. Initially within the ETDF there were only two locations to consider, Dili and Metinaro. Thus the planning factors were simple to achieve. Once the 1st Battalion deployed to Los Palos, a large degree of flexibility was lost and this was compounded by the planned move of the 2nd Battalion into the Oecusse Enclave, which is surrounded by Indonesian territory. Luckily this move was stopped by the ODFD owing to resupply difficulties and the provocative nature of its placement.

Four fundamental precepts follow from the above principles, logistic units and assets must be deployed and controlled in a way which supports the operational plan, logistic units must be able to move their assets quickly to match changes in the operational situation, scarce and vital items must be carefully controlled so that they can be found and moved in accordance with operational priorities and unserviceable equipment must be repaired quickly and as far forward as possible to maintain the combat capability of the fighting and support arms.

Conclusion

The requirement to implement a logistic strategy within the ETDF was fraught with difficulties and the major ones were lack of qualified personnel and the cost to rectify this situation (both in time and physical resources). Resolution was either to outsource completely or retain the capability in-house. This placed the ETDF on the horns of a dilemma; mandated policy required the logistic infrastructure to support 1500 Regular Force and 1500 Reserves with an support element of 150 personnel.

This would entail intensive control of all logistic functionality within an organisation that was striving for autonomy and wished to throw off all control measures and go it alone.

Chapter Three discusses the methodologies utilized within this dissertation, and how the ODFD analyzed the current situation in order to implement a course of action to mitigate logistic risk to the ETDF.

Chapter 3

METHODOLOGY

The methodologies utilized in this thesis were diverse and ranged from a reconnaissance visit to ascertain which specialist trades will be required for the ETDF, a Training Needs Analysis visit to ascertain specific logistic infrastructure training that NZ, in liaison with Australia, could conduct; and a posting to the ODFD within the UNTAET as the Logistic Advisor. This is substantiated by a qualitative, and experimental approach involving six case studies, utilized to study the factors implicit to raise, train and sustain a fledgling defence force.

The case studies will be discussed in detail further on in this paper, but orientate around the specific design and development of requirements based upon observation, interview, strategic guidance, financial imperatives, best practice and maximum utilization of extant capabilities.

During this exercise there was noticeable “natural tension”, particularly between the new training forces who were establishing their presence, and the training regime in place; it became very apparent that establishing a presence within East Timor had some political ramification which was initially lost upon some members of the ODFD, who in the first instance believed they were there to regulate, supplement, improve and facilitate the training of a fledgling ETDF. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p.59.)

The Portuguese on the other hand were already in location, had taken the moral high ground and were driven by their political masters to maintain the training upper hand – this despite being chronically under-funded and under-resourced in terms of manpower and expertise, and again the Angolan factor surfaced when the researcher recognized individuals who had been posted to Angola as trainers and openly admitted that, “we don’t train them 100%, as you never know when you may have to fight them!” (Major X, Portuguese Army.)

3.1 Description of Research Design

The strategies used were interrogation of written sources, briefings, physical visits, observation both direct and indirect and case studies; the data gathered in the physical visits both supplemented and substantiated the findings of case studies. It must be stated here that overt political drivers were manifest within all three tours the researcher made to East Timor.

Upon discussion with Dr. Nolan, it was ascertained that direct observation and participation in all training development, design and initiation of the training management plan by the researcher was an additional sound basis for the production of this dissertation.

To some extent the use of anecdotal evidence is unavoidable owing to the fact that a large part of the research was conducted by personal interview and observation. Where substantiating material is not anecdotal specific references have been made to sources utilized.

3.2 Reconnaissance Tour of Duty (TOD)

From 28th March until April 1st 2001 the researcher deployed into East Timor, following extensive debriefings on the military, political and civilian situation within East Timor. The rationale for being selected were the completion of university papers on International Relations, Conflict and Conflict Resolution and having deployed for twelve months as the Logistic Advisor, within the Contracts Management Unit of the UNAVEM III in Angola, a former Portuguese colony, and being a qualified Logistic Instructor and Training Development Officer.

Subsequent briefings articulated that the initial aims of the Reconnaissance TOD were fourfold; to identify which specialist trades will be required for the ETDF, to confirm the chronology of events to commence the build up of the ETDF, to identify constraints, if applicable, which will impact upon this training

and to identify what training could be effectively and efficiently be conducted by NZ Instructors.

Once these factors have been identified, further direction was requested to outline the training options to be employed, and ascertain whether to; train ETDF specialist within NZ, deploy instructors within East Timor, employ a combination of both previous mentioned methodologies or deploy NZ instructors to train the ETDF within ADF facilities. (Land Headquarters Concept for the Mounting and Deployment of the ATST-EM, 2001, pp. 3-4.)

Prior and subsequent to the TOD to East Timor, extensive debriefings were conducted in Australia at both Land Headquarters (LHQ) and Training Command Army (TC-A), whilst at TC-A the team was also briefed by the International Policy Division (IPD) from Canberra. The IPD also briefed the researcher separately to gain a feel for operating in former Portuguese colonies and the subtleties of dealing with “*assimilados*” as the Portuguese call those who are colonized and assimilate themselves into Portuguese culture.

During the TOD the following constraints were noticed that hindered the ability for effective and efficient training to be conducted for the ETDF. The current training establishment at Aileu utilized extant ex-Portuguese Army Barracks that were burnt out, vandalized, unhygienic and sub-optimal at best. This had an adverse effect on morale, personal hygiene and general well being mentally and physically. It was also the same area where the FALANTIL were in cantonment and is barely more than a “containment area” only marginally above a prison, even if only mentally. The new recruit-training camp at Metinaro was still under construction and looked to be developing as a “minimal credible option”. The design did not cater for tropical environs and was already the focus for increased international trainer tensions.

The ETDF had not received any communication equipment, vehicles, ammunition or compasses. Nor had it received any Third-Party End User Certificates for the donated M16-A1 Rifles. This had a drastic effect on

training capability and had a dramatic effect on decreasing morale; further the rifles could not be issued to the ETDF as it was not part of a nation state and this further degraded the Portuguese training regime.

Anecdotal evidence supported the fact that some donor nations were withholding support until East Timor became a nation state. As this did not occur until May 2002, it had dire ramifications for any training regime instigated in the near future; the majority of the more expensive and technical equipments were not in place and soldiers passed out of recruit training without any familiarization with current technology.

Presently, four different languages are utilized within the ETDF, to varying degrees of skill and understanding; English, Portuguese, Tetum and Bahasa Indonesian. There were no interpreters employed by the ETDF nor were any of the triumvirate trainers (Australia, NZ and Portugal) fluent in all four languages.

The current training ratio within the Training Camp was 50 students to 1 instructor. This was abhorrent to all visit participants and would produce sub-optimal soldiers. This factor was exacerbated by the translation from Portuguese to Tetum by which the training medium was facilitated. The Portuguese Instructors appeared to be uncomfortable with having ODFD instructors present and the Portuguese Defence Attaché (a Colonel equivalent) was present at all briefings – thus a free and open exchange of information was stifled.

The donor's conference had yet to confirm exactly what support would be forthcoming from donor nations. This placed additional stress on the trainer nations. An example was the use of dual fuels; the majority of military fleets had shifted to diesel-engine vehicles, thus the requirement for Fuels, Oils and Lubricant (FOL) operators and vehicle mechanics could be refined and defined; furthermore there was a real danger of donated left-hand drive vehicles moving in a country which operated with right-hand-drive road rules. The current concept for donor nation support has major impact upon the

training requirements and is based on a three-tier support framework. The framework consists of the following; Tier 1. The Platform donated, i.e. Trucks from Italy, Tier 2. The Training Support Package, i.e. Driving Instructors and the Training Management Package (TMP) and Tier 3. The Logistics Support Package, i.e. Complete Equipment Schedules (CES) and associated Class 9 Repair Parts. (CES includes tyre-changing equipment, shovels and self-recovery equipment and tarpaulins/seats etc.)

The donor input will be finalized at a donor's conference. However, it is believed that this is a flawed concept or considered optimistic in the main as donors have intimated that they can provide either goods (Tiers 1 and 3) or services (Tier 2). Finding donors to contribute a complete package has the advantage of reducing logistic and training overheads, but orchestrating the co-ordination of the concept to link-in with training poses potential difficulties. Furthermore the financial implications of this concept to donors may become unmanageable and unpalatable.

There are other unfortunate problems which arise out of the U.N.-sanctioned donor nation concept, firstly – donated goods may fit the generic description of the battlefield operating system they support i.e., mobility, but may cause other problems in the support and training arenas. Secondly, NGO's whilst altruistic in their goals, often donate goods at a timing that is inopportune and out of synchronization with government, U.N. or military programmes and lastly it can be seen as poor form to turn down donated goods, and often, donated goods are not in a fit state to be used requiring additional financial input to render them fit for purpose.

3.3 Training Needs Analysis Tour of Duty

From 7th – 30th May 2001, the researcher redeployed into East Timor to conduct a TNA TOD; briefings were conducted at TCA in Sydney and at the ODFD in Dili. Several major in-roads had been made since the reconnaissance TOD in March/April and these provided the following guidance. The ADF is keen to allow donor nations to control all training

disciplines excluding leadership and intelligence training. The ODFD has articulated that it will actively seek donor support of storeman, driver, medic and communications training, allowing the ADF to focus on areas of strategic interest.

The training camp at Metinaro has limited resources and is constrained in relation to instructor accommodation and shared facilities, including lecture rooms, training areas and computer facilities. A caveat has been placed upon additional training running concurrently with recruit basic training, in that only one additional course can be conducted.

To reduce NZ instructor impact in the East Timor, and to gradually phase out NZDF instructional support requirements and facilitate the Timorisation of the ETDF Training School, the following methodology will reduce sub-optimal Instructor supplementation; course one, will train the students and train the trainers (TTT), course two will employ TTT personnel as assistant instructors (AI). Course three will entail NZDF Instructors taking secondary roles and assessing TTT Staff while following course four if TTT are assessed as competent, NZDF Staff will withdraw from theatre.

This will allow NZDF personnel to draw down from the East Timor theatre during the 2004-training year, without compromising safety or training standards.

The primary output of the TNA TOD was the production of a TNA synopsis for storeman, medical assistant basic, medical assistant advanced, driver, communications and a forecast of instructor supplementation and costs; a secondary output of the TNA TOD was a request to provide a Logistic Advisor to the ODFD/ETDF. Supporting documentation for the synopses is further discussed within Case Study Two.

3.4 United Nations Transitional Authority East Timor (UNTAET) Tour of Duty

From January – May 2002 the researcher deployed as the Logistic Advisor within the ODFD, of the UNTAET in East Timor. Both international and national staff man the ODFD and responsibilities are to provide routine professional defence policy input and operational advice to the HQ ETDF, Ministry of Defence, HQ UNTAET and to contractors.

NZ's contribution to the ODFD was two Majors, one Logistic Advisor and one Personnel Advisor. The position involved a great deal of liaison, with the area of operations being; Dili the headquarters area, Metinaro the main Recruit Training Camp and Los Palos the location of the 1st Battalion.

The methods utilized to collect information will be discussed in the next paragraph; however, in the role as the Logistic Advisor the main tasks were to trouble-shoot and rectify logistic deficiencies. The most efficient methodology was to turn the "problem situation" into a lesson and work through the problem in the form of a Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT). This allowed a tactile method of training to be employed, which worked well with the ETDF.

The policy of Timorisation, within the ODFD, required the key appointments to train understudies within the various disciplines; despite requesting an understudy in February the incumbent did not arrive until April and was subsequently rejected owing to severe health problems, language problems, lack of trade skills and inability to follow the most basic instructions. When reported back through the ETDF command chain, no answer was forthcoming NZ's withdraw both the Logistic and Personnel Officer when their TOD's were complete and did not offer up a replacement. The result was a personal plea from the ETDF to NZDF to reinstate the positions and with some due haste; this was done but took three months to initiate.

3.5 Methods of Data Collection

ODFD staff employed a systematic set of collection procedures designed to ensure that the training is directly related to the ETDF's current and future needs. Each method has various merits and the variety of methods include; questionnaire survey, interview, observation both direct and indirect, discussion and examination. (Australian Department of Defence Army 1991, Training Development Handbook. Chap 3.)

Questionnaire Surveys involve the use of a formulated series of questions used to obtain facts about current conditions and practices; these were utilized in all three TODs and also for preparation of the thesis. The major difficulty in utilizing questions in the ETDF theatre were the fact that the majority of the soldiers are only semi-literate and then often one or even two translators were required, which posed further problems.

The East Timorese are friendly, but shy by nature and the presence of translators caused some reticence to answer questions openly and freely and their translators had the habit of asking or reinterpreting the questions in the manner in which they think the questioner wants it answered. This was exacerbated when the duration of a translated question can be beyond the attention span or comprehension of some individuals and although Portuguese is the *lingua franca* of East Timor, only 10% of the population can speak it fluently.

Questionnaires were delivered as either open or closed-form questions. Open-form questions give the respondents more freedoms in their choice of answers and frame of references, and also allows for them to answer in their own words. This methodology gave the respondents an opportunity to reveal their motives or attitudes and to specify the background or conditions, which their answers are based on.

If questions were asked in large groups they became time consuming, as the whole group would want to join in, and the situation, no matter how serious

became a source of utter hilarity. This required great patience and tolerance, especially when the topic of the matter became somewhat obscured, or when the more astute individuals maneuvered the subject matter into an area they wanted rectified. In matters verbal, the East Timorese can assimilate and maintain track of many complex ideas at the same time, the task for the questioners was to unstring these co-joined ideas and reassemble them in a useable fashion.

Closed-form or structured questionnaires consist of a prepared list of specific, concrete questions and a list of possible answers, which are to be responded to by yes or no, checks, ticks, circles, underlining or ranking of a series of statements in order of their importance. When used in East Timor, these types of questionnaires were easy to administer and fill out. They also kept the respondents focused on subject and facilitated the tabulation and analysis processes. The East Timorese often demonstrated a dislike for cut-and-dried answers and would vacillate, giving a definitive answer, but to the degree that if left unsupervised, they would add another answer to the ones specified in the text, despite them being unambiguous in nature.

Strengths, Weaknesses and Relevance: Questionnaire

The strengths of well-constructed questionnaires include that they allow managers, supervisors, jobholders, instructors and trainees to contribute to the process of determining the training. Further it gives wide coverage at a low cost. The weaknesses of questionnaires are that individuals may give unreliable information and answers that are not relevant in relation to the context of the situation.

The relevance of questionnaires as research tools are that they allow a diverse audience to be covered in a relatively cost-effective manner and provide a chronological assessment of a “given situation”, and this is invaluable when a training audit is conducted.

Interviews take the form of conversations within a specific context and having a very specific purpose. The majority of interviews with the ETDF took place in private settings, although *en-masse* interviews did occur. Successful interviewing requires careful planning, rigorous preparation and methodical execution. During the Reconnaissance and TNA TODs, the ability to carry out thorough and in-depth interviews was stifled by setting and some personality conflicts.

Interviews were also conducted *en-masse* at Aileu among semi-trained and trained recruits; latterly these interviews were also conducted at the Training Camp at Metinaro, while further Interviews were also conducted at Los Palos among the Infantry Battalion located there. Feedback was consolidated every Monday at the ODFD Orders Groups, which discussed training, logistic and personnel matters and also included representatives from the Armada (Navy). These *fora* also allowed for gathering of informal and anecdotal information, which, while not directly attributable to any source, proved invaluable for further investigation of matters, which had the potential to become issues requiring rectification.

Strengths, Weaknesses and Relevance: interviews

The strengths of interviews can be that they are the only methods that can be utilized to obtain some information, in particular those of a personal nature, and it allows the interviewees to express themselves openly and honestly.

Some weaknesses of interviews can be that they are time consuming, and as a consequence only a small slice of one's target audience can be covered effectively, unless one has no time constraints.

The relevance of interviews as research tools are that they encourage individuals to reveal information, and they can motivate interviewees to keep presenting useful information, which can then be analyzed.

Observation is a very useful methodology to employ when attempting to find out information about a job, particularly within the ETDF where some emphasis was placed on correcting deficiencies from former training regimes. There were some constraints with this method, which has been utilized primarily to record personnel carrying out their daily activities, as the East Timorese were a guerilla army - and the daily activity of a guerilla army is hemispheres apart from that of a regular army.

When collecting information by the observation method a number of tools are employed; these are sometimes called instruments. The tools focus attention on specific phenomena, help form objective and accurate observations and systemize the collection of information. These can range from scorecards, rating scales, tests, assessments, check lists or schedules, and audio-visual (AV) recording. With the exception of the latter the majority of these tools were utilized regularly in some, way, shape or form.

AV recording was often used to correct deficiencies, and in the latter stages of the TOD when AV equipment became prevalent, many East Timorese became totally distracted by the thought of being immortalized on film – so that the methodology was discarded for being a distraction rather than an aid-to-training. The biggest problems encountered with observation were that staff with no operational experience focused on procedures not the outcome.

Observation further falls into another two categories, direct and indirect. If personnel know they are being observed they often act differently (rather as with reality television). This is particularly noticeable in scenarios where an individual's behavior is critical to career advancement, such as with selection for Officer Recruitment, or leadership phases on the Junior or Senior Non-Commissioned Officer courses.

Conversely if one does not know one is being observed, then the reality factor of an individual's behavior is more obvious, but not necessarily enhancing or complimentary.

Strengths, Weaknesses and Relevance: Observation

The strengths of observation are that it is a flexible and practical method of gathering information, and audio-visual equipment can also be utilized for in-depth analysis if required. The weaknesses of observation are that it is time-consuming, and as a consequence only a small proportion of personnel can be observed. There is also a tendency for some people to react differently when they are under observation.

The relevance of observation as a research tool is that it produced refined and reliable information; within the ODFD scenario this method was supplemented by other methodologies and the results cross-referenced.

Discussion was a valuable tool in East Timor, as by virtue of their nature the East Timorese love to discuss, debate and rectify problems by verbal means, which more than likely reflects their communal roots. Discussion is an invaluable tool and enables information to be collected by analyzing or examining the opinions of several members.

To maximize its benefits, participation by group members needs to be maximized and discussion kept relevant to the subject, though this was often not entirely achievable in a hierarchical society and given that even in a guerilla army, rank has its privileges. To successfully run a military discussion session in NZ, it is often necessary to segregate the ranks and then invoke "Chatham House Rules", where "no one can be quoted and what happens in this room stays in this room". East Timor was no different and the fact that many of the senior officers were idolized meant that free-and-frank discussion did not occur. This was through no fault of the leadership, but through a reverence and respect, which was often refreshing in its candour.

The biggest advantage of the discussion methodology, when compared to questionnaires, surveys, interviews and observation methods, is the rapidity with which results can become available.

Strengths, Weaknesses and Relevance: Discussion

The strengths of discussion are that by its nature it fosters debate and can make transparent any issues that may have previously been overlooked. It also allows results to be made quickly available. The weaknesses of discussion are that often, vocal minorities will monopolize an arena to the detriment of the more low-profile participants.

The relevance of discussion as research tool is that in the right environment it allows free-and-frank dialogue to take place. It also allows for the introduction of new material and topics, which may be left or right of the parameters originally tabled.

Examination is the action of measuring or judging by a standard and involves the processes of testing or assessing; from those being tested it requires some sort of response, and responses can be written, oral or practical.

Written responses may be classified as objective, or, essay; an objective answer requires a person to indicate the correct response or provide a short answer. Essay answers require a person to write an answer, and the response may range from a short answer to many pages.

Oral responses can be specific or descriptive and are normally given in response to two types of questions, structured or unstructured. A structured question requires careful planning and preparation and takes the same form as questions requiring written responses – except for the presentation, which is oral. Unstructured questions are utilized to supplement information and are generally in response to a statement made which may require clarification or amplification.

Practical responses are the most valid indicators of performance; they provide a direct indicator of ability and are preferred above all other responses, particularly for job-orientated objectives. Within the ETDF, practical response took the form of tests at the end of lessons, often referred to in training as

Tests of Elementary Training (TOETs). Examples of these are carried out before weapon or drill lessons, e.g., prior to carrying out a range shoot it is common practice to have groups of soldiers perform the load, unload, make safe, instant and action drills; all are states of weapon readiness and all are required to be utilized during a range shoot.

Practical responses for complex and detailed tasks can be carried in groups or individual scenarios; the ETDF soldiers were great copiers, so that even if they had not observed a complete lesson, in groups they would mimic the action of those surrounding them. This placed additional onus on the examiner to ensure they were fit to pass onto the next stage and initially the NZ Small Arms Training Team (SATT) who took over from the previous incumbents found huge deficiencies.

Strengths, Weaknesses and Relevance: Examination

The strengths of examination are that they are a flexible and valuable method of data collection and allow the marker to assist in determining the training requirement, if deficiencies are found. Examinations also allow written, oral or practical responses to be utilized. The weaknesses of examination are they can take large amounts of time to construct properly and are labour-intensive if large numbers are required to be marked.

The relevance of examination as research tools is that they give a “snapshot” of the student capability, and within the ETDF this was often assessed in practical application as job or mission achievements. Examination also assists in determining training requirements and details the standards of trainee performance so it can clearly identify specific training problems.

3.6 Sampling Procedures

The sample procedures utilized for this study are small in size, due to the limitations of the study. The current ETDF logistic doctrine allows for 5% of the total ETDF Force structure to be designated as logistic support, which

equates to 150 personnel; the Logistic SOR denotes this number as being 158 personnel. However, the figure 150 will be utilized. (ETDF Contracted Logistics Support Statement of Requirement, 2001, p.1.)

Only three logistic officers and one logistic senior non-commissioned officer were identified, further limiting the actual sampling available to be processed. This was further compounded by the fact that the first 600 soldiers and officers trained were the most able former-FALINTIL guerilla fighters, who were to form the cadre staff. Recruiting for the remaining force commenced in the last month of the researcher's stay in East Timor, and brought evidence of a wide range of skills and diverse backgrounds.

To offset the criticality of a small sample size, detailed objective analysis of the exact role and task of the logistic infrastructure occurred and the researcher was at pains to investigate, evaluate and analyze every nuance of those requirements; in particular where opinions were divided and more so when these differences were aired vocally.

The Logistic Element of the Royal New Zealand Army Logistic Regiment is approximately twice the size of the ETDF; thus some ready reckoning comparisons could also be made there, along with the recognition that the majority of our non-core activities have also been contracted-out.

3.7 Data Gathering Procedures

The researcher gathered data for this dissertation over a three-year period which commenced in 2001, and culminated in 2003. A multitude of procedures was utilized to gather information; these included a detailed literature review on East Timor's history and training trends backed up by personal observation of ETDF trainees, recruiting procedures, individual and collective training and physical interaction with ETDF personnel complete with questioning of ETDF personnel in both written and verbal format.

There was also a great deal of physical interaction with Australian, NZ

and Portuguese training cadres, culminating in the practical assessment of the generic tasks required for ETDF logistic personnel.

3.8 Analytical Procedures

One of the greatest dangers relating to the analysis of any findings is one's perception of any given situation. Members of the ODFD were trained similarly, utilized the same doctrine and the same prime publications were utilized in their respective training establishments. This allowed for analysis of situations to be carried out concurrently and then brainstormed together, to facilitate the promulgation of a training solution based on our collective findings, which normally quickly and succinctly identified factors facilitating or inhibiting our desired training end-states.

Having trained within both the armies of Australia and the United States of America, the researcher had intimate knowledge of their training regimes; both are significantly larger armies than the NZDF and both are predicated around mass growth of whatever capability the training resource is focused upon.

Perception of requirements differs owing to educational standards, calibre of recruit, and resources allocated to carry out training. The researcher utilized the following analogy to articulate how perception could have an adverse effect on the collective and individual training being developed:

The ETDF, particularly those who were former FALANTIL guerilla fighters, often suffer poor health and the associated diseases that come from living in damp, cold environments and lack of adequate heating or ventilation. Thus, they are prone to coughing and spitting when ever phlegm or mucus builds up in their throats. The ODFD Trainers, knowing that such habits can be a medium for the transmission of Hepatitis and Tuberculosis, actively discouraged this behaviour. When the researcher demonstrated the use of a handkerchief and blew his nose into it – the ETDF personnel were appalled

and disgusted that I would want to save and then carry around a device that harboured such disease.

Therefore, as trainers, it was critical that any analysis conducted was not assessed on our perceived requirements, but on the requirements of the East Timorese, and often this was achieved with difficulty in the initial stages. This was particularly so with some members of the initial training team, who had never had to operate in sub-optimal conditions without electrical power, modern training aids and with the problems that multi-translation and/or interpretation causes.

3.9 Ethical Issues with the Sources of Evidence

The case studies' sources of evidence were reliant on reviewing a variety of documentary evidence and analyzing the findings; and further, the observation, questioning and analysis of subject matter was done with the full cognizance of all participants involved, and all participants consented to being involved in the various studies. At no stage were any individuals coerced into co-operation and all were aware that they could cease to participate in the questionnaires at any given stage of the interviews or discussions. Notes attributable or quoted from any one individual were read back to the participant to ensure that misinterpretation or ambiguity of facts was eliminated as far as practicable.

All participants were aware that the true nature of the research was to identify factors that would contribute to the raise, train and sustain elements of the ETDF, and that deception from the questioner or questioned would skew the findings and have long-term adverse effects on the ETDF. While the recruits and potential recruits were exposed to some physical and mental stress during some of the exercises, this was to ascertain their physical and mental agility to operate in stressful and austere environments, as would be found on the battlefield.

At no stage was the privacy of the participant invaded and in all situations where one could reasonably expect some privacy, the communal environment notwithstanding, recruits were asked, *via* translators where appropriate, if they minded the observation team being present. During all three TOD's within East Timor, all participants were treated fairly and shown consideration and respect.

On three separate occasions, observers to persons-being-interviewed attempted to influence the findings of the researcher. On all occasions the interview was halted and the influencing party cautioned as to their behaviour and the person/s interviewed requested to ignore interjections. On one occasion the interjection was reported to a higher authority owing to ethical and commercial-in-confidence breaches of protocol.

Conclusion

The various methods utilized to gather data have proved invaluable to the implementation of training programs within the ODFD. As a generalization, the East Timorese responded best to practical training applications where actual scenarios were turned into training role-plays and they either individually or as a group were required to resolve issues.

Chapter 4 will discuss the analysis of data and then present six case studies, which focused on the eight generic competencies that ensured that all logistic activities were approached in an effective and efficient fashion.

Chapter 4

ANALYSIS OF DATA

The collection and collation of data leading up to the design and development of this thesis commenced in 2001 and culminated in 2005. Many military and civilian organizations have made similar studies of East Timor, ranging from the NZ, Australian and Portuguese Military to Brown and Root, a United States-based contracting firm.

Similarly, anecdotal evidence supports a view that business intelligence-gathering has also been undertaken by both Indonesia and Australia as to the viability of contractors re-establishing themselves within the infrastructure of East Timor. Although these businesses were dealt a severe blow resultant from the riots on the 4th December 2003, during which many foreign-owned contractors' establishments were subjected to arson attacks.

In March/April 2001 the researcher carried out an overview of the current situation, view extant training regimes, sighted the current and planned training venues and outline what, if any aid NZ is best positioned to provide. (NZ Army Contribution Option, 2001, p.1.)

In May 2001 the researcher's assistance was requested by an ADF Training Team to carry out a TNA for the ETDF. This culminated in the production of a TNA for the ETDF within specific logistic trades. (NZ Army TNA, 2001, pp.1-4.)

From January to May 2002 the researcher was seconded to the ODFD within UNTAET as the Logistic Advisor to the ETDF. This role encapsulated all facets of logistic training for the ETDF and culminated in the production of an SOR for contracted logistic support and the production of TMP's for various ETDF Trades.

Six case studies were also conducted and analysis for all six case studies centers around eight generic major competencies.

Identifying the objectives that support the aim. It is imperative that soldiers/officers are capable of identifying and clarifying the main purpose of any given activity or task. This is taught in officer/soldiers' career courses and the enabling competency is the ability for individuals to be able to interpret instructions, scenarios or tasks (implied or stated) and identify the task aim.

Analysis and planning. This involves the processes that involve the collection of information, organisation of thoughts, logical analysis and generation of innovative ideas to develop a plan or course of action. The enabling competencies are identification of relevant factors, use of initiative and application of problem-solving techniques.

Decision-making and directing. This involves the directing and co-ordination of relevant factors needed to make timely decisions about the best course of action. Execution of task/activities and communication to clarify the requirement to enable effective and efficient implementation of the final plan. The enabling competencies are sound decision making processes and effective command-and-control measures.

Monitoring, reviewing and adjusting. Requires the incumbent to maintain a close view of what progress is being made in relation to stated aim, goals and targets. They must consider information about progress and ensure that adjustments are made when appropriate and necessary. The enabling competencies are situational awareness and flexibility/response to change.

Leadership. This entails instilling confidence and trust in subordinates and peers, further it encapsulates the developing and motivating of team members and all facets of team management. The enabling competencies are self-confidence, motivation, communication skills (oral and written), commitment and resolve, moral courage, mental robustness and physical stamina.

Managing materials and resources. This requires that material and financial resources be managed as effectively and efficiently as possible. The enabling competencies are effective allocation of and efficient use of resources.

Advising, influencing, creating and fostering working relationships. This requires members of the ETDF to develop and manage the necessary working relationships that allow effective advising and influencing of the appropriate people in support of achieving the desired aim of the ETDF. The enabling competencies are team management, working with peers, working with superiors and working with civilian staff.

Human resource management. This encompasses applying relevant legislation and Army/Government initiatives, also the provision of advice to team members on finance, administration, discipline and welfare. The enabling competencies are knowledge of relevant legislation, provision of first-line advice and enforcement of these mandates. (Army Doctrine and Training News Number 13 May 2000. p. 78.)

These factors further reinforce the three distinct-but-interdependent needs hierarchy, those being, the needs of the soldiers, including career aspirations, career plan, personal development and financial security; the needs of the Army, including career planning, manning, promotion boards, career management advice, and task needs which provide operational effectiveness; included being career management, yearly reports and military career management profiles. (British Army Review, Number 129, Spring 2002. p. 63.)

These preceding factors were further developed paying due attention to tried-and-true tenets of military training; none was more important than getting the foundations right – and that is recognition of five critical and significant developments which had their origins in the eighteenth century; professionalism, nationalism, mechanization, intellectualization and diversification. (Preparing Future Leaders, p. 19.)

Professionalism – With its emphasis on controlled entry, career specialization and training, and creates an ongoing tension between rationalism and conservatism. This factor had the potential to be one of the most influential, either facilitating or inhibiting the raise, train and sustain factors within the ETDF. All former members of the FALANTIL had expectation that entry into the ETDF would be automatic, albeit some were merely waiting out time until their pensions arrived.

Nationalism – During the French Revolution, war was made a national undertaking in which all the resources of the state, including its citizens, can be used in the military endeavour. The East Timorese are fiercely nationalistic and the army rides high on a wave of popularity. This will ensure that the recruit lines are full and accordingly a high proportion of high-quality recruits can be expected.

Mechanisation – With the gradual reduction in physical strength as a criterion for the conduct of war, and a new creation of activities such as communications, and the development of new notions about where the battlefield might be located, the size, stature and dimensions of armies have changed. In the ETDF situation, consideration was given to integrating the genders within the new force, regarded in a largely patriarchal society as a novel concept.

Intellectualisation – The increasing use of technologically-advanced equipment in the war zone, and the increased complexity of military operations and maintaining complex weaponry, has caused an increased requirement for the military to recruit soldiers with higher scholastic abilities than previously entertained. The ETDF faced difficulties with literacy and numeracy skills and will face increased difficulties, particularly regarding a lack of computer-literate soldiers, and soldiers possessing higher academic qualifications than their officers or superiors.

Diversification – As the world becomes increasingly more complex, the military branches out into more diverse roles, such as peacekeeping, disaster

relief and infrastructure assistance. The greatest quantum-leap for the ETDF is with making the transition from a guerilla army to a conventional one, and the additional responsibilities the East Timor Government has placed upon it. There are several characteristics that make a profession eminently suited for an effective army, and these are; a monopoly of a distinctive set of skills and knowledge, a purpose in an area of vital concern to mankind, the maintenance of a system of continuous education combined with a commitment to altruistic service to the extent of unlimited liability, an unconstrained service to society as a client, allegiance and obedience to a lawfully-constituted national politically, an adherence to a set of ethical standards and self-regulation and a robust sense of professional community. (Preparing Future Leaders, p. 76.)

These factors are discussed in outline within the following six case studies. The detail for each study is contained within Appendices A-F attached to this dissertation.

4.1 Case Study One – Findings of a Reconnaissance Tour of Duty within the East Timor Defence Force

Case Study One was carried out during the period 28th March – 1st April 2001 and involved briefings in New Zealand and Australia and a Reconnaissance Tour of Duty into East Timor. Several methodologies were utilized to gather data including interviews, oral questions, discussion groups, direct observation of ETDF recruits, interviews with supporting training nations, both collectively and individually, and guidance from the Military Attaches of both Australia and Portugal.

Constraints to the gathering of data included increased threats to security, the researchers perception of unclear delineation by Australian and Portuguese Defence Attaches as to each other's roles, and perception by the Portuguese Trainers that the team was there to cast aspersions upon their current training efforts.

Enclosure 1 to Case Study One contains a Skills, Knowledge and Attitudes (SKAs) analysis matrix, which outlines abilities required for specific tasks within the ETDF. The SKA is an adaptation of the Malcolm Craig Abilities Analysis Sheet (Craig, p. 26) and was utilized to highlight the extant skill sets of the ETDF recruits.

Enclosure 2 to Case Study One contains a Reconnaissance Report to East Timor.

The main outcome from Case Study One was the development of an SKA analysis and recommendations that a Training Needs Analysis be conducted.

A main finding within Case Study One was that as a generalisation, the ETDF recruits demonstrated an underdeveloped nature of intellectual skills and cognitive processes. This is not to say they are intellectually sub-optimal, this rather is a reflection on their limited exposure to the types of tasks a

conventional army is trained to carry out (as opposed to their experience of 25 years of guerrilla fighting).

4.2 Case Study Two – Findings of a Training Needs Analysis within the East Timor Defence Force

Case Study Two was carried out during the period 7th – 30th May 2001 and again involved briefings in Australia, NZ and a Training Needs Analysis (TNA) Tour of Duty into East Timor. Reinforced by the findings of SKA analysis of ETDF recruits, this TOD utilised personal participation, observation, interview, discussion groups and strategic guidance to ascertain its outcomes.

Constraints to the gathering of data included the size of the team, the operational tempo within East Timor at the time of the visit, the lack of donor nation support and the on-going refinements to the Statement of Requirements for the Logistic Contract.

Enclosure 1 to Case Study Two contains a Capability Needs Assessment Model (CNAM) for the Driver Trade.

Enclosure 2 to Case Study Two contains a TNA Report for the driver, storeman, medic and communicator trades.

The main outcomes from Case Study Two were the production of a CNAM and a TNA, used to outline support and resource commitment required to man positions within the U.N. for training the ETDF. It also led to the suggestion that NZ investigate filling the position of ODFD Logistic Advisor.

A main finding within Case Study Two is that the organisational shape of the ETDF logistic support mechanism needs to be clearly defined and the supply chain modelled, before training starts.

4.3 Case Study Three – Findings of a Contribution Options Study within the East Timor Defence Force

Case Study Three was carried out concurrently within East Timor during Case Study Two, and also when the researcher returned to NZ. Reinforced by the findings of the TNA and concerned by comments made by logistic members of the ODFD, the researcher carried out analysis as to the value added by filling the Logistic Advisor's position within the ODFD.

There were no constraints to gathering data for this Case Study, the current incumbent being an RNZAF Wing Commander who saw critical importance in this area as a governance-and-development issue. The incumbent also stated that the position was ideally suited for an Army Officer, as opposed to one from Air Force or Navy. A strong background in instruction, with logistic instruction being a pre-requisite was absolutely required, as was the ability to draft Standard Operating Procedures and being able to conduct analysis quickly as well as draft responses to ministerial enquiries.

Enclosure 1 to Case Study Three contains a contribution option for the NZDF for the Logistic Advisor position within the ODFD.

The main outcomes from Case Study Three were acceptance and agreement from HQ NZDF that this position was critical to the strategic, long-term development of the supply chain modelling utilised by the ETDF and the secondment of the researcher into this position.

The main finding of Case Study Three is that the ETDF hierarchy lack the managerial skills sets required to manage the logistic functionality required by a conventional army.

4.4 Case Study Four – Findings of an Analysis of Likely Contract Costs within the East Timor Defence Force

Case Study Four was conducted in East Timor during the period 7th - 30th May 2002 and supplemented the findings already carried out in-theatre by the researcher's predecessor.

Constraints to Case Study Four were the lack of initial funding for the scoping of the out-sourced logistic option. This resulted in a Catch-22 situation occurring; the funding was not adequate to place uniformed manpower into logistic positions (nor were there any suitable candidates); nor did the funding adequately allow for all variables within the supply chain management sphere to be initiated.

Enclosure 1 to Case Study Four contains a brief summary of likely contract costs.

Enclosure 2 to Case Study Four contains a condensed statement of requirement for contracted logistic support.

The main outcome from Case Study Four was the initiation of an outsourced logistic contract, although this did not eventuate until April 2002 during the TOD into East Timor. This also included responsibility for contractor logistic training.

The main finding of Case Study Four is that the ETDF lacked the knowledge and corporate or personnel skill sets to undertake its own logistic management and delivery. This is due to the predominance of ex-guerrilla members in the ETDF whose *modus operandi* is subsistence or survival logistics, which is not sustained, or in-depth support-centric. It is not feasible to grow this capability within the pre-designated time frames, thus an external solution is necessary.

4.5 Case Study Five – Findings of the Development of a Training Management Package for East Timor Defence Force

Case Study Five resulted in the development of TMP for the ETDF. This was a co-joint operation between Australian and NZ trainers, conducted during the TNA TOD within East Timor and utilising the SKA analysis and CNAM analysis findings. This was also partially-shaped by articulation of areas of interest by HQ ADF and HQ NZDF, which shaped the training into spheres of speciality, thus reducing time needs and numbers of persons carrying out analysis within an operational theatre.

Case Study Five had one major constraint; in that donor nation support was not forthcoming by the time the TMP was required to be developed. This was not a major impediment to progress, however it entailed that the TMP was made more generic than would normally be the case. A case-in-point was the requirement for mechanic and auto electrician training to cover both diesel and petrol applications, which increased the instructional time, instructor numbers and special tools and equipment required. This made the donor nation input less palatable. The desired outcome was a single-fuel fleet, with diesel being the preferred option.

The main outcome from Case Study Five was the development of TMPs that clearly stated resource input and could be costed to indicate the duration of the training effort (in years), the cost of resources required but not supplied, the instructional skill sets needed and the outcomes anticipated.

The main finding of Case Study Five is that instructors in modern armies are not used to operating in austere environments, i.e., without the use of electronic training aids or modern classrooms, a factor exacerbated by language and cultural differences, and we find these are prevalent situations in modern U.N. peacekeeping environments.

A sub-finding of Case Study Five, which directly relates to factors facilitating or inhibiting the raise, train and sustain functions within the ETDF, was that

the researcher noted that trainers from Australia, NZ and the United Kingdom were constrained by the invisible “Chinese Walls” that the systems-approach to training has. Examples of these “Chinese Walls” are attendances on certain courses are subject to course prerequisites, for instance physical, educational or chronological constraints.

Actual examples being that a soldier had not passed a required fitness level test and was precluded from attending a course, although the course was purely academic and required no physical exertion. Chronological constraints are time bars preventing soldiers from attending courses early even if course are under subscribed and the attendee has all the skills, knowledge and attitudes required to successfully pass the course.

Assumptions made by trainers have serious ramifications on the assimilation of subjects taught, and lessons learned. As a generalisation, publications developed in certain countries are predicated on training a slice of the society that they are developed in – the assumption that they can be utilised anywhere and everywhere is a flawed concept.

During the Malayan Emergency, British, New Zealand and Australian soldiers were employed, housed and integrated with the villagers who were most vulnerable to infiltration and coercion from communist insurgents. This enabled them to watch and learn the subtleties of village life; to identify and inspect the power brokers, to discover if a society is matriarchal or patriarchal, whether it imposes any unwritten laws, any of which factors would cause damage to the training regime or place the trainers or trainees in an invidious situation.

4.6 Case Study Six – Findings of an Independent Battalion Audit within the East Timor Defence Force

Case Study Six was conducted in East Timor during the period January – May 02 during the researcher’s TOD as the Logistic Advisor to the ODFD. The majority of the findings were carried out as a result of direct observation and

questioning by the researcher, either at orders groups held weekly at the ODFD or by fortnightly site visits to the 1st Battalion position at Los Palos.

Constraints to the findings were the ever-present lack of communication with the battalion position at Los Palos and the less-than-honest reports received back at HQ ODFD.

The main outcomes from Case Study Six were the co-location of an Australian Training Support Team within battalion lines at Los Palos and the drafting of SOPs for every possible contingency that could befall an Infantry Battalion during its work-up training and the requirement for the Battalion Commander to detail activities for the previous week and forecasted events within the routine, collective and individual training spheres.

The main finding of Case Study Six is that the altruistic aim of allowing the ETDF to become self-sufficient and self-reliant too quickly can have catastrophic and financially-damaging downstream affects. This places great emphasis on the teaching and testing of command and control elements for the senior ETDF Officers and even greater stringency on the selection of Officers for the ETDF.

Case Study Six was utilised as a proofing exercise and allowed the ODFD to articulate examples of deficiencies to the HQ ETDF from a lessons-learned perspective. Lessons learned were defined as validated knowledge and experience derived from observations and historical study of military operations, exercises, activities and training. (Lessons Learned Cell, 2003, p. vii.)

Teaching from a lessons learned perspective was a successful medium once personality conflicts were resolved and the Battalion Commander was briefed that the ODFD and the Australian Training Team were not actually spying on him, but observing the battalion *per se*.

Conclusions

Data analysis for this dissertation proved a protracted affair and studies of lessons learned for previous missions was enlightening as lessons learned tended to be “lessons learned and subsequently forgotten”, which meant they were not lessons learned at all. As a consequence of objective criticism aimed at improving this situation, a centrally administered database has been initiated within Army Training Group, Waiouru as a repository to all operational and training issues raised ensuring the same problems are not relitigated and lessons learned are just that.

The case studies conducted provided valuable data to the headquarters element of the ODFD and further substantiated some earlier assumptions made by previous training needs analysis teams.

Chapter Five will discuss the results found by the researcher and discusses factors which had both positive and negative effects on the future direction taken by the ETDF.

Chapter 5

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Following the researcher's departure from East Timor, the logistic training management package is now in-place within the ETDF and promises to be a major success, notwithstanding that the preliminary work required to get the training and contract up-and-running was arduous and at times resource-intensive.

However, the Civilian Contract Manager required to be evacuated from East Timor following consecutive death threats, these in relation to hiring, firings and refusal to endorse the common practice of adding a tithe to any financial activity taking place. Largely, this has been attributed to a lack of situational awareness and lack of empathy with the personnel who were influential in the interactive process of hiring and firing in East Timor's current environment.

Following the withdrawal of their respective national battalions, both NZ and Australia have committed to retaining personnel in the training facility at Metinaro and the ODFD, and to provide strategic oversight to matters logistic and financial within the ETDF. (Lessons Learned Cell, 2003, p. 37.)

The case studies and other analyses reinforced the general principles of training; these being that it is a function of command and must be continuous, progressive, relevant, realistic, challenging, not zero defect oriented (i.e. allow mistakes to be made), must have an aim and objectives, should be integrated, and it requires continuous review. (Army Doctrine and Training News, Number 18, Winter 2002/2003, p. 107).

5.1 Problem Restated

The aim of this study is to identify the factors that facilitate or inhibit the raising, training and sustaining of the logistic support mechanisms for the East Timor Defence Force.

A salient point to be considered by training specialists is to observe problems in a contextual setting. Seen singularly, many “problem” situations were seemingly innocuous and did not detract from the overall training state, but cumulative effects often rendered training ineffective and inefficient. (Craig, 1987, pp.288-289.)

Another self-evident truth that emerged was the individual focus of teeth-arms personnel *versus* the support-arms elements. The teeth-arms or fighting branches were not particularly interested in the support-arms or logistic elements problems, as they had neither the time nor the expertise to understand, address and resolve them. This had the potential for committing training resources to activities that were logistically unsupportable and additionally not being able to justify the allocation of resources in the long term. (Craig, 1987, p.669.)

5.2 Summary Description of Procedures

The description of procedures utilized within this thesis are varied and based on tried-and-tested military analysis, civilian best-practice and effective and efficient utilization of resources.

In the first instance, great reliance was placed on published case studies, doctrinal philosophies and clearly articulated “desired end-states” from within the ODFD. These were then supplemented and substantiated by personal interviews with key players and then by direct observation of the ETDF recruits, soldiers under training, battalions in work-up training, and finally by in-depth discussions with potential contractors.

No one, single methodology was utilized and many paradigm shifts in logic were required, especially when “observers” were theorists and not practitioners. Cultural differences added another layer, which often superimposed itself, and not always overtly. Understanding some of the cultural idiosyncrasies from international staff often compounded already difficult situations.

The major research tool utilized by the researcher and discussed in detail with Dr. Brendan Nolan was direct observation of all activities associated with these activities. The ability to carry out this observation was facilitated by the researcher’s previous visits to ascertain; training parameters, general instructor availability, general student psychological metrics, and time-and-space imperatives. Observation was carried out in some cases continuously, in others over a period of time and lastly at set periods of the day to observe specific activities. (Craig, 1987, p. 373.)

The researcher’s previous employment within the United Nations Verification Mission in Angola III, from 1995-1996, also allowed insight into former Portuguese colonies’ training methodology and the shortfalls of the U.N. and NZ Training Regimes. It also allowed for pre-emptive moulding of training philosophies to take place, particularly when senior government officials were traveling to Angola seeking advice for the fledgling nation-state.

5.3 Major Findings

The major findings within this area of study are extremely diverse, and as such will be amplified under specific subject headings. These headings are not in any order of precedence and often factors were interdependent.

Financial factors had a major impact in shaping the force development plan, which in turn shaped the logistic support and personnel plan.

Personnel Factors. The skills, knowledge and attitudes study outlined the initial problems that the training donor nations could expect and influenced

methodology for resolutions of these issues.

Political Factors. The political drivers from UNTAET, ETTA, ETDF Ministry of Defence and the East Timor Government placed impediments to progress on a regular basis and much of the unnecessary bureaucracy was learned behavior. Further there were limits to the U.N. mandate in particular the placing of restrictions on UNTAET's capacity to respond to FALANTIL's requests to play a more active part in security. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p.8.)

Interdepartmental Bias and Rivalry. Tensions between the ETDF and the East Timor Police Force reached unacceptable levels when both were competing for scarce resources – manpower and funding. Decidedly more options were considered when raising the Police force than the ETDF and the allowances and conditions of service were markedly different. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p.27.)

Logistic Factors. The training of a conventional army from a predominantly guerilla-oriented army required many paradigm shifts in training philosophy to eventuate. Often staffs were presented with almost insurmountable problems exacerbated by bureaucracy, ineptitude and sometimes apathy. Further it appeared that the ETDF knowledge of defence management, as it relates to modern armed forces in a democratic country was understandably limited. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p.30.)

Resource Factors - Time and Space. Resources are influenced by every one of the preceding factors; the superimposing of "Timorisation" required the adoption of a "walk-before-you-run" training philosophy that when corrected was misconstrued as patronizing and having "Big Brother" overtones.

Capability Factors. These drive the shape and form of any defence force. Capability is determined by a combination of human resource issues, financial issues and the ultimate shape that the government wishes its military forces to assume. Capability is also impacted by input from donor nations. Capability

also drives the training requirements - the more you have, the more you need
- and this exponentially increases with technological advances, and,

Doctrinal Factors. Army Doctrine had a major impact upon the ETDF and therefore how training was conducted; manoeuvre warfare and directive control having the largest impact and both being foreign to the ETDF. Doctrine provides a military organisation with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort. (NZDF, NZ Military Doctrine, p.1-3)

Many of the factors outlined above were identified through the process of segregating the outcomes of the six case studies into factors that facilitated or inhibited the raise, train or sustain of the Logistic Support Elements of the ETDF. This allowed the root cause or effects to be addressed incrementally and progressed to a state where solution or risk mitigation strategies could be implemented.

5.4 Financial Factors

Despite rigorous appreciation processes and detailed planning which produced minimal credible options (MCO) for areas of functionality within the ETDF, plans were often overruled for purely financial reasons. Financiers often interpreted minimal credible options as the optimum solution and would start financial support from such a perspective.

Just in time (JIT) principles involve the concept of reducing inventory, which are huge overheads for any army, involving storage, maintenance, security and depreciation issues, all of which add no value to the operational capability of an Army. They do however play a vital part in the operational viability of an army and often financiers and some senior ETDF Officers did not understand this concept.

The ETDF was the last government department to be appointed a Minister within the East Timor Cabinet. The lack of a Minister meant that financial

delegations and purchasing authority was not devolved from ETTA until April 2002 and no contracts could be entered into, nor could petty cash be utilized for sourcing items. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p.30.)

Monetary accountability was not understood by many of the senior ETDF Officers and led to probity issues, investigations and withholding of funds by external agencies. Routine activities, e.g., the issuing of monthly pay had to be overseen by a Colonel and a Lieutenant-Colonel from within the ODFD and rarely went without some sort of problem emerging. (Center for Defence Studies, op cit.)

5.5 Personnel Factors

Cultural differences can have a huge and often detrimental impact upon training plans, cause loss of face, and exacerbate poor communication skills and any tendency within the verbal passage of information to cause disruption to training, particularly when complex factors or theories are being discussed. (Craig, p. 665.)

Training Management Plans are rendered useless if there are interpretation problems, and translators must become an integral part of any training organization if there is more than one language or if the *lingua franca* is under some dispute. (Lessons Learned Cell, p. 21.)

The researcher observed that positions within the ETDF were initially given to long-term supporters of “the struggle”; this nepotism caused damage to the intellectual and structural integrity of the ETDF by placing sub-optimal operators into positions that were clearly beyond their initial capability and invariably required direct intervention to resolve issues emanating from poor decision-making. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, pp.10-11.)

Owing to poor management of international staff and the failure to “shadow post” ETDF personnel for training within the ODFD, NZ withdrew both the Personnel and Logistic Advisors when their TODs ended. Whilst this was both

a political statement and financial imperative (both positions had only received parliamentary permission to be manned and funded for 12 months) it actually undid many months of work by previous incumbents. (Lessons Learned Cell, p. 21.)

Guerilla armies operate in a dispersed and isolated area of operations and a major requirement is self-sufficiency and independence on operations. When moving from groups of five-to-ten up to Company and Battalion organizations (up to 600-strong), many East Timorese organizational skills were understandably sub-optimal. It took great lengths of time for the ETDF to conceptualize plans that involved interaction, or in which a Unit, Platoon or Company was required to link into larger strategy. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, pp.11-13.)

Non-regular forces while having great standards of self-discipline are not accustomed to reacting to or being subject of imposed discipline. Orders were subject of debate and regulations largely ignored. Resulting disciplinary action often resulted in individuals going absent without leave (AWOL), believing they had been wronged. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p.13.)

Capital offences, such as rape and murder, had regular impact upon ETDF members and at any one stage at least two were in detention for suspicion of various serious offences. The East Timorese had a surprising attitude, in a predominantly Catholic society, to crimes such as rape. Often the husband of the victim would ask for some sort of compensation; money usually, or recompense in the form of livestock, if that was duly supplied the "issue" went away; if not the claim was subject to judicial intervention. The importance of a restorative justice system as a philosophy, a system and a method of justice is evident in East Timorese society. The researcher noted that a major teaching point made to the ETDF soldier was - all of you are an ambassador from the whole military *per se* and just because the occupying forces for the last 25 years had acted in an abhorrent fashion does not make it acceptable for you to do the same. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p.24.)

Gender integration was a governmental policy directive within both the East Timor Police Force and the ETDF. East Timor is a patriarchal society and often the placement of women in positions of authority or oversight was poorly received. Training of all-female platoons was done centrally and in isolation from male recruits; these additional training requirements placed strain on an overburdened training organisation and some resentment surfaced following reallocation of scant resources, i.e. barracks, facilities, uniforms, positions and the requirement for female instructors/mentors. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, pp.27-28.)

Many of the former soldiers from FALINTIL were inducted into the ETDF and were waiting for their “veteran affairs department’ to provide retirement inducements and/or a pension plan. These soldiers, often-senior officers, soaked up excessive logistic infrastructure for their administration that would have been better utilized elsewhere. While constrained by budget and government direction on what to do with these personnel, there is a requirement to quarantine prospective retirees from the cadre staff, recruits and the fledgling Army. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p. 8.)

5.6 Political Factors

The U.N. has no Mandate to assist in the raising, training or sustaining of a defence force within its area of operations; this can lead to conflicting priorities, particularly when donor nations are also contributing training nations under the U.N. Mandate. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, pp. 8-9.)

As a Minister of Defence was chosen, but not appointed, ETDA attempted to maintain command-and-control over all financial transactions, effectively adding another layer of bureaucracy to any monetary action without adding value. The researcher rewrote Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), by-passing any department that hindered progress; however, upon the researcher’s return to NZ (RTNZ), ETDA returned all process and procedure to the former *status quo*.

Training for the ETDF must be synchronized with the express aims of the government in mind; unless government expectations are clearly and unambiguously articulated, the majority of training becomes immediately redundant and the effectiveness and efficiency is questionable. (ETDF, 2001, Contracted Logistic Support , pp. 1-3.)

It would be imprudent not to mention the political aspects of the relationships between the training triumvirate, Australia, Portugal and NZ Defence Forces and Governments. Australia and NZ do not have much interaction between Portugal and the respective spheres of influence are poles apart, however NZ and Australia have a long standing relationship, have multiple exchange programmes operating and have near identical training regimes which lead to increased training interoperability and mutually supporting training programmes. While not wishing to be accused of ethnocentricity there were great synergies utilized by the ANZAC forces within both INTERFET and UNTAET, this was relationship was not enjoyed by other host nations to the same degree. (NZDF, 2004, NZ Military Doctrine, p. 2-3.)

5.7 Interdepartmental Rivalry and Bias

The rivalry between the East Timor Police Force and the ETDF reached unacceptable levels during the researcher's UNTAET TOD. Some of the machinations behind this tension were related to their being the same size, receiving the same pay, but having vastly-differing conditions of service. This was further exacerbated by a perception from ex-FALANTIL members of the ETDF – that there was a lack of respect being shown to soldiers, in general.

The East Timor Government went to great lengths to ensure that neither the Police nor Army became paramilitary forces and were accountable for all their actions to civilian oversight. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p. 8.)

It is an unreasonable expectation to believe that errors will not be made, specifically in line with jurisdiction(s); however, once errors are made they must be captured by a reporting system. A case in point is Riot Control. In two

instances the researcher witnessed the ETDF in action and concluded that it did not acquit itself well. Firstly, soldiers throwing stones at protesters, and secondly, aiming and pointing loaded weapons at unarmed, peaceful protesters in a controlled and authorized demonstration brought the force into disrepute and showed a lack of self-imposed discipline. Some of these procedural oversights were definitely brought about by poor planning and it was noted that the Secretary General's report of 4th October 2000 sets out the goal of developing rapidly an East Timorese Police Force, but contains no corresponding plan to develop a defence force that would take over the tasks carried out by the U.N. Peacekeepers. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p. 8.)

5.8 Logistic Factors

Logistic Training cannot be conducted in isolation, it requires integration into and governing by the organization's role and tasks, delivered under realistic circumstances comparable to those in which operations are likely to take place. This may or may not be supported by the logistics contractor or by donor nation support. (ETDF, 2001, Contracted Logistic Support, p. 3.)

Donor nation support must be co-ordinated and monitored carefully, and while East Timor graciously accepted any offer within the logistic spheres, the acceptance into the ETDF of certain commodities did not facilitate training regimes, rather it hindered them.

Careful selection of contractors can be a force-multiplier, particularly in the training sphere, if they are former military personnel and have the capability and capacity to undertake a training role. Luckily this was factored into the logistic contract exclusive of those core competencies of which the ODFD was the training overseer. (ETDF, 2001, Contracted Logistic Support, p. 23.)

As the ETDF grows, logistically and technologically all training must be continually reviewed. The first equipments issued to the ETDF were low-technology and provided minimal credible option only, and as a consequence

required only basic logistic support. There must be regular evaluation of both the medium utilized for training and the training itself. Assessment of training must be against pre-determined standards, and the results fed back to the training organisation. Resultant observations should form the basis of the lessons learned portfolio – which must be monitored and corrected, lest they become lessons repeated and forgotten. (Lessons Learned Cell, 2003, p. 21.)

Logistic Training must also be multi-echeloned (i.e., be given to more than one training audience) and encapsulate the entire organisation that it is supporting; training for officers should be aligned with training for troops on-the-ground; and tasks given should be related both upwards, downwards and across corps' and rank strata boundaries. It will be measured in years not months before this capability is realized, but the adage, "train as you fight", must not be forgotten. (ETDF, 2001, Contracted Logistic Support, p. 23.)

5.9 Resource Factors – Time and Space

Allocation of real estate to the ETDF was fraught with many problems ranging from land title disputes to an "out-of-sight, out-of-mind" approach taken by factions of the U.N. The U.N. was not mandated to assist in raising, training or sustaining a force and an underlying theme within some government circles was that the ETDF was an anathema; and the researcher is of the opinion that the general feeling was that the ETDF spheres of responsibility could be subsumed by the Police Force. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p. 8.)

Currently, land titles in East Timor are legal and recognized under Portuguese, Indonesian and East Timorese mandate. Some of these titles conflict with and contradict each other and many titled landowners were killed, leaving their belongings intestate. Two areas within the Metinaro Training Camp are areas where, historically, the local villagers gathered firewood. Goodwill with the locals notwithstanding, this poses a training risk, a security risk and entailed damage occurring to service property on a weekly basis, damage mainly being fences and padlocks cut as villagers exercised their previously-held access rights. (Hill & Saldanha, 2001, pp. 177-191.)

The policy of “Timorisation”, supported with enthusiasm by the U.N., has led to problems within the infrastructure of government departments as self-sufficiency becomes predominant. The first positions disestablished within ETTA were those of the translators, due to staff cutbacks and related funding issues. At the time of the researcher’s departure from East Timor there were approximately 200 lesson plans, 50–60 written examinations and a plethora of SOPs awaiting translation from English into Portuguese, Tetum and Bahasa Indonesian. (Lessons Learned Cell, 2003, p.21.)

Within the ETDF the policy was to have been Staff supplementation of ODFD positions by shadow-posting ETDF personnel alongside International staff to enable them to become proficient within the respective disciplines within the headquarters elements of the ETDF. This policy was an abject failure within the personnel and logistic arenas for the following reasons. The personnel officer refused outright to turn up for duty in Dili and the logistic officer could only speak Portuguese, was barely literate, was continually ill owing to Tuberculosis and received medical advice that the illness was terminal. Further he had no computer literacy and the NZ Logistic Advisor having sought medical advice was informed that Tuberculosis is contagious and requested the individual be removed and replaced. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p. 30.)

The majority of the ETDF personnel were notorious timekeepers and the assistant personnel officer assigned to payroll had poor numeric skills. These factors were exacerbated by the senior ETDF Logistic Officer only wanting the easy jobs and almost caused internecine warfare to break out when he fired all the sub-contractors hired by the civilian contractor and replaced them with his allies, resulting in a riot at the employment agency, the contractor’s life being threatened and the contract being a month late standing up. The underlying factors here were the limited ability or knowledge of defence management in relation to modern armed forces and this was where the ODFD was required to provide mentorship and a degree of stewardship to the ETDF. (Center for Defence Studies, *op cit.*)

5.10 Capability factors

The ETDF capability was firstly directed by the East Timor Government and then shaped by donor nation input. The government articulated that the role of the ETDF was “to deter aggressors, defeat incursions, support the government in times of crises and delay or harass an invader until help arrives”. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, p. 44.)

Initially the ETDF was postured for defensive operations, which it was not physically able to do. Nor was it in any position to be logistically supported to do so. After much dialogue, during which the attributes of attritional type-warfare were clearly articulated, and the fact that they had no air superiority or armoured capability clearly stated, it was seen by some, that in essence they would fix themselves for destruction in trench-type warfare. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, pp. 43-44.)

Training must have clear aims and objectives, and these must be synchronized to the ETDF capability, both internally and externally. There is an inherent danger that rapid Timorisation of the ETDF Training will result in sub-optimal assessment and an irrational belief in the ability of the force-in-being. Further training must be relevant to both operational doctrine and to the needs of individual and collective training. It must also be realistic so that it presents a credible scenario to current operations and maintain the interest of the trainees. (ETDF, 2001, Contracted Logistic Support, pp. 23-24.)

Capability in the form of soldiers-to-task is a prime consideration that the ETDF must analyze; 150 logistic staff must support 3000 soldiers and this drives contracting as the only viable option for realization of significant manpower savings. (ETDF, 2001, Contracted Logistic Support, pp. 1-4.)

5.11 Doctrinal Factors

Two major doctrinal factors influenced the shaping of the ETDF, those being Manoeuvre Warfare and Directive Control. Manoeuvre Warfare is defined as

“an approach to operations in which shattering the enemies’ overall cohesion and will to fight is paramount. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed.” (British Army Review Number 130, Autumn 2002, p. 15). This is aligned with the capability factors outlined above and orientates itself to avoiding the enemy’s strengths and attacking their weaknesses, an area that guerilla armies are able to exploit extremely well.

Directive or Mission Control is another area that modern armies are adopting as a *modus operandi*; it involves the commander articulating what his outcome/endstates are, but not how to get there. In essence, it is “give me the tools, tell me the job and let me get on with it”. It is not a new concept; it does however have huge training implications and increases the training overhead owing to the depth and breadth of training required before commanders have an inherent trust in their subordinates’ capability – and this is what the whole concept is predicated upon. (NZDF, NZ Military Doctrine, 2004, p. 6-1.)

The logistic doctrine, if predicated around contractor-support-on-the-battlefield, must review, analyze and place training measures in place to ensure that the ETDF personnel have a full understanding of the ramifications of contracted logistic support. This includes understanding the rationale for asking the following questions; what should remain military-owned and operated, what should be military-owned but contractor-operated, what could be contractor-owned but remain military-operated, and what could be contractor-owned and contractor-operated? (ETDF, 2001, Contracted Logistic Support, pp. 25-26.)

Chapter 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The review of the initiation of the implementation of the TMP for the Logistic Management of the ETDF has clarified the factors which inhibit or facilitate the Raise, Train and Sustain factors within the ETDF.

What determines how a war is fought? Tactics and Strategy is the logical answer, but what determines the success of strategy and tactics – the answer is Logistics, and within the ETDF this branch is absolutely critical to the effective operation – now and into the future.

The studies of the factors, which either facilitate or inhibit the Raise, Train and Sustain of the ETDF have identified the principles, which will dictate the success or failure of the Logistic Support Mechanisms. These commodities are time, donor nation input and resources – East Timor has been rapidly transformed from an “invaded nation”, to a “non-state under U.N. mandate” to independent nation status, and is pursuing with vigour the “Timorisation” of the entire nation.

The commodities denoted above are in short supply and this increases proportionally the risk of failure, particularly if the national predilection for self-sustainment in the form of Timorisation is actively pursued. This study has provided the following responses to each of the three hypotheses made during the initial stages of this dissertation; these were:

Hypothesis One: The ETDF does not possess the corporate knowledge or personal skill sets required to undertake its own logistic management and delivery:

Therefore it is necessary to investigate other methodologies by which this can be achieved, either fully contracted-out to a commercial contractor operating as a partner to the ETDF, or *via* an international military-logistic organization.

Hypothesis Two: These deficiencies of the ETDF will require to be rectified by formal training mediums within the specialist logistic spheres.

Therefore, Training Needs Analysis (TNA) will require to be carried out for each and every logistic trade within the ETDF, and formal Training Management Packages (TMP) developed for each development course. These will also require translation into Portuguese and Tetum.

Hypothesis Three: The deficiencies of the ETDF will require large donor nation input and shadow-posting of ETDF soldiers alongside international staff to assist formal training.

Therefore, co-ordination of donor nation support and intensive career management options require development to ensure that application of logistic training assets is carried out in an effective and efficient manner.

Recommendations

The U.N.; revisit the extant policy surrounding the support mandated to raise and train authorized defence forces within the countries it is performing peace keeping operations within and both the U.N. and governments place the infrastructure to develop and support its defence forces in place prior to the developmental teams arriving *in situ*.

All contributing nations require strategic co-ordination when donating equipment and training specialists to missions, further they need commit to a tangible end-state rather than time constraints for the secondment of staff.

Ex-guerilla fighters face stringent screening processes to ensure that war criminals, terminally-ill personnel and those of dubious allegiance are not automatically assimilated within the armed forces and pension plans for former guerillas are clearly articulated to lessen the impact on the ETDF and cantonment for guerilla forces is carried out at separate quartering areas away from potential or actual recruits.

6.1 Template for Training

The primary aim of this dissertation is to identify the factors that facilitate or inhibit the Raise, Train and Sustain factors of the ETDF, and to identify if a template may be utilized by the military or the U.N. to develop generic training parameters to place a training organization on the ground. Although one might be hesitant to generalize the findings of this research, it is possible to devise a generic template for logistic training based on the format of the Kings College Study.

The reason for selecting the Kings College Study is that this study represents an extremely thorough analysis of all contributing factors and externalities that impact upon the strategic management of the ETDF.

The format of the template is as follows:

Chapter One, Introduction, includes the methodology and structure utilized to present the findings.

Chapter Two, Warring Factions, includes a dissertation about the aims, goals and aspirations of the combatants. This should cover U.N. mandates, piecemeal history, command structures, either-sides plans for a defence force and obstacles to the creation of a transitional defence force.

Chapter Three, Governance Issues, includes constitutional and structural arrangements, specific policing issues, civil-military relations, conscription/national service issues and transparency and accountability.

Chapter Four, Economy Issues, includes economic performance, reconstruction and redevelopment, price inflation and cost of living, demography, employment and wages, economy, the government budget and costs of a defence force.

Chapter Five, Strategic Environment, includes threats to security, be they economic, social, political, military, border issues and militia, and internal crime threats.

Chapter Six, Security and Defence Options, includes mission statements, assumptions, costing, training options, skills, knowledge and attitude assessment, donor nation support, training timelines, specialized military aspects, training management packages and indicative costs.

6.2 Recommendations for Further Investigation

The following outlines areas of potential future study within the East Timor Defence Force.

Recruiting Study – addressing conscription, induction and recruitment policy and procedure. This study could also address how the reserve forces are to be structured and paid. This study has a long-term impact upon the ETDF and is also their rapid-growth-capability and surge-capacity in a time of disaster relief. A sub-study of this area of future study could be the monitoring and selection of potential officer recruits to be trained in NZ or Australia.

Gender Analysis Study – addressing the integration of women into the ETDF. Currently, East Timor is a patriarchal society and the first female recruits were inducted into the EDTF in May 2002. There are no senior officer or non-commissioned females serving and this may have a detrimental effect on recruiting at a latter stage.

Veteran Affairs Study – addressing the retirement of former-FALINTIL Officers from within the ETDF. This study would require to address the broader spectrum of welfare issues among former serving soldiers, as the ETDF relies heavily upon goodwill within the community for not only recruiting and intelligence gathering, but also for word-of-mouth recommendations for a wide variety of related activities, such as locally-employed civilians, land usage, etc.

Wider Training Area Study – addressing the feasibility of leasing a training area for jungle warfare within East Timor to facilitate a cost-neutral defence economy or realize economies of scale. East Timor would be required to locate a sizeable training area which could facilitate battalion live-firing in humid, savannah, jungle, coastal terrain and offer this to other nations. This offers an additional spin-off of closer co-operation with nations within their geo-political sphere, such as Australia, NZ, Malaysia, Singapore or the US.

Self-Sustainment Feasibility Study – addressing the effectiveness and efficiency of whether it is appropriate of having the ETDF supply some of its core requirements. As the majority of the East Timorese come from an agrarian background, investigation should be made into producing commodities - livestock or vegetables - as the Uruguayan armed forces do. The Vietnamese Army pursues similar policies, albeit under a different political system. This may be a factor contributing to the successful civilian integration or rehabilitation of retiring ETDF members and/or ex-FALANTIL members.

Civil-Military Relations in East Timor – addressing how and if the culture of violence and militarisation has been improved or degraded by the inception of the ETDF. This study should address specifically the separation of military and civilian power, legality, accountability, transparency and the government's responsibility.

Military-Police relations in East Timor – addressing the co-ordination aspects of intelligence and strategic information-gathering and dissemination. Specific areas to address are: demarcation issues on the types of intelligence and who co-ordinates such matters.

Conditions of Service Study – The conditions of service for the ETDF were designed fairly quickly and did not factor-in each and every permutation. This study should address issues of service housing, pensions for soldiers and widows, rank and promotion structures for regular force soldiers and reserve forces and a pension scheme; and,

Secondment of Officers within the ETDF – Currently the Office of Defence Force Development provides International officers from within the U.N. to Raise, Train and Sustain the ETDF. When the current mission leaves the area of operations this training regime will cease to be funded and, as a consequence, manned. Many armies have positions within other-nations' armies to upskill and foster the exchange of information; this needs to be investigated for feasibility, and Australia, NZ and Portugal are prime contenders. (Center for Defence Studies, 2000, pp. 64-67.)

The significance of the research and its contribution to the development of East Timor, Australia's near neighbour, is that this analysis allows reflection on current military training with a view to improvement of training doctrine, and addresses a deficiency within the U.N., which is that the U.N. organisation is not equipped to raise, train or sustain an emerging armed force. This lack of capability allows a sense of "power vacuum" to remain an influence as a political liability.

Neither Australia nor NZ can afford for East Timor to be destabilized or the Army to become despotic in nature, to the degree where the populace neither trusts nor respects it as an entity. If both ANZAC nations are constantly intervening in Pacific Rim nations' internal affairs, the political and regional implications of this will draw valuable training time and resources away from their respective main training efforts and will eventually gain a momentum disproportionate to the actual event – an event which can be resolved by "getting it right first time".

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APPENDIX A

CASE STUDY ONE

**REPORT REGARDING THE FINDINGS OF A RECONNAISSANCE TOUR OF
DUTY WITHIN THE EAST TIMOR DEFENCE FORCE**

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FEBRUARY 2005**

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report on the East Timor Defence Force (ETDF) is to investigate the current skill sets extant within the ETDF to enable the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) to offer Donor Nation support to the United Nations (UN) through the Office of Defence Force Development (ODFD).

This was conducted by means of a Reconnaissance Tour of Duty (Recon TOD), by the author over the period 28th March - 1st April 2001, and addresses the following:

- a. Identification of which specialist Trades will be required by the ETDF;
- b. Confirm the chronology of events to stand up the ETDF;
- c. Identify constraints, if applicable, which will impact upon this Training; and,
- d. Identify what Training can effectively and efficiently be conducted by NZDF Instructors.

Once these areas had been assessed the author was further directed to ascertain the Training Options to be employed and their geographical location, this resulted in four options being proffered:

- a. Train the ETDF specialist within New Zealand (NZ);
- b. Deploy NZ Instructors to East Timor;
- c. Employ a combination of both a and b, above; or,
- d. Deploy NZ Instructors to train ETDF personnel within Australian Defence Force (ADF) establishments.

The areas for which the NZDF has offered up Instructor Assistance include, but are not limited to:

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- a. Driver;
- b. Storeman;
- c. Medic; and,
- d. Communicator.

This report examines various possible solutions and will produce a Skills, Knowledge and Attitude (SKA) Analysis which will be crucial in the development of a Training Needs Analysis for the ETDF.

At Enclosure 1, is a summary of the SKA Analysis of ETDF personnel.

At Enclosure 2, is a NZDF Reconnaissance Report to East Timor.

SUMMARY

The problems present at the East Timor Defence Force are as follows:

Problem Definitions

The major problem at the East Timor Defence Force is the under-developed nature of intellectual skills and cognitive processes of the ETDF personnel. This is exacerbated by the UN's Mandate not being scoped to allow for the creation of the ETDF and the perception that the ETDF has developed a "cargo cult mentality" in-as-much as their expectations and capabilities are being profoundly confused. Added to this is the triumvirate of power (Australia, New Zealand and Portugal) which has stepped into the military vacuum created and on occasion has presented diametrically-opposed resolutions to the ETDF's shortfalls.

Aggravating problems evident at the ETDF are:

- 1 The first 600 Trainees are former FALANTIL guerrilla members.
- 2 The current Training Area at Aileu utilises ex-Portuguese Army barracks which are burnt out, vandalised and sub-optimal at best.

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- 3 The new Recruit Training Camp at Metinaro is still under construction.
- 4 The ETDF has not received any communication equipment.
- 5 The Training Ratio at present is 50 students to one instructor.
- 6 The *lingua franca* utilised by the current instructors is Portuguese.
- 7 The students utilise four different languages and only 10% speak Portuguese.
- 8 The Donors' conference has yet to confirm what support to the ETDF will be forthcoming.
- 9 The current Training Regime is seen as under-resourced and Portuguese-centric.
- 10 Nations, Australia and New Zealand, have promised Support but have been slow in producing any tangible support to the ETDF.
- 11 The ETDF remain operating with a "guerrilla mentality".
- 12 The ETDF have unrealistic expectations for capability development.
- 13 Conventional military skills, administratively and logistically are not evident.
- 14 Anecdotal evidence supports the perception that the Australian, New Zealand and Portuguese Military/Civilian Infrastructures are being played off against each other.
- 15 Literacy and numeracy skills are evidently slim.
- 16 Prevailing perception that the ETDF has been abandoned by the U.N. and the East Timor Government.
- 17 Police perceived as being favoured over the ETDF by the U.N.

After considering and reviewing the above problems, the following possible solutions were developed. These solutions have been divided into short-term and long-term solutions.

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Short-Term Solutions

1. The NZDF post personnel within the Small Arms Training Team (SATT) at Metinaro to supplement the extant Portuguese Instructors who are inundated with instructional tasks but lack physical resources.
2. The NZDF and the ADF approach this matter with view to a co-joint solution being proffered and recommend that a Training Needs Analysis TOD be instigated to address the perceived and real shortfalls in Donor Nation Support being aired. This is as much a “hearts and minds” activity as one which will offer tangible results.
3. A preferred option for Donor Nation Support be promulgated from within the ANZAC fraternity: this serves two purposes; firstly, it identifies areas in which both Australia and New Zealand can contribute and, secondly, it becomes the medium by which consciences can be pricked into action. NZ has stated it can contribute ANPRC-77 Radio Sets while Australia has indicated it can donate M16-A2 Rifles.
4. A concept for Donor Nation Support be promulgated, allowing Donor nations (potential and real) to visualise the support areas that are currently sub-optimal. This be established on a three-tier support framework, with Tier 1 being the platform i.e. the Truck, Tier 2 the Training Support Package i.e. the Instructors and Tier 3 the Logistic Support Package i.e. the Vehicle Spare Parts.
5. A Training Needs Analysis is conducted within the next two months and this forms the basis of resource allocation from New Zealand and Australia for support of the ETDF.

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Long Term Solutions

6. The NZDF post personnel within the UN to the ODFD within the Logistic and Personnel Advisor positions.
7. The Training Needs Analysis form(s) the basis of the development of a Training Management Package for the disciplines that Australia and New Zealand can support.
8. The UN Mandate for UNTAET is clarified to ensure that Support for the fledgling ETDF are facilitated within the current constraints.
9. Donor Nation Support concepts require to be closely synchronised with the finding of the Training Needs Analysis and this synergy must be carefully nurtured to ensure that equipment donated does not outstrip resources required to manage equipment, i.e. Donor nations will be requested to provide Right-Hand Drive Diesel Vehicles, thus eliminating the requirement for Petrol Mechanics and reducing the overall need for Auto Electricians.
10. Logistic Strategies must be developed that can be supported and sustained by the ETDF within severe resource constraints and the bounds of reality. A further study will rationalise whether the ETDF should outsource all Logistic Capability excluding Core functions.
11. Capability Statements are clearly articulated to ensure that the ETDF does not fix itself for destruction, by posturing as an offensive Force and that minimum credible options are set, that are within the ETDF's ability to Raise, Train and Sustain, i.e. Donor nations will not attempt to supply Attack Helicopters to the ETDF, as mooted by one ETDF senior officer.

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12. The new Training Camp at Metinaro is future-proofed prior to the plans and construction being finalised. This must cater for an eventual transition to computer literacy and the downsizing of instructional staff and the eventual Timorisation of the entire EDTF Instructional Staff, where the final camp must accommodate up to at least 800 personnel.

Recommended Solutions

The author recommended that Solutions 1- 5 be implemented as soon as possible in the short term and Solutions 6 - 12 be investigated as part of the Long Term Development Program (LTDP) based on manning impositions. The next logical phase of developments would be for the Training partners to initiate a Training Needs Analysis TOD to clearly outline Capabilities, Requirements and carry out a Gap Analysis, which will identify the delta between these two.

A Long Term Development Plan is both a plan and a contract, which outlines by increments and cost how any future development should take place; it, prioritises by both cost and necessity and clearly identifies those activities that are sequential. The contractual obligation part of the plan is signed off when the East Timor Government agrees to fund the ETDF as a government-sanctioned entity, which will include payroll, facilities management and employment benefits.

Solutions must also consider that already the UN and contributing nations are planning their extraction from East Timor. The New Zealand force is postured for reducing the battalion footprint by year-end 2002 and the Australian force for the following year; which has both advantages and disadvantages for the ETDF, the advantages being equipment left-in-theatre and the disadvantages being the reduction in manpower/expertise available in theatre.

CONCLUSIONS

The problems existing within the ETDF have been identified as follows:

Major Problem

The major problem is that the East Timorese Defence Force Recruits have under-developed intellectual and cognitive skills; this is further exacerbated by the paradigm shift required by the initial inductees, from a “guerrilla mentality” to a conventional warfare doctrine and associated philosophies.

The second tranche of inductee training will not have this problem, as all recruits will be recruited from purely civilian spheres among the general populace. There may be minor exceptions to this rule, in that some former expatriates enlisted within the Portuguese Army and may see fit to enlist within the ETDF (this being seen as the exception, not the norm).

Aggravating Problems

The first aggravating problem is the standard of the extant training syllabus being offered at Aileu. This is being conducted by the Portuguese Army, the former colonial power, in the former cantonment area in which the FALANTIL voluntarily sequestered itself. The lack of Donor Nation Support has caused this Training to be sub-optimal owing to the lack of communication systems, ammunition, and vehicles and formal Logistic Support. The ratio of 50 students to 1 instructor is unpalatable at best to both ANZAC partners, and places the Portuguese in an invidious situation of being set-up-to-fail and the political muck-raking that this has the potential to generate.

The second aggravating problem is the lack of Support forthcoming from the U.N., as it is not postured to assist in the development of a new-nation Army. This, to the extent where rules are being applied in an arbitrary fashion by those

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in control of Assets, required to place the ETDF on the ground in a feasible manner, which is construed or misconstrued as being unreasonable, unhelpful and lacking respect to the former guerrillas.

Immediate Problem

The third aggravating problem, which presents an immediate problem, is the lack of any qualitative or quantitative measures in place to assess whether the current Training will, can, or is able to fulfil the Strategic, Tactical and Operational requirements of the ETDF.

This deficiency spurred the New Zealand and Australian Governments to send in Training Assessment Teams into East Timor and this Case Study, which resulted in the development of the SKA Analysis attached at Enclosure 1.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon the investigations this Study has identified four recommendations to be implemented. These recommendations have been divided into short-term measures, which should be implemented immediately, and long-term measures, which should be implemented gradually as circumstances permit.

Short Term Recommendations

Recommendation 1: NZDF provide personnel to conduct a Training Needs Analysis (TNA) within the ETDF. This TNA be restricted to Storeman, Driver, Medic and Communicator Trades.

Expected Result of Recommendation 1: A thorough Training Needs Analysis can be developed which clearly articulates the NZDF commitment to training the ETDF in terms of Resources, i.e., Instructors, Time and Equipment.

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This also articulates the National Strategic Intent of the NZ Government through the allocation of funding to achieve this goal.

Recommendation 2: Until a TNA is conducted, the NZDF commitment to the ETDF remains in the form of Instructor Supplementation to the Small Arms Training Team (SATT) only.

Expected Result of Recommendation 2: Clear articulation and amplification of immediate instructional shortfalls for the Recruit Training Courses only, within the Small Arms Training arena. The fit, form and function of a SATT is a routine action within many Pacific Rim Nations, i.e., Tonga, Fiji, Solomon Islands, etc.

Long Term Recommendations:

Recommendation 3: The NZDF begins training Small Arms and Logistic/Personal Instructors in Tetum and Portuguese Language Skills.

Expected Result of Recommendation 3: The ability to post against pre-designated Training Positions personnel that can communicate with a wide proportion of the East Timor population. Instructors who have been TOD into Angola and Mozambique, former Portuguese colonies, will aid this.

Recommendation 4: The NZDF posture itself to provide instructor supplementation to the four disciplines mentioned in Recommendation 1 above for two Instructors per Trade over a six-month rotation period.

Expected Result of Recommendation 4: Military Career Management can Raise, Train and Sustain the pre-requisite 16 personnel and ensure they are inoculated and language-trained prior to the NZDF making a formal commitment.

DISCUSSION

The problems faced by the Training fraternity within and external to the U.N. remain as a result from the rapid transition of East Timor from a colony, to an invaded territory, to new nation status. This rapid transition, facilitated in part by the U. N. and previous to that by forces from Australia and New Zealand, within INTERFET resulted in a great deal of unguided altruism being manifest within the island and with no one-party having the resources or mandate to pick up the threads and weave them into a structured entity, that is, the ETDF.

Consequently, no single solution exists; rather an intricate plan requiring a great deal of Donor Nation goodwill, a massive influx of Trainers and the resources to equip those Trainers is required; this will result firstly in a Skills, Knowledge and Attitude (SKA) Analysis being convened and then a Training Needs Analysis being developed. This when superimposed with the co-ordination of Donor Nation Support will result in the skeleton organisation of the ETDF being raised and managed by the Office of Defence Force Development (ODFD).

Situational Factors

The media had the ETDF and the U. N. under close scrutiny and those sceptical of the U. N.'s inability to navigate around bureaucracy, ineptitude and inertia had the developmental process for the ETDF under the microscope, focussing on the failures, not the successes.

Australia and Portugal appeared to be squaring-off within the Raise, Train and Sustain spheres of responsibility, and while New Zealand attempted to remain neutral, it found itself accused of, and in fact being bi-partisan by nature, owing to the close ties the armies had with INTERFET and other ANZAC military activities, Training and Development being first-and-foremost.

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Summary of Discussion

The Reconnaissance TOD into East Timor was conducted over a very short period of time and the team was placed under time, resource and security constraints. The situation in East Timor was still volatile and to reinforce this fact, we found a demonstrator was killed outside the ANZAC Participants Accommodation during this TOD, in a failed demonstration of free speech. This had a positive spin-off as the majority of the team had no operational experience and had not viewed the volatile nature of the population as a factor that could be harnessed within Training, yet also had the potential to be a damaging factor if it was not managed carefully.

The composition of the team allowed for good cross-pollination of ideas and fostered intense debate and discussion. All members had intimate involvement in training and development, albeit, only a few had operational experience within East Timor, Angola, Zambia, Solomon Islands and Northern Ireland, to name a few situations.

ENCLOSURE 1 TO APPENDIX A

East Timor Defence Force Skills Knowledge and Attitude (SKA) Analysis

An adaptation of the Malcolm Craig Abilities Analysis Sheet (Craig, p. 26), called the SKAs Analysis Sheet, will be used to highlight the SKA required by an ETDF recruit to highlight the recruiting guidelines for Recruits and the Training Deficiencies to be addressed in Recruit Training.

The SKA analysis matrix will use the following definitions, which include an example of the jobs typically associated with the use of the ability described:

- a. **Arm-hand steadiness:** the ability to maintain steady, controlled use of arm and hand, whether in a moving or static position. (welder, sign-writer, dentist, surgeon)
- b. **Attention to detail:** the ability to concentrate upon the smallest detail of a task so that nothing is left undone. (surgeon, aircraft maintenance technician, mechanic, editor)
- c. **Body orientation:** the ability to judge where you are in relation to another person or object, where they are in relation to you. (footballer, driver, dancer)
- d. **Colour discrimination:** the ability to detect fine differences between colours and to match colours. (painter, printer, electronic engineer, fashion designer)
- e. **Deductive reasoning:** the ability to work from general rules and arrive at detailed logical answers or solutions. (solicitor, tax inspector, surveyor, bank manager)
- f. **Dynamic strength:** the ability to exert muscle force repeatedly or continuously for long periods; the resistance to muscle fatigue. (coalminer, ship builder, road builder)

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- g. **Finger dexterity:** the ability to make skilled coordinated movement of the fingers of one or both hands. (musician, keyboard operator, fine art painter)
- h. **Flexibility of focusing:** the ability to recognise quickly a known pattern or piece of information among a complex collection of patterns or information. (proofreader, instrument panel controller, pilot, quality inspector)
- i. **Flexibility of movement:** the ability to use whole-body movement in completing a task by bending, stretching, twisting or reaching. (farrier, nurse, bricklayer)
- j. **General hearing:** the ability to detect and discriminate among sounds which vary in pitch and or loudness, and to locate the source of the specific sounds. (marine engineer, plumber, conductor)
- k. **Idea fluency:** the ability to produce ideas, 'to think on your feet' and to see beyond a common fixed idea. (production controller, planner, project team leader)
- l. **Inductive reasoning:** the ability to combine separate information to form general rules or conclusions; to think of reasons why particular factors go together. (medical practitioner, accident examiner, engineering technician)
- m. **Information ordering:** the ability to follow rules and instructions arranging the relevant information in a sequence that can be followed reliably. (process operator, librarian, theatre nurse)
- n. **Manual dexterity:** the ability to make coordinated and skilled movements with arms and or hands in such tasks as assembly-and-use of tools. (carpenter, welder, driver)
- o. **Mathematical reasoning:** the ability to solve problems by using appropriate mathematical methods, and to understand mathematical concepts. (engineering, research scientist, statistician, systems analyst)

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- p. **Memory:** the mental ability to recall words, numbers, graphics and sequence(s) of operations. (nurse, actor, referee)
- q. **Multi-limb coordination:** the ability to coordinate the movement of more than one limb at the same time, for example, two arms and legs in driving. (fork-lift operator, potter, driver, sewing machinist)
- r. **Number facility:** the ability to add, subtract, multiply, estimate, and use percentages accurately and quickly. (bank personnel, accountant, commodity dealer)
- s. **Originality:** the ability to think of unusual or novel ideas that can help provide creative solutions to problems, or help provide new products. (management consultant, clothes designer)
- t. **Perceptual speed:** the ability to make comparisons between letters, numbers, objects, and patterns quickly and accurately. The items may be grouped together, or occur one after the other, or may involve making a comparison between presented items and items that have been remembered. (helicopter observer, pilot, power-station operator)
- u. **Problem sensitivity:** the ability to sense when something is wrong, or is likely to go wrong. (pilot, supervisor, machine operator)
- v. **Rate control:** the ability to judge speed and to adjust controls and or/ limb movement in response to any change of speed. (pilot, welder, driver)
- w. **Selective attention:** the ability to concentrate upon a task without being distracted by events that are not part of the task. (referee, air traffic controller, stockmarket dealer)
- x. **Speed of focusing:** the ability to recognise/reorganise different pieces of information into a recognisable pattern(s) so that the results can be described verbally, or can be acted upon in a practical way. (air traffic controller, radar observer, commodity dealer)

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- y. **Stamina:** the ability to perform physical tasks for prolonged periods of time while maintaining normal breathing and efficiency. (farmer, footballer, chef)
- z. **Static strength:** the ability to use muscle force to lift, push, pull or carry objects; the maximum force that someone can exert for a brief period of time. (warehouse packer, nurse, builder)
- aa. **Time-sharing:** the ability to transfer quickly and efficiently between different types of information, and to switch attention. (nurse, police, librarian)
- bb. **Visual acuity:** the ability to see the finest detail possible with the naked eye when looking at an object. (art dealer, electronic circuit inspector, surgeon)
- cc. **Visualisation:** the ability to image what something will look like from the description given, and to image any changes in shape, position or state when these have been described to you, without actually seeing the object being described. (hairdresser, designer)
- dd. **Word fluency:** the ability to make full use of words; to understand meaning and to be able to apply words appropriately in both report writing and in expressing ideas. (journalist, teacher)

The following scale will be used in rating the abilities of the ETDF recruit on the SKA analysis sheet.

- a. **Highly Developed:** little scope for improving the current ability.
- b. **Adequate:** ability to satisfy any requirements where it is needed.
- c. **Underdeveloped:** could improve the level of ability.
- d. **Weak:** not realistic to expect any improvement.
- e. **Do not know:** not had the opportunity to use or think about the ability.

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Abilities of ETDF Recruit	Highly Developed	Adequate	Under Developed	Weak	Do Not know
Arm-hand steadiness	X				
Attention to detail		X			
Body orientation	X				
Colour discrimination		X			
Deductive reasoning			X		
Dynamic strength		X			
Finger dexterity		X			
Flexibility of focusing		X			
Flexibility of movement	X				
General hearing		X			
Idea fluency			X		
Inductive reasoning			X		
Information ordering			X		
Manual dexterity		X			
Mathematical reasoning				X	
Memory		X			
Multi-limb coordination		X			
Number facility				X	

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
Abilities of ETDF Recruit	Highly Developed	Adequate	Under Developed	Weak	Do Not know
Originality				X	
Perceptual speed				X	
Problem sensitivity				X	
Rate control				X	
Selective attention		X			
Speed of focusing		X			
Stamina	X				
Static strength		X			
Time-sharing				X	
Visual acuity			X		
Visualisation			X		
Word Fluency				X	

Conclusion/ Recommendation

The SKAs noted of the ETDF recruit highlight the under-developed nature of the intellectual skills and cognitive processes of the ETDF personnel.

ENCLOSURE 2 TO APPENDIX A

NZDF Reconnaissance Report to East Timor



17 April 2001

Assistant Chief (Ops)
Operations Branch
Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force
Private Bag
WELLINGTON

**RECONNAISSANCE VISIT REPORT FOR THE NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE
DEVELOPMENT TEAM EAST TIMOR (NZDFD-EM) MAJOR S.P. O'BRIEN, RNZALR**

Reference:

- A. BRF AC (Ops)/ GSO2 Log Systems of 22 March 01
- B. OP DIR 14/01 – DEPLOY OF PERS TO SPT ETDF of 15 March 01

Background

1. Reference A directed that the following be actioned :
 - a. Identify which specialist trades will be required for the East Timorese Defence Force (FDTL).
 - b. Confirm the chronology of events to stand up the FDTL.
 - c. Identify constraints, if applicable, which will impact upon this training.
 - d. Identify what training can effectively and efficiently be conducted by New Zealand Instructors.
2. Once these factors have been identified, further direction was requested to outline the training options to be employed, and ascertain whether to :
 - a. Train FDTL specialists in New Zealand.
 - b. Deploy NZ Instructors within East Timor (EM).
 - c. Employ a combination of both sub-para a and b.

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- d. Deploy NZ Instructors to train FDTL within Australian Defence Force (ADF) facilities.

General

3. Major O'Brien attended briefings at both Land Headquarters (LHQ) and Training Command Army (TC-A), in Sydney. At LHQ, Lt Col S. Caughey outlined LHQ perspectives and concerns and then provided background data on the situation. At TC-A, Lt Col L. Collins covered all relevant training matters and background data and outlined the rationale for the reconnaissance visit.
4. Concurrently at the TC-A, the International Policy Division (IPD) from Canberra, that controls the monetary and resource input into this activity (AUS \$26M over five years), also conducted a further briefing.
5. From 28 Mar – 1 April a four-man team deployed into EM to conduct a reconnaissance for the Training Needs Analysis (TNA) Team, which will deploy over the May 01 period. A draft visit report for this reconnaissance was written by Maj. O'Brien for TC-A and is attached as Enclosure One to this document.

Constraints

6. The following constraints currently hinder the ability for effective and efficient training to be conducted for the FDTL:
 - a. The current training establishment at Aileu utilises extant ex-Portuguese Army Barracks that are burnt out, vandalised and sub-optimal at best.
 - b. The new recruit training camp at Metinaro is still under construction.
 - c. The FDTL has not received any communication equipment, vehicle platforms, ammunition, or compasses. Nor has it received the Third-Party End User Certificates for the donated M16-A1 rifles.
 - d. Anecdotal evidence supports the fact that some donor nations are withholding support until EM becomes a nation state.
 - e. Presently four different languages are utilised within the FDTL, to varying degrees of skill and understanding, English, Portuguese, Tetum and Bahasa Indonesian.
 - f. The training ratio at present is 50 students to 1 instructor.
 - g. The donor's conference has yet to confirm exactly what support will be forthcoming from donor nations.
 - h. The contract for Logistic Support to the FDTL has yet to be let.

Donor Concept

7. The current concept for Donor Nation Support, has major impact upon the training requirements, and is based on a three-tier support framework. The framework consists of the following:
 - a. Tier 1. The platform donated, i.e. Trucks from Italy.

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- b. Tier 2. The training support package, i.e. Driving Instructors and the Training Management Package (TMP).
 - c. Tier 3. The Logistic Support Package, i.e. Complete Equipment Schedules (CES) and associated Class 9 Repair Parts.
8. Donor input will be finalised at a donor's conference to be held late 2001. This concept is considered somewhat optimistic as most donors have indicated that they can provide either goods (Tiers 1& 3) or services (Tier 2).
9. Finding donors to contribute a complete package has the advantage of reducing logistic and training overheads, however orchestrating the co-ordination of the concept to link in with training poses potential difficulties. Furthermore the financial implications of this concept to the donors may become unmanageable.

Logistic Strategy

10. The Logistic Strategy for the FDTL has been developed in-situ and the options for Logistic Support discussed were:
- a. FDTL soldiers carry out all logistics functions in both the deployed and camp environments.
 - b. Logistics functions not required at unit level be performed by a civilian contractor.
11. The FDTL will carry out the following logistics functions at the tactical unit level:
- a. Catering – MRE's and Hotbox Rationing.
 - b. Supply – A Supply Platoon, managing small unit supply stores.
 - c. Transportation – A Cadre of 8 drivers in each infantry battalion.
 - d. Vehicle Maintenance – First-line daily driver checks.
 - e. Fuel Storage and Supply – Accounting and issuing of fuel held at unit level.
 - f. Equipment Maintenance – Daily User/Operator checks and first line maintenance in the field.
 - g. Weapons and Ammunition – First-line maintenance of unit weapons, storage and accounting of unit weapons and ammunition and maintain unit basic load.
 - h. Freight Distribution – Daily resupply to deployed units.
 - i. Facilities Management – Day-to-day allocation, usage and tidiness of unit occupied buildings and soldier accommodation.
 - j. Medical – Provision of Unit Medics for First Aid Duties and Medical Evacuation to Battalion Aid Stations and managing unit medical supplies.
 - k. Amplification of the Contractors role is contained at Annex A.

Training Needs Analysis (TNA) Visit

12. A further visit is planned over the period May 18-30 to complete a detailed TNA, TC-A is submitting a formal request for NZDF representation on this team. Phase One the reconnaissance visit identified the concept of operations in a generic sense and outlined many of the prime concerns that require immediate rectification prior to attempting a TNA. These points were articulated within the Reconnaissance Visit Report drafted at TC-A and sought immediate application of assets to resolve these issues.

13. The reconnaissance provided the majority of the base data required to formulate an outline training plan and enable a brief gap analysis to be overlaid upon desired endstates. Annex B provides an overview of a proposed training schedule up to and including TY 2003. **Caveat** – these endstates have become an iterative process as financial and political influences overrule the initial requirements stipulated. It is believed that the training requirement will reduce in numbers and currently this is still being negotiated.

Conclusions

14. The NZDF has the ability to support the ATST-EM in the provision of training for the FDTL and it is also in NZ's interest to maintain the profile it has currently has. However it would be premature to commit to detailed specialist training prior to:

- a. The TNA visit being completed over the period 18-30 May 01.
- b. The Logistical Support Plan being accepted as confirmed policy.
- c. The outcomes of the donor conference being agreed in principle.
- d. The capabilities resultant from the donor conference being clearly and unambiguously articulated.

15. While both the ADF and International Policy Division are extremely keen for NZ to participate in the training of the FDTL, the results of committing instructors to the FDTL prior to at least sub-paras a-c being confirmed would result in the production of nugatory staff work and the ineffective use of resources.

16. Instructor supplementation in the form of specialist instructors in the following spheres are feasible and sustainable, for the duration of the FDTL Recruit Training:

- a. Drivers – Basic Drivers Cse.
- b. Medics – Combat Medic Cse.
- c. Supply – Basic Storeman Cse including Class 5 Ammunition, Class 8 Medical, Class 9 Repair Parts, Class 3 FOL.
- d. Materiel Support – Basic Mechanics Cse. Basic Recovery Cse.
- e. Signallers – Regimental Signallers Cse.

17. Instruction for the specialist courses should be conducted in-situ in the majority of the training spheres, the rationale being:

- a. Cultural differences.

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- b. Language barriers.
 - c. Realistic training.
 - d. Effectiveness/Efficiency of training, and
 - e. The adverse financial impact of training outside EM. This would include airfares, rations and quarters, provision of training uniforms, liaison officers, interpreters, medical support etc.
18. Notwithstanding these reasons, specialised training for advanced courses i.e. signals, medical and supply (including materiel support), could be conducted for small numbers of the more fluent English speaking members in either Australia or New Zealand.
19. It is envisioned that the role of the NZ Army would be a supplementary role supporting the Australian lead, which would reduce perceptions of Australian centricity, involve another English speaking nation within the training roles and reduce the administrative and instructional overheads on both the Portuguese and Australian elements.

Recommendations

20. It is recommended that:
- a. The NZ Army provides personnel to carry out the TNA in EM from 18th May 2001.
 - b. The NZ Army tentatively agrees in principle to instructor supplementation in the spheres articulated above. Two instructors per speciality over a six month rotation. (Based upon the resolution of the impediments to progress articulated within paragraphs 5 and 13 and NZ Army commitments.)
 - c. The NZ Army input is maintained as instructor supplementation only.
 - d. The NZ Army input is underpinned by the provision of capabilities from either the donor nations or the United Nations i.e. weapons, communications equipment, and vehicles etc.
 - e. Training is conducted in the EM theatre of operations.
 - f. DIRLAUTH be granted between TC-A and the NZ Army TNA representative.

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APPENDIX B

CASE STUDY TWO

**REPORT REGARDING THE FINDINGS OF A TRAINING NEEDS
ANALYSIS WITHIN THE EAST TIMOR DEFENCE FORCE**

**PREPARED BY MAJOR SAEN O'BRIEN, BAL, Dip PMM, CMILT, ledc
FEBRUARY 2005**

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report on the East Timor Defence Force (ETDF) is to investigate the Training Requirements of the ETDF to enable a Training Needs Analysis (TNA) to be conducted for the Trades of Driver, Storeman, Medic and Communicator. From this a Capability Needs Assessment Model (CNAM) was developed for the trade of Driver within the ETDF.

This was conducted by means of a Training Needs Analysis Tour of Duty by the author over the period 7th – 30th May 2001 including an in-country visit to Dili, East Timor from 14th – 24th May 2001.

The TNA was developed to present various options to the NZDF for the Training of Driver, Storeman, Medic and Communicator within the ETDF. Specifically, the TNA was to provide the following:

- a. A synopsis of training required for each trade;
- b. The Gross Training Requirement until 2004;
- c. Delivery strategies for each course;
- d. Proposed training outcomes;
- e. Indicative training resources required; and,
- f. Indicative costing for each activity.

A CNAM was developed for each specific trade, for ease of assimilation of data and dissertation presentation; this has been presented for the Driver Trade only. The CNAM presents the data for analysis in POSTED format; i.e. People, Organisation, Support and Facilities, Training Equipment and Doctrine. This allows for a detailed review to be conducted by potential trainers and allows extremely accurate estimation of resource allocation to take place.

The major problem evident during the TNA TOD was that the trainers would have to provide a Complete Training Package, (Tier 1 being the Platform, Tier 2 the

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Training Support Package and Tier 3 being the Logistic Support Package.) owing to the lack of donor nation support at the time this report was promulgated. This has the potential to put off many nations prepared to provide training assistance, or reluctant to commit themselves substantially as the cost-escalation from providing Tier 2 support to Tiers 1 and 3 could potentially be financially unviable for some donor nations.

This report examines various possible solutions and will produce a TNA and a CNAM.

At Enclosure 1, is the CNAM for the ETDF Driver Trade.

At Enclosure 2, is a TNA Report for the Driver, Storeman, Medic and Communicator trades.

SUMMARY

The problems present at the East Timor Defence Force are as follows:

Problem Definitions

The major problem at the East Timor Defence Force is that the trainers require to clearly identify the organisational shape the training is to cater for. To accurately identify this, a Capability Needs Assessment Model (CNAM) is required for the trades of Medic, Storeman, Driver and Communicator. The CNAM will identify the desired organisational capability, analyse the current in-service capability, provide a solutions analysis and then identify a training support plan.

Aggravating problems evident at the ETDF are:

- 1 Logistic Staff numbers are limited to 150 personnel.
- 2 Donor nations have not been forthcoming in all promised areas.

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- 3 Donor equipment will be donated centric to a three-tier system.
- 4 Immediate Logistic Training Staff are limited to New Zealand and Australian personnel.
- 5 The Logistic Contract has yet to be stood up.
- 6 The Logistic Supply Chain covers the Army and the Armada.
- 7 Supply Chain Management (SCM) is predicated around Dili, Metinaro and Los Palos.
- 8 The SCM also includes ETTA and UNTAET input.
- 9 Contractor Infrastructure within East Timor is limited.

After considering and reviewing the above problems, the following possible solutions were developed. These solutions have been divided into short-term and long-term solutions.

Short Term Solutions

1. The ODFD identify which Trades are suitable for donor nation input.

Long Term Solutions

2. The ODFD have donor nations conduct a Training Needs Analysis and a Capability Needs Assessment Model

Recommended Solutions

The author recommends that Solution 1 be implemented as soon as possible in the short-term and Solution 2 be implemented once the ODFD can identify a Donor Nation to deliver the Capability.

CONCLUSIONS

The problems existing within the ETDF have been identified as follows:

Major Problem

The major problem is that the donor nation support for the various logistic trades is based on a three-tier system. Tier 1 being the platform, Tier 2 is the Training Support Package and Tier 3 is the Logistic Support Package. Unless the ODFD can clearly articulate the exact requirement by way of a Training Needs Analysis (TNA) and then expand this *via* means of a Capability Needs Assessment Model (CNAM) to the Donor nations, they may be loathe to offer Support for fear of being committed to support a project which is subject to project creep and does not have clearly defined parameters, owing to poor scoping factors.

For ease of data assimilation the TNA will be restricted to four trades; Storeman, Driver, Medic and Communicator. The CNAM will focus on one trade, that of Driver, although the generic country descriptors and considerations remain similar for all the trades.

Aggravating Problems

The first aggravating problem is that logistic training will be limited to 150 ETDF personnel and few of these personnel have been identified. The main thrust of the current recruiting philosophy is to fill the battalion positions and then ancillary trades. The current logistic umbrella also includes managing the requirements of the Armada (Navy), which is located at Hera, just out of Metinaro.

The second aggravating problem is that the logistic contract has yet to be stood up, thus the training contingencies developed may have to be made very generic in the first cut.

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Immediate Problem

The third aggravating problem that presents an immediate problem is the requirement for the ODFD to identify immediately those trades which are suitable for donor nation input. This must be done in consultation with the team developing the requirements for the Logistic SOR, as this will minimise the functional areas to be trained.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon the investigations this study has identified three recommendations. These recommendations have been divided into short-term measures, which should be implemented immediately, and long-term measures, which should be implemented gradually as circumstances permit.

Short Term Recommendations

Recommendation 1: ODFD identify those trades to be trained by donor nations within the ETDF.

Expected Result of Recommendation 1: ODFD will promulgate a detailed list of donor nation capabilities and the tier level to which they can train. This will result in further discussions specific to trade training and identify any areas that require additional support.

Long Term Recommendations:

Recommendation 2: The Donor Nation and the ODFD conduct a training needs analysis for logistic trades, specifically Storemen, Driver, Medic and Communicator.

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Expected Result of Recommendation 2: Donor nations and the ODFD will have a clear indication of the resource commitment required from the various parties to facilitate the Raise, Train and Sustain functionality as stated.

Recommendation 3: Donor nations and the ODFD conduct a Capability Needs Assessment Model for the logistic trades, specifically Storemen, Driver, Medic and Communicator.

Expected Result of Recommendation 3: A detailed analysis of the requirements for training based entirely upon the area of operations within East Timor; this will ensure that the trade capability matches the Strategic organisational ability required and is an effective and efficient utilisation of the resources allocated.

DISCUSSION

Like most organisational problems the factors outlined within this case study are easier to isolate and identify than to resolve. The ODFD will largely rely on donor nation support to stand up the logistic elements and careful selection of both donor nations and donated equipments must be carried out by the ODFD to ensure that capabilities and expectation delineations are clearly demarcated. Basic philosophies, the like of single-fuel fleets, low-technology equipments and common special tools and test equipments will ensure the ETDF does not fix itself for complex Trade streaming, which it patently cannot support or afford.

Situational Factors

The logistic trades required by the ODFD will be at a very basic level for the initial stages of the Raise, Train and Sustain of the ETDF. Until the platforms that the army will be based upon are clearly identified, much training will be homogenous by nature and extremely generic; it will also lack technological sophistication and will in-the-main be based upon manual accounting systems. Ideally, this training

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will suit donors from other nations' armies which are used to operating in low-electronic-signature, austere environments. The ODFD must provide critical guidance to the ETDF to ensure their equipment acquisition processes are oriented around defensive, not offensive, capabilities and are well within the realms of the funding allocated to the ETDF.

Summary of Discussion

The production of a TNA and the Capability Needs Assessment Model provide a foundation for the development of force logistic capability. It identifies by quantity, resource requirement and trade skill sets the exact requirements, which can then be utilised as a basis for financial assessment of the training model.

ENCLOSURE 1 TO APPENDIX B:

Capability Needs Assessment Model Application to the Development of the East Timor Defence Force

Background

In co-operation with other U. N. nations, particularly Australia and Portugal, the NZDF has agreed to provide the East Timor Defence Force (ETDF) with specialist military training. The training support is sponsored by UNTAET, and other donor nations will be contributing.

Aim

The aim of this brief is to outline the findings of the Training Needs Analysis, and for ease of data assimilation and dissertation size will focus on identifying the ETDF Driver requirements.

Design Methodology

The Capability Needs Assessment Model (CNAM) outlined below was employed for the conduct of the analysis. The model identified the following outcomes.

Phase One Capability Analysis

Step One: Determine the desired organisational capability. Input would include the doctrinal direction on the capability. Output should be a broad mission profile/capability statement and a detailed description of all the elements of POSTED that would be required to support the capability statement.

The following information should be included in the POSTED elements:

People: a job description (conduct job analysis, competency analysis) employment specification; a description of the competencies of the job; career progression; numbers of personnel at each rank.

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Organisation: a generic name for the organisation, mission statement, goals and objectives for the organisation, the total number of organisations needed.

Support and Facilities: a list of all the support and facilities required to meet the capability requirements.

Training: the types of training required, frequency and location limitations.

Equipment: a list of all the equipment required to meet the capability, by number and types.

Doctrine: the relevance of current in-service doctrine and how it supports the capability at the philosophical, application and procedural levels, or identification of the requirements to develop new doctrine.

Step Two: Analysis of the current in-service capability against the POSTED elements. Inputs would include the current Doctrine and identification of the unit's mission. Information on any current in-service unit, their mission, goals and objectives, and a review of the unit's POSTED elements. Output should be a broad mission profile/ capability statement covering the current capability and a detailed description of all the elements of POSTED of the current capability.

Phase Two Gap Analysis a comparative analysis of the POSTED elements. Mapping the POSTED results for comparison should do this. The output should be a statement of the limitations of the current POSTED elements over the proposed capability and possible solutions to address the shortfalls.

Phase Three Solutions Analysis including prioritising solutions against need, cost, and simplicity of implementation.

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Phase Four Training Support Plan. The training support plan should include: the gross training requirement (GTR), a list of all training resources, a detail of program requirements and the implementation schedule.

Method

The Analysis method used consisted of conducting a desktop review of available data, direct observation of ETDF personnel and East Timor (EM) infrastructure (14-20 May 01) and discussions/interviews. The desktop analysis has the advantage of utilising existing, objective data; however, it will limit the reliability and scope of the analysis findings to the quality of the references used. The primary references for the desktop analysis were the following: Briefing by AC Operations HQ NZDF; Army Headquarters Chief of Army Directive on Army Support to the Defence Cooperation Program for East Timor; Kings College Study on the Options for the Development of an East Timor Defence Force; ETDF Office of Force Development (ODFD) Plan for ETDF Development and Structure; and a briefing by Lt Col. Collins, Training Command Army, Sydney.

Observation of the ETDF personnel at the current Ailue training facility and the capability of the East Timor civil infrastructure over the period 14-20 May 01. These observations were restricted by time and access to certain areas because of the perceived security risk to personnel. Albeit, the author believes it was a not-so-subtle attempt to prevent observation of areas that were causing some international ructions, despite observation being an excellent medium for either the substantiation or refutation of any allegations.

Mission Profile

The East Timor Defence Force will exist to defend against external threats to East Timor, its people and its territory. The means of achieving this mission will be shaped by two overarching principles: first, that East Timor's Military Strategy

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be defensive, and second, that the ETDF should be capable of defeating small-scale incursions by hostile groups and of delaying a larger force until external assistance can arrive. East Timor's Military Strategy also requires a commitment to contribute to regional security. At least initially, East Timor will only be able to be in a position to offer neighbours assistance in operations other than war (OOTW) such as natural disaster relief. Finally, East Timor's military strategy requires a force capable of undertaking missions that support peacetime national needs. This could include accomplishing government-directed missions in support of coastal surveillance, crisis and emergency support and providing assistance during natural disasters.

Political decisions have already been taken that define much of the emerging East Timor Defence Force. The force will be a Light Infantry organisation of about 3,000, comprised of regular and reserve soldiers. It will be a volunteer organisation cadred initially with FALINTIL veterans and filled out with soldiers recruited from throughout the country, an apolitical force accountable to civilian oversight, and a force not involved in internal security matters. The force will also have to be sustainable out of annual operating budgets. To be successful the ETDF will be required to make concerted efforts to work with other governmental agencies such as the Police and Border Control Service as they are stood up.

Owing to the small size of the ETDF the logistic function will be provided by two components: firstly, the battalions will maintain a limited integral logistic capability and secondly, the main Logistic function for the ETDF will be provided by contracted support. This contract shall be provided for the first five years by donation from a foreign country and after that period will be maintained in part or fully by the ETDF. There is the potential for the ETDF to assume part, or wholly, the functions provided by the contractor after the initial five-year period.

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Personnel

The ODFD analysis of the Kings College Study options and direction of ETDF leadership has developed a model for the ETDF presented in the ETDF Force Development Document. The manning of this organisation has been set with the following approximate personnel figures: Headquarters ETDF – 60 Regular and Reserve Personnel, Force Communications Unit – 50 Regular and Reserve personnel, Four Infantry Battalions of identical structure (480 personnel per Battalion). Two will be regular infantry battalions and two will be reserve infantry battalions with a regular cadre of 75 personnel.

Each Battalion will consist of: Headquarters Element (23 personnel); three rifle companies (107 personnel per company). Each rifle company will consist of; headquarters element (8 personnel), three rifle platoons (33 personnel per platoon), support company (101 personnel).

The Support Company will consist of: Headquarters Element (5 personnel), pioneer platoon (33 personnel), reconnaissance platoon (30 personnel), and communications platoon (33 personnel).

A Logistics Support Company (35 personnel) will consist of: Headquarters (4 personnel), medical platoon (16 personnel), and a supply platoon (15 personnel).

One independent Rifle Company – 150 Regular and Reserve Personnel. This will consist of: Headquarters (10 personnel), three rifle platoons (33 personnel in each), support platoon (33 personnel), and a logistics section (8 personnel).

The ETDF Training School – 90 Regular and Reserve Personnel.

The Armada (Naval Patrol Force) – planning figure of 150 Regular and Reserve Personnel, pending formal advice from the donor nation. (Portugal)

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Analysis of the tasking undertaken by an infantry battalion and the driving tasks required point to a requirement for each battalion to have drivers to meet the integral logistic, communications and support functions within the organisation follow.

External to the Battalion, a logistics contractor will require a number of additional drivers to meet the base logistic support function for the ETDF. In developing the GTR for Drivers for the ETDF, the advice of the ODFD on the ETDF structure and analysis of similar Australian/New Zealand Army units were used as the benchmarks.

The Driver GTR Table outlined below is based on the following model:

- a. INF Bn HQ requires two drivers per vehicle and 5% additional capacity for leave, sickness, courses, general absences, to man two Ambulances, one light 4x4 vehicle and two motorcycles per Bn HQ.
- b. Rifle Coy require two drivers per vehicle and 5% additional capacity for leave, sickness, courses, general absences, to man one light 4x4 vehicle and one motorcycle per Coy.
- c. Spt Coy require two drivers per vehicle and 5% additional capacity for leave, sickness, courses, general absences, to man one light 4x4 vehicle, one motorcycle and three quad motorcycles per Coy.
- d. Base logistic support contractor require one driver per vehicle to man fifty 4x4 two tonne-capacity trucks.
- e. Wastage and turnover is set at 5% per annum; and,

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- f. Ongoing GTR is based on 5% of total drivers required in an organisation.

DRIVER GROSS TRAINING REQUIREMENT (GTR) TABLE

Vehicle types	GTR 2001	GTR 2002	GTR 2003	GTR 2004	GTR 2005	GTR Ongoing
2 tonne truck	20	20	10			3
Light 4x4	22		11		5	6
Vehicle types	GTR 2001	GTR 2002	GTR 2003	GTR 2004	GTR 2005	GTR Ongoing
Ambulance	9		5		3	3
Motorcycle	13		13		18	3
Quad Motorcycle	7		7		9	3

To develop and maintain a transportation capability an organisation requires four levels of expertise, a driver to operate the vehicle, a transport manager to maintain the fleet and coordinate tasking efficiently, a maintenance capability to ensure the vehicles continue to operate and a driver testing officer to qualify personnel as:

Drivers. An ETDF Driver is defined as a soldier who loads, drives and maintains a vehicle and its associated equipment with a payload up to and including two tonnes. The driver may be employed to drive a variety of specialist vehicles including ambulances, all-terrain motorcycles (ATV) and motorcycles.

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The driver will be capable of the performing the following duties:

- a. Operate a loaded military B-vehicle,
- b. Apply road law and traffic regulations,
- c. Compile transport and accident documentation,
- d. Load a vehicle (including applying restrain devices, complete load documentation, and change vehicle configuration),
- e. Navigate from a vehicle,
- f. Perform vehicle servicing, and,
- g. Conduct faultfinding and minor repair (including completing documentation, changing tyres and repairing minor components),
- h. Operate a vehicle in difficult terrain (including water-fording, tyre chains, winching operations, vehicle towing),
- i. Operate in an environment of threat (including tactical driving, camouflage, and protection).

The transport manager is defined as a person who will be able to:

- a. Manage road transport workflows,
- b. Maintain driver and vehicle documentation,
- c. Plan vehicle loads,
- d. Implement a suitable schedule for fleet maintenance,
- e. Maintain fleet maintenance records,
- f. Ensure vehicles are available for tasking to meet the satisfaction of the unit CO/OC, and,
- g. Provide advice on current publications governing vehicle operations to superiors, peers and subordinates.

The driver testing officer will be able to:

- a. Advise superiors on the conduct of driver training;

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- b. Conform to defence and civilian regulations and requirements when planning or conducting training;
- c. Locate and interpret information necessary for the conduct of training within the appropriate Training Management Package;
- d. Compile administrative documentation for the conduct of the course;
- e. Develop modified course programs which meets both unit and training requirements;
- f. Prepare risk management plans for the conduct of driver training;
- g. Organise training facilities and resources, and establish training areas and routes;
- h. Prepare and present to trainees theoretical and practical lessons on driving;
- i. Apply adult learning and motivational theories when conducting training;
- j. Conduct recovery exercises for military B vehicles;
- k. Debrief trainees on individual performance, both in the classroom / field environment and in the vehicle;
- l. Allocate and supervise all staff under their direction;
- m. Finalise course documentation and training files for archiving; and
- n. Conduct both written and practical assessment for drivers.

The current ODFD plan for the development of the ETDF has identified the short-term requirements to qualify a limited number of ETDF drivers trained by international instructors. The remaining capability bricks of Transport Management, Vehicle Maintenance and Driver Training will be provided by a contractual arrangement.

Although this will work in the short term, it will not be cost-effective in the longer term. The small number of personnel that will require driver training in the future, the low level of driver tasking and the ability to conduct driver training as a

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continuous training activity, make it ideal for the ETDF to conduct driver training in-house. This would require the ETDF to qualify a small number of driver testing officers to conduct this training and these personnel should also be developed as transport managers to provide a level of expertise integral within the ETDF.

The other provider of driver support to the ETDF will be the short-term, five-year strategy for the transport management and maintenance requirement to be met by a contract provider based at Metinaro and funded by a donor nation. This contractor should also assist in developing expertise amongst the ETDF personnel to take over the contractor function in the future if required. Contractor drivers will be responsible for servicing the ETDF routine driving tasks. All contractor personnel should be at the standard required of a military driver, as this is more advanced than the standard a civilian driver meets.

Organisation

The ETDF will have the following functional and operational components:

A Ministry of Defence. Responsible for policy development (strategic, tactical, personnel, logistical and operational), strategic guidance, force development, recruitment, finance and legal functions as well as liaison with other government departments.

Headquarters ETDF. This Component provides the command, control and communications capability for the force. It will coordinate the operations and logistics capabilities to maintain and sustain the force during peacetime. During periods of conflict the headquarters will command-and-control the combat elements, and coordinate logistic sustainment. This headquarters will coordinate, collate and disseminate military information.

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Combat Forces. This capability provides the ETDF with its combat capability to deter or defeat an adversary.

Training Center. This component provides the ETDF with the Capability to Raise, Train and Sustain the Force at an appropriately trained level.

Logistics elements. This component provides the ETDF with the capability to sustain the force in peace or conflict.

Analysis of the capabilities and force components allowed the internal unit components to be identified. Unit components allow initial unit structures to be analyzed in order to provide the required capabilities, therefore contributing to the overall capability requirements of the ETDF. The unit components and the capabilities they provide are:

A Headquarters Element. This provides the Command, Control and Communications Capability (C3) for the unit. It will coordinate the operations, Logistics and administrative capabilities to maintain and sustain the unit during peacetime. During periods of conflict the headquarters will command-and-control the combat elements, and coordinate logistic sustainment. The headquarters will coordinate, collate and disseminate military information; and command and control collective training for the unit.

A Logistics Element. This provides the unit with the capability to sustain itself in peace or conflict. This element is responsible for the supply, contract management, medical and mobility capabilities within the unit; and,

A Combat Element. This provides the unit with its combat capability to deter or defeat an adversary. This component provides the unit with its ability to fight, to conduct reconnaissance, establish communications and provides a limited engineering capacity in order to allow it to conduct designated missions.

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The headquarters elements of the ETDF will be based in the Dili area, the battalion locations are yet to be confirmed but in the shorter term will be located in Metinaro. Planning is well underway for deployment of the 1st Battalion to Los Palos. In the longer term, one battalion will be in the eastern region of the country and one in the western region, with the reserve battalions co-located. The ETDF Training School will remain in Metinaro as will the base logistic support area.

Support and Facilities

East Timor Environment For analysis of the driver requirements for the ETDF it is important to understand the environment they will be required to operate in and the civil infrastructure capable of supporting the vehicle fleet. It is important to have an understanding of the geographic and weather conditions of East Timor to understand the limitations on driving vehicles and training Personnel to meet these limitations. East Timor's climate consists of a monsoon November-to-April and dry season from May to October. The monsoon season effectively divides the nation in two between the northern and southern coastal regions as it occasionally washes out the few roads which transverse the country's spine and makes off-road driving impossible.

East Timor is relatively small in size being 265km in length, with a maximum width of 92km, a mountainous country dominated by a central crest, with many mountains in excess of 2000m; all these geographical features restrict driving. The distances a driver needs to travel are limited in kilometres but may be influenced by the geographic barriers they may encounter. Steep ridges present a major impediment to mobility and interior vehicle movement is limited to a few mountain roads that often are not passable.

Road System. East Timor has developed few all-weather roads outside the major population centres. The key transportation route follows the north coast from Batugade to Baucau to Los Palos, with Dili as the transportation hub. The

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vast majority of roads are unpaved and passable only in the dry season. There are seven main routes that traverse the mountain range to link the northern and southern regions. All roads are subject to degradation by climatic conditions, particularly in the wet season, with many being cut off or destroyed by floodwaters.

There are numerous chokepoints affecting the East Timor road system, which include numerous intermittent streams, swampy areas, and mountain passes. Off-road travel is extremely slow and often requires engineer assistance. There are 18 major bridges in East Timor, many of which can become submerged in the wet season, while the southern coastal road relies on fords across waterways in several locations.

Civil Infrastructure. East Timor has a barter-based, agrarian economic system, which has the potential to develop over time, but the process will be subject to a variety of internal and external pressures. The economy was severely disrupted following the 1999 Referendum and by internal population displacement to West Timor.

East Timor's economic development is making a gradual turn-around and this effort is being assisted by the return of the local population, increased local consumer confidence, and the beginnings of external investments in the country. The economy is dependent on its agriculture, with the major exports being coffee, sandalwood and handicrafts. There is hope that over time, untapped natural resources such as the gas and oil of the Timor Gap should bring increased wealth and economic growth, with Dili as the economic hub of the country.

There are limited civil support vehicle dealerships within the country and this will influence the support available from the civil sector for vehicle maintenance. The government of East Timor is still being developed and any potential for mutual

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development of the vehicle fleet management of all government departments, such as the Defence Force, Police and other government organisations will not be possible in the short term. This should be investigated in the future to exploit savings of large-scale administration of the vehicle fleets and to utilise leverage and administrative synergy between the assorted East Timor Government departments requiring heavy-duty, robust vehicles, namely Police and Customs.

ETDF Support Structures. The ETDF Logistic support is to be primarily delivered by Contract and the Logistics Contract underpins the *raison d'être* of the Logistic Concept of Operations. For logistics functions performed at major camp levels, or in second-line support of a deployed tactical unit, a commercial contractor will carry out support of deployed tactical units. A single, multi-activity commercial support contract is required, which will see the contractor managing and delivering logistics support to the ETDF in a partnering arrangement with the contractor integral to the ETDF supply chain.

The contract will cover support of ETDF operations throughout East Timor, operating at all current and subsequent locations. The ETDF's initial operating location at Metinaro will be the primary logistics support depot and all bulk storage and depot-level maintenance activities will be carried out or coordinated through the contractor's operation at this location.

The draft Statement of Requirements (SOR) for the ETDF Logistic Contract articulates the following areas to be supported under contractual obligations:

- a. Catering and Ration support;
- b. Supply Services and Warehousing;
- c. Transportation;
- d. Fuels, Oils and Lubricants and Gas Products;
- e. Equipment Maintenance;
- f. Weapons and Ammunition;

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- g. Facilities Management;
- h. Medical and Dental Services; and ,
- i. ETDF Government Furnished Facilities and Equipment.

Training

ETDF School Facility. The Australian Government has built a training facility for the ETDF at Metinaro, which will be complete by the end of 2001. The school will be responsible for the full range of ETDF training requirements, from recruit training to specialist weapons training and leadership training. The facility will be capable of accommodating up to 800 personnel and will have limited computer classrooms and access to outdoor instructional areas. The buildings are built on a modular framework and are capable of being converted to other use in the future; this allows buildings to be converted from accommodation to additional classrooms if required. Access to a classroom facility for driver training should be available within the Metinaro Facility.

The primary limitations on the facility are: access to drinking water, which will come from an underground bore; the capacity of the sewerage system; and the capacity of the diesel generator systems used to provide power.

A range complex will be developed four kilometres west of the school for small arms training and field training. This close field training area contains a number of track systems suitable for off- road driver training. The school camp has an internal access road for administrative vehicle movement, which would be unsuitable for driver training, because of its limited size and the volume of personnel and vehicles having access to it. A ring road could be developed around the perimeter of the camp that could be used as an initial safe driver training area, prior to access public roads being available. The main public access road to the ETDF school from Dili is a relatively quiet road and would be ideal as an introduction to public roads for learner-drivers.

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The Metinaro Camp includes a compound area for vehicle refuelling, storage and servicing and these facilities could be accessed for driver training requirements, and it is recommended that the drivers use the same facilities. Practical aspects of servicing and vehicle fleet management will therefore be taught on the ETDF Driver job site.

All ETDF driver training is to be conducted at the Metinaro Facility. This training will be designed to qualify personnel to drive and maintain a military vehicle for on and off-road use (Vehicle types will include two-tonne truck, light four-wheel drive, light four-wheel drive Ambulance, motorcycle, and four-wheel quad motorcycle). It is possible that the ETDF could also train for other government departments, i.e., Police and Customs, etc.

The five different vehicle courses will be based on the same broad skill sets with training outcomes focused on the required vehicle type. The competencies a driver will be trained in will include:

- a. Perform Driver maintenance,
- b. Drive a loaded Military Vehicle,
- c. Operate a Military Vehicle in a difficult environment, and,
- d. Operate a Military Vehicle in an environment of threat.

Equipment

Each Battalion will have a requirement for a number of vehicles to meet the integral logistic, communications and support functions within the organisation. A logistics contractor will require a number of vehicles to meet the base logistic support function for the ETDF. The vehicle-holding table outlined below is based on the guidance of the OFD Development Plan:

INF Bn HQ; require one light 4x4 vehicle for command-and-control functions.

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The vehicle should be capable of being fitted with a radio and carrying personnel and stores. Two ambulances will be required for evacuation of casualties; the vehicles should be capable of carrying two patients and a medic attending to a patient's needs whilst moving, and two motorcycles for command-and-control functions; the bikes should be capable of carrying two personnel and equipment on-and-off road.

Rifle Company; require one light 4x4 vehicle for command, control and resupply functions. The vehicle should be capable of being fitted with a radio and carrying personnel and stores, and one motorcycle for command-and-control functions; the bikes should be capable of carrying two personnel and equipment, on-and-off road.

Support Company; require one light 4x4 vehicle for command, control and resupply functions. The vehicle should be capable of being fitted with a radio and carrying personnel and stores. One motorcycle for command-and-control functions; the bikes should be capable of carrying two personnel and equipment on-and-off road, and three quad motorcycles per Coy for resupply and engineering tasks.

The Base Logistic Support Contractor; requires fifty 4x4 two-tonne capacity trucks. Vehicle availability is set at 80 % (downtime for general maintenance); and vehicle attrition rate is set at 5% of total drivers required in an organisation.

The vehicles to be used by the ETDF are yet to be identified, and donor countries will donate them over a period of five years. All this equipment is to be supported by a minimum of two years' spare parts requirements. They should ideally be supportable by the local East Timor civilian infrastructure for spare parts access and maintenance ability, and therefore should ideally be based upon chassis readily supportable on the island or from Australia.

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Italy has offered to provide the trucks for the ETDF, delivered over a five-year period. All these vehicles will be issued with one-to-two year spares, including 10 spare tyres and four spare batteries and a range of engine components. The vehicle are an average age of fifteen years and travelled 30 000 to 40 000 kilometres.

The Vehicle is an IVECO ACL 75, five-litre, six-cylinder diesel, five-tonne unladen weight, capable of carrying twelve personnel and two tonne of cargo. The vehicle is configured as a right-hand-drive, five-speed, and floor-shift-manual gearbox. The vehicle has a high-and-low-range gear-ratio and differential lock for off-road driving. The suspension is a leaf-spring system and has centre-setting electric trailer brakes. Train the Trainer Training is available by the Italian Defence Force at Lenta, Italy, or the U.N. Logistic Base, Dili, for approximately one week. Manuals are available in Italian and they are well-illustrated and include technical diagrams.

The light four-wheel-drive should be capable of being fitted with a commercial radio system, carrying up to five personnel and their equipment and capable of carrying a small quantity of stores. The vehicle should ideally be compatible with the existing Landrover fleet of vehicles used by the ETDF and supportable by the civil vehicle dealership within East Timor.

The light four-wheel-drive ambulance should be capable of carrying two patients and a medic in the rear whilst driving, plus sufficient stores to provide first aid for a twenty-four-hour period. The vehicle should ideally be compatible with the existing Landrover fleet of vehicles used by the ETDF and supportable by the civilian vehicle dealership within East Timor.

The Quad motorcycle should ideally be a four-wheel-drive version fitted with off road tyres and a minimum engine capacity of 350cc. It should be capable of carrying two personnel and stores on the front and back of the motorcycle. It

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should be fitted with a towbar in the rear and ideally have a small trailer. The vehicle should ideally be supportable by the civil vehicle dealership within East Timor.

The two-wheel motorcycle should ideally be fitted with off-road tyres and have a maximum engine capacity of 350cc. It should be capable of carrying two personnel and a quantity of stores in pannier bags on the rear of the bike. The vehicle should ideally be supportable by the civil vehicle dealership within East Timor.

Doctrine. Development of the East Timor legal system is in its infancy and as a consequence the development of any road laws in the country are yet to be progressed. As a general rule, the East Timorese drive on the left side of the road and follow similar road signage and application to New Zealand and Australian laws. However, the civil road laws applicability or otherwise to the Defence Force, and its ability to override civil requirements in times of conflict, are yet to be decided.

The development of military doctrine for the East Timor Defence Force is yet to occur, but it will align to the standard NATO requirements for interoperability.

Current ETDF Capability

The current ETDF Capability Elements under the POSTED structure are in their infancy. The Force has started initial recruitment from the old FALANTIL guerrilla force and the old guerrilla leadership have taken over the senior appointments within the EDTF. U.N. nations are providing a cadre military staff to assist in structuring the ETDF on the lines of more conventional force structures.

A number of U.N. nations will assist in the training of the ETDF, the initial recruitment and a Portuguese Training Team is providing training. The original

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FALANTIL guerrilla force was equipped from Indonesian Defence Force equipment and weapons acquired in battle. These weapons and equipment have been removed for destruction and the ETDF is to be issued a number of equipment and weapons provided by donor nations. As the ETDF existing capability is very limited, analysis can only be made of the personnel currently in the force and of equipment and weapons currently provided by donor nations. The gap analysis will force on these elements the identification of the requirements to support the ETDF mission profile.

Gap Analysis

The Skills, Knowledge and Attitudes of the ETDF Personnel were analysed and compared to the SKA requirements for a Driver, Transport Manager and Driver Testing Officer to identify the gaps that should be addressed by training and the delivery options to be employed. The physical skills required to be a driver will be assimilated easily, however, the intellectual skills and cognitive processes will require more time and new approaches in instruction to be assimilated successfully.

The basic limitation of language and educational standards for the ETDF personnel will need to be addressed in training. Most ETDF Personnel have only a rudimentary level of formal education, with basic written and arithmetic skills. The ETDF Personnel come from a variety of backgrounds and may speak Portuguese, Tetum or Bahasa to differing levels of fluency, with no language being universally applicable to all personnel. There is also a strong push to for English to be learned, to be used as the international language.

The modelled organisation and structures being developed for the ETDF will provide a good framework for the ETDF; however, the lack of detail in the logistic model and the numbers and employment of drivers should be further investigated. The numbers and tasks recommended in the capability analysis

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section of this report should be adopted or further developed. The current model, to develop a limited number of ETDF Drivers, will not be cost-effective for training and long-term employment. Efficiencies could be achieved by developing a larger pool of East Timor Defence Force personnel as drivers. This would allow for flexibility in tasking and develop personnel for employment beyond the five-year-mark, when the contract logistic organisation must be funded by the ETDF, a task the ETDF may find difficult with a limited operating budget.

The logistic contract organisation that has been identified has merit for the running of fixed and routine functions; however, the nature of military operations both in training-for and conducting fighting operations requires a flexible logistics organisation. The ability of a contractor to provide such an organisation at an affordable price is questionable, and possibly the development of a more robust logistic capability within the ETDF would overcome this problem and prove more cost-effective in the long term.

While the equipment options identified for the ETDF are ideal, the reality of the ETDF - currently using only fifty trucks from a donor nation – should be explored more fully. These fifty trucks could be utilised to meet the roles identified for other vehicles, including command-and-control functions. The exact numbers of vehicles should also be identified, as a holding of fifty trucks, if not required for ETDF operations, will still have a resource bill to maintain. An option of the reallocation of a number of these vehicles to other East Timor Government Agencies should be investigated more fully.

The ability to link to other government agencies such as the Police for synergies in training and logistic maintenance of a vehicle fleet(s) should also be investigated since the size of both these organisations would warrant savings by combining driver-functionality where-ever possible. The current facility at Metinaro being developed as the ETDF School has insufficient classroom facilities and support facilities to meet the school's requirements. The current

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compound for vehicle holding, servicing and refuelling is too small to hold the ETDF fleet of vehicles in any functional holding pattern, and the facilities required for Driver Training are available only in the crudest form.

Solutions Analysis

The developing nature of the ETDF and the unknown influence of the external support to be provided by donor nations makes it difficult to advance a solution to the driver-training requirements for the ETDF. The current focus on an external provider should be reviewed, as the operational tasks and tempo of the ETDF point to the ETDF retaining drivers and their training in-house as the most cost-effective and efficient means of providing this capability.

Training Support Plan (TSP)

The development of the TSP is impossible to determine at this stage and will be influenced by the willingness of nations to donate to the development of East Timor.


Recommendations

The Recommendations made by the TNA are:

- a. Driver Training be conducted by the ETDF;
- b. Facilities at Metinaro be enhanced to suit the requirements for driver training; and,
- c. The ETDF vehicle and training requirements be investigated against other East Timor Government organisations, such as Police and Customs, to achieve saving by combining administrative and logistic functionality.

ENCLOSURE 2 TO APPENDIX B

TNA Report for the Driver, Storeman, Medic and Communicator Trades



Assistant Chief (Ops)
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TRAINING NEEDS ANALYSIS (TNA) REPORT FOR THE NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE DEVELOPMENT TEAM EAST TIMOR (NZDFD-EM)

Reference:

- A. BRF AC (Ops)/ GSO2 Log Systems of 2 May 01
- B. 4642/5/Log Exec/DFAM Reconnaissance Visit Report dated 17 April 01

Background

1. Reference A, directed that a Training Needs Analysis be conducted for the East Timorese Defence Force (ETDF) over the period 7-30 May 01. This was conducted at Training Command (Army) (TC-A) Sydney, and the Office of Defence Force Development (ODFD), Dili (14-24 May). Reference B contains background information to this situation.
2. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is keen to allow donor nations to control all training disciplines excluding leadership training and intelligence training. The ODFD has articulated that it will actively seek donor support of storeman, driver, medic and communications training, allowing the ADF to focus on areas of strategic interest.

General

3. The training camp at Metinaro has limited resources and is constrained in relation to instructor accommodation and shared facilities, including lecture rooms, training areas and computer facilities. A caveat has been placed upon additional courses running concurrently with Basic Recruit Training in that only one additional course can be conducted.

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4. The scope of training required by the ETDF has been analysed and the deliverables required are attached as Annexes A - E to this document (Synopsis to training). The synopsis of training has been approved by the ODFD, and the level of technical and logistical sophistication required to stand up the ETDF will be minimal with the majority of the platforms supporting training having been identified.

5. The requirements for Driver, Storeman and Communications require little if any support, excluding instructor assistance, and the training platforms are deliverable from donor nations. It is envisaged that the Medical Support Option will require instructor and stores support from the nation delivering the training for effectiveness and efficiency of training and this may preclude this option from being viable. The additional cost of medical spares is approximately NZ \$3500.00.

6. The ODFD has developed a forecast of activities for the next four training years and this is attached as Annex F to this document.

Logistic Strategy

7. The Logistic Strategy for the FDTL has previously been articulated within Ref. B and the impact that this contract will have on logistic deliverables, particularly training is still extant. The Logistic Contractor will have limited responsibility for training ETDF Storeman, Drivers and Medical personnel, and provide 2-4 th line vehicular support. The Training Management Packages (TMP's) for this training will require development by the donor nation taking the lead for the respective specialist training.

Indicative Costings

8. To estimate the cost to the NZDF base salary's, medical preparation, clothing requirements, transportation costs and OIA allowances were calculated based upon the gross training requirement and duration of courses. The indicative costings for the provision of training teams follows:

- a. Storeman – 2001 – 2004 \$11,599.91 per annum.
Total \$46,399.64.
- b. Driver – 2001-2002 \$62,189.12 per annum, 2003 \$36,073.85, 2004 N/A.
Total \$160,453.09.
- c. Communications – 2001 – 2004 \$44,789.96 per annum.
Total \$179,159.84.
- d. Medic – 2001 N/A, 2002 \$41,011.82, 2003 \$45,939.82, 2004 \$43,739.82.
Total \$130,691.46.

9. Data on the specialist trades are amplified at Annex G.

Instruction Methodology

10. To reduce NZ instructor footprint in the area of operations, and gradually phase out NZDF Instructional Support requirements the following methodology will reduce sub-optimal instructor supplementation:

- a. Course One – Train Students and Train the Trainers (TTT).

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- b. Course Two – Employ TTT personnel as Assistant Instructors (AI).
 - c. Course Three – NZDF Instructors take secondary roles and assess TTT Staff.
 - d. Course Four – If TTT assimilation of data and ability to pass on instruction is acceptable NZDF staff will have withdrawn by this stage.
11. Withdrawal by course four (2004 Trg Year) will realise the following savings, within the respective specialist courses:
- a. Storeman - \$11,599.91.
 - b. Communications - \$44,789.96.
12. Where a requirement exists to train more than one course in a trade speciality, these courses will be conducted back to back to reduce unnecessary logistic and financial drag.

Conclusions

13. The training requirements for the ETDF within the spheres articulated within Ref. A are unsophisticated and not resource intensive, with the exclusion of the Medical Training which will require both instructor and stores supplementation. The constraints within Metinaro dictate that a maximum of two courses can be conducted concurrently, and this is inclusive of the Basic Recruit Course. This precludes the option of deploying a training team en-masse.

14. To ensure that NZDF Instructor resources are maximised, it is envisioned that instructor supplementation be action on a “demand” based system, as opposed to a cyclic posting system. This poses an administrative burden but reduces the logistic and financial requirements in the long term.

Recommendations

15. The following recommendations are made:
- a. NZDF support Driver Training at an indicative cost of \$160 K.
 - b. NZDF support Storeman Training at an indicative cost of \$43 K.
 - c. NZDF support Communications Training at an indicative cost of \$179 K.
 - d. NZDF support is in the form of instructional assistance only based on a demand instigated system, initiated by the Chief Instructor of the ETDF Recruit Training School.
 - e. NZDF employ a Train-the-Trainers methodology to reduce long term dependence on NZ and encourage the ETDF to become self-sufficient as quickly as possible.

Annexe(s)

- A. TNA Synopsis Storeman Training.
- B. TNA Synopsis Medical Assistant Basic Training.
- C. TNA Synopsis Medical Assistant Advance Training.
- D. TNA Synopsis Driver Training.
- E. TNA Synopsis Communications Training.
- F. Forecast of Training Activities.
- G. Instructor Supplementation and Costs.

TNA SYNOPSIS STOREMAN TRAINING**Course Description**

1. Two levels of storeman training are required, Battalion Storeman training and Battalion Stores Supervisor training.
2. Battalion Storeman, on completion of this training a storeman will have the required competencies to identify, request, receipt, issue, maintain whilst in storage and stocktake materiel for battalion operations at a base level for day by day activities.
3. Battalion Stores Supervisor, on completion of this training a supervisor will have the required competencies to supervise the identification, requesting, receipting, issuing, maintain whilst in storage, stocktaking of materiel in addition to the required competencies to forecast battalion usage, locally procure materiel, recover deficient materiel and complete reporting requirement as directed by HQ ETDF.

Gross Training Requirement

4. The gross training requirement for storeman training is as follows:

Course	2001	2002	2003	2004
Battalion Storeman	6	6	3	3
Battalion Stores Supervisor	2	2	1	1

Delivery Strategy

5. The selected contractor requirements for accounting and reporting may influence the training of ETDF storeman. The training however can be achieved by one of the following forms:
 - a. Contractor delivered, at ETDF Training Centre or contractor locations,
 - b. Foreign Instructor delivered, at ETDF Training Centre,
 - c. ETDF Instructor delivered, at ETDF Training Centre, or
 - d. Off-shore delivery.

Proposed Training Outcomes

6. The proposed training outcomes for storeman training are as follows:
 - a. Battalion Storeman;
 - (1) Apply materiel supply policies and procedures,

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- (2) Request materiel from a contractor,
- (3) Issue stores to unit personnel,
- (4) Receipt stores from unit personnel,
- (5) Return stores to a contractor,
- (6) Conduct basic stocktake functions, and
- (7) Maintain unit equipment.

b. Battalion Stores Supervisor;

- (1) Supervise the functions of a Battalion Storeman,
- (2) Conduct local procurement under contractor direction,
- (3) Forecast battalion stores requirements, and
- (4) Conduct materiel reporting.

Indicative Resources

7. The resources required to conduct storeman training will be driven by the accounting policies and procedures directed by HQ ETRF and accounting systems selected by the contractor. The lengths of the courses are 7 days each.

8. The following resources have been based on a contractor selecting a stand alone corporate information system for accounting:

Serial	Resource	Quantity
1	Classroom facility	1
2	Desk	8
3	Chair	8
4	Computer	7
5	Printer	1
6	Reproduction source to up-to 1000 sheets per training day	1
7	Electronic projection system	1
8	Stationary	As Reqd

TNA SYNOPSIS MEDICAL ASSISTANT BASIC TRAINING**Course Description**

1. At the completion of this course trainees will be able to render basic first aid to members of their Platoon and/or Company. They will be able to instigate and support evacuation of casualties. They will be able to maintain stock levels of issued individual medical kit and record patient history. They will be able to provide basic advice on field hygiene. Treatments will be limited by the use of commercially available drugs and stores, which are, man portable. At the completion of this course trainees will be able to perform their duties during training activities, exercises and operations to augment other medical support. Medical Assistant – Basics will be required to do annual re-certification for their trade proficiency.

Gross Training Requirements

2. The gross training requirement for Medical Assistant training is as follows:

Course	2001	2002	2003	2004
Med Assist- Basic	NIL	18	18	9
Recertification Cse	NIL	NIL	18	18

Delivery Strategy

3. Delivery strategy will be based on instructor lead practical training underpinned by theory lesson. The predominance of training will be practical in nature with an ideal instructor to trainee ratio of 1:6. The use of images over written words will be used supported by an interpreter. Assessments will be predominately oral, practical and scenario based. Formal written assessment will be used as a last resort. The level of knowledge, skills and attitudes required to perform the tasks of a Medical Assistant-Basic will be low, enabling the majority of ETDF members to be considered. Upon validation of training this level should be able to be increased.

Proposed Training Outcomes

4. The proposed training outcomes for Medical Assistant are as follows;

a. Basic course:

- (1) Applies First Aid Principles;
- (2) Interprets Human Body Systems;
- (3) Provides Emergency Care;

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- (4) Manages Trauma Casualty;
 - (5) Treats Common Injuries;
 - (6) Basic Field Hygiene advice;
 - (7) Assists other medical practitioners;
 - (8) Maintain platoon first aid kits stock levels; and
 - (9) Compiles Documentation for a Casualty.
- b. The duties of a Medical Assistant – Basic are:
- (1) Manages unconscious casualties,
 - (2) Manages respiratory and cardiac arrest,
 - (3) Manages a casualty suffering from shock,
 - (4) Manages a haemorrhaging casualty,
 - (5) Applies dressings and bandages,
 - (6) Manages a burnt casualty,
 - (7) Immobilises fractures,
 - (8) Manages chest, ballistic and abdominal wounds,
 - (9) Manages eye, head, and crushing injuries,
 - (10) Treats heat and cold illnesses,
 - (11) Treats poisoning,
 - (12) Treats bites or stings,
 - (13) Provides coverage to static and non exploding ammunition range practises,
 - (14) Advise on latrine and camp locations;
 - (15) Advise on water suitability and treatment;
 - (16) Maintain stock levels; and
 - (17) Records observations and treatment delivered.

Indicative Resources Required

5. Length of course is estimated to be 15 days. The length of the re-certification course is estimated to be 3 days. The following specialist stores will be required:

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- a. First Aid Kits;
- b. Manikins Resuscitation;
- c. Ambulance;
- d. St Johns Ambulance First Aid Manual;
- e. Medical stores;
- f. Fogging equipment.

TNA SYNOPSIS MEDICAL ASSISTANT ADVANCED TRAINING

Course Description

1. The trainee will be able to perform all the duties of a Medical Assistant- Basic but at an advanced level. At the completion of this course trainees will be able to render advanced first aid to members of their Company and/or Battalion. They will be able to instigate, support, and manage the evacuation of casualties. They will be able to maintain stock levels for the Battalion, record patient history and conduct hand-overs to other medical support staff. They will be able to man Battalion Ambulances and provide oxygen therapy. They will be able to provide basic advice on field hygiene and preventative medicine. They will be able to conduct basic medical training for members of the EDTF and Medical Assistants-Basics. Treatments will be limited by the use of commercially available drugs, stores and oxy-viva systems. At the completion of this course trainees will be able to perform their duties during training activities, exercises and operations to augment other medical support. Medical Assistant – Advances will be required to do annual re-certification for their trade proficiency.

Gross Training Requirements

2. The gross training requirement for Medical Assistant Advanced training is as follows:

Course	2001	2002	2003	2004
Med Assist- Adv	NIL	10	10	5
Recertification Cse	NIL	NIL	10	10

Delivery Strategy

3. Trainees are to complete the Medical Assistant – Basic Course before commencement of this course. Delivery strategy will be based on instructor lead practical training underpinned by theory lesson. The predominance of training will be practical in nature with an ideal instructor to trainee ratio of 1:5. The use of images over written words will be used supported by an interpreter. Assessments will be predominately oral, practical and scenario based. Formal written assessment will be used as a last resort. The level of knowledge, skills and attitudes require to perform the tasks of a Medical Assistant-Advance will be low, enabling the majority of Medical Assistant-Basics to be considered. Upon validation of training this level should be able to be increased.

Proposed Training Outcomes

4. The following are the training outcomes for Medical Assistant

a. Advanced Course:

- (1) Assesses and manages Trauma Casualties;
- (2) Applies Preventative Medicine Principles;

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- (3) Provides Oxygen Therapy;
 - (4) Basic Field Hygiene advice;
 - (5) Provide basic treatments for common diseases and conditions;
 - (6) Maintain stock levels; and
 - (7) Compile documentation and conduct hand-over for a Casualty.
- b. The duties of a Medical Assistant – Advanced are the same as the Medical Assistant Basic with the following additional skills:
- (1) Provides advanced first aid skills to casualties in the field;
 - (2) Processes and monitors casualties;
 - (3) Provides basic oxygen therapy;
 - (4) Manages, or assists medical assistants in the management of trauma;
 - (5) Initiates limited analgesia as required to stabilise casualty;
 - (6) Administers limited medications;
 - (7) Provides basic treatments for common diseases and conditions;
 - (8) Retrieves, prioritises, prepares and co-ordination casualties for evacuation;
 - (9) Assists other medical practitioners;
 - (10) Provides advanced first aid coverage to all types of small arms range practices;
 - (11) Maintain Battalion first aid kits stock levels;
 - (12) Attends continuation training to maintain skills;
 - (13) Conducts platoon first aid refresher training;
 - (14) Provides basic health advice to subordinates, peers, and superiors on first aid and preventative health issues;
 - (15) Advise on latrine and camp locations;
 - (16) Advise on water suitability and treatment,
 - (17) Records observations and treatment delivered; and
 - (18) Conduct patient hand-over.

Indicative Resources Required

5. Length of course is estimated to be 30 days. The length of the recertification course is estimated to be 5 days. The following specialist stores will be required:

- a. First Aid Kits,
- b. Manikins Resuscitation;
- c. Ambulance;
- d. St Johns Ambulance First Aid Manual;
- e. Medical stores;
- f. Fogging equipment; and
- g. Oxy-viva equipment.

TNA SYNOPSIS DRIVER TRAINING**Course Description**

1. To qualify personnel to drive and maintain a military vehicle for on and off road use (vehicle types will include 5 tonne truck, light four wheel drive, light four wheel drive ambulance, motorcycle, and 4 wheel quad motorcycle. The five different courses will be based on the same broad skill sets with training outcomes focused on the required vehicle type.

Gross Training Requirement

2. The gross training requirement for Driver training is as follows:

Vehicle types	GTR 2001	GTR 2002	GTR 2003	GTR 2004	GTR 2005	GTR Ongoing
5 tonne Tcv	20	20	10	NIL	NIL	3
Light 4x4	22	NIL	11	NIL	5	6
Ambulance	9	NIL	5	NIL	3	3
Motorcycle	13	NIL	13	NIL	18	3
Quad MC	7	NIL	7	NIL	9	3

Delivery Strategy

3. Training will be done as practical hands on instruction with reference to the manufacturer handbook for vehicle maintenance requirements. Training could be conducted at the Metinaro site, with initial training utilising the base external ring round the camp prior to progressing to the public road outside Metinaro. Off road driver training could be conducted in the close training area to the east of Metinaro. Initial driver training could be conducted by an organisation external to the ETDF. It would be beneficial for the ETDF to identify members with advanced driver skills for long term employment within the ETDF School to qualify as Driving Instructors and assessors. The small ongoing driver training requirements would best be met by ETDF instructors.

Proposed Training Outcomes

4. A driver will be capable of the following:
- a. Carry out vehicle maintenance (minor component replacement, first parade, fault finding).
 - b. Drive a vehicle on road (vehicle is started, steered, manoeuvred, and stopped in accordance with traffic regulations and hazards and manufacturer's limitations).

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- c. Drive a vehicle off road.
- d. Load and unload a vehicle.
- e. Employ motor transport convoy and camouflage procedures, and
- f. Recover a damaged or stuck vehicle

Indicative Resources Requirements

5. The duration of the driving courses will be a 25 day block training course. Driver training will require access to vehicles, a maintenance facility, an outside instructional area, a controlled road, public roads, an off road driving area consisting of numerous tracks and obstacles. Instructors appropriately qualified to train and assess driver competence and appropriate manufacturer handbooks for the vehicles (English, Tetum, Bahasa and Portugese language).

TNA SYNOPSIS COMMUNICATIONS TRAINING

Course Description

1. To train soldiers to operate and maintain field radio and line communications equipment, and record and pass written messages.

Gross Training Requirement

2. The gross training requirement for Communications training is as follows:

Course	2001	2002	2003	2004
Recruit	260	260	260	260
Specialist	60	60	40	40
Adv Spec	10	10	10	10

Note: All Tier 1 training to be conducted IAW recruit course intake per year.

Delivery Strategy

3. Communications training will be delivered via a three tier training strategy.
 - a. **Recruit Trg** – Basic Communications Course. Conducted during recruit (basic) training course. Endstate the soldier will have sufficient skills to setup and operate the in-service radio and send, receive and disseminate messages to a basic level/standard. Soldier will not employable within the Signal Platoon.
 - b. **Specialist** – Specialist Communications Course. Conducted post basic training (at least 12 mths). Endstate the soldier will gain advanced skills in the operation of the in-service radio, antennae construction, line communications systems and additional radio procedures. Successful completion will allow selected soldiers to be employed as Specialist Operators within the unit Signal Platoon.
 - c. **Advanced Specialist** – Advanced Specialist Communications Course. Conducted for selected officers and NCO’s after gaining experience (12-24 mths) as a specialist operator. Endstate, selected soldiers on successful completion will be able to plan communications for operations, plan/conduct unit training and gain selection as communications instructor for ETDF.

Proposed Training Outcomes

4. A recruit will be capable of the following:
 - a. Setup and operate squad radio
 - b. Send and receive a simple message

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5. A specialist will be capable of the following:
 - a. Setup and operate Coy and Bn radio systems
 - b. Send, receive and disseminate messages
 - c. Understand basic antenna theory
 - d. Construct standard and improvise antennae
 - e. Understand Line communication systems and equipment
 - f. Line route planning
 - g. Construct a line network
6. An advanced specialist will be capable of the following:
 - a. Plan and conduct platoon signal training IAW unit directives
 - b. Plan communications for unit operations
 - c. Prepare unit signal operating instructions
 - d. Prepare unit signal operating procedures

Indicative Resource Requirements

7. The course duration will be Recruit Trg 10 days, Specialist Trg 30 days and Advanced Specialist Trg 20 days.
8. The following resources are required:
 - a. Language interpreter.
 - b. Lecture facility to accommodate min 20 trainees (powered, lighting and weather proof).
 - c. Lecture facility complete with electronic lesson delivery systems (computer, litepro, OHP)
 - d. Lecturn
 - e. Tables and chairs
 - f. Photocopier
 - g. White board / blackboard / Chalk
 - h. White pens assorted colours x 10
 - i. Paper for precis/handouts (20 reams)

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- j. Computer and printer x 2 (for instructors to prepare)
- k. Lined paper (100 sheets per trainee per course)
- l. Pens / pencils 3 boxes per course
- m. Cover outdoor weather facility
- n. Close Training Area
- o. Storage area for communications and battery charging equipment

Annex F to
4642/5/Log Exec/DFAM
dated 6 Jun 01

FORECAST OF TRAINING ACTIVITIES

Yet to be advised by ODFD as at 06 Jun 01.

INSTRUCTOR SUPPLEMENTATION AND COSTS

1. The following outline states the costs for deployment of assistant instructors to assist in training the ETDF. The indicative costs are outlined for each individual training regime as are the gross training requirements (GTR). All soldiers are to be Protocol A prior to deployment.

Storeman Training

YEAR	GTR STMN	GTR SUPERVISOR	NZDF INSTR
2001	6	2	1 (1)
2002	6	2	1
2003	3	1	1
2004	1	1	1
TOTAL	16	6	11:1 RATIO

Note:

(1) Rank Sgt

ACTIVITY	2001	2002	2003	2004	TOTAL
Medical	459.66	459.66	459.66	459.66	1,838.64
Clothing	4,001.25 (1)	4,001.25	4,001.25	4,001.25	16,005.00
Travel	2,040.00 (2)	2,040.00	2,040.00	2,040.00	8,160.00
OIA Dili	2,200.00 (3)	2,200.00	2,200.00	2,200.00	8,800.00
Salary	2,899.00 (4)	2,899.00	2,899.00	2,899.00	11,596.00
TOTAL	11,599.91	11,599.91	11,599.91	11,599.91	46,399.64

Notes:

- (1) Non-recurring cost if same resource used.
- (2) Cost reduced if RNZAF Flights utilised.
- (3) Based on 15-day cse & pre & post admin of 10 days total. Based on non-visitor status.
- (4) Based on gross salary.

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Driver Training

YEAR	GTR 5 T TK	GTR 4 x4	GTR AMBULANCE	GTR MOTORCYCLE	GTR QUAD	NZDF INSTR
2001	20	22	9	13	7	5 (1) (2)
2002	20	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	5
2003	10	11	5	13	7	3
2004	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
TOTAL	50	33	14	26	14	28:4 RATIO

Notes:

- (1) Maximum reqd for instruction.
- (2) Rank Cpl x 5

ACTIVITY	2001	2002	2003	2004	TOTAL
Medical	1,838.64	1,838.64	1,378.98	NIL	5,056.26
Clothing	20,006.25 (1)	20,006.25	12,003.75	NIL	52,016.25
Travel	9,800.00 (2)	9,800.00	5,880.00	NIL	25,480.00
OIA Dili	15,400.00 (3) (4)	15,400.00	9,240.00	NIL	40,040.00
Salary	15,144.23	15,144.23	7,572.12	NIL	37,860.58
TOTAL	62,189.12	62,189.12	36,074.85	NIL	160,453.09

Notes:

- (1) Non-recurring cost if same resource used.
- (2) Cost reduced if RNZAF flights used.
- (3) Based on non-visitor status.
- (4) Duration of cses estimated at 25 day block with 10 days total for pre & post admin tasks.

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Medic Training

YEAR	GTR BASIC	GTR BASIC RECERT	GTR ADVANCED	GTR ADVANCED RECERT	NZDF INSTR
2001	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
2002	18	NIL	10	NIL	2 (1) (2)
2003	18	18	10	10	2
2004	9	18	5	10	2
TOTAL	45	36	25	20	32:2 RATIO

Notes:

- (1) Maximum reqd for 1 to 10 instruction.
- (2) Rank Sgt

ACTIVITY	2001	2002	2003	2004	TOTAL
Medical	NIL	919.32	919.32	919.32	2,757.96
Clothing	NIL	8,002.50 (1)	8,002.50	8,002.50	24,007.50
Travel	NIL	3,920.00 (2)	3,920.00	3,920.00	11,760.00
OIA Dili	NIL	4,400.00 (3)	4,400.00	2,200.00	11,000.00
	NIL	NIL (4)	1,408.00	1,408.00	2,816.00
	NIL	3,520.00 (5)	3,520.00	3,520.00	10,560.00
	NIL	NIL (6)	3,520.00	3,520.00	7,040.00
Salary	NIL	20,250.00	20,250.00	20,250.00	60,750.00
TOTAL	NIL	41,011.82	45,939.82	43,739.82	130,691.46

Notes:

- (1) Non-recurring if same resource used.
- (2) Cost reduced if RNZAF flights used.
- (3) Basic 1st Aid Cse 15 days & pre & post admin of 10 days total
- (4) Basic Recertification Cse 3 days & pre & post admin of 5 days total
- (5) Advanced 1st Aid Cse 30 days & pre & post admin of 10 days total
- (6) Advanced Recertification Cse 5 days & pre & post admin of 5 days total

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Communication Training

YEAR	GTR BASIC	GTR SPEC	GTR ADVANCED	NZDF INSTR
2001	130	60	10	2 (1)
2002	130	60	10	2
2003	130	40	10	2
2004	130	40	10	2
TOTAL	520	200	40	253:2 RATIO

Notes:

- (1) Maximum reqd for basic instruction.
- (2) Rank Sgt

ACTIVITY	2001	2002	2003	2004	TOTAL
Medical	919.32	919.32	919.32	919.32	3,677.28
Clothing	8,002.50 (1)	8,002.50	8,002.50	8,002.50	32,010.00
Travel	3,920.00 (2)	3,920.00	3,920.00	3,920.00	15,680.00
OIA Dili	2,640.00 (3)	2,640.00	2,640.00	2,640.00	10,560.00
	7,040.00 (4)	7,040.00	7,040.00	7,040.00	28,160.00
	5,280.00 (5)	5,280.00	5,280.00	5,280.00	21,120.00
Salary	2,899.00 (3)	2,899.00	2,899.00	2,899.00	11,596.00
	8,291.14 (4)	8,291.14	8,291.14	8,291.14	33,164.56
	5,798.00 (5)	5,798.00	5,798.00	5,798.00	23,192.00
TOTAL	44,789.96	44,789.96	44,789.96	44,789.96	179,159.84

Notes:

- (1) Non-recurring if same resource used.
- (2) Cost reduced if RNZAF flights used.
- (3) Basic Cse 10 days & 5 day pre & post admin.
- (4) Spec Cse 30 days & 10 days pre & post admin.
- (5) Adv Spec Cse 20 days & 10 days pre & post admin.

Costing Analysis

1. Costing analysis is based on the following calculations, provided by the TAC:

- a. Travel Darwin – Dili return NZ \$940.00
 Darwin – NZ return NZ \$1,020.00

- b. Base Salary Driver Instructor Cpl – NZ \$31,500.00
 RNZSIGs Instructor Sgt - NZ \$37,687.00
 Storeman Instructor Sgt - NZ \$37,687.00
 Medic Instructor Sgt - NZ \$37,687.00

- c. Medical Lab tests - NZ \$162.76
 JEV- NZ \$256.00
 Antimalarials - NZ \$40.90

- d. OIA Dili - NZ \$88.00 per day

- e. Clothing – NZ \$4,001.25

- f. Formula for estimating activity costings:

$$\frac{\text{base salary}}{\text{-----}} = A$$

26

$$\frac{\text{course duration}}{\text{-----}} = B$$

14

instructor resources = C

OIA = D

Transport = E

Medical = F

$$(A \times B) + (C \times D) + (E + F) = \text{base cost}$$

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APPENDIX C

CASE STUDY THREE

**REPORT REGARDING THE FINDINGS OF A CONTRIBUTION OPTION
STUDY WITHIN THE EAST TIMOR DEFENCE FORCE**

PREPARED BY MAJOR SAEN O'BRIEN, BAL, Dip PMM, CMILT, ledc

FEBRUARY 2005

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report on the East Timor Defence Force (ETDF) is to investigate the requirements for positioning of New Zealand Army Advisors within the Office of Defence Force Development (ODFD) seconded to the U.N., to provide logistic oversight and advice to facilitate the Raise, Train and Sustain of the fledgling ETDF.

This was conducted by means of a Training Needs Analysis Tour of Duty (TNA TOD) by the author during the period 7th – 30th May 2001. During this period the team deployed from Training Command Australia into Dili, East Timor during the period 14th -24th May 2001. The TNA thrust of the visit is outlined within Case Study 2 to this dissertation. The secondary aim of this TOD was to ascertain the following:

- a. Study the Logistic Strategy for the ETDF;
- b. Study the Logistic Statement of Requirements (SOR) for the Logistic Contract;
- c. Identify positions that could provide oversight to the implementation of Logistic Policy;
- d. Provide a draft copy to HQ NZDF of the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the Logistic Advisor's position; and,
- e. Carry out a costing analysis to fill this position.

This was to be developed by the author into a Contribution Option Study and was to be kept separate from other studies being carried out simultaneously, namely, the Small Arms Training Team Study and the Training Needs Analysis Study. The catalyst for this study is discussed in Case Study One.

The major problem evident during the TNA TOD was that the ODFD had no specialist logistic officers seconded to replace the incumbent advisors upon their return to New Zealand (RTNZ). This would entail the Logistic Contract and the Logistic Concept of Operations being developed and instigated without specialist

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advice, contractual training, and the development of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) being put in place, both a financial and administrative risk.

This Report examines various possible solutions and will produce a Terms of Reference for the Logistic Advisor's position, a recommended TOD duration, and a Financial Impact Statement. This position is seen as being crucial to identifying factors which facilitate or inhibit the Raise, Train and Sustain functionality of the ETDF.

At Enclosure 1 is a contribution option for the NZDF for the Logistic Advisor position within the ODFD.

SUMMARY

The problems presenting at the East Timor Defence Force are as follows:

Problem Definitions

The major problem at the East Timor Defence Force is the fact that the ETDF hierarchy lack the managerial skill sets required to manage the Logistic functionality required by conventional armies. The "guerrilla mentality" does not allow for long-term strategic development for Logistic Support and operates around an immediate-needs philosophy, an "eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we die" attitude. Because of the communal environment in which most East Timorese are raised, there is a rather cavalier attitude to private property, with some residual effects on ETDF property; this is exacerbated by the fact that extortion, theft, bribes and arson are methodologies utilised to enhance the action of the laws of supply and demand.

Aggravating problems evident at the ETDF include:

- 1 U.N. distancing itself from the support of the ETDF;
- 2 Lack of a holistic approach to support matters in general;
- 3 Lack of corporate knowledge;
- 4 Lack of skill-sets to undertake logistic management;

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- 5 Development of local *ad-hoc* regulations, which become *de facto* through the passage of time;
- 6 Current Minister of Defence position unfilled;
- 7 Lack of petty cash facility for minor procurement, *viz.*, Point 6;
- 8 U.N. overlaying bureaucratic procedures;
- 9 Supply chain management inundated with non-value adding processes;
- 10 Distrust emanating from East Timor Transitional Authority (ETTA) towards equipment requests from the ETDF;
- 11 Logistic process and procedure being personality-driven;
- 12 Contractors withdrawing services owing to non-payment of accounts;
- 13 Misappropriation of ETDF funds;
- 14 Misappropriation of ETDF property;
- 15 Donor nations withholding equipment;
- 16 Lack of equipment husbandry;
- 17 Black market and profiteering activity emerging;
- 18 Emergence of a “cargo cult mentality”;
- 19 Frustration among international advisors; and,
- 20 Increased dependence on U.N. facilities and equipment;

After considering and reviewing the above problems, the following possible solutions were developed. These solutions have been divided into short-term and long-term solutions.

Short Term Solutions

1. The ODFD is to be the *de jure* arbiter of all matters logistic within the ETDF. Devolution of command-and control-downwards, as would normally occur in a military force, cannot occur.

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2. Weekly operational reports on equipments held and operated by ETDF units and personnel are to include equipment status and location. Status is to be designated as either serviceable or unserviceable, and ETDF personnel are not to store equipment outside designated barracks or company quartermasters' stores locations.
3. Any misappropriation of stores or equipment is to be deemed an investigable and prevalent offence. Reports of loss-or-damage are to be submitted to company commanders *via* the command chain to the ODFD.
4. The Legal Advisor to the ODFD is to conduct lessons during recruit training on theft, misappropriation and loss of stores and any repercussions to the individual.
5. No member of the ETDF is to draw down petty cash. The ODFD Financial Advisor for disbursement to duly authorised personnel will hold all cash only.
6. No member of the ETDF is to enter into contractual arrangements with contractors, sub-contractors or local businesses without the express permission of the ODFD.
7. A representative from the ODFD is to liase with all major contractors to ensure they are compliant with the officers authorised to exercise financial and purchase authorities and develop a rapport with those franchises, which will preclude any unauthorised procedures from re-occurring.

Long Term Solutions

8. The Logistic Advisor's (LA) position within the ODFD is permanently established and manned by specialist logistic personnel.

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9. The LA position is established for twelve month TODs and manned by personnel with experience in contracted logistics and working within U.N. mandates. The rationale for twelve months is purely to assimilate data and build rapport with all the financial and logistic key appointments within the mission, this position also requires to continually trouble shoot and eventually to write itself out of a job as the ETDF become self sufficient.

10. The LA commence drafting of SOPs for all routine logistic activity and these be translated into Tetum and Portuguese and promulgated to all commanders and to the ETDF School at Metinaro.

11. All SOPs will adhere to the standard Australian/New Zealand Systems Approach To Training (SAT) philosophy, enabling the format to be multi-functional as an SOP, Lesson Plan, Instructional Point and a Guide to Commercial Entities. All SOPs are required to be edited by the ODFD Legal Officer.

12. The LA is under-studied by ETDF Logistic Staff with a view to Timorisation of the process, in the long term, and developing the potential for the growth of this capability within the greater ETDF.

13. The LA position has appropriate terms of reference drawn up articulating clearly the job, task and person specifications.

Recommended Solutions

The author recommends that Solutions 1 -7 be implemented as soon as possible in the short term and Solutions 8 -13 is actioned when a permanent incumbent is identified, but no later than July 2001.

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The Logistic Advisor's role in the Raise, Train and Sustain areas of functionality within the ETDF is critical, as the position is the pivotal link between providing a gap analysis between outsourced logistic functionality and retention of core responsibilities by the ETDF. This position will also recommend whether the ETDF can sustain the cost of the logistic contract and whether in five years the ETDF will be better-structured and positioned to reclaim some of that functionality, this as subject to financial approval from the Minister of Defence.

Many of the long-term solutions rectify the current deficiencies in process and procedure, which place the ETDF in an area of unmitigated risk. The promulgation of SOPs allows trainers to redraft the documents into lesson plans for aspiring ETDF logisticians to train from; the fact that they are already translated into Tetum and Portuguese reduces the Administrative Delay and Lead Time (ALDT).

The LA is in a unique position to clearly identify the weak links in the supply chain management area which require remedial action and for reasons of risk mitigation in the administrative, logistic and financial realms, and the position must be filled by an appropriately-trained individual. The LA also plays an important part in the command-and-control (C2) function, ensuring deployed battalions and/or sub-units are utilising assets effectively and efficiently.

CONCLUSIONS

The problems existing within the ETDF have been identified as follows:

Major Problem

The major problem is that the Logistic Advisor's role within the ODFD is critical to the future development of the ETDF and to ensure that due jurisprudence is applied from a financial, logistic and administrative perspective. A real danger

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exists of the position either being unmanned after the current incumbent (who is RTNZ), or that a developing world nation officer fills the position, and that due diligence is not exercised. The Logistic Advisor underpins the success of the entire contractual outsourcing process; the retained logistic capability requirements (Manpower Required in Uniform MRU), and the financial well-being of the corporation, from a tactical and operational level, and is the gatekeeper for audit purposes for the East Timor Government.

Aggravating Problems

The first aggravating problem is lack of command-and-control skills within the logistic realms; this leads to security implications, financial misdemeanours and poor equipment husbandry. All of these are a burden on the financial inputs to the ETDF and have a direct relationship with diminished capability and increased levels of inventory, luxuries the ETDF do not have and cannot afford.

The second aggravating problem is the unnecessary involvement of third parties in the routine administration of the ETDF logistic functions, whether *de facto* or *de jure*. Initially the U.N. managed all aspects of the logistic requirements for the ETDF and this then transitioned to the East Timor Transitional Authority (ETTA), which is in essence is the new government's agencies-in-waiting. Often, no value is added by their involvement in the process, and when equipment is handed over to the ETDF and a budget is forthcoming, they have no enforceable right to be involved with any of the transactional activities.

Immediate Problem

The third aggravating problem - that presents an immediate problem - is the lack of mandated and authorised standard operating procedures sanctioned by command and legal representatives. These require covering both contracted requirements, in the form of measurable qualitative and quantitative means, and

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core competencies maintained by the ETDF. One of the first tranch of positions to be released when the East Timor Government takes sole charge will be those of the international translators; this is estimated to occur within six months, and if the SOPs are not written, sanctioned and translated, the entire training program will be inherently flawed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon the investigations, this study has identified five recommendations. These recommendations have been divided into short-term measures, which should be implemented immediately, and long-term measures, which should be implemented gradually as circumstances permit.

Short Term Recommendations

Recommendation 1: NZDF provide personnel to fill the position of the Logistic Advisor within the ODFD to the ETDF. These positions to be seconded to UNTAET to ensure all benefits appropriate to a military-assigned force member are available.

Expected Result of Recommendation 1: Immediate remedial action to be initiated on logistic shortfalls within the ETDF, as it now stands, and improved relationships between ETTA and UNTAET, resulting in streamlining of functions owing to clear delineation of tasks and identification of areas requiring demarcation.

Recommendation 2: UNTAET publish a statement of intent or a memorandum of understanding as to the logistic or administrative support available to the ETDF *via* the ODFD.

Expected Result of Recommendation 2: The publication of algorithm-type flowcharts which clearly and unambiguously outline areas of responsibility within

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UNTAET for transactional processes falling within the logistic sphere of operations, namely, financial, administrative and logistic, but also to include those which impact on the periphery of the previously-mentioned factors.

Long Term Recommendations:

Recommendation 3: Permanent assignment of NZDF personnel to the position of Logistic Advisor to the ODFD, for a minimum period of twelve months.

Expected Result of Recommendation 3: Drafting and promulgation of all ETDF Logistic SOPs and translation into Tetum and Portuguese to facilitate the production of regulations and lesson plans.

Recommendation 4: The NZDF personnel assigned to the Logistic Advisor position are corps tied to RNZALR and are of Major status. Incumbent is to be conversant with contractual *modus operandi* and have experience within the contract management environment, particularly the U.N. in developing nations, preferably those stemming from former Portuguese colonies.

Expected Result of Recommendation 4: The Logistic Advisor will be completely conversant with monitoring of contractual compliance and is able to take the U.N. to task when, and if, support is neither appropriate nor forthcoming. Familiarity with Portuguese culture will ensure that procedural oversights from a cultural perspective are minimised, if not altogether eliminated.

Recommendation 5: The Logistic Advisor is qualified as both a Logistic Instructor and a Training Development Officer.

Expected Result of Recommendation 5: The Logistic Advisor will be able to Analyse Tasks, Develop Objectives, Specify Learning Events, Implement Instructional Management Plans and Conduct Internal Evaluation of any Training Plan implemented. Further, the Logistic Advisor will have the prerequisite skills to

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impart knowledge to all categories of students, from senior officers to recruits; they will be familiar with all types of instructional methods including tactile and kinesic methodologies.

DISCUSSION

As with many organisational problems, the factors outlined within this case study are easier to isolate and identify than to resolve. There is the calibre of personnel to be considered, since the individuals required to staff this type of position are high-profile, well-educated and a sought-after commodity; they are often placed in positions of considerable responsibility and often, command clearance to send these individuals overseas is not forthcoming.

The importance of the role of the Logistic Advisor to the entire training aspect of the logistic functions for the ETDF cannot be stressed enough, and essentially it underpins the viability and operational capability of the entire ETDF.

Situational Factors

The factors affecting the dearth of personnel offered up for filling this position are better understood when the size, capability and capacity of the NZDF, and Army in particular, are placed into perspective. Of a Force of 4500 regular force soldiers, 600 are assigned to battalion or U.N. Monitoring Officer roles in East Timor, and Army is involved with some dozen-or-so other missions. At any one time, up to 27% of the New Zealand Army is deployed overseas, and the trend of late is for these positions to be logistics, engineers or medical personnel. Of a force of roughly 10,000 personnel of the three services, Navy, Army and Air Force, some 6,000 served in East Timor and some are onto their third TOD. New Zealand places great importance in supporting its Pacific Rim neighbours, but the reality is that peacekeeping is not our main focus and Army has major problems with routine training to meet government expectations, alone.


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Summary of Discussion

The timing and coincidence of the author being chosen to conduct this TOD were fortuitous in that the problems were readily recognised as being similar to the problems encountered in Angola, another former Portuguese colony. The current incumbent was an RNZAF Wing Commander who at times was unfamiliar with the terms-and-conditions of service required in austere Army environments, and who recommended that the position should ideally be designated as an Army one to fill. The problems if addressed singularly appear routine, and therefore resolution of the same appears a basic procedure. However, the cumulative nature of these problems was likened to “putting out fire with gasoline”, as they compounded and tied up the logistic team with institutionalised inertia.

ENCLOSURE 1 TO APPENDIX C

Contribution Option for the Logistic Advisor position within the ODFD



Assistant Chief (Ops)
Operations Branch
Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force
Private Bag
WELLINGTON

CONTRIBUTION OPTION FOR THE LOGISTIC ADVISOR POSITION WITHIN THE OFFICE OF DEFENCE FORCE DEVELOPMENT (ODFD) EAST TIMOR DEFENCE FORCE HEADQUARTERS (ETDF HQ)

Reference:

- A. Email DDJP/ GSO2 Log Systems of 8 June 01
- B. ETDF Logistic Support Statement of Requirements (SOR) dated 7 May 01
- C. 4642/5/Log Exec/DFAM TNA Report for the NZDFD –EM dated 6 Jun 01

Background

1. Reference A, directed that the Logistic Advisor Position within the ODFD of the ETDF be included as another contribution option and costings and justifications be submitted.
2. Reference B, is the Logistic SOR which underpins the Logistic Strategy for the ETDF. Currently the ETDF does not possess the corporate knowledge or the skill-sets required to undertake its own logistics management and delivery and it is therefore necessary to implement externally managed logistic support arrangements to a commercial contractor. This commercial contractor will require extensive liaison with ETDF Logistic Personnel for day to day administration of the contract and for all quality control and quality assurance (QC/QA) matters and guidance for matters related to contractual obligations.
3. The point of contact for the Logistic Contract Manager, the Chief of Procurement ETDA, Assistant Chief of Support – PKF HQ and other UN and commercial agencies will be the Logistic Advisor to the ETDF.

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Logistic Adviser

4. The Logistic Advisor's position will be a high profile, demanding task which if filled by NZDF personnel will aid the ETDF in establishing sound logistic principles and ensure that the small logistic tail can operate effectively and efficiently under extant restrictive financial directives.
5. Whilst primarily aligned to an external commercial contract, being mission assigned within UNTAET could realise the following advantages:
 - a. Linking in to UN commercial contracts thus gaining improved leverage.
 - b. Economies of scale while the UN - PKF is still in situ.
 - c. Utilisation of UN information webs, and
 - d. Improved conditions of service for the NZDF personnel involved and realistic alignment of those conditions of service for this position with those of NZDF personnel serving with UNTAET.
6. The commitment to the ETDF for the Logistic Advisor would be six-month tours of duty over a period of 12 to 24 months commencing in mid-August 2001. Dependent on conditions of service this TOD could be of 12 months duration.

Indicative Costings

7. The indicative costings for the Logistic advisor are:

ACTIVITY	TOD 1	TOD 2	TOD 3	TOD 4	TOTAL
Medical	459.66	459.66	459.66	459.66	1838.64
Clothing	4,001.25	4,001.25	4,001.25	4,001.25	16,005.00
Travel	1,960.00	1,960.00	1,960.00	1,960.00	7,840.00
OIA Dili	16,060.00	16,060.00	16,060.00	16,060.00	64,240.00
Salary	30,093.75	30,093.75	30,093.75	30,093.75	120,375.00
TOTAL	52,574.66	52,574.66	52,574.66	52,574.66	210,298.64

8. The following gross savings may be made if differing criteria are utilised:
 - a. 12 month TOD NZ \$919.32 Medical, and NZ \$8,002.25 Clothing.
 - b. UN Flights utilised if position is mission assigned NZ \$7,840.00.
 - c. Additional costings in the form of mid-tour leave travel assistance may negate any savings on travel.
 - d. Withdrawal after 12 months will realise savings of NZ \$105,149.32

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9. This option is proffered as an alternative to those offered in Reference C. Ref. C is a commitment of 10 NZDF personnel over a four year period at a total gross cost of NZ \$516,704.03 as opposed to four NZDF personnel over a two year period at a total cost of NZ \$210,298.64.

Conclusions

10. The position of the Logistic Advisor to the ODFD will carry a higher profile than those of the separate instructor supplementation (Ref. C refers) and will come at considerable cost and human resource saving, which is of particular concern to HQ NZDF in light of extended commitments to UNTAET.

11. There are considerable administrative and logistic benefits to supporting the latter course of action, however these must be considered against the profile which HQ NZDF expects from the support it has offered at the first donor conference.

12. It is not considered viable that HQ NZDF consider support of both the instructor supplementation and the logistic advisor position, from a financial, administrative or human resource perspective. The indicative cost saving of providing the Logistic Advisor only is NZ \$306,405.39.

Recommendations

13. If due to extended commitments within UNTAET, financial and human resource constraints influence the outcome of donor nation support, the following recommendations are made:

- a. NZDF support the Logistic Advisor Position.
- b. The TOD's be of six-month duration.
- c. The position is mission assigned within UNTAET.
- d. The position be corps tied to an RNZALR Major, and
- e. A minimal credible withdrawal option of 12 months is pursued.

Annexe(s)

- A. Terms of reference Logistic Advisor ODFD, ETDF-HQ.

TERMS OF REFERENCE LOGISTIC ADVISOR ODFD/ETDF

1. **Rank** – Major. (Could be Captain with acting rank for representational purposes.)
2. **Corps** – RNZALR (Preferable Sup/Q background.)
3. **Duties and Responsibilities** - To provide routine professional Defence Logistics Policy input and operational advice, specifically to:
 - a. Provide oversight at ETDF HQ level of the commercial logistics support contract, ensuring that:
 - (1) The logistic contractor performs all services in accordance with the contract.
 - (2) All contract issues are addressed through consultation between the ETDF and the logistics contractor.
 - (3) Variations to the contract are actioned correctly, and,
 - (4) Full financial accountability is maintained for all aspects of the contract.
 - b. Advise the Commander of Logistics within ETDF HQ on all logistics related matters to ensure that operationally effective and cost effective decisions are made.
 - c. Assist the Commander of Logistics within ETDF HQ to develop appropriate logistics policy and plans, including contribution to the annual budget planning and capital equipment planning processes.
 - d. Assist the Commander of Logistics within ETDF HQ to provide oversight of all logistics processes and performance at unit level.
 - e. Advise the Commander of Logistics within ETDF HQ and the CO Training School on training requirements and personnel career development issues specific to ETDF logistics disciplines.
 - f. Liase with the logistics contractor to develop stores accounting, vehicle management, maintenance planning, and weapons recording systems, appropriate to the needs of the ETDF, which can be the basis for longer-term material management practices within the organisation.
 - g. Provide the Commander of Logistics within ETDF HQ with advice on the safe, secure and effective storage and maintenance of equipment and material, including contribution to any future logistics facilities planning.
 - h. Provide co-ordination and accounting oversight of all equipment and stores provided to the ETDF by donor nations.
 - i. Contribute to the ETDF on-going capacity to assume Logistics duties.

Qualifications

4. The Logistic Adviser must be an Army Officer of Major Rank with experience in:
 - a. Operational logistics support at unit level.
 - b. Contract Management.
 - c. Operational logistics planning.
 - d. Staff Officer Duties.
 - e. Language(s) - proficient in English. Some language skills in Portuguese and/or Bahasa Melayu/Indonesia and/or Tetum would be useful.

4. In addition to the above, the Logistics Adviser must be able to contribute effectively within a small team environment, relating to other military officers, civilian employees, commercial contractors, and local people. High levels of communication and interpersonal skills are needed.

Relationships with External ODFD Authorities.

5. In addition to effective internal ODFD working relationships, this appointment needs to establish and maintain an effective working relationship with the following external ODFD authorities:
 - a. Logistics Contract Manager.
 - b. Chief of Procurement ETTA.
 - c. Assistant Chief of Support – PKF HQ.
 - d. Other UN and commercial agencies as required.

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APPENDIX D

CASE STUDY FOUR

**REPORT REGARDING THE FINDINGS OF AN ANALYSIS OF LIKELY
LOGISTICS CONTRACT COSTS WITHIN THE EAST TIMOR DEFENCE
FORCE**

**PREPARED BY MAJOR SAEN O'BRIEN, BAL, Dip PMM, CMILT, ledc
FEBRUARY 2005**

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report on the East Timor Defence Force (ETDF) is to investigate the options available to provide logistic support to the ETDF, and by way of analysis to further identify the core competencies, which must be trained within the logistic branch of the ETDF.

This was conducted by means of a Training Analysis Tour by the author during the period 14th – 24th May 2001 within Dili, East Timor. This analysis will ascertain the following:

- a. The cost of implementing a commercial contract for logistic support;
- b. The cost of implementing an international military staff contract for logistic support;
- c. Training synergies within the chosen option;
- d. Finding what areas are prime contenders for commercialisation?
- e. What areas fall outside the contractors' scope or capacity? And,
- f. What areas are deemed core competencies to the ETDF?

The major problem evident during the TNA TOD was the fact that the ETDF do not possess the corporate knowledge or skill sets required to undertake its own logistic management and delivery. It is the government's intention that this capability be developed over the first few years of the ETDF's existence, but the real focus during that time will be growth of the combat arms and not growth of the logistic capability.

This report examines various possible solutions and will produce an analysis of contract costs and compare those with the Kings College Study recommendations for percentile comparisons of the proportion allocated from estimated gross domestic product (GDP). The analysis will also represent the cost if International military staff were to provide this service. This case study will

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also produce a statement of requirement (SOR) for contracted logistic support; thus allowing trainers to identify what areas are outside the scope of military training, and conversely, what core competencies must be retained. It will also identify within what areas the contractor is prepared for, or is capable of providing training to ETDF staff which will minimise the immediate effect of the training burden.

At Enclosure 1, a brief summary is given of the analysis of likely contract costs. At Enclosure 2, a condensed statement of requirements for contracted logistic support.

SUMMARY

The problems present at the East Timor Defence Force are as follows:

Problem Definitions

The major problem at the East Timor Defence Force is the lack of knowledge of corporate or personnel skill sets within the ETDF to undertake its own logistic management and delivery. This is predominantly due to the subsistence logistic style prevalent with any guerrilla army whose focus is to undermine and destabilise the permanent army or militia, and who are not equipped financially, administratively or logistically to provide sustained, in-depth support. While it is envisioned that this will become a requirement in the near future, it is not feasible to “grow” this logistic capability within the constraints of time, money and staffing parameters, and thus an external solution becomes increasingly palatable.

Aggravating problems evident at the ETDF are:

- 1 It is based on the predominantly ex-FALANTIL guerrilla force.
- 2 Logistics underpins every activity conventional armies carry out.

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- 3 Logistics is personnel-and-money-intensive.
- 4 Logistic personnel take longer than “fighting arms” to train.
- 5 Logistic orientation is situational by nature, and what works in Papua New Guinea may not work in East Timor.
- 6 Allocation of funds is restricted.
- 7 Often, logistic considerations are assumed away.
- 8 The ETDF logistic Colonel is a reluctant incumbent.
- 9 The ETDF has become donor aid-centric.
- 10 Clear delineation of logistic core competencies have not been articulated.
- 11 In light of no clear guidance, the ETDF want it all, but do not know what “it all” means in physical, monetary or practical terms.
- 12 Value for money is not an easy concept to grasp or articulate for the ETDF.
- 13 To date a Minister of Defence has yet to be appointed; the person allocated this position wants the Education Portfolio and is loathe to accept a lesser position. This has created a strategic information and guidance vacuum within the ETDF.
- 14 Some agencies are utilising the careful analysis concept to further their own cause at the expense of individual training nations.
- 15 In most armies, a perception that logistics isn’t glamorous prevails, and this is becoming prevalent within the ETDF.
- 16 Planning, budgetary and governmental staff regularly omit to ask logistic planners to their conferences.

After considering and reviewing the above problems, the following possible solutions were developed. These solutions have been divided into short term and long-term solutions.

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Short Term Solutions

1. Clear statement of the government's intent as to budgetary funding of the ETDF is required. While the intention to outsource to a commercial entity presupposes that fiscal implications are the main driver, this may also indicate that the ETDF needs time to grow capabilities that are in short supply.
2. Clear identification of the skill-sets required on the ground, in austere environments, is required from the HQ ETDF; this can be overlaid as a form of gross error staff checks when the capabilities of the logistic contractor are issued.

Long Term Solutions

3. The ETDF issue a registration of interest to known international logistic contracting firms with a view to outsourcing all but core competencies to a commercial entity.
4. The ETDF establish exactly how long it would take to grow a logistic capability from within internal resources, then carry out a cost benefit analysis to establish the veracity of such a course of action.
5. The ETDF form a symbiotic relationship with the preferred contractor and establish their ability to train ETDF personnel in a cost-neutral environment. This methodology utilises synergy and symbiotic relationships to mutually advance the cause of both parties.
6. The ETDF develop Training Management Packages (TMPs) for the contractor's use, to ensure that performance, conditions and standards of training are aligned to the ETDF desired end-states.

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7. The ETDF apply an incremental approach when amendments to the logistic contract are being considered; if only 150 personnel are corps-tied to the logistic infrastructure, this may (in the long term) exclude logistics as a prime contender for commercialisation. In the short term however the logistic contract is operating in an arena where logistic skills are low.

8. The ETDF ensure at all times that contracted logistic arrangements encompass a wide range of support activities, delivered in a cost-effective, innovative and operationally-responsive manner, which maximises the operational capabilities of the force elements.

Recommended Solutions

The author recommends that Solutions 1 and 2 be implemented as soon as possible in the short term. Solutions 3 – 8 will be determined by value-added factors and the depth and breadth of the logistic contract. The importance both strategically and operationally of the logistic contract (if chosen) cannot be stressed enough. While the ETDF has 150 personnel earmarked for logistic positions, it is not envisioned those roles will be filled in the near future, owing to a dearth of skill-sets.

As a minimum, the contractor will be expected to include the following in the SOR and associated quotes: Catering and Ration Support, Supply Services and Warehousing, Transportation, Fuels, Oils and Lubricants and Gas Products, Equipment Maintenance, Weapons and Ammunition, Facilities Management, Medical and Dental Services, ETDF Personnel Training and ETDF Government Furnished Facilities and Equipment.

The breadth of the contractual requirements, combined with the requirement to train ETDF Personnel, could ease the lot of the trainers at Metinaro and act as a combat-multiplier to the ETDF as a whole, as the force comes on line much more

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rapidly, if required to build up its own training impetus; however this all comes with a cost and that cost will be the main driver, coupled with Internal competencies.

Many international agencies exist which specialise in exactly the type of logistic support specified within the SOR, however, the financial benefits of being involved in this venture may prove too much of a temptation to some staff members within the ETDF, and should they seek to impose external pressure the system dynamics could be adversely affected. Guerrilla armies are not averse to supplementing their income *via* alternative methods and great potential for subversive action exists within this sphere.

CONCLUSIONS

The problems existing within the ETDF have been identified as follows:

Major Problem

The major problem is the lack of knowledge possessed by the ETDF to undertake its own logistic management and delivery. This will more than likely eventuate with an external civilian contractor being employed to provide logistic support in all its machinations to the ETDF. The contracted logistic support must encompass a wide range of support activities and be delivered in a cost effective manner which maximises the operational Capabilities of the force elements. This fact was summed up extremely eloquently by a senior ODFD Exchange Officer who stated, “you don’t know what you don’t know!”, while this may seem a bizarre statement his articulation of the learning process was not lost in translation – this, combined with the natural aversion of most Asiatic peoples to losing face in front of strangers makes the advisor’s role that of a diplomat, politician, financial advisor and enforcer, all rolled into one.

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Aggravating Problems

The first aggravating problem is that guerrilla armies have little or no concept of strategic logistic support capabilities or requirements. They tend to operate in a subsistence-type mode, which is not to say that they have no comprehension of the long term requirements and they have, in the ETDF's case little cognisance of the long-term effects when placed in a conventional army role.

The second aggravating problem is that logistic staff from the ETDF have had little-if-any input into the logistic infrastructure requirements for both the army and the country-as-a-whole. There has been little-if-any use made of leverage among the supply fraternity, and every government department seems intent on maintaining their own empires to their benefit and detriment of others; a divide-and-conquer mentality is prevailing in an organisation that has no requirement and no resources to pursue this line of folly.

Immediate Problem

The third aggravating problem, and an immediate one, is the lack of a designated Minister of Defence, which from a governmental perspective places the ETDF in an unsupported position.

This is worsened by the attitude of some senior ETDF staff officers, who endorse the fact that the U.N. and donor nations have plenty of money, and have a view, "all we have to do is hold our hands out to get our share", a notion hard to disavow them of, particularly in light of the fact that Angola, another former Portuguese colony, has set up a "slush fund" to cater for exactly this kind of contingency.

RECOMMENDATIONS

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Based upon the investigations, this Study has identified six recommendations.

These recommendations have been divided into short-term measures, which should be implemented immediately, and long-term measures, which should be implemented gradually as circumstances permit.

Short Term Recommendations

Recommendation 1: The ETDF *via* the ODFD identifies those core capabilities, which are not candidates for inclusion in the commercial contract.

Expected Result of Recommendation 1: Clear articulation of the requirement of the logistic contract and isolation of those competencies for which inclusion within the ETDF recruit training and specialist training is mandatory.

Recommendation 2: Politicking by the senior ETDF officers for the position of Minister of Defence to be accepted, even if for the short term, by the nominated candidate.

Expected Result of Recommendation 2: Removal of the ETDF from the political wilderness, even if this is only a perception, and not a reality. The reality is that the ETDF is not being represented when matters of capital expenditure are being discussed and the ability of the East Timor Government to apply leverage upon commercial entities is not even being addressed at basic levels.

Long Term Recommendations:

Recommendation 3: The ETDF establish a position within the ODFD to act as a Contract Management Team and establish routines by which monitoring and management of external contractors can be evaluated.

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Expected Result of Recommendation 3: Seamless integration of the ETDF and the commercial contractor. Rapid rectification of contractual irregularities can take up a disproportionate amount of time if the mechanisms for resolution are not in place early.

Recommendation 4: Locking-in of the training depth and breadth to be provided by the contractor requires clear delineation of what is to be trained and the exact performance, conditions and standards by which success will be monitored.

Expected Result of Recommendation 4: Reduction in training resource input by the ETDF and establishment of performance criterion by which success can be qualified and quantified.

Recommendation 5: Outsourcing and insourcing functionality be monitored by the Logistic Advisor to the ETDF.

Expected Result of Recommendation 5: Identification early in the financial year of potential cost savings that can be made by removal/inclusion of contractual obligations within the logistic spheres. This to include training and staffing imperatives which are parts of the financial viability assessment criteria.

Recommendation 6: To have a neutral or near-neutral, cost-based Contract system in place by year five of the Raising of the ETDF.

Expected Result of Recommendation 6: While highly optimistic, this outcome is measured against the cost of placing ETDF incumbents in positions filled by the international contractor; if there is a cost benefit to the ETDF, this system will be maintained. Other options, while not amplified within this Case Study, are combining this option with a self-sustenance option whereby all consumables purchased by the contractor, i.e., specifically vegetables and

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livestock, are grown/managed by the ETDF to the degree where profits may eventuate. The caveat placed on this recommendation is that at this stage this is not a core competency, albeit, it is one, which is practised by some Latin American armies, i.e., Paraguay and Uruguay, and closer to home in the Republic of Vietnam.

DISCUSSION

The resolution to the problems articulated within this particular case study is fairly cut-and-dried, and only two solutions are proffered, contract-out or retain autonomy within the ETDF. This is predicated on the innate ability that the organisation has, and it has been identified as being minimal to none; therefore, the to-contract option is going to be the most effective and efficient one in terms of Resources allocated and outcomes desired. That is not to say that in five years this whole process cannot be reversed and the entire logistic realm fall under the auspices of the ETDF.

The Government will be the final arbiter, based on ODFD recommendations on which path should be followed, and it will have its direction dictated by the percentage allocation of East Timor's GDP into the ETDF coffers. Army's chew-up large proportions of the Defence vote in personnel and logistic administration management fees, for which, largely, there are no tangible outputs visible.

Situational Factors

The ODFD is well aware that the ETDF is sort of funds and requires getting, in colloquial terms, the "best bang for its buck". Unnecessary overheads, from administrative and training perspectives, can be made by outsourcing those functions which have no direct battlefield-attributable functions; the danger is with outsourcing a function which the contractor can not or will not supply on the battlefield in times of conflict - and this is discussed in the author's dissertation in

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Chapter 2.3. As the ETDF is required to be a defensive, not an offensive force, much of the risk-mitigation supports the requirement to outsource these roles.

Summary of Discussion

The role of the Logistic Contract is pivotal in the successful operation of the logistic functions within the ETDF, and as such requires careful management and monitoring to ensure optimum success and minimal chance of failure. The contractor can and will under contract perform a plethora of training roles for the ETDF; this does not, however, abrogate the responsibility for preparing training platforms away from the ETDF... rather, it imposes additional requirements, which will in the long term benefit the ETDF, if well-managed. In the first instance these will be implemented by the Logistic Advisor to the ODFD, in the form of lesson plans or a complete training management package.

ENCLOSURE 1 TO APPENDIX D

Analysis of Likely Contract Costs

1. The ETDF does not currently possess the corporate knowledge or personnel skill-sets required to undertake its own logistics management and delivery. While it is intended that capability in this area will be developed over the first few years of the organisation's existence, the real focus of development during that period will be on the combat forces. It is unlikely that the ETDF will be in a position to assume greater involvement in depot level logistics and supply chain management tasks for the first five years.

2. It is therefore necessary to implement externally managed logistics support arrangements, either fully contracted out to a commercial contractor operating as part of the overall ETDF force structure, or to an international military logistics management organisation. Both options will extensively use local labour, with management and trade supervisory roles be filled by international personnel. Both options will have high personnel cost components, however both options would introduce the level of capability required for ETDF operations.

3. To allow broad cost comparisons between the two options, indicative costings have been developed using envisaged establishments. One important difference between the two options, is that while both are premised around inventory being ETDF held assets, a commercial contract option will be based around the contractor having direct access to commercial sources of supply for the procurement of goods and services. An international military managed operation, would require the actioning of requisitions through the central East Timor Government procurement organisation, introducing a further level of administrative overhead into the operation.

Commercialised Support Option

4. The contractor will likely use international staff in key managerial and specialist supervisory positions, keeping the actual numbers as low as possible to reduce costs. The positions that are envisaged to be filled by international staff are the Contract Manager, Contract Accountant, Site Manager, Purchasing Manager, Chief Cook, and Medical Advisor.

5. Summarised in Table 1, is an estimation of likely contract personnel costs, using estimated rates for international staff and ETDA provided salary guides for locally employed staff.

Table 1. Estimated Contractor Personnel Salary Rates – US\$

Position	Annual Salary	No. Reqd (Major Camps)			Annual Cost for One Camp	Annual Cost for Two Camps	Annual Cost for Three Camps
		1	2	3			
Contract Manager	\$120,000	1	1	1	\$120,000	\$120,000	\$120,000
Contract Accountant	\$60,000	1	1	1	\$60,000	\$60,000	\$60,000
Purchasing Manager	\$60,000	1	1	1	\$60,000	\$60,000	\$60,000
Site Manager	\$80,000	1	2	3	\$80,000	\$80,000	\$80,000
Catering Manager	\$40,000	1	1	1	\$40,000	\$40,000	\$40,000
Cooks	\$1,200	6	12	18	\$7,200	\$14,400	\$21,600
Chief Driver	\$1,860	1	1	1	\$1,860	\$1,860	\$1,860
Drivers	\$1,200	20	20	20	\$24,000	\$24,000	\$24,000
Chief Maintainer	\$1,860	1	1	1	\$1,860	\$1,860	\$1,860
Vehicle Mechanics	\$1,476	3	3	3	\$4,428	\$4,428	\$4,428
Armourers	\$1,476	3	6	9	\$4,428	\$8,856	\$13,284
Engine Technicians	\$1,476	2	2	2	\$2,952	\$2,952	\$2,952
Chief of Stores	\$1,860	1	2	3	\$1,860	\$3,720	\$5,580
Storepersons	\$1,200	6	12	18	\$7,200	\$14,400	\$21,600
Facilities Supervisor	\$2,412	1	2	3	\$2,412	\$4,824	\$7,236
Facilities Workers	\$1,200	5	10	15	\$6,000	\$12,000	\$18,000
Medical Advisor	\$100,000	1	2	3	\$100,000	\$200,000	\$300,000
Medical Staff	\$1,476	4	8	12	\$5,904	\$11,808	\$17,712
Total		59	87	115	\$530,104	\$665,108	\$800,112

6. Factoring these estimated contractor personnel costs into an overall contract structure, the following logistics contract costs (Table 2) are expected through the first five (5) year contract period. It is emphasised that as the proposed logistics contract limits the contractor supplying and charging only rations as part of their material sourcing responsibility, with all other material costs (such as uniform clothing, ammunition, computers and domestic / kitchen / training equipment, fuels and vehicle spares), being sourced and managed by the contractor, but held in-store as Government owned inventory. These material costs will therefore be additional to the logistics costs outlined.

Table 2. Total Estimated Contract Costs – US\$

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	Year 1 Jul01 – Jun02	Year 2 Jul02 – Jun03	Year 3 Jul03 – Jun04	Year 4 Jul04 – Jun05	Year 5 Jul05 – Jun06
No. of camps	1	2	3	4	4
Max. no. of pers Regular Reservist	910	1,170	1,430	1,500	1,500
No. of vehicles	46	90	90	90	90
Activity	Annual Cost	Annual Cost	Annual Cost	Annual Cost	Annual Cost
Personnel	\$530,104	\$665,108	\$800,112	\$800,112	\$800,112
Pers Overheads	\$53,000	\$66,500	\$80,000	\$80,000	\$80,000
Rations *	\$1,162,525	\$1,494,675	\$1,826,825	\$1,916,250	\$1,916,250
Vehicle Maint.	\$92,000	\$180,000	\$180,000	\$180,000	\$180,000
Facilities Maint.	\$117,000	\$234,000	\$350,000	\$400,000	\$400,000
Laundry	\$39,050	\$51,060	\$69,000	\$69,000	\$69,000
Freight Costs	\$20,000	\$20,000	\$20,000	\$20,000	\$20,000
Contractor veh.	\$12,000	\$20,000	\$26,000	\$26,000	\$26,000
Med / Dental	\$85,000	\$110,000	\$135,000	\$160,000	\$185,000
Sub-total	\$2,110,679	\$2,841,343	\$3,486,937	\$3,651,362	\$3,676,362
20% Mark-up	\$422,135	\$568,268	\$697,387	\$730,272	\$735,272
Total Cost	\$2,532,814	\$3,409,611	\$4,184,324	\$4,381,634	\$4,411,634

Note:

- a. Rations calculated at US\$3.50 per person per day. For Regular personnel, this cost will be applied over 365 days per year. For Reservists, it will be applied over 28 days per year.
- b. Vehicle fuel calculated at US\$0.50 per litre, with each vehicle travelling 20,000 kms per annum at 5 kms per litre.
- c. Vehicle maintenance calculated at US\$2,000 per vehicle per annum.
- d. Medical and Dental is calculated at US\$100 per person (Regular and Reservist) per annum.

International Military Managed Operation

7. While still using local labour as much as possible to carry out all tasks, the following table (Table 3) outlines the suggested international military structure, and associated costs required to provide oversight and technical guidance to the ETDF by an international logistics team. The table uses Australian salary determinations as a guide:

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Table 3. International personnel costs AUD\$

Position	Rank	Full Variable Cost	O/S Living Allowance	Total
Logistics Manager	Major	\$102,052	\$30,401	\$132,453
Logistics Accountant	APS 5	\$63,387	\$25,299	\$88,686
Procurement Officer	CAPT	\$86,751	\$28,007	\$114,758
Procurement Clerk	SGT	\$75,993	\$25,867	\$101,860
Site Manager	CAPT	\$86,751	\$28,007	\$114,758
Chief Cook	WOFF	\$92,135	\$28,750	\$120,885
Ration Clerk	CPL	\$72,398	\$24,851	\$97,249
Shift Leader 1	CPL	\$72,398	\$24,851	\$97,249
Shift Leader 2	CPL	\$72,398	\$24,851	\$97,249
Supply Supervisor	WOFF	\$92,135	\$28,750	\$120,885
POL Supervisor	SGT	\$75,993	\$25,867	\$101,860
Senior Supplier	SGT	\$75,993	\$25,867	\$101,860
Clothing Supplier	CPL	\$72,398	\$24,851	\$97,249
Transport Supervisor	WOFF	\$92,135	\$28,750	\$120,885
Transport Co-ordinator	SGT	\$75,993	\$25,867	\$101,860
Senior Driver	SGT	\$75,993	\$25,867	\$101,860
Senior Mechanic	SGT	\$75,993	\$25,867	\$101,860
Equipment Maintenance Supervisor	SSGT	\$81,937	\$26,965	\$108,902
Equipment Technician	CPL	\$72,398	\$24,851	\$97,249
Chief Armourer	WOFF	\$92,135	\$28,750	\$120,885
Armament Tech	SGT	\$75,993	\$25,867	\$101,860
Armament Tech	CPL	\$72,398	\$24,851	\$97,249
Armament Storemen	CPL	\$75,398	\$24,851	\$100,249
Facilities Supervisor	WOFF	\$92,135	\$28,750	\$120,885
Facilities Clerk	CPL	\$72,398	\$24,851	\$97,249
Medical Officer	CAPT	\$117,247	\$31,542	\$148,789
Medical Supervisor	WOFF	\$92,135	\$28,750	\$120,885
Medic	CPL	\$72,398	\$24,851	\$97,249
Medic	CPL	\$72,398	\$24,851	\$97,249
Medic	CPL	\$72,398	\$24,851	\$97,249
Dental Technician	SGT	\$75,993	\$25,867	\$101,860
TOTALS		2,498,257	823,018	3,321,275

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8. To convert AUD\$ to US\$, the Australian figure was multiplied by 0.52 to establish year 1 costs:

Table 4. Cost of logistics support using international military personnel – US\$.

	Year 1 Jul01 – Jun02	Year 2 Jul02 – Jun03	Year 3 Jul03 – Jun04	Year 4 Jul04 – Jun05	Year 5 Jul05 – Jun06
No. of camps	1	2	3	4	4
Max. no. of pers Regular	910	1,170	1,430	1,500	1,500
No. of vehicles	46	90	90	90	90
Activity	Annual Cost	Annual Cost	Annual Cost	Annual Cost	Annual Cost
Personnel	\$1,299,093	\$	\$	\$	\$
Pers Overheads	\$427,969	\$	\$	\$	\$
Rations *	\$1,162,525	\$1,494,675	\$1,826,825	\$1,916,250	\$1,916,250
Vehicle Maint.	\$92,000	\$180,000	\$180,000	\$180,000	\$180,000
Facilities Maint.	\$117,000	\$234,000	\$350,000	\$400,000	\$400,000
Freight Costs	\$20,000	\$20,000	\$20,000	\$20,000	\$20,000
Med / Dental	\$85,000	\$110,000	\$135,000	\$160,000	\$185,000
Total Cost	\$3,203,587	\$	\$	\$	\$

9. Given that most material and service cost (rations, vehicle maintenance) remain relatively consistent irrespective of how the logistics support is delivered, comparative costs for year one, between a contracted solution and using an international team, with these costs expressed as both total annual and personnel costs, are as follows:

	Personnel Costs	Profit	Total
Contract Cost			
Commercial Contract	\$583,104	\$422,135	\$1,005,239
International Team	\$1,727,062	Nil	\$1,727,062

10. In terms of true cost, a contracted logistics solution will be less expensive.

ENCLOSURE 2 TO APPENDIX D**Contracted Logistic Support Statement Of Requirements**

The following is a synopsis of the Logistics Contract.

Section 1. Introduction

Background

The East Timor Defence Force (ETDF) will be structured as a light infantry force comprising approximately 1,500 regular personnel, and 1,500 reservists. It will ultimately comprise two regular battalions operating from separate camp locations, two reserve battalions headquartered in regional garrison locations, an independent company, a Marine component operating from a fixed-base, a training school, and a Force Communications Unit. The regular unit structure will be reached over a period of three (3) years, with the establishment of reserve forces taking longer. The occupation of facilities and the supporting logistics capability will be graduated.

The ETDF will operate initially from the training school at Metinaro (approximately 30 kilometres east of Dili), and over time will expand its operations to include other operating camps. Additionally, there will eventually be a number of dispersed Reserve Battalion and Company Headquarters sites throughout East Timor. Summarised below in Table 1-1 is the envisaged force personnel expansion plan. It is emphasised that there will be some variation to these indicative figures, but that they will form a reasonable basis for planning.

**Table 1-1. Estimated ETDF Five-Year Personnel Expansion Plan
(Emphasis: Figures are indicative only and will depend on recruiting and training plans and timetables).**

Date	Metinaro Camp Numbers	Second Location Numbers	Third Location Numbers	Fourth Location Numbers	Total ETDF Numbers
July to Dec 2001	650	-	-	-	650
Jan to Dec 2002	430	480	-	-	910
Jan to Dec 2003	360	480	330	-	1170
Jan to Dec 2004	360	480	480	110	1430
Jan to Dec 2005	360	480	480	180	1,500
Jan to July 2006	360	480	480	180	1,500

* It should be noted that there would be minor differences from time to time between camp numbers and total ETDF numbers, reflecting that some personnel will be employed within HQ ETDF in Dili and will not require catering.

To maximise combat effectiveness and the overall efficiency of the force, logistics support of the combat units will be contracted out. ETDF personnel will only be directly involved in those logistics functions carried out at the tactical units themselves, and accordingly, these units will only be established for the logistics personnel required to support that level of capability. ETDF logistics personnel will also be employed within strategic planning and contract management roles within the force Headquarters structure.

Contract Scope

A commercial contractor will carry out logistics functions performed at the major camp level, or in second-line support of deployed tactical units. A single multi-activity commercial support contract is required, which will see the appointed contractor managing and delivering logistics support to the ETDF in a partnering arrangement with the contractor integral to the ETDF supply chain. The contract will cover support of ETDF operations throughout East Timor, operating at all current and subsequent locations. The ETDF's initial operating location at Metinaro will be the primary logistics support depot. All bulk storage and depot-level maintenance activities will need to be carried out at, or co-ordinated through the contractors operation at this location.

The selected contract must be sustainable for the life of the arrangement, develop linkages between the ETDF and local industry and the wider community, and be responsive to any potential changes, or surges, in the operational employment of the force. As will be outlined in section 10 (ETDF Personnel Training), the contractor should also have as a component, the capability to contribute to some of the specialist skills training of ETDF personnel in the above disciplines.

ETDF Contract Authority

The ETDF contract authority for the logistics contract will be the Commander of Logistics within the HQ ETDF.

Section 2 Catering and Ration Support

In addition, the contractor will be required to supply dry rations for units deployed on operations and field training activities, which personnel will use to cook for themselves. These rations are to be in the form of composite ration packs, either sourced from a donor nation or commercial supply source, or the supply of a range of local sourced dry goods made into 24-hour ration packs. Where possible, the contractor is to provide one cooked meal per day to personnel in deployed units, with these meals being delivered to units using arrangements and timings agreed with the ETDF.

Section 3 Transportation

The ETDF will eventually operate an organic transportation capability, comprising a mixture of light 4 x 4 vehicles, and trucks up to approximately 5 tons. These vehicles will be owned by the ETDF and registered on East Timor Government vehicle registers. Some vehicles will be provided to tactical units in accordance with approved operational requirements. All vehicles will be operated through a central Motor Transport Pool to be based at the Metinaro Camp, with these Metinaro based vehicles being driven by civilian contractor personnel. This vehicle pool will provide co-ordinated transport support to ETDF operational units as required to meet mobility planning, with all tasking being managed through HQ ETDF.

Section 4 Fuel, Oils, Lubricants and Gas Products

The contractor will be required to procure, store, distribute among units, and issue all fuels, oils, lubricants, and gas products required by the ETDF. An above ground bulk storage facility for diesel fuel, gasoline, and required oils and lubricants is to be

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maintained at Metinaro and any subsequent permanent camp location. The ETDF will provide the required diesel storage tanks and hazardous materials storage areas for lubricants and gas products.

Section 5 **Equipment Maintenance**

The contractor will be responsible for the scheduled and unscheduled maintenance and repair of all ETDF mechanical, electrical and communication equipment, over and above first-line daily preventative checks and maintenance. This equipment is to include: Portable generators, construction equipment and tooling, mobile workshop equipment and tooling, communication equipment, all ETDF computer and office equipment and specialist material handling equipment (MHE).

Section 6 **Weapons and Ammunition**

The contractor will be responsible for managing the central ETDF Armoury at Metinaro Camp and any subsequent camp armouries. At the first ETDF camp at Metinaro, this will include the storage and accounting for up to 1,500 weapons and 200,000 plus rounds of ammunition held, plus the depot-level servicing of all ETDF managed weapons. The weapons to be managed include the M-16-A2 rifle, Minimi light machine gun, M-203 and Glock pistols. The range and type of weapons to be used may be expanded in the future. All weapons and ammunition allocated to individual units will be the responsibility of that unit to store, account for, and maintain.

Section 7 **Facilities Management**

The contractor will be responsible for the scheduled and unscheduled maintenance and repair of all ETDF camp facilities, including buildings, grounds, boundary fencing and structures, roads and access ways, plus specialist facilities such as weapons ranges.

Section 8 **Medical and Dental Services**

The ETDF will maintain a unit level medical capability at all battalions and companies, to meet the needs of deployed operations. All camp level medical support, and second-line medical support from the battalion back, is to be managed by the contractor using civilian contract medical staff and specialist medical advisers as appropriate.

Section 9 **ETDF Personnel Training**

ETDF support personnel employed within the supply, driving, armourer, medical, and fuel-handling roles, will require training in basic to advance skill-levels within their respective trade responsibilities. It is intended that much of this training be undertaken through formalised ETDF training programmes and through assistance from other nations. However, the opportunity exists for the contractor to assist specialist training by providing some basic trade tuition, plus opportunities for 'on-the-job' training consolidation and experience.

Specifically, the contractor should be able to provide basic trade training under supervision to ETDF personnel in the following areas;

Transportation, driver training to licenced standards, vehicle daily inspection (DI) competence for designated drivers, basic vehicle field servicing.

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Supply / Warehousing, basic inventory management, receipt and despatch (including material packing) procedures, inventory accounting system usage, including data entry training, and stocktaking procedures.

Armourer, weapon storage procedures, weapon accounting system usage, including data entry training, basic weapon maintenance, and weapon cleaning.

Fuel handling, fuel storage and accounting procedures, fuel quality control and testing procedures, fuel spill handling procedures, and inventory accounting system usage, including data entry training.

Medical, on-going medic continuation training for ETDF Medics.

Section 10 **Government Furnished Facilities and Equipment**

The following Government furnished facilities and equipment will be provided by the ETDF to the Logistics contractor on a full-time, full-use, but nil-cost basis, to enable performance of the contract at Metinaro. The provision of similar facilities at subsequent permanent camp locations will be negotiated with the ETDF Contract Authority as force expansion occurs.

APPENDIX E

CASE STUDY FIVE

**REPORT REGARDING THE FINDINGS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
TRAINING MANAGEMENT PACKAGE FOR THE EAST TIMOR DEFENCE
FORCE**

**PREPARED BY MAJOR SAEN O'BRIEN, BAL, Dip PMM, CMILT, ledc
FEBRUARY 2005**

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report on the East Timor Defence Force is to investigate the detailed training requirements for specific trades within the ETDF, including the contracted options and training parameters therein.

This was conducted partially on the author's Training Needs Analysis TOD during the period 7th -30th May 2001, and completed during a posting to the Office of Defence Force Development (ODFD) within the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) Mission from January- to-May 2002.

This Analysis will ascertain the following requirements for the battalion storeman:

- a. Training statements;
- b. Training variables;
- c. Assessment criteria;
- d. Teaching points;
- e. Learning outcomes;
- f. Assessment plans; and,
- g. Course training support requirements.

This allows donor nations to predict exact commitment details if they choose to become donor nations, but more importantly it ensures the end product is exactly what the ETDF requires to project force logistically when the ETDF is fully operational. Secondly, it ensures that any areas deemed to fit under the logistic contractor's sphere of responsibility are adequately articulated.

Case Study Five had one major constraint, in that donor nation support was not forthcoming by the time the TMP was developed, which necessitated the TMP being made more generic than would normally be the case.

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The major problem evident from this analysis is that Instructors in technologically-advanced armies are not used to operating in austere environments, i.e., without the use of electronic training aids or modern classrooms, a factor exacerbated by language and cultural differences, and these situations are prevalent within East Timor and in many U.N. peacekeeping environments.

This report examines various possible solutions pertaining to the development of TMPs and their value to trainers, trainees and donor nations.

SUMMARY

The problems present at the East Timor Defence Force are as follows:

Problem Definitions

The major problem at East Timor Defence Force is that few Instructors in modern armies operate in extremely austere environments with unsophisticated technology, and the majority of this capability has been outsourced to civilian contractors. This factor is exacerbated by the requirement to translate the lessons into at least Portuguese and Tetum, from English, and then factor in the “potential” for translators to be carrying out concurrent activity to the international instructors, if the latter are not fluent in either language.

Aggravating problems evident at the ETDF are:

- 1 The logistic personnel for the ETDF have yet to be chosen;
- 2 The training management package is very generic;
- 3 Specific training variables have not been identified for the Armada
4. Observation of days of religious significance;
- 5 Gender integration within classrooms;
- 6 Transition from guerrilla to conventional-army mindsets;

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- 7 Significant shortfall in translators;
- 8 Mandated use of Portuguese for all official documents and training;
- 9 Limited use of Portuguese within population, i.e. 10%;
- 10 Many who speak Portuguese cannot read Portuguese;
- 11 Heavy reliance on international instructors;
- 12 Lack of funds at the Metinaro Training Centre;
- 13 Lack of equipment to train on;
- 14 Lack of equipment to train with;
- 15 Requirements for significant development of training aids, and aids to training.
- 16 Increasing desire from within the East Timor Government for self-reliance to manifest itself within other government departments;
- 17 Increasing hostility toward international staff in training/guidance roles, related to Point 16 above;
- 18 Lack of strategic guidance linking donor nation equipment to capability, then to funding.
- 19 Failure by some senior ETDF personnel to acknowledge their limited knowledge of the fundamentals of logistic management, leading to absenteeism at tutorials, particularly those for logistic and legal matters.

After considering and reviewing the above problems, the following possible solutions were developed. These solutions have been divided into short-term and long-term solutions.

Short Term Solutions

1. The CDF of the ETDF should be directed that logistic support for all ETDF Units, including the Armada, is to come under the auspices of one logistic umbrella. There is to be no development of autonomous supply chain management outside the parameters articulated by the ODFD.

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2. The Armada Contingent Commander is to submit to the ODFD rationale for, and identification of those logistic functions which will predicate the development of separate, but not necessarily autonomous, systems of supply for Armada, on station at Hera and deployed at sea.

3. Briefing for new Instructors at the Metinaro Training School is to include the requirement for stand-alone training aids, i.e., drops and handouts, owing to the dearth of technological support facilities available at present.

Long Term Solutions

4. The requests to donor nations require to be restated, and also the effects of the lack of equipment reinforced.

5. Planning for Instructors to be posted to the Metinaro Recruit Training Centre is to include knowledge of manual training aids and instructors who have previous experience at Mutual Aid Planning (MAP) locations should be given preference, owing to their expertise at instructing in austere environments.

6. If the East Timorese Government pursues with vigour its Timorisation policies, and translators' and typists' positions vanish, a secondary translation facility for recruit school use only must be set up.

7. The political ramifications of both Australia and New Zealand having limited capability for Portuguese fluency may force donor nation support away from an Australasian to a Portuguese influence, and any from a former Portuguese colony – this can be addressed by undertaking an analysis of planned duration in East Timor and a cost benefit analysis of training ANZAC Instructors in Portuguese or Tetum languages.

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8. An injection of capital into Metinaro for training aids and aids to training is inevitable. If the policy of Timorisation and anecdotal evidence supporting the “going on-line of the ETDF” earlier than five years out is effected, training and trained products will become sub-optimal.

Recommended Solutions

The author recommends that Solutions 1 - 3 be implemented as soon as possible in the short term. Solutions 4 – 8 will be determined by the increased pace of outputs required by the ETDF and the rate of donor nation support. In February 2003 the ETDF pressured the U.N. to allow them to contribute to active patrolling in designated areas of interest, in particular the border regions to the west where the New Zealand Battalion was extracted and repatriated from.

The dangers of proceeding forward too fast, too quickly, for the ETDF are tantamount to being set-up-for-failure, and in the worst possible scenario being fixed-for-destruction by a numerically inferior force which has had better training. A dangerous dichotomy exists here, since the ETDF must feel valued, and to do so it must add value – i.e., defend the territory and the people of East Timor. However, they must be tactfully reminded that as a conventional force they lack the skill sets to carry this out without risking loss to life and limb – and this must be done in a culturally sensitive manner, without offending their sensibilities.

Both the U.N. and the ODFD are on the horns of a dilemma here, since if they do not facilitate the active and aggressive disposition of the ETDF as a patrolling force, they will be seen to be scathing of the ETDF’s ability to perform (and they collectively created that capability). Conversely, if the ETDF do patrol and contact an aggressive interloper and come under effective terms of engagement and suffer losses, the two former agencies will receive scathing criticism about under-training and not fulfilling their respective areas of input – hence the *rationale* for U.N. Missions *not* being mandated to raise, train and sustain armies.

CONCLUSIONS

The problems existing within the ETDF have been identified as follows:

Major Problem

The major problem is that the Instructors at the ODFD and the Metinaro Recruit Training Centre are operating in austere environments with sub-optimal donor nation input, with language and translation problems exacerbating an already invidious situation. There is the real potential for adverse comments to be made as to the calibre of the end-product, and empirically-drawn or anecdotally derogatory statements will further inflame the tension extant among the Portuguese and ANZAC fraternity, while the overarching principle of ANZAC assistance was to enhance the calibre and capability of the ETDF recruits.

Aggravating Problems

The first aggravating problem is funding, which for the ETDF is a multi-tiered operation. The U.N. funds some Mission-appointed positions for the Australian Instructors and all positions for the New Zealand Instructors.

The ODFD draws some money from Angola, some from the U.N. and some from the East Timorese Government. The Australian Government paid for the entire construction of the Metinaro Recruit Facility, while the U.N. contributed in the form of support infrastructure, i.e., transport, medical screening, recruit correspondence and air movement of ODFD personnel around the mission area. The New Zealand Government paid for additional expenses - for the Small Arms Training Team (six personnel) and the two ODFD positions, Major (including the author's position).

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A real danger exists that due to “mission creep”, and the East Timor Government’s downscaling what they perceive as non-relevant Infrastructure, the costs to Australia and New Zealand may increase out of all proportion to altruistic gains made within the training spheres. Accordingly, budgets and budgetary advice must be both drafted and enforced, and if not, both nations may reduce or remove their advisors from the ODFD. (As happened when the author returned to New Zealand.)

The second aggravating problem is the effective and efficient use of limited funding. Linkages were developed to ensure that the logistic infrastructure was moulded along effective and efficient lines, i.e., the outsourced logistic options, the contractor training obligations and the minimalist logistic supply chain management. Branches within the ETDF cannot be allowed to proceed down autonomous supply chains if they are duplicating the administrative and financial outlays required to support this infrastructure. This has the tendency to develop into a “cargo cult mentality” and to increase spending without adding intrinsic value to the process(es).

Immediate Problem

The third aggravating problem, presenting another immediate problem, is the language barrier, and resultant from this are issues of translation(s). Limited fluency in Portuguese exists in the New Zealand Defence Force, with the ADF being only marginally better. Originally all lesson plans, instructions and training management packages were forwarded to the author and then delivered to the ETTA Translation Services. This allowed instructors to instruct, and the advisors to advise. The thinning-out of non-essential activities (East Timor Government’s opinion – not the author’s) has caused a capability gap to impinge on advisory/instructional activities and caused a huge, unbudgeted, financial burden. (A fourteen-page document was estimated to cost USD\$500 to translate from

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English to Portuguese, a situation exacerbated when it was required to be translated into Tetum – a language which has no technical words!)

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon the investigations, this Study has identified five recommendations.

These recommendations have been divided into short-term measures, which should be implemented immediately, and long-term measures, which should be implemented gradually as circumstances permit.

Short Term Recommendations

Recommendation 1: The ODFD promulgate in algorithm format the supply chain for logistic support within the ETDF.

Expected Result of Recommendation 1: Resources, i.e., time, manpower and money are not drawn away from the real logistic issues, namely, Logistic training and effective and efficient utilisations of resources within the ODFD/ETDF, by treating symptomatic problems of lack of understanding, or by treating the symptom, not the cause.

Recommendation 2: Budgets are drawn-back from the Armada and Army, to the ODFD until fiscal jurisprudence can be demonstrated. The 1st Battalion is already under scrutiny for poor financial accountability and the *rationale* for the Armada in developing its own supply chain is to be allocated a budget.

Expected Result of Recommendation 2: Money can be poured into the coalface at the Training School at Metinaro, and not squandered away on duplication and redundancy within the supply chain. As the training environment is austere, the financial and logistic impact of teaching supply chain management

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was largely overlooked, and this is impacting on training capability owing to wastage.

Long Term Recommendations:

Recommendation 3: The training triumvirate, Australia, New Zealand and Portugal, clearly identify how operating in the austere environment at Metinaro is impacting on them in terms of resources, i.e., manual lesson plans, drops, and training aids. Also to be identified are timesavings which will result from a technical upgrade of the training facility.

Expected Result of Recommendation 3: A cost benefit analysis may drive reallocation of funding into a technical upgrade of the training environment.

Recommendation 4: Requests to and honouring of obligations by donor nations be restated and reinforced.

Expected Result of Recommendation 4: Currently, great gaps in capability exist owing to the recalcitrance of donor nations to fulfil the obligation and commitments they gave at the two donor nation conferences. Anecdotal evidence points to the fact that some nations are waiting until East Timor has reached independence in May 2002, and for others. e.g., weapons, and some restricted military hardware that release is pending on End-User Certification by the US State Department, which can not and will not release equipment to a non-state or a country under U.N. Mandate.

Once Donor nations begin fulfilling their obligations, the word austere (within training environs) can be substituted for minimal credible options. Training is deemed to be inefficient if the resources poured into training do not meet an expected output resultant from that training, and this is affected if soldiers are trained on equipments, then do not have the equipment-in-service to carry out

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familiarity training or continuation training, both and either of, collectively and individually.

Recommendation 5: Military Career Management (MCM) Branches within the training triumvirate must ensure that personnel posted within the Metinaro Recruit Training School are familiar with manual training methodologies and not just computer-based or computer-assisted training regimes.

Expected Result of Recommendation 5: If Instructors are familiar with the methodologies utilised within low-technology environments or Mutual Aid Planning-type environments (such as Tonga and Fiji), then a large degree of culture shock and retraining will not be required, this enabling them to come on line faster and thus be productive almost immediately. It also ensures that Training Management Packages are developed that are cognisant of the fiscal and Training-environmental impediments to the situation.

DISCUSSION

As with many organisational problems, the problems with operating in an austere environment are not attributable to any one single or specific cause. Rather, the numerous causal symptoms have interacted with the plethora of training factors to produce a wide range of seemingly unconnected interrelationships.

Situational Factors

The original training provided by Portugal was carried out in old, dilapidated, burnt-out barracks, originally without rifles or ammunition, and then without communications equipment, then, this training was bolstered up by the roulement of Australian and New Zealand trainers into place at the purpose-built facility at Metinaro. Unfortunately, many of the donor-offered equipment was still not in place, which provided doubt on the efficiency of some training.

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Underpinning these factors were language barriers, some imposed by externalities beyond the control of the ODFD, i.e., *lingua franca*, others by the racial diversity which makes up East Timor. Both ANZAC parties had limited facilities available to cope with the other languages required, and then Tetum, the language most popular with the current recruits, has no technical application(s), no technical words in vocabulary, and little capacity within the trainers for mastering a bi-lingual approach.

Both the Australian and New Zealand armies are technologically advanced and, as discussed within the body of this dissertation, have adapted their training regimes away from austere-environment operations into technically-advanced ones. The majority of ANZAC soldiers are:

- a. Computer literate.
- b. Technically astute.
- c. High School or higher-educated.
- d. Familiar with textbook-type training.
- e. Familiar with computer based training (CBT) or computer assisted learning (CAL), and,
- f. Are familiar with self-paced learning applications.

To provide, often at short notice, Trainers or Instructors who are familiar with these techniques, which have really not been taught for at least fifteen years, proved difficult and required a retraining of the trainers *in situ*, which was another time imposition.

Summary of Discussion

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This case study has linked training to financial allocation and to donor nation support, all of which have a major impact on the end product, the recruit. If TMPs are written correctly, donor nations can cost the entire exercise as it articulates and this amplifies on all Instructional requirements, down to the last ball-point pen. Although the construction of a TMP can seem time-consuming, and is best done in-country, it can prevent financial and resource embarrassment to donor nations when their training regime falters. Where TMPs fail, it is, as a generalisation, because there are competing bids for Infrastructure, or perhaps the site visited by the training analysis team differs from the site that the team developing the TMP is shown.

In the case-in-point at Metinaro the TMP was developed to be utilised with computer support and minimal manual interface. However, the donor nations did not supply computers and instructors had to revert to a manual system. This was exacerbated by the requirement for translation – which required that lesson plans be typed onto disks, and then the translators were downsized and removed from theatre.

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APPENDIX F

CASE STUDY SIX

**REPORT REGARDING THE FINDINGS OF AN INDEPENDENT BATTALION
AUDIT WITHIN THE EAST TIMOR DEFENCE FORCE**

**PREPARED BY MAJOR SAEN O'BRIEN, BAL, Dip PMM, CMILT, ledc
FEBRUARY 2005**

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this Report on the East Timor Defence Force (ETDF) is to investigate and audit the relocation and logistic command-and-control of the 1st Battalion of the ETDF.

This was conducted during an UNTAET Tour of Duty by the author during the period Jan – May 2002 and specifically centred on the following:

- a. The relocation of the 1st Battalion from Metinaro to Los Palos.
- b. Command-and-control following the battalion shakeout in Los Palos.
- c. Unauthorised transfer of equipment to Los Palos.
- d. Loss and damage to battalion equipment at Los Palos.
- e. Loss and damage to contractor equipment at Los Palos.
- f. Lack of any battalion standard operating procedures.
- g. Loss of battalion capability due to severe health problems.
- h. Serious breakdown in relationships between embedded training support teams.
- i. Loss of credibility for Battalion C2 in relation to the ODFD.

The major problem evident during the 1st Battalion audit was the lack of command-and-control in relationship to routine conventional army operations. This manifested itself in lack of reporting and corrective procedures for barracks and garrison duties and wastage of logistic assets, to the degree that the enforcement of any type of prudent financial, administrative and logistic control was absent.

This report examines various possible solutions, which indicate that self-reliance and self-determination were not yet achievable, as the hierarchy were not operating in a mature management environment, and tended to opt for a *laissez-*

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faire-type of management style, which is adequate for small, self-reliant, self-sustaining guerrilla units – but not for battalion-sized units under transitional training into conventional armed force units.

The style adopted by the ODFD was initially to back off and allow the unit to commit a few mistakes, for a controlled period of time. However, when loss-and-damages exceeded USD\$150K, immediate action had to be taken and remedial training teams inserted into location to bring the unit back into the fold, *per se*, and to utilise the deficiencies identified as training points, or lessons learned.

SUMMARY

The problems present at the East Timor Defence Force are as follows:

Problem Definitions

The major problem within the East Timor Defence Force is the lack of discipline prevalent within the 1st Battalion and the breakdown of command-and-control (C2), particularly within the logistic sphere of operations.

Aggravating problems evident at the ETDF are:

- 1 Metinaro is a brand-new, purpose-built military training establishment.
- 2 Los Palos is an old school site, formerly utilised by a U.N.-Korean Construction Battalion.
- 3 Field hygiene is non-existent.
- 4 Water discipline is non-existent.
- 5 Gastro-intestinal illnesses affect 50% of the 1st Battalion.
- 6 Equipment husbandry is poor.
- 7 All accommodation tentage is in a state of disrepair.
- 8 Morale is low.
- 9 General discipline is poor.

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- 10 Command elements cannot be found in location most weekends.
- 11 Absenteeism is high.
- 12 Communications with the battalion is regularly lost.
- 13 Self-determination rather than self-reliance has become a key focus.
- 14 The East Timor TELSTRA representative has reported regular damage made to the Earth Station co-located with the 1st Battalion.
- 15 The catering contractor has regular catering problems.
- 16 The general camp infrastructure within Los Palos is poor.
- 17 Regular electrical faults plague the camp.
- 18 Water reticulation is a recurring problem within the camp.
- 19 The 1st Battalion Commander believes that the Australian Training Team co-located with his battalion are spying on him.
- 20 Weapon discipline within Los Palos is poor.
- 21 The water point is located 2.5 kilometers away from Camp.
- 22 The deep-well bore and cables are subject to regular sabotage.
- 23 The refrigerated containers at Los Palos fail regularly.
- 24 Reports of the above factors are sanitised before being presented to the ODFD.
- 25 The 1st Battalion Commander has regularly misled the ODFD during weekly briefs.

After considering and reviewing the above problems, the following possible solutions were developed. These solutions have been divided into short-term and long-term solutions.

Short Term Solutions

1. The Battalion Commander is to report to the ODFD, CGS of the ETDF every Monday, and produce a Situation Report (SITREP) covering Logistic Matters, Personnel Matters, Training Matters, Disciplinary Matters and Public Relations Matters.

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Long Term Solutions

2. The ODFD is to mount a Training Team and co-locate them within the 1st Battalion lines as an Advisory Team. This Team will be known as the Training Support Team (TST) with a nation-designator to be placed in front, i.e., if the team is from Australia they will be known as the ATST.
3. The ATST will carry out routine inspections of battalion lines and report deficiencies to the Battalion Commander and Company Commanders; these will become training points.
4. The ATST will produce Battalion SOPs covering all aspects of garrison life, ranging from room inspections to weapon inspections; the logistic and personnel officers from the ODFD will assist in this task.
5. Infrastructure deficiencies are to be annotated and submitted to the Logistic Officer ODFD for action; this to include but is not limited to, water and power reticulation, accommodation, mess facilities, ablution blocks and recreational areas.
6. The ATST is to report immediately to the ODFD, bypassing command chains, any matters that have an immediate impact upon morale, safety or hygiene. This monitoring is to be overt, to reduce accusations of “spying” from the Battalion Commander and should be seen to produce tangible and beneficial results for the 1st Battalion.
7. Formal Contracts are to be drawn up for any Assets owned-and-operated by commercial entities but residing within 1st Battalion lines.

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Recommended Solutions

The author recommends that Solution 1 be implemented as soon as possible in the short term and Solutions 2 – 7 be addressed within the next six months or sooner, if money is available for Infrastructure spending.

CONCLUSIONS

The problems existing within the ETDF have been identified as follows:

Major Problem

The major problem is that battalion command and control elements want complete autonomy from the training establishments, U.N. and ODFD included.

The Battalion C2 has taken a self-reliant and self-determination path; however, there are no checks and balances in place to ensure that strategic, tactical and operational levels of capability and competence exist.

There is no cognisance of the routine procedures that an infantry battalion carries out on a daily basis to ensure all members are present, fit, and healthy, and that collective and individual training regimes require being initiated.

Despite being given guidance by the ODFD, this advice was ignored and then only reinitiated once all training media had been exhausted and the C2 Elements finally admitted they were failing.

Aggravating Problems

The first aggravating problem is that the infrastructure at the Los Palos facility was in a serious state of disarray, with health issues being prevalent and accommodation and dining facilities being sub-optimal at best. This situation was exacerbated by the poor support offered by the Logistic Infrastructure Officer, who seemed to think a 25-square-metre hole in the mess hall roof was acceptable, and the fact that the camp had not attained permanent status by the

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U.N. or the HQ ETDF, and as a consequence, no money could be spent on any capital purchases.

The second aggravating problem is due to lack of equipment husbandry, which resulted in damage and deterioration occurring on an unacceptable level within the battalion, and the wastage of commodities associated with the support of the battalion which might have promoted a more comfortable existence in location, i.e., questions arising re water discipline, field hygiene, ration accounting, etc.

Immediate Problem

The third aggravating problem, which presents an immediate problem, is the total lack of battalion standard operating procedures, which has eventuated in an inappropriate management style being utilised and disciplinary and health problems becoming rampant. All such problems are interdependent, and the addressing of this factor, alone, placed in motion a resolution methodology for the other associated problems.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon the investigations, this study has identified three recommendations. These recommendations have been divided into short-term measures, which should be implemented immediately, and long-term measures, which should be implemented gradually as circumstances permit.

Short Term Recommendations

Recommendation 1: The Battalion Commander is to provide weekly Situation Reports (SITREPs) to the CDF of the ETDF and the ODFD at the HQ ODFD, every Monday.

Expected Result of Recommendation 1: The ODFD can provide input into routine planned-or-unplanned activities occurring within the battalion and if need

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be, this can be sanctioned or mandated by the CDF. From a logistic perspective, early identification of equipment failure is either resulted from systemic failure or poor training regimes, and this allows for assets to be assigned for remedial action.

Long Term Recommendations:

Recommendation 2: The ODFD is to mount a Training Support Team (TST) and they are to deploy into a discrete location within the Battalion lines. The TST is to be the eyes-and-ears of the ODFD and the CDF. The TST has a direct command link into the CDF and ODFD and this is to be made clear to the CO of the 1st Battalion.

Expected Result of Recommendation 2: The spins-off will be two-fold and of mutual benefit to the ODFD and the Battalion CO. Firstly, the Battalion CO will have a team in place that are trainers and can draft Battalion SOPs and Battalion Routine Orders. Secondly, this team can move freely in and out of all battalion lines, advising on matters of field hygiene, water discipline, barrack cleanliness, weapon carriage, etc.

Recommendation 3: The ODFD Logistic Advisor and Infrastructure officers are to visit the 1st Battalion location no less than weekly.

Expected Result of Recommendation 3: This will ensure all Logistic Infrastructure and Logistic Supply Chain Management-issues are resolved in a timely fashion. This also corroborates the findings/reports of the Battalion CO at the weekly ODFD Meetings. It is envisioned that these procedures will become self-regulating and the requirement in the first two months will be reduced to monthly visits.

DISCUSSION

Again as with many organisational problems the audit deficiencies noted within the 1st Battalion of the ETDF cannot be traced to a specific or single cause. Rather, numerous symptoms have interacted which have contributed to the present situation.

Consequently no single solution exists, but several alternatives have been considered for implementation. Each alternative will be examined in detail.

Situational Factors

The second tranche of recruits entering the Metinaro Training Camp required the original trainees to be posted, and as previously indicated, the majority of these trainees were the original FALANTIL guerrillas or cadre staff thereof. A small minority wished only to retire, and the majority were more-than-happy to be accommodated in the brand-new, \$4.6-million-dollar camp built by the Australian Government, near to the capital, Dili, and close to their families.

Self-Determination

The hierarchy of the ETDF decided that the battalion would move from Metinaro to Los Palos in March, and should be able to fend largely for themselves. This became subject of much debate within the ODFD, with both the Australian and New Zealand Trainers disagreeing vehemently with the rush for self-determination, some stating that the main effort should be on self-reliance first. The adage “walk before you run” was bandied about regularly.

It was mooted that an Australian Training Support Team (ATST) would be co-located with the battalion, initially to provide guidance and draft Battalion SOPs, but this was rejected out-of-hand by the Battalion Commander, Commander

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Felur, who believed the ATST were being sent to spy on him. He remonstrated long and loud and to prevent the situation becoming untenable, he was given detailed Terms of Reference which included detailed Weekly Situation Reports (SITREPS) to be delivered back to the ODFD every Monday, and concurrently, the Logistic Contractor was also reporting directly to the author in his role as the Logistic Advisor, *via* cell phone.

Personalities

The Battalion Commander was a Regular Officer trained by the Indonesian Regular Army. He deserted with his entire Company and weapons and entered East Timor requesting sanctuary and his desire, and his men's, to join the ETDF. This was sanctioned and made so. He has been the subject of several investigations and rumours of misappropriation abound - some substantiated - but the majority were labelled hearsay and deemed invalid. His Logistic Officer is terminally-ill with Tuberculosis and spent the majority of his time being treated by the medical fraternity. The relationship between the ODFD and the Battalion Commander was anything but smooth, and on occasion senior ODFD members questioned his integrity. The author observed a degree of hostility towards the Australian members of the ODFD, and to a degree towards the New Zealand members owing to their empathy within the organisation.

Latterly an ATST was inserted into the battalion location and worked closely with the author ensuring operations went smoothly. This team was not received gracefully and they remained largely self-sufficient, and isolated themselves geographically from the battalion in order to maintain a low profile. When tensions rose over their being monitored constantly, which was in their mandate, an unfortunate accident occurred when an unauthorised discharge from a light machine gun sent five bullets fired out of battalion barracks towards the ATST lines and into the door jamb of their accommodation.

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Control

The author was required to travel to Los Palos on a weekly basis for approximately a month and noted many basic deficiencies, which were not believed to be purposeful omissions, rather than training deficiencies. After comparing notes with our Australian counterparts, the author suggested that rather than provide “pure advice”, which is easily ignored, or can be subjected to cognitive dissonance by a listener, the *modus operandi* when perceiving faults should be to turn them into training points, which then become, *de facto*, control measures.

A case-in-point was water discipline. Los Palos had over 100,000 litres of water storage capability, yet for 600 men was running out on a daily basis. The author did a quick circuit around the camp and noted the following:

- a. Taps left on in the majority of ablution blocks;
- b. Kitchen staff washing dishes with 30mm hoses, which were permanently turned on;
- c. Water reticulation lines lying across roads and being cut by vehicular traffic;
- d. Ball-cocks on storage tanks not functioning properly;
- e. Storage tanks leaking from structural cracks; and.
- f. Water pumps being turned off to save power.

Singularly these effects were not insurmountable; but the cumulative effect was the wastage of approximately 50 litres per minute per day, on a commodity which had to be pumped 2.5km to the storage tanks and which had a major role to play in the collective hygiene of the unit, not to mention money-wastage in the unnecessary emptying of septic tanks.

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An assumption had been made that water discipline would be second nature to these soldiers, that assumption was a gross error, and measures were implemented to rectify the situation.

Lack of Management Skills

The lack of checks-and-balances proved to be a major factor for the rectification of the majority of faults within Los Palos, and an abject failure by senior non-commissioned officers, and commissioned officers, to carry out routine inspections, fault checks or remedial action, which in turn gave the impression that such behaviour was sanctioned. Again, it was noted that the majority of activities carried out by Australian and New Zealand Regular soldiers as a matter-of-course, were not being done by a force which was largely comprised of ex-guerrillas, and this was duly noted, inspiring training points, while the application of a back-to-basics philosophy helped to resolve most issues.

Power Reticulation: The \$100,000 Question?

The following saga caused a great deal of grief within the ODFD and the ETDF, and led to noting of some serious leadership and command-and-control issues. In mid-March a generator was received by the ODFD, donated by China for use by the 1st Battalion at Los Palos.

This generator weighed some 2.5 tonnes and was situated on the tray of an ETDF vehicle. The author noted that the ETDF had no heavy-lift capacity and was unsure of the voltage output of the generator, so placed a caveat upon its transfer and transport to the Los Palos location.

The driver of the vehicle and the Battalion Commander were briefed by the author in English, Portuguese and Tetum, that it was not be transported to Los Palos until it had been serviced, load-tested and transferred to a U.N. vehicle

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with a HIAB Crane to locate it on the ground at Los Palos. All involved relayed my instructions back to me, and thus the intent was clear and unambiguous.

The next day, a Thursday the local electrical contractor was issued a verbal order to service and load-test the generator at the ODFD location. A load-test ensures that the generator output is correct by voltage and hertz generation, thus ensuring that no damage would occur when connected to the grid at Los Palos. This was particularly important as all the instructions on the generator were written in Chinese characters and Los Palos housed a myriad of contractor-leased-and-loaned equipment, well out of the price range of the ETDF.

The author proceeded on leave to Darwin, Australia and briefed his counterpart as to the status of the generator and which contractor would be carrying out the activity; for good measure the keys were removed from its truck and placed in the author's and the Personnel Officer's locked office.

Two days later, the contractor in Dili rang the author as he could not find the truck - or the generator. *Via* the author's opposite number it was ascertained that the driver was still in location and the keys were still in the drawer where left, but the truck had been removed from a guarded-and-locked compound, and no one had seen it go.

Enquiries commenced within the ODFD, as the generator was an attractive item, worth in excess of USD\$60,000. Assurances were made by the security guard that it had not left while he was on duty. The battalion at Los Palos replied they did not have the generator.

The author stated, he will take over action on his return to theatre in two days, and the Military Police and Civilian Police were notified of a tentative theft of equipment – 2.5 tonne of generator on a 4-tonne truck, a very distinctive truck

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donated by the Italians, of which only six were in East Timor and only one unaccountable.

The author returned to Dili and proceeded to enquire as to the whereabouts of said generator. A routine enquiry as to contractual happenings at Los Palos was thwarted owing to a communication failure and would have to wait until the Battalion Commander arrived the next day for routine briefings. At the briefing the Battalion Commander stated all was well and there was nothing to report, no problems with food, water or electrical reticulation. The Battalion Commander returned to Los Palos and was not due back for another week.

The next day an irate TELSTRA Manager stormed into the office and demanded that the ODFD pay retribution of some USD\$97,000 for a burnt-out Earth Station at Los Palos – hence the lack of communications. In the ensuing discussion it turned out that under an unofficial agreement, TELSTRA linked into the Los Palos Grid and ran the Earth Station, which provided local communications – the relationship was all care and no responsibility, a fact the author duly pointed out to the TELSTRA Manager, much to the relief of the ODFD Commander.

An uneasy feeling came over the author at this stage and enquiries were made as to when the Earth Station had been damaged. Apparently, one day after the author left on leave.

At the next ODFD briefing it was announced that a Militia Group L7 had entered the Los Palos area and carried out acts of sabotage, namely short-circuiting a deep-well bore, which short-circuited 2.5 kilometres of cable and burnt-out wiring and 100 fluorescent lamps at Los Palos, thus the camp had no water and no lighting. The author surreptitiously enquired as to whether the missing generator had miraculously appeared at Los Palos – but the reply was negative.

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The next day communications were re-established with Los Palos and the Ration Contractor informed me that he had USD\$10,000 worth of rotting food and the refrigerated freezer (leased) had mysteriously short-circuited.

An electrician was subsequently despatched to Los Palos to repair the damage, which was apparently caused by L7, the Militia group. At the same time, the author caught a helicopter to Los Palos and arrived unannounced at the battalion lines, much to the chagrin of the hierarchy. The following damages were assessed:

- a. USD\$97K to the TELSTRA Earth Station.
- b. ASD\$10K of rotting meat.
- c. 2.5 kilometres of burnt out cable.
- d. 1 x burnt-out deep-well bore pump ASD\$2.5K.
- e. 100 x destroyed fluorescent lights.
- f. 1 x burnt-out refrigerated freezer.

Also located was a 65 KVA Generator that had been connected to the Los Palos battalion grid that was a 200-volt system, whereas the donated generator had been modified overseas to discharge 400 volts. The generator had also been pushed off the back of a truck deck approximately 1.5 metres high, and had sustained considerable damage.

The ATST had not been aware the generator was in camp and the Battalion Commander again denied knowledge or responsibility for the entire matter. However, the Logistic Officer informed me the generator had been removed and connected at the Battalion Commander's behest.

The damage in total was in excess of USD\$150K, albeit USD\$97K, whilst directly attributable, could not be contractually aligned to the ETDF blame. This was

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articulated to the Battalion Commander, whose only comment after the author had departed was that “the U.N. has plenty of money!”

A report was duly drafted and forwarded to the Chief of the ODFD and the Chief of the ETDF. Severe repercussions would follow this matter. In fact, in the Australian Army or the New Zealand Army, this would have led to a Court of Inquiry and a Courts Martial. The ETDF Chief Logistic Officer’s only comment was, “they are like naughty children sometimes”!

At the next ODFD meeting a terse discussion between the Battalion Commander and the 2IC of the ODFD led to a stand-up argument and accusations of lying. As a consequence the Battalion Commander was covertly stripped of all decision-making authority, and the ATST powers were broadened and their role made more overt regarding guidance and training, especially in areas dealing with routine Battalion SOPs.

The entire incident left a bitter taste in the mouths of all those involved and while utilised as a lessons learned platform, did not actually achieve the desired role in that area, owing to fact that the major miscreant could not care less about the damage caused, money wasted, or the fact that great damage had been done to the integrity of the ETDF.

Summary of Discussion

The reader may ascertain that the training issues summed-up within this case study can be articulated as an abject failure, but the author believes the contrary is in fact the case.

There are several salient factors, which must be taken into consideration when utilising this case study for analytical appraisal of the factors which facilitate or inhibit the Raise, Train and Sustain factors for the Training of the ETDF.

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In order of precedence these factors are:

- a. The first Recruit Course was largely populated by ex-FALANTIL guerrillas;
- b. A large proportion of these soldiers had only joined to retire and enjoy the pensions they believe they are rightly owed;
- c. The majority of the first recruit intake was what is now described as mature students;
- d. The majority of the first recruit course was conducted in poor training environs;
- e. The original and initial student-Instructor ratio (50:1) was abysmal and did not facilitate culling or retraining of sub-optimal students;
- f. From a political perspective regarding an ex-guerilla, a recruit's basic training failure was not acceptable, irrespective of their lack of utility as an ETDF soldier;
- g. Medical and intellectual screening of recruits was not actioned as stringently as is within ANZAC armies;
- h. Donor nation support was not as forthcoming as first indicated and the Portuguese Trainers were operating under duress, with no ammunition, no communication equipment, and no firing range complex. Albeit, some of these situations were rectified to a degree;
- i. The ETDF was operating in a hiatus between the U.N., ETTA and with the East Timor Government being in command-and-control, in relation to financial and physical support, thus causing training plans and imperatives to become desynchronised; and,
- j. The lack of mandated commitment by the U.N. to assisting the ETDF, but assisting other government entities, i.e., the East Timor Police Force caused soldiers to feel they were undervalued, the downstream effect being lack of conviction about the end-state of raising the ETDF.