

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE SYNOIKISM AND DEMOCRACY OF ELIS

The *synoikismos* of 471 B.C. created the large *polis* of Elis from a number of smaller *poleis*, and was thus a constitutional reform rather than a simple demographic change. Ancient texts that describe a movement of population into the site of Elis are more likely to refer to a mythical or prehistoric event than to the political synoikism of the early fifth century B.C., when it is likely that each of the small *poleis* that had constituted the Eleian *koinon* became a deme of the new, united *polis* of the Eleians. One of these communities, occupying a favourable site in the Peneios valley, now became known as ‘Elis’ and was from that time the dominant political centre of the new *polis*.

The epigraphic evidence from Olympia, when reassessed in the light of the Eleian chronology proposed above,¹ suggests that democratic institutions had begun to appear among at least some of the members of the Eleian *koinon* several years before 471 B.C., though it is unlikely that the Eleians as a whole constituted a democracy until the time of the synoikism. The creation of the new *polis* was the outcome of internal conflicts that had divided the Eleian *koinon* during the previous decades, akin to the political struggles that took place within and among the Peloponnesian states during the late Archaic and early Classical periods,² and is likely to have been accompanied by the victory of democracy.

The Textual Evidence for the Synoikism

Five pieces of textual evidence must be considered in a discussion of the synoikism of Elis.³ The mid-fourth century B.C. *periplous* of Pseudo-Skylax (43) contains the following entry:

Ἑλις. Μετὰ δὲ Ἀχαιοὺς Ἑλῖς ἐστὶν ἔθνος, καὶ πόλεις ἐν αὐτῇ αἶδε· Κυλλήνη καὶ λιμὴν, καὶ ποταμὸς Ἀλφειὸς· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλη συνοικία πόλεων Ἑλῖς ἐν μεσογείᾳ.

¹ See above, 128-38.

² See Appendix.

³ Ps.-Skylax 43; Leandros *FGrH* 492 F 13; Diod. XI.54.1; Strabo VIII.3.2, pp.336f; Paus. V.4.3; cf. Moggi, M., *I Sinecismi Interstatali Greci* (Pisa, 1976) 157-60; Roy, J., ‘The Synoikism of Elis’ in Nielsen, T.H. (ed), *Even More Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis* (Stuttgart, 2002) 249-51.

Elis. After the Achaians, Elis is the *ethnos*, and the *poleis* in it are: Kyllene, also a harbour, and the river Alpheios; and there is also another *synoikia* of *poleis*, Elis, in the plain.

This passage might at first appear to report that Kyllene, including perhaps the lower Alpheios, remained outside the synoikised *polis* of Elis. As Roy points out, however, this is the only evidence that we have that Kyllene enjoyed *polis* status.⁴ In further passages from Pseudo-Skylax, moreover, other settlements that are unlikely to have been independent are also referred to as *poleis*. The Megarians, for example, are called an *ethnos* containing the *poleis* of Aigosthena, Pegai, fort Geraneia and Aris,⁵ and μετὰ...Μεγαρεῖς εἰσὶν Ἀθηναίων πόλεις, among them Eleusis, Salamis, Peiraieus and Sounion.⁶ These are clearly not meant to be independent political entities, so it is likely that Pseudo-Skylax' use of the term '*polis*' to describe the Eleian port of Kyllene simply means that, like the ports of the Megarians and Athenians, it was a sizeable town. This passage appears to reflect the fact that, from the point of view of one sailing south along the coast, after Achaia comes Kyllene and then the mouth of the Alpheios. Significantly, nevertheless, Elis is described as a *synoikia poleon*. This suggests that it had been formed from smaller independent *poleis* rather than from demes or villages.

The evidence ascribed to the fourth century B.C. Leandros consists of a citation in the *Etymologicum Magnum*:

Ἑλις· ἡ πόλις· ἦτοι, ὡς Λέανδρος, διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ κατακλυσμοῦ περισθέντας ἐν αὐτῇ ἀλισθῆναι, ὃ ἐστὶν ἀθροισθῆναι· ἢ διὰ τὸ κατὰ κόμας οἰκοῦντας ὕστερον εἰς μίαν πόλιν ἀλισθῆναι· ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ Ποσειδῶνος Ἡλέως βασιλεύσαντος τῆς χώρας τὴν πόλιν λαβεῖν τὸ ὄνομα.⁷

⁴ Roy, J., 'Elis' in Hansen, M.H. and Nielsen, T.H., *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis* (Oxford, 2004) 499.254.

⁵ Ps.-Skylax 39.

⁶ Ps.-Skylax 57. Hansen, M.H, *IACP* 362, 363, counts both Eleusis and Salamis as *poleis*, but clearly does not mean to suggest that they stood apart from the Classical *polis* of Athenai, *IACP* 361.

⁷ Leandros *FGrH* 492 F 13; *Etym. Magn.* s.v. Ἑλις.

Elis, the *polis*: either, as Leandros says, because those who escaped with their lives from the deluge were gathered together in it, that is, mustered together, or because living in villages they were later gathered together into one *polis*; or the *polis* took its name from Eleus the son of Poseidon, who was king of the country.

Both the first and second explanations assert that that the name ‘Elis’ was derived from the verb ἀλίζω, ‘to gather together’.⁸ Although this etymological claim appears speculative, and the explanation that ‘Elis’ is derived from the Eleian word for ‘vale’ is accepted here,⁹ this passage appears to reflect an actual belief in a demographic change. As Leandros, with the addition of ἀθροισθῆναι, appears to explain, ἀλισθῆναι indicates that the people involved were brought together rather than that they brought themselves together. The first explanation, the only one that is certainly ascribed to Leandros,¹⁰ belongs, like the third explanation, entirely to myth. It has nothing to offer our understanding of the *synoikismos* apart from the fact that it clarifies the meaning of *halisthenai*, also used in the second explanation, which claims that ‘living in *komai* they were later gathered together into one *polis*’. In contrast to the passage from Pseudo-Skylax, this explanation seems to indicate a population movement to an urban centre from a number of villages rather than a political *synoikism* of previously independent *poleis*. Furthermore, it implies that some agent moved the population.

Diodoros records the *synoikism* in a passage that is clearly meant to indicate that it occurred in the second year of the seventy-seventh Olympiad, and in this case it seems certain that 471 B.C. is indicated. He says straightforwardly that ‘at this time the Eleians, while living in many small *poleis*, *synoikised* into one, which is named Elis’.¹¹ The terminology used by Diodoros here is consistent with that of Pseudo-Skylax rather than with that associated with Leandros, and is in accord with the view

⁸ cf. Eust. *Parekbolai* 409, Müller, K.W.F., *Geographi Graeci Minores* II (Hildesheim, 1965) 292.38-43.

⁹ See above, 5.

¹⁰ Roy, ‘*Synoikism*’, 2002, 250. As Roy points out, it is not certain that the second and third explanations for the name ‘Elis’ in this passage come from Leandros, despite Jacoby’s inclusion of them in this fragment of his work.

¹¹ Diod. XI.54.1: ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων Ἡλεῖοι μὲν πλείους καὶ μικρὰς πόλεις οἰκοῦντες εἰς μίαν συνωκίσθησαν τὴν ὀνομαζομένην Ἡλιν; cf. XI.53.1; Demand, N.H., *Urban Relocation in Early Greece. Flight and Consolidation* (Bristol, 1990) 64; Roy, ‘*Synoikism*’, 2002, 249.

expressed above that the synoikism was a political rather than a demographic event, as in Athens at an earlier time.¹²

Strabo has more to say, though not all of it directly concerned with fifth-century Elis:

Ἔλις δὲ ἡ νῦν πόλις οὐπω ἔκτιστο καθ' Ὅμηρον, ἀλλ' ἡ χώρα κωμηδὸν ᾠκεῖτο· ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ Κοίλη Ἔλις ἀπὸ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἦν ἡ πλείστη καὶ ἀρίστη. Ὅψὲ δὲ ποτε συνῆλθον εἰς τὴν νῦν πόλιν Ἔλιν, μετὰ τὰ Περσικά, ἐκ πολλῶν δήμων. σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τόπους τοὺς κατὰ Πελοπόννησον πλὴν ὀλίγων, οὓς κατέλεξεν ὁ ποιητής, οὐ πόλεις, ἀλλὰ χώρας ὀνομάζει,¹³ συστήματα δήμων ἔχουσαν ἐκάστην πλείω, ἐξ ὧν ὕστερον αἱ γνωριζόμεναι πόλεις συνωκίσθησαν, οἷον τῆς Ἀρκαδίας Μαντίνεια μὲν ἐκ πέντε δήμων ὑπ' Ἀργείων συνωκίσθη, Τεγέα δ' ἐξ ἑννέα, ἐκ τοσοῦτων δὲ καὶ Ἡραία ὑπὸ Κλεομβρότου ἢ Κλεωνύμου· ὡς δὲ αὐτῶς Αἴγιον ἐξ ἑπτὰ ἢ ὀκτὼ δήμων συνεπολίσθη, Πάτραι δὲ ἐξ ἑπτὰ, Δύμη δὲ ἐξ ὀκτῶ· οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ Ἔλις ἐκ τῶν περιοικίδων συνεπολίσθη¹⁴

And the present *polis* Elis had not yet been founded in the time of Homer, but the district was occupied village by village: and it was called Koile Elis because of its character: for most of it, and the best part, was so. But at some later time they came together into the present *polis* Elis, after the Persian Wars, from many *demoi*. And nearly all the other places as well in the Peloponnese that the poet listed, except for a few, he terms not *poleis* but districts, each having a larger number of communities [συστήματα] of *demoi*, from which what were known later as *poleis* were synoikised. In Arkadia, for example, while Mantinea was synoikised by the Argives from five *demoi*, and Tegea from nine, and Heraia, too, from so large a number

¹² Thuc. II.15.2.

¹³ The text is that of the Loeb edition. There does not seem to be any pressing necessity, with the Budé edition, to adopt Meineke's emendation of ὀνομάζει to νομίζει <ν δεῖ >.

¹⁴ Strabo VIII.3.2, pp.336f.

by Kleombrotos or Kleonymos: and in the same way Aigion was united into one city from seven or eight *demoi*, and Patrai from seven, and Dyme from eight: and thus Elis, too, was united into one city from the neighbouring communities.

The expression ‘Koile Elis’ is testified in no other text before Thucydides,¹⁵ and the very fact that an adjective has been added to the name suggests that it was used to distinguish it from the rest of Eleia, of which it can thus have been no more than a part. It is probable that, at some time before Thucydides wrote, this expression began to be used to distinguish the low-lying Peneios valley from the hillier part of Eleia known as ‘Pisatis’, a name that is itself unlikely to have been used until about the turn of the fifth century B.C.¹⁶ Although Strabo appears to believe that ‘Koile Elis’ was used at a much earlier period, this belief reflects his apparently mistaken view, made clear in the previous passage of his work,¹⁷ that in the Homeric epics ‘Elis’ designated only the plain of the Peneios, while the territory to the south was part of Nestor’s kingdom of Pylos.

Strabo goes to disproportionate lengths in an unconvincing attempt to prove his point, apparently contrary to the view of other ancient scholars, that the city of Nestor was that known as the Arkadian, Triphylian or Leprean Pylos, rather than the Eleian Pylos or the one on the Messenian coast that was also called Koryphasion.¹⁸ Modern archaeology has revealed, however, that it is highly likely that the Mycenaean kingdom assigned to Nestor in Homeric epic was based near the Messenian coast, just to the north of Navarino Bay.¹⁹ Strabo seems to have erred in allocating the southern districts of the Eleian region to Nestor, and thus in excluding them from the Homeric Elis. It is also unlikely that, as he implies, the district of ‘Koile Elis’ constituted the entire territory of the *polis* of Elis.²⁰

The words *τοιαύτη γὰρ ἦν ἡ πλείστη καὶ ἀρίστη* in this passage also appear to refer to the district of *Κοίλη Ἑλιδος*, only some small parts of which are hilly. The ‘they’ of *συνῆλθον* in the following sentence seem to be the villages of the

¹⁵ Thuc. II.25.3.

¹⁶ See above, Ch. 6.

¹⁷ Strabo VIII.3.1, p.336.

¹⁸ Strabo VIII.3.3, 7-29, pp.336, 339-352.

¹⁹ Davis, J.L., ‘The Discovery of the Palace of Nestor’ in Davis, J.L. (ed), *Sandy Pylos: An Archaeological History from Nestor to Navarino* (Austin, 1998) 42-46.

²⁰ See above, 177.

chora of the city of Elis. For Strabo, there is no *polis* of Elis in the Archaic period, but simply villages. Then, after the Persian Wars, ‘many demes’ come together into a *polis*. Something appears to be missing. Strabo in this passage is clearly unsure about two other points: Heraia was synoikised by either one of two Lakedaimonian kings, and Aigion from either seven or eight demes. This makes it clear that he used more than one source for at least some of the pieces of information contained in this passage, and this may also be true of his report of the Eleian synoikism. Evidence from other texts suggests that he might have conflated two events.

While both Pseudo-Skylax and Diodoros speak of Elis being created from small *poleis*, the second explanation recorded in the *Etymologicum Magnum* (probably not from Leandros) and the beginning of that of Strabo both speak of villages (*komai*). Pausanias, too, records that, soon after the arrival of the Aitolian Eleians in Eleia at the time of the return of the Herakleidai, Oxylos brought about a demographic change in the immediate vicinity of the city of Elis:

λέγεται δὲ ὡς καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐκ τῶν κωμῶν, ὅσοι τοῦ
τείχους οὐ πολὺ ἀφεστήκεσαν, κατελθεῖν ἔπεισεν ἐς τὴν πόλιν
καὶ πλήθει τε οἰκητόρων μείζονα καὶ εὐδαιμονεστέραν ἐς τὰ
ἄλλα ἀπέφηνε τὴν Ἑλίην.²¹

And it is said that he also persuaded all of the people from the villages who did not live far from the wall to go down into the city, and made the number of inhabitants greater and generally made Elis wealthier.

In Roy’s view, although Pausanias’ report seems unhistorical, this passage ‘might be interpreted as further evidence of an ancient belief that the town of Elis had been formed by synoikism.’²² Whether or not the report is historical, however, it clearly refers to a simple movement of people from the villages in close proximity into the city, and so is more likely to reflect either a mythical or actual prehistoric development of the site that later became known as ‘Elis’ than to refer to the political synoikism of the fifth century B.C. It has much in common with both the second explanation in the passage from the *Etymologicum Magnum*, which Jacoby ascribes

²¹ Paus. V.4.3.

²² Roy, ‘Synoikism’, 2002, 251; cf. Moggi, 1976, 160.

to Leandros, and with the first part of Strabo's opening sentence, and little to do with the reports of Pseudo-Skylax and Diodoros.

Stylianou points out that 'as far as the Greek and Persian narratives of Books 11-15 (16) are concerned there is very wide agreement that Diodorus epitomized Ephoros.'²³ This means that the direct evidence in Diodoros (from the fourth century B.C. Ephoros) and Pseudo-Skylax (mid-fourth century B.C., though including information from various earlier sources),²⁴ which describes a *political* synoikism of what had until then been independent *poleis*, is probably our oldest. The second explanation (which probably does not come from the fourth century B.C. Leandros) in the *Etymologicum Magnum*, a text assembled in the Byzantine period,²⁵ and the passage from Pausanias, both of which record a coming together of villagers, a *demographic* reorganisation, appear to be mythological in origin.

Roy suggests that 'the reports of Diodorus and Strabo...may go back to a common source in Ephoros.'²⁶ If so, Diodoros appears to have ignored any mythical passages included in Ephoros' report.²⁷ The passage from Strabo cited above, on the other hand, may be the result of an attempt to integrate the mythical or prehistoric 'coming together' of villages around the site of Elis found in other sources with the historical, political synoikism of the fifth century B.C. recorded by Ephoros. It is also possible that Strabo carelessly placed information that he knew to refer to two different events in a format that makes it possible for us to miss the distinction. He writes of villages in Homeric times and then, curiously perhaps, mentions that 'many demes' had come together after the Persian Wars. He implies, furthermore, that Elis was synoikised at this time from one of several *συστήματα δήμων* that had existed

²³ Stylianou, P., *A Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus Book 15* (Oxford, 1998) 49f; cf. Roy, 'Synoikism', 2002, 261.

²⁴ I thank Prof. Graham Shipley for this suggestion concerning the likely dates of Ps.-Skylax and the information that is presented in the *Periplous*. According to Arafat, K., *Pausanias' Greece* (Cambridge, 1996) 22, 'Skylax is known to have undertaken his voyage in the late sixth century, whereas the *Periplous* that has been preserved under his name is a good century and a half later.' Arafat finds that 'its accuracy as a record of its author's travels is, therefore, dubious at best'. The information that it contains, nevertheless, may come from any time in the intervening period.

²⁵ Duke, E., review of Lassere, F. and Livadaras, N., *Etymologicum Magnum Genuinum, Symeonis Etymologicum, una cum Magna Grammatica, Etymologicum Magnum Auctum* (Rome, 1976) in 'Etymologica Graeca' *CR* 28 (1978) 295.

²⁶ Roy, 'Synoikism', 2002, 261.

²⁷ As in relation to the *asylia*, where Diodoros (XIV.17.11) appears to follow Ephoros in recording that Eleia was sacred, but does not repeat his claim that this status dated from the mythical time of the return of the Herakleidai (Strabo VIII.3.33, p.357f; Ephoros *FGrH* 70 F 115), giving elsewhere an apparently more historical explanation (Diod. VIII.1f); see above, 14-16.

in the Peloponnese.²⁸ As Sakellariou points out, σύστημα is ‘used by Polybius as a synonym for the term κοινόν (confederacy),’²⁹ so Strabo’s use of this terminology suggests that what had once been an Eleian *koinon* consisting of various small *poleis* became, after the Persian Wars, one large, unified *polis*.³⁰

The context of this passage from Strabo, placed in the middle of his discussion of the Homeric kingdom of Nestor, is also significant. His purpose is to explain the apparent lack of a city of Elis in the Homeric epics, even though one existed later. Strabo’s statement that ‘many demes’ had come together after the Persian Wars appears to be an allusion to the Classical synoikism referred to by Diodoros and Pseudo-Skylax. His first reference to Elis, on the other hand, mentions villages rather than demes, and is likely to refer to the state of affairs believed to have prevailed before the mythical expansion of the site by Oxylos, later recorded by Pausanias and mentioned in the *Etymologicum Magnum*. Because the latter reference probably does not come from Leandros, moreover, we cannot even be sure that the story of a demographic change, set by Pausanias in the prehistoric period, was extant very long before the time of Strabo, who was born c.64 B.C. The evidence for a mythical or prehistoric movement of the inhabitants of nearby villages into the town that occupied the site of the later city of Elis, despite the apparent conflation in Strabo, must be kept apart from that for the historical *synoikismos* of the early-fifth century B.C., which is highly likely to have entailed a fundamental political reorganisation.³¹

As Roy convincingly argues, there can be little doubt that there was a *polis* on the site of Elis long before the synoikism.³² We cannot conclude from this, however, that by the Archaic period the entire area synoikised in 471 B.C. was already the territory of a *polis* based on the site of the later city of Elis. The epigraphic evidence that Roy produces to support the view that an Eleian state had

²⁸ cf. Moggi, 1976, 161.

²⁹ Polyb. II.41.15: Achaians; IX.28.2: Chalkidians; Sakellariou, M.B., *The Polis State: Definition and Origin, Meletemata 4* (Athens, 1989) 317.

³⁰ cf. Andrewes, A., ‘Argive *Perioikoi*’ in Craik, E.M. (ed), ‘*Owls to Athens*’: *Essays on Classical Subjects Presented to Sir Kenneth Dover* (Oxford, 1990) 172, n.5, who points out that when Strabo says ἡ Ἑλῆς ἐκ τῶν περιουκίδων συνεπολίσθη, ‘this appears to be the purely topographic sense.’ We need not assume that these communities were in any way subject to the Eleians.

³¹ cf. Gehrke, H.-J., *Stasis* (Munich, 1985) 52; Walter, U., *An der Polis Teilhaben: Bürgerstaat und Zugehörigkeit im Archaischen Griechenland* (Stuttgart, 1993) 118.

³² Roy, ‘Synoikism’, 2002, 253f; cf. Eder, B. and Mitsopoulos-Leon, V., ‘Zur Geschichte der Stadt Elis vor dem Synoikismos von 471 v. Chr.: Die Zeugnisse der geometrischen und archaischen Zeit’ *ÖJh* 68 (1999) 1-39.

existed before the synoikism rather adds weight to the case for an Archaic *koinon*.³³ It is more likely that the *polis* situated on the site of the later city of Elis was but one of the many small *poleis* that were synoikised in 471 B.C. into the new, extensive *polis* of the Eleians, with the newly-named ‘Elis’ as its dominant political centre.³⁴ The terminology used by Strabo when he says that they came together μετὰ τὰ Περισικά, ἐκ πολλῶν δήμων,³⁵ furthermore, does not preclude us from calling such communities ‘*poleis*’. A *demos* is ‘a people’, and may signify the inhabitants of a *polis* as much as a settlement within a *polis*.

Inglis, while rightly believing that the Eleians ‘were at home in the valley of the Alpheios as well as the Peneios’, accepts Strabo’s apparently misguided implication that Κοίλη Ἰλιδος constituted the entire territory of the synoikised *polis* of the Eleians, and so concludes that ‘we have something remarkable to account for: a large *synoikismos* undertaken in the name of all the Eleioi by the inhabitants of the northern valley.’³⁶ We should, however, keep the prehistoric or mythical element in Strabo’s report apart from the phrases that record the historical synoikism. We should also make allowance for his apparently mistaken implication, based on a spurious interpretation of some passages from the Homeric epics, that the historical synoikism involved only the communities of the Peneios valley. If we do so, there is no impediment to viewing the events of 471 B.C. as a political *synoikismos* of the entire Eleian population of both valleys, excluding only the handful of non-Eleian communities which remained, as in the era of the *koinon*, allies of the Eleians.

The Epigraphic Evidence for Democracy in Eleia

The earliest textual evidence for democracy among the Eleians comes from Thucydides. This passage concerns the manner in which the parties to the alliance of the Athenians, Argives, Mantineians and Eleians in 420 B.C. are to swear the appropriate oaths. At Elis, the *demiourgoi* and the *thesmophylakes* are to administer the oath, and it is to be sworn by the *demiourgoi* and the six hundred.³⁷ The existence of such a large body as ‘the six hundred’, comparable to ‘the five hundred’

³³ Roy, 2002, 256f.

³⁴ cf. Moggi, 1976, 161; Walter, 1993, 118; *contra* Roy, ‘Synoikism’, 2002, 251: ‘the only aspect of the Eleian synoikism reported by Diodoros and Strabo is change in the pattern of settlement.’

³⁵ Strabo VIII.3.2, p.336.

³⁶ Inglis, A., *A History of Elis, ca. 700-365 B.C.* (Harvard PhD Thesis, 1998) 82.

³⁷ Thuc. V.47.9: ἐν δὲ Ἰλιδι οἱ δημιουργοὶ καὶ οἱ ἑξακόσιοι, ἐξορκούντων δὲ οἱ δημιουργοὶ καὶ οἱ θεσμοφύλακες.

at Athens, implies that by 420 B.C. there was a significant democratic element in the Eleian constitution. The contents of a number of inscriptions found at Olympia suggest that such an element had existed among the Eleians from early in the fifth century B.C., but not necessarily that it was a part of the constitution of a unified Eleian *polis*, nor of an Eleian *koinon*.³⁸

Two inscriptions in the Eleian dialect on bronze from Olympia mention both a council and an assembly. *IvO* 3 consists of two fragments of a bronze plate.³⁹ Line eight of this document refers to a council and the people *en masse*: βολάν καὶ ζῶμον πλαθούοντα (Rhodes and Lewis). Rhodes and Lewis follow Jeffery's date of 'c.475?', but van Effenterre and Ruzé assign this inscription to the end of the sixth century B.C.⁴⁰ While it might be placed somewhere in the quarter-century beforehand, Jeffery's dating certainly does not preclude the time of the synoikism itself, 471 B.C.

IvO 7 is a 'grosse Bronzetafel' 8cm high and 51.8cm wide.⁴¹ Jeffery describes it as containing 'part of a law mentioning procedure for alteration of the law by a Boule of 500', but it equally appears to involve a popular assembly in this process. Hill gives 'a rough translation' of part of the fifth line: 'with the whole Council of Five Hundred and a full meeting of the people' (σὺν βολᾷ [π]εντακατίον ἀφλανέος καὶ δάμοι πλεθούοντι δινάκοι). The agreement of the people, furthermore, appears decisive in interpreting the law: ἂ δέ κα Φράτρα ἂ δαμοσία τελεία εἶε δικάδοσα (Buck). Hill tentatively assigns this inscription to the fifth century B.C., and while Buck puts it in the sixth century B.C., Jeffery, followed by Rhodes and Lewis, says 'c.500?'.⁴² It is highly likely to have preceded the synoikism.

Although neither of these documents in the Eleian dialect names any political entity, they seem to have been made by a grouping of the Eleians rather than just one

³⁸ Taeuber, H., 'Elische Inschriften in Olympia' in Rizakis, A.D. (ed), *Achaia und Elis in der Antike, Akten des 1. Internationalen Symposiums, Athen, 19-21 Mai 1989, Meletemata* 13 (Athens, 1991) 111, identifies a total of about 320 certain Eleian inscriptions. About 40 are laws and decrees, all but a few of which belong to the period from the mid-sixth to the late-fifth centuries B.C. Some concern the Eleian state and others 'only regulate the affairs of the shrine and the course of the games.'

³⁹ Dittenberger, W. and Purgold, K., *Inschriften von Olympia* (Berlin, 1896) no. 3.

⁴⁰ Jeffery, *LSAG* 220.9; Rhodes, P.J. and Lewis, D.M., *The Decrees of the Greek States* (Oxford, 1997) 93; van Effenterre, H. and Ruzé, F., *Nomina: Recueil d'inscriptions politiques et juridiques de l'archaïsme grec* I (Rome, 1994) no. 108; cf. Hill, G.F., *Sources for Greek History* (Oxford, 1951) no. 124b.

⁴¹ Dittenberger and Purgold, 1896, no.7.

⁴² Hill, 1951, no. 124c; cf. Buck, 1955, no. 64; Jeffery, *LSAG* 220.5; Rhodes and Lewis, 1997, 93.

community. While ‘the Eleians’ appear to have comprised a number of small *poleis* before the synoikism of 471 B.C., any of which might possibly have produced these documents found in Olympia, a council of 500 seems inordinately large for a small *polis*, and we should rather expect decrees concerning the internal affairs of the constituent *poleis* of an Eleian *koinon* to have been displayed in a local sanctuary rather than at Olympia. We need not assume, however, with some scholars, that the government portrayed in the documents belonged to a state of ‘Elis’,⁴³ and it might just as easily have belonged to the ‘Pisaians’ of Pausanias’ report.

Whibley, writing late in the nineteenth century, could claim that ‘Elis, until a relatively late period, consisted of small communities governed by aristocracies...but on their union in one state democracy was established.’⁴⁴ While much of what Whibley says remains likely, one particular must be modified. Andrewes points out that if Jeffery’s dating for *IvO* 3 (c.475?) and 7 (c.500?) is correct, then it looks as if democracy was instituted in Elis before the Persian Wars, which is unexpected but not impossible.⁴⁵ Yet, as indicated above, while it might *look* this way, we must consider the possibility that an Eleian political entity that was *not* the state of Elis had introduced democratic institutions before the synoikism. Furthermore, while some of the member-*poleis* of the Eleian *koinon* might have been aristocracies, we need not assume with Whibley that this was always the case in the entire period that preceded the synoikism.

Further Late-Archaic and Early-Classical Inscriptions from Olympia

Further Eleian inscriptions from Olympia dating from the period in question suggest that diverse political structures existed among the Eleian communities in the late Archaic period. Apart from *IvO* 3 and 7, discussed above, these inscriptions are considered below in turn, according to the numbers assigned by Dittenberger and

⁴³ O’Neil, J.L., *Greek Democratic Constitutions outside Athens* (Cambridge PhD Dissertation, 1974) 81, 83; *The Origin and Development of Greek Democracy* (Lanham, Maryland, 1995) 32, 37; Robinson, E.W., *The First Democracies: Early Popular Government Outside Athens* (Stuttgart, 1997) 108f; Inglis, 1998, 74.

⁴⁴ Whibley, L., *Greek Oligarchies: Their Character and Organization* (London, 1896) 180.

⁴⁵ Andrewes, A. in Gomme, A.W., Andrewes A. and Dover, K.J., *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides IV* (Oxford, 1970) 60; cf. Cartledge, P.A., *Sparta and Lakonia: a Regional History 1300-362 B.C.* (London, 1979) 215; Demand, 1990, 64; Robinson, 1997, 109; Rhodes, P. J., ‘Epigraphical Evidence: Laws and Decrees’ in Hansen, M.H. (ed), *Sources for the Ancient Greek City-State* (Copenhagen, 1995) 96; Roy, ‘Synoikism’, 2002, 258.

Purgold in 1896, in order to make it clear which of them shed light on political developments in the late-Archaic and early-Classical periods.

IvO 1, dated ‘c.525?’ by Jeffery, is a fragment of a law that mentions *theokoloi* in connection with Olympian Zeus.⁴⁶ These sacred officials are known from later inscriptions on stone, some of which are discussed above in connection with the Eleian *manteis*.⁴⁷ The inscription appears to contain regulations for the management of the sanctuary, and is of little help in determining constitutional developments.

Kahrstedt places *IvO* 2, which he says is clearly ‘a *rhetra* [agreement] of the Eleians’ (ἸΑ Φρότρα τοῖς Φαλείοις) before 470 B.C., and Jeffery dates it ‘c.475-450?’.⁴⁸ Both may be right. This inscription mentions the *damiorgia* and one *Hellanodikes*. Interpretations of its content vary widely. Buck considers *πατριάν* (line 1) to refer to the family in general, and so says that ‘the object of the decree is to do away with the liability which...had attached to the whole gens and family of an accused person’.⁴⁹ Jeffery, on the other hand, interprets *πατριάν* to signify a certain ‘Patrias’, ‘the public secretary of the governing body of Elis’. She disputes Buck’s interpretation on the grounds that such ‘primitive law’ is unlikely to have survived in Elis up to this time.⁵⁰ If the inscription does come from between 475 and 470 B.C., however, the time of the Eleian *synoikismos*, we should expect a codification of law that was intended to supersede the laws of the various small *poleis* that now united into one, especially if some of the more isolated of these had remained ‘primitive’ in this respect.

As Andrewes points out, furthermore, this *rhetra* declares that ‘certain penalties are to be enforced by ὄρ (= Attic ὄς) μέγιστον τέλος ἔχοι καὶ τοὶ βασιλᾶες, otherwise the *Hellanodikes* must exact a fine from them; and other penalties are to be dealt with by the *damiorgia*.’⁵¹ Wallace sees this as evidence that

⁴⁶ Jeffery, *LSAG* 220.2.

⁴⁷ See above, 53.

⁴⁸ Kahrstedt, U., ‘Zur Geschichte von Elis und Olympia’ *Gött. Nachr. aus dem Jahre 1927* (Berlin, 1928) 159f, 166; Jeffery, *LSAG* 220.15.

⁴⁹ Buck, 1955, no. 61; cf. Rice, J.D., *The Greek State of Elis in Hellenistic Times* (University of Missouri Dissertation, 1975) 17, n.4.

⁵⁰ Jeffery, 1961, 218, n.5; O’Neil, 1974, 84 sees the *πατριᾶς γροφεύς* as the secretary of the *gens*.

⁵¹ Andrewes, 1970, 60.

‘a common purpose of archaic legislation was regulating *archai*’.⁵² These need not, however, be the magistrates of the synoikised *polis*, and Whibley seems correct to point out that the expression ὄρ μέγιστον τέλος ἔχοι ‘is used to describe the different magistrates in the different towns (who would have had different titles)’, so *IvO 2* would appear in part to establish procedures for bringing local magistrates under the jurisdiction of the central authority.⁵³ As we shall see, other *rhetrai* in the Eleian script are agreements between parties, so this inscription is likely to be an agreement between the various communities of the Eleians. Because it appears to both standardise fundamental law and bring local magistrates under the jurisdiction of a central authority, *IvO 2* may be a foundation document of the new *polis*. If so, we have an insight into the kinds of legal and constitutional arrangements that the synoikism involved.

IvO 4, like *IvO 1*, refers to religious officials such as the *theokolos*, but also to the *damiorgia* and to the *damos*. While Jeffery gives ‘c.475?’ for this document, van Effenterre and Ruzé say ‘vers 500’, so it could belong to the period before the synoikism.⁵⁴ Since it appears to regulate the functions of the *theokolos* at Olympia, it may be a decree of all of the Eleians. The incomplete state of the inscription, nevertheless, does not allow us to conclude that the *damos*, even if that of the Eleians as a whole, appears in any decision-making capacity.⁵⁵

Jeffery dates *IvO 5*, a ‘bronze plaque bearing part of a law on aliens and the Olympic ritual’, to ‘c.500?’. She seems correct in assigning *IvO 6*, a *kleines Fragment*, to the same inscription.⁵⁶ We can assume that this is a document of the Eleians, but it tells us nothing of their political development. The same can be said for *IvO 8*, in which little more than single words, one restored as [Ὀλ]υμπικῶ, can be made out.

IvO 9, on the other hand, is both significant and controversial. This is an agreement between the Eleians and another people. The initial phrase is transcribed by Dittenberger and Purgold Ἐλεῖοι καὶ τῶν Ἡραίων, ‘a *rhetra* between the Eleians and the (Heraians?)’, although there have been many

⁵² Wallace, R.W., ‘Revolutions and a New Order in Solonian Athens and Archaic Greece’ in Raaflaub, K.A., Ober, J. and Wallace, R.W. (eds), *Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece* (Berkeley, 2007) 66f.

⁵³ Whibley, 1896, 153, n.5; cf. Walter, 1993, 120.

⁵⁴ Jeffery, *LSAG* 220.10; van Effenterre and Ruzé, 1994, 24.

⁵⁵ As O’Neil, 1976, 85, says, ‘this document makes little sense’.

⁵⁶ Dittenberger and Purgold, 1896, no. 6; Jeffery, *LSAG* 220.4

subsequent variations on the final word.⁵⁷ Michel, followed by both Tod and Buck, dates it to the sixth century B.C., while Guarducci prefers the second half of that century and Jeffery, followed by more recent epigraphers, determines a date close to 500 B.C.⁵⁸ We can safely assume that it belongs to the period before the synoikism. Following the traditional interpretation, Buck translates the opening phrase as ‘The covenant of the Eleans and the Heraeans (of Arcadia).’⁵⁹ The identity of the latter party to the agreement, however, has been called into question in recent years.⁶⁰

The most significant aspect of *IvO* 9 for this discussion, nevertheless, is the interpretation of a part of the last sentence: αἴτε Φέτας αἴτε τελεστά αἴτε δᾶμος (Buck). The context is liability for punishment for violation of the *rhetra*. Tod, followed by Meiggs and Lewis, translates ‘whether private man or magistrate or community’ and van Effenterre and Ruzé (‘simple particulier, magistrat ou communauté’) seem to concur. Buck, on the other hand, says ‘whether private citizen, official or the state’, while Guarducci prefers ‘di un privato, o (di) un magistrato, o (di) un’assemblea del popolo’. The difficulty in interpreting this phrase is caused by the ambiguity of the term ‘*damos*’, which in this document could refer to any of the following: the entire citizenry of either the Eleians or the other party to the *rhetra*; any one of the constituent communities of either of two confederacies, one of which was the Eleians, who were parties to the *rhetra*; or the entire citizenry of one party or any one of the constituent communities of the other. This question is considered further below.

Another *rhetra* in the Eleian dialect is *IvO* 10.⁶¹ Jeffery says that it contains ‘the terms of an alliance between the Anaitoi and Metapioi’, and dates it ‘c.475-450?’.⁶² Here, as in *IvO* 9 and presumably *IvO* 2, we see an agreement involving more than one party described as a *rhetra*. Although neither the Anaitoi nor Metapioi are heard of elsewhere, we can assume that a document in the Eleian dialect found in

⁵⁷ Dittenberger and Purgold, 1896, no. 9.

⁵⁸ Michel, C., *Recueil d’inscriptions grecques* (Hildesheim, 1976, [1st edn Paris, 1900]) 1.1; Tod, M.N. (ed), *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions I* (Oxford, 1946) no. 5; Buck, 1955, no. 62; Jeffery, *LSAG* 220.6; Guarducci, M., *Epigrafia greca I* (Rome, 1967) 202.1; Meiggs, R. and Lewis, D.M., *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the end of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Oxford, 1969) no. 17; van Effenterre and Ruzé, 1994, no. 52; Rhodes and Lewis, 1997, 93.

⁵⁹ Buck, 1955, 62; cf. the discussion in Dittenberger and Purgold, 1896, no. 9; Michel, 1900, 1.1; Tod, 1946, no. 5; Jeffery, 1961, 220.6; Guarducci, 1967: ‘(Questo) è; il trattato fra gli Elei e gli Erei’; Meiggs and Lewis, 1969, 17.

⁶⁰ van Effenterre and Ruzé, 1994, 52; Roy, J. and Schofield, D., ‘IvO 9: A New Approach’ *HOPOS* 13 (1999) 155-65.

⁶¹ Dittenberger and Purgold, 1896, no. 10.

⁶² Jeffery, *LSAG* 220.12.

Olympia was placed there by Eleians, and that these peoples were two of the member-communities of the Eleian *koinon*. Since they simply agree to be friends for fifty years under pain of exclusion from the altar by the *proxenoi* and *manteis*, and no mention is made of enemies or warfare, we need not assume that this inscription recorded a *symmachia*, and it might have been intended to restore peace after a period of discord.

IvO 11 is another *rhetra*, but in this case between a community and a private individual. Jeffery, followed by van Effenterre and Ruzé, tentatively dates this bronze inscription c.500-475, and both Guarducci and Rhodes and Lewis place it around the beginning of the fifth century B.C.⁶³ By the terms of this agreement, a certain Deukalion is to join an Eleian community called ‘the Chaladrians’. In addition, he appears to have been granted the right to hold two important offices: that of *proxenos*, likely to have been the representative of the Chaladrians in the amphictyonic management of Olympia,⁶⁴ and that of *damiorgos*.⁶⁵ Furthermore, land ἐν Πίσσῳ is to be guaranteed to Deukalion and his descendants, and the term δάμοι appears in the text.

The manumission list of *IvO* 12, ‘c.475-450?’,⁶⁶ reveals nothing, it seems, of Eleian political developments. *IvO* 13 is likely to be a law concerned with religious functionaries at Olympia, since it mentions both *thearoi* and *proxenoi*. It also appears to refer to the opinion of the *damos*: δόξε καὶ τοῖ δάμοι (Rhodes and Lewis). The text, however, cannot be sufficiently understood and is neither discussed by Jeffery nor dated by Rhodes and Lewis.⁶⁷ *IvO* 14 appears Archaic,⁶⁸ and seems to mention a dedication by the Eleians of one tenth of some funds and perhaps to direct one or more *Hellanodikai* in the use of the money. Although this may refer to a tithe paid to the treasury of Zeus by the various Eleian communities, we cannot be sure of this and again there is little here to benefit this discussion. Jeffery dates *IvO* 15 and 16 to the third quarter of the fifth century B.C. They belong well outside of the period

⁶³ Jeffery, *LSAG* 220.8; van Effenterre and Ruzé, 1994, no. 21; Guarducci, 1967, 203.2; Rhodes and Lewis, 1997, 93.

⁶⁴ See above, 101f.

⁶⁵ See below, 198f.

⁶⁶ Jeffery, *LSAG* 220.13.

⁶⁷ Rhodes and Lewis, 1997, 93.

⁶⁸ Compare the forms of *delta*, *theta* and *gamma*, for example, with the chart of Arkadian and Eleian letters in Jeffery, *LSAG* 206.

under consideration here,⁶⁹ as do the remaining Eleian inscriptions from Olympia recorded by Dittenberger and Purgold.

We can conclude that seven of these inscriptions may be relevant to a discussion of political developments in Eleia in the period leading up to the synoikism. Of these, while *IvO* 4, 7, 9 and 11 are likely to originate from the preceding decades, *IvO* 2, 3 and 10 appear to have been inscribed close to the time of the synoikism. Both *IvO* 7 and 3 imply an empowered popular assembly, as well as a *boule*, though only the earlier *IvO* 7 specifies a council of 500. These seven documents can be used to supplement the reconstruction of events in Eleian history offered above.⁷⁰

Before the Synoikism

Two of the inscriptions that appear to pre-date the synoikism, *IvO* 4 and 9, mention the *damos*. Since this term appears in *IvO* 4 in the accusative (τὸν δᾶμον), whichever *damos* is meant, be it the Eleian people as a whole or that of one of the constituent communities of the Eleian *koinon*, might have been the object of some action rather than its initiator. In *IvO* 9, where the *damos* follows the private citizen and the magistrate in a list of those who might infringe an agreement between the Eleians and another party, this expression appears to have been used to signify any constituent community of either the Eleians or the other party.

As noted above, ‘Heraia’ has been the accepted interpretation of the word in *IvO* 9 transcribed as Ἡραῖαι by Dittenberger and Purgold, a translation substantially followed by scholars since the nineteenth century.⁷¹ Roy and Schofield, nevertheless, have challenged this view.⁷² Using three-dimensional computer modelling techniques, they conclude that in *IvO* 9 ‘there was no other letter after the clearly visible *epsilon* at the end of the first line.’ As a result, ‘the partners of the Eleians in the treaty inscribed on the tablet were the *Ewaoioi*, presumably the

⁶⁹ Jeffery, *LSAG* 221.18, 220.17.

⁷⁰ See above, 142f.

⁷¹ Michel, 1900, 1.1; Tod, 1946, no.5; Buck, 1955, 62; Jeffery, *LSAG* 220.6; Guarducci, 1967: ‘(Questo) è; il trattato fra gli Elei e gli Ereï’; Meiggs and Lewis, 1969, 17; cf. Dittenberger and Purgold, 1896, no. 9. Scholars have opted for various combinations of the initial *eta* or *epsilon*, the later *omega* or *omicron-iota* and the placement and type of the accent. Except for that of van Effenterre and Ruzé who transcribe Ἡραῖαι, and Roy and Schofield, however, all seem to have agreed on the interpretation ‘Heraia’.

⁷² Roy and Schofield, 1999, 155-65; cf. van Effenterre and Ruzé, 1994, 52.

inhabitants of an otherwise unknown community called *Ewa*.⁷³ The Ewaians, they conclude, like the equally unknown Chaladrians, Anaitians and Metapians of *IvO* 10 and 11, were probably ‘a local community within the region eventually known as Elis’. By this treaty the Eleians, Roy and Schofield believe, included the Ewaians among their subject allies.⁷⁴ Morgan, nevertheless, although publishing without having seen Roy and Schofield, is inclined to accept the reading ΕϞ|Φαιοι.⁷⁵

Whatever the case, the ‘*damos*’ that could conceivably infringe the treaty might be a constituent community rather than the entire people of either the Eleians or the other party. If, despite Roy and Schofield, the other party were the Heraians, both of the parties to the treaty would have been among the συστήματα δήμων that Strabo notes had comprised a number of Peloponnesian *poleis* of the Classical period before their respective synoikisms.⁷⁶ If Roy and Schofield are right, and the other party to the agreement were the otherwise unknown Ewaians, then the Eleians would have comprised a σύστημα δήμων that made an agreement with an individual *damos*, and the potential oath-breakers listed in the inscription could still be either a private citizen, a magistrate or a community.⁷⁷ *IvO* 9 cannot be cited as evidence of democracy among the Eleians c.500 B.C.⁷⁸

This inscription does seem to indicate, however, that the Eleians were in need of allies against some enemy. These allies might have been the Heraians, who lived on the Alpheios high up from Olympia, or some other community, perhaps located to the south of the Alpheios, beyond the area inhabited by Eleians. Whatever the case, they are likely to have become members of the *symmachia* mentioned in the Eleian bronze document from the end of the sixth century B.C. discussed by Siewert and Ebert.⁷⁹ The fact that penalties for infringement were to be paid to Olympian Zeus further implies that the sanctuary was in the hands of the ‘official’ Eleians rather than those of the Pisatan rebels at the time when the treaty was made c.500 B.C.

⁷³ Roy and Schofield, 1999, 162. They use ‘w’ rather than ‘F’ to stand for *digamma*.

⁷⁴ Roy and Schofield, 1999, 163f; *SEG* XLIX.462.

⁷⁵ Morgan, C., ‘Cultural Subzones in Early Iron Age and Archaic Arkadia?’ in Nielsen, T.H. and Roy, J. (eds), *Defining Ancient Arkadia* (Copenhagen, 1999) 450f, n.212; cf. *SEG* L.459.

⁷⁶ Strabo VIII.3.2, pp.336f.

⁷⁷ cf. Sakellariou, Athens, 1989, 318.

⁷⁸ *contra* O’Neil, 1974, 80.

⁷⁹ Siewert, P. ‘Symmachien in neuen Inschriften von Olympia. Zu den sogenannten Periöken der Eleer’ in Foresti, L.A. *et al.* (eds), *Federazioni e federalismo nell’Europa antica* I (Milan, 1994) 257-64; cf. Ebert, J. and Siewert, P., ‘Eine archaische Bronzeurkunde aus Olympia mit Vorschriften für Ringkämpfer und Kampfrichter’ in Mallwitz, A. (ed), *Bericht über die Ausgrabungen in Olympia XI* (Berlin, 1999) 391-412; see above, 106.

IvO 7, which mentions ‘the whole Council of Five Hundred and a full meeting of the people’ and in which the agreement of the people appears decisive in interpreting the law, has also been dated c.500, though there are widely differing views.⁸⁰ If *IvO 9* and *IvO 7* came from exactly the same time, we would be able to conclude that an inscription mentioning democratic institutions was set up while the Eleians were in control of Olympia, and that the Eleians as a whole had a democratic constitution at that time. The dating of these documents is not so precise, however, and in a time of conflict control of the sanctuary might have passed quickly between one faction and another.

If the Eleian chronology presented above is correct,⁸¹ then it is likely that Pantaleon was the Pisatan leader during the period when *IvO 9* and *IvO 7* were inscribed at Olympia. The Pisatan usurpation of the Olympic festival under Pantaleon’s generalship is likely to have occurred late in the sixth century B.C., and he led the Pisatan forces in support of the Messenians during the war that resulted in their defeat c.490 B.C. The identity of this figure holds the key to understanding political events in Eleia during the period leading up to the synoikism and must be considered in relation to *IvO 7*.

Pantaleon is described in various ways by our sources. Pausanias says that he was a tyrant in Pisa in one passage and in another he calls him the king of the Pisaians.⁸² While Strabo refers to the Arkadian general sent to help the Messenians against the Lakedaimonians as a king, he calls Pantaleon neither a tyrant nor a king, but simply implies that he was a *strategos*.⁸³ The fourth-century B.C. Herakleides Pontikos, our oldest first-hand source for Pantaleon, says that he was a king, though the characteristics that he ascribes to him rather seem typical of a negative view of tyranny:

Πανταλέων ἐβασίλευσεν ἐν τούτοις, ὑβριστὴς καὶ χαλεπός.
 Οὗτος πρέσβεις πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐλθόντας ἐκτεμὼν ἠνάγκασε
 καταφαγεῖν τοὺς ὄρχεις⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Hill, 1951, no. 124c; Jeffery, *LSAG* 220.5; see above, 183.

⁸¹ See above, 142f.

⁸² Paus. VI.21.1: Πανταλέοντι...τῷ Ὀμφαλίῳ τυραννοῦντι ἐν Πίσῃ; VI.22.2: οἱ Πισαῖοι καὶ βασιλεὺς αὐτῶν Πανταλέων.

⁸³ Strabo VIII.4.10, p.362: Ἀρχάδων μὲν Ἀριστοκράτην τὸν Ὀρχομενοῦ βασιλέα παρεχομένων στρατηγόν, Πισατῶν δὲ Πανταλέοντα τὸν Ὀμφαλίῳ.

⁸⁴ Herakl. Pont. *Peri Politeion* VI ΗΛΕΙΩΝ, *FHG* II, 213.6.

Pantaleon was a king among these people, outrageous and harsh. When the elders came to him he castrated them and forced them to eat up their own testicles.

Castration, as Grote points out, ‘was a practice thoroughly abhorrent both to the feelings and to the customs of Greece’.⁸⁵ In the passage from Herodotus that he cites it is directly associated with Periander, the tyrant of Korinth. One of the adjectives used to describe Pantaleon in the passage from Herakleides (ὕβριστής) is reminiscent of the language used by both Herodotus (ὕβρισαντος) and Pausanias (ὕβρισαντα) to describe Pheidon.⁸⁶ Aristotle says that Pheidon was a king who became a tyrant, and it is possible that Pantaleon, too, had held the office of king in one of the Eleian *poleis*.⁸⁷

A clear distinction was not always drawn between the *basileus* and the *tyrannos*. Until the fourth century B.C., Andrewes points out, ‘the hostility is to monarchy as such and it could make no practical difference whether the monarch was called king or tyrant.’⁸⁸ Although a distinction appears to have been made by Sokrates, who passed it on to Plato and his pupils,⁸⁹ Herakleides’ terminology recalls the traditional, aristocratic view of kingship and tyranny as offensive, and the story of the outrage committed upon the ‘elders’ can be taken as a manifestation of this view. The *presbeis* whom he outraged might have been members of an aristocratic council, like, for example, the *gerontes* in Sparta. The alternative is that they were ambassadors of some kind. Both possibilities suggest the *proxenoi* who appear to have represented the various communities that constituted the Eleian *koinon*.⁹⁰ Pantaleon seems at the very least to have behaved disrespectfully towards traditional authorities at Olympia. Hönle concludes from one episode reported by Pausanias that ‘the Pisatan rulers often behaved autocratically and like tyrants’.⁹¹

⁸⁵ Grote, G., *A History of Greece* I (Everyman edn, London, 1907) 14, cf. 4, n.3, 14, n.1: Hesiod *Theog.* 160-82; Hdt. III.48.2-4; VIII.105.1-106.4; Arist. *Pol.* V.8.12, 1311b.24f; Apollod. *Lib.* I.1.4.

⁸⁶ Hdt. VI.127.3; Paus. VI.22.2; see above, 120.

⁸⁷ Arist. *Pol.* V.8.4, 1310b.25; *IvO* 2: βασιλᾶες.

⁸⁸ Andrewes, A., *The Greek Tyrants* (London, 1956) 26, cf. 20-30.

⁸⁹ Andrewes, 1956, 28.

⁹⁰ See above, 101f.

⁹¹ Paus. VI.21.1; Hönle, A., *Olympia in der Politik der griechischen Staatenwelt* (Bebenhausen, 1972) 40: ‘oft willkürlich und wie Tyrannen aufführten’.

Aristotle claims that tyrants arose

ἐκ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τοῦ πλήθους ἐπὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους, ὅπως ὁ δῆμος ἀδικῆται μηθὲν ὑπ’ αὐτῶν. φανερόν δ’ ἐκ τῶν συμβεβηκότων· σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τυράννων γεγόνασιν ἐκ δημαγωγῶν ὡς εἶπεῖν, πιστευθέντες ἐκ τοῦ διαβάλλειν τοὺς γνωρίμους.⁹²

from the people and the masses against the nobles, in order that the people might not be wronged by them. And this is apparent from what has happened: for the majority of tyrants have generally arisen, so to say, from being demagogues, having become trusted by opposing the nobles.

Although Glotz, followed by de Ste. Croix, assumes from this that the people used tyranny as ‘a battering ram with which to demolish the citadel of the oligarchs’, Cawkwell argues that ‘the people did not come into it. The age was the age of dynasts. Thucydides was right, and Aristotle and the fourth century generally and all his latter-day satellites wrong.’⁹³ Cawkwell, too, may be right. Herakleides Pontikos, nevertheless, like Aristotle, belongs to the fourth century, and Pausanias’ original source might have been from the same period. If ‘the fourth century’, as Cawkwell says, could identify tyrants in general as leaders of the people, then it could also mistake individual leaders of the people for tyrants. Pantaleon might then have been a demagogue, the leader of a popular movement of the late-sixth and early-fifth centuries B.C., to whom fourth-century writers like Herakleides, because he had offended the Eleian aristocrats, attributed the characteristics of a tyrant.

Pantaleon named his first son Δαμοφῶν.⁹⁴ This name is unlikely to have been common in the family of Pantaleon, since Zoumbaki can list no other Damophon among the Eleians of the first millennium B.C., so it might have been chosen for a specific purpose.⁹⁵ Despite its relative rarity in Eleia and the Peloponnese in general,

⁹² Arist. *Pol.* V.8.2f, 1310b.13-17.

⁹³ Glotz, G., *The Greek City and its Institutions* (London, 1965) 116, cf. 107-15; de Ste. Croix, G.E.M., *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (Ithaca, New York, 1981) 281ff; Cawkwell, G.L., ‘Early Greek Tyranny and the People’ *CQ* 45 (1995) 73, 86.

⁹⁴ Paus. V.16.5; VI.22.3f.

⁹⁵ Zoumbaki, S.B., *Prosopographie der Eleer bis zum 1 Jh. v. Chr.* (Paris, 2005) 139f, Δ.18.

its Attic and Ionic form, Demophon, is known among the Athenians from the fifth century B.C., and perhaps from a little earlier in Thasos.⁹⁶ Damophon appears to mean something like ‘voice of the people’ – the kind of name that we would expect to be given to the son of a democrat, or at least of someone who wanted to pose as a champion of the *damos*.

As Cartledge points out, discussing the evidence for Eleian democracy before Plataiai, Elis was ‘significantly, the first refuge of Demaratos’,⁹⁷ who fled there on the pretence of making his way to Delphi.⁹⁸ The Lakedaimonian king Demaratos is likely to have been deposed by Kleomenes because of his resistance to the aggressively pro-aristocratic policies of the latter.⁹⁹ His journey from Sparta to Eleia would have taken him along the course of the Alpheios to Olympia. We need not assume that he went on to ‘Elis’, since that site is unlikely to have been of any particular importance before the synoikism, and Demaratos might have made his way directly to Kyllene in order to embark for Zakynthos.¹⁰⁰ The flight to the Pisatan-controlled districts of Eleia of a proponent at Sparta of tolerance towards popular regimes supports the view that these areas were inclined towards democracy.

The mention of a *boule* of 500 and popular assembly in *IvO* 7, scholars have pointed out, is highly suggestive of the Kleisthenic constitution at Athens.¹⁰¹ If this inscription dates from c.500, moreover, it may post-date the establishment of democracy at Athens by only a few years. The Eleians, who inhabited many cities in both the Peneios and Alpheios valleys, it must be kept in mind, did not live in an intellectual backwater – the Olympic festival saw to that – so they cannot have remained ignorant of the form and significance of events in *poleis* such as Eretria and Athens.¹⁰² The Eleians who inhabited the ports of Kyllene and Pheia, and those of the

⁹⁶ cf. *LGPNI* I (1987), II (1994), IIIa (1997), IIIb (2000), IV (2005), where Δαμοφῶν has a total of 48 mentions, mainly in the southern Aegean, western Greece and the western colonies. Only three of these, however, date from earlier than the fourth century B.C., one in Kroton from the sixth century, one in Sparta from the mid-fifth century and the one under discussion here. Of 89 mentions of the ‘eastern’ variant, Δημοφῶν, the majority are from Athens, Euboia and Thasos. Pausanias (II.4.3) mentions a Damophon among the pre-Dorian kings of Korinth.

⁹⁷ Cartledge, 1979, 205, cf. 204.

⁹⁸ Hdt. VI.70.1.

⁹⁹ See Appendix, 335f.

¹⁰⁰ For the likely adherence of Kyllene to the Pisatan cause, see below, 206f, 272.

¹⁰¹ Andrewes, 1970, 60; Moggi, 1976, 161f; Jones, N.F., *Public Organization in Ancient Greece. A Documentary Study* (Philadelphia, 1987), 144; Inglis, 1998, 79; *contra* Sakellariou, 1989, 447; O’Neil, 1974, 88; 1995, 33, 38f; Osborne, R., *Greece in the Making, 1200-479 B.C.* (London, 1996) 315; Robinson, 1997, 109-11.

¹⁰² For democracy in Eretria in the late-sixth and early-fifth centuries B.C., see Walker, K., *Archaic Eretria* (London, 2004) 236-69.

Alpheios valley where Olympia was situated, are particularly likely to have come under the influence of events in other parts of Greece.

In assuming that the institutions referred to in *IvO* 7, including a council of 500, belonged to an Eleian state, scholars have had to account for the report in Thucydides of ‘the six hundred’ at Elis in 420 B.C.¹⁰³ If the council of 500 existed only among the Pisatan democratic rebels of c.500 B.C., whose leader was Pantaleon, however, there is no need to look for reasons for an enlargement of the Eleian council at a later time. The 600 may reflect twelve Eleian tribes at the time of the synoikism. Aristodemos of Elis says that the *final* number of *Hellanodikai* was ten, one from each tribe,¹⁰⁴ but that earlier there were twelve.¹⁰⁵ Although this reform of the number of *Hellanodikai* appears to post-date the *synoikismos* by many decades,¹⁰⁶ both Aristodemos and Pausanias imply that the twelve tribes had existed among the Eleians before the decision to appoint one *Hellanodikes* for each.¹⁰⁷ Similarly, while Kleisthenes established the ten Athenian tribes in the late sixth century B.C., the number of officials associated with the archons does not appear to have been brought into line with that of the tribes, by the addition of a secretary to the six *thesmothetai*, until the fourth century B.C.¹⁰⁸ The council of 600, then, might have belonged to the synoikised *polis* of Elis, established in 471 B.C., and the council of 500 to a democratic Pisatan state that originated at some time around the beginning of the fifth century B.C.¹⁰⁹

Strabo, acknowledging Tyrtaios as his source, records that the Messenians ‘revolted, having taken the Argives, Eleians, Pisatans and Arkadians as allies’.¹¹⁰ Pausanias lists the Eleians among the allies of Messenia in the battle of the Boar’s

¹⁰³ Thuc. V.47.9: οἱ ἑξακόσιοι; Andrewes, 1970, 61; Gehrke, 1985, 63, 367, n.11; Jones, 1987, 144; O’Neil, 1974, 86f; 1995, 38.

¹⁰⁴ Aristodemos of Elis *FGrH* 414 F 2a = Harpokration s.v. Ἑλλανοδίκαί. This number persisted from Ol. 108 (348 B.C.) to the time of Pausanias (Paus. V.9.6).

¹⁰⁵ Aristodemos of Elis *FGrH* 414 fr. 2b = Schol. Pind. *Ol.* III.22a: ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ιβ, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον ι· τοσαῦται γὰρ αἱ τῶν Ἡλείων φυλαί, καὶ ἅφ’ ἑκάστης εἰς ἦν Ἑλλανοδίκα; Sakellariou, 1989, 445; cf. O’Neil, 1974, 85, n.10.

¹⁰⁶ Paus. V.9.5: Ol. 103, or 412 B.C.

¹⁰⁷ cf. Pausanias V.9.4-6, where the number of *Hellanodikai* fluctuates until established at ten in Ol. 108, where it remained until Pausanias’ day and presumably beyond.

¹⁰⁸ *Ath. Pol.* 55.1, 59.7, 63.1; Glotz, 1965, 221.

¹⁰⁹ In this context it is interesting to note that Olympic victors without a ‘traditional aristocratic heritage’ seem to have appeared from 490 B.C.: Evangelos, A., ‘The social background of ancient Olympic victors’ in *ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΑ Proceedings, 25-28 Sept., Ancient Olympia. Ancient and Modern Olympic Games: Their Political and Cultural Dimensions* (Komotini, 2004) 44.

¹¹⁰ Strabo VIII.4.10, p.362: ἐλόμενοι συμμάχους Ἀργείους τε καὶ Ἡλείους καὶ Πισάτας καὶ Ἀρκάδας ἀπέστησαν, Ἀρκάδων μὲν Ἀριστοκράτην τὸν Ὀρχομενοῦ βασιλέα παρεχομένων στρατήγον, Πισατῶν δὲ Πανταλέοντα τὸν Ὀμφαλίωτος.

Tomb.¹¹¹ Aside from Theoklos, an Iamid *mantis* who divined for the Messenians, however, he makes no mention of any Eleians in his report of this battle.¹¹² Since Pausanias has said that the account of Rhianos does not cover this early period of the second war,¹¹³ he must have used another source here and Tyrtaios, whom he mentions immediately afterwards,¹¹⁴ is a distinct possibility. It may be that Tyrtaios meant something like ‘of the Eleians, the Pisatans’ or ‘the Eleians of Pisatis’, but that both Strabo and Pausanias simply wrote ‘Eleians’, the former including the Pisatans as a separate item, the latter excluding them altogether.¹¹⁵ While Strabo gives the name of an Arkadian *strategos*, Aristokrates of Orchomenos, and a Pisatan one, Pantaleon, he can name no Argive or Eleian general.

The Pisatans might have supported the Messenians, but it seems unlikely that the remaining Eleians, who appear to have been in conflict with the Pisatans in this period, would have followed suit. We can assume that it was the Pisatans, rather than the ‘official’ Eleians, who supported the Messenians in this war. This makes more political sense if the Pisatans were democrats, since the Messenians are likely to have been striving for a freedom denied to them by the Spartans, the sponsors of aristocratic rule in the Peloponnese and beyond.¹¹⁶ *IvO* 7, rather than proving that a democratic state of Elis existed before the synoikism, may indicate that a democratic movement existed among the Eleians at that time.

IvO 11 is likely to date from the period of conflict that preceded the synoikism.¹¹⁷ The full text, as restored by van Effenterre and Ruzé, is given here:

Ἄ Φράτρα τοῖς Χαλαδρίο(ι)ς και Δευ-
καλίονι : Χαλάδριον ἔμεν αὐτὸν
καὶ γόνον : Φισοπρόξενον *vac.*
Φισοδαμιοργόν. Τὰν δὲ γᾶ[ν]
ἔχεν τὰν ἐν Πίσαι. Αἰ δέ

¹¹¹ Paus. IV.15.7. See the doubts of Cartledge, 1979, 127.

¹¹² Paus. IV.16.1-5.

¹¹³ Paus. IV.6.2.

¹¹⁴ Paus. IV.16.6.

¹¹⁵ cf. Frazer, J.G., *Pausanias' Description of Greece* III (London, 1898) 415. For errors in Pausanias, see Habicht, C., *Pausanias' Guide to Ancient Greece* (Berkeley, 1985), 97ff.

¹¹⁶ See Appendix, 331-44.

¹¹⁷ Jeffery, *LSAG* 220.8; van Effenterre and Ruzé, 1994, no. 21; Guarducci, 1967, 203.2; Rhodes and Lewis, 1997, 93.

τις συλαίε, Φέ(ρ)ρεν αὐτὸν
 ποτ τὸν Δία, αἱ μὲ δάμοι δοκέοι.

By this agreement Deukalion became a Chaladrian, but also appears to have been granted the right to hold two important offices, *proxenos* and *damiorgos*. The explicit reference to these offices implies that not all Chaladrians were entitled to them. Despite the reference to the *damos* in the last line,¹¹⁸ this apparent limitation on eligibility for office strongly suggests an oligarchic constitution for the Chaladrians. Deukalion seems to acquire land ἐν Πίσαι, so we might be inclined to wonder, after all, if the Pisatans were not in fact the oligarchs among the Eleians. Yet this is exactly the sort of occurrence that we should expect if a force of ‘official’ Eleians had defeated some Pisatan rebels. Perhaps Deukalion was an aristocrat from a community that had taken the democratic side but who had himself joined the ‘official’ Eleians and was rewarded with the full citizenship of a ‘loyalist’ community and a grant of land confiscated from members of the defeated faction. We need not insist on this interpretation, however, since there are many such possibilities in a period of civil conflict. The important points illustrated by *IvO* 11 are that early in the fifth century B.C. there was some population movement among the Eleians, perhaps of refugees, and that at least one of their communities appears to have remained oligarchic for a time.

The Synoikism and the Establishment of Democracy

IvO 2, 3 and 10 seem to belong to the period of the synoikism. As argued above, *IvO* 2 may be a foundation document of the new *polis* of the Eleians, since it appears to standardise legal procedures and make constitutional arrangements. It mentions only one *Hellanodikes*, even though reform of the administration of the Olympic festival, including a change from one to two *Hellanodikai*, can be dated to 472 B.C.¹¹⁹ Because of this, we must assume that any legal and constitutional reforms implied by *IvO* 2 preceded the reform of the management of Olympia in 472 B.C. and the final establishment of the political institutions of the synoikised state in 471 B.C. The synoikism seems to have consisted of a series of judicial, religious and constitutional reforms carried out over one or two years up to 471 B.C.

¹¹⁸ cf. Walter, 1973, 118f, n.22.

¹¹⁹ See above, 128f, 135f.

In addition to indicating legal and constitutional reform, *IvO* 2 mentions the *damiorgia*, also known from other sources as a board or category of public officials. As Jeffery points out, the δημοεργοί of the *Odyssey* include the herald and the *aisymnetai*. ‘Indeed,’ she continues, ‘not only heralds and judges, but theoroi, proxenoi, presbeis and the like might all be termed “workers” of this sort’.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, since the oath for the quadruple alliance of 420 B.C. is to be administered in Athens by οἱ πρυτάνεις, in Argos by οἱ ὀγδοήκοντα and in Mantinea, as in Elis, by the *demiourgoi*,¹²¹ Jeffery suggests that the Eleian *demiourgoi* should correspond to the Argive eighty, ‘an ex-aristocratic body’.¹²² Her further conclusion, however, that in the ‘West-Greek-speaking states, the archaic *demiourgia* in type lies somewhere between a category...and a board of fixed number such as the Athenian archontate: that is, that their numbers were larger than that of any single board, and may indeed have fluctuated’, allows room to doubt such a claim.¹²³

While the *thesmophylakes*, the ‘guardians of the law’, who also administered the oath for the Eleians, are likely to have been a board, there is no need to assume that this was also true of the *demiourgoi*, who could instead have been members of a ‘category’ of officials that included those devoted to Zeus at Olympia. In the *Odyssey*, a swineherd asks who would invite a stranger from abroad, unless he was one of the *demiourgoi*, ‘a *mantis*, or a healer of ills, or a carpenter, or a divine minstrel’.¹²⁴ Although the concept of a ‘public worker’ is here a quite different one from that of 420 B.C., at least some of the Eleian *demiourgoi* mentioned in the treaty recorded by Thucydides might have been the sacred officials from Olympia, including the *manteis* along with the *theokoloi*, *spondophoroi* and others mentioned in the registers referred to above.¹²⁵

In Athens fifty *prytaneis* administered the oath to the *boule* and the ‘home’ magistrates, and in Argos ‘the eighty’ to themselves and the *artynai*, probably

¹²⁰ *Od.* VIII.258f; Jeffery, L.H., ‘Demiourgoi in the Classical Period’ *Arch. Class.* 25/26 (1973-4) 319.

¹²¹ *Thuc.* V.47.9.

¹²² Jeffery, 1973-4, 328; cf. O’Neil, 1974, 87.

¹²³ Jeffery, 1973-4, 330.

¹²⁴ *Od.* XVII.382-85; εἰ μὴ τῶν οἷ δημοεργοῖ ἔασι, μάντιν ἢ ἰητῆρα κακῶν; cf. Dillery, J., ‘Chresmologues and Manteis: Independent Diviners and the Problem of Authority’ in Johnston, S.I. and Struck, P.T. (eds), *Mantikê: Studies in Ancient Divination* (Leiden, 2005) 177.

¹²⁵ *Thuc.* V.47.9; see above, 53-56.

various magistrates.¹²⁶ In Mantinea the *theoroi* and the *polemarchoi* administered the oath to the *demiourgoi*, the *boule* and the other magistrates. In Elis both *thesmophylakes* and *demiourgoi* administered to the *demiourgoi* and the 600, most likely a *boule*.¹²⁷ As Tomlinson points out, ‘the oath, and the administration of it were as much religious as political matters’.¹²⁸ In the same period, the first of the Athenians listed by Thucydides as an oath-swearer to the Peace of Nikias was the *mantis* Lampon.¹²⁹ The composition of those who administered and swore the oath on behalf of the Eleians and their allies seems designed to involve both a secular element, the council of six hundred and the *thesmophylakes*, and a sacred one, the religious officials included among the *demiourgoi*. The official *manteis* from Olympia would appear to have been among the *demiourgoi* who swore to the treaty recorded by Thucydides, and most likely to all treaties involving the Eleians.

If the *damiorgia* in *IvO 2* was a category rather than a fixed board, then the mention of it in this inscription suggests a role for a range of public officials, perhaps including the official *manteis* from the sanctuary of Zeus at Olympia,¹³⁰ in bringing about the series of reforms of which the synoikism was a part. In this connection we should note that it is precisely in the late-sixth and early-fifth centuries that Eleian *manteis* most commonly appear in locations outside of Eleia: an unnamed ‘Eleian *mantis*’ with Polykrates of Samos and later among the slaves of Dareios in Susa;¹³¹ Kallias among the Krotonians in the late-sixth century;¹³² Hagesias, the Olympic victor of 468 B.C., in Syrakousai;¹³³ Tellias with the Phokians before Xerxes’ invasion;¹³⁴ Hegesistratos, after having injured the Spartans, in flight to Tegea, with the Persians at Plataiai and murdered at Zakynthos;¹³⁵ and before Plataiai, Teisamenos emigrating from Elis, acquiring Spartan citizenship and becoming the state *mantis*.¹³⁶

¹²⁶ Tomlinson, R.A., *Argos and the Argolid* (London, 1972); cf. Jeffery, 1973-4, 328; *Ath. Pol.* 43.2.

¹²⁷ Thuc. V.47.9.

¹²⁸ Tomlinson, 1972, 195; cf. Garland, Y., *War in the Ancient World* (Lloyd, J., transl., London, 1975) 51, who gives the Peace of Nikias as an example.

¹²⁹ Thuc. V.19.2; Dillery, 2005, 197; cf. Garland, R., ‘Priests and Power in Classical Athens’ in Beard, M. and North, J., *Pagan Priests: Religion and Power in the Ancient World* (London, 1990) 84f.

¹³⁰ See above, 56-61.

¹³¹ Hdt. III.132.

¹³² Hdt. V.44.2; cf. 45.2.

¹³³ Pind. *Ol.* VI.4-11 with scholia.

¹³⁴ Hdt. VIII.27.3; Paus. X.1.3, 8; cf. 13.7.

¹³⁵ Hdt. IX.37.1-38.1.

¹³⁶ Hdt. IX.33.1; Paus. III.11.5-8.

We are entitled to ask why during this period so many famous *manteis* left Eleia, where they must have been held in high esteem, to settle in such widely separated parts as Sicily, Lakonia and Samos. If they played a political as well as a religious role in Eleia, we may conclude, at a time of serious political turmoil they might easily have become refugees, driven away from Olympia by one side or the other. The fact that Teisamenos and Hegesistratos took opposing sides at Plataiai suggests that the *manteis* were themselves divided along political lines. The evidence from Herodotus that Hegesistratos had injured the Spartans in some way before the battle leads to the conclusion that he is more likely to have sympathised with a democratic faction, while Teisamenos, who joined the Spartans at the beginning of Xerxes' invasion,¹³⁷ and so probably when Damophon led the Pisatans, might have had aristocratic sympathies. If the *manteis* were included among the *damiorgoi*, then *IvO* 2 suggests that they continued to play a political role during and after the synoikism.

IvO 3 refers to a council and the people *en masse* and, as argued above, can be dated close to the time of the synoikism itself, 471 B.C. It seems to be concerned with regulating affairs at Olympia and so fits easily into the context of a reform of the management of the festival that included the selection of two *Hellandikai*. Assigned by Pausanias to Ol. 50, this change is shown above to be likely to have taken place in 472 B.C. and to have been followed soon after by the construction of the temple of Zeus.¹³⁸

The wording used by Pausanias in his report of this reform suggests that it was democratic. While at first the Olympic festival had been managed by Iphitos and then by one of the descendants of Oxylos, 'at the fiftieth Olympiad two men selected by lot from all of the Eleians (ἐξ ἀπάντων λαχοῦσιν Ἡλείων) were entrusted to arrange the Olympic festival'.¹³⁹ In 472 B.C., it seems, the Eleians abandoned the ancient practice of turning over the management of the games to one of the Oxylidai, the equivalent among them of the Herakleidai at Sparta, and instead adopted a democratic procedure for the appointment of these important officials, the

¹³⁷ Hdt. IX.33.5.

¹³⁸ Paus. V.9.4; see above, 135f.

¹³⁹ Paus. V.9.4.

perpetuation of whose office ‘symbolically kept alive the sacred aura and original purpose of the Games’.¹⁴⁰

IvO 3 makes an explicit reference to an empowered popular assembly.¹⁴¹ The number of *boule* members is not specified, so it could be the 600 mentioned by Thucydides for 420 B.C. rather than the 500 mentioned in *IvO* 7, dated c.500 B.C.¹⁴² Nor is there any difficulty in fitting *IvO* 10, dated by Jeffery ‘c.475-450?’, into the context of the resolution of a conflict within the Eleian state in the period just before the synoikism,¹⁴³ since this inscription may easily indicate that the Anaitoi and Metapioi, perhaps close neighbours, had taken opposite sides in the conflict within the Eleian *koinon*, but were now prepared to live in peace.

The above reassessment of the significance of the Eleian inscriptions from Olympia in the light of a revised chronology for the events recorded by Pausanias supports the conclusion that a political conflict raged among the Eleians during the same period that most of the other Peloponnesian states were engulfed in the turmoil that came about as popular movements challenged the rule of traditional aristocracies.¹⁴⁴ The holy land of Eleia, it seems, was no less fertile a ground for the growth of the democratic movement than were other regions of the Peloponnese. The common people appear to have freed themselves from aristocratic rule in Athens, Argos, Tegea and much of the rest of Arkadia during this period, and it seems that they were ultimately successful in Eleia as well.

As argued above, the so-called Pisatans led by Pantaleon are likely to have taken control of Olympia in the final years of the sixth century B.C.¹⁴⁵ The report of Pausanias implies that others of the Eleians did not support him.¹⁴⁶ If the Pisatan Eleians led by Pantaleon rebelled from ‘the Eleians’, they are likely to have established some kind of political structure apart from the existing *koinon*. If they were indeed democrats, then they might well have established the democratic institutions mentioned in *IvO* 7, dated c.500 and thus to the probable period of Pantaleon’s takeover of Olympia. There is no evidence that they introduced any

¹⁴⁰ Slowikowski, S.S., ‘The Symbolic *Hellandikai*’ *Aethlon* 7 (1989) 133.

¹⁴¹ Robinson, 1997, 109.3.

¹⁴² Thuc. V.47.9.

¹⁴³ Jeffery, *LSAG* 220.12.

¹⁴⁴ See Appendix.

¹⁴⁵ Paus. VI.22.2, cf. 21.1; see above, 136-38.

¹⁴⁶ Paus. VI.21.1-4.

further features reminiscent of the Kleisthenic constitution, though this remains possible.

The Pisatans and their Allies

Pausanias gives some indication of which Eleian communities might have been counted among the ‘Pisaian’. He records that

Πύρρου δὲ τοῦ Πανταλέοντος μετὰ Δαμοφῶντα τὸν ἀδελφὸν βασιλεύσαντος Πισαῖοι πόλεμον ἐκούσιον ἐπανείλοντο Ἑλείοις, συναπέστησαν δὲ σφίσι ἀπὸ Ἑλείων Μακίστιοι καὶ Σκιλλούντιοι, οὗτοι μὲν ἐκ τῆς Τριφυλίας, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων περιοίκων Δυσπόντιοι· τούτοις καὶ μάλιστα ἐς τοὺς Πισαίους οἰκεῖα ἦν, καὶ οἰκιστὴν Δυσποντέα γενέσθαι σφίσι Οἰνομάου παῖδα ἐμνημόνευον¹⁴⁷

when Pyrrhos, the son of Pantaleon, was king after his brother Damophon and the Pisaian willingly entered into war with the Eleians, they drew into revolt from the Eleians the Makistians and the Skillountians, who were from Triphylia, and of the other *perioikoi* the Dyspontians: and their ties of relationship were especially with the Pisaian, and they kept in mind that their founder had been Dysponteus the son of Oinomaos.

Since Pausanias falsely assumes that there was a city of Pisa which rebelled against the Eleians, he is likely to have concluded that any other cities opposed to the Eleians in the conflict of which he writes were the allies of the ‘Pisaian’, rather than themselves being ‘Pisaian’.¹⁴⁸ It is perhaps in this confused state that he says that the Dyspontians were ‘closely related’ to the ‘Pisaian’.¹⁴⁹ Phlegon’s notices of the victory of Ἀντίμαχος Ἑλεῖος ἐκ Δυσποντίου in the stadion in Ol. 2 and of Δάιππος Κροτωνιάτης πύξ, Ἑλείων ἐκ Δυσποντίου τέθριππον in Ol. 27 seem to confirm the existence of an Eleian rather than a perioikic community of that name in

¹⁴⁷ Paus. VI.22.4.

¹⁴⁸ See above, 157f.

¹⁴⁹ Paus. VI.22.4.

the Archaic period.¹⁵⁰ More significant for our present concern, however, is Stephanos' description of Dyspontion as πόλις Πισαίας.¹⁵¹

In addition, Phlegon places the victory of an athlete from Λῆνος: χώρα τῆς Πισατῶν in Ol. 48,¹⁵² but we hear no more of the place. This is also the Olympiad to which Pausanias assigns the Eleian demonstration in Pisatan territory, assigned above to c.480 B.C., so it might have been destroyed during the final period of internal conflict preceding the synoikism.¹⁵³ Both Dyspontion and Lenos appear to have been Eleian communities which took part in the factional struggles of the early-fifth century B.C. Dyspontion was on the Pisatan side, but we cannot be sure about Lenos.

Pausanias twice calls the Skillountians 'one of the *poleis* in Triphylia' and says that they were 'from Triphylia'.¹⁵⁴ It is unlikely, however, that they were ethnically distinct from the Eleians, and the Skillountians appear rather to have comprised one of the Eleian communities that took the Pisatan side in the period of factional strife. Although Strabo says that the Alpheios ran through Pisatis and Triphylia,¹⁵⁵ this need not imply that it divided the two districts or that communities such as the Skillountians, located a few kilometres south of the Alpheios, must have been Triphylian. Strabo believes that together the two districts had comprised Nestor's Pylian kingdom, a single unit, so he can say that a river that ran through Pisatis ran through a state composed of Pisatis and Triphylia. The view that the Skillountians were 'Triphylian' was not uniformly held in 370 B.C. when the Eleians objected to the independence of 'the Marganeians, the Skillountians and the Triphylians'.¹⁵⁶ Nor does Polybios include Skillous in his list of Triphylian cities.¹⁵⁷

Since 'Triphylia' was constructed only at the turn of the fourth century B.C., furthermore, any designation of a community as 'Triphylian' is no evidence that it was not Eleian in the Archaic period. In addition to the evidence reported by Siewert

¹⁵⁰ Phlegon of Tralles *FGrH* 257 F 4, 6; Steph. Byz. s.v. Δυσπόντιον; cf. Moretti, L. (ed), *Iscrizioni Agonistiche Greche* (Rome, 1953) nos. 2, 38, 39; Hönle, 1972, 26.

¹⁵¹ Steph. Byz. s.v. Δυσπόντιον.

¹⁵² Phlegon of Tralles *FGrH* 257 F 7.

¹⁵³ Paus. VI.22.3f.

¹⁵⁴ Paus. V.6.4, 16.1: Σκιλλούντιοι τῶν ἐν τῇ Τριφυλίᾳ πόλεων; VI.22.4.

¹⁵⁵ Strabo VIII.3.7, p.339; VIII.3.12, p.343.

¹⁵⁶ Xen. *Hell.* VI.5.2.

¹⁵⁷ Polyb. IV.77.9.

that the Skillountians donated cult equipment at Olympia,¹⁵⁸ we should also note that they had fully equipped the temple of Hera ‘about eight years after Oxylos gained the kingship of the Eleians’.¹⁵⁹ The antiquity of the temple is attested by Pausanias’ report that one of its rear pillars was made of oak, and by his description of the images of Zeus and Hera therein as ἀπλοῦς, ‘simple’.¹⁶⁰ This suggests that the Skillountians were members of the amphictyony of Olympia. There can be no objection to placing them among the Eleians of the Archaic period. Pausanias’ designation of them as perioikic Triphylian allies of the ‘Pisaians’ appears to reflect the perceptions of a later age. We can include them among the Pisatan rebels rather than among their allies.

Pausanias is probably right, on the other hand, to count the Makistians as allies of the Pisatans rather than as actual Pisatans. Herodotus names Makistos among the Minyan cities, most of which were plundered by the Eleians in his time,¹⁶¹ so it appears to have been inhabited by non-Eleians. It is likely that the non-Eleian cities in Eleia, including the six Minyan cities of the south, Lepreon, Makistos, Phrixa, Pyrgos, Ep(e)ion and Noudion, had been allies of the Eleian *koinon* since at least the period following the defeat of Pheidon, when the Lakedaimonians had helped the Eleians to gain control of all of the territory as far south as the Neda.¹⁶²

Lepreon, at least, appears to have enjoyed amicable relations with the Eleians from this time until late in the fifth century B.C., that is, for the entire duration of the late-sixth and early-fifth century conflict. Thucydides reports that the Lepreans in the fifth century had to pay a tribute of one talent to Olympian Zeus in lieu of the half of their land that had been promised to the Eleians for help in a war with some of the Arkadians.¹⁶³ The record of Leprean tribute to the treasury of the amphictyony at Olympia was verifiable in Thucydides’ time and so seems credible. His explanation of the origin of the tribute, on the other hand, may be based on a Leprean attempt to justify having broken away from the Eleian alliance with Lakedaimonian support during the Archidamian War, and must be treated with suspicion.

¹⁵⁸ Siewert, P., ‘Die frühe Verwendung und Bedeutung des Ortsnamens “Olympia” ’ *AM* 106 (1991) 81f.

¹⁵⁹ Paus. V.16.1.

¹⁶⁰ Paus. V.17.1: ἔργα δὲ ἐστὶν ἀπλᾶ. Arafat, 1996, 47, refers to this passage as evidence that ‘Pausanias saw simplicity as a hallmark of antiquity.’ There is no reason why we should not consider this an accurate criterion.

¹⁶¹ Hdt. IV.148.4.

¹⁶² Strabo VIII.3.30, p.355; 33, p.358.

¹⁶³ Thuc. V.31.2.

In a passage that is open to more than one interpretation, Strabo seems to offer an alternative origin for the Leprean tribute:

καὶ αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν Πυλὸν τὸν ἡμαθόεντα εἰς τὸ Λέπρεον
 συνώκισαν, χαριζόμενοι τοῖς Λεπρεάταις κρατήσασι πολέμῳ καὶ
 ἄλλας πολλὰς τῶν κατοικῶν κατέσπασαν, ὅσας θ' ἐώρων
 αὐτοπραγεῖν ἐθελούσας, καὶ φόρους ἐπράξαντο ¹⁶⁴

And they also synoikised sandy Pylos itself into Lepreon, doing something agreeable for the Lepreans who had seized it in war, and they pulled down many other settlements, as many, at least, as they saw wishing to act independently, and they paid tribute.

This passage of Strabo does not allow us to be sure whether it was the Lakedaimonians or the Eleians or both acting in concert who had made Pylos part of Lepreon, perhaps destroying the former and forcing the inhabitants to move to the latter. The ‘they’ who ‘pulled down many other settlements’, too, might have been either the Lakedaimonians or the Eleians, but they might also have been the Lepreans themselves. Whatever the case, it seems unlikely that the ‘they’ who paid tribute (φόρους ἐπράξαντο) were the cities perceived as having wished to act independently, since the latter were pulled down. The whole passage, in fact, seems to suggest that the Eleians and their Lakedaimonian allies, after the defeat of Pheidon, had pulled down and forced Pylos and other previously independent towns that had perhaps sided with Pheidon into *synoikismos* with the Lepreans. If some of the Arkadians had taken Pheidon’s side, then the passage from Thucydides that has the Lepreans in conflict with them fits quite well with Strabo’s report.¹⁶⁵ In return for this enlargement of their community, it seems, the Lepreans had become allies of the Eleian *koinon* that was based at Olympia and paid one talent each year to the treasury there.

Pausanias includes the Eleians as allies of the Messenians in the second Messenian War.¹⁶⁶ As shown above, however, the Eleians who fought on the

¹⁶⁴ Strabo VIII.3.30, p.355.

¹⁶⁵ Thuc. V.31.2.

¹⁶⁶ Paus. IV.15.7.

Messenian side are likely to have been the Pisatans led by Pantaleon.¹⁶⁷ This means that the Lepreans who fought on the Spartan side must have done so out of hatred of the Pisatan Eleians rather than of those of the opposing faction.¹⁶⁸ While the Lepreans might have been loyal to the ‘official’ Eleians, nevertheless, it appears that at least four of the remaining five Minyan communities joined the Pisatan side.¹⁶⁹

These cities, located in the region that had come under Eleian influence after the defeat of Pheidon, are likely to have remained allies of the Eleians up to this time. The capture and sacking of most of them, reported by Herodotus,¹⁷⁰ seems to have occurred because they had joined the Pisatans in revolt against the Eleian *koinon*.¹⁷¹ Pausanias says that the Eleians attacked and drove out the ‘Pisaians’ and all of those who took their part in the war, and includes the Makistians among the latter.¹⁷² The fissure in the Eleian *koinon*, which most likely ran along factional lines, appears to have divided the allies of the Eleians along with their own communities.

It is likely, too, that the people of the coastal districts of Eleia took the Pisatan part. As shown above, much of what remains of settlement along the Eleian coast lies buried beneath the sand or hidden under the sea, and there might have been a large non-agricultural population there.¹⁷³ There is reason, at least, to believe that the major port of Kyllene was in the hands of the supporters of popular government. After resistance to the Spartans collapsed at the end of the second Messenian War, some of the defeated Messenians fled to Kyllene.¹⁷⁴ Throughout the winter, before they joined Anaxilas of Rhegion in the conquest of Sicilian Zankle in 489 B.C., the Eleians provided the Messenians with both a market and money to spend in it.¹⁷⁵ The

¹⁶⁷ Strabo VIII.4.10, p.362; see above, 195f.

¹⁶⁸ Paus. IV.15.8: *κατὰ ἔχθος τὸ Ἡλείων*. The pro-Spartan, anti-Eleian position of the Lepreans during the Peloponnesian war might have led Pausanias to jump to this conclusion (Thuc. V.31.1-5, 34.1, 49.1, 62.1f).

¹⁶⁹ Hdt. IV.148.4.

¹⁷⁰ Hdt. IV.148.4.

¹⁷¹ See above, 143f, 204f.

¹⁷² Paus. VI.22.4.

¹⁷³ See above, 26-28.

¹⁷⁴ Paus. IV.23.1-3.

¹⁷⁵ Paus. IV.23.5-10: *τὴν ἀγορὰν σφίσι καὶ χρήματα οἱ Ἡλεῖοι παρεῖχον*. The author intends to argue in a work under preparation, too long to be included here, that ‘the Messenians’ were the personally free members of the perioikic communities of the south-west Peloponnese, quite distinct from the Lakedaimonian Helots. This suggests that certain passages of Pausanias, Book IV, the *Messenika*, the content of which is often believed to have been constructed after the creation of an independent Messenian state in the mid-fourth century B.C., may yet contain historical truths retained in the memory of the Messenian perioikic communities. The part of Pausanias’ work in which his report of the flight of the Messenians to Kyllene is found can be shown to have been derived from a

generosity of the Eleians in Kyllene makes more sense if they belonged to the same political faction as Pantaleon, who had led a Pisatan contingent sent to help to free Messenia.¹⁷⁶ This suggests that the area controlled by the rebels was generally the south and west of Eleia, with the exception of Lepreon. Given the scarcity of the reports in the ancient texts, however, we can only speculate about the likely details of the civil conflict among the Eleians and their allies and the *synoikismos* that followed it. Yet it is necessary to do so in order to show how events *might* have unfolded, and the following scenario is a likely one:

The rebels led by Pantaleon appear to have controlled Olympia for at least one Olympiad, for long enough to establish a democracy centred on the sanctuary of Zeus. Perhaps some of the Eleian *poleis* had united in a democratic state that was able to coexist, albeit uneasily, within the framework of the *koinon*. This may help to explain the notice in Eusebios that because of a war with Achaian Dyme the ‘Pisaian’ held the twenty-eighth Olympiad.¹⁷⁷ It is possible that the remaining Eleians, generally concentrated in the north of the region, were obliged to deal with a crisis on the northern border, perhaps associated with the synoikism of Dyme,¹⁷⁸ and so left the Eleians who had enrolled in the Pisatan state to manage the festival alone.

Tension between the Pisatan state and the remaining Eleians, nevertheless, seems to be reflected in Herakleides’ report of Pantaleon’s outrageous behaviour towards the *presbeis* who, as we have seen, might have been identical to the *proxenoi* who appear to have met in the *bouleuterion* at Olympia to administer the Eleian *koinon*. Perhaps after Pantaleon’s death such tensions brought about the stand-off of c.480 B.C. between the Pisatans led by Damophon and ‘the Eleians’.¹⁷⁹ The situation seems to have finally erupted into an open conflict under the leadership of Damophon’s brother, Pyrrhos, during which the populations of some of the *poleis* of the Eleians and their allies on both sides were attacked and driven out. Herodotus

source other than the late literature that he acknowledges, and can therefore be accepted as valid historical evidence.

¹⁷⁶ Strabo VIII.4.10, p.362.

¹⁷⁷ Euseb. *Chron.* Schöne I, 198.8-10: ταύτην ἤξαν Πισαῖοι Ἡλείων ἀσχολουμένων, διὰ τὸν πρὸς Δυμαίους πόλεμον. The context for this conflict appears to be the late-Achaic synoikism of Dyme: Strabo VIII.3.2, p.337; 11, p.342; Paus. VII.17.6f; Steph. Byz. s.v. Δύμη; cf. Moggi, 1976, 121-25; Morgan, C., ‘Politics without the Polis: Cities and the Achaean Ethnos, c.800-500 B.C.’ in Brock, R. and Hodkinson, S., *Alternatives to Athens* (Oxford, 2002) 209.

¹⁷⁸ Strabo VIII.3.2, p.337.

¹⁷⁹ Paus. VI.22.3, cf. 2.

and Pausanias record Eleian attacks on Minyan and Pisatan (i.e. Eleian) cities,¹⁸⁰ and Pausanias says that the Eleians defeated the Pisatans and their allies, taking significant spoils from them.¹⁸¹ It must be kept in mind, nevertheless, that *no source ascribes a final victory to either side*. There is no evidence that the Pisatans were completely crushed.¹⁸²

At some stage, rather, a reconciliation appears to have been arranged, when sixteen women were chosen from the different Eleian communities to bring about peace.¹⁸³ Although Pausanias places this in the time of Damophon, the end of the conflict would provide a better context and the selection by lot of two *Hellanodikai* ‘from all of the Eleians’ to replace the one Oxyliid who had been appointed previously, dated above to 472 B.C., is not only a strong indicator of democratic reform, but also suggests reconciliation.¹⁸⁴ Whatever the case, by the time of the publication of *IvO* 3, which appears to date from around the time of the synoikism, a democratic constitution is likely to have been adopted by a state of Elis that included all of the Eleians, whether or not they had participated in the Pisatan rebellion. This conflict may thus be conceived of as an Eleian revolution. As Moggi concludes, ‘con il sinecismo... fu attuata anche una riforma istituzionale in senso democratico’.¹⁸⁵

Conclusion

Both the democracy and the synoikism of the Eleians appear to have been forged in the course of late-sixth and early-fifth century internal conflicts involving a rival group of Eleian communities who only then adopted a name derived from that of the stream of ‘Pisa’, later called the Kladeos, that ran past the sanctuary of Zeus. A popular leader called Pantaleon, supported by a faction of the Eleians, might well

¹⁸⁰ Hdt. IV.148.4: τουτέων δὲ τὰς πλεῦνας ἐπ’ ἐμέο ἠλεῖοι ἐπόρθησαν; Paus. VI.22.4: Πισαίους μὲν δὴ καὶ ὅσοι τοῦ πολέμου Πισαίοις μετέσχον, ἐπέλαβεν ἀναστάτους ὑπὸ ἠλείων γενέσθαι; cf. V.6.4.

¹⁸¹ Paus. V.10.2.

¹⁸² Though this is certainly the impression created by the over-dramatic finality of the Loeb translation of Paus. VI.22.4 in Jones, W.H.S. (transl.), *Pausanias, Description of Greece* III (London, 1954) 139: ‘It was the fate of Pisa, and of all her allies, to be destroyed by the Eleians.’ Even the Budé translation, ‘Or donc aux gens de Pisa, il advint d’être détruits par les Éléens’, may go too far, since ἀνάστατος appears to suggest either that the people were driven out or the cities ruined or laid waste and need not be taken to imply that they were actually ‘destroyed’: Pouilloux, J. (transl.) in Casevitz, M., Pouilloux, J. and Chamoux, F. (eds), *Pausanias Description de la Grèce VI, L’Élide (II)* (Paris, 2002).

¹⁸³ Paus. V.16.5f.

¹⁸⁴ Paus. V.9.4.

¹⁸⁵ Moggi, 1976, 161.

have taken control of Olympia for a time, and there is good reason to suppose that the ensuing conflicts are reflected in the reports of Pausanias. It is likely, too, that the citizens of the rebel *poleis* established a popularly-governed state which they attempted to legitimise by styling themselves and the mythical king Oinomaos ‘Pisatan’, an innovation recorded by Pindar in his *Olympian* I of 476 B.C., composed shortly before the end of the conflict.

There is no evidence of intervention by an external power in the internal political conflict of the Eleians, partly because the other states of the Peloponnese were themselves locked in conflict over similar issues, partly because of the threat from Persia, and partly perhaps because in the Archaic period and the early decades of the Classical the *asylia* of the Eleians was still respected by the only power capable of crushing the popular cause among them, the Lakedaimonians.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁶ For the threat that the Lakedaimonians generally posed to popular movements in the Peloponnesian and neighbouring states, see Appendix, 331-44.

PART III

THE ELEIANS AND THE LAKEDAIMONIANS

CHAPTER 8: THE ELEIANS AND THE LAKEDAIMONIANS TO THE PEACE OF NIKIAS

The Lakedaimonians and the Sanctuary of Zeus at Olympia – The Eleians and the Lakedaimonians in the Archaic Period – The Eleians in the Disputes over Epidamnos and Kerkyra – The Outbreak of the Archidamian War – The Eleians in the Archidamian War – Conclusion

CHAPTER 9: THE CAUSES AND COURSE OF THE ELEIAN WAR

The Dispute over Lepreon – The Politics of the Dispute over Lepreon – Lakedaimonian Policy after the Peace of Nikias – The Exclusion of the Lakedaimonians from the Olympics – The Quadruple Alliance – The Ancient Texts on the Causes of the Eleian War – The War of the Lakedaimonians against the Eleians – The Chronology of the Eleian War – The Lakedaimonian Objective in the Eleian War

CHAPTER 10: THE RESULTS OF THE ELEIAN WAR

The Peace Settlement – The Constitutional Implications of the Return of Exiles – The Eleian Oligarchy of the Early-Fourth Century B.C. – The Territorial Losses of the Eleians – Triphylia – The Skillountians – The Remaining Communities of Eleia – Some Further Consequences of the War

CHAPTER EIGHT
**THE ELEIANS AND THE LAKEDAIMONIANS TO THE PEACE
OF NIKIAS**

The Lakedaimonians appear to have had a special relationship with the sanctuary of Zeus at Olympia. Instances of cooperation between the Lakedaimonians and the Eleians during the Archaic period are more likely to have resulted from their mutual interest in Olympia than from a formal military alliance between the two peoples. The Eleians took no part in the first Peloponnesian War, and seem to have enjoyed friendly relations with the Athenians from the 460s B.C. They appear to have become involved in the Archidamian War as a result of their support for the policy of the Corinthians in north-west Greece rather than because of any military obligations to the Lakedaimonians. While there is little direct evidence of Eleian participation in allied land campaigns, they made at least a monetary and naval contribution to this war, apparently in response to infringements of the *asylia*, first by the Kerkyraians alone and then by the Athenians themselves together with the Kerkyraians and other allies.

The Lakedaimonians and the Sanctuary of Zeus at Olympia

There is considerable topographical, textual and archaeological evidence that the Lakedaimonians enjoyed a special relationship with the sanctuary of Zeus at Olympia. A direct route up along the Eurotas valley into Arkadia and then down through the Alpheios valley to Olympia facilitated this relationship. The Lakedaimonians appear to have consulted the oracle of Zeus on official matters from early in the Archaic period. The 'disk of Iphitos' at Olympia recorded the participation of the Lakedaimonian legislator Lykourgos in the foundation of the Olympic festival, and Lakedaimonian athletes were among the earliest Olympic competitors. Many Archaic votive offerings and bronze tripods from Olympia are Lakonian in origin, and the work of Lakedaimonian craftsmen was prominent in the Archaic temple of Hera. The Spartans, moreover, were the only non-Eleian people that we know to have made dedications of cult equipment at Olympia and to have had a special seat reserved there for their *proxenos*.

After the end of the Eleian War in 400 B.C., king Agis went to Delphi and dedicated a tenth part of the spoils. On the return journey he became sick at Heraia, where he died.¹ Heraia was on the Alpheios, just above its descent from the highlands of western Arkadia into the low country of Eleia. While Agis might have travelled home from Delphi *via* Eleia because he had other business there in relation to the recent war, it is also possible that the journey from Sparta to Delphi generally passed through the Eurotas and Alpheios valleys and included a visit to Olympia (cf. map 6). When the deposed king Demaratos fled Sparta in the late 490s B.C. he went first ‘to Elis, declaring that he was going to Delphi to consult the oracle’.² The natural access to their homeland for Lakedaimonians travelling from the north of the Peloponnese appears to have been ‘the direct road from the Eleian territory to Sparta, ascending the valley of the Alpheios near Olympia to the sources of its branch the Theius, and from thence descending the Eurotas’.³

Xenophon built a temple of Artemis in the territory of Skillous early in the fourth century B.C., and the district in which it stood was ‘that by which they travel from Lakedaimonia to Olympia, about twenty stades from the temple of Zeus at Olympia’.⁴ Pausanias describes the journey from Heraia down into Eleia across the Ladon and the Erymanthos, that is, heading west towards Olympia with the Alpheios on his left.⁵ If the path described by Pausanias is the same as that beside which Xenophon built his temple, then it must have crossed the Alpheios below the Erymanthos, and then re-crossed it somewhere near Olympia.

Pausanias’ route on the other side of Heraia ran south-east *via* Gortys to the Arkadian city of Megalopolis and thence into Lakonia, and he saw a *stèle* in Olympia that declared that the distance from the sanctuary to Lakedaimon was 660 *stadia*.⁶ Pikoulas has found traces of ancient roads from the upper Eurotas that lead from Lakonia towards the site of Megalopolis and from Gortys, north-west of

¹ Xen. *Hell.* III.3.1: πάλιν ἀπιὼν ἔκαμην ἐν Ἡραΐᾳ.

² Hdt. VI.70.1: ἐπορεύετο ἐς Ἑλίην, τῷ λόγῳ φάσ ὡς ἐς Δελφοὺς χρησόμενος τῷ χρηστηρίῳ πορεύεται.

³ Grote, G., *A History of Greece* III (Everyman Edition, London, 1907) 102; Leake, W.M., *Travels in the Morea* III (London, 1830) 29 calls this the easiest ‘principal entrance into the Lakonice’.

⁴ Xen. *Anab.* V.3.11: Ἔστι δὲ ἡ χώρα ἣ ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν πορεύονται ὡς εἴκοσι στάδιοι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ Διὸς ἱεροῦ.

⁵ Paus. VIII.26.3, 25.3, 26.8, 28.7.

⁶ Paus. VI.16.8; Grote, 1907, 102, n.3.

Megalopolis, to Heraia.⁷ It is likely that these remains are part of a continuous route between Sparta and Olympia that had existed in some form from the prehistoric period.

The Lakedaimonians appear to have regularly consulted the oracle of Zeus at Olympia. In the mid-third century B.C., the ephor Lysandros plotted to depose king Leonidas II. In this context Plutarch records that the Spartan ephors customarily observed the sky on a clear night every eight years to wait for a sign. If they saw a shooting star, they brought the kings to trial for some offence against the god and, says Plutarch, ‘they depose them from office until an oracle from Delphi or Olympia comes to the aid of the condemned kings’.⁸ This observation of the sky and consultation of the oracles appears to have been an ancient tradition.⁹

As Parke concludes, this procedure is likely to have been invoked in the deposition of king Demaratos, whom Leotychides accused on oath at Kleomenes’ instigation.¹⁰ Demaratos was deposed from the kingship, but did not flee until Delphi had been consulted and, presumably, failed to exonerate him.¹¹ The use of Delphi by the Lakedaimonians at a time when Kleomenes had corrupted the officials there may be the earliest instance of the use of such an alternative to Olympia.¹² It is possible that Kleomenes encouraged the use of Delphi, where he knew that he could count on getting the response that he wanted from the Delphians. The oracle of Zeus at Olympia, managed by the Eleian *manteis*, on the other hand, might then have been under the influence of Pisatan democrats, towards whose cause Demaratos appears to have been at least tolerant.¹³ Demaratos had managed to escape to Eleia by pretending that his destination was Delphi.¹⁴ Perhaps he hoped to get a more positive response from Zeus at Olympia, and so gave out that he was heading for Delphi because he knew that the dominant faction of Kleomenes, confident in its control of the sanctuary of Apollo, would not try to prevent him from doing so.

⁷ Pikoulas, Y.A., ‘The Road-Network of Arkadia’ in Nielsen, T.H. and Roy, J. (eds), *Defining Ancient Arkadia* (Copenhagen, 1999) 272.21, 295.45, with his maps 3 and 4.

⁸ Plut. *Agis* 11.5: καὶ καταπαυούσι τῆς ἀρχῆς, μέχρι ἂν ἐκ Δελφῶν ἢ Ὀλυμπίας χρησμός ἔλθῃ τοῖς ἡλωκόσι τῶν βασιλέων βοηθῶν (Budé: Loeb reference is 11.3); Parke, H.W., ‘The Deposing of Spartan Kings’ *CQ* 39 (1945) 106; Hönle, A., *Olympia in der Politik der griechischen Staatenwelt* (Bebenhausen, 1972) 20.

⁹ Parke, 1945, 106; Hönle, 1972, 20f.

¹⁰ See Appendix, 335f.

¹¹ Hdt. VI.65.3, 66.1; Parke, 1945, 107f.

¹² Hdt. VI.66.1-3, 74.1.

¹³ See Appendix, 333-36, 340.

¹⁴ Hdt. VI.70.1.

Parke considers the possibility that the procedure of observing the night sky for signs and then consulting an oracle went back before the rise of Delphi, when the oracle at Olympia would have been consulted, but finds it ‘somewhat difficult to picture the circumstances of such a period, which must have been well before 700 B.C.’ and so prefers to believe that Olympia was first used for this purpose in 243 B.C. when the Aitolians, enemies of the Lakedaimonians, controlled Delphi.¹⁵ Yet, as argued below, the relationship between the Lakedaimonians and the shrine of Zeus might easily have dated as far back as the eighth century B.C.

The Lakedaimonian kings appear to have regularly consulted the oracle at Olympia on state business. In 388/7 B.C. Agesipolis did so on the question of whether he could invade Argos in spite of a festival that the Argives had declared for the purpose of preventing the Lakedaimonian invasion. When he received a positive reply, he went on to Delphi to ask Apollo whether he felt the same as his father, which he did.¹⁶ As Hönle points out, ‘whereas the consultation of the oracle in Olympia was apparently not unusual for Sparta, the additional enquiry in Delphi lay entirely at the discretion of the king and was unmistakably an exceptional case.’ Aristotle, she points out, reported it ‘as an exceptional precautionary measure’.¹⁷ Xenophon records that during the Peloponnesian War king Agis, too, went to Olympia on state instructions in order to sacrifice at the altar of Zeus before beginning a campaign, but on this occasion was refused access to the altar.¹⁸ There might well have been many uneventful, and so unreported, sacrifices of this kind.

Pausanias describes the ‘disk of Iphitos’ in the Heraion at Olympia, upon which is inscribed in circular fashion the *ekecheiria*, the truce proclaimed by the Eleians for the Olympic festival.¹⁹ He also says that the Olympic games were ‘revived’ or ‘restored’ by Iphitos, a descendant of Oxylos and a contemporary of Lykourgos, at the time when Κόροιβος won the sole event, the footrace.²⁰ He appears to have deduced both Iphitos’ contribution and his contemporaneity with

¹⁵ Parke, 1945, 111.

¹⁶ Xen. *Hell.* IV.7.2.

¹⁷ Arist. *Rhet.* II.23.12, 1398b; Hönle, 1972, 20: ‘als außerordentliche Vorsichtsmaßnahme’ (she gives II.23.2). The text of Aristotle has Ἡγήσιππος, but this is clearly the same incident, and we should read Ἀγησίπολις.

¹⁸ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.22; Hönle, 1972, 22.

¹⁹ Paus. V.20.1.

²⁰ Paus. V.4.5: κατεστήσατο, 8.5f: ἀνανεωσαμένου; VIII.26.4: ἀνευέωσατο; cf. V.9.4.

Lykourgos from the inscription on the disk.²¹ Plutarch says that Aristotle supported his view that Lykourgos was a contemporary of Iphitos and that they jointly arranged the *ekecheiria* with the observation that an inscription on a disk at Olympia bore the name ‘Lykourgos’.²² The disk seen by Pausanias appears to be the same as that cited by Aristotle.²³

Hönle finds that ‘the question connected with the disk of Iphitos, whether the presence of a Spartan in the year 776 in Olympia was possible, can...be answered in the affirmative.’²⁴ Yet we need not go back so far. Both Aristodemos of Elis and Polybios say that the Olympic victor list began to be kept from the twenty-seventh Olympiad, when the Eleian Koroibos won the stadion.²⁵ If the first Olympiad took place in 776 B.C., Koroibos’ victory, at the ‘revival’ by Iphitos and Lykourgos,²⁶ should be assigned to 672 B.C. This is not an impossibly early date for Lykourgos to have cooperated with Iphitos in establishing the Olympic festival in the form known in later times, but early enough to indicate that Spartan involvement with Olympia was possible before the rise to prominence of Delphi.²⁷

The status of the disk as an authentic Archaic document is difficult to establish with any certainty, but the passage from Plutarch at least indicates that Aristotle saw it in the fourth century B.C. and appears to have been ready to believe that the Spartan connection with Olympia went back as far as the time of Lykourgos and the establishment of the Olympic games. The introduction of the worship of Herakles to Olympia during the time of Iphitos may also indicate a closer involvement of the Lakedaimonians there at that time, particularly of their Heraklid kings.²⁸

²¹ Paus. V.4.6.

²² Plut. *Lyk.* 1.2; cf. Higbie, C., ‘Craterus and the Use of Inscriptions in Ancient Scholarship’ *TAPA* 129 (1999) 69 and n.68.

²³ cf. Phlegon of Tralles *FGrH* 257 F 1.2; Jeffery, *LSAG* 59, 217.

²⁴ Hönle, 1972, 24.

²⁵ Euseb. *Chron.* Schöne I, 194.10-26; Aristodemos of Elis *FGrH* 414 F 1; Ti. Claudius Polybios *FGrH* 254 F 2. This Polybios might rather be the first century A.D. chronographer Ti. Claudius Polybios than the second century B.C. historian: Walbank, F.W., *A Historical Commentary on Polybios* I (Oxford, 1957) 670f; Jacoby, F. and Bollansée, J., ‘Hermippos of Smyrna’ in *FGrH* (Continued) Part IV (Leiden, 1998) 156, n.164; Shaw, P.-J., *Discrepancies in Olympiad Dating and Chronological Problems of Archaic Peloponnesian History* (Stuttgart, 2003) 69. As Walbank, 1957, 671, points out, the exact date of Aristodemos of Elis is not known, although he appears to belong to the Hellenistic period.

²⁶ Paus. V.4.5.

²⁷ cf. the detailed discussion of the texts and associated chronological issues in Jacoby and Bollansée, 1998, 156-59; Shaw, 2003, 65-71.

²⁸ Paus. IV.4.6.

Pausanias records the victory of Ἄκανθος Λακεδαιμόνιος in the fifteenth Olympiad and has two Lakedaimonians winning the inaugural pentathlon and wrestling events in the eighteenth.²⁹ In a closely preceding passage, he explains that he is counting here from the *continuous* (συνεχέως) Olympics, that is, since their renewal by Iphitos and the victory of Koroibos, likely in 672 B.C.³⁰ This would place the first of these Lakedaimonian victories fifty-six years later, in 616 B.C. and the next two victories in 604 B.C. Dickins assumes from these reports that the ‘Spartans took no part at first in the Olympian festival’,³¹ but we must keep in mind that according to Pausanias there was only one Olympic event until Ol. 14.³² In Eusebios’ list, of the seventeen victors in the first fifteen Olympiads, seven are Messenian, four Eleian and two Korinthian, and there is one victor each from Dyme, Koroneia, Megara and Lakonia. The failure of any Lakedaimonians to win a victory until Ol. 15 is no proof that none competed from the start, and this evidence rather indicates that they were, in fact, among the earliest competitors.

In the eighth century B.C., some Lakedaimonians appear to have joined the local craftsmen already producing bronze tripods and votive figurines at Olympia, and imported Lakonian figurines and tripods are also found from early in that century.³³ Morgan argues that ‘the beginning of Spartan intervention in the western Peloponnese was a turning point in the history of Olympia.’³⁴ She maintains that increased Spartan interest in the west and central Peloponnese was manifested by both participation at Olympia and incursions into Messenia.³⁵ Apparently accepting conventional Olympiad dating, Morgan assigns both of these developments to the eighth century B.C. We should rather conclude, however, that the involvement of the Lakedaimonians at Olympia significantly pre-dated both the regular organisation of the festival and the first Messenian War. In this case, the cooperation of the Lakedaimonians and Eleians in the ‘refounding’ of the games, indicated by the evidence given above concerning the roles of Iphitos and Lykourgos, may belong to

²⁹ Paus. V.8.6f; cf. Euseb. *Chron.* Schöne I, 194; Dion. Hal. *Roman Antiquities* VII.72.3.

³⁰ Paus. V.8.6.

³¹ Dickins, 1912, 10f.

³² Paus. V.8.6.

³³ Morgan, C., *Athletes and Oracles: the Transformation of Olympia and Delphi in the Eighth Century B.C.* (Cambridge, 1990) 31, 35-39, cf. 62.

³⁴ Morgan, 1990, 99.

³⁵ Morgan, 1990, 103.

the early seventh century B.C. and follow an earlier Lakedaimonian participation at the shrine of Zeus.

There is literary evidence that Lakedaimonian craftsmen remained active at Olympia throughout the Archaic period. Pausanias records the presence of works of the sixth-century Lakedaimonians Dorykleidas, Theokles and Medon in the temple of Hera.³⁶ Like some other dedicated images of ivory and gold in the temple, these were ‘particularly ancient’.³⁷ There is, moreover, archaeological evidence that the Spartan state had an official connection to the shrine of Zeus at that time. A bronze cauldron, also of the sixth century B.C. and inscribed [T]οῖ Σπαρτιᾶτα[ι.....Διὸ Ὀλυ]νπίοι ἀν[έθεν] is the only example that we have of a dedication of cult equipment at Olympia from a community that cannot be included among the Eleians.³⁸ Siewert considers from this dedication that ‘a certain special role in Olympia may be inferred’.³⁹

Noting the consultation of the oracle at Olympia by the ephors on the question of transgressions of the Lakedaimonian kings and the report of Herodotus that the Iamid Teisamenos was the only foreigner ever to have received Spartan citizenship,⁴⁰ Siewert also points out that ‘the only stone honour-seats for *proxenoi* of the Eleians that have been found...in Olympia were installed for two Spartans, both in Archaic times’ (fig. 11). He concludes, nevertheless, that the question of ‘whether the cauldron of the Spartans points to any special function of the great power in the amphictyonic Zeus cult must here remain open.’⁴¹ Yet the Spartan *proxenos* at Olympia might have occupied a special position among the Eleian *proxenoi* who administered the amphictyony of Olympia.⁴² The further evidence noted above – the topographical accessibility of Olympia to Sparta, the consultation of the oracle of Zeus there by Lakedaimonian kings, the participation of Lykourgos with Iphitos in the ‘revival’ of the games, the introduction at that time of the worship of Herakles, the early participation of Lakedaimonian athletes, the presence of Lakonian bronze figurines and tripods from as early as the eighth century B.C. and

³⁶ Paus. V.17.1f.

³⁷ Paus. V.17.3: καὶ ταῦτα ἐς τὰ μάλιστα ἀρχαῖα.

³⁸ *IvO* 244; Siewert, P., ‘Staatliche Weihungen von Kesseln und Bronzegegeräten in Olympia’ *AM* 106 (1991) 81-84; see above, 103f.

³⁹ Siewert, *AM*, 1991, 84.

⁴⁰ Plut. *Agis* 11.5; Hdt. IX.33.1-36; see above, 45.

⁴¹ Siewert, *AM*, 1991, 84: ‘Ob aber der Kessel der Spartaner auf eine besondere Funktion dieser Großmacht im amphiktionischen Zeus-Kult hinweist, muß hier offenbleiben.’

⁴² See above, 101f.

the work of Lakonian craftsmen in the sixth century B.C. – appears sufficient to tip the balance in favour of a special role for Sparta in the sanctuary of Zeus.

The Eleians and the Lakedaimonians in the Archaic Period

The Eleians and Lakedaimonians are likely to have cooperated at times during the Archaic epoch. Very early in this period, it seems, the Spartans declared the *asylia* of the Eleians by virtue of their custodianship of the Olympic festival. When Pheidon violated Eleian sacrosanctity by seizing control of Olympia, the two peoples cooperated in defeating the Argives and making all of the territory as far south as the Neda subject to the Eleian *koinon*. There is, nevertheless, as we should expect in a relationship between two parties, one of which had forsworn aggressive warfare, no evidence of a formal military alliance between these states. Their relationship appears to have been based entirely upon their mutual interest in Olympia.

According to Diodoros, the Lakedaimonians had declared the *asylia* of the Eleians. They helped, he says, ‘in establishing for them a neutral life...and they dedicated them to the god’.⁴³ In another passage that also concerns the origin of the *asylia*, the Eleians appear to have been friendly towards the Lakedaimonians at an early period in their history, before the incorporation of Lakonian Helos into Lakedaimonian territory. Phlegon of Tralles records that ‘the Eleians, wanting to help the Lakedaimonians when they were besieging Helos, sent to Delphi to consult the oracle’, but were told to stay away from battle.⁴⁴

When Pheidon seized the Olympic festival, ‘the Eleians, because of the peace, did not have arms to stop him...but because of this they also procured arms and began to defend themselves’.⁴⁵ Later the Eleians joined the Lakedaimonians in putting down Pheidon, ‘and...[the Lakedaimonians]...joined the Eleians in promoting their claim to both Pisatis and Triphylyia’.⁴⁶ Strabo also says that, ‘after the outermost defeat of the Messenians’, the Lakedaimonians assisted the Eleians, who

⁴³ Diod. VIII.1.1: τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους...συγκατασκευάσαι τὸν κοινὸν βίον...καὶ καθιέρωσαν αὐτοὺς τῷ θεῷ.

⁴⁴ Phlegon of Tralles *FGrH* 257 F 1.9: καὶ Ἡλεῖοι δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα βουλόμενοι βοηθεῖν Λακεδαιμονίοις, ὅτε Ἴελος ἐπολιόρχουν, πέμψαντες εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐμαντεύοντο.

⁴⁵ Strabo VIII.3.33, p.358: οὔτε τῶν Ἡλείων ἐχόντων ὄπλα, ὥστε κωλύειν, διὰ τὴν εἰρήνην...ἀλλὰ καὶ ὄπλα κτήσασθαι διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀρξαμένους ἐπικουρεῖν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς.

⁴⁶ Strabo VIII.3.33, p.358: καὶ δὴ καὶ συγκαταλῦσαι τὸν Φεῖδωνα· τοὺς δὲ συγκατασκευάσαι τοῖς Ἡλείοις τὴν τε Πισᾶτιν καὶ τὴν Τριφυλίαν.

had been their allies, in taking control of Pisa and of the country as far as Messenia, all of which then came to be called Eleia.⁴⁷ As argued above, these passages from Strabo are all likely to refer to the same series of events, and the defeat of the Messenians that he refers to probably occurred at the end of the first Messenian War.⁴⁸ At the same time that the Lakedaimonians established their control of Messenia, it seems, they helped the Eleians to enrol as allies the non-Eleian communities between the Alpheios and the Neda, though with the cooperation of the Lepreans rather than in the face of their hostility.⁴⁹

The joint action of the Eleians and Lakedaimonians in the defeat of Pheidon, the subjection of the Messenians and the enlistment of the non-Eleian communities as far as the Neda as allies of the Eleians seems to be an isolated example of military cooperation in the Archaic period. Strabo, on the other hand, appears mistaken when he records that in the second Messenian War the Messenians ‘revolted, having taken the Argives, Eleians and Pisatans as allies’,⁵⁰ and it is much more likely that the Pisatans alone of the Eleians supported the Messenians. The Lepreans who joined the Lakedaimonians on account of their hatred of the Eleians are likely to have done so because of their enmity towards the Pisatans rather than any other Eleians.⁵¹ While this places the ‘official’ Eleians on the same side as the Lakedaimonians in the second Messenian War, since their Pisatan enemies opposed the Lakedaimonians in Messenia, however, no source records that the Eleians sent aid to the Lakedaimonians and we need not assume that this was the case.

Some of the Eleians, at least, appear to have offered to join the Greek states that united to oppose the Persians during the reign of Xerxes. According to Pausanias, the Eleians did their share in resisting the Persian invasion, but he offers no examples.⁵² Herodotus says that after Thermopylai the Peloponnesians, led by

⁴⁷ Strabo VIII.3.30, p.355: μετὰ τὴν ἐσχάτην κατάλυσιν τῶν Μεσσηνίων.

⁴⁸ For the translation of ἔσχατος as ‘outermost’, and the conclusion that Strabo refers here not to the second Messenian War but to the first, see above, 141.

⁴⁹ See above, 204-06.

⁵⁰ Strabo VIII.4.10, p.362: ἐλόμενοι συμμάχους Ἄργείους τε καὶ Ἠλείους καὶ Πισάτας ἀπέστησαν, Ἀρκάδων μὲν Ἀριστοκράτην τὸν Ὀρχομενοῦ βασιλέα παρεχομένων στρατηγόν, Πισατῶν δὲ Πανταλέοντα τὸν Ὀμφαλίωτος; Paus. IV.15.7; see above, 195f. Note that the Budé text of Strabo includes the Arkadians after the Pisatans in the list of allies, explaining that this is an ‘addition rendue nécessaire par le context’: Baladié, R., (transl.) Strabon *Géographie* V (Paris, 1978) 128, n.5. Strabo gives the name of the Arkadian commander in the same sentence.

⁵¹ Paus. IV.15.8: κατὰ ἔχθος τὸ Ἠλείων; see above, 205f.

⁵² Paus. V.4.7.

Leonidas' brother Kleombrotos, built a wall across the Isthmos.⁵³ He includes the Eleians, in company with the Lakedaimonians, all of the Arkadians and the Corinthians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians, Phleisians, Troizenians and Hermioneians, among 'those of the Greeks who came in a mass to help at the Isthmos'.⁵⁴ We need not, however, conclude that members of all of the Eleian communities were present, since it is likely that the Pisatans were at that time alienated from both the Lakedaimonians, having so recently supported the Messenians against them, and the remaining Eleians, with whom they appear to have been engaged in a civil conflict.⁵⁵ Since the wall was built in 480 B.C., eight years before the beginning of the process that led to synoikism and the establishment of democracy among the Eleians, nevertheless, it is clear that at least some Eleians were prepared to stand with the Lakedaimonians and their allies against the Persians.

Herodotus also records that the Eleians were late for Plataiai, went home in disappointment and banished their leaders.⁵⁶ In Lewis' view, the Eleian leaders were probably just cautious about 'a distant and dangerous battle'.⁵⁷ There is, however, a more plausible explanation for why they were late. The battle of Plataiai took place in 479 B.C., close to the approximate date of 480 B.C. assigned above to a major disturbance in Eleia, when the Eleians were able to overawe the Pisatans led by Damophon and thus prevent their revolt.⁵⁸ Perhaps this is what delayed them.

Diodoros, in apparent contradiction to Herodotus, says that the allies sent the Eleians home to play their part in the war effort by fulfilling their responsibility to honour the god(s) at Olympia.⁵⁹ We need not decide between Herodotus and Diodoros here, nevertheless, since both reports may be correct. The Eleians might well have presented themselves to the allied commanders, perhaps at the Isthmos, and then gone home to deal with the Pisatan emergency, thus obeying the (solicited?) command to 'honour the god at Olympia' by confronting the Pisatans led by Damophon and thus maintaining their administration of his sanctuary. Having dealt

⁵³ Hdt. VIII.71.1f.

⁵⁴ Hdt. VIII.72: οἱ δὲ βοηθήσαντες ἐς τὸν Ἴσθμὸν πανδημεὶ οἶδε ἦσαν ἑλλήνων.

⁵⁵ See above, 128-38, 143f, 195f.

⁵⁶ Hdt. IX.77.3: καὶ ὡσαύτως οἱ Ἡλεῖοι τοῖσι Μαντινεῦσι συμφορὴν ποιησάμενοι ἀπαλλάσσοντο· ἀπελθόντες δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἐδίωξαν.

⁵⁷ Lewis, 1992, 104.

⁵⁸ Paus. VI.22.2f; see above, 143.

⁵⁹ Diod. VIII.1.2: ἀφείθησαν διὰ τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ τιμῆς; 1.3: προσταξάντων τῶν ἡγεμόνων πλέον αὐτοὺς ποιῆσειν, ἐὰν ἐπιμέλονται τῆς τῶν θεῶν τιμῆς; cf. Andrewes, 1952, 2; Lewis, 1992, 104.

with the crisis at home, they might then have attempted to get to Plataiai in time for the battle. It is possible that the banishment of their leaders, reported by Herodotus as a consequence of tardiness in reaching Plataiai, was instead a result of the factional conflict in Eleia involving Damophon.⁶⁰

The Eleians were not among those who contributed ships to the allied fleets at Artemision or Salamis.⁶¹ This makes it seem ‘problematic’ that their name, but not that of the Mantineians, who were also late for Plataiai, was included on the serpent column erected at Delphi to commemorate the victory of the forces led by the Lakedaimonians.⁶² Meiggs and Lewis speculate that ‘their control of Olympia perhaps won them special consideration.’⁶³ We may conclude, however, that their name was inscribed at Delphi because of three deeds: their participation in building the wall at the Isthmos; their forestalment of a rebellion in their own territory, just before the battle of Plataiai, that might have been sympathetic to the Persians; and their genuine attempt to join the allied forces there.

In seeking to go to war against the Persians and their allies, the Eleians appear to have been prepared to violate the ancient injunction to refrain from war, and thus to abandon their right to inviolability. The Greeks on the Lakedaimonian side might have considered, nevertheless, that these were exceptional circumstances. If, as appears likely, the forces that opposed the Lakedaimonian hegemony in the Peloponnese, including the Pisatans, were ready to welcome the Persians,⁶⁴ then the ‘official’ Eleians might have had grounds to believe that their control of Olympia, itself the sole reason for the existence of the *asylia*, was under threat. There are no indications that the Greeks considered the *asylia* to have been abandoned once the Persians had been defeated, and there is no evidence of Eleian involvement in any of the warfare in the Peloponnese and central Greece, beginning with the battle of Tegea in 465 B.C., of which the first Peloponnesian War was the latter part.⁶⁵

The Eleian synoikism and concomitant establishment of democracy, we can assume, would not have pleased the actively pro-aristocratic faction that appears to

⁶⁰ Paus. VI.22.2f.

⁶¹ Hdt. VIII.1.1f, 42.2-48.

⁶² ML 27; Hdt. IX.77.1; Macan, R.W., *Herodotus: the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Books* (London, 1908) 758, n.8.

⁶³ Meiggs, R. and Lewis, D., *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the end of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Oxford, 1969) 60.

⁶⁴ See Appendix, 339f.

⁶⁵ Hdt. IX.35.2; see Appendix, 314f, 329-31, 337, 341-44.

have returned to dominance in Sparta by 465 B.C.⁶⁶ Considering their other difficulties, however, such as the hostility of Argos and the Arkadian league headed by Tegea and the Messenian revolt that followed the great earthquake,⁶⁷ the Lakedaimonians might have found it politic in this period to respect the traditional *asylia* of the Eleians, despite any misgivings about their constitution. To violate it would have been to add unnecessarily to the enemies whom they already faced. Hornblower says of the synoikism that ‘such a concentration of resources meant that for the future Sparta would find Elis harder to coerce.’⁶⁸ It is doubtful that the Lakedaimonians had felt the need to coerce the Eleians before the establishment of democracy, but it seems reasonable to assume that the synoikism would have presented an additional deterrent to Lakedaimonian intervention against the newly-established regime.

It is likely, too, that the Eleians were fearful enough of the Lakedaimonians and suspicious enough of their intentions to refuse any request for passage through their territory for much of the second quarter of the fifth century B.C. Thucydides says that the Lakedaimonians rarely opposed the growth of Athenian power during the *pentakontaetia* because of being slow to go to war, as always, but also because of ‘being shut out by wars at home’.⁶⁹ The uncooperative neutrality of the Eleians, along with the hostility of the Argives and the Arkadian league headed by the Tegeans, is likely to have amounted to the containment of the Lakedaimonians within the confines of Lakonia and Messenia during this period.⁷⁰ Aside from the cooperation of some of them with the Greek states that opposed the Persians during Xerxes’ invasion, there is no evidence that the Eleians were enrolled in a military alliance headed by the Lakedaimonians at any time between the defeat of Pheidon early in the sixth century and the outbreak of the Archidamian War late in the fifth century B.C. If a Lakedaimonian confederacy existed in the late Archaic and early Classical periods,⁷¹ it is highly unlikely that the Eleians were members.

⁶⁶ See Appendix, 341.

⁶⁷ See Appendix, 342-4.

⁶⁸ Hornblower, 1983, 25.

⁶⁹ Thuc. I.118.2: πολέμοις οἰκεῖοις ἐξειργόμενοι.

⁷⁰ See Appendix, 342-4.

⁷¹ It is not possible to provide sufficient argument here to support the present writer’s agreement with those scholars who are sceptical about the existence of a so-called ‘Peloponnesian League’. The expression ‘the Lakedaimonians and their allies’ appears entirely sufficient to describe the states that had, at any given time, come together under the leadership of the Lakedaimonians. For recent discussion see Lendon, J.E., ‘Thucydides and the “Constitution” of the Peloponnesian League’ *GRBS*

The Eleians in the Disputes over Epidamnos and Kerkyra

The Eleians appear to have joined the Lakedaimonian side in the Archidamian War as a consequence of their own cooperation with the Corinthians in an attempt to defend their mutual colonial interests in north-west Greece. In the course of this endeavour they unintentionally came into conflict with the Athenians, whom they cannot have foreseen would support the Kerkyraians against the Corinthians and their allies. It appears to have been as a consequence of this conflict that they made a monetary and naval contribution to the war against the Athenians.

In 435 B.C. the Corinthians began to equip a force for the relief of the Kerkyraian colony of Epidamnos, which was under siege from the Kerkyraians. At the same time they announced their intention to re-colonise the place.⁷² Not surprisingly, considering that the democrats had recently taken control of Epidamnos, the new colonists were invited on the basis of equality.⁷³ The Corinthians had already sent a garrison of Ambrakians and Leukadians and some of their own men to Epidamnos.⁷⁴ Now they prepared to send the colonists, escorted by ships contributed by the Megarians, Epidaurians, Hermioneians, Troizenians, Ambrakians, Leukadians and Kephallenian Palians. In addition, the Thebans and Phleasians were asked for money, and the Eleians provided both money and empty ships.⁷⁵

The Corinthians, while prepared to ask for the assistance of the Eleians in this campaign, do not appear to have been willing to ask them to assist in person, either because they thought that it was wrong to ask or because they expected to be refused. The Thebans and the Phleasians were asked for money alone.⁷⁶ While it seems likely that these two peoples were not asked for naval personnel or ships because neither had a fleet, the nature of the request of the Corinthians to the Eleians appears to reflect their respect for the *asylia*. The fact that a request was made at all, nevertheless, requires explanation.

35 (1994) 159-77; Bolmarcich, S., 'Thucydides 1.19.1 and the Peloponnesian League' *GRBS* 45 (2005) 5-34; Yates, D.C., 'The Archaic Treaties between the Spartans and the Allies' *CQ* 55 (2005) 65-76.

⁷² Thuc. I.27.1.

⁷³ Thuc. I.24.5, 27.1: ἐπὶ τῇ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ.

⁷⁴ Thuc. I.26.1f.

⁷⁵ Thuc. I.27.2: Ἡλείους δὲ ναῦς τε κενὰς καὶ χρήματα; 30.2: ναῦς καὶ χρήματα παρέσχον Κορινθίοις.

⁷⁶ Thuc. I.27.2.

Thucydides refers to those who attempted to relieve Epidamnos in 435 B.C. as οἱ Κορίνθιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι.⁷⁷ This was not an expedition undertaken by these forces as allies of the Lakedaimonians, but purely a Korinthian-led venture. The Lakedaimonians, on the contrary, gave their support to a Kerkyraian delegation that attempted to persuade the Korinthians to withdraw from Epidamnos.⁷⁸ Despite the fact that the campaign was undertaken by ‘the Korinthians and their allies’, on the other hand, we cannot assume that this expression signifies a separate, permanent alliance, since the Epidaurians, Troizenians and Hermioneians were apparently not obliged to contribute to the Korinthian expedition of 433 B.C.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, there are signs of a Korinthian hegemony in north-west Greece in the latter half of the fifth century B.C.

By 435 B.C. Korinth seems to have established ‘a position of political supremacy with regard to her colonies.’⁸⁰ The Leukadians gave the Korinthians their full support in the dispute over Epidamnos.⁸¹ Apollonia, which Thucydides describes as Κορινθίων ἀποικίαν,⁸² shared with the Korinthians spoils from a war against neighbouring cities,⁸³ and the Apollonians facilitated the journey of the initial Korinthian and allied garrison to Epidamnos.⁸⁴ Men from both Leukas and Ambrakia were members of that garrison, and the Ambrakians provided eight and the Leukadians ten ships to help escort the colonists. They continued to support the Korinthians after the defeat at Leukimme and the alliance of the Kerkyraians with the Athenians. A greatly increased fleet of twenty-seven ships from Ambrakia, and the same number as earlier from Leukas, were sent to join in the attack on Kerkyra in 433 B.C.⁸⁵

Both Ambrakia and Leukas provided ships for the Peloponnesian fleet from the beginning of the war against Athens. Furthermore, the Ambrakians initiated three campaigns against the Amphilochians and Akarnanians, allies of the Athenians. The extent of the casualties that they suffered in 426 B.C. obliged the Korinthians to

⁷⁷ Thuc. I.30.2.

⁷⁸ Thuc. I.28.1.

⁷⁹ Thuc. I.46.1; cf. 27.2.

⁸⁰ Graham, A.J., *Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece* (2nd edn, Chicago, 1983), 137.

⁸¹ Thuc. I.26.1; 27.2; 46.1; Graham, 1983, 130; Salmon, J.B., *Wealthy Corinth: A History of the City to 338 B.C.* (Oxford, 1984) 273.

⁸² Thuc. I.26.2; Beaumont, R.L., ‘Corinth, Ambracia, Apollonia’ *JHS* 72 (1952) 65.

⁸³ Paus. V.22.2-4; *IvO* 692; Jeffery, *LSAG* 221.21, 229, pl. 43, no. 21; Beaumont, 1952, 65; Graham, 1983, 130f, 131, n.1; Salmon, 1984, 273f. and n.13.

⁸⁴ Thuc. I.26.2; Salmon, 1984, 274.

⁸⁵ Thuc. I.26.1, 27.2, 46.1, 48.4, 49.5.

spare three hundred hoplites to help prevent the capture of their city.⁸⁶ The Leukadians, too, suffered because of their support for the Peloponnesians, and received a Corinthian garrison.⁸⁷ Despite these setbacks, both colonies made contributions to the defence of Syrakousai and to the war in the Aegean.⁸⁸ The truest measure of the extent to which the foreign policy of Ambrakia and Leukas was dominated by Corinth, however, is their stance after the defeat of Athens. In 395 B.C., they joined with Corinth in the coalition against the Lakedaimonians. When the Corinthians returned to the Lakedaimonian camp in 486 B.C., so did they.⁸⁹ With the exception of the Kerkyraians, the colonies of the Corinthians in north-west Greece, whatever their status in earlier times, appear to have been their subject allies by the mid-fifth century B.C.

There is further evidence of the influence of Corinth in the north-west at this time. The Corinthians supported the tyranny of Euarchos at Astakos in 431 B.C.⁹⁰ The extent of Corinthian following in the interior is revealed by the list of *barbaroi* who supported the forces of the Spartan *nauarchos* Knemos in Akarnania in 429 B.C. These tribes, the Chaones, Thesproti, Molossoi, Atintanes, Parauaioi and Orestai, occupied all of Epeiros, their lands extending to the borders of Thessaly, Macedonia and Illyria.⁹¹ Before Sybota, ‘many of the barbarians in the hinterland had also come to help the Corinthians, for the hinterlanders in this region have always been their allies’.⁹²

Korinth’s acceptance of the Epidamnian request for aid in 435 B.C., as Graham points out, seems ‘part of a general plan to increase her control in the North West at Corcyra’s expense.’⁹³ We can at least conclude that the Corinthians were determined to defend their interests there. The Eleians also had colonies in the north-

⁸⁶ Thuc. II.68.1, 9; 80.1-82.1; III.102.6f; 105.1-114.4, esp. 113.6.

⁸⁷ Thuc. II.30.3, 5; 91.2f; cf. 92.3; III.7.1, 5; 94.1-3; IV.42.3; cf. III.114.4.

⁸⁸ Thuc. VI.104.1; VII.7.1. They manned the ships sent to Sicily themselves: Thuc. VII.58.3; VIII.106.3.

⁸⁹ Xen. *Hell.* VI.2.3; Diod. XIV.82.3.

⁹⁰ Thuc. II.30.1; 33.1f; Salmon, 1984, 278f.

⁹¹ Thuc. II.80.5f, cf. 68.9; Hammond, N.G.L., *Epirus* (Oxford, 1967) 464, map 14; Salmon, 1984, 273, fig. 17; cf. Beaumont, 1952, 63f. Note that the Illyrian Taulantians seem to have taken, with the Kerkyraians, the side of the aristocrats in the Epidamnian *stasis*: Thuc. I.24.1, 5.

⁹² Thuc. I.47.3: ἦσαν δὲ καὶ τοῖς Κορινθίοις ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων παραβεβοηθηκότες· οἱ γὰρ ταύτῃ ἡπειροῦται αἰεὶ ποτε φίλοι αὐτοῖς εἰσίν. The name of Ἠπειρος is itself derived from the common noun ἡπειρος, used to indicate the land as opposed to the sea, as, for example in Hdt. I.96.1, where it is used of the Asian mainland. Thucydides might mean in this passage, nevertheless, to indicate the Epeirote tribes in particular.

⁹³ Graham, 1983, 132; cf. Kagan, D., *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, NY, 1969) 217f.

west, all in Kassopaia, southern Epeiros. These colonies, it seems, were placed among the Epeirote tribes, all of which were allies of the Corinthians. The Eleians appear to have felt that their vital interests, including the maintenance of the lines of communication between the sanctuary of Zeus at Olympia and his oracle at Dodona, were best served by cooperation with the Corinthians, whose colonies in this region were as old as their own.⁹⁴

The ten ships that the Eleians contributed to the Corinthian fleet defeated by the Kerkyraians and Athenians at Sybota in 433 B.C., in contrast to those provided in 435 B.C., appear to have been manned by Eleians. It seems likely that, having explicitly stated that the ships that fought off Leukimme were delivered to the Corinthians unmanned, Thucydides would also have said that those sent to Korinth for the battle at Sybota were merely empty ships if that were the case.⁹⁵ He lists the Eleian ships in quite the same way that he lists those contributed by other sea-faring allies of the Corinthians, that is, the Megarians, Leukadians, Ambrakians and Anaktorians, and adds that each of these cities sent its own general.⁹⁶ Since the Eleians were amongst those who sent a commander, they are likely to have been combatants. When the Corinthians and their allies sailed from Leukas in 433 B.C., ‘they came to harbour at Cheimerion, in the land of the Thesprotians’, where they camped.⁹⁷ Cheimerion is the promontory adjacent to the Glykys Limen, the harbour at the mouth of the Acheron river, above which lay the Eleian colony of Pandosia.⁹⁸

The difference in the nature of the Eleian contribution to the Corinthian and allied fleets that fought at Sybota compared with that at Leukimme need not signify that the Eleians had abandoned their traditional *asylia* and taken instead to aggressive warfare. One of the most important buildings in the agora of Elis was known as the Kerkyraian Stoa, built, claimed the Eleians of Pausanias’ day, from the spoils of a retaliatory raid against the Kerkyraians.⁹⁹ This raid might have been carried out in response to the Kerkyraian naval attack on the Eleian port of Kyllene, undertaken because of the money and empty ships that the Eleians had sent to Leukimme.¹⁰⁰ It seems that the Eleians were drawn into warfare by stages. At first, they lent material

⁹⁴ See above, 75, 79-87.

⁹⁵ Thuc. I.46.1.

⁹⁶ Thuc. I.46.2.

⁹⁷ Thuc. I.46.3-5.

⁹⁸ See above, 72-75.

⁹⁹ Paus. VI.24.4.

¹⁰⁰ Thuc. I.30.2.

support in the form of money and ships to the efforts of the Corinthians to maintain their influence in the north-west. Because of this, the Kerkyraians attacked their port. The Eleians might have then carried out a retaliatory raid before sending manned ships to join the Corinthian fleet that found itself engaged with the Athenians at Sybota.

The Outbreak of the Archidamian War

Their involvement in the defeat at Sybota makes it likely that the Eleians were among the Peloponnesian states that joined the Corinthians in 432 B.C. in urging the Lakedaimonians to go to war against the Athenians. As Thucydides records, ‘the Lakedaimonians invited [to come to Sparta] their allies and anyone else who said that they had been wronged by the Athenians’.¹⁰¹ When the Corinthians at the following meeting speak of the need of those who live in the interior and not on the sea-routes (τοὺς δὲ τὴν μεσόγειαν μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ ἐν πόρῳ κατοικημένους) to aid those who do live on them (τοῖς κάτω), it seems likely that the Eleians are included among the latter.¹⁰² The Corinthians, moreover, suggest that the Peloponnesians will be able to use the funds stored ἐν Δελφοῖς καὶ Ὀλυμπίᾳ, unlikely in the case of Olympia unless the Eleians were on their side.¹⁰³ Thucydides, furthermore, lists the Eleians among those who provided ships for the Peloponnesian fleet and includes them as members of the Λακεδαιμονίων ξυμμαχία for this war.¹⁰⁴

In addition, the Eleians appear to have agreed to contribute funds for the war, but perhaps did not pay up the whole amount, since c.400 B.C. the Lakedaimonians ‘demanded the expenses from the war against the Athenians, according to the portion that they had allocated to them’.¹⁰⁵ It appears, too, that some kind of agreement was made between the Lakedaimonians and the Eleians when the Archidamian War began. Because the Lakedaimonians had supported the revolt of their Leprean allies during that war, the Eleians later felt justified in going over to the Argives, ‘presenting the covenant that whatever they had when the Attic war began they

¹⁰¹ I.67.3, cf. 4f: οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι προσπαρακαλέσαντες τῶν ξυμμάχων τε καὶ εἴ τις τι ἄλλο ἔφη ἠδικῆσθαι ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων.

¹⁰² Thuc. I.120.2.

¹⁰³ Thuc. I.121.3.

¹⁰⁴ Thuc. II.9.3.

¹⁰⁵ Diod. XIV.17.5: κατὰ τὸ ἐπιβάλλον αὐτοῖς μέρος ἀπήτουν.

should also have when it ended'.¹⁰⁶ The Eleians entered into alliance with the Lakedaimonians for the duration of the Archidamian War on the basis of specific conditions, set out in a written agreement and, we can assume, sworn to by both parties.

Pausanias reports that the Eleians 'fought together with the Lakedaimonians in the war against the Athenians contrary to their will'.¹⁰⁷ The Lakedaimonians would have found it difficult to force the Eleians to join in the war against the Athenians if the Eleians had not wanted to fight, so perhaps this simply means that they would rather not have fought the Athenians, but felt compelled to do so after the battle of Sybota because they had assisted the Kerkyraians, who had previously raided Eleian territory. There is, in fact, some evidence of good relations between the Eleians and the Athenians, and in particular with the faction of Perikles, during the *pentakontaetia* and even beyond. During this period, Eleian settlers made up one of the ten tribes of the Athenian colony of Thurioi.¹⁰⁸ Pheidias and his brother Panainos, associates of Perikles, appear to have worked on the statue of Zeus at Olympia during the 460s B.C., Panainos was working again in Elis during the eighty-third Olympiad, from 448 B.C.,¹⁰⁹ and in 438 B.C. Pheidias, prosecuted by the political enemies of Perikles, seems to have fled to Eleia, where both he and his posterity were held in honour.¹¹⁰

Alkibiades, who had been a ward of Perikles and his brother, to whom he was closely related, and was perhaps raised in the home of Perikles,¹¹¹ enjoyed a particularly close relationship with the Eleians. In 420 B.C. he urged the Argives to include the Eleians and Mantineians in their alliance with the Athenians,¹¹² and might even have persuaded the Mantineians and Eleians to revolt from the Lakedaimonians.¹¹³ In 419 B.C., when the Athenians sent a force to aid the Argives, Alkibiades went with them, 'privately, because of his friendly relations with the

¹⁰⁶ Thuc. V.31.5: τὴν ξυνηθήκην προφέροντες ἐν ἧ εἰρητῷ, ἃ ἔχοντες ἐς τὸν Ἀττικὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντό τινες, ταῦτα ἔχοντας καὶ ἐξελεθεῖν.

¹⁰⁷ Paus. V.4.7: συνεσέβαλον μὲν Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀκουσίως ἐς τὴν Ἀθηναίων.

¹⁰⁸ Diod. XII.11.3.

¹⁰⁹ Pliny *NH* XXV.34.

¹¹⁰ See above, 130-33.

¹¹¹ Plut. *Alk.* 1.1; Corn. Nep. VII *Alc.* 2.1.

¹¹² Thuc. V.43.3, cf. 44.2; Plut. *Alk.* 15.1.

¹¹³ Paus. I.29.13: ἔπεισε.

Eleians and Mantineians'.¹¹⁴ In 415 B.C., he boasted to the Athenians that he had once entered seven chariots in the race at Olympia.¹¹⁵

When he escaped from the Athenian authorities at Thourioi in 415 B.C., Alkibiades made straight for the Eleian port of Kyllene, but was afraid to enter Lakedaimon, and only when the Lakedaimonians summoned him to Sparta ὑπόσπονδος did he proceed there.¹¹⁶ Until he was given this guarantee, it would seem, Alkibiades had intended to remain in Eleia.¹¹⁷ The close relations that Alkibiades enjoyed with the Eleians appear to have been familial, since another, later Alkibiades was influential with those who managed the games at Olympia, most likely the *Hellanodikai*.¹¹⁸ Yet it was an Athens dominated by the faction of Perikles with which the Eleians went to war in 431 B.C.

The Eleians in the Archidamian War

In the first year of the war a fleet of one hundred Athenian and fifty Kerkyraian ships made a series of raids on the Peloponnesian coast. 'Holding towards Eleian Pheia,' says Thucydides, 'they ravaged the land for two days, and when three-hundred picked troops from *koile* Elis and the Eleians on the spot from the neighbourhood came to the rescue they defeated them in battle'.¹¹⁹ Since they

¹¹⁴ Diod. XII.79.1: ἰδιώτης ὢν διὰ τὴν φιλίαν τὴν πρὸς Ἡλείους καὶ Μαντινεῖς.

¹¹⁵ Thuc. VI.16.2.

¹¹⁶ Thuc. VI.88.9.

¹¹⁷ Cornelius Nepos (*Alc.* 4.4) tells a different story – Alkibiades escaped first to Elis, but then went to Thebes, where he learnt of his condemnation in Athens and so decided to go to live in Lakedaimon: clam se ab custodibus subduxit et inde primum Elidem, dein Thebas venit...Lacedaemonem demigravit. The version of Thucydides is preferred here.

¹¹⁸ Andok. IV *Against Alkibiades* 26: δυνάμενος παρὰ τοῖς ἀγωνοθέταις τῶν Ἡλείων.

¹¹⁹ Thuc. II.25.3; cf. Diod. XII.25.4: προσβοηθήσαντας τῶν ἐκ τῆς κοίλης Ἡλίδος τριακοσίους λογάδας καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ἐκ τῆς περιοικίδος Ἡλείων μάχη ἐκράτησαν. Note that this use of the expression 'koile Elis', apparently to distinguish the valley of the Peneios from the rest of Eleia, appears to be the earliest that we have. Lattimore, S. (transl.), *Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War* (Indianapolis, 1998) translates 'when three hundred picked men from Hollow Elis and some of the Eleians from the subject territory came to the defense they defeated them in battle.' Lattimore unnecessarily assumes that the *perioikis* was subject territory. While this term might sometimes have been used of dependent communities (LSJ s.v. περιοικέω II.2. On the notion of the dependent *polis*, see Hansen, M.H., 'A Typology of Dependent Poleis' in Nielsen, T.H. (ed), *Yet More Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis* (Stuttgart, 1997) 29-37; *IACP* 87-94), even in the passage from Arist. *Pol.* cited by LSJ for this usage (VI.3.4, 1320b.7), although αἱ περιοικίδες probably were subject to the Carthaginians, its use does not necessarily imply so. If Thucydides had meant to suggest that the Eleians, aside from the picked troops from *koile* Elis, who came to the aid of Pheia were members of subject communities we might rather expect the genitive of the plural οἱ περίοικοι, a masculine substantive formed from περίοικος (LSJ s.v. περίοικος, ον). Note, however, that Andrewes, A., 'Argive *Perioikoi*' in Craik, E.M. (ed), 'Owls to Athens': *Essays on Classical Subjects Presented to Sir Kenneth Dover* (Oxford, 1990) 172, although accepting an inferior status for some Eleian communities, finds 'insufficient backing' for LSJ's entry περίοικος II, 'hence generally *dependent*,

had just come from Messenian Mothone,¹²⁰ we should expect the Athenians to have landed on the long beach to the south of Pheia, but Thucydides later reports that because, when a storm blew up, they were exposed in a harbourless district, most of the Athenians and their allies embarked on their ships and sailed around a promontory called Ichthys and into the harbour at Pheia. There is no headland to the south of Pheia until Messenia, so they must have initially sailed past Pheia, landed on the beach between that port and Kyllene and then turned south again when the storm blew up, rounding the headland on the seaward side of the harbour. Meanwhile, some Messenians and other allies, proceeding by land from the beach to the north, captured Pheia.¹²¹ When the main body of the Eleians arrived, however, the Athenian fleet picked up the Messenians and sailed off to Kephallenia.¹²²

After suffering no invasion since the time of Pheidon of Argos, Eleia had now been raided twice within a few years, by the Kerkyraians in 435 B.C. and by the Athenians, Kerkyraians and others in 431 B.C. There is no doubt that the Athenians and their allies had infringed the *asylia* of the Eleians, and it appears that the Eleians felt no qualms about retaliating. We need not assume that Eleians were among the Peloponnesians whom the Lakedaimonians led into Attica on a regular basis during the Archidamian War. It is likely, however, that they made a significant contribution to the Peloponnesian fleet, since Thucydides plainly states that they sent ships to join the allied forces.¹²³

During the Archidamian war, the Peloponnesian fleet appears often to have been based at Kyllene. In 429 B.C., after the defeat of the Peloponnesians at the hands of Phormion off Rhion at the mouth of the Korinthian gulf, the survivors

subject. Gomme, A.W., *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* II (Oxford, 1962) 84, seeks to explain this passage by proposing that the forces from the *perioikis* were ‘not the Pisatai, but Eleians living, as landowners, in Pisatis’, but only his initial assumption that ‘Pheia was in Pisatis, and Pisatis was subject to, and not fully incorporated with, Elis proper’ makes this conjecture necessary. Hornblower, S., *A Commentary on Thucydides* I (Oxford, 1991) 281, who reasonably takes the literal interpretation of τῶν αὐτόθεν ἐκ τῆς περιουκίδος Ἠλείων to be ‘Eleians from the *perioikis*’, does not, however, appear justified in equating these Eleians with the *perioikoi* of Sparta. The primary meaning of ἡ περιουκίς seems to be ‘neighbourhood’ (LSJ s.v. περιουκίω II.1, citing Thuc. III.16.2 and the passage under discussion), so it is more likely, as accepted by Crawley, Smith and Warner, to indicate the district surrounding Pheia without any presumption as to its political status: Crawley, R., (transl.), *Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1910) 88, Smith, C.F. (transl.), *Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War* I (Cambridge, Mass., 1928) 307 and Warner, R., (transl.), *Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War* (Harmondsworth, 1972) 140. Lattimore’s interpretation is not required by the text.

¹²⁰ Methone in Thucydides, but see *IACP* 564.319.

¹²¹ Thuc. II.25.4; Diod. XII.25.5.

¹²² Thuc. II.25.5; Diod. XII.43.5.

¹²³ Thuc. II.9.3.

sailed ἐς Κυλλήνην, τὸ Ἡλείων ἐπίνειον, where they were joined by the Spartan admiral Knemos, who had sailed from Leukas with the allied ships from the northwest.¹²⁴ The fleet set out again from Kyllene soon afterwards to confront the Athenians at Naupaktos, but after indecisive fighting and the arrival of Athenian reinforcements retired to Korinth, where it was disbanded at the start of winter.¹²⁵

In the following year, another fleet was assembled for the relief of Mytilene.¹²⁶ It is highly likely that these ships departed for Lesbos from Kyllene, since Thucydides says that they took their time sailing around the Peloponnese and that finally, after they had been caught in a storm off Krete, made their way back to the Peloponnese, where they found Brasidas at Kyllene with thirteen Leukadian and Ambrakian ships.¹²⁷ From there they set out for Kerkyra, but had the worst of the fighting and went back home,¹²⁸ presumably to Kyllene.

After the battle of Rhion,¹²⁹ the Athenians had dedicated at Delphi figureheads of ships and bronze shields taken from the Peloponnesians and their allies. Pausanias saw these items, and reports that the accompanying inscription recorded the names of the *poleis* from which they were taken: the Eleians headed the list, followed by the Lakedaimonians, Sikyonians, Megarians, Achaian Pellenians, Ambrakians, Leukadians and Korinthians. The inscription also records that from these spoils a sacrifice was offered to Theseus and Poseidon at Rhion,¹³⁰ and Thucydides reports that after his victory Phormion set up a trophy at Molykreian Rhion, on the north side of the mouth of the gulf, and dedicated one of twelve captured ships to Poseidon.¹³¹ Pausanias reasonably concludes that the inscription at Delphi refers to the achievements of Phormion, the Athenian admiral. We need not doubt that the Eleians fought in the battle of Rhion.

When the Peloponnesian fleet arrived too late for the relief of Mytilene in 427 B.C. and took counsel on the coast of Asia near Erythrai, ‘Teutiaplos, an Eleian man’ addressed the meeting, and suggested that they might still take the Athenians at

¹²⁴ Thuc. II.84.5, 86.1, cf. 80.2f.

¹²⁵ Thuc. II.86.1, 92.7.

¹²⁶ Thuc. III.16.3, 25.1, 26.1.

¹²⁷ III.29.1: πλέοντες περί τε αὐτὴν τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἐνδιέτριψαν; III.69.1.

¹²⁸ Thuc. III.81.1: ἐχομίζοντο ἐπ’ οἴκου.

¹²⁹ Thuc. II.83.1-84.1.

¹³⁰ Paus. X.11.6.

¹³¹ Thuc. II.84.4, cf. 86.2f.

Mytilene by surprise, since they had only just captured the city.¹³² Teutiaplos' speech begins as follows: 'Alkidas and as many of us commanders of the force of the Peloponnesians who are present'.¹³³ Teutiaplos includes himself among the commanders (πάρεσμεν) and we can assume that he was the general of an Eleian contingent.¹³⁴

It is likely that the Eleians participated in both this expedition and the fighting off Kerkyra after the return of the fleet to Kyllene in 427 B.C.¹³⁵ The Peloponnesian force that failed to capture Amphilocheian Argos in 426/5 B.C., however, came by land from Herakleia.¹³⁶ In 425 B.C. the Peloponnesian fleet sailed again for Kerkyra, but was soon summoned to Pylos, where it was defeated in the harbour. The ships were surrendered under the terms of the truce at Pylos on the promise that they would be returned when it was terminated, but the Athenians kept them, and we hear no more of Peloponnesian fleets in the Archidamian War.¹³⁷

Conclusion

The Eleians appear to have made a significant contribution to the Korinthian and allied war effort from the time of the attempt to re-colonise Epidamnus until at least the middle of the Archidamian War. Yet they must have been disappointed with the result: defeat at Leukimne; a Kerkyraian raid on their territory; defeat at Sybota; an Athenian and allied raid on their coast and temporary seizure of their second port; defeat at Rhion; stalemate at best in the following battle, despite greatly outnumbering the Athenians; failure to relieve Mytilene or, against the advice of their general, to seize the initiative there once it had fallen; the worst of the fighting and hasty retreat from the waters off Kerkyra; and finally, the loss of the fleet at Pylos.

The Athenians, too, appear to have formidably challenged the Korinthian hegemony in north-west Greece. They had bases *en route* to this region at Kythera and Pylos, and off Epeiros at Kerkyra.¹³⁸ The Zakynthians and Kephallenians, close neighbours of the Eleians (fig. 2, map 6) and of great importance for facilitating

¹³² Thuc. III.29.2-31.1.

¹³³ Thuc. III.30.1: 'Ἀλκίδα καὶ Πελοποννησίων ὅσοι πάρεσμεν ἄρχοντες τῆς στρατιᾶς.

¹³⁴ Thuc. III.29.2f.

¹³⁵ Thuc. III.76.1-81.1.

¹³⁶ Thuc. III.100.2.

¹³⁷ Thuc. IV.2.3, 8.2, 11.2-14.5, 16.1, 23.1f.

¹³⁸ Kythera: Thuc. IV.53.1-55.1.

Athenian *periploi*,¹³⁹ were their allies.¹⁴⁰ Despite Demosthenes' defeat in Aitolia in 426 B.C.,¹⁴¹ moreover, two Peloponnesians expeditions, undertaken in 429 and 426 B.C., had failed to either capture Amphilochian Argos or take control of Akarnania,¹⁴² and the final campaign had ended in disaster for the Ambrakians.¹⁴³ In 425 B.C., furthermore, the Athenians and Akarnanians had captured Anaktorion, the Korinthian colony at the mouth of the Ambrakian gulf.¹⁴⁴ They were now in a position to deny the Eleians access to that gulf, and thus to their colonies on its north shore, including Bouchetion, the main port at which travellers to Dodona seem to have disembarked. The route *via* their other colony of Pandosia,¹⁴⁵ vulnerable to attack from Kerkyra, cannot have been much more secure. One may suspect that even before the Lakedaimonians lent their support to the revolt of their tributary allies, the Lepreans, some among the Eleians might have already begun to question the worth of the Lakedaimonian alliance.

¹³⁹ Thuc. II.80.1.

¹⁴⁰ Thuc. II.7.3, 30.2, 33.2, 66.1, 80.1; III.94.1, 95.2; IV.8.2-5, 13.2.

¹⁴¹ Thuc. III.94.1-98.5; cf. IV.30.1.

¹⁴² Thuc. II.80.1-82.1; III.100.1-114.4.


¹⁴³ Thuc. III.113.6.

¹⁴⁴ Thuc. IV.49.1.

¹⁴⁵ See above, 84-87.



Fig. 11 Inscribed seat for a Lakedaimonian proxenos at Olympia, late-sixth to early-fifth century B.C. (Olympia museum).



Map 6 The Peloponnese (from Hall, J., *Hellenicity*, Chicago, 2002, 60).

CHAPTER NINE

THE CAUSES AND COURSE OF THE ELEIAN WAR

Two factors led the Lakedaimonians to go to war against the Eleians after the end of the Dekeleian War. The first of these appears to be the Eleian response to Lakedaimonian support for the revolt of the Lepreans at the end of the Archidamian War. The second was the hope of the Lakedaimonians, after the defeat of the Athenians, to impose oligarchic government upon the Eleians and their allies. Behind both of these factors, it is argued below, was the determination of a dominant faction at Sparta to pursue its perennial policy of intervention in the Greek *poleis* on behalf of aristocracy.¹

The Dispute over Lepreon

Despite the alliance of the Eleians and the Lakedaimonians during the Archidamian War, the former voted against the Peace of Nikias, and, after its conclusion, the latter supported the Lepreans in their revolt against the Eleians, placing a garrison in the revolting city. When the Lakedaimonians attacked an Eleian border post and increased the garrison in Lepreon during the Olympic peace of 420 B.C., the Eleians fined the Lakedaimonians and excluded them from sacrifice at the altar of Zeus and thus from participation in the Olympic festival. In order to ensure their own safety, the Eleians joined the Mantineians, Argives and Athenians in forming a quadruple alliance that aimed to resist Lakedaimonian interference in the internal affairs of the Peloponnesian states. Once they had recovered Lepreon, however, the Eleians left this alliance and readmitted the Lakedaimonians to the sanctuary of Zeus.

Thucydides records that up to a time during the Archidamian War the Lepreans had regularly paid one talent to Olympian Zeus, but ‘then, using the war as a pretext, they stopped’.² Thucydides does not explain the motive of the Lepreans for severing their ties with the Eleians and establishing a direct alliance with the

¹ For the pursuit of this policy in the late-sixth and early-fifth centuries B.C., see Appendix, 331-44.

² V.31.3: ἔπειτα παυσαμένον διὰ πρόφασιν τοῦ πολέμου. The meaning of πρόφασις has been disputed by scholars, particularly in relation to Thucydides’ use of ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις in I.23.6: Andrewes, A., ‘Thucydides on the Causes of the War’ *CQ* 9 (1959) 224; Gomme, A.W., *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* I (Oxford, 1945) 152f; Rawlings, H.R., *A Semantic Study of Prophasis to 400 B.C.* (Weisbaden, 1975), esp. 61-81; Hornblower, S., *A Commentary on Thucydides* I (Oxford, 1991) 64-66. Here it is taken to signify a pretext or justification rather than a cause.

Lakedaimonians. They might simply have calculated that direct contributions to the allied war fund would be a cheaper option than paying the talent to Zeus, which would be especially urgent if the war had created financial difficulties,³ but there appear to have been deeper motives. It is unlikely that, as Falkner suggests, they were simply ‘attempting to assert their independence while Elis was otherwise engaged’ in the Archidamian War, since this would have undermined the war effort of the Lakedaimonians, whom they could thus not expect to support them.⁴ It is more likely, as argued below, that an aristocratic party had come to power in Lepreon and feared Eleian interference.

The Eleians responded with force to the Leprean refusal to pay the tribute, and the Lepreans turned to the Lakedaimonians, to whom a judgement on this issue was then entrusted.⁵ The Eleians might have expected a verdict in their own favour, since the Leprean revolt had begun while the war was in progress and the Lakedaimonians were their allies, and Eleian support was more valuable to the Lakedaimonians than that of the Lepreans.⁶ The obligations of the Lepreans to the Eleians, furthermore, were long-established,⁷ and the Lakedaimonians had agreed that what the Eleians held at the beginning of the war they were entitled to retain at its end.⁸

Despite this, the Eleians soon came to suspect that they would not get fair treatment and so, neglecting the arbitration, ravaged the land of the Lepreans.⁹ The Lakedaimonians, as the Eleians had feared, judged that the Lepreans were *autonomoi* and the Eleians were in the wrong. Thucydides appears to express surprise at this verdict, and to have favoured the Eleian case over that of the Lepreans.¹⁰ When the

³ Falkner, C., ‘Sparta and Lepreon in the Archidamian War (Thuc. 5.31.2-5)’ *Historia* 48 (1999) 389.

⁴ Falkner, 1999, 389.

⁵ Thuc. V.31.3: οἱ Ἡλεῖοι ἐπηνάγκαζον, οἱ δ’ ἐτράποντο πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, καὶ δίκης Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐπιτραπέισης.

⁶ Andrewes in Gomme, A.W., Andrewes A. and Dover, K.J., *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* IV (Oxford, 1970) 28.

⁷ cf. Falkner, 1999, 390.

⁸ Thuc. V.31.5. Andrewes in Gomme *et al.*, 1970, 28f, discusses the possibility that the Eleians in this passage of Thucydides were instead referring to the peace of Nikias, but concludes that there might yet have been an agreement before the outbreak of the Archidamian war; cf. Falkner, 1999, 393, n.28. Lendon, J.E., ‘Thucydides and the “Constitution” of the Peloponnesian League’ *GRBS* 35 (1994) 162, points out that this cannot have been an appeal to the Peace of Nikias, since ‘Elis refused to ratify the peace (Thuc. 5.17.2), and thus can have had no right to make claims under it formally or informally.’

⁹ Thuc. V.31.3: ὑποτοπήσαντες οἱ Ἡλεῖοι μὴ ἴσον ἔξιν, ἀνέντες τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν Λεπρεατῶν τὴν γῆν ἔτεμον.

¹⁰ Thuc. V.31.4: οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐδὲν ἤσσαν ἐδίκασαν; Andrewes in Gomme *et al.*, 1970, 27; Falkner, 1999, 390.

Eleians refused to abide by their arbitration, the Lakedaimonians sent a garrison of hoplites into Lepreon.¹¹

The Eleians took the apparently accurate view that the Lakedaimonians had received an ally of theirs that had revolted. They responded by dissolving their alliance with the Lakedaimonians on the basis that by supporting the revolt of the Lepreans they had not kept to the agreement by which that alliance was concluded at the beginning of the Archidamian War.¹² The Eleians then allied themselves to the Corinthians before joining the Mantineians in a defensive alliance with the Argives, thus prompting the Corinthians to do the same.¹³ The text of Thucydides, in which the events related above follow closely upon one another, suggests that they occurred within a relatively short period of time, even though they began during the Archidamian War and ended after the Peace of Nikias.¹⁴

Four of the allies of the Lakedaimonians, the Boiotians, Corinthians, Eleians and Megarians, had voted against the Peace of Nikias because the negotiations did not satisfy them.¹⁵ It should come as no surprise that the Corinthians and Eleians were disappointed with the peace negotiations, since nothing is said in the text of the treaty about the return to the Corinthians of Anaktorion, their colony at the mouth of the Ambrakian gulf, captured by the Athenians and Akarnanians in 425 B.C.¹⁶ The return of Anaktorion, along with Sollion in Akarnania, was of prime importance to the Corinthians.¹⁷ Their colony of Ambrakia, greatly depleted after the slaughter of the Ambrakians in 426/5 B.C., is likely to have been the basis of Corinthian influence over Epeiros.¹⁸ Anaktorion commanded access to the Ambrakian Gulf, essential for maintaining contact with Ambrakia.

This same issue was of vital interest to the Eleians, who could be denied access to their own colonies in the Ambrakian Gulf and, furthermore, without a strong Corinthian sphere of influence in Epeiros, might find the route along the

¹¹ Thuc. V.31.4.

¹² Thuc. V.31.5.

¹³ Thuc. V.31.1, 5f; 48.2. That this first alliance was defensive is revealed by Thucydides' use of ἐπιμαχία at V.48.2; cf. Gomme *et al.*, 1970, 64.

¹⁴ Thuc. V.31.2.

¹⁵ Thuc. V.17.2: τούτοις δὲ οὐκ ἤρρεσκε τὰ πρᾶσσόμενα.

¹⁶ Thuc. V.18.1-19.2; cf. IV.49.1.

¹⁷ Thuc. V.30.2; cf. II.30.1; Westlake, H.D., 'Corinth and the Argive Coalition' *AJPhil.* 61 (1940) 415; Kagan, D., 'Corinthian Diplomacy after the Peace of Nicias' *AJPhil.* 81 (1960) 292.

¹⁸ Thuc. III.113.6.

Louros valley to Dodona unsafe for pilgrims or merchants.¹⁹ By the terms of the treaty, it seems, control of the north-west was to be left in the hands of the Athenians and their allies, and both the Eleians and the Corinthians found this damaging to their vital interests. This sufficiently explains the Eleian hesitance to agree to the peace.

Inglis, however, suggests that the refusal of the Eleians to vote for the Peace of Nikias ‘was due primarily to the unresolved Leprean question.’²⁰ If the Lakedaimonians had deprived the Eleians of Lepreon before the Peace of Nikias,²¹ nevertheless, it would seem surprising that the latter attended a meeting of the allies, were privy to the peace negotiations and voted on the treaty.²² This is not a problem, on the other hand, if we place the Leprean revolt towards the end of the Archidamian War, when it was agreed that the Lakedaimonians should arbitrate,²³ but allocate the Lakedaimonian decision against the Eleians and occupation of Lepreon to a time *after* the Peace of Nikias, which the Eleians had refused to swear to on account of the failure of the Lakedaimonians to obtain the return of Anaktorion to the Corinthians.²⁴

Thucydides explains the reticence of the Eleians concerning the Peace of Nikias on the grounds that the negotiations did not satisfy them,²⁵ but cites the dispute over Lepreon as the cause of their alliance with the Argives, rather than the cause of their failure to swear to the peace.²⁶ The Peace of Nikias was sworn at the very beginning of spring, 421 B.C.²⁷ The Lakedaimonian occupation of Lepreon appears to have taken place no earlier than that time and to have been the direct cause of the decision of the Eleians to join the first, defensive Argive alliance in the summer of that same year.²⁸ This alliance, says Diodoros, was formed in the interest

¹⁹ See above, 78-84.

²⁰ Inglis, A., *A History of Elis, ca. 700-365 B.C.* (Harvard PhD Thesis, 1998) 99; cf. Falkner, 1999, 385.

²¹ Thuc. V.31.4.

²² Thuc. V.17.2.

²³ Thuc. V.31.3.

²⁴ Thuc. V.17.2, 30.2; cf. IV.49.1.

²⁵ Thuc. V.17.2.

²⁶ Thuc. V.31.1-5; cf. Hornblower, S., *A Commentary on Thucydides II* (Oxford, 1996) 469; Andrewes in Gomme, A.W., Andrewes A. and Dover, K.J., *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides V* (Oxford, 1981) 376; Falkner, 1999, 390, believes that the Spartan decision was made while the Archidamian war was in progress, but we need not assume so.

²⁷ Thuc. V.20.1.

²⁸ Thuc. V.31.5, cf. 48.2: ἐπιμαχία.

of the common freedom of its members.²⁹ Thucydides records the dispute over Lepreon as the immediate cause of the adhesion of the Eleians to this alliance.³⁰

The Politics of the Dispute over Lepreon

Four possible motives present themselves for the Lakedaimonian decision to support the revolt of the Lepreans. The first is that they felt that the Leprean cause was just. The Lakedaimonians cannot have been altruistic about this, however, since they held their own Lakonian and Messenian *perioikoi* in subjection.³¹ If the Lepreans were only interested in saving money by avoiding the long-standing obligation to pay tribute to the Eleians, furthermore, it is difficult to see how the Lakedaimonians could have judged the case in this way. The second is that they felt annoyed at the Eleians for not voting in favour of peace with the Athenians and so wanted to punish them. The Eleians, however, had become allies of the Lakedaimonians only for the immediate purpose of prosecuting the war against the Athenians and should not be seen as being under their tutelage in any sense. We should look, moreover, for greater pragmatism on the part of the Lakedaimonians, who could not have expected their support for the Lepreans to do anything other than aggravate the problem of Eleian disapproval of the peace terms.

The third possible reason is security. The Athenians still held Pylos, and a hostile power to the north of the Neda might accentuate the danger. Falkner argues that ‘the site of Lepreon, in particular, could act as a place of refuge for deserting and rebellious helots and as a centre of resistance, as Ithome had done earlier.’ The Spartans, she believes, might have feared that ‘democratic Eleians would sympathise with the helots’. This strategic interest of the Spartans might have led the Eleians, already frustrated at the loss of the Peloponnesian fleet,³² ‘to suspect the Spartans’ impartiality as arbitrators’.³³ The Athenians, nevertheless, were now allies of the Lakedaimonians, so it would seem a strange time to be concerned about Pylos. Even when the Athenians withdrew the Messenians, Helots and Lakonian deserters from Pylos at the end of the same summer in which the Lakedaimonians had occupied

²⁹ Diod. XII.75.5: πρὸς τὴν κοινὴν ἐλευθερίαν.

³⁰ Thuc. V.31.1-5.

³¹ cf. Paus. III.8.3; Bosworth, B., ‘Autonomia: the Use and Abuse of Political Terminology’ *SIFC* 3.10.1-2 (1992) 131, n.35, 134.

³² Thuc. IV.16.1, 23.1.

³³ Falkner, 1999, 390f; cf. Ruggeri, C., *Gli stati intorno a Olimpia: Storia e costituzione dell’Elide e degli stati formati dai perieci elei (400-362a.C)* (Stuttgart, 2004) 121.

Lepreon, that of 421 B.C.,³⁴ the latter was not restored to the Eleians. Until the Lakedaimonians occupied Lepreon, moreover, there is no sign of any Eleian hostility towards them.

Falkner raises a fourth possibility, that ‘the Spartans may even have interfered in Lepreon’s internal politics to ensure a favourable outcome’.³⁵ While political interference seems likely, however, such ‘meddling’ cannot have been undertaken for security reasons while the Eleians were still loyal allies and, as argued above, the Peace of Nikias was sworn before the Lakedaimonian arbitration was pronounced. It might, nevertheless, have been undertaken for another purpose. If the Lakedaimonians had indeed decided to support the Leprean aristocrats it is more likely to have been because, once the Archidamian War was over, they felt free to interfere in the internal politics of their allies. Political interference, in other words, might itself have been the motive. The fear of this kind of Lakedaimonian activity appears to have prompted the Korinthian delegates to the peace conference, as they passed through Argos on their way home from Sparta,³⁶ to claim that the Lakedaimonians had made the peace and alliance with the Athenians ‘not for the good but for the enslavement of the Peloponnese’,³⁷ a fear that was widespread among the Peloponnesians.³⁸ If the ‘slaves’ who had once ruled Argos were indeed the aristocrats who came to power as a result of the Lakedaimonian victory at Sepeia, as suggested below,³⁹ then the words of the Korinthians might have had a particular resonance among the Argives.

The refusal of the Lepreans to pay the money to Zeus constitutes an abrupt policy reversal on their part, and this might have been preceded by a change of regime. Thucydides reports that the Lakedaimonians later settled the Helots who had fought with Brasidas, along with some *neodamodeis*, at Lepreon.⁴⁰ Cartledge

³⁴ Thuc. V.35.7.

³⁵ Falkner, 1999, 391.

³⁶ This route *via* Argos was the usual one from Sparta to Korinth: Tomlinson, R.A., *Argos and the Argolid* (London, 1972) 118; Adshead, K., *Politics of the Archaic Peloponnese* (Aldershot, 1986) 2, cf. 1-18.

³⁷ Thuc. V.27.2: οὐκ ἐπὶ ἀγαθῷ ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ καταδουλώσει τῆς Πελοποννήσου.

³⁸ Thuc. V.29.3: βούλωνται Λακεδαιμόνιοι δουλώσασθαι; Diod. XII.75.2, 4; cf. the Eleian accusation against the Spartans at Diod. XIV.17.5f: προσεγκαλούντων ὅτι τοὺς Ἕλληνας καταδουλοῦνται. As Price points out, Thucydides emphasises the role of fear of the Spartans, as well as anger, in motivating those who joined the alliance: Price, J.J., *Thucydides and Internal War* (Cambridge, 2001) 270. Westlake, 1940, 414, unreasonably dismisses this fear as a Korinthian fabrication.

³⁹ See Appendix, 320-29.

⁴⁰ Thuc. V.34.1.

maintains, ‘despite much modern scholarship’, that ‘there is no evidence and no reason to believe that they received grants of land in Triphylia.’ Gomme believes, on the other hand, that ‘Lepreon had been declared “autonomous” by Sparta...in dubious circumstances; it looks as if many Lepreatai had refused the gift of autonomy and migrated to Elis, leaving land to be settled by these enfranchised helots and νεοδαμώδεις’.⁴¹ If so, the Lepreans were by no means monolithic in their support for Sparta, and the dispossessed Lepreans can be counted as political refugees.

The Lakedaimonian declaration that the Lepreans were *autonomoi*, literally that they were to have their own laws and customs, suggests that internal political issues were at stake.⁴² As Raaflaub demonstrates, *autonomia* is best understood by comparison with *eleutheria*.⁴³ While *eleutheria* looks outward to the absence of foreign domination, he convincingly argues, *autonomia* looks inward, stressing self-determination. The Mytilenaians at Sparta, Raaflaub points out, describe themselves as ‘*autonomoi* and at least nominally *eleutheroi*’.⁴⁴ The ‘outside allies’ of Athens, that is, those who were not members of the Delian league, ‘are called autonomous when Thucydides stresses their unrestricted capacity for internal self-determination, in contrast to their external freedom of action’. Raaflaub concludes that *autonomia* was most importantly associated with the ideal ‘that the citizens themselves should be able to determine their *nomoi*: the constitution, way of life, and policies of their community.’⁴⁵

Bosworth, citing Herodotus and Hippokrates,⁴⁶ points out that ‘in the earliest attested prose usages [of *autonomos/autonomia*] the context is the internal political life of a community and the negative is quite simply tyranny.’⁴⁷ In Aristotle, too, we see citizens who are *autonomoi* contrasted with those ruled by a monarch.⁴⁸ The

⁴¹ Cartledge, P.A., *Sparta and Lakonia: a Regional History 1300-362 B.C.* (London, 1979) 251; Gomme *et al.*, 1970, 36; cf. Ruggeri, 2004, 121.

⁴² Thuc. V.31.4. The issues raised by the use of this term cannot be fully explored here. The scholarly literature includes Ostwald, M., *Autonomia: Its Genesis and Early History* (Chico, Cal., 1982); Bosworth, 1992, 122-52, cf. the works cited in 123, n.2; Raaflaub, K., *The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece* (Chicago, 2004) 147-60, cf. the works cited in 147, nn.162-64; Cartledge, P.A., *Agisilaos and the Crisis of Sparta* (London, 1987) 249f.

⁴³ Raaflaub, 2004, 147.

⁴⁴ Thuc. III.10.5: αὐτόνομοι δὴ ὄντες καὶ ἐλεύθεροι τῷ ὀνόματι.

⁴⁵ Raaflaub, 2004, 155.

⁴⁶ Hdt. I.96.1; Hippok. *Airs, Waters, Places* 16.17-19: οἱ ἄνθρωποι μηδὲ αὐτόνομοι, ἀλλὰ δεσπόζονται.

⁴⁷ Bosworth, 1992, 123.

⁴⁸ Arist. *Pol.* V.IX.16, 1315a.4-6.

passage from Herodotus, nevertheless, already reveals that *autonomia* could be threatened by an external power as well as by forces within a state. When the Medes and the other *ethne* of Asia cast off their slavery to the Assyrians and become free (ἐλευθερώθησαν), they are *autonomoi* for a while, but the Medes again fall under tyranny when they choose a king.⁴⁹ As Bosworth points out, citing another passage from Herodotus,⁵⁰ despite the earlier usage in opposition to tyranny, the usual context ‘is that of interstate relationships and the negative of autonomy is the imposition of laws by another state or the policing of laws under external coercion.’⁵¹

When the Lakedaimonians, in the negotiations that led up to the Peloponnesian War, demanded *autonomia* for the allies of the Athenians, they did not mean that the Athenians should give up their hegemony.⁵² The case of Aigina is most illustrative. When some individual Aiginetans complained at Sparta that they were not *autonomoi* as agreed in the Thirty Years Peace, the Lakedaimonians demanded that the Athenians restore them to this state.⁵³ The Lakedaimonians, it seems, were content for the Aiginetans to remain allies of the Athenians, but appear to have been concerned about Athenian interference in their internal affairs. The reply of Perikles to a general Spartan demand is also revealing: the Athenians will make their *poleis autonomoi* when ‘they also allow their own *poleis* to be *autonomoi*, not in a way that is suitable to the Lakedaimonians, but as each of them wishes’.⁵⁴ This passage implies that when the Lakedaimonians demanded *autonomia* for a *polis*, they meant that it should have a constitution of which they approved.

As Raaflaub maintains, the Lakedaimonians in the early-fourth century B.C. used *autonomia* as ‘an instrument of empire’ and ‘Elis was the first victim’.⁵⁵ In such cases there need not have been any immediately preceding event that prompted the Lakedaimonians to spring to the defence of the subject allies of other states, but in the period now under discussion the Eleians are likely to have threatened the *autonomia* of Lepreon in some tangible way. It seems reasonable to suppose that the

⁴⁹ Hdt. I.95.2-98.1.

⁵⁰ Hdt. VIII.140a.2.

⁵¹ Bosworth, 1992, 124; cf. Raaflaub, 2004, 153f.

⁵² Thuc. I.67.2, 139.1, 3, 140.3, 144.2; Raaflaub, 2004, 149; Bosworth, 1992, 126; Ostwald, 1982, 42.

⁵³ Thuc. I.67.2: οὐκ εἶναι αὐτόνομοι κατὰ τὰς σπονδάς; cf. 139.1, 140.3.

⁵⁴ Thuc. I.144.2: καὶ ὅταν κάκεῖνοι ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ἀποδῶσι πόλεσι μὴ σφίσιν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐπιτηδείως αὐτονομεῖσθαι ἀλλ’ αὐτοῖς ἐκάστοις ὡς βούλονται.

⁵⁵ Raaflaub, 2004, 127, 131; cf. Nielsen, T.H., ‘A Survey of Dependent *Poleis* in Arkadia’ in Hansen, M.H. and Raaflaub, K. (eds), *More Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis* (Stuttgart, 1996) 93; Kelly, D.H., *Sources and Interpretations of Spartan History in the Reigns of Agesilaos II, Archidamos III and Agis III* (Cambridge PhD Dissertation, 1975) 24.

Lepreans had made a turn towards aristocratic government and, when the Eleians attempted to intervene, broke away from their alliance and appealed to the Lakedaimonians. The latter, once they had freed their hands by concluding peace with the Athenians, stepped forward as the champions of Leprean *autonomia*. As was common in the fourth century B.C. when, as Bosworth ironically concludes, *autonomia* meant ‘servile dependency’, an aristocratically-governed Lepreon might now become a dependent ally of the Lakedaimonians.⁵⁶

Lakedaimonian Policy after the Peace of Nikias

This explanation seems more likely when we consider both the way in which further conflicts in the Peloponnese developed during the interval between the Archidamian and Dekeleian wars, and the implications of the use of *αὐτόνομος* by the Lakedaimonians during the course of those conflicts. There can be no doubt that constitutional considerations lay behind the decision of the Boiotians and Megarians to decline the opportunity to join the Argive alliance in 421 B.C., since Thucydides says that ‘being oligarchic themselves, they thought that the democracy of the Argives was less suitable than the constitution of the Lakedaimonians’.⁵⁷ The Argives and Corinthians,⁵⁸ despite their hopes, were also unable to enlist as allies the Tegeans, whose democracy appears to have been overthrown in the 450s B.C. and whose city was in oligarchic hands at this time.⁵⁹

In the summer of 421 B.C., the Lakedaimonians intervened in a *stasis* among the Parrhasians, subject allies of the Mantineians who, like the Argives, had a

⁵⁶ Bosworth, 1992, 136.

⁵⁷ Thuc. V.31.6: ἤσσαν ξύμφορον.

⁵⁸ No assumptions are made here concerning the constitution of the Corinthians, though they appear to have had no difficulty in accommodating themselves to either oligarchic or democratic regimes, which suggests that their constitution was a moderate oligarchy or limited democracy flexible enough to allow alternate factions to hold sway at various times. Note in particular their alliance with the Epidamnian democrats against their aristocrats and willingness to send colonists to Epidamnos on the basis of equality (Thuc. I.27.1); cf. Whibley, L., *Greek Oligarchies: Their Character and Organization* (London, 1896) 131 and n.26, 157, 164; Lutz, D.M., ‘The Corinthian Constitution after the Fall of the Cypselids’ *CR* 10 (1898) 419; O’Neill, J.G., *Ancient Corinth* (Baltimore, 1930) 143-46; Kagan, 1960, 293f; Stroud, R.S., ‘Tribal Boundary Markers from Corinth’ *CSCA* 1 (1968) 233-42; Oost, S., ‘Cypselus the Bacchiad’ *CPhil.* 67 (1972) 30; Roebuck, C., *Economy and Society in the Early Greek World: Collected Essays* (Chicago, 1979) 114; Salmon, J.B., *Wealthy Corinth: A History of the City to 338B.C.* (Oxford, 1984) 130, 413-19; Stanton, G.R., ‘The Territorial Tribes of Corinth and Phleious’ *Cl. Ant.* 5 (1986) 139-53; Adshead, 1986, 43.

⁵⁹ Thuc. V.32.3f, 64.1, 82.3; see Appendix, 315.

democratic constitution, and made them *autonomoi*.⁶⁰ All of the parties to the quadruple alliance of 420 B.C., the Athenians, Argives, Mantineians and Eleians,⁶¹ had democratic constitutions, and the Argives decided to make the alliance with the Athenians partly because the latter were old friends and a great sea-power, but also because they were ruled by a democracy, just like themselves.⁶² The battle of Mantinea itself came about through a factional dispute. The democratic allies decided to proceed to Tegea instead of Lepreon before the battle because some in the city were prepared to give the place up to them,⁶³ and the Lakedaimonians sent a huge force to Tegea in order to ensure that the city did not go over to the Argives and their allies.⁶⁴

After the Lakedaimonians had defeated the democratic alliance at Mantinea, peace between the Argives and Lakedaimonians was brought about by men who wanted to put an end to the democracy in Argos.⁶⁵ One of the articles of the treaty that established the peace was that ‘the *poleis* in the Peloponnese, both large and small, are to be *autonomoi*, all consistent with their ancestral constitutions’.⁶⁶ Soon afterwards, when the Argives gave up their alliance with the democratic states and became allies of the Lakedaimonians, politically-loaded phraseology was again prominent. By the terms of the treaty of alliance, the allies would give legal settlements *κατὰ πάτρια*, and, in addition to being *αὐτοπόλιες*, the rest of the cities in the Peloponnese were to be *αὐτόνομοι*. They were to make their own settlements *κατὰ πάτρια*, and private law was also to proceed *κατὰ πάτρια*.⁶⁷

⁶⁰ Thuc. V.33.1, cf. 29.1. See the discussion, mainly by Andrewes, in Gomme *et al.*, 1970, 31-34; cf. Tomlinson, 1972, 119. As Gomme, 32, points out in relation to Thucydides’ use of *ἐπικαλεσαμένων*, ‘the genitive is doubtless due to the fact that only some of the Parrasioi had invited their help, *κατὰ στάσιν*.’

⁶¹ Thuc. V.40.1-47.12.

⁶² Thuc. V.44.1: *δημοκρατουμένην ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοί*.

⁶³ Thuc. V.42.2.

⁶⁴ Thuc. V.64.1ff.

⁶⁵ Thuc. V.76.2: *βουλόμενοι τὸν δῆμον τὸν ἐν Ἄργει καταλῦσαι*; cf. 39.4-40.5.

⁶⁶ Thuc. V.77.5: *αὐτονόμως ἤμεν πάσας κατὰ πάτρια*.

⁶⁷ Thuc. V.79.1, 5. Ostwald, 1982, 5f, claims that *τὰ πάτρια* here is used to remind the states ‘that certain traditions, which should not be broken, represented a norm in inter-state relations’, but there can be no doubt that while the fourth provision deals with relations between the states (V.79.4), the first, the only provision in which the expression *κατὰ πάτρια* is used (V.79.1), concerns the *internal* political affairs of both the two parties to the alliance and the other states of the Peloponnese. Finley, M.I., *The Ancestral Constitution* (Cambridge, 1971) 3-14, shows that the interpretation of expressions like *patrios politeia* was a matter of hot political contention in Athens at the end of the fifth century B.C. The claim of Fuks, A., *The Ancestral Constitution* (London, 1953) 60, that the use of *κατὰ πάτρια* in the Lakedaimonian/Argive treaty shows that expressions like *κατὰ τὰ πάτρια* usually mean ‘that the contracting parties guarantee...the internal autonomy, whatever be the constitution of the state’ is not accepted here, since subsequent events suggest otherwise.

The provision that every state would give ‘fair and consistent legal decisions according to ancestral tradition’ (κατὰ πάτρια δίκας διδόντες τὰς ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίως)⁶⁸ appears to indicate that the law would be in the hands of traditional courts. This is likely to imply that the ‘fair and consistent legal decisions’ would be dispensed at the discretion of aristocratic judges. In addition, it indicates that the decisions of such judges would also apply to the organs of government, as is also suggested by the subsequent actions of the 1,000 men from each of the parties to the treaty. Once the alliance had been concluded, the Lakedaimonians and Argives established a kind of political police force, each contributing 1,000 men.⁶⁹ The contingent of the Argives consisted of ‘one thousand of the younger, especially those who were powerful in body and in wealth’ whom they had picked out for intensive military training in 421 B.C.⁷⁰ Aristotle identifies them as οἱ γνώριμοι, ‘the notables’.⁷¹

According to this passage of Aristotle, these men were soon able to overthrow the democracy at Argos because of the reputation that they had gained in the battle of Mantinea.⁷² Diodoros confirms the story of their excellent performance in battle.⁷³ He also reports that on the advice of Pharax, one of the Spartan *syboulai*, Agis had deliberately allowed these men to escape.⁷⁴ Diodoros says that Pharax was wary about the risks of battle against such men if cornered, but also implies that the Lakedaimonians might have killed all of the Argives had they wished.⁷⁵ This leads to the conclusion, not contradicted by the account of Thucydides, that in the last phase of the battle of Mantinea the Lakedaimonians had deliberately preserved the thousand ‘notable’ Argives.⁷⁶

At first the 1,000 Lakedaimonians of the joint force that had been established by the treaty of alliance, without the assistance of the Argive thousand, established a *more* oligarchic, and probably aristocratic, form of government in Sikyon. Griffin suggests that the Lakedaimonians made these arrangements to secure their secondary

⁶⁸ Thuc. V.79.1.

⁶⁹ Thuc. V.81.2.

⁷⁰ Diod. XII.75.7: μάλιστα τοῖς τε σώμασιν ἰσχύοντας καὶ ταῖς οὐσίαις.

⁷¹ Arist. *Pol.* V.3.5, 1304a.25-27; cf. Grote, G., *A History of Greece* VII (Everyman Edition, London, 1907) 129, who calls them ‘citizens of wealth and family’, cf. 140.

⁷² καὶ ἐν Ἄργει οἱ γνώριμοι εὐδοκιμήσαντες περὶ τὴν ἐν Μαντινείᾳ μάχην τὴν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπεχείρησαν καταλύειν τὸν δῆμον.

⁷³ Diod. XII.79.4

⁷⁴ Diod. XII.79.6f.

⁷⁵ Diod. XII.79.6: καὶ πάντας ἂν ἀνεῖλεν.

⁷⁶ Thuc. V.73.4, cf. 72.3, 73.2-3; cf. Kagan, 1960, 308.

route to the north through Arkadia and Sikyon to the Isthmos. Now that Argos was an ally and the main land route from Sparta to the north was in friendly hands, however, this cannot have been a consideration, so it is more likely that the constitutional arrangements at Sikyon were part of a wider political agenda.⁷⁷ Tomlinson says that they ‘went around overthrowing democratic governments (suspected of pro-Athenian sympathies) and replacing them with oligarchic regimes.’⁷⁸ Sikyon was already an oligarchy at this time, nevertheless, so it is more likely that the Lakedaimonians were motivated by the desire to see the Peloponnesian states governed by aristocracies than by security concerns.⁷⁹

The 1,000 Lakedaimonians and 1,000 Argives of the joint force that had been established by the alliance then combined to put an end to the Argive democracy.⁸⁰ Diodoros’ report of the overthrow of democracy in Argos provides a more detailed insight into what the Lakedaimonians and their supporters in Argos intended to follow from the provision that legal settlements in the *poleis* would be made *κατὰ πάτρια*. The thousand Argives replaced the democracy with their own aristocracy.⁸¹ They then put to death the regular popular leaders (*τοὺς δημαγωγεῖν εἰωθότας*), terrified the rest of the people and abolished the existing laws (*κατέλυσαν τοὺς νόμους*). This violent overthrow of the long-established Argive democracy,⁸² and its replacement by the aristocracy of *οἱ γνώριμοι*, appears to be what the Lakedaimonians meant when they spoke of supporting the ‘ancestral constitution’ and, it seems, the kind of thing that they had in mind when they declared that a *polis* was to be *autonomos*.

In 417 B.C., the Lakedaimonians made arrangements suitable to themselves in Achaia, too.⁸³ The process of replacing popular government with aristocracy, nevertheless, was not to continue unimpeded, and democratic revolution soon broke out in both Argos and Tegea. The Lakedaimonians prepared to go to the aid of the oligarchs in Argos, and at this the Argive democrats turned again to the Athenians.⁸⁴ Despite its brevity, the interlude of Lakedaimonian-Argive cooperation helps to

⁷⁷ Griffin, A., *Sicyon* (Oxford, 1982) 65; see Appendix, 343f.

⁷⁸ Tomlinson, 1972, 124.

⁷⁹ cf. Grote, 1907, 146: ‘for the purpose of introducing a more thoroughpaced oligarchy into the already oligarchical Sikyonian government.’

⁸⁰ Thuc. V.81.2; Diod. XII.80.2f; cf. Arist. *Pol.* V.3.5, 1304a.25-27; Kagan, 1960, 309.

⁸¹ Diod. XII.80.2: ἀριστοκρατίαν δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν καθιστάναι.

⁸² At least seventy years old: see Appendix, 318-29.

⁸³ Thuc. V.82.1.

⁸⁴ Thuc. V.82.2-6; cf. Diod. XII.80.3, 81.3.

reveal the aims of the dominant faction at Sparta and its aristocratic counterparts throughout the Peloponnese. The decision of the Lakedaimonian arbitrators only a few years earlier that the Lepreans were *autonomoi* appears to reflect the policy aims revealed by the terms and consequences of their brief alliance with the Argives rather than to result from a desire to free the smaller *poleis* of Eleia from any supposed Eleian oppression.⁸⁵

The Exclusion of the Lakedaimonians from the Olympics

While the Eleians voted against the Peace of Nikias because of the failure of the Lakedaimonians to secure the return of Anaktorion to the Corinthians, they seem to have made the defensive alliance with the Argives in 421 B.C. because the Lakedaimonians had supported the revolt of the Lepreans.⁸⁶ This led to further conflict between the Eleians and the Lakedaimonians, including some events that are cited as causes of the Eleian War of c.400 B.C.⁸⁷ Immediately following the declaration in Eleia of the *ekecheiria* for the Olympic festival of 420 B.C., the Lakedaimonians attacked the Eleian fortress of Phyrkos, presumably near the border with Messenia, and sent a further force of hoplites into Lepreon. Since this was allied rather than Eleian territory, the Lakedaimonians had not violated the *asylia* of the Eleians, but they had infringed the Olympic peace, and so the Eleians fined them the huge sum of 2,000 *minai*, according to the penalty specified by Olympic law.⁸⁸

Roy concludes that the Eleian charge of infringement of the *ekecheiria*, made when the Lakedaimonians already controlled Lepreon, was ‘contentious’, since Lepreon was no longer in Eleian territory. Because the Lakedaimonians had garrisoned Lepreon in 421 B.C. before sending extra hoplites in 420 B.C.,⁸⁹ he believes, all Eleian claims to Lepreon were invalid. This seems a strange view of international justice. The Lakedaimonians in the summer of 420 B.C., moreover, had not only sent more troops into Lepreon but had also attacked an Eleian fortress. In

⁸⁵ Thuc. V.31.4.

⁸⁶ Thuc. V.31.1-5.

⁸⁷ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.21f; Diod. XIV.17.4; Paus. III.8.3; cf. Falkner, 1999, 385.

⁸⁸ Thuc. V.49.1; Roy, J., ‘Thucydides 5.49.1-50.4: the Quarrel between Elis and Sparta in 420 B.C., and Elis’ Exploitation of Olympia’ *Klio* 80 (1998) 360. 2,000 *minai* equalled 200,000 *drachmai*, and each *drachma* appears to have been equivalent to a good day’s wage. It amounted to thirty-three and one third talents: Burn, A.R., in Herodotus, *The Histories* (Harmondsworth, 1972) 36f.

⁸⁹ Thuc. V.31.4, 49.1.

Roy's view, this episode reveals 'how Elis used its control of Olympia', and he concludes that the Eleians were 'exploiting it shabbily'.⁹⁰

The so-called 'exploitation', nevertheless, appears to have consisted of no more than a firm response to Lakedaimonian aggression. As Sordi points out, it was 'precisely the intervention in support of Lepreon...that provided the Eleians in 421/420 the pretext for inflicting an Olympic fine.'⁹¹ The Eleian decision to fine the Lakedaimonians followed fairly closely upon the unfair Lakedaimonian arbitration against the Eleians: the decision against the Eleians, if it followed the Peace of Nikias, cannot have been earlier than spring 421 B.C. and the Lakedaimonians were fined in the summer of 420 B.C.

The decision to fine the Lakedaimonians was probably taken by the Olympic council, a body that is likely to have been composed of the Olympic *proxenoi*, representatives of the states who traditionally constituted the amphictyony of Olympia. Although the Lakedaimonians might have been entitled to send one or more *proxenoi* to this council, the remaining members appear to have been the delegates of the Eleian communities.⁹² The motives of the Eleians seem clear. Since the Lakedaimonians had unfairly adjudicated against them in the matter of Lepreon, they had no hesitation in bringing the full force of Olympic law to bear upon the Lakedaimonians in relation to the same dispute. The Lakedaimonians protested on the basis of the technical argument that they had attacked the fortress before the Eleians had declared the *ekecheiria* in Lakedaimonian territory, but the Eleians were able to point out that the attack took place in their own territory, where the *ekecheiria* had already been declared, rather than in Lakedaimon.⁹³

After further such arguments had failed to resolve the dispute,⁹⁴ the Eleians made an offer that reveals that their aim in persisting with the fine was to pressure the Lakedaimonians into returning Lepreon: if the Lakedaimonians did so, the Eleians would give up the share of the fine that was due to themselves and also pay the share that was due to the god.⁹⁵ When the Lakedaimonians refused this, the

⁹⁰ Roy, 1998, 361f, 366; cf. Cartledge, 1987, 249.

⁹¹ Sordi, M., 'Il santuario di Olimpia e la Guerra d'Elide' *Contributi dell'Istituto di storia antica* 10 (1984) 21f: 'proprio l'intervento di Sparta in appoggio di Lepreon nella...a fornire nel 421/420 agli Elei il pretesto per infliggere una multa olimpica'.

⁹² See above, 101f, 217; Roy, 1998, 362-64.

⁹³ Thuc. V.49.2f.

⁹⁴ Roy, 1998, 360, 365f. finds the Spartan arguments convincing, but they seem to be a last resort.

⁹⁵ Thuc. V.49.4f.

Eleians made a second offer, perhaps designed to head off the serious possibility that the Lakedaimonians might have to be excluded from the games: they could keep Lepreon and attend the games if they swore a public oath on the altar of Zeus that they would pay the money later.⁹⁶

As Roy points out, both offers obliged the Lakedaimonians to accept guilt.⁹⁷ The Eleians, on the other hand, given that the Olympic council could hardly have been expected to revoke its decision, could not have been more conciliatory, and the subsequent exclusion of the Lakedaimonians from participation in the games is evidence of Spartan inflexibility in regard to Lepreon.⁹⁸ The response of the other Greek states helps to clarify general opinion about the matter: aside from the Lakedaimonians, only the Lepreans failed to send *theoroi*, sacred envoys, to the festival of 420 B.C.⁹⁹

The Quadruple Alliance

From this decision of the Lakedaimonians sprang the remaining episodes in this period that involved the Eleians. It was now that the Eleians joined the Mantineians, Argives and Athenians in a full *symmachia*, most likely because they feared an aggressive Lakedaimonian response to their exclusion from sacrificing at the altar of Zeus and so from competing in the Olympic festival.¹⁰⁰ Because of the fear that the Lakedaimonians would force their way to the altar of Zeus and thus signal their intention to participate, the Eleians posted a guard at Olympia of their young men, reinforced by 1,000 Argives, 1,000 Mantineians and some Athenian cavalry.¹⁰¹ Though not large, the presence of these forces at Olympia sent a clear message to the Lakedaimonians: they could not sacrifice or compete in the games without beginning a war in which significant Peloponnesian states would fight on the Athenian side. Thucydides records, in language that suggests that he was present, that ‘a great alarm arose in the assembly that the Lakedaimonians might come with

⁹⁶ Thuc. V.50.1; cf. Xen. *Hell.* III.2.21.

⁹⁷ Roy, 1998, 364, n.21, 365.

⁹⁸ Hornblower, S., ‘Thucydides, Xenophon, and Lichas: were the Spartans excluded from the Olympic Games from 420 to 400 BC?’ *Phoenix* 54 (2000) 222, refers to the offer of the Eleians as a ‘face-saving formula’. Roy, 1998, 365, concludes that, since the Eleians had given a verdict in their own favour, it is ‘remarkable that the Spartan reaction was so mild.’ He does not, however, point out that before this the Spartans’ own blatantly unfair arbitration had enabled them to occupy Lepreon.

⁹⁹ Thuc. V.50.2; cf. Hornblower, 2000, 222, n.25; Gomme *et al.*, 1970, 66.

¹⁰⁰ Thuc. V.46.5-48.1.

¹⁰¹ Thuc. V.50.3.

arms'.¹⁰² The general opinion appears to have been that the Lakedaimonians took this matter so seriously that they might be prepared not only to disregard the *asylia* of the Eleians, but also to violate the sanctuary of Olympian Zeus itself.

This fear was intensified when Lichas, a famous Spartan, received a beating from the rod-bearers (οἱ ῥαβδοῦχοι) after having crowned the charioteer in order to show that the winning team of horses that had been entered in the name of the Boiotian people actually belonged to himself.¹⁰³ Xenophon describes Lichas as an ἀνὴρ γέρον, which indicates that he was of mature age and perhaps one of the γέροντες, the members of the Spartan council of elders.¹⁰⁴ The same Lichas was the Spartan *proxenos* of the Argives and had earlier been an envoy to Argos.¹⁰⁵ After the battle of Mantinea he arranged, in collusion with the pro-Lakedaimonian party, the peace between the Lakedaimonians and Argives that led to the alliance of the two states and the overthrow of the democracy at Argos.¹⁰⁶ He cannot have been extremely fragile in 420 B.C., since nearly a decade later he was sent as one of eleven Spartan advisors to Astyochos, and appears to have headed the negotiations with Tissaphernes.¹⁰⁷

As Hornblower explains, Lichas 'provocatively exploded a fiction which had been made necessary by the exclusion of the Spartans.'¹⁰⁸ Despite this affair, the Lakedaimonians kept quiet (ἡσύχασαν) and the festival was celebrated in peace.¹⁰⁹ The desire to avoid a general war at this time appears to have been the main reason for their restraint, but there could have been other factors. Perhaps the Lakedaimonians did not respond because some of them disapproved of Lichas' actions, or because of religious scruples reinforced by an awareness of the extent of the censure that they might otherwise have incurred. Perhaps, too, they wished to

¹⁰² Thuc. V.50.4; Hornblower, 2000, 212 and n.1; cf. *Thucydides and Pindar: Historical Narrative and the World of Epinikian Poetry* (Oxford, 2004) 53 and n.7, 273f, 277f; Rood, T., *Thucydides: Narrative and Explanation* (Oxford, 1998) 106.

¹⁰³ Thuc. V.50.4; Xen. *Hell.* III.2.21; Paus. VI.2.1-3. Hornblower, 2004, 278-81, explains the international importance of the aristocratic Lichas and his family; cf. Krentz, P., *Xenophon Hellenika II.3.11-IV.2.8 Edited with an Introduction, Translation and Commentary* (Warminster, 1994) 172; Cartledge, 1987, 249. As Roy, 1998, 361, points out, Thucydides does not say that individual Spartans were banned from being present at the Olympiad of 420 B.C. Pausanias says that the beating was inflicted by the *Hellanodikai*, but it is more likely that they ordered it and others carried it out.

¹⁰⁴ Krentz, 1994, 172.

¹⁰⁵ Thuc. V.22.2.

¹⁰⁶ Thuc. V.76.3; see below, 275f; cf. above, 243ff.

¹⁰⁷ Thuc. VII.39.2, 43.3, 52, 84.5, 87.1.

¹⁰⁸ Hornblower, 2000, 212; cf. 2004, 273.

¹⁰⁹ Thuc. V.50.4.

avoid, as Sordi suggests, the risk of giving the Athenians the opportunity to become the champions of Olympia.¹¹⁰ The negative repercussions for the Lakedaimonians of the Olympic festival of 420 B.C. were of such magnitude that the Athenians, Argives, Mantineians and Eleians thought it worthwhile immediately afterwards to attempt to enlist the Corinthians in their alliance.¹¹¹

Some time after the incident with Lichas in 420 B.C., the Eleians prevented king Agis from sacrificing to Zeus at Olympia, explaining the ancient principle that Greeks should not consult the oracle at Olympia about war with Greeks.¹¹² Cartledge places this event in 414 or 413 B.C., ‘when the Spartans judged that they might legitimately renew aggression upon Athens directly (Thuc. 7.18.3).’¹¹³ Xenophon, nevertheless, says merely that it happened ‘after these events’ (τούτων δ’ ὕστερον), and it seems more likely that Agis confronted the Eleians with a demand to consult the oracle for some campaign in the Peloponnese soon after the festival from which the Lakedaimonians had been excluded.

In the next summer, Agis seems to have intended to take revenge by attacking the Eleians. Under his command, the Lakedaimonians marched out to Leuktra, ‘on their own borders opposite Mt. Lykaion’, but when the sacrifices proved unfavourable they returned home.¹¹⁴ Although Thucydides says that ‘no one knew where they were marching to’, this mountain looms in front of the traveller who stands on the Arkadian-Lakonian border on the road from Sparta to Olympia, and Eleia might have been the Lakedaimonian objective.¹¹⁵ Perhaps, when Agis or his *mantis* perceived that none of the allies had joined them, the sacrifices were deliberately interpreted to indicate that the Lakedaimonians should not proceed. On their return home the Lakedaimonians called upon the allies to prepare for a campaign, and it is possible that they again hoped to marshal their support for the same project.¹¹⁶ War between the Argives and Epidaurians, nevertheless, intervened,

¹¹⁰ Roy, 1998, 365f; Hornblower, 2000, 222; 2004, 284; Sordi, 1984, 23: ‘non volevano dare ad Atene, formalmente ancora in pace con loro (anche se alleata degli Elei) l’occasione di divenire la paladina di Olimpia aggredita.’

¹¹¹ Thuc. V.50.5.

¹¹² Xen. *Hell.* III.2.22; Diod. XIV.17.4. Diodoros has Pausanias in place of Agis, but must be mistaken, since Pausanias did not become king until much later – unless he is referring to a different event: cf. Hornblower, 2000, 215, n.10.

¹¹³ Cartledge, 1987, 249; cf. Hornblower, 2000, 215, n.10; Krentz, 1994, 172.

¹¹⁴ Thuc. V.54.1.

¹¹⁵ Pikoulas, Y.A., ‘The Road-Network of Arkadia’ in Nielsen, T.H. and Roy, J. (eds), *Defining Ancient Arkadia* (Copenhagen, 1999) map 3.

¹¹⁶ Thuc. V.54.1f.

and if Agis had promoted a Lakedaimonian plan to invade Eleia, it was now left in abeyance.¹¹⁷

In accord with the terms of the quadruple alliance, the Eleians came to the aid of the Argives in 418 B.C. and appear to have been keen to oppose the Lakedaimonian hegemony.¹¹⁸ When the allies deliberated at Orchomenos, the Eleians proposed that they should go against Lepreon, but the others agreed to proceed to Tegea, where a faction was ready to hand over the city to them. At this, the Eleians returned home and so were not present for the battle of Mantinea.¹¹⁹

Scholars have long insisted that the Eleians deserted the allied cause through narrow self-interest, and Grote goes so far as to suggest that ‘the defeat [at Mantinea] was greatly occasioned by the selfish caprice of the Eleians in withdrawing their 3,000 men immediately before the battle’.¹²⁰ The strategy of the Eleians, however, might have been the wiser of the two that were suggested. The Athenians had by this time returned to Pylos the Helots whom they had previously withdrawn to Kephallenia.¹²¹ The presence of an allied army at Lepreon in conjunction with the Athenian possession of Pylos might have made possible an invasion of Messenia and a Messenian rising, and could even have brought about the creation of a Messenian *polis*, which was not achieved until after Epameinondas’ invasion of Lakonia more than half a century later.¹²² The choice of Tegea and thus of direct confrontation with the Lakedaimonian and allied army, as it turned out, led to defeat and the restoration of Spartan prestige.¹²³ A less risky campaign in Messenia might have threatened Spartan power at its source.

It is likely that Lepreon returned to Eleian control at this time. Soon after the end of the Dekeleian War the Lakedaimonians again demanded that the Eleians allow the Lepreans to be *autonomoi*,¹²⁴ and when Agis invaded Eleia from Messenia in 401 B.C. the Lepreans revolted from the Eleians,¹²⁵ so they must have returned to their Eleian allegiance some time between 418 B.C. and 401 B.C. Aristophanes

¹¹⁷ Thuc. V.53.1, 54.3-55.4, 56.4-57.1.

¹¹⁸ Thuc. V.58.1, 61.1f; cf. Diod. XII.78.4.

¹¹⁹ Thuc. V.62.1f: ἀνεχώρησαν.

¹²⁰ Grote, 1907, 139, cf. 126.

¹²¹ Thuc. V.56.3, cf. 35.7; Plut. *Nik.* 10.8.

¹²² Diod. XV.66.1, 6; Paus. IV.26.3-8, 27.5-9; cf. Falkner, 1999, 385f.

¹²³ Thuc. V.74.3.

¹²⁴ Paus. III.8.3.

¹²⁵ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.25.

called Lepreon ‘Eleian’ in 414 B.C.,¹²⁶ so it is likely to have been back in Eleian hands before then. Roy, supported by Hornblower, considers that the return of Lepreon is likely to have been the result of negotiations ‘not too long before’ Aristophanes’ play, claiming that ‘force seems very unlikely in these years’.¹²⁷ There is reason to believe, however, that Lepreon was in fact recovered by at least the threat of force.¹²⁸

Thucydides reports that in 419 B.C. the Lakedaimonians freed the Helots that had fought under Brasidas in Thrace. ‘Not long afterwards’ they established them at Lepreon with the *neodamodeis*.¹²⁹ It is likely that they constituted a permanent settlement that replaced the original hoplite garrison.¹³⁰ The Brasideioi and *neodamodeis*, however, fought at Mantinea in 418 B.C., just after the Eleians had returned home, so Lepreon was probably poorly defended at the time that the Eleians departed from their allies at Arkadian Orchomenos.¹³¹ If the Lakedaimonian garrison had bolstered a faction at Lepreon,¹³² then it is possible that in its absence an opposing faction was able to admit the Eleian hoplites to the city. This would explain why the Eleians left Arkadia before the allied defeat at Mantinea, but returned soon afterwards to help defend the city and join in an assault on Epidauros.¹³³

It remains likely that ‘the exclusion of the Spartans from the sanctuary was lifted...at some point between 418 and 416’, though by unilateral action on the part of the Eleians rather than, as Hornblower suggests, by negotiation for the return of Lepreon.¹³⁴ Having recovered Lepreon, it seems, the Eleians were ready to resolve the dispute with the Lakedaimonians. They might indeed now have given up their own share of the fine, perhaps nine-tenths, and paid that due to the god, as they had offered to do in 420 B.C.¹³⁵

¹²⁶ Aristoph. *Birds* 149: τὸν Ἡλεῖον Λέπρεον.

¹²⁷ Roy in Hornblower, 2000, 223, n.26; Hornblower, 2000, 222f; cf. 2004, 275f; Andrewes in Gomme *et al.*, 1970, 27f.

¹²⁸ cf. Nielsen, 1996, 76; Kelly, 1975, 23, who places this during the Dekeleian war.

¹²⁹ Thuc. V.34.1: ὕστερον οὐ πολλῶ αὐτοὺς μετὰ τῶν νεοδαμῶδων ἐς Λέπρεον κατέστησαν

¹³⁰ Thuc. V.31.4, 49.1; see above, 239f.

¹³¹ Thuc. V.67.1; cf. Grote, 1907, 131.

¹³² See above, 238-42. The Eleians might have been assisted by loyalist Lepreans both inside and outside the walls. Perhaps Lepreon was recolonised after its return to the Eleians, hence the reference to a colony in Aristophanes *Birds* 149, comical because of the necessarily insecure nature of such an enterprise.

¹³³ Thuc. V.75.5f.

¹³⁴ Hornblower, 2000, 217f, 222f.

¹³⁵ Thuc. V.49.5; Hornblower, 2000, 223, n.26; 2004, 283.

When the Argives withdrew from the quadruple alliance, the Mantineians, unable to hold out, came to terms with the Lakedaimonians.¹³⁶ There are reasons to assume that the Eleians gave up the war against the Lakedaimonians at the same time as the Mantineians. Although condemned by the Athenians, Alkibiades was able to land at Kyllene in 415 B.C. and to safely proceed from there to Sparta.¹³⁷ Relations with the Corinthians appear to have remained cordial, since in 413 B.C., at the Eleian port of Pheia, Demosthenes destroyed a freighter ready to carry Korinthian hoplites across to Sicily, but both the crew and the troops escaped and were able to find another ship,¹³⁸ presumably in Eleia.

Despite the apparently friendly relations that the Eleians enjoyed with the Corinthians, and the statement of Xenophon that the invasion of Attica at the end of the Dekeleian War was undertaken by the Lakedaimonians and ‘the other Peloponnesians except the Argives’,¹³⁹ it seems unlikely that the Eleians followed the Mantineians in resuming their alliance with the Lakedaimonians.¹⁴⁰ Considering the long-standing close relations that the Eleians had enjoyed with the Corinthians and the relative ease of transport between the Eleian ports and Sicily, we would expect, if they had indeed resumed their Lakedaimonian allegiance, to find Eleians among those who fought to defend Syrakousai from the Athenians and their allies. Yet they are not listed.¹⁴¹ Nor were they among those allies whom the Lakedaimonians asked for ships in the winter of 413/12 B.C.¹⁴² It appears that the Eleians, having regained Lepreon and having been released from their obligations to the Argives by the brief accommodation of the latter with the Lakedaimonians after the battle of Mantinea, hoped to return to the neutrality and inviolability that they had enjoyed before they took up arms against the Kerkyraians at Sybota and found themselves embroiled in the late-fifth century conflicts of the Greek states. This, however, was not to be.

¹³⁶ Thuc. V.81.1; Diod. XII.80.2.

¹³⁷ Thuc. VI.88.9.

¹³⁸ Thuc. VII.31.1.

¹³⁹ Xen. *Hell.* II.2.7: οἱ ἄλλοι Πελοποννήσιοι πλὴν Ἀργείων.

¹⁴⁰ cf. Kelly, 1975, 22, who believes, nevertheless, 23f, that Xen. *Hell.* II.2.7 suggests that the Eleians re-joined the Lakedaimonian alliance ‘in 405, at the eleventh hour before the final defeat of Athens.’ He offers no explanation for such a sudden change of policy.

¹⁴¹ Thuc. VII.57.1-58.4.

¹⁴² Thuc. VIII.3.2; Kelly, 1975, 23.

The Ancient Texts on the Causes of the Eleian War

Three ancient sources offer explanations for the outbreak of the Eleian War.¹⁴³ The earliest of these is Xenophon, who reports the causes of Lakedaimonian anger with the Eleians,¹⁴⁴ their objective in the war and the demands that they made upon the Eleians.¹⁴⁵ Diodoros records that the Lakedaimonians brought some charges against the Eleians and made demands upon them.¹⁴⁶ Pausanias, too, records both grievances and demands.¹⁴⁷

Xenophon says first of all that the Lakedaimonians had long been angry with the Eleians. He lists three reasons for their anger: the Eleians had joined the quadruple alliance; on account of the judgement made against the Lakedaimonians they had prevented them from competing in both the equestrian and athletic competitions; and they had flogged Lichas and driven him out of Olympia.¹⁴⁸ In addition, when Agis was sent to sacrifice to Zeus, they had prevented him from praying for victory in war.¹⁴⁹ Xenophon then says that because of this anger, the ephors and the assembly decided ‘to bring them to their senses’.¹⁵⁰ Finally, Xenophon records, the Lakedaimonians demanded that the Eleians allow their neighbouring *poleis* to be *autonomoi*.¹⁵¹

Although he records the revolt of Lepreon during the Eleian War, Xenophon omits the dispute over that city and the details of the judgement made against the Lakedaimonians during the period of the Peace of Nikias. He is thus able to shift the reader’s sympathy to Lichas, the ‘old man’ (ὄνηρ γέρον – though, as argued above, perhaps not so frail) who was flogged by the Eleians for attempting to place a garland on his charioteer.¹⁵² The report of Thucydides reveals that the action of Lichas, considering the circumstances, was highly provocative, but in Xenophon’s narrative the Lakedaimonians appear as the champions of a cruelly mishandled and humiliated senior citizen.¹⁵³ Without the context of the warfare that followed the Peace of Nikias, the limitation that the Eleians placed on Agis at Olympia, too, is

¹⁴³ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.21-23; Diod. XIV.17.4f; Paus. III.8.3; VI.2.3.

¹⁴⁴ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.21f.

¹⁴⁵ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.23.

¹⁴⁶ Diod. XIV.17.4f.

¹⁴⁷ Paus. III.8.3; VI.2.3.

¹⁴⁸ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.21: πάλαι ὀργιζόμενοι τοῖς Ἡλείοις.

¹⁴⁹ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.22.

¹⁵⁰ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.23: σφραρονίσαι αὐτούς.

¹⁵¹ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.23: τὰς περιοικίδας πόλεις αὐτονόμους.

¹⁵² See above, 249.

¹⁵³ Thuc. V.50.4; Xen. *Hell.* III.2.22.

made to appear wanton, and the explanation of the Eleians that it was an ancient custom that Greeks should not consult the oracle of Zeus about war against other Greeks to appear a pretext for unreasonable behaviour.¹⁵⁴

The Lakedaimonian decision to bring the Eleians to their senses, on the other hand, reveals a deeper motive. As Cartledge points out, the σωφροσύνη or ‘soundness of mind’ that Xenophon reports that the Spartans aimed to instil into the Eleians had, by Xenophon’s day, ‘acquired a peculiarly oligarchic connotation’.¹⁵⁵ Because of their anger at the Eleians for joining an alliance that had opposed them in the period following the Peace of Nikias, for excluding the Lakedaimonians from the Olympiad of 420 B.C., for beating Lichas and for preventing Agis from sacrificing at the altar of Zeus, Xenophon’s report implies, the Lakedaimonians decided to attempt to alter their constitution.

Yet this is not what was contained in the Lakedaimonian ultimatum. According to Xenophon, they sent ambassadors to the Eleians to demand that they allow their neighbouring communities to be *autonomoi poleis*.¹⁵⁶ As argued above, this αὐτονομία, as used by the Lakedaimonians by the late fifth century B.C., implied a ‘return’ to a perceived ancestral constitution, that is, an aristocratic one. There can have been no mistaking the aims of the Lakedaimonians on the part of the Eleians: to accept the ultimatum would have been to desert the popular cause in the *poleis* of their allies and to have allowed the establishment of a group of states governed by hostile, pro-Spartan regimes on their boundaries, and thus to have placed their own democratic institutions at risk. This fear is reflected in the refusal of the Eleians to grant *autonomia* to the neighbouring communities on the grounds that the Lakedaimonians enslaved the Greeks.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.22; see above, 250. Sordi, 1984, 21, points out that all of our sources agree ‘nell’affermare che fu questo il motivo profondo dell’ira spartana.’ Unz, R.K., ‘The Chronology of the Elean War’ *GRBS* 27 (1986) 29, claims that ‘there is little dispute about the origins of the war’, and goes on to cite the exclusion of the Spartans from Olympia, the flogging of Lichas and the prevention of Agis’ sacrifice, making no mention of Lepreon; cf. Lewis, D.M., ‘Sparta, 403-395 B.C.’ *CAH* VI² (1994) 41.

¹⁵⁵ Cartledge, P., *Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta* (London, 1987) 250f, citing Thuc. VIII.64.5 as ‘one of the nicest examples’ of this usage; cf. Krentz, 1994, 173; Roy, J., ‘Spartan Aims in the Spartan-Elean War of c.400’ *Electronic Antiquity* 3 <http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/EIAnt/V3N6/roy.html> (1997) 3.

¹⁵⁶ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.23: τὰς περιοικίδας πόλεις αὐτονόμους.

¹⁵⁷ Diod. XIV.17.5f: προσεγκαλούντων ὅτι τοὺς Ἑλληνας καταδουλοῦνται; cf. Paus. III.8.3; cf. Krentz, 1994, 173; Ruggeri, 2004, 65, claims that the Lakedaimonians simply aimed to weaken their opponents by separating their dependent allies from them. Xenophon credits the Eleians with an entirely different reply, that they held the cities by right of conquest (*Hell.* III.2.23: ἐπιληΐδας). The two reports may be selections from the same Eleian defence: if the Spartans could claim to hold the

Diodoros reports that the Lakedaimonians brought many charges against the Eleians, but records only those which he says were the most important (μόλιστα), the exclusion of a Lakedaimonian king from sacrificing to Zeus and of the Lakedaimonians from competing in the games.¹⁵⁸ The Lakedaimonians, he says, sent ten ambassadors to call upon the Eleians to allow their neighbouring *poleis* to be *autonomoi* (τὰς περιόικους πόλεις ἔαν αὐτονόμους εἶναι).¹⁵⁹ Diodoros also records the additional demand that they pay their share of the cost of the war against the Athenians.¹⁶⁰ ‘But,’ he explains, ‘they did these things because they were looking for reasonable and plausible pretexts for beginning a war’.¹⁶¹

Diodoros’ account has much in common with that of Xenophon. He, too, fails to mention the dispute over Lepreon, and although he leaves out the quadruple alliance and the treatment of Lichas, which he seems to have thought were the less important, he includes the other causes of Lakedaimonian anger provided by Xenophon. In his report, too, the Lakedaimonians demand that the neighbouring communities be *autonomoi*. In Diodoros, however, these are already designated as *poleis*, whereas the terminology used by Xenophon is ambiguous about their status in this regard. As argued above, while non-Eleian *poleis* such as Lepreon were allies of the Eleians, the Eleian communities all appear to have been synoikised into the one *polis* of Elis in 471 B.C. We cannot assume that the communities of the *perioikis* in Xenophon, who are called *perioikos* by Diodoros, were anything other than the non-Eleian states to the south of the Alpheios.¹⁶²

When Diodoros claims that in saying ‘these things’ (ταῦτα) the Lakedaimonians were simply looking for a pretext, he may be referring to all of the charges and demands that he has listed. On the other hand, he could mean only the demand to make the *perioikoi autonomoi* and the obviously specious claim that the Eleians had reneged on their undertaking to provide a certain share of the cost of the

Lakedaimonian *perioikoi* by right of conquest (perhaps believed to have occurred at the time of the return of the Herakleidai), the Eleians could make the same claim (of conquest when Oxylos ‘returned’ to the Peloponnese as the guide of the Herakleidai?); and if the Eleians should allow their neighbouring states to be autonomous, then so should the Spartans.

¹⁵⁸ Diod. XIV.17.4.

¹⁵⁹ For *περίοικος*, see above, 229, n.119.

¹⁶⁰ Diod. XIV.17.5.

¹⁶¹ Diod. XIV.17.6: ταῦτα δ’ ἔπραττον προφάσεις αὐτοῖς εὐλόγους καὶ πιθανὰς ἀρχὰς ζητοῦντες πολέμου.

¹⁶² These *poleis* had been allies of the Eleians since the time after the expulsion of Pheidon, when the Lakedaimonians had assisted them to gain control of all of the territory as far south as the Neda: Strabo VIII.3.33, p.358; see above, 140f.

Attic war.¹⁶³ When he says that ‘these things’ were pretexts, then, he could be implying either that the charges that the Lakedaimonians brought against the Eleians were the true cause of the war, or that there were other, more fundamental reasons for the Lakedaimonian attack. If the latter is the case, then the attempt to intervene in the internal affairs of the Eleians implied by Xenophon’s use of σωφροσύνη is likely to be what he had in mind.

Like Diodoros, Pausanias repeats some of the information contained in Xenophon’s account. The Lakedaimonians made complaints (ἐγκλήματα) against the Eleians, especially (μάλιστα) that they had been excluded from both the Olympic games and the Olympic sacrifices.¹⁶⁴ In another part of his work, Pausanias states directly that the Lakedaimonians went to war with the Eleians because they had flogged Lichas, using the terminology of Xenophon (μαστιγῶω) rather than that of Thucydides (πληγὰς ἔλαβεν).¹⁶⁵ There are, however, some differences between Pausanias’ account and those of Xenophon and Diodoros. According to Pausanias the Lakedaimonians sent a herald rather than ambassadors, and they demanded that the Eleians allow the Lepreans (not specifically mentioned by Xenophon or Diodoros) and the other *perioikoi* (τῶν περιοίκων ἄλλοι) who were subject to them to be *autonomoi*. In addition, he records that the Eleians replied that they would comply with this demand ‘when they saw that the territories neighbouring Sparta were *eleutherai poleis*, but not until then did they intend to discharge their own’.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶³ Diod. XIV.17.5f. The claim is specious because the Spartans must have meant contributions for the period after the duration of the Peace of Nikias, since this issue is not raised in the dispute over Lepreon. The contributions were presumably left unpaid during the Dekeleian war, when the Eleians had ceased to be allies of the Lakedaimonians, who now appear to have rather pointedly demanded payment. Falkner, C., ‘Sparta and the Elean War, ca. 401/400 B.C: Revenge or Imperialism?’ *Phoenix* 50 (1996) 22, interprets Diodoros to mean that ‘the Spartan claim to be avenging the past was only a pretext’, but if these charges are included, so must be the demands. Roy, 1997, 3, seems to include only the demands: ‘Diodoros 14.17.6 actually says that the Spartan ultimatum was only a pretext for provoking war’; cf. Buckler, J., *Aegean Greece in the Fourth Century B.C.* (Leiden, 2003) 15.

¹⁶⁴ Paus. III.8.3.

¹⁶⁵ Thuc. V.50.4; Xen. *Hell.* III.2.21; Paus. VI.2.2f.

¹⁶⁶ Paus. III.8.3: ἀποκριναμένων δὲ Ἡλείων ὡς ἐπειδὴν τὰς περιοικίδας τῆς Σπάρτης πόλεις ἴδωσιν ἐλευθέρως, οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ μελλήσουσιν ἔτι ἀφιέναι τὰς ἑαυτῶν. The terminology that Pausanias ascribes to the Eleians – *eleutherai* instead of *autonomoi*, *poleis* in place of *perioikoi* – may imply conflicting political perceptions. While the Lakedaimonians speak of *autonomia* for the supposed Eleian *perioikoi*, the Eleians reply by demanding that the *perioikides*, or ‘neighbouring territories’ of the Spartans, the inhabitants of which we would call their *perioikoi*, ought to become free *poleis*. The Eleian implication appears to have been that while their own allies were free (*eleutherai*) *poleis*, but not *autonomoi* in the Lakedaimonian sense, the communities of Lakedaimonian *perioikoi*, although *autonomoi*, were not free. The desire for such freedom might already have been evident among those of the Lakedaimonian *perioikoi* who appear to have been involved in the plot of Kinadon just a few years later (Xen. *Hell.* III.3.6); cf. Buckler, 2003, 15.

Sordi argues that the true cause of the war was the issue of control of Olympia and that the peace had *conseguenze olimpiche*.¹⁶⁷ She goes on to claim that at its conclusion the Lakedaimonians left Olympia in Eleian hands because the Pisatans had once been allies of the Argives and would later collaborate with the Arkadians, and so wished to prevent the “internationalisation” of conflict over Olympia, such as occurred in relation to Delphi.¹⁶⁸ The Olympic implications of the war, she concludes, were ‘prudently concealed beneath strictly political motivations’.¹⁶⁹ It would seem paradoxical, however, for the Lakedaimonians to have carried out a prolonged war against the Eleians simply to ensure that they kept Olympia, when there was no threat to Eleian possession of the shrine. What did change as a result of the war, it is argued below, was the *political* orientation of the power that continued to administer the sanctuary. The political motives of the Lakedaimonians thus appear to be more profound than the religious ones highlighted by the ancient texts.

The ancient sources for the causes of the Eleian War provide us with three categories of information: the reasons for the anger of the Lakedaimonians; their aims in prosecuting the war; and the demands that they made upon the Eleians. Although none of these sources mentions the support of the Lakedaimonians for the revolt of the Lepreans at the end of the Archidamian War, this action is likely to have given rise to all of the causes of complaint that they mention. The demand made upon the Eleians to make their allies *autonomoi*, along with the claim for their part of the cost of the Attic war, are rightly dismissed by Diodoros as specious pretexts. The Lakedaimonian aim of bringing the Eleians to their senses, however, clearly expressed by Xenophon and perhaps alluded to by Diodoros, implies that the Lakedaimonians wished to alter the Eleian constitution and, considering the record of Lakedaimonian foreign policy after the Peace of Nikias and at the end of the Dekeleian War,¹⁷⁰ this is likely to have been their true objective. Two significant causes of the war remain: Lakedaimonian support for the revolt of Lepreon, itself most likely prompted by factional motives; and the attempt of the Lakedaimonians to impose an oligarchic government upon the Eleians. As Cartledge concludes, Elis

¹⁶⁷ Sordi, 1984, 27; cf. Ruggeri, 2004, 25.

¹⁶⁸ Sordi, 1984, 28-30.

¹⁶⁹ Sordi, 1984, 30: ‘Lo studio della guerra d’Elide e delle sue implicazioni olimpiche, prudentemente dissimulate sotto motivazioni strettamente politiche’.

¹⁷⁰ See above, 242-46; below 277.

should be counted among those states in which Sparta intervened militarily to replace a democracy with an oligarchy.¹⁷¹

The War of the Lakedaimonians against the Eleians

The view that the main motivation of the Lakedaimonians in prosecuting the Eleian War was to replace the Eleian democracy with a form of oligarchy is supported by an examination of the course of the war. Here the account of Diodoros, most likely derived from the Oxyrhynchos historian by way of Ephoros,¹⁷² appears to greatly contradict that of Xenophon, who is largely followed by Pausanias. While Xenophon narrates a Lakedaimonian expedition led by king Agis, Diodoros records a different series of events in which king Pausanias was the general. The most likely solution is that each recorded a separate part of the same war, and for this reason the two accounts are dealt with here in turn.

According to Xenophon, the Lakedaimonians under the command of Agis first invaded Eleia *via* Achaia, but soon after they arrived an earthquake occurred and Agis, interpreting this as a divine omen, left Eleia and disbanded his army.¹⁷³ Later Agis led an army that included contingents from all of the allies of the Lakedaimonians except the Boiotians and Korinthians in an invasion by way of Aulon, on the Messenian coast just south of the mouth of the Neda. At this, the Lepreans, Makistians and Epitalians revolted from the Eleians and joined him, followed once he had crossed the Alpheios by the Letrinians, Amphidolians and Marganeians.¹⁷⁴ Agis then sacrificed at Olympia and marched towards the city (πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ), ravaging and plundering the land as he went.¹⁷⁵ Once there he did some damage to the suburbs and the gymnasia, but although the city was unwalled he did not attempt to capture it, being unwilling rather than unable.¹⁷⁶

While the army was ravaging the country around Kyllene, the supporters of the extremely wealthy Xenias, people who wanted to be responsible for the Eleians

¹⁷¹ Cartledge, 1987, 250.

¹⁷² As Parker points out, ‘scholars have slowly come to realise that for the period from 411 to 387...Diodorus’ history (copied from Ephorus who relied heavily on the nowadays highly esteemed history of the Oxyrhynchus Historian) probably ought to take precedence before Xenophon’s *Hellenica* or at the very least to fall heavily into the balance beside it’: Parker, V., ‘Ephorus and Xenophon on Greece in the Years 375-372 B.C.’ *Klio* 83 (2001) 353, cf. n.3.

¹⁷³ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.23f.

¹⁷⁴ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.25.

¹⁷⁵ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.26.

¹⁷⁶ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.27: ἐνόμισαν αὐτὸν μὴ βούλεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐλεῖν

joining the Lakedaimonians, attempted a reactionary coup. They began a slaughter and killed a man who resembled Thrasydaios, the leader of the *demos*.¹⁷⁷ At this the demoralised *demos* kept quiet, so the supporters of Xenias assembled in the *agora*. Meanwhile, however, the real Thrasydaios was sleeping off a hangover, and when the people realised that he had not been killed, they rallied around him.¹⁷⁸ He led them in defeating the supporters of Xenias, who fled to the Lakedaimonians. Agis then went back across the Alpheios and, leaving a garrison with a harmost and the Eleian exiles at Epitalion, he disbanded his army and returned home.¹⁷⁹

During the rest of the summer and the following winter, the men in Epitalion plundered the *chora* of the Eleians. In the following summer, says Xenophon, Thrasydaios sent to Lakedaimon offering peace.¹⁸⁰ The significance of the coup attempt and the terms of the peace are discussed below, but it should be noted at this point that the account of Xenophon does not sufficiently explain why the victorious Eleian democrats should offer peace terms. Apart from the initial revolts, the Eleian and allied communities appear to have remained loyal. The garrison and exiles at Epitalion, although commanding the mouth of the Alpheios and thus access to its valley from the sea,¹⁸¹ can have denied supplies neither to the communities in the Alpheios valley nor to the city of Elis while routes to the inland and Achaia remained open. The peace, however, is not offered until the following summer, so there is room for further events that may explain the otherwise surprising Eleian capitulation. These events, it appears, are to be found in the account of Diodoros.

Diodoros clearly reports a different campaign.¹⁸² Like Agis before him, Pausanias was accompanied by nearly all of the allies, excepting the Boiotians and Corinthians.¹⁸³ Unlike Agis, however, he invaded the land of Elis *via* Arkadia, took Lasion, won over the four cities of Akroreia and captured Pylos, on the Peneios

¹⁷⁷ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.27.

¹⁷⁸ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.28.

¹⁷⁹ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.29.

¹⁸⁰ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.30.

¹⁸¹ Kraft, J.C., Rapp, G., Gifford, J.A. and Aschenbrenner, S.E., 'Coastal Change and Archaeological Settings in Elis' *Hesperia* 74 (2005) 1, 22.

¹⁸² Kelly, 1975, 26f: 'too discrepant for the latter to be explained away as an erroneous version of the former'; Sordi, 1984, 25: 'completamente diverso'; Unz, 1986, 31: 'the two accounts have almost nothing in common' and are 'utterly different'; Tuplin, 1993, 202; Krentz, 1994, 171. Buckler, 2003, 15-19, writes a narrative of the Eleian war but dismisses the report of Diodoros in a footnote. 'Diodoros,' he says, 'has seriously confused the course of events': 18, n.6.

¹⁸³ Diod. XIV.17.7; cf. Xen. *Hell.* III.2.25.

upstream from the city of Elis.¹⁸⁴ Unlike Agis, too, Pausanias laid siege to Elis, but the Eleians, with a thousand picked Aitolians whom they had received as allies, ‘pouring out from the city, terrified (κατεπλήξαοντο) the Lakedaimonians and struck down (κατέβαλον) nearly three hundred of them’.¹⁸⁵ At this Pausanias raised the siege, but went on to ravage and plunder ‘even though the country was sacred’.¹⁸⁶ By this time it was winter, so Pausanias built forts in Eleia, left garrisons in them, and wintered in Achaian Dyme.¹⁸⁷ The campaign of Pausanias, it would seem, was designed to cut supply lines to Elis from Arkadia and Achaia. Diodoros records in his entry for the next year that the Eleians, fearing the superiority of the Lakedaimonians, ended the war.¹⁸⁸

According to Pausanias’ account, Agis in his first campaign reached Olympia and the Alpheios, fighting a battle in the Altis itself, before the earthquake turned him back.¹⁸⁹ Although Pausanias also appears to place an Eleian victory in the Altis during Agis’ second campaign,¹⁹⁰ Xenophon says that Agis sacrificed there unopposed at that time,¹⁹¹ so perhaps the Eleian victory belongs to Agis’ first campaign. This suggests that the earthquake might not have been the only reason for Agis’ withdrawal from Eleia early in his first campaign, but that his re-appearance with greater forces in his second campaign forced the Eleians to abandon the sanctuary. Pausanias also records that Xenias was the *proxenos* of the Lakedaimonians and a private friend of Agis, and that Agis left the Spartan Lysistratos and a company of troops with the Eleian exiles so that they might help the Lepreans, not mentioned by Xenophon, to ravage the land.¹⁹²

A further report from Pausanias is of great value to the task of establishing the sequence of events. There can be little doubt that the campaign of king Pausanias described by Diodoros is a different one from that of Agis in the account of Xenophon, and the best solution seems to be to place the beginning of the campaign

¹⁸⁴ Diod. XIV.17.8f.

¹⁸⁵ Diod. XIV.17.9f; Unz, 1986, 32, without explanation, assumes that these were mercenaries.

¹⁸⁶ Diod. XIV.17.11: τὴν χώραν ἱερὰν οὕσαν.

¹⁸⁷ Diod. XIV.17.12.

¹⁸⁸ Diod. XIV.34.1.

¹⁸⁹ Paus. III.8.4.

¹⁹⁰ Paus. V.4.8, 20.4f, 27.11; VI.2.3, 8; Sordi, 1984, 26; Kelly, 1975, 38.

¹⁹¹ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.26.

¹⁹² Paus. III.8.4f.

of Pausanias after the beginning of that of Agis, though not after its end.¹⁹³ Yet Xenophon says, immediately after his record of the peace terms, that Agis died at Heraia on his way home from dedicating a tenth of the spoils at Delphi, so he appears to have ended the war. At first impression, this creates a difficulty, but it can be resolved. Pausanias reports that ‘in the third year of the war the Lakedaimonians under Agis prepared to invade Eleia again, but the Eleians under Thrasydaios – for they had been suffering in the extreme – agreed [to make peace]’.¹⁹⁴

The Chronology of the Eleian War

The chronology of the Eleian War, Underhill could already say in 1893, ‘has occupied the attention of commentators and historians for more than a century’.¹⁹⁵ We do not need to spend so long on it here, but it must be considered. The following dates and order of events are proposed:

- | | |
|----------|----------------------------------|
| 402 B.C. | Lakedaimonian ultimatum |
| | Eleian refusal |
| | Agis’ first invasion |
| 401 B.C. | Agis’ second invasion |
| | Pausanias’ invasion |
| 400 B.C. | Eleian peace offer |
| | Conclusion of peace and alliance |

Pausanias’ report that the war spanned three years appears at first glance to contradict the accounts of both Xenophon, who records that the Eleians sued for peace as the summer that followed Agis’ campaigns was approaching, and Diodoros, who places it within two Athenian archonships.¹⁹⁶ This has led scholars, with good reason, to allocate Agis’ second campaign to the second year of the war, so that the Eleian peace overtures would belong to the beginning of the third. The issue of the interval between Agis’ two campaigns rests in part upon the interpretation of a passage from Xenophon, who says that περιόντι δὲ τῷ ἐνιαυτῷ φαίνουσι πάλιν

¹⁹³ Sordi, 1984, 26; Unz, 1986, 32-34; *contra* Kelly, 1975, 30ff, who places the campaign of Pausanias first.

¹⁹⁴ Paus. III.8.5.

¹⁹⁵ Underhill, G.H., ‘The Chronology of the Eleian War’ *CR* 7 (1893) 156.

¹⁹⁶ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.30: τοῦ δ’ ἐπιόντος θέρους; Diod. XIV.17.1, 4-6, 19.1, 34.1.

οἱ ἔφοροι φρουρῶν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλιν.¹⁹⁷ While Warner's interpretation, 'in the same year', is unchallenged by Cawkwell, Unz follows codex B,¹⁹⁸ which has περιόντι rather than περιόντι.¹⁹⁹ As Unz points out, the most natural translation of περιόντι δὲ τῷ ἐνιαυτῷ, literally 'as the year was coming around', is 'as the year was changing' or 'at the start of the new year'.²⁰⁰ The second campaign of Agis, Unz reasonably concludes, referring to both Underhill and Kelly, took place in the second year of the war.²⁰¹

Unz is unconvincing, nevertheless, in allocating the campaign of Pausanias to the third summer, when the Lakedaimonians, finding the Eleian terms unacceptable, forced the Eleians to agree to theirs.²⁰² This claim is weak because it depends upon the assumption that when Xenophon says that the Lakedaimonians compelled (ἠνάγκασαν) the Eleians to surrender Epeion in addition to what they had offered, he means that they mounted another full-scale Lakedaimonian and allied invasion of Eleia in order to achieve this relatively trivial purpose. Xenophon's words seem rather to imply that the Lakedaimonians refused to make peace unless this condition was met and that the Eleians complied. Unz' interpretation would mean, moreover, that Pausanias' campaign, which lasted until the beginning of winter,²⁰³ would have taken place in the same year in which Xenophon says that the Eleians sued for peace 'as the summer was approaching' and in which Diodoros says that the Eleians 'put an end' to the war against the Lakedaimonians.²⁰⁴

Unz, furthermore, concludes that Agis must have died at the end of the second year of the war since, he believes, Pausanias was given the command in the

¹⁹⁷ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.25 (OCT).

¹⁹⁸ *codex Parisinus* 1738.

¹⁹⁹ The dative participle of περιεἶμι with infinitive περιέναι rather than the dative participle of περιεἶμι with infinitive περιεἶναι.

²⁰⁰ Unz, 1986, 30, n.3; Warner, R., (transl.), *Xenophon, A History of My Times* (Harmondsworth, 1979) 155.

²⁰¹ According to Underhill, 1893, 157, this phrase 'can only mean "when the year was drawing to a close"'. He argues that 'as Xenophon, like Thucydides, always begins his year about our April, the close of his year must be February or March.' While this might not be strictly accurate, the point is well-made: the year that went from one summer to the next was well-advanced when the ephors ordered mobilisation for Agis' second invasion of Eleia, probably in the spring of the second year of the war. Kelly, 1975, 25 n.40, who, like Unz, accepts περιόντι rather than περιόντι in the phrase from Xenophon, concludes that 'it means "at the start of the new year"'; cf. Sordi, 1984, 24; Krentz, 1994, 173f; Nielsen, T.H., 'Triphylia: An Experiment in Ethnic Construction and Political Organisation' in Nielsen, T.H. (ed), *Yet More Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis* (Stuttgart, 1997) 137.

²⁰² Xen. *Hell.* III.2.31; Unz, 1986, 30, n.3, 34f, 36.

²⁰³ Diod. XIV.17.12.

²⁰⁴ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.30; Diod. XIV.34.1: κατέλυσαν.

third year because Agis was dead.²⁰⁵ This directly contradicts the evidence of Pausanias that the Eleians surrendered in the third year of the war because Agis was planning another campaign against them.²⁰⁶ Xenophon, too, records Agis' death *after* the end of the war.²⁰⁷ Unz proposes that Xenophon is 'violating strict chronological sequence in order to maintain the continuity of his topical narrative', and gives further examples of such violations.²⁰⁸ Xenophon's use of μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο directly after ending his account of the war and just before relating Agis' death, however, makes this highly unlikely.²⁰⁹

Sordi offers an entirely acceptable solution to this problem. Xenophon reports that more Arkadians and Achaians had later joined Agis' second invasion in order to plunder Eleia.²¹⁰ Sordi proposes that this 'was not an initiative of hostile natives attracted by the booty, but a second front opened under the command of the second Spartan king and with the deliberate intention of shutting down all outlets of Eleian resistance.' She points to links between king Pausanias and the Arkadians and to the withdrawal of his forces to Achaian Dyme when winter arrived.²¹¹ The surrender of the Eleians after that winter, in which they had been 'ruined in the extreme',²¹² with one Peloponnesian army under Pausanias quartered on their northern border and another about to be mobilised under Agis, is thus entirely explicable. Both the second campaign of Agis and the invasion of Pausanias, it appears, took place in the second summer of the war, and peace was made at the beginning of the third year.²¹³

Xenophon appears to have left out of his account Pausanias' entire campaign, but this is easily explained. Unz refers simply to Xenophon's loyalty to Sparta,²¹⁴ but factional politics were also involved. Pausanias had failed to crush the Athenian democrats at the Peiraieus when he had the opportunity in 403 B.C., for which he

²⁰⁵ Unz, 1986, 36f, n.16.

²⁰⁶ Paus. III.8.5.

²⁰⁷ Xen. *Hell.* III.3.1.

²⁰⁸ Unz, 1986, 37, n.16.

²⁰⁹ Xen. *Hell.* III.3.1, cf. 2.31.

²¹⁰ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.26; Sordi, 1984, 24-26.

²¹¹ Xen. *Hell.* III.5.25; V.2.3; Diod. XIV.17.12; Sordi, 1984, 26: 'l'incursione contro l'Elide degli Arcadi e degli Achei nel corso della grande campagna di Agide, non fu un'iniziativa di vicini ostili attirati dal saccheggio, ma un secondo fronte aperto sotto la guida del secondo re spartano e con l'intenzione deliberata di chiudere ogni sbocco alla resistenza elea.'; cf. Krentz, 1994, 174.

²¹² Paus. III.8.5: *κατακωμμένοι γὰρ ἐς τὸ ἔσχατον ἦσαν.*

²¹³ cf. Tuplin C.J., *The Failings of Empire. A Reading of Xenophon Hellenica* 2.3.11-7.5.27 (Stuttgart, 1993) 204; Ruggeri, 2004, 71, n.151.

²¹⁴ Unz, 1986, 35.

was tried but narrowly acquitted.²¹⁵ It is clear that the trial of Pausanias was a matter of political importance at Sparta since it is likely that, as Andrewes points out, Lysandros' 'policy for Athens was wrecked by the intervention of King Pausanias in summer 403, and his defeat was sealed by the acquittal of Pausanias'.²¹⁶ Pausanias neither came to the aid of Lysandros in time to prevent his defeat at the hands of the Boiotians at Haliartos in 395 B.C. nor gave battle to the Thebans and Athenians afterwards. For these actions he was sentenced to death and forced to flee to Tegea.²¹⁷ He was also well-disposed towards the leaders of the Mantineian democrats.²¹⁸ The passages in the *Hellenika* that deal with the Eleian War were composed well after the prosecution of Pausanias.²¹⁹ Given the reputation of Xenophon for omitting important information, the events of the career of Pausanias and the friendship of Xenophon with Agesipolis, the brother of Agis,²²⁰ it should not surprise us that he was prepared to give all of the credit for the Lakedaimonian victory over the Eleians to Agis.²²¹ Kelly is kinder to Xenophon, suggesting that the fact that he reported only Agis' part in the war is 'a sign that interest in Agesilaus' predecessor had led him to the subject.'²²² Diodoros, on the other hand, commonly omits information, and in this case the apparent lack of actual battles in Agis' campaign might have influenced his choice of what to include.²²³

²¹⁵ Harding, P., 'King Pausanias and the Restoration of Democracy at Athens' *Hermes* 116 (1988) 191, concludes that Pausanias, far from being 'soft' on democracy, had intended to suppress it but became convinced 'that it was more in the interests of the Spartan state to abandon the oligarchs than to fight the democrats'; cf. Krentz, 1994, 150-53. The other king, Agis, nevertheless, and fourteen of the twenty-eight Spartan *gerontes* were prepared to convict him on his return to Sparta (Paus. III.5.2): Kelly, 1975, 36. If, as Harding argues, Pausanias had the interests of Sparta at heart, then we must question the motives of these others. Xenophon, furthermore, who was clearly disappointed with the actions of Pausanias, would appear under these circumstances even more conclusively to belong to the camp of the oligarchic hardliners. It seems more likely that, as Andrewes concludes, 'Pausanias had surely made up his mind about Lysander's Athenian policy before he left Sparta': Andrewes, A., 'Spartan Imperialism?' in Garnsey P. and Whittaker, C.R. (eds), *Imperialism in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, 1978) 101. Pausanias, it seems, was prepared to tolerate democracy among the allies in the interests of the Lakedaimonian state, and Xenophon and his friends at Sparta resented him for it.

²¹⁶ Andrewes, 1978, 100.

²¹⁷ Xen. *Hell.* II.4.35-39; III.5.6f, 21-25; Paus. III.5.2.

²¹⁸ Xen. *Hell.* V.2.3: Πausανίου...φιλικῶς ἔχοντος πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μαντινείᾳ τοῦ δήμου προστάτας.

²¹⁹ Brownson, C.L., in *Xenophon, Hellenica Books I-IV* (London, 1943) viii-ix; Cawkwell, G., in Warner, 1979, 18.

²²⁰ Xen. *Ages.* 1.1, 2.11, 7.6f; *Anab.* V.3.6f; Diog. Laert. II.51f.

²²¹ Brownson, 1943, ix-x; Cawkwell, G.L., 'Agesilaos and Sparta' *CQ* 26 (1976) 71-4; 1979, 12f, 22f. Xenophon, furthermore, appears to have been 'part of the network of "best men" through whom Agesilaos sought to control Peloponnesian affairs on an oligarchical basis': Cartledge, 1987, 252; cf. Kelly, 1975, 39.

²²² Kelly, 1975, 26, cf. 25.

²²³ Unz, 1986, 35.

Diodoros' account begins in the archonship of Mikon at Athens (July 402 – July 401 B.C.) and ends in that of Exainetos (July 401 – June 400 B.C.).²²⁴ Scholars have perceived a contradiction between this account and Pausanias' statement that the war lasted three years.²²⁵ Diodoros, nevertheless, recounts only the expedition of Pausanias, which it is argued above belongs in the second year of the war, and thus, according to Diodoros, in 401 B.C. Although he makes mention of the reasons for the war, this may be a prelude to the report that follows, and need not be included in the time-frame that he offers. The campaign of Pausanias began early in 401 B.C., thus towards the end of Mikon's archonship. If Agis' invasion of the summer of 402 B.C., not included in Diodoros' report, is added to the events that he does record, then we have three years for the war, which lasted from 402 B.C. until early in 400 B.C., when the Eleians sued for peace. A problem for this view is that Xenophon says that the Eleian War took place at the same time as the campaign of Derkylidas in Asia, 'solidly' dated to 399-377 B.C., and if this is correct the three-year Eleian War cannot have begun before 401 B.C.²²⁶ This synchronism, nevertheless, is doubted by several scholars.²²⁷ Diodoros, furthermore, places the surrender of the Eleians *before* his account of the campaign of Thibron in Asia, which in Xenophon's account precedes that of Derkylidas.²²⁸ If Derkylidas went to Asia in 399 B.C., then the Eleian War was over at least a year earlier and can easily have begun by 402 B.C.

Diogenes Laertios records that 'Phaidon the Eleian, one of the *eupatridai*, was taken captive, together with his homeland, and forced to stay in a house' and the report of Suidas on the same event suggests that he was captured in battle and sold as a slave to a brothel in Athens.²²⁹ He was then freed by the agency of Sokrates and practised philosophy. We can assume that these events took place before Sokrates' death in 399 B.C., and so Elis must have surrendered by then. Phaidon appears to have been present at the death of Sokrates, a fitting gesture if Sokrates had helped secure his own release not long before.²³⁰

²²⁴ Diod. XIV.17.1, 4-6, 19.1, 34.1; Underhill, 1893, 157f.

²²⁵ Underhill, 1893, 157.

²²⁶ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.21, cf. 1.8-2.20; Unz, 1986, 37f, n.19.

²²⁷ Cawkwell, 1979, 154; Kelly, 1975, 24-26; Unz, 1986, 37 and n.18; Tuplin, 1993, 204; Krentz, 1994, 171; Low, P., *Interstate Relations in Classical Greece* (Cambridge, 2007) 41, n.33.

²²⁸ Diod. XIV.36.1, cf. 34.1, 35.1; Xen. *Hell.* III.1.4, 8.

²²⁹ Diog. Laert. II.105: Φαίδων Ἡλεῖος, τῶν εὐπατριδῶν, συνεάλω τῆ πατρίδι καὶ ἠναγκάσθη στῆναι ἐπ' οἰκῆματος; Suidas, s.v. Φαίδων: εἴτα προθεὶς πορνοβοσκαῶ.

²³⁰ Plato *Phaidon*; cf. Tuplin, 1993, 204; *contra* Underhill, 1893, 157, who without good reason doubts the evidence of Diogenes.

Unz relies on a determination of the date of Agis' death to help to fix the end of the war. Agesilaos, who succeeded Agis, reigned for forty-one years and appears to have died in Egypt 'either during the winter of 359/8 or, more likely, 360/359', so he came to the throne in either 401 or 400 B.C.²³¹ Plutarch also implies that Agesilaos reigned for more than thirty years before the battle of Leuktra which took place in the summer of 371 B.C., and so in 372/1 or 371/0.²³² This means that Agis might have died as late as the early summer of 400 B.C. so Unz, believing that he died at the beginning of the second year of the war, settles on 401 B.C. for its outbreak. As shown above, however, Agis died after the conclusion of the peace in the *third* year of the war, so if Unz's argument from the date of Agesilaos' succession is correct, the war is more likely to have begun in 402 B.C. and to have ended early in 400 B.C., in time for the Olympic festival of that summer.²³³

The Lakedaimonian Objective in the Eleian War

The coup attempt of the faction led by Xenias helps to clarify the objective of Agis' invasions of Eleia. The evidence of Pausanias that Xenias was the *proxenos* of the Lakedaimonians and a personal friend of Agis should not be taken to suggest that the coup was undertaken merely to turn the city over to the enemy.²³⁴ The people who immediately afterwards opposed those who carried out the slaughter were members of the *demos*. Thrasydaios, who later offered terms to the Lakedaimonians, was the *prostates* of the *demos* and had contributed two talents to the Athenian exiles in 404/3 B.C.²³⁵ The two factions were clearly differentiated by political ideology rather than by opposing views of foreign policy alone. As Cartledge points out, if Xenias' faction had succeeded in bringing the city over to the Lakedaimonians, they would then have supported 'this "convenient" faction as the legitimate oligarchic

²³¹ Plut. *Ages.* 40.2; Unz, 1986, 38; cf. Ruggeri, 2004, 16, n.1.

²³² Plut. *Ages.* 40.2.

²³³ It seems unlikely, given the lack of a mention of the games of 400 B.C. in the sources for this war, that they would have taken place while it was in progress: Underhill, 1893, 156; Sordi, 1984, 16; *contra* Unz, 1986, 39, n.39. In support of the dates for the war proposed here cf. Hönle, A. *Olympia in der Politik der griechischen Staatenwelt* (Bebenhausen, 1972) 22, n.1; de Ste. Croix, G.E.M., *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1972) 345, who appears, nevertheless, uncertain; Gehrke, H.-J., *Stasis* (Munich, 1985) 53 and n.7; Cartledge, P.A., *Sparta and Lakonia: a Regional History 1300-362 B.C.* (London, 1979) 271; 1987, 249; Sordi, 1984, 20; Missiou-Ladi, A., 'Coercive Diplomacy in Greek Interstate Relations' *CQ* 37 (1987) 343; Siewert, P., 'Triphylien und Akoreia. Spartanische "Regionalstaaten" in der westlichen Peloponnes' in *Praktika. Parartema* 13 (1987-1988) 7; Tuplin, 1993, 204, cf. 201-03; Lewis, 1994, 41; Krentz, 1994, 171; Ruggeri, 2004, 16, cf. n.1.

²³⁴ Paus. III.8.4.

²³⁵ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.27-30; Paus. III.8.4f; Plut. *Mor.* 835F, cf. Lysias fr. 1.163-71; Edwards, M.J. (ed), *Lysias, Five Speeches* (Bristol, 1999) 2.

government of Elis.’ The links between Agis and the faction of Xenias, too, suggest a degree of collusion.²³⁶

The sacred inviolability of the Eleians cannot explain Agis’ unwillingness, rather than inability, to capture the city of Elis,²³⁷ since by invading the territory of Eleia he had already violated the *asylia* that seems to have been declared by the Lakedaimonians themselves centuries earlier.²³⁸ The hesitancy of the Lakedaimonian king is better understood in the light of his behaviour towards Argos at an earlier time. In 418 B.C., although in a position of great advantage, Agis had preferred to negotiate with one of the Argive generals and the Lakedaimonian *proxenos*, who acted of their own accord and not on behalf of the people, rather than do battle with the Argives and their allies. For this he was convicted at home but obtained a reprieve.²³⁹ As Kagan points out, it is likely that ‘the two Argives, certainly leaders of the aristocratic faction, promised Agis that a *coup d’état* was forthcoming which would overthrow the democracy and bring to power a government favourable to Sparta. Such a development would make war unnecessary and accomplish the aims of Spartan policy.’²⁴⁰

Even after Agis’ eventual victory at Mantinea, instead of assaulting Argos, the Lakedaimonians, waiting at Tegea, negotiated with their friends in the city who wanted to overthrow the democracy, and sent the same Lichas who had been beaten for his provocative behaviour at Olympia in 420 B.C. to offer war or peace. The friends of the Lakedaimonians in Argos persuaded the Argives to vote for peace and then to make an alliance with them, and soon afterwards the democracy was overthrown.²⁴¹ It is likely that the victor of Mantinea advocated this approach towards Argos and that he attempted to apply the same methods in dealing with the Eleians two decades later. As Ruggeri points out, Xenophon’s report that Agis was unwilling to take the city of Elis implies that he wanted to give the oligarchs time to overthrow the democrats.²⁴²

²³⁶ Unz, 1986, 31; Cartledge, 1987, 251; Roy, 1997, 2; Ruggeri, 2004, 23f; *contra* Buckler, 2003, 18.

²³⁷ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.27.

²³⁸ Diod. VIII.1.1-3; cf. Strabo VIII.3.33, p.357f; see above, Ch. 1.

²³⁹ Thuc. V. 59.4, 60.1-4, 63.1-4.

²⁴⁰ Kagan, D., ‘Corinthian Diplomacy after the Peace of Nicias’ *AJPhil.* 81 (1960) 308.

²⁴¹ Thuc. V.76.1-80.1, 81.2.

²⁴² Ruggeri, 2004, 24.

In the first year of the Eleian war Agis marched across the Peneios valley from Achaia to Olympia.²⁴³ In the second year he facilitated the revolt of the Lepreans, Makistians and Epitalians and the desertion of the Letrinians, Amphidolians and Marganeians from the Eleians.²⁴⁴ In the same summer Pausanias captured Lasion, the four Akroreian *poleis* and Eleian Pylos.²⁴⁵ In three campaigns over two summers, the Lakedaimonians and their allies had marched across the open country, ravaging and plundering the land.²⁴⁶ If they had desired merely to vent their anger at the Eleians for their past actions, then these campaigns should have sated them. If they had intended to release the subject allies of their Eleians from their ties, then the unhindered march of Lakedaimonian and allied armies across the countryside provided every opportunity for these communities to rise.

Indeed, although many more appear to have remained loyal, three allied *poleis*, the Lepreans, Epitalians and Makistians, and several communities of the Eleians themselves, had joined the invaders. Krentz suggests that these communities went over because of the ‘overwhelming strength’ of the force commanded by Agis,²⁴⁷ but it is also possible that a faction akin to that of Xenias at Elis had gained dominance among them. Yet after two years of warfare the Lakedaimonians planned to invade Eleia once again, and we must seek to explain their motive by some means other than their anger at the events that followed the Peace of Nikias or their desire to give the subject allies of the Eleians the opportunity to become *autonomoi*. It is likely, as suggested above, that they continued to campaign because they wished to impose an oligarchic government upon the communities of the Eleians and their allies. This had not yet been achieved in Elis itself. The surrender of the city and the return of the oligarchic exiles led by Xenias was a necessary precondition for the fulfilment of this aim. The primary cause of the Eleian War, it appears, was the desire of the dominant faction among the Lakedaimonians to impose oligarchic, preferably aristocratic, governments upon the peoples who inhabited Eleia. As we shall see, it is likely that they were entirely successful in achieving this objective.

²⁴³ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.23; Paus. III.8.3f.

²⁴⁴ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.25.

²⁴⁵ Diod. XIV.17.8f.

²⁴⁶ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.24, 26f, 30; Diod. XIV.17.10; Paus. III.8.4f.

²⁴⁷ Krentz, 1994, 174. Krentz compares their actions to those of the Akanthians in 424 B.C., ‘when Brasidas similarly threatened to destroy their crops (Thuc. IV.84-88).’

CHAPTER TEN
THE RESULTS OF THE ELEIAN WAR

In the pursuit of the primary policy objective of the dominant faction in Sparta at the end of the Dekeleian War, the Lakedaimonians invaded Eleia and divided the territory of the Eleians and their allies into a number of states governed by oligarchies, most likely of the aristocratic type. These states became subject allies of the Lakedaimonians and soon afterwards were obliged to supply contingents to the Lakedaimonian and allied army in the Corinthian War. By this action the Eleians took part in an aggressive war for the first time since the declaration of the *asylia* early in the Archaic period, and can thus be said to have forfeited their claim to inviolability.

The Peace Settlement

The terms of the peace agreement between the Eleians and the Lakedaimonians at the end of the Eleian War are outlined by each of our three sources for the war. According to Xenophon, the Eleians sent to Lakedaimon and offered to tear down the walls of Pheia and Kyllene and to give up Phrixa, Epitalion, the Letrinians, Amphidolians and Marganeians, the Akroreians and Lasion. Although they asked to be allowed to keep Epeion because they had once bought it, the Lakedaimonians insisted that they surrender it as well. The Eleians were to retain control of Olympia. ‘When these things had been agreed upon,’ says Xenophon, ‘a peace and an alliance of the Eleians with the Lakedaimonians took place’.¹ Diodoros, while in accord with Xenophon in reporting that the Eleians initiated the peace, adds that they had to surrender their triremes, but apart from this says merely that they agreed to allow their neighbouring *poleis* to be *autonomoi*, without naming any.² Pausanias gives a third set of conditions: the Eleians agreed ‘not to rule over their *perioikoi* any longer, to tear down the walls of their city and to allow the Lakedaimonians to sacrifice to the god in Olympia and to compete in the games’.³

¹ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.31: εἰρήνη τε γίγνεται καὶ συμμαχία.

² Diod. XIV.34.1: τὰς περιουκούςας πόλεις αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖναι.

³ Paus. III.8.5.

It is clear that the peace terms went beyond the original demands of the Lakedaimonians.⁴ All three sources are agreed in general that the Eleians had to give up certain places. We need not doubt that they were required to leave their ports unfortified and surrender their triremes, since, as their contribution to the Archidamian War makes clear, the Eleians were a sea-power.⁵ Pausanias' claim that they had to tear down their walls seems to contradict Xenophon's statement that the city was unwalled.⁶ While it is possible, nevertheless, that the Eleians in the city had hastily erected walls in the intervening period, it seems more likely that since the inhabitants of Kyllene and Pheia were Eleians too, the walls mentioned by Pausanias were those of the two ports. Pausanias, in summarising Xenophon, might have mistakenly recorded that the walls were τοῦ ἄσπεως...τὸ τεῖχος.⁷

Falkner believes that the loss of the Eleian war fleet and the requirement to demolish the fortifications of their ports 'suggest that Sparta's aims in this war may not have been exclusively land-locked.' The Lakedaimonians and Corinthians, she points out, appear to have been at odds in Sicily, where the former supported Dionysios, the tyrant of Syrakousai.⁸ Falkner concludes that the Spartans might have wanted to use the Eleian harbours on the west coast of the Peloponnese to block Corinth's interest in the west and secure a source of mercenaries and maritime timbers.⁹ The Lakedaimonians might also have wished to facilitate the dispatch of aid from mainland Greece to Dionysios for his war against the Carthaginians.¹⁰

There seems no reason to doubt that the Lakedaimonians would have been happy to have the use of these ports. Falkner further claims, however, that they might at any time have used their long-standing grievances against the Eleians to justify an invasion for this purpose. Until the defeat of the Athenians and their allies in the Dekeleian War, nevertheless, the Lakedaimonians would not have wished to take on

⁴ Missiou-Ladi, A., 'Coercive Diplomacy in Greek Interstate Relations' *CQ* 37 (1987) 343; Roy, J., 'Spartan Aims in the Spartan-Elean War of c.400' *Electronic Antiquity* 3 <http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/EIAnt/V3N6/roy.html> (1997) 3.

⁵ See above, 229-32.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.27. Cartledge, P.A., *Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta* (London, 1987) 251, believes that the city was walled.

⁷ Paus. III.8.5; cf. Krentz, P., *Xenophon Hellenika II.3.11-IV.2.8 Edited with an Introduction, Translation and Commentary* (Warminster, 1994) 175; contra Cawkwell, G.L., 'Agesilaos and Sparta' *CQ* 26 (1976) 75, n.48; Introduction to Warner, R. (transl.), *Xenophon, A History of My Times* (Harmondsworth, 1979) 156 n.

⁸ Diod. XIV.10.2-4.

⁹ Diod. XIV.42.4; Falkner, C., 'Sparta and the Elean War, ca. 401/400 B.C: Revenge or Imperialism?' *Phoenix* 50 (1996) 23; cf. Roy, 1997, 1f, who offers additional material to support Falkner's view that the Eleian ports were important to the Lakedaimonians.

¹⁰ Diod. XIV.41.3-44.1; Falkner, 1996, 24.

another war in the Peloponnese, so the timing of the invasion appears to have more to do with the conclusion of the war against the Athenians than with a dispute between the Lakedaimonians and Corinthians over Sicily. Nor is it necessary to accept Falkner's claim that control of the Eleian coastline was a major objective of the Lakedaimonians from the start.¹¹

Naval considerations, nevertheless, might have been partly responsible for the inclusion of these clauses in the peace agreement, and the recent confirmation that Epitalion, surrendered in the peace, stood on the southern headland of what was then the mouth of the Alpheios adds strength to this view.¹² None of our sources presents a comprehensive account of the Eleian War, and it might have been of greater magnitude than the sum of the campaigns reported in the texts. It is possible that the Eleians had emulated the strategy of the Athenians during the Archidamian War by making naval raids on the Lakedaimonian coast.¹³ The report of Diodoros that the Lakedaimonians next moved against the Messenians in Kephallenia and Naupaktos suggests that they considered the surrender of the Eleian fleet a necessary prelude to a campaign against the Messenians, who might have collaborated with the Eleians during the war.¹⁴ The likelihood, on the other hand, that the population of the Eleian ports was one of the heartlands of the democracy suggests a further aim of the Lakedaimonians in insisting that these cities remained unfortified and that the triremes be surrendered.¹⁵ As Roy observes, 'Eleians committed to the navy or to work in the harbours were more likely to include democrats.'¹⁶

The terms of the peace agreement thus appear to have been that the Eleians were to tear down the fortifications of their two ports and surrender their triremes, that the places listed by Xenophon were to be given up and that they and perhaps some others were, as Diodoros says, to be *autonomoi*, and that the Eleians were to retain Olympia on the condition that they were prohibited from excluding the Lakedaimonians from sacrificing at the altar of Zeus or participating in the Olympic

¹¹ Falkner, 1996, 24, cf. 17; Roy, 1997, 3, while unconvinced that the naval demands were made at the beginning of the war, believes that the Lakedaimonians might have had them in mind at that time.

¹² Kraft *et al.*, 2005, 1, 22; see map 5 for the current location of the coast in relation to Epitalion.

¹³ The Lakedaimonians, on the other hand, established fortified posts in Eleia, a strategy that resembles that used in the Dekeleian war. The fatal flaw in an Eleian naval strategy, if one existed, would have been that so long as the enemy controlled the open country Elis, unlike Athens, could not be supplied by sea.

¹⁴ Diod. XIV.34.2f; cf. Falkner, 1996, 23; Buckler, J., *Aegean Greece in the Fourth Century B.C.* (Leiden, 2003) 18f.

¹⁵ See above, 270.

¹⁶ Roy, 1997, 3.

games. Yet, as we shall see, the consequences of the peace were more far-reaching than the terms alone suggest.¹⁷

Cartledge points out that the very fact that Agis installed the wealthy Xenias and his supporters in Epitalion after they had been driven out by the *demos* implies that he intended that they should be restored to power in Elis.¹⁸ While Kelly suggests that ‘it seems merely a chance omission that nothing is said of the oligarchs returning from exile’,¹⁹ Ruggeri finds evidence that suggests that they were, in fact, returned to Elis after peace had been concluded. Although none of our sources for the war give any hint of the fate of these exiles, Xenias himself is likely to have gone back home, and it seems unlikely that the leader of the exiled party would be allowed to return, but not his followers. Pausanias saw at Olympia a statue of Archedamos, son of Xenias, who, like the wrestler Symmachos whom Pausanias mentions earlier in the same passage, was an Eleian by birth.²⁰ The statue was executed by Alypos of Sikyon after Archedamos had won the boys’ wrestling. Alypos worked in the first half of the fourth century B.C., and Moretti places Archedamos’ victory at 396 B.C.²¹

As Ruggeri points out, there are no chronological difficulties in concluding from this evidence that Xenias returned to Elis with his family before 396 B.C. An Eleian with a similar name to that of the son of Xenias, an Archidamos, furthermore, went as Eleian ambassador to the Persian king in 367/6 B.C., accompanied by a certain Argeios.²² This Argeios was one of the heads of the democratic party during the Eleian-Arkadian war of 365/4 B.C.,²³ and Ruggeri deduces from this that he was sent to ensure that the interests of the democrats were considered at the negotiations, an unnecessary precaution if Archidamos had been a member of the democratic faction.²⁴ This Archidamos, a leader of the Eleian oligarchs in 365/4 B.C., she

¹⁷ cf. Cartledge, 1987, 250.

¹⁸ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.27-29; Cartledge, 1987, 251; for a description of and sources for this place see Buckler, 2003, 18 and n.7.

¹⁹ Kelly, D.H., *Sources and Interpretations of Spartan History in the Reigns of Agesilaos II, Archidamos III and Agis III* (Cambridge PhD Dissertation, 1975) 40.

²⁰ Paus. VI.1.3: γένος καὶ αὐτὸς Ἑλεῖος.

²¹ Ruggeri, C., *Gli stati intorno a Olimpia: Storia e costituzione dell’Elide e degli stati formati dai perieci elei (400-362a.C)* (Stuttgart, 2004) 24; Moretti, L., *Olympionikai: i vincitori negli antichi giochi olimpici* (Rome, 1957) no. 369; Zoumbaki, S.B., *Prosopographie der Eleer bis zum 1 Jh. v. Chr.* (Paris, 2005) 115f.121.

²² Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.33.

²³ Xen. *Hell.* VII.4.15.

²⁴ Ruggeri, 2004, 24; Zoumbaki, 2005, 93f.82; 115f.121, 118f.131. Zoumbaki, 2005, 93f.82, agrees with Ruggeri in identifying Argeios the ambassador with the leader of the democratic party: ‘Mitglied

suggests, should be identified with the Archedamos, son of Xenias, who won the boys' wrestling at Olympia soon after the conclusion of the Eleian War. 'Although it is clear that these two notices do not have the value of a proof,' Ruggeri concludes, 'they stand nevertheless in favour of the hypothesis of an intervention of the Spartans in the Eleians' home affairs at the end of the war in order to secure the return to their country of the oligarchic exiles, upon whose destiny the ancient authors are otherwise silent.'²⁵

Another piece of evidence suggests that the exiles who returned to Elis might have included influential members of one of the Eleian mantic clans. It is suggested above that the diffusion of Eleian *manteis* throughout scattered parts of the Greek world in the early-fifth century may reflect the political upheavals of the time. The Iamid Teisamenos, who emigrated from Elis and was granted Spartan citizenship before the battle of Plataiai,²⁶ for example, might have been a refugee from the rising popular movement led by Damophon, the son of Pantaleon.²⁷ The particularly fine Eleian silver drachm of the 95th Olympiad, the first celebrated after the end of the Eleian War, depicts an eagle with a lizard, apparently the emblem of the Iamid *manteis* (fig. 3).²⁸ If the Iamids had tended to support the aristocratic cause in Eleia, then perhaps this coin celebrated their return to influence there.

Despite the likelihood that they intervened in Elis to ensure the return of the oligarchic exiles, Ruggeri maintains that 'gli Spartani non imposero agli Elei un cambiamento di regime'.²⁹ She seeks to explain this by arguing that after the failure of the coup attempt led by Xenias, the Spartans feared that an attempt to impose a change of regime might create political instability and drive the Eleian democrats to renew their relations with the democrats of Athens, apparent in the funds that Thrasydaios, who had become his *xenos*, supplied to Thrasyboulos in 403 B.C.,³⁰ or with other enemies of Sparta such as Argos. The fall of the Thirty Tyrants at Athens, she believes, had shown the Spartans the folly of political intervention. The terms of

der elischen Gesandtschaft zu Artaxerxes (367 v. Chr.), einer der Anführer der demokratischen Partei in Elis.'

²⁵ Ruggeri, 2004, 24f: 'Pur essendo chiaro che queste due notizie non hanno il valore di una prova, esse stanno tuttavia a favore dell'ipotesi di un intervento degli Spartani presso gli Elei alla fine della guerra per il rientro in patria degli esuli oligarchici, sul destino dei quali tacciono altrimenti gli antichi autori.'

²⁶ Hdt. IX.33.1; Paus. III.11.5-8.

²⁷ See above, 191-96.

²⁸ *Coins of the Peloponnese*, 2006, 618, no. 632; 166, no. 631; 167, no. 632; see above, 59-61.

²⁹ Ruggeri, 2004, 25, 27; cf. Roy, 1997, 2f.

³⁰ Plut. *Mor.* 835F; Lysias fr. 1.163-71.

the peace with the Eleians, she believes, were determined by Pausanias, the king who had favoured the democrats of the Peiraieus against Lysandros and the Athenian oligarchs.³¹ Pausanias would have felt, says Ruggeri, that the military humiliation of the Eleians, the loss of their fleet and of full control of their ports, their enlistment in the Lakedaimonian alliance and the fact that ‘their little hegemonic empire had been destroyed with the liberation of the communities of the *perioikoi*,’ which left them surrounded by newly autonomous states, were enough to ensure their loyalty to Sparta.³²

There are, however, a number of problems with this interpretation. While it is clear that moderate Lakedaimonians like Pausanias might have found it more politic to give up the policy of direct intervention in the internal political affairs of the Greek states pursued by Lysandros, it is likely that king Agis, rather than king Pausanias, carried out the peace negotiations.³³ The methods of Agis have been discussed above. His policy towards Argos both before and after his conclusive victory at Mantinea was to negotiate with the leaders of the oligarchic party in order to secure the allegiance of the city to the Lakedaimonians, and then to bring about a change to oligarchic, most likely aristocratic, government.³⁴ His hope in Eleia during the first summer of the war appears to have been that the party of Xenias would bring the city over to the Lakedaimonians.³⁵

Ruggeri’s interpretation rests upon the assumption that the sole aim of all of the Lakedaimonians was to maintain the interests of their state. While this might have been true in the case of the faction led by Pausanias, who was soon to be deposed for his ‘soft’ approach to popular government,³⁶ the party of Agis appears also to have given considerable priority to the pursuit of the interests of the Greek aristocracy in general. In political terms, this meant favouring oligarchy, of the aristocratic variety wherever possible,³⁷ in the Peloponnesian and neighbouring states.

After the battle of Mantinea, for example, the Argive democrats were prepared to make an alliance with the Lakedaimonians, but Agis’ subsequent

³¹ Ruggeri, 2004, 27f; see above, 264f.

³² Ruggeri, 2004, 28; Zoumbaki, 2005, 94.

³³ See above, 263f.

³⁴ Thuc. V.59.4-60.4, 76.1, 80.1, 81.2; Diod. XII.78.4, 80.1-3.

³⁵ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.27-29; Paus. III.8.4f.

³⁶ Xen. *Hell.* III.5.25; Diod. XIV.89.1.

³⁷ Aristocracy is taken here to mean an oligarchy based upon birth: see above, 8, n.21.

sponsorship of an oligarchic reaction ensured that once the democracy was restored the Argives turned again to the Athenians.³⁸ Despite the unfortunate outcome of his policy for the interests of the Lakedaimonian state, Agis continued to negotiate with his political allies in Argos in the hope that they might be able to betray the city to him.³⁹ Agis was not deterred from attempting to interfere in the constitution of Argos, and there is no sign that he had changed direction by the time of the Eleian War. Zoumbaki, supporting Ruggeri, argues that ‘the victorious Spartans, who profited from the peace terms, humiliating for the Eleians, had no cause to instigate a constitutional change.’⁴⁰ If constitutional change had been the aim of Agis and his supporters at the outset of the war, however, no amount of humiliation would have satisfied them.

The Constitutional Implications of the Return of Exiles

Bolmarcich argues that ‘there is evidence for Spartan encouragement of, but not insistence on, the institution of oligarchies in Spartan peace treaties.’⁴¹ Quoting from Thucydides, who points out that the Lakedaimonians took care that their allies, though not tributary, ‘should be governed under an oligarchy in their interests alone’,⁴² she cites several examples. The first is Tegea, where she believes that a fragment of Aristotle preserved by Plutarch recording an inscription concerning an agreement between the Lakedaimonians and Tegeans shows that ‘although no

³⁸ Thuc. V.82.2-6; Diod. XII.80.3, 81.1ff.

³⁹ Thuc. V.83.2.

⁴⁰ Zoumbaki, 2005, 93: ‘die siegreichen Spartaner, die von den für die Eleer demütigenden Friedensbedingungen profitierten, hatten keinen Anlass, eine Verfassungsänderung zu betreiben.’

⁴¹ Bolmarcich, S., ‘Thucydides 1.19.1 and the Peloponnesian League’ *GRBS* 45 (2005) 11.

⁴² Thuc. I.19.1: κατ’ ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς μόνον ἐπιτηδείως ὅπως πολιτεύσουσι θεοραπέυοντες; Bolmarcich, 2005, 9 (her translation). Bolmarcich’s passive rendition of the aorist subjunctive active πολιτεύσουσι is supported by both Warner (‘by oligarchies’) and Lattimore (‘through oligarchies’). Crawley has ‘to secure their subservience to her interests by establishing oligarchies among them’ and according to Smith they ‘took care that these should have an oligarchical form of government conformably to the sole interest of Sparta’: Warner, R. (transl.), *Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War* (Harmondsworth, 1972) 46; Lattimore, S. (transl.), *Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War* (Indianapolis, 1998) 12; Crawley, R. (transl.), *Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1910) 10; Smith, C.F. (transl.), *Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War I* (Cambridge, Mass., 1928) 35. Perhaps something like ‘but taking care that they should govern them through oligarchy in order that they should act in their interests alone’ would be more literal, but the intention of the Lakedaimonians to impose oligarchy upon the cities is made equally clear by Bolmarcich’s translation, as by those cited above. Note that ‘“care” might run to armed intervention’: Andrewes, A., ‘Spartan Imperialism?’ in Garnsey P. and Whittaker, C.R. (eds), *Imperialism in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, 1978) 95.

mention of oligarchy is made in the treaty, there is a clear attempt on Sparta's part to arrange the government of Tegea in her favor.⁴³

In Athens after the Dekeleian War the terms recorded by Xenophon include the return of the Athenian exiles, while 'the *Ath. Pol.*, Lysias and Diodorus all report not this clause, but a clause stating that Athens would return to its ancestral constitution.'⁴⁴ Examining this and other evidence, Bolmarcich shows that 'these clauses were in fact one and the same, and...the return of the exiles was meant to encourage an oligarchy at Athens.' She concludes that 'Sparta had not formally established an oligarchy at Athens, but she had taken care (θεραπεύοντες) that one was viable'.⁴⁵

Bolmarcich suggests that a treaty with the Aitolian Erxadieis, recorded on a *stele* from the Spartan akropolis first published by Peek,⁴⁶ was concluded on account of the thousand Aitolian hoplites who had been sent to aid the Eleians in the Eleian War,⁴⁷ and might have been intended to prevent the Aitolians from sending aid to the Messenians whom the Lakedaimonians drove from Kephallenia and Naupaktos soon after the end of that war.⁴⁸ Agreeing with Kelly that a certain clause in the treaty concerning exiles does not refer to the Messenians, however, she supports him in 'taking this clause to address not the Messenians but a segment of the Aetolian population, possibly pro-Laconian in their sympathies.'⁴⁹ All three treaties, Bolmarcich points out, 'include clauses that affect the government or at least the citizen body of the non-Spartan party to the treaty, and...all appear to have been peace treaties'.⁵⁰

Two other cases, not discussed by Bolmarcich, further illustrate this point. In 392 B.C., during the Korinthian War, a struggle took place in Korinth between 'the

⁴³ Plut. *Greek Questions* 292B; *Roman Questions* 277C; Bolmarcich, 2005, 16, cf. 12-17; cf. Nielsen, T.H., 'A Survey of Dependant *Poleis* in Arkadia' in Hansen, M.H. and Raaflaub, K.A. (eds), *More Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis* (Stuttgart, 1996) 87f.

⁴⁴ Bolmarcich, 2005, 17: Lys. XII *Against Eratosthenes* 70: τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν πολιτείαν καταλῦσαι; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 34.3: πολιτεύσονται τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν; Diod. XIV.3.2: τῇ πατρίῳ πολιτείᾳ χρῆσθαι.

⁴⁵ Bolmarcich, 2005, 18f; Justin V.8; Andok. III.12; 21. Bolmarcich takes θεραπεύοντες from Thuc. I.19.1, the subject of her article.

⁴⁶ Peek, W., 'Ein neuer spartanischer Staatsvertrag' *AbhLeip* 65.4 (1974) 4; ML *addenda* 67.

⁴⁷ Diod. XIV.17.9f.

⁴⁸ Diod. XIV.34.2f.

⁴⁹ Bolmarcich, 2005, 26, cf. 22-27 and n.41; Kelly, D.H., 'The New Spartan Treaty' *LCM* 3 (1978) 140, cf. 133.

⁵⁰ Bolmarcich, 2005, 27.

greatest and best' and a faction supported by the Argives.⁵¹ Five hundred of the former were defeated by their opponents and departed the country, intending to go into exile.⁵² Noting, nevertheless, that Corinth had been united with Argos, and acting, says Xenophon, with the highest motives, including the desire for εὐνομία, a term that implies oligarchy,⁵³ the exiles, while remaining outside the city, stayed in Corinthian territory. There they collaborated with the Lakedaimonians, who hoped to restore them.⁵⁴

In 386 B.C. the Greek states agreed to the terms of the Peace of Antalkidas, declared by the Persian king, which included a provision that apart from those left to himself and the Athenians, the Greek cities, both large and small, were to be left *autonomoi*.⁵⁵ Those Corinthians who had opposed the exiles fled the city and, as Xenophon puts it, 'the other citizens willingly took back the former exiles'.⁵⁶ This, as Griffith points out, is 'mere humbug' and 'the exiles returned virtually by force', unless by 'citizens' Xenophon means those who retained full political rights under the ensuing oligarchy.⁵⁷

In another work, Xenophon makes it clear that the Lakedaimonians had insisted upon the return of the Corinthian exiles. Agesilaos, he says, 'opposed the

⁵¹ Xen. *Hell.* IV.4.1: οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ βέλτιστοι, cf. 4-5; Diod. XIV.86.1. According to all the manuscripts of Diodoros the latter faction was composed of τινὲς τῶν ἐπιθυμία κρατούντων. Although retained in the Budé edition, this phrase was emended by Wurm, without good grounds, to τινὲς τῶν ἐπιθυμούντων δημοκρατίας: Oldfather, C.H. (transl.), *Diodorus of Sicily* VI (Cambridge, Mass., 1954) 246, n.2. The emendation is accepted by Hamilton, C., *Sparta's Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War* (Ithaca, NY, 1979) 267. Salmon, J.B., *Wealthy Corinth: A History of the City to 338 B.C.* (Oxford, 1984) 355-57, offers an alternative emendation that is, however, both strained and unnecessary, and it seems more likely that Diodoros' description of the opponents of the pro-Lakedaimonian faction as 'ruled by their passions' is based on his interpretation of Xenophon's account. *Hell. Oxy.* (VII.3 = II.3) calls them οἱ μεταστῆσαι τὰ πράγματα ζητοῦντες, 'those who sought to change affairs', perhaps by bringing Corinth closer to Argos. They appear, as Salmon suggests, to have been the faction in power when the war began, rather than democratic revolutionaries, as proposed by Griffith, G.T., 'The Union of Corinth and Argos (392-386 B.C.)' *Historia* 1 (1950) 239f; cf. Hamilton, 1979, 267. They might, nevertheless, have been democrats who were already in control of the city.

⁵² Xen. *Hell.* IV.4.5; Diod. XIV.86.1. Cartledge, 1987, 256, appears to accept Xenophon's account of the massacre of the 'leading oligarchic ultras' by their opponents, even though he believes, 255, that Psamelos, the leader of the extreme oligarchs, was 'almost certainly one of Xenophon's major sources of information for Corinthian events of the 390s'. There is no room here to argue in detail the present author's belief that the contradictions in Xenophon's account, which is apparently accepted by Diodoros, suggest that the so-called 'massacre' was rather a response to a coup attempt on the part of the younger members of *oi beltistoi*, who were gathered together at arms in the gymnasium on a festival day (Xen. *Hell.* IV.4.4).

⁵³ Cartledge, 1987, 256.

⁵⁴ Xen. *Hell.* IV.4.6-13, 17, 5.1, 5, 19, 8.34; Diod. XIV.86.1-6, 91.2, 92.1.

⁵⁵ Xen. *Hell.* V.1.31: τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖναι; Diod. XIV.110.2-4.

⁵⁶ Xen. *Hell.* V.1.34.

⁵⁷ Griffith, 1950, 254, n.55; Cartledge, 1987, 256.

peace until he forced Korinth and Thebes to restore to their homes the citizens who had been exiled on account of their sympathy with the Lakedaimonians'.⁵⁸ Hamilton's conclusion that 'with the exiles, oligarchy was restored', seems a reasonable one, and the flight of their opponents shows that they expected to lose their control of the state, if not their lives, when the exiles returned.⁵⁹ Discussing the widespread outbreak of democratic revolution against οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες in the Peloponnese in 375/4 B.C., Diodoros records the failed attempt of the (post-386 B.C.) Korinthian exiles to return from Argos to their city, which seems by then to have become an oligarchy of 'the best of men', an aristocracy.⁶⁰ We can assume that this aristocracy had been established upon the return of the exiles in 386 B.C.

Xenophon's record of events at Phleious, too, reveals what might have been expected when pro-Lakedaimonian exiles returned to a city. During the Korinthian War the Phleisians had at first been unwilling to allow the Lakedaimonians within their walls for fear that they might bring back their exiles. When attacked by forces led by the Athenian Iphikrates, nevertheless, they invited the Lakedaimonians in to protect them. The Lakedaimonians made no mention of the exiles and later 'handed back their city and their laws just as they had received them'.⁶¹ As Cartledge observes, 'that formulation of Xenophon is richly eloquent of Sparta's normal procedure in such cases.'⁶²

The attitude of the Lakedaimonians changed, however, after peace had been concluded. About 384 B.C., once they had replaced the Mantineian democracy with an oligarchic regime,⁶³ they responded to the request of the Phleisian exiles by sending to Phleious to ask for their return. The Phleisians, fearing that if they refused the Lakedaimonians would campaign against them and that the supporters of the exiles who remained within the walls would then betray the city, voted to agree to the request and to restore to the exiles their confiscated property. Xenophon explains that these supporters included the families and friends of the exiles, but also 'as, indeed, in most *poleis*, some who had their hearts set upon a change in public

⁵⁸ Xen. *Ages*. 2.21; Bosworth, B., 'Autonomia: the Use and Abuse of Political Terminology' *SIFC* 3.10.1-2 (1992) 133f.

⁵⁹ Hamilton, C.D., 'The Politics of Revolution in Corinth, 395-386 B.C.' *Historia* 21 (1972) 37 and n.71.

⁶⁰ Diod. XV.40.3, cf. 1; Griffith, 1950, 254, n.55. This event may belong instead to the period after Leuktra: see below, n.222.

⁶¹ Xen. *Hell*. IV. 4.15: τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοὺς νόμους παραδόντες οἴαντες καὶ παρέλαβον.

⁶² Cartledge, 1987, 263.

⁶³ Xen. *Hell*. V.2.1-7; Diod. XV.5.1-5, 12.1f; Isok. VIII *On the Peace* 100.

affairs'.⁶⁴ The hopes of their supporters and the earlier fears of their opponents inside the city reveal the expectation that the return of the exiles would lead to a change of regime.

The expected transfer of control of the institutions of the *polis* to the exiled party did not, nevertheless, come about, and the Phleisians, as Xenophon puts it, 'boldly made over nothing of what was fitting to those who had been brought back from exile'.⁶⁵ The exiles, in other words, were to have the same political rights as other citizens, and Phleious would remain a democracy. In 381 B.C. a dispute broke out over control of the courts that were to settle *ta amphiloga*,⁶⁶ and the restored exiles and some other citizens went to Sparta to complain.⁶⁷ At this, even though many of the Lakedaimonians pointed out that for the sake of a few individuals they were making themselves hated by a *polis* of 5,000 men, the ephors ordered mobilisation and Agesilaos laid siege to Phleious.⁶⁸ The return of the exiles had not delivered the usual and expected outcome – the establishment of oligarchy – so the Lakedaimonians were forced to resort to military intervention.

The Phleisians had remained loyal allies of the Lakedaimonians, as shown by the fact that they had contributed a large sum of money to the campaign of Agesipolis against Olynthos.⁶⁹ Clearly, the Lakedaimonians attacked the Phleisians not because they had failed in their obligations to them, but because they refused to adopt the constitutional form favoured by the faction led at that time by Agesilaos. Twenty months later, when the city capitulated,⁷⁰ Agesilaos 'had no intention of allowing the majority of Phleisian citizens to have the form of *politeia* that they wished'.⁷¹ He arranged that fifty of the exiles and fifty men from the city should determine who should be put to death and by what laws the city was to be governed, and left a garrison until these matters were settled.⁷² We can be reasonably certain that the fifty men from the city were not elected by a popular assembly, that those

⁶⁴ Xen. *Hell.* V.2.9f: οἷα δὴ ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι νεωτέρων τινὲς ἐπιθυμοῦντες πραγμάτων.

⁶⁵ Xen. *Hell.* V.3.10: θρασέως οὐδὲν τῶν δικαίων ἐποίουν τοῖς κατεληλυθόσιν.

⁶⁶ Xen. *Hell.* V.3.10.

⁶⁷ Cartledge, 1987, 264, believes that 'the returned exiles probably wanted the Spartans to be called in as arbitrators', but there is no evidence for this, and subsequent events suggest that they requested armed intervention to 'restore' their privileges.

⁶⁸ Xen. *Hell.* V.3.11-17; Isok. VIII *On the Peace* 100.

⁶⁹ Xen. *Hell.* V.3.10.

⁷⁰ Xen. *Hell.* V.3.21-25.

⁷¹ Cartledge, 1987, 265.

⁷² Xen. *Hell.* V.3.25: ἔπειτα δὲ νόμους θεῖναι, καθ' οὓς πολιτεύσονται.

exiled or killed were the leading democrats and that the garrison did not leave until an oligarchic constitution, most likely an aristocracy, was securely in place.⁷³

As Ruggeri has shown, it is likely that the Eleian exiles led by Xenias returned home when the war ended. The examples discussed above suggest that the return of oligarchic exiles to a *polis* when peace had been concluded after a defeat at the hands of the Lakedaimonians implied the replacement of popular government by oligarchy, of the aristocratic variety where possible. These factors lead to the conclusion that the democracy of the Eleians that had been established in 471 B.C. was overthrown with Lakedaimonian support soon after the end of the Eleian War in 400 B.C. Not long afterwards, when Timokrates offered funds to those in the Greek states who would urge opposition to the Lakedaimonians, it is likely that he failed to approach the Eleians because no-one with any influence among them had any intention of doing so.⁷⁴

The Eleian Oligarchy of the Early-Fourth Century B.C.

Further evidence supports the conclusion that the Lakedaimonians established an oligarchy favourable to themselves among the Eleians and suggests the likely form of the new constitution. The terminology used by Pausanias to describe the changes in the number of Eleian *Hellanodikai* at various times indicates that an oligarchy was established in Elis soon after the end of the Eleian War. From the time of Iphitos, he reports, the festival was presided over by one of the Oxylidai, the equivalent among the Eleians of the Lakedaimonian Herakleidai. ‘At the fiftieth Olympiad,’ says Pausanias, ‘they selected by lot (ἔλαχον) two men from among all of the Eleians’.⁷⁵ As argued above, we can add the twenty-seven Olympiads that were celebrated before the victory of Koroibos at the time of Iphitos to this figure and conclude that this reform took place at Ol. 77, that is, in 472 B.C., at the time of the synoikism of Elis and the establishment of democracy.⁷⁶

The dating of the next reform at Ol. 95, however, appears to follow a system that includes the twenty-seven Olympiads before Koroibos’ victory, and so was in place for the festival of 400 B.C., held immediately after the conclusion of peace

⁷³ cf. Xen. *Hell.* VII.2.5, 4.11; Cartledge, 1987, 266; Missiou-Ladi, 1987, 344. On Xenophon’s idealisation of Phleious as it was organised after these events, see Dillery, J., *Xenophon and the History of his Times* (London, 1995) 130-38.

⁷⁴ *Hell. Oxy.* VII.2 = II.2; cf. Xen. *Hell.* III.5.1f; Paus. III.9.7f; Kelly, 1975, 41.

⁷⁵ Paus. V.9.4.

⁷⁶ See above, 123f, 135.

with the Lakedaimonians.⁷⁷ At this time ‘they appointed nine *Hellanodikai*’ (ἐννέα Ἑλλανοδίκας κατέστησαν) and these were organised into three panels. Eight years later, in 392 B.C. they added a tenth, and at Ol. 103, 368 B.C., one came (ἐγένετο) from each of the twelve tribes.⁷⁸ These changes may be taken as indicators of constitutional change. Pausanias’ use of *katestesan* for 400 B.C. in place of *lachousin* for 472 B.C., moreover, indicates that an oligarchic method of choosing the most important Olympic officials had replaced the democratic procedure of selection by lot.

The choice of the number nine also appears significant. Aristotle records that:

ὅπερ ἐν Ἥλιδι συνέβη ποτέ· τῆς πολιτείας γὰρ δι’ ὀλίγων οὔσης τῶν γερόντων ὀλίγοι πάμπαν ἐγίνοντο διὰ τὸ αἰδίου εἶναι ἐνενήκοντα ὄντας, τὴν δ’ αἴρεσιν δυναστευτικὴν εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίαν τῇ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι γερόντων⁷⁹

This very thing once happened in Elis, for the government being in the hands of a few, very few took part in the council of elders because the Ninety were chosen for life, and the choice was dynastic and like the Lakedaimonian *gerontes*.

Although Aristotle gives no indication as to when this regime might have been in power, scholars have generally placed it before the synoikism.⁸⁰ As argued

⁷⁷ Olympiad 95 in Pausanias is the result of an emendation by Boeckh from πέμπτη καὶ εἰκοστῇ to πέμπτη καὶ ἐνενηκοστῇ. There are sound reasons for this emendation. The figure of twenty-five in the MSS must be wrong, since Pausanias, in the previous section, records the earlier change to two officials at Ol.50. Jones, N.F., *Public Organization in Ancient Greece. A Documentary Study* (Philadelphia, 1987) 143, 152, nn.1f, prefers an alternative emendation, apparently suggested by K.O. Müller and accepted by Busolt, to καὶ ἑβδομηκοστῇ, which would result in Ol.75 (480 B.C.) for the change to nine *Hellanodikai*. There are two reasons why Boeckh’s emendation should be preferred. Firstly, if the change from one to two *Hellanodikai* was made in Ol.77, the later change to nine cannot be assigned to Ol.75. Secondly, *IvO* 2, which Jeffery dates to the early-fifth century B.C., refers to just one *Hellanodikas* (*LSAG* 218, 220.15), and Pausanias makes it clear that there were two for a long time (V.9.4: ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀπὸ ἐκείνου). Boeckh’s emendation is accepted in the Loeb, Budé and Teubner editions.

⁷⁸ Paus. V.9.5.

⁷⁹ Arist. *Pol.* V.5.8, 1306a.15-19.

⁸⁰ Andrewes in Gomme, A.W., Andrewes A. and Dover, K.J., *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* IV (Oxford, 1970) 60; O’Neil, J.L., *Greek Democratic Constitutions outside Athens* (Cambridge PhD Dissertation, 1974) 81f; Rice, J.D., *The Greek State of Elis in Hellenistic Times*

above, however, there was no time before the synoikism when a *polis* called ‘Elis’ existed,⁸¹ so the council of ninety elders must have governed Elis at some time after 471 B.C. It appears, too, that the democracy of the Eleians survived until the Eleian War,⁸² when the faction of Thrasydaios, leader of the *demos*, held sway there. The Council of Ninety must thus have ruled at some time between 400 B.C. and the composition of the *Politics*, in which the death of Philip of Macedon in 336 B.C. is mentioned.⁸³ A more exact date presents itself when we consider that the nine *Hellanodikai*, first appointed in 400 B.C., would fit nicely with a constitution in which power lay with a Council of Ninety.⁸⁴ The similarity noted by Aristotle with the Lakedaimonian *gerontes*, furthermore, would sit well with the return of the faction of the fabulously rich Lakedaimonian *proxenos* Xenias from exile, when the Spartan model might have been influential at Elis.⁸⁵

The context in which the notice of the Council of Ninety appears in Aristotle’s text, moreover, allows us to make sense of two otherwise confusing references in Plutarch’s *Moralia*. In the passage cited above, Aristotle is giving an example of how an oligarchy might break up when, even though there are few citizens, not even all of these are admitted to the greatest offices.⁸⁶ This implies that the rule of the Ninety was soon superseded by a broader oligarchy. Plutarch says that he is not unaware ‘that some men, curtailing a burdensome and oligarchical council, like Ephialtes at Athens and Phormion for the Eleians, gained power and reputation at the same time’.⁸⁷ In another passage, he makes the identity of this Phormion clear. ‘Plato,’ he says, ‘sent one of his companions, Aristonymos, away to set in order the

(University of Missouri Dissertation, 1975) 17; Moggi, M., *I Sinecismi Interstatali Greci* (Pisa, 1976) 161; Gehrke, H.-J., *Stasis* (Munich, 1985) 52; Jones, 1987, 143; Demand, N.H., *Urban Relocation in Early Greece. Flight and Consolidation* (Bristol, 1990) 64.

⁸¹ See above, 181f.

⁸² Greenidge, A.H.J., *A Handbook of Greek Constitutional History* (Buffalo, 2001, [1st edn, London, 1911]) 214, believes that this aristocratic body survived the establishment of democracy. There is no reason, however, with Greenidge, to identify this council with the *δημοιοργοί* of Thuc. V.47.9. As argued above, 198f, the Eleian *demiourgoi* are likely to have been public officials rather than members of a council, and in fact we hear of no Eleian council in the fifth century B.C. other than the *boule* of 600.

⁸³ Arist. *Pol.* V.8.10, 1311b.2f; Rackham, H., Introduction to *Aristotle, Politics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1944) xviii.

⁸⁴ Busolt makes this connection, but dates the reform to Ol.75 (480 B.C.): Busolt, G., *Die Lakedaimonier und ihr Bundesgenossen* (Leipzig, 1878) 181f; cf. Jones, 1987, 143, 152, n.3.

⁸⁵ Whibley, L., *Greek Oligarchies: Their Character and Organization* (London, 1896) 157, notes the relatively small size of aristocratic councils: 30 at Sparta; 80 at Korinth; and about 90 in the Athenian council of the Areiopagos.

⁸⁶ Arist. *Pol.* V.5.8, 1306a.14-16.

⁸⁷ Plut. *Mor.* 805D.

constitution of the Arkadians, Phormion to the Eleians and Mendemos to the Pyrrhaians'.⁸⁸

While it seems unlikely that a companion of Plato would have been sent to replace an oligarchy with a democracy, Phormion might have been called upon as a kind of 'constitutional consultant' to resolve the difficulties that Aristotle says arose from the over-restrictive requirements for membership of the aristocratic council at Elis. Such consultation is not unprecedented in the early-fourth century B.C. Plato himself appears to have refused the invitation of the Arkadians and Thebans to formulate the laws for the new city of Megalopolis, established soon after 371 B.C.⁸⁹ The notice in Pausanias that the nine *Hellanodikai* were replaced by ten in Ol. 97, 392 B.C., furthermore, suggests a precise date for an adjustment of the Eleian constitution.⁹⁰

It is highly likely that the Lakedaimonians under king Agis at the end of the Eleian War took care to ensure that the aristocratic exiles led by Xenias were able to return to Elis and that the Eleians, considering the irresistible power of the Lakedaimonians at that time and the determination of those who directed their foreign policy to impose aristocratic government upon the states of the Peloponnese, had no choice but to allow them to establish in Elis a highly limited oligarchy of the aristocratic type on the Lakedaimonian model. The arguments presented above make it likely that a major Lakedaimonian objective in the Eleian War was 'to bring [the

⁸⁸ Plut. *Mor.* 1126C. O'Neil, 1995, 38, considering only the first passage from the *Moralia*, assumes that this Phormion was from Elis.

⁸⁹ Diog. Laert. III.23; cf. Aelian II.42. Plato appears to have refused to accept the invitation when he learnt that the constitution was not to be founded on the basis of equality (Diog. Laert. III.23: ὁ δὲ μαθὼν ἴσον ἔχειν οὐ θέλοντας οὐκ ἐπορεύθη; cf. Aelian II.42). Wilson says of the passage from Aelian, which also mentions *isos*, though not Megalopolis, that 'the presentation of Plato as an egalitarian is unexpected, and perhaps the story was originally told of someone else': Wilson, N.H. (transl.), *Aelian, Historical Miscellany* (Cambridge, Mass., 1997) 119, n.a. The evidence is certainly at least third-hand, since Diogenes acknowledges as his source Pamphila, who wrote during the reign of Nero: Hicks, R.D. (transl.), *Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959) 27f. It is possible, nevertheless, that Plato envisaged equality among a limited number of citizens. Note the strict equality in the plutocratic Boiotian oligarchy of the early-fourth century B.C. (*Hell. Oxy.* XVI.2-4 = XI.2-4).

⁹⁰ This Phormion might have been the son of Asopios, son of Phormion. Asopios was killed on Leukas in 428 B.C., so Phormion would have been at least thirty-six years old in 392 B.C., perhaps considerably older, when the constitutional change was made in Elis (Thuc. III.7.1, 5). Plato himself appears to have been born in 428 B.C., however, and would thus have been the same age or younger than Phormion, who is then unlikely to have been his pupil (Diog. Laert. III.2). Neither Phormion nor the other 'constitutional consultants' appears among the pupils of Plato listed by Diogenes, and Plutarch calls Phormion and the others ἐταῖροι rather than μαθηταί. Although this term, too, can indicate pupils, Phormion, Plato's 'companion', might well have been of a similar age or older (Diog. Laert. III.46).

Eleians] to their senses'⁹¹ by overthrowing their democratic constitution in order to replace it with an aristocracy. This, nevertheless, was not the only result of that war, the consequences of which went far beyond the stated aims of the Lakedaimonians.

The Territorial Losses of the Eleians

The Lakedaimonians had demanded at the outset of the Eleian War that the Eleians grant *autonomia* to their so-called *perioikoi*, who, as argued above, are likely to have been the non-Eleian *poleis* who had become their subject-allies.⁹² While at the approach of the armies of Agis and Pausanias some communities of the Eleian region had gone over to the Lakedaimonians, nevertheless, those who did so were not necessarily identical to the Eleian allies.⁹³ The decision either to join the Lakedaimonians or stay with the Eleians appears to have been made because of either fear of the consequences of refusing the demands of a powerful invader or the political preferences of the dominant faction in a community rather than on the basis of ethnicity. Whatever the cause, the Lakedaimonians seem to have ensured that the communities that fell into their hands became *autonomoi* as they understood the term, that is, that they were governed by aristocracies and became their own allies.

There are some irregularities in Xenophon's list of communities lost by the Eleians. The Lepreans, the Makistians and Epitalion had gone over to Agis in the first year of the war, followed by the Letrinians, Amphidolians and Marganeians.⁹⁴ Thrasydaios had offered 'to give up the Triphylian *poleis* of Phrixa and Epitalion and the Letrinians and Amphidolians and Marganeians, and in addition to these the Akroreians and Lasion, which was claimed by the Arkadians', and they had to surrender Epeion as well.⁹⁵ This means that, according to Xenophon, the Eleians surrendered Phrixa and Epeion, which had not gone over to Agis, along with Epitalion and the Letrinians, Amphidolians and Marganeians, who had gone over, and the Akroreians and Lasion, both of which we know from Diodoros had been

⁹¹ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.23: σωφρονίσαι αὐτούς.

⁹² See above, 110f, 140f, 256; cf. Nielsen, T.H., 'Triphylia: An Experiment in Ethnic Construction and Political Organisation' in Nielsen, T.H. (ed), *Yet More Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis* (Stuttgart, 1997) 140ff.

⁹³ Nor does the evidence support the view of Nielsen, 1996, 74, that the 'Eleian perioikoi defected in large numbers during the Spartan invasion'.

⁹⁴ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.25.

⁹⁵ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.30: τὰς Τριφυλίδας πόλεις ἀφεῖναι Φρίξαν καὶ Ἐπιτάλιον καὶ Λετρίνους καὶ Ἀμφιδόλους καὶ Μαργανέας, πρὸς δὲ ταύταις καὶ Ἀκρωρείους καὶ Λασιῶνα τὸν ὑπ' Ἀρκάδων ἀντιλεγόμενον. As Nielsen, 1997, 145, says, this use of Triphylia 'is probably slightly anachronistic'; cf. Ruggeri, 2004, 78.

won, along with Eleian Pylos, by Pausanias.⁹⁶ Xenophon does not, however, mention here the Lepreans and Makistians, who had gone over to Agis and who subsequently became independent from the Eleians.

Despite this irregularity, it is possible to conclude that while the Eleians had already lost the Lepreans and Makistians, they also had to surrender Phrixa and Epeion, which appear to have remained loyal, and Xenophon adds to this list as well the names of the other communities who had deserted and who were officially surrendered in the peace agreement. Four of the *poleis* that Xenophon says were given up in the peace were thus among the six Minyan communities listed by Herodotus, and the other two of these, if they had not disappeared by the late-fifth century B.C., might have been handed over with them.⁹⁷ By Strabo's time, at least, Epitalion was considered part of Makistos, and might also have been Minyan at the time of the war.⁹⁸ Alternatively, it was surrendered because of its strategic position at the mouth of the Alpheios.⁹⁹

Ruggeri believes that all of the territory lost by the Eleians was perioikic, since 'the Eleian *perioikoi*...had not been incorporated into Elis'.¹⁰⁰ While, as argued above, the so-called *perioikoi* of the Eleians were in fact their allies, there is no need to believe that all of the communities that went over to Agis on the approach of the Lakedaimonian and allied army or were surrendered later actually belonged to this category. Xenophon simply names the places without reference to their former status.¹⁰¹ Pausanias' τῶν περιούκων appears to imply that they were *perioikoi* in the Lakedaimonian sense.¹⁰² Diodoros, on the other hand, using a feminine participle of περιουκέω as an adjective, calls them simply 'the neighbouring *poleis*'.¹⁰³ This terminology is not precise enough for us to assume that the surrendered communities had all been dependent upon rather than integral parts of the Eleian state. When Isokrates charges, furthermore, that the Lakedaimonians had robbed the Eleians of

⁹⁶ Diod. XIV.17.8f.

⁹⁷ Hdt. IV.148.4: Lepreon, Makistos, Phrixa, Pyrgos, Epeion, Noudion.

⁹⁸ Strabo VIII.3.24, p.349: 'Επιτάλιον, τῆς Μακιστίας χωρίον.

⁹⁹ See above, 260.

¹⁰⁰ Ruggeri, 2004, 26.

¹⁰¹ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.25, 30.

¹⁰² Paus. III.8.5.

¹⁰³ Diod. XIV. 34.1: τὰς περιουκούσας πόλεις.

part of their *chora*, he appears to mean that they lost some of their own land rather than just that of their allies.¹⁰⁴

Xenophon uses ἀφίστημι, often used to indicate defection from a *symmachia*, to describe the rebellion of some of the Eleian allies, the Lepreans, Makistians and Epitalians, at the arrival of the Lakedaimonian and allied army.¹⁰⁵ Having revolted, these allies then went over to Agis (προσεχώρησαν αὐτῷ).¹⁰⁶ He also uses a form of προσχωρέω for the action of the Letrinians, Amphidolians and Marganeians, revealing that they, too, ‘went over’,¹⁰⁷ but does not say that they revolted. While Xenophon’s use of προσχωρέω may imply ἀφίστημι in this case as well, his text leaves room for doubt. If these three communities, located to the north of the Alpheios below Olympia, were in fact Eleians, perhaps they could not revolt from the Eleians in the same way as their allies, but they could still go over to the enemy. Xenophon’s terminology does not compel us to assume that these communities were among the allies of the Eleians.

Further evidence suggests that these were, indeed, Eleian rather than allied communities. The Letrinians, Amphidolians and Marganeians appear closely linked in going over to Agis in 401 B.C., in their surrender by the Eleians in 400 B.C. and in Xenophon’s list of Lakedaimonian allies at Nemea in 394 B.C.¹⁰⁸ In 371 B.C. the Eleians opposed the King’s Peace because they objected to having to recognise that the Marganeians, Skillountians and Triphylians were *autonomoi*, since these *poleis* were theirs.¹⁰⁹ We can assume from this that the Eleians did not consider the Marganeians and Skillountians to be ‘Triphylian’. The Letrinians and Amphidolians, as sixth-century donors of cult equipment at Olympia, are likely to have been Eleian,¹¹⁰ and the Marganeians appear to have been so too. The passage concerning the King’s Peace also reveals that Xenophon’s list does not include all of the communities that the Eleians had to surrender in 400 B.C. The Skillountians of the Alpheios valley, as argued above, had been a community of the Eleians since the

¹⁰⁴ Isok. VIII *On the Peace* 100.

¹⁰⁵ Ruggeri, 2004, 69; cf. Nielsen, 1996, 76; 1997, 141.

¹⁰⁶ Nielsen, 1997, 141: Hdt. IX.106.4; Thuc. V.31.2, 5.

¹⁰⁷ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.25: προσχώρουσιν.

¹⁰⁸ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.25, 30; IV.2.16.

¹⁰⁹ Xen. *Hell.* VI.5.2.

¹¹⁰ Xen. *Hell.* VI.5.2; Siewert, P., ‘Staatliche Weihungen von Kesseln und Bronzegeräten in Olympia’ *AM* 106 (1991) 81.2, 82.9; see above, 103-05.

arrival of their Aitolian ancestors in the Peloponnese,¹¹¹ but they, too, appear to have been lost to the Eleians in the peace agreement with the Lakedaimonians.

The Akroreians and Lasion, in the border region of Eleia and Arkadia, were also surrendered by the Eleians.¹¹² Since Lasion, a fortified place close to the Arkadian border, was claimed by the Arkadians, it appears to have been ethnically Arkadian, or at least indeterminate.¹¹³ The ethnology of the Akroreians, not discussed by any ancient text, is considered below.

In 394 B.C., after the outbreak of the Korinthian War, the Lakedaimonians fought a coalition of Argives, Athenians, Boiotians, Korinthians and others at the battle of Nemea. The list of the Lakedaimonian allies in this battle includes the Eleians, Triphylians, Akroreians and Lasionians, who provided 3,000 hoplites between them, and there were at least 400 slingers from the Marganeians, Letrinians and Amphidolians.¹¹⁴ Since, except for the Eleians themselves, these political entities first appear in accounts of the Eleian War and the peace negotiations that followed, they require investigation.¹¹⁵

Triphylia

Siewert says that ‘Sparta, after it had freed the so-called “perioikoi” of the Eleians in the Eleian-Spartan War of 402-400 from their supremacy, created around 400 the regional states of Triphylia and probably also Akroreia from a part of them’.¹¹⁶ He infers from the fact that we first hear of these states in Xenophon’s report of the peace that they were the creations of the Lakedaimonians and concludes that they were formed to supply sizeable hoplite contingents for the Lakedaimonian alliance.¹¹⁷ Siewert argues, furthermore, that, since they only appear to have lasted until the Lakedaimonian defeat at Leuktra, these states had but an *ephemere Existenz*, and so were artificially created.¹¹⁸

¹¹¹ See above, 203f.

¹¹² Xen. *Hell.* III.2.30.

¹¹³ Nielsen, 1996, 75; cf. Ruggeri, 2004, 163, 165.

¹¹⁴ Xen. *Hell.* IV.2.16.

¹¹⁵ Siewert, P., ‘Triphylien und Akroreia. Spartanische “Regionalstaaten” in der westlichen Peloponnes’ in *Πρακτικά τοῦ Γ΄ διεθνoῦς συνεδρίου πελοποννησιακῶν σπουδῶν*. (Πελοποννησιακά, παράτημα 13.) 3 vols. Athina: Etaireia Peloponniakiakon Spoudon (1987-1988) 8; Nielsen, 1997, 133, 144; Ruggeri, 2004, 75.

¹¹⁶ Siewert, 1987-8, 7.

¹¹⁷ Siewert, 1987-8, 8, 11.

¹¹⁸ Siewert, 1987-8, 12; cf. Ruggeri, 2004, 69.

Nielsen agrees that the concept of Triphylyia, along with the Triphylian *ethnos*, was ‘a construct of the first half of the fourth century’.¹¹⁹ He questions, nevertheless, Siewert’s view that the Spartans created the new state. He argues that the Triphylian *poleis*, once the Lakedaimonians had freed them from the Eleians, would have willingly formed a federation to defend their independence and joined the Lakedaimonian alliance for protection. The creation of a Triphylian ethnic identity, furthermore, presupposes the active involvement of those involved. Such an identity, Nielsen claims, must have survived Leuktra because it appears to have existed when the constructed *eponym* Triphylos was proclaimed the son of Arkas (the Arkadian *eponym*) at Delphi in 369 B.C.¹²⁰ The desire for a larger hoplite unit can just as easily be ascribed to the Triphylians themselves as to the Lakedaimonians. Although the last datable reference to Triphylyia is in connection with the peace of 371 B.C., he continues, the Triphylians might have joined the Arkadian confederation as a unit by 369 B.C., and so continued to have an ethnic identity.¹²¹

The evidence that Nielsen presents on this question, however, seems rather to suggest the opposite, and shows that the Lepreans acted alone in their relations with the Arkadian league. Rhodes and Osborne, discussing *SEG XXXV.389*, find that ‘whether within the [Arkadian] federation there continued to exist an entity called Triphylyia is uncertain (cf. 32, where among the *damiorgoi* are not “Triphylians” but “Lepreans”).’¹²² Despite Nielsen’s conclusion that ‘the end of the Triphylian state and the reasons for Lepreon’s independent actions must remain shrouded in mystery’, it seems that the various *poleis* attached themselves separately to the Arkadians and that Triphylyia was indeed an ephemeral state held in existence by the power of the Lakedaimonians.¹²³ If the Lakedaimonians supported oligarchic government in the *poleis* of Triphylyia in 400 B.C., furthermore, any locally-generated impetus for union or for membership of the Lakedaimonian alliance might have come from the desire of the ruling elites in the member *poleis* to support each other against popular movements rather than from some pre-existing ethnic connection. The proclamation that Triphylos was the son of Arkas, moreover, could

¹¹⁹ Nielsen, 1997, 129, 145; cf. Ruggeri, 2004, 69f.

¹²⁰ Paus. X.9.5; *Syll.*³160; cf. Ruggeri, 2004, 95, n.251, cf. 94-96.

¹²¹ Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.26; Nielsen, 1997, 152. As Ruggeri, 2004, 79, makes clear, ‘the name of the eponymous hero is derived from the name of the ethnic, and not to the contrary.’

¹²² Rhodes, P.J. and Osborne, R., *Greek Historical Inscriptions 404-323 B.C.* (Oxford, 2003) 69.

¹²³ Nielsen, 1997, 155ff.

have been made to sanctify the claim of the Arkadians to the district between the Alpheios and the Neda and need not reflect the survival of Triphylia as a political and ethnic unit. While Nielsen believes that the motive for the formation of the Triphylian state in 400 B.C. was protection from Elis, it seems more likely that this state was constructed to maintain oligarchic government under Lakedaimonian hegemony.

Ruggeri points out that Xenophon attests to the *rapido e spontaneo* defection of the Eleian ‘*perioikoi*’ from Elis at the approach of Agis.¹²⁴ Spartan support for ‘the claims of the *perioikoi* to independence,’ she notes, ‘corresponds to the propaganda diffused by Sparta at the time of the Peloponnesian war.’ She refers to instances of Spartan interference in the internal political affairs of subject peoples, such as the Mantineians, Thebans and Phleisians, and the possibility of Spartan involvement in the construction of a Euboian federal state in 411 B.C.,¹²⁵ although the evidence for the latter is ‘too insecure’.¹²⁶ Other notices ‘attest to the weight of Spartan intervention on the decisions of the Eleian *perioikoi*’, such as the decision that Lepreon should be autonomous and the way in which the Lakedaimonians later disposed of the territory of Skillous.¹²⁷ Despite these considerations, however, Ruggeri surprisingly concludes that the federal state of Triphylia was not constructed by the Lakedaimonians, but arose from the will of the peoples involved. The readiness with which the ‘*perioikoi*’ rebelled, she believes, shows that the peoples of these states aspired to independence from Elis and that the drive for unity in a federal state came from the Triphylians themselves.¹²⁸

Ruggeri’s conclusion, however, is not borne out by a closer examination of the response of the communities of the Eleians and their allies to the approach of the Lakedaimonian and allied armies. During Agis’ first invasion there is no record of any communities going over to him, even though he reached as far as Olympia.¹²⁹ In his second invasion, of the communities to the south of the Alpheios, only the Lepreans, Makistians and Epitalians went over.¹³⁰ In addition to these, Hansen and

¹²⁴ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.25.

¹²⁵ Thuc. VIII.95.7.

¹²⁶ Ruggeri, 2004, 71f; cf. Larsen, J.A.O., *Greek Federal States: their Institutions and History* (Oxford, 1968) 99-103.

¹²⁷ Xen. *Anab.* V.3.7; Diog Laert. 2.52f.

¹²⁸ Ruggeri, 2004, 72.

¹²⁹ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.23f; Paus. III.8.3f.

¹³⁰ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.25.

Nielsen list five Triphylian communities that are attested as *poleis* (Epe(i)on, Noudion, Phrixa, Pyrgos and Skillous) and six more that are not (Hypana, Pylos, Pyrgoi, Samikon, Stylangion and Typaneiai).¹³¹ Although it is not certain that all of these existed in 401 B.C., it appears that while three of the communities between the Neda and the Alpheios went over to Agis, up to eleven did not. Those who did, the Lepreans, Makistians and Epitalians, appear to have been on Agis' line of march. Perhaps a party similar to that of Xenias in Elis was strong enough in these communities to secure their revolt from the Eleians, especially if the Lakedaimonians threatened to ravage their lands.¹³²

North of the Alpheios, only the Letrinians, Amphidolians and Marganeians went over to Agis, and these, again, appear to have done so because of the approach of the Peloponnesian army.¹³³ Pausanias took Lasion by assault, 'won over' (προσηγάγετο) the four Akroreian *poleis* and captured Eleian Pylos.¹³⁴ The overall picture is *not* one of spontaneous uprisings across the region, and we are not entitled to conclude from the available reports that the so-called *perioikoi* of the Eleians had universally 'aspired at the time to independence from Elis'.¹³⁵ Nor does the evidence presented by Ruggeri for a dialectal sub-group in southern Triphylia imply ethnic unity for the entire region covered by the new state. She shows only that the dialect of Lepreon and that used in the temple of Artemis Limnatis at Kombothékra differed from Eleian.¹³⁶ Strabo seems convinced that the members of the Triphylian state had varied ethnic origins.¹³⁷ While some of the communities in this region are likely to have shared ethno-cultural traits, there is no evidence that a Triphylian *ethnos* existed before the Lakedaimonian victory over the Eleians in 400 B.C., nor that ethnicity was a factor in determining which communities went over to the invaders.

¹³¹ Hansen, M.H. and Nielsen, T.H. (eds), *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis* (Oxford, 2004) 541-46. Skillous, though south of the Alpheios, was not Triphylian: see above, 203f.

¹³² See above, 269, n.247. Ruggeri, 2004, 102-07, shows that it is likely that Makistos was located near the modern village of Skillountía, some kilometres inland from the coastal road between Lepreon and Epitalion. She also concludes, however, 107, that the territory of Makistos extended down to the sanctuary of Poseidon at Samikon, which is located on the main route. While it is only a possibility that Agis marched up to Makistos to encourage its revolt, it is highly likely that he passed through its territory.

¹³³ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.25.

¹³⁴ Diod. XIV.17.8f.

¹³⁵ Ruggeri, 2004, 72.

¹³⁶ Ruggeri, 2004, 87-94; see above, 98f. Perhaps, too, the community of Pyrgoi, mentioned by Strabo, can be located at Prasidáki, south of Lepreon, where one of the documents containing evidence of dialectal variation was found: Ruggeri, 2004, 113f.

¹³⁷ Strabo VIII.3.3, p.337: Τριφύλῳι δ' ἐκλήθησαν ἀπὸ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, ἀπὸ τοῦ τρία φύλα συνελθούσθαι.

Triphylia, created in 400 B.C., was located within the confines of the Alpheios to the north and the Neda to the south, and its eastern border was to the west of Arkadian Alipheira.¹³⁸ It appears to have been a federal state or *koinon* that consisted of several *poleis*.¹³⁹ Four of the cities called Minyan by Herodotus, Lepreon, Phrixa, Pyrgos and Epe(i)on, are among those listed as Triphylian by Polybios, and an inscription of the fourth century B.C. shows that another, Makistos, was also Triphylian.¹⁴⁰ Epitalion, with Phrixa, is called ‘Triphylian’ by Xenophon.¹⁴¹ All of the Minyan communities that had survived up until 400 B.C., it seems, were incorporated into the Triphylian federation. It appears likely, too, as suggested by Ruggeri, that while the temple of Poseidon at Samikon, originally a common shrine of the Minyans, became a federal shrine of the Triphylian state at this time, Makistos was its political centre.¹⁴² In addition, five more places that Polybios says were in Triphylia and for which Minyan ethnicity is not attested might have belonged to the new state.¹⁴³ There are a great many potential archaeological sites in this district, some of which are likely to be the remains of these communities.¹⁴⁴

Two documents of the Triphylians are evidence of their political structure. Although dwelling in separate *poleis*, they appear to have constituted a political unit. Nielsen finds in *SEG* XL.392 evidence of ‘the existence of a Triphylian assembly, a Triphylian executive under an eponymous official, the levying of taxes and the existence of Triphylian citizenship.’¹⁴⁵ In this inscription, τὰ Τριφύλῳιοι make a grant of citizenship, two *damiorgoi* are named and the granting of *ateleia panton* implies that there were taxes. Nielsen says of *SEG* XXXV.389 that ‘here the

¹³⁸ Polyb. IV.77.8; Strabo VIII.3.22, p.348; Siewert, 1987-8, 10; Tuplin C.J., *The Failings of Empire. A Reading of Xenophon Hellenica* 2.3.11-7.5.27 (Stuttgart, 1993) 184; Nielsen, 1997, 131, 155. Ruggeri, 2004, 77-87, considers the possible significance of the name. She concludes, 87, that Herodotus’ notice (IV.148.4) that ‘the Paroreans and Kaukonians had been overcome (*vinti*) by the Minyans on their arrival in Triphylia’ shows that these three peoples were the *phylai* who made up Triphylia. If, as appears from Herodotus’ report, however, the Paroreans and Kaukonians were ‘driven out of the country’ (ἐξέλασαντες ἐκ τῆς χώρας), this seems unlikely.

¹³⁹ Nielsen, 1997, 148-50; Ruggeri, 2004, 75-77.

¹⁴⁰ Hdt. IV.148.4; Polyb. IV.77.9; *SEG* XXXV.389; Nielsen, 1997, 134, 149; Ruggeri, 2004, 109.

¹⁴¹ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.30; Siewert, 1987-8, 9; Nielsen, 1997, 150f. Nielsen, 138f, considers but dismisses an emendation proposed by Grote that places a *kai* between ‘the Triphylian *poleis*’ and ‘Phrixa and Epitalion’ in this passage, and would thus exclude these two places from Triphylia. Phrixa is called Minyan by Herodotus (IV.148.4) and was surrendered by the Eleians, so it would seem strange for it to have been excluded from the new state, especially since we do not hear of it having a separate existence; cf. Tuplin, 1993, 184; Ruggeri, 2004, 110-11.

¹⁴² Ruggeri, 2004, 96-102; see above, 110.

¹⁴³ Polyb. IV.77.9: Samikon, Hypana, Typaneiai, Bolax and Stylangion.

¹⁴⁴ Ruggeri, 2004, 116-19.

¹⁴⁵ Nielsen, 1997, 148f; Ruggeri, 2004, 73 and n.161, 75, 133ff.

assembly and the *damiorgos* appear again'.¹⁴⁶ The *damiorgoi* might have been delegates of the member cities, as in the Arkadian *koinon* of c.370 B.C.,¹⁴⁷ but τὸ Τριφύλιοι are likely to have constituted an assembly. The existence of a federal assembly, nevertheless, reveals little about the degree of its empowerment or the breadth of its membership. Neither Nielsen nor Ruggeri discuss the political orientation of the Triphylian constitution, probably because of the lack of evidence. If we had to make a decision, however, the absence of any reference in the inscriptions to the *demos* or the *plethos* would suggest oligarchy.

The Skillountians

It is unlikely that Skillous was incorporated into the Triphylian state. Xenophon's report that the Eleians refused to acknowledge the *autonomia* of the Marganeians, Skillountians and Triphylians in 370 B.C. implies that they considered neither of the first two named to be Triphylian.¹⁴⁸ Nor does Polybios include Skillous among the Triphylian towns.¹⁴⁹ This is not surprising since, as argued above, the Skillountians appear to have been Eleians.¹⁵⁰ The passage from Xenophon reveals, nevertheless, that the Eleians had lost Skillous at some time before 371 B.C., and Pausanias calls Skillous 'Triphylian'.¹⁵¹ Tuplin conjectures that Skillous was a part of Triphylia in 371 B.C., but that Xenophon recorded it separately because he knew that it was to return to the Eleians in the 360s.¹⁵² Since Xenophon lived in Skillous for almost the entire period that Tuplin believes that it was part of Triphylia, however, he is unlikely to have made such a mistake. By the mid-second century B.C., furthermore, the Romans had reunited the Triphylian towns with Eleia, so Pausanias might have referred to Skillous as 'Triphylian' simply because long before

¹⁴⁶ cf. *SEG* XXX.422; Nielsen, 1997, 149, cf. 157; Ruggeri, 2004, 73 and n.160, 133-40.

¹⁴⁷ Ruggeri, 2004, 138.

¹⁴⁸ *Xen. Hell.* VI.5.2; cf. Ruggeri, 2004, 111.

¹⁴⁹ *Polyb.* IV.77.9.

¹⁵⁰ For Skillountians as Eleians, see above, 203f. Tuplin, 1993, 184, wonders why the Eleians reacquired Skillous after the peace conference of 371/0 B.C. but not 'at least (some of) Triphylia.' He suggests the possibility that the Lakedaimonians had been slow to come to its aid (*Diog. Laert.* II.53), but it seems more likely that the aim of the Eleians was primarily to recover an Eleian community. *Diogenes Laertios* (II.52: Σκιλλοῦντα, χωρίον τῆς Ἡλείας), too, places Skillous in the country of Eleia, though Ruggeri, 2004, 125, finds this to be 'un errore di anacronismo'.

¹⁵¹ *Paus.* V.6.4; VI.22.4.

¹⁵² Tuplin, 1993, 184; cf. Ruggeri, 2004, 38, 74, 112.

his time ‘Triphylia’ had become a geographical concept denoting the district of Eleia to the south of the Alpheios.¹⁵³

Nor is any evidence to be found in the record of Xenophon’s establishment at Skillous in the early-fourth century B.C. to support the belief that it was made a part of Triphylia.¹⁵⁴ Xenophon himself reports that after he had returned from service with the Persian rebel Kyros he settled at Skillous on land that the Lakedaimonians granted him near Olympia. Later, with money that he had left in safekeeping with the Persian Megabazos, he purchased another estate on the road from Sparta to Olympia, which he dedicated to Ephesian Artemis and upon which he built for her an altar and a temple, establishing a regular sacrificial festival financed by the produce of the land.¹⁵⁵ Xenophon appears to have become a citizen of Skillous, since his sons went hunting with those τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν.¹⁵⁶ Diogenes Laertes adds that Xenophon was made *proxenos* of the Lakedaimonians,¹⁵⁷ and this was most likely for Skillous.¹⁵⁸

Diogenes also says that later, when the Eleians marched on Skillous, Xenophon, with his sons, retired to Lepreon and then departed for Korinth, where he spent the rest of his life.¹⁵⁹ While Pausanias, too, records that the Eleians recovered Skillous, he adds in contrast to Diogenes that Xenophon, although tried by the Olympic *boule* for accepting the land from the Lakedaimonians, was acquitted by the Eleians and continued to live in Skillous.¹⁶⁰ Badian argues that nothing contradicts Pausanias’ evidence that Xenophon died in Skillous except the statement of Demetrios of Magnesia, whom he believes to have been Diogenes’ source, and concludes that Xenophon left but was allowed to return in the 360s B.C., when

¹⁵³ Nielsen, 1997, 132, says that ‘in Polybios Triphylia is essentially a geographical concept’; cf. Tuplin, 1993, 184; Nielsen, T.H., ‘Triphylia’ in Hansen, M.H. and Nielsen, T.H. (eds), *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis* (Oxford, 2004) 540f. Before it was reunited with Eleia by the Romans, however, it must at least have continued to signify places that were *not* part of the Eleian *polis*.

¹⁵⁴ cf. Ruggeri, 2004, 111.

¹⁵⁵ Xen. *Anab.* V.3.7-9; cf. Diog. Laert. II.51f; Paus. V.6.5f.

¹⁵⁶ Xen. *Anab.* V.3.10; Ruggeri, 2004, 130.

¹⁵⁷ Diog. Laert. II.51.

¹⁵⁸ Ruggeri, 2004, 130-32; Sordi, M., ‘Senofonte e la Sicilia’ in Tuplin, C., *Xenophon and his World* (Stuttgart, 2004) 75; Badian, E., ‘Xenophon the Athenian’ in Tuplin, 2004, 42, assumes, without explanation, that the Spartans made Xenophon their *proxenos* in Athens rather than Skillous. It is difficult to imagine, nevertheless, how he might have discharged his duties *in absentia* since, as Badian himself points out, ‘the proxeny, at this time, was no empty honour.’

¹⁵⁹ Diog. Laert. II.53, 56.

¹⁶⁰ Paus. V.6.6.

‘political conditions’ allowed.¹⁶¹ Pausanias’ information, nevertheless, appears to have originated in the unsubstantiated claim of the local residents that an elaborate tomb near the sanctuary of Artemis contained Xenophon’s remains. As Pretzler points out, Pausanias made much use of oral evidence, ‘and it is likely that he looked for private hospitality wherever he could, which would have given him ample opportunity for conversation, most likely with members of the élite.’¹⁶² Pausanias’ informants in the locality of Skillous might have been proud to exhibit the ‘tomb of Xenophon’, whether or not it contained his remains. The statement of Diogenes appears more reliable here.

No evidence, on the other hand, contradicts Pausanias’ record of the fate of Skillous after 400 B.C.¹⁶³ He states straightforwardly that the Lakedaimonians divided off Skillous from Eleia and gave it to Xenophon.¹⁶⁴ Since the Lakedaimonians also gave Xenophon an estate there and he purchased another in the district for Ephesian Artemis,¹⁶⁵ it seems unlikely that they gave the community of Skillous to him as his private property, and it might rather have been handed over to his supervision. As argued below, furthermore, it is likely that Xenophon was the leader of those who received the ‘gift’ rather than its sole recipient.¹⁶⁶ Such a gift cannot have been made immediately after the end of the war in 400 B.C., however, since Xenophon did not return to Greece with Agesilaos until after the outbreak of the Korinthian War in 395 B.C. He appears, nevertheless, to have been in Skillous by 392 B.C., when Megabazos attended the Olympic festival.¹⁶⁷

Badian argues unconvincingly that Xenophon was not removed from Sparta to Skillous (‘perhaps sometime in 392, at the earliest’) until after his exile from Athens, which he sees as a consequence of his apparent intention to remain resident

¹⁶¹ Badian, 2004, 38, 45f.

¹⁶² Pretzler, M., ‘Pausanias and Oral Tradition’ *CQ* 55 (2005) 239.

¹⁶³ Tuplin doubts this evidence on the basis that Pausanias appears to be wrong about the tomb, but he need not have been so, since a family tomb might have been constructed before Xenophon was forced to leave. While the information of the Eleians might have been tainted by the evidence of the tomb, we are not entitled to assume that they were wrong about a matter of recorded history: Tuplin, C., ‘Xenophon, Artemis and Scillus’ in Figueira, T.J. (ed), *Spartan Society* (Swansea, 2004) 271.

¹⁶⁴ Paus. V.6.5: Σχιλλοῦντα ἀποτεμόμενοι τῆς Ἡλείας Ξενοφῶντι ἔδοσαν.

¹⁶⁵ Xen. *Anab.* V.3.7-9; cf. Diog. Laert. II.51f; Paus. V.6.5f.

¹⁶⁶ See below, 297-9.

¹⁶⁷ Xen. *Hell.* IV.2.2-5; Tuplin, 2004, 252; cf. Green, P., ‘Text and Context in the Matter of Xenophon’s Exile’ in Worthington, I. (ed), *Ventures into Greek History* (Oxford, 1994) 217 and n.5; *contra* Ruggeri, 2004, 122-25, who places the settlement of Xenophon at Skillous between 390 and 387 B.C., and the visit of Megabazos to Olympia in the Olympiad of 388 or 384 B.C.

at Sparta.¹⁶⁸ Xenophon's adoption of Skillountian citizenship, however, might rather have been the occasion (though not necessarily the cause) of his disgrace at Athens than its consequence.¹⁶⁹ Green, on the other hand, presents a strong case for dating Xenophon's exile to 399 B.C., as part of the same anti-oligarchic series of reprisals that included 'the exactly contemporaneous trials of Andocides and Socrates'.¹⁷⁰ Whatever the case, contrary to Badian, there is no obstacle to placing Xenophon's arrival at Skillous in either 394 or 393 B.C.

It is possible that this Eleian city to the south of the Alpheios had been taken by Agis in 401 B.C. when nearby Makistos revolted from the Eleians, and its capture might even have led to the revolts of Makistos and Epitalion. Although we know from Pausanias that the Lakedaimonians gave Skillous to Xenophon, neither Xenophon nor any other source says anything about how it might have come into their hands. It is not listed among the cities that went over to Agis and, along with Makistos and Lepreon, it is not mentioned among the places that Thrasydaios offered to surrender under the terms of the peace.¹⁷¹ The Lakedaimonians acquired Skillous in some way, but it did not, apparently, simply go over to them. Capture is the likely alternative.

As is made clear above, Xenophon's record of the Eleian War is far from complete. We can only speculate as to why he made no mention of how Skillous came into the hands of the Lakedaimonians, who had decided 'to settle him in a territory to which their title was dubious'.¹⁷² It is possible that he wished to obscure not only the circumstances under which the nearby Makistos and Epitalion revolted and went over to Agis, but also the manner in which the Lakedaimonians acquired the estate that they gave him and the reason why the additional estate that he purchased for Artemis was so affordable.

As Tuplin points out, it seems that when Xenophon acquired the estate dedicated to Artemis, 'land at Scillous was very much cheaper than elsewhere and at normal times...Xenophon had already been "given" a residence by the

¹⁶⁸ Badian, 2004, 42.

¹⁶⁹ Dreher, M., 'Der Prozess gegen Xenophon' in Tuplin, C., *Xenophon and his World* (Stuttgart, 2004) 64, places Xenophon's banishment from Athens and settlement at Skillous in the years 395-393 B.C. While Diogenes Laertes says that Xenophon was condemned ἐπὶ Λακωνισμῷ (2.51), Pausanias (V.6.5f) says that it was because of the offence that his support for Kyros had caused to the Persian king; cf. Sordi, 2004, 72.

¹⁷⁰ Green, 1994, 226, cf. 215-27.

¹⁷¹ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.25, 30.

¹⁷² Badian, 2004, 43.

Spartans...and Xenophon's account prompts one in any case to ask how such a large continuous tract of Scillountian land was available for purchase.¹⁷³ Tuplin seems correct to conclude that 'perhaps Xenophon's cheap acquisition of large tracts of Scillountian land was the happy by-product of confiscation'. Ruggeri believes that the Lakedaimonians had 'land at their disposal that before had probably belonged to some Eleian proprietors, who had lost it at the end of the war.'¹⁷⁴

It is likely that the Spartans at first garrisoned this outpost just to the south of the Alpheios themselves, but handed it over to Xenophon upon his return to Greece.¹⁷⁵ It is unlikely, however, that a whole community was handed over to just one man. Xenophon had taken the survivors of the 10,000 who supported Kyros' claim to the Persian throne to serve as mercenaries with Agesilaos in Asia Minor, and when Agesilaos returned to Greece he brought both Xenophon and the best of his mercenaries with him.¹⁷⁶ Although many of those who had followed Kyros, the *Kyreioi*,¹⁷⁷ were wooed by other commanders, drifted away, became ill or were even sold into slavery, 6,000 remained at the end of the *Anabasis*.¹⁷⁸ A considerable number of these must have returned to Greece with Xenophon. The 'other citizens' with whose sons those of Xenophon hunted at Skillous might, in fact, have included the survivors of the mercenaries who had enlisted with Kyros, and whom the Lakedaimonians were now happy to provide with a home just to the south of Olympia, where they could be trusted to keep an eye on the Eleians.¹⁷⁹ If the Lakedaimonians settled Xenophon and the remnants of the *Kyreioi* at Skillous between 395 and 392 B.C., this would have been at precisely the same time that signs of dissatisfaction with the narrow oligarchy of the Ninety, leading to the moderate reform of 392 B.C., might have appeared at Elis.¹⁸⁰ A precedent can be found in the settlement of the *Brasideioi* and *neodamodeis* at Lepreon two decades earlier.¹⁸¹

¹⁷³ Tuplin, 2004, 257.

¹⁷⁴ Ruggeri, 2004, 120, cf. 127. Considering the Skillountians to be *perioikoi* of the Eleians, Ruggeri, however, assumes that the Eleians had once taken this land from them.

¹⁷⁵ Ruggeri, 2004, 112, 120, 122, 127.

¹⁷⁶ Diog. Laert. II.51; Xen. *Hell.* IV.2.5-8.

¹⁷⁷ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.7, 4.20.

¹⁷⁸ Xen. *Anab.* VII.7.23; Dillery, 1995, 90f.

¹⁷⁹ cf. Ruggeri, 2004, 120-22.

¹⁸⁰ See above, 283f.

¹⁸¹ Thuc. V.34.1; Tuplin, 2004, 266; Ruggeri, 2004, 120-22; see above, 239f.

In addition to and therefore separate from πάντες οἱ πολῖται of Skillous, furthermore, οἱ πρόσχωροι ἄνδρες καὶ γυναῖκες attended the festival of Ephesian Artemis established by Xenophon.¹⁸² These might not have been, as Tuplin suggests, residents of neighbouring communities,¹⁸³ but rather the poorer, disenfranchised remnants of the Eleian population, or even the members of a newly-imported sub-class. The large gift of slaves sent by the Spartan Phylopidas to Xenophon at Skillous might have been designed to provide him and the other citizens with a labour force akin to the Lakedaimonian Helots.¹⁸⁴

When we consider that Xenophon had once intended to establish a colony on the Black Sea coast, the proposition that Skillous became a colony of the *Kyreioi* appears particularly plausible.¹⁸⁵ The sanctuary of Ephesian Artemis dedicated by Xenophon seems intended to supply a cultic focus for such a new community.¹⁸⁶ Skillous might have become a Lakedaimonian-sponsored colony on the southern boundary of the remaining territory of the *polis* of the Eleians, strategically located about one hour's march from the sanctuary of Zeus at Olympia. When, after Leuktra but before the death of Xenophon at Korinth in 360/59 B.C., the Eleians appear to have driven out the colonists,¹⁸⁷ it is likely that they reclaimed an integral part of the territory of the Eleian *polis*.

Pausanias, writing at a time when Triphylia was but a district in the region of Eleia, is the only ancient writer to call Skillous 'Triphylian'. Xenophon's silence on the fate of Skillous in the peace negotiations, cited by Tuplin as evidence that we cannot simply claim that Skillous was not part of Triphylia, lends further support to the view that Xenophon preferred not to mention how his benefactors had acquired it.¹⁸⁸ The fact that the Skillountians are not listed among the allies of the Lakedaimonians at the battle of Nemea in 494 B.C., raised by Ruggeri as evidence of the incorporation of Skillous into Triphylia,¹⁸⁹ moreover, may be attributed to the

¹⁸² Xen. *Anab.* V.3.9.

¹⁸³ Tuplin, 2004, 265.

¹⁸⁴ Diog. Laert. II.53; Tuplin, 2004, 266.

¹⁸⁵ Xen. *Anab.* V.6.15ff; VI.4.7, 14, 6.4; Ruggeri, 2004, 127f; Dillery, 1995, 85-90.

¹⁸⁶ Ruggeri, 2004, 127f; cf. Tuplin, 2004, 267, who rather sees the possibility that the sanctuary contributed to Xenophon's integration into a pre-existing, though 'fairly recently reconstituted' community.

¹⁸⁷ Diog. Laert. II.53, 56; Paus. V.6.6.

¹⁸⁸ Tuplin, 1993, 184; Xen. *Hell.* III.2.30.

¹⁸⁹ Xen. *Hell.* IV.2.16; Ruggeri, 2004, 112. Ruggeri also argues that a disc containing a grant of Triphylian citizenship 'seems to have been found in the present village of Kréstena, where the ancient city of Skillous stood.' Neither the provenance of the disc nor the location of Skillous, however, are

destruction of the Eleian community of the Skillountians and its replacement by a new colony of veteran mercenaries whom the Lakedaimonians established there to ensure that the Eleians attempted neither to re-establish their democracy nor to leave the Lakedaimonian alliance. We cannot assume that this community was made a part of the Triphylian state. Given the political connections of Xenophon, the Lakedaimonian *proxenos* under whose supervision the likely colony appears to have been placed, however, we can assume that it was governed by an oligarchy.

The Remaining Communities of Eleia

With the Lakedaimonians at Nemea were also the Akroreians and the Lasionians, whom Pausanias had won over in the second year of the Eleian War and who were surrendered by the Eleians in the peace. Since Lasion lay in a strategic position that commanded the approach into the Peneios valley from Arkadia, the Eleians might have held it for security reasons.¹⁹⁰ Although Diodoros refers to it as a *φρούριον*, however, Lasion was more than a fortress, since there was a Lasionian contingent in the Lakedaimonian and allied army during the Korinthian War.¹⁹¹ Lasion was claimed by the Arkadians when the Eleians were compelled to give it up, but the presence of the Lasionians at Nemea, but of no Arkadians, indicates that they remained direct allies of the Lakedaimonians. Since there was no Arkadian confederation at the time, the Arkadian claim must mean that Lasion was (at least arguably) ethnically rather than politically Arkadian.¹⁹² It joined the Arkadian confederation in the 360s B.C.,¹⁹³ however, and perhaps at that time became a democracy.¹⁹⁴ This implies that it had been ruled by an oligarchy since its separation from Eleia in 400 B.C.

Pausanias had also won over the four Akroreian *poleis* of Thraistos, Halion, Eupagion and Opous, which were surrendered by the Eleians in the peace and whose hoplites were among the allies of the Lakedaimonians at Nemea.¹⁹⁵ No literary text mentions the Akroreians in any earlier context.¹⁹⁶ The name means ‘inhabitants of

secure, and the disc might instead have come from the territory of the neighbouring Makistos. For the debate on the location of Skillous, cf. Ruggeri, 115, n.324.

¹⁹⁰ Ruggeri, 2004, 162, 164.

¹⁹¹ Xen. *Hell.* IV.2.16; Diod XIV.17.8.

¹⁹² Nielsen, 1996, 75; cf. Ruggeri, 2004, 163, 165.

¹⁹³ Xen. *Hell.* VII.4.12.

¹⁹⁴ Ruggeri, 2004, 167.

¹⁹⁵ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.30; IV.2.16; Diod. XIV.17.8.

¹⁹⁶ Ruggeri, 2004, 144.

the peak of the mountains', and the four cities seem to have been located between Lasion and Eleian Pylos, in the mountainous region between the Ladon and Peneios rivers (map 5).¹⁹⁷

The earliest epigraphic evidence for the Akroreians is *IvO* 258, on a cauldron dedicated at Olympia by the 'Alysytes and Akroreians'. As argued above, this dedication is best dated to the period following the conclusion of the Eleian War. Ruggeri, nevertheless, claims that it was inscribed before 400 B.C.¹⁹⁸ On the basis of this, she proposes a common ethnic identity for the Akroreians that predated the formation of their four *poleis* and had arisen by the fifth century B.C.¹⁹⁹ Ruggeri convincingly excludes the possibility that they were Arkadian, since the adjacent Lasion, claimed by the Arkadians, was not incorporated into Akroreia, and even when the Arkadians captured three of the Akroreian cities in 365/4 B.C., they did not integrate them into their confederation. Since the Akroreians made their dedication at Olympia in conjunction with the Alysytes, says Ruggeri, 'it is possible to suppose that they felt instead united by relations of kinship to the Pisatans.'²⁰⁰

This would mean that the Akroreians were ethnically Aitolian and so, although mountain-dwellers, must, like the Pisatans,²⁰¹ be included among the Eleians, the Aitolians of the north-west Peloponnese whose cultic centre was the sanctuary of Zeus at Olympia. When, after the battle of Leuktra, with the Skillountians, Letrinians, Amphidolians and Marganeians, the Akroreians were returned to the Eleians, the number of Eleian tribes was increased from ten to twelve.²⁰² This need not mean that the Eleians now granted citizenship to their *perioikoi*, as Ruggeri claims,²⁰³ but could instead signify that communities that the Lakedaimonians and their partisans had severed from the Eleian state in 400 B.C. had become reunited with their homeland. As a consequence, it seems, the number of Eleian tribes was restored to the traditional twelve, reflected in the council of 600 that had sworn to the quadruple alliance of 420 B.C.²⁰⁴

¹⁹⁷ Ruggeri, 2004, 144-49.

¹⁹⁸ Ruggeri, 2004, 150-53; see above, 104.

¹⁹⁹ Ruggeri, 2004, 154f.

²⁰⁰ Ruggeri, 2004, 156.

²⁰¹ See above, Ch. 6. Though many examples might be cited of mountain-dwellers feeling themselves to be different from the inhabitants of the plain, there is no reason to conclude that such an outlook need extend to the ethnic sphere or that it must lead to a desire for political separation.

²⁰² Paus. V.9.5.

²⁰³ Ruggeri, 2004, 157.

²⁰⁴ Thuc. V.47.9; see above, 195.

from the powerful, democratic Arkadian league. We may conclude that both the Pisatans and the Akroreians adopted democratic constitutions soon after 365 B.C., when the Arkadians defeated the Eleians, conquered most of Akroreia and occupied Olympia.²¹¹ The Arkadians clearly lent their support to the democratic party in the city of Elis,²¹² so it is reasonable to suppose that when they captured the Akroreian cities they freed their populations from oligarchic rule. An oligarchy is likely to have been in force in Akroreia from the end of the Eleian War.

The Letrinians, Amphidolians and Marganeians appear to have constituted three separate *poleis*.²¹³ As argued above, all three communities were members of the Aitolian amphictyony of Olympia, and thus ethnically Eleian.²¹⁴ Since they contributed only 400 or a few more slingers between them to the Lakedaimonian and allied army at Nemea in 394 B.C., they were probably quite small.²¹⁵ The Letrinians seem to have occupied the site of modern Pyrgos, and the Amphidolians and Marganeians to have lived between there and Olympia.²¹⁶ Since Marganeis was betrayed to the Arkadians in 365/4 B.C., it is most likely that those who betrayed it were the democrats, while the oligarchs were the dominant faction in the town.²¹⁷ If so, it is likely that the Marganeians were ruled by an oligarchy from 400 B.C., and we may assume that such a regime was established in the other two communities at the same time.

Political considerations can also explain why the Lakedaimonians left the Eleians in control of the sanctuary of Olympia. While the return of the Eleian exiles could be expected to deliver oligarchic government to what remained of the Eleian *polis*, the rival claimants were, as Xenophon has it, ‘country people’, and so not good enough to run the games.²¹⁸ This terminology, however, may be Xenophon’s way of saying that they were the small landholders of the hilly country around Olympia, one of the heartlands of Eleian democracy.²¹⁹ Since the Lakedaimonians appear to have defeated the Eleians in order to bring it about that both Eleia and the sanctuary of

²¹¹ Xen. *Hell.* VII.4.14.

²¹² Xen. *Hell.* VII.4.15f.

²¹³ Xen. *Hell.* III.2.30, IV.2.16; VI.5.2; Nielsen, 1997, 138.

²¹⁴ See above, 103f.

²¹⁵ Ruggeri, 2004, 169,

²¹⁶ Ruggeri, 2004, 170-72.

²¹⁷ Xen. *Hell.* VII.4.14: ἐνδόντων τινῶν; cf. 4.26. The toponym is also Margana (Diod. XV.77.4): *IACP* 500.259.

²¹⁸ *Hell.* III.2.31: χωρῖται; cf. Ruggeri, 2004, 66.

²¹⁹ See above, 191-96.

Olympia remained in aristocratic hands, they would not now have handed over the sanctuary to the very people who were most likely to threaten that achievement.

The Eleians of the district around Olympia, or 'Pisatans', were to reveal their democratic sympathies on a later occasion. In 365 B.C., when the Arkadians had defeated the Eleians in battle, they took control of Olympia and marched on the city of Elis, where they cooperated with the Eleian democrats in seizing the akropolis, but were driven out by the cavalry of the oligarchs.²²⁰ In the ensuing warfare, despite aid sent to the Eleian oligarchs from Sparta and a battle fought within the Altis, the Arkadians celebrated the Olympic festival of 364 B.C. together with the Pisatans. These residents of the communities around Olympia appear to have taken the opportunity offered by the Arkadian incursion to separate themselves from the oligarchically-controlled *polis* of the Eleians.²²¹

The Pisatans had made no attempt, however, to break away from the democratic Eleian *polis* when the Lakedaimonians and their allies invaded in 402 and 401 B.C. They were loyal to the Eleian democracy and hostile to the Lakedaimonians on one occasion, but disloyal to the Eleian oligarchy and friendly to the Arkadian democrats on another. The text of the treaty of the Arkadians with the Pisatans and Akroreians, discussed above, suggests that the constitution of the new Pisatan state was democratic, as is also likely from the political nature of the conflict in Eleia in the mid-360s B.C. In 400 B.C., however, Olympia seems to have been left safely in the hands of the narrowly aristocratic Eleian council of the Ninety and its appointees, the nine *Hellanodikai*.

As a consequence of the Lakedaimonian victory over the Eleians in 400 B.C., the region that had comprised the Eleians and their allies was divided into eight independent states of greatly varying size: the Eleians, Triphylians, Akroreians, Lasionians, Letrinians, Amphidolians, Marganeians and Skillountians. Skillous, it is possible, was at first occupied by a Lakedaimonian garrison, but soon became a colony of Xenophon, the Spartan *proxenos*, and the *Kyreioi*. Each of these states was allied directly to the Lakedaimonians, and it is very likely that each was governed by an oligarchy. Olympia, too, was controlled by the narrow Eleian oligarchy that rested on Lakedaimonian support. The Eleians had certainly been 'brought to their senses', and the victory of the interventionist faction at Sparta over the Eleian democrats

²²⁰ Xen. *Hell.* VII.4.15f.

²²¹ Xen. *Hell.* VII.4.19-32.

could not have been more complete. The Eleian War appears to have resulted in a comprehensive political restructuring of the entire region. The consequent arrangement in Eleia was to remain virtually unchanged for decades to come – until it was shattered upon the defeat of the Lakedaimonians at Leuktra in 371 B.C.²²²

Some Further Consequences of the War

As a result of their defeat at the hands of the Lakedaimonians, the Eleians and their allies all appear to have become subject allies of the victors, and it is likely that all were obliged to adopt oligarchic constitutions. Not only did the Eleians have to give up their allies, but some Eleian communities were actually severed from the Eleian state. The defeat, however, might also have had broader implications for the status and role of the Eleians. Firstly, perhaps, it made possible the assumption of the administration of Dodona by the emerging Molossoi, thus weakening the influence of the Eleians over pilgrimage to that sanctuary. Secondly, by participating in the battle of Nemea in 394 B.C., the Eleians appear to have finally surrendered the *asylia* that they had enjoyed for centuries.

Falkner points out the importance to the Eleians of the port of Kyllene for communications with the Eleian colonies in southern Epeiros.²²³ Hammond reports that ‘the earliest building in stone at Dodona is a small temple, dated to c. 400 B.C.’. Further building at the previously open-air site continued throughout the fourth century B.C.²²⁴ Hammond also notes that ‘an important development in the cult at Dodona is revealed by an inscription on a lead tablet’ from the end of the fifth century B.C. ‘The inclusion of the θεοὶ σύνναοι,’ he believes, ‘marks a widening of

²²² After Leuktra the Eleians joined the Arkadians, Argives and Thebans in opposition to the Lakedaimonians and appear to have been active in urging the Thebans to invade Lakonia (Xen. *Hell.* VI.5.5, 19, 23, 30, 50; VII.1.18, 2.5; Diod. XV.62.3-5, 64.5, 68.1). It is likely that the Lakedaimonian defeat at Leuktra had led to political disruption in Elis, as it had among the Arkadians and Argives (Xen. *Hell.* VI.5.3-10, cf. 4.18; Diod. XV.57.3-59.4; cf. Isok. VI *Arch.* 64-69). Political unrest at Arkadian Phigaleia, Korinth, Megara, Sicyon and Phleious, apparently allocated by Diodoros (XV.40.1-5) to 375/4 B.C., may actually belong to the period after Leuktra; cf. David, E., ‘Revolutionary Agitation in Sparta after Leuktra’ *Athenaeum* 52 (1980) 300. As Roy argues, on the other hand, it may reveal that there was political discontent in the Peloponnese before the Lakedaimonian defeat: Roy, J., ‘Diodorus Siculus XV.40 – The Peloponnesian Revolutions of 374 B.C.’ *Klio* 55 (1973) 135-39. If the popular party had gained the upper hand in Elis after Leuktra, it lost it soon after, since in 366 B.C. the Eleians accepted Arkadian refugees, supported them in the seizure of Lasion (Xen. *Hell.* VII.4.12; Diod. XV.77.1f) and then fought a war against the Arkadians, who supported the Eleian democrats (Xen. *Hell.* VII.VII.4.13-36; Diod. XV.77.3f, 78.2f, 82.1). At this time the Eleians returned to their Lakedaimonian allegiance (Xen. *Hell.* VII.5.1, 18; Diod. XV.84.4, 85.2, 7f.).

²²³ Falkner, 1996, 18.

²²⁴ Hammond, N.G.L., *Epirus* (Oxford, 1967) 508f.

the cult, so that it is more Panhellenic in its scope.²²⁵ These cultic changes may indicate that the shrine had come under new management. A fragment of the fifth-century B.C. Hekataios of Miletos shows that the Molossoi were neighbours of the Dodonians and two passages from Strabo illustrate the importance of Dodona to the development of the power of the Molossoi over Epeiros.²²⁶ Although there are signs that the Molossoi expanded in earlier times, they reached the height of their power in the fourth century B.C., beginning at some time before 385 B.C.²²⁷ Perhaps the loss of the Eleian fleet at the end of the war with the Lakedaimonians allowed the Molossoi to establish control over Dodona. While the Eleians retained Olympia, and we need not doubt that the sanctuary there remained of central importance for many centuries after 400 B.C., perhaps they now ceased to monopolise the paths of trade and pilgrimage that linked the shrines of Zeus.

Most significant for the future of the Eleians, however, is likely to have been the permanent loss of the *asylia*. The decision to fight at Sybota, the participation of the Eleians in the Archidamian War and the warfare that followed their alliance with the Argives, Athenians and Mantineians after the Peace of Nikias may be justified on the grounds that these were defensive wars fought against powers who had themselves violated or threatened to violate the *asylia*, as had Pheidon in an earlier age. The Eleians might even have been able to claim later that the Lakedaimonians had forced them in 394 B.C. to go to war against their old friends, the Corinthians. Their sacred status, nevertheless, must have meant little once it had been violated by the very power that had declared it centuries before. In seeking later to regain the territories that they had lost as a result of the Eleian War, moreover, the Eleians became embroiled in the conflicts among the Greek states of the mid-fourth century B.C. and on into the Hellenistic period, so that by the second century B.C., Polybios could call upon them in vain to seek to revive the days of old, when ‘they lived in a holy and unravaged Eleia, being entirely without experience of danger or of any warlike circumstances’.²²⁸

²²⁵ Hammond, 1967, 510.

²²⁶ Hekataios of Miletos *FGrH* 1 F 108: Μολοσσῶν πρὸς μεσημβρίας οἰκέουσι Δωδωναῖοι; Strabo VII.7.5, pp.323f; VII.7.11, p.328; Hammond, 1967, 479.

²²⁷ Hammond, 1967, 523-54.

²²⁸ Polyb. IV.73.10.

CONCLUSION

When they invaded Eleia, even though their ancestors had long before declared it to be sacred and inviolable, the Lakedaimonians of the late fifth-century B.C. revealed that they placed more importance upon the political objective of imposing oligarchic government upon the Greek states than upon the observation of time-honoured religious scruples. Since the Eleian democracy that they suppressed was a feature of the Classical period, the invasion might be said to have been undertaken in order to restore the *status quo* that had prevailed in Archaic times. Ironically, in pursuit of this objective, the Lakedaimonians violated the *asylia*, itself an integral component of the Archaic, aristocratic world that they had sought to maintain.

As Tritle concludes, ‘clearly the Greeks believed that peace was preferable to war, but finding it and keeping it was as elusive for them as it is for us today.’¹ The Eleian *asylia*, it seems, although violated by Pheidon of Argos early in the sixth century, endured for more than three hundred years, from some time in the eighth until the end of the fifth century B.C. The widely-held belief that c.570 B.C. the Eleians conquered the Pisatans of the Alpheios valley and assumed control of Olympia appears to be based upon a misleading chronology and a flawed interpretation of the available evidence. The internal conflicts of the late-sixth and early-fifth centuries B.C., reports of which are often taken as evidence for such a conquest, nevertheless, must have tarnished the holy image of the Eleians. Despite this, the *asylia* was apparently still in force when the dispute over Kerkyra in the mid-430s led the Eleians to war against the Athenians and their allies. The Eleians cannot be said, however, to have forgone their sacred and inviolable status by joining in the Archidamian War since, as with their part in the war against Pheidon, the involvement of the Eleians in this conflict was essentially defensive. The Kerkyraians, allies of the Athenians, had raided Eleian territory and thus violated the land sacred to Zeus, an action that was to be repeated with the aid of the Athenians once the war had begun.

¹ Tritle, L.A., ‘“Laughing for Joy: War and Peace among the Greeks’ in Raaflaub, K.A. (ed), *War and Peace in the Ancient World* (Malden, Mass., 2007) 172. Connor, W.R., ‘Early Greek Warfare as Symbolic Expression’ *P&P* 119 (1988) 5, doubts ‘that the Greeks were as monolithic in their acceptance of the inevitability of war as they were ferocious in its conduct.’

Yet these events signal that new forces were at work in Greece, creating a more competitive political environment in which Archaic institutions like the Eleian *asylia* were out of place. The participation of the Eleians in the quadruple alliance that opposed the Lakedaimonians and their allies after the Peace of Nikias could also be portrayed as defensive, though arguably with less credibility than their contribution to the Attic War. By sending a garrison into Lepreon, the Lakedaimonians had intervened in a dispute between the Eleians and one of their allies, but had not violated Eleian territory. The Eleians were, nevertheless, on the defensive, and although their participation in the allied campaign after the Peace of Nikias against the Lakedaimonians placed considerable strain upon their sacrosanct status, it was not yet broken.

The Lakedaimonian invasion of Eleia was the greatest violation of that status that had occurred since the inception of the *asylia*. Again, however, since the Eleians merely attempted to defend their territory, they cannot be said to have abandoned the injunction to refrain from aggressive warfare. Only when they went to war against the Corinthians in 395 B.C. in accordance with their alliance with the Lakedaimonians can they be said to have done so. Here is a further irony – the very people who had once declared the Eleians to be sacred now forced them, for the first time, to take an action that indisputably disavowed that status.

Polybios, nonetheless, may be right when he says that it was because of their willing participation in the warfare of the mid-fourth century B.C. that the Eleians finally became indistinguishable from the other Greeks with respect to their foreign policy,² so perhaps it was only then that the *asylia* was irreparably broken. The *asylia* belonged to the Archaic, aristocratic Peloponnese of the eighth, seventh and sixth centuries B.C. It must have been shaken by the internal conflict and the apparently varied response of the Eleian communities to the Persian invasion at about the end of the Archaic period. That it was able to stumble on into the Classical is a testimony to the endurance of divinely-sanctioned tradition, but the fact that it finally went under shows that a new era had dawned in which it no longer had a place. Hellenistic declarations of *asylia*, as Rigsby demonstrates, although common, ‘never brought a recipient anything but honor’, ‘protected no one from war’ and ‘did not work’.³ The

² Polyb. IV.74.1f.

³ Rigsby, K.J., *Asylia: Territorial inviolability in the Hellenistic World* (Berkeley, 1996) 22, cf. 23-25.

asylia of the Eleians, in contrast, Archaic in origin, appears to have endured for centuries.

There are three main phases of Eleian history in the time-span covered by this thesis: the period of the amphictyony, which appears to have been founded when the Aitolian Eleians arrived in the Peloponnese during the early Iron Age; the period of the *koinon*, established in response to Pheidon's seizure of the Olympic sanctuary around the beginning of the sixth century; and the period of the democratic *polis* of Elis that arose with the synoikism of 471 B.C. and was dismembered at the hands of the Lakedaimonians in 400 B.C. The Eleians do not appear to have competed with the other states of the Peloponnese for dominance during any of these phases of their history, but towards the end of the period of the *koinon* the Eleian *demos* struggled against its internal enemies to establish a democracy and then, from 421 B.C., against the Lakedaimonians and their friends to retain it.

Much the same can be said about many of the other Greek states that came within the reach of the Lakedaimonians. The Argives, in particular, struggled for over a century to maintain their democratic constitution. Three decades before the battle of Leuktra in 371 B.C. and the subsequent collapse of the Lakedaimonian hegemony, the Eleian democracy, like that of many other Greek states, fell prey to the reactionary forces that so often dominated Sparta from the late-sixth to the early-fourth centuries B.C. These forces, in the pursuit of a perennial political agenda, brought to an end the Eleian *asylia* that appears once to have formed an integral component of the structure of inter-state relations in Greece and thereby to have helped secure for the Spartans possession of the southern two-fifths of the Peloponnese and considerable influence over much that remained of it. There is no irony in the fact that the Eleians played an active role in the events that led to the liberation of Messenia and the overthrow of the Lakedaimonian hegemony. No longer neutralised by the *asylia*, they could now join the forces opposed to the Spartans.

This investigation highlights a particular characteristic of the relationship of the Lakedaimonians with their allies. There was no 'typical' Lakedaimonian ally and probably no typical Greek state, and we can say with some certainty that each the major *poleis*, at least, had its own distinct identity. The binary opposition of Athens

and Sparta that many scholars have found in the text of Thucydides appears illusory,⁴ since we might find characteristics to juxtapose in a comparison of any two of the larger states. If the Athenians were dynamic and the Spartans conservative, the Corinthians might have been adaptable, the Argives determined and the Thebans pragmatic. We need not dwell on the possibilities, since there is no doubt that the Eleians differed from the others by virtue of their custodianship of the sanctuary of Zeus at Olympia. Their relations with the Lakedaimonians, however, display one surprising similarity to those of virtually all of the other neighbours of the latter. The Tegeans, Mantineians, Parrhasians, Argives, Corinthians, Phleasians, Sikyonians, Achaians, Boiotians and Athenians were all at some time subjected to Lakedaimonian interference in their internal political affairs. The Eleians, too, were ultimately violated, despite a strong and enduring religious sanction.

⁴ See most notably Fliess, writing during the Cold War: Fliess, P.J., *Thucydides and the Politics of Bipolarity* (Louisiana State University, 1966).

APPENDIX:
THE PELOPONNESE IN THE EARLY FIFTH CENTURY B.C.

For much of the first half of the fifth century B.C. the Peloponnesian states were engulfed in both internal factional political struggles and external military conflicts. As the century began, the Messenians, supported by the Argives and Arkadians, were in revolt from Spartan rule. The Lakedaimonians attempted to place an aristocracy favourable to themselves in control of the Argive state, succeeding for a brief period after the battle of Sepeia c.494 B.C. While the Mantineians retained an oligarchic constitution and remained loyal to the Lakedaimonians throughout this period, the Tegeans, at the head of an Arkadian league that excluded only Mantinea, turned to democracy and were generally hostile towards Sparta. The Messenian war that ended c.490 B.C. was followed a quarter of a century later by the great earthquake revolt of 465 B.C. to 456 B.C. It is against this tumultuous background that the conflicts within the Eleian *koinon* that led to the *synoikismos* of 471 B.C. must be understood.

The Mantineians

Forrest claims that in 470 B.C. both Tegea and Mantinea were hostile to Sparta.¹ The case for Mantineian hostility in this period is, however, very weak. In this Forrest follows Andrewes, who argues that the abstention of the Mantineians from Plataiai ‘must be taken as deliberate, a sign of very serious disaffection at a critical moment.’² Yet Herodotus also says that the Mantineians wanted to atone for their lateness by pursuing the Persians, and that they exiled their generals for their tardiness.³ Perhaps the *generals* were anti-Lakedaimonian or pro-Persian, or had even been bribed, but the *state* of the Mantineians, at least, was keen to demonstrate its loyalty. Alternatively, as Andrewes speculates, the Mantineians might have made a ‘mere miscalculation of the outcome’ of Plataiai. There is no reason to assume that they were especially hostile towards the Lakedaimonians.

¹ Forrest, W.G., ‘Themistocles and Argos’ *CQ* 10 (1960) 229.

² Andrewes, A., ‘Sparta and Arcadia in the early Fifth Century’ *Phoenix* 6 (1952) 2.

³ Hdt. IX.77.1-3.

Andrewes' claim that 'we may reasonably associate democracy and συνουκισμός' does not stand up to close scrutiny.⁴ Although the Lakedaimonian-enforced διοικισμός of the fourth century B.C. was accompanied by a change to oligarchy,⁵ we cannot assume that the reverse had occurred in the early-fifth century. The synoikism of Mantinea is only dated c.470 B.C. by association with that of Elis. As O'Neil points out, the synchronism is based on Strabo, who also mentions other synoikisms, like that of Heraia, which must be dated to the early fourth century B.C.⁶

The synoikism of Mantinea,⁷ which Lewis dates perhaps as early as 600 B.C., might have had little to do with the appearance of democracy there, not actually attested until 421 B.C.⁸ Synoikism may indicate that a state, or group of states, feels itself to be in danger of attack. If the synoikism of Mantinea does belong to the early fifth-century B.C., it might easily have come about as a reaction to the formation of an Arkadian league headed by Tegea. There can be little doubt that the Mantineians stood aside from this league, since at Dipaia, probably soon after the great earthquake at Sparta,⁹ the Lakedaimonians fought against all of the Arkadians except the Mantineians.¹⁰ Furthermore, as Wallace remarks, 'Mantinea is the one Arkadian *polis* which issued coins at the same time as the league'.¹¹

Strabo's statement that the Argives synoikised Mantinea is the only evidence for Argive involvement, and he gives no indication of when it might have occurred.¹² We need not consider the synoikism to have been directed against the Lakedaimonians. Dickens claims that by 468 B.C., when Archidamos became king, Sparta 'could begin to take measures against the new democracies of Mantinea and Elis', but there is no record of any Lakedaimonian intervention in either state.¹³ The sole testimony of any military action by the Mantineians in this period indicates that they sent help to Archidamos during the Messenian revolt that followed the

⁴ Andrewes, 1952, 2; cf. Forrest, 1960, 229; Davies, J.K., *Democracy and Classical Greece* (Hassocks, Sussex, 1978) 53.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* V.2.7; Arist. *Pol.* VI.2.2, 1318b.

⁶ Strabo VIII.3.2, p.337; O'Neil, J.L., 'The Exile of Themistocles and Democracy in the Peloponnese' *CQ* 31 (1981) 335.

⁷ Diod. VII.13.2.

⁸ Thuc. V.29.1; Lewis, D.M., 'Mainland Greece, 479-451 B.C.' *CAH V*² (1992) 103; cf. O'Neil, 1981, 336, 339.

⁹ See below, 330f.

¹⁰ Hdt. IX.35.2; cf. Paus. III.11.7; Isok. VI *Arch.* 99.

¹¹ Wallace, W.P., 'Kleomenes, Marathon, the Helots, and Arkadia' *JHS* 74 (1954) 34.

¹² Strabo VIII.3.2, p.337: τῆς Ἀρκαδίας Μαντίνεια μὲν ἐκ πέντε δήμων ὑπ' Ἀργείων συνφοκίσθη; Andrewes, 1952, 2.

¹³ Dickins, G., 'The Growth of Spartan Policy' *JHS* 32 (1912) 35.

earthquake at Sparta in 465 B.C.¹⁴ Andrewes speculates that ‘Sparta must have condoned the συνουκισμός and the new constitution, thus buying back Mantinea’s affections.’¹⁵ This is unlikely, since there is no reason to believe either that any reforms had taken place c.470 B.C., or that Mantinea’s loyalty had ever been lost to the Lakedaimonians.

The Tegeans

There is no compelling reason, on the other hand, to believe that the Tegeans were friendly to the Lakedaimonians at any time during the first half of the fifth century B.C. Even when they joined the general Hellenic league against the Persians, there might have been reasons why the Lakedaimonians refused them the opposite wing to themselves at Plataiai, and kept them close at hand throughout the battle.¹⁶ Including Helots, says Herodotus, there were 45,000 in the Lakedaimonian contingent and 1,500 men from Tegea.¹⁷ Perhaps it was their location near to the Lakedaimonians that ensured that the Tegeans fought vigorously for the allied cause.¹⁸ In presenting their unsuccessful case, the Tegeans referred to past victories over the Lakedaimonians.¹⁹ These might have been won in the period when Kroisos of Lydia was searching among the Greeks for valuable allies against the Persians,²⁰ during the reign of Anaxandrides, the father of Kleomenes, Dorieus, Leonidas and Kleombrotos.²¹

The Lakedaimonians, after many defeats, had finally been able to win a victory over the Tegeans.²² Herodotus says that ‘at that time very much of the Peloponnese had been subjected to them’.²³ It cannot be deduced from this, however, that the Tegeans themselves were at this time subjected to the Lakedaimonians in any way. The territory of Messenia, along with the valley of the Eurotas and the nearby Spartan possessions, can be said by themselves to have constituted ‘very

¹⁴ Xen. *Hell.* V.2.3; Andrewes, 1952, 3; O’Neil, 1981, 338.

¹⁵ Andrewes, 1952, 3.

¹⁶ Hdt. IX.26.1-28.3, 56.1, but cf. Andrewes, 1952, 2. Lewis, 1992, 104, sees the Tegean request as an indicator of loyalty to Sparta.

¹⁷ Hdt. IX.28.2f.

¹⁸ Hdt. IX.56.1, 62.1.

¹⁹ Hdt. IX.26.2-7.

²⁰ Hdt. I.56.1f.

²¹ Hdt. I.67.1; V.39.1-41.3; Paus. III.3.5, 9.

²² Hdt. I.65.1, 66.1-68.6.

²³ Hdt. I.68.6: ἤδη δέ σφι καὶ ἡ πολλὴ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἦν κατεστραμμένη.

much of the Peloponnese'. In this passage Herodotus seems to indicate no more than that the defeat of the Tegeans came after the first Messenian War.

In the 490s B.C., Kleomenes fled to Arkadia after revelations of corruption. When it became known that he had used his personal influence in Delphi to secure the deposition of Demaratos, the other king, Kleomenes had first fled to Thessaly. 'Coming from there to Arkadia,' reports Herodotus, 'he achieved a revolution in affairs, uniting the Arkadians against Sparta'.²⁴ Kleomenes is likely to have fled Sparta some time after his invasion of the Argolid c.494 B.C. and probably very late in the 490s B.C.²⁵ We can assume from this that for some length of time in the 490s B.C. and perhaps later, much of Arkadia was on hostile terms with the Lakedaimonians.

In Pausanias' account of the second Messenian War, which appears to have occurred c.510-490 B.C.,²⁶ the Arkadians are allies of the Messenians, but desert at a crucial moment.²⁷ Later, nevertheless, they receive Messenian refugees and overthrow their pro-Spartan king.²⁸ This account seems to indicate unstable relations between the Lakedaimonians and at least some of the Arkadians in this period. In an inscription recorded by Plutarch, dating from at least the time of Aristotle and probably from early in the fifth century B.C., the Tegeans agree to expel Messenian refugees.²⁹ This implies that they had been accepting them into their ranks, so the Tegeans are likely to have been among the Arkadians who supported the Messenians against Sparta.³⁰

There is further evidence of hostility between the Tegeans and the Lakedaimonians in the years before Xerxes' invasion. As Andrewes points out, 'at some time before 480 Hegesistratos, that other Elean seer from the family Telliadai, made his escape from Sparta to Tegea, ἐοῦσαν οὐκ ἀρθμίην Λακεδαιμονίοισι τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον (Her. 9.37.4).'³¹ Apart from this direct statement that the two states were unfriendly, we must also wonder what 'much and untoward'

²⁴ Hdt. VI.74.1f: ἐνθεῦτεν δὲ ἀφικόμενος ἐς τὴν Ἀρκαδίην νεώτερα ἔπραξε πρήγματα, συνιστὰς τοὺς Ἀρκάδας ἐπὶ τῇ Σπάρτῃ; cf. 50.1, 61.1-67.1; Paus. III.4.2-6.

²⁵ Hdt. VI.75.3-84.1; Paus. III.4.1; Wallace, 1954, 32-35; see below, 340.

²⁶ See above, 121-28, cf. 129-36.

²⁷ Paus. IV.15.7, 17.2f, 6-9; cf. Strabo VIII.4.10, p.362.

²⁸ Paus. IV.22.1-7.

²⁹ Arist. fr. 592; Plut. *Mor.* 292B, 5: Μεσσηνίους ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς χώρας, καὶ μὴ ἐξεῖναι 'χρηστοὺς' ποιεῖν.

³⁰ Cawkwell, G.L., 'Sparta and her Allies in the Sixth Century' *CQ* 43 (1993) 368-70; *contra* de Ste. Croix, G.E.M., *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1972) 97, n.18.

³¹ Andrewes, 1952, 2.

Hegesistratos had done to the Spartans, perhaps on behalf of the Tegeans, that led them to capture and bind him, intending to put him to death.³²

It is likely that the Tegeans remained estranged from Sparta, since the Lakedaimonian king Leotychides went into exile at Tegea some time after the battle of Mykale, perhaps in the mid-470s B.C.³³ Supported by the Argives, the Tegeans fought Sparta at the battle of Tegea, probably just before the earthquake of 465 B.C. and joined in the Argive attack on Mykenai soon afterwards.³⁴ At Dipaia in central Arkadia, probably soon after the earthquake, ‘all of the Arkadians, except the Mantineians’ fought against Sparta,³⁵ and the Tegeans were almost certainly their leaders.³⁶

The Tegeans seem to have headed an Arkadian league, excluding only Mantinea, possibly from about the time of the battle of Marathon. Wallace, noting the report of Herodotus cited above, suggests that the exiled Kleomenes formed an anti-Spartan league in Arkadia.³⁷ ‘The coins,’ he claims, ‘show that the league he formed was effective and lasting.’ O’Neil concludes that ‘this league can only have been anti-Spartan in intention.’³⁸ Wallace gives the approximate date for the beginning of this coinage as c.490 B.C. Lewis, however, says that these coins were first minted after 480 B.C., at a disputed location.³⁹ Later, two more mints began production, and there is a ‘reasonable case’ that one was in Tegea. Although Lewis says that ‘it is not implausible to see Mantinea in the third’, he offers no substantial reasons for doing so, and we can assume that the Tegeans headed a league of ‘all of the Arkadians, except the Mantineians’ such as that which fought against the Lakedaimonians at Dipaia.⁴⁰

³² Hdt. IX.37.1f: πολλά τε καὶ ἀνάγκη.

³³ Hdt. VI.72.1f; Paus. III.8.9; cf. Hornblower, S., *The Greek World, 479-323 B.C.* (London, 1983) 24.

³⁴ Hdt. IX.35.2; Thuc. I.101.2; Strabo VIII.6.19, p.377; Diod. XI.65.4; Andrewes, 1952, 3.

³⁵ Hdt. IX.35.2; cf. Isok. VI *Arch.* 99; Paus. III.11.7.

³⁶ Lewis, 1992, 105, argues that Dipaia was before the earthquake.

³⁷ Hdt. VI.74.1f; Wallace, 1954, 32; cf. Tomlinson, R.A., *Argos and the Argolid* (London, 1972) 102; de Ste. Croix, G.E.M., ‘Herodotus and King Cleomenes I of Sparta’ (1976) in Harvey, D. and Parker, R. (eds), *Athenian Democratic Origins and Other Essays* (Oxford, 2004) 435f; Cartledge, P.A., *Sparta and Lakonia: a Regional History 1300-362 B.C.* (London, 1979) 152f, but see 159.

³⁸ Wallace, 1954, 33; O’Neil, 1981, 338.

³⁹ Lewis, 1992, 105; cf. Hornblower, 1983, 24.

⁴⁰ Hdt. IX.35.2: πρὸς Ἀρκάδας πάντας πλὴν Μαντινέων. That the coinage had a military purpose may be inferred from ‘the fact that the predominant denomination is the tribol on the Aeginetan standard, known from Thucydides (V.47.6) as a standard Peloponnesian soldier’s ration allowance’: Lewis, 1992, 105; cf. Wallace, 1954, 34.

Tegean hostility towards the Lakedaimonians seems to have lasted until Kleandridas captured the city, helped by the pro-Lakedaimonian aristocrats.⁴¹ Unfortunately, Polyainos gives no clue as to when, but as Lewis calculates, ‘since Cleandridas was active well after 445, the later this...is put the better, and it may well belong even to the 450s.’⁴² The fall of Tegea to the Lakedaimonians and to aristocracy, and thus of the Arkadian league that it headed, is likely to have been associated in some way with the treaty between Argos and Sparta in 451 B.C.⁴³ Apparent Lakedaimonian assistance to Sikyon in 453 B.C. may indicate that a route through Arkadia had been opened to the Lakedaimonians by then.⁴⁴ This would make the fall of Tegea a cause rather than a consequence of the Argive treaty with Sparta. It is significant, moreover, that the fall of Tegea was brought about as a result of the collusion of the aristocratic party with the Lakedaimonians.⁴⁵ Tegean resistance to Lakedaimonian and aristocratic control, we can conclude, began well before Xerxes’ invasion and lasted until the middle of the fifth century B.C.⁴⁶

Conflict between Argos and Sparta

Conflict between Argos and Sparta in the early-fifth century B.C. is well documented. In 494 B.C., or perhaps earlier, at Sepeia near Tiryns, the Lakedaimonians under Kleomenes inflicted a serious defeat upon the Argives.⁴⁷ The two states had probably been at war well before this time.⁴⁸ Pausanias says that some help arrived for the Messenians in the second Messenian War from Argos and Sikyon.⁴⁹ Since, as argued above, this war is likely to have occurred c.510-490 B.C.,

⁴¹ Polyainos II.10.3.

⁴² Lewis, 1992, 105, n.34; cf. Andrewes, 1952, 4, who places this event in the 460s or 470s B.C.

⁴³ As in the case of Mantinea, Strabo (VIII.3.2, p.337) gives us no clues as to when the synoikism of Tegea took place, and we cannot without further evidence link it to democracy; cf. Andrewes, 1952, 2f; de Ste. Croix, 1972, 98; Adshear, K., *Politics of the Archaic Peloponnese* (Aldershot, 1986) 95-97.

⁴⁴ Diod. XI.88.2.

⁴⁵ Polyainos II.10.3.

⁴⁶ cf. Lewis, 1992, 105.

⁴⁷ Hdt. VI.77.1-80.1; Tomlinson, 1972, 93; de Ste. Croix 2004 (1976), 426; Cartledge, 1979, 149; Andrewes, A., ‘Argive *Perioikoi*’ in Craik, E.M. (ed), *Owls to Athens: Essays on Classical Subjects Presented to Sir Kenneth Dover* (Oxford, 1990) 171; Lewis, 1992, 101 and n.16; Cawkwell, G.L., ‘Cleomenes’ *Mnemosyne* 46 (1993) 510.

⁴⁸ Hostility between Argos and Sparta, nevertheless, might not have been a regular feature of relations between the two Peloponnesian states until the end of the Archaic period: Kelly, T., ‘The Traditional Enmity between Sparta and Argos: the Birth and Development of a Myth’ *AHR* 75 (1970) 971-1003.

⁴⁹ Paus. IV.15.7: ἔτι δὲ ἐξ Ἰαργούρου ἀρίκετο καὶ Σικυῶνος βοήθεια.

we can assume that hostility between Sparta and Argos dated from at least the beginning of that war.

Sepeia is unlikely to have been the only battle between the Lakedaimonians and Argives that took place in the course of the second Messenian War. Shaw finds a credible context at the beginning of the fifth century B.C. for the victory of the Argives over the Lakedaimonians at the battle of Hysiai, often dated to a much earlier period.⁵⁰ In the campaign that culminated in the battle of Sepeia, Kleomenes had at first intended, though the result of the sacrifice dissuaded him, to approach the Argolid by crossing the Erasinos river, to the south of Argos.⁵¹ Furuyama points out that Kleomenes is likely to have considered this dangerous manoeuvre because Hysiai was in Argive hands. Although Furuyama dates the battle of Hysiai much earlier, perhaps the recent loss of this frontier town had compelled the Lakedaimonians to seek a less favourable means of invading the Argolid.⁵²

The decisive Lakedaimonian victory at Sepeia was won c.494 B.C., and thus appears to have been fought during the last phase of the second Messenian War, the eleven-year siege of the fortress of Eira.⁵³ Although the besieged Messenians continued to raid both Messenia and Lakonia,⁵⁴ they had been driven from the open field, and the Lakedaimonians seem to have taken the opportunity to deal with the Argives.

Hostility between the Lakedaimonians and Argives, apart from a brief period of aristocratic rule at Argos, appears to have continued throughout the first half of the fifth century B.C. The Argives took no part in the defence of Greece during Xerxes' invasion. Herodotus expresses scepticism about three explanations offered for this.⁵⁵ In a later passage, nevertheless, he shows that the Argives were sympathetic towards the Persian cause. Here he records that the Argives had previously agreed with Mardonios to prevent the Lakedaimonians from marching against him, but that when they had eluded them by marching *via* Oresthion, and thus

⁵⁰ Paus. II.24.7; Shaw, P.-J., *Discrepancies in Olympiad Dating and Chronological Problems of Archaic Peloponnesian History* (Stuttgart, 2003) 173f, cf. 158-72; Kelly, 1970, 999, doubts the authenticity of this Argive victory, but on the grounds of its early chronology, which Shaw rejects.

⁵¹ Hdt. VI.76.1f.

⁵² Furuyama, M., 'On Perioikic Regions of the Lakonian East Coast, Focusing on Thyreatis and Kynouria' *JCS* 51 (Kyoto, 2003) 179.

⁵³ Paus. IV.20.1.

⁵⁴ Paus. IV.18.1.

⁵⁵ Hdt. VII.148.1-152.3.

through Arkadia, the Argives had sent a messenger to warn the Persians.⁵⁶ It seems likely that their enmity towards the Lakedaimonians was such that the Argives were prepared to take the Persian side in this war.⁵⁷

Hostile relations between the two states, despite a lack of any reports of warfare in the decade following the defeat of the Persians, appear to have continued. At Tegea, probably not long before 465 B.C.,⁵⁸ the Lakedaimonians defeated the Argives and Tegeans. Recording the alliance of Argos with Athens c.460 B.C., Thucydides refers to Argos as ‘Sparta’s enemy’.⁵⁹ In 459 B.C., the Argives, with Athenian assistance, appear to have prevented a Lakedaimonian force from traversing their territory at Oinoe near the modern village of Merkouri in the western Argolid.⁶⁰ In 458 B.C. a thousand Argives fought on the side of the Athenians against the Lakedaimonians at Tanagra in Boiotia.⁶¹

Hostilities seem to have continued for some years after. In 421 B.C. the Argives agreed to a Korinthian proposal to invite any Greeks who wished to do so to become their allies. Their chief motivation was that their thirty-years’ treaty with the Lakedaimonians was on the point of expiring.⁶² This means that they must not have made peace with the Lakedaimonians until 451 B.C.⁶³ Conflict between the Argives

⁵⁶ Hdt. IX.11.2-12.2.

⁵⁷ cf. Lewis, 1992, 106; de Ste. Croix, 2004 (1976), 433.

⁵⁸ Andrewes, 1952, 5; Lewis, 1992, 108 says soon after 465 B.C. If, however, as two references to verses of Simonides suggest (122, 123), some Athenians had helped the Spartans at Tegea, then the battle might pre-date the poet’s death in 467 B.C.: εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας τοὺς τὴν Τεγέαν ἐλευθεροποιήσαντες; εἰς τοὺς ἐν Τεγέῃ πεσόντας ἀριστεῖς Ἀθηναίους; cf. Andrewes, 1952, 4.

⁵⁹ Thuc. I.102.4; cf. Holladay, A.J., ‘Sparta’s Role in the First Peloponnesian War’ *JHS* 97 (1977) 54.

⁶⁰ Paus. I.15.1; X.10.4. There has been much scholarly discussion about this report of Pausanias. It is not possible to provide here the present author’s reasons for concluding that this battle was fought in 459 B.C. for the purpose of preventing the Lakedaimonians from sending aid to their allies in the north-east Peloponnese. The bibliography includes: Wycherley, R.E., ‘The Painted Stoa’ *Phoenix* 7 (1953) 20-35; Jeffery, L.H., ‘The Battle of Oinoe in the Stoa Poikile: A Problem in Greek Art and History’ *BSA* 60 (1965) 41-57; Meiggs, R., *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford, 1972) 469-72; Andrewes, A., ‘Could there have been a Battle at Oinoe?’ in Levick, B. (ed), *The Ancient Historian and his Materials* (Farnborough, 1975) 9-16; Francis, E.D. and Vickers, M., ‘Argive Oenoe’ *Ant. Class.* 54 (1985) 105-15, cf. 105, n.1 for a bibliography of the nineteenth century debate; ‘The Oenoe Painting in the Stoa Poikile and Herodotus’ Account of Marathon’ *BSA* 80 (1985) 99-113; Schreiner, J.H., ‘The Battle of Oinoe and the Credibility of Thucydides’ in Damsgaard-Madsen, A. *et al.* (eds), *Studies in Ancient History and Numismatics Presented to Rudi Thomsen* (Aarhus, 1988) 71-76; *Hellanikos, Thucydides and the Era of Kimon* (Aarhus, 1997) 21-37, 109-12; Bollansée, J., ‘The Battle of Oinoe in the Stoa Poikile: A Fake Jewel in the Fifth-Century Athenian Crown?’ *Anc. Soc.* 24 (1991) 91-126; Develin, B., ‘The Battle of Oinoe Meets Ockham’s Razor?’ *ZPE* 99 (1993) 235-50; Pritchett, W. K., ‘The Alleged Battle of Oinoe’ in *Essays in Greek History* (Amsterdam, 1994) 1-25; *Pausanias Periegetes II* (Amsterdam, 1999) 52-54; Taylor, J.G., ‘Oinoe and the Painted Stoa: Ancient and Modern Misunderstandings’ *AJPhil.* 119 (1998) 223-43; cf. Dickins, 1912, 39.

⁶¹ Thuc. I.107.5; Diod. XI.80.1f; Paus V.10.4.

⁶² Thuc. V.14.4, 22.2, 28.2.

⁶³ cf. Lewis, 1992, 120.

and Lakedaimonians appears to have begun long before Kleomenes defeated the Argives at Sepeia c.494 B.C., and to have continued until the peace treaty of 451 B.C., a period of at least 43 years.

There is, nevertheless, an apparent hiatus in this state of affairs, since, at Dipaia, probably in or soon after 465 B.C., when the Lakedaimonians defeated the Arkadians, the Argives do not seem to have been present.⁶⁴ This is not to be explained, however, as Forrest claims, by a temporary change to aristocratic government at Argos c.468 B.C. Forrest maintains that, despite the earthquake and the Helot revolt of 465 B.C., the Lakedaimonians were able to defeat a ‘depleted’ anti-Spartan league at Dipaia,⁶⁵ but had lost control of Argos by 464 B.C. when the democrats might have returned to power.⁶⁶ A close examination of Argive affairs during the early-fifth century B.C., nevertheless, makes it unlikely that there was a political upheaval at Argos in the 460s, and we must look for another explanation for the absence of the Argives from Dipaia.

The Endurance of Democracy in Argos

Because of the scarcity of evidence, any reconstruction of Argive political history in the first half of the fifth century B.C. is bound to be contentious. The attempt made below turns some earlier interpretations on their heads. Contrary to the view of many scholars,⁶⁷ it is likely that after the great victory of Kleomenes over Argos c.494 B.C. an oligarchy was briefly established in which the local aristocrats of some of the perioikic towns of the Argolid were invited to join with the Argive aristocracy in governing the state. This is the most credible interpretation of Herodotus’ narrative of the events that followed the battle,⁶⁸ summarised in the following paragraphs.

After ‘many’ were killed, ‘many more’ escaped to a grove sacred to the hero Argos. Kleomenes learnt from Argive deserters (αὐτομόλους ἄνδρας) the names of certain individuals, whom he then called upon to come out, pretending that they had

⁶⁴ Hdt. IX.35.2; cf. Paus. III.11.7; Isok. VI *Arch.* 99.

⁶⁵ Forrest, 1960, 229-32, 239; cf. Andrewes, 1952, 1-5.

⁶⁶ Forrest, 1960, 240.

⁶⁷ Forrest, 1960, 222-29, 240; Tomlinson, 1972, 190; O’Neil, 1981, 341ff; Andrewes, 1990, 177f; Robinson, E.W., *The First Democracies: Early Popular Government Outside Athens* (Stuttgart, 1997) 84-88.

⁶⁸ Hdt. VI.78.2-83.2.

been ransomed.⁶⁹ About fifty did so and were immediately executed. When the deception was discovered and the remaining Argives refused to come out, Kleomenes burnt the grove to the ground. Finding from one of the deserters that the grove was sacred to the hero called 'Argos', Kleomenes then declared that a Delphic oracle prophesying that he would take Argos had been fulfilled. He then sent most of his army home, save 'a thousand of his best'.

After having violently removed the priest, Kleomenes sacrificed at the Argive Heraion. There, he later reported, a flame shot from the image of Hera, but not from its head. This occurrence, Kleomenes claimed, revealed to him that he would not take the city of Argos and that he had already fulfilled the oracle of 'the god', Apollo at Delphi.⁷⁰ At this, he too returned home. Once there, Kleomenes was charged before the ephors with having accepted a bribe not to take Argos. When he related to them the details of the sacrifice, however, he was acquitted.

After Sepeia, apparently, Argos was so short of men that the government fell into the hands of the *douloi* until the sons of those slain at Sepeia grew up and ejected them. The 'sons' resumed control, and the 'slaves' occupied Tiryns. For a time, Argos and Tiryns lived on friendly terms, until the 'slaves' in Tiryns attacked their former masters but, after a long struggle, were defeated. There Herodotus' account of these events ends.

Kleomenes had not invaded Argos on a personal initiative. On returning to Sparta, he was charged with not having captured the city, so it is likely that the invasion was state policy. The ephors, furthermore, seem ultimately to have been satisfied with his settlement of affairs there. Perhaps he was able to explain to them that, having taken the grove sacred to Argos, into which the fugitives had fled, he had, in effect, done what was required.⁷¹ Kleomenes, it appears, in relating the supernatural events that he had witnessed in Hera's temple, was able to convey in symbolic terms to the ephors that, after having destroyed the 'body' of Argos, perhaps the *chora* and/or the *demos*, he had no need to capture the 'head', meaning, perhaps the city and/or its aristocracy.⁷² It certainly seems, as Tomlinson points out, that Spartan policy did not aim to destroy the city. While Tomlinson claims that their

⁶⁹ Hdt. VI.79.1.

⁷⁰ Hdt. VI.82.1, cf. 80.1.

⁷¹ Hdt. VI.80.1.

⁷² Hdt. VI.82.2.

purpose was merely to ‘neutralise Argos militarily and politically’, however, the Lakedaimonians might rather have hoped to win it for aristocracy.

It is likely, as argued below, that the Argive ‘deserters’ were Lakedaimonian sympathisers among the Argives and their *perioikoi*, most likely of the aristocratic party. Those who took refuge in the grove, the ones whose names were given to Kleomenes by the ‘deserters’, would then have been the leaders of the *demos*. Having succeeded in destroying the leaders of the ruling democratic faction, Kleomenes was able to dismiss most of his forces, remaining only with the thousand ‘best’ (τοὺς ἀριστεάς). These were presumably the ‘best’ because they were aristocratic, and so could be relied upon politically. He was then able, it seems, to stand by while the appropriate constitutional arrangements were made in Argos, the recruitment of members of the regional nobility to replace the slaughtered leaders of the popular faction in the organs of government.⁷³

Tomlinson, citing Pausanias, concludes that the *douloi* whom Herodotus says took over the government of the city were called ‘slaves’ because they occupied a position in Argive society similar to that of the Spartan Helots.⁷⁴ Pausanias’ narrative agrees closely with that of Herodotus up to a point, and then tells how Kleomenes, having slaughtered all of the Argives, led the Lakedaimonians against the city. There the poetess Telesilla, he says, took charge of the resistance. Telesilla had posted the slaves (οἱ οἰκέται), the elderly and the young on the walls, and armed the women. Kleomenes, unwilling to fight against women, had withdrawn. Tomlinson explains that Pausanias is probably exaggerating the role of the women, who often participated in the last-ditch defence of a city. He then assumes that the *douloi* in Herodotus were identical to the slaves that Telesilla had posted on the walls.⁷⁵ οἱ οἰκέται, however, refers to household slaves, who are highly unlikely to have been the equivalent of Helots. Pausanias’ story, furthermore, allows only a small role for the household slaves in the resistance to Kleomenes.

⁷³ According to Connor, Herodotus’ story of Kleomenes’ invasion of Argos ‘makes him an almost paradigmatic inversion of the warrior code’: Connor, W.R., ‘Early Greek Warfare as Symbolic Expression’ *P&P* 119 (1988) 19, n.74. Connor, 17, also claims that in the ‘early’ period, that code determined that we do not find ‘a victorious hoplite force attempting to change the form of government of a state’. If the latter claim is true, then perhaps Herodotus’ story reflects the fact that towards the end of the Archaic period a Lakedaimonian hoplite force broke the ‘code’ by conducting a massacre of the *demos* for that very purpose.

⁷⁴ Paus. II.20.8; Tomlinson, 1972, 94-100.

⁷⁵ Tomlinson, 1972, 97.

Tomlinson claims that Aristotle, when describing those who took control in Argos after Sepeia as *perioikoi*, uses the term as a variant of Helot.⁷⁶ His claim is based on another passage in the same work in which the Kretans and Spartans are compared. Aristotle says that while in Sparta the Helots do the farming, in Krete it is done by the *perioikoi*.⁷⁷ Aristotle does not mean us to think, however, that the social position of the Kretan *perioikoi* is the same as that of the Lakedaimonian Helots since, soon afterwards, he refers to the tribute that these *perioikoi* pay.⁷⁸ This seems more like contributions paid by perioikic communities to the state treasury than exactions from the produce of individuals. We must reject Tomlinson's identification of those called *douloi* by Herodotus with those called *oiketai* by Pausanias, and of those called *perioikoi* by Aristotle with the *heilotes* of Sparta.⁷⁹ Another explanation of Herodotus' use of the expression *douloi* must be sought.

Those whom Herodotus calls 'slaves' seem most likely to have been the victims of slander. Forrest, although he presents an entirely different interpretation from the one offered here, appears to guess correctly that 'this version of the events of 494 originated among the political opponents of the *douloi*'. These opponents, he suggests, were the sons of those who died at Sepeia. '*Douloi*,' he says,

is no more than political abuse, and as such may have very little to do with literal *douleia*. The name might be applied to anyone outside the traditional ruling class, to new democratic leaders who were not aristocrats of the highest class, or even to aristocrats who were prepared to court the *demos*; or to Aristotle's *perioikoi*, or it could mean that the democratic leaders were criticized for their submission to some external power, to Kleomenes or even to Xerxes.⁸⁰

Whichever Argives accepted Spartan domination, then, might have been maligned in this way by their opponents. Lewis points out that the persons described

⁷⁶ Arist. *Pol.* V.2.8, 1303a.8.

⁷⁷ Arist. *Pol.* II.7.3, 1272a.1-3: γεωργοῦσί τε γὰρ τοῖς μὲν οἱ εἴλωτες τοῖς δὲ Κρησὶν οἱ περίοικοι.

⁷⁸ Arist. *Pol.* II.7.4, 1272a.18f.

⁷⁹ Andrewes, 1990, 174, although concluding that the 'Cretan *perioikoi* may be left where Aristotle put them, in the same category as the Spartan helots', rejects the similar identification of the Argive *perioikoi*': cf. 173.

⁸⁰ Forrest, 1960, 222.

by Herodotus as slaves were ‘more probably members of perioecic communities’,⁸¹ and this is, in fact, the most straightforward interpretation of the evidence. Aristotle says that ‘they were forced to receive certain of the *perioikoi*’.⁸² It remains, however, to determine which particular members of these communities were selected.

Forrest interprets Aristotle to mean that ‘Argos became more democratic’, but has to admit that τῶν περιούκων τινός is ambiguous.⁸³ Plutarch, however, clarifies the issue when he says that they were τῶν περιούκων τοὺς ἀρίστους, ‘the aristocrats among the *perioikoi*’.⁸⁴ O’Neil, unconvinced, doubts Plutarch’s source, Sokrates of Argos, claiming that either Sokrates or Plutarch has misunderstood Aristotle, whom he assumes to be Sokrates’ source.⁸⁵ As O’Neil points out, in the relevant passage Aristotle is meant to illustrate how an increase or decrease in the numbers of wealthy or of poor can change a constitution.⁸⁶ Assuming, like Forrest, that the change was *towards* rather than *away from* democracy, however, O’Neil argues that Plutarch’s ‘best of the *perioikoi*’ would not suit Aristotle’s purpose.⁸⁷

In the passage in question Aristotle gives three examples of how a change in the proportion of citizens can lead to constitutional change. The first occurred at Taras, where the Iapygians defeated and killed so many of ‘the notables’ (οἱ γνώριμοι) that a change took place from *politeia*, by which Aristotle seems to mean a moderate form of oligarchy, to *demokratia*. The second is the report under discussion of events at Argos. The third occurred at Athens when, because of ‘the Lakonian war’, οἱ γνώριμοι had been depleted.⁸⁸ Aristotle then says that ‘this also happens in democracies’ (συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις), but gives no examples, and instead goes on to discuss other causes of constitutional change, such as the use of personal influence.⁸⁹

In Aristotle’s first example, Taras, the change is undoubtedly towards democracy, but from *politeia* rather than from aristocracy. In the third, Athens, the implication is that the democrats were strengthened, but perhaps he means that leaders such as Kleon were more extreme than Perikles, and so the democracy

⁸¹ Lewis, 1992, 101; cf. Andrewes, 1990, 174-77.

⁸² Arist. *Pol.* V.2.8, 1303a.8.

⁸³ Forrest, 1960, 222.

⁸⁴ Plut. *Mor.* 245F; Sokrates of Argos *FGrH* 310 F 6.

⁸⁵ O’Neil, 1981, 343.

⁸⁶ Arist. *Pol.* V.2.7f, 1302b.84-1303a.14.

⁸⁷ O’Neil, 1981, 343.

⁸⁸ Arist. *Pol.* V.2.8, 1303a.9-11.

⁸⁹ Arist. *Pol.* V.2.9, 1303a.15: τὰς ἐπιθείας.

became more radical. As Andrewes suggests, this is a reference ‘at most to a transition from one to another of Aristotle’s types of democracy (*Pol.* 1291^b30-1292^a38)’.⁹⁰ It is highly unlikely that Aristotle means to suggest that in Athens during the Peloponnesian War an incumbent aristocracy, because its numbers were diminished by some disaster, was overthrown and replaced by democracy. He does not say that in the case of Argos the change was *towards* democracy, and the context rather seems to imply that a relatively moderate constitution, such as the *politeia* of Taras or the pre-war Athenian democracy, was replaced by an extreme one of some kind. Aristotle’s aim in this passage, after all, is to explain the kinds of distortions that can occur in a constitution when a disproportion arises between the parts of the citizen body.⁹¹ He compares such a state to the body of an animal, which might be spoiled (φθείρεται) in such a way. In this passage, Aristotle appears to use the events in Argos after Sepeia as an example of how a moderate constitution might be replaced by an extreme one, in this case the rule of the elite among the Argives and their *perioikoi*.

Aristotle cannot be marshalled here, as O’Neil claims, to discredit the evidence of Plutarch,⁹² which suggests that the ‘better classes’ among the Argive *perioikoi* were co-opted into the aristocracy. A fragment attributed to Diodoros that could refer to Argos may shed further light on the matter.⁹³ Here the citizens, because of their hatred for the many, prefer to share freedom with their slaves than citizenship with the free. This passage could indicate that the Argive aristocrats had taken the initiative in sharing their political privileges with the ‘best’ of the *perioikoi*, in order to bolster their faction against the many. Forrest believes that the ‘the sons of the slain’, who later drove out the ‘slaves’ were Argive aristocrats.⁹⁴ They are more likely, however, to have been the sons of the *demos*, whose fathers were slaughtered at Sepeia, and their expulsion of the ‘slaves’ a democratic rather than an aristocratic restoration.

Forrest claims to have found an approximate parallel to the case of democratic leaders being ‘criticised for their submission to some external power’.

⁹⁰ Andrewes, 1990, 176.

⁹¹ cf. Andrewes, 1990, 176.

⁹² Plut. *Mor.* 245F; Sokrates of Argos *FGrH* 310 F 6: τῶν περιούκων τοὺς ἀρίστους.

⁹³ Diod. X.26: διὰ δὲ τὴν φιλοτιμίαν τοὺς δούλους ἠλευθέρωσαν, μᾶλλον βουλόμενοι τοῖς οἰκέταις μεταδοῦναι τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἢ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις τῆς πολιτείας; cf. Oldfather, C.H. (transl.), *Diodorus of Sicily* IV (Cambridge, Mass., 1956) 95, n.4.

⁹⁴ Forrest, 1960, 223.

This is when Dionysios, the Phokaian general, tells the Ionians gathered at Lade during the Ionian revolt that they might be free men or *douloi*.⁹⁵ Perhaps, as Rhodes suggests, when Herodotus uses the term *demokratia* ‘with reference to the Asiatic Greeks under Persian rule he seems to mean no more than constitutional government as opposed to tyranny.’⁹⁶ If so, Forrest would be right to find this parallel less than exact. Even if, on the other hand, the leaders actually were democrats, any regime that favoured submission to the Persians would surely have left itself open to the charge of favouring slavery, so the political persuasion of the Ionian leaders would be irrelevant. There are, moreover, in contrast to Forrest’s observation, a number of cases where aristocracy, rather than democracy, is compared to slavery.

This important point, which does not seem to have been raised in relation to Argos, is illustrated clearly by Dover in a discussion of the politics of Aeschylus’ *Eumenides*.⁹⁷ Dover says that ‘Ἄναρχία is the oligarch’s description of democracy (e.g. Plato, *Rep.* 558c), δουλεία, with which I take δεσποτούμενος βίος to be synonymous, the democrats’ description of oligarchy (e.g. Lys. ii. 56, Thuc. vi. 40. 2)’. The passage of Lysias cited by Dover is from the speech known as the *Funeral Oration*.⁹⁸ Lysias applauds the Athenians of the period of the Delian league, who ‘ruled the sea for seventy years, allowing their allies no factional strife, not tolerating that the many should be the slaves of the few, but compelling all to be equal’. In the passage from Thucydides that Dover cites, Athenagoras, the leader of the democrats in Syrakousai, has accused the party of Hermokrates of plotting to establish an oligarchy.⁹⁹ This city will not, he says, ‘having been terrified by your reports and having taken you as rulers, throw itself into voluntary slavery’.¹⁰⁰

The Argive *douloi* in Herodotus and the *douleia* of Dover’s examples are, of course, not entirely equivalent. In fifth-century Argos, it is likely to have been the former *perioikoi* and perhaps also the pro-Spartan members of the former Argive aristocracy, the deserters who had cooperated with Kleomenes at Sepeia, who were referred to as *douloi*. In the cases cited by Dover, on the other hand, the ‘slaves’ are

⁹⁵ Hdt. VI.11.1f: ἐλευθέροισι ἢ δούλοισι; Forrest, 1960, 223 and n.2.

⁹⁶ Rhodes, P.J., ‘Oligarchs in Athens’ in Brock, R. and Hodkinson, S. (eds), *Alternatives to Athens* (Oxford, 2000) 124f; Hdt. IV.137.2: δημοκρατέεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τυραννεύεσθαι; VI.43.3: τοὺς γὰρ τυράννους τῶν Ἴόνων καταπαύσας πάντας ὁ Μαροδόνιος δημοκρατίας κατίστα ἐς τὰς πόλεις.

⁹⁷ Dover, K.J., ‘The Political Aspect of Aeschylus’ *Eumenides*’ *JHS* 77 (1957) 233.

⁹⁸ οὐ τοῖς ὀλίγοις τοὺς πολλοὺς δουλεύειν ἀξιόσαντες.

⁹⁹ Thuc. VI.38.1-40.2.

¹⁰⁰ Thuc. VI.40.2: ἀυθαίρετον δουλείαν ἐπιβαλεῖται.

the commoners who would endure aristocratic rule. From the point of view of the incumbent Argive democrats for whom life under aristocracy was slavery and who were perhaps Herodotus' informants, nevertheless, the supporters of aristocracy and of compliance with the wishes of the Lakedaimonians might be derided as 'slaves'.¹⁰¹

After the *douloi* had been expelled from Argos, they occupied Tiryns.¹⁰² The choice of this perioikic city as a refuge and base for further activity can easily be explained. When Kleomenes had taken to the sea to invade Argive territory before the battle of Sepeia, c.494, he landed in 'the district of Tiryns and Nauplion', and the battle was fought close to Tiryns.¹⁰³ Here, it seems, Kleomenes could be sure of support, as perhaps among the local aristocracies of the other perioikic towns. Here, too, he seems to have received the Argive deserters. Those who had welcomed Kleomenes from the start and who constituted the regime that took power after his victory appear after their expulsion from Argos to have fled to the secure base from which they had started out and in which they might hope for further support from the Lakedaimonians. The *douloi* at Tiryns are likely to have been aristocratic exiles who had been deposed by the democrats, and some among the latter were perhaps literally the 'sons of the slain' democratic leaders who had fallen at Sepeia. The 'slaves' held out at Tiryns for some time and, urged on by a *mantis* from Arkadian Phigaleia, made a sustained attempt to regain possession of Argos.¹⁰⁴

In considering a date for the expulsion of the 'slaves' and their occupation of Tiryns, Forrest points out that this must have come before the 'revolt' of the *douloi* in Tiryns,¹⁰⁵ no later than the mid-60s, perhaps before 467 B.C. He concludes that we can choose any time from 490-c.467 B.C.¹⁰⁶ The 'sons' need not have been many years in taking action, however, so the expulsion might have come quite early in this period. As Lewis points out, furthermore, Sepeia might have been fought earlier than 494 B.C.¹⁰⁷ Lewis wisely assumes that by 480 and 479 B.C., when Tiryns fought on

¹⁰¹ cf. Thuc. V.27.2, 29.3; Diod. XII.75.2, 4; XIV.17.5f, where the Lakedaimonians are accused or suspected of wanting to enslave other Greeks.

¹⁰² Hdt. VI.83.1.

¹⁰³ Hdt. VI.76.2-77.1; cf. de Ste. Croix, 2004 (1976), 434, who argues unconvincingly that Kleomenes' purpose was to hinder any future Persian landing at Nauplion.

¹⁰⁴ Hdt. VI.83.2: οὗτος τοὺς δούλους ἀνέγνωσε ἐπιθέσθαι τοῖσι δεσπότησι. ἐκ τούτου δὴ πόλεμος σφί ἦν ἐπὶ χρόνον συχνόν, ἐς ὃ δὴ μόγις οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἐπεκράτησαν.

¹⁰⁵ Hdt. VI.83.2.

¹⁰⁶ Forrest, 1960, 225.

¹⁰⁷ Lewis, 1992, 101 and n.16.

the Greek side against Persia, the ‘slaves’ had already been expelled and fled to Tiryns and the Argive government of the ‘sons’ was ‘naturally hostile to Sparta’.¹⁰⁸

The ‘slaves’, however, might have been expelled still earlier. As Andrewes points out, ‘the counter-revolution [as he sees it] need not wait till the youngest of the Sepeia orphans was fully grown’,¹⁰⁹ and if ‘the slain’, as proposed above, were the leaders of the *demos*, then their sons might have been young men rather than boys when Sepeia was fought. Forrest reminds us that ‘at some time before 487, probably in the year of Marathon, the Argives refused to help Aigina in resisting an Athenian attempt to install a democracy there’.¹¹⁰ This makes it likely that Argos was democratic by 487 B.C., and that the sons of the democrats slain at Sepeia had regained their position by then. Before 490 B.C., moreover, the Argives had fined the Aiginetans and Sikyonians for helping Kleomenes at Sepeia.¹¹¹ If Kleomenes had indeed, as both Forrest and O’Neil seem to accept, created the conditions for the establishment of a new regime, it is highly unlikely that the same regime would then have fined those who had assisted him. It is far more likely that a restored democracy fined the Aiginetans and Sikyonians for their part in the imposition of an aristocracy upon Argos.¹¹² The aristocratic regime of the ‘slaves’ installed under Kleomenes’ auspices is likely to have been overthrown before 490 B.C.

Forrest places the overthrow of the (in his view) democratic regime established after Sepeia between c.470 and c.465 B.C., claiming that the aristocratic ‘Epigonoi’ brought it about. Those known as οἱ Ἐπίγονοι in legend are ‘the Afterborn’, ‘sons of the chiefs who fell in the first war against Thebes’.¹¹³ Despite the aristocratic flavour of this terminology, it would not have been beyond the Argive democrats to compare their own vengeance upon those who had profited from their

¹⁰⁸ Lewis, 1992, 106f.

¹⁰⁹ Andrewes, 1990, 178.

¹¹⁰ Hdt. VI.92.1f, cf. 88.1-91.2; Forrest, 1960, 225. Note that while the Argive state (τοῦ δημοσίου) sent no help, a force of a thousand led by the pentathlete Eurybates went of their own accord. It seems reasonable to assume that these were men of the aristocratic party who went to support οἱ παχέες, the men of substance, in Aigina against the *demos* (Hdt. VI.91.1, 92.3). It is not clear whether they were resident in Argos or elsewhere at the time.

¹¹¹ Hdt. VI.92.2; Forrest, 1960, 225.

¹¹² Pausanias says that the Argives and Sikyonians had sent help to the Messenians in the second Messenian war (IV.15.7: ἔτι δὲ ἐξ Ἄργου ἀφίκετο καὶ Σικυῶνος βοήθεια). Perhaps both the Aiginetans and Sikyonians had previously been allies of the Argives, and it was under the terms of this alliance that the Argives were entitled to fine them.

¹¹³ LSJ s.v. ἐπίγονος II.2.

fathers' executions at the hands of Kleomenes with that of the Argive sons who avenged the 'seven against Thebes'.

According to Forrest's view, the fifth-century Epigonoï, whose fathers had been massacred by the Lakedaimonians, would have reversed Argive policy in order to align themselves with Sparta and Kimon's Athens.¹¹⁴ It is more likely, however, that a few years after Sepeia the democratic Epigonoï would have reversed Argive policy in order to oppose, rather than to support, Sparta. There is no need, on the basis of the interpretation offered above, to propose any change of constitution at Argos during the 460s B.C. nor, indeed, at any time between the years immediately following Sepeia and the short-lived reaction that followed the Argive defeat at Mantinea in 418 B.C.¹¹⁵ Forrest supports his view by arguing that 'the collapse of democracy in Argos and the flight of Themistokles are in some way closely linked with each other.'¹¹⁶ Despite what he imagines, however, a joint Spartan-Athenian embassy might well have put enough pressure on Argos, even under a democracy, to make Themistokles' presence there too much of a risk. As Lewis concludes, 'Themistocles did not think he could rely on Argive resistance to the demand and fled from the Peloponnese (Thuc. I.135.2-136.1).'¹¹⁷

Forrest also argues from the dedication of the statues of the mythical Epigonoï seen by Pausanias at Delphi.¹¹⁸ His claim that only such aristocratic offerings would have been accepted by Delphi after the Persian Wars, however, does not hold up. If, as Pausanias reports, the statues of the Epigonoï, like those of their fathers, were dedicated by the Argives 'from the spoils of the victory of themselves and the allied Athenians over the Spartans at Oinoe in the Argolid', then the dedication is likely to have been made in the mid-450s B.C.¹¹⁹ At this time the Phokians, allies of the Athenians, and so at least friendly with the Argives, also Athenian allies, were in control of the sanctuary. The Athenians gained the alliance of Phokis in c.457 B.C., and not until after the five-year truce between Athens and Sparta in 451 B.C., probably in 448 B.C.,¹²⁰ did the Lakedaimonians fight the Sacred

¹¹⁴ Forrest, 1960, 225.

¹¹⁵ Thuc. V.81.2-82.2.

¹¹⁶ Forrest, 1960, 227.

¹¹⁷ Forrest, 1960, 227; Lewis, 1992, 107; cf. Tomlinson, 1972, 104.

¹¹⁸ Paus. X.10.4; Forrest, 1960, 227.

¹¹⁹ Paus. X.10.4; cf. Jeffery, 1965, 49.

¹²⁰ Wade-Gery, H.T., 'Thucydides the Son of Melesias' *JHS* 52 (1932) 227.

War in which they temporarily returned possession of the temple to the Delphians.¹²¹ A few years after their victory over the Lakedaimonians at Oinoe in 459 B.C., thus in the mid 450s B.C., when the Phokians had control of the sanctuary, the Argive democrats might well have dedicated a statue to celebrate that victory which, at the same time, evoked their overthrow of the aristocratic, pro-Spartan ‘*douloi*’ perhaps three decades earlier. There is no reason to believe that their co-allies with the Athenians against the Lakedaimonians, the Phokians, would have refused such a dedication.

Few would doubt that Argos was democratic by the mid-450s B.C., so the group of statues at Delphi, it should be noted, must have been dedicated by a democratic Argos. If the dedication of the mythical Epigonoï was meant to evoke the heroism of the sons of those slain in the massacre that followed Sepeia, then its dedication after the Argive and Athenian victory at Oinoe strongly suggests that both the slain and their sons were democrats.

Forrest claims that there was an aristocratic reaction in Argos between c.470 and c.465 B.C. He suggests c.468 B.C. as the most likely date, but by c.463 B.C. has the democrats back in power, praised by Aischylos.¹²² As to how this occurred, Forrest must speculate, since there is no evidence at all of a democratic or any other kind of revolution in Argos during this period. It seems, moreover, that Tiryns was recaptured only after ‘a long time’.¹²³ If those who fled there were really democrats, c.468 B.C., it is difficult to imagine how, after a period of peace, then revolution, exile and extended resistance, the fall of Tiryns (a defeat, in Forrest’s view, for the democrats) could be followed by a democratic revolution in Argos as soon as c.463 B.C. Aischylos’ praise of the ancient democracy of Argos, furthermore, does nothing to give the impression that it had recently been restored.

O’Neil, opposing Forrest’s claim that Themistokles used Argos as a base for democratic activities, unfortunately finds that ‘a longer period of Argive aristocratic government must be assumed’. He proposes that Argos was under aristocratic rule from c.481 until ‘the late sixties at the very earliest.’¹²⁴ This means, however, that he must claim that Themistokles’ friends in Argos were aristocrats, and that

¹²¹ Thuc. I.108.3, 112.5.

¹²² Aisch. *Suppliants* 605-624; Forrest, 1960, 225, 232, 240.

¹²³ Hdt. VI.83.2: ἐπὶ χρόνον συχρόν; O’Neil, 1981, 341.

¹²⁴ O’Neil, 1981, 341f.

Themistokles himself was not necessarily ‘a staunch democrat’. He must have it, furthermore, that the Lakedaimonians had supported a democratic regime of ‘slaves’, and that the exiled Argive democrats at Tiryns had attacked an aristocratic Argos in order to help Sparta.¹²⁵ While O’Neil makes some valid criticisms of Forrest’s arguments, his reversal of political norms is unnecessary. It is more reasonable to accept that Argos, apart from two brief interludes, both of which followed defeat by the Lakedaimonians, at Sepeia c.494 B.C. and at Mantinea in 418 B.C., remained a democracy throughout almost the whole of the fifth century B.C.¹²⁶

Tomlinson indicates that ‘the square building in the agora at Argos’ constructed in the late fifth century B.C. could be a *bouleuterion*, and that this may indicate that the democracy was established then. He finds, however, that ‘Herodotus, VII, 148 proves the existence of a bouleuterion in Argos as early as 481.’¹²⁷ Tomlinson also points to the existence in Argos of ‘the eighty’, who were entrusted with the administration of the oaths made in the treaty between Argos, Athens, Mantinea and Elis in 420 B.C.¹²⁸ This council, he speculates, is likely to have been a traditional one, like the Areiopagos at Athens or the Gerousia in Sparta, and to have retained religious functions ‘after the establishment of the more democratic council’.¹²⁹ If the βουλευτήριον in which the Argive messengers returning from Delphi before Xerxes’ invasion appeared was indeed the same as that which housed the *boule* to whom Thucydides has the eighty administering the oath in 420 B.C., however, then we may be even less inclined to accept O’Neil’s reconstruction.

The Absence of the Argives from Dipaia

Since it is highly unlikely that the Argive constitution was anything other than democratic during the 460s B.C., another explanation must be sought for the absence of the Argives from the battlefield of Dipaia. Forrest’s view that they were absent for political reasons is disputed by Adshead, who explains the failure of the Argives to appear with the likelihood that they had ‘concentrated solely on the

¹²⁵ O’Neil, 1981, 344f.

¹²⁶ cf. Greenidge, A.H.J., *A Handbook of Greek Constitutional History* (Buffalo, 2001, [1st edn, London, 1911]) 215f.

¹²⁷ Tomlinson, 1972, 195.

¹²⁸ Thuc. V.47.9: ἐξορκούντων δὲ οἱ ὀγδοήκοντα.

¹²⁹ Tomlinson, 1972, 196.

reduction of Mycenae'.¹³⁰ It seems possible that they were compelled to do so by the action of the Corinthians and other Lakedaimonian allies in the north-east Peloponnese in supporting Mykenai at Sparta's time of peril following the Messenian revolt. As Lewis remarks, 'it would be surprising if ...[Korinth]...had not made even a token gesture to help Sparta.'¹³¹ If so, however, the fall of Mykenai must have come at a time when the Corinthians were absent, because Diodoros reports that after a vigorous resistance the Mykenaians were taken by storm 'since the Lakedaimonians were unable to help because of their own wars and the misfortunes arising for them from the earthquake, and there were no other allies'.¹³²

Diodoros places the beginning of this campaign in the year after that in which he places the earthquake at Sparta, so it seems that in the years following the earthquake the Argives were occupied with overcoming the vigorous resistance of the Mykenaians, who held out for some time.¹³³ The Lakedaimonians, on the other hand, were unable to assist the forces at Mykenai because they faced two separate problems: the difficulties that resulted from the earthquake, which presumably means those associated with the Messenian revolt; and τὸς ἰδίους πολέμους, apparently including the battle of Dipaia.¹³⁴

Lewis rejects the 'recent consensus' that places the battle of Dipaia after 465 B.C., when the Lakedaimonians had reduced numbers.¹³⁵ He argues that since Dipaia is in the valley of the Helisson,¹³⁶ 'far to the north of any likely movement between Laconia and Messenia', it only makes sense if the Spartans were on the offensive 'and on a route to or back from Mantinea which will avoid Tegea.' The Lakedaimonians, however, need not have been on the offensive in any direct sense. If the route between Mantinea and Lakedaimonian territory was in the hands of an Arkadian league headed by Tegea, then Mantineian aid for the Spartans during the Messenian revolt provides a clear context for this battle. It is likely to have been

¹³⁰ Adshhead, 1986, 100. Adshhead's chronology, however, is not convincing. She accepts for example, Hammond's date for the Messenian revolt, 469/8 B.C.: 127, n.390; cf. Tomlinson, 1972, 104-09, who places Dipaia before the earthquake.

¹³¹ Lewis, 1992, 110; cf. Salmon, J.B., *Wealthy Corinth: A History of the City to 338 B.C.* (Oxford, 1984) 259f, n.12.

¹³² Diod. XI.65.4: ἄλλων δ' οὐκ ὄντων συμμάχων

¹³³ Diod. XI.65.1, cf. 63.1; cf. Tomlinson, 1972, 106ff.

¹³⁴ Diod. XI.65.4.

¹³⁵ Lewis, 1992, 105; cf. Andrewes, 1952; Forrest, 1960.

¹³⁶ Paus. VIII.30.1.

fought to enable the Mantineians, and perhaps other northern allies of the Lakedaimonians, to march to Messenia.

The Lakedaimonians appear to have been heavily outnumbered on this occasion,¹³⁷ but if their appearance in northern Arkadia was sudden, a relatively small Lakedaimonian force, spared temporarily from the siege of Ithome, might have been able to defeat the Arkadians. Perhaps, although few, they were not as greatly outnumbered as Isokrates suggests, since a part of the Tegean forces appears to have been assisting the Argives at Mykenai.¹³⁸ The Argive absence from Dipaia is easily explained by a preoccupation with Mykenai, and by the likely nature of the Lakedaimonian campaign. We can conclude that a democratic Argos remained hostile to the Lakedaimonians from before the invasion of Xerxes until 451 B.C., despite the Argive absence from Dipaia.

The Argives appear to have sided with the Messenians in the rebellion against Sparta known to us as the second Messenian War. The battle of Hysiai might have come about because of 'a Lakedaimonian intervention in a late Archaic Argive stasis'.¹³⁹ At Sepeia c.494 B.C., it appears, the Lakedaimonians intervened on behalf of the aristocrats of both Argos and the Argive perioikic communities, massacred the democrats and temporarily succeeded in establishing aristocratic government at Argos. Soon after, the Argives expelled their aristocratic party and restored democracy, but aristocratic resistance, centred on Tiryns, continued for many years afterwards. At Mykenai in the late 460s B.C., while the Lakedaimonians were pre-occupied with the earthquake revolt and a war in Arkadia, the Argive democrats seem to have extinguished the last vestige of pro-Spartan and aristocratic resistance. In this part of the late-Archaic and early-Classical Peloponnese, inter-state relations appear to have been determined by factional rivalry, and the Lakedaimonians to have acted as the champions of aristocratic government.

Factional Politics in Sparta during the Reign of Kleomenes

Herodotus has Aristagoras of Miletos, in attempting to gain their support for the Ionian revolt, question the wisdom of the Lakedaimonians in struggling against

¹³⁷ Isok. VI *Arch.* 99.

¹³⁸ Strabo VIII.6.19, p.377; Diod. XI.65.4.

¹³⁹ Shaw, 2003, 174.

the Messenians, Arkadians and Argives for poor and insignificant territories.¹⁴⁰ They indeed appear c.500 B.C. to have faced a Messenian revolt and the hostility of both the Argives and the bulk of the Arkadians. Beaten by the Argives at Hysiai around the beginning of the century,¹⁴¹ they then defeated them at Sepeia c.494 B.C., where they slaughtered the democrats and briefly imposed an aristocratic government upon Argos.¹⁴² When the Persians landed at Marathon in 490 B.C., the Spartans, it seems, were in the process of finally defeating the Messenians at Eira.¹⁴³

The policy and political relations of Kleomenes in the late-sixth and early-fifth centuries B.C. illustrate the nature of the factional conflicts that underlay relations between the Peloponnesian states during his reign.¹⁴⁴ Until his flight from Sparta in the late 490s B.C., the actions of Kleomenes were consistent and in accord with official Spartan policy: he favoured aristocracy over tyranny, and tyranny over democracy.¹⁴⁵ In around 510 B.C. the two kings, Kleomenes and Demaratos, led a Lakedaimonian army that expelled the Peisistratids from Athens.¹⁴⁶ In the factional struggles that followed, the Lakedaimonians supported the aristocratic party led by Isagoras against that of the people led by Kleisthenes, but were ejected from Athens.¹⁴⁷

In supporting aristocracy over both tyranny and democracy, the two kings appear to have been adhering to official Spartan policy.¹⁴⁸ We need not, however, follow Grundy in concluding that there were no parties in Sparta until the time of Lysandros. 'There was,' he claims, 'merely a national policy, followed by consent of

¹⁴⁰ Hdt. V.49.8; cf. Kelly, 1970, 974f; Cartledge, 1979, 152.

¹⁴¹ Paus. II.24.7.

¹⁴² Hdt. VI.75.3-84.1.

¹⁴³ Paus. IV.20.1ff; see above, 121-28, cf. 129-36. Cawkwell, *Mnemosyne* 1993, 511f, supports the view that the Spartans were unable to send a large force to Marathon because of a revolt in Messenia, but believes that this revolt began only in 490 B.C.

¹⁴⁴ Herodotus mentions only Kleomenes as general for this campaign, cf. Cartledge, 1979, 146, but there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of Pausanias (III.7.8) that he shared the command with Demaratos. For the dates of Kleomenes' reign, see How, W.W. and Wells, J., *A Commentary on Herodotus II* (Oxford, 1912) 348; cf. Dickens, 1912, 27; Cartledge, 1979, 144; Cawkwell, *Mnemosyne* 1993, 509, 514f.

¹⁴⁵ Hdt. V.92a.1; cf. Cawkwell, G.L., 'Sparta and her Allies in the Sixth Century' *CQ* 43 (1993) 371-73. Cawkwell, 373, says of the Spartan alliance of this period that 'in return for military service Sparta guaranteed landed aristocracies against the social changes inevitable with large urban populations led by demagogues.'

¹⁴⁶ Hdt. V.64.1-65.5; *Ath. Pol.* 19.1-6; Paus. III.4.2, 7.8.

¹⁴⁷ Hdt. V.66.1, 70.1f; 72.1-73.1; *Ath. Pol.* 20.1-3; cf. Cawkwell, *CQ*, 1993, 373; de Ste. Croix, 2004 (1976) 423.

¹⁴⁸ Dickins, 1912, 29.

the whole people.’¹⁴⁹ Such unanimity would be singular, indeed, for any Archaic or Classical Greek city-state. There does appear, nevertheless, to have been a dominant policy at any given period, changes in which may reflect the varying fortunes of different factions. Grundy maintains that Spartan policy was consistently non-interventionist, despite Kleomenes’ departures from it. Yet the expulsion of the tyrants from Athens appears to have been official policy, and the ephors neither prevented nor condemned further interventions in Athens and an invasion of Argos.¹⁵⁰ Kleomenes seems to have been the champion of the official policy of intervention in favour of aristocracy rather than the opponent of any supposed national, non-interventionist policy.¹⁵¹

After the ejection of the Lakedaimonians from Athens, Kleomenes and Demaratos led a Peloponnesian army as far as Eleusis, perhaps in order to install the exiled Isagoras as tyrant, but more likely to restore aristocratic government.¹⁵² The Corinthians, however, feeling that they were not acting justly, departed.¹⁵³ Cawkwell claims that ‘on the plain of Eleusis the Corinthians had jibbed at the mere slanderous suggestion of Isagoras being reinstalled in Athens as tyrant.’¹⁵⁴ If Kleomenes had actually gone to Athens to ‘restore the order he had established in 510’, however, as Cawkwell also says, then something else must have been worrying the Corinthians.¹⁵⁵ Cawkwell says that the Spartan alliance guaranteed the allies ‘autonomy within the ancestral constitution’, but the ancestral constitution of the Corinthians was that of the Bacchiads, which they are unlikely to have wished to see reintroduced in 506 B.C. They must have concluded that if the Lakedaimonians could impose a traditional aristocratic constitution upon the Athenians, who appeared so resolutely opposed to it, they might be next.

When Demaratos agreed with the sentiment of the Corinthians, the remaining allies left, Kleomenes had to give up the campaign, and the popular faction of Kleisthenes was left unmolested.¹⁵⁶ Demaratos is likely to have agreed with the Corinthians on the injustice of such an action, and thus to have thwarted the policy of

¹⁴⁹ Grundy, G., ‘The Policy of Sparta’ *JHS* 32 (1912) 262.

¹⁵⁰ cf. Grundy, 1912, 267f; *contra* Cawkwell, *Mnemosyne*, 1993, 523-27.

¹⁵¹ de Ste. Croix, 2004 (1976), 424, points out that ‘Herodotus...throughout Cleomenes’ reign almost always speaks of Spartan foreign policy as if it were decided by Cleomenes’.

¹⁵² Cawkwell, *CQ*, 1993, 367; *contra* Cartledge, 1979, 146.

¹⁵³ Hdt. V.75.1: οὐ ποιοῖεν τὰ δίκαια.

¹⁵⁴ Cawkwell, *CQ*, 1993, 374.

¹⁵⁵ Cawkwell, *CQ*, 1993, 367.

¹⁵⁶ Hdt. V.75.1, 76.1; Paus. III.4.2.

the dominant and aggressively interventionist aristocratic party of which Kleomenes was an instrument, if not a leader. Kleomenes' resentment of Demaratos was unrelenting.¹⁵⁷ Foiled in this attempt to impose on Athens either an aristocratic government or the tyranny of an aristocratic leader, Kleomenes then supported a move to reinstate the Peisistratids in power, but the opposition of the allies, again led by the Corinthians, saved the popular regime established by Kleisthenes.¹⁵⁸

The opposition of Demaratos to the schemes of Kleomenes reveals that factional struggles were a feature of political life in Sparta during this period. As How and Wells observe, 'the great invasion can hardly have been a private venture of a single king.'¹⁵⁹ The destination of a Peloponnesian army cannot have been a secret, but the purpose of placing the faction of Isagoras in power might well have been. Demaratos must have been aware of this, but perhaps was finally moved to actively oppose the official line when he witnessed the strength of the popular movement in Athens and the opposition of the Corinthians. In this Demaratos appears to have opposed the official policy and not, as Dickins claims, to have been 'stirred up' by the ephors.¹⁶⁰

Kleomenes then invaded Argos in order, as argued above, to install aristocratic government there.¹⁶¹ Because of legislation introduced after the abortive invasion of Attica, it was now mandatory to send but one Lakedaimonian king to command any expedition.¹⁶² Kleomenes was free to carry out the official interventionist policy without hindrance from Demaratos. Here again we see evidence of factionalism among the Spartans. Having defeated and slaughtered the popular faction among the Argives, Kleomenes made the appropriate constitutional arrangement at Argos, but not until he had sent the bulk of his army home, retaining only a thousand of τοὺς ἀριστέας who, as argued above, were likely to have been the aristocrats among them.¹⁶³ This suggests that Kleomenes was not certain that the constitutional changes that he encouraged at Argos would have the support of ordinary Spartans.

¹⁵⁷ Hdt. VI.64.1.

¹⁵⁸ Hdt. V.91.1-94.1. Cartledge, 1979, 147f, says that the Spartans supported oligarchies of birth or wealth, but perhaps they found oligarchies of wealth tolerable rather than preferable.

¹⁵⁹ How and Wells, 1912, 349.

¹⁶⁰ Dickins, 1912, 30.

¹⁶¹ Hdt. VI.76.1-83.2; see above, 318-29. This is unlikely to have been, as Pausanias (III.4.1) says, at the beginning of Kleomenes' reign: How and Wells, 1912, 352f.

¹⁶² Hdt. V.75.2.

¹⁶³ Hdt. VI.81.1.

On his return from Argos, Kleomenes' enemies (οἱ ἐχθροί) brought him before the ephors to answer a charge of having been bribed not to capture Argos, but his reply shows that the ephors approved of the measures that he had enacted there. At the Argive Heraion, he had witnessed a flame shooting from the image of Hera, but not from its head. This occurrence, Kleomenes claimed, revealed to him that he would not take the city of Argos and that he had already fulfilled the oracle of 'the god', Apollo at Delphi.¹⁶⁴ The head of Hera might have indicated the nobility as much as the city, and the story told by Kleomenes seems to have provided a political rationale embodied in a religious justification for his actions in refraining from the capture of the *asty*. The ephors found his explanation both believable and reasonable (πιστά τε καὶ οἰκότα), and he was easily acquitted.¹⁶⁵

Apart from Demaratos' facilitation of the survival of the party of Kleisthenes by ensuring the withdrawal of the Peloponnesian army from Eleusis, some further pieces of evidence appear to support the belief that he belonged to a less militant party than that of Kleomenes and the ephors of the time. As Cawkwell puts it, 'the revolt was against Cleomenes, not Sparta.'¹⁶⁶ While Kleomenes was away in Aigina, says Herodotus, Demaratos slandered him.¹⁶⁷ Pausanias adds that the slander was directed 'to the Lakedaimonian masses'.¹⁶⁸ On returning to Sparta, however, Kleomenes succeeded in having Demaratos deposed, and some time afterwards the latter went into exile.¹⁶⁹

Kleomenes' first move after deposing Demaratos was to complete the business in Aigina, with the support of the new king Leotychides, that he had been unable to conduct without the agreement of Demaratos.¹⁷⁰ Although Herodotus says that Demaratos slandered Kleomenes not because he was distressed for the Aiginetans against whom Kleomenes was acting, but out of ill-will and malice,¹⁷¹ it

¹⁶⁴ Hdt. VI.82.1f, cf. 80.1. As Dickins, 1912, 31 points out, Kleomenes' defence is 'ridiculous', since he had already disbanded his army. We need not assume, however, that Kleomenes had attempted to capture Argos and failed, or that 'the ephors were unscrupulous in dealing with Cleomenes.' More likely, the moderate party of Demaratos prosecuted Kleomenes before the ephors, the majority of whom, nevertheless, supported the policy that Kleomenes had carried out. It is unlikely, too, as Grundy claims, that the official Spartan policy was one that Kleomenes attempted but failed to carry out, the obliteration of Argos.

¹⁶⁵ Hdt. VI.82.2.

¹⁶⁶ Cawkwell, 1979, 374.

¹⁶⁷ Hdt. VI.61.1: διέβαλε.

¹⁶⁸ Paus. III.4.3: διέβαλλον αὐτὸν ἐς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τὸ πλῆθος.

¹⁶⁹ Hdt. VI.65.1-71.1; Paus. III.4.3-5.

¹⁷⁰ Hdt. VI.73.1, cf. 50.1f; see below, 338f.

¹⁷¹ Hdt. VI.61.1: φθόνῳ καὶ ἄγῃ χρεώμενος.

seems more likely that it was because he opposed Kleomenes' aggressively pro-aristocratic foreign policy.¹⁷² Herodotus reports that Demaratos was so-named because the whole people (πανδημεί) had prayed that the highly popular king Ariston might have a son.¹⁷³ Perhaps this Lakedaimonian king was raised to hold the support of the people in high regard, and so opposed the establishment of Isagoras in power at Athens against the overwhelming will of the Athenians.¹⁷⁴ Kleomenes was so determined to replace Demaratos with his more agreeable cousin Leotychides that he took the risk of conspiring to pervert the response of Apollo at Delphi, for which he later paid dearly.¹⁷⁵

Despite the loss of Demaratos, the party opposed to Kleomenes' policy apparently continued to put pressure on him, succeeding in exposing his conspiracy to falsify the oracle from Delphi that had been used to justify the deposition of Demaratos. In fear, Kleomenes fled to Thessaly, but seems thereafter to have taken measures to secure his return to power in Sparta, perhaps out of 'political opportunism'.¹⁷⁶ Dickins' claim that Kleomenes 'tampered with the helots' is unfounded.¹⁷⁷ While the evidence introduced by Dickins indicates that there is likely to have been a *Messenian* revolt, i.e. a revolt of the Messenian *perioikoi*,¹⁷⁸ during Kleomenes' reign, there is no mention of any Helots, and we need not conclude that Kleomenes suddenly became an extreme populist.¹⁷⁹ His organization of an Arkadian league to oppose the Lakedaimonians secured Kleomenes' recall, but he was soon placed in bonds and finally either suicided or was murdered by the authorities.¹⁸⁰ This appears to have happened not long before Marathon.

¹⁷² How and Wells, 1912, 348.

¹⁷³ Hdt. VI.63.3.

¹⁷⁴ The names of the Eurypontid kings of this period may indeed indicate, as Dickins, 1912, 30, claims, that they were 'more democratic' than the Agiads.

¹⁷⁵ Hdt. VI.66.1-3; 74.1.

¹⁷⁶ Cartledge, 1979, 153.

¹⁷⁷ Dickins, 1912, 31. Cartledge, 1979, 153f. is non-committal, while de Ste. Croix, 2004 (1976), 436, appears to believe that this is possible.

¹⁷⁸ For this view of Messenian identity, see above, 206f, n.175.

¹⁷⁹ cf. Grundy, 1912, 264, 266f, who denies even a *Messenian* revolt in the 490s B.C. His point, however, is well-made: Dickins' conclusion that the 'royalist' policy was to enfranchise the Helots is logically dependent on the assumption that Kleomenes 'tampered' with them, as Dickins himself admits: Dickins, G., 'The Growth of Spartan Policy – a Reply' *JHS* 33 (1913) 111.

¹⁸⁰ Hdt. VI.74.1-75.3; Dickins, 1912, 32; Wallace, 1954, 35; Cartledge, 1979, 153.

The Popular Resistance to Sparta

Until his fall, Kleomenes seems to have been entrusted with the direction of foreign relations at Sparta. While Maiandrios of Samos, Aristagoras of Miletos, the Skythians and the Plataians all dealt directly with the king,¹⁸¹ the ephors appear to have taken control afterwards.¹⁸² This change, nevertheless, need not be seen as a victory of the ephors over the kings, as Dickins would have it, since the ephors of the time appear to have approved of Kleomenes' intervention in favour of aristocracy in both Athens and Argos.¹⁸³ It represents, rather, a change in Spartan policy, perhaps reflected in the election of less interventionist ephors and in measures taken to restrain the kings.

Significantly, the Peloponnese appears to have enjoyed a period of peace after the death of the aggressively interventionist Kleomenes. Although relations with Argos and the Arkadian league led by Tegea seem unfriendly, there is no record of actual fighting until the battle of Tegea, probably just before the earthquake of 465 B.C.¹⁸⁴ Perhaps it was in pursuit of a more moderate policy that the Lakedaimonians brought in the Eleian seer Teisamenos to share their military leadership with the two Heraklid kings.¹⁸⁵ Teisamenos' first victory for the Lakedaimonians was at Plataiai, and he is not mentioned in connection with Sepeia, so he might have arrived at Sparta soon after the death of Kleomenes.

The apparent change in Lakedaimonian policy can be explained by the threat from Persia, which must have made it clear to many Spartans that it was more important to refrain from antagonising other Greek states than it was to attempt to change their constitutions to suit the preferences of the aristocratic party in Sparta. The Persian threat may itself explain the success of Kleomenes' opponents in securing his downfall at this time. Kleomenes' flight from Sparta, recall and death occurred during the period when the Persians were conquering Thrake, not long before their landings on the islands and at Marathon.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸¹ Hdt. III.148.1f; V.49.1-51.3; VI.84.1-3, 108.2.

¹⁸² Hdt. IX.7.11; Thuc. I.87.1f, 131.2; VIII.12.1-3; Xen. *Hell.* III.1.1; V.2.9, 11; *Lak. Pol.* 11.2; How and Wells, 1912, 350.

¹⁸³ See above, 335; Dickins, 1912, 31.

¹⁸⁴ Hdt. IX.35.2; Paus. III.11.7; Thuc. I.101.2.

¹⁸⁵ Hdt. IX.33.1-5, 35.1f; Paus. III.11.5-8.

¹⁸⁶ Hdt. IV.89.1-93.1, 143.1-3; V.1.1-17.1; VI.99.1-102.1ff; cf. How and Wells, 1912, 351.

Against this view, it could be claimed that Kleomenes had pursued ‘a thoroughly “panhellenic”, anti-Persian policy’.¹⁸⁷ In doing so, however, he might simply have been continuing to follow the policy of the dominant faction at Sparta. Kleomenes and the Lakedaimonians in general, nevertheless, had not always been actively anti-Persian. Cartledge sympathises with the suggestion that the Spartans had removed Hippias from Athens because of his medism, and observes that after his expulsion the tyrant ‘duly went over to the Persians’.¹⁸⁸ If this were indeed the motive for the Lakedaimonian move against the Peisistratids, however, it would seem surprising that the Spartans later proposed to restore Hippias, even though he had openly medised by then.¹⁸⁹ De Ste. Croix argues that Herodotus doesn’t mention Kleomenes in connection with this decision, and Cawkwell claims that he was ‘not connected’ with it.¹⁹⁰ Herodotus does, however, record that it was made partly on the strength of some prophecies that Kleomenes had brought to Sparta from the Athenian akropolis, so he might yet have been responsible for the proposal.¹⁹¹

A few years after the deposition of Hippias, Aristagoras of Miletos was unsuccessful in lobbying Kleomenes in the hope of gaining Lakedaimonian support for an Ionian revolt against Persia.¹⁹² By the late 490s B.C., nevertheless, there are definite signs of an anti-Persian stance on the part of the Lakedaimonians. When, soon after the destruction of the fleet of Mardonios at Mt. Athos, Dareios sent heralds around Greece to demand earth and water,¹⁹³ the Aiginetans were among those who complied. Accordingly, Kleomenes was sent to Aigina to arrest τὸς αἰτιωτάτους,¹⁹⁴ perhaps on the grounds that by submitting to the Persians they had broken oaths of allegiance to the Lakedaimonians. Acting upon the advice of Demaratos, however, the Aiginetans refused to hand them over on the grounds that if

¹⁸⁷ Cartledge, 1979, 199; cf. de Ste. Croix, 2004 (1976), 430, who finds Kleomenes ‘a really great (if ruthless) man’, most of whose actions can be explained by ‘a very real understanding of the grave threat to Greece from Persia’; Cawkwell, *Mnemosyne*, 1993, 414.

¹⁸⁸ Hdt. V.65.3, 91.1; VI.107.1-108.1; Cartledge, 1979, 146; cf. de Ste. Croix, 2004 (1976), 431f.

¹⁸⁹ Hdt. V.90.1-92.1. Cawkwell, *Mnemosyne*, 1993, 516, concludes that ‘the evidence affords no justification for holding that it was Hippias’ attitude to Persia that provoked Spartan intervention’.

¹⁹⁰ de Ste. Croix, 2004 (1976), 424; Cawkwell, *Mnemosyne* 1993, 527.

¹⁹¹ Hdt. V.90.2. Some, such as Cawkwell, *Mnemosyne*, 1993, 516, might object that it was the discovery that the Delphic oracles that had originally urged the Lakedaimonians to remove Hippias were false that brought about the move to restore him. If so, then one would also have to accept that it was these same Delphic oracles, rather than Hippias’ supposed medism, that had led to his deposition.

¹⁹² Hdt. V.49.1-51.3.

¹⁹³ Hdt. VI.48.1; cf. 44.1-3, 46.1. The likely date of the Persian demands is 492/1 B.C.: Cawkwell, *Mnemosyne*, 1993, 513.

¹⁹⁴ Hdt. V.50.1.

Kleomenes actually had authority from the Spartans, then the other king would have been present too.¹⁹⁵ Demaratos appears to have opposed this intervention in Aigina, and only by securing his deposition could Kleomenes proceed against the Aiginetans.¹⁹⁶

Many of the mainland and all of the island Greek states that the Persians had approached submitted,¹⁹⁷ but the Lakedaimonians appear to have taken measures against the Aiginetans alone. This might have been because they alone of those who had submitted were Lakedaimonian allies, but it was also perhaps because the Athenians had complained about them.¹⁹⁸ This, along with the report that those most responsible were handed over to the Athenians,¹⁹⁹ tends to indicate that the Lakedaimonians were by then keen to secure the alliance of Athens against the Persians, regardless of past conflicts. Perhaps more remarkably, it was Kleomenes himself, acting as the instrument of the Spartan state, who handed over the Aiginetans. Demaratos was deposed c.491 B.C., and the first attempt at intervention in Aigina cannot have occurred much earlier.²⁰⁰ The episode of Aigina illustrates that by the very late 490s B.C. Spartan policy was actively anti-Persian, and that in pursuit of that policy the Spartans sought a rapprochement with Athens.

Demaratos, on the other hand, appears to have been sympathetic towards and in contact with the Aiginetans who had submitted to Persia. As Cartledge puts it, furthermore, ‘not even Herodotus could turn a blind eye to Demaratos’ subsequent, unambiguous medism.’²⁰¹ It is not inconceivable that Demaratos, who appears to have sided with the popular opposition in Sparta, might have looked forward to a Persian overlordship of Greece.²⁰² Some Greek populists of the period might have seen a token ‘slavery’ to the Great King as preferable to actual hardship under the rule of a self-serving aristocracy. The Argive democracy later willingly attempted to support Mardonios by preventing the Lakedaimonians from taking the preferred

¹⁹⁵ Hdt. VI.50.2f. Cawkwell, *Mnemosyne*, 1993, 513f, believes that Kleomenes acted on his own initiative in demanding that the responsible Aiginetans be handed over, but there is no need to assume that he did not have the ‘approval of the state’, or that he left for Thessaly as a consequence of official displeasure concerning his actions in Aigina.

¹⁹⁶ Hdt. VI.51.1, 61.1-67.1, 73.1f.

¹⁹⁷ Hdt. VI.49.1.

¹⁹⁸ Hdt. VI.49.2.

¹⁹⁹ Hdt. VI.73.2.

²⁰⁰ Parke, H.W., ‘The Deposing of Spartan Kings’ *CQ* 39 (1945) 108; Cartledge, 1979, 143, 199.

²⁰¹ Cartledge, 1979, 199.

²⁰² *contra* Cawkwell, *Mnemosyne*, 1993, 518.

route north before the battle of Plataiai,²⁰³ and we need not doubt that the Messenians, and perhaps many of the Helots too, would have welcomed him.²⁰⁴ In the late 490s B.C., the Persians appear to have made a bid for the support of the popular cause in Greece, since ‘Mardonios deposed all of the Ionian tyrants and established democracies in the cities’.²⁰⁵

There is no contradiction in Kleomenes’ willingness to act as the instrument of both the aristocratic party and anti-Persian policy, particularly when the Persians might have deliberately posed as champions of the popular cause. We need to keep in mind, nevertheless, that while the anti-Persian policy of Kleomenes and the dominant faction at Sparta can be securely dated no earlier than the time of Dareios’ demand for earth and water from the Greek states in the last years of the 490s B.C., the pro-aristocratic policy can be traced at least as far back as 510 B.C., when the Lakedaimonians attempted to impose an aristocracy upon the Athenians.

Despite his compliance with the anti-Persian policy, Kleomenes was himself disgraced and perhaps murdered c.491 B.C.²⁰⁶ Although the revelation that he had corrupted the Delphic oracle in order to oppose Demaratos precipitated Kleomenes’ fall,²⁰⁷ it may also be that he did not survive because he was no longer in step with official Spartan policy, which, owing to the annual election of the ephors, was capable of considerable flexibility. Kleomenes had been the exponent of the politics of confrontation, the consequences of which had once driven the Athenians to conclude an alliance with Persia.²⁰⁸ Although the relationship with Athens had, out of mutual necessity, been patched up, his attempt to intervene in Argos had backfired. Rather than producing a compliant Argos under the rule of a long-lived aristocracy dependent on Lakedaimonian support, Kleomenes’ actions had driven the Argives into a position so uncompromisingly anti-Spartan that they preferred to

²⁰³ See above, 316f.

²⁰⁴ For the belief that these were distinct categories, see above, 206f, n.175. Cawkwell, *Mnemosyne*, 1993, 511f, believes that if there was a Helot revolt (as he sees it) in 490 B.C., ‘it was presumably occasioned by the coming of the Persians and had nothing whatever to do with Cleomenes in Arcadia’.

²⁰⁵ Hdt. VI.43.4: τοὺς γὰρ τυράννους τῶν Ἰώνων καταπαύσας πάντας ὁ Μαρδόνιος δημοκρατίας κατίστα ἐς τὰς πόλεις. While it is possible that these were not actual democracies, they are unlikely to have been aristocracies, or we would expect Herodotus to have described them as such: cf. Rhodes, 2000, 124ff.

²⁰⁶ For this date see Cawkwell, *Mnemosyne*, 1993, 511f.

²⁰⁷ Hdt. VI.74.1, 66.1-3.

²⁰⁸ Hdt. V.73.1. For a discussion of the possibility that Kleisthenes took part in the embassy that came to an agreement with the Persians see Horsley, G.H.R., ‘Kleisthenes and the Abortive Athenian Embassy to Sardis’ *Museum Philologum Londiniense* 7 (1986) 99-107.

cooperate with the Persians than to see Greece remain ‘free’ under Spartan leadership. If the Spartans wanted to maximise support among the Greeks for the war against Persia, Kleomenes and the aggressively interventionist policy that he had come to personify would have to go.

At the same time, it might have been seen as highly dangerous for the Lakedaimonians to attempt to intervene in the internal affairs of other states. Their territory was bordered on by potentially hostile neighbours, Argos to the north-east, Tegea’s Arkadian league to the north and a recently subdued Messenia, ready to revolt again at the first opportunity, to the west.²⁰⁹ The aggressively interventionist policy promoted by Kleomenes, it seems, was abandoned for the time being, and the more moderate party held sway. This appears to have remained the case up until at least the fall of Pausanias, who had promoted an aggressive foreign policy, c.470.²¹⁰

Despite the calm that followed the death of Kleomenes, relations with the Tegean-led Arkadian league remained unfriendly up until the end of the 480s B.C., and there is no sign of rapprochement with Argos. Had the Persians under Xerxes succeeded in reaching the Peloponnese in 480 and 479 B.C., it is likely that they would have found no shortage of sympathisers, not least among the Argives, Arkadians and Messenians, and one might even speculate that they invaded Greece at that time partly because the Peloponnese was so divided.²¹¹ Although the Tegeans fought beside the Lakedaimonians at Plataiai,²¹² Tegea seems to have been hostile in the 470s B.C. when the Lakedaimonian king Leotychides went into exile there.²¹³ The Lakedaimonians defeated the Tegeans and their Argive allies in the battle of Tegea, probably not long before the earthquake of 465 B.C.²¹⁴ This battle was perhaps fought less, it seems, to check a ‘rising tide of democracy and anti-Dorianism’²¹⁵ than because of a return, at an unpredictably inopportune moment, to an aggressive policy in Sparta.²¹⁶

²⁰⁹ There is no need to introduce a Helot threat to explain Spartan reticence in this period, as do Dickins, 1912, 32; Grundy, 1912, 262-7, 9; Cartledge, 1979, 154; cf. Cawkwell, *CQ*, 1993, 369.

²¹⁰ Dickins, 1912, 33ff.

²¹¹ On pro-Persian feeling in the Peloponnese, see Huxley, G., ‘The Medism of Caryae’ *GRBS* 8 (1967) 29-32.

²¹² Hdt. IX.28.3, 56.1.

²¹³ Hdt. VI.72.2; Paus. III.8.9; Parke, 1945, 109.

²¹⁴ Hdt. IX.35.2; Thuc. I.101.2; Paus. III.11.7.

²¹⁵ Dickins, 1912, 35.

²¹⁶ The ‘*volte-face*’ of the ephors postulated by Dickins, 1912, 41, need not be explained as a reaction to the adoption of a peace policy by Archidamos, but rather shows that the Spartans now deemed it necessary to intervene, and so elected ephors who were prepared to do so. The kings, however, were

The revolt that followed the earthquake of 465 B.C., involving two important Messenian perioikic communities,²¹⁷ left Sparta vulnerable to attack. Despite this, resistance at Mykenai, which is likely to have been carried on by aristocratic forces from the various communities of the Argolid who had taken refuge there, possibly aided by the Corinthians and the Lakedaimonians' other allies in the north-east Peloponnese, kept the Argives preoccupied.²¹⁸ The engagement of the Argives at Mykenai enabled the Lakedaimonians to defeat the Tegeans and most of the other Arkadians at Dipaia in the late 460s B.C.²¹⁹ This victory, at least for the time being, kept communications open to the north, allowing assistance to arrive from Kimon's Athens and Mantinea, and perhaps also from other Lakedaimonian allies in the north-east Peloponnese.²²⁰ It did not result, however, in the restoration of the Spartan hegemony in the Peloponnese.

The Containment of the Lakedaimonians

Despite the likelihood that some details need reconsideration, Forrest's thesis that the Lakedaimonians faced 'a solid anti-Spartan bloc across the northern Peloponnese' that was in place from at least c.470 B.C. holds good.²²¹ Furthermore, his characterisation of these states as democratic seems accurate. Argos is very likely to have been a democracy. Although both the democracy and the adhesion of Mantinea to this bloc at any time during this period are in grave doubt, Tegea, at the head of an Arkadian league, seems to have been democratic. Despite the fact that they did not fight on either side, the Eleians also appear to have been democratic and disaffected with the Lakedaimonians.²²² Furthermore, as will now be argued, the Messenian rebels on Mt. Ithome demanded Sparta's attention until 456 B.C.

McNeal has shown that it is philologically sound to keep δεκάτῳ in the text of Thucydides I.103.1, as found in all of the manuscripts.²²³ Thucydides I.103.4 reads very comfortably after I.102.4. The use of δέ and καί in I.103.4 seems to indicate a

not subject to election and so could consistently follow the non-interventionist policy. After the earthquake revolt, there is no question of the ephors overthrowing 'the cautious policy', as Grundy, 1912, 269, suggests. Events overtook them.

²¹⁷ Thuc. I.101.2.

²¹⁸ Strabo VIII.6.19, p.377; Diod. IX.65.1-5.

²¹⁹ Hdt. IX.35.2 cf. Paus. III.11.7; Isok. VI *Arch.* 99.

²²⁰ Thuc. I.102.1; Xen. *Hell.* V.2.3; Diod. XI.64.2.

²²¹ Forrest, 1960, 229.

²²² See above, 221f.

²²³ McNeal, R.A., 'Historical Methods and Thucydides I.103.1.' *Historia* 19 (1970) 306-25; cf. Reece, D.W., 'The Battle of Tanagra' *JHS* 70 (1950) 76; Dickins, 1912, 36.

continuation of the information about alliances in I.102.4, so I.103.1-3 could have been inserted later, when Thucydides realised that he needed to explain why the Messenians were living in Naupaktos (perhaps when he wrote II.9.4). Thus I.103.1-3 completes the narrative begun in I.101.2, concerning the revolt. As Rood observes, ‘it is circular to emend “in the tenth year” on the grounds that the Pentekontaetia observes a linear chronology.’²²⁴ If Thucydides is correct, the Messenian revolt that began in 465 B.C. ended in the tenth year. If 465 B.C. were counted as the first year, as Thucydides meant, the revolt would then have ended in 456 B.C., some years after the alliance of Athens with Megara and Argos.

Thucydides says that the Athenians settled the Messenians at Naupaktos, ‘which they happened to have taken recently from its possessors, the Ozolian Lokrians.’ Badian argues unconvincingly that Thucydides is saying in I.103.3 that the Ozolian Lokrians had recently seized Naupaktos, *not* that Athens had recently seized it from them. He agrees, nevertheless, with the later date for the surrender of Ithome, and argues that Naupaktos was captured and settled by Tolmides during the *periplous* that followed the Tanagra campaign.²²⁵ There is no time at which Athens appears to have been at war with any of the Lokrians between the earthquake at Sparta and the alliance with Megara, so the most likely time for the capture and settlement of Naupaktos is after 459 B.C. When we add to this the account of Diodoros, who also places the capture and settlement in 456 B.C., during Tolmides’ *periplous*,²²⁶ and the testimony of Justin that the Spartans, having been ‘summoned back to the Messenian War’, restored the Theban hegemony in Boiotia,²²⁷ an event that took place during the Tanagra campaign of 459-8 B.C.,²²⁸ the case for an on-going revolt in Messenia seems strong.²²⁹

It is likely that from at least c.470 B.C. until no earlier than 453 B.C., the Eleians, Arkadians and Argives presented an unbroken barrier to their north that greatly inhibited the ability of the Lakedaimonians to extend their influence beyond their own territory. In addition, until 456 B.C., the Spartans faced a serious threat in

²²⁴ Rood, T., *Thucydides: Narrative and Explanation* (Oxford, 1998) 228 and n.10.

²²⁵ Badian, E., ‘Athens, the Lokrians and Naupactus’ *CQ* 40 (1990) 367, 368 and n.12.

²²⁶ Diod. XI.84.7-8.

²²⁷ Justin *Epitoma* III.6.10: revocati Lacedaemonii ad Messeniorum bellum...cum Thebanis paciscuntur, ut Boeotiorum imperium his restituerent; cf. Fornara, C.W. (ed), *Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War* (Baltimore, 1977) 73, no. 73.

²²⁸ Diod. XI.81.1-3.

²²⁹ cf. Hammond, N.G.L., *A History of Greece* (Oxford, 1967) 295; Lewis, 1992, 115, but see Salmon, 1984, 261 and n.19.

Messenia. Not surprisingly, considering his immediate purpose of showing the growth to power of Athens, Thucydides' record of what we call 'the first Peloponnesian War' is written entirely from an Athenian perspective. The events that he narrates, nevertheless, should be seen as part of a conflict that began earlier and was more widespread. We cannot assume, furthermore, that Sparta's troubles in the Peloponnese had abated by the time that Athens, having taken a turn towards a more complete democracy with the reforms of Ephialtes, and having ostracised the pro-Spartan Kimon, joined the democratic camp headed by Argos and Tegea.

In the light of these considerations, it is clear that the position of the Lakedaimonians in the Peloponnese remained insecure during the entire first half of the fifth century B.C. Only after the capture of Tegea c.453 B.C., followed by the swearing of peace with Argos in 451 B.C. and with Athens in 446 B.C., can they be said to have put an end to the troubles that had begun at least as early as the late-sixth century B.C. The Peloponnese of the first half of the fifth century B.C., rather than constituting a stable alliance under a fundamentally secure Spartan hegemony, was subject to violent political upheaval. As traditional aristocracies championed by the Spartan state sought to assert themselves against rising popular movements, no state can have remained invulnerable to internal political struggle. It is in this context that the conflicts in Eleia that culminated in the synoikism of 471 B.C. must be understood.

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