DISCRIMINATION AND RESISTANCE:
A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE AHMADIYYA SECT ISSUE IN INDONESIA

Andi Muhammad Irawan

A PhD Thesis submitted to the School of Arts
University of New England, Australia
in fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of New England
July 2016
DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to
my beloved parents, wife, daughter, brothers and my sister.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My ultimate thanks are due to Allah [God], the almighty, for his uncountable blessings and guidance in my life.

It would not have been possible to write this thesis without the help and support of numerous people. First of all, I would like to deliver my special thanks to my principal supervisor, Dr. Zifirdaus Adnan, who always believed in my work and provided me with intellectual support and sage advice. Secondly, my thanks also go to my co-supervisors, Prof. John S. Ryan and A/Prof. Habib Zafarullah, for their critical and valuable comments as well as their supervision. My supervisors have contributed much in terms of guidance, critiques, and suggestions, but I am fully responsible for any weaknesses, points, and conclusions made in this thesis. Thirdly, I would like to thank all the staff of the School of Arts; Prof. Alan Davidson (Head of School), Gillian Willis (School Manager), Joy Kirby, Jane Kelly, and Helena Davis for their administrative help and assistance.

I also want to thank my sponsors, the Directorate General of Higher Education of the Republic of Indonesia (Dikti) and the Government of South Sulawesi for their partial financial support, Dorothy and McKay Scholarship for providing me traveling scholarship for collecting data in Indonesia, and Higher Degree Research (HDR) Services for their flexibility to let me take study suspension.

I also warmly thank Bu Indrawati Zifirdaus, Pak Novi Prihananto, Pak Ahmad Dakhlan, and all the members of KIAA [Keluarga Indonesia Armidale Australia] in Armidale. Their help and kindness have made this beautiful small town like my second home.

I cannot end this section without warmly and deeply thanking my wife, Hasriani, and my daughter, Adibah. They had to endure long hours without me and, during this hard time, they have shown great patience. It was not an easy
time for us to live separately, on different continents. My special thanks also go to my parents, my brothers, and sister, whose prayers have favoured me throughout my life. They all have done their best to support me and provide me with a great life in this world.
ABSTRACT

This study investigates how the Ahmadiyya is presented discursively in various texts produced by Indonesian state official institutions, social interest groups, and two Ahmadiyya groups. The issue is examined by identifying the discourse topics created and strategies employed in the spoken and written texts of the groups and institutions mentioned above. The identification is centred upon an assumption that, on the one hand, the Ahmadiyya sect has been allegedly discriminated against through some negative discourse presentations, and that, on the other hand, the sect and its supporters may have argued against the negative presentations.

The main question of this study is what is the nature of the two groups of conflicting discourses created by state official institutions, social interest groups, and the two Ahmadiyya groups when addressing the Ahmadiyya sect issue? How and why were they produced? The main question is addressed by finding answers to some subsidiary questions. To answer the questions, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (especially the discriminatory and resistance discourse strategies) is used to examine discourse presentations of Ahmadiyya created in written texts, such as in articles, books, reports, and papers, as well as in spoken texts, such as in speeches, interviews, and personal statements found in television programs.

The first part of the study focuses on how state official institutions present the Ahmadiyya sect in their legal proclamations and personal arguments. The second part discusses how social interest groups that have considerable concern about the Ahmadiyya explore the issue. The third part targets how two Ahmadiyya groups (the JAI and the GAI) present themselves while arguing against discourses that may have discredited them.

The aim of the research project is to contribute to the body of knowledge about the Ahmadiyya issue in Indonesia and the field of CDA by investigating a
relatively new issue in the field, namely the religious minority issue. The research expands the possible applications of CDA approaches to the investigation of the alleged discriminatory discourse practices, and how these practices are responded to through several discourse presentations and strategies.

The findings reveal that the Ahmadiyya sect, especially *Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia* (the JAI), has been discursively discriminated against. The discursive discrimination is created by presenting the Ahmadiyya negatively as, for example, ‘the troublemaker’, ‘blasphemer/the actor of defamation’, ‘deviant sect’, ‘the Hijacker of Islam’, ‘the agent of imperialism’, and ‘the enemy of Islam’. These discourse topics are created using discourse strategies such as problematisation, collocation, quotation, lexicalisation, scapegoating, metaphor, social distancing, and scare tactics.

In order to argue against the negative presentations, the Ahmadiyya groups and their supporters create defensive and offensive resistance discourses. The defensive discourses are ‘discourse of democracy’, ‘discourse of unrestricted freedom of religion’, ‘discourse of impartiality’, ‘discourse of victims’, ‘defenders of Islam’, ‘public deception’, and the ‘discourse of peace’ and these are reacted by both the JAI and the GAI. The offensive discourses are ‘discourse of public deception’, ‘government’s negative actions’, and ‘problematising the government’s authority or legitimacy’. These discourses are created using the strategies of nominalisation, re-contextualisation, contrasting, derogated personification, victimisation, positive attribution, positive personification, power delegitimising, negative portraits of misbehaving, and the strategy of social inclusion.

In conclusion, both the dominant and the Ahmadiyya groups have been involved in a serious discourse conflict. Each side is entrenched in their respective positions, and adopted strategies to maintain their positions, defend themselves, and at times, attack each other. However, this is not healthy for a peaceful co-existence and living peacefully, because it (the discourse conflict)
could lead to further physical attacks as happened in the past. It would be beneficial for both sides and for the nation as a whole, that both sides reflect on and reconsider their positions and search for a common ground. This study could contribute as a source for the reflection and consideration.
LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1. *Fatwas* addressing Ahmadiyya in Indonesia (Crouch, 2009) ……… 81

Table 3.2. Indonesia Governments’ Regulations addressing Ahmadiyya Issue in regional and local levels (Crouch, 2009)………………………………………………… 82

Table 4.1. The Interview Participants…………………………………………… 97

Table 6.1. The Number of Violent Acts against Ahmadiyya in some Provinces in Indonesia, starting from 2007 to 2012 (as documented by Setara Institute)……… 185
**LIST OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAKORPAKEM</td>
<td>Badan Koordinasi Pengawas Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat [The Coordinating Body to Monitor the Development of Religious or Belief Streams in Society]. This body is given authority by government to monitor religious sect. Its members come from several official institutions, such as from the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Attorney General’s Office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>British Columbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPR</td>
<td>Business Processing Reengineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPUPKI</td>
<td>Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia [Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Consent Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDII</td>
<td>Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia [Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI/TII</td>
<td>Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia [The Territory of Islam/Indonesian Islamic Army]. This was a movement attempted by some Indonesia Muslim guerilla fighters to establish an Indonesian Islamic state during 1950s and early 1960s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRJEN BIMAS</td>
<td>Direktorat Jenderal Bina Masyarakat [the Directorate General of Public Guidance]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKUB</td>
<td>Forum Kerukunan Umat beragama [Religious Harmony Forum]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPI</td>
<td>Front Pembela Islam [Islamic Defender Front]. This is a social and Islamic organisation that disseminates messages for the banning and dissolution of Ahmadiyya. It was established on 17 August 1998.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FUI: *Forum Umat Islam* [Islamic People Forum], a conservative Muslim organisation.

G/30/S/PKI: *Gerakan 30 September Partai Komunis Indonesia* [the Coup Movement on the Thirtieth of September said to have been ‘initiated’ by the Indonesian Communist party, the PKI].

GAI: *Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia* [Indonesian Ahmadiyya Movement]. This Ahmadiyya group was established in Indonesia in 1928. Its followers claim Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (the founder of Ahmadiyya) as the messiah, Imam Mahdi, and a reformer (*mujaddid*) of Islam. However, they do not claim Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet.

Gerindo: *Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia* [the Indonesian People’s Movement]

HAM: *Hak Azasi Manusia* (Human Rights)

HT: Hizbut Tahrir, an Islamic movement aspiring to establish an Islamic state mainly through education.

ICCPPR: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

IMF: International Monetary Fund

IIS: Indonesian Interfaith Scholarship

ISP: Information Sheet for Participants

JAI: *Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia* [Indonesian Ahmadiyya Community]. This Ahmadiyya group was founded in Indonesia in 1925. Its followers claim Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as the messiah, Imam Mahdi, Islamic reformer, and prophet of Islam after Prophet Muhammad.

KONTRAS: *Komisi Nasional untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan* [The Commission for the Disappearances and Victims of Violence].

KWI: *Konferensi Wali Gereja Indonesia* [the Indonesian Conference for Bishop]
MASYUMI: Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia [The Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims], a major Muslim political party in the 1950s.

MATAKIN: Majelis Tinggi Agama Konghucu di Indonesia [The Indonesian High Council of Confucianism]

MMP: Minuteman Project

MoRA: Ministry of Religious Affairs

MPR: Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat [People’s Consultative Assembly]. It is one of the Indonesia state bodies. Previously, before the reformation era, it was the highest state body.

MUI: Majelis Ulama Indonesia [Indonesian Council of Clerics], a council that was established in 1975 by the second president of Indonesia, Soeharto. It is authorised to issue religious decrees (fatwas), but the fatwas are not legally binding.

MUSPIDA: Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah [Regional Leadership Consultative Council]. This is a consultation and coordination forum of governments at provincial and regional levels.

NASAKOM: Nasionalisme, Agama, dan Komunisme [Nationalism, Religion, and Communism]. It was a political concept introduced and disseminated by the first president of Indonesia, Soekarno who tried to incorporate nationalism, religion, and communism as a state ideology during his Guided Democracy era (1959-1965).

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NGOs: Non-Governmental Organisations

NII: Negara Islam Indonesia [Indonesian Islamic State] was a form of state attempted firstly by some Indonesia Muslim guerilla fighters who were incorporated in the Territory of Islam/Indonesian Islamic Army (DI/TII).
NU: Nahdlatul Ulama. NU is a major Muslim organisation in Indonesia, claimed to have the most followers amongst Indonesian Muslims.

OKI: Organisasi Konferensi Islam [Islamic Conference Organisation]. This is a Muslim international organisation, which now consists of 57 countries. In MUI’s 2005 fatwa, it is explained that this organisation has issued a fatwa in 1985 considering Ahmadiyya followers to be non-believers of Islam.

Parindra: Partai Indonesia Raya [Great Indonesian Party]

Partindo: Partai Indonesia [Indonesian Party]

PBB: Partai Bulan Bintang [The Crescent Star Party]

PERDA: Peraturan Daerah [Local Regulation]

PERPPU: Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang [The Government Regulations issued by an Indonesian government to address a serious crisis in the absence of certain laws].

Persis: Persatuan Islam [Islamic Union]

PGI: Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia [the Association of Indonesian Churches]

PHDI: Parisada Hindu Darma Indonesia [The Administrative Council of Indonesian Hinduism]

PII: Partai Islam Indonesia [Indonesian Islamic Party]

PIRI: Perguruan Islam Republik Indonesia [the Islamic School of the Republic of Indonesia]

PNPS: Penetapan Presiden [Presidential Decree]

PNI: Partai Nasional Indonesia [The Indonesian Nationalist Party]

PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan [The United Development Party]
PSII : *Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia* [Indonesian Islamic Association Party]

RASIM : Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Immigrants, and Migrants

REPELITA : *Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun* [The Five Years Development Plan]

SATPOL PP : *Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja* [Public Order Agency, a security agency at a regency level of government]

SEB : *Surat Edaran Bersama* [Joint Circular]

SFL : Systemic Functional Linguistics

SKB : *Surat Keputusan Bersama* [Joint Decree]. This refers to a decree signed by three ministries, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Attorney General considering Ahmadiyya as a source of social conflicts.

SI : Setara Institute, a non-government organisation, established by a group of social activists to defend (religious) minority groups, including Ahmadiyya by promoting freedom of religion and human rights.

TODA : Textually Oriented Discourse Analysis

TQM : Total Quality Management

UK : The United Kingdom

UUD 1945 : *Undang-Undang Dasar* 1945 [The Indonesian Constitution of 1945, created in 1945 but not in use from 1949-1959].

WALUBI : *Perwakilan Umat Budha di Indonesia* [The Representatives of Buddhists in Indonesia]

YAPI : *Yayasan Penyiaran Islam* [The Foundation for the Propagation of Islam]
CERTIFICATION OF DISSERTATION

I certify that the ideas, experimental works, results, analyses, software and conclusion reported in this dissertation are entirely my own effort, except where otherwise acknowledged.

I also certify that the work is original and has not been previously submitted for any other award, except where otherwise acknowledged.

18 July 2016
Andi Muhammad Irawan
Candidate

18 July 2016
Zifirdaus Adnan
Principal Supervisor
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Dedication ............................................................................................................. ii  
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................. iii  
Abstract .................................................................................................................. v  
List of Tables .......................................................................................................... viii  
List of Terms and Abbreviations ............................................................................ ix  
Certification of Dissertation ................................................................................... xiv

## Chapter 1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 1  
1.1. Rationale of the Study ....................................................................................... 1  
1.2. Research Problem ............................................................................................ 6  
1.3. Significance of the Research ............................................................................. 8  
1.4. The Aim and Objectives of the Study ................................................................ 9  
1.5. Research Questions .......................................................................................... 10  
1.6. The Limitation of the Study ............................................................................. 11  
1.7. Chapter Outline ............................................................................................... 12

## Chapter 2 Literature Review ................................................................................ 15  
2.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 15  
2.2. (Critical) Discourse Analysis and its Key Concepts ........................................ 15  
2.2.1. Linguistic and Non-Linguistic Traditions of CDA.................................. 19  
2.2.2. ‘Critical’: the Word Distinguishing CDA from the Non-Critical Discourse Studies .................................................. 23  
2.3. Discourse Strategies in CDA ............................................................................. 27  
2.3.1. Studies on Discriminatory Discourse Strategies ........................................ 27  
2.3.2. Studies on Resistance Discourse Strategies .............................................. 40  
2.4. Studies on the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia and around the World................. 46  
2.4.1. Studies on the Ahmadiyya in the International World............................. 47  
2.4.2. Studies on the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia .................................................... 53  
2.5. Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 57

## Chapter 3 Islam – Indonesian State Relationship and Repulsion against Ahmadiyya within Indonesian History ......................................................... 60  
3.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 60
5.5.3. ‘Ahmadiyya has been Repulsed Elsewhere’ …………. 146
5.5.4. The Disrupter of Religious Harmony and Social
Order ……………………………………………………. 149
5.5.5. Sympathetic Discourse……………………………………. 151
5.5.6. Academic Discourse ………………………………………. 154
5.5.7. Safeguard of Muslims and Islamic Purity
Discourses………………………………………………. 156
5.5.8. Discourse of Restricted Freedom of Religion………. 158
5.6. Conclusion ………………………………………………………. 160

Chapter 6 ‘Banning or Protecting’: How Social Interest Groups
Depict Ahmadiyya ……………………………………………….. 163

6.1. Introduction ………………………………………………. 163
6.2. The FPI and the Eradication of Immoral Actions ………… 163
6.2.1. Ahmadiyya, the Hijacker of Islam ……………………. 166
6.2.2. Ahmadiyya, the Enemy of Islam ……………………. 171
6.2.3. Ahmadiyya, the Defamer of Islam ……………………. 172
6.2.4. Ahmadiyya, the Agent of Imperialism ………………. 174
6.2.5. Ahmadiyya as ‘the Other’ ………………………………… 177
6.2.6. A Tolerant Islamic Front ………………………………… 179
6.3. The Setara Institute: Institute for Democracy and Peace …… 181
6.3.1. Annual Reports (2007 to 2012) ………………………… 183
6.3.2. The SI’s Views on Constitution and Laws ………………. 185
6.3.3. Discourse Presentations on the Ahmadiyya issue …… 187
6.3.3.1. Discourse of Implementation of Democracy ………… 190
6.3.3.2. Discourse of Unrestricted Freedom of Religion ……… 192
6.3.3.3. Discourse of Impartiality ……………………………….. 194
6.3.3.4. Weakness of Leadership …………………………….. 200
6.4. Conclusion …………………………………………………… 202

Chapter 7 ‘We are Muslims’, the Analysis of Discourses Created by
the Two Ahmadiyya Groups ………………………………………… 204

7.1. Introduction ………………………………………………. 204
7.2. Ahmadiyya and Its History …………………………………… 205
7.2.1. A Controversy around its Establishment ……………… 206
7.2.2. The Promised Messiah and the Awaited Mahdi ……… 208
7.2.3. The Qadiani and the Lahore Ahmadiyya ……………… 209
7.2.4. Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia ……………………………… 214
7.2.5. Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia …………………………….. 216
7.3. Resistance Discourses Presented by and to Support the JAI

7.3.1. ‘We are the Victims’ ........................................... 220
7.3.2. ‘We are the Defenders of Islam’ .......................... 221
7.3.3. ‘We are not the Agent of Imperialism’ ................. 222
7.3.4. Do not Take God’s Authority: Countering the Government’s Legitimacy ........................................... 229
7.3.5. Discourse of Public Deception .............................. 233

7.4. Discourses Created by the GAI .................................. 235
7.4.1. ‘We are the GAI (Lahore), not the JAI (Qadiani)” .... 236
7.4.2. Discourse of Religious Freedom ............................ 239
7.4.3. ‘We are Muslims’ ................................................. 241
7.4.4. A Peaceful Movement ........................................... 243

7.5. Conclusion ................................................................ 245

Chapter 8 General Discussion and Conclusion .................... 248

8.1. Introduction ................................................................. 248
8.2. CDA and the Issue of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia ............ 248
8.3. Negative Discourse Presentations .............................. 250
8.4. Resistance Discourses: Defensive and Offensive ........... 252
8.5. Theoretical Significance .............................................. 255
8.6. Practical Significance ................................................. 257
8.7. Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research ......... 259

References........................................................................ 261

List of Appendixes ............................................................ 280
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Rationale of the Study

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as an analytical tool is a powerful means for revealing social and political issues, and therefore it has been extensively used to investigate social issues of power, power abuse, social inequality and injustice, and discrimination. One of the strengths of CDA is its ability to reveal how certain minority individuals or groups are presented negatively in texts by dominant groups and how they defend themselves.

Many studies have been carried out previously to investigate how minority groups, such as immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees, ethnic groups, and minority employees are discursively discriminated against, and also how they resist. The discriminatory and resistance discourses are created through the use of a number of discourse strategies. However, studies concerning the issue of religious-based minority groups, of which the Ahmadiyya sect is one, seem under-developed. Further, previous studies that try to investigate the discriminatory discourses of a religious minority group and how this group argues against the discriminatory discourses in one single study receive little attention. This study is an attempt to fill this gap.

The Ahmadiyya sect in Indonesia is divided into two groups, the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Jemaat/Congregation (Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia, henceforth the JAI) and the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Movement (Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia, henceforth the GAI). In the Indonesian reformation era (1998 to the present), which has been marked by the collapse of the ‘New Order’ authoritarian regime led by Soeharto, and the return of democracy to the country, the two Ahmadiyya groups (especially the JAI) have experienced unequal treatment (Kraince, 2009; Mietzner, 2012). They have frequently been the target
of violent attacks. In 2011, for example, three JAI followers were killed and five others were severely injured in Cikeusik, a district of Banten Province, west of Jakarta (“Komnas temukan”, 2011). Since the Indonesian Council of Clerics issued a *fatwa* in 2005 that ruled the two Ahmadiyya groups to be deviant sects, violent actions against Ahmadiyya followers have increased sharply (Colbran, 2010). However, detailed and comprehensive CDA investigation of how the sect is discursively presented and projected in various texts is much less developed.

This study investigates the controversial issue of whether or not the Ahmadiyya sect is being discriminated against using negative representations viewed from the critical discourse analysis point of view. It focuses on the discourses created by the state official institutions (Indonesian government and the Indonesian Council of Clerics) that have an official authority to address the issue. The study is expected to prove whether or not the negative presentations against the Ahmadiyya have been created in the texts produced by the official institutions. If they have, how the two Ahmadiyya groups (the JAI and the GAI) argue against the negative presentations to defend their existence. Because the issue of the Ahmadiyya has been the concern of some social interest groups, the study also examines the discourse presentations on the Ahmadiyya that these social groups have created.

Many researchers have investigated the issue of the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia, but they have not used the framework of (critical) discourse analysis. Previous studies have employed other frameworks, namely freedom of religion and belief (Arifin, 2010; Colbran, 2010), the relationship between the emergence of hardliner Islamic groups and violent acts against Ahmadiyya (Kraince, 2009), democracy and protection of minority rights in Indonesia (Freedman & Tiburzi, 2012), and violations against laws and the constitution (Khanif, 2009; Muktiono, 2012). Since the issue has not been investigated using CDA, the evidence about how the Ahmadiyya sect is discursively presented in texts produced by the state official institutions, parties that support and refuse it, and how the negative presentations are discursively argued against by Ahmadiyya are not provided.
The CDA analytical tools adopted in this study are those that are frequently used to identify discriminatory as well as resistance discourses and their strategies. These two groups of discourse and their strategies are based on the belief that on the one hand, discrimination may have been produced and reproduced by means of discourse, but, on the other hand, other discourse constructions may have served to criticise, delegitimise, and argue against the discriminatory practices (for a discussion about the role of discourse in discriminating as well as defending, see Wodak & Reisigl, 1999, 2001). Similarly, Tilbury (2008), in her study of racism discourse, argues that CDA linguistic tools that are available for constructing racist discourse are also available for expressing anti-racist discourse.

According to Fairclough (1992), two opposing discourse creations always appear in a given society: one is produced by those who try to construct and maintain domination, and the other is produced by those who challenge it. Further, Van Dijk (1996) argues that there is no absolute position of domination; it is only gradual, and the dominated groups may create more or less resistance to counter the domination. The two arguments from these two CDA scholars imply that an analysis of the discourse in any particular social context should be undertaken on both sides. These two theoretical arguments underlie the need for the investigation of discourses of both the dominant and the dominated groups.

The study of both discriminatory discourse strategies and resistance discourse strategies is not new in CDA studies. However, such study has concentrated mainly on the issues associated with immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees, ethnic groups, and anti-Semitic groups. No studies that have used these two discourse strategies to address the issue of the Ahmadiyya sect in Indonesia have been found.

Discriminatory discourse studies have been conducted by Wodak and Reisigl (1999, 2001) on racism and anti-semitism in Europe; by KhosraviNik (2008, 2009) on refugees, asylum seekers, and immigrants in England; by Cheng


As well as the lack of attention paid to the two discourse strategies on the Ahmadiyya issue in Indonesia and around the world, the application of a combination of the two strategies in one single study has not been done. The purpose of CDA is to initiate change (Fairclough, 1992), to criticise reality, and to change society (Wodak & Meyer, 2009), therefore, this study employ both discriminatory and resistance discourse strategies as a tool of analysis to provide a better understanding about how the issue of Ahmadiyya is discursively presented in various texts, either by discriminating against or defending the sect.

In addition, this research investigates a relatively new issue in CDA that is an investigation of the issue of a religious minority group in the present context of religion matters in Indonesia. In this study, it is determined that
discourses constructed by text producers are embedded with specific characteristics (e.g. social, political, and religious) in the Indonesian context. Following Van Dijk’s (1993a) CDA concept of discourse as “text in context” (p. 96), it is established that the production of discourses cannot be separated from the macro-context of ideology held by the text producers.

The Indonesia context has its certain social, political, and religious characteristics. Indonesia has adopted neither secular nor theocratic states. The country has adopted the Pancasila (five basic principles)\(^1\) as the ideology of the state, which, to some extent, provides broad authority for the government to officially control religious issues. Indonesia is also the biggest Muslim country in the world, but it is not an Islamic state either. However, the discourse of Islam has played a crucial role in shaping the Indonesian people’s minds and their opinion about the issue of religious minority groups, including Ahmadiyya. The combination of these two features makes Indonesian context unique when compared to many other countries.

In Indonesia, Islam has been one of the dominant discourses in the social and political life of the society, both before the Indonesian independence in 1945 and after it. The relationship between Islam and the state since 1945 has fluctuated. This fluctuation affects many aspects of social and political life, including the existence of religious minority groups, such as the Ahmadiyya. This situation may affect the creations of discourses associated with the Ahmadiyya issue.

These social, political, and religious governed discourses lie behind an assumption that discourse constitutes the social world and is also constituted by the social world. The production of certain discourses cannot be separated from

---

\(^1\) Pancasila is the Indonesian state ideology. It consists of five principles, i.e. ‘believe in one Almighty God’, ‘humanity’, ‘the unity of Indonesia’, ‘democracy’, and ‘social justice’.
the current situational context and how the text producers interpret the context and express it in their texts regarding the Ahmadiyya issue.

1.2. Research Problem

It has been widely reported that physical attacks against Ahmadiyya followers have occurred in many parts of the Indonesian territory. Such attacks have had a tremendous negative impact upon these people. As has been mentioned earlier, for example, three JAI followers were violently killed and five others were severely injured in 2011 (Mietzner, 2012). Violent attacks against them also occurred before and after this incident (Colbran, 2010; Kraince, 2009). The Ahmadiyya sect has also been the subject of some legal proclamations, such as the joint decree\(^2\) and religious decrees issued by the Indonesian State Official Institutions.

The problems underlying the study are based on the absence of CDA in studies to investigate texts or discourses addressing the issue of religious minority groups in Indonesia. Study on Ahmadiyya using CDA as the analytical tool to investigate how the sect is projected in texts and how its followers defend themselves discursively has also received little attention. As was mentioned earlier, CDA analysis has previously been employed to investigate the issues of immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees, ethnic groups, Muslims, and minority employees in many parts of the world, but not the issues a religious minority.

The absence of CDA in religious minority group study remains a problem that has never been answered previously. It is about the role of the discourses created in various texts to present religious minority groups negatively, how

\(^2\) The decree is signed by three Indonesian ministries; they are the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Attorney General. The decree is entitled ‘Admonition and instruction to the followers, adherents, and the members of Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia and members of the public’. It regulates the restriction of propagation of the JAI teaching and belief.
these groups respond to the negative presentations, and what discourse strategies they employ. It is presumed that certain negative presentations can have a catastrophic impact upon the religious minority groups concerned.

With regard to the possible relationship between negative discourse presentations and the plight of particular religious minority groups (e.g. Ahmadiyya), Kraince (2009) provides a fascinating example. She argues that after the issuing of the religious decree by the Indonesian Council of Clerics in 2005, which ruled that Ahmadiyya is a deviant sect and not Islamic, violent acts against the sect began. According to Colbran (2010), after the issuing of the decree, violent attacks against the sect increased sharply.

From these arguments, it can be assumed that texts or discourse (negative) constructions may have a negative impact by exacerbating the plight of the Ahmadiyya sect. Discourse constructions, particularly those created by official institutions in the form of decrees, may have a remarkable effect on people’s minds. The decrees deliver the message that the deviation of the Ahmadiyya sect is a truth. The negative presentations disseminated by official institutions may also be used by particular groups of people who hate the Ahmadiyya to justify their attacks against the sect. These texts are indeed in need of a detailed critical discourse investigation.

In CDA, texts or discourse constructions have cognitive and social functions (Van Dijk, 1989a, 2006b). Texts are not only a sequence of words governed by particular linguistic rules, but they also provide a new idea and belief, including a negative image against a particular individual or group being presented in the texts. Texts or discourse presentations can have social effects, with the first effect being on the minds of readers (Fairclough, 2003). By reading and interpreting texts, people learn new things that can shape their mind, and it may then influence their attitudes and behaviours, either positively or negatively. This shaping of the public minds by negative discourse presentations can also
occur in the issue of Ahmadiyya, and such presentations can exacerbate the plight experienced by the followers of the sect.

Therefore, it is necessary to carry out a detailed and comprehensive study using CDA on how the Ahmadiyya groups are discursively projected in texts that may have discredited them, and how their followers discursively defend themselves. The CDA investigation also studies the discourse strategies employed and the discourse topics created in these two conflicting discourses.

1.3. Significance of the Research

The study is expected to have significance on two levels: theoretical and practical. Theoretically, the study contributes significantly by expanding the application of CDA to the issues concerning (religious) minority groups. This critical analysis can enrich the literature of CDA especially that regarding discriminatory and resistance discourses, as well as discourse strategies when dealing with the issue of religious minority groups. In previous studies, as has been mentioned earlier, these have been little used to investigate issues related to religious minority groups, including Ahmadiyya. Many discriminatory discourse practices that have occurred in the past, for example, against immigrants and refugees in their new environments, have been triggered by political and economic motives. Immigrants and refugees are considered to be a threat and an economic burden on the government and society. They are also accused of bringing political instability and criminals, which can have a negative impact on people. This current study provides a different perspective, by analysing discursive discriminatory issues triggered by religious belief. Therefore, this research provides a new theoretical insight for the CDA literature.

Practically, the study addresses the debate or controversy in Indonesian society pertaining to alleged discrimination against Ahmadiyya. A CDA analysis can provide evidence about whether the Ahmadiyya groups have been
discursively discriminated against or not and thus provide a better understanding about the issue. This study can also provide research-based findings that could help Indonesia’s policy makers, journalists, media owners, civil organisations, religious majority organisations, and religious minority groups to address the Ahmadiyya issue more effectively and humanely.

Further, religious minority groups in other parts of the world may also have been facing similar problems. The CDA analysis conducted in this study can provide a detailed and comprehensive analysis of how religious minority groups are discursively discriminated against and how they defend themselves, which those groups may be able to learn from and defend themselves better. For example, they may learn about the discourse strategies that are employed by the Indonesians to resist discrimination.

Another practical significance of the study is that it addresses humanitarian concerns. Domination by one group or institution over a religious minority group in order to gain social privilege and a wide access to public resources can violate the principles of equality and human rights. The marginalised are often discriminated against because they are different from the majorities. This violation could generate other social problems including poverty, murder, and physical assaults. These social problems could put the marginalised groups in a very difficult position.

1.4. The Aim and Objectives of the Study

This study aims to understand the discourse presentations that both undermine and defend the Ahmadiyya. To address this matter, this study investigates the nature of the conflicting discourses created by Indonesian state official institutions, social interest groups, and two Ahmadiyya groups. The specific objectives are:
1. to examine the discourses presented by the state official institutions that are considered to be discriminating against the Ahmadiyya, the discourse strategies they use, and the rationale creating such discourses;

2. to investigate the discourses produced by interest groups that may have defended or discriminated against the Ahmadiyya groups, the discourse strategies they have used in their texts, and the reasoning behind the presentation of such discourses; and

3. to investigate the discourses produced by the GAI and the JAI that may have been employed to defend themselves, including the discourse strategies they employ, and the reasons for creating their discourses.

1.5. Research Questions

To achieve these aim and objectives, this study is guided by a central question and some subsidiary questions. The central question is ‘what is the nature of the two groups of conflicting discourses created by state official institutions, social interest groups, and the two Ahmadiyya groups when addressing Ahmadiyya issue? How and why were they produced?’ This central question is addressed by finding the answers to the following subsidiary questions:

1. What discourses have the Indonesian state official institutions created to present the Ahmadiyya in their texts? What discourse strategies have they employed? How do the state official institutions present themselves and depict the Ahmadiyya groups in their individual and more formal and institutional discourses? Is it negatively or positively?

2. What discourses have the Islamic Defender Front and the Setara Institute constructed? What linguistic strategies do they use in constructing their discourses? Do their discourses discriminate against or defend the sect?
3. What discourse presentations have the JAI and the GAI created, and what discourse strategies they have employed to argue against discourses that may have undermined them? How do they discursively present or represent themselves in their texts and depict others, particularly the institutions and organisations that may have presented them negatively? Why are the discursive presentations created?

1.6. The Limitation of the Study

This study is limited to the discourses pertaining to two Ahmadiyya groups, the JAI and the GAI, which have been presented by the state official institutions, social interest groups, and the two Ahmadiyya groups. There are other religious minority groups, such as the Shi’ite, that may have been experiencing similar alleged discriminatory practices. Due to limited time and resources, however, this study only focused on the Ahmadiyya.

For the same reason, the study also limits the number of social interest groups being investigated: they are the Setara Institute (the SI), which is most prominent in promoting protection for human rights and freedom of religion, and the Islamic Defender Front (*Front Pembela Islam* the FPI), which is most prominent in disseminating the messages regarding the banning or dissolution of the Ahmadiyya. There are many other interest groups that have considerable concerns for the Ahmadiyya issue, both secular and Islamic; however, for the same reason, the study does not cover these groups.

The SI is a social organisation that promotes religious tolerance and freedom of religion. It has created discourses concerning human rights and freedom of religion. Its members have produced a number of documents that emphasise the defence of religious freedom. Another organisation that has similar concern on the issue of Ahmadiyya is the Wahid Institute (the WI). Abdurrahman Wahid (the former president of Indonesia) was involved in the
establishment of both organisations. Their missions are very similar, and established at similar times (The Wahid Institute was in 2004 and Setara in 2005). Setara, however, seems to have reported more of religious conflicts involving the FPI and Ahmadiyya. Therefore, it is more interesting to analyse. Conversely, the FPI is a social and religious organisation that considers the Ahmadiyya sect to be blasphemous. For the FPI, the Ahmadiyya’s theological interpretation has deviated from the principle teaching of Islam and its followers are considered to be non-believers. Compared to other similar organisations, the FPI is the dominant group in staging attacks against Ahmadiyya.

Further, the discourses from the state official institutions examined in the study are restricted to those that have been issued by the national government (i.e. the Ministry of Religious Affairs/MoRA) and the Indonesian Council of Clerics (ICoC). These state official institutions are given authority by the government to address religious issues, including the issue of the Ahmadiyya. The data show that both the government and MUI have worked together to address social, religious, and national issues together, meaning that the state at least acknowledges the status, authority, and the role of MUI. The government has the authority to issue policies and regulations, while the Indonesian Council of Clerics is known for its authority to issue a fatwa (religious decree), whether or not the government has requested it.

1.7. Chapter Outline

Chapter Two provides a review about critical discourse analysis, its history (seen from the tradition of linguistics and social studies) and what makes CDA different from other discourse analyses. It also reviews previous studies of discriminatory and resistance discourses that concern some social groups, such as immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and minority employees. The review of Ahmadiyya studies in Indonesia and internationally is also presented.
Chapter Three discusses the relationship between Islam and the state in Indonesia from the pre-independence period to the current reformation era. It highlights the attempt to insert Islam as the ideological basis of the state and the rejection of this proposal. An explanation about the repudiation of the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia, as well as the religious decrees and government decisions addressing the sect are also presented. This chapter is expected to provide the historical, social, political, and religious contexts underlying the production of discourses addressing the Ahmadiyya.

Chapter Four presents the methodology of the study. It covers the research method and data collection procedures, the types of discourse data and discourse producers, the analytical tools and linguistic strategies used to analyse the data, and the steps in the analysis.

Chapter Five presents the CDA analysis on the discourses created by Indonesian state official institutions addressing the Ahmadiyya issue. The analysis focuses on how the Ahmadiyya is discursively presented in a number of legal proclamations and in various personal arguments delivered by the officials and the members of the state institutions. The chapter also elaborates on laws associated with the Ahmadiyya issue – laws protecting the freedom of religion and restricting religious freedom, and those addressing blasphemy. Some other issues pertaining to the Ahmadiyya, for instance, religious harmony, are also presented.

Chapter Six provides the analysis of the discourses created by two interest groups that have considerable concerns about the Ahmadiyya issue, the Setara Institute and the Islamic Defender Front. This chapter examines whether the discourses constructed by these two interest groups have discriminated against or defended the Ahmadiyya. The chapter also presents discourse strategies that have been employed when depicting Ahmadiyya.

Chapter Seven presents the analysis of the discourses created by the JAI and the GAI. The analysis focuses on what discourses they have created and how
they present the discourses to defend their belief and existence. The description of the two Ahmadiyya groups with regard to their establishment, why there are two groups, their religious interpretation of Islam, and their history in Indonesia is also presented.

Chapter Eight is the last chapter of this thesis. It draws on the findings of the research. It reiterates the relevance of the findings relating to the research problem, the aims and objectives of the study, the research questions, the discourse presentations, the discourse strategies, and the significance of the study. The chapter connects all chapters dealing with what the discourses are, and how and why the state official institutions, the interest groups, and the Ahmadiyya groups create their discourses.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

As this thesis identifies the discourses that may have undermined the two Ahmadiyya groups and how these groups have tried to argue against alleged discriminatory discourses, this chapter reviews previous studies that have examined discourse presentations and strategies, both produced and disseminated by the dominant and discriminated groups in various social contexts. Further, it also reviews previous studies that have investigated the Ahmadiyya issue.

Four groups of studies that are relevant to this study are reviewed: (1) Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and its key concepts, (2) studies on discriminatory discourses in various social contexts in different countries around the world, (3) studies on resistance discourses that have been developed to identify how minority groups defend themselves in different social contexts and countries, and (4) studies on the Ahmadiyya sect, which has attracted a great deal of attention, both in Indonesia and around the world.

2.2. (Critical) Discourse Analysis and its Key Concepts

In reviewing CDA, there are some concepts that should be discussed. The term ‘discourse’ itself has been the key concept in CDA, and is also a key concept in this analysis. Other concepts are ‘text’, ‘language’, ‘ideology’, ‘social issue’, ‘inequality’, and ‘power’. These concepts are explained in further detail below.

The term ‘discourse’ has a number of definitions and has been one of the most ambiguous terms in linguistic study. Many experts and discourse analysts
have proposed various definitions. The differences between them are due to their respective perspective and to what particular academic fields the experts belong. The following are some of its definitions:

1. “Discourse is any kind of written, spoken, and any other symbolic forms that are used in people communication” (Bloor & Bloor, 2007, p. 7).
2. “Discourse is the actual instance of communicative action in the medium of language” (Johnstone, 2008, p. 2).
3. “Discourse is a particular view of language in use” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 4);  
4. “Discourse is language in action” (Blommaert, 2005, p. 2).
5. “Discourse is the discipline devoted to the investigation of the relationship between form and function in verbal communication” (Renkema, 2004, p. 1).

These definitions indicate that discourse is seen as a medium or language expression, either written or spoken, that is used or employed in communicative actions. Discourse in CDA and in this current study is used as a medium by individuals, groups, and institutions to express their opinions or perceptions about an issue. Discourse is expressed in the form of language by particular parties to present themselves and others.

The application of CDA as an analytical tool in social issues has rapidly developed and, therefore, it is now widely known worldwide. Such worldwide application cannot be separated from the variability of social issues in different contexts, which requires various analyses and methods. ‘Social issues’ here are defined as issues or problems that create injustice or inequality, such as discrimination. As can be observed in many bodies of literature, the focus of CDA is on social and political problems that establish and maintain social inequality, power abuse, hegemony, domination, and discrimination through the use of discourses (Fairclough, 1992, 2003; Van Dijk, 1993a).
Employing CDA to analyse such problems draws on the social characteristics of language. ‘Language’ here is seen as verbal language, which is mostly created in spoken and written forms. Although discourse is basically constructed using words, phrases, and other linguistic units, however, the construction of discourse does not occur in a vacuum without being affected by social, cultural, and political settings. Blackledge (2005, p. 6), for example, argues that “no text stands alone and outside of its context”, which means each text has a connection with other texts synchronically and diachronically, and this connection provides the background of the relationship between discourse and social practices.

As mentioned above, Fairclough (2003, p. 4) argues that “discourse is a particular view of language in use”. Similarly, Blommaert (2005, p. 2) also defines discourse as “a language-in-action”. The words ‘use’ and ‘action’ imply that the texts or discourses and their linguistic strategies are parts of a wider social context that is embodied in action and interaction. There is a dialogic relation between the micro-context of language or linguistic texts and the macro-context of social reality.

At this point, language and its units are not only seen as the reflection of social reality, but are also seen to shape and construct the reality. In a dialectical relationship, Mulderrig (2012) states that situations, institutions, and social structures do not only shape discursive events, but the discourse also shapes them. Discourse and the social practice where the discourse exists are dialogic. With regard to this dialogic perspective, Paltridge (2006) suggests that the principle of discourse is to reflect as well as to reproduce the social relationship. The choice, the structure, and the construction of language in the process of social action and interaction are socially motivated and ideologically represented. Discourse is “socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned” (Blommaert, 2005, p. 25; Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000, p. 448). Clearly, discourse both represents the realities and constitutes them.
The main concern of the social character of discourse is to perform the social functions of text. It means to construct knowledge or belief (ideational level), social identity (interpersonal level), and social relationship (relational level) (Fairclough, 1992). Text is a representation of reality, but it does not mean that it is without any distortion. The producers of the text also have a particular purpose in amplifying their belief and ideological purpose through the use of the linguistic features that they configure.

Ideology, according to Van Dijk (2001, p. 12), is “a special form of social cognition shared by social groups”. Ideology constitutes individuals and groups’ social representations, practices, and discourses. This social cognition is introduced to the society through texts. Texts, in this case, are seen as the use of language in a particular context to introduce, cultivate, and maintain certain beliefs and knowledge, both in written and spoken forms.

In promoting an ideology, individuals or groups try to identify themselves positively, while, at the same time, they present others negatively. This concept is called the ‘ideological square’ to create the positive self-presentation and negative-other presentation (Van Dijk, 2006). These self and other presentations are performed through the use of contrastive argumentation and some other linguistic strategies.

Through text and discursive practices, ideology is introduced to society as something necessary and natural. The linguistic features are used as a medium to express belief, idea, purpose, and common sense as something inherent in a particular social context on the grounds that this ideology can bring the society into the imagined better condition.

Also, the existence of an ideology in a text or discourse can change the perception, cognition, attitude, and behaviour of individuals or groups about something. When this ideology is permeated individually or collectively by the society without filtering, the process of domination is carried out. Ideology in CDA relies upon the assumption that the belief, idea, interest, and interpretation
of reality can be mediated through discourse to constitute social inequality and power. ‘Power’ here is defined as authority or control over others, which is gained and maintained through discourse.

The ways of putting together the linguistic elements and their construction in a specific genre, context, and institution are not arbitrary, but they are created purposefully by social actors to construct a particular meaning. In the process of interaction, especially in a political context, each participant encodes his or her belief through linguistic expressions to persuade others in order to undertake some purposeful actions either positively or negatively (Van Dijk, 1995a). In this frame, then, the concept of ideology – one’s belief and knowledge – is represented through a discourse. The matter of ideology has been an inseparable part of critical discourse analysis, either in linguistics and non-linguistic traditions.

2.2.1. Linguistic and Non-Linguistic Traditions of CDA

The notion of discourse and discourse study can be traced back to both linguistic and non-linguistic traditions. From the linguistic point of view, the study of language investigates a language in isolation by analysing at word level or analysing how a word is put together with other words to form a phrase, clause, or a sentence (internal structure of a language). However, the study of discourse should go beyond this isolated level. A study of discourse should observe how the internal structure of language is interconnected with other elements of social life, for example, social status and power. The purpose is to see how a language is used in a particular social context and how it contributes to social practice. One prominent figure in this linguistic tradition is Michael Halliday with his Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL).

With regard to this SFL theory, Halliday, when interviewed by Parret in 1972 (2013) concerning the issue of the relation between language and society,
pointed out that language has a close connection with other social elements, so it is not an autonomous subject. Language should be seen as a part of social life and as a medium for building relationships between people. Language in the mind (as a psychological aspect) is not contradictory to the language that goes on between people (as a sociological aspect). Halliday states that there are three functions of a language: ideational, interpersonal, and textual. This division reveals his concern regarding the relationship between language and social life (Parret, 2013).

In the ideational function, the mind of a speaker is the reflection or experience about the real world. This experience then forms the idea of the speaker, which is then externalised through language. The interpersonal function implies that the function of the language is to relate one person with others in a process of communication. Meanwhile, the textual function explains the function of language as a text produced by a speaker that can be understood by a listener or listeners. These three language functions assert a belief that the investigation of a language should focus both on its internal structure and the social context where the language is being used.

Similarly, language is seen as both a system and a function. The use of language should consider the selection of words and organisation of the words available in the system of the language. As well as this notion of system, the language has a particular social function that is achieved in a communicative event. When talking about a social function, of course, the social characteristics of the context surrounding the language use should be included in the language analysis. This language theory of Halliday has much inspired the emergence of discourse analysis in the linguistics field.

This prominent theoretical development initiated the emergence of Pragmatics in the linguistic field (Blommaert, 2005). According to Levinson (1983, p. 2), Pragmatics is “the study of language use”. In a Pragmatic study, a language is investigated from its usage, and covers an analysis of who uses the
language (the participant), when it is used, what topic is discussed, and how the language is expressed. This advanced study of language places great emphasis on the matter of meaning delivered through action and interaction in a social situation. Therefore, in a discourse study, language should be analysed both from its internal structure and from its social aspect by considering the social characteristics of the context where the language takes shape.

Meanwhile, from the non-linguistic tradition, the study of discourse has developed in social studies. In the non-linguistic approach, an analysis of discourse gives a little concern for the language mechanisms used in an interactional process. According to Fairclough (2003, p. 4), “social scientists working in this tradition generally pay little close attention to the linguistic features of texts”. Although the social scientists are aware that social life is fully constructed by the interactional process, their approach deals more with an abstract concept such as power, identity, domination, control, and ideology. Discourse here is seen merely as the statements used by a person or institution to gain power in a particular society.

This social concept of discourse is mainly based on critical social studies. The theory is heavily indebted to political theories, for example, the theory of hegemony developed by Antonio Gramsci (Jones, 2006) and the theory of object formation proposed by Michel Foucault (Fairclough, 2003).

According to Hoare and Smith (1999), hegemony is constructed by power separation. Hegemony is established when a person or social group holds power and control over others (the powerless). Femia (1975) argues that the term ‘hegemony’ in Gramsci’s theory refers to a situation where a social group or class is ideologically dominant. Hegemony applies when people do not have equal access to social resources such as education, knowledge, and media, and it therefore creates social inequality.

Hegemony is gained through the control of ideas, where ideology plays an important role. It is obtained through consent by the subordinate people to an
idea proposed by the powerful person, group, and institution (Jones, 2006). Discourse analysis here is seen as an effort to identify how the idea operates in social life, is institutionalised by power, and leads to the creation of a social inequality. Therefore, hegemony is not always gained through coercion, but through a smooth process by the dominant group to lead the dominated group by obtaining consent for a particular idea.

Another prominent discourse concept in social studies is the concept of object formation proposed by Michel Foucault (Fairclough, 2003). The analysis of discourse of this type is applied by analysing ‘statements’ that involve texts and utterances as the constituent elements of texts (Fairclough, 2003). According to Fairclough (2003, p. 25), “such analysis does not use a detailed analysis of text but it is how the statements or utterances in texts are governed by particular rules”. The text producers, who hold the power control, determine the rules that govern the construction of statements in texts. In Foucault’s discourse studies, power and control are exercised through discourses that classify, define, and position individuals as specific kinds of subjects, and influence the way they look at themselves, others, and the world around them (Jansen, 2000).

For Foucault, the purpose of discourse analysis in social studies is to examine the rules governing the statements in texts. These rules are determined by “the regime of knowledge in order to select which statements are to be accepted and to be considered as truth” (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). Different regimes will have different rules and, therefore, they will have different construction. As well as the notion of discourse selection and the rules governing it, discourse construction and justifying knowledge are used to discipline the subjects (individuals, groups, institutions) and what social position the subjects may occupy in their social life.

These two traditions – linguistic and critical social studies – were the inspiration for the emergence of CDA studies. Various concepts developed in these two traditions have been incorporated into each other to create a critical
social analysis that integrates linguistic or textual analysis and critical social studies. In other words, it is how the linguistic analysis can be used to investigate the construction of power in social life.

2.2.2. ‘Critical’: The Word Distinguishing CDA from the Non-Critical Discourse Studies

The word ‘critical’ in CDA studies distinguishes it from other types of discourse analysis (called non-critical discourse analysis). The term ‘critical’ is defined as the orientation of social studies and research to contribute to critically examining and changing society, not just explaining and understanding the reality. This term can be traced back to the influence of the Frankfurt School of linguistics and Jurgen Habermas (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). It was identified that the purpose of social study, including CDA, is to deconstruct a reality by criticising and initiating a change of social inequality and injustice that has been previously established by a particular power.

Further, the word ‘critical’ signifies the orientation of CDA studies to critically investigate power construction where this power might create social inequality or injustice. Critical investigation in CDA is conducted through an analysis of texts. Texts, whether they are produced in written, spoken, or audio-visual form, or the combination of these three forms (multimodality), are believed to contribute to power construction because texts are considered to be social events and play an important role in constructing social structure. Texts have a social function; they are not just merely linguistic constructions. Language used in the texts is considered to be a medium that carries out or delivers meaning to support a certain ideology or interest.

The ‘critical’ notion is actually taken from the discourse tradition developed in social studies, which mainly focuses on the concept of power. Critical analysis, especially in CDA studies, relies upon this concept. Critical
studies proposed by, for example, Gramsci and Foucault, have been the inspiration for CDA prominent figures such as Fairclough in his socio-linguistic approach, Van Dijk in his socio-cognitive approach, and Wodak in her discourse historical approach. These scholars have formulated critical discourse studies that have been oriented to textual linguistic analysis.

The efforts of these scholars, therefore, have turned the abstract analysis of power in social studies into the more technical and concrete analysis of linguistics. The background assumptions of their approach are based on the belief that textual analysis can contribute to an analysis of power construction in a particular social context. McKenzie (2006) argues that an analysis of discourse can be seen as a political intervention that is employed to challenge a particular dominant discourse. The dominant discourses are constructed by certain individuals or groups to gain power and privileged access to public resources, and they may deny the existence of others, especially minority groups.

In its further development, such studies have been extended to find a more complex relationship between texts, social actors, text production, text dissemination, text interpretation, and the political purposes underpinning the texts. The discourse studies should also consider the interrelationship between verbal and non-verbal aspects of interactions (Wodak, 2010). This extension is based on the assumption that the accomplishment of particular political purposes can be achieved through the use of texts. Texts can bring about both short-term and long-term changes (Fairclough, 2003). In the short term, they can contribute to the change in knowledge, belief, attitude, and values. In the longer-term, texts can shape people’s identity.

Based on the review of the terms ‘critical’ and ‘discourse’ above, CDA could essentially be defined as the analysis of verbal and non-verbal forms of texts in a particular social context of action and interaction in order to contribute to not only understand and explain a reality, but also to criticise and, if possible, gradually change it. The reality referred to here is the reality of social or political
power, which is closely related to a creation of inequality between the powerful (the holders of power) and the powerless.

Therefore, the critical study of discourse, to distinguish it from the non-critical study, investigates deliberate attempts by individuals or groups to gain and maintaining power through texts or discourse constructions. It also identifies ideological interests that are established in the texts, and assists readers to understand the true social reality and to initiate a social change. Thus, research on CDA should take a socio-political position (Van Dijk, 2001).

CDA should also pay particular attention to the relationship between language and power (Wodak & Reisigl, 2001). Wodak and Reisigl (2001) convincingly point out that language in the written and spoken texts can be used to attain power. It is not only because positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation can be constructed in a text, but also because it can lead the thoughts and opinions of other people cognitively to a particular position, for example, hatred against a certain group.

In his socio-cognitive approach to CDA, Van Dijk (1996) argues that the investigation of cognition in CDA studies is one of the important elements in the field. It is because power nowadays is gained through persuasion. Because power is no longer gained through coercion, persuasion through texts and talks is an effective way to influence the minds of people. When consent is taken through this persuasive process, the text producer can control the minds of the text recipients (Van Dijk, 1996). However, according to Gotsbachner (2001, p. 750), when talking about discrimination or discriminatory discourse, “if discrimination is always exerted openly, where it is prone to challenge and criticism by other social actors, its effect possibly would be more limited”.

In his socio-linguistics approach, Fairclough (1992, 2003) states that language in CDA is seen as a social practice. The practice of using language is a domain of social action and interaction because it considers the context where the language is used. In Fairclough’s (2003) point of view, “language is an
irreducible part of social life, and it is dialectically interconnected with other elements of social life”. People act and interact in their social life using language.

Fairclough (1992) calls his discourse concept Textually Oriented Discourse Analysis (TODA). He develops his concept of discourse by dividing discourse into three levels: (i) discourse as text, (ii) discourse as discursive practice, and (iii) discourse as social practice. The first level refers to the use of language in structural and grammatical ways. The second level refers to text production, dissemination, and interpretation by social actors or agents. The last level refers to how the power that is constructed and mediated in the texts is then exercised in society. These three levels are closely related in CDA to reveal the salient roles of discourse in society.

Blackledge (2005) later extends Fairclough’s concept by saying that CDA studies should focus on both micro-analysis of language and macro-analysis of social practice and change. Therefore, CDA defends a belief that social life, or, more precisely, social problems, need to be investigated through the combination of language and social analyses (Fairclough, 1995).

Therefore, it can be stated that a CDA study should investigate both linguistic texts and the social characteristics surrounding the linguistic texts that contribute to gaining and maintaining power over others. A text here may not be defined in a narrow sense, by saying that it is just in a written form, but should be defined here as all symbolic forms that contribute to meaning construction in a particular social context. In a process of action and interaction, many symbolic forms are attached to a text: for example, social position of text producers or actors, what institution he/she represents, and what discourse genre is being used. The last purpose of discourse is to gain and maintain power in order to have privileged access to public resources such as wealth, jobs, and official positions. This definition of CDA is used as part of the theoretical framework of this thesis. However, the author was open to new concepts if found in the data to allow the author to expand them.
2.3. Discourse Strategies in CDA

Among many strategies provided by critical discourse analysis studies, two strategies have been gaining a great deal of attention, particularly for investigating the discourse presentation of minorities in texts. The strategies are discriminatory discourse strategies, which are mainly used to examine negative discursive portraits of certain minority individuals or groups, and resistance discourse strategies, which are mainly used to investigate how these minorities resist, challenge, or argue against the oppressive discourses. The selection and use of these strategies are in line with what Van Dijk (1995b, p. 18) explicitly states about one of the characteristics of CDA, which is that “much work in CDA deals with the discursively enacted or legitimated structures and strategies of dominance and resistance in social relationship”.

In CDA studies concerning discourse presentations of individuals or social groups and their discourse strategies, there are two broad branches of study that are connected to each other. They are those that focus on examining how dominant discourses are constructed to discriminate (i.e. present negatively) against particular individuals or social groups, and how resistance discourses are created by the dominated groups in order to argue against the dominant discourses. The following section provides a broad overview of these two branches of studies of discourses and their strategies (discriminatory and resistance) in investigating issues associated with minorities.

2.3.1. Studies on Discriminatory Discourse Strategies

Discrimination or discriminatory practices constructed in discourses against particular social groups have been widely analysed by many researchers. The analyses have convincingly revealed that the process of discrimination is mainly constituted through the use of linguistic/discourse strategies to construct negative presentation and prejudice against, for example, immigrants, ethnic
groups, refugees, asylum seekers, minority employees, women, and Muslims. Certain negative presentations are constructed to establish biased perspectives of the groups being negatively portrayed in texts.

Discrimination is one of the many concerns of CDA studies. It is seen as a social problem, which is reflected in a form of inequality or injustice experienced by certain individuals or groups. This inequality provides particular individuals or groups with a privilege to access public resources that others cannot enjoy. According to Bowen (2010, p. 1750), “discrimination exists when certain individuals or groups do not enjoy the same rights or privileges as do members of other groups in the society”. Similarly, Graumann (2014)\(^3\) states that “discrimination is to make different and then disadvantage others; denying members of certain social group access to resources that are granted to other groups”.

In Indonesian Law Number 39/1999 concerning human rights, article 1, paragraph 3, states that discrimination is

any restrictions, abuses, and exclusions, either directly or indirectly, which are based on discrimination against human based on religion resulting in reduction, deviation or elimination of recognition and implementation of human rights either individually or collectively in politics, economy, law, social, culture, and all other life aspects.

Discrimination denies the rights of particular individuals or groups (i.e. minority groups) on the one hand, and provides wide access and protects the rights of others (mostly dominant parties) on the other hand. The discrimination is created by restricting, abusing, or excluding minority groups from any access to public resources, such as jobs, wealth, and education. Especially for this study, such

\(^3\) The definition is found in a research paper entitled Discriminatory Discourse: Conceptual and Methodological Problems. The paper is written by Graumann on his research project concerning ‘Verbal Discrimination’ at the University of Heidelberg, Germany. It was downloaded from www.psychologie.uni-heidelberg.de/institutsberichte/SFB245/SFB071.pdf.
restriction and exclusion are based on religion. This study follows the freedom perspective as presented in CDA studies that rejects discrimination restricting the minority rights because such restriction can establish social inequality and injustice, denying minority rights, and denying minority access to social resources. To establish such freedom, government should provide the same access for both majority and minority groups and respect their rights to carry out their own religious belief.

In studies concerning discourse presentation, the process of discrimination may be constructed through the logic of the dichotomy of difference, ‘Us versus Them’, ‘In-group versus Out-group’, ‘Majority versus Minority’, ‘Self versus Others’, and ‘Positive versus Negative’. The dichotomy may constitute, for example, a positive image or portrait attributed to ‘Us’ and a negative presentation of ‘Them’, which is created using some discourse strategies.

Discriminatory discourses can be created in texts and they are deliberately created by text producers against others. Certain individuals or groups are discursively discriminated against when they are presented or depicted negatively in texts (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Van Dijk, 1993a, 1998, 2002; Wodak & Reisigl, 1999, 2001, 2007) using discriminatory discourse strategies. The discriminatory discourses may be based on some social categories, such as race, religion, or economic status. The victims of discrimination are mainly minority groups (Flowerdew et al., 2002).

Discourses (e.g. texts or talks) constructed by dominant groups or institutions may express or signal prejudice, discrimination, and racism toward minority groups (Van Dijk, 1993c). According to Wodak and Reisigl (1999, 2001, 2007), racism is manifested discursively where the racist opinions and beliefs are produced and reproduced by means of discourse. In Van Dijk’s (1993c) study of discursive reproduction of racism created by white people in Europe, he found that “the white dominant group is able to reproduce its abuse of
power only through an integrated system of discriminatory practices and sustaining ideologies and other social cognitions” (p. 97).

Discriminatory practices are enacted against minority groups by, for example, derogation, intimidation, inferiorisation, and exclusion in everyday conversations, institutional dialogues, letters, evaluative reports, and laws (Van Dijk, 1993c, p. 97). All discriminatory practices may be initially introduced in verbal discrimination (Van Dijk, 2002). The discrimination and then domination is constituted through “a subtle form of communicative control of knowledge, beliefs, and opinion of those who have a few resources to oppose such influence” (Van Dijk, 2002, p. 101).

By concentrating on the socio-cognitive approach of discourse, Van Dijk (1989c) has developed a study of discourse on negative prejudice toward social groups by using the concepts of ‘mental representation’, ‘cognition’, and ‘mind control’. The prejudice and then discrimination against particular social groups are the result of negative mental representation in cognition, both in the processes of production as well as of interpretation, and negative construction through linguistic properties. Prejudice is both personal and social; it is shared and disseminated through communication.

There are several strategies that can be used to identify the linguistic properties of prejudice and discrimination in texts. The strategies can be divided into various types, followed by various linguistic moves or mechanisms. The strategy of positive self-presentation, for example, involves actions like denial, affirmation of exception, and transfer (Van Dijk, 1989c). A prejudice strategy may also focus on personal characteristics of the minority groups like their lack of education, lack of development, and other negative characteristics.

Studies concerning discriminatory discourse strategies have been previously carried out by many researchers, for example, Baker (2012), Baker et al., (2008), Barkhuizen and de Klerk (2006), Belmonte, McCabe, and Chornet-Roses (2010), Blackledge (2006), Cheng (2013), Cui (2010), Flowerdew et al.
(2002), Gotsbachner (2001), Goodman (n.d.), Graumann (n.d.), Izadi and Biria (2007), Khosraviani (2009), Ndlovu (2008), Rasinger (2012, Smith and Waugh (2008), and Tahir (2013). No critical discourse study on a religious minority group, in particular the Ahmadiyya sect, was found. The absence of studies on discriminatory discourse practices against this sect leaves a gap in the information and results in a lack of understanding about how such a group is discursively discriminated against, why they are discriminated against, and what dominant discourses may have been used to discredit it.

Moreover, religiously based discrimination against minority religious groups may have been occurring in many places around the world, particularly in countries, such as Indonesia, the USA, Pakistan, or Australia, that have minority religious groups. Thus, critical analysis on how such groups are discursively presented or depicted in texts will not only fill the information gap in the literature of recent discriminatory discourse strategies and their linguistic strategies, but also provide new insight into the nature of discrimination against religious minority groups through discourse presentations.

Flowerdew et al. (2002) investigated the discriminatory discourses created in new reports against Chinese ethnic groups from Mainland China living in Hong Kong. In the news published by the South China Morning Post, the Chinese immigrants were negatively presented in its news reports using some discriminatory strategies. The immigrants are negatively attributed as being ‘poor’, ‘dirty’, ‘unemployable’, ‘uneducated’, ‘uncivilised’, and ‘lazy’. They were also metaphorically presented – using a metaphor of water – as an ‘influx’, ‘flood’, and ‘burden’, which could have a tremendous social impact on Hong Kong society.

Other negative presentations were constructed by using labelling mechanisms to reinforce negative views of immigrants. These were achieved by collocating the word immigrant with ‘illegal’, ‘illegitimate’, and ‘over-stayers’ who have illegitimate status and conduct illegal activities. The immigrants were
also considered to be a threat to the interests and privileges of the dominant groups, public order, and political stability. The ‘blaming the victim’ strategy was also constructed to accuse the immigrants of being the creators of all kinds of problems in the Hong Kong Community (Flowerdew et al., 2002).

Cheng (2013) investigated the social exclusion of immigrants in Australia, which lies behind the concept of racism. The exclusion is carried out by Australian politicians by creating the discourse of ‘difference’ in parliamentary debate about immigration and citizenship (p. 51). In this study, Cheng explores how politicians discursively construct borders around Australia (who may or may not enter Australia) to exclude immigrants. A cultural difference is created through the discourse of “cultural superiority” (p. 56). Australia is depicted as a country that has more advanced cultural values than other countries. Those who want to enter Australia have to be able to accept these values and those who cannot are not allowed to live in the country. The superiority image is created by establishing English as a “dominant language” (p. 58). Those who want to have Australian citizenship have to be proficient in English and this is unquestionable. The language dominance is presented as something natural and it has been taken for granted as an historical fact, not as a construction of the present day government.

Similar investigation on the issue of immigrants in Australian citizenship and immigration acts was also carried out by Ndlovu (2008). He (2008) examined Australia’s immigration policy or legislation, that is, the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 or the so-called ‘White Australia Policy’, which has now been analysed through an historical approach of Critical Discourse Analysis. The focus of this study is the application of language proficiency tests, which were set up by the Australian Federal Government for immigrants of European background (especially those who were not from the United Kingdom) and non-European countries, especially immigrants from Asian countries. The implicit racism of this test is in the use of language terms that are unknown to the immigrants. The language test is employed to restrict the number of immigrants
entering Australia and to enforce the cultural difference between the Australians and the immigrants.

Similar to this study, racism in the language testing policy was also investigated by Blackledge (2006) in England. The background of this language racism is in the ‘race riots’ that happened in the north of England in 2001 between young British Asian men and young White British men. Because of this riot, the British Department of Immigration passed a national law that requires spouses of British citizens to demonstrate their proficiency in English. The focus of this study is on ‘Islamophobia’ against British Asian men, especially those from Pakistan and Bangladesh who are identified as Muslims. The racism actively concerns with Muslims who have different cultural characteristics and language backgrounds from the White British. These non-British people are categorised as ‘other’ and are thus different from the majority.

The discourse presentation of cultural difference to exclude a particular ethnic group is also found in Cui’s work (2010). The group exclusion analysis was used to investigate discourse on Chinese ethnic groups in Canada, as expressed through the publication of cartoon images in Canadian Illustrated News. The image originated from a popular sobriquet for a Chinaman, perhaps derived from Bret Harte’s poem of Truthful James. Cui (2010) argues that hatred against Chinese people in Canada has long been established in various text genres in Canadian history. This hatred can be observed through the branding of Chinese ethnic groups as ‘an inassimilable group’ in relation to Canadian culture. The Chinese immigrants are excluded based on cultural differences because they cannot ‘drink whisky’, ‘talk politics’, and ‘vote’ like the Canadians do.

Another CDA study concerning discourse representation of immigrants was conducted by Belmonte et al. (2010). Following an analysis of media press, they argue that the negative representations against immigrant groups in Spain are constructed through the strategy of ‘quoted utterances’. Some voices or utterances of the immigrants are quoted in the press, but some others are omitted.
Quotation of some and omission of others are discursive strategies to select voices or utterances that may be used to support the ideology of text producers, as well as to exacerbate the negative portrait of the groups being presented in texts.

Rasinger (2012) uses collocation analysis to examine news headlines in the *Cambridge Evening News* about immigrants from Eastern Europe that were published between July 2006 and August 2008. In his findings, the word ‘migrants’ or ‘immigrants’ co-occurred with the word ‘workers’ in plural form, thus presenting them as ‘mass labour’ who come to England to cause crimes, conflicts, and problems. Then, the frequent use of the word ‘police’ to handle immigrants also connotatively imposes the negative image of the immigrants. Further, the word ‘migrant’ was also collocated with the word ‘influx’ to construct meaning of huge flow or flood causing problems that should be blocked.

Beside collocation, Rasinger (2012) also uses the analysis of lexical choice and of metaphorical expressions. Lexical choice means the selection of words that convey a particular meaning to readers. Words and their occurrences are used to show the ideological perception and opinion of the text producers or authors against particular issues. With regard to metaphor, according to Charteris-Black (2005), metaphorical expressions generate ‘semantic tension’. Rasinger’s study shows that a violent water-based metaphor is used by some journalists to associate migrants with the strongly negative connotations of a ‘threat’, with expressions such as ‘flood of immigrants’, ‘rising stream of migrant workers’, ‘population surge’, and ‘fuelled by migrants’. All of these expressions portray migrants as negative agents producing crimes, conflicts, and other negative events, and also how immigration is linked to unaccountable problems, including crimes.

Baker et al. (2008) focus on methodological synergy between critical discourse analysis and corpus linguistics to examine discourse about ‘Refugees,
Asylum Seekers, Immigrants, and Migrants’ (abbreviated as RASIM) in the UK (United Kingdom) press. They argue that analytical tools of corpus linguistics, for example, collocation, concordance, and word occurrences, may contribute to CDA study on negative representations of social groups of the RASIM. The analysis found that RASIM are presented negatively, for instance, as actors in economic problems (economic burden and threat). RASIM are accused of being troublemakers who have had negative impact by creating problems of economy and security. The words refugees, asylum seekers, immigrants, and migrants are frequently collocated with words containing negative meanings.

Smith and Waugh (2008), in an analysis of rhetorical strategies used by the United States anti-immigrant organisation (Minuteman Project abbreviated as MMP) on its website, also find that immigrants (in this case, Mexican immigrants) are negatively depicted. The linguistic strategy of positive self- and negative other-presentations is used by the organisation founders, that is, they positively present themselves, but portray the immigrants negatively. The immigrants are negatively depicted as the source of potential threat to the USA’s national security and a source of job competition. Further, the rhetorical strategies used to portray immigrants negatively are derogatory metaphors.

With the use of such a metaphor, the immigrants are depicted as ‘chaotic’ and ‘destructive’. They are illustrated as illegal aliens who are ‘dangerous’, ‘threatening’, ‘predatory’, ‘barbaric’, ‘numerous’, ‘unstoppable’, ‘vengeful’, ‘unpleasant’, and ‘disagreeable’. While presenting this derogatory description of the immigrants, the organisation founders present themselves positively as ‘lawful’, ‘fair’, ‘knowledgeable’, ‘protective of the US’, and ‘patriotic leaders’ who are concerned with the welfare and future of the country.

In his analysis of discriminatory speech, Grauman (n.d.) argues that the establishment and maintenance of discrimination, as seen in inequality and injustice toward the target group, is particularly achieved through communicative actions, namely speaking and writing. He states that the process of discrimination
through verbal communication is indirect and implicit rather than direct and explicit. In certain texts, such discriminatory speeches are called indirect when ‘it is not directed to the victims’ but they are more attributable to characteristics attached to the victims.

In these direct and indirect speeches of discrimination, linguistic properties concerning indirectness, such as the use of the personal pronouns she, he, or they, are preferable to use rather than directly mentioning the name of the discriminated individuals or groups (Grauman, n.d.). The use of indirect speech, which is mainly implicit, is emphasised in such speeches. Although the discrimination is presented implicitly, the social effect (perlocutionary force) of the speeches to the hearers or readers may contribute significantly to an establishment of discrimination.

Another study concerning discursive discrimination was conducted by Gotsbachner (2001) under the topic of ‘xenophobic discourse’. Xenophobia is simply defined as a fear of strangers or foreigners. Such a phobia is used by Viennese people in Austria as a common sense of knowledge or inner logic when talking about immigrants from Eastern Europe (e.g. Serbia, Bosnia, and Yugoslavia). According to Gotsbachner (2001), there is a self-constructed inner logic among the Viennese people that is sustained as a truth. The CDA analysis reveals how the xenophobic discourse about immigrants was normalised as common knowledge in Austrian society.

In his study, Gotsbachner (2001) analyses naturally occurring talk in the form of gossip as discourse data and reports a number of findings. He divided his analysis into three steps: prejudiced social knowledge, the inner logic of xenophobic discourse, and xenophobic normality in interethnic interaction concentrated on two discourse topics, namely discourses of ‘poor foreigners’ and ‘cultural difference’. He found that the dominant group of Viennese people present themselves positively and, at the same time, construct negative images against immigrants. This strategy of positive self and negative other
presentations is constituted through social demarcation (‘Viennese people live in expensive flats, upper middle-class houses, or purely Austrian houses, where the immigrants cannot afford it’ (p. 735); “immigrants are janitors” (p. 736), “they have no money” (p. 736)); devaluation or exception of good characterisation of immigrants (“diligence is not a personal characteristic of immigrants but rather it is an effect of social pressure” (p. 735)); and the use of personal pronouns (‘we’ when refer of individuals, actions, and groups of Vienna people as well as the use of ‘they’ to refer to the immigrants).

Further, the main point of the inner logic of ‘foreigners are poor’ underlies the statements or opinions of the Viennese people. The statements may be differently expressed in different contexts, directly or indirectly, for example, “the immigrants do not have money” (p. 737) or in interrogative form “How could they send money back home when they always complain that they pay too much for their flats here?” (p. 737). A similar sense of cultural difference is also constructed by pointing to bad characters of immigrants, for instance, “they have deviant mentality, uneducated, lazy, work-shy and they are not able to adapt with the dominant culture” (Gotsbachner, 2001, p. 738). Other negative presentations of immigrants in discourse are “Austria one day will not be Austria anymore” (739); “They (immigrants) breed like rabbits” (p. 739); and “Foreigners live from our assets” (p. 736).

Similar discriminatory discourse practices against asylum seekers are found in the United Kingdom (the UK) in a study conducted by Goodman (n.d.). According to Goodman (n.d.), the discrimination against the asylum seekers is considered to be an effort to maintain social cohesion of the British people. In this context, asylum seekers are considered to be a group of people that can destroy British social cohesion. The concept of this social cohesion relies upon a racist assumption. The construction of harsh policies against asylum seekers, as justified by the UK labour politicians in their arguments, is broadcast in television debates. Such a construction is created to maintain ‘a good
community’. In this context, arrivals of asylum seekers to the UK are considered to have brought social problems, especially to social relationship and cohesion.

In his analysis, Goodman (n.d.) uses common analytical tools concerning discriminatory discourse practices, for example, ‘positive self and negative other presentations’ and ‘blaming the victims’. The politicians present themselves as individuals or social groups who care about secure social relationship, while, at the same time, presenting the asylum seekers as destroyers of it. The politicians’ arguments are used to justify the prejudicial race assumption stipulated in harsh policies to enforce attitudes of hatred toward the asylum seekers.

Another similar study that covers discourse presentation of ‘refugees’, ‘asylum seekers’, and ‘immigrants’ in British newspapers was conducted by KhosraviNik (2009). KhosraviNik investigated the discursive presentation on the three social groups during two major events, namely the Balkan conflict in 1999 and the British general election in 2005. In those two social events, the three groups were presented differently. During the Balkan conflict, the three groups were presented positively, while the Serbian officials were portrayed negatively. In relation to the British general election, in contrast, the newspapers presented the three groups negatively, while depicting the British officials positively.

In relation to the macro-structure, the newspapers selected discourse topics that showed their sympathy to Kosovo refugees. The refugees were presented positively as helpless, desperate, and powerless. The newspapers also constructed the plight experienced by the refugees and, at the same time, the perpetrator of the conflict (Serbian authorities) that caused the plight is negatively presented as the creator of human problems and victimise the refugees.

Negative discourse presentation against Muslims, is reported in Izadi and Biria’s work (2007). They investigated the discourse of the United States’ policies on the Iranian nuclear program as elaborated in the headlines of three of
the most powerful American newspapers, namely *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and *The Wall Street Journal*. The negative depiction is presented using the strategy of collocations.

In so many headlines found in the three newspapers, collocation was used to present Iran, as well as Islam and Muslims, as a ‘threat’ and ‘source of terrorism’. The collocation can be identified in the following expressions: ‘the rogue nation’, ‘the danger flows from Mullah’, ‘the Mullah’s nuke’, ‘the Mullah’s bomb’, ‘Iran’s bomb’, and ‘one more round on Iran’s nuke’. All of these collocations were ideologically selected to construct a negative image for Iran, Islam, and Muslims.

The negative presentation against Muslims using the collocation strategy is also found in Baker (2012). He analyses newspaper texts published by the British press from 1998 to 2009 in newspapers such as *The Star*, *The Mirror*, *The Sun*, *The Daily Mail*, and *The Daily Express*. By using a corpus linguistic approach, he collected 200,000 articles (143 million words) and identified the occurrences of the word ‘Muslim’ in singular and plural forms. In his finding, ‘Muslim’ was very frequently used and collocated with extreme belief terms such as ‘extremist(s)’, ‘militant(s)’, and ‘fundamentalist(s)’, in order to build a negative perception about ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’.

Another negative presentation against Muslims is also reported in a CDA study conducted by Tahir (2013). He examined a newspaper article published in the *Washington Post* (9 February 2006), which talks about the protests of Muslim individuals, groups, and governments in response to blasphemous cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in European Newspapers. By using Van Dijk’s (2006a) analytical framework of positive self and negative other presentations using the ‘othering’ strategy, he found that the Muslims, whom the protests were against, were presented as ‘the others’ and derogatory terms such as ‘suspected’, ‘enemies’, ‘ringleaders’, ‘radicals’, and ‘conservative’ were used (Tahir, 2013, p. 744).
Another group of CDA studies have focused on investigating how powerless or minority groups being discriminated against argue against the discourses that may have undermined them. Such discourse presentations are classified as resistance discourses. The following section reviews studies on the discourses and the strategies that are created by dominated or minority groups when arguing against the discourses perceived to have discredited them.

2.3.2. Studies on Resistance Discourse Strategies

According to Foucault (1990 as cited in Medina 2011, p. 10), resistance is something inherent in the exercise of (political) power, that is, “resistance is never in position of exteriority in relation to power”. The relationship between power or power abuse and resistance could be seen as ‘two sides of a coin’, where the existence of one side is determined by the existence of the other side. Because power or power abuse creates inequality by providing a privilege to certain individuals or groups while denying others, the resistance should be seen as an attempt to regain equality.

Controlled or discriminated individuals or groups are those who have no or less power to access public resources, such as knowledge, media, wealth, and political access. Less access to public resources, however, does not mean that they cannot challenge or argue against the discriminatory discourses that may have undermined them. Some studies have revealed that resistance against discrimination or an attempt to defend their own belief or existence from discourse attacks have been organised by some minority groups. However, such discursive resistance has received less attention than that concerned with discriminatory discourses. According to Lazarus-Black and Hirsch (1994 as cited in Becket and Hoffman, 2005, p. 125), resistance is “any actions that lay bare the historical and constructed nature of hegemonic social structures and the inequalities they generate and sustain”. In a study of anti-racist talk, Tilbury (2000) argues that anti-racist talk opposes discourse that tries to establish,
sustain, and reinforce oppressive power on those who have been defined as being racially or ethnically different.

In their argument about the relationship between discourse and racism, Wodak and Reisigl (1999) argue that discourse can serve to criticise, delegitimise, and argue against racist opinions and practices. It means that in a discourse analysis study, any discriminatory discourses can be argued against. According to this concept, dominant discourses that are considered to be discriminatory against certain individuals or groups can be challenged. Those who are discriminated against may use particular discursive strategies in their texts to resist discourse attacks.

In the literature, there are a number of studies that have addressed resistance discourses in different social contexts. Although the studies have relied a great deal upon the notion of power and inequality, some of them do not strictly use linguistic strategies. Therefore, resistance discourse practices can be divided into two strategies: linguistic and non-linguistic. Compared to the investigation of discriminatory discourses, the analysis of resistance discourses has been explored much less in previous studies. Similar to discriminatory discourse studies, the resistance discourse studies also lack an understanding about how religious-based minority groups around the world (including the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia) try to argue against offensive discourses that may have undermined them.

The studies of resistance discourse can be found in the works conducted by McKenzie (2006) in the context of education; Prieur (2006) in the discourse of disability; Tilbury (2000) in the issue of racism; Jansen (2000) in the context of war; Van Laer and Janssens (2010) in the workplace discourse; and De Cock (1998) in organisational discourse. These studies have clearly shown that individuals and minority groups in a particular social context seek to challenge the dominant power.
In the context of New Zealand’s social and political situations, for example, Tilbury (2000) argues that there is some resistance discourse that has been attempted by the indigenous people (Pakeha and Maori) to challenge the racism discourse that had been created by their government. The government produced a traditional stereotype concerning land productivity that considers “certain groups of people as being more productive than others” (p. 2). The indigenous people are considered to be less productive. To argue against this, the Pakeha people constructed a discourse of ‘criminal’, using the linguistic property of naming tactics, directed against the government, to challenge the racism discourse of productivity it had constructed. The Pakeha argued that the government has misused the land utilisation and acted illegally (criminal) by using the land for recreational purposes, specifically as a golf course. The resistance action using the naming tactics shows that linguistic properties can be used by a minority group to challenge the dominant discourse.

Another resistance attempted by another New Zealand indigenous people (the Maori) was to challenge the race relation of ‘luckiness’ discourse (Tilbury, 2000). The government said that the condition of indigenous people in New Zealand is better or luckier compared to those (the Aboriginal people) in Australia or particular ethnics in Bosnia. This strategy of comparison, for a government, was expected to make the indigenous people feel grateful and to stop any complaints from them regarding their situation. The Maori resisted the discourse of luckiness by saying that “this does not mean that the situation is perfect or that it cannot be improved” (Tilbury, 2000, p. 3).

With regard to power sharing in government, the indigenous people argued against the discourse of “the majority should have more representation than the minority in government” (Tilbury, 2000, p. 5) using the discourse of ‘proportionality of power sharing’. They reject the argument for proportional representation based on majority and minority status (Tilbury, 2000). By using the liberal democratic ideal of equality, the indigenous people argued that the equal sharing of power should be attempted by government in order to truly
realise democracy. So, in this study, it was found that there are some resistance discourses and strategies employed to argue against some dominant discourses. Discourse of land productivity is argued against using the discourse of land misuse as an illegal action, discourse of luckiness is resisted using the discourse of imperfection, and discourse of ‘proportional representation depending on majority and minority status’ is challenged using the discourse of equal power sharing.

Another study of resistance discourse is found in Jansen’s (2000) work concerning the Serbian protest. In this article, Jansen (2000) quotes the definition of resistance from Routledge’s (1996) Critical Geopolitics and Terrains of Resistance, saying that “resistance refers to any action, imbued with intent, that attempts to challenge, change, or retain particular circumstances relating to social relations, processes, and institutions” (p. 393). The work focuses on how the Serbian demonstrators argued against two political powers, the Slobodan Milosevic’s regime in 1996 – 1997 and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation), for example, the 1999 anti-NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) protest.

According to Jansen (2000), these two social waves of protest are not linked and each of them constructs different discourses. In challenging Milosevic’s regime, the demonstrators constructed a discourse of democratic dissent, while the discourses of Serbian national interest, pacifism, and anti-western feelings were presented to challenge NATO. Although the discourses are different, the strategies used by the protestors in those two political events are similar.

There are three discursive strategies of resistance concerning self-image that the demonstrators used: ‘victimisation’, ‘underdog’, and ‘rebel’ (Jansen, 2000). With regard to the strategy of victimisation, the demonstrators presented themselves as victims in both protest actions: ‘Citizens as victims’ to challenge Milosevic’s regime and ‘Serbs as victims’ to argue against NATO’s power. The
motif of underdog is constructed through the image of David struggling against Goliath. The Serbs presented themselves as inferior or powerless groups of people struggling against the stronger opponents of Milosevic’s and NATO’s power. The resistance discourse motif of rebel was constructed by representing the Serbs as anti-authoritarian and dissent rebels who are irrational, passionate, potentially dangerous, unruly, and a little mad.

Another study of resistance discourse was undertaken by Prieur (2006) regarding disability conception. By analysing policy shift about the definition of disability in British Columbia (BC), she found that BC’s government had radically changed the access to social assistance for poor people with and without disabilities. Under this new definition, and then legislation, some people who previously received the benefit, may lose it. Disability advocates and their supporters argued against this policy shift. In order to challenge it, they argued that the new rules appeared to be designed to cut the numbers of people receiving benefits by restricting the definition of disabled in a way that makes it difficult for people with mental illness to qualify. In her findings, Prieur (2006, p. 108) argues that “the resistance discourse is presented to argue against the government’s discourse of concealment, which considers the policy shift as a neutral administrative procedure”.

De Cock (1998), in his study about organisational change and discourse, reveals how cultural change programs in two British manufacturing organisations were achieved. In the study, De Cock reveals how organisational actors play an important role in both constructing hegemonic discourse (concerning structural, cultural, economic, and personal pressure) against the members of the organisation, and in creating discourse to argue against the hegemony.

In changing the organisational culture, the senior managers of the two manufacturing organisations imposed two approaches on their employees, Total Quality Management (TQM) and Business Processing Reengineering (BPR). These two approaches were introduced in order “to increase organisational
effectiveness and efficiency in order to ensure survival in an increasingly competitive market” (De Cook, 1998, p. 6). However, some lower level managers disagreed with these new approaches and showed their resistance by constructing discourses using the discourse strategies of ironic expression and contradictions. The ironic expression strategy can be seen in the following arguments: “TQM was wonderfully done. We are going to become a better organisation, therefore you will love TQM, whether you like it or not” (De Cook, 1998, p. 10). The strategy of contradiction is shown in the following statement: “TQM, continuous improvement, we have got to give a better service, and yet our resources are cut again and again” (De Cock, 1998, p. 11).

Another study of resistance discourse, in the workplace setting, was carried out by Van Laer and Janssens (2010) in Belgium. In their study, resistance discourse was created by a minority group of employees of Turkish and Maghrebi descent (Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian) against dominant discourses that were trying to control them. In this workplace setting, the minority employees were mainly underestimated and stereotypically depicted as ‘low-skilled’, ‘unemployed’, and individuals of foreign descent who are unwilling to work hard (Van Laer & Janssens, 2010, p. 8).

The dominant discourse was constructed through opposition between indigenous and non-indigenous employees based on ethnic consideration. Those who were categorised as comers, particularly Muslim labour immigrants, were considered to not completely belong or to be real Belgians. These Muslim labour immigrants were always associated with or linked to social problems, criminality, abusing the social security system, and increased unemployment, terrorism, and extremism. These negative depictions were also reinforced by depicting the immigrants as economically weak social groups because they do not want to learn the Dutch language. The discourse of opposition was reinforced by saying that “the immigrants’ values are contradictory to Western values” (Van Laer & Janssens, 2010, p. 8).
Some resistance discourses concentrated on how the employees from particular ethnic group deal with the specific position they are given in the discourse and negotiate negative meaning attached to them within the stereotypical discourses. The employees portrayed themselves as individuals who are suitable for specific economic position. This portrait was used to argue against the negative depiction as economically weak groups. Some of the employees also rejected being identified based on their ethnic and ethnic descent. They wanted to be acknowledged as professional and competent workers without being individually tied to their descent and origins. Another strategy of resistance was by avoiding talking about specific topics that are specifically connected to a faith, such as Islam, because there is a negative perception about Islam among the Belgian people.

The investigation of the Ahmadiyya issue has been neglected in previous studies from the perspectives of both discriminatory and resistance discourse studies, and, therefore, it remains underdeveloped. The neglect has led to a poor understanding of the Ahmadiyya issue from a discourse perspective. The following section reviews previous studies concerning the sect, both internationally and domestically in Indonesia.

2.4. Studies on the Ahmadiyya around the World and in Indonesia

Ahmadiyya has been controversial in Islamic circles, not only in Indonesia, but also in many Muslim countries around the world. Since its establishment in 1889 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, this self-defined sect of Islam has attracted debate, particularly on Ahmad’s prophethood claim, which is a sensitive issue in Islam. Ahmadiyya followers, especially the Qadiani followers, maintain a belief that the Prophet Muhammad is not the last prophet of Islam, but there should be another prophet after him, that is, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. This belief is sharply contradictory to the belief of most Muslims around the world, who believe that Muhammad is the holder of the seal of prophethood.
Many studies, both in the international world and in Indonesia, have tried to analyse or examine the attitude to Ahmadiyya from the perspectives of sociology, history, comparative religion, human rights, social and economy, discrimination against minorities, laws and constitution, and freedom of religion. However, the literature suggests that studies on the Ahmadiyya issue using a CDA perspective, especially the use of discourse strategies, seem embryonic. Thus, there is a shortcoming in Ahmadiyya literature, particularly concerning how particular discourse presentations and their strategies contribute to the recent situation that is negatively affecting the Ahmadiyya groups in Indonesia, and whether they have been discriminated against or not. The following subsections (2.4.1 and 2.4.2) discuss the previous studies of Ahmadiyya around the world and in Indonesia.

2.4.1. Studies on the Ahmadiyya in the International World

In the Muslim world, repudiation of the existence and beliefs of Ahmadiyya has long persisted. In Pakistan, particularly in 1974, the Ahmadiyya sect was politically excluded from the Muslim community in the country through state legislation (Saeed, 2007, 2010). By using historical analysis, Saeed (2007, 2010) argues that although the Ahmadiyya followers claim to be a minority sect of Islam, the legislation passed in 1974 rendered them as non-Muslim minorities. Other legislation issued in 1984 (Anti-Islamic Activities of the Qadiani Group, Lahore Group, and Ahmadiis [Prohibition and Punishment] Ordinance) made the Ahmadiyya community the target of harassment (Saeed, 2010). This exclusion was reinforced by a sharp distinction between Ahmadiyya and the majority of Muslims in Pakistan concerning the last prophet in Islam. The majority of Pakistani Muslims believe that Muhammad was the last prophet sent by God, thereby he holds the seal of prophethood.

“An idea or belief, which is contrary to this seal of prophethood belief was considered as blasphemous” (Saeed, 2007, p. 135). The Jemaat Ahmadiyya
(Qadiani Ahmadiyya) maintains the belief that the founder of this sect, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, is a divine prophet of Islam and he should be the last prophet, not Muhammad. On the other hand, the Pakistani Muslims consider Ghulam Ahmad to be apostate and his followers should be excluded from the Muslim community because they are non-believers and are committing a heresy (Saeed, 2007).

Similar research findings regarding discrimination against the Ahmadiyya in Pakistan are also revealed by Jamil (2002). Using comparative analysis to compare the marginalisation of Ahmadiyya in Pakistan and the Baha’i in Iran, he argues that such marginalisation against Ahmadiyya adherents is reinforced by variables, such as the increase of political influence of fundamentalist ulama (Islamic clerics), the association of clerics with state support, and the creation of ‘purist’ Islamic state ideology (Jamil, 2002). The discrimination includes denial of the legal, political, and social rights of these two minority groups.

The fundamental issue triggering the discrimination or marginalisation of Ahmadiyya in Pakistan is also the debate about the seal of prophethood. Jamil (2002) finds that the recognition of Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet after Muhammad has raised a controversy among the majority of Muslims in Pakistan. If Saeed (2007) focuses on the relationship between the exclusion of Ahmadiyya with the formation of Pakistani Muslim citizenship, Jamil’s (2002) study concentrates on the increasing role of clerics in the political arena and the creation of a purist Islamic state ideology.

The Islamic clerics in Pakistan have a prominent role in excluding the Ahmadiyya communities from the Pakistani Muslim community. According to Jamil (2002), the significant role can be seen, at least, in two social and political events: the clerics managed to orchestrate anti-Ahmadiyya riots in various parts of the country, and they politically influenced the government and encouraged it to issue a blasphemy law, which was then used to persecute the Ahmadiyya community.
A study that undertook a more detailed description about the life and work of the founder of Ahmadiyya, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, and the role of the Ahmadiyya movement in the nineteenth and early twentieth century was carried out by Lavan (1970). In his doctoral thesis entitled “The Ahmadiyya Movement: Its nature and Its Role in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century India”, Lavan examined original source materials written by the Ahmadiyya itself (both in Urdu and English), non-Ahmadiyya sources primarily in English, archives of the government of India, and native newspaper reports. By using an historical analysis of comparative religion, Lavan’s thesis (1970) provides a view of the general condition of India, especially Gurdaspur and Qadian where the founder of Ahmadiyya grew up. This analysis reveals social, political, and religious backgrounds that provide the context and source of Ghulam Ahmad’s teachings. His research also provides rich information about the specific history of Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Christian missionaries, and the British Government in India.

Lavan (1970) argues that Ahmad and his Ahmadiyya movement pursued a religious renewal for a new Islamic century, including renewal of the concepts of prophethood and jihad (holy war). With regard to the former, Ghulam Ahmad is considered to be the successor of Muhammad. Pertaining to the latter, jihad with war is not an obligation in Islam. His ideas, inspiration, and religious understanding have been the central issues in establishing the Ahmadiyya movement, and these became the religious beliefs for his followers. His self-acknowledgements as the promised messiah, Mahdi, and being a prophet have been the main issues in the Ahmadiyya movement.

Another study of Ahmadiyya that employed comparative analysis of religions was carried out by Jones (1986). In this study, Jones compared the development of the Mormons in Christianity and Ahmadiyya in Islam, as both are denominations or sects within their respective religions. The Mormons and Ahmadiyya are both excluded from their mainstream religion. In his point of view, these two groups have some similarities: a charismatic leader, rejection of
their beliefs among the respective majority groups, and persecution against their followers. Another similarity is “they can survive and transform to be modern social and religious identities” (Jones, 1986, p. 40).

In his study, Jones (1986) clearly and chronologically explains Ahmadiyya, particularly its founder’s claim to be the messiah, Mahdi, and the prophet, and the split of the community of believers into two rival factions. Ghulam Ahmad claimed and acknowledged himself as the promised messiah on the grounds that it was assigned to him by God through divine revelations, and, in his view, it is justified by the holy Qur’an. He reinforced this claim by spreading his belief that Prophet Isa had died. This claim aimed at challenging many orthodox Muslims’ belief that Prophet Isa will return to Earth and save his people. In Ahmad’s belief, “he himself is the representation of Jesus’ spirit, thus the concept of world end with the return of the promised Messiah has come” (Jones, 1986, p. 43). It is claimed by orthodox Muslims that God will appoint a reformer or restorer (Mahdi or Mujaddid) of Islam at the beginning of every century after the death of Muhammad, and Ahmad claimed himself to be the appointed reformer of the fourteen century.

The Ahmadiyya sect is split into two groups, and Jones’ (1986) argument with regard to this split is similar to what has been argued in many other studies. The Qadiani Ahmadiyya acknowledges Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet, while the Lahore Ahmadiyya accepts Ghulam Ahmad only as a mujaddid (reformer), not a prophet. Besides the claim of prophethood, repudiation to pray with and behind a non-Ahmadi Muslim Imam seems to be the prominent controversy between Ahmadiyya and the mainstream Muslims. Politically, the support for this group from the British Government is another dominant factor that has resulted in conflict with the mainstream Muslim communities.

As well as being positioned as minorities in their respective religions, Ahmadiyya and the Mormons are parallel in their support for the empire or ruling government: Ahmadiyya supported the British ruler and the Mormons
backed the United States Government. Another similarity is their efforts to spread their version of the truth of their religion to all parts of the world through “organised missionary efforts” (Jones, 1986, p. 47).

From a sociological point of view, Anwar (1982) examined the place of Ahmadiyya in Islam and among the major religions in the world. Such analysis was used to investigate the social characteristics of the Ahmadiyya movement, which then, according to Anwar, played important social, cultural, and religious roles in Islamic cultures both in India and around the world. In his analysis, Anwar (1982) offers a new insight regarding the Ahmadiyya movement by arguing that this movement has had an important role in shaping Islamic development in the world especially at the end of nineteenth century and in the early twentieth century. It is different from other works that concentrate on the contradiction between Ahmadiyya Islamic belief and the majority of Muslims (mostly Sunni); Anwar’s work provides a new idea that reveals the positive contribution of the Ahmadiyya to Islam. What has been acknowledged as a new interpretation of Islam, that is, the prophethood of its founder and his claim to be the messiah, has been instrumental in changing the behaviour of the majority of Muslims (Anwar, 1982). Anwar (1982) then argues that “the acceptance of the followers of Ahmadiyya on Ghulam Ahmad as the Messiah and a prophet has distinguished them from other established branches of Islam such as Sunni and Shia” (p. 73).

Balzani (2010) also provides an interesting analysis of Ahmadiyya, which has probably never been highlighted by other researchers, by using historical and anthropological examinations. He investigates the matter of dreams revealed by the Ahmadiyya founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, which then became one of the sources of Ahmad’s teaching and beliefs. The dreams became important in establishing Ahmadiyya charismatic foundations of organisational structure and personal belief, which guide the Ahmadiyya followers to maintain their belief. According to Balzani (2010, p. 296), “the founder of Ahmadiyya admits that he received divine revelation from God through dreams”. These dreams were then
used as the source of Ahmadiyya teachings, chronologically listed and compiled in his book called *Tazkirah* (Tadhkirah). These dreams seem to be the justification of Ahmad’s prophethood and some other claims, such as being Mahdi and the promised messiah (Balzani, 2010).

Balzani’s (2010) study provides relatively new information about one side of Ghulam Ahmad’s life, in particular, and Ahmadiyya, in general. Besides providing information about the Ahmadiyya founder, the study also explains how this religious group can survive and what salient factors influence its continuing survival and development. In his findings, Balzani (2010) states his belief that Ahmad’s dreams are the prominent factor that establishes the loyalty of his followers, particularly for providing continued guidance for his followers working individually and socially.

Further, in a social and economic perspective study, Saifullah (2008) investigated the social and economic roles played by the Ahmadiyya followers who migrated to Flanders, Belgium, in 1982 from countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh. He found several reasons for their migration to Flanders. The first reason related to human right problems they were experiencing in their original countries of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia. In these countries, the Ahmadiyya followers were treated unequally and their religious rights were not equally protected. For example, in Pakistan, they were excluded from the Muslim community. The second reason was the poor economic condition in their original countries, where they became unemployed and were given fewer chances to be involved in the job market. This lack of opportunities was also related to negative treatment meted out to them as a minority group and followers of what was considered ‘heretical sect’. Another major factor was that “Flanders seems to be the best place they could live as this city provides them, as immigrants, freedom of expression, equal opportunity in education, and facilities for health” (Saifullah, 2008, pp. 41-42).
Saifullah (2008) concludes that the Ahmadiyya community in Flanders has made positive contributions to social and economic situations in this city. This contribution cannot be separated from the policies of their leader (the fourth Caliph as the successor of the promised messiah), which must be implemented by the Ahmadiyya followers. These policies are about respecting local laws, loyalty to the state and government, social responsibility, and treating their newer generations better and properly.

From the above review of studies, it is clear that none have examined the Ahmadiyya using a CDA perspective or approach. The next section will review studies on the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia.

2.4.2. Studies on the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia

In Indonesia, studies on Ahmadiyya have been conducted by several scholars and organisations (especially NGOs). Most of them have concentrated on analysing the Ahmadiyya issue from the perspectives of the establishment of human rights, democracy, laws and constitution, the contribution of Ahmadiyya to the development of religious discourse, the analysis of majority versus minority framing, and the analysis of minoritisation of Ahmadiyya. The Setara Institute (the SI, a non-governmental organisation), for example, has concentrated on discriminatory practices against religious minority groups, especially the Ahmadiyya. In its annual reports from 2007 to 2012, the SI reported that discrimination against religious minority groups, especially Ahmadiyya, has occurred frequently. In 2007, for example, there were 21 violent attacks experienced by Ahmadiyya followers, and, in 2008, the violent attacks increased sharply to 238 attacks. This organisation did monitoring in several provinces.

Another study was conducted by Freedman and Tiburzi (2012). In their study about the development of democracy and the protection of minority rights
in Indonesia, they argue that minority communities (e.g. Ahmadiyya) have suffered violence and discrimination from majority communities and sometimes from the police or military. According to Freedman and Tiburzi (2012), the Indonesian Government does not provide full protection for the minority and, the state apparatus is also involved in worsening the problem. This reduced protection has resulted in the Ahmadiyya followers being the victims of several violent attacks.

From the perspective of human rights, the Ahmadiyya issue was analysed by Muktiono (2012). He argues that discrimination against religious minority groups in Indonesia is a paradox, because the government has acted seriously to put universal human rights into national law, but there are still many inconsistencies in establishing freedom of religion. This paradox still continues due to the absence or lack of any government effort to solve the discriminatory problems. The inconsistency can be seen from the weak law enforcement applied to punishing the actors or groups creating the violence and discrimination against the Ahmadiyya.

Khanif (2009) analysed the Ahmadiyya issue from the perspective of the implementation of the 1945 Constitution. According to him, this constitution comprehensively guarantees religious freedom but, at the same time, it only protects the interest of official religions such as Islam, Christianity, and Buddhism. He argues that despite this constitution being the highest legal canopy in the Indonesian legal system, it does not provide specific provision for minority rights. Therefore, there is no strong protection for the minority and the absence of this provision remains ‘a loophole’ that may be used by the majority and any other groups that have a particular interest in discriminating against the minority.

Another prominent researcher who is concerned with the Ahmadiyya issue in Indonesia is Ahmad Najib Burhani. Burhani (2013) investigated the response of Ahmadiyya to Christian missionary activities, which he considers it to be a positive contribution of Ahmadiyya to Indonesian Islam. Burhani (2013)
highlights that the contribution of Ghulam Ahmad and his Ahmadiyya to Islamic literature is the Ahmadiyya’s logical explanation about the contradiction of Christianity’s core belief of the death of Jesus. Such an explanation is highlighted by Burhani (2013) in order to show the superiority of Islam and to reveal the fallacy of this Christian faith.

Much of Ahmadiyya literature on Christianity has influenced and been used by Indonesia Muslims, such as those in Muhammadiyah, the Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia/DDII), the Foundation of the Propagation of Islam (Yayasan Penyiaran Islam/YAPI), and the Islamic Union (Persatuan Islam/Persis), when they are engaged with the issue of Christianity (Burhani, 2013).

In his work, Burhani (2013) also presents the distinction between the JAI and the GAI (Burhani, 2013). He argues that the GAI prefers to focus on intellectual movements by spreading its interpretation on Islam, especially in challenging Christianity. The JAI, meanwhile, concentrates on recruiting members, building branches in Indonesia, and on establishing an organisational chain.

Burhani (2013) claims that there was no Indonesian literature that had critically addressed the issue of Christianity in Indonesia before the arrival of the Ahmadiyya around the 1920s. During the late colonial period of Dutch, the GAI had seriously addressed the issue by “translating Ahmadiyya books on Christianity to the Dutch language while the JAI published similar books in Indonesian and Malay” (Burhani, 2013, p. 145).

The translation and publication of literature on Christianity made the JAI and the GAI prominent examples for how Islamic organisations in Indonesia should perceive and treat the Christian missionaries. The apologetic and polemic writing styles of Ahmadiyya books when dealing with these missionaries inspired the writing style of similar books published by Muhammadiyah. Burhani (2013) further argues that another Islamic organisation, the Foundation of the
Propagation of Islam, also published a number of books dealing with Christianity issues, following a writing style “that was quite similar to that of Ahmadiyya books” (p. 147). By providing these facts, it can be said that Ahmadiyya made a distinct contribution to Indonesian Islam, especially in dealing with Christianity issues.

Abel (2013) provides an important analysis of the persecution and discrimination against Ahmadiyya. He argues that the persecution and discrimination cannot be separated from the Indonesian Government’s framing of categories of majorities and minorities in Indonesian society. This framing led to the violent attacks against Ahmadiyya. Framing is a social event conducted by individuals or institutions in order to locate, perceive, and narrate others. This framing is used to “give meaning to life and all its action in relation to its environment” (Abel, 2013, p. 7). The framing theory on the Ahmadiyya issue determines the relationship between government, mainstream religion, and religious minority groups.

Abel (2013) argues that in two legal proclamations (Joint Ministerial Decree and Law PNPS 1965) and in the ‘Cikeusik Incident’, the Ahmadiyya sect is framed or positioned negatively as blasphemers and deviant sect. As well as this negative image, Ahmadiyya is also narrated through victimisation strategy as religious minority which its religious right is restricted (Abel, 2013). This negativisation is reinforced by establishing bodies or institutions that are authorised to oversee the people’s belief. Another salient fact is that by issuing the laws, “government establishes boundary (boundary framing) and draws a strict line between the Ahmadiyya and majority Muslims in Indonesia” (2013, p. 14). Thus, the process of framing, that is, positioning Ahmadiyya as a defaming and heretical sect in government’s policies, has contributed to persecution and physical attack on Ahmadiyya followers (Abel, 2013).

Similar to Abel’s study, Nastiti (2014) investigated how this sect is minoritised as ‘the other’ and presented as an antagonistic minority through the
constructions of majority discourses. Nastiti (2014) argues that the minoritisation of Ahmadiyya is not based on a theological difference, but it is rather a discourse construction that intentionally categorises Ahmadiyya as a minority.

The construction of majority discourse, which minoritises Ahmadiyya, is constituted through the attachment of several versions of Islam to the Indonesian social and political landscape by Islamist radical groups, Islamic institutions, the state authority, and the media. Islamist radical groups such as Islamic defender front (FPI), Hizbut Tahrir (HT), and the Islamic people forum (FUI) consider Ahmadiyya to be a deviation of Islam, and label its followers as deviants, infidels, apostates, and non-believers (Nastiti, 2014). This negative image is delivered through religious preaching and speech, public campaigns in social and mass media, demonstrations and protests, and violent attacks.

Nastiti (2014) argues that the authorities seem to be inconsistent. Initially, the Ahmadiyya sect was legally recognised and allowed to carry out its religious activities. However, some of the state institutions, such as the Indonesian Council of Clerics (MUI), have issued policies, decrees, or statements that discredit the sect. the MUI has issued two religious decrees that classify Ahmadiyya as a community outside Islam. The issuing of a joint ministerial decree also reveals this inconsistency.

From this review, it is apparent that previous studies on the Ahmadiyya issue in Indonesia did not use CDA comprehensively, especially in identifying discourse topics and strategies, to see how the Ahmadiyya is discursively presented in the government’s legal proclamations, and how the sect defends or argues against negative discourses.

2.5. Conclusion

The study of critical discourse analysis is one of the many social studies that try to investigate social problems such as power abuse, social inequality, and
discrimination. Such a study derives from the integration of two disciplines, namely linguistics and social studies. The critical characteristic of this analysis originates from the critical approach in social studies. From the linguistic point of view, it is assumed that the social issue can be analysed using discourse because the social issue is a terrain of interaction that uses language through speaking and writing in various modes of communication and texts genres (Fairclough, 1992, 2003).

Discourse strategies used in investigating discourse presentations of certain individuals or social groups belong to discriminatory and resistance discourse strategies. The focus of these two strategies is on investigating discursive presentation or depiction of individuals or social groups in texts, either in positive or negative lights. Many studies have been previously carried out to investigate the negative discourse presentations against several minority groups in various social contexts, along with their linguistic strategies. Likewise, there are also some studies that have concentrated on how the marginalised/minority groups resist or argue against the offensive discourses. However, similar studies that have tried to examine the discrimination and resistance discourse strategies of religiously based minority groups, particularly the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia, seem undeveloped.

The Ahmadiyya sect is a current issue in several parts of the world, not only in Indonesia. The most controversial point that is used and justified by others to undermine this sect is the debate around the seal of prophethood in Islam. Ahmadiyya, especially the Qadiani Ahmadiyya, hold the belief that its founder is a divine prophet and became the successor of Muhammad. Also, Ghulam Ahmad claimed himself to be the Imam Mahdi and the promised messiah. In contrast, Islamic communities believe that Ghulam Ahmad and his followers have defamed Islam and conducted blasphemous activities.

In academic circles, both in Indonesia and around the world, many studies have concentrated on Ahmadiyya. However, none of them have tried to
analyse the issue using CDA. In order to enrich and provide a better understanding of Ahmadiyya, particularly in Indonesia, there should be a study that highlights this issue comprehensively from a CDA point of view. This study needs to be an investigation of how the Ahmadiyya groups are presented in texts, either in a positive or negative light, and how they defend themselves or argue against negative presentations that may have undermined them.
CHAPTER THREE

ISLAM-INDONESIAN STATE RELATIONSHIP AND THE REPULSION AGAINST AHMADIYYA WITHIN INDONESIAN HISTORY

3.1. Introduction

This chapter explores two important issues: the history of the relationship between Islam and the state, and repudiation against Ahmadiyya in Indonesia. In regard to the former, the discourse of Ahmadiyya cannot be separated from the history of Islam and the statehood relationship, so this chapter provides an explanation about the development of Islamic discourse in every era or regime. It is necessary to highlight the relationship between Islam and the state, especially the attempt by the mainstream Muslims to make Indonesia an Islamic state by implementing the *sharia* (Islamic laws), in order to understand the relationship between the Islamic discourse and the issue of the Ahmadiyya sect.

The demand for an Indonesian Islamic state and the implementation of Islamic laws has happened in every era, since the time of independence in 1945 to the present. This historical review of Islam and the state relationship is divided into four parts: (i) the seeding of the spirit of nationalism at the time of the independence struggle (from 1900s to 1945), (ii) from independence to the downfall of the ‘Old Order’ (1945 to 1966), (iii) the Soeharto Regime or the ‘New Order’ (1966 to 1998), and (iv) the reformation era (1998 to the present).

The issue of repudiation of the Ahmadiyya sect needs to be highlighted in order to understand the development of the Ahmadiyya issue in Indonesia and how the state and mainstream Muslims deal with it. This second part of the chapter provides a description that compares the rejection of Ahmadiyya before and after the reformation era. Ahmadiyya and its two factions have long existed in Indonesia history: the JAI since 1925 and the GAI since 1928. In the
reformation era, discrimination against Ahmadiyya has significantly increased and involves significantly higher levels of persecution than that in previous eras. It is important to gather information on how the Indonesian society, Islamic organisations, and the government have addressed the issue at different times.

3.2. Islam in Indonesia

Islam for Indonesian people has been an inseparable aspect of their daily life in both the traditional and contemporary sense. Before independence, when the archipelago was still named Nusantara, Islam was an inclusive religion that provided the people with moral values that influenced the social, political, and cultural aspects of their lives. At this time, Muslims began to outnumber those belonging to the long-established religions/beliefs, such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Animism. According to Ricklefs (2008), this spread of Islam in Nusantara is one of the most significant processes in Indonesian history. It is not surprising that Islam, Islamic groups, or the greater Muslim communities have been involved in shaping the establishment of Indonesia and its people.

The first evidence of the existence of an Islamic kingdom in Indonesian territory became known after the finding of the gravestone of Sultan Sulaiman bin Abdullah bin al-Basir, who died in 1211. It was found in the graveyard of Lamreh, in the northern part of the Sumatera Island. A similar explanation is also provided by Salim and Azra (2003) in their statement that the relationship between Islam and politics/state has been experienced by, or been an integral part of, Indonesia since the Muslim era in the seventeenth century.

At present, Indonesia is a country where the majority of the people have identified themselves as Muslims (Lee, 2004). This can be seen in the mixture between Islamic values and many local cultures, and the establishment of the constitution and its laws, which are also inseparable from Islamic values. In
addition, political movements have always been based along religious lines with the establishment of religion-based political parties.

In certain situations, however, Islam is sometimes used by certain individuals or groups to legitimise their violent acts against others – a behavior that is popularly called *Membela Agama dan Tuhan* (Defending the Religion and God). In this context, religion reveals its face as one projecting horror, terror, and a threat to everybody who has a different spiritual understanding from the holder of the mainstream understanding. The horror and threat perpetrated by such groups of people have clearly shown Islam to be a ‘non-peaceful’ religion and one that is a forceful power that discriminates against and violates the religious minority groups, not only at the discourse level, but also at the practical level, such as with physical assaults.

Throughout the history of Indonesia, especially in modern times, from the beginning of the twentieth century to the present, Indonesian politics has been connected to debates, and even confrontation, over the establishment of an Islamic state, the insertion of *sharia* laws into the constitution, and the penetration of Islamic teachings into social life. Rabasa (2003) states that the relationship between Islam and the state has been an unresolved question in the political development of most of the Muslim countries in Southeast Asia, and especially in Indonesia. In the Indonesian context, the insertion of Islam as the core philosophy of the state remains unfulfilled up to the present.

### 3.2.1. The Spirit of Nationalism and Independence

In the beginning of modern Indonesia, especially in the first half of the twentieth century, Islam and the Islamic movements played an important role in seeding the spirit of independence. The movement of the Islamic nationalists to struggle for Indonesian independence started a hundred years ago, dating back to the days of the five Muslim heroes – Prince Diponegoro, Imam Bonjol, Sultan
Babullah in Ternate, Teuku Cik Di Tiro in Aceh, and Sultan Hasanuddin in Makassar – who tried to fight against the Dutch colonial power.

In that era, Islam had a clear role, as “Islam was the focus of movement against Dutch colonial power” (Kingsbury, 2002, p. 10). Another historical fact is about the connection of Islam and the Indonesian state. This was apparent when Indonesia was occupied in 1942 by Japan in the early modern history of Indonesia. According to Boland (1982), Japan preferred and considered Islam to be an effective way to disseminate their ideas and ideals to all levels of society.

Lee (2004, pp. 88-89) also presents a similar argument that:

it was different from the Dutch who marginalise Islam from political matters, for the Japanese, they accommodated religion (e.g. Islam) and recognised the importance of the religion in society although it was also in the sense of the Japanese political interest in that war.

The Japanese had seen the potential for mobilisation of Islam to “support their war effort” (Vatikiotis, 1998, p. 120).

At that time, Islam gained three benefits from Japanese occupation: (i) the establishment of the Office of Religious Affairs, (ii) the formation of Masyumi⁴ (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia/The Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), and (iii) the establishment of Hizbullah (God’s Force or the Party of Allah) (Boland, 1982; Lee, 2004). Although it was more in its political interest, “Japan had represented itself as the liberator of Islam, in order to gain support from the society and to enforce anti-Dutch propaganda” (Lee, 2004, p. 89).

The debate about the relationship between state and religion, especially in Islam, also became the one of the three concerns of the Indonesian founding fathers: “the structure of the state (unitary or federal)”, “the relationship between

---

⁴ Masyumi was the biggest Indonesia Islamic party ever. This party had a significant role in Indonesian history and it was used as a political instrument by the Islamic figures to promote Islam in the political field around the 1940s.
state and religion”, and “whether Indonesia should be a Republic or Monarchy” (Boland, 1982, p. 19). Especially in the relationship between state and religion, the debate was concerned with the issue as to whether Indonesia should be an Islamic state or a national unitary state separated from Islamic affairs.

Those who supported the separation of state and Islam or rejected the Islamic nature of the state argued that the establishment of the newborn state should be based on the awareness of the real identity of Indonesian society. Indonesia is not similar to, or does not have different character from, other existing Islamic states in the Middle East from the perspective of geographical considerations and many other differences such as tribes, religions, customs, and local beliefs. Another argument proposed here was about the implementation of sharia (Islamic laws), which may be understood differently and whether its understanding could fulfill “the international demands”, “present-day requirements”, and be consistent “with modern thoughts” (Boland, 1982, p. 20).

Another reason for the separation of state and religion was that by establishing an Islamic state, Indonesia could face possible problems, for example, in the disintegration and discrimination against minority (religious) groups. The other religious groups (e.g. Christian and other religious minorities) would not feel involved in the country (Boland, 1982), but would rather feel like “second class citizens” (Cribb & Brown, 1995, p. 38), and, therefore, “the non-Muslim community were threatening to repudiate the new nation” (Fealy, 2005, p. 162).

The main question was actually about how the Islamic state and the implementation of Islamic laws can be accommodating and protective of the various differences that had existed from long before the establishment of the modern Indonesian state, and also to guarantee the freedom of religion. According to Ramage (1995), the refusal of the secular nationalist leaders to accept Islam as the basis of the new Republic of Indonesia was because it could be divisive of Indonesian diversity.
In contrast, the Islamic nationalists argued that the promotion of Indonesia as an Islamic state had a historical basis. Some Islamic figures, such as Muhammad Natsir\(^5\), said that the Islamic movement played a prominent role in forcing political action aimed at independence and in furthering Indonesian unity. A similar statement was also given by Harun Nasution, who argued that the rise and growth of Indonesian nationalism was first introduced and promoted by the Indonesian Islamic movement (Anshari, 1976).

These two positions of the nationalists should not be defined in a strict sense, meaning that the Islamic nationalists had attempted to free Indonesia from colonial power, but that they were interested in society being governed by Islamic rules in a comprehensive manner. This is not only defined as the relationship between human and God, but also between humans and other humans, the environment, and animals. The secular nationalists, meanwhile, were not without religion. They had their religions, such as Islam and Christianity, but they also promoted a strict separation between state and religion.

The root of the secular and Islamic nationalists can actually be traced back to the people’s movement and the establishment of some modern organisations at the beginning of the twentieth century. According to Anshari (1976), the organisations, which existed as a reaction against colonialism and aimed at a free Indonesia, can be divided into two large groups. These two groups both promoted themselves as nationalists – the secular nationalists and the Islamic nationalists.

The first group comprised those that based their movement upon the secular nationalists (Kebangsaan) represented by Partai Nasional Indonesia/PNI

---

\(^5\) Muhammad Natsir is a statesman and Indonesian Islamic figure who had an important role in Indonesian independence, especially in seeding the spirit of nationalism, democracy, and Islam in the newborn Indonesia. He was born on July 17, 1908 in Alahan Panjang, West Sumatera. He was the first Indonesian Prime Minister in 1950-1951 and a figure who proposed the formation of the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs (see http://kemenag.go.id/file/dokumen/Natsir).
(Indonesian Nationalist Party) on 4 July 1927, *Partai Indonesia* (Partindo, Indonesian Party) in April 1931, *Partai Indonesia Raya* (Parindra, Great Indonesian Party) on 26 December 1935, and the *Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia* (Gerindo, the Indonesian People’s Movement) on 24 May 1937 (see Anshari, 1976, p. 3). Meanwhile, *Sarekat Islam* – as established on 16 October 1905 – represented the Islamic nationalists that based their movement upon Islamic ideology. Another organisation was *Partai Islam Indonesia/PII* (Indonesian Islamic Party), which was established in 1938. The *Sarekat Islam* was considered to be the first modern Indonesian political organisation that was based on the principle of anti-colonialism (i.e. The Indonesian Human Rights Campaign, 1987).

An account of these two nationalist groups or movements is also provided by Assyaukanie, Hefner, and Azra (2008). They emphasise strongly that the two movements were both supported by Muslims. They argue that, at the time of independence in 1945, Muslims were generally divided into two groups, that is, those who wanted Islam to have a strong role in the state and government and those who rejected it.

Several months before the proclamation of Indonesian Independence on 17 August 1945, the debate between the secular nationalists and Islamic nationalists about the ideology and the form of the state was becoming both sharp and difficult. This difficulty can be identified in the speech delivered by Soekarno on 10 July 1945, in front of the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI/Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia) after a series of serious discussions (see Anshari, 1976, p. 24). The key point of the speech was as follows:

Allah the most high has blessed us. Actually, at first, there were difficulties between so-called nationalist group (*Golongan Nasional*) and so-called Islamic Group (*Golongan Islam*) in seeking agreement between

---

6 Soekarno was the first president of Indonesia from 1945 to 1966. He was named as the creator of *Pancasila*, which then became the ideology of the state.
both of them, especially concerning the question of religion and state (Anshari, 1976, p. 24).

Because of the difficulty, a proposal that seems to be ‘a gentleman’s agreement’ was suggested. The proposal, which was then called Piagam Jakarta (the Jakarta Charter), stipulated obligation for the adherents of Islam to practise Islamic laws. The charter needs to be highlighted here as a compromise between the nationalists who projected Indonesia as a non-Islamic/unitary state, and the Islamic group who promoted the establishment of an Islamic state. The issuing of the charter reveals the existence of a continuous heated debate between the two factions about the basis of the state in the early times of modern Indonesia.

In a further development, the adoption of the Jakarta Charter for the state failed. The debate that led to this failure centred upon a question of how charter was to be implemented in the country where the people are not only Muslims, but also non-Muslims. The charter would be implemented by Muslims, but not by non-Muslims.

The heated debate was then resolved by the charter being withdrawn. Other symbols of Islam were then deleted and changed (such as changing the word Muqaddima to Pembukaan in the introduction of the 1945 Constitution, and the word being Allah exchanged for the word Tuhan). This final decision also included the removal of the proposal that the president and vice president should be Muslims. All Indonesian people, regardless of faith, have the right to become president or vice president. In the compromise, Indonesia was to be neither an Islamic state with a rigid Islamic conception, nor a secular state that would consider Islam as a merely private matter. Indonesian people, however,

---

7 The Jakarta Charter was intended to stipulate in the paragraph concerning the principle of ‘Belief in God’ in Pancasila. It consists of seven words in Indonesian language saying dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya ‘with the obligation for the adherents of Islam to practise the Islamic laws’.
“should be religious and believe in God, and then, religion should have a positive contribution to the nation and character building” (Boland, 1982, p. 23).

In order to unite the two different factions and their unfinished debate, the Pancasila was then proposed as the ideology of the state. The Pancasila was projected to be a compromise and to be a neutral ideology that accommodates the ideas of both the Islamic and secular nationalists. It is considered to be the ideology that can bridge the interests of Islamic and secular nationalist groups. This ideology can accommodate the principles and thoughts of the two opposing factions.

This ideology was continuously promoted in the subsequent phases of Indonesian history, especially in the three successive political eras. They are the ‘Old Order’ (Orde Lama) (1945 to 1966) under Soekarno, the ‘New Order’ (Orde Baru) (1945 to 1998) under Soeharto, and now the ‘Reformasi’ era. One of the functions of the Pancasila in these three eras is to counter the ideology and the demand for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia.

3.2.2. After Independence to the Downfall of the ‘Old Order’ (1945 to 1966)

The demand to make Islam the ideology of the state or to make Indonesia an Islamic state continued during the ‘Old Order’ era under Soekarno, the first president of Indonesia. Compared to the pre-independence era, the demand became more progressive and radical. This can be seen as emerging from the refusal to establish an Islamic state. The Islamic movement at that time was divided into two groups: one pushing for the integration of Islamic teaching into Indonesian society through the democratic way, and the other preferring a more radical way, such as through rebellion.

The Masyumi Party, which was actually established by Muslim groups after the Japanese occupation, represented the former movement, while the latter
group was interested in establishing the Indonesian Islamic State (*Negara Islam Indonesia* henceforth: NII) through the *Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia* movement (DI/TII: the Territory of Islam/Indonesian Islamic Army) (see Boland, 1982). This suggests that the period after independence saw an attempt to reinstate Islam as the basis of an Islamic state in the archipelago, although it was to be more on a regional basis.

The *Darul Islam* was the Islamic movement that used military power as a tool to establish Islamic rules in the newly born Republic of Indonesia, and it was “one of the greatest worries for the government of the Republic of Indonesia, particularly in the period after 1950” (Boland, 1982, p. 54). The Islamic revolt by DI/TII was backed by guerilla-experienced fighters.

The rebellious movement concentrated its forces in three main regions: the region of West Java commanded by Kartosoewiryo, the region of South Sulawesi commanded by Qahhar Muzakkar, and the region of Aceh commanded by Muhammad Daud Beureu’eh (Boland, 1982; Cribb & Brown, 1995). At the beginning, they actually fought against the Dutch, who tried to regain control in Indonesia soon after Indonesian independence was declared in 1945, but later, after the Dutch left Indonesia, the movements demanded the implementation of Islamic rules in those three regions. Because the demand was rejected, they fought against the Indonesian central government.

With regard to this rebellious movement, Sardjono (the son of Kartosuwiryo), in *Mata Najwa TV Program*, states that (Shihab, 2011):

*DI/TII adalah semacam organisasi penyangga untuk terbentuknya Negara Islam Indonesia. Dia sering mengatakan bahwa seluruh pergerakan Islam di Indonesia dalam bentuk apapun pada akhirnya akan bermuara ke satu titik dan muara itu mesti Negara Islam Indonesia (NII).*

DI/TII is actually a supporting organisation that attempts the establishment of the Indonesian Islamic state (NII). He (Kartosuwiryo) always states that all Islamic movements in Indonesia in whatever their forms will lead to one purpose and it is the establishment of Indonesian Islamic State (NII).
In this TV program, Nugroho Dewanto\textsuperscript{8} also argues that the momentum to proclaim the Indonesian Islamic state by Kartosuwiryo was initiated by his disappointment of the ‘Renville Agreement’, that was signed on 17 January 1948 by the Dutch and Indonesian government. The aim of the agreement was to reduce the territory of Indonesia. Similarly, the movements to achieve an Islamic state in South Sulawesi and Aceh, commanded by Qahhar Muzakkar and Daud Beureu’eh, respectively, were due to the disappointment with the republican government.

Sydney Jones\textsuperscript{9} revealed an interesting point in the TV program (Shihab, 2011). She said that in relation to the discourse of Islamic state, DI/TII has an important role and position in Indonesian history. The ideology that had been aspired to before independence by the Islamic figures, including the three commanders of the \textit{Darul Islam}, is still maintained. It inspired the Islamic radicalism movement of the 1990s in Indonesia, such as \textit{Jama’ah Islamiyah} (JI).

Another important symbol of the relationship between Islam and the state was the creation of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1946. The ministry is given authority by the state to administer all religious issues in the country. According to Lee (2004), the ministry was created to appease the Muslim groups because of the failure to create an Islamic state or, at least, to incorporate the Jakarta Charter into the constitution. The ministry has been given the authority to arrange or administer religious matters in Indonesia in a way that recognises the five official religions. Although it serves all these religions, the orientation to Islam is noticeable, as the logo of the ministry contains a depiction of the Koran (Al-Qur’an) (Fealy, 2003).

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{8} Nugroho Dewanto is a senior journalist of \textit{Koran Tempo}.

\textsuperscript{9} Sydney Jones was the senior adviser of International Crisis Group (ICG) on the issue of development of Indonesia, especially the issue of terrorism and Islamic radicalism. Currently, she is the director of the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC).
\end{footnotesize}
3.2.3. The ‘New Order’ and De-politicisation of Islam (1966 to 1998)

The political and ideological contentions in the mid-1960s with the rising of communism, which led to the downfall of Soekarno and his ‘Guided Democracy’, was one grounded on the principles of nationalism, religion, and communism (*Nasionalisme, Agama, dan Komunis*, abbreviated as NASAKOM). Because of his support for the development of communism, Soekarno encountered opposition from both the army and the Islamic groups, which created a major political tension in the country.

The tension peaked on 30 September/1 October 1965 in the movement is then widely known as the G/30/S/PKI (the coup movement on 30 September ‘initiated’ by the Indonesian Communist Party). In this tragedy, six senior military generals were murdered and the Communist Party was accused of staging the coup (Eklof, 1999; Kingsbury, 2002).

Some people claimed later that the history of this tragedy was blurred and still there remains a question about the real story, and whether the actors were from the Communist Party or other groups. After the fall of Soekarno, an army general, Soeharto, became president and established the ‘New Order’ (*Orde Baru*). In the aftermath of this tragedy in 1965 to 1967, Indonesia faced its most critical period since independence.

A significant fact regarding Islam in this era is the disagreement and hatred toward communism and communist movements, which were considered to be a deviation from the path of God. The communists or their followers were deemed to be non-believers and were thought to be in conflict with the principles of the *Pancasila*. The Islamic figures and leaders, such as those from *Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah*, called for the extermination of the communists as Religious Duty and Holy War (*Ibadah dan Jihad*), and recommended it as the obligatory religious duty for Muslims (Boland, 1982).
The new order was a regime signified by “the promotion of the discourse of economic development/political economy and political stability, which was then widely known as Rezim Pembangunan (Regime of Development)” (Cribb & Brown, 1995, p. 115). To boost development, the government produced some policies to attract investment from both international and domestic investors.

Soeharto also invited the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (the previous president, Soekarno, had banned these two monetary institutions) and “made an agreement of debt with them” (Kingsbury, 2002, p. 62). Eklof (1999) also notes that the national development attempted by the new order regime made a tremendous change in the social and economic spheres and made progress in health, education, agriculture, and poverty eradication.

Soeharto attempted to concentrate strong power in his hands to establish zero political instability. With wide military support, he established his dictatorship and tried to remove all barriers and threats that potentially interfered with his regime. The Pancasila and the understanding of it became the political ideology of his regime, and he aimed to remove other ideologies that were considered contradictory to his interpretation. According to Eklof (1999), this regime tried to combine authoritarian control and repression, which was backed up by a degree of success in economic benefits to the vast majority of Indonesians.

Because of the presence of a strong dictatorship in the pursuit of economic development and political stability, all movements that were considered to be inhibiting this progress were to be eradicated and labelled negatively as the ‘inhibitor of the development’ (Penghambat Pembangunan). All activism from any other sources would be banned, including the Islamic movements.

In the new order, Soeharto banned the political movements that had attempted to adopt Islam as the ideology of the state. He forced institutions, organisations, and social groups to “accept Pancasila as their sole ideology,
which was then called ‘Asas Tunggal Pancasila’ (sole ideological foundation of Pancasila)” (Ramage, 1995, p. 3).

Further, all interpretations of the Pancasila should be associated with the understanding of the Pancasila based on the official interpretation of the regime. Soeharto reasoned that the Pancasila is an integrated whole, where the first principle ‘Belief in God’ represents religion, and it is inter-related with the other four principles (Pranowo, 1994). The Islamic movement that struggled for Islam and the implementation of Islamic laws did not have any place in Indonesian politics because such movements were accused of being threats to the existence of the Republic of Indonesia.

In the new order, the movement of Muslims and their activism were discredited. Their image was linked negatively to terrorism and the DI/TII, which had been previously labelled as rebellious in Indonesian history. Some people argue that such incidents were the work of the Intelligence agencies, which were aiming to discredit Islamic activism. One example cited in the Indonesian Human Rights Campaign (1987) was the case of the Tanjung Priok Massacre in 1984.

Further, the development of Islam should be considered to be an individual or personal matter, rather than political. The slogan ‘Islamic Religion: Yes, Islamic Ideology: No’ became popular in that era (see Adnan, 1994, pp. 441-478), indicating the domestication of Islam in the private arena and it no longer being involved in the political field. It can be said that the Islamic movements had experienced failure in this period.

---

10 Shooting and firing by the army at the Muslim demonstrators in the dockland district of Jakarta. The demonstration was triggered by the refusal of Muslims in the Mosque Assa’adah to follow an army order to remove posters commenting on problems faced by Muslims from the mosque’s wall. The confrontation was heated when the soldiers entered the mosque without taking of their jack-boots.
3.2.4. The ‘Reformation’ and the Revivalism of the ‘Radicals’ (1998 to the Present)

The economic recession and monetary crisis, issues of corruption, authoritarianism, and the dictatorship led to the downfall of Soeharto and his ‘New Order’ regime following a massive student demonstration together with civil society protests in 1998. That year, on May 21, Soeharto publicly announced his resignation; this event marked the birth of the *Era Reformasi* (Reformation Era).

Demands for democracy, liberalism, and the pursuit of freedom in all aspects of life have marked the reformation phase. Democracy provides the opportunity for individuals or groups to disseminate their understanding and ideology to influence the direction of the state into the future. There are at least two main streams of ideological movement that signified the development of the reformation era: those who encourage the ideas of democracy, liberalism, and human rights, and those who enforce the idea of Islamic sharia with a rigid implementation of Islamic rules. The reformation era is also signified by the re-emergence of some Islamic radical groups and movements.

Regarding the former, the encouragement of the ideas of democracy, freedom, and human rights can be observed in the establishment of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the constitutional strengthening of freedom of religion/belief. The number of NGOs promoting the concepts of freedom, pluralism, and human rights increased significantly. Some of them are *Kontras* (*Komisi Nasional untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan*/The Commission for the Disappearances and Victim of Violence), the Wahid Institute and the Setara Institute.

In the last eighteen years since 1998, the constitutional guarantees that address the freedom of religion and human rights have been significantly reinforced. They can be found in the second amendment of the 1945 Constitution concerning the articles of religion, especially in articles 28E, 28I, and 28J.
18 August 2000. These articles provide more protection of religious freedom, namely guaranteeing and protecting the fights of the adherents of religions the minority groups to practise their religion and beliefs.

Likewise, the role of Islamic organisation leaders in the early period of the reformation in 1998, such as those from Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, contributed significantly to the development of democracy and the interreligious climate, as well as to the reduction of religious-based violence (Magnis-Suseno, 2013). Additionally, according to Barton (2010), the Islamic leaders, Islamic communities, and the Islamic ideas contributed to the peaceful transition from Soeharto’s regime to the reformation era.

As well as the amendment of the constitution, the Indonesian Government also issued Law Number 39/1999 concerning human rights. This law also became the legal guarantee for the implementation of freedom of religion/belief. In 2005, the government ratified the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICPPR) into Law Number 12/2005, in which one of the issues is the freedom of religion/belief.

The reformation era is ‘a political stage’ for Muslim groups to regain a greater role in public life. In the previous eras, particularly under Soeharto, such a role was suppressed (Butt, 2010; Hosen, 2007). This attempt could be seen in the effort “to reinsert the Jakarta Charter” (Fealy, 2004, p. 108) by Islamic political parties, groups, and Islamic communities in the four instances of amendment of the Indonesian Constitution from 1999 to 2002. Additionally, the issuing of sharia –nuanced local regulations unveils this deliberate attempt (Parsons & Mietzners, 2009).

The idea to establish an Islamic sharia was found in the constitutional debate to amend the 1945 Constitution that was held in Majelis
Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR/People’s Consultative Assembly)\textsuperscript{11}. At that time, there were at least three Islamic political factions: PBB\textsuperscript{12}, PPP\textsuperscript{13}, and the Daulah Ummah Faction. The debate was about the insertion of the Jakarta Charter into article 29, paragraph 1.

At the national level, the Islamic movements and groups failed to insert the idea of Islamic sharia and the Jakarta Charter into the constitution. Surprisingly, the rejection was not only from the secular factions, but also from the largest Islamic organisations in Indonesia, the Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah (Ichwan, 2003). Representing these two Islamic organisations, the former president Abdurrahman Wahid (NU), and the former head of MPR, Dr Amin Rais (Muhammadiyah), refused to amend the religious article in the constitution.

With the failure to insert the idea of Islamic sharia at the national level, the demand to implement the idea turned to the regional levels. This effort seemed successful when looking at the issuing of some Perda Sharia\textsuperscript{14} (Peraturan Daerah Syariah/Local Regulation Sharia) such as Perda ‘pornography’ and ‘the prohibition of Ahmadiyya’. Constitutionally, this local regulation is made possible because of the change in the constitutional system from centralist to decentralist, in the form of Otonomi Daerah (Local Autonomy). Such a decentralisation is stipulated in Law Number 25/1999, and in Law Number 32/2004 (Alim, 2010). In the news reported by Ayyubi (2013), there were at least 151 Perda Sharia produced in the period 1999 to 2009.

The idea underlying the promotion of Islamic laws at the time was the problem of government legitimacy. Some Islamic groups consider that “the

\textsuperscript{11} Majelis Permuswaratan Rakyat, before the reformation era, was the highest body of the state. In the reformation era, however, its position is equal with other state bodies, such as the People’s Representative Council, President, Supreme Court, and Constitutional Court. MPR has the authority to amend the 1945 Constitution.
\textsuperscript{12} PKB: Partai Bulan Bintang (The Crescent Star Party).
\textsuperscript{13} PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (The United Development Party).
\textsuperscript{14} Perda Syariah is a local regulation issued by major, head of regent, or governor that aims at implementing Islamic laws at provincial and municipality levels.
Indonesian government is illegitimate because secularism that the government applies is contradictory to the understanding of Islam” (Freedman & Tiburzi, 2012, p. 139). The secularism must be replaced with a system decided by God as documented in the holy Qur’an and exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad through his Sunnah. The emergence of various Islamic groups with their movements to promote the idea of Islamic laws was progressive. According to Salim and Azra (2003), there are at least four features of the reformation era that signify the emergence of these groups. They are:

(i) the establishment of numerous Islamic parties;

(ii) the demand for the implementation of Islamic laws at regional level, such as in Aceh and South Sulawesi;

(iii) the emergence of Muslim groups that are considered to be hardliners/radical groups, such as the Islamic Defender Front (FPI), Laskar Jihad (Jihad Troops), and the Hizbut Tahrir (The Party of Liberation); and

(iv) the rising popularity of the Islamic magazine, Sabili, which promotes the idea of an Islamic state and the implementation of Islamic laws.

With regard to the term ‘radicalism’ or ‘Islamic radicalism’, Fealy (2004, p. 105) defines two characteristics of groups that may be categorised as radical:

1. Such groups believe that Islam must be implemented in its full and literal form as set out in the holy Qur’an and Sunnah (tradition based on the Prophet Muhammad’s example), free of compromise. They usually give particular emphasis to those sections of the Qur’an dealing explicitly with social relations, devotions, and criminal punishments and assert that these must be carried out to the letter; and

2. Such groups are reactive, whether through language, ideas, or physical violence, to what is seen as corrosively secular, materialist, or deviationist forces. They tend to be hostile toward the status quo and see the fundamental teachings of Islam as providing the basis for rebuilding society and the state.
The establishment of the hardliner groups can be interpreted as an expression of the disappointment of Islamic communities with the Indonesian political system. Most of the groups consider the Indonesian Government, in this reformation regime, to be illegitimate, because the government does not implement Islamic laws. In Eliraz’ words (2007, p. 2), such a government is considered to be “unjust and ignorant of the true way of Islam”.

According to Fealy and White (2008), the establishment of the hardliner groups provides evidence for the view that Indonesian Islam is becoming more conservative and radical, which is a trend that actually began in the 1990s. Similar to this argument, Eliraz (2007, p. 1) also point out that “in the post-Soeharto era, one should not ignore the increasing manifestation of religious intolerance and extremism – the louder voices of hard-line Muslims and radical Islam fundamentalists”. Radical Islam is considered to be the most vivid and enduring image of Indonesian Islam after the downfall of Soeharto (Fealy, 2004).

According to Taylor (2011), in the preface to the English edition of the book *The Illusion of an Islamic State*, the freedom that liberated Indonesia from the dictatorship of Soeharto has allowed the blossoming of religious extremism. The terms hardliner, extremist, radical, and fundamental are used interchangeably as groups that, according to the former president of Indonesia, Abdurrahman Wahid [Gus Dur] (2011, p. 14), “adopt a harsh and violent demeanor and refuse to compromise with other viewpoints” – as if Islam had no tradition or command to create peace, but rather, merely commanded its followers to employ compulsion and violence.

Kraince (2009, p. 1) also argues that since 1999, “Indonesia’s transition to democracy has been marked by the emergence of powerful Islamic groups aiming to dominate the legislative process, to exert strict control over Muslims’ private lives, and to diminish the rights of minorities”. These powerful groups play a significant role in issuing policies addressing religious minority groups, which basically represent the interests of their groups and, conversely, omit equal
rights and protection for the minority. They sometimes use ‘street force’, such as demonstrations, to impose their beliefs upon the minority.

The emergence of some Islamic groups that are considered to be hardliners raises a new problem: the violations and discrimination against other people or groups based on religious justification. In the fasting months (Ramadhan), for example, these groups frequently perpetrate violence against other Muslims who do not fast. They also close prostitution and smash shops selling alcohol, and attack traders. This action is usually justified by the implementation of the Perda Sharia.

Further, this phenomenon has negatively impacted on the religious minority groups, which are considered to hold deviant teaching, especially Ahmadiyya. Threatening and discriminatory practices against religious minority groups have increased significantly (see, for example, in “Komnas temukan”, 2011; Testriono, 2011; and in ‘Intolerance turns’, 2011). Growing agitation, especially against Ahmadiyya, has also been sharply increasing in this reformation era, while previously the religious minorities had coexisted with any other Islamic organisations in Indonesia (Nastiti, 2014). Even though the previous eras had recorded a number of rejections against Ahmadiyya, the reformation era has shown the worst discriminatory practices against this self-defined Islamic sect.

3.3. Repudiation of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia

Historically, the discourse that considers Ahmadiyya as a deviant or heretical sect became well-known after NU and Muhammadiyah (the two major Muslim social organisations in Indonesia) announced their official stance against the sect religious interpretations in 1927 (Burhani, 2014b). Muhammadiyah, the second biggest Islamic organisation, had originally cooperated with the Ahmadiyya movement at around 1925 when the Ahmadiyya Lahore missionaries
first arrived in Jogjakarta. For Muhammadiyah, Ahmadiyya was perceived at first to be an ideal partner in developing Islamic education and in supporting Islamic efforts to resist Christian missionaries’ activities (Crouch, 2009). However, by around 1927, this partnership between Muhammadiyah and Ahmadiyah broke down due to differences relating to acknowledging Ghulam Ahmad as the foretold messiah and Imam Mahdi.

In the literature, there is little information about the repudiation of and discrimination against Ahmadiyya in Indonesia, especially before the reformation era. After independence (in 1945) until the downfall of Soeharto in 1998, the issue of Ahmadiyya was not prominent. According to Burhani (2013), people at that time considered the Ahmadiyya issue as unimportant and insignificant. Federspiel (2001) also argues that Ahmadiyya followers were relatively small in number in this period, and they were also isolated throughout the era.

However, according to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, there are a number of incidents of repudiation by Indonesian people against the sect as listed in a book published by the ministry (Balitbang dan Diklat Kemenag RI, 2013). Such repudiation has been occurring since 1930 in many places, in the form of objections and destruction of places of worship. However, in that book, there is no detailed explanation of how and why this repudiation was carried out.

The historical records of the repudiation against Ahmadiyya in many parts of Indonesian territory are listed as follows: East Sumatera (1953), Medan (1964), Cianjur (1968), Kuningan (1969), West Nusa Tenggara (1976), Central Kalimantan (1981), South Sulawesi (1981), West Kalimantan, Surabaya, Bogor (1981), Riau, Palembang, West Sumatera, Timor-Timur (now Timor Leste), and Jakarta (1990). Recently, similar incidents have also occurred in West Nusa Tenggara (2002), Parung and Bogor (2006), and Kuningan, Majalengka, and Sukabumi (2008). All these repudiations are only addressed to the JAI or Qadiani Ahmadiyya that acknowledges the prophethood of Ghulam Ahmad (Balitbang
dan Diklat Kemenag RI, 2013), which contradict one of the central tenets of Islam, that is, the Prophet Muhammad is the seal of prophethood.

It is undeniable that the problem of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia cannot be separated from the role of the government and Islamic organisations, either at the national, regional, or local levels. Historically, this role can be seen in various official decisions and religious decrees that were issued by the government and Islamic organisations.

As listed by Crouch (2009), the fatwa addressing the Ahmadiyya issue was started in 1929 and continued until 2007 as shown in table below (for more details about the list, see Crouch, 2009).

Table 3.1: Fatwas addressing Ahmadiyya in Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Fatwa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td><em>Fatwa</em> issued by Muhammadiyah stating that there is no prophet after Muhammad and if someone has the opposite claim, he or she is <em>kafir</em> (infidels)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 June 1980</td>
<td><em>Fatwa</em> of the MUI 5/1980 on Ahmadiyya Qadian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td><em>Fatwa</em> of the MUI of Riau 1994 on Ahmadiyya Qadian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td><em>Fatwa</em> of the Syuriah Pengurus Pusat Nahdlatul Ulama (PPNU) 1995 on Ahmadiyya Qadian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2005</td>
<td><em>Fatwa</em> of the MUI of MUNAS VII/MUI/15/2005 on Ahmadiyya Qadian and Lahore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2007</td>
<td><em>Fatwa</em> of the MUI on guidelines to determine whether a teaching is deviant or not</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This list reveals that the Ahmadiyya issue has been the concern of Ulamas, the council of Islamic clerics, and Islamic organisations in some regions for a long time. All the *fatwas* mentioned in the table above targeted the Qadiani Ahmadiyya/the JAI (except the *fatwa* issued in July 2005), which acknowledges
Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet. During this history, the Ahmadiyya Lahore had never been a target of *fatwa*, at least until 2005, when the national Indonesian Council of Clerics decided that the teaching of Lahore Ahmadiyya also deviates from Islamic teachings.

Table 3.2 below reveals the official decisions against Ahmadiyya issued by Indonesian government bodies that was started on 8 March 1976 and continued until 1 September 2008 (for further details about the list, see Crouch (2009)). The name of Ahmadiyya in the table below refers to the Ahmadiyya Qadian (the JAI).

**Table 3.2: Indonesia Government regulations addressing the Ahmadiyya issue at regional and local levels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Decisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 March 1976</td>
<td>Decision of Bakorpakem and Attorney General of Subang (West Java) No. Kep. 01/1.2 JPKI 312/PAKEM/3/1976 on the Prohibition against Spreading the Teaching of Ahmadiyya Qadian in the Regency of Subang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 September 1984</td>
<td>Letter of Director General of Bimas Islam, the Department of Religion, banning Ahmadiyya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 February 1986</td>
<td>Decision of Bakorpakem and Attorney General of Sidenreng Rappang (South Sulawesi) No. 172/N.3.16.3/2/1986 on the Prohibition against Spreading the Teaching of Ahmadiyya Qadian in the regency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 April 1989</td>
<td>Decision of the Attorney General of Kerinci (Jambi) No. 01/I.5.1.2.3/Dks.4/4/1989 on Ahmadiyya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Decision of the Regent of West Lombok No. 35/2001 on the Prohibition and Ban on the Spread of the Teachings/Beliefs of Ahmadiyya to the Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Declaration of the Mayor of Mataram (Lombok) No. 008/283/X/Inkom/02 on the Prohibition on the Teachings and Beliefs of Ahmadiyya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Decision of Regional Leadership Consultative Council (Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah/Muspida), the Regional People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah/DPRD), the Majelis Ulama Indonesia and Islamic Community Organisations in Kuningan (West Java) on Ahmadiyya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2005</td>
<td>Joint Decision of the Regent of Kuningan (West Java) on Ahmadiyya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 June 2008</td>
<td>Joint Decision/Decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Minister of Home Affairs and the Attorney General 8 &amp; 9/2008; a warning and order to the followers, members, and/or the leaders of Ahmadiyya Qadiani (JAI) to the general public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 September 2008</td>
<td>Decision of the Governor of South Sumatera Province No. 563/KPTS/BAN.KESBANGPOL &amp; LINMAS/2008 banning Ahmadiyya and the activities of its followers, members, and leaders of Ahmadiyya Qadiani (JAI) in the Province of South Sumatera</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The issue of Ahmadiyya, seen from the list above, has been a concern of the Indonesian Government at different levels, but mostly at provincial and regency levels. The government has concentrated on prohibiting proselytising and all Ahmadiyya activities in their areas. The official decisions were issued by governors, regents or majors, and the Regional Leadership Consultative Council (Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah/Muspida) before and after the reformation era. What differentiates these two eras (before and after reformation) is the number of
violent attacks against Ahmadiyya that have increased sharply in the current reformation era.

In 2006, for example, the followers of Ahmadiyya in Mataram, Indonesia, were sent by the local government into an evacuation centre after violent attacks by militant groups pushed them away from their community. The local government claimed that they took this action as an attempt to prevent further violence against the Ahmadiyya community (Regus, 2014). Hundreds of Ahmadiyya followers have lived in the camps in Mataram since 2006 as they are too scared to return to their homes (Colbran, 2010).

In 2008, attacks and persecutions against Ahmadiyya followers escalated, mainly due to the issuing of the joint ministerial decree on 9 June 2008 (Hasani, 2009). In this year, “238 out of 367 violent attacks were addressed to Ahmadiyya followers in the forms of intolerance, repression by the state, and criminal actions carried out by some elements of the public” (Hasani, 2009, p. vi).

Hasani (2009) also argues that the persecution against Ahmadiyya followers was exacerbated by opinions and arguments delivered by political elites and state officials at all levels. The form of persecution also varies: prohibiting worship and religious activities, prohibition on the building of places to worship, compulsion to change their belief, sealing of places of worship, sealing of Ahmadiyya’s boarding school, issuing discriminative and repressive policies, threats or violence, intimidation, and discrimination in the workplace (Hasani, 2009).

In 2011, a violent attack was carried out against Ahmadiyya in the Cikeusik District of Banten, on the western end of Java. On 6 February of that year, the violent attack perpetrated by a group of 1,500 radical Muslims killed three Ahmadiyya followers and severely injured five more (Mietzner, 2012). In 2012, Ahmadiyya followers in Bandung, West Java, were attacked by members of the FPI in An-Nasir Mosque, where hundreds of Ahmadiyya followers perform Idul Adha prayers and slaughter animals during the Islamic day of
sacrifice. Members of the FPI raided the mosque on Thursday night, damaged it, and prohibited Ahmadiyya followers from celebrating Idul Adha (Dipa, 2012). Further, discriminatory practices in administrative services against Ahmadiyya were found in Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara. The local officials promised to give them citizen cards, but the religion column in the card was to be empty. With this card, Ahmadiyya followers would be treated like people who had no religious preferences (Nugraha, 2013). Due to this treatment, Ahmadiyya followers are not recognised as Muslims.

On 26 June 2014, the JAI mosque (Nur-Khilafat Mosque) in Ciamis, West Java was sealed by the Regency’s Public Order Agency (Satpol PP/Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja) to protect Ahmadiyya followers because of pressure from certain groups. The sealing was based on the joint ministerial decree and West Java Gubernatorial Decree (Dipa, 2014). The local officials argued that the sealing of the mosque was to maintain peaceful and conducive situations as well as to provide protection for residents (‘Ini alasan’, 2014).

3.4. Conclusion

This chapter has discussed two important issues, namely the development of Islam in Indonesia and the repudiation of the Ahmadiyya sect. With regard to the first point, an explanation about the relationship between Islam and the state was explored. With regard to the Ahmadiyya sect, an explanation for the rejection of the Ahmadiyya teaching (i.e. the JAI) and its existence in the country have also been provided. These explanations are necessary to provide an historical background to Islam, and how Islamic communities disseminate the repudiation of the Ahmadiyya sect.

The issue of Ahmadiyya cannot be separated from the development of discourses on Islam. One of the concerns of the Indonesian Islamic communities and organisations is to eradicate the religious understanding that is considered as
heretical and deviates from the Islamic mainstream understanding. Although the attempt to establish an Islamic state does not have a direct connection with the repudiation and attack against Ahmadiyya, especially before the reformation era in 1998, attempts to maintain the ‘authenticity’ of Islam carried out by many individual Muslims and Islamic organisations have been apparent. The connection between the relationship between Islam and the state, and the Ahmadiyya issue has become more obvious since the reformation era had begun. Consequently, part of Islamic movements shifted their focus to some regional issues, including the eradication of Ahmadiyya. Islam is inseparable from the history of Indonesia. The establishment of the country, which gained its independence in 1945, cannot be separated from the role of Islam and Muslims. Many Islamic figures played a prominent role in fighting against the coloniser (i.e. the Dutch). Defending the country against the coloniser was attempted by, for example, establishing Islamic organisations to disseminate the idea of independence. After independence in 1945, the development of Islamic discourse, especially in relation to the state, was apparent. Politically, the attempt to insert Islam as the ideology of the state to establish an Islamic state has been encouraged in different eras. The demand to make Islam the state ideology, the proposal to insert the Jakarta Charter into the first principle of the Pancasila to implement Islamic laws for Muslims, and the guerilla movement in the 1950s and 1960s by DI/TII in Aceh, West Java, and South Sulawesi have been the significant signs of the relationship between Islam and the state in Indonesia’s history.

The issue of Ahmadiyya has also been one of the main concerns of the Islamic discourse. The teaching of Ahmadiyya has been considered to be contradictory to the core teaching of Islam. Before and after the reformation era, the teaching of Ahmadiyya, especially the Qadian, has been a concern to the Islamic communities and the Indonesian Government. Many religious decrees and government legal proclamations have been issued to address the sect (see the Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Since 1927 (two years after the first arrival of Ahmadiyya
Qadian), the Ahmadiyya sect has been a concern for Islamic organisations, especially Muhammadiyah. The recognition of Ghulam Ahmad as a new prophet after Prophet Muhammad has been the most sensitive issue, and this has been considered to be blasphemous action against Islam. The Islamic communities (especially the Ulema) consider this recognition as a danger because it can destroy the true Islamic teaching. The Indonesian Government (either at local, provincial, or national levels), meanwhile, regard the belief as the source of social conflict.
CHAPTER FOUR
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1. Introduction

This chapter describes the discursive nature of the study and explains the research method and data collection procedures, types of data, analytical tools or discourse strategies used, and the rationale used for selecting them. The study uses critical discourse analysis (CDA) to investigate the Ahmadiyya problem in Indonesia. Such analysis is basically multidisciplinary, and it adopts the principle of eclecticism\(^\text{15}\) (KhosraviNik, 2010) in the data, the field of disciplines, and the frameworks, as well as the analytical tools. The purpose of adopting the multidisciplinary or eclecticism principle is to see the dialogic relationship (dialogicality) between the various analytical tools and discourse constructions concerning discriminatory and resistance discourse strategies. The use of the analytical tools aims at understanding one of the social, political, and religious problems in Indonesia, that is, the Ahmadiyya issue.

4.2. Research Method and Data Collection Procedures

The method used in this study is qualitative in nature. Wodak (2010) argues that (critical) discourse analysis mainly uses qualitative methods, and data may be collected from a variety of sources. The qualitative method is a means to comprehend human actions or experiences (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994), where “its

\(^{15}\) According to KhosraviNik (2010), eclecticism in CDA is required “to explore and select relevant analytical categories based on a number of factors in place such as the nature of social problems and social groups under investigation, research questions, theoretical backgrounds, the affordances of the communicative medium, genre specific features of the data, social-political features of the context, and logistic allowances of the research” (p. 56).
emphasis is placed on processes and meanings, rather than data measurement” (Rightler-McDaniels, 2014, p. 70). The qualitative method in CDA, according to Van Dijk (1987), is much more focused on investigating how certain issues are presented by particular individuals or groups, for example, ethnic groups, rather than how often the presentations are created.

Discourse data sources deal with interviews of all kinds, focus group discussions, policy papers, media (visual, broadcast, press, the internet, blogs, and ‘YouTube’), records, and minutes (Wodak, 2010). Similarly, Van Dijk (2006) also states that “there is a wide range of public discourses that may be used as research data, e.g. parliamentary debates, news, opinion articles, textbooks, scientific articles, novels, TV shows, advertising, and the internet” (p. 362). With regard to the variability of the discourse data, Toft (2014) argues that CDA studies may use the following data: cross-genre corpus of emails, blog posts, government committee and public hearing minutes, mainstream news stories, alternative journalistic texts, field notes, and interviews (p. 784).

The data used in this research are divided into two types: written and spoken forms. In CDA, writing is seen as “a form of social action” (Van Dijk, 1997b, p. 4) and, therefore, written documents, as data, should be seen as a product of social action that contributes to delivering social meaning in talks or interactions. According to Fairclough (2003) and Wodak (2010), data of discourse or discourse mode may vary and can be divided into spoken, written, audio-visual, or the combination of all of these, which is called multimodality. In this study, discourse is seen as texts that are constructed through the use of linguistic strategies (Fairclough, 1992, 2003; Fairclough as cited in Pasha, 2011; Fairclough as cited in Blommaert, 2005).

The data used in this study include multiple public discourses from many different discourse genres. The use of a range of discourse genres makes it possible to identify the discursive constructions on the Ahmadiyya issue, that is, those that may have discriminated against or defended the Ahmadiyya sect.
Genre is “a way of acting and interacting linguistically” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 66). The discursive constructions in this thesis are any language expressions that depict Ahmadiyya negatively or positively in various texts.

In this study, there is no single or specific genre used as the object of investigation. All data in various genres that make possible the unravelling of the Ahmadiyya issue (either negatively or positively, individually or personally) have been selected. The data were collected from three categories of text producers: state official institutions, social interest groups, and the two Ahmadiyya groups. Interview data were collected using semi-structured interviews.

4.2.1. The Collection of Written Texts

To collect the written data, the researcher visited some institutions or organisations belonging to these three categories of text producers. Six months of fieldwork were spent in collecting the data. The researcher collected the data from the state official institutions in the first two months (July-August 2013), from the interest groups in the second two months (September-October 2013), and from the two Ahmadiyya groups in the last two months (November-December 2013).

In the first two weeks of each time period, the researcher contacted these groups and institutions, explained to them the research planning and details, and made appointments for data collection and interviews. At this time, the participants received the Information Sheet for Participants (ISP) and Consent Form (CF), both of which contained the researcher’s affiliation and contact details. The participants were also informed that their involvement was to be entirely voluntary and that they were free to withdraw from the project at any stage. As well as collecting these data from the data bank of groups or
institutions with official permission from the authorities, other kinds of data were also downloaded from their official websites.

4.2.1.1. Data from the State Official Institutions

In order to administer the Ahmadiyya issue, the Indonesian Government issued joint ministerial decree Number 3/2008 and a joint circular\(^\text{16}\), while the Indonesian National Council of Clerics created two religious decrees (fatwas), one in 1980 and the other in 2005\(^\text{17}\). The making of a policy and the text it contains, according to Yeatman (1990), is seen as an arena of struggle over meaning. Policymaking can be seen as an attempt by power holders to formalise one version of thought, on the one hand, and to suppress or emasculate the other versions, on the other. Taylor (2007, p. 435) argues that the use of critical analysis of discourse is valuable “to reveal the relationship between certain policy texts and their historical, social, cultural, and political contexts”.

The CDA analysis of the policy texts, that is, how the Ahmadiyya groups are presented, is expected to reveal what version of thought underlies the production of these texts, what linguistic strategies they use, and what message they are going to deliver. Further, it is also expected to provide answers to what discourses topics are presented and how the discourses are constructed using certain discourse strategies.

Other texts, such as books and personal arguments delivered in interviews and taken from Indonesian television stations (e.g. TV One and SCTV) were also

\(^{16}\) This circular was also issued in 2008 to provide guidelines for state officials in provincial and regency levels on how to implement the joint ministerial decree effectively.

\(^{17}\) The first fatwa was issued in 1980 in the national consensus II of the council. The fatwa is entitled ‘Ahmadiyah Qadian’. The mentioning of Qadian refers to Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (the JAI). The second fatwa was issued in 2005 in national Consensus VII (No. 11/MUNAS VII/MUI/15/2005. The fatwa is entitled ‘Aliran Ahmadiyah’ (Ahmadiyya Sect). Although it aims to reassert the 1980 fatwa, the council addresses both the JAI and the GAI.
analysed in order to enrich the findings. These additional data were collected from interviews, government official websites, and ‘YouTube’. The variability and richness of the data are useful in providing more reliable information and findings on how the Indonesian state official institutions present the issue of Ahmadiyya in their texts.

4.2.1.2. Data from the Social Interest Groups

The issue of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia has also been reinforced by texts or discourses created by a number of social interest groups that are concerned with the Ahmadiyya issue. The interest groups have created some discourses that have been produced in discourse genres such as speeches, annual reports, articles, policy papers, and related books. These texts could be categorised into those that may have discriminated against Ahmadiyya and those that have defended the sect.

The Setara Institute (the SI) is an organisation that has produced some important documents on the issue, for example annual reports\textsuperscript{18}, that examine the implementation of the principle of freedom of religion and belief in Indonesia. The SI has produced these reports since 2007. The annual reports and the related texts\textsuperscript{19} that were used as data in this research were published from 2007 to 2012. During this period, hostilities and violent attacks against Ahmadiyya were relatively high. Additionally, two prominent social events surrounding the issue also occurred at that time – the issuing of the Joint Ministerial Decree in 2008

\textsuperscript{18} Submissive to Mass Judgment: State Justification in Prosecuting Freedom of Religion and Belief (Report 2007); Siding and Acting Intolerantly: Intolerance by Society and Restriction by the State in Freedom of Religion/Belief in Indonesia (Report 2008); State should Take an Action (Report 2009); Denial by the State (Report 2010); Political Discrimination by the SBY Regime (Report 2011); and Leadership without Initiative (Report 2012).

and the ensuing severe attacks on Ahmadiyya followers in Cikeusik, Banten, in which three of them were killed and five others badly injured.

The annual reports were selected as discourse data in this study for two reasons. First, they used scientific research method to collect quantitative data from a range of provinces and regencies in Indonesia concerning a number of human rights violations against the Ahmadiyya groups. The annual reports also contain opinions and arguments of the research team members of this organisation in raising the issues of religious freedom and discrimination against religious minority groups. Secondly, the reports also present the underlying ideology of the SI that has considerable concern for the issue of freedom of religion. By re-contextualising the research findings collected from some provinces in Indonesia into annual reports, and then publishing them in the form of book, the SI tries to present the so-called academic discourse, which can reach a wider audience. Meanwhile, the personal opinions of the SI team members were taken from audio-video recordings and downloaded from ‘YouTube’.

The Islamic Defender Front (the FPI) is a social and religious group that considers Ahmadiyya to be a deviant and heretical sect, and non-believers. The FPI accuses Ahmadiyya of being a troublemaker in Islam (e.g. ruffling [mengacak-acak] the true Islamic teaching), both in Indonesia and elsewhere, because it acknowledges and propagates a new prophet of Islam after Prophet Muhammad. This acknowledgement is sharply contradictory to the belief entrenched in mainstream Muslim in Indonesia and internationally. In many social events, FPI members encourage particular movements to dissolve Ahmadiyya.

Some news and reports claimed that members of the FPI are reported to have been involved in some physical attacks against the sect (Dipa, 2012; Mietzner, 2012). Discourse data produced by the FPI, is mostly created by its
current chairman, Habib Rizieq Shihab, and the data are divided into two text genres, namely articles\(^{20}\) and religious speeches\(^{21}\).

### 4.2.1.3. Data from the Two Ahmadiyya Groups

The two Ahmadiyya groups, the JAI and the GAI, have created a number of texts that are considered to be defending their belief and arguing against all the discourses that may have undermined them. In the CDA framework, such texts are categorised as resistance discourses (Tilbury, 2000; Wodak & Reisigl, 1999, 2001, 2007), which may have employed some resistance discourse strategies. The discourses produced by the JAI and the GAI were collected from various sources of text genre. For the purpose of this study, any data sources produced by the JAI and the GAI that are considered to be discursively arguing against discriminatory discourses are examined using the discourse strategies of resistance.

The discourse data from the two Ahmadiyya groups are articles, books, interview transcripts, magazines, and papers. The selection of these texts is based on the belief that they present ideas, opinions, or arguments that may have revealed resistance against discourses that may have undermined them. The texts provide personal and institutional arguments. The GAI and the JAI have produced a numbers of books, which can be downloaded from their official website. Books, articles, and papers selected as the data for this study provide


\(^{21}\) The speeches are entitled *Kesesatan Ahmadiyah* [The Heresy of Ahmadiyya] (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pSQ04yvB9OM), *Bubarkan Ahmadiyah* [Disbanding Ahmadiyya] (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Q8uLc4MnbE), and *Pejabat yang berani melarang Ahmadiyah* [Officials Who are Brave to Prohibit Ahmadiyya] (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2WVVsgQO3J8). These speeches are in audio-visual recording and were retrieved from ‘YouTube’.
information and arguments that try to provide publicly clear information about their belief and teaching.

The data from the GAI are mostly presented in articles\(^{22}\), speeches\(^{23}\), and magazine interview scripts\(^{24}\). The articles are written by the GAI followers and are published on their official website, [http://www.ahmadiyah.org](http://www.ahmadiyah.org). The researcher downloaded these articles from this website. The printed data, meanwhile, were collected from the GAI’s office in Yogyakarta when the researcher visited this office in 2013.

The data from the JAI are similar to what the GAI has produced. Discourses from the JAI are created to argue against the discourses that may have discredited them. They were found in books\(^{25}\), interviews scripts\(^{26}\), articles\(^{27}\), magazines\(^{28}\), [speeches] and paper presentations\(^{29}\).

\(^{22}\) The articles are as follows *Siapakah yang Disebut Muslim?* (Mulyono, n.d.), *Ahmadiyah dan perkembangan Gerakan Keislaman di Indonesia* (Nanang R.I. Iskandar, n.d.), *Kebebasan Beragama dalam Konteks Bhineka Tunggal Ika* (Nanang R.I. Iskandar, n.d.), and *Ahmadiyah di Mata Pancasila* (Basyarat Asgor Ali, n.d.). All these articles were retrieved from [http://www.ahmadiyah.org](http://www.ahmadiyah.org).

\(^{23}\) (1) *Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia (GAI) dan Permasalahan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia.* This was presented in ‘the dialogue and hearing’ about the solution of the Ahmadiyya problem in Indonesia, held in the Ministry of Religious Affairs on 22 March 2011. (2) *Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia dan tantangannya.* This speech was presented in Yogyakarta at the gathering of the European Union (EU) Representatives of Indonesian Interfaith Scholarship (IIS) initiated by the Centre of Religious Harmony the Ministry of Religious Affairs Indonesia, Indonesian Embassy of Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and the European Union, 26 August 2013.

\(^{24}\) Interview data are transcribed from interviews with the members of GAI and Magazine Interview with the Deputy of PB GAI, Muslich Zainal Asikin entitled *Kami Tak Berbeda dengan Muslim lain* [We are not so different from Other Muslims] (*Koran Tempo*, 11 August 2013).


\(^{26}\) Interview with one follower of the JAI in Jakarta and two interview scripts collected from media (Zafriullah Ahmad Pontoh, JAI spokesman, interviewed by Zack Petersen, *Jakarta Globe*, 2010), and *Jurnalis Belanda Mampir Yogyakarta* (interview conducted by a Dutch journalist to JAI Yogyakarta, 2013).
The personal arguments of the JAI’s followers were also found in some debates and talk shows on Indonesian national television. In these TV programs, the JAI leaders, such as Zafrullah Ahmad Pontoh (the spokesman of this group) were present to explain the JAI’s belief and teaching. The representatives of the MUI, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and other Islamic organisations were also present. These additional data, which present personal arguments, are also included in this present study, and they are expected to enrich the findings.

4.2.2. Interviews

Semi-structured interviews were used in this study (Barriball & While, 1994; Harrell & Bradley, 2009), so the researcher did not have to follow the interview guide strictly. Such interviews constitute directed conversations, as opposed to non-directed conversations, which enabled “a much more detailed study of the propositional content and organisation of underlying cognition” (Van Dijk, 1989c, p. 119).

In these interviews, the researcher sought to get additional details of each participant’s opinion, perception, argument, or clarification on the issue of Ahmadiyya. The researcher provided a number of questions before carrying out the interview sessions, were the order of questions was changed and additional questions that had not been anticipated in the beginning of the interviews were asked. Audio-recording and note-taking were used to document the interviews.

The following table shows the number of participants being interviewed and the group/institution/organisation being visited during fieldwork. The real
names of the participants have been withheld for the sake of confidentiality. Additionally, members of the Indonesian Council of Clerics and the Islamic Defender Front were not interviewed because none of them wanted to be interviewed. Some of them argued that they were not the right person to discuss the Ahmadiyya issue.

Further, some other members were not in their offices at that time as they were outside Jakarta, for example, in Banten and Bogor. However, their personal statements can also be found on their official website and ‘YouTube’ videos. The name of the organisation from which the interview participants came from is listed in Table 4.1 as follows:

Table 4.1: The interview participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Group/Institution/Organisation</th>
<th>Number of participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>The Ministry of Religious Affairs [MoRA]</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>The Indonesian Council of Clerics [ICoC]</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>The Setara Institute [SI]</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>The Islamic Defender Front [FPI]</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>The Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia [JAI]</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>The Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia [GAI]</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3. CDA Analytical Tool and Discourse Strategies

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) studies examine the use of language as a form of social practice (Jank, 1997). Language and language analysis in such studies is seen as an inseparable part of social life. According to Fairclough (2003), the analysis of texts (or analysis of language features used in texts) would be significant in social scientific terms if it connects with the questions about discourse, that is, “no real understanding of the social effects of discourse
is possible without looking closely at what happens when people talk and write” (p. 4). Such argument underlies the role of language and language use in investigating social problems, particularly those concerning power abuse, discrimination, social inequality, social injustice, and discrimination.

This study examines the relationship between the micro-level of analysis (detailed linguistic strategies) and the macro-level of analysis (discourse topics). The analytical tools are used to analyse the texts to identify discourse strategies used in the texts and discourse topics or themes. A discourse topic is defined as the semantic macro-structure or global meaning of the discourse, which organises local meanings of discourse and defines their overall coherence (Van Dijk, 1987).

The analysis of Ahmadiyya discourses in this study is achieved by identifying some discourse strategies that are mainly used in CDA studies. The strategies are used to examine three types of question: namely ‘what’, ‘how’, and ‘why’. The question of ‘what’ critically analyses what is actually presented in the text. It means that the analysis investigates what discourses have been created. The question of ‘how’ critically analyses the quality of the operationalisation of such presentation through linguistic processes or strategies (KhosraviNik, 2010). In other words, how the discourse strategies are employed by the text producers to present their views, opinions, or arguments about the Ahmadiyya issue. The question of ‘why’ critically investigates the reasons for the presentation of the discourses and the operationalisation of particular discourse strategies.

In detail, the relationship between the research questions, the analytical tools, the process of analysis, and the expected answers are as follows:

(i) ‘What’ questions focus on the discourse topics that are created by the three groups of text producers (the state official institutions, interest groups, and the Ahmadiyya groups) in addressing an Ahmadiyya issue and what discourse strategies are employed;
(ii) ‘How’ questions are concerned about how the Ahmadiyya sect or issue is portrayed or depicted using some discourse strategies; and

(iii) ‘Why’ questions focus on the reasons for creating such discourses. The reasoning has a relationship with the ideology adopted by the text producers, which leads them to interpret social, political, and religious contexts of Ahmadiyya. The ideology and interpretation then lead the text producers to produce their texts/discourses.

The use of discriminatory and resistance discourse strategies reveals the discourse topics management that each text producer deliberately creates. According to Van Dijk (1991), control and management of discourses topics could be the most important form of control and manipulation of an ideology. The topics are constructed through the systematic use, selection, and presentation of certain individuals or groups, either negatively or positively, in the texts. The selection of particular topics is dialectically related to the ideology of text producers (KhosraviNik, 2010).

The discourse strategies either relating to strategies of discrimination and resistance employed in this study are collected from a number of previous CDA studies. They have been considered as such in the studies where they have been collected from. The brief description about the discourse strategies are presented below to give clearer explanation on how the strategies are employed to identify the discriminatory and resistance discourses.

4.3.1. Discriminatory Discourse Strategies

The selection of discriminatory discourse strategies is based upon the assumption that the state official institutions and Islamic Defender Front may
have created discriminatory discourses or negative presentations against Ahmadiyya in their texts, for example, by saying that Ahmadiyya is a heretical sect that it is disseminating deviant understanding, and its followers are non-believers.

Discriminatory discourse strategies (Blackledge, 2005; Flowerdew et al., 2002; KhosraviNik, 2009; Van Dijk, 1984; Wodak & Reisigl, 1999, 2001) are employed to constitute negative presentations against others. Such strategies present the processes of negative discourse constructions against certain individuals or groups. Discriminatory discourse strategies are effective strategies for constructing prejudices, stereotypes, or negative presentations concerning particular social groups (Flowerdew, et al., 2002; Van Dijk, 1989c, 1993c). Some analytical tools belonging to these strategies are powerful for constructing negative portraits and affecting the mind or cognition of other people (readers, listeners, or audiences) so that they adopt the beliefs similar to what the producers have.

As was widely reviewed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3), discriminatory discourse strategies have been widely used to present negative presentations against some social groups, namely ethnic groups (racist discourse), immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, employees of a minority ethnic or race, and adherents of a particular religion. The previous studies have revealed that prejudices, stereotypes, and discrimination against others are carefully created in discourses.

The linguistic strategies found in previous studies of discriminatory discourse strategies include problematisation, blaming the victim, stereotyping, criminalisation of others, metaphor, metonyms, prejudice strategy, ‘labelling mechanism, negative attribution, quotation or quoted speech, the selection of certain personal pronouns, social distancing [othering], and devaluation. The strategies are centred upon the three-level analytical frameworks, namely actor description, social actions, and argumentation (Khosravinik, 2010). All those strategies actually have a similar purpose, as they to discursively discriminate
against others in texts. The strategies of discrimination as presented below are taken from some previous studies concerning how minority groups are discursively discriminated.

1. The Strategy of Problematisation

The problematisation strategy negatively constructs the target individuals or groups as the creators of problems. The existence of minority groups disseminating a belief that is different from the belief of the majority is considered to be an obstacle to the existence and interests of the majority. Such minority groups may be described as criminal actors, for example, illegal drug sellers, troublemakers, and destroyers of economic and political stability. In this strategy, according to Van Dijk (1987), the minority groups are presented in texts as a threat and causing problems, that is, they may be discursively associated with crimes, riots, or other social disturbances.

2. Blaming the Victims (Scapegoating)

Blaming the victims is similar to the strategy of problematisation, as it focuses on some individuals or minority groups that are considered to be the source of problems. As well as accusing them of being the troublemakers, the individuals or groups are also victimised. With certain social problems, the individuals or groups who become the victims are blamed for their own actions.

According to Flowerdew et al. (2002), blaming the victim is a discourse strategy that is used to accuse certain individuals or groups of being the creators of problems or troublemakers, and they are therefore victimised. Discriminatory practices, such as physical attacks, torture, and hostilities directed toward the victims are considered to be the consequence of the victims’ actions. In this strategy, minorities, for example, are personally blamed for the structural
inequality in which they become victims, for example, they are discriminated against because “they cannot assimilate”, or “they lack of motivation” (Van Dijk, 1989c, p. 131). This strategy is useful for majority groups justifying their discriminatory attitudes towards the minority groups (Flowerdew et al., 2002).

3. Metaphor

Metaphor is “a figurative language that is commonly used to build racist discourse” (Musolff, 2012, p. 301). According to Santa Ana (1999, p. 193), metaphors are discourse strategies that “allow speakers or writers to connect narratives from one semantic source domain to other semantic target domains”. Similarly, Rasinger (2012) defines metaphor as a strategy in CDA that attributes individuals or groups with characters from other entities. Metaphor can be seen as a strategy used to present others both positively and negatively by embedding them with certain characters of other entities. The use of metaphorical expression in text can carry “social, emotional, and aesthetic values that influence the interpretation of utterance” (Musolff, 2012, p. 303).

The negative character embedded in others can be observed in the use of, for example, derogatory, animal, and water metaphorical expressions. According to Smith and Waugh (2008), derogatory metaphor is depicting certain individuals and groups as chaotic, destructive, and being a potential threat. They may be presented as illegal aliens who are dangerous, barbaric, threatening, and predatory. In regard to the water metaphor, Flowerdew et al. (2002) argue that this sort of metaphor is carried out by attaching to certain individuals or groups the characters of water, e.g. ‘influx’, ‘flood’, and ‘burden’.

4. Prejudice Strategy

The prejudice Strategy focuses on the negative personal characteristics of individuals or groups, such as being non-educated and under developed (Van
Dijk, 1989c). Previously, such a strategy has been used to build the ethnic prejudice of white dominant groups against groups of black and other coloured communities. In this strategy, according to Van Dijk (1989c, p. 117), such prejudice is constructed through “representing others as foreigners embedded with some negative opinions”.

These negative characteristics are presented ‘naturally’ and are considered to be inherent in the lives of the foreigners. A prejudice strategy may also be constructed by copying existing negative attitudes from other groups. The prejudice strategy is mainly organised through the use of categories such as origin, appearance, and cultural characteristics (Van Dijk, 1989c, p. 129).

5. Negative Attribution

Negative attribution is a strategy that deliberately assigns to individuals or social groups certain negative characteristics, such as poor, dirty, unemployable, and uneducated (Flowerdew et al., 2002). In fact, a negative attribution is similar to the prejudice strategy as it focuses on the presentation of negative evaluations against others as something legitimate and justifiable. However, the prejudice strategy is more focused on the study of ethnic groups, while the negative attribution is applied more to various minority groups such as immigrants and refugees. Both these strategies have the purpose of attaching negative characteristics or attributions to others.

6. Labelling Mechanism

The labelling mechanism reinforces negative values by collocating certain word with other words that contain negative meaning, such as collocating the word ‘immigrant’ with illegal, illegitimate, uneducated, lazy, uncivilised, dirty, ignorant, and over-stayer (Flowerdew et al., 2002, p. 332). This labelling is
reinforced in texts when minorities are frequently embedded with various words containing negative meanings.

7. Quoted Utterances or Quotations

Quoted utterance is quoting or omitting the voices of certain individuals or groups in order to worsen the portrait of individuals or groups in texts (Belmonte et al., 2010). This strategy is useful for justifying or legitimising certain negative presentations in texts by quoting other negative opinions or arguments from different texts (Blackledge, 2006).

The production of texts and messages such texts may deliver are embedded by transforming other texts or element of texts from different genres. Quoting the expertise findings from scholars (Johnson, 2011) or speeches from popular political leaders in the current texts may be efficacious in constructing a certain level of ‘truth’. Quotations are discursive strategies to select voices or utterances, which may be used to support the ideology of text producers and exacerbate the portrait of others.

8. The Use of Personal Pronouns to Show Indirectness

Personal pronouns are used to show indirectness. Text producers prefer to use ‘she’, ‘he’, or ‘they’ rather than directly mentioning the names of the individuals or groups being discriminated against (Graumann, n.d.). This mechanism may also use the pronouns ‘we’ and ‘they’ to show the categorisation of ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’. In this strategy, the text producers avoid spelling out individuals or groups being discriminated against in the texts in order to conceal their discriminatory attitudes.
9. Normalisation of Prejudice as Common Knowledge

Normalisation of prejudice as a common strategy considers the negative characteristics of certain individuals or groups as something inherent, normal, and true (Gotsbachner, 2001). In this strategy, the negative characteristics of minorities are presented as something natural. The normalisation can be seen in the following examples: the minorities manifest negative characteristics since their birth; they migrated to our country and have significant impact on our people; and the minorities cannot change as these characteristics are ingrained in their nature.

10. Social Demarcation or Distancing

Social demarcation is constructed through the establishment of a demarcation line or comparison between good and bad things, for instance, Viennese people live in expensive, upper-middle class flat. Immigrants, meanwhile, are janitors that have no money (Gotsbachner, 2001). Social demarcation is a strategy that builds a difference in social status and social identity. The majority tends to present themselves as groups that identify with better social and economic status, believing that they are more wealthy (rich versus poor), professional, diligent, and educated. Meanwhile, the minorities are presented as groups of people who cannot access this higher status. Although in their daily lives the minorities may have such status and identities, the majority rhetorically deny them in their public discourse presentations.

11. Devaluation or Exception of the Good Characteristics of Others

The refutation of good characteristics, status, and identities of minorities in texts is called devaluation. Devaluation, or exception of the good characteristics of individuals or groups, is the linguistic mechanism that denies
good characteristics of individuals or groups being discriminated against (refuting the positive value of others, and considering one’s positive value as not his/her personal characteristics). This can be seen in the following: “diligence is not personal characteristic of immigrants but rather it is an effect of social pressure” (Gotsbachner, 2001, p. 736).

12. Disclaimers

Disclaimers are verbal denials of discrimination used to avoid a negative impression by listeners or readers (Van Dijk, as cited in Flowerdew et al., 2002). In this strategy, text producers present opinions or arguments in order to present a positive portrayal of them not having racist or discriminatory opinions. They may say that the issuing of certain policies, for example, is carried out to protect minorities, while, in fact, it does the opposite, at least by implication. In other social contexts, the majority groups may refute accusation from others that they have committed discrimination against, or unequal treatment, of minorities. Disclaimer may become an effective strategy for counteracting a negative assessment by readers or audiences of alleged discriminatory actions conducted by majority groups.

13. Extensivisation

Extensivisation is describing actions and situations of certain individuals or groups in detail and adding as much subsidiary information as possible (the subsidiary information may be positive or negative). This mechanism is mainly conducted by identifying detailed natural qualities of individuals, such as age and physical appearance. Extensivisation may be used in reinforcing both the positive image of the majorities and the negative depiction of the minorities.
4.3.2. Resistance Discourse Strategies

The selection of discourse strategies of resistance is based upon an assumption that the JAI and the GAI have produced resistance discourses in order to argue against negative discourses directed toward them. The Setara Institute (the SI) has also created some texts to defend Ahmadiyya.

The Ahmadiyya groups may have produced some texts to create the resistance but these texts are publicly limited. The texts are considered to construct discursive resistance to counterbalance the offensive discourses that may have undermined them. The SI has attempted to promote freedom of religion and belief in their texts. One of the concerns of this religious freedom by the SI is that Ahmadiyya has experienced unequal and unjust treatment from both state and non-state actors.

With regard to resistance discourse strategies, Wodak and Reisigl (1999, 2001, 2007), in their study of racism and discrimination, argue that social groups that have been oppressed and exploited in discourses have adopted the idea of racism and turned to construct an alternative discourse, such as positive self-identity, to resist.

As was reviewed widely in Chapter Two, the discourse strategies of resistance should deal with the attempt by the majorities to undermine or discriminate against minority groups by challenging, resisting, questioning, contesting, or arguing against their dominant discourse. The resource of linguistic properties or mechanisms for both discriminatory and resistance discourse strategies are also provided in CDA literature. However, as can be found in the literature, the application of the variety of resistance discourse properties has been attempted less in previous studies than the discriminatory discourse strategies.

Resistance here is seen as the ways certain individuals or groups struggle over signs and meaning in order to change the way people think about the social
world (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991). The attempt to argue against the dominant discourse is seen as a struggle created by the dominated parties to defend their ideas or beliefs and to challenge the existing dominant discourse. According to Toft (2014, p. 787), “the discursive constructions of resistance play in a field of the provision of new interpretation and description of particular issues and social events”. Discursive resistance by dominated groups is an attempt to redefine the established understanding or definition that may have undermined them.

Tilbury (2000) argues that there are a number of linguistic conventions used to present resistance: rhetorical questions, using credentials to present oneself as an expert speaker, speaking with a majority voice, naming tactics, presenting one’s view as the reasonable middle ground, providing examples to support one’s view, and claiming personal experience to support one’s view. The following is a description of some resistance discourse strategies and they are collected from some previous studies.

1. The Strategy of Naming Tactics

Naming tactics are a strategy to ‘name’ social action carried out by dominant groups that has negatively impacted on the condition of minorities. This strategy, according to Tilbury (2000), may force the hearers, readers, and audience to view or evaluate the action of majorities in a different way. The naming of ‘criminal’, for example, to present the unwanted action of majorities on certain social events may influence audiences to assess the action as immoral and illegal. The strategy may be used to reveal a deviant action of the rulers, majority groups, or power holders. Such naming tactics employed by the minority can be identified in the construction of discourse of ‘criminal’ by the indigenous people in New Zealand that is directed against the government to challenge the racism discourse (Tilbury, 2000). Actually, such a strategy may also be used by the majorities to portray the criminal action of minorities to
justify their actions against particular minority groups. Therefore, naming tactics are relevant for both discriminatory and resistance discourse strategies.

2. The Strategy of Comparison

In the strategy of comparison, minorities discursively compare the actual severe condition they experience with the better condition experienced by other minorities (Tilbury, 2000). In this comparison, the minority groups try to provide arguments and pieces of evidence associated with an unequal treatment by the majorities that has led to their miserable condition. This strategy may be used to challenge the policies or behaviours of the power holders who do not treat minorities appropriately or justly.

By revealing the unfair situation, the minorities challenge the positive image of the power holders (e.g. government officials) that they have, for example, for providing equal protection for everyone. Additionally, this strategy implicitly challenges the power holders to change their policies or treatment in order to provide better facilities, give the minorities wider access to public resources and equal rights, and to provide them with legal protection.

3. The Strategy of Victimisation

In this resistance discourse strategy, the minority groups being discriminated against present themselves as victims of oppressive situations created by others (Jansen, 2000). They experience severe situations that restrict them from having a better life. In fact, the strategy of victimisation is also used to discriminate against others; however, its usage has different goals. As has been explained in the previous section, victimisation used in discriminatory discourse aims at blaming the victims; that is, by implying that violent attacks addressed to minorities are caused by their own actions (e.g. their belief deviates from the
mainstream). In contrast, the use of the strategy in resistance discourse shows the severe conditions they experience in order to attract sympathy from the readers or audiences.

4. The Strategies of Ironic Expression and Contradiction

Ironic expression and contradiction are figurative speech employed to show the contradictory actions created by the majorities or power holders (De Cock, 1998). In texts, minorities present contradictory arguments in order to show inconsistencies, for example, governments’ inconsistency in carrying out their policies. The contradiction can be identified in a statement, for example, ‘the government has protected freedom of religion, but there are still some restrictions in its implementation’. In presenting an irony, the minorities may have constructed compliments or praises for the majorities’ actions or policies, but such compliments aim to deliver an opposite meaning. Irony and contradiction show a contrastive meaning in order to reveal negative actions of the majorities.

5. The Strategy of Avoidance

The strategy of avoidance is employed by discriminated groups by avoiding talking about certain issues, especially those that may exacerbate their severe condition (Van Laer, 2010). The strategy may also be conducted by the minorities through avoiding talking about specific elements of their identity. In other social contexts, the minorities avoid having direct discursive opposition against the majorities because it can intensify violent attacks against them. The avoidance of direct opposition may encourage the minorities to construct their discursive opposition using more implicit or subtler arguments.
6. The Strategy of Metaphor

When confronting negative presentations against them, minority groups may also use metaphorical expressions. This strategy is used, for example, to confront a discriminative metaphor (Toft, 2014). Metaphor can be used to portray the majority groups negatively by attaching them negative characteristics of other entities. For example, the homeless activists may argue against the dominant group’s metaphor of ‘a clean sweep’ of the homeless people from their tents by constructing the metaphor of ‘clean’. The homeless may emphasise cleanliness when they talk to other people in order to “build their positive image and challenge dominant discourse at the same time” (Toft, 2014, p. 797).

4.4. Conclusion

The research method adopted in this study is critical discourse analysis. This study employs CDA as a qualitative investigation technique (Rightler-Mcdaniels, 2014; Van Dijk, 1987; Wodak, 2010) focusing on the use of linguistic mechanisms in order to investigate discriminatory and resistance discourse practices on the issue of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia. This CDA investigation examines many kinds of discourse data from different genres (Toft, 2014; Van Dijk, 2006; Wodak, 2010) that make it possible to identify the discourse constructions of Ahmadiyya produced by three categories of text producers: Indonesian state official institutions, social interest groups, and Ahmadiyya groups. The types of data are spoken and written texts (Fairclough, 2003; Wodak, 2010) that have been collected from fieldwork, interviews, and online searching of official websites of the respective text producers.

The study provides answer to three types of research questions: what, how, and why. The question of ‘what’ focuses on providing answers to the nature of the discourse constructions produced by the three categories of groups: the constructions belong either to discrimination or resistance discourse practices.
The question of ‘how’ focuses on identification of the types of linguistic mechanisms and their operationalisation in texts to construct discrimination and resistance discourses. Further, the question of ‘why’ concerns the reasons of the text producers when constructing their discourses. This CDA qualitative method builds a relationship between micro-level analysis of text and macro-level analysis of the management of discourse topics (Van Dijk, 1987).

The discourse strategies discussed above, along with other possible strategies, are used to analyse data in the following chapters (5, 6, and 7). These strategies could reveal the nature of the discourse presentations the three social categories of text producers (the state official institutions, the social interest groups, and the Ahmadiyya groups) have constructed in their texts when dealing with the Ahmadiyya issue.

In the next chapter, the texts that have been created by Indonesian state official institutions when dealing with the issues of Ahmadiyya will be examined. The examination is expected to reveal whether the Ahmadiyya groups have been discursively discriminated against or not by the state official institution
5.1. Introduction

This chapter examines discourse presentations regarding the Ahmadiyya sect as created by Indonesian state official institutions to reveal how these official institutions discursively present the sect in their texts. It investigates discourses found in texts created by the Indonesian Government (under President Yudoyono’s term) and the Indonesian Council of Clerics, namely the Joint Ministerial Decree 2008, Religious Decrees 1980 and 2005, and in a number of personal arguments. The personal arguments are those delivered by government officials, mostly those who speak for the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Indonesian Council of Clerics.

The discourses presented by these official institutions are classified as elite discourses, because they have more power and control on the issue of Ahmadiyya. According to Van Dijk (1993b, p. 102), “elites, by definition, have more power and control over and access to the means of public communication, such as official propaganda, information campaigns, the mass media, advertising, scholarly publications, textbook, and many other forms of public and potentially influential discourses”.

This chapter also provides explanation about the Indonesian laws and constitution in relation to the issues of religion, freedom of religion, human rights, and what may be seen as blasphemy. Some associated discourses regarding the issue of Ahmadiyya are also highlighted, for example, religious tolerance and harmony.
This chapter explores these issues to provide a clear picture of the Ahmadiyya sect as seen from the perspective of state institutions. This chapter addresses the following questions:

1. What discourses have the Indonesian state official institutions created to present Ahmadiyya in their texts?
2. What linguistic strategies have they employed?
3. How do the state official institutions present themselves and depict the Ahmadiyya groups in their individual and more formal or institutional discourses? Is it negatively or positively?

5.2. Government Policies on Religious Issues

The problem of religion in Indonesia cannot be separated from the involvement of the authority, that is, the government. Indonesian historical development reveals that the governments in different eras – the ‘Old Order’, the ‘New Order’, and the ‘Reformation’ – have issued various policies to control certain religious matters in the country, including the issues of blasphemy and religious defamation.

In these eras of government, some attempts to insert Islam as the official national ideology have been made by particular Islamic groups or communities. Those who have attempted this insertion argue that Indonesia is the most populous Muslim country in the world, so it is deemed reasonable to make Islam the ideological basis. On the contrary, those who reject it would argue that political Islam or Islamism might deny the existence of other non-Islamic religions and also that of Indonesian diversity (with regard to the debate about Islam and the state in Indonesia, see Chapter 3).
When viewed from the perspective of global discourse, there are at least three typologies\(^3\) of the relationship between the state and the religion, secular states, theocratic states, and neither theocratic nor secular states, but religions may become the source of moral values for the state (Mudzhar, 2011; Pranowo, 1994 ). However, the division may not be seen in a very strict sense. It is because that division is still debated among religious experts around the world.

5.2.1. Freedom of Religion in the Laws and Constitution

Freedom of religion has been the oldest and most controversial issue within human rights in the world (Evans, 2010). In Indonesia, the issue can be clearly found in some laws and in the constitution since this country declared its independence on 17 August 1945. On 18 August 1945, One day after proclaiming its independence, Indonesia adopted its first constitution, called the 1945 Constitution. At that time, the constitution only consisted of 37 articles, including the fundamental issue of religious freedom under the heading ‘Religion’, as in Chapter XI, article 29 of the constitution\(^3\). This article was the legal reference for all religious matters at that time.

---

30 (i) There is a clear separation between the state and religion. There are no constitutional, structural, or functional relationships between the state and religion. This can be found in some countries such as United States, Canada, France, England, or Australia. (ii) There is a formal relationship between a state and a religion. This relationship can be found in some theocratic states such as the Vatican, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. The role of religion is very important and one in which all regulations, policies, and institutions should be focused on one single religion. (iii) The relationship between a state and a religion is informal, i.e. the state is not based on one single religion, but the values of the various existing religions may be used to guide the country. Indonesia is a real example of this third type.

31 The paragraphs of article 29 are that “the state shall be based upon belief in One Almighty God” (Paragraph 1); and that “the state guarantees everyone the freedom of worship, each according to his/her own religion or belief” (Paragraph 2).
In 1965, the first Indonesian President, Soekarno (1945 to 1966), issued Presidential Decree Number 1/1965\(^{32}\), concerning the prevention of religious abuse and/or defamation. This decree was used to protect the country from the issue of religious defamation. This law was passed by president Soekarno, urged by the Minister of Religious Affairs (Saifuddin Zuhri), at a time of increasing tension between the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia/PKI) and the biggest Muslim organisation (Nahdlatul Ulama) (Colbran, 2010).

The idea underlying this law, that is, religious defamation was then seen as a threat to national security, to the goals of the 1945 revolution, and to Indonesian national development. Those who were considered to have violated the decree would be punished with a sentence of imprisonment.

Essentially, Presidential Decree Number 1/1965 was used as a legal recognition to prevent some groups of people from defaming one or more of the six official religions. However, in its application, according to Salim (2007), the decree was usually misunderstood, and so it was sometimes used to provide the state with the legal authority to discriminate against certain religious minorities.

The discrimination is made possible because the authority that tries to implement the idea of religious defamation is prone to use this idea to protect dominant religions at the expense of minority religions or beliefs. The idea of

\(^{32}\)The articles of the presidential decree are:

Every individual in public is prohibited from intentionally conveying, endorsing, or attempting to gain public support in the interpretation of a certain religion as embraced by the people of Indonesia, or undertaking religious based activities that resemble the religious activities of the religion in question, where such interpretation and activities are in deviation of the basic teaching of the religion (Article 1).

Article 156 (a) of the Criminal Code which imposes a five year prison sentence for whosoever in public intentionally should express their views or engage in actions that, in principle, incite hostilities and may be considered as abuse or defamation of a religion embraced in Indonesia.
religious defamation is usually used to legitimise an authoritarian regime (Lindholm, Durham, Lie, Ghaneya, & Wetlesen, 2004).

At the beginning of the ‘New Order’ era (1966 to 1998), when Soeharto had taken over power from Soekarno, and he became the de-facto second president in 1966, Presidential Decree Number 1/1965 was used to identify those who did not embrace one of the six religions and were, therefore, accused of being non-believers and of having an affiliation with the Communist Party (Colbran, 2010). In this context, the decree became one of the political instruments used to eradicate the existence and development of more followers of the Communist Party.

In 1969, the status of the presidential decree was upgraded to law, called Law PNPS Number 1/1965. This law was officially included in Law Number 5/1969 (Law PNPS Number 1/1965 juncto Law Number 5/1969). During the new order era, this law was used as a legal reference and also to initiate other lower laws to control the issue of blasphemy.

In the reformation era, the case of religion and religious policies in Indonesia has been complex and challenging. This observation is reflected in a number of legal proclamations issued from 1999 to the present. The issuing of the proclamations was also encouraged by the various religious matters triggered by multi-issues such as human rights, the issuing of sharia laws (Islamic laws) in local contexts, called Perda Syariah, and the emergence of intolerant religious/hardliner groups who perpetrate violent acts against religious minority groups. In 1999, the Indonesian Government issued Law Number 39 concerning human rights to provide a constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, as stipulated in article 22, paragraphs 1 and 2\(^\text{33}\) of the law.

\(^{33}\) “Everyone has the right to have the freedom to choose his/her religion and to worship according to the teachings of their religion and beliefs” (Paragraph 1); “The state guarantees everyone the freedom to choose and practice their religion and to worship according to their religion and beliefs” (Paragraph 2).
This law enforces freedom of religions and beliefs as one of the many basic rights for everyone in Indonesia that should be guaranteed by the state. At that time, the emergence of this law can be understood in the context of the reformation era when democracy returned to Indonesia in 1998 after the fall of the authoritarian regime of Soeharto and the demand for human rights protection was very strong and forceful.

One year later, by 18 August 2000, the Indonesian Government enacted the second amendment to the 1945 Constitution to reinforce religious freedom. The amendment introduced several new articles, including articles 28E, 28I, and 28J, which provide details on the guarantee by which the freedom of religion and belief is integrated with other rights.

Religious freedom in Indonesia was extended further to include the individual’s civil and political rights. The extension of religious freedom led to the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), issued by the United Nations (Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa), into Law Number 12/2005, especially article 18. By this ratification, Indonesia is expected to

---

34 “All persons shall be free to adhere their respective religion and to worship according to their religion, to choose their education and learning, their work or occupation, their citizenship, as well as their place of residence within the nation’s territory, and shall be free to depart from it and to return to it” (Paragraph 1); “All persons shall have the right to freedom of belief, and freedom of expression in accordance with their conscience” (Paragraph 2); and “All persons shall have the right to be free to organise, assemble, and express opinions” (Paragraph 3).

35 “The right to life, freedom from torture, freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of religion, freedom from enslavement, recognition as a person before the law, and the right not to be tried under a law with retrospective effect are all human rights that cannot be limited under any circumstances” (Paragraph 1); “Every person shall have the right to be free from discriminative treatment based upon any grounds whatsoever and shall have the right to protection from such discriminative treatment” (Paragraph 2); and “The protection, advancement, enforcement, and fulfilment of human rights are the responsibility of the state, especially the government” (Paragraph 4).

36 “Everyone shall have the duty to respect the human rights of others within the orderly context of living in a community, nation, and state” (Paragraph 1).

37 “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right shall include the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, or
fully implement the international standard on religious freedom and include such freedom as a part of international probity and tolerance.

5.2.2. Restricted Freedom

Despite this new development in the level of recognition of freedom of religion, there is restriction found in some other laws and paragraphs of the 1945 Constitution. Freedom of religion is not totally free as in Western sense. The Indonesian Government usually argues it is necessary that the restriction remain in place because unrestricted freedom may pose social problems associated with morality, public order and security, as well as violation against human rights. The restriction can be found in some of the following features: article 28J in the 1945 Constitution\(^ {38}\), Law Number 12/2005 about the ratification of ICCPR (article 18, par. 3)\(^ {39}\), Law Number 39/1999 about human rights (articles 70 and 73)\(^ {40}\), and Law PNPS (Penetapan Presiden) Number 1/1965.

freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, and teaching” (Paragraph 1); and “No one shall be subject to coercion, which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice” (Paragraph 2).

\(^{38}\) Article 28J (paragraph 2) Chapter XA, concerning human rights of 1945 Constitution, paragraph 2:

In exercising his/her rights or freedoms, every person shall have the duty to accept the restrictions established by law for the sole purposes for guaranteeing the recognition and respect of the rights and freedoms of others and of satisfying just demands based upon considerations of morality, religious values, security, and public order in a democratic society.

\(^{39}\) “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others” (Paragraph 3).

\(^{40}\) “In executing his rights and obligations, everyone shall observe the limitations set forth in the provisions in this Act, in order to ensure that the rights and freedoms of others are respected, and in the interests of justice, taking into account the moral, security, and public order considerations of a democratic society” (Article 70); and “The rights and freedoms governed by the provisions set forth in this Act may be limited only
Another form of restriction can also be found in the establishment of some official institutions that have the task of controlling religious matters in Indonesia: the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Indonesian Council of Clerics, and Bakorpakem (Badan Koordinasi Pengawas Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat/The Coordinating Body to Monitor the Development of Religious or Belief Streams in Society).

The Ministry of Religious Affairs was established in 1946, one year after the proclamation of Indonesian Independence. Up to the present, the ministry has been authorised to administer religious matters in Indonesia. The Indonesian Council of Clerics, which was established in 1975, has an authority to interpret religious teachings to provide direction on social and religious issues by issuing a religious decree (fatwa) in line with Islamic teaching (e.g. fatwa relating to religious sects) (Colbran, 2010).

With this authority, the council has the power to determine whether a religious sect deviates or not. Other official religions also have their religious institutions: the Indonesian Conference for Bishop (Konferensi Wali Gereja Indonesia/KWI) for Catholicism, the Association of Indonesian Churches (Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia/PGI) for Protestantism, the Representatives of Indonesian Buddhists (Perwakilan Umat Budha di Indonesia/Walubi) for Buddhism, the Administrative Council of Hinduism (Parisada Hindu Darma Indonesia/PHDI) for Hinduism, and the High Council of Confucianism (Majelis Tinggi Agama Konghucu di Indonesia/Matakin) for Confucianism (Colbran, 2010).

Meanwhile, the Bakorpakem is given the authority to monitor the various religious sects in Indonesia. This body is legally placed under the office of the
Attorney General and its members come from several official institutions, including the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the police, and the National Intelligence Agency.

5.2.3. Legal Proclamations Addressing the Ahmadiyya Issue

In order to regulate the Ahmadiyya problem, the Indonesian Government, as recommended by the Bakorpakem, issued a joint ministerial decree in 2008 signed by three ministries: the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Attorney General. The decree is popularly known as SKB 3 Menteri. Up to the present, the decree remains a matter of controversy, especially in the studies conducted by several civil society organisations that concern themselves with the issues of human rights and freedom of religion. Some people say that the decree violates the basic rights of religious freedom as stipulated in Indonesian laws and in the constitution (Colbran, 2010; Kraince, 2009).

Another prominent policy regarding Ahmadiyya is the fatwa (religious decree) issued by the MUI. The council issued a fatwa in 1980 and another in 2005, both of which prohibit the activities of the JAI (in both fatwas of 1980 and 2005) and of the GAI (in the fatwa of 2005) in all Indonesian territories. The prohibition is based on the belief that the two Ahmadiyya groups have deviated from the principle teachings of Islam by acknowledging a new prophet after Prophet Muhammad, and also declaring the arrival of the promised Messiah and

41 The joint ministerial decree is about the Admonition and Instruction to the Disciples, Followers, and/or the Adherents of the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation (Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia abbreviated as JAI) as well as to the members of the public.

42 In these two decrees, MUI clearly stated that Qadiani Ahmadiyya has defamed the Islamic principles of teaching and, thus, they are Jamaah/Communities outside Islam. In fatwa 2005, the MUI has also included the Lahore Ahmadiyya, although the inclusion is not described in detail.
the awaited Imam Mahdi in the personality of their figure, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.

In the government’s view, the debate around Ahmadiyya (in this case, the government only addresses the JAI, not the GAI) is twofold. First, it is the debate about religious freedom, and secondly, it is about blasphemy and religious defamation, which are both considered to be threats to religious harmony. The government’s reasoning is that Indonesia appreciates very much its freedom of religion; not only Islam, but there are also five other religions that have the same status, namely Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. The government further argues that the followers of those six religions are to be given equal freedom. In the Ministry of Religious Affairs, they also have their official representation at the level of directorate general called the Directorate General of Public Guidance (Dirjen Bimas), such as Dirjen Bimas Islam (the Directorate General of Islamic Community Affairs) for Muslims and Dirjen Bimas Katolik (the Directorat General for Catholic Community Affairs) for the Catholicism (Balitbang dan Diklat Kementerian Agama RI, 2013).

However, the problem faced by the JAI followers is not that of the religious freedom as given to the six recognised religions. The beliefs of the JAI are considered to be religious defamation because they have defamed Islam and deviated from the core teaching of Islam, especially in their recognition of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet after Prophet Muhammad. Because this deviation might trigger a social conflict, the Indonesian Government argues that the best way to regulate this problem is by issuing the joint decree.

Constitutionally, the joint decree is not part of the hierarchy of the Indonesian legal system identified in Law Number 10/2004, article 7. However, 43

---

43 In the paragraph 1 of the article, the hierarchy of the law is structured as follows: (1) The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia; (2) The Laws/Government Regulations Substituting the Laws (PERPPU); (3) The relevant government regulations; (4) The presidential decree/regulations; and (5) The local regulations (Gubernatorial/Major/District Head Decrees).
in paragraph 4 of Law Number 10, it is stated that such legislation (e.g. laws or decrees) may be fully recognised and legally enforceable if it is countenanced by higher legislation. The joint decree is then recognised as an official regulation because it is placed officially under Law PNPS Number 1/1965 that is concerned with the prevention of blasphemy and religious defamation\(^\text{44}\).

The joint decree consists of six items, divided into two broad parts. The first part is the instruction to the followers, members, and the adherents of the JAI. If they consider themselves to be Muslims, they must stop disseminating the deviant thoughts, interpretation, and activities that contradict the true teachings of Islam. The thoughts, interpretation, and linked activities are the dissemination of understanding about the recognition of a new prophet and all his teachings after Prophet Muhammad. The second part of the decree is the instruction for the members of the public to keep and maintain religious harmony; this is to be ensured by creating no further violent actions against the law of the disciples, the followers, and the JAI members (Balitbang dan Diklat Kementerian Agama RI, 2013).

The former Minister of Religious Affairs, Muhammad Maftuh Basyuni\(^\text{45}\), stated in the socialisation of this joint decree in front of the national heads of Islamic organisations on 9 July 2008 and in the meeting with some ambassadors from the European Union countries on 10 July 2008 that the decree is not a form of government intervention against the faith or the belief of the people\(^\text{46}\). It is, however, the government’s effort to maintain the security and the order of its society, which is being disturbed by the conflict and by the spread of deviant

---


\(^{45}\) Muhammad Maftuh Basyuni was the Minister of Religious Affairs in Indonesia Unity Cabinet I (2004 to 2009). He was in charge when the SKB was issued in 2008.

religious understanding. In this minister’s official statement, the JAI followers and their teachings are considered to have deviated from the principles of Islamic teaching. Hence, from the Indonesian Government’s view, this problem has two aspects: the JAI is the source of conflicting polarisation and social instability, and, at the same time, it is the victim of violence perpetrated by some members of the public.

5.2.4. Joint Decree: Its History and Opposing Views

From the historical perspective, the issuing of the decree had a long process before being released (Ruhana & Abidin, 2011). When incidents of violence were increasing, the Ministry of Religious Affairs invited the national organising board of the JAI to explain their understanding as to what was triggering the social conflicts. Prior to this meeting, the Ministry of Religious Affairs with the Attorney General, the Ministry of Home Affairs, Police Department, and some Islamic figures had hosted a series of dialogues with the national board of the JAI from 7 September 2007 to 14 January 2008. In the meeting, seven options were offered to the JAI as follows:

1. The Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia is dissolved by the Indonesian Government;

2. The Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia is dissolved by the courts and this is carried out through a litigation process;

3. Ahmadiyya is categorised as a religion outside Islam;

4. Ahmadiyya is accepted and recognised by the Indonesian Islamic mainstream as one of the sects in Islam;

5. The Indonesian Government makes a stern warning to the JAI to stop all their missionary activities in all Indonesian territories;

6. There should be a meeting between the MUI, Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia, Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia, other Islamic organisations, and a government delegation in order to make an
agreement about the solution that should be taken based on the principle of ‘take and give’; and

7. Ahmadiyya will not be prohibited, as long as they stop all their missionary activities in all the Indonesian territories.

From the seven options, the JAI national board selected option 4, “Ahmadiyya is accepted by the Indonesian Islamic mainstream, as one of the denominations or streams in Islam”. The JAI followers want to be recognised in the same way as other Islamic organisations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. In order to achieve this acceptance, the JAI followers were requested to explain their belief system and give a list of actions that they would have to carry out in the future.

In order to explain their belief system, the JAI finally issued twelve explanatory statements to assure the government and the mainstream Muslims that their Islamic teaching does not deviate from Islamic teaching (see Appendix A for these explanatory statements). The content of some of these statements are the acknowledgement of Prophet Muhammad as the last prophet, with Ghulam Ahmad being recognised only as a reformer, not a prophet. With agreement on these twelve points, it is expected that the Indonesian people can accept the existence of Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia.47

In order to ensure the implementation of these twelve points, the Bakorpakem was tasked with conducting a monitoring. This coordinating body worked for three months in some 55 locations of the JAI communities, and in 33 regencies and cities around Indonesia. Based on their investigation during the three-month period, it was concluded that the JAI had not completely carried out all the twelve points (Balitbang dan Diklat Kementerian Agama RI, 2013). The JAI followers still violated the following points: (i) the recognition of

Muhammad as the last prophet, (ii) the position of Mirza Gulam Ahmad as only a teacher and a reformer, (iii) the position of Al-Qur’an and Sunnah, (iv) the position of Tadzkirah as the holy book of the JAI, and (vii) the action of accusing other non JAI-Muslims as being non-believers, because they do not recognise the prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. These violations were found in several areas in Indonesia, such as in Depok, South Jakarta, Kendari, Bandung, Kuningan, Medan, Langkat, Yogyakarta, Banjarmasin, and in Tasikmalaya.

In response to these breaches and to improve compliance to the joint decree effectively, the government also issued a Joint Circular (Surat Edaran Bersama abbreviated as SEB) of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence Affairs, and the Director General for National Unity and Political Affairs of the Ministry of Home Affairs on 6 August 2008. The joint circular is used as a guideline for the effective implementation of the joint decree at the regional and city levels. This circular is addressed to all governors, the heads of provincial attorneys, the heads of the provincial offices of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and to the heads of regencies/mayors all over Indonesia.

However, some organisations, especially those who are concerned with the issues of freedom of religion and human rights such as Human Right Watch, Kontras, the Setara Institute, and the Wahid Institute, actually opposed the issuing of the joint decree. They stated that the decree is a form of government intervention in the belief of the people, or groups of people, and one that can violate human rights, especially the right to adhere to a religion or a personal belief (Human Rights Watch, 2012, 2013; Setara Institute, 2009). They also considered the decree to be contradictory to the freedom of religions/beliefs as protected by some laws and the 1945 Constitution.

Those individuals who opposed the issuing of the joint decree argued that freedom of religion/belief is the core content of the 1945 Constitution, article 29, paragraphs 1 and 2, and of the second amendment of article 28E, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3. The decree is also contradictory to Law Number 39/1999 concerning Human Rights, article 22, paragraphs 1 and 2. Freedom of religion in these laws is a *non-derogative right*; it is a right that cannot be cancelled or revoked.

Further, by looking at the Indonesian 1945 Constitution, Law Number 39/1999 and Law Number 12/2005, Indonesia is actually a country that provides equal opportunity for all Indonesian citizens to commit themselves to a religion, as well as to practise it. Every person, whatever his or her religion, should have the same or equal assistance from the state without any discrimination and/or threat against them. At the same time, those who try to derogate this right personally or institutionally will be deemed to have violated the laws, and, therefore, should be punished.

However, the Indonesian Government has an opposite view. The government has explained that the issuing of the decree is not a form of intervention, because the government does not have the authority to control anyone’s religious belief, as it is a personal thing. However, if the belief and the propagation of the belief can trigger problems in the society, especially in violating the general religious harmony, and so become a source of social conflict, then the government has the authority to regulate the issue in order to maintain social order\(^{49}\).

The government argues that it is important to emphasise that freedom of religion only applies to the six official religions, and Ahmadiyya is excluded, therefore, the problem of Ahmadiyya does not belong to these groupings. Thus, the Indonesian Government has decided that the issue of Ahmadiyya should be

\(^{49}\) This information was collected from the interview with MoRA 3 in 2013, a researcher in the centre of Research and Development of Religious Life, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and who was heavily involved in administering the Ahmadiyya issue.
dealt with using the regulations concerning blasphemy and religious defamation, not only at the national level, but also at all lower levels of government.

Ahmadiyya activities in the Indonesian territory became more and more restricted due to the issuing of some decrees by regional governments at provincial and regency levels. Such decrees can be found in South Sumatera and East Java (provincial level) and at the regency level (e.g. Pandeglang in Banten and Samarinda in East Kalimantan). In South Sumatera, the governor prohibited all the JAI activities by issuing decree Number 563/KPT/BAN, Kesbangpol dan Linmas/2008 on 8 February 2011. In East Java, a similar decree was also issued through Number 188/94/KPTS/013/2011, on 28 February 2011. Those regulations are associated with Perda Sharia, which are the local regulations that enforce Islamic laws (Mudzakkir, 2011). All the decrees were issued to protect their territory from any social conflicts, such as those occurring in Cikeusik in 2001, in the district of Banten, which is well known as the ‘Cikeusik Incident’ (in this incident, three followers of the JAI were killed and five others were badly injured).

A similar regulation – but not one that dissolves the JAI – is operative in West Java through decree Number 12/2011. The governor argued that the regulations just prohibit the spread of the JAI’s teaching and understanding, but not their existence. They may live in West Java territory but they may not ask or persuade other people to follow their teaching and understandings.

The regulation about the prohibition of the JAI was operative not only after the ‘Cikeusik Incident’, but also long before the incident. In 2004, on 20 December, the Head of Kuningan Regency had issued joint decree Number 451.7/KEP.58 Pem.Um/2004, KEP-857/0.2.22/Dsp.5/12/2004, Kd.10.8/6/ST.03/1471/2004, about the prohibition of all Ahmadiyya teachings in the regency. In 2007, the head of the Tasikmalaya Regency also issued a joint

---

decree stating that the Ahmadiyya congregation is to be prohibited (Rosyidin & Mursyid, 2007).

5.3. Religious and Inter-religious Harmonies

The issue of Ahmadiyya is also addressed using the discourses of religious and inter-religious harmony (*kerukunan antar umat beragama*). In some texts produced by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, there is to be found a set of descriptions or explanations regarding the harmony. Basically, the discourse is based on the historical, political, geographical, and contextual conditions of Indonesia. It is well known that Indonesia is one of the most diverse countries in the world from the viewpoint of tribes, islands, languages, religions and beliefs, and cultures. This diversity, if it is not treated properly, will be prone to social conflict.

All the major religions of Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism, as well as hundreds other beliefs (*aliran kepercayaan*) can be found in this country, and they are not only concentrated in one or a few locations, but found in almost all regions. Among these religions, Islam is followed by the large majority of the Indonesian population, at around 88.2% (in 2000) and at 87.20% (in 2005)\(^51\). In addition, the differences are not only among the religions (inter-religion), but also in the different understandings and interpretations among the followers within the same religion, or in the so-called intra-religion.

Historically, the term religious harmony can be traced back to a statement delivered by the former Minister of Religious Affairs, K.H.M. Dachlan\(^52\), in his

opening speech at *Musyawarah Antar Agama* (the Inter-Religious Forum) in 1967. In the speech, religious harmony was considered to be the basic requirement or prerequisite for the establishment of Indonesian political stability.

At that time, Dachlan was aware that religious diversity could be a threat to Indonesian unity, especially in the development of Indonesia as a progressive country. The inter-religious harmony forum also aimed at protecting the country from the possibility of social conflicts caused by the influence of a communist ideology and party. Since the speech, the term ‘religious harmony’ has become a formal term in various texts issued by the ministry. It has also been included as a project in the New Order Government’s First Five Years Development Plan (*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun I*, abbreviated REPELITA I), called ‘Religious Harmony Establishment Project’ (*Proyek Pembinaan Kerukunan Hidup Beragama*).

During Alamsjah Ratu Prawiranegara’s⁵³ tenure as the Minister of Religious Affairs (1978 to 1983), the term religious harmony was defined in three domains, called the *Trilogy of Harmony* (*Trilogi Harmoni*). It consists of religious harmony (i) among the adherents of the same religion, (ii) among the adherents of different religions, and (iii) between the adherents of religions and the government.

In the reformation era, President Susilo Bambang Yudoyono released Presidential Decree Number 7/2005 (*Perpres No. 7 tahun 2005*) in order to increase the development of religious harmony, both in the domains of inter- and intra-religions (Mas’ud & Ruhana, 2012). In the decree, this harmony is included in the 2004 to 2009 National Development Plan, and it is one of the central components of the government policy to develop Indonesian religious life. This policy focuses on empowering the people, religious groups, and religious figures,

---

²⁵ K.H. Muhammad Dachlan was the Minister of Religious Affairs in Soeharto’s Cabinet of Development I (1967 to 1971).

⁵³ Alamsjah Ratu Prawiranegara was the Minister of Religious Affairs in Soeharto’s Cabinet of Development III (1978 to 1983).
in order to provide a self-initiated solution to the problem of religious harmony and to provide guidelines for maintaining it. In intensifying the discourse of the religious harmony, the government had also established a ‘Religious Harmony Forum’ (Forum Kerukunan Umat beragama/Forum KUB) in 285 cities/districts in all provinces in Indonesia.

The dissemination of the harmony discourse can be widely found in many texts. One way to socialise it is by publishing books and journals that can be accessed widely by the public, both at the national and international levels. The journal *Harmoni* (Harmony in English) is the publication intended to promote the view of the Indonesian Government in regard to the issues of harmony. To enrich the already effective publication of the journal, researchers and scholars from different academic backgrounds are invited to contribute to this publication.

Viewed from a legal perspective, the discourse of religious harmony has always been used as a justification for issuing a religious policy, especially if the problem is one that tends to trigger a social conflict. Beside policies, the ministry has also conducted various relevant studies and research projects, as well as dialogues, and published the outcomes. Some major issues are also presented at the level of the harmony discourse, such as problems associated with the establishment of places of worship, mass organisations, and the treatment of blasphemy or religious defamation cases.

The problem faced by Ahmadiyya is one that is also placed under the theme of religious harmony. The justification by the government for the JAI issue is that the followers of this religious sect have violated the religious harmony (Balitbang dan Diklat Kementerian Agama RI, 2013; Mudzhar, 2011). This is because the sect promotes a deviant understanding of Islam, which worries many mainstream Muslims and, therefore, it becomes a source of social conflict. In order to maintain harmony, the Indonesian Government, with its political power, believes that it should control the religious matter by issuing all the necessary decrees, including the joint ministerial decree.
5.4. The MUI and Religious Decrees

As mentioned earlier, the MUI has both a significant role to play on the Ahmadiyya issue and is a major influence over the issue. In this respect, the MUI released two fatwas (religious decrees) in 1980 and 2005, which clearly proscribe Ahmadiyya to be a deviant or heretical sect. In the 1980 fatwa, the MUI considered only the JAI to be a heretical sect, but in the 2005 Fatwa, the council included both the JAI and the GAI. The latter fatwa prohibits both the Ahmadiyya groups from considering themselves to be part of Islam.

This fatwa has attracted supporters and opponents within Indonesian society. The supporters state that the fatwa must be issued because Ahmadiyya can destroy the faith of the majority of Muslims. Ahmadiyya’s deviant interpretations of Islam can encourage other Muslims to deviate from the true understanding of Islam. On the other hand, those who opposed it argue that the fatwa violates freedom of religion/beliefs and of basic human rights. The fatwa contradicts Indonesian laws and constitution (Wahid, 2006). Further, the actors of the violent acts might use the fatwa to justify their hatred and physical attacks against Ahmadiyya followers (Assyaukanie, 2009; Hosen, 2005; Kraince, 2009).

5.4.1. The MUI and the Debate surrounding its Establishment

The MUI was established on 26 July 1975 at the national conference of Indonesian Islamic Clerics in Jakarta. The council aims at “implementing the Islamic teachings in order to participate in the creation of secured, peaceful, just, and prosperous Indonesian society, both in the spiritual and physical terms” (Saputra, Andriansyah, & Prasetya, 2011, p. 1). By establishing this council, the Indonesian society – one which is based on the Pancasila – will be blessed by Allah SWT (God). The implementation of the Islamic teachings is to be conducted through the issuing of fatwas to answer various issues faced by the society, whether they become private or social issues (Saputra et al., 2011).
The issues can be classified into the following fields: (i) the fields of faith and religious streams, (ii) the fields of society and culture, (iii) the field of religious activities, and (iv) the field of foods, drugs, sciences, and technologies. Either the Indonesian governments or the public, if they have a problem and need an explanation based on the Islamic perspective, may ask the council to issue a fatwa, especially in terms of halal and haram (Islamically lawful and unlawful).

The establishment of the MUI in 1975 could not be separated from the history of the ‘New Order’ regime led by Soeharto. In the first inauguration of this council, on 27 July 1975, Soeharto emphasised two important roles of the council: they were (i) to unite the Muslims in Indonesia, and (ii) to provide a wide opportunity for Islamic clerics to be involved in overcoming problems faced by the state (Suaedy, Ghasali, & Rumadi, 2006).

The role to unite Indonesian Muslims can be understood since its members are the appropriate representatives of various Islamic organisations. The council is, therefore, considered to represent all Muslims in Indonesia (Nasir, 2011). Further, the notion of this unification can also be understood as an attempt to minimise the deep tensions between the two biggest Islamic organisations in Indonesia at that time – the Nahdlatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah (Assyaukanie, 2009).

Regarding the second role, a fatwa issued by the MUI is considered to be one of the answers to and directions for Indonesian governments and the public to overcome social problems, especially problems that need religious reasoning and consideration. The council can also participate actively in developing the religious knowledge of Indonesian society, and it should work with other Islamic organisations to participate in the development of the state.

However, many parties were suspicious of this council because the MUI had a dependent relationship on the power of Soeharto at that time. This suspicion can be identified in the financial support received by the council from the government. Suaedy et al. (2006) argue that the MUI, as an institution, could
be used by the regime to control the movements of Ulama (Muslim clerics) from the top level to the lowest level of the region. In this context, the Islamic scholars had been employed to legitimise the governments’ policies. This can be seen from, for example, the fatwa issued by the MUI on 30 October 1983 about the Program Keluarga Berencana (Family Planning Program). This program was encouraged by the Soeharto regime in order to restrict the numbers of children that one family may have.

The decision to issue a fatwa, and which social problem relates to it, will depend on the ideology and political interest of the members of the council. According to Assyaukaine (2009), who provides the example of the MUI membership structure in 2005 to 2010, the MUI of this period was driven by ideological and political interests. It is because “many of its members were politicians, activists, journalists, and the leaders of radical Islamic groups” (Assyaukanie, 2009, p. 7).

In the context of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia, the issuing of the fatwa about the prohibition of the sect becomes problematic. Some people argue that the fatwa can justify one’s belief, which is actually a personal or private thing. The numbers of violent attacks against Ahmadiyya followers in some regions of Indonesia were also considered to have a close relationship with the issuing of the fatwa (Assyaukanie, 2009; Hosen, 2005).

Because this Council of Clerics is a quasi-state body, and one that comprises clerics from several Muslim organisations (Nastiti, 2014), the religious decrees may have a greater impact on the Muslim community (Platzdasch as cited in Nastiti, 2014). The discourse construction of Ahmadiyya in the religious decrees may be used by other Islamic groups (particularly the hardliners) to justify their hatred and violent attacks against Ahmadiyya. The religious decrees may be used to legitimate the actions of radical Islamic groups.
and so lead to an intensification of attacks, hostility, and violence against Ahmadiyya\textsuperscript{54}.

The issue of Ahmadiyya, as seen from the view of the Indonesian Council of Clerics, is investigated from the \textit{fatwas} issued in 1980 and 2005, and from personal arguments as delivered by members of the council, especially when participating in some debate programs in Indonesian television about the Ahmadiyya issue. In these television programs, it is stated that Ahmadiyya, especially the JAI, has deviated from the principle teaching of Islam. Therefore, this sect should be banned, and it is not allowed to survive in Indonesian territory.

\section*{5.4.2. The \textit{Fatwas} of 1980 and 2005}

The \textit{fatwa} of 1980\textsuperscript{55} was the first decree issued by the MUI regarding Ahmadiyya. The \textit{fatwa} was released in 1980 at a conference called the National Consensus II, held 26 May to 1 June 1980 in Jakarta. The Ahmadiyya groups considered in this \textit{fatwa} are the JAI and the GAI. Both of them are excluded from Islam.

In the book that compiled \textit{fatwa}, published in 2011, the MUI also attached this \textit{fatwa} with the result of the National Working Meeting (\textit{Rapat kerja Nasional}) that had recommended that the Indonesian Government review the legal status of the JAI. On June 13, 1953, the Ministry of Justice (\textit{Menteri


\textsuperscript{55} The 1980 \textit{fatwa} consists of two points: (i) Based on the data and evidence found in the nine books about Ahmadiyya, the Indonesian Council of Clerics states that Ahmadiyya is a group/congregation outside Islam, deviant, and perverted; and (ii) Regarding the Ahmadiyya issue, the Indonesian Council of Clerics should consult with the Indonesian Government.
Kehakiman) issued a decree saying that Indonesian Law Number JA/23/13/1953 was a legal protection for Ahmadiyya to live in Indonesia.

The recommendation was made based on three reasons: Ahmadiyya can lead to social upheaval because (i) its teaching deviates from the true teaching of Islam, (ii) it can cause disunity, and (iii) it would be dangerous for state order and security. Further, the MUI also called for the Indonesian Government, at all governance levels, to explain the deviation of Ahmadiyya to the public. Those who follow Ahmadiyya were advised to return to the true teaching of Islam. All Muslims were encouraged to raise their awareness and vigilance, and not to be affected by this deviated understanding.

In 2005, at National Consensus VII in Jakarta, the MUI reissued a fatwa about the deviation of Ahmadiyya. The 2005 fatwa (Number II/MUI/15/2005) was a reassertion or restatement of the 1980 fatwa. Compared to the previous one, the 2005 fatwa is more comprehensive, as may be seen from its content and description. Further, the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Movement (the GAI) also becomes the target of this fatwa. In the fatwa compilation book, the description concerning the reason and the background why the MUI had reasserted the deviation of Ahmadiyya was then provided (Saputra et al., 2011). Further, the MUI also provides their perspective, the criteria, and some other supporting arguments to back up the issuing of the decree.

The description about Ahmadiyya (their movements, groups, literature, its founder and his teachings) as seen from the viewpoint of the holy Qur’an and Hadits is presented there. The MUI also cites a number of fatwas issued in the

---

56 The contents of the 2005 fatwa are: (i) Reasserting the fatwa 1980, which stated that Ahmadiyya is outside Islam, deviated, and perverted, and the Muslims who follow the sect are apostate (murtad); (ii) The Muslims who have followed the sect are recommended to return to the true Islamic teaching which is in line with the holy Qur’an and Al-Hadits; and (iii) The government is obliged to ban or prohibit the seeds of Ahmadiyya’s teaching and to freeze their organisation as well as to close all their places of worship.
international Islamic world that were concerned with banning and prohibiting Ahmadiyya. The 2005 *fatwa* was considered to be corresponding to (i) Pakistan and India’s experience dealing with the Ahmadiyya issue, (ii) the organisation of *Rabithah Alam Islamiyah* (World Muslim League), (iii) the Islamic Conference Organisation (*Organisasi Konferensi Islam/OKI*), and (iv) the views from various Indonesian Islamic organisations. A new statement to be highlighted here in this second *fatwa* is that the MUI includes the GAI, which was not included previously in the 2008 *fatwa*.

In an interview session conducted in October 2013 in Yogyakarta, Mulyono, the secretary of the GAI clarifies the association of his organisation in the *fatwa* of 2005 by saying that the people might not distinguish these two Ahmadiyya groups. The unclear information, as is highlighted in the *fatwa*, makes their lives uneasy. The JAI and the GAI, in fact, have a sharp distinction, especially about the prophethood of Ghulam Ahmad (Ahmadiyya founder). The GAI clearly believe that Ahmad is just a reformer, not a prophet. The JAI followers, on the other hand, rely on a belief that Ghulam Ahmad is their new prophet coming after Prophet Muhammad.

Regarding this Ahmadiyya founder, the MUI argues that this man has appointed himself as reformer (1882), the *Imam Mahdi* (1889), the promised *messiah* (1890), and a prophet (1901) (Saputra et al., 2011). At the beginning, Ahmad claimed himself to be a reformer of Islam. On March 4 1889, he acknowledged himself to be the *Al-Mahdi al-Ma’hud* (the awaited Imam Mahdi). Further, in 1890, he had argued that God has appointed him as *Al-Masih al-Ma’wud* (the promised messiah). The last claim, which has raised the heated debate in the Islamic world, is that in 1901 he claimed himself to be a new prophet, and that he had been given divine revelation from God (*Allah*). All these MUI descriptions are based on the books written by Mirza Gulam Ahmad: *Barahini Ahmadiyah, Fath-i Islam*, and *Masih Hindustan Man*. 
5.5. Discourse Presentations of Ahmadiyya

In order to find out how Ahmadiyya is presented using various discourse strategies by the state official institutions, this section analyses a number of written and spoken documents created by the Indonesian Government and its Council of Clerics. As has been mentioned earlier, Law PNPS, the joint ministerial decree, the joint circular, and two religious decrees issued by the MUI are prominent policy texts that are used to address the Ahmadiyya issue. Besides the official laws or decrees, there are some other data collected from books, television programs, and interviews.

5.5.1. Ahmadiyya as a Troublemaker

The most salient negative presentation against Ahmadiyya is the creation of a discourse of troublemaking. In this presentation, the sect is considered to be a threat and a source of conflict. This presentation is created through the use of the discourse strategy of problematisation. This strategy is commonly used to present others as the source of a problem, threat, or troublemaking. According to Van Dijk (1987, p. 42; Van Dijk in Flowerdew et al., 2002, p. 325), “the strategy of problematisation presents minority groups as a ‘threat’ and ‘causing’ problems; i.e. they may frequently be associated with crimes, riots, or other disturbances”.

The presentation of religious minority groups as the source of problems can be identified in Law PNPS Number 1/1965. In this law, deviant sects are presented as groups that may interfere with national security, national development, and with the ideals of a just and prosperous Indonesian society. In the ‘description’ section of the law (in pages 4 and 5), six purposes of the issuing of the laws are stipulated: (i) ensuring the national unity, (ii) pursuing nation building, (iii) increasing national alertness, (iv) encouraging religious harmony, (v) guaranteeing religious practices, and (vi) preventing all actions that may
deviate from true religious teachings. All deviant sects are considered to be obstacles to the pursuit of these ideal purposes. The law problematises all deviant beliefs as threats, sources of a dangerous situation, and social disorder for the Indonesian national unity and security. The Ahmadiyya sect is included in this category.

Further, all deviant sects are presented negatively as the offender of existing laws and posing as a threat to national unity and security. As it is embodied in Law PNPS, the deviant understanding propagated by blasphemers or religious defamers could well be ‘creating actions that may violate laws’, ‘breaking up Indonesian national unity’, ‘defaming religions’, ‘endangering the existence of recognised religions’, and ‘endangering the unity of Indonesian state’.

Similar discourse construction is also found in the MUI’s fatwas of 1980 and 2005. In some parts of the two fatwas, Ahmadiyya is considered to be a danger and a source of threat as well as of social disorder. Some words containing negative meaning in the fatwa of 1980 are deliberately presented to produce negative depictions of the JAI. In the fatwa, the JAI is considered to cause Kererosahan, karena isi ajarannya bertentangan dengan ajaran Islam (unrest, because its teaching is contradictory to Islamic teaching), Perpecahan, terutama dalam hal ubudiyah [ibadah] (split, especially in the case of prayers), and Bahaya bagi ketertiban Negara (danger for the order and security of the state).

The Council of Clerics calls for all Muslims to separate themselves from the JAI’s deviant understanding. This calling can be found in the following statements: Bagi mereka yang telah terlanjur mengikuti Jemaah Ahmadiyah Qadian supaya segera kembali kepada ajaran Islam yang benar (those who have followed Qadiani Ahmadiyya are encouraged to return to the true Islamic teaching) and Kepada seluruh umat Islam supaya mempertinggi kewaspadannya, sehingga tidak akan terpengaruh dengan paham sesat ini (all Muslims are
advised to increase their alertness in order to avoid this deviant teaching) (the *fatwa* of 1980).

Another use of a problematisation strategy can be found in the sentence that states the JAI to be the creator of the problem that disturbs the peace and order of society. JAI followers are presented as criminal actors who provoke social conflict, destroy religious harmony, and who disturb the peace of society.

*Pemerintah telah melakukan upaya persuasif melalui serangkaian kegiatan dan dialog untuk menyelesaikan permasalahan Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia [JAI] agar tidak menimbulkan keresahan dalam kehidupan beragama dan mengganggu ketentraman dan ketertiban kehidupan bermasyarakat.*

(Government has carried out persuasive efforts by conducting a series of events and dialogues to overcome the problem of *Jemaat Ahmadiyya Indonesia* [the JAI] so that it no longer creates problems for religious life and disturbs the peace and order of society).

(Joint Ministerial Decree 2008, p. 1)

Accusation, for being the source of conflict and addressing the JAI followers is also found in the book written by Mohammad Atho Mudzhar (the Former Head of Research and Development, Education and Training, in the Ministry of Religious Affairs) entitled *Islam in the Globalised World* (2011). Mudzhar occupied his official position when the Joint Ministerial Decree was issued. In his book, JAI followers are accused of being the source of conflicting polarisation in society. The negative presentation of Ahmadiyya in the book reads as follows:

*The Qadiani Ahmadiyya members were not prohibited from believing in anything or from observing their religious rituals, but they were warned to refrain from preaching certain doctrines that had proved to cause conflicting polarisation in society, which in turn disturbs law and order.*

(Mohammad Atho Muzhar, 2011, pp. 17-18)
The discourse presentations of threat and of troublemaking can be used to arouse the feeling in society that the existence of this sect (especially the JAI) and its teaching may become a serious social problem. Additionally, it reinforces that the propagation of deviant understanding may destroy the *aqidah* (the faith) and other moral considerations (Abel, 2013). This destruction of religious belief may have a serious consequence for Muslims, both in this world and in the afterlife. The discourse nature of the social problem may also construct a fear in society of the continuation of religious-based social conflict, which has frequently occurred in Indonesian modern history, particularly after the downfall of Soeharto; for instance, the conflicts in Ambon and Poso.

The negative presentation against Ahmadiyya is then reinforced by using a discourse strategy of blaming the victims. According to Flowerdew et al. (2002), blaming the victims (scapegoating) is the discourse strategy used to accuse certain individuals or groups of being the creators of problems or being troublemakers, and so they are finally victimised. Such a strategy is commonly used to legitimise negative presentations or violent acts against particular groups. This strategy can provide the attackers (groups or communities that create violent attacks against Ahmadiyya) with a certain level of justification in initiating their attacks.

Accusation of the JAI followers being troublemakers and the source of social conflict seems to be underlying and justifying discriminatory actions against them. The new interpretation of Islam, the one that acknowledges a new prophet after Prophet Muhammad, has sparked debate, especially among Indonesian Muslims.

Through the strategy of blaming the victim, the JAI followers are, thus, negatively depicted as criminal actors because conflict and violent attacks created by some members of the public toward them had previously been triggered by the propagation of an essentially deviated understanding of Islam. In this case, the JAI followers are accused of being the troublemakers and, at the
same time, they are also victimised. This scapegoating strategy can be seen to be operating in the following statement:

*Bagi pemerintah, masalah Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia mempunyai dua sisi. Pertama, Ahmadiyah adalah penyebab terjadinya pertentangan dalam masyarakat yang berakibat terganggunya keamanan dan ketertiban masyarakat. Kedua, warga JAI adalah korban tindakan kekerasan sebagian masyarakat.*

(For government, the issue of Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (the JAI) has two sides. *First*, it is the source of social conflict that causes a disruption of public order and security. *Second*, the followers of JAI are the victims of violent actions perpetrated by some members of the public).

(Balitbang dan Diklat Kemenag RI, 2013, p. 77)

The scapegoating strategy is commonly used to justify discriminatory or violent acts against minorities (Flowerdew et al., 2002).

### 5.5.2. Ahmadiyya as the Blasphemer

Discourse presentation of blasphemy creates another negative image of Ahmadiyya. Ahmadiyya is considered to have carried out negative conduct, such as those of a heretic, apostate, and infidel. The negative image is constructed through the use of the strategy of lexicalisation (lexical choice) by selecting particular words and phrases containing negative meaning. The words and phrases are ‘heresy’, ‘deviant sect’, ‘outside Islam’, ‘ruffling the principle teaching of Islam’, ‘apostates’, ‘heretical’, ‘defame’, ‘infidels’, ‘perverted’, and ‘non-believers of Islam’. This can be identified in the *fatwa* of 1980 as follows:

*Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Majelis Ulama Daerah Tingkat I, Majelis Ulama Daerah Tingkat II, para ulama, dan da’i di seluruh Indonesia, menjelaskan kepada masyarakat tentang sesatnya Jemaat Ahmadiyah Qadian yang berada di luar Islam.*
(The Indonesian Council of Clerics, those at the provincial level, the city level, the clerics, and the proselytisers [the dai] all around Indonesia, are encouraged to explain to the people about the heresy of Qadiani Ahmadiyya and that this sect is outside Islam).

(Saputra, et al., 2011, p. 41)

Other lexemes of ‘outside Islam’, ‘heretical’, ‘perverted’, and ‘apostate’ are found in the fatwa of 2005. These expressions are sequenced in the following sentence *Aliran Ahmadiyah adalah kelompok yang berada di luar Islam, sesat dan menyesatkan, serta orang yang mengikutinya adalah murtad [keluar dari Islam]** (Ahmadiyya is a sect outside Islam, is heretical and perverted. People who follow them are apostate).

A similar negative presentation can also be identified in personal arguments delivered by an official staff member of the Ministry of Religious Affairs – Abdul Fatah (an expert staff member of the Minister of Religious Affairs) – when attending a debate program in ‘TV One’ entitled *Kontroversi Nasib Ahmadiyah* Part 1 [the Controversy of the Fate of Ahmadiyya] (Deanova, 2013a). The presentation is as follows:

*Jika ada perbedaan, mari kita saling menghormati…. Dan pemerintah sudah melaksanakan itu… kita sudah tawarkan ke pihak Ahmadiyah…. Kalau memang anda mempunyai perbedaan yang prinsip, silahkan bebas melaksanakan keyakinan anda, dijamin konstitusi, tapi jangan bilang Islam, karena ini ada perbedaan yang prinsip dengan umat Islam.*

If there is a difference, let us respect each other. And, the government has carried this out (respecting the religious differences). We offer Ahmadiyya, if you have difference, please, you are free to carry out your belief, it is guaranteed by the constitution, but do not say Islam, because there is a principle difference with Muslims.

His following statement reveals a similar negative presentation by using the phrase ‘religious defamation’ as follows:
An indication of religious defamation is the presence of a controversy of the coming of a prophet of Islam after Muhammad (the Messenger of Allah) …. The second, Tadzkirah is still used as a holy book other than Al-Qur’an.

(Deanova, 2013a)

Two sets of statements above have similar features, that is, they create a negative meaning in order to reveal the blasphemous actions of JAI followers. In a textual analysis of meaning-making, the negative sentences are called ‘negation’, which may infer or presuppose implicit meaning that blasphemous actions have been performed before. The ‘negation’ presents the meaning of a sentence implicitly rather than explicitly (Van Dijk, 1993a). The sentence “do not say Islam” infers that JAI followers have claimed themselves to be Muslims before. The acknowledgement of a new prophet after Prophet Muhammad and a holy book other than the Qur’an are strongly considered to be practices of religious defamation of Islam.

Amirsyah Tambunan – the Deputy Secretary General of MUI – when participating in a TV One debate, also considered unequivocally that the JAI had actually violated Law PNPS regarding the prevention of blasphemy [Kontroversi Nasib Ahmadiyya Part 2] (Deanova, 2013b). Tambunan accused the JAI of having deviated from the core teaching of Islam, especially from the concept of the seal of prophethood of Islam. This strong accusation can be observed in the following argument:

Jika masalah ini (adanya nabi setelah Nabi Muhammad SAW) dikaitkan dengan Undang-Undang PNPS No. 1/1965 tentang penodaan agama... yah.... Itu sebetulnya telah menyimpang dari pokok-pokok ajaran agama (Islam).

(If this problem [the coming of a new prophet after Prophet Muhammad peace be upon him] is associated with Law PNPS Number 1/1965 about
blasphemy… yes…. it has actually deviated from the core teaching of religion [Islam]).

(Deanova, 2013b)

As the deputy secretary of the MUI, and in line with the MUI’s fatwas about Ahmadiyya, Tambunan then continued his argument in order to reinforce the difference between the concepts of religious freedom and religious defamation. Ahmadiyya (i.e. the JAI) is presented as a sect that has destroyed Islam. The following statement is his argument highlighting the distinction as follows: Ini kebebasan beragama, bukan kebebasan merusak agama (This is a freedom of religion, not a freedom to defame a religion) (Deanova, 2013b).

A similar negative depiction is also presented by the chairman of the MUI, K.H. (Kyai Haji) Ma’ruf Amin, in a Metro TV Talk Show program, ‘Today’s Dialogue’, entitled Debat SKB Ahmadiyah [The Debate on the Joint Ministerial Decree on Ahmadiyya] (Yahya, 2013). Amin used a metaphorical expression by selecting some lexemes, such as ‘travelling’ and ‘return’, and the phrase ‘the right path’ to create a metaphor of travelling. The use of ‘return’ and ‘the right path’ deliberately delivers the meaning that religion is an activity of ‘travelling’, that is, the movement from one point or place to another, and Ahmadiyya had been considered to be travelling to a wrong path. The statement of Amin is as follows:

Kami tetap masih mengharapkan Ahmadiyah itu kembali ke jalan yang benar. Karena itu SKB ini, saya kira, kita terima sebagai satu upaya untuk mengembalikan mereka. Tetapi juga Majelis Ulama tetap menginginkan, kalau mereka tidak kembali, kita tetap berusaha untuk supaya dilarang dan dibubarkan.

(We [the MUI] still expect the Ahmadiyya followers to return to the right path. Therefore, this SKB, I think, we accept as an attempt to bring them back [to Islam]. However, the MUI still expects that if they do not return [to Islam], we will try to have the Ahmadiyya prohibited and dissolved).

(Yahya, 2013)
Such a metaphorical expression implicitly considers Ahmadiyya to have a deviant understanding of Islam, and it, therefore, defames this religion. Ahmadiyya is viewed as having travelled in a wrong way, and its followers should return to Islam as based on the original Islamic interpretation (as stated in the Qur’an) or the perspective adopted by the MUI and of the Indonesian Islamic mainstreamers.

5.5.3. ‘Ahmadiyya has been Repulsed Everywhere’

In the fatwa of 2005, the MUI presents the repulsion of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia and in the international world using the discourse strategy of quotation. This strategy is employed to reinforce or justify the rejection of Ahmadiyya by quoting the repulsion of the sect from other texts (created in the past) to the fatwa of 2005. The selection of such a strategy has a goal of telling the public that the prohibition of Ahmadiyya, as stipulated in fatwa 2005, is true because this sect has been previously repulsed everywhere.

According to Belmonte et al. (2010), a quotation or a quoted utterance is a discourse action that is carried out by quoting or omitting a particular voice from certain individuals or groups. This strategy recontextualises some particular discourses from different sources of text, and this operates by extending and/or suppressing a potential meaning in a particular text (Blackledge, 2006). It is carried out by transforming discourses, texts, ideas, opinions, and legal decisions from previous social events and text genres into the current texts being produced. One of the salient features of this strategy is quoting the authorities’ statements to support a claim, which is called “authority” (Tahir, 2013, p. 746).

There are at least three purposes of the discourse transformation through quotation. First, it aims to justify, legitimise, and legalise the belief or ideology of the text producers, either as individuals or members of an institution. Second, the quotation attaches the text being produced to some levels of ‘truth’, that is,
‘repudiation of Ahmadiyya is true, because it has been previously stated by other institutions or countries’. And last, the quoted statements, arguments, decisions, and decrees may reach greater, new, and varied audiences.

The quotation of discourse of Ahmadiyya repulsion is identified under the subtitle ‘Religious decree and the views of the Islamic world’ in the *fatwa* of 2005. The strategy is created by quoting arguments and *fatwas* previously issued by Islamic clerics in India and Pakistan and in other Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam. Other similar decisions are quoted from international Islamic organisations such as the *Rabhitah Alam Islamiyah* (the World Muslim league) and the Islamic Conference Organisation (*Organisasi Konferensi Islam/OKI*).

*Para ulama Pakistan dan India sepakat menghukumi kafir kepada Mirza Gulam Ahmad serta dua kelompok pengikutnya tersebut sejak 70 tahun yang lalu. Pelarangan Ahmadiyah juga dilakukan oleh berbagai negara/pemerintahan Muslim seperti Malaysia, Brunei, dan Arab Saudi.*

(The Islamic clerics in Pakistan and India had agreed to consider Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and his two groups of followers as non-believers for about 70 years. The prohibition of Ahmadiyya is also issued in many Muslim countries/governances, such as those in Malaysia, Brunei, and Saudi Arabia).

(Saputra et al., 2011, p. 111)

Other quotes say:

*Para ulama dari berbagai negeri Islam yang terdiri dari 144 organisasi Islam dan tergabung dalam organisasi Rabithah ‘Alam Islami dalam keputusannya di Mekkah al-Mukarramah pada tahun 1973 secara bulat (ijma’) memfatwakan Ahmadiyah kelompok yang kafir, keluar dari Islam.*

(The Islamic clerics from many Islamic countries consisting of 144 Islamic organisations, which are affiliated in *Rabithah ‘Alam Islamiyah* [the World Muslim League], in their decision issued in *Mekkah al-Mukarramah* in 1973, unanimously state Ahmadiyya to be a heretical sect and not a part of Islam).

(Saputra et al., 2011, p. 112)

(The infidelity of Ahmadiyya has also been determined by the religious decree issued by Islamic clerics from countries affiliated in the Islamic Conference Organisations, that is in the religious decree called Majma’ al-Fiqh al-Islami OKI in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on 22-28 Desember 1985).

(Saputra et al., 2011, p. 112)

The same strategy is adopted by citing statements and decisions of some Islamic figures or organisations in Indonesia. The statements and decisions deliver the message to the audience or readers that the majority of Muslims in Indonesia also repudiate the beliefs and existence of Ahmadiyya. The following statements recontextualise the formal decision of many Indonesian Islamic organisations and the Indonesian clerics into the fatwa of 2005.

Berbagai ormas Islam di Indonesia, seperti NU, Muhammadiyah, dan Persis (Persatuan Islam) telah memfatwakan hal yang sama mengenai Aliran Ahmadiyah. Muhammadiyah sejak tahun 1926 sudah memfatwakan kesesatan dan kekufuran Ahmadiyah.

(Various Islamic organisations in Indonesia, such as NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), Muhammadiyah, and Persis [Islamic Unity], have issued the same decision regarding Ahmadiyya. Muhammadiyah, since 1926, has propagated the heresy and infidelity of Ahmadiyya).

(Saputra et al., 2011, p. 113)

Another quote says:

Pasca MUNAS MUI ke VII, dukungan terhadap fatwa MUI mengenai aliran Ahmadiyah juga disampaikan oleh berbagai ormas Islam. Dukungan atas fatwa ini juga disampaikan oleh kyai-kyai pengasuh pondok pesantren di Jawa, Madura, dan Sumatra.
(After the National Deliberation VII of the MUI, support for the fatwa has been given by other Islamic organisations\textsuperscript{57}. Similar support is also given by Islamic scholars from Islamic boarding schools in Java, Madura, and Sumatera).

(Saputra et al., 2011, p. 113)

By recontextualising some religious decrees, statements, and arguments, both from national and international Islamic circles, the Indonesian Council of Clerics tries to justify its decision against Ahmadiyya and attaches to it some levels of justifiable truth. It means that the fatwa is unanimously true and undeniable, because a similar decision has also been previously issued by many Islamic organisations as well as countries around the world. Such a strategy can be seen as the reinforcement of repulsion against Ahmadiyya, because it conveys meaning that the majority of Muslims, either in Indonesia or in international Islamic circles, reject it.

5.5.4. The Disrupter of Religious Harmony and Social Order

Besides being presented negatively as the troublemakers and source of conflict, Ahmadiyya is also depicted as the destroyer of religious harmony and social order. This negative presentation is created using the discourse strategy of disclaimer. Disclaimer is the verbal denial of discrimination. According to Van Dijk (as cited in Flowerdew et al., 2002), a disclaimer (also popularly known as denial) is an attempt by text producers (writers or speakers) to avoid a negative impression with their readers or audience regarding their opinions or arguments on a particular issue. A disclaimer may also be defined as the attempt by text

\textsuperscript{57} The Islamic organisations are Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII), Badan Kerjasama Pondok Pesantren Indonesia (BKSPPI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Syarikat Islam (SI), Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyah, Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI), Yayasan Pendidikan Islam (YPI) Al-Azhar, Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Perjuangan Islam Solo, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Hidayatullah, Al-Ittihadiyah, PERTI, FUUI, and Al-Washliyah.
producers to “present themselves in a positive light, while, at the same time, to present others negatively” (Van Dijk, 1997, p. 5). In this case, the government presents itself positively while depicting Ahmadiyya negatively.

In the issuing of the joint decree concerning Ahmadiyya, the Indonesian Government argues that it is an attempt to maintain religious harmony and tolerance. Through this strategy, the Indonesian Government attempts to construct a discourse of religious harmony and tolerance in order to deny all opinions or arguments from others who consider the issuing of the decree to be a violation against freedom of religion.

SKB bukanlah intervensi negara terhadap keyakinan seseorang melainkan upaya pemerintah sesuai kewenangan yang diatur oleh undang-undang dalam rangka menjaga dan memupuk ketentraman beragama.

(The issuing of the joint ministerial decree in 2008 is not the government’s intervention into the belief of certain individuals or groups. However, it is the government’s effort to maintain religious harmony).

(Balitbang dan Diklat Kemenag RI, 2013, p. 50)

The government argues that the decree is not an intervention in their personal belief, but it is an attempt to establish religious harmony. Why? It is because the propagation of Ahmadiyya’s deviant interpretation of Islam has disrupted Indonesian religious harmony. Religious harmony has been a long-established jargon and project used by the Indonesian Government since 1967 as one of the key strategies to safeguard the Indonesian national development. It is also seen as an absolute prerequisite for the establishment of Indonesian wealth or prosperity. (For a discussion on religious and inter-religious harmony, see Section 5.3. above.)

The disclaimer is also used to construct a discourse of society order and security. Ahmadiyya and its new interpretation of Islam have threatened the order and security of the Indonesian society. The joint decree was issued to
maintain the security and the order of society. It has been stated before that Ahmadiyya (especially the JAI) is considered to be a threat to national security and to the order of society, and it may lead to social conflict. The disclaimer can be identified in the statement of the former Minister of Religious Affairs, Maftuh Basyuni, as follows:

SKB itu adalah upaya pemerintah untuk memelihara keamanan dan ketertiban masyarakat yang terganggu karena adanya pertentangan dalam masyarakat, yang terjadi akibat penyebaran paham keagamaan yang menyimpang.

(It [the issuing of the joint ministerial decree] is the government’s effort to maintain the security and the order of the society, one that is disturbed by the spread or propagation of the deviant religious understanding).

(Balitbang dan Diklat Kemenag RI, 2013, p. v)

So, the issuing of the joint decree is considered to be the right way to establish and maintain religious harmony, as well as order and security in society. At the same time, it is used to deny any negative impression with people who believe that the decrees have been used to intervene in personal belief and, therefore, discriminate against Ahmadiyya.

5.5.5. Sympathetic Discourse

The positive self-presentation of the government can be identified in the presentation of sympathy for religious minority groups (sympathetic discourse). For example, in commenting on Ahmadiyya, MoRA 2 (interview, 2013), one of the officials of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, revealed his sympathy for the Ahmadiyya groups. He argued that the issuing of the joint decree aims at protecting Ahmadiyya from any violent attacks that may be perpetrated by some elements of the public. This argument is used to underlie the necessity of a joint ministerial decree that may have a positive impact on the followers of
Ahmadiyya, that is, the decree can give them protection from violent attacks and make their life more secure.

With the decree, the Indonesian Government has carried out its constitutional obligation to protect Ahmadiyya. The decree confirms the consequence of punishment for members of the public who perform violent attacks against this sect. The meaning construed is that the joint decree is necessary, because it is the best way to protect the Ahmadiyya followers from physical attacks of others.

*Itu [SKB] adalah kesepakatan dimana saya termasuk yang menggagas. Ahmadiyah sekarang itu tenang. Dulu sebelum SKB ini, Ahmadiyah itu tidak bisa tidur, baik Lahore maupun Qadian.....*

(The joint ministerial decree is an agreement and I was the one who initiated the decree. Recently, Ahmadiyya can live peacefully. Previously, before the decree was issued, they [the followers of Ahmadiyya] could not sleep well, either [those of] the Lahore or the Qadian…)

(Interview, MoRA 2, 2013)

Another statement from MoRA 2 (interview, 2013) that reveals his sympathy for Ahmadiyya is presented below. In the statement, he argues that some members of the public had carried out negative attacks against Ahmadiyya followers. The Ahmadiyya followers have an equal right to carry out their belief, similar to other Muslims, and they have to be recognised as part of Islam if they have recited two *shahada* expressions.


(There are also some minority religious groups that have been unequally treated, such as Ahmadiyya. They have prayed in their mosque, why the mosque is sealed. It is their right to pray [in their mosque]. I always give
sermons in many places … if they have recited two shahada expressions, do not disturb them…. They are also Muslims).

Another sympathetic statement is also stipulated in point four of the joint decree. It states that the actors of violent actions against Ahmadiyya followers will be sentenced to imprisonment. By highlighting this point, the government tries to protect Ahmadiyya followers from any physical and non-physical attacks created by some members of the public. The point is:

Memberi peringatan dan memerintahkan kepada warga masyarakat untuk menjaga dan memelihara kerukunan umat beragama serta ketentraman dan ketertiban kehidupan bermasyarakat dengan tidak melakukan perbuatan dan/atau tindakan melawan hukum terhadap penganut, anggota dan/atau anggota pengurus Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI).

(To warn and instruct the members of the public to keep and maintain the religious harmony and the order of society by no longer creating any activities and/or actions violating laws against the followers, disciples, and/or the members of the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation [the JAI]).

(Joint ministerial decree, p. 4)

Nazaruddin Umar presented another sympathetic discourse for Ahmadiyya when he served as Dirjen Bimas Islam (Directorate General of Islamic Social Guidance). When he was interviewed by SCTV\(^{58}\), he revealed his sympathy by including Ahmadiyya as a part of Indonesian history: Ahmadiyah itu kan juga adalah bagian dari genetika bangsa kita, mereka bukan orang lain dari bangsa ini (Ahmadiyya is a part of the genetics of our country. They are not foreigners). In this statement, Ahmadiyya is to be seen as an inclusive part of Indonesian history, and one that may have made a positive contribution to

\(^{58}\) TV program called Sigi 30 Menit. The recording of the interview was downloaded from ‘YouTube’.
Indonesia. Further, the statement tries to relieve the dichotomy of ‘us’ versus ‘them/others’, to show that the Ahmadiyya followers are part of ‘us’, and that they are not the ‘others’.

5.5.6. Academic Discourse

In some texts, it is found that the government tries to reveal the validity of the deviation of Ahmadiyya. The decision to issue decrees and personal statements addressing Ahmadiyya are not subjective views or baseless accusations, but have been objectively and logically verified and validated. The discourse strategy of lexicalisation is used by selecting some academic prerequisites or, what I call, the ‘academic nuanced-expressions’ to disseminate academic activities in the discursive categorisation of Ahmadiyya. Examples of expressions found are ‘book’, ‘dialogue’, ‘verification’, ‘in-depth analysis’, ‘literary research’, ‘field research’, ‘historical approach and library research’, ‘analysis or analysing’, ‘the research is valid’ and ‘referring to original literature publications’. These expressions are deliberately selected and stated in the fatwa of 1980 to provide a certain level of truth and proof of objectivity in the consideration of the deviation of Ahmadiyya belief from Islam.

Sesuai dengan data dan fakta yang diketemukan dalam sembilan buah buku tentang Ahmadiyah, Majelis Ulama Indonesia memfatwakan bahwa Ahmadiyah adalah jamaah di luar Islam, sesat dan menyesatkan.

(Based on the data and facts found in nine books about Ahmadiyya, the Indonesian Council of Clerics issues a fatwa that Ahmadiyya is a congregation outside Islam, deviant, and perverting).

(Saputra et al., 2011, p. 40)

A similar academic discourse is also found in the fatwa of 2005. It reads as follows:

(The fatwa on Ahmadiyya is issued after there had previously been conducted an in-depth study on Ahmadiyya teachings using an historical approach and library research, i.e. by searching for Ahmadiyya history, analysing their books written by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and other Ahmadiyya figures, and investigating two Ahmadiyya groups and their teachings by directly referring to their original literature publications. Additionally, in-depth analysis of Al-Qur'an, Hadith, Ijma', Aqwal Ulama, and other fatwas in the Islamic world has also been conducted).

(Saputra et al., 2011, pp. 101-102)

Beside it being stipulated in the two fatwas, such academic discourse is also identified in personal arguments delivered by MUI officials at some public events. Amirsyah Tambunan – the Deputy Secretary of the MUI – argues that the deviant belief of Ahmadiyya concerning two fundamental issues in Islam (i.e. the prophethood of Ghulam Ahmad and Tadzikirah as a holy book of Ahmadiyya) has been proven academically and follow proper academic prerequisites, such as dialogue, verification, and field research (Deanova, 2013c). This personal argument reads as follows:

Ada sebenarnya dua masalah pokok yang terkait soal Ahmadiyah. Pertama, yang sangat fundamental itu adalah yang menyangkut soal adanya nabi dan rasul setelah Muhammad SAW. Dan itu mereka (JAI) akui. Dari berbagai dialog yang sudah kita lakukan, dan itu sudah dibuat pernyataan secara tertulis, dan itu sudah kita verifikasi, dan kita sudah lakukan penelitian secara langsung di lapangan. Jadi ada dua hal dalam konteks ini. Pertama adalah ada ambivalensi, menurut saya ada ketidakjelasan dalam konteks ini. Oleh karena itu saya meminta kepada Jemaat Ahmadiyah untuk jujurlah beragama. Karena itu saya meneliti di
bawah... Terus terang, penelitian yang saya lakukan itu valid dan saya temukan fakta-fakta...

(There are actually two main issues regarding Ahmadiyya. The first and the most fundamental issue is the presence of a prophet after Prophet Muhammad. And they (JAI followers) have admitted it in number of dialogues that we have conducted before, and has been admitted in writing, we have verified it, and we have conducted field research. There are two issues in this context. The first is that there is an ambivalence. In my mind, there is dishonesty in this context. I request the followers of JAI to be honest in implementing religion... I have carried out research at the grass roots. Frankly speaking, the research is valid and I have found many facts...)

The presentation of academic activities surrounding the Ahmadiyya issue, both in written and in spoken texts, has both social and communicative functions. First, it tells the public that the deviation of Ahmadiyya and all the legal proclamations concerning the sect are true. The decision has met the objective requirements. Second, such activities have the function of delivering a message to the public that the policies are not merely based on personal judgment or the particular interest of certain individuals or groups, but are based on academic verification.

5.5.7. Safeguard of Muslims and Islamic Purity Discourses

The MUI issues a fatwa in response to a question or questions raised by either the government or members of the community either being requested or otherwise. In discourse presentation as the safeguard of the Muslim Community (Ummah), the MUI presents itself positively as the institution trying to provide answers and solution for Muslims by issuing fatwa. In relation to the Ahmadiyya issue, the MUI presents itself as the safeguard of the purity of Islamic faith when this purity has been polluted by the propagation of a deviant belief. The strategy of indirect quotation is found in the discourse creation by quoting a request by
the public to reissue a *fatwa* concerning Ahmadiyya. Quoting the needs of the Muslims for the reaffirmation of *fatwa* about Ahmadiyya can also be seen as magnifying the voices of the majority of Muslims in order to oppose the Ahmadiyya sect. This is identified in the *fatwa* of 2005 at the consideration section as follows:

_Bahwa sebagian masyarakat meminta penegasan kembali fatwa MUI tentang paham Ahmadiyah sehubungan dengan timbulnya berbagai pendapat dan berbagai reaksi di kalangan masyarakat._

(That some elements of the public request the reinstatement of the religious decree about Ahmadiyya teaching due to various opinions and disagreements in society).

(Saputra et al., 2011, p. 96)

A similar quotation strategy is also found in the section of ‘justification or description’ of the *fatwa* 2005. It aims to provide justification of the issuing of the *fatwa* that it is urgently required by Indonesian Muslims. The justification reads as follows:

_Seluruh fatwa MUNAS VII MUI, termasuk fatwa tentang aliran Ahmadiyah, dijaring dari pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang diajukan oleh masyarakat dalam berbagai forum, seperti Rakorda, Rakernas, Musda, dan berbagai surat serta e-mail yang diterima oleh MUI._

(All *fatwas* issued at the MUI’s national conference VII, including the *fatwa* on Ahmadiyya, are based on various questions addressed by the public in many forums, such as regional working meetings, national working meetings, regional conferences, and various mails and emails received by the MUI).

(Saputra et al., 2011, p. 101)

The MUI, once again, implicitly re-states that the issuing of both *fatwas* is not only based on the opinion of the MUI, or on the opinion of the members of
the council, but that the issuing has also been based on the opinion of most Indonesian Muslim communities. In this presentation, the MUI tries to conduct a self-defence strategy by explaining that the issuing of the fatwa of 2005 is based on the request and demand of the society, and not merely initiated by the MUI itself. For the MUI, it is urgent or necessary to issue the fatwa in order to perform its responsibility to answer or to give a response to a serious social problem faced by society.

_Bahwa untuk memenuhi tuntutan masyarakat dan menjaga kemurnian akidah Islam, Majelis Ulama Indonesia memandang perlu menegaskan kembali fatwa tentang aliran Ahmadiyah._

(In order to meet the demands of the society and to maintain the purity of Islamic teaching, the Indonesian Council of Clerics considers that it is necessary to reissue the religious decree on Ahmadiyya).

_(Fatwa 2005, Consideration section, Saputra et al., 2011, p. 96)_

In this statement, the propagation of Ahmadiyya’s deviant understanding is considered to be a destructive action, and one that endangers the purity of Islamic teaching. The MUI presents itself as the safeguard of Indonesian Muslims and of Islamic purity, while the JAI and the GAI are to be depicted as the destroyers of the purity of Islamic teaching.

**5.5.8. Discourse of Restricted Freedom of Religion**

Freedom of religion in Indonesia is not total, but such a freedom should be restricted. As mentioned earlier (in Section 5.2.2.), an unrestricted freedom may cause social problems associated with morality, public order and security, as well as violation against human rights. In order to restrict freedom, the Indonesian Government has issued several laws to be used as legal proclamations (1945 Constitution, article 28J [2]; Law No. 39/1999, articles 70 and 73; and
Law No. 12/2005, article 18 [3]). Indonesia also has the PNPS Law to protect the country from any blasphemous actions. The issue of Ahmadiya, of course, belongs to this restriction. In the government’s view, the deviant understanding of the sect needs to be restricted because it can violate the religious right of mainstream Indonesian Muslims.

The discourse of restricted religious freedom is clearly presented by the governments, both in policy texts and in more personal arguments. One of them can be seen in Tambunan’s statements as follows:

*Menyangkut soal undang-undang atau konstitusi kita pasal 28J dikatakan bahwa kebebasan beragama itu dibatasi oleh undang-undang. Untuk apa? Untuk menjamin ketertiban beragama, untuk menjamin dan menghargai hak azasi orang lain dalam beragama.*

(Regarding our laws or constitution, in article 28J, it says that freedom of religion is restricted by laws. What for? It is for guaranteeing order in implementing religion (*ketertiban beragama*) and in order to appreciate the rights of other people in implementing their religion).

(Deanova, 2013b)

The restriction to the freedom of religion, including the issuing of the joint ministerial decree, is seen by the government as an attempt to implement the principles of religious freedom. In the Indonesian Government’s view, the principles of freedom of religion should be implemented by restricting such freedom, because without any restriction, such a freedom will violate the rights of others.

The issuing of the joint ministerial decree is seen as an attempt to protect the rights of the mainstream Muslims that have been ‘violated or ruffled’ by the propagation of the deviant interpretation of Islam by Ahmadiyya. In this case, Ahmadiyya followers have conducted *so-called* religious defamation in its way of interpreting Islam, and their interpretation has deviated seriously from the
The principles of Islamic teaching. The decree is based on the principles of religious freedom as follows:

The issuing of the joint decree was based on the principles of religious freedom as it was guaranteed by the 1945 Indonesian Constitution, especially in articles 29, 28E, and 28I. This joint decree was also pursuant to the principles of religious freedom and its possible limitations as stipulated in Human Rights Law No. 39/1999.

(Mudzhar, 2011, p. 15)

Freedom of religion should be restricted by laws in order to guarantee the religious freedom of others. In creating their discourse to address the Ahmadiyya issue, the government officials employ this concept to restrict and to control the dissemination of Ahmadiyya’s deviant understanding, which is considered to be religious defamation.

5.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, texts produced by the state official institutions (legal proclamations and personal arguments) that are delivered in social events have been analysed closely. The analysis is carried out in order to trace the depiction of Ahmadiyya in these texts. This chapter has also presented the laws and the parts of the constitution associated with freedom of religion, restriction of the freedom, and the laws or policies addressing the Ahmadiyya issue. Additionally, some important issues regarding religion in Indonesia, such as the debate around religious harmony, are also highlighted.

In addressing the Ahmadiyya issue, the Indonesian Government issued a joint decree in 2008. The issuing of the decree is based on the Bakorpakem deciding that the sect had not implemented the twelve points. Some of these points are that Ahmadiyya would not disseminate the prophethood of Ghulam
Ahmad anymore and that the *Tadżkirah* is not a holy book that replaces the Al-
Qur'an. In the decree, the sect is considered to be the source of social conflict
because its teaching has deviated from the core teaching of Islam. Similarly, in
the two *fatwas* issued by the MUI in 1980 and 2005, it is stated that the
Ahmadiyya sect has conducted blasphemous actions and defamed Islam. In the
*fatwa* of 2005, the JAI and the GAI are considered to be non-believers and
infidels.

Based on the analysis of these legal proclamations and personal
arguments, the Ahmadiyya sect has been depicted negatively, while the state
official institutions present themselves positively. The negative presentations are,
for example, Ahmadiyya as the ‘troublemaker’, ‘blasphemer’, and the ‘disrupter
of religious harmony and social order’. Meanwhile, the positive self-presentations are, for instance, created in ‘sympathetic discourse’ and the
presentation of the MUI as the ‘safeguard of Muslims and Islamic purity’. These
negative others and positive self-presentations are created using several discourse
strategies, such as the strategies of ‘problematisation’, ‘metaphor’,
‘lexicalisation’, ‘blaming the victims (scapegoating)’, ‘disclaimer’, and the
strategy of ‘quotation’ or ‘quoted speech’.

The reasons for the creation of these discourses by the state institutions
are to prevent any actions of blasphemy and religious defamation and to establish
religious harmony that, in their view, have both been so far damaged by the
propagation of the deviant understanding of Islam. Another reason for the issuing
of the policies is also an attempt to establish laws that have been violated by
Ahmadiyya. Further, *fatwas* are considered to be an effort of the MUI to
maintain the Islamic purity that has been seriously disturbed by the proselytising
of Ahmadiyya deviant teaching.

The issue of Ahmadiyya has been supported and argued against by social
interest groups who have considerable concerns for and against the Ahmadiyya.
The following chapter examines how two social interest groups, namely the
Islamic Defender Front (the FPI) and the Setara Institute (the SI), present Ahmadiyya in their written and spoken texts.
CHAPTER SIX

‘BANNING OR PROTECTING’: HOW SOCIAL INTEREST GROUPS DEPICT AHMADIYYA

6.1. Introduction

This chapter examines the discourse presentations of Ahmadiyya as created by two social interest groups, namely the Islamic Defender Front (Front Pembela Islam, henceforth the FPI) and the Setara Institute (henceforth the SI). ‘Interest groups’ here are defined as groups that have considerable concern with the Ahmadiyya issue either they oppose or support the sect. The FPI is a group that campaigns for the banning and dissolution of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia. The SI, meanwhile, is a social organisation that has serious concerns with the issues of human rights and freedom of religion in Indonesia. These two interest groups are deliberately selected to reveal the perspective or opinion of social interest groups, either supporting or rejecting, when dealing with the Ahmadiyya issue.

The main purpose of this chapter is to present the results of the investigation into the discourses produced and presented by the two interest groups and the discourse strategies they employ. It addresses the following questions:

1. What discourses have the FPI and the SI constructed?
2. What discourse strategies do they employ in creating their discourses?
3. Do their discourses discriminate against or defend Ahmadiyya?

6.2. The FPI and the Eradication of Immoral Actions

The Islamic Defender Front was established on 17 August 1998 in Jakarta, about four months after the downfall of the second president of Indonesia, Soeharto. The declaration of the FPI was attended by a number of
Islamic clerics (*ulama*), preachers, Muslim activists, and hundreds of Islamic boarding school students (*santri*) from the areas of Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi.

According to Habib Rizieq Shihab (2012a), the chairman of the FPI, the establishment of the FPI aimed at defending Islamic religious society. This goal is achieved by implementing or proselytising the common Islamic slogan ‘commanding good deeds and forbidding evil’ (*amar ma’ruf nahi munkar*). Such a slogan is interpreted as aiming to eradicate all immoral actions, such as pornography, alcoholic drink, brothels during the Islamic fasting month (*ramadhan*), and blasphemous sects (e.g. Ahmadiyya). It also encourages a movement against liberalism and secularism, which are knowledge and understandings that are considered by the FPI to be contradictory to Islam. All the issues are seen to be antithetical to Islamic teachings, so they have to be banned.

The FPI adopted the slogan as the main goal of its movement (Shihab, 2008). In its discourse attack against Ahmadiyya, the adoption of the slogan is used as a central idea. All attempts to urge the dissolution of this sect is seen as the implementation of this slogan. The former president of Indonesia, Abdurrahman Wahid (2011), argues that many Islamic groups employ this slogan as a formula for legitimising their compulsion, violence, and attacks against others.

The FPI is popularly known as a group that has a strong desire to eradicate Ahmadiyya. Some of its members are reported to have been involved in some violent acts against the followers of Ahmadiyya in several areas in Indonesian territory (‘Indonesia: New mob attack’, 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2012, 2013; Hasani & Naipospos, 2011a, p. 41; ‘Indonesia: Hard-line Islamic group FPI’, 2015).

According to Shihab (2012b), there are at least five problematic issues that distinguish the Ahmadiyya sect from Islam: the ‘prophethood’ of Ghulam
Ahmad, the holy book, Ahmadiyya as the agent of colonialism, the legality of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia, and the performance of this sect in the Islamic world. The recognition of Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet of Islam by Ahmadiyya followers has been the most controversial issue that has encouraged the FPI to disseminate the information regarding the heresy of this sect.

Shihab (2012b, p. 155) argues that “although the Ahmadiyya followers recognise Prophet Muhammad as the prophet of Islam, they do not recognise him as the seal of prophethood”. Similarly, he argues that the Ahmadiyya followers also recognise the holy Qur’an as a holy book, but they also use Tadzikirah as their holy book. Another point that motivates the FPI to demand the dissolution of Ahmadiyya is the support of this sect for British Imperialism in India. Gulam Ahmad (and his family) is presented as the accomplice/agent of colonialism in that he had a close relationship with and had been a servant of the British (Shihab, 2012b).

According to Shihab (2012b), these controversial issues, which have been disseminated by Ahmadiyya, have deliberately destroyed the correct teaching of Islam. For the FPI, the Ahmadiyya sect is then categorised as a deviant sect and “has always produced many problems for Muslims” (Shihab, 2012c, p. 217). The collocation of the word ‘Ahmadiyya’ with the word kafir (non-believers) has been frequently created by Shihab to emphasise the heresy of this sect. All Shihab’s reflections on Ahmadiyya have underlined his and the FPI’s discourses, either in written or spoken texts. Ahmadiyya and its followers are depicted negatively in several discourse presentations.

The data from the FPI, such as speeches, articles, and books that are analysed in this thesis are those published by Habib Rizieq Shihab. Shihab is the founder of and has been the chairman of FPI since its establishment in 1998. Hence, he has been the most prominent spokesman and ideologist of the organisation. These days, he has been called ‘Imam Besar’ (the Great Imam) of the organisation. Because of his position as the top leader and ideologist, most of
the texts published by FPI are delivered and written by him. Perhaps he has the highest level of education compared to other ulamas or habaib in FPI. He completed his MA degree at the International Islamic University Malaysia majoring Shariah study, and earned his PhD from the University Sains Islam Malaysia that also focuses on Shariah study.

In regard to the Ahmadiyya issue, Shihab is the most prominent person who deals with it compared to other FPI figures. In the texts, Ahmadiyya is considered to be a serious threat to the true Islamic teachings, which is a threat that can also destroy the correct faith of Indonesian Muslims. In the analysis below, it is revealed that the FPI has presented Ahmadiyya negatively in several discourse topics, namely Ahmadiyya as ‘the hijacker of Islam’, ‘the enemy of Islam’, ‘the defamer of Islam’, ‘the accomplice/agent of Imperialists’, and Ahmadiyya ‘as the others’. On the other hand, Shihab depicts the FPI positively as a tolerant Islamic group.

6.2.1. Ahmadiyya, the Hijacker of Islam

The discourse of ‘hijacker of Islam’ is presented through the use of the discourse strategy of metaphor. Metaphorical expression is the rhetorical strategy employed to attach certain characteristics of particular entities (source semantic domain) to other entities (target semantic domain) (Santa Ana, 1999). In this strategy, Shihab (2013b) in his speech compares Ahmadiyya with a ‘false police officer’ and ‘false electronic goods’ and attaches the negative characteristics of these two entities to the figure of Gulam Ahmad. Ahmadiyya, according to FPI, has performed so-called ‘copyright infringement’ by ‘hijacking’ Islam deliberately.

Ahmadiyya, according to Shihab (2013b), has hijacked the true Islamic teaching by claiming itself to be a part of Islam, regardless of the fact that this group has been considered to be deviating far from the true principles of Islamic
teaching. As discussed earlier, the heresy is their recognition of a prophet of Islam after Prophet Muhammad, and the recognition of Tadzikirah as a holy book of Ahmadiyya, replacing the holy Qur’an. Ghulam Ahmad, who is seen as the new prophet of Islam by the Ahmadiyya followers, is strongly considered by mainstream Muslims as a false prophet who has carried out negative conducts of deception, piracy, and manipulation.

The metaphor of ‘hijacker of Islam’ can be found in the two following analogical statements presented by Shihab (2013b). In the statement, the false prophet is comparably depicted as a false policeman:

Kalau ada warga sipil biasa yang memakai seragam polisi, dia pakai atribut polisi, memakai pangkat polisi, padahal dia bukan Polisi, ditangkap tidak? Jelas ditangkap, polisi palsu, polisi gadungan. Itu dipidana....

(If there is a person who wears a police uniform and uses police attributes, while, in fact, he is not a policeman, will he be arrested? Of course, he will. He is a false policeman. That is a crime).

The metaphor is then strongly reinforced by comparing the false prophet with the copyright infringement of a particular brand of product (Shihab, 2013b):

Begitu juga kalau kita punya pabrik TV (televisi), barangnya bagus, kualitas bagus and model bagus. Orang lain lalu produksi, kita ambil merek Sony tanpa izin, persis seperti yang asli, kita jual ke pasar, Pabrik Sony yang asli pasti tahu... kira-kira menuntut tidak? Lapor polisi, ditangkap tidak? Tentu saja ditangkap. Kenapa? Karena pemalsuan, pembajakan, pelanggaran hak cipta, penipuan... Polisi palsu, lurah palsu, gubernur palsu, itu urusan dunia Kalau nabi palsu, itu urusan akherat....

(Likewise, there is a television manufacturer that has a good quality and model. Someone else also produces televisions, but uses exactly the same name, and then sell (the products) to the market. When the original owner finds out, will they sue or not? If they report it to the police, will the police catch the actor of copyright infringement or not? Yes, definitely. Why? Because this is a forgery, piracy, copyright infringement, fraud. False police officer, false chief, false governor... (all are illegal), these
are worldly (secular) affairs. But, the false prophet is the affair of the afterlife.

The two analogous statements above clearly show that Ghulam Ahmad is metaphorically compared to a false police officer and someone who is guilty of a copyright infringement of a product. The metaphor refers to the Ahmadiyya founder, and implies that the two negative conducts carried out by Ahmadiyya are violations against the law and they should be punished. It also implies that the violation is more serious than other (secular) distortions, because a falsification in religion has negative impacts on both the life of the Muslims in this world and in the afterlife.

The comparison of the danger between any false police officer, copyright infringement, and a false prophet can also be identified in Shihab’s rhetorical questions presented below. The use of these questions appears to aim at arousing an angry feeling and encouraging the audience to support his argument. He says: Lalu bagaimana dengan nabi palsu yang urusannya jauh lebih berbahaya? Lalu bagaimana kalau agama Islam digunakan untuk kepalsuan? (Then, what about the issue of the false prophet, which is, in its matter, much more dangerous? Then, what about if Islam is used for falsification?) (Shihab, 2013b).

Additionally, the ‘false prophet’ and the ‘hijacking of Islam’ are considered to be potential dangers for both worldly life and life after death. He says “this is not only a matter of the worldly life, but it also concerns the afterlife”. In this statement, the linguistic strategy of the scare tactic is used to arouse panicky emotions among Muslims. The scare tactic is achieved “by exaggerating the role of particular individuals or groups as sources of danger in order to create threat and panic to the members of the majority” (Flowerdew, et al., 2002, p. 328). In Shihab’s (2013b) speech, the Ahmadiyya followers are considered to be the non-believers who are more dangerous than any other non-believers. He argues that Ini (Ahmadiyah) kafir jadi-jadian yang jauh lebih berbahaya dari kafir-kafir asli (These (Ahmadiyya people) are deliberately made
up infidels who are much more dangerous than true infidels). In this discourse, the true non-believers are the followers of other religions outside Islam.

The scare tactic of ‘danger’ is an exaggeration that implies a dangerous consequence for Muslims if they do not seriously attempt to stop the propagation of Ahmadiyya and ban it, that is, it can destroy the true faith of Islam and lead Muslims to hell (neraka) in the afterlife. Like the hijacking of an airplane, it can create a fatal danger and may even kill all passengers on board.

Furthermore, Ahmadiyya followers are presented as people who take Islam as their religion and then commit illegal acts of deception and piracy, and this presentation reinforces the ‘hijacking of Islam’ discourse. Ahmadiyya followers have practised some Islamic obligations, but they manipulate Islam by recognising a new prophet of Islam after Prophet Muhammad. Through such manipulation, they do not have the right to use Islam as their religious label.

Jadi tidak sembarangan memakai label Islam, harus ada syarat-syaratnya... kalau sekarang Ahmadiyya, mengatakan ada nabi setelah nabi Muhammad, terus mau pakai label Islam, mereka tidak berhak.... Walaupun syahadat kita mereka pakai... walaupun Al-Qur’anul karim kita mereka pakai, walaupun rukun Islam dan rukun iman kita mereka ambil.... Tapi diselewengkan dengan cara sedemikian rupa, mereka tidak berhak untuk menyandang gelar Islam... Mereka tidak berhak memakai Islam. Bahkan tempat ibadah mereka haram kalau kita sebut sebagai masjid. Masjid hanya nama untuk Islam.

(Shihab, 2013b)
By disqualifying Ahmadiyya from Islam, the followers of the sect are excluded from the true Muslim community with the use of the strategy of social demarcation. They are not allowed to use Islam to identify themselves. Shihab (2013b) presents other recognised religions in his text, such as Christianity and Hinduism, to justify the disqualification. He argues that other recognised religions have had their own label, but Ahmadiyya does not have a label and wants to take over Islam as its label. The social demarcation strategy is used deliberately to exclude Ahmadiyya socially and politically from the Indonesian Muslim community.

(Surely, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Ahmadiyya are infidels (kafirs). Kafir is a religion. That is true… they are all misguided. However, there is a difference distinguishing [them from Ahmadiyya]… Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism are true kafirs. They have their own labels. These [Ahmadiyya people] are deliberately made up infidels, who are much more dangerous than the true infidels…

(Shihab, 2013b)

The discourse of ‘the hijacker of Islam’ has clearly demonstrated to readers the negative presentations against this sect. Ahmadiyya followers have been depicted as a group that has carried out a number of negative acts, for example, ‘piracy’, ‘deception’, ‘insult’, and ‘copyright infringement’, because they call themselves Muslims. These negative acts can endanger the life of ‘true’ Muslims, both in the world and in the afterlife, because they can destroy the Muslims’ faith. Ahmadiyya is presented to be much more dangerous for Muslims than any other existing religions, such as Christianity and Hinduism.
6.2.2. Ahmadiyya, the Enemy of Islam

In presenting Ahmadiyya as the enemy of Islam, Shihab (2013c), in his speech Bubarkan Ahmadiyah (Disband Ahmadiyya), creates a discourse of ‘war’. He analogises the FPI’s attempt to disseminate the call for the dissolution and banning, as well as violent acts against Ahmadiyya as a fight against the enemy of Islam. This presentation may be interpreted by the hearers/audiences as a call for a holy war (jihad). The use of the slogan ‘commanding good deeds and forbidding evil’ to combat Ahmadiyya deliberately depicts Ahmadiyya negatively as ‘evil’, and it therefore has to be eradicated in order to maintain the purity of Islam. In this discourse construction, the Ahmadiyya followers are delegitimised or dehumanised and they are considered to be individuals with an evil character. Violent acts against the Ahmadiyya followers are a divine call and so permissible to combat the enemy of Islam.

In this speech, Shihab (2013c) calls for Islamic groups and the Indonesian Muslim community to fight against Ahmadiyya. There are a number of war-nuanced expressions, such as perjuangan (struggle against), membela Allah (defend God), membela Nabi (defend the Prophet), revolusi (revolution), mati di tangan Allah (die for God), and menumpahkan darah (to shed blood). These expressions are found in the following sentences: Kita tidak akan pernah mundur dalam perjuangan untuk membubarkan Ahmadiyya (We will never retreat from the fight to disband Ahmadiyya), Kita tidak akan pernah kompromi, pembubaran Ahmadiyya adalah harga mati (We will never compromise, the disbanding of Ahmadiyya is set in a stone), and Bubarkan Ahmadiyya atau Revolusi (Disband Ahmadiyya or revolution).

The fight against Ahmadiyya, for the FPI, is considered to be a way of defending Allah, the prophet, and Muslims. It is not merely offensive against Ahmadiyya, but it is a divine struggle or jihad to defend Islam. Shihab (2013c) also argues that the dissemination of the call for the disbanding of Ahmadiyya and attacks against its followers are seen as a reaction of Muslims against
individuals or groups that have sought to destroy Islam. Ahmadiyya is considered to be the sect that has insulted God and the prophet, and, therefore, it could destroy the true faith of Islam.

The discourse of defending Islam against its enemy is identified in Shihab’s (2013c) rhetorical questions as follows: Siap membela agama Allah? Siap membela agama Nabi? Siap membela Islam? Siap mati untuk Allah dan Rasul-Nya? Siap mati untuk Islam? (Ready to defend Allah’s religion? Ready to defend the prophet’s religion? Ready to defend Islam? Ready to die for Allah and his messenger? Ready to die for Islam?). Other rhetorical questions are deliberately created to persuade the audience (i.e. Indonesian Muslims) to give everything for this struggle, even their lives. Siap menumpahkan darah? Siap menyumbang nyawa? Siap mati di tangan Allah? (Are you ready to shed your blood? Are you ready to donate your lives? Are you ready to die for God?).

The war-nuanced words and phrases are deliberately selected to arouse the feeling and attention of the hearers/audiences (i.e. Muslims) to fight against the ‘evil’ or enemy of Islam, namely Ahmadiyya. The negative discourse presentation is associated with a divine call for Muslims to carry out jihad or holy war. Jihad against Ahmadiyya followers is not negotiable and it is an obligation for all Muslims.

6.2.3. Ahmadiyya, the Defamer of Islam

Besides considering Ahmadiyya and its followers to be ‘the hijackers’ and ‘the enemies of Islam’, Shihab and his FPI also consider the followers of the sect to be the defamers of Islam. Similar to the Indonesian Government and the Indonesian Council of Clerics, the FPI presumes that Ahmadiyya has defamed Islam by propagating a deviant teaching.
The Ahmadiyya followers are presented as individuals that have carried out negative acts against Islam. Their new interpretation of Islam is considered to be a form of action that destroys the purity of Islam. The negative presentation can be found in Shihab’s (2013c) speech in the expressions: *Menistakan agama Islam* (Insulting Islam), *Karena Ahmadiyya telah menodai agama Islam* (Because Ahmadiyya has defamed Islam), *Ahmadiyya adalah penodaan agama* (Ahmadiyya is a religious defamation), *Legalisasi penodaan agama adalah pelanggaran HAM* [Hak Azasi Manusia] (The legalisation of religious defamation is a violation against human rights), *Ahmadiyya adalah ’pemerksaan’ terhadap ajaran Islam* (Ahmadiyya is a ‘rape’ against Islam), and *Ahmadiyya adalah penodaan terhadap ajaran Islam* (Ahmadiyya is blasphemous teaching against Islam).

The defamation actions of Ahmadiyya followers against Islam automatically position them as a deviant group and *kafir* (infidels). The selection of the words/phrases ‘rape’ and ‘violation against human rights’, clearly presents them as criminal actors. Besides using the discourse strategy of lexicalisation to portray criminal actions, the positioning of Ahmadiyya followers as infidels is constructed through the use of the collocation strategy. Collocation is defined as the deliberate co-occurrence of one word with other words, which are repeated frequently in texts in order to emphasise the deviation of the Ahmadiyya sect.

The collocation is found in an interview between Abdul Halim, a journalist of *Suara Islam* Tabloid, and Shihab. This interview is published in the compilation of articles written by Shihab (2012a) entitled *Wawasan Kebangsaan, Menuju NKRI Bersyariah*. In this interview entitled *Bubarkan Ahmadiyya atau Revolusi*, the word Ahmadiyya is frequently collocated with the word *kafir* (infidels). This collocation can be found in the statement *Jika hari ini, baru tiga kafir Ahmadiyya yang dibunuh, mungkin besok atau lusa akan ada ribuan kafir Ahmadiyya yang disembelih umat Islam* (Today, there are only three infidels of Ahmadiyya killed [referring to casualties in Cikeusik Incident in 2011], probably tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, there would be thousands of infidels of
Ahmadiyya slaughtered by Muslims) (Shihab, 2012a, p. 219). Another statement is as follows:

*Ini kan ajaran yang berbahaya! Kalau ke depan kafir Ahmadiyah punya kekuasaan dan kekuatan, niscaya mereka akan bantai umat Islam dan umat beragama lain sesuai dengan amanat kitab sucinya* (p. 220).

(This is a dangerous teaching! If the infidels of Ahmadiyya have an authority and power in the future, definitely, they will massacre Muslims and the followers of other religions based on the message in their holy book).

(Shihab, 2012a, p. 220)

The use of the word ‘slaughtered’ clearly portrays Ahmadiyya followers as animals, because the word ‘slaughter’ is commonly used to refer to the way an animal is killed. They have been invested with animal characteristics. The use of the ‘animal metaphor’ (Santa Ana, 1999), or the dehumanisation strategy (Bar-Tal, 1989) aims at dehumanising the Ahmadiyya and its followers as non-human entities. They are qualified as animals, such as goats or cattle. Further, the expression “they will massacre Muslims and the followers of other religions based on the message in their holy book” is a scare tactic. This strategy is used to reveal the potential danger of Ahmadiyya. It is also deliberately presented to disseminate fear among Muslims and the followers of other religions about this danger. The word Ahmadiyya is also sequenced with the words *murtad* (apostates), *begundal* (goons), and *penjahat* (villains) (Shihab, 2012a).

### 6.2.4. Ahmadiyya, the Agent of Imperialism

Another negative discourse presentation against Ahmadiyya is created using the strategy of negative attribution by narrating history about the founder of this sect. According to Flowerdew et al. (2002), negative attribution is a discourse strategy created by imposing negative characteristics on certain
individuals or social groups. Ghulam Ahmad and his family are attributed with the negative characteristics of ‘traitor’, ‘liar’, and being the ‘accomplice’ of the British imperialist who works for the political interest of the British in India. Shihab (2012b) narrates a story about the loyalty of the family of Ghulam Ahmad, including his father, to the British Government in India.

Ghulam Ahmad and his family as Muslims, according to Shihab (2012b), were exploited or employed by the British in order to weaken opposition or resistance of most Indian Muslims to British rule. One of the ways to do this was through disseminating a new concept of jihad (holy war). Ghulam Ahmad and his Ahmadiyya, at that time, translated jihad to mean not merely ‘a war’.

*Mirza Ghulam Ahmad ini adalah antek Inggris. Jadi pemerintah Inggris pada saat menjajah India, dia punya kesulitan besar menghadapi umat Islam. Karena di India yang matta-matian menghadapi penjajah itu umat Islam... lalu Inggris mencari cara untuk memecah belah umat Islam. Dia carilah orang Islam yang bisa dimanfaatkan. Itulah dia Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, seorang kurir pada pemerintah Inggris.*

(Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is an agent of the British. When the British invaded India, they had difficulty subjugating Muslims. In India, those who fought to death against the imperialist were Muslims... The British tried to find a way to divide or appease them. They looked for Muslims who could be exploited, and that was Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, a courier of the British Government).

(Shihab, 2013b)

It can be understood that those who work for the imperialist are considered to be traitors or betrayers. This discourse presentation can direct the mind of the public to believe that violent acts against Ahmadiyya are part of the struggle against the agent of the imperialist and a traitor. The traitors of Islam are dangerous because they can manipulate Islam in order to destroy it from within. Additionally, the presence of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia can be regarded to be part of the strategy of imperialism and a global conspiracy to weaken the faith of Islam.
The imposition of this negative attribution is a strategy to contest or oppose the claim of prophethood of the Ahmadiyya founder. In doing so, Shihab (2013b) compares the good characteristics of a prophet, for example, being ‘honest’ and ‘trustful’, with the negative characteristics of a traitor or agent of imperialism, such as ‘deceitful’ and ‘deceptive’. These two categories of characters are sharply contradictory. In the public view, a prophet is a holy figure who is never contaminated with – or carries out – negative actions in his life, such as cheating and lying.

According to Shihab (2013b), Ghulam Ahmad had some negative characteristics. Therefore, he does not meet the criteria of being a prophet: *Ghulam Ahmad adalah pengkhianat. Ada nabi pengkhianat? Semua nabi tidak ada yang pengkhianat... Tidak ada nabi yang penipu... Tidak ada nabi yang pendusta...* (Ghulam Ahmad is a traitor. Can a traitor become a prophet? No prophet is a traitor. No prophet is a cheater. No prophet is a liar).

The discourse of ‘the Agent of the Imperialist’ is a deliberate construction to provide a negative story of the history of Ahmadiyya. The negative story is to inform people about the heresy of the sect since its establishment in the country of its origin (i.e. India). In her discourse-historical approach, Wodak and Reisigl (2001) argue that in presenting certain individuals or social groups negatively, all background information about them from different discourse sources might be represented. The strategy allows certain discourses in the past to be re-contextualised into the current text as it is being produced.

In this case, Shihab (2013b) deliberately presents the history of the cooperation between Ahmadiyya founder and his family in India with British Imperialism to tell the audience of his speech that Ahmadiyya is the traitor of Islam. This presentation may also be interpreted as a deliberate way to associate Ahmadiyya with the foreign interest. The members of the FPI have a strong concern for repudiating every international movement that carries out liberalism, secularism, Zionism, and Christianisation. They argue that all these transnational
movements come from foreign countries (mainly from the United States and Europe) to Indonesia in order to destroy Islam. With this thought, Ahmadiyya is considered to be a part of these movements to demolish the faith of Muslims.

The opinions of Shihab (2013a) concerning liberalism can be widely found in his book entitled *Hancurkan Liberalism, Tegakkan Syariat Islam* (Demolish Liberalism, Uphold Islamic Sharia). In this book, liberalism is seen as a significant enemy of Islam, the agent of foreign interests, and one made up of fascists and racists. Liberalism is regarded as a danger to the life and the faith of Indonesian Muslims.

The notion of Ahmadiyya as a foreign agent is also justified by narrating a story about the presence of Ahmadiyya in Indonesian in the 1920s, when the Dutch ruled the country. Shihab (2012b) argues that the presence of Ahmadiyya in the country cannot be separated from the role of the Dutch Government. Both the British and the Dutch are considered to be imperialists who employed Ahmadiyya as their agents.

6.2.5. Ahmadiyya as ‘the Others’

Another negative presentation is created through the ‘othering’ or ‘social distancing’ strategy. The strategy uses deictic expression to consider Ahmadiyya as a community outside Islam. Deictic expression or *deixis* refers to indexical expressions that are related to various situational features (Chilton, 2004), or “context-dependant pronouns” (Van Dijk, 1993a, p. 109). One of the expressions is person deixis, which uses personal pronouns such as ‘we’ (us) and ‘they’ (them) in order to build a dichotomy. One of the functions of this deictic expression is to create a social demarcation by categorising others as individuals or groups that cannot be assimilated with ‘us’. It is because they have a belief that is opposite or contradictory to ‘our’ belief. In addition, the category of
‘they/them’ is mainly presented negatively, while the category of ‘we/us’ is depicted positively.

The creation of dichotomy using the ‘othering’ strategy has a goal of presenting the ‘true faith of Islam’ versus ‘the manipulated form of Islam’. The FPI (us) of Shihab has been presented as a group that maintains the true faith of Islam. In contrast, the Ahmadiyya followers (them) are portrayed as those who have manipulated Islamic teachings.

Examples of this ‘othering’ strategy can be identified in the following statements presented in Shihab’s speech (2013b): Tempat ibadah mereka haram kita sebut sebagai Masjid (It is forbidden for us to call their place of worship mosque), Mereka telah menodai aqidah kita (They have defamed our faith), Mereka sudah menghancurkan tatanan dan sistem yang ada dalam syariat Islam (They have destructed rules and systems that have been established in Islamic Sharia), Maka dari itu, wajib bagi umat Islam untuk menolak mereka (Therefore, it is an obligation for us [Muslims] to repulse them), and Mereka tidak berhak menggunakan simbol Islam (They do not have the right to use Islamic symbols).

Another ‘othering’ is as follows:

Walaupun Al-Qur’anul karim kita mereka pakai… walaupun rukun Islam dan rukun iman kita mereka ambil… Tapi diselewengkan dengan cara sedemikian rupa, mereka tidak berhak untuk menyandang label Islam.

(Although they use our Al-Quran… Although they take our pillars of Islam and pillars of faith… they misappropriate them in such a way… they do not have the right to use the label of Islam).

(Shihab, 2013b)

These presentations aim to constitute ‘in-group’ versus ‘out-group’ dichotomy, where the members of the ‘out-group’ are excluded (i.e. excluding Ahmadiyya from the Muslim community). The in- and out-group is popularly known as “ideological polarisation” (Van Dijk, 2006, p. 378). Such a
construction is popularly used to create a social distance (distancing) between individuals who belong to the ‘in-group’ and the ‘out-group’. The members of out-groups are those characterised with negative attitudes and behaviours, while the members of the ‘in-group’ are those who defend Islam.

6.2.6. A Tolerant Islamic Front

While presenting Ahmadiyya negatively, Shihab presents his actions and the FPI positively by using the discourse strategy of disclaimers/denials. The positive presentation aims to disclaim or deny the negative image of the FPI as the group that has violated religious freedom. Hatred against Ahmadiyya and any violent actions they have created are not seen as violations against the freedom of religion. They claim that their actions against Ahmadiyya aim at maintaining and establishing the freedom of religion of Muslims, which has so far been interrupted by Ahmadiyya. Similarly, Shihab also delivers a message that the FPI recognises religious tolerance by not creating violent actions against other official religions, such as Christianity and Hinduism.

In doing so, Shihab finds a clear distinction between other official religions – Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism (outside Islam) – and Ahmadiyya. Although he categorises all of them as non-believers (kafir), he indicates that there is an issue distinguishing the official religions and Ahmadiyya. Other official religions do not try to manipulate Islam, while Ahmadiyya does. So, Ahmadiyya does not mesh with religious tolerance, but belongs to religious defamation. The FPI allows other religions to co-exist with Islam, which Shihab calls tolerance, but not with Ahmadiyya. The positive-self presentation as a tolerant group can be identified in the following statements of Shihab (2013b):

Kristen punya label. Dia punya agama sendiri, nabi sendiri, kitab suci sendiri... dia tidak mengobok-obok ajaran kita. Begitu juga dengan Budha dan Hindu... Biarkan saja mereka menjadi agama. Selama
mereka tidak mengganggu kita, kita juga tidak akan pernah mengganggu mereka. Haram kalau kita mengganggu mereka.

(Christianity has a label. They have their own religion, their own prophet, and their own holy book… They do not interfere with our Islamic teaching. Likewise, Hinduism and Buddhism… Let them practise their own religion. As long as they do not bother us, we will never bother them. It is *haram* [unlawful/illegitimate] if we disturb them).

Actually, the statements above try to respond to opposing statements from other parties, which consider the FPI to be an intolerant group. The dissemination of the call to prohibit Ahmadiyya by the FPI is considered by some people to be a violation of the principle of freedom of religion. By distinguishing Ahmadiyya from other religions, such as Christianity and Hinduism, however, Shihab creates a positive image of the FPI as tolerant by explaining that this group recognises other religions as long as they do not interfere with Islam. In contrast, Ahmadiyya and its followers are accused of having ruffled Islamic teachings and manipulated them. This means Ahmadiyya has disseminated heretic teachings of Islam that can destroy the true faith of Islam.

Another similar statement explaining the tolerance of the FPI towards other religions is found in Shihab’s (2012b) article entitled *Ahmadiyah Menipu, Lima Perkara Tolak Ahmadiyah* (Ahmadiyya Deceives: Five Reasons to Reject Ahmadiyya). He states that Indonesian Muslims recognise freedom of religion by allowing the followers of other religions to practice their faith. However, Muslims do not allow any actions that defame Islam, namely Ahmadiyya (Shihab, 2012b). The tolerant attitude underlying Shihab’s views about the difference between other religions and Ahmadiyya is explained further in the following statements:

*In the view of Islam, other religions such as Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism have their own religion and teachings, so they must be respected… This is freedom of religion. But Ahmadiyya claims to be Islamic but has misinterpreted Islam, mixing Islam with other religions and misinterpreting… This is freedom of belief. But Ahmadiyya misunderstands Islam by equating it with other religions.*
sehingga mereka sudah menyerang, mengganggu, dan merusak Islam. Itulah penodaan agama.

(In the view of Islam, other religions, such as Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism have their own religion and teaching concepts. So, they have to be appreciated and respected…This is a freedom of religion. Conversely, Ahmadiyya and its followers consider themselves to be Muslims, but they have distorted Islamic teachings. So, they have attacked, interfered with, and damaged Islam. That is a religious defamation).

(Shihab, 2012b, p. 160)

This notion of tolerance towards others by the FPI is established by allowing other religious followers such as Christians and Hindus to practise their faith and to co-exist with Islam. The statement “other religions should be appreciated and accepted” has a rhetorical function, namely to constitute the linguistic strategy of denial, disclaimer, or avoidance, which rejects the accusation by some members of the public that the FPI has an intolerant attitude by campaigning negative discourses against Ahmadiyya. For the FPI, however, this negative attitude against Ahmadiyya is not a form of intolerance, but it is an attempt to defend the true faith of Islam.

6.3. The Setara Institute: Institute for Democracy and Peace

The Setara Institute (the SI) is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) that was founded on 14 October 2005. It focuses on disseminating and pursuing equality for all people from different ethnic, religious, and social backgrounds. The name ‘SETARA’ itself is taken from the Indonesian language, and means ‘equal’. Its founders emphasise the role of this institution in promoting democracy and peace by having the slogan of ‘Institute for Democracy and Peace’.
The goals of this organisation are\textsuperscript{59}:

1. promoting pluralism, humanitarianism, democracy, and human rights;
2. studying and advocating pluralism, human-centred public policy, democracy and human rights;
3. engaging in dialogues concerning conflict resolution; and
4. undertaking public education activities.

In pursuit of its goals, this organisation actively promotes religious freedom and encourages the state to fulfil the people’s rights of freedom of religion in Indonesia continuously (Hasani, 2009). By having this campaign, according to Hasani (2009), the SI is against all forms of discrimination and violent acts that undermine human rights, which can be observed, at least, from its attempts to defend the existence of religious minorities and discriminated groups, such as Ahmadiyya.

This NGO was founded by some prominent figures who are committed to the issues of democracy, pluralism, freedom, and human rights in Indonesia. They are human rights activists, politicians, lawyers, academicians, and religious personalities. One of them is the former Indonesian president, Abdurrahman Wahid. Since its establishment, its founders have emphasised their concern for human rights protection, especially the issue of removing any discrimination against religious freedom.

Two members as well as researchers of the SI (IL and AK) (personal communication, September 25, 2013) explained that this organisation has a number of concerns in the pursuit of their vision for equality. The concerns can be divided into three main points: (i) the issue of religious freedom and violation of it, (ii) the issue of violation of other sorts of human rights, and (iii) the issue of the development of Indonesian constitutional democracy.

\textsuperscript{59} This information can be found in Setara’s official website \url{www.setara-institute.org/en/profile}. 
Monitoring the implementation of particular human rights policies, criticising policies contradicting human rights, and conducting studies relating to the issue of freedom and democracy are the manifestation of the three concerns stated above. The SI has also been supporting victims of violations or those who are being discriminated against by both the state and the non-state actors. This advocacy is expected to increase the awareness of the victims, so that they can struggle for their own rights and freedom in the future.

In response to the issue of attacks against religious freedom, the SI has produced a number of written documents in various discourse genres, such as books, reports, news, and policy papers. The texts are deliberately published to reveal their defence for the establishment of human rights and freedom of religion. The SI has produced policy papers (e.g. Remedy for the Victim’s Rights of Freedom of Religious/Belief Violation, 2013), books (e.g. Mengatur Kehidupan beragama; Menjamin Kebebasan? [Regulating Religious Life; Guaranteeing Freedom?]) by Hasani and Naipospos (2011a), and a policy paper entitled Penghapusan Diskriminasi Agama/Keyakinan (Eliminating Discrimination against Religion/Belief) by Hasani (2011).

From 2007 to the present, the SI has also launched annual reports concerning freedom of religion/belief. These reports are based on monitoring the extent of religious freedom in several areas/provinces of Indonesia. These annual reports are necessary to highlight and use as the data of the study because they do not only present the number of violations against religious minority groups, but they also record the development of freedom of religion and blasphemy within the years being reported.

6.3.1. Annual Reports (2007 to 2012)

Each of the annual reports has a particular theme. The 2007 report, entitled Submissive to Mass Judgment: State Justification in Prosecuting
Freedom of Religion and Belief, reported the condition and implementation of freedom of religion in Indonesia (Hasani, 2007). In 2008, Siding and Acting Intolerantly: Intolerance by Society and Restriction by the State in Freedom of Religion/Belief in Indonesia was published to inform the public about the implementation of religious freedom in 2008 (Hasani, 2009). This was followed by other reports including State should Take Action for report 2009 (Hasani, 2010), Denial by the State in 2010 (Hasani & Naipospos, 2011b), Political Discrimination by the SBY Regime in 2011 (Hasani & Naipospos, 2012), and Leadership without Initiative in 2012 (Naipospos, 2013).

The general purpose of these reports is to identify instances in which freedom of religion is under threat. All of them show discriminatory practices against minority groups. As well as reporting the number of violent attacks perpetrated against religious minority groups, the reports also provide information about the actors who performed the acts and the various actions performed by the state when dealing with discriminatory practices. The aims of the annual reports are:

(i) documenting and publishing the facts of violations and the breakthroughs/advancements in the guarantee of freedom of religion/belief in Indonesia;

(ii) encouraging the state to guarantee freedom of religion/belief in Indonesia, including the revision of various legislation that restricts such freedom and help recover victim’s rights;

(iii) providing a database on freedom of religion/belief; and

(iv) strengthening civil society networks and expanding the space to participate in promoting the freedom of religion/belief. (Hasani, 2010, p. 3)

The annual reports reveal that Ahmadiyya followers have experienced a number of violent attacks every year since the first report. Table 6.1 provides the evidence for this.
Table 6.1: The number of violent attacks against Ahmadiyya in some provinces in Indonesia, starting from 2007 to 2012 (as documented by the Setara Institute)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Report (Years)</th>
<th>Acts against Ahmadiyya</th>
<th>Acts against all Groups</th>
<th>Monitored in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Report (2011)</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>17 provinces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.3.2. The SI’s Views on Indonesian Constitution and Laws

From the SI’s point of view on the implementation of religious freedom, the state has an obligation to guarantee and protect anyone adhering to a religion/belief. The relationship between the state and religion is obviously stated in the 1945 Constitution, articles 28 and 29. These two articles convincingly provide a constitutional assurance for people to have a religion and to follow its teaching. Further, it is the responsibility of the state apparatus to avoid and prevent any forms of discrimination and violent attacks perpetrated by particular persons, groups, or institutions.

In the implementation and examination of human rights, the SI has relied upon the Siracusa Principles that divide these rights into two main parts, namely derogable and non-derogable rights (Hasani, 2007). These principles belong to the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (the ICCPR), and have been ratified by Indonesia in Law Number 12/2005.

The Siracusa Principles have been agreed to by a group of 31 distinguished experts in international laws. In April and May 1984, the
International Commission of Jurists, the International Association of Penal Law, the American Association for the International Commission of Jurists, the Urban Morgan Institute of Human Rights, and the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Science, met in Syracuse, Sicily (Italy), to talk about the limitation and derogation provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The principles were then mandated by the United Nations of Economic and Social Council (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 1984).

Any derogable rights that are considered to be a threat to the interests of the public can be delayed and postponed; for instance, in a war situation. On the other hand, non-derogable rights cannot be delayed or reduced in any situation and also cannot be postponed or revoked by anyone. The rights belonging to the non-derogable position are (1) the right to live (not to be killed), (2) the right to self-intactness (not to be tortured, kidnapped, ill-treated, and raped), (3) the right to not be held in slavery, (4) the right to freedom of religion, (5) the right to be recognised equally before the law, (6) the right to not be detained for his/her failure to fulfil a contractual obligation, and (7) the right to not be criminalised based on a retroactive law.

From the perspective of laws, the right or freedom to adhere to a religion belongs to the non-derogable rights (Naipospos, 2013). The SI argues that the state and its apparatus may not restrict or violate the right of the Indonesian people to have a religion/belief, even though it is different from the mainstream. Instead, the government should not only provide protect to followers of a religion, but also punish persons or groups who try to impose their belief on other people or a group of people, and those who discriminate against the followers of other beliefs.

Based on written documents it has produced and disseminated (e.g. books, reports, and relevant research findings), the SI has stressed its focus on two main issues: (i) the debate about the Indonesian constitution and laws
regarding freedom of religion (normative level), and (ii) the practice of
discrimination or violent acts against religious minority groups (practical level).
From the normative perspective, the SI argues that the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom – as stated in the 1945 Constitution – does not have
operational regulation to implement the religious freedom guarantee (Hasani &
Naipospos, 2011a).

A similar study that criticises the absence of the operational regulation of
religious freedom can also be found in Hasani and Naipospos’ research published
in July 2011 (Hasani & Naipospos, 2011b). They examined the need for drafting
of a law guaranteeing freedom of religion. The SI states that Law Number 1
PNPS/1965 still remains problematic seen from its regulatory model of religious
freedom, law enforcement for the perpetrators of discrimination against religious
groups, and the safeguard of religious rights. In addition, another background to
the studies is the increasing number of discriminatory acts against minority
groups, especially those against Ahmadiyya, as revealed in the annual reports.

6.3.3. Discourse Presentations on the Ahmadiyya Issue

The SI, in advocating for minority groups (including Ahmadiyya), has
vehemently opposed the Indonesian Government’s implementation of laws
concerning freedom of religion. It criticises the inability of the Indonesian
Government to fully uphold freedom of religion and protect minority religious
groups from any forms of violent attack.

All discourses created by the SI, in both written and spoken texts, are
classified as defending religious minority groups. Resistance or defence is
defined as any action that argues against or challenges inequalities, oppressive,
hegemonic, or discriminatory structures, and the power relation (Tilbury, 2000;
Becket & Hoffman, 2005). In the defending discourses, the JAI and the GAI are
considered to be religious groups that should be constitutionally protected and
defended. The discriminations or violent attacks against them are violation against the establishment of freedom of religion and human rights. Most of the discourse constructions address the implementation of the constitution and laws relating to freedom of religion and the state actions dealing with it.

From a number of written and spoken texts delivered and published by the SI and its members, the failure of the state and its apparatus has been the central topic. Discrimination against Ahmadiyya that is being perpetrated by some members of the public is also associated with this failure. The use of the term ‘the half-hearted guarantee’ (jaminan setengah hati) clarifies the situation and it also reveals that the Indonesian Government is not serious about implementing religious freedom (Hasani, 2010, p. 2).

The failure is embodied into two actions, namely ‘commission’ and ‘omission’ (Hasani, 2010, p. 10). Commission is defined as the active actions of the state and its apparatus in establishing the limitation, differentiation, intervention, and even commission violent acts, which then restrict freedom of religion. Omission, meanwhile, is defined as allowing someone’s rights to be violated, including the inability of the state to provide equal treatment and legal protection for all citizens, regardless of their social background (e.g. religion), from any violent actions against them as citizens.

According to Hasani (2010), committed violent acts by the state and its apparatus, according to the SI in its reports, are, for example, stating other religions or beliefs as deviant, supporting oppression against religious sect, prohibiting the practice of religious activities, banning the establishment of places of worship, forcing people to convert their religion, destroying religious facilities, and detaining people that are accused as heretics. Further, omitted violent acts are all actions by the state that omit violent acts created by some members of the public (Hasani, 2010). The inability of government to establish law fairly to punish those who have perpetrated violent attacks against others also relates to this issue.
The discourse topic of ‘the State Failure’ is created to constitute resistance discourses by discovering all possible failures of the Indonesian Government in protecting and guaranteeing religious freedom. There are at least four sub-discourse topics found in the texts published by the SI that relate to the failure of the state, namely discourses of ‘the Implementation of Democracy’, ‘Unrestricted Freedom’, ‘Impartiality’, and ‘Leadership Weakness’. What makes this interesting is that in some of the discourse presentations found when addressing discrimination against minority groups (including Ahmadiyya), the SI does not derogate actors directly (individuals or institutions that may have carried out discriminatory action). Rather, the discourses focus more on presenting or narrating the actions/events rather than the actors.

According to Fairclough (2003, p. 68), narrating events rather than actors is usually “manifested in high levels of abstraction” and the discourse strategy frequently used in the narratives is “nominalisation” (p. 12). One common feature of the nominalisation strategy is “the agents of processes (people who initiate processes or acts upon other people or objects) are absent from texts or they are not textualised” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 13). The human agent is elided and changed with the non-human agent. This is the case of ‘agentives’, that is, the non-human agent may be used deliberately to replace a human agent in particular texts.

The use of the nominalisation strategy, which elides the human agents/actors of discriminatory actions, corresponds to reluctance to perform direct opposition. Instead of stating that the Indonesian Government and other parties (e.g. Indonesian Council of Clerics and Islamic Defender Front) have created discriminatory actions against religious minority groups, the SI prefers to argue against negative or discriminatory actions created by the government.

The discourse analyses below reveal how the nominalisation strategy is employed frequently, along with other discourse strategies such as ‘metaphor’, ‘re-contextualisation’, and ‘contrasting’. They are widely used to present the
actions/behaviours of the state official institutions and all other parties that may have implicitly undermined the Ahmadiyya groups.

6.3.3.1. Discourse of Implementation of Democracy

The failure of the Indonesian Government to implement freedom of religion can be interpreted as a failure to implement real democracy. The SI argues that the implementation of democracy in Indonesia, especially in the reformation era, still focuses on procedural democracy, not on the substantive. Such a democracy that does not fully concern about guaranteeing freedom of religion and establishing law has triggered the escalation of religious-based conflicts in Indonesia. Procedural democracy is defined as the implementation of democracy that still concentrates on administrative and institutional issues, such as establishment of political parties/institutions and election. Its implementation has not provided full protection of human rights (as one of the substances of democracy) for all citizens, especially the right to religious freedom.

Ada beberapa pemicu tingginya ekskalasi konflik berbasis agama ini; yang pertama adalah terkait praktek demokrasi yang masih menyentuh wilayah-wilayah demokrasi prosedural, belum masuk pada demokrasi substantsial....

(There are some issues that trigger the high escalation of the religious-based conflict; the first is it has to do with the practice of democracy, which still focuses on procedural democracy, and not yet enter into substantive democracy...) (Interview, SI 1, 2013)

In this spoken text, which was taken and transcribed from an interview, there are two separate social events, namely the ‘escalation of religious-based conflict’ and ‘democracy’. In his textual analysis, Fairclough (2003, p. 140) argues that, in particular texts, a speaker or writer may “incorporate or re-
contextualise one social event into another social event”. In the sentence above, the religious-based conflict is re-contextualised into the social event of democracy. The escalation of social conflict, which is one caused by religious-based conflict, is interpreted as a failure of the state to implement real democracy. The implementation of democracy has not provided a guarantee for all Indonesian citizens to have and practise their religion/belief and to protect them from any violent acts.

Further, in the extract above, any reference to the Indonesian Government being the actor that failed to implement democracy is totally omitted. There is no definite description showing the human agent who should be responsible for this failure. In this nominalisation process, Fairclough (2003, p. 139) argues that “agency is shifted to abstract processes and entities”. Although the agent is not explicitly stated, the readers might infer or presuppose in the meaning of the sentence that there should be a human agent who leads the failure (Fairclough, 2003; Van Dijk, 1993a).

With regard to the matter of inference, readers may infer that the agents/actors would be individuals or institutions who have official authority and who have been given the responsibility for establishing democracy in a country. When talking about the political system in a state, of course, government is the state official authority responsible for the establishment of democracy (both procedural and substantive). The expression may also infer or presuppose that the Indonesian Government has failed to implement substantive democracy.

It has been popularly understood that democracy is an established system of politics and economy, and one that is implemented by many developed and developing countries around the world. Democracy is one of the many systems of governance based on the concepts of freedom and human rights. The concept of democracy presented by the SI is one that has been implemented by many democratic countries, and is one where public affairs are separated from religious affairs.
This clear separation is in contrast to the implementation of a democracy that provides authority to the government to interfere in religious affairs and to restrict religious freedom. The discourse may be phrased as follows (Hasani & Naipospos, 2011a, p. 8): Dalam Negara demokratis yang menghargai hak azasi sesungguhnya, pada dasarnya tidak diperlukan adanya regulasi yang mengatur kehidupan keagamaan (In a democratic country that recognises human rights, basically, regulations or policies to administer religious life are not required).

Semantically, the linguistic expression ‘regulating and policing religious matters’ above may infer or presuppose the inference that, for example, ‘Indonesia is a non-democratic country’, or ‘the country still maintains an authoritarian regime (or, at least, semi-authoritarian) by interfering in the personal matter of religious belief’, and ‘the Indonesian Government, with its policies in administering religion, does not recognise freedom of religion completely as a part of human rights’. These inferences may be effective strategies for influencing or controlling the minds of the readers, as they may create a negative image of the Indonesian Government and of the democracy it implements.

### 6.3.3.2. Discourse of Unrestricted Freedom of Religion

Unrestricted freedom is in deliberate contrast to restricted freedom. ‘Unrestricted’ means that the freedom of people to adhere to a religion, and to practise it, is totally free. The government argues that unrestricted freedom of religion may violate human rights (Balitbang dan Diklat Kemenag RI, 2013; Mudzhar, 2011). Therefore, the government should regulate this issue in order to prevent social conflicts in the public arena. On the other hand, the SI argues that “free is free” (Interview, SI 1, 2013). The state may not make any limitation that can interfere with the right of certain individuals to interpret and practise their religion/belief.
Hasani (2010) argues that the restriction may become problematic and debatable because it is a personal thing. When restricted, the state tends to violate basic human rights, especially the right of individuals to have a religious interpretation that may be different from the mainstream. Further, the 1945 Constitution (in article 28J) and some laws (Law Number 12/2005, article 18; Law Number 39/1999, articles 70 and 73; and Law PNPS Number 1/1965) regulating the restriction of freedom of religion may provide legitimacy to the state or its apparatus to intervene in someone’s belief. The argument can be seen as follows (Hasani, 2010, p. 13):

The politics of restricting human rights adopted by the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (Article 28 Paragraph 2) causes the guarantee of freedom of religion/belief and the guarantee of other citizens’ constitutional rights to be ignored and not enforced seriously.

A similar strategy of nominalisation is also seen in the sentence above by the fore-grounding of the action/event (i.e. the politics of restricting human rights as a non-human agent) rather than the human agent who acts upon the restriction (i.e. the Indonesian Government). The actor of the action (i.e. the Indonesian Government) is elided, and the action of ‘restricting’ is used as the subject of the sentence to show causal effect between the restriction of human rights and the ignorance of freedom of religion implementation. The process of elision of the human agent is created by presenting the clause “the politics of restricting human rights …” as the agent of the verb ‘causes’. Another important meaning-making process in the sentence is embodied in the form of a causal relationship. The use of the verb ‘causes’ delivers the meaning that the action (restricting human rights) may have a political effect or consequence for particular minority groups (e.g. Ahmadiyya). The discourse presentation is (Hasani & Naipospos, 2011a, p. 8):

*Kebebasan beragama atau berkeyakinan adalah prakondisi bagi terwujudnya toleransi dan kerukunan beragama/berkeyakinan. Tidak*
mungkin membangun kerukunan beragama tanpa sebelumnya ada jaminan kebebasan beragama/berkeyakinan bagi warga Negara.

(Freedom of religion/belief is the pre-condition for the establishment of religious harmony and tolerance. It is impossible to establish religious tolerance without guaranteeing freedom of religion/belief for citizens).

In this extract, religious harmony/tolerance and freedom of religion are discursively incorporated. Religious freedom is clearly considered to be the prerequisite or the absolute prior condition for the establishment of harmony or tolerance. It also tries to provide legitimacy for all the violent acts against religious minority groups and religious-based social conflicts by claiming they are caused by the restriction of religious freedom. The word ‘impossible’ emphasise strongly that religious harmony and tolerance would exist if freedom of religion is already present. These two concepts (religious harmony and religious freedom) co-exist to tell the audience that they should be implemented simultaneously; the absence of one of them will negate the other.

6.3.3.3. Discourse of Impartiality

Another important discourse presentation produced by the SI is the discourse of impartiality. Discrimination and violent acts against religious minority groups are interpreted as the effect of partiality actions created by the Indonesian Government.

In constructing this discourse, the SI claims that the state has failed to establish an impartial attitude toward its citizens when dealing with religious issues. Such a discourse presentation relies upon the concept of equality and neutrality, where all citizens have the right to be treated equally, regardless of their religions and beliefs. The SI presumes that discriminatory practices or violent acts against Ahmadiyya are caused by the inability of the government to treat its citizens fairly or impartially.
Apapun agamanya, apapun kepercayaan mereka, kita harus perlakukan sama. Mereka adalah warga Negara Indonesia yang harus mendapatkan kesempatan yang sama sebagai warga Negara dan mendapatkan perlindungan konstitutional.

(Regardless of their [citizens] religion and belief, we have to treat them equally. They are Indonesian citizens who have to get the same opportunity and constitutional protection).

(Interview, SI 1, 2013)

The discourse of impartiality is associated with the discourse of citizenship. Who deserves to be in this category as citizens? Every individual needs to be recognised as a citizen, regardless of his or her religion/belief. Although the minority groups have different religious interpretations to the mainstream, their rights need to be recognised and protected. They should be given the same opportunity to practise their belief as is given to the majority.

Further, it is commonly found that in many discourse analysis studies, the personal pronouns ‘we’ and ‘they’ are used to constitute ‘social demarcation’, ‘othering’, and ‘social distancing’. However, the use of these two pronouns in the extract above reveals a different direction. In the extract, ‘we’ does not refer to individuals of the ‘in-group’; likewise, the pronoun ‘they’ does not refer to members of the ‘out-group’. Their referents are indefinite.

The use of the pronoun ‘we’ is used to refer to many discourse referents. The pronoun in the sentence “[we] have to treat them equally” could refer to individuals, groups (e.g. social, religious), and institutions (e.g. state and non-state). The pronoun refers to those who should be responsible for protecting religious minority groups. In a particular social context, religious minority groups are commonly presented as ‘the others’ (othering). Those who belong to ‘them’ are socially and politically excluded.

However, the pronoun ‘they’ in the sentence “[they] are Indonesian citizens” is deliberately used to oppose the group exclusion. By associating and
including ‘they’ with Indonesian citizens, it means that the religious minority groups (the ‘they’) have an equal social position to other Indonesian people. The categories of ‘we’ and ‘they’ are melted, and individuals belonging to these social categories have a similar status to other Indonesian citizens, so ‘his’ or ‘her’ rights (e.g. political and religious) should be equally protected. Instead of referring directly to particular individuals or institutions, SI 1 tries to constitute the meaning that all individuals and parties in Indonesia that have considerable concerns with the religious minority issue should implement this impartiality.

The association of the concepts of citizenship with impartiality can be identified in the sentences below. It emphasises the need for recognising equality for all citizens, regardless of their social and religious backgrounds. Bonar Tigor Naipospos, the Deputy Chairman of the Setara Institute, argues that [Kontroversi Nasib Ahmadiyah Part 3] (Deanova, n.d.):


(Our constitution emphasises that every citizen has the right to choose, adhere, and even to change, his or her religious belief. That is our constitution. Second, the state may not judge someone’s belief. The state should be neutral and it is the duty of the state to guarantee its people to be able to practise the principles and teachings of the people’s religion. The state should be a mediator and look for the best solution to administer the differences in order to create harmony. Why? Because differences in theological interpretation are not the domain of the state…).

Other important arguments concerning this impartiality can be identified in the following statement (Hasani, 2007, p. 4):
The state should perform neutrally to any single social and religious group. Nevertheless, during 2007, the attitude of the state has revealed a paradox; the state was not neutral and it justifies every prosecution carried out by social groups against other religious groups and beliefs, which are considered to be deviant.

In this statement, Hasani (2007) employs the linguistic strategy of contrasting, namely contrasting a paradoxical situation between ‘what should be’ as the ideal condition and ‘what is actually happening’ as the real condition. In an ideal condition, the state should perform impartially by ‘being neutral’ and ‘not giving privilege to any single social religious group’. However, what was actually happening during 2007 reveals a different direction. This contrasting strategy reveals that the state is inconsistent when dealing with the issue of religious minority groups.

‘The state’ as the subject of the sentence is deliberately presented to be the non-human agent/actor that replaces the human agent/actor. The mentioning of ‘the state’ does not provide specific information about the human agents that perform the partiality. The SI tends to generalise (the state is a general subject) rather than particularise (clearly mentioning the actor or the institution, e.g. president or particular ministry).

Some people may interpret the statement to mean that the subject refers to the Indonesian Government as the representation of the state, but in the expression above, it is not directly stated. The use of the generality of the non-human agent allows readers or the audience to make their own interpretation and conclusion to identify definite actors who perpetrate the discriminatory actions. The elision of the human agent as a subject into the non-human agent (the state) is also found in the following sentences (Hasani, 2011, p. 22):

Oleh karena Negara tidak mendasarkan diri pada suatu agama resmi, maka jelas bahwa Negara mesti secara tegas mempraktekkan suatu pandangan atau prinsip keadilan yang berbasis pada sikap ‘equal treatment’ atau perlakuan yang sama dihadapan hukum terhadap semua
warga dan semua umat beragama di bawah hukum dan konstitusi yang berlaku.

(Due to the state is not based on one single official religion, it is clear that the state must practise firmly a view or principle of justice that is based on equal treatment before the law to all citizens and all religious adherents under the recognised laws and constitution).

A similar indefinite human agent of the discriminatory actions is also identified in the following sentence when talking about any intervention against the issue of freedom of religion.

Negara tidak boleh mengintervensi atau melakukan pengaturan-pengaturan. Ketika mereka mengatakan sudah masuk pada forum eksternum, maka ketika mereka masuk pada wilayah itu, maka mereka sebetulnya telah membatasi forum internum.

(The state may not intervene or regulate (the freedom of religion). When they say that they have entered into the forum externum, they have actually restricted the forum internum).

(Interview, SI 1, 2013)

Intervention against religious minority groups is justified by or relies upon the division between *forum internum* and *forum externum*. The former is associated with a personal thing, like religion/belief, while the latter is associated with a social thing, that is, religion may be part of a social issue when it triggers social conflict. The *forum externum* provides a conceptual frame to justify the state’s actions to intervene in religious issues.

Van Dijk (1993a, p. 109) argues that “discourse may be seen as a semantic iceberg, of which only a few meanings are expressed (on the surface) of text and talk, whereas others’ remain (underlying/implicit) knowledge stored in mental models”. With knowledge, the readers or general audiences are able to
infer the implicit meaning from the explicit meaning that has been actually expressed.

Following the description of the ‘surface’ and ‘underlying’ structure, the sentence “the state may not intervene or regulate the freedom of religion” (surface structure) presupposes that the intervention and regulation may have been performed before (underlying structure/implicit meaning). In other words, there has previously been a situation or action that becomes the social background underlying the sentence. This is the case of the underlying structure, which may not have been explicitly and precisely stated in the surface structure.

In this spoken text, the word ‘state’ is again used as the non-human agent that is deemed to be the subject of the sentence. The reference to the state in the statement is the pronoun ‘they’ [the state = they], which is stated in the following sentence. The ‘they’ could mean plurality; for example, policy makers, politicians, and state officials, as well as official institutions administering religious issues that make such division (forum internum and externum).

In other texts, the state’s behaviour that is not impartial toward its citizens is also connected to the issue of political identity. According to SI 1, the transition to democracy in the reformation era has established political identity. He compares the condition of the establishment of this political identity in Indonesia with the condition that had previously occurred in some countries after the 1945 cold war. One of the salient issues regarding this identity is the construction of ‘majority’ versus ‘minority’ as follows:

Politisi dan pengambil kebijakan mengikuti ritme mayoritas daripada minoritas karena mereka itu telah mempraktekkan dan mengedepankan politik identitas yang sama persis pasca perang dingin.

(Politicians and policy makers follow the rhythm of the majority rather than the minority because they have practised and prioritised political identity, which is exactly the same as the situation after the cold war).

(Interview, SI 1, 2013)
More specifically, the sentence above has provided information about the actors in the action of establishing political identity; they are politicians and policy makers. However, there is no definite description about who the ‘politicians’ are and who the ‘policy makers’ are. To what political parties are they affiliated? SI 1 argues that politicians and policy makers have preferred to support the majority rather than the minority. Such an argument is used to reinforce the wrong attitude of government that carries out partial behaviour in administering religious issues.

6.3.3.4. Weakness of Leadership

The establishment of strong government, especially in protecting freedom of religion, is closely connected to the presence of a strong leader or president. The general election in the Indonesian reformation era, in which all citizens can participate in selecting their president, should result in the selection of a strong leader. However, what the SI presents regarding leadership reveals a different fact. Soesilo Bambang Yudoyono and Jusuf Kalla were elected as Indonesian president and vice president in 2004, and Yudoyono was then elected again as president five years later in 2009 (2009 to 2014) with Boediono as his vice president. During his ten years of government (2004 to 2014), the Ahmadiyya sect was a target of violent acts performed by several members of the public. Further, this government also fails to bring legal proceedings against the perpetrators of the violence.

According to Colbran (2010), massive attacks against Ahmadiyya have been occurring since 2005, after the issuing of the religious decree by the MUI that declares Ahmadiyya to be a deviant sect. In 2008, Ahmadiyya faced a serious situation after the issuing of the joint ministerial decree. In 2011, three Ahmadiyya followers in Cikeusik, Banten, were killed.
In the 2007 report (Hasani, 2007), President Yudoyono is presented as a weak president who did not firmly establish freedom of religion during his time of office. He is also considered to have supported majorities for several political reasons (e.g. votes from mainstream Muslims in the election) and to have allowed the minorities to be the victims of discrimination. The discourse of ‘weak leadership’ is created using the strategy of derogated personification by derogating the intellectual traits of Yudoyono. It can be observed in the following sentences:

Yudoyono’s leadership, which, in October 2009, has entered its second term, still shows an ambiguous attitude towards the guarantee of freedom of religion/belief. The ambiguity emerged as a result of the president’s personal political weakness, which has failed to utilise the opportunity under his regime to take political actions that show serious and consistent support for the constitutional guarantee of the citizen’s rights.

(Hasani, 2007, p. 14)

In the linguistic expression above, the president is presented as a person who failed to utilise his political opportunities to solve a problem. He is presented as a president who did not sensibly use his political opportunity to establish his legal and political obligation to guarantee freedom of religion. The inability is considered to be the effect of his ambiguous attitude. The ambiguity delivers a meaning that Yudoyono was not assertive and did not have a firm policy to protect religious minority groups.

Another expression that reveals the weakness of government in establishing rule of law is presented below. Although it does not directly depict the personality of President Yudoyono, the sentence provides a clear message about the weakness of his leadership in protecting human rights (Hasani & Naipospos, 2011a, pp. 45-46). The sentence is as follows: *Secara formal kita menganut prinsip Negara hukum, tetapi dalam prakteknya, Negara seolah-olah membiarkan berlakunya hukum rimba; siapa kuat, dia menang* (Formally, we
adhere to the principle of rule of law (legal state), but in its practice, the state seems to allow the establishment of lawlessness; who is strong, wins).

Besides presenting the weakness of the intellectual traits of Yudoyono, the SI raises the discourse topic of lawlessness (*Hukum Rimba*). The topic is used to depict Indonesia as a country without law enforcement. Although Indonesia has a set of laws and a constitution regulating freedom of religion, there are still many violations against them, especially when dealing with freedom of religion.

The topic of lawlessness or the weakness in law enforcement may be associated with the weakness of the president in enforcing laws. *Hukum Rimba* is a metaphorical expression that refers to the ‘metaphor of jungle’, and it is used to reveal the lawless situation in Indonesia. It portrays a jungle situation where the king of the jungle (i.e. the lion/tiger) has absolute power to control other powerless or less powerful animals.

In *Hukum Rimba*, the strongest or the most powerful would be the winner. The powerful individuals or groups have absolute authority and control over the powerless/minority. The majority is presented as a powerful group, while the minority is depicted as powerless. Such a metaphorical expression implies that the president is not able to protect the rights of the minorities. It is clear that such a statement indicates the weakness of the Indonesian Government to provide protection to the minorities (i.e. religious minority groups).

6.4. Conclusion

This chapter has examined texts produced by the Islamic Defender Front and the Setara Institute; both being social interest groups that have considerable concern for the Ahmadiyya issue. It is found that the two social organisations take opposite positions when dealing with Ahmadiyya. The FPI has constructed negative presentations against Ahmadiyya and attempted the dissolution of the
sect, while the SI has discursively defended this sect by criticising laws, the constitution, and political behaviours of the Indonesian Government that are considered to be discrediting Ahmadiyya.

In its texts, the FPI has considered the Ahmadiyya sect (both the JAI and the GAI) to be the sect that destroys the true faith of Islam, and this destruction may have a negative impact on Muslims. The recognition of Ghulam Ahmad as an Islamic prophet after Muhammad has ruffled the core teaching of Islam. Due to this interpretation, the sect is considered to be, for instance, the ‘enemy of Islam’ and the ‘actor of blasphemy’. While presenting Ahmadiyya negatively, the FPI depicts itself positively as a tolerant Islamic group. The violent attacks and discrimination discourses against Ahmadiyya are not seen by the FPI as a violation against freedom of religion, but as an action to defend Islam.

In contrast, the SI has revealed its concern about the protection of religious freedom and human rights. The issuing of some legal proclamations by the Indonesian Government, such as a joint ministerial decree, is considered to be a violation against religious freedom and human rights. Discrimination against Ahmadiyya, according to the SI, reveals that the Indonesian Government has not acted impartially and has not implemented a real democracy. The physical and discourse discrimination also reflects the weakness of government in establishing religious freedom and human rights.

The next chapter examines discourse presentations and discourse strategies as created by the JAI and the GAI. The discourse presentations are classified as resistance discourses that have been created to argue against discourses that may have undermined or discredited them.
CHAPTER SEVEN

‘WE ARE MUSLIMS’: THE ANALYSIS OF DISCOURSES CREATED
BY THE TWO AHMADIYYA GROUPS

7.1. Introduction

This chapter examines texts created by the two Ahmadiyya groups in Indonesia, *Jemaat Ahmadiyya Indonesia* (the JAI) and *Gerakan Ahmadiyya Indonesia* (the GAI), to find out what discourses they have presented and the discourse strategies they have used. Their discourses are expected to defend them or to argue against all the discourse presentations that may have undermined them, either from the state official institutions or from the social interest groups.

This chapter also provides information about the Qadiani and the Lahore Ahmadiyya and their differences, both in the international Islamic world and in Indonesia. As has been mentioned earlier in this thesis, the two Ahmadiyya groups have some differences, especially when dealing with the concept of the prophethood.

This chapter addresses the following questions:

1. What discourses have the GAI and the JAI created and what discourse strategies have they employed to argue against discourses that may have discriminated against them?
2. How do they discursively present or represent themselves in their texts and depict others, particularly the institutions and organisations that may have presented them negatively?
3. Why are the discursive presentations created?
7.2. Ahmadiyya and its History

Ahmadiyya was established in India more than a hundred years ago. Its establishment in 1889 cannot be separated from the figure of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. Ahmad was born in Qadian, in the province of Punjab, India, on 18 February 1835, and he died in Lahore on 26 May 1908. The word ‘Mirza’ in his name is due to his descent from the Mughal Dynasty, which was an Islamic empire that ruled the Indian subcontinent (India and Pakistan) from 1526 to 1857.

Ghulam Ahmad was known as an intelligent and diligent person. He spent most of his life learning about Islam. He learned the Al-Qur’an enthusiastically and some Persian books from a teacher named Fasl Ahmad. He had also read a number of important Arabic books from a teacher named Gul Ali Syah. Ghulam Ahmad liked staying alone, reading many books about Islam, and he rarely involved himself in daily social affairs (Ali, 2010). From 1864 to 1868 he was a civil servant of the British Colonial Government in Sialkot, India (Fathoni, 2002). For some time, his father had asked him to administer their land, but he did not like the job.

There was a range of internal and external factors that initiated the establishment of Ahmadiyya by Ahmad. The external factor was the British imperialism, and the internal one was the deterioration of the conditions for Muslims in India (Fathoni, 2002; Nadwi, 2005; Zulkarnain, 2005). The arrival of the British in India in the eighteenth century – with their colonialist interests – changed the political situation in India, especially when dealing with Islam.

The British colonial Government attempted to destroy the Islamic power held by the Mughal Dynasty (Zulkarnain, 2005). During this imperial period, the condition of Muslims in India was very poor. Islam was considered to be an obstacle to the development of British imperialism, because its people had a spirit of jihad (holy war), and wished to fight for Islam against non-believers and against any other powers that contradicted Islamic understanding. Muslims did
not want to co-operate with the British, because the British were considered to be non-believers.

Zulkarnain (2005) explains that the British Imperialism became more antipathetic to Islam in India after the Mutiny Rebellion in 1857. The British power maintained that Muslims had provoked this rebellion in order to return the glory of the Mughal dynasty. The Islamic movement was considered to be a danger to the colonialist interests and power in India. This situation had worsened the condition of Muslims in the country.

From the internal aspect, Muslims at this period also experienced deterioration from within. They had no real interest in the development of science and knowledge. They had relied on their belief in mysticism and thus lost the rationalism present in Islamic thought. They had also been separated into many sects and groups. These Islamic sects were always involved in conflicts, which then brought Islam itself into more sectarian conflicts.

According to Fathoni (2002), these internal and external factors encouraged Ghulam Ahmad to establish Ahmadiyya. The Ahmadiyya sect can be seen as the reaction to the movement of Christian missionaries, brought by the British, to recruit new followers in India; this gave rise to the worst conditions experienced by Muslims in India in the colonisation period. The Christian missionaries were considered to have launched the apostasy movement (Nadwi, 2005). According to Fathoni (2002, p. 49), the motive behind the establishment of Ahmadiyya was “to achieve Islamic reform by providing a new interpretation of Islam in order to find the best solution to the downfall of the religion in India”.

7.2.1. A Controversy around its Establishment

There are two main issues regarding the controversy of the establishment of Ahmadiyya. The first issue, as mentioned earlier, was that it aimed to defend
Islam and Muslims from the British imperialist in India (see also Jones, 1986). However, the opposite view has been argued. At that time, Ghulam Ahmad and his family were very co-operative with the British colonisers, and he and his family were ardent supporters of the British Government (Lavan, 1970). Lavan (1970) then explains that this support was basically “religiously motivated” (p. 3). This co-operation was strongly opposed by the majority of Muslims in India (Fathoni, 2002).

Nadwi (2005) also argues that the British welcomed the coming of Ahmadiyya as a new sect or movement. He explained that, at that time, the British were afraid of a revolutionary movement (i.e. jihad or holy war) being created by Muslims. The founders of this sect showed their loyalty to the British imperialists and they made this loyalty the basis of their faith. Nadwi (2005) then explained that even Ghulam Ahmad himself affirmed his loyalty, and his father was appointed by the British Government to be an official in the province of Durbar, because of this loyal support.

Barahini Ahmadiyya, the first book written by Ghulam Ahmad, “contains compliments to the British government, and he overtly calls for the support of the British government” (Nadwi, 2005, pp. 35-36). Jones (1986, p. 46) also indicates that “Ahmadiyya provided support for British Imperial rule, not only in India but also in other countries, e.g. in Afghanistan”. According to Zulkarnain (2005), Ghulam Ahmad’s family and the British Government in India were close friends, and they had a strong relationship with each other.

In the 1857 rebellion initiated by Muslims against the British Government, Mirza Ghulam Murthada (Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s father) recruited many people to be members of the British army forces under the leadership of General Nicholson. Even Ghulam Qadir, Ahmad’s older brother, also joined the army to support the colonisation by the British. Another prominent reason is that this co-operation aimed at maintaining a long-established friendship between Ahmad’s family and the British Government.
7.2.2. The Promised Messiah and the Awaited Mahdi

The second controversy is the acknowledgement of its founder as the Messiah, Mahdi, and the prophet of Islam after Muhammad. The Ahmadiyya followers believe that Ghulam Ahmad is the representation of the Messiah and the Mahdi. The Messiah and Mahdi are the symbols of the revivalism of Islam, and Muslims believe that they will come at the end of the world to save human beings. This revivalism will be started after Islam has experienced the worst conditions for centuries. The Ahmadiyya believe that these two figures have come to this world to bring Islamic glory back. The birth of Ghulam Ahmad in 1835 signalled their coming and, since then, the greater glory of Islam was believed to have started.

Ghulam Ahmad attaches the characters of the Messiah and the Mahdi to himself. He argues that Allah (God) has pointed to himself as having these characters through a number of divine revelations. Therefore, he felt that “he had a moral responsibility to fight for Islam against any powers that might seek to destroy Islam” (Fathoni, 2002, p. 53). He had to work out this holy effort by providing a new interpretation of verses of the holy Qur’an in order to overcome social and religious problems faced by Muslims in his own lifetime.

This belief was clearly supported by the attitude, behaviour, and psychological condition of the majority of Indian Muslims who had been trapped in esotericism (Nadwi, 2005). The political situation and the deterioration of Islam at the time of Ghulam Ahmad’s life had furthered this belief. The situation was considered to be similar to the situation of the end of the world as narrated in some Islamic literature. A worse condition, where the Muslims have been separated into many sects, experience frustration, and have no power, had brought them to hopelessness. When India became a British colony, the Muslims were trapped in their traditional and fatalistic life and they were also stuck in religious fanaticism (Zulkarnain, 2005). Since that period, the province of Punjab has been a central focus of frustration for Muslims.
These worse conditions were marked by much discouragement, a belief in mysticism, and the decline of the prestige of Islamic clerics – all of which had opened a path for the emergence of a new teaching brought by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (Nadwi, 2005). Because of these conditions, they had hoped for the coming of a promised saviour (Dewa Penyelamat yang dijanjikan) at the end of nineteenth century, namely the Imam Mahdi.

The most controversial issue is the recognition of Ghulam Ahmad, by some of Ahmadiyya followers, as the prophet of Islam after Muhammad. This is in sharp contrast to the Islamic belief held by the majority of Muslims around the world. The Prophet Muhammad is considered to be the seal of prophethood; there is no other prophet after him. This ‘prophethood’ of Ahmad led to the separation of its followers into two groups, the Qadiani and the Lahore Ahmadiyya.

7.2.3. The Qadiani and the Lahore Ahmadiyya

In the international world, Ahmadiyya is divided into two groups: they are the Qadiani Ahmadiyya (Ahmadiyah Qadian) and the Lahore Ahmadiyya (Ahmadiyah Lahore). These Ahmadiyya groups have sharp distinctions regarding their core understanding of Islam, especially the concept of prophethood.

The name Qadiani is taken from ‘Qadian’, a district in Punjab, India. According to Ali (2010), the name Qadian was formed from the word ‘Qadi’ or ‘Qadzi’, meaning ‘judge’. When the King of the Mughal Dynasty, named ‘Babar’, ruled India, he rewarded Mirza Hadi Beig, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s ancestor, with fertile land, and also appointed him as a Qadi. Qadi or Qadian was then used to name the area. The area of Qadian is inseparable from the history of Ghulam Ahmad’s family.
Meanwhile, the name ‘Lahore Ahmadiyya’ is taken from the place called Lahore (in present-day Pakistan), a place where this movement was established in 1914. The founders of this Ahmadiyya movement were two prominent followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Maulana Muhammad Ali and Khwaja Kamaluddin. They broke away from the Qadiani Ahmadiyya because of different understandings about the Ahmadiyya teaching.

When Ghulam Ahmad was still alive, there was only one Ahmadiyya, and no Qadiani or Lahore split. It separated when the second Caliph, Mirza Basyiruddin Mahmud, led this sect. Among the followers at that time, there was an irreconcilable view that led them to separate. It was an understanding about the position of Ghulam Ahmad as a reformer or a prophet. The Qadiani acknowledged the prophethood of Ghulam Ahmad after the Prophet Muhammad, whereas the Lahore claimed that this founder of Ahmadiyya is just a reformer, and that Muhammad is the seal of prophethood.

According to Faruqui (1983, p. v, 1990, p. 1), there are at least two basic distinctions between the Qadiani and the Lahore. They are listed as follows:

1. The founder of Ahmadiyya, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, was a mujaddid (reformer) as believed by the Lahore, or a Prophet as believed by the Qadiyyani; and

2. For the Lahore, those who do not believe in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad remain Muslims. For the Qadiani, such people are considered to be kafirs (non-believers).

These two distinctive principles – the prophethood of Ghulam Ahmad and the labelling of other Muslims who do not believe it as non-believers – are claimed to be the reasons for establishing the Lahore movement.

With regard to the difference in this basic understanding, Azis (1995, p. 1) also argues that there are at least four distinctions between the Qadiani and the Lahore. The four distinctions are as follows:
1. The Qadiani belief that no person can be a Muslim without accepting Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet of God, versus the founder’s own belief that everyone who acknowledges the well-known Islamic Kalima⁶⁰ is a Muslim;

2. The Qadiani’s practical treatment of other Muslims as not being fellow-Muslims by refusing to say their funeral prayers, versus the Messiah’s (Mirza Ghulam Ahmad) teaching of being fraternal with all other Muslims except hostile opponents;

3. The Qadiani belief that a prophet can come after the holy Prophet Muhammad and that the Lahore regard the holy Prophet Muhammad as the last prophet; and

4. The Qadiani system of rule by an autocratic Khalifa (Caliphate) possessing absolute power, versus the system set up by the promised Messiah of the supremacy of the collective decision of the Anjuman (the Central Executive Body).

Besides the difference in understanding Islam, the establishment of the Lahore Ahmadiyya was also considered to have a political motive. According to Fathoni (2002), Maulana Muhammad Ali established the Lahore group because he was disappointed at not being selected as the second Ahmadiyya caliph. At that time, Mirza Basyiruddin Mahmud, Ghulam Ahmad’s first child, was appointed as the second caliph. The first caliph was Hakim Nuruddin. However, Fathoni then clarifies the matter by stating that the main reason for the separation was actually due to Aqidah, the principle understanding about the prophethood.

With regard to the prophethood of Ahmad, the Qadiani followers believe that in this world, there are two kinds of prophets: those who bring sharia (Islamic law and teaching) and those who do not. They base their belief upon the concepts of Khaatamun Nabiyyin (the last prophet) and Laa nabiyya ba’di (i.e. no longer on a prophet who brings a new teaching).

---

⁶⁰ Kalima or Kalima shahada: Ash-Hadu an la ilaha ill-Allahu, wa ash-hadu anna Muhammad-ar rasul-ullah is the expression that should be expressed by a person to be acknowledged as a Muslim. This expression means ‘I testify that there is no God but Allah, and I testify that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah’.
They interpret the two concepts – *khatamun nabiyyin* and *laa nabiyya ba’di* – by saying that a prophet who brings a new teaching will not come after Muhammad, but that a prophet who does not bring a new teaching or who continues the teaching of Muhammad could possibly come. Ghulam Ahmad belongs to this second kind of prophethood. The Qadiani followers believe that the coming of Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet is to continue the teachings that have been previously brought and disseminated by Muhammad.

This understanding can be seen in an interpretation provided by Al-Hajj Nadzir Ahmad Mbsy in his book *Al-Qaulus Sharih*, which was then approved and published by the followers of Qadiani Ahmadiyya in Indonesia. This understanding can also be confirmed in a statement delivered by Zulkifli Ahmad Pontoh (ZAP), the Spokesman for the JAI (Petersen, 2010). When he was questioned about “what is the difference between the Qadiani Ahmadiyya and mainstream Islam here in Indonesia?”, Pontoh argued:

> What differs between us and other Muslims is the interpretation of some of the verses of the holy Qur’an. So in the Qur’an, as we understand it, there is the possibility of the coming of a prophet after the holy prophet of Islam (Muhammad) (Petersen, 2010).

Another distinction is that the Qadiani adopts the caliphate (*khilafah*) system. Its leader is called *khalifah* (Caliph). The system refers to Islamic rule that has been implemented ever since the death of Prophet Muhammad by four Islamic caliphs: Abu Bakar, Utsman, Umar, and Ali. The successors of Ghulam Ahmad also called themselves caliphs. The Qadiani has both an international caliphate and a national leadership in many countries (where its national leader is

---

61 See the monthly magazine published by the Qadiani Ahmadis in Indonesia (JAI) called *Nur Islam: Yuhyiddiina wa yaqimusysyarii ‘ah*, pp. 38-41 and 58, edition VI, June 2003. The translator of this content is Ma’mun Ahmad.
called *amir*), including Indonesia. Its current international leader, Hazrat Mirza Masroor Ahmad, is the fifth caliph\(^\text{62}\).

However, the Lahore Ahmadiyya does not adopt this caliphate system. The Lahore followers established a Central Executive Body that they call *Anjuman*. This executive body also has an organisational structure. However, there is no international connection that links its followers organisationally from different countries. The Lahore Ahmadiyya does not concern itself with organisational movement, but is more of a cultural movement. The Lahore followers emphasise their effort in a movement of thought, and it does not involve a political-like movement that tries to establish Islamic rule or government.

Besides these differences, the Qadiani and the Lahore have a similar understanding on some issues. They rely upon a belief that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is the promised *Messiah* as well as the awaited *Mahdi*. A Lahore Ahmadiyya prominent figure in Indonesia, Nanang RI Iskandar, recognises this belief by saying that Ghulam Ahmad appointed himself as the *Messiah* and *Mahdi*. Ghulam Ahmad believed that by representing these two figures, he had a responsibility to re-establish the Islamic struggle to free human beings from the evil influence of *Satan* (evil) (Iskandar, 2005, 2009a). Another Lahore Ahmadiyya figure in Indonesia, Susmoyo Djoyosugito, states that he believes that Ghulam Ahmad is a *mujaddid* (reformer) for the nineteenth century, the *Messiah* and *Mahdi* (Djoyosugito, 1984).

Similar to the condition of Ahmadiyya in the international world, the Ahmadiyya community in Indonesia is also divided into two groups. The Qadiani established *Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia* (the JAI), while the Lahore

created *Gerakan Ahmadiyya Indonesia* (the GAI). The following section provides information about the history of these two Ahmadiyya groups in Indonesia.

### 7.2.4. Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia

*Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia* (the JAI) has officially existed in Indonesia since the 1920s. The teaching and belief of the JAI was introduced to Indonesia on 2 October 1925 by Rahmat Ali (a Qadiani follower) in Tapaktuan, Aceh (Burhani, 2013). Rahmat Ali was an alumnus of the University of Punjab. He was the first missionary of Qadiani Ahmadiyya who was sent to *Hindia Belanda* (nowadays Indonesia) and arrived first on the island of Sumatera (in Tapaktuan). He was invited by three students from *Minangkabau* (South Sumatera) who had studied in Lahore, British India (Harsono, 2010). The students were Abubakar Ayyub, Ahmad Nuruddin, and Zaini Dahlan.

Ali was sent directly to Sumatera Island to proselytise Qadiani Ahmadiyya’s belief and teaching, to recruit new members, and to establish new branches in some parts of the Indonesian territory. After arriving in Tapaktuan, he then travelled to Padang. In 1926, the JAI was officially established as an organisation in Padang. At that time, Sumatera was under the official administration of Governor General Andries Cornelis Dirk de Graeff (1926 to 1931) (Harsono, 2010).

The recruitment of members of the JAI was successful when Ali moved to *Batavia* (nowadays Jakarta), the capital city of *Hindia Belanda*, in 1931. In that year, the teaching of Qadiani Ahmadiyya rapidly spread in Jakarta and Bogor. In these two cities, the JAI organisation was also officially established. From these two cities, the understanding of Qadiani Ahmadiyya then spread to many cities on Java Island, such as in Tangerang, Cianjur, Sukabumi, Bandung, Garut, Tasikmalaya, Ciamis, and Karawang.
The JAI obtained its status as a legal entity/corporation (Badan Hukum) through the decision letter of the Ministry of Justice [Kementerian Kehakiman], Number JA 5/23/13 on 13 March 1953. In another legal proclamation, the JAI was recognised as “a social organisation through a letter from the Directorate for Political Relations, Number 75/DI/VI/2003” (Colbran, 2010, p. 687). The court of central Jakarta, through its letter number 0628/KET/1978, then reinforced this legal acknowledgement on 19 June 1978. According to Harsono (2010), under the administration of five Indonesian presidents, namely Soekarno, Soeharto, Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Megawati, there has never been a prohibition or restriction issued nationally against Jemaat Ahmadiyya. In 2000, President Wahid welcomed the 4th caliph of Qadiani Ahmadiyya, Mirza Tahir Ahmad, to Jakarta.

In regard to the belief about the prophethood of Ghulam Ahmad, the JAI members have the same belief as other Qadiani Ahmadiyya members around the world. They also believe that the founder of Ahmadiyya is the promised Messiah as well as the Imam Mahdi. Suryawan (2010b, para. 12) says:

*Sedikit berbeda dengan kalangan NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), warga JAI percaya bahwa Nabi Isa AS sudah wafat dan tidak akan datang lagi ke dunia ini, dan sosok Nabi Isa Al Masih yang diindikasikan kedatangannya dalam kitab-kitab dan Hadits, dipercaya telah datang dalam sosok Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.

It is slightly different from NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), the JAI followers believe that Prophet Isa (the son of Maryam) had passed away and will not come to this world anymore. Prophet Isa, whose coming is indicated in Al-Qur’an and Hadith, has been arriving in this world through the figure of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.

Due to its belief, especially the prophethood of Ghulam Ahmad, the JAI followers have been the target of violence, especially during the Indonesian reformation era (1998 to the present). During this era, there have been at least two legal proclamations issued by Indonesian state official institutions, the joint ministerial decree and the religious decrees (the fatwas of 1980 and 2005).
Violent acts have also been frequent, and there have been attacks on JAI followers in several places in Indonesia. On 6 February 2011, a violent attack perpetrated by a group of 1,500 radical Muslims killed three JAI followers and severely injured five more (Mietzner, 2012). This was also reported by Indonesian national newspapers, such as Kompas (‘Komnas Temukan’, 2011).

7.2.5. Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia

The Indonesian Ahmadiyya Movement (Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia/the GAI) has been present in Indonesia since the movement era before independence (Burhani, 2014a). According to Burhani (2014a), the GAI has contributed to the history of modern Indonesia; at the very least, this movement became the ‘safeguard’ of the Islamic (keislaman) movement and of some figures at that time, such as Ruslan Abdul Ghani, Cokroaminoto, Soekarno, and Haji Agus Salim. In addition, the GAI has also contributed to Islamic literature, particularly in the literature addressing the issue of Christian missionaries in Indonesia (Burhani, 2013).

The GAI was established officially in Yogyakarta on 10 December 1928. The term ‘officially’ here is used because the Islamic interpretation of the Lahore Ahmadiyya had actually been introduced to Java Island, especially in Yogyakarta, in 1924 (Yasir & Yatimin, 1989). A decision to establish this Ahmadiyya organisation aimed at propagating the thought or understanding of the Lahore Ahmadiyya as a new Islamic movement.

Yogyakarta is known as the centre of Muhammadiyah, which is one of the largest Islamic organisations in Indonesia. Based on this geographical location, there was a close relationship between the Lahore Ahmadiyya and Muhammadiyah from 1924 to 1928. The founders of the GAI were former members of Muhammadiyah.
In 1924, several months after the death of Ahmad Dahlan (the founder of Muhammadiyah), two Lahore Ahmadiyya figures arrived in Yogyakarta: Maulana Ahmad and Mirza Wali Ahmad Baig. They had originally planned to go to China to spread Lahore Ahmadiyya thought; however, when they arrived in Singapore, they received information that the spread of Christianity on Java Island had been largely successful. Therefore, they changed their plan and decided not to go to China, but to Java. The central board of Muhammadiyah, at that time, “welcomed their arrival in Yogyakarta enthusiastically” (Yasir & Yatimin, 1989, p. 31).

At the beginning, the relationship between the Lahore Ahmadiyya and Muhammadiyah was very close. Maulana Ahmad and Mirza Wali Ahmad Baig were free to introduce their understanding to Muhammadiyah followers. Some Muhammadiyah members even learned new Islamic views from these two figures. However, this situation resulted in the emergence of dispute and hatred against Baig and Maulana Ahmad. The dispute and hatred culminated in 1927 when Abdul Alim Assidiqi arrived on Java Island and Yogyakarta from India to propagate an anti-Ahmadiyya movement.

After its establishment in 1928, in 1929 the members of the GAI moved to several parts of Java Island, including Purwokerto, Purbalingga, Malang, Bandung, Sukabumi, and Madiun. While working in their new professions in those districts, they also disseminated their Islamic understanding and established new GAI branches.

The GAI has been continually promoting the Islamic understanding of the Lahore Ahmadiyya in Indonesia. In the Indonesian context, this belief is not adopted by the Islamic mainstream. The GAI relies for its belief on the Islamic understanding brought by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. This can be found in many books written by some prominent figures of the GAI, such as S. Ali Yasir, Susmoyo Djoyosugito, Nanang RI Iskandar, and Mulyono.
The GAI and all Lahore Ahmadiyya followers around the world believe that Ghulam Ahmad was an Islamic reformer in the nineteenth century, and represents the figures of the promised Messiah as well as the awaited Mahdi (Djoyosugito, 1984; Iskandar, 2005; Mulyono, 2003; Yasir, 2012). They believe that the coming of Ghulam Ahmad (the founder of Ahmadiyya) and his Ahmadiyya movement will result in the revival of Islam.

Membership of the GAI is voluntary (prinsip sukarela). In 1930, the GAI were recognised as a corporation (Badan Hukum/Rechtspersoon) by the Indonesian Government, Number IX (Extra Bijvoegsel Jav. Courant 22 April 1930 No. 32), and it was registered in the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1963, Number 18/II. The first chairman of the GAI was H. dr. Susmoyo Djoyosugito (Yasir & Yatimin, 1989). As stated in its Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga63, this organisation is based on the principle of Pancasila. The acceptance of Pancasila as the basic principle of the GAI was decided in 1947 at a congress (Muktamar) conducted in Purwokerto (Ali, 2013).

The GAI also proposes a movement to develop Islam as a peaceful religion through jihad. For GAI members, jihad is not understood to be a holy war that uses weapons or swords to kill those who are considered to be the non-believers or the enemy of Islam. Jihad should be implemented in peaceful ways, or by the so-called jihad by the pen (e.g. writing and publishing books). According to Yasir (1982, 2006), jihad is not similar to war. On the contrary, it is a serious attempt to struggle against lust (hawa nafsu), Satan (setan/syaitan), and all enemies who use violence to destroy the religious truth of Islam. To some extent, this concept is actually contrary to the understandings of jihad of some Islamic groups that consider it to be a holy war to maintain Islam by, for example, suicide bombing.

---

63 Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga is a constitution that is based on mutual agreement of the members of an organisation. This constitution was published by Pedoman Besar Gerakan Ahamdiyya Indonesia (PB GAI) in 1995.
In the 1940s, the GAI established a school in Yogyakarta called *Perguruan Islam Republik Indonesia* (the Islamic School of the Republic of Indonesia), abbreviated as PIRI. PIRI was established on 1 September 1947, and it then became an independent education foundation on 3 February 1959 (Ali, 2013). This educational foundation is used as a medium to spread and maintain the Islamic teaching of the GAI through educational efforts. Although this educational foundation is no longer administered by the GAI, as it became independent in 1959, it has remained an integral part of the GAI movement.

Nowadays, PIRI still survives and the school offers classes from early childhood to university level. Besides having been established in some places in Yogyakarta, the foundation also has some branches in Purwokerto and Sumatera Island, for example, in Lampung and South Sumatera. All students, not only from Yogyakarta, can be accepted to study in this school. This educational foundation has obviously resulted in the GAI becoming an inclusive movement and to be an integral part of the Yogyakarta community.

In an interview in Yogyakarta in 2013, Mulyono – the secretary of the GAI – said that another inclusive effort created by the GAI is to invite preachers from other Islamic organisations to give Friday sermons or other religious speeches in the GAI’s mosque. This activity is important for learning other Islamic views from others. Further, GAI members are also invited by other Islamic groups to give sermons and speeches. The GAI also invites religious leaders from other religions and beliefs. This activity is carried out to share religious thought and knowledge and to build a close relationship with people from different religions and beliefs. In the interview, Mulyono (2013) states convincingly that:

> We do not want to force other people to have a similar belief with us because this belief should be based on comprehension and volunteerism. We never think and do not want to think to accuse other Muslims who have different understanding of Islam as the non-believers. We develop this belief based on understanding that Islam is a peaceful religion.
Up to the present, the GAI still exists in Indonesia and its head office is in Yogyakarta. The precise number of its followers is not well recorded. Mulyono (interview, 2013) argues that the GAI does not concern itself with recruiting members, but focuses on disseminating or propagating its Islamic teaching as a cultural movement.

It has been widely discussed in the previous chapters that Ahmadiyya has been the target of violent acts and has been presented negatively in texts produced by the state official institutions and the Islamic Defender Front. The following section will provide an analysis of how the two Ahmadiyya groups resist or argue against discourses that have undermined them.

7.3. Resistance Discourses Presented by and to Support the JAI

In the previous chapters (5 and 6), Ahmadiyya (especially the JAI) has been depicted negatively. Some negative presentations have presented the sect as ‘the troublemaker and threat to Islam’, ‘the defamer or actor of blasphemy’, ‘the creator of social conflict’, ‘the hijacker of Islam’, and ‘the enemy of Islam’. Beside the negative portrayals, a few positive depictions of the sect are also found in chapter 6, on the discourses created by the SI when this organisation defends the sect.

In arguing against discourses that may have undermined or discredited them, the JAI followers have created texts in the form of books, articles published in blogs, online newspapers, and magazines. Their personal arguments are also found in some TV interviews and debate shows. The following section provides an analysis of discourses that they have been presented and discourse strategies they have employed to constitute their resistance. The discourses clearly reveal the counter discourses against negative portrayals created by the government and the FPI.
7.3.1. ‘We are the Victims’

According to the JAI followers, the development of Indonesian religious life has negatively impacted on their condition. In their texts, they have presented themselves as victims by using the discourse strategy of victimisation. In this strategy, minority groups being discriminated against present themselves as victims of oppressive situations, violent attacks, and unfair treatment created by majorities or power holders (Jansen, 2000). They also depict themselves as “powerless”, “helpless”, and “victims of attacks” (KhosraviNik, 2009, p. 484). This strategy is used by minority groups to reveal the severe condition they experience in order to attract sympathy or attention from others. Such a strategy is employed by the JAI to argue against all unfair treatment and disadvantages that they have felt.

The JAI followers portray the situation of Indonesian religious life as an unsafe situation. They argue that the government has exacerbated the situation by taking actions, such as the issuing of the joint ministerial decree. The issuing of the joint decree and the religious decrees by the MUI have victimised the JAI, because they are presented negatively in the decrees. The negative presentations are that the JAI is considered to be a deviant sect, and one that is not allowed to disseminate its Islamic interpretation to the public.

The discourse presentation of ‘being the victims’ can be identified in an article written by Andreas Harsono (2010). Harsono is one of the human rights activists who is concerned about support and defence of Ahmadiyya. He published an article in his blog entitled Ahmadiyah, Rechtstaat, dan Hak Azasi Manusia (Ahmadiyya, Rechtstaat, and Human Rights) (2010) to reveal the powerless situation of the JAI followers in Lombok in 1999 and how they had to flee or evacuate themselves from the city to avoid violent acts being perpetrated by some members of the public. They had to go to a refugee camp because their houses and mosques were burnt out. One of them was killed, and another was severely injured. In this presentation, Harsono (2010) depicts JAI followers as
powerless, helpless, and without any protection from the government. This situation worsened as it also occurred in several other places.

Expulsion and persecution against Ahmadiyya followers were started in 1999 with the burning of the Ahmadiyya Mosque in Bayan, in the district of West Lombok. One person died, and another was severely injured. In 2001, the persecution also occurred in Pancor, in the district of East Lombok. Over one week, the houses of Ahmadiyya followers were burnt out … All JAI followers had to leave Pancor. They were accommodated in Transito, a government building in Mataram).

(Harsono, 2010, p. 1)

The strategy of victimisation is also reinforced by comparing the religious situation in Indonesia, where the JAI followers have experienced a number of violent attacks, with the scary situation occurring in the Middle East. Syamsir Ali, the JAI spokesperson, presented this comparison on the TV One news program entitled Debat SKB Ahmadiyah Jubir HTI vs Jubir Ahmadiyah. In the TV program, Ali was interviewed on the phone by a news presenter and he was asked for his response to the issuing of the joint ministerial decree.

He said, Kami sangat sedih. Saat ini, Indonesia telah berubah menjadi Timur Tengah kedua. Agama telah dipolitisasi. Agama telah dibawa ke ranah Negara (We [the JAI] are sad. At these moments, Indonesia has been

---

64 The name of the TV program is Kabar Petang. The audio-video recording of the TV program is entitled Debat SKB Ahmadiyah Jubir HTI vs Jubir Ahmadiyah and it was downloaded from ‘YouTube’ at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XHS04u6raWo in 2013.
transformed into the second Middle East. Religion has been politicised, religion has been brought into the state domain). Syamsir Ali argues that actions carried out by government, such as issuing the decree, have exacerbated the severe condition of Ahmadiyya and resulted in them becoming victims. Ali argues that the issuing of the joint decree has brought the theological or religious domain into the political domain.

The comparative situation between Indonesia and the Middle East can also be seen as a strategy of scare tactics. As has been mentioned earlier, scare tactics aim at portraying a dangerous situation to raise fear and panicky emotions in the readers/the public (Flowerdew et al., 2002). Indonesia, where the JAI followers have become the victims of violent attacks, is depicted as having a similar dangerous situation to the Middle East. The dangerous situation has created a precarious situation and chaotic disorder for Ahmadiyya. As is popularly known, the Middle East is the centre of Islam, in which Islam has been a daily part of the political arena in some countries. Religious-based conflicts due to the differences of each school of thought (Madzhab) (e.g. Sunni & Shia) have been colouring the war situation in the Middle East.

7.3.2. ‘We are the Defenders of Islam’

One of the JAI followers, M. A. Suryawan, published a book in 2005 to respond to all the negative recriminations directed towards the Qadiani Ahmadiyya/the JAI. In the book, he portrays Ahmadiyya positively using the strategy of positive attribution by stating that the establishment of the Qadiani Ahmadiyya aimed at defending Islam. The publication is used to counter all negative images, especially the image about being the destroyer, or the enemy, of Islam.

*Gerakan Jemaat Ahmadiyah dalam Islam dilahirkan berdasarkan tuntunan Ilahi dengan tujuan untuk meremajakan moral Islam dan nilai-nilai spiritual. Pergerakan ini mendorong dialog antar agama dan...*
The movement of Jemaat Ahmadiyya in Islam is established based on the guidance of God (Allah/Illahi), one which aims at restoring Islamic morality and spiritual values. This movement encourages religious dialogues and defends Islam as well as attempts to rectify the misunderstanding of Islam in the Western world).

(Suryawan, 2005, p. 2)

Jemaat Ahmadiyya is depicted as the defender of Islam and it has a goal of restoring the morality of Islam and its spiritual values. Further, the JAI followers in their lives are given the responsibility of rectifying misconceptions of Islam in the Western world. They have attempted to do everything possible to maintain Islam, such as conducting religious dialogues. All of these tasks are considered to be the way to defend Islam.

Personifying Jemaat Ahmadiyya figures positively as the defenders of Islam also enforces the positive self-presentation by using the strategy of positive personification. In its Buku Putih (White Book) entitled Kami Orang Islam (Pengurus Besar Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia, 2007), the JAI personifies Ghulam Ahmad as a holy figure who had attempted wholeheartedly to fend off all negative of against Islam from Christian missionaries and from the Hindu sect of Arya Samaj in India. Ghulam Ahmad is portrayed as a figure who devoted all his life to defending Islam by, for example, by writing and publishing articles and books. These publications were expected to explain to others about the honour of Prophet Muhammad and the superiority of Islam.

Pada masa itu, badai perlawanan terhadap Islam menjadi-jadi, menerjang dari segala jurusan. Perlawanan yang paling sengit datang dari golongan Kristen dan Sekte Hindu Arya Samaj yang memburuk-burukkan nama dan pribadi Nabi Muhammad SAW. Dengan rasa pedih, Hadhrat Ahmad menangkis serangan-serangan itu dengan mengirimkan artikel-artikel dalam surat-surat kabar.
(At the time, resistance against Islam was significantly increasing, hitting from all directions. The fiercest resistance was coming from Christianity and the Hinduism sect [Arya Samaj] that depicts Prophet Muhammad negatively. With sadness, Hadhrat Ahmad fended off all the offences by sending articles to newspapers).

(Pengurus Besar Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia, 2007, p. 23)

These statements have clearly depicted Ghulam Ahmad positively as the defender of Islam. He is portrayed as a person who conducted all possible efforts to defend Prophet Muhammad and Islam from any negative offence as may have been created by others. The statements are deliberately selected to argue against negative depictions of Ghulam Ahmad as a person who defamed and destroyed Islam.

The strategy of positive personification is not only to depict the founder of Ahmadiyya positively, but also to portray the JAI followers in Indonesia as figures who have contributed positively to the independence of Indonesia. This depiction is found in the Darsus magazine (2013). The magazine is printed and published by the JAI and it is only distributed to its followers, not to the general public. Two of the JAI followers in Yogyakarta are presented as ‘independence fighters’, that is, figures who have had an important role in disseminating information on the independence of Indonesia through the media (“R. Ahmadsarido Sang Propagandanis”, 2013). They were Raden Ahmadsarido and Sayyid Shah Muhammad. Because of their contribution, the first president of Indonesia, Soekarno, rewarded Sayyid Shah with a house in Yogyakarta.

This discourse presentation has a clear meaning, and is intended to show that Ahmadiyya is inseparable from the history of Indonesia and it has been the integral part of Indonesian Independence. By presenting information on members who had been involved in the independence struggle, Ahmadiyya is automatically depicted as an inclusive part of Indonesia that has made a positive contribution to Indonesian sovereignty.
Another positive presentation of Jemaat Ahmadiyya as the defender of Islam is presented in the Darsus magazine entitled Ahmadiyah Amerika Miliki Banyak Ide Kreatif Kenalkan Islam dan Nabi SAW – [American Ahmadiyya has many creative ideas to introduce Islam and Prophet Muhammad] (“Ahmadiyah Amerika”, 2013). It is presented that Jemaat Ahmadiyya has conducted many events in the United States to disseminate positive images of Prophet Muhammad. One of the events was a national campaign entitled Muhammad, the Prophet of Peace, which aimed to clear up the negative image of Islam and Prophet Muhammad in the US in order to introduce a peaceful Islam after the ‘9/11 attacks’ and all the other terror activities.

Jemaat Ahmadiyah menjadi satu-satunya Jamaah Islam yang memiliki banyak ide kreatif memperkenalkan Islam sejati dan Nabi Muhammad SAW di Amerika Serikat.

(Jemaat Ahmadiyya has been the only one of the Islamic community that has many creative ideas to introduce the true Islam and Prophet Muhammad SAW in the United States).

(“Ahmadiyah Amerika”, 2013, p. 8)

The discourse presentation as the defender of Islam has been deliberately created to counter all negative images that say that Ahmadiyya has destroyed and defamed Islam. Such a presentation is not only created at the national level of Indonesia, but also in the international world. This also serves to tell the public that Jemaat Ahmadiyya is an inclusive part of Islam.

7.3.3. ‘We are not the Agent of Imperialism’

This discourse presentation is constructed to argue against negative attributions that consider the Jemaat Ahmadiyya and its founder as the accomplice of the British imperialist in India and as a supporter of Israel
(Zionism). This negative presentation can be found in texts created by the FPI [Chapter 6, section 6.2.4).

A response to counter the negative attributions is found in Suryawan’s (2005) book Bukan Sekedar Hitam Putih, under the subtitles Ahmadiyah dan Kerajaan Inggris [Ahmadiyya and the British Kingdom], and Ahmadiyah dan Negara Israel [Ahmadiyya and the State of Israel]. The counter discourse is constituted through the use of the linguistic strategy of quotation (Belmonte et al., 2010, Blackeldge, 2006, Johnson, 2011). It is created by incorporating or quoting Ghulam Ahmad’s statements in his book. Suryawan (2005) argues that negative presentations against Ahmadiyya and its founder as being a supporter of the British and loyal to the government are both misinterpretation and misconception.

In his view, the negative presentations are deliberately created and misinterpreted by others to constitute negative portraits of Ahmadiyya, namely that the sect was established by the British and that Ghulam Ahmad and his family had a close relationship with this government (Suryawan, 2005). Mirza Ghulam Ahmad had thanked the British because, under this government, the conditions in India were much better than before. In this period, Muslims could disseminate Islam freely and without any restrictions from the British. Struggle against this ‘good government’ is not considered to be a holy war (jihad), but it is a criminal action.

Berbuat Jahat terhadap suatu pemerintah yang memberikan kebebasan hidup dan keamanan penuh, dan kewajiban agama pun dapat ditunaikan sepenuhnya adalah suatu tindakan kriminal bukan jihad.

(Misbehaving toward a government that gives us freedom of life and full security, and where religious duties can also be conducted, is a kind of criminal action, not a holy war [jihad]).

(Suryawan, 2005, p. 85)
Another similar statement of Ghulam Ahmad, as quoted by Suryawan (2005, p. 86), is as follows: *Tuhan Maha Besar telah menempatkan saya dalam ketentuan bahwa ketulusan dan berterima kasih harus ditampakkan kepada suatu pemerintahan yang baik seperti pemerintahan Inggris* (The God Almighty has placed in me the need that sincerity and gratitude should be revealed to a good government like the British Government).

According to Ghulam Ahmad, *jihad* should not be addressed to the core of this British Government (Suryawan, 2005). Ghulam Ahmad and his Ahmadiyya thanked the British because the government brought India to a better condition, where Muslims in India live peacefully under this government. *Betapa keliru dan jahat jadinya kalau mempunyai gagasan jihad terhadap pemerintah yang berberkah dan cinta damai ini* (How wrong and evil it is if there is an idea of creating *jihad* against this blessing and peace-loving government) (Suryawan, 2005, p. 86).

Quoting these statements by Ahmad is also used to argue against negative presentations that consider Ahmadiyya to be a group that prohibits *jihad*. Ahmadiyya is accused of being a supporter of the British that was manipulated to weaken the spirit of *jihad* of Indian Muslims against the British (see Chapter 6, section 6.2.1.4). *Jihad* for Ahmadiyya is not merely translated as ‘a holy war or resistance against a particular government’, but it is a struggle to defend Islam by using the pen. Such a conception is best translated as the writing of books or of translating Al-Qur’an into other languages in order to disseminate Islamic teaching to non-Muslim communities.

When arguing against the accusation that ‘Ahmadiyya is a supporter of Israel’, Suryawan (2005) highlights Ahmadiyya’s refusal to support the establishment of the state of Israel. The resistance discourse is reinforced by re-contextualising or quoting a speech delivered by Zafrullah Ahmad Khan, a follower of Qadiani Ahmadiyya. He was the first Foreign Minister of Pakistan. He was the 17th president of UN General Assembly.

---

65 Zafrullah Ahmad Khan is a follower of Qadiani Ahmadiyya. He was the first Foreign Minister of Pakistan. He was the 17th president of UN General Assembly.
member of Qadiani Ahmadiyya from Pakistan, before the sub-committee of the UN General Assembly on 9 October 1947 (Suryawan, 2005). It is stated that the Qadiani Ahmadiyya, especially Khan, had struggled for the independence of Palestine by refusing to support the separation of the country by Israel (Suryawan, 2005, p. 101). The discourse presentation is as follows:

Muhammad Zafrullah Khan telah menghabiskan bagian terbesar dari argumentasi pidatonya untuk menentang pemisahan Palestina. Selama penyampaian pidatonya, wajah para wakil dunia Arab terlihat bersinar ceria. Saat berakhirnya pidato, para Pangeran Arab menjabat tangannya serta memberikan pujian atas pidato itu.

(Muhammad Zafrullah Khan has spent the main part of his speech to refuse to support the separation of Palestine. During the speech, the faces of the representatives of the Arabic world looked happy. At the end of his speech, the Arabic princes shook his hand and made compliments on the speech).

Therefore, in defending Ahmadiyya, Suryawan’s statements contain a clear indication that the Jemaat Ahmadiyya supports the independence of Palestine and rejects the establishment of Israel. The discourse presentation as the supporter of Palestine was created to build the positive image that the Jemaat Ahmadiyya is not the agent of foreign interests/imperialists.

7.3.4. Do not Take God’s Authority: Countering the Government’s Legitimacy

In its White Book, Kami Orang Islam, the JAI argues against the MUI and its fatwa. In the MUI’s fatwas (1980 and 2005), the JAI has been depicted negatively as troublemakers and the actors of blasphemy (see Chapter 5, Sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2). The JAI’s teaching of Islam has been considered to have been deviating far from the core teaching of Islam.

229
To argue against these negative images, the JAI delegitimises the authority or power given to the MUI to determine a deviation of a religious sect using the strategy of power delegitimising. According to the JAI, it is only God (Allah) who has the power or authority to exclude individuals or groups from Islam or to determine whether or not they are non-believers. The JAI argues that there should be no institution in this world, including in Indonesia that can be authorised to evaluate any individuals’ beliefs.

_Majelis Ulama Indonesia bukanlah suatu lembaga yang diberikan kekuasaan atau wewenang oleh Allah Ta’ala untuk mengeluarkan orang atau suatu badan dari Islam._

(The Indonesian Council of Clerics is not an institution that is given authority or power by Allah Ta’ala [God] to exclude individuals or groups from Islam).

(Pengurus Besar Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia, 2007, p. 12)

Another similar discourse presentation is found in Suryawan’s (2005) book, _Bukan Sekedar Hitam Putih_. He argues that the MUI has no authority to determine whether Ahmadiyya has deviated or not, or whether its followers are Muslims or non-Muslims. It asserts that the decision to consider Ahmadiyya as non-believers in _fatwa_ 1980, which is based on nine books, is groundless. He claims that the MUI has never mentioned clearly what books they are referring to.

_Suryawan (2005) clarifies that the JAI has requested explanation about the books many times, but the MUI has never been able to provide sufficient information. _Perlu diklarifikasi disini bahwa fatwa itu tidak ada dasarnya sama sekali, jauh dari kebenaran, dan tidak sesuai dengan ajaran Islam_ (It needs to be clarified here that the fatwa is groundless, being far from the truth, and it is contradictory to Islamic teaching) (p. 107)._
Suryawan (2010a) also uses the linguistic strategy of power delegitimising in his article entitled *Ahmadiyah: Anda Salah Alamat, Pak Menteri Agama*... In this article, he also argues that in terms of labelling in religion, neither the Indonesian Government nor the MUI have the right to determine whether individuals or groups that may or may not use Islam as a label. There should be no institution may prohibit Ahmadiyya from the use of Islam as its label. Suryawan (2010a, para. 10) argues that it is only *Allah* (God) who has the right to perform this action.

*(Sebenarnya yang dipersoalkan oleh Menteri Agama, dan juga MUI, adalah nama dan label ‘Islam’ yang digunakan oleh JAI. Sementara Islam adalah nama pemberian Allah SWT kepada Nabi Muhammad SAW dan pengikutnya.)*

*(Actually what the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the MUI are concerned about are the name and the label of ‘Islam’, which are used by the JAI. Islam is the name given by Allah SWT to Prophet Muhammad SAW and his followers).*

The JAI states that the MUI only have the obligation to give suggestions to government regarding religious affairs, either when it is requested or not. The suggestions can be accepted as long as they are not contradictory to *Pancasila* and to the Indonesian Constitution. Taking God’s right to determine the disbelief of someone, and whether he/she belongs to Islam or not, is contradictory to *Pancasila* and the constitution. According to the JAI, freedom of religion is protected or guaranteed, and nobody can interfere with that freedom. Accusing the JAI to be a deviant sect is contradictory to the principle of the freedom of religion and it is seen as a violation against the laws and constitution.

*(Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia itu jelas bertentangan dengan Sila Pertama yang mengemukakan bahwa seseorang atau badan yang berpegang kepada kemahaesaan Tuhan terjamin hidup dalam Negara Republik Indonesia... Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia tentang Ahmadiyya adalah suatu keputusan yang bertentangan dengan Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945).*
(The MUI’s *fatwas* are contradictory to the first principle (of *Pancasila*), which states that the individuals or groups that keep to the oneness of God in their life are protected in Indonesia… The MUI’s *fatwa* addressing Ahmadiyya is a decision that contradicts the *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution).

(Pengurus Besar Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia, 2007, pp. 12-13)

Another similar argument that criticises the MUI is constructed using the strategy of contrasting. The JAI has contrasted the purpose of the establishment of the council (e.g. creating a just and prosperous society) with what the council has performed. According to the JAI, the MUI’s action has deviated from both *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution, especially in regard to the guarantee of freedom of religion. This contradiction makes the establishment of a just and prosperous Indonesian society impossible.

*Bagaimana mungkin Majelis Ulama Indonesia dapat mewujudkan suatu masyarakat yang aman, damai, adil, dan makmur yang diridhai oleh Allah SWT bilamana mereka secara terang-terangan mengabaikan Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945.*

(It is impossible for the MUI to create a safe, peaceful, just, and prosperous society that is blessed by Allah SWT [God], if they ignore *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution).

(Pengurus Besar Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia, 2007, p. 13)

According to the JAI, creating a just and prosperous society in Indonesia is only made possible if religious tolerance and freedom are recognised, and by not taking God’s authority to determine others to be non-believers, Muslims or non-Muslims. One of the realisations of the tolerance is by acknowledging the JAI as part of Islam and not issuing *fatwas* that consider the JAI as infidels.
7.3.5. Discourse of Public Deception

In some texts, JAI followers argue that in particular social events the government has disseminated the so-called public deception (*Pembohongan Publik*). The JAI uses the discourse strategy of negative portraits of misbehaving in order to reveal incorrect actions by the government when presenting Ahmadiyya in the public arena. They argue against the negative image addressed to them concerning the acknowledgement of *Tadzkirah* as their holy book to replace Al-Qur’an. This resistance discourse can be identified in the following argument delivered by Zafrullah Ahmad Pontoh (ZAP) in a TV One ‘debate’ program (Deanova, 2013b):


(The accusation that *Tadzkirah* is the holy book of JAI is groundless. And it is a public deception… Because, the holy book of the JAI is Al-Qur’an. *Tadzkirah* was compiled 27 years after the death of the founder of Ahmadiyya. It contains many citations taken from his books. Thus, it is not a holy book. However, there are some figures in our society who have accused Ahmadiyya of doing so. And it is not true at all).

In order to counter the accusation, Pontoh argues that the religious interpretation that the JAI holds and propagates is the one based on the Al-Qur’an (Deanova, 2013b). Pontoh justifies the JAI interpretation of Islam, which is different from the interpretation of the mainstream, by proposing the matter of a different interpretation in understanding Al-Qur’an (Deanova, 2013b). The argument goes as follows:

\[\text{Kitab suci kami adalah Al-Qur’an. Oleh karena itu, semua pemahaman kami itu berdasar pada Al-Qur’an….. apa yang kami sampaikan itu adalah apa yang kami pahami menurut Al-Qur’an yang kami pahami,}\]

(Our holy book is the Al-Qur’an. Therefore, all our understandings of religion are based on the Al-Qur’an… What we propagate is based on what we understand about the Al-Qur’an, because the verses in the Qur’an can be understood using various viewpoints. So, perspective can be different. This perspective [the perspective of the JAI on Al-Qur’an] is then one that is misunderstood).

Another statement that reinforces their claim that the government has committed a public deception of government is made by arguing against the information about the withdrawal of some followers from the JAI. These followers who withdraw from the JAI are considered to be those who repent and who then return to the true Islamic teaching. The Pontoh’s counter argument is as follows (Deanova, 2013b):

Disini saya klarifikasi, bahwa ada berita di koran dan di TV bahwa ada ratusan orang Ahmadiyah yang keluar dari Jemaat Ahmadiyah itu adalah pembohongan publik. Kami sudah teliti ke lapangan, itu tidak benar.

(Here I clarify the news in a newspaper and television by saying that the statement that says there are a hundred Ahmadiyya followers withdrawing from the JAI is a public deception. We have investigated it and found that it is not true).

The discourse of public deception is deliberately created to reveal the incorrect actions of the government in the way they treat the Ahmadiyya. This misbehaving has disseminated deception and is clearly portraying Ahmadiyya negatively. This, according to Pontoh, may lead to the exacerbation of a negative image of Ahmadiyya in the eye of the public.

Similar discourse presentations to argue against alleged discriminatory discourses have also been created by another Ahmadiyya group: the GAI. In
order to know how they defend themselves, the following section provides an analysis of the discourses that have been created by the GAI.

7.4. Discourses Created by the GAI

GAI members might also have been a target of attacks but no violent attacks on them have been reported. The three Ahmadiyya followers who were killed in Cikeusik were members of the JAI. The GAI in Yogyakarta was a target in January 2012, but, based on an investigation by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, it was a false target. Likewise, the joint ministerial decree and the MUI fatwa 1980 are addressed to the JAI, not the GAI. However, fatwa 2005 and discourse presentations created by the FPI address both of the Ahmadiyya groups.

Muslich Zainal Asikin, in Tempo Magazine (Wijaya, 2013), states that “we at the GAI have never been attacked. Those who are attacked are the JAI”. However, the word ‘Ahmadiyya’ in its name has brought a negative consequence to GAI followers. People who do not have sufficient information about Ahmadiyya will think that there is only one group of Ahmadiyya. Further, they may not know that the Ahmadiyya groups are different. The name ‘Ahmadiyya’ may place the followers, who are affiliated with either the JAI or the GAI, as non-believers who have disseminated a deviant understanding and so they are accused to have defamed Islam.

In the various discourse presentations that have been created by the GAI, there is a deliberate attempt to distinguish themselves from the JAI, especially in the case of prophethood. The GAI followers strictly believe that Ghulam Ahmad

---

66 See Klipping Perkembangan Pengehentian Pengajian Tahunan GAI di Yogyakarta and Hasil Investigasi Tim Kementerian Agama di Yogyakarta (24-27 Januari 2012). The investigation result is audio-recorded by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In the result, it is emphasised that perpetrators of the action have little understanding about the joint ministerial decree and are unable to distinguish between the JAI and the GAI.
is only a reformer of Islam, not a prophet. They only believe that the promised Messiah and the awaited Mahdi have come through the figure of Ghulam Ahmad. This makes their belief different from the JAI’s belief.

Further, they believe that there is no sharp distinction between them and other Muslim mainstreamers, who believe that Prophet Muhammad is the last prophet of Islam, except for their belief about the coming of the Messiah and the Mahdi. For them, the two figures have arrived on Earth, while the Muslim mainstreamers, both in Indonesia and in the international world, believe that these two figures have not yet come.

7.4.1. ‘We are the GAI (Lahore), not the JAI (Qadiani)’

One of the concerns of the GAI followers is their attempt to tell the public that they are different from the JAI, although both of them use the name ‘Ahmadiyya’. GAI followers try to clear up the public misunderstanding about the use of the ‘Ahmadiyya’ name by explaining that the GAI is also Ahmadiyya, but it is different from the JAI. In order to explain this difference, most discourses are presented using the contrastive-argumentative strategy. Mulyono (the Secretary of the GAI), in his speech (delivered in 26 August 2013, para. 3), argues that:

*Kesalahpahaman terhadap GAI yang masih terdapat pada sebagian kecil orang, pada umumnya bukan disebabkan karena paham keagamaan yang dianut dan disebarluaskan oleh GAI, melainkan karena label Ahmadiyya yang melekat pada organisasi ini.*

(Misunderstanding about the GAI, which still exists in the minds of a few people, is not actually generated by any religious understanding adopted and disseminated by the GAI. However, it is caused by the label of Ahmadiyya, which is used by this organisation).
In the discourse presentation above, Mulyono contrasts the GAI and the JAI in the case of religious interpretation of Islam. He argues that the GAI’s Islamic understanding has never been contradicted and it is generally acceptable to the mainstream Muslims in Indonesia. What the mainstream thinks to be a deviation is the understanding of Islam disseminated by the JAI. There is no problem with the Islamic interpretation disseminated by the GAI.

In order to highlight the contrast, the issue of social conflict regarding Ahmadiyya is only related to the JAI, not the GAI. The JAI followers have been the target of violent acts, while GAI followers can live peacefully with other Muslims. This contrast is also found in Mulyono’s speech (2013, para. 4): *Berbagai peristiwa konflik yang menyangkut Ahmadiyah dimanapun di Indonesia tidak ada sangkut pautnya dengan gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia* (Some conflicts related to the Ahmadiyya issue elsewhere in Indonesia do not have any relation to the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Movement [the GAI]).

The contrast is also to be reinforced by stating that these two Ahmadiyya groups do not have any close relationship at all, either in terms of organisation or ideology. This is identified in the following statement (Mulyono, 2013, para. 5):

*Yang perlu diketahui juga bahwa keduanya tidak ada hubungan organisatoris maupun ideologis – yang tersebut terakhir ini terutama dalam sejumlah paham maupun praktek keagamaan.*

(It needs to be known here that neither the JAI nor the GAI have organisational and ideological relationships – especially the latter in some understandings and religious practices).

Another similar statement is also found in Mulyono’s (2011a) article *Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia [GAI] dan Permasalahan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia*. The statement below strongly highlights the point that the GAI strictly rejects the prophethood claim of Ghulam Ahmad and, therefore, it disagrees with the JAI.
Dengan berpedoman pada Q.S. 33:40 dan sejumlah hadits Nabi saw, yang menyatakan bahwa sesudah beliau saw, tidak ada Nabi lagi, maka GAI menolak tegas terhadap klaim kenabian sesudah Nabi Muhammad.

(By referring to the holy Qur’an [33:40] and some of Prophet Muhammad’s Hadiths, which state that there is no longer a prophet after him, the GAI strongly rejects all claims of the prophethood after Prophet Muhammad).

(Mulyono, 2011a, para. 12)

In other presentations, the GAI also reinforces the contrast by refuting the acknowledgement of Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet. The GAI followers do not adhere to Ahmadiyya’s belief that acknowledges Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet. They just acknowledge Ghulam Ahmad as reformer of Islam, the Messiah and the Mahdi. The contrastive presentation is created by delegitimising the prophethood of Ghulam Ahmad as follows:

Jika Ahmadiyah diidentikkan dengan pengakuan Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad sebagai nabi dan sekaligus penerima wahyu kenabian, maka secara faktual GAI berada di luar itu.

(If Ahmadiyya is identified with the acknowledgement of Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet as well as a recipient of prophetic revelation, factually the GAI is outside of this understanding).

(Mulyono, 2011a, para. 5)

Further, in reinforcing this contrast while strengthening positive self-presentation, Mulyono (2013) depicts the GAI positively as the Indonesian Government’s partner in seeking a solution to the Ahmadiyya issue in Indonesia. This implicitly delivers a message that the GAI has a good relationship with the government. The Ahmadiyya group is part of the solution, while the other Ahmadiyya group (i.e. the JAI) is part of the problem. The JAI has been considered to be a deviant sect and is the target of the joint ministerial decree.
Dalam hal ini, GAI telah berulang kali ikut dlibatkan oleh pihak pemerintah dalam upaya mencari penyelesaian terbaik, berkenaan dengan kasus Ahmadiyya.

(In the issue, the GAI has been involved frequently by the Indonesian government in seeking the best solution pertaining to the Ahmadiyya issue).

(Mulyono, 2013, para. 4)

The attempts of GAI followers to distinguish themselves from the JAI are deliberate. The problem of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia, which has actually been a result of the JAI’s understanding of Islam, more or less, has had a negative impact on the GAI. The GAI is different from the JAI, and the name ‘Ahmadiyya’ they use does not mean that they are same with the JAI.

7.4.2. Discourse of Religious Freedom

Some other texts created by GAI followers have concentrated on disseminating the idea of freedom of religion. Nanang R.I. Iskandar (2014), one of the leading figures of the GAI, has explored this idea in his article entitled Kebebasan beragama dalam Konteks Bhineka Tunggal Ika (The Freedom of Religion in the Context of Unity in Diversity)67. Basyarat Asgor Ali (2012), one of the GAI’s leading youth, also highlights this idea in his article entitled Ahmadiyah di Mata Pancasila (Ahmadiyya in the Eyes of Pancasila) by promoting pluralism and cultural differences.

The discourse presentation is created using the linguistic strategy of re-contextualisation. According to Fairclough (2003, p. 34), “re-contextualisation is a transformation of one text/discourse into another text/discourse”. In some statements below, the discourse of freedom of religion is transformed into the

---

67 This article was delivered in a national gathering initiated by the national Commission of Human Rights. This gathering was held in Bali on 18-20 September 2013.
discourse of *Pancasila*, of Indonesian laws and of the constitution, and of human rights.

Ali (2012) argues that violent acts against Ahmadiyya have violated the freedom of religion and, hence, these negative actions are contradictory to the *Pancasila* and also to the Indonesian laws and the Constitution. Ali (2012, para. 13) argues *Terkait dengan kasus kekerasan terhadap Ahmadiyah, tentu saja hal ini bertentangan dengan Pancasila dan Undang-Undang dasar 1945* (In relation to the violent acts against Ahmadiyya, these, of course, are contradictory to *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution). Ali (2012) believes that violent acts, which are mainly based on religion, are not in accordance with Indonesian culture. Indonesia recognises all forms of diversity as well as freedom of religion, and they are protected in *Pancasila* (especially the first principle).

Another re-contextualisation of freedom of religion is also identified in the discourse created by Iskandar (2014). In his article, *Kebebasan beragama dalam Konteks Bhineka Tunggal Ika*, freedom of religion is re-contextualised within the discourse of human rights. In this strategy, religious freedom is considered to be a pivotal aspect in the implementation of human rights. Violent acts against certain groups that are based on religion are contrary to the establishment of human rights in Indonesia. Such a re-contextualisation is to be found in his following statement: *Kebebasan beragama adalah kebebasan hak azasi manusia yang sangat penting untuk diimplementasikan dalam kehidupan sehari-hari* (The freedom of religion is a human rights freedom that it is very important to be implemented in daily life) (Iskandar, 2014, para. 1).

The phrase *kehidupan sehari-hari* (daily life) implies urgency and it delivers the sense or meaning that freedom of religion is an integral part of human daily life. It is similar to other urgent daily activities such as eating, praying, and studying, and so freedom of religion is also an urgent thing to be implemented daily in order to establish a peaceful religious life. The absence of this freedom has a negative impact on Indonesian society.
These discourse presentations are created to argue against all negative presentations that try to discredit the establishment of the freedom of religion. Although Ahmadiyya has a different interpretation on Islam, other parties should appreciate it. Freedom of religion should be viewed as an irreducible part of Indonesian culture and of its daily life. Implementing this freedom of religion is seen as an effort to establish human rights, and one that has been so far very strongly encouraged by the Indonesian Government through *Pancasila*.

7.4.3. ‘We are Muslims’

It cannot be denied that some negative presentations have tried to exclude Ahmadiyya from the Muslim community. Ahmadiyya has been considered to be a sect outside Islam. This exclusion had been created in Pakistan, where this sect was excluded from the Muslim community in 1974 (Jamil, 2002; Saeed, 2007, 2010). In Indonesia, some parties have also urged Ahmadiyya followers not to continue using Islam as their label and religion. The Ahmadiyya followers are urged to establish a new religion called the ‘Ahmadiyya’ religion and to not name themselves as Muslims.

In order to argue against this exclusion from the Muslim community, Mulyono in his article *Siapakah yang disebut Muslim?* (2011b) creates a discourse to deliver a message that GAI followers are Muslims. The strategy is mainly used to include certain individuals as part of particular groups/communities by presenting similarities between the individuals and the members of the groups. By employing the discourse strategy of social inclusion, he argues that religious practices carried out by GAI followers are similar to those that Muslim majorities conduct such as praying, fasting, and doing hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca). *Baik secara aqidah maupun syari’ah, Gerakan Ahmadiyya (Ahmadiyah Lahore) tidak ada perbedaan sedikitpun dengan kaum Muslimin pada umumnya* (Both seen from aqidah [the belief] and sharia [Islamic laws], GAI followers are not different from the majority of Muslims) (Mulyono,
This argument is used to emphasise that there are no fundamental differences between the GAI’s interpretation of Islam and that which the majorities have. GAI followers also believe in the five pillars of Islam (*Rukun Islam*) and in the six pillars of faith (*Rukun Iman*).

The discourse strategy of social inclusion is also found in a statement delivered by Muslich Zainal Asikin, the Deputy Chairman of the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Movement (Wijaya, 2013). He argues that “We (the GAI) are not so different from other Muslims”. Muslim mainstreamers believe that Prophet Muhammad is the last prophet, as the GAI followers do. The statement underlies the point that the GAI belongs to Islam and they are different from the JAI, who believe Ghulam Ahmad to be the last prophet. Azikin’s statements are:

Islam, through the holy Qur’an, clearly and definitely states that Muhammad is the last prophet… The teachings of Ahmadiyya (the GAI) do not differ or are not contradictory to the teachings of other Muslims.

(Wijaya, 2013, p. 60)

The inclusion of the GAI as a part of Islam is also created by presenting the positive contributions of this Ahmadiyya group, especially in the case of Islamic thought, the Indonesian Islamic movement, and modern Indonesian history. The GAI is presented as an organisation in which its Islamic thoughts have fostered the spirit of Indonesian Independence against colonialism. In Indonesian history, the independence of Indonesia could not be separated from the global role of Muslims and Islamic movements. Islam has been a source of the spirit to gain independence and the GAI has played a significant role in it. The discourse presentation can be identified in the article written by Nanang R.I. Iskandar (2009b, para. 2) entitled *Ahmadiyah dan Perkembangan Gerakan Keislaman di Indonesia* [Ahmadiyya and the Development of the Islamic Movement in Indonesia] as follows:
Memang benar bahwa intelektual Islam yang memahami Ahmadiyah, telah mendapatkan spirit Islam atau daya juang dalam amar ma’ruf nahi munkar yang sangat gigih dalam perjuangan untuk melawan imperialisme Belanda, baik melalui politik, maupun melalui perjuangan lain pada periode sebelum kemerdekaan Indonesia.

(It is true that Muslim intellectuals, who understand Ahmadiyya [i.e. the GAI], have obtained the spirit of Islam to establish ‘commanding good deeds and forbidding evils’ as their effort to fight against Dutch imperialism, either through politics or other forms of struggle prior to the independence period of Indonesia).

In this case, the discourse presentation has tried to connect the GAI, Islam, and nationalism. It delivers the meaning that the Ahmadiyya group belongs to Islam and it also contributes significantly to cultivating the spirit of nationalism in Indonesia through its Islamic teachings. Therefore, such a presentation includes the GAI as a sect in Islam and it reveals that the GAI is an inclusive part of Indonesia and its history as well. Because they belong to Islam, GAI followers have attempted to implement the meaning of Islam itself, one which derives from the world salam (peace).

7.4.4. A Peaceful Movement

In some discourse presentations found in their texts, GAI followers create a positive image for themselves. They create a discourse of peace by underlying their role as the creators of a peaceful life using the discourse strategy of positive attribution. According to Van Dijk (2006), positive self-presentation is an ideological square, that is, it is a presentation created by text producers to present self-positive images. Mulyono (2013, para.11) employs this discourse strategy in his article entitled Gerakan Ahmadiyah dan tantangannya in order to present GAI followers as individuals who always attempt to establish a peaceful life:
Seluruh warga GAI selalu mengulang salah satu janji kepada dirinya sendiri bahwa ia tidak akan menyakiti sesama manusia, baik dengan tangan, ucapan, maupun dengan cara-cara lain.

(All GAI followers always keep one of their promises that they will never hurt their fellow human beings, either by using hands, uttering statements, or by any other ways).

The positive image of peacemakers is not only depicted as the promise of GAI followers as individuals, but it has been institutionalised as the main goal of the organisation as well. Still in the same article, Mulyono (2013, para. 2) argues that peace is the main goal of the GAI, which is translated from the meaning of Islam and its related Arabic words such as salama:

_Tujuan utama GAI adalah tegaknya kedaulatan Allah, agar umat Indonesia mencapai keadaan jiwa (state of mind) atau kehidupan batin (inner life) yang disebut salam (damai)._  

(The main goal of the GAI is to establish the sovereignty of Allah (God), so that Indonesian people can reach a state of mind and of inner life that is called salam (peace).

Discourse of peace can also be identified in an article entitled _Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia dan Permasalahan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia_ (Mulyono, 2011a). If, in the two discourse presentations above, GAI followers focus on their relation to other human beings [they will never hurt their fellow human beings] and to God (Allah) [the main goal of the GAI is to establish the sovereignty of Allah], the following discourse presentation of peace is connected to the concept of nationality. The presentation can be seen in the following statement:

_Sebagaimana terlihat dalam tujuan GAI yang telah disebutkan di atas, maka segala usaha yang dilakukan adalah berorientasi kepada ke-Indonesia-an, yakni untuk menciptakan kondisi Indonesia yang damai._
(As can be identified in the goal of the GAI stated above, then, all attempts are oriented to the Indonesian state; that is to create a peaceful life in Indonesia).

(Mulyono, 2011a, para. 14)

The GAI is depicted as an Ahmadiyya group that is concerned with establishing a peaceful life in Indonesia. This positive self-presentation is employed to construct a positive image of this group being oriented to creating a positive image for Indonesian development and, therefore, they will never create problems such as social conflict or destroying the faith of Islam. Further, the GAI is an Indonesian Islamic organisation that has made a positive contribution to the Indonesian state.

7.5. Conclusion

This chapter has analysed texts created by the two Ahmadiyya groups, namely the JAI and the GAI. As has been mentioned earlier, discourses created by the two Ahmadiyya groups are expected to argue against all the negative discourse presentations that may have undermined them, for instance, discourses considering the sect to be a troublemaker and the actor of blasphemy. The analysis has revealed that the JAI and the GAI have created resistance discourses to defend themselves.

The JAI followers have depicted themselves as the defenders of Islam using the discourse strategies of positive attribution and positive personification by presenting its founder, Ghulam Ahmad, positively, so that he can be seen as a person who devoted his life to defend Islam. At the international level, they have introduced Islam and the Prophet Muhammad to the Western people (e.g. in the US) as a peaceful religion. In the context of nationalism, the positive
presentation is created by JAI followers to show them as being fighters for Indonesian Independence.

The JAI also argues against any negative image that categorises them as being the agent of an imperialist (the British in India). This presentation was created using the linguistic strategy of quotation. By quoting Ghulam Ahmad’s statements, the JAI believes that Ahmadiyya’s support of the British is based on the kindness of the British Government, in that they provided protection for Indian Muslims to practise Islam. The government, according to Ghulam Ahmad, brought better conditions to India.

In other discourse presentations, the JAI creates the discourse of political legitimacy and the discourse of impartiality. By using the strategy of power delegitimising, they defy the authority or power of legitimacy as given to the MUI to determine whether particular individuals and groups are non-believers or not. They argue that it is only God who has the authority to perform this action. The discourse of impartiality is created to present the Indonesian Government as the violator of human rights.

Based on this finding, the JAI has also presented the Indonesian Government negatively. The government is accused of behaving negatively, for example, through public deception. The discourse strategy of negative portraits of misbehaving is employed to present the Indonesian Government’s negative actions.

Similar to the JAI, the GAI also considers themselves to be Muslims. The GAI followers argue that their teaching is similar to that of the mainstream Muslims. Their Islamic understanding is not contradictory to the belief of Muslims, except in some minor cases such as the acknowledgement of Ghulam Ahmad as the promised Messiah and the awaited Mahdi.

In order to include itself as the part of Indonesian history, the GAI creates a self-positive image. The GAI argues that its Islamic thought has played a
significant role in fostering the spirit of Indonesian Independence against colonialism. This discourse is created by using the discourse strategy of social inclusion. Another discourse presentation is to address the implementation of freedom of religion in Indonesia. By using the strategy of re-contextualisation, freedom of religion is transformed into a human rights issue and also an issue of Indonesian law and the constitution. This is a deliberate effort to extend the importance of such a freedom as being part of human rights, law, and the constitution.

Another salient feature is that the GAI followers try to distinguish themselves from the JAI by highlighting the concept of prophethood. They distinguish themselves from the JAI using the discourse strategy of contrastive argumentation. It is because the problem of Ahmadiyya, where most of its concern is addressed to the JAI, has established ‘Ahmadiyya phobia’, and it has impacted on the GAI very negatively. This discourse presentation is created by using the strategy of victimisation, where the GAI followers are shown to be victims of the ‘Ahmadiyya phobia’.

This chapter reveals that minority groups, in some text genres, try to defend themselves by creating positive self-presentations. The presentations are used to argue against negative discourses that discredit them and to provide balancing opinions. The defence is also created by presenting majorities negatively. Negative presentations against the Ahmadiyya sect, for the JAI and the GAI, are seen as wrong actions.

The next chapter will present the general discussion and conclusion of the present study.
CHAPTER EIGHT
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

8.1. Introduction

This chapter provides the general discussion and the conclusion of the present study. It presents briefly the research problem, research questions, and summary of the findings, which are presented in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. This is followed by a discussion and analysis of the findings, conclusions, an evaluation (limitations) of the study, and recommendations for further research.

8.2. CDA and the Issue of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia

The problem underlying this study is the absence of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in examining the Ahmadiyya issue, that is, the analysis of how the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation (the JAI) and the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Movement (the GAI) are discursively presented in texts. The written and spoken texts analysed were those that were created by the state official institutions (the Indonesian Government in the reformation era, especially under Soesilo Bambang Yudoyono’s term, and the Council of Clerics/the MUI), social interest groups (the FPI and the SI), and the two Ahmadiyya groups. Texts created by the JAI and the GAI were analysed in order to know how they defend themselves or argue against negative discourses that may have undermined them.

It is necessary to undertake the CDA study because the absence of CDA investigation on the Ahmadiyya issue in previous studies leaves the unanswered question of how the sect is projected in texts. There is a lack of information on how the official institution, in this case, the Indonesian state, deals with the issue, and how the Ahmadiyya groups defend themselves. This study provides
information and understanding about the perspective and opinion of those who have concerns about the Ahmadiyya issue.

Another reason is that it is assumed that negative discourse presentations against a particular sect (in this case, the Ahmadiyya) may create a negative image of the sect in the minds of the public, and it may have a significant negative impact upon the Ahmadiyya. Such an assumption can be identified in Van Dijk’s (1989a, 2006b) statement, saying that texts or discourse presentations have cognitive and social functions.

Texts or discourse presentations can have social effects, with the first effect being on the minds of readers (Fairclough, 2003), and the very prominent effect of discourses is in the minds of people when reading the texts (Van Dijk, 1989a). Texts provide information and this may be a new insight for their readers. By reading and interpreting texts, people learn new things that can shape their mind, and it may then influence their attitudes and behaviours, either positively or negatively.

Negative discourse constructions of the Ahmadiyya may influence and exacerbate the negative image of Ahmadiyya in the readers’ minds and may influence people to hate and even perpetrate violent attacks against the sect. Further, some individuals or groups may also use negative discourses, especially discourses produced and disseminated by state officials/institutions, to legitimise their violent attacks against the Ahmadiyya followers.

In order to address this research problem, this study is guided by a central question and several subsidiary questions. The central question is \textit{what is the nature of the two groups of conflicting discourses created by state official institutions, social interest groups, and the two Ahmadiyya groups when addressing the Ahmadiyya issue? How and why were they produced?}
8.3. Negative Discourse Presentations

In CDA, particular minority groups are discursively discriminated against when they are presented or portrayed negatively in texts by the majority (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Van Dijk, 1993, 1998, 2002; Wodak & Reisigl, 1999, 2001, 2007). The negative presentations are constructed by creating several discourse topics using certain discourse strategies.

Based on the analysis, the state official institutions and the FPI have presented Ahmadiyya negatively by creating several discourse topics using a range of discourse strategies. The Ahmadiyya groups, especially the JAI, are presented negatively as, for instance, the troublemaker, the enemy of Islam, the actor of blasphemy, and the agent of imperialism. These negative presentations are created by employing the discourse strategies of, for instance, problematisation, social distancing/othering, metaphor, and scare tactics. All the discourse strategies adopted and used by the producers of the texts aim at portraying the Ahmadiyya sect negatively. These negative presentations were identified in, for example, joint ministerial decree issued in 2008 that was signed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Attorney General, in religious decrees created by the MUI in 1980 and 2005, and in articles published and speeches delivered by the chairman of the FPI, Habib Rizieq Shihab.

The negative discourse presentations created by the government were based on the dissemination of a deviant teaching of the JAI, especially the recognition of Ghulam Ahmad as a new prophet of Islam after Prophet Muhammad. This recognition was considered to be the source of public debate and social conflict in several places in Indonesian territory. This recognition triggered the fury of some members of the public and it was considered to be a blasphemy.

The government conducted a series of dialogues from 2007 to 2008 and invited the national board of the JAI to explain its belief. Following these
dialogues, the JAI explained its Islamic understanding, and twelve points (see Appendix A) were stipulated that must be implemented by all JAI followers. However, based on monitoring by Bakorpakem (the official body that is given authority to monitor the development of religious sects), it was found that the JAI followers did not implement these points completely. Based on this monitoring, the Bakorpakem recommended that the government issues a joint decree in order to stop the dissemination of the JAI’s deviant teaching.

Legally and constitutionally, the issuing of the joint decree is based on the law of blasphemy (law PNPS number 1/1965) and the restriction of religious freedom as regulated in article 28J in the 1945 Constitution, Law Number 12/2005 about the ratification of ICCPR (article 18, par. 3), and Law Number 39/1999 about human rights (articles 70 and 73).

The negative discourse presentations against Ahmadiyya by the MUI were based on the consideration that the Ahmadiyya groups, either the JAI or the GAI, have conducted a religious defamation of Islam. The recognition of Ghulam Ahmad as a reformer of Islam, Messiah, Mahdi (by both the JAI and the GAI), and a prophet (the JAI only) has ruffled the true faith of Muslims. The Ahmadiyya’s teaching may destroy the core teaching of Islam. The members of the MUI hold a belief that there is no prophet after Muhammad and he is the seal of prophethood. Those who disobey this belief should be categorised as non-believers, infidels, and perverted.

Similarly, negative presentations of Ahmadiyya by the FPI were based on the belief that the sect is a serious threat to the true Islamic teachings, and it can destroy the correct faith of Indonesian Muslims. The FPI is also concerned about the recognition of Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet of Islam. This recognition is contradictory to the belief of Muslims. The dissemination of negative discourses of Ahmadiyya are seen by the FPI as an attempt to defend Islam and Muslims from the deviant teaching disseminated by the Ahmadiyya sect.
The findings of this research have provided additional information about the situation of Ahmadiyya both in Indonesia and globally. The sect has been the target of violent attack (Saeed, 2007, 2010) and has been excluded and marginalised from the Muslim community, in which their legal, political, and social rights are denied (Jamil, 2002; Muktiono, 2012). Another point is the sect has suffered violence and discrimination from majority communities and sometimes from the police or military (Abel, 2013; Freedman and Tiburzi, 2012). This research provides evidence that the Ahmadiyya sect in Indonesia also experiences discrimination from discourse perspective, namely negative presentations in text. The Negative presentations could have been produced by particular groups or official institutions against the Ahmadiyya sect in other countries and this may exacerbate the difficult situation of the sect globally.

8.4. Resistance Discourses: Defensive and Offensive

In defending themselves or arguing against all the negative discourse presentations, the JAI and the GAI have created resistance discourses. The JAI creates ‘the discourse of victims’, ‘the defender of Islam’, they are ‘not the agent of imperialism’, ‘public deception’, and arguing against the ‘governments’ legitimacy’. Similarly, the GAI creates the discourse of Islam that they are Muslims, discourse of ‘religious freedom’, and the discourse of ‘peaceful movement’. A number of strategies, such as victimisation, quotation, positive attribution, power delegitimising, and contrastive-argumentative strategy, are selected to deny all the negative presentations addressed to them and to tell the public that they belong to Islam. Although they have some different interpretations of Islam, the two Ahmadiyya groups state that they want to be recognised as Muslims and be given the same opportunity to implement their Islamic beliefs. The resistance discourses are used to counter the negative discourses that consider them to be non-Muslims and non-believers.
The resistance discourses can be divided into two, namely the defensive and the offensive. The former is seen as an attempt by the two Ahmadiyya groups to create a positive self-presentation in order to counter all the negative presentations addressed to them. The offensive resistance discourses, meanwhile, were created by criticising the Muslim majority’s attitudes, behaviours, decisions, or actions, and, to some extent, portray the majority negatively. These offensive discourses, especially in Indonesia, are made possible by the return of democracy to the country in the reformation era that began in 1998, which allows everyone the freedom to express his or her opinions.

The defensive discourses are, for example, the discourses of victims (the JAI), defenders of Islam or Muslims (both the JAI and the GAI), and the peaceful movement (the GAI). The discourse strategy of positive personification, victimisation, positive attribution, quotation, power delegitimising, contrasting, and re-contextualisation, were used to create the resistance discourses.

The discourse of ‘the defender of Islam’, for example, is deliberately created by the JAI followers to argue against negative discourses that consider them to be the destroyers of Islam or blasphemers. Defending Islam is realised by conducting events to restore Islamic morality and spiritual values; for example, by encouraging religious dialogues and rectifying misunderstanding of Islam in the Western world. The Ahmadiyya founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, is also positively personified as a figure who had conducted all possible efforts to defend Prophet Muhammad and Islam from any negative offences as may have been created by others.

The GAI followers have also created similar defensive discourses. They have disseminated positive self-image by stating that they are Muslims and their Islamic teachings are not so different from the majority of Muslims in Indonesia. Their teachings are not contradictory to the teachings of other Muslims. Although there are some minor differences between the GAI and the majority Muslims, such as that the GAI followers believe that Messiah and Mahdi had
come to this world through the figure of Ghulam Ahmad while the majority Muslims believe that they have not yet come, this should not be a reason to exclude them from the Muslim community. Another reason used to justify the GAI being part of Islam is by presenting the GAI as a peaceful movement or an organisation that promotes peace as the implementation of one of the meanings contained in the word ‘Islam’.

With regard to the offensive discourses, it was found that only the JAI creates negative portraits of the state official institutions, and there is no negative depiction created by the GAI. The reason could be that the GAI has never been the target of violent attacks. Although the name ‘Ahmadiyya’ is attached to its name and this results in them being targets of ‘Ahmadiyya phobia’, its followers can live peacefully with the majority Muslims and other people. Another factor could be that the GAI is not the target of the joint decree and religious decree 1980. The GAI was only the target of religious decree 2005. However, they argue that the decree of 2005 does not actually problematise them, because it is a restatement of the previous decree that was issued in 1980. In some findings, the GAI followers present themselves and the Indonesian Government positively as mutual partners that work together to find the best solution for the Ahmadiyya problem. This presentation aims to create a positive image that the GAI is a part of the solution, not a problem.

The offensive strategy found in the JAI’s discourse construction is the discourse of public deception. The Indonesian Government is presented negatively as the actor of public deception that disseminates information about the secession of some JAI followers from their membership. According to the JAI, this information is not true. Another offensive discourse is also apparent in the accusation that the government undertakes negative action, such as issuing a joint decree, which is considered to be contradictory to the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The issuing of the joint decree is contradictory to the implementations of religious tolerance instantiated in the Pancasila, and of the freedom of religion stipulated in the 1945 Constitution and several laws. The JAI
argues that the decree has also brought religion into the political domain, which has made the Indonesian political situation similar to the political situation in the Middle East. The JAI is also offensive in problematising the government’s authority or legitimacy in determining the deviation or deviant teaching of a particular religious sect and considering others to be non-believers. They argue that only God (Allah) has the authority to perform these actions.

In conclusion, both the dominant and the Ahmadiyya groups have been involved in a serious discourse conflict. Each side is entrenched in their respective positions, and adopted strategies to maintain their positions, defend themselves, and at times, attack each other. However, this is not healthy for a peaceful co-existence and living peacefully, because it (the discourse conflict) could lead to further physical attacks as happened in the past. It would be beneficial for both sides and for the nation as a whole, that both sides reflect on and reconsider their positions and search for a common ground. This study could contribute as a source for the reflection and consideration.

8.5. Theoretical Significance

The investigation of discrimination and resistance discourse strategies to address the Ahmadiyya issue contributes theoretically to the study of CDA. Further, the use of CDA also contributes significantly to the understanding of the Ahmadiyya issue. It expands the application of the discriminatory and resistance discourse strategies on religious minority group, especially the Ahmadiyya issue that receives little attention in the previous studies. Another point is the present study could be the first that identifies discriminatory and resistance discourses in one single study. Especially for the Ahmadiyya sect, some previous studies have applied CDA to investigate religious minority issues, but not the issue of Ahmadiyya in Indonesian context. In CDA, this issue is relatively new compared to the issue of immigrants, refugees, and ethnic groups. As has been widely elaborated in the literature review, such discourse study has mainly focused on
racial, political, and economic-based reasons, which had significant negative impacts on immigrants (Belmonte, et al., 2010; Cheng, 2013; Flowerdew, et al., 2002; Ndlovu, 2008; Rasinger, 2012), refugees (KhosraviNik, 2009), asylum seekers (Goodman, n.d.), ethnic groups (Blackledge, 2006; Cui, 2010), and Muslims (Izadi & Biria, 2007; Tahir, 2013).

This study reveals that various discourse strategies that were used in previous studies either in discriminating against or defending minority groups are also apparent in this study. It reveals that various discourse strategies can be used in various social contexts and issues. Some strategies, such as metaphor, scapegoating, problematisation, victimisation, disclaimers, othering, and scare tactics are used by the state official institutions, social interest groups, and the two Ahmadiyya groups to create positive self- and negative other- discourse presentations. These findings correspond to Van Dijk’s (1998) ‘ideological square’, namely positive self- and negative other- presentations. Text producers tend to create a positive self-image and portray others negatively.

Another theoretical contribution of the study is that it sheds new light on Van Dijk’s ideological square. Van Dijk (1998) argues that in creating discourse, elites present themselves positively and portray others (minorities) negatively. This current study reveals that not only the elites create positive self-image, but also the minorities (in this case, the Ahmadiyya followers) when creating their resistance discourses. The Ahmadiyya groups (both the JAI and the GAI) present themselves positively and, at the same time, create negative images of the elites (as found in the JAI’s discourses).

Previous CDA studies have concluded that only those who have more power and control over others create a positive image of themselves and a negative depiction of others. The finding provides evidence that it is not only the powerful parties or power holders who use this strategy, but also the powerless or the discriminated groups. Their use has a different purpose, however, as the powerful groups use it to gain and maintain their power or control over others,
while the powerless/minorities employ it to defend themselves or to maintain their existence. The positive self-presentation by the minorities is used as a way to be accepted by the mainstream or majority, or to consider themselves to be an inclusive part of the majority. The inclusion is deliberately created to eliminate a social distancing (in- and out-grouping) between the two Ahmadiyya groups (as minorities) and the Muslim mainstreamers.

8.6. Practical Significance

Practically, the study contributes to addressing the debate or controversy in Indonesian society pertaining to alleged discrimination against Ahmadiyya. As has been mentioned in the introduction and literature review chapters, Ahmadiyya (especially the JAI) has been the target of violent acts by some members of the public, especially in the Indonesian reformation era. The religious sect has also been the target of policies like the joint decree. The decree was framed by the state official institutions that mostly consider Ahmadiyya to be a deviant sect and a source of social conflict. The issuing of these policies has aroused a debate in the Indonesian society as to whether or not the Ahmadiyya sect has been discriminated against.

The JAI and the GAI and some social organisations (e.g. the Setara Institute/the SI) have made a claim that the Indonesian Government, the Indonesian Council of Clerics (the MUI), and particular Islamic groups (e.g. the Islamic Defender Front or the FPI) have created discriminatory practices against the sect. The discrimination is created by issuing policies such as joint ministerial decree and religious decrees (*fatwa*) that problematise Ahmadiyya as a deviant sect.

The Setara Institute, for example, argues that “… the Indonesian Council of Clerics is one of the state institutions that legitimises intolerant and discriminative acts against particular religious minority group” (Naipospos,
Similarly, Human Rights Watch (2012, p. 335) states that “… the Indonesian government failed to overturn several decrees that discriminate between religions and foster intolerance”. Another similar argument is revealed by the JAI, which says that “the fatwa issued by the Indonesian Council of Clerics concerning Ahmadiyya is a decision contradictory to the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution” (Pengurus Besar Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia, 2007, pp. 12-13).

However, in responding to the claim, the Indonesian Government and its Council of Clerics reject these claims. According to them, the issuing of the legal proclamations and any attempts created to address the Ahmadiyya issues are not aimed at discriminating against the sect. They aim at finding the best solution to overcome social conflicts, sparked by the dissemination of a deviant interpretation of Islam. These efforts are also considered to be the way to defend Islam from any blasphemous actions created by the Ahmadiyya groups.

The former Minister of Religious Affairs, M. Maftuh Basyuni, argues that “… the joint ministerial decree is not an intervention of the Indonesian Government in the belief of the community, but it is the government’s effort to maintain social order and security that have been disrupted by the dissemination of deviant religious interpretation” (Balitbang dan Diklat Kementerian Agama RI, 2013, p. v). The deviant interpretation has given rise to contradiction and social conflict. Similarly, the MUI also clarifies that “the fatwa is an effort to respond to the demand from society and to maintain the purity of Islamic faith, which have been defamed by Ahmadiyya” (Saputra, Andriansyah, & Prasetya, 2011, p. 96).

This study reveals that the Ahmadiyya sect has been discursively discriminated against in some texts. The identification of the discourse topics and strategies reveals that the sect has been presented negatively. Some studies have convincingly shown that the Ahmadiyya sect has been physically discriminated against. The Ahmadiyya followers have suffered from this discrimination.
(Freedman & Tiburzi, 2012), their rights have been violated (Muktiono, 2012), and it is contradictory to religious freedom as stipulated in the 1945 Constitution (Khanif, 2009).

The findings of this current study contribute not only by addressing the debate or controversy in Indonesian society about the Ahmadiyya issue, but also by providing a new perspective or understanding that can help Indonesia’s policy makers, journalists, media owners, civil organisations, religious majority organisations, and religious minority groups to address the Ahmadiyya issue more effectively and humanely. Such a discourse study can also be beneficial for other researchers to assist in developing their analysis, especially in identifying discourse topics and strategies when investigating the issue of religious minority groups in other countries.

The problem of Ahmadiyya will still be a big challenge or an unfinished work for Indonesian Government and those who have concerns on the Ahmadiyya issue to find the best solution to administer religious issues, especially the issue of religious minority groups. It is also a challenge for the implementation of the freedom of religion and human rights in current and future life for Indonesia. The problem should be solved together by the Indonesian government and Indonesian people to create the peaceful life where all citizens can live peacefully.

8.7. Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research

One limitation of the current study is that it did not provide a comparative investigation that examines discourse presentations of other religious minorities in Indonesia. This current study only investigated the Ahmadiyya sect. Such a comparison would be important for revealing whether such negative presentations against Ahmadiyya are also to be found in the presentations against other similar minority groups such as the Shia.
Another limitation of the study is that it did not collect responses from the readers of the analysed texts (texts produced by the state official institutions, social interest groups, and the Ahmadiyya groups), as it is assumed that presentations of certain individuals or social groups in particular texts may affect the minds of the readers, and it may then control their actions when dealing with the individuals or groups concerned. In the current study, the focus was more on how Ahmadiyya groups are portrayed in public texts (and whether the portraits belong to discriminatory or resistance discourses).

The interpretation and reaction of the actual readers may be a potential topic for further related studies, namely how the texts may maintain or change the readers’ belief about the Ahmadiyya issue. Further investigation needs to be carried out in order to attest this assumption about how the negative presentations against Ahmadiyya may influence (1) the mind and action of the public when dealing with the Ahmadiyya issue, (2) how the presentations may exacerbate the plight of Ahmadiyya followers, and (3) whether or not the negative presentations affect the religious life of Indonesian people.
REFERENCES


Magnis-Suseno, F. (2013). Christian and Muslim minorities in Indonesia: State policies and majority Muslim organisations. In M. Kunkler & A. Stepan (Eds.), *Democratization and Islam in Indonesia* (pp. 73-87). New York, Chichester, and West Sussex: Columbia University Press.


Nugraha. (2013, July 26). Displaced NTB Ahmadis to get Id cards, but with no religious preference. *The Jakarta Post*.


R. Ahmadsarido sang propagandis kemerdekaan RI. (2013, April-May). Darsus, p. 16.


———. (2013c). *Bubarkan Ahmadiyah [Disband Ahmadiyya]*. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Q8uLc4MnbE.


Wijaya, A. (Reporter). (2013, August 11). We are not so different from other Muslims. Tempo English, pp. 59-61.


LIST OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Twelve Explanatory Statements explaining the JAI’s Belief System of Islam

1. Kami warga Jemaat Ahmadiyah sejak semula meyakini dan mengucapkan dua kalimah shahadat sebagaimana yang diajarkan oleh yang mulia Nabi Muhammad Rasulullah SAW yaitu, Asyhadu an la ilaaha illallahu wa asyhadu anna Muhammadar Rasulullah, artinya: aku bersaksi bahwa sesungguhnya tiada Tuhan selain Allah dan aku bersaksi bahwa sesungguhnya Muhammad adalah Rasulullah;

   [We the followers of Indonesian Ahmadiyya Jemaat/Congregation, believe and recite two shahada expressions as taught by the noble Prophet Muhammad SAW; it is Ash-Hadu an la ilaha ill-Allahu, wa as-hadu anna Muhammad-ar rasul-ullah, meaning that ‘I testify that there is no God but Allah, and I testify that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah’];

2. Sejak semula kami warga Jemaat Ahmadiyah meyakini bahwa Muhammad Rasulullah adalah Khatamun Nabiyyin;

   [Since the beginning, we, the followers of Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation, believe that Prophet Muhammad is the last prophet];

3. Diantara keyakinan kami bahwa Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad adalah seorang guru, mursyid, pembawa berita gembira dan peringatan serta pengemban mubasysyirat, pendiri dan pemimpin Jemaat Ahmadiyah yang bertugas memperkuat dakwah dan syiar Islam yang dibawa oleh Nabi Muhammad SAW;

   [Among our understandings, we believe that Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is a teacher, reformer, someone who brings news and warnings, a bearer of mubasysyirat, the founder and leader of Ahmadiyya who is tasked to strengthen the Islamic teaching brought by Prophet Muhammad SAW];

4. Untuk memperjelas bahwa kata Rasulullah dalam sepuluh syarat bai’at yang harus dibaca oleh setiap calon anggota Jemaat Ahmadiyah bahwa yang dimaksud adalah Nabi Muhammad SAW, maka kami mencantumkan kata Muhammad di depan kata Rasulullah;
To clarify that the word *Rasulullah* (the prophet) refers to Prophet Muhammad SAW in 10 points of *ba’iat* that should be recited by prospective members of Ahmadiyya Congregation, so we put the word Muhammad after the word Prophet;

5. Kami warga Jemaat Ahmadiyah meyakini bahwa:
   a. Tidak ada wahyu syariat setelah Al-Quranul Karim yang diturunkan kepada Nabi Muhammad SAW
   b. Al-Qur’an dan Sunnah Nabi Muhammad Rasullah SAW adalah sumber ajaran Islam yang kami pedomani;

6. Buku Tadzkirah bukanlah kitab suci Ahmadiyah, melainkan catatan pengalaman rohani Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad yang dikumpulkan dan dibukukan serta diberi nama Tadzkirah oleh pengikutnya pada tahun 1935, yakni 27 tahun setelah beliau wafat (1908);

7. Kami warga Jemaat Ahmadiyah tidak pernah dan tidak akan mengkafirkan orang Islam diluar Ahmadiyah, baik dengan kata-kata maupun perbuatan;

8. Kami warga Jemaat Ahmadiyah tidak pernah dan tidak akan menyebut masjid yang kami bangun dengan nama Masjid Ahmadiyah;

9. Kami menyatakan bahwa setiap masjid yang dibangun dan dikelola oleh Jemaat Ahmadiyah selalu terbuka untuk seluruh umat Islam dari golongan manapun;
[We state that each mosque that we build and is managed by the Ahmadiyya Congregation is always open for all Muslims from all Islamic sects];

10. Kami warga Jemaat Ahmadiyah sebagai Muslim selalu melakukan pencatatan perkawinan di Kantor Urusan Agama dan mendaftarkan perkara perceraian dan perkara-perkara lainnya berkenaan dengan itu ke Kantor Pengadilan Agama sesuai dengan peraturan perundang-undangan;

[We the followers of Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation, as Muslims, shall register our marriages in the office of religious affairs and shall also register divorce as well as other cases in the office of religious affairs based on the Indonesian rule of laws];

11. Kami warga Jemaat Ahmadiyah akan terus meningkatkan silaturrahim dan bekerjasama dengan seluruh kelompok/golongan umat Islam dan masyarakat dalam perkhidmatan social kemasyarakat untuk kemajuan Islam, bangsa dan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI);

[We the followers of Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation, will continually improve relationship (silaturrahim) with all Muslims and other people in the frame of social solemnity in order to develop Islam, the nation, and the Unitary State of Indonesia]; and


[With all of these points of explanation, we, the National Board of Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation, expect that all followers of Ahmadiyya Congregation, all Muslims, and all Indonesian people could understand to each other by establishing the spirit of Islamic solidarity (ukhuwah Islamiyah) and the unity of the nation].
APPENDIX B

TEXTS PRODUCED BY THE STATE OFFICIAL INSTITUTIONS


NUMBER : 3 Year of 2008
NUMBER : KEP-033/A/JA/6/2008
NUMBER : 199 Year of 2008

ADMONITION AND INSTRUCTION TO THE DISCIPLES, MEMBERS, AND/OR MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZING BOARD OF THE JEMAAT AHMADIYAH INDONESIA (JAI) AND THE MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC


In considering:

a. whereas the right to adhere to a religion is of basic human rights which cannot be diminished whatsoever; every individual is free to adhere to any religion and observe the rituals according to his/her religion and belief, and in exercising such a right and freedom every individual is bound to respect the right of other persons in the order of living in a community, as a member of nation and state, and to obey the limit as set by the law.

b. whereas every individual is prohibited from intentionally preaching before the public, advocating, or gathering public support, in order to interpret a religion adhered to in Indonesia, or to perform religious activities resembling the activities of that religion, where those interpretations and activities deviate from the principles of that religion.

c. whereas the Government has undertaken persuasive efforts through series of activities and dialogues to overcome the
issue of the Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) in order not to trigger upheavals in religious life and disturbing peace and order of the community, and in this matter the Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) has provided with 12 (twelve) Points of Clarification on January 14, 2008.

d. whereas from monitoring upon the implementation of the 12 (twelve) Points of Clarification of the Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) as referred to in point c, the Coordinating Team for the Supervision of Community Belief Groups and Sects, *(Tim Koordinasi Pengawasan Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat, PAKEM)* concludes that despite some points that have been accomplished, there are some other points that have not been accomplished by the disciples, members, and/or the members of the organizing board of the Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) that may cause disturbances to the order and peace of the community;

e. whereas members of the public are obliged to maintain and nurture the religious harmony in order to create peace and order in community for the sake of realizing unity and unitary of the nation.

f. whereas by the objective of maintaining and nurturing peace and order, and based on the considerations referred to in points a, b, c, d, and e above, it is deemed necessary to promulgate a Joint Decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs, The Attorney General, and The Minister of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia on Admonition and Instruction to Disciples, Members, and/or Members of the Organizing Board of the Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) and members of the public;

In pursuant to: 1. Article 28E, Article 28I clause (1), Article 28J, and Article 29 of The 1945 Constitution of The Republic of Indonesia;

2. The Indonesian Penal Code, articles 156 and 156a;

3. Law number 1/PnPs/1965 on Prevention from Abuse and/or Defamation of Religions juncto Law number 5 of the year of
1969 re Declaration on Several Presidential Decrees and Presidential Regulations into Law;

4. Law number 8 of 1985 on Mass Organization;


6. Law number 16 of 2004 on Indonesian Attorneyship;

7. Law number 32 of 2004 on Regional Administration as has been amended by Law number 8 of 2005.


11. Presidential Regulation number 9 of 2005 on Status, Function, Structure, and Administrative Procedures of the State Ministries of the Republic of Indonesia which has been amended by Presidential Regulation number 62 of 2005;

12. Presidential Regulation number 10 of 2005 on the Organization and Tasks of Echelon I of the State Ministries of the Republic of Indonesia that has been amended by Presidential Regulation number 63 of 2005;


17. Regulation of the Minister of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia number 3 of 2006 on the Organization and Administrative Procedures of the Department of Religious Affairs;

Attending to:

1. Minutes of the Central Coordinating Team of the PAKEM meeting of May 12, 2005;

2. Minutes of the Central Coordinating Team of the PAKEM meeting of January 15, 2008;

3. Minutes of the Central Coordinating Team of the PAKEM meeting of April 16, 2008;

HAVE DECIDED:

FIRST: To admonish and instruct all members of the public not to preach, advocate, or gather public support, in order to interpret a religion adhered to in Indonesia, or to perform religious activities resembling the activities of that religion, where those interpretations and activities deviate from the principles of that religion.

SECOND: To admonish and instruct the disciples, members, and/or members of the organizing board of the Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) as long as they claim themselves to be Moslems, to stop from disseminating interpretations and activities that deviate from the principles of the Islamic doctrine, namely the dissemination of the teaching that there is a prophet, with all his doctrines, after the Prophet Muhammad SAW.

THIRD: The disciples, members, and/or members of the organizing board of the Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) who ignore and violate the admonition and instruction as referred to in point FIRST and point SECOND above can be subjected to sanctions in pursuant to the prevailing laws and regulations, including against the organization of the Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) and its legal entity.

FOURTH: To admonish and instruct the members of the public to maintain and preserve religious harmony as well as peace and order by avoiding any illegal acts against the disciples, members, and/or members of the organizing board of the Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI).

FIFTH: Members of the public who ignore and violate the admonition and instruction as referred to in point FIRST and point FOURTH above can be subjected to sanctions in pursuant to the prevailing laws and regulations.

SIXTH: To order all state apparatus of the Central and Regional levels to take necessary steps of guidance in order to ensure the correct supervision and execution of this Joint Decree.

SEVENTH: This Joint Decree takes effect as of the date of its promulgation.
Promulgated in Jakarta
On the 9th of June, 2008

THE MINISTER OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS
Signed by
MUHAMMAD M. BASYUNI

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Signed by
HENDARMAN SUPANDJI

THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS,
Signed by
H. MARDIYANTO
RELIGIOUS DECREE [FATWA] 2005

MUSYAWARAH NASIONAL VII
MAJELIS ULAMA INDONESIA TAHUN 2005

KEPUTUSAN FATWA
MAJELIS ULAMA INDONESIA

Nomor: 11/MUNAS VII/MUI/15/2005

Tentang
ALIRAN AHMADIYAH

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), dalam Musyawarah Nasional MUI VII, pada 19-22 Jumadil Akhir 1426 H / 26-29 Juli 2005 M, setelah

MENIMBANG :

a. bahwa sampai saat ini aliran Ahmadiyah terus berupaya untuk mengembangkan pahamnya di Indonesia, walaupun sudah ada fatwa MUI dan telah dilarang keberadaannya;

[Up to the present, the Ahmadiyya sect is still trying to disseminate its belief in Indonesia, even though the MUI has issued religious decree to prohibit the existence of the sect and its teachings];

b. bahwa upaya pengembangan faham Ahmadiyah tersebut telah menimbulkan keresahan masyarakat;

[The attempt of the Ahmadiyya to spread its belief has raised social problem in Indonesian society];

c. bahwa sebagian masyarakat meminta penegasan kembali fatwa MUI tentang faham Ahmadiyah sehubungan dengan timbulnya berbagai pendapat dan berbagai reaksi di kalangan masyarakat;
Some members of the public has requested the MUI to reassert its fatwa about Ahmadiyya due to the emergence of opinion and reaction in the society in regard to the Ahmadiyya’s belief;

bahwa untuk memenuhi tuntutan masyarakat dan menjaga kemurnian aqidah Islam, Majelis Ulama Indonesia memandang perlu menegaskan kembali fatwa tentang aliran Ahmadiyah.

[To meet this demand and to maintain the purity of the Islamic faith, the MUI considers it necessary to reassert the fatwa about Ahmadiyya].

MENGINGAT :

1. Firman Allah subhanahu wata’ala:

1) ما كان مُحَمَّدُ أَبَا أَحَذٍ يَُّٛٛ، َٔنكٍِْ سَّسُْٕاللهِ َٔخَاتَىَ انَُّبٍَِِّْٛٛ، َٔكَاٌَ اللهُ بِكُمِّ شَْٙءٍ ََهًِْٛاا ااأححضا
2)َٔأٌََّ ْزَا صِشَاطِْٙ يُسْتَقًِْٛاا فَاتَّبِعُُِْٕ َٔلاَ تَتَّبِعُْٕا انسُّبُمَ فَتَفَشَّقَ بِكُىْ ٍََْ سَبِْٛهِِّ، رنِكُىْ َٔصَّاكُىْ بِِّ نَعَهَّكُىْ تَتَّقٌَُْٕ (الأنعام : 153)
3)َٚاأََُّٓا انَّزٍَِْٚ آيَُُْٕاََّ ْسُفَكُىْ لاَ َٚضُشُّكُىْ يٍَْ ضَمَّ إِرَا اْْتَذَْٚتُىْ … (ال ואני : 351)

2. Hadits Nabi shallallahu ‘alaiwasallam; a.l:

قال رَسُوْلُ اللَّهُ صلى الله عليه وسلم: لاَ يَسَّرُّهُمْ مِنْ ضَلَلٍ إِلَّا هَذِهِ الْهَادِيَّةِ (رواية البخاري)
“Rasulullah bersabda: “Tidak ada nabi sesudahku” (HR. Bukhari).

قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم: إن الرسالتة والنبوة قد انقطعت، فلا رسول بعدي ولا نبي (رواه الترمذي)

“Rasulullah bersabda: “Kerasulan dan kenabian telah terputus; karena itu, tidak ada rasul maupun nabi sesudahku” (HR. Tirmidzi)

MEMPERHATIKAN:


رسال اللہ صلی اللہ علیه وسلم ورسال اللہ علیه وسلم ورسال اللہ علیه وسلم ورسال اللہ علیه وسلم

Sesungguhnya apa yang diklaim Mirza Ghulam Ahmad tentang kenabian dirinya, tentang risalah yang diembannya dan tentang turunnya wahyu kepada dirinya adalah sebuah pengingkaran yang tegas terhadap ajaran agama yang sudah dikenal kebenarannya secara qath’i (pasti) dan meyakinkan dalam ajaran Islam, yaitu bahwa Muhammad Rasulullah adalah Nabi dan Rasul terakhir dan tidak akan ada lagi wahyu yang akan diturunkan kepada seorangpun setelah itu. Keyakinan seperti yang diajarkan Mirza Ghulam Ahmad tersebut membuat dia sendiri dan pegikutnya menjadi murtad, keluar dari agama Islam. Aliran Qadyaniyah dan Aliran Lahoriyah adalah sama, meskipun aliran yang disebut terakhir (Lahoriyah) meyakini bahwa Mirza Ghulam Ahmad

291
hanyalah sebagai bayang-bayang dan perpanjangan dari Nabi Muhammad shallallahu ‘alaihi wasallam“.


3. Pendapat Sidang Komisi C Bidang Fatwa pada Munas VII MUI 2005

Dengan bertawakal kepada Allah subhanabu wata’ala

MEMUTUSKAN:

MENETAPKAN:

FATWA TENTANG ALIRAN AHMADIYAH


[Reasserting the MUI's fatwa issued at the national meeting in 1980 that stated that the Ahmadiyya sect is outside Islam, misguided, and perverted, and those who follow the sect are considered to be apostate/non-believers].


[Those who have followed the Ahmadiyya sect are encouraged to return to the true Islamic teaching; a teaching that corresponds to the Al-Qur'an and Hadith].

3. Pemerintah berkewajiban untuk melarang penyebaran faham Ahmadiyah di seluruh Indonesia dan membekukan organisasi serta menutup semua tempat kegiatannya.

[The Indonesian Government has an obligation to ban the spread of the Ahmadiyya belief in all Indonesian territory and to prohibit all of the activities of the sect].

Ditetapkan di: Jakarta
Pada tanggal : 21 Jumadil Akhir 1426 H/28 Juli 2005 M

MUSYAWARAH NASIONAL VII

MAJELIS ULAMA INDONESIA

Pimpinan Sidang Pleno

Ketua, Sekretaris

ttd. ttd.

Prof. Dr. H. Umar Shihab Prof. Dr. H.M. Din Syamsuddin
APPENDIX C

TEXTS PRODUCED BY THE SETARA INSTITUTE (THE SI)

Setara Institute has published several annual reports and related texts. The cover picture and synopsis of the 2007 report and a policy paper are attached here, while other texts can be found and downloaded from the Setara Institute’s official website, i.e. setara-institute.org. Most of the texts have been translated into English. Here is one of reports and papers that is used as the data of this research.

Report 2007:
Submissive to Mass Judgment: State Justification in Prosecuting Freedom of Religion and Belief

SETARA Institute for democracy and peace, adalah organisasi perkumpulan yang didirikan oleh sejumlah orang, yang memiliki kepedulian dalam mewujudkan masyarakat yang setara. Salah satu isu yang menjadi concern perkumpulan ini adalah mendorong negara untuk memenuhi hak kebebasan beragama dan berkeyakinan di Indonesia. Salah satu inisiatif yang dikembangkan adalah memantau dan memaparkan situasi kebebasan beragama dan berkeyakinan di Indonesia, melalui catatan tahunan.

[The Setara Institute for democracy and peace is a non-government organisation that was founded by several people who have a desire to establish an equal society. One of the concerns of this organisation is to encourage the state to
fulfill the rights of people for religious freedom/belief in Indonesia. One of its initiatives is by monitoring the situation of freedom of religion and belief in Indonesia by making annual report].

Publikasi bertujuan untuk mendorong dan mendesak negara memenuhi kewajibannya menghormati, mempromosikan, dan memenuhi hak asasi manusia, khususnya kebebasan beragama dan berkeyakinan.

[This publication aims at encouraging the state to conduct its obligation by respecting, promoting, and protecting human rights, especially freedom of religion and belief].

Metodologi yang digunakan dalam pemantauan dan pendokumentasian ini adalah dengan memantau, menghimpun, dan menganalisis data dari berbagai sumber dengan menggunakan parameter hak asasi manusia, khususnya pasal 18 Kovenan Internasional Hak Sipil dan Politik (ICCPR), termasuk juga pasal pasal 20, 26, dan 27 serta Deklarasi PBB 1981 tentang Penghapusan Segala Bentuk Intoleransi dan Diskriminasi berdasarkan Agama atau Keyakinan.

[Methodology used in this monitoring is by monitoring, collecting, and analysing data from several sources using human rights parameter, especially article 18 of international covenant of civil and political rights (ICCPR), including articles 20, 26, and 27 as well as United Nations' declaration of 1981 about the eradication of all forms of intolerance and discrimination based on religion and belief].

Tahun 2007, adalah tahun di mana pelanggaran kebebasan beragama dan berkeyakinan terjadi sangat nampak di permukaan, di mana serangkaian pengrusakan, kekerasan, dan penangkapan terhadap kelompok-kelompok yang dianggap "sesat" dan kelompok agama lain terjadi dan dipertontonkan kepada publik. Sepanjang Januari-November, SETARA Institute mencatat 135 peristiwa pelanggaran kebebasan beragama dan keyakinan. Dari 135 peristiwa yang terjadi, tercatat 185 tindak pelanggaran dalam 12 kategori.

[2007 was a year of violations against freedom of religion and belief. A series of destructions, violations, and arrests of those who were considered to be 'deviant' and other religious groups were shown to the public. During January to November 2007, the Setara Institute recorded 135 violations against freedom of religion and belief. These violations were categorised into 12 category].

Jumlah terbanyak kelompok (korban) yang mengalami pelanggaran kebebasan beragama dan berkeyakinan adalah al qiyadah al Islamiyyah, sebuah aliran keagamaan dalam Islam yang dipimpin Ahmad Moshaddeq. Aliran ini ditimpa 68 kasus pelarangan, kekerasan, penangkapan dan penahanan. Kelompok berikutnya adalah jemaah Kristen/ Katholik yang mengalami 28 pelanggaran, disusul Ahmadiyah yang ditimpa 21 tindakan pelanggaran. Pelaku 185 pelanggaran kebebasan beragama dan berkeyakinan adalah negara. Sejumlah 92
pelanggaran dilakukan oleh negara (commission) dalam bentuk pembatasan, penangkapan, penahanan, dan vonis atas mereka yang dianggap sesat.

[Religious group that experience this violation were Al Qiyadah al Islamiyah; a religious sect in Islam led by Ahmad Moshadeq. There were 68 violations addressed to this group in forms of prohibition, violations, and arrests. Another group was Christian Catholic Congregation that experienced 28 violations, followed by the Ahmadiyya sect that experienced 21 violations. The actor of these violations was the state. 92 violations were conducted by commission in the form of restriction, arrest, and punishment to those who were considered to be deviant].

Termasuk dalam tindakan langsung ini adalah dukungan dan pembenaran otoritas negara atas penyesatan terhadap kelompok-kelompok keagamaan tertentu. Sedangkan 93 tindakan pelanggaran lainnya terjadi karena negara melakukan pembiaran (omission) terhadap tindakan-tindakan kekerasan yang dilakukan oleh warga atau kelompok.

[Including in this action was support and justification conducted by the state authority for accusing these groups as deviant. Other 93 violations were occurred by omitting (omission) others to perpetrate violent actions].

Selain berbagai pelanggaran di atas, konstitusi maupun berbagai perundangundangan tampaknya masih belum sepenuhnya mengadopsi prinsip-prinsip hak dan kebebasan bagi warga negara. Bakor Pakem, sebuah unit di institusi Kejaksaan yang dibuat oleh Orde Baru sebagai instrumen negara untuk mengawasi agama dan aliran kepercayaan, misalnya, masih efektif bekerja dan menjerat berbagai kelompok agama dan keyakinan.

[Besides these violations, the constitution and laws have not yet adopted principles of civil rights and freedom completely. The Bakorpakem, a coordinating body that was found in the 'new order' era under the Attorney General as the state instrument to monitor the spread of religion and sect, for example, still works effectively to ensnare several religious groups].

Penyerahan otoritas negara kepada organisasi keagamaan korporatis Negara dalam menilai sebuah ajaran agama dan kepercayaan, menurut SETARA Institute merupakan bentuk ketidakmampuan negara untuk berdiri di atas hukum dan bersikap netral atas setiap agama dan keyakinan. Aparat hukum bertindak di atas dan berdasarkan pada fatwa MUI padahal institusi penegak hukum adalah institusi negara yang seharusnya bekerja dan bertindak berdasarkan UU.

[Giving this authority to evaluate a religious sect or belief by the state to religious religious organisations, according to the Setara Institute, is a form of inability of the state to establish law and act impartially and neutrally to all
religions and beliefs. Legal apparatus act based on the MUI's *fatwa*, whereas law institution is the state institution that should work and act based on laws.

Negara telah gagal mempromosikan, melindungi, dan memenuhi hak kebebasan beragama dan berkeyakinan. Negara, bahkan telah bertindak sebagai pelaku pelanggaran hak asasi manusia akibat tindakannya yang melarang aliran keagamaan dan keyakinan dan membiarkan warga/ organisasi keagamaan melakukan persekusi massal atas kelompok-kelompok keagamaan dan keyakinan.

[The state failed to promote, protect, and fulfill freedom of religion and belief. The state has acted as the actor of violations against human rights by prohibiting religious sect and belief and allowed some members of the public or religious organisation to persecute minority religious groups].

*Dokumen Kebijakan: Penghapusan Diskriminasi Agama/Keyakinan (2011)*


[The report about the condition of freedom of religion/belief in Indonesia that is published by the Setara Institute and other civil society organisations reveals that]
the intolerance, either perpetrated by members of the public and the state apparatus, increases. On the contrary, tolerance weakens. Number of violence attacks in 2008 increases significantly compared to those that occurred in 2007. In 2009, the Setara Institute records 291 actions of violation, and, in 2010, it is recorded 286 actions].

Atas dasar pemikiran di atas, SETARA Institute menyusun suatu dokumen kebijakan berupa buku ini sebagai Naskah Akademik dan Rancangan Undang-undang penghapusan diskriminasi agama sebagai bagian dari ikhtiar menegakkan jaminan kebebasan beragama/berkeyakinan.

[Based on this report, the Setara Institute compiles a policy paper in the form of book as an academic paper and legal draft of the eradication of religious discrimination as part of the attempt to establish the guarantee of freedom of religion/belief].
APPENDIX D

TEXTS PRODUCED BY THE ISLAMIC DEFENDER FRONT

Speeches downloaded from ‘YouTube’

The audio-video recordings of the speeches cannot be included in the appendix because the file cannot be put in the Pdf file. It is also too big to send them electronically. However, the recordings can be found and downloaded from the links shown below.


Example of Article Text

Ahmadiyah Menipu! Lima Perkara Tolak Ahmadiyah

[Ahmadiyya Deceives! Five cases to reject Ahmadiyya]

Oleh : Hb. Muhammad Rizieq Syihab, Lc, MA.
Ketua Umum Front Pembela Islam

Published in *Republika* daily newspaper on 28 May 2008

Membaca tulisan Shamsir Ali di Republika, Jum’at 23 Mei 2008, yang berjudul
Ahmadiyah Menjawab, saya memandang perlu untuk menanggapi, karena penuh dengan penipuan dan penyesatan.

[This paper was published in Republika daily newspaper at the end of May 2008, but it was edited by the editor of the newspaper. In this website, this paper is published fully, so that it can be read and understood completely. Reading Shamsir Ali’s paper in Republika published on 23 May 2008, entitled Ahmadiyya answers, it is important to respond to it, because there are many lies and misdirections in it].

Shamsir Ali hanya mengemukakan ”sejumlah persamaan” antara Ahmadiyah dan Islam, sambil menyembunyikan ”segudang perbedaan” antara keduanya, lalu mengambil kesimpulan bahwa Ahmadiyah sama dengan Islam. Padahal, kita sama tahu bahwa banyaknya persamaan antara monyet dan manusia tidak berarti monyet itu sama dengan manusia, karena banyak perbedaan mendasar antara keduanya. Begitu pula antara Ahmadiyah dan Islam, terlalu banyak perbedaan antara keduanya dalam hal yang sangat prinsip.

[Shamsir Ali reveals "some similarities" between Ahmadiyya and Islam, while conceal "numerous differences" between them, and then he make a conclusion that Islam and Ahmadiyya are the same. We need to know that there are many similarities between monkey and human, but it does not mean that monkey and human are the same, because there are many basic differences between them. Likewise, Ahmadiyya and Islam have many principle differences].

Disini, saya akan menyoroti tulisan Shamsir Ali terkait 5 (lima persoalan).

[Here, I will criticise his paper in regard to five issues].


Dalam kitab Tadzkirah hal 493 brs 14 tertulis bahwa Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (MGA) dijadikan sebagai Rasul, dan di hal 651 brs 3 tertulis bahwa Allah memanggil MGA dengan panggilan Yaa Nabiyyallaah (Wahai Nabi Allah).

[First, it is about prophethood. Ahmadiyya recognises that Prophet Muhammad is a prophet and messenger, but Ahmadiyya does not recognise him as the seal of prophethood. Even though Ahmadiyya recognises Prophet Muhammad as the seal of prophethood, it is understood differently. Muhammad is the greatest
prophet, but he is not the last prophet. Ahmadiyya sometimes states that Muhammad is the last prophet, but it was restricted. Prophets who bring a new teaching will no longer come to this world, but those who do not bring a new teaching will continue to come till the end of the world. In Tadzkirah, page 493, line 14, it is written that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was appointed to be a messenger, and, in page 651, line 3, it is stated that Allah calls Ghulam Ahmad with a calling Yaa nabiyllah (the prophet of God).


[Shamsir Ali also gives his compliment to Prophet Muhammad as the special and the best prophet, while in fact, in Tadzkirah pages 192, 368, 373, 496, and 579 it is stated that Ghulam Ahmad is the best human being in this universe and he gets God’s blessing that has never been given to other human beings. Furthermore, Shamsil Ali states that Ghulam Ahmad is the Messiah, and in Tadzkirah, it is stated that he is not only a Messiah, but he is the Messiah the son of Maryam (pages 192,219, 222, 223, 243, 280, 378, 380, 387, 401, 496, 579, 622, 637, and 639). Here, Shamsir Ali tries to conceal his "faith", in Tadzkirah, page 412 line 2 and page 436 lines 2-3, it is stated that Ghulam Ahmad is equalised with the son of God, and in page 636 line 13, he is also equalised with 'Arsy. More than that, Tadzkirah states that the position of Ghulam Ahmad is the same with the oneness of God (pages 15, 196, 223, 246, 368, 276, 381, 395, 496, 579, 636). Ghulam Ahmad is unfified with God and become God, then Ghulam Ahmad who created the sky and the earth (pages 195-197, 696 dan 700). In page 51 line 4, it is written about Gods revelation to Ghulam Ahmad saying that 'O… Ahmad, your name is perfect, and my name is not perfect. (see also page 245, 277 dan 366)].


[Second, it is about holy book. Ahmadiyya recognises that Al-Qur'an is a holy book given to Prophet Muhammad, but Ahmadiyya does not recognise it as a holy book. Even though Ahmadiyya recognises it as aholy book, but it is only a book that brings a new teaching. Meanwhile, revelation that does not contain a new teaching will still come. According to Ahmadiyya, Tadzkirah is a compilation of revelations from Allah to Ghulam Ahmad, in which its position is same with a holy book. Shamsil Ali may deny this, but he cannot deny that the contents of Tadzkirah are from Ghulam Ahmad. He cannot also deny that Ahmadiyya itself that writes, prints, and spreads Tadzkirah to all over the world. In 12 point explaining about Ahmadiyya commitment, it is stated that Tadzkirah is a note of spiritual experience of Ghulam Ahmad. It is important to know that Tadzkirah is holy revelation. In page 43, line 8, Ghulam Ahmad says that "my God talks directly to me". In pages 278, 369, 376, and 637, it is stated that Allah
sent Tadzkirah in a place called Qadian. In page 668, line 12, it is written that the position of Ghulam Ahmad is same with the Al-Qur'an. How could Islam that believes that Muhammad is the seal of prophethood and Al-Qur'an as the last of holy book is equalised with Ahmadiyya that believes that there is a new prophet after Muhammad and, after Al-Qur'an, there is a new holy book called Tadzkirah? How Could Islam that has the true faith is equalised with the false teaching of Ahmadiyya? This is a basic and principle faith].


[Third, Ahmadiyya is the agent of imperialism. This is not a slander, but Ghulam Ahmad himself admits it. In Khaizan, Ghulam Ahmad's work compilation vol. 3 page 21, he reveals his readiness to give his life to the British Government that colonised India. In page 166 at the same volume, Ghulam Ahmad thanks to the British that he himself admits that the British is a blessed government. In volume 8 page 36, Ghulam Ahmad claims that he is the servant of the British (see also in Volume 15 page 155 and 156). In Volume 16 page 26 and Volume 17 page 443, Ghulam Ahmad states his disagreement for jihad (holy war)].

Perlu dicatat, bahwa di tahun 1857, tatkala terjadi pemberontakan besar yang dilakukan kaum muslimin India terhadap penjajah Inggris, ayah MGA yang bernama Ghulam Murtaza (Muartadha) ikut dalam pasukan Inggris untuk membantai kaum muslimin. Hal ini MGA sendiri yang cerita dalam kitab Tuhfah Qaishariyah Hal.16.

It is important to note here, in 1857, when there was a great rebellion carried out by Muslims in India against the British, the father of Ghulam Ahmad (Ghulam Murtadha) joined with the British to fight against Muslims. Ghulam Ahmad explains this in his Tuhfah Qaishariyah page 16. That is the reason why Ahmadiyya is given a protection and support by the British Government. This is also a reason why the Netherland Government was interested to bring Ahmadiyya in Indonesia in 1925. Students from Java and Sumatera that Shamsir Ali mentioned as those who bring Ahmadiyya teaching to Indonesia are only a camouflage. Ahmadiyya is the accomplice of the netherland. In the history of Indonesian Independence against the Netherland, the British, the Portuguese, and the Japanese Governments, there was not Ahmadiyya follower who joined to struggle for the independence. Shamsir Ali mentioned one name that he believes to be an independent fighter, but this still needs to be investigated.

Fourth, it is about the legality of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia. Previously, Ahmadiyya has been approved legally based on the decree issued by the Ministry of Justice Number JA / 23 / 13 on 13 March 1953. However, it is need to be noted here that the decree was expired and, legally, it is no longer valid by the issuing of the presidential decree Number 11/1965 about blasphemy and the criminal code, article 156a about religious defamation. Therefore, the legality of Ahmadiyya should be revised continuously by the issuing of several decrees that prohibit Ahmadiyya in many places in Indonesia such as in SK Kejari Subang – Jabar Th.1976, SK Kejati Sulu Sel Th.1977, SK Kejari Lombok Timur Th.1983, SE Dirjen Bimas Islam – Depag RI Th.1984, SK Kejari Sidenreng – Sulusel Th.1986, SK Kejari Kerinci – Jambi Th.1989, SK Kejari Tarakan – Kaltim Th.1989, SK Kejari Meulaboh – Aceh Barat Th.1990, SK Kejati Sumut Th.1994, SKB Muspida Kuningan – Jabar Th.2003, SKB Muspida Bogor – Jabar Th.2005, Rekomendasi Bakorpakem 18 Jan 2005 & 16 April 2008.

Kelima, soal prestasi dunia Ahmadiyah. Shamsir Ali begitu bangga dengan

[Fifth, it is the achievement of Ahmadiyya. Shamsir Ali is very proud with the establishment of several branches of Ahmadiyya in the world, the building of the places of worship, schools, and television stations. Shamsir Ali claims these to be the evidence of the true teaching of Ahmadiyya. This is useless, because these cannot be used to be the truth of Ahmadiyya.]


[At last, I want to emphasise here that Islam recognises freedom of religion, but Islam does not tolerate religious defamation. Islam proscribes the coercion toward the followers of other religion to adhere Islam, and disallows all forms of insult and disruption for the followers of other religions. In Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism have their own teaching and belief; they may not be interfered as long as they do not disturb Islam. This is freedom of religion. Ahmadiyya followers claim themselves to be Muslims; but they misappropriate it, they disturb and destroy Islam. This is a religious defamation. Therefore, they have to be eradicated in order to maintain the purity of Islam].

Jakarta, 23 Mei 2008
APPENDIX E

TEXTS EXPLAINING THE JAI'S BELIEFS AND VIEWS

My Jakarta: Zafrullah Ahmad Pontoh, Ahmadiyah Indonesia Spokesman

By Zack Petersen

While most of the violence that has affected Ahmadiyah — a controversial sect that believes its founder was a prophet of Islam, a claim that contradicts the beliefs of mainstream Muslims — remains outside the capital, that doesn’t mean the nearly 10,000 members of Ahmadiyah here in Jakarta don’t feel intimidated.

Today, Zafrullah Ahmad Pontoh, the spokesman for Ahmadiyah Indonesia, talks to us from his mosque in Cideng, Central Jakarta, about the controversial attempts to close an Ahmadiyah mosque in West Java and his views on religious freedom.

What is the difference between Ahmadiyah and mainstream Islam here in Indonesia?

According to us, we are Sunnis because we understand that we follow the traditions of the holy prophet.

What differs between us and other Muslims is the interpretation of some of the verses of the holy Koran.

So in the Koran, as we understand it, there is the possibility of the coming of a prophet after the holy prophet of Islam.

What do you say to people who think members of Ahmadiyah are nonbelievers?

They are free to say that. But we believe that God accepts us as Muslims. Anyone can say anything they like.

We won’t say that they are nonbelievers because the holy prophet said that if you call a believer a nonbeliever, then you yourself are the nonbeliever.

Do you introduce yourself to people as a member of Ahmadiyah?

Yes. I just came from Sulawesi and most of my friends are not Ahmadiyah [members], but they saw the attacks in Kuningan and they said: “What kind of people would do this?”

You see, they don’t like this violence either.
Why were the people in Kuningan attacked?

What I understand is that the bupati [district chief] of Kuningan wished to close the mosque.

I understand that some people from outside Kuningan wanted the mosque closed. We had about 4,000 Ahmadiyah members there to protect the mosque in Manis Lor village.

And how do you feel about the church controversy in Bekasi?

Yesterday, I was at the House of Representatives. We are trying to gain religious freedom through dialogue not only for Ahmadiyah, but for all Indonesians.

Because Islam teaches us to live in harmony with others, and never to resort to violence.

The holy prophet never attacked nonbelievers first, he only defended and protected himself and Muslims. Islam is never spread by the sword.

How many Ahmadiyah members are there in Jakarta?

There are seven Ahmadiyah mosques here in Jakarta and around 10,000 Ahmadiyah members. Throughout Indonesia there are 500,000 Ahmadiyah members.

Do you ever fear for your safety?

As a human being, yes, but I still believe in the protection of God. I have no problem walking around the neighborhood here. I was out walking around before you came here.

Has there ever been an attack on this mosque?

The mosque has been here more than 70 years, and in 2006 some Muslims came and asked us to take down the name of the mosque, but I didn’t.

We have been trying to learn patience and love, but as human beings we have limitations, so to be patient is very hard.

I said: “Nobody can stop us from worshiping, God wants us to worship.” Nobody can tell us to stop doing what God wants us to do.

When there are clashes between Ahmadiyah and other Muslim groups, do you feel like the government gives you equal protection?

First, I should clarify that they are not clashes, but attacks. A clash means that
there are two sides [fighting], but an attack is where we have to defend ourselves.

The Constitution gives freedom to every person to be a follower of any religion.

**But it has to be one of the six official religions?**

Yes, but we are Muslims.

**Do you think that Ahmadiyah will ever be fully accepted and recognized in Indonesia?**

Inshallah [God willing]. We always intermingle with people through love and I feel like love will overcome. Last year, nearly 1,000 people joined Ahmadiyah. You would be surprised how many people click on our Web site, www.alislam.org.

**Didn’t the state come up with a law that said Ahmadiyah members are not allowed to worship in public?**

Not a law made by the state, but there is a decree. I heard from some people that the current religious affairs minister said Ahmadiyah is straying from Islam.

He should not say that; he should understand how to protect our faith. But I believe he misunderstands the 2008 decree.

That decree only prohibits us from explaining publicly that there is a prophet after the Prophet Muhammad.

**Isn’t that a violation of your religious freedoms?**

Yes, but our leader said for the time being we should be quiet.

**What would you say to the people who passed the decree?**

I would tell them they are doing something different from the laws of the country. The decree says that we believe in the prophet, but it also hinders us.

APPENDIX F

TEXTS EXPLAINING THE BELIEFS AND VIEWS OF THE GAI

[The article below and some other articles can be downloaded from the GAI official website, i.e. http://www.ahmadiyah.org].

GAI and Its Challenges

Posted by: ahmadiyah.org Oct 1, 2013 in ARTIKEL Leave a comment

By: Mulyono

Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia (The Indonesia Ahmadiyya Movement, furthermore mentioned as the GAI), which is also popular with the term of Ahmadiyyah Lahore, it is autonomous organization, not a part of any organization. This organization is fully active in spreading Islam in Indonesia, by publishing the Islamic books, organizing the formal education, etc.

As a legal organization in the law and its existence is admitted by the government, so a number of important Islamic books published by GAI get formal permit from the government, and those are spread to anyone openly. Likewise, all the educational institutions organized by GAI, which is technically organized by Yayasan Perguruan Islam Republik Indonesia (The Islamic Education Foundation of Republic of Indonesia (PIRI)) it also gets legality from the government, whose students come from various community groups, both Moslem and non-Moslem. Through these two efforts, the religious ideas of GAI have been spreading since this organization was founded in 1928.

Therefore no wonder if there were a lot of Indonesia national movement figures and independence leaders made use of the religious ideas of GAI, like Haji Agoes Salim, HOS Tjokroaminoto and Ruslan Abdul Ghani. Moreover Bung Karno, who proclaims the independence and the first President of Republic of Indonesia declared openly the great benefit of the books published by GAI.

Therefore, if there are still some persons or a group of people who don’t understand the religious ideas of GAI, up to this moments, it is almost certain because of the literature poverty or mere misunderstanding.

Misunderstanding about GAI still exist in a small part of people, generally is not because of the religious concept followed and spread by GAI, but because of Ahmadiyyah label sticking to this organization name. They assumed that GAI was not different from other organization had similar name with GAI by chance.
Nevertheless, the misunderstanding has never grown into conflict up to now, moreover it didn’t bring about the violence to GAI members anywhere in Indonesia. Hopefully, such condition will be in the future.

Various conflict events concerning Ahmadiyah wherever in Indonesia, there is no relation to GAI. Therefore, institution and personal of GAI never became the objective of violence action from anywhere side. Nevertheless, those conflict events brought about deep concern for all GAI members. Therefore, GAI always supports every effort to look for a fair accomplishment from anywhere side. In this case, GAI repeatedly has been involved by the government side in looking for the best accomplishment in connection with the Ahmadiyah case.

The existence of two organizations which use the same name “Ahmadiyah” in Indonesia is an undeniable law fact. However, it needs to be known that there is no relation between both of them organizationally as well as ideologically. The last mentioned is especially in an amount of the religious concept and practice. Concerning the existence of organizational and ideological differences, not only have been explained by GAI since its establishment, but also repeatedly have been explained and socialized by the government side. It is not less from the president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, in front of the national level model teachers in Istana Negara Jakarta (2005), he has explained the existence of differences of those two Ahmadiyah. Likewise minister of Religion Maftuh Basuni (2006) and Surya Dharma Ali. Perhaps, due to the explanation about the differences between those two Ahmadiyah is so important to be explained to the Indonesia community, that the government issued the joint decision letter of three ministers (SKB 3 Mentri) about Ahmadiyah (2008).

Those various efforts from the government side, besides to protect the people group who are considered as a conflict cause by the other people group, also to prevent, so that the similar conflict does not happen again. According to me, the government has made the best efforts, especially in connection with the Ahmadiyah case. On one side the government kept respecting the differences of existing religious view, whereas on other side the government also gave protection, so that the group did not become the objective of violence action from the other people group. Therefore, those government efforts must be supported by all people.

GAI is a movement of spreading Islam, the spreading efforts are carried out with peaceful methods. The word Ahmadiyah used as a name of this organization, refers to the other name of Prophet Muhammad saw. Mentioned in the Holy Quran Surah Ash-Shaff verse 6, namely Ahmad. This name contains the beauty (jamaliyah) aspects in the Prophet Muhammad saw. personality, the manifestation are moral beauty, heart beauty, gentleness, etc. So the purpose of using the word Ahmadiyah in the name of GAI organization in order that the people serving in this organization perceive it and then actualize those Ahmadiyah characteristics (beauty characteristics), not only in the context of
speading Islam effort, but also in the context of social life, namely moral beauty, humble attitude and gentleness.

Indonesia nation is a nation revering religion as a moral and spiritual base in constructing civilization. Long before formed this country, various kinds of religion have been available, they grew and expanded in this archipelago, which were not rare to occur inter-religion follower conflict. The independence of Republic of Indonesia proclaimed on August 17, 1945 must pass a long process until it reached an agreement that the difference in various matters did not block to live side by side peacefully in the unity country of Republic of Indonesia.

The language differences were united in Indonesian language, the differences of social and others were united in Pancasila as a joint life philosophy, and the religion differences were united in the explicit statement was in the constitution 1945, i.e. “The country based on the One God”. In the last thing mentioned, actually contains meaning that the Indonesian people with various kinds of religions and beliefs followed, they have agreed to end the religion and belief conflict. So it must be said that the conflict in the name of religions and beliefs, moreover the violence action, actually injure the agreement very much. It is not impossible, if this matter is not paid attention by all sides, so the harmony and peacefulness principles will shatter and end with the destruction of the unity country of Republic of Indonesia as well. These are big challenges faced by GAI. The aim of GAI establishment is to create peaceful inner life on this Pancasila earth.

In the GAI perspective, Islam is a religion guiding its followers to achieve the peaceful life through two methods, i.e. to submit him/herself entirely to Allah (aslama wajahulillah) and to do good deeds to the fellow human being (mukhsin). Allah is the only God, He is the One and the Almighty Substance (God). According to me, all Indonesian people whatever their religion and belief, they believe to the One and the Almighty God. If the perception of everyone about the God (Allah) is different, this is influenced by many factors. The good deeds are the fruit of the tree of faith in Allah. Due to Allah is Very good God and He must teach goodness, so the faith in Him must produce good deeds as well. According to me, to hurt the fellow human being because of religion difference or religious view, is contradictory with the faith in Allah.

In this context, hurting is not only in the physical meaning, but also in the non-physical meaning. For example, there is a person or a group in Islam mentioning other person outside his/her group as an unbeliever (kafir). Of course that treatment will hurt the hearts of Moslem majority. If this heartsick feeling is not controlled, it can be expressed in various forms of physical violence action, along with the openness of freedom era to express in Indonesia, after the reformation 1998. All GAI members always repeat one of the promises to themselves that they will not hurt the fellow human being, by hand, words, and
by other methods. There is another promise, i.e. They will love the fellow human being, for the sake of their love to Allah and His messenger, Muhammad saw.

According to GAI belief, this era is the promised era by Allah as the Islamic victory era. But GAI has view too, the Islamic victory does not mean a group victory on another group, or one side victory on another side defeat. Islam is not a person, not a group, so the Islam enemy is not a person or a group too. The Islam enemy indeed are such as polytheism, hypocrisy, infidel state, ignorance, etc; all of them can reside in anyone chest, both Moslem and non-Moslem. The victory of Islam only means the victory of value, namely the truth values taught by Islam. The truth values victory will be admitted and carried out as universal truth, such as honesty, fairness, peace, tolerance attitude, etc. Islam is a natural religion, so its teaching truth must be in accordance with the natural demand of all mankind.

It almost can be ascertained that everyone wants peace. This is condition which wants to be achieved by Islam. Therefore, in my opinion, it is impossible that Islam can be upheld with stones throw, wood stroke and boom explosion.
APPENDIX G

Audio-Video Recordings retrieved from ‘YouTube’

These recordings contain personal arguments of the members/representatives of the three text producers (The State Official Institutions, Social Interest Groups, and Two Ahmadiyya Groups). All of the recordings can be downloaded from ‘YouTube’. The audio-video recordings are not included in the appendix because they cannot be put in the Pdf file. However, the recordings can be found and downloaded from the ‘YouTube’ links shown below.

1. *Debat Kontroversi Nasib Ahmadiyah* part 1
   [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQkJHDG8uzc](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQkJHDG8uzc).

2. *Debat Kontroversi Nasib Ahmadiyah* part 2
   [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rjFEh8kU6s](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rjFEh8kU6s).

3. *Debat Kontroversi Nasib Ahmadiyah* part 3
   [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mmLozEVIquA](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mmLozEVIquA).

4. *Today’s Dialogue: Debat SKB Ahmadiyah*
   [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o6f-Hznz9fY](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o6f-Hznz9fY).

5. *Debat SKB Ahmadiyah Jubir HTI Vs Jubir Ahmadiyah*
   [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XHSo4u6raWo](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XHSo4u6raWo).
APPENDIX H

List of Interview Questions for the State Official Institutions

The Ministry of Religious Affairs [MoRA] and the Indonesian Council of Clerics [the MUI]

1. What is your opinion or perception about the existence of Religious minority groups in Indonesia?
2. Regarding to the existence of religious minority groups, what kinds of policies that have been produced by governments? What is the background of making these policies?
3. In your point of view, what requirements should these groups meet to live in Indonesia? Why?
4. Based on the basic constitution of Indonesia, especially the first principle of Pancasila, ‘Belief in God’, how do you interpret this principle regarding the existence of religious minority groups in Indonesia?
5. Regarding to the discrimination against these groups, which has been widely reported by some institutions, such as media and NGOs, what is actually the background of this social problem?
6. In reformation era, Indonesian governments seem to change their perspective and position to this issue compared to the previous regime (e.g. The New Order) where the problem of this religious minority groups was not as serious as the recent situation. According to you, why does it happen?
7. Indonesia is the third largest democratic country nowadays; what is your opinion about the development of democracy in relation to the practice of discrimination against these groups?
8. What are the solutions or efforts, which have been conducted by your institution, to overcome this problem?
9. What is the philosophical and practical background of determining that some religious minority groups are infidel and therefore prohibited?
10. In dealing with the socio-political condition of Indonesia, how importance is this issue?
APPENDIX I

Example of Participant's Responses from the State Official Institutions to the Interview


[Thanks a lot for this opportunity. I am from the linguistic department and the case study of my research deals with the Ahmadiyya issue. I analyse the issue by using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), that is, how the sect is presented in texts. My first question is what is your opinion about the Ahmadiyya issue in Indonesia?].


Actually, this problem is caused by the misdirection of the reformation era. The reformation is too open. America (the US) itself is not like that. Singapore, a developed country in Southeast Asia, is not too open. Such a freedom is used by particular groups. Our people have no problem. Ahmadiyya had existed in Indonesia before independence.
Wahabi and Shi'a had also existed before independence. There is no problem with that. When they entered to Indonesia, they have been experience an "Indonesiation" process. However, when Indonesia started to turn to the reformation era, there was an Iranisation of Shi'a, Arabisation of Wahhabi, and Pakistanisation of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia.


[It always happens. There is a report from the national commission of human rights, human rights watch, and some NGOs in Indonesia that, dealing with several problems of Ahmadiyya, the Indonesia Government is always blamed].


[In the past, our society was very weak, people were oppressed. The state was very strong and oppressed the people at that time. Now, it is different. Our people tend to anarchic. The government becomes weak. We can find an example in the local election. The official house of the mayor was burned out. In the past, it is imposibble to happen. People were afraid to do this kind of violence. Now, how many government official houses are burned, how many police office are burned. These are the symbols of the state. In the'new order' era, people were oppressed, the state oppressed].

Res Apakah menurut Bapak atau Kementerian Agama bahwa kelompok minoritas Ahmadiyah ini memeliki hak untuk hidup di Indonesia atau seperti apa?

[Do you think that the Ahmadiyya religious group have the right to live in Indonesia n territory?]

MoRA 2 Semua WNI berhak hidup di Indonesia. Soal nanti melanggar aturan itu urusan lain. Kalau Ahmadiyah melanggar atau menyalahi komitmen,
yang kita tindak bukan Ahmadiyah-nya. Yang kita tindak karena melanggar hukumnya.

[All Indonesian people have the right to live in this country. If they violate the rules of law, it is a different case. If Ahmadiyya violates the rules or commitments, the state will give punishment based on its fault].

Res Jadi, pemerintah tidak masuk pada urusan teologinya?

[So, the government does not interfere with the theological issue?]


[For Islam, the theological issue should be monitored by the MUI. Konghucu is monitored by Majelis Konghucu and Majelis Katolic for the Chatolics. The state may not intervene in religion. However, the state has the authority to control the religious issue, if it triggers social conflict].

Res Ini ada beberapa alasan kalau misalnya dikaitkan dengan situasi Indonesia, misalnya Pancasila, Pasal 29 dan Pasal 28 amandemen ke dua itu, disana dikatakan bahwa Negara menjamin kebebasan beragama. Tapi pada level bawah, ada beberapa kelompok agama yang minoritas tidak diberi kebebasan sama seperti kempok mayoritas.

[There are some reasons that we can give here in dealing with the situation of Indonesia, for example, in article 29 and the second amendment of the article 28, it is stated that the state guarantees freedom of religion. In the grassroot level, however, there are several religious minority groups that are not given a freedom similar to what the majorities have].


[We need to look at its impact. Majority groups are sometimes oppressed by the anarchic actions of the minorities. Majorities also have the rights, not only the minorities. We tend to defend minorities, but who will defend majorities. When majorities are discriminated against, nobody wants to defend them. Majorities have the rights and also the minorities, so they have to respect to each other. Our NGOs tend to see the minority as the object that they have to defend. However, there is no party who defend the majorities. We need to be fair. There are also majorities that discriminate against minorities. There are also some minority religious groups that have been unequally treated, such as Ahmadiyya. They have prayed in their mosque, why the mosque is sealed. It is their right to pray [in their mosque]. I always give sermons in many places ... if they have recited two shahada expressions, do not disturb them.... They are also Muslims. In dealing with the difference in understanding religion, our parents also had differences among them. In my mind, however, both of them (majorities and minorities) are wrong. Minorities do not want to restrict their wish, want to be recognised similar to majorities. it is not fair...].

Res

Terkait kebijakan pemerintah diantaranya terhadap Ahmadiyah, apa solusi yang bisa dijalankan?

[With regard to the government policy toward Ahmadiyya, what solution that can be implemented?]

MoRA 2

Paling tidak sudah berjalan sekian tahunlah [kebijakan pemerintah, misalnya SKB]. SKB itu adalah kesepakatan. Saya termasuk yang menggagas. Ahmadiyah sekarang itu tenang. Dulu sebelum SKB ini, Ahmadiyah itu tidak bisa tidur, baik Lahore maupun Qadian...

[At least, the government proclamation, that is, the joint decree has been implemented for several years. That is an agreement. The joint ministerial decree is an agreement and I was the one who initiated the decree. Recently, Ahmadiyya can live peacefully. Previously,
before the decree was issued, they [the followers of Ahmadiyya] could not sleep well, either [those of the Lahore or the Qadian…].

Res  Terkait isu Ahmadiyah ini, seberapa penting kira-kira isu ini dalam konteks keindonesiaan kita?

[How important is the Ahmadiyya issue for Indonesia?]


[I think, it depends on the context. It should be proportional. So, people must not be anarchic. The government should not be selfish].

Res  Terima kasih banyak Pak atas waktunya. Informasi yang saya butuhkan sudah cukup.

[Thanks a lot for your time. Information I need is sufficient].
APPENDIX J

List of Interview Questions for Social Interest groups

The Setara Institute (the SI) and The Islamic Defender Front (the FPI)

1. What is your opinion or perception about the existence of religious minority groups in Indonesia?
2. What is actually the position of your organization regarding the issue on religious minority group in Indonesia?
3. How important is this issue to your institution?
4. When you write news or reports, what message does your institution want to deliver to the public?
5. How big is the attention of your institution to this issue?
6. Regarding to the practices of discrimination against the religious minority groups, which has been widely reported, such as the establishment of house of worship, physical assaults, murder, and marginalization, in your opinion what are the factors that trigger these practices?
7. Why do you and your organisation give more attention to this issue?
8. In dealing with the socio-political condition of Indonesia, how importance is this issue do you think?
9. Based on the basic constitution of Indonesia, especially the first principle of the Pancasila, i.e. ‘Belief in God’, how do you conceive this principle regarding the existence of religious minority groups in Indonesia?
10. It has been widely reported that there are many practices of discrimination against religious minority groups in Indonesia, who do you think should be responsible for solving this problem?
APPENDIX K

Example of Participant’s Responses from the Social Interest Groups to the Interview

Res  Terima kasih atas kesempatan yang diberikan. Pertanyaan pertama, apa pendapat anda tentang eksistensi kelompok minoritas agama di Indonesia?

[Thanks a lot for the opportunity to interview you. My first question, what is your opinion about the existence of religious minority groups in Indonesia?]


[Actually, if we talk about religious minorities in Indonesia, it should deal with our constitution, that is, the 1945 Constitution that protects dan
provides guarantee for religious freedom and belief in Indonesia. However, when we criticised law PNPS Number 1/1965 that violates the guarantee freedom of religion, the Constitutional Court refuses it. The court legitimates the clustering or categorisation of religions that are recognised in Indonesia, although in its document the court states that principally they do not give recognition to only certain religion. For us, whoever has the concerns on freedom of religion and belief and if you want to protect, everyone can have this protection. However, the fact shows different thing. Several minority groups are not given protection. In regard to Ahmadiyah, this sect was firstly founded in India and before this sect was spread out to international world, they had been separated into two grups, namely the Qadian and the Lahore. In Indonesia, a group that has been a social problem is the JAI. Actually, there is another Ahmadiyya group, that is, the GAI. Those who are targetted by some members of the publics are the JAI followers. Regardless of their [citizens] religion and belief, we have to treat them equally. They are Indonesian citizens who have to get the same opportunity and constitutional protection. This is guarantteed in article 29 that deals with freedom of religion].

Res

Jadi menurut anda pasal 28 dan 29 menjamin kebebasan dan tidak bertentangan dengan UU PNPS? Selama ini pemerintah menggunakan dalil UU PNPS untuk mengintervensi agama di Indonesia.

[Do you think that the articles 28 and 29 about freedom of religion are not contradictory to law PNPS? So far, the government uses law PNPS to intervene in religion in Indonesia].

SI 1

MK dalam hal ini sepakat bahwa pasal 29 dan pasal 28 j tentang hak beragama dan berkeyakinan itu MKsepakat mengenai hal itu. Artinya PNPS itu juga dianggap, kalau misalnya dilihat dari perspektif MK, dia mengatakan bahwa pasal 29 tentang kebebasan beragama itu satu irama dan satu nafas dengan UU PNPS. Bahwa dalam UU PNPS itu mengatakan bahwa yang namanya Negara atau pemerintah bisa mengintervensi dan memainkan perannya untuk memberikan perlindungan, justru mereka menggunakan pasal 28 j itu. Pasal 28 j yang sebenarnya dalam konstruksi HAM menjadi tidak lazim digunakan karena yang namanya bebas, yah, semestinya tidak ada pembatasan. Tapi menjadi hal lain di Indonesia bahwa konstitusi kita itu memberikan kebebasan, meratifikasi semua konstruksi hukum HAM internasional dan kemudian dikunci dengan pasal 28 j itu. Yang menjadi catatan kami bahwa MK juga mengakui bahwa UU PNPS itu konstitusional.

[In this case, the constitutional court agrees that articles 29 and 28j about religious rights. They argue that law PNPS is not contradictory to article 29 about freedom of religion. In law PNPS, it is stated that the state can intervene in and play its role to provide protection to followers of particular sect. Actually in human rights, article 28 is not commonly used because
'free is free' and there should not be a restriction. It is quite strange in Indonesia because our government provides protection for freedom of religion and ratifies all international legal constructions regarding human rights, but the government also issues article 28j that restricts this freedom. Therefore, the constitutional court agrees that law PNPS is constitutional).

Res 2 bulan lalu saya sempat ke kementerian agama dan mereka mengatakan konsep Negara kita bukan Negara Islam, bukan juga Negara yang full sekuler. Mereka mengatakan bahwa urusan agama itu pemerintah tidak mencampuri urusan internum agama. Tapi ketika urusan externum suatu agama atau kepercayaan menimbulkan masalah di tingkat bawah maka pemerintah memiliki hak untuk mengintervensi. Menurut anda bagaimana?

[Two months ago, I went to the Ministry of Religious Affairs and some of the officials there said that our state is neither Islamic nor secular. They argued that the state does not intervene in religion. However, when a religion or religious interpretation is used to create a social conflict, the government has the authority to have an intervention. What is your opinion about this?]

SI 1 Itu yang saya tidak setuju yang mengatakan bahwa konsepsi dalam beragama dalam teori-teori hukum ada forum internum dan forum externum. Bagi kami, yang namanya beragama menjadi satu kesatuan antara forum internum dan forum externum. Negara tidak boleh mengintervensi atau melakukan pengaturan-pengaturan. Mereka mengatakan bahwa ketika sudah masuk pada forum externum, maka Negara boleh hadir di wilayah itu, bagi kami mereka juga telah membatasi forum internum.

[I disagree with this concept that in a country there should be forum internum and forum externum. In our mind, in an issue of religion, forum internum and externum should be united. The state may not intervene or regulate (the freedom of religion). When they say that they have entered into the forum externum, they have actually restricted the forum internum.]


[If we may compare the periodisation of our country, starting from the ‘old order’, the ‘new order’, and the ‘reformation’, it seems that the number of violent attacks in the reformation era is much higher compared to the previous eras. What is actually the main problem that causes this fact?]

In some research that we have conducted before, there are some issues that trigger the high escalation of the religious-based conflict; the first is it has to do with the practice of democracy, which still focuses on procedural democracy, and not yet enter into substantive democracy... That is the main problem. We have to remember that transition either through revolution or reformation will finally create identity politics that will hegemonise Indonesian politics and international politics after the cold war. Politicians and policy makers follow the rhythm of the majority rather than the minority because they have practised and prioritised political identity, which is exactly the same as the situation after the cold war).
APPENDIX L

List of Interview Questions for Ahmadiyya

Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia [JAI] and Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia [GAI]

1. What is your opinion about the existence of religious minority groups (where you and your group belong to) in a country, like Indonesia?
2. Could you describe about your group and your relationship with other institutions, vertically (with institutions above you) and horizontally (with other Muslim organisations)?
3. What is your opinion about some policies made by the Indonesian government regarding the existence of your group? Why?
4. In your point of view, why does the practice of discrimination against religious minority groups always happen nowadays?
5. Is there any effort you do to challenge the dominant discourse or at least introduce an alternative discourse to the public in order to balance the discourse?
6. What types of text or means (books, newspaper or TV, website, or in academic fields) do you use to introduce your own discourse?
7. What will you do next to reduce the number of discriminatory practices against your group?
8. What is your opinion about the development of democracy in Indonesia, considering the practices of discrimination against you and your group?
9. Indonesia has Pancasila as the state ideological basis especially its ‘Belief in One God’. What is your opinion about this principle considering the practices of discrimination against you and your group?
APPENDIX M

Example of Participant’s Responses from Ahmadiyya to the Interview


[First of all, I thank you for your time to discuss the Ahmadiyya issue in Indonesia. my first question is what is your opinion about the development of religious minority groups in this reformation era, in which Ahmadiyya is one of them?] 


[The life of minority groups in this reformation era is getting harder and harder compared to the 'old order' and the 'new order'. It was under Soekarno (the first president of Indonesia), we (the JAI) was highly respected by the president. Under Soeharto, at least, we could practise our religious activities and our security was protected. In the first years of reformasi, when Gus Dur became the fourth Indonesian president, we were actually protected. It does not mean that today we are not protected. Here, in this mosque, [the JAI's mosque, at Jl. Balikpapan, Central Jakarta], many people always come, especially when the Parung's accident in Bogor happened. Many people think that this mosque is the central office of Ahmadiyya. Previously, it was in here before in Parung].

Res Jadi di era reformasi ini dibanding era sebelumnya, kasus kekerasan atau diskriminasi itu meningkat. Kira-kira masalah utamanya apa?

[Compared to the previous eras, violent attacks or discriminations are increasing. What is actually the main problem?]

[I think, in this reformation era, there is so many information spread out. Ahmadiyya is always portrayed negatively that Ahmadiyya is the sect that always present Prophet Muhammad negatively, while, in fact, we love Muhammad very much. Probably, in local area, people are easy to be provoked. It is different from the big cities, such here in Jakarta, some of our neighbours here are also provoked, but they use their mind, is this information wright or wrong. We have been neighbours for many years. They see me praying five times a day, I never miss the prayer. I go to the mosques every day. If you want to know whether or not we are the followers of Muhammad, just listen to our adzan (calling for prayers). In the adzan, there is a shahada. In our banner, we have the shahada. We can explain our interpretation about the Islamic leadership. However, what is spread out outside is misunderstood. In the remote area, information received by local people is misdirected. They are easily to be
provoked. Like the terrorists, they understand *jihad* (holy war) mistakenly. It is same when they address Ahmadiyya. They say that Ahmadiyya can be killed… I have heard some sermons stating that Ahmadiyya followers can be killed because they are non-believers. Prophet Muhammad has shown us example that we may not kill people who have recited *shahada* and also all other people although they are not Muslims. This is a real example… We also recite *shahada*, in our adzan, there is *shahada*. However, this situation is very difficult for us. Those who understand Islam and the Al-Qur'an properly, this would be different. The head of MUI of central Jakarta was previously anti-Ahmadiyya. We were always invited to come to the district office as one of the Islamic organisations. The head of the MUI always comes here and we give him the Qur'an and book. Until now, we are friends… Those who always discriminate against Ahmadiyya are those who do not understand Ahmadiyya properly].

**Res**  
Jadi kelompok-kelompok yang selama ini katakanlah kelompok-kelompok tertentu yang menyerang Ahmadiyah intinya mereka tidak mengerti Ahmadiyah?

[So, those who always perpetrate violent attacks against Ahmadiyya do not understand this sect properly?]

**JAI 1**  
Betul. Mereka tidak pernah mengenal langsung Ahmadiyah.

[That is right. They do not understand Ahmadiyya properly].

**Res**  
Atau ada motivasi lain mengapa mereka begitu intens melakukan kekerasan atau diskriminasi terhadap Ahmadiyah?

[Or, there is another motivation why they intensively attack or discriminate against Ahmadiyya?]  

**JAI 1**  
Pertama, mereka tidak memahami secara utuh. Kedua, saya juga tidak tahu ada apa di balik itu. Saya tidak berani berprasangka karena tidak ada bukti.

[First, they do not know the sect completely. Second, I do not exactly what is the motivation behind the attacks. I am afraid to be wrong because I do not have evidence].

**Res**  
Apakah masalah atau isu ini juga dipengaruhi oleh perkembangan informasi yang begitu cepat?

[Do you think that this issue is also influenced by the information that spread out quickly?]

**JAI 1**  

[Yes. It is like an accident that occurred first time in Parung. The dissemination of information that Ahmadiyya is a deviant sect. In Indonesia, the people are very easily to be provoked by using particular issue of deviant sect. Those who are presented as deviant sect, including the Shi'ite, are all attacked... If we know the Shi'ite, it is one of the religious sects in Indonesia. That is the problem, I think, that our people are easily provoked. Sometimes some clerics do not learn about the issue comprehensively... I have many Shi'ite friends and there is no problem with that. People are easily provoked and this also occurs in religious conflicts in Ambon and Poso].

Res 

Sebenarnya konstitusi Negara kita itu menjamin. Pasal 28, pasal 29, apakah konstitusi ini betul-betul telah dijalankan sampai ke level bawah kaitannya dengan kelompok minoritas agama.

[Actually our constitution guarantees freedom of religion, especially in articles 28 and 29. Do you think that this constitution is implemented from the highest to lowest level of society in regard to religious minority groups?]

JAI 1 


[Not all. Since the local autonomy is implemented, it seems that the local government has full authority. In Bekasi, for example. Our mosque is sealed and this is justified by many reasons. It is clear in our constitution that the religious problem should be managed by central government, not the local government. Our mosque is destroyed and it seems that the actors of the destruction are allowed to do it. Therefore, it seems the local government is given the authority to solve this problem].

Res 

Jadi sepihnya di daerah semakin banyak masalah yah?

So, it seems that such problems are increasing in the local area, right?

[Nowadays, we can seem nay examples broadcasted in television. Islamic organisation, for example, destroys alcoholic drinks and this is seen by the police. The destruction violates the law. Those who perpetrate the setruction should be arrested. In the fact, however, the police did not do anything. They seem to be powerless].

Res Waktu itu juga kasus di Cikeusik itu, ada Jemaat Ahmadiyah yang meninggal. Kalau saya tidak salah itu, justru aktor yang melakukan tindak kekerasan itu tidak diberikan hukuman yang setimpal.

[In Cikeusik, for example, the followers of the JAI were killed. If I am not wrong, the law is not enforced here to punish the actors of the killing?]


[There is an injustice here… The actors of the killing were only arrested for three months and the provocators were also three months. Is this fair? Not at all…].


[In this reformation era, there are two important things that need to be explained regarding Ahmadiyya. First, it is about the MUI's *fatwa* (that considers Ahmadiyya to be a deviant sect) and joint decree. What is your opinion about these two legal proclamations?]

JAI 1 Sebelum ada fatwa MUI memang ada kekerasan, tapi tidak sporadic dan tidak banyak. Sejak ada Fatwa MUI itu jadi semacam ada provokasi. Walaupun tujuannya, saya yakin, bukan untuk itu. Itu Cuma seperti mengeluarkan fatwa halal dan haram saja. Tapi dampaknya ke masyarakat bawah itu luar biasa sekali. Bahwa Ahmadiyah itu sesat. Itu yang menyebabkan provokasi kepada masyarakat di pedesaan.

[Before the issuing of the MUI *fatwa*, there had been violent attacks against Ahmadiyya, but it was not sporadic and its number was a few.
Since the issuing of the MUI's *fatwa*, it is like a provocation. I am sure that the goal of the *fatwa* is not to persuade others to attack Ahmadiyya. It is like an issuing of *lawful* and *unlawful*. However, its impact to people is very huge. The *fatwa* provokes people to attack Ahmadiyya, especially in the rural areas.

Res  Itu yang menjadi awal yang sehingga kekerasan terhadap Ahmadiyah menjadi massif?

[Do you think that this is the beginning of massive violation against Ahmadiyya?]


[Yes, this becomes worse when the government issued a joint decree. The decree says that Ahmadiyya may not disseminate its teaching. That is the goal of the decree. For the anti-Ahmadiyya people, however, the joint decree is defined as the prohibition to Ahmadiyya to not doing any activities, including prayer. In my mind, SKB still allows us to do our activities as long as we do not disseminate our teachings… However, the interpretation of the anti-Ahmadiyya people is different. The do not allow us to pray to God. They said that they are the true Muslims, we are not allowed to pray…].

Res  Jadi menurut anda SKB ini benar, atau tidak ada masalah dengan SKB ini. Cuma persoalannya karena dijadikan sebagai landasan interpretasi oleh kelompok-kelompok tertentu untuk menyerang Ahmadiyah?

[So according to you, there is no problem with the joint decree. The only problem is the decree is used by some people to justify their actions to attack Ahmadiyya?].

JAI 1  Betul.

[That is right].

Res  Jadi, posisi Negara dalam hal ini tidak salah yah [mengeluarkan SKB]?

[So, in this case, the government is not wrong, right?].
JAI 1 Tidak salah dalam tanda kutip. SKB itu sedikit banyak telah merugikan kita. Karena membatasi gerak langkah kita. Apapun seperti Syiah, semuanya kan kita tetap mengikuti ajaran Rasulullah…

[To some extent, it is not wrong. However, the decree more or less has negative impact to us because it restricts our activities. Every sect, including the Shi’ite has the right to follow Prophet Muhammad…].

Res Jadi menurut anda bahwa setiap WNI memiliki hak untuk hidup dan disetarakan dengan kelompok-kelompok yang lain, baik dari segi hokum maupun dari segi pelayanan publik? Karena informasi selama ini banyak juga kelompok Ahmadiyah yang tidak dilayani, dalam urusan administrasi kependudukan misalnya.

[So, do you think that all Indonesian people have the right to live and are treated equally similar to other groups, either seen from the legal perspective and from public services? So far, I have heard information that, in administrative service, many Ahmadiyya followers are not served well].


[Yes, that is right. This country is not only for Muslims. It is not owned by particular organisation. This is Indonesia. All Indonesian people have the same right. In some places, the followers of the JAI can not get married; we do not give citizen cards. In Lombok, for example, some JAI followers still live in the evacuation. When they returned home, they were attacked].

Res Ini diskriminasi yah?

[Is this discrimination?].

JAI 1 Diskriminasi… Kasihan mereka, sudah bertahun-tahun, sudah lebih dari 10 tahun mereka tinggal di Transito itu.

[Yes, discrimination… It has been several years, they are living in Transito].

Res Mungkin ada pernyataan terakhir yang ingin anda sampaikan?

[Do you have the last statement that you want to share?]

[We are brothers, one nation, Indonesian Nation. We have to live peacefully, side by side. We have to respect each other. It must be much better if we live peacefully…].