

# INTRODUCTION



# 1 LIMINAL PLACE, LIMINAL EXPERIENCE

## 1.1 Introduction

This thesis is concerned with the liminal as it is presented in Second Sophistic<sup>1</sup> literature. It breaks new ground in two important ways.

Firstly, it identifies the places and beings accounted liminal in the period – and those that figured most prominently in the Second Sophistic imagination – together with the most-often referenced traditional stories and story patterns associated with them. The importance to Second Sophistic people of certain key figures and particular stories about them has long been recognized; recurrent story patterns are likewise well-recognized and can be dismissed as tropes. The present study uniquely draws together those associated with journeys to liminal places and demonstrates their significance – as a code conveying truths about the protagonist – in selected ostensibly biographical and autobiographical works. Philostratos' *Vita Apollonii* has been chosen for intensive study as an ostensible biography rich in locationally liminal episodes; Lucian's *Alexander*, for its treatment of a similar protagonist in a very different way. Dion's and Aristeides' bodies of work have been selected for those authors' references to significant episodes of a relevant kind in their own experience.

Secondly, the thesis takes up the idea of liminal experience, as identified in the works of Arnold van Gennep and Victor Turner, and examines its applicability in the focal Second Sophistic accounts. A liminal experience is a social and/or psychological turning point in a life. In the biographies of Apollonios and Alexander and the ostensibly autobiographical writings of Dion and Aristeides, apparently life-changing experiences can be identified; relevantly in the context of this thesis, they turn out to be associated with geographically or otherwise locationally liminal episodes.

The van Gennep/Turner model posits an extended liminal period – rather than simply a liminal moment or episode – as essential to the effecting of long-term psychological change. This thesis identifies reasons for supposing Dion's and Aristeides' accounts to be 'true' in the sense that they reported real turning points in the protagonists' lives, and examines the extent to which each can be said to have experienced a liminal period of the kind suggested by the model.

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<sup>1</sup> The term was invented by Philostratos (VS 1.481) to refer to the floruit of those who spoke with the oracular authority of the earlier sophists but according to the rules of art (κατὰ τέχνην); the followers of Gorgias spoke according to their own judgement (κατὰ τὸ δόξαν). For a detailed overview of modern use of the term, see Whitmarsh 2005, 4-10. In this thesis, the term will be taken in its broadest sense to refer to the period 60-230 CE rather than (for example) the literary culture associated with it, although that literary culture is the focus of discussion.

Specifically, the thesis is about the Second Sophistic use of paradigmatic tales to set the course of, or interpret, real lives, and to construct accounts of lives. It explores ways in which tales about protagonists deliberately visiting places associated with the divine, or human or other beings potentially sharing the qualities of the divine, were used to assert or deny the superior or even divine nature of the subject of a biography or (in the case of autobiography) to indicate the discovery, or attainment, of a true (and superior, or even divine) identity.

The journeys that are central to this study can be undertaken for any reason, and encounters in which they culminate may be reverential, hostile or simply observational. For the most part, they fall into two sub-categories, those to religious sites within the known world and those that go beyond it, towards the ends of the earth. The two are not generally considered together, but parallels are likely, and of interest. Both sub-categories can be related to traditional and universal story forms which have been conceptualized in different ways by modern mythographers – by Campbell as the Hero's Journey, or by Booker as the Quest, and Voyage and Return.<sup>2</sup> In this context, the conclusion that the stories are fundamentally about testing or establishing the identity of the protagonist is perhaps not unexpected. In this thesis, no attempt will be made to assimilate Second Sophistic accounts to preconceived schemata like Campbell's or Booker's. Rather, paradigmatic understandings common to Second Sophistic writers and their audiences will be identified, and their use to make the focal authors' points investigated in some detail.

This introductory chapter provides first (Ch. 1.2) an overview of the places where Second Sophistic and earlier Greek writers believed that the divine was to be encountered. These distant and sacred places – thresholds between the mundane and the numinous Other – can quite literally be called 'liminal'. Ch. 1.3 presents twentieth century understandings of sociological and psychological liminality, and discusses attempts to identify 'pilgrimage', and so potentially at least some of the journeys and encounters that are the subject of this thesis, as liminal in a sociological sense. An overview of Second Sophistic biography, with its emphasis on the diagnostic anecdote, and of the complex of contemporary genres that substituted for autobiography in the modern sense in the period, provides a necessary background for later discussion. Ch. 1.4 outlines the contents of Parts A, B and C of this thesis.

The originality of this thesis lies less in new understandings of individual works than in the identification and documentation of patterns common to many. It owes debts to the insights

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<sup>2</sup> Campbell 1949; Booker 2004, 69-106. Campbell (1949) does not call his monomyth the Hero's Journey, but the phrase is now commonly used for his concept.

of many who have investigated particular topics and individual authors and works in depth. Sources relevant to liminal places and to social/psychological liminality are noted in the appropriate context in Chs 1.2 and 1.3. Parke and Wormell's and Fontenrose's studies of oracles are referenced in Part A. In the specialized field of ancient magic, the works of Kingsley (1995a) and Collins (2008) have been consulted. On Pythagorean traditions, Burkert (1972), and on the interrelated myths of Herakles, Dionysos and Alexander, Galinsky (1972), Bosworth (1996) and Cartledge (2005) have provided important insights. The works examined in Part B are discussed in the context of foundational and recent critical studies; these are referenced in the chapters themselves and the related appendices. In particular, the chronologies of the lives and works of Dion and Aristeides that are provided in App. 5 and App. 6 respectively are based principally on the works of Jones (1978a) and Behr (1968, 1981, 1986, 1994); notes indicate where dates are controversial or where a different sequence of events has been preferred.

## 1.2 Liminal places

The Latin *limen* or threshold pertained primarily to the doorway of a house, but it could be used metaphorically: *in limine belli* (Tac. *Ann.* 3.74); *in ipso limine victoriae* (Curt. 6.3.16). In this section, 'liminal' places are those that are physically thresholds between the mundane world of everyday experience and the transcendent, places where one can encounter the divine or human beings in close association with it. These divide sharply between identifiable sites in the accessible world that can be the focal points of journeys – natural or man-made wonders, shrines and tombs (Ch. 1.2.1, 1.2.2) – and the mythical or semi-mythical places beyond (Ch. 1.2.3). Identification of the places accounted 'liminal' in the period of the Second Sophistic is complicated by the Hellenistic and Roman expansions of the 'accessible world'.

In the 'accessible world', ancient belief set encounters with the numinous Other in wild or remote nature – on the slopes of Mount Helikon (D.Chr. 55.1) or Kithairon (Paus. 2.2.7) or Etna (D.L. 8.67-9), in a cave on Krete (D.L. 1.109) or at sea near Lesbos (Plut. *Mor.* 163b-c). Natural features retained their aura in the period of the Second Sophistic, when many had become the focal points of local or regional cult; among these we can perhaps see the warm springs at Smyrna and Allianoi and Lebedos, where Aristeides' *Hieroi logoi* suggest related medical and religious presences (*HL* 2.7, 3.2, 3.10). In the same period, certain cult centres, regardless of the historical or geographical reasons for their location, had become specialized in providing contact, mediated or unmediated, with the divine.

### **1.2.1 Liminal places in the accessible world: mediated oracles and direct encounter with the numinous Other**

Before seeking oracular guidance on a crucial political question – whether or not he should go to war against the Persians – King Kroisos of Lydia sent test questions to Delphi, Abai in Phokis and Dodona, to the oracles of Amphiaraos and Trophonios, to the Branchidai at Didyma and to Ammon in Libya (Hdt. 1.46). Delphi and Amphiaraos had the right answers. In a more confined circuit, on behalf of Mardonios (Xerxes' representative in Greece after Salamis), Mys went to Lebadeia, Abai in Phokis and Apollo Ismenios in Thebes; he sent a representative to Amphiaraos and consulted Apollo Ptoios at the Ptoion near Akraiphia in Boiotia, where the god gave him a significant message in Karian (Hdt. 8.134). According to Pausanias (4.32.5), 'the Thebans say' that before the battle of Leuktra (371 BCE), Thebes sent inquiries to the Ismenion, the Ptoion, and to Abai, Delphi, and Trophonios at Lebadeia.

Delphi was an ancient foundation where Apollo communicated verbally through the Pythia, his priestess. At the end of the first century CE, the oracle was flourishing (Plut. *Mor.* 409a-b). Some writers (most notably Lucan at 5.69-70, 111-14, 120-3, 131-40) suggest a period of inactivity or cessation of operations, but they can probably be dismissed: evidence points to activity into the third quarter of the third century, and the oracle may well have continued operation until all oracle centres were closed by Theodosius' edict of 391.<sup>3</sup>

The oracles of Asia Minor may be equally old. Pausanias believed that the oracle at Didyma predated the Ionic invasion of Asia Minor (7.2.6). In historical times it was controlled by the priestly family of the Branchidai; Herodotos always refers to it by their name. The temple was destroyed by Dareios I in 494 BCE, and the Branchidai exiled to Sogdiana. It was refounded in the time of Alexander the Great and experienced its greatest flowering in the period of the Second Sophistic, when Trajan restored the Sacred Way between Miletos and the temple and Hadrian visited in person. There are more recorded oracular responses in the period 100-225 CE than for any earlier period.<sup>4</sup> The temple at Klaros, near Kolophon, was likewise ancient, possibly of pre-Greek origin. The seer Mopsos was credited with founding both Klaros and the oracle of Mopsos at Mallos in Kilikia. Flower suggests that 'Mopsos' may in fact have been a hereditary name of the rulers of Kilikia; in any case, the legend of the contest between the seers Kalchas and Mopsos, as recounted by Hesiod (Frg. 278 Merkelbach/West = Str. 14.1.27), would have

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<sup>3</sup> Pottery and bronzes found at Delphi suggest an eighth-century foundation; the earliest extant possibly authentic response (T1.5, in which the Spartans seek approbation of their laws) would date from the early seventh century BCE. Cf. Fontenrose 1978, 4-5, 271, Scott 2014, 45-56.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Parke 1985, 2, 72-4.

been intended by Greeks of Klaros to supply heroic credentials to the founder of their oracle. Klaros was probably continuously an oracular centre although perhaps a minor one, since it is not one of the oracles allegedly tested by Kroisos (Hdt. 1.46). During the Augustan principate, it received patronage from a member of the Imperial family and (probably in consequence) figures prominently in the later poetry of Ovid. It was visited by Germanicus.<sup>5</sup> Pausanias refers to unfinished sanctuaries at both Didyma and Klaros, suggesting living sites with work in progress about 170 CE (7.5.4).

The oracle of Trophonios was reputed to lie at the place where the hero was swallowed up by the earth, a boundary between this world and the underworld. Although classed among the oracles, Trophonios communicated not through a priest or priestess but in person. Pausanias claims himself to have inquired of Trophonios; he provides a description of the procedures at Lebadeia, and indicates – on the basis of his own inquiry and those of others – that communication could be by a vision or by voice (9.39.5-14). It is of particular interest that the Trophonios cult required those who had an experience to provide a record of it for the shrine: τοὺς δὲ ἐς τοῦ Τροφωνίου κατελθόντας, ἀνάγκη σφᾶς, ὅποσα ἤκουσεν ἕκαστος ἢ εἶδεν, ἀναθεῖναι γεγραμμένα ἐν πίνακι (Paus. 9.39.14), 'Those who have descended into the shrine of Trophonios must dedicate an account, written on a *pinax*, of all that each has heard or seen'. A *pinax* was a wax tablet of the kind used for notes, a much lesser requirement than a commemorative inscription. Plutarch mentions the oracle of Trophonios as one of the few that remained active in his day (*Mor.* 411f).

At Oropos, Amphiaraos communicated through dreams. His oracle was very much alive in the Second Sophistic. Aristeides (*Or.* 25.60, 38.21) reports an active oracle. Pausanias records a visit and an encounter with a named guide, Iophon the Knossian, who produces popular verses (ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη τὸ ἐς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπαγωγὸν ἀκρατῶς εἶχε, 1.34.4) given to the Argives sent against Thebes. Pausanias rejects the idea that a *mantis* like Amphiaraos produced verse; however, *manteis* interpreted dreams as well as the flights of birds and the entrails of victims, and the fact that the present oracle is a dream oracle is totally in keeping with this tradition (1.34.4-5).

In the context of the oracle of Amphiaraos at Oropos, Pausanias refers to the oracle of Amphilochos at Mallos in Kilikia as 'the most trustworthy of my day' (1.34.3). Aristeides also mentions the oracles of Amphiaraos and Amphilochos together, and as active (*Or.* 38.21).

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<sup>5</sup> Cf. Parke 1985, 113-15, 126, 133-7; Flower 2008, 43-5.

According to a legend mentioned as early as the seventh century BCE by Kallinos of Ephesos (*ap. Str.* 14.4.3), Amphilochos partnered the prophet Mopsos on an expedition into Pamphilia and Kilikia; they jointly established the city of Mallos, killed each other in a duel after falling out, and were buried on opposite sides of a hill. It seems likely that the legend was created to account for the rival shrines of the two heroes.<sup>6</sup> Plutarch's Demetrios visits the oracles of Mopsos and Amphilochos and finds them flourishing (*Mor.* 434d). Lucian's attribution to Glykon of oracles recommending Amphilochos along with Apollo at Klaros and Didyma (*Alex.* 29) can be taken as evidence of the flourishing of the sanctuary in the second century CE.

By the period of the Second Sophistic, several of the famous oracles were extinct, though their sites apparently remained intact as religious centres. Plutarch's Demetrios and Kleombrotos travel to the shrine of Ammon and Demetrios talks to the priests, but the oracle itself is no longer functioning (*Mor.* 410b, 411d-e).<sup>7</sup> Pausanias visits the sanctuary at Mount Ptous and reports that, before Alexander's expedition against Thebes, here there was an oracle that never lied (9.23.6). The oracular sanctuary of Apollo at Abai (Phokis) was similarly no longer in operation (Paus. 10.35.1). According to Pausanias, it was burned by the Persians (480 BCE) and the ruins burned again in the Phokian War (346 BCE). In his own day, very frail ruins remained, alongside a new temple of Apollo, built by Hadrian (10.35.1-4).<sup>8</sup> Philostratos represents Apollonios visiting Abai – as a religious centre, but with no mention of an oracle – at *VA* 4.24.1.<sup>9</sup> Probably as at Abai, Apollo no longer gave oracles at his Ismenian *temenos*. Pausanias' description calls to mind the sanctuary's oracular associations: the statue of the god is like that at Branchidai and by the same artist; there is a stone where Manto, the daughter of Teiresias, used to sit; a legend gives to Teneros – son of Apollo and twin brother of Ismenos – the art of divination (*mantike* [*techne*]). However, there is no mention of the giving of oracles (9.10.2-6).<sup>10</sup> Zeus once communicated with questioners at Dodona through entranced priestesses (Pl. *Phdr.* 244b) who responded 'yes' or 'no' to inquiries submitted on lead tablets. Philostratos represents

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. Parke 1985, 116. Herodotos mentions Amphilochos in Pamphilia (7.91) and as founder of Posideion on the border between Kilikia and Syria (3.91).

<sup>7</sup> The cult of Ammon was alive in Greece: Paus. 3.18.3, 3.21.8, 5.15.11, 9.16.1.

<sup>8</sup> Since Pausanias reports the oracle being consulted by the Thebans before the battle of Leuktra in 371 BCE (4.32.5), the oracle cannot have closed down completely after the first burning.

<sup>9</sup> This is possibly a temporal anomaly: Hadrian's rebuilding would have taken place between the lifetimes of Apollonios and Philostratos and perhaps led the latter to an inappropriate picture of a flourishing first century centre.

<sup>10</sup> If oracles had still been given by Ismenian Apollo in his day, Plutarch would have mentioned the fact at *Mor.* 411f, where he claims that all the Boiotian oracles except that at Lebadeia have fallen silent.

Apollonios visiting a functioning centre at Dodona but, as in the case of Abai, makes no reference to oracles (VA 4.24.1).<sup>11</sup>

Along with these famous sites, Pausanias provides a picture of small, obscure, local oracles. For the sick, there was the shrine and incubation oracle of Dionysos at Amphikleia. The text suggests two kinds of oracles: an incubation procedure for the sick, and verbal oracles uttered by the priest under divine inspiration (10.33.11). Argos possessed an oracular shrine of Apollo on the Ridge (Deiradiotes), by repute a derivative of Delphi, where a woman gave oracles after a sacrifice once a month (2.24.1). Boura in Achaia had a dice oracle of Herakles Bouraikos, located in a cave (Paus. 7.25.10).<sup>12</sup> Also in Achaia, at Pharai, an inquirer could find the oracle of Hermes Agoraios. He would come in the evening, burn incense and perform other rituals, and whisper his question to the image of the god; then he would stop his ears and leave the marketplace and whatever he first heard when he uncovered his ears was the oracle. In this context, Pausanias refers to the similar divination at the sanctuary of Apis in Egypt (7.22.2-4). Near Tainaron, between Oitylos and Thalamai, was an incubation oracle of Ino (Paus. 3.26.1). Thebes had an altar of Apollo Spodios, where divination from 'voices' (μαντική ... ἀπὸ κληδόνων) was practised – a method (Pausanias claims) typical also of Smyrna (9.11.7).

Some local oracles had disappeared. There was a former oracle of Pan above the sanctuary of the Despoina near the abandoned city of Akakesion in Arkadia (Paus. 8.37.10-12). Another abandoned city, Hysiai in Boiotia, had a formerly oracular well, located in the unfinished *naos* of Apollo (Paus. 9.2.1). At Mount Kithairon, in a sacred cave known as the Sphragidion, there was a former oracle of the nymphs (Paus. 9.3.9). Philostratos provides a (mythologized) account of the rise and fall of a short-lived oracle. In Lesbos, he claims, is a shrine where once – his head having arrived from Thrace – Orpheus gave oracles. The practice came to an abrupt end when Apollo criticized Orpheus for taking business from his own oracles at Gryneion (near Pergamon) and at Klaros (VA 4.14.1).

As places of direct encounter, the most important were perhaps the Asklepieia. Like the communications of Trophonios, Asklepios' prescriptions could be called oracles: Aristeides

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<sup>11</sup> A number of tablets survives. Apollonios' visit to a flourishing centre at Dodona is possible if unlikely. The sanctuary never recovered after the Roman attack on Epiros in 167 BCE, but the festival of Naia, instituted by Pyrrhos, was revived and lasted until the third century CE. Cf. Parke 1967, 94-128.

<sup>12</sup> After putting his question, the inquirer threw four dice (*astragaloi*); every possible resulting configuration could be interpreted from writing on a tablet (Paus. 7.25.10). Alphabet and dice oracles and the similar oracles of Astrampsychos with their decades of answers were popular among the non-elite. For examples and discussion, Potter 1994, 24-9; Horsley and Mitchell 2000, 22-38, 161-4; Graf 2000, 53-94; Nollé 2007; T. Morgan 2007, 319-21; Toner 2009, 44-52.

classes them together with the words of the *mantikoi* at *Or.* 45.7, and refers to a dream revelation as a *pheme* at *HL* 5.29. The cult was primarily a healing one.<sup>13</sup> Strabo (8.6.15) mentions the significant early centres in Kos and Epidauros from which it spread. The Asklepieion at Aigai in Kilikia, where Apollonios began his career (Philostr. *VA* 1.7), was founded from Kos (Jul. *Gal.* 200a-b), and Epidauros established daughter cults in Athens (where the festival celebrating Asklepios' arrival was called the Epidauria), in Pergamon and in Balagrai in Kyrene in North Africa (Paus. 2.26.8-9), in Sikyon (Paus. 2.10.3), and in Rome (Livy, *Epit.Per.* 11). Pergamon founded a sanctuary of Asklepios at Smyrna, and Balagrai, one at Leben in Krete (Paus. 2.26.8-9). The incubatory method of consultation involved a direct, personal experience of or vision from the god. Something of the experience is conveyed in Aristeides' *Hieroi logoi* (see below, Ch. 6.2.1). The success of the god's prescriptions was conveyed in inscriptions dedicated at the shrines (Ch. 6.1).

Aristeides places the Sibyl and Bakis alongside the priestesses and priests inspired by gods at Delphi, Dodona, Klaros and the sanctuary of Ammon as individuals who entered wholly into god without the benefit of art (καθάπαξ ὑποδύντες θεῶ καὶ τέχνης οὐδὲ μικρὸν μετασχόντες) and foretold marvels to their own and future generations (*Or.* 2.46). The Sibyl seems originally to have been a single prophetess but her name became a generic one; Varro (Frg. 56a Cardauns) listed ten sibyls, Persian, Libyan, Delphic, Cimmerian, Erythraean, Samian, Cumaean, Hellespontine, Phrygian and Tiburtine; Pausanias mentions Libyan, Kymaean (Cumaean) and Hebrew (or Babylonian or Egyptian) sibyls along with Herophile, whom he associates with the Troad, Samos, Klaros, Delos and Delphi rather than Erythrai, which lays claim to her (10.12.1-9).<sup>14</sup> Bakis was a male prophet. His oracles are mentioned by Herodotos (8.20, 9.43). Pausanias calls him a Boiotian possessed by nymphs (10.12.11); Plutarch assumes the existence of a number of Bakides (*Mor.* 399a). Second Sophistic literature provides many references to circulating oracles attributed to figures of these kinds and to the professionals – chresmologues – who dealt in them. The 'ancient' (*palaios*) oracles about Lucian's Peregrinos circulated by Peregrinos himself (*Peregr.* 27), and the Sibylline oracle circulated by his follower Theagenes (*Peregr.* 29), must have come from the collections of chresmologues. Lucian says that

<sup>13</sup> As appropriate to Asklepios, described in the *Iliad* as a blameless physician (ἀμύμων ἰητήρ, *Il.* 11.518) taught by the centaur Cheiron (*Il.* 4.219).

<sup>14</sup> On the sibylline tradition, Parke 1988, Potter 1994, 75-83. In the Roman world the most famous of the sibyls was the Cumaean, whose prophecies had been conveyed to Rome by Tarquinius Priscus and placed in the care of a priestly college for consultation by the Senate. The first collection was destroyed when the Temple of Capitoline Jupiter was burned in 83 BCE. Augustus moved the reconstituted collection from the Capitoline to the temple of Apollo on the Palatine (Suet. *Aug.* 31), thus indicating that the oracles were to be considered inspired by Apollo. Cf. Parke 1988, 136-41, Potter 1994, 83, 151.

it was through oracle-bearers (*chresmophoroi*) that Alexander of Abonouteichos circulated oracles of Glykon in connection with warding off plague (*Alex.* 36); Alexander is presumably supposed to have used the same method to circulate oracles about himself – possibly those found on bronze tablets (*Alex.* 10), certainly that attributed to the Sibyl (*Alex.* 11). Of particular interest is Plutarch's reference at *Mor.* 407b to those who, formerly, were present during consultations at Delphi and translated the Pythia's words into verse.<sup>15</sup> Plutarch groups these presumably legitimate professionals with less reputable figures who include Onomakritos, known to Herodotos (7.6) as a *chresmologos* and an editor and forger of oracles. Possibly similar are the expounders (*exegetai*) present when Lucian's Alexander delivers his nocturnal oracles (*Alex.* 49).

The reputation of chresmologues was not a positive one.<sup>16</sup> Aristeides refers to their failures as oracle interpreters in the context of the Delphic oracle of the wooden wall (*Or.* 3.234-5). Nevertheless, it seems to have been the fallibility of the practitioners rather than the continuing relevance of oracles pronounced in the past that was seen to be at fault. A very interesting case attesting to the worth of past oracles occurs at Aristid. *HL* 4.75. Aristeides asks the god (presumably Asklepios, in private prayer – he is not at an Asklepieion) about his current problems and the god responds (presumably in a dream) with an old oracle from Delphi – the famous oracle about the 'white maidens', which would have been known to Aristeides from the tradition. Time reveals the relevance of the message (see Ch. 6.2.2). Like the oracles purveyed by chresmologues, the oracle had meaning not only in its original context but also in the present and in personal circumstances; the power of the god's oracles is not exhausted in a single application.

### **1.2.2 Liminal places in the accessible world: the broader picture**

The established temples and shrines of the Graeco-Roman world often lay outside cities; visits to them – for whatever reason they were undertaken – had to be deliberately planned.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> The Second Sophistic belief that Delphic oracles were anciently delivered in verse (Plut. *Mor.* 397d) may possibly have arisen from the preservation of early oracles in verse form by chresmologues.

<sup>16</sup> Dillery (2005) charts the decline in reputation of religious professionals about the fifth century BCE as oracles were increasingly recorded in written form and *manteis* were replaced by *chresmologoi*.

<sup>17</sup> MacMullen 1981, 27. For the location of *temenoi* in relation to city centres and boundaries, Bruit Zaidman and Schmitt Pantel 1992<sup>2</sup>, 55-7. For the location of Asklepieia, Edelstein 1945/1998, vol. 2, 233, Cilliers and Retief 2013, 70-2.

Those who consulted an oracle or a god in person under ritual conditions did so in the hope of a specific answer or some other boon. More broadly, people sought out the numinous environment of temples and the gods' presence in their statues. Lucian comments that those who gaze on the images in temples imagine themselves to be looking on the gods themselves (*Sacr.* 11).<sup>18</sup> Dion refers to women who believe that stones or clods of earth from sacred places (*hieroi*) can provide answers to their inquiries (13.2).

There were many reasons for attendance at a shrine. Visiting professionals included sophists in search of an audience, oracle interpreters, and itinerant holy men like Apollonios, seeking the god's accreditation, looking for or leading disciples, or proclaiming the god's will.<sup>19</sup> Mass attendance, particularly for periodic festivals, and the popular attractions available at major cult centres suggest 'tourism'. The term, which most generally means recreational travel,<sup>20</sup> is often used in a derogatory way, though in fact 'tourists' ranged from those seeking only entertainment to serious inquirers. Catering for the popular end of the spectrum, some centres had cult theatres which seated – and so must have attracted – thousands; some housed regular markets.<sup>21</sup>

Temples' collections of art works, inscriptions and more ephemeral texts, and miscellaneous curiosities and wonders were often unique primary sources of religious and historical information that brought serious inquirers to sacred sites. Dion notes – among the four sources of knowledge of the gods – the works of art that were most commonly available at shrines (12.44). He demonstrates the kind of learning that can take place when he notes that an Egyptian priest's tale of Troy is confirmed by a memorial he has seen on the wooden chest dedicated by Kypselos in the temple of Hera at Olympia (11.45). Plutarch and Pausanias both provide evidence of the existence of guided tours and guides (*exegetai* or *periegetai*).<sup>22</sup> Plutarch describes instances in which a guide points out sights as his party tours the precinct at Delphi (*Mor.* 400f) and a visitor questions guides about the name of a building (*Mor.* 400d). At *Mor.* 395a-b, guides complete their prearranged program (τὰ συντεταγμένα) and expound

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<sup>18</sup> He disapproves of regarding Pheidias' Athena or Praxiteles' Aphrodite as the goddesses (*Pr.Im.* 23). Plutarch refers to Greeks who regard statues of the gods as 'gods' (*Mor.* 379c, 167d-e). Philostratos' Apollonios considers it an impiety to treat the statues of the gods as goods for sale (*VA* 5.20.3).

<sup>19</sup> Dion lectures in the sanctuary complex at Olympia (Ch. 5.3.2); Plutarch (*Mor.* 407b) and Lucian (*Alex.* 49) mention oracle interpreters (Ch. 1.2.1); Apollonios travels as a religious professional (Ch. 3.6.1).

<sup>20</sup> For discussion of the term, Mossman 2006, 295, n. 7.

<sup>21</sup> Theatres: Paus. 2.27.5; markets: D.Chr. 27.5; for discussion and archaeological evidence, MacMullen 1981, 18-27.

<sup>22</sup> Pausanias prefers the older *exegetes*; *periegetes* is first attested (LSJ, s.v.) in the Roman period. Inscriptions show that (some) *exegetai* and *periegetai* were cult personnel and/or of high social standing; for a detailed discussion, Jones 2001, 33-9.

inscriptions, although the learned visitor is far from interested. Pausanias' readiness to learn from local guides is apparent in interchanges at Delphi, Oropos and Argos, in the *demoi* of Myrrhinous and Athmonon in Attika, at Megara, Olympia, Plataia in Boiotia and at Sikyon and Troezen in Argolis. But he is also ready to dispute – he points out fallacies in local understanding at Temenou Thyrai in Lydia (1.35.8). Although Pausanias' guidebook is the only one to survive, others are known by author and title.<sup>23</sup>

Heliodoros provides a fictional snapshot of Delphi as a centre of intellectual inquiry. Leaving Memphis, where he was High Priest, in an attempt to thwart the fated fight between his sons, Kalasiris chooses his destination: πυνθανόμενος δὲ εἶναι τινα Δελφοὺς Ἑλληνίδα πόλιν ἱερὰν μὲν Ἀπόλλωνος θεῶν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τέμενος ἀνδρῶν τε σοφῶν ἐργαστήριον θορύβου τε δημῶδους ἐκτὸς ... (*Aeth.* 2.26.1), 'having learned that there was a Greek city called Delphi sacred to Apollo and a sacred precinct of the other gods and workshop of wise men, free from clamour and crowds ...'. Once there, he reports,

ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἱεροῖς ἦν ἢ πρὸς θυσίαις ἐξηταζόμενην, ἃς πολλὰς καὶ παντοίας ἀνὰ πᾶσαν ἡμέραν ξένος τε καὶ ἐγχώριος λεῶς τῷ θεῷ χαριζόμενοι δρῶσιν, ἢ φιλοσοφοῦσι διελεγόμεν ... Τὸν μὲν δὴ πρότερον χρόνον ἄλλοτε περὶ ἄλλων ἡμῖν αἰ ζήτησεις ἀνεκινούντο, καὶ ὁ μὲν τις ὅπως τοὺς ἐγχωρίους οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι σέβομεν θεοὺς ἀνηρώτα ... (*Aeth.* 2.27.2-3)

I either was present at the sacred places or sought out the many and varied sacrifices which foreign and local people perform on every day seeking the favour of the god, or I conversed with philosophers ... At first our inquiries went back and forth from time to time about one thing and another, and one would ask how we Egyptians worship the local gods ...

An historical example can be set in parallel. At the Asklepieion in Pergamon, Aristeides meets an old acquaintance from his days in Egypt; Euarestos of Krete is a philosopher who has come in search of information about the god (*HL* 4.23). In fact, Asklepieia are frequently mentioned in the literary sources for their vigorous and varied intellectual life. At Agai, Apollonios obtains his early education in philosophy (Philostr. *VA* 1.7.2); the sophist Antiochos likes to converse regularly with his fellow-incubants as well as with the god (Philostr. *VS* 2.568). At Aigion in Achaia, Pausanias discusses an abstruse matter with a Phoenician visitor (Paus. 7.23.7-8). At Pergamon, Aristeides lectures daily (Aristid. *Or.* 4.2).

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<sup>23</sup> For the guide's fee, Luc. *Am.* 8; for negative reactions to commentary, Plut. *Mor.* 395a, Paus. 1.35.7-8. For the authors and titles of ancient guidebooks, Casson 1994, 294.

Many who visited the sacred sites in a specifically religious spirit could be differentiated from intellectual inquirers and 'tourists' only by their attitude.<sup>24</sup> However, some sought a deeper experience by participation in ritual. This might entail no more than ritual circumambulation of a sanctuary;<sup>25</sup> at the other end of the spectrum, it might mean initiation into Mysteries like those of Eleusis (see Ch. 6.2.1c). Ritual circumambulation could identify a larger landscape as a sacred space and the participant as more than an inquirer or casual visitor.<sup>26</sup> Elsner identifies Pausanias as a 'religious' traveller, distinguishing him from simple inquirers like Plutarch's Kleombrotos. Pausanias' narrative is not structured in the usual way of geographies like Strabo's but follows his experiential order – on the broad scale, the order of his travels, but on the smaller scale, the order of a participant in ritual. His account is 'a narrative to contextualize objects – to derive meaning from and supply meaning to those objects', and it marks off and excludes those things accessible only to initiates.<sup>27</sup>

The reader of a book like Pausanias' joins him – but only to a limited extent – in his experience. Recent commentary compares the experience of the occasional inquirer and the devotee, the reader and the real-life 'pilgrim', in the context of Philostratos' *Heroicus*, a dialogue between a vinegrower and a Phoenician trader with an interest in the *Iliad*. The encounter takes place near the *heroon* of Protesilaos, a pivotal spot on the route between Europe and Asia where the vinegrower has had personal interviews with the hero. Swain contrasts the religious experience available to the two protagonists. 'There is a sense that if we move out of the city along with the vinedresser, we too shall re-discover a religious domain that is missing from our lives.' Elsner notes that, like the trader, the reader is never vouchsafed the vision of Protesilaos experienced by the vinedresser. Reading is not equivalent to a journey; the '*Heroicus* rather

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<sup>24</sup> The term 'pilgrim' has traditionally been used to designate a traveller whose journey is undertaken in a spirit of religious faith; thus for Rutherford (2001, 41), pilgrimage is a journey motivated by personal piety or religious celebration. In recent years the terms 'pilgrim' and 'pilgrimage' have proved controversial, in large part because of their Christian overtones (Elsner and Rutherford 2005a, 2-5). In an attempt at inclusivity, Morinis (1992, 4) suggests that 'pilgrimage is a journey undertaken by a person in quest of a place or state that he or she believes to embody a valued ideal. At its most conventional, the end of the pilgrimage is an actual shrine ... Some sacred journeys are wanderings that have no fixed goal; the pilgrimage here is the search for an unknown or hidden goal'. Elsner and Rutherford note the difficulty in distinguishing between 'pilgrimage' and tourism: whether a journey is a 'pilgrimage' can depend simply on the attitude of the one who makes it. In this thesis, 'pilgrimage' will be used principally in the specialized sense set out at Ch. 6.3.3.

<sup>25</sup> One itinerary is set out in the *Lex sacra* discovered at Pergamon; see Ch. 6.3.3.

<sup>26</sup> Rogers (1991, 111-12) comments of the civic processions instituted in 104 CE by C. Vibius Salutaris at Ephesos: 'We can see how the procession dramatized a historical identity of the city ... the *primary* purpose of this public ritual was to help acculturate the ephebes, who both acted and watched this drama, into their fathers' reconstruction of the past'.

<sup>27</sup> Elsner 1995, 127-52.

portrays itself as failing to offer the full reality of divine vision which pilgrimage and a proper way of life, like the vinedresser's, would supply'.<sup>28</sup>

### 1.2.3 The edges of the earth

The *Hymnus Homericus ad Cererem* (402) places the murky darkness (ζόφος ἠερόεις) of the world of the dead underground. Hesiod's Tartaros lies in a recess of the broad-pathed earth (μυχῶ χθονὸς εὐρουδείης, *Th.* 119-20), as far beneath the earth as the earth is beneath the heavens (τόσσον ἔνερθ' ὑπὸ γῆς ὅσον οὐρανός ἐστ' ἀπὸ γαίης, *Th.* 720). In the *Iliad* (8.14-16), Tartaros is as far below Hades as the earth, the sky (τόσσον ἔνερθ' Ἄϊδεω ὅσον οὐρανός ἐστ' ἀπὸ γαίης); the passage evokes an image of four vertically-arranged tiers. However, in the *Odyssey* (11.13-22), Hades is rather beyond the land of the Kimmerians, by the bordering, liminal Ocean at earth's far edge.<sup>29</sup>

Odysseus' journey to Hades so-positioned is reflected in Lucian's account of Menippos' journey (made with the assistance of the Chaldaian Mithrobarzanes) down the Euphrates and into the marsh in which it loses itself (*Nec.* 9).<sup>30</sup> Menippos returns – from below the earth – via Lebadeia. In the related *Cataplus* (4), Kyniskos enters an underground Hades from Tainaron. So also does Apuleius' Psyche (*Met.* 6.16-21). In Antonius Diogenes' *De incredibilibus*, Derkyllis' journey to Hades picks up a tradition that – before the period of the Second Sophistic – related both Odysseus' voyage and an underground Hades to a sacred site. On her journey, she travels to Krete and then on to the Tyrrhenoi (Etruscans) and to the Kimmerians and Hades (*Phot. Bibl.* codex 166, 109a, 38-9). Obviously, the Kimmerians have been repositioned from the border of the earth to Italy; in fact, as early as the fourth century BCE, Ephoros (*ap. Str.* 5.4.5) placed them near Lake Avernus in Campania, where a volcanic crater was believed to give access to the Underworld.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Swain 2009, 39; Elsner 2009, 12.

<sup>29</sup> The *peirata gaires* have been the subject of detailed studies by Bergren (1975) and Romm (1992). Homer conceived them as the shoreline of an island surrounded by the 'river' Ocean; Ocean is the outermost rim of the shield of Achilles at *Il.* 18.607-8. Hesiod's Islands of the Blessed lie in whirling Ocean ἐξ πείρατα γαίης (*Op.* 169-71).

<sup>30</sup> The mixed light and dark of the northern world that Odysseus enters (*Od.* 11.15-16) is echoed in the mixed land and water of the marsh in which – at least until last century – the Euphrates did indeed end.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Stephens and Winkler 1995, 123, n. 41. Herodotos (1.16) calls a nomadic people driven south into Phrygia by the Skythians Kimmerians; they overthrew Phrygia and terrorized Ionia (*Str.* 14.1.40). Plutarch reports speculation that the Kimbroi, who erupted south into Italy at the end of the second century BCE, are Homer's Kimmerians displaced from their northern shore (*Mar.* 11.6). No connection between these historical peoples and either Homer's Kimmerians or Lake Avernus is known.

In many Second Sophistic accounts, the Homeric world is juxtaposed with or replaced by a Hellenistic one. The idea of a spherical earth was firmly established by the time of Plato: in the *Phaedo* (109a), Sokrates describes the earth as round and in the centre of heaven. Aristotle provided supporting reasons based on observation: the shadow of the earth in a lunar eclipse is round; travellers from north to south find the angle of sight of the stars change (*Cael.* 297b-298a). By the Hellenistic period, the cosmos was pictured as a spherical earth surrounded by the increasingly distant concentric planetary spheres of the moon, Mercury, Venus, the sun, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. Aristotle postulated that everything in the sublunar region is made up of the traditional four elements – earth, air, fire and water – and the superlunar realm of pure and unchanging *aither* (*Cael.* 269a-270b). In the period that followed, the order anciently associated with the heavens was relocated to the superlunar realm and earth's disorder expanded to fill the region below the moon; the new profoundly liminal place became the moon itself.<sup>32</sup> It is in this new, Hellenistic, cosmos that, conducted by a mysterious guide, Plutarch's Timarchos of Chaironeia travels in the heavens as in a sea dotted with islands, and sees the chasm that is the Styx (*Mor.* 589d-592f).

With the Hellenistic cosmos went related, Middle Platonic, theories of the soul, its immortality, and the extent of its freedom of choice. Plato's own ideas were set out in myths, most notably the myth of Er (*R.* 614-21) and the myth at the conclusion of the *Gorgias* (523-7), and in the *Timaeus* (28-42). Middle Platonic developments (most explicit in the *De fato* often attributed to Plutarch, in Plutarch's own *De defectu oraculorum* and in Apuleius' *De Platone*) expanded and modified them to present an elaborate, three-tier cosmos in which primary providence is associated with the will of the primary god, secondary providence with the planets and fate, and tertiary providence with *daimones* (see App. 2.2.1) dwelling on and below the moon. Timarchos of Chaironeia sees *daimones* moving in the heavens in the form of stars (Plut. *Mor.* 591d-f). In passages linking the ancient Ocean (interpreted as the Atlantic) with the boundaries of the Middle Platonic sublunar realm, Plutarch's inhabitants of an island off Britain watch for signs of *daimones*' passage and tell of the island where Kronos is confined, with them as attendants, in an eternal sleep (*Mor.* 419e-420a); Aridaios of Soloi, led by a *daimon* on a journey through the heavens, hears the song of the moon sibyl (Plut. *Mor.* 566d), and Antonius Diogenes' Deinias and Karmanes travel onwards from Thule, on the edge of Ocean, to an encounter with her (Phot. *Bibl. codex* 166, 111a, 11-14).

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<sup>32</sup> Cf. Martin 1987, 6-8, 19-20, Barton 1994, 61, Wright 1995, 36, 40-1, 50-1, 114, 129. The Hellenistic cosmos was given its definitive form by Ptolemy in the second century CE; Plutarch refers to a three-tier universe with regions of the fixed stars, of the planets, and below the moon (*Mor.* 745b).

*Daimones* are central to Plutarch's Kleombrotos' account at *Mor.* 421a-422e: in a remote region near the Erythre Thalatta, he claims, he has met a non-Greek (*barbaros*) hermit who spends his days (apart from once a year, when he accepts human consultants) in association with nymphs, and with the *daimones* who give him powers of prophecy. The tale is debunked by Plutarch's narrator,<sup>33</sup> who can prove that the hermit must necessarily be, in fact, (only) a Greek.

Kleombrotos' suggestion of the superiority of the remote picks up an ancient theme: the more distant a place or people, the better it was supposed to be.

Ethiopians had Homeric connotations. Homer calls his Ethiopians blameless (ἀμύμων). They are remarkable for their piety and moral virtue, and their fertile homeland is a resort for the gods (*Il.* 1.423-4). Herodotos believes that the countries on the circumference of the inhabited world produce the most rare and beautiful things (3.106),<sup>34</sup> but among their peoples he credits only the Ethiopians with extraordinary powers. They are the tallest and best-looking people in the world; they are remarkably long-lived; their king admires nothing from the Persian world but its wine (the barbarian susceptibility to wine was to be a recurrent motif), and he sends back to the Persian world a bow which no-one can bend (3.21-2). Often coupled with the Ethiopians were the Hyperboreans. First mentioned by Hesiod (*Frg.* 150 Merkelbach/West), they were associated with Apollo: Herodotos reports the conveyance of their offerings to the god to Delos (4.33). Their name suggests a dwelling place ὑπὲρ Βορέας, beyond the North Wind; Pindar (*O.* 3.31) refers to it as ὄπιθεν Βορέα, behind the North Wind, and tradition set it behind the Rhipaean mountains, which protected it from Boreas' effects.<sup>35</sup> Pindar's Hypoboreans (*P.*10.30) are a mirror-image of Homer's Ethiopians, untouched by sickness, old age, toil and war.

Unlike the Hyperboreans, the ancient Ethiopians could be identified with contemporary, accessible, people. Romans had some contact with the Ethiopian kingdoms of Meroe and Axum. The former, known to Herodotos (2.29), was a threat to the southern frontier of Roman Egypt. A punitive expedition into its territory followed a raid in 25 BCE; Augustus received an Ethiopian embassy in 21/20 BCE.<sup>36</sup> Nero sent an expedition up the Nile beyond Meroe in 61-63 (*Plin. HN* 6.181-6, 12.19; *D.C.* 63.8.1)<sup>37</sup> but, significantly, Aelius Aristides proceeds no further than the Roman border (*Or.* 36.48-50). The Ethiopians of Meroe possess something of the aura of Homer's liminal Ethiopians in the *Historia Alexandri Magni*, and in Heliodoros' *Aethiopica* (cf. Ch.

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<sup>33</sup> 'Lamprias' (*Mor.* 413d); for this narrator, see also Ch. 2.3.3.

<sup>34</sup> The countries include India to the east (*Hdt.* 3.97), Arabia to the south (*Hdt.* 3.106), Ethiopia, south-west (*Hdt.* 3.113), and Europe, north-west (*Hdt.* 3.113).

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Romm 1992, 65.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Scullard 1976<sup>4</sup>, 260.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Scullard 1976<sup>4</sup>, 327.

3.4.1, 3.5.4). Axum figures less prominently in literary sources but was known to traders; it rose to prominence in the first century CE with its Red Sea port of Adulis, mentioned by Pliny (*HN* 6.173-4) and in the *Periplus Maris Rubri* (4).

Post Homer, as various distant places were incorporated within the accessible world, their 'wonders' and the learned of non-Graeco-Roman traditions took on the numinous aura of the edges of the earth and simultaneously confirmed the truth of the ancient paradigm of the superior remote. One of the aims of this thesis is to identify the places of this kind and the associated human groups that figured most prominently in the Second Sophistic imagination.

Some obvious possibilities are mooted in App. 1; discussion there suggests a Second Sophistic readiness to juxtapose pre-Second Sophistic imagery with contemporary observation and understanding. Those groups of non-Greek wise most referenced in Second Sophistic literary accounts, and the nature of their characterization, will be investigated further in Ch. 2.

#### **1.2.4 The denizens of liminal places: liminal beings**

In pre-Second Sophistic and Second Sophistic accounts alike, the Other was not simply 'human' or 'divine'. In myth, the remote places of the world were associated with beings impossible to classify as animals, human beings or gods. On his far-flung journeys, Herakles encounters Atlas and Prometheus, descendants of the Titans and so cousins of the Olympian gods; Theseus meets Sinis, a giant known as 'bender of pine-trees' (*pityokamptes*), and Phaia, a sow descended – according to Apollodoros (*Epit.* 1.1) – from the liminally human and animal monsters Echidna and Typhon. Beings thus liminal in form and nature are considered in more detail at App. 2.1. In myth and Second Sophistic fiction, it was possible to meet one of the great gods in person. In the real Second Sophistic world, as we have seen, they were present in their temples as statues; however, only Apollo communicated with human beings – and he, only through an intermediary. Those who provided answers at oracular shrines were usually not gods but *heroes*, mortals who continued – after their death or disappearance into the earth – to exert their powers from below.<sup>38</sup> As we have seen (above and App. 2.2.1), the Second Sophistic world was also inhabited by *daimones*, spirits intermediate in their nature between gods and human beings.

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<sup>38</sup> *Heros* will be understood in this sense throughout this thesis; for different uses of the term, App. 2.1.1. Amphilochos and Mopsos both died (Ch. 1.2.1). Amphiaraos was swallowed, living, by the earth (see e.g. *Pi. N.* 8, *S. El.* 837-9, *Aristid. Or.* 25.60, *Paus.* 1.34.2, 2.23.2, 9.8.3, *Philostr. VA* 2.37.2), and Aristeides (*Or.* 25.60) refers to him explicitly as a *heros*. Trophonios likewise vanished (*Paus.* 9.37.7), and Pausanias' eye-

Some mythical individuals (Herakles, Asklepios) – usually the sons of gods – achieved apotheosis and could rightly be regarded (at least in different periods of their existences) as both men and gods. In the period of the Second Sophistic, it was also possible for a living human being to be accounted simultaneously (in some sense of the word) 'divine'. The title 'god' could be awarded as a human honour. Most famously, Alexander seems to have claimed divine honours; literary accounts to this effect are confirmed by his request for the erection of a statue of himself as *theos aniketos* in Athens (Hyp. Dem. Frg. 7, col. 32, 3-5 Jensen).<sup>39</sup> Although his demands were criticized by Kallisthenes as un-Greek (Arr. An. 4.11), there were Greek precedents. About 400 BCE the returned oligarchic exiles of Samos took the extraordinary step of honouring their saviour, the Spartan Lysander, in his lifetime: they set up altars, sang paeans, and renamed their annual religious festival the Lysandreia (Plut. Lys. 18.3-4).<sup>40</sup> Most relevantly to Alexander's case, his father Philip seems to have presented himself as a living god. At Olympia, he commissioned a *tholos* (usually a sacred structure) containing chryselephantine statues of himself and his immediate family, including Alexander (Paus. 5.17.4, 5.20.9-10). Chryselephantine statues, like Pheidias' statue of Zeus at Olympia, made in the 430s, were typically 'cultic' rather than only 'honorific'. At Aigeai in 336, on the occasion of his daughter's wedding and his own assassination, his statue was carried in procession with those of the Olympians (D.S. 16.91-2).<sup>41</sup> Later, Roman *principes* were also recognized in cult. Julius Caesar seems to have been granted divine status in his lifetime, with the honours ratified and implemented after his death.<sup>42</sup> Augustus, Claudius, Vespasian and Titus were deified only after their deaths, but Caligula and Domitian presented themselves as living gods.<sup>43</sup> Titular or legal

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witness description of cult procedures (Ch. 1.2.1) makes his chthonic nature clear. However, both could be referred to as 'gods'. They are jointly such at Paus. 1.34.2; 'people say' that Amphiaraios rose from a spring at Oropos as a god (Paus. 1.34.4). Plutarch calls Amphiaraios alternatively a *heros* (*Mor.* 111b with *Od.* 15.245) and a god (*Mor.* 412a-b); Trophonios is a god at *Mor.* 590b and at Philostr. VA 8.19.2.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Bosworth 1996, 166. See also Ch. 3.4.2a.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Cartledge 2005, 238-9.

<sup>41</sup> For discussion and supporting evidence, including that provided by the excavated Philippeion, Fredrickmeyer 1979, 39-61, Lapatin 2001, 115-9, Cartledge 2005, 241.

<sup>42</sup> In his lifetime, Caesar was granted a statue with an inscription declaring him *aniketos theos* (D.C. 43.45.3 with Cic. *Att.* 12.45, 13.28); shortly before his death he was granted honours appropriate to a god and the cult name *Divus Iulius* (Cic. *Phil.* 2.110). Cf. Weinstock 1971, 186-8, 265, 280, 389-90; Fishwick 1987, vol. 1.1, 56-72; Gradel 2002, 54-6. On Greek interpretation of *divus* alternatively as *theios*, *heros* or *hemitheos*, and Roman differentiation between *divus* and *deus*, Gradel 2002, 61-9.

<sup>43</sup> Suetonius gives Augustus, Claudius, Vespasian and Titus the title *Divus* and records the pretensions of Caligula (*Cal.* 22, 52) and Domitian (*Dom.* 13). An exhaustive study of the sources by Gradel (2002, 109-11, 159-60, 227-8) suggests that no living emperor accepted official deification (i.e. deification by the Senate and the title *Divus*) and that all emperors were the objects of municipal and private cult; Caligula and Domitian simply actively encouraged private worship of themselves. At least from the time of Nero, there was official worship of the *genius* of the emperor; the model was the worship of the *genius* of a *paterfamilias* by his slaves, freedman and *clientes*, and the divinity of the emperor himself was not implied (Gradel 2002, 100, 132, 162). See also Ch. 3.4.2.

divinity was not (necessarily) taken literally by awardee or recipient; Vespasian takes his coming deification as a joke at Suet. *Ves.* 23.

Of particular relevance to this thesis, Reitzenstein proposed that there existed a widely-held belief in another type – the *theios aner* or *theios anthropos*, a living human being possessed of supernatural knowledge and power – in the first centuries CE. The idea – controversial because of its implications for New Testament studies – was taken up most notably by Bieler (1935-6/1967) and Betz (1983) and it has since generated an extended debate. Examining application of the adjectives *theios*, *daimonios* and *thespesios* to human beings in imperial period texts, du Toit showed that the terms were used primarily for founders of philosophical traditions or others admired for their moral qualities; he thus effectively undermined the idea of any such (named) conception. However, as du Toit himself admits, the conclusion does not preclude the existence of the conception separate from the name.<sup>44</sup> The issue is considered in more detail in App. 2.2.2, in particular as it relates to Philostratos' demonstration and elucidation of Apollonios' nature (Ch. 3) and Lucian's presentation of Alexander's claims (Ch. 4).

### 1.3 Liminal experience

A liminal experience is a turning point in a life, not – necessarily – an experience in a liminal place. 'Liminality' in this sense first became important in the early-twentieth-century anthropological work of Arnold van Gennep.<sup>45</sup> Comparing the rites of passage (and, in particular, initiation rituals<sup>46</sup>) practised in a spectrum of pre-modern societies, he ascribed to any transition three distinct phases: separation, a metaphorical death in which the initiand is forced to break with previous practices and routines; a liminal period proper; and reaggregation, reincorporating the initiand into society as a changed being. Van Gennep's conception of liminality was taken up, and its applications expanded, by Victor Turner in the 1960s and 1970s. Focusing initially on traditional societies, Turner posited extended, socially-prescribed liminal periods as the structures that effected psychological and social transitions in individuals' lives. Candidates undertaking rites of passage – who relinquished, or were expelled from, pre-existing social

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<sup>44</sup> Cf. Reitzenstein 1927, 26; du Toit 1997, 401-2, 406 n. 26; Flinterman 2009b, 170-1.

<sup>45</sup> For slightly earlier uses of related terms in a psychological context, *OED* s.v. liminal.

<sup>46</sup> Initiation is here seen as formal entry into a defined social group.

positions – lived in egalitarian *communitas*, open to new ideas and the self-reassessment that a loss of accustomed status entailed.<sup>47</sup>

Turner's legacy has been a rich one. Following Turner himself, historical sociologists have evoked the van Gennep/Turner tripartite, processual model in analyses of societal change. Szokolczai and Thomassen identify Jaspers' empirically-identified, world-wide Axial Period (c. 800-200 BCE) of spiritual and intellectual unrest and creativity as a liminal period in the Turnerian sense. Eisenstadt compares the parallel but variant structures in different 'Axial Age civilizations' – the civilizations that crystallized out of the Axial Period – that shaped their different development.<sup>48</sup> The situation of a society in the throes of change nevertheless differs markedly from that of an individual in a ritual situation. In the latter, 'the liminal state is always clearly defined, temporarily and spatially: there is a way into liminality and there is a way out. Members of the society are themselves aware of the liminal state: they know that they will leave it sooner or later, and have "ceremony masters" to guide them through the rituals'.<sup>49</sup> In contrast, in a large-scale situation, 'the collapsing order ... undercuts the authority of those individuals who could act as "guardians" or "masters". In their absence, and in the frightening presence of the dissolution of all stable frameworks ... the liminal conditions are far from being restricted to a temporary suspension of order ...'.<sup>50</sup> As Turner himself recognized, in their demands for self-denial, medieval monastic orders institutionalized liminality, endlessly repeating rites of separation. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century court ritual can be seen as mechanical performance leading to nothing, and so as perpetuation of a liminal period proper; post-Second-World-War communist regimes can be accused of dwelling endlessly on revenge and so of failing to complete reaggregation. Szokolczai identifies modernity as 'permanent liminality'.<sup>51</sup>

Psychologists have expanded on the idea of liminal experience in an individual's life. In ritual situations, liminal experience is 'artificially produced'; otherwise, it may be deliberately sought out, or occur by chance.<sup>52</sup> However the experience comes about, the associated psychologically liminal period can be seen as one in which 'a person's sense of identity is hung in suspension ... Critical questions arise as to who and what the "I" is, what it is capable of,

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<sup>47</sup> van Gennep 1960<sup>2</sup>, especially 10-11, 65-115, 191-2; Turner 1964/1967; Turner 1969. Van Gennep's *Rites de passage* was first published in 1909 but received little scholarly attention until the English edition appeared in 1960; for the history, Thomassen 2009, 5-12. For an account of Turner's development of his understanding, E. Turner 1985, 4-5.

<sup>48</sup> Turner and E. Turner 1978, 2-3; Jaspers 1953, 1; Szokolczai 2003, 80-9, 242; Thomassen 2009, 19-20; Eisenstadt 1995, 317-23.

<sup>49</sup> Thomassen 2009, 21.

<sup>50</sup> Szokolczai 2000, 218-9.

<sup>51</sup> Turner 1969, 107; Szokolczai 2000, 215-27.

<sup>52</sup> Thomassen 2009, 18-19.

where it comes from, where it is going ...'.<sup>53</sup> Szokolczai evokes Turner to justify reconstruction of a biography from an academic *curriculum vitae*.<sup>54</sup>

Jungians in particular have found points of contact in Turner's work. They believe that the *psyche* as a whole – the Self – prompts the *ego* to make major life transitions – including those from childhood to youth and youth to middle life – by presenting it with appropriate imagery. Henderson stresses the significance of imagery common to initiation rituals world-wide: an indicative dream may begin with submission, expressed symbolically by defeat or death, and continue with containment – perhaps seen as entombment – followed by liberation or rebirth. The developmental process, over an individual's lifetime, constitutes individuation.<sup>55</sup> A psychologically liminal period can be seen as one in which conscious and unconscious contents of the *psyche* unite in a process culminating in wholeness and a new identity. Jung refers to this union of opposites as the 'transcendent function'; the Jungian conception is explicitly related to Turner's work by James A. Hall and by J.C. Miller.<sup>56</sup>

Relevantly to this thesis, Turner linked liminal experience – initiation – with a locationally liminal encounter in the classical tradition: Cheiron 'half wise old man, half stallion ... in his mountain cavern – epitomizing outsiderhood and liminality – instructed, even initiated, the adolescent sons of Achaean kings and princes'.<sup>57</sup> In *Image and pilgrimage in Christian culture*, he and Edith Turner identified Christian pilgrimage to a sacred site or holy shrine as the liminal period of a rite of passage.<sup>58</sup> Nightingale applied the model to traditional Greek civic *theoria*. The *theoros* travelled as a representative of his city to a religious sanctuary (often a panhellenic one) some distance away where he witnessed spectacles and took part in rituals celebrating a different identity from that of his native place; there was always at least the possibility that he might embrace and bring home the 'foreign' ideas and practices that he had learned.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Stein 1983, 8-9.

<sup>54</sup> Szokolczai 2000, 5-6.

<sup>55</sup> Individuation and life stages: Jung 1933/1969<sup>2</sup>d, 387-403; Jung 1939/1969<sup>2</sup>b, 275-89; Stein 2006, 196-214; archetypal dream imagery: Jung 1948/1969<sup>2</sup>c, 290-3; von Franz 1964/1978, 159-162; initiation imagery: Jung 1928/1966<sup>2</sup>, 230-1; Henderson 1964/1978, 120-8, 156; Henderson 1979<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>56</sup> Jung 1939/1969<sup>2</sup>b, 288-9; James A. Hall 1991, 33-51; J.C. Miller 2004, 104-8. In the context of this thesis, it is significant that Jung himself (1950/1969<sup>2</sup>a, 135-6) and Wyly and Grandy (1991, 169-78) interpret ancient tales of journeys to liminal places as accounts of journeys into the unconscious to encounter a deeper level of the Self.

<sup>57</sup> Turner 1974a, 253.

<sup>58</sup> Turner and E. Turner 1978, especially 4-11, 34-5; see also Turner 1973, Turner 1974b.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Nightingale 2004, 42-4. Nightingale accepts the applicability of Turner's model to the *theoros* with some reservations. For civic *theoria* as religious pilgrimage and religious pilgrimage as sacred viewing and so *theoria* or (in association with the Mysteries) *epopteia*, see Rutherford 2000, 138-42.

In many different contexts, Turner's suggestion that 'pilgrims' lived together in undifferentiated *communitas* has proved unsustainable; in the Greek context mentioned above, the civic *theoros* remained at all times very much a representative of his home city.<sup>60</sup> The evidence of Lucian's *Alexander* and Aristeides' *Hieroi logoi* suggests that the communities of suppliants of Glykon at Abonouteichos and Asklepios at Pergamon were not socially undifferentiated. The wealthy Aristeides must have been privileged to live with the temple warden Asklepiakos in Pergamon (*HL* 2.35); at *Alex.* 26, Glykon provides direct 'autophone' oracles only to the highly-placed (*euparyphos*), rich (*plousios*) and munificent (*megalodoros*).

Nevertheless, the social and psychological liminality of religiously-motivated travel beyond one's own community can hardly be denied. Plato deliberately chooses traditional, civic *theoria* as a model for his psychologically life-changing, philosophical *theoria*, presented in the *Respublica* (474b-541b) not simply as contemplation of the Forms but contemplation and return (519d), an activity set firmly in the context of civic life and culminating in social action. The philosopher is transformed and 'thus "returns" as a sort of stranger to his own kind, bringing a radical alterity into the city'.<sup>61</sup>

The sociologically and psychologically liminal nature of particular encounters represented in Second Sophistic literature as liminal in a locational sense will be explored in Chapters 3-6 comprising Part B of this thesis.

### **1.3.1 Biography and the diagnostic encounter**

Biography can be seen simply as an account of a human life from birth to death.<sup>62</sup> Much of the history of ancient biography is lost to us; the collections of biographies – by Plutarch, Suetonius, Philostratos, Diogenes Laertius and the *Scriptores Historiae Augustae* – that now virtually define the genre all date from the period of the Roman Empire.<sup>63</sup> The genre had antecedents in oratory. The earliest extant Greek biographies (or proto-biographies) are *encomia*, Isokrates' *Evagoras*

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<sup>60</sup> Cf. Eade and Sallnow 1991, 4-5; Coleman and Elsner 1991, 63-8; Coleman and Elsner 1995, 201-2; Nightingale 2004, 43; Elsner and Rutherford 2005a, 5; Kowalzig 2005, 45-56.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Nightingale 2004, 4-5; see also Nightingale 2001, 36-8.

<sup>62</sup> Momigliano 1971, 11.

<sup>63</sup> As well, we have some of the biographical works of Cornelius Nepos, a contemporary of Cicero; Hellenistic biographers are known only from summaries of and references to their works. Cf. Momigliano 1971, 8-9. McGing (2006, 119) identifies Plutarch, Suetonius and Nepos as the 'canonical' writers of ancient biography. Bowie (2006, 141) adds Diogenes Laertius, Philostratos and the *Scriptores Historiae Augustae*.

and Xenophon's *Agésilas*.<sup>64</sup> We can still see links with the epideictic ('display') tradition in Philostratos' *VA*, written for the *time* of its subject (1.3) and including all the standard *topoi* (ancestry, birth, education, physical attributes, deeds, virtues, death), and in Lucian's *Alexander*, based on the *psogos* or speech of reproach.<sup>65</sup> 'Suetonian' or systematically-ordered biography is more closely related to the oratorical tradition than 'Plutarchian' or chronological biography, but there is no reason to suppose that both did not emerge from it in Hellenistic times.<sup>66</sup> Plutarch's *Vitae* in particular depart from the epideictic tradition to avoid unqualified praise or blame; in them we have nuanced accounts that allow positive qualities taken to excess to have disastrous consequences.<sup>67</sup>

Plutarch explicitly distinguishes his biographies from history, another closely-related genre.

οὔτε γὰρ ἱστορίας γράφομεν, ἀλλὰ βίους, οὔτε ταῖς ἐπιφανεστάταις πράξεσι πάντως ἔνεστι δῆλωσις ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας, ἀλλὰ πρᾶγμα βραχὺ πολλάκις καὶ ῥῆμα καὶ παιδιὰ τις ἔμφασιν ἦθους ἐποίησε μᾶλλον ἢ μάχαι μυριόνεκροι καὶ παρατάξεις αἱ μέγισται καὶ πολιορκίαι πόλεων ... οὖν ... οὕτως ἡμῖν δοτέον εἰς τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς σημεῖα μᾶλλον ἐνδύεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τούτων εἰδοποιεῖν τὸν ἐκάστου βίον ... (*Alex.* 1.2-3)

I am not writing histories but lives, and virtue and vice are not wholly manifest in the most overt actions, but often a small matter, either a word or a game, demonstrates character better than battles with untold numbers of dead and the greatest of armies and sieges of cities ... therefore ... I must rather be allowed to display signs of the soul, and through these to characterize the life of each person ...

Plutarch can be interpreted as suggesting (at least in this passage<sup>68</sup>) that biography reveals an individual's true or fundamental nature.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Momigliano 1971, 49-50. Momigliano (30-6) sees another strand of biographical tradition in (lost) Persian-influenced Greek biographies of the fifth century BCE; an example is Xanthos the Lydian's account of Empedokles, as reported by Aristotle (D.L. 8.63).

<sup>65</sup> Cf. Pernot 2005, 175-81, Whitmarsh 2005, 76-7. Setting out explicitly the standard *topoi*, Polybios (10.21) details the contents of his own earlier three-book encomium of Philopoemen: origin, childhood, youthful characteristics and aims, and a somewhat exaggerated account of later achievements.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. Momigliano 1971, 86-9.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. Whitmarsh 2005, 78; Pelling 1995, 205-20; Duff 1999, 54-5.

<sup>68</sup> If no development were possible, he would hardly stress the role of education and personal progress as he does in his *De audiendis poetis* (*Mor.* 14d-37b), *De audiendo* (*Mor.* 37c-48d) and *De profectibus in uirtute* (*Mor.* 75a-86a). The Pythagorean conception of successive rebirths suggests the possibility that development or learning over the course of a life will lead to a higher state of being – or at least a human life conducive to attaining one – in the next.

A variety of sources was available to Second Sophistic biographers; Diogenes Laertius, in particular, meticulously records his sources and provides us with the titles of many works now lost. For protagonists who were equivocally historical or mythological, the primary sources were the poets.<sup>69</sup> As well, there were the accounts of the mythographers,<sup>70</sup> and tales preserved in visual representation and oral tradition at the major cult centres of the Greek world (Ch. 1.2.2, 2.3.2). For political protagonists, there were the works of historians and the *encomia*/biographies of their contemporaries and near-contemporaries. Of particular interest in the present context is a tradition that has been associated with the Peripatetic School. Aristotle's stress on the systematic collection of facts to answer specific questions may have been an early stimulus to the production of books on specific virtues, natural phenomena, and different ways of life and philosophical schools. Herakleides Pontikos, Aristotle's contemporary and associate, composed works on Justice, Temperance, Piety, Courage, and Virtue in general (D.L. 5.86), on Nature, and on phenomena associated with the Heavens and the Underworld (D.L. 5.87). He (D.L. 5.87), as well as Klearchos of Soloi (Frg. 37-62 Wehrli) and Dikaiarchos (D.L. 3.4), wrote *Peri bion*, not biographies but accounts of different kinds of ways of life. Among those possibly influenced by the Peripatetics, Phantias of Erisos composed a *Peri ton Sokratikon* (D.L. 6.8), and Hermippos, a *Peri ton sophon* (D.L. 1.42). These genres did not remain unique to the Peripatetics. The Epikoureian Idomeneus wrote a (probably hostile) *Peri ton Sokratikon* (D.L. 2.20); little is known about Hippobotos, author of *Ton philosophon anagraphe* (D.L. 1.42).<sup>71</sup> Works of all of these kinds focused on, and so preserved, anecdotes (or other details or sayings) chosen for the points they made about protagonists;<sup>72</sup> when drawn from sources of these kinds, as they often are, the tales of liminal encounters that are the focus of this thesis were very likely to characterize or categorize the protagonist.

<sup>69</sup> Thus, for example, in his biography of Theseus, Plutarch cites Simonides (10.2, 17.5), Euripides (3.2, 15.2, 29.4-5) and (as contradicting Euripides), Aischylos (29.5).

<sup>70</sup> In the *Theseus*, Plutarch cites Herodotos' younger contemporary Hellanikos (31.1) and the later Herodoros (30.4), who wrote an extended biography of Herakles. For these, see *BNP s.vv.* Hellanicus, Herodorus (accessed 18.2.13). On the mythographers more generally, Henrichs 1987, 242-77.

<sup>71</sup> The Peripatetic connection is posited by Momigliano (1971, 66-89); for Hippobotos and Idomeneus, *BNP s.vv.* Hippobotos, Idomeneus (2) (accessed 21.2.13). Relevant also in the context (and with examples pre-dating Aristotle) are collections of apt remarks (*apophthegmata, chreiai, gnomai*), of wonders, and of anecdotes on particular subjects. Aristotle refers to preserved *apophthegmata* (Anaxagoras: *Metaph.* 1009b; Pittakos: *Rh.* 1389a; Stesichoros: *Rh.* 1395a); on the subject more generally, *BNP s.vv.* *Apophthegma, Chreia, Gnome* (accessed 18.2.13). Collections of wonders include most notably Theopompos' *Thaumasias* (D.L. 1.115, 117), those of anecdotes, (for example) the sub-genre originating in accounts of the death of Sokrates and Xenophon's account of the death of Cyrus (*Cyr.* 8.7.6-28) and named for Titinius Capito's *Exitus illustrium virorum* (Plin. *Ep.* 8.12.4); on the subject, *BNP s.v.* *Exitus illustrium virorum* (accessed 17.2.13). An important extant collection of *exempla* is Valerius Maximus' *Facta et dicta memorabilia*.

<sup>72</sup> Even Herakleides' account of the Underworld (D.L. 5.87) seems to have been a source of anecdotes characterizing Empedokles (D.L. 8.67-9).

Confirming both the prevalence of belief in a fixed nature or character and the pre-Second Sophistic emphasis on the stories that best illuminate it, as we shall see in Part A (Ch. 2), 'encounter' stories differentiate individuals and even rank them on a scale which culminates in the godlike or even divine; even when an encounter poses a challenge or test, the true nature of the protagonist is ultimately revealed. Perhaps more than any other kinds of incidents, encounters with the divine or semi-divine serve to diagnose an individual's worth.

### **1.3.2 Autobiography and liminal experience**

Autobiography in the modern sense of a 'mirror of the soul' – its subjectivity its defining feature and the source of its value – is often considered to have come into being with Augustine's *Confessions*.<sup>73</sup> Certainly, long after *Vitae* were recognized as a genre, autobiography in the sense of literary self-portrayal was not seen as a valuable or even acceptable activity. Personal accounts were interpreted as self-praise, and so intrinsically untrustworthy. Cicero writes to Lucceius: *ardeo cupiditate incredibili neque, ut ego arbitror, reprehendenda, nomen ut nostrum scriptis illustretur et celebretur tuis ...* (Fam. 5.12.1), 'I burn with an extraordinary and, I think, not reprehensible desire that my name be celebrated and made illustrious through your works ...', since

*uerecundius ipsi de sese scribant necesse est, si quid est laudandum, et praetereant, si quid reprehendendum est. accedit etiam ut minor sit fides, minor auctoritas, multi denique reprehendant ...* (Fam. 5.12.8)

it is necessary that those writing about themselves do so very modestly where anything is to be praised and pass over anything blameworthy; still, confidence [in the work] is rather small, [its] credibility rather small, and many censure ...

It is in this context that we can see Aristeides' comment after his description of an oratorical triumph: ἐμοὶ δ' οὐχ ἥδιον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις διατρίβειν (HL 5.16), 'but it is not too pleasant for me to linger over such things'.

Aristeides is obliged to defend self-praise (Or. 28) in response to a criticism of his own. He makes truthfulness the important criterion (Or. 28.13-14), and notes the self-praise of the inspired poets and their subjects, and of the gods (Or. 28.44-8). Notably, he comments on the

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<sup>73</sup> Cf. Misch 1950, 17; Pascal 1960, 21, 182; Humble and Sidwell 2006, 214.

wealthy, who purchase orators' praise (*Or.* 28.153) – presumably a reference to the biographical tradition of epideictic eulogy.

Different origins have been suggested for socially-acceptable autobiography. Whitmarsh sees them in *apologiai*; particularly famous was that of Sokrates, in Plato's (*Apologia*) and Xenophon's (*Apologia Socratis*) versions. Among the sources examined in Part A (Ch. 2) of this thesis are Apuleius' *Apologia*, written in response to charges of witchcraft, and Lucian's *Pro Imaginibus*, *Apologia*, *Piscator*, and *Bis Accusatus*, all of them *apologiai* that are also (sometimes slightly veiled) self-presentations, although less than full 'lives'. Plutarch's *De laude ipsius* allows self-praise in the context of an *apologia* (*Mor.* 540c), leaving open the possibility that early autobiographies (for example, Josephus') were self-consciously framed as *apologiai* to deflect criticism.<sup>74</sup>

Autobiographies could also be framed as personal notes. Literary works were typically worked up in finished or literary style from pre-existing notes: *apomnemonemata* (Latin: *memorabilia*), records of what was memorable or noteworthy, or *hypomnemata*, diaristic notes or memoranda. Aristeides refers to the loss of *hypomnemata* relating to his travels in Egypt at *Or.* 36.1. It seems likely that works in the style of his dream diary were enjoined on consultants of Asklepios (see Ch. 6.1) so that successes could be included in the temple records: we have seen the obligation placed upon Trophonios' consultants to record their experiences, and the role of chresmologues in recording oracles (Ch. 1.2.1). The Latin equivalent of *hypomnemata* was *commentarii*; Cicero promises Luceius, if he consents to write his biography, *commentarios rerum omnium* (*Fam.* 5.12.10).

Neither *apomnemonemata* nor *hypomnemata* were originally considered literary works in their own right: Philostratos saw Aristeides' published *Hieroi logoi* as guides to style rather than of value as an account of his life (*VS* 2.581).<sup>75</sup> However, many surviving works in *apomnemonemata* or *hypomnemata* style were sophisticated literature deliberately presented in these forms. Anderson points to Lucian's *Demonax* as a collection of *apomnemonemata* and

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<sup>74</sup> Cf. Whitmarsh 2005, 79-81. Josephus' is the earliest extant example of an autobiography in Graeco-Roman literature (cf. McGing and Mossman 2006, xv); it is presented as a defence of the author's conduct in Galilee in response to his critic, Justus of Tiberias. In his commentary on the work, Mason (2001) sees it as a planned sequel to the *Antiquitates Judaicae* designed to show its author's possession of the virtues praised in the earlier work; Justus, although possibly genuinely a critic, did not motivate its composition ('This interpretation of Josephus' *Life* ... completely displaces Justus' provocation as the occasion for writing. Josephus wrote because he wished, positively, to present his own life as an example of the culture and tradition he presents to his eager audience'; Mason 2001, xlix.) For a nuanced view attaching more importance to Justus, Rodgers 2006.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. Misch 1950, 509.

contrasts this with his *Nigrinus*, where a similar basis has been expanded into a Platonic dialogue.<sup>76</sup> However, Clay rightly notes that the *Demonax* is a sophisticated work taking its form from Xenophon's *Apomnemonemata/Memorabilia*.<sup>77</sup> Xenophon's work may well have established *apomnemonemata* as specifically the collected sayings and acts of a master<sup>78</sup> and a distinctive literary form. In parallel, from Hellenistic times the political and campaign diaries of powerful figures were deliberately published in diaristic or note form, to the extent that *hypomnemata* became the usual term for an autobiographical work.<sup>79</sup> Recent work stresses the devotional character of Aristeides' work.<sup>80</sup> The published *Hieroi logoi* are his own equivalent of a dedicatory inscription (Ch. 6.1); however, this must not obscure the fact that they are also sophisticated literary productions, deliberately presented (at least in part) in *hypomnemata* form.

Second Sophistic autobiographical writing was often presented apparently incidentally, in the context of arguing for something else, or else obliquely, posing a riddle. Plutarch provides glimpses of his own life in his works; however, as Lamberton has noted, these 'refuse to form a coherent picture; they are vivid pieces of a perverse jigsaw puzzle, arbitrarily and irrelevantly constituted and defined, very seldom offering a join, utterly oblivious to any larger picture that they might be assembled to form'.<sup>81</sup> Dion's similarly apparently incidental references to his own life will be discussed in Ch. 5. Lucian's veiled self-portrayal in apparently autobiographical works – he is 'the Syrian' in *Bis Accusatus*, 'Parrhesiades' in *Piscator*, the unnamed narrator in *Nigrinus* and the *Verae historiae*, and 'Lykinos' in works that include *Hermetimus* and *Pro Imaginibus* – has been related to Plato's self-concealment in his dialogues and to the traditions of Old Comedy;<sup>82</sup> certain of his autobiographical works present riddles whose correct interpretations are still open to debate.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Anderson 1986, 165.

<sup>77</sup> Clay 1992, 3426-8. Clay (3447) goes so far as to suggest that *Nigrinus* and *Demonax* are themselves Lucian's literary inventions.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. LSJ s.v. *apomnemonemata*.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Misch 1950, 186, 203-10. In the Latin-speaking world we have Sulla's *Commentarii* (Plut. *Sull.* 17.1); for these, Peter 1914-6/1967, vol. 1, 270-80.

<sup>80</sup> Quet 1993, 236-9, Petsalis-Diomidis 2006, 194-5.

<sup>81</sup> Lamberton 2001, 3-4.

<sup>82</sup> In the scholarship of the Alexandrian tradition, the poets were believed to have appeared in their own plays and used them to detail their own lives and to express their opinions of their rivals. Cf. Humble and Sidwell 2006, 214.

<sup>83</sup> On the *Nigrinus* and *Demonax*, see above; for different interpretations of the *Somnium*, Jones 1986, 9-10; Branham 1989, 28-9; Gera 1995, 237-50; Saïd 1993, 267-70; Humble and Sidwell 2006, 214-222. See also Ch. 5.2.2b.

The diagnostic incident that provides an outsider with evidence of the true nature of a protagonist's soul also reveals it to him or her; it becomes liminal – a psychological and social turning-point – in the person's life. As we shall see, encounters that are liminal in this sense – and, as well, liminal in a locational one – are a significant feature of ancient autobiographical writing, however it happens to be framed.

An additional point should perhaps be made. Though objectively or retrospectively the outcome of a (psychologically) liminal encounter may seem inevitable, as the event unfolds, to the individual involved, it may appear contingent, dependent on a choice that could easily go the other way. It is important to recognize that an after-the-event/before-the-event, objective/subjective dichotomy pertains regardless of the inevitability or contingency of any outcome *in fact*. Second Sophistic opinion favoured inevitability but made some allowance for contingency; as we shall see (Ch. 5.2.1b), an inevitable fate permitted variant outcomes manipulable by appropriate choice.

#### **1.4 An outline of the chapters to follow**

This initial chapter has explored the concept of liminality as it applies to place and to experience, and identified the kinds of places that were accounted liminal in the period of the Second Sophistic.

In Part A (comprising Ch. 2) of this thesis, a survey of Second Sophistic sources will identify those liminal places that figured most prominently in the Second Sophistic literary imagination, and the story patterns that made locationally liminal encounters experientially liminal in their protagonists' lives. It establishes first of all the traditional – historical and mythological – tales relating to the seeking out of the numinous Other that were most frequently repeated by Second Sophistic authors, noting the places most often said to be visited, those who were to be encountered there, the powers or knowledge associated with them, and the *paradigmatic stories* and *story paradigms* associated with encounters. A survey of Second Sophistic fictional accounts adds detail to the picture. The chapter demonstrates that, in spite of their diversity, the reported tales are overwhelmingly about their protagonists' status or capacities: in an encounter with the numinous, an individual is revealed as superior or even godlike, or as falling short.

Part B (Chs 3-6) of the thesis is an exploration of the use of the paradigms identified in Part A in two Second Sophistic biographies and two bodies of Second Sophistic autobiographical

writing. In all the works, story paradigms and parallels drawn between the protagonists and heroic figures from the past are used to assert the protagonists' superior or even godlike character – or lack of it. Ch. 3 is concerned with Philostratos' – rather than the historical – Apollonios of Tyana. It links his circuits of the liminal places of the world with the Pythagoreanism probably attributed to the historical figure, and it explores Philostratos' nuancing of his likeness to Pythagoras so as to retain the positive and gloss over the negative associations implicit in the imagery. In parallel, Ch. 4 demonstrates Lucian's use of Pythagorean and other paradigms associated with locationally liminal encounters to denigrate his Alexander. Chapters 5 and 6 focus respectively on the oracle to Dion described at his *Or.* 13.9, and the revelation of Asklepios to Aristeides recounted at *HL* 2.7. In these ostensibly autobiographical works, the two encounters – each presented by the author as both locationally and psychologically liminal – are examined, with consideration given to genre and the historical background as it is known from other sources. The intention is to identify paradigms lived out in practice – for example, by consulting an oracle – and to distinguish between accounts intended to be taken literally and those that use the imagery of a geographically liminal encounter to express metaphorically the psychologically liminal nature of an experience. Both chapters conclude with discussion of the conformity of the protagonist's experience to the van Gennep/Turner model.

Part C (Ch. 7) draws out issues characteristic of Second Sophistic (as opposed to earlier) literature; it addresses the author's communication to the reader of the lived experience of a liminal encounter, and the reader's engagement with the author in a text. The principal conclusions of the thesis are drawn together in Ch. 8.

**PART A. THE LIMINAL ENCOUNTER MOTIF IN SECOND  
SOPHISTIC LITERARY WORKS**



## 2 PARADIGMATIC STORIES AND STORY PARADIGMS RELATING TO LIMINAL ENCOUNTERS

### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter surveys the references to, and accounts of, encounters with the numinous or inspired or differently-human Other that are to be found in a substantial number of Second Sophistic and period works; the aim is to identify the associated paradigmatic stories and story paradigms prevalent in the period. Here, a **paradigmatic story** is a story so well-known that the briefest reference is sufficient to refer to it. Plutarch can refer to Chairephon returning from Delphi with 'the oracle about Sokrates that we all know' (*Mor.* 1116e-f; cf. Ch. 2.3.1). It is so identified with its protagonist that the protagonist can hardly be mentioned without suggesting it; conversely, and importantly in our context, reference to the tale evokes the protagonist. To refer to 'Labours' (*aethloi, athloi, ponoj, erga*; cf. Ch. 2.3.2) calls up the image of Herakles, and to associate Labours with a contemporary figure gives him the aura of Herakles, even if the comparison is not explicit. A **story paradigm** is rather different. It is a story pattern used repeatedly in different contexts and with different protagonists to illustrate a paradigmatic 'fact'. Marsyas, Thamyris and Linos, Phaethon and Ikaros, Aktaion and Ixion all suffer similar fates for challenging the gods; their stories make it clear that *challenging the gods ends in disaster*.

To be included in the survey, encounters must be in some way sought or elicited by those who experience them.<sup>1</sup> Protagonists typically (but not always) journey to 'liminal' places of the kinds discussed in Ch. 1 in order to bring them about.

The sources selected for the survey are the works of Dion of Prousa, Plutarch, Aelius Aristeides, Lucian, Apuleius (*Metamorphoses, Florida, and Apologia*), Pausanias, Philostratos (*Vita Apollonii, Vitae sophistarum*), Diogenes Laertius, Antonius Diogenes (*De incredibilibus*), and Heliodoros (*Aethiopica*). They have been chosen for their richness in examples of the motif, and as spanning the genres most characteristic of the Second Sophistic: real or pretended oratory (Dion, Aristeides, Lucian), biography (Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, Philostratos), ostensible

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<sup>1</sup> It is of fundamental importance that the protagonist is an active agent, seeking an answer or a benefit, even if the original search is later deemed to have been misguided. Thus a dream received (for example) in the precinct of a temple which has been the focus of a journey is included, but one that occurs spontaneously at home is not. No journey is necessary as long as the confrontation is intentional. Queen Persinna awaits the arrival of a sage whom she may consult (Heliod. *Aeth.* 4.12); Apuleius' Lucius seizes the opportunity at hand and prays to the goddess Isis on the seashore where he finds himself (Apul. *Met.* 11.1-2); threatened by pirates in the course of his voyage, Arion leaps into the sea (Plut. *Mor.* 160e-162b).

autobiography (Dion, Aristeides, Plutarch, Lucian, Pausanias), satire (Lucian), essays (Plutarch, Lucian), and fiction (Apuleius, Antonius Diogenes, Heliodoros).<sup>2</sup>

There can be little debate about either the dates of composition or the importance to the Second Sophistic literary tradition of most of these texts. However, some comment should probably be made about the dating of Antonius Diogenes and Heliodoros, and the choice to include their relatively marginal works. *De incredibilibus* is known principally from Photios' epitome.<sup>3</sup> Two papyrus fragments (*P.Oxy.* 3012 and *PSI* 1177) are written in hands usually assigned to the late second or early third century; the work was known late in the third century to Porphyry (Διογένους δ' ἐν τοῖς ὑπὲρ Θούλην ἀπίστοις, *VP* 10), and a late second century reference to it by Serenus Sammonicus can perhaps be inferred from Servius' commentary on Vergil's *Georgics* (1.30). Similarities between *De incredibilibus* and Lucian's *Verae historiae* were noted by Photios; the two works are approximately contemporary, but there is no reason to suppose that either author was known to the other.<sup>4</sup> Dates ascribed to Heliodoros' *Aethiopica* range from c. 250 CE to c. 350 CE.<sup>5</sup> The novel is included at the extreme end of the date range for this study because of its particular relevance to discussion of the *Vita Apollonii* as well as its general relevance to the 'liminal destination' theme.

A fairly obvious point but one that should perhaps be underlined is that, although the chosen bodies of work have been examined exhaustively, no claim is made to results that are statistically significant in relation to Second Sophistic literature as a whole. As noted, the works selected have been chosen for their richness in relevant material. Even without this limiting factor – and if it were possible to examine all surviving Second Sophistic works – the factors that secured the survival of the extant literature would inevitably skew our picture of the literary production of the period.

In this chapter, it will be demonstrated that, in spite of their apparent diversity, the traditional accounts preserved in Second Sophistic literature primarily make points about their

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<sup>2</sup> Of works sometimes attributed to Lucian, *Soloecista*, *Asinus*, *Amores*, *Demosthenis Encomium*, *Halcyon*, *Podagra*, *Ocybus*, *Cyniscus*, *Philopatris*, *Charidemus* and *Nero* are omitted as certainly or probably not by him. Among works sometimes attributed to Plutarch, the following are omitted as spurious: *Parallela Graeca et Romana*, *De fato*, *Narrationes amatoriae*, *Decem oratorum vitae*, *Aqua an ignis utilior sit*, *Compendium libri De animae procreatione in Timaeo*, *De musica*. Similarly among works attributed to Dion, *Orr.* 37, 63 and 64, and among works attributed to Aristeides, *Or.* 35, are excluded.

<sup>3</sup> Phot. *Bibl.* codex 166, 109a, 6 - 112a, 12 Bekker, referred to in future when the context is clear as Phot. 109a, 6 - 112a, 12.

<sup>4</sup> Stephens and Winkler 1995, 107-9, 118-20; Morgan 1985, 475-90. Photios (111b, 36-7) saw *De incred.* as the πηγή καὶ ῥίζα of the *VH*.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Morgan 1989, 352; Morgan prefers the later date. For further commentary on the dating of the work, Ch. 3.5.4.

protagonists' status.<sup>6</sup> In consequence, as we shall see (Chs 3-4), the association of contemporary and near-contemporary figures with historical or mythological individuals or with particular story patterns enabled Second Sophistic authors to demonstrate that their subjects were superior or even godlike, or else fell short; in autobiographical accounts (Chs 5-6), visits to liminal places become the liminal experiences that define their writers' identities and incidentally confirm the superior nature of their being. This chapter also locates the liminal destinations most regularly mentioned in Second Sophistic literary accounts, and characterizes the interlocutors who are most usually sought out. Whether and how an author conveys the *experience* of an encounter is not addressed, but will be taken up in Parts B and C, most specifically at Ch. 7.1.

## 2.2 Methodology

The analysis of accounts falls into broad sections dealing with different kinds of encounters and journeys.

### 2.2.1 Consultations at oracular shrines

Oracles are typically seen as verbal answers and pronouncements of the kinds issued by Apollo from his seats in Delphi, Klaros and Didyma. In Second Sophistic texts, Apollo responds with a χρησμός (D.Chr. 13.9) or μαντεῖον (Aristid. *HL* 3.12), or with a *sors* (Apul. *Met.* 5.17) – literally a *lot* – or *oraculum* (Apul. *Met.* 4.32-33). However, Apollo's oracles cannot be identified on the basis of terminology alone. They may simply be λόγοι (Philostr. *VA* 4.1.1). A god or prophet may pronounce an oracle (προμαντεύεσθαι at Luc. *Alex.* 11, χρησμοδεῖν at *Alex.* 25, χρῆν at Luc. *Philops.* 33) or simply predict or foretell (προειπεῖν at Heliod. *Aeth.* 4.19.3 and Luc. *Peregr.* 29, προαγορεύειν at Heliod. *Aeth.* 2.29.3) an event to come. The concept of an oracle can also be interpreted more broadly: Aristeides classes together the responses given by the prophetess at Delphi, the priestesses at Dodona, Trophonios, and in the dreams sent by Asklepios and Sarapis (*Or.* 45.7).

In the following discussion, an 'oracle' will be taken as a verbal answer or message from a god, acquired in a formal situation and conveyed through a religious professional – a priestess

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<sup>6</sup> 'Status' is used here to refer to standing, however measured, not simply social status.

or priest, or a chesmologue.<sup>7</sup> Because they are generally classed as 'oracles' in Second Sophistic literature, verbal communications from Trophonios, from Amphiaraos at Oropos, and from Amphilochos or Mopsos at Mallos in Kilikia will also be included, regardless of the method of consultation.<sup>8</sup> Communications from Asklepios' and any other incubation oracles will not be included unless they have become detached from the original consultation and seem to have circulated independently as oracles (a *logos* from Asklepios at Pergamon is mentioned as circulating with *logoi* from Kolophon and Didyma at Philostr. VA 4.1.1). The seven verses delivered directly to Eukrates (μοι καὶ ἔχρησεν ὁ Μέμνων αὐτὸς ἀνοίξας γε τὸ στόμα ἐν ἔπεσιν ἑπτὰ) by Memnon (Luc. *Philops.* 33) will be taken as an oracle.

### **2.2.2 Unmediated encounters with the divine**

Second Sophistic authors were heirs to a complex tradition conveyed not only in literary sources – Plutarch mentions the most stirring at *Mor.* 1093a-c – but in local oral traditions and the paintings and sculptures preserved at cult sites. Our analysis and discussion of pre-Second Sophistic unmediated encounters reported or referred to in the focal works will be confined to protagonists who are mortal though not specifically human. This allows for the inclusion of, for example, the satyr Marsyas, and Herakles and Dionysos before their apotheoses as gods.<sup>9</sup> Any distinction between mythical and historical protagonists will deliberately be avoided: modern distinctions are often different from the euhemerizing ones of the Second Sophistic writers, and the life-stories of genuinely historical figures were surrounded by accretions of myth. Only individual protagonists will be considered. Lesser-known historical figures will be identified and their approximate dates provided on Table 5.

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<sup>7</sup> Not included as 'oracles' are communications obtained after seeking out omens in a ritually prescribed way – usually in the entrails of a sacrifice, though Plutarch (*Agis* 11.3) describes ephors sitting in a presumably designated place at a particular time to watch the sky for a sign.

<sup>8</sup> Where appropriate, encounters with Trophonios are also included as 'direct encounters', as are all experiences at incubation oracles.

<sup>9</sup> Alpheios is a river-god, son of the Titans Okeanos and Tethys, at Hes. *Th.* 338. However, a later tradition (Paus. 5.7.2) presents him as a hunter transformed into a river as a result of his love for the huntress Arethousa (for discussion and variants, Grimal s.v. Alpheus). He is included among the protagonists. Dionysos' status was ambivalent. A son of Zeus, he was born prematurely by his human mother Semele and then again from Zeus' thigh (Apollod. 3.4.3; the tale is first referenced – without mention of the thigh – in a fragmentary Homeric Hymn to Dionysos [lines 6-7, Allen, Halliday, and Sikes]) and so could claim Zeus as both his father and his mother (e.g. *satumque iterum solumque bimatrem*, Ovid, *Met.* 4.12). In this study, in his period on earth, Dionysos appears both as mortal protagonist and – to his human challengers in the Greek world – a god.

Encounters are divided into those with 'monsters' (beings who are not ordinarily human or animal in capacity or form), ghosts or spirits, gods, and the unspecified divine. Defining the boundary between 'monsters' and the ordinarily human or animal is not without difficulty. Sinis (see Ch. 1.2.4) will be classed as a 'monster' for the more-than-human strength that earned him the epithet *pityokampes* (Plut. *Thes.* 8.2), Phaia, the sow of Krommyon, for being (Apollod. *Epit.* 1.1) more than simply a sow. Amazons lie on a boundary between aberrant forms of humanity and barbarian peoples. The distinction between god and monster is similarly blurred. 'Divine' beings were often credited with animal or semi-animal forms as they became genealogically further removed from the Olympian gods (App. 2.1.2). For the purposes of this study, the Titans will be classed along with Zeus and his siblings and personified forces of nature – rivers, winds – as 'gods'.<sup>10</sup> So, too, will Roman divinities and (in spite of the semi-animal form usually attributed to him) Pan. An encounter with a monster may conceal an encounter with its divine sponsor; the matter is taken up at Ch. 2.3.2.

Among figures liminally human and divine, humans (for example, maenads) who are possessed by a god will be classed as the god him- or herself. Heroes in their human lifetimes are simply humans. After their deaths they will be considered, along with the other dead, as 'ghosts and spirits'. The Dioskouroi will be classed as gods.

Like the other distinctions, that between encounters with the defined and the undefined Other is fluid. In some well-known stories (those of Empedokles and Epimenides), extant accounts offer no suggestion of an encounter with a particular god. Usually in stories of encounters with death by fire or drowning, no specific divinity is named. The encounter is with the element, or with death itself. Nevertheless, named divinities may appear as helpers, attendants, or saviours, to underline the nature of the encounter. An illustration of the death of Herakles described by Pausanias (3.18.10-16) shows Athena taking Herakles to dwell with the gods. When Odysseus confronts the waves (manifesting or personified as Poseidon) alone (Ch. 2.3.2), the goddess Ino/Leukothea takes pity on him, advises him to swim, and provides the protection of her veil (*Od.* 5.339-50); Athena plots his arrival in the land of the Phaiakians (*Od.* 5.375-87). Britomartis is saved from the sea by Artemis and 'made a goddess' (Paus. 2.30.3); Arion was probably assisted in the original version of his story by Apollo.<sup>11</sup> Theseus' identity (as

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<sup>10</sup> Titan descendants – other than Zeus and his siblings and personified forces of nature – are classed as 'monsters'; thus, Kalypto – a daughter of Atlas (*Od.* 1.52) who is himself son of the Titan Iapetos (Hes. *Th.* 507-9) – is a 'monster', although Homer calls her a 'goddess'. Rulers of human kingdoms and their siblings are classed as human beings, regardless of the ancestry attributed to them.

<sup>11</sup> Herodotus (1.24) makes no mention of Apollo. However, Griffiths (2006, 139-40) suggests reasonably that Arion's performance only makes sense as an appeal for help to his patron god; Herodotus edited out

son of Poseidon) and/or power over the sea is confirmed by a symbol presented by a goddess (Paus. 1.17.3). Just as the sea may or may not explicitly be identified as or associated with Poseidon, so the liminal site of Delphi may or may not explicitly be associated with Apollo:<sup>12</sup> the shepherds' first numinous experience there can be described with (Paus. 10.5.7) or without (Plut. *Mor.* 433c-d, 435d) reference to the god. More generally, in reports of numinous experience, naming a god rationalizes the experience and sums up the protagonist's interpretation of it. Aristeides refers to Asklepios' prescriptions with such phrases as 'the god instructs' (προσάπτει ὁ θεός, *HL* 1.6) or 'the god ordained' (ὁ θεὸς ἀνεῖλεν, *HL* 1.58) though, as his detailed descriptions show (see Ch. 6.2.1a), his dreams only rarely took the form of manifestations of the god.

Episodes are categorized as the individual accounts suggest. However, if an encounter of an obscure kind happens at the sanctuary of a god or a place associated with a particular god or spirit, it is ascribed to that god or spirit; thus, for example, the first experience of the numinous at Delphi is listed as an encounter with Apollo.

The very well-known nature of some of the protagonists and stories meant that very slight references – a few words quoting or echoing more remotely a famous account – were sufficient to evoke them.<sup>13</sup> Far from obvious to the modern reader, for example, is Lucian's reference at *Fug.* 20 to Kirke's description to Odysseus of the dangers of Charybdis: μὴ σύ γε κέῃθι τύχοις ('may you never chance to be there') quotes directly from *Od.* 12.106. As many relevant references as possible have been included in the Tables.

Some problems of definition have required somewhat arbitrary but at least consistent resolution. Are we justified in conflating accounts emphasizing different aspects of what was presumably seen as a single encounter? In the following analysis, Midas' capture of Silenos with wine (Paus. 1.4.5, Philostr. *VA* 6.27.2) and his wringing from him an answer about happiness (Plut. *Mor.* 115b, 115d) are classed together. When can a reference simply to an individual be regarded as alluding to a particular, famous, story about him or her? In the analysis, any references to Proteus that simply mention his shape-changing are included as references to his

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the god in accordance with a self-imposed rule not to mention divine intervention in the historical as opposed to the legendary period.

<sup>12</sup> Or another deity in myth preceding him on the site. Legends suggesting that Apollo took over possession of Delphi from Ge and her daughter Themis are recorded after 500 BCE, but the earliest reference to the oracle's beginnings in the *Hymnus Homericus ad Apollinem* (281-374) mentions only Apollo. Cf. Fontenrose 1978, 1.

<sup>13</sup> On the difficulties associated with determining what constitutes an allusion, Finkelpearl 2001.

encounter with Menelaos, even if they do not mention the Homeric context.<sup>14</sup> References to Sirenes or to Skylla and Charybdis *per se* are omitted because they belong independently to the stories of the Argonauts and of Odysseus, and to Pegasos *per se*, because he is found in the mythic cycles of both Perseus and Bellerophon. Medousa's head – cut off by Perseus – had a separate 'life' as an emblem on Athena's costume; when the priestess Iodama saw it, she was turned to stone (Paus. 9.34.2). Thus mention of the head *per se* cannot be taken as a reference to the Perseus story.

### **2.2.3 Journeys to the 'edges of the earth' and dwelling-places of the wise associated with them**

The expansion of the known world and the gradual incorporation into the Roman Empire of places formerly seen as the numinous edges of the earth were discussed at Ch. 1.2.3. Since an aim of this study is to identify places retaining or gaining the aura of geographical 'liminality' in the period of the Second Sophistic, any destination with a non-Graeco-Roman cultural tradition will be considered appropriate for inclusion on Table 7. Destinations in the ancient Greek-speaking world – including Sicily and Krete – and Italy are excluded. Alexandria, long at least in part culturally Greek, is included but distinguished from 'Egypt' to the south. Destinations excluded *per se* are nevertheless included when they are parts of more expansive world circuits.

Interlocutors associated with geographically liminal places – the divine, the monstrous and, in particular, the 'wise' who are to be found in them – are identified in the course of the analysis. The circles of Hellenistic monarchs are not included among the latter: those who go to Ptolemy Soter (Demetrios of Phaleron, D.L. 5.78) or to Ptolemy Philopater in Alexandria (Sphairos of Bosphoros, D.L. 7.177) are not seeking non-Greek wisdom.

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<sup>14</sup> For example: κάπειτα Πρωτέως τινός δίκην ἀλλάττων καὶ μετατιθεὶς αὐτὸν (D.Chr. 33.60), 'then, in the manner of a certain Proteus, changing and transforming himself'; Πρωτέως τινός οὐκ εὐτυχοῦς οὐδὲ πάνυ χρηστοῦ τὸ ἔργον, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ γοητείας ἑαυτὸν εἰς ἕτερον εἶδος ἐξ ἑτέρου μεταλλάττοντος (Plut. *Mor.* 97a), 'the work of a certain Proteus, not fortunate or very good but by sorcery changing himself from one form to another'; καὶ ὄλως ποικιλώτερος αὐτοῦ Πρωτέως (Luc. *Sacr.* 5), 'and altogether more changeable than Proteus himself'.

## 2.3 Pre-Second Sophistic tales and their associated paradigms

### 2.3.1 Oracle tales

This study is particularly concerned with stories that were frequently repeated and so obviously well-known. **Table 1** identifies the more 'famous' oracular consultations made by pre-Second Sophistic protagonists, that is, those recounted (in some variant) in the focal sources listed at the outset of this chapter more than once. Given the many oracle stories (and particularly those associated with Delphi) gathered in the table, the first point that should perhaps be made is that even more have been excluded by the requirement for at least two references. Even a cursory examination of the collections made by Parke and Wormell (1956) and by Fontenrose (1978) shows that many oracle stories are recorded only once in extant sources.

Among the stories cited more than once, some stand out as particularly popular. That of the oracle to Chairephon (T1.1) is cited thirteen times, those establishing Sparta's laws (T1.5) and giving Athens a 'wooden wall' (T1.24) nine times, the god's spontaneous acknowledgement of Lykourgos (T1.4) and the answer to Kroisos' test question (T1.20) seven times, and both the the answer to Kroisos' real question (T1.21) and the oracle to Kadmos (T1.47) six times. In cases like these, the slightest hint can serve as a reference to the story. In his argument at *Mor.* 1116e-f, Plutarch can refer to three (or four) of the tales (T1.1, 4, 5, 24) in a single paragraph:

ὁ Κωλώτης, καὶ διηγησάμενος ὅτι χρησμόν ἐκ Δελφῶν περὶ Σωκράτους ἀνήνεγκε Χαιρεφῶν, ὃν ἴσμεν ἅπαντες, ταῦτ' ἐπέειρηκε· τὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦ Χαιρεφῶντος διὰ τὸ τελέως σοφιστικὸν καὶ φορτικὸν διήγημα εἶναι παρήσομεν. φορτικὸς οὖν ὁ Πλάτων ὁ τοῦτον ἀναγράψας τὸν χρησμόν, ἵνα τοὺς ἄλλους ἐάσω· φορτικώτεροι δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὸν περὶ Λυκούργου χρησμόν ἐν ταῖς παλαιοτάταις ἀναγραφαῖς ἔχοντες· σοφιστικὸν δ' ἦν διήγημα τὸ Θεμιστοκλέους, ᾧ πείσας Ἀθηναίους τὴν πόλιν ἐκλιπεῖν ...

After narrating that Chairephon brought back from Delphi the oracle about Sokrates that we all know, Kolotes spoke thus: 'we shall pass over Chairephon's account because of its being completely sophistic and vulgar'. Then Plato, who described this oracle, was vulgar, not to mention the others: more vulgar were the Lakedaimonians, keeping in their most ancient records the oracle about Lykourgos; and the tale about Themistokles was sophistic, the one in which he persuaded the Athenians to abandon the city ...

A few words from a famous oracle were sufficient to specify it. Using the god's own answer to Kroisos' test question (T1.20), Plutarch claims that the Pythia can deliver oracles immediately, before any question is put to her, since the god whom she serves 'understands the

dumb and hears the silent' (κωφοῦ ξυνήσι καὶ οὐ λαλέοντος ἀκούει, *Mor.* 512e, T1.20). Lucian relates the same words to the art of dance (*Salt.* 62). Heliodoros can use the fame of the god's acknowledgement of Lykourgos (T1.4) as a joke: Kalasiris claims that the Delphians 'were saying that I had come to the god beloved [only] after a certain Lykourgos of Sparta' (φίλον ἤκειν με τῷ θεῷ μετὰ Λυκοῦργόν τινα Σπαρτιάτην λέγοντες, *Aeth.* 2.27.1). This kind of fame is the marker of paradigmatic stories.

In other cases – possibly those in which oral versions of a story circulated freely – a single story seems to have given rise to a complex of variants.<sup>15</sup> Two sets of stories of this kind provide evidence of the assimilation of oracle stories to Delphi. In some variants of the story complex noted at T1.15, a discovered tripod is claimed by both Miletos and Kos, and the two cities jointly consult the (Delphic) oracle for adjudication. The oracle awards the tripod 'to the wisest' and it is sent immediately to Thales, who was associated with Miletos. Thales passes it on to others of the wise, and in two of the multiple versions (D.L. 1.29, 1.32) – that at D.L. 1.29 without any oracular pronouncement – when it returns to him, he presents it to Apollo Didymeus or Apollo Delphinos of Miletos. It seems clear that the oracle originally consulted must have been that of Apollo at Didyma. Similarly, in one of the versions of a story about Diogenes the Cynic (T1.39) that was known to Diogenes Laertius (D.L. 6.20-1), the oracle obtained by Diogenes is ascribed, probably correctly, to the Delion at Sinope, the city in which the story is set.<sup>16</sup>

Turning now to story paradigms, we note two groups of stories evidenced in Table 1. In the first, a person (later famous) asks for life direction or about his destiny, or whether he is fated to be eminent, or what he can do in order to become eminent. Questions of these kinds must be considered together because of the complex interrelationship that existed between identity or ability, destiny, and what one ought to do. Some protagonists ask apparently simple questions about appropriate action in an immediate situation. Diogenes the Cynic asks whether he should adulterate the currency in the mint where he is in charge (T1.39), Battos, what he should do about the speech defect that makes him ineffective as an orator (T1.12). Others ask –

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<sup>15</sup> The preservation of variants was due to the efforts of the (principally) Hellenistic chroniclers who recorded them (Ch. 1.3.1). The Seven Sages were of particular interest. Diogenes Laertius (1.41-2) mentions those attempting to enumerate them: Maiandrios, Plato, Ephoros, Dichaiarchos, Hermippos (whose *Peri ton sophon* must have been devoted to them) and Hippobotos in his *Ton philosophon anagraphē*.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Fontenrose 1978 s.vv. Q76, Q201. In another instance of assimilation to Delphi, Kadmos asks where he should settle (T1.47); although extant sources associate the oracle he obtains with Delphi, the Kadmos legend dates from before the eighth century, so any direction given in it would have come from a seer (Teiresias or Ismenos) or a god; cf. Fontenrose 1978 s.v. L11. The 'Apollo' who advises Telephos at T1.50 may have originally been Apollo Lykios; cf. Fontenrose s.v. L34.

perhaps indirectly – about major undertakings and the capacities that establish their identities and determine their destinies. Chilon (or Anacharsis) asks 'who is wisest' in the hope (Paus. 1.22.8) of hearing that it is himself (T1.14). The Persian commander Mardonios asks how he can take Hellas (T1.26). Apparently more thoughtfully,<sup>17</sup> Kroisos asks whether he should make war on the Persians (T1.21) – his real question is whether, if he does so, he is destined to win. Alexander approaches the oracle of Ammon with an unspoken question about his destiny (T1.58). Orestes' question (T1.46) is essentially about the nature of his destiny. Apollo confirms that he must do his duty and kill his father's murderers; otherwise (in Aischylos' version of the story) he will be homeless and friendless and forbidden access to sacred rites (*Ch.* 270-96). Origin (he is Agamemnon's son) and destiny are inextricably linked.

More instances of career and destiny-related questions can be found when the restriction to repeated stories is removed. **Table 2** lists all the questions relevant to destiny or career put to oracles by pre-Second Sophistic protagonists, and the oracular responses. The nature and outcomes of the question-and-answer exchanges can be summarized as follows.

Often, irrespective of the wisdom of the original question, the response brings about significant, appropriate, and welcome career direction. Telesilla asks about her health (T2.16) and is directed to a religious vocation; Teisamenos, about having children (T2.18), and he becomes (after first misunderstanding the answer) state diviner at Sparta. Zenon (T2.22) and Diogenes (T2.19) – when he correctly interprets his oracle – are directed to philosophy, and Cicero (T2.24), to his future career. Battos (T2.9) frames a question with a relatively limited career in mind (oratory was a necessity in most public roles), and the god specifies a superior and more fitting one.<sup>18</sup> Most noteworthy are oracles advising Xenophon (T2.1) and Themistokles (T2.44) at crucial decision points in their lives.

In a related type, the protagonist is a king or other leader and the venture, settlement. Oracles advise an extended list of the founders of cities or colonies where to go.<sup>19</sup> Unsurprisingly, most of the surviving oracle stories detail successes. That colonies could fail is evident from T2.7, where success eludes until the place that the god specified is identified. In the case of Timesias (T2.8), an unpropitious oracle is supposedly a warning that the recipient will be

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<sup>17</sup> Cf. Sokrates' criticism of Xenophon in a parallel context (D.L. 2.49-50, T2.1).

<sup>18</sup> This is Plutarch's interpretation of the traditional story at *Mor.* 405b-c.

<sup>19</sup> See T2.5, 6, 7, 9, 25, 29, 30, 32, 34, 36, 37, 48.

driven from his settlement by hostile Thracians.<sup>20</sup> In theory, a would-be leader could have been rejected outright by the god.

Oracles at the 'destiny' end of the spectrum reveal the questioner's identity, status and fate. Some oracles – those to Kypselos of Corinth (T2.11), Kleotimos on behalf of his brother Prokles (T2.13), Kroisos (T2.15), and Attalos I of Pergamon (T2.23) – are concerned with the gaining or retaining of power. Particularly notable are the oracles addressed to those contemplating wars of conquest: Kroisos (T2.14), Philip of Macedon (T2.20), Alexander (T2.21 and T2.39), and Agesilaos of Sparta (T2.45).<sup>21</sup> In all these cases, an apparently favourable response is a powerful accreditation of the questioner himself. Oracles prescribing a fearful destiny – for Oidipous (T2.31) and Alkmaion (T2.33) as well as Orestes as noted above (T2.28 = T1.46) – link destiny with identity and ancestry. Moreover, success (in particular, for a ruler) was linked with establishing a dynasty – it is in this context that we should understand oracles (T2.11, 23) granting kingdoms to sons but not to grandsons or great-grandsons – so oracles associated with having children – to Teisamenos (T2.18), Aigeus, king of Athens (T2.26), Erginos, king of Orchomenos (T2.27), and Laios, king of Thebes (T2.31) – can be seen as a related type.

Certain questions seem implicitly to seek self-affirming answers. Diogenes (in one variant of his story) and Cicero ask about becoming famous/obtaining the highest reputation (T2.19, 24).<sup>22</sup> Chilon (or Anacharsis) asks about his status in a hierarchy of the wise (T2.12 = T1.14 above) and is cut down to size. In this context, it is worth noting too that the god can refuse to speak to a suppliant (Kallondes Korax, T2.10), or can acclaim him before he asks anything at all (Lykourgos, T2.3 = T1.4).

In the second group of stories suggested by Table 1, an oracle accredits a living human being other than the questioner himself.<sup>23</sup> All relevant accounts from the focal sources are listed in **Table 3**. In some of them, the oracle accredits an individual with no prompting from the questioner(s); in others that presumably more accurately reflect historical situations, a

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<sup>20</sup> Fontenrose (1978, 142) sees the supposed oracle as an invention based on a proverb and inserted into the story of the foundation of Abdera; the latter is described, without mention of an oracle, at Hdt. 1.168.

<sup>21</sup> Oracles were also given to those already involved in wars: Mardonios (T2.17) and his Lydian envoy (T2.42), Hannibal (T2.41), and another envoy of Mardonios, Mys (T2.47). But in these cases, the decision point was probably past.

<sup>22</sup> For discussion of the question form, Ch. 5.2.1a.

<sup>23</sup> Oracles could also accredit the deceased (if only as powerful spirits capable of causing harm): well-known responses (Table 1) refer to Theseus (T1.28), Kleomedes (T1.29), Oibotas (T1.30), Theagenes (T1.31) and Pausanias (T1.32). On the last, Fontenrose 1978, 129-31.

questioner asks about a particular individual. Most notably, Chairephon asks about the wisdom of Sokrates (T3.1 = T1.1).

Oracles can point to those best qualified to fill particular roles. Aigon is the god's choice as king of the Argives (T3.3), Echelaos, as leader of the Aiolian colonists to Asia (T3.10), Aleuas, as king of the Thessalians (T3.11). Plutarch records a tale of an elaborate fraud attributed in the tradition to Lysander. In this plan, an ancient oracle – supposedly long kept secret by priests at Delphi – proclaiming that it was better for the Spartans to choose their kings from the best citizens rather than the traditional kingly families was to be brought to light. Lysander, one of the Herakleidai but not from a kingly family, would then certainly have been chosen king. In the event, the plot was aborted when one of the key figures drew back (*Lys.* 25.2-26-4).

In parallel with accreditations are warnings against individuals in their prospective roles. An oracle warns Spartans against a 'lame kingship' (χωλή βασιλεία), variously interpreted<sup>24</sup> (T1.27); Apollo expresses disapproval of Melas, from near Sikyon, as a settler (T1.43) but Aletes of Corinth allows him in, and his descendents later displace Aletes' as rulers.

Individuals can be accredited other than as kings or leaders.<sup>25</sup> As noted above, one of the most often-mentioned oracles is that affirming the wisdom of Sokrates (T3.1 = T1.1). The oracle to Anacharsis or Chilon accredits Myson as 'wise' (T3.6 = T1.14). In a tale of an oracle fraudulently obtained, Herakleides bribes envoys and the Pythia to proclaim that famine will cease if they crown him with a golden crown in life and honour him as a hero after death (T3.8). In the event, Herakleides dies of a stroke while receiving the crown.

A small but important group of oracles (Tables 2 and 3) accredits an individual to the extent of calling him, or suggesting that he is, divine. The most obvious case is that of Lykourgos, who arrives at Delphi to request the god for laws or approval of already-formulated laws (T2.3). In a spontaneous oracle, before he can even speak, the god commends him. Herodotos (1.65) records a four-line verse oracle ending: δίζω ἢ σε θεὸν μαντεύσομαι ἢ ἄνθρωπον· ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ

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<sup>24</sup> Lysander promoted the kingship of Agesilaos (brother of the deceased king Agis), who was lame, against the claims of Leotychides (supposed son of Agis), on the grounds that the latter was illegitimate. Against Agesilaos, Diopithes cited the (unsourced) oracle; Lysander then claimed (successfully) that the lameness the oracle referred to was in fact illegitimacy (Plut. *Ages.* 3.4).

<sup>25</sup> A kind of accreditation oracle surprisingly common but not included in the Table is the demand that a certain person be offered or offer him- or herself as a human sacrifice. The individual is usually of high status. Plague will cease in Kalydon when the maiden Kallirhoe or one prepared to die for her is sacrificed (Paus. 7.21.2-3); success in war will be obtained if the noblest citizen agrees to die by his own hand (Paus. 9.17.1); for an Athenian victory, one of the children of Herakles must die a voluntary death (Paus. 1.32.6); for success in battle, Marathon must make himself a voluntary sacrifice (Plut. *Thes.* 32.4); the Athenians will be victorious if their king is killed or, that side will win whose king is killed (T1.54); a drought will be averted by stoning king Oinoklos (T1.57).

μᾶλλον θεὸν ἔλομαι, ὧ Λυκόοργε, 'I doubt whether to declare you god or man but, I think, rather a god, Lykourgos'. The seventh-century poet Archilochos is accredited by the god as immortal (*athanatos*) in an oracle to his father reported by Dion (T3.5). The meaning is perhaps immortal as a poet; at 33.11, Dion calls Homer and Archilochos the two poets with whom no other can be compared. The god's high opinion of Archilochos is confirmed by a spontaneous oracle after his death, noted above, expelling his killer from the temple (T2.10); in this account, Archilochos is called by Apollo only a man sacred to the Muses (Plut. *Mor.* 560e), or a servant of the Muses (D.Chr. 33.12). The contemporary musician Thaletas of Gortyn in Krete is accredited to the Spartans as possessing the ability to stop plague (T3.4). His staying of the plague is mentioned (with no reference to the oracle) at Paus. 1.14.4; here, significantly, Pausanias pairs him with Epimenides who, as we shall see (Ch. 2.3.2), was regarded as a more-than-ordinarily human figure. Finally, an oracle to Philip of Macedon (T3.7) indicates clearly that the unborn Alexander is Ammon's son.<sup>26</sup>

The paradigms discussed so far relate to the content rather than the verbal peculiarities of oracles. Many of the oracular consultations listed in Table 1 elicit ambiguous oracles. **Table 4** limits Table 1 to oracles 'ambiguous' in the sense that aspects intended (by the god) to confuse or mislead or test recipients were read into them by Second Sophistic writers. These 'ambiguous' oracles are subdivided into two categories: those seen as riddles by their recipients, and those seen only in retrospect (by the protagonist or others) as having presented a riddle or the need for careful thought. Among those 'seen as riddles' are responses couched in what appears to be metaphorical language. Instances range from fairly obvious metaphors – Ἄσκοῦ τὸν προὔχοντα πόδα ... μὴ λύσης πρὶν δῆμον Ἀθηνέων εἰσαφικέσθαι (Plut. *Thes.* 3.3, T4.12), 'Do not open the spigot of the wineskin [i.e. do not have sex] until you come to Athens' – to the relatively obscure: εὔτε τράγος πίνησι Νέδης ἐλικόρροον ὕδωρ, οὐκέτι Μεσσήνην ῥύομαι (Paus. 4.20.1, T4.1), 'when a he-goat drinks the whirling water of the Neda, I will no longer protect Messene'.

On examination, just under half (28 out of 69) of the 'famous' oracles of Table 1 prove 'ambiguous' in one or other of these senses. Particularly noteworthy is the ambiguity of some of the very best-known. Sokrates famously interprets the god's apparently straightforward answer to Chairephon (T4.16 = T1.1) as a riddle at Pl. *Ap.* 21b. After his fall, Kroisos tackles the god for giving him misleading oracles (i.e. T4.20 = T1.21) and the god responds by pointing out the less-than-obvious ambiguity – the fault was after all Kroisos' own (Hdt. 1.91). Herodotos (7.142) reports debate in Athens about the meaning of the oracle of the 'wooden wall' (T4.6 = T1.24).

<sup>26</sup> For different ways of viewing the 'divinity' of Alexander, Ch. 1.2.4, 2.5.1, 3.4.2a, 4.4.

A different categorization could separate the oracular responses listed in Table 4 into those that require the correct interpretation of a metaphor or homonym and those that pose some other kind of riddle. Oracles that are literally ambiguous – those involving a metaphor or homonym – fall into subclasses categorized by folklorists. In the 'Jerusalem Chamber' type, the indicated sign of doom – something apparently easily avoidable – turns out to be other than the protagonist imagined. Told that he will be buried in 'Lybissan' earth, Hannibal assumes a victorious homecoming; in fact, he dies in Lybissa in Bithynia (T4.27). In the 'Macduff' or 'Birnam Wood' type, a protagonist is told that his power will last until something apparently incredible happens. Assured that he will reign until a mule becomes king of the Medes, Kroisos fails to see the danger posed by Kyros, half Persian and half Mede (T2.15).<sup>27</sup> Table 4 includes many examples of oracular answers involving metaphors or homonyms. Told to annex 'Sicily', the Athenians fail to realize that the god (at Dodona) means a small hill of that name not far from Athens (T4.28). Told that they will conquer the Peloponnese if they 'await the third harvest and go through the road of the narrows', the Herakleidai misunderstand and try unsuccessfully to force a way through the Isthmos (T4.25). Three generations later they successfully cross the strait between Capes Antirrhion and Rhion, near Naupaktos (Apollod. 2.8.2). Plutarch suggests a less-than-obvious metaphor embedded in an oracular answer at T4.22. In need of advice about their military campaign in Sicily, the Athenians sought the god's advice and were directed to fetch the priestess of Athena from Erythrai (*Mor.* 403b) or Klazomenai (*Nic.* 13.4). They sent for the woman and found that she was called Hesychia, Quiet; Plutarch concludes that quiet was what the god (*daimonion*) advised for the city at the time (*Nic.* 13.6). As in the previous examples, hindsight is involved; the Athenians perceived no hidden message in the priestess' name and came to disaster in Syracuse.

Oracles that pose other kinds of riddles are more diverse. Those that are most patently riddles are those in which the oracle itself asks a question, putting the onus on the protagonist. A discovered tripod is to go τῷ σοφωτάτῳ (Plut. *Sol.* 4.1, T4.4). Oracles less obviously seen as riddles include those easily understood superficially but in fact requiring proper attention to the literal meaning of the god's words. The Delians are told to double the size of their altar and, in the accounts at Plut. *Mor.* 386e and 579b, take the response as a mathematical riddle, though it would surely have been easy to understand it more generally (T4.10). As it turns out (*Mor.* 386e, 579c-d), their literal approach is the correct one, although they fail to appreciate the god's underlying intent. In the context of the oracle to Laios (T4.24), Dion suggests that the god gave

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<sup>27</sup> The example is excluded from Table 1 and so from Table 4 because it is cited only once in the focal sources.

two commands – ἔχρησεν οὖν μὴ γεννᾶν, ἢ ἐκτιθέσθαι γεννήσαντα, 'he commanded not to beget, or, having begotten, *not* to expose' – neither of which Laios obeyed (10.24-5).

In the discussion so far, reported oracles and the interpretations given them traditionally and by Second Sophistic writers have been taken at face value. It seems obvious that in fact many oracular responses were wrong and that finding 'ambiguities' in them served to save the god's face. As well, the 'fact' that oracles were ambiguous provided opportunities for story construction: any riddle or ambiguity could be given context as an oracle tale. Fontenrose suggests that the story about the oracle to Kroisos (T2.15) was developed from a riddle: Q: What 'mule' sat on the throne of Persia? A: Kyros, son of a Persian and a Mede. Along similar lines, the responses at T4.1 and T4.2 both seem to have been constructed from the riddle: Q: What is the 'goat' (*tragos*) who dips his beard in the water? A: A wild fig tree (also *tragos*), whose boughs dip down into a stream.<sup>28</sup> Zenon of Kition asks the god what he should do to attain the best life and is told that συγχρωτίζοιτο τοῖς νεκροῖς (he should be in contact with the dead); in consequence, he studies ancient authors (T2.22). Σ Ar. *Nu.* 144 claims that the line came from a comic poet. It was possibly a common saying later incorporated as a riddling oracle into the legend of the philosopher.<sup>29</sup>

Interpretations and literary developments of these kinds would hardly have been possible without a preexisting paradigm establishing that the god did indeed speak in riddles. In any investigation of the possible origins of such a paradigm, major studies of the mantic interview at Delphi by Amandry (1950), Parke and Wormell (1956), and Fontenrose (1978) are relevant, as are more recent studies of the oracles of Asia Minor and of particular aspects of the procedure at Delphi by Parke (1985), Fontenrose (1988), Compton (1994), Maurizio (1995, 1997, 2001), and Bowden (2005).<sup>30</sup>

We know very little about the mantic session at Delphi: few Greek or Latin authors whose works have come down to us consulted the oracle or attended a consultation; and Plutarch, who was a priest at Delphi, says little. Certainly, oracles were spoken by the Pythia, inspired by the god, from a tripod in the *adyton*.<sup>31</sup> Whether the priestess's inspiration was

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<sup>28</sup> Cf. Fontenrose 1978, 63, 80-1.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Fontenrose 1978, s.v. Q224. The oracle to Zenon is excluded from Table 1 and so from Table 4 because it is cited only once in the focal sources.

<sup>30</sup> The discussion to follow draws largely on Fontenrose 1978, 196-232. Compton (1994) draws up a picture of the mantic session (very similar to Fontenrose's) using only Herodotos as a source. Bowden (2005) looks at evidence provided by tragedies written for fifth century Athens' City Dionysia. Maurizio (1995, 1997, 2001) is concerned with oracles as oral performance and authoritative female speech.

<sup>31</sup> We know with some certainty that she prepared herself by bathing in the Kastalian spring (Σ E. *Ph.* 224), and burned bay leaves and barley meal on an altar before mounting the tripod (Plut. *Mor.* 397a).

assisted by vapours from the earth has long been a matter of conjecture.<sup>32</sup> Whatever the truth of the matter, only two accounts suggest anything other than a completely rational and intelligible priestess, one of them not 'historical'<sup>33</sup> and the other, a description of an extraordinary occasion.<sup>34</sup> Could inquirers see the Pythia throughout the session, or was she screened from view? We do not know for certain, but only one passage from a reliable source (Plut. *Mor.* 438b) even remotely suggests that inquirers could hear but not see the Pythia throughout the interview. There is no suggestion that any shrine official acted as a go-between between the Pythia and a consultant, except when an inquirer consulted Delphi by means of envoys. In that case, a prophet/priest sealed a written response in an envelope to be returned to the inquirer.<sup>35</sup> On the basis of 'historical' responses and Plutarch's comments in *De Pythiae oraculis*, Fontenrose believes that the Pythia responded in person, audibly, coherently and unambiguously, to all the questions put at Delphi. No subsequent research seems to have called into question the essential correctness of this view.<sup>36</sup>

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Probably at this point she drank from the spring Kassotis; Pausanias (10.24.7) believes that it was from this that she drew her inspiration.

<sup>32</sup> A famous story describes how a goatherd stumbled upon a cave whose vapours gave him the power of prophecy (Plut. *Mor.* 435d). Excavations in the first half of the twentieth century failed to find any trace of a source of vapours (Amandry 1950, 215-30). In this context and reviewing the literary evidence, Fontenrose (1978, 197-203) regarded Plutarch's *pneumata*, *dynameis*, *anathymiaseis* and *atmoi* as theoretical rather than perceptible to the senses, and rejected the suggestion of a vapour-inspired trance. More recently, geological investigation of the area around Delphi suggests that the temple was built at a point where two fault lines cross. There is evidence that gases did come up along these fault lines and that these gases included ethylene which, in low concentrations, induces a trance-like effect. Nevertheless, given the variation in the phenomenon necessarily occurring over the 1000 years of the life of the oracle, and the fact that trances can be produced without vapours, and oracles without trances, it is unlikely that vapours were of major importance (cf. Bowden 2005, 19). As an alternative to vapours, Lucian (*BisAcc.* 1) and his older contemporary Oinomaos (*ap. Eus. PE* 5.28.9) both suggest that prophets of Apollo in general became inspired by chewing bay leaves.

<sup>33</sup> Fontenrose (1978, 7-8) classes an oracular response as 'historical' if its accepted probable date fell within the lifetime of the writer who attested it, or not long before the date of the inscription that recorded it.

<sup>34</sup> The first details Appian Claudius Pulcher's interview with a frenzied priestess, described by Valerius Maximus (1.8.10) and, more graphically, by Lucan (5.123-224). Plutarch (*Mor.* 438b) notes the priestess reduced to frenzy when forced to speak on an inauspicious day.

<sup>35</sup> At least after 200 BCE, there were two *hiereis* at Delphi, appointed for life. They may have been the same figures sometimes called *prophetai*; the term 'prophet' can be used of a mantic figure but (as in the case of the 'prophet' of Apollo at Didyma) it can simply mean an overseer of the shrine. Five *hosioi* assisted the priest/prophet. A non-citizen consulting the god would have been accompanied by a Delphic citizen, probably a prophet, who nevertheless took no part in the consultation. Women may not have been allowed to question the oracle in person (Plut. *Mor.* 385c). Cf. Fontenrose 1978, 217-19, Sourvinou-Inwood 1990, 297, Maurizio 1995, 83-4, Maurizio 2001, 39, Bowden 2005, 21.

<sup>36</sup> Fontenrose 1978, 206, 212, Bowden 2005, 21. Maurizio (1997, 309-11; 2001, 41-6) accepts the authenticity of many oracles regarded as inauthentic by Parke and Wormell and Fontenrose, whom she criticizes as accepting as authentic (only) those of a kind they have subjectively decided to be so. This criticism is fair of Parke and Wormell, but could also be applied to Maurizio herself. Fontenrose's use of 'historical' oracles to identify the forms taken by authentic oracular pronouncements seems the least

'Historical' questions carefully worded to be answered 'yes' or 'no' ('should I ... or should I not', evoking the response *λῶον καὶ ἄμεινόν ἐστι ...*) suggest the use of lots. The verb *ἀναιρέω* which introduces eight 'historical' oracles, may imply the same. Amandry suggested two kinds of consultation at Delphi, a divinatory rite in which the Pythia drew lots, and a grander prophetic rite in which she spoke at length, the former held every day that was not *apophras* (forbidden), and the latter only once a month. Certainty is impossible; however, although there were certainly occasions on which the Pythia was asked to draw lots, no conclusive evidence establishes the procedure as a regular practice.<sup>37</sup>

The pattern of historical responses from Didyma suggests a similar procedure to that at Delphi; there, too, a prophetess conveyed Apollo's message.<sup>38</sup>

The situation at Klaros seems to have been different. Evidence is provided by Oinomaos of Gadara, a Cynic and older contemporary of Lucian. Oinomaos claimed that Apollo's oracles were worthless nonsense, citing as evidence three verse responses he obtained from Klaros (*ap. Eus. PE 5.22.1-5.23.3*). In the first, he was prepared to find an interpretation relevant to his own question until he realized that the same obscure response had also been given to another. The second and third he found meaningless. Fontenrose accepts Oinomaos' evidence and concludes that the oracles may have been drawn by lot (or selected in some other way) from a stock of prepared texts. He cites two unquestionably genuine oracles from Klaros contemporary with Oinomaos that could have been prepared in this way. Parke is more sceptical about Oinomaos, but notes his essential agreement with another important witness. Tacitus (*Ann. 2.54*) describes the prophet at Klaros hearing only the number and names of consultants, departing to drink at a grotto (*specus*), and then delivering answers, in set forms of verse, to questions formed only in the mind. Parke makes the point that Tacitus, though purportedly describing Germanicus' consultation nearly a century earlier, in this description uses the present tense. At the time he wrote, he had recently been proconsul of Asia; no doubt he described the procedure of his own day.<sup>39</sup> It seems likely that there was a major reformation at Klaros shortly after the visits of Oinomaos and Tacitus, perhaps stimulated by the patronage of Hadrian. For a hundred years

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subjective methodology discoverable. His study (14, 21, 35-9) suggests that the oracle was most often asked for its sanction of a plan or enterprise, or of legislation, worked out in detail beforehand; its response would open with the formula *λῶον καὶ ἄμεινόν ἐστι*.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Amandry 1950, 29-36, 84-5, Fontenrose 1978, 219-23, Potter 1994, 23 and n. 60. As Fontenrose suggests, it seems likely that *ἀναιρέω* early acquired the broader meaning 'speak oracularly'. For occasions on which lots do indeed seem to have been drawn, *Pl. Lg. 759d*, *Arist. Ath. 21.6*, *Plut. Mor. 492a-b*.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Fontenrose 1978, 228, Fontenrose 1988, 55.

<sup>39</sup> Fontenrose 1978, 237-8, Parke 1985, 137, 142-4. Potter (1994, 53) notes the obvious parallel between Oinomaos' activities and those of Lucian in his narrative *persona* at *Alex. 53-4*.

from the mid-second century CE, Klaros is regularly mentioned with Didyma as a leading oracular centre. Inscriptional evidence from many towns attests to lengthy poetic oracles given in response to particular inquiries; in the third century, Klaros produced complex, syncretistic, theological oracles.<sup>40</sup>

The oracles' reputation for obscurity may be attributable at least in part to the use of standardized verses drawn by lot. This and other similarly simple methodologies producing 'ambiguous' responses – we might recall Pausanias' mention of the dice oracle of Herakles Bouraikos and the random word oracle of Hermes Agoraios at Pharai in Achaia (Paus. 7.25.10, 7.22.2-4; Ch. 1.2.1) – were probably more common than surviving evidence can prove. The oracle collections of chresmologues (Ch. 1.2.1) also undoubtedly contributed to the belief that oracular responses were obscure. Plutarch notes the miscellaneous nature of the chresmologues' resources when he refers to:

περὶ τὰ μητρῶα καὶ Σεραπεῖα βωμολοχοῦν καὶ πλανώμενον γένος, οἱ μὲν αὐτόθεν οἱ δὲ κατὰ κλῆρον ἔκ τινων γραμματείων χρησμούς περαίνοντες οἰκέταις καὶ γυναῖοις ... (*Mor.* 407c)

the tribe of wanderers and hangers-on in the vicinity of the temples of the Mother and Sarapis, providing oracles – some of their own invention and others drawn by lot from certain documents – for servants and women ...

### **2.3.2 Tales of unmediated encounters with the divine or with liminal beings**

**Table 5** shows tales of unmediated encounters reported in Second Sophistic literary sources, and indicates their relative popularity. Most immediately, we can note the importance of stories about protagonists we would regard as mythological rather than historical, and in particular about Herakles and Odysseus; also significant is the evidence our sources provide of one means of propagation of these stories, pre-Second Sophistic figurative representation at sacred sites.

In the focal sources, the better-known a story, the more minimal a reference to it may be. Evidence for the popularity of the *Odyssey* as a literary text is provided by the very slightness of the lines or paraphrases of lines considered sufficient to refer to it.<sup>41</sup> However, the *Odyssey* is

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<sup>40</sup> Parke 1985, 144, 149-50, 163-70.

<sup>41</sup> Plutarch (*Mor.* 16e) claims that the one who remembers the sorcery of poetic art will cease weeping over the dead Achilles and Agamemnon in Hades and simply say to himself: ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἴσθ', ἵνα καὶ μετόπισθε τεῖν εἴπησθα γυναῖκί (*Od.* 11.223-4). Asked why he made the journey to Hades, Lucian's

less than well-represented in the figurative arts. The painted Lesche (Place of Talk) at Delphi (Paus. 10.25.1-10.31.12) is essentially Homeric, with a detailed depiction of the Trojan War and of material from the *Odyssey*. Otherwise, there is little: the story of Menelaos and Proteus (*Od.* 4.349-570) figures at Amyklai (Paus. 3.18.10-16), and Pausanias sees a reference to Odysseus and Kirke on the Chest of Kypselos at Olympia (Paus. 5.19.7).<sup>42</sup>

Unlike the stories about Odysseus, the heroic cycles featuring Bellerophon, Herakles, Jason, Perseus and Theseus are well-represented in art works at the major shrines.<sup>43</sup> Pictorial representations both encapsulated, and played a significant part in the creation of, paradigmatic stories. It is instructive to note variations among depictions of Herakles' Labours.<sup>44</sup> At Amyklai, we find representations of the Nemean lion, the Lernaean hydra, the horses of Diomedes, the cattle of Geryon and the hound of Hades, as well as centaurs at the cave of Pholos and various others of Herakles' opponents; among the images offered by the people of Herakleia at Olympia are the lion, the hydra, the hound of Hades and the Erymanthean boar; on the Chest of Kypselos at Olympia are the hydra, Geryon, and the quest for the golden apples of the Hesperides – and, again, Herakles and the centaurs. Describing the sanctuary of Herakles at Thebes, Pausanias comments that most of what are called the twelve Labours are represented; however, the Stymphalian birds and the cleansing of Elis are omitted, with their place taken by Herakles wrestling with Antaios (9.11.6). Describing the metopes of the temple of Zeus at Olympia, he can include all the 'standard' Labours other than the hound of Hades (5.10.9). It is now generally accepted that the canon of the Labours as we have it owes its existence to the representation on

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Menippos quotes, in suitably modified form, *Od.* 11.164-5: μήτηρ ἐμή, χρειώ με κατήγαγεν εἰς Αἴδαο ψυχῆ χρησόμενον Θηβαίου Τειρεσίαιο; he replaces μήτηρ ἐμή with Ὡ φιλότις (*Nec.* 1). At *Mor.* 941a, Plutarch's explicit quotation of Homer's reference to Ogygia at *Od.* 7.244 – Ὀγυγίη τις νῆσος ἀπόπροθεν εἰν ἄλι κέϊται – suggests that the tale to follow is myth. Pausanias (5.19.7) bases his belief that an obscure illustration on the ancient Chest of Kypselos is one of Odysseus and Kirke on the fact that four women attendants shown are engaged in τὰ ἔργα, ἃ ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσιν Ὀμηρος εἶρηκε; the reference is to *Od.* 10.348-59. For Lucian's reference to *Od.* 12.106, Ch. 2.2.2 above.

<sup>42</sup> Probably wrongly; for discussion, Snodgrass 2001, 132.

<sup>43</sup> Because of the nature of his work, Pausanias is the best guide to representations to be found at sacred sites. In his descriptions of major art works illustrating complex sets of mythological themes, Bellerophon is represented at the Sanctuary of the Graces at Amyklai (3.18.10-16) and on the seat of the image of Asklepios at Epidauros (2.27.2); the Jason story, at Amyklai and on the Chest of Kypselos at Olympia (5.17.5-5.19.9); Perseus in all three places and at the Temple of Athena at Sparta (3.17.2-3); and Theseus at Amyklai and on the Chest of Kypselos. Herakles appears at Amyklai, at his sanctuary at Thebes, at the temple of Athena at Sparta (3.17.22-3) and, most dramatically, at Olympia – on the metopes of the temple of Zeus (5.10.9-5.11.10), as well as in a group of images offered by the people of Herakleia (5.26.7) and on the Chest of Kypselos.

<sup>44</sup> Technically, Herakles' Labours are the tasks he carries out at the bidding of his cousin Eurystheus. The term is usually *aethloi* (*Il.* 8.363) or *athloi* (Apollod. 2.4.12); however, at Paus. 7.18.1, it is *erga*, and Theseus is paired with Herakles by Dion (31.16) as one who has undergone great Labours (*ponoi*) for virtue's sake. In the latter case, Herakles' Labours are perhaps recast as his life's work as a whole, with Theseus' seen in the same light.

the temple of Zeus at Olympia, which was constructed in the period 470-456 BCE. The inclusion of the cleansing of the stables of Augeias (the only Labour not to involve a liminal opponent *per se*) in particular can perhaps be attributed to the story's local associations in Olympia.<sup>45</sup>

In fact, not only shrines were decorated: sculptures, mosaics and paintings of mythological subjects intended for a domestic setting survive from antiquity.<sup>46</sup> This reality is echoed in Second Sophistic fiction: Apuleius describes a sculptural representation of the story of Aktaion in the atrium of a house in Hypata (*Met.* 2.4); Heliodoros, wall paintings of the story of Perseus and Andromeda at the Ethiopian court (*Aeth.* 4.8, 10.5, 10.14). In both these cases, the author uses a popular (cf. T5.65, T5.37) mythological theme to make his own point.<sup>47</sup>

Most relevantly to the present study, Table 5 suggests three story paradigms identifying outcomes of an encounter with the numinous Other.

Death (or terrible punishment) follows when a mortal unwisely challenges a god. Eurytos challenges Apollo at archery and dies for it (*Hom. Od.* 8.224-8, T5.78). Challenging Apollo or the Muses at music seems to have been particularly dangerous. In often-repeated stories, the satyr Marsyas competes with Apollo at music and is condemned to be flayed alive (T5.96); the Thracian Thamyris challenges the Muses, who blind him and deprive him of his musical skills (T5.112).<sup>48</sup> Pausanias reports that Hera persuaded the daughters of Acheloios to enter a singing competition with the Muses (T5.74); no punishment is mentioned, probably because the Muses won.<sup>49</sup> Another mode of challenge to the gods involved high flight, with Phaethon (a half-brother of Kirke and Pasiphae) determined to play the part of a god (T5.107), Ikaros soaring towards the sun (T5.125) and Bellerophon approaching Heaven (T5.72). Unwelcome sexual approaches to a god – unintentional like Aktaion's (T5.65) or intentional like Ixion's (T5.84) – are challenges and receive appropriately draconian punishments. Boupagos dies (T5.73); Alpheios is comparatively fortunate (T5.68).<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> For the 'standard' Labours in the order set out by Apollodoros (2.5.1-12), see Table 6. For a reconstruction of the original appearance of the metopes and discussion, Blanshard 2005, 68-70.

<sup>46</sup> Mattusch 2008.

<sup>47</sup> In Heliodoros' case, the picture is central to the plot (*Aeth.* 10.14). Apuleius underlines his protagonist's danger.

<sup>48</sup> Linos is killed by Apollo for rivalling him in singing (T5.90), and another musician of the same name, by the child Herakles (*Paus.* 9.29.9). The musician Amphion dies at Apollo's hands (T5.69), but because of a boast unrelated to his music.

<sup>49</sup> In a parallel story not recorded in the present sources, the daughters of Pieros challenge the Muses and are changed into birds (*Ov. Met.* 5.669-78, *Ant.Lib.* 9).

<sup>50</sup> In a famous 'challenge' omitted from Table 5 because a group of protagonists is involved, Gauls attack Delphi and are destroyed by Apollo (*Aristid. Or.* 22.8, *HL* 4.75; *Paus.* 1.4.4, 8.10.9, 10.23.2).

A second group of stories shows, first, that a mortal can more successfully challenge a less-than-divine being. Against encounters in which the god strikes down a challenger can be set those in which a mortal challenges a monster, or (in the course of a larger project<sup>51</sup>) is challenged by one, and emerges victorious from the contest. Sometimes there is divine assistance, but it only provides tools; the encounter constitutes a test. Bellerophon is sent to Iobates, king of Lykia, with a letter requesting him to put the bearer to death, so Iobates sends him to kill the Chimaira (T5.6). Jason's quest for the Golden Fleece involves a journey to Kolchis and encounters with harpies (T5.26), the offspring of dragon's teeth (T5.24), and a dragon (T5.25); he is assisted by Athena, who provides the *Argo* (Apollod. 1.9.16), and a crew made up of the heroes of Greece. Perseus' quest to obtain the head of Medousa (T5.36) is set in motion by a rash answer to a question set by a king: what would be a fitting gift for the king? He succeeds with the assistance of Hermes and Athena; his famous rescue of Andromeda (T5.37) follows as he returns through Ethiopia. Herakles' Labours – all except the anomalous cleansing of the stables of Augeias involving a 'monstrous' opponent – were mentioned above (cf. T5.9, 11-13, 17-23). In an approximate parallel, Theseus encounters the bandits Periphetes, Sinis, Skiron, Kerkyon and Prokroustes, and the sow Phaia on his journey from Troizen to Athens (T5.41), and he confronts the Minotaur in Krete (T5.44).

In some cases, a whole series of encounters with monstrous opponents has been planned by a god who intends the protagonist to succumb. In such cases, the series as a whole can be seen as 'wrestling' with a god. Herakles' Labours are undertaken under bondage to his cousin Eurystheus. In the best-known version of his myth, his servitude expiates the murder of his children – itself brought about by the hostility of Hera, whose divine presence lurks behind the human task-setter.<sup>52</sup> The Labours can be regarded as a challenge thrown down by the goddess, who wills him to fail, and it is in this heightened context that his superiority in completing them is proved. As often in accounts of this kind, there is divine help too. As Pausanias notes (8.18.3), the *Iliad* (8.362-3) describes Athena keeping Herakles safe through the course of his labours (*aethloi*) for Eurystheus. Odysseus' voyage home is metaphorically a series of Labours: just as Herakles' Labours are in effect trials (in which he is expected to fail) set up for him by Hera, so the difficulties experienced by Odysseus on his journey are trials instigated by Poseidon, whose hostility he has incurred in the blinding of Polyphemos. At *Od.* 1.44-79, Athena

<sup>51</sup> Trials involved in a single project will be referred to as Labours.

<sup>52</sup> At *Il.* 19.106-33, Hera contrives their births so as to make Herakles subject to his cousin Eurystheus. In most versions of the Herakles myth, Hera sends upon Herakles a divine madness which leads to the murder of his family and its expiation in the Labours. In Euripides' version, Hera is responsible for Herakles' madness and so the murders (*HF* 827-32), but they fall after the completion of the Labours. Cf. Blanshard 2005, 45-7.

pleads for him in the court of the gods. The Labours of Herakles and Odysseus are often rightly seen as metaphors for human life. Nevertheless, Odysseus and Herakles are not just any protagonists – to each belongs a superior status that is confirmed by the successful (to an extent that will be nuanced later) outcome of his encounter with a god.

Other tales of human protagonists wrestling with gods, spirits and monsters place them and the gods themselves in hierarchy. Very much in parallel are Menelaos' planned encounter with Proteus (a minor god) to obtain the instructions he needs to return home (T5.97) and Midas' wresting of an answer about the nature of happiness from Silenos, a monster (T5.28).<sup>53</sup> Numa captures Picus and Faunus – minor divinities – and (astonishingly) tricks Jupiter (T5.102, 100). Theseus and Peirithous are imprisoned by Hades (T5.113). Herakles, on the other hand, wins Hades' respect and on separate occasions rescues Alkestis and Theseus (T5.81, 80); as well, he wrestles successfully with Apollo until Zeus calls a halt to the match (T5.79).<sup>54</sup> Pentheus falls victim to Dionysos (equivocally god or man) and his maenads (T5.105). However, the heroes of the Trojan War pit themselves against gods – albeit with divine help or licence – with some success: Achilles overcomes the river god or personified river Skamandros (T5.62); Diomedes wounds Aphrodite but comes to no harm (T5.75). As we have seen, lesser mortals do not fare well when, intentionally or unintentionally, they challenge the gods. However, no doubt because they challenge those lower on the spiritual hierarchy, Euthymos successfully challenges a hero (T5.48) and an unidentified Spartan can drive away a spirit (T5.61).

In all of these cases, the outcome affirms the status of the challenger himself. A hierarchy of human challengers emerges, with Herakles – in terms of the power of the gods he challenges, the outcomes he achieves and the fame of his exploits as attested by references to them – unquestionably at its head.

In a third group of stories, the god embraces a protagonist seeking his or her presence as an approved and beloved being. Numa retires from human society to a deserted place – implicitly to seek out the divine – and is deemed worthy of celestial marriage (*theios gamos*) to

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<sup>53</sup> In Plutarch's extended account (*Mor.* 115b-e), Midas' success is equivocal because it brings home his mortal limitations – one can be happy only in death. The equivocal nature of mortal 'success' against a god is also present in the story of Orpheus, who wrests his wife from death but cannot retain her (T5.103), and that of Pausanias, who wins access to the spirit of Kleonike (T5.56) but finds that it predicts only his death.

<sup>54</sup> In other accounts of Herakles' interactions with the gods, his capture of Artemis' deer (T5.19) leads (in versions of the story not touched on in the present sources) to confrontation with the goddess herself (Apollod. 2.5.3). In freeing Prometheus of the eagle tormenting him (T5.16), Herakles can be considered to be challenging Zeus himself. At Apollod. 2.5.11, Herakles placates Zeus by taking on himself a bond (*desmos*) of olive and presenting Cheiron as a (willing) sacrifice.

the *thea* or *daimon* Egeria (T5.99). His story bears a resemblance to other tales of the loves of the gods (alongside the women visited by Zeus and other male gods there are men – Peleus, Anchises, Orion, and Emathion as well as Numa [Plut. *Mor.* 321b-c] – who make divine marriages), but in his case the impetus is his own: it is his search for the divine that wins the approval of the goddess. More relevantly in the present context, his story can be related to those in which a god simply takes up residence with an approved individual – Plutarch names the poets Pindar and Sophokles, and rulers and lawmakers Zaleukos, Minos, Zoroaster, and Lykourgos (*Num.* 4.5-7).

A substantial group of stories of divine approbation involves confrontations with an element which metaphorically represents the divine. Of great importance is the sea. In Plutarch's full version of Arion's tale (*Mor.* 160e-162b, T5.117), Arion – harassed by pirates – performs his music for the last time and entrusts himself to the sea; saved by dolphins, he knows the reality of the gods, and that he is loved by them.<sup>55</sup> The sea also figures in the stories of Ino and her son Melikertes (Ino casts herself into the sea with her son and the two become sea deities, T5.126), of Britomartis (T5.119) and Glaukos (T5.123), who also experience apotheosis, and of Enalos (T5.121), who is rescued by dolphins and acquires unusual powers. Earlier, Odysseus and Herakles were noted as the two whose prowess made them uniquely successful in countering the challenges of gods. Ultimately, however, both fail. Odysseus, cast into the sea and in a predicament that it is beyond his cleverness to overcome, is saved when Ino, Athena and a river god take pity on him (*Od.* 5, T5.128). Herakles throws himself onto a funeral pyre – fire, like the sea, can be seen as a manifestation of the divine – and is recognized for his merits and taken up into the heavens by the gods (T5.124). In contrast, Empedokles – in one surviving version of his story (D.L. 8.69) – leaps into a volcano aspiring to apotheosis and is rejected (T5.120).<sup>56</sup>

Otherwise similar stories are omitted from Table 5 because the transforming liminal encounter was not specifically sought out. Romulus is taken up into the heavens from Goat's

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<sup>55</sup> As noted earlier (Ch. 2.2.2), in the original version of his story Arion may have entrusted himself to Apollo rather than to the unspecified divine. An alternative conception of the story sees Arion saved because his music has the power to draw beasts. Thus he is seen as a *miseriordium beluarum oblectator* (charmer of tender-hearted monsters) at Apul. *Fl.* 17.

<sup>56</sup> Empedokles' rejection is supposedly confirmed by the discovery of his bronze sandal, thrown up by the volcano. The sandal belongs to the earliest strand of tradition: Herakleides is cited by Diogenes Laertius as knowing a version of the story mentioning it which he felt compelled to deny (D.L. 8.69). However, a single bronze sandal was a symbol of Hekate and access to the Underworld. It is possible that the tale of the leap into the volcano originally referred to a ritual descent into the Underworld from which Empedokles rose as *theos ambrotos* (Empedokles *Frg.* 102(112) Wright = 1/112 Inwood, 4). Cf. Kingsley 1995a, 233-56; see also App. 2.2.1.

Marsh (Aigos Helos) to become the god Quirinus.<sup>57</sup> Amphiaraios and Trophonios are swallowed by the earth.<sup>58</sup>

In other tales of acceptance, Saon of Akraiphnion enters the underground place later to be associated with Trophonios and learns the rites which will allow the latter to be consulted (T5.60); Amphiaraios spends the night in the mysterious *oikos mantikos* at Phlissia and emerges with new powers (T5.116); and Epimenides (in one version of his story) seeks out the solitude of a cave and emerges a healer and purifier (T5.122).<sup>59</sup> Also in this category is the tale of the much more obscure Kleomedes of Astypalaia, who disappears in the sanctuary of Athena at Astypalaia and is proclaimed by the Pythia to be a hero (T5.86).

Of note in this context is the marked interest of Hellenistic writers – as evidenced by Diogenes Laertius' references to his sources – in the stories about Empedokles and Epimenides. In the case of Epimenides, the tale of a long period of withdrawal was preserved by Theopompos (D.L. 1.109), possibly in his *Thaumasioi* (D.L. 1.115), and by others whose interest was in his extraordinarily prolonged life – by Phlegon specifically in his *Peri makrobion* (D.L. 1.111). The survival of the tale of Empedokles' leap into the volcano – along with the debate about its outcome – can be associated with the Hellenistic fascination with characterizing anecdotes (cf. Ch. 1.3.1); it was transcribed from the original early source by Hippobotos (D.L. 8.69) and commented on by Herakleides (D.L. 8.69), Diodoros of Ephesos (D.L. 8.70) and Timaios (D.L. 8.71). Other unadmiring versions of Empedokles' death (possibly variants of the famous one) refer to suicide and accidental drowning (D.L. 8.74).

Dionysos' encounters with deep water are only hinted at in the focal sources, in Pausanias' references to his confrontation with Lykourgos (T5.94) and to his journey (via the Alkyonian Lake at Lerna) to Hades to release Semele (T5.76). In the forms in which they would have been known to a Second Sophistic readership,<sup>60</sup> the stories suggest Dionysos' development

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<sup>57</sup> Plut. *Cam.* 33.7, Plut. *Num.* 2.1, 2.3, Plut. *Rom.* 27.3, 27.6-7, 28.1-2, Plut. *Mor.* 320c. At *Mor.* 320c, Plutarch draws a parallel with Herakles.

<sup>58</sup> Aristid. *Or.* 25.60, Paus. 1.34.2, 2.23.2, 9.8.3, Philostr. *VA* 2.37.2 (Amphiaraios); Paus. 9.37.7 (Trophonios).

<sup>59</sup> In one version of his story, Epimenides fell asleep in a cave after being sent by his father in search of a stray sheep; he slept for 57 years (D.L. 1.109) and acquired the powers that enabled him to purify Athens in a time of plague (D.L. 1.110). The tale in this form makes his entry into the cave a matter of chance. However, in an alternative version, he deliberately withdrew (*ἐκπατεῖν*) there (D.L. 1.112). The meaning of the verb is confirmed by its similar use at D.L. 4.19, 9.3, 9.63. Cf. Hicks 1925 n. *b*, *ad loc.*

<sup>60</sup> Kerenyi (1976, 176-81) speculates that both stories were variants of a single ancient original, referred to at Σ Hom. *Il.* 14.319 (ὄτι Διόνυσον ἀνεῖλεν εἰς τὴν Λερναίαν ἐμβαλὼν λίμνην), in which Dionysos' opponent was Perseus (cf. Paus. 2.20.4, 2.22.1). Pausanias (2.37.6) and Plutarch (*Mor.* 364f) confirm that the lake at Lerna was the site of an archaic Dionysos cult.

of the potential offered by his ambivalently mortal/divine nature. In the tale of his flight from Lykourgos into the sea, the frightened infant (*Il.* 6.130-40) or youth (*Apollod.* 3.5.1) is apparently bested by a human opponent and has to be saved, in the element to which he commits himself, by Thetis. At the end of his earthly life, the mature Dionysos needs no salvation. He deliberately penetrates the waters of the bottomless lake at Lerna, accesses Hades, rescues his mother, and attains the apotheosis that he merits (*D.S.* 4.25.4, *Apollod.* 3.5.3).

### **2.3.3 Tales of journeys beyond the familiar world: 'Labours'**

'Labours' in the course of a larger project were mentioned above. In later chapters, they will be linked with journeys of beneficence and conquest and with wandering; in this section, they are used to explore the relationship between real and mythical geographies, and to introduce the geographically remote as possessors of extraordinary knowledge and power. **Table 6** fills in aspects of the Labours of Herakles, Jason, Odysseus and Perseus – references to them in a larger sense, and to significant encounters/interactions with extraordinary beings other than gods, spirits and monsters – not included on Table 5. Clearly, their Labours cause the protagonists to 'circle the earth'.

Perseus' Labours take him to the far west in search of Medousa (*Hes. Th.* 274-6), and then to Ethiopia (*Apollod.* 2.4.3) on his way home (T6.38, 39).

Herakles' first six Labours are set within the heartland of the known, Greek, world (T6.1-8). The seventh takes him to Krete (T6.9), the eighth to Thrace (T6.10, 11), and the ninth to the area associated with the Amazons, the region of the river Thermadon on the south coast of the Black Sea (T6.12).<sup>61</sup> For his tenth Labour (T6.13), he traverses Libya (*D.S.* 4.17.4) and crosses Ocean to the island of Erytheia, later located near Gadeira, on the Atlantic coast of Spain;<sup>62</sup> his route home lies through Italy, where various adventures are attributed to him.<sup>63</sup> The eleventh Labour is usually set in the far west but Apollodoros puts it in the land of the Hyperboreans in the remote north. The route lies through Libya, where Herakles wrestles the giant Antaios, Egypt, where he encounters King Bousiris, and the Kaukasos, where he kills the eagle (offspring of Echidna and Typhon) tormenting Prometheus and thus (*Apollod.* 2.5.11) wins the advice of Prometheus himself (T6.14-17). Herakles' twelfth Labour takes him to Hades, the ultimately

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<sup>61</sup> Apollodoros (2.5.9) has Herakles travel to Themiskyra, on the Thermadon, where Hippolyte meets him.

<sup>62</sup> Erytheia is the home of Geryon at *Hes. Th.* 286-9; Herodotos (4.8) and Apollodoros (2.5.10) place it near Gadeira.

<sup>63</sup> E.g. at *D.S.* 4.20-22, *Verg. A.* 8.184-305, *Prop.* 4.9, *Ov. Fast.* 1.543-86. They involve Kakios/Cacus.

liminal place (T6.18-19). Probably he was envisaged entering at Ephyra in Thesprotia. In Plutarch's euhemerized version of the story (*Thes.* 35.1), Hades is replaced by Molossia, adjacent to Thesprotia; as well, Pausanias claims that Herakles found the white poplar (*leuke*) growing on the banks of the Acheron in Thesprotia and brought it from there into Greece (Paus. 5.14.2). His return is variously described as via Tainaron (Paus. 3.25.5), Troizen (Paus. 2.31.2), or a chasm on Pron, a mountain on which Hermion, near Troizen, is built (Paus. 2.35.4, 10); all are in the Peloponnese.

Jason's voyage takes him to Kolchis, traditionally placed at the far eastern end of the Black Sea.<sup>64</sup> Apart from noting an incident at Salmydessos in Thrace (T6.21) – visited to consult the blind seer Phineus about the route (Apollod. 1.9.21) – the focal sources of this study say little about the liminal challenges of the voyage, or of the return home. Apollodoros, on the other hand, mentions the passing of the Symplegades (1.9.22) on the way to Kolchis; and of the Sirenes and Charybdis and Skylla, Thrinakia, where the cattle of the sun are to be found, and Kerkyra, the home of king Alkinoos, where Jason and Medeia wed (1.9.25), on the way home. Kirke appears in a way that underlines the geographical problems associated with the story. Fleeing Kolchis with Jason's party and the fleece, Medeia becomes responsible for the death of her brother Apsyrtos. Apollodoros (1.9.24) places the event near Tomis, on the Black Sea, and continues his tale with the Argonauts sailing past the mouth of the Eridanos on the coast of Italy, in the Adriatic (1.9.24). Apollonios Rhodios clarifies the route. Tomis lies near the mouth of the Danube/Ister, which is described in the *Argonautica* as a horn of the northern part of Ocean; it splits in two, with one branch entering the Black Sea and the other, the Adriatic, so that a ship may pass between the two (4.282-93), circumventing the straits separating the Black Sea from the Mediterranean.<sup>65</sup> Near the mouth of the Eridanos, Zeus sends a storm to blow the ship off course as a punishment for the murder of Apsyrtos. The *Argo* itself tells Jason that he must be purified by Kirke; as the party seeks her out on her island of Aiaia, the ship is introduced into the Mediterranean, where the incidents involving the Sirenes, Charybdis and Skylla, Thrinakia and Kerkyra can be placed (Apollod. 1.9.24-5).<sup>66</sup> There can be little doubt that this is a Hellenistic rationalization of the original myth, based on the assumption that related incidents in the *Odyssey* took place in the Mediterranean.

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<sup>64</sup> E.g. by Lucian at *Tox.* 3: τὸν Πόντον ἀπείρατον ἔτι τοῖς Ἑλλησιν ὄντα πλὴν μόνων τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀργοῦς ἐς τὴν Κολχίδα στρατευσάντων, 'the Pontos, still unexplored by the Greeks except those alone who went on expedition on the *Argo* to Kolchis'.

<sup>65</sup> Apollonios Rhodios places the death of Apsyrtos at the far end of the river system, with the remnants of his crew settling the Apsyrtides Islands in the Adriatic (4.515).

<sup>66</sup> Apollonios Rhodios has the *Argo* sail west along the Eridanos and then south down the Rhodanos (Rhône) to find Aiaia on the west coast of Italy (4.596, 4.627, 4.659-61).

On his parallel voyage, Odysseus – swept off course beyond Cape Maleia (*Od.* 9.80-1) – visits the islands of the Lotophagoi with their memory-obliterating *lotos* (T6.27), of the Kyklopes (T6.28), of Aiolos (T6.29), of the man-eating Laistrygones (T6.30), and Aiaia, the home of Kirke (T6.31). After a visit to Hades (6.32) – on the border of the earth, in the far north, where the Kimmerians live in perpetual fog (*Od.* 11.14-15) – he returns to face the challenges of the Sirenes (T6.33), of Skylla and Charybdis (T6.34) and of Thrinakia (T6.35). He reaches Ogygia, Kalypso's island (T6.36), as the sole survivor of the original crew (*Od.* 12.448-9), and ultimately the court of King Alkinoos, who sends him home.

The geographical complexities of Jason's and Odysseus' voyages raise questions about Second Sophistic differentiation between real and mythical geographies. Homer refers to the journey of the *Argo* (*Od.* 12.69-70), and modern commentators generally agree that the geography of the *Odyssey* – once Odysseus has been swept beyond Cape Maleia – is a mythical one based on that of the earlier story.<sup>67</sup> Nevertheless, on one, euhemerizing, level Second Sophistic writers invariably located Odysseus' voyage in the real Mediterranean/Atlantic world. 'Kalypso's isle' is in the vicinity of Dikaiarchia in southern Italy in Philostratos' *Vita Apollonii* (7.10.2); Plutarch places it in the Atlantic, west of Britain (*Mor.* 941a). There are other instances of mythical geographies becoming associated with real ones. In Hesiod, the Islands of the Blest (*makaron nesoi*) lie on the edges of the earth by the deep-eddying Ocean (*Op.* 169-71); Homer similarly locates his Elysian Field (*Od.* 4.563-8). Plutarch's Sertorius identifies both with Atlantic islands of which he has heard (*Sert.* 8.1-3); he has a deep desire – thwarted only by his Kilikian pirate allies – to go and live there (*Sert.* 9.1). Pausanias describes an encounter at the opposite end of the known world. Leonymos of Kroton visits White Island (Leuke) at the mouth of the Ister/Danube on the Black Sea and finds there the spirits of Achilles, the two Ajaxes, Patroklos and Antilochos (3.19.12-13). Hades was also variously placed. As we have seen, Odysseus finds it at the edge of the earth, by Ocean in the remote north; and another tradition saw it below the earth, with entrances identified as above. Pausanias (1.17.5) suggests that Homer based his description of Hades on Thesprotia, adopting as the names of its rivers those of the rivers – Acheron and Kokytos – of that place.

It is nevertheless an oversimplification to suppose that all Second Sophistic people simply identified the liminal places of poetry and myth with real ones. Rather, real and mythical worlds merged and overlapped. Sacred geographies conveying obscure and metaphorically-expressed truths coexisted with secular ones. Second Sophistic readers knew Homer's Kalypso's

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<sup>67</sup> Dowden 2004, 197.

isle as the *omphalos* of the sea (*Od.* 1.50); a sacred stone at Delphi was known as the *omphalos* (Paus. 10.16.3),<sup>68</sup> and both Plutarch and Lucian report the tale that eagles flying from the edges of the earth met there at its centre (Plut. *Mor.* 409e-f, Luc. *Salt.* 38). Moreover, real geographies shaded into fabulous ones reported at second or third hand as stories became 'Chinese boxes' of tales of reported tales. In Plutarch's *De facie*, the Carthaginian Sylla reports to the narrator – identified only later (*Mor.* 937d) as 'Lamprias' and so therefore possibly Plutarch's brother (*Mor.* 385d) – a conversation in his home city with a *xenos* (*Mor.* 942b); the stranger comes from the mainland (*epeiros*) across Ocean and has lived on Kronos' isle, west of Ogygia, which is itself five days' sail west of Britain (*Mor.* 941a).

It would probably be fair to say that sophisticated Second Sophistic writers believed in a bedrock of fact behind reported traditional tales. Certainly they were aware of the hazards of transmission; yet, as well, at least some of them believed in the possibility of inspired representation of the truer than literally true. Veyne has assembled evidence to show that myth was seen as truth overlaid by lies.<sup>69</sup> However Plutarch, at least, saw myth as more than distorted fact. It was divinely-inspired metaphor or allegory and perhaps something more (Ch. 7.2.2), an expression of deep and even supernatural truth. To take myth (*mythos*) as history (*logos*) is to downgrade it (*Mor.* 374e). Superstition (*deisidaimonia*) – no less an evil than atheism (*Mor.* 355c-d) – is the over-literalistic interpretation of myth (*Mor.* 379e).

In the context of the aims of this chapter, Table 6 does one particularly significant thing: it provides us with a first glimpse of the non-Greek 'wise'. Here, we find human beings marked out as the possessors of extraordinary knowledge – Medeia, associated with Jason (T6.22, 25), Aiolos, associated with Odysseus (T6.29), and Kirke, associated with both (T6.31 and above).<sup>70</sup> The nature of their knowledge will be taken up at Ch. 2.5.3.

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<sup>68</sup> Earlier references include those of Pindar (*P.* 4.74), Aischylos (*Eu.* 40, 166) and Plato (*R.* 427c).

<sup>69</sup> Veyne (1988, 59-60) refers to use of the term *mythodes* to refer to falsities mixed in with truth: it was used first by Thoukydides (1.21), then by Strabo (1.1.10) and later (in a context to be discussed at Ch. 7.2.2) by Plutarch (*Thes.* 1.3).

<sup>70</sup> Kirke and Medeia, sister and daughter of King Aietes of Kolchis, are of Titan descent (*Od.* 10.138-9, Hes. *Th.* 956-7), so their classification as 'human' (see Ch. 2.2.2) may seem arbitrary. Discussion of the knowledge that is the basis of their powers (Ch. 2.5.3) will justify it. Homer makes no suggestion that Aiolos is other than human; Apollodoros (1.7.3) sees him as a descendent of Deukalion and Pyrrha, and so one of the primal human beings.

### 2.3.4 Tales of journeys beyond the familiar world: autopsy

As we have seen (Ch. 2.3.3), myth and epic attest the extraordinary nature and powers of the 'monsters' and human or equivocally human beings of the ends of the earth. This section examines the picture of remote places and, in particular, the remote human wise presented in a different literary tradition. It is concerned with autopsy, seeing for oneself.

Long before the period of the Second Sophistic, reports of early explorers and travellers had spawned identifiable genres: the Catalogue of Wonders (foreshadowed by the *Indika* of Ktesias of Knidos)<sup>71</sup> and, most relevantly in our context, the Explorer's Tale, most famously represented by the account of Skylax of Karyanda. Since the only substantial report of Skylax' work (Tz. *H.* 7.621-31) mentions shadow-feet (*skiapodes*), winnowing-fan-ears (*otoliknoi*), one-eyes (*monophthalmoi*) and countless other monsters (ἐκτραπέλων ἄλλων δε μυρίων), it was probably a fictionalized version of reality intended for a Greek audience craving wonders. We should note as well the *periodos ges* or *periegesis* – literally a circuit of the earth but in fact an account of an individual's more limited journey or a traveller's guide describing daily journeys and stopping places – and its maritime equivalent, the *periplous*.<sup>72</sup> Autopsy is the essence of the historian's craft in Herodotos.<sup>73</sup> Second Sophistic writers embraced it. Though as a chosen or desirable activity it was foreign to the mentality of the mythic and Homeric world, Apuleius attributes Odysseus' superiority to it:

*nec immerito priscae poeticae divinus auctor apud Graios summae prudentiae virum monstrare cupiens, multarum civitatum obitu et variorum populorum cognitu summas adeptum virtutes cecinet. (Met. 9.13)*

Not without merit the divine originator of ancient poetry among the Greeks, desiring to show a man of the highest prudence, sang of one who had acquired the greatest excellence by visiting many cities and knowing various peoples.

Plutarch provides a classic example of travel (at least partly) for the sake of autopsy in the sense of seeing and judging for oneself in his account of the journeys of Lykourgos. Travelling in

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<sup>71</sup> Paradoxography is a modern term for accounts of the *apistos* or *thaumasios* or *paradoxos*; the invention of a genre consisting specifically of lists of *mirabilia* is attributed to Theopompos (*Thaumasias*, see Ch. 1.3.1) or Kallimachos (Θαυμάτων τῶν εἰς ἅπασαν τὴν γῆν κατὰ τόπους ὄντων συναγωγή, Suid. s.v. Kallimachos). For references and discussion, Romm 1992, 92 and n. 24, Johnson 2006, 400, *BNP* s.v. *Paradoxographi* (accessed 13.1.14).

<sup>72</sup> Cf. Romm 1992, 28-30, 84-8.

<sup>73</sup> Herodotos (2.99) calls the activity in which he is engaged *historie*; its components are observation (*opsis*), the reception of oral reports (*akoe*), and his own reasoning (*gnome*). Cf. Luraghi 2006, 77. In the broadest sense, 'autopsy' can be taken as its equivalent.

voluntary exile in order to avoid appearing a rival to his nephew (*Lyc.* 3.5), Lykourgos examined and approved the laws of Krete and resolved to use them in his own country (*Lyc.* 4.1); he went on to Asia (Ionia), to examine the difference between the manner and rules of life of the Kretans and those of the Ionians and so form a judgement (*Lyc.* 4.3), and to Egypt, where the Egyptians and some Greeks say that he came to appreciate the value of the separation of social classes (*Lyc.* 4.5).

**Table 7** details accounts of journeys involving at least one destination beyond the boundaries of the Greek world that were undertaken (or can be assumed to have been undertaken) at least partly for the sake of autopsy.<sup>74</sup> Protagonists are limited to those for whom the goal or the result of the journey or journeys undertaken is explicitly said (in at least one source) to be learning, or whose description as philosophers (or sophists), explorers or historians implies autopsy as at least one of the motives for the travel. In fact, the sources hint that complex motives lay behind travel undertaken at least in part out of a desire to observe and learn. Lykourgos' travels are effectively exile, and the verb *πλανάομαι*, wander, is appropriately used (*Lyc.* 3.5; on exile and wandering, see Ch. 5.3.3). Solon's travels are associated variously with business interests, politics, and the desire to learn (Plut. *Sol.* 2.1). Eudoxos travels on the 'business' of being a sophist (Philostr. *VS* 1.484). Pythagoras may have been forced to travel as Cambyses' prisoner, but Apuleius stresses the aspect of free will in the version of the story generally preferred: *enimvero celebrior fama optinet sponte eum petisse Aegyptias disciplinas ...* (*Fl.* 15), 'truly the more famous story holds that of his own accord he sought Egyptian learning ...'.

Examining the Table, we find a limited number of protagonists, with Pythagoras particularly frequently mentioned. Of interest is evidence for the accretion of destinations to the journeys of known travellers. Plutarch describes Lykourgos' journeys to Krete, Ionia and Egypt and then mentions other journeys he finds less authoritatively attested: to Libya, to Iberia and to India for conferences with the gymnosophists (T7.11). Along the same lines, Diogenes Laertius points out his diverse sources for variant and increasingly elaborate tales about Demokritos (T7.4). Apuleius presents both a basic and a more elaborate version of Pythagoras' travels (T7.22, 23). Obviously, extended travels to gain wisdom were readily attributed to protagonists whose foreign travels were already well-known.

Particularly noteworthy on the Table are the groups of non-Greek wise encountered or sought out: Egyptians (often priests), Chaldaians and Magoi, and Indian gymnosophists or other

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<sup>74</sup> Of course, circuits of comparative autopsy could also take place entirely within the Greek world; Kroisos' testing of the major oracles (Ch. 1.2.1) is an example. In the period of the Second Sophistic, Pausanias' journey can be considered one of autopsy to the sacred sites of Greece.

wise. The *gymnoi* of Ethiopia are mentioned only in connection with Eudoxos of Knidos, by Philostratos (T7.8); Hebrews and Arabs, only in connection with Pythagoras, by Antonius Diogenes (T7.27).

**Table 8** allows closer examination of these non-Greek wise. Expanding the scope of Table 7 to include all relevant encounters reported in the sources, regardless of the (Graeco-Roman) protagonists' motivation, it details the location, description, and particular expertise ascribed to the Egyptian, Babylonian or Persian, and Indian wise, or the nature of an incident in which they are involved. Where an account provides no detail beyond that included on Table 7, it is omitted from Table 8.

Added in Table 8 to the protagonists of Table 7 are the statesman Kleoboulos of Lindos (like Solon, he was considered one of the traditional Greek Sages, D.L. 1.13), Philotas of Amphissa (a friend of Plutarch's grandfather Lamprias and contemporary of Antony, Plut. *Ant.* 28.2), Sulla, Themistokles, Antony and, most notably, Alexander the Great. Protagoras and Sokrates are also included; although philosophers, their only reported interactions with the non-Greek wise – single encounters with Magoi – were omitted from Table 7 as explicitly having taken place in Abdera and Athens respectively. Meetings with non-Greek wise within the Greek world will be taken up at Ch. 2.4.3. In Egypt (T8.1-20), priests and prophets are singled out as sources of wisdom, with wisdom seen most commonly as either geometry or religious knowledge. Magoi and Chaldaians (T8.21-33) are associated with the Persian Empire and with astronomical, religious and occult knowledge, but the stories do not make a clear distinction between the two groups or place them accurately.<sup>75</sup> Indians (T8.34-44) appear in the Table principally in the Alexander tradition, associated with philosophy rather than any sort of occult knowledge. Consonantly with this tradition (see App. 1.3), some are explicitly called *gymnosophistai*.

The likelihood of genuine contact with the non-Greek wise varies from protagonist to protagonist. In the case of Eudoxos, there can be little doubt: he was an important mathematician and theoretical astronomer and geographer, and the Egyptian section of his *Periodos ges* is cited repeatedly by Plutarch in his *De Iside et Osiride*.<sup>76</sup> Anaxarchos, Onesikritos,

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<sup>75</sup> E.g. Diogenes Laertius (9.35) has Demokritos travel to *Persia* to visit the Chaldaians (T7.4). This may be considered a sign of the times rather than an indication of ignorance. By the time of Alexander's expedition, Zoroastrianism had been heavily influenced by Babylonian ideas, and 'Chaldaian' had begun to take on the simple meaning of 'astrologer'. Cf. Kingsley 1995b, 201.

<sup>76</sup> For fragments and testimonia relating to his works, Lasserre 1966. Philostratos presents him – as his own context requires – in the two variant (but not necessarily incompatible) roles of performing sophist and sycophant to the king (VS 1.484; VA 1.35.1).

Nearchos and Pyrrhon were all associated with the Alexander tradition. Anaxarchos is represented by Plutarch (*Alex.* 52-3) and by Arrian (*An.* 4.9-11) as an opponent of Kallisthenes and one responsible for persuading Alexander that might is right. Onesikritos and Nearchos are both important Alexander sources. Onesikritos wrote a history of Alexander which was dismissed by Strabo (15.1.28) and Arrian (*An.* 6.2) as lies, and Strabo (15.1.63-5) and Plutarch (*Alex.* 65) both describe his interview, on Alexander's behalf, with Indian gymnosophists (see App. 1.3). Nearchos is cited extensively by Arrian (*An.* 6.13.4, 6.24.2-3, 7.3.6, 7.20.9). Pyrrhon, the founder of Greek Skepticism, wrote nothing, and the later tale of his journey to India may simply have been based on his supposed association with Anaxarchos (D.L. 9.61). Demokritos' early association with Magoi or Chaldaians in Abdera is no more than feasible, and his student (Phil. VS 1.494) Protagoras', less likely. Philostratos claims that, when Xerxes led his expedition against Greece (480-479 BCE), he was entertained in Abdera by the wealthy father of Protagoras; in return, the host obtained a boon usually granted only to Persians – permission for his son to be educated by the Magoi (VS 1.494). Diogenes Laertius makes Demokritos' father Xerxes' host; Xerxes left Magoi and Chaldaians in charge of Abdera, and it was from them that the youth learned theology and astronomy (9.34). Now, Valerius Maximus (8.7 ext. 4) notes that Demokritos' father feasted Xerxes' army. It can be posited that Diogenes Laertius' tale is an elaboration,<sup>77</sup> and Philostratos', a more distant variant, of the report.

Some protagonists' associations with particular groups of wise seem to have been no more than deductions from the nature of their later achievements. Lykourgos is a case in point, although he does not qualify for inclusion in Table 8.<sup>78</sup> His laws were probably the basis for his supposed association with Krete, which was believed – for example, by Aristotle (*Pol.* 2.10) – to have anciently been a political entity with a single constitution and laws. The association of Krete with laws may have had some basis in fact. Although there is no evidence of an ancient state unified under a king or dynasty of kings called Minos, some of the oldest Greek legal inscriptions extant have been found on Krete; the oldest, from Dreros, dates from the mid-seventh century BCE (ML 2). The poet Thaletas who, Plutarch asserts (*Lyc.* 4.1), taught Lykourgos in Krete, may be an embodiment in a single person of those involved in drawing up and propagating laws of the kind known from the inscription.<sup>79</sup> Pythagoras' association with the Persian wise seems to have been based wholly on perceived similarities between Pythagorean doctrine and Persian beliefs;

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<sup>77</sup> Perhaps drawing on Hdt. 8.120; cf. Hicks 1925, n. *a* at D.L. 9.34.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. T7.11. Krete is considered part of the Greek world. Lykourgos' learning in Egypt as noted by Plutarch is from observation rather than from the wise; where he confers with the non-Greek wise (Indian gymnosophists), no particular learning is mentioned or field of knowledge attributed to them.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Lewis 2007, 18, 48-51.

marked differences (the pre-existence of souls does not seem to have been a Persian belief) make it unlikely that Pythagoras did in fact learn from the Magoi.<sup>80</sup> No substantive early tradition links Pythagoras with Indians. The earliest known assertion of an association – that attributed by Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* 1.15.70.1) to Alexander Polyhistor, making Pythagoras a pupil of the Assyrian Zaratas (i.e. Zoroaster), the Gauls, and the Brachmanes – falls into the tradition of accretion of destinations mentioned earlier. Suggestions of contact based on perceived similarities between Pythagorean and Indian beliefs concerning reincarnation remain entirely unsubstantiated.<sup>81</sup>

In most of the reported stories, the recorded encounter is presumably amicable and an accreditation of both the non-Greek wise and the philosopher who travels and learns from them. Episodes in Plutarch's *Alexander* (T8.36, 38) display most dramatically an edgier tradition in which the visitor's relationship with the non-Greek wise is antagonistic: Alexander trumps his opponents, but his superiority lies not in his cleverness but in his power in the first reported tale and his magnanimity in the second. The possibility that association with the non-Greek wise could be seen as discreditable to a protagonist who seeks them out will be taken up at Ch. 2.5.3.

## 2.4 Second Sophistic fictional writing

The sections to follow explore use of the established paradigms in Second Sophistic fictional accounts.<sup>82</sup> In order to leave open questions about the fictionalization of biography or autobiography, they deal only with tales presented by their authors as literary creations. This introductory section elucidates the issues involved in distinguishing such works from works

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<sup>80</sup> Cf. Guthrie 1962, vol. 1, 254. South Italian and Sicilian Pythagoreans would have been in contact with Persian thought at least at the time of the Peloponnesian War (late fifth century BCE). For a Syracusan presence in Miletos in the period, Th. 8.26, X. *HG* 1.1.27-31; for the Pythagorean Zopyros of Tarentum (Iamb. *VP* 36.267) specifically, Kingsley 1995a, 143, 149-53; cf. also Kingsley 1995b, 187-8.

<sup>81</sup> On the lack of convincing evidence for an Indian influence on Western thought, see e.g. Parker 2008, 264 and n. 67.

<sup>82</sup> That fiction was recognized by Second Sophistic writers as distinct from myth and poetry on the one hand and history on the other is evidenced by Quintilian, who notes three kinds of narrative: *fabulam, quae uersatur in tragoediis atque carminibus, non a ueritate modo sed etiam a forma ueritatis remota; argumentum, quod falsum sed uerosimile comoediae fingunt; historiam, in qua est gestae rei expositio* (*Inst.* 2.4.2), 'myth, which is used in tragedies and poetry, remote not only from truth but from the likeness of truth; fiction, false but with the appearance of truth, which comedies present; history, in which what happened is set out'. Ancient critics make almost no mention of the novel (for which there was no identifying term in either Greek or Latin) as a fictional form; on the issue and the theoretical framework within which novels and other works of fiction would have been seen, Morgan 1993, 175-93; Feeney 1993, 232 and n. 6.

about contemporary figures that may be literally true or intended to be taken as such, and from tales about pre-Second Sophistic protagonists extrapolated from existing traditions.

Sometimes, an author says explicitly that his work is fictional. Lucian notes at the beginning of his *Verae historiae* that he is truthful at least in admitting that his account is lies (καὶν ἔν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο ἀληθείῳ λέγων ὅτι ψεύδομαι, *VH* 1.4). At *Met.* 1.1, Apuleius calls the tale to follow a *fabulam Graecanicam*. Dion's *Or.* 5 is a *Libykos mythos*. Plutarch's tale of Timarchos of Chaironeia is described as more like myth or fiction than an account (μῦθοις ὁμοιότερα καὶ πλάσμασιν ἢ λόγοις ὄντα,<sup>83</sup> *Mor.* 589f). His tale of Aridaios of Soloi is *mythos* (*Mor.* 563b), as is his Sylla's account of the tale he has heard from a stranger about Kronos' island (*Mor.* 940f). Platonic myth, by this time, was an established genre.<sup>84</sup>

Sometimes, the author's intention to present a work as fictional or mythic is not quite so clear. Most obviously, pointed literary references or the grotesque overuse of literary tropes effectively declare the fictionality of a work.

Lucian mentions lamboulos as a liar, one of those who present fiction as fact (*VH* 1.2-3). He is being deliberately naïve: lamboulos' work, as recorded by Diodorus Siculus (2.55-60), seems to have been a Cynic-Stoic manifesto making references to Aristotle's *Politica* that were surely meant to be recognized as such.<sup>85</sup> Similarly, Euhemeros' *Hiera anagraphē* – describing a journey to an island in the Ocean where discovered inscriptions prove Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus to have been human kings (D.S. 5.41.4-5.46.7, Lactant. *Div.inst.* 1.11) – was probably intended to be recognized as polemical fiction: there were echoes of Homer's Phaiakia and of Plato's Atlantis, and place names were clever variants of real ones. (Nevertheless, at *Mor.* 360a Plutarch understands it as invented traditional myth.<sup>86</sup>) In the same tradition, Lucian's *Verae historiae* recalls aspects of the works of Herodotos, Aristophanes and, most notably, Homer.<sup>87</sup> His *Necyomantia*, *Dialogi Mortuorum* and *Icaromenippus* make explicit reference, in the name of the

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<sup>83</sup> As reconstructed by de Lacy and Einarson 1959; the passage is corrupt but the meaning clear.

<sup>84</sup> Plato disapproved of traditional myth as morally unedifying (*R.* 376e-378d) and created his own to make specific points. For Plutarch's attitude to Platonic myth, Lambertson 2001, 37-8, 93-4, 143-4, 150-1.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. Ferguson 1975, 124-9.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. Ferguson 1975, 104-5; Romm 1992, 48, 197-8. Plutarch (*Mor.* 360a) makes two separate criticisms of Euhemeros' mythology: it is incredible (*apistos*) and invented or unreal or nonexistent (*anhyparktos*). See further Ch. 7.2.2.

<sup>87</sup> *VH* 1.7 cf. *Hdt.* 4.82: Herakles' footprint; *VH* 1.16 cf. *Hdt.* 3.102: enormous ants; *VH* 1.16 cf. *Hdt.* 4.191: dog-headed men; *VH* 1.29 cf. *Ar. Av.* 819-20: Nephelokokkygia; *VH* 2.27 cf. *Hom. Od.* 11.100-37: Teiresias' directions; *VH* 2.27, 32-5 cf. *Od.* 19.559-69: the Island of Dreams; *VH* 2.27, 35-6 cf. *Od.* 5.1-268: Kalypso's island.

protagonist, to satirical works of Menippos, and other works (*Cataplus*, *Juppiter confutatus*) probably replicate aspects of Menippos' plots.<sup>88</sup>

By the period of the Second Sophistic, story forms invented in an earlier period to convey the reliability of an account had become sufficiently over-used for a sophisticated audience to recognize their types and for a sophisticated writer to expect such recognition. One such story paradigm – building on the autopsy tradition – was the observer's circuit of the earth to gain the knowledge that he presents. Another was the elaborate narrative framework that explains the transmission of the information that the writer now imparts. It has been suggested that, in the Second Sophistic, the framework device of the recovered document was so conventional that no sophisticated audience would have treated it as anything else. The motif was notably used in the 'memoirs' of Diktys of Krete and it appears also – along with the circuit motif – in Antonius Diogenes' *De incredibilibus* (ap. Phot. 111a, 24-9), virtually proclaiming the fictionality of the work.<sup>89</sup> Plutarch made use of it in the *De genio Socratis*, in which – as discussion below indicates – it should be seen as an indication of fictionality. Another paradigmatic pattern – an oracle sets the agenda – will be identified at Ch. 5.2.1b.

The use of journey tales and frameworks in ways not automatically suggesting caricature leaves fictionality and reportage – at second or third or fourth hand – as alternatives. Even Iamboulos' work was perhaps based in part on real knowledge of India and Sri Lanka.<sup>90</sup> Equivocally 'true report' or myth are Plutarch's account of the message to the pilot Thamos at *Mor.* 419b-d and Lucian's description of the numinous experience of the Machlaian Indians at *Bacch.* 6-7.<sup>91</sup> To the reader – as the authors no doubt intended (see Ch. 7.2) – the literal truth or mythical status of the stories remains forever an insoluble riddle.

Historical dialogue might not necessarily be intended as fiction. Plutarch adds riddling incongruities to indicate the fictional nature of his work in his *De genio Socratis*, in which Simmias describes his past experience in Egypt. The tradition that Plato visited Egypt supplies the backdrop to the narrative. Simmias reports that he, Plato and the Egyptian Chonouphis had

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<sup>88</sup> Cf. Harmon 1913-36, vol. 2, 1, 59.

<sup>89</sup> As far as we can tell, Antonius Diogenes did not call his work fiction or myth, although Photios (109a, 10-11) calls it *μύθων ἐγγύς καὶ ἀπίστων*. For the 'recovered document' motif in Diktys' *Ephemeris belli Troiani*, in the medical and scientific works of Thessalos of Tralles and Bolos of Mendes, and in Antonius Diogenes' *De incredibilibus*, see Bowie 1978, 1663, Winkler 1985, 258-62, Stephens and Winkler 1995, 102-3, 127 n. 59.

<sup>90</sup> Ferguson 1975, 175-6.

<sup>91</sup> At *Bacch.* 8, Lucian refers to the *mythos* he has recounted, but the reference is to the story of Dionysos' invasion of India. The tale of the Machlaian Indians relates to the Dionysos story – and is recounted – only because it is set in India and involves drink-initiated inspiration.

many philosophical discussions, and he presents Chonouphis deciphering mysterious inscriptions from Alkmene's tomb (*Mor.* 578f-579a). Now, Chonouphis was known as the teacher of Eudoxos (Plut. *Mor.* 354d-e, D.L. 8.90), not of Plato; the incongruity indicates, to the educated, the fictional nature of Simmias' account. Challenging his readers' knowledge, Plutarch provides a tongue-in-cheek expansion of traditions associated with the mathematical problem of doubling a cube.<sup>92</sup> According to Eratosthenes (see T4.10), and as Plutarch knew (*Mor.* 386e), the Delians approached Plato with the problem, which had been set for them by the god, and Plato was able to explain the god's true intention. In this account, the Delians approach Plato specifically as a *geometer* (*Mor.* 579b), and he predicts Eudoxos' still-to-be-achieved provision of a mathematical solution (*Mor.* 579c; cf. 718e).

Tables 9, 10 and 11 of this thesis detail encounters with the Other in Second Sophistic fictional writing. All the sources included on Tables 9 and 11 are either novels, or classifiable as fictional using criteria of the kinds discussed above.<sup>93</sup> Table 10 lists incidents reported in identifiably fictional sources, and (as equivocally fictional) any contemporary encounters with divine beings or 'monsters' at the 'edges' or 'ends' of the earth reported in others of the focal sources.

#### **2.4.1 Oracles**

**Table 9** details the oracular consultations attributed to protagonists of fictional accounts. We note a limited readiness to refer to flourishing contemporary oracles (Amphilochos at Mallos, Apollo at Didyma, see Ch. 1.2.1) other than Delphi. However, the tendency to assimilate oracle tales to Delphi is apparent when, in a later reference to an oracle originally explicitly associated with Didyma (T9.10), Apuleius can call it 'Pythian' (*nunc recordare sortis Pythicae*, *Met.* 5.17). The well-established themes of consultation concerning destiny (Aridaios, T9.1; Eukrates, T9.2; Aristeas and Moirichos, T9.3) or what to *do* (Psyche's father on her behalf, T9.10), of accreditation of living persons (Charikleia and Theagenes, T9.7), and of oracles as cryptic and only rightly understood in retrospect (T9.5, 7, 10), are all present.

Closely associated with the fact that we are now dealing with fictional accounts is the writers' use of oracles for their own authorial purposes. Oracles to Aridaios (T9.1) and Timarchos (T9.12) provide frameworks within which Plutarch can present the points he wants to make.

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<sup>92</sup> On the problem, T. Heath 1921, 244-6.

<sup>93</sup> Lucian's *Toxaris* is explicitly a collection of stories to make a point (*Tox.* 10); at *Philops.* 1, Tychiades dismisses all the tales he is about to recount as lies.

Heliodoros' oracles – to Charikles (T9.5), concerning Charikleia and Theagenes (T9.7) – excite the reader's speculation by indicating in compellingly cryptic form the events to follow. A more interesting fictional construction – the *protagonists'* use of the fact that the oracle's predictions must come to pass – will be taken up at Ch. 5.2.1b.

#### 2.4.2 Unmediated encounters

**Table 10** sets out Second Sophistic fictional encounters with the divine at liminal places in the accessible world, and at the edges or mythical ends of the earth. In cases bringing to mind the experiences of pre-Second Sophistic protagonists, we find divine acceptance and accreditation (Charikleia on her execution pyre, T10.19) and contests with monsters (snake-women, T10.20-22).

*Daimones* enter the picture as a 'new' (see App. 2.2.1) kind of liminal being likely to be encountered at the edges and ends of the earth. We meet them in tales of remote earthly regions, Kronos' island (T10.35) and the vicinity of the Erythre Thalatta (T10.31), as well as of journeys inspired by Plato's myth of Er: Aridaios of Soloi and Timarchos of Chaironeia consult respectively Amphilochos and Trophonios (T9.1, 12) and are granted revelatory, life-changing (in the case of Aridaios) and life-completing (in the case of Timarchos) journeys beyond the confines of the earth (T10.42, 43).

Some of the journeys on which the encounters are obtained can be likened to Labours. Derkyllis (see T10.41, 51) circles the earth in what is essentially a quest to undo a spell cast on her parents (Ant.Diog. *De incred. ap. Phot.* 110b, 23-35); Charikleia's journey to Ethiopia (see T10.17, 19), undertaken for love, culminates in her winning back her birthright (Heliod. *Aeth.* 10.41). Other journeys are undertaken explicitly for the sake of autopsy. Travelling from the mysterious *epeiros* beyond Kronos' island to 'our' world, the *xenos* of Plutarch's *De facie in orbe lunae* (see T10.35) finds the sacred writings and initiation rituals of a realm hitherto unknown to him (*Mor.* 942b-c). Leaving the familiar world, Lucian's Menippos (T10.44, 48), his narrative *persona* in the *Verae historiae* (T10.36-8, 46) and Antonius Diogenes' Deinias (T10.47) experience encounters with divine or liminal beings more reminiscent of myth than of the journeys of autopsy summarized in Table 7.

Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* in particular provides a substantial body of relevant material. In 'Cupid and Psyche' (*Met.* 4.28-6.24), we find many of the traditional 'direct encounter' paradigms. Psyche, abandoned on the clifftop above Cupid's valley, is lifted and carried into the

valley by a breeze (T10.24); her sisters, attempting to enter uninvited, are dashed to the ground (T10.25-6). Psyche's confrontation with Venus (T10.13) entails Labours in which she is set up to fail, and which end in her defeat and death (*Met.* 6.21). Her subsequent salvation by Cupid and apotheosis have rightly been seen as both influenced by Plato's thought (*Smp.* 209e-212a, *Phdr.* 246a-252b) and a development of it – Plato allows the soul no personified saviour or 'salvation by grace'.<sup>94</sup> In fact, as well, they echo the rescues of Odysseus (T5.129) and Arion (T5.118) and the apotheoses of Herakles (T5.125) and Ino (T5.127); in these cases too, the protagonist's salvation follows defeat in a contest with a god or by an element metaphorically representing the divine, and recognition for him- or herself by a merciful power. (Certainly the recognition is for merits, but these merits proved insufficient for the protagonist to save him- or herself; Apuleius' Psyche similarly has won Cupid's love with – if nothing else – the merit of her beauty, but probably also with the sufferings her Labours have entailed.) In an account paralleling Psyche's initial acceptance by Cupid, Apuleius' Lucius is redeemed and returned from ass to human form after an encounter with the goddess Isis in which she accepts and takes pity on him (*Met.* 11.1-6, T10.28). Later encounters in repeated initiations give him a whole new life – paralleling Psyche's apotheosis – in communion with the goddess. Lucius' endeavours to be accepted in initiation (*Met.* 11.21-3, 28-30) can be seen as 'Labours' comparable with Psyche's. Certainly they reflect the contemporary belief that ritual can provide access – and relatively 'safe' access – to the god; the issue will be taken up at Ch. 2.5.2. A sceptical view sees Lucius as deluded, psychologically convinced that he has a new life because of the difficult ritual requirements he has fulfilled.<sup>95</sup>

### **2.4.3 The non-Greek world**

**Table 11** sets out encounters with the non-Greek 'wise' – wherever they are to be found – reported in Second Sophistic fiction and original myth.

Some fictional and mythical journeys undertaken specifically for autopsy – those involving an encounter with the monstrous or divine – were noted in discussion (Ch. 2.4.2) of Table 10. Table 11 fills in the picture of autopsy when it picks up journeys of encounter with the remote wise that echo those of the pre-Second Sophistic travellers of Tables 7 and 8. Plutarch's Simmias interviews the priests of Egypt (T11.1); Lucian's Antiphilos and Demetrios travel to study

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<sup>94</sup> Apuleius' Cupid is less Plato's abstract Eros than the personified figure of Plut. *Mor.* 764f-65a. Cf. Walsh 1981, 29-30, Kenney 1990, 193-4.

<sup>95</sup> The issue is canvassed by Winkler 1985, 216-27.

in Egypt (T11.9, 10), though their teachers in Alexandria are probably Greek rather than Egyptian, and Demetrios contemplates a further journey to the Brachmanes of India (T11.11). Queen Persinna seeks out Ethiopian gymnosophists – to be discussed in more detail at Ch. 3.5.4 – near Meroe (T11.26). Apuleius' Lucius, visiting Thessaly (T11.14), is eager to meet the witches (*magae*)<sup>96</sup> associated with the place and learn about spells (*artis magicae ... cantamina*, *Met.* 2.1, 5-6); the account makes a significant addition to the non-Greek 'wise' we have encountered so far. Thessalian women had long been notorious for their ability to draw down the moon; the theme occurs in Aristophanes (*Nu.* 749-55), Plato (*Grg.* 513a) and Plutarch (*Mor.* 145c-d, 416f-17a), and Lucan's full-blown account of a Thessalian witch (6.413-830) refers to the power to bring down the stars and dim the moon (499-502).<sup>97</sup>

In accounts included on Table 11, individuals seek out various of the non-Greek wise in their traditional locations not just for the sake of autopsy but for pragmatic ends. Antonius Diogenes' Derkyllis seeks the direction of Zalmoxis in Thrace (T11.19); Lucian's Menippos travels to Babylon to find Mithrobarzanes, one of the Chaldaians who can open the gates of Hades (T11.4). Equally often, those sought out seem to be resident in the Greek world or at least in other than their native place. Ion's father can summon a local Chaldaian to cure snakebite (T11.6); Kleodemos pays a *barbaros xenos* (a Hyperborean) to make a love charm (T11.8). A Thessalian summons an Egyptian prophet living locally to bring a spirit back from the dead (T11.17).

The issues of the location of the non-Greek wise and the apparently new, negative, image of them that is obvious in some of these examples will be taken up at Ch. 2.5.3.

## 2.5 Further paradigms

In each of the three story categories discussed above – mediated and unmediated encounter, and encounter with the remote wise – a further paradigm can be proposed.

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<sup>96</sup> The context makes Apuleius' negative interpretation of the term clear.

<sup>97</sup> For these and other relevant references, Luck 1985, Ogden 2009.

### 2.5.1 The god responds with a riddle in order to test the inquirer

At Ch 2.3.1, it was demonstrated that oracular answers were expected often to be ambiguous. Plutarch himself believed that, although many oracles were straightforward answers to inquirers' questions, Apollo sometimes deliberately chose to speak in riddles (*Mor.* 384e-f).<sup>98</sup>

**Table 12** lists accounts of oracles taken as riddles and correctly interpreted. Entries build on those set out in Table 4, with instances reported only once in the sources added. Cases in which the oracle was immediately seen to be a riddle and interpreted correctly by the recipient (sometimes with human or divine help) are listed first; those in which apparently unambiguous responses were understood correctly (or cleverly) in sufficient time for the protagonist or another interested party to benefit follow. Cases in which an oracle was understood as a riddle only well after the event, or by an uninvolved narrator, or in which the god was obliged to provide the correct understanding in a second oracle, are not included.

Examining this Table and Table 4 together, we find that, sometimes, the interpretation of the god's riddle is rather obvious. In Plutarch's version of his story (*Mor.* 403d, T12.5), Prokles immediately understands that the god intends him to drown or bury himself. On the basis of the formulaic nature of oracle tales, Fontenrose suggests that, in the original story, Prokles would not have understood the oracle.<sup>99</sup> This being the case, Plutarch's interpretation is a recognition of the obviousness of the 'riddle'. We need hardly be surprised that King Erginos understands the meaning of ἰστοβοῆι γέροντι νέην ποτίβαλλε κορώνην (T12.10). Rather more surprising (and probably only an excuse) is Aigeus' failure to understand Ἄσκοῦ τὸν προὔχοντα πόδα ...μὴ λύσης πρὶν δῆμον Ἀθηνέων εἰσαφικέσθαι (T4.12). Sometimes, the meaning of a cryptic oracle becomes clear to the protagonist in the course of events. Phalanthos understands the god's meaning when he sees 'rain falling from a clear sky' in his wife Aithra's tears (T12.3). In each of the stories about Alkmaion (T12.12), Lokros (T12.13), and Chalkinos and Daitos (T12.14), the protagonist(s) must be perceptive enough to recognize the fulfilment of the oracle when it presents itself.<sup>100</sup>

The correct interpretation of a truly cryptic metaphor or other verbal riddle (whether immediate or on contemplation) is limited to those credited with unusual insight or wisdom. They include Theoklos, identified as a *mantis* (T12.1), and Phalanthos (T12.2), Zenon (T12.9),

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<sup>98</sup> He made his comment in the context of the possible meaning of the mysterious letter E inscribed at Delphi. It seems likely that his belief in the ambiguity of genuine oracles was based on puzzles of this kind and oracle tales of the past rather than his own contemporary experience.

<sup>99</sup> Fontenrose 1978, 66-7.

<sup>100</sup> In the case of the oracle to Alkmaion (T12.12), Thucydides' version (2.102) presents the story in this way. In Pausanias' version, the oracle gives Alkmaion a clue enabling him to identify appropriate land.

Theseus (T12.11), and Aisymnos (T12.15); the stories about the last four may have been built around well-known riddles, but the protagonists were obviously meant to be hearing them for the first time.<sup>101</sup> Also correctly interpreting riddles are Sokrates (T12.17), Diogenes (T12.19) and perhaps Cicero (T12.21). In these last three cases in particular, the oracle functions as a test question. When the protagonist asks about his own destiny (Diogenes, Cicero) and when Sokrates contemplates the meaning of an oracle about himself, the correct interpretation both confirms the individual's wisdom and points out the course that will lead him to the role in which his wisdom will find expression. If he had failed to understand the oracle, he would also have failed to find his role.

Another even more remarkable set of stories is attested in Table 12: occasionally, a protagonist seizes upon a potential ambiguity apparently unintended by the god and so forces upon the god an outcome. Two minor instances lead on to the more significant ones. An alternative to the interpretations of the oracle to Alkmaion (T12.12) suggested above – that the god was testing him to see whether he could find the right answer to the riddle or recognize the right answer when he came upon it – is to suppose that a place which did not exist as land (μηδὲ γῆ ἦν) when he killed his mother (Th. 2.102) was a circumlocution for 'nowhere'. Alkmaion creatively finds land satisfying the oracle and so forces the god's (or fate's) hand. To Messenians inquiring about victory over Sparta (T12.18), the god replies that victory belongs to those who first place 100 tripods around the altar of Zeus Ithomatas. In Pausanias' interpretation (4.12.7-10), the oracle is perfectly straightforward and favours the Messenians, who are nevertheless fated to a destruction that follows from their own complacency. They assume that only they have access to a shrine in their own territory, but a Spartan gets in first, hiding clay tripods in a bag and again forcing the god's hand.<sup>102</sup>

However we see, or are intended to see, these stories, there can be no doubt that Alexander seizes upon oracles to create his own fate. At the oracle of Ammon, the priest spontaneously addresses Alexander as, or in a way that can be interpreted as, 'son of Zeus' (T12.22). According to Plutarch, some say (ἔνιοι δὲ φασί) that the priest, meaning to address him as παιδίον (child), by a slip of the tongue (ὑπὸ βαρβαρισμοῦ) addressed him as παιδίος (i.e. παῖ

<sup>101</sup> For the riddle behind T12.1 = T4.1 and T12.2 = T4.2, see Ch. 2.3.1. The answer at T12.15 might seem to suggest forming a democracy. Aisymnos' understanding makes sense in the light of what was a well-known riddle: Who are more numerous, the living or the dead? Similarly, at Plb. 8.28.7, the colonists who found Tarentum are told to make their settlement with the majority, and they place their graveyard within the walls. Cf. Fontenrose 1978, 71.

<sup>102</sup> A second, obscure part of the oracle proves that the god knew the outcome all along (Paus. 4.12.7, 4.26.4). It is doubtless a face-saving addition.

Διός, son of Zeus); Alexander took this for an oracle, and was pleased (Plut. *Alex.* 27.5).<sup>103</sup> On being enthroned as pharaoh, Alexander automatically became son of Ammon,<sup>104</sup> so the priest's addressing him as 'son of Zeus' would have been quite natural and no slip of the tongue.<sup>105</sup> Making the word a mistake was a brilliant move (on the part of whoever first created the variant) to insert in the story an ambiguity of the kind seen as inherent in oracles and upon which Alexander could seize. A parallel story recounts Alexander's experience at Delphi (T12.20). In Plutarch's account, prior to crossing the Hellespont, Alexander approaches the oracle to ask about the outcome of his great campaign. He arrives on a day on which it is improper to question the oracle and, when the priestess tells him so, he drags her forcibly towards the temple. Overcome by his importunity, she exclaims ἀνίκητος εἶ ὦ παῖ, 'My son, you are invincible'. As above, Alexander takes the answer as an oracle and declares that there is no need to consult the god further (*Alex.* 14.4). The two stories are possibly related, with the Delphic response secondary to the response from Ammon: the vocative ὦ παῖ with which the priestess addresses Alexander is more appropriate to Siwa than to Delphi – Alexander is son of Zeus, not son of Apollo. Further, the account of Alexander's consultation at Delphi may have been assimilated to an account of a Delphic consultation made by Philomelos, a Phokian chief during the Third Sacred War and reported at D.S. 16.27.1. Philomelos forces the Pythia to speak from the tripod and he takes her word – that he may do as he wishes – as an oracle. The story about Alexander is less credible in that the Pythia does not speak from the tripod.<sup>106</sup>

In the broader context of riddling answers, in the episode discussed at Plut. *Arist.* 11.3 (T12.7), Zeus reveals the meaning of a less-than-obvious oracle to Arimnestos in a dream. In cases excluded from Table 12, protagonists return to consult the god again: Battos, about his lack of success in 'Libya' (T4.18), and the Thasians, whose compliance with a direction to 'bring back the exiles' has not produced the desired result (T4.21). In all these cases, a 'riddle' is solved, but only with divine help. When stories of this kind are added to those already examined in this section, a sequence of possibilities becomes apparent. Those who interpret a riddling oracle rightly with the god's help are favoured by the gods, those who – like Sokrates – can work out

<sup>103</sup> At least from the time of Herodotos (see Hdt. 2.55-6), Ammon and Zeus were identified.

<sup>104</sup> Cf. Hamilton 1971, 151, n. 9.

<sup>105</sup> In fact, in Curtius' account of the incident at Siwa, Alexander is acknowledged by the priest as son of Jupiter (4.7.25). The title is bestowed deliberately and as from the god; no mistake or oracle is implied.

<sup>106</sup> Cf. Fontenrose 1978, 250-1, 338-9. The example of the Philomelos story shows that the Alexander stories are not unique in suggesting an adversarial relationship with the god. Persistence in the face of a bad oracle wrings for the Athenians the more favourable oracle of the wooden wall (T12.6). Cleverness and persistence are likewise required in an (obviously fictional) account in Aristophanes' *Plutus* (32-8): Chremylos asks whether his son should give up virtue and take to crime, and the god is forced into providing the young man with an opening.

the answer are wise, but the one who – like Alexander – can force the god's hand is perhaps divine. Riddling oracles can be set alongside Labours (Ch. 2.3.3) as tests set up by a god.

### **2.5.2 There are relatively safe ways to approach the god**

At Ch. 2.4.2, reference was made to the ritual requirements enjoined on Apuleius' Lucius in his quest for initiation by Isis' priests. He must first of all be accepted as a candidate by the goddess – who conveys her approval and her ceremonial requirements both to him and to her priests – and then abstain from certain foods and drinks and equip himself at some expense in readiness for the day (*Met.* 11.21-3). Even a cursory examination of Second Sophistic purportedly non-fictional literature relating to contemporary and near contemporary figures confirms the importance of ritual in obtaining access to a god. Aristeides undertakes physically demanding open air incubations (*katakliseis*) in winter in the sacred precinct at Pergamon (*HL* 2.80). Pausanias describes the ritual procedure that he himself has undergone in order to obtain an interview at Lebadeia: days of ascetic living for purification, sacrifices with a diviner present to ascertain whether Trophonios will see him, ritual bathing and anointing, and worship of a statue of Trophonios (9.39.5-8). At the same place, Apollonios proves his extraordinary status when he ignores adverse omens (supposedly relating to the day rather than to him personally) and has a triumphant interview with the divine being (Philostr. *VA* 8.19.1-2). Plutarch reports the death of a recent Pythia who was forced into an oracular session with the omens warning against it (*Mor.* 438a-c); in this case, the would-be suppliants had been submitted to a ritual test.

In the cases of Lucius (*Met.* 11.1-14) and Aristeides (*HL* 2.26-8), ritual and divine encounter become a self-perpetuating cycle: liminal encounters (Lucius by the sea, Aristeides in a dream) lay down ritual requirements (approaching a procession, sacrifice and bathing) issuing in a wholeness or sense of completion (Lucius' return to human form, Aristeides' experience likened to an initiation) that turns out to be incomplete. Further ritual processes (Lucius' initiations, Aristeides' ongoing treatment at the Asklepieion) follow.

Ritual was obviously part of the Second Sophistic reality of approaching a god. **Table 13** – which restricts Table 5 to accounts of encounters with a god or spirit in which a ritual approach is mentioned or, because of the locale and outcome, implicit – shows that ritual figures relatively little in reported tales about pre-Second Sophistic protagonists. The reason is genre: reported traditional stories mentioned ritual only when the plot required it. Failure to observe the rites at any of the shrines was worthy of mention because it usually resulted in the destruction also

accorded to those who challenged the god outside the cult setting. Aipytos, king of the Arkadians, is blinded and dies when he enters the forbidden sanctuary of Poseidon Hippios at Mantinea (T13.12). A bodyguard of Demetrios who performed none of the usual rites and descended only in the hope of stealing is the only man to have been killed as a result of descent into the cave of Trophonios (T13.1). In contrast, we note the accrediting stories of Herakles at Delphi (T13.13) and Alexander at Delphi (T12.20), and the case of the boxer Euthymos, who confronts a hero at his shrine with such success that the spirit flees the land permanently and requires no further sacrifices (T13.3).

Table 13 nevertheless provides literary reflections of pre-Second Sophistic cult-facilitated approaches to a god. A mythological story is reshaped more plausibly in the context of a cult: at Paus. 9.30.6, Orpheus seeks out his wife's spirit at the *nekyomanteion* at Aornon in Thesprotis (T13.7).<sup>107</sup> The story of Saon of Akraiphnion provides an aetiology for the ritual well-known to be required at Lebadeia (T13.11). Plutarch describes Elysios of Terina visiting a *psychomanteion* and performing the preliminary sacrifices required (T13.2). In this context, we might note the complex relationship between literature and cult procedures for consulting the dead. We have seen Thesprotia associated with Hades in the context of Herakles' Labours and possibly by Homer (Ch. 2.3.3). More specifically, an oracle of the dead there is mentioned by Herodotos (5.92η),<sup>108</sup> as well as by Pausanias in the context of Orpheus noted just above. The references are probably to the archaeologically-attested oracle of the dead at Ephyra whose rites perhaps inspired – and, in the Hellenistic period, gained authority from their association with – Homer's description of the meeting of Odysseus and Teiresias at *Od.* 11.23-99. Dakaris, the excavator at Ephyra, believed that the local cult of Hades antedated the *Odyssey* and that its ritual procedures were echoed in Homer's account. The sanctuary was finally destroyed by fire in 167 BCE.<sup>109</sup>

Usually, in reported stories, ritual required little or no mention. Table 13 includes a number of instances in which an ordinary questioner summons up and obtains a word from a god or spirit. The Spartan leader Pausanias evokes a spirit at the oracle of the dead at Herakleia in Pontos (T13.8); a Karian envoy of Mardonios obtains an answer at Lebadeia and a Lydian envoy, at Oropos (T13.4, 5); Quintus Titius and Salvenius learn about events to come at Lebadeia

<sup>107</sup> Pausanias differentiates this story from the traditional one (T5.103), which he notes at 9.30.4 and claims not to believe. Clearly, different variants were in circulation. At D.S. 4.25.4, Orpheus' rescue of Eurydike is likened to Dionysos' of Semele; Gantz (1993, 723) plausibly sees this as an indication that, in one variant, Orpheus' mission to Hades ended in success.

<sup>108</sup> Periander of Corinth sends envoys ἐς Θεσπρωτοῦς ἐπ' Ἀχέροντα ποταμὸν ... ἐπὶ τὸ νεκυομαντήριον to interview the ghost of his wife Melissa.

<sup>109</sup> Dakaris 1970, 139-49.

(T13.9, 10); Timoleon receives a symbolic answer (rather than an oracle) at Delphi (T13.18). All the locales are cult places where ritual is known to have been – or, in the case of Herakleia, would have been – in place. There can be no doubt that the questioners would have been supposed, by those hearing the stories, to have followed the appropriate procedures. Of course, obtaining an interview is no guarantee of a pleasing answer: the summoned spirit of Kleonike foretells Pausanias' death.

Even with a ritually-correct approach, there was always the possibility of rejection. The god at Delphi spontaneously expels Kallondes Korax from his temple as Achilochos' killer (T2.10). Moreover, an appropriate approach did not rule out the higher recognition that was itself possibly something to be feared. Presumably while obeying priestly protocol, Iodama, priestess of Itonian Athena, sees the goddess and is turned into stone (T13.14); this seems to have been interpreted locally as a metamorphosis and a mark of the goddess' favour (Paus. 9.34.2). After a rite of human sacrifice, Lykaon, ancient king of Arkadia, experiences metamorphosis and becomes a wolf (T13.17).

Many Second Sophistic individuals must have sought out unmediated encounters with the divine solely because of their need for information or advice; an oracle from (for example) Trophonios could only be obtained in an encounter. However, possibly, using the enabling methodology and safety-measures offered by cult, Second Sophistic individuals – knowing the risks involved in confronting a god – deliberately sought divine recognition. Certainly, in stories about their encounters, we might expect to find a god differentiating between them according to their status in his or her sight, granting to the superior privileged access, verbal accreditation, or even an identity-affirming transformation. The possibilities will be explored in Chapters 3-6.

### **2.5.3 The knowledge of the non-Greek wise is illegitimate**

In the Graeco-Roman world, the only things universally agreed about 'magic' – as specified by a range of terms including *μαγεία*, *γοητεία*, and *magica maleficia*<sup>110</sup> – were the knowledge and power of its practitioners and its illegitimacy. Some identified explicitly in the literature as 'witches' have supernormal knowledge, including knowledge of the future – Pamphile, a *maga* (Apul. *Met.* 2.5, cf. Ch. 2.4.3), stares into a lamp and proclaims that a rainstorm is coming (*Met.*

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<sup>110</sup> *Magica maleficia* was used by Apuleius (e.g. at *Apol.* 9) to describe the charge against him. His is an early use of a cognate of *magus/magia* in specific connection with *maleficia*. Cf. Collins 2008, 152.

2.11) – but supernormal knowledge *per se* seems generally not to have been condemned.<sup>111</sup> 'Magic' was very much associated with the manipulation of events to secure a better outcome, but this too was not necessarily illegitimate. In the multi-tier Hellenistic cosmos, divine will or inexorable necessity dictated only the broader outlines of the pattern of a life. In the sublunar realm, free will, contingency and the activities of *daimones* all shaped the course of events within the broader framework established by destiny or fate (Ch. 1.2.3; see also Ch. 5.2.1b). Rulers constantly sought advice in order to work with fate and the gods rather than against them. Kroisos consults Delphi about the outcome if he should choose to go to war with the Persians (T2.14). Kleombrotos reports rulers and secretaries of kings (δυνάσται καὶ γραμματεῖς βασιλέων) consulting with a supernaturally knowledgeable hermit in a remote region near the Erythre Thalatta (Plut. *Mor.* 421b, cf. T10.31). Vespasian explicitly tells Apollonios that he wants to do only what is fated to succeed (Philostr. *VA* 5.29.4). In Second Sophistic fiction, Kalasiris contrasts the understanding implicit in these instances with its opposite when he compares true or higher Egyptian wisdom (*sophia*), which gains knowledge of the future by studying the stars and is directed to the good of humankind, with a lower wisdom utilizing ghosts (*eidola*), herbs (*botanai*) and spells (*epoidai*) and directed towards unsanctioned acts and intemperate pleasures (Helioid. *Aeth.* 3.16).

'Magic' can perhaps be described as using 'unnatural' means to manipulate outcomes. Apuleius suggests as much when he proposes that a magician is commonly seen as one who *communione loquendi cum deis immortalibus ad omnia quae uelit incredibili[a] quadam ui cantaminum polleat* (*Apol.* 26), 'speaking in communion with the immortal gods, can cause whatever miracles he wants by the power of incantation'. Even so, issues remain. Charged with magic, Apuleius raises the issue of what is 'natural' and what is not.<sup>112</sup> Again, if a problem can be attributed to an evil spirit, is it not legitimate to use supernatural methods to control it? Apollonios destroys a *daimon* causing plague at Ephesos at Philostr. *VA* 4.10.2-3.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> The issue of its legitimacy was clouded by accusations as to how it was obtained: Philostratos' Apollonios is charged with ritual human sacrifice for the purposes of divination (*VA* 8.5.2, 8.7.30-45).

<sup>112</sup> He is accused of paying fishermen for specimens of unusual fish – the seahare (*Iepus marinus*, a mollusc which could be used as a poison or to procure abortions; cf. Collins 2008, 154), and two fish whose names refer to the male and female genitals and so presumably were regarded as appropriate for sympathetic magic (*Apol.* 33). While he denies the identities of the fish, he admits to asking both fishermen and friends to seek out for him unusual specimens (*Apol.* 33), setting himself in the scientific/philosophic tradition of Aristotle and Theophrastos (*Apol.* 36). This tradition, he claims, not only allows but encourages examination of the natural world; no one complains when doctors make use of the properties of the natural world to do good (*Apol.* 40)!

<sup>113</sup> Apollonios has the Ephesians stone the man – hardly a supernatural method – but the presence of Herakles the Averter suggests the supernatural battle between Apollonios and the *daimon* that is simultaneously taking place (see Chs 3.2, 3.4.2c).

Modern specialists prefer to define magic in terms of practices. Collins, for example, focuses on those associated at various times with the terms 'magic' and 'magicians' to show that the practices had a long and consistent history although the terms used to describe them, and the reasons given for their success or for their inappropriateness, changed over time.<sup>114</sup> In the *Leges* (11.932e-933a), Plato identifies two methods of inflicting injury: that using drugs (*pharmaka*) and so natural (κατὰ φύσιν), and witchcraft (*goeteia*), including specifically incantations (*epoidai*) and binding (*katadesis*).<sup>115</sup> In practice, the use of incantations and binding was inseparable from that of drugs. Incantations (*epelysiai*) appear at *Hymn.Hom.Cer.* 227-30, where Demeter, disguised as an old woman, claims to know those protecting babies. Binding, referred to by Plato also (as *katadesmos*) at *R.* 2.364b-c, can be identified with the archaeologically-attested phenomenon of 'binding magic'. There were two forms. Tablets (usually of lead and attested throughout the Greek world from the fifth century BCE) were inscribed with the name of the intended victim and (increasingly) the names of divinities or *daimones* called upon, and then rolled, folded or pierced; the term *katadesmos* was used on the tablets themselves. As well, there were figurines of wax – the κήρινα μμήματα πεπλασμένα mentioned explicitly by Plato at *Lg.* 11.933a-b – or other materials, often pierced, or with limbs bound or twisted.<sup>116</sup>

Graeco-Roman legal references to magic add little clarity and indicate the confusion that existed in the period. In Greek law, the term *pharmaka* was used to refer ambiguously to drugs, poison and magic. In Roman law, the *Lex Cornelia* on assassins and poisoners of 81 BCE mentioned only drugs (*uenena*) but was used in cases of witchcraft that did not involve drugs. The word for poisoner (*ueneficus*) was the same as that for magician.<sup>117</sup>

Gradually, and certainly by the period of the Second Sophistic, sorcery could be associated with the Magoi. In the earliest Greek tradition, a practitioner of magic or sorcerer was a *goes*, and the use of drugs or spells, *pharmakeia*. The Magoi, on the other hand, were the Persian wise. That their knowledge was seen as legitimate is attested by the fact that – in the encounters recorded in Table 8 – it was sought out by the canonical Greek philosophers. As we have seen (App. 1.2), Plato identifies them as inheritors of the wisdom of Zoroaster (*Alc.* 122a).

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<sup>114</sup> Collins 2008, 43-4.

<sup>115</sup> The use of drugs had not always been seen as 'natural'. Among the Presocratics, any attempt to manipulate natural processes could be seen as wrong; however, from the fifth century, *pharmaka* were considered the legitimate tools of physicians. Cf. Collins 2008, 28-31.

<sup>116</sup> On the meaning of *pharmaka* and the inseparability of *pharmaka* and *epoidai*, Kingsley 1995a, 222. On curse tablets and figurines, Collins 2008, 64-103.

<sup>117</sup> On Greek and Roman law relating to magic, Collins 2008, 132-65. Taylor (2011, 151-5) addresses the complex nature of the Roman law in the context of Apuleius' *Apologia*.

Nevertheless, *magos* and related terms are used in a perjorative way by Sophokles and Euripides.<sup>118</sup> Kingsley suggests that Plato and his circle may deliberately have avoided the term *magos* because of its negative associations.<sup>119</sup> By the Second Sophistic, μαγεύω meant equally 'be a Persian Magos' or 'bewitch'. At Plut. *Art.* 3.3, in the context of the upbringing of Kyros, a priest is noted as having taught him Magian philosophy (διδάξας μαγεύειν αὐτόν); at Plut. *Num.* 15.5, *daimones* have used magic to bring down Zeus from heaven (καταγαγεῖν τὸν Δία μαγεύσαντας). Dion was aware of the ambivalent implications of the term. At 36.41, he notes that among the Persians the Magoi are those who know how to cultivate the divine power (ἐπισταμένους θεραπεύειν τὸ δαιμόνιον), but the Greeks in their ignorance use the term to denote wizards (*goetes*). Philostratos tends to a negative assessment when he describes the philosophers Pythagoras, Demokritos and Empedokles associating with Magoi without being subjected by their *techné* – the term had negative connotations – at VA 1.2.1.

How did the development come about? It may be related to the reputations of others of the non-Greek wise. Certainly, undesirable 'magical' practices were early associated with particular individuals. Prototypes of the non-Greek wise as witches are Medeia and Kirke, who appear in the ancient Jason saga and in the *Odyssey* (for references from the focal sources, see Table 6). Medeia falls in love with Jason on his arrival in Kolchis and saves him – with invocations of Hekate and a drug (*pharmakon*) with which he can anoint himself<sup>120</sup> – from the bulls of Hephaistos and armed men springing from the dragon's teeth that he sows (T6.22-3). Back in Iolchos, with Jason complicit in the deed, she brings about King Pelias' murder by tricking his daughters with a magical demonstration involving *pharmaka* (T6.25). In the *Odyssey*, Kirke turns men into beasts with *pharmaka* (10.275-320) but, won over by Odysseus (10.321-35), gives him wise and helpful advice (T6.31).<sup>121</sup> As noted earlier, before the fifth century, *pharmaka* – later considered the legitimate tools of physicians – were seen in a negative light. Beside Kirke and Medeia we can perhaps put King Aiolos – never described as a magician – who has power over the winds (*Od.* 10.1-27). In Second Sophistic literature, Menippos' journey to Hades (*Luc. Nec.* 9) evokes Kirke's directions to Odysseus (*Od.* 10.504-40, cf. T6.31) and Apollonios' observations at the citadel of the Indian Sophoi (Philostr. VA 3.14.2) recall Aiolos' power over the winds (*Od.* 10.19-22, cf. T6.29); the passages can be interpreted as associating Menippos' guide

<sup>118</sup> E.g. at S. *OT* 387-9, E. *Or.* 1495-7b. Cf. de Jong 1997, 387-8.

<sup>119</sup> Kingsley 1995b, 202-3. Plato uses *magos* in a contemptuous sense at *R.* 572e.

<sup>120</sup> A.R. 3.1026-45. In the same context, Apollodoros (1.9.23) refers to a *pharmakon* and Dion (16.10), to the *dynamis* provided by Medeia.

<sup>121</sup> She sends him to Teiresias in Hades (10.490-5); when he returns to her for further direction, she warns him of the Sirenes, of Skylla and Charybdis, and of Thrinakia, where Helios' cattle are to be found (12.36-141).

Mithrobarzanes and the Sophoi with magical powers. The reputation of Thessalians for dangerous powers was discussed in the context of Table 11 above (Ch. 2.4.3).

An interesting and more specific suggestion accounting for the negative connotations of the term *magos* has been made by Burkert. In the Behistun inscription (c. 500 BCE), King Dareios condemns his rival Gaumata and, each time that his name is mentioned, adds the epithet 'the Magos'. The inscription adds that the same texts were read in public in all Dareios' lands in his subjects' own languages. They must therefore have been read in Greek throughout Ionia about 520 BCE, and the connotations of the term *magos* could hardly have failed to make an impression.<sup>122</sup>

Whatever the reason for the development, it seems likely that, by the period of the Second Sophistic, a converging tradition linked in opprobrium non-Greek 'witches', the Magoi, and other groups of the non-Greek wise: in parallel to the paradigm asserting the superiority of the knowledge of the non-Greek wise was another asserting its illegitimacy. Traces of the latter can be identified in Tables 7 and 8. Alongside the negative reference in the context of the learning of Empedokles, Demokritos and Pythagoras at VA 1.2.1, noted above, we can put Pythagoras acquiring possibly-doubtful *symbolikon* and *mysteriodes* (symbolism and Mystery-like teachings, T8.9) and *caerimoniarum potentiae* (the powers of ritual, T8.12) from the Egyptians; even more ominously, he learns *epodai* (incantations) as well as *mageiai* (magical/Magian matters) from the Magoi (T8.28).

Table 11, discussed above (Ch. 2.4.3), listed interactions between the protagonists of Second Sophistic fictional accounts and the non-Greek wise. **Table 14** identifies those of the episodes that can be considered to involve 'magic'. Included are, first, instances in which individuals seek or obtain means outside the natural order in order to achieve their own ends. The means include drugs, spells (incantations), charms, and ritual actions. The ends include healing, raising of the dead (to answer a question), and success in love. Also included in the Table are episodes in which, in an encounter, the interlocutor displays supernatural powers – changing the natural order for his or her own benefit – which are observed (or otherwise experienced) by the protagonist.

On examination, a substantial proportion (14/27) of the entries included in Table 11 qualify for inclusion in Table 14. Of particular interest, at Delphi the Egyptian Kalasiris is asked for love charms (T14.13, 14); probably also within the confines of the Greek world, Kleodemos'

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<sup>122</sup> Burkert 2004, 108-9.

Hyperborean magician flies (T14.5), a Syrian exorcizes a spirit (T14.4), and a Chaldaian summons up snakes (T14.3). Note has already been made of the fact that, at least in fiction, many 'non-Greek wise' seem to have been resident in the Greek world (Ch. 2.4.3). It now becomes clear that the practices attributed to them were 'magic'. Could practitioners of magic, truthfully or not calling themselves Chaldaians or Egyptians, have contributed to the disrepute of the non-Greek wise?

Plato, the medical author of *De morbo sacro*, and the fifth-century dramatists all refer to self-proclaimed, itinerant religious specialists acting in their own interests. Plato (*R.* 2.364b-c) mentions beggar-priests (*agyrtai*) and seers (*manteis*); the author of *De morbo sacro* lists purifiers (*kathartai*), *agyrtai*, charlatans (*alazones*) and – significantly – *magoi* (1.10 Grensemann). The same cast appears in fifth century drama: in Sophokles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* (387-9), Teiresias is denounced as a *magos* and *agyrtes* whose only interest is profit. We can identify the types. The term *alazones* was not specific to magic. *Agyrtai* were wandering mendicants, often from Asia Minor. Some were devotees of Rheia or Kybele, the Mother of the Gods, who was invoked in Attic curse tablets (*DT* 72.17, 79.3). Little in surviving accounts associates them directly with magic. Since seers could perform purifications, *kathartai* and *manteis* cannot be separated. The latter were the professional seers attached to temples and armies, and probably also the wanderers who claimed to be seers and invented lineages for themselves. Such a one was Deiphonos who – according to Herodotos (9.95) – may have gained work all over Greece by claiming falsely to be the son of the seer Euenios. Purifiers included Epimenides, who purified Athens (D.L. 1.110) and was known to Aristotle as a *mantis* (*Rh.* 1418a.23-6), and Empedokles, so respected that his *Katharmoi* was recited at the Olympic Games (D.L. 8.67, Ath. 14.12).<sup>123</sup>

The author of *De morbo sacro* attributes to the group he names claims to draw down the moon, eclipse the sun, and affect the weather (1.29 Grensemann). The supposed ability of Thessalian witches to draw down the moon was discussed above (Ch. 2.4.3); of interest in the present context is Aristophanes' suggestion (*Nu.* 749-55) that an *Athenian* can hire – locally – a Thessalian witch (*pharmakis*) to draw down the moon and so free him of the necessity of paying debts that fall due at new moon.

In Second Sophistic times, the wandering non-Greek wise were often seen as frauds. The focal texts alone provide examples. At Apul. *Met.* 2.12-14 (T11.13), Cerdo asks the Chaldaian Diophanes for a suitable date for travel; in the course of his answer, the latter reveals his own

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<sup>123</sup> Cf. Collins 2008, 49-53.

recent near-disastrous voyage, inadvertently showing himself a fraud. At *Met.* 9.8 (T11.18), followers of the Syrian goddess compose a single, obscure, prophecy suited to any occasion. Examples from (ostensibly) non-fictional accounts are less blatant. In his *Apologia*, Apuleius suggests that his stepson's father-in-law Rufinus consulted Chaldaei on the profit he might expect from his daughter's marriage; they responded (correctly) that the girl's first husband would die within a few months, *cetera enim de hereditate, ut adsolent, ad consulentis uotum confinxerunt* (97), 'and fabricated other things about the inheritance according to the wishes of the consultant, as they were accustomed'. Philostratos reports the case of the self-satisfied Diogenes of Amastris, a student of Chrestos of Byzantion ambitious for a place close to emperors (τὸ ἀγχοῦ βασιλέων ἐστήξειν); he finds comment on the veracity of the Egyptian who promised the youth this boon unnecessary (*VS* 2.592).

Whatever its origin, we have established the existence of a paradigm prevalent in the Second Sophistic ascribing illegitimate knowledge to the non-Greek wise. If we take earlier discussion into account, it is obvious that the period saw the coexistence of two mutually-contradictory paradigms ascribing, on one hand, profound wisdom and, on the other, illegitimate knowledge, to identifiable groups. How these paradigms were used to make statements about the status of a protagonist will be taken up in the chapters to follow.

## 2.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, comprehensive analysis of the focal sources has enabled us to identify popular stories about pre-Second Sophistic protagonists who consulted oracles (Table 1), encountered the divine (Table 5), or learned from the remote, non-Greek wise (Table 8). The collected data have suggested a set of story patterns (paradigms) prevalent at the time. Tables 2-4, focusing in on different subsets of the entries on Table 1, identify those associated with visiting an oracle. Table 6 details a topic – the world circuits involved in Labours – suggested by Table 5. Table 7 examines an alternative kind of world circuit and identifies the canonic non-Greek wise – who are then examined in more detail on Table 8.

Tables 9-11 have examined Second Sophistic fictional accounts for the authors' use and development of the established paradigms. Tables 12-14 draw on Tables 4, 5 and 11 to identify an important story pattern – riddling oracles test the inquirer – and two embedded suppositions – ritual provides safe access to the divine; and the non-Greek wise possess magical powers – of the period.

Knowing paradigms of the kinds identified in this chapter, Second Sophistic individuals could well have found, or at least represented, locationally liminal experiences as turning points in their lives, experiences that were liminal in a psychological sense. **Tables 15-17** examine the focal sources for locationally liminal episodes in accounts of the lives of the authors' contemporaries or near-contemporaries, and in purportedly autobiographical accounts. All relevant episodes are included.

Examination of the Tables reveals the richness, in particular, of Lucian's *Alexander*, Aristeides' *Hieroi logoi* and Philostratos' *VA*, all to be examined in more detail in Part B. Dion's significance is less evident from the Tables; it will become apparent on closer examination in Ch. 5.

**PART B. BIOGRAPHICAL AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL ACCOUNTS:**

**CASE STUDIES**



### 3 APOLLONIOS OF TYANA: THE PROTAGONIST AS A GODLIKE MAN

#### 3.1 Introduction

The primary subject of this chapter is not the historical Apollonios of Tyana or even the pre-Philostratan Apollonios – the man as he was seen before the composition of the *VA* – but rather Philostratos' Apollonios. The chapter explicates Philostratos' use of established story paradigms and paradigmatic stories to assert Apollonios' superior status, to define its nature, and to distinguish his more-than-ordinarily-human powers from 'magic'. Most immediately, Philostratos identifies Apollonios as a Pythagorean on the basis of a probably historically accurate contemporary tradition (App. 3). Pythagorean paradigms (assumptions about what one who is like Pythagoras would do) are sufficient to account for Philostratos' ascription to Apollonios of world and local travels, just as they can account for his Apollonios' self-presentation and powers. It will be argued that Philostratos uses the journeys encircling the earth and the liminal encounters that he ascribes to Apollonios both to provide suitable contexts for the presentation of his own preferred understanding of Apollonios' nature and to evoke powerful images more broadly suggestive of it.

As Philostratos relates it (1.3.1<sup>1</sup>), the Empress Julia Domna commissioned him to write a biography of Apollonios; she had acquired the *hypomnemata* of Damis of Old Ninos (Hierapolis in Syria), a companion of the sage, and wanted them recast in a more literary style. Foundational studies – most notably those of Meyer (1917), Bowersock (in his introduction to Jones' 1970 translation of the *VA*) and Bowie (1978) – established conclusively that Philostratos' work was no simple, factual account of the sage's activities. Alone among recent commentators, Anderson has argued for the existence of an historical Damis, whose account he sees as an itinerary similar to the (later) *Itinerarium Egeriae*.<sup>2</sup>

The finished work was unprecedented in its form.<sup>3</sup> If a biography, it departed radically from the 'one book per life norm' of Plutarch's *Vitae* or Suetonius' biographies of the Caesars. Its length and the use of tropes – including world travel – characteristic of Greek romance led to its identification as a novel.<sup>4</sup> The inclusion of the apparently miraculous suggested the *VA* as an

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<sup>1</sup> In this chapter alone, references to the *Vita Apollonii* will not be qualified by the prefix *VA*.

<sup>2</sup> Anderson 1986, 157, 159, 200.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Elsner 2009, 7-8.

<sup>4</sup> Rohde (1914, 496) saw Philostratos' work as a precursor of Heliodoran romance. Bowie (1978, 1664-5; 1994, 189) identified as novelistic features: the form of the Greek title (Τὰ ἐς τὸν Τυανέα Ἀπολλώνιον cf. e.g. Τὰ ὑπὲρ Θούλην ἄπιστα), the division of the work into eight books, the construction of convincing testimony in the journals of Damis, and the emphasis on travel.

aretalogy, in the sense of a hagiographical work about a human protagonist that focuses on miracles.<sup>5</sup> Speyer and Cox see it as specifically Pythagorean biography, inspired by traditions that culminated in Porphyry's and Iamblichos' biographies of Pythagoras himself.<sup>6</sup>

In this chapter, the VA will be seen as a sophistic work intended primarily to elevate its author – a different figure from the narrator, whose agenda and opinions are expressed explicitly in the text. In response to the empress' commission, the latter has decided to present as full as possible an account of Apollonios' words and deeds with the intention of defending him against the charge of being a *magos* or a βιαίως σοφός (1.2.1). In the context, and paralleled by the expression βιαίως σοφός, *magos* must obviously be interpreted as 'wizard' or 'sorcerer'.<sup>7</sup>

Is the empress' commission credible or should it be seen as a cover story invented for Philostratos' own ends, justification for an account that he himself wanted to write?<sup>8</sup> It seems likely that – whatever her motivation – Julia Domna actively promoted a cult of Apollonios. Independent evidence of varying quality suggests that her son Caracalla and her sister's grandson Alexander Severus were practitioners.<sup>9</sup> It is not absurd to suggest that the empress had a theoretical interest in religion: she was a daughter of Julius Bassianus, a descendent of the hereditary priest-kings of Emesa whose interests may well have extended to esoteric faiths.<sup>10</sup> However, a social/political agenda is usually attributed to her. It has been suggested that the Apollonios cult was intended specifically to counter a perceived threat from Christianity;<sup>11</sup> Elsner

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<sup>5</sup> See App. 2.2.2. Francis (1995, 18-24) argues that the VA cannot be regarded as an aretalogy because Philostratos seeks to de-emphasize the very aspect – miracles – that defines the genre; his Apollonios is a philosopher whose characteristic attribute is his ascetic way of life and who denies being divine (7.32). This opinion is challenged in this chapter.

<sup>6</sup> Speyer 1974, 50; Cox 1983, 34-44.

<sup>7</sup> LSJ cites Philostratos' usage as the defining instance of βιαίως σοφός meaning 'wizard'. At 1.2.1, Philostratos uses the term *magos* in two completely different ways: in the derogatory sense noted above and (as at 1.18, 1.25.3, 1.26, 1.29, 1.32.1, 1.41.1) as a technical term for a Babylonian sage.

<sup>8</sup> The work was completed after Julia Domna's death in 217 CE, as is indicated by the fact that it is not dedicated to her and she is referred to by verbs in imperfect tenses. Certainly, it pre-dates the *Vitae sophistarum*, which makes reference to it (VS 2.570) and which most probably was completed in 242/3 CE. Cf. Bowie 2009, 29.

<sup>9</sup> Caracalla's shrine to Apollonios in Tyana is mentioned by Cassius Dio (78.18.4). According to the *Historia Augusta* (Alex. 29.2), Alexander Severus set up statues of Orpheus, Apollonios of Tyana, Abraham and Christ as objects of veneration. Bowersock (1970, 12-13) notes the late date and unreliability of the work and finds the juxtaposition of Apollonios and Christ suspect. However, Swain (2009, 37) is inclined to accept the report: Severus' influential mother Julia Mamaea had established Christian leanings. Backhaus (2014, 129) acknowledges in this context that the *Historia Augusta* is 'notorisch unzuverlässig'.

<sup>10</sup> A group of portrait busts of the Roman period shows a man with a distinctive cranial protuberance (*ushnisha*) obviously based on Buddhist prototypes; the subject is possibly Julius Bassianus. Cf. Cimino 1994, 127 and pl. 31.

<sup>11</sup> Explicit parallelism between Apollonios and Christ was developed during Diocletian's persecution of Christians; for the evidence, Petzke 1970, 5-10, Jones 2006, 148. Most notably, in his *Contra Hieroclem* (4.3), Eusebios sets out to counter Hierokles' claims with proofs that Apollonios was not fit to be

sees Philostratos commissioned to encourage religious revival; Swain suggests that the *VA* promotes not so much the cult of Apollonios *per se* as the Hellenic values and culture he is seen to represent. Morgan argues that Philostratos was commissioned to propagate a version of the Emesan sun-cult accommodated to Hellenic culture and at variance with the unmodified cult later championed by Elagabalus.<sup>12</sup> Whatever the specific purpose, it seems likely that an imperial commission lies behind Philostratos' account.

Modern writers variously see Philostratos the author carrying out his narrator's agenda or undermining it.<sup>13</sup> The matter is not susceptible to conclusive proof either way. In this chapter, it will be argued that Philostratos the author genuinely defends Apollonios by embracing rather than denying his reported Pythagoreanism and concurrently providing a non-magical explanation of his powers. Certainly Pythagorean identity was a two-edged sword.<sup>14</sup> Writing about the *Vitae sophistarum*, Jones points out that, at a time when the term *sophistes* had negative connotations, Philostratos embraced it.<sup>15</sup> It is proposed here that, in the *VA*, Philostratos similarly deliberately chooses to identify Apollonios as a Pythagorean and include his miracles and conferences with the non-Greek wise in defiance of their possible connotations.

At 1.2.3-1.3.2, Philostratos (the narrator) claims to have sought out civic traditions and Apollonios' letters and to have used the biographies of Maximus of Aigai and Moiragenes; he rejects specific details – or perhaps the interpretation – provided by Moiragenes, whom he finds 'ignorant' (ἀγνοήσαντι). Maximus and Moiragenes are historical figures, and Philostratos' claim to have sought out civic traditions is supported by his inclusion of stories from Ephesos (4.3.1-2, 8.26.1-2) recorded as well by Cassius Dio and Porphyry (see App. 3). Superficially, we have the work of a careful and critical historian. However, while Philostratos the narrator knows Damis as an historical source, Philostratos the author knows him as an invented figure; as author, Philostratos is obviously concerned with issues other than historical accuracy.

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compared with philosophers or even reasonable and moderate men, let alone Christ. For Philostratos' possible use of Christian sources, see Anderson 1986, 144. All that can be said is that no connection between the gospels and the *VA* can be proven. Examining parallels between the Apollonios accounts and the New Testament, Petzke (1970, 150) simply notes that Apollonios and Jesus inspired similar traditions.

<sup>12</sup> Elsner 1997, 35; Swain 2009, 36; Morgan 2009, 268, 276-81.

<sup>13</sup> Most commentators see the *VA* as a defence of Apollonios, however motivated. The exception is Schirren (2009), who sees irony (it is suggested here) where others would not.

<sup>14</sup> For references to Hellenistic and early imperial texts suggesting that Pythagoras was a sorcerer, Flinterman 2009b, 156, n. 10. Artemidoros' lumping together of Pythagoreans with other named frauds – *physiognomonikoi*, *astragalomanteis*, *tyromanteis*, *koskinomanteis*, *morphoskopoi*, *cheiposkopoi*, *lekanomanteis* and *nekyomanteis* – can be added (2.69).

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Jones 1974, 12.

Why include Damis? As a life-long companion of Apollonios, he facilitates the narrative: he is a perfect source for the travels and adventures Philostratos ascribes to his protagonist. Philostratos may well have expected sophisticated readers to recognize his fictional nature (cf. Ch. 2.4). More interesting reasons can be suggested. Philostratos-the-narrator's critiques of Damis and other sources are first and foremost a means of establishing his chosen intellectual *persona*. However, they also serve to place these sources before the reader. The fact that Philostratos the author invents, in Damis, an unsophisticated voice of the kind rejoicing in birth, miracle and apotheosis stories suggests his positive desire to include in his work popular perceptions of Apollonios – perceptions of the very kind from which Philostratos the narrator distances himself.

In his *persona* as narrator, Philostratos attributes to the Indians – and so gives highest credence to – a doctrine of the capacities of the pure soul which blurs the ancient ontological distinction between gods and mortals (Ch. 3.5.3b). In early Greek tradition, a mortal could never be reckoned as amongst the gods, whose very essence lay in their immortality (Ch. 1.2.4, App. 2.1.1). Later, a human being believed physically to be the child of a god (Alexander) or destined to achieve apotheosis (Empedokles) might be called, or even apparently call himself, 'divine' (Ch. 4.4, App. 2.2.1). Living individuals who possessed the superhuman abilities attributed to the gods or the gods' outstanding moral qualities or absolute power (all conveniently covered by the single term *arete*) could also be accounted 'divine': their *arete* proved that they possessed, or had earned, or even itself constituted, 'divinity'.<sup>16</sup> These different conceptions of what it means for a human being to be 'divine' – all different again from the one Philostratos apparently espouses – are implicit in stories associated with Apollonios reported in the VA.<sup>17</sup> In including such stories, Philostratos the author adds voices certainly at variance with his narrator's intellectual one but nevertheless supporting it in its fundamental assertion of Apollonios' superhuman nature. In giving them place, Philostratos the admirer of sophists avails himself of their connotations and perhaps admits that no point of view – even one he identifies as his own – is the final word.

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<sup>16</sup> To see the possession of *arete* as (ontologically) constituting divinity is not the same as (though perhaps not far removed from) creating honorary or legal divinity, awarding of the name of 'god' as a mark of human honour. See Chs 1.2.4, 3.4.2a.

<sup>17</sup> For birth and apotheosis stories, Ch. 3.2. At 7.38.2, Damis explicitly concludes that Apollonios' nature is *theia* on the basis of his extraordinary powers; for discussion, Ch. 3.3.3.

### 3.2 Philostratos' Apollonios

Philostratos' Apollonios is seen by others as a superior being: his follower Damis regards him as a *daimon* (1.19.2) and recognizes that his nature is *theia* and more than human (7.38.2); the Alexandrians look on him as a god (5.24.1); the Greeks consider him a divine man (*theios aner*, 8.15.3).

Apollonios has supernatural knowledge and foresight. Apparently supernaturally, he helps a man in difficult straits find a treasure (6.39.1-3). When an earthquake strikes while he is lecturing at the sanctuary of Asklepios at Leben, he rightly foresees the emergence of new land (4.34.3-4). He predicts who will initiate him at Eleusis (4.18.2, 5.19.1), and Nero's failed attempt to cut through the isthmus (4.24.2, 5.7.4). At Alexandria, he 'sees' the burning of a temple in Rome (5.30.1-2) and, most famously at Ephesos, 'watches' the assassination of Domitian in Rome (8.26).

Philostratos nevertheless nuances Apollonios' clairvoyance. At 4.3.1-2, Apollonios lectures on *koinonia* in Ephesos. A bird comes and communicates with other birds around about, and they all fly off. Apollonios knows why this is so – readers may remember Damis' claim that Apollonios learned the language of animals from the Arabs (1.20.3) – but ignores it. When his audience treats the event as an omen, Apollonios explains that a slave boy has inadvertently scattered grains of wheat. The fact is verified and the answer is treated as a miracle, but Apollonios simply uses the example of the birds' *koinonia* in his address.<sup>18</sup> Are we to conclude that Apollonios has supernatural knowledge of some kind but makes no particular use of it other than as his philosophical agenda requires, or simply that he can draw intelligent conclusions?<sup>19</sup> Philostratos allows the two explanations to lie in balance. At 6.13.1, Apollonios is at first surprised by the Ethiopians' charges that he slandered them, but quickly infers (ξυμβάλλω) the truth – that the story has been spread by his opponent Euphrates. We are left in doubt as to the natural or supernatural nature of his insight. At 6.13.3, his rejection of the Ethiopians as wise is due equivocally to their lack of supernatural foreknowledge or of wise assessment of human character. Allowing different interpretations, Philostratos the author provokes the reader to independent thought.

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<sup>18</sup> As noted at App. 3, this story in some form may have been part of the pre-Philostratan Apollonios tradition.

<sup>19</sup> In the latter case, Apollonios is a sophist who can present himself as divine, like those praised later by Philostratos in the *Vitae sophistarum*. Relevantly, at 1.17, Philostratos admires Apollonios' claims to absolute knowledge not as indications of his supernatural foreknowledge but as rhetorical technique and the approach suited to a lawgiver. See also Ch. 3.6.3a.

Apollonios has the ability to see through surface appearances to the 'reality' underlying them. In Ephesos, he identifies a plague *daimon* in the person of a beggar, and has him stoned (4.10.1-2). In Egypt, he recognizes in a lion the reincarnated soul of King Amasis (5.42.1-2). In Corinth, he unmasks a disciple's bride as an *empousa* (4.25.2-6).<sup>20</sup>

Apollonios is not bound by the usual physical limitations of human existence. He is present in Ephesos as soon as he is summoned there from Smyrna (4.10.1). After acquittal at his trial in Rome, he miraculously escapes the city and turns up, as prearranged, at Dikaiarchia on the shore opposite the island of Kalypso, materializing in a cave of the Nymphs. He asks his followers to touch him to assure themselves that he is no ghost; he has travelled almost instantaneously, and attributes his passage to an escorting god (θεὸν ἐπιγράφων τῇ πομπῇ ταύτῃ, 7.41.1, 8.12.1-2). He can take his leg out of a shackle and put it back in again (7.38.2). At 7.39.1-3, Philostratos differentiates this last ability from magic (*techne*), seen as any attempt to change the natural course of events by ritual activity or the use of talismans. He denies the practitioner of magic (*goes*) any power, in this context and again (in the voice of Apollonios) in the Apology, where apparently successful magic is attributed to human trickery and the naivety of spectators (8.7.10).<sup>21</sup>

Birth legends from Tyana are presented by Philostratos as numinous pointers to Apollonios' nature. Although they can be seen as indications that Apollonios was physically a son of Zeus and even himself a god,<sup>22</sup> Philostratos suggests that he himself sees them differently. The lightning bolt accompanying Apollonios' birth is a metaphorical expression of his brilliance and closeness to the gods.<sup>23</sup> Philostratos' interpretation of the sign is surely an indication that he

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<sup>20</sup> Apollonios similarly recognizes a shape-shifting *empousa* between the Kaukasos and the Indos (2.4), and a *daimon* possessing a youth at Athens (4.20.1-3).

<sup>21</sup> Philostratos is less dismissive of the *goes*' power at 5.12. It is just possible that, at 8.7.10, the sorcerers' ability to make 'the nonexistent exist and the existent, doubtful' (τὰ ... οὐκ ὄντα εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὄντα ἀπιστεῖσθαι) is an ability to create a metaphysical illusion rather than perform a trick. A related possible anomaly in the Apology deserves mention. At 8.7.41, Apollonios denies that he has the power, using spells or the songs of Orpheus, to raise the dead. The reader is immediately reminded of an earlier incident in which he is described raising a girl from her apparent (δοκοῦντος) death (4.45.1). The equivocation could simply express Philostratos' disbelief in a miracle that was part of the Apollonios tradition, i.e. the girl was in fact not dead. It is suggested here that it does something rather different, distinguishing an apparent or delusional or superficial reality from a deeper, underlying reality, as in the examples of the beggar (4.10.1-2) and the lion (5.42.1-2) above. Cf. Ch. 3.5.3b.

<sup>22</sup> Proteus, who identifies the unborn Apollonios as himself, is a 'god' (1.4). The choir of swans present at Apollonios' birth echoes the similar one at Apollo's (Call. *Del.* 249-55), and a lightning bolt accompanying the event implies the involvement of Zeus. Presented with these pointers, the local people identify Apollonios as Zeus' son (1.6) or perhaps (Boter 2009, 55-6) a son of Zeus Asbamaios.

<sup>23</sup> The manifestation: ... οἶμαι, ἐκφανές καὶ ὑπὲρ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ γῆ καὶ τὸ ἀγχοῦ θεῶν καὶ ὁπόσα ὄδε ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐγένετο, φαίνοντες οἱ θεοὶ καὶ προσημαίνοντες (1.5), '... shining forth over all things in the earth

intends his readers to look for metaphors in nature and perhaps in his own work, as well as a rejection of any implication of divine conception. He stresses that Apollonios claimed only the patrynomic *Apolloniou* for himself (1.6).

An apparently local identification of Apollonios with Proteus (1.4) is remarkable in more ways than one. Apollonios is equated not only with a divinity but a divinity with a dubious reputation. Homer uses the word *techne* in connection with him (*Od.* 4.455). Proteus is the prototypical shape-shifter, appearing to observers as what he is not, and as such, in Philostratos' own terms (8.7.10), a *goes*.<sup>24</sup> The essential point in interpreting the reference seems to be Philostratos' explicit statement that the story is to be taken allegorically.<sup>25</sup>

τί ἂν ἐξηγοίμην τοῖς γε ἀκούουσι τῶν ποιητῶν, ὡς ποικίλος τε ἦν καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλος καὶ κρείττων τοῦ ἀλῶναι, γινώσκειν τε ὡς ἐδόκει καὶ προγιγνώσκειν πάντα; καὶ μεμνησθαι χρῆ τοῦ Πρωτέως, μάλιστα ἐπειδὴν προῖων ὁ λόγος δεικνύη τὸν ἄνδρα πλείω μὲν ἢ ὁ Πρωτεὺς προγνόντα, πολλῶν δὲ ἀπόρων τε καὶ ἀμηχάνων κρείττω γενόμενον ἐν αὐτῷ μάλιστα τῷ ἀπειληφθαι. (1.4)

Why should I present, to those knowing the poets, how multiformed he was and at one time and another more powerful than to be caught, and how he seemed to know and to predict all things? And it is necessary to remember Proteus, especially whenever the story set out shows the man more prescient than Proteus and, when much was in doubt or confused, having become more powerful in himself particularly on being cornered.

Clearly, we have a reference to Apollonios' evasions of Nero, Domitian, and Euphrates.<sup>26</sup> Beyond this, modern opinions are disparate and necessarily speculative. Flinterman suggests that the imagery is an indication of Philostratos' own frustration in understanding and defending his shape-shifting subject. Gyselink and Demoen draw attention to Philostratos' use of the adjective *ποικίλος* to praise the sophistic art (*VS* 2.528) and shift the comparison with Proteus from Apollonios himself to Philostratos' masterly representation of him.<sup>27</sup>

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and the place near to the gods [was], I think, the gods showing and foretelling how many things this man became'.

<sup>24</sup> On the wise man's need to remain unchanged (ἐαυτῷ ὁμοίος), 6.35.1-2. At 7.34, Apollonios says explicitly that he would not change his shape to save himself from the consequences of his chosen situation even were he able. At 8.7.12, he claims to have remained ἐμαυτῷ ὁμοίος through his travels.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Flinterman 2009a, 236.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Francis 1995, 120, Flinterman 2009a, 232.

<sup>27</sup> Flinterman 2009b, 157; Gyselink and Demoen 2009, 106-7. Praet (2009, 316-17) considers the comparison of Apollonios with Proteus a complimentary one in the light of neo-Pythagorean tradition,

Parallel to birth stories are tales suggesting Apollonios' apotheosis. The traditional sign of apotheosis was the absence of mortal remains. Philostratos sets his stories in this context with his use of the verb *aphanizesthai* in his account of the report from Lindos (8.30.2), and the explicit ἴθι ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἄνω, 'ascend from the earth', in his account of the report from Krete (8.30.3).<sup>28</sup> Notably, he distances himself from both the tales.<sup>29</sup> In fact, Philostratos – in his *persona* as intellectual narrator – does not endorse any suggestion of an apotheosis involving bodily assumption to the heavens; tales of apotheosis express only a metaphorical truth. His own Platonic image of the divine *soul* is the one conveyed by Apollonios in his epiphany to a youth in Tyana after his death: ἀθάνατος ψυχὴ κοῦ χρημα σόν, ἀλλὰ προνοίας | ἦ μετὰ σῶμα μαρανθέν, ἅτ' ἐκ δεσμῶν θεοῦ ἵππος | ῥηιδίως προθοροῦσα κεράννυται ἠέρι κούφῳ ... (8.31.3), 'the immortal soul is not your possession but Providence's; after the body is wasted, just like a swift horse from its bonds, easily springing forward, it blends with the light air ...'.<sup>30</sup> Philostratos – as author – allows the reports, with their numinous connotations, to stand.

In spite of his ability to do so, Apollonios refrains from changing the course of fate through supernatural action. *A goes* claims to alter the course of destiny; Apollonios submitted himself to the Fates and simply foretold what must come to pass (5.12). In a particularly significant episode, after submitting to Domitian in order to defend his friends, Apollonios notes that he would not escape magically even if he could (7.34); to Damis he reveals later just how easily he could escape if he chose to do so (7.38.1-2).<sup>31</sup> The stress on not challenging the will of the gods seems negative, but the gods' justice makes it positive. Even early in his life, Apollonios is presented as rejecting attempts to manipulate the just and natural workings of the universe. In the context of elaborate sacrifices intended to compensate for crimes, he questions, and gets the better of, a priest at Aigai. Are the gods not just and sagacious? Then surely the only appropriate prayer is: ὦ θεοί, δοίητέ μοι τὰ ὀφειλόμενα (1.11.1-2), 'Gods, give me what I deserve'.<sup>32</sup> Perhaps the prayer was characteristic of Apollonios for it is repeated in an interview with the Roman consul Telesinus (4.40.2).

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which identifies Proteus with the Monad. Schirren (2005, 48-50) sees it as a deliberate attempt to subvert the ostensible message of the *VA*.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Flinterman 2009a, 229.

<sup>29</sup> οἱ δ' ἐν Λίνδῳ ... οἱ δ' ἐν Κρήτῃ ... (8.30.2).

<sup>30</sup> The narrator's acceptance of the account is indicated by the words that follow the poem: καὶ σαφῆς οὗτος Ἀπολλωνίου τρίπους ἔστηκεν ὑπὲρ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπορρήτων, 'and this sure statement of Apollonios exists, concerning the secret things of the soul'.

<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless, foreknowledge occasionally allows for the mitigation of human circumstances by appropriate non-supernatural action. See Ch. 3.6.3a.

<sup>32</sup> The same principle is apparent in practice in an incident in which Asklepios sends to Apollonios a young man simultaneously praying for health and ruining his body with a bad diet (1.9.1-2).

Elements of this picture of Apollonios will recur in the following sections as they fall into place in the context of paradigmatic stories that Philostratos uses to further his agenda.

### 3.3 Pythagorean paradigms shaping the VA

#### 3.3.1 Philostratos' references to Pythagoras and Pythagorean doctrine

As Philostratos presents the tale, Apollonios begins his education in Tarsos but rejects the city for its worldliness. With his father's permission, he moves to quieter Aigai, where – studying in the Asklepieion with Platonists, Stoics, Peripatetics, Epikoureians and Pythagoreans – he surveys the kinds of wisdom available in the Greek world and chooses for himself the doctrines of Pythagoras. His choice is due not to any virtues of his local teacher but to an innate percipience (ἀρρήτωρ τινὶ σοφία, 1.7.2). From the age of fifteen he devotes himself to a life of Pythagorean asceticism within the sanctuary of Asklepios (1.7.3-1.8.2). Later, after the death of his father, he gives away his property and serves a five-year apprenticeship of Pythagorean silence in Pamphylia and Kilikia (1.14.2-1.15.1). It is at this stage of his life, and as a mature Pythagorean, that he decides upon his first great journey to the East.

Apollonios constantly acknowledges his master Pythagoras. His Pythagoreanism is characterized by his uncut hair, linen clothing and lack of shoes, his abstinence from meat and wine, his practice of silence, and his opposition to blood sacrifice;<sup>33</sup> that external characteristics of these kinds had long been popularly associated with Pythagoreans is sufficiently evidenced in Middle Comedy.<sup>34</sup> Philostratos makes frequent reference, too, to the transmigration or reincarnation of souls (3.23.1, 5.42.1, 8.7.19), a doctrine particularly associated with Pythagoras.<sup>35</sup> Lucian makes it clear that this was a standard Pythagorean trope when he presents Pythagoras (reincarnated as a cock) remembering his previous incarnations (*Gall.* 20).<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Acknowledgement: 1.7.3, 1.32.2, 4.16.1, 6.11.3-7, 6.11.12-13, 8.7.13-14; hair, clothing and footwear: 1.8.2, 1.32.2, 6.11.3, 6.11.5, 8.5.1, 8.7.6, 8.7.16-18; dietary abstinence: 1.8.1, 6.11.3, 6.11.5, 8.7.15; silence: 1.14.1-2, 6.11.3, 6.11.5; opposition to blood sacrifice: 1.31.2, 5.25.1, 8.7.30.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Burkert 1972, 199.

<sup>35</sup> The concept was first associated with Pythagoras by his contemporary Xenophanes, who reports that Pythagoras forbade the beating of a dog: παῦσαι, μηδὲ ράπιζ', ἐπεὶ ἡ φίλου ἀνέρος ἐστὶν ψυχὴ, τὴν ἔγγων φθεγξαμένης αἰῶν (Frg. 7a West), 'stop, don't strike, since the soul is actually my friend's, which I recognized, hearing its cries'.

<sup>36</sup> Hall (1981, 165) comments that reincarnation as a cock was a wise choice, since Pythagoras had forbidden the eating of white cocks (D.L. 8.34, Ael. *VH* 4.17).

Apollonios is regularly concerned with sacrifice, both Pythagorean and traditional.<sup>37</sup> This emphasis is not incompatible with Pythagoreanism; Iamblichos, for example, suggests that the Pythagoreans made careful sacrifices to particular gods (*VP* 28.152). However, it differentiates Apollonios' thought, as Philostratos presents it, from that of his neo-Pythagorean near-contemporaries. Moreover, although aspects – such as the existence of *daimones* – of the amalgam of Pythagorean and Platonic thought typical of the Second Sophistic are evident throughout the *VA*, Apollonios does not address the complex issues associated with the fundamental principles of the universe central to the thought of the only slightly later neo-Pythagoreans Moderatos of Gades, Nichomachos of Gerasa and Noumenios of Apameia. Philostratos' Apollonios presents a simplified Pythagoreanism; Dillon calls him 'more of a prophet than a philosopher', but it is probably more accurate to see him as a Pythagorean philosopher as the broader public conceived one.<sup>38</sup>

### **3.3.2 Elements of Apollonios' life-story suggested by his Pythagoreanism**

Much of the story of Apollonios' life as it is recounted in the *VA* – Apollonios' journeys beyond the Greek world and his interviews with the non-Greek wise, his visits to the sacred sites of Greece – can be seen (from the protagonist's point of view) as a working-out of his Pythagoreanism and (from the modern critic's) as an elaborate construction developed by Philostratos on the basis of paradigmatic stories about the life of Pythagoras and Pythagorean doctrine.

Apollonios' wider travels and association with the non-Greek wise can be related immediately to his Pythagoreanism. As we have seen (Ch. 2.3.4 and Tables 7 and 8), Pythagoras was particularly associated by Second Sophistic writers with distant travels. His reputed connection with the Persian world goes back almost certainly to Aristotle;<sup>39</sup> that with the Egyptians seems to pre-date Herodotos.<sup>40</sup> Apollonios' youthful journey to visit the non-Greek –

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<sup>37</sup> Pythagorean (bloodless) sacrifice: incense: 1.31.2, 5.25.1-2; libations: 4.20.1. Traditional sacrifice: 4.16.3-4, 4.19, 6.41.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Dzielska 1986, 142-3, Dillon 1977, 341.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Guthrie 1962, vol. 1, 251-4.

<sup>40</sup> At *Hdt.* 2.81, Herodotos couples Egypt and Pythagoras when he claims that burial customs called Orphic and Bacchic are in reality Egyptian and Pythagorean. At 2.123, he attributes the doctrine of transmigration of the soul to the Egyptians and adds that the theory has been adopted and put forward as their own by certain Greek writers: τῶν ἐγὼ εἰδὼς τὰ οὐνόματα οὐ γράφω. Burkert (1972, 125-8) points out that the Egyptians never had such a doctrine, which was probably introduced into the Greek-speaking world from southern Italy; he speculates that Greeks in Egypt, in awe of the ancient culture around them, supposed Pythagoras to have visited the Egyptians and to have learned from them.

in his case, Indian – wise is (with a qualification to be seen at Ch. 3.3.3) one undertaken in homage to the Master.

Perhaps the most important implication of Apollonios' Pythagoreanism in the *VA* is its conferral of his identity as a philosopher. Evidencing the power of the philosophical *persona* to rebut any accusation of 'magic', Apollonios presents himself not only as a Pythagorean but specifically as a philosopher in the Apology, his prepared response to the legal charges brought against him:<sup>41</sup> in making the charges, Domitian puts himself in danger in a way no previous emperor has been in seeming unjustly to slander philosophy (σύ τε γὰρ κινδυνεύεις ὑπὲρ ὧν μήποτε αὐτοκράτωρ, εἰ πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν οὐδεμιᾶ δίκη διαβεβλήσθαι δόξεις, 8.7.1). In this context, it is significant that it is as a philosopher that Apollonios interacts with the non-Greek wise; it is this wholly respectable Greek identity, not only stated but demonstrated by Philostratos in his account (Ch. 3.5.3a), which persuades the reader to acquit both Apollonios himself and his non-Greek interlocutors of any possible suspicion of 'magic'.

Within the Greek world, Apollonios' interest in Trojan sites can be related directly to Pythagoras. Philostratos sets out the Master's claim to reincarnate the obscure hero Euphorbos in the very first sentence of his book (1.1.1); according to Pythagorean tradition, Pythagoras was confirmed in his conviction as to his former identity when he recognized Euphorbos' shield on a visit to the temple of Hera at Mykenai.<sup>42</sup> Perceptively, Miles finds reference to this story in Philostratos' account of Apollonios' discussion of the statue of Milon at Olympia (4.28).<sup>43</sup>

Rather more speculatively, Apollonios' circuit of the holy places of the Greek world can be interpreted as an implication of his own particular version of Pythagoreanism. Philostratos' Apollonios' interest in sacrifice was noted above (Ch. 3.3.1); on his visits to sanctuaries, a major aspect of his agenda is the correction of temple procedures, with sacrifice sometimes specifically mentioned.<sup>44</sup> In recent years, the nature of Apollonios' supposed corrections, and Philostratos' reason for emphasizing this aspect of his activity, have been the focus of academic debate. A conclusion that can be drawn is that Philostratos did not simply report (or wholly invent)

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<sup>41</sup> 'Magic' is not mentioned explicitly in any of the charges (8.5.1-2), which nevertheless suggest attempts to change the natural course of events by means of ritual activity or objects.

<sup>42</sup> Porph. *VP* 27, Iamb. *VP* 14.63, Paus. 2.17.3. Diodoros (10.6.2) and Ovid (*Met.* 15.163-4) set the incident in Argos; for further references and discussion, Burkert 1972, 140 n. 109.

<sup>43</sup> Miles 2009, 135-9. As Miles suggests, the Pythagorean tale indicates Pythagoras' – and so Apollonios' – rootedness in Hellenic tradition. Nevertheless, we should note Philostratos-the-author's ambivalence: at 3.19.1, the Indian Iarchas criticizes the Greeks for their obsession with the Trojan War.

<sup>44</sup> At 1.16.3, he sets priests right if they have deviated from any tradition and suggests ways to make ritual more appropriate; at 4.19, he discourses on correct sacrifice; at 4.40, his expertise is in how to pray and sacrifice; at 4.24.1, he makes amendments at holy sites.

Apollonios' activities; rather, he reconstructed them on the basis of his own understanding of what Apollonios would have chosen to do. Bowie has pointed out the lack of contemporary literary or epigraphical evidence for Apollonios' visits to Greek cult sites;<sup>45</sup> while this alone proves nothing, it is in conformity with the suggestion that the activities at Greek sanctuaries attributed to Apollonios in the *VA* are Philostratos' own creative deductions.

From the *VA* we learn that, along with other works, Apollonios composed a treatise on sacrifices, the *Περὶ θυσιῶν*, which Philostratos claims to have seen in many sanctuaries, cities and homes (3.41.2). The work was in τῆ ἑαυτοῦ φωνῇ (4.19), an expression Jones translates as 'in his own words'. Dzielska suggests that it means his 'in own language', and that this was perhaps the Middle Aramaic then spoken in Kappadokia and unknown to Philostratos himself. Francis rightly comments that Apollonios is unlikely to have written such a work in anything other than 'universally accessible Greek' and suggests that the work was just exceptionally erudite.<sup>46</sup> We can obtain an idea of the content of the work because Eusebios quotes a fragment of the *Περὶ θυσιῶν* attributed to Apollonios of Tyana in his *Preparatio evangelica* (4.13).<sup>47</sup> The ideas it presents belong to the mixed neo-Pythagorean and Middle Platonic philosophy of the first and second centuries CE; the author stresses that God, who is pure reason, does not need earthly things. Nothing could be further from the ethos of the *VA*, which presents Apollonios prescribing to the Athenians how to make a sacrifice, libation or prayer in the way appropriate to each god, and the time of day or night at which it should be made (4.19). Dzielska concludes that Philostratos drew the wrong conclusion from the title of Apollonios' book (which he could not read because of the language), and so on a wholly mistaken basis constructed the interest in disseminating the practice of correct worship that his Apollonios demonstrates in the course of his circuit of Greece. Francis suggests more realistically that Philostratos knew the work, which was expressed in obscure or technical language, and sought to improve Apollonios' reputation by making him a religious expert in an acceptable and traditional way.<sup>48</sup> Such a view is consistent with Philostratos' construction of Apollonios' journey on the basis of the title and of what he preferred to understand as the ethos of the well-known work.

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<sup>45</sup> Bowie 1978, 1689.

<sup>46</sup> Dzielska 1986, 150; Francis 1995, 110, n. 92.

<sup>47</sup> The same passage is quoted by Eusebios in his *Demonstratio evangelica* (3.3.11). A similar text, with the author not named (ὡς τις ἀνὴρ σοφὸς ἔφη), is to be found in Porphyry at *Abst.* 2.34.

<sup>48</sup> Dzielska 1986, 139-42; Francis 1995, 111. Bowie (1978, 1685 n. 131, 1688-90) does not attribute the *Περὶ θυσιῶν* to Apollonios. In the account of Apollonios' early life based on that of Maximus of Aigai (see 1.12.2), Apollonios discourses about sacrifices (1.11); Bowie suggests Maximus as one interested in sacrifice and so a possible forger of the *Περὶ θυσιῶν*. Dzielska (1986, 145-7) concludes that Bowie obviously misunderstands the true nature of the work. In fact – consistently with both Maximus' accuracy and an authentically Apollonian *Περὶ θυσιῶν* – Apollonios denigrates elaborate sacrifices at 1.11.

### 3.3.3 Nuancing the relationship between Apollonios and Pythagoras

Further consideration of Philostratos' references to Pythagoras suggests that Apollonios' travels are inappropriately taken as simple homage to the Master. Pythagoras had long been credited with study in Egypt (Ch. 2.3.4, 3.3.2). At 3.19.1, the sage Iarchas reveals that the Indians' beliefs are those that Pythagoras taught the Greeks, and the Indians, the Egyptians; it is obvious that, in travelling to the original source of Pythagorean wisdom, Apollonios has notably surpassed Pythagoras himself. We have here more than a reflection on the relative ease of travel in Pythagoras' lifetime and Apollonios'. At the very beginning of his account, Philostratos expresses Apollonios' superiority to his Master: Apollonios followed Pythagorean practices but approached wisdom in *a more divine way* (θειότερον) than Pythagoras himself (1.2.1). The hierarchical ranking required some nuancing of the legends of both sages.

Pythagoras' status was ambiguous. According to Aristotle, the Pythagoreans taught that τοῦ λογικοῦ ζώου τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ θεός, τὸ δὲ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ δὲ οἶον Πυθαγόρας (Iamb. VP 31), 'among rational beings, there is that which is god, that which is man, and that which is like Pythagoras'; however, some at least believed that their Master was the Hyperborean Apollo.<sup>49</sup> Significantly, Philostratos does not take up the identification with Hyperborean Apollo. As Flinterman points out, he may simply have been reluctant to identify a mortal with a god; however, to present Pythagoras as an incarnation of Apollo would also have made his own demonstration of Apollonios' outdoing of his master 'over-ambitious'.<sup>50</sup>

As a figure similar but superior to Pythagoras, Apollonios must share the superhuman powers attributed to him in Pythagorean sources. Fourth century BCE accounts of Pythagoras' (or his teacher Pherekydes') predictions – of an earthquake after taking a drink of water from a well, and of the imminent sinking of a ship after seeing it sail by<sup>51</sup> – are closely paralleled in stories about Apollonios, who predicts new land when an earthquake strikes at Leben (4.34.3-4) and a shipwreck at 5.18. As noted (Ch. 3.2), Apollonios' clairvoyance is central to Philostratos' picture of his special nature.

We can note as well a more enigmatic collection of 'miracles' deriving from Aristotle's account of the Pythagoreans. Prominent among them are Pythagoras' simultaneous presence in both Kroton (or Tauromenion) and Metapontion, his thigh of gold, and the greeting he was

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<sup>49</sup> Ael. VH 2.26, D.L. 8.11, Iamb. VP 140; Aelian cites Aristotle as his source. Cf. Burkert 1972, 141 n. 117.

<sup>50</sup> Flinterman 2009b, 163.

<sup>51</sup> Pythagoras: Iamb. VP 136, Porph. ap. Eus. PE 10.3.6-7 (source: Andron of Ephesos); Pherekydes: D.L. 1.116 (source: Theopompos); for Pherekydes as Pythagoras' teacher, Andron ap. D.L. 1.119. Cf. Burkert 1972, 144-5.

offered by a river.<sup>52</sup> The golden thigh was particularly popular.<sup>53</sup> Diogenes Laertius mentions it in conjunction with Pythagoras' identity with the Hyperborean Apollo (8.11), and Iamblichos likewise considers it a mark of divinity (*VP* 140), although there is no explanation as to the precise nature of the imagery.<sup>54</sup> Unsurprisingly in this context, Philostratos makes no mention of a golden thigh in connection with either Pythagoras or Apollonios. Neither does he mention the river's greeting. However, he does mention Pythagoras' bilocation or instantaneous transit: Apollonios' rapid translation from Smyrna to Ephesos is compared with Pythagoras' simultaneous presence in Thourioi and Metapontion (4.10.1). Here, the phraseology could simply be taken as hyperbole. The feeling is very different at 8.10, where Apollonios escapes Domitian's court at Rome before noon and appears at Dikaiarchia in the evening, with the reference to Pythagoras left implicit.<sup>55</sup>

There can be no doubt that Philostratos intends Pythagoras' well-known, if obscurely-defined, superhuman status to colour his reader's conception of Apollonios. At 7.38.2, Apollonios demonstrates Pythagorean freedom from normal bodily limitations in freeing of himself from his shackles. Damis spells out his conclusion: τότε πρῶτον ὁ Δάμις φησὶν ἀκριβῶς ξυνεῖναι τῆς Ἀπολλωνίου φύσεως, ὅτι θεία τε εἴη καὶ κρείττων ἀνθρώπου, 'then for the first time, Damis says, he fully appreciated Apollonios' nature, that it was divine and more than human'. Philostratos (in his narrative *persona*) draws out the implications. Freeing himself without sacrifice, prayer or incantation, Apollonios behaved completely unlike a *goes*, whose ritual activities have no effect at all (7.38.2-39.3). Damis' function as a foil to Philostratos' more sophisticated narrative voice was mentioned at Ch. 3.1; here, the two voices in conjunction proclaim Apollonios' more-than-ordinarily-human nature and absolve him of any suggestion of magic.

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<sup>52</sup> Sources include Ael. *VH* 2.26, D.L. 8.11, Iamb. *VP* 134-6, Porph. *VP* 27-8.

<sup>53</sup> Sources: Luc. *Vit.Auct.* 6, *Gall.* 18, *DMort.* 6.3(415); Plut. *Num.* 8.5; Ael. *VH* 2.26, 4.17; D.L. 8.11; Iamb. *VP* 135, 140, Porph. *VP* 28; Amm.Marc. 22.16.21. Cf. Burkert 1972, 142, n. 119.

<sup>54</sup> Kingsley (1995a, 251, 291) speculatively interprets it in the context of a ritual sequence of descent to the underworld, death and regeneration.

<sup>55</sup> Yet another significant link between Pythagoras and Apollonios is their mutual understanding of the language of animals (Porph. *VP* 23-4, *VA* 1.20.3). The Pythagorean tradition known to Aristotle included stories crediting Pythagoras with a close association with animals, but not with this particular ability. Cf. Burkert 1972, 142-3.

### 3.4 Encircling the earth: applications of the motif in Philostratos' VA

#### 3.4.1 Journeys as allegories

Commentators have regularly found symbolic and allegorical significance in Philostratos' accounts of Apollonios' journeys; their ideas can be summarized and developed.

Apollonios' journeys encompass the earth: he reaches the remote east (India), west (Gadeira) and south (Ethiopia). Elsner suggests that, in reaching the Kaukasos (2.2), he also reaches the far north.<sup>56</sup> Certainly the fabled mountain range was originally located there, and it can serve as a symbol of the north; however, as Strabo notes (11.5.5), the Alexander historians flattered Alexander by displacing it to the east so that Alexander could pass the place where Prometheus was chained. In fact, the part of the Kaukasos that Apollonios passes is in the east and the far north is a gap in his world itinerary. Why? By the period of the Second Sophistic, the Hyperboreans had disappeared into myth. The best-known northerners were the Skythians and the other nomadic peoples of the region north of the Black Sea,<sup>57</sup> but they were no longer necessarily sought out by the wise. As discussed at App. 1.5, the reputation of nomads had declined. Philostratos is derogatory: it is easy to enslave Thracians and Getai, and foolish to free them, since they do not consider slavery shameful (7.3.1). Possibly Skythia was regarded as no more than a source of commercial goods – a captain is accused of treating the gods like wares from Hyrkania or Skythia (5.20.2). However, there seems also to have been a story that Apollonios was exiled to Skythia for sexual misconduct; possibly to quash any such tale, Philostratos claims explicitly that he never visited Skythia and was completely chaste (1.13.3).<sup>58</sup>

Along with the ends of the earth, Apollonios visits the *omphaloi*<sup>59</sup> of the Graeco-Roman world. He completes a circuit of the sacred sites: Dodona, Delphi and Abai, and the sanctuaries of Amphiaraos and Trophonios (4.24.1). The symbolic nature of the collective reference is clear: though all were famous in literature for their oracles, neither Abai nor Dodona retained an oracular function in the period of the Second Sophistic, and remotely-located Dodona may have been derelict (Ch. 1.2.1). Apollonios spends time in what Bompaire classes as the three famous

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<sup>56</sup> Elsner 1997, 29.

<sup>57</sup> Herodotos knew that the Skythians were not all nomads (App. 1.5), but it is as nomads that they appear in the Second Sophistic popular imagination. Philostratos reports celebrated addresses on the Skythians' nomadism by Alexander Peloplaton (VS 2.572). Apollonios refers to them at VA 7.26.5 to make the point that no human beings are really free in this mortal life.

<sup>58</sup> At VS 2.570, Philostratos denies the charge that Alexander Peloplaton was a natural son of Apollonios, referring back to the VA.

<sup>59</sup> The term is appropriately used metaphorically, cf. Ch. 2.3.3. The Indians call the peak of their hill the *omphalos* of India (3.14.3).

citadels of Hellenism: Athens, Sparta and Corinth.<sup>60</sup> In Corinth he is associated with the Cynic tradition (4.25.1), in Athens with philosophy of the highest kind and the Epidauria and Dionysia (4.17-21), in Sparta with Lykourgos and the traditional institutions (4.31.3). He visits the *omphalos* of empire at Rome. Anderson references Apollonios' symbolic coverage of the earth when he notes that his destinations are the 'canonic sites of "rhetorical" geography': Arabia, Babylon, India, Asia Minor, Athens, Sparta, Rome, Gades, Libya, Egypt.<sup>61</sup>

The completeness of Apollonios' circuit can be taken as an allegorical expression of the completeness of his knowledge. Elsner notes rightly that 'the breadth of Apollonios' autopsy, his external knowledge of the world in its greatest extent, is an analogy for the extent of his wisdom'.<sup>62</sup>

In less static mode, Philostratos uses travel allegorically to express truths about Apollonios' spiritual journey.<sup>63</sup> As we shall see (Ch. 3.4.3), Apollonios' early journeying qualifies him to teach. Elsner relates his spiritual maturity and his culminating journey to Rome. A series of contacts of escalating intensity with supreme power – with Nero's praetorian prefect Tigellinus in Rome (4.44), and with Vespasian in Alexandria (5.27-38) and Titus in Tarsos (6.30-4), on the outskirts of empire, before either is sole ruler – leads up to the final confrontation with Domitian, as sole ruler, in the centre at Rome. With this confrontation past, Apollonios can finally ignore the summons of Nerva (8.27). Elsner further, though more questionably, sees the culmination in Rome as a relocation of centre, away from the ancient centres to the contemporary one. 'The hagiographic geography evoked by Philostratus ... maps the sacred world firmly onto that of the Roman empire, centring itself upon the city of Rome'.<sup>64</sup> Certainly, Philostratos – a client of the empress – accepted the reality of imperial power. However, many Greek intellectuals were ambivalent about Rome.<sup>65</sup> Philostratos' attitude will be explored further in Ch. 3.4.2; here, we can simply note that his Apollonios returns triumphantly from Rome to his own centre in the Hellenic world.

Over and above holistic knowledge, a complete survey of the world can suggest a

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<sup>60</sup> Bompaire 1958, 224.

<sup>61</sup> Anderson 1986, 129.

<sup>62</sup> Elsner 1997, 31.

<sup>63</sup> That he intends his readers to see allegory in a reported journey is confirmed by Apollonios' words in a letter to his Indian teachers at 3.51: ἀφικομένω μοι πεζῇ πρὸς ὑμᾶς δεδώκατε τὴν θάλατταν, ἀλλὰ καὶ σοφίας τῆς ἐν ὑμῖν κοινωνήσαντες δεδώκατε καὶ διὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ πορεύεσθαι, 'to me coming to you on foot, you have given the sea, and as well, sharing your wisdom, you have caused me to be carried through heaven'.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Elsner 1997, 29-35.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. for example Tatum 2009, 13-14.

superhuman capacity and perspective. At // 13.1-6, Homer represents Zeus surveying the most distant reaches of the earth from above. In the period of the Second Sophistic, the motif had become well enough known for Lucian to have made it into a joke (*Icar.* 11). As well, tales of the gods' travels can express metaphorically their omnipresence. In the *VA*, Homer's omnipresent Zeus is to be preferred to Pheidias' static ivory one (4.7.2). Apollonios notes that the gods do not spend all their time dwelling in heaven but travel to Ethiopia, to Olympos, and to Athos; and just as they visit men, so men should visit the gods (4.40.4). The immediate reference is to pilgrimage to the gods' shrines. Elsner has suggested that, by his own criterion thus stated, Apollonios is both ideal pilgrim and god-like traveller.<sup>66</sup> The concept of a god-like traveller, at least, can be developed and nuanced.

There are limits beyond which a living human being cannot go; Pindar places one at the Pillars of Herakles (*O.* 3.43-5). In his lifetime, Apollonios' encompassing of the earth is only near-divine. He reaches limits which he recognizes as those of human capacity when, travelling towards the sources of the Nile, he comes to a point at which the road becomes impassable and unimaginable, reportedly occupied by *daimones* (6.26.2). It is only at the end of his mortal life that he transcends human limitations. Philostratos presents an account evoking a sense of his continuing journey: his disappearance into a sanctuary in Krete to the sound of a disembodied choir singing 'go from earth, go to heaven, go!' (στεῖχε γᾶς, στεῖχε ἐς οὐρανόν, στεῖχε, 8.30.3) can be interpreted as apotheosis. Characteristically, Philostratos dissociates his *persona* as rational narrator from the tale, which he mentions as only one – though the culminating one – of the surviving traditions about Apollonios' death.

Reference to the limits of human journeying (6.26.2) and to transcendence of those limits (8.30.3; see also 3.51, noted just above) associates the *VA* with the Second Sophistic novel. In the blatantly fictional *Verae historiae*, Lucian's narrator circles the cosmos, visiting the most outrageously unlikely of possible mythical, literary and geographical destinations. Nevertheless, his end that is no end – a shipwreck off the coast of the Great Continent lying opposite the known one – suggests that there is more to be discovered and conveys a sense of the incompleteness of human understanding and the endlessness of human learning. Antonius Diogenes' *De incredilibus* likewise apparently presented journeys intended in combination to encompass the accessible world and go beyond it. Examining Photios' summary of the work, Stephens and Winkler argue persuasively for a deliberate attempt to represent Pomponius Mela's picture of the earth. Mela imagined the peoples of the world distributed in two

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<sup>66</sup> Elsner 1997, 31-2. For the concept of pilgrimage, Ch. 1.2.2; see also Ch. 3.6.1.

concentric rings accessible by water – the inner ring the circum-Mediterranean lands, and the outer, the lands bordering the encircling Ocean. In the novel, the male protagonist Deinias follows Mela's outer circuit and (less certainly) his female counterpart Derkyllis, the inner, before the two meet at Thule.<sup>67</sup> On a final journey in which the distinction between reality and metaphor is blurred, Deinias travels beyond Thule to the region of the moon and an understanding of his heart's desire.

Unlike Apollonios in his lifetime, the protagonists of the *Verae historiae* and the *De incredibilibus* overstep human boundaries. Alexander's inability to do so is central to the *Historia Alexandri Magni*. The extant work (which exists in a number of rescensions) was probably compiled in Alexandria between 140 and 340 CE from earlier sources, principally a history deriving from Kleitarchos (c. 300 BCE) and an epistolary novel which included Alexander's correspondence with his adversaries Dareios and Poros, his mother Olympias, and his tutor Aristotle (c. 100 BCE).<sup>68</sup> In it, although Alexander penetrates the depths of the sea in a submarine and the heights of the sky in a chariot drawn by carrion-eating birds (2.38-41), his ambition to reach the end of the earth (2.37) cannot be fulfilled. In a letter to Olympias he reports traversing a region where – as at *Od.* 11.15-16 – the sun does not shine (2.39); here, he is turned back by birds with human faces crying: τί χώραν πατεῖς, Ἀλέξανδρε, τὴν θεοῦ μόνου; ἀνάστρεφε δειλαίε. μακάρων γῆν πατεῖν οὐ δυνήσῃ ... (2.40), 'Alexander, why do you tread the place of God alone? Turn around, wretch. You cannot tread the land of the Blessed ... '. In stressing the limitations of even the most godlike mortal, the *Historia Alexandri Magni* shares the mindset of the *VA*.

Of particular interest in the context of this thesis is the pairing of Indians and Ethiopians as supremely liminal peoples that is common to the *Historia Alexandri Magni* and the *VA*. Stoneman notes that a passage in the *VA* – in which King Phraotes identifies the Indian Sophoi captured by Alexander as Oxydrakai and inferior to the Sophoi living between the Hyphasis and the Ganges (2.33.1-2) – suggests that Philostratos knew at least one of the component traditions of the *Historia Alexandri Magni*: only in that work (3.4), among those extant, are the Brachmanes identified with the Oxydrakai, whom the Alexander historians knew as a warlike people of the southern Indos.<sup>69</sup> If, as is possible,<sup>70</sup> the passage had already been united with accounts of Alexander's interviews with Indian *gymnosophistai* (3.4-5) and encounters with

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<sup>67</sup> Cf. Ch. 1.2.3, Stephens and Winkler 1995, 101, 104, 123 n. 41.

<sup>68</sup> Dowden 1989, 650-2.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. Stoneman 1995, 102. Arrian uses the term Brachmanes for philosophers who provoked a rebellion against Alexander (*An.* 6.16.5); his Oxydrakai are an Indian people (*An.* 5.22.2).

<sup>70</sup> Cf. Dowden 1989, 650.

Kandake, queen of Ethiopia (3.18-24), we have a potential source for Philostratos' juxtaposition of India and Ethiopia in the VA. We will return to the issue at Ch. 3.5.4.

### **3.4.2 Journeys of beneficence and conquest**

The Hellenistic period saw the development and propagation of a complex of stories relating to Herakles, Dionysos and Alexander, their journeys to the East, and the nature of the excellence that justifies rule. Outcomes in the period of the Second Sophistic included popular knowledge of euhemerizing stories about the journeys of Herakles and Dionysos that were unknown before the Hellenistic period, an emphasis on the motif of encircling the earth (or conquest of the earth) to do good, and widely-held beliefs about the divinity or divine right to rule of those in power. As we shall see, all these motifs occur to some extent in Philostratos' account of Apollonios' journeys.

#### *a. The paradigms*

Herakles is quintessentially a world traveller. In the course of his traditional Labours, his travels take him – in search of the golden apples of the Hesperides – as far as the land of the Hyperboreans; on this same mission he rescues Prometheus from an eagle devouring his liver on Mount Kaukasos. Hesiod's *Theogony* presents Herakles as a divine distributor of benefits; it is as a saviour that he fights such monsters as Geryon (289-94), the Lernaean hydra (313-8) and the Nemean lion (326-32). Pindar denies his guilt of unworthy deeds (e.g. at *O.* 9.30-9); the Labours undertaken at Eurystheus' command are a necessity imposed by his father (ἀνάγκα πατρόθεν, *O.* 3.28), that is, the will of Zeus.<sup>71</sup> Aristeides presents this ancient picture of Herakles in classic form:

ἦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων ἡ βουλή, ὅπως κοσμηθεῖη τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα καὶ γῆ καὶ θάλαττα ἐνεργὰ κατασταίη. καὶ γίγνεται δὴ οὕτως Ἡρακλῆς συνεργὸς τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ὑπαρχος τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν τῆς σελήνης πόλον ... (*Or.* 40.2)

For [Zeus'] wish was for the whole, that the affairs of human beings be ordered and earth and sea rendered productive. And thus Herakles was born a co-worker with his father and sub-ruler of things in the region below the moon ...

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<sup>71</sup> Cf. Galinsky 1972, 16, 30-1.

In Pindar's version of his story, Herakles has no choice. The theme of virtue as a moral choice was developed by Prodikos: in his 'Choice of Herakles', Herakles must choose between Kakia, offering the pleasures of food, drink and women, and Arete, promising the honour that comes from acting for the public good and the pleasures of a simple, natural, life (X. *Mem.* 2.1.21-34). Dion adds a political dimension to the tale when, in his version (1.66-84), Herakles is rewarded for choosing Basileia over Tyrannis with the right to rule over all humanity (1.84), and he travels the world with an army to enforce the good (1.63).<sup>72</sup>

Political implications are to the fore in tales of the travels of Dionysos and Alexander the Great. Myths of Herakles' and Dionysos' journeys to India probably date from the time of Alexander's expedition;<sup>73</sup> certainly, before the period of the Second Sophistic they were firmly in place (Str. 15.1.7-8, 58).<sup>74</sup> In Arrian's account (*An.* 5.3.2), Herakles' journey to India is 'discovered' when Alexander's companions recognize a cave in the country of the Parapamisidai (i.e. around Kabul and Begram) as the place where he rescued Prometheus from the eagle. Dionysos' Indian travels were evidenced by ivy in a place which – its inhabitants tell Alexander – Dionysos named Nysa in honour of his nurse (Arr. *An.* 5.1.5-6). As Arrian records it, Alexander compares his achievements with Herakles' and Dionysos' in a speech to mutineers:

ἢ οὐκ ἴστε ὅτι ὁ πρόγονος ὁ ἡμέτερος οὐκ ἐν Τίρυνθι οὐδὲ Ἄργει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ ἢ Θήβαις μένων ἐς τοσόνδε κλέος ἦλθεν ὡς θεὸς ἐξ ἀνθρώπου γενέσθαι ἢ δοκεῖν; οὐ μὲν δὴ οὐδὲ Διονύσου, ἀβροτέρου τούτου θεοῦ ἢ καθ' Ἡρακλέα, ὀλίγοι πόνοι. ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς γε καὶ ἐπέκεινα τῆς Νύσης ἀφίγμεθα καὶ ἡ Ἄορνος πέτρα ἢ τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ ἀνάλωτος πρὸς ἡμῶν ἔχεται. (*An.* 5.26.5)

Don't you know that it was not by remaining in Tiryns or Argos or even in the Peloponnese or Thebes that our ancestor [Herakles] gained such great glory that, from being a man, he became, or was held to be, a god. And the labours of Dionysos, this more delicate god than Herakles, were not few. But we have passed beyond Nysa, and the rock of Aornos, which was impregnable to Herakles, is possessed by us.

Here, conquest wins (or perhaps even constitutes) divinity. Two consequences are implicit: gods and heroes are no more than super-men whose achievements can be bettered by Alexander;

<sup>72</sup> Similarly, at D.Chr. 47.4, Herakles uses military force to make himself king in Ilion (cf. Hom. *Il.* 5.638-51).

<sup>73</sup> Cf. Bosworth 1996, 98, 118-126.

<sup>74</sup> In imperial period Greek literature, Dionysos' all-conquering army had become a set-piece with its own imagery. It appears most notably in Lucian's *Dionysos* (1-2) and Polyainos' *Strategemata* (1.1.1), and in visual form on sarcophagi (Cimino 1994, pl. 28-9). Elephants were part of the imagery; fossil elephant bones found on Samos thus became evidence of Dionysos' passage there (Plut. *Mor.* 303e; cf. Mayor 2000, 54-5).

and conquest, winning 'divinity', both confers and legitimizes rule.<sup>75</sup> Confirming this literary picture of Alexander is the fact that the epithet he seems to have favoured for himself was *aniktos*, 'unconquered'. It is attested both in the narrative tradition<sup>76</sup> and by the statue of himself as *theos aniktos* that he seems to have asked the Athenians to erect in Athens (cf. Ch. 1.2.4).

In parallel with his claim that conquest justifies rule, in Persia Alexander seems to have sought recognition as Dareios' legitimate successor by adopting Persian regalia and in other ways seeking reconciliation with the Persian ruling class.<sup>77</sup> Beyond the Persian Empire, in search of the appearance of legitimacy, Alexander possibly, and his successors certainly, used an asserted association between Alexander and Dionysos to justify their claims. As conqueror of India and a forerunner of similar ancestry, Dionysos legitimized Alexander's rule. Alexander's literal descent from Dionysos – a later adjustment to the story – made his claim to sovereignty even stronger.<sup>78</sup>

In the years subsequent to Alexander's death, a new justification for Dionysos' – and so Alexander's and his successors' – rule took shape. The traditional image of Dionysos as a disruptive force was joined by that of Dionysos as civilizer. The new image was already present in Megasthenes (*ap. Arr. Ind.* 7-8 and *D.S.* 2.38.3-4), but its most fruitful life seems to have been in Egypt. Dionysos had long been conflated with the Egyptian Osiris, who was associated with agriculture and the pharaoh; this identification became official in a state-sponsored synthesis of Greek and Egyptian religion commissioned by Ptolemy I Soter. In the new Hellenistic cult, Osiris/Dionysos was said to have travelled the world in mythical times bringing the benefits of civilization to all. As an adjunct to the royal cult, Ptolemy II Philadelphos introduced a festival, the Ptolemaieia, in which Alexander seems to have been identified with Dionysos.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Of relevance here is the fact the same word, *arete*, can mean moral excellence or capability, power. Dangerous variants of the idea were spelled out elsewhere in the Alexander tradition. At *Alex.* 27.6, in the context of Alexander being hailed 'Son of Zeus', Plutarch reports the philosopher Psammon's claim that all human beings are governed by god because that which rules is divine. A point similar to Psammon's (that which rules is 'just') is suggested by the philosopher Anaxarchos when Alexander is assailed by remorse after his murder of Kleitos (*Arr. An.* 4.9.7).

<sup>76</sup> Diodoros (17.93.4) and Plutarch (*Alex.* 14.4) both report the incident in which the Pythia proclaims Alexander invincible. The story is probably an inference from the epithet *aniktos* (cf. Bosworth 1996, 166); for its origins, see also Ch. 2.5.1.

<sup>77</sup> Cf. Cartledge 2005, 152-3.

<sup>78</sup> The genealogical link between Alexander and Dionysos seems to have been developed in Alexander's last years; it was in place in the Ptolemaic period. Cf. Bosworth 1996, 125-6 and n. 128.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. *Ath.* 5.196a-203b; Hunter 2003, 2, 115; Mossé 2004, 156, 168. While emphasizing the connection with Dionysos, the Ptolemies also made use of the common descent from Herakles of Alexander and Ptolemy Soter, celebrated, for example, in Theokritos' encomium on Ptolemy Philadelphos (*Id.* 17.20-33).

The contemporary and later view of Alexander as a philosopher-king who conquers the world for the benefit of all is a variant of this same tradition. In his *Politica* (3.13, 17), Aristotle argues that absolute monarchy is justified (only) when one individual possesses *arete* – seen here as capacity to rule for the common good (and so involving understanding of the common good as well as the ability to implement it) – superior to that of all other members of the community. To present Alexander as a philosopher-king is to present him as such an individual, and so to justify his rule. Alexander first appeared as a philosopher in Onesikritos' purportedly eyewitness account (Str. 15.1.64). In *De Alexandri magni fortuna aut uirtute*, Plutarch goes further: Alexander is *philosophotatos* (Mor. 329a) not because of intellectual curiosity of the kind he shows in Onesikritos' account but because of his mission to impose Greek civilization upon the world: καὶ κατασπείρας τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἑλληνικοῖς τέλεσι τῆς ἀνημέρου καὶ θηριώδους ἐκράτησε διαίτης (Mor. 328e), 'having sown Asia with Greek magistracies, he overcame its wild and brutish way of life'.<sup>80</sup>

#### *b. Applications: living out the paradigms*

Use of the figures of Herakles and Dionysos and of Alexander himself to suggest the divine nature of rulers who conferred benefits on the people became widespread, and even a cliché, in the Hellenistic and Roman worlds. Those who saw themselves as Alexander's successors emphasized Dionysos; Demetrios, son of Antigonos, is a case in point (Plut. *Demetr.* 2.3). In the west, Herakles was more popular; Cicero held him up as an example of a man (*vir*) who becomes a god by strength of his own *virtus* i.e. *arete* (*Tusc.* 1.33). For rulers in east or west, Alexander remained the supreme model of legitimate, because 'divine', kingship.

Pompey was identified, and identified himself, with Alexander (Plut. *Pomp.* 2.2, 46.1). Antony claimed descent from Herakles; he was said to look like representations of Herakles, and he stressed the connection in his choice of dress (Plut. *Ant.* 4.2, 36.4). Nevertheless, it was with Dionysos that he was identified in the east (*Ant.* 24.3, 26.3); his downfall was heralded symbolically in events making reference to both deities (*Ant.* 60.2, 75.3-4). The linking of Augustus with Herakles may be seen as the Augustan poets' direct counter to Antony's claims. Horace associates the two (*Carm.* 3.3.9-12). In the *Aeneid*, Vergil associates Aeneas (a figure of Augustus) with Herakles by emphasizing Juno's hostility (1.8-10), and by his use of the term *labor* to denote a task (most notably, at 1.10, 1.241, 1.372-4, 4.233, 6.890-2). The association of the

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<sup>80</sup> Cf. Bosworth 1996, 2.

emperor with Herakles had become a standard motif derided by Vespasian (Suet. *Ves.* 12.2); Martial flattered Domitian as greater than Herakles (9.101.11-24); Commodus' statues showed him dressed as Herakles (D.C. 73.15.6).

Alexander was the focus in the context of the conquest of Parthia. Trajan took the capital Ktesiphon in 116 and then sailed down the Tigris to the Persian Gulf, where he is supposed to have lamented not being younger and able to follow in Alexander's footsteps to India (D.C. 68.17-29).<sup>81</sup> Of particular relevance to Philostratos is the fact that Septimius Severus followed Trajan in attacking the Parthians and annexed the territory between the Euphrates and the Tigris in the years 197-202 (D.C. 76.9-12).<sup>82</sup> Caracalla – said to admire and even claim to reincarnate Alexander – followed his father and Trajan and Alexander in 216 with another expedition against Parthia, but was murdered *en route* (D.C. 79.1-4, Hdn. 4.10-13).

Even without specific reference to Herakles, Dionysos or Alexander, the symbolic motifs of reaching the end of the earth (Ocean) and encompassing the whole world could imply a ruler's divinity, superior wisdom and right to rule. Caesar reaches the end of the earth (Plut. *Caes.* 23.2), and he plans to encompass it (*Caes.* 58.3). Crassus' ambition to go as far as Bactria and India and Ocean itself (Plut. *Crass.* 16.2) is the supreme *hybris*.

Augustus lives out the role of one ruling the world for the benefit of all when, in the course of his travels, he receives the homage of Alexandrian traders; they affirm that they owe him their entire freedom and prosperity, and he doles out largesse (Suet. *Aug.* 98).

### *c. Philostratos' use of the paradigms*

Paradigmatic stories about the journeys of Herakles, Dionysos and Alexander, and the political implications of these stories, are an undercurrent in Philostratos' text.

Most immediately, there are explicit references to overlaps between Apollonios' journeys and those of Herakles and Dionysos. Apollonios visits the cave in the Kaukasos where Herakles (not the Theban<sup>83</sup>) rescued Prometheus (2.3), and a sanctuary on Mount Nysa planted by Dionysos himself (2.8). He is shown superior to both Herakles and Dionysos when he is

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<sup>81</sup> For further discussion of Trajan and Alexander, Ch. 5.3.2a. For Trajan's and his successors' attempts to change the eastern boundary of the Empire, P. Parker 2010, 292, 294-5, 309.

<sup>82</sup> Severus seems to have felt threatened by Alexander and his cult: at D.C. 76.13.2, he seals Alexander's tomb.

<sup>83</sup> For the distinction between the 'Theban' Herakles and Dionysos and their Egyptian and Indian namesakes, Ch. 3.5.1.

admitted to the *tyrsis* of the Indian Sophoi that the two once besieged unsuccessfully together (2.10-12, 2.33.2, 3.13).

Philostratos associates Apollonios with Herakles in his *persona* as Herakles the Averter (Apotropaios). In the Apology, Apollonios' cleansing of Ephesos of plague (Ch. 3.2) is represented as one of the bases of the charges made against him (8.7.24-5). Apollonios does not deny his own clairvoyance, which surely would have been adequate to explain what happened (8.7.27-8); nevertheless, he claims also to have prayed to Herakles Apotropaios, who was associated with a similar cleansing in Elis. (The reference is to the Labour of the cleansing of the stables of Augeas.) It was he, working through Apollonios, who effected the result. Apollonios claims the same assistance from Herakles in ridding the region of Corinth of a *lamia*. In this context, Herakles is seen in his ancient *persona* as a divine distributor of benefits; he is pure and benevolent to humanity (καθαρὸς γὰρ καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εὖνους) and sought no reward other than honeycake and frankincense and to do something for the sake of the *soteria* of humankind (8.7.29).

Philostratos' narrator's description of the cleansing at Ephesos leaves a rather different impression.<sup>84</sup> No prayers to Herakles are mentioned. In the Apology, Apollonios claims to have set up a statue of the Averter at the site where the cleansing took place (8.7.28); Philostatos' text at 4.10.1 and 4.10.3 simply draws attention to the current presence of the statue. Ostensibly the intention is to identify the location by a well-known feature; nevertheless, the reader's impression is of a pointer to the nature of Apollonios as one who – like Herakles – travels the world to do good.

Philostratos' Apollonios compares himself explicitly with the Herakles of the Choice (6.11.2). Like Prodikos' Herakles, he undertakes his travels not in order to do good but rather to live rightly, a 'selfish' motive that involves perfecting his own understanding as well as living it out in teaching, the correction of rites and the conquest of phantoms.<sup>85</sup> As he describes it himself in discussion of the Choice, the Pythagorean philosophy he adopts, though 'unpleasant' (*aedes*) and full of toil – and so comparable to the Labours – offers self-control (*sophrosyne*), freedom from envy, power over tyrants, and the purity that issues in supernatural knowledge and power over spirits (6.11.5-6). Living out this life, Apollonios replicates the life-history of Herakles – who is accounted divine.

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<sup>84</sup> In this discussion, it is assumed that the Apology, although attributed to Apollonios, is Philostratos' own composition.

<sup>85</sup> In Prodikos and the Cynic and Stoic traditions that followed his lead, the outcome of Herakles' Labours in apotheosis and immortality was reinterpreted as the happiness in life that is the consequence of living rightly. Cf. Galinsky 1972, 56, 103-7.

A political dimension is added to the text when Philostratos uses Apollonios' journey in the footsteps of Alexander to express the latter's inferiority to the sage. Apollonios passes Alexander's stopping point, thirty stades past the Hyphasis and marked with a plaque (2.43). Again surpassing Alexander, who only aspired to it (Arr. *An.* 7.1), he reaches Gadeira in the far west (5.4-10). Alexander's limitations are underscored. In the extent of his travel east, he is inferior not only to Apollonios but – contrary to popular belief – also to Herakles and Dionysos, who reached the dwelling-place of the Indian Sophoi (3.13). His moral inferiority to Apollonios is suggested subtly at 1.24.3. Apollonios visits Kissia, the home in exile of a group of Eretrians since the sack of Eretria in Euboia by Datis, Dareios' admiral, in 490 BCE (Hdt. 6.119). Apollonios treats the exiles with honour and obtains for them the favour of King Vardanes (1.24.3, 1.36.1-2), in marked contrast to Alexander's famous murder of the descendents of the Branchidai, exiled by Xerxes and settled in Sogdiana (Curt. 7.5.28-35).

The superiority of sages to kings is expressed in the Indian sages' relationships with King Phraotes (2.31.3, 2.41, 3.17.2, 3.26.1, 3.28.1-2), who honours them, and with the less reverent Indian king who courts their assistance (3.26-3.34.1). Apollonios is shown as superior in his interchanges with Vardanes (1.31-1.33, 1.36-1.41), Vespasian (5.28-38), Titus (6.30-32) and Domitian (7.32-4, 8.4-5). In his friendly relations with Vardanes, Vespasian and Titus, he is recognized for his wisdom and takes care always to be the one granting rather than receiving the favour.<sup>86</sup> Relevant here is his dictum concerning parasites: the wise man who is overcome by anger, sexual desire or alcohol may perhaps be forgiven, but not the one who lowers himself for money (1.35.2).

The aura of divinity – whether or not it was associated with Herakles, Dionysos or Alexander – that surrounded conquerors and rulers has been noted (Chs 1.2.4, 3.4.2b above). In a story about Apollonios' youth, Philostratos refers to the enforced reverence accorded to Tiberius' statues – they were more feared and inviolate than those of Zeus at Olympia – and even to his image on coins (1.15.2). Domitian apparently demanded recognition as 'divine'. Suetonius (*Dom.* 13.2) and Martial (e.g. at 8.2.6) refer to his use of the title *dominus et deus*.<sup>87</sup> Dion claims to have borne the hatred of a man (Domitian) called by Greeks and barbarians

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<sup>86</sup> Apollonios refuses to live in royal style with Vardanes (1.33.1) and expensive gifts for himself (1.36.1-2, 1.39.2). He refuses to accompany Vespasian on his travels (5.37.3) and again refuses gifts (5.38.1). He refuses to travel to Rome with Titus (6.31.2).

<sup>87</sup> For Martial's use of the terms *dominus*, *deus*, and the two in combination, Sullivan 1991, 141.

δεσπότης καὶ θεός (D.Chr. 45.1).<sup>88</sup> It is in this heightened context that we must see the final contest between Apollonios and Domitian. Domitian's claim is brought to the fore at 8.4: Apollonios, in court, does not look at the emperor, and his accuser tells him to keep his eyes on the god of all humankind (ἐς τὸν ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων θεόν). Apollonios conspicuously stares at the ceiling. The trial proceeds and Domitian is forced by public opinion if nothing else into an acquittal (8.5.3); Apollonios demonstrates his freedom from imperial authority with a godlike display, simply disappearing from the court (8.5.4).

Did Philostratos have a contemporary or even personal agenda in so stressing Apollonios' superiority to Domitian? The historical Apollonios' opposition to Domitian and the likelihood that Philostratos' patron Julia Domna fostered a cult of Apollonios are addressed at App. 3 and Ch. 3.1 respectively. The Severans had no interest in promoting Domitian personally, but a great interest in maintaining the status of the emperor *per se*. Significantly, Apollonios is no threat to imperial rule. Like Herakles in his traditional *persona*, he travels without a conquering army (cf. D.Chr. 1.63).<sup>89</sup> He argues for the inevitability of the imperial system in the light of contemporary realities (5.35) and confines his political opposition to individuals of whom he disapproves – Nero (4.38-44) and Domitian (7.16-8.14). But although Philostratos toes an imperial line, we can perhaps catch a glimpse of a personal agenda. Apollonios outdoes Septimius Severus as surely as he outdoes Alexander when he travels in Egypt beyond the statue of Memnon.<sup>90</sup> The Severans themselves recognize Apollonios as their equal (8.31.3). The superiority of a wise man to the rulers he advises is surely intended to have implications for Philostratos' own status.

### **3.4.3 Journeys of autopsy**

The urge to see for oneself had its roots in Greek tradition. Before the period of the Second Sophistic, journeys of autopsy had inspired a number of literary genres. The Explorer's Tale and the related Catalogue of Wonders, the *periegesis* and Herodotos' *historie* have already been

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<sup>88</sup> At 7.24, Philostratos suggests that Domitian claimed to be son of Athena. Domitian was indeed a devotee of Minerva/Athena (cf. Sullivan 1991, 144), but there is no evidence in support of this particular assertion. Cf. Jones 2005, n. 43 at 7.24.

<sup>89</sup> The ability of a charismatic individual to present himself in the guise of a 'divine' figure and so perhaps threaten political stability is evident from an incident described by Cassius Dio (80.18.1). A figure proclaiming himself Alexander of Macedon journeyed through Thrace with a party of four hundred men equipped with Bacchic wands and faunskins, performing rites. Cf. Anderson 1994b, 2.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. D.C. 76.13.1, SHA *Sept. Sev.* 17.4, Anderson 1986, 216.

mentioned (Ch. 2.3.4). A tradition of scientific autopsy established by Aristotle and Theophrastos produced accounts of the natural world and ethnographic works.<sup>91</sup>

Living out their own version of the Herodotean/scientific tradition, sophists learned by travelling and established their credentials by referring to their travels. Philostratos' *Vita sophistarum* shows Eudoxos of Knidos – cited repeatedly by Plutarch for his knowledge of Egypt (*Mor.* 353c, 354e, 359c, 363a, 372e, 376c, 377a) – travelling widely as a sophist (*VS* 1.484). Dion establishes his *persona* on the basis of his journeying (Ch. 5.3.3).

Philostratos presents Apollonios as a traveller in the autopsy tradition, circling the world to learn from observation, conversation with the wise, and personal contemplation and comparison. To an official on the border of Babylon, Apollonios declares himself on a trip to India to learn by inquiry about matters there (καθ' ἱστορίαν τῶν ἐκεῖ, 1.21.2). Damis declares that he and Apollonios travel about for love of learning and to take in foreign cultures (φιλομαθῶν καὶ περιφρονῶν τὰ ἐν τῇ ξένη, 2.11.2). Apollonios plans a trip to the far west to see the Ocean tides (a physical phenomenon) and Gadeira (a seat of the cult of Herakles); he has also heard of the love of wisdom and closeness to the divine of the people who live there (περὶ φιλοσοφίας τῶν ἐκεῖνη ἀνθρώπων ... ὡς ἐς πολὺ τοῦ θεοῦ προηκόντων, 4.47).

The VA can be seen (at least in one of its aspects) as a compendium of marvels in the tradition of the Explorer's Tale or the Catalogue of Wonders. Drawing out this strand, Anderson mentions as paradoxographic sights a well in Tyana that makes perjurers confess (1.6), a form-changing *empousa* (2.4), a *daimon* Nereid on an island (3.56), a tree with a woman's voice (6.10.3) and a bicoloured woman (3.3), the automatic servants of *Il.* 18.373-9 (3.27.2), the speaking statue of Memnon (6.4), gold-digging griffins (3.48), shadow-feet (3.45.2), fish eaters (3.55), hybrid creatures (3.45.1, 6.24), and the magical *pantarbe* stone (3.46).<sup>92</sup> More can be added: a worm whose fat produces an inextinguishable flame (3.1.2), the unicorn (3.2), *drakontes* more terrible than Homer's at *Il.* 2.308 (3.6-8), pygmies (3.45.2, 3.47), the phoenix (3.49), another *empousa/lamia* (4.25.4-6), and the satyr that Apollonios captures in an Ethiopian village (6.27.1-4).<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> Examples include, in the former category, the records of Alexander's bematists (Plin. *HN* 8.17.44) and, in the latter, Poseidonios' account of the Celts.

<sup>92</sup> Anderson 1976c, 90-1.

<sup>93</sup> Other than those with bases in Greek myth (an *empousa* or *lamia*, Nereids, satyrs), most can be traced to Ktesias (*ap. Phot. Bibl. codex* 72, 45a, 21-50a, 4 = *FGrH* 688 F 45) or Herodotos. For the well – which is echoed also in the the Indians' *realgar* well, used as a pledge of oaths (3.14.1) – *FGrH* 688 F 45(31); for the griffins, *App.* 2.1.2, *Ctes. ap. Ael. NA* 4.27 = *FGrH* 688 F 45h; for the shadow-feet, *Ctes. ap. Plin. HN* 7.23 = *FGrH* 688 F 51a (they seem also to have been mentioned by Skylax, Ch. 2.3.4); for the fish eaters,

Countering Anderson's suggestion that the *VA* is no more than a miscellany of genres,<sup>94</sup> we can note that Philostratos uses the wonders he introduces for allegorical ends. As Romm has pointed out, mention of the unicorn and the death-averting properties of its horn leads to discourse on mortality (3.2). A tale of an *empousa* (4.25) points to the dangers of the superficially pleasant. Herodotos' (3.102-5) gold-guarding ants and Ktesias' (*ap. Ael. NA* 4.27) gold-guarding griffins are replaced in Philostratos' account by *drakontes* prized for the powerful stones – like that in the ring of Gyges – concealed in their heads. They are taken by Indians not by stealth but by spells, chants inducing sleep (3.8.1-2). 'Philostratos has here reworked a traditional gold-getting story so as to portray a battle waged by philosophers, using philosophy itself as a weapon, for the sake of a purely philosophical prize. The episode ... is perhaps closer to allegory than ethnography'. The validity of attempting readings of this kind is confirmed by Philostratos' authorial comment at 3.45.1: in claiming that there would be benefit in neither believing nor disbelieving all things (γὰρ κέρδος εἶη μήτε πιστεύειν, μήτε ἀπιστεῖν πᾶσιν) in the account to follow, he indicates the metaphorical as opposed to the literal truth of the stories he recounts.<sup>95</sup>

Of greatest significance is the fact that Apollonios is shown as a philosopher/scientist, learning from his observation of physical phenomena. Meeting with an elephant as he approaches the Indos, Apollonios discourses learnedly on the animal on the basis of what he has seen among the nomads (2.11.4). He goes on to make astute observations as he watches elephants cross the river (2.14.1). Philostratos' narrator and his protagonist Apollonios are equally practitioners of autopsy in the context of the Ocean tides at Gadeira. The narrator's comments about the area convey both personal observation – he notes the lack of twilight in comparison with countries further north – and attention to local myth – 'they say' that the Islands of the Blest lie on the other side of the strait, off the coast of Libya (5.3). He has seen the tides himself, and he perceives – from one of Apollonios' letters to the Indians – that Apollonios

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Hdt. 3.20.5 (and for their idealization, Agatharch. 49); for the hybrid *martichoras* (3.45.1), *FGrH* 688 F 45(15) [the *boutragos* of 6.24 seems to be unique to Philostratos]; for the *pantarbe*, *FGrH* 688 F 45(6); for the worm, Ctes. *ap. Ael. NA* 5.3 = *FGrH* 688 F 45r; for the unicorn, Ctes. *ap. Ael. NA* 4.52 = *FGrH* 688 F 45q; for pygmies, *FGrH* 688 F 45(21); for the phoenix, Hdt. 2.73. Speaking trees evoke the prophetic trees of Dodona (*Od.* 14.327-30, *Ar. Pr.* 830-2, *Pl. Phdr.* 275b); the statue of Memnon will be discussed at Ch. 3.6.2.

<sup>94</sup> Anderson (1976c, 94) interprets the *VA* as a mosaic of the genres of the period – romantic fiction, paradoxography, biography, religious rhetoric – rather than an integrated whole.

<sup>95</sup> Cf. Romm 1992, 117-9 (the quotation occurs at 119); see also Elsner 1997, 29. Nuancing Romm's account, we should note that both the Indians' means of conquering a *drakon* and their prize are not 'philosophical' but magical: Gyges' ring, which made its wearer invisible, is mentioned at *Pl. R.* 2.359d-360a. In similar fashion, Ktesias' *pantarbe*, a stone which attracts gems, becomes in Philostratos an object possessed by a spirit of mysterious strength, to be drawn from under the earth with rituals and utterances (τὰ μὲν δράσαντες, τὰ δὲ εἰπόντες) – that is, magic (3.46).

came rightly to understand their nature (5.2). At Etna, Apollonios shows himself as a scientist in the tradition of Aristotle. He rejects local legends about the mountain – for example, that Typhon is imprisoned there – and finds an explanation for its appearance worthy of philosophers (λόγους ... προσήκοντας τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν, 5.14.1): the earth contains bitumen and sulphur and smoulders by its own nature (5.17).

The Indian sage Iarchas is equally a philosopher/scientist, expressing the principle of drawing conclusions from first-hand observation in the context of the exotic beasts described by Skylax (3.47). About the animals or plants or fountains which Apollonios has seen on his journey, what is Iarchas to say to him? It is Apollonios' task to describe them to others (σὸν γὰρ ἤδη νῦν ἐξηγεῖσθαι αὐτὰ ἑτέροις, 3.45.2).

Apollonios is capable both of learning from those reputed as 'wise' and of judging them. He learns from the Magoi and teaches them too, calling them σοφοὶ μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐ πάντα (1.26). At Gadeira, contrary to his expectations (4.47), he finds no foreign wise. The temple at Gadeira has objects posing more questions than the priests can answer; inspired by the Egyptian Herakles, Apollonios is able to instruct them (5.5).

In Egypt, like an historian or a sophist, Apollonios can argue that his knowledge is superior because he has been elsewhere. He objects to the traditional blood sacrifices in the *hieron* at Alexandria, and a priest dares to challenge him. Who is so clever as to correct the customs of the Egyptians? Any wise man, if he comes from the Indians (παῖς ... σοφός, ἦν ἀπ' Ἰνδῶν ἦκη, 5.25.1). On the basis of his knowledge of the Indians, he can best the Ethiopian Gymnoi and prove their wisdom inferior (6.11.10-14).

All these instances show Apollonios as a philosopher, with no supernatural access to knowledge. The picture is in marked contrast to 2.5.3, where Apollonios differentiates between knowledge from physical observation and the true knowledge discerned by the pure soul. The subject will be taken up at Ch. 3.5.3b.

### **3.5 The non-Greek wise: applications of the motif in Philostratos' VA**

#### **3.5.1 A hierarchy of Greek and non-Greek peoples and their wise**

A certain ethnocentrism is apparent in the VA: the Indian wise speak Greek (3.12.1); Apollonios' own Greek is of the purest, Attic kind with no hint of a regional accent (1.7.1). Nevertheless, the thrust of Philostratos' work is that Greek wisdom is not supreme. As a philosopher, Apollonios is

prepared to travel and learn (Ch. 3.4.3). In the course of his travels, through autopsy and in conversation with the wise, he establishes the higher wisdom of non-Greek traditions that – it turns out – are both geographically remote and more ancient than his own. The pattern reflects paradigms long established in Greek tradition.<sup>96</sup>

In fact, Apollonios' journeys reveal that, even among the mythic figures identified as 'Herakles' and 'Dionysos', the Indian and Egyptian surpass the Greek. The Indians have proof that it was the 'Egyptian' Herakles who surveyed of the earth and made boundary stones of the mountains at Gadeira (2.33.2); he is a more powerful figure than the 'Theban' Herakles of the Labours who captured Geryon and his cattle.<sup>97</sup> There is also an Indian Dionysos superior to – the teacher of – the Theban Dionysos whose journey from the west Apollonios has traced. A statue at Nysa has the appearance of a youthful Indian; the divinity represented is the Indian Dionysos, in honour of whom the Theban established the shrine (2.9.2). The Dionysos of the attack on the Indians' citadel is the Theban, who invaded India with an army (2.9.1, 2.33.2).

In the journeys he undertakes over the course of his life, Apollonios visits the groups most commonly accredited as wise: Mesopotamians (in the *VA*, Magoi rather than Chaldaians) and Egyptians. As noted above (Ch. 3.4.3), he judges both critically. However, the itineraries he plans suggest a working assumption that the greatest wisdom is to be found among the most remote.

A first journey – to the east – is undertaken explicitly to visit the Indian wise, with the Magoi simply a bonus on the way (1.18).<sup>98</sup> Although India was known earlier as a place associated with wonders, its wise entered western consciousness only in the context of Alexander's expedition (cf. Ch. 1.2.3). They were regularly (for example, at Str. 15.1.63, Plut. *Alex.* 64.1-65.4, Arr. *An.* 7.2) presented as ascetics and proto-Cynics. Philostratos sees them differently (Ch. 3.5.2), and rejects those whom Alexander supposed to be wise as knowing nothing worthwhile (*chrestos*, 2.33.1). Encountering increasingly impressive individuals as he

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<sup>96</sup> As noted at Ch. 1.2.3, the people of the ends of the earth and of ancient indigenous traditions *per se* could be credited with special virtues. In later accounts, regional virtues were manifest in the persons of kings or the wise. Thus, in the *VA*, the Magoi and King Vardanes represent intermediate Mesopotamian, and the Sophoi and King Phraotes, higher Indian, wisdom.

<sup>97</sup> The two are honoured separately at Gadeira (5.4.1). At 5.4.1, the grammar of the sentence suggests that the Egyptian captured Geryon and the Theban surveyed the world to its boundary. The assignment of tasks to the two Herakles here is as 'they say' (φασίν) at Gadeira; the suggestion at 2.33.2 is that evidence from India shows that the people of Gadeira have it wrong.

<sup>98</sup> The Indian wise are identified as Brachmanes and Hyrkanioi. The term Brachmanes is used only here and at 1.2.1, 3.15.1 (where it may be part of the pre-Philostratan tradition) and 8.7.14 (in the *Apology*). The Hyrkanioi are mentioned only here; since Hyrkania was far from India, the text may be corrupt. Cf. Jones 2005, n. 24 *ad loc.*

progresses towards the edges of the earth, Apollonios converses with the wise king Phraotes at Taxila and then presses on to the Sophoi whom Phraotes identifies as his teachers. They live between the Hyphasis and the Ganges in territory Alexander the Great never reached, and from which Herakles and Dionysos were turned back (2.33.1-2, 3.13); they take indirect credit for Pythagoras' teaching, believing about the soul 'that which Pythagoras taught you [i.e. the Greeks], and we, the Egyptians' (3.19.1).

A journey to the far west is equally to see the Ocean tides and the people of Gadeira, of whose love of wisdom and sanctity Apollonios has heard (4.47). In this case, a liminal location proves no guarantee of its inhabitants' wisdom (5.5).

A final journey is to the south. In Alexandria, Apollonios dismisses an Egyptian priest (Ch. 3.4.3) and rejects Vespasian's invitation to join him on his travels in order to go south to meet the Gymnoi (5.37.3). Significantly, they are linked with the defining physical feature of the southern reaches of the earth, the sources of the Nile. Philostratos' presentation of their identity and location is confused. Certain references could suggest that they are Egyptians (5.37.3, 8.7.14), but they are identified explicitly at 6.11.13 as Ethiopians; the name associates them with the blessed and superior Ethiopians of Homeric myth. Conversing with them in their compound at 6.22, Apollonios notes that he has already reached Ethiopia. Now, at 6.1.1 Ethiopia joins Egypt at Meroe, and at 6.4.3 the Gymnoi seem to be located much further north, just south of the sanctuary of Memnon – who ruled over Ethiopia (6.4.1) – near Thebes. The sages' Ethiopian identity can be maintained and the geographical discrepancy resolved by suggesting Philostratos' dependence on Herodotos (2.29), who mentions Ethiopians dwelling among the Egyptians immediately south of Elephantine as well as the Ethiopian capital at Meroe.<sup>99</sup>

Confirming the symbolism of their identity as Ethiopians, the Gymnoi occupy the limits of the known world. Pressing beyond them past the Cataract, Apollonios finds Herodotos' (2.29) nomad Ethiopians (to be distinguished from the Ethiopians mentioned above), the pygmies and

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<sup>99</sup> Re Philostratos' use of Herodotos, cf. Robiano 1992, 416. At 6.5.1-2, the Gymnoi were clearly, at least originally, in the region of Memphis; if Philostratos means to indicate that they are still in this region, his geography is particularly confused. There is similarly confusion in discussion of Pythagoras' teachers. The Egyptians with whom Pythagoras was traditionally associated were the established Egyptian wise, the priests of Lower Egypt. There is nothing untoward about Iarchas' declaration of a transmission of wisdom from Indians to Egyptians to Pythagoras to Greeks (3.19.1); Egyptian visitors in the area of the Indians' *tyrsis* are noted at 3.32.1. However, at 6.20.6, the Gymnos Thespision makes his own group teachers of Pythagoras and, in his Apology, Apollonios relates his costume and diet to a principle of Pythagoras, who had it from the Gymnoi of Egypt, who had it from the Brachmanes (8.7.13-14). At 8.7.39, Egyptian Gymnoi and Indian Sophoi are the sources of Pythagorean wisdom.

*skiapodes* whose existence he discussed with Iarchas (3.47),<sup>100</sup> and a *daimon* satyr that he must confront (6.25-7).

Significantly, Philostratos explicitly pairs India and Ethiopia. The two are alike in the wonders they contain: both the Indos and the Nile have the hippopotamus and crocodile; both India and Ethiopia have spices, lions and elephants, black people and other marvels (6.1.1-2).<sup>101</sup> Only a single substantive difference separates the two: India is greater in extent than Ethiopia and Egypt together (6.1.1).<sup>102</sup> Along with their homelands, Philostratos pairs Gymnoi/Ethiopians and Indians. In his account they are unquestionably the most significant of the non-Greek wise: Apollonios' interviews with only these two groups are recorded at length. Anderson has developed a fully worked-out Indian-Ethiopian *synkrisis*. As he points out, the Indian sages live on a high hill (3.13) and the Ethiopian Gymnoi, on a low one (6.6.1). Apollonios discourses with each group on a theological theme – the nature of the universe (3.34.2-3), the portrayal of the gods (6.19) – and a practical one – divination (3.42-4), justice (6.21). Each group associates the Indians and the Ethiopians: the Indians discuss the history of the two groups, and the Ethiopians (3.20.1-2), the different nature of their philosophies (6.10.6).<sup>103</sup> Yet in spite of the parallels, and as the relative heights of their hills indicates, Philostratos sees Indians and Ethiopians in a hierarchy: in wisdom, the Gymnoi are more inferior to the Indians than they are superior to the Egyptians (6.6.1). The basis for this differentiation – one conspicuously defying the paradigm relating superiority to remoteness from the centre – will be taken up in Ch. 3.5.4.

### **3.5.2 Proto-Pythagorean Indians**

A desire to present the Indian Sophoi as the original source of Pythagoras' doctrines is sufficient to account for at least the outline of Philostratos' presentation of them: obviously, they must be similar in appearance and principles to Pythagoreans, and display in exaggerated form the powers attributed to Pythagoras himself.

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<sup>100</sup> Iarchas placed the former beyond the Ganges and denied the latter's existence.

<sup>101</sup> Philostratos also pairs India and Ethiopia at 2.18.2. At 6.1.2, Indian griffins and Ethiopian ants alike are celebrated for guarding gold. In fact, both Herodotos' ants and Ktesias' griffins (see Ch. 3.4.3 above) are Indian.

<sup>102</sup> As well, India's elephants are superior in size (2.12).

<sup>103</sup> Anderson 1986, 218-9.

In fact they are associated with Pythagoras even before Apollonios meets them: their invitation uses a Pythagorean form.<sup>104</sup> Their appearance and their avoidance of animal-based food and clothing point conspicuously to Pythagoreanism.<sup>105</sup> Moreover, their leader Iarchas' history parallels – in a superior way – Pythagoras' own; it becomes clear that he reincarnates a more ancient and nobler figure than Euphorbos, the hero of Troy with whom Pythagoras was identified (1.1.1). In an interview with Iarchas, in the context of reincarnation Apollonios mentions the heroes of Troy as persons whom the sage may have been in a previous life. Iarchas points out the superiority of his former self. He is a reincarnation of King Ganges, son of the river Ganges. When the river inundated India, he turned the flood into the Erythre [Thalatta],<sup>106</sup> reconciling his father and the land; he founded sixty cities, surely a greater deed than destroying Troy (3.19.2-3.20.3)! Iarchas' childhood proof of his former identity as Ganges – his location of seven swords (3.21) – subtly echoes Pythagoras' recognition of Euphorbos' shield (Ch. 3.3.2).

Philostratos could presumably have chosen to avoid any suggestion that the Sophoi had more-than-human and so possibly inappropriate powers. Instead, he chooses to use Homeric and Pythagorean imagery to convey their godlike nature, making them in practice very much like the stereotypical magical non-Greek wise. The VA is a careful negotiation of this fact.

In the course of Apollonios' second interview with the Sophoi (3.27-3.33), a local king arrives to seek advice.<sup>107</sup> For his benefit, the sages display their powers: walking tripods like those described by Homer (*Il.* 18.373-9) bear in food and drink (3.27.2), couches spring spontaneously from the earth, and artificial light illuminates the night (3.33.1). Homer's tripods were constructed specifically for the feasts of the gods and their possession can endow the Indians with a godlike aura. However, Lucian's tale of Eukrates (*Philops.* 33-6) – mocking the supposed powers of the non-Greek wise and the folly of those who believe in them alike – makes similar automata servants of the Egyptian Pankrates, whose incantations to set them in

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<sup>104</sup> κελεύουσι γὰρ αὐτοί (3.12). For the 'αὐτὸς ἔφα' principle' as expressed at D.L. 8.46, Burkert 1972, 91, 135, 188.

<sup>105</sup> The Indians' appearance is noted when Apollonios meets them; their costume is made of 'wool that grows naturally from the earth', possibly cotton; their hair is long and their feet are bare (3.15.4). Apollonios sets out the Pythagorean objection to clothing of animal origin in the Apology at 8.7.13-14, 16.

<sup>106</sup> Here, the Indian Ocean rather than the present Red Sea, which (along with the Persian Gulf) was considered only part of the larger entity. The term was so-used by Herodotos, who distinguishes the (present) Red Sea as the Arabios Kolpos (1.180, 2.11, 158, 4.42); it retains the broader meaning in the *Periplus Maris Rubri*.

<sup>107</sup> He criticizes philosophy and Phraotes (3.28.1); he has had his mind poisoned by the Egyptians against the Greeks (3.32.1), and the very fact that this is possible proves his inferior position in the hierarchy of the wise. Apollonios converts him to an appreciation of the Greeks.

motion mark him out as a magician. The Indians' possession of the tripods can present them in a far from positive light.

Elsewhere in the text we find others of the sages' remarkable powers. Like Odysseus' Aiolos, they can control the climate with their Jars of the Winds and the Rains (3.14.2). They can make themselves visible or invisible as they please (3.13). Damis describes an extraordinary ability less explicitly attested in what seems to have been a well-known saying attributed to Apollonios: εἶδον Ἴνδους Βραχμᾶνας οἰκοῦντας ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς καὶ οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῆς (3.15.1), 'I saw the Indian Brachmanes dwelling on the earth and not on it'.<sup>108</sup> According to Damis, although the Sophoi certainly slept on the ground, he saw them levitating two cubits above it, not out of ostentation but as appropriate in worship of the Sun (3.15.1). The same ability is attested at 3.17.2 and referred to at 6.11.20; it evokes the freedom from normal bodily limitations traditionally associated with Pythagoras.<sup>109</sup>

In the context of this ambivalent picture of the Sophoi, Philostratos counteracts any suggestion that Apollonios was a magician in two significant ways. These will be examined in the sections to follow.

### **3.5.3 Philostratos' defence of Apollonios**

#### *a. Apollonios as a philosopher*

Philostratos uses dramatized encounters to present Apollonios and the Indians as philosophers in the Greek tradition and so establish their legitimacy.

Certain 'famous' accounts of meetings between philosophers and the non-Greek wise were available in the literary tradition to provide patterns and reference points for later tales. Onesikritos' account of his encounter with Indian ascetics near Taxila (*ap.* Str. 15.1.63-4) spawned variants in the Alexander tradition;<sup>110</sup> it can be identified as a model for Philostratos' account of Apollonios' encounter with the Ethiopian Gymnoi (see Ch. 3.5.4). Anacharsis' meeting

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<sup>108</sup> The saying is repeated in Apollonios' address to the Gymnoi at 6.11.13. Given the use of the term Brachmanes, untypical of Philostratos, it may be pre-Philostratan; if so, it suggests a pre-Philostratan tradition linking Apollonios with India.

<sup>109</sup> The Indians' ability to become invisible and their levitation can be seen as of a kind with Pythagoras' bilocation or instantaneous transit (Ch. 3.3.3).

<sup>110</sup> See e.g. Sedlar 1980, 68-74.

with Solon was the archetypal instance of a 'barbarian' confounding a Greek.<sup>111</sup> In this tradition, Lucian's Anacharsis criticizes Greeks for their naked sport (*Anach.* 32), and his Solon is forced to defend Spartan floggings to Anacharsis (*Anach.* 38-9). Probably independent parallels in the *VA* are to be identified at 3.30.2-3 (Iarchas' criticism of the procedure for selecting Olympic judges) and at 6.20 (Apollonios' defence of Spartan floggings to Thespesian).<sup>112</sup> Anderson argues persuasively that Plato's description (*Ti.* 21e-23d, *Criti.* 108d) of Solon's consultation of priests in Sais (Egypt) influenced Philostratos' account of Apollonios' consultation of the Indian Sophoi;<sup>113</sup> he suggests that a letter to the people of Sais attributed to Apollonios and referring to the *Timaeus* (*Ep.* 70) may pre-date Philostratos and have inspired him in the matter.<sup>114</sup>

This section presents a rather different approach and focuses more generally on Philostratos' use of patterns established in earlier dramatized accounts of encounters between protagonists and the (usually Greek) wise.

Apollonios uses the Sokratic method to bring his opponent to self-contradiction in Philostratos' account of his dialogue with a priest at the Asklepieion at Aigai (1.11), and again in a less dramatic incident at 5.22. A different pattern associated with dialogue among the wise or between the wise and their would-be interlocutors was available to Philostratos in tales of the Seven Sages. It required the establishment in an opening exchange of the right of an interlocutor to conversation with a Sage; where interlocutors were of similar status, its essence was the readiness of each to learn from the other.<sup>115</sup> A variant of the tradition described a Colloquium of the Sages.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> For the origins of the Anacharsis tradition, R. Martin 1996. Diogenes Laertius (1.101-2) records a story transmitted by Hermippos; Plutarch (*Sol.* 5.1) knows a variant.

<sup>112</sup> Cf. Anderson 1986, 212-3.

<sup>113</sup> Anderson 1986, 214, 220. Anderson argues that the Indians' story of King Ganges (3.20.1-2) is parallel (in that it mentions the inundation of a whole country) to the Egyptians' story of Atlantis (*Ti.* 25c-d); in parallel also are the shrine of Kleito and Poseidon at Atlantis (*Criti.* 116c-117a) and the residence of the Indian Sophoi (3.13), the Atlantans' possession of *oreichalkos* (*Criti.* 114e) and the Indians' of *realgar* (3.14.1), and collective ritual behaviour of the Atlantans and the Indians (*Criti.* 119d-120c, 3.15.2, 3.17). We might add to Anderson's list a parallel between the Atlantans' statue of Poseidon (*Criti.* 116e) and the Indians' of Tantalos (3.25.3).

<sup>114</sup> Anderson 1986, 220. Penella (1979, 126) notes that Philostratos knew of letters to the Egyptians (1.2.3). Moreover, similarities between the letter to the Athenians attributed to Apollonios at 4.22.2 and *Ep.* 70 – both make reference to the departure of Athena from Athens, and both are critical of 'wise' Athenians – suggest that Philostratos may have known the latter.

<sup>115</sup> Clever answers establish an unknown interlocutor's credentials in the exchange between Solon and the young Anacharsis (D.L. 1.102, Plut. *Sol.* 5.1-2) mentioned above, and in another between Anacharsis and Myson of Chen (D.L. 1.106). Reciprocity appears in a particularly memorable form in Lucian's *Anacharsis*. At the outset of their conversation, Solon urges Anacharsis to feel free to disagree with him and assures him that, if he can convince him that Athenian customs are wrong, he will persuade Athens to amend its laws (*Anach.* 17). Anacharsis then ridicules the use of athletics as training for war (*Anach.* 32), forcing

In the VA, Philostratos makes regular use of the test question motif. Apollonios tests a would-be follower, and rulers in search of a mentor test him. In a rare account of a student approaching a potential teacher, Timasion of Naucratis approaches Apollonios' party on the Nile and asks to share the philosophers' voyage. Apollonios tests him: tell me what bad (*phaulon*) or what good (*chreston*) you have done, so that you may be absolved of the bad because of your age, or praised for the good and become a student of philosophy with me and these others (6.3.2). Timasion is at a loss, for (he says) there is no particular merit in abstaining from wrong. On the basis of this correct opinion (echoing – as we shall see – that of the sage Iarchas), Apollonios accepts Timasion as a follower (6.3.3).<sup>117</sup> King Vardanes offers Apollonios ten gifts of his own choice (1.33.2, 1.36). Apollonios accepts only a present for the downtrodden Eretrians. 'Do you yourself require nothing?' 'Dried fruit and bread'. That this is a classic test question is obvious from another incident in Philostratos' account, in which Apollonios sets up his opponent, the philosopher Euphrates, to earn Vespasian's scorn (5.38). Apollonios provokes the incident by asking Vespasian what gifts he will give Apollonios himself. Vespasian offers ten at once and, when Apollonios comes to Rome, 'everything I have' – a good reason for Apollonios to decline those offered at present. Others present are then naturally asked for their requests. Euphrates has a detailed list already prepared. He had intended to present it privately; forced to read it aloud, he appears a greedy fool.<sup>118</sup>

The pattern of testing is prominent in interviews with the Indians. In their first interview, the Indians ask Apollonios about his motive for journeying and he answers like a philosopher – he believes the Indians to be wiser than himself but, even if they are not, he will have learned that he has nothing to learn (3.16.2). In a second interview, Apollonios and the sages test each other. After a break for religious rites which establishes that Apollonios is not their highest priority,<sup>119</sup> Iarchas tells Apollonios to ἐρώτα ... ὅ τι βούλει, παρ' ἄνδρας γὰρ ἤκεις πάντα εἰδότας, 'ask whatever you like, for you have come among people who know everything'. Apollonios asks whether they know *themselves*. It is a test question (recalling, of course, the Delphic maxim) that Iarchas passes with flying colours: no-one is even admitted to the group unless he does so (3.18).

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Solon to defend the practice (*Anach.* 36-8). The context in which Lucian intends us to see their interchange is surely Solon's historical curtailing of the excessive honours given to athletes (D.L. 1.55-6) – evidence that Solon was as good as his word.

<sup>116</sup> Plutarch provides the definitive Second Sophistic expression of the motif in his *Septem sapientium convivium* (*Mor.* 146b-164d), which puts emphasis upon the posing and solving of riddles.

<sup>117</sup> Perhaps because Damis' role is to be a foil, Apollonios accepts him as a follower in spite of his demonstrated ignorance (1.19.1-2).

<sup>118</sup> In other examples of interchanges with rulers, Apollonios is tested by Vespasian (5.28), and the young Titus by Apollonios (6.30.2)

<sup>119</sup> Apollonios similarly ostentatiously displays his own priorities at 1.30.

Hierarchical ordering of the wise – integral to tales of the Seven Sages – is prominent in the VA. The Indians have Iarchas as their undisputed head (3.16). On the basis of their foreknowledge, they distinguish Apollonios from his companions for different treatment from the start (3.12). By the third interview, Damis is considered worthy to be present (3.34.1-3.35.2),<sup>120</sup> and he wins further approval by placing himself appropriately in the wisdom hierarchy and so proving that he knows himself. The Gymnoi recognize Thespesion (the eldest) as their head (6.10.1).

Intimately connected with the wisdom hierarchy is who learns from whom. Among the Indians, Apollonios simply learns. On being given permission to question them (3.34.1), he inquires and is instructed about the nature of the universe (3.34.2-3). In the Colloquium of the Sages tradition, he presents them with what is at least in form a riddle: which is greater, the sea or the land (3.37)? Differently, in his association with the Magoi, there is a genuine exchange (Ch. 3.4.3). Among the Gymnoi, Apollonios and Thespesion converse with an (at least ostensible) view to mutual learning (6.18-6.22). Echoing Solon's attitude in Lucian's *Anacharsis* (see above), Thespesion says (of justice) that if the Indians' opinion (as espoused by Apollonios) is proved correct, the Gymnoi will accept it; but if the Gymnoi have something wiser to say, Apollonios must accept that (6.21.1). In their association, though he remains respectful of Thespesion, Apollonios significantly proves his own superiority, besting the sage in discussion of adornment (*kosmos*) as opposed to ascetic simplicity (6.11.15-20), and of appropriate representation of the gods (6.19.1-5). As noted (Ch. 3.5.1), Anderson sees the latter discourse as in parallel – because of its theoretical nature – with Apollonios' discourse with the Indians on the nature of the universe (3.34.2-3). In this context, we can contrast the outcomes of the two episodes: the Indians' expansion of Apollonios' theoretical knowledge, and Apollonios' exposure of Thespesion's misunderstanding of the behaviour of Sokrates (6.19.5).

*b. The nature of Apollonios' (and the Indians') superhuman powers*

The Indians' apparently magical powers were noted above (Ch. 3.5.2). Philostratos defends Apollonios on charges of magic arising from his association with them, first, by explaining and so justifying the nature of the powers shared by the Indians and Apollonios and, further, by showing Apollonios deliberately holding himself back from the acquisition of unnecessary powers. The two approaches will be considered in turn. Finally, aspects of Philostratos' picture of

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<sup>120</sup> In part a narrative ruse, so that he can report the conversation.

the Indians and of Apollonios apparently inconsistent with his theoretical views will be related to pre-Philostratan tradition.

As we have seen, Apollonios learns like a philosopher, from observation and comparison. However, the learning so acquired is not the most significant. Crossing the Kaukasos – the supreme vantage point for viewing the heavens – Apollonios stresses that the essential things – how the divinity cares for people and rejoices in worship, the nature of virtue, justice and self-control – are to be discerned not with the eyes but by the soul, which εἰ καθαρὰ καὶ ἀκήρατος αὐτῶν ἄπτοιτο, πολλῶ μείζον ... ἄπτειν τουτουὶ τοῦ Καυκάσου (2.5.3), 'if it were to apprehend them pure and undefiled ... would dart much higher than this Kaukasos here'. Moreover, a mysterious perception available to the wise reveals all that is, and is shortly to come, as if reflected in a mirror (8.7.27). θεοὶ μὲν γὰρ μελλόντων, ἄνθρωποι δὲ γιγνομένων, σοφοὶ δὲ προσιόντων αἰσθάνονται (8.7.27), 'For the gods perceive the future, human beings the present, but the wise, what is imminent'.

Superior knowledge can be attributed to communications from the gods. Pythagoras claimed visits from Apollo, Athena, the Muses, and divinities unknown to humankind (1.1.2); in parallel, Apollonios' clairvoyance is not the result of sorcery but of revelation from the gods (ἐξ ὧν οἱ θεοὶ ἔφαινον, 5.12). At 8.7.30, Apollonios refers to the voice of his *daimonion*; in the context of the Apology, the reference serves to exonerate Apollonios by associating his supernatural knowledge with Sokrates'. Du Toit has argued for the *daimonion* as a consistent explanation of Apollonios' apparently supernatural clairvoyance as it is revealed in the VA.<sup>121</sup> However, in fact, in Philostratos' account, both divine and *daimonic* communication are secondary to an explanation connecting sensory apprehension with purity of the body and so the soul. At 8.7.27, Apollonios attributes his special insight to a diet which keeps the perceptions in a certain sacred atmosphere (*aithria*) and prevents any obscuring cloudiness from surrounding them (θολερὸν περὶ αὐτὰς οὐδὲν εἶναι). In his interviews with the Indians, the crucial connection is set in place. Aristotle postulated that everything in the sublunar world is made up of earth, air, fire and water, but in the superlunar realm, of *aither* (*Cael.* 1.3). Iarchas links clairvoyance to the presence of this divine substance in the soul (3.42.2); in its absence, the obscuring (sublunar) elements in the soul occlude what the senses would otherwise perceive.<sup>122</sup> The gods' (or *daimonion*'s) revelation is a legitimate source of knowledge; here we have an alternative but

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<sup>121</sup> du Toit 1999, 157-61.

<sup>122</sup> Elsewhere in the VA, the young Apollonios disapproves of wine as darkening (διαθολοῦντα) the *aither* in the soul (1.8.1): since Apollonios learns the theory of the composition of the soul in India, Philostratos seems here to have made a chronological mistake.

equally legitimate source, described in a 'scientific' account tied to the theories of Aristotle.<sup>123</sup> Flinterman finds Apollonios' appeal at 8.7.27 to 'the clarity surrounding his sensory system ... curiously reductionist when compared to the claim of privileged access to the divine made elsewhere'; he sees it nevertheless as appropriate to the circumstances of the Apology.<sup>124</sup> It can be suggested that association of the same theory with the Indians is a similarly strategic denial of the illegitimate or 'magical' nature of their power – or at least of their supernatural access to information.

In a startling extension to the theory – one dissolving the boundaries between human beings and gods – the possessor of supernatural insight is divine. According to Iarchas, those delighting in the faculty of divination are by it rendered divine (οἱ μαντικῇ ... χαίροντες ... θεῖοι τε ὑπ' αὐτῆς γίνονται, 3.42.1). Moral virtue and divinity are similarly linked. In his Apology, Apollonios notes the continuum between gods and men. Human beings and gods share rationality, form, and, more importantly – insofar as they are virtuous – the divine nature.<sup>125</sup> Apollo at Delphi reckons the Spartan law-giver Lykourgos as much god as man because of his goodness (8.7.21; cf. Ch. 2.3.1).<sup>126</sup>

Philostratos' conception of the clairvoyance/divinity of the pure soul suggests that the divinity – recognized by Damis (7.38.2) – that allows Apollonios to free himself at will from his bonds is an incremental state; the restricting body becomes less confining as the soul becomes purer, until ultimately, perhaps (cf. 8.30.2), it disappears.<sup>127</sup> Apollonios is reticent about his own nature. He has not claimed divinity, nor has he told the Greeks what his soul has been or will become, although he knows (8.7.19). His statement most obviously suggests Pythagorean reincarnation and another earthly life, but it admits the possibility of a future state of being transcending mortal incarnation, a Platonic equivalent to traditional apotheosis of a kind that is suggested at 8.31.1 (cf. Ch. 3.2 and App. 2.2.1).

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<sup>123</sup> Philostratos (the author) simply juxtaposes the two explanations, leaving readers to think what they will (cf. Chs 3.1, 3.2).

<sup>124</sup> Flinterman 2009b, 169.

<sup>125</sup> At 8.7.21, τὰς τε ἀρετὰς θεόθεν ἤκειν ἐπ' αὐτὸν πέπεισται καὶ τοὺς μετέχοντας αὐτῶν ἀγχιθέους τε εἶναι καὶ θεῖους, '[any human being] considers the virtues to have come to him from the gods, and those sharing them to be near to the gods (or godlike) and divine'. In this passage, two possibly conflicting statements – that the virtues are gifts of the gods, and that their possession constitutes divinity – are combined.

<sup>126</sup> Here, we may have an explanation of a cryptic answer in Apollonios' first interview with the sages. Who do the sages consider themselves to be? Gods, because good men (θεοὺς ... ὅτι ... ἀγαθοὶ ἐσμεν ἄνθρωποι, 3.18). The idea is repeated at 8.5.1. Certainly, in statements of this kind possession of the virtues in itself seems to constitute divinity.

<sup>127</sup> Although at 7.38.2 freedom from normal bodily limitations is taken as an indication of divinity, at 8.12.2 Apollonios ascribes his instantaneous travel from Rome to Dikaiarchia not to his own nature but to a god.

In sum, Philostratos' presentation of Apollonios provides a concept of 'divinity' crossing the established boundaries. 'Divinity' is possession of a nature at the godlike end of a continuum extending from human beings to gods; it is neither membership in an established group of gods nor simply possession of virtues which themselves define the 'divine' – although both these concepts have play in Philostratos' text. In his mortal life, Apollonios manifests an inherent divinity; by his *arete*, he earns for himself a yet more elevated, disembodied, state of being.

In spite of his powers, Apollonios deliberately refrains from learning techniques that would permit him to change the natural order. He chooses not to inquire about a specific aspect of the Indians' wisdom, knowledge of the devices that replicate the feast of the gods (5.12), and he claims to have learned from the Indians only as much as he considered relevant to himself (6.18). Philostratos makes the essential issue in his discussion of magic an intention to alter the course of destiny. A *goes* claims to do so, but Apollonios submitted himself to the Fates (5.12). Visiting the tomb of Leonidas, Apollonios expresses particular admiration for Megistias the Akarnanian, who foresaw his death and chose not to avoid it (4.23). He himself submits to Domitian in order to defend his friends and would not escape even if he could (7.34). Implicit here is the Stoic assumption that nature/the gods/destiny are good and all works well when mortals live in harmony with them.<sup>128</sup>

Defending the Indians to Thespesion, Apollonios declares that the earth that can provide spontaneously for the Kyklopes who neither sow nor reap (*Od.* 9.106-11) and for Euripides' Edonians and Lydians possessed by Bakchos (*Ba.* 704-11) does so too – at a level appropriate to their nature – for the Indians and the gods themselves (6.11.18). His reference is to the self-propelling tripods that serve both. Of note is the fact that, while at 3.27.2 presumably, and at 5.12 explicitly, these are contrived by the Sophoi, here they are represented as a spontaneous gift of the earth. The change can be seen as a sophistic trick – Apollonios reframes the nature of the Indians' powers to make his point and present them in the best light. Very speculatively, it can be suggested that Philostratos intends an educated reader to conclude that supernatural events associated with the divine cannot be pinned down. Describing them alternatively as gifts of the gods, or of the earth, or the spontaneous expressions of a divine nature, or intentionally-

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<sup>128</sup> It is a characteristic of Philostratos/Damis' presentation of Apollonios' and his followers' journeys that, to the extent that wise souls obey their clairvoyant or semi-clairvoyant impulses, all goes well. The almost-wise King Vardanes is inspired to look favourably on Apollonios as the result of a dream (1.29) and he obtains the benefits of the latter's wisdom. The wise youth Timasion is drawn to Apollonios (6.3.2) and subsequently becomes his follower. And *because* these characters are so inspired, not only do they themselves benefit, but (in the first instance) Apollonios is enabled to meet the Magoi (1.41.1) and continue on to the Sophoi of India (1.41.2), and (in the second) he gains an essential guide on the Nile (6.4.1).

brought about ends is less offering a series of different explanations than proposing a series of different metaphors for a connection that is patent but beyond analysis.

As noted at Ch. 3.2, Apollonios expresses his confidence in the gods' justice in a characteristic prayer. Ὡ θεοί, δοίητέ μοι τὰ ὀφειλόμενα is his prayer at Aigai (1.11.2) and again in his interview with the Roman consul Telesinus (4.40.2), and it expresses the principle behind his recommended judgement in a case involving the discovery of hidden treasure (2.39.2-3).

The Indians were potentially open to criticism not only for 'magic' but on the basis of their attitude to Tantalos. In myth, Tantalos was given the honour of dining with the gods; he abused their hospitality and was condemned to stand in a pool that drained away whenever he tried to drink. In Pindar's version, Tantalos' crime was to distribute to mortals the gods' nectar and ambrosia (*O.* 1).<sup>129</sup> In the *VA*, Iarchas displays a statue of Tantalos in the context of his claim that, contrary to what the Greeks think, justice (and, implicitly, doing good) is not the same as avoiding wrong (3.25.1).<sup>130</sup> Iarchas praises Tantalos – although the poets deprive him of food and drink – because he gave his friends a share in the immortality (in the form of nectar) that the gods gave him (3.25.2). Adding a personal comment, Philostratos concludes that the poets were mistaken in attacking Tantalos; had he displeased the gods, the Indians – who do nothing ἔξω τοῦ θείου – would never have admired him (3.25.3). In a later episode, a king, initially hostile, is brought around by Apollonios to agree to toast the Greeks (3.32.1). Iarchas proposes the toast of Tantalos, and the statue's single goblet provides enough for all those present (3.32.2). In this context, Philostratos comments that the Indians use the toast as a pledge of friendship (*philotes*), since they see Tantalos as the friendliest of men (3.32.2). Apollonios obviously intends a reference to friendship when he mentions Tantalos in his letter of farewell to the sages (3.51).<sup>131</sup>

It is obvious that Philostratos has gone to some trouble to gloss the Indians' approbation of Tantalos, and this perhaps suggests that he is justifying a pre-existing tradition relating them to him. A slight piece of evidence supports such a claim. Stobaios' *Anthologium* includes a passage from Porphyry's lost *De Styge* in which Porphyry refers to Bardesanes' account of an Indian cave temple containing a hermaphrodite statue.

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<sup>129</sup> Pindar's is the earliest surviving literary indication of Tantalos' crime; *Od.* 11.582-92 describes only his punishment.

<sup>130</sup> This dictum is echoed in the answer later given to Apollonios by the youth Timasion, whom Apollonios in consequence judges wise (6.3.3; Ch. 3.5.3a).

<sup>131</sup> On the importance given to friendship in the *gnomai* of the Seven Sages, T. Morgan 2013, 118-19.

οἶμαι δὲ τούτου καὶ Ἀπολλώνιον τὸν Τυανέα μεμνησθαι τοῦ ὕδατος, τοῦ ἐν τῷ σπηλαίῳ λέγω. γράφων γὰρ τοῖς Βραχμαῖσιν ὄρκον τινὰ ὀμνύει· οὐ μὰ τὸ Ταντάλειον ὕδωρ, οὔ με ἐμύησατε. οἶμαι γὰρ Ταντάλου λέγειν τοῦτο, διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ τῇ προσδοκίᾳ κολάζειν τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐλθεῖν ἐσπουδακότας κάκ τούτου ποτὸν ἀρύσασθαι. (Stob. Anth. 1.3.56)

I think that Apollonios of Tyana mentioned this water, I mean that in the cave. For, writing to the Brachmanes, he swears an oath, 'Not by the water of Tantalos with which you initiated me'. I think that he says 'of Tantalos' because of the perpetual punishment with anticipation of those who have gone to it eager to draw a drink from it.

Porphry's interpretation of the reference to Tantalos is a conventional one with no reference to friendship. The letter he reports may possibly be an independent element from a tradition linking Apollonios and the Indians in approval of Tantalos. However, as Jones comments, it could equally well be a misremembering of the letter at 3.51.<sup>132</sup>

Assuming that 'magic' consists in an intention to alter the course of destiny (cf. Ch. 2.5.3), it is interesting to examine those instances in the VA in which Apollonios appears to do just this. It seems likely that the stories were well-known in the pre-Philostratan tradition.

In one apparently famous story, Apollonios raises a young woman from the dead (4.45.1-2). Philostratos hedges in two different ways. Apollonios wakes the girl from her *apparent* death: she may not really have been dead. (For discussion, see Ch. 3.2.) On the other hand, if she were dead, the deed is to be compared with Herakles', when he revived Alkestis. In another instance – 'the most famous of the stories about Apollonios' (τοῦτον τὸν λόγον γνωριμώτατον τῶν Ἀπολλωνίου τυγχάνοντα) – Apollonios unmasks Menippos' bride as an *emprousa/lamia* (4.25.4-6). Again, Philostratos seems to juggle with possible justifications. The theme of doing good or of friendship is taken up: Apollonios acted as he did to save Menippos (4.25.6). The illusory nature of the *lamia's* appearance (4.25.2) and accoutrements (4.25.5) is stressed: Apollonios unmasks the illusory and uncovers the real. In a third justification, when he refers to the case in his Apology, Apollonios attributes the destruction of the *lamia* to Herakles, to whom he prayed (8.7.29). In the instance that figures most prominently in the Apology, Apollonios averts plague at Ephesos, identifying it as a *daimon* in the form of a beggar whom he causes to be stoned (4.10.1-3). Apollonios justifies himself with reference to famous purifiers (8.7.25-7) and attributes the purification itself to Herakles (8.7.28-9). He describes his own role as unmasking an illusory appearance, and he attributes his ability to diet (8.7.27-8).

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<sup>132</sup> Jones 2006, 74, n. 114.

In all three episodes, Apollonios' role can be seen as unmasking an illusion. In the latter two cases, the illusions are associated with *daimones*, whom the Middle Platonists introduced alongside human beings as shapers of events in the sublunar world. In the *De fato* attributed incorrectly to Plutarch, primary providence is associated with the primary god, secondary providence with fate and a tertiary providence with *daimones* stationed about the earth as guardians and overseers of human affairs (*Mor.* 572f-573a; Ch. 1.2.3, App. 2.2.1). This being the case, what happens in this world is not necessarily in accordance with the divine will and/or fate. Implicitly in the *VA*, in both the cases above *daimones* were acting contrary to, or independently of, the just and consistent rulings of higher powers. Apollonios' special abilities enabled him to see them for what they were.

In the *Apology*, in both the episodes discussed, it was Herakles, acting on behalf of the gods, who restored the status quo. This is conservative argument for a defence in court; as we have seen (Ch. 3.4.2c), elsewhere in the *VA* Philostratos presents Apollonios himself as the Averter.

### **3.5.4 Philostratos' ranking and characterization of the Ethiopian wise**

As we have seen (Ch. 3.5.1), Philostratos presents his Indian and Ethiopian wise in hierarchy. The Indians are Pythagoreans, but the Ethiopians are ascetics in a Cynic mould.<sup>133</sup> Why the hierarchy, and why this representation of the Ethiopians? Given the chronology of Apollonios' visits to them on what Philostratos presents as his life's journey, it is to be expected that the Indians are superior to him in knowledge, and the Ethiopians, inferior.<sup>134</sup> But (discounting the possibility that he had factual knowledge of Apollonios' movements) Philostratos was not obliged to choose this chronology of visits.

Philostratos provides a rationale for his ranking of the wise in a myth apparently of his own creation. In his first interview with the Ethiopian sage Thespesion, Apollonios claims to prefer the Indians' doctrines about nature and the gods; these were indeed the Ethiopians' own original ones, though now disowned (6.11.13). He is referring to Iarchas' account at 3.20.1-2: the ancestors of the Ethiopians, then resident in India, killed the civilizing hero King Ganges (see Ch. 3.5.2) and were rejected by the earth itself; it refused them sustenance and children and caved in under the cities that they founded. Ganges' ghost drove them away, only ceasing to torment

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<sup>133</sup> For their nakedness: 6.6.1, 6.8, 6.10.6; for their lack of built accommodation: 6.6.2, 6.10.2, 6.10.6.

<sup>134</sup> Late in life, Apollonios notes that he asked questions at the appropriate time, in his youth, and can now teach what he discovered (1.17.1).

them when they sacrificed the murderers to him. In Egypt, the Ethiopians cast off their original identity, adopted Egyptian gods and told discreditable stories about the Indians (6.11.13).

At 2.18.2, Philostratos presents the Indians and Ethiopians as a balanced pair at the furthest east and west, where the sun must always shine or they would not be black. At 6.1.1, Ethiopia is the western half of the world as India is the eastern. Now, elsewhere in his book (5.4), Philostratos is well aware that Gadeira lies in the far west; this setting of Ethiopia in the west points to a pre-Philostratan pairing of India and Ethiopia.

Homer identified two groups of Ethiopians, one dwelling near the setting, and the other, the rising sun (*Od.* 1.22-24). Herodotos placed the two in Africa and Asia respectively (7.70). In the *Supplices* (284-6), Aischylos refers to a physical connection between the two areas, a hypothesis that makes the Indian Ocean a lake. Ptolemy accepted the connection at the expense of the idea of an encircling Ocean (*Geog.* 7.5, 7.7, 8.1).<sup>135</sup> With such a geography established, identifying the eastern Ethiopians as Indians was a minor step.

As discussed earlier (Ch. 3.4.1), the juxtaposition of India and Ethiopia in the *Historia Alexandri Magni* was possibly known to Philostratos from the work itself or an earlier combination of component strands. Diogenes Laertius (9.35) cites a contemporary tradition about Demokritos that pairs Indians and Ethiopians. Lucian pairs the two peoples and also seems to present them in hierarchy. In his *Fugitivi* (6-8), Philosophia reports her journey first to the Brachmanes and then to the Ethiopians, the Egyptians, the Chaldaioi and Magoi, and to Skythia and Thrace. Reitzenstein was the first to suggest that this reflected a pre-Philostratan ordering of the wisdom of the peoples mentioned, privileging Indians over Ethiopians.<sup>136</sup> In the *Book of Sothis* (40), attributed to Manetho, we are told that the Ethiopians left the river Indos to settle in Egypt. The work has been transmitted only by Syncellus (eighth century CE) and its attribution to Manetho is in doubt.<sup>137</sup> However, the possibility remains that the belief was current in Egypt in the early centuries CE, and so that at least the fundamental aspect of migration in the story discreditable to the Ethiopians and reported at 3.20.1-2 and 6.11.13 had a pre-Philostratan source. The ranking of Indians and Ethiopians follows: the originators of a line of descent are superior to their derivatives.

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<sup>135</sup> Here he departed from the consensus found at (e.g.) Str. 1.1.8, 2.5.5, Plin. *HN* 2.166-170. Cf. Berggren and Jones 2000, 22.

<sup>136</sup> Reitzenstein 1906/1963, 40, n. 4. Lucian's passage is also mentioned in the context by Robiano 1992, 414.

<sup>137</sup> Cf. Waddell 1940, 235, n. 1.

At one place in his text, and apparently inconsistently with the migration myth, Apollonios accounts for the Indians' superiority to the Ethiopians in terms redolent of end-of-the-earth mythology:<sup>138</sup>

λεπτότεροι μὲν τὴν ξύνεσιν οἱ τοιοῖδε ἄνθρωποι καθαρωτέραις ὁμιλοῦντες ἀκτῖσιν, ἀληθέστεροι δὲ τὰς περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ θεῶν δόξας, ἅτε ἀγχίθιοι καὶ πρὸς ἀρχαῖς τῆς ζῳογόνου καὶ θερμῆς οὐσίας οἰκοῦντες· (6.11.10)

people of this kind [i.e. Indians] are more delicate in understanding, conversant with purer light and more truthful in their opinions about nature and the gods, because they dwell near to the gods and the sources of life-giving, warm being.

As noted earlier (Ch. 3.5.1), Philostratos' India and Ethiopia are much alike geographically and in the wonders they contain. Nevertheless, India surpasses Ethiopia in size (6.1.1), and Philostratos perhaps intends us to see his Indian wise – located not only in India but at its furthest reaches – as closer than the Gymnoi to the edges of the earth. Alternatively, he may simply be inconsistent.

Why Cynic Ethiopians? Reitzenstein accounted for them with the suggestion that the narrative of Apollonios' encounters with Indians and Ethiopians was included in an earlier Apollonios biography specifically in order to demonstrate the superiority of Pythagoreans over Cynics.<sup>139</sup> Bowie disagreed. Certainly, he argued, rivalries between schools of philosophy were more significant in the second century than in the third, when the other schools had waned with the rise of Platonism and conflicts between sophists were personal. However, if the earlier biography identified the competing schools with the Indian and Ethiopian wise, Apollonios' Indian and Ethiopian travels must already have been present in the work. Bowie rejected the idea, citing the association of Damis with the travel theme, and Philostratos' apparent debt to the genre of the novel, with its emphasis on travel.<sup>140</sup>

It seems most likely that, given the established coupling of India and Ethiopia, the archetypal Ethiopian wise were generally imagined to be similar to the Indian wise as they were

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<sup>138</sup> Philostratos uses the term 'Indians' loosely, often (as here) to refer specifically to the Indian Sophoi. That not all Indians shared the wisdom of the Sophoi is obvious from the lack of wisdom of their client Indian king (3.26-33).

<sup>139</sup> Reitzenstein 1906/1963, 42-6.

<sup>140</sup> Bowie 1978, 1674-6. If Reitzenstein were right, the earlier biography could possibly have been Moiragenes'. Moiragenes knew Apollonios as a *magos* with victims Euphrates (a Stoic) and an unnamed Epikoureian philosopher (*Cels.* 6.41). His biography very likely expressed the enmity between Apollonios and Euphrates as one between competing Pythagorean and Cynic/Stoic Schools. Cf. App. 3, Bowie 1978, 1657, 1673-4.

known from the Alexander tradition. In that tradition, Arrian refers to τῶν σοφιστῶν <τῶν> Ἰνδῶν τοὺς γυμνοὺς (*An.* 7.2.2), and Plutarch explicitly to *gymnosophistai* (*Alex.* 64.1). Certainly the Indian wise seem to have been models for Heliodoros' fictional wise, Ethiopians living near Meroe. Heliodoros calls them *gymnosophistai* (10.2), and the influence on his work of traditions associated with India is further confirmed by the name – Hydaspes – given to the Ethiopian king: the Hydaspes is a river in India. It seems very likely that, working independently against a similar literary background, Philostratos presented his Ethiopians in Alexander's Indians' image; as less than completely wise, they are Gymnoi rather than *gymnosophistai*.<sup>141</sup>

It has been suggested that Philostratos based his Ethiopian wise on ascetic or semi-ascetic groups present in Egypt in the period. In the context mentioned above, Reitzenstein proposed Greek-speaking Cynics from the region of Alexandria; another possibility is the religious recluses (*katochoi*) who were resident in the Sarapeion in Memphis and possibly elsewhere. Anderson rejects both in favour of Philo's Therapeutai, who shared with the Gymnoi their dawn and evening prayers, separate dwellings, common assembly, and ascetic diet. The Therapeutai lived near Lake Mareotis in the extreme north of Egypt but, Anderson suggests, a misunderstanding could have displaced them to Meroe, the Ethiopian capital.<sup>142</sup> All that can be said is that marked differences in lifestyle or location between each of the groups mentioned and Philostratos' Gymnoi make a literary basis for Philostratos' conception of the Ethiopians most probable.<sup>143</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> It is here assumed that Heliodoros' work was not directly influenced by Philostratos', or *vice versa*. (The *Aethiopica* is usually accepted as later than the VA. Cf. Ch. 2.1, Morgan 1996, 417-21, Morgan 2009, 280.) Certainly the dramatic conclusion to the *Aethiopica*, which culminates in the abolition of human sacrifice, suggests a link with Philostratos' account of the punishment of King Ganges' murderers (3.20.2). However, the likeness can be accounted for by Morgan's suggestion that both works were vehicles for the propagation of a Hellenized version of the Emesan sun-cult (Ch. 3.1). In this context, the emphasis on rejection of human sacrifice makes sense: accusations of human sacrifice were part of the polemic against the cult in the reign of Elagabalus (D.C. 80.11, SHA *Heliogabalus* 8.1; cf. Turcan 1985, 128-9, Morgan 2009, 270, Icks 2011, 92-122). Philostratos addresses and dismisses them by making Indians the higher representatives of sun worship, Heliodoros, by presenting the Ethiopians' decisive rejection of the practice.

<sup>142</sup> Reitzenstein 1906/1963, 42-6; Anderson 1986, 216. For the *katochoi*, Bell 1953, 20-2; Bell makes no reference to Philostratos.

<sup>143</sup> Anderson points out that Cynics did not live in community like the Gymnoi, and that monks of Sarapis were a temple community rather than a scattered one of the kind Philostratos describes. His own comparison of the Gymnoi with the Therapeutai fails to convince, not only because of factors he discounts – location and the Jewishness of the Therapeutai – but because of (minor) discrepancies in the parallels that he himself draws. Most notably, at Ph. *Vit.Cont.* 24, the Therapeutai use simple shelters; at VA 6.6.2, the Gymnoi have no shelters at all.

### 3.6 Oracles and encounters with a god: applications of the motifs in Philostratos' *VA*

#### 3.6.1 Encircling the sacred Greek world

On his journeys, Apollonios encompasses the sacred Greek world. Philostratos necessarily includes the places that claimed an association with Apollonios (see App. 3): Tyana (1.4-5), Aigai (1.7.2-1.12.2), Antioch (1.16.1) and Ephesos (4.1-2, 4, 10, 8.26.1). Beyond this, in his account, Apollonios travels widely in the Greek world and visits as many as possible of the local shrines (1.16.3, 4.40.4, 5.20.1). Specific centres mentioned include the sanctuary of Apollo at Daphne (1.16.1), Paphos, famous for its image of Aphrodite (3.58), the temple of Artemis in Ephesos (4.2), the shrine of Orpheus on Lesbos (4.14), Dodona (4.24.1), Delphi (4.24.1), Abai (4.24.1), the shrines of Amphiaraos (4.24.1) and Trophonios (4.24.1, 8.19.1-2), the shrine of the Muses on Mount Helikon (4.24.1), Olympia (4.27, 8.15.1), Zeus' birthplace on Mount Ida (4.34.1-2), the sanctuary of Aphrodite at Knidos (6.40.1), and Asklepieia at Aigai (1.7.2-1.12.2), Pergamon (4.11.1), and at Leben near Phaistos (4.34.3). He is present at significant festivals and gatherings: at Smyrna at the time of the Panionian sacrifice (4.5), at Pylaia (Thermopylai) in Thessaly for the meeting of the Amphictyony (4.16.3, 4.23), at Olympia for the Games (4.27), at Athens at the time of the Eleusinian Mysteries (4.17-18, 5.19.1, 5.20.1).

Some of the contexts in which this journeying can be seen have already been discussed: the completeness of Apollonios' coverage – now seen in its fullness – suggests the completeness of his knowledge (Ch. 3.4.1); special attention to sites associated with the Trojan War – Ilion and Achilles' mound (4.11.1-3, 4.16.1-6) – can be associated with his Pythagoreanism (Ch. 3.3.2). In fact, an examination of his itineraries indicates that Apollonios' appreciation of the heroes of Greek history is not limited to those of Troy: he all but embraces the tomb of Leonidas the Spartiate at Thermopylai (4.23). Philostratos' presentation of his encircling of the Greek world suggests an integration of Greek religion and history apparent also in Pausanias' *Graeciae descriptio*, in which a visit to Plataia and the tombs of those who died fighting the Persians is incorporated in a tour of the sacred sites of Greece (9.3.5). Apollonios' Hellenism is a holistic rather than a limited or specialized one.

On his circuits of the Greek world, Apollonios can be seen as inseparably an intellectual inquirer, a religiously-motivated traveller and a religious professional. As inquirer, he investigates any cult that is non-Greek (*barbara*) and distinctive (*idiotropa*) (1.16.3). As devout traveller, as noted above, he visits all the sanctuaries in whichever area he is staying. His pattern of movement is religiously motivated: in Rome, he justifies it with reference to the gods' own

travels (Ethiopia, Olympos, Athos), and the need for servants to respect their masters (4.40.4; Ch. 3.4.1). Apollonios is also a professional holy man, acting as a magnet and drawing in to the sanctuaries people who expect extra blessings (τὰ ἀγαθὰ πλείω παρὰ τῶν θεῶν) because of his presence (4.41). He appears as well in Philostratos' text as a sophist; in Corinth, through his lectures, he makes a follower of the Cynic Demetrios, who also happens to be lecturing there (4.25). The impossibility of separating Apollonios' roles is evident in Philostratos' description of his routine at 1.16.3-4. Apollonios performed his own rites (ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ τινα ἔπραττεν) at sunrise, revealing them only to those who had kept Pythagorean silence for four years. Later in the day, he might discourse with priests, learning from them aspects specific to local cult and advising on improvements (ὑποθέμενος, εἴ τι σοφώτερον τοῦ δρωμένου ἐνθυμηθείη). He would invite questions from his hearers (μετήξει ἐπὶ τοὺς ὁμιλητὰς καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἐρωτᾶν, ἃ βούλονται), and then, but only after noon, present a lecture to the public (τὴν διάλεξιν ... τὴν ἐς πάντας).

### **3.6.2 Divine recognition**

#### *a. Apollonios and shrine officials*

Apollonios' interactions with staff and visitors at shrines can be seen as a series of divine attestations to the superior status of the man himself.

Any conflict with temple staff ends in vindication. In the context of inappropriate offerings (see Ch. 3.2), the young Apollonios bests a priest in discourse at the Asklepieion at Aigai (1.11.1-2); the location of the discussion in the sacred place suggests the god's own approval of the superior speaker. Apollonios' mature-age visit to Athens is obviously timed to allow his initiation at Eleusis. The hierophant at first refuses to initiate him and, although he changes his tune when he finds his decision unpopular, Apollonios rejects him and names the successor who will eventually induct him (4.18.1-2, 5.19.1). A later vindication at the sanctuary of Trophonios will be discussed at Ch. 3.6.2b. One tale of the end of his life has Apollonios chained by officials at the sanctuary of Dictynna in Krete for attempting to enter in an unauthorized manner at night. Divine vindication follows when he frees himself; the doors of the sanctuary open spontaneously and a mysterious song instructs him: στείχε γᾶς, στείχε ἐς οὐρανόν, στείχε (8.30.3), 'go from earth, go to heaven, go!' <sup>144</sup>

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<sup>144</sup> Flinterman (2009a, 231-4) sees the story of Apollonios' self-liberation here and at 7.38.2 as a reference to Dionysos' self-liberation at E. *Ba.* 580-640. Marked parallels extend to the cutting of Dionysos' (*Ba.* 493) and Apollonios' (7.34) hair.

In most of Apollonios' visits to sanctuaries, there is apparently no conflict. He acts virtually as a member of staff at Asklepieia in Aigai (1.9.1-2) and in Pergamon (4.11.1). Constantly, he is the authoritative one, correcting temple procedures; the (apparent) acceptance and implementation of his emendations suggest the approval of priests and gods alike.

*b. Apollonios and a divine figure in person*

In other episodes, divine approbation is expressed more directly. Asklepios commends Apollonios in dreams sent to priests (1.8.2) and to an Assyrian youth (1.9.1) in his sanctuary at Aigai, and in *logoi* – presumably given in dreams – from his sanctuary outside Pergamon (4.1.1). Apollo accredits him in oracles from Kolophon and Didyma (4.1.1).

Apollonios' status is most forcefully revealed, however, in his direct encounters with the heroic dead. Most significantly, Apollonios encounters Achilles and Trophonios in person. The content of his discussions with them is of relatively minor importance; the mere fact of the meetings – Apollonios' ability to initiate, achieve and survive a direct encounter with a powerful spirit – is a confirmation of his status. It is perhaps worth noting here the relatively lowly status of Achilles and Trophonios in the spiritual hierarchy. Both were once human beings; Apollonios' approach does not involve the same *hybris* as an approach to (say) Apollo or Zeus.

The meeting with Achilles is initiated by Apollonios; it is not something ordinarily sought out or obtained. On his return from India, Apollonios visits Ilion and spends a night on Achilles' burial mound where, significantly, his experience with the Indians helps him gain an interview with the hero (4.11.1-3, 4.16.1-6). Prior to the meeting, Apollonios' companions try to scare him, pointing out that Achilles still has a terrifying appearance (τόν τε Ἀχιλλέα φοβερὸν ἔτι ... φαίνεσθαι). Apollonios displays the confidence of one sufficiently versed in Homer to be familiar with Achilles' character: the hero behaved graciously to the wise Nestor, to his companion Phoenix, and even to his opponents Priam and Odysseus, and has no reason to be hostile to himself (4.11.2-3).<sup>145</sup> The amicable encounter he achieves gives Apollonios the status of these heroes, and especially of Odysseus, who similarly sought out Achilles' spirit. Perceptively, van Dijk notes that the encounter is reported by Apollonios to Damis after the event, and only on the

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<sup>145</sup> The last reference is to Odysseus' raising of Achilles' ghost (*Od.* 11.472-540); Apollonios refers to it again at 4.16.1. In spite of the confidence in Achilles' character that Homer bestows, in one tale Homer himself is blinded at the Achilleion when, in answer to his prayer, Achilles appears to him in dazzling armour. The Muses provide compensation with the gift of poetry (*Vita Romana* [Vita 6 Allen] 5; Σ Pl. *Phdr.* 243a, vol. 6 p. 268 Hermann; cf. Grossardt 2009, 76-9). Philostratos could well have known the story.

latter's explicit request, so echoing exactly Odysseus' narration to Alkinous (*Od.* 9-12).<sup>146</sup> Another reason for this deliberate framing of the incident – a framing which distances it from the reader – will be suggested shortly.

The numinous character of Apollonios' encounter with Achilles is apparent from the manner and nature of the hero's appearance. The mound is shaken by an earthquake and Achilles emerges over two metres tall – he continues to grow taller and more beautiful until he is over five metres high (4.16.2). Undaunted by the apparition, Apollonios questions him about aspects of Homer's account of the Trojan War.<sup>147</sup> The respectful but logical questions are those of a junior sage to his superior (cf. Ch. 3.5.3a); the last is about the poet's omission of any reference to Palamedes, whose reincarnation he met among the Indians.<sup>148</sup> Achilles confirms the Indians' high opinion of the hero, so elevating Apollonios himself at Homer's expense. Achilles sends Apollonios on to the tomb of Palamedes at Methymna in Lesbos. Later, Apollonios goes to Thessaly to fulfil Achilles' request (4.12.1) that he reprimand the Thessalians for neglect of his tomb.

That the Achilleion was important to Philostratos is suggested by the fact that it appears also in his *Heroicus*; there, Philostratos also describes the Thessalians' pilgrimage to the site and its history, and he mentions a *heroion* of Palamedes on the south coast of the Troad.<sup>149</sup> Rutherford regards the tale of the pilgrimage as possibly a literary fiction, and notes that the *heroion* of Palamedes is otherwise unknown.<sup>150</sup> A likely reason for the significance of the Achilleion to Philostratos is a visit to it by Caracalla, in imitation of Alexander,<sup>151</sup> in 213. In Cassius Dio's account (78.16.7), Caracalla makes offerings (*enagismata*) and organizes contests; in Herodian (4.8), he assumes the identity of Alexander and imitates Achilles himself in cremating the body of a freedman who dies there, just as Achilles cremated Patroklos. In the present context, it is significant that in no account is either Alexander or Caracalla reported to have been granted an interview with Achilles.

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<sup>146</sup> van Dijk 2009, 184.

<sup>147</sup> Achilles contradicts the Homeric narrative to present the Greek heroes of the Trojan War in a more sympathetic or morally admirable light. Achilles was killed in a treacherous ambush (4.11.3, 4.16.3) rather than simply in battle as predicted at *Il.* 22.359: for the story and sources, Gantz 1993, 628. Polyxene was not sacrificed by the Greeks (4.16.4). A version of Helen's story dating back to Herodotos (2.113-20) presents her character, and the Greeks' behaviour, in a relatively positive way (4.16.5). Cf. Zeitlin 2001, 252-4.

<sup>148</sup> For Palamedes as a subject of interest in Greek and especially sophistic literature, Zeitlin 2001, 250-1.

<sup>149</sup> *Her.* 51.12-13, 52.3; *Her.* 33.48-9 de Lannoy.

<sup>150</sup> Rutherford 2009, 231, 244-5.

<sup>151</sup> For Alexander's visit to the Achilleion, *Arr. An.* 1.12.1, *D.S.* 17.7, *Plut. Alex.* 15.4.

It is impossible to be sure about the relative dates of the *VA* and the *Heroicus*. The *VA* was completed after 217 (Ch. 3.1). The *Heroicus* must at least post-date 213 because of its reference to the second Olympic victory of the athlete Helix.<sup>152</sup> Both Rutherford and Grossardt see the two accounts inspired by Caracalla's visit, with the *Heroicus* expanding on the inventions of the *VA*.<sup>153</sup>

Philostratos' use of narrative to distance Damis and the reader from Apollonios' visit to the Achilleion was mentioned earlier. If we take his agenda as a serious religious one – pertaining either to Apollonios personally or more generally to Greek religious principles that he saw Apollonios embodying – we can perhaps interpret this removal of the reader from Apollonios' numinous encounter as an expression of its exclusivity. The episode can be contrasted with the party's encounter with Memnon in Egypt. In that context, Philostratos distances himself from the account – he stresses at the outset that it is Damis' own (6.4.1) – but places it at the obvious place in his narrative. As Platt has noted, the description is of *theoria*. Although Memnon was famous for producing sound, the emphasis is on the visual. As Damis and the others present view the sacred image, the image itself – struck by the light – seems to *see* and to raise itself in worship of the Sun; those present join in (6.4.3).<sup>154</sup> In the episode at the Achilleion, Apollonios has a personal interview with Achilles and questions him; in contrast, in the presence of Memnon, Damis has no role other than to join in worship. The ready availability of this lesser experience even to Damis – whose lowly status relative to Apollonios' is stressed throughout the *VA* – is an expression of its non-exclusive nature, and the reader's access to it, too, is immediate. In contrast, initially all – including the reader – are excluded from the epiphany of Achilles, which is granted to Apollonios alone.

The reader is wholly excluded from Apollonios' interview with Trophonios. It is noteworthy that this takes place only on Apollonios' second visit to the sanctuary at Lebadeia. On the first, Apollonios did not encounter the hero (8.19.1); now, at the end of his life, he has the confidence to face him. Denied access to the oracular cave by priests who consider him a *goes anthropos*, Apollonios stages a dramatic and public forced entry, conspicuously presenting

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<sup>152</sup> *Her.* 15.9 de Lannoy; cf. Maclean and Aitken 2003, lxxii, Bowie 2009, 30-1.

<sup>153</sup> Cf. Grossardt 2009, 75-6, 90-1, Rutherford 2009, 237. Detailed consideration of the *Heroicus* is beyond the scope of this thesis. Recent critical commentary (e.g. Whitmarsh 2004, Miles 2005, Whitmarsh 2009) ascribes to the author an agenda similar to that put forward in this thesis (Chs 3.1, 3.8, 7.2.2) in respect of the *VA*.

<sup>154</sup> Cf. Platt 2009, 140-2; on the statue, Bowersock 1984. As Platt notes (136-7), the description of the statue is historically impossible. Pausanias' account (1.42.3) suggests that the sound was a sonic phenomenon caused by the statue's broken state. Its repair – possibly by order of Septimius Severus after his visit in 199 (SHA *Sept. Sev.* 17.4) – would have been responsible for the cessation of the sound that is attested at Jer. *Chron.* p. XVII Helm.

himself as a philosopher. After he has descended into the cave dressed in his *tribon*, Trophonios personally rebukes the priests and sends them to Aulis to see the most wonderful of all emergences. Apollonios surfaces after seven days – the longest time ever spent in the cave – with a book containing the tenets of Pythagoras, proof that Trophonios favours Apollonios' own preferred philosophy (8.19.1-2). We are provided with no details of the numinous encounter other than Apollonios' question: which philosophy do you consider best and purest (8.19.2)? Its extraordinary nature – indicated to outsiders only by pointers: the priests' humiliation, the remarkable emergence, the book – is sufficient evidence of Apollonios' superior status.

In well-known tales in the Greek literary tradition, Menelaos triumphs in a bout with Proteus, and Midas with Silenos (Ch. 2.3.2). In his encounters with Achilles and Trophonios, Apollonios can perhaps be seen metaphorically wrestling with more-than-human powers, undergoing whatever tests they impose and winning their approval. His encounters with less beneficent spirits can similarly be seen as competitions between superhuman powers; the relevant episodes – in which he is able to perceive a *daimon* or an *empousa* through the layers of illusion that constitute its disguise and to expose and overcome it – were noted above (Ch. 3.5.3b).

Philostratos provides Apollonios with an exact parallel to Midas' encounter with Silenos. In Ethiopia, Apollonios encounters and overcomes what Philostratos significantly describes not simply as a satyr but a phantom of a satyr (σατύρου φάσμα, 6.27.1) and a *daimon* satyr (6.27.4). The episode is presented as part of the Apollonios tradition: supposedly, one of Apollonios' letters refers to it (6.27.4).<sup>155</sup> Philostratos, in his *persona* as intellectual narrator, is defensive as to the reality of satyrs, balancing eye-witness testimony against his readers' presumed disbelief (σατύρους δὲ εἶναι ... μὴ ἀπιστῶμεν, 6.27.4). His version of the episode can be construed as an attempt to assimilate a tale about a mythical minor divinity – Apollonios' exorcism of the satyr uses Midas' famous technique – to a contemporary world view in which *daimones* take on forms of their choice at will. Whether or not the tale had a pre-Philostratan basis, in the form in which Philostratos presents it, it provides a paradigmatic image of Apollonios in confrontation with a mythical opponent in the liminal region at the end of the earth.

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<sup>155</sup> No such letter is extant; Philostratos the author may have invented the whole story, including the letter. Certainly, he was interested enough in the Midas story to describe a picture based on the incident in his *Imagines* (1.22).

### 3.6.3 A godlike Apollonios

#### a. Apollonios' 'oracles'

Significantly, Apollonios is not a recipient of oracles mediated by a human representative of a god. Such an interaction could only diminish the status of one who confers in person with the divine. Rather, Apollonios is himself the source of 'oracles', identifiable as such by their prescient content, the terminology used to describe them, and their riddling form. Philostratos signals the fact at the beginning of his account, where Apollonios speaks as from the tripod (ὥσπερ ἐκ τρίποδος, 1.17), and where his claim to know what people do not say (ὅσα σιωπῶσιν ἄνθρωποι, 1.19.2) recalls the famous oracle to Kroisos (Hdt. 1.47; Ch. 2.3.1; T1.20).

Repeated examples evidence Apollonios' supernatural insight.<sup>156</sup> In some instances, a prediction enables Apollonios himself or someone else to escape a fated catastrophe: he predicts, and so avoids, the wreck of a ship on which he has been travelling (5.18), and saves the life of a condemned man by realizing that the proof of his innocence is shortly to arrive at the place of execution (5.24.2).<sup>157</sup> Two predictions lead to what are apparently attempts to change fate. After foretelling plague in Ephesos (4.4, 8.7.26-8), Apollonios destroys the responsible *daimon* – though only after the disease has broken out (4.10.1-3, 8.7.24-9; cf. Ch. 3.4.2c, Ch. 3.5.3b).<sup>158</sup> After foreseeing an earthquake in the wider region (4.6), he prays and the earthquake is apparently forestalled; Philostratos sees the prediction perhaps (οἴμαι) fulfilled in a later devastation of the Ionian cities.

Philostratos uses terms appropriate to oracles to refer to Apollonios' predictions. The prediction of Nero's attempt to cut the Isthmus is a *logos* (4.24.3) or *prorrhesis* (4.24.2). *Logos* is likewise used to refer to interpretations of the eclipse at Rome (4.43.2) and of the conjoined

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<sup>156</sup> Apollonios predicts or supernaturally 'sees': the wicked deeds of a suppliant at Aigai (1.10.1-2); the death of the ruler of Kilikia (1.12); the inadvertent scattering of grains of wheat (4.2-3); a plague in Ephesos (4.4); an earthquake in the wider region (4.6); who will initiate him at Eleusis (4.18.2, 5.19.1); Nero's failed attempt to cut through the isthmus (4.24.2, 5.7.4); the emergence of new land after an earthquake at Leben (4.34.3-4); Nero's narrow escape from death (4.43.2); the fall of Nero's sovereignty 'to many Thebans' (an expression to be understood metaphorically as an indication of the short reigns of Vitellius, Galba and Otho, 5.11); the number and fate of the 'Thebans' (5.13.2); the imminent wreck of a ship on which he has been travelling (5.18); the arrival at the place of execution of proof of the innocence of a condemned man (5.24.2); the burning of a temple in Rome (5.30.1-2); Vespasian's rule (5.31.1); the location of a buried treasure (6.39.1-3); the assassination of Domitian in Rome (8.26).

<sup>157</sup> Prediction perhaps helps mitigate fate in a subtle way in another episode. At Alexandria, in the guise of a prayer, Apollonios reports to Vespasian the burning of a temple in Rome only the day before, and he predicts Vespasian's rebuilding of it (5.30.1). This might be seen as a manipulation of fate, with its hint to Vespasian that (when it is confirmed that the temple has indeed been destroyed) he should rebuild it.

<sup>158</sup> Technically, it can be argued that Apollonios mitigates but does not change fate. In fact he begins praying to avert the plague before it occurs, but desists when local people ignore the issue (4.4).

birth (5.13.2) that are indicators of Nero's fate; to the prediction of shipwreck (5.18); and to supernatural knowledge of the burning of a temple in Rome (5.30.1). Apollonios' own words also take oracular forms. A statement about the ship in which he has been travelling – it would be better (λῶον) for this ship not to sail to Achaia (5.18) – makes use, in a way typical of oracles,<sup>159</sup> of the word λῶον. In the case of the unjustly condemned man, Apollonios commands the executioners to proceed slowly because one man will go free; it would be better (λῶον) not to kill the prisoners (5.24.2). The same word is used, and specifically related to a god's advice, in the context of Apollonios' mentors, the Indian Sophoi. Local people fear them more than their king; the king himself asks them what to say and do ὥσπερ οἱ ἐς θεοῦ πέμποντες, and they indicate what it is better for him to do and not do (ὅ τι λῶον, αὐτῶ πράττειν, ὅ τι δὲ μὴ λῶον, 3.10).

Oracles were supposed often to take the form of riddles (Ch. 2.3.1). Philostratos presents a number of cases in which Apollonios' predictions are cast as riddles: of Nero's attempt to cut the Isthmos Apollonios claims that 'this neck of land will be cut, or rather not cut' (4.24.2); of an earthquake in Krete, 'the sea has given birth to land' (4.34.4); of an eclipse in Rome, 'something momentous is going to happen and not to happen' (4.43.1). Nero's throne will fall 'to many Thebans' (5.11).

Riddles are significant to Apollonios' superhuman identity in other, inter-connected, ways. Pythagoras was regarded as divine (Ch. 3.3.3) – so highly was he regarded that his associates (*gnorimoi*) were called θεοῦ φωνάς (D.L. 8.14)<sup>160</sup> – and he was believed to have spoken in riddles. The latter belief was an ancient deduction from his *akousmata* or *symbola*, the orally-transmitted maxims and sayings that belonged to the oldest strand of the tradition. Iamblichos' account, based on Aristotle, assumes that the precepts were meant to be taken literally; but the prevailing view, as expressed by Androkydes, attributed to them a deeper, allegorical meaning: the *akousmata* were *ainigmata*, intentionally unintelligible to the uninitiated.<sup>161</sup> Apollonios claims to the Gymnoi that Pythagoras transmitted riddling as a precept once he discovered that his words induced silence (παρέδωκε γὰρ καὶ τὸ αἰνίττειν διδάσκαλον εὐρών σιωπῆς λόγον, 6.11.13).

Riddling can also be linked to Philostratos' larger presentation of Apollonios as a sophist. The isthmos 'will be cut or rather not cut' (4.24.2) and 'something momentous is going to

<sup>159</sup> Fontenrose 1978, 37. See also Ch. 2.3.1.

<sup>160</sup> This is Long's (1964) emendation of the corrupt text.

<sup>161</sup> Cf. Burkert 1972, 166-7, 174-5. The *akousmata* were recorded by Philochoros and by Iamblichos, but the principal source is Androkydes' *Περὶ Πυθαγορικῶν συμβόλων*, which was in existence in the first century BCE. Diogenes Laertius provides allegorical interpretations of *symbola* at 8.18.

happen and not to happen' (4.43.1) are antitheses typical of the sophistic tradition. Apollonios uses the form outside the predictive context when he announces that 'the Magoi are wise but not in all matters' (1.26). Typically sophistic also are Apollonios' use of form appropriate to place, obvious in the laconic aphorisms with which he answers the Spartans (4.31.2), and his use of abstractions. His declaration to an official on the Euphrates of mistresses (*despoinai*) who are named abstractions (1.20.1) echoes (for example) Lucian's use of abstractions at *BisAcc.* 28-9, where he is married to Rhetorike but deserts her for Dialogos, and at *DMort.* 20.8(369), where a philosopher is obliged to leave Alazoneia, Amathia and a tribe of others at the Styx.<sup>162</sup> All of these forms produce ambiguities that can be seen as riddles and are in that sense 'oracular'. At *VS* 1.480-1, Philostratos draws a more profound comparison between sophists and oracles when he claims that the sophistic approach resembles that of soothsayers and oracles (τῆ θεσπιωδῶ τε καὶ χρηστηριώδει). Unlike the philosopher, who claims not yet to know, the sophist speaks with authority, as one who knows (cf. Ch. 7.2.1). Philostratos' picture of Apollonios in the *VA* as a charismatic, authoritative sophist at the same time presents him as an oracle.

#### *b. Apollonios' epiphanies*

Finally, something should be said about Apollonios' epiphanies, occasions on which he appears, in a way that defies ordinary explanation, to travellers to an appropriate place; episodes of this kind invert the situation in which Apollonios himself obtains an encounter with a god. One such occasion occurs at the end of the *VA* when, after Apollonios' death or disappearance, a sceptical youth who has travelled to Tyana encounters him in the centre maintained by his followers (8.31).

Another important occasion occurs earlier. After his trial before Domitian, Apollonios materializes in a cave at Dikaiarchia in the presence of his followers Demetrios and Damis (8.11-12). Van Dijk has examined the passage closely for parallels with the *Odyssey*. The area is that in which the tales of Kalypso are set (8.11), and Demetrios has already been identified in the context with Odysseus when he lived with Kalypso and forgot the smoke of Ithake and home (7.10.2). Apollonios' appearance evokes that of Hermes, the intermediary between gods and men, who (*Od.* 5) reintroduces Odysseus into the drama of his life just as Apollonios

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<sup>162</sup> Cf. Anderson 1986, 127-8.

reintroduces his followers into Philostratos' narrative.<sup>163</sup> The correlation gives us yet another variant – the divine messenger – of Apollonios' identity as one who circles the world to do good.

In the context of this thesis, Apollonios' appearance to his followers in a Nymphaion (8.11) – a liminal place – underlines the numinous nature of his presence and the significance of the incident to them as an encounter with the 'divine'. Van Dijk draws a different analogy, pointing out similarities between 8.11-12 and *Od.* 13.102-12: it is to a cove in the vicinity of a Nymphaion that the Phaiakians return Odysseus when they bring him home to Ithake; in parallel, Apollonios' triumph over Domitian is his homecoming and 'Ithake'.<sup>164</sup>

Philostratos' imagery may have more than one referent; however, the identification of Apollonios with Odysseus is hardly a critical one. Certainly, repeated references evoke a comparison between Apollonios and Odysseus.<sup>165</sup> However, other references to the *Odyssey* are to sites identified in local tradition with the Homeric ones.<sup>166</sup> As noted just above, Demetrios rather than Apollonios is identified with Odysseus at 7.10.2, and Apollonios can be associated with Hermes at 8.11-12. In another incident referring back to the Hades episode in the *Odyssey*, Philostratos associates Apollonios with Teiresias rather than Odysseus (6.32.2). The change in identity of the Odysseus-figure suggests that Apollonios' association with Odysseus in the VA is contingent rather than central. Philostratos' extensive use of the *Odyssey* simply reflects the overwhelming popularity of that work in the period (Ch. 2.3.2).

Apollonios' journeys are deliberately undertaken, and to destinations of his own choice; Odysseus can rather be characterized as a *wanderer* whose itinerary is dictated by forces beyond his control. The nature of wandering – which can at once subsume and go beyond the journey of autopsy and the journey to do good – will be taken up in Ch. 5.

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<sup>163</sup> van Dijk 2009, 188-9.

<sup>164</sup> van Dijk 2009, 191.

<sup>165</sup> A longer-than-appropriate stay in Vardanes' court evokes the image of the Lotus Eaters (1.40). Like Odysseus, Apollonios calls up the spirit of Achilles (4.16.1). Philolaos compares Apollonios confronting Nero in Rome with Odysseus confronting the Kyklops (4.36.3), and Apollonios uses the same imagery to refer to his approaching meeting with Domitian (7.28.3). Damis suggests divine help like Leukothea's to the imprisoned Apollonios but he rejects the idea – in not needing it, he shows himself superior to Odysseus (7.22.2). Less obviously but appropriately, the Indian Iarchas is Aiolos (3.14.2, 7.14.8).

<sup>166</sup> Dikaiarchia is associated with Kalypso, as above, and the Strait of Messina with Charybdis (5.11). A scheme of correspondence between the locales of the *Odyssey* and real places in the western Mediterranean was developed early – elements are mentioned by Thoukydides (6.2) – and long remained current (*Str.* 1.2.9-18), although it was criticized by Eratosthenes (*ap. Str.* 1.2.19) and other Alexandrian scholars. See Romm 1992, 184-96; cf. also Ch. 2.3.3.

### **3.7 Liminal experience in the life of Philostratos' Apollonios?**

The issue of whether an individual's nature is fixed and demonstrated in revealing incidents, or mutable and evolving, was raised at Ch. 1.3. To outsiders, Philostratos' Apollonios is marked out from birth for his remarkable nature; Philostratos nevertheless suggests that he himself experienced turning points in his life. Apollonios' youthful adoption of Pythagoreanism is a result of his innate percipience (1.7.2; Ch. 3.3.1). However, to Apollonios himself in retrospect, it was a Choice of Herakles necessarily entailing the training and learning that made him the person he has become (6.11.4-7; Ch. 3.4.2c). His youth as Philostratos describes it includes the liminal periods of ascetic withdrawal, in the Asklepieion at Aigai (1.8) and travelling Pamphylia and Kilikia in silence (1.15.1), probably characteristic of Pythagorean holy men. His great journey to the Indians – an implicit consequence of his Pythagoreanism (1.18) – completes his knowledge and qualifies him to teach (5.25.1). The reader notes, however, that it is Apollonios' own intrinsic superiority that makes him acceptable to the Indians, and his own perception of what a human being may appropriately know that limits the extent of his learning from them (5.12, 6.18; Ch. 3.5.3a-b). His human life refines the nature that is already his and culminates in the shedding of mortal constraints that can be represented metaphorically as 'ascent from the earth', i.e. apotheosis (8.30-1).

### **3.8 Conclusion**

In this chapter, a distinction has been made between Philostratos the narrator and Philostratos the author. It has been argued that the latter knew his protagonist as a miracle-worker and a Pythagorean, and that he presents – as the narrator's – his own preferred neo-Pythagorean/Platonic image of what it means for a human being to be 'divine'. In defiance of the traditional ontological distinction between gods and human beings, he suggests a continuum between the two: the soul of the godlike Apollonios explicitly (3.42.2), and his body demonstrably (4.10.1, 7.38.2, 8.10), are in his mortal life already, and perhaps increasingly, aetherial. Perhaps relevantly in this context, some at least say that Apollonios' life culminates in the total disappearance that was traditionally associated with bodily assumption to the heavens/apotheosis (8.30.2-3).

Philostratos makes careful use of Pythagorean and other paradigms both to reconstruct his protagonist's biography and to counteract the negative associations that Pythagoreanism can entail. In the scientific autopsy tradition, Apollonios travels to learn (Ch. 3.4.3), and he confronts

his human – and even divine – interlocutors as a philosopher (Ch. 3.5.3a, 3.6.2b). Like Lykourgos, he is acknowledged by Apollo (4.1.1) – as well as by Achilles and Trophonios (Ch. 3.6.2b). Like Herakles, he circles the earth doing good, simultaneously living out his special status and refining it (Ch. 3.4.2). As much like Zeus as a human being can be, he knows the accessible world to its boundaries (Ch. 3.4.1). Like Apollo, he possesses the power of prophecy (3.42.1) and conveys more-than-human truths in riddles (Ch. 3.6.3a).

Philostratos the author introduces the fictitious Damis of Old Ninos, the life-long companion of Apollonios upon whose *hypomnemata* the narrator's account is supposedly based. Damis' inclusion facilitates the narrative and provides contexts for criticism of the naïve point of view he presents (e.g. at 2.5); his and other different images of 'human divinity' work together in the VA to provide Apollonios with an undefined but nevertheless powerful numinous aura. In introducing an invented source, Philostratos the author challenges his more sophisticated readers to recognize a contemporary literary trope (cf. Ch. 2.4); discussion in Ch. 7 will raise the additional possibility that, in juxtaposing world views, he challenges them to ponder the authority of any report and the possibility of knowing 'reality'.

## 4 ALEXANDER OF ABONOUTEICHOS: THE PROTAGONIST AS A FRAUD

### 4.1 Introduction

#### 4.1.1 *The focus of this chapter*

Lucian's *Alexander* antedates Philostratos' *VA*, but his protagonist Alexander lived after Apollonios of Tyana.<sup>1</sup> Lucian refers to the latter in a derogatory way at *Alex.* 5 and suggests a teacher-pupil tradition linking the two. Apollonios and Alexander seem in fact to have been not dissimilar figures, both Pythagoreans, both associated with the Asklepios cult and healing and both accused of 'magic' (*Alex.* 4-5; App. 3, App. 4),<sup>2</sup> though in the extant, famous, biographies the first is lauded and the second castigated as a fraud. Lucian – in his *persona* as Epikoureian narrator – makes his position clear. Any possibility of human possession of divine powers or inspiration is to be rejected *a priori*; Alexander is *prophetes* (*Alex.* 22, 24, 55) of a puppet god of his own creation.

This chapter explores Lucian's use – to very different ends – of variants of some of the very paradigms that, in Ch. 3, we have seen Philostratos employing to elevate Apollonios. Apollonios travels in his youth to gain wisdom; on a parallel journey, Alexander finds the inspiration for his cult. Apollonios consults the non-Greek wise; so too, but to learn magicians' ploys, does Alexander. Apollonios confronts semi-divine powers as an equal; Alexander presents himself as the intimate of Glykon, his invented god. Apollonios and Alexander both claim the ability to recognize *daimones* in disguise and, in this context, both demonstrate their power. Apollonios expresses more-than-human knowledge in oracles; Alexander engineers the impression that he does so.

The focus of this thesis and so of this chapter is authorial use of paradigms associated with locationally liminal encounters. As we have seen (Chs 3.3.1, 3.3.2), the narrative of

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<sup>1</sup>An area of some interest and speculation is Philostratos' knowledge of and attitude to Lucian. Philostratos never mentions his predecessor. Bowie (2009, 26-7) sees remarkable resemblances between the *oeuvres* of the two writers, and proposes that Philostratos did indeed know Lucian's work: 'one is tempted to attribute the biographer's silence on Lucian to his sense that he was too uncomfortably close to give a reader free rein to admire Philostratos' own originality'. Bowie sees Philostratos as a sophist and downplays the seriousness of his intent in the *VA*. Alternatively, if the *VA* is intended seriously, Philostratos' failure to mention Lucian might suggest his disapproval. Jones (1986, 21-2) probably rightly finds neither position necessary: Philostratos does not mention all the known sophists, and Lucian was only a minor figure in his own lifetime. Grossardt (2009, 80-2) finds two unusual motifs from the *Verae historiae* repeated in Philostratos' *Heroicus*, but of course no direct influence can be proven.

<sup>2</sup> Admittedly, there is no evidence independent of Lucian for Alexander's association with Apollonios and with magic or his claimed likeness to Pythagoras, but these and other elements of Lucian's description do present an internally-consistent picture; see App. 4.

Philostratos' *VA* seems to have been constructed from Pythagorean paradigms involving just such encounters: Apollonios follows Pythagoras' (real or supposed) example when he searches out the wise in India and Ethiopia and encircles the sacred places of the Greek world. The narrative of the *Alexander*, however, is shaped by a different story pattern apparently developed by Lucian himself; an account of this pattern here prefaces the systematic discussion of Lucian's use of liminal encounter imagery that makes up the body of this chapter.

#### **4.1.2 Lucian's construction of the Alexander: the Alexander and the De morte Peregrini compared**

Philostratos wrote long after Apollonios' death or disappearance. However, Lucian and his Alexander were contemporaries; Lucian's work is written after Alexander's death (*Alex.* 59-60), but Lucian – in his *persona* as narrator – is an active participant in the events involving Alexander that he describes.<sup>3</sup> His work takes the form of an address to the Epikoureian Kelsos, who has asked for an account of his experiences (*Alex.* 2).<sup>4</sup>

The *Alexander* presents its narrator pitted against a clever and unscrupulous opponent. Before the two meet, Lucian has submitted trick questions to Alexander's oracle. One that has obviously not been read elicits an unintelligible 'nocturnal' (νυκτερινός) oracle in response (*Alex.* 53). The same question presented twice, with misleading external indicators as to its content, gets two different responses (*Alex.* 53); the same question presented as eight receives eight (*Alex.* 54). (It is worth noting here that Lucian adopts the methodology of his Cynic predecessor Oinomaos of Gadara; see Ch. 2.3.1.) Learning about the tricks, and that Lucian attempted to dissuade the influential Rutilianus from marriage to his daughter, Alexander knows the narrator as *echthistos* (*Alex.* 54). When Lucian arrives at the cult centre, Alexander feigns friendship; Lucian bites his hand (*Alex.* 55). Alexander attempts bribery, with indications of the benefits of association (*Alex.* 55); Lucian – now fearing for his own safety – pretends to agree, and

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<sup>3</sup> The narrator is named as Loukianos at *Alex.* 55. The *Alexander* seems to be based on events that took place when Lucian was *en route* from Samosata to Greece with his family (cf. *Alex.* 56), probably to escape the scene of operations of the Parthian War (c. 164). For reconstructions of his movements – including early trips to Gaul and Italy (*BisAcc.* 27, *Apol.* 15) and a return to Samosata via Antioch, where he spent time in attendance upon Lucius Verus – based on analyses of his texts, see Hall 1981, 1-44, Jones 1986, 6-23, Lada-Richards 2007, 132-3, 152-8.

<sup>4</sup> Kelsos is obviously an Epikoureian, since the conclusion to the *Alexander* (*Alex.* 61) is a eulogy to Epikouros. He is also the author of a book revealing sorcerers' fraudulent practices (κατὰ μάγων, *Alex.* 21). This suggests that he was perhaps the Kelsos known to Origen, identified by the latter as an Epikoureian living at the time of Hadrian and later (*Cels.* 1.8) and possibly the author of a treatise against sorcery (οὐκ οἶδα εἰ ὁ αὐτὸς ὦν τῷ γράψαντι κατὰ μαγείας βιβλία πλείονα, *Cels.* 1.68).

Alexander plots his murder at sea (*Alex.* 56). Lucian (with help from followers of the philosopher Timokrates of Herakleia) attempts to prosecute Alexander but is persuaded to desist by Avitus, governor of Bithynia and Pontus, who feels the need to placate Rutilianus (*Alex.* 57).

Comparison with the *De morte Peregrini* suggests studied construction, certainly of the narrative but perhaps also of the sequence of events recounted in it. Like the *Alexander*, the *De morte Peregrini* can probably be seen as a reaction to an existing cult: the cult 'predicted' at *Peregr.* 28, 41 seems in fact to have been established after Peregrinos' death.<sup>5</sup> Like the *Alexander*, it is presented as an address, in this case to a Platonist (*Peregr.* 1).<sup>6</sup> As in the *Alexander*, the narrator plays an active role: at Harpina, just beyond Olympia, where he watches Peregrinos die (*Peregr.* 36), his laughter earns the wrath of those of Peregrinos' followers present (*Peregr.* 2, 37); he invents omens – an earthquake, and a vulture flying out of the flames (*Peregr.* 39) – to mock the naivety of those who take them up. The two accounts are structurally similar in that the *Alexander* as well as the *De morte Peregrini* has an unnamed protagonist who (at risk to himself) first exposes the villain (*Peregr.* 7-31, *Alex.* 44-5), leaving the narrator to carry the unmasking to its conclusion. In the *De morte Peregrini*, the unnamed protagonist is a double of the narrator;<sup>7</sup> in the *Alexander*, he is an Epikoureian who has to be rescued from stoning. It is obvious that Lucian is working to a formula.

Lucian stresses the theatricality of his opponents' behaviour. Peregrinos outperformed Sophokles and Aischylos, presenting tragedies his whole life long (ἐτραγῳδεῖ παρ' ὄλον τὸν βίον, *Peregr.* 3); at his pyre, Lucian elaborates the work a little himself (ἐτραγῳδῶν τι παρ' ἑμαυτοῦ, *Peregr.* 39). Alexander's teacher knows his master Apollonios' whole *tragoidia* (*Alex.* 5). Peregrinos stages the public spectacle of his death (*Peregr.* 35-6); Alexander, the discovery of Glykon (*Alex.* 13-14), personal communion with the god (*Alex.* 15-17, 26), and Mysteries (*Alex.* 38-40). Perceptively, Clay relates the element of performance to the deliberate behaviour of sophists from the time of Gorgias. In typically sophistic style, Lucian's Alexander and Peregrinos are 'always on stage and always histrionic; their success was the success of the actor – it hung on their ability to convince their audience'.<sup>8</sup> It is also noteworthy that Lucian the narrator presents himself to readers of the *Alexander* and the *De morte Peregrini* as a performer outdoing his

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<sup>5</sup> Athenagoras (*Legatio* 26.3-4; cf. Clay 1992, 3432) reports a statue of Peregrinos said to pronounce oracles. Hall (1981, 28) and Jones (1986, 120) both suggest that Lucian's work post-dated the formation of the cult. Peregrinos' self-immolation took place immediately after the Olympic Games of 165; it is impossible to know whether the *De morte Peregrini* pre- or post-dated the *Alexander*.

<sup>6</sup> Identified as such by the form of the greeting. Cf. Clay 1992, 3434.

<sup>7</sup> Jones (1986, 119 and n. 8) sees as evidence for the identification the motif of the laughter of Demokritos (*Peregr.* 7) characteristic of Lucian and his doubles (*Peregr.* 2, 37, 45, *Sacr.* 15, *Vit.Auct.* 13).

<sup>8</sup> Clay 1992, 3416-8.

protagonists; he is the greatest sophist, demonstrably superior to masters in the field.<sup>9</sup> The issue will be taken up at Ch. 7.2.1.

Theatricality alone does not make a fraud: in religious processions (as evoked most spectacularly at Apul. *Met.*11.8-10), for example, participants deliberately played out sacred roles.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, Lucian's Peregrinos and Alexander are frauds, and whether Lucian's texts denigrate relatively honest men – both Alexander and Peregrinos are unquestionably historical figures<sup>11</sup> – is a valid question, although no firm answer seems possible. Commentators have noted repeatedly how difficult it is to judge Alexander's *bona fides*;<sup>12</sup> Peregrinos was considered a *virum gravem atque constantem* by his contemporary Aulus Gellius (12.11).

Of equal concern, to what extent is Lucian's self-presentation (in particular, in the *Alexander*) accurate? How closely are he and his narrative *persona* linked? Did he attempt or simply invent the deceptions that his narrator claims to have perpetrated? Did Kelsos really make the request that Lucian reports, or are Lucian's references to him (*Alex.* 1-2, 61) simply a framing device that is intended to give credibility to the account or, alternatively, to be recognized for what it is (cf. Ch. 2.4)? Definitive answers are impossible. The events recounted are not inconsistent with the little that we know about the lives and movements of Alexander and Lucian (see above and App. 4). That Lucian's trick questions replicate those reported by Oinomaos does not prove that Lucian did not perpetrate them. Galen reports Lucian forging a treatise under the name of Herakleitos and then duping one or more eminent literary figures into commenting on it;<sup>13</sup> Lucian may well have endeavoured to live out the life of the narrative *persona* he chose to adopt. Nevertheless, the formulaic approach discussed above suggests at least a degree of literary construction. The narrator's claim to be writing only on Kelsos' insistence – he would prefer not to waste his time memorializing a man who was not worthy to be read about by the educated (*Alex.* 2) – is disingenuous. Branham separates author and narrator, arguing – on the basis on the narrator's proclaimed Epikoureian ideals and decidedly un-Epikoureian behaviour – that the text of the *Alexander* is intended to satirize him.<sup>14</sup> This is certainly possible. However, we must not go too far in separating author and narrator; as Petsalis-Diomidis has rightly commented, the work as a whole is such a devastating attack on

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<sup>9</sup> Cf. Anderson 1982, 69-71.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Petsalis-Diomidis 2010, 53-4.

<sup>11</sup> Re Alexander, App. 4. For a discussion of testimonia to the historical Peregrinos, Clay 1992, 3430-5.

<sup>12</sup> E.g. Nock 1933, 270; Caster 1938, 100, n. 1; Robert 1980, 421; Jones 1986, 148.

<sup>13</sup> Strohmaier 1976, 117-22; for discussion, Anderson 1982, 73-4, 84, Clay 1992, 3407, Hall 1981, 4-5, 436-7, Ní Mheallaigh 2008, 425. The anecdote survives only in an Arabic translation of Galen's commentary on Hippokrates' *Epidemiai*.

<sup>14</sup> Branham 1989, 204-10.

Alexander and the Glykon cult that we cannot separate Lucian's opinion of them from his narrator's.<sup>15</sup>

The present chapter is concerned with Lucian's Alexander rather than his historical counterpart. Certainly, he is Lucian's creation; however, given the relatively short time between Alexander's death and the writing of the account, Lucian was less free than Philostratos in his life of Apollonios to recreate inventively the events of his life.

Given the parallels between the *De morte Peregrini* and the *Alexander* noted above, it is useful to consider Lucian's use of paradigms associating Peregrinos' death with a divine identity. First, there are the claims Lucian attributes to Peregrinos himself. The man's Cynic costume and Herakles-club (*Peregr.* 36) establish his self-identification with Herakles, a quintessentially Cynic hero (Ch. 5.3.2). Peregrinos announces his coming death with the claim that one who has lived like Herakles must die like Herakles (χρῆναι γὰρ τὸν Ἡρακλείως βεβιωκότα Ἡρακλείως ἀποθανεῖν, *Peregr.* 33). His adoption of the epithet Phoinix (*Peregr.* 27) confirms an expectation of a Herakles-like apotheosis.<sup>16</sup> Peregrinos' leading apologist Theagenes compares his death with the famous suicides of the Brachmanes (*Peregr.* 25), and the planned timing of his suicide in imitation of the Brachmanes' (*Peregr.* 39) suggests self-identification with them; like Herakles, the Brachmanes were closely associated with the Cynic movement (App. 1.3). Lucian mocks Peregrinos by pointing up the differences between his death and his exemplars': the Brachmanes' acceptance of pain contrasts with Peregrinos' efforts to shorten his sufferings (*Peregr.* 25); unlike Peregrinos, Herakles cremated himself privately (*Peregr.* 21), and only because he was terminally ill (*Peregr.* 25).<sup>17</sup>

Lucian's picture of Peregrinos' self-presentation is sufficiently simple and consistent to suggest historicity. Ludicrously incongruous additions are attributed to Peregrinos' credulous followers or insinuated by Lucian (in his *persona* as narrator) himself. At *Peregr.* 4, Theagenes relates Peregrinos' death not only to the death – and divinization – of Herakles but to the divinization of Asklepios and of Dionysos by lightning stroke. The last two cases are hardly comparable, either with Herakles' or with each other. Asklepios restored so many of the dead to life that Zeus feared for the natural order and struck him down with a lightning stroke, removing

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<sup>15</sup> Petsalis-Diomidis 2010, 47.

<sup>16</sup> The mythical bird's regeneration from its own dying body is described by Ovid at *Met.* 15.391-407; Ovid does not associate the death with fire, though that element is present in Martial's *Epigrammata* (5.7) and Lactantius' poem *De ave Phoenice*. Peregrinos chose 'Phoinix' to replace 'Proteus', an epithet adopted earlier no doubt to associate his obvious mutability with a nevertheless divine nature.

<sup>17</sup> Cynics (and Stoics) sanctioned suicide only when it was no longer possible to continue living appropriately. Cf. Droge and Tabor 1992, 23-6, 29-39, Cooper 1999, 531-6, König 2006, 234.

him to a higher sphere. Dionysos' pregnant mother Semele foolishly asked to see her lover Zeus in all his glory and was struck dead by the lightning stroke that was necessarily inflicted by the vision; her child was taken up by Zeus and born from the god's thigh.<sup>18</sup> Theagenes adds a reference to Empedokles, underlining the author's satirical purpose; the latter was a favourite Lucianic target (*DMort.* 6.4 (416), *Fug.* 2, *Icar.* 13, *Pisc.* 2, *VH* 2.21; cf. Ch. 2.3.2), and already referred to in a derogatory way at *Peregr.* 1. Finally, Peregrinos is the equal of Pheidias' Olympian Zeus (*Peregr.* 6)! Lucian (in his *persona* as narrator) adds further apparently discrepant images. He references the apotheosis of the emperor (as well as Peregrinos' choice of the name Phoinix) with his invention of the vulture (*Peregr.* 39).<sup>19</sup> As well, he associates Peregrinos' death with the crucifixion of Jesus (*Peregr.* 34)<sup>20</sup> and he suggests that Peregrinos did the same: Peregrinos' cry at *Peregr.* 36 echoes Jesus', from the cross (Luke 23.46). Incongruous as this may seem, the Christians were Peregrinos' former associates (*Peregr.* 11-13, 16) and it is possible that the historical Peregrinos did associate himself in his death with Christ. Like Herakles' apotheosis, Christ's resurrection and ascension demonstrate divine justification following deliberate confrontation with death (cf. Ch. 2.3.2); it was this that Peregrinos probably hoped to obtain for himself.

Lucian's formulaic approach suggests that the pattern identified in *De morte Peregrini* may well be repeated in the *Alexander*; the issue will be revisited at Ch. 4.7.

## 4.2 Lucian's Alexander

Lucian's Alexander is a clever fraud. At the outset of his account (*Alex.* 1), Lucian characterizes him as a *goes* as he sets out to give an account of his designs (*epinoiai*), daring deeds (*tolmemata*) and tricks (*magganeiai*). His early lover (a disciple of Apollonios) is a *goes*, one of those who provide 'magic' (*mageiai*) and incantations (*epoidai*), favours (*charites*) for lovers, attacks (*epagogai*) on enemies, unearthings (*anapompai*) of treasures, and successions (*diadochai*) to inheritances (*Alex.* 5). Alexander and his later accomplice Kokkonas go about

<sup>18</sup> Asklepios: Apollod. 3.10.4; see also Ch. 6.1. Dionysos: Apollod. 3.4.3. There can be little doubt that Lucian considers the juxtaposition of Herakles, Asklepios and Dionysos ludicrous; nevertheless the *Anthologia Graeca* (16.185) links Dionysos with Herakles as having achieved immortality by fire. Cf. Harmon 1913-36, n. 1 at *Peregr.* 4.

<sup>19</sup> Augustus' spirit rose visibly from his funeral pyre (Suet. *Aug.* 100.4, D.C. 56.46.2); the ascent of the emperor's spirit in eagle form had become enough of a trope by the time of Pertinax to be stage-managed at his funeral (193 CE; D.C. 75.5.5).

<sup>20</sup> That the reference to crucifixion is intended to refer specifically to Jesus is suggested by explicit mention of him at *Peregr.* 11 and 13. Cf. König 2006, 239.

γοητεύοντες καὶ μαγγανεύοντες and use between themselves the traditional language of *magoi* (*Alex.* 6) – a term undoubtedly used here in its derogatory sense (cf. Ch. 2.5.3).

In the period, the term *goes* designated either a sorcerer – one possessed of illegitimate powers – or a charlatan. Philostratos evidences its ambiguity. At VA 5.12, he apparently gives credence to *goetes'* powers when he notes that many, brought to court, have confessed to a capacity to alter fate; however, at VA 7.39.1-3, *goetes* are no more than frauds. Lucian's attitude is simpler. He refuses to admit the possibility of supernatural powers; *goeteia* is simply trickery, its achievements illusory, produced by mechanisms and sleights of hand. Moreover, he admits no distinction between a Persian Magos and a *goes*. The non-Greek wise are reduced in his account to the level of the local frauds who adopt their name.

Realizing that foreknowledge (*prognosis*) is particularly saleable (*Alex.* 8), Alexander establishes his own cult, modelled on Delphi, Klaros, Delos and Didyma. Lucian explains his oracle-producing methodology, designed to suggest supernatural knowledge of the content of sealed questions.<sup>21</sup> Most of his oracles are straightforward, as was indeed the case at the major centres (*Alex.* 22, Ch. 2.3.1), but some are obscure, ambiguous or unintelligible, 'in the oracular manner' (χρησιμωδικόν, *Alex.* 22). Obscurity – for example, in the 'nocturnal' oracles – also expedites the production of oracles, eliminating the need to open and reseal questions (*Alex.* 49). Abonouteichos is chosen as cult centre not simply as Alexander's home town but because he knows its inhabitants to be fools (*Alex.* 9).<sup>22</sup>

Lucian attributes to Alexander an active program to promote his oracle. He spreads rumours of correct predictions, healings and even raising the dead (*Alex.* 24). Some of his responses send their recipients to Klaros, Didyma or Mallos, encouraging professional friendship and – no doubt – an exchange of clients between shrines (*Alex.* 29).<sup>23</sup> Alexander seems also to have made friends of the followers of Plato, Chrysippos and Pythagoras, though the Epikoureians remained obdurate (*Alex.* 25, 38, 45-7). Techniques to enhance the prestige of the oracle include very explicit responses to pretended questioners (*Alex.* 50, 52), and responses in foreign languages (*Alex.* 51). At a more sinister level, Lucian suggests the use of their questions to

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<sup>21</sup> The standard procedure involved submission of a sealed question which Alexander, as prophet, would submit to the god. The questioner received back an answer with the original scroll apparently still sealed (*Alex.* 19). 'Autophones' were oracles given in person by the god, with manipulation of his puppet head involved (*Alex.* 26). 'Nocturnal' oracles were issued to Alexander in dreams (*Alex.* 49).

<sup>22</sup> This is a calumny typical of Lucian. Peregrinos can establish himself among Christians because of their naivety; he makes them look like children (*Peregr.* 11-12). Christians have a rather different image at *Alex.* 25, 38, where they are paired with Alexander's enemies the Epikoureians.

<sup>23</sup> In an oracle to Sakerdos of Tieion, Glykon astutely refrains from commenting on the oracles of Klaros, Didyma and Delphi (*Alex.* 43).

blackmail over-frank politically-involved inquirers (*Alex.* 32). The warding off of natural disasters – earthquakes and plagues – was a fertile field for those who claimed to possess superior knowledge: Egyptians and Chaldaians, who asked for money (*VA* 6.41), and Apollonios, who took appropriate action free of charge (*VA* 4.10.1-3, 6.41, 8.7.24-8). Alexander involves himself in the business at *Alex.* 36.

### 4.3 Pythagorean paradigms shaping the *Alexander*

In a letter to Rutilianus, Lucian claims, Alexander proclaimed his own likeness to Pythagoras (*Alex.* 4). Such an association was a two-edged sword, and Lucian deliberately chooses to accentuate the negative: all the worst said about Pythagoras to discredit him (Lucian claims not to believe it, but the reference to it is enough) is nothing in comparison with Alexander's deeds (*Alex.* 4). It is noteworthy that, similarly, Peregrinos is more publicity-seeking than Empedokles at *Peregr.* 1.

In fact, Lucian's Alexander presents himself not merely as a Pythagorean but as an incarnation of Pythagoras himself. In the course of the Mysteries celebrating his cult, he is observed to have a golden thigh; as intended, learned fools (*morosophoi*) among his followers are provoked to ask whether he possesses Pythagoras' soul (*Alex.* 40). A further implication is embedded in the symbolism of the thigh. As discussed at Ch. 3.3.3, the golden thigh may have been associated with his followers' identification of Pythagoras with Hyperborean Apollo. Lucian's Alexander has the *hybris* to adopt a costume suggesting that he is divine.

Not only the golden thigh (*Vit.Auct.* 6, *Alex.* 40) and the long hair typical of both (*Vit.Auct.* 2, *Alex.* 3, 11, 59) link Alexander and Pythagoras; Lévy has identified less familiar, scatological, elements from the Pythagorean tradition used by Lucian simultaneously to denigrate and associate the two.<sup>24</sup> Alexander's youth as 'mignon du médecin de Tyane' (*Alex.* 5) can be compared with Pythagoras' playing Aspasia to the tyrant<sup>25</sup> (σὲ γοῦν φασὶ καὶ Πυθαγόραν ὄντα τὴν ὥραν λαμπρὸν πολλάκις Ἀσπασίαν γενέσθαι τῷ τυράννῳ, *Gall.* 19). Alexander's follower Sakerdos' coming incarnations as camel, horse and prophet (*Alex.* 43) echo Pythagoras' later incarnations as Aspasia, Krates, a horse, a jackdaw, a frog and a cock (*Gall.* 19-20). Alexander's refusal to kiss anyone over eighteen (*Alex.* 41) echoes Rhadamanthos' Pythagorean-inspired instructions to 'Lucian' at *VH* 2.28. He is μήτε πῦρ μαχαίρα σκαλεύειν μήτε θέρμους

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<sup>24</sup> Lévy 1926, 139-41.

<sup>25</sup> Presumably Polykrates of Samos; cf. *D.L.* 8.3.

ἔσθιεν μήτε παιδί ὑπὲρ τὰ ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἔτη πλησιάζειν, 'not to stir the fire with a sword-blade, and not to eat *thermoi* and not to have sexual intercourse with a youth over eighteen years of age'.<sup>26</sup> Along the same lines, Alexander's marriage to the Moon – as Lucian presents it, at once ludicrous, blasphemous and sexually suggestive – may link him with Pythagoras. Robinson sees marriage to the Moon (*Alex.* 35), interpreted literally in the *Alexander*, as a symbolic element of Pythagorean origin: the moon was important in Pythagorean eschatology.<sup>27</sup>

#### 4.4 Encircling the earth: applications of the motif in the *Alexander*

As we have seen, Philostratos' Apollonios travels in his youth in the autopsy tradition in order to observe for himself and learn (Ch. 3.4.3). Ch. 2.3.4 demonstrated that historic pre-Second Sophistic individuals were credited with combining autopsy or learning from the wise with other goals on journeys motivated by political necessity or business interests.<sup>28</sup> In the period of the Second Sophistic, autopsy could be combined with recreational travel – tourism – and it inspired the educational travel that became an appropriate rite-of-passage for the young. In this last category – the 'young man's journey to gain wisdom' – fall Aristeides' youthful travels as far as Philai and the Cataracts in Egypt (*Or.* 36) and, in fiction, Eukrates' travels on his father's orders to further his education (Luc. *Philops.* 33-4), as well as Demetrios' and his friend Antiphilos' journey to Egypt to study philosophy and medicine (Luc. *Tox.* 27). Significantly, in the Roman period, Egypt was remarkable as a still-liminal place easily accessed from the traditional Graeco-Roman world (see App. 1.1).

It is as a parody of the 'young man's journey to gain wisdom' – in itself a diminution of the autopsy tradition that gave rise to it – that we can see Alexander's youthful journey to Macedon to cultivate a wealthy mistress (*Alex.* 6). In the only travel beyond his own region (i.e. Bithynia and Pontus) that Lucian attributes to him, he discovers a key characteristic of a liminal place: a natural wonder – in the form of tame snakes – unknown elsewhere in the Greek world (*Alex.* 7). The discovery provides both the concept and, with the acquisition of Glykon, the basis of his cult, and determines the course of his future career. That the episode is a deliberate

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<sup>26</sup> Not stirring the fire with a sword-blade is noted as a Pythagorean precept at Plut. *Mor.* 12e. Not eating *thermoi* mocks Pythagoras' famous prohibition of beans (Aristotle *ap.* D.L. 8.34): in Hippokrates' *De diaeta* (2.45 Littré), of the flatulence-producing legumes (*kuamoi*), *thermoi* are the least offensive.

<sup>27</sup> Robinson 1979, 60. The divinity of the sun, moon and stars is a Pythagorean tenet at D.L. 8.27.

<sup>28</sup> In other examples, Aemilius Paulus combined politically-motivated travel with autopsy on a journey undertaken *ad circumeuendam Graeciam uisendaque quae nobilitata fama maiora, auribus accepta, sunt, quam oculis noscuntur* (Liv. 45.27), and Germanicus visited the historic and religious sites of Asia Minor *cupidine ueteres locos et fama celebratos noscendi* (Tac. *Ann.* 2.54).

parody of the 'young man's journey' is underlined by its repetition in a varied form in the *De morte Peregrini*: in youthful travels corresponding to Alexander's Macedonian adventure, Peregrinos wanders the world in voluntary self-exile – to escape charges of having murdered his father (*Peregr.* 10).

Alexander's destination – Macedon – associates him closely with his namesake Alexander of Macedon. Lucian's introduction of the tame snakes of the region serves to undermine the pretensions of the two. Principally, of course, the episode mocks the supposed divinity of Glykon, but Lucian uses it simultaneously to discredit the pretensions to divinity of Alexander the Great. Legend had it that Olympias conceived her son sleeping with Zeus (or Ammon or, more appropriately to the imagery, Dionysos) in serpent form.<sup>29</sup> In gleefully euhemerizing mode, Lucian suggests that it was Olympias' possession of a tame snake that gave rise to the tale (*Alex.* 7). Alexander and Alexander the Great are repeatedly associated – by Lucian rather than Alexander himself. Alexander is as great in villainy as Alexander the son of Philip in heroism (*Alex.* 1). Lucian compares himself – in his *persona* as narrator – with the Macedonian's biographer, Arrian (*Alex.* 2).<sup>30</sup> The viewing of Alexander and the new-born Glykon in Abonouteichos resembles the viewing of the dying Alexander the Great in Babylon (*Alex.* 16). Alexander's death is succeeded, as was his namesake's, by funeral games (*agon*) for the possession of his legacy; however, Rutilianus refuses to award this to anyone, even the doctor Paitos (*Alex.* 60).

If Lucian's dismissive reference to the conception of Alexander of Macedon can be seen as subtle mockery not only of his but of any human pretension to physical sonship of a god, it casts its shadow over claims that Alexander of Abonouteichos probably made. Alexander's claims to descent from Perseus and – through his son, Podaleirios the Healer<sup>31</sup> – Asklepios (*Alex.* 11, 58) are probably historical. Glykon was a 'new Asklepios' (*Alex.* 43) and his serpent form evokes the god. Asklepios was usually represented in human form, holding a staff entwined with snakes, but he could also manifest himself as a snake. It was in this form that he customarily arrived at places that were to become new centres of his cult (App. 4). Descent from Perseus as well as from Asklepios himself may have been a reference to Asklepieian cult. Perseus was generally honoured in Paphlagonia as part of the meeting of Greek and Persian culture in the

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<sup>29</sup> Plutarch reports two different stories about the supernatural conception of Alexander: Olympias was struck by a thunderbolt/stroke of lightning, or found sleeping with a snake (*Alex.* 2.2, 2.4). The former tale suggests Zeus as the father of her child but the latter – in spite of the oracle (Plut. *Alex.* 3.1 = T3.7) naming Ammon – Dionysos; Plutarch sees Olympias as a devotee of the god's ecstatic cult.

<sup>30</sup> For Lucian's use of Arrian, see for example Wirth 1964, 231, Macleod 1994, 1374, Lane Fox 1986, 243 n. 7.

<sup>31</sup> Asklepios' sons Podaleirios and Machaon are healers at // 2.731-2, 11.833.

region;<sup>32</sup> descent from him may suggest local aristocratic origins, but it may also refer to Aigai, where Perseus was the founding hero and where Alexander could have studied at the famous Asklepieion (App. 4). Lucian makes sure that he presents Alexander's claims in as ludicrous and literalistic a form as possible. Podaleirios' passion for Alexander's mother must have carried him all the way from Trikke to Paphlagonia (*Alex.* 11)! Alexander himself has a daughter by the Moon (*Alex.* 35; cf. Ch. 4.3).

In fact, Alexander of Macedon and his successors based his claim to divinity more on his achievements than the physical circumstances of his birth (Ch. 3.4.2a). It was as conqueror of the earth, ruler and civilizer that he was divine. Lucian's Alexander applies related imagery to Glykon rather than to himself. In an oracle to Sakerdos of Tieion, Glykon proclaims that, after delivering oracles for one thousand and three years, he will move on to Baktra and the surrounding region: δεῖ γὰρ ἀπολαῦσαι καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους τῆς ἐπιδημίας τῆς ἐμῆς, *Alex.* 43, 'for the barbarians must profit from my presence'. The reference to Baktra evokes Alexander the Great.

Another hero who travels the world to do good, Herakles appears in the *Alexander* as a figure beyond reproach. Lucian associates his protagonist not with him but with the villains he overcomes. Herakles is famous for cleansing the world of monsters and bandits; Alexander surpasses in evil the Kerkopes, Eurybatos, Phrynonidas, Aristodemos and Sostratos (*Alex.* 4).<sup>33</sup> Lucian can himself be compared with Herakles, undertaking a Labour (*athlon*) and cleaning out an Augeian stable in exposing Alexander's crimes (*Alex.* 1).

#### 4.5 The non-Greek wise: applications of the motif in the *Alexander*

In Lucian's fiction and (ostensible) non-fiction, the non-Greek wise acquire the character of their imitators, tricksters wandering the Greek world and calling themselves 'Chaldaians' and 'Hyperboreans' (Chs 2.4.3, 2.5.3).

As noted (Ch. 4.2), the young Alexander's lover was a *goes*. Although he claimed to be a physician (*iatros*), he knew a lot about malignant drugs as well as those that are good in mixture (φάρμακα πολλὰ μὲν ἐσθλὰ μεμιγμένα, πολλὰ δὲ λυγρὰ, *Alex.* 5). Lucian here quotes Homer

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<sup>32</sup> He was represented on the coins of Amisos (*BMC* 13.16.32-3) and Amastris (*BMC* 13.85.8); cf. Lane Fox 1986, 245-6. For discussion of the myth (*A. Pers.* 79-80, Hdt. 7.61) linking Perseus with the Persian royal house, Gruen 2011, 256-7.

<sup>33</sup> The Kerkopes were two bandits overcome by Herakles and sometimes named Eurybates and Phrynonidas (D.S. 4.31.7, Apollod. 2.6.3, Ovid *Met.* 88-100; Grimal 1996 s.v. Cercopes). Other possible identities of Eurybates and Phrynonidas, and the identities of Aristodemos and Sostratos, are noted by Harmon (1925, n. 1 at *Alex.* 4).

(*Od.* 4.230) on the knowledge of the wife of Thon the Egyptian, so linking Alexander's teacher and the dubious non-Greek wise. Again, Alexander and his fellow-conspirator Kokkonas use the traditional language of *magoi*, indistinguishably magicians and Persian Magoi (*Alex.* 6). When he is inspired to find the egg from which Glykon will hatch, Alexander behaves like a devotee of the Mother, frenziedly uttering meaningless words in Hebrew or Phoenician (*Alex.* 13). The text calls to mind the ill-reputed wandering devotees of Kybele described by Apuleius at *Met.* 8.25-9.10.

Alexander's lover and any other 'non-Greeks' who influenced his early life were resident in the Greek world. In others of his works, Lucian makes derogatory allusions to at least certain of the non-Greek wise in their native places. Peregrinos learns the *thaumaste sophia* of the Christians from their priests and scribes in Palestine (*Peregr.* 11); it is a wisdom nevertheless diminished by the fact that the Christians become the dupes of Peregrinos, soon established as their leader and prophet. In Egypt, Peregrinos studies ascetic practices with Agathoboulos (*Peregr.* 17); Lucian's image of the wonder-working (*thaumatopoion*) sage is both ludicrous and sexually suggestive. Also in Egypt, Eukrates studies with Pankrates (*Philops.* 34-6); the marvels (*terastia*) worked by the latter include riding on crocodiles and (most notoriously) bringing household implements to life (cf. Ch. 3.5.2). It is interesting that, at *Demon.* 3, Agathoboulos (presumably the same person as Peregrinos' teacher) is referred to approvingly as a teacher of Demonax (along with Timokrates of Herakleia, whom Lucian praises at *Alex.* 57). In fact, Agathoboulos was presumably a Greek and probably a Cynic (cf. Ch. 5.3.1a), given the character of an Egyptian wonder-worker at *Peregr.* 17 by Lucian for his own purposes. Lucian's description of Pankrates (*Philops.* 34), on the contrary, marks him out as an African.

#### **4.6 Oracles and encounters with a god: applications of the motifs in the *Alexander***

Supernatural accreditation of Alexander parallels in its forms the proofs of Apollonios' superior status. Oracles bear witness to Alexander as they do to Apollonios. When bronze tablets 'discovered' in the temple of Apollo at Chalkedon proclaim Asklepios' imminent arrival in Abonouteichos (*Alex.* 10), an associated (unattributed) oracle accredits Alexander as Podaleirios' son (*Alex.* 11). To eliminate any ambiguity, a Sibylline oracle spells out Alexander's name (*Alex.* 11). The oracles are obviously Alexander's and Kokkonas' concoctions (*Alex.* 10-11); that Lucian gives no credence to the possibility of divine communication through oracles, even from the

established centres at Klaros, Didyma and Mallos, is implied by Alexander's apparently successful cultivation of cross-referrals (*Alex.* 29).<sup>34</sup>

The 'discovered' tablets have connotations of their own. The recovered document was a *topos* characteristic of Second Sophistic literature, and sophisticated writers like Antonius Diogenes and Philostratos seem to have treated any reference to one as a transparent fiction (Chs 2.4, 3.1). Lucian intends his readers to find the planting of the tablets ludicrous and see the inhabitants of Bithynia and Pontus who take them seriously as fools. Significantly, Lucian attributes the invention of 'ancient' oracles proclaiming his own superior status to Peregrinos as well as to Alexander (*Peregr.* 27); any judgement of the historicity of his narratives must take into account the formulaic nature of his approach.

Accreditation of any individual is most dramatically achieved in direct encounter with the divine. Most obviously, Alexander presents himself as prophet and intimate of the god (cf. *Alex.* 18, 43) Glykon. We have seen his supposed relationship with the Moon (Ch. 4.3). Engineered fits of madness, with Alexander μεμηνέναι προσποιούμενος ἐνίστε καὶ ἀφροῦ ὑποπιμπλάμενος τὸ στόμα (*Alex.* 12), 'pretending at times to have been raving and foaming at the mouth' were perhaps intended to suggest the frenzy sometimes attributed to the Pythia (Ch. 2.3.1).

Lucian subverts tales of a spiritually superior person's hostile encounters with supernatural beings in an account that throws a chilling light on one of the most famous episodes in the Apollonios tradition. Apollonios' freeing of Ephesos from plague by identifying a plague *daimon* and causing him to be stoned seems to have been part of the pre-Philostratan tradition (Ch. 3.5.3b). Philostratos describes the incident at VA 4.10.1-3, and it figures prominently in the Apology (VA 8.7.24-8). Alexander uses the same technique to eliminate his enemies. At *Alex.* 25, in a proclamation, he commands his followers to drive away his critics (atheists and Christians) with stones if they want the god to be gracious (εἴ γε θέλουσιν ἴλω εἶχεν τὸν θεόν). The suggestion is that they will be doing the god's will. At *Alex.* 44-5, an unnamed Epikoureian publicly challenges the truth of one of Alexander's oracles: apparently, on Alexander's word, servants had been executed for the murder of their young master when in fact their account of his absence was true. To cover his own error, Alexander presents the man's words as a lie; he commands his followers to stone the man or they themselves will be accursed (*enages*). Even if no specific reference to the Apollonios tradition is intended, the episodes caricature the wise man's recognition of, and conflict with, spirits defying the divine will.

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<sup>34</sup> Nevertheless, Kokkonas is struck down by a snake while composing oracles at Chalkedon (*Alex.* 10).

Like Apollonios, Alexander expresses his more-than-ordinarily-human knowledge in 'oracles'. Apollonios' 'oracles' are spontaneous pronouncements oracular in their form and prescient wisdom. Alexander's oracles, on the other hand, are such in the traditional sense (Ch. 2.2.1), the communications of Glykon, conveyed by his prophet. Their forms are oracular in studied ways. Like the responses provided by the established shrines, some – prescribing, for example, medical treatments and diets – are simple and direct; others are obscure, ambiguous or even unintelligible, as seemed appropriate to an oracle (*Alex.* 22).

For all Alexander's care, some responses prove ludicrously wrong. Lucian's test questions were mentioned above (Ch. 4.1.2). A grotesquely inappropriate oracle prescribing his son's education is given a favourable twist by Rutilianus himself (*Alex.* 33). An oracle to Severianus encouraging the invasion of Armenia has to be changed in the records after his disastrous defeat (*Alex.* 27; App. 4). Oracles to the sick are amended after their deaths (*Alex.* 28). A disastrously wrong prediction of imperial victory in Germany can only be explained away with Delphi's famous self-justification to Kroisos (*Alex.* 48). In a final irony, an oracle predicting his remote and glorious end is proved wrong by Alexander's sordid death (*Alex.* 59).

Parodying the 'career and destiny oracle' responses set out at Ch. 2.3.1, Alexander's oracles self-servingly affirm unambiguously the superior status of high-ranking questioners. In lives to come, Sakerdos of Tieion will be a camel and a horse, but then a wise man and prophet as great as Alexander (*Alex.* 43). Rutilianus has been Peleus' son (Achilles) and Menander; in his next life, he will be a shaft of light (*aktis*) from the sun (*Alex.* 34). Told in another oracle to marry Alexander's daughter, he imagines himself son-in-law of the Moon and one of the heavenly beings (*epouranioi*, *Alex.* 35).

Above all, Alexander's oracles affirm the superiority of Glykon and of Alexander himself. Glykon is grandson (*triton aima*) of Zeus (*Alex.* 18);<sup>35</sup> an oracle to Sakerdos of Tieion confirms the serpent's identity as a new (*neos*) Asklepios (*Alex.* 43). Glykon commands honour for his prophet (*hypophetes*) Alexander (*Alex.* 24). But Alexander is more than a prophet. An oracle – given in response to a question inspired by a glimpse of his golden thigh (Ch. 4.3) – suggests that Alexander's soul will return to Zeus smitten by the god's lightning stroke (*keraunos*, *Alex.* 40). The predicted *keraunos* recurs at *Alex.* 59 where, again, it will bring about Alexander's death – and, presumably, his apotheosis. As we have seen (Ch. 4.1.2), at *Peregr.* 4, Peregrinos' follower Theagenes refers to Asklepios' and Dionysos' divinization by lightning stroke; it is of such examples that Alexander presumably intends his own followers to think.

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<sup>35</sup> As a manifestation of Asklepios, son of Apollo, son of Zeus (*Alex.* 10).

Alexander provides more than oracles. He engineers for his followers regular epiphanies of himself as divine in Mysteries (*telete*) that commemorate the births of Apollo, Asklepios, Glykon, himself and his daughter by the Moon; it is in the course of these that he displays his golden thigh (*Alex.* 38-40). Lucian parodies his protagonist's epiphanies quite differently in *De morte Peregrini*, in which a dignified observer reports seeing Peregrinos, after his cremation, dressed in white and wreathed with the Olympic victor's garland of wild olive.<sup>36</sup> Lucian destroys the man's credibility by noting that he also 'saw' the ascent of the vulture that Lucian himself invented (*Peregr.* 40)! The over-neat success of this deflationary ploy suggests that at least part of the story is invented. The comparative originality of Alexander's self-created epiphany in the *Alexander* leaves open the possibility that Lucian is basing his account of it on fact.

#### 4.7 The historical Alexander revisited

At Ch. 4.1.2, it was noted that Lucian's Peregrinos' self-presentation is consistent with a Cynic (and possibly also Christian) background; quite possibly it echoes the historical Peregrinos' self-understanding. Peregrinos' *bona fides* is undermined by ludicrously inconsistent elements attributed to followers or insinuated by Lucian (in his narratorial *persona*) himself. In the *Alexander*, as we have seen, Lucian undermines the founder of the Glykon cult with comparisons – in particular, with Alexander the Great – that his protagonist does not himself make; Glykon's oracle to Sakerdos of Tieion suggests that Glykon, not Alexander, will benefit the people of Baktra in years to come (Ch. 4.4). Lucian's Alexander's own self-presentation portrays him both as Glykon's prophet and a Pythagorean 'divine man' in his own right; certainly, he leaves his followers to deduce the implications of imagery – the golden thigh, the lightning bolt – suggestive of his divine identity, but he himself provides the imagery, and the deductions are not hard to make. Is it possible that the historical Alexander saw himself in the same way?

A case can be made for an underlying consistency in Lucian's Alexander's self-presentation. Obviously, Asklepieian imagery was at the heart of the Glykon cult and, as noted above (Ch. 4.4), the prophet's claimed descent from Perseus and Asklepios (*Alex.* 11, 58) may suggest a link with the Asklepieion at Aigai. It is of interest that it was at this very place, according to Philostratos, that Apollonios was converted to Pythagoreanism after exposure to all the contemporary philosophical cults (VA 1.7.2). Certainly, it is likely that the Asklepieia were places of intellectual gathering and inquiry (Ch. 1.2.2). Philostratos' account of Apollonios' period

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<sup>36</sup> For the significance of the *kotinos* wreath, Hdt. 8.26, Ar. *Pl.* 583-6, Thphr. *HP* 4.13.2, Paus. 5.7.7.

at Aigai – where, after his conversion, Apollonios lived an ascetic lifestyle in the *hieron* (VA 1.8.2) – is based on the earlier, and credible, account of Maximos of Aigai (VA 1.12.2; App. 3); it suggests a symbiosis, at least at Aigai, of Asklepieian and Pythagorean thought. Lucian refers to Alexander's teacher as a follower of Apollonios (*Alex.* 5), so quite possibly he was not only an *iatros* (*Alex.* 5) but also a Pythagorean. Alexander's Asklepieian cult and his self-promotion as a Pythagorean 'divine man' may not be as incongruous as they can at first appear. Alexander's teacher's, and his own, association with *mageia* (*Alex.* 5, 6) may even, though more remotely, be linked with Pythagoreanism and Pythagoras' well-known learning from the non-Greek wise (Ch. 2.3.4).

#### 4.8 Liminal experience in the life of Lucian's Alexander?

We can tie Lucian's presentation of his Alexander back to discussion at Ch. 1.3. The *Alexander* parallels the VA in ascribing an innate, essentially unchanging, nature to its protagonist (cf. Ch. 1.3.1). Lucian's Alexander lives out the consequences of his combined lack of principle and eye for the main chance. He chooses the life of a *goes* (*Alex.* 6); he visits Macedon to take advantage of a wealthy mistress, and there his capacity to perceive an opportunity when it presents itself – in this case, that offered by the tame snakes of the region (*Alex.* 7) – sets the specific course that his subsequent life will take. Lucian nevertheless suggests the life-changing significance – the liminality, as Alexander himself would have seen it – of the purchase of Glykon and the period of cult foundation that followed it. He notes in connection with the former: καὶ κατὰ τὸν Θουκυδίδην ἄρχεται ὁ πόλεμος ἐνθὲνδε ἤδη (*Alex.* 8; cf. Th. 2.1.1).

#### 4.9 Conclusion

In Ch. 3, we saw Philostratos' use of paradigms rooted in the literature of the period to affirm, and define the nature of, his Apollonios' 'divinity'. In this chapter, we have seen Lucian making use of variants of the same paradigms to mock his Alexander.

Both authors make careful choices from the two-edged traditions associated with Pythagoras and Alexander the Great. Philostratos praises Apollonios as a philosopher like Pythagoras. Lucian draws on Pythagorean symbolic language open to ludicrous or scatological interpretation and on Pythagorean imagery with hubristic associations to denigrate Alexander. Philostratos associates Alexander the Great's claim to divinity with the extent of his journeying

and shows Apollonios superior. Lucian associates the same claim with birth legends, and manages simultaneously to undermine Alexander of Macedon's pretensions to divine birth and to provide a less-than-divine origin for Alexander of Abonouteichos' god Glykon.

Philostratos' Apollonios lives out his own version of the journeys and encounters attributed to the paradigmatic wise. Rather differently, Lucian's Alexander lives out practices in the contemporary world that reflect them. As a young man, Apollonios travels to the end of the earth to see for himself and learn in philosophical discussion with the liminal wise. Alexander's youthful trip to Macedon parodies not so much such an elevated venture as the contemporary young man's journey to study and see the world – itself inspired by the autopsy tradition. Apollonios consults the Indian and Ethiopian wise. Alexander consults or models himself on a type which could not have existed without a widespread belief in the wisdom of the peoples of the ends of the earth – the professionals who call themselves Magoi, Egyptians or even Hyperboreans (*Philops.* 13-15) to suggest their possession of extraordinary powers. Apollonios perceives and battles *daimones* and other spirits in human guise. Alexander (like Apollonios himself in one well-known story) shows how mob violence can be generated by belief – obviously prevalent in the period – that a wise man can identify opponents of the gods in disguise. Apollonios perceives the truth and speaks it, functioning as an oracle, a conduit of the god's will. Alexander plays on public belief in oracles and public knowledge of the forms they take to set up a professional operation.

In the *Alexander*, Lucian the author is to be distinguished from the narrator, an Epikoureian in active conflict with Alexander. Both are intent on undermining the protagonist. It has been argued in this chapter that the narrator's role in the *Alexander* echoes that of the narrator in the *De morte Peregrini*, and that parallels between the two works allow us to draw cautious conclusions about the historical Alexander. Peregrinos' self-presentation as it is represented in the *De morte Peregrini* probably reflects that of the historical figure. In parallel, Lucian's Alexander's self-presentation as a Pythagorean divine man is consistent with the historically-attested Asklepieian nature of the Glykon cult (App. 4), and may well reflect reality.

## 5 DION OF PROUSA: CONFRONTING THE GOD AS A METAPHOR, AND THE PROTAGONIST AS WANDERER

### 5.1 Introduction

To an outsider, an individual's successful negotiation of an encounter with the divine, or a being in touch with or sharing the qualities of the divine, confirms his or her standing: the individual was superior, or destined for superiority, all along. However, to the one who lives through it, the same experience may be a watershed – confirming a belief, providing a sudden new understanding, triggering an irrevocable decision, or setting out a new course of action. This and the following chapter on Aelius Aristeides are concerned with personal experience of a life-changing kind and its representation in apparently autobiographical accounts; of particular interest is the use of journey and encounter imagery and its implications to account for the writer's progression towards self-understanding.

In certain of his works, Dion suggests that encounters in liminal places set the direction of his life and were formative of his mature world-view. Dion's works are oratory, not autobiography in the modern sense of the term; their purpose was to make points, not necessarily to convey literal truths about his life. In this chapter, we investigate whether the encounters that Dion describes in fact took place, and whether any were truly 'liminal' in his experience. It will be argued that a genuine self-understanding shaped by contemporary paradigms emerges from Dion's work. At a crucial point in his life, he found a *persona* with which he could identify, which defined a way forward and which he chose to embrace. It was one easily given context in the contemporary political situation, and one consistent with his social position and upbringing. This *persona* was that of the wandering sage; in spite of changed circumstances, he continued to identify with it throughout his life. Dion used all the related imagery that the Greek literary tradition could supply to elaborate his self-portrait. He did so in a way that would have been transparent to educated listeners or readers; to do so was indeed normal rhetorical practice.

Since – as we shall see – Dion's works must be seen in the political context of his life and times, these can be sketched in. Dion was born in the middle of the first century CE to a well-to-do family, a citizen of Prousa, in Bithynia, through his father, and of neighbouring Apameia through his mother and maternal grandfather (41.6, 44.3-5, 46.2-4). His references to his forebears make clear the tradition of benefactions to one's native city prevalent in his time. He

was a pupil of the famous Stoic Musonius Rufus.<sup>1</sup> Early in life he had imperial connections. Perhaps through Musonius, he seems to have become friendly with Titus; two short works (*Orr.* 28, 29) are dedicated to Titus' favourite, the boxer Melankomas of Karia.<sup>2</sup> Closeness to another member of the ruling elite – possibly Titus' son-in-law Flavius Sabinus<sup>3</sup> – was responsible for Dion's exile c. 83-96 CE: Domitian banished him as the 'friend and counsellor' (φίλον ὄντα καὶ σύμβουλον) of one whom he had put to death (13.1). Dion's own works supply a realistic picture of the conditions of his banishment. His exile took the relatively mild form of *relegatio*; he was forbidden to enter Italy or his native province, but otherwise was able to travel freely. His property was not confiscated, and he was free to speak in public.<sup>4</sup> After Domitian's assassination in 96 CE, Nerva proclaimed a general recall of all whom he had exiled (*Plin. Ep.* 1.5.10, 9.13.5; *D.C.* 68.1.2). Dion did not return before Nerva's death (45.2), but later cultivated a relationship with Trajan that won substantial concessions for his native Prousa (45.3-4).

The sections to follow examine different paradigms that Dion used to express his self-understanding. Particular passages and exemplars will necessarily recur as we see Dion in turn meeting the challenges of a divinely-prescribed task, observing and learning from the remote, benefiting the world, suffering, and wandering.

## 5.2 Oracles and encounters with a god

### 5.2.1 The oracle to Dion

In *Or.* 13, Dion presents himself as one whose life has been shaped by an oracle (T15.1). As he tells the story, on being exiled, he visited Apollo's temple – we are not told which one – and the god gave him advice which he found 'strange' and 'not easy to understand', terminology

<sup>1</sup> Fronto (*Epistulae* p. 133, 8-9 van den Hout): *Quid nostra memoria Euphrates, Dio, Timocrates, Athenodotus? Quid horum magister Musonius?*

<sup>2</sup> For Musonius' association with Titus, Them. *Or.* 173c; for the boxer, Them. *Or.* 139a; on Titus' love life, Suet. *Tit.* 7, Jul. *Caes.* 311a; cf. Jones 1978a, 15; Moles 1978, 84.

<sup>3</sup> Cohoon 1939, n. 1 at 13.1, Jones 1978a, 15, 45-6. Swain (2000b, 40) sees as a more likely candidate L. Salvius Otho Cocceianus as proposed by Sidebottom (1996, 450-6); Sidebottom argues that Dion's connections were less with the Flavians than with the family of Nerva, the Cocceii, as evidenced by his use (*Plin. Ep.* 10.81.1, 82.2) of the name Cocceianus. It is impossible to decide conclusively between the candidates. Both are included among Domitian's victims by Suetonius (*Dom.* 10.2-4); Russell (1992, 4) mentions them as alternatives.

<sup>4</sup> Berger 1953 s.v. *relegatio*; cf. Jones 1978a, 46. For the conditions of his exile from Dion's own accounts: forbidden to cross a boundary (19.1) but otherwise free to wander (1.50); property not confiscated (40.2, 45.10-11); able to speak publicly (13.12, 45.1).

immediately calling to mind the oracle's power to test and discriminate between consultants (Ch. 2.5.1). The passage should be quoted in full.

ταῦτα ἐνθυμουμένω μοι ἔδοξε καὶ αὐτὸν εἰς θεοῦ βαδίσαντα χρήσασθαι συμβούλῳ ἱκανῶ κατὰ τὸ παλαιὸν ἔθος τῶν Ἑλλήνων. οὐ γὰρ περὶ νόσου μὲν καὶ ἀπαιδίας, εἴ τῳ μὴ γίγνοιτο παῖδες, καὶ περὶ καρπῶν ἱκανῶς συμβουλεύειν αὐτόν, περὶ δὲ τοιούτου πράγματος ἦττον δυνήσεσθαι. καὶ δὴ χρωμένω μοι ἀνεῖλεν ἄτοπὸν τινα χρησμὸν καὶ οὐ ῥόδιον συμβαλεῖν. ἐκέλευε γὰρ με αὐτὸ τοῦτο πράττειν ἐν ᾧ εἰμι πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ, ὡς καλὴν τινα καὶ συμφέρουσαν πράξιν, ἕως ἄν, ἔφη, ἐπὶ τὸ ὕστατον ἀπέλθῃς τῆς γῆς. (13.9)

Pondering these things, I thought it best to go to the god's [temple] myself and consult him as a competent advisor, in conformity with the ancient custom of the Greeks. For if he can advise competently about sickness, and about childlessness if one has no children, and about harvests, he will be no less able to advise in a matter of this kind. And then when I consulted him, he responded with a strange oracle, not easy to understand. For he urged me to do this very thing in which I was engaged with total dedication, as a good and profitable activity, 'until you come', he said, 'to the utmost part of the earth'.

Commentators have formed different opinions about the genuineness of the oracle. It is 'historical' in Fontenrose's sense of that term (Ch. 2.3.1). This does not mean that it is genuine but, as Fontenrose points out, the cryptic nature of the oracle lies in the mysteriousness of its command, not in any linguistic ambiguity, and in this it is in accord with Delphic oracles of the period. Jones suggests that, since Dion was indeed at the 'end of the earth' on his recall, the oracle – which was only reported later – was an invention after the event.<sup>5</sup>

Certainly, it is possible that Dion constructed the story from a well-known paradigm in a way that he expected an educated audience to appreciate. People knew the rules of *rhetorike*, the *technē* of the professional speaker, from the virtuoso performances of the epideictic orators who were established in major cities and toured the provinces and, more intimately, as a component of their own education.<sup>6</sup> In the schools, rhetorical exercises often involved summaries and paraphrases of the classics, and students were expected to fictionalize and adapt

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<sup>5</sup> Fontenrose 1978, 15 n. 4; Jones 1978a, 47. For the date of *Or.* 13, in which alone the oracle is reported, App. 5.

<sup>6</sup> For the content of Hellenistic and Roman *enkyklios paideia* – general education – and of *rhetorike*, usually seen as one of its components, T. Morgan 1998, 33-9, 191, Cribiore 2001, 2-3, 185-6, 220-38. Quintilian's *Instituto* is our most detailed source. *Enkyklios paideia* (*enkyklia paideumata*, *mese paideia*) was distinct from, and a preparation for, philosophy: see e.g. Plut. *Mor.* 7c, Ph. *De cong.* 145.

their sources to make appropriate points in different contexts.<sup>7</sup> In this context, Dion's application and variation of a well-known paradigm can be seen as a demonstration of his skill rather than intended either to be taken literally or to deceive. To investigate Dion's intention at 13.9, we must examine Second Sophistic applications of the life-direction oracle motif, and the passage itself, in more depth.

*a. Life-direction oracles: living out the paradigm*

We cannot altogether rule out the possibility that – inspired by knowledge of practices at Delphi and other oracular centres, or by literary accounts that more or less accurately reflected them – Dion did indeed consult an oracle of Apollo. The most often-repeated stories about pre-Second Sophistic protagonists reflected – to different extents – real practices. In an apparently autobiographical account, Xenophon consults the oracle at Delphi about his proposed life-changing journey to the court of Kyros at Sardis (*An.* 3.1.5-8, T2.1). His report is very probably both true and accurate,<sup>8</sup> and it reflects the fact that, at least by the early fourth century, private individuals with pressing life-direction decisions to make could and did consult the oracle at Delphi using question forms dictated by the sanctuary. Another famous life-direction oracle was purportedly given to Diogenes the Cynic (T2.19). Different versions reported by Diogenes Laertius seem to show the tale under construction. Diogenes was very probably forced into exile because either he or his father was guilty of financial fraud (D.L. 6.20). At some stage, the aptness of 'debasing the currency' (*παραχαράττειν τὸ νόμισμα*) as a metaphor for Diogenes' activity later in life became apparent,<sup>9</sup> and different oracle tales were constructed around the ambiguity. One variant at least provides what seems to be a reflection of real practice. In a version of the tale particularly relevant to life-direction, the disgraced Diogenes fled to Delphi where he asked the god what he should do in order to be held in the greatest repute (*τί ποιήσας ἐνδοξότατος ἔσται*); Apollo instructed him to alter the political currency (*τὸ πολιτικὸν νόμισμα*, D.L. 6.20-1). As we shall see, although the tale itself is fabulous, other reports of oracles suggest that the form of Diogenes' question was a standard one.

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<sup>7</sup> Virtuoso examples are presented in Aristeides' *Orr.* 5-8, 11-15.

<sup>8</sup> The questions that Xenophon asks and Sokrates suggests as more appropriate – 'to what god should I sacrifice to succeed at ..?' and 'should I ... or should I not?' – are those analysis suggests are to be expected of a person with a new enterprise in mind. It follows that Xenophon's account is probably an accurate one. Cf. Fontenrose 1978, 39, 43. See also Ch. 2.3.1.

<sup>9</sup> For example: *τοιαῦτα διελέγετο καὶ ποιῶν ἐφαίνετο, ὄντως νόμισμα παραχαράττων ...* (D.L. 6.71), 'things of this kind he spoke and apparently did, truly revaluing the currency ...'.

The life-direction tradition seems to have been familiar enough in the period of the Second Sophistic to generate both bogus stories about famous people and real-life application. Stories about Aristotle and Aesop are found only in post-Second Sophistic sources and almost certainly do not date back to the period of the protagonists.<sup>10</sup> However, epigraphic evidence shows that, in the first centuries CE, individuals did indeed consult oracles in order to obtain life-direction. In an inscription from Miletos of about 130 CE, echoing Diogenes' terminology, the circus performer Appheion of Alexandria asks: εἰ ἐνδόξως ὡς πάντοτε ἀπαλλάξει ἔν | τε τοῖς ἀκρωνύχοις καὶ τῆ ταυροδιδα|ξίᾳ καὶ εἰ ἐνδόξως ὑπηρετήσῃ,<sup>11</sup> 'whether as at all times he will come off with good repute in his tip-toe performances and bull-training, and whether he will serve with good repute'. Another inscription from Miletos, c. 150 CE, records the question of Alexandra, a priestess of Demeter Thesmophoros who seems to have become concerned about her calling as a result of the many manifestations of the gods being made to others.<sup>12</sup>

Some reported life-direction oracles to famous people may or may not have had a factual basis. In his *Prolegomena in Aristidem* (Treatise B, 13 Lenz = 740 D), Sopater reports a life-directing oracle to Galen but rejects the tale on the ground that the Delphic oracle was not in operation at the time. Although he accepts that this is probably not correct, Fontenrose dismisses the oracle. Parke and Wormell suggest that it may be genuine.<sup>13</sup> Obviously, no definitive answer is possible. An oracle to Cicero (T2.24) is recorded in a single account. Plutarch (*Cic.* 5.1) reports that Cicero asked the oracle ὅπως ἂν ἐνδοξότατος γένοιτο – significantly, as in the case of Appheion, the question echoes the words attributed to Diogenes – and the god at Delphi told him to make his own nature, not the opinion of the multitude, the guide of life. Cicero misunderstood the oracle and avoided public life until his ambitious nature (φύσει φιλότιμος ὢν) got the better of him; then, immediately – because unwittingly he had followed the god's advice – he received the recognition that he sought (*Cic.* 5.2). As it stands, the story is a perfect example of an oracle tale built around a riddle (see Ch. 2.5.1); this, together with the lack of any reference to the episode in Cicero's own work, suggests its inauthenticity.<sup>14</sup> The oracle performs a useful function in Plutarch's narrative, underlining the overwhelming desire for public recognition that Plutarch sees as his protagonist's fundamental flaw,<sup>15</sup> though this does

<sup>10</sup> Aesop: Avianus, *Fab. praef.* (c. 400 CE); Aristotle: *Vit. Arist. (Vita vulgata)* 4 Düring; *Vit. Arist. (Vita Marciana)* 5 Düring. Cf. Fontenrose Q108, Q208.

<sup>11</sup> *Milet* 1.7.205a, 6-8; cf. Fontenrose *Did.* 29; Parke 1985, 78.

<sup>12</sup> *DI* 496 = Peek 1971, no. 8; Fontenrose *Did.* 24; Parke 1985, 82-3.

<sup>13</sup> Fontenrose Q252; Parke and Wormell 1956, 409.

<sup>14</sup> Fontenrose (1978, 349) considers Cicero's silence conclusive of inauthenticity. Parke and Wormell (1956, vol. 1, 407-8) speculate that the oracle may have been reported in his lost *De gloria*.

<sup>15</sup> *Cic.* 6.5, 24.1, 25.1, 32.6.

not necessarily mean that he invented it. Even if he did, since Plutarch was a priest at Delphi, his imprimatur legitimizes both the form of Cicero's question and the answer given. Plutarch repeats the gist of the answer in his interpretation of the tale of Battos (*Mor.* 405b-c, T2.9), and he applies the principle in the context of the talents of the present priestess at Delphi: she is uneducated and therefore cannot be expected to write verse (*Mor.* 405c). Platitude though it may seem, the principle is wise and of general application, and closely related to γνώθι σεαυτόν, the maxim famously associated with Delphi.<sup>16</sup> It may well have been advice regularly tendered at the shrine.

In this context, it is not impossible that Dion was inspired to consult the oracle of Apollo, possibly at Delphi, as he claims. As we shall see (Ch. 5.2.1b), his use of consultation as a literary trope is at least equally probable. Even in this case, he may have considered himself the recipient of an 'oracle'.

On being exiled, Dion was faced with a critical decision. His options seemed to be to defy the ruling and remain as part of the underground opposition to Domitian – Philostratos presents Apollonios making this choice (VA 7.14-15) – or to fade into the relatively comfortable obscurity that *relegatio* (Ch. 5.1) permitted and be seen – or perhaps see himself – as a coward.<sup>17</sup> In presenting his final decision as a response to Apollo's command, Dion makes it clear that he is aware of its possible implication. At 13.6 he recalls:

μυρία δὴ τολμηθέντα τολμήματα καὶ πολέμους πολεμηθέντας ὑπὸ φυγάδων, ὅπως οἴκαδε κατέλθοιεν ... μέγα νομιζόντων, εἰ καὶ δέοι τελευτᾶν μαχομένους ἐν τῇ αὐτῶν γῆ· ... ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐνεθυμήθην ὅτι Κροίσω τῷ Λυδῶν βασιλεῖ συνεβούλευσεν ὁ Ἀπόλλων συμβάντος τινὸς φεύγειν ἐκόντα καταλιπόντα τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ μηδὲν αἰσχύνεσθαι τούτου ἔνεκεν, εἰ δόξει κακὸς εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

a myriad of daring deeds undertaken and wars waged by exiles in order to return home ... [for] they regarded this as important, even if they had to die fighting on their own soil ... But later I brought to mind that Apollo advised Kroisos, the king of the Lydians, when a certain event occurred, voluntarily to go into exile, leaving behind his kingdom, and not to be ashamed on this account if people thought him a coward.

In fact, Dion chose to defy the obvious dichotomy and make exile a badge of honour and an avenue to a courageous new endeavour. Paradigms that may have presented him with the

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<sup>16</sup> This was sometimes itself seen as an oracle; cf. T1.16.

<sup>17</sup> Tacitus' *Agricola* has been seen as a defence of that historian's adoption of a policy of *quies et otium* in order to avoid trouble under Domitian. Cf. Whitmarsh 2006, 305-6.

option that he took up will be discussed at Ch. 5.2.2. It is suggested here that Dion recognized that, metaphorically, he *had* received an oracle. At 13.9, he stresses the revelatory nature of the right choice as it presented itself to him, and the seriousness with which he took it up, by attributing his decision to Apollo's command.

*b. Life-direction oracles: an oracle as a literary device*

A body of literature almost contemporary with Dion suggests that reference to an oracle is a transparent literary device.

Implicit in the seeking out of an oracle is an ancient understanding of fate: the future is prescribed in its general outline but not in its details. The fate that an oracle predicts can never be changed, but it can be mitigated with appropriate action if it is bad or enhanced if it is good. To mitigate a fated outcome, it is important to work in harmony with fate rather than against it – to accept rather than to challenge the god's direction. This implicit understanding became explicit, and a plot device, setting the events of the story in motion, in Second Sophistic novels, most notably Xenophon's *Ephesiaka* (1.6) and the Cupid and Psyche story in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* (4.32-3). In both, protagonists seek an oracle and then deliberately – in the hope of mitigating their fate – set in motion the predicted course of events.<sup>18</sup>

The novelists had a precedent in Sophokles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*. The Theban legend-cycle of Laios and his son Oidipous predates the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, in which it is mentioned. An oracle to Laios ('If you and Jokasta have a son, he will kill you') is fundamental, and mentioned by Pindar and Aischylos, our earliest surviving detailed sources (see T4.24). In contrast, the oracle to Oidipous ('You are destined to kill your father and marry your mother') seems not originally to have been part of the story but rather introduced in a narrative tradition – subsequently taken up by Sophokles – in order to set events in motion. Oidipous flees the destiny that the oracle predicts and, in so doing, brings it upon himself.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Other Second Sophistic examples confirm that the motif was a well-recognized fictional device. A life-directing oracle sets events in motion in Antonius Diogenes' *De incredibilibus* (ap. Phot. 110a, 28-34), although in this story the source of the oracle (*chresmos*) is not Apollo but Zalmoxis, the living god of the Getai in Thrace. In the *Aethiopica*, when the Ainianes carry out their sacred mission to Delphi to sacrifice to Achilles' son Neoptolemos, a spontaneous oracle playing on the names of the officiating priestess Charikleia and the mission leader Theagenes predicts their future in obscure language (2.35). It is in contemplating the meaning of the oracle that the Egyptian priest Kalasiris is inspired to take action and to set the events of the novel in train (3.11).

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *Il.* 23.679-80, *Od.* 11.271-80, *Pi. O.* 2.38-40, *A. Th.* 745-57, *S. OT* 774-833; Fontenrose 1978, 110.

Dion's story does not exactly parallel Oidipous' or the fictional protagonists' stories. When he receives the oracle, he has already been exiled; no oracle is necessary to set the events of his life in train. Nevertheless, the oracle sets in motion the course of his exile; in obedience to the god's word, he puts on low-status clothing (στολήν τε ταπεινήν ἀναλαβών) and wanders everywhere (13.10). Moreover, it sets in motion his literary account. Although extant Second Sophistic novels making use of the device post-date Dion,<sup>20</sup> it was possibly already in use; it may be this narrative tradition that Dion is trying to evoke.

*c. Life-direction oracles: evoking parallels with Diogenes and Sokrates*

We will now see Dion himself hinting to a sophisticated audience that he does not intend his account to be taken literally.

Dion calls the oracle he receives 'strange' and 'not easy to understand' – although in fact it is clear and unambiguous. Oracles were famously ambiguous or cryptic (Ch. 2.3.1). Moreover, an ambiguous oracle could constitute a test, with the protagonist's response bringing about a positive or negative version of the predicted events, respectively, as it was 'wise' and insightful or not: if the protagonist solves the riddle, he is worthy of the positive outcome that the solution brings (Ch. 2.5.1). Kroisos failed to understand the oracle's prediction that his going to war would destroy a great kingdom, and he destroyed his own (T4.20, Hdt. 1.90-1). Aristodikos' refusal to be seduced into immoral behaviour by an oracle apparently allowing the Kymaians to surrender a suppliant to his enemies saved his people (Hdt. 1.158.1, 1.159.3-4; Fontenrose *Did.* 6).

One variant of the tale of the oracle to Diogenes the Cynic falls into this clever narrative tradition. Workmen at the mint where he is employed at Sinope suggest to Diogenes that he debase the currency. He goes to Delphi or to the Delian oracle in his own city to ask the god if he should take their advice and apparently receives permission – permission which at first leads him astray but finally, on its correct interpretation, to his career as a philosopher (D.L. 6.20). In another key story (T1.1; at Ch. 2.3.1 we saw it as the most often referenced of all oracle tales), contemplation of the god's answer leads Sokrates to one of the central discoveries of his life. In answer to his friend Chairephon's inquiry, the Pythia asserts that no-one is wiser than Sokrates (Pl. *Ap.* 20e-21a). Sokrates takes the answer as a riddle – he knows that he is not wise, so what

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<sup>20</sup> On the probable date of the *Ephesiaka*, Anderson 1989, 125; on those of *De incredibilibus* and the *Aethiopica*, Ch. 2.1.

can the god mean? – and ultimately concludes that the god intends to say that the wisest is the one who, like Sokrates, understands the worthlessness of his wisdom (23b).

Dion's reference to the god as a competent advisor (*symbolos hikanos*, 13.9) suggests a deliberate evocation of this story: at Pl. *Ap.* 20e, Sokrates relates the story he is to tell to a trustworthy (*axiochreon*) source. Moreover, Dion's presentation of his own story evokes other parallels. The god's answer leads Sokrates into systematic discussion with the reputedly wise; it leads Dion into travel that brings him into contact with all manner of human opinion. Sokrates already knows that he is not wise, but it is only the oracle to Chairephon that makes him ponder the implications of the fact and become truly wise. Dion's experience is comparable:

πολλοὶ γὰρ ἠρώτων προσιόντες ὄ, τι μοι φαίνοιτο ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν· ὥστε ἠναγκαζόμενη φροντίζειν ὑπὲρ τούτων, ἵνα ἔχομι ἀποκρίνεσθαι τοῖς ἐρωτῶσιν. (13.12)

For many, coming up to me, kept asking what my opinion was about good and evil. Consequently, I was forced to think about these things, in order to be able to reply to the questioners.

Dion knows the principles of philosophy, but it is only because of his response to the god's answer that he is forced into the deeper contemplation that will make him wise. As presented in Plato's story, Sokrates' career as a practising philosopher dates from the course of events provoked by the oracle. Likewise, Dion notes that:

οἱ δὲ ἐντυγχάνοντες ἀνθρώποι ὀρώντες οἱ μὲν ἀλήτην, οἱ δὲ πτωχὸν ἐκάλουν, οἱ δὲ τινες καὶ φιλόσοφον. ἐντεῦθεν ἐμοὶ συνέβη κατ' ὀλίγον τε καὶ οὐ βουλευσάμενον αὐτὸν οὐδὲ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ μέγα φρονήσαντα τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυχεῖν. (13.11)

Some people, meeting and looking at me, called me a vagabond and others, a beggar, but certain others again, a philosopher. Thus it happened that I acquired this title, gradually and not because I planned it or because of my own thinking a lot of it.

He also notes that:

πάλιν δὲ ἐκέλευον λέγειν καταστάντα εἰς τὸ κοινόν. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον ἐγίγνετο λέγειν περὶ τῶν προσηκόντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἀφ' ὧν ἔμελλον ὀνίνασθαι τὰ ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα. (13.12-13)

Again, they used to urge me to stand before the public and speak. Therefore it became necessary to speak about the duties of human beings and the things from which, in my opinion, they were going to benefit.

Obedience to the god's command gave him the reputation of philosopher, and made him one.

#### *d. Conclusion*

Discussion so far has suggested that Dion intended his audience to see literary allusions in his account of his consultation of the oracle. Further consideration of the longer passage in which he refers to oracles (13.1-13) will now be seen to confirm that he expected those sufficiently familiar with the literary tradition to appreciate his manipulation of it.

Dion compares himself with two figures. Odysseus bewails his exile (13.4) but ultimately (in Dion's version of his story) does not hesitate to follow Teiresias' direction to continue his journeying. As Dion puts it:

ἐλογισάμην οὖν ὅτι ὁ μὲν Ὀδυσσεὺς μετὰ τοσούτους πλάνους οὐκ ᾤκνησεν ἀλᾶσθαι  
πάλιν κώπην φέρων, Τειρεσίου συμβουλευσάντος ... ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐ ποιητέον τοῦτο τοῦ θεοῦ  
κελεύοντος. (13.10)

So I reasoned that Odysseus after so much wandering did not hesitate to roam again, carrying his oar, after Teiresias advised him ... And should I not do this, since the god commands it?

The reference is to *Od.* 11.121-34. Nothing in Homer indicates that this was Odysseus' fate, let alone one he embraced willingly; Dion is here reading Teiresias' oracle as an agenda-setter in the later tradition discussed above (Ch. 5.2.1b).

Dion also perhaps sees himself as Kroisos, instructed, as we saw earlier (Ch. 5.2.1a), to treat exile as no shame (13.6-8). Dion here also adapts a well-known story to his own agenda. The oracle to Kroisos instructs: ἀλλ' ὅταν ἡμίονος βασιλεὺς Μήδοισι γένηται, | καὶ τότε, Λυδὲ ποδαβρὲ, πολυψήφιδά παρ' Ἑρμον | φεύγειν μηδὲ μένειν μηδ' αἰδεῖσθαι κακὸς εἶναι (13.7), 'when a mule becomes king of the Medes, then, delicate Lydian, flee to pebbly Hermon; do not stay where you are or be ashamed to be a coward'. In the narrative tradition, the oracle is a riddle: Kroisos fails to recognize Kyros, son of a Persian father and Median mother, as a 'mule',

and so believes that he will never be forced into shameful flight (T2.15; Ch. 2.3.1). Dion has recast a riddle or test as unambiguous life-direction.

Significantly, Dion makes no explicit mention in his account of the oracles whose contemplation led Sokrates and Diogenes to their philosophic careers.<sup>21</sup> Both were well-known in the literary tradition (Ch. 2.3.1) and much more relevant to Dion's circumstances than pronouncements addressing sickness, childlessness or harvests, though it is on the basis of the latter that Dion claims to have decided to consult the god (13.9).<sup>22</sup> It seems most likely that Dion is being deliberately naïve in a way that is intended to be transparent: reference to the oracle he obtained *is* a reference to Diogenes and Sokrates, essentially identifying himself with them. Like an oracle itself, Dion's text presents his listeners/readers with a (simple) riddle which, when solved, makes statements about the identity of the author that are all the more persuasive for not being explicit.<sup>23</sup>

### **5.2.2 Another perspective on Dion's motivation**

It has been suggested (Ch. 5.2.1a) that Dion's story of the oracle is a myth expressing metaphorically the revelatory nature of a realization in a time of crisis. It can further be suggested that the realization was inspired by a different paradigm, 'Exile leads to philosophy'; it was in terms of this paradigm that Dion interpreted his subsequent life. 'Exile leads to philosophy' is in turn wholly consistent with 'Conversion to philosophy'. It will be argued that Dion did indeed see himself as a 'convert' of this kind. 'Exile leads to philosophy' also implies the very life of wandering that Dion presents as the oracle's demand; associated paradigms will be explored in Ch. 5.3.

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<sup>21</sup> Perhaps giving a helping hand to any in his audience who fail to understand, immediately following the account of the oracle, Dion presents himself voicing – in the course of his exile – the appeal of 'a certain Sokrates' (13.14).

<sup>22</sup> The oracle as it was known from the literary record advised only on the childlessness of kings and on famine in regional contexts and the context of the foundation of colonies (T1.44, 45, 48; T1.17, 31, 53, 57). That it did have a broader clientele with ordinary needs is suggested by Plutarch's reference to the god's responding to questions about the perplexities of life with straight answers rather than riddles (*Mor.* 384e-f).

<sup>23</sup> The interpretation in this section differs from that of Moles (1978, 99-100), who recognizes Dion's use of the tales about Diogenes and Sokrates but does not suppose that Dion meant his audience to do so; he sees Dion attempting 'to misrepresent the circumstances in which he became interested in philosophy'. On this issue, see Ch. 5.2.2b.α.

a. *Exile leads to philosophy*

“Ότε φεύγειν συνέβη με ... έσκόπουν πότερον όντως χαλεπόν τι και δυστυχές εΐη τὸ τῆς φυγῆς κατὰ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν ... (D.Chr. 13.1-2)

When it happened that I was exiled ... I began to ponder whether the experience of exile is really difficult and unfortunate as most consider it ...

In classical Greek literature, the usual term for exile (φυγή) meant 'flight' and had connotations of disgrace.<sup>24</sup> That a life in exile could successfully be mythologized in a way that all but eliminated reference to 'exile' is apparent from Philostratos' account of Dion's life. In that account, Dion travelled as far as the Getai when he was wandering (όπότε ήλᾶτο), but his journey cannot be called *phyge*, since he had not been ordered to go into exile (μῆ προσετάχθη αὐτῷ φυγεῖν, VS 1.487-8).

In search of stories giving exile a positive spin, Dion claims that he can cite only two instances – those of Odysseus and Kroisos as discussed above (Ch. 5.2.1d) – in which it was apparently the god's will and so, surely, to be embraced (13.6-7, 13.10). Here, he is being deliberately naïve. An established literary motif – and one which, as we shall see, had political connotations – established the *persona* of the one whom exile (or another apparent disaster) led to philosophy. Diogenes was the principal role model. Variants of his life story have been noted (Ch. 5.2.1a, 5.2.1c); at D.L. 6.49, he is reported to have claimed explicitly to one who reproached him with his exile: Ἀλλὰ τούτου γ' ἔνεκεν ... ὧ κακόδαιμον, ἐφιλοσόφησα, 'But it was through that ... you wretch, that I became a philosopher'. Plutarch pairs Diogenes with Krates, his follower and also a famous Cynic, and Zenon of Kition, Krates' follower and the founder of Stoicism. Diogenes and Krates are two who made banishment (πατρίδος στέρησις) and loss of property an opportunity for philosophic study (*Mor.* 87a). Krates was not exiled: Diogenes Laertius reports two different versions of his voluntary renunciation of property (D.L. 6.87). Zenon was redirected to philosophy by shipwreck and subsequent financial ruin (Plut. *Mor.* 87a, 467d, D.L.7.4-5). Exile was not necessarily a negative in the Cynic/Stoic tradition to which Dion belonged.

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<sup>24</sup> On the Greek attitude to exile, Doblhofer 1987, 21-49. The fact of exile was a misfortune, whether or not the term *phyge* was explicitly used; at *Il.* 9.648, Achilles is insulted to have been treated like a dishonoured wanderer/emigrant (ὡς εἴ τινα' ἀτίμητον μετανάστην). Other relevant references include Tyrnt. Frg. 10, 1-10 West, Thgn. Book 1, 1197-1201 Young; S. *OT* 813-20, 236-40, *OC* 562-6, 1254-63, 1333-37; E. *Ph.* 357-407.

In fact, Cynic and Stoic world views each provided a context in which exile could be contemplated with equanimity. Cynic cosmopolitanism asserted the individual's independence of his country of birth; at D.L. 6.38, Diogenes describes himself as ἄπολις ... πατρίδος ἐστερημένος, 'without a city ... deprived of homeland'. More positively, Stoic cosmopolitanism pictured a single community of all rational beings, and the individual as a citizen of the world.<sup>25</sup> Of particular significance in Dion's case is the position of his teacher Musonius, a Stoic close in thought to Epiktetos and Seneca, exiled for involvement in the conspiracy of Piso and perhaps condemned to work on Nero's isthmus canal.<sup>26</sup> Among the extant fragments of Musonius' work is a discourse on exile (Frg. 9), apparently given in the course of his banishment. Musonius puts forward a number of reasons why one need not be perturbed by exile, and cites Diogenes and Spartiatikos the Lakedaimonian as two who benefited from it (36-44 Lutz; Spartiatikos was forced to eat a sparser and so healthier diet.) He denies that the exile lacks freedom to speak, referring to his own present freedom and Diogenes'. Exile can be a source of strength (ἄλλοις δέ ... ἔρωσεν ἢ φυγή, Frg. 9, 40 Lutz).<sup>27</sup>

In Dion's circle and among educated people more generally, exile was not seen as negatively as Dion pretends. The implicit political message will be taken up later. Here, it is sufficient to note that, in the personal myth he recounts at 13.1-13, Dion chooses to embrace the identity of an exile and this in turn makes him a philosopher. No oracle is really necessary; 'exile leads to philosophy' is an adequate description of Dion's path.

#### *b. Conversion to philosophy*

Philostratos classes Dion among those pursuing philosophy though considered sophists (τῶν φιλοσοφησάντων ἐν δόξει τοῦ σοφιστεῦσαι, *VS* 1.492). Commenting critically on the passage, the fifth-century Christian commentator Synesios claimed that Dion rather converted during his exile from sophism to philosophy:

<sup>25</sup> *SVF* 2, 527-8; D.L. 7.138 [Posidonios]; Cic. *Leg.* 1.23, *ND* 2.154, *Rep.* 3.33. On Cynic and Stoic cosmopolitanism, van Geytenbeek 1963, 144-5, Moles 1996, 118-20, Sharples 1996, 127, Whitmarsh 2001a, 279 n. 55.

<sup>26</sup> Tac. *Ann.* 15.71, Philostr. *VA* 5.19.2, 7.16.2, Ps.-Luc. *Nero*. For the many parallels between Musonius' thought and that of the Stoics, and Epiktetos and Seneca in particular, van Geytenbeek 1963, 142, 145-6. At *Peregr.* 18, Lucian associates Musonius and Dion as famously exiled for speaking out.

<sup>27</sup> Whitmarsh (2001a, 282) suggests that Musonius intentionally inverts a pun recorded at Plut. *Rom.* 1.1 when he claims that strength (*rhome*) is generated not by Rome (*Rhome*) but by distance from it.

ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπιγνούσης ὀψὲ τῆς φύσεως τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον, οὐ κατὰ μικρόν, ἀλλ' ὅλοις τοῖς ἰστίοις ἀπηνέχθη τῆς σοφιστικῆς προαιρέσεως ... διό μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν ἐπιγράφειν ἅπασιν τοῖς Δίωνος λόγοις, ὅτι πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς ἢ μετὰ τὴν φυγὴν, οὐχ οἷς ἐμφαίνεται μόνοις ἢ φυγῇ, καθάπερ ἐπέγραψαν ἤδη τινές, ἀλλ' ἀπαξάπασιν. οὕτως γὰρ ἂν εἶημεν τοὺς τε φιλοσόφους καὶ τοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο σοφιστικούς λόγους διεληφότες ἑκατέρους χωρὶς ... (Synesios, *Dio* 1, 80-3, 95-101 Terzaghi)

For with his nature recognizing at last its own particular task, not in a small way but under full sail he was carried away from his calling as a sophist ... Therefore, I think it is right to inscribe 'before the exile' or 'after the exile' on all Dion's speeches, not on those alone in which exile figures, as certain people have already done, but on them all. For thus we would be separating the philosophic speeches and the truly sophistic ones, each kind apart ...

In his classic study of 'conversion' as a concept, Nock saw it as a life-changing choice made in response to recognition of the truth. Conversion to philosophy, in particular, was a well-known motif in the period of the Second Sophistic; Philostratos' Apollonios, for example, presents himself as a convert to (Pythagorean) philosophy at VA 6.11.2-7, using the imagery of Herakles' Choice (Chs 3.3.1, 3.4.2c). The first converts to philosophy were followers of Sokrates inspired by his charismatic personality and his death; the literary archetype is Plato's Apollodoros, the constant companion and student of Sokrates who, before his change of heart, used to think that it was better to do anything rather than philosophize (*Smp.* 173a). Plato's Academy and other Schools gave the tradition 'a permanent *locus standi*'; they offered teaching and required in return not simply intellectual assent but a prescribed way of life.<sup>28</sup>

Nock refers to the experience of conversion as an *epopteia*, a seeing of the kind experienced in the Mysteries.<sup>29</sup> Seneca uses the metaphor of initiation to describe the apprehension of philosophical truth: *Haec eius initiamenta sunt, per quae non municipale sacrum, sed ingens deorum omnium templum, mundus ipse reseratur* (*Ep.* 90.28), 'These are her [Philosophy's] initiatory rites, through which not some local town shrine but the vast temple of all the gods, the universe itself, is revealed'. Referring to the life-change it brings, he notes that *non emendari me tantum sed transfigurari* (*Sen. Ep.* 6.1), 'I am not only being improved but transformed'. Lucian employs the imagery of seeing and transformation in the *Nigrinus*. The convert – perhaps the Lucian (Loukianos) of the prologue to the work himself – was once a slave

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<sup>28</sup> Cf. Nock 1933, 165-73, 181-2.

<sup>29</sup> Nock 1933, 182. See also Ch. 6.2.1c.

but is now free (1); after visiting Rome for medical consultation about his eyes (2), he has had them metaphorically opened by the Platonist philosopher Nigrinos (4).

Conversion brings about a change in focus. Lucretius claims that anyone who makes the fundamental human discovery – that we are all weighed down with the inescapable burden of our own selves – will leave the world behind to study the nature of the universe (3.1053-75). Sometimes, conversion entails a passionate desire to spread the word. Epiktetos sees the true Cynic as a messenger (*angelos*) sent by Zeus to show human beings where they have gone astray (3.22.23).<sup>30</sup> The Epikoureian Diogenes of Oinoanda records: ἠθέλησα τῆ στοᾶ ταύ|τη καταχρησάμενος | ἐν κοινῷ τὰ τῆς σωτη|ρίας προθεῖν[αι φάρμα]|κα, 'I wished, making use of this colonnade, to set forth publicly the remedies which bring salvation'.<sup>31</sup>

The prevalence of the phenomenon of conversion to philosophy in real life is evidenced by Lucian's repeated references. Hermotimos' conversion to Stoicism and Peregrinos' to Cynicism are ridiculed.<sup>32</sup> The *Nigrinus* has been seen alternatively as a graceful compliment to a philosopher friend or as mockery of its narrator, the convert.<sup>33</sup> Lucian suggests what has been interpreted as his own conversion to philosophy in the *Bis Accusatus* (32);<sup>34</sup> however, Hall argues convincingly that the Dialogos to which 'the Syrian' (14, 25) turns is not philosophy but a new sophistic genre of comic or 'Menippean' dialogue.<sup>35</sup>

In this context, did Dion really 'convert' from sophism to philosophy as Synesios suggests? Nock believed he did: his Dion is a former foe of philosophy forced by external events to find 'a scheme of values which would make life tolerable and give it meaning'.<sup>36</sup> In support of the position, it is possible to point to many passages in Dion's later works explicitly critical of

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<sup>30</sup> In this context, note Ch. 5.3.2b below on Dion's role as Hermes.

<sup>31</sup> Frg. 3, col. 5, 12-col. 6, 2 Smith (= Frg. 2 Chilton); cf. Chilton 1971, 3-4.

<sup>32</sup> Hermotimos renounced everyday life twenty years ago to devote himself to philosophy (*Herm.* 2); 'Lykinos' persuades him of the worthlessness of his quest (*Herm.* 83). Peregrinos publically adopted his philosophical *persona* for fear of charges of parricide, and because the property he was obliged to relinquish was worth little anyway (*Peregr.* 14-15).

<sup>33</sup> For the first position, Hall 1981, 164; for the second, Jones 1986, 25, Clay 1992, 3408.

<sup>34</sup> E.g. see Schwartz 1965, 49.

<sup>35</sup> Hall 1981, 35-8, 66-71, 155. Not necessarily inconsistent with this conversion is the one from *Techne* to *Paideia* set out in the *Somnium* (5-16). This does not even pretend to be a conversion to philosophy; like Herakles, Lucian makes his Choice, preferring the benefits provided by education to manual labour as a sculptor. As Saïd (1993, 269) and Gera (1995, 242-50) point out, Lucian's characterization of *Techne* (ugly) and *Paideia* (attractive) suggests their association with Prodikos' *Arete* and *Kakia* respectively rather than *vice versa*. See also Jones 1986, 8-14, Humble and Sidwell 2006, 221-2.

<sup>36</sup> Nock 1933, 173-4. Also Schmid 1887-97/1964, 76: 'und so wandte sich Dio von den Rhetoren ab und fuhr, wie Synesios sich ausdrückt, mit vollen Segeln der Philosophie zu'.

sophists.<sup>37</sup> Dion's costume and long hair identify him as a philosopher during and after his exile.<sup>38</sup> At the same time, the surviving titles – *Praise of a parrot* (τοῦ ψιτακοῦ ἔπαινος) and *Praise of a gnat* (τοῦ κώνωπος ἔπαινος) – of lost early works are typically sophistic;<sup>39</sup> apparently conclusively, Synesios mentions two early works, both lost, which he sees as attacks on philosophers:

ἀλλ' οὗτός γε πλεῖστα δὴ καὶ μάλιστα σοφιστῶν εἰς φιλοσόφους τε καὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἀπηναισχύντηκεν. ... ὅθεν ὁ τε κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων αὐτῷ λόγος ἐσπουδάσθη σφόδρα ἀπηγχνισμένος καὶ οὐδὲν σχῆμα ὀκνήσας· καὶ ὁ πρὸς Μουσώνιον ἕτερος τοιοῦτος ... (Synesios, *Dio* 1, 68-70, 73-5 Terzaghi)

but he very many times and especially among the sophists was shameless in his attacks on philosophers and philosophy ... Therefore his speech *Against the philosophers* was really intense in its choking anger and unshrinking in its approach, and his *Reply to Musonius*, another of the same kind ...

Nevertheless, the argument cannot stand. The very fact that Dion was a pupil of the philosopher Musonius makes an early total hostility to philosophy unlikely. Examination of an apparently early oration<sup>40</sup> shows that Dion wore the *tribon* before his exile (32.22). In the *Rhodiacus*, he praises a true philosopher (31.122). In the *Ad Alexandrinos*, he berates those who fail to speak out although they call themselves philosophers (32.8), and he mourns the lack of truth-speakers among the *kolakes* (flatterers), *goetes* and *sophistai* who flourish in the city (32.11); the last make orations intended for display (ἐπιδεικτικὸς λόγους) and chant verses pandering to the popular taste (32.10, 32.68). He himself feels called by a deity to speak out the plain truth for the general good (32.39). In the *Troicus*, he calls sophists *kakodaimones* (11.6); they have wretched young followers whose speech he considers inferior to the speech of apes (τὰ δύστηνα μειράκια, ὧν ἐμοὶ ἐλάττων λόγος ἐστὶν ἢ πιθήκων, 11.14).

Can we conclude, then, that Dion's claim in his thirteenth oration to have become a philosopher in the aftermath of his exile is completely untrue? It will be argued here (α) that

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<sup>37</sup> E.g. Diogenes had no crowd about him as the sophists and flute-players and choral masters have (4.14); sophists do not know how to live, let alone be king (4.28); sophists are ignorant but delude themselves with the belief that they are wise (10.32); sophists are like peacocks rather than the owl i.e. (12.13-14) Dion himself (12.5). However, there are *some* honourable sophists (35.8-10); for Dion's nuanced mature attitude to sophists, Moles 1978, 88-93, Winter 2002<sup>2</sup>, 54-8.

<sup>38</sup> Dion dresses in a way that identifies him as a philosopher (12.9) or like a Kynikos (34.2); Dion has long hair (12.15, 35.2); Dion compares himself with Odysseus in beggar's disguise (33.15).

<sup>39</sup> Philostr. *VS* 1.487; Synesios, *Dio* 3, 80-1 Terzaghi; cf. Jones 1978a, 15.

<sup>40</sup> An early date for the *Ad Alexandrinos* (*Or.* 32) is disputed; for discussion, App. 5 and Ch. 5.3.1a.

Dion cannot be regarded as having converted from sophism; (β) that neither did he convert to a different and more radical form of philosophy in Cynicism, as has also been suggested; and (γ) that Dion's self-representation is nevertheless not untrue, given a more appropriate interpretation of 'conversion'.

#### α Dion's conversion from sophism

In this section we address Synesios' evidence for Dion's early anti-philosophical stance, and the concept of a 'sophist' itself.

Moles believes that Dion fabricated a later conversion to philosophy to cover early apostasy. He suggests that the young Dion 'lost his nerve' and renounced his teachers and friends during Vespasian's purge of philosophers (in particular, Stoics and Cynics) in 71: Synesios' suggestion (*Dio* 1, 102-4 Terzaghi) – that in one period of his life Dion insulted Sokrates and Zenon with the gibes of the Dionysian festivals (τοῖς ἐκ Διονυσίων σκώμμασι) and proclaimed their followers worthy to be driven from every land and sea – can be seen as an indication that he established himself as an apologist for the expulsion.<sup>41</sup>

An alternative explanation looks to division among the philosophers with whom Dion was associated.<sup>42</sup> Two generations of a 'Stoic Opposition' made up of senators – including Rubellius Plautus, Thrasea Paetus, Barea Soranus, Helvidius Priscus – and philosophers – Musonius Rufus, Annaeus Cornutus (teacher of Persius and Lucan) and the Cynic Demetrius – opposed imperial rule through the principates of Nero, Vespasian, Titus and Domitian. Nero was responsible for the deaths of Thrasea Paetus and Barea Soranus, who were forced to commit suicide on the failure of the Pisonian conspiracy in 65 (*Tac. Ann.* 16.21, 16.33; *D.C.* 62.26). Vespasian hated Paetus's son-in-law Helvidius Priscus for his political opposition and executed him (*D.C.* 65.12.1; *Suet. Ves.* 15). The philosophers were the senators' advisors. Musonius was close enough to Rubellius Plautus to accompany him into exile (*Tac. Ann.* 14.22, 14.59). Demetrius was an advisor to Paetus and stayed with him through his painful death (*Tac. Ann.* 16.35); he was threatened by Nero (*Arr. Epict.* 1.25.22) and driven from Rome by the latter's praetorian prefect Tigellinus (*Philostr. VA* 4.42.2). In this context, we can understand regular

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<sup>41</sup> Moles 1978, 85-6, 99-100.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Jones 1978a, 15-16.

expulsions of philosophers. Nero exiled the philosophers in 65, after the failed Pisonian conspiracy. Vespasian exiled philosophers in 71, and Domitian in 89 and again in 94.<sup>43</sup>

The Opposition was not itself united. In 70, Demetrius, back in Rome from exile, defended Publius Egnatius Celer, an informer against Soranus who was being prosecuted by Musonius (Tac. *Hist.* 4.10, 4.40) – who had himself been exiled by Nero in 65.<sup>44</sup> In 71, Musonius was apparently exempted from Vespasian's banishment of the philosophers (D.C. 65.13.2).<sup>45</sup> Dion's lost *κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων*, mentioned by Synesios, could have been an attack on only *some* philosophers in a divided intellectual community; the *πρὸς Μουσώνιον* that Synesios describes as an attack on Musonius may simply have been a justification of an aspect of Dion's work to his teacher.<sup>46</sup> *Contra Moles*, there is no firm evidence to suggest that Dion was an enemy of philosophy *per se* early in his life.

We turn now to the concepts of 'philosopher' and 'sophist' and the mutual exclusivity of the two that Synesios suggests.<sup>47</sup> Sophism was given negative connotations by Plato, who saw it as the opposite of philosophy (e.g. *Grg.* 457a, 463d, 521d-e, *R.* 493a-c). Nevertheless *rhētorikē*, the *technē* inspired by the practices of the early sophists, was too powerful a tool to be ignored. Aristotle recognized the fact and established a typology and training techniques; his work was extended by Theophrastos.<sup>48</sup> That ancient writers distinguished in often contradictory ways between rhetors – the practitioners of *rhētorikē* – and sophists is suggested by different modern assessments of the evidence: Bowersock sees rhetors and sophists fundamentally the same, with sophists – as Sextus Empiricus claimed (*M.* 2.18) – those who had reached the peak of rhetorical skill; Jones suggests that the term *rhētor* was used for a lawyer or a politician as opposed to a declaimer.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> For the Stoic Opposition, Syme 1958b, 550-62, van Geytenbeek 1963, 3-4, Desmond 2008, 48-51.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Desmond 2008, 51, van Geytenbeek 1963, 4.

<sup>45</sup> Alternatively, or later, he may have been exiled: Jerome (*Chron. s.v. Titus*) reports that Titus permitted his return; Pliny's reference to him at *Ep.* 3.11 suggests that, at the time of writing (101/2 CE), he was already dead.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Jones 1978a, 16. Moles (1978, 85, n. 51) and Whitmarsh (2001a, 271 n. 12, 290) acknowledge the ambiguity of *pros* but nevertheless posit an antagonistic master-pupil relationship.

<sup>47</sup> On the terms, Bowersock 1969, 12-14, Stanton 1973, 350-64, Jones 1974, 12-14, Vanderspoel 2010, 135.

<sup>48</sup> Aristotle differentiated between epideictic (display), deliberative (political), and forensic (judicial) rhetoric (*Rh.* 1.3), and instituted training which involved arguing both sides of an argument. Cf. T. Morgan 1998, 190, Vanderspoel 2010, 125-6. Quintilian (*Inst.* 12.2.25) claims that it was the practice of the Academy to dispute both sides of a question.

<sup>49</sup> Bowersock 1969, 12-14, Jones 1974, 12.

In the Roman period, rhetors (including sophists) and philosophers were rivals because philosophy and rhetoric were two distinct and important parts of higher education.<sup>50</sup> Negative references to 'sophists' were common.<sup>51</sup> The young Dion couples *sophistai* with *goetes* at 32.11 and 32.39. At 11.6, he seems to use the term 'sophist' simply as one of abuse for rivals. 'Sophist' is likewise used as a term of abuse by Plutarch (*Mor.* 710b, *Mor.* 857f) and Epiktetos (*Arr. Epict.* 22.20.23, 3.2.11). Lucian uses it of Christ in a derogatory way at *Peregr.* 13. Aristeides notes historically inconsistent usage of the terms *philosophos* and *sophistes* (*Or.* 3.677-81). He praises rhetors (at 3.613, *rhetores*; at 3.663, 'certain men' i.e. the politicians Miltiades, Themistokles, Perikles and Kimon) at the expense of philosophers because of the practical application of their profession. Philosophers' words have borne no fruit: οὐ πανηγύρεις ἐκόσμησαν, οὐ θεοὺς ἐτίμησαν, οὐ πόλεσι συνεβούλευσαν, οὐ λυπούμενους παρεμυθήσαντο, οὐ στασιάζοντας διήλλαξαν, οὐ προὔτρεψαν νέους (*Or.* 3.672), 'they have neither enhanced festivals nor honoured the gods nor advised cities nor consoled the grieving nor reconciled those involved in civil strife nor urged on the young'. Taken at face value, Aristeides' distinction is unjust;<sup>52</sup> rhetors and philosophers had many roles in common, and both made use of the spoken and written word. Inscriptions confirm the fact that an individual could be regarded as both a rhetor and a philosopher.<sup>53</sup>

Philostratos was correct when he distinguished between sophists and philosophers but allowed that philosophers were (at least in times past) called sophists if they expressed their opinions fluently (*VS* 1.484). Synesios' fifth-century understanding separates sophists and philosophers inappropriately. Dion can rightly be regarded as among those who, though they pursued philosophy, were considered sophists (*VS* 1.492).

## β Dion's conversion to Cynicism

Synesios believed that Dion converted from sophism to philosophy; alternatively, it can be argued that he converted from Stoicism to Cynicism in his exile. Certainly, there are indications

<sup>50</sup> See Ch. 5.2.1. Rhetoric is the final stage of (general) education with its own teacher at Quint. *Inst.* 1.2.1-3. Cf. T. Morgan 1998, 191.

<sup>51</sup> Many epideictic orators seem to have preferred the term 'rhetor' for themselves because of the negative connotations of 'sophist'. Philostratos (*VS*) simply chose to ignore these connotations. Cf. Jones 1974, 12-14, Jones 1978a, 9.

<sup>52</sup> In the specific context (*Or.* 3.663-676), Aristeides' criticism is obviously of Cynics, whom he denies to be truly philosophers (*Or.* 3.676-7).

<sup>53</sup> Bowersock 1969, 11-12. For relevant inscriptions, Oliver 1949, 246-7 (the inscription discussed is *IG* II<sup>2</sup>, 3704); Kaibel 1878/1965, 36, no. 106; Jones 1967, 311-12.

in this direction. As we have seen, Dion trained with the Stoic Musonius. Early in life, he was very critical of Alexandrian Cynics (32.9, 62). His later self-identification with Diogenes (*Orr.* 6, 8, 9, 10) can be interpreted as indicating that he was a Cynic, at least during his exile. So too can his customary mature self-presentation, as he himself admits at 34.2.<sup>54</sup>

However, Dion's self-identification with Diogenes can be related to Trajan's with Alexander (Ch. 5.3.2a); moreover, Stoics as well as Cynics were admirers of Diogenes (*Arr. Epict.* 1.24.6-10, *M.Aur.* 8.3).<sup>55</sup> As already noted, Dion wore the *tribon* – characteristic of Cynics (*Arr. Epict.* 3.22.10) – even before his exile (32.22). Conclusively, after his exile he presents himself as a Stoic, and as having identified himself as a Stoic during his exile (36.29, 36-7; see Ch. 5.3.3c). His actions in his later years to re-establish his position in Prousa and advance his son (40.2, 44.8, 50.5, 10) prove that he was not, at least in this period of his life, a Cynic: Cynics were expected to renounce family and civic involvement (*Arr. Epict.* 3.22.67-85).<sup>56</sup>

Dion's complex attitude to Cynicism can be contextualized. The distinction between Stoics and Cynics was always fluid, and the two schools shared a number of attributes and sympathies.<sup>57</sup> Outwardly, Stoics and Cynics could look alike; the full beard in particular was characteristic of both.<sup>58</sup> Within the Stoic Opposition, there was a range of views. The movement was in principle Republican and opposed to one-man rule. It was also not Cynic, since Cynic virtues conflicted with traditional Roman ones: Cynic shamelessness with Roman *gravitas*, Cynic irreverence with Roman *pietas*, Cynic contempt for custom with Roman respect for the *mos maiorum*.<sup>59</sup> But views varied. The attitudes to the ruling *princeps* of Thrasea Paetus and his son-in-law Helvidius Priscus – those of Priscus perhaps closer to the Cynics' – can be distinguished (*D.C.* 65.12.2-3); Musonius and those near him were not opposed to kingly rule. A Stoic/Cynic divide can possibly be seen in the quarrels among philosophers noted above (Ch. 5.2.2b.α): the attacks Synesios reports on Sokrates and Zenon and their followers suggest (in Jones' speculative

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<sup>54</sup> Höistad (1948, 153 n. 4) sees Dion as a Cynic in his post-exile period. Navia (1996, 4, 8) calls Dion 'a Cynic – or rather a sort of Cynic – only during one phase of his life'.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Jones 1978a, 49. The Neoplatonist Julian was also an admirer (*Or.* 6).

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Jones 1978a, 49. That many made some such renunciation is evidenced by derogatory references to Cynic beggars by Dion himself (32.9, 34.2). On Cynic practice in the Roman Empire, Branham and Goulet-Cazé 1996, 12-18.

<sup>57</sup> For continuities between Cynic and Stoic doctrine, Desmond 2008, 210-11.

<sup>58</sup> In an extant fragment (*Frg.* 21), Musonius, following Zenon, allows no part of the beard to be shaved, and permits hair trimming only when the hair becomes troublesome. Cf. van Geytenbeek 1963, 119-123. Close-cropping of the hair seems at one time to have been characteristic of Cynics (*D.L.* 6.31), and later to have been adopted by the Stoics (*Luc. Herm.* 18).

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Desmond 2008, 45, 48.

but reasonable opinion) hostility to 'that left wing of Stoicism which sympathized with the libertarian views of the Cynics'.<sup>60</sup>

γ A different interpretation of 'conversion'

Preserved fragments suggest that Musonius was no theoretical ethicist.<sup>61</sup> His strength lay in applied ethics; he was primarily concerned with how to live out the philosophical life. Zenon is said to have seen, as the goal of life, living consistently with nature (τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῆ φύσει ζῆν, D.L. 7.87); Chrysippos added that, for rational beings, the natural life is that lived according to reason (D.L. 7.86). For Roman Stoics this had political implications, as the course of Musonius' own life proves (Ch. 5.2.2b.α). Further, politics meant oratory and, indeed, *rhetorike*. The Romans used it – as they did coins and inscriptions – to communicate imagery and ideology and promote consensus. Sophists were the performers who swayed public – in particular, educated, elite, and so politically powerful public – opinion.<sup>62</sup>

We are thus returned full circle to the subject of Dion as a practitioner of *rhetorike* and/or of philosophy; it is clear that he himself would have seen the two as not in opposition but inextricably linked. The connection was expressed explicitly in Stoic circles. Quintilian makes the (Stoic) assumption that the world is orderly and designed for good, and hence that the state should and will be governed by those best able to do so for the benefit of all: *nam si regitur providentia mundus, administranda certe bonis uiris erit res publica* (*Inst.* 12.2.21). Moreover, he sees human beings distinguished from animals by their reason – which enables them to identify the good – and their speech, which allows them to communicate it. Oratorical ability, requiring superiority in both reason and speech (*Inst.* 12.1.2-3), marks out the superior person who is fit to rule.<sup>63</sup>

In this context, it is clear that the crisis of his exile did indeed lead Dion to a conversion to philosophy in the sense of a living out of the values he espoused – that, like 'exile leads to philosophy', 'conversion to philosophy' was a trope that he could accurately have used to

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<sup>60</sup> Jones 1978a, 15-16. On Musonius' discourse on the philosopher-king (Frg. 8), van Geytenbeek 1963, 124-9.

<sup>61</sup> van Geytenbeek 1963, 160; cf. also Sandbach 1989<sup>2</sup>, 162-4. On Stoic ethics more generally, Sandbach 1989<sup>2</sup>, 28-68.

<sup>62</sup> On the consensus which was the basis of Roman imperial power and its cultivation, Ando 2000. *Rhetorike* contributed in a subtle as well as the obvious way to its creation: in the educational system, the study and practice of *rhetorike* required students to articulate for themselves and so internalize embedded values. Cf. T. Morgan 1998, 223.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. T. Morgan 1998, 226-34.

describe his life. As we have seen (Ch. 5.1), at an early date he was involved in politics at the highest level. In the *Ad Alexandrinos*, he expressed the opinion that the philosopher is morally obliged to put his beliefs into practice by speaking out for the good of all (32.8, 11). On being exiled, in what he could have called a 'Choice of Herakles' but never did – he used the imagery of the oracle instead – he made the decision not to attempt to mitigate the effects of his exile and disappear from public view but rather to live out his philosophy and embrace his exile in conspicuously dramatic form.<sup>64</sup> It was in living out the wandering, and socially/politically involved, life of exile that he became – and was called and so affirmed as – a philosopher (13.11-13). Dion may have continued his overtly political role in exile: Philostratos sees him visiting military camps in disguise (VS 1.488; see Ch. 5.3.1b below). Certainly, he resumed it promptly afterwards.<sup>65</sup> His oratorical skills gained him the patronage of Trajan, and he used the same skills and the patronage that he had acquired to enhance his position in his own community, and his community's position in the Roman world.<sup>66</sup> Dion's conversion to philosophy at the time of his exile was a genuine one, and one from which he was never to resile.

A possible challenge to this picture of Musonius' and Dion's attitudes to the nature of the philosophical life is implicit in the distinction that Whitmarsh draws between Musonius' vision of exile (Frg. 9) as a permanent break with earlier concerns – he is to remain '(metaphorically) an exile from the socio-political concerns of Rome' – and Dion's concept (expressed in post-exilic orations) of a period of separation authorizing his assumption of a philosophical role in the Roman world.<sup>67</sup> However, here we must note that Whitmarsh's comments relate to the extant (and, in Musonius' case, reported<sup>68</sup>) self-representations; the thought of the two men can scarcely be separated on the basis of the passages. Musonius is speaking in exile; we know that he returned to Rome and the political scene. Dion's references to his exile mostly postdate it. On restoration, both would undoubtedly have argued that exile confers freedom from political constraints rather than from political involvement. It is of some interest that, although he makes no explicit mention of Turner's conception of a sociologically liminal experience (cf. Ch. 1.3), Whitmarsh is obviously using it as a model: he refers to exile as

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<sup>64</sup> It is even possible that, as Moles suggests (Ch. 5.2.2b.a), Dion did feel some guilt for not provoking his own exile in 71, and now saw an opportunity to compensate.

<sup>65</sup> Contrary to the argument in this chapter, Swain (1996, 190) sees Dion's adoption of the *persona* of a wandering philosopher as a cynical use of imagery for political purposes after his exile rather than 'a reflection of a true change of heart'.

<sup>66</sup> As noted above (Ch. 5.2.2b.β), Dion refers to his own and his son's roles at 40.2, 44.8, 50.5, 10; see also Ch. 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.4.2.

<sup>67</sup> Whitmarsh 2001a, 283, 292.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. van Geytenbeek 1963, 8-9, Whitmarsh 2001a, 276-7.

philosophic initiation, as (in Musonius' case) something other than 'a period of enforced seclusion prior to reaggregation into the community' and (in Dion's) a '*rîte de passage*'.<sup>69</sup>

The singular, formative nature of Dion's conversion is potentially challenged by what has reasonably been suggested as a later-life development in his thought. In the *Charidemus*, Dion presents three increasingly optimistic understandings of human life: that the world is a prison prepared by the gods as a punishment for human beings, with death a welcome escape (30.10-11); that the world was prepared by the gods as a colony and now, left to the colonists' control, is less than perfect (30.25-7); and that the world is a palace into which the king of the gods has invited human beings for a banquet (30.28-32).<sup>70</sup> Cohoon notes that 'it seems reasonable to suppose that the three explanations of life represent three stages in Dio's own belief'. Moles concurs, but points to difficulties that suggest that we should examine the work in more detail.<sup>71</sup>

The *Charidemus* seems intended to evoke Plato's *Phaedo* – according to Philostratos (VS 1.488), one of Dion's favourite works. In the oration, the father of Dion's beloved pupil Charidemus reports his son's dying words, just as Phaidon reports Sokrates', thus associating the young man with the sage. This construction suggests that the account is not a simple report of a real event, and that the views attributed to 'Charidemus' (whether or not a real Charidemus existed) are Dion's own.

Plato's Orpheus supposed that, when any die, it is only because they have been sufficiently chastised (*Cra.* 400c); in the *Phaedo* itself, the universe is a prison prepared by the gods (*Phd.* 62b). In Dion's *Charidemus*, these views are attributed to ἀνὴρ δυσάρεστος ... καὶ πολλὰ λελυπημένος κατὰ τὸν βίον, ὁψὲ παιδείας ἀληθοῦς ἠσθημένος (30.25), 'a difficult-to-please man ... who has suffered many things throughout his life and late obtained a true education'. This man – who is also a beggar (*aner agyrtes*, 30.20) – can obviously be identified as an *alter ego* of Dion himself. Moles notes the problems associated with interpretation.<sup>72</sup> On the most obvious reading of the oration, 'Charidemus' learned from the *dysarestos* man and then replaced his account with a better and more positive one; the 'true' education that the man had obtained must then have been judged by Dion-Charidemus as – to some extent – less than true. Alternatively, ὁψὲ παιδείας ἀληθοῦς ἠσθημένος may be Dion-Charidemus' reference to the

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<sup>69</sup> Whitmarsh 2001a, 281, 283, 292.

<sup>70</sup> In the light of Musonius' attitude to rural work (Ch. 5.4.2 below), it is relevant that the two later and explicitly 'better' views are contributed by a farmer (*anthropos georgos*, 30.25).

<sup>71</sup> Cohoon 1939, 399 (introductory comment at *Or.* 30); Moles 2000, 203-4.

<sup>72</sup> Moles 2000, 204.

*dysarestos* man – that is, himself – as he is at present; the 'true' education, embracing the ideas expressed in the oration, is that of his maturity, and one relatively recently obtained.

In the context of the discussion above, it can be suggested here that the first of these two readings is to be preferred. Dion made his significant life-decision on being exiled. If the period of his exile was 'liminal' in the sense that it transformed him into the philosopher he had chosen to be, it undoubtedly provided his 'true education'. To a Stoic and a student of Musonius, negative or more positive mythologically-expressed understandings of the human condition would have been of secondary importance to the identity that the living out of the philosophical life conferred. Dion's late-life position would have been a variant – but a relatively minor one – of that which his exile taught.

Dion perhaps implies as much when he locates the wise in the first and the third of the three understandings mentioned above. In the first, they are the clever (*kompsoi*) and shrewd (*drimys*) who use the file (*rhine*) of reason (*logos*) to mitigate their lot (30.23-4). In the third, they accept with joy (or equanimity) the hierarchical positions at table offered them (30.29), and correctly choose a personified Intelligence (*nous*) as their cup-bearer (30.36-7). In the best and worst conceptions of the human condition, they obtain the most to which a human being can aspire.

### *c. Conclusion*

In his thirteenth oration, Dion uses or suggests three contemporary paradigms – exile leads to philosophy, conversion to philosophy, and acceptance of an oracle's advice – to describe a turning point in his life. 'Conversion to philosophy' can be regarded as a true representation of the experience – Dion lived out the paradigm (Ch. 5.2.2b.γ) – although the truth is complicated by the fact that he had undoubtedly represented himself as a philosopher earlier in life. Dion obscures 'exile leads to philosophy' in a way that, to those familiar with the literary tradition, virtually deliberately refers to it (Ch. 5.2.2a); he uses the myth of the oracle (Ch. 5.2.1) to express – and to suggest divine sanction for – what 'conversion to philosophy' in the context of his exile meant.

### 5.3 Encircling the earth

Deciding to adopt a specific way of life/ identity was only one step in a process. Dion was obliged to live out his decision, journeying in fact 'to the utmost part of the earth'. In this section, we investigate the world-encircling journeys that, together, confirmed him in the identity he assumed. In discussion of Apollonios, journeys of beneficence and of autopsy were addressed separately. Here, we shall see the concept of wandering as appropriate to a philosopher subsuming both ideas.

#### 5.3.1 Journeys of autopsy

Repeatedly in his orations, as we shall see (Ch. 5.3.1a-b), Dion stresses what he has learned on his travels from observation and from the remote wise.

He can represent his journeys simply as journeys of autopsy, undertaken to observe. At 36.1, he travels towards the land of the Getai in order to observe conditions there (ὅπως θεάσωμαι τὰκεῖ πράγματα ὅποῖά ἐστι). He can also stress the extent of his journeying: ὡς γὰρ ἔτυχον ἐν τῇ φυγῇ ποτε ἀλώμενος ... ἐπήειν δ' οὖν ὡς ἐδυνάμην πλείστην γῆν ... τοῦτο μὲν παρ' Ἑλλήνας, τοῦτο δὲ παρὰ βαρβάρους ... (1.50), 'when I happened once to be wandering in my exile ... I went to as much of the world as I was able, now among the Greeks, now among barbarians ... '. Here, we have an expression of the completeness – to the limits of his human capacity – of Dion's autopsy, and so of his knowledge of the lands and peoples of the earth.

In spite of this self-representation, Dion's real journeys were necessarily limited and chosen. We can reconstruct at least some of those that took him beyond the Graeco-Roman world from his works, and suggest probable reasons for his choice of specific destinations.

##### *a. Journeys before exile*

There is evidence to suggest that Dion travelled beyond the Graeco-Roman world prior to his exile. As discussed at Ch. 4.4, an educational visit to Egypt seems to have been part of the career of many intellectual young men. The strongest evidence for an Egyptian sojourn early in Dion's career lies in *Or.* 32, addressed to the people of Alexandria and dated – controversially, on the basis of identification of 'Konon' (32.72) – to 71-75 CE (cf. App. 5). Dion's knowledge of the contemporary city and the wider region – for example, local Cynics (32.9; cf. *Luc. Peregr.* 17) and

the cults of Sarapis in the city (32.12; cf. Paus. 1.18.4) and of Apis at Memphis (32.13; cf. Paus. 7.22.2-4) – virtually establishes his presence in the area, at least at some time in his life.

A supporting argument for an early visit lies in the connection Philostratos sees between Dion, Apollonios of Tyana and Euphrates of Tyre (*VS* 1.488); in the *VA*, the three interact with Vespasian at Alexandria in Dion's youth (5.27.1-5.40). Philostratos' reference to letters from Apollonios to Dion (*VA* 5.40) quotes the beginning of the extant *Ep.* 9, suggesting its pre-Philostratan origin. (Also addressed to Dion are *Ep.* 10 and *Ep.* 90.) However, Philostratos may simply have invented the Alexandrian association on the basis of Dion's *Ad Alexandrinos*.

Also possibly relevantly, in the early *Troicus*, Dion refers to a visit to Onouphis, a city in the Delta not far from Sais (11.37). However, the literal truth of his account, in which an old priest corrects Homer's version of the tale of Troy on the authority of ancient Egyptian records (11.38), is suspect; the tale is obviously modelled on Pl. *Tim.* 20e-25d, in which an old Egyptian priest at Sais criticizes the Athenians' ignorance of their own ancient history (23c) and tells Solon the tale of Atlantis.<sup>73</sup>

More conclusively, a passage in the *Ad Alexandrinos* (32.52) suggests familiarity with Rhodes and exactly echoes Dion's *Rhodiacus* (31.162). Rhodes was a customary stage on the voyage to Egypt,<sup>74</sup> and independent evidence (App. 5) dates the *Rhodiacus* to Dion's youth; the probability of an early date for the *Ad Alexandrinos* follows.

#### *b. Journeys during and shortly after exile*

At 13.9, Dion reports that the god commanded him to travel to the ὕστατον ... τῆς γῆς. At one level, the command suggested an unending quest (ἐπήειν δ' οὖν ὡς ἐδυνάμην πλείστην γῆν, 1.50). At another, Dion obviously interpreted the ὕστατον ... τῆς γῆς as a geographical counterpoint to the Graeco-Roman centre. His great, intentional, journey was to the Getai – remote, culturally different, and rebels against Rome – with Olbia a stopping-place on the way. At the beginning of *Or.* 36 he records: Ἐτύγχανον μὲν ἐπιδημῶν ἐν Βορυσθένει τὸ θέρος, ὁπότε εἰσέπλευσα μετὰ τὴν φυγὴν, βουλόμενος ἐλθεῖν, ἐὰν δύνωμαι, διὰ Σκυθῶν εἰς Γέτας ... , 'I

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<sup>73</sup> The priest's account is also suspect for its masterful use (11.53-61) of the *anaskeue* (refutation), a form typical of the rhetorical schools. The challenge to Homer and use of this form suggest this oration as one of Dion's early works. Cf. Jones 1978a, 17; on favoured subjects for rhetorical exercises, T. Morgan 1998, 119-20.

<sup>74</sup> For Apollonios' visit on his way to Egypt, Philostr. *VA* 5.21-3; for Aristeides', App. 6.

happened to be staying in Borysthenes for the summer, when I sailed there after my exile, wanting to go, if I was able, through the Skythians to the Getai ... '.

Dion's Getai are the Dacians of modern Romania. Dion himself refers to the 'land of the Getai or Mysians (Mysoi), as Homer calls them, using the modern name (*nyn epiklesis*) of the people' (12.16): Poseidonios (*ap. Str.7.3.2*) had previously identified the Mysians whom Zeus surveys at *Il. 13.5* as the later Moisians (Moisoi) of Thrace. Historically, the Getai, Moisians and Dacians seem to have been different peoples of the Danube Valley, though the Greeks regularly referred to the Dacians as 'Getai'.<sup>75</sup> Borythenes is an alternative, older, name for Olbia (cf. Ch. 5.3.3c).

Dion's desire to visit the Getai was undoubtedly political. The question is: was it political in a broad sense, motivated simply by a desire to observe at first hand alternative societies of the kinds idealized in literature that he knew? Or was it motivated by practical political engagement – a desire to remove Domitian, or to make himself an asset to Domitian's successor? The two possibilities will be considered in turn.

Possibly, in the wake of his experiences, Dion was interested in social alternatives – although, in spite of the fact that he presents India as a fanciful, end of the world paradise (*Or. 35*), there is no suggestion that he ever considered going there. The tradition of admiration of barbarians and particularly nomads was examined at App. 1.5. Barbarians can be represented as 'free', as opposed to those enslaved by tyrants. In his *Olympicus*, Dion describes himself among Roman and Getic hosts ἐπιθυμῶν ἰδεῖν ἄνδρας ἀγωνιζομένους ὑπὲρ ἀρχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως, τοὺς δὲ ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας τε καὶ πατρίδος (12.20), 'desiring to see men contending for rule and power, and others for freedom and homeland'. Moles (who dates the work to 97, in the immediate aftermath of Dion's exile) sees the passage as evidence that Dion contrasted an ancient freedom-loving people – Homer's Mysians (12.16) – with Romans and with the unfree Greeks, in implicit criticism of Greek acceptance of Roman rule.<sup>76</sup> Desideri (who dates it to 101 or 105) has a similar view.<sup>77</sup> However, the passage need not be anti-Roman *per se*. 'Contending for freedom and homeland' (12.20) may simply be an appropriate expression of the rebels' feelings, part of their characterization as noble barbarians, as is Tacitus' recreation of Calgacus' words at *Ag. 30-2*.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Jones 1978a, 51; Russell 1992, 171.

<sup>76</sup> Moles 1995, 181, 183.

<sup>77</sup> Desideri 2000, 102.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. Russell 1992, 173.

Could Dion's intention have been more overtly political, to bring about change by undermining Domitian as chance permitted among the troops in military outposts?

There is some confusion about the date of Dion's visit to the Getai. Dion seems to have been exiled relatively early in Domitian's reign, possibly in connection with the fall of Domitian's cousin Flavius Sabinus (Ch. 5.1). Philostratos has him in Dacia when he hears of Domitian's assassination; at the time, Domitian had recently come to terms with the Dacians after a period of war.<sup>79</sup> As Philostratos describes it:

θαμίζων δὲ ἐς τὰ στρατόπεδα, ἐν οἷσπερ εἰώθει τρύχεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας ὀρών ἐς νεώτερα ὀρμώντας ἐπὶ Δομετιανῶ ἀπεσφαγμένῳ οὐκ ἐφείσατο ἀταξίαν ἰδὼν ἐκραγεῖσαν, ἀλλὰ γυμνὸς ἀναπηδήσας ἐπὶ βωμὸν ὑψηλὸν ἤρξατο τοῦ λόγου ὧδε· Αὐτὰρ ὁ γυμνώθη ῥακέων πολύμητις Ὀδυσσεύς, καὶ εἰπὼν ταῦτα καὶ δηλώσας ἑαυτὸν, ὅτι μὴ πτωχός, μηδὲ ὄν ὦντο, Δίων δὲ εἶη ὁ σοφός, ἐπὶ μὲν τὴν κατηγορίαν τοῦ τυράννου πολὺς ἔπνευσεν, τοὺς δὲ στρατιώτας ἐδίδαξεν ἀμείνω φρονεῖν τὰ δοκοῦντα Ῥωμαίοις πράττοντας. (VS 1.488)

Frequenting the military camp in the kind of clothing he had become accustomed to wear and seeing the soldiers roused to rebellion after the assassination of Domitian, he did not draw back at the sight of the lack of discipline which had broken out but, leaping up wearing next to nothing onto a tall altar, began his speech thus: 'But Odysseus of many counsels stripped himself of his rags'. And, having said this and revealed himself – that he was neither a beggar nor the person whom they thought, but Dion the wise – he uttered a forceful denunciation of the tyrant and taught the soldiers to reconsider and do what seemed good to the Roman people.

Suetonius (*Dom.* 23) records the mutiny by supporters of Domitian against the new regime.

Against any such scenario, at 36.1 Dion claims that he reached Olbia in the summer *after his exile* (μετὰ τὴν φυγὴν), intending at the time to go on to the Skythians and the Getai. The chronology can be reconstructed as follows. Domitian died in September 96. Dion would have heard about this and about Nerva's recall of exiles (Ch. 5.1) in early 97 when he was somewhere north of the Black Sea.<sup>80</sup> Nevertheless, he delayed his return to sail into Olbia in the summer of

<sup>79</sup> For Domitian's and Trajan's campaigns against the Dacians, *PIR*<sup>2</sup> D 19. Cf. Jones 1978a, 118-9.

<sup>80</sup> The Tauric Cherrones (Crimea), which Dion's text suggests he must have seen (36.3), had been within the Roman sphere of influence since the defeat of Mithridates (see Butyagin 2007, 14-16). The necessarily speculative chronology of Dion's activities that follows is indebted principally to Jones 1978a, 51-4, 122-3.

97 (36.1) and possibly went further, as he claims to have intended, towards Skythia and the Getai (36.1). Alternatively – since at 36.25 the local elder Hieroson politely wishes him a speedy return home – Dion may not have heard of the recall when he was in Olbia.

An alternative chronology is possible if we accept that the words *μετὰ τὴν φυγὴν* belonged originally with the title, as Synesios (*Dio* 1, 95-101 Terzaghi) perhaps suggests.<sup>81</sup> In that case the work as a whole was written after the exile, but Dion's visits to Olbia and afterwards to the Getai could have fallen in the course of the exile. This would tie in well with Hieroson's wish for a speedy return home. In this context, the early journey remains a possibility.

Whatever the chronology, after the events described above and before he could reach Rome, where he intended to see Nerva, the new emperor had died (January 98; 45.2). Dion probably then searched out Trajan on the Rhine or the Danube; something like this must have been the case because eventually he reached Prousa with 'a letter from the emperor' (40.5). His immediate quest for new imperial connections suggests Dion's steadfast resolution to involve himself politically as circumstances permitted. Later, in answer to an invitation from the emperor (44.12), he led a delegation from Prousa (40.13-15) which won substantial concessions for the city (45.3-4).<sup>82</sup>

Trajan reached Rome for the first time as emperor in late 99 and left again in March 101 (*ILS* 5035) to fight the First Dacian War. Dion was thus probably in Rome – on his mission on behalf of Prousa – in 100, when Trajan was also there, and it would have been at this time that he composed his Kingship Orations.<sup>83</sup> Dion could have accompanied Trajan in March 101: if he represented himself as knowledgeable about the Getai, Trajan could well have wanted his company both as an expert and as one capable of writing a favourable account of his campaign.

Dion could then have returned via Olympia to Prousa; this would account for 12.16-20, where Dion claims to have been in Olympia for the Olympic Games after visiting the Danube and the land of the Getai at a time when the Dacians were preparing for war; the Games would be

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<sup>81</sup> See Ch. 5.2.2b; cf. also Russell 1992, 211.

<sup>82</sup> *Orr.* 40, 44, 45, 47, 48 and 49 all date from the period of Dion's return to Prousa for the second time after his exile. They trace a progression from public acclaim for favours successfully obtained to discord and litigation over the construction of a *stoa* to beautify the city (40.8-9, 47.11, 16-17, 48.9-12). See App. 5.

<sup>83</sup> Since the time of Synesios (who refers to *Or.* 4 as τὸν ἔσχατον περὶ βασιλείας, *Dio* 2, 25 Terzaghi), the Kingship Orations (*Orr.* 1-4) have been grouped together as addresses to the emperor; certainly Photios knew the present order and nomenclature (*Bibl.* codex 209, 165b-166a). Cf. Whitmarsh 2001b, 326, Whitmarsh 2005, 61. That the orations were in fact presented to Trajan can never be proven. *Orr.* 1 and 3 are addresses, and *Orr.* 2 and 4, imaginary dialogues. However, format is not necessarily an indication of presentation. The dialogues may have been presented before the emperor (cf. Suet. *Aug.* 89.3) and, like later Christian apologies, the addresses were not necessarily presented. Cf. Jones 1978a, 115.

those of 101. It would have been during this visit to Greece that Dion gave his thirteenth oration, referring to his exile, in Athens. Dion's return to Prousa after what was apparently an absence of a year (40.18) ties in with his absence for parts of the years 100 and 101.

Dion is known to have written a history of the Getai, the *Getika* mentioned by Philostratos at VS 1.487. Its date is uncertain. It seems to have been completed after Domitian's death, since a passage that may be from it refers to him unflatteringly; certainly, Trajan's victory over the Dacians rather than Domitian's compromise was the appropriate time for publication of such a work. Jones suggests a date c. 106, late in Dion's life, with the work commemorating Trajan's Getic wars of 101-102 and 105-106,<sup>84</sup> and this seems reasonable.

Summing up, it seems most likely that Dion's journeys to the Getai were undertaken in opposition to Domitian or in support of Trajan as much as (or as well as) simply to observe 'the Other'. This said, we can turn to consideration of Dion's relationship with Trajan, the role of a ruler, and encompassing the earth to do good.

### **5.3.2 Journeys of beneficence and conquest**

#### *a. Dion or Trajan as Herakles; Trajan as Alexander the Great*

Herakles can be seen as a divine distributor of benefits (Ch. 3.4.2a). In another aspect of his traditional *persona*, he is the one who endures unending toil (*ponos*).<sup>85</sup> Uniting the two motifs, Dion's Herakles – motivated by his desire to do the most people the greatest good (1.65) – laboured more than all (καὶ πάντων μάλιστα ἐπόνει, 1.63).

Herakles was a favourite Cynic hero<sup>86</sup> and closely associated with Diogenes.<sup>87</sup> The latter understood labour as training (*askesis*): supposedly, he injured himself to hardship by rolling in hot sand in summer and embracing snow-covered statues in winter (D.L. 6.23).<sup>88</sup> Stobaeus' Diogenes allegorizes the story of Medeia to exemplify the virtues of *ponos*: the legend that

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<sup>84</sup> For the *Getika*, *FGrH* 707; the passage referring to Domitian is 707 F 5. Trajan's doctor Kriton accompanied him to the front and wrote an account of the campaign with the same title as Dion's (*FGrH* 200). Cf. Jones 1978a, 123, 139.

<sup>85</sup> E.g. see *Ar. Nu.* 1048-50.

<sup>86</sup> For early Cynic references to Herakles, Höistad 1948, 33-50. Julian notes that the more high-minded (*gennaioteroi*) Cynics claim that Herakles bequeathed to mankind the greatest *paradeigma* of their way of life (*Or.* 6.187c).

<sup>87</sup> Thus e.g. Lucian's Diogenes claims to have modelled himself on Herakles (*Vit. Auct.* 8).

<sup>88</sup> Training ensured the freedom that was the ultimate Cynic goal. At D.L. 6.71, asceticism itself is subordinated to freedom: like Herakles, Diogenes preferred the latter to anything else.

Medeia boiled the flesh of men arose from the fact that she made them strong by forcing them to toil at gymnastic exercise and in sweat baths (*Anthologium* 3.29.92). In this context, Dion's Diogenes undoubtedly identifies himself with Herakles – the tale of whose Labours he proceeds to recount (8.27-35) – when he claims to have come to Olympia to compete (8.11, 26).<sup>89</sup>

Embracing willingly the suffering that exile and wandering entail in order to become the person he has decided to be, Dion identifies himself with both Diogenes – who will be discussed later – and Herakles. He is the suffering Herakles who does good in *Or.* 47, in which Herakles' bad treatment by his fellow townsman (Eurystheus) is a pointed reference to Dion's poor treatment by the citizens of Prousa (47.4). In counterpoint to Herakles' continuing beneficence to Thebes (his original city) and Argos (Eurystheus' city), Zenon, Chrysippos and Kleantes, Homer and Pythagoras, all fled from home (47.2-6).<sup>90</sup> Dion can be seen as identifying himself with Herakles when, standing before Pheidias' great statue of Zeus at Olympia, he claims that even one who has suffered great misfortunes (*symphorai*) and griefs (*lupai*), κατ' ἐναντίον σταῶν τῆσδε τῆς εἰκόνοσ ἐκλαθέσθαι ἂν πάντων ὅσα ἐν ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ δεινὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ γίνεταί παθεῖν (12.51), 'standing before this image would forget everything, as many of the terrible and painful things in human life as he happens to have experienced'.

Dion does not compare only himself with Herakles. Trajan deliberately associated himself closely with the divinity. Herakles had a cult centre at Gades in Trajan's native Baetica, and the emperor made Herakles the emblem of his new legion the Second Traiana, probably raised for the First Dacian War, and minted coins bearing the image of Hercules Gaditanus.<sup>91</sup> Moreover, Herakles' double (divine/human) nature made him particularly well suited to representing a Roman emperor, worshipped in cult and often deified on death (Ch. 1.2.4). Dion uses the association in the Kingship Orations. His tale of Herakles' Choice (1.56-84) can be construed as an application of officially-sponsored imagery (Trajan as Herakles) to make an officially-sponsored point (the contrast between Trajan and Domitian).<sup>92</sup> However, Moles makes the valid point that use of imperial imagery does not necessarily imply flattery. 'To the extent that Dio's ideal king is described in terms of Trajan's own imperial propaganda ... the point is not merely to praise Trajan but so to praise him as to emphasise the need to translate his own

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<sup>89</sup> Cf. Dudley 1998<sup>2</sup>, 33, Saïd 2000, 166.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. Saïd 2000, 166.

<sup>91</sup> Jones 1978a, 117, Jaczynowska 1981, 636-7, Moles 1990, 323.

<sup>92</sup> Pliny associated Trajan's service to Domitian with Herakles' to Eurystheus (*Pan.* 14.5). Both Dion and Pliny's works seem originally to have been delivered c. 100, but there is no evidence of the influence of one on the other. Cf. Jones 1978a, 118, Moles 1990, 301-3.

propaganda ... into full reality'.<sup>93</sup> In the first part of Dion's myth, Trajan is Herakles, the one who must make a correct choice between Basileia and Tyrannis; Dion takes the perhaps risky step of warning him to do so. However, he covers himself.<sup>94</sup> Trajan is also Basileia: Basileia has the look of Trajan<sup>95</sup> and Tyrannis, her alternative, is markedly reminiscent of Domitian.<sup>96</sup> Basileia is the child of King Zeus (1.73), so Zeus and Basileia can be taken as Nerva and Trajan, just as, in *Or.* 2 and more obviously, can Philip and Alexander. In the final section of the speech (1.84), Trajan is the one who has made the right choice – he is a king and not a tyrant – and so he has Herakles' honour and protection. But he can also be seen as Herakles himself, a destroyer of tyrants among Greeks and barbarians (here, a reference to the Dacian leader Decebalus) alike.<sup>97</sup>

In *Or.* 3, a ruler who shares the character of the 'first and best god' (i.e. Zeus, 3.50) is like the sun, which can itself be assimilated – in its unceasing labour for the benefit of the world – to Herakles. The good ruler endures toils (*ponoi*) and annoyances (*pragmata*) seeing that the sun is untroubled by the tasks he must perform through all the ages for the salvation of human beings and life (3.57). Trajan must imitate the sun's untiring *dynamis* and *philanthropia* (3.73-82). A ruler's glory or justice was often likened to that of the sun; Moles speculatively sees the passage as evidence for a Sol-cult under Trajan.<sup>98</sup>

The imagery of beneficence and conquest – used to justify Alexander the Great's career (Ch.3.4.2a) – undoubtedly underlay Trajan's self-association with Alexander. At least in the wake of Trajan's Parthian campaign (113-116), Alexander was recognized (along with Julius Caesar) as his role model;<sup>99</sup> very probably, his interest in the conqueror pre-dated Dion's Kingship Orations, which were composed at the beginning of his reign. Moles points to the fact that the Parthians must early have loomed large on his horizon – he had fought against them in his youth (Plin. *Pan.* 14.1) – and that his first campaigns as emperor were – like Alexander's – against the Dacians.

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<sup>93</sup> Moles 1990, 336.

<sup>94</sup> Ancient rhetors discussed the appropriate ways – between flattery and direct criticism – to address rulers; Demetrius (294) called the techniques together figured speech (λόγος ἐσηματισμένος). Cf. Moles 1990, 304, Whitmarsh 2005, 57-9.

<sup>95</sup> Moles (1990, 327) pairs Dion's description of Basileia at 1.71 and Pliny's of Trajan at *Pan.* 4.7 (*honor capitis et dignitas oris*) and 55.11 (*laetissima facies et amabilis uultus*).

<sup>96</sup> For details, Moles 1990, 329 and n. 102. In fact, Domitian was the *tyrannos* personified both to Dion (40.12, 50.8) and to his contemporary Epiktetos (Arr. *Epict.* 1.19.1-10, 1.29.5, 4.7.1-32). Cf. Starr 1949, 20-9, Jones 1978a, 46 n. 1.

<sup>97</sup> Cf. Moles 1990, 324, 327-30, 338-40.

<sup>98</sup> Moles 1990, 357 and n. 153; for association of rulers with the sun in Greek thought from the time of Plato (*Lg.* 945e-946), see Nock 1947/1972, 672-3, Lane Fox 1986, 593 n. 25.

<sup>99</sup> D.C. 68.29, Jul. *Caes.* 333a, 335d, SHA *Hadr.* 4.9. Caesar himself was inspired by Alexander; for his aspiration to attack Parthia, Suet. *Jul.* 44.3; Suetonius (*Jul.* 7.1) presents him admiring a statue of Alexander in the temple of Herakles at Gadeira. Cf. Jones 1978a, 116, 118. See also Ch. 3.4.2b.

Jones suggests on the basis of 45.4 that Trajan consulted the oracle of Apollo at Didyma in 79/80 in imitation of Alexander.<sup>100</sup>

In the Kingship Orations, Dion evokes Trajan-as-Alexander imagery and, in the process, identifies himself as Trajan's wise advisor. (In parallel, as we have seen [Ch. 3.4.2c], Philostratos uses the Apollonios story to stress the role of the wise man as guide/superior to the emperor.) In *Or.* 1, Dion compares himself to Alexander's musician Timotheos (1.1-8).<sup>101</sup> In *Or.* 2, Trajan is surely Alexander and Dion, Aristotle.<sup>102</sup> In *Or.* 4, Alexander and Diogenes are (perhaps) Trajan and Dion. In fact, Dion probably chose self-assimilation to Diogenes in the Diogenes speeches (*Orr.* 6, 8, 9, and 10, all probably contemporary with *Or.* 4) because of Diogenes' association with Alexander (*Arr. An.* 7.2.1, App. 1.3) and Alexander's with Trajan.<sup>103</sup>

The purport of *Or.* 4 has been debated. The young Alexander is about to set out on his great journey of conquest. Diogenes suggests that the true king must be his own ruler before he attempts to conquer others: he depicts (4.83-138) the three spirits whom the mass of humanity serve<sup>104</sup> – Alexander is a slave of *doxa* (4.60) – and promises (4.139) to introduce a superior, and even divine, fourth. The work ends (in the version that survives) without the appearance of the last. In the light of the criticism of Alexander, and of Alexander and Trajan's parallel expeditions against the Persians/Parthians, it has been suggested that the work is a criticism of Trajan's Parthian expedition (115-116) and/or delivered not to him but to an audience of Greeks.<sup>105</sup> This seems unlikely. Diogenes' most significant point is that those with the capacity and so the right to rule (4.24), appropriately called 'sons of Zeus' (4.27, 31),<sup>106</sup> are born, not made; their education, like Herakles', serves only to crystallize and reveal the superior nature that they have always possessed (4.31-2). This and, in particular, the association with Herakles mitigates the explicit criticism of Alexander and any implicit criticism of his double, Trajan: the superior nature of one born to rule needs only to be shaped. With suitable mentoring by Diogenes/Dion, the

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<sup>100</sup> Moles 1990, 299; Jones 1975, 403-6.

<sup>101</sup> Cf. Jones 1978a, 116, Moles 1990, 305, 308.

<sup>102</sup> Cf. Jones 1978a, 119. The parallel with Aristotle is made explicit at 47.9: in the context of the benefits he is bestowing on Prousa, Dion claims that he used to envy Aristotle because he brought it about that Stageira (his native town) was resettled. After the destruction of Stageira, Aristotle had prevailed on Alexander to restore it (*Plut. Alex.* 7.2). The same parallel is evoked at 49.4; more generally, *Or.* 49 argues that philosophers should be the advisors of kings; Agamemnon benefited from Nestor's advice (49.4) and Perikles from Anaxagoras' (49.6).

<sup>103</sup> Cf. Jones 1978a, 49-50.

<sup>104</sup> Almost every human being is a lover of, and so slave to, pleasure, money or fame (*philedonos*, *philochrematos* or *philodoxos*, 4.84, 134-5).

<sup>105</sup> Momigliano 1969, 265, Momigliano 1975, 1005-7.

<sup>106</sup> Homer – who called kings *διογενεῖς* – is not explicitly named. Moles (1983, 270) astutely points out the pun on the name Diogenes: Dion's reference at 4.27 to those rightly called sons of Zeus is intended to indicate the superiority of Diogenes/Dion.

young Alexander of the oration and Trajan himself will grow into the roles that their own natures equip them to fulfil. Closely aligned with this interpretation is Jones' suggestion that the fourth spirit of 4.139 should be associated with the mature Alexander/Trajan.<sup>107</sup>

*b. Dion as Hermes*

Dion is not only Herakles but also Hermes, another figure who (as the messenger of the gods) travels the world to do good.<sup>108</sup> In the first Kingship Oration, a prophetess instructs Dion to act as a messenger to the ruler of many lands and peoples whom he will meet (1.56-8); and Hermes appears as Zeus' messenger to the young Herakles – who, as discussed above, is a figure for Trajan (1.65-6).<sup>109</sup> In the *Ad Alexandrinos*, Dion's role is not of his own choosing, but dictated by a deity (32.12); later, he identifies his inspirer as Zeus (the inspirer of Hektor at *Il.* 17.177-8) and himself as Hermes (32.21).

*c. Dion as Diogenes: undermining the status quo*

Dion presents Diogenes in a number of orations (*Orr.* 4, 6, 8, 9, 10) in ways that suggest self-association with him. Some reasons for this self-identification have already been broached. Diogenes was one whom exile made a philosopher (Ch. 5.2.2a). He was famous as the interlocutor of Alexander the Great, who was associated with Trajan as discussed above (Ch. 5.3.2a). He was a Cynic hero but also admired by the Stoics, with whom – it has been argued (Ch. 5.2.2b.β) – Dion always identified. It is of particular interest in the present context that Epiktetos saw Diogenes as one who encircled the world to do good.

ἀλλ' εἶδέναι δεῖ, ὅτι ἄγγελος ἀπὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἀπέσταλται καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ὑποδείξων αὐτοῖς, ὅτι πεπλάνηνται καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ ζητοῦσι τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, ὅπου οὐκ ἔστιν, ὅπου δ' ἔστιν, οὐκ ἐνθυμοῦνται, καὶ ὡς ὁ Διογένης ἀπαχθεὶς πρὸς Φίλιππον μετὰ τὴν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχην κατάσκοπος εἶναι. τῷ γὰρ ὄντι κατάσκοπός ἐστιν ὁ Κυνικός τοῦ τίνα ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις φίλα καὶ τίνα πολέμια. καὶ δεῖ αὐτὸν ἀκριβῶς κατασκευάμενον ἐλθόντ' ἀπαγγεῖλαι τάληθῆ ... (*Arr. Epict.* 3.22.23-5)

<sup>107</sup> Cf. Jones 1978a, 120-1, Moles 1983, 270-1, 277-8.

<sup>108</sup> Note that Apollonios also appears like Hermes (Ch. 3.6.3b).

<sup>109</sup> Cf. Moles 1990, 325, Saïd 2000, 167.

But it is necessary to know that [the Cynic] has been sent as a messenger from Zeus also to human beings: to show them about matters of good and evil, because they have gone astray and are seeking the substance of good and evil elsewhere, where it is not, and not imagining where it is; and, like Diogenes led off to Philip after the battle at Chaironeia, to be a spy. For the Cynic is in essence a spy, investigating things friendly and hostile to human beings. And, having reconnoitred accurately, he must come to report the truth ...

Dion can more specifically be seen 'doing good' in a way particularly associated with Diogenes – 'debasement of the currency' (νόμισμα παραχαράττων, D.L. 6.71; cf. Ch. 5.2.1c). Saïd sees him doing so in the *Troicus* (*Or.* 11), which she understands as a serious philosophical examination of the incorrectness of Homer and the reasons for it. In fact, the oration seems to have been typical of epideictic orators of the period; Homer was not an untouchable figure.<sup>110</sup> Dion 'debased the currency' less in his criticism of him than in his delivery of unpalatable moral truths to cities. This he did both before and after his exile, often using the autopsy that was a natural consequence of his travels to give strength to his position. Before the exile, in the *Ad Alexandrinos*, Alexandria is compared unfavourably with Athens (32.4) and Rhodes (32.52). After the exile, Prousa is shown up by implicit comparison with Olbia (*Or.* 36; Ch. 5.3.3c), and Rome with Euboia (*Or.* 7; Ch. 5.4.2b). Apameia (identified by its ancient name of Kelainai) is attacked for its commercialism; with scathing irony Dion calls it only less fortunate than an India blessed with rivers of milk, wine, honey and olive oil (35.15-18).

### **5.3.3 Wandering**

#### *a. Wandering in Greek tradition*

Traditionally, wandering (ἀλᾶσθαι or πλανᾶσθαι) was viewed negatively; most famously, at *Od.* 15.343, πλαγκτοσύνης δ' οὐκ ἔστι κακώτερον ἄλλο βροτοῖσιν, 'nothing is worse for mortals than wandering'. As we have seen, exile could be identified with flight. The two were further equated with wandering; implicit in the ancient idea is the perception that journeying away from home (unless on a mission associated with home, and involving a return home) is necessarily

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<sup>110</sup> Saïd 2000, 185-6. Re Homer, T. Morgan (1998, 203-24) suggests an oscillating perception of the same texts, which could be seen by rhetors either as canonical versions of a story or as tools to be used and altered at will. Dion makes a similar point himself at 11.42.

undirected and pointless.<sup>111</sup> An *alazon* was a wanderer and (consistently with the negative connotations of the term) sometimes an imposter; *alazoneia* was imposture or boasting, and *alazoneuomai* meant to boast. At *Or.* 45.2, Dion makes use of the play on words: if he narrates the course of his exile (*phyge*), he will be said to be boasting (*alazoneuesthai*).<sup>112</sup>

In the pre-Second Sophistic tradition, Diogenes was an exile (Ch. 5.2.2a) and also a wanderer in the sense that he lived where chance and impulse led.<sup>113</sup> Dion's *Or.* 8 sees him arrive as a beggar in Athens, presumably to meet Sokrates' companions (8.1), and then move on to Corinth at the crossroads (*triodos*) of Greece (8.5). However, the two quintessential wanderers were Odysseus and Herakles. Odysseus is a man who has suffered much and wandered much (μάλα πολλά πάθη καὶ πόλλ' ἐπαληθῆ, *Od.* 15.401); at the end of his journey he comes to a river god as one who has wandered and suffered many things (ἀλώμενος ... πολλά μογήσας, *Od.* 5.448-9). Herakles is presented as a wanderer at (for example) Pl. *Ap.* 22a, E. *HF* 1197 and Hor. *Carm.* 3.3.9.<sup>114</sup> Both are credited with journeys to the ends of the earth. Odysseus reaches the border of Hades beyond the land of the Kimmerians in the far north (*Od.* 11.14-15); Herakles' Labours take him across the Ocean to Erytheia, to Mount Kaukasos and to Hades itself (Ch. 2.3.3). Both can be regarded as 'exiles': Odysseus, longing for his wife and home on Ithake, is detained by the nymph Kalypso (*Od.* 1.13-14); Dion's Herakles is an exile from Thebes and Argos (47.4, Ch. 5.3.2a).

Wandering acquired positive connotations when Cynics and Stoics took Herakles and Odysseus respectively as exemplars. As we have seen (Ch. 5.3.2a), Herakles was closely associated with Diogenes as a Cynic hero. Odysseus' status was more complex. In the Cynic *Epistulae*, 'Diogenes' distinguishes between Odysseus' and Diogenes' reasons for wearing rags: Odysseus sought only to kill the suitors but Diogenes, to achieve *eudaimonia* (34.3 Hercher). 'Krates' notes that Odysseus wore the Cynic cloak only once, and criticizes his softness (19.1 Hercher). However, Antisthenes saw Odysseus as a hero. The titles of his works – most now lost – make clear both his appreciation of Herakles and his interest in Odysseus, whose versatility

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<sup>111</sup> Cf. Montiglio 2005, 30-7. Nevertheless the gods were wanderers (Montiglio 2005, 3-4, 62-90), and as such associated with the planets (Ch.5.3.3c), whose apparently irregular movements account for their name. For Empedokles as both outcast wanderer and wandering god, see App. 2.2.1.

<sup>112</sup> In parallel, Dion's student (Philostr. *VS* 1.490) Favorinus claims at the very beginning of his exile speech (Frg. 96.1 Barigazzi) that he may be accused of composing it out of *alazoneia*. Cf. Gleason 1995, 149.

<sup>113</sup> In one of the Cynic *Epistulae*, 'Diogenes' claims to go ἐλεύθερος ὑπὸ τὸν Δία πατέρα ἐπὶ ὅλης γῆς (34.3 Hercher). Although literary inventions of the early Roman period, the *Epistulae* were believed to reflect (and may indeed have reflected) the historical Diogenes and Krates' thought; cf. Goulet-Cazé 1990, 2743-4, 2805-6, Rosenmeyer 2001, 195, Montiglio 2011, 68 and n. 5. Diogenes Laertius evidences the wanderings attributed to Diogenes at 6.20-21, 27, 41, 43, 74 (the sale of Diogenes), 77.

<sup>114</sup> Cf. Moles 1990, 324 n. 90. Nevertheless it should be noted that Labours *per se* are not 'wandering' because they are directed to specific ends and completion permits a return home.

(*polytropa*) nevertheless he obviously felt obliged to defend. He does this in a passage transmitted by Porphyry (Frg. 51 Caizzi), and in the extant *Ajax* (Frg. 14 Caizzi) and *Odysseus* (Frg. 15 Caizzi). In the latter – rhetorical addresses in which the protagonists claim their right to the armour of Achilles – the focus is on Odysseus' indifference to his own image. Ajax will never submit to anything shameful (Frg. 14.5); Odysseus on the contrary can claim that οὐδ' ἔστιν ὄντινα κίνδυνον ἔφυγον αἰσχρὸν ἠγησάμενος, ἐν ᾧ μέλλοιμι τοὺς πολεμίους κακόν τι δράσειν (Frg. 15.9), 'it is not the case that I fled any danger, supposing it shameful, in which I might be going to do the enemy some harm'; and καίτοι εἴπερ καλόν γε ἦν ἐλεῖν τὸ Ἴλιον, καλὸν καὶ τὸ εὐρεῖν τὸ τούτου αἴτιον (Frg. 15.4), 'and yet if indeed it was good to have taken Ilion, it was good also to find the means of doing it'. As a consequence of his attitude, he can claim to his fellow-soldiers to have done more good to the army than them all (Frg. 15.1).<sup>115</sup> Odysseus may only questionably be a Cynic hero, but he undoubtedly qualifies as a Stoic one. Cynic freedom required renunciation of one's social identity, Stoic freedom, attachment to it: we should accept with equanimity the roles allocated by fate, playing them seriously but remembering that we are wearing masks. Epiktetos makes the point. The actor Polos took equal pleasure in playing Oidipous as king and beggar; we should show ourselves his equal, imitating Odysseus ὃς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥάκεσιν οὐδὲν μεῖον διέπρεπεν ἢ ἐν τῇ οὐλῇ χλαίνῃ τῇ πορφυρᾷ (Frg. 11), 'who was no less distinguished in his rags than in a thick cloak of purple'.<sup>116</sup>

#### *b. Dion's self-presentation as a wanderer*

At 13.10, Dion claims that, taking the advice of the oracle, he dressed himself poorly and proceeded to wander everywhere (ἠλώμην πανταχοῦ). In *Or.* 80, possibly written during his exile (App. 5), he describes himself as a person οὕτως δὲ ἀτόπως ἰών τε καὶ ἀπιών καὶ παριστάμενος, ἔνθα μηδὲν αὐτῷ πρᾶγμα ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν τύχη τε καὶ ὀρμήσῃ (80.1), 'coming and going and being present in such a strange way when he has no business, but as he chances or wants'. In orations delivered after his return from exile, he regularly describes himself as a wanderer, using words derived from the verbs *πλανάομαι* or *ἀλάομαι*.<sup>117</sup> At 1.9, Dion is among the ἄνδρες ἀληταὶ καὶ αὐτουργοὶ τῆς σοφίας, πόνοις τε καὶ ἔργοις ὅσον δυνάμεθα χαίροντες τὰ πολλὰ, 'men [who are] wanderers and self-taught in wisdom, usually rejoicing in toils and tasks as much as we are able'. In this one self-description, he likens himself not only to Herakles (πόνοις τε καὶ

<sup>115</sup> Cf. Montiglio 2011, 20-37, 70.

<sup>116</sup> Cf. Montiglio 2011, 73; for the actor metaphor in Epiktetos, Long 2002, 242-3.

<sup>117</sup> For example, 1.50 (Ch. 5.3.1), 1.55, 7.1, 7.9, 12.16, 19.1, 40.2. For the dates of these orations, see App. 5.

ἔργοις) but also, in an echo of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (1.5), to Sokrates (αὐτουργοὶ τῆς σοφίας), whose self-reliance is itself reminiscent of Herakles' (1.63).<sup>118</sup> At 47.8 (dated c. 101 or later), Dion mentions the epithet *planetos* in a way that suggests that it was applied to him as an insult<sup>119</sup> – one echoing his regular self-description.

Dion's association of himself with Herakles and Diogenes was discussed above (Chs 5.3.2a, 5.3.2c). In the context of wandering, of particular interest is his self-assimilation to Odysseus. He describes himself ἐν ἀγύρτου σχήματι καὶ στολῇ ... αἰτίζων ἀκόλους, οὐκ ἄορας οὐδὲ λέβητας (1.50), 'in the form and clothing of a beggar, "Asking for morsels, not swords or cauldrons"'. Here, he quotes *Od.* 17.222 word for word. In the *Euboicus* Dion, like Odysseus, is shipwrecked (7.2, cf. *Od.* 12.420-49); his meeting with a huntsman recalls Odysseus' meeting with the swineherd Eumaios (7.4, cf. *Od.* 14); as in the *Odyssey*, we find the motif of the killing of a stag (7.3-5, cf. *Od.* 10.158-63). In other orations, self-referential passages naming Odysseus include: καὶ δὴ ἀνεμιμνησκόμεν Ὀδυσσεῶς τε παρ' Ὀμήρῳ κατοδυρομένου πολλάκις αὐτόν ... διὰ πόθον τῆς πατρίδος (13.4), 'and, indeed, I recalled Homer's Odysseus often deploring his lot ... because of his longing for his native land', and

ἀλλ' ὅστις ... αὐτόν μιν πληγῆσιν ἀεικελίησι δαμάσσας, | σπεῖρα κάκ' ἀμφ' ὤμοισι βαλῶν,  
οἰκῆι ἐοικώς, | ἀνδρῶν θρυπτομένων κατέδου πόλιν εὐρυάγυιαν | ἐπ' οὐδενὶ κακῶ τῶν  
πέλας, ὥσπερ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐπὶ κακῶ τῶν μνηστήρων ἦκε τοιοῦτος, ἀλλὰ τούναντίον ζητῶν  
ἂν ἄρα τι δύνηται λαθῶν ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσασθαι ... (33.15)

but whoever ... 'Having subdued himself with injurious blows, throwing poor wrapping around his shoulders like a servant, creeps into the wide-avenued city of enervated men', is present intending no harm to his neighbours – as Odysseus intended harm to the suitors when he came in such a form – but on the contrary seeking whether in some way, while escaping notice, he may be able to do good ...<sup>120</sup>

and

οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῷ μὲν Ὀδυσσεῖ ... συνέβη καταφρονηθῆναι διὰ τὴν ἀποδημίαν οὕτως ὥστε  
τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ καταλάβοντας ἐνίους ἐστιᾶσθαι καὶ πίνειν ... ἐμὲ δὲ οὐκ ἦν εἰκὸς ὑπὸ  
πολλῶν πολλὰ τοιαῦτα πεπονθέναι ... ; (45.11)

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<sup>118</sup> Cf. Moles 1990, 309.

<sup>119</sup> Cf. Lamar Crosby 1946, n. 3 *ad loc.*

<sup>120</sup> Dion makes a slight misquote of *Od.* 4.244-6, and he confuses Odysseus' arrival at Troy, to which this passage refers, with his return to Ithake. Cf. Cohoon and Lamar Crosby 1940, n. 2 at 33.15.

for certainly didn't it befall Odysseus to be so despised because of his absence from home that some, taking possession of his house, made themselves guests and drank? ... and in my case, wasn't it probable that I should have suffered many such things at the hands of many people ...?

Dion is both like, and morally better than, Odysseus.

*c. Learning and doing good in the course of wandering*

Wandering, taken in an appropriate spirit, can subsume the journey of autopsy and the journey of beneficence: in the course of wandering, opportunities to observe and to do good arise.<sup>121</sup> At 13.11-12, it is in the course of his wanderings that Dion is asked for advice: his interlocutors' questions provoke the reflection and consequent learning which enable him to enlighten them (cf. Ch. 5.2.1c). As noted above (Ch. 5.3.3a), Diogenes was an archetypal exile and wanderer. Dion presents him, in exile from Sinope, at the Isthmian Games: εἰώθει γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἐν ταῖς πανηγύρεσι τὰς σπουδὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ὧν ἔνεκα ἀδημονοῦσι ... παρέσχε δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν τῷ βουλομένῳ ἐντυγχάνειν , 'for he was accustomed to examine, at the public festivals, the enthusiasms of people and the desires for the sake of which they left home ... and he made himself available to anyone who wanted to meet' (8.6-7). He said that:

δεῖν οὖν τὸν φρόνιμον ἄνδρα, ὡσπερ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἰατρόν, ὅπου πλεῖστοι κάμνουσιν, ἐκεῖσε ἰέναι βοηθήσοντα, οὕτως ὅπου πλεῖστοί εἰσιν ἄφρονες, ἐκεῖ μάλιστα ἐπιδημεῖν, ἐξελέγχοντα καὶ κολάζοντα τὴν ἄνοιαν αὐτῶν. (8.5)

Just as the good physician must go to that place to assist where very many are sick, so the thoughtful man must dwell especially where very many are fools, exposing and correcting their folly.

His way of life allowed him both to learn and do good.

In the *Borystheniticus* (Or. 36), Dion provides an instance of learning and doing good in the course of wandering. On his journey to the Getai, Olbia is a stopping-place. Dion shows

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<sup>121</sup> 'Wandering' in the traditional sense excluded journeys undertaken with specific ends/itineraries in mind, and so journeys of autopsy or beneficence. In Homeric/early Greece, any purposeful journey became complete only with a return home (Ch. 5.3.3a) or, in the case of colonists, the establishment of a new home. But if the individual is a citizen of the world (Ch. 5.2.2a), a 'return' ceases to be essential, and purposeful journeys of autopsy or beneficence can become open-ended and in this sense resemble wandering. And if a wanderer chooses to learn and do good, his or her wandering can easily become a journey of autopsy and beneficence.

himself using the opportunity primarily to teach; his teaching demonstrates to his audience – in Olbia and also in Prousa (App. 5) – the observation and learning engendered by his wanderings, which have already taken him, he intimates, as far as the Magoi. It is suggested here that, while there is no reason to doubt the fact of Dion's Olbian sojourn, his account of that sojourn has been shaped for presentation to a Prousan audience. It is also suggested that the message of the oration confirms the picture of Dion's self-understanding and world-view that is set out at Ch. 5.2.2.

The earliest Greek settlement of Borysthenes was on the island of Berezan at the mouth of the estuary of the River Borysthenes; Olbia displaced the island as a trading centre, but the island retained its importance as a centre of the cult of Achilles, displacing Leuke off the Danube delta.<sup>122</sup> Historical confirmation is available for elements in Dion's account. The disastrous devastation by the Getai described at 36.4-5 is probably that of the Dacian king Byrebista at the time of Julius Caesar.<sup>123</sup> The island temple to Achilles (36.9) will be that on Berezan, where a dedication to Achilles contemporary with Dion has been found.<sup>124</sup> A recent Skythian raid (36.15-16) is made likely by Antoninus Pius' measures to protect the city from such incursions.<sup>125</sup>

Dion presents himself encountering at Olbia a society that has itself been formed from contacts between others: early Greek, 'barbarian', and contemporary. A young man's costume is Skythian, his love of his own sex Milesian, apparently an inheritance from the city's founders (36.7-8). The local Greek is heavily accented (36.9) and literary knowledge stops with Homer (36.10) or, among the learned, Plato (36.26).<sup>126</sup> Men wear long flowing hair and beards in 'Homeric' style (36.17), though one individual has shaved in flattering imitation of the Romans (36.17). Like the Romans and the merchants who are the only Greeks to visit (36.25), Dion is a representative of the modern world; more saliently, he is appreciated as a philosopher sent by Achilles – the local deity – himself.<sup>127</sup> The young Kallistratos wants to become his follower (36.8); the people are eager for his message (36.16).

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<sup>122</sup> On the early history of Olbia and the cult of Achilles in the area, Hedreen 1991, 313-30, Russell 1992, 212, Anderson 1994b, 177, Butyagin 2007, 8-11. Herodotos (4.55) refers to another holy site in the area, the *Dromos* of Achilles.

<sup>123</sup> Str. 7.3.11; *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 762; Jones 1978a, 62, Russell 1992, 212, 213.

<sup>124</sup> Gorbunova 1972, 49-50, Jones 1978a, 62.

<sup>125</sup> SHA *Ant. Pius* 9.9, cf. Jones 1978a, 62.

<sup>126</sup> Inscriptions of the Roman period show that the people of Olbia did indeed use Homerisms. This ties in with their remoteness and lack of Greek: the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were the basic means of learning Greek in the ancient world. Cf. Bäbler 2007, 155.

<sup>127</sup> ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεὸς ἡμῶν ἐστίν (36.14), 'for [Achilles] is our god'; σὲ δὲ αὐτὸς ἡμῖν ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἔοικε δεῦρο ἀπὸ τῆς νήσου διαπέμψαι (36.25), 'it seems that Achilles himself has sent you here to us from the island'.

In certain ways, Dion's address is suited to Olbia. In response to a request from the local elder Hieroson<sup>128</sup> (36.28) for a speech in the style of Plato (36.27), Dion produces a myth which, in spite of its Stoic content (see below), is Platonic in form: it is placed like Plato's myth of Er (*R.* 614b-621d) at the end of a longer account, and the imagery of the horses and chariot echoes the *Phaedrus* myth.<sup>129</sup> Appeals to the Magoi as a source can be traced to Plato (*Alc.* 122a, *Ps.-Pl.* *Ax.* 371a),<sup>130</sup> so the Magian origin of Dion's myth can be considered part of an appropriately 'Platonic' response; however, a Platonic myth certainly need not cite the Magoi, so more must be involved.<sup>131</sup> A cult of Zeus the King possibly existed at Olbia; if Dion presented his address in the forecourt of the god's temple, as he claims (36.17), the venue itself would naturally have inspired a discussion of divine rule.<sup>132</sup>

On the other hand, the address can be seen as particularly appropriate to Prousa. The image of the universe as a single, law-abiding city (36.38) was an argument for concord and a challenge to Prousa: the city was in conflict with its neighbour Apameia (*Orr.* 40, 41), and friction between rich and poor seems to have been an ongoing concern.<sup>133</sup> Perhaps most relevantly from Dion's point of view, the ruling elite of the city was not united. Dion was to become embroiled in factional disputes;<sup>134</sup> although evidence of division post-dates the *Borystheniticus*, Dion cannot have been unaware of incipient tensions (e.g. 40.1). The same image of the universe had

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<sup>128</sup> A plausible emendation of the abbreviated form given in the manuscripts; an unusual and apparently local name, it is found in an inscription relating to Borysthenes (*CIG* 2.2077). Cf. Cohoon and Lamar Crosby 1940, n. 2 at 36.28, Jones 1978a, 63. Moles (1995, 187) sees it chosen by Dion on account of its etymology, '[preserver] of holy things'.

<sup>129</sup> Cf. Russell 1992, 231.

<sup>130</sup> Cf. Moles 1995, 189; see also App. 1.2.

<sup>131</sup> In fact, as Russell (1992, 232) has pointed out, Dion's Magian myth can be seen as totally inappropriate to Olbia: the audience expected Greek culture, and the city was at war with the Sarmatians, who were Iranian nomads. It is rather what a Greek audience would want from a traveller returning from remote parts.

<sup>132</sup> At 36.17, Dion refers simply to the temple of Zeus; however, at 36.36, Zeus is more specifically King. Bäßler (2007, 157) and Kryzhitskiy (2007, 9) note the veneration of Zeus under a number of epithets including Eleutherios and Soter in Olbia, but do not mention Basileus. Hirst (1903, 37) and Minns (1913, 476) find only a single inscription recording the epithet (*IosPE* 1.105); on this rather insubstantial basis, Russell (1992, 230), claims the existence of a cult. Jones (1978a, 63) cites *SEG* 3.584, 17 and Belin de Ballu (1972, 162) for the existence of a temple of Zeus. However, Bäßler (2003, 119-21; 2007, 157-8) notes archaeological evidence showing that a temple of Zeus in Olbia lay in the *temenos* of the Upper City; this was destroyed by Byrebista about 55 BCE, and not rebuilt in Dion's time. Since there is no evidence of another temple of Zeus in the city, she believes that Dion invented the temple for the purpose of the oration. As in the *Olympicus*, in which Dion's location in front of the statue of the god (12.12) suggests the topic of the artistic representation of the divine, it is impossible to be sure whether the discourse inspired a discourse-appropriate location or *vice versa*.

<sup>133</sup> Re Dion's attitude to the poor in Prousa, 50.3-4. See also Ch. 5.4.2b.

<sup>134</sup> In particular, in connection with his gift to the city of a *stoa* (40.5-12, 47.11-19). At 36.31, a city perpetually divided into factions is not worthy of the name *polis*.

broader connotations. Government by Zeus Basileus suggests earthly empire (36.32); with his connections to Nerva and Trajan, Dion was undoubtedly an advocate of imperial rule.

In a Prousan setting, perhaps the most important function of the speech is to present Dion in his chosen *persona* as a charismatic wanderer. At Olbia he is one with a divine imprimatur, recognized by local people as the envoy of Achilles (36.25). It is in his interest to exaggerate the isolation and antique virtue of those who so perceive him, and his use of the ancient name Borysthenes for the city suggests just such an intent. In fact, in Roman times, the trade that was Olbia's *raison d'être* continued, along with its civic life; barbarian influence was minimized by Rome's active aid and the presence (at least at times) of an imperial garrison; Dion overstates the isolation of the place.<sup>135</sup> Dion's myth of the Magoi contributes to his *persona*: in Olbia, he is the wanderer who has learned from both West (Greeks) and East (Persians). For an oratorical performance at Prousa, Olbia was a perfect (fictional or semi-fictional) setting for an ostensibly autobiographical account.

Can such a fictionalization be seen as an attempt to deceive? Comparison with works of other Second Sophistic authors suggests that fictionalization of personal experience was not uncommon, that a discourse-appropriate setting for a reported oration had become a trope and the degree to which a personal account was literally true, a riddle. The point is best made with an example. In Plutarch's *Amatorius* (*Mor.* 748e-771e) the narrator, Autoboulos, describes events following from a journey that his father made to Thespiiai with his young wife before his own birth. Since an Autoboulos is identified in the *Quaestiones convivales* as Plutarch's son (*Mor.* 666d), we can perhaps identify the 'father' of the work as Plutarch himself. But we cannot know: 'Plutarch manipulates the frames of his dialogues ... savouring the paradox of our endlessly frustrated attempts to know the truth'.<sup>136</sup> In the same work, and to the same obscuring end, coincidences that culminate in the father's address on the relationship between Beauty and Love, delivered appropriately at the Shrine of the Muses on Mount Helikon, are perhaps, but not necessarily, too fortuitous to be literally true. In this context, the parallel noted above between Dion's account and Plato's *Phaedrus* is relevant. The introduction to the myth at 36.40 – οὐδεις ἄρα ὑμνησεν ἀξίως τῶν τῆδε οὔτε Ὀμηρος οὔτε Ἡσίοδος – echoes *Phdr.* 247c: οὔτε τις ὑμνησέ πω τῶν τῆδε ποιητῆς οὔτε ποτὲ ὑμνήσει κατ' ἀξίαν. Dion's chariot has four horses to Plato's two

<sup>135</sup> Dion himself admits the continuation of trade with the Greek world (36.25); inscriptions (*IosPE* vol. 1, 40, 41, *Iolbia* 47; cf. Braund 1997, 130) attest the interconnectedness of Olbia and other Greek cities, including Prousa, in the period. For the situation in Olbia, Butyagin 2007, 15. For Dion's exaggeration of isolation and decline, Minns 1913, 466-8, Jones 1978, 63, Braund 1997, 126-30, Bähler 2007, 158. For the relationship with Rome, Bähler 2007, 159, Krapivina 2007, 166-8, Zubar 2007, 173-4. See also Ch. 5.4.2b for the *topos* of the city in decline.

<sup>136</sup> Lamberton 2001, 149. For Plutarch's use of narrative frameworks, see also Ch. 2.3.3, 7.2.2.

but, as at *Phdr.* 253d-e, each horse has a distinctive character (36.43-7). Trapp identifies other parallels in the discourses to the Olbians and notes in particular Dion's reference at 36.33-5 to poets at the doors (*thyrai*) and divine inspiration, echoing *Phdr.* 245a.<sup>137</sup> Now, references to Plato could have been inserted by Dion for the sake of an Olbian audience. However, there is more in the oration than the content of Dion's address which calls to mind the *Phaedrus*. Dion – strolling outside the city (36.7) at mid-morning (*plethousa agora*) by the River Hypanis (36.1) – and the young Kallistratos evoke Sokrates and Phaidros strolling outside the city walls (*Phdr.* 227a) by the Ilisos (*Phdr.* 229a) at high noon (*stathera mesambria*, *Phdr.* 242a). Dion's Platonic myth seems to include not only the ostensible myth itself but its framework. At one level, Dion's oration elevates him as a charismatic wanderer teaching archaic Olbians; at another, it elevates him as an orator who presents a kernel of unquestionable truth at the core of a maze of riddles.

This thesis suggests that Dion's journeys in exile together comprised a 'liminal' experience in the sense of an experience establishing an earlier-chosen identity. However, the fact that *Or.* 36 culminates in a myth that Dion attributes to the Magoi could suggest as well that Dion learned something important from them in the course of his wanderings, that an encounter with them was 'liminal' in the sense of formative of his mature world-view.

Can any aspect of Dion's myth in fact be associated with the Magoi? The Mithraic scholar Cumont saw Dion as an authentic source; however, his theory that communities of Hellenized Magoi produced their own eclectic mythology has been discredited. Russell sees as conclusive the fact that Dion's myth differs substantively from the Mithraic myth of a succession of planetary ages culminating in an age of the sun. De Jong similarly sees the Stoic conflagration and sacred marriage of Zeus and Hera in Dion's myth as 'wholly alien' to Iranian tradition.<sup>138</sup> Connection of horses with worship of the sun (36.39) and worship of fire (36.39-40) were Persian, but known to Herodotos and Xenophon.<sup>139</sup> Weighing up the evidence, we can conclude

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<sup>137</sup> Cf. Trapp 1990, 149, 151-2. Trapp's study establishes more generally that the *Phaedrus* was particularly well-known among rhetors and philosophers.

<sup>138</sup> Bidez and Cumont 1938, vol. 1, 92 ('Dion avait exprimé les idées des Mages avec une fidélité insoupçonnée'); Russell 1992, 232; de Jong 1997, 35-7, 364 and (for a nuanced position) 2003, 175-6. Anderson (2000, 158) suggests a possible Persian background on the basis of four elements (fire, wind, water, earth) in the account of the creation in Ferdowsi's *Shah-Nama* and of the presence of flying horses in the *Arabian Nights*. However, these elements are more likely to have entered medieval Persian literature from Greek sources than they are to preserve early Persian thought. That Dion *did* have some knowledge of Iranian culture is perhaps suggested by his report of the Persian festival called the Sacaia (4.66-7); for the divergent Western accounts of this festival and its probable nature, de Jong 1997, 380-4.

<sup>139</sup> Herodotos (1.131-2) refers to worship of the sun and fire along with the moon, earth, water and wind, and to sacrifice of a beast (*ktenos*); Xenophon (*An.* 4.5.35) refers to (Armenian) horse sacrifice to the sun. A further piece of evidence for the western origin of Dion's account is his reference to Zoroaster's retreat (36.40) which – in various forms – was well-known in the Graeco-Roman world (Plin. *HN* 11.102 Mayhoff;

that Dion attributed to the Magoi, and gave Persian colouring to, a myth that he had constructed himself from elements which were Platonic – as discussed earlier – but, in their essential content, Stoic.

Dion begins with a Stoic definition of the city: the *polis* is 'a multitude of human beings dwelling in the same place, governed by law' (πλήθος ἀνθρώπων ἐν ταύτῳ κατοικούντων ὑπὸ νόμου διοικούμενον, 36.20).<sup>140</sup> It follows that, just as an *anthropos* lacking reason is no *anthropos*, so there is no true city that is not governed by law. In the perfect city of the gods, there is no strife or dissent (36.22). Using well-known imagery, Dion presents the stars and planets as respectively the secondary and primary gods – the latter apparently wandering but in fact dancing a purposeful dance (36.22) – who provide together an image of the perfect *politeia* or ordered government (36.23).<sup>141</sup>

At 36.29, identifying himself explicitly as a Stoic (τῶν ἡμετέρων), Dion argues that Stoic doctrine sees the *polis* as an exclusively human system and the *kosmos* as a *zoion* rather than a city; nevertheless, that the present orderly constitution of the universe (*diakosmesis*) can be likened to that of a city (36.29-30).<sup>142</sup> The divine lawgiver sets the pattern of beneficent monarchy (36.31-2). The obvious implication is the legitimacy of beneficent Roman imperial rule.<sup>143</sup>

The subject of Dion's myth proper is the team of horses driven by Zeus. A conflagration and the Deluge associated with Deukalion are described in terms of interactions between the horses (36.47, 49); a greater transformation takes place when the outermost horse, identifiable as the intellect (*to phronoun*) and leadership (*to hegoumenon*) of the soul of Zeus (36.54), subsumes the others and the universe is re-created. The message is that minor disasters like those associated in myth with Phaethon and Deukalion can be seen as divine corrections to an imbalance sometimes to be associated with human error (36.50); the world-transforming

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Porph. *Antr.* 6; Σ Pl. *Alc.* 1, 122a Greene; Amm.Marc. 23.6.33) but seems not to have been part of the Persian tradition. Cf. Russell 1992, 231-2, 235, de Jong 1997, 321.

<sup>140</sup> For Stoic definitions of the *polis/politeia/populus*, SVF 3, 80-1, Cic. *Rep.* 1.39. Cf. Long and Sedley 1987, vol. 1, 431, Russell 1992, 221.

<sup>141</sup> Russell (1992, 222) supplements the extant text at 36.22 to capture the meaning. The purposefulness of the planets (e.g. Pl. *Lg.* 821b) and their dance (e.g. Pl. *Ti.* 40c) were both literary commonplaces.

<sup>142</sup> On the correct understanding of Dion's rather obscure text, Russell 1992, 226-7; for the Stoic concept of the *kosmos* as an animal, SVF 2, 191-4.

<sup>143</sup> Cf. Desideri 1978, 321-2, Russell 1992, 23. Schofield (1991, 84-92) sees 36.31-2 as Dion's own extension of established Stoic theory. Arguing for an anti-Roman Dion, Moles (1995, 186-7) rejects any parallel between the divine city and the Roman Empire. Dion's social position and life-history suggest a nuanced attitude to Rome; on the subject in general and the difficulties involved in determining Dion's true opinions – as opposed to those tailored to suit his audience – Swain 1996, 187-241.

conflagration, on the other hand, is a glorious act unrelated to any particular faults, making all things new (36.50-61). The final conflagration (*ekpyrosis*) and rebirth of the world (*palingenesia*) are Stoic doctrines. Dion's account – which distinguishes between partial catastrophes and the *ekpyrosis* – is probably closer to Chrysippos' and Kleanthes' original conception than accounts which associate the myths of Phaethon or Deukalion with the catastrophe and so admit the possibility of human survival (Man. 4.831-3, Sen. *NQ* 3.27.12-14). Russell demonstrates Dion's correct use of the Stoic technical terms *topos* and *chora* (36.53).<sup>144</sup> Dion's exposition of classic Stoic doctrine at the culminating point of an oration pointedly referring to his exile – and his association of this doctrine with benevolent imperial rule – suggests no change at all from the position he would have learned in Musonius' circle. It confirms the point made at Ch. 5.2.2b: Dion's conversion was not a conversion from one world-view or set of doctrines to another; it was rather one from weakness and ambivalence to a living-out of the values that he had all along professed.

## 5.4 The liminal wise

### 5.4.1 The non-Greek wise

Dion was well aware of the mythic attributes of the places and peoples accounted 'liminal' in Graeco-Roman tradition, and he used them as a trope. At 35.17-23 he describes a fabulous India in which the rivers run with milk, wine, honey and olive oil, the people dine on the lotus, life is without labour, and the Brachmanes drink from the Fountain of Truth. Alongside the Indians he sets an even more fortunate people endowed with gold-mining ants (35.23-4); his account is drawn, at least in part (the lotus, the ants), from Herodotos (2.93, 3.102-5).<sup>145</sup>

Reference to the archetypal non-Greek wise has a similarly mythical quality. Dion provides a standard list (cf. App. 1) when he notes that, since kings cannot always be philosophers, the most powerful nations have set in place philosophers to oversee their kings: the Persians the Magoi, the Egyptians the priests, the Indians the Brachmanes, the Celts the Druids (49.7-8). His reference at 12.10 to money-loving false philosophers who establish themselves in Babylon or Baktra or Sousa or Palibothra (i.e. Pataliputra) calls to mind the associates of the young Alexander of Abonouteichos (Luc. *Alex.* 5-6), though Dion's sophists are

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<sup>144</sup> Kidd 1988 s.v. Posidonius F 13; Russell 1992, 232-3, 243. *Topos* is space occupied wholly by a body, and *chora*, space partly contained by a body; cf. *SVF* 2, 503-5.

<sup>145</sup> In the context, in which Apameians are only less well off than Indians (35.17; Ch. 5.3.2c), the possessors of the ants may be Romans. For the ants and similar creatures, Ch. 3.4.3.

presumably a more elite group than Lucian's 'scammers'. His use of the Magoi in *Or.* 36 was discussed above (Ch. 5.3.3c).

Dion presents a rather different picture of 'barbarians'. In his works, the term can simply mean non-Greeks, as at 36.43, where the Magoi are so-called. Most usually, it refers to nomads. It is not always flattering. A negative reference at 36.8 opposes barbarian violence in homosexual acts to Greek practice.<sup>146</sup> At 36.19, the uneducated, like barbarians, do not define their terms but only point to what they indicate. Nevertheless, as we have seen (Ch. 5.3.1b), Dion presents himself seeking out (36.1) and admiring (12.20) the Getai.

Some evidence suggests that Dion sought out other non-Greek groups for their wisdom. As discussed above (Ch. 5.3.3c), we have no proof of a meeting with the Magoi, though one cannot be ruled out. Dion's probable journey to Egypt in the period prior to his exile has been mentioned (Ch. 5.3.1a). As well, he may have made contact with the Essenes. According to Synesios: ἔτι καὶ τοὺς Ἑσσηνοὺς ἐπαινεῖ που, πόλιν ὄλην εὐδαίμονα τὴν παρὰ τὸ Νεκρὸν Ὑδωρ ἐν τῇ μεσογειᾷ τῆς Παλαιστίνης κειμένην παρ' αὐτά που τὰ Σόδομα (*Dio* 3, 8-11 Terzaghi), 'yet also [Dion] somewhere praises the Essenes, a wholly happy civic community beside the Dead Sea in the interior of Palestine, lying somewhere near Sodom'. It is not clear whether Dion claimed to have visited them; the reference to Sodom seems to be Synesios' own, since it would only have been made by one living in a largely Christian society. The Essene community was known and praised by the elder Pliny (*HN* 5.73), Dion's contemporary, so an encounter at some stage in Dion's career is certainly possible.<sup>147</sup>

#### ***5.4.2 The archaic/rural Greek wise and the motif of the significant encounter in the course of wandering***

As Dion presents it, the true liminally-located wise – the ones who demonstrate to him how society should be – are Greek, and encountered only by accident: wandering has provided him not only with the opportunity to observe chosen remote peoples, but also with unlooked-for encounters of profound significance.

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<sup>146</sup> Cf. Russell 1992, 216.

<sup>147</sup> Cf. Jones 1978a, 63-4.

*a. The rustic prophetess*

An instance occurred (Dion claims) when he met a rustic prophetess somewhere between Heraia and Pisa (1.52) in the western Peloponnese. The setting is remote pastoral countryside; Pausanias suggests its atmosphere when he describes the ruins of the temple of Hera at Heraia, and sanctuaries of Dionysos and of Pan (8.26.11-3).

Moles suggests that Dion's meeting with the woman conforms to a standard pattern in which 'a solitary traveller meets on the road a god or his representative, who promises the help needed to overcome a crisis';<sup>148</sup> the tale can be also taken as a 'liminal encounter' in the course of a larger project of the kind discussed at Ch. 2.3.2. As well, and more specifically, Platonic precedents can be identified. Dion's introduction of the woman echoes the introduction of Diotima in the *Symposium*.<sup>149</sup> As in *Or.* 36, the framing story is modelled on the *Phaedrus*. Dion's path takes him along the banks of a river (1.52, cf. *Phdr.* 229a); Dion and the prophetess meet in a grove (1.52, cf. *Phdr.* 230b) at noon (1.52, cf. *Phdr.* 242a). Like Sokrates at *Phdr.* 235c, 241e, the prophetess is divinely inspired (1.54) and, like him (*Phdr.* 244a-245a), she discusses the nature of inspiration (1.57-8);<sup>150</sup> Dion carefully distances the woman from the negative stereotype of the Delphic prophetess (1.56, cf. Ch. 2.3.1). Her myth (1.59-84) is very obviously a variant of Prodikos' Choice of Herakles. It is clear that, whatever truth there may be behind the story of the encounter (we cannot dismiss the possibility that Dion travelled in Eleia or Arkadia and met an archaic religious functionary), the tale has been shaped by Dion in a way that he would expect his audience to recognize.

Dion's oration – like the *Borystheniticus* – thus functions at two levels. At one, Dion is a wanderer whose peregrinations have provided him with an encounter both affirming his worth and providing divinely-ordained direction: the woman's words (he will meet a mighty ruler, to whom he will pass on her tale, 1.56) suggest the role of advisor to Trajan which – with this oration – he proceeds to take up. At the other level, Dion is a skilled orator, making his political and moral point with a transparent set of allusions to Greek literary tradition.

As in the case of the *Borystheniticus*, Dion's message makes it clear that no encounter that he has experienced has changed his position in a substantive way. After a period in exile,

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<sup>148</sup> Moles 1990, 320.

<sup>149</sup> Pl. *Smp.* 201d: τὸν δὲ λόγον τὸν περὶ τοῦ Ἔρωτος, ὃν ποτ' ἤκουσα γυναικὸς Μαντινικῆς Διοτίμας; 1.49: ὃν ἐγὼ ποτε ἤκουσα γυναικὸς Ἡλείας ἢ Ἀρκადίας ὑπὲρ Ἡρακλέους διηγουμένης. Cf. Moles 1990, 319, Anderson 2000, 150-1.

<sup>150</sup> Cf. Trapp 1990, 141-8.

with this oration he assumes again the role of associate of, and advisor to, the emperor that he cultivated in his youth.

*b. The Euboian encounter*

Another instance of a significant encounter in the course of wandering occurs on Euboia; Dion recounts it in the *Euboicus*, which praises *penia*, the need to work hard (*ponein*) for a living, and rural as opposed to city life (7.81, 103).<sup>151</sup>

As Dion reports it, once, when crossing from Chios to Greece, he was forced by a storm to land on the so-called 'Hollows' (*Koila*) of Euboia (7.2). He was taken in by a huntsman and introduced into an isolated community living a simple, joyful life. The huntsman's own account to Dion of his experience in the city points up the contrast between urban and rural life. As in the cases of the *Borystheniticus* and first Kingship Oration (*Or.* 1), it will be argued that, while there is no reason to doubt the fact of the visit that Dion records, the *Euboicus* was shaped for Dion's audience and by the political issues that he thought relevant to that audience. Moreover, the encounter with the huntsman was not the liminal – in the sense of life-changing – event that Dion might have us suppose.

Nothing in the description of the setting conflicts dramatically with reality. The *Koila* were well-known in antiquity as a place dangerous to shipping, although their exact location is obscure. Herodotos' reference (8.13) does not specify the location. Strabo (10.1.2) placed the *Koila* between Chalkis and Geraistos on the west coast of Euboia, Ptolemy (*Geog.* 3.14.22 Müller), north of Cape Kaphereus on the east coast.<sup>152</sup> Jones has identified aspects of the report of the huntsman's visit to the city that are in accordance with contemporary civic and legal

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<sup>151</sup> *Or.* 7 may originally not have been a single oration: it seems to be made up of two distinct pieces, 7.1-80, the narrative of Dion's experience on Euboia, and 7.81-152, a discourse on the life of the poor. On the basis of 7.82, the latter has been identified as an *anaskeue*, a recognized rhetorical exercise refuting a given passage, in this case, Euripides' *Electra* 424-31; it would necessarily have been preceded by a *propositio* referring to Euripides' words. Cf. Russell 1992, 9-10. Nevertheless, any reworking may have been Dion's own; the piece holds together as an entity and in the following discussion will be treated as such.

<sup>152</sup> Pritchett (1969, 19-23) argues convincingly for the stretch of coast between Geraistos and Kaphereus, a location tying in with Dion's description at 7.2, 7. Mason and Wallace (1972, 136-9) dismiss Strabo but accept Ptolemy's location on basis of the absence of harbours on that coast as opposed to the area preferred by Pritchett. Cf. Jones 1978a, 50, Russell 1992, 111.

reality. He himself acknowledges that they are not specific to Euboia; Dion could have derived his picture from his knowledge of politics in Prousa and the countryside of Bithynia.<sup>153</sup>

On the other hand, Dion's description of the area he visits suggests depopulation and economic collapse. Two-thirds of the land is a wilderness from lack of population (7.34); land just outside the city gates is wild (7.38); people are farming the gymnasium and grazing cattle in the *agora* (7.38). Archaeological work casts doubt on the historicity of this scenario. The urban centre Dion describes was probably Karystos. Studies have found an expansion of the city and the erection of new civic buildings in Roman times, possibly the result of the city's proximity to the quarries producing popular *cipollino* marble. Although the quarries seem to have been imperially owned, the city would have benefited from their proximity. Certainly, rural settlements around the city decreased in Roman times; however, this may have resulted from the growth of large estates rather than simple population decline.<sup>154</sup> In fact, the concurrence of Roman-period sources on the general decline and depopulation of Greece<sup>155</sup> suggests a trope. Dion seems to have allowed a generally-accepted perception to colour or even shape his account of Euboia.

On the basis of the terms Dion uses at 7.145, Russell argues that the oration (or at least that part of it) was presented at Rome.<sup>156</sup> What was the message of the piece?

Most obviously, it is the supreme example of Dion's self-presentation as a wanderer. As we have seen, Dion and the huntsman are Odysseus and the swineherd Eumaios (Ch. 5.3.3b), respectively. Dion's explicit reference to the huntsman's hairstyle (7.4) as different from that

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<sup>153</sup> Jones 1978a, 60-1. Parallels between Dion's text and other sources include: schemes under Nerva, Trajan and Hadrian making unused land available to the poor (7.36-7 cf. D.C. 68.2.1, Plin. *Ep.* 7.31.4, Mart. 12.6.9-11 [Nerva]; *CIL* 8.25902, 8.25943 [Trajan and Hadrian]); distribution of money to citizens by the wealthy (7.49 cf. Philostr. *VS* 2.549); citizen vigilante groups raised against bandits (7.49 cf. Robert 1937/1970, 94-6). At 7.55, the huntsman's defender calls himself a citizen, showing that, as at Tarsos (34.1), non-citizens could attend the assembly. His testimonial includes the commonly-used (for an example, Jones and Russell 1993, 298-9) 'hortative' formula (7.61). The huntsman should receive dinner at the town hall (*prytaneion*) at public expense (7.60); for the *prytaneion* as an honour, 31.108, Plut. *Mor.* 820c. The defender also proposes that the huntsman be given a perpetual lease and offers to defray the cost (7.61); similarly encouraging people to stay on the land, Pliny offers money so that children can be educated locally (*Ep.* 4.13.5).

<sup>154</sup> Cf. Day 1951, 217-18, 235, Alcock 1993, 30, 39, 101, 111.

<sup>155</sup> Instances include Plut. *Mor.* 413f (Greece); Str. 7.7.9 (Dodona and Epeiros), 8.4.11 (Lakonia), 8.8.1 (Arkadia), 9.2.5 (Thebes); D.Chr. 7.121 (Thebes), 12.85 (Greece), 31.158 (Greece apart from Rhodes), 33.25 (Thessaly and Arkadia), 36.6 (Olbia). Cf. Russell 1992, 120.

<sup>156</sup> *Kepoi* = *horti* (a private house with a park); *proasteia* = *suburbana*, Russell 1992, 1, 156. Evidence of this kind is indicative but not conclusive.

which Homer attributed to the Euboians seems specifically intended to call the reader's attention to Homeric associations.<sup>157</sup>

Further, Dion-as-wanderer is wise because his lifestyle has presented him with the opportunity to encounter a remote people differently-wise from contemporary Greeks. Belief in the existence of a rural Greek wisdom is well-attested in Second Sophistic literature. Herodes Attikos admires the wise, simply-living 'Herakles' who claims as his teacher 'the interior of Attike, a good school for a man wanting to converse' (ἡ μεσογεία ...τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀγαθὸν διδασκαλεῖον ἀνδρὶ βουλομένῳ διαλέγεσθαι, *VS* 2.553).<sup>158</sup> Pausanias accepts the reality of a preserved archaic Greek wisdom when, on reaching Arkadia – landlocked and so cut off from outside contact (8.1.3) – he decides to accept local tradition as embodying an ancient and superior knowledge of the divine (8.8.3). The rural idyll – available to Dion's contemporaries in the Hellenistic pastoral poetry of Theokritos, Moschos and Bion and, in Latin, Vergil and Calpurnius Siculus – provided a related image of the wisdom of the remote.<sup>159</sup> Dion calls on its themes of idealized country life and love in the *Euboicus* (7.65-80). Some of his imagery – Euboia's abundant pure water, perpetual breeze in summer and absence of pests (7.14-15) – evokes the Golden Age;<sup>160</sup> his feast of the poor (7.75) recalls both Plato's ideal city (*R.* 2.372) and his own Diogenes' ascetic feast (6.62).<sup>161</sup> A relatively recent addition to the idealized rural life was the hunt. Hunting seems to have been taken up by the Roman elite and incorporated by intellectuals in the ideal rural picture because of Trajan's (D.C. 68.7.3) – and later Hadrian's – enthusiasm for it. At Plin. *Pan.* 81.1, Trajan's only recreation is to wander the woodlands, driving wild beasts from their lairs; at 3.135, Dion's good king considers hunting the best recreation.<sup>162</sup>

The ideal rural world of the *Euboicus* requires more explanation than Dion's self-presentation. As noted above, the oration was probably presented in Rome. However, though it

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<sup>157</sup> For the hairstyle of the Abantes of Euboia, *II.* 2.542. The difference may simply be that Dion's huntsman has a beard.

<sup>158</sup> The man was considered an indigenous Boiotian by local people (*VS* 2.553); he can perhaps be identified with the (modern, educated) Cynic Sostratos described at Luc. *Demon.* 1 – date, place, and broad description agree. Cf. Dudley 1998<sup>2</sup>, 182.

<sup>159</sup> Cf. Russell 1992, 9, Ma 2000, 110.

<sup>160</sup> Cf. Moles 1995, 178. For the Golden Age or Race, App. 1.5, App. 2.1.1.

<sup>161</sup> Cf. Russell 1992, 130. Other literary parallels can be mooted. Highet (1973, 35-40) associates Dion's work with Middle Comedy, reconstructing the plot of the lost work on which he conjectures that Dion based his account. Many have commented on parallels between the *Euboicus* and the novel: the protagonists of novels are typically wanderers, shipwrecks are common, and *Daphnis and Chloe* culminates (like Dion's tale of the hunter) in a rustic wedding (4.37-40 cf. D.Chr. 7.80). Dion's work predates extant novels; it perhaps helps us place the origin of the new genre in the rhetorical tradition. Cf. Anderson 1976c, 94-8, Jouan 1977, 40-4, Hunter 1983, 66-7, Russell 1992, 9, Ma 2000, 110, Anderson 2000, 146. For discussion of Dion's possible use of another novelistic motif, Ch. 5.2.1b.

<sup>162</sup> Cf. Jones 1978a, 130, Moles 1990, 320, 360.

is unquestionably an attack on materialism, it should probably not be interpreted as an attack on Rome *per se* as its embodiment – as was Tacitus' Rome, in which 'degraded and shameful practices from everywhere collect and flourish' (*Ann.* 15.44.3). Certainly, in his *Peri kallous*, Dion suggests that whenever the Romans choose a *basileus* they choose the wealthiest person as the one from whom they can expect the most money (21.8). However, he does not limit his criticism to Rome; equally he condemns the materialism of Apameia (35.15-17) and of Tarsos (34.34-5).<sup>163</sup>

Probably most relevant to the purpose of the oration is Dion's explicit focus on the urban working poor, though it is impossible to be specific. Jones sees Dion taking the position of the Greek upper classes, who were 'no less interested than the emperors in making their cities less dependent on imported food, and their poor on public welfare';<sup>164</sup> since the work probably dates from a period when he had re-engaged with Prousan politics, he would indeed have had such a concern. Dion suggests the resettlement of the poor in the country as ideal (7.107-8) and questions whether suitable work can be found for the virtuous poor in the city (7.114-26). The answer is that some is available for those prepared to work with their hands (*autourgein*), though Dion seems more interested in discussing inappropriate work and does not specify the work in detail: οὐ γὰρ πολιτείαν ἐν τῷ παρόντι διατάττομεν, ὅποια τις ἂν ἡ ἀρίστη γένοιτο ἢ πολλῶν ἀμείνων (7.125), 'for we are not at present setting out the form of government that would be best, or better than many'. Obviously, *Or.* 7 is not about urban social regulation, although in his (later) political/social involvement in Prousa, Dion shows his practical concern about such things (50.3-4). It has reasonably but not conclusively been suggested that the oration was written specifically in support of one of Trajan's schemes making unused land available to the poor.<sup>165</sup>

Whatever its purpose, certainly in the oration Dion shows rural wellbeing in a setting which also allows him to present himself in his chosen *persona*. Whether a nugget of autobiographical truth lies behind the account can probably never be ascertained with any certainty. Nevertheless, we can be fairly sure that any real-life incident on which it was based was not the mind-changing revelation of the superiority of unsophisticated rural life that Dion suggests. Among the extant works of Dion's teacher Musonius, *Frg.* 11 deals with farming. Musonius' work is relevant to the poor in its assertion that the man who earns his living by his own labour is more to be respected than the one who receives the necessities from someone else. Moreover, while most Greek and Roman authors praise the life of the landowner, Musonius

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<sup>163</sup> Cf. Jones 1978a, 127.

<sup>164</sup> Jones 1978a, 60.

<sup>165</sup> For discussion, Mazon 1943, 85-7, Jones 1978a, 59-60.

praises rural work itself: he prefers shepherding to agriculture because it allows more time for spiritual development, and asserts that it makes no difference whether one tills one's own or someone else's soil.<sup>166</sup> An idealization of the rural working poor was one thing that Dion most likely learned from his teacher.

Not only was Dion not converted to an appreciation of rural poverty as the ideal lifestyle by a chance encounter in Euboea; he seems to have re-evaluated his early disapproval of the city later in his life. Orations dating from late in his career reveal a relatively positive assessment of the *polis*.<sup>167</sup> Certainly, there is disapproval of particular cities – Alexandria, Apameia/Kelainai – in works written early (*Or.* 32) and late (*Or.* 35) in Dion's life. However, this is not criticism of the city *per se*. Passages in earlier works suggest theoretical disapproval. In *Or.* 80, probably dating from Dion's exile, cities themselves deprive people of freedom: ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἄφθονόν τε καὶ πολλήν δουλείαν ἐντὸς τῶν τειχῶν ἐγκαθείρξαντες ἔπειτα ἐπάλξεσι καὶ πύργοις καὶ βέλεσιν ἡμύνοντο, ὅπως μὴ εἰσίοι ἔξωθεν παρ' αὐτοῦς (80.4), 'but having confined slavery on a massive scale within the city walls, then with battlements and towers and missiles they warded it off in order that it might not enter among them from outside'. In this oration, Dion proclaims his right to live apart from politics (80.2). In one of the Diogenes speeches, εἰς δὲ τὰς πόλεις συνελθόντας, ὅπως ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν μὴ ἀδικῶνται, τούναντίον αὐτοῦς ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὰ δεινότατα πάντα ἐργάζεσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ξυνεληλυθότας (6.25), 'having come together into cities in order that they might not be wronged by those outside, on the contrary they wronged themselves and committed all the most terrible deeds just as if for this purpose they had come together'. The suggestion at 32.91 that cities are prone to the outbreak of moral diseases confirms the early date of that oration.

In the *Euboicus*, composed in a period in which Dion can be seen as re-engaging with the political life of his home city, he at least admits the possibility of suitable urban occupation for the poor (7.125). Late speeches reveal a more positive attitude to the city. On Dion's arrival in Prousa after obtaining privileges from Trajan, he differentiates between technical *eleutheria*<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> Cf. van Geytenbeek 1963, 129-33. Xenophon (*Oec.* 4-5) and Cicero (*S. Rosc.* 50-1) are among those whose praise of agriculturalists is of landowners rather than workers. In contrast, Musonius claims that Μύσωνα τὸν Χηναῖον ὁ θεὸς ἀνεῖπε σοφὸν καὶ τὸν Ψωφίδιον Ἀγλαὸν εὐδαίμονα προσηγόρευσε, χωρτικῶς ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν βιοῦντα καὶ αὐτουργία χρώμενον καὶ τῆς ἐν ἄστει διατριβῆς ἀπεχόμενον (Frg. 11 Lutz), 'the god [i.e. Apollo; cf. T2.12 and Fontenrose Q97] proclaimed Myson of Chen wise and named Aglaus of Psophis happy, each of them living in a rustic way and working with his own hands and avoiding spending time in the city'.

<sup>167</sup> For the following discussion, cf. Desideri 2000, 96, 98, 103.

<sup>168</sup> *Eleutheria* for a city was exemption from the jurisdiction and visits of a Roman governor; for discussion, Millar 1978, 430-3. Its significance was limited by the fact that it was granted and withdrawn at the whim

and the true kind which each *polis* obtains for itself if it administers its affairs in a highminded (*megalophron*) manner (44.12). He defends his own local political involvement: ὅστις δὲ ὀκνεῖ τὴν αὐτοῦ πόλιν ἐκοῦσαν καὶ ἐπικαλουμένην διοικεῖν, οὐ φάσκων ἰκανὸς εἶναι, ὁμοίός ἐστιν ὥσπερ εἴ τις τὸ μὲν ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα θεραπεύειν μὴ θέλοι (49.13), 'when someone hesitates to manage his own city when it wants him and calls upon him, claiming that he is not competent, it is as if he would not wish to treat his own body'.

Commenting on this development, Desideri suggests a change in political culture in the principate of Trajan. Early in the period, there arose 'what one may call a new formula of political involvement of "intellectuals"' designed to accommodate Greek ideas about the political liberty of the city. It was voiced by Plutarch in works contemporary with Dion's – *Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum* (*Mor.* 776b-779c), *An seni sit gerenda res publica?* (*Mor.* 783b-797f) – after a long period in which it had not been expressed in relation to contemporary Greek cities. Before this development, Greeks had made significant political contributions only as counsellors to the ruler – a role cultivated by Dion in the Kingship Orations.<sup>169</sup> It was in this new political climate, with power to direct the course of civic affairs in Prousa, that Dion could feel more optimistic about the city *per se*.

Desideri's hypothesis relates to a Greek-speaking worldwide phenomenon and so is not to be associated with any change in the administration of a particular province; in any case, in Dion's own Bithynia, there was no major change from the time of Pompey until well after Dion's lifetime.<sup>170</sup> The reality of the power of the Greek intellectual elite under Roman rule, at least in the later years of the Second Sophistic, has often been remarked. It was intimately connected with the ideology of empire. Even under Augustus, Greeks had been assigned a cultural role in parallel with the Romans' pragmatic power (*Verg. A.* 6.851-2). In their interactions, Romans were prepared to honour Greeks for their contribution (e.g. *Plin. Ep.* 8.24), and Greeks were aware that power ultimately lay with Rome (e.g. *Plut. Mor.* 813e).<sup>171</sup> By the second and third centuries,

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of emperors; as Dion notes, it comes into being at the instance of those with authority and power (44.12).

<sup>169</sup> Desideri 2000, 105-6.

<sup>170</sup> Bithynia and Pontus became a Roman province in 63 BCE, following Nikomedes IV of Bithynia's bequest of his kingdom to Rome and Pompey's subsequent campaign; Pompey divided the territory into largely self-governing cities. In Bithynia, the one major development seems to have been the refounding of Apameia/Myrleia on the shore of the Sea of Marmara as a Roman colony at the time of the Triumvirate (cf. A. Jones 1937, 157-65, Jones 1978a, 91, Swain 1996, 207). Imperial legates replaced proconsuls as governors of the province under Trajan (*Pliny c.* 110-112: *CIL* 5.5262, cf. Vervaet 2007, 129-32; Gaius Iulius Cornutus Tertullus c. 112-114/15: *PIR*<sup>2</sup> I 273, cf. Dmitriev 2005, 325). In this apparently stable context, cities competed with one another for benefits of the kinds Dion mentions at 44.11-12: a larger *boule*, the right to hold assizes, increased revenue, as well as *eleutheria*.

<sup>171</sup> Cf. Bowersock 1969, 30-58, Brown 1978, 31-3, Dmitriev 2005, 323-5, Whitmarsh 2005, 11-12.

the eastern Empire saw a cooperative power-sharing arrangement in which Greek local elites and Roman provincial authorities worked hand in hand; within the elites, individuals competed for civic status and Roman recognition in ways which included (though they were not limited to) the rhetor's specialities of 'being Greek' and sophistic performance.<sup>172</sup>

So much is widely accepted; to identify an important turning point – and one consciously engineered – in the early years of Trajan's administration is speculative. In Dion's case, the development in attitude to the city noted above could simply have had psychological roots. Early in his life, when Dion took – for whatever reason<sup>173</sup> – no responsibility for his city, he could have adopted an anti-city view perhaps learned in Musonius' circle. Later, and taking up a position of personal responsibility, self-justification would have required a more positive theoretical approach. Swain rightly notes the continuity between Dion's civic role in his later life and that played, in particular, by his maternal grandfather (41.6), who spent a fortune on public benefactions and attempted to obtain the *eleutheria* of his city (46.3-4, 44.5).<sup>174</sup> If civic involvement was a role new to Dion in the post-exilic part of his life, it was by no means one new to either his family or his class.

### 5.5 Locationally liminal encounters and liminal experience in the life of Dion

In his thirteenth oration, Dion presents himself as one whose life has been shaped by an oracle and the period of 'wandering' that obedience to the god's command entailed. It has been argued that, although the oracle was a metaphorical one, the decision that it represented, the wandering, and the permanent impact of the experience on Dion's sense of identity, were real (Ch. 5.2.2b.y). Clearly, Dion's experience conforms to the van Gennep/Turner model of a liminal experience to the extent that an extended, psychologically-fruitful period of separation from normal social life was involved. Can any further parallels be drawn?

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<sup>172</sup> Outsiders sought admission to the Senate; for its changing composition and the associated rise of families and individuals, Hammond 1957, 74-81, Syme 1958a, 7-23, Lambrechts 1936, 111-4, Kaimio 1979, 137. Provincial governors – proconsuls and *legati Augusti* – were drawn from the Senate; when imperial succession was itself in question, emperors adopted a senator (Nerva, Trajan; Trajan, Hadrian) as a successor. For 'being Greek' in a cultural rather than an ethnic sense, Whitmarsh 2001a, 272-3, Whitmarsh 2005, 14-15 and n. 35.

<sup>173</sup> An earlier lack of personal involvement in Prousan politics may have been related to his absence for the purpose of study (App. 5), the existence and involvement of older brothers (44.3-4), or disaffection at what Dion may have considered unreasonable demands following his father's death (46.5-6).

<sup>174</sup> Swain 1996, 191.

Turner emphasized initiands' loss of established social position and (positively) their *communitas* throughout the liminal period (Ch. 1.3). In exiling Dion, the Roman authorities simply removed him from the situation he occupied; we find no suggestion of a community of exiles. Dion presents himself as a solitary and perhaps random wanderer. If he were so, but even if he happened to be accompanied by a servant or to have sought out the residences of connections, his arrival at a new place would have required an explanation of what had happened and of his reasons for adopting the way of life he chose. The constant need to reiterate and justify his position would simultaneously have tested his ability to be the philosopher he hoped to be and – as he himself suggests at 13.11-13 – established him in that role.

Scrutiny of one's own views – questioning what has been taken for granted – and openness to alternatives have been posited as critical characteristics of the liminal period.<sup>175</sup> Nevertheless, in spite of Dion's claim to have been forced to contemplate what he considered good and evil (13.12) in the course of his exile, and in spite of the different world views that he must undoubtedly have encountered on his travels (Ch. 5.3), he does not seem to have modified his core beliefs in any substantive way.

In traditional rites-of-passage situations, the end result of the ritual process – adulthood, admission to an inner circle or a specific role – and the duration of the process are predetermined. The right to be a candidate may not be automatic but, to be successful, an accepted candidate needs only to endure/negotiate prescribed ordeals to the end.<sup>176</sup> Dion's exile was socially prescribed, but he himself chose his goal – transformation from an individual who knew the tenets of philosophy to a practising philosopher – and he himself had to determine the criteria whose fulfilment would signal the achievement of that goal.<sup>177</sup> Certainly, if he believed that he had successfully, up to that point, passed the tests that he had set himself, the formal end of his exile may have signalled successful accomplishment of his goal. However, if his journey to the Getai did indeed follow the technical end of his exile (Ch.5.3.1b), we have perhaps an indication of a difference between the formal end of exile and fulfilment of what the 'god's command' entailed.

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<sup>175</sup> Turner 1969, 167: 'if liminality is regarded as a time and place of withdrawal from normal modes of social action, it can be seen as potentially a period of scrutinization of the central values and axioms of the culture in which it occurs'; Turner's ideas are developed by Boland 2013, 228-35.

<sup>176</sup> For ordeals as part of the ritual process, Turner 1969, 95, 170-2.

<sup>177</sup> It makes sense that, to whatever other influences Dion may have allowed himself to be open, he could not make himself open to challenges to the basis of his self-appointed task.

## 5.6 Conclusion

As we have seen (Ch. 1.3.2), as late as the third century 'autobiography' in the form of portrayal of one's own states of mind did not exist as a genre. Dion's writings are not autobiography in the modern sense of the term; they are oratory, intended to make a point or achieve an end. Reported incidents are at best factually based. Transforming raw experience into transparently mythic form, Dion at once gives it more importance than it could have as factual report and obviates the need for absolute, literal truth.

Dion's fundamental good faith is apparent in the consistency of the implications of the different paradigms – an oracle's direction, 'exile leads to philosophy' – that he employs to account for the direction of his life.<sup>178</sup> Both lead logically to his adoption of the *persona* of a wandering sage. Dion's lifelong adherence to this identity suggests that it was central to his self-perception; a psychologically liminal experience began with his initial decision to take on the role and continued through the years of journeying that established his ability to live it out.

In extant orations (Chs 5.3.3c, 5.4.2), Dion presents himself in encounters with liminally-located human beings who convey to him messages of crucial importance. In fact, the messages themselves and the points that Dion makes in the orations in which he presents them are consistent with the Stoic philosophy that was appropriate to his pre- and post-exile social position and instilled by early study. Genuine development in his thought can perhaps be observed (Chs 5.2.2b.γ, 5.4.2b), but it cannot be attributed to a particular 'liminal encounter'.

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<sup>178</sup> In contrast, as we have seen (Chs 4.1, 4.7), Lucian insinuates ludicrously discrepant imagery into his portraits of Peregrinos and Alexander in order to undermine their own probably consistent self-presentations.

## 6 AELIUS ARISTEIDES: CONFRONTING THE GOD IN REALITY, AND THE PROTAGONIST AS 'PILGRIM'

### 6.1 Introduction

Like Dion, Aristeides was an orator; most of his surviving works are orations addressed to a particular audience and intended to make a point. The *Hieroi logoi* (five and a fragment of a sixth survive) are apparently different.<sup>1</sup> The first includes a section (*HL* 1.4-58) that reads as a series of diary entries for the period January to February 166.<sup>2</sup> Very probably, devotees – like Aristeides – of Asklepios were encouraged to keep such notes, which could have been retained by their cult centre or rewritten and inscribed as testimony of a cure. At *HL* 2.2, Aristeides claims: εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς προεἶπεν ὁ θεὸς ἀπογράφειν τὰ ὀνείρατα· καὶ τοῦτ' ἦν τῶν ἐπιταγμάτων πρῶτον, 'right from the beginning the god<sup>3</sup> ordered me to write down my dreams. And this was the first of his injunctions'.

Commencing the *Hieroi logoi*, Aristeides notes that he has often been encouraged by his friends to write about his experience of the god in more depth (*HL* 1.2, 2.1); the surviving *Hieroi logoi* are apparently a straightforward attempt to do just this. Aristeides claims that some of his notebooks have been lost over the years (*HL* 2.3) and that the contexts of his dreams were never recorded (*HL* 2.2); he relies on memory, and links his material thematically rather than chronologically.

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<sup>1</sup> Aristeides' use of the expression *hieroi logoi* is not wholly consistent. *Hieroi logoi* is a title given to his speeches more generally by the god at *HL* 2.9; a divine revelation to Aristeides is a *hieros logos* at *Or.* 28.116. Aristeides calls these particular works *hieroi logoi* at *Or.* 42.4, written some time after them (App. 6). Philostratos calls them *hiera biblia* (*VS* 2.581). The *hieros logos* was an established genre; instances (e.g. *Hdt.* 2.81, *Paus.* 8.15.4) provided accounts of the origins of religious customs or ceremonies (cf. Festugière 1954, 88, Petsalis-Diomidis 2006, 195). There seems no reason to suppose (as does Whitmarsh 2005, 84) that personal testimonies left at cult sites were called *hieroi logoi* before Aristeides adopted the term.

<sup>2</sup> The genuineness of the dream experience that Aristeides reports (in the dream diary and elsewhere) is underlined by the similarity it bears to modern dream experience: it is normal to forget dreams or parts of dreams if no attempt is made to rehearse their content (cf. *HL* 2.18, 2.27, 3.21); anxiety and wish-fulfilment dreams are common (cf. *HL* 1.27, 1.28 and *HL* 1.23, 1.36-9); dreams frequently include the 'day's residue' (*Tagesreste*, cf. *HL* 1.51) and are characteristically incoherent (cf. e.g. *HL* 1.17, 2.18). For discussion and sources, Harris 2009, 14-17, 97, 106, 120-1.

<sup>3</sup> The god: Asklepios was the son of Apollo and the mortal Koronis (*Hymn.Hom.Aes.* 16.1-5 = Edelstein 31) or Arsinoe (*Paus.* 2.26.7 = Edelstein 36); for all the references, Edelstein 21-40. His divine nature was revealed in stories relating to his birth (*Paus.* 2.26.5). A mortal, he died a mortal's death; for discussion of the variant accounts, Edelstein 1945/1998, vol. 2, 75 and n. 29. He seems never to have been regarded as a hero, since his burial place (which would have been the focus of his hero cult) remained unknown; neither was he believed to have disappeared from human sight at a particular place, as did Amphiaraios and Trophonios (Edelstein 1945/1998, vol. 2, 50, 91, 93). Various accounts suggest different reasons for, and circumstances surrounding, his apotheosis; his status was similar to that of Herakles, the Dioskouroi and Romulus (Edelstein 1945/1998, vol. 2, 75, 77-8).

Nevertheless, the naivety of the works has been questioned. Whitmarsh asks whether they 'represent "genuine" theological devotion or ... a calculated attempt to raise the orator's status by capitalizing on his notorious ill health'. Certainly, as Whitmarsh suggests, in the *Hieroi logoi* Aristeides is an insider with privileged access to the god. Elsewhere, he is an essential link in the chain of dissemination of information about the god – at *Or.* 42.12, the actor (*hypokrites*) who performs the god's words.<sup>4</sup> Aristeides' approach can be seen as in no way naïve: an apparently unsophisticated style can be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to suggest objectivity; suggesting that relevant records have been lost serves to magnify the impact of what remains.<sup>5</sup>

However, accepting an element of calculated self-promotion in the published *Hieroi logoi*, we nonetheless need not deny Aristeides' religious devotion; in fact, the two are inextricably linked. The *Hieroi logoi* can be seen in parallel with votive offerings, often of images of body parts, made to the god at the Asklepieion at Pergamon.<sup>6</sup> Offerers presented the god with symbolic representations of the benefits they had received from him and at the same time established themselves as in his favour. Since Aristeides saw himself benefited principally in oratory, it was appropriate for him to make an oratory-related offering. Such an offering could be of various kinds. Aristeides' older contemporary Polemon dedicated a statue of Demosthenes, whom Philostratos (*VS* 1.542) claims that he (Polemon) imitated.<sup>7</sup> A doctor of actors had a dedication inscribed in trochaic tetrameters; an individual who playfully concealed his identity made a poetic dedication to Kypris (Aphrodite).<sup>8</sup>

A physical object was not absolutely necessary. Any recipient of the god's goodness could always express thanks in an oral account: at *Or.* 42.7, Aristeides refers to those listing benefits received from the god, οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ στόματος οὕτως φράζοντες, οἱ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἐξηγούμενοι, 'some declaring [them] verbally and others expressing [them] in votive offerings'. He sees oratory itself as his own most appropriate gift to the god (*Or.* 42.2). Choral performances of his works at the Asklepieion are offerings to the god (*HL* 4.38-9, 43-4); Aristeides further offers a tripod (a typical victor's prize) in commemoration of the completed

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. Whitmarsh 2005, 84-5.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Petsalis-Diomidis 2010, 105-7, 123, 127-8. On the complex relationship between Aristeides' notebooks and the *HL*, Percy 1988, Downie 2013a, 37-56. Downie (147-53) sees the *HL* as essentially an oratorical work, its unprecedented style intended to elevate Aristeides without provoking criticism of the kind to which he responds in *Or.* 28 (cf. *Or.* 28.2, 21, 94, 96).

<sup>6</sup> Tapari offers a bronze votive plaque with eyes (*AvP* 8.3 no. 111b and pl. 30); Fabia Secunda and Proklos, plaques showing ears (*AvP* 8.3 no. 91, 115b and pl. 30).

<sup>7</sup> *AvP* 8.3 no. 33. Polemon was the leading sophist in Smyrna in the period of Aristeides' youth and possibly one of his teachers; see below.

<sup>8</sup> *AvP* 8.3 no. 102, 129.

series and in gratitude for his own inspired work (*HL* 4.45). In this context, the *Hieroi logoi* can be seen as oratorical offerings to the god. Certainly, they were intended for presentation to the public: νυνὶ δὲ τοσούτοις ἔτεσι καὶ χρόνοις ὕστερον ὄψεις ὄνειράτων ἀναγκάζουσιν ἡμᾶς ἄγειν αὐτὰ πῶς εἰς μέσον (*HL* 2.2), 'now with so many years and seasons passed, dream visions compel me somehow to make [earlier events] public'. Because he is the first to make his own inner development the subject of a published literary account, Aristeides can perhaps be regarded as the first practitioner of autobiography in the modern sense of that term.<sup>9</sup>

The *Hieroi logoi* are intelligible in the context of the cult of Asklepios. Modern commentators have often dismissed the cult and its practice of incubation and (applying their own contemporary paradigms) found psychological explanations for Aristeides' repeated illnesses and religious experiences. Among those attempting explanations of his need for the god's imprimatur, Brown suggests that

the rising within him of a threatening sense of superiority backed by considerable energy and aggression unconsciously help[ed] bring on the illnesses and the murderous cures that tied his energy down to a battle with his body ... Aristides gives the impression of a powerful engine constantly stalling through being driven on the brake.<sup>10</sup>

Swain sees him rather as 'someone who wanted to go as far as he possibly could but was afraid that he might not get there on his own'.<sup>11</sup> However, Aristeides' beliefs can only appropriately be seen in the context of his own time. The cult of Asklepios was widespread and widely accepted in his contemporary world and it was associated with the most advanced medical knowledge. The Hippocratic Oath was taken in the names of Apollo the healer and Asklepios; Galen was associated with the cult.<sup>12</sup> 'Religiously' and 'medically' oriented approaches to dream interpretation – were dreams predictive and of divine origin, or simply indications of dreamers' bodily states? – are jointly acknowledged and given their place in Galen's *De dignotione ex insomniis* (vol. 6, p. 833 Kühn) and in the Hippocratic *Regimen 4 = Peri Enyption* (87-8 Jones).<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> For discussion of the genre, Quet 1993, 214-15.

<sup>10</sup> Brown 1978, 43.

<sup>11</sup> Swain 1996, 262. For other charges of neurosis or hypochondria: Festugière 1954, 86, Bowersock 1969, 72, Reardon 1971, 258, 261-2, Lane Fox 1986, 160, Cox Miller 1994, 194, 203-4, Harris 2009, 92. Even Behr (1981, n. 1 at *HL* 1) calls Aristeides 'a deeply neurotic, deeply superstitious, vainglorious man'.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Kudlien 1981, 117-30, Jackson 1988, 138-40. Galen calls himself a *therapeutes Asklepiou* at *Libr. Propr.* vol. 19, p. 19 Kühn = Edelstein 458. That there were doubters as to the value of dreams is obvious from Cic. *Div.* 2.59.123 = Edelstein 416.

<sup>13</sup> Downie (2013b, 116-7) finds in Aristeides' dream diary (*HL* 1.6-8) an illuminating illustration of the interrogative diagnostic process that differentiated between interpretations. In the period, dreams were classed as predictive or non-predictive; the former could be god-sent or simply perceptions of the soul, and the latter – called *enyptionia* by Aristeides' contemporary Artemidoros (1.1-2, 4 *praef.*) – included

Inscriptions attest the many genuine cures that the Asklepieia achieved.<sup>14</sup> They and related cult centres were patronized by the elite. Aristeides may emphasize the presence of the elite at the Asklepieion at Pergamon in order to enhance his own status,<sup>15</sup> but certainly they were there.<sup>16</sup> Lucian is scathing about Alexander's highly-placed devotee Rutilianus,<sup>17</sup> but his account would have lost its point if the man were not an adherent of the Glykon cult. Caracalla sought dreams in incubation at the Asklepieion at Pergamon (Hdn. 4.8.3).<sup>18</sup>

In this chapter it will be argued that Aristeides' self-presentation follows a completely different model from those we have encountered in Philostratos' VA and in Dion's works. Both Apollonios and Dion journey to liminal places to see for themselves and form their own opinions. Like Zeus, they survey the world; like Herakles, they do good; and their experiences – to a greater (Apollonios) and a lesser (Dion) extent paralleling those of the gods – at once win and establish their superiority. On his own initiative, Apollonios confronts divine beings (Achilles, Trophonios) and almost-divine ones (the Sophoi), and he wins their acceptance; Dion wins the acceptance of the archaic wise. Aristeides, in contrast, submits himself to the god and achieves only the superiority that the god endorses and even provides. The journeys he undertakes are not of his own volition – a challenge to the gods – but prescribed by the god and carried out with the god's protection every step of the way.

In the broad context of his submission to the god, Aristeides is presented with revelations – made to himself and others, in incubation and in spontaneous dreams and visions – which enable him to identify himself with paradigmatic images of one who is superior or even

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responses to bodily conditions and fearful apparitions (*phantasmata*). Aristeides undoubtedly saw all his dreams as divine revelations and (as Behr 1968, 191, notes) he applies dream terminology indiscriminately, using both *enhyption* and *phantasma* for god-sent dreams. On beliefs about the nature of dreams, Behr 1968, 171-95, White 1975, Cox Miller 1994, 77-105, Harris 2009, 123-278.

<sup>14</sup> Edelstein 1945/1998; note especially 423, 424 (Epidauros), 426 (Lebena), 428 (Athens), 431, 432 (Epidauros), 438 (Rome), 439, 440, 441, 442 (Lebena). For Epidauros, see also LiDonnici (1995); for Pergamon, Petsalis-Diomidis 2010, 242-60. Many inscriptions suggest cures or other benefits without specifying them: AvP 8.3 nos 63, 65, 69, 71, 81, 87, 88, 95b, 102, 126; a previously unpublished inscription at Müller 1987, 194 refers to ἐκ [πολ]λῶν καὶ μεγάλων κινδύνων σωθεὶς, 'having been saved from many serious dangers'. Further, while the specific nature of a healing could be indicated in an inscription (e.g. Εὐετηρία ὀφθαλμοῦς θεραπευθεῖσα Ἀσκληπιῶι Σωτῆρι εὐχὴν, 'Euteria, having been healed in respect of her eyes, [made] a votive offering to Asklepios the Saviour', AvP 8.3 no. 86), offerings of images of parts of the body, of the kind noted above, were more common.

<sup>15</sup> For example, at the beginning of his address to Kapitón (Or. 4.2), Aristeides notes that his lectures at Pergamon were attended daily by Maximus (Q. Tullius Maximus, cf. CIL 2.2660, Behr 1986 n. 4 *ad loc.*), a Roman senator and admirer of the speeches of Demosthenes (Or. 4.2).

<sup>16</sup> Dedicatory inscriptions were set up at the Asklepieion at Pergamon by the *licitor* to the proconsul of Asia (AvP 8.3 no. 67), the public notary (*tabularius*) of the province of Asia (AvP 8.3 no. 107), and the treasurer (*arcarius*) of Lower Mysia (AvP 8.3 no. 125).

<sup>17</sup> For the association of Glykon with Asklepios, Luc. Alex. 14-15, 43, Chs 4.4, 4.6. For Rutilianus, App. 4.

<sup>18</sup> For Caracalla's search for a cure for his physical and mental ailments, D.C. 78.15.3-7.

divine. These images were to be found in literary accounts of encounters with the divine, in implications of the social role of rhetoric, in tales about 'divine' figures (Sokrates, Alexander), and in the Mysteries.

Aelius Aristeides was born in Mysia on 26 November 117, probably in the area which later became the city of Hadrianoi after a visit by the emperor Hadrian. His full name – P. Aelius Aristeides Theodoros (*OGIS* 709) – indicates that he received Roman citizenship from Hadrian, possibly at the time of founding of the city. However, he saw himself primarily as a citizen of Smyrna (*HL* 473). His father was an important figure in his own locality (and possibly the regional priest of Zeus) and he had his son well-educated, probably in Smyrna under Polemon, in Pergamon under Aristokles, another eminent sophist, and in Athens under Herodes Attikos.<sup>19</sup> Hopes of a rhetorical career collapsed when the young man became ill on a first trip to Rome (*HL* 2.60-8).

It was on his return to Smyrna in 144 that the revelation of Asklepios that was to be central to Aristeides' life and self-understanding took place.

ἐδόκει δὴ χρῆναι τοῖς ὕδασι χρήσασθαι τοῖς θερμοῖς, εἴ τι δυναίμην γενέσθαι ῥᾶων, ἢ τὸν ἀέρα μᾶλλον πως ἀνασχέσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἦν ἤδη χειμῶνος ὥρα, ἀπέχει δὲ τῆς πόλεως οὐ πολὺ. ἐνταῦθα πρῶτον ὁ Σωτὴρ χρηματίζειν ἤρξατο. (*HL* 2.7)

It seemed to be necessary to use the warm waters if ever I were to become in any way more comfortable or rather somehow put up with the atmosphere. For it was already winter time, and the place is not very far from the city. Here first the Saviour began to offer me his advice.<sup>20</sup>

Aristeides details the experience, which seems to have been a spontaneous dream.

ἀνυπόδητόν τε γὰρ προελθεῖν ἐπέταξεν καὶ ἐβόων δὴ ἐν τῷ ὀνείρατι ὡς ἂν ὕπαρ τε καὶ ἐπ' ὀνείρατι τετελεσμένῳ· μέγας ὁ Ἀσκληπιός· τετέλεσται τὸ πρόσταγμα. ταῦθ' ἅμα προῶν ἐδόκουν βοᾶν. (*HL* 2.7)

He ordered me to go out barefoot, and I was shouting in the dream as in a waking state and after fulfilling [the order of] the dream: 'Great is Asklepios! The order is fulfilled'. While I was going forward, I seemed to shout these things.

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<sup>19</sup> For evidence relating to Aristeides' early life, App. 6.

<sup>20</sup> The springs are noted by Strabo (14.1.36) and Philostratos (*Her.* 23.30 de Lannoy). Philostratos places them 40 stades from Smyrna. Behr (1968, 25, n. 13) locates them at Ilica on the Ilica Deresi.

On what seems to have been a separate incident in the same period:<sup>21</sup>

Ἔτερον τοίνυν λουτρὸν ἐν Σμύρνῃ προσετάχθη χειμῶνος ἰσταμένου, ἔδει δὲ πορευθέντα πρὸς τὰς πηγὰς τὰς θερμὰς τῷ μὲν θερμῷ ὕδατι μὴ χρῆσθαι, τῷ δὲ παραρρέοντι ποταμῷ. καὶ ἦν ἡμέρα πᾶσα ἔφυδρός τε καὶ ψυχρὰ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ τοσοῦτον διέλιπεν ὅσον ἀρκέσαι τῇ πορείᾳ· καὶ πρῶτον ἦν τῶν θαυμάτων τοῦτο. (HL 2.50)

Moreover another bath in Smyrna was ordered after winter had begun, and it was necessary, having travelled to the warm springs, not to use the warm water but the river flowing past. And the whole day was wet and cold, and the water abated enough to permit a crossing. And this was the first of the miracles.

After this there followed Aristeides' call to Pergamon in the summer of 145:<sup>22</sup> μετὰ ταῦτα κλήσις καὶ ἄφιξις ἀπὸ Σμύρνης εἰς Πέργαμον μετὰ τῆς ἀγαθῆς τύχης (HL 2.7), 'after this a summons and a journey from Smyrna to Pergamon with good fortune'. The summons can probably be regarded as the god's; the journey initiated the period in which Aristeides lived as an incubant at the Asklepieion at Pergamon and which he referred to later as the *Kathedra* (HL 2.70, 3.44; see also HL 4.14). The term *Kathedra* suggests a period of stillness, a cessation of normal activity, and it evokes the period of dissociation from society that is central to Turner's picture of psychologically/socially liminal experience (Ch. 1.3). Aristeides' experience at Pergamon reflects Turner's model as well in the finiteness of its duration – though the circumstances of its termination remain obscure (see App. 6) – and in the lifelong change to his self-perception and (more subtly) his social role that it effects. It is the liminal period of the *Kathedra* that makes Aristeides the divinely-inspired – or even divine – orator that he becomes.

## 6.2 Oracles and encounters with a god

### 6.2.1 Direct encounters

This section will explore more closely the different kinds of imagery associated with encounters with the divine that Aristeides uses to persuade himself of his own privileged status, and even 'divinity'.

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<sup>21</sup> Behr 1968, 26 n. 18, Behr 1981, chronology *ad loc.*; the incident is out of chronological sequence in the text.

<sup>22</sup> Behr 1968, 26 n. 19, Behr 1981, chronology *ad loc.*

### a. Acceptance by the god

As we have seen (Ch. 2.3.2, 2.5.2), the god could reject those who unilaterally sought his or her presence. However, cult practice enabled the devotee to approach a god in relative safety with divine permission assured; thus at *Met.* 11.21-2, at the temple of Isis, Apuleius' Lucius impatiently awaits a formal indication of the goddess' readiness for his approach. Even those approaching with permission experienced degrees of acceptance and gradations in the kind of experience granted them. Asklepios did not provide dreams to all who incubated.<sup>23</sup> On his first night of incubation at the Asklepieion at Pergamon, Aristeides had no dream, though one relating to him was granted to his foster father (*tropheus*) Zosimos (*HL* 2.9).

Even when a dream was provided, it was relatively rare for the god to appear 'in person'. For evidence, we have only to look at the diaristic part of the *Hieroi logoi*. Although the dreams recorded there were not received in formal incubation – Aristeides was resident at Laneion at the time (see App. 6) – there can be little doubt that he considered them all sent (or possibly sent) by Asklepios himself. In his introductory comment, he notes:

ἐκάστη γὰρ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἡμερῶν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ νυκτῶν, ἔχει συγγραφὴν, εἴ τις παρῶν ἢ τὰ συμπίπτοντα ἀπογράφειν ἐβούλετο ἢ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ πρόνοιαν διηγεῖσθαι, ὧν τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ παρῶν, τὰ δὲ τῆ πομπῆ τῶν ἐνυπνίων ἐνεδείκνυτο, ὅσα γε δὴ καὶ ὕπνου λαχεῖν ἐξῆν· (*HL* 1.3)

Each of our days and similarly also of our nights has a history, if someone present either wanted to write down what happened or to describe the providence of the god – some things he showed manifestly being present, and others by the sending of dreams, inasmuch as it was possible actually even to obtain sleep.

The last distinction can be interpreted as separating dreams (not waking experiences<sup>24</sup>) in which the god appears 'in person' to deliver his message from dreams providing (or potentially providing) a meaningful message in some other way. In his study of dreams, Harris categorizes the two types as 'epiphany' and 'episode' dreams. In the former, an authority figure visits the sleeper and makes a significant pronouncement; the latter (the characteristic modern dream) is

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<sup>23</sup> For example, Edelstein 423 B33 = LiDonnici 1995, 110-11, B13(33).

<sup>24</sup> When Aristeides doubts whether a revelation was received in a dream (*onar*) or a waking vision (*hypar*), e.g. at *HL* 2.32, 5.31, the text makes it clear that the waking vision could only have been experienced on the threshold of sleep. It seems most likely that he never had a fully waking experience of the god. Cf. Behr 1968, 192 n. 68, Michenaud and Dierkens 1972, 28.

simply a sequence of experiences or events.<sup>25</sup> The diaristic part of the *Hieroi logoi* shows that Aristeides' dreams were very largely of the latter kind; a significant instance confirms the fact that he considered these, as well as 'epiphany' dreams, potentially messages from the god. At *HL* 1.22, we have a description of a dream in which Aristeides finds himself in an assembly of people in the marketplace at Smyrna at sunrise. About a year after the date of the dream (early 167; for the chronology, App. 6), visiting Smyrna, he is greeted by an enthusiastic crowd and sees this as a fulfilment of the oracle (*pheme*) that he received (*HL* 5.29). Loosely-related references to anxieties about time (*HL* 5.29, cf. *HL* 1.22) and to sunrise (*HL* 5.31) suggest that the *pheme* is the earlier-recorded dream.<sup>26</sup>

The god could appear 'in person' in different forms. On Aristeides' first night of incubation at Pergamon, Asklepios appeared to Zosimos in the form of Salvius, a fellow-incubant (*HL* 2.9);<sup>27</sup> however, 'in person' usually meant in the form of his cult statue. Aristeides provides examples, some cryptic. In an early (Winter 144-145) vision at the Temple of Isis in Smyrna, Sarapis and Asklepios appear together θαυμαστοὶ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τινα τρόπον ἀλλήλοις ἐμφερεῖς (*HL* 3.46), 'marvellous in beauty and size, and in some way similar to one another'. The incident perhaps marks Aristeides' changing allegiance from Sarapis to Asklepios. When Aristeides' interest in Egyptian cult is reawakened (Ch. 6.2.1c), there is a vision of Sarapis in the form of his seated statue (<έν> ὤπερ κάθηται τῷ σχήματι, *HL* 3.47). After an aborted journey to Chios in 149, in Smyrna, Asklepios appears: ἦν ἅμα μὲν Ἀσκληπιός, ἅμα δὲ Ἀπόλλων, ὃ τε δὴ Κλάριος καὶ ὁ Καλλίτεκνος καλούμενος ἐν Περγάμῳ, οὗ ὁ πρῶτος τῶν ναῶν τῶν τριῶν ἐστίν (*HL* 2.18), 'he was at the same time Asklepios and Apollo, both the Klarian and the one who is called the Kalliteknos in Pergamon and whose is the first of the three temples'.<sup>28</sup> An even deeper awareness of the god's acceptance and presence did not necessarily require his appearance in visual form. In the case just mentioned, after Aristeides obeys a divine command to bathe,

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<sup>25</sup> Harris 2009, 23, 46. Harris (57-62) argues for a real distinction between ancient and modern dreams in that epiphany dreams, now extinct, were genuinely experienced in the Hellenistic and Roman imperial worlds. In the light of the analysis of Aristeides' dreams that follows, any major difference seems unlikely.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Behr 1981, n. 50 at *HL* 5.29.

<sup>27</sup> The fact that the dream occurred in incubation would have given the speaker the authority of the god. At *HL* 1.58, Aristeides identifies the authoritative words of the temple warden Asklepiakos, given in a dream, as the god's.

<sup>28</sup> Apollo Kalliteknos ('of the handsome child', i.e. as father of Asklepios) appropriately was worshipped at one of the three Hellenistic temples in the Asklepieion at Pergamon; cf. Behr 1981 n. 30 *ad loc.*, Petsalis-Diomidis 2010, 167-8.

οὔτε γὰρ οἶον ἡδονὴ περιφανῆς ἦν οὔτε κατ' ἀνθρωπίνην σωφροσύνην ἔφησθα ἂν εἶναι αὐτὸ, ἀλλ' ἦν τις ἄρρητος εὐθυμία, πάντα δεύτερα τοῦ παρόντος καιροῦ τιθεμένη, ὥστε οὐδ' ὀρῶν τὰ ἄλλα ἐδόκουν ὀρᾶν· οὕτω πᾶς ἦν πρὸς τῷ θεῷ. (HL 2.23)

It was not like manifest pleasure, nor would you say that it was in accordance with human moderation, but it was a mysterious well-being making all things second to the present moment, so that I did not seem to see the other things I was seeing. Thus I was entirely in the presence of the god.

In a particularly significant dream in Pergamon (Winter 146-147), Aristeides sees himself standing in the forecourt of the temple with others in white garments. Apparently without any physical manifestation of the god, Aristeides becomes deeply conscious of his presence:

καὶ γὰρ οἶον ἄπτεσθαι δοκεῖν ἦν καὶ διαισθάνεσθαι ὅτι αὐτὸς ἦκοι καὶ μέσως ἔχειν ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως καὶ βούλεσθαι ἐκβλέπειν καὶ ἀγωνιᾶν μὴ προαπαλλαγείη ... καὶ τρίχες ὀρθαὶ καὶ δάκρυα σὺν χαρᾷ καὶ γνώμης ὄγκος ἀνεπαχθῆς ... (HL 2.32)

It was like seeming to touch [him] and to perceive that he himself had come, and to be between sleep and wakefulness and to want to look out and to be anxious lest he depart first ... my hair was standing on end, and there were tears together with joy, and an inoffensive swelling of my mind ...

The expression καὶ γνώμης ὄγκος ἀνεπαχθῆς seems to convey both Aristeides' pride in the fact that he has been selected for recognition by the god and an element of humility – it is the god who has graciously bestowed his recognition.

In the context of acceptance and favour, it is of interest to consider an episode which bears the hallmarks of the motif of wrestling with a god; the very fact that he is presented with the opportunity described locates Aristeides among the elite (Ch. 2.3.2). Zosimos has fallen ill.

φανέντος δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ λαμβάνομαι τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐπαλλάξ τοῖν χεροῖν, καὶ λαβόμενος ἐδεόμην σῶσαί μοι τὸν Ζώσιμον· ἀνένευσεν ὁ θεός. πάλιν οὖν τὴν αὐτὴν λαβὴν λαβόμενος ἐδεόμην ἐπινεῦσαι· αὐθις ἀνένευσε. τὸ τρίτον παραλαβὼν ἐπειρώμην πεῖσαι ἐπινεῦσαι· ὁ δὲ οὔτε ἀνένευσεν οὔτε ἐπένευσεν, ἀλλ' εἶχεν δι' ἴσου τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ μοι λέγει ῥήματα ἄττα, ἃ χρὴ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις, ὡς ἀνύσιμα· (HL 1.71)

With the god revealed, I took hold of his head crosswise in my hands, and having taken hold, I begged him to save Zosimos for me. The god refused. Therefore again having taken hold with the same hold, I begged him to assent. Again he refused. The third time, having

seized him, I kept trying to persuade him to assent. And he neither refused nor assented, but held his head in an even way and told me certain phrases which it is necessary to say in such circumstances, because efficacious.

Aristeides' comment here (οὐκ οἶμαι δεῖν ἐκφέρειν εἰκῆ, 'I do not think that I should reveal them needlessly') indicates that he is referring to incantations and so to what can be seen as 'magic' (Ch. 2.5.3).

Aristeides' persistence wins a reprieve from the god. Nevertheless, we are left in no doubt that the respite is the god's gift to one he favours rather than the result of his defeat. Later, in the person of the temple warden (*neokoros*) Asklepiakos, he spontaneously provides Aristeides with advice for the preservation of Zosimos' life that Zosimos himself ignores (*HL* 1.76). Aristeides sums up his understanding of the case: οὕτως ὅσον τε ἐπεβίω, χάρις ἦν τοῦ θεοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς φυλάξαντος αὐτόν μοι (*HL* 1.77), 'thus how long he survived was a favour of the god, who truly guarded him for me'.

#### *b. Inspiration by the god and its implications*

Aristeides' thought can be summarized under six headings.

α The god provides for each as appropriate to that person

'Know yourself' (γνῶθι σεαυτόν) was one of the maxims inscribed at Delphi (Paus. 10.24.1); as discussed (Ch. 5.2.1a), Delphi may have promulgated the view that the god ordains lives appropriate to individuals' innate abilities as part of his holistic care for those who seek his help. Holistic care seems also to have been attributed to Asklepios, whose restoration of physical health could be seen as a metaphor for his gift of wholeness to those who gave over their lives to his direction. Aristeides expresses the idea explicitly at *Or.* 42.5. The god benefits all humankind with his gifts of sustenance and of children to form the succeeding generation. He provides health as a 'universal drug' (*koinon pharmakon*) facilitating all labours and activities. More particularly, he gives to each what is appropriate (ἐκάστῳ τὰ προσήκοντα); this is explained further as distributing individual gifts – for example, the arts, employment and ways of life – 'with a view to the man' (πρὸς ἄνδρ' ὁρῶν<sup>29</sup>).

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<sup>29</sup> Aristeides here quotes *Ar. Av.* 1334.

In this context, the god intervenes positively in the professional careers of those whose lives/careers are in accordance with his will and their own natures:

... ἕτεροι δέ γε φήσουσιν ὡς πράγματα ἅττα κατώρθωσαν ὑποθήκαις ἀκολουθήσαντες τοῦ θεοῦ ... ἀλλὰ καὶ σοφίσματα πυκτικὰ πύκτη τινὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἐγκαθεύδοντι προειπεῖν λέγεται τὸν θεόν, οἷς ἔδει χρησάμενον καταβαλεῖν τινα τῶν πάνυ λαμπρῶν ἀνταγωνιστῶν· (Or. 42.10-11)

... others will say how they succeeded in various enterprises following the advice of the god ... but it is even said that the god revealed boxing tricks to a boxer in our time while he was sleeping; using these, he must inevitably knock down one of his absolutely illustrious opponents.

It is of particular significance that, to Aristeides himself, he has revealed the subjects, ideas and wording of speeches (λόγων ὑποθέσεις καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἐννοήματα αὐτὰ καὶ τὴν λέξιν), like those who teach boys to write (Or. 42.11).

Petsalis-Diomidis points out what seems to be a divergence between Aristeides' thought on rhetoric and others' on comparable 'sciences' – Polemon's on physiognomics and Galen's on medicine. Both the latter express confidence in *technē* – seen here as something that can be taught and learned in a wholly human way.<sup>30</sup> As he makes clear in the statement above, Aristeides appreciates the fact that his rhetorical ability is divinely inspired. However, in the context of the present section, it is clear that *technē* – and more particularly, the capacity to acquire it – and inspiration coexist naturally and without conflict in his thought: the god recognizes aptitude, and rewards and enhances it with inspiration.

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<sup>30</sup> Polemon asserts the possibility of teaching the science of physiognomy 'just like teaching a boy refinement stage by stage' in the Arabic Leiden Polemon (Ch. 1 A8); on the possibility of learning the medical *technē*, Galen's *De locis affectis* vol. 8, p. 146 Kühn. Cf. Petsalis-Diomidis 2010, 80-2. Nevertheless, in tension with his description of physiognomy as a *technē*, Polemon presents its practitioner in terms evoking inspiration: he knows the character and purpose of the lives of all as if by some god-sent and unerring oracle (Adam. *Physiognomonica* 1.2 Foerster). Petsalis-Diomidis argues that ultimately both Polemon and Galen accepted that the inspired expert's intuitive knowledge overrides *technē*.

β The god has provided Aristeides with rhetorical ability

Aristeides stresses inspiration when he expands on the god's encouragement in the field of rhetoric. The crucial time is the *Kathedra* period in Pergamon that followed immediately after Asklepios' self-revelation.

καθημένω δέ μοι ἤδη ἐν Περγάμῳ κατὰ τὴν κλήσιν τε καὶ ἱκετείαν γίγνεται παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πρόσταγμα καὶ παράκλησις, μὴ προλιπεῖν τοὺς λόγους. ὅ τι μὲν δὴ πρῶτον τῶν ὄνειράτων ἀφίκετο, ἢ πῶς ἕκαστον ἔχον τοῖς ἅπασιν, ἀμήχανον εἶπεῖν ὑπὸ πλήθους ἐτῶν. ἦν δ' οὖν ἐκεῖνά τε τῶν παρακλητικῶν, σοὶ πρέπουσι λόγοι σὺν Σωκράτει καὶ Δημοσθένει καὶ Θουκυδίδῃ κατὰ πρώτας εὐθύς γενόμενα. (HL 4.14-15)

To me now staying in Pergamon in accordance with the summons and [my] supplication, there came from the god a command and summons not to abandon oratory. Which of the dreams actually came first or how each contributed to the whole, [it is] impossible to say due to the sheer number of years. But those of a hortatory kind, 'your words resemble those of Sokrates and Demosthenes and Thoukydides', occurred on the first [nights], straightaway.

The god provided him in dreams with style beyond his models.

καὶ μὴν τό γε πλεῖστον καὶ πλείστου ἄξιον τῆς ἀσκήσεως ἢ τῶν ἐνυπνίων ἦν ἔφοδος καὶ ὁμιλία. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἤκουσα νικῶντα καθαρότητι καὶ λαμπρῶς ἐπέκεινα τῶν παραδειγμάτων, πολλὰ δ' αὐτὸς λέγειν ἐδόκουν κρείττω τῆς συνηθείας καὶ ἄ οὐδεπώποτε ἐνεθυμήθην. (HL 4.25)

And in fact the greatest and most valuable part of the training was the access and instruction provided by dreams. For I heard many things brilliantly excelling in purity that of my models, and many things I myself seemed to say [in dreams] in a better way than usual, and which I had never considered.

In a much later speech at Kyzikos, Aristeides notes that: ὁ γὰρ Ἀσκληπιὸς κελεύει λέγειν ... οὔτε γὰρ πρόσθεν ἔγνω ὅ τι χρὴ λέγειν, πρὶν ἔδει λέγειν ἤδη (Or. 27.2-3), 'Asklepios orders me to speak ... for I did not know beforehand what it was necessary to say until the time when I needed to speak'. At HL 4.25, he refers to speeches – *Hyper tou dromou* (*In defence of running*), *Athena* and *Dionysos* – directly inspired by dreams.<sup>31</sup> Elsewhere, speeches about the gods are

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<sup>31</sup> The first two are lost; re the *Athena*, see App. 6. The *Dionysos* is probably Or. 41. Certainly, that oration was inspired by a dream: at Or. 41.1, 'Ἠγείσθω μὲν αὐτὸς Ἀσκληπιὸς ὁ φήνας τὸ ὄναρ, 'Let Asklepios

most necessary and just, and Aristeides' oratory concerning them originates from the god [Asklepios] himself (κατ' αὐτούς τοὺς λόγους παρ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ γενόμενον, *Or.* 42.3). Indeed, Aristeides' illness was itself divine good fortune, because his improvement as an orator was brought about by his association with the god.

καὶ δὴ Παρδαλᾶς ποτε ἐκεῖνος, ὃν ἐγὼ φαίην ἂν ἄκρον τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν Ἑλλήνων γενέσθαι γνῶναι λόγους, ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ καὶ διυχυρίσασθαι, ἧ μὴν νομίζειν τύχη τινὶ θεία συμβῆναί μοι τὴν νόσον, ὅπως τῷ θεῷ συγγενόμενος ἐπιδοίην ταύτην τὴν ἐπίδοσιν. (*HL* 4.27)

And indeed once Pardalas, that famous man who, I would say, was the best of the Greeks in our day in his knowledge of oratory, dared to say to me and insist that in truth he thought my illness came about with a certain divine good fortune, in order that, associating with the god, I might make this improvement.<sup>32</sup>

γ Rhetorical ability is the most important human ability

The god's inspiration of Aristeides' rhetoric has a more important implication than simply that he cares for Aristeides as he does for all his followers: it makes Aristeides a superior and even – in a sense of the term to be explored in the following sections – 'divine' man.

The superiority of oratory was raised at Ch. 5.2.2b.γ: there, we saw that oratorical ability defines the one who is fit to rule. Aristeides explicitly gives oratory the fundamental social role. At *Or.* 34.33, persuasion is the single goal of reason and oratory.<sup>33</sup> Again, in *Pros Platona hyper rhetorikes*,

οὐκ ἂν ὁμοῦ κόλακές τε καὶ ῥήτορες εἶεν, οὐδὲ ὁμοῦ συκοφάνται καὶ ῥήτορες, εἴπερ ὄντως ἡ ῥητορικὴ τοῦ δικαίου χάριν εἰσῆλθεν καὶ σωτηρίας <τοῖς> ἀνθρώποις, ὥσπερ οἱ νόμοι. ἀλλ' ἕως ἂν ἰατρικὴ σῶζῃ τοὺς κάμνοντας καὶ κυβερνητικὴ [σῶζῃ] τοὺς πλείοντας καὶ νόμοι τοὺς χρωμένους, οἱ ῥητορικῆς λόγοι σῶζουσιν οὓς χρὴ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον φυλάττουσιν. (*Or.* 2.257-8)

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himself, who revealed the dream, be the guide'. The extant *Athena*, *Asklepiadaí* and *Herakles* were inspired by dreams (*Orr.* 37.1, 38.1, 40.22).

<sup>32</sup> Asklepios also inspired Aristeides to return to poetry, which he had begun to write in Rome (*HL* 4.31, 38).

<sup>33</sup> At *Or.* 34.44-5, he rejects the idea that the best oratory cannot persuade the masses, citing his own successes.

They could not at the same time be flatterers and rhetors, and not at the same time slanderers and rhetors, if indeed rhetoric came in for the sake of justice and safety for human beings, like the laws. But while medicine saves the sick, and navigation those sailing, and the laws those using them, the words of rhetoric save those whom they should, and guard justice.

In a Platonic myth (*Or.* 2.394-400), Aristeides sets out a new version of the Prometheus story: from Zeus, Prometheus obtained the art of oratory (ῥητορικὴν [τέχνην]) for humankind, thus saving the species from extinction by laying the foundations of communal, civilized, life. It is significant that, unlike other abilities, oratorical ability is not distributed equally to all but only to the best, noblest and strongest:

τὸν δὲ Ἑρμῆν οὐχ οὕτως ἐκέλευσεν ὥσπερ θεωρικοῦ διάδοσιν διελεῖν, ἵνα πάντες ῥητορικῆς ἐφεξῆς μετέχοιεν, ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ χειρῶν καὶ ποδῶν, ἀλλ' ἐπιλεξάμενον τοὺς ἀρίστους, καὶ γενναιοτάτους καὶ τὰς φύσεις ἐρρωμενεστάτους, τούτοις ἐγχειρίσαι τὸ δῶρον, ἵνα ὁμοῦ σφᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους σώζειν ἔχοιεν. (*Or.* 2.397)

[Zeus] ordered Hermes not to divide it [rhetoric] like the festival fund, so that all in turn might have a share, as [they do] of eyes and hands and feet; but having selected the best, the noblest and those with the strongest natures, to entrust the gift to them, in order that they might have the ability to save both themselves and others together.<sup>34</sup>

The primacy of oratory is stressed also in the *Panathenaios*: ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία νικᾶν ἔδωκε τῇ πόλει ... πρῶτον μὲν λόγους τε καὶ νόμων τάξιν καταδείξασα καὶ πολιτείαν δυναστείας ἀπηλλαγμένην (*Or.* 1.42-3), 'she [Athena] gave to the city to surpass in wisdom ... first she made known rhetoric and the drawing up of laws and a form of government set free from oligarchy ...'.

δ Those who possess rhetorical ability are godlike or mouthpieces of the divine

The first sophists saw oratorical skill as a personal attribute and themselves as godlike in their ability to persuade and control. Protagoras was famous for proclaiming that man is the measure of all things. If this meant that all is relative – in Plato's words, that things are for me as they appear to me and for you as they appear to you (οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τοιαῦτα μὲν

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<sup>34</sup> Not many are so superior: ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ λέοντες καὶ ὅσα ἐντιμότερα τῶν ζωῶν σπανιώτερα τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ τῆ φύσει, οὕτω καὶ κατ' ἀνθρώπους οὐδὲν οὕτω σπάνιον ὅσον ἄξιον προσεῖπεῖν ῥήτορα· (*Or.* 2.425), 'for as lions and all the more honoured of the animals are rarer than others in nature, so among human beings nothing is as rare as one worthy to be called rhetor'.

ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί, *Tht.* 152a) – that which people are persuaded of is true, and the one who can persuade is 'god' (see Ch. 7.2.1). Aristeides believes rather that the orator is divinely inspired, a mouthpiece of the god. He sets him beside the Pythian priestess (*Or.* 2.34), those who pronounce oracles at Dodona, Klaros and the shrine of Ammon (*Or.* 2.42-4), Bakis, and the Sibyl (*Or.* 2.46). The poets confess their human ignorance and invoke the aid of the Muses (*Or.* 2.47-8); surely Hermes inspires the rhetor in the same way, and rhetoric should be called divine (*theios*) and greater than *technē* (*Or.* 2.49).<sup>35</sup> Sokrates claimed to know nothing, but he was attended by a guiding spirit and so the wisest of men (*Or.* 2.78-80). Aristeides adds a personal note, referring to the attitude of himself and others who call upon Asklepios and the gods of Egypt: ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ καταφυγεῖν ἐπὶ τοὺς θεοὺς σχεδὸν ἀρχὴ τὸ τῆς τέχνης ὑπεριδεῖν ἐστίν (*Or.* 2.69), 'the disdain of *technē* is close to the beginning of flight for refuge to the gods'.

ε Aristeides is an appropriate associate of his god, 'the best', and divine

In giving Aristeides rhetorical ability, the god has made him a suitable associate of himself: ἔφη χρῆναι κινηθῆναι τὸν νοῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ καθεστηκότος, κινηθέντα δὲ συγγενέσθαι θεῷ, συγγενόμενον δὲ ὑπερέχειν ἤδη τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἕξεως (*HL* 4.52), 'he said that it was necessary that my mind be changed from its present state, and having been changed, associate with god, and having associated, now be superior to the human condition'. The remarkable revelation is recorded separately in an oration given not long after the communication described.

Ἔχω δέ σοι καὶ λόγον τινὰ ἱερὸν διελθεῖν, ἀκούσας νύκτωρ οὐ πάλαι παρά του τῶν κρειπτόνων, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ χρῆμα τῆς θείας μανίας. εἶχεν δὲ πῶς ὧδε ὁ λόγος. ἀνάγκη τὸν νοῦν, ἔφη, κινηθῆναι τὴν πρώτην ἀπὸ τοῦ συνήθους καὶ κοινοῦ, κινηθέντα δὲ καὶ ὑπερφρονήσαντα θεῷ συγγενέσθαι καὶ ὑπερέχειν. (*Or.* 28.116)

I can narrate to you a sacred tale, having heard [it] at night not long ago from one of the superior ones [gods], concerning the matter of divine madness. And the tale was somewhat like this: 'It is necessary', he said, 'that your mind be changed first from the

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<sup>35</sup> In the same vein, ὃς δ' ἂν ἄνευ μανίας Μουσῶν ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας ἀφίκηται, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα ἐκ τέχνης ἱκανὸς ποιητὴς ἐσόμενος, ἀτελής αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ ποιήσις ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν μαινομένων ἢ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος ἠφανίσθη (*Or.* 2.52), 'whoever without the madness of the Muses arrives at the doors of poetry, having been persuaded that by means of *technē* he will be a competent poet, is himself uninitiated, and his poetry, that of the sane man, is effaced by that of the mad'.

habitual and common and, having been changed and become disdainful, associate with god and be superior'.<sup>36</sup>

Aristeides accepts the name Theodoros (*HL* 4.53, 70)<sup>37</sup> because his present elevated state of being – indeed, everything he has – is a gift from the god (*HL* 4.53).

God-given ability and the success attendant upon it elevate Aristeides to divinity. The sequence of events is as follows. At Pergamon, in the *Kathedra* period, Aristeides maintains a chorus of boys to sing his compositions (*HL* 4.38). He decides to sponsor a series of choral performances by boys and men (*HL* 4.43) and, on their success, he plans a thanksgiving dedication. The god provides the words to be inscribed on it in a dream: Οὐκ ἀφανῆς Ἑλλησιν Ἀριστείδης ἀνέθηκεν | μύθων ἀνάνων κύδιμος ἠνίοχος (*HL* 4.45), 'not unknown to the Greeks, Aristeides dedicated [this], the glorious charioteer of everlasting tales'. Aristeides picks up the 'everlasting' (*aenaios*): the god himself has proclaimed the immortality of his work (*HL* 4.47).<sup>38</sup> Some time later, Aristeides dreams of being crowned in the temple of Olympian Zeus near his ancestral home as 'invincible in rhetoric' (ἀήττητος περὶ λόγους, *HL* 4.48). Near the temple he finds a common monument to himself and Alexander, son of Philip – each the best in his own field: χαίρειν τε οὖν καὶ συμβάλλεσθαι ὡς ἄρα ἀμφοτέροι τὸ ἄκρον λάχοιμεν, ὁ μὲν τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὄπλοις δυνάμεως, ἐγὼ δὲ τῆς ἐπὶ τοῖς λόγοις (*HL* 4.49), 'therefore I rejoiced and conjectured that we both had reached the summit, he in military power and I in rhetorical'. Paired in this way with Alexander, Aristeides can be seen as – in a specific sense<sup>39</sup> – 'divine'.

ζ Aristeides can be identified with his god

One more step is possible. Aristeides is worshipping with others – perhaps in the temple of Asklepios before his house (*HL* 4.49) – when Asklepios, in the form of his statue, sends the others away, indicating to Aristeides himself to stay. The man so singled out continues: κάγῳ περιχαρῆς τῇ τιμῇ γενόμενος καὶ ὅσον τῶν ἄλλων προὔκριθην ἐξεβόησα, εἶς, λέγων δὴ τὸν θεόν. καὶ ὃς ἔφη, σὺ εἶ (*HL* 4.50), 'and I, delighted by the honour and by how much I was

<sup>36</sup> *Or.* 28 dates to the period of the *Kathedra*, as evidenced by references to Aristeides as an incubant (*Or.* 28.88, 132-3). 'Divine madness' evokes the inspiration mentioned above.

<sup>37</sup> The name is attested in the inscription (*OGIS* 709) included in App. 6 (176-178 CE).

<sup>38</sup> Perceptively, Downie (2013a, 136-7) notes Aristeides' appropriation of the god's words (μύθων ἀνάνων), which associate him with the poets, as a reference to his prose works (ἐπειδὴ γε ἀνάνους τοὺς λόγους ὁ θεὸς ἔτυχε προσειρηκῶς (*HL* 4.47).

<sup>39</sup> In spite of the well-known stories about his physical sonship of Zeus (Plut. *Alex.* 2.2-4), Alexander seems to have based his claim to divinity on being 'the best'. See Ch. 3.4.2a.

preferred to the others, shouted, "One", meaning the god. And he said, "It is you". 'Heis ho theos', was a common acclamation expressing personal devotion to one god ('there is no other god *like* this god') rather than a monotheistic theology ('there is no other god *except* this god').<sup>40</sup> In this extraordinary passage, Asklepios identifies Aristeides with himself. The experience was not unique. In a dream recorded in the dream diary of 166 CE, Aristeides records: περιεσκόπου δὲ, ὡς ἐν τῷ προνάῳ δὴ τούτῳ, ἀνδριάντα ἑμαυτοῦ· καὶ τότε μὲν γε ὡς ἑμαυτοῦ ὄντα ἐώρων, πάλιν δὲ ἐδόκει μοι εἶναι αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ μέγας τις καὶ καλός (*HL* 1.17), 'I examined, as if in this vestibule, a statue of myself. At then on one hand I saw it as being of me, and again it seemed to me to be a large and beautiful statue of Asklepios himself'.

### *c. Life-transforming encounter with the god: the Mysteries*

A rather different and potentially less elite image of personal transformation and god-given identity might be seen to follow from Aristeides' perception of the god as Saviour and his linking of his experience in the Asklepios cult with the Mysteries: Aristeides is one who shares in the salvation accorded to all the god's 'initiates'. It will be argued here, nevertheless, that Aristeides uses Mystery imagery not to suggest a different *understanding* of his special status from that put forward in sections *a* and *b* above, but rather to indicate the nature of his *experience* in encounter with the god.

The argument can be summarized as follows. The best-known, Eleusinian, Mysteries offered initiates a joyful afterlife; Aristeides may well have been an initiate. Related Mystery theology seems to have been available in the cult of Asklepios but, even if so, it was not central to Aristeides' Asklepieian faith; at a time of need, for intimations of an afterlife, he turned to the Egyptian gods. His *Or.* 34 links Mystery terminology with Platonic revelation, and examination of his works suggests that it is experience of a related kind that he uses Mystery imagery to evoke.

Mysteries were defined by their secrecy. The archetypal *mysteria* were those of Demeter at Eleusis, and their secrecy was already a topos in the *Hymnus Homericus ad Cererem*; the goddess went to the law-giver kings and taught them the solemn rites which cannot be inquired into or spread about: μέγα γὰρ τι θεῶν σέβας ἰσχάνει αὐδὴν (479), 'for a certain great reverence for the gods checks the human voice'. Herodotos associated the secrecy of the rites of Osiris at Sais – though he is familiar with them, 'let me keep a sacred silence' (εὐστομα κείσθω,

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<sup>40</sup> Henotheism: it appears first in relation to Dionysos but seems to have been particularly associated with Isis and Sarapis. Cf. Versnel 1990, vol. 1, 35, 205, 232.

2.171) – with that of the rites of Demeter. The secrecy of the Mysteries was often referenced in Second Sophistic literature.<sup>41</sup> Plutarch's Kleombrotos evokes Herodotos in a passage that does not specify any single rite or cult: *περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μυστικῶν, ἐν οἷς τὰς μεγίστας ἐμφάσεις καὶ διαφάσεις λαβεῖν ἔστι τῆς περὶ δαιμόνων ἀληθείας, εὖστομά μοι κείσθω, καθ' Ἡρόδοτον (Mor. 417c)*, 'therefore about the Mysteries, in which it is possible to find the greatest reflections and transparencies as to the truth about *daimones*, "let me keep a sacred silence", as Herodotos says'. Herodotos' *εὖστομα κείσθω* recurs when Plutarch chooses not to reveal an Orphic doctrine that is to be regarded as *mystikotera* (*Mor.* 636d-e). Pausanias claims that he has been forbidden in a dream to describe anything within the sacred enclosure at Eleusis (1.38.7). Aristeides seems relatively forthcoming. Referring to the Eleusinian Mysteries at *Or.* 1.341, he notes: *τὰς δ' ἀρρήτους τελετάς, ὧν τοῖς μετασχοῦσι καὶ μετὰ τὴν τοῦ βίου τελευτὴν βελτίω τὰ πράγματα γίνεσθαι δοκεῖ, τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐξαρκεῖν φαίη πᾶσιν ἔν ἀντιθεῖναι;* 'and the secret ceremonies in which, for those participating, it seems that matters turn out better after the end of life – who would not say that this one thing is enough to set against everything?'

There is evidence that (at least in certain of the Mysteries) the soul was believed to make a journey to the world of the dead and back in the experience of initiation. In his letter of consolation to his wife on the death of their young daughter, Plutarch asserts that both tradition and the Mysteries of Dionysos – 'about which we share in the knowledge with other companions' – provide evidence that the soul is imperishable and imprisoned in the body like a captive bird (*Mor.* 611d-e). The statement may be taken to suggest that the initiate's soul has made a journey and encountered the surviving souls of the dead. Other sources make the same point. In Lucian's *Cataplus*, as the dead proceed, led by Hermes, to the Underworld, Mikyllos (a cobbler) asks Kyniskos (a philosopher) if the experience does not remind him of the Eleusinian Mysteries. A reminiscent element is a fierce-looking woman with a torch (22). In his *Necyomantia*, Menippos' interlocutor has been initiated into the Mysteries and so (the implication is) can be told about events after death (2). A relatively explicit account of the experience of initiation is presented as fiction in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*. In his initiation ceremony into the Mysteries of Isis, Lucius dies and returns to life: *accessi confinium mortis et, calcato Proserpinae limine ... remeavi (Met. 11.23)*, 'I came to the boundary of death and, with the threshold of Proserpina trodden, I ... returned'.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>41</sup> For an overview of references to the Mysteries in selected Second Sophistic works, Humbel 1994, 9-18, 147-89.

<sup>42</sup> As noted above, Herodotos (2.171) associated the Mysteries of Osiris and those of Demeter. With his reference to Proserpina, Apuleius similarly and even more appropriately linked the Mysteries of Isis with

His *Eleusiniος* (*Or.* 22) in particular makes it clear that Aristeides was familiar with the cult at Eleusis; he could well have been initiated in his youth when he studied in Athens under Herodes Attikos (Ch. 6.1).<sup>43</sup> However, in this oration as at *Or.* 1.341, he says no more about the annual rites and their meaning than must commonly have been known:

ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε κέρδος τῆς πανηγύρεως οὐχ ὅσον ἢ παροῦσα εὐθυμία οὐδ' αἰ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ πρότερον χρόνου δυσκολιῶν λύσεις καὶ ἀπαλλαγαί, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῆς τελευτῆς ἡδίους ἔχειν τὰς ἐλπίδας ὡς ἄμεινον διάζοντα, καὶ οὐκ ἐν σκότῳ τε καὶ βορβόρῳ κεισομένους, ἃ δὴ τοὺς ἀμυήτους ἀναμένειν. (*Or.* 22.10)

Indeed, the gain from the festival was not so much the present joy or the release and deliverance from discontents of the past, but also in having more pleasant hopes about death; that we are going to be spending time in a better way and not lying in gloom and mud, which indeed await the uninitiated.<sup>44</sup>

Aristeides seems to find Mystery implications in the cult of Asklepios.

καὶ οὔτε χοροῦ σύλλογος πρᾶγμα τοσοῦτον οὔτε πλοῦ κοινωνία οὔτε διδασκάλων τῶν αὐτῶν τυχεῖν, ὅσον χρῆμα καὶ κέρδος εἰς Ἀσκληπιοῦ τε συμφοιτῆσαι καὶ τελεσθῆναι τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ἱερῶν ὑπὸ τῷ καλλίστῳ καὶ τελεωτάτῳ δαδούχῳ καὶ μυσταγωγῷ καὶ ᾧ πᾶς ἀνάγκης εἴκει θεσμός. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτός εἰμι τῶν οὐ δις [βεβιωκότων] ὑπὸ τῷ θεῷ, ἀλλὰ πολλοὺς τε καὶ παντοδαποὺς βίους βεβιωκότων ... (*Or.* 23.16)

Neither gathering in a chorus nor the companionship of a voyage nor encountering the same teachers [is] as great a matter as the gain and profit in having been of the company at the temple of Asklepios and initiated in the first of the rites under the guidance of the most beautiful and perfect Torchbearer and Mystagogue and the one to whom every law of necessity gives way. I myself am among those having lived not twice under the protection of the god but many lives of all sorts ...

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Eleusis: the intervening period had seen an official synthesis of traditional Egyptian and Greek religion sponsored by Ptolemy Soter or Ptolemy Philadelphos. It was undertaken by the Hellenised Egyptian priest Manetho in consultation with Timotheos, brought from Eleusis in his capacity as priest of the Mysteries (Tac. *Hist.* 4.83.3, Plut. *Mor.* 362a, cf. Turcan 1996, 78).

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Behr 1968, 110, Behr 1981, n. 1 at *Or.* 22.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Pl. *Phd.* 69c, Isoc. 4.28, Plut. *Frg.* 178 Sandbach = Stob. 4.52.49. For modern discussion and speculative reconstruction of the ceremonies, which seem to have involved an epiphany of Demeter and Kore, Burkert 1987, 91-5, Clinton 1992, 131, Clinton 1993, 118-9, Humbel 1994, 130, Clinton 2003, 65-7, Sourvinou-Inwood 2003, 35-7, Bowden 2010, 26-42.

*Daidouchos* (Torchbearer), like *mystagogos*, was an office of the Eleusinian Mysteries.<sup>45</sup> In the same context (*Or.* 23.14), Asklepios is *soter*. He is *soter* as well at *Orr.* 20.2, 27.2, 30.1, 36.124,<sup>46</sup> 39.3, 40.21, 42.4,<sup>47</sup> 53.3, and *HL* 1.1, 66; however, at *Or.* 16.41, the *soter* is Zeus, at *HL* 4.32, he is Apollo and, at *HL* 4.36, Aristeides himself is *soter* to his friends. The term *soter* was certainly typical of the Mysteries<sup>48</sup> but it was not exclusive to them, and its repeated use in relation to Asklepios does not necessarily make him a Mystery god.<sup>49</sup>

Eleusinian Mystery imagery could well have been purveyed by the Asklepios cult. Asklepios was associated with Demeter and the Mysteries of Eleusis from the fifth century BCE (*IG* II<sup>2</sup>, 4960a = Edelstein 720), though references that identify Asklepios as a *mystes*, an initiate, are later (Philostr. *VA* 4.18.1 = Edelstein 565; Paus. 2.26.8 = Edelstein 564).<sup>50</sup> Evidence, principally from the Christian era, showing that sacrifices (*IG* IV, 1<sup>2</sup>, 126 = Edelstein 432) and dedications (*IG* IV, 1<sup>2</sup>, 194, 507, 508, 551) were made to Demeter at Epidauros indicates the closeness of the Eleusinian and Asklepieian cults. Edelstein points out that Asklepios was the arbiter of life and death (*Artem.* 5.13 = Edelstein 453). Devotees submitted themselves to his superior judgement; to Aristeides, the god's refusal to help indicated that it was time to die (*Or.* 28.132 = Edelstein 464b). In this context, Edelstein argues convincingly that the god did not abandon his votaries on the point of death (although they were barred from his sanctuaries, Paus. 2.27.6 = Edelstein 488), but rather passed them over to the cult of Demeter and to a focus on a new realm of being.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> At *Or.* 22.4, Aristeides notes correctly that, at Eleusis, the Eumolpidae and the Kerykes provide *hierophantes* and *daidouchoi* respectively. Cf. Clinton 1974, 8, Price 1999, 68.

<sup>46</sup> Coupled here with Sarapis; Aristeides confuses the Egyptian names of the latter and the Nile (Behr 1981, n. 173 *ad loc.*)

<sup>47</sup> Coupled here with Zeus, appropriately in an address given in the vicinity of the Temple of Zeus Asklepios at Pergamon; see Ch. 6.3.2.

<sup>48</sup> For example, note the Great Mysteries of the Saviour Maiden (Kore) at Kyzikos. Cf. Bowden 2010, 77. The potentially contradictory concepts of the god as the initiate's 'saviour' and the initiate's identification with the dying and rising god coexist in many Mysteries. Isis labours to save Osiris who is imprisoned in death, and Demeter, to save Persephone/Kore – with whom in cult she is identified – from the Underworld.

<sup>49</sup> Mystery associations of the Asklepios cult might also seem to be suggested by the fact that Asklepios is typically represented with, or in the form of, a snake (Ch. 4.4, App. 4), a creature associated with the Underworld and – since it sheds its skin – renewal and perhaps life after death. However, although snake symbolism can be Mystery-related, it need not be so (Toynbee 1973, 234-5). For non-Mystery interpretations of a serpent shedding its skin in Asklepieian contexts, Edelstein 701, 703-6.

<sup>50</sup> The annual festival of the Mysteries began with ceremonies in Athens; for a reconstruction of the ritual sequence contextualizing Philostratos' account at *VA* 4.18.1, Robertson 1998, 547-75. From 421 BCE, the fourth day was a celebration of Asklepios, introduced after a snake sacred to the god was lodged overnight that year in the City Eleusineion. Cf. Edelstein 1945/1998, vol. 2, 127, Edelstein 720, Bowden 2010, 34-5.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Edelstein 1945/1998, vol. 2, 127-30.

Behr concedes an association between Asklepios and Demeter but probably rightly sees no reference to belief in an afterlife associated with the cult of Asklepios in Aristeides: the latter uses the terms *Mystagogue* and *Torchbearer* 'on his own initiative to emphasize his feeling of the holiness' of the cult.<sup>52</sup> References to multiple lives (*Or.* 23.16, above) and to resurrection – εἰσὶν οἱ φασιν ἀναστῆναι κείμενοι ... καὶ πάλαι τῷ θεῷ μελετώμενα (*Or.* 42.6), 'there are some who say that, lying dead, they were raised ... as was anciently the practice of the god' – are to life in this world, not after death. Elsewhere, Aristeides explicitly denies human immortality. He refers to his student Apellas' family: ὧ τρίς ἐκέῖνοι καὶ πολλάκις εὐδαίμονες, οἱ τὴν μόνην τῷ γένει τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀποδοθεῖσαν ἀθανασίαν ἐν σοὶ καρπούμενοι (*Or.* 30.23), 'O three times and often blessed, those who have reaped the fruits in you [Apellas] of the only immortality available to human beings'. Asklepios μεγίστην δὲ καὶ κοινοτάτην εὐεργεσίαν εἰς ἅπαντας κατέθετο ἀθάνατον ποιήσας τὸ γένος τῆ διαδοχῆ (*Or.* 42.5), 'has performed the greatest and most common beneficence for all, having made the human race immortal by means of succession'. Zeus has caused καὶ θνητὸν ὃν ἡμῶν τὸ γένος κατὰ μέρος ἀθάνατον εἶναι τῆ διαδοχῆ (*Or.* 43.21), 'our race which is mortal individual by individual to be immortal by means of succession'.

An experience deeply reminiscent of the aspect of the Mysteries that has to do with the immortality of the soul occurs in Aristeides' dreams when he is mourning the loss of Zosimos and receives some comfort from the *chthonioi theoi* (*HL* 3.47), and from Sarapis.

... αἶ τε δὴ κλίμακες ἦσαν αἱ τὸ ὑπὲρ γῆς τε καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς ἀφορίζουσαι, καὶ τὸ ἐκατέρωθι κράτος τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ ἕτερα ἔκπληξιν θαυμαστὴν φέροντα, καὶ οὐδὲ ῥητὰ ἴσως εἰς ἅπαντας, ὥστε ἀσμένω μοι φανῆναι <τὰ> σύμβολα [τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ]. κεφάλαιον δ' ἦν περὶ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως ὅτι καὶ χωρὶς ὀχημάτων καὶ χωρὶς σωμάτων ὁ Σάραπισ οἷός τ' εἶη κομίζειν ἀνθρώπους ὅπη βούλοιο. τοιαῦτα ἦν τὰ τῆς τελετῆς ... (*HL* 3.48; Keil: τὰ *addidi*; τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ *seclusi*)

... there were indeed ladders marking off the boundaries above and below the earth and the power of the god on each side, and other things causing a wonderful terror and not told equally to all; consequently I was glad to have been shown the signs. The principal thing was about the power of the god, that without vehicles and bodies, Sarapis in some

<sup>52</sup> Behr 1968, 149 n. 9, Behr 1981, n. 11 at *Or.* 23.16. Humbel (1994, 32) posits that Mystery-related terminology was taken into the Asklepios cult from the Eleusinian cult and used in connection with incubation ritual rather than Mysteries proper. There is no evidence for this, and Aristeides' reference to initiation and multiple lives (however interpreted) at *Or.* 23.16 suggests a deliberate intention to evoke Eleusis.

way can convey human beings wherever he wishes. These kinds of things came from the initiation ...

Aristeides was probably acquainted with the Egyptian Mysteries. He would have become familiar with them in Egypt, and he continued to be associated with the cult of Sarapis in Smyrna. He notes a specific occasion on which he sacrificed to Isis and Sarapis in the temple of Isis in Smyrna (*HL* 3.49), and the oration *Eis Sarapin* (*Or.* 45) – delivered on his return from Egypt – was presented at the god's annual festival in the city (*Or.* 45.33). In this context, Behr suggests convincingly that, in the short period when he was in need of comfort in the face of death (i.e. after the death of Zosimos), he turned to the Egyptian gods.<sup>53</sup> Aristeides already knew Sarapis as a god who subsumes all divine powers (*Or.* 45.23); moreover, at *Or.* 45.25, he is explicitly a god of the afterlife, both a saviour and a guide of the dead (σωτήρ αὐτὸς καὶ ψυχοπομπός). Asklepios was a saviour only in life.

It is suggested here that Aristeides uses imagery related to the Mysteries in connection with Asklepios not to make reference to Eleusinian teaching about life after death but rather to evoke the *experience* of initiation. In the context of the significant dream in Pergamon – in which he sees himself in the forecourt of the temple – described above (Winter 146-147, Ch. 6.2.1a), Aristeides expresses his experience in terms of the Mysteries: καὶ τίς ἀνθρώπων ταῦτά γ' ἐνδείξασθαι λόγῳ δυνατός; εἰ δέ τις τῶν τετελεσμένων ἐστὶ, σύνοιδέ τε καὶ γνωρίζει (*HL* 2.32), 'who among human beings [is] able to describe these things in words? If anyone has been initiated, he knows and understands'. In a dream, the god prescribes sacrifices to prevent Aristeides' imminent death (Winter 145-146). He carries them out and notes that:

τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο <οὐκ> ἔξεστιν εἰκάζειν ὅπως διεκείμεθα, καὶ ὁποίαν τινὰ ἀρμονίαν πάλιν ἡμᾶς ἠρμόσατο ὁ θεός. σχεδὸν γὰρ ὡσπερ ἐν τελετῇ περὶ πάντα ταῦτα διήγομεν, παρεστῶσης ἅμα τῷ φόβῳ τῆς ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος. (*HL* 2.28)

After this it is impossible to represent the state I was in and into what kind of harmony the god again brought me. For I was passing time in all these things almost as in initiation, good hope being my companion together with fear.

Nine years after the onset of his illness, in December 152, the god orders Aristeides to repeat the journey to the river Aisepos that he made before his trip to Rome. He follows the instructions.

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<sup>53</sup> Behr 1968, 149-50.

καὶ τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων ἡμερῶν διαγενομένων γίγνεται φωνὴ δι' ὄνειρατος, ὅτι πέρας τε ἔχοι καὶ ἐπανήκειν δέοι. ἦν οὖν οὐ μόνον τελετῇ τινι ἐοικὸς, οὕτω θείων τε καὶ παραδόξων τῶν δρωμένων ὄντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνέπιπτε τι θαυμαστὸν ἀηθεία, ἅμα μὲν γὰρ ἦν εὐθυμεῖσθαι, χαίρειν, ἐν εὐκόλοις εἶναι καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ... (HL 4.6-7)

After three or four days had passed, a voice came in a dream, that the end had come and it was necessary to return. It was therefore not only like an initiation, with the things done being so divine and strange, but something wonderful in its novelty coincided as well, for at the same time there was cheerfulness and joy, and being contented both in soul and body ...

The candidate for initiation certainly makes a journey to a liminal place to learn, but his or her experience cannot be described as autopsy, seeing and judging provisionally for oneself. Rather, true knowledge is revealed, suddenly and overwhelmingly, so that nothing can ever be the same again. In a fragment that almost certainly relates to the Eleusinian Mysteries (Plut. Frg. 178 Sandbach = Stob. 4.52.49),<sup>54</sup> Plutarch claims: ἐκ δὲ τούτου φῶς τι θαυμάσιον ἀπήνησεν καὶ τόποι καθαροὶ καὶ λειμῶνες ἐδέξαντο ... , 'after this a wonderful light came to meet you, and pure regions and meadows received you ...'. The words probably reflect initiates' experience at Eleusis, but as well they evoke the experience of the one brought from Plato's cave into the light (R. 7.516c-d). Initiation rather than any kind of scientific observation provides a model for the nature of Aristeides' life-changing experience of the god.

Aristeides explicitly links the Mysteries and Platonic revelation in *Or.* 34, which deals with oratory. He notes that physical beauty inspires love: δεῖ γὰρ, οἶμαι, κάλλει μὲν χάριν εἶναι, χάριτος δὲ ἔρωτα ἐξηρητῆσθαι. ὅτω γὰρ ἂν τις χάρη, τοῦτ' ἀνάγκη ποθεῖν (*Or.* 34.25), 'for, I think, beauty must have charm, and charm give rise to love. For in whatever people delight, this they must desire'. Moreover, τὸ τῶν λόγων κάλλος μετὰ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως καὶ τοῦτ' ἔχει, κηλεῖν τοὺς ἀκούοντας (*Or.* 34.26), 'the beauty of words along with all Nature has this, [the power] to enchant the listeners'.<sup>55</sup> The passages evoke Plato's *Symposium* and the spontaneous love that Beauty inspires (*Smp.* 211c); Aristeides associates them with the Mysteries by his use of a Mystery-related term – *exorcheisthai* – in the oration's title (*Kata ton exorchoumenon*): at *Salt*.

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<sup>54</sup> See e.g. Clinton 2003, 66.

<sup>55</sup> Elsewhere, oratory is better than beauty: φημί δ' ἔγωγε καὶ κάλλος τε καὶ ῥητορικὴν συνελθόντα τῇ ῥητορικῇ κριθήσεσθαι (*Or.* 2.417), 'I say that, beauty and rhetoric having come together, rhetoric will be preferred'.

15, Lucian claims that τοὺς ἐξαγορεύοντας τὰ μυστήρια ἐξορχεῖσθαι λέγουσιν οἱ πολλοί, 'most people say that those divulging the Mysteries "dance them out"'.<sup>56</sup>

In this section, the emphasis has been on Aristeides' experience of the god; however, the discussion can be related back to his perception of his oratorical role. In *Or.* 34, the Mysteries not to be profaned are those of oratory. Aristeides also uses Mystery terminology in connection with oratory in his prose hymn to Dionysos: αὐτοὶ δὲ ὡσπερὶ συμβόλου χάριν, ὡς οὐ τῶν ἀμυήτων ἄρ' ἤμεν, συμμέτρῳ τῇ φωνῇ προσείπωμεν τὸν θεόν (*Or.* 41.2), 'let us address the god in an appropriate tone just as if for the favour of a sign that we were not among the uninitiated'. As one who has reached the summit of his profession (*HL* 4.48-9), Aristeides is more than an initiate. He is the one whose words have the power to enchant his listeners (*Or.* 34.26), the celebrant of the Mysteries and a human mouthpiece of the god.

### 6.2.2 Oracles

At *Or.* 45.7, Aristeides refers to the prophetic pronouncements given – metrically and otherwise – by the prophetess at Delphi, the priestesses at Dodona, Trophonios, and in dreams sent by Asklepios and Sarapis. Elsewhere, he refers to Delphic oracles (*Orr.* 28.9, 48, 103, 40.10, 15, 43.25, *HL* 4.75), and to oracles of Apollo at Klaros/Kolophon (*HL* 3.12, *HL* 3.38), of Amphiaraos, Trophonios and Amphilochos (*Or.* 38.21) and of Sarapis and Isis (*HL* 4.97) – the latter presumably provided in dreams. In this section, the term 'oracles' will be used to refer only to traditional, mediated, oracles, and the two that Aristeides records obtaining himself will be examined.

On a prescribed visit to the warm springs at Lebedos towards the end of the *Kathedra* period (Spring 147),

ἐνθύμιον γίγνεται μοι χρήσασθαι τῷ θεῷ τῷ ἐν Κολοφῶνι καὶ περὶ τῶν παρόντων καὶ περὶ πάσης τῆς ἀσθενείας. ἀπέχει δὲ ἡ Κολοφῶν τῆς Λεβέδου οὐ πολὺ, καὶ ἡ νύξ ἐτύγχανεν ἡ ἱερὰ ἐπικειμένη. δόξαν ταῦτα πέμπω τὸν Ζώσιμον. ἐπελθούσης δὲ τῆς νυκτὸς τῷ μὲν Ζωσίμῳ γίγνεται τότε τὸ μαντεῖον φέρον εἰς ἐμέ· Ἰήσεται σε νοῦσον ἢδ' ἀκέσσειται | Ἀσκληπιός, πόλισμα Τηλέφου κλυτὸν | τιμῶν, Καίκου ναμάτων οὐ τηλόθεν. (*HL* 3.12)

It occurred to me to consult the god at Kolophon about both present issues and my overall weakness. Kolophon is not far from Lebedos, and the Sacred Night was at hand. With this

<sup>56</sup> The expression is also used by Lucian at *Pisc.* 33 (τὰ ἀπόρρητα καὶ ἐξορχούμενον), by Alciphron (μυστήρια ἐξορχησάμενοι, 3.36.1 Schepers) and by Achilles Tatius (ἐξορχήσομαι τὰ μυστήρια, 4.8). See also LSJ s.v. ἐξορχέομαι.

resolve, I send Zosimos. When night came on, Zosimos received the following oracle pertaining to me: 'Asklepios will heal and cure your disease, honouring the famous city of Telephos not far from the streams of Kaikos' [i.e.Pergamon].

This could well have been a standard response – cults were prepared to cross-refer. Aristeides refers to the fact that 'the two saviour gods'<sup>57</sup> work together and send suppliants (or possibly questions or information) to one another (*Or.* 27.39); Lucian's Alexander sends his clients to Klaros, Didyma and Mallos (Ch. 4.2).

On another occasion, faced with an unwanted appointment (January 153; for the whole tale, *HL* 4.71-94), Aristeides consults the god: ἑσπέρα τε ἐπέρχεται καὶ ἠρώτων τὸν θεὸν τί τε εἶη ταῦτα καὶ τί χρὴ ποιεῖν. καὶ μοι γίγνεται τὸ ἔπος τὸ ἐκ Δελφῶν· Ἐμοὶ μελήσει ταῦτα καὶ λευκαῖς κόραις (*HL* 4.75), 'evening comes on, and I was asking the god what these things were and what it was necessary to do. And I received the word from Delphi: "These things will be my concern and that of the white maidens"'. Here, we have no formal Delphic consultation: Aristeides is nowhere near Delphi. Moreover, the response is a famous one (T4.11), uttered in the context of an attack on Delphi in 278 BCE during the invasion of the Galatian Brennus. It was probably well known in Aristeides' lifetime<sup>58</sup> and, as the practices of chresmologues evidence (Ch. 1.2.1), old oracles were believed to have continuing significance. It is just possible that Aristeides obtained the oracle by consulting a chresmologue; however, it seems most likely that Asklepios provided Aristeides with this Delphic oracle in a dream. Aristeides continues:

ποῦ οὖν τοῦτο ἐτελεύτησεν; ἡμέραις οὐ πολλαῖς ὕστερον ἐξ Ἰταλίας ἀφικνοῦνται ἐπιστολαί μοι παρὰ τῶν βασιλέων, τοῦ τε αὐτοκράτορος αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ παιδός, ἄλλας τε εὐφημίας ἔχουσαι καὶ τὴν ἀτέλειαν ἐπισφραγιζόμεναι τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς λόγοις, εἰ τυγχάνοιμι χρώμενος αὐτοῖς. (*HL* 4.75)

How therefore was this fulfilled? Not many days later, a letter arrived for me from Italy, from the rulers, the emperor himself and his son, containing other praises and confirming the exemption on account of my oratory, if I were actually practising it.

Aristeides' 'white maidens' are a letter, though in the circumstances in which the oracle was first given, the 'white maidens' turned out to be snow (*Val. Max.* 1.1 ext. 9).

As Swain has pointed out, the oracle was particularly apt. Aristeides' problem occurred under the proconsul of Asia C. Julius Severus. Severus was from Ankyra in Galatia and a

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<sup>57</sup> i.e. Asklepios and Sarapis; for the two as saviours, Ch. 6.2.1c.

<sup>58</sup> It is cited by Diodoros (22.9.5) and Pompeius Trogus (Justin 24.7-8) as well as as noted at T4.11.

descendant of the Pergamene and Galatian royal houses, proud of his royal descent from the Gauls. 'White maidens' free Aristeides, as they once did Delphi, from a Galatian attack.<sup>59</sup> If Dion had presented us with this oracle and its fulfilment in one of his orations we would assume it to be his own invention, created to convey the divine providence of the letter's arrival. The *Hieroi logoi* are usually (and rightly) seen as of a different genre; thus, in his discussion of the passage, Swain makes no suggestion that the oracle is a rhetorical ruse, although he describes Aristeides' narrative as 'extraordinary'. The form of the prognostication may perhaps be attributed to Aristeides' subconscious mind; the only alternatives are coincidence, a clever chresmologue, or divine intervention.

### 6.3 Encircling the earth

As we have seen, periegesis can be associated with autopsy – seeing for oneself – and comparing and judging for oneself. Aristeides made at least one journey of this kind, to Egypt, in his youth. However, his journeys after his encounter with Asklepios seem to conform to a completely different model.

#### 6.3.1 Journeys of autopsy

In 141, with funds liberated by the death of his father,<sup>60</sup> the young Aristeides set out for Egypt. From Alexandria, he made four excursions within Egypt proper (*Or.* 36.1),<sup>61</sup> with visits to Kanobos (*Or.* 36.109), Hermopolis (*Or.* 3.583), Naukratis (*Or.* 3.583), Hermounthi (*Or.* 36.33), the Labyrinth at Lake Moeris (*Or.* 36.1), and the Pyramids at Memphis (*Or.* 36.1), as well as a separate journey as far as Ethiopia (*Or.* 36.1).

Behr rightly sees him on the journey that traditionally completed a young man's education and cites in comparison Lucian's *Philopseudes* (33) and *Toxaris* (27). He further seems

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<sup>59</sup> Cf. Swain 1996, 271 and n. 69. For Severus, App. 6; for Severus' ancestors, *IGRom.* 3.173 = *OGIS* 544 = Mitchell/French 72, Mitchell 1993, vol. 1, 38. Aristeides notes that Severus would not yield to anyone once he had made a decision (*HL* 4.71), and was so incorruptible that one could sooner stop the flow of the rivers than bribe him (*HL* 4.82); Cassius Dio calls him just, intelligent and a person of reputation (69.14.4).

<sup>60</sup> Behr (1968, 14 and n. 36) makes this assumption on the basis of *HL* 4.105, concerning the purchase of Laneion for Aristeides.

<sup>61</sup> He regards Alexandria as only the fringe (*kraspedon*) of Egypt (*Or.* 36.18), citing the usage of Euripides (i.e. σχεδὸν παρ' αὐτοῖς κρασπέδοις Εὐρωπίας, *TGF* vol. 5, *Euripides*, Frg. 381).

to dismiss Aristeides' journey as 'tourism'.<sup>62</sup> The term 'tourist' can have derogatory overtones, but if by it Behr simply means one visiting primarily to contemplate the wonders of a place rather than in any professional capacity, he is probably correct.<sup>63</sup> Here, Aristeides will be seen as a traveller in the autopsy tradition and, moreover, one genuinely trying to carry out in practice the journey of discovery to the ends of the earth enshrined in the literary tradition (Ch. 2.3.4).

Applying the principles of autopsy, Aristeides studies the natural phenomena, religion and customs of Egypt, calling upon (among others) priests (*Or.* 36.1, 109, 122) and prophets (*Or.* 36.1), and making use of interpreters (*Or.* 36.15, 55, 109) when necessary. He uses books (*Or.* 36.1, 20, 115) and takes his own measurements (*Or.* 36.1). One particular interest is the flooding of the Nile (*Or.* 36.20, 115). Aristeides' scientific observation of a broader range of Egyptian phenomena is recorded at *Or.* 36.9, 18, 30, 34, 46-63, 70, 74, 113.<sup>64</sup>

In an attempt to investigate the sources of the Nile, the young man sets off up river to Ethiopia (*Or.* 36.1); he reaches Syene, the last major Roman garrison, located on the east bank of the Nile, and then diverts inland to the Ethiopian garrison at the 'Altars'<sup>65</sup> before returning to the river at Philai, above the Cataract. Following the same route back to Syene, he realizes that he has missed seeing the Cataract and persuades the commander to send him back by river before his return to Alexandria (*Or.* 36.48-9). The realism of the narrative contrasts markedly with Philostratos' account of Apollonios' journey on a similar quest (*VA* 6.23-26). Philostratos makes no mention of the Roman military presence, though there were three cohorts stationed at Syene in the time of Augustus (*Str.* 17.817, 819, 820), and probably two in Aristeides' day;<sup>66</sup> Aristeides requires the help – reluctantly given – of the garrison commander (*Or.* 36.49). Apollonios sees wild animals and nomad Ethiopians and finds a village terrified by the *phasma* of a satyr (*VA* 6.24-27.1). Aristeides visits historically attested settlements and converses with officials – the commander at Syene (*Or.* 36.49), and the Ethiopian Deputy Prefect, through interpreters, at the Altars (*Or.* 36.55). Apollonios reaches the Third Cataract (*VA* 6.26.2); Aristeides, only the First, well within the confines of the Roman world (*Or.* 36.50). Nevertheless, the outcomes of the two journeys are similar. Apollonios learns that there are limits beyond which human beings cannot go (*VA* 6.26.2). Aristeides conveys a similarly numinous discovery in his account of his

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<sup>62</sup> Behr 1968, 14: 'Ever the tourist ...'.

<sup>63</sup> Nevertheless, Aristeides seems to have practised as an orator at Kos and Knidos on his journey to Egypt (*App.* 6).

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Behr 1981, n. 1 at *Or.* 36.

<sup>65</sup> The location is conjectural; for discussion, Behr 1981, n. 59 at *Or.* 36.48. On the river route from Syene to Philai, *Str.* 17.1.49.

<sup>66</sup> I Flavia Cilicum Equitata (*CIL* 3.14147<sup>3</sup>) and II Ituraeorum Equitata (*IGRom.* 1.1348), cf. Behr 1981, n. 62 at *Or.* 36.49.

experience, written up some years after his journey. Many make confident assertions about the Nile, ὅπως τι δοκοῖεν περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἐπίστασθαι (*Or.* 36.2), 'so that they may seem to know something about what is unknown'. Aristeides himself cannot explain the Nile's rising (*Or.* 36.2): dismissing contemporary theories, he attributes the flow of the river – which is Zeus-fallen (*diipetes*, *Or.* 36.104)<sup>67</sup> – solely to the wisdom and providence of the god (*Or.* 36.123).

As Philostratos' account of Apollonios' journey confirms, in the period of the Second Sophistic the source of the Nile retained its aura as a liminal place. In seeking it out, the young Aristeides identified himself as one who intended to translate into contemporary terms, and to live out, the ancient (and contemporary novelistic) journey to the ends of the earth. The source of the Nile was not his only 'liminal' goal. At *Or.* 36.87-93, he presents a picture of the ancient, world-encircling Ocean modified by contemporary knowledge.<sup>68</sup> His Ocean is well-travelled (*Or.* 36.91) but nevertheless, like the upper reaches of the Nile, for him it retains its ancient aura. A proposed journey to one extremity – beyond the Pillars of Herakles – has been thwarted only by illness (*Or.* 36.91).

In later years, Egypt figured occasionally in Aristeides' dream life. Thus, at *HL* 1.24, the temple of Apollo on Mount Milyas is conflated with buildings in Elephantine in a dream; at *HL* 3.3-4, Aristeides dreams of being on the Egyptian Sea,<sup>69</sup> and of travelling through Alexandria, where he hears children reciting his own verses. The influence of Egyptian religion on his thought has already been mentioned (Ch. 6.2.1c). Aristeides can demonstrate his knowledge of Egyptian geography and beliefs in the relatively late (c. 161-165) *Pros Platona hyper ton tettaron*. Criticizing Plato for identifying the birthplace of Theuth as Naukratis (*Phdr.* 274c), he notes that Theuth is Hermes and: ἀπὸ δὲ Ναυκράτιδος εἰς τὴν ἐπώνυμον πόλιν αὐτοῦ καὶ οὗ πάντες αὐτὸν ὁμολογοῦσιν Αἰγύπτιοι γενέσθαι ἀνάπλους ἡμερῶν ἔστιν οὐκ ὀλίγων (*Or.* 3.583), 'from Naukratis to the city named after him [Hermopolis] and where all the Egyptians agree that he [Hermes] was born it is no few days' sailing upstream'.

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<sup>67</sup> The Nile is 'Zeus-fallen' also at *Or.* 43.28; the epithet goes back to *Od.* 4.581: ἄψ δ' εἰς Αἰγύπτιοι, διυπετέος ποταμοῖο.

<sup>68</sup> Albeit outdated; see Behr 1968, 20 and n. 70. Herodotos (1.203) already knew that the Caspian Sea was not, as Aristeides claims (*Or.* 36.87), an inlet of the northern part of Ocean.

<sup>69</sup> The modern Red Sea; cf. Ch. 3.5.2.

### 6.3.2 Journeys of beneficence

On a single occasion, Aristeides associates himself with Herakles in his Labours; he reports that a divine voice issuing from the Metroion (probably in Kyzikos in Summer 166) παρεκελεύετο δὲ ἀνέχεσθαι τὰ συμπίπτοντα, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ Ἡρακλῆς Διὸς παῖς ὦν ἠνέσχετο (*Or.* 40.22), 'exhorted me to endure what happens, since Herakles also, although he was son of Zeus, endured'.<sup>70</sup> Given that the passage concludes a hymn to Herakles, is the numinous experience suggested no more than a rhetorical strategem, adding to the power of the work? Aristeides mentions his special friendship with Herakles (ἐμοὶ δέ τι καὶ φιλίας ἴδιον πρὸς αὐτόν ἐστιν, *Or.* 40.22), but can this be sincere, coming from one whose life-long devotion was unquestionably to Asklepios? In this section, an argument is made for Aristeides' fundamental good faith.

Herakles imagery aside, and in a way that will be nuanced in the section to follow, Aristeides did see himself as one – like Herakles (Ch. 3.4.2a) – travelling the world for the benefit of humankind. Asklepios makes him a divinely-inspired/divine orator (Ch. 6.2.1b), influencing the world for good. Because of his connection with the same god, Aristeides is himself a healer. Wrestling with the god, he wins a cure for his foster father Zosimos (late 147; *HL* 1.69-72, Ch. 6.2.1a). Asklepios sends him from Pergamon to restore the health of his nurse (*trophos*) Philoumene (late 147; *HL* 1.78). In Smyrna at a time of local earthquakes (early 148), Aristeides is instructed by the god to sacrifice to Zeus the Saviour and the earthquakes stop; another similarly-commanded sacrifice at the ancestral temple of Olympian Zeus keeps the quakes from the area of his family estates (*HL* 3.38-43). Aristeides is a saviour, securing the good, but always as an intercessor or co-worker with Asklepios or perhaps Zeus.

Aristeides himself provides a key to understanding his self-assimilation to Herakles at *Or.* 40.21, where he refers to the dream of a 'Thasian or Macedonian stranger':

εἰ δ' ὀρθῆ <ή> δόξα τοῦ Θεοῦ ξένου ἦτοι Μακεδόνας γε, ὃς ἔφη ποτὲ παιᾶνα δόξαι ἄδειν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ πεπονημένον, εἶναι δ' αὐτῷ τοῦτο ἐπαδόμενον, ἢ Παιᾶν Ἡρακλεῖ Ἀσκληπιέ, εἰ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ καὶ κύρια, καλὸν ἂν τι χρῆμα καὶ τοῦτο συζυγίας πεφηνός, ὁ Καλλίνικος ἅμα τῷ Σωτήρι.

<sup>70</sup> Behr (1981, n. 1 at *Or.* 40, n. 38 and n. 39 at *Or.* 40.22) sees the Metroion (of Meter Dindymene) as that in Kyzikos, and the time August 166, in the context of plague. Aristeides explicitly mentions a link between Herakles and the Mother of the Gods (*Or.* 40.20); Behr (1981, n. 36a *ad loc.*) suggests that Aristeides identifies Herakles with a bearded figure sometimes represented beside her in small figural groups. For this figure, Vermaseren 1977, 79, 144; it is rare to find an identifiable Herakles depicted with the goddess.

But if the opinion of the Thasian or Macedonian stranger is correct, the one who once said that he seemed to be singing a *paian* composed by me and that it had this line: 'Ie Paian Herakles Asklepios', if these things are true and valid, this matter of union is shown to be beautiful in some way, the Kallinikos together with the Saviour.<sup>71</sup>

The same incident is set in the *Kathedra* period in Pergamon at *HL* 4.42.

No cult of a conflated Herakles Asklepios is known. However, conflation of divine figures in general, and in the Asklepios cult at Pergamon in particular, can be demonstrated; so, too, can the appropriateness of the conflation of Herakles and Asklepios.

Worship of a Zeus Asklepios was established in Pergamon with the consecration of a temple established under the patronage of L. Cuspius Pactumeius Rufinus, consul ordinarius in 142, who is mentioned in this context by both Aristeides (*HL* 4.28) and Galen (*De Anatomicis Administrationibus* vol. 2, pp. 224-5 Kühn).<sup>72</sup> In the context of the temple, Aristeides refers to 'his teacher's' (i.e. Asklepios') revelation that he possesses the powers usually attributed to Zeus:

Ἀσκληπιοῦ δυνάμεις μεγάλαι τε καὶ πολλαί, μᾶλλον δ' ἅπασαι, οὐχ ὅσον ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίος χωρεῖ. καὶ Διὸς Ἀσκληπιοῦ νεῶν οὐκ ἄλλως οἱ τῆδε ἰδρῦσαντο· ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἔμοι σαφῆς ὁ διδάσκαλος, εἰκὸς δὲ παντὸς μᾶλλον – ἐν ᾧ τῷ δὲ ταῦτ' ἐδίδαξε τρόπῳ καὶ ὅπως, ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς λόγοις εἴρηται –, οὗτός ἐσθ' ὁ τὸ πᾶν ἄγων καὶ νέμων σωτὴρ τῶν ὄλων καὶ φύλαξ τῶν ἀθανάτων, εἰ δὲ θέλεις τραγικώτερον εἰπεῖν, ἔφορος οἰάκων, σῶζων τὰ τε ὄντα ἀεὶ καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα. (*Or.* 42.4)

The great and many powers of Asklepios, or rather all his powers, are not such as human life contains. And for no other reason, those here established the temple of Zeus Asklepios. But if my teacher is clear, and this is more than all likely – in what way and how he taught these things has been told in the *Hieroi logoi* – it is he who is guiding and controlling everything, saviour of all and guardian of things immortal or, if you wish to put it in a rather tragic tone, 'the overseer of the helm',<sup>73</sup> saving the things eternally in existence and also those coming into being.

<sup>71</sup> Paian (Paieon) seems originally to have been a healing god (*Il.* 5.401, 900); however, a *paian* became a song of praise to a god – usually Apollo (as at *Il.* 1.473), but the term could also refer to an address to Zeus (*X. An.* 3.2.9) or Poseidon (*X. HG.* 4.7.4). For Kallinikos, 'with glorious victory', as one of Herakles' titles, Aristid. *Or.* 40.15.

<sup>72</sup> See also *AvP* 8.3 no. 2. Zeus Asklepios was worshipped also at Epidauros and Hermione; for relevant inscriptions, Cook 1914-40, 1076-7.

<sup>73</sup> *TGF* vol. 2, *Fragmenta adespota*, Frg. 39; cf. *Or.* 30.28, *Iamb. Myst.* 7.2, Behr 1981, n. 8 *ad loc.*

Elsewhere, Aristeides sees Asklepios of Pergamon as the Platonic soul of the universe (*Ti.* 34b). In one of his dreams, his friend, the Platonist Pyrrhion is

ἀνασχὼν τὴν χεῖρα δείκνυσί μοι τόπον τινὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ ἅμα δεικνὺς ἔφη· Οὗτος δὴ σοί ἐστιν ὃν καλεῖ Πλάτων τοῦ παντός ψυχὴν. ἀναβλέπω τε δὴ καὶ ὁρῶ Ἀσκληπιὸν τὸν ἐν Περγᾶμῳ ἐνιδρυμένον ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ... (*HL* 4.56)

holding up his hand, showing me a place in the sky. And at the same time as showing it, he said, 'This indeed is, as far as you are concerned, what Plato calls the soul of everything'. I look up and now I see Asklepios, the one established at Pergamon, in the sky ...

The passage indicates Aristeides' invention, or acceptance, of a theology which culminated in the fully-fledged Neoplatonic picture of Zeus as creator but beyond the world, and all lesser gods, emanations of Zeus; in Aristeides' version, Asklepios is the one who takes on the supreme role in this world. Such a theology is consistent with maintaining the separate identities and hierarchical positions of Zeus and Asklepios; it does not simply identify them. Edelstein probably rightly attributes it to the cult of Zeus Asklepios at Pergamon rather than to Aristeides himself.<sup>74</sup>

In the Pergamene cult, Asklepios took on a role traditionally attributed to Herakles. Aristeides only puts forward an established image (see Ch. 3.4.2a) when at *Or.* 40.2 he presents the latter as Zeus' deputy on earth, συνεργὸς τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ὑπαρχος τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν τῆς σελήνης πόλον.<sup>75</sup> Given this image, it is not surprising that there were cults in which Herakles was credited with the healing traditionally associated with Asklepios and the salvation from the sea usually associated with Poseidon (*Or.* 40.12). Evidencing the contemporary trend to syncretism, at *Or.* 40.19 Aristeides notes an existing cult of Hermes Herakles.<sup>76</sup> Hermes – Zeus' messenger – was another obvious candidate for the role of his deputy on earth.

In the context of the Pergamene cult, a conflation of Asklepios and Herakles is eminently reasonable. As we have seen, Aristeides saw himself inspired and enabled by Asklepios to benefit the world and even as an embodiment of his god (Ch. 6.2.1b); it seems very likely that the Macedonian stranger's words – brought to mind on a visit to a Metroion after a period of

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<sup>74</sup> Stoics identified Zeus with the *kosmos* (e.g. Cic. *N.D.* 2.21), but Aristeides' Zeus (*Or.* 43), like Plato's (*Ti.* 34b-c), is its creator and superior. Cf. Edelstein 1945/1998, vol. 2, 107 n. 21 and n. 22.

<sup>75</sup> Elsewhere Aristeides presents his own version of the traditional Herakles of the Choice (cf. Ch. 3.4.2a): Herakles followed the example set by the archaic Athenians and grasped that intention on behalf of all human beings which afterwards placed him among the gods (τὴν διάνοιαν ἐκείνην ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων λαβεῖν, ἢ μετὰ τῶν θεῶν αὐτὸν καταστήσασα ἔχει, *Or.* 1.34-5).

<sup>76</sup> ἀλλὰ μὴν Ἑρμοῦ γε καὶ Ἡρακλέους ἔστι νῦν ἀγάλματα κοινά, 'but indeed now there are statues jointly of Hermes and Herakles'; for the joint worship of Herakles and Hermes, Preller and Robert 1964-7<sup>5</sup>, vol. 2, 643 and n. 5.

personal hardship – moved him to identify equally with Herakles, whose toilsome Labours so obviously paralleled his own.<sup>77</sup>

### 6.3.3 Pilgrimage

A 'pilgrimage' is often seen as a journey undertaken in a spirit of religious faith. It can be a journey undertaken for a specific purpose or one – like Pausanias' – simply to honour, and to participate in, the life of the sacred places associated with a destination. Journeys of this kind were usually to religious centres in the Greek world, where further 'journeys' in the form of ritual circuits of the sanctuary could be prescribed (Ch. 1.2.2). When individuals came to a god with questions, in some cases they received answers that were riddles, sending them on intellectual journeys; in others, they were prescribed physical journeys, sometimes to similar cult centres but sometimes to places more intimately connected with their own lives (Chs 2.3.1, 2.5.1, 4.2, 5.2.1a, 6.1, 6.2.2). As well, as we shall see in the case of Aristeides, divine commands to undertake a journey were not always consciously sought out: they could be unexpectedly revealed.

Aristeides' writings reveal a life-long series of 'pilgrimages' in the broad sense of journeys undertaken for religious reasons or to sacred sites. As well, surviving inscriptions testify to his perception of the sacred nature of particular places and his participation in their life.<sup>78</sup> The dedication of a statue of Hera (and probably one of Zeus) has been found in Hadrianoutherai in Mysia;<sup>79</sup> from Omer Köy, near Laneion, we have a dedication to Dike and Nemesis,<sup>80</sup> and from the hill Asar Kale (probably the Atys of *HL* 3.41) one to (probably) Isis and Sarapis.<sup>81</sup> From the vicinity of Mytilene, where the earthquake of 148 was most severe, comes: Ἀριστείδης

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<sup>77</sup> Here we leave aside the question of the metaphorical or literal nature (and in the latter case, the psychological or other origin) of the voice referred to at *Or.* 40.22.

<sup>78</sup> Included here are only those inscriptions that can be attributed with some confidence to Aristeides. For inscriptions more controversially attributed to him, Behr 1986, 425-6, Behr 1994, 1217-19, Petsalis-Diomidis 2010, 117-18.

<sup>79</sup> Καὶ τήνδ' Ἀργεῖν Διὸς αἰγίλοχο[ο] σ[ύ]νευνον | εἶσατ' Ἀριστείδης ἐν δαπέδοις [Ἀπίοις], 'And this Argive spouse of aegis-bearing Zeus, Aristeides erected in the plain [of Apia]'. See Robert 1937/1970, 211, Behr 1986, 425, no. 1, Puech 2002, 138-9, no. 40, Petsalis-Diomidis 2010, 117. The 'plain of Apia' is Behr's suggestion (n. 2 at no. 1; cf. *Plb.* 5.77.9, *Str.* 13.1.70) for what Aristeides calls the Mysian Plain at *HL* 1.58; the probable location is shown at Talbert 2000, Map 56, F2.

<sup>80</sup> Δίκη | καὶ Νεμέσει | Ἀριστείδης. See Robert 1937/1970, 216, Behr 1986, 425, no. 2, Puech 2002, 139, no. 41, Petsalis-Diomidis 2010, 117. For Aristeides on Dike and Nemesis, *Or.* 16.38.

<sup>81</sup> [-κ]αὶ Σαράπι | δι | Ἀριστείδης. See Robert 1937/1970, 218, Behr 1986, 425, no. 3, Puech 2002, 139, no. 42, Petsalis-Diomidis 2010, 117. The initial letter is missing from one of the two extant copies of the inscription, and a *sigma* in the other (Puech).

Ἀσκλη|πιῶ Σωτῆρι | εὐχὴν, 'Aristeides to Asklepios the Saviour (made) a votive offering'.<sup>82</sup> Aristeides may have erected the monument because Laneion was spared the devastation of the earthquake. Found on Mount Pentelikon in Attika is an inscription whose dedication calls to mind Aristeides' in the temple of Zeus Asklepios in Pergamon at *HL* 4.46: [Υγίεια] κα[ὶ] | [Τελε]σφόρ[ω] | [Ἀρι]στείδης | εὐ[ξ]άμενος, '[To Hygieia] and [Teles]phor[os] [Ari]steides (set this up) having made a vow'.<sup>83</sup> Aristeides could have dedicated it on his journey of 155.

In the following discussion, the term 'pilgrimage' will be taken in a more specialized sense to refer to (physical) journeys undertaken in obedience to a god's command. In journeys of this kind, it is not simply the destination but the whole experience which – like the intellectual journey stimulated by a riddling answer – can be liminal in the sense of revelatory or life-changing. Dion's journey, if Apollo really prescribed it, would have been of this kind. In this thesis it has been argued that in fact there was no oracle; Dion's travels in exile are best described as (philosophical) 'wandering', a concept which subsumes the journey of autopsy and the journey to do good (Ch. 5.3.3). Here, 'pilgrimage' will be identified as a different kind of journeying which does the same.

Most of Aristeides' journeys after the first spontaneous revelation of Asklepios can be seen as prescribed by the god. Whether or not the initial journey to Pergamon was enjoined,<sup>84</sup> certainly the journeys made from the Asklepieion there were divinely prescribed.<sup>85</sup> Some were ritual peregrinations in the precinct of the temple. We know something of the ritual practices required of all incubants at Pergamon from the *Lex sacra* apparently placed at the entrance to the Asklepieion and dated to the second century CE.<sup>86</sup> As Petsalis-Diomidis notes, the prescribed offerings together with the deities (represented in the Asklepieion by their cult statues) to whom incubants were to offer them 'in effect govern both the route and the timing of the pilgrims' itinerary around the sanctuary'.<sup>87</sup> Aristeides records more specialized peregrinations. At the spring equinox of 146, in accordance with an annual custom, he smears himself with mud before bathing in the temple's sacred well or tank (*phrear*); on a second occasion, he circles the temple

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<sup>82</sup> Charitonides, 1968, 27-8, no. 33, Behr 1986, 425, no. 4, Puech 2002, 139-40, no. 43, Petsalis-Diomidis 2010, 117.

<sup>83</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup>, 4531, Jones 1978b, 231-4, Behr 1986, 425, no. 5, Petsalis-Diomidis 2010, 117. Jones adds a dedication to Asklepios; cf. *HL* 4.46.

<sup>84</sup> For Aristeides' summons to Pergamon (*HL* 2.7), see Ch. 6.1.

<sup>85</sup> It is often not clear whether the command was given in a formal incubation. *HL* 3.7 specifies that a journey to Lebedos (Spring 147) was undertaken after incubation (*kataklisis*) in the temple of the Saviours i.e. (Behr 1981 n. 10 *ad loc.*) Zeus Asklepios.

<sup>86</sup> Wörrle 1969, Lupu 2005, 61-3. Fragments found suggest that the inscription may have been duplicated in the courtyard of the Asklepieion. Cf. Petsalis-Diomidis 2005, 199, Petsalis-Diomidis 2010, 221-2.

<sup>87</sup> Petsalis-Diomidis 2010, 227.

compound three times before the bath (*HL* 2.74-6). A year later, mud-smearing is followed by bathing in an icy spring outside the compound walls (*HL* 2.77-9). Other ritual journeys were to rivers, springs and other bodies of water – themselves liminal places in nature – with bathing and sometimes more elaborate sacrifices prescribed. In the period of the *Kathedra*, Aristeides is sent to bathe in local rivers, the Kaikos (*HL* 2.48) and the Selinos<sup>88</sup> (*HL* 2.26-8, 51), and in the sea at Eleia, Pergamon's port (*HL* 2.54-5). As well, he travels to the warm springs at Allianoi (*HL* 3.1-2, 6)<sup>89</sup> and at Lebedos (*HL* 3.7-13).

After the *Kathedra*, the god continued to prescribe journeys, usually in spontaneous dreams. Some pilgrimages were to well-known religious destinations: Epidauros (c. 155; *HL* 6.1), and the temple of Apollo in Mysia<sup>90</sup> (c. 166; *HL* 5.19). Others, however, were to places closely associated with Aristeides' own life. As he reports it, sick and at his ancestral home (January 148), καί μοι γίνεταί πρόσταγμα πορευθῆναι πρὸς τὴν τῶν τροφῶν ἐστίαν, καὶ προσκυνῆσαι τὸ ἔδος τοῦ Διὸς πρὸς ᾧ ἔτρεφόμην (*HL* 3.20), 'I received a command to go to the hearth of my foster parents and make obeisance to the statue of Zeus, near which I was brought up'. His health is restored. Nine years after the onset of his illness (December 152), a *phasma* tells him: ἐγὼ τὴν αὐτὴν νόσον νοσήσας περιμόντι τῷ δεκάτῳ ἔτει, βουλομένου τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ πορευθεῖς ἐπὶ τοὺς τόπους, ἐν οἷς ἡ νόσος ἤρξατο συλλέγεσθαι, ἀπηλλάγην (*HL* 4.1), 'sick with the same disease [and] with the tenth year coming around, when Asklepios wanted it, I went to the places in which the disease began to be contracted and was set free'. He sets out (ὡς εἰς θεωρίαν, *HL* 4.2)<sup>91</sup> for the river Aisepos, where he first became ill, and a few days later a voice informs him that 'the end has come' and he can return (*HL* 4.6, Ch. 6.2.1c). Sick again and in Smyrna (August 165; *HL* 5.1), he is told ἐλαύνειν ὀρθὴν εἰς Διὸς χωρίον (*HL* 5.10), 'to go straight to the place of Zeus'; identifying the prescribed destination as the temple of Olympian Zeus near his ancestral home, he goes there and his health improves.

In some of the god's prescriptions, the significance of the whole journey rather than simply the final destination becomes clear. In these instances, provided that Aristeides follows the divine direction, the god's providence mitigates the inescapable decrees of fate and leads to a positive outcome. At *HL* 2.11, probably in late 148, Aristeides is sent to Chios for a purification.<sup>92</sup>

<sup>88</sup> The river that flows through the city', identified as the Selinos by Behr 1981, n. 42 at *HL* 2.27.

<sup>89</sup> Twenty-five kilometres west of Pergamon. Cf. Behr 1981, n. 2 at *HL* 3.1.

<sup>90</sup> At Mount Milyas, cf. *HL* 1.24; the mountain is possibly the same as or near to Mount Pelekas, mentioned by Polybios (5.77.9). Cf. Behr 1981, n. 43 at *HL* 1.24; for the location, Talbert 2000, Map 56, G2.

<sup>91</sup> The term recalls the state pilgrimages of classical Greece. Cf. Elsner and Rutherford 2005a, 12-14.

<sup>92</sup> The context makes it clear that he leaves from the Asklepieion at Pergamon, though the period is after the *Kathedra* (see App. 6).

The party travels to Klazomenai and then is nearly shipwrecked sailing to Phokaia. In the harbour at Phokaia, a 'safe' shipwreck is contrived after Aristeides receives the god's message:

καὶ φράζει δὴ τὸ πᾶν, ὡς εἰμαρμένον τε εἶη ναυαγῆσαί μοι καὶ τούτου ἄρα εἶνεκα καὶ ταῦτα συμβαίη καὶ νῦν ἔτι δέοι ὑπὲρ ἀσφαλείας καὶ τοῦ παντάπασιν ἐκπλῆσαι τὸ χρεῶν ἐμβάντα εἰς λέμβον ἐν τῷ λιμένι οὕτω ποιῆσαι· ὡς τὸν μὲν λέμβον ἀνατραπῆναι καὶ καταδῦναι, αὐτὸν δὲ ἐξάραντός τινος ἐξενεχθῆναι πρὸς τὴν γῆν· (*HL* 2.13)

And he tells everything, that it was decreed by fate that I suffer shipwreck, and because of this these things happened, and now still it was necessary for personal safety and wholly to complete what was necessary that, having embarked in a dinghy in the harbour, I contrive thus: that the dinghy be overturned and sunk but I, with a certain person having lifted me out, be brought to shore.

Smyrna replaces Chios as the final destination – τέλος δὲ ἀφίησιν ἡμᾶς ὁ θεὸς τοῦ πλοῦ τοῦ εἰς τὴν Χίον ... (*HL* 2.17), 'at last the god remits our voyage to Chios' – and it supplies (as we shall see) an outcome that makes the journey worthwhile. The motif of the god's guiding hand working in conjunction with an inevitable but not wholly deterministic fate evokes the novel (Ch. 5.2.1b). Here, we need not doubt the veracity of Aristeides' account, and the fundamental realism of the novelistic scenario is confirmed.

The pattern recurs. On the prescribed journey to the temple of Apollo in Mysia noted above, Aristeides is absent from home at the time of the death of his foster sister's daughter (*HL* 5.20). He is convinced that the coincidence did not take place without some supernatural agency (ὡς οὐκ ἄνευ δαιμονίου τινὸς πᾶν τοῦτο συνέβη, *HL* 5.21); a dream reveals the god's substitution of the child's death for his own (*HL* 5.22-4). Significantly, the girl's brother had died of plague on the same day that Aristeides was freed from a fever: ἀπέθανε καὶ αὐτὸς σχεδὸν ὡς εἶπεῖν ἀντ' ἐμοῦ (*HL* 5.25), 'and he died, one could almost say, instead of me'. The rationale must be that fate had demanded a death. At *Or.* 19.6, the god's command to Aristeides to leave Smyrna and remain on his estate ensures that he avoids the earthquake (early 177) that devastates the city.

Some of Aristeides' most important spiritual experiences occur as the culminations of pilgrimages. At Smyrna after the aborted pilgrimage to Chios (149), the god appears and promises him seventeen years' protection. Asklepios was

στάς ἔμπροσθεν τῆς εὐνῆς προβαλὼν τοὺς δακτύλους καὶ χρόνους τινὰς συλλογισάμενος, ἔχεις, ἔφη, δέκα ἔτη παρ' ἐμοῦ καὶ τρία παρὰ τοῦ Σαράπιδος—καὶ ἅμα τὰ τρία καὶ δέκα ὡς ἑπτακαίδεκα ἐφάνη τῇ θέσει τῶν δακτύλων—, ... (HL 2.18)

standing before my bed holding out his fingers and, having reckoned up some time periods, he said 'You have ten years from me and three from Sarapis', and at the same time the three and ten appeared as seventeen by the position of the fingers.<sup>93</sup>

Aristeides bathes and experiences a contentment which he describes as like being entirely in the presence of the god (HL 2.23; Ch. 6.2.1a). On another occasion on which the god averts fate, a pilgrimage from the Asklepieion in Pergamon to the local river is required, to make sacrifices necessary to forestall imminent death; the result is an experience 'almost as in initiation' (Winter 145-146; HL 2.28, Ch. 6.2.1c). When, on the god's command, Aristeides returns to the river Aisepos, re-enacting the journey on which he first became ill, he experiences a cheerfulness and joy beyond anything obtained in the Mysteries (152; HL 4.6-7, Ch. 6.2.1c).

Later in Aristeides' career, journeys to places where he can triumphantly display his superiority in oratory are prescribed by the god, and thus become themselves sacred circuits. At Epidaurus, he is encouraged to go on to triumphs in Italy and Greece (155; HL 6.1-3). Instructed in a dream, he travels from Laneion to Kyzikos for an enthusiastically-received presentation (*Or.* 27) in the *bouleuterion*, its content inspired by the god (166; HL 5.11-16, Ch. 6.2.1b). The journey associated with the child substitution (c. 166-167) culminates in a triumphant reception in Smyrna – predicted in a dream (HL 1.22; see Ch. 6.2.1a) – and an address to a packed *bouleuterion* when an Egyptian competitor can only muster an audience of seventeen (HL 5.18-34). A prediction of crowns (*stephanoi*) of victory at Ephesos is apparently fulfilled: Aristeides refers his readers to the many who were present (between 167 and 170; HL 5.35).

In this chapter we have characterized Aristeides' journeys as 'pilgrimage', directed journeying which is the precise opposite of 'wandering'. However, Odysseus was an archetypal wanderer (Ch. 5.3.3) and, in a number of passages, Aristeides seems to identify himself with him.<sup>94</sup> The matter requires closer scrutiny.

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<sup>93</sup> The fingers on one hand signified fives, and those on the other, units. With an interchange of the significance of the hands,  $2 \times 5 + 3 = 13$  becomes  $2 + 3 \times 5 = 17$ . Cf. Behr 1981 n. 32 *ad loc.*

<sup>94</sup> As has often been noted (e.g. Holmes 2008, 81, Petsalis-Diomidis 2008, 138, Downie 2013a, 52), the *Hieroi logoi* are likened to the *Odyssey* at HL 1.1. Aristeides sees himself as Odysseus in dreams at HL 5.12, 44.

We begin with an account – making no reference to Odysseus – already mentioned (Ch. 6.3.2): at *Or.* 40.22, Aristeides claims that a divine voice coming from the Metroion in Kyzikos told him to endure whatever he might meet with, as Herakles endured. There is no promise of help.<sup>95</sup> A similar admonition occurs at *HL* 2.42. Aristeides reports that, when he was near death during the smallpox epidemic of 165, Athena appeared and referred him to the *Odyssey*, telling him: δεῖν οὖν καρτερεῖν, εἶναι δ' αὐτὸν πάντως καὶ τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα καὶ τὸν Τηλέμαχον καὶ δεῖν αὐτῷ [i.e. ἐμαυτῷ Keil] βοηθεῖν (*HL* 2.42), 'It was necessary to endure. I myself [i.e. Aristeides] was indeed both Odysseus and Telemachos, and she must help me'.

Aristeides refers more specifically to assistance that Athena gives Odysseus at *Od.* 7.14-145, 8.1-23 and at *Od.* 5.382-493, respectively, in two orations. At *Or.* 42.14, he declares that he has been enabled by Asklepios to perform before the emperors and the imperial family just as 'Ὀδυσσεῖ δὲ ὑπῆρξεν παρ' Ἀθηνᾶς ἐν Ἀλκινόου καὶ Φαίαιξιν ἐπιδείξασθαι, 'Odysseus was enabled by Athena to display himself in the house of Alkinous and among the Phaiakians'. At *Or.* 33.18, responding to the criticism that he does not declaim, Aristeides justifies himself. In fact, he has devoted his life to oratory. He was faced with the worst possible sickness and misfortune.

ἀλλ' ὁμως κὰν τούτοις διεγιγνόμεθα ὥσπερ τις Ὀδυσσεύς, ἐχόμενοι τῆς σχεδίας, ἄτε οὐδ' ἔρημοι πλέοντες ἡμεῖς γε, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῷ μεγίστῳ καὶ φιλανθρωποτάτῳ τῶν κυβερνητῶν, ὃς ἡμῖν ἀεὶ τοὺς <ἀκάτους> ἀνεῖχεν τὸ μὴ καταδῦναι.

But nevertheless I kept surviving in these circumstances like an Odysseus, clinging to my raft, since I was not sailing abandoned but under the greatest and most benevolent helmsman, who has always kept my ships from sinking.

Here, as at *Or.* 42.4 (Ch. 6.3.2), Asklepios is the helmsman; 'I was not sailing abandoned' echoes Aristeides' unjustified fear ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πλεῖν, 'that I truly sailed alone', at the beginning of his pilgrimage to Chios (148-149, *HL* 2.11).

In both the passages, Aristeides alludes to the divine help Odysseus received in his situations of greatest need; the second in particular brings to mind even this most capable and self-reliant hero's ultimate need for divine mercy (Ch. 2.3.2). Odysseus' travels must be characterized as 'wandering' rather than 'pilgrimage'; they are not, like Aristeides', divinely prescribed. Nevertheless, in Odysseus – characterized as both enduring and beloved by a god – Aristeides finds an image of himself.

<sup>95</sup> Nevertheless, at *Or.* 40.19 Athena acted as Herakles' guardian and guided his Labours; cf. *Il.* 8.362-3, Ch. 2.3.2.

#### 6.4 Locationally liminal encounters and liminal experience in the life of Aristeides

We conclude with an examination of Aristeides' experience in the context of the van Gennep/Turner model. Aristeides presents his first encounter with Asklepios – sought out only to the extent that he sought relief from illness at the warm springs near Smyrna – as the pivotal point of his life. A subsequent period in Pergamon consolidated his identity as the god's devotee.

In this period, he participated in what can be seen as a liminal community of suppliants at the Asklepieion. Nevertheless, as noted earlier (Ch. 1.3), his experience was not one of Turner's *communitas*; at the Asklepieion, a socially-differentiated group of suppliants interacted with an established hierarchy of temple officials and doctors. Aristeides occupied a privileged position on account of the status and income which allowed him to take up residence with the temple warden Asklepiakos (*HL* 2.35), maintain a chorus of boys (*HL* 4.38), and sponsor public performances by boys and men (*HL* 4.43).

Was Aristeides exposed to outside ideas or forced to question his own assumptions at the Asklepieion? At first sight, a cult setting would seem to preclude ideas conflicting with authorized ones. However, as we have seen, Asklepieia attracted intellectual inquirers, and sophisticated theological discussion seems to have been part of the agenda at Pergamon (Chs 1.2.2, 6.3.2). Cult association with the medical profession added another range of ideas (Ch. 6.1). Doctors advised those resident at the Asklepieion and translated the god's instructions into treatments; the doctor Theodotos reveals a perceptive appreciation of Aristeides' needs (*HL* 2.34, 4.38, 4.42).

For most of those who sought the god's help at the Asklepieion, the period there would have terminated with a prescription for ongoing treatment or a cure. Dion's aim in the period of his exile was more than simply to be restored; it was to be transformed. Similarly, Aristeides' aim in his period at the Asklepieion was more than simply to be healed. He used the opportunity to submit himself in the most rigorous way possible to the god's demands; the period provided a series of ordeals which were also tests, primarily of the god's favour but also of his own capacity to carry out whatever might be required.

It ended neither with physical healing nor the disillusion that would have brought about a complete break with the cult but rather with Aristeides' new *persona* firmly in place.

We see Aristeides' growing confidence in the god's care for him, and his own ability to interpret and carry out the divine commands, in incidents coinciding with the end of the *Kathedra* period. In Spring 147, in the face of particularly serious ill-health, he consults the

visiting doctor Satyros, one of Galen's teachers<sup>96</sup> and obviously an eminent figure (σοφιστής, ὡς ἐλέγετο, οὐ τῶν ἀγεννῶν, *HL* 3.8). This perhaps suggests a lingering lack of confidence in the god; certainly it suggests a lack of confidence in the doctors who were his regular interpreters. Satyros prescribes cessation of bloodletting, and a drug. Aristeides is unwilling to abandon the bloodletting that the god has unquestionably ordained but – on a divinely-prescribed journey to the warm springs at Lebedos (*HL* 3.7) – he is prepared to test the effects of the drug. The result is disastrous and the god indicates that Aristeides has *phthone*, probably tuberculosis (*HL* 3.11). Aristeides now turns to Apollo at Kolophon. An oracle affirms that Asklepios will heal him, and a dream follows, indicating that salvation comes from the gods (*HL* 3.12-13). As discussed earlier (Ch. 6.2.2), very probably the oracle was a standard one designed to send the recipient to Pergamon. In Aristeides' case, it has the opposite import. The god, rather than any doctor, is to be trusted; Aristeides – who recovers (*HL* 3.14) – is wholly convinced of the god's ongoing care. Aristeides is able to demonstrate his mature confidence in Asklepios shortly afterwards. Probably before returning to Pergamon from Lebedos, he spends a period of at least four months in Smyrna, his home city. There, doctors – divided among themselves – advise a range of treatments for a tumour which the god instructs him to leave untouched (*HL* 1.61-3). Aristeides refuses, on his own authority, to be deflected from rigorous adherence to the divine instructions, and he is justified when the god provides a complete cure (*HL* 1.64-8).

In later periods, we see Aristeides comfortable in his role as interpreter of medical advice offered to him. In the period of the dream diary, his then-doctor knows better than to contravene a divine command (*HL* 1.57). At *HL* 5.49-50, he has the confidence to amend Hippokrates' prescription.

Aristeides may have had more than one reason for terminating the *Kathedra* period in Pergamon. Issues concerning his claim to the possession of Laneion (*HL* 4.105-8) could have been a factor. Certainly, his departure from the Asklepieion followed the success of the public performances of his works (*HL* 4.43-5) that established him as a 'glorious charioteer of everlasting tales' (*HL* 4.45, Ch. 6.2.1b.ε); he could at last be confident of the god's gift to him of the oratorical ability to which he had always aspired. However, in addition, mature confidence in his own capacity to interpret, and carry out, divine commands in the face of new, serious and protracted illnesses must have played a part.

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<sup>96</sup> Galen refers to him e.g. at *De antidotis libri ii* (vol. 14, p. 69 Kühn), *De ordine librorum suorum ad Eugenianum* (vol. 19, p. 57 Kühn). Cf. also Behr 1968, 162, 169.

Dion's and Aristeides' experiences were structurally much more similar to one another than either was to the experience of an initiand as van Gennep and Turner have characterized it. In traditional rites of passage, candidates aspired to a fixed, socially-recognized identity and role, and had to submit themselves to the prescribed trials of the liminal period that qualified them for it. Even a radical reformulation of an individual's views in this liminal period did not affect his or her attainment of the role, though it may have affected the nature of his or her conception of it. Dion and Aristeides each chose the identity to which he aspired; and ultimately each had to determine when the sequence of ordeals to which he had submitted himself could be considered complete, when the chosen identity could be judged to have been attained. Dion's liminal period was not necessarily identical to the period of his exile; Aristeides did not leave the Asklepieion physically healed. Though both men were undoubtedly exposed to diverse ideas in the liminal periods of their lives, neither reassessed – or could afford to reassess without completely derailing his project – the world-view to which he had committed himself, and which provided him with his goal.

## 6.5 Conclusion

In Ch. 5, it was suggested that, on being exiled, Dion 'converted to philosophy': he understood clearly what he should do and he did it, and the liminal period of his exile made him the philosopher he had decided to be. Dion attributed his understanding to Apollo in a passage which – it has been argued in this thesis – is to be understood metaphorically. In the present chapter, we have seen that an encounter with Asklepios – a genuine experience of the numinous Other – led Aristeides to the extended period of the *Kathedra* that established his life-long identity as a devotee of the god.

The experiences of the two men in the liminal periods of their lives are to be contrasted. Dion travels as a philosophical wanderer, learning – as he claims – from the remote wise and teaching others as he goes. Aristeides lives as a pilgrim; there is nothing random about his experience, and any revelations he receives are the god's.

Modern commentators have suggested various psychological explanations for Aristeides' life experience (Ch. 6.1). Evaluating such assessments is not the aim of this chapter. Certainly Aristeides' career can be understood in terms of subconscious desires and auto-suggestion – paradigms not available to Aristeides himself. In this chapter, an attempt has been made rather to see his life experience as he saw it, in terms of the paradigms available to him. It was not so

unhappy. The misfortunes to which he was subject were decreed by fate; however, decreed as well was his own superior being. In repeated instances of what has here been called pilgrimage, both during and after the liminal period of the *Kathedra*, he carried out journeys dictated in every particular by the god; invariably they culminated in public triumph or personal euphoria. Aristeides' whole life, from the time of his encounter with Asklepios, can indeed be seen as metaphorically a 'pilgrimage'.

## **PART C. CODA: AUTHOR AND READER**



## 7 THE LIMINAL ENCOUNTER THEME: CHARACTERISTICALLY SECOND SOPHISTIC AUTHORIAL APPROACHES

This chapter looks back to the broad range of Second Sophistic literature discussed in Part A to identify authorial approaches to the liminal encounter theme new to, or characteristic of, the period. Discussion will address briefly the ideology of the sophistic tradition that was familiar to all the authors, and the authors' attitude to traditional myth and poetry. Detailed consideration of these substantive topics is beyond the scope of this thesis.

### 7.1 Liminal experience and numinous experience

Liminal experience in the sense discussed at Ch. 1.3 is to be distinguished from numinous experience. Unlike biographies built up from transmitted anecdotes or sayings, Second Sophistic real and pretended *apomnemeumata* and *hypomnemata* provide the reader with access – though necessarily limited access (cf. Ch. 1.2.2) – to the latter.

A numinous experience is one whose unusual and often, though not necessarily, inexplicable nature arouses awe and wonder in the beholder. In his or her account of the occasion, the beholder may simply detail what occurred, arousing in the reader a similar feeling of awe. Philostratos' Apollonios describes in some detail an apparition of Achilles that produces just this effect (VA 4.16.2, Ch. 3.6.2b). Alternatively, the beholder's apparent inability to describe what happened may convey its extraordinary nature. Aristeides describes manifestations of Asklepios' presence that seem to have had no visual component and in which he himself lay between sleep and a waking state (HL 2.23, 2.32, Ch. 6.2.1a); a statue seen in a dream is in turn one of himself and of the god (HL 1.17, Ch. 6.2.1b.ζ). The cryptic and disjointed nature of his accounts suggests fidelity to experience.<sup>1</sup> At HL 2.28 and HL 4.6-7, he uses the metaphor of the Mysteries to convey the nature of an experience otherwise impossible to express (Ch. 6.2.1c).

A narrator may undermine the beholder's experience, providing a less-than-inspiring explanation of what he or she finds wonderful, mocking his or her gullibility. Lucian explains Alexander's oracle-producing methodology (Ch. 4.2); what must have been the numinous experience of his Mysteries (Alex. 38-40) is undercut by a rationalistic explanation of his

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<sup>1</sup> As we have seen, the *Hieroi logoi* were sophisticated accounts intended for publication. Aristeides undoubtedly chose the *hypomnemata* form deliberately; Downie (2013a, 66-85) sees his dream-description as 'an extension of ancient rhetorical practices of vivid description – *enargeia*' (85). This does not make his reminiscences less than truthful.

displayed golden thigh and by deprecating reference to those who take it seriously as *morosophoi*.

A narrator can suggest the numinous nature of an experience by keeping its sacred secrecy inviolate (Ch. 6.2.1c), or by indicating his own and the reader's remoteness from it. In his myth of the Magoi, Dion conveys the numinous nature of the beauty of the form of the *kosmos* at the moment of its creation by stressing its inaccessibility to human perception and communication. It is of a kind that οὐδείς δύναιτ' ἄν ἀνθρώπων διανοηθῆναι καὶ εἰπεῖν ἀξίως οὔτε τῶν νῦν οὔτε τῶν πρότερον, εἰ μὴ Μοῦσαι τε καὶ Ἀπόλλων ἐν θείῳ ῥυθμῷ τῆς εἰλικρινοῦς τε καὶ ἄκρας ἁρμονίας (36.60), 'no human being present or past would be able to conceive or worthily express, but only the Muses and Apollo with the divine rhythm of pure and highest harmony'. The augur cannot divine when the bird ascends too high into the heavens and hides itself in the clouds (36.61). Two of the most extraordinary of Apollonios' numinous encounters – those with Achilles, noted above, and with a satyr above the Cataracts in Ethiopia (VA 6.27) – are not observed by Philostratos the narrator or even by Damis, his source, but reported to Damis, who was forbidden or unable to go so far (VA 4.11.1, 6.26.2), by Apollonios. As Philostratos the narrator has demonstrated (and as Philostratos the author, who knows Damis to be a fiction, probably wants us to note), Damis' accounts are literalistic interpretations of Apollonios' typically allegorical words (VA 3.15.1-2, Ch. 3.5.2).<sup>2</sup> We as readers of Philostratos' narrative are far removed from whatever may have happened in Ilion or India or Ethiopia; however, the existence of letters attributed to Apollonios and referring to experiences in India (VA 3.15.1) and Ethiopia (VA 6.27.4) suggests that Philostratos the author had reason to believe that – although its precise nature may have been irrecoverable – something significant happened there.<sup>3</sup>

Can an author convey anything of the lived experience of a numinous encounter that is also liminal in the sense of providing a life-changing apprehension?

As we have seen (Ch. 3.3.3), at VA 7.38.2 Damis describes his sudden apprehension of the truth when he sees Apollonios free himself from his bonds: τότε πρῶτον ὁ Δάμις φησὶν ἀκριβῶς ξυνεῖναι τῆς Ἀπολλωνίου φύσεως, ὅτι θεία τε εἶη καὶ κρείττων ἀνθρώπου. Dion makes no attempt to convey the experiences in which the Magoi (Ch. 5.3.3) or a rustic prophetess (Ch. 5.4.2a) – his supposed sources – have apprehended truths beyond human reason. However, in an account sufficiently signposted as a reworking of traditional myth by its inclusion in his

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<sup>2</sup>Apollonios' claim that ἐν τῇ γῆ τε εἶναι τοὺς Βραχμᾶνας καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῇ γῆ (VA 3.15.2) becomes in Damis' narrative an account of levitation (VA 3.15.1).

<sup>3</sup> Of course, we cannot altogether rule out the possibility that Philostratos invented the existence of the letters.

*Septem sapientium convivium* (see Ch. 7.2.2), Plutarch conveys the numinous nature of the lyre-player Arion's experience and puts into his protagonist's mouth an expression of his apprehension of a turning point, a sudden realization of what is significant in life. In a liminal situation and place, between life and death and supported by dolphins in the midst of the sea:

μήτε τοσοῦτον ἔφη δέους πρὸς θάνατον αὐτῷ μήτ' ἐπιθυμίας τοῦ ζῆν ὅσον φιλοτιμίας ἐγγενέσθαι πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν, ὡς θεοφιλῆς ἀνὴρ φανείη καὶ λάβοι περὶ θεῶν δόξαν βέβαιον. (*Mor.* 161e)

Not so much, [Arion] said, there arose in him fear in respect of death or yearning for living as an ambition for salvation, that he might be shown a man beloved by the gods, and that he might take a firm opinion about them.

He is convinced that οὐκ ἔστιν εἷς ὁ τῆς Δίκης ὀφθαλμός, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τούτοις ἐπισκοπεῖ κύκλω ὁ θεὸς τὰ πραττόμενα περὶ γῆν τε καὶ θάλατταν (*Mor.* 161f), 'the eye of Justice is not one, but with all these [eyes] the god watches all about him what is being done on land and sea'.

Plutarch associates another visionary apprehension of higher truths with a dramatically redirected life in his myth of Timarchos of Chaironeia (*Mor.* 590a-592e). On a quest to learn the nature of Sokrates' *daimonion*, the young Timarchos descends to the cave of Trophonios and is conveyed by a mysterious companion – presumably a *daimon* (*Mor.* 591a, 591c) – on a tour of the region below the moon (cf. Ch. 1.2.3).<sup>4</sup> The extraordinary revelation he experiences makes his original question insignificant; when asked what he would like to know, he can only reply: πάντα· τί γὰρ οὐ θαυμάσιον; (*Mor.* 591a).<sup>5</sup> Timarchos learns about rebirth, the nature of *daimones* and his own approaching death. This is no longer something to be feared but an opportunity to continue the journey of learning on which he is engaged. As he is told: ταῦτα δ' εἴσῃ' ... σαφέστερον, ὧ νεανία, τρίτῳ μηνί (*Mor.* 592e), 'these things you will know more clearly, young man, in two months' time'.

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<sup>4</sup> For the similar story of Aridaïos/Thespesios, *Mor.* 563b-568a. The latter in particular recalls Plato's myth of Er (*R.* 10.614b-621d).

<sup>5</sup> Timarchos' learning about 'everything' is limited in that his journey and his interlocutor's knowledge are confined to 'one part of the four' (*Mor.* 591a) i.e. the region below the moon. (For three of the four regions, *Mor.* 745b; the fourth is presumably that beyond the created *kosmos*.) If, or when, he has become one who has attained cessation of birth (*geneseos teleute*, *Mor.* 591c), he will move on to the moon and perhaps beyond.

## 7.2 Riddling and its uses

Among the forms characteristic of Second Sophistic literature is the riddle. We have noted the conundrums or riddles posed by Plutarch and by Dion in different contexts (Chs 2.4, 5.2.1, 5.3.3c); riddling was a trope, and it could be used by different authors to different ends. However, perhaps its fundamental purpose was to bring the reader into active engagement with the author. When the reader takes up the text, author and reader meet in an encounter that the reader him- or herself has initiated.

### 7.2.1 *The reader's encounter with the author: the Second Sophistic author as a godlike figure*

Authors can provide their readers with vicarious experience. As we have seen, they can describe a numinous encounter from the protagonist's point of view. They can lead a reader on journeys to remote and not-so-remote 'liminal' places, following – like Pausanias in his geography and unlike Strabo in his (Ch. 1.2.2) – an experiential order evoking ritual or a 'divine' protagonist's travels; the sacred journey becomes (to some extent) the reader's own. It can be suggested that, over and above this, a Second Sophistic text can provide its reader with an encounter with the 'divine' in the person of its godlike author. A text which excludes the reader from a numinous experience at the same time creates a heightened sense of its extraordinary nature and accredits the author who suggests that he has experienced it. In Aristeides' texts, the very inadequacy of words to convey the author's experience at once excludes the reader and convinces him or her of Aristeides' privileged status.

Aristeides' 'divinity' is associated with his closeness to his god. A tradition well-known in intellectual Greek circles saw the sophist *per se* as 'divine'; it seems likely that the early sophists denied the existence of any higher authority than the persuasive word. Protagoras of Abdera is famous for the statement that πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος (S.E. *M.* 7.60-61 = Protagoras Frg. 1 Diels/Kranz). However his ideas originated, they led to a differentiation between *physis* and *nomos*, the law or custom or convention that governs social behaviour. If social structure and right behaviour are not divinely-prescribed, it follows that the one who dictates what they are to be in a society is 'god'.<sup>6</sup>

Plato's Protagoras, at least, shows an interest in comparative culture. In the *Protagoras*, he suggests that certain beliefs – concerning, in particular, justice and civic virtue (*politike arete*)

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<sup>6</sup> On the godlike nature of the powerful, D.Chr. 3.30; alternatively, God has appointed the superior to rule over the inferior (D.Chr. 3.62).

– are universal in human communities; however, and significantly, these beliefs are not innate but taught by parents to children (*Prt.* 323c-324e). Demonstrating early Greek appreciation of cultural relativism, Herodotos cites an anecdote in which Dareios appals Greeks and Indians by suggesting that, respectively, they should eat and burn their dead. He comments:

Εἰ γάρ τις προθείη πᾶσι ἀνθρώποισι ἐκλέξασθαι κελεύων νόμους τοὺς καλλίστους ἐκ τῶν πάντων νόμων, διασκεψάμενοι ἂν ἐλοίατο ἕκαστοι τοὺς ἐωυτῶν· οὕτω νομίζουσι πολλόν τι καλλίστους τοὺς ἐωυτῶν νόμους ἕκαστοι εἶναι. (3.38)

If someone were to put it to all human beings, commanding [them] to choose as their laws the most beautiful of all laws, after considering, all would take their own; thus do all very much hold their own laws to be the most beautiful.

Herodotos attributes his insight to Pindar: καὶ ὀρθῶς μοι δοκέει Πίνδαρος ποιῆσαι, νόμον πάντων βασιλέα φήσας εἶναι (3.38), 'Pindar seems to me to be right, saying that *nomos* is king of all'.<sup>7</sup> Significantly, however, he seems to have been familiar with the work of his contemporary Protagoras.<sup>8</sup>

Many of the first to discover the human nature of the law down-valued it. Aristophanes mocks those philosophers who denigrate human law as opposed to nature:

οὐκουν ἀνήρ ὁ τὸν νόμον θεὸς τοῦτον ἦν τὸ πρῶτον, | ὥσπερ σὺ κάγῳ, καὶ λέγων ἐπειθε τοὺς παλαιούς; | ἦττόν τι δῆτ' ἐξεστι κάμοι καινὸν αὖ τὸ λοιπὸν | θεῖναι νόμον τοῖς υἱέσιν, τοὺς πατέρας ἀντιτύπτειν; |... |...| σκέψαι δὲ τοὺς ἀλεκτρούνας καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ βοτὰ ταυτί, | ὡς τοὺς πατέρας ἀμύνεται. (*Nub.* 1421-8)

Wasn't it a man like you or me who made the law in the first place and, speaking, persuaded the ancients? Am I less permitted, then, to make a new law for sons in turn in future to beat their fathers? ... Look at the cocks and these other beasts, how they avenge themselves on their fathers.

Alternatively, law – albeit conventional and varying from society to society – could be seen as an improvement on nature, the one thing that enables human beings to work cooperatively together and so ensures their survival. In this context, the orator – the one who can persuade –

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<sup>7</sup> Pindar said that: Νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων ἄγει δικαίων τὸ βιαιότατον ὑπερτάτῃ χειρὶ (*Frg.* 169a, 1-4 Maehler), '*Nomos*, king of all mortals and immortals, leads, justifying greatest violence with ruling hand'. Cf. Scullion 2006, 196.

<sup>8</sup> For evidence and discussion, Thomas 2006, 67-8.

plays the essential part.<sup>9</sup> His role is that ascribed to the *rhetor* and the *sophistes* at Pl. *Tht.* 166d-167d; it is not to distinguish the true from the false but the worse from the better, and so ensure the adoption of the most advantageous laws. He is godlike in his capacity to dictate what seems, and so what *is*, most good and just.

As we have seen, the term 'sophist' acquired negative connotations, and even those among our Second Sophistic authors who – as oral performers – could have qualified for the name would have rejected it (Ch. 5.2.2b.α). Nevertheless, many present themselves as godlike figures. In this thesis, we have seen Dion (Ch. 5.3.2) and Philostratos (Ch. 3.4.2c) using paradigms evoking divine and less-than-divine travellers to show themselves superior to the rulers who represent themselves as divine. Aristeides goes further and presents himself inspired by, and even to be identified with, his god (Ch. 6.2.1b). Dion represents himself recognized in Olbia as the one with a divine imprimatur, sent there by Achilles himself (36.25; Ch. 5.3.3c). Elsewhere, however, he reveals his godlike nature not by referring to it but by demonstrating it; like Apollo challenging the recipients of his oracles, he challenges the listener or reader to perceive and solve the (relatively simple) riddles that he sets. A pointed lack of reference to Sokrates and Diogenes evokes the oracles that set the course of their lives (Ch. 5.2.1d). Scene-setting in *Or.* 36 and *Or.* 1 makes similarly pointed reference to Plato's myths (Chs 5.3.3c, 5.4.2a).

It is suggested here that Lucian and Philostratos similarly test their readers and establish their own *personae* in the *Alexander* and the *VA*.

If Damis' testimony is invented, Philostratos' *VA* presents those perceptive enough to appreciate the fact with a riddle: what are the implications of the separation of the author from his rationalist narrator? As we have seen, the *VA* operates at two levels, both stressing the 'divinity' of Apollonios. For those who take it at face value, it is the collected testimony of disparate voices, all expressing different conceptions of this 'divinity'; those who are clever enough to recognize Damis as a fictional creation are led into ultimately unresolvable speculation. Testing and provoking his readers, Philostratos the author engages them as a sophist does his audience and establishes his own godlike power over them.

Modern critical commentary has been divided over Lucian. Bompaigne saw him as a skilful creator of permutations of motifs from the literary and sub-literary (handbooks of oracles, proverbs, quotations) sources available to him: 'son originalité consiste à imiter ... La Mimésis,

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<sup>9</sup> Those who, like Aristeides (Ch. 6.2.1b.δ), consider law divinely ordained and the rhetor divinely inspired would not disagree.

loin d'être une charge, est la condition même de cette originalité'.<sup>10</sup> In the same spirit, in his earlier commentary, Anderson attributes to Lucian only a creative process of self-imitation generating variants on a limited number of themes.<sup>11</sup> His knowledge of classical literature is superficial: the limited number of identifiable quotations in his work suggests his heavy reliance on rhetorical manuals.<sup>12</sup> However, increasingly, Lucian has been credited with acute observation of the social scene;<sup>13</sup> it has become clear that pointed innuendos were there for those with the contemporary local knowledge, and the wit, to pick them up. In the context of the new scholarship, Anderson modified his earlier views to present a Lucian who can apply relevant examples from his repertoire of motifs to contemporary situations. 'The real world ... and that of the sophist's imagination could be made to converge and coincide.'<sup>14</sup> Commenting on the impossibility of deciding whether – in any particular passage – Lucian is an observer or merely a practitioner of variants, he points to the question – what was Homer's native country? – that 'Lucian' puts to Alexander at *Alex.* 53. Robert set it in the context of the *Alexander* by pointing out that the nearby town of Amastris – an Epikoureian stronghold and particularly hated by Alexander (*Alex.* 25) – claimed association with Homer. The question could thus have been chosen specifically to irritate Alexander and so indicate the text's specificity to the historical situation. However, it can equally well be explained as Lucian's redeployment of a standard *topos* – one he puts to Homer himself on the Island of the Blest (*VH* 2.20).<sup>15</sup> Whatever we decide in a specific situation, it is a mistake to underestimate Lucian. Recognising the fact, Elsner is inclined to attribute the notoriously controversial *De Syria dea* to him on the basis of its cleverness.<sup>16</sup>

In this context, it is suggested here that, in the *Alexander*, Lucian the author presents his true *persona* to those with the capacity to see. At one level, his work undermines Alexander – a 'divine' sophist superficially at least not unlike Apollonios – and presents the narrator as a

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<sup>10</sup> Bompaire 1958, 742.

<sup>11</sup> Anderson 1976a, 1-4.

<sup>12</sup> Anderson 1976b, Anderson 1978. Macleod (1994, 1369) rightly comments that Lucian's choice of quotations and allusions would have reflected his audience's knowledge rather than his own.

<sup>13</sup> A major catalyst was Robert's *A travers l'Asie Mineure* (1980); Jones (1986, 5, 23) uses the work and other evidence of the kind that Robert adduces to present Lucian as 'a practiced observer' and 'a man in touch with his time'. Thus reference to Christian belief is 'surprisingly exact'; even the title ('the new Sokrates') that the Christians give Peregrinos (*Peregr.* 12) has early Christian precedents (Jones 1986, 122 and n. 23). In contrast, Anderson (1976a, 26) sees the Christian community as just 'another Utopia in contemporary guise'.

<sup>14</sup> Anderson 1982, 78-9, 81.

<sup>15</sup> Anderson 1994a, 1429. Robert (1980, 415-19) makes his inference from local coinage; Amastris' association with Homer would have followed from its incorporation of the ancient cities of Sesamos and Kromna.

<sup>16</sup> Elsner 2001, 153.

modest Epikoureian who has exposed him for what he is and now provides this account to oblige a friend and to spread the word (Ch. 4.1.2). Inconsistent is the self-described virtuoso exposure of Alexander in which the narrator displays himself as a sophist out-performing a rival. Lucian the author's use of a formulaic approach – adopted also in the *De morte Peregrini* – confirms that, whether his account was requested by Kelsos or not, this is no naïve report; rather, it is a clever work certainly attacking Alexander but also and perhaps primarily elevating Lucian himself.

Attempting to decipher a Second Sophistic text, the reader can perhaps be seen as 'wrestling with a god'. The author's riddles separate those who simply accept the text at face value and those who take on the puzzles that the author sets, establishing their own positions, superior or inferior, in hierarchy with him.

### ***7.2.2 The reader's interaction with the text: the Second Sophistic text as a pointer to divine truth***

In this section, it will be argued that a sophistic text can function like an oracle: posing a problem in riddling form, it can direct the reader to an important and even ineffable truth.

The early sophistic tradition noted above (Ch. 7.2.1) allowed a relativist reassertion of the possibility of the numinous Other. The matter can be explained as follows. As Veyne has pointed out, pre-literate peoples do not reject the traditional stories they hear as untrue, but neither do they assume that they take place in a reality continuous with everyday life; rather, they see mythic stories taking place beyond a horizon whose precise nature they do not attempt to define. The first hearers of the Greeks myths were instinctively aware of the existence of this horizon.<sup>17</sup> Veyne sees it as one of time – in the Golden Age the gods consorted with men – but it can equally well be associated with space; as we have seen, anciently, remote places were assumed to be 'liminal', qualitatively different from the everyday world. In Herodotos' day, there were two reactions to the expanding knowledge of distant places and times. The first was to push the liminal further away. Another, however, was to eliminate the horizon between the 'real' and the liminal and to class anything at odds with everyday reality as an 'error' or a 'lie'. In practice, the two approaches are complementary: as the liminal is pushed further away, all

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<sup>17</sup> Veyne 1988, 17-18.

reality becomes everyday reality.<sup>18</sup> From the fifth century, for the more sophisticated in the Greek world, the era of the Greek myths was firmly on 'our' side of the horizon.<sup>19</sup> Stories about the gods were rationalized. Prodikos claimed that whatever proved beneficial to humankind was accounted 'divine'; he further gave a naturalistic account of the origin of religion in which culture-bearers – mythical figures credited with the invention of important cultural achievements – were mortals who have been deified in popular imagination because of their inventions.<sup>20</sup> Overturning this facile rationalism, relativism – suggesting that you should not believe something just because it seems 'obvious' in your present geographical, social and cultural situation – led to an intellectual rejection of disbelief. Traditional texts reporting unlikely (in contemporary terms) events could possibly (in some sense) be true. This led to a re-evaluation of myth and poetry.

Plutarch has a high regard for (traditional) myth and believes that it encodes genuine, divine truth. It *may* reflect historical truth. In his essays, Plutarch is open to various historically-based interpretations. In the *Quaestiones graecae*, a place-name may indicate where Dionysos fought the Amazons (*Mor.* 303d-e). In the *Mulierum virtutes*, Bellerophon's slaying of the Chimaira has been interpreted as his victory over a pirate in a lion-prowed, serpent-sterned ship; alternatively, it has been seen as his clever modification of a landscape to improve crops (*Mor.* 247f-248c).

However, myth is not to be confused with history (*Mor.* 374e), and it does not necessarily convey literal truths. Ὅταν οὖν ἃ μυθολογοῦσιν Αἰγύπτιοι περὶ τῶν θεῶν ἀκούσης ... δεῖ τῶν προειρημένων μνημονεύειν καὶ μηδὲν οἴεσθαι τούτων λέγεσθαι γεγονὸς οὕτω καὶ πεπραγμένον (*Mor.* 355b), 'Whenever therefore you hear the things the Egyptians mythologize about the gods ... it is necessary to remember what has been spoken about, and not to think that they are meant to have happened and been effected as described'. Plutarch disbelieves the literalness of stories about Poseidon rending the earth, and Achilles and Agamemnon in the underworld (*Mor.* 16e). Myths are subject to interpretation, and for this we must use the reasoning that comes from philosophy (*Mor.* 378a). For reason is divine: οὐδὲν γὰρ ᾧν

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<sup>18</sup> Herodotos pushes back the period of divine activity on earth on the basis of Egyptian records at *Hdt.* 2.142-4. Cf. Vannicelli 2001, 228-30, Fowler 2006, 36. Ephoros made the return of the Herakleidai the beginning of his *Historiai*, and so of history proper (D.S. 4.1.3); and Aristeides echoes him in this at *Or.* 22.4-5. Cf. Saïd 2008, 53.

<sup>19</sup> Re the changing attitudes of mythographers, Hard 1997, x-xi. Re educated opinion, at *Ar.* V. 1179, a son tells his father that it is not appropriate to talk about *mythoi*; one must speak of human things; cf. Veyne 1988, 31.

<sup>20</sup> See *Cic. N.D.* 1.118; *S.E. M.* 9.18; for evidence from the Herculaneum Papyri (1428), Henrichs 1975, 107-23; cf. Henrichs 1984, 141, Bremmer 2007, 14-15.

ἄνθρωπος ἔχειν πέφυκε θειότερον λόγου καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ περὶ θεῶν οὐδὲ μείζονα ῥοπήν ἔχει πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν (*Mor.* 378c), 'nothing human beings have is more divine than reason, and especially than that about the gods; and nothing has a greater influence on happiness'.

Plutarch approves – to some extent – of allegorical interpretation. The most perspicuous (he says) are like the Greeks who say that Kronos is a figurative name for time (*chronos*), Hera for air (*aer*), and that the birth of Hephaistos symbolizes the change of air into fire (*Mor.* 363d). However, myth is more than an allegory of nature. We must not be among those εἰς πνεύματα καὶ ρεύματα καὶ σπόρους καὶ ἀρότους καὶ πάθη γῆς καὶ μεταβολὰς ὥρων διαγράφοντες τὰ θεῖα καὶ διαλύοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ Διόνυσον τὸν οἶνον, Ἥφαιστον δὲ τὴν φλόγα' (*Mor.* 377d), 'erasing and dissipating divine things into winds and streams, and sowings and ploughings, and traumas of the earth and changes of the seasons, like [those who make] Dionysos wine and Hephaistos flame'. Elsewhere, Plutarch makes the same point in relation to Apollo and the sun. Some in earlier generations regarded Apollo and the Sun as the same, but ὅπερ σῶμα πρὸς ψυχὴν ὅψις δὲ πρὸς νοῦν φῶς δὲ πρὸς ἀλήθειάν ἐστι, τοῦτο τὴν ἡλίου δύναμιν εἴκαζον εἶναι πρὸς τὴν Ἀπόλλωνος φύσιν (*Mor.* 433d-e), 'as body relates to soul, sight to mind and light to truth, in this way [the more perceptive] conjectured that the power of the sun relates to the nature of Apollo'. The sun has made all ignorant of Apollo, ἀποστρέφων τῇ αἰσθήσει τὴν διάνοιαν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος ἐπὶ τὸ φαινόμενον (*Mor.* 400d), 'turning the mind by means of sense perception from the reality to the appearance'.

Pausanias comes to a similar conclusion. Before his visit to Arkadia, he is in general agreement with the position that makes myth an allegory of nature (7.23.7-8). However:

τούτοις Ἑλλήνων ἐγὼ τοῖς λόγοις ἀρχόμενος μὲν τῆς συγγραφῆς εὐηθίας ἔνεμον πλέον, ἐς δὲ τὰ Ἀρκάδων προεληλυθὼς πρόνοιαν περὶ αὐτῶν τοιάνδε ἐλάμβανον· Ἑλλήνων τοὺς νομιζομένους σοφοὺς δι' αἰνιγμάτων πάλαι καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ εὐθέος λέγειν τοὺς λόγους ... τῶν μὲν δὴ ἐς τὸ θεῖον ἠκόντων τοῖς εἰρημένους χρῆσόμεθα' (8.8.3)

Beginning my book, I considered these words of the Greeks more than silliness but, having proceeded to Arkadia, I began to take some kind of thought about them, that those recognized among the Greeks as wise anciently spoke their words not in a straightforward way but in riddles ... Now, in matters relating to the divine, we will use what has been said.

The poets and, in particular, Homer were often seen to express divine truths. Pausanias' attitude to Homer is reverential. On the basis of Homer's words, he accepts local identifications of the burial-places of Aipyros in Arkadia (8.16.3) and Tydeus near Thebes (9.18.2), and of a

plane tree mentioned in the *Iliad* (2.307) at the temple of Artemis at Aulis (9.19.6-7). Of particular interest is a passage in which he praises Homer's versions of incidents associated with the Trojan War. In a picture from a collection on the Akropolis at Athens,

τοῦ δὲ Ἀχιλλέως τάφου πλησίον μέλλουσά ἐστι σφάζεσθαι Πολυξένη. Ὀμήρω δὲ εὖ μὲν παρείθη τόδε τὸ ὠμὸν οὕτως ἔργον· εὖ δέ μοι φαίνεται ποιῆσαι Σκυῖρον ὑπὸ Ἀχιλλέως ἀλοῦσαν, οὐδὲν ὁμοίως καὶ ὅσοι λέγουσιν ὁμοῦ ταῖς παρθένοις Ἀχιλλέα ἔχειν ἐν Σκύρω δίαιταν, ἃ δὴ καὶ Πολύγνωτος ἔγραψεν. (1.22.6)

Near the grave of Achilles, Polyxene is about to be sacrificed. And Homer fortunately passed over this so savage act. And fortunately also it seems to me he made Skyros captured by Achilles, in no way like those who say that Achilles had a place of residence on Skyros among the girls, as indeed even Polygnotos represented in his paintings.

Homer's version is preferable, but perhaps morally rather than historically 'truer' than the painted scene.<sup>21</sup> Taking a different approach from Pausanias', as we have seen (Ch. 3.6.2), Philostratos elevates Apollonios at the expense of Homer in the *VA* (4.16.4-6). In analytic fashion, the young Dion attacks the literal veracity of Homer's work in the *Troicus* (*Or.* 11). Criticism of the poet on various counts had been common from Plato's time and it can be seen as part of the sophistic repertoire;<sup>22</sup> in practising it, Dion is primarily demonstrating his skill. In the *Troicus*, Homer's account is praised only when its verisimilitude suggests historicity (11.87-8). An undatable but apparently more mature work (*Or.* 53) looks to the Homeric criticism of Antisthenes and Zenon, who saw the poet's work as a mixture of truth and opinion (*aletheia* and *doxa*, 53.5) and nevertheless appreciated it all. Dion himself finds everything that Homer wrote both profitable and useful (*ophelimos* and *chresimos*, 53.11). Moreover, the inspired nature of Homer's work is stressed; Homer is to be seen as ὥσπερ οἱ προφῆται τῶν θεῶν ἐξ ἀφανοῦς καὶ ἀδύτου ποθὲν φθεγγόμενος (53.10), 'like the prophets of the gods, speaking from somewhere hidden and the inner sanctuary'. He lived a life particularly worthy of praise, in poverty, as a

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<sup>21</sup> For these and other examples of Pausanias' deferential attitude to poetic texts, Elsner 1995, 316-17, n. 30. The sacrifice of Polyxene was recorded in the Epic Cycle (*Chrestomathia* 274 Severyns) and by Euripides (*Hec.* 40-1); for the sack of Skyros, *Il.* 9.668, and for the alternate tradition, *Chrestomathia* 130-1 Severyns. Cf. King 1987, 84-5, 178-80.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Cohoon 1932, introductory comments at *Or.* 11; on ancient criticism of Homer and Dion's intention in the *Troicus*, Saïd 2000, 176-86.

wanderer (53.9); Dion's own self-image would have been well enough known for his audience to draw the appropriate parallel.<sup>23</sup>

In his *Quomodo adulescens poetas audire debeat*, Plutarch admits that all poetry (even Homer's) includes some falsehood (*Mor.* 16c). This does not preclude divine inspiration but simply limits its extent. Even on moral issues, the poets contradict themselves, and the student should think critically and approve the better of conflicting statements. Thus, from Euripides one must choose between *πολλάϊσι μορφαῖς οἱ θεοὶ σοφισμάτων ἰσφάλλουσιν ἡμᾶς κρείσσονες πεφυκότες*, 'with many forms of artifice, the gods, born stronger, trip us up' (bad), and *εἰ θεοὶ τι δρῶσι φαῦλον, οὐκ εἰσιν θεοί*, 'if gods do anything bad, they are not gods' (good) (*Mor.* 20f-21a).

Poetry can be likened to oracles in that its interpretation presents riddles. It can also be likened to oracles in that the obscurity of the message is the god's rather than the poet's intention, and/or the result of a poet misunderstanding or only obscurely comprehending the divine message. Plutarch notes that Homer foreshadowed a contemporary theory – one resolving many difficulties – when he referred to *daimones*. He did not distinguish them from gods; but Hesiod separated them from gods on the one hand and heroes and human beings on the other (*Mor.* 415a-b; cf. App. 2.2.1).

In the context of the discussion at Ch. 7.2.1, sophistic literature can be set beside myth and poetry as 'divine' text. It can convey 'divine' truth, and it was for this reason – as well as to demonstrate their cleverness – that sophists (and others who would not have accepted the designation) recreated rather than simply reported myths and the well-known tales told by the poets. The wholesale invention of myth for didactic purposes has already been associated with Euhemeros (Ch. 2.4); Prodikos was responsible for Herakles' Choice (Ch. 3.4.2a). Kindstrand has noted that the moralizing use of Homeric characters was particularly prevalent among Cynics and Stoics; he cites the case discussed at Ch. 5.3.3 in which Antisthenes – the founder of the Cynic movement – elevates the inventive, adaptable and shameless Odysseus at the expense of the noble and straightforward Ajax.<sup>24</sup>

It is instructive to review some substantial Second Sophistic re-workings of myth. Dion's use of traditional stories ranges from allegorical interpretation and modification to the

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<sup>23</sup> Dion uses Homer in support of his own contentions at (e.g.) 1.12, 1.14, 1.38. At 12.59-62, he suggests that Homer presents a metaphorical truth when he gives the gods human form. On the relative powers of Homer and Hesiod and the appropriateness of the two to different audiences, 2.7-14.

<sup>24</sup> Kindstrand 1978, 383.

wholesale invention of myth. At 16.10, the ointment that Medeia offers Jason as protection against dragon and bulls is interpreted allegorically. At 8.33, in the context of Herakles' Labours, the eagle devouring Prometheus' liver is *doxa*, 'popular opinion'. Diomedes and Bousiris are unable to defeat Herakles because they have been weakened by giving in to pleasure; Herakles' overcoming of the Amazon shows him proof against sexual power (8.31-2). *Or.* 60 provides a cleverly modified story of Herakles, Nessos and Deianeira in which Herakles abandons his hard life and later commits suicide in remorse (60.8). In this context, Dion refers approvingly (they are like Sokrates) to philosophers who have remodelled myths: ὥστε ὁποῖον ἂν μῦθον ἢ λόγον λάβωσιν ἔλκοντες καὶ πλάττοντες κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν διάνοιαν ὠφέλιμον καὶ φιλοσοφία πρέποντα ἀπέδειξαν (60.9), 'consequently, whatever myth or story they might take, by stretching it and moulding it according to their own way of thinking, they showed it useful and appropriate to philosophy'. Dion's most dramatic re-creation of a myth is his version of Prodikos' Choice of Herakles (1.56-84; cf. Chs 3.4.2a, 5.3.2a). In his retelling of the Herakles myth at 8.29-35, Dion retains the framework of the original tale: the existence of Eurystheus, Herakles' solitary travel. Differently, in the first Kingship Oration, Herakles does not perform labours for Eurystheus – he is always king (1.59) – and on his world travels he is accompanied by an army.<sup>25</sup> In spite of this obvious invention, Dion attributes to the woman who purportedly told him the tale harsh criticism of invented myth:

ὅσοι γὰρ ποτε σοφοὶ καὶ ἀληθεῖς κατ' ἀνθρώπους λόγοι περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος, οὐκ ἄνευ θείας τε βουλήσεως καὶ τύχης ἐν ψυχῇ ποτε ἀνθρώπων ἐγένοντο διὰ τῶν πρώτων μαντικῶν τε καὶ θείων ἀνδρῶν. ... ὅσοι δὲ ἄνευ δαιμονίου κατοχῆς καὶ ἐπιπνοίας λόγους τινὰς ὡς ἀληθεῖς παρ' αὐτῶν ἐκόμισαν εἰς τὸν βίον, ἄτοποι καὶ πονηροί. (1.57-8)

For whatever statements about the gods and everything are on occasion wise and true in human terms, it was not without divine will and fortune that they arose at some time in the human soul through the agency of the first prophetic and divine men ... those who – without daimonic possession and inspiration – have put forward on their own initiative certain words as true for life are out of place and wicked.

If (as we can probably assume) Dion intended his audience to recognize the fictional nature of his creation, he here presents his own words as higher truth.

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<sup>25</sup> For another variant, 47.4.

In spite of his criticism of Euhemeros (*Mor.* 360a-b),<sup>26</sup> Plutarch is prepared to rationalize myth: in his *Theseus*, the 'Hades' to which Theseus and Herakles penetrate is Molossia, ruled by a king Aidoneus whose wife is Persephone, daughter, Kore, and dog, Kerberos (31.4, 35.1). In the same work, the monstrous Minotaur (15.2) becomes Minos' *strategos* Tauros (16.1, 19.1-3). Plutarch explains his approach by making it clear that the issue is one of genre. Justifying his practice at the beginning of his book, and significantly associating the temporarily and geographically liminal, he notes that:

Ὡσπερ ἐν ταῖς γεωγραφίαις, ὧ̃ Σόσσιε Σενεκίων, οἱ ἱστορικοὶ τὰ διαφεύγοντα τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτῶν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις μέρεσι τῶν πινάκων πιεζοῦντες ... οὕτως ἐμοὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν βίων τῶν παραλλήλων γραφὴν τὸν ἐφικτὸν εἰκότι λόγῳ καὶ βάσιμον ἱστορίᾳ πραγμάτων ἐχομένη χρόνον διελθόντι, περὶ τῶν ἀνωτέρω καλῶς εἶχεν εἰπεῖν· Τὰ δ' ἐπέκεινα τερατώδη καὶ τραγικὰ ποιηταὶ καὶ μυθογράφοι νέμονται, καὶ οὐκέτ' ἔχει πίστιν οὐδὲ σαφήνειαν. (*Thes.* 1.1)

Just as in geographies, Sossios Senekion, the investigators squeeze the things that elude their knowledge around the farthest edges of their maps ... so I, in my composition of the *Parallel Lives*, after I passed the period of matters easily reached by probable reasoning and accessible to inquiry, about earlier things could justly have said: 'Poets and mythographers are assigned the things beyond – marvellous and tragic, but no longer having assurance or clarity'.

His own account, with the fabulous element (*mythodes*) cleared away, will comply with reason and take on the appearance of history (*Thes.* 1.3).

The genre of the *Septem sapientum convivium* is different, and we can expect a different approach to myth. The work is modelled on the dialogues of Plato; Plutarch underlines its fictional nature by adding Neiloxenos and Aesop to the traditional Seven present at the banquet. Of interest in our context, the central account frames a retelling of the myth of Arion (*Mor.* 160e-162b; cf. Chs 2.2.2, 2.3.2, 7.1) in which we know that Plutarch, like Plato in his myths, must be making his own point; the genre conveys at once the fictional nature and the deep significance of the tale.

Literature which we can legitimately call 'sophistic' is expressed in riddles. Unlike the poet's, the sophist's riddles are deliberately posed; echoing the god's oracular form, they suggest

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<sup>26</sup> Plutarch's interpretation of Hades as a human king seems very like Euhemeros' treatment of Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus (cf. Ch. 2.4). The primary difference is, of course, that Euhemeros' mythology is invented (*anhyparktos*).

a work's, and its author's, 'divine' status. Wrestling with the text, the reader encounters, and wrestles with, a 'god'. Riddles can also serve a deeper purpose, suggesting, and drawing the reader towards, a numinous reality to which words can only point. In the *De E Delphico*, the narrator (here presumably to be identified as Plutarch himself<sup>27</sup>) suggests that while Apollo provides straightforward answers to questions about life problems, he sets riddles for those inclined to the love of knowledge; for riddles create in the soul a yearning that leads on to the truth. It is in this context that we must see the mysterious votive E (*Mor.* 384e-f). The idea is set out most explicitly by Ammonios<sup>28</sup>: ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν, ἔφη, τὸ ζητεῖν ἀρχή, τοῦ δὲ ζητεῖν τὸ θαυμάζειν καὶ ἀπορεῖν, εἰκότως τὰ πολλὰ τῶν περὶ τὸν θεὸν ἔοικεν αἰνίγμασι κατακεκρῦθαι ... (*Mor.* 385c), 'and since, he said, inquiring is the beginning of philosophizing, and wondering and being in doubt the beginning of inquiring, many of the things relating to the god seem to have been concealed in riddles ...'.<sup>29</sup>

Some riddles, of course, can easily or at least satisfactorily be solved. Dion presents truths about the nature of society and rule that he regards – and, as a godlike sophist, puts forward for acceptance – as 'divine' (Chs 5.3.3c, 5.4.2). The riddling, mythical forms in which they are cast make them all the more pointed and memorable to hearers or readers.

Other riddles must perhaps necessarily always remain opaque. Philostratos perhaps intends us to appreciate all the conceptions of 'human divinity' given expression in the *VA* as the culturally-specific creations that they are, and to leave the nature of Apollonios' 'divinity' a mystery. Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* is one of the texts examined in Part A of this thesis, but little has been said so far about the problems it presents. Certainly the work is one in which the author challenges readers to distinguish his own voice from his narrator's. There is no warning signal when the author's prologue is replaced by the narrator's tale at *Met.* 1.2; the reader who has made the appropriate separation is bewildered when, in a vision afforded to the priest

<sup>27</sup> We can never assume the narrator's identity in Plutarch's works. In this case he is the brother of Lamprias (*Mor.* 385d), the narrator of the *De facie* (*Mor.* 937d) and the *De defectu oraculorum* (*Mor.* 413d).

<sup>28</sup> Probably Plutarch's teacher; cf. *Eun.* VS 454.

<sup>29</sup> Aristotle saw the riddles inherent in nature as the first impulse towards philosophy: διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν (*Metaph.* 982b), 'for because of their wondering people both now begin and originally began to philosophize ...'. Wondering of this Aristotelian kind comes to an end when the mysterious phenomena are explained (983a). Nightingale (2001, 43-53) contrasts it with Platonic wonder, the contemplation of divine beauty which is the culmination of the human quest. When the lover of beauty systematically views beautiful things: ἐξαίφνης κατόψεταί τι θαυμαστόν τὴν φύσιν καλόν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὗ δὴ ἔνεκεν καὶ οἱ ἔμπροσθεν πάντες πόνοι ἦσαν (*Smp.* 210e), 'all of a sudden he will perceive something wonderful, beautiful in its nature; this is that thing, Sokrates, for the sake of which all his earlier labours were undertaken'.

Asinius Marcellinus (*Met.* 11.27), Osiris refers to 'a Madauran', presumably Apuleius, rather than to the narrator 'Lucius' as expected. Is Apuleius identifying himself with his protagonist? Book 11 has been seen alternatively as spiritual autobiography and as satire, with the final sentence of the work revealing the naive protagonist as a shaven fool.<sup>30</sup>

In an influential reading of the work, Winkler argued that Apuleius designed his work to eliminate any authoritative authorial voice. He distinguishes not only between Apuleius and the narrator Lucius but between Lucius as *auctor* and as *actor*. In this interpretation, at *Met.* 11.27 the god Osiris and the Madauran Apuleius are equally introduced from outside into a fiction that has reached its satisfying conclusion at *Met.* 11.1-26.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, as Lucius the *actor* is forced to go through the rigours and costs of unexpected additional initiations, the narrator – though apparently a confirmed Isiac – remains 'strangely removed'; he fails to go through 'the writerly process of tempering in hindsight the shocks of the past'.<sup>32</sup> Winkler concludes: 'my ultimate assessment of the *Golden Ass* is that it is a philosophical comedy about religious knowledge ... The implicit argument of the novel is that belief in Isis or in any integrating cosmic hypothesis is a radically individual act that cannot be shared. We can watch Lucius make a leap of faith but we cannot find the grounds to stand on (*in the novel*) that would enable us to leap with him'.<sup>33</sup> The effect of the book on all its readers 'is to show how all supernatural and revelatory knowledge is essentially relative to the unsharable point of view of an individual'.<sup>34</sup>

Winkler's suggestion is by its very nature unprovable; more recently, Harrison has argued strongly for a simple, parodic interpretation of Book 11.<sup>35</sup> The fact that the *Metamorphoses* as a whole is replete with inconsistencies attributable – in some cases – to Apuleius' use of a variety of different sources<sup>36</sup> throws into doubt any theory of a well-planned narrative conundrum: the discrepancies between narratological levels fundamental to Winkler's argument may well have been (originally) no more intentional than these. Nevertheless, we

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<sup>30</sup> On scholarly opinion about the *Metamorphoses*, Schlam and Finkelppearl 2000, Harrison 2004<sup>2</sup>, 229-32, 235-8. On the final image, Winkler 1985, 223-7.

<sup>31</sup> Winkler 1985, 219.

<sup>32</sup> Winkler 1985, 222.

<sup>33</sup> Winkler 1985, 124.

<sup>34</sup> Winkler 1985, 319-20.

<sup>35</sup> Harrison 2004<sup>2</sup>, 244-52. Harrison (250-2) conjectures that the work is a parody of the *Hieroi logoi* of Aelius Aristeides.

<sup>36</sup> No attempt can be made here to enumerate Apuleius' inconsistencies. One is the portrayal of Fortuna: at 9.1 identified with divine providence; at 11.15, separate from and subservient to Isis (cf. Winkler 1985, 149). Apuleius' negative picture of the cult of the Syrian goddess is in marked contrast to his (apparently) positive image of the (similarly exotic, eastern) cult of Isis. The discrepancy can be explained by direct copying, in the case of the former, from the *Metamorphoses* of Loukios of Patras (Phot. *Bibl.* codex 129, 96b Bekker).

must note that Apuleius has knowingly let all his inconsistencies stand. He deliberately provokes the conscientious reader who wrestles with the text seeking a single consistent meaning where none is to be found. It can be suggested that – like Philostratos in his *VA* (cf. Ch. 3.1) – he intended the *Metamorphoses* to be read on different levels: by the simple as a religious work, by the more subtle as a parody, and by others as a riddle that points to the fallacy of relying on the authoritativeness of any account.

It is unlikely that (except perhaps in circumstances of political or religious persecution) an author would want the 'true' message of a piece to subvert the most accessible one; certain modern interpretations of Philostratos' *VA* and Lucian's *Alexander* (cf. re Schirren, Ch. 3.2, Branham, Ch. 4.1.2) are to be rejected for this very reason. Apuleius' powerful evocation of religious experience, together with his subtle subversion of the reliability of second-hand reports, can speculatively be seen as intended to send a reader on his or her own journey in search of the divine or the remote.

### **7.3 Conclusion**

Earlier chapters have provided systematic examinations of the occurrence of certain motifs in a body of Second Sophistic literature (Ch. 2), and of the use of related motifs in selected works (Chs 3-6). In this chapter, systematic examination has not been the goal. Examples proffered illustrate the techniques that authors of the period used to evoke the lived experience of a numinous encounter, and to engage their readers and send them on their own necessarily individual intellectual quests.



## **CONCLUSION**



## 8 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS

This thesis has been concerned with Second Sophistic accounts of protagonists who deliberately visit places associated with the divine, or seek out human or other beings sharing the qualities of the divine. It has demonstrated why, and how, Second Sophistic authors used episodes involving locationally 'liminal' encounters to assert or deny the superior status of the subjects of their biographies, and to describe or otherwise indicate their own attainment of a true and superior identity.

### **8.1 Methodology, and a summary of the chapters**

The introductory Chapter 1 set the scene with a discussion of 'liminality' in respect of place, of beings (possibilities range from monstrous or animal to divine), and of human experience. The nature and status of biographical and autobiographical writing in the period were addressed. Parts A and B took two different, systematic, approaches to the thesis topic. Part A (Ch. 2) surveyed a substantial number of Second Sophistic works chosen for their variety as well as their relevance to the topic; Part B (Chs 3-6) investigated in depth two parallel but contrasting biographies and two very different bodies of autobiographical writing. Part C (Ch. 7) of the thesis drew out ways in which Second Sophistic authors may be considered to have provided their readers with access to the experience of a liminal encounter.

The present section (Ch. 8.1) outlines the contents of the principal chapters. Those following (Ch. 8.2-4) address thematically the most important conclusions drawn; Ch. 8.5 concludes the thesis with reference to a direction in which further investigation might be pursued.

#### **8.1.1 Summary of the chapters**

Often-repeated tales about pre-Second Sophistic protagonists – about their quests for an oracular pronouncement or a direct experience of the divine, about their world-encompassing journeys in search of the Other and their interviews with the remote wise – make it clear that such experiences were tests, that they told their protagonists who they were and constituted turning points in their lives. Chapter 2 identified the paradigmatic stories and the story paradigms embedded in the tales. We saw them transmitted in Second Sophistic accounts of

pre-Second Sophistic protagonists, and taken up and sometimes developed in Second Sophistic fiction. Tables 1-17 (Vol. 2) detail the results of the survey of Second Sophistic literature upon which the discussion is based.

Part B (Chs 3-6) of the thesis explored authorial use of the paradigms identified in Part A in selected Second Sophistic works.

Chapter 3, dealing with Philostratos' *VA*, began with discussion of the controversy surrounding the genre of the work and its author's agenda. It is now generally accepted that the *VA* was a work commissioned to promote the cult of Apollonios; moreover, that Philostratos the author is to be distinguished from the narrator, who takes a contemporary intellectual approach to his protagonist's nature, and that Apollonios' life-long companion Damis is a fictional character expressing a more popular, but complementary, understanding (Ch. 3.1). Beginning with the premise that Philostratos knew Apollonios as a miracle-worker and a Pythagorean, the chapter demonstrated ways in which he made clever use of traditions about Pythagoras, and other paradigms associated with liminal encounters, both to reconstruct Apollonios' biography and to present him in a positive light. Philostratos attributes to Apollonios distant travels that suggest his superiority to his master, the world-traveller Pythagoras (Ch. 3.3), that quash a tale of sexual misconduct (Ch. 3.4.1), that take him first to learn from the wisest, and then to the less wise in order to teach (Chs 3.5.1, 3.5.4). Apollonios' travels in the Greek world can perhaps be associated with his Pythagoreanism (Ch. 3.3.2). Philostratos uses paradigms associated with autopsy and the Seven Sages tradition to present Apollonios as a philosopher, and so to counteract negative associations possibly arising from his contact with the non-Greek wise (Ch. 3.5.3). Moreover, Apollonios is approved by divine figures (Achilles, Trophonios) in person (Ch. 3.6.2b).

Chapter 4 addressed Lucian's *Alexander*. The historical Alexander of Abonouteichos – linked by Lucian with Apollonios – was probably not a dissimilar figure; he was associated with the Asklepios cult and probably a Pythagorean. Lucian's narrator is his active opponent; this narrator's account of his conflict with Alexander is sufficiently similar to the narrator's account of his conflict with Peregrinos in the *De morte Peregrini* to suggest that Lucian the author is working to a formula (Ch. 4.1). In the *Alexander*, Lucian makes use of carefully-chosen traditions about Pythagoras, and stories about his protagonist's namesake Alexander the Great, in order to discredit both, and Alexander of Abonouteichos with them (Chs 4.3, 4.4). Both Pythagoras and Alexander of Abonouteichos grant sexual favours to make their way (Ch. 4.3); the existence of

the tame snakes of Macedon undermines the claims to divinity of Alexander the Great and of Glykon alike (Ch. 4.4).

Significantly, Philostratos and Lucian use variants of the same story paradigms to make their points. Apollonios travels to the end of the earth to perfect his knowledge in consultation with the Indians; in parallel, Alexander travels as far as Macedon and obtains the inspiration that will shape his life. Apollonios consults as a philosopher with the non-Greek wise, Alexander, with magicians whom Lucian associates with them. Apollonios' superiority is vindicated in interviews granted him by Achilles and Trophonios; Alexander is an intimate of his invented god.

Chapters 3 and 4 were concerned with ostensible biographies of real or pretended 'divine men'. Chapters 5 and 6 contrasted autobiographical accounts of life-changing encounters in the works of two famous and successful orators.

In his thirteenth oration, Dion of Prousa describes the oracle – received when he was condemned to exile – that changed the course of his life. It was argued in Ch. 5 that the oracle was a metaphorical one: Dion intends to evoke paradigmatic stories of life-changing oracles relating to Sokrates and Diogenes the Cynic in order to suggest – to an educated audience – his own likeness to both. Dion's journeys in exile – characterized as wandering, which was traditionally viewed negatively (Ch. 5.3.3a-b) – are reinterpreted by him as at once journeys of beneficence and of autopsy. Dion likens his role to those of Herakles, Hermes and Diogenes (Ch. 5.3.2). Different orations present him learning, in the course of his exile, from the (Greek and non-Greek) liminal wise (Chs 5.3.3c, 5.4.2a-b).

In parallel with the oracle to Dion we can set Aristeides' life-changing encounter with Asklepios. Although Aristeides was an orator, the *Hieroi logoi* – in which his account of the episode is to be found – are not orations but rather oratorical offerings to the god. They are by no means naïve, but internal comparisons suggest their essential truthfulness to memory; they can be considered 'autobiography' in the modern sense of that term. In these works, Aristeides reports repeated encounters with the god that confirm his belief in his own godlike nature and – inspiring his oratory – make him more godlike. Like Dion, Aristeides travels; however, while Dion's journeys can be characterized as wandering, Aristeides' conform to a completely different model that can be designated 'pilgrimage' (Ch. 6.3.3).

That the experiences central to both Dion's and Aristeides' sense of identity include periods of withdrawal from society suggests that the episodes conform to the van Gennep/Turner model of a liminal experience. Discussion in Chs 5 and 6 found parallels between

the life-experiences of the two orators, and differentiated both from the experience of a candidate undertaking formal rites of passage (cf. Chs 1.3, 5.5, 6.4).

The brief Ch. 7 (Part C) acts as a coda to the thesis, drawing out possibilities suggested by the texts surveyed in Part A, and in the process engaging with works by authors (Plutarch, Apuleius) not the focus in Part B. It first contrasts liminal and numinous experience and explores attempts by Second Sophistic authors to convey the latter. Then, identifying riddling as characteristic of the literature of the period, it suggests that Second Sophistic authors posed riddles in order to engage their readers and demonstrate to them their own (i.e. the authors') superiority; the reader's encounter with the author in the text can be seen as a chosen confrontation, a contest with a 'god'. Authors' riddles may also – like Apollo's oracles – send readers on their own individual searches for a perhaps ultimately unobtainable 'truth'.

## **8.2 The paradigms and their applications in Second Sophistic literature and reality**

Identifying a body of paradigms associated with liminal encounters has enabled us to recognize, in Chs 3-6, authors' systematic use of these paradigms to affirm or deny a protagonist's superiority. In the VA, by judicious use of paradigms, Philostratos constructs Apollonios' biography and establishes his identity. Dion conveys truths about his own identity and authority using a code that he expects an educated audience to understand. Lucian – it has been argued – leaves his protagonist's self-affirming Asklepieian/Pythagorean imagery in place; he expects his audience to appreciate his own twists and his addition of discordant paradigms intended to undermine the protagonist.

In parallel, in the case of Aristeides – and even in the case of Dion, who indeed travels 'to the utmost part of the earth' – we have seen individuals attempting to live out, in real life, the established paradigms.

The present section of this concluding chapter summarizes the most important paradigms identified in this thesis and points to some literary and real-life applications.

When a protagonist seeks out an oracle, *the god provides life-direction appropriate to the individual* (Ch. 2.3.1). Whatever the historical truth of the individual cases popularly recounted, the expectation of appropriate direction seems to have inspired real-life questioners. Xenophon very probably inquired at Delphi as he reports, and second-century inscriptions from Miletos evidence ordinary individuals' inquiries about their careers (Ch. 5.2.1a). Writers of

Second Sophistic fiction developed a – narratively useful – related motif in which questioners align themselves with fate by deliberately setting in motion the sequence of events that an oracle predicts (Ch. 5.2.1b).

Another oracular paradigm – *the god communicates in riddles* – can also be related to life-direction. The god's response is a riddle designed to test the inquirer, and the one who – like Phalanthos (T12.2) – solves it is worthy of the outcome that the solution brings (Ch. 2.5.1). In particularly famous cases – the oracles relating to Sokrates (T12.17) and Diogenes (T12.19) – an intellectual journey set in train by a cryptic oracle *makes* the recipient the person that the god knew he should be. The claim that oracles were ambiguous enabled apologists to justify those oracles – like the famous oracle to Kroisos (T4.20) – that apparently proved untrue. However, the use of lot or standard oracles and the practices of chresmologues – in particular, their recycling of 'ancient' oracles as having contemporary application – suggest that oracles were indeed often obscure (Chs 1.2.1, 2.3.1, 6.2.2). In the period of the Second Sophistic, the obscurity of oracles figures prominently in fiction (Ch. 2.4.1), and is most notably referred to by Dion in the context of the life-changing oracle that he claimed to have received (Ch. 5.2.1).

In a final important paradigm to be associated with oracles, *the god accredits superior individuals* (Ch. 2.3.1). We find the theme in Second Sophistic fiction (Ch. 2.4.1); in the real world, divine accreditation was claimed by some in the highest echelons of Roman power. Evidence of an instance pre-dating the Second Sophistic can be found in entries in Table 5. Plutarch records oracles to the Romans Quintus Titius (T5.58) and Salvenius (T5.59) supposedly predicting Sulla's second victory over Mithridates and his coming ascendancy in Rome. Whatever the original context and detailed content of the oracles, presumably with their own interests in mind, the two men reported them to Sulla as accreditations of himself. He saw them as such and incorporated them in his *Hypomnemata* (Plut. *Sull.* 17.1); seriously or cynically, he was a man who paid attention to indications of the gods' favour.<sup>1</sup> In what is probably a reflection of contemporary reality, in Lucian's *Alexander*, supposedly ancient oracles proclaim the prophet's coming to the world (Ch. 4.6).

In cases of direct encounter, those who approach a god uninvited – or cast themselves into a liminal element that can be identified with a god – throw themselves upon divine mercy: story paradigms allow that they may be struck down for presumption, or recognized for their intrinsic worth and embraced (Ch. 2.3.2). Cult and ritual provide relatively – but not wholly – safe access to the divine (Ch. 2.5.2). Herakles' Labours provide a model for series of trials and

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. August. *C.D.* 2.24; Potter 1994, 148.

hardships that are to be seen as contests with the divine power that mandates them. Only the superior stand even a chance of success; the most worthy 'contestants' may be granted the rescue accorded to Odysseus, or even the divinity granted Herakles (Ch. 2.3.2).

In later retellings, Herakles' Labours 'morph' into voluntarily-undertaken journeys of beneficence and provide a model for the world travels and conquests of Dionysos and Alexander (Ch. 3.4.2a). Living out the paradigm, Roman conquerors identified themselves with the divine figures whose conquests proved their divinity and whose divinity justified their rule. Pompey associated himself with Alexander, Antony with Herakles or (later) Dionysos, and Augustus and his successors with Herakles (Ch. 3.4.2b).

A completely different motivation for world-encircling journeying was autopsy, seeing for oneself. Historically, it came relatively late on the scene: Herodotos (2.99) saw it as the basis of *historie*. The one who encompasses the earth can claim the godlike knowledge of Zeus himself (Ch. 3.4.1; he can judge the wisdom of those he encounters and learn from those he considers wise. In the real world, the autopsy tradition flourished among those who followed the scientific tradition established by Aristotle and Theophrastos (Chs 2.3.4, 3.4.3). At the other end of the intellectual spectrum, it gave rise to 'the young man's journey to gain wisdom', and to popular tourism (Ch. 4.4). Autopsy was a popular motif in Second Sophistic fiction (Ch. 2.4), most notably in Antonius Diogenes' *De incredibilibus*, in which Deinias travels in his quest for knowledge (κατὰ ζήτησιν ἱστορίας, Phot. 109a, 13-14) as far as the vicinity of the moon; it is a feature of Philostratos' biography of Apollonios (Ch. 3.4.3).

Circling the earth can be associated with two more paradigms. *Wandering*, the apparently aimless journeying of an exile, can also become a choice and an opportunity to learn and to do good. Dion presents his travels in exile as such (Ch. 5.3.3). In *pilgrimage* in the special sense of a journey undertaken by divine command, as in wandering, what is significant is the experience as a whole rather than any specific destination laid down. Wandering takes you where chance or fate determine, but pilgrimage, where the gods specify. Pilgrimage of this kind was a common undertaking in the Second Sophistic world, where (for example) visitors to a temple performed ritual circumambulations (Ch. 1.2.2). Aristeides carries out many divinely-prescribed journeys from the Asklepieion at Pergamon, and he understands later journeys – inspired by dreams – as of the same kind (Ch. 6.3.3).

Those who circle the earth are likely to encounter the non-Greek wise. Anciently the most remotely-located peoples – Homer's Ethiopians, Hesiod's Hyperboreans – were credited

with godlike virtues and powers (Ch. 1.2.3). As contact with distant places increased, the historical wise of non-Greek cultural traditions took on some of their aura: those most notably present in the Second Sophistic literary sources are the priests of Egypt, the Chaldaians and Magoi associated with the Persian Empire and the *gymnosophistai* of India. In Second Sophistic accounts of well-known philosophers' travels, there is little to suggest that any of these groups were to be viewed in a negative light (Ch. 2.3.4). Second Sophistic fiction presents a more nuanced picture (Ch. 2.4.3), reflecting the contemporary association of the non-Greek wise with magic: the use of supposedly supernatural means to procure desired outcomes was widespread in the Graeco-Roman world, with many practitioners probably claiming to be Egyptians or Chaldaians (Ch. 2.5.3). In purportedly biographical or autobiographical accounts, paradigms associating the non-Greek wise with superior but possibly inappropriate powers made any interaction with them a test. In the *VA*, Philostratos treads a fine line when he associates Apollonios with Indian Sophoi possessed of remarkable powers (Ch. 3.5.3). In the *Alexander*, Lucian makes use of the popular, negative image of the non-Greek wise to denigrate Alexander's teacher and Alexander himself (Ch. 4.5).

### **8.3 Liminal beings: concepts of human 'divinity' in the focal biographical and autobiographical accounts**

Chs 3-6 (Part B) demonstrate four authors' use of paradigms to suggest (or deny) their protagonists' superior or even 'divine' nature. Seen together, they contribute to ongoing, modern academic discussion (cf. Ch. 1.2.4, App. 2.2.2) of what it meant, in the period of the Second Sophistic, for a human being to be 'divine'.

Myth, and popular stories about historical and even contemporary individuals (Alexander the Great, Apollonios), associated human divinity with physical descent from a god (e.g. Plut. *Alex.* 2.2, 2.4, Philostr. *VA* 1.5-6). A related motif was apotheosis, seen as physical ascent to the heavens; Alexander of Abonouteichos produces an oracle suggesting his own (*Alex.* 40, 59, Ch. 4.6).

Lucian's and Philostratos' use of the imagery of divine parentage and/or apotheosis suggests that, at least when it was applied to contemporary and near-contemporary individuals, intellectuals rejected it or understood it metaphorically. Lucian mocks tales of the divine conception of Alexander the Great (*Alex.* 7), and he ridicules Alexander of Abonouteichos' claims to descent from Podaleirios (*Alex.* 11) and of having a daughter by the Moon (*Alex.* 35). In fact, in

Alexander's cult the imagery may have had (or been seen to have had, by more sophisticated adherents) a metaphorical meaning (App. 4, Ch. 4.3). In the *VA*, Philostratos the intellectual narrator distances himself from birth and apotheosis stories, choosing to understand them allegorically (Ch. 3.2). However, Philostratos the author gives space not only to popular traditions of these kinds but also to the voice of the – fictitious – unsophisticated observer Damis. All speak directly to a mass audience (Ch. 3.1). They provide a suggestive aura with their intimations of divinity; moreover, it has been suggested in this thesis (Ch. 7.2.2) that Philostratos intends to point his audience to the ultimately unknowable nature of Apollonios' being.

The historical Apollonios seems to have been known by contemporaries as a Pythagorean miracle-worker, and in this sense a 'divine man' (App. 2.2.2, App. 3). Alexander of Abonouteichos may have represented himself in the same way (App. 4, Chs 4.3, 4.7). In his *persona* as intellectual narrator of the *VA*, Philostratos introduces a complementary Pythagorean/Platonic conception of human divinity that stresses the soul's capacity to refine itself to become increasingly aetherial until – after successive rebirths – it can shed its material and mortal nature and become 'divine'. Apollonios, in his human life, is at an advanced stage of the process and already free from normal human limitations (Ch. 3.5.3b). His human life can well be expected to end in the 'apotheosis' that consists in freedom from mortal rebirths (*VA* 8.30-1).

The 'godlike' human beings of our ostensibly autobiographical accounts (Chs 5 and 6) have no supernatural powers. Dion makes no claim to divinity; the parallels he evokes for himself are with Diogenes and Sokrates (Ch. 5.2.1c). However, Aristeides claims Asklepios' inspiration, the inspiration appropriate to one with the capacity to make use of it. Moreover, inspired by the god, he is in some sense to be identified with him (Ch. 6.2.1b). Divine inspiration or even possession was a well-known literary motif, with the Pythia the most famously inspired priestess (Ch. 2.3.1). Alexander of Abonouteichos – Lucian's Alexander and probably the historical figure as well – claimed intimacy with, and inspiration by, Glykon; Lucian's Alexander imitates the Pythia's reputed frenzy (Ch. 4.6, App. 4).

In the sophistic tradition, the one who rules – who can impose his will upon society by military means or, most significantly, by persuasion – is 'god' (Chs 3.4.2a, 7.2.1). An orator who can impress and control his audience is in this same sense 'divine'. We can perhaps see all four of the authors considered in Part B seeking to persuade their listeners/readers of their own, godlike, superiority. Philostratos stresses the superiority of the wise man to the rulers he advises (Ch. 3.4.2c), and he provokes those perceptive enough to appreciate it with the insoluble riddle posed by his text (Ch. 7.2.1). Lucian presents himself as a heroic individual successfully

challenging Alexander (Ch. 4.1.2); a perceptive reader may appreciate him as a *poseur* as clever as his protagonist. Dion challenges educated readers with encrypted texts that – it has been argued – he fully expects them to understand (Chs 5.2.1d, 5.3.3c, 5.4.2a, 7.2.1). And, finally, Aristeides presents us with a devout and self-revelatory text that also – as he intends it to – reveals him to us as divine (Chs 6.1, 6.2.1b).

#### **8.4 Liminal experience in the focal biographical and autobiographical accounts**

A liminal experience transforms a life. It may or may not be deliberately sought out; certainly, in the anthropological/ritual contexts in which the concept was first formulated (Ch. 1.3), individuals set in train the courses of events that transform their senses of identity and social roles. Any liminal experience will probably involve an extended period in which ordeals – Labours – test the individual involved; it is always possible that he or she will fail (cf. Ch. 2.3.2).

Chapters 3 and 4 have identified the *VA* and the *Alexander* as fictional recreations of the lives of the protagonists, developed by authors with their own agendas in view; we cannot expect to find in them a reflection of the historical Apollonios' or Alexander's experience. In each, the focus of the work is the divine – or other-than-divine – nature of the protagonist; in each, the course of the protagonist's life seems – to the reader of the book – the inevitable consequence of his intrinsic nature, not the outcome of a life-changing revelation or decision. However, as noted at Ch. 1.3.2, an episode that seems diagnostic to an outsider, or in retrospect, may seem contingent and a turning point to the one experiencing it. Philostratos suggests that his Apollonios saw conversion to Pythagoreanism as the liminal experience of his life (Ch. 3.7). Lucian chooses his Alexander's purchase of Glykon and concomitant commitment to cult foundation (Ch. 4.8).

In Chapters 5 and 6, it has been argued that the accounts of Dion and Aristeides give us access to the life-events most significant to the self-perceptions of the two; moreover, that each account associates self-transformation with both a (real or metaphorical) revelatory event coupled with a decision, and a sequestered period that tests and develops the individual's ability to live the decision out.

Dion represents an oracle of Apollo – received at the critical moment of his exile – changing his life; it has been argued that the oracle is a metaphor for a life-changing decision at that pivotal time (Ch. 5.2.1). Nevertheless it is the period of his exile – lived out in accordance with 'Apollo's command' (Chs 5.3, 5.4) – that establishes for Dion the identity that he will retain

for life (Ch. 5.2.2). Similarly, Aristeides identifies a revelatory experience of Asklepios as the turning point in his life. However, it is the following period of the *Kathedra* at Pergamon – a period spent testing Asklepios' commitment to himself and his own ability to interpret and fulfil the divine commands – that establishes his life-long identity as a devotee of the god (Ch. 6.1). Many of the critical revelations detailed at Ch. 6.2.1 were obtained at Pergamon, although the *Hieroi logoi* in which they are recorded date from a much later period in Aristeides' life (App. 6).

In each of Chapters 5 and 6, the protagonist's experience contrasts with that of candidates undertaking traditional rites of passage in that – although a liminal period is involved – the completion of this period must, at least in part, be identified by the individual concerned (Chs 5.5, 6.4).

### 8.5 Further directions

In this study of journeys in search of the remote or the divine, Judaeo-Christian sources have deliberately been excluded. Further investigation could determine whether – as a cursory overview of the canonical New Testament suggests – journeys reported in these sources fall exclusively into the category designated in this thesis 'pilgrimage undertaken in response to a divine command', and/or culminate in 'unmediated encounter with the divine'. Inclusion of documents of somewhat later date could well produce a different result. Oracles should be irrelevant in a Judaeo-Christian context, but Anthony (Athanasius, *Vita Antonii* 2.3) and Augustine (*Confessiones* 8.12) take scripture heard or selected randomly as an oracular text. In the canonical *Acts of the Apostles*, Paul and other travelling missionaries show no interest in the wonders and learning of the lands they visit. Theirs are not journeys of autopsy, but Backhaus suggests a contrasting presentation in later apocryphal *Acts*.<sup>2</sup>

A survey of Christian accounts would also allow us to place Jewish counterparts alongside the paradigmatic stories of the classical tradition. Moses (*Exodus* 19.20) and Elijah (*1 Kings* 19.11-12) encounter the divine on a mountain-top as Epimenides did in a cave (T5.122). Christ's mountain-top experience is explicitly related to Moses' and Elijah's at *Ev.Matt.* 17.3.<sup>3</sup> Herakles and Odysseus undergo 'Labours' devised by a god who expects them to fail (Ch. 2.3.2);

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<sup>2</sup> Backhaus 2014, 133.

<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless his superiority to them is made clear; Elijah the forerunner (*Malachi* 4.5) is to be identified with John the Baptist (*Ev.Matt.* 17.11-13).

in parallel, Job is tested on his life-journey, and Christ in the wilderness, by Satan (*Job* 1-2, *Ev. Marc.* 1.12-13).<sup>4</sup>

The canonical New Testament makes exclusive use of Jewish paradigmatic stories. However, again, the inclusion of somewhat later sources may well make a difference: Backhaus refers to pagan and Christian use of pagan figures (Orpheus, Dionysos, Herakles, Odysseus) as types of Christ.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> As a superior figure, Christ is never associated with Job.

<sup>5</sup> Backhaus 2014, 133-66.



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<sup>1</sup> This bibliography includes only works cited in the thesis. Works listed under 'Abbreviations' are not repeated here. Reprints by different publishers, or substantially later than the original editions, are listed here as used, with the original imprint noted; both original and reprint dates are specified in citations. In the body of the thesis, the following are referred to by personal name or initial(s) and surname to distinguish them from another or others with the same surname: E. Bernand, L. Edelstein, James A. Hall, T. Heath, A. Jones, R. Martin, J.C. Miller, T. Morgan, P. Parker, F. Robert, R.F. Thomas, E. Turner. Edelstein and L. Edelstein 1945/1998 is simply 'Edelstein 1945/1998'.

<sup>2</sup> Both source texts and texts relevant principally for their editorial comment are listed here, by editor, or by translator when no editor is specified. The choice of source texts is addressed at 'Editions used' at the beginning of this thesis.

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**SEEKING OUT THE REMOTE AND THE DIVINE:  
STORY PARADIGMS SHAPING SECOND SOPHISTIC 'LIVES'**

**VOLUME 2. APPENDICES AND TABLES**



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## APPENDIX 1: THE EDGES OF THE EARTH IN SECOND SOPHISTIC THOUGHT

See Ch. 1.2.3.

Long before the period of the Second Sophistic, particular places and peoples remote from the Graeco-Roman world had taken on the numinous aura of the edges of the earth. The following sections address both the identities of associated groups presented in literary sources as 'non-Greek wise', and the opportunities that existed for Second Sophistic contact with them.

### 1.1 Egypt

Egypt had been known to Greeks from archaic times. Herodotos reports its wonders: its strangely reversed social customs (2.35); the crocodile (2.68), hippopotamus (2.71) and phoenix (2.73); the pyramids (2.124-6). They reappear in Second Sophistic accounts: Philostratos pairs the crocodile and hippopotamus as characteristic of the Nile (VA 6.1); Lucian's Pankrates rides on a crocodile (*Philops.* 34) and Philostratos' Apollonios learns more about the phoenix (VA 3.49); Lucian's Demetrios visits the pyramids (*Tox.* 27) and so too does Aristeides (*Or.* 36.1).

The high reputation accorded to the Egyptian priests seems to have been based at least in part on the antiquity of their records – and so, on an unspoken assumption about the supreme wisdom of the most ancient peoples. Herodotos spent time with priests in Thebes and was astonished to find records going back 341 generations (2.142-6). Presumably on the basis of the antiquity of Egyptian wisdom, he assumes that 'certain Greeks' adopted the theory of the transmigration of the soul from them (2.123). Plato makes use the antiquity of Egyptian records to create a framework for his myth of Atlantis.<sup>1</sup>

Although it had become a Roman possession in 30 BCE, Egypt beyond Alexandria remained for the most part 'culturally other'. Combining exotic sights with relatively easy travel (Philostratos notes the extent of traffic between Greece and Egypt at VA 5.24.1), it was accessed regularly not only by professionals – officials, the military, traders – but by many who can only be described as tourists. Inscriptions attest Roman-period visits to the underground tombs (*syringes*) around Egyptian Thebes and the statue of Memnon nearby, with Philai, near the First

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<sup>1</sup> His Kritias attributes the story to Egyptian priests (*Ti.* 20e-21b), who explain to Solon that their records have been preserved while those of other parts of the world have been destroyed periodically by fires and floods (*Ti.* 22d-23a).

Cataract, the end of the tourist road.<sup>2</sup> Combining an official visit with sightseeing, Septimius Severus travelled the Nile to the border of Ethiopia investigating everything: ἦν γὰρ οἶος μηδὲν μῆτε ἀνθρώπινον μῆτε θεῖον ἀδιερεύνητον καταλιπεῖν (D.C. 76.13.1-2), 'for he was the kind to leave nothing human or divine unexamined'.

## 1.2 Judaea, Syria and Persia

By the Hellenistic period, Jews were widely dispersed through the Mediterranean world, with a large and particularly influential community in Alexandria. Their intransigent monotheism attracted attention and converts but their priests do not figure significantly in literary sources; the ascetic Essenes were commented upon favourably by Pliny (*HN* 5.73).<sup>3</sup> The cult of the *Syria Thea/Dea Syria* was well known in the Greek and Latin west from the third century BCE, but it and its priests the Galloi are best-known from Second Sophistic sources (Luc. *Syr.D.* 1-60, Apul. *Met.* 8-9).<sup>4</sup> Babylonian and Persian wise impinge much earlier on the western literary imagination. Plato knew the Magoi as instructors of the Persian royal heir and possessors of the wisdom of Zoroaster (*Alc.* 122a).<sup>5</sup> Their wisdom, like Egyptian wisdom, seems to have been valued at least in part because of its supposed antiquity. Diogenes Laertius tells us that Xanthos the Lydian – an older contemporary of Herodotos<sup>6</sup> – estimates a period of 6000 years between Zoroaster and the expedition of Xerxes and lists the names of Zoroaster's successors down to Alexander's conquest of Persia (1.2). 'Chaldaians' was the name given in the Graeco-Roman west to the Babylonian wise, though in Babylon itself the term designated tribal groups rather than the learned.<sup>7</sup> To Herodotos, Chaldaians are priests of the god Bel (1.181). Diogenes Laertius associates them with astronomy and foretelling the future (1.7).

Syria became a Roman province in 64 BCE after Pompey's conquest of the area; Antony gave part of it to Cleopatra but, under Augustus, Rome's suzerainty over the whole of the middle part of the west bank of the Euphrates – the western boundary of the Parthian empire – was

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<sup>2</sup> Hunt and Edgar 1932-34, vol. 2, no. 416; Baillet 1920-6; Bernand and Bernand 1960; E. Bernand 1969; Casson 1994, 101-2, 198-9, 257-61, 278-83.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Scullard 1976<sup>4</sup>, 296-7, 374-9; Goodman 2008, 81-2, 132-4. Nero's wife Poppaea was one who gave her protection to Jewish priests (J. *Vit.* 13-16).

<sup>4</sup> For relevant references and imagery, *LIMC* s.v. Dea Syria (3.1, 355-8; 3.2, 263-6).

<sup>5</sup> Kingsley (1995b, 185-6, 188, 196-8, 204) notes a Persian influence on Plato and his circle, both mediated by the Pythagoreans of Sicily and direct: Persian Magoi seem to have been associates of Plato at the time of his death.

<sup>6</sup> Ephoros (*FGrH* 70 F 180) claims – credibly, cf. Kingsley 1995b, 174-6 – that Xanthos was used by Herodotos as a source.

<sup>7</sup> Leick 2002, 277.

reasserted; Judaea became a Roman province in 6 CE. In the 70s, in the aftermath of the Jewish revolt of 66-74, Vespasian consolidated Roman power in the region with a military build-up in Kappadokia and the absorption of Commagene and (probably) Emesa into Syria. Trajan's Parthian campaigns of 114-116 were the first of a series of incursions, led by emperors, into Parthian territory itself. Trajan reached the capital Ktesiphon and the head of the Persian Gulf and reputedly regretted being too old to follow Alexander to India (D.C. 68.29). After Parthian interference in Armenia, Lucius Verus took Ktesiphon in 165; a further incursion by Septimius Severus in 197-198 led to the formation of the Roman province of Mesopotamia.<sup>8</sup>

Realistically, Philostratos pictures Apollonios at Zeugma, the major crossing-place on the Euphrates (VA 1.20.1). Lucian refers to Lucius Verus' campaign: in his *Quomodo historia conscribenda sit* (14, 31), 'Ouologessos' is Verus' opponent Vologesus III.

### 1.3 India

The Alexander historians established the Indian wise in the Hellenistic imagination. The historicity of an encounter between Alexander's party and Indian sages is in no doubt. The initial meeting in Taxila was reported by both Onesikritos and Aristoboulos; there was no relevant earlier tradition from which it could have been constructed, and the sage Kalanos who is mentioned returned west with the Greeks and later committed suicide in a spectacular way that provoked extensive comment.<sup>9</sup> More controversial is the extent to which the literary picture of the sages reflected reality.

Strabo records Aristoboulos' account of two Brachmanes in Taxila; the elder had his head shaved and the younger, long hair; both were followed by their disciples (15.1.61). Onesikritos reports being sent by Alexander to converse with a group outside the city. The men are naked. Kalanos addresses the stranger insolently and demands that he take off his clothes if he wishes to be admitted into conversation. The older and wiser Mandanis rebukes Kalanos and enters into discussion. He asserts that the best philosophy is that which liberates the mind from pleasure (*hedone*) and grief (*lupe*); Pythagoras, Sokrates and Diogenes, whose doctrines Onesikritos describes, were mistaken only in preferring custom (*nomos*) to nature (*physis*), for otherwise they would not be ashamed to go naked, like himself (Str. 15.1.63-5; for a similar account, Plut. *Alex.* 65). Onesikritos' mention of Diogenes along with Pythagoras and Sokrates

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<sup>8</sup> Millar 1993, 27-126.

<sup>9</sup> The event was reported by Strabo (15.1.4, 15.1.64, 15.1.68), Diodoros (17.107.1), Plutarch (*Alex.* 69.3), and Arrian (*An.* 7.3.1-6).

suggests that he was a Cynic; Plutarch explicitly calls him a Cynic at *Alex.* 65.1. Very probably he reconstructed the interview on the basis of his own predilections.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless we have Aristoboulos' more distanced eyewitness account, and Megasthenes confirms the existence of ascetic sages in India in the period.<sup>11</sup>

Philostratos' Apollonios follows Alexander's overland route to India (VA 1.18-2.20.3) but, in the period of the Second Sophistic, the barrier of the Parthian Empire was regularly bypassed by sea. The sea route linking the Red Sea ports of Myos Hormos and Berenike (Str. 17.1.45, *Peripl.M.Rubr.* 1, 19, Ptol. *Geog.* 4.5) with Barbarikon (*Peripl.M.Rubr.* 38-9), Barygaza (*Peripl.M.Rubr.* 41-7) or Muziris (*Peripl.M.Rubr.* 53-4, Plin. *HN* 6.104) on India's west coast had been discovered by the west only late in the second century BCE;<sup>12</sup> a trade route first developed under the Ptolemies was expanded in the Augustan era (Str. 2.5.12, 17.1.3), and many sailors and merchants made the journey. However, there are no narratives of their travels, which can be reconstructed only from the archaeological record, the extensive Roman literature on the goods they brought back, and occasional other references.<sup>13</sup>

In Second Sophistic literature, contemporary and historical geography exist side by side. The Alexander histories and the India of the *Periplus* are simultaneously reflected in Lucian's *Quomodo historia conscribenda sit*, with its reference to writing from Muziris or the Oxydrakai (31).<sup>14</sup> Pausanias can evoke Hellenistic mythology with a reference to Dionysos' invasion of India (10.29.4), but he also refers to those who sail to India (3.12.4) and to the Chinese: the Seres are Ethiopians who live on an island in the Erythre Thalassa (here, the Indian Ocean; 6.26.6-9).

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<sup>10</sup> Arrian reports the encounter as a direct one between Alexander and local sages. Dandamis, their leader, rejects Alexander's offer of patronage and asserts that he is as much a son of Zeus as Alexander himself and has no need of anything that Alexander can give (*An.* 7.2.2-3). Arrian pairs this account with the famous doublet – Hamilton (1971, 350, n. 4) notes 22 references to the incident – in which Alexander introduces himself to Diogenes of Sinope (*An.* 7.2.1); almost certainly, *An.* 7.2.2-3 is a variant of Onesikritos' tale influenced by the well-known Alexander story.

<sup>11</sup> Megasthenes (*ap.* Str. 15.1.59-60) distinguishes between Brachmanes and the more diverse Garmanes; for discussion, Stoneman 1994, Stoneman 1995.

<sup>12</sup> Strabo (2.3.4) claims that the discovery of the monsoon that broke the Arab monopoly on eastern trade was made when a lone Indian sailor was found stranded in the domains of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes (182-116 BCE); the king saw a unique opportunity to learn the secrets of the route to India and sent Eudoxos of Kyzikos to escort the man home. The *Periplus Maris Rubri* (57) attributes the discovery to a certain Hippalos.

<sup>13</sup> For the route, the key work is the *Periplus Maris Rubri*, dated by Casson (1989, 6-7) to the first century CE. For archaeological evidence from India, Begley and de Puma 1992, Cimino 1994, Suresh 2007, Tomber 2008. For Indian products in the Roman world, Dalby 2000. For overviews of the subject, Miller 1969, Raschke 1978, Parker 2008, 171-83. Aristeides discusses Rome's imports from Arabia Felix and India at *Or.* 26.12.

<sup>14</sup> The latter are a people who surrender to Alexander; cf. Arr. *An.* 5.22, 6.4, 11, 14.

## 1.4 Gaul and Britain

In the first century BCE, the western Celts<sup>15</sup> became the subject of Poseidonios' ethnographic investigations. He was the first to mention their 'wise' – *bardoï* (bards), *ouateis* (*vates*) who were augurs, and the *druidai* who were students of nature and dispensers of justice. He noted the Druids' and, more generally, the Gauls' belief in the immortality of the soul (*ap. Str.* 4.4.4) and associated this and a related belief in transmigration with Pythagoras (*ap. D.S.* 5.28). Caesar borrowed from Poseidonios; he notes the Druids' belief in immortality of the soul and transmigration and places their origin and centre in Britain (*Gal.* 6.13-14). Cicero reports meeting one of them, Divitiacus, in Rome (*Div.* 1.41[90]). Pliny records their rituals involving mistletoe (*HN* 16.249), the plant known as *selago* (*HN* 24.103-4), and the serpent stone (*HN* 29.52). Tacitus describes the Roman attack on their centre on the island of Mona (Anglesea) in 60 CE and justifies it with reference to their practice of human sacrifice (*Ann.* 14.30).<sup>16</sup> The accounts suggest a trend over time: the Druids gained credibility in earlier Graeco-Roman thought from their association with Britain (and, in fact, an island off the far coast of Britain), in Ocean, at the very end of the earth; by Tacitus' time, they were reviled as active enemies of Rome.

Hostile contact with the tribes of Britain began when Caesar raided in 55 and 54 BCE. Southern Britain became Roman after Claudius' invasion in 43 CE. In the north, Agricola penetrated deep into Scotland in the 80s CE; after his decisive victory at Mons Graupius, he sent a fleet around the northern tip of the island to ascertain its circumnavigability (*Tac. Ag.* 38).<sup>17</sup> However, Hadrian and Antoninus Pius emphasized consolidation and set limits to Roman territory with their walls; unrecorded journeys undertaken in the earlier period are perhaps evidenced in place names recorded by Pomponius Mela, Pliny and Ptolemy.<sup>18</sup> Plutarch presents his Demetrios as one who has visited Britain at least in part in a professional capacity (*Mor.* 410a); it is on the emperor's orders that he has investigated islands off the coast (*Mor.* 419e).

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<sup>15</sup> There were also Keltoi/Gauls in the east. From the fifth century BCE, Celtic (La Tène) tribes erupted from their homeland in central Europe north of the Alps. To the south, they occupied Cisalpine Gaul and attacked Rome itself in 390 BCE (*Liv.* 5.33-49) and again in 225 (*Plb.* 2.25-31). In the east, they advanced down the Danube. They are mentioned by Herodotos (2.33, 4.49) as at once located near the Ister/Danube and a people of the far west, and by Plato (*Lg.* 637d-e) for their cultivation of drunkenness. Pausanias (10.19.5-23.4) reports their attack on Greece in 279 BCE. Another group crossed the Hellespont, terrorized the Ionian coast and finally settled in Galatia. Cf. Freeman 2006, 20-66.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Freeman 2006, 157-74. For fragments and testimonia relating to Poseidonios, Edelstein and Kidd (1972-99).

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Mattingly 2007, 118. Tacitus simply says *circumuehi Britanniam*; because of the logistics of such a voyage, the lesser aim is probable.

<sup>18</sup> For geographical works as evidence of Roman surveyors, Mattingly 2007, 28.

### 1.5 The borderlands of the primitive and archaic wise

Aside from their designated 'wise', tribal peoples had an equivocal reputation in pre-Second Sophistic and Second Sophistic literature. Alexander the Great meets a Celt near the Danube; the man refuses to dilute his wine with water and declares that he fears nothing other than that the sky might fall down on his head (Str. 7.3.8, Arr. *An.* 1.4.8). Later, Tacitus' Caledonians are characterized by their *ferocia* (Ag. 8, 11, 31), a term with both positive and negative connotations. Whitmarsh comments rightly that his chief Calgacus exemplifies 'simultaneously the heroism of the resistant and the military and organizational inferiority of the barbarian'.<sup>19</sup>

Peoples not as remote as the Ethiopians and Hyperboreans were anciently considered to share their virtues though not the climatic advantages of their realm, to live more 'rightly' than the more sophisticated in the Greek centre. At *Il.* 13.4-6, Zeus turns away from the battlefield of Troy to look upon Thracian horsemen and close-fighting Mysians and ἀγαυῶν ἱππημολγῶν | γλακτοφάγων Ἀβίων τε δικαιοτάτων ἀνθρώπων, 'noble horse-milking, milk-drinking Abioi, the justest of human beings'. The passage is the first extant Greek idealization of barbarian races.<sup>20</sup> In the 'inverse ethnocentric model', the further away the people, the more virtuous they were. Herodotos (3.97) distinguishes the Ethiopians on the Egyptian border from the *makrobioi* Ethiopians; the former are a lesser people who were subdued by Kambyses. His most remote Royal Skythians are superior to the nomadic Skythians who know nothing of agriculture, and to the Hellenized Skythians in the region of the river Borysthenes who grow grain (4.17-20).

Writing in the fourth century BCE, Ephoros (*ap.* Str. 7.3.9) notes that some writers emphasize the savagery of the Skythians; he, however, intends to write only about the nomadic Skythians, paradigms of human life, fed on mares' milk and surpassing all other peoples in justice.<sup>21</sup> The passage suggests that, by his time, the ancient tradition idealizing remote and primitive peoples had been replaced by a tradition critical of them. In fact, an anonymous biography of Pythagoras preserved by Photios (*Bibl.* codex 249, 441a, 13-24) attributes to Pythagoras the doctrine that the Greeks surpass the barbarians in manners and habits because of the mildness of the climate in which they live. The idea was taken up by Ps.-Plato (*Epin.* 987d)

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<sup>19</sup> Tac. *Ag.* 29-33; Whitmarsh 2006, 316.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Romm 1992, 53.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Romm 1992, 45. For discussion of the various categories of Skythians and the complex interrelationship between nomadism, mare-milking and slavery, Braund 2008. On Skythian nomadism as cultural identity and as strategy (Hdt. 4.120-7), Hartog 2013, 255-65.

and Aristotle (*Pol.* 1327b).<sup>22</sup> Strabo (7.3.7) follows Ephoros, accusing the Greeks of greed and corruption and of impacting adversely on barbarian peoples.<sup>23</sup>

Romans of the imperial period were predisposed to prefer the centre to the periphery. Rome lay in the remote west of the Greek world but it could be re-envisioned at the centre – of the Mediterranean, or of the inhabited world stretching from Portugal to the Ganges – and so destined to rule; the temperate climate of 'central' Italy could be contrasted with remote extremes. Vergil (*G.* 2.136-76) presented Italy as the land where Saturn reigned in the Golden Age (see below); Italy's environmental superiority was present as well in Pliny (*HN* 3.38-42, 37.201), Propertius (3.22.17-42) and Varro (*R.* 1.2.3-7).<sup>24</sup>

Nevertheless, poets could still embrace the idea of a hard life resulting in virtue. Vergil's third Georgic includes an ethnographical description of Skythia (3.349-83), whose harsh climate contrasts with Italy's eternal spring. The Skythians adapt themselves to their natural environment and live a life of comparative *otium*, in harmony with nature; their life is to be preferred to that of the inhabitants of Italy, obsessed with war. Lucan describes the harsh life of the Libyans (9.411-44), who possess none of the natural resources of Italy. Their one potentially commercial product is the Mauretanian citrus tree; Lucan points out their utopian primitiveness – they are content simply to make use of its shade (9.27-8).<sup>25</sup>

In the Second Sophistic, the most prevalent tendency seems to have been to denigrate barbarians and particularly nomads. Apuleius sees the Skythians as the stupidest of men – although the wise Anacharsis was a Skythian (*Apol.* 24). Philostratos claims that it is easy to enslave Thracians and Getai, and foolish to free them, since they do not consider slavery shameful (*VA* 7.3.1). In all his travels, Apollonios did not visit Skythia (*VA* 1.13.3), and he regards the nomad Skythians no less prisoners than other human beings (*VA* 7.26.5). Diogenes Laertius notes that the Getai worship Pythagoras' slave (8.2).

Turning from spatial to chronological imagery, human history could be seen (and represented mythologically) as either an ascent (Greek myth has its culture givers, most notably Prometheus and Herakles) or a descent, with a Golden Race (or Age<sup>26</sup>) giving way to Races (or Ages) of Silver, Bronze and Iron (see App. 2.1.1). If we assume that human nature is essentially

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<sup>22</sup> Cf. Fideler 1988, 140.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Romm 1992, 46-7.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Vasaly 1993, 134.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. R.F. Thomas 1982, 51-3, 110-12.

<sup>26</sup> Hesiod (*Op.* 109-26) refers to a Golden Race. A Golden Age (*aurea aetas*) is characteristic of the Latin poets: Ovid (*Met.* 1.89-127) describes the Ages of Gold, Silver, Bronze and Iron.

one, the idea of an ascent justifies empire. Strabo seems to have believed that all peoples could be raised to civilization through contact with the civilized world – except perhaps where the land was not suitable for agriculture, the basis of civilized life.<sup>27</sup> Caesar – who considered that the extent to which a people was civilized could be deduced from its development of agriculture<sup>28</sup> – used the idea of an ascent to civilization as a justification of conquest.<sup>29</sup>

Tied to the ideas of a descent and of the superior remote was that of the superiority of the archaic Greeks and the remote communities that preserved their way of life and values. The issue is discussed at Ch. 5.4.2b.

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<sup>27</sup>For discussion, Vasaly 1993, 146-8. The alternative 'essential factor' – put forward in the Prometheus myth – was fire. Cf. Guthrie 1957, 95-8.

<sup>28</sup>The Britons of Cantium (Kent) are more civilized (*humanissimi*) than their compatriots further inland, who do not sow grain and live on milk and meat (*Gal.* 5.14). Cf. R.F. Thomas 1982, 4.

<sup>29</sup>Caesar casts Ariovistus' Germans as cruel and savage (*Gal.* 1.31-3) in order to justify his campaign against them. Vasaly (1993, 148-9) notes Caesar's inconsistency: he has a genuine admiration for the least civilized tribes and suggests that contact with civilization has made the Gauls soft (*Gal.* 6.24).

## APPENDIX 2: DIVINE, HUMAN, AND LIMINAL BEINGS

See Ch. 1.2.4, App. 1.5.

### 2.1 Divine, human, and liminal beings in pre-Second Sophistic thought

#### 2.1.1 *The mortal/immortal dichotomy*

The works attributed to Hesiod suggest two fundamental differences between gods and human beings. Gods are immortal but human beings, mortal; moreover, the younger generations of gods are the offspring of their predecessors, but human beings, their handiwork.

The gods' immortality is attested in a formula that appears at the beginning of the *Theogony*. Hesiod names various of the gods – Zeus, Hera, Athena, Apollo, Artemis, Poseidon, Aphrodite, Hebe, Dione, Leto, Kronos, Iapetos, Eos, Helios, Selene, Gaia, Okeanos, Nyx – and couples them with ἄλλων τ' ἀθανάτων ἱερὸν γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων (21), 'the holy race of the other immortal ones, living forever'. The same formula – ἀθανάτων ἱερὸν γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων (105) – introduces an account of the earliest divinities, Chaos and Gaia, and their lines of descent. Gaia bears starry Ouranos as a dwelling-place for the *makares theoi* (127-8), and then his children the Titans (132-8, so-named at 207), the one-eyed Kyklopes (139) and the hundred-armed Kottos, Gyges and Briareus (149-50). The Titans Kronos and Rheia become the parents of Hestia, Demeter, Hera, Hades and, lastly, Zeus (453-8), who rebels against his father and establishes the consortium of the Olympians – all *athanatoi theoi* (390-6).<sup>1</sup> Zeus' children include Klotho, Atropos and Lachesis, the Moirae (904).

Offspring of the (Olympian) gods who had a human parent were not automatically gods, but could be promoted. The mortal Semele bore Dionysos to Zeus: νῦν δ' ἀμφοτέρω θεοί εἰσιν (942), 'and now both are gods'. Herakles, μέγα ἔργον ἐν ἀθανάτοισιν ἀνύσσας | ναίει ἀπήμαντος καὶ ἀγήραος ἧματα πάντα (954-5), 'having completed his great work, dwells among the deathless ones, without misery and young forever'.

Descendants of the early generations of gods may or may not be mortal. Pontos is Gaia's self-generated son; the two are the parents of Keto and Phorkys, and they, of the Gorgons, three sisters among whom only Medousa is mortal (277). Of Medousa's children by Poseidon, Pegasos

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<sup>1</sup> Olympus was the home of Rheia's children (633-4); at 390-6, Zeus accepts there any other gods who will join him in the war against the Titans. The vanquished Titans' fate is to be imprisoned in Tartaros (719-21).

is certainly immortal (284-5) and Chrysaor, only possibly so: his son by Kallirhoe, a daughter of ancient gods, is Geryon (Geryoneus), the strongest of all mortals, and killed by Herakles (981-2).

Human beings are mortal; moreover, in *Opera et dies* they are also characterized as the gods' creations rather than their offspring. Hesiod describes a succession of races. The first was created by Olympian gods in the reign of Kronos: Χρύσειον μὲν πρῶτιστα γένος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων | ἀθάνατοι ποίησαν Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες (109-10), 'the immortal ones dwelling on Olympus first made a Golden Race of human beings, endowed with speech'. These humans were mortal but eternally young; death came to them as sleep (116). They live on underground as *daimones*, a category of beings to be examined in more detail below at App. 2.2.1. An inferior Silver Race followed. Zeus destroyed it for insufficiently honouring the gods, and it too lives on underground, as spirits (ὑποχθόνιοι μάκαρες θνητοὶ, 141) lower in status than the *daimones* of the Golden Race. A Bronze Race created by Zeus (143-4) was captured by Death and went – like later mortals – to Hades' icy house (153-5). It was followed by *hemitheoi*, the godlike race of participants in the Theban and Trojan Wars (159-65).<sup>2</sup> These died, but Zeus granted them a home in the Islands of the Blest at Earth's edge (ἐξ πείρατα γαίης, 169-71). Present humanity is a Race of Iron (176). Its inevitable fate – as Homer knew – is the 'house of Hades' (e.g. *Il.* 7.131, 22.52, 22.482; *Od.* 4.834, 9.524, 15.350, 20.208, 24.264) where ἔνθα τε νεκροὶ | ἀφραδέες ναίουσι, βροτῶν εἶδωλα καμόντων (*Od.* 11.475-6), 'there corpses dwell senseless, the mere shapes of the mortal dead'.

Hesiod mentions a separate and not necessarily consistent account of human origins in both the *Theogony* (512-14, 571-602) and *Opera et dies* (53-100): the first woman (named Pandora at *Op.* 81) was created by the gods at Zeus' command as a punishment for Prometheus' provision to 'men' of fire. Epimetheus makes the mistake of accepting her.<sup>3</sup> Apollodoros (1.7.2) reports that Epimetheus and Pandora were the parents of Pyrrha, who married Prometheus' son Deukalion. The two survive a flood sent by Zeus to destroy humankind. They subsequently repopulate the earth, both by having children and by tossing stones that become people. The stone-tossing, at least, was known to Pindar (*Ol.* 9.42-56), who associates it with the origin of the Race of Bronze.

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<sup>2</sup> Hesiod's *hemitheoi* are also *heroes* (159, 172). The term admitted a number of different interpretations. In Homer (and consistently with Hesiod's understanding), it refers to living warriors and other respected figures (e.g. *Il.* 2.110, 7.453, 19.34, *Od.* 1.101, 6.303, 8.483). Plato equates *hemitheoi* and *heroes*, but he identifies them as offspring of a god and a mortal (*Cra.* 398c). Differently again, *heros* was the term for a deceased mortal to whom cult sacrifices were made (e.g. *Hdt.* 5.114, 7.117, *Th.* 5.11); Herodotos, at least, suggests the *heros*' ongoing power.

<sup>3</sup> In Apollodoros' version (1.7.1), Prometheus makes 'men' from clay as well as providing them with fire.

Animals are to be linked with human beings – presumably they are similarly the gods' creations rather than their offspring – though they are differentiated from them on various counts. Above, we saw Hesiod apply to human beings the epithet *merops* (*Op.* 109), probably 'endowed with speech'. Animals lack speech, and as well they are inferior to humans in that they have no law:

τόνδε γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νόμον διέταξε Κρονίων,  
ἰχθύσι μὲν καὶ θηροῖ καὶ οἰωνοῖς πετεηνοῖς  
ἔσθειν ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶ μετ' αὐτοῖς·  
ἀνθρώποισι δ' ἔδωκε δίκην, ἣ πολλὸν ἀρίστη  
γίνεται· (*Op.* 276-80)

The son of Kronos made this ordinance for human beings: fish and beasts and winged birds may eat one another, since they have no law; but to human beings he gave law, which is by far the best.<sup>4</sup>

The creation of animals is explicitly related to that of human beings by Plato in his version of the story of Prometheus and Epimetheus (*Prt.* 320c-22a). The gods moulded mortal creatures from earth and fire and assigned to the two the task of providing each kind with appropriate abilities. Epimetheus used up the stock of those available on non-reasoning animals, leaving human beings defenceless; it was for this reason that Prometheus famously (*Hes. Op.* 53-8) provided the latter with fire.

### **2.1.2 'Monsters'**

The division between beings taking human, and semi-animal or otherwise extraordinary, form cuts across the mortal/immortal divide. There is no reason to suppose that the divine should exist in human or animal form at all. However, in early artistic representations, the Olympians are anthropomorphic.<sup>5</sup> They are often also linked with animals, but usually in a way that avoids explicit identification. In myth, the gods can transform themselves into animals – most famously, Zeus into a bull or a swan. In epic, Homer uses animal similes: Apollo and Athena take on the appearance of vultures (ὄρνισιν εἰκότες αἰγυπιόισι, *Il.* 7.59), Poseidon bursts into flight like a swift-winged hawk (αὐτὸς δ' ὥς τ' ἴρηξ ὠκύπτερος, *Il.* 13.62), Athena likens herself to a swallow

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<sup>4</sup> On Greek differentiation between human beings and animals and in particular the primacy given to speech, Heath 2005, 6-12.

<sup>5</sup> For Dion's Second Sophistic rationale, 12.59-61.

(χελιδόνι εικέλη, *Od.* 22.240) so as to watch from above. The words suggest, but do not quite specify, the physical form. Burkert comments that, in the Homeric formula 'cow-eyed mistress Hera' (βοῶπις πότνια Ἥρη, e.g. *Il.* 1.551, 1.568, 4.50), 'it is no longer possible to distinguish what was metaphor and what was belief'. Various of the gods were iconographically associated with animals: Zeus with bull or eagle, Poseidon with bull or horse, Hermes with ram or he-goat, Apollo and Artemis with deer, Athena with the owl. In at least some of these cases, there seems to have been a cult connection. Often, the animal was a customary sacrifice to the associated god. However, Dionysos himself was represented at Kyzikos as a bull (ἐν δὲ Κυζίκῳ καὶ ταυρόμορφος ἴδρυται, *Ath.* 11.51 = C 476a), and elsewhere with bull horns (ὁ βούκερως Ἴακχος at *Soph.* *Frg.* 959; τὸν Διόνυσον κερατοφυῆ at *Ath.* 11.51 = C 476a; *cornu decorum leniter atterens* at *Hor. Carm.* 2.19.30).<sup>6</sup>

Some other-than-human beings were regularly represented in animal-related forms that conveyed aspects of their nature or powers. Wings suggest mobility. Eros (called *pteros* in an ancient hymn quoted at *Pl. Phdr.* 252b) was winged in vase-paintings and on the Parthenon frieze. Hermes, as Zeus' *angelos* (*Od.* 5.29), is presented by the god with sandals (*Il.* 24.340-2 = *Od.* 5.44-6) – admittedly not described as winged, but represented as such in later art. Iris, also Zeus' messenger, is *chrysopteros* at *Il.* 8.398 and 11.185 and typically represented with wings.<sup>7</sup>

A part-animal body can suggest sensuality, power, and a lack of human inhibitions. Notoriously sensual and uninhibited, the Silenoi, Satyroi and Pan were almost invariably represented in semi-animal form in art. Satyroi and Silenoi are first mentioned by Hesiod (*ap. Str.* 10.3.19 = *Frg.* 10b; 10a, 17-19 Merkelbach/West) and in the *Hymnus Homericus in Venerem* (262) respectively; neither source mentions form, but sixth-century artistic representations show figures named 'Silenoi', 'Silenos' and 'Satyros' with equine ears, tails and/or hind legs. By the late sixth century, creatures of this kind had become part of Dionysos' train. Sophokles (in his fragmentary *Ichneutai*) and Euripides (in his *Cyclops*) fused what may originally have been two different types when they gave a chorus of Satyroi the leader 'Silenos'. From this period, artistic representations of the creatures become increasingly goat-like; however, Pan is already two-horned (*dikeros*) and goat-footed (*aigipodes*) in the *Hymnus Homericus in Pana* (2).<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Emphasizing the Olympian gods' anthropomorphic form, Heath 2005, 25. On Homeric animal similes, Dietrich 1983, 57-9. On the association of the great gods with animals, Burkert 1985, 64-5; for Plutarch's version, *Mor.* 379d.

<sup>7</sup> Gantz 1993, 3-4 (Eros), 105-9 (Hermes), 17-18 (Iris).

<sup>8</sup> Gantz 1993, 135-7 (Silenoi and Satyroi), 110 (Pan).

The term *kentauros* (piercer, spearman) does not suggest the form now familiarly associated with centaurs. Homer knew the Battle of the Centaurs and Lapiths (*Od.* 21.295-8), and that Cheiron was a centaur (*Il.* 11.832), but he does not suggest that the Centaurs had an other-than-human form. However, by the sixth century, vase paintings show Herakles (named) fighting centaur-like beings who include Asbolos – a participant in the Battle of the Centaurs and Lapiths (*Hes. Sc.* 184-8) – and Cheiron with a centaur form that has been modified to include human front legs.<sup>9</sup> In Pindar (*P.* 2.36-48), Ixion's intercourse with a Cloud (*nephele*) produces Kentauros, and the latter's subsequent mating with mares results in offspring resembling their father above and mother below (τὰ ματρόθεν μὲν κάτω, τὰ δ' ὑπερθε πατ'ρός, 47-8). The text suggests not only Kentauros' human appearance but also the poet's acquaintance with the now-familiar centaur form.<sup>10</sup>

Of all the tales associated with Theseus, that involving the Minotaur is the earliest, the only one commonly represented in Archaic art. Homer refers to Theseus' Kretan adventure at *Od.* 11.322-3. The Minotaur seems to have been represented before the mid-seventh century – in parallel with the centaur type – as a bull with a human forepart.<sup>11</sup> However, in this case a completely different image was to become dominant: the bull-headed man of some near-contemporary and later art follows a pattern common to Eastern and Egyptian – and early Kretan – art. Speculatively, Boardman proposes that the story of the Minotaur was itself first suggested by Minoan representations of bull-headed human figures at Knossos.<sup>12</sup>

Egyptian and Near Eastern images of human-headed lions (wingless and winged respectively) may have served as prototypes for hybrid forms manifest in Greek art. The winged lion appears as a generic monster in Greek art of the eighth century BCE. At much the same time, Hesiod's Sphinx is undescribed; his indication that it brought ruin to the Kadmeioi, the inhabitants of Thebes (Φῆκ' ὀλοῖν ... Καδμείοισιν ὄλεθρον, *Th.* 326) implies that he was aware of its role in Theban myth and so probably more particularly of its riddling challenge to Oidipous. By the mid-sixth century, the Sphinx (as *theichs* and *sphichs*) had been identified on vases as a

<sup>9</sup> Boardman 2002, 149, figs 122, 123. Boardman (147-8 and fig. 121) suggests the pre-existence of the centaur type as 'a generic symbol of rusticity'; a ninth century clay figure of what we would call a centaur from Euboia cannot necessarily be associated with any myth.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Gantz 1993, 146.

<sup>11</sup> *LIMC* 6.2, 321, no. 33 with commentary at *LIMC* 6.1. Cf. Boardman 2002, 148.

<sup>12</sup> Boardman 2002, 148. For a fifteenth century BCE image of a bull-man found in Krete, Boardman 2002, 150 and fig. 124; for later Greek images of the Minotaur as a bull-headed man, *LIMC* 6.2 s.v. Minotauros.

human-headed lion; vases illustrating the story of Oidipous (seen as a man confronting a sphinx; the reference is clear although the figures are not named) date from the fifth.<sup>13</sup>

The winged lion can be associated with other types. The Chimaira is described by both Homer (*Il.* 6.181) and Hesiod (*Th.* 319-22) as a fire-breathing creature with lion, goat and snake heads. A *chimaira* is simply a she-goat. Boardman has evoked the pungent volcanic caves of Lykia – with which the story of Bellerophon and the Chimaira (*Il.* 6.171-83) is associated – to suggest that the hero's opponent was originally a fire-breathing goat. Lion and snake heads would have been literary embellishments. Eastern figurative art embellished the extremities of mythical creatures with other animals' heads; and it is in this tradition that, in an attempt to portray the beast, an Athenian vase painter has portrayed the Chimaira as a winged lion whose tail becomes a snake, and wing, a goat's head.<sup>14</sup> Another creature whose visual representation can be linked with the winged lion is the griffin, *gryps*, whose name derives from *grypos*, 'hooked'. This gold-guarding beast was known from the poem of Aristeas, who travelled among the Skythians and returned with an account of the distant, one-eyed Arimaspoi (*Hdt.* 3.116, 4.14-16, 27). The earliest literary description of its appearance is provided in the *Prometheus vincetus* attributed to Aischylos: ὄξυστόμους γὰρ Ζηνὸς ἀκραγεῖς κύνας | γρῦπας φύλαξαι, τὸν τε μουνῶπα στρατὸν | Ἄριμασπὸν ἵπποβάμον' ... (803-5), 'beware the silent dogs of Zeus – the sharp-beaked griffins – and the one-eyed army, Arimaspean horsemen ...'.<sup>15</sup> Boardman notes that the creature can be identified in Greek art post-dating the poem as a winged lion with an eagle's head.<sup>16</sup>

Many extraordinary or part-animal forms – ascribed by the *Theogony* both to mortals and immortals – suggest the powers of the monsters possessing them. Geryon has three heads (τρικέφαλον Γηρυονῆα, 287). The multiplied body parts suggest his exceptional strength; sixth-century art works take up the implication that Herakles had to slay three separate beings in succession.<sup>17</sup> Echidna is half young woman (νύμφη) and half monstrous snake (πέλωρον ὄφιν,

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<sup>13</sup> *Theichs*: LIMC 8.2, 808, no. 222; *sphichs*: LIMC 8.2, 799, no. 82; Oidipous: LIMC 7 s.v. Oidipous. Cf. Boardman 2002, 134-5.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Boardman 2002, 138-9. The creature is not named, but can be identified by the associated image of Bellerophon on Pegasos.

<sup>15</sup> Herodotos explicitly rejects the Arimaspean/griffin story because he cannot believe in one-eyed human beings (3.116); he does not describe the griffins.

<sup>16</sup> Boardman 2002, 128-32. Ktesias' description of the griffin (*ap. Ael. NA* 4.27) suggests that he had seen an artistic representation of the creature; cf. Nichols 2011, 145. In an interesting though necessarily speculative suggestion deriving from studies in the field of palaeontology, Mayor and Heaney (1993) and Mayor (2000, 16-30) propose that Aristeas' poem was based on authentic observation: the beaked land animal of the poem was inspired by the discovery of the remains of prehistoric creatures in the area of the Tien Shan and Altai ranges.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Gantz 1993, 402-3.

298-99). Snakes were closely associated with the underworld as well as autochthony, so Echidna's form hints at her otherworldly power. As the last and most terrible of Gaia's offspring, Typhon has a hundred snake-like heads (ἑκατὸν κεφαλαὶ ὄφις , 825).

Sometimes a creature's form is necessary to a story, indicating the relatedness of the two. In the *Theogony*, the Kyklopes:

ἦτοι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα θεοῖς ἐναλίγκιοι ἦσαν, | μῶνος δ' ὀφθαλμὸς μέσσω ἐνέκειτο μετώπῳ· |  
Κύκλωπες δ' ὄνομ' ἦσαν ἐπώνυμον, οὔνεκ' ἄρα σφῶν | κυκλοτερὴς ὀφθαλμὸς ἔεις  
ἐνέκειτο μετώπῳ (142-5)

in truth were like the gods in everything except that a single eye lay in the middle of their forehead; and they were given the name Kyklopes, because their one circular eye lay in their forehead.

In fact, the word *kyklops* means 'round eye' and not, as Hesiod suggests, 'single eye'; nevertheless the Kyklops' single eye is integral to the story of Odysseus and Polyphemos, and so part of a very early conception of the monster.<sup>18</sup>

In the light of the discussion above, it seems likely that non-anthropomorphic forms were originally attributed to protagonists' opponents or associates either to suggest their character and powers or to facilitate a narrative; imagery was further developed in a complex cross-fertilization between the visual and literary arts.

Non-anthropomorphic forms came also to be associated with genealogical distance from the Olympians and from human beings: semi-animal forms could be associated alternatively with the mating of anthropomorphic beings with animals or (more often) descent from the most ancient gods.<sup>19</sup> Hesiod (Frg. 145 Merkelbach/West) seems to have known the tale of the Minotaur's origin in the mating of Pasiphae and a bull;<sup>20</sup> above, we noted the centaurs' descent from the anthropomorphic Kentauros and mares (Pi. P. 2.36-48). The extraordinarily-formed Kyklopes (Hes. *Th.* 139), and Kottos, Gyges and Briareus (149-50), are offspring of Gaia and

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<sup>18</sup> The passage quoted suggests that Hesiod saw 'the gods' (and particularly the Titans and Titanides, whom he had just listed) as anthropomorphic. If the concept of a one-eyed creature pre-dated the Odysseus story, it may speculatively have been inspired by the discovery of the fossil remains of elephants in Mediterranean caves. Othenio Abel (*Die Tiere der Vorwelt*, 1914) first suggested that the skulls' large nasal cavities could easily have been mistaken for eye sockets. Cf. Mayor 2000, 35.

<sup>19</sup> Somewhat anomalously, part-animal form was also associated with descent from Hermes – a son of Zeus whose mother was Maia, daughter of Atlas (938). Pan is a son of Hermes (*Hymnus Homericus in Pana* 1), and Hesiod's Satyroi may also have been Hermes' sons; for the deduction based on Hes. Frg. 10a, 13, 17-19 Merkelbach/West and Nonn. *D.* 14.105-17, Gantz 1993, 135.

<sup>20</sup> The first full account is that of Diodoros (4.77.1-4); see also Apollod. 3.15.8; cf. Gantz 1993, 260-1.

Ouranos, but many of those whose part-animal or other unusual forms were mentioned above are descended from Gaia and Pontos through their children Phorkys and Keto: Pegasos 'the horse' (281), three-headed Geryon (981-2), Echidna (297), the Chimaira (319) and (though Hesiod does not describe her) the Sphinx (326). Iris and the explicitly winged Harpies (266-9) are offspring of Gaia and Pontos' son Thaumas. Eros is a primal divinity alongside Chaos and Gaia (120) and an attendant at Aphrodite's birth (201-2); his representation as Aphrodite and Hermes' or Ares' son is later.<sup>21</sup>

We should not expect consistency. The centaur Cheiron is a son of Kronos (*Th.* 1001-2, *Pi. P.* 3.1-4, 4.115). Gantz speculates that he was the single original of his form, which later came to be associated with the Lapiths' opponents; Pindar's account can be seen as an attempt to explain the existence of a race of centaurs.<sup>22</sup> Hesiod's *Kyklopes*, Ouranos and Gaia's sons, are to be distinguished from the race of *Kyklopes* known to Homer. The latter's Polyphemos, although certainly a *Kyklops*, is also Poseidon's son (*Od.* 1.68-73).

## 2.2 Divine, human, and liminal beings in Second Sophistic thought

By the period of the Second Sophistic, the ancient world view implicit in Homer and Hesiod coexisted with later-developed ones in which the dichotomy between mortal and immortal beings had been broken down. The following discussion examines the presentation of *daimones* and 'divine men' as intermediary in nature between gods and humans.

### 2.2.1 Daimones

Powerful spirits called *daimones* are a newly-important presence in Second Sophistic accounts of encounters with the numinous Other. Plutarch's Timarchos of Chaironeia watches *daimones* in the form of stars (*Mor.* 591d-f); a hermit consults them in the region of the Erythre Thalatta (*Mor.* 421a); Kronos sleeps on a remote island, attended by *daimones* (*Mor.* 420a); Apollonios of Tyana encounters and overcomes a malignant *daimon* at Ephesos (*VA* 4.10.2).

To Plutarch, *daimones* are literally 'liminal', neither gods nor human beings, and to be distinguished from the powerful spirits of the heroic dead. At *Mor.* 415a, he refers to τὸ τῶν δαιμόνων γένος ἐν μέσῳ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων. At *Mor.* 390e, there are five forms of living

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<sup>21</sup> For the different genealogies attributed to Eros, Grimal 1996 s.v. Eros, Gantz 1993, 3.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Gantz 1993, 145-6.

beings, *theoi*, *daimones*, *heroes*, human beings and animals. However, our focal Second Sophistic authors are not consistent. At Paus. 6.6.8, a *daimon* is the spirit of a dead man and explicitly a *heros*; at Luc. *Luct.* 24, it is simply a spirit of the dead.

Here, we overview briefly the history of the term, and of the concept of a hierarchy of living beings. Homer can call the gods themselves *daimones*. At *Il.* 1.221-2, Athena returns to Olympus and the house of Zeus μετὰ δαίμονας ἄλλους; at *Il.* 3.420, Aphrodite is the δαίμων. A *daimon* can also be a powerful and malicious spirit: hence συγερός ... δαίμων (*Od.* 5.396); κακός ... δαίμων (*Od.* 10.64); δαίμονος αἴσα κακή (*Od.* 11.61). Hesiod introduced the idea of *daimones* as guardian spirits and provided them with a genealogy that related them to mortals, though not to contemporary human beings: αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ τοῦτο γένος κατὰ γαῖα κάλυψε, | τοὶ μὲν δαίμονες ἀγνοῖ ἐπιχθόνιοι τελέθουσιν | ἐσθλοί, ἀλεξίκακοι, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων (*Op.* 121-3), 'Moreover then earth covered this race, | pure *daimones* upon the earth they arise, | kindly, warding off evil, guardians of mortal human beings'. Here, 'this race' is the Golden Race, the human beings who lived during the reign of Kronos (see App. 2.1.1). In Greek drama, *daimones* are usually harmful spirits (e.g. A. *Ag.* 1568-9, S. *OT.* 1194).

Gods and *daimones* cannot be distinguished in Empedokles' *Katharmoi*, in which the narrator is self-described as both *theos* and *daimon*. Beginning his account, he claims: ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος οὐκέτι θνητός πωλεῦμαι ..., 'I wander among you an immortal god, no longer a mortal ...' (Frg. 102(112) Wright = 1/112 Inwood, 4-5).<sup>23</sup> Moreover, the fate of any one of the long-lived *daimones*<sup>24</sup> who has sinned by shedding blood is exile from the company of the *makares* for three times ten thousand years. A banished *daimon* is reborn in successive mortal forms; air forces him into the sea; sea spits him up onto solid land which casts him into the rays of the blazing sun, and the sun, back into the air (Frg. 107(115), 1-12). The narrator is such a figure: τῶν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἶμι, φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης ... (13), 'Now I am one of them, exiled from the gods and a wanderer ...'.

We should not automatically suppose that the narrator is to be identified with Empedokles himself. The poem seems to recount in mythic form – as the fall and subsequent ascent of the *ego/daimon* – the dissociative force of Strife and the unifying power of Love; in the universe described in Empedokles' extant work, the latter brings into being the highest form of self-reflective intelligence as the culmination of a series of phases associated with the four

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<sup>23</sup> There are minor textual variations between Wright's and Inwood's texts; Wright's text is used in the following discussion.

<sup>24</sup> δαίμονες οἵτε μακραίωνος λελάχασι βίοιο, '*daimones* who have obtained the life of the long-lived' (Frg. 107(115), 5).

component 'roots', water, earth, fire and air. Bloodshed and its traditional punishment, exile, account metaphorically for a downfall which permits a rehearsal of the different forms of life as the 'banishment' runs its course. At Frg. 14(21), 12, *theoi dolichaiones*, 'long-lived gods', are the last-mentioned and highest in a series of forms of life – including trees, men and women, animals, birds and fish – generated by the roots. They can be identified with the long-lived *daimones* of Frg. 107(115), 5, and this leads us to an important consequence of Empedokles' theory. The dividing line between immortal gods and mortal human beings that was assumed in the epics – and that is apparently affirmed at the outset of the poem (Frg. 102(112), 4-5) – has been broken down: *gods/daimones* are simply long-lived.<sup>25</sup>

As a human being, Empedokles was not a *god/daimon*, but he may not have supposed apotheosis to be impossible. Wright believes that tales of Empedokles' suicidal leap into Etna (Herakleides *ap.* D.L. 8.67-8, Hippobotos *ap.* D.L. 8.69) were simply extrapolated from the line referring to the *daimon* cast from earth into the sun's blazing rays (Frg. 107(115), 10-11), and factually untrue. However, a connection between the sun's rays and volcanic fire is tenuous. Kingsley provides a more convincing explanation for the early-established tradition about Empedokles' death on Etna in the Sicilian cult practices which probably provide a context for his life and poem;<sup>26</sup> it is quite possible that Empedokles sought apotheosis in the way described.

Unlike Empedokles, Plato postulates a supreme Creator god, with *daimones* spiritual beings intermediate in nature between this god and human beings. Thus Eros is Δαίμων μέγας, ὃ Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον μεταξύ ἐστὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ (*Smp.* 202d-203a), 'a great *daimon*, Sokrates; for everything daimonic is between god and mortal'.

Plato locates *daimones* in the *kosmos* as a physical entity. The most relevant passage is *Ti.* 28b-42e. Here, the Maker and Father of all that exists (τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντός, 28b-c) is called *ho theos* (31b); his primary creation, the *kosmos*, is itself a living creature (30c) with a soul (34b). The Creator made the sun and moon and planets and then those gods (οὐράνιον θεῶν γένος) who are the fixed stars, and placed them in the heavens (38c, 39e-40a). The Earth itself is a god (πρώτην καὶ πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν, 40c). Plato acknowledges traditional assertions of the existence of 'other *daimones*' (40d) and, in so doing, makes the generic equivalence of 'gods' and *daimones* clear. After his completion of the broader *kosmos*, the Creator made souls and delegated the rest of the work – in particular, the equipping of the

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<sup>25</sup> Cf. Wright 1981, 60-1, 64. For the four roots (*rhizomata*, Frg. 7(6), 1) e.g. Frg. 7(6), 2-3, Frg. 8(17), 18, Frg. 60(71), 2. For the roles of Love (*philotes*) and Strife (*neikos*), Frg. 8(17).

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Wright 1981, 16-17, Kingsley 1995a, 289-91.

souls with mortal bodies and other necessary parts<sup>27</sup> – to the created gods (41b-42d). Each soul is associated with a (fixed) star. Those who live good lives return to their stars to live lives of happiness in accordance with their characters (βίον εὐδαίμονα καὶ συνήθη);<sup>28</sup> those whose lives fall short are reincarnated as women, and then as successively lower animals (41d-42c).

The association of the individual soul with a star/god/*daimon* is echoed in (though not wholly consistent with) the account at *R.* 614-20, in which, at the end of a human life, the soul is treated according to its deserts and then granted another chance in a new incarnation. Warned by its after-death experience, it makes its own new choice of life circumstances and of the *daimon* that will be its intimate and prompter and so shape the course of its new life; the guardian *daimon*, good or bad, can perhaps thus be regarded as a metaphor for human character. With its choices made, the soul is bound by Necessity (*anagke*).<sup>29</sup>

In Plutarch's version, somewhat differently again, every soul has *noos* as one of its components, though this can be sunken in the body and obscured by the passions. People think that it is part of themselves, οἱ δ' ὀρθῶς ὑποννοοῦντες, ὡς ἐκτὸς ὄντα δαίμονα προσαγορεύουσι, 'but those conjecturing rightly call it a *daimon*, as something external' (*Mor.* 591d-e). This *daimon*, when not submerged, appears in the heavens as a star (*Mor.* 591f).

A complex daimonology was developed by Middle Platonist philosophers, many of whose works are lost; much of the detail is preserved in the philosophical works attributed to Apuleius.<sup>30</sup> In his *De deo Socratis*, Apuleius takes a tripartite division between astral and non-astral gods and human beings that he attributes (incorrectly) to Plato (115) and replaces it with a more complex hierarchy in which the relationship between human beings and *daemones* is developed.<sup>31</sup> Plato distinguished between astral gods (*dei caelites*, 116), traditional gods (*incorporalis, animalis*, 123) and the supreme god (*omnium rerum dominator atque auctor*, 124; cf. *Ti.* 28b-c, 38c, 40d). Apuleius eliminates the last from his discussion: neither he nor Plato

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<sup>27</sup> τό τ' ἐπίλοιπον, ὅσον ἔτι ἦν ψυχῆς ἀνθρωπίνης δέον προσγενέσθαι (42d), 'the rest, whatever still had to be added to the human soul'. These mortal components of the soul are discussed further at *Ti.* 69d, and named as its appetitive (*epithymetikos*) and spirited or emotional (*thymos*) parts at *R.* 439d-e.

<sup>28</sup> Association of immortal souls with separate stars suggests that Plato sees them as individuals, even before they acquire their mortal soul-components and bodies.

<sup>29</sup> For a similar account, *Grg.* 523a-527a. At *Phd.* 107d-e, the soul's guardian *daimon* leads it to judgement at the end of a life; after this, other guides are appointed. The guardian *daimon* can also be related to (though not necessarily identified with) Sokrates' *daimonion* (*Pl. Ap.* 31c-d, 40a).

<sup>30</sup> The *De deo Socratis* is almost indubitably Apuleian, the *De mundo* and *De Platone*, less assuredly so. Cf. Harrison 2004<sup>2</sup>, 136, 174-80.

<sup>31</sup> Apuleius' account is similar to that in the *Dialexis* (8 and 9) of his contemporary Maximus of Tyre; the two perhaps shared a common Greek source. The tripartite division attributed to Plato occurs first in Pythagorean writers of the first century BCE. Cf. Harrison 2004<sup>2</sup>, 139, 145.

could supply *ulla uerba pro amplitudine rei* (125). He introduces *daemones* as intermediate in nature between 'gods' and human beings. Physically, they are located in the *aer*, between Earth and *aether*, the dwelling-place of the astral divinities that is bounded by the Moon (132-40). *Daemones* can make themselves visible or invisible at will, a capacity that associates them with the Olympian gods (144-5). Their possession of emotions (147) associates them with the deities of cult (148-50); their nature equips them for their role as intermediaries between the (higher, astral) gods – who are never polluted by direct human contact (132) – and human beings (128, 133).

Human beings are no more clearly separable from *daemones* than are *daemones* from the traditional gods. The souls (*animi*) of human beings are *daemones* (150); those of the living are the *genii* of Roman tradition (151), and those of the dead, the *lemures*, *lares* and *larvae* (152-3). However, not all *daemones* are, or have ever been, souls. Somnus and Amor are 'external' to human beings (155), and Sokrates' guardian spirit – the '*deus*' of Apuleius' title – was of such a kind (157). 'External' *daemones* are the guardians who bring the soul to trial (Pl. *Phd.* 107d-e; 155), and Sokrates' guardian is to be distinguished from his wise soul (162-3). In a minor inconsistency, Apuleius associates the guardian with a *lar* (157).

In Plato, the Creator (*Ti.* 28c), gods/*daimones* (*Ti.* 40-1) and Fate/Necessity (*R.* 620d-e) are separated. Other world views made Fate supreme. Fatalist astrology claimed that the stars control the political fates of kingdoms and of kings and that an individual's fate can be known from the configuration of the heavens at the time of his or her birth. In *De astrologia* (27-8), Lucian records the sceptics' views: it is absurd to suppose that the stars move in the sky for humans as fatalist astrology claims, and, if they do, there is no point in knowing what cannot be altered. The Stoics pictured a one-tier cosmos in which Fate, *heimarmene*, was an orderly succession of causes (*ordinem seriemque causarum*, Cic. *Div.* 1.55[125]) and an absolute power. They equated Fate with the active principle in the universe, God and Zeus, and accepted its inescapable ordinance as good. They believed as well that the actions of individuals are as much laid down as other events; the sage is free, since freedom consists in never having one's desires thwarted, and the sage accepts whatever happens as providentially ordained for the best. Astrological and Stoic world views were not incompatible: Stoics claimed that the heavenly bodies are not powers in their own right, working balefully on individual human beings, but an easily-observed part of the causal nexus in which human beings are also involved. They do not exist to affect human beings, nor are they the only indication of human outcomes, only the most visible one.

Against this understanding, the Middle Platonic cosmos allowed for a sublunar realm in which – alongside Fate and the overruling will of the supreme god – the activities of *daimones*, human will, and chance could play their parts. In his *De Platone*, Apuleius identifies Fate with the broadly-ordained providence of the supreme god. He entrusts its administration to the astral gods and their subordinates (205-6); moreover, *nec sane omnia referenda esse ad uim fati ... sed esse aliquid in nobis et in fortuna esse non nihil*, 'truly not all things are to be attributed to the power of Fate ... but some to us, and not none to chance' (206).<sup>32</sup>

### 2.2.2 *The theios aner*

In the body of this thesis, we find a variety of ways in which, in the period of the Second Sophistic, a living human being could be classed as 'divine'. He or she might be physically the child of a god or destined to become a hero or achieve apotheosis. The possession of *arete* could win or even constitute divinity. Legal divinity could be awarded by the state. In the VA, we see increased purity/elevation of the soul dissolving bodily constraints and giving rise to supernatural powers, at least of vision and movement. The suggestion is perhaps that the completely pure soul cannot be incarnated; in Platonic terminology, it might be said to become indistinguishable from, or to be united with, its attendant *daimon*/star (Chs 1.2.4, 3.2, 3.4.2, 3.5.3b).

The controversial modern concept of human miracle-workers as a recognized category of 'divine man' is addressed at Ch. 1.2.4. It is obvious from the discussion there, and from the list of ways in which a human being could be 'divine' above, that more than simply the appellation 'divine' is required to identify an individual as of this kind. The existence as a genre of aretalogies extolling human beings would perhaps be the only unequivocal evidence for widespread belief in the type.

Surviving quasi-liturgical enumerations of the qualities, powers and miracles (*aretai*) of Isis (cf. for example D.S. 1.27) can be called 'aretalogies'; there were probably similar recitations of stories of the cures and other miracles of Asklepios and Sarapis.<sup>33</sup> In an inscription from Delos, a certain Ptolemaios describes himself as '*oneirokrites* and *aretalogos*' (*Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 1133); he was most

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<sup>32</sup> Cf. on astrology Barton 1994, 34-6, 53-7; on the Stoics, Sharples 1996, 43-9, 74-7; on the Middle Platonists, Dillon 1977, 324-5.

<sup>33</sup> Records were certainly available. For those of the cures of Asklepios, Ch. 6.1; re those of Sarapis, in his *Eis Sarapin*, Aristeides refers to observers of the god ὧν ἱεραὶ θῆκαι βίβλων ἱερῶν ἀπείρους ἀριθμοὺς ἔχουσι (*Or.* 45.29), 'whose holy chests contain countless numbers of sacred books'.

probably not a sacred official but one of the professionals who habitually clustered around holy shrines (Chs 1.2.1, 2.3.1).<sup>34</sup> His aretalogies would have been accounts of the miracles of a god, but the same cannot necessarily be said about others'. Juvenal (5.15.16) and – in the context of Augustus' dinner parties – Suetonius (*Aug.* 74) convey a decidedly negative impression of *aretologi* as liars and public entertainers; their subjects were possibly but not certainly the lives and miracles of extraordinary human beings.

From the early twentieth century, scholars assumed the existence of the aretalogy to a human being as a genre. Reitzenstein interpreted the VA as a *Propheten-Aretalogie*; Bompaire noted Lucian's *Alexander* and *De morte Peregrini* as parodies of the form. Hadas and Smith suggested traditions about the lives of Pythagoras and Sokrates as models for the genre and (in the absence of early examples) used Suetonius' and Juvenal's references to *aretologi* as evidence of its existence. Smith later backtracked, noting the absence before the Antonine period of an account of the combined life and miracles of any holy figure other than in a Judaeo-Christian context. There can be no doubt that stories about the miracles of Pythagoras and Apollonios were in circulation in the first century CE. Assessing the available evidence, Francis and Flinterman have independently concluded that human miracle workers and aretalogical stories about them were probably well-known in the period. The stories were not reflected in the Greek literary tradition because – until miracles became intellectually respectable with the rise of neo-Pythagoreanism – sophisticated people rejected them; the anti-aretalogies of Lucian thus pre-date literary examples of the form.<sup>35</sup> Their conclusion seems most likely on the basis of the evidence that we have.

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<sup>34</sup> Cf. Winkler 1985, 236-7.

<sup>35</sup> Reitzenstein 1906/1963, 39; Bompaire 1958, 617 and n. 4; Hadas and Smith 1965, 60; Smith 1971, 177-8; Francis 1995, 125; Flinterman 1996, 89-90.

### APPENDIX 3: THE HISTORICAL OR PRE-PHILOSTRATAN APOLLONIOS OF TYANA

See Ch. 3.

Very little is known about the historical Apollonios. Bowie concluded that the only incontrovertible fact about him is that he was a prophet and miracle-worker,<sup>1</sup> as indeed he is presented in the only reliably pre-Philostratan literary references to him. The earliest is Lucian's in the mid-second century and so at most two generations after Apollonios' death: at *Alex.* 5, Alexander's teacher is described as from Tyana and a follower of Apollonios, one knowing τὴν πᾶσαν αὐτοῦ τραγωδίαν, 'his whole performance'. Cassius Dio calls Apollonios a *magos* and *goes* (78.18.4), and he records that Apollonios was transported in a vision from Ephesos (or perhaps somewhere else) to Rome to watch and encourage the assassination of Domitian in 96 (67.18.1). His *Historiae Romanae* were written between 200 and 222 and are probably independent of Philostratos, whose *VA* was published after 217 (Ch. 3.1).<sup>2</sup>

Apollonios was probably born about 40 CE, rather than about 4 BCE as Philostratos' text would suggest. At *VA* 1.12.2, Apollonios is a youth when the Kappadokian king Archelaos is sentenced to death by Tiberius in 17. However, Cassius Dio's claim that Apollonios' *akme*<sup>3</sup> fell in Domitian's time (78.18.4) puts his birth around 40-50 CE, and other evidence, although not conclusive, supports this later date. The longest of Apollonios' letters (*Ep.* 58), sometimes considered genuine, is addressed to a certain Valerius who is proconsul of Asia; this Valerius is now considered most probably to be Valerius Asiaticus Saturninus, proconsul 108-109.<sup>4</sup> Philostratos' reference to Archelaos is made in the context of a story that he attributes to Maximus of Aigai (*VA* 1.3.2); it may well have been a deduction of his own, made on the basis of Maximus' text.<sup>5</sup> In making Apollonios a contemporary of Euphrates (*ob.* 119-121) and Dion of Prousa (c. 40 - after 112) at *VA* 5.27.1, Philostratos himself suggests that the sage was born in the middle of the first century.

Apollonios' influence is attested only in a limited number of cities in the eastern Empire. (A Sanskrit source purported to prove Apollonios' visit to India has been proven a forgery.<sup>6</sup>) The early reference noted above (*Alex.* 5) suggests that he was known as a teacher in his home city.

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<sup>1</sup> Bowie 1978, 1686.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Dzielska 1986, 30-2, 38. Philostratos has a similar version of the story of the assassination at *VA* 8.26.1-2.

<sup>3</sup> Usually taken as about forty (cf. Jones 1986, 14). Cassius Dio uses the verb ἀνθέω.

<sup>4</sup> For discussion, Eck 1978, 292-5, Penella 1979, 119-20, Dzielska 1986, 32-6, Jones 2006, 51, n. 66.

<sup>5</sup> The suggestion is made in the context of a discussion of Apollonios' birthdate at Dzielska 1986, 32-6.

<sup>6</sup> Swain 1995, 251-4.

Philostratos mentions a cult of Apollonios in Tyana (VA 8.29, 8.31.3), and Cassius Dio records Caracalla's building of a *heroion* to him (78.18.4) there. Late antique sources suggest a continuing cult of Apollonios in the city of his birth.<sup>7</sup> Maximus of Aigai (an historical figure<sup>8</sup>) is Philostratos' respectable source for tales of Apollonios' fame in Aigai (VA 1.12.2). Further evidence of the connection is provided by an inscription, now in Adana Museum, which refers to Apollonios and describes him as a healer, one sent by heaven to expel the sufferings of mortals; most commentators believe that it is from Aigai.<sup>9</sup> Antioch was probably a third centre of Apollonios' cult. Philostratos was part of Julia Domna's circle there before her death in 217 (Ch. 3.1). The local cult is mentioned by late antique historians who refer also to talismans, a cult aspect not mentioned by Philostratos; Apollonios' connection with Antioch is also noted in the Arabic *Great book of talismans*.<sup>10</sup> An association with Ephesos can be deduced from Cassius Dio's account of Apollonios' vision, mentioned above. Porphyry (*Abst.* 3.3) provides an account – similar to Philostratos' (VA 4.3.1-2) – of Apollonios' understanding of the language of birds; he could have taken it from the VA, but Bowie suggests, on the basis of variations in detail, that both authors took it from local tradition in Ephesos.<sup>11</sup> The *Great book of talismans* mentions a cult statue of Apollonios in the city.<sup>12</sup> Other than in these four cities, there is no substantive evidence of a pre-Philostratan Apollonios connection or cult. Of course, this does not mean that there *was* no such connection or cult.

Of particular interest is whether Apollonios was simply a prophet and miracle-worker or also a philosopher. The two sources besides Damis whom Philostratos names (VA 1.3.2) seem not only to be genuine but also to link Apollonios with the Greek intellectual world. As noted above, Maximus of Aigai is generally accepted as an historical figure. According to Philostratos (VA 1.12.2), he presented Apollonios as a convert to Pythagoreanism as well as associating him

<sup>7</sup> Aurelian decides to erect an effigy, statues and a temple to Apollonios in Tyana (SHA *Aurel.* 24.2-6); the Bordeaux Pilgrim finds a city that still remembers Apollonios the *magus* in 333 (*It. Burd.* 578.1).

<sup>8</sup> Bowersock 1969, 19 and n. 7.

<sup>9</sup> For the inscription, translation and discussion, Horsley 1983, 49-50.

[οὔτο]ς Ἀπ[ό]λλωνος μὲν ἐπώνυμος, ἐκ Τυά[νων δ]ὲ  
 λάμψας ἀνθρώπων ἔσβεσεν ἀμπλακίας.  
 |[γαῖα τρο]φὸς Τυάνων; τὸ δ' ἐτήτυμον οὐρανὸς αὐτὸν  
 |[γείναθ' ὄ]πως θνητῶν ἐξελάσει πόνους.

'This man called after Apollo and who came from Tyana gained fame by quelling the faults of men.  
 The land of Tyana nursed him, but it was really heaven who bore him so that he might expel the sufferings of mortals.'

For somewhat different reconstructions of the original, Bowie 1978, 1688, Jones 1980, 190-4. It is impossible to be sure whether the inscription pre- or post-dates the VA (Jones 1980, 190-1).

<sup>10</sup> For late antique and Arabic references to Apollonios (Balinas) in Antioch, Downey 1961, 208 and n. 35, Kraus 1986<sup>2</sup>, 270, 290-5.

<sup>11</sup> Bowie 1978, 1687.

<sup>12</sup> Kraus 1986<sup>2</sup>, 295.

with the Asklepieion at Aigai – a medical connection supported by the text of the inscription noted above. The use of Moiragenes as a source links Apollonios even more closely with the Greek intellectual world. A comment by Origen (*Cels.* 6.41) records that Moiragenes wrote a work entitled Τὰ Ἀπολλωνίου τοῦ Τυανέως μάγου καὶ φιλοσόφου ἀπομνημονεύματα, presenting Apollonios not only as a *magos* but also explicitly as a philosopher in competition with Euphrates and an unnamed Epikoureian philosopher.<sup>13</sup> Euphrates was a friend of Pliny the Younger (*Plin. Ep.* 1.10) and (as a pupil of Musonius) a Stoic (Fronto, *Epistulae* p. 133, 8-9 van den Hout). Weighing up the evidence, Bowie believes that Apollonios was a Pythagorean competing with an Epikoureian and a Stoic.<sup>14</sup>

Certainly, Pythagoreanism is a (and probably the only) plausible background for one presented as both a miracle-worker and a philosopher. Flinterman argues that a second-century proliferation of sources relating to miracle-workers was probably a result of the rise of neo-Pythagoreanism. Apollonios, if a Pythagorean, is the first attested Pythagorean miracle-worker.<sup>15</sup>

Texts attributed to Apollonios provide equivocal evidence of his Pythagoreanism. In their biographies of Pythagoras, Iamblichos (*VP* 254-64) and Porphyry (*VP* 2) both specify 'Apollonios' as a source. Since they are not specific, this Apollonios could be an otherwise unknown Apollonios, or Apollonios of Tyana. He is identified as Apollonios of Tyana in the *Suda* (α 3420 Adler); however, this could simply be an assumption made by a writer who knew the *VA*. Even if Porphyry and Iamblichos believed their source to be Apollonios of Tyana, they could have been misled by a work either inspired by the *VA* or mistakenly attributed to Apollonios on the basis of Philostratos' reference (*VA* 8.19.2) to a book of Pythagorean doctrines carried away from Trophonios' cave.<sup>16</sup> It is nevertheless possible that the historical Apollonios was indeed the author of a biography of Pythagoras. Bowie sees Philostratos' failure to mention Apollonios' biography of Pythagoras as evidence against the authenticity of the work later attributed to him.<sup>17</sup> Dzielska gives weight to Apollonios of Tyana's authorship on the ground that Porphyry (who was familiar with his works) cites it.<sup>18</sup> Certainty is impossible. However, Bowie's argument is the more persuasive of the two. Certainly, Porphyry preserves fragments of the *Περὶ θυσῶν* (*Abst.* 2.34) and of a letter he attributes to Apollonios (*ap. Stob. Anth.* 1.3.56). The *Περὶ θυσῶν* was quite possibly a genuine work of the historical Apollonios; it and its implications for

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<sup>13</sup> Cf. Bowie 1978, 1673, Raynor 1984, 222-4.

<sup>14</sup> Bowie 1978, 1691-2.

<sup>15</sup> Flinterman 1996, 90; see also App. 2.2.2.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Gorman 1985, 130-1. Philostratos does not attribute the work to Apollonios.

<sup>17</sup> Bowie 1978, 1672, n. 77.

<sup>18</sup> Dzielska 1986, 133.

Apollonios' Pythagoreanism are discussed in more detail at Ch. 3.3.2. The letter fragment, discussed at Ch. 3.5.3b, may well not be genuine; although Porphyry was undoubtedly interested in Apollonios, he may not have been able to distinguish the genuine from the spurious in the Apollonios tradition.

On the basis of the discussion above, it is assumed in this thesis that Philostratos started his account with the 'facts' that Apollonios was a Pythagorean and had been accused of practising magic. He had access also (as he claims at VA 1.2.3-1.3.2) to extant traditions, writings purportedly by Apollonios, and two biographies, one of which he rejected. The issue of the *hypomnemata* of Damis of Old Ninos is discussed at Ch. 3.1.

## APPENDIX 4: THE HISTORICAL ALEXANDER OF ABONOUTEICHOS

See Ch. 4

Composition of the *Alexander* post-dates the death of Marcus Aurelius (180 CE), referred to at *Alex.* 48 as the θεὸς Μάρκος, and certain of Lucian's characters can be identified as historical persons active in the immediately preceding decades. Alexander's devotee Rutilianus is P. Mummius Sisenna Rutilianus, who capped off a distinguished career by becoming proconsul of Asia about 170; Severianus is M. Sedatius Severianus, the Roman governor of Kappadokia defeated in Armenia in 161; also mentioned are Tiberius Julius Eupator, king of the Kimmerian Bosphoros c. 154-171, the Epikoureian Lepidus, and the legate L. Hedijs Rufus Lollianus Avitus.<sup>1</sup> Of particular interest is the philosopher Timokrates of Herakleia. Timokrates is noted by Lucian as a leader of the opposition to Alexander (*Alex.* 57); Philostratos (*VS* 1.536) knows him as an admirer of Euphrates of Tyre, Apollonios' implacable opponent in the *VA* (1.13.3, 2.26.2, 5.27-39, 6.7-9, 8.3, 8.7.7, 11, 34, 46). Lucian expresses admiration for Timokrates in his *Demonax* (3), and Fronto couples him with Euphrates as a pupil of Musonius in his *Epistulae* (p. 133, 8-9 van den Hout). The references are consistent with one another and together provide a picture of the philosophical partisanship of the period.

Disparate pieces of evidence for the existence of Alexander and his cult make sense in the light of Lucian's account. A cult statue which has been identified as that of Glykon has been found at Constanza (Tomis),<sup>2</sup> and a fragmentary inscription spelling out the protective oracle prescribed at *Alex.* 36 at Antioch.<sup>3</sup> In Lucian's account, Alexander persuades the emperor to change the name of Abonouteichos to Ionopolis, and to show Alexander and Glykon on its coins

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<sup>1</sup> Lepidus is known from inscriptions (*CIG* 4149, 4150) and Lollianus, to Apuleius (*Apol.* 24.95). Cf. Clay 1992, 3442. For Rutilianus, *CIL* 14.3601, 4244. Cassius Dio (71.2.1) records Severianus' disastrous defeat. Tiberius Julius Eupator is known principally from his coins: *SNG* (accessed 13.4.13), items SNGuk 0402 1610; 1201 1036; 1201 1037; 1201 1038. Cf. also *PIR*<sup>2</sup> H 40 (Lollianus), I 300 (Eupator), M 711 (Rutilianus), S 306 (Severianus).

<sup>2</sup> Robert 1980, 397-8. Smaller bronze statues also probably representing Glykon are recorded by Robert 1981, 513-16. For reviews of Glykon imagery and images that may represent Glykon, *LIMC* 4.1, 279-83, 4.2, 161-2; Petsalis-Diomidis 2010, 14-19. Images from the appropriate area are generally taken to be of Glykon when they have a hybrid serpent/human head, in accordance with Lucian's reference to a κεφαλὴ δράκοντος ὀθονίνῃ ἀνθρωπόμορφόν τι ἐπιφαίνουσα (*Alex.* 12) and a *drakon anthropomorphos* (*Alex.* 16). There seems to have been no single, canonical image of Glykon.

<sup>3</sup> The inscription was first described by Perdrizet 1903, 62-6. The context of the oracle was probably the great plague brought home from the east by the victorious armies of Lucius Verus in 165-166 CE. Antioch was Verus' headquarters and would have been one of the first cities affected. Cf. Jones 1986, 142, Clay 1992, 3439. Petsalis-Diomidis (2010, 43) rightly cautions against taking the inscription as proof of the accuracy of Lucian's text: 'it does no more than demonstrate that ... Lucian included a real contemporary oracular pronouncement, which may have originated in Abonouteichos or in another oracle in Asia Minor'.

(*Alex.* 58). The coinage of the city shows that the name Ionopolis was in fact adopted; coins honouring a serpent with a mane and its head raised and sometimes explicitly identified as Glykon were issued until the mid-third century, though numismatic reference to Alexander himself is unattested. Glykon's image appeared also on the coins of Tieion, the home of Alexander's devotee Sakerdos (*Alex.* 43), and of Germanikopolis and Nikomedeia.<sup>4</sup>

All modern commentators rightly ground Alexander's cult in the Asklepieian tradition: Glykon is a 'new Asklepios' (*Alex.* 43), and medical treatments, although not stressed in Lucian's account, are part of Alexander's repertoire (*Alex.* 22). Coinage of Abonouteichos that may date from the period prior to the existence of the Glykon cult shows Asklepios and the goddess Hygieia with snakes; this makes it likely that Alexander grafted his cult on to an existing Asklepieian cult in the city.<sup>5</sup> The prophet's claimed descent from Perseus and Asklepios (*Alex.* 11, 58) can be explained by study at the Asklepieion at Aigai – Perseus was the founder of the city itself – and a link with that major institution would have accredited Alexander at an Asklepieion in Abonouteichos.<sup>6</sup> The god hatching in the form of a snake from an egg (*Alex.* 13-14) is not inconsistent with Asklepieian cult beliefs: Asklepios arrived at various of his temples in serpent form, and stone eggs associated with Asklepios' cult survive from Thrace.<sup>7</sup> That the only named aspirant to Alexander's position after his death is an *iatros* (*Alex.* 60) confirms the Asklepieian and medical nature of his shrine; that honours are paid to Glykon and Asklepios while Alexander is only the *prophetes* or *hypophetes* (*Alex.* 22, 24, 55) bears the stamp of reality.<sup>8</sup> Glykon's snake form is clearly related to standard Asklepieian imagery, though it is remarkable in its

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<sup>4</sup> Waddington, Babelon and Reinach 1925<sup>2</sup>, vol. 1, 168\*-70 and pl. 17, 545; pl. 94, 562; pl. 97, 623; pl. 107; cf. Robert 1980, 395-9, 410-11; Jones 1986, 138; Clay 1992, 3438-9. The image and name of Glykon first occur on the coins of Abonouteichos in the principate of Antoninus Pius (138-161), and the image is attested until that of Trebonius Gallus (251-253). Relevant images from Tieion and Nikomedeia date from the principates of Antoninus Pius and Caracalla respectively. Serpent imagery on coinage of Germanikopolis unlisted by Waddington, Babelon and Reinach is illustrated at Robert 1980, 397 fig. 6.

<sup>5</sup> For coins of Abonouteichos dating from the principate of Antoninus Pius and bearing the image of Asklepios with Hygieia, Waddington, Babelon and Reinach 1925<sup>2</sup>, vol. 1, 167\* and pl. 17. Contemporary Glykon imagery, and the existence of Glykon imagery alone on later coinage, suggest the replacement of an existing Asklepios cult with the Glykon cult. Cf. Nock 1933, 94, 288, Lane Fox 1986, 244-5.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Lane Fox 1986, 245-6. A tradition making Perseus the founder of Aigai was known to the rhetor Publius Anteiou Antiochos of Aigai (probably the Antiochos of Philostr. *VS* 2.568-70), who convinced the people of Argos of the *syngeneia* of the two cities; for details and the relevant inscription, Robert 1973, 185, 200, 202-3, Robert 1977, 119-29. Taking a different approach to the Perseus connection, Jones (1986, 134-5) suggests that Alexander claimed descent from Perseus, the mythical ancestor of the Achaemenids, as a descendent of the old aristocracy of his city.

<sup>7</sup> For Asklepios' arrival in serpent form at Athens: *IG* II<sup>2</sup>, 4960a = Edelstein 720; at Halieis, *IG* IV, 1<sup>2</sup>, 121-2 = Edelstein 423.33; at Sikyon, Paus. 2.10.3 = Edelstein 695; at Epidaurus Limera, Paus. 3.23.6-7 = Edelstein 757; at Rome, Liv. *Periochae* 11 = Edelstein 846, Val. Max. 1.8.2 = Edelstein 848, Ov. *Met.* 15.622-744 = Edelstein 850. For stone eggs, Lane Fox 1986, 245; for snake imagery in the cult of Asklepios more generally, Kerenyi 1960.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Lane Fox 1986, 249.

identification of the god with the snake. Petsalis-Diomidis suggests reasonably that numismatic imagery evidences the fact that individual centres stressed particular variants of standard Asklepieian imagery in order to assert their unique importance: Epidauros its status as birthplace of the god; Kos its association with the physicians Hippokrates and C. Stertinus Xenophon; Pergamon its identity as the chief cult centre of Asia Minor; and Abonouteichos, its unique manifestation of the god. 'The numismatic evidence from Abonouteichos/Ionopolis suggests that the city did no more than welcome the opportunity to host and even develop a distinctive Asklepieian cult, something which is exceptional only in the particular direction which was chosen.'<sup>9</sup>

The Asklepieian and medical nature of the cult perhaps helps us contextualize Lucian's claim that Alexander had children by women who consulted him (*Alex.* 42): reference in two inscriptions to individuals styled 'son of Glykon' can be taken to suggest that childless women attending his shrine claimed to have been given offspring by the god.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, it can be argued that 'son of Glykon' is more likely to have been used by a cult adherent rather than for a child born as the result of prayer; the latter would rather have been given the personal name 'Glykodotes' or 'Glykodotos', which is unattested.

Summing up, the historicity of Alexander and his cult are incontestable. The cult can be dated precisely, and its acceptance by eminent figures and continued existence after Alexander's death, as suggested by local coinage, indicate its respectability. Other details, and most particularly Alexander's own motivation and *bona fides*, can probably only ever be the subjects of speculation.

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<sup>9</sup> Petsalis-Diomidis 2010, 29, 35-41.

<sup>10</sup> Μειλήτου τοῦ Γλύκωνος Παφλαγόνος, *IGRom.* 4.1498; Νεικήτης Γλύκωνος Τειανὸς ἰατρός, *SEG* 18.519; for discussion, Robert 1980, 407-8, Lane Fox 1986, 720 n. 6, Jones 1986, 143, Jones 1998b, 107-9. Glykon was a widely-attested name particularly common in Asia Minor (*LGPN* 1-5B, s.v. Glykon); however, Meiletos' association with Paphlagonia in the first inscription, and Niketes' with Tieion in the second, strengthen the likelihood of a direct connection with Alexander's cult. In the context of the inscription naming Meiletos, Victor (1997, 138) suggests that his mother's supplication at a shrine of Podaleirios may have been the origin of Alexander's claim (*Alex.* 11) to be Podaleirios' son.

## APPENDIX 5: DION OF PROUSA: A SUMMARY GUIDE TO HIS CHRONOLOGY

See Ch. 5.

### 5.1 A chronology of Dion's life

Dion's life is known principally from his works. As well, there are references by contemporary and near-contemporary writers: correspondence between Trajan and Pliny refers to him (Plin. *Ep.* 10.81-2);<sup>1</sup> Fronto calls him a student of Musonius (Ch. 5.1); Lucian couples him with Musonius as an exile (*Peregr.* 18). He is a character in Philostratos' *VA* (5.27-40), where Philostratos presents him as a student of Apollonios and a recipient of his letters (*VA* 5.40).<sup>2</sup> Philostratos (*VS* 1.486-92) and Synesios (*Dio*) both wrote biographies.

Like his maternal grandfather, mother and father, Dion was a Roman citizen.<sup>3</sup> His full Roman name is unknown; the *cognomen* Cocceianus is attested by Pliny (*Ep.* 10.81.1).

Except where otherwise indicated, the following chronology is that established by Jones (1978a). Orations are mentioned only when they are significant in establishing the sequence of events in Dion's life or are referred to for other reasons in Ch. 5. Their cited titles are commonly-used Latin ones, or transliterations of the Cohoon-Lamar Crosby Greek titles.

#### *Early life, c. 40-82*

Dion is born c. 40 to a well-to-do family in Bithynia; he is a citizen of Prousa through his father, and of neighbouring Apameia through his mother and maternal grandfather. He studies under the Stoic, Musonius Rufus (Ch. 5.1), possibly in Rome, or possibly in Asia when the latter accompanied Rubellius Plautus there (60-62 CE, Ch. 5.2.2b) or on the island of Gyara, where Musonius was exiled (65 CE, Philostr. *VA* 7.16.2).<sup>4</sup> To this period, we can probably assign his Melankomas discourses (*Orr.* 28, 29).

Probably c. 70-75, he makes a trip to Egypt via Rhodes. *Or.* 31, *Rhodiacus*, seems to belong to this period. Nero's principate (54-68 CE) is 'very recent' (110) and Rhodes is free (112-13); its freedom (*libertas/eleutheria*, granted by Claudius at Nero's request) was taken away by

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<sup>1</sup> Swain (2000b, 43) comments that Trajan's letter to Pliny about Dion shows no sign of friendship or even acquaintance.

<sup>2</sup> For surviving letters supposedly from Apollonios to Dion (the first quoted in part at *VA* 5.40), Jones 2006, *Epp.* 9, 90.

<sup>3</sup> For his citizenship, 41.6 with Jones 1978a, 7 n. 60.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Jones 1978a, 13-14.

Vespasian (69-79 CE), probably near the beginning of his principate, and restored by Titus or, more probably, Domitian.<sup>5</sup> Von Arnim put the speech in the time of Titus on the (unsustainable) ground that Dion would have been too young to compose such a speech in Vespasian's reign. Jones gives the oration a Vespasianic date.<sup>6</sup> Recent apologists for a Trajanic date have been obliged to ignore or explain away references to Nero and a lack of reference – either explicit or as the *tyrannos* (cf. 13.1, 40.12, 50.8) or *despotes* (cf. 45.1) – to Domitian.<sup>7</sup>

The dating to this period of *Or. 32 (Ad Alexandrinos)* is similarly controversial. Jones dates the oration to c. 71-75 on the basis of the identification of 'Konon', in command of Roman troops and who recently quelled a riot (32.72), with the prefect L. Peducaeus Colonus, who governed from 70 to 72 or 73.<sup>8</sup> Arguments in favour of a Trajanic date, beginning with that of von Arnim, are based principally on perceived similarities to the Kingship Orations (e.g. 32.25-6; cf. 1.23, 3.45-9).<sup>9</sup>

To this period can be assigned *Or. 46*, according to the manuscript title (*Pro tou philosophhein en tei patriidi*) written before he was a philosopher; Dion has only a wife and small child (46.13). Content typical of the exercises set in rhetorical schools suggests that *Or. 11 (Troicus)* was also written in Dion's youth. The fact that Dion attributes a tale (11.37) to a priest in Onouphis could perhaps suggest that he had recently been in Egypt; however, see Ch. 5.3.1a. As a clever reworking of traditional myth, *Or. 60* can tentatively be considered an early work.

#### *Exile, c. 83-96*

Dion refers to his exile at 1.50, 13.1-2, 40.2. *Or. 80 (Peri eleutherias)* can tentatively be dated to the period because Dion portrays himself as a wanderer unburdened by ordinary human cares; so too can *Or. 16*, because it addresses the right attitude to suffering (*lype*). *Or. 21 (Peri kallous)* may be contemporary because all Romans wish that Nero were alive (21.10).

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<sup>5</sup> Nero: Tac. *Ann.* 12.58, Suet. *Cl.* 25.3, Suet. *Ner.* 7.2; Vespasian: Suet. *Vesp.* 8.4; Titus: *IG* 12.1.58 = *IGRom.* 4.1129; Domitian: *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 819. That the freedom of Rhodes was restored by Titus is an assumption based only upon a reference to his *kallista grammata*; *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 819 says explicitly that ἀπε[κα]τεστάθη ἁ πάτριος πολιτεία. Cf. Jones 1978a, 27-8, Sidebottom 1992, 409 and n. 28; on the inscriptions specifically, Momigliano 1951, 150-1. For the nature of political *eleutheria*, see Ch. 5.4.2b.

<sup>6</sup> von Arnim 1898, 210-18; Jones 1978a, 133.

<sup>7</sup> See Sidebottom 1992, 409-14, Swain 1996, 428-9. Swain acknowledges that certainty is impossible.

<sup>8</sup> Jones 1973, 302-9, Jones 1978a, 36, 134, Jones 1997, 249-53.

<sup>9</sup> von Arnim 1898, 435-8, Swain 1996, 429. For recent commentary on both sides of the controversy: Kindstrand 1978, 378-83, Sidebottom 1992, 415-18, Brunt 1994, 41 n. 70, Swain 1996, 429, Salmeri 2000, 82 n. 142 (reign of Trajan); Desideri 1978, 68, Desideri 2000, 96 n. 5 (reign of Vespasian). Trapp (1995, 167) is careful not to come down in favour of one period or the other.

*After exile, but probably before Dion's visit to Rome c. 100*

Composition of *Or. 36, Borystheniticus*. The full title of the speech indicates that it was delivered in Prousa, which Dion did not reach until some time after his recall (45.2).<sup>10</sup>

*After exile, probably when Dion is in Rome with Trajan, c. 100*

Composition of *Or. 7, Euboicus*. The experiences described draw upon the exile; Dion has been thought to call himself a *presbys* (1), but, as Russell correctly points out, he is in fact referring to himself as a wanderer and not necessarily old.<sup>11</sup> The oration possibly makes reference to Nerva and/or Trajan. Nerva resumed the lapsed practice of distributing land to the urban poor.<sup>12</sup> Under Trajan and Hadrian, the cultivation of unused lands using schemes of the kind mentioned in the oration was encouraged; the suggestion is that Dion wrote in support of one such scheme (see Ch. 5.4.2b). On the basis of 7.145 (οὕτως<sup>13</sup> εὐδαίμονας), Russell suggests that the oration was presented in Rome. Further indications of a Roman setting for the presentation of at least one version of the oration are provided by Moles.<sup>14</sup> The fragmentary *Or. 19* echoes the format of *Or. 7* and probably belongs to the same period.

Dion's Kingship Orations (*Orr. 1-4, Peri basileias 1-4*) can be dated to early in Trajan's reign; they make reference to Trajan's relationship with Nerva and to the contrast between Trajan and Domitian, and there are parallels with Pliny's *Panegyricus* (Ch. 5.3.2).<sup>15</sup> As well, 2.79 refers to Aristotle's being permitted by Alexander to rebuild his hometown of Stageira; the reference is undoubtedly to Dion's rebuilding of Prousa.

To this period we can also assign *Or. 5, Libykos mythos*, and *Orr. 6, 8, 9, and 10* (the Diogenes speeches).

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<sup>10</sup> Re the dating, Jones 1978a, 135, Salmeri 1982, 28 n. 88.

<sup>11</sup> Russell 1992, 110.

<sup>12</sup> Duncan-Jones 1974, 292 n. 3.

<sup>13</sup> Accepted by Russell against the emendation of Geel (ὄντως), which is accepted by Cohoon in the Loeb text.

<sup>14</sup> Russell 1992, 1, 156, Moles 1995, 177. Dion's orations seem to have been presented orally in different versions, with the written one a patchwork of verbal ones. In the *Troicus*, Dion tells his audience that the oration must be presented to others as well (προλέγω δὲ ὑμῖν ὅτι τοὺς λόγους τούτους ἀνάγκη καὶ παρ' ἐτέροις ῥηθῆναι, 11.6). *Or. 5* can be seen as an alternative ending to *Or. 4*: 4.73-4 reads as an introduction to the *Libykos mythos*. *Or. 57* is apparently a *prolalia* to a public repetition of words previously addressed to the emperor (τοὺς ῥηθέντας πρὸς τὸν αὐτοκράτορα νῦν ἀπαγγέλλοντες, 57.11). Cf. Whitmarsh 2001b, 325-7. In the case of the *Euboicus*, as Moles notes, 7.83-90 – detailing Odysseus' trials on his eventual return home – suggests a Prousan rather than a Roman setting.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Moles 1990, 346.

*On Dion's route home after obtaining privileges from Trajan and accompanying him on his Dacian campaign, 101*

Presentation of *Or. 12, the Olympicus*, at Olympia at the time of the Games; Dion has just returned from a visit to the Getai (12.16).<sup>16</sup> On this same visit to Greece, Dion would have presented *Or. 13, De exilio* – as indicated by the full title (*En Athenais peri phyges*) – in Athens. It was delivered after the end of Dion's exile and a subsequent visit to Rome (13.1, 29).

*After Dion's return to Prousa from Rome, c. 101-112*

Presentation (probably c. 101-105) of a series of orations pertaining to local and regional politics (*Orr. 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49 and 50*).

Dion mentions his mission to Rome to win concessions for Prousa (see Ch. 5.3.1b) at 40.13 and the benefits won at 45.3-4; the same mission is mentioned at 43.8 and 44.11. *Or. 40* also includes a reference to Dion's controversial plan to rebuild part of the old town (40.7-10), a theme taken up at 47.11-23 and 48.9-12. *Or. 41*, addressed to the people of Apameia, can be dated to the same period: it is concerned with *homonoia* between Prousa and Apameia and is closely related in theme to *Or. 40* (cf. 40.16).

Dion mentions his adult son at 40.2 and 44.8, and several children at 41.6; the last passage suggests that Dion's family may have lived with family connections at Apameia in the period of his exile. Reference to Dion's son has also been used to associate *Or. 48* with *Or. 49*. The latter presents Dion declining high office in Prousa, but only on account of an impending journey (49.15). Dion also refers to an earlier occasion on which he was proposed for office (49.15); it has speculatively but not unreasonably been suggested that, at the time, Dion substituted his son, and that it is for this young man that he seeks support at 48.17.<sup>17</sup> Dion's son is seen in a high role in the presumably later *Or. 50* (50.5, 10).

Specific dating is difficult. *Or. 43* presents Dion under attack for abetting a *poneros hegemon* (43.11); he has been identified as the proconsul Julius Bassus, whose conduct is

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<sup>16</sup> The dating is controversial; see Ch. 5.3.1b. That adopted here is preferred by Jones (1978a, 53) and Russell (1992, 171).

<sup>17</sup> von Arnim 1898, 390; Lamar Crosby 1946, introductory note to *Or. 49*.

addressed in Pliny's letters, but certainty is impossible. *Or.* 48.1 mentions Varenus Rufus as *hegemon*, but the date of his proconsulship is not precisely known.<sup>18</sup>

The period after the return to Prousa probably saw a visit to Tarsos and presentation of the First and Second Tarsian Orations (*Orr.* 33, 34); that the orations date from the same visit to Tarsos is suggested by similarities of theme (33.51 cf. 34.14, 47). The unquestionably late *Or.* 47 refers to Tarsos as one of the cities which welcomes Dion (47.16-17). *Or.* 35, an address to the people of Kelainai (Apameia), probably dates from the same period. *Or.* 30, the *Charidemus*, belongs to Dion's later life.

Dion's lost *Getika* (see Ch. 5.3.1b) can probably be dated c. 106. Dion last appears in the historical record c. 111-112 when he is called before Pliny, now imperial legate, to answer charges relating to the construction of his *stoa* (Plin. *Ep.* 10.81). The date of his death is unknown.

## 5.2 Summary of the orations mentioned and their probable dates

1	<i>Peri basileias</i> 1	c. 100
2	<i>Peri basileias</i> 2	c. 100
3	<i>Peri basileias</i> 3	c. 100
4	<i>Peri basileias</i> 4	c. 100
5	<i>Libykos mythos</i>	c. 100
6	<i>Diogenes e Peri tyrannidos</i>	c. 100
7	<i>Euboicus</i>	c. 100
8	<i>Diogenes e Peri aretes</i>	c. 100
9	<i>Diogenes e Peri Isthmikos</i>	c. 100
10	<i>Diogenes e Peri oiketon</i>	c. 100
11	<i>Troicus</i>	71-80

<sup>18</sup> Lamar Crosby 1946, introductory notes to *Or.* 43 and *Or.* 48. Varenus seems to have prosecuted Bassus and then succeeded him as proconsul in Bithynia. Pliny defended Bassus, and later Varenus when he too was prosecuted for corruption (*Epp.* 4.9, 5.20).

12	<i>Olympicus</i>	c. 101
13	<i>De exilio</i>	c. 101
16	<i>Peri lypes</i>	c. 83-96
19	<i>Peri tes autou philekoias</i>	c. 100 or later
21	<i>Peri kallous</i>	c. 88-96
30	<i>Charidemus</i>	c. 101-112
31	<i>Rhodiacus</i>	70-75
32	<i>Ad Alexandrinos</i>	71-75
33	<i>Tarsikos protos</i>	c. 101-112
34	<i>Tarsikos deuterios</i>	c. 101-112
35	<i>En Kelainais tes Phrygias</i>	c. 101-112
36	<i>Borystheniticus</i>	98-100
40	<i>En tei patriidi peri tes pros Apameis homonoias</i>	c. 101-105
41	<i>Pros Apameis peri homonias</i>	c. 101-105
43	<i>Politikos en tei patriidi</i>	c. 101-105
44	<i>Philophronetikos pros ten patrida eishegoumenen autoi timas</i>	c. 101-105
45	<i>Apologismos hopos escheke pros ten patrida</i>	c. 101-105
46	<i>Pro tou philosophein en tei patriidi</i>	70-75
47	<i>Demegoria en tei patriidi</i>	c. 101-105
48	<i>Politikos en ekklesiai</i>	c. 101-105
49	<i>Paraitesis arches en boulei</i>	c. 101-105
50	<i>Peri ton ergon en boulei</i>	after c. 105
60	<i>Nessos e Deianeira</i>	71-80



## APPENDIX 6: AELIUS ARISTEIDES: A SUMMARY GUIDE TO HIS CHRONOLOGY

See Ch. 6.

### 6.1 A chronology of Aristeides' life

A few key dates in Aristeides' life can be ascertained with some certainty. His birth date (26 November 117) has been determined from the horoscope he presents at *HL* 4.58, which suggests a date between 14 November and 13 December 117, and from the fact that he was born on the fourth day of a month, deducible from his references to Hermes (the *genius* of those born on the fourth day of any month) at *HL* 4.57 and to a day likened to a birthday feast (*genethlia*) with associated offerings at *HL* 1.30-33.<sup>1</sup> *HL* 4.1 and *HL* 4.12 together date the beginning of the tenth year of his illness, when he returns to the River Aisepos at the god's command (*HL* 4.2), to the proconsulship of 'Severus'. Aristeides' prose hymn to Athena (*Or.* 37) seems to be contemporary; a subscription to the hymn mentions the place of composition as Baris – on the shore of the Aisepos at the springs of Artemis Thermaia – and the proconsulship of Severus, and it gives Aristeides' age as 35 years and one month. Since Aristeides' birth date is known, the proconsulship of (C. Julius) Severus can be dated to 152-153, and the first journey to Rome, to 144.<sup>2</sup> Other dates are tentative, and deduced from Aristeides' works.

Three ancient biographies of Aristeides are extant. The earliest is Philostratos' (*VS* 2.581-5). Next comes the *Prolegomena* to the orations of Aristeides; Sopater (fourth century CE) was probably the author of the original, but the extant text shows the hand of at least one redactor. The last is the brief entry on Aristeides (α 3902 Adler) in the *Suda*.<sup>3</sup> Inscriptions certainly or possibly erected by Aristeides or in his honour have been identified;<sup>4</sup> those relevant to the discussion are noted in the appropriate places in this thesis.

The following chronology summarizes important dates in Aristeides' life and provides a temporal framework for incidents referred to in the body of the thesis, and for significant orations. It is based principally on that developed by Behr in his various commentaries (1968, 1981, 1986, 1994) on Aristeides. Comments not more specifically footnoted are from Behr's introductory notes to individual orations or from notes *ad loc.* in his 1981 and 1986

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<sup>1</sup> Behr 1994, 1141-6. The approaching 'birthday' referred to at *HL* 1.31 would have been on the fourth of Lenaion (27 January).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Syme 1983, 279-80; Behr 1994, 1149-50; Swain 1996, 265. For Severus: *IGRom.* 3.173-5; Mitchell/French 72-6; Behr 1968, 79-80; Mitchell 1993, vol. 1, 154-5; Behr 1994, 1143.

<sup>3</sup> Behr (1968, 142-7) discusses the interrelatedness of the three. For a detailed analysis of the text of the *Prolegomena*, Lenz 1959, 40-107.

<sup>4</sup> For listings and discussion: Behr 1986, 425-6; Petsalis-Diomidis 2012, 217-19.

commentaries. *Or.* 35 is omitted as spurious. Behr classes *Or.* 25 as spurious on stylistic grounds. However, Aristeides composed a consolation to the Rhodians after the earthquake of 142 while he was resident in Alexandria (*Or.* 24.3), *Or.* 25 was undoubtedly written in the immediate aftermath of the quake (*Or.* 25.53), and Behr himself finds parallels between the text of the oration and Aristeides' later works.<sup>5</sup> More recent critical opinion accepts *Or.* 25 as genuine,<sup>6</sup> and this position will be taken in this thesis. Display orations with historical settings (*Orr.* 5-16) – some pairs arguing the two sides of a case – are not dated by Behr and are omitted from the chronology.

Keil/Behr names and numbers are used for the Aristeides orations throughout.

### *Early life, c. 117-143*

Aristeides was born on 26 November 117 in Mysia – at his ancestral estate, probably located in what became the administrative district of Hadrianoi (Philostr. *VS* 2.581) when the region was granted city status in either 123-124 or 131-132 CE. Behr discusses and dismisses the competing claims of Hadrianoutherai.<sup>7</sup> Late sources suggest that his father was regional priest of Zeus, and that his teachers included Polemon, Aristokles and Herodes Attikos.<sup>8</sup>

In early 142, Aristeides made a journey to Egypt and Ethiopia (*Or.* 36.1) via Kos, Knidos and Rhodes.<sup>9</sup> In Egypt, he seems to have met Heliodoros (*HL* 4.75), who was prefect at least from

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<sup>5</sup> Behr 1981, n. 1 at *Or.* 25.

<sup>6</sup> For discussion of the authenticity of *Or.* 25, Jones 1990, Franco 2008, 218-21.

<sup>7</sup> Behr 1994, 1151-5, Swain 1996, 256. Aristeides describes the location of his family home at *HL* 3.41 as πρὸς τῷ ἱερῷ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου and places it near the *lophos* of Atys. Other family properties were in Smyrna (*HL* 2.38-9, 43) and dispersed about Poimananon. This city lay between Aristeides' ancestral estate (and the nearby residence of Aristeides' foster parents, cf. *HL* 3.20) and the estate near the Aisepos at Baris (subscription to *Or.* 37) where he was staying when his disease began (*HL* 4.1-4). Laneion (see below) lay south of Atys (*HL* 3.42) and near the temple of Olympian Zeus (*HL* 4.105). Aristeides also mentions a farm north of Laneion on the road to Kyzikos (*HL* 5.17-18). For the locations, Talbert 2000, Maps 52, B4 (Poimananon, Baris, Kyzikos) and 56, F2 (Atys, Laneion).

<sup>8</sup> For Aristeides' father Eudaimon, Philostr. *VS* 2.581, Sopat. *Prolegomena* 737 Dindorf, *Suid.* s.v. Aristides (α 3902 Adler). Only the *Suda* refers to Eudaimon's priesthood of Zeus (υἱὸς Εὐδαίμονος, φιλοσόφου τε καὶ ἱερέως γενομένου τοῦ ἐν τῇ πατρίδι αὐτοῦ ἱεροῦ τοῦ Διός). In the *Prolegomena*, Polemon is mentioned as Aristeides' teacher; Polemon is probably also the '*koryphaios* of our age' at *HL* 4.28 and the figure presented in an unflattering light at *Or.* 34.47; cf. Behr 1981, n. 34 at *Or.* 34.47, n. 53 at *HL* 4.28. Philostratos' comment at *VS* 2.581 – that Aristeides was educated at Athens when Herodes was at the height of his fame, and at Pergamon when Aristokles was teaching oratory there – is probably intended to suggest that they were among his teachers; the *Suda* mentions Polemon, Herodes and Aristokles as Aristeides' instructors. Aristeides seems also to have studied under Alexander of Kotiaion (*Or.* 32.2); for Alexander as an historical figure, Behr 1981, n. 1 at *Or.* 32.

<sup>9</sup> Aristeides practised as an orator on the journey: at *Or.* 33.27, he mentions incidents of a kind that he claims to have experienced when he was speaking in Kos and in Knidos.

January 138-August 141, and to have composed *Or.* 25 (see above); the earthquake on Rhodes helps date the journey. His estate at Laneion is purchased for him by his family during his stay in Egypt (*HL* 4.105). On his return home (April 142), Aristeides delivers *Or.* 45, *Eis Sarapin*, in Smyrna; the early date is attested by the style. *Or.* 45.13 and *Or.* 45.33 refer to a vow made during a storm on the voyage from Egypt.

In December 143, there is a journey to the area of the river Aisepos and the warm springs of Artemis Thermaia at Baris; it is to this period that Aristeides dates the beginning of his illness (*HL* 4.1-2).

*A journey to Rome, via the Hellespont and Edessa, and return (HL 2.5, 2.60-8), January-October 144*

In Rome, composition of lyric poetry in honour of Apollo for the festival of the Apollonia (13 July 144; *HL* 4.31). In gratitude for the work, Apollo saves Aristeides and his companions from a storm at sea (*HL* 4.32-6).

*Revelation of Asklepios, Winter 144-145*

A first revelation of the Saviour at the warm springs near Smyrna (*HL* 2.7, 2.69-70) in December 144. Subsequent incidents relevant to this thesis can be ordered chronologically as follows:

December 144: Ritual bathing in the cold river near the warm springs near Smyrna (*HL* 2.50).

Winter 144-145: A command from Isis at the warm springs near Smyrna (*HL* 3.45). In Smyrna, at the Temple of Isis, Asklepios and Sarapis appear together and seem alike (*HL* 3.46).

Summer 145: Direction to go to Pergamon (*HL* 2.7, 2.70).<sup>10</sup>

*The Kathedra (HL 2.70, 3.44) period at Pergamon, Summer 145-mid 147*

Aristeides is resident at the house of the temple warden Asklepiakos (*HL* 2.35). The sequence of relevant incidents is as follows:

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<sup>10</sup> Careful examination of the text suggests that the 'year and months passed' of *HL* 2.70 refers to the time elapsed since the origin of Aristeides' illness in December 143. Cf. Behr 1968, 26 n. 19.

Summer 145: A pilgrimage to bathe in the Kaikos, a river south of Pergamon (*HL* 2.48).

Winter 145-146: A pilgrimage to the local river, the Selinos (*HL* 2.26-8, *HL* 2.51-3).

Winter 145-146: A pilgrimage to bathe in the sea at Eleia, the port of Pergamon (*HL* 2.54-5).

Spring 146: Ritual bathing in the Sacred Well at Pergamon (*HL* 2.71, 74-6).

Spring 146: A pilgrimage from Pergamon to Allianoi, which had warm springs (*HL* 3.1-2).

August 146: A legal case re the title of Laneion; it is resolved with the help of the provincial governor Julianus<sup>11</sup> (*HL* 4.105-8).

Winter 146-147: The complementary visions of Aristeides and Philadelphos, a temple warden, in which the god prescribes that Aristeides take wormwood. Aristeides' dream culminates in an experience he likens to initiation (*HL* 2.29-35).

Winter 146-147: Ritual bathing and other practices at and near the temple in Pergamon (*HL* 2.77-80)

Spring 147: In the context of a particularly severe bout of illness, a pilgrimage to the warm springs of Lebedos (*HL* 3.7-13); consultation of Apollo at Kolophon, near Lebedos (*HL* 3.12).

145-147: Composition of *Or. 2, Pros Platona hyper rhetorikes*, in Pergamon at some time between 145 and 147; *Or. 4, Pros Kapitona* – a response to the criticism that ensued – follows in 147. Behr dates to the *Kathedra* period or the following months *Orr.* 24<sup>12</sup>, 28, 30, 38 and 41.

#### *After the Kathedra period, mid 147-May 180*

Aristeides does not explain the reason for the ending of the *Kathedra* period and his return to 'normal' life, initially in an extended period in Smyrna in middle-late 147. An averted attempt by others to appropriate his home at Laneion (*HL* 4.105-8) may have been a contributing factor. There was apparently no rupture with Pergamon, and Aristeides was not disease-free: the period

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<sup>11</sup> Probably Q. Fabius Julianus Optatianus, proconsul 145-146; Behr 1981, n. 193 at *HL* 4.107.

<sup>12</sup> Despite its civic content, Behr (1994, 1204, n. 270) dates the *Rhodiois peri homonoias* to 147 rather than later on the basis of Aristeides' reference (*Or.* 24.3) to the earthquake of 142 without any reference to those of 148.

in Smyrna coincided with a long battle with a tumour (*HL* 1.61-8). From December 147, Aristeides moves between Mysia, Smyrna and Pergamon and (at least to some extent) resumes his professional career; exempting himself from public office is an ongoing concern.

July-October 147: In Smyrna for an extended period after his pilgrimage to Lebedos (*HL* 1.61-8),<sup>13</sup> Aristeides is (in September) offered nomination to the High Priesthood of the Provincial Assembly of Asia.<sup>14</sup> He persuades the Assembly to withdraw the nomination, but is proposed instead as priest of Asklepios; he rejects even this (*HL* 4.100-2).

October 147: In Pergamon, Aristeides discusses with Asklepiakos his recovery from the disease (*phthoe*, probably tuberculosis) that sent him to Lebedos (*HL* 3.14).

October 147: A journey from Pergamon to the ancestral estate to save Aristeides' nurse (*HL* 1.78).

December 147: A renewed attempt by delegates of Smyrna to have Aristeides elected High Priest of the Provincial Assembly is subverted (*HL* 4.103-4). Aristeides is resident at Laneion: διέτριβον δ' ἐν τῷ χωρίῳ τῷ εἰωθότι (*HL* 4.103), 'I was spending time at the usual place'.

January 148: Sick and at his ancestral estate, Aristeides travels to the home of his foster parents, near the statue of Zeus (*HL* 3.20).

February 148: Zosimos' death, and Aristeides' related visions pertaining to the Underworld (*HL* 1.75-7, 3.47).

Early 148: Earthquakes centred on Mytilene (Lesbos) during the governorship of Albus; sacrifices to Zeus (*HL* 3.38-43).

Summer 148: A pilgrimage to the warm springs at Allianoi (*HL* 3.6).

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<sup>13</sup> The period discussed at *HL* 1.61-8 can be tied to *HL* 4.100, in which Aristeides returns to Smyrna after a long absence, in that it must post-date the *Kathedra* proper, and Zosimos is still alive (*HL* 1.66). For its length, *HL* 1.64; Smyrna is indicated by a reference to the harbour at *HL* 1.65.

<sup>14</sup> On the nature of the High Priesthood and the Assembly and its convening dates and procedures, Behr 1968, 61-4. Behr (1994, 1202-5) takes the governor at the time to be L. Antonius Albus, who began his proconsulship in mid 147. This involves an amendment to the textual correction (Behr 1981, n. 172 at *HL* 4.100) in his earlier edition/translation of the work, and an amended chronology for the period 146-149, set out at Behr 1994, 1203-5 and incorporated here.

Late 148-early 149: A journey to Chios via Smyrna and Klazomenai. When Aristeides reaches Phokaia, the divine command to go to Chios is revoked and he returns to Smyrna, where the god promises him seventeen years; the episode culminates in ritual bathing in the river (*HL* 2.11-23). The time promised runs out when Aristeides contracts plague (*HL* 2.37) in the summer of 165.

February 149: Aristeides' presentation of *Or.* 43, *Eis Dia*, in Smyrna on his return to the city, in fulfilment of a vow and in thanks for a safe return (*Or.* 43.1-2).

April 149: Aristeides' vision of ladders, associated with Sarapis (*HL* 3.47-8).

147-149: Composition of *Or.* 36, *Aigyptios*, a work on the Nile drawing upon Aristeides' earlier experience in Egypt.<sup>15</sup>

c. 150: Composition of *Or.* 32, *Epi Alexandroi epitaphios*.

July 152: Aristeides is put forward as *eklogeus* (tax collector) – in fact, *eklogistes*, a non-Attic term he avoids; he gains exemption under Pollio<sup>16</sup> (*HL* 4.94-9).

December 152: Nine years after the first onset of Aristeides' illness, a pilgrimage (*HL* 4.2: ὡς εἰς Θεωρίαν) to the place where the disease began, to be rid of it. The destination (reached via Poimanenos) is the river Aisepos, where Aristeides went just before his ill-fated visit to Rome (*HL* 4.1-10). The experience is 'like an initiation into a mystery' – a great renewal, clouded only by incredulity that such a state could persist (*HL* 4.7); it is dated to the proconsulship of (C. Julius) Severus (*HL* 4.12).

January 153: Aristeides' prose hymn to Athena (*Or.* 37).<sup>17</sup>

January 153: Aristeides desires exemption from appointment as *eirenarches*<sup>18</sup> (police commissioner) of Hadrianoi<sup>19</sup> (the city which could claim to be his birth place) under

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<sup>15</sup> On the factors together suggesting the date, Behr 1968, 19 n. 63.

<sup>16</sup> T. Vitrasius Pollio, proconsul of Asia 151-152; Behr 1981, n. 160 at *HL* 4.94.

<sup>17</sup> The oration is precisely dated by its subscription, as noted above. It therefore differs from that in honour of Athena mentioned at *HL* 4.25. The latter, which is lost, probably provoked the criticism of self-praise to which Aristeides responds in *Or.* 28 (see *Or.* 28.2, 7), dated to the *Kathedra* period. Cf. Behr 1981, n. 2 at *Or.* 37, F. Robert 2012, 478-9.

<sup>18</sup> Aristeides avoids the term: τὰ δὲ γράμματα ἐκέλευε προστῆναι τῆς εἰρήνης (*HL* 4.73), 'the letters commanded me to take charge of the peace'.

<sup>19</sup> For the identification of the town that Aristeides does not name (*HL* 4.72) as Hadrianoi, the comment at *HL* 4.73 referring to Smyrna's right to his services is relevant; see Behr 1968, 4-5, Behr 1981, n. 126 at *HL* 4.73.

proconsul Severus. In this context, he receives the oracle of the 'white maidens' (*HL* 4.71-94).

July 153: Aristeides' name is put forward as *prytanis* (chairman of one of the standing committees of the city council) at Smyrna (*HL* 4.88); the matter is quashed by Severus (*HL* 4.93).

September 153: Quadratus<sup>20</sup> succeeds Severus as proconsul; Aristeides wins his support (*HL* 4.63-7).

After April 155: A journey from Laneion to Epidauros (a purely religious destination) and on to Athens and Italy (*HL* 6.1-3); one vision that encouraged Aristeides to leave home was related to Musonius Rufus, Dion's teacher (*HL* 6.2). Aristeides' destinations gave rise to significant orations: the *Panathenaikos* (*Or.* 1) and *Eis Rhomen* (*Or.* 26), both of 155. A productive period followed.

c. 157: *Or.* 17, *Smyrnaikos*.

c. 161-165: *Or.* 3, *Pros Platona hyper ton Tettaron*.

Summer 165: A smallpox plague in Smyrna and the surrounding areas in which Aristeides' servants and finally he himself become infected (*HL* 2.38-45, 4.9, 5.25).

August 165: In Smyrna, Aristeides is commanded to go 'straight to the place of Zeus' (*HL* 5.10). His route takes in Larissa, Kyme, Myrina, a walk to the temple of Apollo at Gryneion, Eleia, and Pergamon, and ends at Aristeides' ancestral home and the temple of Olympian Zeus there for sacrifice (*HL* 5.1-10). Behr identifies a lesion mentioned by Aristeides (*HL* 5.9) as a symptom of smallpox.

January-February 166: The diaristic portion of the *Hieroi logoi* (*HL* 1.4-58); it is composed with Aristeides resident at Laneion (*HL* 1.43) and can be dated with some precision to the period after the peace treaty that ended the Parthian War (late 165, *HL* 1.36) and before the emperor (Lucius Verus) left Syria (Spring 166, *HL* 1.33).<sup>21</sup> There is also a reference to the proconsul Quadratus (*HL* 1.22).<sup>22</sup> Aristeides dreams of being honoured by the elder and younger emperors – Marcus Aurelius and Verus (*HL* 1.46).

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<sup>20</sup> C. Julius Quadratus Bassus, proconsul of Asia 153-154; Behr 1981, n. 109 at *HL* 4.63.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Behr. 1968, 98 and n. 13, Behr 1994, 1161.

<sup>22</sup> Statius Quadratus, proconsul of Asia 165-166; Behr 1981, n. 40 at *HL* 1.22.

Late Summer 166: A command to deliver a speech at Kyzikos, which Aristeides has never visited before; the journey and a successful speech (*Or. 27, Panegyrikos en Kyzikoi*); a command to return home to Laneion (*HL 5.11-18*). The temple of Hadrian at Kyzikos had been destroyed by an earthquake (*Or. 31.13*) in 161, but since repaired and *Or. 27* (in particular, 27.17-22) celebrates it. Behr suggests that *Or. 40*, a hymn to Herakles, was presented at this time. *Or. 33* has been dated to September 166.

December 166-January 167: A journey prescribed by the god, via the temple of Apollo in Mysia, and Pergamon, to Smyrna (*HL 5.18-34*). In the course of the journey, Aristeides hears of the death of his foster sister's daughter (*HL 5.20*). Aristeides delivers *Or. 23, Peri homonoias tais polesin*, in Pergamon at the annual assembly of the cities of the province of Asia (*Or. 23.8, 13*), and *Or. 39, Eis to phrear to en Asklepiou*, probably at the same time and place. He triumphs over an Egyptian competitor in Smyrna (*HL 5.29-34*).

Between 167 and 170: A journey to Ephesos for an oratorical victory (*HL 2.81-2, 5.35-7*).<sup>23</sup>

170: *Or. 34, Kata ton exorchoumenon* (= 'against the sophists' at *HL 5.39*) delivered in the *bouleuterion* at Smyrna (*HL 5.38*).

Summer 170: A journey from Laneion(?) to Kyzikos, where Aristeides consorts with distinguished people (*HL 5.42-7*).

Winter 170-171: Composition of the *Hieroi logoi* at Laneion.

June 171: Aristeides delivers his *Eleusinos* (*Or. 22*) in Smyrna when news arrives of the burning and looting of Eleusis, probably by the Kostobokai.<sup>24</sup>

176-178: A successful meeting with Marcus Aurelius in Smyrna in 176 (Philostr. *VS 2.582-3*); in consequence, after an earthquake early in 177 (*Or. 18.1*), Aristeides is able to write to the emperors (*Or. 19, Or. 21.2*) and obtain relief for the city (*Or. 20.1, Philostr. VS 2.582*).<sup>25</sup> It is to the period 176-178 that we can probably assign the only inscription<sup>26</sup> unquestionably honouring Aristeides:

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<sup>23</sup>Behr (1981) dates this variously to 170 at *HL 2.81* and to 167 at *HL 5.35*.

<sup>24</sup>Cf. Paus. 10.34.5.

<sup>25</sup>For the date of the quake, Behr 1968, 112 n. 68. *Or. 18 (Monoidia epi Smyrnei)* and 19 (*Epistole peri Smyrnes*, Aristeides' letter to Marcus Aurelius and Commodus) were written in its immediate aftermath, *Or. 20 (Palinoidia epi Smyrnei)*, in 178, with reconstruction underway (*Or. 20.21-3*).

Ἡ πόλις τῶν Ἀλεξαν|δρέων καὶ Ἑρμούπο|λις ἡ μεγάλη καὶ ἡ βου|λή ἡ Ἀντινοέων  
 νέ| |ων Ἑλλήνων καὶ οἱ | ἐν τῷ Δέλτα τῆς Αἰ|γύπτου καὶ οἱ τὸν Θη|βαϊκὸν νομὸν  
 οἰκοῦν|τες Ἑλληνας ἐτίμη| |σαν Πόπλιον Αἴλιον | Ἀριστείδην Θεόδωρον | ἐπὶ  
 ἀνδραγαθίαι καὶ | λόγοις.

The city of Alexandria and Hermopolis Magna and the Council of the Antinoeis  
 Neoi Hellenes and the Greeks dwelling in the Delta of Egypt and in the Theban  
 Nome have honoured Publius Aelius Aristeides Theodoros because of his good  
 character and his speeches.

January 177: Delivery of *Or. 42 (Lalia eis Asklepion)* in Smyrna; Aristeides refers to a friendly  
 meeting with Marcus Aurelius and his son Commodus at *Or. 42.14*.

After 177: Composition of *Or. 53, Panegyrikos epi toi hydati <toi> en Pergamoi*.

May 180: Aristeides dies at Laneion, aged about sixty-three.<sup>27</sup>

## 6.2 Summary of the works mentioned and their probable dates

Diaristic portion of the <i>HL</i> ( <i>HL</i> 1.4-58)	January-February 166
<i>HL</i> 1-6 ( <i>Orr.</i> 47-52)	Winter 170-171
<i>Or. 1 Panathenaikos</i>	c. 155
<i>Or. 2 Pros Platona hyper rhetorikes</i>	145-147
<i>Or. 3 Pros Platona hyper ton Tettaron</i>	c. 161-165
<i>Or. 4 Pros Kapitona</i>	147
<i>Or. 17 Smyrnaikos (I)</i>	c. 157
<i>Or. 18 Monoidia epi Smyrnei</i>	177

<sup>26</sup> *OGIS* 709 = *IGRom.* 1.1070; Behr 1986, 425 (App. 2, Inscriptions), no. 8. The wording of the inscription makes it almost certain that it was associated with a statue, set up in Smyrna, mentioned at Philostr. *VS* 2.582. Behr suggests that Aristeides made a successful plea on Egypt's behalf on the occasion of Marcus Aurelius' visit to Smyrna, and that the inscription was a response. Certainly the emperor's recognition of Aristeides in Smyrna, and his assistance after the earthquake in response to Aristeides' plea, are the two contexts in which Aristeides is most likely to have been honoured. For further, speculative, suggestions, Bingen 1987, 182-3, Quet 1992, 399, Swain 1996, 284 n. 115, Petsalis-Diomidis 2010, 118-19.

<sup>27</sup> Behr 1968, 114.

Or. 19	<i>Epistole peri Smyrnes</i>	177
Or. 20	<i>Palinodia epi Smyrnei</i>	178
Or. 21	<i>Smyrnaikos (II)</i>	179
Or. 22	<i>Eleusinos</i>	June 171
Or. 23	<i>Peri homonoias tais polesin</i>	December 166-January 167
Or. 24	<i>Rhodioides peri homonoias</i>	147
Or. 25	<i>Rhodiakos</i>	142
Or. 26	<i>Eis Rhomen</i>	c. 155
Or. 27	<i>Panegyros en Kyzikoi</i>	Summer 166
Or. 28	<i>Peri tou paraphthegmatos</i>	145-147
Or. 30	<i>Apellai genethliakos</i>	147
Or. 32	<i>Epi Alexandroi epitaphios</i>	c. 150
Or. 33	<i>Pros tous aitiomenous hoti me meletoi</i>	September 166
Or. 34	<i>Kata ton exorchoumenon</i>	170
Or. 36	<i>Aigyptios</i>	147-149
Or. 37	<i>Athena</i>	January 153
Or. 38	<i>Asklepiadai</i>	147
Or. 39	<i>Eis to phrear to en Asklepiou</i>	December 166-January 167
Or. 40	<i>Herakles</i>	Summer 166
Or. 41	<i>Dionysos</i>	145-147
Or. 42	<i>Lalia eis Asklepon</i>	January 177
Or. 43	<i>Eis Dia</i>	February 149
Or. 45	<i>Eis Sarapin</i>	April 142

Or. 53 *Panegyrikos epi toi hydati <toi> en Pergamoi* after 177



## TABLES

Tables 1-17 detail the findings of a comprehensive survey of the focal sources of Part A. For these sources, see Ch. 2.1. Each Table is intended to be read in conjunction with a specific subsection of Ch. 2, noted at the beginning of the Table.

Later Tables build on earlier ones. Thus, for example, Table 1 lists 'famous' oracles; the listing enables oracle types of interest to be identified and Tables 2 and 3 elaborate, detailing *all* the oracles of these types that are referred to in the sources. Table 7 details journeys of autopsy and so suggests the identities of the 'non-Greek wise'; Table 8 follows up, listing *all* the encounters with an important subset of groups in which specific learning is mentioned.

Details are repeated from Table to Table so that (for example) at Ch. 2.5.2 the reader does not need to turn back for details from Table 13 to Table 5. Although repetition is involved, the Tables (like the Appendices) are not part of the thesis or its word-count, but rather a subsidiary foundation for it.

In Tables 2-17, \* indicates a substantive account; \*\* indicates a reference to a figurative representation.

In Tables referring to oracles, entries are ordered by Fontenrose number (in the order H, Q, L) or assigned number (O); PW references are included under 'Sources'. 'Earliest references' (as identified by Fontenrose) are mentioned specifically only when they predate references from the focal accounts. In all Tables, square brackets indicate what is otherwise known or probable but not explicitly stated in the cited sources.

In lists of authors and their works, authors are ordered as at Ch. 2.1, and their works, usually alphabetically. However, among Plutarch's works, the *Moralia* are always listed before the *Vitae*. References from the *Synkriseis* in Plutarch's *Vitae* are omitted unless a comparison adds substantially to what has been said in the *Vitae* on which it comments.



**Table 1: 'Famous' oracular consultations of pre-Second Sophistic protagonists**

i.e. oracle tales mentioned in the focal sources more than once

See Chs 2.2.1, 2.3.1. Historical and mythical oracles are not separated. Entries pertaining to Delphi are listed first and ordered by Fontenrose number; entries pertaining to other oracles are ordered alphabetically by oracular centre or divinity/prophet and then by protagonist. Oracles are assigned to Delphi, even if Delphi is not specified in the survey sources, if the evidence from all sources together (as provided by Fontenrose 1978) so warrants. References to different variants of what is basically the same story – for example, those at Paus. 1.22.8 and D.L. 1.29-30, 1.106-7 with either Chilon or Anacharsis as protagonist (T1.14) – are considered separate references to a single story.

No.	Fontenrose no.	Oracle	Protagonist	Source
1	H3	Delphi	Chairephon	PW134, 420; earliest reference Pl. <i>Ap.</i> 20e-21c. D.Chr. 13.30; D.Chr. 55.8; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1116e-f; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 1.366; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 2.78-83; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 3.311; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 28.81; Luc. <i>Herm.</i> 15; Luc. <i>Rh.Pr.</i> 13; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 25; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 10.33; Paus. 1.22.8; D.L. 2.37
2	H5	Delphi	Spartans	PW137; earliest reference Th. 1.118.3, 1.123.1, 2.54.4. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 403b; Philostr. <i>VS</i> 2.575
3	H13	Delphi	Agesipolis, king of Sparta (Xenophon and Aristotle) or Agesilaos of Sparta (Plutarch)	PW 175; earliest reference X. <i>HG</i> 4.7.2; relevant early reference Arist. <i>Rh.</i> 2.23. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 191b; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 209a
4	Q7	Delphi	Lykourgos of Sparta	PW29; PW216; earliest reference Hdt. 1.65.3. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1098a; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1103a; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1116e-f; Plut. <i>Lyc.</i> 5.3; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 1.366; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 8.7.21; Heliod. <i>Aeth.</i> 2.27.1

5	Q8	Delphi	Lykourgos of Sparta	PW21; PW217; PW219-21; earliest reference Hdt. 1.65.4; relevant early reference X. <i>Lac.</i> 8.5. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 403e; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 789e; Plut. <i>Lyc.</i> 6.1; Plut. <i>Lyc.</i> 6.5; Plut. <i>Lyc.</i> 13; Plut. <i>Lyc.</i> 29.3-4 (a second inquiry about the same subject); Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 1.382; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 2.39; Paus. 3.2.4
6	Q10	Delphi	Lykourgos of Sparta or Alkamenes and Theopompos, kings of Sparta (Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 239f) or Spartans (Paus. 9.32.10)	PW222. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 239f; Plut. <i>Agis</i> 9.1; Paus. 9.32.10
7	Q17	Delphi	Messenians	PW365. Paus. 4.12.7; Paus. 4.26.4
8	Q20	Delphi	Aristomenes and Theoklos, Messenian envoys	PW366. Paus. 4.20.1-3; Paus. 4.21.3; Paus. 4.21.10
9	Q23	Delphi	Argives	PW483. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 340c; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 396c
10	Q34	Delphi	Phalanthos of Sparta	PW46; earliest reference D.S. 8.21.3. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 408a; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 28.9. (Plutarch's reference is equivocally to Q34, Q36 or both; it will be listed under both in all relevant Tables.)
11	Q36	Delphi	Phalanthos of Sparta	PW525. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 408a; Paus. 10.10.6-7
12	Q47	Delphi	Battos of Thera	PW39, 71; earliest reference Pi. <i>P.</i> 4.6-8, 56, 61-2, 259-62, 5.62; an account at Hdt. 4.155. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 405b-c; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 408a
13	Q58	Delphi	Kallondes Korax	PW4-5. D.Chr. 33.12; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 560e; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 3.610

14	Q75	Delphi	Anacharsis or (D.L. 1.29-30) Chilon	PW245; Paus. 1.22.8; D.L. 1.29-30; D.L. 1.106-7
15	Q76	Delphi	People of Miletos (D.L. 1.27-8) or of Miletos and Kos	PW247-8. Plut. <i>Sol.</i> 4.2-3; D.L. 1.27-8; D.L. 1.32-3
16	Q77	Delphi	Chilon of Sparta	PW423; earliest reference Aristotle <i>ap.</i> Clem.Al. <i>Strom.</i> 1.60.3; relevant reference Klearchos <i>ap.</i> Stob. 3.21.26. D.Chr. 4.57; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 116c; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 385d, Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 392a; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 394c; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 408e; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1118c; Plut. <i>Dem.</i> 3.2; Paus. 10.24.1; D.L. 1.40. Not all these references consider the famous admonition ('Know yourself') an oracle. Aristotle called it a Delphic oracle, and Klearchos attributed the question to Chilon. It was inscribed at Delphi (Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 116c, 385d, 392a, 394c, 408e; Paus. 10.24.1), and Diogenes Laertius (1.40) saw it as a maxim ascribed variously to Thales, Pemonoe (the first Pythia) and Chilon
17	Q79	Delphi	Hellenes and foreigners	Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 1.37; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 1.399; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 12.66; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 22.4.
18	Q88	Delphi	Spartans	PW31; earliest reference Hdt. 1.66.2. D.Chr. 17.16; Plut. <i>Cor.</i> 3.3; Paus. 3.7.3; Paus. 8.1.6; Philostr. <i>VS</i> 2.575
19	Q92	Delphi	Glaukos of Sparta	PW35-6; earliest reference Hdt. 6.86. D.Chr. 74.15; Paus. 2.18.2; Paus. 8.7.8
20	Q99	Delphi	Envoys of Kroisos of Lydia	PW52; earliest reference Hdt. 1.47. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 512e; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 28.48; Luc. <i>JConf.</i> 14; Luc. <i>JTr.</i> 30; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 62; Philostr. <i>VS</i> 1.481; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 6.11.16

21	Q100	Delphi	Envoys of Kroisos of Lydia	PW53; earliest reference Hdt. 1.53; verse form Arist. <i>Rh.</i> 1047a. D.Chr. 10.26; Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 48; Luc. <i>Cont.</i> 11; Luc. <i>JConf.</i> 14; Luc. <i>JTr.</i> 20; Luc. <i>JTr.</i> 43
22	Q125	Delphi	Athenians under Kleisthenes	PW80; earliest reference Arist. <i>Ath.</i> 21.6. Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 1.382; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 3.324; Paus. 10.10.1
23	Q146	Delphi	Athenians	PW94; earliest reference Hdt. 7.140. Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 1.117; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 23.43.
24	Q147	Delphi	Athenians	PW95; earliest reference Hdt. 7.141-142. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 828d; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1116e-f; Plut. <i>Them.</i> 10.2; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 1.167; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 3.234; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 3.312; Luc. <i>JTr.</i> 20; Paus. 1.18.2; Philostr. <i>VS</i> 1.481
25	Q154	Delphi	Athenians sent by Aristeides	PW102. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 628f; Plut. <i>Arist.</i> 11.3
26	Q155	Delphi	Mardonios, Persian commander at Plataia 479 BCE (named as protagonist only at Σ Aristid. Jebb p. 144.4 Dindorf; cf. Fontenrose 1978 s.v. Q155)	PW103; earliest reference Hdt. 8.141. Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 1.167; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 1.173
27	Q163	Delphi	Spartans	PW112; earliest reference Xen. <i>HG</i> 3.3.3. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 399 b-c; Plut. <i>Ages.</i> 3.4; Plut. <i>Ages.</i> 30.1; Plut. <i>Lys.</i> 22.5; Paus. 3.8.9
28	Q164	Delphi	Athenians	PW113. Plut. <i>Cim.</i> 8.6; Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 36.1; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 3.408-9; Paus. 3.3.7

29	Q166	Delphi	Astypalaians	PW88. Plut. <i>Rom.</i> 28.5; Paus. 6.9.8
30	Q169	Delphi	Achaians	PW118. Paus. 6.3.8; Paus. 7.17.6; Paus. 7.17.13
31	Q170, 171	Delphi	Thasians	PW389-91. D.Chr. 31.97; Paus. 6.11.7-8
32	Q174	Delphi	Spartans	PW114; earliest reference Th. 1.134.4; relevant reference Aristodem. 1.8.5, 104J. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 560e-f; Paus. 3.17.9
33	Q175	Delphi	Spartans	PW 115; Paus. 3.11.8; Paus. 4.24.7
34	Q180	Delphi (Aristeides) or Bakis (Aristophanes) or the Sibyl (Plutarch)	Athenians	PW121; earliest reference Ar. <i>Av.</i> 978, <i>Eq.</i> 1013, 1087. Plut. <i>Dem.</i> 19.1; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 1.399
35	Q192	Delphi	Mantineians	Paus. 8.9.4; Paus. 8.36.8
36	Q193	Delphi	Athenians	PW166. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 403b; Plut. <i>Nic.</i> 13.4
37	Q199	Delphi	Lysander of Sparta	PW173. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 408a; Plut. <i>Lys.</i> 29.5
38	Q200	Delphi (Fontenrose [s.v. Q200] gives this oracle to Delphi only because Plutarch mentions it in his <i>De E Delphico</i> )	People of Delos	PW179; earliest reference Eratosthenes <i>ap.</i> Theo Sm. 2 Hiller. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 386e; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 579b-d

39	Q201	Delphi (D.L. 6.21) or the Delion at Sinope (D.L. 6.20-1)	Diogenes the Cynic	PW180. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 332b-c; D.L. 6.20-1; D.L. 6.21
40	Q210	Delphi	Phokion of Athens	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 187f; Plut. <i>Phoc.</i> 8.3
41	Q231	Delphi	Delphians	PW 329; earliest reference Cic. <i>Div.</i> 1.37.81; relevant reference Val. Max. 1.1 ext. 9. Aristid. <i>HL</i> 4.75; *Paus. 10.22.12
42	L2	Delphi	Manto, daughter of Teiresias, and other Theban captives of the Epigonoï presented to Apollo	PW 20, 523; earliest reference <i>Epigonoï</i> (Epic Cycle), <i>ap. Σ Apollonii Rhodii Argonautica (scholia vetera)</i> , p. 35, 308b Wendel. Paus. 7.3.1-2; Paus. 9.33.2
43	L3	Delphi	Aletes, king of Corinth	PW22. Paus. 2.4.4; Paus. 5.18.8
44	L4	Delphi	Aigeus, king of Athens	PW110; E. <i>Med.</i> 679, 681. Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 3.3; Plut. <i>Comp.Thes.Rom.</i> 6.5
45	L5	Delphi	Erginos, king of Orchomenos	PW111. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 784b; Paus. 9.37.4
46	L7	Delphi	Orestes	PW139; the story is reported by Aischylos (in a particularly dramatic form at A. <i>Ch.</i> 270-96), Sophokles and Euripides. D.Chr. 10.27; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 3.323

47	L11	Delphi	Kadmos	PW 142, 374, 481, 501; earliest reference Pindar (Frg. 13 Bowra), as cited at Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 397a, <i>Mor.</i> 1030a and at Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 3.620, and for the oracle, Euripides at <i>Ph.</i> 642-4. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 397a; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1030a; Plut. <i>Sull.</i> 17.5; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 3.620; Paus. 9.12.2; Paus. 9.26.3
48	L17	Delphi	Laios, king of Thebes	PW148, 372; earliest reference Pindar ( <i>O.</i> 2.38-40); note also A. <i>Th.</i> 745-57; E. <i>Ph.</i> 17-20. D.Chr. 10.24-5; D.Chr. 11.8; Luc. <i>JConf.</i> 13; Paus. 9.5.10
49	L22, Q247	Delphi; Plutarch associates (2) with the Sibyl	(1) Theseus (Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 24.5), and (2) Athenian refugees at the time of Sulla (Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 24.5, Paus. 1.20.7)	PW154, 434. Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 24.5; Paus. 1.20.7
50	L34	Delphi?	Telephos	PW 198. Luc. <i>Nigr.</i> 38; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 6.43.2
51	L40	Delphi	Alkmaion	PW202; earliest reference Th. 2.102. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 602d-e; Paus. 8.24.8-9
52	L42	Delphi	Orchomenians	PW207. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 162e-f; Luc. <i>Peregr.</i> 41; Paus. 9.38.3
53	L46	Delphi	Hellenes	PW211; earliest reference D.S. 4.61.1. Paus. 1.44.9; Paus. 2.29.7
54	L49	Delphi	Thracians (Plutarch) or Spartans (Pausanias)	PW215. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 310a; Paus. 7.25.2
55	L61, 62, 63	Delphi	Herakleidai	PW288, 289, 290. Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 3.325; Paus. 2.7.6
56	L80	Delphi	Homer	PW317-9. Paus. 8.24.13-14; Paus. 10.7.3; Paus. 10.24.2

57	L125	Delphi (cf. Fontenrose 1978 s.v. L125)	Ainianes	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 294a; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 297c
58	O2	Ammon	Alexander	Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 27.5; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 180d; Luc. <i>DMort.</i> 12 (395)
59	O3	Ammon	Envoys of Alexander	Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 72.2; Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 75.2
60	O4	Ammon	Hannibal	Plut. <i>Flam.</i> 20.3; Paus. 8.11.10-11
61	O5	Amphiaraos	Lydian envoy of Mardonios	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 412a; Plut. <i>Arist.</i> 19.1-2
62	O6	Amphitrite	Aiolians	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 163a-b; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 984e
63	O7	Bakis	Thebans	Paus. 9.17.5; Paus. 10.32.11
64	O9	Dodona	Athenians	D.Chr. 17.17; Paus. 8.11.12
65	O11	Olympia ( <i>Mor.</i> 191b) or Dodona ( <i>Mor.</i> 208f)	Agesilaos of Sparta	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 191b; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 208f
66	O13	Sibyl	Greeks	Plut. <i>Dem.</i> 19.1; Plut. <i>Dem.</i> 19.3
67	O15	Sibyl	Romans	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 284b-c; Plut. <i>Marc.</i> 3

68	O16	Trophonios (Plut. <i>Arist.</i> 19.1-2 or Ptoan Apollo (Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 412a, Pausanias)	Mys, a Karian envoy of Mardonios	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 412a; Plut. <i>Arist.</i> 19.1-2; Paus. 9.23.6
69	O19	Unspecified oracle	Spartans	Paus. 3.16.10; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 6.20.2-3

**Table 2: The oracular consultations relevant to destiny or career of pre-Second Sophistic protagonists**

See Ch. 2.3.1. Historical and mythical oracles are not separated. Entries pertaining to Delphi are listed first and ordered by Fontenrose number. Entries pertaining to other oracles are ordered alphabetically by oracular centre or divinity/prophet and then by protagonist.

No.	Fontenrose no.	Oracle	Protagonist	Question or occasion	Response	Source
1	H11	Delphi	Xenophon	To what god should he sacrifice and pray to make his intended journey (to the court of Kyros in Persia) successful?	Appropriate gods named (Sokrates is critical of the question)	PW172; earliest reference *X. <i>An.</i> 3.1.5-8, 6.1.22. *D.L. 2.49-50
2	H13	Delphi	Agesipolis, king of Sparta (Xenophon and Aristotle) or Agesilaos of Sparta (Plutarch)	Re going to war with the Persians (Is Apollo's opinion the same as his father's? Cf. T2.45)	A positive response	PW 175; earliest reference X. <i>HG</i> 4.7.2; relevant early reference Arist. <i>Rh.</i> 2.23. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 191b; *Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 209a
3	Q7	Delphi	Lykourgos of Sparta	A visit to the oracle in the context of the need for better laws provokes a spontaneous oracle	Lykourgos is dear to Zeus and all the gods and is himself divine	PW29; PW216; earliest reference *Hdt. 1.65. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1098a; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1103a; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1116e-f; Plut. <i>Lyc.</i> 5.3; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 1.366; *Philostr. <i>VA</i> 8.7.21; Heliod. <i>Aeth.</i> 2.27.1

4	Q21	Delphi	Damagetos, king of Ialysos	Re marriage	He should marry a daughter of the best man of the Hellenes (the form could suggest a riddle, but in the context the answer was apparently obvious)	PW368. *Paus. 4.24.2
5	Q27	Delphi	Archias of Corinth	Re a proposed migration and foundation of a colony	Accreditation specifying precisely the appropriate location	PW2; possible reference by Diodoros at D.S. 5.3.5. *Paus. 5.7.3
6	Q34	Delphi	Phalanthos of Sparta	Re migration from Sparta and resettlement. Do you grant us Sikyonia?	Accreditation specifying the appropriate location in a riddle	PW46; earliest reference *D.S. 8.21.3. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 408a; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 28.9
7	Q36	Delphi	Phalanthos of Sparta	Probably re resettlement	Accreditation specifying the appropriate location in a riddle	PW525. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 408a; *Paus. 10.10.6-7
8	Q43	Probably Delphi	Timesias of Klazomenai	Re his colony	An unpropitious response	PW48. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 96b

9	Q47	Delphi	Battos of Thera	(1) Re a speech defect; (2) Re the apparent failure of his attempt to comply with the god's command	A redirection: colonize Libya. As reported by Herodotos and Pindar, Battos settled an island off the coast of Libya; the colony was not a success and he returned to complain to the god, who pointed out that he had not colonized Libya	Fontenrose Q47; PW39, 71; earliest reference Pi. <i>P.</i> 4.6-8, 56, 61-2, 259-62, 5.62; an account at *Hdt. 4.155.3. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 405b-c; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 408a
10	Q58	Delphi	Kallondes Korax	Kallondes Korax enters the temple, provoking a spontaneous oracle	You killed the Muses' servant [Archilochos]; leave the temple	PW 4-5. *D.Chr. 33.12; *Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 560e; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 3.610
11	Q61	Delphi	Kypselos of Corinth	Probably re his future: he was related to the ruling family, which feared him because of previous oracles in his favour	Ὀλβιος οὗτος ἀνὴρ ὃς ἐμὸν δόμον ἐσκαταβαίνει, Κύψελος Ἡετίδης, βασιλεὺς κλειτοῖο Κορίνθου, αὐτὸς καὶ παῖδες, παίδων γε μὲν οὐκέτι παῖδες (Blessed is this man who enters my house, Kypselos son of Eetion, king of Corinth, himself and his sons, but not his grandsons; Hdt. 5.92e). Dion's version omits the exception of the grandsons	PW8; earliest reference *Hdt. 5.92e. D.Chr. 37.5

12	Q75	Delphi	Anacharsis or (D.L. 1.29-30) Chilon	Is anyone wiser than himself?	Myson is wiser	PW245; Paus. 1.22.8 (Anacharsis); *D.L. 1.29-30 (Chilon); *D.L. 1.30 (Anacharsis); *D.L. 1.106-7 (Anacharsis)
13	Q81	Delphi	Kleotimos for his brother Prokles, tyrant of Epidauros	Re flight in face of weakening power and change of residence	A condemnation: Prokles will have refuge where he bade the Aiginetan place the basket or where the stag casts the horn. A friend from Aigina had disposed of a man murdered by Kleotimos in a basket dropped in the sea, and a stag buries its horns in the earth	PW26. *Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 403d
14	Q100	Delphi	Envoys of Kroisos of Lydia	Should Kroisos make war on the Persians?	If he takes the field against the Persians (Hdt. 1.53) or crosses the Halys (Arist. <i>Rh.</i> 1047a), he will destroy a great realm	PW53; earliest reference *Hdt. 1.53; verse form *Arist. <i>Rh.</i> 1047a. D.Chr. 10.26; Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 48; Luc. <i>Cont.</i> 11; Luc. <i>JConf.</i> 14; Luc. <i>JTr.</i> 20; Luc. <i>JTr.</i> 43
15	Q101	Delphi	Envoys of King Kroisos of Lydia	Will Kroisos' monarchy last long?	An apparent accreditation: he need not flee until a mule becomes king of the Medes (Hdt. 1.55.2)	PW54; earliest reference *Hdt. 1.55. D.Chr. 13.7
16	Q135	Delphi	Telesilla of Argos	Re recovery of her health	She should serve the Muses	PW85. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 245c

17	Q155	Delphi	Mardonios, the Persian commander at Plataia (named as protagonist only at Σ Aristid. Jebb p. 144.4 Dindorf; cf. Fontenrose 1978 s.v. Q155)	How can he take Hellas?	If the Athenians join the Persians, the Greek cause will perish	PW103; earliest reference *Hdt. 8.141. Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 1.167; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 1.173
18	Q160	Delphi	Teisamenos, lamid of Elis	Re his desire for children (Hdt. 9.33)	A redirection: he will win five famous contests	PW107; earliest reference *Hdt. 9.33. *Paus. 3.11.6
19	Q201	Delphi (or the Delion at Sinope)	Diogenes the Cynic	Two alternative questions re his career: (1) as superintendent of the mint as Sinope, should he adulterate the coinage? (2) having fled Sinope after adulterating the coinage, what should he do to be held in the greatest repute?	In each case, the god's response was that he should alter the (political) currency	PW180. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 332b-c; *D.L. 6.20-1; *D.L. 6.21
20	Q213	Delphi	King Philip II of Macedon	Will I vanquish the king of the Persians?	An apparent accreditation: ἔστεπται μὲν ὁ ταῦρος, ἔχει τέλος, ἔστιν ὁ θύσων (The bull is garlanded, the end has arrived, the sacrificer is ready; Paus. 8.7.6)	PW266; earliest reference D.S. 16.91.2. Paus. 8.7.6

21	Q216	Delphi (Pythia)	Alexander the Great	An unspoken question re the outcome of his proposed Persian campaign	ἀνίκητος εἶ ὦ παῖ (My son, you are invincible; Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 14.4)	PW270; earliest reference D.S. 17.93.4. *Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 14.4
22	Q224	Delphi	Zenon of Kition	In the context of the need of a profession: what should he do to live in the best way?	He will have the best life if he is in contact with the dead	PW421. *D.L. 7.2
23	Q245	Delphi	King Attalos I of Pergamon	No circumstances or question specified	An accreditation: Θάρσει, ταυρόκερως, ἔξεις βασιληίδα τιμὴν/καὶ παῖδες παίδων, τούτων γε μὲν οὐκέτι παῖδες (Take courage, bull-horned; you will have kingly office and so will your grandsons, but not their sons; D.S. 34/35.13)	PW431; earliest reference D.S. 34/35.13. Paus. 10.15.3
24	Q248	Delphi	Cicero	Re his career: how will he become famous?	He should make his own nature, not the opinion of the multitude, the guide of life	PW435. *Plut. <i>Cic.</i> 5.1
25	L2	Delphi	Manto, daughter of Teiresias, and other Theban captives of the Epigonoι presented to Apollo	No question specified	Manto should marry whatever man she meets; then she and her companions should go to Kolophon in Ionia (Pausanias refers only to the god's command to found a colony)	PW 20, 523; earliest reference <i>Epigonoι</i> (Epic Cycle), <i>ap. Σ Apollonii Rhodii Argonautica (scholia vetera)</i> , p. 35, 308b Wendel. Paus. 7.3.1-2; Paus. 9.33.2

26	L4	Delphi	Aigeus, king of Athens	How may I have children?	A warning against having children, expressed as a riddle	PW110; E. <i>Med.</i> 679, 681. *Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 3.3; Plut. <i>Comp. Thes. Rom.</i> 6.5
27	L5	Delphi	Erginos, king of Orchomenos	Re having children	Advice – he should take a young wife – expressed as a riddle	PW111. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 784b; *Paus. 9.37.4
28	L7	Delphi	Orestes	How should he avenge his father's (Agamemnon's) murder?	He must kill the murderers, although (in Aischylos' version of the story) this will make him homeless and friendless and forbidden access to sacred rites (A. <i>Ch.</i> 270-96)	PW139; the story is reported by Aischylos, Sophokles and Euripides. D.Chr. 10.27; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 3.323
29	L11	Delphi	Kadmos	Where may he find Europa, or, where should he settle?	Follow a cow and, where she lies down, found a city	PW142, 374, 481, 501; earliest reference Pindar (frg. 13 Bowra), as cited at Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 397a, 1030a and at Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 3.620, and for the oracle, Euripides at * <i>Ph.</i> 642-4. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 397a; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1030a; Plut. <i>Sull.</i> 17.5; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 3.620; Paus. 9.12.2; Paus. 9.26.3
30	L16	Delphi	Amphiklos of Histiaia in Euboea	Re migration	He should settle in Chios	PW147. *Paus. 7.4.9

31	L17	Delphi	Laios, king of Thebes	How may he have a son?	An apparently straightforward warning against having children: if he has a son, that son will kill him	PW148, 372; earliest reference Pindar ( <i>O.</i> 2.38-40); note also *A. <i>Th.</i> 745-57; *E. <i>Ph.</i> 17-20. *D.Chr. 10.24-5; D.Chr. 11.8; Luc. <i>JConf.</i> 13; *Paus. 9.5.10
32	L31	Delphi	Teukros	Re exile from Salamis	Accreditation specifying an appropriate resettlement: he should settle in Cyprus and call his city Salamis	PW194; earliest reference E. <i>Hel.</i> 148-50. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 408a
33	L40	Delphi	Alkmaion	Re his mother's dying curse (Th. 2.102, Paus. 8.24.8-9)	An answer that can be taken as a condemnation or a riddle	PW202; earliest reference *Th. 2.102. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 602d-e; *Paus. 8.24.8-9
34	L50	Delphi?	Archelaos	Re a contemplated colony in Macedonia	He should settle in Macedonia where goats lead him	PW227; relevant reference Hyg. <i>Fab.</i> 219.5. *D.Chr. 4.71-2
35	L80	Delphi	Homer	Re his origin and/or destiny	A cryptic oracle indicating that he will be both unhappy and blessed	PW317-9. Paus. 8.24.13-14; Paus. 10.7.3; *Paus. 10.24.2
36	L83	Delphi	Lokros	On a difference with his father and leaving home, where should he found a colony?	Accreditation/minor riddle specifying the appropriate location: he should found a city where he is bitten by a wooden dog	PW323. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 294e

37	L102	Delphi	Theseus	Where should he found a city?	Whenever in a foreign land he feels distressed and sad, he should found a city	PW411. *Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 26.5
38	L132	Delphi	Chalkinos and Daitos	Request to return to Athens ten generations after Kephalos' exile	Apparent accreditation/minor riddle: they should sacrifice to Apollo first at that place in Attica where they see a trireme running on land	PW541. *Paus. 1.37.7
39	O1	Ammon	Alexander	Re rule, whether the god gives him lordship over all men	Accreditation: it is given	Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 27.4
40	O2	Ammon	Alexander	Alexander visits the oracle with an unspoken question about his destiny and is addressed spontaneously by the priest ( <i>Alex.</i> 27.5)	Accreditation as divine: meaning to address him as ὦ παιδίον (my child), the priest, by a slip of the tongue, says ὦ παιδίος (Son of Zeus) ( <i>Alex.</i> 27.5)	*Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 27.5; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 180d; Luc. <i>DMort.</i> 12 (395)
41	O4	Ammon	Hannibal	Re his place of death	He will be buried in Libyssan earth (Plut. <i>Flam.</i> 20.3); the answer (wrongly) suggests a return home	*Plut. <i>Flam.</i> 20.3; Paus. 8.11.10-11

42	O5	Amphiaraios	Lydian envoy of Mardonios	Re Mardonios' future or success	A warning: during the incubation, the envoy dreamed that a minister of the divinity ordered him out and, when he refused, threw a stone at him	*Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 412a; *Plut. <i>Arist.</i> 19.1-2
43	O8	Didyma	Hermotimos (an earlier incarnation of Pythagoras)	Hermotimos visits the temple hoping to authenticate his memory of himself as Euphorbos	A confirmation of his identity: he identifies there a shield dedicated by Menelaos	*D.L. 8.5
44	O10	Dodona	Themistokles	Re his exile from Athens	He is to go to one with a name like his own	*Plut. <i>Them.</i> 28.3
45	O11	Olympia (Xenophon; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 191b) or Dodona (Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 208f)	Agesipolis, king of Sparta (Xenophon), or Agesilaos of Sparta (Plutarch)	Re going to war with the Persians	A positive response	Relevant early reference X. <i>HG</i> 4.7.2 (cf. T2.2). *Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 191b; *Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 208f
46	O12	Sibyl	Publius Cornelius Lentulus Sura	Probably re his future	Of the three Cornelii designed by fate to be monarchs, two (Cinna and Sulla) had already fulfilled the decree; divine fortune was now advancing for the third	*Plut. <i>Cic.</i> 17.4

47	O16	Trophonios (Plut. <i>Arist.</i> 19.1-2) or Ptoan Apollo (Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 412a, Pausanias)	Mys, a Karian envoy of Mardonios	Probably re Mardonios' future or success	A response in the envoy's own language	*Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 412a; *Plut. <i>Arist.</i> 19.1-2; *Paus. 9.23.6
48	O17	Unspecified	Kolainos, Attic founder of the city of Kolonides in Messenia	Re where he should found a settlement	Accreditation and direction: he should follow a crested lark ( <i>korydos</i> )	*Paus. 4.34.8

**Table 3: Oracular accreditation of pre-Second Sophistic living persons other than the questioner**

See Ch. 2.3.1. Historical and mythical oracles are not separated. Entries pertaining to Delphi are listed first and ordered by Fontenrose number. Entries pertaining to other oracles are ordered alphabetically by oracular centre or divinity/prophet and then by protagonist.

No.	Fontenrose no.	Oracle	Protagonist	Question or occasion	Response	Source
1	H3	Delphi	Chairephon	Is anyone wiser than Sokrates?	No one is wiser (Pl. <i>Ap.</i> 21a) or Sokrates is the wisest of all men (D.L. 2.37)	PW134, 420; earliest reference *Pl. <i>Ap.</i> 20e-21c. D.Chr. 13.30; D.Chr. 55.8; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1116e-f; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 1.366; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 2.78-83; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 3.311; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 28.81; Luc. <i>Herm.</i> 15; Luc. <i>Rh.Pr.</i> 13; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 25; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 10.33; Paus. 1.22.8; D.L. 2.37
2	H22	Delphi	Unknown	Re the continued success of Philip II of Macedon as he advanced through Greece	A response favourable to Philip	PW265; earliest reference Aeschin. 3.130; also relevant Cic. <i>Div.</i> 2.57.118. Plut. <i>Dem.</i> 19.1, 20.1 (the two references are part of a single account)
3	Q23	Delphi	Argives	Re choosing a king when the line of the Herakleidai became extinct	An eagle will show you. The eagle indicates Aigon	PW483. *Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 340c; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 396c
4	Q54	Delphi	Spartans	Re plague	They should summon Thaletas	PW223; earliest reference Philodemos ( <i>Mus.</i> 4.18.37-8). Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1146c

5	Q56	Delphi	Telesikles of Paros, father of Archilochos	Telesikles visits Delphi as part of a civic delegation and receives a spontaneous oracle	Accreditation as 'immortal' of the son who first speaks to him when he disembarks on his native land (Kontoleon 1952, 41, 50-2) or the son to be born (D.Chr. 33.12)	PW231; earliest reference *Inscription of Paros, Kontoleon 1952, 41, 50-2 = Peek 1955, 8, 50-2. *D.Chr. 33.12
6	Q75	Delphi	Anacharsis or Chilon	Is anyone wiser than himself?	Myson	PW245; Paus. 1.22.8 (Anacharsis); *D.L. 1.29-30 (Chilon); *D.L. 1.30 (Anacharsis); *D.L. 1.106-7 (Anacharsis)
7	Q211	Delphi	Chairon of Megopolis for King Philip II of Macedon	Re the meaning of Philip's dream about his wife Olympias: in the dream, Philip sealed her belly with a seal with an impression in the form of a lion	He should worship Ammon, whom he saw in snake form lying with his wife. An accreditation of Alexander	PW269. *Plut. <i>A/ex.</i> 3.1
8	Q223	Delphi	Envoys of Herakleia on Pontos	Re famine	To free themselves from the evil, they must crown Herakleides with a golden crown and honour him as a hero after his death	PW419. *D.L. 5.91
9	L46	Delphi	Hellenes	Re escape from drought and famine	They will have deliverance if Aiakos prays for them	PW211; earliest reference D.S. 4.61.1. *Paus. 1.44.9; *Paus. 2.29.7
10	L104	Delphi	Aiolian colonists	Re migration to Asia	Appoint Echelaos leader	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 163b

11	L162	Delphi	Thessalians	Re the best choice of king	A repeated accreditation of Aleuas	*Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 492a-b
12	O14	Sibyl	Macedonians	No question or occasion specified	Verse oracle re two Philips who will rule in Macedon: one Philip [Philip II, son of Amyntas] will make the Macedonians kings over cities and peoples, and another [Philip V (238-179 BCE), who made peace with the Romans after his defeat in Thessaly in 197] will lose all honour	*Paus. 7.8.9
13	O18	Unspecified oracle	Sokrates' father	Re Sokrates	Let the child do whatever comes into his mind	*Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 589e

**Table 4: 'Ambiguous' oracular responses to pre-Second Sophistic protagonists**

See Ch. 2.3.1. Within each of the two divisions, entries are ordered as on Table 1.

No.	Fontenrose no.	Oracle	Protagonist	Question or occasion	Response	Source
<i>Oracular responses seen as riddles by the recipients</i>						
1	Q20	Delphi	Aristomenes and Theoklos, Messenian envoys	In the course of war with Sparta, re the safety of Messene	εὔτε τράγος πίνησι Νέδης ἐλικόρροον ὕδωρ, οὐκέτι Μεσσήνην ῥύομαι (When a he-goat drinks the whirling water of the Neda, I will no longer protect Messene; Paus. 4.20.1)	PW366. *Paus. 4.20.1-3; Paus. 4.21.3; Paus. 4.21.10
2	Q34	Delphi	Phalanthos of Sparta	Re migration from Sparta and resettlement. Do you grant us Sikyonia?	καλόν τοι τὸ μεταξύ Κορίνθου καὶ Σικυῶνος· ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰκήσεις ... Σατύριον φράζου σὺ Τάραντός τ' ἀγλαὸν ὕδωρ καὶ λιμένα σκαιὸν καὶ ὅπου τράγος ἀλμυρὸν οἶδμα ἀμφαγαπᾷ τέγγων ἄκρον πολιοῖο γενείου· ἔνθα Τάραντα ποιοῦ ... (The area between Corinth and Sikyon is beautiful, but you will not settle there ... Look to Satyrion, the splendid water of Taras, a harbour on the left and the place where a he-goat loves salt water, wetting the tip of his grey beard. There build Tarentum ...; D.S. 8.21.3)	PW46; earliest reference D.S. 8.21.3. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 408a; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 28.9

3	Q36	Delphi	Phalanthos of Sparta	Probably re resettlement	Where he sees rain falling from a clear sky (ὑετοῦ αὐτὸν αἰσθόμενον ὑπὸ αἴθρα), he should acquire land and found a city (Paus. 10.10.6)	PW525. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 408a; *Paus. 10.10.6-7
4	Q76	Delphi	People of Miletos (D.L. 1.27-8) or of Miletos and Kos	To whom should a discovered tripod be awarded?	To the wisest	PW247-8. *Plut. <i>Sol.</i> 4.2-3; *D.L. 1.27-8; *D.L. 1.32-3
5	Q77	Delphi	Chilon of Sparta	What is best for humankind?	Know yourself	PW423; earliest reference Aristotle <i>ap.</i> Clem.Al. <i>Strom.</i> 1.60.3; relevant reference Klearchos <i>ap.</i> Stob. 3.21.26. D.Chr. 4.57; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 116c; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 385d, Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 392a; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 394c; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 408e; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1118c; Plut. <i>Dem.</i> 3.2; Paus. 10.24.1; D.L. 1.40
6	Q147	Delphi	Athenians	In the context of the Persian threat to Athens and an oracle telling them to fly to the world's end, the Athenians ask for a better oracle	Zeus grants Athena a wooden wall that will not fall (Hdt.7.141-142)	PW95; earliest reference *Hdt.7.141.3-4, 142.2. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 828d; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1116e-f; Plut. <i>Them.</i> 10.2; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 1.167; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 3.234; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 3.312; Luc. <i>JTr.</i> 20; Paus. 1.18.2; Philostr. <i>VS</i> 1.481

7	Q154	Delphi	Athenians sent by Aristeides	Re overcoming Mardonios	They should pray to Zeus and Demeter Kithaironia and fight the battle in their own land on the plain of Demeter Eleusinia and Kore (Plut. <i>Arist.</i> 11.3)	PW102. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 628f; *Plut. <i>Arist.</i> 11.3
8	Q163	Delphi	Spartans	A query in the context of the rival claims of Agesilaos (brother of the deceased king Agis), who was lame, and Leotychides (supposed son of Agis), who was illegitimate	Beware a lame kingship (Plut. <i>Ages.</i> 3.4)	PW112; earliest reference Xen. <i>HG</i> 3.3.3. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 399 b-c; *Plut. <i>Ages.</i> 3.4; Plut. <i>Ages.</i> 30.1; Plut. <i>Lys.</i> 22.5; *Paus. 3.8.9
9	Q199	Delphi	Lysander of Sparta	A prediction of the manner of his death	Beware a sounding hoplite and a snake, coming behind (Plut. <i>Lys.</i> 29.5)	PW173. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 408a; *Plut. <i>Lys.</i> 29.5
10	Q200	Delphi	People of Delos	Re ridding themselves of a plague	The present troubles of the Delians and the rest of the Greeks will be at an end when they double the size of the altar at Delos (Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 579b)	PW179; earliest reference Eratosthenes <i>ap.</i> Theo Sm. 2 Hiller. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 386e; *Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 579b-d
11	Q231	Delphi	Delphians	Re the approach of the Gauls: should they abandon Delphi?	I and the white maidens (λευκαί κόραι) will attend to this (Aristid. <i>HL</i> 4.75)	PW 329; earliest reference Cic. <i>Div.</i> 1.37.81; relevant reference Val. Max. 1.1 ext. 9. Aristid. <i>HL</i> 4.75; *Paus. 10.22.12

12	L4	Delphi	Aigeus, king of Athens	How may I have children?	Ἄσκοῦ τὸν προὔχοντα πόδα ... μὴ λύσης πρὶν δῆμον Ἀθηνέων εἰσαφικέσθαι (Do not open the spigot of the wineskin [i.e do not have sex] until you come to Athens; <i>Thes.</i> 3.3)	PW110; E. <i>Med.</i> 679, 681. *Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 3.3; Plut. <i>Comp. Thes. Rom.</i> 6.5
13	L5	Delphi	Erginos, king of Orchomenos	Re having children	ἱστοβοῆι γέροντι νέην ποτίβαλλε κορώνην (Put a new tip on the old plough-beam [i.e. take a young wife]; Paus. 9.37.4)	PW111. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 784b; *Paus. 9.37.4
14	L22, Q247	Delphi; Plutarch associates (2) with the Sibyl	(1) Theseus (Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 24.5), and (2) Athenian refugees at the time of Sulla (Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 24.5, Paus. 1.20.7)	Re the future of Athens	(1) ἄσκοὸς γὰρ ἐν οἴδατι ποντοπορεύσει (a wineskin will pass over the sea on the swell; Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 24.5) (2) Ἄσκοὸς βαπτίζη· δῦναι δέ τοι οὐ θέμις ἐστίν (a wineskin may dip: but for you to sink is not permitted; Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 24.5)	PW154, 434. *Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 24.5; Paus. 1.20.7
15	L40	Delphi	Alkmaion	Re his mother's dying curse (Th. 2.102, Paus. 8.24.8-9)	To avoid the curse, he must settle in a place ἣτις ὅτε ἔκτεινε τὴν μητέρα μήπω ὑπὸ ἡλίου ἑωρᾶτο μηδὲ γῆ ἦν (which had not yet been seen by the sun and was not yet land when he killed his mother; Th. 2.102)	PW202; earliest reference *Th. 2.102. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 602d-e; *Paus. 8.24.8-9

**Oracular responses not obviously riddles**

16	H3	Delphi	Chairephon	Is anyone wiser than Sokrates?	No one is wiser (Pl. <i>Ap.</i> 21a) or Sokrates is the wisest of all men (D.L. 2.37)	PW134, 420; earliest reference *Pl. <i>Ap.</i> 20e-21c. D.Chr. 13.30; D.Chr. 55.8; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1116e-f; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 1.366; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 2.78-83; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 3.311; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 28.81; Luc. <i>Herm.</i> 15; Luc. <i>Rh.Pr.</i> 13; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 25; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 10.33; Paus. 1.22.8; D.L. 2.37
17	Q17	Delphi	Messenians	After a long-drawn-out war, re whether they will have the victory over Sparta	To those who first place 100 tripods around the altar of Zeus Ithomatas, heaven grants glory in war and the Messenian land (Paus. 4.12.7). There is a cryptic addition referring to the actual outcome: ἀπάτη δέ σε πρόσθε τίθησιν ... οὐδ' ἄν θεον ἐξαπατώης. ἔρδ' ὄππῃ τὸ χρεῶν (Deceit puts you [the dedicator of the tripods] ahead ... but you do not deceive the god. Act according to fate ...; Paus. 4.12.7)	PW365; *Paus. 4.12.7; Paus. 4.26.4

18	Q47	Delphi	Battos of Thera	(1) Re a speech defect; (2) Re the apparent failure of his attempt to comply with the god's command	Colonize Libya. As reported by Herodotos and Pindar, Battos settled an island off the coast of Libya; the colony was not a success and he returned to complain to the god, who pointed out that he had not colonized Libya	PW39, 71; earliest reference Pi. <i>P.</i> 4.6-8, 56, 61-2, 259-62, 5.62; an account at Hdt. 4.155.3. *Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 405b-c; *Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 408a
19	Q88	Delphi	Spartans	Re a possible conquest. Do you give us Arkadia?	Arkadia is too much to ask. δώσω τοι Τεγέην ποσσίκροτον ὀρχήσασθαι καὶ καλὸν πεδίον σχοίνῳ διαμετρήσασθαι (I will give you Tegea to dance in with beating feet and mark out the lovely plain with a measure; Hdt. 1.66). (The reference is to their life as prisoners.)	PW31; earliest reference *Hdt. 1.66. *D.Chr. 17.16; Plut. <i>Cor.</i> 3.3; Paus. 3.7.3; Paus. 8.1.6; Philostr. <i>VS</i> 2.575
20	Q100	Delphi	Envoys of Kroisos of Lydia	Should Kroisos make war on the Persians?	If he takes the field against the Persians (Hdt. 1.53) or crosses the Halys (Arist. <i>Rh.</i> 1047a), he will destroy a great realm. (The realm turns out to be his own.)	PW53; earliest reference *Hdt. 1.53; verse form *Arist. <i>Rh.</i> 1047a. D.Chr. 10.26; Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 48; Luc. <i>Cont.</i> 11; Luc. <i>JConf.</i> 14; Luc. <i>JTr.</i> 20; Luc. <i>JTr.</i> 43
21	Q170, 171	Delphi	Thasians	(1) Re famine; (2) Re continuing famine after their attempt to comply with the god's command	(1) Bring back the exiles; (2) You have forgotten Theagenes (D.Chr. 31.97). Theagenes was a brilliant athlete whose statue had been prosecuted for murder and dropped into the sea (D.Chr. 31.95-6; Paus. 6.11.5-6)	PW389-91. *D.Chr. 31.97; *Paus. 6.11.7-8

22	Q193	Delphi	Athenians	Re proposed war on Syracuse	They should bring the priestess of Athena from Klazomenai (Plut. <i>Nic.</i> 13.4) or Erythrai (Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 403b). (The Athenians ignore the hidden message in the priestess' name and come to disaster in Syracuse.)	PW166. *Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 403b; *Plut. <i>Nic.</i> 13.4
23	Q201	Delphi (D.L. 6.21) or the Delion at Sinope (D.L. 6.20-1)	Diogenes the Cynic	Two alternative questions re his career: (1) as superintendent of the mint as Sinope, should he adulterate the coinage? (2) having fled Sinope after adulterating the coinage, what should he do to be held in the greatest repute?	In each case, the god's response was that he should alter the (political) currency	PW180. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 332b-c; *D.L. 6.20-1; *D.L. 6.21
24	L17	Delphi	Laios, king of Thebes	How may he have a son?	If he has a son, the son will kill him. Euripides ( <i>Ph.</i> 17-20) suggests that if Laios has a son at all, that son will kill him. In Pausanias' version (9.5.10), the son must be Iocasta's. Dion (10.24-5) suggests a different form: the god instructed Laios not to beget, or, having begotten, <i>not</i> to expose (ἔχρησεν οὖν μὴ γεννᾶν, ἢ ἐκτιθέναι γεννήσαντα)	PW148, 372; earliest reference Pindar (Pi. <i>O.</i> 2.38-40); note also *A. <i>Th.</i> 745-57; *E. <i>Ph.</i> 17-20. *D.Chr. 10.24-5; D.Chr. 11.8; Luc. <i>JConf.</i> 13; *Paus. 9.5.10
25	L61, 62, 63	Delphi	Herakleidai	Re conquest of the Peloponnesos	The gods give you victory if you await the third harvest and go through the road of the narrows (Apollod. 2.8.2)	PW288, 289, 290. Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 3.325; Paus. 2.7.6; *Apollod. 2.8.2

26	O2	Ammon	Alexander	Alexander visits the oracle with an unspoken question about his destiny and is addressed spontaneously by the priest ( <i>Alex. 27.5</i> )	Meaning to address him as ὦ παιδίον (my child), the priest, by a slip of the tongue, says ὦ παῖ Διός (Son of Zeus) ( <i>Alex. 27.5</i> )	*Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 27.5; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 180d; Luc. <i>DMort.</i> 12 (395)
27	O4	Ammon	Hannibal	Re his place of death	He will be buried in Lybissan earth (Λίβυσσα βῶλος); he takes the oracle to refer to Libya when in fact it refers to the nearby village of Libyssa (Plut. <i>Flam.</i> 20.3)	*Plut. <i>Flam.</i> 20.3; Paus. 8.11.10-11
28	O9	Dodona	Athenians	Re proposed conquest of Sicily	They should annex Sicily; the 'Sicily' meant was a small hill near Athens (D.Chr. 17.17)	*D.Chr. 17.17; *Paus. 8.11.12

**Table 5: Pre-Second Sophistic unmediated encounters with the divine**

See Chs 2.2.2, 2.3.2. Encounters range from those obtained only after journeys to remote places (caves or the depths of the sea, the far reaches of the earth, Hades) to those that involve seizing upon a situation that presents itself in the course of events (e.g. Demokritos and a Spartan challenge what is apparently a manifestation of a spirit at a local tomb). Since encounters must in some sense be elicited by the protagonists, loves of the gods are omitted. The protagonist must be a named individual, so (for example) the confrontation between the people of Tanagra and a Triton at Paus. 9.20.4 is not included. Numinous encounters of any kind occurring at a sanctuary are associated with the god of that sanctuary. The collective references Paus. 3.18.10-16, 5.10.9-5.11.10, and 5.17.5-5.19.9 group together imagery associated with the *thronos* of Amyklai and the temple and Chest (*larnax*) of Kypselos at Olympia, respectively. Under each subheading, entries are ordered alphabetically by protagonist.

No.	Protagonist	Liminal being/Place	Source
<b><i>Encounters with 'monsters'</i></b>			
1	Achilles	Amazon [Penthesileia]/Troy	D.Chr. 11.31
2	Achilles	Cheiron/[Mount Pelion, Thessaly]	D.Chr. 58.1-6; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 16.37; **Paus. 3.18.10-16; Paus. 9.31.5
3	Alexander	Amazon/Skythia	*Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 46.1
4	Alexander (in his dream)	Satyr/Tyre	*Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 24.5
5	[Asklepios]	Cheiron/[Mount Pelion, Thessaly]	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 717d-e

6	Bellerophon	Chimaira/[Lykia]	D.Chr. 32.28; *Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 247f-248c; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 3.308, <i>Or.</i> 37.24, <i>Or.</i> 46.29; Luc. <i>Cal.</i> 26; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 8.16; ** Paus. 22.27.2; **Paus. 3.18.10-16
7	Bellerophon	Amazons/unspecified place	*Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 247f-248c
8	Dionysos	Amazons/Ephesos and (Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 303d-e) Samos	*Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 303d-e; Paus. 7.2.7
9	Herakles	Amazon Hippolyte/[region of the River Thermadon] (ninth Labour)	*D.Chr. 8.32; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 301f; Plut. <i>Luc.</i> 23.5; **Paus. 5.10.9-5.11.10; **Paus. 5.25.11; Paus. 7.2.7
10	Herakles	Antaios, a giant/[Libya]	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 342a; Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 11.1; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 45.3; **Paus. 9.11.6
11	Herakles	Birds/Stymphalos (Peloponnese) (sixth Labour)	D.Chr. 47.4; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 341f-342a; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 40.5; Luc. <i>JTr.</i> 21; **Paus. 5.10.9-5.11.10; Paus. 8.22.4
12	Herakles	Boar/River Erymanthos (Peloponnese) (fourth Labour)	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 341f-342a; **Paus. 5.10.9-5.11.10; **Paus. 5.26.7; Paus. 8.24.5
13	Herakles	Bull/Krete (seventh Labour)	**Paus. 5.10.9-5.11.10; Paus. 11.27.10
14	Herakles	Centaur Nessos/River Euenos	*D.Chr. 60.1-10; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 50; **Paus. 3.18.10-16; Paus. 10.38.2; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 6.10.6
15	Herakles	Centaur/Mount Pholoe (cave of the Centaur Pholos)	*D.Chr. 60.3; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 387d; Luc. <i>JTr.</i> 21; Luc. <i>Symp.</i> 14; **Paus. 3.18.10-16; Paus. 5.5.10; **Paus. 5.17.5-5.19.9

16	Herakles	Eagle tormenting Prometheus (and Prometheus himself)/[Kaukasos]	DChr. 8.33; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 387d; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 40.7; *Luc. <i>DDeor.</i> 5(1).1-2; Luc. <i>J.Conf.</i> 8; *Luc. <i>Prom.</i> 1-21; Luc. <i>Prom.Es</i> 3; Luc. <i>Sacr.</i> 6; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 38; *Paus. 5.10.9-5.11.10; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 22.3
17	Herakles	Geryon, a three-bodied giant/island of Erytheia [in the vicinity of Gadeira (Hdt. 4.8)] (tenth Labour)	*D.Chr. 8.31; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 267e-f; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 2.229; Luc. <i>Fug.</i> 31; Luc. <i>Herc.</i> 2; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 56; Luc. <i>Tox.</i> 62; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 2.32; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 3.19; Paus. 3.16.4; **Paus. 3.18.10-16; Paus. 4.36.3-4; **Paus. 5.10.9-5.11.10; **Paus. 5.17.5-5.19.9; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 6.10.6; Philostr. <i>VS</i> 1.505
18	Herakles	Guardians (a dragon, Atlas) of the apples of the Hesperides/Libya [or (Apollod. 2.5.11) the land of the Hyperboreans] (eleventh Labour)	*D.Chr. 8.34; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 387d; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 941c; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 40.7, ** <i>Or.</i> 40.15, <i>Or.</i> 45.3; Luc. <i>Cont.</i> 4; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 56; Paus. 2.13.8; **Paus. 5.10.9-5.11.10; **Paus. 5.17.5-5.19.9; **Paus. 6.19.8
19	Herakles	Hind/River Kerynitis (Peloponnese) (third Labour)	**Paus. 5.10.9-5.11.10
20	Herakles	Hydra/Lerna (Peloponnese) (second Labour)	D.Chr. 47.4; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 341f; Luc. <i>Anach.</i> 35; Luc. <i>JTr.</i> 21; Luc. <i>JTr.</i> 32; Luc. <i>Phal.</i> 1.8; **Paus. 1.24.2; Paus. 2.37.4; **Paus. 3.18.10-16; **Paus. 5.10.9-5.11.10; **Paus. 5.17.5-5.19.9; **Paus. 10.18.6; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 6.10.6

21	Herakles	Kerberos/Hades (twelfth Labour)	*D.Chr. 47.4; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 285f; *Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 35.1; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 37.25, <i>Or.</i> 40.7; Luc. <i>Fug.</i> 31; Luc. <i>Nec.</i> 1; Luc. <i>Nec.</i> 8; Luc. <i>Nec.</i> 10; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 3.19; **Paus. 2.31.2; Paus. 2.35.10; **Paus. 3.18.10-16; Paus. 3.25.5; Paus. 5.14.2; **Paus. 5.26.7; Paus. 8.18.3; Paus. 9.34.5; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 4.46.2
22	Herakles	Lion/Nemea (Peloponnese) (first Labour)	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 341f-342a; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 2.307; Luc. <i>JTr.</i> 32; Luc. <i>Philops.</i> 8; Paus. 2.15.2; **Paus. 3.18.10-16; **Paus. 5.10.9-5.11.10; **Paus. 5.26.7; Paus. 6.5.5; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 6.10.6
23	Herakles	Mares of Diomedes/Thrace (eighth Labour)	*D.Chr. 8.31; D.Chr. 33.47; Luc. <i>JTr.</i> 21; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 7.16; **Paus. 3.18.10-16; **Paus. 5.10.9-5.11.10
24	Jason	Bulls (fire-breathing) and the offspring of dragon's teeth (cf. Apollod. 1.9.23)/Kolchis	D.Chr. 16.10; D.Chr. 23.4
25	Jason	Dragon guarding the Golden Fleece (cf. Apollod. 1.9.23)/Kolchis	D.Chr. 16.10
26	Jason	Harpies/[Salmydessos, Thrace]	**Paus. 3.18.10-16; **Paus. 5.17.5-5.19.9
27	Meleagros of Kalydon	Boar/Kalydon	Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 29.3; Paus. 2.7.9; **Paus. 3.18.10-16; Paus. 8.4.10; Paus. 8.45.2; **Paus. 8.45.4-7; Paus. 8.47.2
28	Midas, king of Phrygia	Silenos/[remote place in Phrygia]	*Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 115b-e; Paus. 1.4.5; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 6.27.2

29	Odysseus	Giants (maneating)/island of the Laistrygones ( <i>Od.</i> 10.106-32)	Paus. 8.29.2
30	Odysseus	Kalypso/[Ogygia ( <i>Od.</i> 1.85)]	D.Chr. 11.20; D.Chr. 11.41; D.Chr.13.4; D.Chr. 32.21; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 831d; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 941a; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 2.145; Luc. <i>Philops.</i> 10; Luc. <i>VH</i> 2.29; Luc. <i>VH</i> 2.35-6; Apul. <i>Apol.</i> 57; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 1.12; Paus. 8.3.7; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 7.10.2; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 8.11
31	Odysseus	Polyphemos/island of the Kyklopes ( <i>Od.</i> 9.105-564)	D.Chr. 11.34; D.Chr. 33.40; D.Chr. 55.11; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 181f; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 506b; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 545c; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 557c; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 986f; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 992d; Plut. <i>Cat.Ma.</i> 9.3; Plut. <i>Galba</i> 1.4; Luc. <i>Cat.</i> 14; Luc. <i>Cont.</i> 7; *Luc. <i>DMar.</i> 2.1-4 (292-4); Luc. <i>Pseudol.</i> 27; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 4.36.3; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 7.28.3
32	Odysseus	Seirenes/island of the Seirenes ( <i>Od.</i> 12.39-54, 12.165-200)	D.Chr.12.36; D.Chr. 32.47; D.Chr. 33.41; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 745f; Luc. <i>Cal.</i> 30; Luc. <i>Cont.</i> 21; Luc. <i>Im.</i> 14; Luc. <i>Nigr.</i> 3; Luc. <i>Nigr.</i> 19; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 3-4; Luc. <i>Sat.</i> 32; Paus. 10.5.12; Paus. 10.6.5
33	Odysseus	Skylla and Charybdis/twin rocks at sea ( <i>Od.</i> 12.73-110, 12.234-59)	D.Chr. 11.34; D.Chr. 55.11; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 476b; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 545c; Plut. <i>Dio</i> 18.3; Luc. <i>Cont.</i> 7; Luc. <i>Pseudol.</i> 27
34	Oidipous	Sphinx/[Thebes]	D.Chr. 10.31; D.Chr. 11.8; *Paus. 9.26.2-4
35	Pasiphae	Bull/Krete	D.Chr. 21.4; D.Chr. 32.77; D.Chr. 71.6; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 139b; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 49; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 10.19; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 10.22

36	Perseus	Medousa/[far west, near the Hesperides (Hes. <i>Th.</i> 274-6)]	D.Chr. 32.28; D.Chr. 33.47; D.Chr. 66.21; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 18.9; <i>Or.</i> 37.24, <i>Or.</i> 46.13; **Luc. <i>Dom.</i> 25; Luc. <i>Hist.Conscr.</i> 1; Luc. <i>Im.</i> 1; Luc. <i>Im.</i> 14; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 44; Luc. <i>Vit.Auct.</i> 25; **Paus. 1.22.7; **Paus. 1.23.7; *Paus. 2.21.5-6; **Paus. 2.27.2; **Paus. 3.17.2-3; **Paus. 3.18.10-16; **Paus. 5.17.5-5.19.9; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 7.20.4
37	Perseus	Sea-monster/[Ethiopia]	*Luc. <i>DMar.</i> 14.2 (323); **Luc. <i>Dom.</i> 22; Paus. 4.35.9; **Philostr. <i>VA</i> 1.25.2; **Heliod. <i>Aeth.</i> 4.8; **Heliod. <i>Aeth.</i> 10.5; **Heliod. <i>Aeth.</i> 10.14
38	Pompey	Amazons/River Abas, near the Caspian (Hyrcanian) Sea	Plut. <i>Pomp.</i> 35.3
39	Theseus	Amazons/Athens (and other Greek cities)	*Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 26.1-2; **Paus. 1.15.1; **Paus. 1.17.2; **Paus. 1.25.2; Paus. 1.41.7; Paus. 2.32.9; **Paus. 5. 10.9-5.11.10; Paus. 7.2.7
40	Theseus	Amazons/region of the River Thermodon	D.Chr. 11.47; *Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 26.1; Luc. <i>VH</i> 2.8; *Paus. 1.2.1
41	Theseus	Bandits Periphetes, Sinis, Skiron, Kerkyon, Prokroustes, and the sow Phaia/road from Troizen to Athens	*Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 8.1-11.1; *Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 29.1; Luc. <i>JTr.</i> 21; **Paus. 1.3.1; Paus. 1.38.5; Paus. 1.39.3; Paus. 1.44.8; Paus. 2.1.3; Paus. 2.1.4
42	Theseus	Bull of Marathon/Tetrapolis (the region about Marathon)	*Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 14.1; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 1.23; Paus. 1.27.10

- |    |         |                                   |  |
|----|---------|-----------------------------------|--|
| 43 | Theseus | Centaurs/[Mount Pelion, Thessaly] | D.Chr. 27.2; D.Chr. 32.53; *Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 29.3; *Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 30.3; Luc. <i>Symp.</i> 45; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 4.8; **Paus. 1.17.2; **Paus. 1.28.2; **Paus. 5. 10.9-5.11.10  |
| 44 | Theseus | Minotaur/Labyrinth, Krete         | D. Chr. 80.9; *Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 19.1; Luc. <i>Herm.</i> 47; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 49; Paus. 1.1.2; Paus. 1.22.5; **Paus. 1.24.1; *Paus. 2.31.1; **Paus. 3.18.10-16; **Paus. 5.17.5-5.19.9; Paus. 8.48.3; *Paus. 9.40.4; *Paus. 10.29.4 |

***Encounters with spirits***

- |    |  |  |                            |
|----|--|--|----------------------------|
| 45 | Bodyguard of Demetrios, son of Antigonos (336-283 BCE) | Trophonios/Lebadeia  | *Paus. 9.39.12             |
| 46 | Demokritos of Abdera, 5th century BCE                  | Youths dressed up as spirits/tomb outside Abdera                                     | *Luc. <i>Philops.</i> 32   |
| 47 | Elysios of Terina, probably 4th century BCE            | Spirits of Elysios' father and son/a <i>psychomanteion</i>                           | *Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 109b-d  |
| 48 | Euthymos, a boxer, 5th century BCE                     | Hero who travelled with Odysseus and was stoned to death in Temesa/the hero's shrine | **Paus. 6.6.9-11           |
| 49 | Herakles   | Spirit of Alkestis [and Hades]/Hades   | Philostr. <i>VA</i> 4.45.1 |

50	Herakles	Theseus/Hades or (Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 35.1) Molossia	*Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 35.1; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 4.46.2
51	Karian envoy of Mardonios, the Persian commander at Plataia 479 BCE	Trophonios/Lebadeia	*Plut. <i>Arist.</i> 19.1-2
52	Leonymos of Kroton, a general	Spirits of Achilles, the two Ajaxes, Patroklos and Antilochos/Leuke, an island at the mouth of the Istros on the Black Sea	*Paus. 3.19.12-13
53	Lydian envoy of Mardonios, the Persian commander at Plataia 479 BCE	Amphiaraos/[Oropos]	*Plut. <i>Arist.</i> 19.1-2
54	Odysseus	Spirit of Teiresias and other spirits/Hades ( <i>Od.</i> 11.1-332)	D.Chr. 4.37; D.Chr. 11.34; D.Chr. 74.19; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 16e; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 516a-b; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 740e-f; Plut. <i>Mar.</i> 11.6; Luc. <i>Astr.</i> 24; Luc. <i>DMort.</i> 23 (448); Luc. <i>DMort.</i> 26.1-3 (399- 401); Luc. <i>Luct.</i> 5; Luc. <i>Nec.</i> 1; Luc. <i>Nec.</i> 8; Apul. <i>Apol.</i> 31; Paus. 2.13.3; Paus. 3.24.11; Paus. 8.48.6; Paus. 9.33.2; **Paus. 10.28.1, 10.29.8 (both references parts of the description of the same painting); Philostr. <i>VA</i> 4.16.1

55	Orpheus	Spirit of Eurydike/oracle of the dead at Aornon in Thesprotis	Paus. 9.30.6
56	Pausanias, Spartan leader of the combined Greek forces at Plataia 479 BCE	Spirit of Kleonike/oracle of the dead at Herakleia in Pontos	*Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 555c; *Plut. <i>Cim.</i> 6.4-7; Paus. 3.17.8-9
57	Pelopidas, Theban general at Leuktra 371 BCE	Spirits of Skedastos and his daughters/tombs of the daughters of Skedastos, Leuktra (Boiotia)	Plut. <i>Pel.</i> 20.6-21.1. The story is told also at Ps.-Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 774d.
58	Quintus Titius, a Roman trader in Greece and acquaintance of Sulla, c. 86 BCE	Trophonios/Lebadeia	*Plut. <i>Sull.</i> 17.2-3
59	Salvenius, a Roman soldier known to Sulla, c. 86 BCE	Trophonios/Lebadeia	*Plut. <i>Sull.</i> 17.2-3
60	Saon of Akraiphnion, c. 6th century BCE	Trophonios/Lebadeia (prior to the founding of the oracle)	*Paus. 9.40.1-2
61	Spartan	Unidentified spirit/unidentified tomb	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 236d

***Encounters with gods (including all encounters at sanctuaries/temples/residences of gods, and natural places that were to become sanctuaries)***

62	Achilles	Skamandros, a river god or personified river/Troy	D.Chr. 11.32; D.Chr. 11.107
63	Aipytos, king of the Arkadians	Poseidon Hippios/Mantineia	Paus. 8.5.5; *Paus. 8.10.2-3
64	Aischylos	Dionysos/a field of grapes	*Paus. 1.21.2
65	Aktaion	Artemis/Mount Kithairon	D.Chr. 10.5; Lucian. <i>DDeor.</i> 18.2 (245); Luc. <i>Deor.Conc.</i> 7; Luc. <i>Peregr.</i> 2; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 41; Luc. <i>Sat.</i> 8; **Apul. <i>Met.</i> 2.4; Paus. 9.2.3; **Paus. 10.30.5
66	Alexander	Herakles/Tyre	*Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 24.3
67	Alexander	Nemeses/Mount Pagos, near Smyrna	Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 20.7; *Paus. 7.5.1-3
68	Alpheios, a hunter	Artemis/Latrinoi (Elis)	*Paus. 6.22.9
69	Amphion	[Apollo (Apollod. 3.5.6)/Mount Kithairon]	Paus. 9.5.8
70	Aristomenes, hero of the Messenian resistance to Sparta c. 650 BCE	Dioskouroi/battlefield near Sparta	*Paus. 4.16.5

71	Aristomenes, hero of the Messenian resistance to Sparta c. 650 BCE	Helen and the Dioskouroi/Sparta	*Paus. 4.16.9
72	Bellerophon	[Zeus/Heaven]	Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 46.13; Luc. <i>Astr.</i> 13
73	Bouphagos	Artemis/Mount Pholoe	Paus. 8.27.17
74	Daughters of Acheloios	Muses/Koroneia (Boiotia)	*Paus. 9.34.3
75	Diomedes	Aphrodite/battlefield near Troy	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 739b
76	Dionysos	[Hades (the god)]/Hades	Paus. 2.31.2; Paus. 2.37.5
77	Er	[The judges of souls (Pl. <i>R.</i> 614b)]/Hades	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 740b-c
78	Eurytos	Apollo/unspecified place	Luc. <i>Pisc.</i> 6
79	Herakles	Apollo/Delphi	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 387d; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 413a; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 557c; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 560d; Paus. 3.21.8; **Paus. 8.37.1; *Paus. 10.13.7-8
80	Herakles	Hades or (Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 35.1) the king of the Molossians/Hades or (Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 31) Molossia	*Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 35.1; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 4.46.2

81	Herakles	Hades [and the spirit of Alkestis]/Hades	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 4.45.1
82	Hesiod	Muses/Mount Helikon	D.Chr. 55.1; D.Chr. 77/8.1; D.Chr. 77/8.1; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 2.100, <i>Or.</i> 28.20; Luc. <i>Ind.</i> 3; Luc. <i>Rh.Pr.</i> 4; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 24
83	Iodama, priestess of Itonian Athena	[Athena]/sanctuary of Itonian Athena at Koroneia (Boiotia)	*Paus. 9.34.1-2
84	Ixion	Hera/[Heaven?]	D.Chr. 4.123; D.Chr. 4.130; D.Chr. 32.75; Plut. <i>Agis</i> 1.1; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 6.40.2; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 7.12.2
85	Kenchrias	Artemis/Corinth, on the road to Lechaion	*Paus. 2.3.2
86	Kleomedes of Astypalaia, a boxer, 5th century BCE	[Athena]/sanctuary of Athena at Astypalaia	*Paus. 6.9.6-8
87	Koretas, a shepherd (Plutarch), or shepherds (Pausanias)	Apollo/Delphi (prior to the founding of the oracle)	*Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 433c-d; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 435d; Paus. 10.5.7
88	Larentia, a prostitute	Herakles/Temple of Herakles, Rome	*Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 272f; *Plut. <i>Rom.</i> 5.1-3
89	Leonidas of Sparta, 5th century BCE	Prophetic dream presumably sent by the god/Temple of Herakles, Thebes	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 865f

90	Linus	Apollo/unspecified place	Paus. 9.29.6
91	Linus	Muses/Mount Helikon	D.Chr. 1.58 [the reference taken alone could equally well be to Hesiod; Cohoon (1932, n. 2 at D.Chr. 1.58) sees it as a reference to Linus because it is coupled with mention of Orpheus: Vergil ( <i>Ecl.</i> 4.55-6) and Apollodoros (Apollod. 1.3.2) pair the names of Orpheus and Linos]; Paus. 9.29.6
92	Lucullus, Roman military commander fighting Mithridates, 1st century BCE	Aphrodite/Temple of Aphrodite, Troas	*Plut. <i>Luc.</i> 12.1
93	Lykaon, ancient king of Arkadia	[Zeus]/Altar of Zeus Lykaios, Mount Lykaion (Arkadia)	*Paus. 8.2.3
94	Lykourgos, king of Thrace	Dionysos/[Thrace]	**Paus. 1.20.3
95	Mantineians fighting Spartans under Agis	Poseidon/battlefield near Mantinea	Paus. 8.10.8
96	Marsyas, a satyr	Apollo/unspecified place	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 713d; Plut. <i>Alc.</i> 2.5; Luc. <i>DDeor.</i> 18.2 (244); Apul. <i>Fl.</i> 3; Paus. 2.7.9; Paus. 2.22.9
97	Menelaos	Proteus/Pharos, off the coast of Egypt ( <i>Od.</i> 4.354-570)	D.Chr. 33.60; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 97a; *Luc. <i>DMar.</i> 4.1 (298); Luc. <i>Peregr.</i> 1; Luc. <i>Sacr.</i> 5; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 19; Apul. <i>Apol.</i> 31; Apul. <i>Apol.</i> 32; **Paus. 3.18.10-16; Paus. 8.53.5; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 1.4; Philostr. <i>VS</i> 2.592-3; Heliod. <i>Aeth.</i> 2.24

98	Mousaios	Boreas/unspecified place	**Paus. 1.22.7
99	Numa Pompilius, legendary second king of Rome	Egeria/groves and fields consecrated to the gods	*Plut. <i>Num.</i> 4.1-2
100	Numa Pompilius, legendary second king of Rome	Jupiter/Mount Aventine	*Plut. <i>Num.</i> 15.5
101	Numa Pompilius, legendary second king of Rome	Muses/unspecified place	Plut. <i>Cam.</i> 20.4
102	Numa Pompilius, legendary second king of Rome	Picus and Faunus/Mount Aventine	*Plut. <i>Num.</i> 15.4
103	Orpheus	Hades and Persephone (and the spirit of Eurydike)/Hades	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 566c; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 761e-f; Luc. <i>DMort.</i> 28.3 (428); Luc. <i>Nec.</i> 1; Luc. <i>Nec.</i> 8; *Paus. 9.30.4; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 8.7.41
104	Orpheus	Women maddened by a god [variously identified cf. Gantz 1993, 721-5]/Thrace	Luc. <i>Ind.</i> 11; Luc. <i>Pisc.</i> 2; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 51; Luc. <i>Sat.</i> 8; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 2.26; Paus. 9.30.7; D.L. 1.5

105	Pentheus	Maenads (women maddened by Dionysos)/Mount Kithairon	Plut. <i>Crass.</i> 33.3; Luc. <i>Ind.</i> 19; Luc. <i>DDeor.</i> 22.1 (248); Luc. <i>Deor.Conc.</i> 7; Luc. <i>Peregr.</i> 2; Luc. <i>Pisc.</i> 2; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 41; Luc. <i>Sat.</i> 8; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 2.26; **Paus. 1.20.3; *Paus. 2.2.7; Paus. 9.2.4; Paus. 9.5.4
106	Perseus	Dionysos/Argos	Paus. 2.20.4; Paus. 2.22.1; Paus. 2.23.7
107	Phaethon	Zeus/the heavens	D.Chr. 1.46; D.Chr. 36.48; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 466e-f; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 557d; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 607f; Luc. <i>Astr.</i> 19; Luc. <i>Electr.</i> 1-2; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 55; Luc. <i>VH</i> 1.12 (Phaethon's position as ruler of the sun is taken as an indirect reference to the famous story); Paus. 1.4.1; **Paus. 2.3.2
108	Phalkes	Hera/Corinth, on the road to Sikyon, at a place later the site of a temple of Hera	Paus. 2.11.2
109	Philippides, Athenian envoy to Sparta, 5th century BCE	Pan/Mount Parthenios, at a site later a sanctuary of Pan	*Paus. 1.28.4; Paus. 8.54.6
110	Phormion of Sparta and his daughter	Dioskouroi/Phormion's house, once the home of the Dioskouroi	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1103b; *Paus. 3.16.2-3
111	[Skamandrios]	[Artemis/wild places appropriate to hunting]	D.Chr. 71.7

112	Thamyris	Muses/Dorion [near Pylos]	D.Chr. 13.21; Luc. <i>Pisc.</i> 6; Paus. 4.33.3; Paus. 4.33.7; Paus. 9.5.9; **Paus. 9.30.2; **Paus. 10.30.8
113	Theseus and Pirithous	Daughter of Hades or Persephone/Hades or Thesprotia (Paus. 1.17.4-5; Paus. 2.22.6) or Molossia (Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 31.4)	*Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 31.4; Luc. <i>Luct.</i> 5; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 60; **Paus. 1.15.3; Paus. 1.17.4-5; Paus. 1.41.5; Paus. 2.22.6; **Paus. 3.18.10-16; Paus. 9.31.5; **Paus. 10.28.2, 10.29.9-10 (both parts of the description of the same painting)
114	Timoleon, Corinthian commander who expelled Dionysios II from Syracuse, 4th century BCE	[Apollo?]/Delphi	*Plut. <i>Tim.</i> 8.2
115	Valeria, sister of Publicola, and other Roman ladies, 5th century BCE	[Jupiter?]/Altar of Jupiter Capitolinus, Rome	*Plut. <i>Cor.</i> 33.2

***Natural or other places – the nature of the divine contact not specified***

116	Amphiaraios	The House of Divination (οἶκος μαντικός), Phleious	Paus. 2.13.7
117	Arion	The sea, on a voyage from Italy to Corinth	D.Chr. 32.61; *Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 160e-162b; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 984d; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 2.376; Luc. <i>Nav.</i> 19; Luc. <i>DMar.</i> 5.2 (308); Apul. <i>Fl.</i> 17; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 6.29; **Paus. 3.25.7; **Paus. 9.30.2;

118	Aristeas of Prokonnesos	A fuller's workshop in Prokonnesos	*Plut. <i>Rom.</i> 28.4; Paus. 1.24.6; Paus. 5.7.9
119	Britomartis	The sea, off Krete	*Paus. 2.30.3
120	Empedokles of Akragas (Sicily)	Etna	Luc. <i>DMort.</i> 6.4 (416); Luc. <i>Fug.</i> 2; Luc. <i>Icar.</i> 13; Luc. <i>Peregr.</i> 1; Luc. <i>Peregr.</i> 4; Luc. <i>Pisc.</i> 2; Luc. <i>VH</i> 2.21; *D.L. 8.67-8.69 (source: Herakleides); *D.L. 8.69 (source: Hippobotos)
121	Enalos	The sea, near Lesbos	*Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 163b-c; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 984e
122	Epimenides of Knossos	A cave on Krete	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 784a; Luc. <i>Philops.</i> 26; Luc. <i>Tim.</i> 6; **Paus. 1.14.4; *D.L. 1.109-112 (citing Theopompos and others)
123	Glaukos	The sea off Anthedon (in Boiotia, opposite Euboia)	Paus. 9.22.7
124	Herakles	Mount Oita	D.Chr. 4.32; D.Chr. 8.34; D.Chr. 33.47; D.Chr. 60.8; D.Chr. 77/8.44; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 1.50, <i>Or.</i> 11.65; Luc. <i>DDeor.</i> 15.1 (236); Luc. <i>DMort.</i> 11.5 (405); Luc. <i>Herm.</i> 7; Luc. <i>Peregr.</i> 4; Luc. <i>Peregr.</i> 21; Luc. <i>Peregr.</i> 24; Luc. <i>Peregr.</i> 33; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 50; Apul. <i>Apol.</i> 22; **Paus. 3.18.10-16; **Paus. 3.19.5
125	Ikaros	Vicinity of the sun	*D.Chr. 4.120-1; D.Chr. 71.6; Luc. <i>Astr.</i> 15; Luc. <i>Gall.</i> 23; Luc. <i>Icar.</i> 2-3; Luc. <i>Philopatr.</i> 2; Luc. <i>Im.</i> 21; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 49; *Paus. 9.11.4-5

126	Ino	The sea	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 162c; <i>Mor.</i> 675e; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 46.32-4; Luc. <i>DDeor.</i> 6.1(312); Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 42, 67; Paus. 1.44.7-8; Paus. 4.34.4
127	Kalanos	An intentionally-constructed pyre (in Persia)	Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 69.4
128	Odysseus	The sea	Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 33.18, <i>Or.</i> 37.23, <i>Or.</i> 46.39; Paus. 5.25.3; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 7.22.2
129	Pindar	The road to Thespiai	*Paus. 9.23.2
130	Theseus	The sea, on a voyage from Athens to Krete	*/**Paus. 1.17.3
131	Zoroaster	A mountain	D.Chr. 36.40

**Table 6: The liminal circuits (Labours) of Herakles, Jason, Odysseus, and Perseus**

See Chs 2.2.3, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, 2.5.3. In this Table, square brackets indicate information, other than that available in the *Odyssey*, that is not provided by the cited sources. Entries are ordered alphabetically by protagonist, and then chronologically. The collective references Paus. 3.18-10-16, 5.10.9-5.11.10, and 5.17.5-5.19.9 group together imagery associated with the *thronos* of Amyklai and the temple and Chest of Kypselos at Olympia, respectively.

No.	Protagonist	Liminal being/Place	Source
1	Herakles	Labours in general	*D.Chr. 1.59-63; D.Chr. 8.27-36; D.Chr. 31.16; Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 30.4; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 37.25, <i>Or.</i> 40.4-6, 22; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 41; Apul. <i>Apol.</i> 22; Apul. <i>Fl.</i> 22; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 3.19; **Paus. 3.17.2-3; Paus. 7.18.1; Paus. 8.14.9; Paus. 8.18.3; Paus. 8.32.4; **Paus. 9.11.6; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 7.10.2; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 8.7.29
2	Herakles	First Labour: lion/Nemea (Peloponnese)	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 341f-342a; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 2.307; Luc. <i>JTr.</i> 32; Luc. <i>Philops.</i> 8; Paus. 2.15.2; **Paus. 3.18.10-16; **Paus. 5.10.9-5.11.10; **Paus. 5.26.7; Paus. 6.5.5; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 6.10.6
3	Herakles	Second Labour: hydra/Lerna (Peloponnese)	D.Chr. 47.4; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 341f; Luc. <i>Anach.</i> 35; Luc. <i>JTr.</i> 21; Luc. <i>JTr.</i> 32; Luc. <i>Phal.</i> 1.8; **Paus. 1.24.2; Paus. 2.37.4; **Paus. 3.18.10-16; **Paus. 5.10.9-5.11.10; **Paus. 5.17.5-5.19.9; **Paus. 10.18.6; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 6.10.6
4	Herakles	Third Labour: hind/River Kerynitis (Peloponnese)	**Paus. 5.10.9-5.11.10

5	Herakles	Fourth Labour: boar/River Erymanthos (Peloponnese)	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 341f-342a; **Paus. 5.10.9-5.11.10; **Paus. 5.26.7; Paus. 8.24.5
6	Herakles	Parergon in the course of the fourth Labour: centaurs/Mount Pholoe (cave of the Centaur Pholos)	*D.Chr. 60.3; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 387d; Luc. <i>JTr.</i> 21; Luc. <i>Symp.</i> 14; **Paus. 3.18.10-16; Paus. 5.5.10; **Paus. 5.17.5-5.19.9
7	Herakles	Fifth Labour: Augeias, king of Elis/Elis (Peloponnese)	D.Chr. 8.35; D.Chr. 47.4; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 562f; Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 1; Luc. <i>Fug.</i> 23; Luc. <i>Fug.</i> 23; *Paus. 5.1.9-10; **Paus. 5.10.9-5.11.10; Paus. 6.20.16; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 8.7.28
8	Herakles	Sixth Labour: birds/Stymphalos (Peloponnese)	D.Chr. 47.4; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 341f-342a; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 40.5; Luc. <i>JTr.</i> 21; **Paus. 5.10.9-5.11.10; Paus. 8.22.4
9	Herakles	Seventh Labour: bull/Krete	**Paus. 5.10.9-5.11.10; Paus.11.27.10
10	Herakles	Eighth Labour: mares of Diomedes/Thrace	*D.Chr. 8.31; D.Chr. 33.47; Luc. <i>JTr.</i> 21; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 7.16; **Paus. 3.18.10-16; **Paus. 5.10.9-5.11.10
11	Herakles	Parergon in the course of the eighth Labour: spirit of Alkestis [and Hades]/Hades	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 4.45.1
12	Herakles	Ninth Labour: Amazon Hippolyte/region of the river Thermadon	*D.Chr. 8.32; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 301f; Plut. <i>Luc.</i> 23.5; **Paus. 5.10.9-5.11.10; **Paus. 5.25.11; Paus. 7.2.7

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| 13 | Herakles | Tenth Labour: Geryon, a three-bodied giant/island of Erytheia [in the vicinity of Gadeira (Hdt. 4.8)]                                | *D.Chr. 8.31; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 267e-f; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 2.229; Luc. <i>Fug.</i> 31; Luc. <i>Herc.</i> 2; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 56; Luc. <i>Tox.</i> 62; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 2.32; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 3.19; Paus. 3.16.4; **Paus. 3.18.10-16; Paus. 4.36.3-4; **Paus. 5.10.9-5.11.10; **Paus. 5.17.5-5.19.9; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 6.10.6; Philostr. <i>VS</i> 1.505              |
| 14 | Herakles | Eleventh Labour: guardians (dragon, Atlas) of the apples of the Hesperides/Libya [or (Apollod. 2.5.11) the land of the Hyperboreans] | *D.Chr. 8.34; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 387d; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 941c; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 40.7, ** <i>Or.</i> 40.15, <i>Or.</i> 45.3; Luc. <i>Cont.</i> 4; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 56; Paus. 2.13.8; **Paus. 5.10.9-5.11.10; **Paus. 5.17.5-5.19.9; **Paus. 6.19.8  |
| 15 | Herakles | Parergon in the course of the eleventh Labour: Antaios, a giant/[Libya]  | Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 342a; Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 11.1; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 45.3; **Paus. 9.11.6   |
| 16 | Herakles | Parergon in the course of the eleventh Labour: Bousiris, king of Egypt/Egypt   | D.Chr. 8.32; D.Chr. 33.47; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 315b-c; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 342a; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 857a; Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 11.1  |
| 17 | Herakles | Parergon in the course of the eleventh Labour: eagle tormenting Prometheus (and Prometheus himself)/[Kaukasos]                       | DChr. 8.33; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 387d; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 40.7; *Luc. <i>DDeor.</i> 5(1).1-2; Luc. <i>J.Conf.</i> 8; *Luc. <i>Prom.</i> 1-21; Luc. <i>Prom.Es</i> 3; Luc. <i>Sacr.</i> 6; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 38; *Paus. 5.10.9-5.11.10; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 22.3   |
| 18 | Herakles | Twelfth Labour: Kerberos/Hades   | *D.Chr. 47.4; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 285f; *Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 35.1; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 37.25, <i>Or.</i> 40.7; Luc. <i>Fug.</i> 31; Luc. <i>Nec.</i> 1; Luc. <i>Nec.</i> 8; Luc. <i>Nec.</i> 10; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 3.19; **Paus. 2.31.2; Paus. 2.35.10; **Paus. 3.18.10-16; Paus. 3.25.5; Paus. 5.14.2; **Paus. 5.26.7; Paus. 8.18.3; Paus. 9.34.5; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 4.46.2 |

19	Herakles	Parergon in the course of the twelfth Labour: Hades or (Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 35.1) the king of the Molossians/Hades or (Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 31) Molossia	*Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 35.1; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 4.46.2
20	Jason	Voyage of the <i>Argo</i> in general	D.Chr. 4.117-8; Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 19.4; Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 29.3; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 46.29; Luc. <i>Demon.</i> 31; Luc. <i>Fug.</i> 29; Luc. <i>Gall.</i> 2; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 52-3; Luc. <i>Tox.</i> 3; Paus. 1.1.4; **Paus.1.18.1; Paus. 2.12.6; Paus. 2.12.6; Paus. 3.24.7; **Paus. 5.17.5-5.19.9; Paus. 7.4.4; Paus. 7.26.14; Paus. 8.4.10; Paus. 9.32.4; D.L. 1.111
21	Jason	Harpies/[Salmydessos, Thrace (Apollod. 1.9.21)]	**Paus. 3.18.10-16; **Paus. 5.17.5-5.19.9
22	Jason	Medeia/Kolchis	*D.Chr. 16.10
23	Jason	Bulls (fire-breathing) and the offspring of dragon's teeth (cf. Apollod. 1.9.23)/Kolchis	*D.Chr. 16.10; D.Chr. 23.4
24	Jason	Dragon guarding the Golden Fleece (cf. Apollod. 1.9.23)/Kolchis	*D.Chr. 16.10
25	Jason	Medeia/Iolkos, home of Jason and King Pelias	*Paus. 8.11.1-3
26	Odysseus	Voyage in general	D.Chr. 4.37; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 46; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 2.14; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 9.13; Paus. 8.44.4

27	Odysseus	Memory-obliterating lotos/island of the Lotophagoi ( <i>Od.</i> 9.84-104)	Luc. <i>Merc.Cond.</i> 8; Luc. <i>Nigr.</i> 3; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 3-4; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 1.40
28	Odysseus	Polyphemos/island of the Kyklopes ( <i>Od.</i> 9.105-564)	D.Chr. 11.34; D.Chr. 33.40; D.Chr. 55.11; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 181f; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 506b; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 545c; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 557c; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 986f; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 992d; Plut. <i>Cat.Ma.</i> 9.3; Plut. <i>Galba</i> 1.4; Luc. <i>Cat.</i> 14; Luc. <i>Cont.</i> 7; *Luc. <i>DMar.</i> 2.1-4; Luc. <i>Pseudol.</i> 27; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 4.36.3; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 7.28.3
29	Odysseus	Aiolos and the bag of winds/island of Aiolos ( <i>Od.</i> 10.1-75)	Paus. 10.11.3; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 3.14.2; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 7.14.8; Apul. <i>Apol.</i> 31
30	Odysseus	Man-eating giants/island of the Laistrygones ( <i>Od.</i> 10.106-32)	Paus. 8.29.2
31	Odysseus	Kirke/Aiaia ( <i>Od.</i> 10.210-574)	D.Chr. 6.62; D.Chr. 8.21; D.Chr. 11.34; D.Chr. 33.58; D.Chr. 77/8.34; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 139a; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 985d-992e; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 996d; Luc. <i>Fug.</i> 20; Luc. <i>Nec.</i> 9; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 85; Apul. <i>Apol.</i> 31; **Paus. 5.17.5-5.19.9
32	Odysseus	Spirit of Teiresias and other spirits/Hades ( <i>Od.</i> 11.1-332)	D.Chr. 4.37; D.Chr. 11.34; D.Chr. 74.19; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 16e; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 516a-b; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 740e-f; Plut. <i>Mar.</i> 11.6; Luc. <i>Astr.</i> 24; Luc. <i>DMort.</i> 23 (448); Luc. <i>DMort.</i> 26.1-3 (399-401); Luc. <i>Luct.</i> 5; Luc. <i>Nec.</i> 1; Luc. <i>Nec.</i> 8; Apul. <i>Apol.</i> 31; Paus. 2.13.3; Paus. 3.24.11; Paus. 8.48.6; Paus. 9.33.2; **Paus. 10.28.1, 10.29.8 (both references parts of the description of the same painting); Philostr. <i>VA</i> 4.16.1

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| 33 | Odysseus | Seirenes/island of the Seirenes ( <i>Od.</i> 12.39-54, 12.165-200)        | D.Chr.12.36; D.Chr. 32.47; D.Chr. 33.41; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 745f; Luc. <i>Cal.</i> 30; Luc. <i>Cont.</i> 21; Luc. <i>Im.</i> 14; Luc. <i>Nigr.</i> 3; Luc. <i>Nigr.</i> 19; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 3-4; Luc. <i>Sat.</i> 32; Paus. 10.5.12; Paus. 10.6.5   |
| 34 | Odysseus | Skylia and Charybdis/twin rocks at sea ( <i>Od.</i> 12.73-110, 12.234-59) | D.Chr. 11.34; D.Chr. 55.11; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 476b; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 545c; Plut. <i>Dio</i> 18.3; Luc. <i>Cont.</i> 7; Luc. <i>Pseudol.</i> 27  |
| 35 | Odysseus | Cattle of Helios/Thrinakia ( <i>Od.</i> 12.260-419)                       | Luc. <i>Sat.</i> 23; Paus. 1.35.4; Paus. 5.25.3  |
| 36 | Odysseus | Kalypso/[Ogygia]  | D.Chr. 11.20; D.Chr. 11.41; D.Chr.13.4; D.Chr. 32.21; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 831d; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 941a; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 2.145; Luc. <i>Philops.</i> 10; Luc. <i>VH</i> 2.29; Luc. <i>VH</i> 2.35-6; Apul. <i>Apol.</i> 57; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 1.12; Paus. 8.3.7; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 7.10.2; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 8.11                       |
| 37 | Odysseus | The sea (Odysseus on the raft and swimming ashore; <i>Od.</i> 5.233-463)  | Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 33.18, <i>Or.</i> 37.23, <i>Or.</i> 46.39; Paus. 5.25.3; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 7.22.2  |
| 38 | Perseus  | Medousa/[far west, near the Hesperides ( <i>Hes. Th.</i> 274-6)]          | D.Chr. 32.28; D.Chr. 33.47; D.Chr. 66.21; **Luc. <i>Dom.</i> 25; Luc. <i>Hist.Conscr.</i> 1; Luc. <i>Im.</i> 1; Luc. <i>Im.</i> 14; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 44; Luc. <i>Vit.Auct.</i> 25; **Paus. 1.22.7; **Paus. 1.23.7; *Paus. 2.21.5-6; **Paus. 2.27.2; **Paus. 3.17.2-3; **Paus. 3.18.10-16; **Paus. 5.17.5-5.19.9; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 7.20.4 |
| 39 | Perseus  | Sea-monster/[Ethiopia ( <i>Apollod.</i> 2.4.3)]                           | *Luc. <i>DMar.</i> 14.2 (323); **Luc. <i>Dom.</i> 22; Paus. 4.35.9; **Philostr. <i>VA</i> 1.25.2; **Heliod. <i>Aeth.</i> 4.8; **Heliod. <i>Aeth.</i> 10.5; **Heliod. <i>Aeth.</i> 10.14  |

**Table 7: Pre-Second Sophistic wisdom circuits among the non-Greek wise**

See Chs 2.2.3, 2.3.4, 2.5.3. The table is ordered by protagonist, with separate entries for different accounts of the world travels ascribed to him.

No.	Protagonist	Source	Circuit
1	Anaxarchos	Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 28.2-3, 52.2-5	Liminal places encountered in the course of Alexander's expedition, as indicated by specific mention of Anaxarchos in the account of the journey
2	Anaxarchos	D.L. 9.58	Liminal places encountered in the course of Alexander's expedition
3	Demokritos of Abdera	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 1.2.1	Magoi (place unspecified)
4	Demokritos of Abdera	D.L. 9.34-5	Abdera, his birthplace, where he studied with Magoi and Chaldaians; Egypt, to learn from priests, Persia, to see the Chaldaians, and the Erythre Thalassa, according to Demetrios and Antisthenes; 'some say' he conversed with gymnosophists in India and went to Ethiopia
5	Empedokles	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 1.2.1	Magoi (place unspecified)

6	Eudoxos of Knidos	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 353c, 354e, 359c, 363a, 372e, 376c, 377a	Egypt, where he spent time with priests and was instructed by Chonouphis of Memphis (354e). Plutarch's references to Eudoxos' <i>Periodos ges</i> (353c, 359c, 363a, 372e, 376c) indicate Eudoxos' learning from the priests and (377a) questioning in the context of their teachings
7	Eudoxos of Knidos	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 1.35.1	Egypt, for money (χρήματα)
8	Eudoxos of Knidos	Philostr. <i>VS</i> 1.484	Travelling as a sophist, the Hellespont and Propontis, Memphis, and Egypt beyond Memphis where it borders on Ethiopia and the region inhabited by the men called <i>gymnoi</i>
9	Eudoxos of Knidos	D.L. 8.86-7, 8.90	Athens, to hear the Socratics; Egypt, with a letter of introduction to Nektanabis, to study with the priests – here, he spent time with Chonouphis of Heliopoulis; Kyzikos and the Propontis, acting as a sophist (σοφιστεύω)
10	Lykourgos	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 354e	Egypt, where 'some say' he spent time with priests

11	Lykourgos	Plut. <i>Lyc.</i> 3.5-4.6	Krete, travelling in voluntary exile in order to avoid appearing a rival to his nephew (3.5), and where he approved the laws and resolved to use them in his own country (4.1); Asia (Ionia), to examine the difference between the manner and rules of life of the Kretans and those of the Ionians and so form a judgement (4.3); Egypt, where the Egyptians and some Greeks say that he observed the value of the separation of social classes (4.5); according to the Spartan Aristokrates alone, Libya, Iberia and India, where he had conferences with the <i>gymnosophistai</i> (4.6)
12	Onesikritos	D.L. 6.84	Liminal places encountered in the course of Alexander's expedition
13	Plato	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 354e	Egypt, where he spent time with priests
14	Plato	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 578f	Egypt (Memphis), where he philosophized (φιλοσοφῆω) with Chonouphis, the <i>prophetes</i> of the god
15	Plato	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 1.2.1	Egypt, where he incorporated in his own thought many things learned from the <i>prophetai</i> and priests

16	Plato	D.L. 3.6-7, 3.18, 3.21, 3.23	The Greek world (to Megara with other disciples of Sokrates to meet Euklides; to Cyrene to meet Theodoros the mathematician; to Italy to see the Pythagoreans Philolaos and Eurytos); Egypt, to meet <i>prophetai</i> . Plato intended to visit the Magoi, but was prevented by wars in Asia. Later, he made three voyages to Sicily, the first to see the island and the craters [of Etna] (3.18), the second in an attempt to get land from Dionysios the Younger to realize his republic (3.21); and the third in an unsuccessful attempt to reconcile Dionysios and Dion (3.23)
17	Pyrrhon	D.L. 9.61	Accompanying Anaxarchos [and Alexander], the Persian empire, where he encountered the Magoi; India, where he encountered the <i>gymnosophistai</i>
18	Pythagoras	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 354e-f	Egypt, where he spent time with priests and was instructed by Oinouphis of Heliopolis
19	Pythagoras	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 729a	Egypt, where he learned priestly rites (ἱερατικὰ ἁγιστεῖα) from <i>sophoi</i>
20	Pythagoras (a personified Pythagorean Way of Life)	Luc. <i>Vit.Auct.</i> 3	Egypt, where he was educated by the <i>sophoi</i>

21	Pythagoras	Luc. <i>Gall.</i> 18	Egypt, where he studied with the <i>prophetai</i> ; Italy, where the Greeks thought him a god
22	Pythagoras	Apul. <i>Fl.</i> 15 (story 1)	Egypt as a prisoner of Cambyses, where he encountered the Persian Magoi
23	Pythagoras	Apul. <i>Fl.</i> 15 (story 2)	Egypt of his own accord ( <i>sponte</i> ), where he was taught by priests; the Chaldaians (no place is specified, but possibly Babylon); India, where he visited the Bracmani and, in particular, the gymnosophists; as well, Miletos to study with Anaximander and Krete to learn from Epimenides and from Creophylus, said to have been a friend of Homer
24	Pythagoras	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 1.2.1	Magoi (place unspecified)
25	Pythagoras	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 8.7.13-14	[Egypt], where Pythagoras was the first Greek to associate with the Egyptians
26	Pythagoras	D.L. 8.2-3	Lesbos, to study with Pherekydes; Samos (his birthplace), to study under Hermodamas; Egypt (where Polykrates sent him a letter of introduction to Amasis); travel among the Chaldaians and Magoi (presumably in the Persian empire); Krete, where he entered the cave of Ida with Epimenides; Samos; finally Kroton in Italy

27	Pythagoras	Ant. Diog. <i>De incred. ap. Porph. VP</i> 11-12	Miletos to study geometry and astronomy with Anaximander; Egypt, where he associated with priests; Arabia, Babylon to meet the Chaldaians (especially Zaratas); he also visited the Hebrews
28	Solon	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 354e	Egypt, where he spent time with priests and was instructed by Sonchis of Sais
29	Solon	Plut. <i>Sol.</i> 2.1, 26.1-27.1	Unspecified travel in youth as a trader and/or to gain knowledge (2.1); a later trading journey – to escape criticism of/attempts to change his laws – to Egypt, where he studied with Psenophis of Heliopolis and Sonchis the Saite (26.1), to Cyprus (26.2), and to Sardis and the court of Kroisos; Plutarch acknowledges possible problems of chronology but refuses to doubt an honoured narrative with so many witnesses (λόγον ἔνδοξον οὕτω καὶ τοσούτους μάρτυρας ἔχοντα (27.1)
30	Solon	Luc. <i>Scyth.</i> 5	Asia and Egypt (no particular wise mentioned)
31	Solon (with Thales)	D.L. 1.43-4	Greece; Asia; Krete; Egypt, to confer with priests and <i>astrologoi</i> ; potentially Pherecydes of Syros (described as the teacher of Pythagoras at D.L. 8.2-3)
32	Solon	D.L. 1.50	Egypt; Cyprus; the court of Kroisos

33	Thales	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 354e	Egypt, where he spent time with priests
34	Thales	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 364d	Egypt, where he gained knowledge from the Egyptians
35	Thales	D.L. 1.24	Egypt
36	Thales	D.L. 1.27	Egypt, where he learned from priests
37	Thales (with Solon)	D.L. 1.43-4	Greece; Asia; Krete; Egypt, to confer with priests and <i>astrologoi</i> ; potentially Pherecydes of Syros (described as the teacher of Pythagoras at D.L. 8.2-3)

**Table 8: Pre-Second Sophistic protagonists seek out the non-Greek wise**

See Chs 2.3.4, 2.5.3. The Table is organized by group of wise, and then by protagonist. Encounters experienced in the course of journeys undertaken for any purpose, and encounters experienced in unspecified circumstances, are included if wisdom is conveyed. Only interviews in which something specific is learned or sought to be learned are included. The seeking out of liminal places, groups or individuals in order to learn, but where no particular learning is specified, is recorded in Table 7 when the protagonist is one of those included in that Table.

No.	Protagonist	Source	Wise group or individual (if specified)	Location (if specified)	Interchange or personal experience	Body of knowledge or specific knowledge conveyed
<b><i>The Egyptian wise</i></b>						
1	Antony	Plut. <i>Ant.</i> 33.2	An Egyptian diviner, one of those who examine nativities (μαντικὸς ἀπ' Αἰγύπτου τῶν τὰς γενέσεις ἐπισκοπούντων)		Antony has questions re his own future, and Caesar's (i.e. Octavian's); he is told to steer clear of Caesar	
2	Demokritos of Abdera	D.L. 9.35	Priests	Egypt		Geometry
3	Eudoxos of Knidos	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 354e; <i>Mor.</i> 353c, 359c, 363a, 372e, 376c, 377a	Priests; Chonouphis of Memphis	Egypt		Detailed information about Egyptian learning and tradition, as recorded in Eudoxos' <i>Periodos ges</i>

4	Eudoxos of Knidos	D.L. 8.90	Chonouphis of Heliopolis and priests		Priests foretell the future from an omen: Eudoxos will be famous but short-lived	
5	Homer	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 364d	Egyptians			Water as the source and origin of all things ( <i>Il.</i> 14.201)
6	Kleoboulos of Lindos	D.L. 1.89				Egyptian philosophy
7	Philotas of Amphissa	Plut. <i>Ant.</i> 28.2	Unspecified: possibly Egyptians, but more probably Greeks	Alexandria		Medicine
8	Plato	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 1.2.1	<i>Prophetai</i> and priests	Egypt	Plato incorporated in his own thought many things learned from the <i>prophetai</i> and priests	
9	Pythagoras	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 354e-f	Priests; Oinouphis of Heliopolis	Egypt	Pythagoras incorporated the Egyptians' teaching in his own doctrines in <i>ainigmata</i>	<i>Symbolikon</i> and <i>mysteriodes</i>
10	Pythagoras	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 729a	<i>Sophoi</i>	Egypt		Priestly rites and ritual abstentions, including abstention from beans

11	Pythagoras	Luc. <i>Gall.</i> 18	<i>Prophetai</i>	Egypt	Books of Horus and Isis
12	Pythagoras	Apul. <i>Fl.</i> 15 (story 2)	Priests ( <i>sacerdotes</i> )	Egypt	The powers of ritual; the properties of numbers; geometrical theorems
13	Pythagoras	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 8.7.13-14	Egyptians	Egypt	The principle that animals should not be killed for the sake of clothing or food
14	Pythagoras	D.L. 1.24	Egyptians		Geometry
15	Pythagoras	D.L. 8.2-3	Egyptians	Egypt	The Egyptian language; secret things about the gods (καὶ τὰ περὶ θεῶν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις ἔμαθεν)
16	Pythagoras	Ant.Diog. <i>De incred. ap.</i> Porph. <i>VP</i> 11-12	Priests	Egypt	The priests' <i>sophia</i> ; the Egyptian language and the three categories of written characters; more about the gods
17	Solon	Plut. <i>Sol.</i> 26.1	Psenophis of Heliopolis and Sonchis the Saite, the most learned of the priests	Egypt	The Atlantis <i>logos</i>

18	Solon	Plut. <i>Sol.</i> 31.3	The learned ( <i>logioi</i> ) in Sais	Egypt		The Atlantis <i>logos</i>
19	Thales	D.L. 1.24	Egyptians			Geometry
20	Thales	D.L. 1.27	Priests	Egypt	As a result of his learning, Thales calculated the height of pyramids from the length of the shadow they cast	

***The Babylonian or Persian wise***

21	Demokritos of Abdera	D.L. 9.34	Magoi and Chaldaians	Abdera		<i>Theologia and astrologia</i> (astronomy)
22	Nearchos	Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 73.1	Chaldaian diviners	Near the Euphrates	Nearchos receives a warning that Alexander ought not to go to Babylon	
23	Protagoras of Abdera	Philostr. <i>VS</i> 1.494	Magoi from Persia	Abdera		The claiming of lack of knowledge as to whether the gods exist or do not

24	Pyrrhon of Elis with Anaxarchos and Alexander	D.L. 9.61	Magoi		Pyrrhon learns his agnosticism ( <i>akatalepsia</i> ) and suspension of judgement ( <i>epoche</i> ) after discussion with Magoi and gymnosophists	
25	Pythagoras	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1012e	Zaratas			The philosophical implication of number
26	Pythagoras	Apul. <i>Fl.</i> 15 (story 2)	Chaldaians			The science of the stars, the fixed orbits of wandering powers, and the effect of them on human horoscopes ( <i>geniturae</i> ); medicinal remedies
27	Pythagoras	Ant.Diog. <i>De incred. ap.</i> Porph. <i>VP</i> 11-12	Chaldaians, especially Zaratas	Babylon		Dream interpretation; the source of purity for serious people; about nature and the origins of the universe
28	Pythagoras	Ant.Diog. <i>De incred. ap.</i> Porph. <i>VP</i> 33	Magoi			<i>Epodai</i> and <i>mageiai</i> to alleviate the suffering of the physically and spiritually ill
29	Pythagoras	Ant.Diog. <i>De incred. ap.</i> Porph. <i>VP</i> 41	Magoi			God (whom the Magoi call Horomazes) is like in body to light and in soul to truth

30	Sokrates	D.L. 2.45	Magos from Syria	Athens	In what was presumably an unsolicited remark, the Magos predicts for Sokrates a violent end	
31	Sulla	Plut. <i>Sull.</i> 5.5-6	A Chaldaian in the retinue of Orobazos, a Parthian ambassador	On the banks of the Euphrates	The Chaldaian predicts that Sulla will become the greatest of men	
32	Sulla	Plut. <i>Sull.</i> 37.1	Chaldaians		Chaldaians predict that Sulla will lead a life of honour ending in prosperity	
33	Themistokles	Plut. <i>Them.</i> 29.4	[Magoi]	The court of Xerxes		Magian learning
<b><i>The Indian wise</i></b>						
34	Alexander	Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 58.5	Akouphis, eldest of the ambassadors from towns near Nysa	India	An interchange shows Akouphis an astute opponent	
35	Alexander	Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 59.1	King Taxiles, who is reputed wise	India	An interchange shows Taxiles to be a philosopher	

36	Alexander	Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 59.4	Indian <i>philosophoi</i> , critics of kings who joined Alexander		Alexander shows his superiority by taking and hanging many of them
37	Alexander	Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 60.8	King Poros		An interchange shows Poros' dignity
38	Alexander	Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 64.1-5	Ten Indian philosophers, called <i>gymnosophistai</i>	India [on the Indos River]	An interchange: Alexander tests the ten philosophers with a question each, and they save their lives by providing astute answers
39	Alexander	Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 65.4	Kalanos, a <i>gymnosophistes</i>	India	Kalanos advises Alexander to stay in the middle of his empire using the metaphor of a dry hide
40	Onesikritos, a disciple of Diogenes the Cynic	Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 65.2	Indian philosophers of the greatest reputation (version 1)	India	Kalanos rejects Onesikritos for not being naked; Dandamis is prepared to listen to his account of Sokrates, Pythagoras and Diogenes, but judges that they had 'too great respect for the laws and customs of their country'

41	Onesikritos, a disciple of Diogenes the Cynic	Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 65.2	Indian philosophers of the greatest reputation (version 2)	India	Dandamis rejects Alexander with a pertinent question: why did he undertake so long a journey?
42	Pyrrhon of Elis with Anaxarchos and Alexander	D.L. 9.61	<i>Gymnosophistai</i>	India	Pyrrhon learns his agnosticism ( <i>akatalepsia</i> ) and suspension of judgement ( <i>epoche</i> ) after discussion with Magoi and gymnosophists
43	Pyrrhon of Elis with Anaxarchos	D.L. 9.63	An Indian	[India]	Pyrrhon withdrew from the world after hearing the Indian criticise Anaxarchos, saying that he would never be able to teach others the good while he himself attended upon kings
44	Pythagoras	Apul. <i>Fl.</i> 15 (story 2)	<i>Bracmani</i> , and among them the <i>gymnosophistae</i>	India	The arts of teaching the mind and exercising the body, the doctrine of the soul and reincarnation (transmigration), knowledge of rewards and punishments in the world of the gods below

**Table 9: Oracular consultations: Second Sophistic fictional writing**

See Ch. 2.4.1. Entries are ordered by oracle, then grouped by work and, within each work, ordered alphabetically by protagonist.

No.	Source	Protagonist
<b><i>Amphilochos at Mallos</i></b>		
1	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 563d	Aridaios of Soloi – a friend of 'that Protogenes who was once with us here' (563b-c) – renamed in a vision Thespesios (564c)
2	Luc. <i>Philops.</i> 38-9	Eukrates
<b><i>Apollo at Delphi</i></b>		
3	Luc. <i>DMort.</i> 21.1 (376)	Aristeas and Moirichos
4	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 5.17	Psyche's father
5	Heliod. <i>Aeth.</i> 2.29.3	Charikles, priest of Apollo at Delphi
6	Heliod. <i>Aeth.</i> 4.19.3	Charikles, priest of Apollo at Delphi
7	Heliod. <i>Aeth.</i> 2.35.5	Delphians and Ainianes

8 Heliod. *Aeth.* 2.26.5

Kalasis

9 Heliod. *Aeth.* 4.16

Kalasis (a manifest answer to an intended question before it could even be asked)

***Apollo at Didyma***

10 Apul. *Met.* 4.32-33

Psyche's father

***Memnon***

11 Luc. *Philops.* 33

Eukrates

***Trophonios at Lebadeia***

12 Plut. *Mor.* 590a-592f

Timarchos of Chaironeia

**Table 10: Encounters with the divine: Second Sophistic fictional writing**

See Ch. 2.4.2. Entries are separated into major subgroups; they are then grouped by work and any more specific place of encounter, and ordered alphabetically by protagonist. Lucian's Menippos, who appears in his *Icaromenippus*, *Dialogi Mortuorum* and *Necyomantia*, is probably based on Menippos of Gadara (Syria), the satirist, but is taken throughout this thesis as a fictional rather than a pre-Second Sophistic protagonist. Encounters at the edges or ends of the earth include some which could arguably be intended as non-fiction: Philostratos' Apollonios is an historical figure; Plutarch's account of a hermit is drawn from a bowl of myths and (true) stories mixed up together (μύθων καὶ λόγων ἀναμειγμένων κρατήρ) which listeners must test (*Mor.* 421a).

No.	Source	Specific place	Protagonist
<i>Shrines, tombs, or places associated with a particular divinity or spirit</i>			
1	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 589d-592f	Lebadeia, at the sanctuary of Trophonios	Timarchos of Chaironeia, a contemporary of Sokrates
2	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 585e-586	Thebes, at the tomb of Lysis, a Pythagorean	Theanor, a Pythagorean
3	Luc. <i>Philops.</i> 30-1	Korinth, at the house of Eubatides, which is haunted by a spirit	Arignotos, a Pythagorean
4	Luc. <i>Sat.</i> 1-39	Unidentified place, at Kronos' temple	Kronosolon, a priest
5	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 11.19	Kenchreai, at the temple of Isis	Lucius
6	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 11.20	Kenchreai, at the temple of Isis	Lucius

7	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 11.22	Kenchreai, at the temple of Isis	Lucius
8	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 11.6, 11.13, 11.14 (all references to the same incident)	Kenchreai, at the temple of Isis	[Mithras], <i>sacerdos</i> of Isis
9	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 11.22	Kenchreai, at the temple of Isis	Mithras, <i>sacerdos praecipuus</i> of Isis
10	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 11.27	Rome, at the temple of Osiris	Asinus Marcellus, priest of Osiris
11	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 6.2-3	Unidentified place beyond Cupid's realm, at Ceres' temple	Psyche
12	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 6.3-4	Unidentified place beyond Cupid's realm, at Juno's shrine	Psyche
13	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 6.8-16	Unidentified place beyond Cupid's realm, at Venus' residence	Psyche
14	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 5.15	Unidentified place, at Hermes' sanctuary	Aesop, according to a <i>mythos</i> recounted by Apollonios' mother
15	Heliod. <i>Aeth.</i> 3.5	Delphi, in the sacred precinct	Charikleia, Theagenes

16	Heliod. <i>Aeth.</i> 4.19.3	Delphi, in the sacred precinct	Charikles
17	Heliod. <i>Aeth.</i> 6.14-15	Egypt, on a battlefield near the village of Bessa where bodies were lying unburied	An old woman, mother of one of the slain, watched by Charikleia and Kalasiris
18	Heliod. <i>Aeth.</i> 10.28-9	Ethiopia (Meroe), at the altar of the Sun	Theagenes and spectators

***Specially-constructed places (pyres)***

19	Heliod. <i>Aeth.</i> 8.9	Egypt (Memphis), an execution pyre	Charikleia
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***Natural places***

20	D.Chr. 5.24-7	Libya, a desert haunted by a snake-woman	Greek envoys travelling to the oracle of Ammon
21	D.Chr. 5.18-21	Libya, a wood (δρυμός) haunted by snake-women	Herakles (taken as figuring here in a myth original to Dion)
22	D.Chr. 5.18-21	Libya, a wood (δρυμός) haunted by snake-women	King of Libya
23	Luc. <i>Philops.</i> 22-4	Unidentified place, a wood (ῥλη) at midday where Hekate, in the form of a Gorgon, opens up a chasm leading down to Hades	Eukrates

24	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 4.35	Cupid's realm and its boundary: the mountain crag above Cupid's valley and his valley below	Psyche
25	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 5.27	Cupid's realm and its boundary: the mountain crag above Cupid's valley and his valley below	Psyche's first sister
26	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 5.27	Cupid's realm and its boundary: the mountain crag above Cupid's valley and his valley below	Psyche's second sister
27	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 5.25	Cupid's realm and its boundary: a river bank in Cupid's valley occupied by the god Pan	Psyche
28	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 11.1-6	Kenchreai, on the seashore, on the eve of the annual festival of the launching of Isis' ship, at full moon ( <i>Met.</i> 11.16)	Lucius (as an ass)
29	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 8.19-20	Unidentified place, a grove ( <i>nemus</i> ) haunted by a snake ( <i>draco</i> ) that can transform itself into an old man	Lucius (as an ass) and others

### ***Edges of the earth***

*Echinides Islands, between mainland Greece and Ithaca*

30	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 419b-d	Vicinity of the Echinides Islands	Egyptian pilot Thamos, and others on a ship
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*Erythrean Sea*

31 Plut. *Mor.* 421a-422e Vicinity of the Erythrean Sea A 'non-Greek' hermit

*Ethiopia*

32 Philostr. *VA* 6.27.2-3 Village beyond the cataracts bothered by a satyr Apollonios

*India*

33 Luc. *Bacch.* 6-7 Pool of Silenos, India Machlaian Indians

*Ocean*

34 Plut. *Mor.* 419e-420a Island off the coast of Britain The inhabitants, holy men held inviolate by the Britons

35 Plut. *Mor.* 940f-945d Kronos' island, where the god lies sleeping, attended by *daimones* (*Mor.* 942a) A stranger (*xenos*)

36 Luc. *VH* 1.5-9 Island beyond the Pillars of Herakles that was the furthest point of Herakles' and Dionysos' travels 'Lucian', identified by name (Loukianos) at *VH* 2.28

37	Luc. <i>VH</i> 1.30-2.1	Inside a whale, in the Ocean	'Lucian', identified by name (Loukianos) at <i>VH</i> 2.28
38	Luc. <i>VH</i> 2.2-2.47	Ocean and islands: frozen sea (2.2); island of bulls with horns under their eyes (2.3); sea of milk (2.3); island of cheese (2.3); territory of the Corkfeet (2.4); Isle of the Blest (2.5-2.28); island of punishment (2.30-1); Homer's island of Dreams (2.32-35); Ogygia (2.35-6); encounters with pirates (2.37-8); an enormous nest; a floating forest; a chasm in the sea; island of Bullheads (2.44); encounters with unusual sailors (2.45); island of women with asslegs (2.2.46); shipwreck off the coast of the continent opposite the one we inhabit (2.47)	'Lucian', identified by name (Loukianos) at <i>VH</i> 2.28
39	Paus. 1.23.5-6	An island of satyrs	Euphemos the Carian, as told to Pausanias
40	Paus. 10.4.6	Vicinity of Gadeira (Cadiz)	Kleon of Magnesia

*Thrace*

41	Ant.Diog. <i>De incred. ap.</i> Phot. 110a, 17-38	Thrace	Derkyllis and Mantinias, accompanying Astraïos in order to question his friend Zalmoxis
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## ***Beyond the earth***

### *The heavens*

- |    |                             |   |   |
|----|-----------------------------|---|---|
| 42 | Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 563b-568a | The heavens, in a near-death experience   | Aridaios of Soloi, renamed in a vision Thespesios (564c); conducted by the soul of a kinsman  |
| 43 | Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 589d-592f | The heavens, seen as a sea dotted with islands and cleft by a chasm that is the Styx  | Timarchos of Chaironeia, a contemporary of Sokrates; conducted by a <i>daimon</i>   |
| 44 | Luc. <i>Icar.</i> 1-34      | Heaven and the <i>akropolis</i> of Zeus, by ascent from Mount Olympos   | Menippos, a Cynic ( <i>Nec.</i> 1), who despairs of hearing the truth about the gods on earth and equips himself with wings in order to travel to Heaven ( <i>Icar.</i> 10, 11) |
| 45 | Luc. <i>JConf.</i> 1-19     | Heaven? [The dialogue does not make clear how Kyniskos obtained his interview with Zeus, or where they are. In the <i>Cataplus</i> , Kyniskos dies and is judged fit by Rhadamanthys to go to the Isles of the Blest ( <i>Cat.</i> 24); this may possibly be a sequel.] | Kyniskos, a philosopher ( <i>Nec.</i> 24)   |

46	Luc. <i>VH</i> 1.10-30	The Moon (encounters with king Endymion and his military forces and participation in Endymion's war against Phaethon, 1.10-18); the Sun, as Phaethon's captive (1.19-21); a return to Earth via the Morning Star and Lamptown, bypassing Cloudcuckootown (1.27-9)	'Lucian', identified by name (Loukianos) at <i>VH</i> 2.28
47	Ant.Diog. <i>De incred. ap.</i> Phot. 111a, 7-19	Vicinity of the Moon	Deinias and Karmanes
<i>Hades</i>			
48	Luc. <i>Nec.</i> 3-22	Hades via the Euphrates and the lake in which it loses itself; with a return via Lebadeia	Menippos, a Cynic ( <i>Nec.</i> 1) who is disappointed with the contradictions of philosophers ( <i>Nec.</i> 3) and seeks guidance from Teiresias ( <i>Nec.</i> 1); conducted by the Chaldaian Mithrobarzanes
49	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 11.23	Hades, in the experience of initiation, which is likened to a journey: <i>Accessi confinium mortis et, calcato Proserpinae limine, per omnia uectus elementa remeavi</i> (I came to the boundary of death and, having trodden the threshold of Proserpina, I travelled through all the elements and returned)	Lucius

50	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 6.16-21	Tartarus, via Cape Taenarus (Tainaron)	Psyche
51	Ant.Diog. <i>De incred. ap.</i> Phot. 109a, 39 - 109b, 2	Hades, via Etruria and the Kimmerians	Derkyllis

**Table 11: Encounters with the non-Greek wise: Second Sophistic fictional writing**

See Chs 2.4.3, 2.5.3. Entries are grouped by work and, within each work, ordered alphabetically by protagonist. An intentional encounter, or journey to the place where an encounter takes place, is essential. The Table is inclusive in the sense that a number of those consulted – although associated with non-Greek wisdom or located in a remote place – may in fact be Greek.

No.	Source	Protagonist	Place	Group of wise or wise individual sought or consulted
1	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 578a, 578f	Simmiias, at whose house Theban conspirators are accustomed to meet ( <i>Mor.</i> 576b)	Egypt	Priests; Chonouphis, the <i>prophetes</i>
2	Luc. <i>Anach.</i> 1-40 [Lucian's dialogue is here treated as a fictional expansion of the established tradition rather than a reported story about a pre-Second sophistic protagonist.]	Solon	Athens	Anacharsis, a Skythian
3	Luc. <i>DMort.</i> 21.1 (376)	Aristeas and Moirichos	Corinth	Astrologers and dream interpreters in the Chaldaian tradition

4	Luc. <i>Nec.</i> 6-22	Menippos, a Cynic ( <i>Nec.</i> 1), who is disappointed with the contradictions of philosophers ( <i>Nec.</i> 3) and seeks guidance from Teiresias ( <i>Nec.</i> 1)	Babylon	Mithrobarzanes, a Chaldaian; Menippos seems to identify the Chaldaians with the Magoi, the disciples and successors of Zoroaster, who can open the gates of Hades ( <i>Nec.</i> 6)
5	Luc. <i>Philops.</i> 33-6	Eukrates, a man of sixty devoted to philosophy ( <i>Philops.</i> 5)	Egypt	Pankrates of Memphis, a holy scribe ( <i>hierogrammateus</i> ) who knew all the teaching of Egypt and had lived 23 years in underground sanctuaries, taught to do magic (μαγεύειν) by Isis
6	Luc. <i>Philops.</i> 11-12	Ion, a follower of Plato ( <i>Philops.</i> 6)	[Greek world]	A Babylonian man, one of the so-called Chaldaians
7	Luc. <i>Philops.</i> 16	Ion, a follower of Plato ( <i>Philops.</i> 6)	[Greek world]	A Syrian from Palestine, a specialist (σοφιστής) among those 'singing away' phantoms (ἐξάδοντες τὰ φάσματα)
8	Luc. <i>Philops.</i> 13-15	Kleodemos the Peripatetic ( <i>Philops.</i> 6)	[Greek world]	A Hyperborean <i>magos</i> ( <i>Philops.</i> 14)
9	Luc. <i>Tox.</i> 27	Antiphilos of Alopeke, a contemporary figure ( <i>Tox.</i> 10)	Alexandria	Unspecified teachers of medicine (ιατρική)

10	Luc. <i>Tox.</i> 27	Demetrios of Sounion, a contemporary figure ( <i>Tox.</i> 10)	Alexandria	'That <i>sophistes</i> from Rhodes', a Cynic
11	Luc. <i>Tox.</i> 34	Demetrios of Sounion, a contemporary figure ( <i>Tox.</i> 10)	India (proposed journey)	Brachmanes
12	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 1.5-20	Aristomenes	Hypata, Thessaly	Meroe, a <i>saga</i> ( <i>Met.</i> 1.8). Her powers enable her to bring down the sky and suspend the earth, solidify fountains and dissolve mountains, raise ghosts and enfeeble the gods, extinguish the stars and lighten Tartarus ( <i>Met.</i> 1.8). She can make men fall in love with her ( <i>Met.</i> 1.8), change human beings into animals ( <i>Met.</i> 1.9), seal the wombs of pregnant women ( <i>Met.</i> 1.9), imprison people in their houses ( <i>Met.</i> 1.10) and transport houses across the earth ( <i>Met.</i> 1.10)
13	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 2.12-14	Cerdo, a salesman ( <i>negotiator</i> )	Hypata, Thessaly	Diophanes, a Chaldaeus
14	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 2.5-3.25	Lucius, a young man travelling on business ( <i>Met.</i> 1.2)	Hypata, Thessaly	Pamphile, a <i>maga</i> ( <i>Met.</i> 2.5)
15	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 3.16-18	Photis, servant to Pamphile	Hypata, Thessaly	Pamphile, a <i>maga</i> ( <i>Met.</i> 2.5)

16	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 2.21-30	Thelyphron	Larissa, Thessaly	<i>Sagas mulieres</i> ( <i>Met.</i> 2.21); <i>cantatrices anus</i> ( <i>Met.</i> 2.30)
17	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 2.28-29	Unidentified man who believes that his nephew has been murdered	Larissa, Thessaly	Zatchlas, an Egyptian prophet who can bring back a spirit from the dead for a short time and reanimate the dead body
18	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 9.8	Unidentified questioners who receive a single answer: the goddess' followers use ( <i>Met.</i> 9.9) a single oracle that can with suitable interpretation be applied to questions about marriage, buying property, travelling on business, and pursuing robbers	An unidentified village	Followers of the Syrian goddess: whatever the true ethnic origins of members of the band, they have adopted the traditional appearance of the goddess' followers ( <i>Met.</i> 8.24)
19	Ant.Diog. <i>De incred. ap.</i> Phot. 110a, 22-38	Derkyllis and Mantinias, accompanying Astraios	Thrace	Zalmoxis
20	Ant.Diog. <i>De incred. ap.</i> Phot. 110a, 41 - 110b, 10; 110b, 20-9	Derkyllis and Mantinias	Thule	Paapis, an Egyptian priest (Phot. 109a, 30)
21	Ant.Diog. <i>De incred. ap.</i> Phot. 110b, 29-33	Derkyllis and Mantinias	Tyre	Paapis, an Egyptian priest (Phot. 109a, 30)

22	Helioid. <i>Aeth.</i> 2.33	Charikles, priest of Apollo at Delphi ( <i>Aeth.</i> 2.29.1)	Delphi	Kalasis of Memphis, a wanderer ( <i>aletes</i> ) but formerly a <i>prophetes</i> ( <i>Aeth.</i> 2.24.5)
23	Helioid. <i>Aeth.</i> 10.39	Hydaspes, king of Ethiopia	Ethiopia, the temple of the Sun and Moon, across the river Astaborrhas from Meroe ( <i>Aeth.</i> 10.4-5)	Sisimithres, chief of the gymnosophists who live at the temple of Pan, near Meroe ( <i>Aeth.</i> 10.2, 10.4)
24	Helioid. <i>Aeth.</i> 4.12	Kalasis of Memphis	Ethiopia, the royal court at Meroe	<i>Sophoi</i>
25	Helioid. <i>Aeth.</i> 4.12	Persinna, queen of Ethiopia	Ethiopia, the royal court at Meroe	Kalasis of Memphis, a wanderer ( <i>aletes</i> ) but formerly a <i>prophetes</i> ( <i>Aeth.</i> 2.24.5)
26	Helioid. <i>Aeth.</i> 10.4	Persinna, queen of Ethiopia	Ethiopia, the temple of Pan, near Meroe	Sisimithres, chief of the gymnosophists who live at the temple of Pan, near Meroe ( <i>Aeth.</i> 10.2, 10.4)
27	Helioid. <i>Aeth.</i> 3.16	Theagenes, a Thessalian	Delphi	Kalasis of Memphis, a wanderer ( <i>aletes</i> ) but formerly a <i>prophetes</i> ( <i>Aeth.</i> 2.24.5)

**Table 12: Ambiguous oracular answers correctly interpreted**

See Ch. 2.5.1. Within each of the two divisions, entries are ordered as on Tables 1 and 4.

No.	Fontenrose no.	Oracle	Protagonist	Question	Response	Interpreter and interpretation	Source
<i>Oracular responses seen as riddles correctly interpreted by the recipients</i>							
1	Q20	Delphi	Aristomenes and Theoklos, Messenian envoys	In the course of war with Sparta, re the safety of Messene	εὔτε τράγος πίνησι Νέδης ἑλικόρροον ὕδωρ, οὐκέτι Μεσσήνην ρύομαι (When a he-goat drinks the whirling water of the Neda, I will no longer protect Messene; Paus. 4.20.1)	Theoklos, identified as a <i>mantis</i> , understands that the 'he-goat' is a fig tree already overhanging the river bank and touching the waters, and that disaster is therefore inevitable. Aristomenes can at least hide the city's secret talisman (Paus. 4.20.3-4)	PW366. *Paus. 4.20.1-3; Paus. 4.21.3; Paus. 4.21.10

2	Q34	Delphi	Phalanthos of Sparta	Re migration from Sparta and resettlement. Do you grant us Sikyonia?	καλόν τοι τὸ μεταξύ Κορίνθου καὶ Σικυῶνος· ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰκήσεις ... Σατύριον φράζου σὺ Τάραντός τ' ἀγλαὸν ὕδωρ καὶ λιμένα σκαιὸν καὶ ὄπου τράγος ἀλμυρὸν οἶδμα ἀμφαγαπᾷ τέγγων ἄκρον πολιοῖο γενείου· ἔνθα Τάραντα ποιοῦ ... (The area between Corinth and Sikyon is beautiful, but you will not settle there ... Look to Satyrion, the splendid water of Taras, a harbour on the left and the place where a he-goat loves salt water, wetting the tip of his grey beard. There build Taras [Tarentum] ... ; D.S. 8.21.3)	Phalanthos interprets the oracle correctly and founds Tarentum	PW46; earliest reference D.S. 8.21.3. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 408a; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 28.9
3	Q36	Delphi	Phalanthos of Sparta	No question specified	Where he sees rain falling from a clear sky (ὑετοῦ αὐτὸν αἰσθόμενον ὑπὸ αἴθρα), he should acquire land and found a city (Paus. 10.10.6)	Believing that the oracle required an impossibility, Phalanthos nevertheless sailed to Italy and sought a settling place. He had no success until his wife Aithra (Cloudless) wept over him and he perceived the meaning of the oracle. He became the founder of Tarentum (Paus. 10.10.6)	PW525. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 408a; *Paus. 10.10.6-7

4	Q76	Delphi	People of Miletos (D.L. 1.27-8) or of Miletos and Kos	To whom should a discovered tripod be awarded?	To the wisest	The tripod goes the round of the sages – each refuses to call himself the wisest – and is finally sent by Thales to Apollo Ismenios at Thebes or to Apollo at Delphi (Plut. <i>Sol.</i> 4.4)	PW247-8. *Plut. <i>Sol.</i> 4.2-3; *D.L. 1.27-8; *D.L. 1.32-3
5	Q81	Delphi	Kleotimos for his brother Prokles, tyrant of Epidauros	Re flight in face of weakening power and change of residence	He will find refuge where he asked the Aiginetan to place the basket or where the stag casts its horns. A friend from Aigina had disposed of a man murdered by Kleotimos in a basket dropped in the sea, and a stag buries its horns in the earth	In Plutarch's version of what was probably an ancient story, Prokles immediately understood that the god intended him to drown or bury himself. He did neither, but in due course he was killed by friends of the man whose remains he had disposed of in the basket mentioned in the oracle, and his body was thrown into the sea	*Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 403d.

6	Q147	Delphi	Athenians	In the context of the Persian threat to Athens and an oracle telling them to fly to the world's end, the Athenians ask for a better oracle	Zeus grants Athena a wooden wall that will not fall (Hdt.7.141.3-4, 142.2)	Pausanias (1.18.2) suggests that some responded to the oracle by fortifying the Akropolis with wooden stakes. In Herodotos' fuller account, some thought that the oracle referred to the ancient wooden wall of the Akropolis. Those who feared relying on the ships found an ominous note in the last lines of the (lengthy) oracle, but Themistokles found a more hopeful interpretation – the warning there referred to enemy deaths, not Athenian ones (Hdt. 7.142-3). His 'wooden wall' of ships was the Athenians' salvation	PW95; earliest reference *Hdt.7.141.3-4, 142.2. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 828d; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1116e-f; Plut. <i>Them.</i> 10.2; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 1.167; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 3.234; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 3.312; Luc. <i>JTr.</i> 20; Paus. 1.18.2; Philostr. <i>VS</i> 1.481
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7	Q154	Delphi	Athenians sent by Aristeides	Re overcoming Mardonios	They should pray to Zeus and Demeter Kithaironia and fight the battle in their own land on the plain of Demeter Eleusinia and Kore (Plut. <i>Arist.</i> 11.3)	The answer presented a problem in that the proposed supplications were to be made in the vicinity of Mount Kithairon in Plataia and nowhere near Eleusis. The plan was nevertheless to fight at Eleusis until Zeus revealed in a dream to Arimnestos that the oracle meant them to fight in Plataia. A temple of Demeter Eleusinia and Kore at the foot of Mount Kithairon proved the perfect place for an ambush (Plut. <i>Arist.</i> 11.3)	PW102. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 628f ; *Plut. <i>Arist.</i> 11.3
8	Q200	Delphi	People of Delos	Re ridding themselves of a plague	The present troubles of the Delians and the rest of the Greeks will be at an end when they double the size of the altar at Delos (Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 579b)	The Delians turn to Plato, as a geometer. Plato assures them that the god is not interested in the altar <i>per se</i> but is urging the Greeks to calm their passions in discussion and the study of mathematics, and so to give up war (Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 579b-d)	PW179. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 386e; *Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 579b-d
9	Q224	Delphi	Zenon of Kition	In the context of the need of a profession: what should he do to live in the best way?	He will have the best life if he is in contact with the dead	Zenon understands the oracle and studies ancient authors (D.L. 7.1.2)	PW421. *D.L. 7.1.2

10	L5	Delphi	Erginos, king of Orchomenos	Re having children	ἰστοβοῆι γέροντι νέην ποτίβαλλε κορώνην (Put a new tip on the old plough-beam [i.e. take a young wife]; Paus. 9.37.4)	Erginos understands the rather obvious metaphor and does as directed (Paus. 9.37.4)	PW111. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 784b; *Paus. 9.37.4
11	L22, Q247	Delphi; Plutarch associates (2) with the Sibyl	(1) Theseus (Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 24.5), and (2) Athenian refugees at the time of Sulla (Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 24.5, Paus. 1.20.7)	Re the future of Athens	(1) ἀσκὸς γὰρ ἐν οἴδατι ποντοπορεύσει (a wineskin will pass over the sea on the swell; Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 24.5) (2) Ἀσκὸς βαπτίζη · δῦναι δέ τοι οὐ θέμις ἐστίν (a wineskin may dip: but for you to sink is not permitted; Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 24.5)	On both occasions, the metaphor is understood by the recipient(s)	PW154, 434. *Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 24.5; Paus. 1.20.7
12	L40	Delphi	Alkmaion	Re his mother's dying curse (Th. 2.102, Paus. 8.24.8-9)	To avoid the curse, he must settle in a place ἧτις ὄτε ἔκτεινε τὴν μητέρα μήπω ὑπὸ ἡλίου ἐωρᾶτο μηδὲ γῆ ἦν (which had not yet been seen by the sun and was not yet land when he killed his mother; Th. 2.102)	Alkmaion settles on alluvial deposits of the river Achelous (Paus. 8.24.8-9)	PW202; earliest reference *Th. 2.102. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 602d-e; *Paus. 8.24.8-9
13	L83	Delphi	Lokros	On difference with his father and leaving home, where should he found a colony?	He should found a city where he is bitten by a wooden dog	On being scratched by a dog-briar thorn (κυνόσβατος), he founds Ozolian Lokris on the spot	PW323. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 294e
14	L132	Delphi	Chalkinos and Daitos	Request to return to Athens ten generations after Kephalos' exile	They should sacrifice to Apollo first at that place in Attica where they see a trireme running on land	They sacrifice where they see a snake running into its hole, then come to Athens where they are made citizens	PW541. *Paus. 1.37.7

15	L158	Delphi	Aisymnos of Megara	Re the foundation of the Megarian republic: in what way will the Megarians prosper?	The Megarians will prosper if they consult with the majority	The Megarians take the oracle to refer to the dead and build their council chamber over a tomb of heroes	PW567. *Paus. 1.43.3
16	O10	Dodona	Themistokles	Re his exile from Athens	He is to go to one with a name like his own	He goes to Xerxes, who is also called king. (This is Themistokles' account to Xerxes; if true, it is clever manipulation or right interpretation of an oracle)	*Plut. <i>Them.</i> 28.3

***Oracular responses that are not obviously riddles understood correctly (or cleverly) in sufficient time for the protagonist or another interested party to benefit***

17	H3	Delphi	Chairephon	Is anyone wiser than Sokrates?	No one is wiser (Pl. <i>Ap.</i> 21a) or Sokrates is the wisest of all men (D.L. 2.37)	Sokrates debates within himself the meaning of the god's answer, which he understands to be a riddle (Pl. <i>Ap.</i> 20e-21c)	PW134, 420; earliest reference *Pl. <i>Ap.</i> 20e-21c. D.Chr. 13.30; D.Chr. 55.8; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1116e-f; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 1.366; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 2.78-83; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 3.311; Aristid. <i>Or.</i> 28.81; Luc. <i>Herm.</i> 15; Luc. <i>Rh.Pr.</i> 13; Luc. <i>Salt.</i> 25; Apul. <i>Met.</i> 10.33; Paus. 1.22.8; D.L. 2.37
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18	Q17	Delphi	Messenians	Re victory over Sparta after a long war	To those who first place 100 tripods around the altar of Zeus Ithomatas, heaven grants glory in war and the Messenian land (Paus. 4.12.7). There is a cryptic addition referring to the actual outcome: ἀπάτη δέ σε πρόσθε τίθησιν ... οὐδ' ἄν θεον ἐξαπατώης. ἔρδ' ὄππρη τὸ χρεῶν (Deceit puts you [the dedicator of the tripods] ahead ... but you do not deceive the god. Act according to fate ...; Paus. 4.12.7)	The oracle (at least without the cryptic addition) is not ambiguous, but lack of proper attention to literal meaning led to a bad outcome. The Messenians assumed that they had unique access to a shrine in their own territory and that the oracle virtually pledged them victory. Taking advantage of the literal meaning of the oracle, a Spartan pre-empted them, entering the shrine with clay tripods hidden in a bag. The Spartans won	PW365; *Paus. 4.12.7; Paus. 4.26.4
19	Q201	Delphi (D.L. 6.21) or the Delion at Sinope (D.L. 6.20-1)	Diogenes the Cynic	Two alternative questions re his career: (1) as superintendent of the mint as Sinope, should he adulterate the coinage? (2) having fled Sinope after adulterating the coinage, what should he do to be held in the greatest repute?	In each case, the god's response was that he should alter the (political) currency	In due course Diogenes correctly understands the god's meaning (D.L. 6.20)	PW180. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 332b-c; *D.L. 6.20-1; *D.L. 6.21
20	Q216	Delphi	Alexander	An unspoken question re the outcome of his proposed Persian campaign	ἀνίκητος εἶ ᾧ παῖ (My son, you are invincible; Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 14.4)	Alexander understands the exclamation as an oracle and declares that it is unnecessary to consult the god further (Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 14.4)	*Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 14.4

21	Q248	Delphi	Cicero	Re his career: how will he become famous?	He should make his own nature, not the opinion of the multitude, the guide of life	Cicero at first misunderstands the oracle and avoids the public gaze, but later realizes that his own nature is best fulfilled in public life	PW435. *Plut. <i>Cic.</i> 5.1
22	O2	Ammon	Alexander	Alexander visits the oracle with an unspoken question about his destiny and is addressed spontaneously by the priest ( <i>Alex.</i> 27.5)	Accreditation as divine: meaning to address him as ὦ παιδίον (my child), the priest, by a slip of the tongue, says ὦ παῖ Διός (Son of Zeus) ( <i>Alex.</i> 27.5)	Alexander takes the slip of the tongue as an oracle (Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 27.5)	*Plut. <i>Alex.</i> 27.5; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 180d; Luc. <i>DMort.</i> 12 (395)

**Table 13: Pre-Second Sophistic unmediated encounters with the divine: reference to ritual**

See Ch. 2.5.2. Entries are ordered as on Table 5.

No.	Protagonist	Liminal being/Place	Goal	Preparation/propitiation	Outcome	Source
<i>Encounters with spirits</i>						
1	Bodyguard of Demetrios, son of Antigonos (336-283 BCE)	Trophonios/Lebadeia	Robbery	None	The man dies	*Paus. 9.39.12
2	Elysios of Terina, probably 4th century BCE	Spirits of Elysios' father and son/a <i>psychomanteion</i>	Liminal encounter	A preliminary sacrifice as custom required, followed by incubation ( <i>Mor.</i> 109c)	Elysios is consoled by a message from his son's spirit	*Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 109b-d
3	Euthymos, a boxer, 5th century BCE	Hero who travelled with Odysseus and was stoned to death in Temesa/the hero's shrine	Prevention of the customary ritual sacrifice	None	Euthymos expels the spirit	**Paus. 6.6.9-11
4	Karian envoy of Mardonios, the Persian commander at Plataia 479 BCE	Trophonios/Lebadeia	Liminal encounter	None specified, but appropriate preparation can be assumed	The envoy obtains his answer	*Plut. <i>Arist.</i> 19.1-2

5	Lydian envoy of Mardonios, the Persian commander at Plataia 479 BCE	Amphiaraos/[Oropos]	Liminal encounter	Incubation at the shrine	The envoy receives a cryptic prediction of the nature of Mardonios' death	*Plut. <i>Arist.</i> 19.1-2
6	Odysseus	Spirit of Teiresias and other spirits/Hades ( <i>Od.</i> 11.1-332)	Liminal encounter	Direction and elaborate instruction from Kirke as to the route and the sacrifices to be made on arrival ( <i>Od.</i> 10.490-540)	Odysseus receives instructions from Teiresias for his homeward voyage ( <i>Od.</i> 11.100-17)	D.Chr. 4.37; D.Chr. 11.34; D.Chr. 74.19; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 16e; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 516a-b; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 740e-f; Plut. <i>Mar.</i> 11.6; Luc. <i>Astr.</i> 24; Luc. <i>DMort.</i> 23 (448); Luc. <i>DMort.</i> 26.1-3 (399-401); Luc. <i>Luct.</i> 5; Luc. <i>Nec.</i> 1; Luc. <i>Nec.</i> 8; Apul. <i>Apol.</i> 31; Paus. 2.13.3; Paus. 3.24.11; Paus. 8.48.6; Paus. 9.33.2; **Paus. 10.28.1, 10.29.8 (both references parts of the description of the same painting); Philostr. <i>VA</i> 4.16.1
7	Orpheus	Spirit of Eurydike/oracle of the dead at Aornon in Thesprotis	Liminal encounter	None specified, but the appropriate preparation can be assumed	Orpheus encounters the spirit of Eurydike and believes that it is following him away, but loses it when he turns around	Paus. 9.30.6

8	Pausanias, Spartan leader of the combined Greek forces at Plataia 479 BCE	Spirit of Kleonike/oracle of the dead at Herakleia in Pontos	Liminal encounter	None specified, but appropriate preparation can be assumed	Pausanias successfully evokes the spirit of Kleonike, but it foretells his death	*Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 555c; *Plut. <i>Cim.</i> 6.4-7; Paus. 3.17.8-9
9	Quintus Titius, a Roman trader in Greece and acquaintance of Sulla, c. 86 BCE	Trophonios/Lebadeia	Liminal encounter	None specified, but the appropriate preparation can be assumed	A figure similar to Jupiter Olympios appears; Quintus Titius learns of a battle and a victory to come	*Plut. <i>Sull.</i> 17.2-3
10	Salvenius, a Roman soldier known to Sulla, c. 86 BCE	Trophonios/Lebadeia	Liminal encounter	None specified, but the appropriate preparation can be assumed	A figure similar to Jupiter Olympios appears; Salvenius learns about future events in Italy	*Plut. <i>Sull.</i> 17.2-3
11	Saon of Akraiphnion, c. 6th century BCE	Trophonios/Lebadeia (prior to the founding of the oracle)	Liminal encounter	Direction from Delphi	Trophonios teaches Saon the ritual to be observed at the oracle	*Paus. 9.40.1-2

***Encounters with gods (including all encounters at sanctuaries/temples/residences of gods, and natural places that were to become sanctuaries)***

12	Aipytos, king of the Arkadians	Poseidon Hippios /Mantineia	Liminal encounter	None: access is wholly forbidden	Aigyptos is blinded and dies soon afterward	Paus. 8.5.5; *Paus. 8.10.2-3
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13	Herakles	Apollo/Delphi	In Pausanias' version (10.13.7-8), an oracle	Oracle refused on the grounds of guilt of murder; Herakles responds with violence	Herakles and the god come to terms; Herakles gets what he wants	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 387d; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 413a; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 557c; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 560d; Paus. 3.21.8; **Paus. 8.37.1; *Paus. 10.13.7-8
14	Iodama, priestess of Itonian Athena	[Athena]/sanctuary of Itonian Athena at Koroneia	Liminal encounter	None specified, but rites appropriate to a priestess can be assumed	Iodama sees the goddess and is turned into stone	*Paus. 9.34.1-2
15	Leonidas of Sparta, 5th century BCE	A prophetic dream presumably sent by the god/Temple of Herakles, Thebes	Liminal encounter	Incubation in the temple	Leonidas receives a vision predicting general turmoil and the destruction of Thebes by Alexander	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 865f
16	Lucullus, Roman military commander fighting Mithridates, 1st century BCE	Aphrodite/Temple of Aphrodite, Troas	Liminal encounter (or possibly just a resting place in the context of a military campaign)	Incubation in the temple	Lucullus is given strategic advice (in cryptic form) by the goddess	*Plut. <i>Luc.</i> 12.1
17	Lykaon, ancient king of Arkadia	[Zeus]/Altar of Zeus Lykaios, Mount Lykaion (Arkadia)	Liminal encounter or benefits of some other kind from the god	Human sacrifice	Lykaon experiences a metamorphosis and becomes a wolf	*Paus. 8.2.3

18	Timoleon, Corinthian commander who expelled Dionysios II from Syracuse, 4th century BCE	[Apollo?]/Delphi	Liminal encounter	None specified, but appropriate preparation can be assumed	In the sanctuary, Timoleon receives a symbolic assurance of victory	*Plut. <i>Tim.</i> 8.2
19	Valeria, sister of Publicola, with other Roman ladies, 5th century BCE	[Jupiter?]/Altar of Jupiter Capitolinus, Rome	Liminal encounter	None specified, but appropriate preparation can be assumed	Valeria receives divine guidance as to appropriate action in the current political situation (i.e. to address herself to the mother of Coriolanus, who was threatening the city)	*Plut. <i>Cor.</i> 33.2

**Table 14: Non-Greeks make use of their supernormal powers**

See Ch. 2.5.3. Entries are grouped by work and, within each work, ordered alphabetically by protagonist. An intentional encounter, or journey to the place where an encounter takes place, is essential.

No.	Source	Protagonist	Place	Group of wise or wise individual sought or consulted	Interchange
1	Luc. <i>Nec.</i> 6-22	Menippos, a Cynic ( <i>Nec.</i> 1), who is disappointed with the contradictions of philosophers ( <i>Nec.</i> 3) and seeks guidance from Teiresias ( <i>Nec.</i> 1)	Babylon	Mithrobarzanes, a Chaldaian; Menippos seems to identify the Chaldaians with the Magoi, the disciples and successors of Zoroaster, who can open the gates of Hades ( <i>Nec.</i> 6)	Mithrobarzanes provides Menippos with access, in life, to Hades. After ritual preparation for 29 days by the Euphrates and further ritual preparation by the Tigris, he escorts Menippos downriver to the marsh and lake in which the Euphrates ends; after a further sacrifice across the lake, a chasm leading down to Hades opens up ( <i>Nec.</i> 6-10). On his instruction, Menippos returns to the world via the sanctuary of Trophonios at Lebadeia ( <i>Nec.</i> 22)
2	Luc. <i>Philops.</i> 33-6	Eukrates, a man of sixty devoted to philosophy ( <i>Philops.</i> 5)	Egypt	Pankrates of Memphis, a holy scribe ( <i>hierogrammateus</i> ) who knew all the teaching of Egypt and had lived 23 years in underground sanctuaries, taught to do magic (μαγεύειν) by Isis	Sent by his father to complete his education in Egypt, Eukrates meets Pankrates while sailing up from Memphis to see Memnon. He identifies him as a holy ( <i>hieros</i> ) man when he sees him riding on crocodiles; after joining him, he observes Pankrates turn inanimate objects into servants by repeating a certain incantation ( <i>epoide</i> ), and attempts to imitate him

3	Luc. <i>Philops.</i> 11-12	Ion, a follower of Plato ( <i>Philops.</i> 6)	[Greek world]	A Babylonian man, one of the so-called Chaldaians	The Chaldaian cures Ion's father's vine-dresser of a snake bite with a spell ( <i>epoide</i> ), and by binding against the wound a piece of stone from the tombstone ( <i>stele</i> ) of a dead girl. As well, he summons up and destroys all the snakes on the property
4	Luc. <i>Philops.</i> 16	Ion, a follower of Plato ( <i>Philops.</i> 6)	[Greek world]	A Syrian from Palestine, a specialist (σοφιστής) among those 'singing away' phantoms (ἐξάδοντες τὰ φάσματα)	Ion claims to have seen the man exorcize a <i>daimon</i> that came out black and smoky in colour
5	Luc. <i>Philops.</i> 13-15	Kleodemos the Peripatetic ( <i>Philops.</i> 6)	[Greek world]	A Hyperborean <i>magos</i>	Kleodemos employs the magician on behalf of Glaukias, his student, to fetch the woman with whom Glaukias is in love. Kleodemos also claims to have seen the magician fly, and walk on water and through fire. The narrator debunks the story by asserting that the woman was easily bought

6	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 1.5-1.20	Aristomenes	Hypata, Thessaly	<p>Meroe, a <i>saga</i> (<i>Met.</i> 1.8). Her powers enable her to bring down the sky and suspend the earth, solidify fountains and dissolve mountains, raise ghosts and enfeeble the gods, extinguish the stars and lighten Tartarus (<i>Met.</i> 1.8). She can make men fall in love with her (<i>Met.</i> 1.8), change human beings into animals (<i>Met.</i> 1.9), seal the wombs of pregnant women (<i>Met.</i> 1.9), imprison people in their houses (<i>Met.</i> 1.10) and transport houses across the earth (<i>Met.</i> 1.10)</p>	<p>At Hypata, Aristomenes meets his old friend Socrates, who has been given up for dead at home. Socrates describes how, on a business trip to Larissa, he was lured into a sexual relationship with the innkeeper Meroe. Aristomenes takes care of the fleeing Socrates in his inn room; Meroe breaks in at night with another witch and removes Socrates' heart. Aristomenes fears arrest for murder, but in the morning Socrates is alive and seems perfectly well; only later in the day, when he stoops to drink, does the wound the witch closed gape open so that he falls down dead (<i>Met.</i> 1.19)</p>
7	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 2.5-3.25	Lucius, a young man travelling on business ( <i>Met.</i> 1.2)	Hypata, Thessaly	Pamphile, a <i>maga</i> ( <i>Met.</i> 2.5)	<p>Lucius watches in secret with Pamphile's servant Photis while Pamphile turns herself into a bird in order to fly away to her beloved. He learns from Photis how the deed is accomplished, and tries it himself (<i>Met.</i> 3.21-5)</p>

8	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 3.16-3.18	Photis, servant to Pamphile	Hypata, Thessaly	Pamphile, a <i>maga</i> ( <i>Met.</i> 2.5)	Intent on summoning her beloved to her house, Pamphile sends Photis for the young man's hair clippings; his barber refuses to hand them over, and Photis takes instead the clippings from goatskin bags. Pamphile's spells thus summon to the house the raised-up goatskins, which are 'murdered' by Lucius
9	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 2.21-2.30	Thelyphron	Larissa, Thessaly	<i>Sagas mulieres</i> ( <i>Met.</i> 2.21); <i>cantatrices anus</i> ( <i>Met.</i> 2.30)	Travelling through Larissa on his way to the Olympic Games, Thelyphron hires himself out to stand guard over a corpse and protect it from the <i>sagae mulieres</i> who are accustomed to take parts of the face for their <i>ars magica</i> ( <i>Met.</i> 2.21). He falls asleep but finds the body apparently untouched ( <i>Met.</i> 2.26). However, an old man accuses Thelyphron's employer of the murder of her husband, his nephew, and arranges for an Egyptian prophet to raise the dead for questioning. The revived corpse agrees that his wife has murdered him. As proof of his story, he reveals something that no-one else could know: witches came in the night to remove parts of his body but instead took those of the guard, who happened to have the same name and who came to their summons. Thelyphron's face is then revealed to be fitted with a wax nose and ears

10	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 2.28-2.29	Unidentified man who believes that his nephew has been murdered	Larissa, Thessaly	Zatchlas, an Egyptian prophet who can bring back a spirit from the dead for a short time and reanimate the dead body	Called back to confirm the truth of the charge that he has been murdered, the nephew objects to being raised. The prophet threatens torture by the Furies ( <i>Dirae</i> ) unless he answers a question, and the spirit then confirms the charge
11	Ant.Diog. <i>De incred. ap.</i> Phot. 110a, 41 - 110b, 10; 110b, 20-9	Derkyllis and Mantinias	Thule	Paapis, an Egyptian priest (Phot. 109a, 30)	In the course of their wanderings, Derkyllis and Mantinias came upon Paapis in the Sicilian city of Eryx and stole from him his books and herb-chest (110a, 3-20). Now, pursuing them to Thule, Paapis casts upon them an enchantment condemning them to death every day, with revivification at night
12	Ant.Diog. <i>De incred. ap.</i> Phot. 110b, 29-33	Derkyllis and Mantinias	Tyre	Paapis, an Egyptian priest (Phot. 109a, 30)	Asked by Derkyllis and Mantinias to help their parents in some way, Paapis puts the parents into an extended deathlike trance
13	Helioid. <i>Aeth.</i> 2.33	Charikles, the priest of Apollo at Delphi ( <i>Aeth.</i> 2.29.1)	Delphi	Kalasiris of Memphis, a wanderer ( <i>aletes</i> ) but formerly a <i>prophetes</i> ( <i>Aeth.</i> 2.24.5)	Charikles asks Kalasiris to use <i>sophia</i> and witchery (ἰσχυξ) of an Egyptian kind to make his daughter fall in love with his own choice as her husband
14	Helioid. <i>Aeth.</i> 3.16	Theagenes, a Thessalian	Delphi	Kalasiris of Memphis, a wanderer ( <i>aletes</i> ) but formerly a <i>prophetes</i> ( <i>Aeth.</i> 2.24.5)	Theagenes turns to Kalasiris – on the grounds that he is from Egypt, and a <i>prophetes</i> – for assistance in love

**Table 15: Oracles: Second Sophistic non-fiction**

See Ch. 2.6. Consultations of oracular divinities: entries are ordered by oracle and then protagonist.  
Circulating oracles spread by chresmologues: entries are ordered by purported origin.

***Oracular sites***

<b>No.</b>	<b>Oracle</b>	<b>Protagonist</b>	<b>Source</b>
1	Apollo [at Delphi?]	Dion of Prousa	D.Chr. 13.9
2	Apollo at Delphi	Unnamed priest of Herakles Misogynos in Phokis	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 403f-404a
3	Apollo at Klaros	People of Ephesos and Smyrna	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 3.38
4	Apollo at Klaros	Zosimos, Aristeides' foster-father ( <i>tropheus</i> )	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 3.12
5	Glykon	Disciples of Alexander	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 40
6	Glykon	'Lucian' (sealed written question)	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 53
7	Glykon	'Lucian' (sealed written questions)	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 53
8	Glykon	'Lucian' (sealed written questions with misleading summary note)	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 54

9	Glykon	Pretended questioner	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 50
10	Glykon	Pretended questioner	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 52
11	Glykon	Rutilianus	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 33
12	Glykon	Rutilianus	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 34
13	Glykon	Rutilianus	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 35
14	Glykon	Sakerdos of Tios	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 43
15	Glykon	Sakerdos of Tios	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 43
16	Glykon	Sakerdos of Tios	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 43
17	Glykon	Sakerdos of Tios	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 43
18	Glykon	Sakerdos of Tios	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 43
19	Glykon	Sakerdos of Tios (unsolicited oracle)	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 43
20	Glykon	Senator's brother	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 25
21	Glykon	Severianus	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 27
22	Glykon	Severianus	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 27

23	Glykon	Skythian	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 51
24	Glykon	Paphlagonian	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 44
25	Glykon	Unidentified questioner	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 25
26	Glykon	Unidentified questioner(s)	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 28
27	Glykon	Unidentified questioner(s)	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 29
28	Glykon	Unidentified questioner(s)	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 29
29	Glykon	Unidentified questioner(s)	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 29
30	Mopsos at Mallos	Freedman sent as a spy by the ruler of Kilikia	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 434d-f
31	Trophonios at Lebadeia	Pausanias	Paus. 9.39.5-14
32	Trophonios at Lebadeia	Apollonios	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 8.19.1-2

***Circulating oracles/chresmologues***

<b>No.</b>	<b>Purported origin</b>	<b>Source</b>
33	Apollo (spurious oracle)	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 10

34	Apollo at Didyma	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 4.1.1
35	Apollo at Kolophon (Klaros)	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 4.1.1
36	Asklepios at Pergamon	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 4.1.1
37	Bakis (spurious oracle)	Luc. <i>Peregr.</i> 30
38	Glykon	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 18
39	Glykon	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 24
40	Glykon	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 36
41	Glykon	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 47
42	Glykon	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 48
43	Glykon	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 59
44	Sibyl (spurious oracle)	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 11
45	Sibyl	Luc. <i>Peregr.</i> 29
46	Unspecified (spurious oracle)	Luc. <i>Alex.</i> 10-11

47 Unspecified

Luc. *Peregr.* 27

**Table 16: Encounters with the divine: Second Sophistic non-fiction**

See Ch. 2.6. Entries are separated into major subgroups and then ordered alphabetically by specific place and protagonist. Only deliberately sought-out encounters are included; in the case of Aristeides in particular, this excludes many apparently spontaneous experiences of/messages from a god. Experiences in Asklepieia, whatever their form, can be taken to be messages from Asklepios; the nature of other numinous encounters is indicated briefly.

No.	Place	Protagonist	Source
<i>Asklepieia</i>			
<i>Aigai</i>			
1		Antiochos of Aigai, a sophist, second century CE	Philostr. <i>VS</i> 2.568
2		Unnamed Syrian youth	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 1.9.1-2
<i>Pergamon (or probably Pergamon)</i>			
3		Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 2.10
4		Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 2.11
5		Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 2.26-7
6		Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 2.31-3

7	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 2.47
8	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 2.48
9	Aristeides (another occasion)	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 2.48
10	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 2.51
11	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 2.54
12	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 2.71
13	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 2.74
14	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 2.75
15	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 2.77
16	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 2.78
17	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 3.2-3
18	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 3.7
19	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 3.44
20	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 4.14-18

21	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 4.19
22	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 4.21
23	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 4.24
24	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 4.25-6
25	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 4.28
26	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 4.29
27	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 4.38
28	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 4.39-41
29	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 4.44
30	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 4.45-7
31	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 4.58
32	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 4.106
33	Asklepiakos, the temple warden	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 3.14
34	Euarestos of Krete	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 4.23

35	Hermokrates of Phokaia, a sophist	Philostr. <i>VS</i> 2.611
36	Hermokrates of Rhodes, a lyric poet	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 4.23
37	A Macedonian	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 4.42
38	Philadelphos, a temple warden	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 2.30
39	Polemon, a sophist	Philostr. <i>VS</i> 1.535
40	Rufinus, a consul	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 4.43
41	Sedatius, a Roman senator	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 2.48
42	Zosimos, Aristeides' <i>tropheus</i>	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 2.9
	<i>Poimaneos</i>	
43	Aristeides	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 4.3-5
44	Farmer	Aristid. <i>HL</i> 4.5
	<b><i>Other shrines, tombs, or places associated with a particular divinity or spirit</i></b>	
45	Athens, at the temple of Kanobos	Herodes [Atticus] (a validation of the mysterious figure whom Herodes had arranged to meet)
		Philostr. <i>VS</i> 2.552-4

46	Delphi, at the sanctuary of Apollo	Pythia who died not long ago (after approaching the god at an inappropriate time, the woman died)	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 438a-c
47	Egypt (Koptos), at the sanctuary of Isis	Man bribed by the Roman governor of Egypt (after relating what he saw, the man died)	Paus. 10.32.18
48	Ephesos, near the present position of the statue of Herakles the Averter	Apollonios (an encounter with a <i>daimon</i> in human form)	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 4.10.2-3
49	Ilion [Troy], at the tomb of Achilles	Apollonios (an encounter with Achilles)	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 4.11.1-3, 4.16.1-6
50	Kilikia, at the incubation oracle of Mopsos	Freedman sent as a spy by the ruler of Kilikia (a validation of the oracle)	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 434d-f
51	Knidos, at the temple of Artemis	Man who thought he was in love with the statue of Aphrodite (a proposed encounter; the protagonist is deterred after discussion with Apollonios)	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 6.40.1-2
52	Krete, at the sanctuary of Dictynna	Apollonios (apotheosis?)	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 8.30.2-3
53	Lebadeia, at the sanctuary of Trophonios	Apollonios (an encounter with Trophonios)	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 8.19.1-2

54	Lebadeia, at the sanctuary of Trophonios	Pausanias (an encounter with Trophonios?)	Paus. 9.39.5-14
55	Lindos, at the sanctuary of Athena	Apollonios (apotheosis?)	Philostr. VA 8.30.2
56	Mysia, at the temple of Olympian Zeus adjacent to Aristeides' ancestral home	Aristeides (a divine message, presumably – in spite of the location – from Asklepios)	Aristid. HL 4.1
57	Smyrna, at the Temple of Isis	Aristeides (a mystic experience associated with Isis)	Aristid. HL 3.45-6
58	Tithoria, at the sanctuary of Isis	Man not τῶν καταβαιόντων i.e. without the necessary credentials (an encounter with phantoms [ <i>eidola</i> ], followed soon after by death)	Paus. 10.32.17
59	Tyana, at Apollonios' school	Young man (an encounter with Apollonios after the latter's apotheosis)	Philostr. VA 8.31.1-3

***Specially-constructed places (pyres)***

60	Athens	Indian visitor to Athens (self-immolation)	Plut. Alex. 69.4
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|----|---------------------------------------|--|---|
| 61 | Olympia, just after the Olympic Games | Peregrinos (Lucian) or 'The Cynic Proteus' (Philostratos) (self-immolation, possibly a bid for apotheosis) | Luc. <i>Peregr.</i> 35-9; Philostr. <i>VS</i> 2.563 |
|----|---------------------------------------|--|---|

***Natural places***

- |    |   |   |                                 |
|----|---|---|---------------------------------|
| 62 | Mysia, at the river Aisepos and associated Warm Springs | Aristeides (an experience similar to an initiation, <i>HL</i> 4.7)                                      | Aristid. <i>HL</i> 4.6-7        |
| 63 | Pergamon, at the river Selinos                          | Aristeides (an experience almost like an initiation, <i>HL</i> 2.28)                                    | Aristid. <i>HL</i> 2.26-8, 51-3 |
| 64 | Smyrna, at a local river                                | Aristeides (an experience of the complete presence of the god: οὕτω πᾶς ἦν πρὸς τῷ θεῷ, <i>HL</i> 2.23) | Aristid. <i>HL</i> 2.18-23      |
| 65 | Smyrna, at a local river                                | Aristeides (an aspect of Aristeides' first encounter with Asklepios)                                    | Aristid. <i>HL</i> 2.50         |
| 66 | Smyrna, at the warm springs                             | Aristeides (an aspect of Aristeides' first encounter with Asklepios)                                    | Aristid. <i>HL</i> 2.7, 2.69    |
| 67 | Tyana, a meadow outside the city                        | Apollonios' mother (a manifestation of swans at the time of Apollonios' birth)                          | Philostr. <i>VA</i> 1.5         |

**Table 17: Encounters with the non-Greek wise: Second Sophistic non-fiction**

See Ch. 2.6. Entries are ordered by protagonist and then place. Each entry requires an intentional journey to the place where the consultation takes place; interlocutors must have a stated area of knowledge or must demonstrate some degree of wisdom in an interaction. In Philostratos' *Vita Apollonii*, Apollonios rates his interlocutors against each other and against himself in respect of wisdom. Of these interlocutors, only those for whom he has some degree of respect or who fall into the traditional categories of the non-Greek wise are included in the Table. Timasion and Neilos are not included among the non-Greek wise encountered by Apollonios, although they are possibly Egyptian and have some natural wisdom, since they seek out Apollonios as a mentor rather than vice versa.

No.	Protagonist	Place	Group of wise or wise individual sought or consulted	Source
1	Apollonios	Babylon	Magoi	Philostr. VA 1.26
2	Apollonios	Babylon	King Vardanes	Philostr. VA 1.29-41
3	Apollonios	Egypt, the <i>hieron</i> [Serapeion] at Alexandria	A priest	Philostr. VA 5.25.1-2
4	Apollonios	Ethiopia, the <i>phrontisterion</i> of the Gymnoi	Gymnoi	Philostr. VA 6.5.6-6.23.1
5	Apollonios (sometimes accompanied by Damis)	India, between the Hyphasis and the Ganges (VA 2.33.1)	Indian Sophoi	Philostr. VA 3.12-50
6	Apollonios	India, Taxila	King Phraotes	Philostr. VA 2.23-41

7	Apollonios	Mesopotamia (μέση τῶν ποταμῶν, explicitly the area between the Tigris and Euphrates; VA 1.20.2)	Arabian <i>nomades</i> who understand the language of birds and animals	Philostr. VA 1.20.2-3
8	Aristeides	Egypt	Priests (36.1, 36.122) and <i>prophetai</i> (36.1)	Aristid. Or. 36.1, 36.122
9	Demetrios the <i>grammatikos</i> (Mor. 410a), on a voyage of inquiry and observation at the emperor's behest	Island off the coast of Britain	Inhabitants held holy and inviolate (ἱεροὺς δὲ καὶ ἀσύλους) by the Britons	Plut. Mor. 419e-420a
10	Diogenes of Amastris, a student of Chrestos of Byzantion	Unspecified	Egyptian	Philostr. VS 2.591-2
11	Dion of Prousa	Egypt, Onouphis	Egyptian priest	D.Chr. 11.37-8
12	Kleombrotos the Lakedaimonian (Mor. 410a); rulers ( <i>dynastai</i> ) and kings' secretaries ( <i>grammateis</i> )	Uninhabited place near the Erythrean Sea	A non-Greek ( <i>barbaros</i> ) who meets with human beings only once a year	Plut. Mor. 421a-422e
13	Local clients of the Indian wise seeking healing and similar boons	India, between the Hyphasis and the Ganges (VA 2.33.1)	Indian Sophoi	Philostr. VA 3.38-40

14	Neilos	Ethiopia, the <i>phrontisterion</i> of the Gymnoi	Gymnoi	Philostr. VA 6.16.3
15	Neilos	India (proposed journey)	Indian Sophoi	Philostr. VA 6.16.4
16	Neilos' father	India	Indians living near the sea, who relate tales of the Sophoi	Philostr. VA 6.16.3
17	Peregrinos	Egypt	Agathoboulos, a [Greek?] ascetic	Luc. <i>Peregr.</i> 17
18	Rufinus, father-in-law of Pontianus		Chaldaians	Apul. <i>Apol.</i> 97
19	Unnamed Indian king	India, between the Hyphasis and the Ganges (VA 2.33.1)	Indian Sophoi	Philostr. VA 3.26.1-33.2