CHAPTER THREE

Image and Substance: Mrs. Thatcher and Thatcherism
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This examination of Thatcherism considers the extent to which it was based upon political image and substance. Several questions will be asked to draw out these complexities of Thatcherism. Firstly, what was the nature and composition of Thatcherism? The next point to be considered deals with the question was there Thatcherism without Mrs. Thatcher? Thatcherism will be debated in terms of Mrs. Thatcher's personal qualities, style of political leadership as well as through certain of Mrs. Thatcher's policies. This argument will then be waged in terms of the four areas of gender policy raised in the wider discussion.

The nature and composition of Thatcherism.

In Thatcherism: A Tale of Two Nations (1988) Jessop, Bonnett, Bromley and Ling identified six main tools to dissect and explain the origins, nature and significance of Thatcherism. The first chapter of Jessop et. al.'s text is devoted to analysing the six approaches (1988, 3-9). The methods of research selected for discussion were three of those evaluated by Jessop et. al. (1988, 6-9). According to Jessop et. al.'s appraisal of the personal quality definition, this approach "...assumes that there is something unique about Mrs. Thatcher which justifies focusing upon these qualities and associating them with a specific 'ism' " (1988, 6-9). Jessop et. al. also questioned the use of this approach as it implied that "...Thatcherism is best deciphered from Mrs. Thatcher's speeches, personal statements and interviews, rather than from the policies and action of her Government (1988, 6-9). This criticism was certainly valid, but is easily countered in the case of this examination because the approach was combined and not being solely used depending upon the individual's psychological views (Jessop, et. al.,
The disadvantage of this approach was that it reduced Thatcherism to issues of personality. Jessop et. al. additionally raise concern over the scope of the debate in terms of clearly defining what Mrs. Thatcher's personal qualities comprise.

The second part of the approach focuses upon political leadership style. Jessop et. al.'s criticism of this approach suggested that there was both something "distinctive" and that "...her political style has major political consequences" (1988, 7). Jessop et. al. implied that this approach has the advantage of looking more directly at the political significance of Thatcherism than the personality quality approach (1988, 7).

The final component of this research method complements the other methods. This approach analyses Thatcherism in terms of the distinct set of policies Conservative Party and Government pursued under Mrs. Thatcher's leadership. Jessop et. al.'s criticism of this approach to Thatcherism "...accepts that there is a unique collection of Thatcher policies" (1988, 7). Jessop et. al.'s consideration of this method additionally intimated that the 1979 election of Mrs. Thatcher signalled a significant change in Government policies (1988, 8). Hence, the combined method approach being adopted to examine the political image and substance of Thatcherism aimed to express a new focus in the research does not intend to suggest an agnostic understanding of Thatcherism. Like Jessop et. al. this examination acknowledges the existence of a variety of appreciations about Thatcherism (1988, 9). This belief, similar to that of Jessop et. al.'s, stems from retrospective reflections on the changes in the strategic line adopted by Thatcherism as well as its application to different policy areas (1988, 9). On its own
the first approach would be highly inadequate in defining Thatcherism. This critique examines Mrs. Thatcher's personal qualities which will be used to help define a set of values and predispositions and the influence these traits had on British politics. However, this approach may greatly assist in the assessment of the extent to which Thatcherism was related to Mrs. Thatcher's personal qualities. This particular line of argument proffered both affirmative and negative criticism about Mrs. Thatcher's personal qualities and political style. This approach provides a new, unusual and very distinctive view of Thatcherism and Mrs. Thatcher's political style. This examination certainly suggested that the very components which signalled Mrs. Thatcher's political image - her personal traits and political style - can not simply be discounted. The unique policies pursued by Mrs. Thatcher's Governments were also very helpful instruments in the breakdown of Thatcherism. The policies used in this examination have been very thoughtfully selected. It was recognised that the very lack of political clarity associated with these Thatcher policies was a definitive feature of Thatcherism; a point affirmed in Jessop et. al.'s examination of Thatcherism definitions (1988, 10). This was the reasoning behind the choice of the policy areas and the particular focus upon isolated policies within the six areas since 1979.

To what extent was Thatcherism based upon Mrs. Thatcher’s political image and substance?

This part of the discussion examines the premise that Thatcherism was mostly image based. This argument aims to imply that Thatcherism was overwhelmingly the product of Mrs. Thatcher's political image. This viewpoint will initially be put forward using an examination of the periodisation of Thatcherism. It will be contested that the periodisation
of Thatcherism indicated the political image based character of Thatcherism.

According to Jessop, Bonnett and Bromley's essay "Farewell to Thatcherism? Neo-Liberalism and 'New Times'", Thatcherism was largely the product of Mrs. Thatcher's own political image making (1990, 82). This point was born out in Jessop et. al.'s proposed four fold periodisation (1990, 82). Jessop et. al.'s four phases of Thatcherism included: the rise of Thatcherism as a social movement; the period of consolidation, 1979-1982; the consolidation of Thatcherism, 1982-1986; and finally radical Thatcherism, from the 1986 Party Conference onwards (1990, 82). These authors added that Thatcherism could have concluded with any of these periods, however with each period came the appreciation that only another "specific version or stage" of Thatcherism had ended only to be succeeded by a new, revitalised Thatcherite effort (Jessop et. al., 1990, 82). Jessop et.al also supported the espousal that Thatcherism was able to be closed identified with Mrs. Thatcher's own political image and eponymous political strategies (1990, 82).

This periodisation of Thatcherism lends credence to the argument that Thatcherism was overwhelmingly the construct of Mrs. Thatcher's political image. Jessop et. al.'s periodisation suggested that the nature of Thatcherism was organic, and like Mrs. Thatcher's political image, it was very changeable over time.

In earlier discussions it has been strongly expounded that Mrs. Thatcher's political image was a cultivated creation born out of the need for optimum political flexibility and appeal. Thatcherism seemed to have been based upon very similar political needs. It had to be capable
of purporting political image changes linked with the current political-economic social climate of Britain in certain policy areas and the overall political programme which helped comprise Thatcherism. This point was acknowledged by Jessop et. al. who prompted the question that perhaps only the latter more extreme and outrageous images and stages of Thatcherism were in crisis and had no prospect of survival (1990, 82). As the main journal to have attempted to make an in-depth analysis of Thatcherism, Marxism Today also recognised that Thatcherism was largely image based as the journal noted a significant shift in focus over the years from ideological to economic (Jessop et. al., 1990, 82).

This point was well expressed through various turnabouts. Jessop et. al. recognised this image change in Thatcherism through their identification of phase four, radical or neo-liberal Thatcherism (1990, 82). They believed phase four promoted not only a new political image of Mrs. Thatcher for "popular acclaim", but also saw the addition of a different phase of Thatcherism which was "...less strident, greener, and more caring..." than previous trends of Thatcherism (1990, 82). Jessop et. al. stated "...as the evidence has mounted..." concern has continued to rage over "...Thatcherism's alleged ability to identify itself economically and politically with the 'New Times' accompanying the transition to post-Fordism..." (1990, 82). This unlikely change in the focus of Thatcherism was reflected in the fact that Thatcherism was couched in image not substance; as any major alterations in a political style, if substance based, would completely debase and refute the whole political style. Hence, the very changeability of Thatcherism suggested it was largely based upon image rather than substance.
A further exponent of the notion that Thatcherism was political image based was made by Graham Little, in his book *Strong leadership: Thatcherism, Reagan and An Eminent Person* (1988). Little espoused this understanding of strong leadership through his description of Mrs. Thatcher as a "conviction politician" saying Mrs. Thatcher was both a strong leader and "...used her philosophy like a political catechism and a set of marching orders ..." (1988, 42). Little explained that "There is no doubt, though, that Thatcherism was a direct expression of Mrs. Thatcher herself, her personal views, her prejudices, turned into political truths" (1988, 42).

A different approach which affirmed the overwhelming contribution of Mrs. Thatcher's political image upon Thatcherism was made by Kenneth Minogue in the "Introductory Comments" of his text *Thatcherism: Personality and Politics* (1987, x-xviii). Minogue made his examination of Thatcherism from the point of her opponents. Minogue suggested that"...Thatcherism as an expression is largely the creation of Thatcher's enemies..." and like other terms began an instrument of political division; it has since entered into everyday language usage, has even become a symbol of common identification and even a title of pride for Thatcherites (1987, x). In addition, Minogue implied that the term Thatcherism was coined by intellectual (Leftist political opponents, such as Marxists and the propounders of *Marxism Today*) enemies who would hardly be satisfied with merely disliking a person when they really disapproved of everything she stood for (1987, x). Minogue's comments emphasised the understanding that Thatcherism was a reflection of the holistic political character of Mrs. Thatcher; her political image, her policies and political attitude. Jessop, Bonnett, Bromley and Ling also spoke to the presentation of Thatcherism being based upon the political
image of Mrs. Thatcher (1988, 22). These authors suggested that Thatcherism was a political phenomenon which implied heavily upon British society through their statement:

"Once a phenomenon such as Thatcherism emerges and seeks to remake society in its image, it becomes ever more difficult to imagine an institution, relation or event which has not been affected. This is a measure of the dominance (if not necessarily the hegemony) of Thatcherism in contemporary Britain and its capacities to influence the agenda in many different areas of social life" (1988, 23).

Hence, Jessop et. al.'s statement lent credence to the argument implying the political image laden nature of Thatcherism (1988).

Peter Riddell's account of Mrs. Thatcher's, The Thatcher Era: And its Legacy (1991) additionally supported the assumption that Thatcherism was mostly the result of Mrs. Thatcher's political image. Riddell firstly suggested that the distinctive political flavour which was Thatcherism was mainly the product of Mrs. Thatcher herself, her highly individual political style. Riddell confirmed that Thatcherism was more an approach than coherent set of political ideas (1991, 2 &13). Riddell summed his analysis of Thatcherism and Mrs. Thatcher's input saying:

"Mrs. Thatcher is not a great political thinker or theorist. Her inspiration is personal experience and a view of Britain" and "Thatcherism is essentially an instinct, a series of moral values and add an approach to leadership rather than an ideology. It is an expression of Mrs. Thatcher's upbringing in Grantham, her background of hard work and family responsibility, ambition and postponed satisfaction, duty and patriotism" (1991, 3).
Riddell made a strong argument contradicting the notion that Thatcherism was essentially substance based (1991, 12-13). His findings intimated that Thatcherism was “...a reflection of the particular British conditions of the late 1970’s...” and that “...Thatcherism has been working with the grain not only of domestic developments but also of international trends. The shift in economic policy towards tighter financial and public spending restraint began in the mid-1970’s not only in Britain but also in the US,... and on the Continent of Europe” (Riddell, 1991, 12-13).

These findings lent support to the notion that Mrs. Thatcher’s policies were not unique to Thatcherism, thence the most distinguishing feature of Thatcherism was Mrs. Thatcher and her special political image. This stand was backed-up by the fact that when Mrs. Thatcher was spilled as Conservative Party leader in 1990 the reasoning was that as leader she had become a political and electoral liability (Riddell, 1991, 220). Riddell explained the Party faithful felt it was “...necessary to modify some of the more unpopular aspects of Thatcherism” (1991, 220). It seemed that Thatcherism was equated with Mrs. Thatcher and her political image. Riddell’s interpretation of the bitter in-fighting of the Conservative Party’s spill of 1990 as “...primarily a change of personality and style, rather than of fundamental strategy...” was a rather subjective account of what effectively spelt the extraction of the essential elements of Thatcherism (1991, 220). This was the case as Riddell had already expressed at great length that Thatcherism was heavily dependent upon Mrs. Thatcher and her political image for its foundations. Once Mrs. Thatcher and her political image had been removed in 1990, not only the most identifiable components were gone, but also the quintessential core of Thatcherism was lost. The installation
of Mr. Major as Prime Minister forever altered the character of Thatcherism because Mrs. Thatcher's political image and influence were absent, despite the fact that Mr. Major's Government followed through with some of the political programmes implemented by Mrs. Thatcher before her political demise (1991, 220). For example, Mr. Major's Government attempted to continue on in the general economic and industrial programme directions started by Mrs. Thatcher (Riddell, 1991, 220). The main disparity was that Mr. Major's Government changed the rate, the methods of implementation and the overall political tone of the political programme (Riddell, 1991, 220). The separating difference between Mr. Major's efforts and the continuance of Thatcherism lay in the whole appearance, style and attitude of politics being practiced. Mr. Major was not truly carrying on with Thatcherism from a purely political understanding. Thus, it appeared that Thatcherism truly was a political image based phenomenon.

Riddell's investigation of periodisation was a further indicator of the political image based character of Thatcherism. Riddell told how Thatcherism appeared to have a re-generative nature, a point clearly seen through the successive steps of Thatcherism (1991, 11). He suggested that the ability of Thatcherism to "renew itself" was one of the most striking image oriented components of Thatcherism (Riddell, 1991, 11). Riddell elaborated upon this point, explaining that Thatcherism had been more successful in rejuvenating itself than any previous administration (1991, 11). Riddell's beliefs were further qualified through the emphasis of Mrs. Thatcher's background and personality in Thatcherism; Riddell credited the application of "...Mrs. Thatcher's instincts, values and, above all energy to the solution of successive
problems...” or her political image, in the development of the various phases and overall organism of Thatcherism (1991, 11).

Jeremy Moon and Jenna Sindle’s article “Reading Thatcherism” (1994, 369-377) analysed many of the most popular and prominent political studies made on Mrs. Thatcher and Thatcherism. Moon and Sindle’s dissection of Riddell’s research of Thatcherism suggested it was more inclined towards the belief that Mrs. Thatcher and her political image were at the heart of Thatcherism (1994, 370). Moon and Sindle stated that Riddell conceded that Thatcherism was “...essentially an instinct, a series of moral value and an approach to leadership rather than ideology...” (1994, 370) A view evidenced by Thatcher’s talk of the “British character”: “...what you and I, as individuals are prepared to do...”; epitomised by “...another Britain of thoughtful people, tantalisingly slow to act, yet marvellously determined when they do...”; and with “our old vigour and vitality” (1988, 2, 3, 7). Moon and Sindle’s conclusion supported Riddell’s implication that Thatcherism was ostensibly political image based.

In his article, “The Thatcher Years”, Bill Schwarz suggested that Thatcherism was never radical and went onto question whether it ever existed beyond its reflection of Mrs. Thatcher’s political image (1987, 116). On the sixth anniversary of the 1979 election The Times made the same kind of political assessment as Schwarz, complaining that “...Thatcherism is still only skin deep...” (1987, 116). Schwarz implied that Thatcherism and even the image based term itself was the product of overheated Marxist imaginations, ever keen to ascribe to a non-existent ideological coherence to the opposing Conservative forces (Rutherford, 1983). Schwarz’s description even found favour with some
Marxist theorists whose determination to avoid reductionism refused to ascribe any coherence to contemporary Conservative politics, relying on the mix of chaotic conceptions as the everyday political commentators (1987, 116). In conclusion, Schwarz stated that Thatcherism was image based because it "...simply provided an ideological gloss to earlier deflationary and monetarist initiatives of the earliest stages of Thatcherism (1987, 118).

In reply to his own image based argument Schwarz implied that Thatcherism was actually largely substance based because the victories of the Right in the earlier periods of Thatcherism could not be overlooked; as this would be denying the force of Thatcherism and understating the extent to which the present situation in Britain is attempting to deal with the legacy of the political substance of Thatcherism (1987, 118).

The view that Thatcherism was an image based construct focused solely upon Mrs. Thatcher's image oriented style and approach taken to the process of governing was strongly countered by Geoff Gallop. In Gallop's article "The Future of Thatcherism", he strongly espoused the view that Thatcherism was substantially couched in Mrs. Thatcher's and the Conservative Party's policy objectives which were relentlessly pursued on a country-wide basis (1986, 75). Gallop based his substantialist argument upon the fact that Mrs. Thatcher created her own policy programmes, albeit with the aid of the ideas of Enoch Powell and her political supporter and mentor Keith Joseph (1986, 75). Gallop indicated Andrew Gamble's analysis of Thatcherism to support the point that Mrs. Thatcher's political goals were substantially couched in her clearly defined policies for a strong state and free economy (1986, 75).
In his essay, Gallop implied that the way Mrs. Thatcher drew upon the general programme concepts of others was not at all unusual (1986, 75). The particular style and approach employed by Mrs. Thatcher showed that these substantialist objectives were focal components, in Gallop’s opinion (1986, 75). In his examination of Thatcherism, The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism, Gamble seemed to conclude that the aims of Thatcherism were achieved through programmes reliant upon a mix of both liberal macro-economic policy (to reduce inflation) and micro-economic policy - to create a climate conducive to increasing employment (1988, 20).

The comments of Thatcher analyst Shirley Letwin opposed the sentiment that Thatcherism was dependent upon Mrs. Thatcher and her political image, as she stated:

"After her resignation it became, if anything, still more difficult to discuss politics in Britain without talking about Thatcherism. Academics no less than journalists and politicians, however much they disliked coining ‘isms’, came to speak of Thatcherism and Thatcherites because they had no other name for what they regarded as an important, and readily discernible, new feature of British politics" (1992, 17).

Letwin’s description of Thatcherism supported this view as she implied that Thatcherism was about a series events and Mrs. Thatcher’s new and unique substantially based responses (1992, 26). A view also observed in Andrew Gamble’s “working definition of Thatcherism”, which stated:

"Thatcherism has come to stand for the distinctive ideology, political style and programme of policies with which the Conservative
party has been identified since Margaret Thatcher became their leader" (1988, 20).

Letwin's description of Thatcherism was apparently based upon the common thread - Mrs. Thatcher's unique substantial policy beliefs - which united all the various manifestations of Thatcherism (1992, 26). Letwin contended that Thatcherism was a "...historical phenomenon, addressed to the concerns of a particular time and place..." (1992, 26). She added that its political substance was shaped by the response of its founders, above all herself, to the conditions of Britain at the time (Letwin, 1992, 27). The impression given by Letwin's discussion, signalled Mrs. Thatcher's very individualistic interpretation of events and her equally unique creation of political substance as the "common thread" running through Thatcherism.

The notion that Thatcherism was based upon political substance was supported by Letwin's belief that Thatcherism was couched in practical political responses and that it had not "...consisted in an academic analysis of politics at any level of abstraction..." adding, "...Its concerns had been with action..." (1992, 27). It seemed because Letwin's understanding of Thatcherism was so practical, as well as substantially based it did not have what it took to be a true theory (1992, 27).

However, Letwin described the political substance of Thatcherism as: ignoring the attributes of a true theory, whilst possessing other qualities theories did not include (1992, 27). Letwin explained that a theory does not offer concrete guidance on the approximate response to concrete practical circumstances at a given place and time; whilst a theory offers general principles which may be difficult to translate or make applicable to a situation but can be used (1992, 27). Letwin made this point after consideration of theories such as Marxism, which offered Lenin
insufficient practical guidance on how to deal with the Russian situation (1992, 27). Letwin added, Lenin had to translate Marxist theory into a series of practical situation instructions (1992, 27). Letwin explained that by eschewing theoretical argument and concentrating solely on practical prescriptions, Thatcherism was able to avoid any problems of translation (1992, 27). Thus, from Letwin’s examination it would seem Thatcherism, although not a political theory, was heavily based in very unique political substance.

Letwin’s final discriminator was Thatcherism’s flexibility to respond to spontaneous practical circumstances (1992, 28). Instead of the general principles of a true political theory Thatcherism was distinguished by direction, movement and purpose (1992, 29). On top of these findings Letwin made the statement that an equally consistent theme of Thatcherism was the general recognition of the truly unique substance of her policies, as well as her prominence as a “conviction politician” (1992, 28). Letwin’s latter comments suggested that as a politician, Mrs. Thatcher had some form of a mission and agenda; a point echoed by other analysts of Thatcherism (1992, 29). A view noted in Mrs. Thatcher repeated remarks about her sense of political mission observed through comments, such as having “...much more to do...” (Letwin, 1992, 29).

Although Thatcherism was not a proper political theory, nor simply a collection of ideas, it certainly was wholesaley discerned to be something of rare political substance. Hence, according to Letwin’s examination, it was entirely possible for a political ‘ism’, such as Thatcherism to be coherent without having a theoretical core to base its practise. This view lends further weight to the premiss that a political
"ism", such as Thatcherism was not simply the reflection of Mrs. Thatcher's political image, but also the construct of the unusual substance of Mrs. Thatcher's political beliefs. Letwin noted that Thatcherism additionally presented a coherent political attitude and set of responses to events of the 1980's; points Letwin implied were also the product of Mrs. Thatcher's uncommon substantialist appreciation of British politics in the 1980's. Letwin confirmed that Thatcherism was a "...remarkable personal method of government..." (1992, 44). Hence it seemed Letwin's study implied the overwhelmingly substantial nature of Thatcherism.

The central components of Thatcherism's political programme were comprised of a unique political substance which reflected some of the traits of Mrs. Thatcher's character. This examination of just one part of the substantial facets of Thatcherism seeks to demonstrate that this did not in any way reduce the substantial core of Thatcherism's political programme.

Letwin noted that Thatcherism was centred on the conception of the individual: promoted favoured characteristics of the individual; the support of a suitable family unit for the individual; and the existence of a society which propounded the favoured characteristics of the families of these individuals (1992, 32). Letwin intimated that the individual was preferred under Thatcherism: upright, self-sufficient, energetic, adventurous, independent-minded, loyal to friends and robust against enemies (1992, 32-33). This stereo-typical political individual was not unique to Thatcherism; however, the role this individual played in Thatcherism was unique, assured Letwin (1992, 33). Letwin noted that the individual was one of the principal preoccupations of Thatcherism.
and that it appeared to employ some of the traits of Mrs. Thatcher's political image whilst demonstrating an overwhelming and highly detailed substantialist framework. Hence, Letwin’s investigation of Thatcherism suggested that although it combined characteristics of Mrs. Thatcher's personal image it was largely couched in the substance of Mrs. Thatcher's political programme. With the benefit of Letwin's analysis concluding that Thatcherism was image rather than substantially based, would be an overt denial of the substantial nature of the policies and programmes of Thatcherism.

In reply to Letwin's substantialist policy espousals is a detailed suggestion of the image based nature of Thatcherism's response to gender issues and policies. Most analyses of Thatcherism do not usually explain it in terms of individual policy areas or political issues; especially in areas such as gender issues. Thatcherism is usually described in much broader terms of reference, as a widescale political entity, because it was based upon whole policy programme areas. Perhaps it was this broad scale political substantial approach of Thatcherism which flagged the generalistic nature of this political entity?

This point was justified by analysts of Thatcherism who implied that the substantial orientation of Thatcherism was essentially based around key economic and political strategies. For instance, Minogue offered a unique viewpoint and analysis of Thatcherism which suggested it definitely incorporated a substantial policy programme; however, their research led them to the conclusion that Thatcherism was actually image based because it was based upon Mrs. Thatcher's own character or even policies and programme (1987, 7). This view was couched in
the results of earlier debates which indicated that Mrs. Thatcher's political image was found to be a conglomeration of many varied facets of character which helped create a multi-purpose political image. Minogue's examination revealed that Mrs. Thatcher and Thatcherism was actually the "mirror image" of Attlee's much earlier conservative political agenda (1987, 7). Thus, even though Minogue examined Thatcherism in terms of its political substance he did state that because it was not Mrs. Thatcher's original political substance it could truly be interpreted as being image based. To help describe his interpretation, Minogue used Butt's analogy:

"If 1945 represented a constitutionally achieved revolution in political structure, 1979 began a constitutionally achieved counter-revolution..." and elaborated saying "Mrs. Thatcher set herself objectives as radical as Attlee's policy agenda; with Conservatism reassuming its proper function as a project of reversal rather than the hollow endorsement of the fallacy of inexorable unidirectional progress; and with the redefinition not just of its methods but also of its fundamental goals" (1987, 7).

Hence, Thatcherism was essentially couched around the rejuvenated radical conservative philosophies, political programmes and individual policies of a political economy. The consensus of Thatcherite opponents expounded that Thatcherism was merely the 1980's form in which the peculiarities of British capitalism had been expressed through Conservative politics (Jessop et. al., 1990, 89).

Hugo Young and Anne Sloman confirmed the view that Thatcherism was image based, as it was a "recognised label for a political philosophy" (1986). Young and Sloman explained that Thatcherism was characterised by a person "...interested in ideas...", a theme reflected in
this political philosophy which seemed to merely represent a "set of ideas about how to run the economy" (1986, 58). Young and Sloman clarified this description by saying that Mrs. Thatcher's personal or intellectual contribution to these economic policies was very questionable (1986, 58). In his article Bill Schwarz suggested that a shift was occurring in the earlier and recent analyses of Thatcherism (1986, 58).

This point was also outlined by Beatrix Campbell in her article "The Invisible Woman" (1995). Campbell implied that Thatcherism was merely a phenomenon (1995, 47). From Campbell's examination of Mrs. Thatcher's most recent memoirs in The Path To Power (1995) Campbell found that Thatcherism was mostly image based. She revealed that Thatcherism only very loosely adhered to a Conservative Party policy agenda, and thus was not substantially couched (1995, 45-47). It appeared that Thatcherism was essentially the creature of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership. Thatcherism unfolded in the wake of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership rather than be guided by it. It seemed that the complexity of Thatcherism lies in its inconsistency; it was a series of random responses and adaptations to changing political circumstances and to whatever political crises faced Mrs. Thatcher's Government. This appeared to be the basis for Campbell terming Mrs. Thatcher a politician and not an ideologist (1995, 47). Mrs. Thatcher's inability to explain the inconsistencies between the political image and substance of Thatcherism in The Path to Power (1995) also implied that it was ostensibly political image based.
Another angle of this debate about Thatcherism focuses upon the conservative political image or political substance of Thatcherism. The nature of the British conservative ideological tradition was couched in the ideas of the constitutional state and limited politics, the promotion of a governing class, the practise of high politics, and the upholding of authority. These points had been used to analyse and evaluate Thatcherism and Mrs. Thatcher's leadership style. In terms of these political perspectives there was little difficulty in seeing Thatcherism as an authentic expression representative of the British Conservative tradition (Gamble, 1989, 154-55). W. H. Greenleaf identified two main strands in British conservatism - Libertarianism and collectivism - as the major axes around which ideological debate and evaluation revolved (Gamble, 1989, 155). Greenleaf's work supported the view that Mrs. Thatcher's leadership style and Thatcherism were seen to be a reassertion of the four main concepts dominant in nineteenth century British conservative politics (Gamble, 1989, 155). These four main points were measurable reductions in the role of the state seen in spending and the range of decision making, the weakening of trade union power, and a renewed emphasis on individual self-reliance (Gamble, 1989, 157). According to Blake and Thomas' treatment supporters of Thatcherism answer the historical debate with the reply that any aberration of conservatism in Party history was in the period between 1945 and 1975 (Gamble, 1989, 157). Lord Blake was quoted to suggest that based upon the key Conservative tenets the Party only deviated between 1957, 1963, 1972 and 1974 (Gamble, 1989, 157).

At the centre of this deliberation was the description of Mrs. Thatcher as a radical conservative. For many analysts Mrs. Thatcher was simply using conservatism to allow Thatcherism to return to the
Victorian values and principles of laissez faire and Gladstonian finance (Gamble, 1989, 155). John Nott and Milton Friedman used this premise to oppose Greenleaf's support of Mrs. Thatcher as a conservative, suggesting that she was really a nineteenth century liberal and thus not a true conservative (Gamble, 1989, 155). Gamble conceded that Mrs. Thatcher and her supporters certainly asserted many of the libertarian ideas dominant in the nineteenth century (1989, 155).

In reply to the above debate it will be suggested that Mrs. Thatcher was a conservative by her own political convictions and protestations. Many have pondered and attempted to define what British Conservatism really is. Roy Macridis' investigation led him to the understanding that conservatism was more a state of mind rather than a political ideology (1992, 79). Macridis implied that for someone to be truly conservative - they must wish to conserve something - whether it be property, status, power or a way of life (1992, 79). Macridis characterised conservatives as those persons likely to have power, wealth or status and who basically wish to maintain this situation and therefore resist any changes particularly those which threaten to alter the status quo (1992, 79). A definition based upon the defence of the status quo and the rationalisation and the legitimisation of an order of this kind is a situation-based ideology (1992, 79). Macridis explained that conservative movements have always and everywhere borrowed from these principles, regardless of the situation and time (1992, 79). These tenets were couched in the belief that individual's liberties were of paramount significance to conservatives, rather than equality; and that political power should not be concentrated in the hands of the people (Macridis, 1992, 79). These main points were further enhanced by a definition from the American Political Science Review which stated
that conservatism was the "...articulate, systematic, theoretical resistance to change. It is primarily an ideology that defends the status quo..." (1957, 454-473).

The British or classical model of conservatism was best expressed by Edmund Burke in the latter part of the eighteenth century. And the most poignant implementation of this ideology was the British Conservative Party. Macridis found that the British model of conservatism was characterised by certain basic propositions that relate to political authority; a conception of society and the nature of the individual; and the relationship between the national economy and the state (1992, 81). Burke's explanation of British conservatism also noted its organic and hierarchical nature. He added that democratic notions of equality and freedom were superseded by an emphasis upon rights and liberties (Macridis, 1992, 81). Such understandings dispensed with any need for formalised written constitutions, usurping a preference for customs, understandings, roles and traditions to define political power and limit its exercise (Macridis, 1992, 84). The arrogance of the British Conservative Party is not so surprising when it is added that their leaders maintain that they are endowed with capabilities which enable them to govern in a superior manner to any opponent, expounded Macridis (1992, 85). And it is because of this the twin ideological undercurrents of the British Conservative Party are liberalism and conservatism.

In answer to the arguments of Blake and Thomas, Gamble found them highly problematic; saying that Thatcher's government had deviated from the doctrines of reducing the role of the state seen in spending and the range of decision making as well as in the re-emphasis
on individual self-responsibility (1989, 157). Instead far from
decentralised power, Mrs. Thatcher had centralised it, whilst the internal
Parliamentary Party structure remained deeply divided, implied Gamble
(1989, 157). Gamble went further to add that many steadfast One
Nation Conservatives doubted that a stable hegemony could be rebuilt in
Britain from problems attributed to Mrs. Thatcher's unaddressable and
non-Conservative policy legacies of polarisation, social division, poverty
and unemployment (1989, 157). Harvey Kaye's discussion fuelled this
argument with the notion that Mrs. Thatcher abused the traditional
tenets of conservatism through repeated gross manipulation, and
suggested that traditional conservatism was directly related to her late
Therefore Thatcherism was largely image based because it was not
truly Conservative Party or even slightly substantially based in
traditional conservatism.

Is there Thatcherism without Mrs. Thatcher?

This argument will suggest that Thatcherism was political
substance based, and thus Thatcherism could exist without Mrs.
Thatcher and her political image. This discussion aims to respond to the
debate of periodisation, confirming the substance based nature of
Thatcherism.

Jessop et. al raised the counter notion that Mrs. Thatcher and her
political image were not synonymous and inextricably dependent (1990,
82). The authors stated "...it does not follow that Thatcherism without
Thatcher is unthinkable. Nor should we exclude the possibility that
Britain might be ruled by the umpteenth Mrs. Thatcher, as it was once
governed by the fourteenth Lord Home or the 'fourteenth Mr. Wilson' ” (1990, 82). Jessop et. al also said that:

"...whilst distinguishing successive stages of Thatcherism, they should not be treated as unfolding according to iron laws of history: capitalist laws of motion, the dynamic of electoral cycles, an inevitable trend towards authoritarian statism, or whatever. Nor should we make the mistake or reducing the development of Thatcherism to the wilful realisation of an individual or collect project conceived out of time and place. Thatcherism is neither a natural necessity nor a wilful contingency. It is the complex, contradictory, unstable, inchoate and provisional product of social forces seeking to make their own history - fully understand, and cannot hope to master" (1988,13).

Further evidence was levelled in support of the belief that Thatcherism was not the sole derivative of Mrs. Thatcher's political image through the research of Phillip Norton (1990, 41-58). Norton concluded that Thatcherism could continue without Mrs. Thatcher as Prime Minister or even Conservative Party leader (1990, 58). In his commentary "The Lady's Not For Turning", Norton summed:

"Mrs. Thatcher had not crafted a party that is inherently Thatcherite in terms of attitude and composition"; and added "Loyalty will flow to the new leader as leader, regardless of which particular section of the party he or she is drawn from" (1990, 58).

Norton finalised his examination with the statement:

"The principal means of achieving a continuation of the Thatcherite revolution thus lay in Mrs. Thatcher's being succeeded by another Thatcherite;... The timing of Mrs. Thatcher's departure, and the conditions under which it takes place, will be crucial;... The Thatcher Revolution may last beyond Mrs. Thatcher's tenure of the premiership,
but what the foregoing analysts demonstrate is that there is nothing in terms of developments within the Conservative parliamentary party that ensures that it will” (1990, 58).

This point of view was iterated by Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques in the “Preface” of their co-edited text The Politics of Thatcherism (1983, 9-16). Hall and Jacques implied their support of the notion that Thatcherism was not political image based as well as the belief that Thatcherism could exist without Mrs. Thatcher. When considering the achievements and failings of Thatcherism, Hall and Jacques intimated that Thatcherism was more fully the product of Conservative Party politics and the political-economic-social circumstances of Britain in the 1970's and 1980's, than the result of a single individual's political image (1983, 13). Hall and Jacques said:

"There is, indeed, no guarantee that this will have exhausted the repertoire of the radical right. Alternatively, at some point something worse, something more authoritarian could follow" (1983, 13).

Peter Riddell's analysis of Thatcherism was also debased by a hint of weakness concerning the extent of influence expended by Mrs. Thatcher’s political image in Thatcherism. It would seem, even amidst Riddell's study of Thatcherism, were overbearing indicators of the significant contribution of political substance in Thatcherism. Although Riddell found evidence suggesting the contribution of Mrs. Thatcher and her political image in Thatcherism, the degree of involvement he found implied these elements were more "...a matter of presentation..." (1991, 236).
This point was carried further by admissions from the succeeding Major Government which detailed this point through the dilemma they faced concerning "...how far to appear to be unlike Mrs. Thatcher (who was very unpopular with the electorate when she resigned) and how far to take forward the radical edge of Thatcherism" (Riddell, 1991, 236). Riddell's investigation revealed that there was early contention over the transition of Thatcherism under Mrs. Thatcher's Premiership to Mr. Major's leadership, however he also saw a reconciliation of many differences in practise (1991, 236). This point was born out in the way Mr. Major's new Government maintained the direction of Conservative economic and industrial policy, save the poll tax, established as part of Mrs. Thatcher's political programme implemented under Thatcherism (199, 220). Riddell had to concede that any changes to this tenet of Thatcherism were only minor technical alterations, such was the pace and method of implementation (1991, 220).

Riddell noted another Thatcherism policy continued by Mr. Major's Government was by changing public agenda through heightened concern with the quality of public services and the environment (1991, 220). Research implied that any shifts in the political substance of Thatcherism - observed in the Major Government's implementation of individual policies were in response to changed circumstances and changed times (from the 1980's to the 1990's under any Party), rather than as dramatic policy reversals (1991, 237). Riddell additionally realised that much of the shift from the post-war economic and industrial policy consensus, initiated under Thatcherism, was accepted and maintained by the new Major Government (1991, 220). A continuation Riddell claimed particularly pleased Mrs. Thatcher (1991, 220). Other than minor circumstance based adjustments the Major
Government seemed to adhere to the central political substance of Thatcherism, explained Riddell (1991, 237). From an overall perspective, Riddell seemed to devote a great deal of his discussion to the political substance of Thatcherism and the contribution of substance towards the make-up of Thatcherism. Thus, suggesting the mainly substantial make-up of Thatcherism in support of the notion that Thatcherism could exist and continue with out Mrs. Thatcher.

Was Thatcherism political image or political substance based in terms of gender issues?

Equality of Economic Status and Employment.

Most analyses of Thatcherism were not usually explained and based in terms of individual policy areas or political issues, such as the four gender issue areas which will be raised in this debate. However, the harsh political economic programme that described the broad based entity of Thatcherism certainly exacerbated other economic problems; or at least served to add new elements to the ever deforming British economy and the problems of the disadvantaged of the 1980's, especially thrust upon the poor in particularly women (Jessop et. al., 1990, 85). Jessop et. al. confirmed this view saying, "...the actual legacy of the Thatcher years has been a further decline down the international economic hierarchy..." for Britain (1990, 86).

Women were at the forefront of disadvantaged groups who were excluded and exploited through Thatcher's boom - often of deliberate policies - added Jessop et. al. (1990, 96). Jessop et. al. also explained that because of the organisational and strategic terrain of Thatcherism it had chosen to "...turn against labour and various subordinate, deprived and underprivileged sectors; this included groups such as women who
would be most adversely affected (1990, 86). These strategies were stressed to be merely "international" responses and were justified in the name of promoting the free market and Britain as the "opportunity society" under Thatcherism (Jessop et. al., 1990, 86). However, Jessop et. al. explained that even though there are always poor people in every society, at least before Thatcherism came to British society the poor were never marginalised, unprivileged and stigmatised to anywhere near the extent as they were in the Thatcherite era - nor was this a matter of policy (1990, 96).

Women workers were especially hard hit by the political economic programme of Thatcherism. This Thatcher initiative weakened organised labour, whilst promoting Britain's private sector's increased use of hire-and-fire and flexi-wage policies as it eroded what little industrial protection female labourer's used to possess. This plan was more concerned with speeding up and intensifying the labour process than with up-grading labourers' skills and improving the value of worker's labour, directed Jessop et. al. (1990, 87). It appeared that Thatcherism both epitomised and reinforced the low-skill, low-wage, low-productivity character of the British political economy, whilst echoing the exploited character of the more economically, socially and politically disadvantaged groups who lived this outrageous political economic experiment of the 1980's. Hence, women workers equality of employment opportunity was very significantly stunted under the Thatcherism programme.
Thatcherism went further in its onslaught against disadvantaged groups, such as women, through dismantling the safety-net styled welfare system of Britain. The breakdown of the British welfare system was a huge blow for female workers and families. It removed their safety-net, only fallen back upon in the event of very hard times, in a time when the exploitation of female workers was increasing because of Thatcherism's attacks upon the union movement. This point was exposed by F. Field in Losing Out: The Emergence of Britain's Underclass who suggested that the policies of Thatcherism simultaneously incorporated cuts in the welfare system which amounted to some five billion Pounds in the years 1988-89 (1989, 14). Field went further, saying that these cuts to the welfare system essentially paid for tax cuts benefiting the upper-classes (1989, 70-71). Thus, the financial and fiscal costs of Thatcherism were real rather than symbolic, as disadvantaged groups such as women, were adversely and purposefully affected by the economic policy programmes and individual gender biased policies which actively discriminated against the equality of employment and conditions for women workers.

This point was further supported by very real substantial policy steps - such as changes to the economic and social infrastructure through alterations to the tax gains and subsidies of the middle and upper classes - which have had to be taken to attempt to reverse more than decades damage under Thatcherism. As Jessop et. al. explained the main social focus of Thatcherism was to benefit the entrepreneurial society and popular capitalism of the richest groups in Britain, or as J. Rentoul from The Rich Get Richer labelled the “have lots” (1987). Under Thatcherism the top one percent of tax units, or the 210 000 top most of the middle and upper classes, gained a reduction of 4.7 billion
Pounds of their accumulated tax debts and correspondingly had their accumulated pre-tax income threshold increased from 4.9 percent to 7.0 percent of their total income in 1988-89 (Field, 1989, 70-71).

The fact that women workers were so harshly affected by the political economic policies of Thatcherism was evidenced by the very real substantial policy steps which have since taken place in an attempt to counter some of the adversities caused under Thatcherism. This explains why the 1990's have been heralded as the "decade of caring", and why ministers have been vying to offer low-cost but politically symbolic concessions; such as higher pensions for some war widows and various other forms of compensation to women and other disadvantaged groups in British society (Jessop et. al., 1990, 97).

Health

As feminism and gender exponents always intended, issues such as health had become socially acknowledged priorities of the whole British community. The reasons for this change in perception was that during the stage of radical Thatcherism rampant many policy areas began to pinch the economic, social and political base and previous beneficiaries of Thatcherism (Jessop et. al., 1990, 97). It seemed the extreme cuts and down grading of the National Health Service (NHS) had at last surpassed the disadvantaged groups, such as women, and reached the "entrepreneurial society" of the middle and upper classes of Britain. In the key area of health and the NHS the Government, under the auspices of Thatcherism, sponsored reforms to inspire and reinforce financially-driven managements who would subordinate the labour process to value for money criteria and compete with each other for custom (Jessop et. al., 1990, 98). Under such a plan general practitioners
would receive financial incentives to adopt new management systems and to deliver new services, hospital administrations would be encouraged to become more autonomous or private oriented medical service facilities, implied Jessop et. al. (1990, 98). A very polarised effect would result, with the few advantaged customers of the Thatcherite styled health services having vested financial interests in the implementation and development of these modifications whilst the majority of disadvantaged people would equally strongly lose out their medical services (Jessop et. al., 1990, 98). Jessop et. al. identified this link between the middle and upper classes of entrepreneurial managers and consumer self-interest, suggesting it could seriously damage the British health system by undermining the social bases of collectivism (1990, 98). This view was backed by Thatcherite tendencies that carried-on the traditional Conservative biases of national and domestic levels of defence in preference to civil areas of research and development by retarding their modernisation and forcing areas, such as health, towards the market and the privatisation of such areas under Thatcherism (Jessop et. al., 1990, 92). The consequence of Thatcherism upon the national health service and its clients, particularly women, was an ever failing antiquated health system crippled under the burden of the ever increasing numbers of underprivileged persons priced out of modernised private health care.

In his book *The Road From Thatcherism: The Alternative Economic Strategy* (1981), Sam Arronovitch implied that Thatcherism's response to gender issues was linked to Mrs. Thatcher's political image. Arronovitch espoused the need for a new substantial response to the image based racist and sexist policies of Thatcherism (1981, 75-76). In so doing Arronovitch was asking for more than just criticism of
Thatcherism's negative reply to the gender issue of health. He suggested public opposition to private insurance schemes and the development of a community based movement pursuing the need for a democratic structure around reconstructed health authorities and also in health institutions (Arronovitch, 1981, 76). In Arronovitch's view the community reaction should be aimed at creating a service directed at the prevention and positive improvement of the health of the majority of people, improving the patient/doctor relationship and the way people, particularly women and disadvantaged groups are handled in health institutions; points which had been consistently over looked and been especially damaging to women (1981, 76). According to Arronovitch's analysis, the situation was couched in the principle of the inequality of access for disadvantaged groups, such as women (1981, 76). As part of Arronovitch's reply was the suggestion that groups, such as women, gave practical meaning to their criticism of Thatcherism's gender bias and image based by removing discrimination on the grounds of class, sex age and race which pervaded the system through the implementation of positive discrimination to redress the situation (1981, 76).

Education

Another gender issue greatly affected by the programmes of Thatcherism was education. The gender concern of education was another example of how the substantial component of Thatcherism was actually a projection of Mrs. Thatcher's political image. Similar to the British health crisis education had become a community based issue, as cuts had forced the negative ramifications beyond women and other disadvantaged groups and onto the more affluent middle and upper classes under Thatcherism. Under Thatcherism issues of gender, such as education, were economically and politically over looked in
preference of more traditional Conservative priorities as national and
domestic areas of defence. According to Jessop et. al.'s diagnosis
Thatcherism included education under the umbrella of unaffordable
"high-tech civil research and development" which instead experience the
pinch of ageing, reduced resources and no new developments in an on
going field of modernisation (1990, 92). Under Thatcher, Britain's highly
competitive and renowned education system was being reduced to a
delapidated hulk (Jessop et. al., 1990, 92).

Education, like health, was programmed to become the domain of
only the wealthy middle and upper classes under Thatcherism.
Mrs. Thatcher's government sponsored education reforms that inspired
and reinforced financially-driven managements who would compete
with other private sector education providers in the market place to
produce a "value for money" service, explained Jessop et. al. (1990, 98).
Jessop et. al. went to state that each school would have its own budget
and would publish the education achievement of its pupils. whilst
furthered educational institutions, such as polytechnics, would turn to
corporate planning and tender on unit costs to win more students (1990,
98). Again the seriously dangerous problem of stimulating greater
divisions among consumer and clients of the services because of the
vested interests of some in the area of education was not considered
significant under Thatcherism (Jessop et. al., 1990, 98).

Sam Arronovitch concurred with the view that although
Thatcherism had a substantial component it was based around Mrs.
Thatcher's political image. Arronovitch evidenced this view point in his
suggestions to fight Thatcherism's education costs (1981, 100).
Arronovitch prescribed the formation of committees, organisations and
alliances to begin intervening in local government policy on education, to make the local education authorities both more representative and responsive (1981, 100). He went on to add that all these forces needed to combine and be involved in a public discussion on the political substance of education, curricula and examination development in order to overcome racist and sexist ideas of Thatcherism (Arronovitch, 1981, 100). According to Arronovitch, criticism of negative substantial and image oriented facets of Thatcherism was not enough; he implied that opponents should be able to offer both substantial and image based alternatives (1981, 100).

These policies included the 1980 Education (No. 2) Act which increased parental choice and subsidised the private school system with Government money; the 1986 Education (No. 2) Act, which provided for an increased number of parent governors on schools’ governing bodies and effectively reduced the number of LEA governors to a minority; and finally, the 1988 Education Reform Act, this introduced Local Management of Schools (LMS), ensuring individual schools were suitably managed and responsive to ‘customer needs’ (Coxall and Robins, 1994, 373) and traditional Conservative curriculum standards. The gender oriented impact of Thatcherism upon education was very significant. The education reform acts effectively denied parents from socially and economically disadvantaged backgrounds access to the better educational resources as they could not afford private schools fees and could become market affected commodities consumed by the middle competitor the best educational resources as they and upper class frequented wealthy private schools. A trend increased by the 1980 Act saw increased government subsidies for private schools as well as increased student standards and numbers through government
sponsorship of a few lower classed gifted children through the Assisted Places Scheme. The Conservatives touted this Act as providing increased parental choice. The notion of the voucher system was aimed at assisting the movement of education into the British market place. A policy initiative that never gained sufficient momentum. This programme was designed to enable parents to buy a better education for their children by giving their vouchers to schools who could then convert them into appropriate educational resources, such as the best qualified and experienced teachers and up to date equipment. Thus Thatcherism aimed to provoke 'better' schools on the basis of their school vouchers. This situation was expected to make the 'poorer' schools in some way raise their educational standards to draw new parental support and vouchers and survive or perish in the new market-led education system (Coxall and Robins, 1994, 376). This initiative was never introduced because of anticipated opposition to the overt inequality of education it promoted.

The 1986 Act gave parents of children the opportunity to stack school governing bodies. These governing bodies wielded incredible powers extending over curriculum selection and development. Because of the generally Conservative background of the families of many parents at private schools the curriculum reflected Conservative traditional value-based subjects at the expense of multicultural and economic opportunities which had previously been the priority of LEA's (Coxall and Robins, 1994, 372). According to Coxall and Robins, "'traditional values' encompassed prejudices of one type or another..." (1994, 372). Coulby went further, adding: "Urban LEA's phrased their policies... (Coxall and Robins, 1994, 372). In tandem with the 1988 Act the ILEA was abolished and the control of schools firmly given to the
LMS, local parents and the community. Curriculum was to be selectively controlled and Conservatively oriented to reflect traditional values such as, English, maths science, history, geo-technology, art, music, physical education, foreign language, religious education as well as cross-cultural citizenship themes and national testing. These acts actively disallowed the introduction of progressive forces in education including a vocational education, multicultural and equal opportunity themes in Britain's educational system, remarked Coxall and Robins (1994, 373). These acts directly affected female students and students from generally poorer backgrounds who could not afford to enter university and thus had little use for such an academically geared education system. As for those students from economically depressed working class background statistics proved that little has improved and although the numbers of female entrants had increased it remained disproportionate and mostly part-time (Coxall and Robins, 1994, 375). Thus it seemed the gender, social and economic prejudices of Thatcherism were reflected in the wider education policy programme and in individual policies.

Conclusion

From this discussion it can be concluded that there was strong evidenced on both sides of the debate about the degree to which Thatcherism was political image or political substance based. From the arguments put forward it has been concluded that Thatcherism was essentially a belief system largely based around the political image of Mrs. Thatcher. The substance of Thatcherism was found to be overwhelmingly unoriginal and mostly the product of recycled programmes and values expressed in slightly altered kilters and formats
to produce an apparently new political substance from merely a bold political image.

Furthermore, Thatcherism was the expression of a series of traditional associations and relationships between the images of revitalised and popularised beliefs and minor references to past and present programmes/policies/issues of political substance. Hence, evidence compiled from this discussion implied that Thatcherism was the incredibly clever, yet precarious construct of the apparent confidence of Mrs. Thatcher’s political image.

The effect of Thatcherism upon individual gender issues and policies demonstrated its generalised substantial nature, highlighting its lack of sophistication with individual policy platforms and development. It was in this manner that Thatcherism fell back upon the biases of Mrs. Thatcher’s political image for direction. In conclusion it seemed that although Thatcherism was the end-product of the combined elements of Mrs. Thatcher’s political image and political substance, the proportion of this mixture was more heavily dependent upon Mrs. Thatcher’s political image.
CHAPTER THREE

Bibliography


CHAPTER FOUR
Image and Substance: Mrs. Thatcher's Leadership
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Image and Substance: Mrs. Thatcher's Leadership

This chapter considers the political image and substance of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership. Four main areas of debate concerning Mrs. Thatcher's leadership will be brought into contention. The first question examines whether the political image and substance of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership was sold for media and mass consumption. The ensuing discussion considers whether Mrs. Thatcher worked for herself through the way she may have re-written the political image and substance of her leadership. Next to be investigated is whether Mrs. Thatcher's political image and substance of leadership were considered Machiavellian according to the analyses of a variety of political commentators. The final component of this exploration of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership makes a study of whether the political image and substance of her leadership was controlled by patriarchy. The cumulative aim of each of these linked studies is to provide an insight into some of the least examined facets which comprised Mrs. Thatcher's leadership. This investigation aims to discover whether there was any disparity or other kind of association between the image and substance of her leadership. In keeping with the gender issues theme, the political substance of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership will be contested in terms of these policy areas.

The sale of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership through the media for mass public consumption.

This discussion firstly considers whether Mrs. Thatcher sold her leadership to the media for mass public consumption. This analysis also considers whether it was the political image and/or political substance
of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership which was sold. Whilst pondering this point, the question of whether this was an act of self improvement or self creation is debated?

Mrs. Thatcher certainly used a skilfully crafted political image. (An issue already discussed in the second chapter of the thesis). Young considered it a "...continuing necessity of political leadership", a pursuit which was not unique to Mrs. Thatcher (1990, 429). As Young saw it, Mrs. Thatcher was, "Like others before her, she simply sought to make the most of a limited talent to enthrall" (1990, 429).

A point echoed by University of Queensland lecturer Patsy McCarthy, she explained that the publicly well known political image of Mrs. Thatcher was manufactured by the reputed advertising agency Saatchi and Saatchi (1994 and Young, 1990, 312). McCarthy told how Saatchi and Saatchi employed vocal and behavioural modifications, as part of their scheme to improve and better promote the political image of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership (1994).

In his book The Selling of the President 1968 (1970, 27), Joe McGinniss confirmed the view that political leaders are seen as products on sale to the electorate through the mass media. McGinniss was specifically discussing the candidacy of Richard Nixon; however, much of his analysis and conclusions are useful concerning the general nature of selling political images of leadership. McGinniss began his debate with the notion that politics was a con-game and that there was "...a difference between the individual and (his) the image..." and that "...the difference is exaggerated and exploited electronically..." (1970, 26). He remarked that it was therefore not unusual that "...politicians and
advertising men should have discovered one another...", once they mutually discovered that the voter was reticent to face political reality (McGinniss, 1970, 27).

In his book The Image, Daniel Boorstin claimed that the race to gain mass media attention and mass public support often caused political leaders to lose their real political purposes (Boorstin in McGinniss, 1970, 27). Boorstin implied that political leaders often sacrificed their political content - political issues and policies - for an apparently more polished and electorally appealing political image (Boorstin in McGinniss, 1970, 27). With the aid of specialised advertising agencies and image maker political leaders, such as Mrs. Thatcher, have become media objects. Boorstin also acknowledged the drop in the discerning values of the public in creating what he termed, "The deeper problems connected with advertising", and adding that they "...come less from the unscrupulous of our 'deceivers' than from our pleasure in being deceived, less from the desire to seduce than from the desire to be seduced..." (Boorstin in McGinniss, 1970, 27). Boorstin went on to say:

"We have become so accustomed to our illusions that we mistake them for reality. We demand them. And we demand that there be always more of them, bigger and better and more vivid" (Boorstin in McGinniss, 1970, 27).

The sale of political leadership through electronic media for mass public consumption was another means of advertising, Boorstin suggested this enabled the re-shaping of the truth about the political leader (Boorstin in McGinniss, 1970, 28). Boorstin added that television and the knowledge of how it could be best used to seduce voters totally
and forever changed traditional political strategies and values (Boorstin in McGinniss, 1970, 28). American speech writer Marshall McLuhan wrote:

"Policies and issues are useless for election purposes, since they are too specialised and hot. The shaping of a candidate's integral image has taken the place of discussing conflicting points of view" (McLuhan in McGinniss, 1970, 28).

McGinniss clarified this view saying, "Television, in fact, has given status to the 'celebrity' which few real men attain" (1970, 28). McGinniss compounded this definition with the comment that the political celebrity on television appeared "Neither good nor bad, great nor petty... the human pseudo-event... fabricated on purpose to satisfy our exaggerated expectations of human greatness" (1970, 28).

Mrs. Thatcher was well informed about the advantages of using the electronic media to promote her political image and leadership. Her image maker and former television producer Gordon Reece was well experienced with British television prior to his image making role with Mrs. Thatcher. Mrs. Thatcher willingly handed over her malleable personality to Reece to adjust in whatever ways he deemed essential to the creation of her new political image. Reece also knew the distinct advantages that would be obtained from Mrs. Thatcher's media exposure. Mrs. Thatcher had a distinct advantage over both Party and political rivals at election times. McGinniss concurred with this view as he phrased it, failure could result because they had "no press to lie" for them, and "did not know how to use television to lie" about themselves (1970, 32). The people selected to create, advertise and sell Mrs. Thatcher's political image and leadership had to appreciate precisely what they could and could not do with her; as well as understand
exactly what Mrs. Thatcher wanted to achieve with her political image and leadership. In addition, the political image makers had to know how to best utilise the media and television. McGinniss agreed with this standpoint, he explained that image makers, public relations and media assistants had to share the leader's dignity and vision, as well as understand that "...television was a political weapon from the broadest concept to the most technical detail..." (1970, 34).

Mrs. Thatcher's personality problems, such as a lack of an apparently caring nature and sense of humour, would have to be corrected. The creation of Mrs. Thatcher's political image had to be very carefully and professionally done, so that her appearance as leader was not only more appealing, but still possessed a natural feel. Mrs. Thatcher’s image makers realised this goal by the approach taken. Mrs. Thatcher's political image was a sophisticated layered enigma. Mrs. Thatcher's image makers appreciated the need to pay close attention and not forget the most obvious elements of her political image; as these were the focal aspects of using television and the mass media to best exploit a political image. In her earlier terms Mrs. Thatcher was encouraged to show a feminine side through a softer style of hair, wardrobe and elocution speech; whilst in her third term she adopted a modified style of language and attempted to show her emotional involvement with issues.
Public relations or media assistants recognised the usefulness of the electronic media in selling Mrs. Thatcher from the earliest days. William Gavin, one of Nixon's speech writers concluded their aim was:

"...saturation with film, in which the candidate can be shown better than they can be shown in person because it can be edited, so only the best moments are shown; then a quick parading of the candidate in the flesh so that the person they’ve gotten intimately acquainted with on the screen takes on a living presence - not saying anything, just being seen... the politician has to come across larger than life, the stuff of legend. People are stirred by the legend, ... It's the aura that surrounds the charismatic figure more than it is the figure itself, that draws followers. Our task is to build that aura..." (Gavin in McGinniss, 1970, 36-37).

The political image of leadership sold through the media is incredibly important to the leader's success, because it is the political image the wider public responded to, suggested a former editorial writer for the New York Herald Tribune, Raymond K. Price (Price in McGinniss, 1970, 37-38). Selling Mrs. Thatcher's political image and leadership was viewed as an investment. Mrs. Thatcher's advertised appearance would sell both her image of leadership and the vision of Britain's future that she wanted to be identified with. The promotion of Mrs. Thatcher's new political image and leadership was immensely successful. It could be said that the skilful sale and projection of Mrs. Thatcher's political image and leadership gave her the edge. Mrs. Thatcher's improved media profile gave her an advantage at election time and it certainly assisted her three time, general election success. The sale of Mrs. Thatcher's political image and leadership to the media also led to her increased and new level of self-confidence. The media's inflated projection of Mrs.
Thatcher's political image of leadership both reflected and contributed to her strength. McGinniss concurred with this judgement saying that a winning political image can directly equate with the individual politician (1970, 39).

For the purposes of political success, Mrs. Thatcher knew she had to be prepared with more than just policies. This suggestion of the almost paramount importance of political image at election time confirmed the view the political substance was of far lesser political priority. Young concurred with McGinniss' implications that, "...all elections tend towards the presidential, with voters' attention being focused on the aspirant prime ministers to the exclusion of much else (1989, 124). Young recognised the overwhelming political significance and potency of a highly saleable image. Young added that the Conservative Party had long been aware of taking professional advice about presentation in the media (1989, 124). The Central Office of the Party was heavily geared to the politics of salesmanship (Young, 1989, 124). Mrs. Thatcher also recognised the political importance and usefulness of a carefully crafted political image when it came to making herself the most attractive subject in the media's focus at election times. Mrs. Thatcher was a canny professional, she understood that if selling the Party and re-shaping the leader's political image were fundamental to winning an election than she would unhesitatingly do what she thought she was required. Young said from all accounts Mrs. Thatcher entered with the greatest enthusiasm, "...into every stratagem they thought was necessary..." (1989, 124). This point was iterated by the way Young stated that Mrs. Thatcher "...did not hesitate to adapt to this tradition to her own purposes" (Young, 1989, 124). Reece became an incredible influential force with Mrs. Thatcher. He was credited with
persuasive powers which made him the repository of Mrs. Thatcher's total confidence, as well as a "...rare sense of television effects" and a "lack of interest in the political substance of issues which afforded him a "political command quite out of the ordinary" (Young, 1989, 124-125). He had discovered her before anyone else, advising her with her earliest broadcasts as Education Secretary, at the October 1974 election and during her leadership contest. Reece was behind all the important political steps in Mrs. Thatcher's political career.

It was Reece who introduced Maurice and Charles Saatchi - owners of the fastest rising advertising agency in Britain - to Mrs. Thatcher (Young, 1989, 125). Under Reece's direction Saatchi and Saatchi created the political image of Mrs. Thatcher with a winning election campaign (Young, 1989, 125-126). Both Reece and Mrs. Thatcher saw the need to sell her political image to and through the mass media and then to the popular masses. Reece, the Saatchi Brothers and Mrs. Thatcher embarked upon an advertising campaign that made few concessions to the elevated sensibilities of British politics. Mrs. Thatcher had taken the Conservative party and British politics into a new highly commercialised and mass media driven arena. Reece told the trade magazine "Campaign" that the Saatchi's were going to break new ground: "...by the time it is all finished the Tories may well have an election property which party members find difficult to recognise and the electorate finds a complete surprise" (Young, 1989, 126). Mrs. Thatcher’s new political image coincided with her monarchical authoritarian political style. Senior Conservative ministers found themselves excluded from almost all decision making procedures and "...squarely put in their place..." with swiftly revised expectations of their new illustrious leader (Young, 1989, 126). Mrs. Thatcher dominated Conservative Party politics with her new
media image. Senior Conservative figures only made appearances in Party broadcasts and in the media by the grace of Mrs. Thatcher's concession and on the suggestion of Reece and the Saatchi's, their scripted speaking roles and as a reflection of Mrs. Thatcher's one-person political advertising campaign (Young, 1989, 126). Under instruction from Mrs. Thatcher the Saatchi's were to "...eschew the cliches which have dominated Tory party politics from the past decade and major [sic] on the selling of a brand in the most acceptable way" (Young, 1989, 126).

In the Summer of 1978, Saatchi and Saatchi effectively coupled the new political image of Mrs. Thatcher with the winning advertising campaign "Labour Isn't Working" (Young, 1989, 126). Mrs. Thatcher's political image and advertising programme had a marked effect upon the British electorate, causing the opinion polls to swing against Callaghan and postpone the Autumn 1978 election to the following Spring (Young, 1989, 126-127). Young explained that the re-scheduling of the 1978 election proved the existence of Mrs. Thatcher's new political image and advertising an anti-Labour campaign, at the same time confirmed the success and sale of Mrs. Thatcher's political image with the media for mass consumption. Again it seemed the promotion of her positive political image and the negativity of the Opposition's bad political image, was preferable to campaigning on the political substance of her own policies. Thus it would seem that Mrs. Thatcher created a political image of her leadership for the express purpose of selling it to the mass media for the most effective communication to the electorate.
A further question that must be addressed when attempting to deal with the creation of Mrs. Thatcher's political image through and for media and public consumption was whether Mrs. Thatcher's appearance was only recognised through media images. It seemed largely the case as once a person takes on a public role, they become what is popularly termed "public property" and are seen to be in the "public eye" and thus are often only viewed and identified by their media image. This is frequently a sore point with people in well known positions, such as television and film celebrities, popular artists and politicians among others. These people are frequently heard to complain that they are only two-dimensionally expressed by the media and perceived by the public massess. This point was supported by recent comments from former Australian Liberal Party leader and Prime Ministerial contender John Hewson. In a November 1995 interview Hewson spoke about his former political career and his perception of political image and political substance in his work, when he confided:

"There were people in politics who weren't real people", "They were saying one thing and doing another. I started to lose faith..." (Hewson in Lesmond, 1995, 5). Hewson further suggested his understanding of the roles of political image and substance in a political career when he implied how he tried to effect real changes to people's lives through the projection of his true self image throughout his political career, he added: "I never tried to be a 'politician'" (Hewson in Lesmond, 1995, 5). In the negative extreme the public property personality often complains, this suggests that the media only wants to portray isolated incidents of their character or behaviour which are able to be sensationalised for optimum copy sale or audience attention and which create a loose, and incomplete media image of the person.
Conversely this same two-dimensional, incomplete and incorrect portrayal of a personality, such as a politician, can be used to great advantage. It can mean that less popular, character traits and actions can be selectively ignored or highlighted and new features developed where ever necessary to create the most desired political image. All of this is expressly for the purpose of media attention, projection and sale for mass public consumption. For a politician such as Mrs. Thatcher, the media was a tool by which she could convey whatever political image was desired to the British public.

This was known to be the case with Mrs. Thatcher, prior to her Party leadership and Prime Ministership her public image was vastly different. Firstly, Mrs. Thatcher's public identifiability was very low; and secondly her public image was one of a determined, naturally feminine, Grantham accented, young woman who spoke for the equal rights of women in the workforce in the early 1950's (Young, 1989, 305). Thus, Mrs. Thatcher changed many of her political image-based short-comings with the express intention of improving her media appearance to assist her political career.

**Did Mrs. Thatcher really sell or simply promote her political image of leadership to the British electorate in the most effective means via the mass media?**

This discussion responds to the previous arguments suggestion that Mrs. Thatcher sold her political image of leadership to the mass media in order to best reach the popular support. It will be argued that Mrs. Thatcher was simply persuaded by the Conservative Party's normal practises to take on a political image that would be produced for the consumption of the mass media.
This response to the previous discussion will suggest that Mrs. Thatcher did not sell a political image of her leadership, but that she actually promoted the substance of her leadership. It would seem that Mrs. Thatcher accepted the need to appear in the media as leader, seeing it as the norm or another forum for political completion and representation of the political image, of the Conservative Party in contemporary politics. Young suggested that the Conservative Party had "...never been short of professional advice about their presentation in the media" and that the Central Office "...had long been heavily geared to politics of salesmanship" (1989, 124). It was additionally mentioned that other Prime Ministers including Macmillan took advice from the Colman, Prentis and Varley Agency, whilst Heath used personal adviser Barry Day (Young, 1989, 124). Thus suggesting the employment of advertising agencies was a usual practice of Conservative Party leaders.

Young added that Mrs. Thatcher "...did not hesitate to adopt this tradition" and that "...she entered with greatest enthusiasm,... into every stratagem they thought necessary" (1989, 124). Mrs. Thatcher was openly encouraged to invest her trust and "total confidence" in the judgement of those employed to best highlight the features of her leadership (Young, 1989, 125). In addition to this evidence was Young's contention that "Mrs. Thatcher showed a lack of fastidiousness that did credit to her commitment to victory" (1989, 126). By this comment Young implied that Mrs. Thatcher was not concerned by the advertisement of her leadership as part of her Party loyalty and desire to be a successful leader. The balance of information implied that although Mrs. Thatcher accepted her new political image, this need to be publicly seen as leader in the media was a requirement of Conservative Party leadership. Thus, it appeared Mrs. Thatcher was largely
comfortable with the advertisement of the substance of her leadership, accepting it as a part of Conservative Party leadership practise in contemporary British politics.

An additional point which implied Mrs. Thatcher's substantial side was highlighted in the specialised way her gender was emphasised in the creation and promotion of the image based component of her political image. Mrs. Thatcher had long been concerned about her gender as a political handicap to her success in British politics. She believed her gender might severely hamper her chances of gaining the Conservative party leadership and retaining it, as Cosgrave explained: "Discussion of her sex appeal - even of her sex - is not something that particularly pleases Margaret Thatcher" (1974, 14). Mrs. Thatcher's reservations were mostly just her own, however Bernard Levin wrote to The Times encouraging the Tories to select Mrs. Thatcher over other contestants and particularly addressed any misgivings they might have had on account of her sex (Levin in Cosgrave, 1974, 13-14). However, the Conservative Party saw Mrs. Thatcher's gender as a part of their holistic political identity and sought to show her gender as an attribute. Young interviewed Gordon Reece who admitted: Mrs. Thatcher as a leader of the Conservative Party, was not simply an "election property"; and that it was with ease her political image of leadership could be promoted because of her gender (Reece in Young, 1989, 124, 126). This emphasis upon Mrs. Thatcher's gender identity as an individual was the strongest possible indication of the substantial core of her leadership advertisement, Reece went on to tell:

"Being a woman, in fact, made her all the more receptive to his cosmetic advice. Women, he reasoned, were accustomed to being dressed and coiffured by other people, usually men. A woman was an
easier product for an image-maker to work with" (Reece in Young, 1989, 125).

The balance of information gathered suggested that the Conservative Party dispelled Mrs. Thatcher's gender reservations. It thus seemed that the Conservative Party machine encouraged Mrs. Thatcher to employ an image maker and advertising agency to help her highlight her leadership in the highly competitive, media oriented contemporary British political arena.

Thence, Mrs. Thatcher was not the willing recipient of a new political image for media advertisement and mass public communication. This premise was upheld by the very media role Mrs. Thatcher played in working with the advertisement of her leadership. This point was confirmed by the observations of linguistics and speech specialist Luke van Buuren in his article Margaret Thatcher's Pronunciation: An exercise in ear-training (1988, 2621-38). Van Buuren suggested that Mrs. Thatcher had been advised by Saatchi and Saatchi to make her voice less "strident" because a September 2, 1986 MORI poll had revealed:

"...sixty percent of people felt Mrs. Thatcher 'talked down to them', fifty-six percent thought she was 'out of touch with ordinary people' and that the 'Thatcher tone was considered haughty, hectoring and gave rise to infuriated irritation even among her supporters' " (1988, 30).

In view of her electoral successes, Van Buuren speculated that Mrs. Thatcher may have never become Leader of the Conservative Party with her Grantham pronunciations; so to that extent he implied she was right in aiming at the unnatural, but more prestigious and cultivated kind of Oxbridge accent (1988, 30-37).

The implication from the citation is a total involvement with the process of producing the most effective advertisement of Mrs. Thatcher. It
seemed that the advertisement of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership was so successful that the Conservative Party hired the Saatchi's to re-vamp the media's understanding and view of the Cabinet ranks.

Perhaps one of the more convincing and less well known factors supporting the view that Mrs. Thatcher sold her political image of leadership to the media was the Saatchi's treatment of her as a product. Saatchi and Saatchi also controlled the image projected by senior Conservative figures, they metered them: "their public appearances and broadcasts were by grace and favour of the agency, often with scripts that reflected an advertising rather than a political judgement" (Young, 1989, 126). The Cabinet and Mrs. Thatcher were warned about the extent of power conducted by political images and advertising agencies when in 1989 Mr. Reece explained that the Party members would find it difficult to recognise the Party's new political image (Reece in Young, 1989, 126). The Cabinet seemed to be becoming ill at ease and sceptical of the growing power media and publicity afforded political images by the advertising agencies. For instance, Cabinet's only applause of Saatchi's work was through sarcastic comments which intimated only nominal positive outcomes for the Party (Young, 1989, 126). Thus it seemed clear that Mrs. Thatcher comfortably accepted the advertisement of her leadership. Allowing Saatchi and Saatchi to better and most effectively communicate the substantial qualities of her leadership to the British public. Hence, it seemed likely any sales campaign of Mrs. Thatcher's was out of control. It seemed that the Saatchi's believed they not only controlled Mrs. Thatcher's political image but also that of the Cabinet.
Mrs. Thatcher's personal background and new political image.

This discussion hopes to show how and why Mrs. Thatcher re-constructed her personal background as part of her new political image. This discussion will also attempt to suggest any statement Mrs. Thatcher appeared to be making about her leadership with the recreation of her personal background and new political image. Was Mrs. Thatcher working for herself or other forces in the re-writing of her personal history and her political image. The final component of this discussion considers the substantial content of Mrs. Thatcher's re-constructed personal background and new political image.

One way in which Mrs. Thatcher re-wrote her personal history was through the way she allowed references of her image being Queen-like to circulate. The Queen tag began after Britain's success in the Falklands War. Warner espoused the view that "...the traditional allegory, which casts queen as country, attached itself in popular mythology to the person of the prime minister: ..." (1985, 38-49). Warner supported this view saying that, "Mrs. Thatcher came to replace the Queen as the 'symbolic centre of power' in Britain" (1985, 43). She added that "...many British children failed to recognise the difference between the Queen and the Prime Minister..." (Warner, 1985, 43). These shifts in the female figurehead illustrated the shift in Mrs. Thatcher's personal history. Warner explained that in this way Mrs. Thatcher was able to use her gender and feminine qualities to her advantage, as she had "...tapped an enormous source of female power..." (1985, 38-49).

According to Warner, Mrs. Thatcher proved that she was equal to male leadership demonstrating, "...she is not under the governance of Venus, that she is a stranger to the exactions and weaknesses of the heart, that her most private organ is her gut" (Warner, 1985, 38-49).
Barbara Castle also noted the sexual connotations associated with Mrs. Thatcher's re-written history as Queen (Castle in Young, 1989, 306-307). Mrs. Castle pointed-out the way Mrs. Thatcher's leadership inspired the revival of a code of chivalrous patronage among her male Cabinet ministers (Castle in Young, 1989, 306-307). Mrs. Castle's reference conjured scenes of Queen Guinevere at Camelot. Mrs. Castle explained that Mrs. Thatcher,

"...brought out a kind of male gallantry which she obviously enjoyed. 'Margaret's election has stirred up her own side wonderfully: all her backbenchers perform like knights jousting at a tourney for a lady's favours, showing off their paces by making an unholy row at every opportunity over everything the government does' " (Castle in Young, 1989, 307).

Thus was Mrs. Thatcher's use of a Queen-like image to enhance her new political image and help recreate her personal history.

Another way in which Mrs. Thatcher recreated her personal background and new political image was through the way she used and did not use the feminine and masculine genders. Norton additionally confirmed the existence of Mrs. Thatcher's revised personal history and new political image through the use of her gender to manipulate others. This point was confirmed amongst the ranks of Mrs. Thatcher's Cabinet Ministers. Chief Whip Humphrey Atkins and other Ministers attested to the sexual qualities Mrs. Thatcher exuded in private conversations and noted her particular weakness for handsome well-dressed young males (Young,1989, 310). Young found a definite sexual aspect to Mrs. Thatcher's revised character saying she possessed a "capacity to allure" (Young, 1989, 310). Mrs. Thatcher was obviously confident of the sexual aspect of her re-written history when Minister Jim Prior commented on
tabloid descriptions of her newly acquired "sexy voice", she retorted "what makes you think I wasn't sexy before?" (Prior in Young, 1989, 310). And again, at a Party conference in 1969 Mrs. Thatcher espoused confidence in the sexual side of her re-created history when she quoted Sophocles: "Once a woman is made equal to a man, she becomes his superior" (Young, 1989, 311). Young concluded that sexuality had certainly been added to Mrs. Thatcher's re-written history, saying "The fact is that sex, if not sexiness, was incontestably a conscious part of the Thatcher personality as a political leader" (1989, 311).

Mrs. Thatcher was very strategic in the manner in which she used her sexuality in the creation of her new political image. Feminist Beatrix Campbell concurred, saying "...she uses womanhood merely as a helpful device..." (1987, 233-247). In her text The Iron Ladies: Why do Women Vote Tory?, Campbell hastened to extrapolate "...she shows how much femininity is a production, ... femininity is what she wears, masculinity is what she admires..." (1987, 243).

In extension of this point was Mrs. Thatcher's use of some traditional Victorian values in the re-writing of her personal history and the building of her new political image. Campbell suggested this as a major reason behind Mrs. Thatcher's attraction to and adoption of Victorian values in her political image; Campbell termed it, "...the lady's pre-occupation with maleness and manly virtues..." and "It is not femininity but buccaneering masculinity which is evoked in her celebration of Victorian values, ..." (1987, 243-245). Through these recurring preferences in Mrs. Thatcher's recreated personal background and new political image Campbell implied that Mrs. Thatcher showed how she worked for herself.
Norton also recognised Mrs. Thatcher's revision of her personal history through her attempts to resurrect and incorporate some Victorian values into her new political image (1990, 42). Norton's explanation of Mrs. Thatcher's focus upon Victorian values differed, he suggested that Mrs. Thatcher's values were exercised in the moral component of Thatcherism (1990, 42). Norton went on to explain that Mrs. Thatcher: "...not only lauded the economic liberalism of the Victorian era but has been keen to recreate the morality of the period as well." (1990, 42). Thus Mrs. Thatcher seemed to use and combine both masculine traits and Victorian values to strengthen and emphasise her newly created personal history and new political image.

In her most recent and revealing analyses of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership style "The Invisible Woman" (1995), Campbell examined Thatcher's autobiographies The Downing Street Years (1993) and The Path to Power (1995). As part of her examination of Mrs. Thatcher's memoirs Campbell noted that more could be gleaned from what was "...not said..." and clearly implied through omission in Mrs. Thatcher's memoirs (1995, 45). Campbell very clearly implied that Mrs. Thatcher re-wrote her personal history as part of her new political image and leadership style. Campbell identified the alteration of Mrs. Thatcher's personal background in the way she "...imposed a vow of silence on her personal background as a girl, as her father's daughter..." preferring to proffer her recreated personal background and political image as the Iron Lady of the cold war (1995, 45).
Campbell also suggested that Mrs. Thatcher felt she was politically burdened by her feminine gender; a point born out through her efforts to distance herself from feminine traits and by her adoption and applause of more traditional masculine traits (1995, 45). Campbell also indicated Mrs. Thatcher's repudiation of her mother, the closer relations and almost revere with which she referred to her father in her memoirs; Campbell implied this as the reasoning behind Mrs. Thatcher's efforts in re-writing her personal background and creating her new political image (1995, 45). Campbell's interpretation of Mrs. Thatcher's autobiographical implication suggested, "It was as if she was a woman born of her father's womb" (1995, 45).

Campbell also used comparison with another diarist's memoirs to enhance the impersonal tone of Mrs. Thatcher's writings. The nature of both volumes of Mrs. Thatcher's memoirs was very matter-of-fact, not at all conversational, controlled and even detached as though it were written in third person or about someone unfamiliar to the writer. Campbell suggested these findings supported the notion that Mrs. Thatcher did indeed adopt a revised personal background and new political image. According to Campbell, The Path to Power (1995) was Mrs. Thatcher's nearest admission of the truth about her reconstructed personal background and new political image (1995, 47). This would additionally explain the awkwardness of the memoirs and why Mrs. Thatcher found it difficult to write about her personal history and new political image. Perhaps Mrs. Thatcher felt very self-conscious or even guilty about the falseness of her revised personal background and new political image and this was the reasoning behind her total avoidance of her gender - as "...the one thing she is unable to speak..." - during interviews, question times and all other public discussions (Campbell,
Perhaps it was also because Mrs. Thatcher was at a loss to explain the inconsistencies of her usage of the feminine and masculine genders in her re-written personal background and new political image.

One of the most resounding themes of Mrs. Thatcher's memoirs was her resolution not to be defeated by her gender and her unrelenting efforts not to succumb. Mrs. Thatcher revised her personal history to add dimension to her political image and also to assist with the successful delivery of the political substance of some of her policies, particularly those relating to national defence and issues of law and order.

Mrs. Thatcher certainly revised her personal background and manufactured a new political image through her use of mythological and historical figures. Mrs. Thatcher was definitely working for herself when she promoted the mythological warrior image of herself (Norton, 1990, 43). She drew upon the symbolic caricature of Britannia - female leader, warrior, protector and saviour of Britain. Mrs. Thatcher preferred to appear as the never wearying warrior than the healer (Cosgrave, 1975). This point was clearly demonstrated through Mrs. Thatcher's national defence policies, particularly concerning her reaction to the Falklands situation. Mrs. Thatcher relished the opportunity for a variety of self-promoting reasons. A war would distract and unify the battered British public and Mrs. Thatcher was eager to seize the opportunity of war to promote herself as Britannia - warrior-leader of a nation. In his essay "Britain Under Mrs. Thatcher", Robert Skidelsky implied the Falklands War was a way Mrs. Thatcher could attempt to "...restore pride and confidence to the British people, to put the 'Great' back into Britain" (1985, 55). Skidelsky went on to add that "Defeating
the enemy in the Falklands War was as much part of Thatcherism as reducing the money supply in Threadneedle Street;..." (1985, 55).

In her analysis Monuments and Maidens: The Allegory of the Female Form, feminist Marina Warner acknowledged Mrs. Thatcher's use of the Britannia symbolism as part of her re-constructed personal background (Warner, 1985, 38-49). Ms. Warner also raised Mrs. Thatcher's manipulation of the media, particularly the print media, in the proliferation of her re-written personal history (Warner, 1985, 38-49). Warner was referring to the way Mrs. Thatcher's used the Britannia caricatures drawn by tabloid press cartoonists to '... intimate identification with Britannia" (Warner, 1985, 5ff). This preoccupation for recreating herself was not only highly visible, but also very important in explaining Mrs. Thatcher's Prime Ministerial style and support within the Conservative Party (Norton, 1990, 43). (See Appendix Two).

Warner added that Mrs. Thatcher's new personal history, "...represented traditionalism, national pride and authoritarian pride..." in both political image and substance (1985, 43). Mrs. Thatcher's new personal history also helped push her desire for strong national and domestic defence policies and practises. Rose explained that Mrs. Thatcher's renewed personal history combined the contradictory forces of rationality and femininity; producing a fascinating, yet terrifying and powerful female executioner who legitimated extreme forms of state violence in the names of strengthened national defence and law and order (1988, 3-31). In Sexuality in the Field of Vision (1986), Rose believed Mrs. Thatcher used associations with violence and terror in her revised personal history because they contributed a kind of psycho-
sexual element which would appeal to the British electorate. From this discussion the evidence weighed in favour of the view that Mrs. Thatcher exercised both political image and policy substance through her re-constructed personal history and new political image. Mrs. Thatcher also demonstrated how she was working as an independent political force through the use of both her re-vamped personal background and newly created political image.

Harvey J. Kaye, in his article "The Use and Abuse of the Past" (1987, 332-361), also verified the view that Mrs. Thatcher significantly altered her personal background to assist in the development of her more honed political image. Kaye espoused that Mrs. Thatcher and her Government colleagues were very inclined to repeat the past, saying that they spoke "...by design from the past and often about the past..." (1987, 332). Kaye also supported the wider contention that Mrs. Thatcher was heavily reliant upon her re-ssurrection of past personages, events and experiences which she had intentionally used to capture and command history and thereby fashion particular interpretations and representations of it, to mobilise it in support of her respective programmes and policies (1987, 332-333). Kaye noted Mrs. Thatcher's mobilisations of the past termed "crisis of history", highlighting the desired meaning and significance of Mrs. Thatcher's Governments initiatives in whatever policy area (1987, 333).

Warner also stridently claimed that Mrs. Thatcher re-worked her personal background through the use of historical representations of the female form and British power (1985, 41). Warner suggested that Mrs. Thatcher drew on the historical spirit of Britain in travail and triumph, the war the spirit was characterised through famous historical female
figures - such as its famous queens and the convention of Britannia - as well as through the language of female representation (1985, 41). Mrs. Thatcher re-used the histories of previous powerful British female warrior/leaders to re-construct her personal history. Warner further explained this standpoint:

"In Margaret Thatcher... Britannia has been brought to life. But she achieved this singular hypostasis not because she is a battle-axe like Boadecia, but because she is so womanly, combining Britannia's resoluteness, Boadecia's courage with a proper housewifely demeanour" (1985, 51).

Thus, from Warner's observations Mrs. Thatcher did work for herself, as she re-conditioned her personal history. A point reflected in both the political image and the political substance of her leadership.

As already suggested Mrs. Thatcher definitely re-wrote her personal history. Marina Warner also argued that Mrs. Thatcher re-created her background through the association of herself with "Britishness itself, in particular a new form of British strength displacing several decades of fading colonial and economic power" (1985, 41). Warner nominated the Falkland's War as an example of her newly created personal history, saying that the resolution of the War proved this conflation of Mrs. Thatcher's Britishness (1985, 41). She implied that following the War Mrs. Thatcher enjoyed the trappings of her new personal history echoed in the media through slogans, such as "The Iron Duke, conquering hero" (1985, 41). Mrs. Thatcher demonstrated her approval of the media attention to the success of her new personal history when she said on American Television: "I have the reputation as the Iron Lady. I am of great resolve. This resolve is matched by the British people" (Thatcher in Warner, 1985, 41). Thus Mrs. Thatcher's
use of an association with Britishness was carefully selected to help promote her sale of a strengthened national defence initiative, a programme enacted through Mrs. Thatcher’s swift commitment of British forces to the Falkland’s War effort.

In response to the above argument, supporting Mrs. Thatcher’s re-written personal history and newly created political image, will be an opposing critical evaluation. Ms. Warner’s argument traded on the successful transmission of Mrs. Thatcher’s carefully re-created personal history. Warner believed Mrs. Thatcher actively worked for herself in the way she accepted being likened with historical female figures and myths, personifying the nation, which were deemed popular icons and were widely recognised by her colleagues, supporters, her opponents and the media alike as symbols of law and order and national defence. Points-in-case were the way Warner and others equated Mrs. Thatcher: as the first female Prime Minister; with the way she implemented policies of strengthened law and order; in particular the way she involved Britain in the Falkland’s War through a heightened programme of national defence; and with the female warrior/leaders and myths of Britain’s past.

In addition, was the way Mrs. Thatcher re-constituted her personal history with the re-collection of female figures from Britain’s strong Elizabethan and Victorian periods. Not only were these images re-enforced in the political image likenesses Mrs. Thatcher drew upon, but were also evident in the role-back oriented policy programme she pursued. For instance, Mrs. Thatcher re-introduced Victorian styled moral and economic values in the political substance of her policies; such as notions of self help and individual responsibility being incorporated.
in programmes to reduce the British welfare budget and slash public services. Warner stated that Mrs. Thatcher as Britain’s first premiere did not rebel against this assimilation of the nation with herself; what Prime Minister would? (1985, 41). The success of Mrs. Thatcher’s efforts to change her personal history, surely confirmed the fact that she did work for herself as Prime Minister.

In countering this view, it is suggested that this comparison was more a reflex and unconsidered response. It is a natural reply for any audience to compare the present with the past, to liken one person to another on the basis of the substance of their endeavours and perceived images. This was precisely what Warner was doing in her argument. Thus, any similarities drawn were probably coincidental and in no way concrete illustrations of Mrs. Thatcher’s self efforts to create a new personal history.

Hardly a sound theoretical basis for political debate. In addition, Warner’s argument did not truly confirm the public’s support of Mrs. Thatcher’s re-created personal history with concrete evidence such as statistics. It is not enough to allude to the existence of Mrs. Thatcher’s re-created history by stating that her efforts were successful. Ms. Warner’s argument was weakened by its lack of concrete evidence. Hence, it seemed Mrs. Thatcher may not have totally re-worked her personal history.

Instead evidence suggests Mrs. Thatcher re-wrote her personal background to support and promote a more impressive political image of her leadership, as well as to suggest a congruence with the political substance of certain political programmes and individual policies. A
point similarly justified and used by other politicians and leaders. In one of the last interviews recorded with the late President of France, Francois Mitterand, spoke to raging accusations about his re-written personal history and political image to which he answered; "If you want history to treat you kindly you must write the history yourself" (1995, CNN Television Interview). Michael Crick's unofficial biography of Jeffrey Archer likewise showed, "...that take away Archer's own bragging and self-hype, and you're left with a shadow - or else a screen for other people's fantasies. This is really the diary of nobody" (1995). This debate has raised the theoretical question of the style of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership and its origins. Was it perhaps Machiavellian?

This discussion has also raised questions of the nature and the relationship which existed between Mrs. Thatcher's political image and substance of leadership and feminism.

Was Mrs. Thatcher's leadership Machiavellian?

The next part of this discussion examines whether Mrs. Thatcher's leadership appeared to be Machiavellian in political image or substance. This investigation of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership does not intend to transgress into an argument of the incredibly sophisticated intricacies of Machiavellian discourse. Instead, this discussion will draw upon the work of a number of writers who use Machiavellian references to the appearances and realities of leadership, in so far that they are useful in discussing the image and substance of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership.

Anthony King's examination explained that he judged Mrs. Thatcher as "...a political operative, a political technician, someone whose job it was to match her political means to her political ends" (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 51).
As part of his analysis of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership, King turned his attention to the manner in which she pursued her policy goals. King explained that an authority figure can adopt either one or two dichotomous approaches to policy making (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 60).

The first approach King referred to was "deliberative" policy making. Deliberative policy making requires not just forethought from the policy maker; but "...involves deliberating with other participants, and potential participants, in the business of deciding on the details of the policy and actually putting them into effect. Deliberative policy making is bound to be an interactive process, a back- and-forth process, both intellectually and in political and administrative terms (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 61).

The second policy making approach is what King calls "declarative" policy making (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 61). The process behind this type of policy making is through public declaration of goals. This method of policy making is more visible, as the goals are publicly stated and it is the responsibility of the policy maker to decide how the goals will be realised (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 61). King suggested that it is believed that public declarations maximise the chances of goal-achieving success (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 61). However, much risk is associated with this approach of policy making as everyone knows the goal, it can not be escaped from, and failure to achieve the goal not only means the dissatisfaction of the leader with their subordinates but also the possibility of the leader's political humiliation and demise (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 61).
King's argument was supported by the recent work of Andrew Hede and Rae Wear in their article "Transformational Versus Transactional Styles of Cabinet Leadership" (1995, 469-484). Although Hede and Wear's analysis did not state any relativity to the Machiavellian style leadership discussed in The Prince, their argument certainly considers the mainstays of the Machiavellian leader.

Hede and Wear attempted to "...distinguish leadership from naked power-wielding..." using J. M. Burns' leadership test, from his book Leadership (1978). They found Burns' leadership test, which tested the effectiveness of leadership, could be judged by "actual social change measure by intent and by the satisfaction of human need and expectations" (Burns, 1978, 3 in Hede and Wear, 1995, 470).

According to Hede and Wear, leadership is inseparable from followers' need and goals. The outcome of using this test with the political image and substance of Mrs. Thatcher's style of leadership suggested that her satisfaction of the needs and expectations of her parliamentary supporters and the electorate was not always intentional but occurred because their respective needs temporarily coincided (Hede and Wear, 1995, 470). Hede and Wear added that when the needs and expectations of the followers/electorate and Mrs. Thatcher differed, she chose to satisfy her own needs and thus failed Burns' test of leadership (1995, 470).

Using J. V. Downton's (1973) broadbased leadership categories, the transformational and the transactional, Mrs. Thatcher fell into the transformational group. The transformational and declarative styles of leadership share much the same principles and appear to include very
similar character traits. Hede and Wear carefully selected the
Machiavellian styled leadership of Adolf Hitler as a case study to explain
and provide details of Burns' typical transformational leader. Although
not wishing to liken Mrs. Thatcher to Hitler, their leadership styles
shared the main distinguishing transformational leadership traits of
Burns' test.

As a transformational leader Mrs. Thatcher could be termed heroic
or charismatic in that she was often supported because of her personage
or political image and the sense of vision she advertised, rather than on
the merits of her political substance (Hede and Wear, 1995, 470-471).
Similar to the transformational leadership style, Mrs. Thatcher's support
was expressed directly through votes, handshakes and applause rather
than intermediaries (Hede and Wear, 1995, 470). This type of leader
releases the electorate from conflict by giving them another focus to
project their fears and aggressions upon; such was Mrs. Thatcher's use of
the Falkland's War (Hede and Wear, 1995, 470). A transformational
leader - such as Mrs. Thatcher - also usually arises in a society
undergoing profound crises or transition (Hede and Wear, 1995, 470).
This style of leadership is either revolutionary or reactionary by its
nature (Hede and Wear, 1995, 471). Mrs. Thatcher's leadership style
indeed Thatcherism - was reactionary in nature, a point illustrated by
her policy making. Thus, a transformational leader - such as Mrs.
Thatcher - provided the symbolic or political image based solution to her
country's internal and external conflict (Burns, 1978, 244 in Hede and
Wear, 1995, 470). Finally, and in Mrs. Thatcher's case, if the
transformational leader only provides image based gratification and
dependability for their supporters and electorate - and there is no
lasting purpose or intentional improvement of affairs - than they are not
an authentic leader (Hede and Wear, 1995, 470). Points considered in detail in the chapter "Image and Substance: Mrs. Thatcher and Thatcherism".

King implied that Mrs. Thatcher's policy making was based on a mixed style, however this decision seemed to be more metered with caution than evidence (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 5-64). As King concluded: "One has to be careful about answering this question too hastily" (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 62). He opened his case by saying that authorities could adopt "...one or the other of two quite different approaches to the making of policy", then implied Mrs. Thatcher used a mixed approach (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 62). King appeared more concerned with not committing himself to either side, than he was with providing strong evidence for one side of the argument. This point was made clear by the very general descriptions of the examples of deliberative policies. Instead of referring to individual policies and exact dates he simply made reference to policy areas, such as the reform of tax policy; "...the evolution of youth training policy", the "withdrawal of subsidies from loss-making state industries" and the "reform of trade union law" (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 62). These references firstly beckoned immediate questions about which specific policies King was indicating. Without this sort of information King's argument was problematic.

Secondly, the policy areas King indicated were not usually noted for their deliberate nature. Again without detailed explanations from King, the argument was weakened. According to King's own description of the process of deliberate policy making, Mrs. Thatcher's reform in the areas of tax policy, cuts to unprofitable state subsidised industries (such
as the NHS) and changes to trade union legislation were in reality more declarative policy decisions. It was well known that Mrs. Thatcher’s government pursued these areas of policy decision, mostly because of her own political agenda. Mrs. Thatcher merely declared her policy outlines: she eluded discussion at Party and Parliamentary levels; indignantly avoiding questions through repetitive policy outlines; she managed to dodge queries of feasibility and political cost; had little concern for those implementing the policies and the policy impracticalities; became hostile to all who questioned her politics; and had negligible regard for those involved and adversely affected by her new policies. From King’s description of the declarative process of policy making, Mrs. Thatcher’s policies appeared much more declarative than deliberative in style. Hence King’s statement that Mrs. Thatcher’s policy making approach “...has frequently been extremely deliberative...” in appearance.

However King stated that Mrs. Thatcher’s approach to government was also frequently declarative. King chose the Falkland’s War, abolition of the Greater London Council and the Education Reform Bill as prime examples of Mrs. Thatcher’s increasing declarative style of policy making (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 62). King implied that Mrs. Thatcher’s declarative policy making approach and personality style were similar and in some instances the same (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 62). King additionally implied that through the increasing use of the declarative approach to policy making Mrs. Thatcher was behaving not only in the image but also in a substantially Machiavellian fashion (King in Skidelsky, 1990,62). King explained this flaw in Mrs. Thatcher’s leadership by saying: “All successful people, especially those who have been successful against the odds, are in danger of becoming isolated,
over-proud and, worst of all, careless..." (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 63). King used a passage from Machiavelli to clarify his point:

"A prince should be slow to take action, and should watch that he does not come to be afraid of his own shadow; his behaviour should be tempered by humanity and prudence so that over-confidence does not make him rash or excessive distrust make him unbearable" (Machiavelli in King, 96 in Skidelsky, 1990, 63).

King also claimed that Mrs. Thatcher's leadership was Machiavellian in image and substance, by the way she allowed her use of fear to become excessive and lead to hatred (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 63). King explained that if a political leader was not loved by his supporters, they would have no pool of genuine support to draw upon in times of political strife (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 63). Patrick Weller, in his text Malcolm Fraser: A Study in Prime Ministerial Power in Australia (1989, 148), agreed with this point saying that a Prime Minister only holds power as long as they retain the support of their Party. They are elected by the members of the Parliamentary Party and can be removed if political fortunes decline. Weller suggested that the successful Prime Minister must be mindful that Members of Parliament are not mere sheep to be driven unquestioningly, but instead need to be persuaded, duchessed or overawed into supportive pursuit (1989, 148). Weller ultimately predicted division and mutiny for the Machiavellian-styled Prime Minister or leader (1989, 149). This situation was particularly apparent through out the ranks of the leader's most ardent opponents and closest associates, who anticipated the ramifications of excessive fear and wait to seize opportunity of the leader's weakest moment of affection and support. Mrs. Thatcher fell prey to Machiavelli's warning about the use of excessive force, and thus fulfilled the image and
substance of the Machiavellian leader. Mrs. Thatcher's use of excessive force served to add dissent to her Party's ranks and resulted in her loss of support and the spill in favour of Mr. Major. This revelation detracts a great deal of credibility from King's argument that Mrs. Thatcher's leadership style was Machiavellian in political substance and image.

For instance, in the case of the trade union policy area, King stated Mrs. Thatcher used a "step-by-step" approach (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 62). From all accounts of Mrs. Thatcher's trade union policy making, the process was declarative. The only step-by-step part of Mrs. Thatcher's treatment of the trade union policy area, was the way she enlisted an overall methodical approach to debasing the whole trade union movement of Britain. Mrs. Thatcher declared that the British trade union system was completely contradictory to her laissez-faire market economy and would have to be changed from her earliest days in Office. King referred to individual policy development under the step-by-step approach, yet he used whole policy programmes as examples of this approach. In this way King countered some facets of his own argument.

A finer point of contradiction in King's argument about Mrs. Thatcher's use of the deliberative policy making style were his references to her "natural caution" (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 63). King explained that many critics often overlooked Mrs. Thatcher's quality and use of extreme and natural caution in her policy making (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 60, 63). On the one-hand King was speaking about this leader's use of a very bold and "risk-taking" approach to policy making, whilst on the other King implied Mrs. Thatcher possessed the power of natural caution in her policy making. From Mrs. Thatcher's experience with the supposed deliberative reforms of the British taxation system
and the creation of the disastrous Poll tax it seemed she overlooked her own powers of natural caution (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 55, 60, 63). As part of King’s explanation of how Mrs. Thatcher was able to demonstrate Machiavellian tendencies of policy making, he suggested she possessed the "...ability to gauge accurately..." and "...combine extreme caution with a breath taking willingness to take risks..." (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 60). The Poll Tax seemed to contradict King’s standpoint. A point King seemed to have overlooked when he wrote:

"...she is determined that her agenda will be her Government’s agenda is therefore willing to desert herself - and willing to take risks with her authority and her own personal position - on an unprecedented scale..." (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 55).

Another major flaw in King’s argument that Mrs. Thatcher’s leadership was Machiavellian both in image and substance, was noticed in the execution of political enemies. It could be debated that Mrs. Thatcher’s leadership was not truly Machiavellian as the execution of political enemies was not always totally justified (Machiavelli x King in Skidelsky, 1990, 63). Machiavelli stated that if a leader decided to carry out an execution, it should always be "...when there is proper justification and manifest reason for it..." (Machiavelli x King in Skidelsky, 1990, 63). King suggested that Mrs. Thatcher’s political executions probably fell into this category, "None seem to have been an exercise of purely personal spite..." (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 63-64). However, King counters this point in his earlier discussion when he explained that:

"...far more than any other twentieth-century Prime Minister Mrs. Thatcher, has used her hiring-and-firing power single-mindedly to
produce a team of ministers to her person, and more important, to her policy agenda" (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 59-60).

It seemed Mrs. Thatcher preferred to commit political executions on the basis of personal politics than uphold British political traditions by using her power of appointment to create a "balanced Cabinet" of broad public appeal (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 60). For instance, Mrs. Thatcher weeded-out the Heathites or Wets from her Cabinet from the earliest days of her Office. The ranks of Wets and others whom Mrs. Thatcher did not desire included; Norman St John-Stevas, Mark Carlisle, Lord Soames, Sir Ian Gilmour, Francis Pym and John Biffen because of political bias rather than impending political threat. King admitted this viewpoint about Mrs. Thatcher's unjustified political execution saying that, "...many of those who have remained inside the government have gradually altered their political views as time has gone on..." (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 59).

King's view demonstrated the similarities of image and substance with Mrs. Thatcher's Machiavellian standards of behaviour. However, at the same time "She had no trouble in winning the affection and loyalty of those in her immediate circle, principally at Number Ten Downing Street", stated King (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 57). This point was verified by Mrs. Thatcher's closest supporters. However, the credence of the point was devalued by King's admission that even a supposedly "loved" colleague of Mrs. Thatcher, could find themself being politically threatened and executed for not always, or even behaving in a less than desired manner on isolated occasions. This was the case with the "once-loved John Biffen" who Mrs. Thatcher politically executed (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 59). Furthermore, the notion of loving one's colleagues and supporters appeared to be a very subjective line of argument.
King paraphrased Machiavelli to imply that Mrs. Thatcher would have liked to be both loved and feared by her colleagues and subjects:

"...but because it is difficult to combine them, it is far better to be feared than loved if you cannot be both... men worry less about doing an injury to one who makes himself loved than to one who makes himself feared (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 56). The bond of love is one which men, wretched creatures that they are, break when it is to their advantage to do so; but fear is strengthened by a dread of punishment which is always effective... I conclude that since men love as they please but fear when the prince pleases, a wise prince should rely on what he controls, not on what he cannot control" (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 56).

This paraphrased excerpt of Machiavelli is strengthened with a quote used by King to highlight Mrs. Thatcher's Machiavellian behaviour:

"The prince should none the less make himself feared in such a way that, if he is not loved, at least he escaped being hated. For fear is quite compatible with an absence of hatred... If ... it proves necessary to execute someone, this should be done only when there is proper justification and manifest reasons for it" (Machiavelli x King in Skidelsky, 1990, 56).

King explained Mrs. Thatcher exercised the use of fear as a weapon in her dealings with fellow ministers, civil servants and Conservative M.P's (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 57). It seemed Mrs. Thatcher sought to control the content of public policy, her Government and Britain's destiny by pursuit of the Machiavellian tendency of relying on what she could control with fear rather than love (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 57).
Leonard Grob made the point that Mrs. Thatcher's leadership showed Machiavellian tendencies of image and substance by her success in becoming Prime Minister, Grob's interpretation of Machiavelli implied that:

"...all human beings are motivated by the desire for power. In the midst of inevitable conflict among individuals so motivated, the leader is one who succeeds best at the game of power in which all are involved" (Grob in Kellerman, 1984, 265). Grob further qualified his point, saying: "...his leadership consists in his superior ability to wield instruments of physical and psychological force..." (Grob in Kellerman, 1984, 265). This view of Machiavellian leadership was certainly congruent with Mrs. Thatcher's elimination of political opponents, such as Heath, and to secure her selection as Conservative Party leader.

In addition Grob suggested that the Machiavellian leadership must aim to maintain order through the establishment of,

"...some superior power which, with a royal hand, and with full and absolute powers, may put a curb upon the excessive ambition and corruption of the power..." (Machiavelli x Grob in Kellerman, 1984, 265). Grob's use of Machiavelli's view that the leader should be endowed with full and absolute powers in order to halt the corruption of power seems in concord with Mrs. Thatcher's aim to obtain monarchical powers so as to be able to make policy and lead Britain more effectively.

Grob also supported Mrs. Thatcher's Machiavellian styled leadership goals. Grob's interpretation of Machiavelli suggested that "...if political anarchy was to be avoided, moral considerations must be subordinated to the mechanics of a struggle for power" (Grob in Kellerman, 1984, 264). Mrs. Thatcher enacted this point in her sacrifice
of certain policies, such as the reduction of Britain's welfare budget and NHS cutbacks, for the promotion of policy areas prioritised in her vision of Britain's future. He added that "Given the distaste of the circumstances at hand, the leader must be prepared to employ any and all means in the service of his sole end: ..." (Grob in Kellerman, 1984, 264). This Machiavellian interpretation of leadership closely described Mrs. Thatcher's leadership style and method of attaining political goals.

Grob's support for this point is however tempered with criticism, as he suggested that "...neither moral nor immoral conduct is to be cultivated for its own sake" (Grob in Kellerman, 1984, 264). An issue Mrs. Thatcher seemed to pursue in her approach to leadership and in realising her political goals. Grob's interpretations of the Machiavellian style of leadership was explained in the statement: "...the establishment, maintenance, and continued welfare of the State in his charge" (Grob in Kellerman, 1984, 264). Although Mrs. Thatcher declared her plan to cut the welfare and NHS budgets she did not take responsibility for the effects of these cuts. Instead, Mrs. Thatcher attributed the need for these NHS cuts to the abuse of the British health system by patrons and the Labour Party. Furthermore, Mrs. Thatcher did not appear genuinely concerned about the "charge" of being responsible for the "...continued welfare of the State..." by her cuts to the welfare system and NHS, which so harshly affected the most needy British constituents. From this discussion the weight of evidence implied that Mrs. Thatcher's leadership style bore close image and substantial resemblances to certain interpretations of Machiavellian leadership.
Mrs. Thatcher's leadership was not only Machiavellian in political image but also in its political substance. This is not say that Mrs. Thatcher used Machiavelli's *The Prince* and *The Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius* as "how to..." guide books.

From Hugo Young's analysis of Mrs. Thatcher in *One of Us* (1989) and *The Iron Lady: A Biography of Margaret Thatcher* (1990), he raised discussion comparing her political style and substance with the role model presented by Machiavelli in *The Prince* and *The Discourses* (1989, 429). A comparison Young suggested Mrs. Thatcher preferred people not to draw (1990, 429). Similar to Machiavelli, Mrs. Thatcher formulated much of her political style and policy programme from the careful examination of previous Conservative leaders and governments. According to Grob, the political philosophy behind Machiavelli's *The Prince* and *The Discourses* was drawn from comparative conclusions of earlier modes of government (1984, 264). Grob indicated Machiavelli's own introduction to suggest this point:

"But my intention being to write something of use to those who understand, it appears to me more proper to get the real truth of the matter than to its imagination... for how we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, than he who abandons what is done for what about his own run than his preservation" (Machiavelli in Ricci, 1950, 56 x Grob in Kellerman, 1984, 264).

In broad terms the political substance of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership was Machiavellian. For instance, the general organisation imposed upon the Cabinet, committees and machinery of government by Mrs. Thatcher was controlling. Mrs. Thatcher implemented her ultimate grasp over the usual British system of Cabinet government by the
breakdown of consensus politics. Young explained, from the beginning Mrs. Thatcher's Cabinet met less frequently - usually only once a week - compared with previous Prime Ministers (1990, 430). The system of Cabinet committees was also far reduced from prior post-war governments. Young used the record of Attlee's government. Attlee's government had 148 standing committees and 313 ad-hoc committees in six years compared with Mrs. Thatcher's results of 30-35 and 120 respectively over a similar period (1990, 430). Instead of using the traditional and formal mechanisms of the British Cabinet system of government, Mrs. Thatcher resorted to only bringing the government together semi-formally under her aegis and outside structured agendas of the conventional system (1990, 430). These ad-hoc meetings afforded Mrs. Thatcher a means of maintaining tight control, by-passing many rival interests and narrowing the circle of decision. Like the classic Machiavellian leader, Mrs. Thatcher did not have discussions, she stated opinions and retained complete creative licence whimsically to change her mind, suggested Young (1990, 430). The whole process certainly aided Mrs. Thatcher's goal of Prime Ministerial domination. As an anonymous Whitehall figure expressed: "We have a form of presidential government in which she operates like a sovereign in her court" (Young, 1990, 430). Another example of the Machiavellian nature of Mrs. Thatcher's political substance was seen through a different application of her use of fear to control. In Chapter 17 of *The Prince* "Cruelty and Compassion; and whether it is better to be loved that feared, or the reverse" Machiavelli discussed the relationship between the leader, his supporters, colleagues and advisers and the subjects. A memorable quote from Chapter 17 sums Machiavelli's main implication: "The prince should none the less make himself feared in such a way than, if he is not loved, at least he escapes being hated..." Mrs. Thatcher
followed Machiavelli's advice and employed fear as a political tool to maintain control over her daily relations with fellow ministers, civil servants and Cabinet. King added that Machiavelli said, "Men bestow love as they please, not as the prince pleases" (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 56). King explained that Mrs. Thatcher used fear on a face-to-face level - threatening, bullying, humiliating and embarrassing - with officials and politicians (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 58). She also used the fear of constant scrutiny, sudden and unquestionable dismissal, and equally unexpected appointment and promotion to high-profile posts to control those around her. The examples of the successful Sir Stafford Cliffs and the unsuccessful wets or Heathites and the fall of Francis Pym and John Biffen; served as clear examples of behaviours and Mrs. Thatcher's responses. These examples were all signs of Mrs. Thatcher's Machiavellian uses of fear and justified execution.

An extension of the Machiavellian nature of Mrs. Thatcher's political behaviour was additionally noted in the way she excessively used fear to the point it turned to political dissent. King found that Machiavelli predicted and warned the leader against the use of excessive fear in The Prince (King in Skidelsky, 1990, 63). Like many political leaders, Mrs. Thatcher kept her enemies close-by to monitor them; however, this position also afforded them the unique advantage of being able to notice her failures and first-hand and immediate weaknesses. Patrick Weller concurred with the view that a leader must be in touch with the moods and swings of the Members of the Parliamentary Party at all times, otherwise they would be easily and unexpectedly ousted, as was the case with Mrs. Thatcher (1989, 150). The spill of Mrs. Thatcher as leader in favour of Mr. Major was a prime
example of Mrs. Thatcher's mis-use of a Machiavellian-styled political behaviour.

Another instance of the Machiavellian nature of Mrs. Thatcher's political behaviour was seen through her slashing cuts to the welfare budgets. Mrs. Thatcher made large-scale policy changes in the way of cuts to these budgets from the earliest days of her Prime Ministership. These policy changes reflected a Machiavellian direction which advised the leader that: "Injuries should be done all together, so that being less tasted, they will give less offence..." (Machiavelli in Hearne, 1867, 4 x Tivey, 1988, 141).

In addition to this Machiavellian advice, Mrs. Thatcher also pursued a strategy of granting apparent policy concessions to needy voter groups. Mrs. Thatcher's policy concessions to women were a plain example of this behaviour. Mrs. Thatcher was well known not to advocate special policy changes for women, however she did initiate the repeal of English legislation to make rape within marriage illegal and thus give women legislative status as independent individuals; this enabled women to declare a taxable income separate from their spouse and raised the retirement age of women to the same as men. The fact that these policy changes were initially welcomed by women, exponents of gender issues and feminists alike was aside from the fact that these policy changes were aimed at Mrs. Thatcher's policy emphasis to maximise revenue collection. This example of Mrs. Thatcher's policy behaviour also mirrored more of Machiavelli's plan, as he suggested: "Benefits should be granted little by little, so that they may be better enjoyed" (Machiavelli in Hearne, 1867, 4 x Tivey, 1988, 141).
Therefore Mrs. Thatcher's leadership not only exhibited Machiavellian traces in the political substance of certain of her policy areas, but also showed Machiavellian semblances in the political image of leadership she expressed in the opinions of a number of Thatcher analysts. Points for further consideration which come out of this debate, include finding why Mrs. Thatcher was inclined to pursue this political image and at times of substantial levels of control in her leadership. Perhaps investigation of theory based role of patriarchy upon Mrs. Thatcher's political image and substance of leadership would assist overall discussion.

Did patriarchy dominate Mrs. Thatcher's leadership?

Finally, whether the political substance and image of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership was being controlled by patriarchy will be addressed. When Mrs. Thatcher attained the Prime Ministership of Britain in 1979, her success heralded the beginning of a new era of radical Conservative politics. Tessa ten Tusscher's assessment of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership "Feminist Perspectives on the New Right" revealed much more about her New Right political goals (1986, 66-84). Ms. ten Tusscher's explanation of Mrs. Thatcher's political style included: the restoration of class forces in favour of capitalism as well as the instatement of patriarchally-dominated gender-relations (1986, 76). Ten Tusscher's essay refuted what she termed the "naive arguments" about a female Prime Minister being a victory for British feminism and the 300 Group's assertion that seeing any woman in a position of power was a victory for feminism. (The 300 Group referred to a group of 300 business women). Instead, ten Tusscher suggested that Mrs. Thatcher did nothing to advance the position of women (1986, 76). Ten Tusscher stated "Patriarchal domination was not dependent upon the gender of
the leader of a government" (1986, 76). Not an unusual espousal alone, ten Tusscher qualified her view saying: "Thatcher's image and the rhetoric of Thatcherism are fully consonant with the restoration and maintenance of patriarchal gender relations" (1986, 46). Ten Tusscher indicated various examples of Mrs. Thatcher's patriarchal rhetoric, including the following instances:

"...feminists have become far too strident and have done damage to the cause of women by making us out to be something we're not. You get on because you have the right talents" and "I am absolutely satisfied that there is nothing more you can do by changing the law to do away with discrimination. After all, I don't think there's been a great deal of discrimination against women for years" (Thatcher in ten Tusscher, 1978 and 1981).

The nature of patriarchal domination in Britain under Mrs. Thatcher's leadership usually manifested itself in a more vicarious manner than it did in other countries, such as the United States. For instance, Mrs. Thatcher's government did not make any overt political programmes against the promotion of gender issues. However ten Tusscher declared that Mrs. Thatcher's government did launch a more general offensive against women's rights (1986, 78). The Thatcher Government's push to promote and uphold "traditional family" values were at the base of ten Tusscher's claim. Ten Tusscher pointed at the leaked guidelines of the Family Policy Group, as being plain examples of the patriarchal oriented gender-relations expressed through Mrs. Thatcher's policy making (1986, 78). It must be added that the Family Policy Group's creation was initiated by Mrs. Thatcher, for the express purpose of advising her in the formulation of the overall policy programme and with individual policies in the general area of family
welfare. Hence, the Group - like a number of other covert committees formed by Mrs. Thatcher - had a definite and rather narrow political agenda which was congruent with the political biases of Mrs. Thatcher. Ten Tusscher intimated that the Family Policy Group and its prescriptions were especially designed to "...seek ways of counteracting those factors which tended to undermine, or even prohibit, the exercise of personal responsibility and a sense of individual self-respect" (The Guardian, Feb. 17, 1983 x ten Tusscher, 1986, 78).

The core issue of the Family Policy Group was aimed at shifting responsibility for social and public services away from the government towards the family, following the patriarchal moral ideology espoused by Mrs. Thatcher's Government that "God designed the family to take care of people from the cradle to the grave. The state is no substitute" (Marshall, 1985, 36 in ten Tusscher, 1986, 78). A view paraphrased and frequently echoed by Mrs. Thatcher in media, public addresses, among others as tenets of individuals responsibility and self-help. And because the shift was patriarchically motivated, the displacement of responsibility from the state to the family institution or onto women was not by chance. This shift was strategically supported by the Family Policy Group's initiative to:

"...encourage mothers to stay at home, the promotion of schools with a clear moral base, the privatization of aspects of the personal social services and the encouragement of private provision for social needs, the shifting of responsibility for anti-social behaviour of children onto parents and the encouragement of self-help among the unemployed" (ten Tusscher, 1986, 78).
At the heart of the Groups' policies was the "family" or moreover women. Using women in this way clearly afforded patriarchy and Mrs. Thatcher: the opportunity to maintain the sexual division of labour; imply that all caring and supporting roles should not only be performed by women, but that women be held responsibility for the negative behaviours of those they supported and cared for; and that the personal aspirations or rights of women were unimportant and non-existent political concerns. Ten Tusscher's argument implied that Mrs. Thatcher's policy creation, highlighted by policies concerning the family and women, was certainly heavily influenced by patriarchal doctrines.

Finally, it appeared that Mrs. Thatcher was very influenced by the teachings of patriarchy in the political substance of her leadership. Even her political image of leadership was apparently affected by traits of patriarchy. However, this is not to say that Mrs. Thatcher was controlled or a creature of British patriarchy.

Mrs. Thatcher's political demise was a clear instance of patriarchy's control over her political substance. In his article "The Demise of Mrs. Thatcher: Further Reflections", Martin Burch suggested that Mrs. Thatcher was deliberately and successfully conspired against by those eager to replace her or just see her replaced (1992, 126-132). Burch alleged that the Howe camp wanted Mrs. Thatcher removed from the leadership; Howe only wanted Mrs. Thatcher out, but in Hestletine's case he wanted the Party leadership (1992, 129). These patriarchal conspiracies were determined to oust Mrs. Thatcher because she had ceased to promote a successful Conservative party leadership image to the electorate.
Burch's second accusation of conspiracy was levelled at various groups of ministers who met on the 20th November, or the eve of the first leadership ballot (1992, 129). This meeting occurred at the home of a junior Foreign Office minister, Tristan Garel-Jones at Catherine Place and was thus called the "Catherine Place Conspiracy" (Burch, 1992, 129). The purpose of the Catherine Place meeting was to discuss the situation following the first ballot, the meeting concluded that Mrs. Thatcher was going to be beaten or that she would only just win, either way it would cause a split within the Party (Burch, 1992, 129). The Catherine Place Conspiracy was serious about their intentions that Mrs. Thatcher should resign and allow other candidates to come forward, informed the Chief Whip (Burch, 1992, 129). Other meetings like the Catherine Place Conspiracy also occurred around the 20th and 21st November 1990. As Burch implied Mrs. Thatcher, "...had had her moments, but once she looked like an electoral liability the long term development of the party fortune required she be removed" (1992, 129). Hence, patriarchal support of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership had obviously swung against her, along with the public opinion polls.

Burch believed the real reasons for Mrs. Thatcher's demise were far more realistic than arguments of patriarchal domination. Burch suggested that in realistic terms the meetings of November 20th and 21st 1990 could not have truly merited the label "conspiracy" (1992, 129). The meetings were at most very informal contacts between mostly junior members, and additionally took place after the first crucial leadership ballot. In the case of the most formal of these meetings - the Catherine Place gathering - the goal seemed to combine the removal of Mrs. Thatcher with the halting of Mr. Hestletine's desire to become the next leader. Surely, if these meetings were demonstrations of the
patriarchal domination of Mrs. Thatcher then the men involved would have been orchestrating her downfall, not contemplating the possibilities of what might happen if she lost the first ballot. Burch believed the patriarchal conspiracy theory could not stand up to any careful examination. Burch explained that although Mrs. Thatcher had made enemies within the Party and there were eager contenders for her leadership, that unpopularity and ready challengers were the "everyday lot of all political leaders" (1992, 129). Burch concluded that it was not patriarchal collusion within her own party that brought Mrs. Thatcher down (1992, 129). Furthermore, the fact that Mrs. Thatcher was determined to remain party leader, despite her political indiscretions - such as the Westland Helicopter Affair and the miners' strike falls in her popularity and competition from other contenders, supports the non-existence of the patriarchal dominance of Mrs. Thatcher.

The political substance of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership was not patriarchally controlled. In the text, Off-Centre: Feminism and Cultural Studies (1991), authors Sarah Franklin, Celia Lury and Jackie Stacey suggested that Mrs. Thatcher's leadership was not patriarchally dominated. Using the analyses of Beatrix Campbell and Andrea Dworkin, it was considered how Mrs. Thatcher used feminine fatalism and patriarchal images to be in control of the political substance of her leadership. Both Dworkin and Campbell raised the notion that women's lives are often shaped by fears of male violence, crime, lawlessness and intimidation (Dworkin and Campbell in Franklin et. al. 1991, 30-31). This point was iterated in feminist and psychoanalyst Janet Sayers' work, where she stated that the substance of Mrs. Thatcher's programme exploited the fears of the British community, particularly
women; she said, "It plays on peoples anxieties..." such as "...unemployment, poverty, crime, mugging" (1985,106).

The outline of Dworkin’s analysis implied that the political Right made certain metaphysical and material promises to women that both exploited and quieted some of their deepest fears (1983, 21). From this perspective, Franklin et. al interpreted the support of some females from the right as part of a struggle to avoid the “something worse” that can happen if they transgress the rigid boundaries of appropriate feminist behaviour (1991, 30). Franklin et. al.’s explanation certainly intimated the existence of feminine fatalism and the control of patriarchy. However from Campbell’s observations it seemed that Mrs. Thatcher combined popular beliefs of patriarchy - its immovable, unbreachable and inevitable - with notions in Conservative discourse - that women as housewives, wives and mothers are ascribed a privileged status denied by other parties to create her own controlling style of leadership (Campbell in Franklin et. al., 1991, 31). This point was born out through Mrs. Thatcher’s dominance as Conservative leader, particularly in the policy decisions she made. Campbell also noted this occurrence saying that Mrs. Thatcher’s policy response to women’s fears - such as growing crime, violence, unemployment and rising prices - showed little real concern. Mrs. Thatcher’s substantial response to women’s fears was neglected in favour of policies against industrial action and acts of national terrorism, which Mrs. Thatcher claimed addressed women’s needs (Campbell in Franklin et. al., 1991, 31). Mrs. Thatcher exploited the patriarchically generated fears of Conservative voting women to help her win the leadership of the Party. From this standing Mrs. Thatcher was able to assume a controlling political position and exert her dominance as leader through areas such as policy making. Franklin detected Mrs. Thatcher’s dominance through the
policies her Government made concerning women and the family which departed from the policies traditionally associated with the Conservative Party (1991, 31). Thus, Mrs. Thatcher's leadership was not dominated by patriarchy; instead, she used the image based traits of patriarchy to gain policy making powers whilst attempting to establish an authoritarian hold over the Government.

This part of the discussion aims to demonstrate that Mrs. Thatcher and her leadership were in no way dominated by patriarchy. Franklin et. al. disputed part of Campbell and Dworkin's arguments that Mrs. Thatcher was dominated by patriarchy citing an "obvious" flaw in their inability to consider the "common sense belief that women are inherently conservative" (1991, 31).

Mrs. Thatcher's political image of leadership was not dominated by patriarchy. This claim investigates the so-called patriarchal characteristics of strength and conviction presented by Mrs. Thatcher in her national leadership. In her article, "Thatcher uses her Woman's Touch" Ros Brunt suggested that Mrs. Thatcher seemed able to combine a "masculine" political image of power with one on femininity in a new way (1987, 22-24). Brunt argued, "...Mrs. Thatcher's success in the realm of patriarchal politics is precisely to do with her effectiveness as a woman, an the way she inhabits particular feminine role, while appearing to disavow femininity" (1987, 23). Mrs. Thatcher's selective use of labels and political image of superiority, additionally implied how she was not patriarchically dominated. For example, Mrs. Thatcher constantly re-affirmed her superiority by describing herself as "the best man in the Cabinet" and "This Lady's not for turning" and accepting titles such as "The Iron Lady", whilst referring to her male opposition as "Tory
Wets” (Brunt, 1987, 23). Brunt explained that these labels demonstrated how Mrs. Thatcher combined femininity with strength and determination in ways that drew attention to her gender, whilst undermining any conventional female gender associated insignificance (1987, 23). It seemed that Mrs. Thatcher managed to mediate the contradictions between her femininity and her leadership in political life, thus the traditionally male dominated Conservative Party was not able to use her gender to control her. Not ill at ease with the contradiction, Brunt argued, Mrs. Thatcher actually thrived as a political leader and powerful female politician (1987, 23).

Marina Warner in her text Monuments and Maidens: The Allegory of the Female Form similarly argued that Mrs. Thatcher managed to exploit her powerful role as Prime Minister and her political image as a woman to her advantage:

“Margaret Thatcher has never repudiated as alien or undesirable the image of strength that clothes her,... for it provides her personality with a dimension that traditional definitions of female nature exclude” (1985, 40).

Warner iterated that far from presenting difficulties, the characteristics of power and strength were central components of Mrs. Thatcher’s domineering political image of leadership (1985, 40). Warner believed that Mrs. Thatcher very successfully incorporated the presence of femininity - such as the traditional domestic feminine roles - in her domineering political image of leadership (1985, 40).

Warner also pointed to the way Mrs. Thatcher adopted feminine labels to affirm her leadership and control of a once patriarchically dominated bastion (1985, 42). For instance, Mrs. Thatcher termed her
parliamentary Party the "kitchen cabinet", described the economy as a
domestic budget and commonly drew home-based analogies with her
Prime Ministerial duties (1985, 42). Mrs. Thatcher effectively co-
ordinated self-representations of a feminine woman, whilst
simultaneously demonstrated the appearance of a powerful female
political image of leadership. A political image hardly dominated by
patriarchal forces.

Franklin et. al. and other feminists suggested that it was Mrs.
Thatcher's skilful use of her feminine, yet strong political image of
leadership which afforded her a means of getting harsher policies
publicly accepted (1991, 35). Franklin et. al referred to various policy
areas as indications of this premise, the policies included: the miners'
strike; denials of trade union and civil rights; stricter immigration laws;
and the dismantling of the welfare state (1991, 35).

Warner supported the notion that Mrs. Thatcher used her feminine
yet strong political image to maintain her controlling leadership style
(1985). Warner's analysis of Mrs. Thatcher political image and her
strong leadership style noted her usage of the nanny governess aires of
authoritarianism:

"Nanny, matron, governess... these are not Mrs. Thatcher's personal
role models. But they are perceived to be in character because they are
women of discipline. Margaret Thatcher has trapped an enormous
source of female power: the right and prohibition. She exercises over
unruly elements, near and far, the kind of censure children receive from
a strict mother. It is a very feminine form of female authority; it just
looks novel applied by a prime minister. It is also an authority many
are used to obeying" ( 1985, 52).
Franklin et. al. stated Mrs. Thatcher assumed her position of political leadership on the terms of patriarchy (1991, 41). Even the political image of leadership Mrs. Thatcher projected was controlled by patriarchy and the Conservative Party's understanding of how a woman should appear. Mrs. Thatcher's political image was characterised as a mother, home maker and housewife, even in her professional life as Party leader (Franklin et. al., 1991, 41). Aside from her feminine oriented political image little else denoted her Party leadership which would distinguish it from that of a male leader. For example, the majority of women did not benefit from the feminine intentions of Mrs. Thatcher's political image in the outcomes of her Government's political substance. Franklin et. al. used the summary of a poster of Mrs. Thatcher with the slogan: "My message to women of the Nation" to suggest her message to women was "Tough" (1991, 41).

The political substance of Mrs. Thatcher's policy programme was heavily directed by the patriarchal forces of the Conservative Party, her policies towards women and the family were essentially unchanged and kept with traditional views of women. For instance, Mrs. Thatcher emphasised the compatibility of women's paid work with their roles in the home (Franklin et. al., 1991, 31).

In her article "Margaret Thatcher and Ruth Ellis", feminist and cultural studies writer J. Rose added a further dimension to Mrs. Thatcher's use of violence and terror to the psycho-sexual aspects of her domineering political image of leadership (1988, 31-33). Rose argued how Mrs. Thatcher made use of the repudiation of violence - in the forms of terrorism, football hooliganism, rioting and the Hungerford massacre, among others - whilst simultaneously promoting a fascination
with other forms of violence - such as the Falkland's War, capital
punishment, military strength and harsh programmes of law and order -
as central features of her controlling political image (1988). In addition,
Rose believed Mrs. Thatcher would not have been able to successfully
combine and legitimise a political image of control and leadership based
upon violence with her gender (1988). Rose couched this claim in the
work of Kristeva, who suggested that femininity could be exploited to
set boundaries of social chaos and irrationality (1988). Rose went on to
explain that as a controlling female leader Mrs. Thatcher brought
together "...the contradictions of rationality and femininity, whilst
embodying the fragility of that boundary..." (1988). Franklin et. al.
summed Rose's view, saying:

"This produces the fascinating and yet terrifying powerful female
executioner who legitimated extreme forms of state violence in the
name of law and order" (1991, 36).

Mrs. Thatcher's political image was her own creation of a selective
feminine invocation and denial of a female leader in a traditionally male
role and patriarchically dominated arena. Therefore, Mrs. Thatcher's
political image was not cast by patriarchy. According to Rose's study of
Mrs. Thatcher's political image by both aggressively controlling and
aggressively using contradictory forces of violence to affirm her strong
leadership. Rose also stressed how Mrs. Thatcher used her gender
identity in her image to enhance her Party domination from the twin
positions of mediation with areas of her policy making and help secure
popular consent for her leadership (1988).
Conclusion

This chapter aimed to expose whether there was any difference between the political image and substance Mrs. Thatcher displayed in her leadership. From the individual debates the overall consensus of evidence suggested that Mrs. Thatcher did actively alter her political image of leadership to achieve a higher degree of concord and support for the often harsh, unpopular and even drastic substance of her programmes and individual policies. These points were demonstrated through references to the on-going themes of gender issues and individual policies in these four areas. The discussion of political image and substance of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership attempted to offer answers to just four aspects of debate. However it seemed the overall discussion served to raise more questions about the image and substance of Mrs. Thatcher than it answered. This chapter additionally foreshadowed issues that would be addressed by latter feminist theory debate, whilst simultaneously considering the overarching discussion themes of Mrs. Thatcher's political image and substance.

The first argument of this discussion considered whether Mrs. Thatcher sold a political image and or the political substance of her leadership for the purpose of media consumption. On a wider basis the evidence raised in this particular foray into Mrs. Thatcher’s leadership revealed that Mrs. Thatcher sold her political image to the media for greater, more positive public exposure and to assist her promotion and implementation of certain policies. The overwhelming degree of evidence showed that Mrs. Thatcher worked for herself, through the way she recreated her personal background of leadership to coincide with her new political image and assist the promotion of often unlikely, harsh and unpopular programmes and individual policies.
The second portion of this chapter investigated how Mrs. Thatcher was self-motivated in the re-creation of her personal history of leadership. This discussion looked at the way Mrs. Thatcher re-used the political images of historical female figures to give an added dimension to her political image of leadership. The political substance of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership was additionally aided by the way she re-conditioned her own personal history through the re-use of the political images and substance of attractive female figures from Britain's history. Thus, the overwhelming weight of evidence confirmed the standpoint that Mrs. Thatcher did work for herself as leader, a notion illustrated through the manner in which she re-vamped her personal history.

The next segment of this discussion about Mrs. Thatcher's leadership examined the manner in which a number of political analysts had questioned whether Mrs. Thatcher's leadership bore likeness to the political image and substance of the Machiavellian leader. Strong support was ventured for both the for and against arguments about whether Mrs. Thatcher's leadership displayed Machiavellian tendencies. The portion of debate about whether a variety of political writers considered Mrs. Thatcher's leadership Machiavellian in terms of its political image and substance, raised the option for more in-depth discussion on this topic at the theory-based level; rather than just from the position of the opinions offered in secondary sources. Hence, in final assessment the weight of evidence put forward was fairly balanced.

The final section of this chapter investigated whether Mrs. Thatcher's leadership was controlled by patriarchy or not. This question of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership was hotly debated. The evidence implied
that although Mrs. Thatcher's political image of leadership may have displayed some patriarchal traits, the substance of her policy making was very independent of any patriarchal Party pressure. Thus, it appeared that Mrs. Thatcher was not only in control of the substantial sale of her leadership, but that she also controlled the political image of patriarchy she publicly disclosed to first obtain, then retain the Party leadership. It therefore seemed Mrs. Thatcher was able to manipulate the traditional patriarchal forces of conformity to her advantage as leader. Thence, the information gathered firmly suggested that Mrs. Thatcher's leadership was not controlled by patriarchy.
CHAPTER FOUR

Bibliography


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