

## Chapter 4

### Internal Factors

#### Introduction

The reasons that Muslim riots have occurred in Xinjiang so frequently in recent years are complicated. On the one hand, there are domestic and external reasons. On the other hand, the historical and realistic reasons should not be overlooked. This chapter analyzes and discusses the causes of the emergence of Islamic revivalism and Muslim separatism in Xinjiang in the 1980s from the internal and realistic viewpoint.

Debate about the history of Xinjiang has lasted for centuries. Muslims claim they have never belonged to China in terms of culture, language, religion and ethnicity, and Xinjiang has kept its independence for most of its history.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, using archaeological studies and historical records, Chinese official always insist that Xinjiang has been an integral part of China since ancient time, long before the advent of Islam, though not successively.<sup>2</sup> The continuous friction and resentment led to a series of rebellions against Chinese rules until the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Manipulated and exploited by foreign powers, Xinjiang Muslims attempted to establish the short-lived Eastern Turkestan Republics in the 1930s and 1940s.<sup>3</sup> Even after Xinjiang became an Uighur Autonomous Region in 1955, the Han-Muslim tension in Xinjiang has never eased. Since the 1980s under the reform and open policy

---

<sup>1</sup> Turghun Almas, *Weiwuer Ren (The Uighurs)*, Xinjiang qingshaonian chubanshe, Urumqi, 1989.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example: *Xinjiang: the Land and the People*, Beijing, Xinshijie chubanshe, 1989, pp. 30-59.

<sup>3</sup> Y. Shichor, p. 75.

of China, Muslim separatists have restated the issue of Xinjiang's history, which is a spark of Xinjiang's independence.

For realistic and domestic reasons, Muslim nationalism, Islamic revival and the defects of China's policies towards ethnic minorities have emerged as three important factors, which provoked the rebellions in Xinjiang in recent years. As has been well acknowledged, the Great Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) almost crushed both religion and nationalism. From 1979, when Deng Xiaoping launched economic reform and relaxation policies towards ethnic minorities and their religions, the national identities among Xinjiang Muslims started to grow stronger. Chinese authority reestablished the so-called 'socialist-nationalism' in which people could call themselves Uighurs or Kazaks, and were allowed to use their own languages. Meanwhile, there was a great revival of Islam in all forms: sectarianism, fundamentalism, and a general mass revival of the traditions and customs emerged throughout the region. Muslims believe that nationalism and Islam are the best forms of expression both for demanding their rights and independence and for fighting against Chinese rule and its policies towards ethnic minorities. For some ethnic minorities, in particular the Uighurs, nationality and religion are the same thing. In addition dissatisfaction with the central government policies towards Muslims in terms of education, family planning, economic development and political rights have stimulated unrest in Xinjiang.

## **Revival of Islam and Tensions between Communist and Religion in the 1980s and 1990s**

Religion and national issues are the two major factors, which have always affected the stability and development of Xinjiang, although they are not the most acute problems for the whole of China. While religious activities have flourished in Xinjiang since the early 1980s, when Beijing relaxed its control, religion has contributed enormously to the growth of national identity among Muslims. A report from Hong Kong comments that the revival of Islam is a fuse that could ignite Muslim unrest and rebellions in Xinjiang.<sup>4</sup> Another reason is that with the growth of religious activities, faith in Marxism-Leninism is becoming less attractive since the collapse of the former Soviet Union. This led to a vacuum in the lives of many people, which religion and an attachment to ethnicity has tried to fill, to some extent successfully. It is known that religion has been playing an important role in the life of Xinjiang Muslims, which presents a big challenge to the Communist Atheistic education among the Party members and young students.

Over the past few years, many manifestations have shown that religious activities have not only flourished but also have changed form. These include the rise in the number of believers and changes in their age and occupational profiles; stepped-up efforts to build and renovate mosques; the increasing of young and educated clergymen; an increase of private religious schools (madrasas); an involvement of Communist Party members and officials in religious activities. Observances of ritual obligations and pilgrimages to holy places have been increased. The 'illegal religious

---

<sup>4</sup> He Pin, 18 December 1991, p. 76.

activities' so-called by the Chinese government have become more serious, which have interfered with the legal system, government policies, education, family planning, and marriage, particularly in the countryside.<sup>5</sup>

The promotion of more liberal policies towards ethnic minorities throughout China is having an important effect in southern Xinjiang. Since 1979, great religious freedom has led to a rapid growth of state-sponsored rebuilding of mosques. The government has spent large sums of money to rebuild and restore famous mosques in southern Xinjiang. In addition, new mosques were built from donations of Muslims. For example, in 1979, over 6000 mosques in the Kashgar and Khotan districts of southern Xinjiang were built, and the number increased to 13000 mosques ten years later.<sup>6</sup> In Yecheng County of southern Xinjiang, there were 598 newly built mosques between 1980 and 1990. In 1986 alone, 209 mosques were built, which accounted for 35 percent of the total number for ten years. The best and most expensive mosque in Yecheng costs about 2 million yuan (RMB). An internal investigation report stated that the extensive rebuilding and restoration of mosques had laid a heavy burden on Muslims who are still very poor in the undeveloped areas of southern Xinjiang.<sup>7</sup>

The government also showed deep concern about the decrease of students enrolled in public schools and the increase in private religious madrasas attached to mosques. According to the Constitutions and regulations of the Chinese government, the private madrasas are strictly banned and children under the age of 18 are not allowed to study

---

<sup>5</sup> Liu Zhongkang, 'jin nian lai nanjiang zongjiao kuangre de zhongzhong biaoqian', *Xinjiang shehui kexue yanjiu*, 2 (1991), p.13.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p.11.

<sup>7</sup> Internal report from Kashgar local government, *Xinjiang shehui kexue yanjiu*, 2 (1991), p 53.

religious knowledge or to be clergymen in mosques. However, the results of the survey indicated that the private madrasas were growing rapidly in southern Xinjiang. In 1979, there were only 5 private madrasas in Yecheng County, and Talips (Muslim students in private madrasas) numbered 150. In 1989, private madrasas had increased to 33, and Talips had increased to 722. According to the survey carried out in a primary school of Jiashi County, 61 percent of school children were studying the Koran in private madrasas in 1990,<sup>8</sup> and this situation has become even more serious in recent years. The following shows that believers are no longer largely of venerable age, but are young educated students (see Table 4.1).

**Table 4.1: The Situation of School Students Who were Involved in Religious Activities in Yinjisha, Yecheng and Luopu Counties in southern Xinjiang in 1990**

Survey Areas	Total number of students	Pray once a day	Pray five times a day	Pray on Friday	Fast on Ramada	Go to private madrasas
Yinjisha	5700	996	113	249	964	140
Yecheng	10358	851	171	/	3644	178
Luopu	22477	877	162	404	177	900
<b>Total</b>	<b>38535</b>	<b>2724</b>	<b>446</b>	<b>653</b>	<b>3785</b>	<b>1218</b>

Source from Sang Rong, 'nanjiang diqu qingshaonian xinjiao qingkuang diaocha fenxi', Xinjiang shehui kexue yanjiu, 2 (1991), p. 48.

In the past few years, rapidly growing private madrasas in southern Xinjiang have attracted large numbers of young Talips, not only within the region but also from other provinces, such as Gansu and Ningxia. After graduation, they went back to their hometowns and established more private madrasas. Some religious extremists used the private madrasas as the bases, not only for disseminating the Islamic doctrines and

<sup>8</sup> Liu Zhongkang, pp. 11-15.

cultivating Talips but also for training Muslim separatists.<sup>9</sup> The 'Baren Incident' was the best example of a large number of Muslim separatists involved in this bloody-riot, being Talips or clergymen from different mosques. Since the 1980s, the number of young Muslims going abroad to study the Koran has also increased. In the Kashgar and Khotan districts, more than 190 young Muslims applied to study the Koran abroad between 1986 and 1990.<sup>10</sup>

For the last ten years, another trend has become very serious, that of the issue of Communist Party members believing in religion. There is considerable evidence that since 1980, many Communist Party members and government officials were condoning or even promoting Islam, especially the lower rank officials in the countryside.<sup>11</sup> In the southern Xinjiang villages, Party members believing in religion numbered about 50-70 percent, and in some areas, reached 100 percent. According to the investigation in the Khotan areas in 1990, of the total 1432 Uighur party members in the town, about 670 of them (47 per cent) were involved in religious activities. Another example is that there were 5299 Party members in the countryside of Moyu County, about 4413 of them (83 per cent) being involved in religious activities. In some villages, 100 percent of the Party members prayed in the mosques. Currently, in Xinjiang, Ahong and Imam are the most powerful members in their community, more influential than the government cadres are. In some towns or villages, if the local government wants a policy implemented, for example, birth control, it must get the support of the local Islamic clergymen. Sometimes, the religious clergymen arbitrated

---

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p.12.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p.13.

the legal matters among Muslims for shortage of law courts. There is absolutely no guarantee that Islamic law will not exercise a powerful influence in their judgments.<sup>12</sup>

Involvement of Communist Party members in religious activities, government support of mosque reconstruction, and establishment of good relations with the conservative Islamic countries, have been interpreted by Muslims as the Communist Party's encouragement of religion. This situation in Xinjiang has led the government to realize that a revival of Islam among Muslims has reached the point of fundamentalist 'fanaticism'. This trend could threaten the stability of Xinjiang and intensify the tension between the sense of ethnic identities and the integration of China. Muslims feelings and expression of dependence is much stronger than any other ethnic groups in Xinjiang. Because of its wide social functions in the minority areas, religion has become a sensitive issue, which if not handled properly will escalate into a national and political issue. However, from long experience, it can be concluded that the Chinese government will continue to impose restrictive practices on religious activities, by any measures if necessary, in order to maintain the social stability in Xinjiang.

### **Population Policies and Practices in Xinjiang**

In addition to the religious issue, population is another important aspect that is influencing the sentiment of Muslims and the stability of Xinjiang. Muslim

---

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

representatives believe that the demographic change in Xinjiang provides another source of conflict.<sup>13</sup> Muslims have always complained that the large growing population of the Han nationality is one of the causes of conflict, restricting the development of the minority population and the regional economy. They are strongly against the population policies of the Chinese government towards minorities. They are very much concerned with the steady flow of Chinese Han settlers into Xinjiang, where the Turkic Muslims are faced with the danger of becoming a small minority and losing their identity in the future.<sup>14</sup> However, presenting the opposite view, a government leader said: “The problem of restricting the development of minority population has never existed in Xinjiang. The population policy in minority areas has given great benefit to the economic development of Xinjiang”.<sup>15</sup>

### **Population Trends in Xinjiang**

Since 1949, the trend of rapid growth of the population in Xinjiang can be attributed to two sources. One is the influx of the Han population; and the other is the high birth rate of ethnic minorities. From 1953 to 1990, minorities (mostly Muslim) fell from 93 percent of Xinjiang's population to 62.4 percent, mainly because of the influx of Han settlers raising their proportion of the population of Xinjiang. Between 1964 and 1982, the Han population more than doubled (see Table 4.2 and 4.3).

---

<sup>13</sup> Y. Shichor, p. 76.

<sup>14</sup> E. Alptekin, p. 163.

<sup>15</sup> Wang Enmao, p.47.

**Table 4.2: National Minorities in China and Xinjiang 1953-1990**

<b>Census</b>	<b>1953</b>	<b>1964</b>	<b>1982</b>	<b>1990</b>
<b>Minorities: PRC</b>	25,032,085	39,923,718	67,038,983	91,155,483
<b>Population: Xinjiang</b>	4,783,454	7,270,238	13,080,971	15,155,778
<b>Chinese: Xinjiang</b>	331,972	2,321,387	5,283,404	5,695,626
<b>Minorities: Xinjiang</b>	4,451,482	4,948,851	7,797,567	9,460,152
<b>Minorities Share in Xinjiang</b>	93.06%	68.07%	59.61%	62.42%
<b>Minorities Share in PRC</b>	12.71%	12.40%	11.63%	10.38%

Sources from Zhongguo Minzu Tongji 1949-1990, pp. 43-44

**Table 4.3: Muslim Minorities in China 1953-1990: Demographic Change**

<b>Census</b>	<b>1953</b>	<b>1964</b>	<b>1982</b>	<b>1990</b>
<b>Minority: Hui</b>	3,559,350	4,488,015	7,227,002	8,602,978
<b>Uighur</b>	3,640,125	4,000,402	5,962,814	7,214,431
<b>Kazak</b>	509,375	491,867	908,414	1,111,718
<b>Dongxiang</b>	155,761	147,460	279,397	373,872
<b>Kirghiz</b>	70,944	70,175	113,999	149,549
<b>Salar</b>	30,658	34,680	69,102	87,697
<b>Tajik</b>	14,462	16,236	26,503	33,538
<b>Uzbek</b>	13,626	7,717	12,453	14,502
<b>Bonan</b>	4,957	5,125	9,027	12,212
<b>Tatar</b>	6,929	2,294	4,127	4,873
<b>Total</b>	8,006,187	9,263,971	14,612,858	17,605,370

Sources from Zhongguo Minzu Tongji 1949-1990, pp. 41-42.

These tables have also shown that the ethnic minority population is growing more rapidly than the Han population, in particular in the countryside. This is mainly because the birth rates among Muslim minorities are much higher than other nationalities. The 1988 statistics showed that Xinjiang was the region with the highest birth rate in China, having an average of 27.3 births per thousand people, compared with Ningxia's 25.1 per thousand and Guangxi's 24.4 per thousand.<sup>16</sup> The Xinjiang region also rated highest for allowing two or more children, the percentage for Xinjiang being 45.2 percent. However, in relatively well developed provinces and cities, the birthrate was very low, for instance, Beijing was only 1.9 percent, Liaoning was 1.4 percent and Shanghai was zero.<sup>17</sup> It is said that if the minorities continue to have an average of 2.5 children in the cities and 3.5 children in the countryside, the minority population could increase to 11.3 million in Xinjiang by the year 2000, but the Han population would remain at 6.6 million.<sup>18</sup> This calculation has shown that minority populations, in some cases, are becoming numerical majorities in their own regions, and that the minorities are beginning to catch up with their higher birth rates.

### **Migration Policies in Xinjiang**

Migration has always been considered as one of the effective measures for dealing with the ethnic issue and developing the regional economy by the Chinese government since ancient times. As far as the present government is concerned, there are at least three significant reasons for internal migration. Firstly, it is necessary to open up and

---

<sup>16</sup> *Zhongguo tongji nianjian*, Beijing, 1988, p. 99.

<sup>17</sup> *Jingji cankao*, December 24, 1988.

<sup>18</sup> *Renkou Yanjiu*, Beijing, 1 (1987), p. 38

exploit sufficiently the rich natural resources in Xinjiang with the help of Han migration from inland China, because the local population is not strong enough to handle it alone. Han specialists and skilled workers among the migrants would work together to develop the raw material resources of the region, make the land tillable, and build industry, to develop the economies of the region. Secondly, shifting the growing Han population from densely populated areas to sparsely populated Xinjiang would relieve some of the burden on the state and be mutually beneficial. Thirdly, migrations have played an important role in military security along the Xinjiang borders and facilitate the integration of minorities and their regions into the Chinese mainstream.<sup>19</sup>

As soon as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to Xinjiang in 1949, the initial large-scale immigration project started. The first migration wave was Guomintang troops and their families who were left by the Guomintang government after being defeated by the military of the CCP. Then there were the communist armies which came to Xinjiang for provide regional safety against threats. From the 1960s to the 1970s, urban youngsters and skilled workers came to Xinjiang from inland to engage in local economic activities, in particular in the countryside in the name of *Zhiyuan Bianjiang* (supporting the frontier areas). Since the start of the economic reform in 1979, tens of thousands of Han impoverished peasants from flood-ridden and densely populated and surplus-labor area have been transferred to Xinjiang. Ethnic minorities

---

<sup>19</sup> Ba Dai, 'Xinjiang de fazhan fanrong libukai guojia he xiongdi shengqu de zhiyuan', *Xinjiang Ribao*, 4 March 1990.

complain that although the local economy has developed the demographic balance has been changed at the expense of ethnic minorities.<sup>20</sup>

With regard to the Han immigrants, the newcomers faced innumerable difficulties. They volunteered or were forced to leave their homes. They had to face harsh climatic conditions, different languages and habits, physical hardships of poor living conditions, and poor logistical and transport situations. Most of the Han immigrants have never regarded Xinjiang as their hometown, although they may have stayed or lived in the region for over thirty years. They tried hard to find ways to return to their hometown, but only some of them were successful through their children finding jobs in the inland of China. The central government attempted to halt this kind of return, thereby aggravating another problem, which is that those who managed to return to their hometowns left a vacuum that the local people were not be able to fill, so that those who remained became even more frustrated.<sup>21</sup>

The local ethnic minority people regarded Han immigrants as a great challenge and threat to their traditional culture and economy. Population growth and unlimited expanding of the areas under cultivation had caused great environmental disasters. Due to the high unemployment, the influx of impoverished peasants and prisoners has increased the social and public instability in Xinjiang. Some of the new migrants were contemptuous of the religious and cultural customs of the local minorities and were disrespectful of the minority people. For these reasons, ethnic minority representatives are demanding that such immigrations should be stopped and that the Han Chinese

---

<sup>20</sup> Y. Schichor, p. 77.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

should leave the region. In regard to this issue, Heberer concluded: “The tensions between nationalities in Xinjiang are the natural consequence of this immigration policy”.<sup>22</sup>

### **Family Planning in Xinjiang**

Since 1949, ethnic minorities in Xinjiang have been exempt from family planning. Ethnic minorities in remote areas are quite casual in their observance of official regulations. Even in the cities, where the authorities have greater means of social control, the minority birth rate is declining slowly. For example, in 1983 in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, 94.5 percent of the Han adhered to the family planning policy, but only 36.3 percent of Hui Muslims did. In other cities of the region, 42.4 percent of the Kazaks and 36.2 percent of the Uighurs had more than three children, while 14.7 percent of the Uighurs had more than five children.<sup>23</sup> According to official statistics in 1986, 99.7 percent of the Han adhered to family planning policies in Xinjiang, but only 66 percent of ethnic minorities did.<sup>24</sup>

Until October 1985, the Communist Party Committee of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region stipulated that minority married couples living in cities could have two children, and that those living in the countryside could have three or, in exceptional cases, four children. In April 1988, the Xinjiang government issued the *Temporary Provisions for Minority Birth Control in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region*. In July

---

<sup>22</sup> T. Heberer, p.98.

<sup>23</sup> *Renkou Yanjiu*, 1 (1987), p. 37.

<sup>24</sup> *Renmin Ribao*, May 3, 1987.

1992, a new regulation of *Family Planning Measures of Xinjiang Autonomous Region* was put into effect to replace all previous regulations. It had set out very detailed policies about Han and minority family planning. However, these regulations were never implemented completely among the minorities, because the faithful Muslims regard their children as a 'blessing of Allah' and reject family planning on religious grounds. They think that the family planning program is an attempt to assimilate ethnic groups. In Xinjiang, support from Muslims for family planning programs is weaker and opposition is stronger than in any other minority area in China. In order to implement this policy, the Chinese government needs to get support from the local Muslim communities, especially from clergymen. They were encouraged to locate a powerful basis from Islamic traditional culture, such as 'few children would bring prosperity, but many would be a factor leading to poverty'.<sup>25</sup> In addition, some government supported religious leaders even proclaimed publicly that family planning does not go against the Koran and it is also practiced in the other Muslim countries.<sup>26</sup>

Based on the analysis above, the Chinese population policies in Xinjiang are clearly outlined. Xinjiang is the most important raw material base in China. China's rapid economic development relies on the expansion of these rich resources in Xinjiang. Nevertheless, Xinjiang's economic development also needs support and help from immigrants. For security reasons, Xinjiang also needs immigrants to help in the defense of sparsely populated border areas. Perhaps, the most important reason for migration is in the political aspect. Chinese officials described the migration project as

---

<sup>25</sup> Liu Jinglong, 'Cong konzhi renkou yundong kan Yisilan jiao shehuiguan de yanjin', in *Zhongguo Yisilan jiao yanjiu wenji*, Ninxia Renmin chubanshe, Yinchuan, 1988, pp. 427-29.

<sup>26</sup> Zhang Tianlu, 'Zhongguo de zongjiao yu shaoshu minzu renkou zaishengchan', *Zhongyang minzu xuanyuan xuebao*, 1 (1990), p.17.

to 'mix sand' into the ethnic minorities, which could condition each other between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities. No matter what the reason, those ambitious resettlement projects are expected to be part of Chinese population policies towards minorities at present and in the future. The implementation of family planning policies is also facing many difficulties and challenges among ethnic groups. Now the Chinese government is in a dilemma. Respect for minority autonomy would go against the interests of population policy, and certainly against the interests of the development of the country. How to deal with this problem is of crucial importance for the stability of Xinjiang and the relationship between ethnic groups and the Han.

### **Minorities and Education**

Education is important for its function of raising future generations. For this reason, the Chinese government has paid much attention to it, in particular to national education in minority areas. The Chinese official media always emphasizes that a certain level of education among the minorities is a symbol of social progress and modernization. It also has a strong function as an agent influencing the integration of China. In this important respect, education has become the competitive front between the CCP and the Muslim separatist forces for winning the young generation.<sup>27</sup>

Muslim separatists in Xinjiang and their representatives outside China have always suspected that China is attempting to Sinicize Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang through

---

<sup>27</sup> Sakda Dongsheng, 'Yao qieshi zhongshi dui qingshaonian jinxing fandui minzu fenlie zhuyi de jiaoyu', *Xinjiang shehui jingji*, 4 (1992), p. 92.

education. They blamed the Chinese government for using Chinese textbooks and the Chinese language in tertiary education, causing Muslims to lose their tradition and national identity. Furthermore, they criticized the Chinese government for being responsible for the lower entrance of Muslim graduates from senior high schools to tertiary education because of poor facilities, unqualified teachers and less money compared with Chinese schools.<sup>28</sup>

However, the Chinese government insisted that the situation of minority education has changed dramatically since 1949. Official figures showed that illiteracy among the population in Xinjiang were over 90 percent before 1949. Only a few rich people were able to get an education. At least the Chinese State education system has been successful in guaranteeing the education rights of the majority of people. With the preferential policies towards minority students and subsidies for minority education, the Xinjiang government promised that students of different nationalities could enjoy quality study and conditions.<sup>29</sup> The following gives an overview of the changes in minority education situation in Xinjiang.

For centuries, Xinjiang Muslims received primary education usually at mosques, where Koranic schools were opened, or at private religious schools (madrasas). Children spent their early years in studying Koran and Arabic languages and then went to higher schools to study Islamic literature, philosophy and theology. Since 1949, the influence of religious schools has weakened fundamentally mainly because

---

<sup>28</sup> E. Alptekin, p. 164.

<sup>29</sup> Chen Shengyuan, 'Gezu renmin chongfen xiangyou shoujiaoyu de quanli', *Xinjiang Ribao*, 29 November 1991.

the CCP has succeeded in establishing its state education system. Since the 1980s, modern education has been significantly expanded in minority areas, and official policies have given high priority to the development of minority education.

### **Policies on Minority Education from the 1980s**

In 1981, in accordance with the principles of autonomy and with the confirmation of the Ministry of Education and the State Nationalities Affairs Commission, ethnic minorities were allowed to use their own languages in education. At the same time, the Chinese government allocated some funds for minority schools and teacher training programs for minorities.<sup>30</sup> In 1985, the CCP Central Committee announced a series of major educational reform policies, the main part being the introduction of universal nine-year education. In 1986, the National People's Congress adopted the *Law of the PRC on Compulsory Education*, which guarantees the nine years' compulsory education universal in the cities and developed areas by 1990 and almost everywhere in the country by the end of the century.<sup>31</sup> Although these policies were national ones, not directly referring to minorities, they were applied to minorities as well as to the Han.

Regarding minority education in Xinjiang, one special policy in terms of autonomy is to establish 'nationality schools' and 'nationality classes' in high residential minority areas. Generally, students of these schools or classes are mainly or entirely one

---

<sup>30</sup> *Chronology of Nationalities Work in Contemporary China Editorial Department, 1949-1988*, Minzu chubanshe, Beijing, 1990, p.173.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p.176.

nationality and students are taught in their own languages. For example, Uighurs, Kazaks, Uzbeks, Mongols and others have their own schools. In the Uighur school, all lectures and teaching materials are in the Uighur language, but in those for Han or Hui children, they are in Chinese. For special needs, the Xinjiang government has also established 'tent schools' or 'mobile classrooms' in the fields or more permanent locations for children of minority herdsmen. Teachers in local communities move with the herdsmen to give the children an elementary education.<sup>32</sup>

Minority students also constitute a high proportion of the total enrolments of students at various levels of school and in universities. In 1990, minority students of primary school accounted for 68.3 percent in the region. At middle school level, students of minority nationalities dropped to 44.9 percent, but at the secondary schools, minority students accounted for 51.9 percent of the total students. Approximately 56.4 percent of all students attending higher education (universities and colleges) in the region were minority students.<sup>33</sup> This figure was equal to the percentage of minorities in the total population of Xinjiang. In recent years, the number of minority students enrolled at various levels of education institutions remains very high. The following figures reflect the situation of minority education in Xinjiang in the past few years (see Table 4.4 and 4.5).

---

<sup>32</sup> Chen Dajun, p. 156.

<sup>33</sup> Chen Shengyuan, *Xinjiang Ribao*, 29 November 1991.

**Table 4.4: Minority Students at Various Education Levels in Xinjiang**

(0'000)

Year	University	Upper secondary school	Lower secondary school	Vocational school	Technical school	High school	Middle school	Primary school
1993	21045	409016	31696	18094	14842	74171	344384	147.54
1994	23166	437432	32671	16299	17452	53103	371123	151.76
1995	24125	477379	33264	20013	16040	52570	408062	157.84
1996	24064	538467	36928	22997	15464	60430	463078	163.04

Sources from *Xinjiang nianjian of 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996*, Xinjiang Renmin chubanshe, Urumqi

**Table 4.5: Students at Various Education Levels in Xinjiang**

(0'000)

Year	University	Upper secondary school	Lower secondary school	Vocational school	Technical school	High school	Middle school	Primary school
1993	39422	884083	63314	58509	43653	166203	718607	203.94
1994	43687	892041	73922	50894	43629	137870	723516	210.59
1995	44918	912597	68586	54122	40101	141330	749788	230.13
1996	44303	967253	72782	51952	38663	149937	803856	230.18

Sources from *Xinjiang nianjian of 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996*, Xinjiang Renmin chubanshe, Urumqi.

In minority areas, what languages are to be used in minority education remains a sensitive issue. In Xinjiang, this was obviously the case, because language is directly related to ethnic identity and traditional culture. For this reason, China's 1984 *Law on Nationalities* states that in schools where most students are from the minority nationalities, the schools "ought to use textbooks in the relevant minority language and use that minority language as the medium of instruction".<sup>34</sup> According to the official report, in primary and middle schools, six different languages-Uighur,

<sup>34</sup> *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo falu huibian, 1979-1984*, Renmin chubanshe, Beijing, 1985, p. 548.

Hanyu (Chinese), Kazak, Mongol, Xibe, and Kirghiz-are used for teaching and for textbooks at different nationality schools. Most of the textbooks were translations of Hanyu textbooks stipulated by the State Education Commission, and some were prepared locally. The exception was the few schools with mixed nationalities, where they had to teach in more than one language.<sup>35</sup>

The highest institution for minority students of China is the Central Nationalities University in Beijing, where Muslims and other nationalities are trained to become cadres and administrators in the ethnic minority areas. For some ethnic minorities such as the Uighur and Kazak, who are keen to preserve their own culture and arts, Xinjiang University and the Institute of Arts provides special courses and research programs on teaching and researching the literature, arts and culture of the relevant nationalities.

Together with the education reform in China, the traditional culture of minority nationalities has been improved and ethnic minority literature and arts have become more and more prosperous since the early 1980s. In Xinjiang, the Latin alphabet, which was modified to fit Chinese phonology, has been withdrawn and replaced by the Uighur alphabet based on the Arabic script. Then the Association of Central Asian Cultural Studies was established. Another two associations for studying Turkic Languages and Ancient Turkic Inscriptions followed in 1980. Recently, Chinese-Uighur, Chinese-Kazak, Kazak-Chinese, and Uighur-Chinese dictionaries have been published. A great lexicon of Muhammad Kashgari written in Turkic dialects has

---

<sup>35</sup> Chen Dajun, p. 157.

been published in the modern Uighur language. The famous work of Yusuf Has Hajip, *Kutat-Ku Bilik* (The Knowledge that Leads to Happiness), has also been published in modern Uighur language and in Chinese.<sup>36</sup>

From the above examples, it can be seen that minority students are given greater advantages in education than are Han students. Furthermore, minority students are also entitled to enjoy some special preferential policies. For instance, the entry score to the tertiary institute for minority students is lower than that for Han students, usually 100 points lower than the average score of Han students. Members of ethnic minorities are given priority in admission to institutions for higher education, employment and promotion.<sup>37</sup> In the pastoral areas where Tajiks, Kirghizes, Mongols and Kazaks are living, the government established key primary schools providing minority students with free food, clothing, accommodation and study materials.<sup>38</sup> In some areas, minority students are given a special subsidy by the state and enjoy the services of higher quality teachers and better equipment. The subsidies are designed as a kind of affirmative action in support of minorities.<sup>39</sup> There is no doubt that the Xinjiang government is trying to extend basic education to most of the regional population and to introduce special ameliorative measures for improvements in minority education. However, on the other hand, these policies lead to great inequity with regard to the Han and other nationalities, which could generate dissatisfaction among the ethnic groups and enhance their grievances against each other.

---

<sup>36</sup> *Xinjiang Ribao*, April 5, 1993.

<sup>37</sup> Chen Dajun, p.40.

<sup>38</sup> Chen Shengyuan, 1991.

<sup>39</sup> A.D.Barnett, *China's Far West: Four Decades of Change*, Westview Press, 1993, p. 607.

## **Education and Religion in Xinjiang in the 1980s and 1990s**

Since 1949, the old education system, which was dominated by religious organizations and their clergies, has been replaced by the secular state educational system. According to the policies of the CCP, both religious education systems and the ideological base that gave them power and influence must be destroyed. Religious activities were allowed only to the extent stipulated by China's Constitutions, laws and policies, and cannot be used by clergymen to meddle unduly in education. This clearly shows that any kind of religious instruction is allowed in either the state education system or the private religious schools (madrasas) attached to mosques, except in theological colleges that have the special function of training imams sponsored by the government.

In other ethnic minority areas of China, the policy that religion must not interfere in the state education system, was implemented reasonably easily, but not in Xinjiang. For example, in the Kashgar district, the number of mosques increased from 5000 to 9190 within ten years, but the number of schools decreased from 1826 to 1438 in the same period. In Shule County, 11 mosques surrounded each school. About 20 percent of minority students in the high schools of this county went to private madrasas frequently. Nevertheless, among 1925 school-teachers and administrators in Yingjisha County, nearly 50 percent were involved in religious activities.<sup>40</sup> Religious doctrine is a big challenge to the state education system, playing an important role in youth education. The demonstrations and riots in favor of Xinjiang's independence, which

---

<sup>40</sup> Kutruk Yiming, 'Jiaqiang wushenlun jiaoyu shi dangqian keburonghuan de renwu', *Xinjiang Shehui Kexue*, 2 (1991), p.30.

took place from the 1980s to the 1990s, have shown that young minority students and intellectuals are a source of potential instability. Government officials have called for the strengthening of anti-separatist education for youth in order to develop a 'patriotic spirit'. It has been also stressed that education is the most important front between communists and separatists in fighting for the next generation.<sup>41</sup>

The governments of autonomous regions have realized the danger of religious activities incorporated in the minority education, especially in the countryside. Even in the late 1980s, many Muslims were unconvinced by the value of state school education because of the deep influence of Islamic education. Chinese authorities had also realized that the "Ethnic identities, which have reasserted their influence along with religion in the 1980s, are inimical to their own education system and to Chinese nation cohesion".<sup>42</sup> It is not only now that the religious question exercises an impact on the development of Xinjiang's education, but also it seems likely to continue to have a strong influence into the future.

### **Minority Political Status**

Since the establishment of new China in 1949, the 10 Islam-dominated Chinese national minorities have witnessed fundamental changes in their political status and economic strength. The proportion of Deputies of these ethnic groups in national and local people's congresses and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference

---

<sup>41</sup> Sakda Dongsheng, 1992, p.92.

<sup>42</sup> C. Mackerras, 1995, p.152.

(CPPCC) Committees exceeds that of their population representation in China. For instance, they have 97 Deputies to the session of the National People's Congress, accounting for 3.3 percent of the total, and hold 57 seats in the current CPPCC National Committee, making up 2.8 percent, while their population accounts for only 1.5 percent of the national total.<sup>43</sup>

The Chinese government implements a policy of regional autonomy in areas where people of minority nationalities live in compact communities. Article 114 of the Chinese Constitution states that "The chairman of an autonomous region, the prefect of an autonomous prefecture or the head of an autonomous county shall be a citizen of the nationality exercising regional autonomy in the area concerned".<sup>44</sup> In addition, the government pays great attention to cultivating cadres among the 10 ethnic groups and more cadres of minority nationalities now hold leading positions in government departments and various organizations.

One sensitive issue is about the political leadership in the higher rank of Xinjiang officials. The Muslim leader claimed that the Chinese have monopolized not only official ranks of authority and influence, but also 90 percent of positions in all walks of life in Xinjiang.<sup>45</sup> Real power, political and especially military, has always rested in the hands of Han Chinese, which is another source of ethnic conflict.<sup>46</sup>

---

<sup>43</sup> Xiong Sihao, 'Islam in China', Beijing Review, June 12-18, 1995, p. 10.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> E. Alptekin, p.164.

<sup>46</sup> Y. Shichor, p.76.

Yet, all of this type of statistics in Xinjiang's official publications clearly indicated that members of minority groups were playing a much larger role than in the past in both leadership and enterprises, and that they had risen steadily also in the intellectually scientific elite of the region. For example, in 1988, 15 members in the Party Standing Committee, 8 members in the government departments and 6 secretaries and deputy secretaries in the regional CCP committee were ethnic minority persons. The secretary of the Communist Party was Han, and the other 5 deputies included 2 Han Chinese, 2 Uighurs, and 1 Kazak. Of the 9 other members of the Standing Committee, 6 were Han, 2 were Uighurs, and 1 was Mongol.<sup>47</sup> Of the 7 chairmen and vice-chairmen of the Xinjiang People's Government, the Chairman was a Uighur, and the other 6 deputies included 3 Han, 2 Uighurs, and 1 Kazak. The secretary-general was a Uighur.<sup>48</sup> Among the leaders of the Xinjiang People's Congress, the Chairman and 8 of the 12 deputy chairmen were of minority ethnic origin. Among the 50 members of the People's Congress Standing Committee, more than half of them (55 percent) belonged to ethnic minority groups.<sup>49</sup>

There is also a large representation of minority groups in the local Communist Party and government apparatus and in the leadership at lower levels. For instance, at both the regional and prefectural levels, more than 41 percent of the unit heads within the apparatus were minority cadres. In autonomous counties, 53 percent of all cadres were said to be the members of minority groups.<sup>50</sup> In the whole region, the total number of minority people who were 'state cadres' (guojia ganbu) had reached to 258,000 in

---

<sup>47</sup> *Xinjiang nianjian*, Xinjiang Renmin chubanshe, Urumqi, 1988, p. 20.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>50</sup> A.D.Barnett, p. 377.

1992, that was 86 times the number of minority people who held any sort of official position in Xinjiang before 1949. Minority cadres who were working in the enterprises consisted of 73.8 percent of the total cadres, and the total number of minority 'scientific and technical personnel' had risen to 160,000.<sup>51</sup>

Concerning this situation, it can be confirmed that "The Uighurs in high positions are by no means mere figureheads now; they do have real influence; actually, some Han Chinese increasingly complain about the discrimination in favor of minorities".<sup>52</sup>

### **Natural Resources and Economic Development Issue in Xinjiang**

The issue of natural resources and economic development was also a cause of ethnic tension in minority areas. This is because most of the minority regions are among the poorest and undeveloped regions in China, primarily for historical reasons. They inhabit 50-60 percent of Chinese territory, mainly the outlying and border regions, which are as important for their rich deposits of raw materials as they are for defense. For this reason, the ownership of nature resources and unbalanced economic development became the key issue causing instability in the minority areas.

Since the 1980s, when the Chinese government adopted the open and economic reform policy, the autonomous regions have taken advantage by making their own decisions about local development and exploitation of their resources, which were to

---

<sup>51</sup> *Xinjiang Ribao*, 15 September 1993.

<sup>52</sup> A.D.Barnett, p. 377.

be used to benefit the local people. The central government is currently making an effort to develop the minority regions and these areas have benefited from the general economic boom of the last few years. For instance, in 1986 the state allocated 8.5 billion yuan for the development of minority economies. Despite this, in 1988, 29 percent of the minority population still did not have enough food and clothing,<sup>53</sup> and about 25 percent of the ethnic minorities were earning less than a living wage.<sup>54</sup> While the minorities desire progress and modernization, at the same time they are apprehensive and fear that the result of such progress could be the loss of their national and cultural identities.

Xinjiang has seen demonstrations against the population influx and ecological destruction by factories or individuals from the Han regions during the last few years. One of the underlying reasons for tension in Xinjiang is the feeling among the local ethnic minority people that the region is economically exploited, and neglected by Beijing. They insist that Beijing monopolized Xinjiang's oil, coal, aluminum, wool and cotton without adequate compensation to the local people. Xinjiang's development is much behind in contrast to southern and eastern provinces. Under Beijing's economic supervision, Xinjiang has no choice about its economic plan and its budget, but had to listen to the central government.<sup>55</sup>

Yet an official stated that "Xinjiang's resources are owned by the state and the people throughout the country, not by a certain region nor by a certain nationality."<sup>56</sup> Beijing

---

<sup>53</sup> *Renmin Ribao*, September 9, 1988.

<sup>54</sup> *Guangxi shehui kexue*, 3 (1988), p. 7.

<sup>55</sup> Y. Shichor, 1994, p. 78.

<sup>56</sup> 'Kaifa Xinjiang ziyuan zaofu gezu renmin', *Xinjiang guangbo dianshibao*, 22 May 1990.

maintained that the central government had provided Xinjiang with financial subsidies totaling 24.6 billion yuan between 1953 and 1988 to improve the people's living standard, and had invested heavily in Xinjiang's resources.<sup>57</sup> In the 1980s, nearly 10 trading ports along the Xinjiang borders were reopened and border trade with Soviet Union and Mongolia was recovered after twenty years' interruption. By 1989, the total volume of Xinjiang's import and export trade with the Soviet Union reached 118.5 million Yuan.<sup>58</sup> The Karakorum Highway was opened, which made it easier to access Pakistan and Afghanistan. In 1984, the first Muslim stock company in China was founded in Urumqi. Supported by the Urumqi Islamic Association, its main business was to accept funds from both domestic and foreign Muslim sources for the benefit of Muslim enterprises. Several new oil fields were discovered in the last half of the 1980s both in the south and east part of Xinjiang, which made Xinjiang one of the richest petroleum areas in China. Several foreign oil companies made exploration trips and developed co-operation with Xinjiang's oil companies. Private and township enterprises have flourished in the minority areas, just like everywhere else in China. Indeed, since 1979 with the period of reform, there have been dramatic developments in Xinjiang's foreign economic relations, border trade, and the regional economies.

The future status of Xinjiang has already been planned by the central government. Xinjiang will become one of China's most important developmental bases in the next century, but for the rest of this century it will continue to support developmental programs in the economically more advanced areas of China. Xinjiang is strategically

---

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Shen Bingnian, "Xinjiang yu zhongya guojia jingmao guanxi zhong de wengti ji duice", *Zhongya Yianjou* 1 (1993), p. 105.

important in terms of national defense, is rich in natural materials, and could provide for the whole country's development.<sup>59</sup> All of this potential, however, is linked directly to the question of ethnic unity. If the Chinese government is unable to guarantee self-determination regarding minorities' economic development, while at the same time allowing them to preserve their cultural identity, national conflicts will become more acute as time goes on.

## **Conclusion**

Several domestic reasons that caused ethnic conflicts in Xinjiang since the 1980s have been discussed. For Chinese Muslims, the most important feature of the post-1979 reforms associated with Deng Xiaoping is that the social environment in China has been changed. Muslims have been allowed to rebuild mosques and national identities that had been torn down, to speak freely and to develop their economic power without jeopardizing the Communist Party's domination over the frontier regions. It is in Beijing's best interest to be tolerant of minorities and their religion because it wants to re-establish a reputation for respecting minority religious belief and traditional customs following the period of the Great Culture Revolution. These changes have brought direct material benefits for the Muslim community in Xinjiang and convince foreign Muslim states that China is a fit custodian of its Muslim population.

---

<sup>59</sup> *XHNA*, Urumqi, 20 May 1983, in *SWB/FE*, No. 7341, BII, pp. 1-5; *XHNA*, Urumqi, 1 September 1983, in *SWB/FE*, No. 7342.

It has been shown that religious activities have run rampant in the minority areas under the protection of China's new policies towards minority and religious beliefs since the 1980s. There is no evidence to show that Han Chinese and other nationalities would assimilate Muslim minorities by increasing the number of migrants. By contrast, the minority population is growing faster than ever before. The new state education system and the preferential policies provided minority children with the chance of getting a better level of education than previously. Muslims are able to enjoy more benefits in religion, education, promotion, family planning and economic support than any other nationalities in China.

The Chinese government maintains the stability and development by using the relaxation policy in religious and national affairs, and in promoting of economic prosperity for all sectors. However, there were two consequences of the implementation of these preferential policies. On the one hand, Muslim extremists were encouraged to ask for more autonomy and self-independence instead of feeling grateful for the government policies. On the other hand, other ethnic groups, including the Han, were dissatisfied with these preferential policies which made them feel unequal and discriminated against in Xinjiang. Thus, the Xinjiang government has put itself in a very difficult position: soft policies will stimulate Muslim separatists' further demands from authority; and tough policies to curb the growth of the independence movement in Xinjiang will exacerbate Muslim unrest.

There is urgent need for the Chinese government to find out what is the best way to calm the grievance of Muslims but also to satisfy the CCP and local government. No matter what the method is, what can not be changed is that Xinjiang will not be

allowed to separate from China and any Muslim activities should not be a threat to the inter-ethnic harmony in Xinjiang or to the future integrity of China.

## **Chapter 5**

### **External Factors**

#### **Introduction**

From a historical viewpoint, it can be seen that most of Xinjiang's unrest has its sources not only inside but also outside China. The Chinese government generally believes that the main threat comes from outside China and that it has some kind of association with the West, particularly with the Soviet Union. For example, in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Russia and Britain were condemned for involving and supporting Xinjiang Muslim rebellion. After the revolution, Moscow continued to support Xinjiang local nationalists to establish 'Eastern Turkestan Republics' in the 1930s and 1940s by cultivating spies and stirring up unrest. In the 1960s, the Sino-Soviet conflict became very serious after the two Communist Parties' relationship collapsed. China blamed Moscow for instigating the Yili riots, which directly encouraged the exodus of 60,000 Muslim Chinese from Xinjiang into Soviet Central Asia.

In the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, the whole international situation has changed. A trend towards the emergence of small independent sovereign states became a fashion around the world. The collapse of the Soviet Union redrafted the geographic, ethnic and political map of the region. Independent Muslim states appeared on China's western frontier that becoming another possible threat to the stability of Xinjiang.

Furthermore, the reverberations of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and Islamic fundamentalist movements in Islamic countries started to penetrate Xinjiang. This

provided another factor that increased Chinese Communists' anxieties about nationalist unrest, Muslim separatist activities and Pan-Islamic tendencies in Xinjiang. The creation of 'Turkicunion', which included wide areas of Xinjiang and had been proposed by Turkey and the Central Asian Republics, also became a factor in ideas of seceding Xinjiang from China in terms of Pan-Turkism identity.

### **Collapse of Soviet Union and Emergence of the Central Asian Republics**

The collapse of the Soviet Union has created historic opportunities as well as dangers for the world. On the one hand, the abandonment of Marxism-Leninism and the establishment of political democracy within Russia, Ukraine, and other newly independent states of the former Soviet Union have improved the possibility of global cooperation and the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, acute instability and growing tensions within the new states have also created a serious risk of military clashes within the states and widespread civil war in the heart of Eurasia.<sup>1</sup>

It was very clear that the Soviet collapse forced independence upon Central Asia. Unlike Xinjiang, none of the Central Asian republics experienced large-scale movements for independence before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although there were sporadic expressions of sovereignty and demands for greater control over republican economic and political matters, that did not mean doing away with the Soviet system, but making a change in the inequalities that existed in the centre-periphery relations.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> K.Dawisha and B.Parrott, *Russia and the New States of Eurasia: the Politics of Upheaval*, Cambridge, 1994, p.1.

<sup>2</sup> S.Akbarzadeh, 'Nation-building in Uzbekistan', *Central Asian Survey*, vol.15, 1 (1996), p.23.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the military threat around northwestern China no longer existed; instead, a new threat of Muslim separatism from newly independent Central Asian republics emerged abruptly along the border of Xinjiang. Following the unravelling of the Soviet Union, it is possible that national separatism in Xinjiang was provoked mainly by the adjacent Central Asian republics. China's attitude towards Central Asia republics, as one observer described, has been "primarily defensive to stop instability from spilling over into Chinese Turkestan".<sup>3</sup> China was not immune to such influences, particularly when the unrest in Xinjiang suggested that the forces of instability in the Soviet Union had somehow already leaped over the border. Independence of the Central Asian republics was an attractive example, which encouraged Muslim separatists in Xinjiang to follow indiscriminately.

From the previous discussion about the history of the independence movement of Xinjiang in the past century, it can be seen that any political change occurring on one side of the border could affect the other. This is because the same ethnic group lives on both sides and each side desires independence. Presently, Turkic nationalism and Islamic revivalism have been sweeping through the Soviet Central Asian republics. On the other side, a very similar trend of anti-Han, anti-Chinese sentiment among the Muslim population of Xinjiang, is being expressed both in the form of Islamic fundamentalism and in the form of Muslim nationalism.<sup>4</sup> For instance, Uighur nationalists who fled to Kazakhstan in the early 1960s threatened to launch cross-border operations into Xinjiang on behalf of the 'Front for the Liberation of

---

<sup>3</sup> *Economist*, 26 December 1992.

<sup>4</sup> A. Rashid, 'Islam and Nationalism in Pakistan and Central Asia: An Address', *South Asia*, Vol.XIII, 2 (1995), P. 114.

Uighurstan'.<sup>5</sup> Since the 1980s, several new phenomena emerged in the Central Asian republics, such as 'unity of transnational ethnic groups', 'internationalisation of the issue of the Eastern Turkestan', 'Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism' which appear to be raising the concerns of the Chinese government.

The issue of 'unity of transnational ethnic groups'<sup>6</sup> has been bothering the Chinese government for the past few years. The independence of the Central Asian republics provided a possible chance to make the dream of unity of transnational ethnic groups come true. Following independence, the Kazakhstan government strongly appealed to the one million Kazaks in Xinjiang to join with the transnational Kazaks in Kazakhstan or to be united as a one nation state. More and more Kazak people left Xinjiang to live together with the same ethnic groups in Kazakhstan.<sup>7</sup> It is apparent that the government of Kazakhstan is expected to shift the internal ethnic issue upon China. The president of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayefu, once said: "We are looking forward to seeing Kazaks outside the country back to Kazakhstan and we would provide special policies towards those who want to return to their motherland, in particular Kazaks from neighbouring countries".<sup>8</sup> Kazakhstan's attitude toward ethnic Kazaks outside the country has caused the Chinese government apprehension at the unrest among Kazaks in Xinjiang

Along the northwester frontier of China, two minority areas are becoming hotspots where have attracted great attention from the world: Tibet and Xinjiang. The most

---

<sup>5</sup> J. Becker, 'Separatists Step up Struggle for Motherland', *The Times*, 3 March 1992.

<sup>6</sup> Liu Bin, 'Kuaguo minzu zhuyi—zhongguo yu zhongya guanxi de zhuyao zhangai', *Zhongya Yanjiu*, 2 (1993), p. 95.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Speech of Nazarbayefu on the World Kazaks Congress in 1992, see unpublished internal report, 1993.

worrisome issues for the Chinese government are the unrest among the ethnic groups in the two regions, and the powerful support from the international arena. In recent years, the 'Uighur International League' in Kazakhstan has proposed a motion of internationalisation on the issue of 'Eastern Turkestan'. It aimed to make the issue of Xinjiang's independence (called 'Eastern Turkestan' by nationalists) prominent internationally. Members of this organisation have declared at the first 'Eastern Turkestan International Congress' held in Istanbul in December 1992, that they would like to get international involvement in solving the issue of Eastern Turkestan, which should be considered as having the same importance as the issue of Tibet.<sup>9</sup> At the initial stage of Kazakhstan's independence, more than 300,000 Uighur people who are living in Kazakhstan, asked for autonomy within the state. However, since 1993, Kazakhstan has changed its attitude and claimed that "it is impossible to talk about autonomy of the Uighur within Kazakhstan".<sup>10</sup> One official newspaper in the Uighur language has repeatedly emphasised that the issue of the Uighur is actually the issue of Uighur State, which was known as the issue of Eastern Turkestan in the world media.<sup>11</sup> With the support of the Kazakhstan government, the 'Uighur International League' became the sole representative of the Uighurs in Kazakhstan instead of other organisations, such as 'the Front for the Liberation of Uighurstan' and 'the Eastern Turkestan Committee'. It is said that the 'Uighur International League' had some connections and cooperation with the Dalai Lama, and it will continue to fight for the international recognition as an independent state.<sup>12</sup> Its action gave considerable pressure to the Uighurs in Xinjiang and to the Chinese government.

---

<sup>9</sup> Liu Bin, 1993, p.96.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 95.

<sup>11</sup> Quoted by Liu Bin, Kazakhstan newspaper *The Voice of the Uighur*, from February to April 1993.

<sup>12</sup> Liu Bin, 1993, pp. 95-96.

Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamic movements in the Central Asian republics also have had a significant impact on the national separatism movement in Xinjiang. Pan-Turkism first appeared among the Muslims of Russia early in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, its chief promoter being Crimean Tatar, Ismail Gaspirali (Gaspirinski). The original Pan-Turkism included the same language devised by Gaspirali, Gaspirali's newspaper, and Jadidism (new modern method, reformism). The foundation of Pan-Turkism was Gaspirali's famous saying "unity of language, thought and action of all the Turkish-speaking peoples". However, the Pan-Turkic ideas spread chiefly among the Muslim intellectuals in Russia, without reaching the masses in its early days.<sup>13</sup>

The breakup of the Soviet Union has provided a great opportunity for the revival of Turkic nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism in the Central Asian republics. After a century, Pan-Turkism was again put forward in Central Asia. At the Summit of Turkic-Speaking Nations in Ankara in 1992, the President of Kazakhstan Nazarbaev strongly advocated the conception of 'Turkicunion'. Uzbek nationalists were the most active advocates of the recreation of a 'Greater Turkestan' as well.<sup>14</sup> In the new situation, "Turkicunion" implied the 'dream of unifying about 135 million Muslims who speak languages related to Turkish under a single, independent political umbrella'.<sup>15</sup> There appear to be rising concerns among the regional states that there is a real possibility that 'Turkicunion' could wreak havoc in the whole area, including Xinjiang.<sup>16</sup> Because of the independence of the Central Asian republics, all Turkic-speaking nationalities in these states belonged to the Turkic world and were free from

---

<sup>13</sup> Liu Bin, Han Lin and Liqi, p.8.

<sup>14</sup> K.Dawisha and B.Parrott, p. 85.

<sup>15</sup> G.Pahta, 'Turkestan, A Mystical Empire May, Ethnic Clashes Mar the Dream of a Muslim Federation in Central Asia', *Voice of Eastern Turkestan*, 29 March 1991, p. 3.

<sup>16</sup> J.Rudelson, cited in Pahta, 'Turkestan', p. 6.

the control of the Communist power. Now the Turkic-speaking Muslims of China are the only ones left who were termed by international Pan-Turkism as 'outside Turks'. They are supposed to be the next group of people to be joining the Turkic world.

Closely related to Turkic nationalism is another Pan-Islamic tendency. There seems to be no suspicion that an Islamic revival is under way in all the republics of Central Asia. The 'Islamic Renaissance Party', was one of the Islamic extremist organisations which was strong in Tajikistan and developed in other republics. Its development was potentially a serious challenge to the state and the legitimacy of the existing state governments because of its calling for 'Islamic government' and 'Islamic morality' in daily life. It is an interesting phenomenon that there was no serious conflict between Islam and nationalism in Central Asia. These two forces tend to support each other, and Islam served as a vehicle for nationalist expression as well, especially against non-Muslim populations such as Slavs.<sup>17</sup> On this point, there are many similarities between Muslim separatism in Xinjiang and Muslim nationalism in Central Asia. For example, Islam and Muslim nationalism supported each other in fighting against Han Chinese and the Communist Party in the 'Baren Incident'.

While discussing the impact of Central Asian republics on Xinjiang, increasing growth of border trading between Xinjiang and adjacent republics of Central Asia has to be mentioned. A new Silk Road of modern railways and highways was a transmission belt that could bring any influence from Central Asia to Xinjiang. Communications and other kinds of connections on both sides were getting closer through border trading and business affairs. Chinese government recognised that it

---

<sup>17</sup> G.E.Fuller, 'The New Geopolitical Order' in A.Banuazizi and M.Weiner (eds), *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its borderlands*, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1994, pp. 26-27.

has a strong national interest in promoting the long-term stability and economic development of the Central Asian republics. Here China and the five new republics had strong mutual interests. Yet the Chinese clearly agree that 'economic development offers the region the only possibility of limiting future ethnic and religious conflict'.<sup>18</sup>

### **Turkey, Pan-Turkism and Turkicunion**

The Chinese authority believes that Turkey is another source that influenced the stability of Xinjiang, although without the countries having adjacent frontiers. Turkey's influence has been no less than the Central Asia states. Despite the official relationship between the two countries being friendly, Turkey has been the "ideological and political centre of the Eastern Turkestan Republic for more than sixty years".<sup>19</sup> The exiled Uighur organisations, which were promoting a separate Turkic state in China, have long been based in Istanbul. The Pan-Turkic element inherent in Turkey's primary culture has made approaches to the five republics of Central Asia. These facts raised China's strong suspicion against Turkey.<sup>20</sup>

Like the Dalai Lama, the exiled Uighur Isa Yusuf Alptekin (1909-1995) based in Istanbul, was regarded as the spiritual leader and symbol of Xinjiang Muslims.<sup>21</sup> Born in Ying Jisha County in 1909 and educated in a Han-Chinese school, Alptekin became a local government interpreter in his early life. He accepted the ideology of

---

<sup>18</sup> 'Central Asia on the Rise', *Beijing Review*, August 3-9 (1992), p. 12.

<sup>19</sup> Y. Shichor, p.80.

<sup>20</sup> R.H.Munro, 'Central Asia and China' in M.Mandelbaum (ed.), *Central Asia And The World*, New York, 1995, p. 228.

<sup>21</sup> He Pin, 18 December 1991, p.77.

nationalism when he was in Tashkent in 1929, and he got instructions from the leaders of the Pan-Turkism organisations in Turkey in 1938. Afterwards, his separatist ideology was formed based on the principle of “uniting with Guomintang government, getting materials support from America and spiritual support from Turkey”.<sup>22</sup> In 1945, Alptekin returned to Xinjiang as a leader of the Soviet-supported ‘Eastern Turkistan Republic’, and also as a director of the Altai Press that published newspapers and periodicals not only in Xinjiang, but also in India, Pakistan and Turkey. On his newspapers and periodicals, there was always the three sentence headline: “We are Turks; we believe in Islam; our hometown is Turkistan”.<sup>23</sup> Following the failure of the ‘Eastern Turkistan Republic’ in 1949, Alptekin fled to India, then to Turkey, and settled in Istanbul.

His separatism activities did not stop despite his fleeing to other countries. In 1950, Alptekin established the ‘Eastern Turkestan Emigrants Association’ in Kashmir. The association aimed to establish the ‘Eastern Turkestan Islamic Republic’ in Xinjiang; strengthen the ties with Turkey, India, and Saudi Arabia; make connections with Pan-Turkism organisations in Central Asia; and send people back to Xinjiang to obtain information and recruit travellers. Since the early 1950s, this association has sent nearly a hundred volunteers back to Xinjiang with special tasks. They were involved in several uprisings in Xinjiang.<sup>24</sup> During the 1950s and 1960s, Alptekin attempted to get international support by launching appeals and writing letters to the Turkish President; meeting Azzam, Secretary-general of the Arab League; and attending Bandung and other international meetings.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup> Cheng Guanglian, p. 6.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>25</sup> J.M.Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study of Irredentism*, Hamden, 1981, p. 115.

In 1981, Alptekin became a member of council of the 'World Muslim League'. With his support, 'Eastern Turkistan Charity Funds' was established and it published a journal called *The Voice of Eastern Turkestan*. This organisation has arranged several exhibitions, commemorative activities and congresses around the world to advocate the independence of Xinjiang.<sup>26</sup> The Chinese official report has confirmed that those Uighur students' demonstrations in 1985 and the Baren Incident in 1990 were supported by this organisation through its sending some exiled Muslim activists back to Xinjiang to be involved in the demonstrations and riots.<sup>27</sup> Another big concern of the Xinjiang government is the close connection between Alptekin and other separatist organisations abroad, such as the 'Joint Committee for the Manchu, Mongol, Eastern Turkmen and Tibetan peoples'. It is noteworthy that Alptekin's son, Erkin Alptekin, took an active part in the International Consultation on Tibet which was held in London in It was very clear that the Soviet collapse forced independence upon Central Asia. Unlike Xinjiang, none of the Central Asian republics experienced large-scale movements for independence before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although there were sporadic expressions of sovereignty and demands for greater control over republican economic and political matters, they did not mean doing away with the July 1990.<sup>28</sup>

The Chairman of the Xinjiang government, Tumour Dawamat said in April 1991 in Beijing that Isa Alptekin has never stopped his independent activities. He uses means to penetrate Xinjiang, in order to oppose communism and attempt to overthrow the socialist system. His thinking has really influenced a small number of people in

---

<sup>26</sup> Ding Shurong, 'guowai zongjiao shentou shi yinxiang Xinjiang anding tuanjie de zhongyao yinsu', internal publication, Xinjiang shehui kexueyuan, vol.1, 1991, p.98.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 99.

<sup>28</sup> W. Peters, 'Central Asia and the Minority Question', *Asian Affairs*, June 1991, p. 156.

Xinjiang.<sup>29</sup> The influence of exiled Uighurs is only one of the concerns to Beijing. The Chinese government has long appeared to be more concerned about another influence, which also originated in Turkey: Pan-Turkism.<sup>30</sup>

According to Landau, “Pan-Turkism is a kind of irredentism”.<sup>31</sup> The objective of this movement is to “strive for some sort of union -cultural or physical, or both- among all peoples in proven or alleged Turkic origins, whether living both within and without the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire”.<sup>32</sup> During the early years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Pan-Turkists were very active in Russia. They spread their ideology to other countries and areas through self-editorial newspapers, journals and Muslim congresses. Later, some Russian Pan-Turkists were exiled to Turkey because of the recovery of the Russian autocratic government. They started to develop their followers among the intellectuals in Turkey.

The historical opportunity for Pan-Turkism arrived shortly before the First World War. An influential group among the Young Turks, who would determine the Empire's destiny, adopted Pan-Turkism as a guiding principle of state.<sup>33</sup> In 1908, the ‘Association of Turks’ was set up. It was more a small elitist group of intellectuals than a political one. Its meeting and journal had definite undertones of cultural Pan-Turkism.<sup>34</sup> The pioneer of the Association included well-known Pan-Turkist Yusuf Akchura. A journal which he edited, *The Turkish Homeland*, soon became the important forum among Pan-Turkists around the world.

---

<sup>29</sup> Quoted by He Pin, 18 December 1991, p. 78.

<sup>30</sup> Y. Shichor, p. 81.

<sup>31</sup> J.M.Landau, 1981, p. 1.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 44.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

During 1913 to 1918 when Turkey was involved in a bitter struggle with Russia, Pan-Turkish propaganda was officially promoted by the Ottoman government.<sup>35</sup> Tens of thousands of pamphlets containing Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islam ideology were distributed to Afghanistan, Russia and 'Chinese Turkistan'.<sup>36</sup> In the 1920s and 1930s, Kemal Ataturk de-emphasised Pan-Turkism, instead encouraging Turkish nationalism within Turkey. He proclaimed that he was fighting for the Turks living within the country's boundaries, not the entity that was beyond Turkey.<sup>37</sup>

The Second World War brought the hope of renewing their interest in Pan-Turkism to Pan-Turkist circles within Turkey and abroad. They added emphasis on both race and anti-Communism in their books and periodicals.<sup>38</sup> At this stage, exiled Turkestanis also had their own periodicals, such as *Turkestan: a Scholarly, Social, Economic and Cultural Monthly*, edited by Mehmet Emin Bugra (a Uighur, born in Luopu of Xinjiang, 1898-1964).<sup>39</sup> Articles and poems in these journals were full of attacks on China's policies in 'Eastern Turkestan'. In the later 1950s, *The Voice of Turkestan* was published in Ankara, which was also edited by Emin. The 'national credo' of this journal was full independence for the whole of Turkestan.<sup>40</sup> After the 1950s, Pan-Turkist activities declined in Turkey.

On the failure of Pan-Turkism, Landau has clearly concluded in his book that "Although Pan-Turk ideology has evolved over the years and become increasingly politicised, yet it has remained throughout a cultural, racial, political and territorial

---

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 45.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>37</sup> Liu Bin, Han Lin and Liqi, p.15.

<sup>38</sup> J.Landau, 1981, p. 115.

<sup>39</sup> Cheng Guanglian, p. 2.

<sup>40</sup> J.Landau, 1981, p. 122.

type of Pan-nationalism, marked by strong irredentism”.<sup>41</sup> Despite its cultural impact, it had no definite political success. One of the most important reasons for the failure of Pan-Turkism was that “It has not obtained any significant political support among government and states”.<sup>42</sup>

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of the Central Asian republics offered Pan-Turkists a chance to go back to the political arena again from their long latent period. For Turkey, the rise of the new Turkic republics represented an opportunity for the dissemination of Pan-Turkist ideologies into Central Asia, and the whole of Turkestan.<sup>43</sup> An article in the Turkish newspaper clearly expressed the two growing stages of Turkism. The first stage was the early 20<sup>th</sup> century; Turkism was named ‘Anatolia Turkic nationalism’ in the narrow sense. The second stage is the current reforming stage; Turkism now can be explained as a common sense of unity for all Turks both within and outside Turkey.<sup>44</sup> In advocating Turkism under the current circumstance, the Turkish government played an important role. Prime Minister Demirel proclaimed at the Summit of Turkic-Speaking Nations in 1992 that “They have the same root, they are the different branches from the same tree. If they could make a correct assessment of this historical opportunity, the 21<sup>st</sup> century could be the century of Turks”.<sup>45</sup> He made another statement during his visit to the Central Asian republics in May 1992 that “Now nobody can deny that there is a Turkic world stretching from the shores of the Adriatic to the walls of China”.<sup>46</sup>

---

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., p. 184.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 186.

<sup>43</sup> S. Sayari, ‘Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia’, in A. Banuazizi and M. Weiner (eds), *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its Borderlands*, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1994, p. 189.

<sup>44</sup> Liu Bin, p. 92.

<sup>45</sup> See the translation from the Turkish newspaper by Lin Han in internal publication in June 1992.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

Although Turkish political leaders have repeatedly stated that Turkey's regional policies were not based on the ideology and objectives of Pan-Turkism, yet most Turks favoured using Pan-Turkism as close ties to unite all Turks.<sup>47</sup> The emergence of independent Turkic republics in Central Asia represented a turning point in Turkey's regional role and policy. It has strengthened nationalist sentiments within Turkey as well. There is not much evidence to show the political success of Pan-Turkism in Turkey's relations with Central Asia, however, the success of cultural Pan-Turkism or the idea of promoting cultural unity among all Turks seems very obvious.

### **Islamic Countries: Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia**

In addition to the Central Asian republics and Turkey, the Islamic countries, which includes Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, is perhaps the most influential source for Xinjiang, because nearly 60 percent of Xinjiang's population are Muslims. Most of them consider themselves to be Orthodox Sunnis, but there are two Shi'a groups, one being the Tajiks in the Kashgar region who are Ismailis, and the other being the small community of Uighur in Shache (Yarkan) County in the southeast of Kashgar who are Twelvers.<sup>48</sup> Among the non-Han population of Xinjiang, most of them are Turkic language speakers, with the exception of the Tajiks whose language belongs to the Persian branch of the Indo-European family. Therefore, they have linguistic, social, cultural, and religious links with the Islamic communities outside China.

---

<sup>47</sup> S. Sayari, p. 190.

<sup>48</sup> Feng Jinyun, *zhongkuo de Musilin*, Ningxia Renmin chubanshe, Yinchuan, 1991, p. 62.

Following the Iranian Revolution in 1979 the influence of Islamic fundamentalism has spread to the region. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, Turkey and Iran have been the most active countries in pursuing new opportunities in Central Asia areas by building on ethnic, linguistic and cultural ties to the region. Based initially on its ties to the Persian-speaking Tajiks, Tehran seeks to establish widespread connections to its neighbours and competitors. Its ambitions are further fuelled by a desire to export its own brand of politically active Islam.<sup>49</sup> Some observers have pointed out that there is a “great hope for the fundamentalist of recreating Persian Empire in Iran”.<sup>50</sup>

China and Iran began to expand their bilateral ties from arms trading to cultural, scientific and theological exchanges when Ayatullah Ahmad Jannati, president of Iran’s Islamic Propagation Organisation, visited China in September 1989. Jannati said during his visit: “Iran attaches great significance to its relations with China, and with its Muslim community in particular, and was prepared to strengthen them through the exchange of cultural and scientific delegations and theology students”.<sup>51</sup> However, the Chinese government is showing great concern about Iran’s religious interference with Chinese Muslims. This is not only because Iran is the main source of Islamic fundamentalism in the region, but also because of its ambition to export its political and religious doctrine into China. Warning came from Wang Zhen, the former deputy-chairman of the Central Military Commission in 1989, that: “We do not interfere in the religious affairs of other countries and we will also not allow other

---

<sup>49</sup> B.Z.Rumer, ‘The Potential for Political Instability and Regional Conflicts’, in A.Banuazizi and M.Weiner (eds), *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands*, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1994, p. 69.

<sup>50</sup> ‘Seeking for the Economic Cooperation’, *Middle East*, London, March 1992, p. 15.

<sup>51</sup> Xinhua (Beijing), 13 September 1989 and IRNA (Teheran), 12 September 1989, in FBIS-CHI, 13 September 1989, pp. 7-8.

countries to interfere with China's religious affairs".<sup>52</sup> In the same year, an internal report showed that representatives of Iran's Shi'ite Muslims had been to Shache (Yarkand) county to conduct religious activity clandestinely, and Xinjiang local Shi'ite Muslims had been assumed to get financial support from the Iranian Embassy in Beijing.<sup>53</sup>

Pakistan is regarded as a corridor that connects China and the Islamic world. It has a 530 kilometre boundary with Xinjiang. Historically, relationships between the two countries have been very friendly, especially, after 1984 when the Kalakhorum Highway was opened, and the border trading business between the two countries increased greatly. Apart from business, to a certain extent, Pakistan is an "ally of China and one of the best conventional and non-conventional military customers of China".<sup>54</sup> Because of its important strategic position, various religious forces, including several small sectarian groups and extremist organisations from Saudi Arabia, Iran and other Middle East countries, attempted to approach Central Asia and China through Pakistan for spreading their religious and political messages. Thus, there was an image of Pakistan being "an exporter of Islamic fundamentalism with the backing of the government".<sup>55</sup>

In fact, Pakistan has been the base for Muslim separatists' study, training and organising for a long time. According to a Chinese government report, some of the Xinjiang Muslim students came to the College of Islamic Theology in Lahore and

---

<sup>52</sup> Ding Shurong, p. 102.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Y. Shichor, p. 81.

<sup>55</sup> A. Rashid, p. 120.

Islamabad to study Islamic doctrines with financial support from the 'Islamic Alliance of the World', which has always supported Xinjiang Muslims. Some of Xinjiang's Muslim students were trained by the 'Islamic Mujahidin', which was supported by Afghanistan fundamentalists, and then sent back to Xinjiang with weapons.<sup>56</sup> Based in Pakistan, the 'World Islamic Religious Association', supported by Aga Khan the Fourth, an Ismail of the Shi'a group has continually sent people to Xinjiang to involve in local religious activities. Also Aga Khan's visit to Xinjiang in 1981 really made an impact upon the Ismailis of Xinjiang Muslims.<sup>57</sup>

The Chinese government's official view is that Saudi Arabia is a Muslim country, which combined religion and politics into one. Riyadh regards itself as the most orthodox Muslim society, being firmly pro-Western and anti-Communist. Therefore, it has an obligation to support and propagate Pan-Islamism around the world.<sup>58</sup> Despite far away and without a boundary line with Xinjiang, Saudi Arabia has always been the most desirable place for Xinjiang Muslims. There are more than twenty thousand Muslims living in Saudi Arabia at present, who are originally from Xinjiang. Their sentiment of anti-Communism and anti-Han Chinese as well as their separatist activities influenced the Riyadh's policies towards China to some extent.<sup>59</sup>

Based at Mecca, and established in 1962, the 'Islamic Alliance of the World' was the mechanism for Saudi Arabia to disseminate Islamic doctrines and culture to the world. As far as the Xinjiang government is concerned, the Islamic Alliance of the World has formulated four policies directly towards it and started to implement them

---

<sup>56</sup> Ding Shurong, p. 101.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., p. 101.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p.86.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., p. 87.

since the 1980s. The four policies endorse a number of principles, including: sending Islamic delegations to Xinjiang regularly; helping Xinjiang Muslims to get more freedom of religion; establishing a number of Islamic institutes in cooperation with Xinjiang Muslims; inviting and supporting some Xinjiang Muslims to study and visit abroad every year; and introducing Islamic ideology to Xinjiang Muslim by sending Islamic publications and materials.<sup>60</sup>

These policies were put into practice by the members of the 'Islamic Alliance of the World' and Xinjiang Muslims who came to Mecca on pilgrimage and for visiting. For instance, in 1981, a delegation of the Islamic Alliance came to visit Xinjiang officially for the first time. They planned to seek a representative of the Islamic Alliance in Kashgar, but were unsuccessful because of the riot in Jashi. In 1983, a member of this organisation, Imam Mijiti Harati, came to visit Urumqi, Kashgar and 12 other counties and cities, aiming to establish a number of clandestine religious organisations. Rahmutula, director of the Department of non-Muslim Nations in the Islamic Alliance, visited Xinjiang six times from 1981 to 1989 and caused disturbances among Xinjiang Muslims.<sup>61</sup>

Following a fifteen year interruption, Chinese Hajj missions of pilgrimage to Mecca started again in 1979. To date, more than 20,000 Chinese Muslims have visited Mecca in government organised groups, as well as privately.<sup>62</sup> About 6,500 of Xinjiang's Muslims went to Mecca between 1980 and 1987. These missions have contributed significantly to the consolidation of Islam in Xinjiang, not only spiritually but also

---

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., p.88.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., p. 90.

<sup>62</sup> Xiong Sihao, p. 8.

materially. A government official report showed that some of the members of these missions were supported and sponsored by donations from Saudi organisations. According to the statistics of Kashgar, donations for the building of mosques amounted to millions of RMB from the Islamic Alliance and from individuals abroad.<sup>63</sup> In 1985, Memetisha, a member of the Islamic Alliance, proposed to spending 2 million US dollars to build a school in the name of his father in Atushi. Meanwhile, the Islamic Alliance also provided financial support to the organisations, societies and conferences around the world, which have connections with Xinjiang Muslims. For example, with its support, an Uighur language team was set up at radio Jidda and a Turkish language team at radio Islamabad, to generate active propaganda, particularly towards Xinjiang Muslims. In 1988 the Islamic Alliance supported the 'Eastern Turkistan Charity Funds' to hold the first 'International Conference on Turkistan Culture and History' in Turkey.<sup>64</sup>

## **Conclusion**

Among many factors which influenced the stability of Xinjiang and caused violent riots, external factor is recognized as an important force. Considered to be catalysts, external sources have played a key role in the Xinjiang Muslim unrest. However, for a long period, it seemed that this fact has been almost ignored by Westerners. Probably for diplomatic reasons, China has never made public allegations against any of these countries, which supported directly or indirectly subversion in Xinjiang, yet it does not mean the absence of trends among the Muslim forces in these countries to secede

---

<sup>63</sup> Ding Shurong, p. 93.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., p. 95.

Xinjiang from China. Also, it seems that forces for the pro-independence of Xinjiang in its neighboring countries are getting stronger.

Following Chinese economic reform and policies of opening to the outside world, connections between Xinjiang and the outside world, in particular with its neighbouring countries, will be expanded further. Ideologies, which include Pan-Turkism, Pan-Islamism, Islamic revivalism and Turkic nationalism, would consistently influence Xinjiang directly through various channels.

The difficulty for the Chinese government is how to protect Xinjiang from the impact of external factors in an effective manner while not jeopardising friendship with these neighbouring countries. China and the Central Asian Republics have made an official agreement that these Islamic republics would continue to ban separatist activities against China in these areas.<sup>65</sup> Yet, it is hard to cut the private and individual connections between Xinjiang Muslims and their relations with the Islamic world, Central Asia and other countries. The strategic position of Xinjiang condemns it to continuing to be a cockpit for political intrigue, competition and conflict, unless Xinjiang closes its door again to the outside world, but this kind of decision would be unacceptable to Xinjiang Muslims.

---

<sup>65</sup> 'China is Mending Fences with the New Republics of Central Asia that Share its Borders', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 7, 1996, p. 2.

## Chapter 6

### Response from Chinese Government to Muslim Separatism

#### Introduction

As discussed previously, it is obvious that Chinese authorities, whether the Qing dynasty, the Guomintang government or the Chinese Communist Party, have consistently fought against any attempt of secession by Xinjiang. Despite variations in their policies, they agree on this one issue, that Xinjiang is an integral part of Chinese territory, and they all wish to keep the unity of China.

Since the 1980s, concerned about the uncertain situation in Xinjiang, the Chinese government adopted more practical and diversified policies towards ethnic problems in Xinjiang, which were slightly different from those of other minority regions such as Yunnan province and Inner Mongolia, where the situation is much better than in Xinjiang. One of the Party leaders of Xinjiang stressed that regarding the over-all situation of Xinjiang, fighting against ethnic separatism has been a political task of prime importance, rather than of economic reform and development within the whole of China.<sup>1</sup> Among several factors, which could affect the stability of Xinjiang, the Xinjiang government has realized that the momentum of national separatism inside and outside China has been the most dangerous one.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Wang Enmao, 'zai zizhicu dangwei sanjie shiwuci quanwei kuoda huiyi shang de jianghua', *Xinjiang Ribao (Xinjiang Daily)*, 25 July 1990.

<sup>2</sup> Janabul, 'zai zizhiqu dangwei sanjie shiwuci quanwei kuoda huiyi shang de jianghua', *Xinjiang Ribao (Xinjiang Daily)*, 2 August 1990.

In this circumstance, the Xinjiang government implemented stricter policies than ever towards Muslim separatist activities, such as formulating special regulations for religious activities, restricting the number of pilgrims, intensifying political and patriotic education among clergymen and youth, and a campaigning against national separatism. In addition to the above policies, armed suppression was also an essential method the government used to maintain the stability of Xinjiang. The official attitude towards national separatism, as a Party leader said is “We should firmly explore and crack down on the riots made by ethnic splittists and will under no circumstance be soft-hearted”.<sup>3</sup>

### **China’s Response to Muslim Separatism**

China’s policies towards Muslim separatism have changed from the 1980s to the 1990s in accordance with the different circumstances. Xinjiang government has formulated various policies to fight against the different stages of Muslim separatist activities. The Baren Township Incident was the demarcation line.

#### **Period of the 1980s**

In the early 1980s, following the examples of other provinces in China, opening to the outside world and economic reform have been the major issues for Xinjiang. Preferential policies for developing the regional economy include expanding connections with the coastal regions, granting the regional government greater autonomy to approve foreign

---

<sup>3</sup> Song Hanliang, ‘zai zizhiq dangwei sanjie shiwuci quanwei kuoda huiyi shang de jianghua’, *Xinjiang Ribao (Xinjiang Daily)*, 28 July 1990.

trade agreements and additional border stations, and establishing companies aimed at exploiting business opportunities in the Islamic countries for the benefit of Xinjiang. Meanwhile, a number of Xinjiang economists suggested that the central government should increase the transfer of investment and technology from the east of China to Xinjiang in order to narrow the gap between Xinjiang and coastal regions.<sup>4</sup> With the implementation of these policies, positive results have appeared. Xinjiang became the most developed region among the five provinces in the northwest part of China.

In addition to economic development, the central government policies towards the ideological sphere were even more positive and relaxed. With regard to minority political rights, the 1982 Constitution reaffirmed five basic points of the 1954 and 1978 Constitutions,<sup>5</sup> adding more detail. Article 113 states that “the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the minority area shall include a citizen or citizens of the nationality or nationalities exercising autonomy”, thereby guaranteeing one of the highest government posts to one or more national minority representatives for the first time.<sup>6</sup> That also includes the highest government position, even the administrative head of an autonomous unit of government at regional, prefecture (district) or county level. Other changes include calling for revenues accruing to national minority areas to be managed and used within the autonomous region itself; the autonomous regions may independently arrange

---

<sup>4</sup> Yu Rongchun, “yianhai quyu farzhan zhanlue ji Xinjiang de duice”, *Xinjiang Jingji Yanjiu*, 1 (1989), pp. 4-13.

<sup>5</sup> Chinese constitutions between 1954 and 1978 consistently referred to five basic propositions with regard to China’s national minorities. In brief, China is a multinational and unitary state and no area may secede. Regional autonomy is the basic form of government for areas inhabited by national minorities. There is equality for all nationalities within China. There is freedom to believe and not to believe in religion. National minority peoples have the right to use their national language in written and spoken forms.

<sup>6</sup> *The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Section VI*, In Chinese, Beijing 1986, pp.33-35.

and administer their local economic development, education and culture.<sup>7</sup> These added contents of the 1982 Constitution clearly demonstrated the new policy lines of the Chinese government, which had put more emphasizes on local and regional control over the affairs in the 1980s. Based on these new regulations, the Seventh People's Congress of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region was held in 1988 in Urumqi with an attendance of 541 deputies. Among these deputies, there were 357 minority nationalities, accounting for 66 percent of the total numbers. Among the 37 members of the Standing Committee of the Seventh People's Congress, minority members accounted for a considerable proportion about 24 (65 percent). Within the 24 minority members, the Uighur people numbered 21.<sup>8</sup>

With regard to freedom of religious belief, the situation has improved immeasurably in China compared with the previous decade. Firstly, the Chinese government and higher officials repeatedly stressed that respecting and protecting the freedom of religious belief is the Chinese government's basic religious policy. Based on this fundamental policy, the Central Committee of the CCP in 1982 issued an official communiqué entitled 'Concerning the Basic Viewpoint and Policy towards the Question of Religion during China's Socialist Period', which summed up China's policies and experiences in religion for the last thirty years.<sup>9</sup> The 1982 Constitution further explained that religion should not interfere in politics or the legal system, and above all should not be used to split the

---

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.,p.55.

<sup>8</sup> Janabul, 'zai Yili sandizhou ganbu hui shang de jianghua', 15 August 1988, *guanche minzu zhengce wenjian xubian*, Xinjiang Renmin chubanshe, Urumqi, 1990, p.451.

<sup>9</sup> C Mackerras, 1995, p. 113. For a detailed summary of the document in English see Julian F. Pas, 'Introduction: Chinese Religion in Transition', in Julian F. Pas (ed.), *The Turning of the Tide, Religion in China Today*, Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society and Oxford University Press, Hong Kong, 1989, pp. 7-12.

country. “Any acts that undermine the unity of the nationalities or instigate their secession are prohibited”.<sup>10</sup> One official from the Bureau of Religious Affairs within the State Council explained in detail about the religious policies, stating: “Religious belief is the citizens’ personal affairs. The government will not interfere with any religious activities engaged by Muslims within the limits permitted by China’s Constitution, laws and policies. Every Chinese citizen has the freedom to believe, or not believe in religion, and both religious and non-religious people are politically equal”.<sup>11</sup>

Secondly, in order to implement the Communist Party’s religious policies, the Xinjiang government has done considerable work to improve the religious situation in Xinjiang. By the end of 1989, the government had allocated about 3.2 million RMB for repairing thousands of mosques, which were destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, and appropriated special funds annually for repairing mosques of historical importance. In addition, a number of mosques have been listed as historical relics under the protection of state and local governments. Meanwhile, 320,000 square meters of religious properties, which were occupied by government sections or individuals during the Cultural Revolution, have been returned to the owners or mosques. Some mosques and individuals have received compensation from local finance or from the regional government at the market value for their properties, totaling about 2.8 million RMB.<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> *The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China*, Beijing, 1986, p. 34.

<sup>11</sup> Xiong Sihao, p. 10.

<sup>12</sup> Wang Wenheng, “zuohao zongjiao gongzuo weihu shehui wending”, *Xinjiang Shehui Kexue*, 2 (1990), p. 21.

For many years, the government has also published up to 800,000 volumes of various religious publications, of which a quarter were Uighur versions of the Koran.<sup>13</sup> In order to improve the religious knowledge of professional Islamic clergymen, the Islamic Association of Xinjiang has conducted many training classes of advanced studies. By 1989, about 1000 Islamic clergymen joined the classes. However, the China Institute of Islamic Theology and the Xinjiang Islamic College also provided special training classes for cultivating imams and mullahs.<sup>14</sup> The Islamic Association has been extended to the level of prefectures, cities and 22 counties (towns), and there were more than 1400 members of the organization in Xinjiang by the end of 1990.<sup>15</sup> Concerned about the improvement of living standards, the Chinese government provided a huge amount of living allowances to 4500 professional clergymen by the end of the 1980s, the money being around 3 million RMB per year.<sup>16</sup>

During the meeting between government officials and a number of clergymen in southern Xinjiang in February 1990, an Uighur clergyman from Muoyu County stated “This is the golden period for implementing the Party’s policies towards the freedom of religious belief”. Another Uighur clergyman from Aksu added: “I have been to many countries, compared with them, religious policies in our country are the best”. Furthermore, an Ahung, who is a Hui Muslim, recited a paragraph of the Koran, stating that Muslims should speak with justice and practice justice, then said: “Fairly, we have to acknowledge

---

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p.21.

<sup>16</sup> Mahmet Yusup, “cong zongjiao xinyang ziyou kan renquan”, *Xinjiang Ribao (Xinjiang Daily)*, 29 November 1991.

that after nearly 1400 years since Islam spread into China, it witnessed many dynasties, no policies have ever been better than the policies made by the CCP today”.<sup>17</sup> It is not an exaggeration to say that many people believe this is one of the best periods in Xinjiang’s history, with political stability, national unity, and economic development.

However, these new policies towards religion are also the signal for Xinjiang Muslims’ expressing their grievances, demanding independence and becoming exponents of religious fanaticism. In this circumstance, ethnic relations are getting worse, especially in southern Xinjiang. Regarding several demonstrations and turmoil in the early 1980s, the only thing that the government could do was to relax the tension, through tolerance, persuasion and education. In the late 1980s, the situation in Xinjiang has escalated from peaceful demonstrations to violent actions, particularly in 1989. Chinese authority started to show great concern about the unrest in the region and began to change its policies from tolerance to suppression. Song Hanliang, the secretary of the Party Committee of Xinjiang, emphasized in 1989 that: “The year 1990 would be the toughest year for Xinjiang than any previous year because of the unpredictable changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We should prepare to face more serious riots that could possibly emerge in the next few years. If something happened we should be able to calm it down immediately. From now on, stability is the first priority among the whole regional work”.<sup>18</sup> With the exception of international changes, another reason that the Chinese government changed its attitude towards Muslim separatist activities was that

---

<sup>17</sup> Wang Wenheng, p. 22.

<sup>18</sup> Song Hanliang, ‘zai zizhiq dangwei diwuci changweihui shang de fayan’, 25 January 1990, *guanche minzu zhengce wengjian xubian*, Xinjiang Renmin chubanshe, Urumqi, 1990, p. 293.

some non-Muslim people complained that government has gone too far in implementing the new policies concerning ethnic Muslim minority people and religion, so that the Mullahs and Ahungs could become too arrogant and narrow-minded, and national sentiment was abetted. Although not many people hold the same viewpoint, they did account for a proportion of the local cadres. Xinjiang government officials also admitted “Because of deficient fighting against ethnic separatism in the ideological fields, many errors and loopholes in our work provided the chance for Muslim separatists to stir up riots and disturbances. For instance, some books and articles published in our region in recent years were full of wrong political thought and ethnic separatism ideology. These caused confusion among the people, in particular in ethnic groups and had a very bad political impact around the whole region”.<sup>19</sup>

### **Period of the 1990s**

The 1990s symbolize a new stage of ethnic separatism in China. The first sign was the ‘Baren Incident’ which occurred in southern Xinjiang in 1990. In fact, after the incident, ethnic separatist activities in Xinjiang have developed from sporadic fighting to well-organized, large-scale armed rebellions and terrorist actions. Their demands turned directly to extreme actions against the Chinese government, the Communist Party, the state system and the Han Chinese. In the meantime, they insisted on Xinjiang’s independence.

---

<sup>19</sup> Song Hanliang, *Xinjiang Ribao (Xinjiang Daily)*, 28 July 1990.

The 1990s are also a challenge for the Chinese government in dealing with the problem of Xinjiang's Muslim separatism. Responding to the worsening situation in Xinjiang, the Chinese government adjusted its relaxed policies towards ethnic minorities and religion and implemented tougher and more controlled policies. Both the central and Xinjiang governments re-emphasized that fighting against ethnic separatism was the most important political task for the region rather than economic development, which used to have top priority in the region since the economic reform of the 1980s.

Immediately following the Baren Incident, a series of government official meetings was held in Urumqi and the regional government formulated new policies and regulations. The most important meeting was the Fifteenth Enlarged Plenary Session of the Third Party Committee held in Xinjiang in 1990, with 800 Party leaders above the county level attending. The meeting summarized the experiences and lessons of implementing the Communist Party's policies towards ethnic minorities and religion, and laid down the strategy of fighting against ethnic separatism for the next few years. After the meeting, the campaign for anti-ethnic separatism was launched by the Xinjiang government and the Party Committee throughout the whole region. Then a series of meetings for implementing the strategy of the Party Committee was held in the local government at different levels, and even in the villages. Official media including newspapers, television and radio reported the Baren Incident frequently. An exhibition entitled 'Putting down the Anti-Revolutionary Armed Rebellion in the Baren Township' was held at the exhibition centre and lasted for several months. It was recommended to students from

schools, universities and people from every working unit and arrangements made for them to visit it.

Through the Baren Incident, Xinjiang government officials came to realize that the problem of Xinjiang was not as simple as the regional problem of nationality and religion, but was a political campaign of 'secession and anti-secession'. Temul Dawamet, Chairman of the Xinjiang government, stated "Because ethnic separatists used a cloak of nationality and religion to distort and falsify history, misrepresent and smear the current policies of government, whip up national sentiments, and advocate religious zealotry, therefore, they had great fraudulence, in particular, among the young people and religious believers".<sup>20</sup> Janabul, Deputy Chairman of the Xinjiang government, emphasized that "The big lesson we had from this incident is that ethnic separatism is the primary danger to the stability of Xinjiang. The Baren Incident has proved this comment is correct".<sup>21</sup> Keyum Bawudon, Deputy Chairman of the regional government said on television: "Xinjiang, as the northwest gateway of the motherland, is very important in terms of its strategic position. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen education on national defense among all ethnic groups in the region, and it is also necessary to enhance solidarity between the army and the local people and to increase inter-ethnic unity".<sup>22</sup>

In order to help people to clarify the confusion about Xinjiang's history, a research group was set up at Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences in 1990. The research subject was the

---

<sup>20</sup> Temul Dawamet, "weixie he pohuai Xinjiang wengding de zhuyao weixian laizi guo neiwai minzu fenlie zhuyi," *Xinjiang Ribao (Xinjiang Daily)*, 29 July 1990.

<sup>21</sup> Janabul, *Xinjiang Ribao (Xinjiang Daily)*, 2 August 1990.

<sup>22</sup> *Reuter*, January 5, 1992.

'Dissemination of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism in Xinjiang and the countermeasures'. Under the leadership of the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party Committee, this research project was carried out for three years and cooperated with several government departments, such as, Department of Policy Research of the Communist Party Committee, Bureau of Religious Affairs, Administrative Committee of National Affairs, Security Department and other government organizations. After three years' work, the research group published a series of research reports, articles, books, and translated works, but most of them were highly confidential and difficult to access.<sup>23</sup>

Through the Baren Incident, the Chinese government has realized that young Muslims are still a potential source of instability. Some academics have suggested that the government should pay more attention to the education of young people on anti-ethnic separatism.<sup>24</sup> They are convinced that because of a lack of historical knowledge, young people are easier to be cheated.<sup>25</sup> Therefore, it is necessary to "intensify education on Xinjiang's history, Marxist ethnic theory and atheism among the youth".<sup>26</sup> After that, books, and articles relevant to the history of Xinjiang were published in various national languages. Xinjiang's history became a compulsory subject for school students and university students.

---

<sup>23</sup> Some of the references I have been used in this thesis were the research papers of this group. Because of highly confidential and published internally, it is inconvenient to give the name of publication, volume and other detail references.

<sup>24</sup> Sakda Dongsheng, p. 92-94.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 93.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., pp. 93-94.

Concerning religious issues, since the 1990s, the regional government has issued stricter policies and regulations to keep the overgrown religious activities under control. In 1988, the Xinjiang government promulgated 3 temporary provisions entitled 'Administration on Religious Activities, Religious Activity Places and Clergymen in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region'. The policies contained two aspects: one was the temporary provisions which aimed to protect the regular religious activities and legal rights of mosques; and the other was it being essential to impose restrictions on the abnormal religious activities and illegal activities, which went beyond the permission of the Constitution, laws and policies.<sup>27</sup> Some other tough policies included: closing mosques and other religious activity places which had no government approval, restricting the growing number of mosques, closing private religious schools (madrasas) and promoting the education of 'patriotism and socialism' among clergymen.

It is important to discuss in more detail the procedure of 'patriotism and socialism' education among clergymen. Generally, the regional authorities at various levels examined clergymen regularly on the two aspects of political ideology and religious knowledge. Clergymen who passed the examination would receive the certificate and be qualified to continue their professional religious careers, such as holding general religious rites and being able to be high religious leaders. Those who failed the examination would not qualify to continue their professional religious careers.<sup>28</sup> By the end of 1992, about 2500 thousand clergymen had attended the government examination and nearly 92

---

<sup>27</sup> Wang Wenheng, p. 23.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

percent of them were qualified to continue their professional religious careers in the region.<sup>29</sup>

Since the 1990s several bombings, political killings and assassinations occurred throughout Xinjiang, Chinese government policy has become very tough to the few Muslim pro-independence activists. According to the official report, several Muslim terrorists, who were involved in violent terrorist activities in 1990, bombings in 1992, riots in southern Xinjiang in 1995, and assassinations in 1996, were executed. One official from the public security department said: “Those who were involved in illegal activities and violent terrorist activities would face severe punishment according to the law”.<sup>30</sup> There would be no more tolerance and excuse for the action of Muslim separatists and their members.

In order to stop the spread of the Islamic fundamentalist movement from outside, the Chinese government signed a landmark pact with three Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kirgystan, Tajikistan) and with Russia in April 1996, the primary purpose of this pact being to eliminate border problems and avoid military clashes along the borders. After the signing ceremony, the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said: “We have an understanding with Kazakhstan, Kirgystan and others that we should work together to fight against separatist and terrorist activities and oppose fundamentalist activities”.<sup>31</sup> In the meantime, Beijing ordered tighter controls along Xinjiang’s long border to block the

---

<sup>29</sup> Abulati, “zongjiao hodong zhengchang shehui wending,” *Xinjiang Ribao (Xinjiang Daily)*, 11 November 1992.

<sup>30</sup> Sources from unpublished internal report, 1996.

<sup>31</sup> *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 1996, p. 29.

smuggling of weapons and subversive materials from nearby Central Asian states.<sup>32</sup> Xinjiang media stated that in less than one month, police in Xinjiang seized 13.2 kg of explosives, 4,100 sticks of dynamite, 604 firearms and recovered 31,000 rounds of ammunition.<sup>33</sup>

In 1997, the Fourth Plenary Session of the Fifth Party Committee of Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region was held in Urumqi. Abuleti Abudurahiti, the new Chairman of the Xinjiang government summarized the recent achievements of the campaign against ethnic separatism in his government working report. He said: “Over five months since April we have had initial achievements through consolidating public order, and fighting firmly against violent terrorist criminal actions in the regional key spots. A number of violent terrorist cases were cracked down upon by the Public Security Organization. A number of serious criminals were punished in accordance with the law. Ethnic separatist forces were hit a heavy blow. Illegal religious activities were stopped effectively and social public order was obviously improved”.<sup>34</sup> However, at the same time, he also warned that this campaign is a continuous and long-term task. The government should maintain the social stability of Xinjiang on one hand and economic development on the other hand.<sup>35</sup> When talking about the central point of the campaign, the new Chairman emphasized that the campaign will focus on some core members of ethnic separatism, violent terrorist criminals and the leaders of religious extremists.<sup>36</sup> Later, the new Communist Party

---

<sup>32</sup> Sources from unpublished internal report, 1996.

<sup>33</sup> *Xinjiang Ribao (Xinjiang Daily)*, 11 June 1996.

<sup>34</sup> Abuleti Abudurahiti, ‘zai zizhiq dangwei wujie sici quanwei kuoda huiyi shang de jianghua’, *Xinjiang Ribao (Xinjiang Daily)*, 26 October 1997.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

Secretary of the regional Party Committee, Wang Lequan, emphasized in his report: “We should fight against illegal religious activities and punish violent terrorist criminals, who took their revenge on patriotic religious professionals, and destroy religious extreme forces. We must also be firmly against the interference of foreign religious groups. All propaganda materials, which include Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism thoughts and speeches against the CCP, socialist system and the Party’s policies, should be banned, as the violent terrorist criminals would not be allowed in any county around the world”.<sup>37</sup>

After the series of changes in government policies toward minorities and religion in the 1980s and 1990s, it is interesting to note the current situation in Xinjiang. As experienced during field research in October 1997 minority grievances were still grow, and tensions between the Muslim and the Han nationality were serious. Many people including both the Han and the ethnic minority were afraid of talking about the sensitive issues of nationality and religion, which may spark future turmoil. It was reported that during the violent riot in Yili in February 1997 a Han and an Uighur family, which had been friends for thirty years, suddenly turned into the opposite, and the whole Han family was killed by their Uighur friends one night.<sup>38</sup> Another example was that Han taxi drivers in Urumqi were unwilling to pick up minority customers at night because of strong concerns about their safety. This potentially unstable situation also affected economic development in Xinjiang, because investors and tourists were worried about the whole environment. It

---

<sup>37</sup> Wang Lequan, ‘zai zizhiqu dangwei wujie sici quanwei kuoda huiyi shang de jianghua’, *Xinjiang Ribao* (*Xinjiang Daily*), 24 October 1997.

<sup>38</sup> Sources from my friend who was working in Yining when the Yili riot erupted in February 1997.

seems that if ethnic problems in Xinjiang cannot be solved effectively, there will be no hope for its economic development and prosperity.

## **Conclusion**

The Chinese government policies on ethnic separatist activities have been changed from tolerance to toughness during the last seventeen years. They are based on the essential changes of the separatist movement from peace talks to terrorist actions. By the Chinese authorities' own reckoning, ethnic separatist activities are more politically motivated rather than being national or religious issues at the present stage. The Xinjiang government strongly condemned the pro-independence violence as 'criminal actions against the law' which is no longer tolerated by the Chinese government.<sup>39</sup>

There seems to be no sign to show that the Chinese government would change its attitude and policies towards ethnic minorities in the next few years, because it believes that its policies towards ethnic minorities are correct, successful and supported by different nationalities.<sup>40</sup> Smayi Emeti, Deputy-Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and head of the Nationalities Affairs Commission of the State Council stated that the Chinese government has created a new way to solve minority problems with Chinese characteristics. In contrast to the former Soviet Union, the Chinese government chose regional national autonomy instead of federation or alliance, which became a basic principle for solving solve the national problems in China. In this

---

<sup>39</sup> Wang Lequan, 1997.

<sup>40</sup> Smayi Emeti jiejian quanguo shaoshu minzu canguantuan shi de jianghua, *Xinjiang Ribao (Xinjiang Daily)*, 29 September 1994.

way, China would not only be able to protect the autonomous rights of minority people, but also able to defend the unity of the country.<sup>41</sup> No matter what will happen in the future, in the case of Xinjiang, the Chinese central government will continue to implement tough policies regarding the ethnic Muslim minorities who wish to secede from China at all costs.

---

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

## Chapter 7

### Conclusion

An interesting point of comparison is that small independent sovereign states did not emerge in China in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century following the breakup of Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Some Western media predicted that it would be quite possible that China would be the next socialist country to fragment, especially after Deng Xiaoping's death. The analysis included the possibility of the independence of Tibet and Xinjiang, which could cause China's disintegration. However, 18 months after Deng's death and more than 15 years of Tibet and Xinjiang demanding independence since 1980, China still remains a unified and multinational country. Yet, this fact does not mean that the situation in minority areas is stable and that no secession activities have happened in China. In actuality, the unstable situation in minority areas, particularly in Xinjiang, has got worse in recent years.

This study has shown that there is a history of rebellion and secession in the Muslim areas of Xinjiang. Ethnic Muslim separatism is not a new question to the Chinese government; it has appeared for a hundred years and will continue.<sup>1</sup> The secessionist uprisings in Xinjiang from the early 19<sup>th</sup> to the mid-20<sup>th</sup> centuries were "locally rather than ethnically or nationally based", and they "depended mostly on effective leadership which emphasized personal and religious more than ethnic loyalty".<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, the examples given in Chapter 1 indicated that the feelings of nationalism and identity among the ethnic Muslim minorities of Xinjiang and the

---

<sup>1</sup> Song Hanliang, 1990, p. 293.

<sup>2</sup> C.Mackerras, 1994, p. 260.

demand for independence were very strong during this period. Another characteristic of these uprisings was the involvement with foreign countries, particularly Russia (later the Soviet Union). The results of these rebellions were the same, the failure of which temporarily weakened the political power of Islam in Xinjiang, but this ethnic awareness could provoke Muslims' interest in nationalism, irredentism and Islamic revivalism under certain circumstances. Ethnic separatist activities, which occurred from the 1980s to 1990s, were the best examples of this aspect.

This research has analyzed many causes of ethnic Muslim separatist activity, which frequently occurred in China during the last fifteen years, from both domestic and international perspectives. Domestically, the policies' changes towards ethnic minorities, the economic reforms and opening to the outside world since the 1980s are largely responsible for the ethnic conflicts in Xinjiang. Without relaxed policing of freedom of religion for Muslims, there would not be this revival of Islam in Xinjiang or the emergence of ethnic separatist activities among the national minorities in China. On the other hand, it has to be admitted that these relaxed policies have brought great benefits to Xinjiang Muslims by giving them the advantage of improving their relations with Muslims in Central Asian and Western Asian countries; and enjoying preferential treatment in religious belief, education, political rights, family planning and economic development.

Islamic revivalism awoke ethnic identities among Muslims and has become much stronger in Muslim minorities in recent years. It has shown that under the protection of Chinese policies towards national minorities, the Communist Party did not eliminate Islamic religion and the Han Chinese did not assimilate national minorities

as some Muslim separatists claimed.<sup>3</sup> By contrast, religious activities prevail and national culture is prosperous in the minority areas. However, this result is likely to lead minorities to express their feelings in an extreme way and consider their interests at the expense of other ethnic groups. If ethnic identity among Muslims was expressed in an extreme way, it would encourage strong ethnic sentiment and nationalism against other ethnic groups. It seems that the “appearance of ethnic separatism in Xinjiang is a great exposure of local nationalism and strong national identity”,<sup>4</sup> was probably right.

The study of Muslim separatist activities in Xinjiang should not ignore international influences. This is due to the possibility of international interference into the unrest of Xinjiang. It can be considered as another potential source of Xinjiang’s ethnic conflicts. This is determined by the strategic significance of Xinjiang. The appearance of ethnic separatism in Xinjiang was probably encouraged initially by the trends of ‘ethnic revival’, particularly in the small ethnic groups of one state. “This appears to be very much part of the *Zeitgeist* of Europe, Asia and elsewhere in the 1990s”.<sup>5</sup> The trends of ethnic revival aimed at gaining national self-determination and finally to achieve the status of an independent country.<sup>6</sup> These ethnic groups often believe that self-determination and independence could change everything. There is a legend among Xinjiang Muslims that “wheat could be as high as a mountain, and milk could be as deep as the sea by secession from China”.<sup>7</sup> It is extremely doubtful that independence would be able to find a solution for all the problems the minorities’

---

<sup>3</sup> Erkin Alptekin, p. 161.

<sup>4</sup> Wang Enmao, 1990, p. 42.

<sup>5</sup> C.Mackerras, 1994, p. 194.

<sup>6</sup> Pan Zhiping, ‘minzu wenti yu minzu fenlie zhuyi’, *Shijie minzu*, Beijing, 1 (1997), p. 11.

<sup>7</sup> Abudurahiti Wusmen, p. 168.

face, as exemplified by the secession of Eastern European states from the Soviet Union. Xinjiang's ethnic conflict was also greatly influenced by two international ideologies—Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism, which are the theoretical foundations for Xinjiang Muslim separatist activities.<sup>8</sup> The newly emerging Turkic states of Inner Asia have shown another possibility, that of Turkic nationalism spreading to Xinjiang, not through the deliberate stirring up of rebellion or disturbances, but through acting as a model.<sup>9</sup> The 'Turkicunion' proposed by the leader of Kazakhstan, would be a symbol or a dream for Turkic-speaking ethnic groups of Xinjiang. Supported by exiled Uighur separatists in Turkey and in Central Asian republics, ethnic Muslim separatists wish they could rebuild the lost 'Turkish-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkistan' in Xinjiang. Nevertheless, the potential for Islamic fundamentalism in newly independent states and Western Asia Islamic countries such as Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, also encouraged the Muslim secessionist movement by sending religious materials, tapes, money and people to Xinjiang. It has considerable influence among the young Muslims, who are the potential force for threatening the stability of Xinjiang.

Muslim separatist activities in Xinjiang are complicated issues, which include historical, ethnic, religious, political, economic and international factors. Seeking self-determination and independence has been influenced more by political than by other factors. It is a kind of racial conflict. It also has element of a religious conflict, considering the Islamic revival of the last decade. Economic factors played an important role in the conflict because ethnic Muslims are seeking more control of the economy from the central government administration.

---

<sup>8</sup> Ji Dachun, 1992, p. 33.

<sup>9</sup> C.Mackerras, 1994, p. 273.

Ethnic separatist activities in Xinjiang have their common ideologies, characters, and goals, although they vary as widely as they were separated geographically. As the ethnic separatists proclaimed, they aimed to secede from China and establish an independent state. They expressed their ideology by three brief concepts: “Our nation is Turkic; our hometown is Eastern Turkistan; and our religion is Islam”.<sup>10</sup> From the history of Muslim separatist activities, it is clear to see the progression of their activities from peaceful demonstrations to violent riots, armed rebellions, bombings, and assassinations. The form of the ethnic conflict has been changed to “Muslim separatist activities have become extreme terrorist actions for killing so many innocent people”.<sup>11</sup>

The Chinese government believes that Xinjiang’s ethnic Muslim separatism is aimed at making a social disturbance and secede from the unity of China, holding the banner of Pan-Islam and Pan-Turkism under the cloak of nation and religion, to fight for independence and against the CCP and socialist systems.<sup>12</sup> By analyzing the speeches of Chinese government officials and recent policies relating to Muslim separatists, it can be seen that the Chinese central government has become more concerned by Xinjiang’s ethnic issue. Once the nature of a riot was characterized as separatist activity by the central government, the government would crack down on it without any hesitation, using military force. Based on the last forty years’ experience, the Chinese government has set up a series of policies and principles regarding ethnic riots. The basic measures for dealing with ethnic conflict include cracking down with armed forces, achieving political support from the higher and influential elite among

---

<sup>10</sup> Ji Dachun, 1992, p. 32.

<sup>11</sup> Abuleti Abudurexiti, 1997.

<sup>12</sup> Song Hanliang, 1990.

the ethnic groups and mobilizing the masses against the separatist activities, and these three measures were used sometimes alternately. Regardless of whether or not these measures were effective, to some extent, the Chinese government controlled the ethnic conflict so it would not become a disaster to Xinjiang in the near future.

In addition, there are some reasons for the failure of ethnic separatist activities. China has a long history of comparative unity as a single state since the Qin emperor united China two thousand years ago. Although it is true that the borders have not been entirely consistent over the centuries, the Chinese tradition of unity supported by a centralized government is both long and powerful.<sup>13</sup> In today's China, the Han nationality is in a dominant position among the fifty-five nationalities. It has strong power with respect to national politics, economy, culture, society and above all the military. Another crucial factor is China's strong central government system that would never allow the disintegration of China, no matter what the cost. Due to lack of effective organization and strong financial and military support, there is no chance for Muslim separatist activities to become a large-scale movement and survive for long. For example, the Baren Incident and other violent riots lasted for only a few days.

However, there is only one possibility that ethnic separatist activities could succeed in overthrowing of the Chinese Communist Party. From the author's viewpoint, this possibility is unlikely to become a reality at least in this century. Because Deng Xiaoping's successor has firmly held the power of the Communist Party and military leadership in the current situation, there is no suspicion that they would not continue to preserve the socialist system and do their best to maintain unity. Unlike the federal

---

<sup>13</sup> C.Mackerras, 1994, p. 275.

or allied governments in Western countries, the central government of China still has sufficient power to control ethnic separatist activities and extreme religious activities through political and economic aspects, though these influences have declined in the autonomous region in the last few years.

Although Muslims of both sides -China and the Central Asian Republics- demand independence, they are entirely different in many aspects. Firstly, the independence of Central Asian Republics was pushed by the collapse of the Soviet Union. China regards itself as a multinational unitary state. Autonomy in the minority areas does not mean independence and getting rid of the control of the central government in all aspects. There has been no Chinese government, no matter of what political color, willing to give up sovereignty and let Xinjiang become an independent state. Secondly, the most direct reason for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of the Central Asian states is the economic factor, although there is some racial and religious conflict between Russians and Muslims. Along with the Soviet economic decline, for several years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian states desired to control the economy by themselves. In China, economic development has grown faster in recent years, especially along the south coast areas. The economic situation in the minority areas has also improved. Although there were claims from Muslim separatists for self-determination regarding to the economy, the demand for independence and freedom of religion is much stronger than that for economic self-determination.

Through this research, it can be seen that Muslim separatist activities in Xinjiang are likely to continue to provoke riots frequently in certain areas, such as southern and

northern Xinjiang, along the borders with the Central Asia republics and Pakistan in the next few years, but that a large-scale independent movement would not eventuate. Furthermore, the wish to create a 'Turkic union' or 'Turkic World' is hardly likely to become a reality after the agreement signed by the governments of both sides in terms of maintaining border security. The prospect of Xinjiang's independence is nil so long as China is still a unified and centralized country. In other words, the future of China's minority nationalities relies also on the developments in China as a whole.

The implications of this study are that it generates opportunities for further research regarding Muslim separatism in Xinjiang. As stated earlier, Muslim separatism is a complex issue, which is related to many aspects of nationality, religion, politics, economy and social affairs. There is a potentially wide research field for more detail study of this topic. Further study needs to be carried out with regard to how to get first-hand information from local minority people, including interviews, investigations in minority languages etc., as these can provide more convincing evidence and data analysis for the further study.

It is hoped that in focusing on the causes and features of Muslim separatism, this thesis offers a special case of Xinjiang for the Chinese authorities and for foreign governments, which have the same problem of how to handle ethnic issues thereby establishing good relations among different nationalities.

## Bibliography

- Abudurahiti Wusmen, 'Barenxiang fan geming baoluan pinding hou dui woqu zongjiao huodong de fansi', *unpublished internal report*, Xinjiang shehui kexueyuan, 1991, pp. 160-161.
- Abulati, 'zongjiao hodong zhengchang shehui wending,' *Xinjiang Ribao*, 11 November 1992.
- Abuleti Abudurahiti, 'zai zizhiq dangwei wujie sici quanwei kuoda huiyi shang de jianghua', *Xinjiang Ribao*, 26 October 1997.
- Akbarzadeh, S., 'Nation-building in Uzbekistan', *Central Asian Survey*, vol.15, 1 (1996), pp. 23-32.
- Alptekin, E., 'Chinese Policy in Eastern Turkestan', *Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs*, vol.13, 1 (1992), pp. 158-168
- 'Eastern Turkestan: An Overview', *Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol.6, 1 (1985), pp. 127-135.
- Asia Week, XVIII, 15 April 1992, p. 28.
- Ba Dai, 'Xinjiang de fazhan fanrong libukai guojia he xiongd shengqu de zhiyuan', *Xinjiang Ribao*, 4 March 1990.
- Bao Erhan, 'guanyu Xinjiang lishi de ruogan wenti', *Xinjiang shehui kexue yanjiu*, 2 (1990), pp. 32-35.
- Barnett, A.D., *China's Far West: Four Decades of Change*, Westview Press, 1993.
- Becker, J., 'Separatists Step up Struggle for Motherland', *The Times*, 3 March 1992.
- Beijing Radio*, June, 1989.
- Beijing Review, 'Central Asia on the Rise', *Beijing Review*, August 3-9 (1992), pp.12-13.

- ‘More Preferential Terms from Xinjiang’, *Beijing Review*, vol.31, 28 March 1988, p. 43.
- Benson, L. and Svanberg, I. (eds), *The Kazaks of China: Essays on Ethnic Minority*, Uppsala, 1988.
- Benson, L., *The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944-1949*, Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 1990.
- Cai Jinsong, ‘Erbai yu nian lai Xinjiang de fenlie yu fan fenlie douzheng’, *Xinjiang shehui kexue yanjiu*, 2 (1990), pp. 39-46.
- Chamber's Encyclopedia*, vol.10, Pergamon Press, 1996.
- Chen Chao, ‘Fan Yisilan zhuyi he Fan Tujue zhuyi zai Xinjiang de zaoqi chuanbo’, *Xiyu yanjiu*, 1 (1994), pp. 70-75.
- Chen Guoguang, ‘Zhongya Nahexibandi jiaotuan yu woguo Xinjiang Hoja, xibei Menhuan’, *shijie zongjiao yanjiu*, 1 (1988).
- Chen Hua, ‘wei minzu fenglie zhuyi zhizao lishi genjiu de sanbenshu’, *Xiyu yanjiu*, 1991, Special Issue, pp. 27-40.
- Chen Shengyuan, ‘Gezu renmin chongfen xiangyou shoujiaoyu de quanli’, *Xinjiang Ribao*, 29 November 1991.
- Chen Yanqi, ‘shilun Fan Yisilan zhuyi he Yisilan fuxing yundong jiqi dui Xinjiang de yingxiang’, *internal publication*, Xinjiang shehui kexue yuan, 1991, pp. 64-85.
- Cheng Dajun, *Xinjiang Today*, Xinjiang Renmin chubanshe, Urumqi, 1992.
- Cheng Guanglian, ‘Fan Tujue zhuyi fenzi Mehmet Emin he Isa Alptekin de minzu fenlie huodong jiqi yingxiang’, *Internal Publication*, Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, vol.1, 1991, pp. 1-28.

- Cheng Suoluo, 'Wudai, Song, Liao Jin shiqi Xinjiang Uighur renmin he zuguo gedi de jingji lianxi', *Xiyu yanjiu*, 1991, Special Issue, pp. 84-89.
- Chi-yu-Wu, 'China, Russia and Central Asia', in D.Wang, 'Xinjiang of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in historiography', *Central Asian Survey*, vol.14, 2 (1995), pp. 265-283.
- Christoffersen, G., 'Xinjiang and the Great Islamic Circle: The Impact of Transnational Forces on Chinese Regional Economic Planning', *The China Quarterly*, 133 (1993), pp. 131-151.
- Chronology of Nationalities Work in Contemporary China Editorial Department, 1949-1988*, Minzu chubanshe, Beijing, 1990.
- Dawisha, K. and Parrott, B., *Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval*, Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Delfs, R., 'Islamic Call to Arms: Muslim Rebels in Xinjiang Crushed by Police', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol.148, May 3, 1990, pp. 10-11.
- Dikotter, F., *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, London, C.Hurst & Co., 1992.
- Dillon M., 'Muslims in Post-Mao China', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, vol.16, 1 (1996), pp. 41-47.
- Ding Shurong, 'guowai zongjiao shentou shi yinxiang Xinjiang anding tuanjie de zhongyao yinsu', *internal publication*, Xinjiang shehui kexueyuan, vol.1, 1991, pp. 86-102.
- Dittmer, L. and Kim, Samuel.S., *China's Quest for National Identity*, Cornell University Press, 1993.
- Dreyer, J.T., 'The Kazakhs in China' in A.Suhrke and L.G.Noble (eds), *Ethnic Conflict in International Relations*, New York, 1977, pp. 146-177.

- ‘The PLA and Regionalism in Xinjiang’, *The China Quarterly*, 133 (1993), pp. 41-55.
- *China’s Forty Millions: Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the People’s Republic of China*, Cambridge, Mass., 1976.
- Du Shaoyuan, ‘Kashi, Shache he Hetian diqu Yisilan jiaopai qinkuang diaocha’, *Zongjiao*, 1 (1987).
- Eberhard, W., *China’s Minorities: Yesterday and Today*, Belmont, Wadsworth, 1982.
- Economist*, 26 December 1992.
- Edward Shou-tus Su, ‘Sino-Russian Relations in Sinkiang: A Comparison of Internal Relationship Outside and Inside the Communist System’, *Central Asian Survey*, vol.14, 2 (1995), p. 280.
- Emeti Mullaturdi and Xing Songzheng, ‘Weiwuer Ren deng sanbenshu de zhuyao wenti jiqi sixiang genyuan’, *Xiyu Yanjiu*, Special Issue, 1991, pp. 23-26.
- Esman, M.J., ‘Two Dimension of Ethnic Politics’, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol.8, 3 (1995), pp. 438-440.
- Esposito, J.L., *Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics, & Society*, Oxford University Press, 1987.
- *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, Oxford University Press, 1983.
- Fan Xiaojun, ‘lianmeng tizhi de neizai maodun yu Sulian minzu fenli zhuyi yundong’, *Sulian Dongou wenti*, 1 (1992), pp. 7-11.
- Far Eastern Economic Review, ‘China is Mending Fences with the New Republics of Central Asia that Share its Borders’, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 7, 1996.
- ‘Distant Smoke: Growing Unrest Reported among Muslim Minorities’, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol.148, April 1990, pp. 10-11.

FBIS-CHI, 24 June 1993.

Feng Jinyun, *zhongkuo de Musilin*, Ningxia Renmin chubanshe, Yinchuan, 1991.

Fierman, W., *Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation*, Westview Press, 1995.

Fletcher, J.F., 'Ching Inner Asia, c.1800', in J.K.Faibank (ed.), *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol 10, part I, Cambridge, 1978, pp. 35-106.

Forbes, Andrew D.W., *Warlords and Muslim in Chinese Central Asia: A political history of Republican Sinkiang 1911-1949*, Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Ford, J.F., 'Some Chinese Muslims of the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Centuries', *Asian Affairs: Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, June 1974, pp. 144-156.

Franklin, L.A., *The Chinese Response to British and Russian Encroachment in northwest China*, see D.Wang's 'Xinjiang of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in historiography', *Central Asian Survey*, vol.14, 2 (1995), pp. 265-283.

Fuller, G.E., 'The New Geopolitical Order' in A.Banuazizi and M.Weiner (eds), *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its borderlands*, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1994, pp. 19-43.

——— 'Central Asia: The Quest for Identity', *Current History*, U.S.A., vol.93, 582 (1994), pp. 145-149.

Fuyu and Tan Wutie, 'Xinjiang Hui zu Zhehelinyie Menhuan lishi de diaocha baogao', *Xinjiang shehui kexue*, 2 (1986)

Gladney, D.C., *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic*, Council of East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London, 1991.

——— 'Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol.53, 1 (1994), pp. 92-123.

- Gu Bao, 'Qing chao weishime jiang Xiyu gaicheng Xinjiang', *minzu yanjiu wenxuan*, Xinjiang Renmin chubanshe, Urumqi, 1991, pp. 148-152.
- 'Weishime buneng ba Xinjiang chengzuo Dong Turqisitan', *Xinjiang shehui kexue*, 2 (1990), pp. 9-10.
- *minzu yanjiu wenxuan*, Xinjiang Renmin chubanshe, Urumqi, 1991.
- Guan Jie, 'Xinjiang wuzhuang baodong jishi', *Zhengmin* (Hong Kong), March 1997, pp. 26-27.
- Guangxi shehui kexue*, 3 (1988).
- Guo Pingliang, 'weishenme yao qujie Taohuashi', *Xiyu yanjiu*, Special Issue, 1991, pp. 68-71.
- Guo Yunhua, 'fayang Xinjiang gezu renmin zai weihu zuguo tongyizhong tuanjie zhandou de lishi chuantong', *Xiyu yanjiu*, 1991, Special Issue, pp. 90-94.
- Harris, L.C., 'Xinjiang Central Asia and the Implications for China's Policy in the Islamic World', *The China Quarterly*, 133 (1993), pp. 111-129.
- Hasiotis, Jr A.C., *Soviet Political, Economic and Military Involvement in Sinkiang from 1928 to 1949*, London, 1987.
- Hasmu Hoja and Han Lin, 'guowai Fan Tujue zhuyi shili huodong he Yisilan fuxing yundong jiankuang', *a research report* published by Xinjiang shehui kexueyuan, 1991, pp. 51-63.
- He Pin, 'Why do Rebellions Occur so Frequently in Xinjiang?' *Nan Bei Ji*, Hong Kong, 18 November 1991, pp. 26-29, 18 December 1991, 74-79.
- Heberer, T., *China and its Minorities: Autonomy or Assimilation?*, M.E.Sharpe, Inc., 1989.
- Heidhues, M.F., *Politik in Sudostasien*, Hamburg, 1983.

- Ibn Al-Athiri, *Chronicon Quod Prefectissimum Insoribitur*, vols 9-12, translated by Wei Liangtao, see his work *Karahana Wangchao Shigao*, Xinjiang Renmin chubanshe, Urumqi, 1986.
- Internal report from Kashgar local government, *Xinjiang shehui kexue yanjiu*, 2 (1991), p 53.
- Israeli, R., *Muslims in China: A Study in Cultural Confrontation*, London and Malmö, 1980.
- Janabul, 'zai Yili sandizhou ganbu hui shang de jianghua', 15 August 1988, *guanchede minzu zhengce wenjian xubian*, Xinjiang Renmin chubanshe, Urumqi, 1990, pp. 451-452.
- 'zai zizhiqū dangwei sanjie shiwuci quanwei kuoda huiyi shang de jianghua', *Xinjiang Ribao (Xinjiang Daily)*, 2 August 1990.
- Ji Dachun, 'Fan Yisilan zhuyi he Fan Tujue zhuyi de chansheng jiqi dui Xinjiang de shentou yu pochan', *Xinjiang shehui kexue*, 2 (1990), pp. 11-20.
- 'Fan Yisilan zhuyi, Fan Tujue zhuyi dui Xinjiang de weihai', *Shishi qiushi*, 3 (1992), pp. 29-33.
- 'Guchui Fan Tujue zhuyi jiushi xuanyang minzu fenlie zhuyi', *Xiyu yanjiu*, 1991, Special Issue, pp. 60-67.
- Ji Ping, 'Frontier Migration and Ethnic Assimilation: A Case of Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of China', *Dissertation Abstracts International, The Humanities and Social Sciences*, vol.51, 8 (1991), pp. 2885-2886.
- Jiahop Mirjahan, *Hasak zu*, minzu chubanshe, Beijing, 1989.
- Jingji cankao*, December 24, 1988.

- Journal of International Middle East, 'China: Choice Between Marx and Allah',  
*Journal of International Middle East*, London, vol.397, 6 July 1990, pp. 19-20.
- Kohut, J., 'Xinjiang's Separatist Organizations Extent Examined', *South China Morning Post*, 23 February 1992.
- Kou Zgengling, 'Xinjiang: Opening Wider to the Outside World', *Beijing Review*, vol.34, 25 November 1991, pp. 15-19.
- Kutruk Yiming, 'Jiaqiang wushenlun jiaoyu shi dangqian ke bu ronghuan de renwu', *Xinjiang Shehui Kexue*, 2 (1991), pp. 28-36.
- Landau, J.M., *Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study of Irredentism*, London, 1981.  
——— *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*, Oxford, 1990.
- Lattimore, O., *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, New York, Capital Publishing Co., 1951.  
——— *Pivot of Asia: Singkiang and the Inner Asia Frontiers of China and Russia*, Boston, Mass., 1950.
- Lee Zijing, 'Xinjiang shire xianshi baodong', *Dongxiang* (Hong Kong), December 1993, pp. 18-19.
- Li Rongxia, 'Xinjiang Expands Foreign Links', *Beijing Review*, vol.34, 15 July 1991, p. 40.
- Liu Bin, 'kuaguo minzu zhuyi---zhongguo yu zhongya guanxi de zhuyao zhangai', *Zhongya Yanjiu*, 2 (1993), pp. 91-97.
- Liu Bin, Han Lin and Liqi, *wenhua Fan Tujue zhuyi yanjiu*, a research report published by Xinjiang shehui kexueyuan (Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences), Urumqi, 1990.

- Liu Jinglong, 'Cong konzhi renkou yundong kan Yisilan jiao shehuiguan de yanjin', in *Zhongguo Yisilan jiao yanjiu wenji*, Ninxia Renmin chubanshe, Yinchuan, 1988, pp. 427-29.
- Liu Zhixiao, 'Zhonghua minzu tongyi tuanjie jinbu de lishi zhuliou burong fouding', *Xiyu yanjiu*, 1991, Special Issue, pp. 51-59.
- *Weiwuer zu lishi (part I)*, Xinjiang Renmin chubanshe, Urumqi, 1990.
- Liu Zhongkang, 'jin nian lai nanjiang zongjiao kuangre de zhongzhong biaoqian', *Xinjiang shehui kexue yanjiu*, 2 (1991), pp. 11-16.
- Local news and unpublished internal report, 1992.
- Local news and unpublished internal report, 1993.
- Ma Yin (ed.), *Questions and Answers about China's National Minorities*, Beijing, New World, 1985.
- Ma Yong, 'cong Xinjiang lishi wengwu kan handai zai Xiyu de zhengzhi cuoshi he jingji jianshe', *Xiyu yanjiu*, 1991, Special Issue, pp. 77-83.
- MacInnes, D.E., *Religion in China Today: Policy and Practice*, New York, Orbis Books, 1989.
- Mackerras, C., *Cambridge Handbook of Contemporary China*, Cambridge UK, C.U.P. 1991.
- *China's Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century*, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1994.
- *China's Minority Cultures: Identities and Integration since 1912*, Longman, St.Martin's Press, New York, 1995.
- Mahmet Yusup, 'cong zongjiao xinyang ziyou kan renquan', *Xinjiang Ribao (Xinjiang Daily)*, 29 November 1991.

- McMillen, D.H., 'Xinjiang and Wang Enmao: new directions in power, policy and integration?', *The China Quarterly*, 99 (1984), pp. 569-593.
- Middle East, 'Seeking for the Economic Cooperation', *Middle East*, London, March 1992.
- Mohamad, M., 'Bosina and the west', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 7 September 1995, p. 38.
- Moltz, J.C., 'Regional Tensions in the Russo-Chinese Rapprochement', *Asian Survey*, vol.35, 6 (1995), pp. 511-527.
- Moseley, G., *A Sino-Soviet Cultural Frontier: The Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou*, Cambridge, Mass., 1966.
- Moser, L.J., *The Chinese Mosaic: the peoples and provinces of China*, Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1985.
- Muhammad Usiar Yang Huaizhong, 'The Four Upsurgences of Islamic Culture in Chinese History', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, vol.16, 1 (1996), pp. 9-19.
- Muhmet Salam and Ma Pinyan, 'Xinjiang Mazar ji Mazar chongbai', *shijie zongjiao yanjiu*, 4 (1986).
- Munro, R.H., 'Central Asia and China' in M.Mandelbaum (ed.), *Central Asia And The World*, New York, 1995, pp. 225-238.
- Newby, L.J., *The Rise of Nationalism in Eastern Turkestan, 1930-1950*, Oxford, 1986,
- Official internal report, 1995.
- Official internal report, 1996.
- Olcott, M.B., 'Central Asia's Islamic Awakening', *Current History*, U.S.A., vol.93, 582 (1990), pp. 150-154.

- Pahta, G., 'Turkestan, A Mystical Empire May, Ethnic Clashes Mar the Dream of a Muslim Federation in Central Asia', *Voice of Eastern Turkestan*, 29 March 1991.
- Pan Zhiping, 'minzu wenti yu minzu fenlie zhuyi', *Shijie minzu*, Beijing, 1 (1997), pp. 1-13.
- Pas, Julian.F., 'Introduction: Chinese Religion in Transition', in Julian F. Pas (ed.), *The Turning of the Tide, Religion in China Today*, Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society and Oxford University Press, Hong Kong, 1989, pp. 7-12.
- Peters, W., 'Central Asia and the Minority Question', *Asian Affairs*, June 1991, pp. 153-157.
- Qi Qingshun, 'da xiao jingchuan diqu yieceng bei chengwei Xinjiang', *Xinjiang shixue*, 1 (1980).
- Qian Bequan and Wan Binhua, *tongsu Xinjiang shi*, Xinjiang Renmin chubanshe, Urumqi, 1987.
- Rashid, A., 'Islam and Nationalism in Pakistan and Central Asia: An Address', *South Asia*, vol.XVIII, 2 (1995), pp. 105-121.
- Renkou Yanjiu*, Beijing, 1 (1987).
- Renmin Ribao*, 17 October 1982.
- *Renmin Ribao*, May 3, 1987.
- *Renmin Ribao*, September 9, 1988.
- Reuter*, January 5, 1992.
- Rumer, B.Z., 'The Potential for Political Instability and Regional Conflicts', in A.Banuazizi and M.Weiner (eds), *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands*, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1994, pp. 45-67.

- Sadri, R., 'The Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan: A Commemorative Review', *Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs*, vol.5, 2 (1984), pp. 240-264.
- Sakda Dongsheng, 'yao qieshi zhongshi dui qingshaonian jinxing fandui minzu fenlie zhuyi de jiaoyu', *Xinjiang shehui jingji*, 4 (1992), pp. 92-94.
- Sang Rong, 'Nanjiang diqu qingshaonian xinjiao qingkuang diaocha fenxi', *Xinjiang shehui kexue yanjiu*, 2 (1991), pp. 47-50.
- 'Xinjiang Yisilan jiao yanjiu zongshu 1982-1989', *Xinjiang zongjiao yanjiu ziliao*, vol.17, 1990, pp. 106-110.
- Sanqu geminshi: da shiji (taolun gao)*, Zhonggong Yili Kazak zizhizhou dangwei *Sanqu geminshi bianxiezu*.
- Sayari, S., 'Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia', in A. Banuazizi and M. Weiner (eds), *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its Borderlands*, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1994, pp. 175-197.
- Shen Bingnian, 'Xinjiang yu Zhongya guojia jingmao guanxi zhong de wengti jiduce', *Zhongya Yanjiu* 1 (1993), pp. 106-110.
- Shichor, Y.H., 'Separatism: Sino-Muslim Conflict in Xinjiang', *Pacifica Review*, vol.6, 2 (1994), pp. 71-82.
- Smayi Emeti, 'jiejian quanguo shaoshu minzu canguantuan shi de jianghua', *Xinjiang Ribao (Xinjiang Daily)*, 29 September 1994.
- Song Hanliang, 'zai zizhiqiu dangwei diwuci changweihui shang de fayan', 25 January 1990, *guanchede minzu zhengce wengjian xubian*, Xinjiang Renmin chubanshe, Urumqi, 1990, pp. 293-297.
- 'zai zizhiqiu dangwei sanjie shiwuci quanwei kuoda huiyi shang de jianghua', *Xinjiang Ribao (Xinjiang Daily)*, 28 July 1990.

- Su Beihai, *Hasak zu tongshi*, Xinjiang Renmin chubanshe, Urumqi, 1995; and *Hasak zu wenhua shi*, Xinjiang Renmin chubanshe, Urumqi, 1989.
- T'ien Ju-K'ang, *Muslim Rebellion in China: A Yunnan Controversy*, Canberra, ANU, 1981.
- Tan Feng, 'Yisilan jiao yu Zhongguo minzu jiaoyu shulue', *minzu jiaoyu yanjiu*, 1 (1990), pp. 49-52.
- Temul Dawamet, "weixie he pohuai Xinjiang wengding de zhuyao weixian laizi guo neiwai minzu fenlie zhuyi," *Xinjiang Ribao*, 29 July 1990.
- The China Quarterly, 'Minority Affairs', *The China Quarterly*, 123 September 1990, p. 583.
- The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Section VI*, In Chinese, Beijing 1986.
- The New Encyclopedia Britannica*, vol.9, Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1992.
- The Voice of the Uighur*, Kazakhstan newspaper, February to April 1993.
- Thrhun Almas, *Weiwuer Gudai Wenxue (The Uighur Ancient Literature)*, Xinjiang qing shaonian chubanshe, 1989.
- Tiglao, R., 'Under the Gun', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 24 August 1995, p. 23.
- Turghun Almas, *Weiwuer Ren (The Uighurs)*, Xinjiang qingshaonian chubabshe, Urumqi, 1989.
- , *Xongnu Jianshi (The History of Hsiung-nu)*, Weiwuer yu chubanshe, Kashgar, 1986.
- Unpublished internal references, 1991.
- Unpublished internal report, 1986.
- Urumqi Radio*, 6 January 1982.
- *Urumqi Radio*, 6 January 1982.

- Wang Enmao, 'Xiang zizhiqu dangwei changweihui de huibao', 29 January 1986, in *guanche minzu zhengce wengjian xubian*, Xinjiang Renmin chubanshe, Urumqi, 1990, p. 42.
- 'zai zizhiqu dangwei sanjie shiwuci quanwei kuoda huiyi shang de jianghua', *Xinjiang Ribao*, 25 July 1990.
- Wang Lequan, 'illegal religious activities' means any action by using religion to advocate separatism ideology, jeopardize the national security, subvert state power and undermine unity of the nation all can be considered as 'illegal religious activities', *Xinjiang Ribao*, 24 October 1997.
- 'zai zizhiqu dangwei wujie sici quanwei kuoda huiyi shang de jianghua', *Xinjiang Ribao*, 24 October 1997.
- Wang Shukai, 'Weiwuer zu Yisilan jiao Yishan pai zhong de Saman jiao yingxiang chutan', *Zhongyang minzu xueyuan xuebao*, 4 (1987).
- Wang Tiezhi, 'woguo shaoshu minzu gaodeng jiaoyu fazhan yu gange zhi tantao', *Zhongyang minzu xueyuan xuebao*, 1 (1190), pp. 14-20.
- Wang Wenheng, 'zuohao zongjiao gongzuo weihu shehui wending', *Xinjiang Shehui Kexue*, 2 (1990), pp. 20-27.
- Wang, D., *Under the Soviet Shadow: the Yili Rebellion of 1944-1949 in Xinjiang*, Tasmania, 1994.
- William, O.M.Jr and Brian, D.S. (eds), *Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers*, Pergamon Press, 1979.
- Wilson, P., 'Racism's Pall Mars March of Triumph by America's Blacks', *The Australian*, 18 October 1995.
- Wimbush, S.E., 'The Politics of Identity Change in Soviet Central Asia', *Central Asian Survey*, vol.3, 3 (1984), pp. 71-75.

- Winters, C.A., *Mao or Muhammad: Islam in the People's Republic of China*, Asian Research Service, Hong Kong, 1979.
- Wu Chuangun, 'Yisilan Yuanjiaozhi zhuyi de tiaozhan he Fan Tujue zhuyi de youhuo: yuan Sulian Zhongya guojia mianlin de zhongyao jueze', *Sulian Dongou jianjiu ziliao*, 5 (1992), pp. 1-7.
- XHNA*, Urumqi, 20 May 1983, in *SWB/FE*, No. 7341, BII, pp. 1-5; *XHNA*, Urumqi, 1 September 1983, in *SWB/FE*, No. 7341, BII, pp. 1-5; and *XHNA*, Urumqi, 1 September 1983, in *SWB/FE*, No. 7342.
- Xialipuhan Abudali, 'dui Xinjiang shaoshu minzu wenhua fazhan wenti de kanfa', *Xinjiang yishu*, 5 (1995), pp. 29-30.
- Xiao Zhixing, 'Qing dai de jige Xinjiang', *Lishi yanjiu*, 8 (1978).
- Xinhua (Beijing), 13 September 1989 and IRNA (Teheran), 12 September 1989, in FBIS-CHI, 13 September 1989, pp. 7-8.
- Xinjiang guangbo dianshibao, 'Kaifa Xinjiang ziyuan zaofu gezu renmin', *Xinjiang guangbo dianshibao*, 22 May 1990.
- Xinjiang Jianshi (A Concise History of Xinjiang, 4 vols)*, Xinjiang Renmin chubanshe, Urumqi, 1990.
- Xinjiang nianjian*, Xinjiang Renmin chubanshe, Urumqi, 1988, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996.
- Xinjiang Ribao*, 11 June 1996.
- 15 September 1993.
- 2 June 1989.
- 5 October 1980; 3 November 1981.
- Xinjiang: the Land and the People*, Beijing, Xinshijie chubanshe, 1989.
- Xiong Sihao, 'Islam in China', *Beijing Review*, June 12-18, 1995, pp.8-10.